[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TESTING THE LIMITS: IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE
PROGRAM, SANCTIONS, AND THE ISLAMIC
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 29, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-14
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
DARRELL E. ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
RON DeSANTIS, Florida DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D., specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs,
Congressional Research Service................................. 8
Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, Kahn Fellow, director of Military and
Security Studies Program, The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy.................................................... 24
Ms. Elizabeth Rosenberg, senior fellow and director, Energy,
Economics and Security Program, Center for a New American
Security....................................................... 42
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 10
Mr. Michael Eisenstadt: Prepared statement....................... 27
Ms. Elizabeth Rosenberg: Prepared statement...................... 44
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 70
Hearing minutes.................................................. 71
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 72
TESTING THE LIMITS: IRAN'S BALLISTIC
MISSILE PROGRAM, SANCTIONS, AND THE
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize
other members seeking recognition for 1 minute or longer. We
will then hear from our witnesses.
Without objection, witnesses, your prepared statements will
be made a part of the record. Members may have 5 days in which
to insert statements and questions for the record subject to
the length limitation in the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
In the nearly 2 years since the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 2231, approving the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA, and lifting sanctions on
Iran, one thing has been abundantly clear: The notion that Iran
would now modify its behavior and become a responsible member
of the international community has proven to be completely and
utterly false.
Many of us knew that the Iranian regime would not moderate
its behavior, but that it would amplify its illicit activity
using the nuclear deal as leverage. Sure enough, since the
JCPOA was signed, we have seen an Iran that has taken U.S.
citizens hostages and demanded, and unfortunately, received
ransom for their return. As a result, Iran has since held
additional U.S. citizens and permanent U.S. residents with the
expectation of receiving more ransom payments.
The regime continues to support the Assad regime with
money, supplies, weapons, fighters, and is doing the same in
Yemen with the Houthis. Iran's ships have made dozens of
provocative actions toward U.S. ships in the Strait of Hormuz
and the Persian Gulf, with the regime playing a dangerous game
and harassing our vessels.
Iran continues to support terror around the world, most
notably through its support of the terror group Hezbollah. This
has allowed Hezbollah to increase its stockpiled rockets and
missiles to 150,000 or more and add more sophisticated missiles
to its arsenal, putting our friend and ally, the democratic
Jewish state of Israel, under greater threat.
All of these activities have seen an uptick since the JCPOA
and all are indeed very troubling, but perhaps the most
egregious and troubling is Iran's continued pursuit of a viable
ballistic missile program. Why? Because history has shown us,
and as one witness before this panel previously stated, that
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs go hand in
glove.
Over time, the correlation between a country's nuclear
program and a corresponding ballistic missile program has
proved to be absolute: That countries that sustain indigenous
medium and long-range ballistic missiles always aspire to
possess nuclear weapons.
Since the signing of the JCPOA, Iran has tested, according
to some sources, at least 15 ballistic missiles, and it has
done so in open defiance of Resolution 2231.
It came as a shock to so many of us that a final concession
to Iran was given when the U.S. agreed to lift the arms embargo
as part of the nuclear deal, especially when we were told
repeatedly that the deal was only on the nuclear program. That
is why the Trump administration needs to follow through on some
of its promises and reevaluate the JCPOA and the 2231
resolution.
We are seeing an uptick in these ballistic missile tests
and Iran's aspiration for an ICBM program, precisely because
the regime wants to be ready to be able to deliver a nuclear
payload when the terms of the JCPOA expire and we will have
walked them right into it.
We simply cannot allow the regime to continue with these
provocations. We need to go back to the Security Council and
find a way to make sure that there can be no ambiguity. Any
ballistic missile testing, any attempt to acquire ballistic
missile technology or expertise, and any attempt to proliferate
from the regime must be stopped and sanctioned.
The original intent of the nuclear sanctions was to put so
much pressure on the regime that it would be forced to end all
enrichment and completely dismantle its nuclear program and
infrastructure. That needs to be our approach on the regime's
missile program, while also revisiting the JCPOA and all of its
flaws.
We already have important tools for the President to use
now, like the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
Act. Sadly as this subcommittee learned last Congress, the
State Department and the previous administration sat on these
important reports and sanctions, oftentimes for years, in order
to not upset the regime during these sensitive negotiations.
The latest round of sanctions, on March 21, is a good step, but
this report came 9 months after the previous report and only
covered activities that took place in the year 2014. So we
still have a very serious backlog.
The new administration needs to step up its Iran, North
Korea, and Syria nonproliferation activities and it needs to
use the other tools available to it. One tool should be
Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel's new bill, of which I
am proud to be a cosponsor, that specifically targets Iran's
ballistic missiles.
We need Iran and those that seek to supply it with the
technology or know-how to know that we will bring down
sanctions so crippling on them that they will have to think
twice about developing its ballistic missile program. We need
to fully and vigorously enforce our current sanctions and then
strengthen and expand them to ensure maximum pressure is
exerted because Iran only responds to strength and pressure.
With that, I am pleased to yield to the ranking member, Mr.
Deutch, for his opening statement.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks for calling
today's very timely hearing.
Iran is not a new subject for the subcommittee. We have
explored its nuclear program, the threat it poses to Israel,
its relationships with North Korea and Hezbollah, and the
realities that it hopes to exploit under the JCPOA.
Today we will focus on Iran's nonnuclear behavior, its
ballistic missile program and its dangerous Revolutionary Guard
Corps. I know that you and I share the belief that this
Congress can still move resolutely against Iran's continued
pursuit of ballistic missiles. I want to thank our witnesses
for being here to answer our questions and help us frame our
conversation, and I look forward to what I know will be a
healthy exchanges of ideas.
Despite the nuclear deal, Iran's behavior has not changed.
Now freed from many of the sanctions that once isolated it,
Iran is looking to integrate itself into the global economy and
to normalize its relations with the Western countries.
Unsurprisingly, this hope has been undermined by Iran's
continued support for the murderous Assad regime in Syria,
funding of Hezbollah in Lebanon, calls for the destruction of
Israel, and insistence on sowing instability beyond its
borders.
In many areas of conventional military power, Iran lags far
behind its neighbors. To make up for these deficiencies, Iran
now has the Middle East's largest arsenal of ballistic missiles
and is developing the know-how to produce increasingly complex
missile components on its own. Thanks to the Russians, Iran now
has the S-300 missile defense system. And in a matter of a few
years, the Iranian space program claims it will be able to
create rockets that can drop a warhead anywhere in the world.
It is clear that left unhindered, the scale and the
sophistication of the Iranian missile program will only grow,
and it is incumbent on this Congress to act decisively to halt
its progress. However Members may have felt about the nuclear
deal, we can all agree that the JCPOA does not prevent us from
responding to reckless behavior from Iran and that U.N.
Security Council Resolution 2231 forbids the Iranians from
testing or developing ballistic missiles.
Despite that resolution, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps, which oversees the missile program, has conducted test
after test of these weapons in defiance of the will of the
international community. The fact that an organization like the
IRGC, which supports terrorist organizations like Hamas and
Hezbollah, is also in charge of dangerous missile technologies
should send a chill down the spine of anyone working for peace
and stability in the Middle East.
The United States has an obligation to stand against the
IRGC's repeated provocations by raising the issue of missile
tests in the Security Council at every opportunity. We also
need to use our influence at the U.N. to encourage allies to do
the same, even at a time when our new President seems intent on
abdicating America's role as a leader in international
diplomacy.
In addition to robust engagement at the Security Council,
we can take a number of concrete steps to box in the Iranians.
First, we need to pass the bipartisan H.R. 1698, which I am
proud to cosponsor. The bill would sanction countries like
Russia that sell missile technology to Iran, the financial
institutions that make those sales possible, and the Iranian
entities that contribute to the country's domestic missile
industry.
Second, we have to support full and vigorous enforcement of
the JCPOA, which means ensuring that the IAEA has the resources
that it needs to carry out its monitoring, and, importantly,
embracing Europe's renewed interest in tightening
implementation of the deal.
Finally, we should encourage GCC states to adopt a
coordinated missile defense system that will act as a deterrent
to Iranian aggression in the Gulf.
I don't pretend that this list is exhaustive, and I am glad
we have the opportunity today to discuss all of our options.
Whatever path we take, it is clear that we must act together
and that we must act quickly. The danger that Iran continues to
pose through its funding of terrorist organizations, its
meddling in regional affairs, and its pursuit of ever more
deadly ballistic technologies demands continued engagement from
the United States and our allies.
We have seen that international coordination against the
threat from Iran is possible, and we know that there is strong
bipartisan support in Congress for decisive action of this
kind. I welcome a thoughtful discussion today about the tools
we have at our disposal, and I encourage my colleagues to
remain united against Iran's violations of international law
and its clear refusal to live in peace with its neighbors.
And I will yield back the balance of my time. Thank you,
Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
And now we will turn to our members for their opening
statements, starting with Mr. DeSantis of Florida.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
We have been on this committee years talking about Iran,
talking about the Iran deal. We were told at the time this deal
would help bring Iran into the community of nations, it would
improve their behavior if we just let our boot off their neck
and released all these sanctions. That hasn't happened here. We
are talking about now their belligerence, what they are doing
with ballistic missiles.
Go back to this deal. The Obama administration conceded at
the outset on the ballistic missile issue, which was a major
mistake to begin with. We see Iran has been emboldened by this
deal, their belligerent conduct throughout the Middle East in
places like Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, has demonstrated that they
are very much a malevolent force.
And I think I join both my colleagues in supporting the
need for us to move very swiftly on tough sanctions, both again
Iran's ballistic missile program and against the Revolutionary
Guard Corps.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSantis.
Mr. Boyle of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Boyle. Thank you, and I will be brief. Some of this
will be a little bit repetitive from what Mr. Deutch was
saying.
Essentially the intelligence community has assessed that
Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the
Middle East. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 calls upon
Iran--and let me quote it specifically, because I think this is
sometimes confused by some, ``not to undertake any activity
related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of
delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic
missiles technology.''
Despite that, we know now there have been some 15 illegal
tests since 2231 came into force. So I look forward to this
hearing and specifically discussing ways we can move forward on
this matter that do not in any way conflict with the JCPOA, but
live up to the letter of the law of 2231.
Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you Mr. Boyle.
Mr. Mast of Florida.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
You know, as we speak about this issue, I just ask that we
always keep into perspective what we have allowed to become
very cliche, in that we constantly point to Iran using the
phrase ``the largest state sponsor of terror,'' and ask
ourselves, what does that really mean?
For those of us that have spent time on our Nation's
battlefields in modern history, we know exactly that that looks
like. It was Iranian hands that produced improvised explosive
devices that literally killed thousands of our servicemembers
in Iraq. It was Iranian hands that packed improvised explosive
devises with nuts and screws and bolts and other pieces of
shrapnel so that they would put so many holes in our
servicemembers that we couldn't plug each and every one of them
before they would hemorrhage out. That's the enemy that we are
dealing with. As my colleague, Mr. Deutch, put it, the group
that is sowing instability. That is how they sow that
instability. And I ask that we keep that in perspective as we
move forward in this dialogue.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir, for your service.
Mr. Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank
you and the ranking member for calling this very important
hearing. I thank the witnesses for sharing their perspectives
and insights.
Iran obviously remains a significant threat in the region,
around the world, to our allies and to our interests. And while
a nuclear Iran is without question one of the greatest threats
we could face, Iran continues to, through its ballistic missile
development, through its shipment of conventional arms, through
its nefarious activities in the region, in the world, and as
well as its violations of human rights, to remain a very bad
actor.
As the ranking member said, the JCPOA does not preclude us
from taking actions to thwart Iran's ballistic missile program
or to address their other nefarious actions around the world
and in the region. I would take it a step further in fact: I
believe we have a moral obligation to do just that. And I look
forward to have this hearing to talk about how we can push back
on Iran's behavior.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
As a former FBI agent dealing with counterterrorism
matters, it was often our job to find the nexus between
terrorists and their state sponsors. And since the 1980s, the
largest and most adept state sponsor of terrorism has been the
Islamic Republic of Iran. Americans first became aware of this
somber fact back in 1983 when an Iranian-sponsored terrorist
group, Hezbollah, bombed the Marine barracks in Beirut,
Lebanon.
Since then, Iran has continued to support groups that
target Americans abroad. From 1982 to 1992, Iranian-backed
Hezbollah kidnapped and held captive some 104 hostages in
Lebanon, including the CIA's Beirut station chief, William
Buckley. After the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Iranian
intelligence and Revolutionary Guard Corps operatives provided
training, arms, IED materials to insurgents.
In recent years, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps,
specifically the shadowy Quds Force group, has attempted to sow
continued instability throughout the Middle East. In Syria, the
IRGC advisers have fought and died alongside of the forces of
Bashar al-Assad.
In Iraq, the commander of the Quds Force has been seen
advising and assisting local Iraqi Shiite militias. Some of
these militias, such as the Badr organization, have been
accused of heinous human rights abuses. These militias have
worsened the already heightened sectarianism between the Sunnis
and Shiites in Iraq.
Unfortunately, Iran's treachery has not been met with any
increased sanctions or diplomatic pressure. Rather in recent
years they have been awarded over $1 billion in frozen assets
to Iran as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
otherwise known as the JCPOA.
The JCPOA has not only upset America's Sunni Arab allies,
it has also emboldened Iran. Iran still continues to test
ballistic missiles and continues to sow discord and
sectarianism throughout the region. While it is important to
continue the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, we must
remain vigilant and prevent Iran from establishing a crescent
of influence throughout the region.
I yield back, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking
Member Deutch, for holding this important hearing on Iran's
ballistic missile program.
Without question, Iran's continued efforts to develop
short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles and its
ambition to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles pose a
significant challenge to the United States and our allies.
Development of these capabilities pose significant risks to
U.S. forces and interests in the region, and it is also places
Israel and our allies in the Persian Gulf in danger.
Iran cannot be allowed to define international agreements
and create increased uncertainty and disorder in the Middle
East. At the same time, I believe it is essential that our
response to Iran's defiance of international agreements not
undermine the progress made under the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action to curb Iran's nuclear program.
It is my hope that the Trump administration will continue
to work closely with our partners and allies to address the
mutual challenges posed by Iran. I look forward to hearing from
today's witnesses and hearing their insights on how to best
respond to Iran's continued development of its ballistic
missile program while ensuring that we do not move backwards in
the international effort to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear
weapons.
And with that, I thank the gentlelady and yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank Mr. Cicilline.
And now we turn to Mrs. Wagner of Missouri.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Last month a senior member of the Iranian Parliament's
National Security and Foreign Policy Commission warned us that
had the U.S. Army's Fifth Fleet in Bahrain will be, and I
quote, ``razed to the ground if the enemy,'' the United States,
``makes a mistake.'' These comments are particularly
threatening in light of Iranian's denial of confrontations
between its fast attack boats and U.S. ships in the Gulf last
week.
It is clear that Iran interprets reality, their own
reality, however, as it chooses, and future incidents could
easily end in shots fired. Iran is one of the United States'
most severe security threats and the JCPOA--or, as we would
call it, the Iran deal--has done little to mitigate dangerous
conflict.
I look forward to discussing this afternoon how we can best
reduce tensions in the region and hold Iran accountable for its
actions.
And I thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you for an excellent statement.
And now I am pleased to introduce our witnesses this
afternoon.
First, we are delighted to welcome back Dr. Kenneth
Katzman, who serves as the senior Middle East analyst for the
Congressional Research Service. He is a specialist on Iran, on
the Persian Gulf states, and Afghanistan. Dr. Katzman is also
an expert on Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the
IRGC, and he has written one of the preeminent books on the
subject and is an expert on Iranian-backed groups operating in
the Middle East. Prior to this, he was an analyst at the CIA.
He is a foremost expert on Iran's Revolutionary Guard.
We look forward once again to your testimony, Dr. Katzman.
Welcome back.
Next, we want to also welcome back Mr. Michael Eisenstadt.
He is the director of the Military and Securities Study Program
at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Prior to
joining the institute, he served for 26 years as an officer in
the U.S. Army Reserve.
Thank you for your service, sir, and we look forward to
your testimony, Mr. Eisenstadt.
Finally, we would like to welcome Elizabeth Rosenberg,
director of the Energy, Economics and Security Program at the
Center for a New American Security. She served as a senior
adviser to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, to the
assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial
crimes, and then to the under secretary for terrorism financial
intelligence. In these roles she has worked on tightening
global sanctions on Iran.
Welcome to our subcommittee, Ms. Rosenberg.
And as I stated in my opening statement, your full
statements will be made a part of the record. Please feel free
to synthesize. Thank you.
Dr. Katzman, we will begin with you while I clean up here.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH KATZMAN, PH.D., SPECIALIST IN MIDDLE
EASTERN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Katzman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And thank you,
Mr. Deutch, for inviting CRS to testify today. I will summarize
my statement. I ask that my full statement, which was cleared
by the CRS review process, be included in the record.
First, I will talk a little about what are Iran's
objectives in its ballistic missile program. We think it is
multifaceted: Iran's longstanding national identity, Iran's
ideology, a response to perceived threats, and domestic
political dynamics in Iran.
In terms of national prestige and pride, developing a large
sophisticated missile arsenal enhances Iran's prestige and
international reputation.
Ideologically, the transfer by the Quds Force, as was
mentioned, the IRGC Quds Force, of shorter-range missiles and
rockets to forces in the region, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the
Houthis in Yemen, appears to be aimed at boosting movements
that share Iran's ideology, which is ultimately to overturn a
power structure in the region that Iran's leaders feel was
established by and serves the United States, Israel, and Saudi
Arabia.
Strategically, Iran's missile program can be interpreted as
an equalizer to address Iran's conventional military weaknesses
relative to the United States or any other regional power.
Iran's supply of short-range missiles to Hezbollah, for
example, gives Iran and Hezbollah the option to attack Israel.
Iran's shipments to the Houthis in Yemen, which they have used
on several occasions, position Iran to project power not only
in the Gulf, where it traditionally projects power, but also
now on the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula.
In terms of Iranian politics, Iran's President Hassan
Rouhani might perceive that because he was the architect on the
Iranian side of the JCPOA, he might be vulnerable to hardline
elements who might ask him, ``Well, you have given up Iran's
nuclear deterrent potential, how do you plan to defend the
country?'' And missiles could be seen as his answer to that
challenge.
On the IRGC, the ballistic missile program, as was noted,
is run by the IRGC Air Force. The IRGC Air Force originally was
designed to become an air force, but Iran quickly learned that
it was too expensive and too time consuming to develop another
air force alongside the regular air force, so they assigned the
IRGC Air Force to handle Iran's ballistic missile program.
The Quds Force, as was noted, is a key instrument in Iran's
attempts to reshape regional politics to its advantage through
these weapons transfers of cruise short-range missiles.
The IRGC also, because its charter is to defend the
revolution, it interprets its mission as justifying its
involvement in Iranian politics, which is really unique to
militaries around the world. It is one of the only--I haven't
studied all of the militaries in the world--but it is one of
the only militaries that says its mission is to involve itself
in politics.
The IRGC Navy is amply supplied with cruise and coastal
defense missiles, mostly purchased from outside suppliers. The
IRGC Navy and the regular navy, again two navies, IRGC Navy and
a regular navy, use these missiles to try to control Iran's
territorial waters.
Sanctions and others options. The JCPOA imposes no
restrictions on Iran's missile program. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 2231 calls upon Iran to refrain for a maximum of 8
years from developing ballistic missiles designed to be capable
of delivering nuclear weapons. And that is 8 years from October
2015, so we are now really 6\1/2\ years until that restriction
expires.
There are a number of options available to the Trump
administration to counter Iran's ballistic missile program. One
option is additional sanctions. At their height in 2012-2013,
sanctions had significant effect on Iran's economy and clearly
contributed to its acceptance of the JCPOA. Yet, Iran continued
to expand its nuclear and missile programs.
One problem is the JCPOA essentially walls off Iran's main
economic sectors from new sanctions, because there is language
that Iran would consider it a breach if sanctions are
reimposed, the ones that were lifted are reimposed, which makes
it difficult, we think, to impose new proliferation-related
sanctions, which would not touch the main economic sectors. If
you don't touch Iran's main economic sectors, it might be hard
to be effective in changing Iran's calculations.
Another option would be to designate the IRGC as a foreign
terrorist organization. It is difficult, however, to see how
much additional actual pressure this would add on the IRGC that
is not already imposed under existing sanctions, which are
extensive on the IRGC.
Other options could be enhancing U.S. and regional missile
defense. And as far as military options, President Trump has
said that all options are on the table, but he has not
specified criteria or circumstances that could trigger
potential U.S. military action on Iran.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Katzman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Excellent testimony. Thank you, Mr.
Katzman.
We have been joined by Mr. Chabot and Ms. Gabbard. So
before we move to the witnesses, I wanted to see if they had an
opening statement or anything that is on their mind.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you for offering, but I think I will pass
at this time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And I know you are on
Judiciary that has a markup right now.
Ms. Gabbard? Okay, thank you.
So, Mr. Eisenstadt, you are up. It is still going on. Thank
you, sir.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL EISENSTADT, KAHN FELLOW, DIRECTOR OF
MILITARY AND SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Eisenstadt. Chairperson Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member
Deutch, committee members, thank you for inviting me to address
your committee today.
As stated by several committee members in their opening
statements, Iran has the largest missile force in the Middle
East, consisting of thousands of short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles and possibly land-attack cruise missiles.
Although its missiles are conventionally armed, many could
deliver a nuclear weapon if Iran were ever to acquire such a
capability in violation of its NPT obligations and JCPOA
commitments.
While the recent nuclear accord with Iran will likely defer
such a possibility, it did not impose new constraints on Iran's
missile program. On the contrary, Security Council Resolution
2231, which gave international legal force to the nuclear
accord, loosened them and included provisions for the lifting
of these constraints in 8 years, if not sooner.
Missiles and rockets are central to Iran's way of war and
that of its proxies. Missiles permit quick, flexible responses
during rapidly moving crises. Missile salvos can generate
greater cumulative effects on enemy morale and staying power in
a shorter period of time than can terrorist attacks. For these
reasons, Iran's missile forces are the backbone of its
deterrent and warfighting capabilities.
The United States and its regional partners have been
investing significant resources in missile defenses in recent
decades. However, the continued growth in size and accuracy of
Iran's missile force raise concerns that it could saturate and
overwhelm missile defenses in the Gulf and Israel.
This problem will only increase with the passage of time.
At current production rates, Iran's missile force could more
than double in size by the time the major limits imposed by the
JCPOA are lifted in the year 2030.
Iran's growing missile force, in tandem with its growing
offensive cyber capabilities, will enable it to target the
critical infrastructure and missile defenses of our partners
with a powerful one-two punch in the physical and virtual
domains, while putting American military bases and forces in
the region, including our carrier strike groups, at risk.
An Iranian nuclear missile force would be highly
destabilizing. Short missile flight times between Iran and
Israel, the lack of reliable crisis communication channels, and
the impossibility of knowing whether incoming Iranian missiles
are conventional or nuclear could spur Israel and any other
regional nuclear states that might emerge in the interim to
adopt a launch-on-warning posture, undermining the prospect for
a stable nuclear deterrent balance in the region.
So what can be done to deal with this threat? Sanctions, to
the degree that they complicate Tehran's ability to procure
equipment and special materials for its missile program, to
include cruise missiles, are helpful and underscore
Washington's commitment to addressing the threat. They are an
important element of U.S. policy.
Washington should also continue to press allies, partners,
and others, especially states that are members of the Missile
Technology Control Regime, to tighten enforcement of export
controls to prevent Iran from acquiring technology, equipment,
and special materials that are essential to its missile
program.
The U.S. also needs to further strengthen its deterrent
posture. To this end, it should continue to build up coalition
missile defenses in the Middle East. After all, Iran's missile
force is a problem to which there is a viable solution, albeit
an extremely costly one. And it should continue to strengthen
the ability of U.S. and partner nations to deliver long-range
precision fires and conduct aerial strikes against Iranian
missile bases and launchers to attrite Iran's missile forces
``left of launch.''
These capabilities also ensure that the U.S. and its
partners have the ability to respond in kind to Iranian missile
strikes.
But the U.S. response must go beyond missiles. The United
States needs a comprehensive strategy toward Iran that pushes
back against destabilizing Iranian regional activities,
strengthens the JCPOA, and deters Iran from building an
industrial-scale nuclear infrastructure or attempting a nuclear
breakout down the road.
To this end, the United States should respond in a more
assertive fashion to Iranian naval harassment in the Gulf,
increase efforts to interdict Iranian arms transfers to
regional proxies and partners, ramp up support for non-Salafist
opposition groups in Syria, and commit to a long term defense
partnership with Iraq.
The intent of these steps would be to restore Washington's
credibility in Tehran and alter Iran's cost-benefit calculus
vis--vis the United States, inducing it to greater caution in
areas where the possibility of a conflict with the United
States exists.
As for the nuclear deal, it would be a mistake to tear it
up. This would isolate the United States, further complicate
the reimposition of sanctions should it prove necessary, and
provide Iran with a pretext to resume formerly proscribed
nuclear activities.
Rather, the U.S. should strictly enforce the JCPOA, try to
address its shortcomings, and maximize the productive use of
the decade-plus bought by the agreement.
One of the main flaws of U.S. policy toward Iran is that it
pursued a time-buying approach, the JCPOA, without a strategy
for how to use the time gained. The United States needs to put
together such a strategy now by, first, addressing loopholes
and shortcomings in the existing nonproliferation and
safeguards regime; assembling a broad coalition to persuade
Iran to forgo its option to build an industrial-scale nuclear
infrastructure once JCPOA-mandated restrictions are lifted
after 15 years; and perhaps most importantly, leveraging the
credibility conferred by its pushback against destabilizing
Iranian regional policies to alter Tehran's nuclear risk
calculus, thereby bolstering America's ability to deter a
future Iranian nuclear breakout.
I look forward to discussing these matters with you. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenstadt follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Rosenberg.
STATEMENT OF MS. ELIZABETH ROSENBERG, SENIOR FELLOW AND
DIRECTOR, ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A
NEW AMERICAN SECURITY
Ms. Rosenberg. Thank you, Chair Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking
Member Deutch, distinguished members of the committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the topic of
Iran ballistic missile and IRGC sanctions.
International sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile
activities and the IRGC are an integral component to the broad-
ranging and powerful financial measures that target and isolate
Iran for its nefarious activities. They are at the heart of
U.S. sanctions on Iran and set an appropriately aggressive tone
for Washington to pursue its interests with this destabilizing
regime.
Congress has provided critical leadership in this effort to
target Iran's missile activity and the IRGC, and I applaud this
important work. I encourage you to continue this attention to
make it clear to Iran that while the international community
has entered into a strong agreement with Iran over its nuclear
program, U.S. policy leaders will aggressively hold Iran
accountable for its threatening nonnuclear activities.
The United States has imposed sanctions on the IRGC and
Iran's ballistic missile activities specifically to highlight
Iran's weapons proliferation, human rights abuses, including
through cyber-enabled means, and in the case of the IRGC Quds
Force, its support for terrorism.
Even after the nuclear deal, of course, many sanctions on
Iran's ballistic missiles development and the IRGC remain
firmly in place. U.S. sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile
activity seek to expose and counter the agencies and the
entities that develop and deploy Iran's missile program. Along
with regional missile defense capabilities and the U.S.
military's significant presence in the Middle East, as has been
mentioned, they are an integral part of the United States
effort to deter Iran from using missiles to threaten its
neighbors and to protect U.S. interests in the region.
The Iranian missile arsenal is the largest and most lethal
in the Middle East, and it is fundamental to the Iranian
strategy to project power and influence.
Iran continues its dangerous and provocative missile tests,
as you mentioned in your statement, in a show of force.
However, the greatest threat that this arsenal presents is the
potential for missiles to serve as delivery systems for nuclear
weapons, of course.
Financial sanctions imposed by the United States on the
IRGC more broadly than just on its missile program target this
proliferation activity and its human rights abuse, and in the
case of the Quds Force, as I mentioned, its support for
terrorism. These various sanctions are important, given the
political prominence of the IRGC in Iran and in the Middle
East, and its extensive role in a host of Iranian commercial
sectors.
However, they have a limited financial impact given the
relatively limited links between the U.S. and the Iranian
economies and the broad avoidance by Iranians of the U.S.
dollar as a means to limit their sanctions exposure. Indeed,
the IRGC has been able to function during the last several
years of most severe international sanctions pressure on Iran
before and leading up to implementation day for the nuclear
deal.
The United States has a variety of options to expand
sanctions pressure on Iran's ballistic missile activities and
the destabilizing and threatening role of the IRGC.
First, the administration should aggressively go after
implementing existing sanctions authorities, targeting Iran's
ballistic missile procurement networks and the agencies
responsible for development and deployment of the missile
program.
Second, the administration should immediately embark on a
concerted and broad-ranging sanctions campaign to expose and
target the dangerous and insidious activities of the IRGC
within and beyond the borders of Iran, including exposing the
financial activity and holdings of the IRGC, its agents, and
instrumentalities and regional terrorist proxies wherever
feasible.
The strongest and most successful approach to countering
Iranian threats is through continued multilateral action. Where
European sanctions on Iranian ballistic missiles and the IRGC
do not match those of the United States, U.S. policymakers
should strongly urge EU counterparts to align their financial
measures.
U.S. leaders should also work with U.N. member states to
add new arms or missile proliferators to sanctions lists where
there is sufficient information.
Congressional leaders are well placed to outline the
contours of such a strategy and to urge aggressive
administration implementation. And congressional members can
also set the right expectations for successful multilateral
engagement, including renewed sanctions pressure, and also a
fresh look at force posture arrangements and intelligence and
covert activities.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with you
today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenberg follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you to the three of you. Excellent
testimony.
Dr. Katzman, I will begin with you. You stated in your
written testimony that some are interpreting the JCPOA as
essentially walling off core economic sectors in Iran, like
energy, banking, manufacturing, from new sanctions. I believe
that Iran's core economic sectors are absolutely eligible for
impact by nonnuclear-related sanctions under the JCPOA because
the IRGC is in control of Iran's ballistic missile programs, as
well as so much of Iran's economy. Any effective sanctions
targeting the missile program will by necessity impact these
core economic sectors.
So do you believe that these economic sectors are walled
off from nonnuclear sanctions?
Mr. Katzman. Thank you, Congresswoman.
The sanctions that were lifted basically were secondary
U.S. sanctions that force major foreign corporations to choose
between doing business in Iran with its major economic sectors
or doing business in the United States. Those sanctions were
lifted in concert with the JCPOA, and we have seen foreign
corporations now return.
Some of the big energy majors have returned and are talking
about drilling for oil again. Iran's ships are patrolling the
seas again, delivering oil. Iran's oil exports are back to
where we were in 2011. Iran is back into the international
banking system. It has been relinked to the SWIFT electronic
payment system. So the Iranian economy has grown, possibly as
high as 6 percent in the 1 year since the sanctions were
lifted.
So if those sanctions cannot be reimposed like that, it may
be difficult to cause Iran to make the calculations on missiles
or human rights or terrorism like was made when they accepted
the JCPOA. Their economy was hurting so badly that they felt
they had to accept the JCPOA. If you cannot reimpose those
sanctions at that extensive level, they might not think twice
about some of these other activities, yeah.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
And, Mr. Eisenstadt, can you please outline for us the
IRGC's involvement in Iran's economy? Which sectors does it
have a stake in? And how are they connected to Iran's ballistic
missile program? And how can our sanctions against the IRGC and
Iran's missile program be more effective?
Mr. Eisenstadt. Madam Chairperson, this is not an area that
I am really a specialist in, so I will defer for the most part,
except to say my understanding is that the IRGC has involvement
throughout just about every sector of the economy. They either
have full ownership or partial ownership of firms throughout
the economy. Many of them are in sectors that are important,
that have a potential contribution to make to the missile
program, whether it be related to heavy industry, mining,
production of materials that are important potentially for the
missile program.
But showing the connection between those industries and the
missile program, I think at least in the public domain, is the
missing link. And I think therefore any new sanctions regarding
the missile program that mandates reporting that exposes these
connections would be very helpful.
So let me just say, my approach to sanctions on the
missiles, Iran's missile program, is to look at how we can
disrupt their ability to acquire special materials, technology,
and the like from overseas. And we see in pictures that they
continue to publish of missile production facilities that they
are getting production technology that they should not be
getting under the MTCR, Missile Technology Control Regime. So
clearly some of our allies have more work to do in terms of
tightening their export controls. So there is more work to be
done in that area.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
I don't know if Ms. Rosenberg or Dr. Katzman wanted----
Ms. Rosenberg. I would be happy to speak to this question,
as well as to the question you posed to Mr. Katzman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes, please.
Ms. Rosenberg. I would like to affirm your interpretation
of the JCPOA, which I also agree does not preclude the United
States from pursuing sanctions pursuant to nonnuclear areas of
its concern with regard to Iranian behavior. So should there be
an entity that is engaged in significant acts of support for
terrorism or regional destabilization, the United States can
and should pursue sanctions against such an entity. That is
different from going after sectors of the Iranian economy which
were broadly delisted in the nuclear agreement.
Speaking to the areas of the economy in which the IRGC is
involved, they are reported to be quite extensive: Heavy
industry, engineering, construction, energy, and shipping.
However, as was mentioned, it is difficult to trace the
beneficial ownership link between the IRGC and many of its
entities in the Iranian economy for various reasons, but such
legal requirements for disclosure of this corporate information
are not very good in Iran. In fact, that has been pointed out
by professional institutions in the financial services sector.
One of the most effective ways that the United States can
go after the IRGC for its concerns relating to the IRGC have to
do with identifying further agents, entities, companies,
fronts, commanders, and business executives in these companies
in the economy that work on behalf of the IRGC.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Rosenberg.
Dr. Katzman, you wanted to comment on that?
Mr. Katzman. I would just comment, one of the biggest
construction companies in Iran is called Khatam al-Anbiya,
which means seal of the prophet. It is called GHORB. It is a
designated sanctioned entity. It is very large, thousands of
employees. It was started by the IRGC. In fact, it grew out of
the IRGC's--like their Army Corps of Engineers. It was the
IRGC's construction wing during the Iran-Iraq war, and then it
was spun off as essentially a construction company. It is very
large and it is a designated entity and it is sanctioned, yes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
Dr. Katzman, do you want to just continue with that? So it
is already sanctioned and so what more can be done with a huge
entity like that.
Mr. Katzman. Well, I mean, I think the point is, when the
JCPOA was implemented last January, 2016, hundreds of entities
were delisted from U.S. sanctions. In other words, they were no
longer subject to U.S. sanctions. But these were mainly, again,
as I mentioned, energy companies, shipping, shipping insurance,
banks, the Central Bank, Iran Air--Iran's civilian economy,
delisted.
The IRGC-related companies, like GHORB, other IRGC
affiliates, missile entities, anything to do with terrorism,
IRGC commanders, I mean, hundreds of entities remain designated
for sanctions, and it is in these areas, proliferation,
terrorism, human rights. But the civilian economy, Iran's
civilian economy, the energy sector, banking, what I mentioned,
transportation, sanctions were lifted.
And under the JCPOA, Iran has said that if the sanctions
that were lifted are reimposed, Iran would consider that a
breach and it would cease implementing its commitment. So, for
example, if Iran's Central Bank were again sanctioned to the
extent that it was cut off from the international banking
system, I think I have a lot of confidence in saying Iran would
say the deal is finished.
Mr. Deutch. Even if the sanctions had nothing to do with
proliferation activity?
Mr. Katzman. Correct. The language in the JCPOA is
sanctions that were lifted cannot be reimposed for other
justifications, nonnuclear. In other words, terrorism, human
rights, these other things, cannot be reimposed under other
justifications, right.
Mr. Deutch. I wanted to just follow up on the concept of
multilateral sanctions, which are still I think the best
approach, and the frustration of the Security Council to act
against the ballistic missile tests. This has now gone on in
two administrations. And we raised the tests at the Council and
Russia and China played lawyer for Iran and argued that the
tests aren't prohibited under 2231.
So if U.N. sanctions aren't an option, what about the EU?
And what is the best argument for our EU allies that adopting
strong sanctions, ballistic missile sanctions, aren't just of
paramount importance to international security, but that they
also don't violate the deal--at a time, we should point out,
when the EU is interested in vigorously enforcing the deal at
least to ensure that the deal remains in place?
Ms. Rosenberg.
Ms. Rosenberg. Thank you for the question.
I think there is a lot of running room for the United
States to work with the EU on sanctions and on further
sanctions concerning the IRGC, for example. The EU targets the
IRGC under its own sanctions and some of those remain in place
still.
It is difficult for the U.N. Security Council, for a number
of reasons mentioned already this afternoon, to go after these
Iranian missile tests and call them a violation. It doesn't
meet the test of the language in the U.N. Security Council
resolution and furthermore to the extent that Iran has----
Mr. Deutch. They argue that it doesn't meet the test, that
is the role they play.
Ms. Rosenberg. Correct. So if it is difficult to find a
violation at that level, then surely the United States and
Europe can move forward further here.
I think for the United States offering leadership by
designating additional fronts in the network, the procurement
network related to the ballistic missile program and working
with the EU to share information and asking them to match the
sanctions in the EU, by the EU Commission, is a perfectly
viable, reasonable, and important strategy for the U.S. to
take.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
Mr. Eisenstadt.
Mr. Eisenstadt. If I could just add, the Islamic Republic
has itself said that the U.N. Security Council resolution is
something separate than the nuclear deal and they don't
consider it binding.
We should say, well, if we are trying to argue for our
allies to join us on sanctions related to the missiles, we
should say that, look, the Islamic Republic itself says that
this is not part of the deal and, therefore, there should not
be consideration with regard to our allies. And also we share
concern with regard to freedom of navigation in the Gulf and
the security of the Gulf and this impinges on that. So I think
we have a good argument to make with regard to our European
partners.
Mr. Deutch. And, Madam Chairman, if I could ask just one
other question, and that is in order to weaken the IRGC's
involvement in terrorism we have to cut off their access to
Hezbollah. And the concern that I know we all share is that as
long as Russia continues to turn a blind eye to what Iran is
doing in Syria, it makes that really difficult.
Rouhani was just in Moscow this week. Russia, it seems, has
accomplished its goal in Syria, being firmly entrenched now in
the Middle East. It continues to aid Iran, not just in Syria,
but in the uranium sale, the S-300 sale, for reasons that
appear to be only to serve their own self-interest or being
bulwarks against the United States.
The question I would just put out to you is, if the United
States, as the President has now told us repeatedly, wants
closer cooperation with Russia, how do we get tough with Iran
at the same time? I didn't mean to stump you.
Yes, Ms. Rosenberg.
Ms. Rosenberg. I don't think that these necessarily must be
inconsistent. And whether you appreciate or not the example of
the previous administration, there was a demonstration of, on
the one hand, working in coordination with Russia and the U.N.
process around the nuclear deal, and working aggressively with
Russia when it came to application of new sanctions with regard
to its activities in Ukraine.
There is no reason why there cannot similarly be a
variegated strategy under this administration which could seek
to coordinate with Russia as appropriate, perhaps on Syria-
related issues, and push back more firmly in this case with
regard to support for Iran's ballistic missile program.
Mr. Deutch. And Iran's support of Hezbollah and Syria.
Ms. Rosenberg. Absolutely.
Mr. Eisenstadt. If I could just add to that. I mean, we
have worked productively in the past with regard to, say, for
instance, the S-300 missiles, delaying the delivery of those
for quite some time.
The problem is, I think, given the current trajectory of
U.S.-Russian relations--and the fact that there is probably
some daylight between Russia's position toward the conflict in
Syria and Iran's position--but given the general trajectory of
U.S.-Russian relations, I think it will be increasingly
difficult in the future because of all of the stuff that is
going on with regard to hacking and Ukraine and the like, it
will be increasingly difficult to find areas to cooperate on.
But in principle it is a possibility.
Mr. Katzman. If I can just add. In my assessment, it is
going to be extremely difficult to get Iran and Hezbollah to be
separated. Iran sees Hezbollah as the most prominent outgrowth
of the Islamic revolution of 1979. Iran will do anything to
defend Hezbollah.
I would argue Iran is in Syria in a big way because it
wants to protect that weapons channel to Hezbollah. The IRGC
created Hezbollah's military wing. The Quds Force grew out of
the IRGC's contingent that went to Lebanon to create
Hezbollah's military wing.
The connection between Iran and Hezbollah is organic. It
would take a tremendous heavy lift to separate these two
entities, in my estimation.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Great questions. Thank you so much, Mr.
Deutch.
Mr. Mast of Florida.
Mr. Mast. Mr. Eisenstadt, you spoke in your written
testimony about the way Hamas and Hezbollah use their rockets
against Israel and that is a useful template for what could
happen in the future. And I wanted to start with something
backing up a little bit before that.
To what would you attribute this? You know, the United
States of America mastered this ballistic technology in the
1950s, 1960s, China did as well, you know, Russia, 1950s,
1960s, 1970s. What would you provide the greatest attribution
to, to say this far in the future, 2017, Iran still hasn't
mastered that? Why would you say they still haven't mastered
that?
Mr. Eisenstadt. One thing that we, I think, often
underestimate is exactly how hard it is to even create
technologies that we developed in the 1940s and the 1950s for
many developing countries today. And so, many proliferators are
in some ways along the--if you look at it in terms of
proliferation timeline in terms of their capabilities, they are
still in the 1940s in many ways.
But you know what, to use a term that my friend Peter
Zimmerman coined, while pursuing ``bronze medal technology,''
from their point of view and in terms of their needs it is good
enough, because we have seen time and again that even Hamas,
with rockets made in home, kind of garage workshops, until the
Israelis deployed the Iron Dome, were able to terrorize
populations in southern Israel and to harass these people and
cause casualties.
So now with the development of Israeli missile defenses,
they have developed the ability, at least in--well, in theory
and in practice, to intercept these capabilities, but the
Iranians are producing them in such numbers and they are cheap
relative to the price of defenses, that they have the ability
to saturate defenses.
And the Israelis are developing a layered approach, that
they have the low end capabilities now with Iron Dome, they
have high end with the Arrow, in the middle range they are
developing David's Sling and deploying it this year. But most
of----
Mr. Mast. To pause you. Are you saying that it was
basically pure dumb luck or a lack of intelligence on their
part that didn't get them to this point? What about what we
have done in modern history, prior to the JCPOA, has prevented
them to getting to this point? Prior to that, what prevented
them from getting this?
Or even talking about proliferation. You know, the first
nuclear weapon, we didn't even have to test Trinity. We knew if
you fire one piece of fissile material into another, you are
going to get a critical mass. We didn't have to test it.
What has prevented them, previous to the JCPOA, to getting
to that point?
Mr. Eisenstadt. It is a combination of efforts to disrupt
what they were doing by us, arms control, export control
regimes, efforts to try to prevent the spread of this
information, although now this stuff is pretty much out there.
But it is one thing to know it. It is another thing to actually
be able to apply in practice. And you need to have a very large
human manpower base, human capital base that is capable of
handling complex projects and integrating all the different
aspects of it.
We often under-estimate how difficult it. How many
countries in the world produce fighter jets or even cars? Iran
does produce cars now, but for many years it was kind of knock-
down kits that they imported from Peugeot or whatever.
So we often underestimate how difficult it is, these kind
of complex industrial tasks. So a lot of it is just that it is
extremely hard. We have been doing it for so long--we have what
people call tacit knowledge--because we have a lot of people
who have learned how to do this kind of thing. But if you are
starting from scratch, it is very difficult to be able to
master the full range of capabilities needed for a robust
ballistic missile program.
Mr. Mast. Where would you say access to the world market
puts them in terms of advancing toward what they have yet been
able to master? That is China, Russia, U.S., a number of other
countries.
Mr. Eisenstadt. Yes, it is very important, because in the
1990s they benefited from Russian help in terms of individuals
who were formally associated with Russia's missile programs.
Their Shahab-3 missile was based on the North Korean Nodong. So
they have gotten help from the North Koreans, the Russians, and
also China was involved in their solid fuel rocket program.
So they have benefited from foreign assistance and they
probably still do. Every program around the world has benefited
from foreign assistance. But they have reached a point now
where they have in some ways surpassed their former teachers in
North Korea and they are generally considered to be more
capable in this area than the North Koreans in most areas in
the missile realm.
But getting know-how and materials from abroad is still
very important for their program, and there are some areas
where I think they will continue to benefit. For instance,
penetration aids and countermeasures, which as far as we know
they don't really put on their missiles yet. That is the next
step and that will make missile defense much harder if they are
able to jam and put out countermeasures to the missile
defenses.
Mr. Mast. We didn't get into MIRV or anything else, but my
time has expired.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Mast.
I will follow up with some of your questions. Mr.----
Mr. Suozzi. Suozzi.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Suozzi.
Mr. Suozzi. You have got it.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I have got a really difficult name. So I
hope you don't get insulted by Suozzi.
Mr. Suozzi. Suozzi, in Italian.
Madam Chair, I want to thank you very much for your
leadership here, as well as the ranking member.
I want to thank the witnesses for their thoughtful insight
and analysis. It really is a great education that you are
giving us here today.
I think there is broad agreement in this room that there is
a serious problem with Iran's ballistic missile program and
that something has to be done. It is a question of, what is the
proper authority, and how are we going to do it, and who are
our partners going to be in that process? But I think that
there is broad agreement.
I want to ask a question about timing. The elections are
coming up in Iran in May. I would like to just hear the benefit
of your analysis regarding the politics of Iran and how the
President, Rouhani, and the Supreme Leader and the IRGC and all
the different players that are involved here--the regular
military--just tell me a little bit about the intersection of
all them and then how what we do could or could not affect that
outcome.
Mr. Katzman. I will start with that. The regular military
that existed under the Shah, it is still there. It does not
interfere in politics at all. In fact, during the uprising of
2009, the regular military issued a letter saying, ``Do not ask
us to go repress these demonstrators.'' So they are not a
factor.
Now the IRGC, as I said in my statement, is a factor.
Mr. Suozzi. Does the regular military report to the
civilian President?
Mr. Katzman. It reports up to the general headquarters that
reports to the Supreme Leader, actually.
Mr. Suozzi. To the Supreme Leader. Okay.
Mr. Katzman. Yes. The Supreme Leader is technically the
commander in chief of the whole Armed Forces, right.
The IRGC does interfere in politics, and they have done so
on several occasions. In fact, it was widely reported, and
there seems to be agreement, that it did put Mr. Ahmadinejad
over the top in 2005. He came out of nowhere. But the IRGC
deployed the Basij. They leafleted for him. They drove people
to the polls. And they view it as their mission to interfere in
politics to defend the revolution.
Now, I think most experts--and I would say I am in this
camp too--think if it is a free and fair election, Mr. Rouhani
is the favorite. He ran on a platform of delivering Iran from
its international isolation. He negotiated the JCPOA. He did
bring them, to some extent, out of their isolation. So the
people that voted for him in 2013 seem to probably vote for him
again.
Now, the issue is the hardliners. There was some thinking
earlier on that the hardliners would maybe just not even
contest it so much. But no. They seem to be organizing. They
are trying to unify around one conservative hardline candidate
to oppose him.
Mr. Suozzi. Who is that?
Mr. Katzman. Well, they are having some caucuses, for the
first time, they are actually having some meetings to try to
vote on one unified candidate. The issue is there is one
particular figure who the Supreme Leader favors a lot who they
might choose. And that would be significant because, if this
individual runs, the regime might be tempted to try to, let's
say, interfere on his behalf, to put it mildly. He is the
leader of the Quds Razavi Foundation in Mashhad. Khamenei
appointed him last summer. And Khamenei appears to favor him as
the next Supreme Leader. So engineering him to the Presidency
would give him an advantage to be the next Supreme Leader.
Mr. Eisenstadt. If I could take a----
Mr. Suozzi. I am sorry. Does it help or hurt for us to do
something before May?
Mr. Katzman. You mean in terms of sanctions? Well, probably
the hardliners, the Supreme Leader, they have been criticizing
Rouhani to some extent that he--they are saying he has not
delivered all the promises of sanctions relief. It is possible
that new action----
Mr. Suozzi. I am running out of time.
Mr. Eisenstadt, go ahead.
Mr. Eisenstadt. I will just be quick. Iran's domestic
politics has its own internal logic. And our ability to
influence it in ways that redounds to the benefit of American
policy has generally worked out, you know, just the opposite
that we had hoped. And I would just say we could probably do a
lot to hurt things. But there is not a lot we can do to help
the people that we want to help.
You know, President Khatami, when he was elected in 1997,
we had hopes that this would herald a change. He was undercut
by his domestic opponents. President Bush wanted regime change,
but the people didn't rise up. They rose up in 2009, when we
had a President who wanted to engage the regime there.
And with the JCPOA, we were hoping that the nuclear
agreement would lead to a broadened--you know, a general
improvement in the relations between the two countries. But
what we have seen is in fact it has probably emboldened those
who are against the improvement of relations. So our ability to
game this in a way to achieve--to advance our goals has been
shown to be very limited, if nonexistent.
But there are things we can do that could harm things if we
act in a heavy-handed way sometimes. But often we can't really
help the people we want to help usually.
Ms. Rosenberg. I will just be very brief in responding to
this. I would like to agree with the comments just made by my
colleague, Dr. Eisenstadt, that in fact it is very difficult
for U.S. policymakers to specifically engineer particular
political outcomes in Iran. We should be very humble about
that.
I don't think that undertaking sanctions enforcement using
existing authorities will meaningfully sway Iranian politics.
It doesn't actually change the broader U.S. posture or the set
of authorities that are in place. Nevertheless, there is no
specific need to do something now versus 60 or 90 days from
now, absent a particular provocation against which the U.S.
should push back.
There are plenty of opportunities. The United States has an
ability to use them whenever it wants.
Mr. Suozzi. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir. Excellent
questions and answers.
Now we turn to Mrs. Wagner--Ambassador Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Eisenstadt, the rules of Iranian cyber warfare seem to
deviate I think from the codes that guide the world's five
cyber powers: The U.S., U.K., Russia, China, and Israel.
Iranian hackers do not just engage in espionage and gather
intelligence; they try to do harm. There were some reports last
spring that there had been a lull in Iranian cyber activities
since the nuclear deal. Can you discuss, to the best of your
ability, how Iranian cyber strategy has shifted in the wake of
the nuclear deal and how Iran will use destructive cyber
capabilities in the future?
Mr. Eisenstadt. Yeah. A lot of this will be necessarily
speculative. My understanding is that, during the negotiation
of the JCPOA, they actually held in abeyance a lot of their
offensive cyber activities. After its conclusion, my
understanding is that there was--they resumed a lot of their
net reconnaissance activities. In other words, they were kind
of snooping around to try to gather information about critical
infrastructure in the United States and elsewhere, both
probably to send the signal that they have the capability to
harm us in this domain in the future should relations
deteriorate and also to build up their cyber target folders.
And a lot of this also involved spear-phishing activities
against personnel involved in American Iran policy and the
like.
There were also some attacks directed against Saudi Arabia
over the winter, which probably are related to the worsening or
the downturn in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
So, from Iran's point of view, a lot of their activities
are in response to aggressive action either by the United
States and Israel, for instance, with regard to Stuxnet, or
other activities that were done, for instance the sanctions
against their financial sector; so they attacked our financial
sector with denials of service activities, and, likewise, they
engaged in attacks on Saudi Aramco and Qatar's RasGas in
response to our sanctions on their oil industry a few years
ago.
So, from their point of view, a lot of it has been
defensive thus far, but I have no doubt that if there was a
kind of deterioration in relations with Iran--from their point
of view, we live in a cyber glass house. We have massive
critical infrastructure which, right now, we don't have the
ability to protect. Their capabilities are not advanced; they
are kind of a third-tier cyber power. But I think they have
great potential in this area. But this is an area which, in the
future, I think will be much more important for them. Right
now, there is not probably--they could do some--they could be a
nuisance at this time, and perhaps more.
Mrs. Wagner. I have great concerns about our future and
where we may be going with this.
Moving on, it seems that Erdogan has long been loath to
criticize Iranian ballistic missile and nuclear programs. The
complicated relationship between Turkey and Iran has become
more concerning with the Moscow Declaration and the trial of
Turkish-Iranian sanctions-buster Reza Zarrab in New York.
Ms. Rosenberg, given the arrest of Turkish sanctions-
busters in the U.S. and the information that courts may
uncover, do you think we will find that the Turkish elite have
extensive Iranian ties?
Ms. Rosenberg. Ties to Iran or ties to sanctions evasion?
Mrs. Wagner. Yes.
Ms. Rosenberg. That is a subject that has been of great
concern and focus for U.S. policy leaders and for the U.S.
intelligence community. There has been quite a lot of
investigation into this, appropriately so, given economic
linkages and also political ties. I should say that Turkey is
not singled out in this category. There are other jurisdictions
where linkages between high-level officials and economic
linkages put----
Mrs. Wagner. But you would say there are ties there?
Ms. Rosenberg. There are links, and the concern is they may
be more insidious than merely political or commercial ties
could suggest.
Mrs. Wagner. Interesting. Okay.
So, Mr. Eisenstadt, in my short time here--or others on the
panel--to what extent does Iranian money fund terror groups
operating inside of Turkey?
Mr. Eisenstadt. I will defer to my colleagues. I don't
follow Turkey very closely. So I will defer to others on this.
Mr. Katzman. You are talking about Kurdish groups?
Mrs. Wagner. Yes.
Mr. Katzman. The IRGC has some relation with the Iraqi
Kurds. PKK--not sure--not really a close connection there.
Mrs. Wagner. Ms. Rosenberg? I know my time is up.
Ms. Rosenberg. I have nothing further to add.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I yield
back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mrs. Wagner. You
make a valuable contribution to our subcommittee.
Mr. Kinzinger, thank you for your service also on our
subcommittee and to our Nation.
Mr. Kinzinger. It is good to be back. Thanks.
Thank you all for being here. Obviously, I think it comes
as no surprise I thought the JCPOA was a pretty bad deal. I
think it really just provides, as we look at it, a roadmap for
a timeline on how to acquire nuclear weapons eventually. And
when it comes to playing the long game, I think Iran is okay
with saying, ``We can have weapons in 10 or 15 years,'' or the
threat of weapons is almost, in many cases, as good as having
them.
But I also think now, obviously, we are in a situation
where to redevelop, despite the discussion of snapback
provisions and sanctions, which we knew would never happen,
being able to develop a coalition of people to reengage Iran
through that would be difficult. But I think we have to watch
this JCPOA like a hawk and be ready to fight back against any
violations and push back against ballistic missile technology.
I also think, when you look at Iran--and it is not just
what is happening in Yemen--I think what is extremely important
is what is happening in Syria. And you look at Bashar al-Assad,
who I actually believe created ISIS, not necessarily by signing
on the dotted line somewhere, but by creating an environment
where it is easy to recruit into Daesh or ISIS from. So I
believe that Iran bears some responsibility for the existence
of ISIS.
Now, I also want to say--I am co-chair of the Iraq Caucus
and, you know, obviously, an Iraq veteran myself. And when I
was in Iraq, we saw the role of Iran and Iraq very closely. We
know that hundreds of Americans died as a result of Iran's
involvement in Iraq. And we know that, in fact, the incoming
Iranian Ambassador is a senior IRGC official. So we can only
estimate what that means. We cannot allow Iran to continue to
destabilize Iraq.
So, in addition to sanctions, Mr. Eisenstadt, how would you
advise the administration to counter Tehran's influence in
Iraq?
Mr. Eisenstadt. First of all, the first thing I would
recommend is that we commit to make it clear to the Iraqis--let
me just say that the Iraqi Government, both the current
government and even the previous government under Nouri al-
Maliki, has always wanted to maintain a balance between the
United States and Iran. And indicating to them that we want to
maintain a long-term security relationship with them as well as
a relationship in other areas will make it clear to them that
they will have the ability to continue with that policy.
We have to recognize, because of proximity, they have to
make their peace with the Iranians and live with a certain
degree of influence that many Iraqis feel uncomfortable with.
Making it clear that we want a long-term security relationship
with them is the first part of that. I think committing to a
long-term training relationship with the Iraqi Armed Forces--I
mean, one of the things that has come through with this
campaign in Mosul is that it was--basically, while, in the
early days after June 2014, the Popular Mobilization Forces
were very important for breaking the advance of ISIL, the
conventional military forces have been key to pushing them back
in most places. And I think we can make a very convincing case
to the Iraqi Government that you need to continue building up
your conventional security forces, and we are really the ideal
partner to do that. Iran can't help you there.
So, basically, there are things we can do, I think, in this
regard to continue to ensure that Iraq knows that we want this
relationship, and they will be able to push back.
Mr. Kinzinger. That is important to know, too, is the Iraqi
military can be fully capable, but they need the American
military to stiffen their spine at least for now. And we see,
obviously, that was important in the fight against Daesh.
Ms. Rosenberg, I want to ask you about Syria. Again,
500,000 dead Syrians almost, 50,000 of which are children. You
are watching Iran use, I think, money from sanctions relief to
prop up that regime. And, unfortunately, around the world,
there is kind of this belief now that it is either Bashar al-
Assad or it is terrorism, and I don't think people recognize
that, in fact, Assad is creating the next generation of
terrorists right now--that we will end up having to fight--by
taking away opportunity and freedom for people.
But, specifically, when I talk about the sanctions relief
and the money, do you know if there is any way we can track how
much that money is being used in Iran? And if they are using
that to fund genocides, what kind of action can we take to
punish them?
Ms. Rosenberg. Thank you for the question. It is difficult,
as I think you are indicating, to track exactly where Iran's
money that was unfrozen after the nuclear deal is going or is
flowing specifically. That is true for a number of reasons. Two
key ones are that, if we are talking about state revenues, it
goes into a state budget and can be allocated under the design
of the state. So there is not a transaction chain to follow if
it were going through independent institutions that must use
private banking channels, et cetera.
Another significant reason that it is difficult to
understand exactly where it is flowing is because Iran has
ample reason to keep that money outside of its own jurisdiction
and not to repatriate it and then to hand it over, in this
instance, to President Assad in terms of cash or material
support, using this to defend its currency, using it to balance
international trade. Iran still struggles for access to hard
currency. So there is quite ample reason for it to use this for
what is essentially the civilian economy. There are great needs
there in order to deliver economic relief to the population,
which was a mandate, of course, of President Rouhani as part of
this deal and following on.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
With that, I will yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Kinzinger.
And Mr. Schneider of Illinois. Thank you.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
And, again, thank you to the witnesses for your testimony.
Dr. Katzman, in your opening statement, you talked a bit
about Iran's calculus and trying to change their calculus. If I
think about math briefly, on the right-hand side of the
equation are goals and objectives for Iran. Broadly speaking,
that is preserving the regime and maintaining their influence.
On the left-hand side of that equation are factors they control
and factors they don't control--hopefully we can. Now,
ultimately, it is up to everybody. What are the factors post or
within the context of the JCPOA, within the context of what is
happening in Syria, in Yemen, and around the region, with broad
context of what is happening in our country and around the
world--what can we do to change that calculus? And what do we
have to understand about Iran's thinking to know which levers
to pull or which buttons to push?
Mr. Katzman. I would just start by saying Iran's calculus
is multifaceted in the region. As I said in my statement, Iran
views the Middle East as controlled basically by the United
States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. That is how they think, which
is a power structure, in Iran's view, that is weighted against
Shia, against Islamist parties, against anyone that is not part
of the dominant elite. So they have chosen to intervene in a
number of places to protect national interests, to protect
their allies, to protect favored parties. And what is really
needed is a multifaceted approach.
Obviously, I think if all the conflicts we see going in
Syria, in Yemen, in Iraq were ended, then Iran might not have
rationale to be intervening as it is.
Mr. Schneider. I suspect they would find other rationales.
Mr. Eisenstadt, your thoughts?
Mr. Eisenstadt. I just want to build on Ken's comments
before about Iran and Hezbollah. I agree that we probably can't
separate Iran from Hezbollah, but we haven't increased costs
for Iran for its involvement in Syria. Our train-and-equip
program with the Syrian opposition in the past was really not a
serious effort. It may be too late now for us to mount a
serious effort. But I would argue that we need to find people
among the non-Salafist opposition to arm, both in order to
ensure that areas where there are ceasefires remain
ceasefires--because if the regime is able to build up its
strength, it won't keep these ceasefires over time--and in
areas where there aren't ceasefires and the regime continues to
fight, we increase the costs for them and their allies, which
includes the Iranians. And if this becomes a long-term quagmire
for Iran, which this may be something which we don't have the
ability to do now, but if we were able to do that, we might
also be able to drive a wedge between Iran and Russia because I
don't think--Russia has, I think, different interests in Syria
than the Iranians do.
But we need to have a cost-imposing strategy in Syria,
which we have not really tried until now. And I would hope this
current administration might consider that going forward.
Mr. Schneider. I will come to you, Ms. Rosenberg, in a
second.
But, Mr. Eisenstadt, I need you to talk about Hezbollah. Is
it fair to say that HIFPA, the Hezbollah International
Financing Prevention Act, has had an impact on Hezbollah's
ability to act in the region, or are there more things we can
do around that as well?
Mr. Eisenstadt. My understanding is it has had a major
impact but perhaps not on their ability to act in the region,
because I think, in terms of prioritizing moneys, from their
point of view, their activities in Syria and elsewhere is
existential, from their point of view, and if they have less
money for social services and to provide for their base, well,
in terms of guns and butter, the money goes to the guns and not
the butter at this point. But in the long term, that could have
an impact in terms of how their domestic support base looks at
them if they can't benefit from this in the future.
Mr. Schneider. Ms. Rosenberg.
Ms. Rosenberg. I would just add briefly to that, in
addition to raising the costs, I think that creating greater
leverage for the United States and other international allies
can be cultivated by exposing--further exposing--Iran's
dangerous activities or naked violations of arms restrictions,
for example. What I am talking about here is using sanctions as
a means to expose particular violations or circumvention
activities, doing more public interdiction of weapons for
Houthis or to proxies, terrorist proxies, in the Middle East,
and again through possibly use U.S. force posture and
protection in the Middle East by identifying instances where
Iran is engaged in threatening behavior, saber rattling in the
Gulf and in the straits.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
With that, my time is all but expired. I will yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Schneider.
Now, Mr. Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you so
much for pulling this together.
Wonderful panel. I wish we had lots of time with each one
of you because I have enjoyed listening to the testimony and
watching it.
I am going to go kind of rapid fire. Bear with me because I
only have got 5 minutes, and this chairman is tight.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. No, no, no. Take all the time you want.
Mr. Connolly. Ms. Rosenberg, you answered Mr. Deutch's
question about the apparent incompatibility of the Trump
administration's desire for a rapprochement with Russia with
Iranian threats. You said these don't need to be inconsistent.
And I want to give you a chance to explain that because, to me,
there is prima facie evidence they are inherently inconsistent.
I mean, their support for Houthis, their support for Hezbollah,
their support for Assad: These are all goals antithetical to
U.S. policy that has not changed with the new administration--
that I am aware of.
And what did you mean they don't need to be inconsistent?
How could they be otherwise? I am not trying to challenge you.
I want to give you an opportunity to clarify.
Ms. Rosenberg. Sure. What I meant was that on U.S. posture
toward Russia there could be both cooperation in certain
domains and a tough pushback in others.
Mr. Connolly. Even where we disagree.
Ms. Rosenberg. Correct.
Mr. Connolly. Got it. That is what you meant.
Ms. Rosenberg. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Dr. Katzman, how important do you believe, in resolving all
of these issues ultimately--what is going on in Yemen, the
civil war in Syria, and other tensions in the region; I could
go down the laundry list--how important, at the end of the day,
will diplomacy be as part of the solution?
Mr. Katzman. Well, actually----
Mr. Connolly. Could you speak up?
Mr. Katzman. It was tried. After the JCPOA, there was in
fact an effort to enlist Iran to try to get----
Mr. Connolly. No. I am talking about our diplomacy.
Mr. Katzman. Well, the U.S. tried to--we were talking with
the Iranians after the JCPOA was finalized to get them to be
helpful on Syria. It did not succeed. The JCPOA still went
forward, but that did not succeed because Iran's interests were
just completely different. They need Assad there because he is
allowing this channel for Iran to support Hezbollah, which is
their most cherished goal. So the Iranians did not cooperate.
We tried diplomacy, and it did not succeed in that particular
example.
Mr. Connolly. Fair enough. But although that kind of goes
back to Ms. Rosenberg's point--we agree on some things; we are
going to disagree on others--it really depends on what is in--
perceived national interest. Apparently Iran perceived that a
nuclear agreement was in its interests.
Mr. Katzman. They absolutely did.
Mr. Connolly. As did we and the other world powers.
Mr. Katzman. The sanctions drove them into what we here, if
it had done that much damage to our economy, it was on the line
of the Great Depression here.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Very good point.
And that allows me to segue to Mr. Eisenstadt, and you can
comment as well. How efficacious will sanctions be, can they
be, on the issue of ballistic missiles and other unacceptable
behavior by Iran? It seemed to work on the nuclear front. Can
it, will it work here?
Mr. Eisenstadt. I think the case of the nuclear sanctions
are kind of sui generis at this point. And I think the best we
could hope for is kind of incremental benefits, disrupting
their efforts to acquire technology, know-how, and the like,
small wins, if you will. The JCPOA gave us, if it works as
intended, perhaps 15 years of respite in which we could use the
time to perhaps change Iran's nuclear calculus. With the
missiles, it is going to be an ongoing kind of thing with small
victories at best.
Mr. Connolly. When you said ``sui generis,'' part of that
is we actually had, mirabile dictu, the cooperation of Russia
and China and France. On ballistic missiles and other behavior,
we clearly will not.
Mr. Eisenstadt. Yes. I agree, yes.
Mr. Connolly. Very good point. Either one of you, Ms.
Rosenberg or Dr. Katzman, want to comment on that? This is very
relevant to us, as the chairman knows, because we are, as we
speak, looking at additional sanctions legislation.
Ms. Rosenberg. Sure. I would add that----
Mr. Connolly. If you can speak into that microphone like
Dr. Katzman did.
Ms. Rosenberg. In addition to sanctions that can and should
be part of the strategy, I certainly agree that, as a kind of
creation of leverage or means to cultivate U.S.--for deterrence
for Iran, these are small by comparison to a conventional
deterrence force, which underscores the point that sanctions
must be part of a broader, more holistic strategy of alliance,
politics, and operational activities, as well as conventional
defenses, not to mention cyber activity, covert activity.
And this body, Congress, is well positioned to oversee not
just sanctions, of course, but other--these other realms as
well, particularly force structure and appropriations.
Mr. Connolly. Madam Chairman, if you would just allow Dr.
Katzman to respond, and then I will yield back. I thank the
chair.
Mr. Katzman. I would say that----
Mr. Connolly. You have got to speak into the microphone
again, Dr. Katzman.
Mr. Katzman. I sort of lost my train of thought.
Mr. Connolly. Sorry. ``I would say,'' you started to say.
Mr. Katzman. What was the question again? I am sorry.
Mr. Connolly. I think were you about to say, ``I would say
that was a brilliant question, Congressman Connolly, and God, I
wish this hearing had been having more like that,'' something
like that. No? That wasn't it. I was trying to help you here.
Mr. Katzman. I mean, I would say sanctions were effective
in getting the JCPOA because they affected Iran's core
economic--its economy, its entire civilian economy. To work at
the margins, to have other sanctions that are only going to
nibble at the margins of Iran's economy are not likely to
affect Iran's calculations.
Mr. Connolly. Would you agree with Mr. Eisenstadt that in
some ways the sanctions with respect to the nuclear development
program were sui generis?
Mr. Katzman. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. And, therefore, unlikely to be replicated for
anything else?
Mr. Katzman. Well, if the new administration decides that
it is going to implement the JCPOA, Iran is very clear that if
the sanctions that were lifted are reimposed under other
justifications, Iran is going to walk away from the deal. Iran
is very clear on that.
Mr. Connolly. Well, let me just say: There are many of us
up here who support the JCPOA, who believe fervently the JCPOA
is working, that, as a matter of fact, the existential threat
to Israel was denial of JCPOA, not approval, and will not
support sanctions that encroach on--that we won't do. I am more
than willing to look at sanctions in the other venues. But I
always worry with respect to sanctions about efficacy. And that
is why I take what Mr. Eisenstadt said seriously. It doesn't
mean don't do it, but if we are going to do it, it can't just
be a feel-good, symbolic kind of thing. It has to be toward
some end, a change in behavior. And that was the nature of my
question.
Mr. Katzman. Let me just give you--Iran was exporting 2.6
million barrels a day of oil. When the sanctions kicked in,
Iran was reduced to 1 million barrels a day, 60 percent
decrease. That is what caused, that type of diminishment is
what caused Iran to make a new calculation. Unless you can
replicate that, it is going to be very difficult to get Iran to
make a new calculus.
Mr. Connolly. Excellent point. And we even got nations like
India to agree--think about this--to reduce Iran as a supplier
of something they don't really produce. That is a big hardship.
And to get that level of cooperation takes a lot of diplomatic
and other skills. And I take Mr. Eisenstadt's point: Not so
easy to replicate that for other things. We can try, but that
is going to be a bigger challenge.
Mr. Eisenstadt?
Mr. Eisenstadt. Can I make just one more point? Also,
depending upon how U.S. relations with Russia and China evolve,
even if Iran was to violate its JCPOA commitments, I am not
sure we would even be able to snap back sanctions a few years
from now. The stars all aligned in the last couple years to
enable JCPOA and the sanctions. And politics might evolve in a
certain way that it may not be possible in the future even for
nuclear violations.
Mr. Connolly. Good point.
Madam Chairman, you have been very indulgent. And I really
appreciate it, but I think this is a really important
discussion. Thank you for putting this together.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You are right, especially in terms of new
legislation that is building up in Congress.
Thank you, Mr. Connolly, as always.
And thank you to our witnesses.
With that, our subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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