## CONTENTS

**STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornberry, Hon. William M. “Mac,” a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WITNESSES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., Former Secretary of State</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadley, Stephen J., Former National Security Advisor</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX**

**PREPARED STATEMENTS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prepared Statements</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., joint with Stephen J. Hadley</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Hon. Adam</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornberry, Hon. William M. “Mac”</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:**

[There were no Documents submitted.]

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:**

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Bordallo</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Franks</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Langevin</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. “Mac” Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. “MAC” THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

So far this year, the committee has examined the state of the strategic environment in the world around us as well as the state of the U.S. military. We have examined specific security challenges such as cyber and nuclear deterrence. We have, of course, a lot more work to do before we mark up this year’s defense authorization bill.

But today we step back and consider the bigger picture. The size and characteristics of the United States military should be related to the role we expect the United States to play in the world, which is the topic of today’s hearing.

Let me read the opening words of the 2014 National Defense Panel report, and for members who were not here at the time, I might mention that the National Defense Panel was led by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and retired General John Abizaid and consisted of a bipartisan group of eight proven national security leaders.

They started their report with the following: “In the first half of the 20th century alone, the world experienced two devastating world wars, the rise of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian menace, and the advent of the nuclear age. This grim history and the threats to America and our interests following World War II prompted America’s leaders to employ our extraordinary economic, diplomatic, and military power to establish and support the current rules-based international order that has greatly furthered global peace and prosperity and ushered in an era of post-war affluence for the American people.”

National Defense Panel goes on: “Since World War II, no matter which party has control of the White House or Congress, America’s global military capability and commitment has been the strategic foundation undergirding our global leadership,” end quote.

There have been debates in both parties questioning whether the role America has played over the last 70 years should be reduced or otherwise changed. Few witnesses have thought more about
these issues or could provide more thoughtful insights than those
we are privileged to welcome today. Before turning to them, let me
yield to the ranking member for any comments he would like to
make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you hav-
ing this hearing and having two such distinguished witnesses to
testify and help us develop an understanding of our national secu-
rit y strategy and of where we are going in the world. I think it is,
you know, without question true at this point that the world order
that existed for, you know, a long time post World War II is
stressed and requires some changes.

We need to figure out what role we are going to play in that, how
we are going to work together with allies, and also, frankly, a lot
has changed since World War II ended. You have had the rise of
a great many powers. How does that change how we use the inter-
national organizations that have served us so well, how we con-
tinue to build partnerships that will help us meet national security.
There is a lot that can be said about this, but the big thing is we
need changes, we need a new strategy, we need a new idea of how
to approach this.

The only thing that I will say before yielding back is that I think
this needs to be a comprehensive and not just military strategy.
Foreign aid, development, these matter in terms of building the
types of relationships that we are going to need to build in order
to protect ourselves and our interests and the rest of the world, and
hopefully work towards a more stable and peaceful globe, and that
is in our best interest.

But you know, one thing is clear. There is a lot of powers out
there, China, Russia, India, Brazil, that have risen up and are
going to play a greater role in the world than they did from much
of that post-World War II era. How do we work into that greater
role that they are going to play? What relationships do we set up
to accommodate it?

It is a complex and difficult question and one I hope we will
make some progress on answering today. I look forward to the tes-
timony and to the questions.

I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 50.]

The CHAIRMAN. We are very pleased and grateful that each of
our witnesses have joined us today. Of course, former Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright, former National Security Advisor Ste-
phen Hadley, there is much more to their résumés before and since
those jobs and currently, but members have that fully in front of
them.

I understand you-all have a joint written statement, and without
objection, that will be made part of the record, and we would be
pleased to hear any oral comments you-all would like to make.
Madam Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, and Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before you this morning.

And I am very honored to appear alongside my good friend Stephen Hadley, who is one of the most brilliant and principled people that I know.

We have worked together on a number of foreign policy initiatives in the years since we left office and most recently co-chairing the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Strategy Task Force. We have done this not only because we happen to like each other but also because we both believe fervently in the importance of a bipartisan foreign policy.

We know this committee has always been bipartisan in its approach, and you have had your share of vigorous debates, but you have been able to come together, compromise, and do what is right for our country and our men and women in uniform. Steve and I have also had our share of debates, and it is no secret that I was critical of some decisions made by the Bush administration. I suspect he had some disagreements with the Clinton administration, which is fine because everybody knows we were perfect.

But whatever arguments we have had in the past, we are in vigorous agreement on the defining question before us today, the question of America’s role in the world. We both believe it is profoundly in America’s greatest interest to be engaged globally because our security and prosperity at home are linked to economic and political health abroad. This mindset is what led our country to construct a system of international institutions and security alliances after World War II, as both the chairman and the ranking member said. It is why Presidents of both parties have worked to promote peace, democracy, and economic opportunity around the world.

The system America built has not been perfect, but it has coincided with a period of security and prosperity unmatched in human history. And while many nations have benefitted from the investments America has made in global security and prosperity, none have benefitted more than the United States.

We recognize that today this system is under stress in different ways from China, Iran, North Korea, and a resurgent Russia. Meanwhile, the value of our global engagement is under question at home. Many Americans feel that their lives have been threatened rather than enhanced by it. This popular dissatisfaction with international trade, technological change, and the facelessness of globalization, needs to be understood and acknowledged, but so do the consequences of disengagement.

For while it is comforting to believe that we can wall ourselves off from the ailments of the world, history teaches us that whenever problems abroad are allowed to fester and grow, sooner or later they come home to America. Isolationism and retreat do not work. We know because we have tried them before.
I am sure this will come as a surprise, but I am slightly older than most of you, and also, I was not born in the United States. Instead, I entered the world in Czechoslovakia only a year before the Munich Agreement sacrificed my country’s sovereignty in order to appease Hitler.

In my early years, I saw what happened when America was absent as it was at Munich and what happened when America was present as it was during World War II when I lived in London during the Blitz. The lesson I drew is that terrible things happen when America is not engaged. We are not an ordinary country that can just put our narrow interests first and forget about the rest of the world. We are the indispensable nation, and it would be terrible to pretend otherwise.

But we should also remember that there is nothing in the word “indispensable” that means alone. We want and need other countries to have the desire and the capacity to work alongside us in tackling global challenges.

The testimony that Steve and I have submitted for the record makes a bipartisan case for continuing America’s global leadership in partnership with our allies while acknowledging that the international order needs refurbishment as do most humans and institutions after 70 years of age.

Drawing on the task force’s work, we also outline a new approach for dealing with the chaos and disorder of the region. In a moment, Steve will provide a brief overview of the strategy we propose, but since we are very much looking forward to your questions, I would just make a few points before turning to him.

First, decades of experience have taught us that in order for America to engage effectively in the world, we need to be able to use every tool in the national security toolbox. This includes diplomatic pressure, economic leverage, technical assistance, and the threat of the use of force. Any one of these tools is ineffective on its own, which is why Steve and I are opposed to the steep and arbitrary cuts to the State Department and international affairs budget which were proposed last week.

Our diplomats work every day at considerable sacrifice to ensure that the United States has the superb representation that our interests demand and the civilian capabilities our military needs in order to achieve its mission. We cannot have that on the cheap.

We must invest the resources necessary to make sure that our diplomats succeed, and this is especially true today when our personnel are often in danger in conflict areas, when our diplomats face criticism from would-be autocrats who do not like their advocacy for democracy, American values, and American nongovernmental organizations. It is your responsibility as Members of Congress to ensure that all of our instruments of national power are properly funded, and so I hope that you will join us in rejecting these unwise cuts. And I would like to thank the chairman and the ranking member and the members of this committee who have already spoken out about this.

As we consider America’s role, another point worth emphasizing is that we need to be clear, not only about what our Nation is against in the world, but also of what we are for. We cannot and will not give in to those who threaten us or who conspire to kill
our citizens but neither can we allow any enemy to cause us to abandon the ideals that made America a symbol of liberty and justice.

For more than 200 years, our country’s strength has come from its inclusiveness. You cannot tell an American by his or her last name. You all know me as Madeleine Albright, but in fact my name is Marie Jana Korbelova. America has always been able to lead the world because we spoke and listened to people from vastly different cultures. In today’s era of interdependence, these are traits that we must retain, and this hearing comes at a time of deep political division at home and heightened instability abroad.

In this pivotal moment, there must be a national debate about how and why America engages in the world. Congress has a vital role to play in convening that debate, given your representative nature and the responsibilities given to you by Article I of the Constitution, which I read to my students yesterday at Georgetown and was delighted to see Article I section 8 embodied in a tablet in your room. This is the time for Article I.

So let me close by thanking this committee for convening this hearing and by urging you and your colleagues to continue working together in a bipartisan way to explore these issues.

Thank you so very much for your attention.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Albright and Mr. Hadley can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, ma’am. Mr. Hadley.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN HADLEY, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

Mr. HADLEY. Good morning.

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, other distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to be with you this morning.

One of the great privileges I have enjoyed since leaving the Bush administration has been the opportunity to work with Madeleine Albright on bipartisan solutions to today’s foreign policy problems, and I am honored to have the chance to appear with her again here today.

Madeleine has well summarized our views as set out in our more detailed written testimony. Let me just elaborate on three points, if I might.

First, the state of the U.S.-led rules-based international order. As Madeleine so eloquently pointed out, for 70 years since the end of World War II, the centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy has been to build and lead an international order composed of security alliances, international institutions, and economic openness to advance the causes of freedom, prosperity, and peace.

But this international order is under enormous strain because of the return of great power rivalry with Russia challenging the international order in Europe, and China challenging it in Asia, chaos in the Middle East spreading disorder throughout the region and beyond, increasingly disruptive and accelerating technological change, popular dissatisfaction in the West with globalization and the economic and political status quo, and disillusionment in the United States with American global leadership.
Madeleine and I would argue that the reason for the current chaos, conflict, and disorder in the world today is precisely the breakdown of the U.S.-led international order in the face of these challenges. We believe a U.S.-led global order is necessary to provide a framework for effectively dealing with these threats and to advance the peace and prosperity of the United States as well as our friends and allies around the world. But at the same time, the order needs to adapt to changes in the international environment and to take account of the real grievances and concerns expressed by American voters in the last Presidential election.

It is in the interest of the United States to lead this effort, which presents a real opportunity for the Congress to work with the Trump administration and for Republicans and Democrats to come together on this common project. Congress can begin the process by conducting a national debate on what such an international order would look like through a series of structured hearings. These need to be held not just in Washington but throughout the country to ensure that congressional deliberations reflect the views of all Americans.

A good place to start the debate would be a recently issued Brookings Institution report written by a bipartisan group of foreign policy experts, including myself, entitled, “Building Situations of Strength.”

Second, let me say a word about the Middle East, if I might. This new international order and American leadership will be sorely tested in the Middle East. As described in our Atlantic Council Middle East Strategy Task Force report, the goal of U.S. strategy in the region should be to help change the trajectory of events there toward a Middle East that no longer spawns terrorism and refugees, is not a drain on international resources, and does not, through instability and political vacuums, aggravate great power and regional competition. To achieve this goal, the U.S. approach to the Middle East should be informed by a set of guiding principles that reflect the new reality of the region since 2011.

First, the old order is gone and it is not coming back. The region itself should assume the principal responsibility for defining a new order that will offer the people of the region the prospect of a stable and prosperous future, free from both terrorist violence and governmental oppression.

Second, disengagement is not a practical solution for the United States or the West. Disengagement will only allow the region’s problems to spread and deepen unchecked, creating further threats. But the role of the West must be different from what it has been in the past. Rather than trying to impose its will or dictate how countries in the region should behave, outsiders should support and facilitate the positive efforts of people and governments in the region.

Our report outlines a two-pronged strategy. The first prong involves outside actors helping partner countries in the region to wind down the violence, starting with the civil wars. This means containing the spread of the current conflicts and accelerating diplomatic efforts to resolve them while addressing the staggering humanitarian crisis they have generated, but it will also require increased diplomatic and military engagement from the United
States and its friends and allies, something that we are already begin-
ing to see from the Trump administration.

The second prong, which must be pursued simultaneously and in
parallel with the first, seeks to support now those efforts in the re-
gion that will create the social basis for long-term stability, pros-
perity, and peace. This means supporting the bottom-up citizen-
based entrepreneurial and civic activity that is already occurring
throughout the region. It also means encouraging those regional
governments that are facilitating these efforts by their citizens and
that are investing in the education and empowerment of their peo-
ple, and addressing the societal, economic, and governance issues
that are key to future peace and success.

Finally, let me say a word about the significance of this last
point for the budgetary guidance recently issued by the administra-
tion. Madeleine and I agree that we must continue to upgrade and
enhance our Nation's military capabilities and deterrent power.
There is no debate on that. But to accomplish the second prong of
our Middle East strategy requires the nonmilitary civilian instru-
ments of our national security toolkit: diplomacy, trade and invest-
ment, development assistance, reconciliation and peace-building
skills, and sound political advice. These are precisely what have
been targeted in the administration’s recent budget guidance.

The administration has made destroying ISIS [Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria] a top priority. Military forces can push ISIS out of
Iraq and Syria and other territory it controls, but ISIS will return
in an even more vicious and virulent form if those liberated lands
do not enjoy some measure of political stability, societal reconcili-
ation, and economic progress. And such progress requires the very
nonmilitary elements of national power targeted by the recent
budget guidance.

Gutting these institutions will make America less safe, under-
mine the success of our military, and open the door to terrorists.
And if you don’t believe us, then ask the military men and women
who have served in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones.
They will tell you that they cannot succeed in the military mission
without these civilian capabilities. Failing to win the peace, after
so many have fought so bravely, would be an insult to the memory
of those who laid down their lives in service to our Nation.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify before you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both for being here.

And Madam Secretary, I appreciate your reflections on your per-
sonal experience and how they relate to this topic. They not only
are a credit to you but a credit to the country if you think about
the journey you have taken.

Madam Secretary, a couple of years ago you testified on the other
side of the Capitol and said: The greatest danger is becoming so in-
tent on enjoying our freedom that we neglect the responsibility to
defend it.

And I would want to invite each of you to reflect a little more
on the role, the size, the shape of the United States military, what
it should be in order to defend our freedom, in order to play its ap-
propriate role in the sort of world that you all have outlined.

And I appreciate your point about the proposed cuts in other
agencies of government, which as you know I share; but as we
think about the size, characteristics of the United States military in this rapidly changing world, how should we think about that? What are the things that we ought to look for and try to help shape?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me just take a crack at it.

Thank you very much. And I do think that we have to recognize the fact that the role of the military has adjusted over the last 70 years. What I have found very interesting is that we have moved away from the concept of two-and-a-half wars in terms of that there are a variety of different kinds of conflicts out there. Often that it is hard to identify the enemy, that they are many—a variety of conflicts that erupted after the end of the Cold War, and that they really are different, and that we have to adjust our military to deal with that.

I do think we also have to pay attention to the third offset to kind of look at how we look at new technology, how we deal with the cyber aspect, and just basically to understand the modernization of it.

I have had the privilege of serving on the Defense Policy Board, and have spent quite a lot of time over at the Pentagon, and I have the greatest admiration for our military and the civilians that are a part of it.

But I do think that your job here is really one that is so crucial in terms of analyzing what the force needs to look like, the adaptability of it, what the weapons systems are that need to be there, and then how in fact we deal with the asymmetrical threats that are out there. And those are evident whether one looks at what is happening in the Middle East or what we are about to see in Asia, and then the asymmetrical aspects of what the Russians are doing vis-a-vis Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics and what they have done in Ukraine.

So I think it is a period where there needs to be a lot of exploration and openness in terms of living in a different era with different kinds of conflicts that require a different force, and I very much liked reading General—Secretary Mattis’ memo that came with the skinny budget that explained that readiness was one of the very important parts, and strategy was important.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hadley, and just to further that for a second, we have had testimony that half the planes in the Navy can’t fly; Army readiness is not where it should; Air Force, smallest, oldest it has ever been. Do we have the sort of credibility our military needs in that sort of world?

Mr. HADLEY. I think we clearly don’t. We have got to fix that readiness problem, but I think we also, as this committee well understands, the challenge our military face is sort of like no challenge that any other military in the world faces. I always am amused where people say: Well, we spend more on defense than the next 7, 9, 11, whatever the countries combined. Well, that is because we have a national security challenge like no other nation in the world.

If you think about it, we have to simultaneously modernize and maintain our nuclear infrastructure and weaponry, which is in some sense of decline. We have got to deal with the military innovations and improvements that China and Russia have been pur-
suing for the last decade or two while we have been focused heavily on the Middle East. We have to make sure we don't lose those capabilities we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere. We need to find how to aid and support other countries so that they can take more responsibility for their own defense and we can do less. That is itself an art. And we have got to deal with the burgeoning personnel costs of our military while still keeping faith with our men and women in uniform.

That is a lot of stuff to do, and I think one of the things, Mr. Chairman, we talked about before the hearing was there is an issue of risk management and prioritization that is required and it has really got to start with some sense of national strategy. What is the national strategy of this administration, how does that translate into a defense strategy, and then what does it mean for where we are going to put our resources? That is where it has to start.

And I would hope, as we talked about, one of the things this committee could do would be start a structured set of hearings on what is the national security strategy, have administration officials come forward and testify before you in public session and private session. I think it will stimulate exactly the kind of thinking we need to have within the administration to get that national security strategy right and in order to give the committee a framework as you look at what to do with the resource and budgetary aspects.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith.

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following up a little bit on the budget thing. The thing that worries me about it is, you know, everyone makes a very passionate argument for all the areas that need more money, you know, but at the same time we have a $20 trillion debt, and forgive me, I forget what the deficit of that is these days, I think it is in the $650 billion range and projected to go up, and you know, when you are dealing with the discretionary budget, it is a trillion dollars, you know, very small portion of the overall, like maybe 25 percent, 30 percent of the overall budget.

So you know, if we talk about, well, gosh, our military has all these needs, and we hear about it in this committee all the time, some of it the chairman alluded to, more I am sure will be said later, you know, really even the $603 billion that the President proposed or the $640 billion that I gather the chairman and Senator McCain are going to propose, I mean, that doesn't get us to where President Trump said he wants to be. And if you are doing a dollar-for-dollar thing, my goodness, we may as well just get rid of the discretionary budget at that point.

And as we have heard, forget about the domestic needs for the moment, there are national security implications in the nondefense discretionary budget, that is the State Department, Homeland Security, foreign aid, development assistance, which is all part of our plan.

So I guess I don't see any way to square this circle, you know, except to say, look, we have got to spend less money and therefore we have to adjust our strategy. Am I wrong about that, or can we keep on fantasizing that we are going to have more money than we actually are and develop a strategy that, frankly, leads us to the place that we are at, which is if you have the strategy that has all
these grandiose ambitions, then you get to the reality of you can’t spend the money for it, so half your airplanes don’t fly, so your readiness is down, you know, all of these things happen when we give our military a larger mission than they can accomplish. Is there a way to shrink that mission, in your viewpoint?

Because if you look at the Defense Department guidance, if you at their projections for what it is our military is supposed to be able to do, you know, I am just pulling this number off the top of my head, but you are looking at a budget of 7-, 8-, 900 billion, you know, not 603 or even 640.

So is there another way to look at this and say, you know, we can adjust our national security strategy where the Defense Department is concerned and spend less money? Is there any area in there where you could see for that to happen?

Mr. Hadley. I think you are right. It has to start with strategy, and one of the problems about strategy is everybody says: Well, you know, say what are our priorities, and then in the administrations, you always come up with priorities, you know, one through eight, and you think, well, seven and eight don’t really matter until something happens in strategy seven and eight and—on issues seven and eight. They are on the front page of all the papers and in the social media and everybody asks: What are you doing about it?

Mr. Smith. I think the number is actually higher than eight, and that is part of the problem.

Mr. Hadley. Right, right.

Mr. Smith. In security we seem to have like 25 top priorities.

Mr. Hadley. So I think the only way to do it is, one, a sense of strategy, which leads to prioritization, and secondly, you know, we always start with the threat assessment, but you don’t have to meet every threat. What you need to do is a risk management. Some threats, you are going to focus on; some threats, you are going to say that the risk of their happening is acceptable.

These are very difficult decisions because once they happen and the threats present, everybody is sort of asking what are you doing about it and why was it number 7 or 8, or 19 and 20, when it should have been 1 or 2? So it is not an easy problem, but I think it has to begin with a sense of strategy and sense of priority.

You have to fix the readiness. There is no point in having the forces if they are not ready to deploy, and that is—and you know, paper tigers are not good for deterrence and they are not good for military operations, so you have to fix that.

I think President Trump is right, allies need to do more, and we need to be developing the capabilities of our high-end allies and those allies that are more dealing with the problems of terrorism so they can take more responsibility for itself.

The model of what we are doing in Iraq and Syria is basically, I think, the right model, and that is what we have to pursue and that is what we have to get good at. I think also we need to have a different view about innovation. Innovation has been used really to increase performance. I think we have got to find a way to use innovation to cut costs. Innovation not just in technology but how we operate the force that has an eye towards reducing cost and making it more effective.
But I don’t—you know, and I am not a budget guy and I am not an economist. I just don’t see how you square the circle for what we need to do with defense to not gut the nonmilitary elements of the national security toolkit, to still pursue these nonmilitary discretionary items and meet our budget requirements without doing something about entitlements. That is where the money is.

And I just think it is difficult, it is politically difficult, politically difficult for the administration given what they campaigned on; but I don’t see any way around it without getting some of the money out of the entitlements while still keeping faith with Americans and particularly those Americans that are most dependent on those programs.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Madam Secretary, did you want to comment.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me say I worked for Ed Muskie as his chief legislative assistant when the budget process came into place. It was the first time that the Budget Committee got together and how it worked, and I think that the very important part is to remember how many functions there are in the budget and the fact that there are ways to also create revenue. I do think that that is something that needs to be looked at.

It is a privilege to live in this country, and paying taxes is one of them, and I do think that that has to be looked at. And I do think that personally I wouldn’t change our mission. As I said earlier, the United States is the indispensable nation but not alone, and obviously I agree with Steve in terms of the way that we have to get our allies to help us. It is a total thing, I think, in terms of whether we threaten them and kind of act as if they owe it to us. We owe it to each other; but that is a point that has to be made.

I, as part of my discussion really, I don’t want to see the U.S. withdraw, and we do need to be ready, and so it is a question of balancing that but also looking at what the revenue stream can be. And I think part of the problem that we are seeing is that all of this is taking a long time, that the idea of what is happening in terms of tax reform along with the health packages and all that is going to take some time, and in the meanwhile, you all have to begin to look at what the defense budget looks like.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. A couple of observations, and then I will yield back the time.

First of all, yes, I mean, more revenue is certainly an option, and I understand campaign promises, but all of the campaign promises that the administration made, they don’t add up, so something has got to give, and that will be one suggestion.

And also, partnerships are so important to what we do. You know, when you look at what we are doing in Southeast Asia, a lot of people aren’t aware of how much Japan and South Korea contribute to our presence there. You know, in dealing with Somalia, we have had great allies in Ethiopia, and Kenya, and Rwanda, Uganda. We built those partnerships so that we don’t have to spend as much.

And the last thing I will say, yeah, it is perfectly okay to push our allies that they need to contribute more, but if you are pushing them in a way that sort of implies that they are not even allies
anymore, you know, then they are not going to contribute more and they are going to go their own way. So we have to maintain those relationships even as we try to get more out of them.

With that, I will yield back.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Jones is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and Mr. Hadley and Madam Secretary, thank you for being here today. Thank you for what you have done for our Nation.

I represent the Third District of North Carolina, the home of Camp Lejeune Marine Base. I have a great relationship with Marines who are active duty as well as Marines who are now retired.

I bring up this issue because every time experts like you, I mean that most sincerely, testify, it is always the bottom line is revenues, whether it be a foreign policy decision or a military decision. What has disappointed me as a Member of Congress for 22 years, and I go back, Mr. Hadley, when Mr. Bush went into Iraq, is the fact that we in Congress never seem to be willing to debate and review a policy.

I am looking at Afghanistan. We have wasted I don't know how many billions of dollars in Afghanistan. I don't know what we have to show for it. Mr. Karzai right now is reaching out to the Russians trying to get the Russians to come back and meet with the Taliban, our enemy. Now we know that the Chinese want to put military troops in Afghanistan.

My concern is that we, in Congress, after 16 years, have never had another debate on the floor of the House. I am not talking about the committees of jurisdiction, which this would be one of them, but the American people who pay the bills, I think we owe them, based on our constitutional responsibility, after 16 years, to review where we are in Afghanistan.

I met with Mr. Royal. I wrote a letter to Ash—excuse me, yes, to Ash Carter, who is now out of office, several months ago when I read an article in the Washington Post that we have been paying 200,000 Afghan soldiers that don't even exist. They called them ghost soldiers. I got a very nice letter back of what they want to do to correct it and met with Mr. Royal.

What I got from my conversation with Mr. Royal—who I have a great respect for, he worked for Jesse Helms—is the fact that if these other countries have a presence in Afghanistan, we need a presence.

I said: Mr. Royal, does that mean if my neighbor next door bought a Cadillac and my wife and I can't afford a Cadillac that I need to buy a Cadillac so I can compete, so I have got the same thing my neighbor has? So where in the world, how would you tell us in Congress, is it right that we should review, after a period of time, because of the financial cost and the cost of limbs and blood? What is your opinion to my rambling?

Mr. Hadley. I would say amen. I think you are right. And one of the things we say and we have it at the conclusion of our written statement is we think the Congress of the United States and the committee needs to get more involved in the front end about this whole issue of America's role in the world.
Do we still support a revised and revitalized international order? What should be our strategy in the Middle East now that we have been at this for, you know, 15 years or so? And we believe very strongly that Congress needs to come forward and lead a national debate on these issues, and we suggest some ways to do it.

So I think you are absolutely right. I would say one word at the beginning. You talk about revenues. The one word we have not talked about here in this issue of the budgetary problem is economic growth. You know, a way to get revenues is not to raise taxes. It is also to get the economy growing and expanding, and that produces revenues. So part of this strategy that we are talking about has got to be to get this economy growing in a more robust rate.

Mr. JONES. Thank you.

Madam Secretary.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I really agree in terms of the fact that there needs to be a national debate, but I also do think that Congress has to step up in some terms, in terms of asking for reviews earlier and being a part of it and not thinking that once the authorization has been given that you just kind of say, okay, and pony up the money. I think there need to be regular reviews of various of our missions in places and to really be a partner.

My whole public life has been involved in terms of executive-legislative relationships. It is the most interesting part of our government, but that does mean that you are—well, you are more than equal partners, and so I think you should be asking for the reviews, not just of that but of our other military commitments.

Mr. JONES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for inviting such distinguished witnesses that we have today.

It is nice to see you again, Madam Secretary Albright and Mr. Hadley.

Your testimony today has been a stark reminder of why American leadership is needed on the international stage. Given the challenges that the world faces, we need strong relationships and a strong military, but a whole-of-government approach in a coherent strategy is essential.

I represent Guam, and in Guam we are acutely aware of the value of international engagement as many of our closest neighbors are foreign nations. Some are friendly and some are not so friendly.

Our strategic objectives will only be achieved in the Pacific through inclusive engagement that reflects our values and is consistent and clear to our allies and adversaries. Pivoting inward is not an option. I also appreciated how you noted that we must encourage other world leaders to join us to address the challenges before us today.

It is only through strong partnerships, international rule of law, and strength that we can deter aggressive and autocratic behavior that threatens our homeland and many citizens of the world.

Now we are starting to see that the administration is looking to pursue a national policy that withdraws the U.S. from a leadership role, and as you said, wall ourselves off from the world, a quote. This in conjunction with the recent statement by a senior diplomat-
ic official that the pivot to the Pacific is over, though what that means remains to be seen, is particularly concerning.

So Secretary Albright, how would you demonstrate the value of investing in diplomacy to the American taxpayer? Everyone can see a new fighter or a carrier and understand where their tax dollars have gone, but how do you articulate that an investment in capacity building has paid off, and why is it not enough to have just a strong military?

Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. And let me just say, Americans don’t like the word multilateralism. It has too many syllables and it ends in an ism. Mostly we have to talk about partnerships and burden sharing and trying to explain that we are in this together.

I do think that it is important to point out to people that, in many ways, the State Department budget and our diplomats are the front line, that they are there in terms of trying to help us work through problems before in fact a military involvement is necessary.

But I have always believed in a very close relationship between the military and the civilians, that we do this together, and I think that what I have heard that I find so interesting, it is the military that believes that we should have a strong diplomatic arm and that force and diplomacy go together.

And I do think that we have to show—I mean, it is a little hard because sometimes it is the dog that didn’t bark, you know, things that diplomats have been able to do that don’t show up. What does happen, though, is if we are going to—and I believe we need to strengthen our security relationships in the Pacific.

By the way, I have always said the U.S. is not monogamous, we are both an Atlantic and a Pacific power, and we have to remember that, and that this is not just a pivot to Asia, that is where we belong. And I think that what is very important is to be able to show that we have common interest with our Asian allies and friends and that part of it is the diplomatic, the economic of ties that then underpin what the military is doing.

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.

Mr. Hadley, do you have any views on this?

Mr. Hadley. You know, one of the things I think we have to recognize is that this international order that the United States helped build and maintain for 70 years after World War II was really an almost an unprecedented experiment for a major global power. Most major global powers historically have maximized their own value, used their position to maximize their own value at the expense of others.

We had a different concept. We constructed an international order that benefitted the prosperity and security of the United States but also advanced prosperity, security, and peace globally.

Very unusual in history, but it requires America to continue to participate in that because we have that vision. Where we don’t participate, where vacuums emerge, other people come in with different agendas, and you have seen that in Syria with the Russians and the like.

People forget that that international order was created as much by American diplomacy as by our military. Crafting those set of in-
stitutions that were developed after the end of World War II, those set of alliances, which have underpinned our security and prosperity for the last 70 years, that was the work of our military certainly, but it was also a work of very skillful American diplomacy, and we are going to need that diplomacy going forward if we are going to adapt and revitalize that international order.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Thank you very much, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hadley, Secretary Albright, thank you so much for joining us today and thanks for your leadership.

Mr. Hadley, I want to begin with you. In reading through your joint testimony with Secretary Albright, you mention three immediate priorities. First, mitigating human suffering in Syria, then recapturing ISIS-held territory, and then containing Iran’s aggressive foreign policy behavior in the region, all important elements.

You also said there needs to be a greater degree of engagement of American and allied interests in the region, both diplomatically and militarily. We see today our special operations forces working alongside Iraqi Security Forces achieving success in Mosul. Eventually they will, I think, recapture Mosul from ISIS.

Two questions. What comes next for the U.S. military after Mosul is recaptured? And then what is America’s military engagement in a post-ISIS Iraq?

Mr. HADLEY. I think the model that you just described is the right one, and I think that model probably continues after ISIS has been pushed out of Iraq, and that is very much what Prime Minister Abadi was talking to President Trump about, some residual U.S. presence that can continue to train and stiffen the Iraqi forces so that they can maintain this security and control over the country that we will help them regain. We don’t want to leave as we did in 2011. That was not a good experience for us, but it has got to be done in a supportive role for the Iraqis.

The real challenge, I think, is going to be whether we will then work with the Iraqis as again Prime Minister Abadi said yesterday very clearly, we need to follow up pushing ISIS out of Iraq with good governance that isn’t corrupt, that gets economic activity going, that deals with the social needs of the people. The question is whether we will, in a supporting role with other friends and allies, help the Iraqis take on that most difficult piece. If we don’t, I think our military operation will be in vain because I think the country will fall back into sectarian violence and being—opening the door for the terrorists. That is, I think, the real challenge, and that is going to be as hard, if not harder than the military issue.

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. Hadley, I agree. I appreciate that perspective.

Secretary Albright, I wanted to ask you in a little bit different perspective, and I know in the joint statement, article that you and Mr. Hadley put out, you said that a bipartisan approach in the Middle East would begin by insisting that the bulk of the vision, effort, and resources come from the country themselves, from the people within the country.

As we look at Syria and we look past where some sort of security can be gained in Syria, the question then becomes governance.
Where does that go? What do we see in that region where we see a tremendous amount of effort by Iran to influence Syria? And when you have that, what happens with current leadership? What happens in places like Aleppo and Damascus when we are looking to engage them, when we are looking at a post-ISIS Syria and the role that the U.S. has but there may be affinities towards Iran or other influences in the area, how do we assure governance? How do we assure that that takes place in a proper way? We have seen in the past that those things haven't turned out necessarily well in the aftermath of the U.S. gaining security. Give me your perspective on how you see that shaping up.

Secretary Albright. Well, there clearly has to be a political settlement. The military has created an environment that makes it possible to think about moving out the bad guys, but we really do need to figure out a political settlement, which requires the parties that have been involved to be a part of it.

I have now been in a lot of different meetings where people talk about the possibility of having Syria kind of divided into a number of zones that would reflect who is in them at the time. I personally think that Assad has lost any legitimacy to run the government in any shape or form because he kills his own people, but I do think that there are probably some people around him that can be part of a transition government.

I do think that part of what has to happen is to engage those countries that have been involved and explain or work with them and put pressure on them diplomatically in order to come along with a political settlement, but this is unbelievably hard. And I think what is interesting is to put yours and Congressman Jones' ideas together in terms we have been in Afghanistan too long. Steve just said we left Iraq too soon. And so we can't not pay attention, but I do think that the reconstruction efforts are important in Syria as well as in Iraq, but there has to be a political settlement, which is where the diplomats really come in. But the level of difficulty is as high as anything that I have ever seen.

Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The Chairman. Ms. Speier.

Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Albright and Mr. Hadley. It is truly refreshing to hear you both speak.

Secretary Mattis, when he met with us, made it very clear that he thought that the Secretary of State and foreign aid was critical to our national security. So he gets it. But the OMB [Office of Management and Budget] director said, when the budget was issued, that the budget seeks to reduce or end direct funding for international organizations whose missions do not substantially advance U.S. foreign policy interests, are duplicative, or are not well managed. Funding for the United Nations and affiliated agencies, including peacekeeping organizations, foreign military assistance programs, support for multilateral development banks such as the World Bank, economic and development assistance, and international, educational, and cultural exchange programs would be specifically affected.

Can I have your thoughts on those cuts and what damage, if any, they will do?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think they are so stunningly damaging to America's position that I find it hard to believe that somebody that is in the U.S. Government could even suggest them, if I could put it bluntly. And let me say that I do think that the role that international organizations have played generally in the wellbeing of this system that has been set up have to be recognized.

But let me just say I was Ambassador of the United Nations [U.N.]. I do know that it needs some reforms. It is very hard for us to have influence in reforming if we are the ones that are creating a financial crisis there and you lose your influence. If you go off the Human Rights Council, you lose your influence in terms of being able to explain who needs to be doing what in terms of projecting our values.

So the bottom line is we are cutting off our nose to spite our face if we decide that we are not going to be involved in any of these aspects, and they also play to what Steve and I have been talking about in this report, is I never—soft power, nobody likes that term anymore, but in terms of other issues that help to create an environment where terrorists don't prosper.

And so we are—they are not—I teach a course on the national security toolbox. There are not a lot of tools in it, and if we decide that we are not going to fund half of them, then we have lowered the possibilities of the United States, our national interests being met in these countries or in these organizations. We need to have an influence there, and we need to be able to work.

I know when during the Clinton administration, when we were behind in our bills and I was trying to get reform at the U.N., our best friends, the British, delivered a line they had waited more than 200 years to deliver: representation without taxation. And so if we are going to play a role there, we have to be players there, and we have to use our influence in them by being members of it.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you.

Mr. HADLEY. I think this distinction between soft power and hard power is not a good one because a lot of our soft power converts into real hard power. I will give you an example. I chair the board of the U.S. Institute of Peace [USIP], one of 19 organizations that were destined to be disestablished in this budgetary framework. The U.S.—just as an example, USIP has been in Iraq since 2003. We never left in all the hard times Iraq went through. Training local people who could negotiate peace among the tribes and bring violence down.

So for example, in 2007, USIP in Mahmudiya Province, the triangle of death, negotiated an arrangement among the tribes to accept the U.S. military presence there. Violence went down dramatically. The U.S. military presence was able to reduce by 80 percent. It saved a lot of lives, it saved a lot of dollars, and that basic peace agreement among the tribes has held up for 10 years. Now that is how soft power can contribute to higher powered tasks in a way that saves lives and saves money.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you.

Mr. HADLEY. It is crazy how——

Ms. SPEIER. I want to try and get one more question in.
Mr. Tillerson, our Secretary of State, just announced that he is not going to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. He is instead going to meet with the President of China and then move to Russia and meet with Vladimir Putin. What does that—what kind of signal is that saying to our NATO friends?

Secretary Albright. I think it is a most unfortunate signal. I would blame it on schedulers, and I do think that that is part of the problem. He will have met with a lot of the ministers in other venues, but given the discussion that is going on about NATO, I think that it is an unfortunate scheduling problem.

Ms. Speier. Thank you.

The Chairman. The gentlelady’s time is expired.

Mr. Hadley, I will just observe, soft power can also be a lot more effective if it is backed up by military power, so it goes both ways.

Mr. Hadley. No, I think they are complements, and we need to think of them as complements and really integrated complements of each other.

The Chairman. Yeah.

Mr. Hadley. But I agree that diplomacy without a military backup is fantasy.

The Chairman. Yeah.

Mr. Bacon.

Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you both for being here, sir, and your wisdom and experience. I would like to ask you a question on North Korea. It seems to me the policy has not worked in previous administrations, but I think the banking sanctions we had a while back were effective.

What would you recommend for the current President on our way ahead, because we have a very unstable country and unstable leader. He has killed two generals that I know of with cannons, killed his half brother, we think he has 10 nuclear weapons, and it is obviously very worrisome to many of us, so thank you.

Secretary Albright. Well, I believe that we need to really look in that toolbox and that there are a lot of different kinds of sanctions that can be put on that in fact really make sure that they aren’t shipping their material out, that they can’t get things in. I think the banking sanctions were very important and that we have learned a lot about how sanctions can be kind of parsed in a way that they affect, even the smart sanctions, the targeted sanctions that really have to be looked at.

We also do have to get the Chinese to be more helpful on it, and I think that Secretary Tillerson was really working that issue as best he could, and it has a lot to do with the kind of strength that we maintain in the region.

And so I think it has to be a full court press that as Secretary Tillerson said there is no option off the table. But I do think that the sanctions regimes are the ones that need to be really looked at very carefully and be very tight.

Mr. Hadley. I agree with that.

I think, look, two administrations, the Clinton administration and then the Bush administration, tried and reached agreements with North Korea to give up their nuclear weapons, and neither administration was able to keep North Korea in either of those agree-
ments. So negotiations beginning where we are now don’t look particularly attractive.

I think, as Madeleine says, we have now more sophisticated ways to put financial pressure on North Korea; we ought to be doing those. I think we also use—need to build up a little bit of our hard power, if you were, not the offensive hard power, but I think we need to enhance deterrents and capabilities to deal with a ballistic missile threat from North Korea to us, to our friends and our allies. I also think we need to do things to reduce the threat North Korea can pose to Seoul through its rocket attacks and the like.

If we do these things, I think it both will increase pressure on North Korea in the event it is possible to reach a negotiated solution, but if it is not, it will put us in a position to be able to deter and defend against North Korean capacities as they mature.

Mr. BACON. Thank you.

One more question on NATO. I was stationed at Ramstein for 3 years, part of the NATO team. But we saw the combat parts of the Army withdrawn, and now they have a rotating unit. And we see very little—just a little bit of Navy power there. A lot of our Air Force units have been withdrawn; it is probably about half of what it was.

What do you think the future is there? I think we should be putting more deterrence forces there to make a statement, especially after what we are seeing with Putin. I would love to have your thoughts on that.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I do think that we need to relook. We have been sending some forces and our allies into the Baltics and into Poland and kind of relooking at what has to be done. I think the defense missile activities there are very important.

I also do think—I spent some time at the Munich Security Conference talking to various defense ministers from the Scandinavian countries, and they are very worried about what the Russians are doing in terms of buzzing their ships and kind of looking at what the naval aspect of this is, in addition to what they are doing in following airplanes around.

So I think it has become an all-force kind of activity and that we need to work with our NATO allies on the military part of this.

Mr. HADLEY. I agree.

Mr. BACON. Well, thank you for your feedback.

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Veasey.

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to ask you specifically about governance. One of the things that we talk a lot about on this committee is ungoverned spaces and how that can be breeding grounds for radicalism around the world.

Do you think that within the State Department we need an agency whose mission is first and foremost nation-building? And I know that USAID [United States Agency for International Development] does some of that, but if you look at USAID and everything that they do, nation-building and governance, you know, is kind of far down on their list.

And what I mean specifically by this is that you hire people who have a specialty and a background in governance, so we can get
some of these places where we see this radicalism forming up and
go in there and start working with them at the very beginning be-
fore it gets out of control and have people that really know how to
do this thing, and then let some of the other things that USAID
is doing, let those things take care of themselves after they under-
stand the basic fundamentals of governance.

And I would love your opinion on that.

Secretary Albright. I do think that governance is absolutely es-

tential. And let me just say, I am chairman of the board of the Na-
tional Democratic Institute that is part of the Endowment for De-

cracy that has been going on now for 35 years. It is in countries
in partnership there with people in order to work on governance
issues at a local level, trying to also strengthen the legislative
branches within, rule of law, a number of different things. Works
often with USAID.

The State Department does have a section that works on democ-

cracy and issues. Nation-building has kind of become a four-letter
word. I do think, however, it is very important to think about what
happens at the local levels so that people—by the way, I actually
believe we are all the same, that we want to be able to make deci-
sions about our own lives, and that people need to have help in the
nuts and bolts of governance, of how they make their points. And
it goes also with economic development, because governance has to
deliver. People want to vote and eat.

And so the bottom line is there has to be some outside organiza-
tions—NDI [National Democratic Institute], USIP Steve has spo-
ken about—that are kind of—help funded by the U.S. Government
and operate with those people that are in both the State Depart-
ment and USAID.

Mr. Hadley. I think you are exactly right. That is the priority.

Our report on the Middle East says basically it is a crisis of govern-
ance and the failure of governance that created disaffected popu-
lations, which were then very susceptible to the siren call of the ex-
tremists.

The problem is helping countries get good governance is hard.
We have been at it a long time in Iraq and Afghanistan with mixed
success. We have to do some lessons learned, figure out what
works, what doesn't work. Corruption is a huge threat in these
places, in these fragile states, in these early democracies. We don't
really have a good formula for going after and rooting out systemic
corruption.

And, finally, you know, not every government is willing to do the
things required to provide good governance to their people, and we
have to triage a little bit and work with those governments that
get it.

It is one of the things we talked about in our report, about more
for more. We ought to be saying, if you are willing to do the right
things for your people, to invest in them, in their education, pro-
vide good governance, we will help you. It will be a good invest-
ment for a future of stability and peace. But if governments are not
willing to do that, we shouldn't throw our money at them. So we
are going to have to be tough-minded on it.

But it is a really tough problem. It needs to be more a priority.
But we don't have—you know, we don't have the silver bullets for
helping to provide, you know, noncorrupt, good governance to these fragile states.

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you.

And one last question. Speaking of ungoverned territories, I would like for you to just briefly characterize what you think America's role should be in helping in places on the continent of Africa. Because I am very worried about just some of the, you know, early stages of radicalism that seem to be there. It is not as bad as it is in the Middle East, but it is certainly a growing threat there. And I wanted to know what you thought about America's role in that continent.

Mr. HADLEY. You know, one of the problems with, as we talked earlier, the budgetary framework is it not only overlooks what some of these agencies can do with our military to bring peace in conflict zones, but it overlooks the role these agencies play in preventive, in taking countries as—and helping countries, as in Africa, which have ethnic divisions, are under enormous pressure economically from climate change and other things, and helping them stabilize their societies and not let conflicts in the society become violent conflicts, with all the consequences for refugees and suffering and the like.

Those preventive tools avoid our need to use the military end strength down the road when a fragile state has become a conflict state. We underinvest in those at our peril.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Can I just have 1 minute on this?

I just was in Germany, and I went to visit the headquarters of AFRICOM [United States Africa Command]. It is a very interesting command because it not only has its military job but it also does a lot of civilian activities with a civilian deputy. And I think it is a very interesting model in terms of how the military and the diplomats can work together.

They are operating in a number of African countries. They have a base in Djibouti, but they also are able to kind of combine—I think it is an interesting model to be looked at for some of the commands.

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Albright, Mr. Hadley, thank you for being here. Thank you for your service to our country.

Secretary Albright, as the father of three daughters, thank you for the example that you provide to young women about how they can impact—substantially have an impact on our world.

And my first question is for you. I appreciate your emphatic opposition to the President's proposed budget cuts to diplomatic programs at large. But can you talk more specifically about the cuts to foreign military financing, what that would do? Maybe give us either anecdotal or real examples of what those cuts would cost, if those budget cuts were enacted.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I have been very troubled by them, actually, because it is a way to have influence over the militaries in a number of different countries in terms of some of the training that we do with them, also the IMET [International Military Education and Training] programs in terms of having a relationship with mili-
taries in other countries, and then having—I think it is useful sometimes to condition the assistance in a way to them for behavioral—I mean, we use tools in order to change the behavior of X of a country. And I do think that the FMS [foreign military sales] programs really do help in that, in terms of the interaction between our military and the militaries in other countries, the training that comes from that, the relationships, also the movement in terms of joint procurement on a number of issues.

So I think cutting those is very dangerous also, because they are—I like talking about the use-of-force tool, and it has a lot of different gradations beyond just the size and character of our military and the number of technology—the equipment that we have. Some of it has a lot to do with the relationships that are established by our military. And that is where the FMS and IMET really come in.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you.

Mr. Hadley, switching gears a little bit, you served for President Bush during the last time that we passed an authorization of military force in 2001 and 2002 against Al Qaeda, the perpetrators of 9/11, and then Iraq in 2002.

Last week, I joined Senator Todd Young, also from Indiana, in calling for a new AUMF [authorization for the use of military force] that would specifically identify ISIS as a target of that resolution. I wonder if you could comment on that.

In heeding your call for Congress to be more active and heed your call of your recommendations in both of your testimonies today, could you comment specifically on whether or not you view there to be a benefit from a new authorization of military force?

Mr. HADLEY. I do. I think it would be a good thing. I think the American people need to know that the Congress of the United States is behind this effort that the administration is trying to mount.

So I think it is important both as a symbol of a national commitment to deal with this problem, but it is also important to rebalance a little bit this relationship between the Congress and the President.

You know, in time of national crisis, power tends to move towards the Presidency, and it is important, once the immediate crisis is over, for that rebalance to be established. That is what we need, I think, to be doing now.

Mr. BANKS. Secretary Albright, do you have any comments on that as well?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I do believe that there needs to be a new AUMF, partially because it is needed but partially also because of the discussion.

I fully agree with Steve. This is an Article I time. And you are the representatives of the people, and it has to be really a discussion so that people understand why—to answer some of the questions about why has Afghanistan taken so long, or general discussion but focused on the AUMF, I think, makes a big difference.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke.

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At the time that we were fighting for and winning this international world order that we have been talking about today, we were also building many of the military installations throughout this country to support that, including many in Texas.

I was just at Dyess Air Force Base this weekend, and they are operating out of airplane hangars for B–1 bombers that were built 70 years ago. And to go inspect one of the B–1 bombers, you actually had to wear a hardhat because there are pieces of rebar that are falling from the ceiling.

You look at Fort Hood, and there are hundreds of millions of dollars in deferred maintenance costs that we haven’t paid for and are just going to become more expensive the longer we defer them. Billions of dollars just in the State of Texas alone.

When you add to that this AUMF authorized in 2001 that has not only been used to fight wars in Afghanistan, where we still are today, but has been used in five other countries as well, including Iraq and Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, the needs that we have, the wars that we are currently fighting, the projected costs to meet the threats that will come, none of that seems sustainable to me. And I think the ranking member used the word “fantasy,” that we are going to be able to pay for and meet all the commitments that we have identified.

And when asked to help us make the tough choices, you have talked about cutting entitlements; we have talked about raising revenues, raising taxes. And I wonder, though, is there not a tougher choice to be made about this world order and whether, 70-plus years in, it is sustainable and should not be rethought.

And when asked to help us make the tough choices, you have talked about cutting entitlements; we have talked about raising revenues, raising taxes. And I wonder, though, is there not a tougher choice to be made about this world order and whether, 70-plus years in, it is sustainable and should not be rethought.

It doesn't mean we stop being an indispensable country, because I agree with the Secretary’s conclusion on that. And it doesn't mean that we have the leading role. But I don't know that this trajectory is sustainable or that we should want to sustain it.

And I join Mr. Banks, Mr. Jones, and others and the two of you who have called for a new AUMF. I think that is part of this. But can you talk about some bigger, tougher international choices that we have to make? Or—and this is a conclusion that a reasonable mind could come to—must we just muddle on along this current path and do the best that we can?

Secretary Albright. Let me say, I do think that we have to look at it from the perspective of what threatens the United States. It is the job of the President to protect our people, our territory, and our way of life. And it is the job of Congress to be a part of that discussion, to fund it, to have discussions about it, and to be a part of the decision of how to protect our people.

I happen to believe that our people are most threatened when there are various disasters happening, whether they are terrorists or whether they are climate change or whether they are people starving or whether they are refugees who are coming and have become a part of a complicated political situation.

So I do think that we have a stake in not just thinking about ourselves, that our security depends on what is happening in other parts of the world.

I think that one of the answers here is to develop the partners, the alliances. And I think the alliance structure is something that has to be made to work, and the others have to pay their fair
share. We also need to think about how to develop those forces in other countries that can help us, whether they are those that work on the governance issues or on various military issues.

We cannot operate in the world alone. And so that is the part that I think we have to work on and decide that we are not safer if we are isolated. An isolationist America is the most dangerous thing for Americans as well as for the world.

Mr. O’ROURKE. Mr. Hadley.

Mr. Hadley. Well, one—I will probably get myself in a little trouble on this one, but one of the things about the infrastructure that you talk about is we have more infrastructure than we need, given the size of our current military. And, you know, the BRAC [base realignment and closure] process, I haven’t followed it as closely as I probably should; it seems to have broken down.

And one of the difficult issues is that Congress is going to have to both hold the administration’s feet to the fire in terms of strategy and prioritization, but Congress is also going to have to make some tough decisions about allowing for this infrastructure to shrink to the size of what we really need given the military we have today.

I think Madeleine would agree, the current conception of the international order is not sustainable. That is why we say it needs to be revised and revitalized. We may have made huge investments in helping Europe, Japan, South Korea emerge to be the healthy, prosperous societies they are. We helped China integrate into the international system. We have seen the growth of India. These countries need to be given a greater role to play in the international system. But that, of course, comes with some responsibilities, and part of that responsibility is not only responsible action and constructive action but also to foot some of the bill.

So I think there has to be a readjustment and a rebalancing, a look at division of labor and division of responsibilities. But if we step out from that process and do not lead it, an international order that will emerge in the traditional way—which is, it will benefit the big powers, like Russia and China, at the expense of the little powers—that is not the international order that we want, it is not the international order that is in our interest, and it is not an international order that will provide enduring peace and security.

Mr. O’ROURKE. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. LoBiondo.

Mr. LoBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, Mr. Hadley, thank you for being here.

I want to turn back to the Middle East for a moment and the situation with Israel and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]. Do you think it is an equal problem with politics and economics or it is one more than another?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think, actually, it has a lot to do with both, and the economics part, I think, primarily on the Palestinian side, in terms of questions as to how they are able to function in a very difficult situation and feed their own people and various aspects to do with that in terms of trying to get more help in terms of them. And I do believe in a two-state solution. And they need
to begin—this is my view—to create some of the institutional structures that would provide for their people.

And, politically, it really is a problem in terms of the various—it is as difficult a political situation as many of us have seen, because the Palestinians do not have any—they are divided among themselves between the Fatah and the Palestinian Authority and Hamas and various problems, and, therefore, it is hard for them to look at it in some way that doesn’t then look threatening to the Israelis.

Mr. LoBiondo. Well, let me just follow up for a minute. I agree with you. But it seems to me, on the economic problem, that a lot of the younger Palestinians that don’t have much hope for the future because they don’t have jobs, it is easy to recruit into some bad behavior; jobs would be something that would be very helpful there, yes?

Secretary Albright. Yes, very much. And let me just say—

Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. So let me—

Secretary Albright. Sorry.

Mr. LoBiondo. Excuse me for interrupting. I don’t want to lose my chain of thought, which I tend to do sometimes.

So how much have the wealthy Arab nations contributed to job creation? Everybody wants to blame Israel for the problem there. Now, maybe I haven’t followed this as closely as I should have, but I am curious, do you know if they have? And if they haven’t, why aren’t they being held accountable? They have money for everything. Why wouldn’t they help out Palestinians in this effort?

Secretary Albright. I have to say I have also been surprised about the lack of effort there. I do think that there is beginning to be more of a sense among some of the Arab nations that they have a greater responsibility. But I do think that is one of the questions, in terms of why they have not done more.

The other part, though, is that we are trying—I am involved in something called the Middle East Investment Initiative that is backed by OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation]. OPIC is another one of the agencies that is about to be cut. So, in terms of trying to figure out how we get economic assistance in there and then use it as a magnet so that the Arabs help more.

Mr. LoBiondo. Yeah. Well, it seems to me that the wealthy Arab nations could in a heartbeat help turn this around.

Mr. Hadley, what are your thoughts on this?

Mr. Hadley. I agree. And it was a source of frustration when I was national security advisor and when Salam Fayyad was Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority. He was trying to build noncorrupt, good-governance institutions in the Palestinian territories. It was a very hopeful thing. And I would go around trying to encourage our Arab friends and allies to support him, and they would dole out money in a teaspoon. And I think it was a huge strategic blunder on their part.

But I think it has to be two things. I think the Palestinians need to get back to building noncorrupt governance, helping build the institutions of a Palestinian state even before they have one. And the more they will do themselves, the more we can press Israel to support it and the Arab states to support it. It needs to be the two.
But I think the Arab states have largely been very shortsighted about this and very stingy.

Mr. LoBiondo. Well, I totally agree. I appreciate your response. And I just that think everyone is very quick to condemn Israel for all the problems with the Palestinians, when there are solutions that could be helpful that the Arab nations are either choosing not to—which makes me wonder a little bit about the whole situation.

But I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.

Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for being here. It is an honor to have you before us. And the example of bipartisanship that you set is one that we would do well to follow.

Recently, Vice Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Selva confirmed that Russia is in direct violation of the INF Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. What should be our response?

Secretary Albright. I happen to believe that we are not using a tool here, in terms of taking an examination of what they have done. We should call them on it, and we have not really been doing that.

And it is clear that it is contributing to additional problems in terms of the deployment, what it does to create a sense of unease in Central and Eastern Europe among the Baltics.

And then the Russians blame us for tit-for-tat, but the bottom line is they haven't—from what I have seen, they have been violating it, especially up in Kaliningrad. And so it is one of the things that we have to—we should call them on it.

Mr. Hadley. I think Putin is a great opportunist. He looks at vacuums and seizes opportunities and then kind of sees what happens. And if he succeeds and if he is not resisted, he then does a little bit more. And if he continues to succeed, is not resisted, he does a little bit more.

So when he—whether it is in terms of agreements, whether it is in terms of destabilizing his neighbors, whether it is in terms of his own force buildup, we need to match him, not just by calling him on it, but also taking concrete steps to counter the benefit that he thinks he achieves by these actions and then some, so that, in fact, he pays a price.

So we have to counter in our diplomacy, we need to call him on it, but I think what we need to look at what we need to do to counter the capability so that it does not—not only does it not produce an advantage for him, but it actually results in the situation being worse. I think that is the only way you are going to deter this kind of behavior.

Ms. Moulton. And do you have any specific suggestions, Mr. Hadley, as to how we can increase the price for Mr. Putin?

Mr. Hadley. Well, one of the things we could do is in terms of missile defense and make it clear that, you know, we are able to counter that cruise missile capability and deploy against it if need be. That is one.

But, again, this is the task I would then give General Mattis. So how do we counter this? Deprive it of military utility and impose a price.
Mr. MOULTON. If your analysis of Mr. Putin is correct, which is consistent with other experts that I have heard on Russia, then, given his interest in interfering in our elections, if we do not have a robust, bipartisan response to that, what would you expect him to do?

Mr. HADLEY. He will do more of it. I mean, this was the testimony that the Congress heard yesterday. And, certainly, we need to figure out what was done and have a political, diplomatic response.

But, you know, the thing that I feel is lost in this debate is the old “fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.” If we do not mobilize to harden our electoral infrastructure to make sure that it is safe and impervious to cyber penetrations, whether by Russia or anybody else, shame on us. We should never be in a position where we have this concern that an outside power could manipulate our electoral process.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you.

Madam Secretary.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that we have to remember that he is a KGB [Committee for State Security] agent and somebody that knows how to use propaganda and knows how to play what I would say is a weak hand in a very strong way. And while it is sad that we have to kind of return to the kind of language that we used during the Cold War, I think we have to be more vigilant.

And we have to build—I happen to agree with what NATO has been doing, in terms of moving forces around and showing our willingness. I obviously agree on the missile defense system. But I also think that we have to understand that he has one goal, which is to disaggregate what is the European Union, that they really do not want that to exist. That cannot be our goal so that we are helping him on that. We have to keep the sanctions on. We have to use every tool that we have and recognize that we have the strength to do something about it.

And I think that it is always hard in diplomacy in terms of finding the areas where you can agree—because there are some areas on the Middle East that we have been doing things together—and then find the areas where we have to push back. And we have not done that enough. And so I think we need to be tough and recognize what has been going on here.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I thank you both for being here. It is very refreshing to hear from you. In a lot of ways, when you sit in front of this committee, you are preaching to the choir on so many issues. And it is, how do we get that sphere of influence to, in particular, other Members of Congress, but the American public as well?

You know, I couldn't agree with you more on so many of the things you have said. It is a perfect time for this conversation, I believe, with a new Congress, a new administration. But we need to really define, I believe, what our strategy is and what our principles are and then work in the right direction. Rather than making a strategy based on a budget, we make a budget based on a strategy.
And I think, as you have heard from a few veterans here today, and we have our conversations, you are spot-on. Military itself is not the answer, and diplomacy is key. Because we would much rather not have to go to war. And once we are in war, as an extension of politics for whatever reason—or, hopefully, it is because our national security is threatened—civil affairs can’t do it all. That is not the long-term answer. So all of these tools—economic, et cetera—we have to continue to use.

As we seek for more funding in the areas that we agree with, that you do need more in State [Department] than is being proposed, in my opinion—how we use it is, of course, part of it as well—I guess the trick is getting other people on board, right? Because people may say, yeah, we want increases, but then they are not necessarily willing to talk about how we need to get increases to those areas.

Mandatory spending 50 years ago was at 34 percent; now it is 68. When I am out talking to people in the public, they think military is in mandatory spending. They have no idea how this works. And we just can’t keep doing this and squeezing, squeezing, squeezing discretionary spending unless we embrace the mandatory spending component. Our debt going on the rise, and it is just money going out the door.

I think, you know, you touched on some things. Economic growth is important. But we’ve got to address all of these, and we’ve got to make the case to the American people. I consider it a situation where we need you out there talking about this. Because we are in somewhat a World War II-type state, where the world is in a volatile position and things are breaking down all over, and we need all of America to come together to address where we need to be.

And I guess, you know, my question is, how can we drive this conversation? I hope more Americans have a chance to listen to the two of you when you are out talking about these issues. But how in Congress can we help drive this a little bit further and do it on a bipartisan basis like you are doing?

Secretary Albright. We don’t have any problems talking. And——

Dr. Wenstrup. Keep going.

Secretary Albright [continuing]. We have spent a lot of time together, and I think we present a pretty good picture. I do think we need to get out, but maybe there is some way that we could have, kind of, common sorties out, in terms of where some of us would go with some of you to your districts to talk about it and really explain.

And then I do think—I hate to bring this up, but the media has to be brought into it. They have to be willing to do more than take sound bites and to really have capable discussions and try to figure out how to use the social media in something other than tweets. And so using the new information technology to get information out in some way.

The Russians are really good at trying—this is part of what was going on, in terms of their capability of using propaganda. We have to figure out how to tell the truth to our people and also get foreigners mobilized with us.
Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you.

Mr. HADLEY. We do talk, but we are disadvantaged in talking to the American people because I am either part of the blob, if you are an Obama person, or part of the swamp, if you are a Trump person. And that disadvantages me, if not disqualifies me, from talking to the American people.

We are here because you have to talk to the American people. You actually know how to talk to the American people. That is why you are elected and sitting here. I don't. So I think this is a conversation that you have to lead in your districts.

And if I could suggest one thing, it is a new media environment. I mean, when President Trump is tweeting to his 16 million folks during the Comey hearing and Members of Congress are reading the tweets and turning them into questions, this is a new media environment.

And one of the challenges, I think, for you is how does the Congress use this new technology and figure out how to better communicate with the American people. Because we are still using 20th-century approaches.

Thank you.

Mr. HADLEY. I think the challenge we have, if we are going to play the role we need to play in the world, is we need to fix a lot of what is broken here at home. One is that we have to show that our politics can actually, on a bipartisan basis, solve some of the problems we face.

I think we also need to get our economy growing. We are going to be in this struggle against terrorism for a long time. I think we need to get the economy going. I am no economist. People say that tax cuts are a way to get the economy going. I don’t know the answer to that. It has worked in the past.

But I think what we need is, to play our role in the world, we have to have a robust economy, we need to show that our politics can work and solve our social problems, and we need to fix our brand.
We have been an example that democracy and free markets brings prosperity and peace. People are beginning to wonder about that. Our brand is in disrepair. And I think we don’t fix it until we get our economy fixed and, quite frankly, get our politics fixed and then go to the world and—one, to the American people and say, the model still works, and then we can make a case that, by our engagement in the world, we are an example worth following.

Mr. McEACHIN. Well, Mr. Hadley, let me explore what you just said for just a moment, when you say that tax cuts can cause the economy to grow, although, admittedly, you did confess that you are not an economist——

Mr. HADLEY. Yep.

Mr. McEACHIN [continuing]. And neither am I. But is it not the case that, during the Bush years, the most recent Bush years, President Bush decided to do away with the Clinton tax increases, essentially absorb the surplus, put us into a deficit, and went to war at the same time, and that is at least part of the reason why we are struggling with our economy today?

Mr. HADLEY. Well, you know, I will try on the history on this. The tax cuts, the Bush tax cuts, I think the people around President Bush believe that it produced a fairly sustained period of economic growth and job growth. We did, of course, hit the wall in the 2008 recession.

Second, we decided that, in order to maintain that growth, we would not increase tax cuts. The judgments that were made was that the deficits that we were running were manageable. And how much of the Clinton-era surplus was real and how much it was a paper surplus, I don't know.

Those were the judgments that were made. A lot of those went out the window after the 2008 financial and economic crisis. That is my understanding of the legacy during the Bush period.

Mr. McEACHIN. Let me switch to another assumption that we are working under. As I understand it, our national defense policy is predicated upon being able to—and this is my paraphrasing, so forgive me if it is inartful—being able to fight two major conflicts simultaneously. That seems to make some sense to me. And that then leads you to make certain policy decisions, if you buy into that base assumption.

My question for the two of you all is: Is that a good assumption in today's political climate, or should we be operating under a different set of assumptions? That is, should we really be prepared to fight two major wars simultaneously?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me just say President Obama, in the national security strategy that he put forward and the various Defense Department documents on this, moved away from that two-and-a-half-war strategy and said that what we are going to have to do is look at a lot of different kinds of conflicts, that they are mixed.

And so, therefore, I think in terms of looking at the defense budget generally and the foreign affairs budget, it is harder, in many ways, because the conflicts are of a variety. Some of them are asymmetrical. We have now seen Russia putting much more pressure on. And we don't know exactly what the Chinese are doing.
And so moving away specifically from the two and a half doesn’t mean that we don’t have to think about larger conflicts, but, in fact, there are a variety of conflicts that have to be dealt with that make this much harder for you and for explaining it to the American people.

Mr. McEachin. My time has expired. I yield back. And I thank you both.

The Chairman. Ms. McSally.

Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Secretary Albright, Mr. Hadley.

Secretary Albright, as a woman who was in the military, I just want to say thank you for breaking through barriers and the example that you were as a pioneer for all of us.

And I want to thank you for something in particular. This is the first time I have met you, so you probably don’t know this, but in 1995 I started a bit of a battle within the military related to then making our American troops wear the full abaya and headscarf in Saudi Arabia. And about 4½ years into this, you don’t know it, but you went to Saudi Arabia and didn’t put it on, and that put a little boost into my step for the fight that I had.

Eventually, we got legislation passed to overturn it, and many State Department individuals there at the Embassy were with me and cheering for me as I put my career on the line to fight this fight.

But, again, you didn’t know it, and I just wanted to tell you now I really appreciated your example of being a strong leader with grace but not, you know, conforming with seventh-century norms, from my view. And I appreciate your example on that.

I was at AFRICOM—you mentioned it previously—as part of the initial team to stand it up. And we had a lot of great expectations for the different kind of command that it was going to be, with a civilian deputy and all that kind of integrated stuff. But, in reality, we still operate, authorize, and fund through our stovepipes of the agencies.

The civilian deputy was helpful. Certainly, most people, my colleagues don’t realize that, when we do building partnership capacity, where the military is training our partners, that is title 22 State Department money. That is not money that we authorize here; it is not part of the defense bill. That is critical for us when we are doing prevention activities. But that is all funded through the State Department, even though you look at military operators there.

But, you know, there is a lot of discussion about we need a Goldwater-Nichols 2.0, we need to reorganize to have sort of the three D’s [development, defense, and diplomacy] more integrated in how we operate. You know, none of that really moved in any direction.

I just want your thoughts about some of those discussions of further integrating across the board between these agencies that are all critical for our international security.

Secretary Albright. Well, thank you very much for your service. I have always admired our military and the women in it, so thank you very much.
I do think that what needs to be looked at more is how—not even talking about the money at the moment—how the State Department and the Defense Department work together.

I think that what has happened since 2000 is that a lot of State Department activities were transferred to the Pentagon, partially because we were at war. And so one of the questions, no matter what, is: What is the job of the State Department, and under what circumstances do they do it, and how do they cooperate? So that, I think, does need to be looked at.

I also do think that the funding of it is obviously very important, in terms of where the money is also brings some of the influence in creating the strategy. But it has to be relooked at. Because it is very hard often—and you see it in the AFRICOM thing—of how to separate what is a military activity and what is a purely civilian one. What happens if there are security issues about how the civilian operators are able to work in a dangerous atmosphere; then how AFRICOM, for instance, works with peacekeeping operations. There are so many new things that need to be looked at.

But I was fascinated by, kind of, a step forward that it had taken in terms of how the command structures work. But I think this requires a major discussion both inside the government and also on the outside and Congress' role in it.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you.

And I will just say—Mr. Hadley, I would like to hear your thoughts. I mean, we had great hopes for how that was going to play itself out. In reality, it helped us kind of better understand the different tribes and the different roles and maybe coordinate a little better. But, in reality, the deputy there from the State Department didn't really have any authorities within the State Department, just had relationships. And it was, like, a lot of basically liaison officers. It helped educate us so that we could better understand better courses of action, but, really, those stovepipes and those tribes remain.

So, Mr. Hadley, any thoughts——

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Can I just add one thing?

Ms. MCSALLY. Yes.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. There were criticisms of it that, in fact, it militarized democracy, kind of, activities, when I think there actually is a way to make it cooperative.

Ms. MCSALLY. Great.

Mr. Hadley, any thoughts?

Mr. HADLEY. Yeah, I think we are in a—a need for a strategic relook. And, you know, two conventional wars, that was an idea that came 15, 20 years ago, and for the last 15 years, we have been fighting nonconventional wars. I don't know if it makes any sense. This integration the chairman talked about, you talked about, of the State and Defense, the nonmilitary and the military, how do we do that, we need to relook at it again.

I think what we really need—and I would hope this Congress and committee would take the lead—is a step-back look. What is the context in which we are operating? What are our assumptions about the world that we face? What is our strategy then for achieving our objectives in that context? Then, you know, what are the implementing policies we need? And then what is the organization
we need to fit that strategy? And then how do you resource it in a way that is sensible?

We need a strategic relook, given the 15 years we have been through. And now is a good time to do it, with the new Congress and new administration.

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you.

I am over my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Rosen.

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith.

And I thank you so much for being here today and your thoughtful and experienced answers. It is really wonderful.

So I want to go back to yesterday's confirmation from Director Comey that the Trump campaign is under investigation for possible Russian collusion and that President Trump's claims of wiretapping are indeed false.

Can you tell me how you see that that impacts U.S. credibility in the world, Secretary Albright?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think it raises a lot of questions with our friends and allies in terms of how we operate. But I think that they have been critical of some of the ways that we have been doing things, and it plays into a whole theory about what is this administration about.

I think the hearings and everything are going to go on a while. It is a little hard to figure out where they are going to go. But I do think the testimony yesterday really spoke for itself, and I think it will have an effect in the way that we are viewed, since we see ourselves as a country that operates by the rule of law.

Ms. ROSEN. And do you think that will jeopardize our security and the willingness especially of our NATO allies to work with us?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think not so much that, but I do think some of the issues in terms of our issues already with the British intelligence community. And a lot of sharing intelligence and things is based on trust, and so I think that is going to have to be rebuilt through the various Cabinet Secretaries.

Mr. HADLEY. Look, there is—Director Comey said the investigation is ongoing. We need to let the investigation run its course and see what it yields. We need to get to the bottom of these allegations, no doubt about it.

I think it is manageable with our allies. We shock our allies quite frequently these days, over the last decade or two, and I think it will survive.

But I think we have to recognize that, while we need to get to the bottom of this, it is a huge distraction from real issues that the administration and the Congress need to address. It is taking a lot of oxygen out of the system. And we have to get to the bottom of it, but we are going to pay a price, because it is distracting us from real work that needs to be done.

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. I appreciate your answers.

And I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for being here.

Stephen, in your history review, you left out the impact that the collapse of the dot-com era had on the economy and those make-
believe or fictitious surpluses that were projected at that point in time. So just add that to your narrative next time that you get a chance to answer that question.

I am intrigued by this idea that it is time to redo, kind of, the strategy, the world order, whatever the phraseology is, you know, that we have enjoyed for 70 years. That one was done in the face of the Soviet Union being on the other side, and its acolytes were a part of that, and it was successful throughout that timeframe.

As we set the new one—you mentioned a couple of new emerging powers, India and China—how would we do that, with Russia in effect taking the Soviet Union’s place as a force on the other side; China, who is operating outside the rule of law, particularly in the South China Sea and the things that they are doing, the mischief that they are creating around and the things that are going on, their lack of impact on North Korea, other things.

India certainly would be—the world’s largest democracy would be one that you would think would join some sort of an order that the United States would be the leader of or be of significant impact on it.

Can we do that? We did it once with the Soviets. Can we do it again, with adding both the Chinese and the Russians out there, versus what the rest of the world would be trying to do? Can you walk us—your thoughts on that? Both of you, please.

Mr. HADLEY. Yeah. I think Russia is going to be very tough. I think Russia really has convinced itself that this international order was just a fig-leaf cover for advancing American interests at everybody else’s expense. I think that is wrong analysis, but I think that is their analysis.

China, on the other, is more ambivalent. The Chinese I have talked to understand that China has benefited enormously by participating in that international system for the last 30 years, in terms of its prosperity and the like. So I think they would be loathe to overturn it, but they do want a role in it. They want a role in setting the rules.

And that is why it was important, I think, that we finally agreed to the change in the IMF [International Monetary Fund] rules that gave China, for example, more votes and more of a role. I know it will be controversial.

I would do things—I would try to send China the signal that they can be at the table in revising and revitalizing this order if they play in a responsible way. I would, for example, have us join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank that they proposed. Why? Because I want to make sure that it is really used to encourage development of the neighborhood and not just to extend China’s influence. The best way to do that is for us, our friends and allies, to be a part of it and condition it. And it would send the message to China that, if they have ideas for revising and revitalizing the international order, great, we are willing to participate.

I think China we can still bring into a revitalized order, and I think very much India we can do so. So I am hopeful that we can pull this off, but it is a challenge.

Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Albright.

Secretary A LBRIGHT. I do think it is worth really giving it some larger thought, because the post-World War II era was totally dif-
ferent, as was the post-Cold War era. And the question is, to what extent does one bring these countries in in order to have a discussion where they don’t like the fact that we are deciding what the order is?

I mean, I heard that an awful lot from the Russians after the end of the Cold War, that we didn’t respect them enough. It is hard to respect them when they, in fact, are, you know, taking over pieces of countries and threatening them with cyber activities.

The Chinese themselves never felt that they were part of the post-World War II order. That was the Nationalist government, not the Communist one. And so the question is whether we really would have the energy and the interest to resummon something like Bretton Woods agreements, I mean, really begin to look at things in a very large way.

I do think that the way the world is—besides, the United States doesn’t want to run the world. We prefer to have partners in it. And so, as an academic, I think it would be kind of—or track two, to begin to think about some different world order here where we ask the others to be participants in creating it.

At the moment, we are not in that position. We are deterring Russia, and we are trying to figure out what China’s role is, as they now say that they are more liberal, capitalistic, and are moving into a vacuum that we have left.

So there are real problems that are out there, but I think, as an academic practitioner, I think it would be interesting to see whether there is some way to have a new conference on a new world order.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you for your thoughts. I appreciate it.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

And thank you both for being here.

I have been a member of this committee for 6 years, and the conversation has obviously changed quite a bit. But what I am concerned about—we were looking at the state of readiness for our military all the way through this era. But what I am really concerned about is that our domestic tax policies absolutely conflict with our military needs or our perceived military needs and our role around the world.

You know, this is tax season, and so I am seeing ads, “Cheat Uncle Sam legally.” You know, “Here is a way to avoid paying a single penny.” And I feel that people don’t understand that if we are going to fulfill our responsibilities that we have to look at that side too, that we can’t ignore the fact that we have to pay for this, we can’t continue to drive up our debt.

And this is a challenge that is not just here for this committee and not just for Congress but, actually, around the world.

But shifting—I just had to say that this has been, you know, an issue for me and certainly all of us who try to figure out how to pay for what we need and to make sure that we stay strong.

But shifting, I know, Mr. Hadley, that you said that we need to do a strategic relook with this administration. But this administration has given us all pause and concern.
We take a look at former National Security Advisor Flynn, who didn’t register as a foreign agent, who clearly was very close to Putin and to others. And we see others—and we see the President’s family with financial ties, and we don’t know what they are.

I don’t feel confident that there is going to be another strategic relook from this administration. So I think it falls on the rest of us to be talking about these issues.

And I have been briefed a number of times about this, but here is what I want to ask both of you: What is going to be the right response?

We know that Russia has been active in Europe, and we know that they have had the same kind of propaganda tools and efforts in, like, Brexit and also in elections for democracies, countries that are democracies. And so we are sitting there looking outward and then back inward because of our own problems, and I see Russia very engaged in other people’s elections, not just ours.

So what is our proper response?

And, Secretary Albright, you talked about using some tools, but what tools do we have? I mean, I turn on television, you know, in a hotel, and there is Russian television sending out a propaganda message all the time.

So could you expand on that? And how much do we alert the world about their engagement—you know, Putin’s engagement, literally, throughout democracies in Europe?

Secretary Albright. I think we need to think about how we re-engage in terms of pressing our values system and explaining who we are. And we used to have a system through Radio Free Europe and a variety of radios, Voice of America. And I think we need to begin to rethink again what public diplomacy is about. It is not propaganda. It is actually telling the truth. Propaganda is not telling the truth. And I think that we need to figure out how to expand our voice and how to make clear to the American people that it is worth spending the money on it, frankly. That is part of the problem.

Russia, today, is a very clever mechanism. They are actually doing a lot of broadcasting around the United States, and there are Americans, Larry King, for instance, who participate in it. It is a propaganda machine. And I think the bottom line is we need to figure out how to get our voice out there again.

I think the main thing that we have to think about is how to explain to the American people that our safety and security depends on a different—that we can’t wall ourselves off from things, that we have to be a part of this, and that what Putin wants more than anything is to have our democracy be so confused that we don’t pay any attention to what he is doing, and he just keeps kind of moving into the vacuum and pushing there.

And so we can’t allow the vacuum to exist, and we need to go back to some of the public diplomacy methods that we have developed.

Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.

Mr. Hadley.

Mr. Hadley. I agree with that.

I think in terms of what Putin is doing in elections, we have to expose it, particularly in Europe. We need to shame him for it. And
then, hopefully, the Europeans will show in their response that they are willing to stand up to it, and he will conclude that, actually, his interference made it worse for him rather than better.

But we have to recognize that Russia is trying to discredit democracy and discredit our system of government through fake news and faux think tanks. And we need to expose that, and then we need to push back by exporting truth. We used to be in the business of exporting truth. We need to get back into it.

Look, the administration did tap into some nerve of the American people, some discontent of the American people, and it needs to be addressed. There are Cabinet Secretaries, I think, who can be participants in this process. But I think the strategic relook, I would like to see Congress take the lead, and I think you can get a response from the administration. But I think it would be good for Congress to lead this one.

Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to both of our witnesses.
Secretary Albright, it is an honor to meet you for the first time.
And, Mr. Hadley, it is great to see you. You are a great friend and served as such a role model in the Bush administration.

I wanted to pick up on the line of questioning that some of my colleagues asked.

When we consider this strategic relook and the context in which we operate, in a 21st-century global construct, what has changed over my lifetime and in even over the past 5 years is the use of technology. And this is tied in to Ms. Shea-Porter’s questions. We have seen Russia increasingly utilize hybrid warfare through propaganda, through influence campaigns, through shaping media coverage.

Do you assess that we are adequately prepared to counter that propaganda by exporting the truth?

Secretary Albright. I don’t think we are. You would think that we would be ahead in this particular aspect, but we have not, I think, taken advantage enough of the great innovative spirit of Americans and somehow link it to what the needs of the government are.

And, in fact, that relationship between the government and the private sector on this, I think, is a very complicated one that needs to be explored in a way that it doesn’t put censorship in but does, in fact, create a better tool out of it. I am not an expert on this, but there is some missing piece here that we have not in fact taken advantage of.

Ms. Stefanik. So that is what I am interested in. I chair the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, and we have hosted a number of roundtables and hearings on this threat of hybrid warfare and what steps we need to take to adequately counter it.

We used to have a U.S. Information Agency. Currently, today, we have what is called the Global Engagement Center within the Department of State.
I would like to get your guidance as to what specific steps we should be taking in the short term in this Congress and then in the longer term.

Mr. Hadley. So I think you have it exactly right. It is ironic that both the terrorists and extremists and the authoritarians like Russia are taking technology that we innovated and produced and using it to beat us in the public space every single day, day in, day out. We have to counter it.

And I think what your subcommittee can do—there are a lot of views of some people that, well, we need to go back to what we did in the Cold War. But the context has changed, and the technology has changed. And the question is, can we use that in an innovative way to get out ahead of it?

For example, there was an article in the press that said that there are broadcasts now being made against the Lord’s Army in Central Africa, this gruesome group that has been kidnapping children and sex slaves and all the rest for 15 years, broadcasting statements by members of that group from their family asking them to go home, and flying over the territory where they operate and broadcasting these messages. And it is having the effect; people are leaving the Lord’s Resistance Army and going back to their villages. That is the kind of innovative thing that we ought to be doing.

And I think what we need to do is not restore what we had in the Cold War but figure out how we can leapfrog and use the technology in a creative way to do the exporting of truth in a more effective way, more effective than actually the authoritarians and the extremists.

I don’t know the solution, but your subcommittee could really bring in the witnesses to develop a toolkit for 21st-century information operations, if you will.

Ms. Stefanik. One of the pieces of feedback we have heard is a challenge when you have a whole-of-government approach with multiple agencies engaged is the pace of the 24/7 news cycle and the fact that, at any given moment, a tweet can come out and that is heard around the world.

How do we structure an agency, whether it is the Global Engagement Center or something else, that is able to overcome just the pace of how information works in the 21st century?

Secretary Albright. I think it is very hard.

And, basically, let me just say on USIA [United States Information Agency], I am the one that had it abolished, because Senator Helms had suggested it, but it also made sense in terms of bringing it more into the Department instead of something that was just so independent that it couldn’t react in a way or have something to do with what our overall policies were.

So I do think that there needs to be some way that the departments themselves are involved in it. Definitely should not go back to Cold War, because different technology exists. But I think that the hardest part is the rapidity of the information and how it is dealt with. And I am surprised that we have not developed our technology enough to deal with that.
But, also, because we have a free press, it makes it harder than—I mean, Russia today, it is a part of their government, and so they are able to direct what it is supposed to do.

But I think you are on the right track. I would be very happy to be involved in discussions with you if it is helpful.

Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. And my time has expired, but I will follow up. Thanks.

The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.

Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Hadley and Secretary Albright.

I want to talk about your joint memo. Because I think your joint memo is telling us very clearly, if we would read it carefully, that, though Secretary Albright has said she doesn’t like isms, isolationism is a major force that we are going to have to deal with.

And, in addition to that, the whole concept of the international order, which we can’t sustain, but, notwithstanding, something that has effectively worked for 70 years, is something that we all have to look at.

And you, of course, conclude by saying that Congress has to start a national debate regarding America’s role in the world. And you take that to the continued references by Secretary Albright throughout these hearings today about Article I, section 8, which is Congress’ role.

Having said all of that, the concern that I have is that there is probably no stronger policy statement than what the budget represents and, of course, what the appropriations are. We have almost a schizophrenic, in my opinion, statement, which is an increase in defense of 10 percent, which is about $54 billion, which represents, of course, the need to raise the—or ignore sequestration; a cut in the non-defense categories, which, of course, includes State. And how can you have both? To me, it is like you can have isolationism with an increase in defense, depending on where it goes. But you can also augment isolationism by simply refusing to fund State.

And by doing the both, I think that what I am concerned about is, we can talk about these different points, but the overarching theme in all of this seems to be, from your paper, that we have hit a critical crossroads, and we have to decide it, and you have tasked Congress with saying, okay, go out there and have this discussion. I am not sure that Congress can have this discussion effectively if our budget posture or our policy statement is really as schizophrenic as I see it.

So what I would like to hear from the both of you is whether or not I have misread what you are saying. Because it seems to me that this is a very critical point that we are at. And I would like both of you to comment, if you will.

Mr. Hadley. I don’t think you have misread us. I think what you have pointed out is we have some strategic confusion going on, and we have started with a budget before we have a clearly articulated strategy. And what we are saying and what the chairman was saying earlier, we have to go the other direction. We have to start with a strategy, and then we can use it to set our budget priorities. But we are doing it—we got it just reversed. And it results in exactly
the kind of inconsistency you were talking about. So I think you read us absolutely right.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I am fascinated that you asked it that particular way, because the thing is, we have been working on this Middle East Strategy Task Force for about a year. We had no idea who the next President was going to be.

What we had said was that our approach to the Middle East had been, kind of, Band-Aids and fire drills and that we really needed to take a much deeper look at the Middle East in terms of what was happening internationally, in terms of what was in our U.S. national interest. We looked at various things of trying to create a regional organization so that it wasn't just us giving money to the Middle East. There were green shoots there that needed to be supported.

President Trump got elected, and the budget debate, all of a sudden, was put in on top of it. So it made it look more schizophrenic than our initial plan, which is an example of the fact that if something is considered only from the budget perspective, to let the budget drive the strategy is the problem.

And the question—and I think you have raised it in a right way—is now how we bring this together. Because our approach to here was: The defense clearly had to be, we had a part on that, and we talked about standby forces, but we also talked about the need of what the State Department provides, which is to make sure that there is not an environment that creates the terrorists and disequilibrium everywhere.

But I think we are at a breakpoint in the way that the international system works. We need to see this as an opportunity to really think through what needs to be done in the future. It is a huge time for this, and I think that we welcome your role in it and would love to play a part in it.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Khanna.

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience in allowing every member on the committee to ask a question.

Secretary Albright, Mr. Hadley, thank you for your service.

A few days ago, Senator McCain said of Senator Rand Paul that he was working for Vladimir Putin. And this is because of Senator Paul's principled opposition to Montenegro being part of NATO.

Given our country's own history with McCarthyism, are you concerned about that kind of rhetoric from senior political leaders and its potential to fan another Cold War?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I have to say that what makes me sad is about the lack of discussion that has gone on, the civility of how we talk to each other and how we recognize that we are entitled to have different opinions.

And in my testimony that I gave here, I talked about not having been born in this country. And, Mr. Chairman, you spoke about what an incredible country it is. And I love to go to naturalization ceremonies. And I can't swear people in because I am not an officer of the law, but I can give them their naturalization certificate. And, all of a sudden, I heard this person say, “Oh, my God, can you imagine a refugee got a naturalization certificate from the Secre-
tary of State?" And I said, "Can you imagine that a refugee is the Secretary of State?"

And what this country has been about is civil discourse and the capability of understanding each other's differences. And so, while it may feel good at a particular moment to be nasty to somebody, it doesn't prove where we are.

And I do think that, given the discussion here today, we are recognizing more and more that we are at some kind of a turning point in the world system.

And if I may just throw in some other large issue, the social contract is broken. That is what taxes are about. People gave up their individual rights in order to be protected by a government and to have services. We are not talking about that. Who owes what to whom? And that is the basic discussion that we should be having.

And I do think that having a discourse where we respect each other's differences is what has to happen.

Mr. HADLEY. And that is why we would like the Congress and, in particular, this committee, which has a tradition of bipartisanship, to be leading this national dialogue, not just in Washington but out in the country, so that the country can see that Republicans and Democrats in this Congress and in this committee can deal with each other with mutual respect and civility and have a substantive conversation on issues that really matter for the peace and security of the country.

So our view is we would like to do it on the merits, but we would also like to do it to model a model of right behavior in front of the American people.

Mr. KHANNA. I appreciate those responses.

And, Secretary Albright, I of course have great admiration for your story and your career.

To this point, though, of civil disagreement, you know, Secretary Perry had a different view on NATO, and he had said that he thought that the NATO expansion should be slower than it was.

Do you both, having seen the last 20 years, think there is anything we could have done to have avoided the confrontation we now have with Russia or anything we can do going forward?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that a mistake was made at the end of the Cold War when we said that we had won the Cold War. They lost the Cold War. And that is not just a semantic difference. The system failed.

The Clinton administration was in office when we did the first tranche of NATO expansion. It was the right thing to do because these countries wanted to be part of a European system. And it was not against Russia. And I specifically spoke to President Yeltsin, and I said, this is not against you, and, at some point, you might be able to be members as part of a new system.

And what has happened is I think that Putin has deliberately tried to figure out how to make sure that it is viewed as a threat to them, when it was never set up in the post-Cold War period as a threat to them. So I don't think we have done anything wrong. I think that Putin needs an enemy, and that is what he has been doing.

Mr. KHANNA. I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. If you all will indulge me with one last question.
Madam Secretary, we started talking about your story, and I think about the World War II experience, how that shaped this country. The Cold War experience has helped shape our institutions and our approaches to things.

I believe more than two-thirds of the Congress was not in office on 9/11. So you think about memory and events that shape us, but yet you have these students coming through your classroom all the time. What is your reflection on their view of the world, and how do they see things?

Secretary Albright. I think that they are actually a very forward-looking group of young people who have an understanding that they need to acquire the knowledge to deal with a completely different world.

I do have to say that when I tell stories about the Clinton administration it is a little bit like teaching about Napoleon. And so the, kind of, memories that they have don’t exist. They have come up in a very different era. And the way that they see things a lot, in terms of technology, what can be done.

I teach at Georgetown in the School of Foreign Service. So that is a very—it has a lot of foreign students in it, which, by the way, if I may say, is one of the strengths of our university systems, is that they are able to have foreign students. And what troubles me about the ban and various aspects of it is that colleges are now wondering if the foreign students can come in and if they can stay. And it will be a loss to our students in terms of specifically the question you asked. Because the next generation is going to deal in a world where we will, in fact, be dealing with a number of different countries, number of different ethnic and religious groups within an international system, and my students very much want to be a part of things.

I have to admit we are having a little bit of a hard time this semester, because I teach about decision making, and I can talk about what decision making—I do talk about the Bush administration and about the Obama administration. And I tell my students, you have to decide now for yourselves how the decision-making process is working.

But they are very eager. And if I might just say, over the weekend, we do a role-play, and we are dealing with North Korea. So I will let you know what we come up with.

The Chairman. We are looking for answers, that is for sure.

Mr. Hadley, do you have any reflections on collective memory in our future?

Mr. Hadley. It is one of the problems—I was talking to some Europeans—Europe has, because the young people in Europe have no recollection, of course, of World War II and that history in the first half of the 20th century. So they don’t know really why the EU [European Union] came about.

And I think we have the same problem in the United States. We have generations of people who have taken the international order for granted, don’t understand how it came to be and what value it has provided.

So there is a huge educational role, which, again, is why we come back to a national debate that you folks would lead.

The Chairman. Okay. I took your charge. I understand.
Thank you all very much, not only for being here today but for, both of you, your continuing involvement in the affairs of the country.
The hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X

MARCH 21, 2017
So far this year, the Committee has examined the state of the strategic environment in the world around us, as well as the current state of the U.S. military. We have examined specific security challenges such as cyber and nuclear deterrence. We have, of course, much more work to do before marking up this year’s Defense Authorization Bill.

But today we step back to consider the bigger picture. The size and characteristics of the United States military should be related to the role we expect the United States to play in the world, which is the topic of today’s hearing.

Let me read the opening words of the 2014 National Defense Panel Report. And for Members who were not here at the time, I might mention that the National Defense Panel was led by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and retired General John Abizaid and consisted of a bipartisan group of eight proven national security leaders. Their report started with the following:

“In the first half of the 20th century alone, the world experienced two devastating world wars, the rise of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian menace, and the advent of the nuclear age. This grim history and the threats to America and her interests following World War II prompted America’s leaders to employ our extraordinary economic, diplomatic, and military power to establish and support the current rules-based international order that has greatly furthered global peace and prosperity and ushered in an era of post-war affluence for the American people.”

They go on:

“Since World War II, no matter which party has controlled the White House or Congress, America’s global military capability and commitment has been the strategic foundation undergirding our global leadership.”

Debates in both parties have questioned whether the role America has played over the last 70 years should be reduced or otherwise changed. Few witnesses have thought more about these issues or could provide more thoughtful insights than those we are privileged to welcome today.
Ranking Member Adam Smith
Opening Remarks
House Armed Services Committee
Full Committee Hearing on “America’s Role in the World”
March 21, 2017

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. I also wish to thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing today. Their expert views, refined by years of service and accomplishment, are instrumental to our assessment of world affairs.

Consistent congressional evaluation of America’s role in the world is warranted by the complex and evolving nature of the global security environment. I want to emphasize, however, that active, persistent, and responsible U.S. leadership in the international community is essential to addressing threats and challenges confronting the United States and to promoting global stability.

That is why I am alarmed by recent calls for the United States to become more disengaged from international affairs. We have not always gotten it right, but the United States’ willingness to engage in the world has been instrumental to advancing peace and prosperity and to upholding a system of norms and values, which reinforce our national interests. The United States has been most effective when it has employed a whole-of-government approach and worked constructively and cooperatively with its many allies and partners around the world to achieve mutually beneficial results. The United States will achieve very little by staking out isolationist positions or forsaking international relationships. Reckless unilateralism, contempt for international organizations, and other forms of alienation undermine those relationships and detract from sound foreign policy.

Authoritarianism thrives when the United States becomes too self-absorbed, and some of the worst suffering the world has ever experienced occurred while the United States clung to short-sighted, isolationist policies, which often proved ineffective in shielding U.S. national interests.

We know that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and numerous violent extremist organizations continue to threaten global stability in a variety of ways. Given reports of Russian interference in our most recent national elections, a revanchist Russian posture in Europe, and the Russian military becoming increasingly adept in destabilizing cyber and hybrid warfare methods, Russian aims and activities appear to be especially concerning. Going forward, the United States must demonstrate its resolve to oppose Russian efforts to disrupt world order, which will require maintaining solidarity with our allies and partners in that effort.
The United States must show similar resolve and build broad cooperative support regarding the predations of ISIS, Al Qaeda, and other violent extremist organizations, Chinese encroachments in the South China Sea, North Korean provocations, and Iran’s malign activities across the greater Middle East. Moreover, American foreign policy must preserve a worldview that seeks the betterment of the entire international community and that seeks to coax outliers into the normative fold.

These objectives demand a robust American national security policy. Although current contingencies and the potential for future conflict necessitate that U.S. military capabilities continue to underwrite foreign policy, they are neither the exclusive, nor the primary means for effectuating good policy. A successful national security policy must clearly rely on exercising skillful diplomacy and facilitating stability through development assistance, as well as maintaining a credible defense. A balanced and well-resourced approach supported by all three of these pillars helps guard against costly and unnecessary conflicts.

For this reason I am deeply skeptical of the new Administration’s eagerness to subsidize increases for defense spending by slashing funding for the State Department and USAID. The President’s 2018 budget request reduces funding for these entities by twenty-eight percent from the funding level currently supported by the continuing resolution, and it would affect, among other things, U.S. support for the United Nations and affiliated agencies (including UN peacekeeping organizations), foreign military assistance, and development assistance. This inclination is misguided, and it now falls to Congress to protect against harmful disparities that could cripple our foreign policy.

I look forward to the views of our panel. I am particularly interested in learning how the United States might constructively engage in the Middle East to facilitate long-term strategic ends. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Submitted Statement of Madeleine K. Albright and Stephen J. Hadley
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Tuesday, March 21, 2017

Thank you Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and other distinguished members of the committee.

We are grateful for the opportunity to testify before you this morning on America’s role in the world. In our testimony, we would like to offer our perspective on the current challenges to the international system, share some insights relevant to this topic from our Middle East Strategy Task Force, and suggest some ways in which Congress might be able to help forge a new bipartisan consensus on American foreign policy.

America’s Role in the World

This hearing comes at a time of deep political divisions at home and heightened instability abroad. At this pivotal moment, we believe there needs to be a national debate about how and why America engages in the world. We also believe that Congress has a vital role to play in convening this debate, given its representative nature and the responsibilities given to it by the Constitution.

Over the past seventy years, Democratic and Republican administrations alike have understood that American security and prosperity at home are linked to economic and political health abroad, and that America does better when other countries have the incentive and the capacity to work alongside us in tackling global challenges. This is why we constructed a system of international institutions and security alliances after World War II. They provided a framework for advancing economic openness and political freedom in the years that followed.

The international order America built and led has not been perfect, but it has coincided with a period of security and prosperity unmatched in human history. And while many nations benefited from the investments America made in global security and prosperity, none benefited more than the United States.

Yet today, the value of America’s global engagement is under question. A substantial number of Americans feel that their lives and livelihoods have been threatened rather than enhanced by it. They view international trade as having shuttered the factories at which they worked, immigrants as threatening their standard of living or safety, and globalization as undermining American culture.

This popular dissatisfaction needs to be understood and acknowledged. Washington needs to ensure that the benefits of America’s international engagement are shared by all of our citizens. But we also need to be clear about the consequences of disengagement. For while it is comforting to believe that we can wall ourselves off from the ailments of the world, history teaches us that whenever problems abroad are allowed to fester and grow, sooner or later, they come home to America.
Isolationism and retreat do not work; we know because we have tried them before.

We also know, from recent experience, that if America recedes from the global stage, people in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East will increasingly look elsewhere for inspiration and guidance – whether to authoritarianism or extremist ideology.

In our opinion, such a shift would be harmful to the interests of those populations, but it would be harmful above all to the interests of the United States, because our security and our prosperity depend on having friends abroad that share our values – including our belief in the rule of law, freedom of movement, and access to markets.

Neither Russia nor China proclaim the same loyalty to those principles as we do. Were they to fill a vacuum left by the United States, it could very well mark a return to a balance of power system, where the world’s major powers competed militarily for territory and spheres of influence at great human and financial cost. This is a world to which none of us should want to return.

America’s continued global leadership cannot be taken for granted, but a retreat into isolationism is not preordained. We have an opportunity – and, in our view, an obligation – to defend those aspects of the international system that work in the twenty-first century, and to adapt those that do not.

In doing so, we should acknowledge that the existing order is in need of revision and refurbishment. The international system was designed for a different era, and it requires a renewal of purpose and a reform of its structures. Its mission should more clearly extend beyond preventing war in Europe to include stabilizing other strategic regions that affect our well-being. Its approach should reflect the fact that long-term stability depends on well-governed states whose leaders are seen as legitimate by their people. And its structure must be adapted to the realities of a world in which power is more diffuse, so other countries can take on a greater role commensurate with the contributions they make and the responsibilities they assume.

China, Russia, and other countries should understand that there is a larger place for them at the decision-making table, provided they are constructive and respect the interests of other nations. And they need to understand that there will be costs if they do not.

For this and other reasons, U.S. military power will remain vital in a renewed international order. We appreciate this committee’s efforts to ensure that our military remains the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led force on earth. Given the variety of threats facing our country, it makes sense to continue upgrading and enhancing our country’s military capabilities and deterrent power. But we strongly believe that it would be a mistake to increase defense spending at the expense of other critical investments in national security – especially those in diplomacy, development, democracy, and peacebuilding.

We know from experience that force, and the credible possibility of its use, are essential to defend our vital interests and keep America safe. But as one of us has said in the past, force alone can be a blunt instrument, and there are many problems it cannot solve. The military leaders who so frequently testify before this committee would be the first to tell you that they cannot succeed in their missions without the vital capabilities that our civilian agencies bring to the table. Gutting these capabilities will put an unacceptable burden on our men and women in
uniform, and would make America less safe. We need to fund these other civilian elements of American power as robustly as we do the military element.

We recognize that government can always be made more efficient and effective, but the best way to accomplish that goal is to build a budget based on a sound strategy. This administration first needs to take the time to staff the Departments and agencies, and to develop a national security strategy. As members of the legislative branch, it is your responsibility to ensure that every dollar is spent wisely, but it also your responsibility to protect our national security institutions from arbitrary and senseless cuts.

The Middle East Strategy Task Force

No region has seen more death and suffering or presented more challenges to the international order than the Middle East, with outcomes that have frustrated both Democratic and Republican administrations. The Middle East is likely to be an important test case in the coming years – the region in which the international order gets rejuvenated for a new era or ceases to function entirely.

From 2015 to 2016, we served as Co-Chairs of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Strategy Task Force, which sought to understand better the underlying challenges in the region and to articulate a long-term strategy for meeting them. Our goal was not to develop a new U.S. strategy, but to understand the role that the U.S. can play in supporting a larger international effort led by the region itself.

One of our initial insights was that we face not just a crisis in the Middle East, but from the Middle East having global impact. The roots of this crisis lie in a long history of poor governance in many states in the region. The Arab Spring was a consequence of the dissatisfaction of increasingly connected and empowered citizens with a number of political leaders who ruled ineptly and often corruptly. Where leaders sought to quash these popular protests by force, the result in most cases was civil war.

The four civil wars raging in the Middle East – in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen – have had destabilizing consequences for the region and beyond. They have produced the ungoverned spaces and grievances that have allowed terrorist groups to direct or inspire attacks in the West. They have also created the greatest worldwide refugee crisis since the Second World War, the devastating human cost of which has been coupled with profound effects on our own domestic politics and those of Europe.

The challenges we face in the Middle East bear some resemblance to those of post-war Europe. Countries torn apart by war will need to determine the new shape of their governments, and how those governments interact with their people. The entire state system will need to be shored up so that countries are less prone to subversion, supported by effective regional institutions to mediate conflicts and prevent them from spiraling into all-out war.

But there are also important differences between the modern Middle East and post-war Europe. There is no magnanimous victor in the mold of the Allies, with the will and capability to reshape the region from the outside. New global and political realities mean that no Marshall Plan is in the offing for the rebuilding of the Middle East. The American people have no appetite...
for this, and the people of the region, too, are tired of being beholden to outside powers. The Middle East must chart its own vision for the future.

There is reason for hope. The fact is that now, more than any time in the Middle East’s modern history, the region has significant capabilities and resources of its own to define and work toward this vision and secure better opportunities for its people. And more than ever, there are also indications that people and some governments in the Middle East have the will to take on the region’s hard challenges.

Although not always evident at first glance, there are promising developments happening in the Middle East, even in the most unexpected places. In Saudi Arabia, female entrepreneurs are founding startup companies at a rate three times that of women in Silicon Valley, as they begin to claim their rightful place in Saudi civic life. In Egypt, the social enterprise Nafham is using technological solutions to address the problem of overcrowding in Egyptian schools. And in Jordan, Syrian refugees are using innovative 3D printing technology to help develop more affordable prosthetic limb components for friends and neighbors who bear the physical scars of Bashar Assad’s war on his own people. The region’s vast population of educated youth, commonly understood to be a liability, can in fact be a tremendous asset.

Some governments are beginning to understand that their future depends on promoting these efforts and partnering with their people to build a common future. Tunisia is showing that revolution need not result in either chaos or authoritarianism, but can begin a transition to an inclusive, democratic future. The UAE has led the way for positive economic and social reforms and Saudi Arabia has now adopted its own vision for the future. Jordan is making its own efforts. These can be examples for other countries in the region.

Renewed and enhanced American leadership is needed in the Middle East. But not to impose our will militarily or otherwise. Instead, America has a clear interest in supporting and accelerating the positive changes that are already happening. The goal of our strategy in the region should be to help the Middle East move from the current vicious cycle in which it finds itself to a more virtuous one -- one in which the Middle East no longer spawns violence and refugees, is not a drain on international resources, and does not through its instability and political vacuums aggravate great power competition.

With this goal in mind, US foreign policy toward the Middle East should be informed by a set of guiding principles that represent the new reality of the region since 2011.

First, the old order is gone and is not coming back. Stability will not be achieved until a new regional order takes shape. The region should assume the principal responsibility for defining this new order, which should offer the people of the region the prospect of a stable and prosperous future free from both terrorist violence and government oppression.

Second, disengagement is not a practical solution for the West. Disengagement will only allow the region’s problems to spread and deepen unchecked, creating further threats. Instead, it is in the interest of the United States and others to help the Middle East achieve a more peaceful vision. But their role must be different from what it has been in the past. Rather than dictating from the outside how countries should behave, they should support and facilitate the positive efforts that some people and governments in the region are beginning to take.
Third, a strategy for the region should focus on more than counterterrorism. Pernicious as they are, groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda are not the sole cause of the current crises. Even if these groups disappeared tomorrow, others would arise in their place so long as the underlying grievances that led to the Arab Spring remain unresolved.

Fourth, sectarian and ethnic rivalries are not as entrenched or inevitable in the Middle East as many assume. Instead, they wax and wane with broader tensions in the region. Achieving political solutions to the civil wars would go far in stanching these communal tensions. To this end, empowered local governance will be essential going forward, so as to allow people the freedom to shape their own communities.

Finally, the Middle East cannot build a better future without the active participation of the people of the region—including women, youth, minorities, and those displaced by conflict. If enabled and empowered, they can be the engines of job creation, help motivate the broader population, and innovate solutions to the region’s economic and social problems. It is high time for all of us to bet on the people of the region, not just on the states.

With these guiding principles in mind, we have, in our Middle East Strategy Task Force report, proposed a two-pronged strategy that we think will be able, over time, to change the trajectory of the region in a more positive direction, to the benefit of people in the region and the United States.

The first prong involves outside actors helping partner countries in the region to wind down the violence, starting with the four civil wars. This means containing the spread of the current conflicts and accelerating diplomatic efforts to resolve them, while addressing the staggering humanitarian crises that they have generated.

The most immediate priorities must be 1) mitigating the current human suffering in Syria and 2) recapturing the territory that ISIS now controls. A third, longer-term priority is to contain Iran’s aggressive foreign policy behavior while still exploring opportunities to engage with it. Achieving these priorities will require a limited but greater degree of American and allied engagement in the region, diplomatic as well as military. This greater engagement and the kind of concrete steps we recommend in our report, taken together, will rally and reassure America’s friends and allies in the region, send a message of strength to its adversaries, and provide additional leverage for the United States to work with all internal and external players to end these destabilizing wars.

The second prong of the strategy, which must be pursued simultaneously with the first prong, seeks to support now those bottom-up efforts that will create the social basis for stability and prosperity. This means supporting the citizen-based entrepreneurial and civic activity occurring throughout the region. It also means encouraging regional governments to facilitate these efforts, to invest in the education and empowerment of their people, and to address the societal, economic, and governance issues that are key to future peace and success.

Ultimately, this prong seeks to unlock the significant human potential in the Middle East. Governments in the region need to create the enabling environment for individuals to deploy fully their talents, whether as innovators, entrepreneurs, or just engaged citizens. This means better and fairer legal and regulatory frameworks, but also more inclusive, effective, transparent, and accountable governance more generally.
The United States should support those governments that are trying to create such an enabling environment. The idea is to create a “more-for-more” relationship with countries in the region that are trying to do right by their people. The more ambitious the efforts for change in the region, the more support countries should expect from the United States—not as charity or aid, but because it is a good investment of resources likely to yield solid returns on our security. By the same token, where countries are not taking steps for change, they should not expect support—not because we wish to punish them, but because it would be a waste of our own limited resources.

Most importantly, the American approach toward the Middle East needs to be colored with a good deal of humility. This is the most difficult problem that either of us has seen in our careers, and it won’t be solved overnight. We all should be steeled for the long term, and prepared to weather setbacks when they come—and they will. But the good news is that our country has succeeded at long-term foreign policy challenges such as this before, not least the rebuilding of Europe after World War II and ending the Cold War. America’s efforts were strengthened by a bipartisan national consensus regarding the importance of these missions and the soundness of the principles upon which they were based. It is time to forge a similar national consensus on our approach to the Middle East and, more broadly, the world.

**Conclusion: The Role of Congress**

Congress has an incredibly important role to play in forging such a consensus. It is our belief that Congress should:

1) Help start a national debate regarding America’s role in the world;
2) On the basis of that debate, forge a bipartisan strategy for American leadership to build a revised and revitalized international order for the 21st century;
3) Insist that American efforts to defeat ISIS and al Qaeda are embedded within a larger strategy to make the Middle East over time more stable and prosperous;
4) Ensure that U.S. efforts at diplomacy, peacebuilding, advancing democracy and development do not get shortchanged as we increase our expenditures on defense; and
5) Through its legislative actions, provide reassurances to our friends and allies regarding America’s continued commitment to their defense and to a rules-based international system.

We thank you again for this opportunity to testify before you and look forward to your questions.

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Madeleine K. Albright

Madeleine K. Albright is a Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group and Chair of Albright Capital Management, an affiliated investment advisory firm focused on emerging markets. She was the 64th Secretary of State of the United States. Dr. Albright received the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor, from President Obama in 2012.

In 1997, Dr. Albright was named the first female Secretary of State and became, at that time, the highest ranking woman in the history of the U.S. government. As Secretary of State, Dr. Albright reinforced America’s alliances, advocated for democracy and human rights, and promoted American trade, business, labor and environmental standards abroad. From 1993 to 1997, Dr. Albright served as the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations and was a member of the President’s Cabinet.

Prior to her service in the Clinton Administration, she served as President of the Center for National Policy, a member of President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Council and White House staff and served as Chief Legislative Assistant to U.S. Senator Edmund Muskie.

Dr. Albright is a Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. She chairs both the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the Pew Global Attitudes Project and serves as President of the Truman Scholarship Foundation. She also serves on the Boards of the Aspen Institute and the Center for American Progress. In 2009, Dr. Albright was asked by NATO Secretary General Anders Fog Rasmussen to Chair a Group of Experts focused on developing NATO’s New Strategic Concept.


Dr. Albright earned a B.A. with honors from Wellesley College and holds Master’s and Doctorate degrees from Columbia University’s Department of Public Law and Government, as well as a Certificate from its Russian Institute.

She is based in Washington, DC.
Stephen J. Hadley

Stephen Hadley is a principal of Rice Hadley Gates LLC, an international strategic consulting firm founded with Condoleezza Rice, Robert Gates, and Anja Manuel. Rice Hadley Gates assists senior executives of major corporations in overcoming the challenges to doing business successfully in major emerging markets like China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Indonesia.

Mr. Hadley is also Board Chairman of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). He has co-chaired a series of senior bipartisan working groups on topics such as Arab-Israeli peace, U.S. political strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S./Turkey relations, and U.S. policy on Iraq and Egypt.

Mr. Hadley served for four years as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 2005-2009. In that capacity he was the principal White House foreign policy advisor to then President George W. Bush, directed the National Security Council staff, and ran the interagency national security policy development and execution process. From 2001 to 2005, Mr. Hadley was the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor, serving under then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. In addition to covering the full range of national security issues, Mr. Hadley had special responsibilities in several areas including a U.S./Russia political dialogue, the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, and developing a strategic relationship with India.

From 1993 to 2001, Mr. Hadley was both a partner in the Washington D.C. law firm of Shea and Gardner (now part of Goodwin Proctor) and a principal in The Scowcroft Group (a strategic consulting firm headed by former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft).

In his law practice, Mr. Hadley was administrative partner of the firm. He represented a range of corporate clients in transactional and international matters—including export controls, foreign investment in U.S. national security companies, and the national security responsibilities of U.S. information technology companies. In his consulting practice, Mr. Hadley represented U.S. corporate clients investing and doing business overseas.

From 1989 to 1993, Mr. Hadley served as the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy under then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. Mr. Hadley represented the Defense Department on arms control and defense matters, including negotiations with the Soviet Union and then Russia, security issues involving NATO and Western Europe, and export and technology control matters.

Prior to this position, Mr. Hadley alternated between government service and law practice with Shea & Gardner. He was counsel to the Tower Commission in 1987, as it investigated U.S. arms sales to Iran, and served on the National Security Council staff under President Ford from 1974 to 1977.

During his professional career, Mr. Hadley has served on a number of corporate and advisory boards. He is currently the Chair of RAND's Center for Middle East Public Policy Advisory Board, chair of the Human Freedom Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Institute, a member of Yale University's Kissinger Papers Advisory Board, a member of the Executive Committee and Board of Directors of the Atlantic Council, a member of the Board of Managers of the John Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory, and a member of the State Department's Foreign Affairs Policy Board. Other positions have included past service as a member of the Department of Defense Policy Board, member of the National Security Advisory Panel to the Director of Central Intelligence, and co-chair with former Secretary of Defense William Perry of the 2010
Mr. Hadley graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Cornell University in 1969. In 1972, he received his J.D. degree from Yale Law School, where he was Note and Comment Editor of the Yale Law Journal. From 1972 to 1975 he served as an officer in the U.S. Navy.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 21, 2017
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. U.S. leadership abroad in this day and age depends not only on our ability to defend ourselves from physical attack, but also from cyberattack. Combating the challenges posed by cyber is a global problem and is impossible to do alone. Developing acceptable behavior in cyberspace can improve stability and provide a foundation for international action when those norms are violated. How can we promote like-minded countries working together to advance international norms and responsible behaviors in cyberspace? Have actions the United States has taken—such as the response to the Russian interference in our presidential elections—been helpful in that regard?

Secretary ALBRIGHT and Mr. HADLEY. We would like to extend our thanks once again for the opportunity to testify before you and your colleagues on the House Committee on Armed Services on March 21, 2017. We were grateful for your time, for your thoughtful questions, and for the spirit of bipartisanship in which you received us.

We have received the questions for the record that you have submitted to us. While we share your interest in these important issues, we regret that we are not well positioned to provide answers. Many of the questions deal with government programs with which we have not been directly associated for years since leaving government. An administration witness may be a better source of information. We would be delighted to discuss other issues raised in the hearing with you at any time.

We are deeply appreciative of the Congress’s role in helping to craft American foreign policy at this unsettled global time, and we once again thank you and the Committee for your efforts on behalf of our country.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. How would you propose we should counter North Korean and Chinese aggression in the Pacific region? North Korea is in the news lately and their continued missile tests are a significant concern and have garnered a lot of attention. At the same time China continues to aggressively pursue their own agenda without any regard to international law. In your opinion, how do we address these alarming but different threats to the Pacific? How can we employ a whole-of-government approach that will address both of these threats?

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS

Mr. FRANKS. Which country do you believe is our #1 geopolitical foe right now? Who was our #1 geopolitical foe in 2012?

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Mr. FRANKS. Part 1: Do you believe peoples from religious or ethnic minorities who the State Department has officially identified as being targeted for genocide should be given preference for being granted refugee status and admitted to the United States as refugees?

—Christians and Yezidis have been officially recognized by the State Department as being the target of genocide in Syria and Iraq—the Islamic State has specifically targeted them for extermination based upon their religious beliefs.

Part 2: Should Christians and Yezidis fleeing the Islamic State be given preference for being granted refugee status and admitted to the United States as refugees?

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