    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 115-25]

                         MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN

                  ACTIVITIES AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 MARCH 28, 2017

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                                   __________

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                         One Hundred Fifteenth Congress

                 WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman

    WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      ADAM SMITH, Washington
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia          JACKIE SPEIER, California
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
    PAUL COOK, California                SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
    BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio               CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
    BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama               JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
    MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona              ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
    STEPHEN KNIGHT, California           STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
    STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma              RO KHANNA, California
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
    RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana         THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
    TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             (Vacancy)
    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
    MATT GAETZ, Florida
    DON BACON, Nebraska
    JIM BANKS, Indiana
    LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming

                      Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
                  Catherine Sendak, Professional Staff Member
                     Katy Quinn, Professional Staff Member
                             Britton Burkett, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
      Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     1
    Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
      Chairman, Committee on Armed Services..........................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, United States
      European Command...............................................     2

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M....................................    43

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Lamborn..................................................    67

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Dr. Abraham..................................................    71
        Mr. Moulton..................................................    71
        Mr. Scott....................................................    71

    MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN
                                     EUROPE

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                               Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 28, 2017.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
    Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
                                SERVICES

        The Chairman. Committee will come to order.
        Last week the committee heard from experts on hybrid
    warfare, which is also known by several other names. Today we
    focus on one of the regions that has experienced many, if not
    most, of the tactics that we had discussed.
        From the little green men in Ukraine, to political
    assassinations as recently as last week, to buying influence in
    political parties, snap exercises to intimidate neighbors, and,
    of course, cyberattacks of various kinds, Europe has seen all
    of that and more.
        Meanwhile, the Russians continue to invest in their nuclear
    weapons, their anti-access/area-denial capability, and in a
    variety of other capabilities designed to reduce or eliminate
    any technological military advantage that the United States may
    have had in the past. We know that one of their primary goals
    is to divide and weaken NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization], arguably the most successful military alliance
    ever.
        To discuss these issues today we are pleased to welcome
    NATO Supreme Allied Commander and commander of the U.S.
    European Command, General Curtis Scaparrotti, not for the first
    time, but for the first time in this capacity.
        Before turning to him, let me yield to Mr. Smith for any
    comments he would like to make.

    STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
              RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And welcome, General. It is great to see you again. I
    always appreciated your leadership out at Joint Base Lewis-
    McChord when you were out there and appreciate your leadership
    even more in Europe.
        And I agree with the chairman's opening remarks, look
    forward to your testimony.
        But Europe is, you know, as great a challenge as we have
    had since the end of the Cold War now. And I won't belabor the
    point because we have all heard about it, but Russia is
    reasserting itself not just in Eastern Europe but in many ways
    in Western Europe, trying to influence elections, trying--
    basically trying to undermine liberal democracy.
        Vladimir Putin's goal is to make the world safe for
    autocratic dictatorships and to undermine the values that we
    hold dear in this country, which is representative democracy.
    And he is doing that, frankly, on a very low budget using a lot
    of cyber and a lot of intel operations, and I think we have to
    get smarter about how we counter that. And a lot has been said
    about that. I look forward to your comments.
        Last thing I will say is, obviously the big question we
    have is what should our presence be in Europe as a deterrent to
    what Russia is doing? Because that, I think, should be the
    goal.
        Putin is not stupid. They are nowhere near as strong as
    they were during the height of the Cold War. So basically he is
    trying to have influence on the cheap, but the higher the cost
    the less likely he is to engage in his destabilization efforts.
        Does a larger presence by us in that region act as that
    deterrent? And if so, what should that presence look like?
        So those are some of the questions I know we need answered.
    And obviously, you know, we want to reaffirm our commitment to
    NATO and its enduring importance in all of our alliances in
    Europe in terms of maintaining the peace and stability in the
    world that we want.
        With that, I yield back. I look forward to your testimony.
        The Chairman. General, without objection your full written
    statement will be made part of the record, and at this time you
    are recognized for any comments you would like to make. Thanks
    again for being here.

    STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

        General Scaparrotti. Well, thank you.
        Chairman Thornberry and Ranking Member Smith and
    distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to testify
    today as the commander of the United States European Command.
    On behalf of over 60,000 permanently signed service members as
    well as civilians, contractors, and their families who serve
    and represent our Nation in Europe, thank you for your support.
        European theater remains critical to our national interest.
    The transatlantic alliance gives us a unique advantage over our
    adversaries: a united, capable warfighting alliance resolved in
    its purpose and strengthened by shared values that have been
    forged in battle.
        EUCOM's [U.S. European Command's] relationship with NATO
    and the 51 countries within our AOR [area of responsibility]
    provides the United States with a network of willing partners
    who support global operations and secure the international
    rules-based order. Our security architecture provides more than
    1 billion people a safeguarded transatlantic trade, which now
    constitutes almost half of the world's GDP [gross domestic
    product].
        However, this security architecture is being tested, and
    today we face the most dynamic European strategic environment
    in recent history. Political volatility and economic
    uncertainty are compounded by threats to our security system
    that are transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional.
        In the east, a resurgent Russia has turned from partner to
    antagonist as it seeks to reemerge as a global power. Countries
    along Russia's periphery, including Ukraine and Georgia,
    struggle against Moscow's malign activities and military
    actions.
        In the southeast, strategic drivers of instability converge
    on key allies--especially Turkey, which has to simultaneously
    manage Russia, terrorists, and refugee flows.
        In the south, violent extremists and transnational criminal
    elements spawn terror and corruption from North Africa to the
    Middle East, while refugees flee to Europe in search of
    security and opportunity.
        And in the high north, Russia is reasserting its military
    presence and positioning itself for strategic advantage in the
    Arctic.
        In response to these challenges, EUCOM has shifted its
    focus from security cooperation and engagement to deterrence
    and defense. Accordingly, we are adjusting our posture, plans,
    and readiness so that we remain relevant to the threats we
    face. In short, we are returning to our historic role as a
    warfighting command focused on deterrence and defense.
        EUCOM's transition would not be possible without
    congressional support of the European Reassurance Initiative.
    Thanks in large measure to ERI, over the last 12 months EUCOM
    has made clear progress with an enhanced force presence,
    complex exercises and training, infrastructure improvements,
    increased pre-positioning of equipment and supplies, and
    partner capacity-building throughout Europe.
        But we cannot meet these challenges alone. In response to
    Russian aggression EUCOM has continued to strengthen our
    relationship with strategic allies and partners, including the
    Baltic nations, Poland, Turkey, and Ukraine. EUCOM has also
    strengthened ties with Israel, one of our closest allies.
        Above all, EUCOM has supported the NATO alliance, which
    remains, as Secretary Mattis said, ``the bedrock for our
    transatlantic security.''
        Thus, the EUCOM posture is growing stronger, and I remain
    confident in our ability to affect this transition. But there
    is much work to do.
        We must not only match but outpace the modernization
    advances of our adversaries. We must invest in the tools and
    capabilities needed to increase effectiveness across the
    spectrum of conflict. And we must ensure that we have a force
    that is credible, agile, and relevant to the dynamic demands of
    this theater.
        To this end, EUCOM has identified the following focus
    areas: ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
    collection platforms to improve timely threat information and
    strategic warning; land force capabilities to deter Russia from
    further aggression; enhanced naval capabilities for
    antisubmarine warfare, strike warfare, and amphibious
    operations; pre-positioned equipment to increase our
    responsiveness to crisis; and enhanced missile defense systems.
        Let me conclude by again thanking this committee's members
    and staff for their continued support of EUCOM, not only
    through increased funding, but also by helping us articulate
    the challenges that lie before us. Support from the other
    leaders and, above all, from the public at home and across
    Europe is vital [to] ensuring that we have a ready and a
    relevant force.
        This remains a pivotal time for EUCOM as we transition to
    meet the demands of a dynamic security environment, and I
    remain confident that through the strength of our alliances and
    partnerships, and with the professionalism of our service
    members, we will adapt and ensure that Europe remains whole,
    free, and at peace.
        Thank you.
        And, Chairman, I look forward to the questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found
    in the Appendix on page 43.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
        Both Mr. Smith and I mentioned some of the tactics Russia
    has used, but can you step back for a second and summarize in,
    obviously, this open session what they are doing with their
    military capability? How and in what areas are they advancing
    their capability, and how does it relate to us? Just kind of a
    general picture of their military capabilities.
        General Scaparrotti. Chairman, thank you.
        I think if you look at their forces from what we know as
    hybrid or asymmetric means, to conventional, to nuclear, they
    are modernizing this force in every one of those categories.
    Within the hybrid, for instance, we are well aware of their use
    of cyber, their use of disinformation, or ``information
    confrontation,'' as they call it. And, in fact, in recent
    months they announced new elements within their force that
    focus on information confrontation, information operations.
        So they are focused on that and, in fact, I would add here
    that when you look at their view of the spectrum of conflict,
    unlike our view, theirs includes those activities below what we
    would call the level of, or the threshold of, conflict. It
    includes political provocation, information operations,
    disinformation, cyber, et cetera. So it is a functional part
    now of their doctrine, I believe, and they put it into play.
        In the conventional realm they are upgrading the systems
    that they have--their naval ships, their airplanes, et cetera--
    as well as building new ones for the future. They have refitted
    their aircraft and their ships for some of their newer
    munitions, which are very capable.
        Caliber [cruise missile] system, for instance, can be
    placed on the ground, in the air, at sea, so it is a
    multifunctional system, gives them, you know, long reach and
    precision, et cetera. So that is how they are advancing in
    their force.
        Their nuclear forces, as well. Across all the areas they
    have been increasing their capability, really refining their
    capability from the old systems.
        And one of the things you see that is disturbing is the
    fact that they are using similar weapon systems that can either
    be conventional or nuclear, which then makes it difficult for
    us to clearly understand what they have employed. And then
    secondly, within their doctrine again, they have made the
    statement openly that they see a use for nuclear tactical
    capabilities within what we would consider a conventional
    conflict, which is very alarming.
        So that is how I would--I would categorize their movement
    at this time.
        The Chairman. Okay.
        Let me just remind all members that immediately following
    this open hearing we will have a closed session with General
    Scaparrotti where we can go into more detail on classified
    matters. Again, that will be immediately upon the conclusion of
    this open hearing.
        Mr. Smith.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Could you give us some idea of the importance of the
    presence of U.S. troops in Europe as a deterrent to what Russia
    is doing? And what size force do we have there now? What size
    force do you think we should have? And how would that presence
    help us to deter the activity that has been described?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all our presence there
    is and always has been a very important component of the
    alliance, the NATO--you know, NATO alliance, of which we are
    one of 28 nations, as well as our partners in Europe.
        We have the best military in the world. It works across
    multi-domain, it is a joint functional force, and it provides a
    critical element to our partners. It also, in operating with
    them, builds interoperability which is essential, you know,
    within the alliance itself.
        Today we have about a little over 60,000 of all services
    stationed in Europe. It provides a force that allows us to
    deter today but, as you know, with this committee and ERI we
    are looking to modernize that force to put us in a better
    posture, particularly given Russia's modernization that they
    are on that I just described.
        We need a greater force there, I think, potentially in the
    land component, either a rotational or rotational enduring
    footprint of an armored division, for instance.
        Within the Air Force we have a pretty good posture there, a
    very capable posture. But again, they are looking forward to
    adding, you know, fifth-generation aircraft, which are
    important given the modernization, again, of Russia.
        And with the Navy, again, an additional naval component on
    rotation through Europe in order to deter, but specifically
    with respect to antisubmarine warfare, which is an area of
    concern with the Russians. We are still dominant in that
    domain, but we have to continue to invest in order to properly
    deter and also remain dominant.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. One last question: Specifically on
    the Ukraine, what more could we be doing to help the Ukraine
    both fight off the Russian insurgency in the East and then also
    to strengthen their government, which I understand is, you
    know, plagued by corruption and plagued by inefficiency and
    that is part of the problem?
        Because if Putin is unsuccessful in the Ukraine or if the
    cost gets too high for his interference there I think that is,
    you know, the best deterrent we could give to further activity
    because that is sort of, you know, where--I don't know if it is
    where he started, but it is certainly where he has had the most
    public involvement. What more could we be doing in the Ukraine?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, I have been to Ukraine twice now,
    both in their training area and out to the ATO [anti-terrorist
    operation zone]. I would say first of all I am very impressed
    with their military and its discipline. What we have provided
    them in terms of our training capability as well as equipment
    is being well used, and they are very eager in terms of their
    ability to learn more.
        So we presently are involved in reform of their government
    and capacity-building within their security system. We need to
    continue that.
        I don't know that it is more; I think it is probably a
    little better organization across the whole of government.
    Within the training environment, what we do with other NATO
    allies there is very effective.
        Again, there, I have been out to it and seen it done over
    the past year. I think better organization there would help.
    There are things we can do to continue to refine it.
        The Ukrainian forces are learning and they are getting
    better, and we need to consistently adjust.
        In terms of weaponry, I personally believe that we need to
    consider lethal defensive weapons for Ukraine. They are
    fighting a very lethal, tough enemy.
        It is a Russian proxy, really, and the Russians provide
    some of their newest equipment there in order to test it. They
    have tested UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] sensor-to-shooter
    techniques, et cetera, which are lethal. And so we need to
    continue to support them, in my view, to have the appropriate
    weapons to defend Ukraine.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, General, thank you very much. I have had the
    extraordinary opportunity to visit with you and I know
    firsthand your extraordinary dedication and success, and it is
    just heartwarming as the proud dad of three sons in the Army. I
    particularly appreciate--even one in the Navy--we appreciate
    you and just thank you so much.
        With your service on the European Command and your previous
    assignment, of all things, to United States Forces Korea, you
    faced extraordinary challenges. Sadly, with the--so many
    permanently assigned forces not in your command currently now,
    how is this being addressed? And do you feel that we have
    enough military assets regionally to properly deter Russian
    aggression against the NATO alliance?
        What other forces in particular do you need to properly
    deter any aggression? In addition, would the presence of these
    forces be accepted and welcomed in Europe?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, thank you very much. It is good
    to see you again.
        And within Europe we can do our job today. We can deter the
    Russian force that we see. We can counter terrorism, which is a
    part--a key part of our mission. We can enable our partners.
        But if you look at the environment today and how it is
    evolving, and particularly the modernization I mentioned with
    Russia and the creativity of our--of the terrorists that we
    face as well, we need to ensure that we build a force that is
    relevant to that threat and can continue to deter.
        So for those things that I need, one, it is--you know, I
    need intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in greater
    numbers than I have now because to deter properly I have to be
    able to have a good baseline of Russia in particular so that I
    know when things change, I can posture my forces properly. So I
    need increased ISR to have good indications and warning and be
    able to set that posture properly over time.
        Land force capabilities, which I mentioned earlier, but it
    is particularly the enablers of an armored division, a fires
    brigade, an engineer brigade, air defense, those kinds of
    systems in the numbers that I need there and as we move
    forward--now done on a rotational basis, but perhaps a
    rotational enduring or some mix of that.
        Increased naval capabilities. It would be helpful to have a
    carrier support group and amphibious forces more than I have
    them now. I have them rotational as they go to other combatant
    commands. An increase of that would help us in deterrence; it
    would help us reinforce our interoperability with our partners
    and work with our partners.
        And particularly I have noted ASW, antisubmarine warfare,
    because of the advances that Russia in particular is making in
    the undersea domain.
        Enhanced missile defense. As we have seen every place in
    the world, ballistic missiles are proliferating and that is a
    very tough area.
        And then finally, munitions, both modernization and
    appropriate stockpile, so that I have what we need if
    deterrence fails and we have to respond to crisis.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you for being so specific.
        I am concerned that the military as a whole is facing a
    stark readiness crisis. Funding for training, maintenance and
    repair, new equipment, and future development of equipment has
    been short.
        Aside from the aforementioned additional forces you may
    need, what shortfalls are you in particular seeing in your
    command? Please assess the readiness, the challenges of the
    European Command, and what resources are required to increase
    readiness in your area of responsibility.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, first of all when it
    comes to readiness I am fortunate in that particularly
    rotational forces, both Air Force, Army, Navy, et cetera, they
    are ready when they deploy. They come to me as a ready force.
        And I would tell you that they depart as ready or more
    ready when they leave Europe because of our ability and
    training capacity there. So we are good in that area.
        That is still, though, given the budget today and the
    demand against the OPTEMPO [operations tempo], as well as
    modernization that the services face, you know, increased
    funding, particularly for our pilots, would increase their
    capabilities within Europe. It would be helpful even at this
    point to increase their capability to fly more. That is both
    Army, that is Air Force as well.
        When you go to our support within Europe, you know, we have
    been underfunding all the facilities that support not only our
    forces but support our families. And that is another area that
    as we look at--it is function of readiness as well, and it is
    something that today we don't fully fund and would be helpful
    to the force, too.
        Mr. Wilson. And I want to thank you.
        Another question concluding, the European Deterrence
    Initiative is very important, been very successful. And I know
    the South Carolina Army National Guard is grateful that we had
    a unit just leave for Poland, so thank you for your success.
        The Chairman. General, just so I am clear, when you list
    ISR, antisubmarine warfare, missile defense, those are things
    you need more of, correct?
        General Scaparrotti. They are things that I need more of.
    And, we also, when we get into the classified section I can
    talk to each of those in terms of capabilities and advancement
    we need to make, given modernization of our adversaries.
        The Chairman. Okay. Thank you. I just wanted to be clear.
        General Scaparrotti. That is correct.
        The Chairman. Ms. Gabbard.
        Mr. Norcross.
        She didn't want to.
        I am sorry, you are good? You want to wait? Okay.
        Ms. Hanabusa.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you, General.
        General, I am kind of curious, I mean, I was here for the
    2014 QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and, you know, it is sort
    of like how we set the tone, and I don't recall in that QDR or
    the QDR before that that I had an opportunity to review--I was
    not here for that--that there was a major concern about Russia.
        And, matter of fact, I thought the philosophy was more
    along the lines that we thought we could kind of bring them
    around and they would become an ally of us. Then it seems like
    something occurred and all of a sudden they are viewed by some
    as our greatest threat.
        So can you explain to me, General, how we go from thinking
    that maybe they will maybe be part of NATO, and all of a sudden
    it is like we have got to protect NATO and protect the 51
    countries that are really part of EUCOM's AOR?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, yes. I think prior to 2014--as I
    said, the transition that we are making in Europe right now is
    one from engagement and cooperation to deterrence and defense.
    And we made that--what the real trigger was--I mean, we began
    to see the modernization and where Russia was going prior to
    that, but 2014 the annexation of Crimea, the occupation of
    Ukraine, for instance, was enacted, clearly set out that we
    have Russia as a competitor that is willing and did break
    international law. And I think what you see in their activities
    today often is pushing wherever they can against the
    international norms.
        They still occupy Ukraine and Georgia, for instance, with
    troops without invitation. We have seen their activities in
    cyber that are, at a minimal, criminal, in some cases: an
    attack on the Ukrainian power grid; most recently, Latvia
    believes they were a part of an attack on their government web
    system; and then their attempt to influence or inside of our
    election, and probably France and Germany, and others.
        So I think, you know, if you look at their action it tells
    us that we have a nation here that we need to be very sober
    about. We don't seek conflict with them. Deterrence, in fact,
    has its mission to prevent conflict or war. But at this point
    Russia has not been very responsive to the international
    community in advancing Ukraine, Crimea, et cetera.
        Ms. Hanabusa. So, General, what is your strategy that you
    would propose to this body as to what is necessary to prepare
    for Russia, whatever they may or you may be afraid that they
    are going to do? I think we like to have some sort of certainty
    of what--you know, what do you think the most probable scenario
    would be, and what is then what you need to have?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, for example, I think Russia will
    continue to press against the international norms. They want to
    regain great power status, and the actions they are taking, in
    their view, is to ensure that.
        What we need to do is we need to demonstrate strength. We
    need to be strong. That is what Russia respects.
        They are opportunistic. Where they see weakness they will
    take advantage of it when it is in their interest.
        We need a whole-of-government approach to this. It is not,
    in fact, the military is not the major part; it is the smaller
    part of this. We exist as a postured force to really provide
    muscle to our diplomacy, to information, to economics, et
    cetera.
        We need to invest in the capabilities to make sure that we
    have a relevant force. A part of deterrence is, you know, the
    capability, and the credibility, and the final thing is
    communication. And I think communication with Russia is an
    important part to play in this.
        Finally, strengthen our partners.
        Ms. Hanabusa. General, do you believe that the concept of
    the triad and, you know, basically our nuclear forces is part
    of that deterrence structure that you need to have in the
    EUCOM?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, I do. I think the triad, as it
    exists in a safe and credible nuclear deterrent, is very
    important, particularly given Russia's capabilities.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Do you think that is the only force that
    Russia understands, or would respect, I guess is the word?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes. I think that they do focus on the
    strength of their opponent, and I think they are optimistic.
    Where they see weakness and they believe that they can gain
    their interest or objectives, they will move out on that.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, good to see you again. Thank you for your efforts
    in keeping us safe and helping us to plan for the defense of
    the United States and our allies.
        Thank you for your strong statement on the issue of arming
    Ukraine. Congress has passed very strong resolutions calling
    for the same, including authorizing arming of Ukraine, so I
    appreciate your assessment of that circumstance and the advice
    that they bear investing in with the defensive armament.
        As you know, I am very active in the NATO Parliamentary
    Assembly. I appreciate your participation with NATO
    Parliamentary Assembly. Several members of the Armed Services
    Committee are very active in that.
        You know, it gives us an opportunity to interface with
    members of the various parliaments of the 28 nations. Recently
    we had a group of parliamentarians into Washington and we
    invited RAND in to conduct a military exercise based upon the
    RAND Russia-Baltics report that exposed the vulnerability of
    our Baltic NATO members. It was intriguing because a lot of the
    time that we spent on the presentation was informing our
    partners of Russia's current military posture, deployment, and
    capability.
        So I would like you to talk for a minute about how do you
    keep our NATO partners informed, and is that a part of what you
    have to do of informing our partners of Russia's posture and
    the threat from Russia? Also then, if you would talk about if
    you believe that the forward-stationing of an armored brigade
    combat team in Europe on a permanent basis rather than
    rotational would be helpful in your deterrence quest.
        And could you also give us just a brief discussion of how
    you have seen that the European Reassurance Initiative, our
    effort to pre-position equipment and to reassure our allies,
    has transitioned over the past year.
        Thank you.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, it is one of my
    responsibilities to work with our allies, both as EUCOM
    commander to the 51 nations, but specifically as the SACEUR
    [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] and NATO command with the 28
    nations.
        We do that through a number of means: personal visits of
    myself and other leaders; information to the North Atlantic
    Council; exercises within the--within Europe, either with
    partners and/or NATO. And we invite leadership--political
    leadership, as well, to those.
        And then finally, we do CMX, or a crisis management
    exercise, that brings in the leadership in NATO about every
    couple years, probably similar to what you experienced, in
    order to inform them of not only the capability of our
    adversaries, but the nature of war today.
        You know, it is--decision space is much tighter.
    Information moves much faster. Those are the kinds of things,
    too, that I think it is helpful to discuss with the leadership.
        Secondly, in terms of a--the rotational brigade, I would
    prefer to have an enduring armed force in Europe. That is a
    service decision. They provide right now is a rotational force;
    I would prefer to have an enduring one because the force then
    becomes accustomed to the environment, it forms relationships
    with our allies, they become well known over the period of time
    of several years that our service members are then stationed
    there, and have a greater appreciation for the problem set.
        And then finally, within ERI: ERI is advancing very well,
    and thank this committee for your support of that. Without ERI
    we would not be postured to deter today as I have said we are.
        It is what has allowed us to improve that posture today
    with a rotational brigade there with the ability to reinforce
    NATO with one of the Enhanced Forward Presence [EFP] battle
    groups from the U.S. and Poland, with additional support with
    air and naval forces. We have used it to improve infrastructure
    so that we can move forces into Europe and around Europe, and
    station forces in a more flexible, agile way.
        All of those things have made a significant difference, and
    they also make a difference to our allies because we don't do
    this alone. We do this as an--you know, as an alliance, and
    just as our battle group will have a Romanian contingent with
    it and others, that is common when we train in Europe, as well.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, General.
        The aspect of informing our partners--it is very
    interesting to me because this is their neighborhood, but yet
    it seems like the United States still takes a lead on allowing
    our European partners to understand what their threats are and
    what the posture in the European arena is.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, part of this--and I think it
    isn't just Europe, you know, the environment has changed; the
    nature of warfare has changed. And so it is easy sometimes not
    to realize that and then realize what the impacts of those
    changes are.
        So that is the importance of doing the CMX, of getting out
    and keeping our allies informed and then, you know, our--both
    our military and our policy leaders have to also engage in that
    so that they learn, as well, because this environment is
    continuing to change and it has dramatically since 2014, for
    instance.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Carbajal.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        General Scaparrotti, you state that Russia is now the top
    theater priority. The Secretary of Defense has stated that
    Russia's aggressive actions have violated international law and
    are destabilizing. The message to this committee has been
    consistent: that Putin and the Russian Federation seek to
    disrupt the international order and the cohesion of the
    international organizations like NATO and EU [European Union].
        You stated in your testimony that deterring Russia's--
    deterring Russia requires a whole-of-government approach.
    Unfortunately, I do not believe we have used a whole-of-
    government approach, especially as this branch of government
    has refused to investigate Russia's effort to disrupt this
    country's democratic process.
        General, there are not many who can supersede your
    expertise on Russia. Today you have presented this committee
    with strategies to confront the Russian threat militarily.
    However, I am sure that you agree that it will take more than
    just military strength to effectively combat a state that is
    undermining and threatening democracies globally, including
    America's.
        General, can you provide this committee the type of whole-
    of-government approach necessarily--or necessary to effectively
    deter Russia?
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you, sir.
        Russia is an adversary that employs whole of government. We
    see them work politically; we see them use economics as
    leverage; we see them use information to influence
    populations--some of that is disinformation, as well. And so
    for us to be effective we have to respond across all those
    domains, as well.
        So as a government--and we did this during the Cold War--as
    a government we had overarching objectives with respect to the
    Soviet Union then, but we need overarching objectives today. We
    need some lead agencies, like a lead agency in information,
    that has authorities to integrate across the different agencies
    in the government with respect to information. We need to
    approach them economically with the same overarching
    objectives.
        So, you know, it is a very general description but that is
    literally where we need to go, every agency focused on our
    approach to Russia. And again, it is to influence them and not
    to have conflict, but to avoid conflict with them and yet
    protect our interests.
        Mr. Carbajal. Do you find that we are being effective?
        General Scaparrotti. I would say that we are not as
    effective as we could be. We can organize, particularly as
    whole of government, in a better way, and I believe we will. I
    think that at least my leadership and what I know is focused on
    that, and we have work to do.
        So we can be more effective, particularly in the
    information domain where, you know, we have, I think, very good
    capability, good talent, creativity, and we just need to move
    out on that a bit.
        Mr. Carbajal. And not to make it so simplistic, but what
    could this Congress do to address the highest priority that
    perhaps is our weakest link in being more effective?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think provide the leadership
    in those objectives. Provide the leadership toward a, you know,
    a cohesive, integrated governmental approach to this problem.
    And then as you do, finance those efforts, as well.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Thank you very much. I yield back,
    Mr. Chair.
        The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Scaparrotti, thanks again. Appreciate you joining
    us here, and thanks again for your service. It has always been
    an honor to visit you when we have had the opportunity in
    places like Korea and elsewhere.
        I wanted to ask you about the mission of the Enhanced
    Forward Presence battalions that are located in the Baltic
    nations and Poland. Can you give us a little laydown about what
    those units are there training and preparing to do? And do
    these battalions effectively deter Russia? How does Russia look
    at that with a total force presence there?
        Obviously, with Russian forces along the border there in
    the Baltic nations--as we visited the Baltic nations they are
    deeply concerned about the presence of armor artillery units
    and Russian troops stationed along the border.
        Does our presence there with these Enhanced Forward
    Presence units--is that a significant deterrence? And how do we
    use those units in coordination with our allies, both in
    training and in presence?
        General Scaparrotti. The Enhanced Forward Presence is a--in
    NATO terms they call it a battle group. It is a battalion task
    force.
        Mr. Wittman. Yes.
        General Scaparrotti. But it is combined with--in Poland
    with Polish troops. We have Romanian troops as a part of that,
    and others. And we operate with Polish forces in the defense of
    their nation.
        It is under NATO operational control. It is a very
    significant force. I think it has a significant impact on
    deterrence.
        This is a very strong commitment from the 28 nations of
    NATO that they are--that they will honor Article 5, that an
    attack on one nation is an attack on all. And so while some may
    say, ``Well, it is four battalion task forces,'' it is four
    battalion task forces but it is a statement that is backed by
    28 nations and all of their capability--not just military, but
    economic, informational, et cetera.
        Russia does respect NATO. It is one of the reasons that
    they are trying to undermine NATO and fracture it is because
    they do respect NATO. So I think it is effective.
        The last thing I want to say is, is that while we do focus
    on a battle--a task force, it is connected to the other
    domains. You know, we connect with our air, our maritime, and
    those others that we can bring to bear. So we can fight it as
    we fight today.
        Mr. Wittman. As I visited there our allies express two
    desires. One is increased U.S. presence as a permanent presence
    there in the Baltic States. And, of course, we talked to them
    about rotational presence, and I would try to convince them you
    actually have more troops there on a rotational presence that
    know your country and know operationally than you would if you
    had just a battalion. But they are all about, let's have a
    battalion presence there.
        So I want to ask about how your conversations with our
    allies have gone about their view of our commitment and that
    element of presence. And then secondly, too, when Secretary
    Mattis went there and had a heart-to-heart discussion about the
    commitment that NATO nations need to make as far as funding
    their militaries, give me your perspective on whether you see
    that commitment growing.
        Is it growing in the right ways to make sure that they are
    working with us to create that presence and that deterrence?
    And how important is it in the minds of many of our allies
    there for that permanent presence, which, as you know, we have
    moved away from since the days of the Cold War?
        General Scaparrotti. First of all, I just visited each of
    the Baltic countries a week ago, and in every country, as you
    said, they asked for permanent presence of U.S. forces. And I
    have said publicly that they have near-permanent presence of
    U.S. forces. It is rotational, but it is enduring.
        Mr. Wittman. Right.
        General Scaparrotti. And we are committed to that as long
    as these conditions exist.
        The one upside of a rotational force is that we are
    bringing rotational forces through and much more of our force
    structure then becomes familiar with the environment----
        Mr. Wittman. Yes.
        General Scaparrotti [continuing]. The people, the
    challenges, their allies in Europe. That is a benefit to it.
        And so, for instance, from the Army chief of staff's
    perspective that is very good for his force----
        Mr. Wittman. Sure.
        General Scaparrotti [continuing]. As you rotate different
    units through.
        Mr. Wittman. Yes.
        General Scaparrotti. And that is good for us. If we had to
    respond to a crisis we would certainly bring forces from the
    States to reinforce us.
        I think they understand that. I would just say they are
    very appreciative of the United States contributions to their
    defense. There is no question about that.
        In terms of funding growth, we have seen a change in NATO
    and a response. Last year was the first year that was--the
    trend was not down in terms of percent of funding of GDP across
    the 28 nations. It turned up.
        This year it was an increase of 3.8 percent, I think it is,
    but 22 nations have increased their budget this year.
        I said I was just in the Baltics, for instance. Estonia
    already meets the 2 percent; Lithuania and Latvia both told me
    they will meet it by 2018 and probably go beyond that.
        So countries are responding. What is important to this,
    too, though, I would point out, is that we meet the 20 percent
    agreement for modernization----
        Mr. Wittman. Yes.
        General Scaparrotti [continuing]. Because they have to be a
    relevant force, as well.
        Mr. Wittman. Right. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
    yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Brown.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, General, thank you for your presence here. Thank you
    for your service and your leadership in Europe.
        A few decades ago I had the privilege of serving with
    180,000 or so Army personnel when we defended the Fulda Gap. We
    won the Cold War.
        A lot has changed since then. I participated in a lot of
    interoperability exercises, Reforger and a number of others,
    with, you know, French and British and German forces. And we
    relied a lot on their infrastructure, particularly the
    transportation and communication network.
        My question has to do with that infrastructure. You
    mentioned in your written testimony as well as, I think, you
    briefly touched upon it today, that the expansion of the
    alliance to include Central and European--Central and Eastern
    European countries has made it a little more challenging with
    the lack of a common transportation network.
        So as you anticipate what could be a Russian aggression on
    the eastern flank of NATO, could you briefly describe some of
    the challenges that you would have in feasibly moving both U.S.
    and NATO forces along or across multiple sovereign countries
    and getting the permissions and the support--roads, bridges,
    rail, and the like?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes. In the days that you trained
    there--and I trained there, as well--we had a very good basis
    and understanding of the--of mobility, whether it is rail, air,
    ground, bridge construction, weight that it would take. We had
    a very good understanding of Europe and how to move our force.
        Over the years of partnership, the last 20 years or so, we
    began to atrophy that. We don't have as good an understanding
    of our road networks, and particularly those nations that were
    once a part of Warsaw Pact to the east that are now partners
    with us.
        So we are developing that and we are working that hard with
    our partners. The alliance countries are doing a lot. Germany,
    in particular, has been very helpful.
        But we are having to take a look at do we have the rail
    capacity? Are the bridges strong enough, and which ones can we
    move across? Those kinds of things.
        And with EFP and our rotational brigade, those two in
    particular, we have been exercising that.
        Final thing I would like to say is the allies contributed
    to this. They are all becoming a part of mobility and
    infrastructure that we need to have an agile force in Europe.
        Mr. Brown. And can you state whether or not we currently
    or--and if not, whether we should be making any investments in
    that infrastructure, considering the security interests that we
    have?
        General Scaparrotti. We are currently making investments in
    that, as well as our allies, and we should continue to do that.
        We have to have some agility. We won't know exactly how
    things may roll out if there is a crisis nor where it may
    happen. We are routinely not as good at being very precise in
    that determination in the future.
        So we have to develop infrastructure and mobility within
    Europe that allows us a good deal of agility. And then we need
    to train against that, as well, and exercise it.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, good to see you again. Part of my questions
    revolve around rail, the difference in the gauges, the fact
    that our equipment is so large now that it won't go through
    some of the tunnels that have been there for so long.
        I will shift, then, to lift capacity--our large lift
    capacity. If we can't get our equipment there by rail or by
    tunnel, do we have the lift capacity, with the retirement of
    the C-5s that we have had in the last couple of years, that we
    would need? And do we have the ability to land those planes
    with their weight where we would need the equipment?
        General Scaparrotti. As you can imagine, we are looking at
    all this with respect to our plans. STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic
    Command] could probably give you the--or Transportation Command
    could give you the best response to that, but as I have
    conversed with them and we look at our plans, we can move. It
    is little slower than I might like at this point.
        I am concerned about the future, in terms of the investment
    not only in military but also civilian ships and aircraft that
    we routinely rely upon in a crisis. And in that area we need to
    continue investment or we will continually meet greater
    challenges here in the future, from what I have seen in our
    planning.
        Mr. Scott. Yes, sir. I am concerned about that, as well. I
    think that the lift capacity, especially large lift capacity,
    is something that we need to revisit.
        We talked about the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target
    Attack Radar System] in Europe. I have very serious concerns
    about is the number of units we have go in for major overhauls,
    major depot maintenance, that you would potentially end up with
    a shortage of that. Do you see the demand for JSTARS
    decreasing? And what effects are there if there is a moving
    target indicator gap?
        General Scaparrotti. This is particularly important against
    a large force like Russia so that we do have good information,
    we understand movement and change. That is how we build the
    indications and warnings [I&W] and the ability to react
    appropriately, so it is very important to us.
        I am concerned about the reduction as we bring on new
    aircraft, which we need to do. I do not have all that I would
    like to have today to provide the I&W that I need in Europe.
        Mr. Scott. As we discuss the upcoming budget, potential
    decreases in funding to the State Department are a concern, I
    think, of most of the people on this committee.
        How much more difficult does this make your mission? And
    what challenges do you face with these potential shortcomings
    in the budget? And how does it potentially hurt our
    partnerships in the region?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, I--in terms of where
    the budget is at is not in--mine to comment on, but I would say
    that, as I noted earlier, our problems--all the problems that
    we face in Europe require a whole-of-government approach and
    they require, you know, approach with partners in the same
    fashion.
        So if you look at how I counter transnational threats or
    terrorism inside of Europe, military is a part of that; we have
    that cell that runs that in EUCOM, but most of the work is done
    by Treasury, State, and others across our agencies to complete
    that work and enable us to do it.
        And again, I think that in deterring Russia it is a whole-
    of-government approach, as well. Diplomacy should be the
    priority and we, as a military, with the right posture, provide
    some muscle for diplomacy to work.
        Mr. Scott. General, I appreciate your service. And with
    that, Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time.
        The Chairman. Mrs. Murphy.
        Mrs. Murphy. General Scaparrotti, thank you for being here
    today.
        I want to start by noting that I have deep concerns about
    the current administration's continued publicly questioning of
    our alliances and the sanctity of the post-World War II
    international order. I think it is a dangerous narrative that
    reflects both an internal and external threat to our national
    security.
        Externally, the rise of Russian aggression in the--and
    Russia's use of hybrid warfare tactics are directly intended to
    erode the credibility of U.S. leadership in the world. And
    internally here at home there is a growing sentiment that we
    should withdraw from the world.
        Isolationism resonates in our own country with people who
    are worried about their livelihoods being taken away by
    increasingly interconnected world and who are increasingly
    weary of being involved in a protracted conflict overseas. But
    this view is populist and perilous.
        You know well, though, that our alliances help prevent
    larger conflict around the world every day and shore up our
    security at home. And in your testimony you have spoken a lot
    about the successes of the European Reassurance Initiative, or
    ERI, to reassure our allies and deter regional aggression.
        What policies, authorities, capabilities have been
    particularly useful in the success of ERI? And then what
    authorities and investments do you still need to complement the
    ERI efforts, especially in the emerging cyber domain?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, thank you very much.
        In terms of ERI, the focal areas have been the rotational
    force presence that we have, so it supports that rotational
    brigade--armored brigade; it supports the rotational combat
    aviation brigade; it supports our Enhanced Forward Presence,
    the battle group in Poland.
        It supports an expansion and pre-positioning of stops--
    stocks of the airfields that we will have available to use day
    to day and in a crisis. It provides the pre-positioning of
    stocks for Army forces so that I can build combat power that is
    not in Europe if I need to in a crisis.
        It has enhanced our training and interoperability with our
    allies. We are doing--I wouldn't say more necessarily; we are
    doing better exercises that are integrated with allies and
    reinforce interoperability that is relevant to the adversaries
    that we will face.
        It has helped us with antisubmarine warfare, for instance,
    which is another area that I noted. So it is very important.
        I would tell you, as I look to the future I will continue
    to need it for those same reasons and more. But it will be
    across all the services and it will tackle the correct posture
    that I need and the capabilities that I need to deter Russia.
        Finally, I didn't mention infrastructure, although I have
    said it several times. It has been fundamental in making
    infrastructure upgrades in airfields, bases, and other places
    that enable the movement of not only our forces but the allies,
    as well.
        Mrs. Murphy. And then, given your experience as the
    commander of U.S. Forces Korea, do you think that the ERI model
    can be effectively exported to the Asia-Pacific region to deter
    provocative and aggressive behavior from actors like North
    Korea and China?
        General Scaparrotti. You know, really it comes down to
    specified funding. And to me it would be--it certainly could be
    a concept used in the Pacific, but I think what is important,
    and what is important even within ERI, is that we have, you
    know, a predictable funding into the future because really, as
    a military that is most helpful. It allows us to plan ahead and
    set objectives in the future and know that we will be funded to
    reach that and set the readiness that we need.
        Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, sir. And I yield back the remainder
    of my time.
        The Chairman. Mr. Cook.
        Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see you
    again, General. I was there with Chris Gibson last summer.
        Just like when we met in Korea, you are very, very candid.
    Your comments about the U-2 in Korea and some of the last time
    on readiness I thought gave us great insight into what is going
    on.
        We were there, one of things I was concerned about is--I
    don't know how you sleep at night. I asked you the same thing,
    I think, in Korea. I think you just have more nightmares in
    this new job than the last one, but we won't go there--because
    I have my own; I am in Congress.
        Anyway, the pre-positions--I am concerned about obviously
    the RAND study, the T-14, the modernization of the T-90, et
    cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And when we were there we went
    out and looked at some of the pre-positioning that had changed,
    and obviously, like the gentleman that had asked you that
    question about the Fulda Gap years ago, boy, we don't have that
    many troops in our pre-positioned forces. We have to go a long,
    long ways.
        And looking at some of the warehouses and the condition, I
    knew it was bad but I didn't think it was that bad. And can you
    comment? Am I just being alarmist about one of 20 different
    things and--but I share those--I don't think we are going to
    have the lift, everything else, if we don't have pre-positioned
    forces and equipment there. I think we are going to be behind
    the power curve.
        General Scaparrotti. We can deal with the challenges we
    have today with the posture we have, but it is at increased
    risk. And it is increased risk. If we have a conflict it is
    going to be increased casualties, it is going to take more
    time, et cetera.
        I will sleep more comfortably as our posture improves. And
    that is why ERI is so important; that is why getting, you know,
    the pre-post stocks that you mentioned in place is important;
    it is why, you know, the service chiefs are focused on
    readiness today to ensure that we have got forces that are
    ready for the challenges they face with a--you know, with a
    peer like--with an adversary like Russia.
        So we have got a good deal of work to do. In the closed
    session I can be more frank about those things that are most
    concerning to me.
        Mr. Cook. I am going to switch gears a little. I am going
    to put on partly a foreign affairs hat.
        Montenegro, the vote yesterday was 98-2 in the Senate. It
    looks like that is going forward. And from a military
    standpoint I think you know about the designs of Russia on that
    country and the importance of that country militarily and
    politically in NATO. So I was optimistic.
        How do you think the possibilities, whether that is going
    to happen--and obviously this is going to give you another
    nightmare or headache or what have you, but I was one of those
    ones pushing for Montenegro.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think we have two nations, one
    of which is ours, to confirm that within the alliance, so I
    expect fully that they will be. I think it is critical that
    Montenegro does become a part of the alliance, as is planned.
        For Russia, this is something they did not want to see
    happen. As you know, they went to great lengths to try and
    undermine Montenegro's accession to NATO.
        So I think it is critical that this occurs. And I have said
    before, I think that Russia has every objective of ensuring
    that there is not another country that joins NATO in the
    future. I think that is their objective.
        Mr. Cook. Once again, I want to thank you so much. Looking
    forward to seeing you again over there. And I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Suozzi.
        Mr. Suozzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, I want to add my voice to the chorus of praise for
    the great work that you have devoted your life to, and we are
    very grateful to you for your service, and you really do have
    an awesome responsibility.
        I am new to this and I am very concerned about the things
    that aren't easy to measure. You know it is easier--and you are
    doing a great job--to measure troop movements and hardware and
    things like that, but in your testimony you talk about,
    ``Russia has employed a decades-long strategy of indirect
    action to coerce, destabilize, and otherwise exercise a malign
    influence over other nations.'' And you talk about the
    neighboring states of Moldova and Georgia and the Balkans.
        And then you say, ``Additional Russian activities short of
    war range from disinformation to manipulation. Examples include
    Russia's outright denial of involvement in the lead up to
    Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea;
    attempts to influence elections in the United States, France,
    and elsewhere; its aggressive propaganda campaigns targeting
    ethnic Russian populations among its neighbors; and cyber
    activities directed against infrastructure in the Baltic
    nations and the Ukraine.''
        So everybody, I think, now agrees that Russia has been, you
    know--Ukraine was easy to see and what they did there was such
    a negative action; and the cyber threats, everybody agrees that
    that is a big part of their strategy these days; propaganda,
    influencing the media; Russian oligarchs spreading money around
    in all different places of the world, from Ukraine to Europe--
    European elections.
        So when you talk about the whole-of-government approach,
    they are not as easy to measure these different things that
    they are doing.
        I am a big advocate that we need to give some sort of punch
    in the nose, some sort of clear manifestation that, ``We don't
    like what you are doing,'' and we need to go after the
    oligarchs with financial sanctions and try and pay more
    attention to sending a clear message that you can't mess with
    us that way.
        What is the one thing that you would like to see the whole
    of government--really not just related to more hardware, more
    positioning of troops, more the things that you are advocating
    for--what is the one thing you would like to see the rest of
    government do to give them a strong message that you can't do
    this to us or you are going to have to pay a price?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think the whole-of-government
    approach--I think one of the most important things we can do is
    get organized in the information campaign.
        Mr. Suozzi. Whose job is that?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, I think today the way
    it rests is with State traditionally has that. We have the GEC
    [Global Engagement Center]. But again, you know, they have to
    be resourced. We as a government have to say----
        Mr. Suozzi. This is a priority.
        General Scaparrotti [continuing]. And it is a priority, and
    provide the integration, provide them the authority to
    integrate in a way that would have that effect.
        But when you look at the way Russia is working today with
    disinformation, even the way that they approach different
    countries in Europe and in the public world on RT [Russian
    international TV network], Russian TV, et cetera, we have to
    compete in that environment. We have to compete in it.
        We have to show strength that also supports our values. I
    think we ought to be very strong in our values in doing this,
    as well, and I think that would have a great effect.
        It is interesting because in many countries in the East,
    even though they are doing all of this, there are countries
    that the populace is not necessarily swayed by what they hear
    from Russia.
        Mr. Suozzi. Yes.
        General Scaparrotti. That is not true in all of them. It
    depends on where you are at, but it is interesting to me.
        And yet, you know, if we made a greater--a, you know, a
    greater effort in this area, I think we could see some good
    benefit.
        Mr. Suozzi. So you would like to see some more strength
    from America as far as coordinating the information campaign,
    preferably using the State Department as they have
    traditionally done, to try and get this information out there
    and then send a message clearly back to them.
        General Scaparrotti. Absolutely, and to work with our
    allies.
        Mr. Suozzi. I have 59 more seconds in my time, but I just
    wanted to say that, you know, I was speaking to the Italians.
    The Italians' biggest concern of the whole world right now is
    Libya. And, of course, that is the funnel where, you know, they
    have closed off through Turkey and now everybody is coming up
    through Libya.
        What is it we should be doing to try and help stabilize
    Libya or to try and create an environment where that is less of
    a channel for people to be migrating from the rest of Africa
    and the surrounding region?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, Libya is not a part of EUCOM. It
    is AFRICOM's [U.S. Africa Command's] domain.
        What we are doing basically in EUCOM is to assist our
    allies with both the refugees that come from there and their--
    the challenges in Europe they have with that, as well as
    countering the transnational threats that are coming out of the
    instability in the north, as well.
        Mr. Suozzi. But you are hearing the same concerns from the
    Italians that that is their big concern is what is going on
    Libya?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I mean, if you go to the
    southern part of Europe the more imminent threat to them is--or
    challenge--I wouldn't say it is a threat; it is a challenge--it
    is the continued flow of refugees and the terrorist threat.
    Those two are more prominent than Russia.
        If you go to the east of Europe it is obviously Russia. But
    all of those challenges are true for all the nations in Europe.
        Mr. Suozzi. Thank you, General.
        The Chairman. Mr. Kelly.
        Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General
    Scaparrotti, for being here.
        I have two questions so I would like to kind of contain the
    first one to the first 2.5 minutes so I can get into the
    second.
        This committee has consistently supported ERI and now EDI
    [European Deterrence Initiative]. In fact, last year we tried
    to shift a large portion of the EDI to base budget funding.
        One of the reasons is that by budgeting through OCO
    [Overseas Contingency Operations] we don't have a complete FYDP
    [Future Years Defense Program] for EDI so we can't plan and we
    can't see how you are planning for these activities. In fact, I
    can't think of much that would concern Putin more than to see a
    5-year EDI plan and budget.
        Can you provide the committee with your best military
    advice on what an EDI FYDP would look like, broken down by
    budget activity, before we mark up the fiscal year 2018 NDAA
    [National Defense Authorization Act]?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, when we in EUCOM have produced
    our request for ERI we have done it in a very deliberate
    fashion based on the guidance from Congress as to what ERI's
    purpose is across all of the services that support me and
    EUCOM. And so it is a detailed list.
        We scrubbed it against things like--you know, we questioned
    ourselves: Is this something that really ought to be in base or
    ought to be a service expense, not a part of ERI?
        So I think we did a very faithful job of that and provided
    it to OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], and we can
    certainly, you know, break that out in terms of we not only had
    the categories but also the prioritization that we provided
    OSD, as well. And assuming that there is no issue there, I can
    tell you we have done the work.
        Mr. Kelly. And you agree that it is much better to have a
    5-year plan rather than a 1-year and we don't know what the
    budget--baseline funding, as opposed to OCO, is much better for
    us to plan and also shows our allies our commitment. Would you
    agree, General?
        General Scaparrotti. I, as I have said before, said that we
    need predictable long-term budgeting so that we can plan out
    ahead, as opposed to a year at a time.
        Mr. Kelly. And thank you.
        And I am an Old Guard member. I grew up in the 1980s. I
    grew up as part of the Reforgers and all those things in
    Europe.
        When we had three ACRs [armored cavalry regiments], we had
    2nd, 3rd and 11th--we may have had more--but those were our
    screening forces. Those weren't even talking about the
    divisions and corps behind them and our commitment to the
    European theater.
        We no longer have that. I actually visited Hohenfels near
    Nuremberg last year and saw the difference in what it looked
    like in the 1980s versus now.
        I am also a big, strong proponent of the National Guard and
    our Guard and Reserves. We have 8 National Guard divisions; we
    have 32 BCTs [brigade combat teams], of which 10 are armored, I
    believe, or heavy BCTs in the Guard and Reserve.
        I also believe in what you said, General Scaparrotti, about
    having that continuous force over there that the people know
    and trust. So I think we need to look outside of how we have
    always done things or how we look and project.
        If we kept one heavy BCT that is an Active Component over
    there and integrated a divisional rotation from the National
    Guard of maybe two heavy and one light or, you know, one heavy
    with another heavy plus a light, it gives training
    opportunities to those division headquarters; it gives terrain
    familiarity; it gives so many things.
        What do you think about that, and including also like your
    engineer and your ADA [air defense artillery] and your aviation
    assets, to go with those Guard divisions on maybe a 5-year--one
    division for 5 years--I mean for 1 year and then, you know,
    through a 5-year cycle.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, as I have said before,
    that is really a service function for them to determine. I make
    the requirement.
        There are a number of ways that--as you said, there are a
    number of ways we can fulfill my requirement and there are pros
    and cons of each. And, you know, as you noted, rotational units
    provide a lot of experience to our force, and it provides a
    force that then has knowledge of Europe. So those are the
    advantages of that.
        Mr. Kelly. And one other thing, I think you can look at
    deployment, your RSOI [reception, staging, onward movement, and
    integration], a little differently. Rather than having to send
    a Guard unit that is 100 percent ready on day one, if you send
    them to the European theater as a division those BCTs can
    actually get those rotations at Hohenfels and other places
    rather than at the NTC [National Training Center].
        And so the end product is a completely trained and ready-
    to-fight division and BCTs, as opposed to sending one over
    there that is already ready. I think maybe you get to train and
    be ready across the spectrum. Would you agree with that?
        General Scaparrotti. What I need is a trained and ready
    unit at the point of employment. So certainly we can use our
    capabilities in Europe if that is the most efficient way to get
    there.
        And I would just add that, you know, the Guard plays an
    important role in what we do in Europe every day. The
    partnership that they have formed with each of the countries is
    really quite remarkable--20-some years of relationship that
    builds trust.
        Mr. Kelly. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Gallego.
        Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General.
        First off--and we will be switching direction a couple
    times--do our European partners support the provision of lethal
    defense equipment to Ukraine?
        General Scaparrotti. I haven't discussed that specific
    issue with most of our partners. As you know, there are some of
    our allies in Europe that are supporting Ukraine; they train
    right along beside us. So they are as convicted as we are in
    supporting Ukraine and the protection of their sovereignty. I
    can say that.
        Mr. Gallego. And switching gears--thank you, General, for
    that answer--how should we holistically approach deterrence in
    our response to hybrid threats in Europe specifically from
    Russia? Are other measures such as sanctions effective in
    dealing with hybrid activity, or should we be looking at
    potentially a military response for some level of hybrid
    activity?
        General Scaparrotti. First of all, I think, for instance,
    you mentioned sanctions. Again, I think that a response to
    Russia has to be a whole-of-government approach, and that is
    the economic part of that that is important that we retain.
        As I have said, I think demonstrating strength in every
    area is significantly important with Russia. I think that we
    have got to have the right posture of our military.
        And when you look at deterrence you look at capability,
    credibility, and then communication. And communication being,
    do we communicate our intent and our objective, and does Russia
    understand that so there is no miscalculation? And then a part
    of that military is an enhanced missile defense, as well.
        Mr. Gallego. I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, good to
    see you again. Thanks for being here and thank you for your
    service to our country.
        I especially appreciated your comments earlier today about
    the United States needs to provide some lethal force capability
    to the Ukrainian military. I have been there twice and going
    back next month, and they are begging for something to fight
    with. And this is a life-or-death battle for them, so I
    appreciate your candor on that.
        I want to talk to you first about the INF [Intermediate-
    Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]. In your best military
    professional judgment, do you believe that Russia in the
    foreseeable future will return to compliance with the INF
    Treaty?
        General Scaparrotti. I don't have any indication that they
    will at this time.
        Mr. Rogers. How much longer do you think that the United
    States should continue to unilaterally comply with that treaty?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, that is really a policy
    decision. What I would say is that, from my perspective, is
    that we have to respond to their violation of that treaty one
    way or the other. We have to take steps; we have to address it.
    But----
        Mr. Rogers. What steps would you take?
        General Scaparrotti [continuing]. It is a policy matter.
        Mr. Rogers. What steps would you take? What would you
    recommend to the President that we take?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, I think we
    confront them and then we consider what actions we might take
    in terms of our capabilities in order to deal with the advance
    that their violation of the treaty incurs--in other words, the
    risk that we are taking because they are not following that
    treaty and how do we respond to it.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay. I want to turn to the nuclear weapons
    ban. What are some of the military risks to the alliance and
    our allies if NATO members sign onto and thus comply with the
    draft of a U.N. [United Nations] nuclear weapons ban that is
    currently being negotiated?
        General Scaparrotti. My view is that the nuclear weapons
    ban is just not realistic. I mean it is occurring in a world
    where we have North Korea, in particular, who is in violation
    of U.N. sanctions and resolutions--multiple ones--and show no
    respect for the international community's directive; Russia,
    who is also aggressively improving their modernization of their
    nuclear weapons, et cetera.
        So I think we are in a world today where that is just not
    realistic at this point.
        I think it is something that probably all of us would like
    to see and, you know, a world without nuclear weapons. But I
    don't think we are at the point to exercise that ban at this
    time.
        Mr. Rogers. Do you believe that it would be inconsistent
    for NATO members who have signed on to the Warsaw Communique to
    also sign on to that treaty?
        General Scaparrotti. Again, that is each nation's sovereign
    decision, but I think it would be.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. There are a lot of questions we ought to get
    to here and probably quickly to the classified hearing, so I am
    going to be very quick.
        Our new President has created considerable concern about
    the role of the United States vis-a-vis the European Union and
    NATO. Has that uncertainty caused you problems in your work as
    NATO--with NATO?
        General Scaparrotti. No. Our mil-to-mil relationships
    within the alliance are strong. We have continued to do what we
    need to do as an alliance of military components to protect the
    transatlantic region.
        Mr. Garamendi. Is there clarity in your mind as to what the
    administration's policy is with regard to NATO?
        General Scaparrotti. The Secretary of Defense attended the
    last defense ministers [meeting] and had sat through 2 days of
    sessions and was very clear in terms of America's commitment to
    NATO as well as in Munich at the Munich Security Conference.
    And the Vice President spoke there, as well. So I think that
    they were very clear in our commitment to NATO.
        Mr. Garamendi. Well, that is not the entire story, is it?
    There are other people that have commented in various ways.
        General Scaparrotti. What I would say, Congressman, is that
    there has been uncertainty throughout our election, et cetera,
    that the Secretary and the Vice President spoke on behalf of
    the administration. I do believe that Secretary Tillerson's
    attendance at the foreign ministry--at the foreign ministers
    conference coming up, as well as the President's attendance in
    May, will reinforce our commitment.
        Mr. Garamendi. Is it important in your work that there be
    clarity from the administration with regard to its commitment
    to NATO and Europe?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes.
        Mr. Garamendi. Well, we will hopefully have that in the
    near future.
        Down into the weeds for a few moments, you mentioned the
    issue of being able to move material and troops and the role of
    the civilian organizations in doing that. We have a hearing
    coming up at the end of this week with TRANSCOM [U.S.
    Transportation Command], and specifically on the issue of
    ships, the Ready Reserve, and the MSP [Maritime Security
    Program].
        Do you see the--are--do we have sufficient ships, planes,
    to address any contingency that you might face as your role in
    EUCOM?
        General Scaparrotti. Again, that is best answered by them,
    but I can tell you from my experience in the past year and a
    half that they and I have concern about particularly our
    civilian support in both ships and air, and that we have to
    invest in those.
        I haven't recently sat down with them to get the actual
    facts, but that is my view in dealing with the planning that we
    are--we have done.
        Mr. Garamendi. Well, your last two commands have been at
    the far ends of the world, so you would know. I think I will
    let it go at that point.
        Thank you, and I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
    General Scaparrotti, for your leadership.
        You and I have had the opportunity to discuss the
    importance of countering Russian propaganda and malign
    influence in the information space, and during our last
    conversation you mentioned the Russia Information Group, which
    is a working-level interagency group to counter Russian
    aggression. And I am pleased to see the efforts of this group
    and the State Department's Global Engagement Center.
        But my question for you is: What aren't we doing that we
    need to be doing in this area to more effectively counter
    Russian propaganda? We discussed a lot of the improvements that
    have been made in terms of grappling with this issue, but what
    more do we need to be doing?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, you know, we do have a
    structure. We have the group that you mentioned, for instance,
    that is multiagency, et cetera.
        But we actually have to, you know, provide it direction and
    resourcing on a larger scale than has been done to this point.
    That is the first thing.
        Second thing is I think we have to be more direct in our
    values and our messaging. If we think back to Voice of America,
    there is--in Europe today there are those in the eastern
    countries that tell me that they recall when they were in the
    Warsaw Pact hearing Voice of America and the difference it
    made. Those are the kind of things we need to do on a greater
    scale than we are doing today.
        Ms. Stefanik. So let me ask you this: As you know, in last
    year's NDAA we expanded the mandate of the Global Engagement
    Center, which is within the State Department, to include state-
    sponsored entities of propaganda such as Russia. How can we
    empower the Global Engagement Center? And a larger question is,
    is that the right coordinating body within the State
    Department?
        General Scaparrotti. Again, I think whether that is the
    right coordinating body I think is probably best determined by
    the State Department, not I. I really can't tell you best how
    they should organize for this.
        But I think it is a good start. It is an agency that we
    know we can go to that is empowered within State to conduct
    this mission.
        And so, again, my experience with it is that this is on a
    much smaller scale than we need today. We have an opportunity
    here, I think, to focus on this. And perhaps with a new
    administration, et cetera, we can begin to empower that more
    and reinforce it.
        And whether that is exactly the way it should be, I think
    we will see as time goes on.
        Ms. Stefanik. You mentioned in your response to some of the
    other questions the importance of working with our partners.
    What can we do to better leverage more the NATO Strategic
    Communication Center of Excellence in Latvia, similar to the
    way that EUCOM and NATO leverage the NATO Special Operations
    Headquarters?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes. We in EUCOM are actually
    connecting with that node. We in EUCOM are connecting with EU
    and NATO, for instance.
        So what we are trying to do is form nodes, and on the cyber
    side that is a very important one in Estonia. And then, through
    that, reinforce this network that defeats a network, so to
    speak. That is what we have to do. And so we are working--I
    mean, that is one of our basic models within EUCOM to empower
    that.
        And, on the NATO side, they have approved a strategic
    direction, is what I would call it there, that enables parts of
    our chain of command within NATO to link with EUCOM's command.
        So I think there are the beginnings of this. We just need
    to begin to reinforce it and develop it.
        Ms. Stefanik. And my last question is, 2 years ago in the
    fiscal year 2016 NDAA this committee noted concern about hybrid
    and unconventional threats and directed DOD to submit a
    strategy for countering unconventional and hybrid threats.
    Unfortunately, the DOD has yet to submit or even begin to
    coordinate with other government agencies.
        In our language in the NDAA we also noted that, quote,
    ``Most state sponsors of unconventional warfare, such as Russia
    and Iran, have doctrinally linked conventional warfare,
    economic warfare, cyber warfare, information operations,
    intelligence operations, and other activities seamlessly in an
    effort to undermine U.S. national security objectives and the
    objectives of U.S. allies alike.''
        First, do you agree with this assessment still and the need
    to develop such a comprehensive whole-of-government strategy?
    And second, in terms of countering hybrid warfare, are we any
    closer to linking all of our tools and capabilities?
        General Scaparrotti. I agree that we have to have a
    holistic, whole-of-government strategy, as you stated. I think
    we are closer. I think we, you know, we are not sitting still;
    we are making progress.
        And particularly, I can speak to the military side of this.
    As I said, we are working with our allies through established
    nodes. Our special operations forces, in particular, are very
    good at this and they are active, not only in what they can
    provide us in this domain but also building capacity with our
    allies.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. General, welcome.
        I have a question to clarify some Pentagon math I am trying
    to figure out. It goes--and maybe you can help--it goes back to
    your comments about wanting a division in EUCOM. So I am trying
    to figure out, were you suggesting that you wanted an
    additional brigade on top of the two brigades to get to a
    division, or are you suggesting an additional division on top
    of two brigades?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes. I am suggesting an additional
    division, because what I need is I need armored and mech
    [mechanized] brigades. The two I have there today are, you
    know, a cavalry, light cav, as well as an airborne infantry
    brigade combat team.
        Mr. Larsen. Yes. And then along with that, a headquarters,
    presumably?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, and the enablers. But the reason
    a division is so important is because it is at that level you
    can then have the command and control, communications,
    capability to integrate the different domains in the way we
    fight. And then that division brings the enablers, like
    appropriate artillery, engineers, air defense, et cetera, that
    fill out a proper defense.
        Mr. Larsen. And then does that--does your concept then come
    with additional pre-positioned forces--or equipment, that is,
    pre-positioned equipment? Are we looking at supporting the
    division with pre-po or equipment coming with the division
    itself?
        General Scaparrotti. Today the pre-position stocks that we
    are building are an integral part of that division so that it
    would--so that people would fly over, fall in on, and I would
    have a division filling that out. So that is the plan today.
    The plan today is a rotational brigade, and then a pre-po that
    provides the remainder of the resources.
        Mr. Larsen. All right, thanks. Thanks for clarifying that.
    Appreciate it. Pentagon math, sometimes pretty easy.
        Can you talk about a little bit the high north? There are
    some comments in your written testimony on Russia's investment
    in its area of the Arctic, which there is some rational basis
    to that because as the ice recedes they no longer--nor can much
    of anyone--rely on the ice to sort of protect your surface.
        We are active in the Arctic Council--the U.S., along with
    Russia and Norway and five other countries, as active members
    of the Arctic Council, and a lot of observers, as well. Just
    kind of what--since it is mentioned in your written testimony
    about the high north, what do you suggest from a EUCOM
    perspective, or even from a NATO perspective, would be an
    appropriate response?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I agree that, you know, we
    have typically looked at the Arctic as a place for commerce, a
    peaceful place, not a militarized part of the world. And what I
    see today is Russia refurbishing some of its older bases. They
    are placing in radar, ground forces, et cetera, that could
    potentially influence the free flow of trade in the Northern
    Sea Route.
        I think our concern is that--they certainly, as you said,
    you know, that trade route follows most closely to their----
        Mr. Larsen. Right.
        General Scaparrotti [continuing]. You know, to their
    border. So they have the right to take steps that most
    countries would take to secure that.
        I think most of our influence is whether they are taking
    steps that would influence, then, internationally accepted free
    flow of trade in the North Sea or along the North Sea Route.
        Secondly, I am concerned about the high north because their
    Northern Fleet operates out of there, and they are building
    capabilities in that, as well, that, just as we did in the Cold
    War, we have to properly deter and be aware of.
        Mr. Larsen. Yes, that is great. Thank you very much. I
    yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Knight.
        Mr. Knight. Thanks, General.
        I just have a couple brief questions. I was one of those
    Grafenwoehr, Reforger, Fulda Gap kind of guys. And looking at
    the map here, just a quick question to kind of help us
    understand.
        As we were there in the 1980s and there was a totally
    different aspect of having 50 posts over there and, you know, I
    don't how many hundred thousand troops were there, compared to
    today, when NATO is so much different and we have so many more
    countries that we are working with.
        When I was over there with the chairman a couple years ago
    we were watching Polish soldiers and we were in Romania and it
    was very enlightening to me to watch the Poles and the
    Americans work together, and it was just easy to see the
    symbiotic relationship that they had there.
        Tell me how that works. When we are doing three rotations,
    either a unit is there, a unit is coming home, or a unit is
    preparing to go. How does that work well when we are talking
    about Polish soldiers and Romanian, that we can work together
    and use them for certain areas that we couldn't back in the
    1980s, obviously, because of the change to NATO?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, first thing I think about
    is the fact that, as you mentioned, our allies in NATO and in
    Europe, not just--but our partners as well as those 28 nations,
    you know, they have been overseas with us in Iraq, in
    Afghanistan, in other areas--Bosnia, Herzegovina, et cetera.
    Over the years we have developed relationships and we have
    refined interoperability.
        Secondly, we are a force that is used to deploy. I mean,
    our--all of our military forces, of all services, are good at
    expeditionary operations and routinely deploying and falling in
    with host nations, with allies. We have really developed this,
    and I think that makes a difference. It is what you are talking
    about.
        And so when you see the ease that we work with the Poles,
    for instance--you mentioned them. I served with the Polish
    elements in central Iraq; I served with them both tours in
    Afghanistan. I know many of their leaders. Our forces are used
    to working together. So when we fall in we know how to
    communicate, we know how to make those linkages, et cetera.
        Mr. Knight. Yes, and I am going to yield back here, Mr.
    Chairman, but I think that that is one of the most important
    things to our military right now is our connections to the
    allies and our connections over the last 20 years or more, even
    going back to the early 1990s, where we have been in combat
    with a lot of these folks and we have seen how they react and
    we have been training with them and they have been training
    with us. So it is a very close relationship.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General,
    for your testimony.
        Just want to follow up on Mr. Larsen's questions regarding
    the high north and the Arctic. I mean, you described, I think
    very pointedly, the upgrade in terms of military facilities
    that Russia is engaged in in that part of the world.
        There is another aspect, I think, which I wanted to focus
    on a second, which is that they have actually filed a pretty
    aggressive claim through UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on
    the Law of the Sea], in terms of continental shelf rights. And
    I just wondered if you could sort of talk about that in terms
    of, again, your concerns about making sure, you know, maritime
    freedom of the seas continues.
        And, of course, as I think you are probably expecting, I
    just wanted to ask whether you think the U.S. should actually
    stop handcuffing itself and ratify that treaty so we can get
    into these kinds of claims--international claims process.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. First of all, I don't know
    the details of their claim, but that is obviously one of the
    concerns that we have about this for the future. And I do
    believe that we should be a part of the UNCLOS Treaty.
        We adhere to those--to the international norms today
    already, as most nations do. That simply gives us an actual
    seat at the table and a vote legally, et cetera.
        Mr. Courtney. I mean, as we found out with the South China
    Sea, we actually were not even allowed standing to participate
    in that ruling----
        General Scaparrotti. Right.
        Mr. Courtney [continuing]. Which, again, had just huge
    consequences in terms of our country's military, you know,
    posture, et cetera.
        So you have also mentioned, you know, again, the focus that
    you are engaged in in terms of antisubmarine warfare in your
    opening remarks and a couple other questions.
        I guess what I would like to ask is the Office of Naval
    Intelligence has a document which is unclassified, the Russian
    Navy Historic Transition, which sort of walks through some of
    the new shipbuilding activity that Russia is engaged in.
        So in terms of, you know, we--you are saying we need to
    have antisubmarine activity. Why? I mean, what are they doing
    with submarines?
        General Scaparrotti. We remain dominant and--you know, as
    we have been in that arena.
        My point is we can't be comforted by that. They are
    producing several different classes of new submarines. They are
    very capable and will challenge us, and so we--and we do have
    plans to increase ours, but we need to continue to invest in
    that, as well as those other systems that help us with
    antisubmarine warfare. And I can talk to that in more detail in
    a closed session, as well.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Because again, as the--this
    unclassified document makes clear, I mean, just based on
    Russia's geography, I mean, the submarine force is the backbone
    of the Russian navy. It is just where they, you know, where
    they are situated, that is the platform that can get them out
    into international waters. Isn't that correct?
        General Scaparrotti. That is true. The other thing I would
    point out is the systems that they are placing on them today
    gives them good reach from wherever they are located, as well.
    Black Sea, et cetera.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Bacon.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And it is an honor to have you here today. Thank you for
    your leadership and your hard work, and thanks for bringing
    your
    J-5/8, one of the smartest guys I know. Good to have him here.
        I wanted to just start off by saying I second your desire
    to put more ground forces in Europe. I think we need it for
    deterrence. I think it is needed to reassure our Polish and
    Baltic friends, in particular.
        One of the most important missions that you have, in my
    view, too, is the ballistic missile defense mission that we are
    doing with Israel right now. Can you give us an update where we
    are at with that? Are we at a status quo? Are we building onto
    it? What else do you need for that important mission?
        General Scaparrotti. Israel, as I said in my comments, is
    one of our--it is a special ally, but it is one of our closest
    in Europe. Our staff has very regular and a routine exchange of
    intelligence and discussions with them. I mean, it is
    remarkable.
        We are just now going through another one of our exercises,
    and a part of that is the missile defense so that we stay
    trained as partners in that mission.
        That mission is very solid. We continue to train on it; we
    continue to increase capabilities. The Israelis continue to
    increase their capabilities, as well.
        I do have some needs with respect to that. I am very
    confident of our ability to support Israel, but I have some
    needs with respect to that, and I can talk about that in a
    closed session more specifically.
        Mr. Bacon. One of the concerns I had--and I was part of
    that mission early on down at Ramstein--is the mismatch between
    Iran's capabilities versus how to defend. And a lot of this
    defense becomes really deterrence or counterstrike so that they
    fear, you know, doing the first strike. But that takes a lot of
    coordination with CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command].
        How is that coordination with two different COCOMS
    [combatant commands] where that seam is right there?
        General Scaparrotti. An experienced question from having
    dealt with this seam, but actually, it works very well. We have
    done integrated planning now any place that we have that the
    seams, you know, interfere with a plan or be a subject of a
    plan.
        So the dynamic of this environment that we live in, where
    virtually everything that any one of our COCOMs deals with is
    multiregional, it has some connection across their border, we
    have become much more agile at working with each other. I am
    very confident of our relationship with COCOM, actually, with
    CENTCOM in particular.
        Mr. Bacon. One last question. We want to expand our
    presence in EUCOM, but yet we are still--we are continuing to
    reduce our infrastructure there. And when I came in in 1985, I
    think we have cut our presence in Europe by over half, maybe
    two-thirds even.
        And when I was the commander at Ramstein I note that we
    were continuing to find bases that we wanted to close. Is it
    prudent to continue to close multiple bases in Europe while we
    are trying to expand and expand deterrence with Russia?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes. We have actually taken a look at
    this since I have been in command; I am sure that General
    Breedlove did before me.
        A good many of those that we had planned for closure I
    agree with moving on. We have got about 15 left now; there are
    some of those that we are looking at that I think is worth
    another look, given the dynamics of the day, because we have
    got to get our posture right.
        So I think holistically, as a program, it was profitable,
    but there are some of those today that we are going to take a
    look at that remain.
        Mr. Bacon. Okay. I appreciate that you are re-looking at
    that. My instinct tells me we are cutting too much. At the same
    time realizing that we want to expand, it just doesn't make
    sense. So thank you.
        Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Ms. Speier.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, I have got to tell you, your presentation here is
    so compelling, and I really appreciate the clarity with which
    you spelled out the infractions--maybe that is too timid a word
    to use--but the infractions that Russia has engaged in over
    these many years. Have you had the opportunity to brief the
    President?
        General Scaparrotti. I have not.
        Ms. Speier. If you were in a position to brief the
    President and were asked, would you recommend that the
    President condemn these violations by Russia, in terms of the
    INF Treaty and the CFE Treaty [Treaty on Conventional Armed
    Forces in Europe]?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, you know, first of all,
    I give best military advice on our military activity, et
    cetera. That would be a decision that the President would have
    to make.
        Ms. Speier. No, I understand that. But do you think that
    the conduct by Russia rises to the level that would suggest
    that we speak out publicly about Russia's engagement in so many
    areas that border Russia?
        General Scaparrotti. I would say personally that I believe
    that we should confront the Russians on the violations, et
    cetera. I have said that publicly, and that would be consistent
    with my personal opinion or advice.
        Ms. Speier. Do you think that they have engaged in enough
    bad behavior that we should impose greater sanctions on them?
        General Scaparrotti. Again, I think that is something that
    is considered holistically, but I think that there is--that
    more, probably, we need to do across the entire government in
    order to have the proper influence on Russia.
        Ms. Speier. You have spent a fair amount of time, certainly
    last week and I believe today as well, when you testified in
    the Senate about the Russian information warfare campaigns that
    they have engaged in. And I couldn't agree with you more. I
    think that we have been asleep at the switch in terms of, you
    know, showing a countervailing force to their misinformation.
        Do you think that in order to kind of beef up our efforts,
    besides funding Voice of America to a greater degree, what else
    would you recommend that we do?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think that we have to within
    our government determine a lead agency that is empowered to
    integrate the remainder of our government in the information
    sphere; and then resource, whatever that resourcing level would
    be, in order to get our message out in a way that is at a level
    that it has influence.
        I just don't think that we are organized to do what we are
    capable of doing, in terms of the information and the message
    that we send. And this isn't just about a message to Russia.
    This is actually about assurance to our allies, et cetera.
        Ms. Speier. There has been some misinformation, I think,
    that has been offered up regarding the New START Treaty
    [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] with Russia. Do you think it
    is a bad deal?
        General Scaparrotti. As I look back on the treaties and
    understanding why they were put in place, I think they are
    actually productive. What we need is to ensure that everyone
    that is a part of the treaty adheres to the treaty, and then if
    they don't we decide what steps ought to be taken, as opposed
    to--in another words, we have to acknowledge whether the treaty
    is actually in force.
        You know, for CFE the Russians have said--I think about
    2011 or so they said that they were setting it aside. So these
    are things that we need to come together and address.
        Ms. Speier. There was an article in the New York Times, a
    huge spread, yesterday on, ``is our military big enough,'' and
    showed, you know, how some of our greatest adversaries, Russia
    being one, spend $60 billion a year on its military and we
    spend $540 billion. There was a lot of interesting commentary
    in that piece about--by persons arguing that, you know, you
    build up a force when you are going to war.
        Do you have any comments about that piece? Did you read it?
    And if you haven't, I would really be interested in you going
    through it and giving us some advice on what you agree with and
    what you don't.
        General Scaparrotti. All right, thank you. I haven't read
    it, but I would--I will read it and I will provide you a
    response if you would like.
        Ms. Speier. Great. Thank you. I yield back.
        [The information referred to was not available at the time
    of printing.]
        The Chairman. Mr. O'Halleran.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General,
    thank you and your command for all you do for our Nation.
        I have a question. I am going to go back to Turkey here for
    a little bit. You made a statement that Turkey has long been
    and remains an ally of the United States. That word
    ``remains,'' why did you put that in there?
        General Scaparrotti. It just happened to--I put it in there
    because they remain an ally. To be frank, you know, there is
    some concern about their drift, given some of the drift to
    authoritarianism. I would tell you that they remain a close
    ally with us.
        I have spent a good deal of time in Turkey. I have a good
    relationship with their chief of defense and we are focused on
    transparency with them, on supporting them in their objectives
    as well as ours, with respect to countering terrorism and the
    coalition efforts in Syria. So that is going well, but I do
    have concern.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Okay. And your statement also identifies
    that it--that Turkey maintains a complicated relationship with
    Russia. Given its position in the Black Sea, and with Syria and
    Iran and the--its internal conflicts, and everything else that
    is going on in that area, along with its Russian issues, what
    is the status of the U.S. military relationship with Turkey,
    which I think you answered a little bit? What are the
    challenges moving forward? And what are the implications, given
    the Russian actions in the region?
        General Scaparrotti. Again, our mil-to-mil relationship is
    very good, and despite the attempted coup and the many
    challenges they face, they have been very committed to both the
    support of and protection of our forces that operate out of
    Turkey and are important to our coalition efforts.
        Of the challenges that we have, certainly we see all the
    challenges there that we see in Europe. I mean they have an
    internal insurgency, a terrorist fight against PKK [Kurdistan
    Workers' Party]. They have the refugee issue, about 3 million.
        And then they have a conflict on their border, where we
    have troops and are operating as well as Russia, Iran, and
    others. That is a challenge. And that is part of what we spend
    a good deal of time on, making sure that we are transparent
    with each other, we understand each other's objectives and
    figure out how we can be complementary in that.
        But it is probably the most difficult problem set I have
    seen in my career, frankly.
        Mr. O'Halleran. And I am sure we can go in further on that,
    but the--I have sat here and listened to the word ``State'' or
    ``State Department'' mentioned many times and, you know, we
    have a cut proposed by the President in the State Department
    budget. What is the importance of the State Department in your
    role and your ability to complete your mission?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, the State Department as well as
    the other agencies are fundamental to what I do in Europe.
    Again, I strongly believe in a whole-of-government approach. I
    think that we lead with diplomacy in the State Department, that
    the military's posture there is to--intent is to give muscle to
    that diplomacy.
        You know, our intent is that we never have to employ our
    military in a conflict in Europe, that we prevent conflict. And
    to do that we need a strong diplomatic corps.
        Mr. O'Halleran. And I guess that is the--just a comment,
    that is the issue in my head that is problematic as far as any
    cuts to the State Department, given the other issues that we
    have in the world and the need for us to maintain strong
    relationships with all these countries, and especially
    countries like Turkey, which are so complicated.
        And I yield. Thank you, General.
        The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for your testimony here today and thank
    you for your great service to our Nation. I regret that I
    couldn't be here for the early part of the hearing. I was in a
    competing hearing on--dealing with cybersecurity issues, which
    is another important topic of national security importance.
        But I thank you again for your testimony. So I apologize if
    some of the things I may have--I may ask have already been
    covered, but let me get to it.
        So, General, I understand that Secretary Tillerson has
    recently decided to forgo meeting with his NATO counterparts in
    April and instead travel to Russia later in the month. You
    know, I wanted to get your perspective on what does this say to
    our NATO allies that our Secretary of State is choosing to
    visit with Russia--a nation, by the way, that has meddled in
    our elections and possibly colluded with the administration--
    rather than meet with them?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, as always, you know, when NATO
    meets, particularly for the foreign ministers conferences, you
    know, they welcome the United States representative there as
    one of the central members. It is my understanding now that the
    meeting will be on the 31st of March and the--NATO agreed with
    the United States to find a date that was good for all allies.
        And so at least my last report, I expect that we will have
    the foreign ministers on the 31st of March and Secretary
    Tillerson will be in attendance.
        Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you for that update.
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
        Mr. Langevin. So, General, I know that we just sort of
    touched on this topic with my colleague who just spoke before I
    did, but following the President's release of his skinny
    budget--so I am highly concerned about the potential cuts to
    the State Department budget, which proposes a 28 percent
    reduction from last year's levels.
        We spend money through the State Department and USAID [U.S.
    Agency for International Development] in order to further
    international diplomatic relations so that we might avoid and
    prevent war. So with a cut like that, what effects do these
    cuts have in the EUCOM arena, and how will they hinder our
    allies as we collectively seek to deter an aggressive and
    unruly Russia?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I can't comment on the cuts
    themselves or the impact that might have in Europe. State
    Department will determine that.
        But I have said here that the importance of the State
    Department and the work that we do in European Command is just
    fundamental.
        I have a deputy, for instance, my senior POLAD [Foreign
    Policy Advisor], is an ambassador and plays a significant role
    in my headquarters, as do--as does State and all the embassies
    in all of our missions in Europe. So I think it is paramount
    that we maintain the capacity to continue to work as a team.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay. General, something that is probably
    often overlooked is that EUCOM is the primary resourcer of
    personnel and equipment to AFRICOM, which is a growing area of
    security challenges, if you will. And how does that draw of
    resources, is that hindering your ability to do your job in the
    EUCOM arena? And are we not properly resourcing the AFRICOM
    arena at this point?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. The relationship between I
    and AFRICOM is actually quite good. We do share component
    commands, and often we deploy forces in support of AFRICOM's
    operations, so it is working.
        It does impact from time to time on my mission as well as
    General Waldhauser's, because we have a force that is pulled in
    two different directions at times.
        My greatest concern is making sure that we understand risk,
    I and General Waldhauser, with the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs, that when we deploy forces that haven't been planned
    for, say a response to a potential crisis or a mission in
    AFRICOM, that I can verbalize the impact on the EUCOM
    commission and that we as leaders understand the risk that we
    are taking in that regard.
        That is another way of saying that I think we do need more
    force structure there. This is working okay. It is a good
    working relationship. But it does from time to time put a
    strain on our force and its readiness.
        Mr. Langevin. All right. Is your assessment that we are too
    often taking too much risk in----
        General Scaparrotti. No, not too often taking too much
    risk. There have been a couple of times in the year that I have
    been in command, probably two, that I was concerned enough that
    I, you know, that we had a discussion and I had a discussion
    with the Chairman and we--so that we all understood and made
    the appropriate decision. And so I am confident that we can
    make the right decision and not take unnecessary risk, but that
    is--so that gives you an idea of how often that comes up in a
    year's time.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General. I have other questions
    that I will submit for the record. But I will yield back. Thank
    you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General. And I am going to make this real brief
    and ask you to answer for the record so that we can keep our
    schedule moving along here today and also because elements of
    your answer might be more appropriate in a closed setting.
        But I represent Fort Carson, which has an armored brigade
    combat team over in the Baltics and Bulgaria and Poland. They
    are doing a great job. They are rotational as opposed to
    enduring, like you were saying earlier, but I think it has
    great promise for the future.
        But what are the challenges that we are learning from this
    extended rotation as far as infrastructure and host country
    capacity and things like that? That is a sensitive topic that I
    will just take for the record.
        And then also, what are our readiness challenges that we
    are learning and that we need to improve on from a funding
    standpoint?
        I hope to go over and see these great troops later this
    spring, but if you could supply those answers for the record I
    would appreciate it.
        General Scaparrotti. I will. Thank you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 67.]
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you so much.
        The Chairman. General, we haven't really today touched on
    your role in dealing with the terrorism threat in Europe. Could
    you just touch on that briefly?
        General Scaparrotti. It is one of the central challenges,
    Chairman, in Europe and with our allies today. In EUCOM we
    formed a cell as a part of the headquarters that addresses
    counter--transnational threats to counter those. It is
    multiagency; it is not just military.
        And our concept is a tri-nodal concept of where we are
    building a relationship with EU, and particularly the Europol,
    and through the EU nations as well as NATO with a headquarters
    in JFC [Allied Joint Force Command] Naples, and then with our
    other partners, as well, outside of NATO, to really strengthen
    that network.
        Everything from information and intelligence sharing,
    analysis of the transnational threats as, you know, as well as
    capability--sharing capabilities, building partner capacity, et
    cetera.
        It struck me as I was there that we have, particularly
    within the alliance, an organization with headquarters,
    processes, troops if needed, ready-made in order to form a
    response to this. And all 28 nations in NATO are part of the
    coalition to fight ISIS today, so I think it fits well and it
    is one of the key things that we do in Europe.
        The Chairman. And on the 28 nation, did I understand you
    earlier to say that 22 of the 28 nations are increasing their
    defense spending this year?
        General Scaparrotti. That is correct, 22, and 10 within
    the--there is a 20 percent mandate toward modernization. Ten
    nations have met that as we go into the year. So that is good
    news. We expect to see that improving, as well, as we go
    forward.
        The Chairman. And you have had several questions today
    about the European Reassurance Initiative and any investments
    we are making in infrastructure and so forth to make that work.
    Are the Eastern European nations making investments toward that
    goal as well?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, Chairman, they are. In every
    country they have invested themselves in facilities to support
    our mechanized and armored units, in terms of motor pools, et
    cetera. Barracks facilities, also transportation hubs for the
    movement of forces.
        And so they have also invested. And I think it underscores
    the importance that they see in our efforts as well as NATO's
    Enhanced Forward Presence.
        The Chairman. Finally, just a comment. General, today you
    have gotten a number of questions about Russian violations of
    the INF Treaty and you have also gotten a number of questions
    about information warfare, for lack of a better expression.
        Both are subjects of some frustration for me. I wrote
    numerous letters and had numerous briefings on the INF Treaty
    violations to try to get the Obama administration to take this
    more seriously, to call the Russians' hands, to have an
    adequate response. And for some reason they were reluctant to
    do so.
        On information warfare, Mr. Smith and I have been pushing a
    whole-of-government approach to being more engaged in this ever
    since the Bush administration, when it became clear that the
    terrorists were doing a better job than we in information
    warfare, through the Obama administration.
        I am glad to have more people engaged in these issues. We
    have got some new converts now.
        But my point is I want to encourage you to continue to have
    a strong voice within the military and, because of your--both
    of your hats, within the government at large. Because for
    whatever motivation, our government needs to take treaty
    violations more seriously and to develop better capability on
    information warfare. I think you can help.
        We will certainly be pushing that, as well. And as I say, I
    am glad to have some new converts to those causes.
        With that, this hearing will stand adjourned. And in
    roughly 5 minutes or so, if it is okay with you, we will get
    back together upstairs in a classified session.
        Thanks.
        [Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 28, 2017

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 28, 2017

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       [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 March 28, 2017

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                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

        General Scaparrotti. As the first of continuous ``heel-to-toe''
    rotations of heavy brigades to deploy a full armor equipment set and
    personnel from the United States to Europe, we are continuously
    learning specific infrastructure challenges. We are testing logistical
    networks, transportation routes, host nation capacity, infrastructure,
    and the supporting capabilities of the NATO Force Integration Units
    through a series of multi-national exercises and the simultaneous
    rotation of the inbound 2/1 rABCT and outbound 3/4 rABCT in September
    2017. So far we have validated transportation issues such as limited
    access to rail and the low availability of EU compliant trucks and
    trailers. ERI investments from FY15-FY17 funded upgrades to several
    rail heads, vehicle maintenance facilities and training areas with
    several projects already complete or currently underway. ERI also
    funded improvements at several airfields that will enable the
    deployment and positioning of combat and mobility airpower. With our
    NATO partners, we continue to focus on rapid mobility, capturing
    lessons learned, and identifying gaps at airfields, seaports, rail,
    transportation, storage and distribution centers, and life support
    areas. Finally, ERI is also funding meaningful exercises for the rABCT
    that facilitates extensive exercising with Allies which maintains the
    brigade's readiness at a high level.   [See page 36.]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 28, 2017

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                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

        Mr. Scott. The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
    (JSTARS) plays a critical national security role supporting combatant
    commands around the globe. In your previous position as Commander of
    U.S. Forces Korea you had personal experience with the weapon system
    and expressed its value in your Korean theater. With its ability to
    sweep large areas with its wide area surveillance radar and ability to
    provide responsive on-scene command and control with its battle
    management crew, it detects potential adversary movements and vectors
    other scarce ISR or strike platforms directly to a potential target,
    increasing their effectiveness exponentially. The Air Force is
    currently pursuing a recapitalization of the JSTARS to replace the
    aging fleet. With the growing threats in your theater, and experience
    employing the JSTARS in another part of the world, would you please
    characterize the contribution the JSTARS would bring to your current
    warfighting mission? Realizing there is currently insufficient JSTARS
    capacity to meet combatant command requirements, are you concerned
    there may be an increased gap in capacity if we remove current
    capability from the force structure prior to transitioning to the
    recapitalized system?
        General Scaparrotti. As our strategy and military activities evolve
    from engagement and assurance to deterrence and defense, the
    surveillance capability provided by JSTARS and similar platforms become
    more important. This capability provides needed Indications and Warning
    of Russian troop movements along NATO's eastern border and is key to
    our readiness to counter Russia. As with all high demand, low density
    Airborne ISR capabilities, requirements far outstrip capacity,
    therefore any decreases in ISR assets would increase the delta between
    requirements and ability for those requirements to be satisfied.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
        Mr. Moulton. European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) has been an
    important policy to provide support to our allies and counter Russia.
    However, I am concerned that deployments of ground troops, aircraft
    squadrons--while critically necessary--are not sufficient in themselves
    to counter Russia's insidious hybrid warfare. How can we better tailor
    ERI to address this? Particularly, covert influence and information
    warfare--how can we provide additional or new legislative authority or
    budgetary resources to ensure these methods of Russian influence are
    countered?
        General Scaparrotti. The Information Operations program is one of
    the EUCOM commander's most powerful tools to challenge an adversaries
    disinformation and propaganda, expose the false narratives that
    accompany ``hybrid warfare,'' counter violent extremist messaging, and
    share the information environment prior to and during a crisis. We
    currently do not need any new legislative authorities and are working
    Information Operations requirement through our established ERI process
    to ensure we use these funds in the best areas to get the desired
    result. The best way to counter this type of warfare is thru a whole of
    government approach. We are actively participating in the interagency,
    State Department led, Russia Information Group (RIG) which is looking
    at new ways to counter Russia's massive hybrid warfare campaign.
    Outcomes from this interagency working group may result in the need for
    new authorities or budget resources.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. ABRAHAM
        Dr. Abraham. With last year's coup attempt in Turkey and the
    potential for political instability ahead of this year's April
    presidential referendum there, what are some of the challenges you have
    faced and expect to face with U.S. and coalition basing access to
    Incirlik Air Base? Have we faced similar access issues with other
    allies who experienced political instability in the past?
        General Scaparrotti. Last year's coup attempt in Turkey created
    several initial challenges for EUCOM. These included cutting power and
    fuel supplies to Incirlik AB that were all quickly resolved. Presently,
    we do not expect the Turkish political situation will play a persistent
    role with regards to Allied access at Incirlik AB. For the purposes of
    flexibility, we have assessed alternative basing options, not only for
    Incirlik AB but throughout the EUCOM AOR. While EUCOM is prepared to
    shift our assets from Incirlik if required, we are working closely with
    Turkish military and political leadership to ensure a long, continued
    basing and access relationship with our Turkish Ally. Access challenges
    are not limited to Turkey, and we have been required to work through
    freedom of movement and access issues with forward based troops in many
    of our Allies throughout the years.

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