    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                      U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 22, 2017

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-11

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          AMI BERA, California
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 DINA TITUS, Nevada
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             NORMA J. TORRES, California
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York              BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York     THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
    F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,         ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
        Wisconsin                        TED LIEU, California
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
    FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

             Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats

                     DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    TED POE, Texas                       BRAD SHERMAN, California
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,         DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
        Wisconsin                        ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Paul A. Goble, principal professor, The Institute of World
      Politics.......................................................     7
    Ms. Lisa Sawyer Samp, senior fellow, International Security
      Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies........    13
    Mr. Matthew Rojansky, director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson
      Center.........................................................    23
    Mr. Edward Lucas, senior vice president, Center for European
      Policy Analysis................................................    39

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Mr. Paul A. Goble: Prepared statement............................     9
    Ms. Lisa Sawyer Samp: Prepared statement.........................    15
    Mr. Matthew Rojansky: Prepared statement.........................    26
    Mr. Edward Lucas: Prepared statement.............................    42

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    64
    Hearing minutes..................................................    65
    The Honorable Robin L. Kelly, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of Illinois: Prepared statement......................    66
    Ms. Lisa Sawyer Samp: Material submitted for the record..........    68
    Mr. Matthew Rojansky: Material submitted for the record..........    69
    Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Robin L.
      Kelly and written responses from:
      Mr. Edward Lucas...............................................    71
      Ms. Lisa Sawyer Samp...........................................    72

                      U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2017

                           House of Representatives,

             Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Good afternoon. I call the subcommittee to
    order.
        Today's hearing is focused on the Baltic region, U.S.
    policy to the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
        My colleagues in Congress, other opinion makers, and policy
    deciders often refer to the danger or conflict of this region.
    The reality of what has been happening or not happening in this
    corner of the world deserves a closer and, yes, a more
    comprehensive examination. And that is what this hearing is all
    about.
        Our relationship with the Baltic people and governments has
    probably lasted 100 years. We have stood by those populations
    through the Soviet period in our firm support for the rights of
    Baltic people to freely choose their own governance and not
    have it dictated to them by the Nazis, the Communists, or
    anybody else.
        Those who know me know how strongly I believe in self-
    determination. I am proud that American support helped these
    three Baltic countries reestablish their independence as
    communism collapsed in the Soviet Union. We stood by Estonia,
    Latvia, and Lithuania in the past, and they can be confident
    that we will remain the case in the future.
        The citizens of the Baltics, like citizens in the Eastern
    Europe, are not pieces on a board for foreign policy powers to
    manipulate and to control. They are fully and equally sovereign
    nations.
        Within that context, the Baltic nations were permitted to
    join NATO, which, as a consequence, has put troops that are a
    part of a hostile military alliance positioned right on
    Russia's border, a potential threat from Russia's perspective.
    Whatever you think about Russia today, it behooves us to act
    responsibly and to recognize that Russia too is a powerful
    nation, whose leaders make decisions based on their country's
    security and national interests. We do that, as well as every
    other major power.
        However, the question today remains: Has Russia stepped
    over the bounds of acceptable behavior or has the U.S. been
    overreacting?
        Since 2014, there have been numerous NATO exercises in the
    Baltics. And when we say that, that means we have had numerous
    NATO military exercises within a relatively short distance from
    St. Petersburg and Moscow and directly on the Russian border.
    Some of our witnesses today will help explain what is happening
    and what's been happening there in the Baltics and why. Knowing
    the facts of what is happening certainly will help us determine
    what America's policy toward this region should be, and what
    should our policy be toward Russia as well. But establishing
    the prerequisites for a peaceful world must remain a priority
    for us and for the Russians and for the people in the Baltics.
        One thought. We here should do our best not to confuse a
    strong U.S. policy with a confrontational policy. What is the
    goal of peace through strength? It is not just strength. It is
    peace, and that we should never lose that perspective.
        I welcome our witnesses this afternoon.
        Without objection, your full written statements will be
    made part of the record.
        So if you could, we would like to ask you to make a 5-
    minute presentation, and then we will move on to questions and
    dialogue with the panel and with the members.
        I would like to focus on a few key questions. I would like
    to know about the specific acts that Russia is accused of doing
    in the Baltics. I don't want intentions. What are the specific
    acts that we should be most concerned about? And is our
    response to these specific acts reasonable or is it
    belligerent?
        With that said, would ask my ranking member, Mr. Meeks, to
    move forward with his opening statement.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    calling today's hearing on U.S. policy regarding the Baltics.
    It is a region we do not always get to examine in detail, but
    do not often see in the news either.
        Before my remarks, I would like to take a moment, though,
    to remember the attacks in Brussels just 1 year ago. And,
    today, we see a similar democracy being attacked again in
    London. It is a reminder that democracy is continuous, it is
    daily, and it is difficult. And we mourn those that may have
    lost their lives in the attack in London today.
        The Baltics hold a special place in modern history. I
    admire their citizens for their peaceful, brave resistance to
    the Soviet regime during the nonviolent Singing Revolution.
    Soviet repression was not able to crush their cultures, their
    people, or their thirst for freedom. A beautiful story that
    one--and one that resonates here in the United States Congress.
        The U.S. never recognized the Soviet occupation by force,
    and upon deliberation, they continued normal diplomatic
    relations. The same international laws compel us to never--
    today, to never recognize the Kremlin's attempt to annex
    Crimea.
        In 1991, newly independent Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
    and--had to mature quickly in a dangerous post-Communist space
    where corruption, economic malice, and ethnic divisions were
    always a threat. The scars from the transformation can be seen
    and manipulated by outside actors today. Nevertheless, they are
    free. They reformed. They are banging on the doors to Europe
    saying, don't forget us. They are persistent. They joined NATO
    and the EU in 2004, and continue to play integral roles in
    both.
        Estonia takes over the presidency of the council in July,
    and I look forward to learning more about their stories on the
    ground soon.
        I am also a senior member of the Financial Services
    Committee and remember seeing the Baltic States suffer
    immensely during the financial crisis in 2008. Latvia saw its
    GDP shrink over 25 percent in less than a year, for example.
    The final result, a success story. Internal devaluation, belt
    tightening within an agreement between society and the
    government helped the small open economies turn the corner and
    enjoy sustained growth. It was not easy, but the results are a
    best practice example for dealing with the euro crisis.
        The Baltic States are also leaders in the internet age. I
    admire the Estonia movement, the dedicated push to bring the
    country to the forefront in e-commerce and e-democracy, where
    citizens can vote and register businesses online. I believe we
    have a few e-residents in the crowd today.
        However, this makes Estonia vulnerable to cyber attacks,
    which they have experienced, most notably in 2008. The result:
    Estonia is now home to the NATO Cyber Centre of Excellence,
    where all NATO member states can share and sharpen their skills
    in today's wide world.
        The region is also a leader in the push toward energy
    transformation and independence. Seeing and feeling the way the
    Russian Government uses energy as a political tool is a direct
    threat to the economies and populations in the Baltic States. A
    striking example is Lithuanian LNG terminal independence, which
    is only a part of a puzzle linking the region with a
    competitive supply of energy. Projects like this help Lithuania
    and Europe, both, from an energy and supply side and,
    importantly, from a security angle.
        Finally, the success of the three states is an important
    symbol for those who need a united and free Europe. With NATO
    support, it is an important symbol for the region as an example
    of what can be achieved with membership in the transatlantic
    organizations that the guarantee of justice and the rule of
    law. Yet as the Baltic States continue to integrate and
    flourish as democracies, they are under threat. I do not
    believe that Russian tanks will roll across their borders, but
    the threat from the Kremlin is often subtle, often denied, in
    fact--or a post-fact world, but just as real and just as
    powerful. Their tools corrupt our information sphere, our
    economies, and use cynicism only to protect kleptocracies in
    Moscow.
        I believe we have an excellent panel here to examine these
    threats and discuss the best responses. I believe we must
    support the free press, much like we recently examined with
    Chairman Royce of the full committee level. And I also would
    like to examine the role, both symbolic and economic, of
    personal sanctions, specifically, the Magnitsky Act, which goes
    after corrupt individuals, not the Russian people.
        I am also an adamant supporter of NATO and the EU's role in
    values-based transatlantic relationship and how economies and
    people are better off with it.
        To conclude, I would like to submit two excellent reads for
    the record that shaped what I am talking about today. President
    Reagan's Proclamation 4948, which created Baltic Freedom Day,
    and President Obama's speech in Tallinn in 2014. These
    documents show the continued bipartisan support for the Baltic
    States and the freedom and democracies that they bravely fought
    to establish.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you. And I sure appreciate you
    putting some of my writing into the work.
        And then we have Mr. Fitzpatrick from Pennsylvania----
        Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. For 2 minutes.
        Mr. Fitzpatrick. Yes, sir.
        The fall of the USSR in 1991 ushered in a new era of
    freedom for many former Soviet Republics who had struggled for
    decades to maintain and express their national identities. The
    Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are prime
    examples of the demise of the Soviet Union and how the demise
    of the Soviet Union led to a freer and more independent Europe.
        After gaining their independence in the summer of 1991, the
    Baltic States began to craft their own economies, their own
    militaries, and even more importantly, their own identities.
    This is something that we as Americans should all appreciate.
        The Baltic States also desire to become part of the
    integrated global community by becoming both members of NATO as
    well as the European Union. However, in recent years, the
    Russian bear has once again reared its ugly head. We first saw
    this in 2008 when the Russian army invaded its fiercely
    independent southern neighbor, Georgia. In a quick but brutal
    war, the Russians showed what lengths they were willing to go
    in order to exert their dominance over their newly independent
    neighbors.
        Likewise, in 2014, Vladimir Putin covertly moved Russian
    military forces into the Crimean region, quickly seizing it.
    Subsequent that year, the Russian-backed insurgency began to
    take hold of the eastern Donbass region in the Ukraine,
    culminating in the shoot-down of a Malaysian Airlines flight
    under very suspicious circumstances, this all being done with
    limited intervention from previous administrations;
        As we look forward, it is imperative that we maintain our
    relationship with critical allies in the Baltic States. We must
    reassert America's commitment to prevent the rise of another
    Soviet block where a country's leaders are beholding to Moscow
    and not their own people.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. And now Brad.
        All right, Brad, you are first.
        Mr. Sherman. Okay. I want to associate myself with the
    comments of the ranking member recognizing the people of
    Belgium and the people of the United Kingdom and what they have
    suffered, and his praise for the Baltic States.
        The foreign policy establishment has spoken. Everything
    that Putin does is wrong and, therefore, anything done by
    anyone in conflict with Putin must be right. I will spend a few
    minutes questioning that second assumption. The Baltic States
    are, indeed, praiseworthy, but they can and should do better.
        I have been in this room for 20 years, and for most of that
    time, the foreign policy establishment said anyone who focused
    on burden sharing was ignorant or worse. Now, they have caved
    in on that and, instead, clung to this 2 percent standard. It
    should be a 4 percent standard. America spends over 4 percent
    of our GDP on our military. The foreign policy establishment
    deliberately understates that by ignoring the cost of the
    veterans benefits which, after all, are compensation we provide
    our soldiers and sailors.
        Unfortunately, only one of the Baltic States even meets the
    2 percent requirement, and the others--one other is saying they
    will get to it eventually, but that leaves their armaments way
    too low a level because, for decades, they have been
    underspending. Baltic States should at least match our 4
    percent level and make up for the armaments they don't have
    because they've deliberately underspent for decades.
        NATO is important. Only one NATO country has been attacked
    during NATO, and that is the United States. We had support in
    Afghanistan. The support from the Baltic States was there, but
    incredibly modest. In contrast, the Baltic States have asked us
    for an incredibly robust response to the national security
    threats that they face, including, as the chairman points out,
    deploying American soldiers by the thousands on the Russian
    border.
        In the United Nations, I have been disappointed with the
    Baltic States support for us, voting against us again and again
    and again in the general assembly, though I support the recent
    support of two of the Baltic States in one UNESCO vote.
        And, finally, we need to urge the Baltic States to treat
    the Russian minorities with as much respect as possible and
    more respect than maybe popular in their own political--among
    their own people, especially the Estonian issue with so many
    citizens of Estonia or residents of Estonia not be--having
    Estonian passports, not being recognized as citizens. I would
    hope that there would be a system that would allow dual
    citizenship and allow these folks to have whatever rights
    Russia chooses to grant them, but to have all the rights of
    Estonian citizens.
        There are many arguments on both sides as to how the
    Russian-speaking minority should be treated, but since this
    could be a flashpoint for a major war, I would hope the Baltic
    States would err on the side of treating their Russian-speaking
    minority well.
        And I yield back.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
        And now, Mr. Cicilline.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher and Ranking
    Member Meeks for calling this hearing today and to the
    witnesses for being here to discuss a region that is vital to
    America's strategic national security interests.
        Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are located at Russia's
    doorstep and, in many ways, are at the forefront in the
    increasing tensions in Eastern Europe. Each of these states
    serves as an example of the ability of the people to rise out
    of the chaos of the fall of the Soviet Union, embrace democracy
    and free markets, and thrive.
        Formerly members of the Warsaw Pact, as part of the Soviet
    Union today, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are vital members
    of NATO. And perhaps no countries face a graver challenge from
    the renewed aggression of Putin's Russia. The invasions of
    Georgia and Ukraine have caused many within the Baltics to fear
    for their own sovereignty as Putin attempts to delegitimize
    states that have a large Russian-speaking population. And that
    is why it is so important that the United States not waiver in
    our commitment to the NATO alliance and to our Baltic friends
    to ensure that the ties we have forged remain strong in the
    face of increased pressure.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. And I
    want to apologize in advance, we have a Judiciary Committee
    markup, so I will be in and out. But I'm anxious to hear what
    we can do to reinforce and strengthen our NATO commitments and
    to continue the strong relationships the United States has
    built with our Baltic friends. I thank you.
        And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much.
        And I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us
    today. I will introduce all of you, and then we will proceed.
        First, we have Paul Goble, who is a long-time expert in
    minority nationalities and the former Soviet Union. He has had
    a distinguished career working at various times for the United
    States Government, the State Department, as well as Radio Free
    Europe. He has been honored by the governments of all three
    Baltic republics for his efforts to promote their independence.
        Lisa Sawyer Samp or Sap?
        Ms. Samp. Samp.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Samp. Okay. A senior fellow in the
    Internation Security Program at the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies. She is an expert on NATO and European
    defense strategies. And before joining CSIS, she was in a
    previous role as director for NATO and European Strategic
    Affairs on the National Security Council staff.
        We have Matthew Rojansky. He is the director of the Kennan
    Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center. He is a leading expert
    on U.S.-Russian relations and an adjunct professor at Johns
    Hopkins. He serves as U.S. executive secretary for the
    Dartmouth Conference which is a two-track of the Russian-U.S.
    conflict resolution initiative. I hope I got that exactly
    right, but you get the picture.
        Mr. Edward Lucas is a senior editor for The Economist. And
    I might add, I read that magazine all the time. I think it is,
    frankly, the only magazine I do read all the time. He is a
    senior vice president at the Center for European Policy
    Analysis. He has been observing and writing about developments
    in Eastern Europe and that part of the world for over 20 years.
        So we are very pleased to have you and grateful to have you
    with us. So, as I say, if you could proceed with 5-minute
    opening statements or you could add to that, just for the
    record, and then we will proceed with questions from the
    members.
        Mr. Goble.

       STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL A. GOBLE, PRINCIPAL PROFESSOR, THE
                      INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITICS

        Mr. Goble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling
    this hearing on this most important topic and for giving me an
    opportunity to appear.
        I would like to dedicate my remarks to the late Aleksander
    Einseln, the Estonian-American colonel, who died about 10 days
    ago, who went to Estonia and became the commander of the
    Estonian Defence Forces and played a key role in transforming
    those forces into ones that could be integrated into the
    Western alliance.
        It is an ancient observation that old generals always
    prepare to fight the last war, but we don't always think about
    what that means. It often means that they look for the same
    kind of threat that happened in the past and try to counter it,
    or not seeing it, decide there isn't any threat at all, and
    that they fail to prepare for combating new threats, because
    the means they have adopted in the past to counter the threats
    of the past are no longer the ones that are most important.
        I do not believe, as long as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
    are a members of the western alliance, that any Russian
    Government will send its tanks over the eastern borders of
    those countries. I think that is almost unthinkable because I
    think it is almost certainly suicidal.
        Having said that, however, I believe there is a very real
    Russian threat that flows both from the purposes that Mr. Putin
    has announced for his government going back more than a decade
    and the means he has chosen to use to pursue those purposes.
        On the one hand, Mr. Putin has clearly signaled that the
    three--that his foreign policy is driven by a desire to
    challenge the three bedrock principles of the international
    system that the United States took the lead in forming in the
    20th century. First, the 1919 settlement that declared that the
    Arab empires is over. He wants to restore one. Second, the
    settlement of 1945, which held that citizenship is more
    important than ethnicity. That is what we fought World War II
    about when the Germans thought that ethnicity was more
    important than citizenship. And 1991, when the international
    community accepted the demise of the USSR as something that was
    irreversible.
        But the other aspect of the Russian threat is also serious,
    and that is that Mr. Putin has chosen to use the strategies of
    subversion rather than the strategies of open force. Far more
    often we have seen actions by the Russian Government that are
    those of intelligence services rather than those of defense
    ministries. What that means is if you are looking for actions
    by the military, you won't find them, but if you are looking at
    what goes on in banks, in government offices, in propaganda
    outlets, they are very much there.
        Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have particular reasons for
    being concerned about both Mr. Putin's goals--if any of those
    are realized, they would be at risk--and his tactical approach
    because of their size and their propinquity to Russia. We in
    the United States tend to forget how small the Baltic countries
    are, how much they suffered under various aspects of Russian
    rule, and how much they have depended on the United States.
        For Putin, those three realities have a contradictory
    message. On the one hand, they mean that Mr. Putin is certainly
    aware that any military move against the Baltic countries would
    be resisted by the United States as part of its NATO alliance
    and, second, it means that Mr. Putin has an interest in
    challenging the West precisely there as a way of indicating
    that the West is more of a paper tiger than the West believes.
        I believe that what we need to do in order to promote
    Baltic security has less to do with the expansion of NATO
    presence there, although I welcome that presence, than it does
    with doing other things. And I would like to suggest three of
    what would be a very large list.
        First, as several of the members have pointed out, we need
    to encourage all three countries to complete the integration of
    ethnic minorities in their countries, that the progress that
    has been made is truly amazing. Indeed, last week, it was
    announced that there are 4,000 ethnic Russians in Estonia who
    now declare that Estonian is their native language, which is--
    would have been unthinkable a decade ago. That is an impressive
    achievement. Second, we need to promote transparency of all
    economic and political activities, banking, the communication
    sector. And, third, we need to involve Estonians, Latvians,
    Lithuanians in as many conversations as possible with Russian
    counterparts.
        There are people in the West who are not interested in
    pushing that, who prefer to see the question of Russian power
    as being one that there is only a military response to. But, in
    fact, it is in these other areas that the fight is going to be
    won or lost, and, therefore, we should be spending far more
    time developing strategies in those areas than in others.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Goble follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. Ms. Samp, you may go right ahead.

    STATEMENT OF MS. LISA SAWYER SAMP, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL
       SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
                                STUDIES

        Ms. Samp. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, good afternoon.
        I would like to make just two points regarding the current
    security situation in the Baltic States. My first point is
    foundational to this discussion. Russia is a threat. Russia is
    a threat to the Baltic States and, more broadly, to the post-
    World War II international order.
        In the Baltics, Russia has conducted cyber attacks,
    crossborder kidnappings, and unannounced snap exercises with up
    to 80,000 troops just across the border. It has also violated
    their sovereign airspace, issued hostile statements, and filled
    their airwaves with propaganda.
        For an accurate threat picture, though, this behavior must
    be considered in the context of what Moscow has done and is
    doing beyond the Baltics. In addition to meddling in foreign
    elections, violating arms control agreements, and nuclear saber
    rattlings, Putin's bullying has escalated to the use of
    military force in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria.
        In Ukraine, he has annexed Crimea and continues to sow
    instability and violence in the country's east. Thousands have
    died and over a million have been displayed. Let us also please
    not forget about the 298 civilians who were killed when a
    Russian-provided missile brought down a civilian airliner, or
    about the thousands of civilians killed by indiscriminate
    Russian bombs in Syria.
        Russia's actions reflect an effective blending of both
    conventional and unconventional tactics. These tactics are
    designed to circumvent U.S. and NATO redlines, confuse
    traditional response options, and use the virtues of the West
    against it.
        Putin likely doesn't want a war with the West, but he is
    finding he can get a lot done without one. For that reason, he
    has no intention of stopping now. He is becoming more
    emboldened over time and growing increasingly comfortable
    taking risks. What was once primarily an eastern-flank
    challenge is now hitting closer to home. Moscow may no longer
    be motivated by a Communist ideology that sees it trying to
    overthrow democracies and replace them with dictatorships. But
    that does not mean Russia isn't still a threat to our democracy
    and our institutions.
        The difference today is that instead of offering an
    alternative, Russia is satisfied to create chaos and sow
    instability. It wants to knock the United States down a peg and
    break Western unity so we can't call shots Russia doesn't like
    or hold it accountable to the rule of law.
        The system, though, that Russia is seeking to undermine has
    served the United States well over the past 70 years. And
    without it, the world would undoubtedly be poorer, less free,
    and less safe. Russia may just be looking out for what it
    considers to be in its national interests, but then we need to
    do the same, and that entails pushing back to protect
    ourselves, our allies, and the international order.
        This brings me to my second point, which is that the steps
    taken by the United States and NATO to bolster security in the
    region are prudent and are what is minimally required. They are
    neither hostile nor provocative.
        While Russia has not resorted to military force in the
    Baltics, and while its ever doing remains extremely unlikely,
    the possibility cannot be discounted completely. To manage this
    risk, the United States and NATO have taken steps, as described
    in my written testimony, to establish a credible deterrence.
    Far from being provocative, these steps are designed to prevent
    war and to make clear the costs that would be entailed with any
    aggression. It may, in fact, be more provocative to do nothing.
    To invite Russian opportunism by baiting it would weak
    defenses.
        While it is important to debate what constitutes credible
    deterrence and what amounts to unhelpful provocation, one can
    also err in being too cautious, lending credence to Russia's
    reflexive protests and false indignation. I would argue there
    exists a wide gulf between the steps that have been taken to
    date and the steps that could be taken in the future to
    increase the West's leverage without sparking a conflict or
    even coming close.
        Step back and recall, for example, that despite recent
    troop increases, the U.S. combat presence in Europe remains a
    full brigade-strength below what it was in 2012, prior to
    renewed tensions with Russia, and that NATO's largest exercise
    conducted since the end of the Cold War included about 30,000
    troops. By contrast, Russia's Zapad exercise planned for later
    this year may reach up to 200,000. Thus, the idea that holding
    relatively moderately sized exercises on alliance territory
    constitutes provocation seems wildly unfair.
        NATO is also not the ones flying with its transponders off,
    failing to announce exercises in accordance with the Vienna
    document, and buzzing ships in the Black and Baltic Seas. While
    it is also fair to consider the West's role in contributing to
    the current standoff with Russia, suggesting moral
    equivalencies or assigning blame does not solve the current
    problem. It neither changes how the West or Russia view their
    security interests nor makes what we seek to preserve any less
    valid.
        To conclude, none of this means we cannot still cooperate
    with Russia where it is in our interest, but rushing to make
    deals with Moscow to secure what would amount to short-term
    gains may well end up sacrificing more fundamental goals.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Samp follows:]

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        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
        And, Mr. Rojansky.

    STATEMENT OF MR. MATTHEW ROJANSKY, DIRECTOR, KENNAN INSTITUTE,
                         WOODROW WILSON CENTER

        Mr. Rojansky. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. But you need to turn your mike on.
        Mr. Rojansky. Right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
    Meeks. I am enormously grateful to have this opportunity. And I
    have got to do this, the disclaimer: Personal views only, not
    those of the Wilson Center, which, of course, is a
    congressionally chartered memorial to President Wilson. So we
    are very grateful that we can fulfill our public interest
    mission and participate in here.
        You know, I think--I understood your question, Mr.
    Chairman, about Russia's specific acts rather than just sort of
    vague general ideas of a threat and the reasonableness of
    American response as soliciting an analysis of how the Russians
    are thinking and why. What do they intend, and is there
    evidence for their intent?
        And so I would like to tackle that problem as directly as I
    can, and I break it down into three parts. Any time that I
    think about a threat, I try to break it down into motive,
    capability, and opportunity. So those are the three parts I
    want to tackle in that order.
        In terms of motive, let's look at what Russia's actions
    have been against other states to try to discern a motive, vis-
    a-vis, in particular, its neighborhood or what Russians call
    the near abroad. Generally speaking, Russians do not view other
    countries in the near abroad as fully sovereign. Certainly, not
    in the way they see themselves or the United States. Obviously,
    we know that President Medvedev talked about a sphere of
    privileged influence; the Russians have supported separatists
    in Moldova, in Georgia; they have invaded Ukraine. This is well
    known.
        In terms of specific actions against the Baltic States,
    famously in 2007, around the Bronze Soldier conflict, they
    intervened with cyber attacks against Estonia. In 2014, they
    abducted Eston Kohver, an Estonian security agent from the
    border, essentially kidnapped him. In Latvia, they have
    mobilized ethnic Russian voters, stirred up antigovernment
    sentiment in Latgallia. In Lithuania, they have mounted an
    information war disparaging living standards for Lithuanians
    and encouraging them to move to Kaliningrad, a neighboring
    exclave of Russia. And, of course, there's been sophisticated
    social media campaigns backing all of these things up.
        Now, what do Russians want in the Baltic States? Basic
    motivation. Certainly, they fear the American presence there,
    what it may lead to, but they like to maintain, basically,
    stable political and economic ties. Now, much is made of the
    Russian-speaking population. It is a tricky issue. Who is an
    ethnic Russian? Who is a Russian speaker? In terms of
    percentages, we may be dealing with somewhere between 30 and 36
    percent in Latvia, 25 to 28 percent in Estonia, 5 to 8 percent
    in Lithuania, depending on how you define those numbers.
    Sometimes they are concentrated, like in Narva and eastern
    Estonia; sometimes they are very well integrated, like in the
    city of Riga, the capital of Latvia.
        Now, Putin talks about the Russian world within which these
    people would certainly be included as being a major priority
    for Russian foreign policy and being the largest diaspora in
    Europe. He claims 25 million Russians left outside the borders
    of The Russian Federation.
        And in 2014, in a speech in Riga, Russia's commissioner for
    human rights, Konstantin Dolgov, said: It has to be stated with
    sadness that a huge number of our compatriots abroad, whole
    segments of the Russian world, continue to face serious
    problems securing their rights and lawful interests. We will
    not tolerate the creeping offensive against the Russian
    language that we are seeing in the Baltics.
        So does Russia intend to use force in the Baltics?
    Interestingly, most Russian sources say, no, they don't. Dmitri
    Trenin says Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are safe,
    even if they don't feel that way. The Kremlin has no interest
    in risking nuclear war by attacking a member state, and the
    sphere of Russian control to which Putin aspires certainly
    excludes these countries.
        Now, Russians would have plenty of reasons to make these
    claims, but it may be that they have other motives and
    intentions in being threatening toward the Baltic States, like
    signaling to other post-Soviet countries. In particular,
    Belarus, Kazakhstan, part of the Eurasian core countries on
    Russia's borders. And most military deployments, if you look at
    Russian military deployments, are about exerting control and
    dominance over Ukraine.
        Capability--I will keep this very short. Russia's military
    capability is stronger than it was, for sure. It comes nowhere
    close to what the United States can feel, much less the NATO
    alliance. And one of the challenges in assessing Russia's
    actual capability is the bread-and-toast problem, vis-a-vis,
    Russian troops that are simply always going to be in and around
    St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad versus troops that are there for
    the specific reason of sort of either masking or preparing for
    an attack on the Baltic States.
        But there are other capabilities of concern, nonmilitary
    capabilities. And, again, this comes back to the issue of
    Russian speakers. Russian television has been called a couch
    potato's dream, an attractive, even mesmerizing mix of frothy
    morning shows, high-decibel discussion shows, tear jerker
    serials and song contests peppered with news bulletins and
    current events shows that tow the Kremlin line. So you get the
    idea that Russian broadcasting creates a very sophisticated
    media milieu within which people are persuaded by the Russian
    world view.
        But be careful not to generalize here. At the end of the
    day, Russian speakers, ethnic Russians in the Baltic States,
    they are people. Many of them don't necessarily like Mr. Putin,
    many of them have no desire to abandon their EU citizenship,
    which they have, thanks to being citizens of the Baltic States,
    and many of them tune out from politics altogether.
        The last point--and I will end quickly here--on opportunity
    there is both good news and bad news. The good news is that Mr.
    Goble is exactly right. The Russians do not seek to provoke a
    conflict with the nuclear armed alliance in NATO, and as long
    as the Baltic States are NATO members, that is going to be the
    case. The bad news is that a crisis is still absolutely
    possible. A crisis is possible. Either imagine a scenario
    within which this ethic Russian or Russian language issue is
    provoked, even completely made up and then blown out of
    proportion by Russian media, there is a firm response from
    local authorities, and that results in a crisis. And the other
    possible crisis here is a military crisis. This so-called heavy
    metal diplomacy, a Russian aircraft coming close to an American
    ship or another NATO flag vessel.
        So definitely, in terms of motive, capability, and
    opportunity, we are looking at a real threat, a real set of
    concerns, but it is important to see it in context. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rojansky follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. In context. That is good. We will be
    discussing that as we get into the questions and answers.
        And, finally, Mr. Lucas, you may proceed.

     STATEMENT OF MR. EDWARD LUCAS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, CENTER
                      FOR EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS

        Mr. Lucas. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and
    distinguished members, it is an honor and privilege to come
    here and give testimony to this committee on this vitally
    important subject.
        I have been dealing with this issue since the early 1980s.
    My message is very straightforward and is contained in my
    written testimony. I will now go on to answer some of the
    questions that have come up in the discussion already.
        Russia is a revisionist power. It doesn't like the way the
    world is at the moment. It wants to change it. It has the means
    to do this if we don't keep ourselves united and strong. So
    far, it is doing really well, much better than many people
    would have suspected. If you had been thinking 10, 15 years ago
    that we would be discussing a threat from Russia of the kind we
    are discussing now, people would have thought that was crazy.
    It is going to get worse before it gets better.
        You mentioned in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, that
    we created a hostile military alliance stretching to Russia's
    border and put troops there, and the Russians don't like that.
    I think it is worth reminding ourselves why they are there. Why
    did this change? Why has this happened? And, of course, during
    the 1990s, we didn't have NATO membership for the Baltic
    States, and we expanded it for a reason. We expanded it because
    these countries were scared, and there was enough going on that
    they were right to be scared. After 2004, many people said,
    that is it, job done. Russia will not touch a NATO member, and
    there is no reason to worry about it anymore. We had no plans,
    no contingency plans for defending the Baltic States. We had no
    troop deployments there. We had no exercises there.
        That would have been a stable situation, but Russia
    provoked, undermined, and subverted the Baltic States, notably
    in the Bronze Soldier attack, but in many other things as well.
    And so after 2008, the war in Georgia, President Obama said we
    need contingency plans. We developed a plan, and then we
    increased them. There was a huge jolt which came with the 2009
    Zapad exercises, which practiced the invasion and occupation of
    the Baltic States and finished off with a dummy nuclear attack
    on Warsaw. That was a real wake-up call to the West.
        Russia tends to do the things that it rehearses, and
    everything we have done, in a much smaller scale, since then, I
    think has been a response to Russia raising the ante. Russia is
    testing our will in the Baltic States. And the best way of
    guaranteeing that we keep the peace that we have is by
    responding to that with calmness and firmness.
        You asked for specific examples. Well, I think the military
    exercise and, particularly, terrifying snap exercises, which
    happen at no notice and involve large numbers of troops
    hurdling toward the border when we have no idea, really, what
    is going on. And perhaps the biggest example, I would also
    mention the role of money in Baltic politics. And if you read
    the reports of the Estonian and Lithuanian security agencies,
    which are available on the internet, they list in chilling
    detail the things that Russia is doing inside those countries.
        I would also like to respond to the idea that it is a big
    ask from the Baltic States. They want a lot from America. Well,
    that is true. But you are not just defending them, you are
    defending the whole international order. And if you are worried
    about America's leadership in the world and you are worried
    about America's leadership in Asia and you are worried about
    whether your allies take you seriously, well, the Baltics is
    high noon. That is where it starts. If you can't defend the
    Baltic States, your treaty allies, then you have no credibility
    in other parts of the world. So you are defending the whole
    rules-based order, not just the Baltic States.
        And, finally, I would just point out that the Baltic States
    are not just consumers of security; they are also providers.
    They were warning us about this 20 years ago when we weren't
    listening. They see things that we don't see. They can go to
    places that we don't go. They understand things that we don't
    understand. And we, in my country in Britain, your country in
    the United States, and other NATO allies, we are eagerly and
    greedily lapping up some of this expertise, some of these
    capabilities they have in cyber, in intelligence, and other
    things, which fill gaps, stuff that we neglected, capabilities
    that we got rid of in the past 20 or 30 years because we
    thought we would never need them again. So they contribute a
    lot to us.
        What should we do? Well, first of all, we have got to
    understand that Russia is trying to change the rules and be
    clear that we want to defend that rules-based order. It is
    worth it. It brings peace, it brings prosperity, it brings
    freedom. It really matters.
        We need to raise the cost to Mr. Putin of his attacks, and
    I strongly endorse the point about raising visa sanctions on
    the Russian elite. We have no quarrel with the people of
    Russia. They suffer from this regime just as much as anybody
    else does, if not more. But we should say to those top 1,000,
    10,000 people in Russia, if you preach anti-Westernism, if you
    say that the West is decadent, the fount of all evil,
    imperialist, horrible, backward, and so on, well, you can't
    then expect to launder money in the West. You can't expect to
    send your kids here to be educated. You can't send your
    families here for medical treatment. You can't come here on
    holiday. We can do that. That is not a quarrel with the Russian
    people. That is targeting the sanctions on the elite.
        And, finally, I think we just need to do a bit more on
    deterrence. What NATO has done in the Baltics is very small. It
    is 1/10th, 1/20th of what Russia has done. It is already a
    game-changer. But just having a few more American soldiers in
    the Baltics would make a very big difference, because Russia
    takes you really seriously.
        And I will finish off by saying, we should look at the
    Baltic States like West Berlin. There are many things in West
    Berlin we didn't like during the Cold War. I know you, Chairman
    Rohrabacher, were a regular visitor there, and it was
    tremendously important symbolically for us. We didn't try and
    defend West Berlin militarily as West Berlin. We didn't put a
    Maginot line on West Berlin, anymore we should put a Maginot
    line down the Baltics. We said, this is where it stops. This is
    the furthest outpost of the West. And by defending West Berlin,
    we defend every member of the Western alliance, and we should
    look at the Baltic States in the same way.
        Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lucas follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much.
        And I see we are on our own.
        Mr. Meeks. Me and you, baby.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. And me and you, baby.
        Let me start out by saying that I apologize that this is
    not a balanced panel. You all have basically the same message,
    and we should have had at least one person to present the other
    perspective, and we did not. And I am concerned about that.
        Well, I am here. There is only so much as to what I can do
    on my own. Okay.
        Let me first apologize about that, because I don't believe
    this is a balanced panel. I mean, I just have to say, you all
    are intellectuals. You all are good sources of information, but
    we need to juxtapose your arguments with someone else, and we
    didn't do it, and so we failed.
        And maybe we will have another hearing where the points
    that you have made, you could have two or three here, and maybe
    someone on the other side who could refute some of the points
    that have been made.
        So with that said, let me just go into some questions that
    will be provocative questions, anyway.
        I did ask for a specific military aggression and acts. I
    didn't seem to get any, frankly. I hear about the amassing of
    300,000 troops in Russian territory, in Russia, is an act of an
    aggression against their neighboring countries. But amassing
    NATO troops and tanks in their neighboring countries, on their
    border is not an aggression. Talk about a double standard. I
    would think that that is a major double standard.
        I will have to say that when my friend, my fellow
    journalist, a former journalist as I am, that I believe that
    the idea of declaring the Baltics like to be similar to Berlin
    demonstrates a basic perceptional problem of why we are heading
    in the wrong direction. The Cold War is over. As long as we are
    thinking about Russia as it was during that time period, and
    others, and Berlin, West Berlin, as being threatened, as it was
    at that time, in a government that was controlled by the
    Communist Party, that was an ideological-based party that
    wanted to create Marxist, atheist dictatorships throughout the
    world, replace democracies with Marxist dictatorships. That is
    not the world we live in today, and it is not the Russia.
    Russia is different than what it was.
        Now, how different? Let me just ask for some specific
    things in the Baltics. I know there was a cyber attack, which
    someone brought up; I would like to ask about that cyber attack
    in Estonia, if you know about this. I am sure you all should.
    There was a cyber attack when the Russians and the Estonians
    got into a personality match when the Estonians said, we are
    going to take down the statue that is dedicated to the Russian
    soldiers who gave their lives in liberating the Baltics from
    the Nazis. And at that point, there was a massive cyber attack,
    which really was very extensive, and it was a heavy duty attack
    by Russia on Estonia.
        How long ago did that happen? When was it? What year was
    that? When was it?
        Mr. Lucas. 2007, sir.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. 2007. And since that time, have there been
    any attacks of that magnitude in the Baltics? Any other attacks
    since 2007?
        Now, I will tell you, we have heard over and over and over
    again about the incredible cyber attacks, and that was 2007. I
    am not excusing the fact somebody is insulting. France insulted
    us a number of times, and we didn't get so angry at them that
    we punished them. There are all sorts of stories about that.
        We are talking that their 300,000 troops are a threat, but
    our NATO 30,000 aren't. Is the panel aware that we are part of
    those NATO exercises and there has been a number of them now.
    Part of that has been B-52 flights headed from England and then
    turning around at the Russian border? Does anyone here not
    considered that a provocative act?
        Ms. Samp. I do not.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. You do not. Okay. So you think a nuclear
    weapons delivery system aimed at the heart of Russia and then
    turning around right on the border is not hostile and
    provocative?
        Ms. Samp. It might be if they weren't doing the same thing
    to us. They are flying bear and blackjack bombers off the coast
    of Alaska around the outer edges of Europe. So the flights are
    a wash----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. It is not the same. Let me just note. What
    you are saying is ridiculous. It is not the same as aiming a
    flight of bombers into the capital areas, meaning St.
    Petersburg in Moscow, versus flying along a coast. Everybody
    has a right to fly along someone's coast. Now, let me ask you
    this: Are there also ships as part of those exercises that we
    had or do we have any nuclear weapons capability of carrying
    ships that were part of that? Any of you know that? Well, yes,
    there were.
        Tell me, if we actually are bringing nuclear weapons
    delivery systems to the Russian border, you don't believe that
    is provocative. Does anyone else here agree with that?
        Yes, go right ahead.
        Mr. Lucas. Sir, can I respond to that? I think one has to
    look at this in over a period of, say, 10 years, say we start
    in 2004, when we have expanded NATO and we have built quite
    good relations with Russia through the NATO-Russia Founding Act
    and the NATO-Russia Council. Things have deteriorated since
    then. But in each case, the deterioration started with actions
    on the Russian side, and we followed by much smaller actions on
    ours.
        Now, you mentioned nuclear weapons, and it is an extremely
    important point. Russia has a very large arsenal of so-called
    tactical nuclear weapons, and these are integrated into its
    military doctrine and integrated into its exercises. And they
    practice getting these nuclear artillery shells, depth charges,
    short-range weapons out of the bunkers onto delivery systems.
    And they do this again and again and again.
        We in the West have almost given up on tactical nuclear
    arms. We have very few. Those that we have are kept a very long
    way away from the Baltic States, chiefly in bunkers in the
    Netherlands. Our exercises do not involve their use.
        It is a specific part of Russian military doctrine to do
    what they call escalate to de-escalate, which means if they
    think they are losing a conventional war, they will go nuclear.
    They make no secret about that. And they talk about these
    nuclear weapons all the time in a way that the neighbors find
    terrifying, not just the NATO members. They say this to the
    Finns and to the Swedes.
        You mentioned B-52 flights. I don't know if you are aware
    of what happened on Good Friday 2014, I think it was, when a
    Russian flight carried out a dummy attack on Stockholm and on
    another very important military target in Sweden at a time when
    the Swedish Air Force had taken the weekend off because it was
    Easter. They had to scramble Danish fighters from Lithuania to
    intercept these Russians.
        In my country----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. So the Russian----
        Mr. Lucas. May I just finish?
        Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. In the incident you are
    describing, did they actually penetrate----
        Mr. Lucas. No. They turned around at the last minute. And
    we also had a similar event in--and if you penetrate someone--
    --
        Mr. Rohrabacher. So they turned around at the last moment.
    You remember that, and you condemn that, but you don't condemn
    U.S. B-52 bombers and nuclear weapons carrying ships going
    right to the Russian border?
        Mr. Lucas. Understand that the Russians are trying to make
    us think that we have no nuclear deterrence. And they have
    said, and they say privately and publicly, they don't believe
    that NATO deterrence works. And so long as NATO is a nuclear
    alliance, we have to show that we are nuclear capable. Now, we
    have many gaps on the escalation----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Sir, I just have to tell you that I
    believe it demonstrates a double standard that will give the
    Russians a message that we are judging our behavior differently
    than we are judging yours.
        Mr. Lucas. Can I respond to that, sir?
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. Okay. I am sorry we don't have other
    witnesses here to make these points, and I am going to have to
    give it to him. But I will let you answer that, and then we
    have to go on----
        Mr. Lucas. I just want to respond to your point about West
    Berlin, sir.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes.
        Mr. Lucas. You said the Cold War is over. It is true, the
    old Cold War is over. But as I said in my opening remarks,
    Russia is trying to change the rules. Russia doesn't like the
    way the world operates at the moment. It doesn't like American
    leadership. It doesn't like the Atlantic alliance. It doesn't
    like multilateral rules-based organizations by the EU, and that
    is a threat. It is not the same as the Soviet Union. It is much
    weaker. But the symbolic bastion of the West is the Baltic
    States, because they are militarily vulnerable.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
        Mr. Lucas. And in that sense, I think it is very similar to
    West Berlin.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, let me just note that Great Britain
    seems not to like the EU either. Do they? Great Britain decided
    they might not like that as well.
        And, yeah, the institutions that were created during the
    Cold War are beginning to, not evaporate, but to readjust, and
    some of them will disappear, some of them will remain strong,
    but this isn't the Cold War.
        Let me just remind you, you are looking at the ultimate
    cold warrior here. I mean, this is not some guy who, you know,
    did not believe we should confront the Soviet Union. And I was
    deeply involved with that for 20 years of my life, actually, 30
    years of my life.
        Well, anyway, we will have a second round of questions,
    even though it is just the two of us.
        Mr. Rojansky. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible before you
    move on to just add something on the----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. With permission from my----
        Mr. Meeks. Yeah. I was going to give you--okay.
        Mr. Rojansky. I appreciate that. I just feel badly, because
    I think I was invited to try to elucidate Russian thinking and
    the conclusion of much of my research into Russian analysis and
    the statements of Russian leaders and the disposition of
    Russian forces has been that while there are real causes for
    concern--and that is why I broke it into that three-part
    analysis of motive, capability, and opportunity--that,
    nonetheless, we are not facing an acute, immediate Russian
    military threat to the Baltic States. And there are two
    principal reasons for that on the military side, speaking about
    nuclear deterrence.
        One is that nuclear deterrence works. And the Russian
    sources I looked at were very clear that that is a big part of
    the reason why they wouldn't, under any circumstances, so
    assume plenty of other motives, potentially, to intervene in
    the Baltic States. The fact that you are talking about
    intervening against members of a nuclear armed alliance makes
    that--I mean, the Russian sources are very clear, they have no
    desire to provoke that, and there are certainly plenty of
    others targets that would be more desirable.
        The second issue, and I made this point very quickly
    before, and I do encourage you to take a look at my written
    remarks as well, is this issue of disposition of location, that
    even if kind of politically and psychologically the Baltic
    States may have a similar resonance to West Berlin today, they
    are in a different spot on the map. They are just a couple of
    100 kilometers away from St. Petersburg. They are, in the case
    of Lithuania, actually bordering on Kaliningrad on a heavily
    militarized Russian exclave.
        And so what that means is, there is a certain amount of
    Russian military activity we are just going to see. We are
    going to keep seeing it, and it is sort of normal that we would
    see it, because that is where Russia's population is and that
    is where their assets are.
        So I think that is why in terms of context, I think it is
    very important that we interpret Russia's actions and threats,
    not with charity, but in the context in which they are actually
    taking place and not in a sort of fear-laden fever dream kind
    of politicized context. That would be my only----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. And, Mr. Meeks. Thank you very much for
    that.
        Mr. Meeks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And let me say, Mr.
    Chairman, I am sure the committee would love to have maybe
    General Flynn or Paul Manafort come to testify, because they
    will have the opposite--you know, they will--hear their point
    of view. They may be great witnesses.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Go right ahead.
        Mr. Meeks. Well, let me jump into this, because--and maybe
    I will ask Ms. Stamp, because we started and we were talking
    about that, because over the past 2 decades, since the end of
    the Cold War, you know, we talk about what we are doing or
    what--NATO is there, but the Russians have also engaged in
    exercises and have often quadrupled, is that not correct, the
    size of the NATO forces in the region? In fact, a lot of the
    Russian exercises have--you know, you have seen over 100,000
    troops. And NATO, our Baltic allies have been--you know, they
    have been talking and telling us this for years, that it is not
    just something happening on one side, but there is a threat
    that they see right across the border, 100,000 troops
    unannounced. You know, they do this unannounced.
        So my first question is, actually, has the U.S. military
    presence in Europe increased or decreased since the end of the
    Cold War? Two, is the post-Wales response enough? And what
    happens or what do you see with reference to the comparison of
    the exercises that the Russians have been going on for the last
    few years?
        Ms. Samp. Sir, thank you for that question. I would
    describe the scale of Russian activities as an order of
    magnitude greater, that is ten times greater than anything that
    NATO and the U.S. is doing. The size of the U.S. presence in
    Europe since the end of the Cold War has decreased
    dramatically. At its height, it was about 350,000 troops. That
    would have been in the late 1980s. We are now at about 62,000
    troops. With the rotational forces that we have put in since
    2014, that number has risen by about 6,000 rotational,
    nonpermanent forces.
        And is it enough? I would argue there is more to do. I
    think we should seriously consider having at least as many
    troops in Europe now as we did in 2012.
        Mr. Meeks. Does anybody disagree, agree? Mr. Goble?
        Mr. Goble. I would--Congressman, I would like to come at
    this in a slightly different way that I think speaks to that. I
    think we are wrong to both operate on a model that the Cold War
    has been restored and that the Cold War is over. The one
    implies that we are going back to a status quo ante of 1991,
    and therefore, we need to respond as we did then. The other is
    to imply that when you don't have a Cold War, the only possible
    default setting is cooperation, peace, happiness, and niceness
    with people. History suggests otherwise. There are competitions
    between countries.
        I have tried to say in my testimony, perhaps not very well,
    I tried--it is clear in my written remarks, I think this is--
    that we need to address what Russia is doing less in terms of a
    military threat than in terms of the other kinds of threats it
    poses: Using subversive measures, using massive amounts of
    money. I would be far happier to learn that we were investing
    in more cyber attacks--counter cyber attack centers, that we
    were investing in more transparency in banking systems,
    especially, I would say, in the three Baltic countries, in
    Latvia, where the banks have been used as a major money
    laundering enterprise for Russian oligarchs, than to talk
    immediately about more troops anywhere. That is what I believe.
        Mr. Meeks. Let me ask this question, because I think in
    your written testimony, you do talk about the fact that you
    think the lines of communication between the Kremlin and the
    Baltic States should increase or they should be there.
        Mr. Goble. Absolutely.
        Mr. Meeks. Now, given the subversions that you are saying
    is taking place, and given that, you know, we are seeing it and
    feeling it, you know, from the hearings we just had right here
    in the United States----
        Mr. Goble. Right.
        Mr. Meeks [continuing]. As to some things with reference to
    Russia trying to get involved in our politics and democracy, do
    you think that, you know, that the suppression that Mr. Putin
    obviously has at home against the media, et cetera, and then
    the subversion that he is trying to do in other countries, will
    that ever change under Mr. Putin's leadership?
        Mr. Goble. Congressman, the good news is Vladimir Putin
    will not live forever. That is the really best news I can tell
    you from this region. Moreover, Mr. Putin has changed his own
    approach domestically and in foreign policy terms several times
    since he came to--he was installed in power at the end of 1999.
        Encouraging conversations has at least three effects, all
    of which are positive: First, if the Baltic countries show
    themselves willing to have such conversations and the Russians
    refuse to do so, the onus of not talking is clearly
    demonstrated; second, the notion that people in the Baltic
    countries are interested in talking--in having conversations
    with their Russian counterparts can be an important conduit of
    information and influence into the Russian Federation; and
    third, and this week--you know, this is something when I was
    working on Baltic affairs at the State Department 25 years ago,
    while the President of Estonia at one point famously said he
    would rather have Canada for a neighbor and that he wished
    there was a very large ocean between himself and the Russian
    Federation, the reality is that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
    are going to be Russia's neighbors for a very long time.
        Now, one would like that relationship to be such that
    Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians will make the choices
    about what they will do rather than those choices being made in
    Moscow. And that is what this is about. But the best way to do
    that, in my mind, as I said in my written testimony, is for us
    to be promoting those kinds of transparency changes
    domestically that limit the ability of Moscow to engage in the
    subversive activities which it has been doing consistently
    since 1991.
        Mr. Meeks. Let me do this. We have a vote that is up, and I
    know my colleague may have a question. And I did want to ask
    Mr. Lucas one other question. I think that the chairman had
    made a statement, and it is important for me to know also.
        The benefits, you know, can you tell us a little bit what
    the benefits have been for the Baltic States to continue to be
    in the EU membership? And has the EU supported their liberty
    and independence in face of the aggression of Russia? And is
    there any difference--you know, and I think you being--you
    know, Mr. Rohrabacher indicated because of your accent, of
    course, and England, is there any difference of what you see
    the difference now with Brexit and NATO and the EU, and your
    opinion on that?
        Mr. Lucas. Thank you for the question. I am strongly
    against Brexit and I think it was a bad mistake by my country,
    but the position of the Baltic States is very different. There
    is overwhelming support for the EU in all three countries, and
    the benefits have been colossal, chiefly in the integration
    into decisionmaking, because in this rules-based format, small
    countries get a voice. This is not the Europe of the 19th
    century where the big countries do the deals that they can and
    the small countries accept the outcomes that they must.
        We have people in the Baltic States in really senior
    positions, and making a difference, in the EU's decisionmaking.
    Very large sums of money have flown into the Baltic States, and
    the infrastructure has been transformed by EU money. The people
    in the Baltic States have the right to live and work and travel
    all through the European Union as European EU citizens. This is
    extremely popular in the Baltic States. And I think one
    shouldn't read too into British thing wnhich is very specific
    and very, very different.
        I just wanted to relate to one other point. You were asking
    about why there are no examples of military aggression in the
    Baltic States. Well, that is because NATO works, Chairman
    Rohrabacher. And if there had been military aggression in the
    Baltic States since 2004, we would have responded in military
    terms and----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Excuse me. Can you repeat that?
        Mr. Lucas. Sir, I was just saying you were asking why there
    were no examples of military aggression in the Baltic States.
    That is because NATO works. You know, Russia tries other stuff,
    and my fellow panelists referred to some of the examples, and I
    could give many more. But we have drawn a red line in the
    Baltics, and that is a good thing, and everybody is therefore
    better off as a result, not least the Russians.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
        We didn't have a big enough panel here. We didn't have
    anybody on the panel here to offer the other arguments. I am
    just going to have a very short closing statement and then I am
    going to have to run off and vote. We have a vote on right now.
    I am sorry we couldn't let this go on for another \1/2\ hour
    and have a better exchange.
        Look, I fought in Afghanistan against Russian troops. All
    right? I was a speech writer for President Reagan for 7\1/2\
    years. One of the things my friend quoted was something I had
    worked on with President Reagan.
        Let me note, I just think there is a mind-set, and it is
    represented right here on the panel. I am sorry, I am going to
    be very frank with you, that we are dealing with the Soviet
    Union now, except maybe for the gentleman on the end, but this
    is not the threat that we faced. If the Russians were doing to
    us, what we are doing to them. Our manned bombers heading
    straight into Moscow and St. Petersburg. No, it is not
    justified. It is provocative and it is hostile.
        And the fact is that our Baltic friends, they don't even
    feel threatened enough to spend money for their own defense. So
    what does that tell you? That tells you that we have got people
    here, as well as there, that have a motive, in that they hate
    the Russians. All right? Not all the Baltic people hate the
    Russians, but there is hatred there for a just reason.
        While the Russians controlled the Baltics, they murdered
    millions of people. And Russians were in Eastern Europe, and
    they murdered millions of people. And, yes, that is because
    they were there when it was communism. It was communism that
    motivated that occupation. It was communism that motivated
    Russians to go in different places in the world to try to
    supplant democratic governments with atheist dictatorships. It
    was communism; it wasn't the Russian people. And I will just
    have to say that the current Russian Government is flawed
    dramatically, we all know that, but it is not the Communist
    government that existed before.
        Just this thing, I guess there was no other major cyber
    attacks that basically were able to cripple a country, except
    for the one in Estonia. I asked that. So I guess, as far back
    as 2007, we are going to start using that as an example of
    hostility today. The people in the Baltics don't think they are
    under military threat, because they don't even spend their own
    allocation for their own defense.
        And, finally, let me just say that when I look at Russia, I
    would hope that we do not judge other countries differently
    than we judge our own. And I will have to say that the United
    States has military forces all over the world today, and in
    some cases we are places that we shouldn't be. And sometimes it
    is greatly important for our national security, but the idea
    that when a Russian spy ship comes down our coast, that we all
    go crazy about it and start saying this is provocative, which
    is what I heard in the news, but it doesn't make any difference
    about us having our warships, some of which can carry nuclear
    warheads, right up next to the Russian coast.
        These double standards, we got. All I am saying is let's
    build a more peaceful world by at least dealing with the people
    who control Russia today, and try to reach an understanding,
    what is in your interest and what is in our interest. And
    today, we are acting in a very belligerent way as if, no, no,
    you don't have the right to do things in your own interest and
    to have a military exercise in your own country. We are
    comparing us having nuclear weapons delivery systems and
    thousands of troops right on the Russian border, we are saying,
    well, no, that is not aggression, but 300,000 troops inside
    Russia itself, its own country, that is aggression? This is
    nonsense, and we have got to, if we are going to have peace in
    this world, be realistic and we have to say to ourselves, how
    do we do this?
        And it is not giving up territory. Nobody is talking about
    giving up the Baltics. But let's not say over and over again,
    which I have heard, the Russian aggression in the Baltics. I
    have heard that expression, military aggression in the Baltics,
    dozens, if not 30 or 40 times used to justify a hostile foreign
    policy toward Russia. And I will tell you, nothing that I have
    heard today justifies that phrase being used: Russian military
    aggression in the Baltics.
        So with that said, I want to thank our panel. I am sorry
    that I was able to do this tirade at the end. I really wanted
    it to be an exchange where you could refute me, and back and
    forth, because that is what we are supposed to have here, but I
    have to go vote and my friend has to go vote as well.
        I want to thank you very much. And thank you for putting up
    with me venting at the very last minute without your chance to
    retort. But if you would like to put in the record a retort, we
    will do it. Okay? Thank you all very much.
        [Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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