[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-28]
THREATS TO SPACE ASSETS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
__________
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
meeting jointly with
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
[Serial No. 115-12]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 29, 2017
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama RO KHANNA, California
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
Steve Kitay, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk
------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
John Katko, New York Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Martha McSally, Arizona J. Luis Correa, California
John Ratcliffe, Texas Val Butler Demings, Florida
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Kathleen Crooks Flynn, Deputy General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York, Chairman
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Martha McSally, Arizona James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
John H. Rutherford, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Subcommittee Staff Director
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Donovan, Hon. Daniel M., Jr., a Representative from New York,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications, Committee on Homeland Security................. 2
Garamendi, Hon. John, a Representative from California,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services.. 3
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services.. 1
WITNESSES
Allen, ADM Thad W., USCG (Ret.), Member, GPS Advisory Board,
Former Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard............................ 6
Nimmich, Hon. Joseph, Former Deputy Administrator, Federal
Emergency Management Agency.................................... 9
Shelton, Gen William L., USAF (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S. Air
Force Space Command............................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Allen, ADM Thad W............................................ 45
Donovan, Hon. Daniel M., Jr.................................. 29
Nimmich, Hon. Joseph......................................... 57
Payne, Hon. Donald M., Jr., a Representative from New Jersey,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications, Committee on Homeland
Security................................................... 31
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 27
Shelton, Gen William L....................................... 33
Thompson, Hon. Bennie G., a Representative from Mississippi,
Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security............. 32
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
THREATS TO SPACE ASSETS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Meeting Jointly with the Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 29, 2017.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in
Room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. I want to welcome you to this
hearing on ``Threats to Space Assets and Implications for
Homeland Security,'' held jointly by the House Armed Services
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and the Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications.
I want to start by thanking our witnesses for being here
and taking the time to prepare. I know it takes a lot of time
to prepare for these and make your expertise available. We have
an expert panel with us regarding topics of space and homeland
security. Though testifying in their personal capacities, they
each have decades worth of experience with the issues being
discussed here today.
Our witnesses are General William Shelton, retired Air
Force and former commander of U.S. Air Force Space Command;
Admiral Thad Allen, retired Coast Guard and member of the GPS
Advisory Board and former commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard;
and the Honorable Joseph Nimmich, former deputy administrator,
Federal Emergency Management Agency and retired rear admiral,
U.S. Coast Guard.
I also want to thank Chairman Donovan and Ranking Member
Payne for joining us in support of this hearing. We have heard
extensively from Department of Defense and intelligence
community officials regarding the potential foreign threats to
our space systems. The threats are real, serious, and only
getting worse.
Unfortunately, talking about a conflict extending to space
isn't science fiction anymore and the impact of that threat
extends beyond the military. It extends to our way of life here
in the United States. There likely isn't a person in this
hearing room, nor within the entire Capitol campus that hasn't
utilized the services provided by satellites at some point
today.
For instance, aside from DIRECTV and DISH satellite TV,
which allow me to watch Alabama play football on Saturdays no
matter where I am--Roll Tide--the Global Positioning System, or
GPS, is probably the most widely known space asset and for good
reason. While I think many recognize that GPS powers their
navigation in their cars and cellphones, they may not know or
may not recognize the support it provides to financial
transactions, farming, shipping, public safety, environmental
monitoring, and a host of other areas.
The American public may also not realize that GPS is built
and operated [by] the United States Air Force. Potential
adversaries recognize our dependence on it. I guarantee you
that.
And GPS is one of many important space systems. We spend
time in the Armed Services Committee understanding what the
loss of space would mean to the military and that we need to
protect and defend those assets. But what does a loss of space
mean to our economy and our financial institutions, our
agricultural activities, our transportation and infrastructure?
Today our witnesses will help us understand the importance
and role of space regarding our homeland security and our
emergency preparedness. The public deserves to know what is at
stake when we are talking about the risk of loss to our access
to space. It is my sincere hope that a conflict never reaches
into space, but conflict has extended across air, land and sea,
and cyberspace. Hearings like this are needed to make sure we
are aware of the consequences we now face if it ever does
happen and ensure that we are ready for it.
I will now turn to Chairman Donovan for any opening
statement he may have and then to Mr. Garamendi today, standing
in for Ranking Member Cooper, and Mr. Payne after that.
So Chairman Donovan is recognized.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS, COMMITTEE
ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all of our witnesses.
I would like to thank you, Chairman, for holding this
hearing today and including my subcommittee in this very
important and timely discussion.
In today's world, our lives are connected more than ever
before and this is because of our space-based capabilities,
specifically satellites. Without satellites, we cannot make
financial transactions, communicate with cellphones, navigate
from one location to another, fly airplanes, watch television,
or effectively prepare for and respond to natural disasters or,
God forbid, terrorist attacks.
Space-based capabilities, like global positioning systems,
satellite communications, and remote sensing, not only help our
military operations, but have made it safer for our first
responders to effectively and efficiently respond to a crisis
or emergency.
Nearly 5 years ago, my district, which includes Staten
Island and parts of Brooklyn, was devastated by Superstorm
Sandy. This perfect storm caused dozens of New Yorkers to lose
their lives, thousands of homes destroyed or damaged, and for
millions of dollars being used and spent on reconstructing
communities, including my own.
The preparedness and response efforts directed at
Superstorm Sandy, while not perfect, were much better than
previous major disasters, like Hurricane Katrina. Satellite
capabilities were part of the reason first responders and
government agencies had the information needed to respond
decisively and quickly.
Satellites are being used to enhance our Nation's
preparedness and response efforts, especially when critical
infrastructure is damaged, destroyed, or overloaded. I saw this
firsthand during Superstorm Sandy. Prior to Superstorm Sandy
making landfall, the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]
used the storm tracking predictions from weather satellites to
pre-position equipment and resources all along the east coast.
Additionally, FEMA used satellite imagery to expedite the
disaster declaration process and provide assistance to impacted
areas.
During this response effort, teams deployed satellite
communications equipment and high-throughput satellite
terminals to provide voice and internet connectivity to first
responders and survivors. These are a few of the growing
reasons why satellite capabilities are key to our homeland
security.
While we need to continue to look for ways to incorporate
space-based capabilities into our preparedness and response
efforts, we need to be cognizant of the threat to those space
systems. There are numerous threats, whether intentional or
naturally occurring, that could damage or destroy our
satellites and significantly reduce the lifesaving capabilities
they provide for our first responders. I am particularly
interested in learning more today about how our Nation's
preparedness and response efforts could be impacted if our
space capabilities were diminished.
I want to thank our distinguished panel again for
testifying this afternoon, and I look forward to learning more
about what we in Congress can do to help ensure our Nation's
military and first responders don't lose these vital
capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Donovan can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Garamendi for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GARAMENDI, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Chairman Donovan. Thank you for doing the joint hearing. I
think it is extremely important.
I know that our chairman has spent a great deal of time
bringing us information on communication systems and the
vulnerabilities as well as the potential that they have, both,
mostly in the military area, but also as it extends beyond
that.
We do know there is enormous vulnerability on the military
side, as the chairman pointed out. We have also spent some time
looking at the domestic vulnerability, mostly as it has
occurred on another subcommittee on which I am on, which is the
Coast Guard and Maritime. And the Coast Guard has had in the
past the navigational portfolio of the Federal Government.
So we have looked at this and now bringing together these
issues is extremely important and to look at the continental
United States, Alaska, and Hawaii and other areas in the
context of satellite communication and the necessity for a
backup system or how to deal with all the benefits that those
satellite communication systems bring to us from GPS and beyond
is extremely important.
I thank you for doing this. Mr. Cooper was called away to a
meeting, and I was the only option available at the time he
left, so he put me in this position.
[Laughter.]
Thank you very much.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. And Mr. Payne's statement will be
taken for the record when he arrives.
So we will turn to our witness panel, and we will start
with General Shelton. And, General Shelton, before you start, I
understand you have got some guests with you today.
General Shelton. Actually, I do. I have got my daughter and
her husband and my two grandsons.
Mr. Rogers. Welcome to the hearing. Your granddaddy's an
American hero. All right.
General Shelton. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rogers. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF (RET.), FORMER
COMMANDER, U.S. AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND
General Shelton. Chairman Rogers, Chairman Donovan, and Mr.
Garamendi and distinguished members of the committees, thank
you for your invitation to appear today to discuss threats to
our space assets and the implication of those threats to our
homeland security.
I believe the vast majority of our American citizens are
not conscious of these threats and are therefore blissfully
unaware of the impacts on our way of life should conflict
extend to space. I commend your committees for taking up this
subject.
There is a host of satellites that provide services
essential to modern life in the United States and across the
planet. In fact, according to the latest edition of the Space
Report published annually by the Space Foundation, the global
space industry is a $325 billion enterprise.
Satellite-provided services have become analogous to
electricity, a utility we really take for granted. Most of us
don't need to, nor want to, know where or how our power is
produced, but we expect our local power company to continuously
provide the power we need to heat and cool our houses and run
our myriad electrical devices. Space services are now a utility
as well. Few Americans understand that fact.
In contrast, potential adversaries are well aware of our
dependence on satellites. Continuous combat operations since
Operation Desert Storm in 1991 have provided an unparalleled
learning laboratory for them. Not surprisingly, nations are now
actively testing methods to deny us continued use of space
services during conflict.
They have developed a full quiver of these methods, ranging
from satellite signal jamming to outright destruction of
satellites via a kill vehicle, such as successfully tested by
China in 2007. The pace of these counterspace efforts appears
to be accelerating and the impact of the use of counterspace
likely would be felt by all sectors of the space community.
A few examples of existing counterspace weapons and their
impacts: Global Positioning System and communication satellite
jammers can deny use of essential navigation, timing, and long-
distance communication services. Advanced anti-satellite
weapons capable of reaching all our orbital altitudes,
including the orbits of our critical missile warning and
strategic communication satellites, can destroy a satellite and
create dangerous orbital debris. And the higher the altitude of
engagement, the longer that debris will remain in orbit.
Ground-based lasers can temporarily blind various optical
sensors on satellites and other nations are looking to increase
the laser power to destructive levels.
Our space capabilities also are reliant on ground stations
and cyber connectivity. The ground stations scattered around
the world monitor satellite health, receive mission data from
these satellites, and send operating commands to those
satellites. Without the ground stations, the satellites would
not be capable of accomplishing their intended purpose. The
possibility of physical attacks on these satellites is
certainly a concern.
Equally concerning in this information age is the
possibility of cyber attack. With cyber activity occurring at
the speed of light, damage can be done very, very quickly. And
attributing the activity to a particular actor is often very
difficult and time-consuming.
The environment of space has fundamentally shifted then
from the ethereal sanctuary of the past to the increasingly
crowded and contested environment of today. Broad agreement on
this fact, however, has not produced the architectural change
decisions to reduce those vulnerabilities.
A recent analysis by the Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation [CAPE] team in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense found that space research and development [R&D] is at a
30-year low. The space industrial base is eroding due to this
low level of investment. At a time when the space industry's
engineering talent and innovation should be put to work,
decisions to initiate new programs that are responsive to the
threats have not been made.
Understandably, industry is unwilling to invest internal
R&D funds until the government makes those decisions. Because
satellites have limited lifetimes, the lack of a decision to
make needed changes to our architectures due to the changed
space environment is a de facto decision to continue the status
quo with no additional meaningful protection for our critical
space assets.
The last administration began initial steps toward space
protection. The relatively new Joint Interagency Combined Space
Operations Center has the potential to be a catalyst for how
operations in a contested environment must evolve.
Experimentation and eventually realistic operational exercises
will produce revelations about operating in this new era of
space.
But exercises alone won't be enough if the systems in space
are not built with prediction and mission resilience as key
performance requirements. There simply will be no levers to
pull to defend.
To this point, the CAPE analysis found that of the $6
billion added for additional space protection in the 2016
President's budget, approximately 80 percent is currently
allocated to non-satellite programs.
Warfare in space is in no one's best interest. And the
level of the United States dependence on space means we have
the most to lose. As we consider space capability protection
options in space, in cyber, and on the ground, we must consider
whether our actions are stabilizing or destabilizing in the
international arena.
Every action we contemplate should cause us to ask
ourselves if said action dissuades and deters potential
adversaries from nefarious activity. We urgently need sponsors
and funded study work on what constitutes deterrence in the
21st century and what recommended steps would increase our
deterrent posture.
We need to think our way through this maze, which requires
that we deter use of space and cyber weapons while continuing
to deter use of nuclear weapons. The potential consequences are
just too great for us to merely hope for the best.
Many of us remember the tag line from the 1979 movie,
``Alien'': ``In space, no one can hear you scream.'' From my
perspective, apparently no one on earth can hear you scream
about space vulnerabilities either. Many have banged the gong
very hard since 2007, but 10 years of innumerable studies and
policy debates have not produced tangible improvements in our
space protection posture.
If you know the armed burglar is on the front porch, you
don't wait until he is already inside to take action, yet that
is precisely our posture today.
I thank the two committees for delving into this subject,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Shelton can be found in
the Appendix on page 33.]
Mr. Rogers. Admiral Allen.
STATEMENT OF ADM THAD W. ALLEN, USCG (RET.), MEMBER, GPS
ADVISORY BOARD, FORMER COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Allen. Thank you. Chairman Rogers, Chairman
Donovan, Mr. Garamendi, I want to thank you very much for
having us here today.
Let me first associate my remarks with General Shelton. I
take objection to nothing he has said and wholeheartedly
endorse his comments related to space.
I will make mine additive so we aren't duplicative here at
the hearing today. And what I would like to do is focus on the
civil users segment of GPS.
I serve on the Position, Navigation, and Timing [PNT]
Advisory Board to the GPS EXCOM [Executive Committee]. That is
the governing entity for GPS in the country, that is co-chaired
by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of
Transportation.
The PNT Advisory Board is a subject matter expertise group
that provides them recommendations. Many of my comments today
and recommendations are grounded in conversations that have
been held in public fora associated with that advisory
committee and reflect my peers and our collective view of the
threats and vulnerabilities and what to do about them moving
forward.
What I would like to do is talk about vulnerabilities
related to GPS in a little bit more detail and offer a strategy
on how we might want to proceed that has been well-discussed,
at least among my peer group.
We need to understand in addition to the comments made by
yourselves and General Shelton the ubiquity of GPS chips and
receivers. They basically permeate all critical infrastructure.
This is an issue for homeland security. And in addition to the
examples already given, it is the phasing of electrical
generation distribution and down to the microsecond as you
noted in financial transactions.
The father of GPS is generally regarded as Dr. Brad
Parkinson, a professor emeritus at Stanford who I work with on
the PNT Advisory Board. And he, together with our peers, have
come up with a strategy that I would like to go over with you
today that talks about the vulnerabilities and where we might
go with them.
Let me just quote Dr. Parkinson first, though: ``The first
prerequisite for GPS-based position, navigation and timing is a
receivable, clear and truthful (truthful implies full
integrity) ranging signal, and the second is satellite geometry
for the user who cannot see enough of the sky.''
The second challenge really requires a denser constellation
of satellites and I will talk about the larger, global,
navigational satellite system later.
But in regard to the five challenges, the challenges
related to availability, let me just talk about five challenges
that we have put forward.
First is adjacent spectrum interference. Power signals in
adjacent bands to GPS can drown out the signal denying use. In
some cases, this is caused by FCC [Federal Communication
Commission] authorized users where the implications of
licensing decisions are not understood or issued with
insufficient testing.
There is natural interference from phenomena such as solar
flares.
There is inadvertent, natural or man-made jamming. These
are cases where use nearby can cause spurious or destructive
emissions.
There is collateral interference. These are privacy devices
individuals use to shade where they are at. They can interfere
with GPS signals as well.
And then finally, deliberate jamming or spoofing.
In looking how to deal with these threats to GPS, my body
recommends, and I recommend personally in my personal capacity,
a strategy of protect, toughen, and augment. I would like to
break that down to three segments for you, sir.
First on protect, we need to protect the signal. We need to
protect the signal and the delivery system. We need to create a
deterrent to illegal jamming. We need to control the
manufacture and web sale of jammers, which is pretty unabated
right now. We need to improve jamming detection. We need to be
able to localize and pinpoint jammers. And to the extent that
we can eliminate jamming altogether, we should try and do that
and that means to be able to find and fix inadvertent or
illegal jamming.
And finally, where we have reason to believe that laws have
been violated, we need to prosecute offenders and set up
consequences for these actions.
Regarding toughening, we need to toughen receivers. There
is a number of ways we can do that. Some receivers can be
toughened by merely shading through barriers any nearby
interference. There is something called signal beam steering by
antennas where you basically separate the beams, but it is
expensive to toughen receivers this way and it creates a huge
expense for ordinary users.
We can integrate GPS with other navigation tools, such as
inertial systems. There is always the option to increase GPS
signal power, but that is not likely due to expense. GPS was
created with a very low signal decades ago without the thought
that it would ever be as ubiquitous as it is now and the signal
would be put at risk.
And finally, you can separate the GPS signals to allow more
effective and discrete processing.
The third PTA, protect, toughen and augment, is augment and
by that means to augment the signal itself. One way is to start
looking at the international global navigation satellite
systems. And that would be Galileo, GLONASS, the Russian
system, and the Chinese BeiDou system, and see where we can
create compatibility, interoperability, or interchangeable
systems.
There also is something called pseudolites or pseudo-
satellites which are ground-based equivalent performance of
satellites. However, they are limited in their range and they
cause frequency interference as well.
And finally, eLORAN [Enhanced Long Range Navigation]--
eLORAN is a terrestrial system. It was a system largely in use
before GPS was created. It is a high-power, low-frequency
signal that can follow the curvature of the Earth. It can also
penetrate urban canyons where there are problems with GPS.
In 2009 when I was the commandant and the new
administration came in, there was a decision taken to effect
cost savings and we terminated the upgrade of the existing
LORAN-C [LORAN Revision C] or any development requirements for
eLORAN, contrary to domestic agreements that had been made and
international agreements that we would pursue this.
We have been in an 8-year hiatus and now there is active
discussion about whether eLORAN is a competent terrestrial
backup to GPS. My counsel to these committees are that the time
is over for talking about this. We need to make a decision and
move on.
And I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Allen can be found in
the Appendix on page 45.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you for that statement.
And now we turn to Mr. Nimmich for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH NIMMICH, FORMER DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Mr. Nimmich. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Chairman
Donovan, and Mr. Garamendi and the other distinguished members
of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
about the critical role of satellite technology and preparing
for, responding to, recovering from, and mitigating both
natural and man-made disasters.
The use of satellites and satellite-derived data is mission
critical for emergency management operations. Emergency
managers require extensive, timely, and accurate information to
make critical lifesaving and life-sustaining decisions.
The decision-making information comes from a multitude of
sources with satellites being one of the most critical.
Satellites, both national and commercial, inform almost every
aspect of emergency management, allowing responders to act
faster, smarter, to preserve the safety and security of the
American public.
The National Weather Service depends on weather satellites
to monitor and collect information about evolving weather
systems that are the primary cause of natural disasters. These
include tropical systems, tornadoes, flash floods, winter
storms, dust storms, volcanic eruptions, forest fires, and
geomagnetic space storms to help forecasters predict future
weather events and increasing accuracy.
I am going to deviate from my comments to talk about what
just was occurring last night and will occur today in the
Midwest, Texas, and Louisiana. Those tornadoes were predicted 3
days ago by our weather services. That allowed emergency
managers to be prepared for, put extra staff on, and to alert
the American public in those areas at a much better and more
lifesaving capability.
Emergency managers require these short- and long-term
forecasts to carry out their missions. Advanced knowledge of
incoming storms, as I just discussed, allows leaders and
emergency managers to pre-position assets in a safe location to
provide assistance to mitigate the impacts of both river
flooding and storm surge, the two most life-endangering events.
Satellites provide critical communication and coordination
for response operations. Data and voice communications are the
nervous system of an effective response. During disasters,
commercial communications are often severely overloaded.
In spite of the overtaxed lines, national satellite
communications ensures emergency responders are able to
continue to communicate and maintain connectivity at all times.
Emergency managers across the country rely on the national
communications capability during the most severe events.
Satellite data preserves one of the most valuable resources
in emergency management: time. Time, and more specifically
advance warning, is the difference between life and death in
many events. Local emergency managers can order evacuations
based on solid predictions supported extensively by satellite
data.
Emergency managers and city planners utilize satellite data
in developing and maintaining critical evacuation routes. While
evacuations are synonymous with hurricanes, new satellite
technology is also improving predictive capabilities to support
flash flooding and evacuations and tornado events. Evacuation
planning for man-made catastrophes is also ongoing.
This advance knowledge allows FEMA to pre-position assets,
build accurate staffing models, and more precisely allocate
limited resources to where they are most needed and rapidly
adjusts to ever-changing situations. The ability to pre-
position resources and make real-time adjustments is critical
to an effective emergency response that saves lives.
Satellites are also critical to local, State, and Federal
recovery missions. Satellite imagery and geospatial analysis
has enabled FEMA to accurately determine house-to-house damage
assessments and expedite millions of dollars of rental
assistance to disaster survivors. This capability reduces the
cost to the taxpayer as damage assessments can be derived from
satellite imagery at a fraction of the cost of ground
inspections. In some cases, up to 90 percent less costly.
A single satellite image can cover hundreds, even thousands
of square miles and provide cheaper and timelier data to
deployed teams, especially in remote areas.
I cannot leave my comments allowing you to think that
without satellites there would be no response to disasters.
Every level of emergency management prepares for emergency
response where there is limited access to information,
including satellite information and communications capability.
But to be very clear, responses to emergencies with degraded
satellite information will be less timely, less capable, less
efficient, and less effective.
Satellite supports every aspect of emergency managers'
efforts to prepare for, mitigate against, respond to, and
recover from disasters confronting our Nation. It is critical
that the Federal Government continue to invest in these
capabilities and ensure their reliability if we are to support
the American people in their time of greatest needs.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify today, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nimmich can be found in the
Appendix on page 57.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank all of you for those opening
statements.
I now recognize myself for questions.
General Shelton, I think I know the answer to this, but for
the record, are we moving as a nation at the speed we need to
in order to address the threats you laid out in your opening
statement? And if not, why not?
General Shelton. Congressman, let me take you back to 2007.
I was the commander of 14th Air Force at Vandenberg. We were
monitoring the Chinese ASAT [anti-satellite weapon] test in
progress. And I was in my operations center, and I watched that
successful engagement. And I don't remember if I said this out
loud, but I pushed back from the table, and I said the world
just changed because that is not a simple engineering feat. And
yet, here we are 10 years later and we don't really have a
whole lot to show but a pile of studies for our protection
posture.
And I really think there are three things here. I think
there are some policy decisions that need to be made. Our
policy is actually pretty permissive, but we need to make those
policy decisions at the highest levels to commit to protecting
our space assets.
There are also funding constraints. You know, I mean, that
is the age-old story for all of you, but we do have via
sequestration, via some other priorities, some constraints on
how much money is available to spend on satellite protection.
And we have also been part of this ``one more study'' kind
of attitude. Well, that may not be the perfect answer, so let
us just do one more study. And meanwhile, time marches on. And
as I said in my written statement, since satellites have fixed
lifetimes and you need to plan for the death of a satellite, a
decision not to move forward is a de facto decision to maintain
the status quo with no additional protection.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Nimmich and Admiral Allen, in your
experience, does the left hand know what the right hand is
doing in the United States Government regarding space threats
and dependence? For instance, the Department of Defense knows
that there are threats and are working to address them.
However, to what extent does the Department of Homeland
Security and FEMA and other appropriate organizations, to what
extent are they aware and are working to ensure that they can
execute their missions when necessary?
Admiral Allen. Sir, with all due respect I would say left
hands and right hands. As we move forward, I would just
underscore what General Shelton said regarding the one more
study. We have become very effective at miring problems in this
country. We have governing processes that don't have a clear
lead agency for developing requirements where the programs of
record should be for funding.
And in my view, until we start to address the overall
structure of how we govern, these things are going to continue
to have a discussion over whose base is the funding going to
come from, who should lead the study, how do we develop
requirements. And if you put on that gaps created by changes of
administration, this drags on and on and on.
And I think it is time, if we are going to be serious about
it, we have to look at the governing process that can produce
answers more quickly.
The government has always had a problem in adjusting and
deploying technology. But at the rapid rate of advancement,
especially with the capabilities of our adversaries, we are in
a stern chase and following further behind unless we revisit
how we are actually going to make these decisions.
Mr. Nimmich. Sir, my experience in DHS [Department of
Homeland Security] would indicate that they don't own them,
therefore they look for somebody else to be able to ensure
their operability.
As Admiral Allen pointed out, I think one of the challenges
you have got with satellite and space-based capability is the
fact that there is no specific critical infrastructure section
inside DHS. And the structures, the way they look at critical
infrastructure, it is embedded across all of the different
critical infrastructure. Therefore, it becomes harder to focus
on.
But I would tell you that it is, again, a consumer
mentality that we are consuming the capabilities that are
provided by others, both commercial as well as national assets.
But we are expecting those people that provide them to provide
the reliability and the defenses against them.
Mr. Rogers. I thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Chairman Donovan.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Allen you pointed out something we in Congress
could do about the jamming devices.
You have mentioned many challenges, the three of you, the
entire panel. What are some of the steps that you think
Congress should take to address some of the challenges that
each of you have pointed out during your testimony?
Admiral Allen. There are a number, but let me just focus on
a couple that would almost appear to be simple. The first one
is easy access to jammers via the internet. A lot of these
actions are illegal, but hardly enforceable. This requires a
unity of effort across government. We have just spoken about
that. It also requires a level of cooperation between the
departments and agencies and the independent regulatory
authorities, such as the FCC and the FTC [Federal Trade
Commission], moving forward.
But the whole issue of widely available jammers, lack of
prosecution or consequences associated with their use, and then
the ability for those to be in the hands of either folks that
are involved in criminal activity or terrorism, is a clear
vulnerability that we should address. And if I were to focus
anything specifically, it would be that.
And the second one is adjacent spectrum inference which is
another issue regarding signal-to-noise ratio and whether or
not GPS signals can be disrupted.
But the availability of jammers, I think, is something we
have to address.
Mr. Donovan. General.
General Shelton. Yes, sir. This is going to sound
incredibly naive to you, but I think the executive branch and
the legislative branch could get together and agree on a
strategy and a way forward and then move out and execute.
I don't see any other way. There has to be some broad
agreement here in the whole of government as we move forward.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Nimmich. Sir, I think one of the things when we look at
FEMA and the challenges we face is try to eliminate single
points of failure. We are talking about jammers and signal
strength, but the potentials of a geomagnetic storm taking out
entire swaths of satellite capability exists.
I think that we do need to look at a backup system of some
sort, whether it be LORAN-E or some other capability. But we
have put all of our eggs in one basket and that basket is
fragile.
Mr. Donovan. That was actually my next question to you. In
the case of a disruption in our capabilities, our first
responders have backup methods in order to efficiently or as
efficiently as they can--I know you mentioned in your testimony
one of the things if the systems go down is going to be the
time in which they could react or the time in which they get
advanced notice of those tornadoes that you spoke about. Do we
have backup systems in place?
Mr. Nimmich. So responders, first responders and emergency
managers responded to disasters before there was satellite
capability. Satellite capability has enhanced and improved all
of the responses as you have pointed out, Chairman.
And what we do is we continue to ensure that we have the
proficiency in those pre-satellite capabilities. If GPS goes
down, can we use the national grid and train our people both at
the State, the local, and the Federal level to be understand
what the national grid is and we exercise those. Cascadia
Subduction Zone, 2015, national level exercise, used national
grid capability.
We look at the redundant capabilities that HF allows us in
communications, HF frequency communications, high-frequency
communications. That has been tested all the way down to the
amateur radio operators who are some of probably the most
proficient and the most wide-ranging across this country.
In that same exercise, NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command]
worked with FEMA to be able to have members of the national
amateur radios actually engage with us and provide information
that came up.
So there are systems that allow us. They are not as
efficient. They are not as effective. They don't take away
duplication of effort, so there would be a slower response no
matter how you look at it, sir.
Mr. Donovan. And your recommendation would be that we
invest in a backup system?
Mr. Nimmich. I think anything that provides the ability,
not just from the response side, but the recovery piece. And I
think we mentioned in the chairman's office the fact that most
of the individual assistance, you are well aware in Staten
Island, the number of people that were either left homeless or
didn't have resources, the Federal Government provides a
certain level of resource up to about $30,000. That is all done
electronically. And if GPS fails and there is no timing
mechanism, then those transfers don't go into their accounts
and now we worry about life-sustaining capability, not just
lifesaving capability.
Mr. Donovan. I thank you all for your testimony and your
response to my questions.
Thank you. I yield the rest of my time, Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. The members of your subcommittee, Mr.
Chairman, are well-aware of where I am likely to take this
conversation to eLORAN. And so my apologies to all of them for
once again raising this issue.
For Mr. Donovan and your committee, you may not have had
the opportunity to be so bored as I carried on about this
issue. But we have been at this some time, principally from the
Coast Guard and Maritime Subcommittee side of it, which
actually happens to be in the Homeland Security Department and
so there is interaction there.
General Shelton, you laid out very well in your testimony
the overarching situation we are faced with, the dependence on
satellites, the vulnerabilities that they have. And we have
heard that repeatedly from you and from your successors in our
subcommittee.
So I really want to go to Admiral Allen here and the rest
of you can chime in along the way.
Your testimony is a little different than most of what we
have heard. You actually are suggesting solutions.
And I believe, General Shelton, you have told us very
clearly that it lies in decisions that have to be made.
And just running through the recommendations that you have
made, Admiral Allen, I am going--protect the signal, jammers,
there ought to be a law. There ought to be a law. It ought to
be illegal, and certainly that would come under the Homeland
Security Committee.
And there are four different recommendations here. Some are
different, but they basically say there ought to be a law. If
you have a jammer, it is illegal to use it and it is illegal to
manufacture and sell it and you are going to get prosecuted.
That is something we can do. And I must tell you, it is very
important.
Well, since my cellphone is actually working on the
internet here, I could probably order up a jammer legally and
probably put this entire committee out of commission with that
jammer.
Toughen receivers, these are rather important things, all
of which can be done. Physical barriers to the receivers,
whomever that receiver is that has that, they should be aware
and they should deal with it.
Augmenting the signal gets me to where I really want to go.
And this is something that we have dealt with many times in
committees, in various committees actually.
Some of these have all been discussed, but here we really
need a decision. And last year in the transportation
legislation, we passed out of this House a decision to move to
the eLORAN system and to go with a public/private partnership
to make that happen. It did not survive the conference,
unfortunately. I think people who know me know that I am going
to try again on this one.
But basically it sets up a mechanism for the home security
secretary and the commandant of the Coast Guard to put together
a request for proposal for a public/private partnership that
would build out the eLORAN system.
The eLORAN system, and, General Allen, I am going to leave
it to you to describe because I could not do it nearly as well
as you could, could you please describe how an eLORAN system
could be built in the United States?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. And then how that might be able to be
accomplished.
Admiral Allen. Let me describe what LORAN is. LORAN is a
hyperbolic aid to navigation, a signal that is transmitted,
high-power, low-frequency, follows the curvature of the earth.
A second signal is transmitted. When you receive both of those
signals, you take the difference between them, and I am
oversimplifying this, and it puts you on a hyperbole between
the two points and multiple lines give you a position.
eLORAN is an advancement of this basic technology, it has
been around since the end of World War II, that would allow
additional information to be transmitted with a signal, a
higher degree of accuracy and then produce the three things
that GPS does produce, position, navigation, and timing. It
does require the construction of terrestrial antennas, big,
large radio stations, if you will, to be able to transmit that
signal.
We were actively looking at this in 2009 and with the
change of administration it was decided that the eLORAN program
would be terminated as a cost efficiency. And again, as I noted
in my written testimony, we are at a point now where we are
actually starting over again where we were 8 years ago.
Mr. Garamendi. There are three different parts to this:
position, timing, navigation. The timing is essential for the
operation of virtually everything, from the electrical grid to
cellphones and ATM [automated teller] machines and the like.
Positioning and navigation are an additional that GPS adds. Can
we do an eLORAN system for timing only and then add to it later
the position and navigation?
Admiral Allen. You can, sir. There is a timing signal that
is being transmitted from a tower in Wildwood, New Jersey,
right now to test just that, the timing signal. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. What would it take for those signals, both
timing, position, and navigation, to be built into one of these
or ATM machines or whatever else?
Admiral Allen. That is a little bit of a different
challenge, sir, because we stopped building LORAN receivers
when there was no signal to be received. There has been some
talk in Europe and some movement to combine both eLORAN over
there and Galileo which is their global navigation satellite
system or their equivalent of GPS.
One might envision in the future with advances made in
computation and [miniaturization] that you could hold an eLORAN
receiver and GPS receiver in the same device for a redundancy.
Right now if you are using an iPhone 6 or above, you have both
a GPS chip and Russian GLONASS chip in it to ensure redundancy
and reliability.
And I might add that we need to take a look at how we
interface with these other systems and how we bring it into a
situation where we can assure reliability and signal integrity
and take advantage of those signals as well.
Mr. Garamendi. Final question and this goes to General
Shelton.
How important is a backup system to the work that you did
before you retired?
General Shelton. Sir, we tried to have backups to
everything we did.
Mr. Garamendi. We have done some studies of this in
committee and hopefully I don't get out of bounds here, but it
seems to me that in the command and control of the nuclear
weapons system that backups are exceedingly important. And
without going into any of the detail, could the eLORAN system
be a backup system at least for some of those command and
control mechanisms?
General Shelton. You know, sir, I couldn't answer that on a
technical level. Maybe Admiral Allen could. But as I understand
eLORAN, it is more about navigation and timing and less about
direct communications.
Mr. Garamendi. It is a very powerful, low-frequency radio
signal capable of transmitting data and information one way. Is
that correct, Mr. Allen?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me, Admiral.
Admiral Allen. It is all right. I was a commanding officer
of a LORAN-C station in Thailand in the war in Vietnam. And
information has since been declassified. There was actual work
being done on whether or not you could augment a LORAN signal
for a fleet broadcast to naval units who are operating in the
area. So it has been demonstrated you can use a LORAN signal to
transmit command and control information.
Whether or not that is the solution for the nuclear
enterprise I don't want to comment on that, but it has been
demonstrated that signal can be used as a communications
channel as well.
Mr. Garamendi. And my final is my own comment. To do the
navigation timing, we could do it with a public/private
partnership. The Federal Government could or could not engage,
but it is about somewhere south of a hundred million dollars to
set it up. And that is for the timing issue that allows these
things to operate, not your location and your mapping wouldn't,
but at least you can do your ATM work remotely. That is a cheap
solution on one of the pieces of it.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. This is not a technology issue.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Thank you very much for the time.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to focus, Admiral Allen, on your position on the
PNT Advisory Board. You mentioned that some systems use
pseudolites. Can you tell us, does the U.S. GPS constellation
take advantage of pseudolites?
Admiral Allen. They are available and they have been
proposed. My understanding is, and I am not going to get in
over my depth of water here, my technical background,
pseudolites are limited in their range because they are
terrestrial based and the amount of power needed can cause
disruption with GPS signals. I think it is a general consensus
opinion of the folks that I talk with that that would not be a
suitable backup.
Mr. Bridenstine. Can you tell me if the BeiDou system
operated by the Chinese, does that use pseudolites?
Admiral Allen. Not directly. But since you mentioned
BeiDou, there is an issue about whether or not we want to take
an international look at all of these global navigation
satellite systems and see if we can come up with some common
way to create interoperability and whether or not these signals
can be used for redundant and backup purposes for the other
signals.
I think the leading candidate to do that right now would be
Galileo, the European Union system. But the international
governance structure over the top of this is maturing as well.
And there are some options we could explore internationally,
but it has been limited to date.
Mr. Bridenstine. Well, let me ask, you mentioned
pseudolites as one of the augmentation capabilities that might
help mitigate whether it is jamming or spoofing or some other
signal problem that you have with GPS. Do you still believe
that?
Admiral Allen. In my testimony I listed it only because for
the purpose of discussion we have looked at all possible areas
where you could protect, toughen, or augment the signal.
Pseudolites are a way to augment the signal, but the downside
associated with that in terms of coverage area and the amount
of power that is used makes it not an advisable backup.
Mr. Bridenstine. So does anybody use pseudolites right now
as an augmentation that you know of?
Admiral Allen. Oh, I think there are pseudolites being
used, but I don't think it is in any type of a coherent
government structure.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. General Shelton, do you have
thoughts on that?
General Shelton. Well, the only thing I would say in
addition to what Admiral Allen said was, one of the problems
with the GPS reception is it is easily blocked by big buildings
or canyons on earth or mountains, you know.
Mr. Bridenstine. The site of your aircraft.
General Shelton. Exactly.
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes.
General Shelton. So if you have got a ground-based attempt
at augmentation here, like he says, the coverage isn't very
great, plus you have got these potential interruptions in the
coverage, you know, just due to geography or buildings or
whatever.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
Admiral Allen. Within the level that we can talk about in
this room here, there are localized augmentation options that
are being looked at for in-theater loss of GPS for operations.
But probably not the focus of this hearing.
Mr. Bridenstine. When we talk about eLORAN, as Mr.
Garamendi was talking about, we think about it being maybe a
solution to maybe if you lose GPS. At the same time, can you--I
mean, right now, of course, our systems aren't designed for it.
But if they were, could you use eLORAN in order to, you know,
to drop a JDAM [Joint Direct Attack Munition], a precision-
guided munition.
Admiral Allen. I would defer to General Shelton.
General Shelton. First you would have to figure out how you
are going to receive that signal for a signal that is really
intended for kind of nap-of-the-earth coverage as opposed to
coming from space.
Mr. Bridenstine. So when we drop a GPS-guided weapon, we
have very precise measurements that come from the Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency and we are able to know that we have a
designated mean point of impact and there is a certain circular
error probability for every weapon that we drop that we know we
are going to hit that target.
If we went with eLORAN, I would imagine none of that
exists, none of that has been tested or proven, which means
that it wouldn't necessarily be perfect, although certainly
being able to navigate is important. But using it for
precision-guided munitions would probably not be something we
would be able to do for a number of years.
General Shelton. Significant testing program would be
required, no doubt.
Admiral Allen. If I could just add, my comments were
directed at the civil user community.
Mr. Bridenstine. Oh, okay, civil user, got it.
Well, a couple of other things. As far as remote sensing
for FEMA when we talk about ultimately if there is some kind of
natural disaster, we have to figure out what happened and get
the right information to the right people.
A lot of the satellites that do that remote sensing are
commercial nowadays. And of course, the Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency has a huge, you know, desire to have more information,
more data.
One of the challenges we have and one of the reasons I
think the National Space Council would be so important is
because we need to get those satellites licensed quicker. They
are being licensed, of course, by NOAA [National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration], but they have DOD [Department of
Defense] implications, they have FEMA implications. There is a
whole-of-government challenge here, an interagency problem that
we have to deal with. So that is another topic.
And I would leave this with Chairman Donovan and Chairman
Rogers. We have heard General Shelton talk about this being
infrastructure. This is an important point that General Shelton
made, that space is now infrastructure just like the grid. And
when we do an infrastructure bill, which I know the President
wants to do an infrastructure bill and it seems to be that
there is bipartisan support for that, I think space ought to be
a big part of that infrastructure bill.
And with that, I will yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island,
Mr. Langevin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony and also
for your service to the Nation and the various contributions
you have made to keeping us safe.
So following on the issue of critical assets, so cyber
exploitation of our critical infrastructure is one of the
greatest threats to our Nation as I see it right now and that
we face as a country today. And in your testimonies, you have
alluded to the fact that our satellites and space assets should
in fact be included in this category and that we must protect,
toughen, and augment these assets.
So what actions have we taken to ensure that we are
protecting these critical assets? And how are we mitigating our
risk and preventing against cyber attacks on our satellites?
General Shelton. I think the satellites themselves are very
secure. Without going into any detail on that, I think the
satellites themselves are well-protected from cyber attack.
The ground stations, however, are an avenue of attack for a
potential adversary. We have done everything we know to do to
harden those ground stations against cyber attack. But as we
have seen in many instances, there are cyber surprises. And so
to take any comfort in the fact that our hardening has been a
forever fix, so to speak, I don't think that is the appropriate
attitude.
Continuing to improve cyber defenses at all our satellite
ground stations has got to be a priority.
Mr. Langevin. So one of the things that I am greatly
concerned about is miscalculation on behalf of our enemies and
adversaries, that they might think of our satellite
architecture as assets where they could take action as sending
a message or thinking that it is a standoff action that would
help to deescalate a situation, where in fact those are
critical national assets that we depend on and that we would
see as, I believe, a red line.
Do you think that we have done enough to convey to our
enemies and adversaries what critical national assets these are
and that we will use all assets of national power to protect
them and that were they to take action against one of these
assets that we would consider it more than just a deescalatory
action or that it is expendable, but it is something that we
would respond to very harshly?
General Shelton. Sir, that is a very interesting question.
And during the Cold War, there was if not explicit, there was
certainly implicit agreement that certain satellites were
strategic assets and you didn't do anything to interfere with
their operation. That was at least a tacit agreement between us
and the Russians.
I don't believe that same level of agreement exists with
the Chinese. We have seen in their public writings that they
consider this just as another opportunity to take away a
strategic advantage that an adversary would have.
Our policy is very clear. We do say very clearly in
national space policy that we consider an attack on those
assets as vital interests. So it is not prescriptive, it is not
an if/then statement, but it is fairly clear in diplomatic
language what we mean by that.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
To the panel, I also feel strongly that our satellites are
like flashlights in the dark, that they are allowing us to see
what is not readily observable using traditional technologies,
particularly when it comes to climate damage.
How does climate damage threaten our national security
interests? And how do our space-based systems and data-driven
tools help FEMA to evaluate the threat and prepare for it?
Mr. Nimmich. Sir, as you know, the nature of the rising sea
level as well as the climatic differences that are causing
massive rain events that have not been realized before are
causing extensive damage to both individual as well as national
capabilities.
We use an awful lot of the climatology information that is
provided by satellites, as well as satellite use in terms of
being able to determine where the risk will be in the future.
So we are working closely with NOAA in terms of surge modeling
that didn't exist before so that we can actually identify what
the storm event may cause damage, flash flooding, and others
through our risk map programs and just looking at the natural
transition that is occurring in terms of the nature of the
storms that are there.
So the ability to understand future impacts along our
coastal and our most vulnerable cities and infrastructure are
exactly what we are using.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Admiral, did you have anything to
add?
Admiral Allen. The whole notion of sensing is something
that we are coming to grips with in the complexity we are
dealing with with increasing interaction between the built
environment and the natural environment. We are seeing, as
Admiral Nimmich said, events of greater frequency and greater
consequence and greater scope and scale.
Space-based technology have the opportunity to help us out
in some other ways. It is possible with GPS signals to detect
very small changes in elevation and other parameters that would
give us a warning that there might be seismic activity or even
the density of water vapor might help us predict storms. So
this is all something that is there, we can use it, and we need
to move forward very aggressively and employ it.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you all for your testimony.
And I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Rutherford, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today.
I go back to something that General Shelton said earlier
about Congress and the executive branch getting together and
moving forward and defining roles. And you talked a little bit
about responses, Admiral Allen did.
Oddly enough, that was one of the things that came out in a
discussion about cyber attacks and warfare, too, is this
inability to really define whose roles and responsibilities are
at play in protection and prosecution and those things.
I would ask, we talked about the government response, I was
wondering in this, like in the cyber world, where does private
industry, what responsibilities do they accept when they go
into space?
Admiral Allen. Let me talk on the user side and then maybe
General Shelton would like to comment.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you.
Admiral Allen. There are very few critical infrastructures
that don't have embedded GPS receivers someplace. And so you
need to talk about the responsibility of the private sector in
carrying out their own enterprises and basically standard of
care if you will.
In this case, GPS PNT issues and cyber issues are not that
far apart. We are operating in an area where the technology is
advancing. We are operating in an area where some of the legal
frameworks for international cooperation and what constitutes,
say, an act of war or a crime are not as clear and we are faced
with the challenge of defending, protecting, and even using
offensive operations simultaneously in the same environment.
Very, very confusing moving forward.
But from the civil side, there is a discussion going on
right now with Homeland Security and the critical
infrastructure sectors about what it means to have
vulnerabilities in industrial control systems and other areas
where you have GPS receivers that, if they were denied that
service or spoofing or jamming, what it might do to that
critical infrastructure sector. And I think that is a current
focus, but it needs to be continued.
Most of those upgrades to reduce those vulnerabilities
don't happen unless it is part of an operations maintenance
cycle because there is no monetary incentive for companies to
do that and we have to change that.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, sir.
General Shelton. Sir, I think a good analogy is the
maritime domain. You know, people operate in the maritime
domain, they don't have any defensive capability, they don't
worry about protection. They count on host-nation support and
the United States Navy support for U.S.-flagged vessels.
Same thing in space, I think. Private industry is not
concerned about coming under attack because they think we are
going to provide the protection for U.S. assets. And
unfortunately right now, it is just not so.
Admiral Allen. If I can maybe just add another comment. And
I will try and quote, I may not do it exactly right, our former
colleague, Keith Alexander. He and I were on a panel last week
when the notion of common defense came up as defined in the
Constitution. I think we are seeing a re-definition of what
that means.
In the past, a banking system didn't seem to be something
that would be critical to national security. But if you look at
the implications of loss of time and what might happen to the
banking system or cyber denial of service or other attacks, I
think we are reshaping what actually the common defense means
and what our responsibilities are related to that. And it is a
conversation that is in progress.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, sir.
And I would also just make an observation that when we
talked about the jamming and those who have been prosecuted and
really the lack of significant penalties going along with that,
we see the same thing on the cyber side.
And I really think, Mr. Chairman, this is one area where
Congress should certainly step up and address the lack of real
penalties for some of these violations, particularly in the
finance and commerce world, but also in protecting our space
assets as well. And I think that is something that we should,
as legislators, should certainly be looking at very strongly.
Would you support that concept?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. Let me just make sure I was clear
on my comments. There are some penalties associated with the
illegal activities. The question is, are they significant
enough to deter activity? Are they enforceable? And do we have
a unity of effort in how we are addressing the problem?
And all of that, in my view, speaks to room for
improvement.
Mr. Rutherford. General Shelton.
General Shelton. Interestingly enough, GPS jamming has been
used to block criminal activity, you know, put a jammer in
place so the criminal can't be tracked. So, yes, sir, more
penalties would be a good thing.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you.
Mr. Nimmich, did you want to comment on that?
Mr. Nimmich. It really doesn't fall under emergency
management in that regard, sir. But clearly, one of the
challenges you have gotten in past experiences, it is not just
the penalties, but the infrastructure to be able to identify
where the jammer is and take action to prevent that jammer. We
still have not developed the countermeasures for jamming that
are necessary to maintain the reliability of the system.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes for a closing question the
gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. I noticed Mr. Cooper just arrived, so I am
going to make this a very quick question.
Mr. Bridenstine raised the question of the potential for
eLORAN in a military situation. There are some systems that
could work, but I don't see how they would work for the
precision munitions that you might fly on your plane. But there
are some ground-based systems out there that are either in
place or about to be put in place.
But the eLORAN is basically continental United States and
Alaska and it could be offshore. It goes about a thousand miles
offshore.
But my question is this and this is part of what Mr.
Bridenstine was going at and that is positioning. Can eLORAN
give an accurate position? We know that its timing is nearly as
accurate or is as accurate as GPS, but how about positioning
and navigation? If it were established within the continental
United States, could it give good positioning and navigational
work?
And I guess to any of you, but let us start with Admiral
Allen and then the rest of you can jump in.
Admiral Allen. It could. The level of accuracy related to
LORAN has to do with the physical parameters of the distance
between the antenna and the reception. So you would have to
decide, what would be the level of reliability and signal
strength and accuracy that you wanted. The more accurate you
get, the more sophisticated and expensive the system is going
to be to do that.
But we are looking at ability to back up the GPS when it is
needed. And I think that would have to be discussed. You can
crank that down to a pretty fine degree of accuracy, but there
is a question of cost and the infrastructure that would be
required to support it.
Mr. Garamendi. And that is really the number of towers that
you would place and where you would place them.
Admiral Allen. That is correct. And if I could just add on,
you were correct earlier, the current version of the eLORAN
system would be for the U.S. area to basically provide a backup
in that area below the GPS coverage that is current in the GPS.
You could conceivably have a global backup system, but that
would be an extensive, extensive eLORAN system.
Mr. Garamendi. I yield back my time. I see my colleague has
arrived, he seems to have been satisfied listening in on all of
this.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I want to thank the witnesses for your
participation today. This has been a very important topic to
help us focus on it also, but raise awareness that we need to
be taking some action. So thank you for being here and your
participation.
And with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:11 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 29, 2017
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 29, 2017
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