[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-16]
CRAFTING AN INFORMATION WARFARE
AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA STRATEGY
FOR THE EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 15, 2017
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
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25-048 WASHINGTON : 2017
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Chairwoman
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana JIM COOPER, Tennessee
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair JACKIE SPEIER, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
Kevin Gates, Professional Staff Member
Lindsay Kavanaugh, Professional Staff Member
Neve Schadler, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 13
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.. 1
WITNESSES
Armstrong, Matthew, Associate Fellow, King's Centre for Strategic
Communications, King's College London.......................... 3
Lumpkin, Michael D., Principal, Neptune.......................... 5
Thomas, Timothy L., Senior Analyst, Foreign Military Studies
Office, Fort Leavenworth....................................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Armstrong, Matthew........................................... 37
Lumpkin, Michael D........................................... 50
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M....................................... 35
Thomas, Timothy L............................................ 62
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Franks................................................... 81
CRAFTING AN INFORMATION WARFARE AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA STRATEGY FOR THE
EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 15, 2017.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:16 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elise M.
Stefanik (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
Ms. Stefanik. The subcommittee will come to order.
I would like to welcome everyone to this hearing of the
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee on the very timely topic of
information warfare and counter propaganda. Although the
subcommittee has met several times already in closed classified
sessions, today is our first open and public hearing. As such,
I would like to take a moment to welcome and thank our new and
returning subcommittee members.
Our topic today is incredibly important. Cyber warfare and
influence campaigns that are being waged against our country
represent a national security challenge of generational
proportions. In talking about influence campaigns, we too often
focus on the digital and technical aspects on the internet and
social media. While those aspects are critical and indeed have
served as an accelerant to speed up communications and effects,
we should remember to take a step back and keep in mind that
information warfare is about information, not just the medium.
And our understanding of this form of warfare should also
include the psychological, cognitive, and cultural aspects of
the messages bombarding us from all sources.
I would like to read a quote I recently reviewed. Quote,
``There has never been a time in our history when there was so
great a need for our citizens to be informed and to understand
what is happening in the world. The cause of freedom is being
challenged throughout the world today and propaganda is one of
the most powerful weapons they have in this struggle. Deceit,
distortion, and lies are systemically used by them as a matter
of deliberate policy,'' end quote.
Those were the words of President Harry Truman in 1950. He
spoke of a conflict of ideas that is still occurring today.
And, unfortunately, it is a conflict we have largely ignored. I
chose this quote as a reminder that information warfare and
propaganda efforts are not new. The tools have changed, but
enemy doctrine has not. Information warfare is shaping the
international environment. There may not be overt and open
fighting, but there is certainly open conflict.
Information warfare is being waged in an aggressive ongoing
competition over territory, resources, and people in the
Crimea, in the South China Sea, in Iraq, and in Syria. People
are being desensitized to the reality of actions around them,
increasing the likelihood of misunderstanding and
miscalculation.
Our core values of truth, democratic principles, and self-
determination are under assault. While the Department of
Defense [DOD] plays a critical role in this form of warfare, it
cannot bear responsibility alone. Countering adversarial
propaganda requires a whole-of-government strategy using all
instruments of national power to harness the authorities,
tools, and resources required to mitigate and marginalize its
harmful effects. With this in mind, the National Defense
Authorization Act [NDAA] last year authorized and expanded the
mission of the State Department's Global Engagement Center
[GEC] to counter state-sponsored propaganda efforts such as
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
We look forward to continuing to work with the center and
the Department of Defense this year as we craft an information
warfare and counter-propaganda strategy for an emerging
security environment.
Before I turn to the ranking member for his comments, I
would like to highlight a few questions for our witnesses and
members to consider as we proceed throughout the hearing.
First, do we have an adequate strategy for countering the
blatant lies and mistruths being promulgated by sophisticated
nation-state actors that have both resources and political
will? Second, do we truly understand the information warfare
and propaganda strategies of our enemies, be they state or
nonstate actors? And lastly, since the United States remains a
technological leader and innovator with tremendous creativity,
how do we better harness our advantages to counter our
adversaries?
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stefanik can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Ms. Stefanik. In the future, when the ranking member
arrives, I will turn to him for his opening statements, but in
the meantime, I am going to introduce our witnesses.
We welcome three distinguished witnesses here this
afternoon. First, the Honorable Matt Armstrong, an associate
fellow at the King's Centre for Strategic Communications,
King's College London. Next, the Honorable Michael Lumpkin,
formerly an Assistant Secretary of Defense and coordinator of
the Global Engagement Center, now a principal at Neptune
Strategies. And finally, Mr. Timothy Thomas, a senior analyst
at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, and
the author of several books and articles on Russian and Chinese
information operations [IO] and cyber policy, one of which I
have here.
Welcome to all of our witnesses. I would like to remind you
that your testimony will be included in the record, and we ask
that you summarize key points from that testimony in 5 minutes
or less. We will wait for Mr. Langevin's arrival, but in the
meantime, Mr. Armstrong why don't you go ahead with your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW ARMSTRONG, ASSOCIATE FELLOW, KING'S CENTRE
FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS, KING'S COLLEGE LONDON
Mr. Armstrong. Thank you. Chairwoman Stefanik,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to speak on information warfare and countering
propaganda. This is an important conversation as information
and informational activities create both opportunities and
threats to our Nation's physical, societal, and economic
security. This is a strategic problem requiring a strategic
review of not just the threat, but also of our constraints. We
may develop good tactics, but any success from these will be
undone if we fail to get the strategy right, as well as
properly align our efforts toward our objectives. Be confident
that our adversaries are doing this realignment and using our
doctrine and our public writings as their starting point.
The information domain is not a nuance at the margins, but
a central facet of international affairs. We have known this
for a long time, even if we need constant reminding. A 1918
report by the U.S Army General Staff recognized that in the,
quote, ``strategic equation of war, there are four factors:
Combat, economic, political, and psychologic, and that the last
of these is coequal with the others,'' end quote.
Today, we refer to this as the DIME model of national
power: diplomacy, information, military, economic. A July 1945
report from the State Department recognized that the, quote,
``nature of present day foreign relations makes it essential
for the United States to maintain informational activities
abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign
affairs.'' Two years later, a joint congressional report
elucidated on this point: ``Europe today has again become a
vast battlefield of ideologies in which words have replaced
armaments as the active elements of attack and defense,'' end
quote.
Today, as the traditional barriers of influence and
disruption are obliterated by modern communication and
transportation networks, the role of information is more
important than ever.
Understanding and elevating the appreciation of the
informational or psychological affect of our words and deeds
can make for more effective, more enduring, and less expensive
outcomes. Every situation is unique and sometimes you need to
put two in the heart and one in the mind, but between
increasingly transparent battlefields and adversaries
intentionally operating below or outside of our escalation
ladders, we must be more adept in this environment. We may call
this affair information warfare, but this is too narrow and too
shallow, and it inhibits appreciating the psychological affects
of actions. It also encourages the false concept of a battle of
narratives as if there is a magic combination of nouns and
verbs that will win the day. We may use more inclusive labels,
like political warfare or hybrid warfare, two terms with subtle
yet possibly useful distinctions.
Putting aside the label, we fail to appreciate how the
success of our adversary's propaganda supporting their agenda
or targeting our activities, whether military, economic, or
political, often rest on our credibility. Its effectiveness is
often influenced by the degree to which people believe what we
say, how much they trust what we do, and how the audience
perceives the two as consistent and aligned.
Abroad, we face a situation which our adversaries are often
perceived as more credible than us as they spotlight, exploit,
and often outright manufacture gaps between what we say, what
we do, and our national values. Proof of this is when our
adversaries are given the benefit of the doubt, while our word
is questioned, our actions subjected to charges of hypocrisy
and aggression. This is magnified by failing to understand the
local information environments.
There are several challenges hindering our credibility and
the ability to be effective in today's environment. First, our
messages and actions are generally disunified. We have a
competitive advantage in terms of resources, people skills, and
scale. Yet our various government departments and agencies are
organized in such a way that makes coordination nearly
impossible.
Beyond the obvious, this includes failing to understand,
coordinate, or support programs that may develop and strengthen
local defenses, even inoculation, against adversarial
influence. Lesser known examples include fish and wildlife
services, helping game wardens in Africa, exchange programs,
and the U.S. Navy tenders helping local harbor masters and
mechanics. And then there is the damaging divide between
defense public affairs and other defense information
professionals, as well as the segregation of public diplomacy
inside the State Department.
The lack of coordination and bureaucratic cultural divides
contribute to our second challenge, which is that our response
to adversarial propaganda is almost invariably reactionary.
When our adversaries explain their actions to the world or make
claims about us, we find ourselves scrambling to prove them
wrong. This keeps us on our heels and requires us to overcome
the narrative set by others. It also means limited
consideration of the psychological affect of actions, which the
Chinese appear to be overcoming in their recent reorganization
of their cyberspace operations forces.
The third challenge is the militarization of our foreign
policy. In the absence of a clear strategy and organizing
principles, the Department of Defense has by default taken the
lead in much of our foreign policy efforts. The very term
``strategic communication'' reflects this role as it was born
out of the need to fill a gap left by the State Department. But
placing our military as our primary implement of foreign policy
also promotes a perception that we are an insecure Nation.
We have remarkably little relevant experience in combatting
the political warfare being waged against us. We may imagine
that the United States Information Agency [USIA] and the Active
Measures Working Group are guideposts, but they were never
intended or fit for purpose for this action and they were
relatively small and reactionary. Neither is a useful model for
proactive and unified defense, let alone offense.
We must change our mind-set about adversarial propaganda
and subversive actions, especially those carried out below or
outside the military's phasing construct. This starts with
changing the language we use. We need to think and speak in
terms of undermining adversarial psychological influence which
will guide us toward preemptive behavior and messages. We need
to think and speak in terms of a communication environment
which will guide us toward a preemptive interactivity that can
establish, preserve, and strengthen our credibility so that we
set the narrative that must be displaced by our adversaries. We
must think about why adversarial propaganda has traction, and
accept that we cannot bomb our way to success. We must organize
in a way that aligns our efforts for credible, smart,
preemptive action and swift, credible, trusted reactions.
In addition to internal reorganizations addressing cultural
divides, departments and agencies beyond Department of Defense
and State bring skills and expertise to this struggle.
I am thankful that this committee has convened this hearing
as I am thankful for past amendments from this committee that
have affected the State Department, but in many ways this
discussion is happening in a vacuum. Are other committees
exercising their oversight to inquire about this topic, set
priorities, or hold their respective departments and agencies
accountable? And we must understand the role of society in our
foreign policy and the permeability of our borders and the
marketplace of loyalty, which I described elsewhere. There is a
vulnerability, not just political support for our efforts, but
what might be considered within organizational security
parlance as insider threats. Consider Major Nidal Hasan, Jihad
Jane, and other so-called lone wolves who are inspired often
through sympathy or empathy with our adversaries.
I will close with another quote, this one from 1963: ``Some
day, this Nation will recognize that global nonmilitary
conflict must be pursued with the same intensity and
preparation as global military conflicts.'' Unfortunately, that
day has yet to come, but I hope this hearing is the start of
setting us on the right path. Continuing to get this wrong is a
threat to our national security, to our economic growth, and to
our very standing as a world leader.
Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this
important topic. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Armstrong can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Armstrong.
Mr. Lumpkin.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, PRINCIPAL, NEPTUNE
Mr. Lumpkin. Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin,
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today as a private citizen in an
individual capacity. Thank you very much.
I trust my experience as a career special operations
officer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations,
and special envoy and coordinator at the Global Engagement
Center will be helpful in providing perspective on the current
state of the U.S. Government's [USG's] strategy, capabilities,
and direction in information warfare and counterpropaganda.
The previous administration and the 114th Congress
demonstrated clear commitment to this issue, as evidenced by
President Obama's executive order that established the Global
Engagement Center and the 2017 National Defense Authorization
Act that expanded the center's mission.
The NDAA expanded the GEC's mandate to include counter-
state propaganda, as Chairwoman Stefanik mentioned, and
disinformation efforts. This is well beyond the original
charter which limited it to diminishing the influence of
terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria [ISIS] in this information domain. This is a big step in
the right direction, but the sobering fact is that we are still
far from where we ultimately need to be to operate in the
modern information environment.
As I said, I am very pleased to be joined by Matt and Tim,
two of the most experienced people in this space, who I think
collectively, we should be able to answer most of this
committee's questions.
Since the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, which
was largely--arguably, the last period in history when the U.S.
successfully engaged in sustained information warfare and
counter-state propaganda efforts, technology and how the world
communicates has drastically changed. We now live in a
hyperconnected world where the flow of information moves in
real time. The lines of authority and effort between public
diplomacy, public affairs, and information warfare have blurred
to the point where, in many cases, information is consumed by
U.S. and foreign audiences at the same time via the same means.
To illustrate this fact, as this committee is aware, it was
a 33-year-old IT [information technology] consultant in
Abbottabad, Pakistan, that first reported the U.S. military
raid against Osama bin Laden in 2011 on Twitter. This happened
as events were still unfolding on the ground and hours before
the American people were officially notified by the President
of the United States address.
While the means and methods of communication have
transformed significantly over the past decade, much of the
U.S. Government thinking on shaping and responding in the
information environment has remained largely unchanged, to
include how we manage U.S. Government information dissemination
and how we respond to the information of our adversaries. We
are cognitively hamstrung for a myriad of reasons, to include
lack of accountability and oversight, bureaucracy resulting in
insufficient levels of resourcing, and inability to absorb
cutting-edge information and analytic tools, and access to
highly skilled personnel. This while our adversaries are
increasing investment in the information environment, while not
being constrained by ethics, the law, or even the truth.
The good news is that we have good people working this
effort. The workforce is committed and passionate and recognize
why this is important and why we as a nation need to get it
right.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lumpkin can be found in the
Appendix on page 50.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Lumpkin.
I now recognize Mr. Thomas.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY L. THOMAS, SENIOR ANALYST, FOREIGN
MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE, FORT LEAVENWORTH
Mr. Thomas. Chairwoman Stefanik, distinguished members of
the House Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
talk about Russian concepts and capabilities for information
warfare.
By way of disclaimer, while I work for the Department of
the Army as a senior analyst at the Foreign Military Studies
Office, which does unclassified work, I am appearing today in
my capacity as a subject matter expert and not as a person who
can speak in an official capacity about Army or defense policy.
As such, the views I express today are my own and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Army or
Department of Defense.
Russia's information warfare approach is holistic. It is
focused not only on media and propaganda, but on information
technologies that fit weaponry as well. Ever since the 1990s,
Russia has divided its information warfare concepts into two
parts: Information technical and information psychological.
Social media and cyber have tended to blend the two and caused
a significant change in how Russia views the emerging trends in
the character of warfare.
First, they note that nonmilitary activities, such as media
use or information deterrence capabilities, are being used more
often, they say by a ratio of four to one, than military ones.
And second, they note that information technologies reduce
distance and make remote engagement, whether it be by
international media, infiltration abroad, or the use of high-
tech weapons to be considered as a principal tactic or means.
Forecasts are made after these trends are studied that
reflect how conflict might unfold, which appears to be the
general staff's development of a new type warfare scenario, the
diagram of which was part of the written testimony. This new
type warfare includes disorienting a victim state's leadership,
creating dissatisfaction in the populace, intensifying
diplomatic pressure and propaganda, applying cyber attacks and
software effects, covertly deploying special forces, and using
weapons based on either new physical principles, robotics, or
other issues.
After trends and forecasts are made, a military strategy
encompassing all aspects of military and state activity is
established to take advantage of the forecast. An information
strategy, according to one Russian source, is a state's use of
information technologies and effects to attain information
superiority over competitors in several areas. Evolving science
and technology developments potentially alter the correlation
of information-based forces along strategic sectors or in
space.
Finally, forms and methods of employing the strategy are
developed. The chief of the Russian General Staff Valery
Gerasimov has stated often that the production of new forms and
methods of warfare is an urgent task for military academies to
develop. A form is an organization which in regard to
information warfare could include international media elements
such as Russia Today [RT] or Sputnik, or military developments,
such as the creation of science companies or information
operation forces.
These forms or organizations implement methods. Methods are
composed of two parts: Weaponry and military art. Weaponry can
include hackers, reflexive control techniques, trolls,
disinformation, deterrence capabilities, and other agents of
destruction or influence. Military art includes the use of
indirect and asymmetric capabilities to achieve specific goals,
such as the exploitation of the West's free press or an
indirect attack on the cyber infrastructure of another nation.
Russian's excellent contingent of algorithm writers ensures
that the nation will be strong for years to come in writing
software as weapons that could eavesdrop, persuade, or destroy.
To summarize, the effort is holistic, it follows trends,
makes forecasts, strategies, and force correlations, and
develops forms and methods to implement the strategy.
I thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found in the
Appendix on page 62.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
My question, I actually would like to start with you in
regards to your testimony. When it comes to Russian propaganda
and disinformation activities against NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] and the EU [European Union], how damaging
are their propaganda campaign against these organizations? And
what impact is that having on U.S. national security and
economic ties to Europe? And then the second part of my
question is, knowing that I would like to focus on Russian
propaganda dealing with NATO and the EU, can you also add
another layer, you referenced the exploitation of the Western
free press, how is that a part of their broader propaganda
strategies?
Mr. Thomas. Thank you. The first part of your question with
regard to propaganda, propaganda is usually associated with
emotional content. It varies from what you might call the
disinformation aspect, which is designed to focus more on the
logic of decision making. So what you will have as a
combination of these two, the emotional aspect is aimed, I
believe, more at the population of the country, whereas the
disinformation aspect is aimed more at decision makers within
the EU or NATO. The final goal would be, clearly, to disrupt or
destroy the relationships among NATO and members of the EU.
The second part of your question which addressed Western
thought and how Russia might take advantage of it, back in
1946, George Kennan noted that Russians do not believe in
objective truth. If you fast forward ahead to about 2014, and
you listen to some of their commentators, like Dmitry Kiselyov,
Kiselyov noted that objectivity is a myth being imposed upon
us. So what you have within the Russian information domain, if
you want to call it that, is no real truth. You just have the
ability to create an alternate reality, which doesn't coincide
at all with the Western understanding of information in a free
press.
Perhaps the best example of that was the downing of the
Malaysia airliner. Immediately, we had our own understanding of
what had happened. We had the intercepts. We had the images of
the air defense platform leaving the area, yet for the next 3
or 4 years, we listened incessantly to Russian alternate views
of what had happened, with the last one coming the day before
the Netherlands released their report. They attempted to create
an alternate reality. This seems to be the focus of the
propaganda effort there as they study us and they study
audience behavior.
Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik. I want to broaden my followup to Mr.
Armstrong and Mr. Lumpkin. So what strategies do we need to
pursue to counterbalance the example that Mr. Thomas just laid
out?
Mr. Lumpkin. I think we need to do--because we can develop
strategies, we have to have a strategy for respective
countries. One thing that I have learned in my time is that
like all politics is local, all messaging is local as well. So
a strategy that works for Russia, for example, countering their
disinformation propaganda efforts, may or may not work in
another nation, but each one has to be tailored. For example,
if you were going to do counter-propaganda disinformation
against Russia, you would want it to have a different strategy,
for example, with Iran or any other nations that we were going
to work with. And it is not just a nation-state issue; it is
also true against violent extremist groups as well.
So I think the key is you have to understand the audience,
have clear goals set out of what you want to achieve, and then
develop a strategy that is unique to that particular audience.
Ms. Stefanik. And that is something that Russia does,
unfortunately, effectively. They have country-specific
strategies when it comes to their disinformation and
propaganda.
Mr. Lumpkin. Absolutely. And I do believe that we have to
think about information in the same way when you are going
against other nation-states' efforts.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Armstrong.
Mr. Armstrong. So to add to Michael's comments, we need to
understand the local information environment. I think one of
the problems we suffer is that we mirror-image. We pretend that
the local audiences know what we know, that they have the same
access to the information, and that is simply often not the
case. We have to pay attention that the Russians will make
fake--not just deliver fake stories, whether it is a rape or
some other abhorrent action to spur up local concerns and
issues, but they will put fake experts on the air and they will
create fake groups.
So it is one thing for us to come from the outside and
probe into a country and say, this is what we need to say and
what we need to do, but we need to help those nations and those
markets, if you will, understand and be more critical about the
information that they are getting.
One of the things that the Russians take advantage of is
the lack of critical thinking. They don't want a critical
thinker. A critical thinker is not the audience for a Russian
media product. That is why they will throw out three or four,
five, six, in the case of MH17, eight different stories lines
at one time, maybe even within the same hour of broadcast,
because it will resonate with different people in different
ways. But they also have a tolerance for failure. So they will
drop a story line if it is not working or they will drop an
effort.
And that is one of the challenges that we have is that we
have almost zero tolerance for failure. So we delay, we wait
until we have it perfect, whereas our adversaries are spinning
and trying and trying and trying until something actually
works. So I would say we need to partner with local capacity
and help develop local capacity.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Armstrong.
I now recognize Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank you for
having this hearing. I think this is really a critical area
that we spend really too little time and underfund our efforts
mightily.
I was struck when reading through the list of Russian
military tactics for offensive media campaigns: Lies for the
purposes of disinformation; focusing on the negative, which is
more readily accepted than the positive; simplification,
confirmation, and repetition; introducing taboos on categories
of news. It sounds to me a lot like the 2016 Presidential
campaign.
Now, don't get me wrong. I do firmly believe, based on all
the available evidence, that Russia played a heavy hand as
well, but as we have seen this behavior during the campaign
continue in the Presidency, I am forced to wonder how much
additional damage has been self-inflicted.
So, Mr. Thomas, would you assess that the undermining of
public confidence in domestic and international institutions,
attacks on the free press, are all consistent with Russian
information warfare objectives?
Mr. Thomas. Yes, I think that they are consistent. I think
what you see when you listen to the Russians, is at home they
have what I would call an echo chamber in that everything they
say is being said by the same people over and over. The way
they have tried to handle their audience vulnerabilities is
they have stopped allowing surveys like we would have with a
Gallup Poll so that they can limit vulnerabilities to that
audience. Meanwhile, as Matt and Michael have said, they are
studying the vulnerabilities in other countries to the best of
their ability to find those--they look at the Gallup Polls and
find where they might be able to place some important
information.
Ms. Speier. So if you were to identify what our
vulnerabilities are as seen by the Russians, what would they
be?
Mr. Thomas. I don't think I would be a person who could
answer that particular question.
Ms. Speier. Do any of you have a comment on that? Mr.
Armstrong.
Mr. Armstrong. So I think it is really important. I think
there are some good, obvious examples over in Europe right now.
But with regard to the United States, I had a conversation with
a senior Russian involved in their information activities, and
they made a comment that there would not be a market in the
United States for RT if the American media was doing their job.
And I think there is some legitimacy to that, is that the
polarization of our news has created some gaps and has--there
is an interesting thing that RT has done, I believe. Where we
perceive a linear spectrum, there is a far left and a far
right, RT has managed to bend that so that they are addressing
the far right and the far left simultaneously.
Now, they are generally on the fringes and it is easy for
us to overestimate their impact, but their true impact, I
think, is their seepage of their stories, of their messages, of
their questioning that gets into our conversations. So I think
that's where we should be looking at. But RT is not alone in
that space.
Ms. Speier. So Mr. Clapper has suggested, as you pointed
out in your testimony, re-creation of the USIA, although I
guess one of you indicated not in its original form. I think
that was you, Mr. Lumpkin. How would you see an agency that is
robust in terms of putting out information in localities around
the world, what would that look like to you?
Mr. Lumpkin. Just to kind of follow up on my written
statement is, I do believe that, based upon the complexity of
the information environment, the numbers of actors and players
within the U.S. Government, that there is a lot of people
working hard, everybody's rowing the boat, not necessarily in
the same direction. And I do believe that the creation of the
GEC, the Global Engagement Center, was a step in the right
direction on trying to coordinate, synchronize, and ultimately
lead U.S. Government efforts.
Ms. Speier. But you said that, in the end, was suggestive.
Mr. Lumpkin. Yes, and I believe that. Unfortunately, it is
too mired in the bowels of the bureaucracy that it doesn't have
the ability to direct the interagency nor advocate for
resourcing. I believe if you elevated an entity to something
similar to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
that could effectively coordinate and direct the interagency,
you would be able to garner more resources, better synchronize
the efforts, and have better end-states over U.S. information
efforts against----
Ms. Speier. Okay. I have 15 seconds, and I have one more
question for you, Mr. Lumpkin. Do you believe the hiring freeze
is having a deleterious effect on our ability to respond?
Mr. Lumpkin. I think it will. I do believe it will.
Ms. Speier. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. I now recognize Dr. Abraham.
Dr. Abraham. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for the
very sobering testimony. I hope we and the Department of
Defense take heed.
It appears that Russia and other state players are--have a
lot of smoke and mirror-type technology where, unfortunately,
we in America have to adhere just because of moralistic
standards to a more rigid structure.
Mr. Lumpkin, you referenced a particular strategy for a
particular state or a particular country. The problem is, as we
all know, is that now there is a mixture and a menagerie of all
these states and terrorist organizations that sometimes
certainly cloud the picture. And I totally agree that,
unfortunately, the way our laws and somewhat our citizenship,
as far as being basic good people, we are restricted somewhat
to being more of a reactionary than a proactive state. And I
think we saw that in the OPM [Office of Personnel Management]
breach.
The question I have is why has the USG been unable to unify
and orient its various interested organizations and
capabilities to compete in this broader information
environment? What is the disconnect there?
Mr. Lumpkin. I wish I could say that there was one thing
that was the causal agent, but if we--I have had many jobs in
my life. The most complicated and complex environment I ever
operated in was being the special envoy and the coordinator at
the Global Engagement Center, because the stakeholders are
vast, budgets are all over the map, authorities are not aligned
with the current environment between public affairs,
information operations, and public diplomacy and--nor are the
efforts. And I think it is, we are at the point where we need
to take a step back, especially while technology in the world
is continuing to advance and become more hyperconnected, to
look at how we can effectively do this.
But I do believe we can have an overarching strategy in
organization structure and then come up with substrategies for
specific countries or groups.
Dr. Abraham. So do you think maybe the DOD needs a global
nonkinetic-type coordinator to kind of herd the cats?
Mr. Lumpkin. Well, I don't know that it should be DOD that
is leading the effort, and here is why: Because the information
operations efforts are generally focused on title 10, support
of military objectives.
Dr. Abraham. Right.
Mr. Lumpkin. And this is much larger than the military.
They are a key stakeholder and a key component and probably the
best resourced, but that doesn't mean that they should be
leading the effort, because there are limitations to their
authorities on how and where they can operate.
Dr. Abraham. That is a little bit unsettling. The next
question for you again, Mr. Lumpkin. And, Mr. Armstrong, please
chime in, and Mr. Thomas, if you have comments.
What do you see as the major challenges for the Department
of Defense today in conducting information operations and
counter-propaganda within the structure that they now have?
Mr. Lumpkin. I think that they continue to have resourcing
challenges. Again, lots of good people working on this issue,
just not enough of them. I think that is one part that they
have got as far as people. There is the budget levels. As Mr.
Armstrong mentions, there is also the tolerance for risk. We
have to increase our acceptance of a risk and be able to
iterate very rapidly when we do a--try to come up with a
messaging program or strategy and we find it not effective, we
have to iterate and move very rapidly. We have to build
agility, which means that most of our work has to be
underpinned with data analytics. It has to be an analytics-
based structure, which means we have to have the analytic
tools, capabilities, and access to talent that knows how to use
them.
Dr. Abrahams. And other state players, such as Russia, they
don't even pay attention to the analytics; they just kind of
throw them out of the window and say they really don't exist at
all sometimes.
Mr. Lumpkin. I am sure that is the case, but I would argue
that because our adversaries have a very high threshold for
risk, they can get it wrong a lot and still just inundate the
airwaves and the information space.
Dr. Abrahams. Anything to add, Mr. Armstrong, right quick?
Mr. Armstrong. I do, thank you. So I would rephrase the
same thing that Mr. Lumpkin said: There is an acceptance of a
threat that is absent, there is a prioritization that is
absent, and there is a strategy that is absent. So put another
way, the combatant commander or the commander on the ground is
going to be more concerned with LOAC, law of armed conflict,
rather than the informational or psychological effect of an
activity, which means in this transparent battlefield
environment, the psychological effect of an action may be more
narrow than what the legal--what the law allows. But yet they
will have the lawyer there rather than the psyop or information
officer there.
Dr. Abrahams. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Langevin, for his
opening statements and then the opportunity to ask questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair. And welcome to our
witnesses here today. I apologize that I was late. My plane
just landed a little while ago, and got here as quick as I
could. But I am sorry I missed your opening statements, but we
have your statements for the record, and I appreciate your
being here today.
So, Mr. Lumpkin, in particular, it is nice to see you
again. Welcome back. And as the former Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict as
well as the prior special envoy of the Global Engagement Center
at the Department of State, you certainly have valuable
insight. I know that we have benefited, the government can
benefit from his work to understand information operations
conducted by our adversaries and improve U.S. efforts to
counter propaganda and other activities under the IO umbrella.
Our other two witnesses, of course, also bring
extraordinary perspectives. Mr. Armstrong was previously with
the Broadcasting Board of Governors [BBG], and Mr. Thomas has
spent his career in the IO fields and earned his expertise on
Russia through extensive study. So I appreciate your
perspectives and taking the time to be here today.
As the witnesses' robust backgrounds demonstrate, U.S.
information operations require what I believe is a whole-of-
government approach. This subcommittee has worked tirelessly on
U.S. IO policy and capabilities over the years, and more
recently focused on fine tuning our ability to counter
propaganda. One such effort is a provision in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 that expands the
scope of the Global Engagement Center to include countering
propaganda of nation-state actors, which is the focus of
today's hearing.
Nation-states, like the Russian Federation, use the
information environment outside of a combat zone in a strategic
effort to intimidate, to undermine, and control allies, as well
as stymie U.S. objectives. They are doing so in an increasingly
aggressive and overt manner as evidenced by Russia's recent
acknowledgment of the formation of new IO troops.
IO is only one component of Russia's strategy to achieve
objectives, but their tactics, their techniques and procedures
often executed with complete disregard for international norms
have proven effective at achieving favorable conditions for
their underlying intentions and their motivations.
The United States is not a nation that will disregard the
law or compromise basic values. Data collection, analysis, and
storage required to inform our own counter-propaganda and
information operations writ large, especially outside the
combat zone and using social media, must continue to comply
with domestic and international law. The United States overt
messaging must always be delivered consistently and maintain a
truth and integrity.
In accordance with our values, we must improve the U.S.
Government and our allies' ability to counter IO of other
actors and take back the narrative in order to promulgate
truth. This effort will require us to ask hard questions, such
as, is the government organized for and prioritizing effective
IO? Is the Department of State force structure which--I am
sorry. Is the Department of Defense force structure, which
currently aligns IO capabilities to many commands, conducive to
effective employment of information operations in concert with
other interagency efforts outside of an area of active
hostilities?
The U.S. must leverage technological advancements and other
new capabilities in a timely manner. The Department of Defense
must also be able to effectively employ such capabilities with
operational funding authorities that allow for flexibility in
an ever-evolving information environment while still
maintaining transparency and oversight of activities.
Finally, and most importantly, U.S. strategies and military
commander objectives for addressing threats must be realistic
and holistic. We must leverage all tools at our disposal for
disruption, deterrence, and response, while mitigating conflict
escalation in the development of ever more pernicious
techniques for conducting influence campaigns.
So with that, I will stop there and go to questions.
Ms. Stefanik. Yes.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. So again, thanks to our witnesses.
Mr. Lumpkin, if I could, based on your experience in the
DOD, what role should Cyber Command [CYBERCOM] have in
countering IO of nation-state military or nonmilitary actors
outside of an area of hostilities? And does that change if the
IO is being conducted on U.S. soil? And is there more that can
be done to leverage the capabilities of this command consistent
with international and other laws?
Mr. Lumpkin. I believe that CYBERCOM is a key player in
this space. When you look at--and this is why in the language
of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act it was critical
that it said countering--to go against--counter-state
propaganda and disinformation efforts. It allowed us to think
differently about the problem set, to look at this--this isn't
a tit for tat in the information space, but rather looking at
the entire tools of government that can be applied against this
problem set. And I think CYBERCOM is a key player in this
space.
Now, I do recognize and appreciate the lines of authority
of operating domestically for CYBERCOM, and I respect those
lines. But that said, it is becoming much more difficult to see
where information starts and where it stops. It is very
difficult to see whether somebody is an American citizen when
they are using a computer in a nation outside of the United
States. There is no passport with an IP [internet protocol]
address. So as we look to what affects U.S. citizens and what
affects domestic policy, the lines are very gray and very
blurred right now.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Thomas, you stress in your testimony that Russia
perceives it is under attack from the West. If the U.S. ramps
up its own IO and other efforts to counter their indirect
warfare activities, how do we do so in a manner that decreases
the risk of conflict escalation and modern warfare arms race?
Mr. Thomas. Well, the first--the very first thing that I
would be thinking of is for us to counter what Russia is doing,
you really have to understand what they are doing. And what I
mean by that is the tools that they have, the tools they use
are different than some other nations, specifically because of
their ability to use half truths or lies and get away with it,
because they have, as we have said, an echo chamber that
everybody's kind of on the same page when you listen to the
evening news. But you have to understand what they mean when
they say, I am employing information deterrence, when they say
I am employing reflexive control, when I am using trolls.
People really have to understand the lay of the land.
Probably the best issue you can think of is if two teams
are playing basketball and--we are into the Final Four here of
March Madness--one team is not practicing against its own
offense in practice. It is practicing against what the other
guy is set up for offense and what kind of defense they play.
And it is kind of the same way with looking at Russian
propaganda and disinformation activities. You have to
understand what it is objectively that sits behind the way they
do business. It is different than us. And once that is
understood, you have a base from which you can then begin to
respond. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Okay. And to all of our witnesses, in your opinion, what
are the most effective capabilities and activities the U.S. can
employ to deter, disrupt, and counter IO of nation-states,
specifically propaganda, for deterrence and disruption? Is it
disruption or denial of service to our adversary or
dissemination of truthful narrative or are sanctions outside of
the IO space most effective, for example, sanctions?
Mr. Armstrong. So if--before I answer that question, if I
can go back to your previous question to Mr. Thomas. I think
there is a challenge here that we must not be accepting the
Russian narrative, that they say that they are perceiving being
attacked by the West is part of Putin's game. So I think part
of the problem is we are too quick to accept their narrative
and to undermine that narrative. He is riding a tiger that he
has to keep finding an outside target for everybody.
And that leads into the answer to your question. I think
that you gave several options, and I think the answer is yes,
it depends on the situation. There is certainly an issue that
we have with regard to Russia, as well as China, as
reciprocity. We permit Russian media to operate here freely
just as we would because that is our principles, those are our
principles, and we allow Chinese media to operate freely.
However, both countries deny our access, either our commercial
media or our government media. For example, the BBG, for Voice
of America [VOA], Radio Free Europe, are denied access to
Russia, and China denies VOA and Radio Free Asia.
So I think there is an issue of reciprocity, but I also
think there are elements where there needs to be, if you will,
a more cyber--or rather a more physical type of attack response
to their various activities. This is an incursion, it is a
digital incursion, but I think there are times where a similar
response is needed, just as much we need to get our message out
there and make our statements. So the answer would be yes to
all.
Mr. Langevin. Okay.
Mr. Lumpkin. I agree that all of those are very important
and need to be an area of focus. I would add one more, if I
could. It would be leveraging our partners. We have many
partners who see the Russian threat in particular as
existential, as something they live with every day.
Last year, I was in Lithuania and had some opportunity to
talk to people and to get to understand the problem set and how
they see the world. They have some very talented people who,
frankly, there are many folks that are just looking for a
little leadership. And I think it is one of the things we can
do is to work with our partners to make sure we help build
their capabilities, because this is a problem much bigger than
just with us here in the United States. But I think we can
leverage and lean heavily on our allies to carry a lot of water
for us.
Mr. Langevin. Agreed, agreed. Thank you. Well said. All of
you, thank you very much.
I yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And, Mr. Armstrong, you talked about a lot of the issues
that I had written down, state-owned media versus free press,
that 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week news cycle where
sensationalizing and getting it fast is more important to the
news channels than getting it right. I can't name a journalist
anymore, to be honest with you. I think that is a greater
threat to our country than any outside influence.
But with regard to this type of warfare, if you will, it is
the exact opposite from a strategy standpoint as traditional
war from what I can tell. I mean, we have always had--a
country's capabilities were typically limited by their
capacity. Capacity could be money, it could be the ability to
get food and ammo to your soldiers, it could be manpower.
Geography in and of itself limits a country's capacities. We
are talking about Russia. You know, I don't think Russia has
the ability to carry out operations in the Ukraine, Poland, the
Baltic States, Syria. I don't think their economy allows them
to do that right now. But their economy does allow them to
create chaos, and then wherever they see the weakest point or
the cheapest opportunity, if you will, to take advantage of it.
And so I have two questions, specifically with offense is
cheap in this type of warfare and defense is expensive. So with
that said, how do you limit the capacity of your adversary if
you are not playing offense? And then two is, do you think that
Russia has an endgame in mind or do you think that their goal
is to create chaos and then simply take advantage of whatever
weak points they see?
Mr. Armstrong. Thank you for that question. Starting with
your second question, yes. I think they have an endgame, and I
think you answered that. I think it is the chaos to allow
them--they would prefer to set up bilateral relations. They
would prefer their adversaries or the other nations, Europe,
not just us, to be in turmoil so that they can seed any message
they want in there and they can get whatever they want to
achieve out.
As far as what is a good defense to an aggressive offense,
I think this is something where a good offense is a good
defense. We are--as I said in my testimony, we are on our back
feet. We are on our heels. We are responsive and reactive. And
as the comment I made earlier about the Russian media leader,
we are creating all sorts of opportunities for them. We don't
have a strategy. As I said in my testimony, we have a
credibility gap, and that creates not just a domestic
vulnerability but a foreign vulnerability. When we don't have--
this has been going on for years. When we don't have a clear,
concise strategy and our adversaries are able to exploit that
or when they manufacture a gap and we are unable to defend that
and close that gap by exposing the truth, it is a
vulnerability.
So I would go back to my earlier comment that we need to
understand that this is a priority. This is asymmetric warfare.
This is on the cheap. It is an ability to gain your foreign
policy objectives very easily. As the chairwoman said in her
opening statement, that this is the ability to reach into
another nation very freely, very easily. So I think we need to
prioritize this and we need to understand that this is a risk.
And we can't, as Mr. Lumpkin said, we cannot separate cyber
data, as I would call it, and cyber psychological. This is a
merged environment.
Mr. Scott. So the only way to limit their capacity is for
us to be on offense, not defense?
Mr. Armstrong. Well, yes. And I would add, undercut their
will to act in that way.
Mr. Scott. Fair enough.
Mr. Armstrong. If they don't perceive value, there is no
risk, there is no cost. So I think part of this too is our lack
of strategy is we have not established an escalation ladder. We
don't necessarily need to publish that because somebody will
come right up to it, as they are in hybrid warfare.
Mr. Scott. Someone may publish it for us.
Mr. Armstrong. But we don't know when it is too much. We
haven't decided that. So we don't know when we are going to
react. And I think the Russians are a perfect example of a
group that is willing to keep literally and virtually pushing--
--
Mr. Scott. I am down to 20 seconds. Would you agree then
that they are not going to stop until we stop them?
Mr. Armstrong. Agree completely.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the country.
Ms. Stefanik. Mrs. Murphy.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you all for being here.
Mr. Lumpkin, you were recently leading the Global
Engagement Center at the State Department, an organization that
was created last year to lead and coordinate the Federal
Government's counter-propaganda efforts. In your written
testimony and as you have discussed a bit here today, you
suggest that the center should be elevated above the assistant
secretary level at State in order to give the organization more
authority to direct the interagency.
What sort of resources and authorities would it take to
elevate the center to something akin to the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence? And do you have examples of
how the current interagency structure prevents us from having
an effective governmentwide information warfare and counter-
propaganda strategy?
Mr. Lumpkin. First, I think, let me take the second part of
that first. What I found as the special envoy and coordinator
for Global Engagement Center, I had so many peers, so my
position was relegated to suggesting action. I had no influence
over budgets, how they spent their money, where they put their
people, and what was a priority and what was not. In order for
me to--I had a very good working relationship and we were able
to do a lot based on power of personality, and based on me
coming directly from the Department of Defense previously. But
there are a host of different players in this. You have got
USAID [United States Agency for International Development], the
regional bureaus at the State Department, you have got the
intelligence community [IC], you have CYBERCOM, you have many
different organizations that have a role here to play. And it
is just trying to herd those cats to get them to actually do
what you need to do. That is the problem set as far as
organization.
Again, using my analogy, is everybody is rowing the boat
really hard, just not necessarily in the same direction, which
impedes forward progress.
I do believe there are several ways this could be done. I
think it is best done through legislation, just as what was
done with the GEC being codified and expanding its mission set
to include the counter-state and disinformation efforts. I
think that is generally the best mechanism to get things
changed to be enduring. So that would be my first--and also
make sure everybody's got skin in the game, which I think is
important from a resourcing perspective, and not just leaving
it up to the executive branch to sort this out, because we all
own this problem set.
Mrs. Murphy. And then my second question is about our
efforts to counter ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]
propaganda on the internet and to make it harder for them to
recruit online. To be successful, this effort requires U.S.
personnel, military and civilian, with the proper linguistic
skills as well as cultural skills to be able to understand what
they are reading and engage.
A recent article about the CENTCOM [Central Command]
program to counter ISIL's online propaganda indicated that our
efforts may not be effective or at least as effective as they
could be. I raised this issue at a previous hearing with
Michael Sheehan, who ran NYPD's [New York Police Department's]
counterterrorism operations. Mr. Sheehan said that the Federal
security clearance process is the real obstacle, which makes it
hard for qualified linguists to get cleared to do this critical
work for the Federal Government. He noted that at NYPD, they
put their linguists in a box, as he put it, so that they could
do their work without having access to classified information.
He suggested the NYPD model could be replicated on the Federal
level. Would you comment on this idea?
Mr. Lumpkin. I think there is some merit to it. One of the
authorities that was granted to the Global Engagement Center
was access--it is leveraging what they call section 3161, which
is a hiring authority, which allowed the GEC to hire people to
work in the U.S. Government uncompetitively based on their
skill sets for a limited term.
For example, it gave me access to folks in Silicon Valley,
Madison Avenue, people who were pros in this space, in addition
to folks who have unique cultural or language capabilities that
I could--the challenge I always ran into is the security
clearance requirement, because what I found within the
Department of State, it takes about the same time to get
somebody a top secret access to sensitive compartmented
intelligence as it does a confidential clearance.
So normally it takes about, I am told, a year to 18 months.
What I was able to do is, one individual, we were able to fast
track it, we put a lot of pressure on the system, and we did it
in 5 months. I know it can be done, but that was a one-off. It
doesn't happen every time.
Mrs. Murphy. And do you think that there is a way to hire
some of these people and box them in such that they don't need
a clearance?
Mr. Lumpkin. I think it depends on--I think it can be done.
It is problematic, especially if you are looking in
collaborative work environments, where--an information space
that is very dynamic and is moving in real time. It is very
hard to go out to a box and get somebody's--it is difficult.
So, I mean, it is a short-term solution, but it will have
long-term consequences of not being as productive as it could
be. A better option would be to find ways to fast track the
security clearance process to bring the right people in to do
the mission set that needs to be done.
Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
You know, I think there is consensus that on the tactical
level America has very effectively engaged the terrorist groups
throughout the world. We win the battle on the battlefield, but
we really haven't engaged them on the strategic level as
effectively as we should, namely their narrative of global
jihad.
And I guess my first question is related to the Global
Engagement Center. Do you believe that we need to encourage or
to make sure that the GEC places a greater emphasis on Islamist
theology and jihadist ideology if it is to effectively counter
the propaganda success of jihadi groups like ISIS, or is the
problem just a lack of money?
Mr. Lumpkin. Well----
Mr. Franks. Mr. Lumpkin, yes, sir----
Mr. Lumpkin. Yeah, no, I have looked at this problem set
quite a bit. And as I look at ISIS, if I look at ISIS and I see
how they recruit and who they recruit, when they are recruiting
from abroad, they are generally going after vulnerable
populations.
The way I kind of do the math, is there is about 7 billion,
7.5 billion people on the planet, okay. At the height of ISIS,
there was about 30,000 of them, 30,000 people. We know how many
people have been killed, how many people have been wounded, and
how many people have defected from the battlefield, plus or
minus, which leads us to a number between 9,000 and 19,000 that
joined this organization per year.
When I simplify it like that and I look at--so we have 7.5
billion people being held hostage by 9,000 to 19,000 recruits
every year. In order to find those people, we have to use
scalpel-like messages that resonate with those individuals
instead of just going after one broad of a--Islamic messages,
because people join ISIS for different reasons.
The best study I have seen was done by the group called
Quantum out of Lebanon, which basically binned those people who
joined ISIS into nine different bins, everything from death
seekers to thrill seekers, some are hardcore fundamentalists,
some are looking for redemption. But each one of those groups,
when you understand the recruit and you understand the
audience, you have to target why they joined, and you have to
come up with messaging strategies against each and every one of
those groups.
Mr. Franks. So do you believe that the challenge is just a
lack of funding or more specifically focusing on those messages
that you have cited?
Mr. Lumpkin. I think you have challenges in both. I will
tell you, in 2015, we--the U.S. Government, did a single
kinetic strike against a high-value target that cost the U.S.
taxpayers--when you look at the intelligence gathering before
and after the strike was about $250 million that had about 2
weeks of difference of impact on the battlefield to take out
one high-value target.
That same year in messaging, we spent about $5.6 million in
base funding. So we have a discrepancy in where we want to put
our money. Because I will tell you, I can tell you what your
priorities are based on where you put your money and where you
put your people. And in 2015, we weren't resourced
appropriately. We have made huge strides in a short amount of
time, but we still have a ways to go.
Mr. Franks. All right. Well, let me shift gears on you here
just a little bit.
To combat the Russian hybrid warfare, do we merely need to
park armored brigade combat teams in Eastern Europe without
improving our cyber capabilities or hardening our space assets,
in order to deter Russia, or do we have to sort of have a
mirror effort to be able to engage them at and oppose them at
every stage of their hybrid warfare?
And that would be Mr. Thomas, I think.
Mr. Thomas. Congressman, first of all, this is just my own
personal opinion. I don't think Russia does hybrid war. I know
a lot of people think they do.
What we see when we read their press, initially they were
doing something called new generation war, and that had to do a
lot with initially pressuring the leaders and then gradually
working into a regular warfare-type scenario where they
deployed special forces and then they had more traditional
combat.
That term went away in 2013 and has been replaced by the
diagram that I put in the testimony of new type warfare. I
think why it is important is because that diagram enables you
to see a scenario finally, a template of how Russia does
envision what a future war might look like.
I certainly understand why many people still ascribe
Russian efforts as hybrid, because they, from our definition,
it appears that way. But as we study them, we tend to look at
the Russian version because that is our job, you know, we look
at what they write all the time. But ever since that moment in
2013 or 2015 when this template was proposed, they have been
using that and the guys who talk new generation now talk new
type as well.
So what have they done that would answer your question,
they tend to--as you know, in this coming year they are going
to have a big exercise in the western district. They have
increased their--the number of divisions there; in other words,
they have increased the correlation of forces there with three
new divisions.
I think that General Hodges and others in Europe are doing
what they can to offer a counter, let them know that if they
did try to provoke actions or if they did try to come across
the border, there would be a deterrent to that activity.
So I think what we are doing at the moment is absolutely
what is needed. The question becomes when can both sides start
to pull back, you know, when can we talk about equal security
where we both feel secure. And like Michael said, how do we get
them out of this feeling of this existential situation where
everybody, on both the Baltic side, they feel like they are
being--their survival is under threat and the Russians
basically feel the same way.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Madam Chair, for an excellent
hearing, and thank the witnesses.
Mr. Armstrong, you had mentioned in your answer to, I
think, Ms. Speier's question that there are other RTs operating
in the U.S. Can you describe them, list them?
Mr. Armstrong. Sure. Thank you.
So you have RT, you have Sputnik, you have Ruptly, and then
I think you have them feeding other entities, Infowars comes to
mind, where those are echo chambers for those modalities. I
would suspect that you have a variety of other groups. There
was a project I was looking at with some colleagues. We were
looking at VK, VKontakte, the social media site, the Russian
social media site where American white supremacists were
flocking to VK because social media sites in the U.S., like
Facebook, were kicking them off.
And what we found was, it appeared that American white
supremacists were happily involved in discussions there, and
there were very Russian, not cloaked but Russian actors in
those spaces as well. So I think this is another insidious way
of spinning or getting into the conversation. So I think
besides these larger organizations, there is a lot of stuff
that they are doing on the margins.
Mr. Cooper. Are Chinese efforts in any way comparable to
this?
Mr. Armstrong. I think the Chinese are more sophisticated.
RT is willing to play on the margins and play at the extremes,
and China is a much more sophisticated actor. They are--I think
if you want to compare which one lies more, which one distorts
the truth more, I think RT's slogan of ``question more'' fits
them because they don't want you to find an answer. They just
want you to be confused.
And CCTV is a much more intellectual and they are trying to
push the Chinese view, but I think they do tend to be a more
professional operation. So I wouldn't equate them, per se, on
the same level. I don't think that either of them are
particularly good for the American market.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Thomas, I appreciated your detailed
knowledge of Russian techniques, particularly reflexive
control. I think you quoted Kennan as saying that the Russians
don't believe in objective truth. Was that from the Long
Telegram or some other of Kennan's writings? Do you remember?
Mr. Thomas. Yes, it was.
Mr. Cooper. How many other countries do you think have
leaders that share a similar philosophy of not believing in
objective truth, whether they articulate that or not?
Mr. Thomas. Uh-huh. Well, I do think that that is probably
the situation in China as well because they are strongly
Marxist as well, and anytime that you look at what is being
taught in the schools, especially in the propaganda schools,
they are looking, first of all, at how do I visualize objective
reality, and then subjectively, how do I manipulate those
factors to my benefit. That basically is their definition of
strategy, by the way. So we do see that.
One other thing I could add to what Matt said is that when
you look at Chinese propaganda in the United States, it is
interesting that you do see a subtler aspect like Sun Tzu
institutes where language is being taught in 39 or so
universities.
And you also see--I remember the last time I stayed at a
hotel here in Washington. There were two newspapers offered to
me in the morning, the Washington Post and the China Daily. And
when you start to see that, you realize that there--in one of
the books I wrote the Chinese did say point-blank that they
needed to take over the cultural environment in other
countries. And so there is an effort underway, with CCTV and
others, to more gradually, I think, than the Russian version,
which is quite dramatic and offensive.
Mr. Cooper. I don't know if any of you gentlemen have seen
the movie ``Occupied.'' It is a 10-part European series about
the takeover of Norway by Russia on energy issues. It was very
subtly done. I find when I am explaining defense policy to
folks back home, it is easier if I refer to a movie they might
have seen because they tend to have such disbelief and they
don't read newspapers.
So any popular materials you could suggest to us that might
help average people understand would be very useful. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
We will now go to the second round of questions for those
members who want another opportunity.
My question, I will start with Mr. Lumpkin. Some have
advocated for the creation of a U.S. Information Agency 2.0,
bringing together the technical capabilities of cyber with some
of the traditional information and communications component. Is
that something that GEC, the Global Engagement Center, can
build into? What is your opinion on that, having headed the
Global Engagement Center, on whether that is a viable proposal?
Mr. Lumpkin. I think that there is merit to a USIA, U.S.
Information Agency-like organization. I am loathe for more
bureaucracy. So what I would like to do is to envision
something that is more above the bureaucracy that can leverage
what is already happening in government and get it to work
better together and to make sure it is fully resourced, both in
moneys and people.
But I do believe that we have significant capability in the
U.S. Government; we just have to harness it, and, again, do
that without creating too much bureaucratic tension or
significant expense.
Ms. Stefanik. And just to delve a little bit further into
that, harnessing the capabilities we have today, can you talk
about specific steps we can take to continue to mature the
Global Engagement Center or continue to provide the resourcing
that is necessary; and then the third piece is making sure that
there is interagency communication rather than interagency
friction.
Mr. Lumpkin. I think you can do that by elevating the
Global Engagement Center within the Federal Government and
increase its authority by doing so. I think that will do that.
I do believe that there are several other things that can be
done. I think having access to key talent, the 3161 hiring
authority, which is only through the executive order, so if
that executive order were to go away, the 3161 hiring authority
would go away as well.
So--and that authority, because the executive order was
only for the countering violent extremist mission set, the
interpretation is that it can only be used for that mission
set. So you cannot use the 3161 hiring authority for the
counter-state and disinformation efforts mission set within the
Global Engagement Center.
So I think those are some key things that can be done. The
other thing of significance is the GEC does not have a
dedicated budget line. So it was funded largely through public
diplomacy dollars, but it was up to the discretion of the
senior leadership at the State Department on what that budget
line would be from year to year. And there is a lack of
stability in that funding, so it is hard to make long-term
decisions, and it is also difficult to use that color of money,
that type of money, that public diplomacy money to build
partner capacity, to teach our partners and make our partners
effective in this space. Because the more they do, the less we
have to.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Armstrong or Mr. Thomas, do you have
comments on that line of questioning?
Mr. Armstrong. I do. Thank you.
The notion of a new USIA I found very difficult to stomach,
because as I have written about, USIA was created as a part two
of a two-part reorganization of government by Eisenhower. And
unless we are going to reorganize government, it is going to be
really difficult to just recreate this thing because it was a
simpler communication environment. It was also a simpler
government. We have a much more complex space.
I would echo Mr. Lumpkin's comments, but I would also add
that we are ignoring that there is an office in the State
Department now that I think GEC, in some ways, and its
predecessor CSCC [Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications], was trying to not just augment but in a way
bypass or replace, and that is the Office of the Under
Secretary of Public Diplomacy and its operation the Bureau of
International Information Programs, which is the true legacy of
United States Information Agency in that it was a global
information center.
It does not have the flexibility either because of
authority or leadership to do these things, and so CSCC was
stood up and I think this recent GEC amendment, which
originally took shape as the Portman-Murphy amendment, which
was intentionally bypassing R, the Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy, I think it should be a wakeup call that R is not
executing within the Department, it is marginalized within the
Department. It is not executing what you need as far as foreign
policy and national security.
And as Mr. Lumpkin just said, even the money within there
and with the--both the authorities and the leadership, it has
been a challenge to properly support GEC.
And what is interesting, and this goes into what Ranking
Member Langevin started to--accidentally started to say ``State
force structure,'' I think there is a need to dramatically
review the State Department's force structure along these
lines, because one of the realities is that State Department
has forward presence everywhere, everywhere. They have local
expertise everywhere, and they are dramatically underfunded,
undersupported. They are not experiencing these type of
hearings. They don't have the same oversight. And, you know,
they are out there on the ground utterly underfunded,
undersupported, and not trained.
I would like to add too, is that while the Russians are
training their foreign service in--we can call it next
generation warfare or we can call it hybrid warfare, but they
are training their foreign service in this regard.
And I met with some of their version of FSI [Foreign
Service Institute], MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of
International Relations], and they were citing Frank Hoffman,
one of our military writers on this, and they were wondering
why Frank is so militaristic. But this is their civilian side,
and we have no comparable support to our foreign service or our
foreign ministry.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. That was an interesting
perspective. And on that, I would ask Mr. Lumpkin if he had
anything to add to what Mr. Armstrong just had to say about the
State Department?
Mr. Lumpkin. I only have 1 year of experience at the State
Department, so my perspective is probably not--it is not as
robust as my time in the Department of Defense. That said,
people who know me know that I am not a huge fan of
bureaucracy. I am not. I appreciate the need for it to
standardize routine tasks.
I had thought I had seen bureaucracy at the Department of
Defense until I got to the State Department. It is much
thicker, much more ingrained. Wicked smart people, amazingly
smart people, but I affectionately refer to the State
Department as a 19th century bureaucracy using 20th century
tools against a 21st century adversary. And we have to do
better.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
This is a question for all of our witnesses: How can we
better leverage technological advancements to counter IO
activities of other nations? Specifically, how can the U.S.,
particularly the Department of Defense, spur innovation and
obtain new technological capabilities?
Mr. Lumpkin. I would like to take that one. There is a lot
of--especially in the world of analytics, there are tremendous
number of tools. Last time I looked, there was between 3,400
and 3,800 analytic tools just on social media alone. It is an
area of technology and science that is emerging every day, that
is continuing to advance and to iterate itself.
What we have to do is to find ways to streamline access to
those tools so we can get them put on U.S. Government systems.
We are talking information technology systems, computer
software, to get those implemented. So we need to fast track or
streamline access to those because they are changing so fast.
And the social media environment and the media environment
writ large is changing so rapidly, what we find ourselves
frequently doing is putting 2-year-old tools into the workforce
because that is how long it takes to get approvals to use them
in many cases. So we have to find and streamline to keep up
with technological advancements and leverage those things that
can make our workforce more productive, more effective, and so
we can speed our messaging capabilities.
Mr. Armstrong. Can I add to that. I would say, one, we have
to understand what we want to achieve. I think simply ``stop
it'' is inadequate. I think we need to have a broader strategy,
and I think we need to have a cost. We need to impose a cost on
them to continue to conduct these activities, and I don't see
that that is part of our process.
Mr. Thomas. If I might add just one or two things quickly.
Russia has developed what they call science companies. They
have got about 10 or 11 of them now within the military. Those
science companies unite new, young brains with the older guys,
and they are learning from one another about electronic warfare
and programming and these sort of things.
They also have an advanced research foundation, which is--
they have created. It is similar to DARPA [Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency]. But they are into all of the things
that DARPA is and robotics and UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]
and all of these type of issues as well.
And perhaps most important of all has been the Russian
education system. They continue to churn out incredible
mathematicians and algorithm writers. And as anyone knows, you
know, the key to software is in search engines, is algorithms
and what it produces. And those are the--there is a high-tech
capability there that they have invested in for sure.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Sure. I don't disagree with that at all.
Point well taken.
So this is more of a longer term issue, well short and long
term. But to all witnesses, so the U.S. has struggled with
gauging the effectiveness of our own messaging and other IO
efforts. In your opinion, how can we improve U.S. ability to
measure effectiveness of IO activities and overall impact of
operations?
Mr. Lumpkin. This goes back to the analytic tools I was
talking about, is to making sure we have access to them and
also make sure that any strategies we develop and as we move
forward especially in the counter-state propaganda and
disinformation space is that they have to be underpinned with
analytics.
And it is not just assessing whether your message is
effective; if it is not, is how are you going to change it
rapidly, reassessed and--and change and change. Because at the
speed of information it has to constantly be iterated for the
consumer to keep up with the 24-hour, 7-days-a-week, 365-days-
a-year news and information cycle that is out there.
So I think the data is key to both what we do every day and
how you stay relevant in this space.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
I would like to explore for a second the extent to which
your worlds intersect with liberal arts academics in this
country. Like, there are lots of theories on social cohesion,
social capital, trust in the society, things like that. The
work of Robert Putnam or anybody like that mean anything to you
guys, or is that just----
Mr. Lumpkin. I think one of the keys for the Global
Engagement Center is there is several academic affiliations
where you look at--because this is about behavior, right, when
it is all said and done. It is about creating cognitive
realities for people, whether it is based on logic or it is
based on emotion, to change their ultimate behavior. So the
behavior aspects of this are pretty much everything when it is
said and done.
Mr. Cooper. That is why I am asking the question. He is
more on the sociology side. On the behavioral economics side
there are folks like Daniel Kahneman, won the Nobel Prize.
There are theorists like Jonathan Haidt wrote the ``Righteous
Mind: Why Good People Fight Over Politics and Religion.'' Do
you intersect with these worlds at all?
Mr. Lumpkin. The GEC does, absolutely, and myself as a
recovering anthropologist before I actually joined the United
States Navy many years ago, so I have a deep-seated
appreciation for the impacts of anthropology, sociology, and
the other liberal arts, and the effects of what we are trying
to actually do, so yes.
Mr. Cooper. So it's true that you can't conduct a public
opinion poll in Russia or presumably in China? Is that right?
Mr. Armstrong. So because they are difficult spaces to get
into, there is one--I think there were two, but there was one,
Levada, which was essentially the well-known Russian
independent public opinion center. If memory serves, there was
something that happened that caused relatively recently that
they are no longer viewed that way, because--so it is difficult
to do surveys in Russia. And China, I am not sure what our
capacity is.
Mr. Cooper. It seems like an environment in which there is
no trusted source, and that seems to be increasingly true in
this country, like I spoke at Rotary in Nashville this Monday,
and I have said that, well, 17 U.S. intelligence agencies
agreed there was some sort of Russian involvement in our
election. We don't know the extent or whether anybody was
persuaded, but at least they tried. And I got a lot of pushback
from Rotarians who said, well, why do you believe those guys.
Like shouldn't unanimity among 17 U.S. intelligence agencies
mean something to the average patriotic citizen?
Mr. Armstrong. So going to your earlier question, I think
there is a marketplace for loyalty that is evolving here, and
there is a redefinition of citizenship and national security
and nationalism, of who do you trust? Where is your alignment?
In that particular situation, what I am about to say doesn't
apply, but in the broader sense, you can now test drive another
identity.
This goes into your behavioral concepts. You can now test
drive an identity, and nobody has to know about it. You can
reconnect with a vast culture that you have no connection. As I
mentioned in the opening remarks about Jihad Jane, you can have
no affiliation, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and decide you
want to be part of something.
So there is an element here that is evolving our notion of
hyphenates to commas where you can carry multiple identities at
once. And from a marketing perspective, each one of those is an
opportunity for me to subvert you and do something.
So I think that there is a challenge here that is playing
within our trust scheme as well, even if it is not an outside
actor, but who do we trust. I think this goes into the
polarization of news. So we are continuing to subdivide, and I
see nothing that is moving to reverse that pathway right now.
Mr. Cooper. In the newspaper today, they say that the
German Government is considering imposing a 50,000 euro fine or
something for fake news on the German internet. Do you know of
any country that has done something like that?
Mr. Armstrong. Well, one, each nation has a different
relationship to the news. Our--such an act in our society would
be very, very difficult. There is a comparable--each of the
Baltic States, I think, have similar. They have tried--was it
Estonia? No, it was Latvia that actually shut down Russian TV,
and they continued to make efforts like that.
Britain has Ofcom, which is their regulatory for TV
broadcast. They recently shut down RT's London U.K. bank
account under those regulations. Now, that just covers
broadcast so it doesn't cover internet.
So each nation has a different relationship to what news is
flowing within their environment, so the answer is, yes, it
does pose interesting challenges in various places because it
can become a propaganda coup against that state.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Madam Chair. I see I have used my
time. Thanks.
Ms. Stefanik. Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. We just got word that the President has
recommended a 28 percent cut in the State Department.
Mr. Cooper. Thirty seven percent.
Ms. Speier. Well, I heard 28, but--and I think there is a
belief by some that by cutting that and cutting foreign aid
that we are somehow not impacting our national security. And I
think, Mr. Thomas, you had commented earlier, and I would like
you to explore for us the impacts on national security, cuts to
foreign aid and information distribution in foreign countries,
as anemic as it is for us, how that will affect our national
security.
Mr. Thomas. Congresswoman, I don't think I can answer that
question properly. I think I would rather defer to a State
Department person.
Ms. Speier. All right. Mr. Lumpkin.
Mr. Lumpkin. I think a cut of that magnitude would have
devastating consequences on everything from the goodness that
the State Department does from Fulbright scholarships that
help, you know, bring people and access people and bring the
world closer together and have people understand who we are as
a nation and what our values are and what we believe.
I know that on--I just look at, from my time at DOD in
conjunction with the State Department, we are not going to kill
our way to victory. We are not going to message our way to
victory. This is about having a layered approach to what we do,
and you cannot cut--make a 37 percent cut to a single
department that has such a crucial role without having
devastating consequences.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Armstrong.
Mr. Armstrong. So I think, like Mr. Lumpkin, we would both
say that the State Department is a dysfunctional place and full
of bureaucracy. That said, it needs to be revamped rather than
massive cuts. Even elements such as exchanges, they
historically have been part of the United States Government's
efforts to win or engage in the struggle for minds and wills by
developing local capacity.
Getting them to understand--getting the exchange
participants to understand the United States better is really
secondary or even tertiary. It is about building local
capacity, inoculating against adversarial information or
experiences.
So you add to that various other efforts, even the broader
public diplomacy realm or the various efforts in global affairs
or even their elements of counterterrorism or the narcotics,
INL [Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs], there are a tremendous number of activities there
that are operating in a silo.
And I think they do not just further our foreign policy in
the economic sense and societal sense but definitely contribute
to developing partner capacity on the ground.
Ms. Speier. I am going to interrupt you for a moment
because I have only got a minute 30, and I want you each to
answer this question. I serve on the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, as does Ms. Stefanik. What message
would you want to convey to the members of that committee in
terms of the Russian influence and its potential impacts in
this country?
Mr. Armstrong. That it is severe, we are underestimating
it, and there is no cost to the Russians for them doing it.
Mr. Lumpkin. And mine would be to reinvest the IC in their
capabilities to monitor, detect, and understand what the
Russians are doing.
Mr. Thomas. And I would add that it is probably just
unknown here just how insidious, if that is the right word, the
effort is in other countries overseas. I know there was one
country in the Baltics who said propaganda and information
influence is like carbon monoxide. It is colorless, it is
odorless, and it comes in and does its job.
And it is a very interesting way to think about how
propaganda is being used over there, especially in those
countries where when a TV, a cable package is put together and
within that package is Russian TV so that those people are
getting simply a different point of view that is in key areas
too, it is along the borders there with Russia. So there is
much to consider there.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you to all of the members from both
sides of the aisle for such thoughtful questions. As you can
see, there is an increased interest in these important issues.
I want to also thank our witnesses, Mr. Armstrong, Mr.
Lumpkin, and Mr. Thomas. We look forward to continuing working
with you as we begin the process of this year's NDAA, and thank
you very much for your testimony today.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 15, 2017
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 15, 2017
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 15, 2017
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. If we are to take seriously the threat posed by
Russian, Chinese, and jihadi information operations seriously, is the
GEC the appropriate institution to combat these aggressive (and
successful) information operation strategies? What reforms or changes
should be made to the GEC to make it more effective--or should we
create a new entity for this mission?
Mr. Armstrong. Thank you for this question. The informational
element is not a sideshow. It is at the heart of international affairs.
The kinetic effect of a bullet or bomb is often secondary to the
informational effect. At its core, terrorism is an informational act.
Our adversaries, from Russia to China to Iran to ISIS, understand that
success in the informational, or more specifically the psychological or
cognitive, domain is central to a successful offensive and defense. We
must begin to accept this reality.
The GEC was established as an interagency hub within the State
Department to provide a point of leadership--and accountability--for
the Government's response to adversarial information activities. The
majority of the staff are from the interagency--mostly from the Defense
Department--with few from the State Department. Its ability to
coordinate, let alone affect and effect, actions within the State
Department and the interagency is limited.
The GEC has and continues to face resistance from elements within
the Department that perceive GEC as not a part of the Department's
mission. Several functional and geographic bureaus do not understand or
accept how the GEC supports the Department. The reasons are numerous:
an ossified State Department bureaucracy and operational culture;
confusion over the Department's role in national security; questions
over authorities, questions on what tactics may and should be used;
and, a remarkable lack of leadership support from outside of GEC,
including from past Secretaries, senior staff, and other Under and
Assistant Secretaries.
These challenges will not be irrelevant by creating yet another new
entity without addressing the fundamentals that led to the creation of
CSCC and GEC, based on a faulty vision of tactics and poorly defined
mission, both of which limited any possible effectiveness. These same
barriers caused ripples that negatively influenced interagency
partners' willingness to work with and support the GEC. At this time,
there are no indications that any of the GEC's limitations have been
removed or will be soon.
The function of an organization like GEC (though GEC's mission, in
all aspects, is too narrowly defined) should remain inside the State
Department. The expeditionary, long-term approach of the State
Department, it's ground presence in nearly every nation on the planet,
and its fundamental role in our foreign policy and national security
makes the Department the best location for an operation like the GEC.
I have two recommendations. They are not exclusive in that they
may, and should, be pursued simultaneously.
First, there is an existing operational and integrative hub for
global informational and in-person engagement in the Department: the
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. However, only
one of the eight persons to hold the office since it was established in
1999 (the office has been vacant for nearly 30% of the time since
then), none have been adequately prepared, directed, or supported to
fulfill a role of coordinating, integrating, and supporting U.S.
Government-wide global engagement. An Under Secretary will wield
substantially greater influence than a ``coordinator'' or ``Special
Envoy.'' This existing Under Secretary has direct or indirect control
over a nearly $1b budget, which contains the bulk of the USIA's former
informational (short-term and long-term) engagement capabilities.
However, this Under Secretary faces similar redundancies and turf-
protecting (and building) that the GEC met, and has done so without
leadership support to overcome these limits to better support our
foreign policy, national security, and support to interagency partners
for the same.
Congress must address the systemic deficiencies at the State
Department as it is the right home for the required hub. The original
Portman-Murphy proposal in the Senate was intriguing as it could have
been a spark to cause a substantial reconsideration of the poor
organization, misalignment, and disconnectedness of various overlapping
Department efforts while undoing the forced segregation of
``information'' from the rest of national security and foreign policy
structures and bureaucratic cultures.
I am not aware of a single Congressional hearing or clear mandate
by a Secretary of State or President to empower and hold accountable
this Under Secretary to fulfill the role embedded in it when it was
created following the abolishment of USIA in 1999. The GEC, like the
Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication it replaced, and
the Portman-Murphy bill proposed in the last Congress, are direct
responses to the failure of this Under Secretary to perform a function
too many have forgotten it is positioned and resourced to execute.
Second, I recommend the Congress reconsider the ``Political West
Point'' idea of an organization that provides analysis and training for
adversarial informational activities that State Department, Defense
Department, and other agencies, as well as relevant private sector and
friendly nation governments and civil society actors, can attend. The
name for this ``Political West Point'' was the Freedom Academy when it
was introduced in Congress in the late 1950s, though a different name
may be useful today. Such an organization would address the underlying
resistance derived from a denial that information is anything but a
sideshow to the other three core elements of national power: Diplomacy,
Military, and Economic. The ``D,'' ``M,'' and ``E'' are not coequal
with the ``I'' of information, but rely on Information for their
effect. Further, on the military side, the lack of appreciation of the
centrality of informational activities have permitted, if not
encouraged, military public affairs officers to aggressively segregate
themselves, and their advice, from the military's trained information
professionals. At the State Department, this will help break down the
cultural divide between the Public Diplomacy cone (where ``cone'' is
the Department's loose equivalent the military's ``MOS'') that
information is a key facet of international affairs. It would also
benefit the military through an increase informational training for
MOSs not directly involved in information (i.e. look beyond Information
Operations, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs), as would
other agencies, from Agriculture to Treasury to AID. This would provide
some of the analytical support GEC presently strives to deliver, and
operate similar to and likely with West Point's Combating Terrorism
Center. This Academy would be a repository for the collection and
analysis and training on adversarial tactics, techniques, and
procedures across the psychological and cognitive domains, including
the cross-over to the physical domain.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the question. I look
forward to discussing this issue in greater detail with you.
Mr. Franks. If we are to take seriously the threat posed by
Russian, Chinese, and jihadi information operations seriously, is the
GEC the appropriate institution to combat these aggressive (and
successful) information operation strategies? What reforms or changes
should be made to the GEC to make it more effective--or should we
create a new entity for this mission?
Mr. Lumpkin. The GEC is currently the most viable institution in
the Executive Branch of government to lead and direct efforts to
counter the threat posed by Russian, Chinese, and Jihadi information
operations. That said, the GEC continues to face significant challenges
to fully realize its potential in addressing these threats.
Insufficient funding, manpower, and support coupled with the thick
bureaucratic layers at the State Department have historically hampered
effective operations.
Four principle things can be done to make the GEC significantly
more effective;
1. Increase funding to the GEC and provide it a dedicated funding
line.
2. Significantly increase the assigned manpower.
3. Elevate the GEC in status at both the Department of State and
within the Interagency and authorize it to ``direct'' U.S. government
efforts to counter both State and non-State actor threats in the
information environment.
4. Ensure the GEC has aggressive leadership with a proven track
record of success operating in the interagency.
Mr. Franks. What specific steps must we take to combat Russian
hybrid warfare: Do we ultimately need to oppose them at every stage?
For example, if we merely park armored brigade combat teams in Eastern
Europe but do not improve our cyber capabilities or harden our space
assets, will Russia be deterred?
Mr. Thomas. The basis for my response utilizes contemporary Russian
open source military thought, and not the mirror-imaging of U.S.
concepts onto Russian activities, which is the type of analysis many
U.S. analysts incorporate. Russia's military leaders state often that
it is the U.S. who developed the term hybrid war, and it is the U.S.
who is using this concept to confront Russia. Westerners, on the other
hand, state that Russia is using hybrid techniques. The Russians
themselves state that they tend to depend on ``new-type'' warfare
methods, the outline of which is attached [see graphic below]. Russia's
chief of its Main Operations Directorate stated in 2015 that
``nonstandard forms and methods are being developed for the employment
of our Armed Forces, which will make it possible to level the enemy's
technological superiority. For this, the features of the preparation
and conduct of new-type warfare are being fully used and `asymmetric'
methods of confronting the enemy are being developed.'' After
determining vulnerable areas, Special Forces, foreign agents,
information effects, and other nonmilitary forms of effects are used in
each conflict, with each involving a different set of asymmetric
operations (coordinated with respect to targets, location, and time, a
combination of asymmetric and indirect actions).''
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
.epsRussia's new-type warfare method has several apparent phases
(none of which are numbered) that ratchet up confrontations
incrementally. The U.S. should confront Russia at every stage of this
template and attempt to ensure the phase involving classical war
methods is never reached. The initial phase of new-type warfare would
be the best time to confront Russia, when we are only dealing with
various types of deterrence methods (information, psychological, etc.),
diplomatic pressure, and propaganda means before actual confrontation
evolves. We are clearly in this phase now, which involves posturing and
threats. We should do all in our power not to move beyond this phase.
However, if this phase fails, then new-type war's next phase involves
the covert deployment of special operations forces and cyber-attacks,
and the use of heretofore unnamed types of new weapons systems. This
would be a real step toward actual fighting and the absolute last
chance before, according to the Russian General Staff's new-type
warfare scenario, classical warfare methods begin. As long as President
Putin views an existential threat to Russia, I do not believe that
Armored Brigades in Eastern Europe will deter him, nor will hardening
space assets. He will find a way to asymmetrically, as the Russian
military has stated, threaten the U.S. Perhaps these ways have already
been prepared and are ready for use or exploitation. I do not believe
he wants his military to conduct combat operations against NATO or the
U.S., but I also believe he is prepared to use them if necessary. Of
recent importance is that a major discussion of the term ``war'' is
underway among Russia's military elite. This debate must be followed
closely as perhaps new types of warfare methods are under serious
consideration. For example, the military's emphasis on ``nonstandard,''
``asymmetric,'' and ``nonmilitary'' methods should be watched closely
for indications of their future application in war.
The views expressed in this response are my own and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Army or
Department of Defense--Mr. Timothy Thomas.
[all]