    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                               [H.A.S.C. No. 115-16]

                        CRAFTING AN INFORMATION WARFARE
                        AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA STRATEGY
                     FOR THE EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

               SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 MARCH 15, 2017

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                      ______

                             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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               SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Chairwoman

    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio               RICK LARSEN, Washington
    RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana         JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair      JACKIE SPEIER, California
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
                     Kevin Gates, Professional Staff Member
                  Lindsay Kavanaugh, Professional Staff Member
                              Neve Schadler, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
      Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
      Capabilities...................................................    13
    Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York,
      Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities..     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Armstrong, Matthew, Associate Fellow, King's Centre for Strategic
      Communications, King's College London..........................     3
    Lumpkin, Michael D., Principal, Neptune..........................     5
    Thomas, Timothy L., Senior Analyst, Foreign Military Studies
      Office, Fort Leavenworth.......................................     7

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Armstrong, Matthew...........................................    37
        Lumpkin, Michael D...........................................    50
        Stefanik, Hon. Elise M.......................................    35
        Thomas, Timothy L............................................    62

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Franks...................................................    81

    CRAFTING AN INFORMATION WARFARE AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA STRATEGY FOR THE
                         EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
             Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
                             Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 15, 2017.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:16 p.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elise M.
    Stefanik (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE
    FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
                              CAPABILITIES

        Ms. Stefanik. The subcommittee will come to order.
        I would like to welcome everyone to this hearing of the
    Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House
    Armed Services Committee on the very timely topic of
    information warfare and counter propaganda. Although the
    subcommittee has met several times already in closed classified
    sessions, today is our first open and public hearing. As such,
    I would like to take a moment to welcome and thank our new and
    returning subcommittee members.
        Our topic today is incredibly important. Cyber warfare and
    influence campaigns that are being waged against our country
    represent a national security challenge of generational
    proportions. In talking about influence campaigns, we too often
    focus on the digital and technical aspects on the internet and
    social media. While those aspects are critical and indeed have
    served as an accelerant to speed up communications and effects,
    we should remember to take a step back and keep in mind that
    information warfare is about information, not just the medium.
    And our understanding of this form of warfare should also
    include the psychological, cognitive, and cultural aspects of
    the messages bombarding us from all sources.
        I would like to read a quote I recently reviewed. Quote,
    ``There has never been a time in our history when there was so
    great a need for our citizens to be informed and to understand
    what is happening in the world. The cause of freedom is being
    challenged throughout the world today and propaganda is one of
    the most powerful weapons they have in this struggle. Deceit,
    distortion, and lies are systemically used by them as a matter
    of deliberate policy,'' end quote.
        Those were the words of President Harry Truman in 1950. He
    spoke of a conflict of ideas that is still occurring today.
    And, unfortunately, it is a conflict we have largely ignored. I
    chose this quote as a reminder that information warfare and
    propaganda efforts are not new. The tools have changed, but
    enemy doctrine has not. Information warfare is shaping the
    international environment. There may not be overt and open
    fighting, but there is certainly open conflict.
        Information warfare is being waged in an aggressive ongoing
    competition over territory, resources, and people in the
    Crimea, in the South China Sea, in Iraq, and in Syria. People
    are being desensitized to the reality of actions around them,
    increasing the likelihood of misunderstanding and
    miscalculation.
        Our core values of truth, democratic principles, and self-
    determination are under assault. While the Department of
    Defense [DOD] plays a critical role in this form of warfare, it
    cannot bear responsibility alone. Countering adversarial
    propaganda requires a whole-of-government strategy using all
    instruments of national power to harness the authorities,
    tools, and resources required to mitigate and marginalize its
    harmful effects. With this in mind, the National Defense
    Authorization Act [NDAA] last year authorized and expanded the
    mission of the State Department's Global Engagement Center
    [GEC] to counter state-sponsored propaganda efforts such as
    Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
        We look forward to continuing to work with the center and
    the Department of Defense this year as we craft an information
    warfare and counter-propaganda strategy for an emerging
    security environment.
        Before I turn to the ranking member for his comments, I
    would like to highlight a few questions for our witnesses and
    members to consider as we proceed throughout the hearing.
    First, do we have an adequate strategy for countering the
    blatant lies and mistruths being promulgated by sophisticated
    nation-state actors that have both resources and political
    will? Second, do we truly understand the information warfare
    and propaganda strategies of our enemies, be they state or
    nonstate actors? And lastly, since the United States remains a
    technological leader and innovator with tremendous creativity,
    how do we better harness our advantages to counter our
    adversaries?
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Stefanik can be found in the
    Appendix on page 35.]
        Ms. Stefanik. In the future, when the ranking member
    arrives, I will turn to him for his opening statements, but in
    the meantime, I am going to introduce our witnesses.
        We welcome three distinguished witnesses here this
    afternoon. First, the Honorable Matt Armstrong, an associate
    fellow at the King's Centre for Strategic Communications,
    King's College London. Next, the Honorable Michael Lumpkin,
    formerly an Assistant Secretary of Defense and coordinator of
    the Global Engagement Center, now a principal at Neptune
    Strategies. And finally, Mr. Timothy Thomas, a senior analyst
    at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, and
    the author of several books and articles on Russian and Chinese
    information operations [IO] and cyber policy, one of which I
    have here.
        Welcome to all of our witnesses. I would like to remind you
    that your testimony will be included in the record, and we ask
    that you summarize key points from that testimony in 5 minutes
    or less. We will wait for Mr. Langevin's arrival, but in the
    meantime, Mr. Armstrong why don't you go ahead with your
    opening statement.

    STATEMENT OF MATTHEW ARMSTRONG, ASSOCIATE FELLOW, KING'S CENTRE
          FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS, KING'S COLLEGE LONDON

        Mr. Armstrong. Thank you. Chairwoman Stefanik,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
    opportunity to speak on information warfare and countering
    propaganda. This is an important conversation as information
    and informational activities create both opportunities and
    threats to our Nation's physical, societal, and economic
    security. This is a strategic problem requiring a strategic
    review of not just the threat, but also of our constraints. We
    may develop good tactics, but any success from these will be
    undone if we fail to get the strategy right, as well as
    properly align our efforts toward our objectives. Be confident
    that our adversaries are doing this realignment and using our
    doctrine and our public writings as their starting point.
        The information domain is not a nuance at the margins, but
    a central facet of international affairs. We have known this
    for a long time, even if we need constant reminding. A 1918
    report by the U.S Army General Staff recognized that in the,
    quote, ``strategic equation of war, there are four factors:
    Combat, economic, political, and psychologic, and that the last
    of these is coequal with the others,'' end quote.
        Today, we refer to this as the DIME model of national
    power: diplomacy, information, military, economic. A July 1945
    report from the State Department recognized that the, quote,
    ``nature of present day foreign relations makes it essential
    for the United States to maintain informational activities
    abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign
    affairs.'' Two years later, a joint congressional report
    elucidated on this point: ``Europe today has again become a
    vast battlefield of ideologies in which words have replaced
    armaments as the active elements of attack and defense,'' end
    quote.
        Today, as the traditional barriers of influence and
    disruption are obliterated by modern communication and
    transportation networks, the role of information is more
    important than ever.
        Understanding and elevating the appreciation of the
    informational or psychological affect of our words and deeds
    can make for more effective, more enduring, and less expensive
    outcomes. Every situation is unique and sometimes you need to
    put two in the heart and one in the mind, but between
    increasingly transparent battlefields and adversaries
    intentionally operating below or outside of our escalation
    ladders, we must be more adept in this environment. We may call
    this affair information warfare, but this is too narrow and too
    shallow, and it inhibits appreciating the psychological affects
    of actions. It also encourages the false concept of a battle of
    narratives as if there is a magic combination of nouns and
    verbs that will win the day. We may use more inclusive labels,
    like political warfare or hybrid warfare, two terms with subtle
    yet possibly useful distinctions.
        Putting aside the label, we fail to appreciate how the
    success of our adversary's propaganda supporting their agenda
    or targeting our activities, whether military, economic, or
    political, often rest on our credibility. Its effectiveness is
    often influenced by the degree to which people believe what we
    say, how much they trust what we do, and how the audience
    perceives the two as consistent and aligned.
        Abroad, we face a situation which our adversaries are often
    perceived as more credible than us as they spotlight, exploit,
    and often outright manufacture gaps between what we say, what
    we do, and our national values. Proof of this is when our
    adversaries are given the benefit of the doubt, while our word
    is questioned, our actions subjected to charges of hypocrisy
    and aggression. This is magnified by failing to understand the
    local information environments.
        There are several challenges hindering our credibility and
    the ability to be effective in today's environment. First, our
    messages and actions are generally disunified. We have a
    competitive advantage in terms of resources, people skills, and
    scale. Yet our various government departments and agencies are
    organized in such a way that makes coordination nearly
    impossible.
        Beyond the obvious, this includes failing to understand,
    coordinate, or support programs that may develop and strengthen
    local defenses, even inoculation, against adversarial
    influence. Lesser known examples include fish and wildlife
    services, helping game wardens in Africa, exchange programs,
    and the U.S. Navy tenders helping local harbor masters and
    mechanics. And then there is the damaging divide between
    defense public affairs and other defense information
    professionals, as well as the segregation of public diplomacy
    inside the State Department.
        The lack of coordination and bureaucratic cultural divides
    contribute to our second challenge, which is that our response
    to adversarial propaganda is almost invariably reactionary.
    When our adversaries explain their actions to the world or make
    claims about us, we find ourselves scrambling to prove them
    wrong. This keeps us on our heels and requires us to overcome
    the narrative set by others. It also means limited
    consideration of the psychological affect of actions, which the
    Chinese appear to be overcoming in their recent reorganization
    of their cyberspace operations forces.
        The third challenge is the militarization of our foreign
    policy. In the absence of a clear strategy and organizing
    principles, the Department of Defense has by default taken the
    lead in much of our foreign policy efforts. The very term
    ``strategic communication'' reflects this role as it was born
    out of the need to fill a gap left by the State Department. But
    placing our military as our primary implement of foreign policy
    also promotes a perception that we are an insecure Nation.
        We have remarkably little relevant experience in combatting
    the political warfare being waged against us. We may imagine
    that the United States Information Agency [USIA] and the Active
    Measures Working Group are guideposts, but they were never
    intended or fit for purpose for this action and they were
    relatively small and reactionary. Neither is a useful model for
    proactive and unified defense, let alone offense.
        We must change our mind-set about adversarial propaganda
    and subversive actions, especially those carried out below or
    outside the military's phasing construct. This starts with
    changing the language we use. We need to think and speak in
    terms of undermining adversarial psychological influence which
    will guide us toward preemptive behavior and messages. We need
    to think and speak in terms of a communication environment
    which will guide us toward a preemptive interactivity that can
    establish, preserve, and strengthen our credibility so that we
    set the narrative that must be displaced by our adversaries. We
    must think about why adversarial propaganda has traction, and
    accept that we cannot bomb our way to success. We must organize
    in a way that aligns our efforts for credible, smart,
    preemptive action and swift, credible, trusted reactions.
        In addition to internal reorganizations addressing cultural
    divides, departments and agencies beyond Department of Defense
    and State bring skills and expertise to this struggle.
        I am thankful that this committee has convened this hearing
    as I am thankful for past amendments from this committee that
    have affected the State Department, but in many ways this
    discussion is happening in a vacuum. Are other committees
    exercising their oversight to inquire about this topic, set
    priorities, or hold their respective departments and agencies
    accountable? And we must understand the role of society in our
    foreign policy and the permeability of our borders and the
    marketplace of loyalty, which I described elsewhere. There is a
    vulnerability, not just political support for our efforts, but
    what might be considered within organizational security
    parlance as insider threats. Consider Major Nidal Hasan, Jihad
    Jane, and other so-called lone wolves who are inspired often
    through sympathy or empathy with our adversaries.
        I will close with another quote, this one from 1963: ``Some
    day, this Nation will recognize that global nonmilitary
    conflict must be pursued with the same intensity and
    preparation as global military conflicts.'' Unfortunately, that
    day has yet to come, but I hope this hearing is the start of
    setting us on the right path. Continuing to get this wrong is a
    threat to our national security, to our economic growth, and to
    our very standing as a world leader.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this
    important topic. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Armstrong can be found in
    the Appendix on page 37.]
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Armstrong.
        Mr. Lumpkin.

          STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, PRINCIPAL, NEPTUNE

        Mr. Lumpkin. Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin,
    and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to be here today as a private citizen in an
    individual capacity. Thank you very much.
        I trust my experience as a career special operations
    officer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations,
    and special envoy and coordinator at the Global Engagement
    Center will be helpful in providing perspective on the current
    state of the U.S. Government's [USG's] strategy, capabilities,
    and direction in information warfare and counterpropaganda.
        The previous administration and the 114th Congress
    demonstrated clear commitment to this issue, as evidenced by
    President Obama's executive order that established the Global
    Engagement Center and the 2017 National Defense Authorization
    Act that expanded the center's mission.
        The NDAA expanded the GEC's mandate to include counter-
    state propaganda, as Chairwoman Stefanik mentioned, and
    disinformation efforts. This is well beyond the original
    charter which limited it to diminishing the influence of
    terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and
    Syria [ISIS] in this information domain. This is a big step in
    the right direction, but the sobering fact is that we are still
    far from where we ultimately need to be to operate in the
    modern information environment.
        As I said, I am very pleased to be joined by Matt and Tim,
    two of the most experienced people in this space, who I think
    collectively, we should be able to answer most of this
    committee's questions.
        Since the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, which
    was largely--arguably, the last period in history when the U.S.
    successfully engaged in sustained information warfare and
    counter-state propaganda efforts, technology and how the world
    communicates has drastically changed. We now live in a
    hyperconnected world where the flow of information moves in
    real time. The lines of authority and effort between public
    diplomacy, public affairs, and information warfare have blurred
    to the point where, in many cases, information is consumed by
    U.S. and foreign audiences at the same time via the same means.
        To illustrate this fact, as this committee is aware, it was
    a 33-year-old IT [information technology] consultant in
    Abbottabad, Pakistan, that first reported the U.S. military
    raid against Osama bin Laden in 2011 on Twitter. This happened
    as events were still unfolding on the ground and hours before
    the American people were officially notified by the President
    of the United States address.
        While the means and methods of communication have
    transformed significantly over the past decade, much of the
    U.S. Government thinking on shaping and responding in the
    information environment has remained largely unchanged, to
    include how we manage U.S. Government information dissemination
    and how we respond to the information of our adversaries. We
    are cognitively hamstrung for a myriad of reasons, to include
    lack of accountability and oversight, bureaucracy resulting in
    insufficient levels of resourcing, and inability to absorb
    cutting-edge information and analytic tools, and access to
    highly skilled personnel. This while our adversaries are
    increasing investment in the information environment, while not
    being constrained by ethics, the law, or even the truth.
        The good news is that we have good people working this
    effort. The workforce is committed and passionate and recognize
    why this is important and why we as a nation need to get it
    right.
        Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lumpkin can be found in the
    Appendix on page 50.]
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Lumpkin.
        I now recognize Mr. Thomas.

        STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY L. THOMAS, SENIOR ANALYST, FOREIGN
               MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE, FORT LEAVENWORTH

        Mr. Thomas. Chairwoman Stefanik, distinguished members of
    the House Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
    thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
    talk about Russian concepts and capabilities for information
    warfare.
        By way of disclaimer, while I work for the Department of
    the Army as a senior analyst at the Foreign Military Studies
    Office, which does unclassified work, I am appearing today in
    my capacity as a subject matter expert and not as a person who
    can speak in an official capacity about Army or defense policy.
    As such, the views I express today are my own and do not
    necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Army or
    Department of Defense.
        Russia's information warfare approach is holistic. It is
    focused not only on media and propaganda, but on information
    technologies that fit weaponry as well. Ever since the 1990s,
    Russia has divided its information warfare concepts into two
    parts: Information technical and information psychological.
    Social media and cyber have tended to blend the two and caused
    a significant change in how Russia views the emerging trends in
    the character of warfare.
        First, they note that nonmilitary activities, such as media
    use or information deterrence capabilities, are being used more
    often, they say by a ratio of four to one, than military ones.
        And second, they note that information technologies reduce
    distance and make remote engagement, whether it be by
    international media, infiltration abroad, or the use of high-
    tech weapons to be considered as a principal tactic or means.
        Forecasts are made after these trends are studied that
    reflect how conflict might unfold, which appears to be the
    general staff's development of a new type warfare scenario, the
    diagram of which was part of the written testimony. This new
    type warfare includes disorienting a victim state's leadership,
    creating dissatisfaction in the populace, intensifying
    diplomatic pressure and propaganda, applying cyber attacks and
    software effects, covertly deploying special forces, and using
    weapons based on either new physical principles, robotics, or
    other issues.
        After trends and forecasts are made, a military strategy
    encompassing all aspects of military and state activity is
    established to take advantage of the forecast. An information
    strategy, according to one Russian source, is a state's use of
    information technologies and effects to attain information
    superiority over competitors in several areas. Evolving science
    and technology developments potentially alter the correlation
    of information-based forces along strategic sectors or in
    space.
        Finally, forms and methods of employing the strategy are
    developed. The chief of the Russian General Staff Valery
    Gerasimov has stated often that the production of new forms and
    methods of warfare is an urgent task for military academies to
    develop. A form is an organization which in regard to
    information warfare could include international media elements
    such as Russia Today [RT] or Sputnik, or military developments,
    such as the creation of science companies or information
    operation forces.
        These forms or organizations implement methods. Methods are
    composed of two parts: Weaponry and military art. Weaponry can
    include hackers, reflexive control techniques, trolls,
    disinformation, deterrence capabilities, and other agents of
    destruction or influence. Military art includes the use of
    indirect and asymmetric capabilities to achieve specific goals,
    such as the exploitation of the West's free press or an
    indirect attack on the cyber infrastructure of another nation.
    Russian's excellent contingent of algorithm writers ensures
    that the nation will be strong for years to come in writing
    software as weapons that could eavesdrop, persuade, or destroy.
        To summarize, the effort is holistic, it follows trends,
    makes forecasts, strategies, and force correlations, and
    develops forms and methods to implement the strategy.
        I thank you for your attention.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found in the
    Appendix on page 62.]
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
        My question, I actually would like to start with you in
    regards to your testimony. When it comes to Russian propaganda
    and disinformation activities against NATO [North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization] and the EU [European Union], how damaging
    are their propaganda campaign against these organizations? And
    what impact is that having on U.S. national security and
    economic ties to Europe? And then the second part of my
    question is, knowing that I would like to focus on Russian
    propaganda dealing with NATO and the EU, can you also add
    another layer, you referenced the exploitation of the Western
    free press, how is that a part of their broader propaganda
    strategies?
        Mr. Thomas. Thank you. The first part of your question with
    regard to propaganda, propaganda is usually associated with
    emotional content. It varies from what you might call the
    disinformation aspect, which is designed to focus more on the
    logic of decision making. So what you will have as a
    combination of these two, the emotional aspect is aimed, I
    believe, more at the population of the country, whereas the
    disinformation aspect is aimed more at decision makers within
    the EU or NATO. The final goal would be, clearly, to disrupt or
    destroy the relationships among NATO and members of the EU.
        The second part of your question which addressed Western
    thought and how Russia might take advantage of it, back in
    1946, George Kennan noted that Russians do not believe in
    objective truth. If you fast forward ahead to about 2014, and
    you listen to some of their commentators, like Dmitry Kiselyov,
    Kiselyov noted that objectivity is a myth being imposed upon
    us. So what you have within the Russian information domain, if
    you want to call it that, is no real truth. You just have the
    ability to create an alternate reality, which doesn't coincide
    at all with the Western understanding of information in a free
    press.
        Perhaps the best example of that was the downing of the
    Malaysia airliner. Immediately, we had our own understanding of
    what had happened. We had the intercepts. We had the images of
    the air defense platform leaving the area, yet for the next 3
    or 4 years, we listened incessantly to Russian alternate views
    of what had happened, with the last one coming the day before
    the Netherlands released their report. They attempted to create
    an alternate reality. This seems to be the focus of the
    propaganda effort there as they study us and they study
    audience behavior.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Stefanik. I want to broaden my followup to Mr.
    Armstrong and Mr. Lumpkin. So what strategies do we need to
    pursue to counterbalance the example that Mr. Thomas just laid
    out?
        Mr. Lumpkin. I think we need to do--because we can develop
    strategies, we have to have a strategy for respective
    countries. One thing that I have learned in my time is that
    like all politics is local, all messaging is local as well. So
    a strategy that works for Russia, for example, countering their
    disinformation propaganda efforts, may or may not work in
    another nation, but each one has to be tailored. For example,
    if you were going to do counter-propaganda disinformation
    against Russia, you would want it to have a different strategy,
    for example, with Iran or any other nations that we were going
    to work with. And it is not just a nation-state issue; it is
    also true against violent extremist groups as well.
        So I think the key is you have to understand the audience,
    have clear goals set out of what you want to achieve, and then
    develop a strategy that is unique to that particular audience.
        Ms. Stefanik. And that is something that Russia does,
    unfortunately, effectively. They have country-specific
    strategies when it comes to their disinformation and
    propaganda.
        Mr. Lumpkin. Absolutely. And I do believe that we have to
    think about information in the same way when you are going
    against other nation-states' efforts.
        Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Armstrong.
        Mr. Armstrong. So to add to Michael's comments, we need to
    understand the local information environment. I think one of
    the problems we suffer is that we mirror-image. We pretend that
    the local audiences know what we know, that they have the same
    access to the information, and that is simply often not the
    case. We have to pay attention that the Russians will make
    fake--not just deliver fake stories, whether it is a rape or
    some other abhorrent action to spur up local concerns and
    issues, but they will put fake experts on the air and they will
    create fake groups.
        So it is one thing for us to come from the outside and
    probe into a country and say, this is what we need to say and
    what we need to do, but we need to help those nations and those
    markets, if you will, understand and be more critical about the
    information that they are getting.
        One of the things that the Russians take advantage of is
    the lack of critical thinking. They don't want a critical
    thinker. A critical thinker is not the audience for a Russian
    media product. That is why they will throw out three or four,
    five, six, in the case of MH17, eight different stories lines
    at one time, maybe even within the same hour of broadcast,
    because it will resonate with different people in different
    ways. But they also have a tolerance for failure. So they will
    drop a story line if it is not working or they will drop an
    effort.
        And that is one of the challenges that we have is that we
    have almost zero tolerance for failure. So we delay, we wait
    until we have it perfect, whereas our adversaries are spinning
    and trying and trying and trying until something actually
    works. So I would say we need to partner with local capacity
    and help develop local capacity.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Armstrong.
        I now recognize Ms. Speier.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank you for
    having this hearing. I think this is really a critical area
    that we spend really too little time and underfund our efforts
    mightily.
        I was struck when reading through the list of Russian
    military tactics for offensive media campaigns: Lies for the
    purposes of disinformation; focusing on the negative, which is
    more readily accepted than the positive; simplification,
    confirmation, and repetition; introducing taboos on categories
    of news. It sounds to me a lot like the 2016 Presidential
    campaign.
        Now, don't get me wrong. I do firmly believe, based on all
    the available evidence, that Russia played a heavy hand as
    well, but as we have seen this behavior during the campaign
    continue in the Presidency, I am forced to wonder how much
    additional damage has been self-inflicted.
        So, Mr. Thomas, would you assess that the undermining of
    public confidence in domestic and international institutions,
    attacks on the free press, are all consistent with Russian
    information warfare objectives?
        Mr. Thomas. Yes, I think that they are consistent. I think
    what you see when you listen to the Russians, is at home they
    have what I would call an echo chamber in that everything they
    say is being said by the same people over and over. The way
    they have tried to handle their audience vulnerabilities is
    they have stopped allowing surveys like we would have with a
    Gallup Poll so that they can limit vulnerabilities to that
    audience. Meanwhile, as Matt and Michael have said, they are
    studying the vulnerabilities in other countries to the best of
    their ability to find those--they look at the Gallup Polls and
    find where they might be able to place some important
    information.
        Ms. Speier. So if you were to identify what our
    vulnerabilities are as seen by the Russians, what would they
    be?
        Mr. Thomas. I don't think I would be a person who could
    answer that particular question.
        Ms. Speier. Do any of you have a comment on that? Mr.
    Armstrong.
        Mr. Armstrong. So I think it is really important. I think
    there are some good, obvious examples over in Europe right now.
    But with regard to the United States, I had a conversation with
    a senior Russian involved in their information activities, and
    they made a comment that there would not be a market in the
    United States for RT if the American media was doing their job.
    And I think there is some legitimacy to that, is that the
    polarization of our news has created some gaps and has--there
    is an interesting thing that RT has done, I believe. Where we
    perceive a linear spectrum, there is a far left and a far
    right, RT has managed to bend that so that they are addressing
    the far right and the far left simultaneously.
        Now, they are generally on the fringes and it is easy for
    us to overestimate their impact, but their true impact, I
    think, is their seepage of their stories, of their messages, of
    their questioning that gets into our conversations. So I think
    that's where we should be looking at. But RT is not alone in
    that space.
        Ms. Speier. So Mr. Clapper has suggested, as you pointed
    out in your testimony, re-creation of the USIA, although I
    guess one of you indicated not in its original form. I think
    that was you, Mr. Lumpkin. How would you see an agency that is
    robust in terms of putting out information in localities around
    the world, what would that look like to you?
        Mr. Lumpkin. Just to kind of follow up on my written
    statement is, I do believe that, based upon the complexity of
    the information environment, the numbers of actors and players
    within the U.S. Government, that there is a lot of people
    working hard, everybody's rowing the boat, not necessarily in
    the same direction. And I do believe that the creation of the
    GEC, the Global Engagement Center, was a step in the right
    direction on trying to coordinate, synchronize, and ultimately
    lead U.S. Government efforts.
        Ms. Speier. But you said that, in the end, was suggestive.
        Mr. Lumpkin. Yes, and I believe that. Unfortunately, it is
    too mired in the bowels of the bureaucracy that it doesn't have
    the ability to direct the interagency nor advocate for
    resourcing. I believe if you elevated an entity to something
    similar to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    that could effectively coordinate and direct the interagency,
    you would be able to garner more resources, better synchronize
    the efforts, and have better end-states over U.S. information
    efforts against----
        Ms. Speier. Okay. I have 15 seconds, and I have one more
    question for you, Mr. Lumpkin. Do you believe the hiring freeze
    is having a deleterious effect on our ability to respond?
        Mr. Lumpkin. I think it will. I do believe it will.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. Stefanik. I now recognize Dr. Abraham.
        Dr. Abraham. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for the
    very sobering testimony. I hope we and the Department of
    Defense take heed.
        It appears that Russia and other state players are--have a
    lot of smoke and mirror-type technology where, unfortunately,
    we in America have to adhere just because of moralistic
    standards to a more rigid structure.
        Mr. Lumpkin, you referenced a particular strategy for a
    particular state or a particular country. The problem is, as we
    all know, is that now there is a mixture and a menagerie of all
    these states and terrorist organizations that sometimes
    certainly cloud the picture. And I totally agree that,
    unfortunately, the way our laws and somewhat our citizenship,
    as far as being basic good people, we are restricted somewhat
    to being more of a reactionary than a proactive state. And I
    think we saw that in the OPM [Office of Personnel Management]
    breach.
        The question I have is why has the USG been unable to unify
    and orient its various interested organizations and
    capabilities to compete in this broader information
    environment? What is the disconnect there?
        Mr. Lumpkin. I wish I could say that there was one thing
    that was the causal agent, but if we--I have had many jobs in
    my life. The most complicated and complex environment I ever
    operated in was being the special envoy and the coordinator at
    the Global Engagement Center, because the stakeholders are
    vast, budgets are all over the map, authorities are not aligned
    with the current environment between public affairs,
    information operations, and public diplomacy and--nor are the
    efforts. And I think it is, we are at the point where we need
    to take a step back, especially while technology in the world
    is continuing to advance and become more hyperconnected, to
    look at how we can effectively do this.
        But I do believe we can have an overarching strategy in
    organization structure and then come up with substrategies for
    specific countries or groups.
        Dr. Abraham. So do you think maybe the DOD needs a global
    nonkinetic-type coordinator to kind of herd the cats?
        Mr. Lumpkin. Well, I don't know that it should be DOD that
    is leading the effort, and here is why: Because the information
    operations efforts are generally focused on title 10, support
    of military objectives.
        Dr. Abraham. Right.
        Mr. Lumpkin. And this is much larger than the military.
    They are a key stakeholder and a key component and probably the
    best resourced, but that doesn't mean that they should be
    leading the effort, because there are limitations to their
    authorities on how and where they can operate.
        Dr. Abraham. That is a little bit unsettling. The next
    question for you again, Mr. Lumpkin. And, Mr. Armstrong, please
    chime in, and Mr. Thomas, if you have comments.
        What do you see as the major challenges for the Department
    of Defense today in conducting information operations and
    counter-propaganda within the structure that they now have?
        Mr. Lumpkin. I think that they continue to have resourcing
    challenges. Again, lots of good people working on this issue,
    just not enough of them. I think that is one part that they
    have got as far as people. There is the budget levels. As Mr.
    Armstrong mentions, there is also the tolerance for risk. We
    have to increase our acceptance of a risk and be able to
    iterate very rapidly when we do a--try to come up with a
    messaging program or strategy and we find it not effective, we
    have to iterate and move very rapidly. We have to build
    agility, which means that most of our work has to be
    underpinned with data analytics. It has to be an analytics-
    based structure, which means we have to have the analytic
    tools, capabilities, and access to talent that knows how to use
    them.
        Dr. Abrahams. And other state players, such as Russia, they
    don't even pay attention to the analytics; they just kind of
    throw them out of the window and say they really don't exist at
    all sometimes.
        Mr. Lumpkin. I am sure that is the case, but I would argue
    that because our adversaries have a very high threshold for
    risk, they can get it wrong a lot and still just inundate the
    airwaves and the information space.
        Dr. Abrahams. Anything to add, Mr. Armstrong, right quick?
        Mr. Armstrong. I do, thank you. So I would rephrase the
    same thing that Mr. Lumpkin said: There is an acceptance of a
    threat that is absent, there is a prioritization that is
    absent, and there is a strategy that is absent. So put another
    way, the combatant commander or the commander on the ground is
    going to be more concerned with LOAC, law of armed conflict,
    rather than the informational or psychological effect of an
    activity, which means in this transparent battlefield
    environment, the psychological effect of an action may be more
    narrow than what the legal--what the law allows. But yet they
    will have the lawyer there rather than the psyop or information
    officer there.
        Dr. Abrahams. Okay. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Langevin, for his
    opening statements and then the opportunity to ask questions.

      STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
    RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
                            AND CAPABILITIES

        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair. And welcome to our
    witnesses here today. I apologize that I was late. My plane
    just landed a little while ago, and got here as quick as I
    could. But I am sorry I missed your opening statements, but we
    have your statements for the record, and I appreciate your
    being here today.
        So, Mr. Lumpkin, in particular, it is nice to see you
    again. Welcome back. And as the former Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict as
    well as the prior special envoy of the Global Engagement Center
    at the Department of State, you certainly have valuable
    insight. I know that we have benefited, the government can
    benefit from his work to understand information operations
    conducted by our adversaries and improve U.S. efforts to
    counter propaganda and other activities under the IO umbrella.
        Our other two witnesses, of course, also bring
    extraordinary perspectives. Mr. Armstrong was previously with
    the Broadcasting Board of Governors [BBG], and Mr. Thomas has
    spent his career in the IO fields and earned his expertise on
    Russia through extensive study. So I appreciate your
    perspectives and taking the time to be here today.
        As the witnesses' robust backgrounds demonstrate, U.S.
    information operations require what I believe is a whole-of-
    government approach. This subcommittee has worked tirelessly on
    U.S. IO policy and capabilities over the years, and more
    recently focused on fine tuning our ability to counter
    propaganda. One such effort is a provision in the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 that expands the
    scope of the Global Engagement Center to include countering
    propaganda of nation-state actors, which is the focus of
    today's hearing.
        Nation-states, like the Russian Federation, use the
    information environment outside of a combat zone in a strategic
    effort to intimidate, to undermine, and control allies, as well
    as stymie U.S. objectives. They are doing so in an increasingly
    aggressive and overt manner as evidenced by Russia's recent
    acknowledgment of the formation of new IO troops.
        IO is only one component of Russia's strategy to achieve
    objectives, but their tactics, their techniques and procedures
    often executed with complete disregard for international norms
    have proven effective at achieving favorable conditions for
    their underlying intentions and their motivations.
        The United States is not a nation that will disregard the
    law or compromise basic values. Data collection, analysis, and
    storage required to inform our own counter-propaganda and
    information operations writ large, especially outside the
    combat zone and using social media, must continue to comply
    with domestic and international law. The United States overt
    messaging must always be delivered consistently and maintain a
    truth and integrity.
        In accordance with our values, we must improve the U.S.
    Government and our allies' ability to counter IO of other
    actors and take back the narrative in order to promulgate
    truth. This effort will require us to ask hard questions, such
    as, is the government organized for and prioritizing effective
    IO? Is the Department of State force structure which--I am
    sorry. Is the Department of Defense force structure, which
    currently aligns IO capabilities to many commands, conducive to
    effective employment of information operations in concert with
    other interagency efforts outside of an area of active
    hostilities?
        The U.S. must leverage technological advancements and other
    new capabilities in a timely manner. The Department of Defense
    must also be able to effectively employ such capabilities with
    operational funding authorities that allow for flexibility in
    an ever-evolving information environment while still
    maintaining transparency and oversight of activities.
        Finally, and most importantly, U.S. strategies and military
    commander objectives for addressing threats must be realistic
    and holistic. We must leverage all tools at our disposal for
    disruption, deterrence, and response, while mitigating conflict
    escalation in the development of ever more pernicious
    techniques for conducting influence campaigns.
        So with that, I will stop there and go to questions.
        Ms. Stefanik. Yes.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay. So again, thanks to our witnesses.
        Mr. Lumpkin, if I could, based on your experience in the
    DOD, what role should Cyber Command [CYBERCOM] have in
    countering IO of nation-state military or nonmilitary actors
    outside of an area of hostilities? And does that change if the
    IO is being conducted on U.S. soil? And is there more that can
    be done to leverage the capabilities of this command consistent
    with international and other laws?
        Mr. Lumpkin. I believe that CYBERCOM is a key player in
    this space. When you look at--and this is why in the language
    of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act it was critical
    that it said countering--to go against--counter-state
    propaganda and disinformation efforts. It allowed us to think
    differently about the problem set, to look at this--this isn't
    a tit for tat in the information space, but rather looking at
    the entire tools of government that can be applied against this
    problem set. And I think CYBERCOM is a key player in this
    space.
        Now, I do recognize and appreciate the lines of authority
    of operating domestically for CYBERCOM, and I respect those
    lines. But that said, it is becoming much more difficult to see
    where information starts and where it stops. It is very
    difficult to see whether somebody is an American citizen when
    they are using a computer in a nation outside of the United
    States. There is no passport with an IP [internet protocol]
    address. So as we look to what affects U.S. citizens and what
    affects domestic policy, the lines are very gray and very
    blurred right now.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
        Mr. Thomas, you stress in your testimony that Russia
    perceives it is under attack from the West. If the U.S. ramps
    up its own IO and other efforts to counter their indirect
    warfare activities, how do we do so in a manner that decreases
    the risk of conflict escalation and modern warfare arms race?
        Mr. Thomas. Well, the first--the very first thing that I
    would be thinking of is for us to counter what Russia is doing,
    you really have to understand what they are doing. And what I
    mean by that is the tools that they have, the tools they use
    are different than some other nations, specifically because of
    their ability to use half truths or lies and get away with it,
    because they have, as we have said, an echo chamber that
    everybody's kind of on the same page when you listen to the
    evening news. But you have to understand what they mean when
    they say, I am employing information deterrence, when they say
    I am employing reflexive control, when I am using trolls.
    People really have to understand the lay of the land.
        Probably the best issue you can think of is if two teams
    are playing basketball and--we are into the Final Four here of
    March Madness--one team is not practicing against its own
    offense in practice. It is practicing against what the other
    guy is set up for offense and what kind of defense they play.
    And it is kind of the same way with looking at Russian
    propaganda and disinformation activities. You have to
    understand what it is objectively that sits behind the way they
    do business. It is different than us. And once that is
    understood, you have a base from which you can then begin to
    respond. Thank you.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
        Okay. And to all of our witnesses, in your opinion, what
    are the most effective capabilities and activities the U.S. can
    employ to deter, disrupt, and counter IO of nation-states,
    specifically propaganda, for deterrence and disruption? Is it
    disruption or denial of service to our adversary or
    dissemination of truthful narrative or are sanctions outside of
    the IO space most effective, for example, sanctions?
        Mr. Armstrong. So if--before I answer that question, if I
    can go back to your previous question to Mr. Thomas. I think
    there is a challenge here that we must not be accepting the
    Russian narrative, that they say that they are perceiving being
    attacked by the West is part of Putin's game. So I think part
    of the problem is we are too quick to accept their narrative
    and to undermine that narrative. He is riding a tiger that he
    has to keep finding an outside target for everybody.
        And that leads into the answer to your question. I think
    that you gave several options, and I think the answer is yes,
    it depends on the situation. There is certainly an issue that
    we have with regard to Russia, as well as China, as
    reciprocity. We permit Russian media to operate here freely
    just as we would because that is our principles, those are our
    principles, and we allow Chinese media to operate freely.
    However, both countries deny our access, either our commercial
    media or our government media. For example, the BBG, for Voice
    of America [VOA], Radio Free Europe, are denied access to
    Russia, and China denies VOA and Radio Free Asia.
        So I think there is an issue of reciprocity, but I also
    think there are elements where there needs to be, if you will,
    a more cyber--or rather a more physical type of attack response
    to their various activities. This is an incursion, it is a
    digital incursion, but I think there are times where a similar
    response is needed, just as much we need to get our message out
    there and make our statements. So the answer would be yes to
    all.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay.
        Mr. Lumpkin. I agree that all of those are very important
    and need to be an area of focus. I would add one more, if I
    could. It would be leveraging our partners. We have many
    partners who see the Russian threat in particular as
    existential, as something they live with every day.
        Last year, I was in Lithuania and had some opportunity to
    talk to people and to get to understand the problem set and how
    they see the world. They have some very talented people who,
    frankly, there are many folks that are just looking for a
    little leadership. And I think it is one of the things we can
    do is to work with our partners to make sure we help build
    their capabilities, because this is a problem much bigger than
    just with us here in the United States. But I think we can
    leverage and lean heavily on our allies to carry a lot of water
    for us.
        Mr. Langevin. Agreed, agreed. Thank you. Well said. All of
    you, thank you very much.
        I yield back.
        Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And, Mr. Armstrong, you talked about a lot of the issues
    that I had written down, state-owned media versus free press,
    that 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week news cycle where
    sensationalizing and getting it fast is more important to the
    news channels than getting it right. I can't name a journalist
    anymore, to be honest with you. I think that is a greater
    threat to our country than any outside influence.
        But with regard to this type of warfare, if you will, it is
    the exact opposite from a strategy standpoint as traditional
    war from what I can tell. I mean, we have always had--a
    country's capabilities were typically limited by their
    capacity. Capacity could be money, it could be the ability to
    get food and ammo to your soldiers, it could be manpower.
    Geography in and of itself limits a country's capacities. We
    are talking about Russia. You know, I don't think Russia has
    the ability to carry out operations in the Ukraine, Poland, the
    Baltic States, Syria. I don't think their economy allows them
    to do that right now. But their economy does allow them to
    create chaos, and then wherever they see the weakest point or
    the cheapest opportunity, if you will, to take advantage of it.
        And so I have two questions, specifically with offense is
    cheap in this type of warfare and defense is expensive. So with
    that said, how do you limit the capacity of your adversary if
    you are not playing offense? And then two is, do you think that
    Russia has an endgame in mind or do you think that their goal
    is to create chaos and then simply take advantage of whatever
    weak points they see?
        Mr. Armstrong. Thank you for that question. Starting with
    your second question, yes. I think they have an endgame, and I
    think you answered that. I think it is the chaos to allow
    them--they would prefer to set up bilateral relations. They
    would prefer their adversaries or the other nations, Europe,
    not just us, to be in turmoil so that they can seed any message
    they want in there and they can get whatever they want to
    achieve out.
        As far as what is a good defense to an aggressive offense,
    I think this is something where a good offense is a good
    defense. We are--as I said in my testimony, we are on our back
    feet. We are on our heels. We are responsive and reactive. And
    as the comment I made earlier about the Russian media leader,
    we are creating all sorts of opportunities for them. We don't
    have a strategy. As I said in my testimony, we have a
    credibility gap, and that creates not just a domestic
    vulnerability but a foreign vulnerability. When we don't have--
    this has been going on for years. When we don't have a clear,
    concise strategy and our adversaries are able to exploit that
    or when they manufacture a gap and we are unable to defend that
    and close that gap by exposing the truth, it is a
    vulnerability.
        So I would go back to my earlier comment that we need to
    understand that this is a priority. This is asymmetric warfare.
    This is on the cheap. It is an ability to gain your foreign
    policy objectives very easily. As the chairwoman said in her
    opening statement, that this is the ability to reach into
    another nation very freely, very easily. So I think we need to
    prioritize this and we need to understand that this is a risk.
    And we can't, as Mr. Lumpkin said, we cannot separate cyber
    data, as I would call it, and cyber psychological. This is a
    merged environment.
        Mr. Scott. So the only way to limit their capacity is for
    us to be on offense, not defense?
        Mr. Armstrong. Well, yes. And I would add, undercut their
    will to act in that way.
        Mr. Scott. Fair enough.
        Mr. Armstrong. If they don't perceive value, there is no
    risk, there is no cost. So I think part of this too is our lack
    of strategy is we have not established an escalation ladder. We
    don't necessarily need to publish that because somebody will
    come right up to it, as they are in hybrid warfare.
        Mr. Scott. Someone may publish it for us.
        Mr. Armstrong. But we don't know when it is too much. We
    haven't decided that. So we don't know when we are going to
    react. And I think the Russians are a perfect example of a
    group that is willing to keep literally and virtually pushing--
    --
        Mr. Scott. I am down to 20 seconds. Would you agree then
    that they are not going to stop until we stop them?
        Mr. Armstrong. Agree completely.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you very much.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the country.
        Ms. Stefanik. Mrs. Murphy.
        Mrs. Murphy. Thank you all for being here.
        Mr. Lumpkin, you were recently leading the Global
    Engagement Center at the State Department, an organization that
    was created last year to lead and coordinate the Federal
    Government's counter-propaganda efforts. In your written
    testimony and as you have discussed a bit here today, you
    suggest that the center should be elevated above the assistant
    secretary level at State in order to give the organization more
    authority to direct the interagency.
        What sort of resources and authorities would it take to
    elevate the center to something akin to the Office of the
    Director of National Intelligence? And do you have examples of
    how the current interagency structure prevents us from having
    an effective governmentwide information warfare and counter-
    propaganda strategy?
        Mr. Lumpkin. First, I think, let me take the second part of
    that first. What I found as the special envoy and coordinator
    for Global Engagement Center, I had so many peers, so my
    position was relegated to suggesting action. I had no influence
    over budgets, how they spent their money, where they put their
    people, and what was a priority and what was not. In order for
    me to--I had a very good working relationship and we were able
    to do a lot based on power of personality, and based on me
    coming directly from the Department of Defense previously. But
    there are a host of different players in this. You have got
    USAID [United States Agency for International Development], the
    regional bureaus at the State Department, you have got the
    intelligence community [IC], you have CYBERCOM, you have many
    different organizations that have a role here to play. And it
    is just trying to herd those cats to get them to actually do
    what you need to do. That is the problem set as far as
    organization.
        Again, using my analogy, is everybody is rowing the boat
    really hard, just not necessarily in the same direction, which
    impedes forward progress.
        I do believe there are several ways this could be done. I
    think it is best done through legislation, just as what was
    done with the GEC being codified and expanding its mission set
    to include the counter-state and disinformation efforts. I
    think that is generally the best mechanism to get things
    changed to be enduring. So that would be my first--and also
    make sure everybody's got skin in the game, which I think is
    important from a resourcing perspective, and not just leaving
    it up to the executive branch to sort this out, because we all
    own this problem set.
        Mrs. Murphy. And then my second question is about our
    efforts to counter ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]
    propaganda on the internet and to make it harder for them to
    recruit online. To be successful, this effort requires U.S.
    personnel, military and civilian, with the proper linguistic
    skills as well as cultural skills to be able to understand what
    they are reading and engage.
        A recent article about the CENTCOM [Central Command]
    program to counter ISIL's online propaganda indicated that our
    efforts may not be effective or at least as effective as they
    could be. I raised this issue at a previous hearing with
    Michael Sheehan, who ran NYPD's [New York Police Department's]
    counterterrorism operations. Mr. Sheehan said that the Federal
    security clearance process is the real obstacle, which makes it
    hard for qualified linguists to get cleared to do this critical
    work for the Federal Government. He noted that at NYPD, they
    put their linguists in a box, as he put it, so that they could
    do their work without having access to classified information.
    He suggested the NYPD model could be replicated on the Federal
    level. Would you comment on this idea?
        Mr. Lumpkin. I think there is some merit to it. One of the
    authorities that was granted to the Global Engagement Center
    was access--it is leveraging what they call section 3161, which
    is a hiring authority, which allowed the GEC to hire people to
    work in the U.S. Government uncompetitively based on their
    skill sets for a limited term.
        For example, it gave me access to folks in Silicon Valley,
    Madison Avenue, people who were pros in this space, in addition
    to folks who have unique cultural or language capabilities that
    I could--the challenge I always ran into is the security
    clearance requirement, because what I found within the
    Department of State, it takes about the same time to get
    somebody a top secret access to sensitive compartmented
    intelligence as it does a confidential clearance.
        So normally it takes about, I am told, a year to 18 months.
    What I was able to do is, one individual, we were able to fast
    track it, we put a lot of pressure on the system, and we did it
    in 5 months. I know it can be done, but that was a one-off. It
    doesn't happen every time.
        Mrs. Murphy. And do you think that there is a way to hire
    some of these people and box them in such that they don't need
    a clearance?
        Mr. Lumpkin. I think it depends on--I think it can be done.
    It is problematic, especially if you are looking in
    collaborative work environments, where--an information space
    that is very dynamic and is moving in real time. It is very
    hard to go out to a box and get somebody's--it is difficult.
        So, I mean, it is a short-term solution, but it will have
    long-term consequences of not being as productive as it could
    be. A better option would be to find ways to fast track the
    security clearance process to bring the right people in to do
    the mission set that needs to be done.
        Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you.
        Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Franks.
        Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
        And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
        You know, I think there is consensus that on the tactical
    level America has very effectively engaged the terrorist groups
    throughout the world. We win the battle on the battlefield, but
    we really haven't engaged them on the strategic level as
    effectively as we should, namely their narrative of global
    jihad.
        And I guess my first question is related to the Global
    Engagement Center. Do you believe that we need to encourage or
    to make sure that the GEC places a greater emphasis on Islamist
    theology and jihadist ideology if it is to effectively counter
    the propaganda success of jihadi groups like ISIS, or is the
    problem just a lack of money?
        Mr. Lumpkin. Well----
        Mr. Franks. Mr. Lumpkin, yes, sir----
        Mr. Lumpkin. Yeah, no, I have looked at this problem set
    quite a bit. And as I look at ISIS, if I look at ISIS and I see
    how they recruit and who they recruit, when they are recruiting
    from abroad, they are generally going after vulnerable
    populations.
        The way I kind of do the math, is there is about 7 billion,
    7.5 billion people on the planet, okay. At the height of ISIS,
    there was about 30,000 of them, 30,000 people. We know how many
    people have been killed, how many people have been wounded, and
    how many people have defected from the battlefield, plus or
    minus, which leads us to a number between 9,000 and 19,000 that
    joined this organization per year.
        When I simplify it like that and I look at--so we have 7.5
    billion people being held hostage by 9,000 to 19,000 recruits
    every year. In order to find those people, we have to use
    scalpel-like messages that resonate with those individuals
    instead of just going after one broad of a--Islamic messages,
    because people join ISIS for different reasons.
        The best study I have seen was done by the group called
    Quantum out of Lebanon, which basically binned those people who
    joined ISIS into nine different bins, everything from death
    seekers to thrill seekers, some are hardcore fundamentalists,
    some are looking for redemption. But each one of those groups,
    when you understand the recruit and you understand the
    audience, you have to target why they joined, and you have to
    come up with messaging strategies against each and every one of
    those groups.
        Mr. Franks. So do you believe that the challenge is just a
    lack of funding or more specifically focusing on those messages
    that you have cited?
        Mr. Lumpkin. I think you have challenges in both. I will
    tell you, in 2015, we--the U.S. Government, did a single
    kinetic strike against a high-value target that cost the U.S.
    taxpayers--when you look at the intelligence gathering before
    and after the strike was about $250 million that had about 2
    weeks of difference of impact on the battlefield to take out
    one high-value target.
        That same year in messaging, we spent about $5.6 million in
    base funding. So we have a discrepancy in where we want to put
    our money. Because I will tell you, I can tell you what your
    priorities are based on where you put your money and where you
    put your people. And in 2015, we weren't resourced
    appropriately. We have made huge strides in a short amount of
    time, but we still have a ways to go.
        Mr. Franks. All right. Well, let me shift gears on you here
    just a little bit.
        To combat the Russian hybrid warfare, do we merely need to
    park armored brigade combat teams in Eastern Europe without
    improving our cyber capabilities or hardening our space assets,
    in order to deter Russia, or do we have to sort of have a
    mirror effort to be able to engage them at and oppose them at
    every stage of their hybrid warfare?
        And that would be Mr. Thomas, I think.
        Mr. Thomas. Congressman, first of all, this is just my own
    personal opinion. I don't think Russia does hybrid war. I know
    a lot of people think they do.
        What we see when we read their press, initially they were
    doing something called new generation war, and that had to do a
    lot with initially pressuring the leaders and then gradually
    working into a regular warfare-type scenario where they
    deployed special forces and then they had more traditional
    combat.
        That term went away in 2013 and has been replaced by the
    diagram that I put in the testimony of new type warfare. I
    think why it is important is because that diagram enables you
    to see a scenario finally, a template of how Russia does
    envision what a future war might look like.
        I certainly understand why many people still ascribe
    Russian efforts as hybrid, because they, from our definition,
    it appears that way. But as we study them, we tend to look at
    the Russian version because that is our job, you know, we look
    at what they write all the time. But ever since that moment in
    2013 or 2015 when this template was proposed, they have been
    using that and the guys who talk new generation now talk new
    type as well.
        So what have they done that would answer your question,
    they tend to--as you know, in this coming year they are going
    to have a big exercise in the western district. They have
    increased their--the number of divisions there; in other words,
    they have increased the correlation of forces there with three
    new divisions.
        I think that General Hodges and others in Europe are doing
    what they can to offer a counter, let them know that if they
    did try to provoke actions or if they did try to come across
    the border, there would be a deterrent to that activity.
        So I think what we are doing at the moment is absolutely
    what is needed. The question becomes when can both sides start
    to pull back, you know, when can we talk about equal security
    where we both feel secure. And like Michael said, how do we get
    them out of this feeling of this existential situation where
    everybody, on both the Baltic side, they feel like they are
    being--their survival is under threat and the Russians
    basically feel the same way.
        Mr. Franks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Cooper.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Madam Chair, for an excellent
    hearing, and thank the witnesses.
        Mr. Armstrong, you had mentioned in your answer to, I
    think, Ms. Speier's question that there are other RTs operating
    in the U.S. Can you describe them, list them?
        Mr. Armstrong. Sure. Thank you.
        So you have RT, you have Sputnik, you have Ruptly, and then
    I think you have them feeding other entities, Infowars comes to
    mind, where those are echo chambers for those modalities. I
    would suspect that you have a variety of other groups. There
    was a project I was looking at with some colleagues. We were
    looking at VK, VKontakte, the social media site, the Russian
    social media site where American white supremacists were
    flocking to VK because social media sites in the U.S., like
    Facebook, were kicking them off.
        And what we found was, it appeared that American white
    supremacists were happily involved in discussions there, and
    there were very Russian, not cloaked but Russian actors in
    those spaces as well. So I think this is another insidious way
    of spinning or getting into the conversation. So I think
    besides these larger organizations, there is a lot of stuff
    that they are doing on the margins.
        Mr. Cooper. Are Chinese efforts in any way comparable to
    this?
        Mr. Armstrong. I think the Chinese are more sophisticated.
    RT is willing to play on the margins and play at the extremes,
    and China is a much more sophisticated actor. They are--I think
    if you want to compare which one lies more, which one distorts
    the truth more, I think RT's slogan of ``question more'' fits
    them because they don't want you to find an answer. They just
    want you to be confused.
        And CCTV is a much more intellectual and they are trying to
    push the Chinese view, but I think they do tend to be a more
    professional operation. So I wouldn't equate them, per se, on
    the same level. I don't think that either of them are
    particularly good for the American market.
        Mr. Cooper. Mr. Thomas, I appreciated your detailed
    knowledge of Russian techniques, particularly reflexive
    control. I think you quoted Kennan as saying that the Russians
    don't believe in objective truth. Was that from the Long
    Telegram or some other of Kennan's writings? Do you remember?
        Mr. Thomas. Yes, it was.
        Mr. Cooper. How many other countries do you think have
    leaders that share a similar philosophy of not believing in
    objective truth, whether they articulate that or not?
        Mr. Thomas. Uh-huh. Well, I do think that that is probably
    the situation in China as well because they are strongly
    Marxist as well, and anytime that you look at what is being
    taught in the schools, especially in the propaganda schools,
    they are looking, first of all, at how do I visualize objective
    reality, and then subjectively, how do I manipulate those
    factors to my benefit. That basically is their definition of
    strategy, by the way. So we do see that.
        One other thing I could add to what Matt said is that when
    you look at Chinese propaganda in the United States, it is
    interesting that you do see a subtler aspect like Sun Tzu
    institutes where language is being taught in 39 or so
    universities.
        And you also see--I remember the last time I stayed at a
    hotel here in Washington. There were two newspapers offered to
    me in the morning, the Washington Post and the China Daily. And
    when you start to see that, you realize that there--in one of
    the books I wrote the Chinese did say point-blank that they
    needed to take over the cultural environment in other
    countries. And so there is an effort underway, with CCTV and
    others, to more gradually, I think, than the Russian version,
    which is quite dramatic and offensive.
        Mr. Cooper. I don't know if any of you gentlemen have seen
    the movie ``Occupied.'' It is a 10-part European series about
    the takeover of Norway by Russia on energy issues. It was very
    subtly done. I find when I am explaining defense policy to
    folks back home, it is easier if I refer to a movie they might
    have seen because they tend to have such disbelief and they
    don't read newspapers.
        So any popular materials you could suggest to us that might
    help average people understand would be very useful. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
        We will now go to the second round of questions for those
    members who want another opportunity.
        My question, I will start with Mr. Lumpkin. Some have
    advocated for the creation of a U.S. Information Agency 2.0,
    bringing together the technical capabilities of cyber with some
    of the traditional information and communications component. Is
    that something that GEC, the Global Engagement Center, can
    build into? What is your opinion on that, having headed the
    Global Engagement Center, on whether that is a viable proposal?
        Mr. Lumpkin. I think that there is merit to a USIA, U.S.
    Information Agency-like organization. I am loathe for more
    bureaucracy. So what I would like to do is to envision
    something that is more above the bureaucracy that can leverage
    what is already happening in government and get it to work
    better together and to make sure it is fully resourced, both in
    moneys and people.
        But I do believe that we have significant capability in the
    U.S. Government; we just have to harness it, and, again, do
    that without creating too much bureaucratic tension or
    significant expense.
        Ms. Stefanik. And just to delve a little bit further into
    that, harnessing the capabilities we have today, can you talk
    about specific steps we can take to continue to mature the
    Global Engagement Center or continue to provide the resourcing
    that is necessary; and then the third piece is making sure that
    there is interagency communication rather than interagency
    friction.
        Mr. Lumpkin. I think you can do that by elevating the
    Global Engagement Center within the Federal Government and
    increase its authority by doing so. I think that will do that.
    I do believe that there are several other things that can be
    done. I think having access to key talent, the 3161 hiring
    authority, which is only through the executive order, so if
    that executive order were to go away, the 3161 hiring authority
    would go away as well.
        So--and that authority, because the executive order was
    only for the countering violent extremist mission set, the
    interpretation is that it can only be used for that mission
    set. So you cannot use the 3161 hiring authority for the
    counter-state and disinformation efforts mission set within the
    Global Engagement Center.
        So I think those are some key things that can be done. The
    other thing of significance is the GEC does not have a
    dedicated budget line. So it was funded largely through public
    diplomacy dollars, but it was up to the discretion of the
    senior leadership at the State Department on what that budget
    line would be from year to year. And there is a lack of
    stability in that funding, so it is hard to make long-term
    decisions, and it is also difficult to use that color of money,
    that type of money, that public diplomacy money to build
    partner capacity, to teach our partners and make our partners
    effective in this space. Because the more they do, the less we
    have to.
        Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Armstrong or Mr. Thomas, do you have
    comments on that line of questioning?
        Mr. Armstrong. I do. Thank you.
        The notion of a new USIA I found very difficult to stomach,
    because as I have written about, USIA was created as a part two
    of a two-part reorganization of government by Eisenhower. And
    unless we are going to reorganize government, it is going to be
    really difficult to just recreate this thing because it was a
    simpler communication environment. It was also a simpler
    government. We have a much more complex space.
        I would echo Mr. Lumpkin's comments, but I would also add
    that we are ignoring that there is an office in the State
    Department now that I think GEC, in some ways, and its
    predecessor CSCC [Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
    Communications], was trying to not just augment but in a way
    bypass or replace, and that is the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Public Diplomacy and its operation the Bureau of
    International Information Programs, which is the true legacy of
    United States Information Agency in that it was a global
    information center.
        It does not have the flexibility either because of
    authority or leadership to do these things, and so CSCC was
    stood up and I think this recent GEC amendment, which
    originally took shape as the Portman-Murphy amendment, which
    was intentionally bypassing R, the Under Secretary for Public
    Diplomacy, I think it should be a wakeup call that R is not
    executing within the Department, it is marginalized within the
    Department. It is not executing what you need as far as foreign
    policy and national security.
        And as Mr. Lumpkin just said, even the money within there
    and with the--both the authorities and the leadership, it has
    been a challenge to properly support GEC.
        And what is interesting, and this goes into what Ranking
    Member Langevin started to--accidentally started to say ``State
    force structure,'' I think there is a need to dramatically
    review the State Department's force structure along these
    lines, because one of the realities is that State Department
    has forward presence everywhere, everywhere. They have local
    expertise everywhere, and they are dramatically underfunded,
    undersupported. They are not experiencing these type of
    hearings. They don't have the same oversight. And, you know,
    they are out there on the ground utterly underfunded,
    undersupported, and not trained.
        I would like to add too, is that while the Russians are
    training their foreign service in--we can call it next
    generation warfare or we can call it hybrid warfare, but they
    are training their foreign service in this regard.
        And I met with some of their version of FSI [Foreign
    Service Institute], MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of
    International Relations], and they were citing Frank Hoffman,
    one of our military writers on this, and they were wondering
    why Frank is so militaristic. But this is their civilian side,
    and we have no comparable support to our foreign service or our
    foreign ministry.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you. That was an interesting
    perspective. And on that, I would ask Mr. Lumpkin if he had
    anything to add to what Mr. Armstrong just had to say about the
    State Department?
        Mr. Lumpkin. I only have 1 year of experience at the State
    Department, so my perspective is probably not--it is not as
    robust as my time in the Department of Defense. That said,
    people who know me know that I am not a huge fan of
    bureaucracy. I am not. I appreciate the need for it to
    standardize routine tasks.
        I had thought I had seen bureaucracy at the Department of
    Defense until I got to the State Department. It is much
    thicker, much more ingrained. Wicked smart people, amazingly
    smart people, but I affectionately refer to the State
    Department as a 19th century bureaucracy using 20th century
    tools against a 21st century adversary. And we have to do
    better.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
        This is a question for all of our witnesses: How can we
    better leverage technological advancements to counter IO
    activities of other nations? Specifically, how can the U.S.,
    particularly the Department of Defense, spur innovation and
    obtain new technological capabilities?
        Mr. Lumpkin. I would like to take that one. There is a lot
    of--especially in the world of analytics, there are tremendous
    number of tools. Last time I looked, there was between 3,400
    and 3,800 analytic tools just on social media alone. It is an
    area of technology and science that is emerging every day, that
    is continuing to advance and to iterate itself.
        What we have to do is to find ways to streamline access to
    those tools so we can get them put on U.S. Government systems.
    We are talking information technology systems, computer
    software, to get those implemented. So we need to fast track or
    streamline access to those because they are changing so fast.
        And the social media environment and the media environment
    writ large is changing so rapidly, what we find ourselves
    frequently doing is putting 2-year-old tools into the workforce
    because that is how long it takes to get approvals to use them
    in many cases. So we have to find and streamline to keep up
    with technological advancements and leverage those things that
    can make our workforce more productive, more effective, and so
    we can speed our messaging capabilities.
        Mr. Armstrong. Can I add to that. I would say, one, we have
    to understand what we want to achieve. I think simply ``stop
    it'' is inadequate. I think we need to have a broader strategy,
    and I think we need to have a cost. We need to impose a cost on
    them to continue to conduct these activities, and I don't see
    that that is part of our process.
        Mr. Thomas. If I might add just one or two things quickly.
    Russia has developed what they call science companies. They
    have got about 10 or 11 of them now within the military. Those
    science companies unite new, young brains with the older guys,
    and they are learning from one another about electronic warfare
    and programming and these sort of things.
        They also have an advanced research foundation, which is--
    they have created. It is similar to DARPA [Defense Advanced
    Research Projects Agency]. But they are into all of the things
    that DARPA is and robotics and UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]
    and all of these type of issues as well.
        And perhaps most important of all has been the Russian
    education system. They continue to churn out incredible
    mathematicians and algorithm writers. And as anyone knows, you
    know, the key to software is in search engines, is algorithms
    and what it produces. And those are the--there is a high-tech
    capability there that they have invested in for sure.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Langevin. Sure. I don't disagree with that at all.
    Point well taken.
        So this is more of a longer term issue, well short and long
    term. But to all witnesses, so the U.S. has struggled with
    gauging the effectiveness of our own messaging and other IO
    efforts. In your opinion, how can we improve U.S. ability to
    measure effectiveness of IO activities and overall impact of
    operations?
        Mr. Lumpkin. This goes back to the analytic tools I was
    talking about, is to making sure we have access to them and
    also make sure that any strategies we develop and as we move
    forward especially in the counter-state propaganda and
    disinformation space is that they have to be underpinned with
    analytics.
        And it is not just assessing whether your message is
    effective; if it is not, is how are you going to change it
    rapidly, reassessed and--and change and change. Because at the
    speed of information it has to constantly be iterated for the
    consumer to keep up with the 24-hour, 7-days-a-week, 365-days-
    a-year news and information cycle that is out there.
        So I think the data is key to both what we do every day and
    how you stay relevant in this space.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
        Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Cooper.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
        I would like to explore for a second the extent to which
    your worlds intersect with liberal arts academics in this
    country. Like, there are lots of theories on social cohesion,
    social capital, trust in the society, things like that. The
    work of Robert Putnam or anybody like that mean anything to you
    guys, or is that just----
        Mr. Lumpkin. I think one of the keys for the Global
    Engagement Center is there is several academic affiliations
    where you look at--because this is about behavior, right, when
    it is all said and done. It is about creating cognitive
    realities for people, whether it is based on logic or it is
    based on emotion, to change their ultimate behavior. So the
    behavior aspects of this are pretty much everything when it is
    said and done.
        Mr. Cooper. That is why I am asking the question. He is
    more on the sociology side. On the behavioral economics side
    there are folks like Daniel Kahneman, won the Nobel Prize.
    There are theorists like Jonathan Haidt wrote the ``Righteous
    Mind: Why Good People Fight Over Politics and Religion.'' Do
    you intersect with these worlds at all?
        Mr. Lumpkin. The GEC does, absolutely, and myself as a
    recovering anthropologist before I actually joined the United
    States Navy many years ago, so I have a deep-seated
    appreciation for the impacts of anthropology, sociology, and
    the other liberal arts, and the effects of what we are trying
    to actually do, so yes.
        Mr. Cooper. So it's true that you can't conduct a public
    opinion poll in Russia or presumably in China? Is that right?
        Mr. Armstrong. So because they are difficult spaces to get
    into, there is one--I think there were two, but there was one,
    Levada, which was essentially the well-known Russian
    independent public opinion center. If memory serves, there was
    something that happened that caused relatively recently that
    they are no longer viewed that way, because--so it is difficult
    to do surveys in Russia. And China, I am not sure what our
    capacity is.
        Mr. Cooper. It seems like an environment in which there is
    no trusted source, and that seems to be increasingly true in
    this country, like I spoke at Rotary in Nashville this Monday,
    and I have said that, well, 17 U.S. intelligence agencies
    agreed there was some sort of Russian involvement in our
    election. We don't know the extent or whether anybody was
    persuaded, but at least they tried. And I got a lot of pushback
    from Rotarians who said, well, why do you believe those guys.
    Like shouldn't unanimity among 17 U.S. intelligence agencies
    mean something to the average patriotic citizen?
        Mr. Armstrong. So going to your earlier question, I think
    there is a marketplace for loyalty that is evolving here, and
    there is a redefinition of citizenship and national security
    and nationalism, of who do you trust? Where is your alignment?
    In that particular situation, what I am about to say doesn't
    apply, but in the broader sense, you can now test drive another
    identity.
        This goes into your behavioral concepts. You can now test
    drive an identity, and nobody has to know about it. You can
    reconnect with a vast culture that you have no connection. As I
    mentioned in the opening remarks about Jihad Jane, you can have
    no affiliation, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and decide you
    want to be part of something.
        So there is an element here that is evolving our notion of
    hyphenates to commas where you can carry multiple identities at
    once. And from a marketing perspective, each one of those is an
    opportunity for me to subvert you and do something.
        So I think that there is a challenge here that is playing
    within our trust scheme as well, even if it is not an outside
    actor, but who do we trust. I think this goes into the
    polarization of news. So we are continuing to subdivide, and I
    see nothing that is moving to reverse that pathway right now.
        Mr. Cooper. In the newspaper today, they say that the
    German Government is considering imposing a 50,000 euro fine or
    something for fake news on the German internet. Do you know of
    any country that has done something like that?
        Mr. Armstrong. Well, one, each nation has a different
    relationship to the news. Our--such an act in our society would
    be very, very difficult. There is a comparable--each of the
    Baltic States, I think, have similar. They have tried--was it
    Estonia? No, it was Latvia that actually shut down Russian TV,
    and they continued to make efforts like that.
        Britain has Ofcom, which is their regulatory for TV
    broadcast. They recently shut down RT's London U.K. bank
    account under those regulations. Now, that just covers
    broadcast so it doesn't cover internet.
        So each nation has a different relationship to what news is
    flowing within their environment, so the answer is, yes, it
    does pose interesting challenges in various places because it
    can become a propaganda coup against that state.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Madam Chair. I see I have used my
    time. Thanks.
        Ms. Stefanik. Ms. Speier.
        Ms. Speier. We just got word that the President has
    recommended a 28 percent cut in the State Department.
        Mr. Cooper. Thirty seven percent.
        Ms. Speier. Well, I heard 28, but--and I think there is a
    belief by some that by cutting that and cutting foreign aid
    that we are somehow not impacting our national security. And I
    think, Mr. Thomas, you had commented earlier, and I would like
    you to explore for us the impacts on national security, cuts to
    foreign aid and information distribution in foreign countries,
    as anemic as it is for us, how that will affect our national
    security.
        Mr. Thomas. Congresswoman, I don't think I can answer that
    question properly. I think I would rather defer to a State
    Department person.
        Ms. Speier. All right. Mr. Lumpkin.
        Mr. Lumpkin. I think a cut of that magnitude would have
    devastating consequences on everything from the goodness that
    the State Department does from Fulbright scholarships that
    help, you know, bring people and access people and bring the
    world closer together and have people understand who we are as
    a nation and what our values are and what we believe.
        I know that on--I just look at, from my time at DOD in
    conjunction with the State Department, we are not going to kill
    our way to victory. We are not going to message our way to
    victory. This is about having a layered approach to what we do,
    and you cannot cut--make a 37 percent cut to a single
    department that has such a crucial role without having
    devastating consequences.
        Ms. Speier. Mr. Armstrong.
        Mr. Armstrong. So I think, like Mr. Lumpkin, we would both
    say that the State Department is a dysfunctional place and full
    of bureaucracy. That said, it needs to be revamped rather than
    massive cuts. Even elements such as exchanges, they
    historically have been part of the United States Government's
    efforts to win or engage in the struggle for minds and wills by
    developing local capacity.
        Getting them to understand--getting the exchange
    participants to understand the United States better is really
    secondary or even tertiary. It is about building local
    capacity, inoculating against adversarial information or
    experiences.
        So you add to that various other efforts, even the broader
    public diplomacy realm or the various efforts in global affairs
    or even their elements of counterterrorism or the narcotics,
    INL [Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
    Affairs], there are a tremendous number of activities there
    that are operating in a silo.
        And I think they do not just further our foreign policy in
    the economic sense and societal sense but definitely contribute
    to developing partner capacity on the ground.
        Ms. Speier. I am going to interrupt you for a moment
    because I have only got a minute 30, and I want you each to
    answer this question. I serve on the House Permanent Select
    Committee on Intelligence, as does Ms. Stefanik. What message
    would you want to convey to the members of that committee in
    terms of the Russian influence and its potential impacts in
    this country?
        Mr. Armstrong. That it is severe, we are underestimating
    it, and there is no cost to the Russians for them doing it.
        Mr. Lumpkin. And mine would be to reinvest the IC in their
    capabilities to monitor, detect, and understand what the
    Russians are doing.
        Mr. Thomas. And I would add that it is probably just
    unknown here just how insidious, if that is the right word, the
    effort is in other countries overseas. I know there was one
    country in the Baltics who said propaganda and information
    influence is like carbon monoxide. It is colorless, it is
    odorless, and it comes in and does its job.
        And it is a very interesting way to think about how
    propaganda is being used over there, especially in those
    countries where when a TV, a cable package is put together and
    within that package is Russian TV so that those people are
    getting simply a different point of view that is in key areas
    too, it is along the borders there with Russia. So there is
    much to consider there.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you to all of the members from both
    sides of the aisle for such thoughtful questions. As you can
    see, there is an increased interest in these important issues.
        I want to also thank our witnesses, Mr. Armstrong, Mr.
    Lumpkin, and Mr. Thomas. We look forward to continuing working
    with you as we begin the process of this year's NDAA, and thank
    you very much for your testimony today.
        The meeting is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 15, 2017

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 15, 2017

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 15, 2017

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS

        Mr. Franks. If we are to take seriously the threat posed by
    Russian, Chinese, and jihadi information operations seriously, is the
    GEC the appropriate institution to combat these aggressive (and
    successful) information operation strategies? What reforms or changes
    should be made to the GEC to make it more effective--or should we
    create a new entity for this mission?
        Mr. Armstrong. Thank you for this question. The informational
    element is not a sideshow. It is at the heart of international affairs.
    The kinetic effect of a bullet or bomb is often secondary to the
    informational effect. At its core, terrorism is an informational act.
    Our adversaries, from Russia to China to Iran to ISIS, understand that
    success in the informational, or more specifically the psychological or
    cognitive, domain is central to a successful offensive and defense. We
    must begin to accept this reality.
        The GEC was established as an interagency hub within the State
    Department to provide a point of leadership--and accountability--for
    the Government's response to adversarial information activities. The
    majority of the staff are from the interagency--mostly from the Defense
    Department--with few from the State Department. Its ability to
    coordinate, let alone affect and effect, actions within the State
    Department and the interagency is limited.
        The GEC has and continues to face resistance from elements within
    the Department that perceive GEC as not a part of the Department's
    mission. Several functional and geographic bureaus do not understand or
    accept how the GEC supports the Department. The reasons are numerous:
    an ossified State Department bureaucracy and operational culture;
    confusion over the Department's role in national security; questions
    over authorities, questions on what tactics may and should be used;
    and, a remarkable lack of leadership support from outside of GEC,
    including from past Secretaries, senior staff, and other Under and
    Assistant Secretaries.
        These challenges will not be irrelevant by creating yet another new
    entity without addressing the fundamentals that led to the creation of
    CSCC and GEC, based on a faulty vision of tactics and poorly defined
    mission, both of which limited any possible effectiveness. These same
    barriers caused ripples that negatively influenced interagency
    partners' willingness to work with and support the GEC. At this time,
    there are no indications that any of the GEC's limitations have been
    removed or will be soon.
        The function of an organization like GEC (though GEC's mission, in
    all aspects, is too narrowly defined) should remain inside the State
    Department. The expeditionary, long-term approach of the State
    Department, it's ground presence in nearly every nation on the planet,
    and its fundamental role in our foreign policy and national security
    makes the Department the best location for an operation like the GEC.
        I have two recommendations. They are not exclusive in that they
    may, and should, be pursued simultaneously.
        First, there is an existing operational and integrative hub for
    global informational and in-person engagement in the Department: the
    Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. However, only
    one of the eight persons to hold the office since it was established in
    1999 (the office has been vacant for nearly 30% of the time since
    then), none have been adequately prepared, directed, or supported to
    fulfill a role of coordinating, integrating, and supporting U.S.
    Government-wide global engagement. An Under Secretary will wield
    substantially greater influence than a ``coordinator'' or ``Special
    Envoy.'' This existing Under Secretary has direct or indirect control
    over a nearly $1b budget, which contains the bulk of the USIA's former
    informational (short-term and long-term) engagement capabilities.
    However, this Under Secretary faces similar redundancies and turf-
    protecting (and building) that the GEC met, and has done so without
    leadership support to overcome these limits to better support our
    foreign policy, national security, and support to interagency partners
    for the same.
        Congress must address the systemic deficiencies at the State
    Department as it is the right home for the required hub. The original
    Portman-Murphy proposal in the Senate was intriguing as it could have
    been a spark to cause a substantial reconsideration of the poor
    organization, misalignment, and disconnectedness of various overlapping
    Department efforts while undoing the forced segregation of
    ``information'' from the rest of national security and foreign policy
    structures and bureaucratic cultures.
        I am not aware of a single Congressional hearing or clear mandate
    by a Secretary of State or President to empower and hold accountable
    this Under Secretary to fulfill the role embedded in it when it was
    created following the abolishment of USIA in 1999. The GEC, like the
    Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication it replaced, and
    the Portman-Murphy bill proposed in the last Congress, are direct
    responses to the failure of this Under Secretary to perform a function
    too many have forgotten it is positioned and resourced to execute.
        Second, I recommend the Congress reconsider the ``Political West
    Point'' idea of an organization that provides analysis and training for
    adversarial informational activities that State Department, Defense
    Department, and other agencies, as well as relevant private sector and
    friendly nation governments and civil society actors, can attend. The
    name for this ``Political West Point'' was the Freedom Academy when it
    was introduced in Congress in the late 1950s, though a different name
    may be useful today. Such an organization would address the underlying
    resistance derived from a denial that information is anything but a
    sideshow to the other three core elements of national power: Diplomacy,
    Military, and Economic. The ``D,'' ``M,'' and ``E'' are not coequal
    with the ``I'' of information, but rely on Information for their
    effect. Further, on the military side, the lack of appreciation of the
    centrality of informational activities have permitted, if not
    encouraged, military public affairs officers to aggressively segregate
    themselves, and their advice, from the military's trained information
    professionals. At the State Department, this will help break down the
    cultural divide between the Public Diplomacy cone (where ``cone'' is
    the Department's loose equivalent the military's ``MOS'') that
    information is a key facet of international affairs. It would also
    benefit the military through an increase informational training for
    MOSs not directly involved in information (i.e. look beyond Information
    Operations, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs), as would
    other agencies, from Agriculture to Treasury to AID. This would provide
    some of the analytical support GEC presently strives to deliver, and
    operate similar to and likely with West Point's Combating Terrorism
    Center. This Academy would be a repository for the collection and
    analysis and training on adversarial tactics, techniques, and
    procedures across the psychological and cognitive domains, including
    the cross-over to the physical domain.
        Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the question. I look
    forward to discussing this issue in greater detail with you.
        Mr. Franks. If we are to take seriously the threat posed by
    Russian, Chinese, and jihadi information operations seriously, is the
    GEC the appropriate institution to combat these aggressive (and
    successful) information operation strategies? What reforms or changes
    should be made to the GEC to make it more effective--or should we
    create a new entity for this mission?
        Mr. Lumpkin. The GEC is currently the most viable institution in
    the Executive Branch of government to lead and direct efforts to
    counter the threat posed by Russian, Chinese, and Jihadi information
    operations. That said, the GEC continues to face significant challenges
    to fully realize its potential in addressing these threats.
    Insufficient funding, manpower, and support coupled with the thick
    bureaucratic layers at the State Department have historically hampered
    effective operations.
        Four principle things can be done to make the GEC significantly
    more effective;
        1.  Increase funding to the GEC and provide it a dedicated funding
    line.
        2.  Significantly increase the assigned manpower.
        3.  Elevate the GEC in status at both the Department of State and
    within the Interagency and authorize it to ``direct'' U.S. government
    efforts to counter both State and non-State actor threats in the
    information environment.
        4.  Ensure the GEC has aggressive leadership with a proven track
    record of success operating in the interagency.
        Mr. Franks. What specific steps must we take to combat Russian
    hybrid warfare: Do we ultimately need to oppose them at every stage?
    For example, if we merely park armored brigade combat teams in Eastern
    Europe but do not improve our cyber capabilities or harden our space
    assets, will Russia be deterred?
        Mr. Thomas. The basis for my response utilizes contemporary Russian
    open source military thought, and not the mirror-imaging of U.S.
    concepts onto Russian activities, which is the type of analysis many
    U.S. analysts incorporate. Russia's military leaders state often that
    it is the U.S. who developed the term hybrid war, and it is the U.S.
    who is using this concept to confront Russia. Westerners, on the other
    hand, state that Russia is using hybrid techniques. The Russians
    themselves state that they tend to depend on ``new-type'' warfare
    methods, the outline of which is attached [see graphic below]. Russia's
    chief of its Main Operations Directorate stated in 2015 that
    ``nonstandard forms and methods are being developed for the employment
    of our Armed Forces, which will make it possible to level the enemy's
    technological superiority. For this, the features of the preparation
    and conduct of new-type warfare are being fully used and `asymmetric'
    methods of confronting the enemy are being developed.'' After
    determining vulnerable areas, Special Forces, foreign agents,
    information effects, and other nonmilitary forms of effects are used in
    each conflict, with each involving a different set of asymmetric
    operations (coordinated with respect to targets, location, and time, a
    combination of asymmetric and indirect actions).''

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        .epsRussia's new-type warfare method has several apparent phases
    (none of which are numbered) that ratchet up confrontations
    incrementally. The U.S. should confront Russia at every stage of this
    template and attempt to ensure the phase involving classical war
    methods is never reached. The initial phase of new-type warfare would
    be the best time to confront Russia, when we are only dealing with
    various types of deterrence methods (information, psychological, etc.),
    diplomatic pressure, and propaganda means before actual confrontation
    evolves. We are clearly in this phase now, which involves posturing and
    threats. We should do all in our power not to move beyond this phase.
    However, if this phase fails, then new-type war's next phase involves
    the covert deployment of special operations forces and cyber-attacks,
    and the use of heretofore unnamed types of new weapons systems. This
    would be a real step toward actual fighting and the absolute last
    chance before, according to the Russian General Staff's new-type
    warfare scenario, classical warfare methods begin. As long as President
    Putin views an existential threat to Russia, I do not believe that
    Armored Brigades in Eastern Europe will deter him, nor will hardening
    space assets. He will find a way to asymmetrically, as the Russian
    military has stated, threaten the U.S. Perhaps these ways have already
    been prepared and are ready for use or exploitation. I do not believe
    he wants his military to conduct combat operations against NATO or the
    U.S., but I also believe he is prepared to use them if necessary. Of
    recent importance is that a major discussion of the term ``war'' is
    underway among Russia's military elite. This debate must be followed
    closely as perhaps new types of warfare methods are under serious
    consideration. For example, the military's emphasis on ``nonstandard,''
    ``asymmetric,'' and ``nonmilitary'' methods should be watched closely
    for indications of their future application in war.
        The views expressed in this response are my own and do not
    necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Army or
    Department of Defense--Mr. Timothy Thomas.

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