    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 115-11]

             MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE REQUIREMENTS

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 MARCH 8, 2017

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                                    __________

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                         One Hundred Fifteenth Congress

                 WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman

    WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      ADAM SMITH, Washington
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia          JACKIE SPEIER, California
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
    PAUL COOK, California                SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
    BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio               CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
    BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama               JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
    MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona              ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
    STEPHEN KNIGHT, California           STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
    STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma              RO KHANNA, California
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
    RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana         THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
    TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             (Vacancy)
    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
    MATT GAETZ, Florida
    DON BACON, Nebraska
    JIM BANKS, Indiana
    LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming

                      Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
                     Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
                             Leonor Tomero, Counsel
                               Mike Gancio, Clerk

                                 C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
      Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     2
    Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
      Chairman, Committee on Armed Services..........................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command......     5
    Moran, ADM William F., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.......     6
    Selva, Gen Paul J., USAF, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff...     3
    Wilson, Gen Stephen W., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air
      Force..........................................................     7

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Hyten, Gen John E............................................    59
        Moran, ADM William F.........................................    68
        Selva, Gen Paul J............................................    52
        Smith, Hon. Adam.............................................    49
        Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''..........................    47
        Wilson, Gen Stephen W........................................    74

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Cooper...................................................    92
        Ms. Hanabusa.................................................   100
        Mr. Rogers...................................................    93
        Ms. Rosen....................................................   103
        Mr. Smith....................................................    91
        Ms. Speier...................................................    99
        Dr. Wenstrup.................................................   101

               MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE REQUIREMENTS

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                              Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 8, 2017.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
    Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
                                SERVICES

        The Chairman. Committee will come to order.
        The Nation's strategic deterrent is the foundation upon
    which all our defense efforts are built. We simply cannot allow
    it to weaken or to crack, and yet we have neglected it for some
    time while other nations have not only invested in their
    nuclear systems but advanced their capability.
        Our strategic deterrent consists of the delivery systems,
    the three legs of the triad, and also the nuclear weapons
    themselves and the command and control over those systems.
        Our Minuteman III missiles were first fielded in 1970; our
    B-52 and B-2 bombers were first deployed in the 1950s and the
    1980s; our ballistic missile submarines began entering service
    in 1981 and, like the other legs of the triad, have a limited
    lifespan. The warheads themselves were largely designed and
    built in the 1970s or before, and the last time a warhead was
    fully tested was 1991.
        And so, for some years some of our most brilliant
    scientists and engineers have been working to keep these
    complex machines safe, secure, reliable, and credible without
    being able to test the entire weapon. They have done so in
    aging, neglected facilities with an aging workforce.
        Similarly, the command and control systems for our
    deterrent have not received the attention something so vital
    should have received. And meanwhile, our potential adversaries
    develop and field new delivery systems and they develop and
    field new weapons. And confidence in the U.S. strategic
    deterrent erodes.
        I am sure all of you have noticed articles over the last
    few days which reported that Europe was considering developing
    their own nuclear deterrent if they can no longer count on
    ours. The same may well be true in Asia, as well.
        Some say we cannot afford to update this part of our
    defenses, but depending on how one allocates the cost of the
    new bomber, operating, sustaining, and updating our strategic
    deterrent never requires more than 6 to 7 percent of our
    defense budget.
        As former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and others have
    pointed out, this is affordable because it is our highest
    priority defense mission. Contemplating a world without a
    reliable strategic deterrent is a nightmare the modern world
    has never had to face, and I hope it never does.
        The committee has a number of events over the course of
    this week focusing on this topic of strategic deterrence. Today
    we are grateful to have several of our top military leaders to
    help us consider what our strategic deterrent means for
    American national security.
        Now, it may well be that members have some policy questions
    which uniformed military members are not able to answer. As you
    know we are--do not yet have people in place in the new
    administration to answer some of those questions. But they are
    here to talk about the military implications of our strategic
    deterrent.
        This hearing and the committee's broader series on nuclear
    deterrence will remind us, the American people, our allies, and
    potential adversaries that the U.S. strategic deterrent must
    always be credible and must always be ready.
        Before turning to our witnesses, I would yield to the
    ranking member for any comments that he would like to make.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
    the Appendix on page 47.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
              RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you having
    this hearing. I appreciate the focus on our nuclear weapons
    deterrent for this week. I think it is incredibly important.
        And the chairman is correct, it is a series of aging
    systems that need to be replaced, and we need to think about
    what our long-term nuclear strategy is.
        The concern that I have, we absolutely have to have a
    nuclear deterrent because, unfortunately, there other
    countries--and hostile countries like Russia, North Korea--that
    have nuclear weapons. We have to have enough of a deterrent to
    make sure that they never use them because they know that it
    would lead to their own destruction because of the size of our
    deterrent.
        My questions as we go forward is whether or not we need as
    many nuclear weapons as we have had to present that deterrent.
        I have always pointed out that China has a very
    straightforward deterrent. They don't have anywhere near as
    many nuclear weapons as we do, but they have got enough. And if
    anybody challenges them, they have enough weapons to obliterate
    that person if they were to use nuclear weapons.
        So I hope that as we go forward and try to figure out what
    the new nuclear deterrent needs to look like we don't imagine
    that we have to have absolutely everything, that we really look
    at it. What is a credible deterrent force?
        We are coming down, but at the peak here a year or so ago--
    it wasn't the peak--but we had well over 5,000 nuclear warheads
    and, you know, plenty of delivery systems. Is there a way that
    we can do this in a more cost-effective manner?
        And I say that because while I agree with the chairman that
    we have to have a nuclear deterrent, no question about it, we
    also have to have it fit within a budget because we have a lot
    of other priorities. When you look at what President Trump has
    said he wants, in terms of the size of the force--you know, the
    size of the Army, the size of the Marine Corps, the way we want
    to build out the Navy--at a certain point the numbers don't add
    up.
        So if there is a way to do this in a more cost-effective
    manner, I think that is something we should look at. I don't
    think we should simply say, ``Well, it is important so we are
    going to spend whatever it takes.'' I don't think we can afford
    that, and I don't think it is a credible deterrent.
        And I also want to make sure that our policy going forward
    continues to be just that, that it is a deterrent force against
    any other adversary using nuclear weapons, that we don't dive
    into some of the conversations that have happened in our
    military circles over the course of the last 30 years that
    somehow we can use, quote, ``tactical'' nuclear weapons on a
    first-use basis. I think we should maintain our policy of not
    using them first and using them as a credible deterrent. And I
    worry that some of the discussions have moved us in that
    direction.
        Now, I am aware that Russia has changed its tone on that
    and there is cause for worry about how they view the use of
    nuclear weapons. And that is the last point I will make:
    Credible deterrent is not just about how many nuclear weapons
    you have, but it is also about maintaining an open dialogue
    with as many of those adversaries as possible to make sure that
    they know about that credible deterrent and that discourages
    them.
        This is not just a military issue; it is diplomatic as
    well, to make sure that we keep open those channels so there
    are not misunderstandings about what our nuclear deterrent is
    and what we are prepared to do with it. We certainly don't want
    a country like Russia to start thinking that they can do a
    first-use nuclear weapon attack and get away with it.
        So with that, I look forward to testimony and the
    questions, and I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
    Appendix on page 49.]
        The Chairman. Let me welcome our distinguished witnesses
    today.
        We have the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    General Paul Selva; we have the Commander of U.S. Strategic
    Command, General John Hyten; Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
    Admiral Bill Moran; and Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air
    Force, General Stephen Wilson.
        Without objection, your full written statements will be
    made part of the record. Again, thank each of you for being
    here.
        General Selva, the floor is yours for any comments you
    would like to make.

      STATEMENT OF GEN PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT
                            CHIEFS OF STAFF

        General Selva. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry and Ranking
    Member Smith and members of the committee.
        Thanks for the opportunity to testify on the continuing
    relevance of our U.S. nuclear forces for our national security,
    the considerations that are influencing the size and shape of
    those forces, and the steps the joint force is taking to
    modernize or replace them. Given the gravity of these issues, I
    deeply appreciate the committee's interest, attention, and
    oversight.
        With the President's recently directed Nuclear Posture
    Review to assess the existing nuclear policy, and through many
    details regarding U.S. nuclear capabilities and employment
    concepts, these are all highly sensitive. Although they are, I
    look forward to your questions in this public forum and my
    ability to answer them as appropriate.
        As you know, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is
    to deter nuclear use against the United States, its allies, and
    partners. Simply put, nuclear weapons pose the only existential
    threat to the United States and there is no substitute for the
    prospect of a devastating nuclear response to deter that
    threat.
        Our nuclear forces play important roles as well, to include
    reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation and contributing to
    the deterrence of large-scale conventional war.
        These are longstanding objectives that have served U.S.
    national interests, but our ability to achieve them cannot be
    taken for granted. No one should doubt that our weapons, our
    delivery systems, the infrastructure that supports them, and
    the personnel who operate, monitor, and maintain them, are
    prepared to respond to any contingency.
        Our current challenge, however, is to maintain this high
    level of readiness and capability as long as the policy and
    strategy of this Nation depends in part on nuclear weapons for
    its security. This hearing comes at a critical moment in
    meeting that challenge.
        For more than two decades, the joint force has implemented
    a U.S. policy that calls for the reduction of the role of
    nuclear weapons and forces and our strategies and plans to
    decrease the number and types of those nuclear forces in our
    inventory. Yet a number of nations, including potential nuclear
    adversaries, have not followed our example.
        They instead are increasing their reliance on nuclear
    weapons, improving their nuclear capabilities, and in some
    cases expanding their nuclear arsenals.
        Our nuclear deterrent, as has already been stated, is
    nearing a crossroads. To date, we have preserved this deterrent
    by extending the lifespan of legacy nuclear forces and
    infrastructure, in many cases for decades beyond what was
    originally intended. But these systems will not remain viable
    forever.
        In fact, we are now at a point where we must concurrently
    recapitalize each component of our nuclear deterrent: the
    nuclear weapons themselves, the triad of strategic delivery
    platforms, the indications and warning systems that support our
    decision processes, the command-and-control networks that
    connect the President to our fielded forces, and our dual-
    capable tactical aircraft that can be equipped with
    nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
        Our joint force's ability to preserve these capabilities
    beyond their intended lifespan is indeed a technical
    achievement. However, nuclear modernization can no longer be
    deferred.
        Any disruption in the current program of record for future
    acquisition plans will introduce the risk--significant risk to
    our deterrent. As a result of previous delays and deferrals,
    all well considered, we are currently depending on just-in-time
    modernization and replacement of many of the components of our
    nuclear triad.
        The cost of these efforts is substantial. Even at their
    peak, however, they will still represent less than 1 percent of
    anticipated Federal spending and approximately 6 percent of the
    defense budget.
        Moreover, there is no higher priority for the joint force
    than fielding all of the components of an effective nuclear
    deterrent, and we are emphasizing the nuclear mission over all
    other modernization programs when faced with that choice.
        Mr. Chairman, I appreciate accepting my written statement
    into the record and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Selva can be found in
    the Appendix on page 52.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        General Hyten.

    STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC
                                COMMAND

        General Hyten. Good morning, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking
    Member Smith, members of the committee.
        On behalf of the men and women of United States Strategic
    Command [STRATCOM], I would like to echo the thanks of the vice
    chairman and express our appreciation for the committee's
    continued support for the nuclear mission. I look forward to
    build upon this relationship on our shared objective of
    protecting the Nation.
        Our mission at United States Strategic Command is to employ
    tailored nuclear, space, cyberspace, global strike, joint
    electronic warfare, missile defense, and intelligence
    capabilities. We deter aggression, decisively respond if
    deterrence fails, assure allies, shape adversary behavior,
    defeat terror, and define the force of the future.
        Let there be no doubt, we have a safe, secure, reliable
    nuclear enterprise today, and our nuclear forces are ready to
    meet any challenge.
        Nonetheless, much work is needed to make sure that this is
    the case as we look out into the coming decades. At STRATCOM
    peace is our profession, and one of the ways it is achieved is
    through strategic deterrence. That mission has been the bedrock
    of our national security for decades now. It is foundational.
        As such, I have three priorities in my command.
        My number one priority is to provide that strategic
    deterrence against any potential adversary. Our operations are
    ceaseless, deliberate, and enabled by a commitment to execute
    and modernize our C2 [command and control] and nuclear
    enterprise, which will enable us to meet the demands of the
    current and future strategic environment.
        My second priority is to account for a deterrence failure,
    in which this Nation will count on us for a decisive response.
    That response must defeat any adversary with our nuclear,
    space, cyberspace, missile defense, and other strategic
    capabilities.
        Neither strategic deterrence nor decisive response will
    function, however, without a resilient, equipped, trained, and
    combat-ready force, which is my final priority.
        Our fight is continuous, each and every day, across and
    around the globe. This requires our forces to have depth in
    capability and breadth in capacity.
        We cannot do it alone. We must constantly challenge
    ourselves to integrate with allies, partners, the
    interagencies, the Department, the Joint Staff, and other
    commands to ensure we capitalize on the unique capabilities
    that STRATCOM can bring to bear.
        Today's deterrent force remains safe, secure, reliable, and
    ready. However, the United States faces significant future
    challenges in sustaining the required capabilities to meet our
    enduring national security objectives and the extended
    deterrence commitments we have around the world.
        At a time when others continue to modernize and upgrade
    their nuclear forces, nearly all elements of the nuclear weapon
    stockpile, our delivery systems, our other critical
    infrastructure are operating well beyond their designed service
    life.
        Maintaining strategic deterrence, assurance, and escalation
    control capabilities requires a multifaceted long-term
    investment approach and a sustained commitment to maintain a
    credible nuclear deterrent. That nuclear deterrent is only as
    effective as the command and control that enables it to
    function. Therefore, our nuclear command and control
    communication systems, NC3, must be assured, reliable, and
    resilient across the full spectrum of conflict.
        Maintaining a credible deterrent requires sustainment and
    modernizations of key systems and capabilities throughout the
    architecture. The unpredictable challenges posed by today's
    multi-domain, multi-threat security environment make it
    increasingly important to optimize our legacy NC3 systems and
    leverage new technologies and capabilities. Through continuing
    funding for NC3 modernization we can ensure effective command
    and control for these forces well into the future.
        So I look forward to participating in the hearing today and
    the
    administration's recently announced Nuclear Posture Review,
    which
    will address many of the issues we will discuss.
        And I thank the committee again for your support. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Hyten can be found in
    the Appendix on page 59.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral Moran.

      STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM F. MORAN, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
                               OPERATIONS

        Admiral Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
    opportunity to be here this morning, and I echo the comments by
    both General Selva and General Hyten.
        And I am extremely proud to represent the men and women who
    man, operate, and maintain our strategic ballistic submarine
    force. And I look forward to your questions, thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Moran can be found in
    the Appendix on page 68.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        General Wilson.

     STATEMENT OF GEN STEPHEN W. WILSON, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
                            OF THE AIR FORCE

        General Wilson. Chairman, the same. I look forward to any
    questions from the members here today. I represent the United
    States Air Force, that provides two-thirds of the Nation's
    triad and three-fourths of the nuclear command and control
    communications. We stand ready to answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Wilson can be found in
    the Appendix on page 74.]
        The Chairman. Well, thank you all.
        General Selva, yesterday I had the opportunity to tour Fort
    Campbell. It just reminds me that we have a lot of needs in
    this military, and--but did I hear you correctly, that there is
    no higher priority for the joint force than modernizing this
    part of our defense effort, our strategic deterrence?
        General Selva. Mr. Chairman, we in the joint force put our
    nuclear deterrent as the number one priority for modernization
    and recapitalization.
        I would make two quick points.
        One, we have made several--and I have referred to them as
    considered decisions over the last decade to defer some of the
    modernization of that force in order to address urgent needs
    while still maintaining a safe, reliable, and secure arsenal
    and delivery capability. But in making those decisions we have
    squeezed about all the life we can out of the systems we
    currently possess, and so that places an extra premium on a
    very deliberate long-term investment strategy to replace those
    systems as the existing systems age out of the inventory.
        And that is the reason we use the terminology we place it
    as our number one priority. There is an urgency in terms of
    time and in terms of stable long-term investment in order to be
    able to deliver this capability.
        The Chairman. Okay. Let me just ask one other question for
    either you or General Hyten to comment on.
        A couple weeks there--ago there was an article by Peter
    Huessy, who is president of GeoStrategic Analysis and guest
    lecturer at the U.S. Naval Academy. Among other things he
    writes in this letter is that early in the next decade, around
    2020 or 2021, Russia will have modernized close to 100 percent
    of its bombers, land-based missiles, and submarines.
        And China will, by the end of the next decade, have a fully
    modernized and expanded nuclear deterrent with mobile ICBMs
    [intercontinental ballistic missiles], a new missile-armed
    submarine, and long-range cruise missiles. New data now
    indicates that China can build a thousand new nuclear warheads
    quite rapidly. If the U.S. stays on its current projected
    course we will, at best, fully modernize our nuclear deterrent
    by the mid-2030s, some two decades hence.
        He then goes on to say we are at about 10 percent of a
    number of warheads where we were at one time and talks about
    Russia's tactical nuclear weapons.
        I am not asking you all to comment on the accuracy of
    information that may be, and probably is, classified. But I am
    asking relative to other nations, are they gaining in
    capability faster than we are? Where is the momentum here?
    Because if you--if he is in the ballpark of being right, that
    Russia will have modernized everything in a handful of years
    and at best we are two decades after that, it looks to me like
    we are behind in this race.
        General Selva. Chairman, thanks for the question.
        There are two dynamics that are at play here. One is Russia
    has been and continues to modernize their nuclear force, and
    China continues to modernize and grow their nuclear force.
    Those are facts. We don't have to go to intelligence to
    determine those.
        Having said that, the path that we have chosen to modernize
    and replace our existing nuclear arsenal, particularly the
    delivery systems, the indications and warning, and command and
    control, potentially puts us in a position not only to keep
    up--because we do have a qualitative advantage at this point--
    but to capitalize on that advantage over time by continuing to
    have a triad that gives us a ballistic missile force that
    confounds Russian and Chinese targeting; a bomber force that is
    resilient enough and capable enough to penetrate enemy air
    defenses and respond to a nuclear attack; and a survivable
    portion of that triad, in the case of our strategic ballistic
    missile submarines, that gives us an ability to respond even if
    an adversary were to believe that they could execute a
    decapitating attack on our nuclear capability.
        So it is our strategy going forward to continue to
    modernize all three legs of the triad in order to continue to
    pose unsurvivable targeting challenges to adversaries that
    match us in number and very close to match us in quality to the
    delivery systems themselves.
        The Chairman. Okay. General Hyten, you want to add
    anything?
        General Hyten. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think the only thing I will add is that the key to a
    nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, reliable, and ready. It has
    to be able to work.
        Now, I think the vice chairman used the term ``just-in-time
    delivery,'' so if you look at all of the elements, each
    element, leg of the triad--our nuclear weapon system, our
    nuclear command--and you put them all on a table, they all
    deliver in just in time. And that is the risks that we have to
    make sure we monitor.
        Because the forces that we have, the forces that we are
    projected to have in our budget, will provide that nuclear
    deterrent without a doubt as long as we can modernize according
    to that schedule. If those schedules slip, though, that is when
    we put risk in the system.
        The Chairman. So back to what General Selva said at the
    beginning, we have no room for error here in getting this done
    because we have stretched things as far as we can.
        General Hyten. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. Okay.
        Mr. O'Rourke.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        For General Selva, I would like you to talk a little bit
    about the long-range standoff capability for which you
    advocate. Talk about where it is in your priorities, what it
    gains the United States. And I would also like you to address
    some of the concerns raised about unintended consequences and,
    you know, things that we may want to know in terms of the total
    cost of ownership of these strategically, in terms of what our
    adversaries or potential adversaries will interpret by that and
    what that may invite from them.
        General Selva. Thank you, sir.
        Several quick points. First of all, the long-range strike
    system is integral to extending the life and utility of our
    current bomber fleet, and it also increases the number of
    options for the use of our future bomber fleet.
        In this respect, the missile itself imposes a cost on any
    potential nuclear adversary because in addition to modernizing
    their nuclear arsenal, they also have to modernize their air
    defense arsenals. This is a strategy that we used in the 1980s
    when we widely deployed the air-launched cruise missiles into
    our B-52 inventory.
        We believe that over the course of time, to keep the B-52
    viable and buy us enough time to deploy the B-21, we have to
    have a long-range standoff weapon in our inventory that poses a
    challenge to increasingly sophisticated air defense systems in
    any one of the potential adversary nations that we might face.
    And so in that respect, the missile itself is an integral part
    of our modernization and replacement strategy.
        There are those who say that long-range standoff strike
    capabilities are inherently destabilizing. I disagree with that
    particular point for two reasons.
        One, it ignores the fact of deployment of those same
    systems by our adversaries. If you look at Russian deployments
    in their bomber force, they are largely composed of long-range
    standoff air-launched cruise missiles launched from what we
    would consider relatively old legacy bomber platforms. That is
    a challenge we are going to have to face and they are going to
    have to face.
        The second reason I think it is something we must introduce
    into our arsenal is if we don't have that capability in our
    arsenal, negotiating it out as a type and class of weapon over
    time becomes increasingly unlikely. So the places we have had
    success in negotiating types and classes of weapons out of
    adversary nuclear arsenals in our strategic arms reductions
    talks has been when we possess a similar capability that poses
    a tactical, operational, and strategic problems for our
    adversaries.
        So I am very concerned that the open debate about
    abandoning the system in the interest of cost actually puts us
    at a strategic disadvantage over the length of time.
        Mr. O'Rourke. So there is the argument on cost. You
    referenced the argument that it may destabilize or introduce
    some ambiguity that could be--that could turn out badly for
    both sides. And your response to that seems to be that our
    adversaries have this capability, and it wouldn't be
    responsible for us not to match that.
        Would you then say if our adversaries did not have this
    capability the United States would not seek to introduce it?
        General Selva. I think I would say that we should take that
    to the table and negotiate it in a bilateral, verifiable way so
    that we don't give up the option and the strategic leverage
    that we have in the existence of the system a priori.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Couple of administrative notes.
        We have obviously a lot of member interest. We need to try
    to just stay within the 5 minutes.
        Secondly, if--when you all answer questions, if you would
    talk directly into the microphone. Sometimes it is hard to hear
    back here and that would help us.
        Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you for being here today.
        I am very grateful to represent the Savannah River Site,
    where multiple generations have been dedicated to promoting
    peace through strength by building our nuclear weapons
    capability. In fact, the staff and workers there have made, I
    think, a positive difference, as General Hyten has cited,
    protecting the Nation.
        And so it really is very meaningful to me that you are here
    today and your success that we want to continue.
        General Selva, over the course of the past 8 years the
    military has contributed to detailed efforts to examine various
    options for changing the structure of the U.S. nuclear forces.
    We know from a GAO [Government Accountability Office] study and
    review of these efforts that the Obama administration examined
    big changes, like eliminating one or more of the legs of the
    triad. After these reviews, President Obama ultimately
    concluded to retain the triad and continue pursuing the nuclear
    modernization plans laid out by his administration.
        Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services recommend
    and support the decision to retain the triad, and what was the
    reasoning?
        General Selva. Congressman, in advance of the consultations
    with President Obama's administration on the status and
    potential options for how to manage the triad the Joint Chiefs
    did meet. We did affirm the necessity to maintain a triad,
    largely for the reasons that I have already pointed out about
    managing the strategic risk not only with Russia as a potential
    adversary, but China as a potential nuclear adversary, with an
    increasingly aggressive North Korea and his pursuit of nuclear
    weapons, and based on the fact of JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive
    Plan of Action], that we have forestalled an Iranian entry into
    the nuclear arena but have not completely stopped it for the
    future.
        So based on the collection of potential threats and
    adversaries that exist in the world, the Joint Chiefs
    affirmed--pardon me--the necessity to maintain a triad and to
    modernize the weapon systems, the indications of warning, and
    the command and control associated with that triad.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I am grateful for
    President Obama's decision, although you referenced Iran, and I
    am so concerned about the continuing development of missile
    capability, ICBMs. Sadly, that can only be used for the purpose
    of, in my view, delivery of a nuclear weapon and a threat to
    the American people.
        General Hyten, we sometimes hear arguments that the triad
    has too much redundancy, that it will not intentionally--it is
    not intentionally designed, it is more by accident and grew up
    into what it is today. Do you believe we should retain and
    modernize the full triad? And additionally, what reasoning do
    you have on this?
        General Hyten. So, I believe we should retain and modernize
    the triad, Congressman, absolutely. I believe that is
    fundamental to deterrence.
        In order to deter you have to have a capability that
    provides the adversary a calculus that he looks at and decides
    that his options will fail. If the adversary has capabilities
    to operate from the sea, from the land, from the air, then we
    have to be able to deter in all those elements. That is how the
    triad was developed and that is how we need to go.
        And I will just end with the fundamental statement that I
    am fundamentally opposed to unilateral disarmament because that
    fundamentally changes the deterrent equation. In deterrence,
    parity--rough parity--is actually a good thing, not a bad
    thing, because that causes the adversary to pause when they are
    about to make a decision.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I agree with your
    analysis just there of peace through strength. Thank you very
    much.
        And, both General Selva and General Hyten, what are your
    view of the concerns that we are launching a new nuclear arms
    race with Russia by pursuing the nuclear modernization program?
        General Selva. Congressman, I would suggest that we are not
    entering an arms race because we bilaterally have a verifiable
    inspection regime for the weapons that are deployed; we have
    capped the number of weapons that are available. What we are
    doing in this modernization program--and I very bluntly try to
    call it a replacement program--we have to replace the systems
    that exist. We should replace them with systems that are
    viable.
        The Russians understand that is what we are doing. They
    know it is a path we are on.
        So we have a bilateral, mutually verifiable treaty cap at
    this point in our relationship, and I think that keeps us from
    entering an arms race.
        General Hyten. Congressman, I agree with the vice chairman.
    We have numbers of our force: 400 ICBMs, 240 SLBMs [submarine-
    launched ballistic missiles], 60 bombers, 1,550 accountable
    warheads. Those are defined numbers that we have to meet.
        So we are not racing to increase that number; we are not
    racing to beat that number. We are working hard to make sure we
    can maintain that.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you very much.
        The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
    very much for joining us here today.
        General, I was wondering--General Selva, I was wondering if
    you could talk about the Russian compliance with the
    Intermediate [Range] Nuclear Forces Treaty. There have been
    some concerns expressed in the press that they have not been
    complying. I would like to know what your view is on that
    situation.
        General Selva. We believe that the Russians have deployed--
    pardon me--a land-based cruise missile that violates the spirit
    and intent of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. We have
    conferred with the Russians in a bilateral consultation
    committee that exists underneath the New START [Strategic Arms
    Reduction] Treaty in order to confront them on that deployment,
    and we will continue to do so.
        The system itself presents a risk to most of our facilities
    in Europe, and we believe that the Russians have deliberately
    deployed it in order to pose a threat to NATO [North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization] and to facilities within the NATO area of
    responsibility.
        Mr. Moulton. If those discussions do not bear fruit, what
    is the next step? What is the administration's plan to deal
    with what seems like a flagrant violation of a treaty?
        General Selva. We have been asked to incorporate a set of
    options into the Nuclear Posture Review, so it would be
    premature for me to comment on what the potential options might
    be for the administration to respond.
        Mr. Moulton. Okay. It seems that this is part of a broader
    move of Russian aggression throughout Europe and against NATO.
    One of things that concerns me is that as Russia continues to
    threaten the Baltic States, may not be deterred from further
    action in places like Ukraine, that a conventional conflict
    could escalate to the point where it becomes nuclear.
        What is the U.S. doing to make sure that that doesn't
    happen, that Russia never crosses a threshold into using
    tactical nuclear weapons in a theater like Eastern Europe?
        General Selva. Congressman, never is a fairly absolute
    word, but our strategy in Europe is to maintain an inventory of
    nonstrategic nuclear weapons that are in the hands of both the
    United States and our NATO allies. They are operated on a
    category of aircraft we call dual-capable aircraft, where the
    aircraft are designed to actually accommodate the use of
    nuclear weapons.
        Those aircraft are distributed in a very deliberate
    readiness process between U.S. forces and our NATO allies, and
    we believe that that capability poses a significant risk to
    Russia and, therefore, it helps deter Russia from employing
    nuclear weapons on the European continent.
        Mr. Moulton. General, I would hazard to say that using the
    word ``never'' is not going too far when we are talking about
    the existential threat of----
        General Selva. No, sir, I am not----
        Mr. Moulton [continuing]. Nuclear weapons.
        General Selva [continuing]. Not suggesting it is too far.
    It is just such an absolute word I avoid it.
        Mr. Moulton. Fair enough. What kinds of doctrine changes
    are we contemplating in the face of what appear to be doctrine
    changes on the side of the Soviet--of the Russians?
        General Selva. Sir, we have begun an investigation of a
    series of potential strategy changes, many of which will have
    to be incorporated into the Nuclear Posture Review. As you
    recall, in the prior administration we looked to limit the
    potential use and utility of nuclear weapons in any scenario
    with an eye towards reducing the numbers to a much smaller
    inventory than we have today--a noble goal, to be sure.
        One of the things that happened in the context of that
    conversation is our adversaries started to articulate a
    doctrine of escalation to deescalate. And we have to account
    for in our nuclear doctrine what that means and what the ladder
    of strategic stability implies as we look at an adversary that
    expresses in their rhetoric a willingness to use nuclear
    weapons where they may or may not actually be exercising the
    operational capability to do so.
        So we are going to have to get to the bottom of what that
    means. We have done several war games and exercises over the
    last couple of years. We are not done with that process but
    this will be part of the Nuclear Posture Review.
        Mr. Moulton. General, I think you will find bipartisan
    support in this committee for making sure that we have an
    effective nuclear deterrent. But at the end of the day, I think
    you would also find bipartisan support for working towards
    strategic arms reductions.
        What is the most effective thing we can do today to head
    down that path, because obviously those talks seem to be
    stalled?
        General Selva. Sir, I think there are two things we can do
    from a military perspective.
        The first is maintain a safe, secure, reliable, and ready
    nuclear arsenal and project to the public and to our
    adversaries that we take this incredibly seriously. It is why
    it is our top priority.
        The second is also emphasize that the existence of that
    arsenal need not be absolute, that we are open to negotiations
    but they must be bilateral, they must be verifiable, and we
    have to go into this completely open to the idea that there are
    now more than just two nuclear players at a strategic level in
    the world. We must accommodate in our bilateral relationships
    with any adversary the existence of other adversaries.
        And so the inventory today grows. Russia and China present
    strategic threats to the United States if they chose to use
    their weapons, and our deterrent must be able to address both.
    If new nuclear adversaries enter the population of potential
    threats, we need to be ready to address them.
        I think if we can balance those two things in our
    discussion both publicly and privately of what the implications
    are for maintenance of an arsenal and reduction of that arsenal
    in a measured and prudent way, we can be successful.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I
    appreciate you talking today to us about what you have
    described, General Selva, as the top priority.
        General Selva and General Hyten, I would like to talk to
    you for a moment about the nuclear command and control system
    component of that top priority. The PowerPoint we have been
    given describes the command and control as enabling national
    command conferencing, attack detection, strike planning, and
    dissemination of execution messages--all incredibly important.
    It also allows the President to have uninterrupted connectivity
    with nuclear forces.
        Admiral Moran says maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent
    for the long term requires recapitalization of these key
    systems, so we know that it is essential for our concept of a
    credible deterrent.
        General Hyten, in your written testimony you say that our
    command and control system is increasingly unreliable and in
    desperate need of modernization. ``Unreliable'' and
    ``desperate'' are words that are in contrast to ``credible.''
        General Selva, you say that the ability to preserve these
    capabilities beyond their intended lifespan is a technical
    achievement, acknowledging they are already past their
    lifespan. However, nuclear modernization can no longer be
    deferred.
        Well, as we talk about the issue of deterrence I would like
    for you to describe to me some of the risks that we are facing
    by doing this, because it is not just that these might not work
    or that we can't respond if we are attacked. Doesn't it go
    right to the calculation of our adversaries as to whether or
    not we have a credible deterrent, as we have here what is an
    open hearing and we are hearing words such as ``unreliable''
    and ``desperate''? And we also don't have an ability to fix
    this tomorrow, right?
        General Selva, General Hyten, could you describe the risk
    that we are taking and the situation we are in?
        General Hyten. Congressman, I will go first.
        The nuclear command and control and communications, NC3, is
    my biggest concern when I look out towards the future. When I
    put all the modernization plans on the table I see the
    modernization plan for the submarine, for the bomber, for the
    long-range standoff munition, for the GBSD [ground-based
    strategic deterrent], I see--the new missile--I see all those
    coming together.
        When I look out at the NC3, although everything we have
    today works very effectively, but it is very resilient, robust,
    and ancient. Ancient is the concern I have because an ancient
    command and control system in today's world is very, very hard
    to recapitalize.
        Mr. Turner. And, General, doesn't that mean that our
    adversaries know that and if they are taking a calculation as
    to whether or not we can credibly respond, don't they look at
    those issues as to our decaying infrastructure?
        General Hyten. I am sure they do. I am sure they look at
    those. We look at those very hard.
        That is why it is my number one priority now inside the
    modernization piece to make sure we have a plan to modernize
    the nuclear command and control capability.
        Mr. Turner. In order to fix this--again, we can't just fix
    it tomorrow. You can't go down to Home Depot and buy a bunch of
    stuff and just plug it in and make this thing work. Let's talk
    about some of those components on the entire system.
        Could you speak about the ITW/AA system, and what if it
    doesn't do its job of providing an early warning of attack?
        General Hyten. So the integrated tactical warning and
    attack assessment system, ITW/AA, is the--it is the integrated
    architecture that basically goes all the way from indications
    and warning from our space-based constellations to our ground-
    based radars into the command and control system and provides
    the picture of any threat that would come at the United States
    of America.
        So it is exercised every time there is a launch on the
    planet, as recently as last Sunday night. We were up most of
    the night watching the North Korean launches of Scuds. Even
    though that did not present a threat to North America, we still
    exercised those same pieces.
        The satellites see the threats. If it comes into the radar
    fans the radars will see it, and then the command and control
    system works.
        But as we look at that structure and we look at it 10 years
    from now, when you have a 20th-century architecture that you
    are trying to maintain 10 years from now, 10 years from now is
    when my concern really is. It is not 2035 in the NC3
    architecture. It is much more fragile than that. That is why we
    have to take a hard look----
        Mr. Turner. If it doesn't work or if there are deficiencies
    in it, does our adversaries, again, understand that that
    relates to our ability to respond?
        General Hyten. Congressman it works. It works every time we
    pull it together.
        My concern is that we are creating fragility in the future,
    and that fragility in the future has to be addressed and it has
    to be addressed in the near term across the enterprise--that is
    in the Navy and in the Air Force.
        Mr. Turner. And can you talk about the assent system? And
    there are delays in this system that apparently we were not
    informed of, and how do we address that?
        General Selva. Congressman, all of the national command and
    control leadership communication systems have now been brought,
    with the help of this committee and the Senate Armed Services
    Committee, under the oversight of a single council in the
    Pentagon. I co-chair that council with the director of
    acquisition, technology, and logistics. It is----
        Mr. Turner. Do you believe that the services and DISA
    [Defense Information Systems Agency] should have to provide
    everything they know about delays in the system?
        General Selva. Yes, sir. And that is precisely what that
    oversight council does is it pulls all of the community of
    interest together so that we don't run the risk of looking at
    the process in ``eaches''; we actually look at it as an entire
    end-to-end set of programs that are critical to providing
    nuclear command and control and connectivity to our most senior
    leadership.
        The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
    witnesses for your testimony today, and most especially of your
    service to the Nation.
        Gentlemen, as you know, our nuclear enterprise is aging,
    and we have spoken about that several times this morning,
    obviously. And like the previous member, I had the privilege of
    chairing the Strategic Forces Subcommittee a few Congresses
    ago, and so I was able to do a deep dive on this aging nuclear
    enterprise.
        One of the things that I certainly find concerning is the
    work that our adversaries are doing in their nuclear programs,
    particularly China and Russia. And they are designing new
    delivery systems and warheads.
        And I wanted to touch on a, you know, somewhat sensitive
    but important topic, and that is our nuclear warheads that we
    have in our arsenal.
        I know we are going through the refurbishment program. I
    mean some of the components of our warheads don't even exist
    anymore. It is not easy to replace them. And some of the
    materials are not easily obtainable.
        So the question is obviously I--we are not interested in at
    all setting off an arms race, but does it make sense to
    continue to try to refurbish and make things work, or does it
    make more sense to design a more modern weapon?
        And the question, if so, what does that do in terms of does
    that endanger us of setting off an arms race? And could we
    design a new warhead without testing?
        General Selva. Sir, one of the first priorities I engaged
    in when I took this job was to partner with Frank Klotz at the
    National Nuclear Security Agency, which is the arm of DOE
    [Department of Energy] that builds and does the actual physical
    maintenance of the warheads themselves. I took a trip to both
    Livermore and Sandia and talked to the scientists who are doing
    the work of design and prototyping of those--I will use the
    words ``modernized repurposed warheads.''
        And their belief, and all of the information that they
    could present to me, is that there is sufficient life and
    resiliency left in the warheads that we currently possess that
    we can very deliberately modernize them with new technologies
    without building new warheads and essentially replicate the
    capability we have today in a safer, more secure, more
    reliable, and more resilient set of weapons without going into
    the detail of what that strategy looks like.
        So the scientists themselves--and I spent a day at each
    location quizzing them and having them demonstrate their
    beliefs, not just in showing me their conclusions but actually
    showing me the math--they are convinced, as am I, that the path
    we are on is actually a reasonable path into the near future.
        That doesn't ignore the fact that sometime in the future of
    these weapon systems we are actually going to have to replace
    the core components that still have lifetime left in them.
        General Hyten. And, Congressman, I will just add on that
    tomorrow we will have a classified session with this committee
    where we will actually bring in Frank Klotz and Charlie
    McMillan and myself, and we will sit down and we will walk
    through that entire nuclear weapons piece with you, as well as
    the threat information that we can't share in this hearing.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay, thank you.
        Admiral Moran, being from Rhode Island and as co-chair of
    the Submarine Caucus with my good friends Congressman Courtney
    and Congressman Wittman, I understand the critical importance
    placed on our SSBN force in conjunction with our nuclear
    deterrence. Showing as the most survivable leg of the triad,
    the maritime force shoulders a significant burden and the Ohio-
    class submarines has primarily borne it.
        The existing modernization projects that the Columbia-class
    submarines won't enter service until 2029 and that the Navy
    will only operate 10 SSBNs during the 2030s, reaching a full
    fleet of 12 SSBNs in 2041.
        So, Admiral, how will we sustain our nuclear deterrence
    requirements while transitioning to the Columbia-class
    submarine, and what can Congress do to ensure the future
    requirements of the Navy's nuclear submarine fleet are met?
        Admiral Moran. Congressman, thanks for the question. We
    have worked out the requirements in the 2030s with STRATCOM and
    the joint force. Clearly, what will be done with re-cores of
    Ohio here in the not too distant future, so that is a major
    draw on our total force structure, if you will.
        Then, as you indicated, in the late 2020s and early 2030s
    we start replacing Ohio with Columbia class. So we think we can
    accept that and we are going to have to maintain a ready status
    of fewer submarines during the 2030s, but working that through
    STRATCOM we believe we have enough to satisfy the requirement.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
        General Selva, for you I wanted to ask, what are the risks
    of launch on warning and what can be done to increase
    Presidential decision-making time in the midst of a crisis?
        General Selva. Thank you, Congressman.
        As you are aware, the launch-on-warning criteria basically
    are driven by physics. The amount of time the President has to
    make a decision is based on when we can detect a launch, what
    it takes to physically characterize the launch, and the entire
    scenario is predicated on an adversary that believes they can
    attack us and decapitate our intercontinental ballistic missile
    fleet without us responding.
        And so the only ways physically to buy more time for the
    President to make that decision are to increase the fidelity
    and the distribution of our radar and on-orbit detection
    systems.
        But even those criteria face the facts of physics, which
    say while you may detect the launch, it--the weapon itself must
    cross through some sort of radar detection capability in order
    to characterize the launch as an attack on the United States.
        The short answer to your question is, I don't believe the
    physics let us give him much more time. And so what we owe the
    President is a set of options ahead of time that he or she can
    consider and determine whether or not they are willing to take
    that shot, because they are not going to have the benefit of a
    long period of time to make that decision.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
        And in addition to that, obviously I have always been a big
    believer that good intelligence is always the very pointy tip
    of the spear, and the better our intelligence is the more
    standoff warning time we may have, as well. It adds to what we
    already have in place.
        So, I want to be respectful of other people's time, so with
    that I will yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the witnesses
    for being here, for your service to our country.
        In April of 2016 the State Department released its most
    recent Arms Control Compliance Report, and it found in there
    that Russia remains in violation of the Intermediate-Range
    Nuclear Forces Treaty, or the INF Treaty.
        General Selva, in your professional military view, do you
    believe that Russia intends to return to compliance with this
    treaty?
        General Selva. Congressman, I don't have enough information
    on their intent to conclude other than that they do not intend
    to return to compliance absent some pressure from the
    international community and the United States, as a cosigner of
    the same agreement. There is no trajectory in what they are
    doing that would indicate otherwise.
        Mr. Rogers. And did I hear you say earlier in this hearing
    that Russia is now deployed?
        General Selva. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. What is the military's assessment of the
    impacts of this violation?
        General Selva. Sir, our assessment of the impact is that it
    more threatens NATO and infrastructure within the European
    continent than any other part of--area of the world that we
    have national interests in or alliance interests in.
        And our intent is to factor that into the NPR [Nuclear
    Posture Review] and look for leverage points to attempt to get
    the Russians to come back into compliance. I don't know what
    those points are at this point in time.
        Mr. Rogers. Witnesses from the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy testified several times in the
    past several years that the U.S. was considering various
    responses, including active defense; two, counterforce; three,
    countervailing capabilities. What actions have been taken in
    each of these three to implement such capabilities?
        General Selva. Sir, I would like to give you a more fulsome
    answer in a classified environment, but basically it is the
    assessment of where the Russians are deploying and how they are
    deploying that system that provide for the latter option, which
    is a countervalue or counterforce option against the actual
    weapon system itself. But the balance of the capabilities I
    would have to talk to you about in a classified environment.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay.
        General Hyten and General Selva, would you please provide
    this committee before the end of the month your recommendation
    on military options based on your best professional military
    advice for options that policy makers like this committee can
    choose to support?
        General Selva. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Veasey.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I wanted to ask General--all the generals that are here
    today about the F-35's Block 4 dual-capability platform, and
    with it being a--strictly a tactical complement to the
    strategic bomber fleet. And I was wondering, in your opinion,
    can this platform actually supplant some functions that the
    bomber fleet performs in the future, in conjunction with the
    new B-21, as our strategy evolves?
        General Selva. Congressman, I think it is possible they can
    work together. But given the relatively small numbers of dual-
    capable aircraft and the fact of that commitment only to our
    NATO allies, that we have not extended our dual-capable
    aircraft outside of the European area of responsibility in more
    than a decade, our capacity to provide for an extended nuclear
    deterrent umbrella over other allies, partners, and friends
    principally comes from our capacity to deploy weapons from the
    United States to those locations.
        So I am cautious that we not build the connotation that
    because the airplanes can operate together they would
    necessarily at a strategic level be built into the same plan.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you. Anyone else? Okay.
        My next question is to General Selva and Hyten. Each
    element of the nuclear triad requires significant investment
    and modernization. Of the three, how would you rank order with
    them, in terms of priority, to undergo modernization efforts?
        General Hyten. I will take that first, General. Thank you,
    Vice Chairman.
        It is choosing among your children. It is impossible. It
    depends on your perspective.
        You can come at from a perspective of which is the oldest.
    Which is the oldest? You probably go to the bomber. The bomber
    is the oldest. We need a modernized, penetrating bomber.
        But then you look at the ICBM and the ICBM has a problem.
    You look at the submarine, the submarine--at some point in time
    the Ohio class will not be able to go under the surface of the
    water, and a submarine that can't go under the surface of the
    water does not have a significant use to the United States of
    America.
        So as you walk through each of those you realize that under
    the current construct of what deterrence is, I can't give up
    any element of the triad. And that is why all three have to be
    modernized and all three have to be monitored as you go through
    that.
        I think it is important that we look at it as each of these
    programs goes on and we make prudent decisions concerning where
    we are spending our money to make sure that they deliver in
    time, but I can't make a determination of which one today would
    be the most important.
        General Selva. Congressman, the way I would phrase it is
    not unlike my colleague, and that is: If you believe the triad
    is important, if you believe the existence of all three legs of
    the triad are necessary in order to deter an adversary from
    openly attacking the United States and denying them the
    capacity to be able to do that, then you have to put all three
    of them as a--as priorities and not pick and choose among the
    three.
        There are schedule realities within the triad that drive us
    to pay particular attention to the modernization of each leg.
    The Ohio-class submarine is on a design and construction
    schedule that has almost no slack in it because of the dynamic
    that was just pointed out a few moments ago about the Ohio
    class reaching end of life and Columbia class having to be
    ready to replace her. And so that puts a premium on that design
    and construction schedule.
        The B-52 fleet, as the chairman pointed out, that is the
    bulk of our air leg of the triad; that fleet was built in the
    1950s and 1960s. The weapons that they employ, the air-launched
    cruise missile and the gravity bombs that they carry, were
    designed and built in the 1970s with a 10-year lifespan. We
    know today they remain relevant, but we can't continue to
    maintain them.
        A decade from now those weapons will not be able to
    penetrate Russian air defenses. And therefore, there is an
    urgency to their replacement.
        And finally, the Minuteman III missile system was put into
    silos in the 1970s with an expected 10-year lifespan. We have
    extended its lifespan and believe we can continue to do so for
    about another decade.
        When we did the analysis of alternatives on what would be
    best--extending life again or replacing--the cost of extending
    life actually almost matches the cost of replacement. So that
    means all three of them must be addressed at the same time.
        What we have to do, and what we owe you, is our considered
    judgment on where we put resources to make sure that all three
    of those replacement programs stay on a schedule for design and
    deployment that matches the time span that the weapons
    themselves will age out of the fleet.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Franks.
        Mr. Franks. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of
    you gentlemen for your lifetime commitment to human freedom.
        Let me begin by suggesting that the comments you have made
    here today as to the importance of our nuclear deterrent, I so
    deeply agree with, given that I think it has kept us out of
    involvement in a world war for 70 years. I mean, it is almost
    impossible to overstate its significance.
        And with that, I will probably go ahead and bias my
    question deeply and suggest to you that I think that the long-
    range standoff capability is one of the strongest--one of the
    strong components for rationale and for leverage to keep the
    bomber leg of our triad.
        And I know that the argument is made that somehow this is a
    destabilizing weapon--and, General Selva, you had mentioned
    earlier, and I thought you addressed it well, but I would like
    to kind of expand on it slightly because I think that this is
    one of those things that is in play.
        And with that, you know, I have asked the Air Force many
    times now how many times--and, General Wilson, this is
    addressed to you too, sir, and General Hyten--how many times
    the ALCMs [air-launched cruise missiles], you know, has been
    fired and how many times that--in combat, and how many times it
    has been taken as a potential nuclear strike. And, of course,
    the answer was none.
        And if, indeed, the LRSO [long-range standoff weapon] is
    destabilizing then so are dual-capable bombers. I mean, all of
    these things just don't make sense in my mind.
        And so the questions I have for you--first--I am going to
    make a series of them because I don't want to run out of time
    here--what do you think of LRSO? Do you support the program?
    What is the military requirement for this program? Do you think
    it is destabilizing?
        And, General Selva, I will point over to you specifically:
    Do the Joints Chiefs of Staff support the program? And do you
    believe LRSO is a good part of cost-imposing strategy on our
    adversaries?
        That is a lot of questions. I am sorry to throw it all at
    the same time.
        General Selva. Congressman, the Joint Chiefs did consider
    the commitment to the LRSO and the development program when we
    looked at our recommendation to President Obama last year on
    whether or not to adjust the modernization and recapitalization
    program and committed to the fielding and deployment of the
    LRSO. We do believe that it is a significant tool for imposing
    costs on our potential adversaries.
        The requirements state in short that it be able to fly a
    specific range, which I won't talk about in this forum; that it
    be able to penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of an
    opponent; and deliver a nuclear weapon. And those are the three
    baseline requirements for the system that I can talk about in
    this room.
        Mr. Franks. And you would reject again the notion that it
    is destabilizing?
        General Selva. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Franks. And what emphasis do you put on the
    significance of that capability and maintaining in the future
    an effective rationale for keeping our bomber leg of our triad?
        General Selva. I think it does two things for us. We have
    already talked about the cost imposition on any potential
    adversary. That is a critical piece of keeping the bomber leg
    of the triad viable.
        It is also critical to keeping the B-52 viable, as the
    airframe itself cannot penetrate Russian air defenses--or
    Chinese air defenses, for that matter--and, as a consequence,
    must have a standoff weapon that is capable of contributing to
    its leg of the deterrent.
        Mr. Franks. Yes. General Hyten.
        General Hyten. Congressman, I will bring to the classified
    session tomorrow a detailed explanation. There is actually an
    integrated story when you put the bomber together with the LRSO
    that we can only talk about in a classified forum that actually
    explains the military requirement very specifically and why we
    need that.
        There are a lot of policy discussions we have had today but
    I think the military requirement is actually the most powerful,
    and we can share that tomorrow.
        Mr. Franks. Thank you, and I look forward to that. General
    Wilson, did you have anything to add?
        General Wilson. Congressman, I would say the LRSO is the
    most flexible leg because when I match a weapon with all the
    bombers--in the future it will go on not only the B-52, the B-
    2, or the B-21--it provides lots of flexibility.
        Mr. Franks. Yes.
        General Wilson. When you put numbers on them, again, just
    as the other generals have said, it is a cost-imposing strategy
    against our adversaries. I think it is a very effective
    deterrent capability and will do so in the future.
        Mr. Franks. Well, thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I think
    that last point was very important: It gives our command
    capability the opportunity to make some additional decisions if
    they have to rather than having the bombers over enemy
    territory.
        And finally, I think we should reject this notion of
    destabilization because Russia certainly has this capability
    and they continue to build on it and expand it.
        So I appreciate you all being here today. And thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Ms. Hanabusa.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
    gentlemen, for being here.
        One of the things that concerned me as I was reading
    through everything: Yes, there is an emphasis by all of you of
    the need for modernization and for replacement, and there is
    this concept of the triad. And I have heard the testimony
    before, and you seem to be just assuming that the triad is the
    way we must go. And I have heard your explanations and I, quite
    honestly, I am not necessarily convinced that that is the way
    that we must go.
        For example, the warheads you talked about, 1971, I think,
    was when they were put together. You all realize that it took
    10 years after that before you all graduated college.
        So when we are talking about modernization, right, how or
    why are you all assuming that the triad system is like the
    essential threshold to modernization? And that is other than--
    if you will respond in this way--other than your respective
    jurisdictional areas.
        General Selva. Thank you, ma'am, for the question.
        First of all, it is not that the triad is foundational to
    modernization. We believe the triad is foundational to
    deterrence. It is not about how we view the triad; it is how
    our potential adversaries view the triad.
        So three times in the last 5 years the Joint Staff has been
    asked this question: Could we go to a dyad? Could we eliminate
    a leg of the triad? If you were to eliminate a leg, which leg
    would you eliminate?
        The sum total of all of that analysis has resulted in a
    commitment on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to maintain
    the triad because of its value in deterring our opponents.
        It does several things for us. We have talked about the
    operational parts, where no single leg can be taken out at one
    time and that presents a targeting and strategic problem to an
    adversary.
        The other thing it brings us is the ability, strategically,
    to hedge between legs of the triad, so if someone were to
    figure out how to completely defeat our bomber force we have a
    fallback position.
        Ms. Hanabusa. But, General, you have all basically said
    that everything that we have in the triad needs to be
    modernized. And I believe General Wilson, in his testimony,
    said that, you know, the really peer that we have is Russia.
    There is China and North Korea who are coming on board, but our
    real peer in terms of this area is Russia.
        So, I guess my issue is this: If we are looking at how we
    are going to battle into the, quote, ``the modern era,'' or
    modernizing, shouldn't we be focusing on how they--our quote,
    ``potential adversaries'' and the ones that we anticipate are
    coming on board--how they will arm and what we must do to
    combat that?
        Because it seems like we are sort of in this mode of, well,
    we--not necessarily that the triad is the essence of
    modernization but somehow it is sacrosanct right now, and this
    is what we think works best.
        But we are talking about modernizing; we are talking about
    a new series of adversaries. And so how is it that you have
    thought about that potential and in then assuming that the
    triad is necessary and the way that you are all choosing to
    modernize within the triad is what is going to be the best way?
        I understand the Columbia class coming on board. I do
    understand that. And I understand the essence of the--then the
    quote what we call the ``deep blue sea'' and what they need to
    do. However, I am wondering about the ICBMs, where we place
    them, and this bomber capacity.
        General Hyten. Congresswoman, we start from the adversary.
    That is where all the analysis starts.
        We start looking at Russia. That is where the nuclear
    analysis starts.
        Then we look at China, we look at North Korea, look at
    Iran. But we start from what they are doing, because the
    adversary gets a vote. They get a vote, and we don't get the
    vote on what they are going to do. So we have to look at what
    they are doing and figure out how to respond.
        And if you look at the role of deterrence, the primary role
    of deterrence is to deter the use of nuclear weapons anywhere
    else on the planet. And if you eliminate one element of the
    triad, the challenge that creates for us as military officers
    is that now we are one failure, we are one problem away, we are
    one challenge away, we are one breach in intelligence away from
    an adversary thinking that they can possibly attack the United
    States with a nuclear weapon.
        That fundamentally changes deterrence.
        Ms. Hanabusa. General, I am going to run out of time, and
    what I would like is to have you respond to me in writing if
    you can.
        I understand that. However, when your basic essentials,
    which is the weaponry that we have and all of that, may not be
    the proper deterrent, or the bombers may be something that can
    be detected, those are the issues that I would like to have you
    respond as to how that fits into modernization.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank
    you so much for joining us, and thanks so much for your
    service.
        General Hyten, I would like to discuss the military
    requirement for the long-range standoff cruise missile in a
    little more detail. I want to focus on the platforms.
        And we have penetrating platforms like the B-2 and upcoming
    the B-21. Tell me why those platforms, with their capability
    and them going in to deliver a gravity nuclear weapon like the
    B-61 would not meet the standards or the requirements that have
    been set by LRSO.
        General Hyten. Sir, I can't talk about the specifics in an
    open hearing. I will bring those specifics into the closed
    classified session tomorrow so I can give you the number.
        But in general, let me just describe that it is a mix of
    ranges. What is the range of the long-range standoff weapon?
    What is the range of the bomber? What is the target that we
    have to do?
        And if you look at the globe and you look at Russia and
    China in particular, they are very large countries, and it is
    about an access issue. And so when we combine all those
    military requirements together and we meet the requirements
    that are in the air leg of the triad for what we have to do,
    that is how it comes together.
        And I will show you the details tomorrow in the classified
    session.
        General Selva. Congressman, if you would let me add one
    more point to that----
        Mr. Wittman. Yes, General Selva, yes.
        General Selva [continuing]. And this is something that is
    missed quite often in the LRSO conversation. In order for a
    bomber to deliver gravity--to deliver a gravity bomb it must
    fly over or approximate to the target. And it has to do that
    one target at a time.
        If we find ourselves in a position where we have to strike
    multiple targets with relative simultaneity, the lack of
    existence of a long-range standoff munition means we have to
    dedicate more force to that same problem set.
        And so part of the advantage in the LRSO--and it is one of
    the requirements--is that it be shot from some distance and
    that it can be released from the bomber in relative short order
    so that you can get that degree of simultaneity that you cannot
    get with the laydown of gravity bombs.
        And again, until or unless we negotiate cruise missiles out
    of everyone's nuclear arsenal, the capacity to be able to do
    that adds value, brings flexibility, and it confounds the
    enemy's belief that they might be able to attack us and get
    away with it.
        Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you. Thank you. Great point.
        General Wilson, I wanted to go to you and get your
    perspective. We had heard some comments earlier about the aging
    inventory of our air-launched cruise missiles, and we know
    where they are today with their age, what they were planned for
    originally.
        But tell me, what happens with the current age of these
    missiles and our ability to perform the mission if LRSO is not
    delivered on time, and do we have the same element of
    deterrence as that inventory of air-launched cruise missiles
    ages and if we don't get LRSO?
        General Wilson. Yes, thank you for the question.
        As you remarked earlier, our current cruise missiles were
    built in the early 1980s, designed to last 10 years. We are now
    on their fifth SLEP [service life extension program], their
    service life extension for those missiles. To meet General
    Hyten's requirements we talk about being safe, secure,
    effective, and ready.
        As these missiles continue to age out they will become
    potentially unreliable and--on one piece and not able to reach
    their target. So there is an effectiveness piece and there is a
    reliability piece.
        They are currently safe, secure, effective, and reliable.
    But looking 10 years in the future, we don't have much slack.
    Again, right now we are on our fifth service life extension and
    we need a new replacement for that ALCM missile, the LRSO.
        Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
        Admiral Moran, I wanted to talk to you about that
    extraordinarily important part of the nuclear triad, our Ohio-
    class submarines. We are today in the process of replacing
    those submarines with the Columbia class.
        Give me your perspective. I know that we are pushed with
    having the proper number of 12 submarines, which is the
    projection, and being, for a period of time, as you spoke of
    earlier, at 11 submarines. Give me your perspective on what we
    will do to accommodate for that lower number of submarines
    through that period of time.
        Is it longer deployments at sea? What do we do to make sure
    we have the proper presence there? Because as we know, we need
    11 submarines to have a presence, I believe, at any one time of
    6 submarines at sea.
        Can you give us perspective about how you create that
    balance and why 11 is going to be sufficient for the mission
    through that timeframe?
        Admiral Moran. Thank you sir.
        You captured it quite well there in terms of the length of
    deployments and how much longer we would be able to sustain a
    crew at sea or turn around a crew at sea, shorter durations. So
    there are several aspects of what you described that we can do
    to make up that delta.
        The biggest one is the maintenance of those existing Ohio
    as they reach the end of their life and the new Columbia as
    they come in in the 2030s.
        Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
    back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Carbajal.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all
    for coming here today.
        The Congressional Budget Office [CBO] estimates the cost of
    modernizing U.S. nuclear deterrent will cost about $400 billion
    over the next decade. Reports also indicate U.S. will spend $1
    trillion over the next 30 years in order to modernize and
    maintain our nuclear triad.
        All our witnesses have expressed the importance of
    modernizing our nuclear capabilities and the risks of
    continuing to use systems that are operating beyond their
    service life. To this end, I believe it is imperative for this
    committee to be informed of the long-term plans, timelines, and
    cost projections of implementing such a costly and extensive
    modernization program.
        This is the National Nuclear Security Administration's
    annual report that covers DOE's costs and plans for nuclear
    warheads and related infrastructure over the next 25 years.
        General Selva, can DOD [Department of Defense] provide this
    committee with its 25-year plan, timelines, and cost estimates
    in regards to its nuclear modernization efforts? If yes, when?
    And if no, why not?
        General Selva. Congressman, my understanding is we
    communicated those requirements in our President's budget in
    2017. They will be re-communicated as part of our program.
        But I will be happy to work with our team back in the
    Pentagon and come back to you with a more fulsome answer to
    your question over the next decade to decade and a half. Our
    numbers are slightly different than CBO's for a couple of
    reasons, but we will work through that with you and make sure
    you have the numbers.
        Mr. Carbajal. Great. Thank you very much. I yield, Mr.
    Chair.
        The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Wilson, there are large differences in the opinion
    of the Air Force and the Office of Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation [CAPE] at the Secretary of Defense.
        Why are there such large differences on the assessment of
    the ground-based strategic deterrent? Does the Air Force stand
    behind its service cost position? And when will the Air Force
    and CAPE have enough data to revisit and revise their cost
    estimates and narrow the range that we are seeing?
        General Wilson. Congressman Scott, we certainly stand
    behind our projections. Quite frankly, the projections differ
    because we use different sources. We haven't built a new
    missile in many years, so we used Minuteman III and Peacekeeper
    data; CAPE used D5 [Trident II] data as well as MDA [Missile
    Defense Agency] data. Therefore, the differences in the two
    service cost positions.
        We expect to have--we got our proposals in now and about a
    year from now, this March of 2018, we should have further data
    to be able to refine that and provide that forward.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you.
        General Hyten, would you please describe the military
    requirements driving the need for GBSD? What are the military
    effectiveness and cost implications of choosing to life-extend
    the current Minuteman III missile fleet and related ground
    infrastructure rather than pursue GBSD?
        General Hyten. So, the detailed military requirements are
    classified, sir. We can provide you with those in a separate
    forum. We would be glad to do that.
        Mr. Scott. Okay.
        General Hyten. In general, the requirement for the land-
    based element of the triad is to be able to provide a
    survivable, responsive capability to any threat attack that is
    coming from any adversary around the globe. We have to be able
    to do that inside the timelines of what that adversary
    missile--and if you just do the math, the public math is it is
    about 30 minutes from Russia to the United States.
        So that drives the timelines that we have to respond. That
    not only drives the missile capabilities, but it describes the
    infrastructure it has to be put into as well as the command and
    control with it.
        Mr. Scott. General Selva, if you can't speak to it in this
    forum, perhaps tomorrow: What is the collective judgment of the
    Joint Chiefs on whether we should pursue the GBSD program and
    retain the land-based leg of the triad?
        General Selva. The Joint Chiefs have endorsed moving
    forward with the ground-based strategic deterrent program based
    in large part on an analysis of alternatives that was done for
    the Joint Requirements Oversight Council that incorporated in
    one of its excursions life extension of the Minuteman III
    versus deployment of a new missile, and the costs were seen to
    be equivalent if not prohibitive for the continued life
    extension of the Minuteman III.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you.
        General Hyten, we have seen a lot of GBSD acquisition
    details loaded into unclassified acquisition databases and run
    by the Air Force. We all know that Russia, China, and others
    scoop all this stuff up to the best of their abilities and
    analyze it intensively.
        Why is all of this put out in the open? Should we reassess
    what is unclassified in these acquisition documents?
        And could you speak to also the greatest cost and technical
    risk in the GBSD the program? For example, what is your view of
    the priority of possible mobile command-and-control concepts
    being considered?
        General Hyten. I hate the stuff that shows up in the press.
    I think we should reassess that.
        Just to complete that thought, I hate the fact that cost
    estimates show up in the press as well. Because if you put a
    cost estimate out in the press it is not only our adversaries
    that are looking at it, but the people that are going to build
    the system are looking at that, and if that is what our cost
    estimates say, if we say it is going to cost $80 billion it is
    probably going to end up costing $80 billion. I hate that we go
    down that path.
        Mr. Scott. And then some.
        General Hyten. And then some. So I would really like to
    figure out a different way to do business than that. I hate
    seeing that kind of information in the newspaper.
        Now, as for the complications in the GBSD program, I think
    the--you know, we spend all our time talking about the missile.
    The missile, to me, is the easiest part of the structure.
    Everybody thinks about the missile and how much is the missile
    going to cost. How much is that?
        At the last, just a couple weeks ago I was at F.E. Warren
    in Wyoming. I went down in one of the missile holes and the
    sign as you came in said, you know, this was created in 1963.
    That structure was created in 1963.
        The command-and-control assets that go around with it were
    started in the 1960s, modernized in the 1970s. They have gone
    through multiple life extension programs. It is the
    infrastructure that is around the missile that will be the
    challenge of the program, not the missile itself.
        Mr. Scott. Gentlemen, thank you for your service. My time
    is about expire so, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the 8 seconds.
        The Chairman. And we will take it.
        Mr. O'Halleran.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for being here today.
        General Selva, you had mentioned in your written comments
    about the 6.5 percent projection moving forward. How do we know
    that that is going to be enough money to be able to deal with
    the multitude of issues we have here, whether it is command and
    control or new systems coming onboard?
        General Selva. Sir, all I can tell you is that that is our
    best judgment of what resources we are going to need to do the
    modernization on the schedule that we have laid it out. So that
    6.5 percent estimate is actually based on taking all of the
    design and build programs and projecting them forward as a
    percentage of our base budget.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Admiral Moran, the Columbia class, the
    minimum are--the minimum that we need are 10 at a time--are 10.
    Two are going to be down because of reactors replacement at
    times?
        Admiral Moran. No, sir. The Columbia class has a reactor
    core that it will last for 40-plus years, so we will not have
    to re-core those unless we extend the life----
        Mr. O'Halleran. Okay.
        Admiral Moran [continuing]. Beyond 42 years.
        Mr. O'Halleran. I misread that then.
        Admiral Moran. Yes, sir.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you----
        Admiral Moran. The other two, the reduction from 14 to 12
    is to account for the fact that the core lasts that long, and
    there is other maintenance that has to be done on any ship, and
    that is why we are able to do it with the 12 instead of the 14.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Okay. Thank you.
        And, General Hyten, the cyber warfare aspects of all this,
    command and control and the--how does that--has that factored
    into your cost estimates?
        General Hyten. So I will just say that, you know, we were
    having a conversation with Congressman Turner a while ago about
    the concerns about the NC3 capabilities that we have today. The
    good news about the nuclear command and control capability we
    have today is it is very cyber secure. When you build a system
    in the 1960s, before anybody knew what the term ``cyber'' was,
    you have inherently built in an amazing amount of
    cybersecurity.
        The challenge that we have as we go into the future is that
    you can't build that again. We have to fundamentally build it
    now in a 21st-century architecture, which will have the cyber
    threat that we have to work through.
        That is a significant element of our risk assessment as we
    go through and part of the design criteria as we look at how we
    are going to do this nuclear command and control in the future.
        Mr. O'Halleran. And, General, you--I had mentioned cost,
    also. How does that factor in as far as being able to fund the
    other systems, which all require cyber issues, also?
        General Hyten. It is a significant element of the cost
    estimates. You would have to ask the services for the details
    that are in those cost estimates, but I have talked to the DOD
    CIO [Chief Information Officer] in particular about that
    capability. I have sat in on the panels that General Selva was
    talking about a while ago.
        We look at those very close and that cybersecurity, cyber-
    resilience, cyber-defense architecture is involved in every one
    of the plans that we come up with, as well as the cost
    estimates.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Okay. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I
    yield.
        The Chairman. Dr. DesJarlais.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Selva, you spoke with a bunch of us yesterday
    regarding the aging of our nuclear forces and, you know, we
    have talked about a lot of the slippage issues that we want to
    avoid.
        General Hyten, what are the impacts to the credibility of
    our nuclear deterrent if we see major schedule slips to any of
    these programs?
        General Hyten. Congressman, that is the risk in the program
    right now. I have been involved in this business long enough to
    know that if you have five different programs that all deliver
    just in time you have inherently put a risk in the program that
    is very significant because, sadly, one of those programs, two
    of those programs, three of those programs, they won't all
    deliver on time.
        Therefore, that is why we have to manage it very closely.
    And that is why stable budgets, stable planning, stable
    structure is so important to the entire Department of Defense,
    but in this area in particular, because without that stability
    we really do insert risk into the systems in the future.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Chairman Thornberry mentioned earlier
    that--this--the cost for this deterrence program is usually
    about 6 to 7 percent of the budget. Considering that this has
    been called the Nation's highest priority defense mission, do
    you agree with CBO that roughly 6 percent is a proper amount?
        General Selva. Congressman, we have looked at the numbers
    for the better of the 18 months or so I have been in this job
    and have scrubbed them really hard. Part of the debate about
    how much is enough came from how much is it going to cost? So
    we scrubbed every program to take any excess cost out of it;
    6.5 percent is where we land.
        On any given day we spend almost 3.5 percent of our defense
    base budget on maintaining the existing strategic deterrent. So
    what we are talking about is a period of time, roughly a decade
    and change, where we have to double that investment to continue
    to maintain the existing deterrent and field its replacement,
    and that is the consequence of where those numbers came from.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Well, I would like to thank all you
    gentlemen for being here today, and I yield back my time.
        General Selva. Thank you, sir.
        The Chairman. Mr. Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
    service and for the questions that you have answered. I look
    forward to the classified hearing. Hope we can get into this in
    much more depth.
        But, General Hyten, a question for you. Last week
    Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein stated that the New START
    [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] has huge value for the United
    States and that the agreement has been good for us. He noted
    that the reason you do a treaty is not to cut forces but to
    maintain strategic stability among world powers, and the New
    START Treaty allows us to maintain that stability. Those are
    his quotes.
        If the United States--and the question for you--if the
    United States withdrew from the New START or took steps which
    called into question our treaty obligation, what would be the
    effect on strategic stability?
        General Hyten. So, Congressman, I have stated for the
    record in the past and I will state again that I am a big
    supporter of the New START agreement. I believe that,
    especially when it comes to nuclear weapons and nuclear
    capabilities, that bilateral, verifiable arms control
    agreements are essential to our ability to provide an effective
    deterrent.
        If you remove that effective deterrent structure, which is
    the New START Treaty, it makes it very difficult for us to know
    the levels. The risk would be an arms race.
        We are not in an arms race now, to go back to a previous
    question. The concern would be what do we have to do in order
    to stay at the same level as our adversaries, and that could be
    a very risky proposition. That is why I continue to support the
    New START levels that we are under right now.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, General. General Selva, are you
    of the same mind?
        General Selva. I am, sir. When the New START Treaty was
    brought to the Congress for ratification the Joint Chiefs
    reviewed the components of the treaty and endorsed it. It is a
    bilateral, verifiable agreement that gives us some degree of
    predictability on what our potential adversaries look like.
        Mr. Garamendi. Now, keeping that in mind, there has been
    discussion about new tactical or new low-yield strategic
    weapons. Maybe they are both tactical as well as strategic.
        The Defense Science Board, in their seven defense
    priorities for the new administration, recommended expanding
    our nuclear options, including deploying low-yield weapons on
    strategic delivery systems. Is there a military requirement for
    these new weapons?
        General Hyten. So, Congressman, that is a great
    conversation for tomorrow when I can tell you the details. But
    from a big picture perspective in a public hearing, I can tell
    you that our force structure now actually has a number of
    capabilities that provide the President of the United States a
    variety of options to respond to any numbers of threats.
        Mr. Garamendi. And----
        General Hyten. I will also say that I don't agree with the
    term ``tactical nuclear weapon.'' I just fundamentally disagree
    that there is such a thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. I
    believe that anybody that employs a nuclear weapon in the world
    has created a strategic effect and all nuclear weapons are
    strategic.
        Mr. Garamendi. I thank you for that statement. I think it
    is accurate. And that goes to escalate to deescalate; that also
    goes to our deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
        General Selva, you spoke to this earlier about the dual-
    capable aircraft that we have in Europe. And the purpose of
    those apparently is to cause Russia not to invade, so that is
    an escalation to deescalate, or could be.
        General Selva. Congressman, not to be argumentative, the
    stated purpose of those weapons is to deter the Russians from
    escalating to nuclear warfare in order to prevent a
    conventional attack from going nuclear. They are--I use the
    NATO nomenclature--nonstrategic nuclear weapons, accepting what
    General Hyten just said. But I take your point.
        The stated intended purpose of those weapons is to deter
    the Russians from using nuclear weapons if they were to attempt
    to escalate a conventional war.
        Mr. Garamendi. All of which creates a conundrum. Thank you
    very much, gentlemen. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Gallagher.
        Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to zoom back out, if we could, to the
    strategic level. The last Nuclear Posture Review was published
    7 years ago. The world, obviously, is very different today than
    it was in 2010, particularly when talking about countries like
    Russia.
        Today, at least for my perspective, it is hard to see
    Russia as a partner and a friend, like the 2010 NPR envisioned.
    For instance, Russia continues to make dangerous and aggressive
    nuclear threats and exercises directed against the U.S., NATO
    allies, and neighbors. Russia has declared an openly discussed
    doctrine to use a Russian nuclear weapon early in a conflict to
    deescalate and get the United States to back down.
        Russia continues to brazenly violate the INF Treaty, and a
    recent media report indicates its INF-violating cruise missile
    is now operational and deployed. Russia intentionally broadcast
    plans for its so-called Status-6 nuclear weapon, which is a
    high-speed unmanned underwater vehicle that would carry a
    megaton-class nuclear weapon into a U.S. harbor and detonate.
    Not to mention the invasion, occupation, and annexation of the
    sovereign territory of its neighbors.
        Would you please, this is a question really for the entire
    panel starting with General Selva: Would you please provide, in
    your professional military views, what has changed in the
    world, in your professional opinion, since the 2010 NPR? And
    why, from a military perspective, does that matter?
        General Selva. Yes, sir. I would make two points.
        One, I have been public with the notion that Russia and
    China are the two nations of the world that potentially pose an
    existential threat to the United States. I am on the record in
    my confirmation hearing as the vice chairman saying the same.
        What has changed in the last 10 years is the--is a
    continuing realization that Russia intends to assert themselves
    as a great power and in doing so has changed the relationship
    in terms of our military-to-military qualitative and
    quantitative match. And we have to address that.
        And so as we enter this first--the first NPR of this
    administration--Nuclear Posture Review of the Trump
    administration--one of the very key questions that will have to
    be asked as we start the process from the intelligence
    community is a definitive answer to what has changed since the
    last time we did this work.
        To be fair to the Obama administration, there was a 2010
    NPR. There were two major nuclear strategy reviews in 2012 and
    2014 as well, but they didn't raise to the status of an NPR
    because the President didn't believe we needed to do one. So a
    lot has changed, Congressman, to your point.
        General Hyten. So, Congressman, the vice chairman hit
    pretty much all the points I wanted to make with the exception
    of one broad issue that has changed significantly since 2010.
        Since 2010 our potential adversaries, particularly China
    and Russia, have not just looked at the nuclear enterprise;
    they have looked at space and cyber. And strategic deterrence
    in the 21st century is much bigger than nuclear deterrence was
    in the 20th century.
        We have adversaries that are building weapons and
    capabilities to counter our advantages in space and in cyber.
    We have to look at the entire strategic landscape and make sure
    we consider all that action. The nuclear capabilities that we
    have is the backstop for all of that, but it is a much broader
    issue that has become very apparent since 2010.
        Admiral Moran. Congressman, I don't have much to add there
    except that when we look just navy-to-navy, and the
    capabilities that the Russians have deployed since the last
    Nuclear Posture Review are significantly better than what we
    saw leading up to that review. So we have to account for that
    in this next step.
        General Wilson. Congressman, the only thing I would add on
    to tag onto General Hyten's comment is when we talk about the
    nuclear triad we have to realize it is bigger than just the
    bombers, the ICBMs, and the submarines. It is the command and
    control; it is space; it is tankers. It is a much bigger
    enterprise than just the three legs of the triad that we have
    got to be thinking about.
        Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman. I yield the rest of my time.
        The Chairman. Mr. McEachin.
        Mr. McEachin. Mr. Chairman, my question has been asked and
    answered, and I have enjoyed listening and learning today, so I
    yield back.
        The Chairman. Ms. McSally.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, gentlemen.
    Good discussion today about the importance of investing in
    recapitalization of the triad.
        I want to talk about an important element of that, which is
    the human capital and specifically, General Wilson, the
    missileers in the ICBM force. I mean, we have seen over the
    last year some challenges there.
        You know, we are in a new time and we are with a different
    generation. I don't like to make generalizations, but the old
    SAC [Strategic Air Command] warriors that we all know and love
    are very different from the mindset of millennials coming into
    this role. There are real challenges. They are going to--no
    insult to my colleagues from these States--but challenging
    geographic locations.
        F.E. Warren was our sister squadron when I was at the
    Academy. For many years, you know, often no deployment, and
    they see that they are working with old technology too, so that
    shows, I think, that, you know, hey, this isn't a priority for
    us to be further investing in that.
        We have addressed some of these shortfalls very much in, I
    think, a punitive way. I mean, obviously it is appropriate to
    have zero-fail, but that doesn't help with morale, culture,
    motivation, and all the important things that we need for
    people to be motivated to do this important mission.
        So as we are looking at modernizing parts of the
    infrastructure and the force, are we looking at modernizing the
    workforce? So are we thinking outside the box?
        Does it need to be a dedicated career field anymore? Are
    there ways for them to become the deterrent experts for our
    military, not just in nuclear deterrence?
        Is there a thought of how to do some innovative things for
    their leadership development while they are in these
    assignments that is not fake but actually very real and shows
    that value?
        So I am just wondering, are we willing to shake up and look
    at some fresh ideas to modernize the workforce? It is very
    important.
        General Wilson. The short answer is absolutely. And that is
    a key part of what you are hitting is this human weapon system.
        So coming out of the Force Improvement Program, both the
    internal and external reviews hit upon this piece of culture.
    And I would say the culture had gone to a culture of
    micromanagement.
        And so today's workforce we are focusing on this, how do I
    empower our airmen? And how do they see themselves in a future
    of which they believe what they are doing is important?
        So for a long time our Nation didn't, I would argue, didn't
    value the nuclear force. We have to change that at all levels.
        And so how do we then develop and grow airmen that realize
    that what they are doing is important and then they can do
    something about it? We have certainly lots of opportunities
    that we develop our missileers, and empowering them earlier,
    whether they become an expert in their weapon system, we make
    them flight commanders in our weapon system, we send them to
    weapon schools, we are sending them to very prestigious
    universities, to Stanfords to Harvards for training.
        We stood up the School for Advanced Nuclear Deterrence
    Studies there at Kirtland Air Force Base, which is focused on
    how do I build a person who can understand and articulate what
    deterrence means in the 21st century?
        So the short answer is yes. We think that this is a really
    important part of changing the culture, and you are hitting on
    a big piece of it.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you. General Hyten or General Selva, you
    got any other comments on that?
        General Hyten. I would like to add something, ma'am.
        One of the things I do on holidays is I just pick up the
    phone, and I punch the number for the folks that are in the
    missile fields, because when I left the enterprise really in
    2009 the morale was really bad. Really bad. And I saw that you
    couldn't miss it.
        And now I--when I talk to lieutenants--and it is mostly
    lieutenants that are there--their morale is high. They are all
    excited about what they do. They understand the importance;
    they understand it is the most important thing.
        But I think one of the things that you mentioned is that
    that can be a temporary issue. That is the power of leadership.
    And leadership is good, but we need to follow it up with real
    capabilities where they are operating on 21st-century
    equipment, they are operating those kind of pieces. And if we
    don't follow through on that I am afraid that the morale could
    go back the other direction.
        But right now, through the power of leadership and focused
    effort, I am very pleased at how high the morale is in the
    missile fields.
        Ms. McSally. So you think the punitive culture that I am
    talking about is behind us? We need to hold people accountable,
    don't get me wrong; but when you feel like I am going to be
    punished for all the little things, that's a morale----
        General Hyten. So the change it's made is really good. It
    is because the no-fail is now a no-fail mission.
        Ms. McSally. Yes.
        General Hyten. It is not a no-fail person; it is a no-fail
    mission. And when you realize it is the entire team that has to
    come together, and if there is a glitch on one person in the
    team, whether that is a security forces or wherever it is, and
    the rest of the team can overcome that and have a no-fail
    mission, that is what we are trying to get after. And that is
    the conversation I hear now with the lieutenants in particular.
        Ms. McSally. Great. General Selva, anything?
        General Selva. I think I would make two points very
    quickly.
        One is a path to leadership and a continuing real emphasis
    on relevance and the importance of the mission. And what I see
    when I go out to missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine
    bases is a group of very motivated, very dedicated and
    disciplined sailors and airmen who see both of those right now.
        That has not always been the case, particularly in some of
    the incidents that we saw inside the ballistic missile force
    and in a small element of the bomber force.
        So I am optimistic--and I am generally not an optimistic
    person--that we have put in place a pathway that attends to the
    professional development and the future of the officers and the
    young airmen in the Air Force that we are asking to do this
    mission, and in the case of the Navy, the sailors and the
    officers who are manning our strategic ballistic missile
    submarines and the infrastructure that supports them.
        Ms. McSally. Great, thanks. I am over my time. I appreciate
    it.
        The Chairman. Mrs. Hartzler.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Our Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee is going to
    have a hearing next week on infrastructure problems at the
    Department of Energy's nuclear weapons enterprise. They have an
    almost $4 billion backlog in deferred maintenance and are
    operating facilities that date back to the Manhattan Project.
        Now, I realize that the facilities still comply with
    nuclear safety requirements, but I am not sure how long that
    will last.
        And so, General Selva and General Hyten, I know that you
    have both had the opportunity to visit some of these important
    DOE facilities. Can you tell us about the state of their
    infrastructure, any views that you have on the need to rebuild
    NNSA's [National Nuclear Security Administration's] facilities
    so that they can deliver on their mission to support the
    military?
        General Selva. Ma'am, I think it is really important that
    we get at the infrastructure shortfalls inside of DOE.
        To that end, inside the Department we host every other
    month a group we call the Nuclear Weapons Council that looks at
    the safety, security, and reliability of the arsenal itself and
    then attends to the issues in partnership between the National
    Nuclear Security Agency, DOE, and DOD to the emerging
    infrastructure needs and human capital needs inside of that
    workforce that assembles and maintains the core parts of our
    nuclear arsenal, and those are the weapons themselves.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. General Hyten.
        General Hyten. Ma'am, the Department of Energy has taken
    that on pretty seriously, but it has been about a year since I
    was at the three national labs, in particular Livermore,
    Sandia, and Los Alamos. And there are really two issues that
    you have to look at, and two issues that I look at when I go
    there. One is the people, and number two is the infrastructure.
        And each of the labs has done a very interesting
    recruitment process on the people. And now they have this young
    set of physicists and engineers that have been brought onboard
    that are some of the best and brightest in the country that
    really set up for that structure.
        But it goes back to the same conversation I was just having
    with Congresswoman McSally, is that it is--if you don't follow
    up with the infrastructure and all the other pieces that come
    with that, you put that at risk because people that are that
    bright have choices in this country today, and we want them to
    be able to do that.
        So the infrastructure is a significant issue and we need to
    go after that as an enterprise. That is a national security
    issue. That is why the Department of Defense is interested.
        General Selva. Ma'am, if you would allow me to make a
    follow-up point----
        Mrs. Hartzler. Sure.
        General Selva [continuing]. And that is we tend to be
    focused on the physicists, the scientists, and the designers
    that do the work of designing and analyzing the weapons that we
    employ.
        In point of fact, the infrastructure has a huge impact on
    the young mechanics and machinists who are the people that are
    touching the weapons and actually assembling them. And to see
    the discipline that they put into the work that they do to
    disassemble and reassemble nuclear weapons--and they know
    precisely what that means--and to have them working in
    infrastructure some of which dates back to the Manhattan
    Project, and they have to deal with not only the safety and
    security of the weapons but the physical environment that they
    work in, my worry is for that part of the workforce because
    they can come and go as they please.
        And we have to address their capacity to do the work we are
    asking them to do, which is a fairly major process of
    remanufacturing weapons to meet the requirements for the
    future.
        Mrs. Hartzler. I really appreciate those comments. And
    those will help build into what we are going to look at next
    week, so thank you for sharing your views on that.
        Let's talk about nonstrategic nuclear weapons because there
    is a gross disparity on that front between United States and
    Russia and they are not covered by any treaty.
        So, General Hyten, would you please compare and contrast
    the U.S. stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons versus that
    of Russia? And in general unclassified terms, would you
    describe our respective stockpiles as equal in size and
    capabilities?
        General Hyten. I believe our stockpile allows us to provide
    an effective strategic deterrent. Again, I have a unique
    perspective as the commander of Strategic Command, but I look
    at every nuclear weapon as having a strategic impact.
        So as I look at what Russia is doing, I am very concerned
    about that. That is why I agree with the vice chairman in his
    discussions earlier about the need for future bilateral,
    verifiable arms control discussions with Russia, China, all of
    the players in--so that we can look at exactly where we are
    going in the future. And all of those things should be
    discussed.
        Mrs. Hartzler. So what about the numbers?
        General Hyten. The Russian numbers are huge and our numbers
    are small. We will show you the specific numbers tomorrow. But
    that is because we have--our nuclear weapons are a strategic
    deterrent.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Fifteen seconds, where are we in our
    modernization compared to Russian modernization of the weapons?
        General Hyten. The modernization of the weapons? I don't
    have a detailed insight into the nuclear weapon modernization
    in Russia or China, but I can tell you that they are, across
    the nuclear enterprise, ahead of us in some areas of
    modernization, behind in other areas.
        But in general we can still provide the effective strategic
    deterrent we have to in this Nation, but we have to step
    forward quickly into the modernization realm.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Bacon.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I want to thank all four of you for being here. We
    respect the leadership that you are giving your organizations
    and grateful.
        I wanted to ask a question about unmanned aerial vehicles
    and protecting our strategic installations. We are seeing a
    growing threat, whether it is other countries or even
    terrorists buying commercial drones or whatever it may be, and
    it is the threat to our installations.
        So in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA [National Defense
    Authorization Act] the Secretary of Defense was given authority
    to field and equip, train forces to defend our installations.
    So I had two questions, really.
        One to the force providers, Admiral Moran and General
    Wilson: Are we starting the process of fielding and equipping
    this capability to defend our bases?
        And then I wanted to ask General Hyten if he could comment
    about is he seeing the results? Do we need to do more? And how
    can we help?
        Admiral Moran.
        Admiral Moran. Sir, thanks for the question.
        As you know we have seen this issue around our submarine
    bases and it is very concerning. There is a lot of technical
    work going on to address the issue. I think the more important
    aspects of this discussion, though, are the policy and
    authorities to deal with them. So not only here in the U.S.,
    but as well as overseas on the unmanned aerial threats that are
    developing worldwide.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Admiral.
        General Wilson.
        General Wilson. Yes. Congressman Bacon, there is a big team
    looking at this from across the Joint Staff and interagency to
    be able to get at those questions that you just asked.
        Are we fielding capability? I would say right now we are
    giving--delivering on the first initial tranche of capability,
    but there is a lot of work to do. This is a very complicated
    threat, and we are learning more every day.
        So we have a bunch of projects under work with a bunch of
    different agencies, but in terms of actually delivering
    capability to the field, we are not there yet.
        Mr. Bacon. Yes. The threat is there and it is growing.
        General Wilson. Right.
        Mr. Bacon. General Hyten, how are we doing and what can we
    do to help?
        General Hyten. We are going too slow. We are going too slow
    both on the material solution side as well as the policy and
    authority side.
        The NDAA was enormously helpful in starting us down the
    policy and authority side. But, holy cow, the number of lawyers
    that are involved in this discussion right now are just--well,
    it is significant.
        We have to get the right policy and authorities out so our
    defenders know exactly what to do. Then we have to give them
    the material solutions, allow them to react when they see a
    threat and identify that it is a threat so they do the right
    things. We are just going way too slow and we need to
    accelerate that process across policies, authorities, and
    material solutions.
        Mr. Bacon. Well, thank you, General Hyten. Hopefully this
    committee will help give a nudge on that, as well.
        I wanted to ask one follow-up question or--on the command
    and control. I used to fly in the ABM CAP [Air Battle
    Management Combat Air Patrol], as you may know. I was one of
    the flag officers on there. It was really old technology.
        And I wanted to get your opinion, General Hyten. Should we
    be recapitalizing that entire fleet? Do we have enough numbers
    to do 24-hour operations if you wanted to go to that again?
        And how does this work with the alert force, doing it at
    Offut but based in another base? Do we need to relook at that?
    Thank you.
        General Hyten. So I believe that our airborne command and
    control across the board, including the ABM CAP and the TACAMO
    [take charge and move out], which is the same aircraft right
    now, both have a recapitalization initiative that is out in the
    future too, and we need to start looking at that right now. So
    I have asked the Navy to start looking at that.
        I will ask Admiral Moran to talk about those kind of
    pieces, but I know they are going through an analysis right now
    to determine what the right way is to get after those. But that
    is really in the service line.
        Mr. Bacon. Just a quick follow-up: Do we have the right
    number, too, if you wanted to go back to 24-hour operations,
    God forbid, if the world deteriorates?
        General Hyten. So that is a good theoretical question
    because a theoretical question when you actually put it out on
    a whiteboard it works, but when you have an airplane that is
    that old, how long you can actually keep that going is the
    question.
        There is no doubt that we could exercise it right now. We
    could go to 24/7 ops. But when you are operating in an aircraft
    that old, how long will they fly? And since we haven't done 24/
    7 ops for a while that is a risk issue.
        Now when we look at it really hard, we believe that we can
    do that. We know we can execute it for a significant period of
    time but we don't know if it is a month, 2 months, 3 months, 4
    months, because they are old airplanes.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you. And, Admiral Moran, appreciate your
    follow-up.
        Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. We are jointly working on figuring
    out a common airframe to satisfy the missions of both services.
    We currently have a plan in place to extend the service life
    for A-6s out to 2038, which will make them 49 years old, so you
    know what that is all about.
        That cannot be the final solution here. So we are looking,
    as the general indicated, at a way to get at a joint program or
    at least a common airframe to satisfy both missions.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you. And, Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Dr. Abraham.
        Dr. Abraham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Selva, thank you for hosting us--some of us
    yesterday on the--aboard the National Airborne Operations
    Center. It was instructional, educational, and it certainly
    highlighted how important it is to maintain and modernize the
    triad, that the dyad is not enough and we need all three legs
    of the stool to keep America safe. So thank you again for that.
        I am going to ask some rapid-fire questions. A lot of these
    have been answered. I want to put them in one-question format
    so we can refer back when we talk to our colleagues and educate
    them of how important it is to fund these issues.
        General Wilson, how old is the B-52?
        General Wilson. B-52s were built, most of them, in 1960.
        Dr. Abraham. And how old will it be when we plan to retire
    it?
        General Wilson. We are planning to fly it through 2050, so
    it will be 90 years old.
        Dr. Abraham. Wow. How old are the B-2s and how old will
    they be when they retire?
        General Wilson. B-2s today are 24 years old. We are
    scheduled to fly them through 2058, so they will be in the mid-
    60s.
        Dr. Abraham. How old is the Minuteman III?
        General Wilson. Built in 1970, but it is really built with
    Minuteman I parts, which are 1960.
        Dr. Abraham. How old will it be when it is retired in 2030?
        General Wilson. Really old.
        [Laughter.]
        Dr. Abraham. Okay. Sixty. What was it designed to do? What
    was its lifetime design----
        General Wilson. Design life was 10 years.
        Dr. Abraham. Wow. Admiral Moran, how old will the Ohio-
    class submarines be when they are retired?
        Admiral Moran. They will be 42 years.
        Dr. Abraham. It is unusual for a submarine to----
        Admiral Moran. It was designed for 30 years, so we got a 40
    percent increase in the service life through engineering.
        Dr. Abraham. And that brings risk, I am sure.
        Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. We can't go beyond 42.
        Dr. Abraham. I got you. General Hyten, what is the average
    age of our nuclear warheads?
        General Hyten. The average age of our nuclear warheads is
    26 years old right now.
        Dr. Abraham. Okay.
        And one more for you, General Wilson. On the nuclear
    weapons storage facility, I know most of them--or a lot of them
    are so outdated that we can't store there so we are having to
    store warheads in one place and Barksdale in Louisiana has to
    go pick those warheads up if they need to fly an operational
    mission. What does that do with readiness?
        General Wilson. Well, it just puts a stress on the force.
    And we have got to--when we consolidate to one place it
    provides for vulnerabilities. We have a plan to get after that,
    to re-modernize all of our weapon storage facilities.
        We will start here with the first one here at F.E. Warren.
    After that will become Barksdale and Malmstrom. And over the
    next 13 years we have a plan to replace all of our weapon
    storage facilities.
        Dr. Abraham. Okay. Thank you for your service, gentlemen.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. General Wilson, I don't think anybody asked
    you directly today the status of the new bomber program. Is it
    on time, on schedule, moving ahead as it should?
        General Wilson. Chairman, the chief of staff, the Secretary
    of the Air Force and I receive regular updates on it. They just
    finished a preliminary design review recently. It is making
    great progress, and we are pleased with the way it is headed.
        The Chairman. And so it is where it should be at this
    point?
        General Wilson. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. Okay. And Admiral Moran, let me ask you about
    the Columbia class. We have heard there is no slack. Today is
    it on time, on schedule? Are you satisfied with where it is
    today?
        Admiral Moran. We are on time and on schedule. I am not
    satisfied with how much margin we have and obvious impacts and
    risk to delivering on time. But I am very comfortable with
    where we are on the schedule and the costing today.
        The Chairman. Okay.
        General Hyten, a few moments ago you made an interesting
    point. We tend to think of strategic deterrence as nuclear
    deterrence, but it is broader than that. There are other
    implications. There are press reports, and actually I think
    some of this has been confirmed, that other nations are trying
    to deny our ability to operate in space and from space.
        That has implications for the broader sense of strategic
    deterrence. I would ask you or General Selva, what should
    potential adversaries understand about attacks on our space
    system and how we would view such attacks?
        General Hyten. So attacks in space in general are bad--bad
    for the United States, bad for the world. Anything that creates
    debris in space lessens our ability to explore.
        I think all nations of the world have the desire to explore
    the heavens, and if we contaminate the space environment then
    we can never do that. So it is important for us to protect that
    environment as we go forward.
        When you look at what adversaries are doing, they are
    clearly building capabilities to deny us. Some of those
    capabilities could go after our strategic early warning
    systems. If there is an attack on our strategic early warning
    systems, our adversaries need to realize that they have just
    crossed a threshold that puts our understanding of what their
    actions are at risk and creates a potential issue that we may
    have to respond to in the broader strategic deterrent
    construct. Everything is integrated.
        An attack against an overhead satellite of a tactical
    variety has one impact; of strategic variety had another
    impact. But they are all bad.
        So our desire is to deter bad behavior in space, to deter
    any kind of activity in space that would harm the space
    environment.
        And so the message to our adversaries that you ask is that
    they should know that we are watching very, very closely. And
    we are developing capabilities to allow us to continue to fight
    through and respond to any attack that would come in the space
    domain now and in the future.
        The Chairman. General Selva, you have anything?
        General Selva. Chairman, just quite briefly, specific to
    the conversation we have been having today, the delineation
    between the indications-and-warning and command-and-control
    satellites is a signal we should send to our potential
    adversaries, that crossing that line in space denies us
    visibility into their actions and intentions and therefore
    creates ambiguity that is not helpful in terms of nuclear
    deterrence on both sides of the equation. I think that is a
    clear message we have to send every single day.
        The Chairman. Okay.
        General Hyten, on nuclear command and control, as you were
    talking about that being the thing you are most concerned
    about, it goes through my mind about what I describe as a ghost
    fleet phenomena. Are we better off to have 1960s technology
    that cannot be hacked into and have more reliability with that
    ancient sort of approach than if we were to update it?
        General Hyten. So, sir, I have asked that question myself,
    and there are two pieces to the answer.
        Answer number one is that if you have the ability to
    provide the President of the United States and the Secretary of
    Defense better situational awareness because they can make
    better decisions, you should do that. You can't do that with
    the legacy infrastructure; we can do that with a new
    infrastructure.
        And the second piece--and it sounds a little bit trite but
    it is actually true--is that with today's technology you really
    can't build what we built in the 1960s. The information
    technology today is fundamentally different.
        If you try to go back and--you can't build 8-inch floppy
    disk drives. You can't buy those things anymore.
        So you really don't have a choice. You have to modernize
    and you have to do it in a secure environment.
        But what you can do and what you can learn from the 1960s
    is you can segment things off so that people can't get into it.
    There is no such thing as a fully closed network because there
    is always a human in the loop, but you can create as closed a
    system as possible to improve your cybersecurity.
        The Chairman. Okay. One comment, and then I have one
    additional question.
        My comment is having been--watching these issues for a long
    time, I have seen the interest of the Department of Defense wax
    and wane in the DOE's activities on the weapons.
        You know, General Selva, you were just talking about
    visiting the labs, about the Nuclear Weapons Council meeting
    and those other things. For what it is worth, I would just
    encourage both you and General Hyten to keep the attention on
    this issue. It is not a situation where you can say, ``Oh, that
    is their job, and I am not going to worry about it.'' And you
    talked about the infrastructure and the other challenges that
    are facing the NNSA mission.
        So for what it is worth, I just want to encourage you both
    to stay on top of this because when DOD does not stay on top of
    it usually we degrade our capability and it is not a good
    thing. And we have seen this up and down over the last 20
    years, so I would just mention that.
        Last question I would like to ask each of you is just the
    state of our thinking on deterrence, because there is concern
    that after the fall of the Cold War we decided we didn't really
    have to worry about strategic deterrence as much, that, yes we
    had China but they weren't really a threat, and that we have
    put a lot of intellectual capital into counterterrorism and
    other problems but these issues have been neglected. And we
    were talking about that a little bit with the Air Force, about
    the importance that was put on these.
        But talk about, if you will, your comfort level with the
    intellectual effort that is being put on what is deterrence and
    how do we know whether it is credible? And if something we
    think will deter Russia, do we automatically assume that will
    deter North Korea, or is that a different kind of deterrence
    that we--that is not a lesser included case.
        I am just interested in y'all's perspectives on how much we
    have caught up in our thinking about these problems.
        General Selva. Sir, I won't say we have caught up. We are
    catching up.
        The impact of the attacks on 9/11 on the focus of our
    intellectual capital going after CT [counterterrorism], I would
    argue right and appropriate. But we took our eye off of the
    strategic nuclear deterrence intellectual capital of the Nation
    in a way that may not have been healthy.
        What I am encouraged by--and this is why I say we are
    making progress but we are not there yet--is the number of
    young men and women who are pursuing degrees in both physics
    and political science that are now beginning to study the
    components of nuclear deterrence and debate and seek graduate
    and post-graduate degrees. I have a young man working for me
    now who got his Ph.D. in political science and wrote about
    strategic stability in his dissertation.
        Those are the kinds of young men and women we are going to
    have to seek out, bring into the circle of policymakers so they
    can benefit from the experience of some of our more senior
    policymakers who have been doing this for decades, and build
    that cadre of people that are going to carry us into the
    future.
        General Hyten. Chairman, I will--I think catching up is the
    proper characterization. We are in a good place catching up.
        Where I think we have caught up is that inside the military
    we are having a very robust discussion now. We are talking
    about how do we integrate all of the plans between the various
    combatant commanders, including Strategic Command, and with
    European Command and Pacific Command.
        We are having a robust discussion of what deterrence means
    in Russia, in China, in space, in--but where we haven't caught
    up yet--and if you remember when we were all younger, when we
    were lieutenants and ensigns in the Air Force and the Navy,
    there was a robust academic discussion of what deterrence
    really meant. There were books written, there was debate. Even
    though we didn't have nearly as broad-based of a national media
    infrastructure, there was still this huge discussion in the
    academic community. That is just really starting back up right
    now.
        In STRATCOM we have now formed an academic alliance with 35
    different universities and think tanks to basically try to
    reenergize that broader discussion because it is a national
    discussion; it is not just a military discussion.
        The Chairman. Well, I just think that is very important.
    And there have been some articles written about whether you can
    analogize cyber deterrence with strategic nuclear deterrence.
    And I am not making a point for or against that.
        But the key kind of skills about thinking about what will
    deter an adversary in whatever realm you are talking about is
    something I think we have neglected. And it is encouraging to
    me to hear y'all think that that is getting going again and
    that, as you say, we are catching up.
        Thank you, each of you, for being here today. I think this
    has been helpful.
        And we will thank you ahead of time for the further
    discussions we will have this week and beyond.
        Hearing stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 8, 2017

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 8, 2017

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       [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 8, 2017

    =======================================================================

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

        Mr. Smith. You stated during the hearing that we ``were not
    entering an arms race because we bilaterally have a verifiable
    inspection regime for the weapons that are deployed. We have capped the
    number of weapons that are available.'' However, is there a risk that a
    nuclear arms race could still occur because the New START Treaty, while
    it imposes caps on launchers, does not impose any limits on the number
    of non-deployed or reserve nuclear weapons? Why/why not?
        General Selva. The New START Treaty caps the number of deployed
    warheads and deployed and non-deployed launchers both sides can
    possess. Thus compliance with New START is preventing either side from
    ``racing.'' There is always risk that a nuclear arms race may occur,
    but not because the New START Treaty does not impose any limits on the
    number of non-deployed warheads. For example, Russia could decide to
    breakout from New START limits and continue its ongoing modernization
    program beyond what is allowed under the Treaty. In fact, one of the
    purposes of the U.S. stockpile of non-deployed warheads is to deter
    such a breakout by enabling us to increase our forces as well.
        Mr. Smith. Secretary Work stated before our committee in June 2015,
    ``Anyone who thinks they can control escalation through the use of
    nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire'' and ``Escalation is
    escalation, and nuclear use would be the ultimate escalation.'' Do you
    agree, and do you think escalation can be reliably controlled? What are
    the risks that using a lower-yield nuclear weapon would lead to a
    massive nuclear exchange?
        General Selva. As there has thankfully never been a limited nuclear
    exchange, we do not know whether such escalation can be controlled, and
    we cannot know for certain how reliable an effort to control escalation
    might be. The use of any nuclear weapon could lead to a large-scale
    exchange and the prospect of such uncontrolled escalation arguably
    enhances the deterrence of nuclear first use. However, just because we
    do not know for certain whether we can control escalation does not mean
    we should not attempt it if an adversary uses a nuclear weapon in a
    conflict. Were deterrence to fail in a limited way, it would be better
    for the President to have a full range of response options, including
    options to attempt to control further escalation and reestablish
    deterrence.
        Mr. Smith. Given the increasing costs for nuclear weapons
    modernization and the conventional capabilities requirements, could you
    provide a chart to the Committee showing the costs of nuclear weapons
    modernization/recapitalization as a percentage of the DOD acquisition
    budget over the next 10 years and next 25 years?
        General Selva. [See table below.]

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            FYDP (2017-2021) Estimate   10-Year (2017-2026) Estimate
                           Program                                    ($B)                          ($B)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    COLUMBIA-Class                                        13.2                          43.7
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ground Based Strategic Deterrent                       3.4                          13.2
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Long Range Stand Off                                   2.2                           5.6
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    B-21\1\                                                0.6                           1.9
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3)    10.7                          20.4
     Investment \2\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Notes
    1. These amounts represent the nuclear-related costs for the B-21 program which are estimated at 5%.
    2. Includes procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation costs.
    The Department is still compiling 10-year estimates based on the FY18 budget and cannot offer a 25 year plan.

        Mr. Smith. Secretary Work stated before our committee in June 2015,
    ``Anyone who thinks they can control escalation through the use of
    nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire'' and ``Escalation is
    escalation, and nuclear use would be the ultimate escalation.'' Do you
    agree, and do you think escalation can be reliably controlled? What are
    the risks that using a lower-yield nuclear weapon would lead to a
    massive nuclear exchange?
        General Hyten. I agree with Secretary Work in that escalation
    management is a complex concept. In the scenario described, nuclear
    employment has occurred and, as an international community, we are in
    uncharted waters. That is one of the reasons I do not like to use the
    term ``tactical nuclear weapons.'' In my opinion, the employment of any
    nuclear weapon is a strategic decision and will demand a strategic
    response. Although considerable thought has been paid to the theory of
    limited war over more than half a century, there remain considerable
    risks of misperception and misunderstanding leading to miscalculation;
    which is one reason why dialogue with foreign actors, arms control
    agreements, and other mechanisms are so important Again, regardless of
    the yield, any use of a nuclear weapon will have strategic implications
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
        Mr. Cooper. Are you concerned about the shift in Russian nuclear
    doctrine and potential consequences as a result of such a shift that
    could lower the threshold of using nuclear weapons? How can we increase
    strategic and regional stability, especially in the context of nuclear
    proliferation, modernization, and evolving nuclear doctrines?
        General Selva. Yes, I am concerned about Russian nuclear doctrine
    and the potential it creates for uncontrolled escalation in a crisis. A
    fully modernized U.S. nuclear triad and nonstrategic nuclear forces
    raise Russia's threshold for using nuclear weapons because it ensures
    our ability to respond should Russia seek to escalate its way out of a
    failed conventional conflict. Therefore one way for us to increase
    strategic and regional stability is to continue the nuclear
    modernization program of record to avoid capability gaps that might
    threaten the credibility and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent.
    Another complementary way would be dialogue with Russia regarding
    strategic stability to reduce the likelihood of misperception and
    miscalculation.
        Mr. Cooper. Should nuclear threat reduction and nuclear
    nonproliferation be considered as part of the discussions related to
    the nuclear posture review? Why/why not?
        General Selva. Yes, I believe the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
    should consider aspects of nuclear threat reduction and non-
    proliferation because they are important and related national security
    interests. I believe our nuclear deterrence policies, strategies and
    capabilities provide added insurance to achieve U.S. nuclear
    nonproliferation objectives, and are key enablers to reducing threats
    to the United States and our allies from nuclear and WMD-armed
    adversaries.
        Mr. Cooper. Should nuclear threat reduction and nuclear
    nonproliferation be considered as part of the discussions related to
    the nuclear posture review? Why/why not?
        General Hyten. Yes, reducing the threat of nuclear weapon use and
    proliferation are essential elements to determining the adequacy of
    U.S. nuclear forces' ability to deter nuclear attack against the U.S.,
    our allies, and our partners Beyond the nuclear posture review, the
    U.S. regularly participates in dialogue with other ``P-5'' members and
    the broader international community to improve understanding of nuclear
    capabilities and reduce the potential for miscalculation Similarly,
    consistent with our treaty obligations, the U.S., along with our allies
    and partners, continue to pursue nuclear non-proliferation policies and
    strategies to reduce escalatory risks and maintain strategic and
    regional stability.
        Mr. Cooper. How could the Department increase the incentives for
    commonality between the Navy and the Air Force while minimizing risks,
    in order to reduce long-term costs for the planned nuclear
    modernization?
        Admiral Moran. The Navy and the Air Force are both addressing the
    challenges of sustaining aging strategic weapon systems in a fiscally
    constrained environment, and are working collaboratively to ensure
    these capabilities are retained in the long-term. We are seeking
    opportunities to leverage technologies and make the best use of scarce
    resources. The Navy and the Air Force assessed whether increasing
    commonality between the GBSD program and the Trident II (D5) life
    extension program could improve affordability while ensuring a safe,
    secure, effective and credible nuclear deterrent, as well as retain
    essential diversity to hedge due to unforeseen technical problems or
    vulnerabilities. The assessment identified some impediments to full
    commonality of major subsystems, like solid rocket motors; however, it
    also identified several D5 life extension candidate processes and
    components that showed promise for application in GBSD development. The
    Navy also expects to leverage, where possible and feasible, Air Force
    ICBM technologies in the longer-term for its own follow-on strategic
    weapon system capability.
        Mr. Cooper. Four years ago, you were faced with bad morale and poor
    leadership in the ICBM missileer ranks and were called on to address
    this problem. What caused the breakdown in leadership? What are the
    milestones for improved morale and leadership?
        General Wilson. In 2014, various internal and external assessments
    identified a number of factors within the Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missile (ICBM) force that had contributed to culture and morale issues.
    Some of the most frequently cited included a culture of perfection and
    micromanagement that had developed, manning and resource constraints
    that led to workarounds outside of accepted procedures, and excessive
    administrative requirements.
        Since 2014, the Air Force has applied deliberate and sustained
    focus to strengthen the ICBM mission as well as the broader nuclear
    enterprise. Our ongoing efforts--spanning the full-range of personnel,
    management, oversight, mission performance, training, testing, and
    investment issues--continue to produce tangible and lasting
    improvements. We have institutionalized a culture of continuous
    improvement and have placed renewed emphasis on establishing effective
    processes to assess and oversee the health of the nuclear enterprise.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
        Mr. Rogers. The Congressional Budget Office recently said that
    we're planning to spend ``roughly 6 percent'' of the total defense
    budget on the nuclear deterrence mission over the next 10 years. In
    your professional military judgment, is 6 percent of our defense budget
    an appropriate level of spending for the nuclear deterrence mission--
    for what you termed in the hearing the nation's highest priority
    defense mission?
        General Selva. I will re-emphasize that the nuclear deterrent is
    the nation's highest priority defense mission and, as such, needs to be
    funded appropriately. The past sequestration and budget caps have
    negatively impacted the modernization of our nuclear weapon systems and
    infrastructure. We have delayed making investments in modernization
    which has driven our current systems to the end of their service lives.
    Further delays will cause gaps in our capabilities and jeopardize the
    nuclear deterrence mission as well as increase costs later. It is
    imperative that we fund the nuclear deterrence mission now to assure it
    is safe, secure, and effective for years to come.
        Mr. Rogers. The hearing touched on how cruise missiles are cost-
    imposing capabilities. We know how hard it is defend against cruise
    missiles. Please describe how LRSO is a cost-imposing capability/
    strategy on our adversaries?
        General Selva. LRSO complicates a potential adversary's air defense
    problem by presenting many more small and low-observable penetrators
    than a single bomber with gravity weapons can present on its own. In
    combination with a penetrating bomber, LRSO will significantly reduce a
    potential adversary's ability to achieve sanctuary within his borders.
        Mr. Rogers. The hearing touched on whether dual-capable air-
    launched cruise missiles (ALCM) are destabilizing. Does Russia deploy
    such dual-capable ALCMs? How many times has the U.S. fired an ALCM in
    combat and did any adversary ever mistake one of those conventional
    ALCMs for a nuclear one? Do you believe LRSO would be destabilizing--
    why or why not?
        General Selva. Russia currently has multiple types of dual-capable
    ALCMs. Russia has Kh-101 (conventional) and Kh-102 (nuclear) subsonic
    cruise missiles that are comparable to U.S. CALCMs and ALCMs. Russia
    also has Kh-32, a dual-capable air-launched supersonic cruise missile
    for which the U.S. has nothing comparable. Of note, the Kh-101 and Kh-
    102 have significantly greater range than their U.S. counterparts, and
    Russian press has reported that Kh-101 was launched from Russian
    strategic bombers (Tu-95 and Tu-160) into Syria over the past 6 months.
    The United States has employed over 300 CALCMs in various conflicts
    since 1991, most recently in 2003 in Iraqi Freedom. None have been
    mistaken as nuclear variants. I do not believe LRSO is destabilizing
    because, like the ALCM it is replacing, it does not provide a disarming
    first strike capability.
        Mr. Rogers. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff examine eliminating LRSO
    during the review of nuclear deterrence last year? Did the Joint Chiefs
    ultimately recommend continuing to pursue LRSO? Why?
        General Selva. As part of the previous Administration's review of
    its nuclear policy last year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluated a
    proposal to defer the current LRSO acquisition program. The Joint
    Chiefs recommended continuing the current program to ensure a
    replacement for the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is available
    before the ALCM ages out. When fielded, LRSO will sustain a nuclear
    standoff capability that the ALCM has provided for decades, and it is a
    critical element of our ability to enhance deterrence by enabling
    credible response options to an adversary's limited or large-scale
    nuclear attack.
        Mr. Rogers. Are there military requirements that the U.S. military
    cannot currently satisfy because we adhere to INF? What are they?
        General Selva. There are no military requirements we cannot
    currently satisfy due to our compliance with the INF Treaty. While
    there is a military requirement to prosecute targets at ranges covered
    by the INF Treaty, those fires do not have to be ground-based. However,
    ground-based systems would increase both the operational flexibility
    and the scale of our intermediate-range strike capabilities. We are
    continually monitoring emerging needs in the face of a rapidly changing
    security environment. If major shifts in the geopolitical landscape
    drive a specific requirement for a ground-based intermediate-range
    strike capability, our compliance with the INF Treaty would restrict
    our ability to field such systems.
        Mr. Rogers. Is there any compelling need to extend the New START
    treaty today? The treaty currently goes to 2021. What are some of the
    considerations that you, in your professional military opinion, believe
    must be addressed in any decision by policymakers to extend this
    treaty?
        General Selva. No, there is no need to extend New START today. It
    is too early to consider extending the Treaty. We are focused this year
    on completing our reductions under the Treaty and ensuring Russia meets
    its obligations by February 2018 when the Treaty's limits go into
    effect. Russia remains in compliance with New START, and I support
    continued implementation. New START continues to provide predictability
    of and transparency into Russia's strategic forces. However, I
    anticipate Russia's violation of its international commitments such as
    the INF Treaty will be a consideration in any future arms control
    discussions.
        Mr. Rogers. Nuclear disarmament advocates are attempting to build
    support for a treaty that would ban nuclear weapons around the world.
    What are the military ramifications if U.S. allies sign such a treaty?
    How might that affect our military, including alliance commitments to
    NATO and the ability to deter and assure in Europe?
        General Selva. If allies sign a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, it
    would undermine long-standing security relationships that have
    underpinned the international security structure in place since the end
    of World War II. Efforts to negotiate such a treaty also seek to
    delegitimize nuclear deterrence, which would be at fundamental odds
    with the extended deterrence guarantees that we provide to allies in
    Europe and Asia. Therefore, if NATO Allies were to sign such a treaty,
    it would undermine longstanding U.S. extended deterrence commitments,
    which are a core element of NATO's deterrence and defense posture.
        Mr. Rogers. Do you believe we should pause or defer development of
    LRSO to wait to see if we can successfully negotiate a treaty banning
    on cruise missiles? In your professional military judgment, do you see
    indications that Russia would negotiate, agree to, and abide by such a
    treaty, given their ongoing violation of the INF Treaty?
        General Selva. No, I do not believe we should pause or defer
    development of LRSO to wait for a successful negotiation of a treaty
    banning cruise missiles. As I stated in my testimony, we are currently
    depending on ``just-in-time'' modernization and replacement of our
    nuclear forces, and that is certainly true of LRSO replacing the aging
    Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). In my view, there is no chance
    Russia or any of the numerous countries who possess cruise missiles
    would negotiate or agree to such a treaty if the United States did not
    also have a credible and effective cruise missile capability.
        Mr. Rogers. The Congressional Budget Office recently said that
    we're planning to spend ``roughly 6 percent'' of the total defense
    budget on the nuclear deterrence mission over the next 10 years. In
    your professional military judgment, is 6 percent of our defense budget
    an appropriate level of spending for the nuclear deterrence mission--
    for what you termed in the hearing the nation's highest priority
    defense mission?
        General Hyten. Yes. Modernization underpins national security and
    will enable the U.S. to defend itself and Allies against existing and
    emerging existential threats. Any further modernization delays will
    result in the loss of deterrent capability. Recapitalization last
    occurred in the 1980s and accounted for 12% of defense spending.
        Mr. Rogers. The hearing touched on how cruise missiles are cost-
    imposing capabilities. We know how hard it is defend against cruise
    missiles. Please describe how LRSO is a cost-imposing capability/
    strategy on our adversaries?
        General Hyten. The combination of LRSO attributes (ability to
    launch beyond range of adversary defenses, hold large geographical area
    at risk, low observable signature, multi-axis routing, large attack
    packages) severely challenges the effectiveness of even the most
    advanced Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). Huge investments and
    technological advancements in detection, tracking, command and control,
    and area/point defenses are required to challenge LRSO viability.
        Mr. Rogers. The hearing touched on whether dual-capable air-
    launched cruise missiles (ALCM) are destabilizing. Does Russia deploy
    such dual-capable ALCMs? How many times has the U.S. fired an ALCM in
    combat and did any adversary ever mistake one of those conventional
    ALCMs for a nuclear one? Do you believe LRSO would be destabilizing--
    why or why not?
        General Hyten. Yes, Russia deploys dual capable cruise missiles.
    The United States has launched a total of 369 Conventional Air Launch
    Cruise Missiles (CALCMs) and over 2,000 Tactical Land Attack Missiles
    (TLAMs) in combat since 1987. None have been mischaracterized by an
    adversary as a nuclear ALCM/TLAM-N. I do not believe LRSO is
    destabilizing--nuclear cruise missiles have existed for decades.
        Mr. Rogers. Would you please describe the military requirements
    driving the need for GBSD? What are the military effectiveness and cost
    implications of choosing to life extend the current Minuteman III
    missile fleet and related ground infrastructure, rather than pursue
    GBSD?
        General Hyten. Minuteman availability and effectiveness is
    increasingly challenged due to system and component age-out, asset
    attrition, and facility degradation issues. As Minuteman III has done
    for over 40 years, GBSD will continue to provide a responsive, highly
    reliable, cost effective force as part of a credible strategic
    deterrent capability. GBSD enhances strategic stability by forcing
    potential adversaries to commit a large number of highly accurate
    ballistic missiles and warheads in order to defeat the force. This
    ``barrier to entry'' encourages restraint as no adversary could defeat
    GBSD without considering the consequences of a U.S. retaliatory
    response. 2014 GBSD Analysis of Alternatives determined the entire
    Minuteman weapon system, to include the C2 infrastructure, requires
    modernization beginning in 2028 and concluded executing the GBSD
    program is more cost effective than an additional Minuteman life
    extension.
        Mr. Rogers. Where do you see the greatest cost and technical risks
    in the GBSD program? For example, what is your view on the priority of
    possible mobile command and control concepts being considered for GBSD?
        General Hyten. From USSTRATCOM's perspective, the greatest cost and
    technical risk is executing a modernization program that goes beyond
    replacing the missile. GBSD must be a fully integrated weapon system
    spanning flight systems, weapon system command and control, missile
    facilities, and the supporting equipment. The U.S. has not conducted
    this level of work in the ICBM force for several decades and it will
    require years of dedicated work and consistent investment to execute
    the program successfully. USSTRATCOM supports the Air Force's
    integrated weapon system approach which focuses low technical risk
    solutions to deliver the required capabilities as the Minuteman force
    retires. The Technical Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase's
    objective is to investigate technologies which reduce development and
    production risk while meeting strategic deterrence requirements. As
    part of this process, the TMRR will examine a full range of options,
    including mobile command and control concepts, to meet our
    requirements.
        Mr. Rogers. We've seen a lot of GBSD acquisition details loaded
    into unclassified acquisition databases run by the Air Force. We all
    know that Russia, China, and others scoop all of that stuff up and
    analyze it intensively. Why is all of this put out in the open? Should
    we reassess what is unclassified in these acquisition documents?
        General Hyten. We share your concerns regarding the amount of
    program information that is available. We need to assess our
    acquisition processes to strike a balance between protecting our
    national security and providing industry the information they need to
    develop our weapon systems while preventing the release of sensitive
    information. We will continue assessing the information we must provide
    to industry while safeguarding our classified information through DOD
    security procedures and safeguards.
        Mr. Rogers. Please explain why we must replace Vietnam-era UH-1N
    ``Huey'' helicopters that are currently used to help protect our ICBM
    fields? Is it the case that one of the two security requirements can't
    be met without new helicopters? Should this replacement be pursued with
    all possible speed? Why? When you rescinded your request for forces,
    what was your understanding of the date for issuance of the RFP for
    this program? Has that date shifted?
        General Hyten. The 1960's era UH-1N fleet does not have the
    required speed, range, endurance, payload or survivability to fully
    execute the emergency response mission. USSTRATCOM's rescinding the
    Request For Forces (RFF) was not intended to diminish the need for a
    replacement helicopter, but to support a focused effort on fielding a
    replacement aircraft as soon as possible. At the time of the RFF
    rescission it was my understanding that the Final Request For Proposal
    (RFP) release was to be February 2017. Due to industry feedback a
    second draft RFP was required and a final RFP is expected in summer
    2017. The Air Force plans to award a contract in FY18 that will result
    in delivery of the first operational helicopter in the FY21 timeframe.
    I was very unhappy when the Air Force notified me of the need to
    reissue the RFP. This should be a simple and straight forward
    acquisition. I rescinded the RFF to ensure that the entire community
    was focused on the new helicopter. I will continue to monitor this
    closely.
        Mr. Rogers. At the hearing, you said that ``rough parity is
    actually a good thing'' in deterrence. I agree. In broad terms, how
    does Russia's ability to produce nuclear weapons compare to the U.S.
    capability at this time? Is this disparity in production capacity a
    risk to the United States?
        General Hyten. Russia is assessed to have a significantly greater
    production capacity than the U.S. due to the preservation of a large,
    modernized infrastructure (roughly comparable to Cold War era Soviet
    Union capability). This infrastructure has enabled the continuous
    modernization, expansion, and diversification of Russia's nuclear
    arsenal. The U.S. has moved to a much smaller infrastructure with a
    manufacturing capacity that limits our ability to address, within a
    relevant time-frame component age-out and advancing adversary
    capabilities. Although our nuclear stockpile is safe and secure, the
    disparity in manufacturing capability puts the U.S. at a possible
    future disadvantage from technical risks associated with an aging
    stockpile and geopolitical risks, if Russia were to abandon parity and
    seek to achieve supremacy.
        Mr. Rogers. At the hearing, you said that ``rough parity is
    actually a good thing'' in deterrence. You also said that for non-
    strategic nuclear weapons, ``the Russian numbers are huge and our
    numbers are small.'' We also know that Russia operates many different
    types of non-strategic nuclear weapons while the U.S. operates
    essentially one. Is this disparity a risk to the United States?
        General Hyten. The distinction between tactical and strategic
    nuclear weapons is nebulous--anybody that employs a nuclear weapon in
    the world has created a strategic effect--all nuclear weapons are
    strategic. Our current force structure, i.e. the Triad, is sufficient
    to maintain strategic stability and manage the risk you are referring
    to. The disparity between U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear
    systems only becomes an issue if our nuclear modernization program is
    not implemented. I am, however, concerned with the recent Russia
    deployment of a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) in violation of
    the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. We will need to decide,
    as a nation, how to respond. I expect this will be addressed in the
    upcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
        Mr. Rogers. What are the impacts to the credibility of our nuclear
    deterrent if we see major schedule slips to any of these programs? How
    will such slips be seen by both our allies and our potential
    adversaries?
        General Hyten. All three legs of our TRIAD are serving well beyond
    their planned service life, experiencing age related degradation, with
    replacements characterized as just in time. There is no schedule margin
    remaining for any program slips. Any further delays and/or
    cancellations will result in the loss of deterrent capabilities and
    failure to meet our strategic objectives and extended deterrent
    commitments causing adversaries, allies and partners to doubt the
    credibility of the U.S. deterrent.
        Mr. Rogers. Do you agree with the characterization that we hear
    that our nuclear forces, particularly our ICBMs, are on ``hair trigger
    alert''? Please tell us what open-ocean targeting is and why it is
    important?
        General Hyten. No, our nuclear forces are not on ``hair trigger
    alert.'' Comprehensive and redundant personnel, technical, and
    procedural safeguards preclude the unauthorized use of TRIAD nuclear
    forces. U.S. nuclear forces proactively strive for the utmost safety
    and security standards, to include the practice of ``open-ocean
    targeting.'' Our nuclear command and control system is constantly
    exercised to ensure that only the President, after consultations with
    his senior advisors and military leaders, can authorize any employment
    of our nuclear forces. ``Open-ocean targeting,'' is the practice of
    loading our ICBMs/SLBMs with target coordinates located in open ocean
    areas. The practice of ``Open-ocean targeting,'' was implemented as
    part of the 1994 Moscow declaration with the stated purpose to protect
    the U.S. and Russia from an accidental or unauthorized nuclear strike
    by the other.
        Mr. Rogers. The Congressional Budget Office recently said that
    we're planning to spend ``roughly 6 percent'' of the total defense
    budget on the nuclear deterrence mission over the next 10 years. In
    your professional military judgment, is 6 percent of our defense budget
    an appropriate level of spending for the nuclear deterrence mission--
    for what you termed in the hearing the nation's highest priority
    defense mission?
        Admiral Moran. Yes. The 1-2% of the national defense budget for the
    sea based strategic deterrent is appropriate and consistent with what
    our nation previously invested to build both the ``41 for Freedom'' in
    the 1960s and the first nuclear modernization with the OHIO Class in
    the 1980s. Beyond deterring the threat of massive attack on the United
    States, having credible nuclear forces is essential to assuring our
    allies of our extended deterrence commitments, thereby convincing them
    that they don't need to pursue their own nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Rogers. The Congressional Budget Office recently said that
    we're planning to spend ``roughly 6 percent'' of the total defense
    budget on the nuclear deterrence mission over the next 10 years. In
    your professional military judgment, is 6 percent of our defense budget
    an appropriate level of spending for the nuclear deterrence mission--
    for what you termed in the hearing the nation's highest priority
    defense mission?
        General Wilson. Making the necessary investments in modernization
    to ensure our nuclear forces remain credible and effective in the years
    ahead is of paramount importance. The level of investment is
    commensurate with the priority the Department of Defense places on this
    mission and its foundational role in our National defense.
        Mr. Rogers. The hearing touched on how cruise missiles are cost-
    imposing capabilities. We know how hard it is defend against cruise
    missiles. Please describe how LRSO is a cost-imposing capability/
    strategy on our adversaries?
        General Wilson. Developing and deploying defensive systems capable
    of detecting, tracking, and defeating the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO)
    weapon would require a potential adversary to expend significant
    technical and financial resources. This investment in defensive systems
    diminishes the amount of resources a potential adversary can expend on
    the development and fielding of offensive capabilities.
        Mr. Rogers. The hearing touched on whether dual-capable air-
    launched cruise missiles (ALCM) are destabilizing. Does Russia deploy
    such dual-capable ALCMs? How many times has the U.S. fired an ALCM in
    combat and did any adversary ever mistake one of those conventional
    ALCMs for a nuclear one? Do you believe LRSO would be destabilizing--
    why or why not?
        General Wilson. The Russian Federation possess dual-capable air-
    launched cruise missiles.
        Since its first use during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, more
    than 350 conventional air launched cruise missiles (CALCM) have been
    employed by the Air Force in combat. The Air Force is not aware of any
    of these CALCM launches being mistaken for nuclear-armed air launched
    cruise missiles.
        I do not believe the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon would be
    destabilizing. The U.S. has employed CALCMs in combat for more than 25
    years without strategic miscalculation.
        Mr. Rogers. What are the military effectiveness and cost
    implications of choosing to life extend the current Minuteman III
    missile fleet and related ground infrastructure, rather than pursue
    GBSD?
        General Wilson. Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is the only
    cost-effective solution that will fully meet Combatant Commander
    requirements through 2075. The GBSD program addresses the challenges of
    the future strategic environment that a life-extended Minuteman III (MM
    III) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile cannot and will do so for
    approximately the same cost. MM III was designed and fielded to counter
    1970s-era threats; in the decades since, advancements in adversary
    capabilities have created a significant and growing threat to MM III's
    effectiveness.
        Life extending MM III would not provide combat capability to 2075
    and would also require multiple sub-system recapitalization programs,
    including the flight system (i.e. boosters, propulsion system rocket
    engine, and guidance and control), weapon system command and control,
    and associated physical infrastructure. In some areas, integration of
    remanufactured legacy components would create new and complex
    compatibility issues, lead to higher costs, and fail to provide
    critical capability upgrades. These and other challenges--such as
    obsolescence and age-out of critical subsystems, asset depletion, and
    diminishing manufacturing sources--make GBSD the only cost-effective
    option that will deliver credible and effective combat capability
    through 2075.
        Mr. Rogers. Please describe the process the Air Force used during
    the analysis of alternatives (AOA) for the GBSD program. Did it
    thoroughly examine all options? Did it rigorously follow DOD and CAPE
    guidance on how to conduct an AOA?
        General Wilson. Yes, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)
    Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) rigorously followed Department of
    Defense processes, was structured in accordance with the Office of Cost
    Assessment & Program Evaluation (CAPE) study guidance and included
    direct Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) oversight through a
    Study Advisory Group (SAG) chaired by Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics and CAPE senior leadership. The GBSD AOA study team complied
    with all CAPE/DOD guidance as part of the assessment. The GBSD study
    team conducted the AOA based upon CAPE's GBSD AOA Guidance, dated
    August 28, 2013. Furthermore, CAPE provided sufficiency review and
    concurrence for the GBSD AOA on November 10, 2015.
        The AOA explored trade space in performance, schedule, and cost
    across the full range of strategic options to include the impacts of
    not meeting validated GBSD Initial Capability Document requirements.
    The AOA was conducted in two parts: Part one was a basing mode analysis
    with a primary focus on survivability; Part two analyzed the Minuteman
    III (MM III) delivery system and focused on MM III recapitalization or
    replacement. Additionally, Part two assessed the entire range of
    validated gaps against several combinations of missile subsystems, to
    include propulsion (boost and post boost), guidance, navigation and
    control, re-entry systems, including existing and new technologies and
    associated industrial base.
        While the aforementioned options thoroughly examined basing modes
    and delivery systems, the compression of the AOA timeline and funding
    (from 18-months to 10-months) did require additional post-AOA
    assessment of the Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) system to include
    detailed NC2 architecture definition and an industrial base interface
    analysis.
        Mr. Rogers. Is the Air Force looking at pursuing putting new
    engines on the B-52 fleet and leverage third party financing to do
    this? This seems like a smart way to get this done in the near-term
    while making the B-52 much more efficient and military effective for
    the long-term.
        General Wilson. The Air Force is assessing options to re-engine the
    B-52 should it become a funded program.
        Additionally, the Air Force is assessing the potential use of third
    party financing options for the production phase of a re-engine
    program. The initial B-52 re-engine Business Case Analysis (BCA)
    indicates significant benefits with lifetime savings exceeding program
    costs. Payback comes from a variety of engine related expenses; fuel
    only provides 23% of the savings. Several factors contribute to the BCA
    include: escalating engine overhaul and related costs; diminishing
    sources of supply; engine related repair costs; fuel costs; increased
    electrical power needs. New engines would also increase the B-52's
    electrical power generation, which would support future modernization
    efforts.
        The Air Force requested $10 million in the Fiscal Year 2017
    President's Budget (FY17PB) Amendment that was not received. The funds
    were to be used to continue more detailed analysis and pre-acquisition
    planning and preparation for a potential re-engine program. Efforts
    include, but not limited to, analysis of engine data to determine best
    value engines, scoping aircraft integration requirements for engines
    (avionics, structural, electrical), and initial program documentation
    preparation and support. The FY18PB requests $10 million for these
    efforts.
        Mr. Rogers. Do you agree with the characterization that we hear
    that our nuclear forces, particularly our ICBMs, are on ``hair trigger
    alert''? Please tell us what open-ocean targeting is and why it is
    important?
        General Wilson. The assertion that the Nation's Intercontinental
    Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) are on ``hair trigger alert'' is incorrect.
    The Minuteman III ICBM relies on extremely robust and secure command
    and control that ensures only the President can authorize a launch.
        All U.S. ICBMs are targeted day-to-day against areas in the open
    ocean. Prior to launch, ICBMs must to be retargeted from the ocean to
    their land-based targets. The U.S. and Russia agreed to implement this
    confidence building practice in 1994.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
        Ms. Speier. The President has called publicly for a ``build-up'' in
    our nuclear arsenal, claiming we've been ``falling behind'' our
    adversaries. I don't understand what metric he's using to make that
    assessment, and your statements mention nothing about an expansion
    being needed to meet our warfighting and deterrence requirements. Are
    you able to corroborate the President's claim that there's a valid
    requirement for new warheads? Do you have any idea on what he's basing
    his claim?
        General Selva. We are initiating a Nuclear Posture Review at the
    direction of the President. I anticipate this review will consider the
    changes in the global security environment since the previous NPR
    (2010) and assess U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and capabilities
    against the current and future threat environment. Once the 2017 NPR is
    completed, we will have higher confidence in any recommendations that
    may result in changes to U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and
    capabilities.
        Ms. Speier. The President has derided the New START Treaty as
    ``one-sided'' and a ``bad deal.'' This is in stark contrast to comments
    made last week by Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force
    Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration.
    General Weinstein said that the agreement has been ``good for us.'' He
    further explained that ``The reason you do a treaty is not to cut
    forces but to maintain strategic stability among world powers . . . I
    think there is a huge value with what the New START treaty has
    provided.'' General Selva: Do you agree with General Weinstein? Is the
    Chairman prepared to offer his best military advice on this question to
    the President?
        General Selva. I believe the New START Treaty remains in the
    national security interest of the United States as long as Russia
    complies with its terms. Russia is currently in compliance with New
    START, and I support continued implementation. The Treaty has provided
    transparency, predictability, and stability over the past six years
    since the Treaty entered into force and has helped increase mutual
    confidence. The Chairman is prepared to offer his best military advice
    on this question to the President.
        Ms. Speier. President Obama declared that the greatest threat to
    international security is a terrorist with a nuclear weapon--not a
    state program. From what we can tell so far, President Trump also seems
    to be prioritizing the terrorist threat. Yet we're talking here about
    spending--according to independent estimates--up to a trillion dollars
    over the next several decades on programs that have effectively zero
    value against terrorists. At the same time, I'm concerned that,
    following an intensive international effort during the Obama
    administration to lock down nuclear material that could fall into the
    hands of terrorists, our nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear threat
    reduction programs at the Departments of Energy and Defense will be
    getting short shrift under this administration. Are you prepared to
    recommend to the Secretary and the President a sustained--or even
    increased--level of funding for U.S. Government nuclear
    nonproliferation and threat reduction programs?
        General Selva. I support a continued multifaceted approach to
    countering nuclear proliferation, including adequate funding for the
    nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear threat reduction programs at the
    Departments of Energy and Defense.
        Ms. Speier. The string of problems that led to the 2014 Nuclear
    Enterprise Review are a stunning example of how the Department can
    spend billions on bombers, missiles, and subs--and then have military
    readiness degraded by something incredibly stupid like mass cheating on
    competency examinations, or failing to properly maintain the equipment
    we already have. Can you please provide more details on how you will
    ensure that the fundamentals of maintenance, morale, and management
    don't get lost in the push to modernize?
        Admiral Moran. The Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review in 2014
    included an internal and external review and resulting in the
    establishment of the Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group (NDERG)
    by the Secretary of Defense. The NDERG codified senior leader
    accountability and brought together all the elements of the nuclear
    force into a coherent enterprise. The efforts following the review
    strengthened the oversight and regulatory elements to ensure the
    fundamentals of maintenance, morale, and management are fully supported
    and integrated as we move forward with modernization.
        In addition, the Department of the Navy took the following actions
    to further strengthen the actions we were already taking in oversight
    and management of the Navy's top mission.
        -  The Navy expanded the Nuclear Deterrence Mission Oversight
    Council (NNDMOC) to include support commands and nuclear command,
    control and communications (NC3). The council coordinates Navy nuclear
    weapon activities and provides oversight, operations, personnel,
    policy, and material support. The council meets every two months and is
    updated on various aspects of the Navy's Nuclear Weapons Enterprise.
        -  Strategic Systems Program (SSP) was assigned the responsibility
    as regulatory lead, reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations
    (CNO) for the Navy nuclear deterrence mission. SSP performs a
    continuous independent end-to-end assessment, reporting annually to the
    CNO.
        -  Biennially the Navy continues to conduct a comprehensive Navy
    Nuclear Weapons Assessment (NNWA) and reports the results to the Chief
    of Naval Operations. The assessment includes specific site visits and
    inspections to assess compliance with higher level guidance and also
    the fundamentals of maintenance, morale, and management, as well as
    security, safety, operations and facilities.
        Ms. Speier. The President has derided the New START Treaty as
    ``one-sided'' and a ``bad deal.'' This is in stark contrast to comments
    made last week by Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force
    Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration.
    General Weinstein said that the agreement has been ``good for us.'' He
    further explained that ``The reason you do a treaty is not to cut
    forces but to maintain strategic stability among world powers . . . I
    think there is a huge value with what the New START treaty has
    provided.'' General Wilson: Do you side with the comments made by your
    Deputy Chief of Staff, or with those by the President?
        General Wilson. The United States has consistently maintained its
    obligations under the New START Treaty. It is a bilateral, verifiable
    agreement that provides the U.S. with some degree of predictability on
    Russia's capabilities and intentions concerning their strategic forces.
    The President recently directed a bottom-up review of the U.S.'s
    nuclear posture, an effort that may include a review of existing
    treaties and agreements.
        Ms. Speier. The string of problems that led to the 2014 Nuclear
    Enterprise Review are a stunning example of how the Department can
    spend billions on bombers, missiles, and subs--and then have military
    readiness degraded by something incredibly stupid like mass cheating on
    competency examinations, or failing to properly maintain the equipment
    we already have. Can you please provide more details on how you will
    ensure that the fundamentals of maintenance, morale, and management
    don't get lost in the push to modernize?
        General Wilson. The Air Force continues to apply deliberate and
    sustained focus towards strengthening the nuclear enterprise. In recent
    years we have implemented major organizational changes and streamlined
    authorities to ensure the nuclear mission receives the focus it
    deserves. We have institutionalized a culture of continuous improvement
    and are developing a comprehensive assessment tool to monitor and
    evaluate the health of the nuclear enterprise. Our goal is for this
    process to enable early identification of issues and elevate them to
    senior leadership before they escalate into problems.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA
        Ms. Hanabusa. Given the significant modernization needs of the
    Triad, particularly the deterrent abilities of our ICBMs and our bomber
    fleet, how or why do you assume that fully modernizing the entire Triad
    system is the threshold we need to meet? If we are figuring out the
    best way to modernize our capabilities, shouldn't we focus on how our
    adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea will arm and develop
    and how we can best counter them?
        General Selva. We work closely with our partners in the
    intelligence community to ensure that the decisions we make on the
    future of our nuclear deterrent are informed by the current and
    projected threat environment. In fact, it is this very uncertainty
    regarding the future, particularly with respect to adversary
    capabilities, that a triad of nuclear forces hedges against. Numerous
    reviews conducted over multiple Administrations have considered whether
    the United States still needs a triad of nuclear forces. Each one
    determined that a nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
    strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles provides
    the most effective deterrent against the only existential threat to our
    Nation, and is therefore essential to our national security. I have
    participated in some of these reviews, and I agree with this
    conclusion.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Given the significant modernization needs of the
    Triad, particularly the deterrent abilities of our ICBMs and our bomber
    fleet, how or why do you assume that fully modernizing the entire Triad
    system is the threshold we need to meet? If we are figuring out the
    best way to modernize our capabilities, shouldn't we focus on how our
    adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea will arm and develop
    and how we can best counter them?
        General Hyten. Our nuclear modernization program has taken into
    account a range of factors with respect to potential adversary
    developments, not just offensive systems but defensive capabilities as
    well, to ensure the continued effectiveness of our deterrent forces.
    Moreover, because we cannot predict with absolute certainty the
    direction potential adversaries might choose to invest in their nuclear
    weapons programs; we maintain a flexible, responsive, and survivable
    force that can meet a diverse range of threats. Collectively, the
    comprehensive nuclear modernization program ensures an appropriate
    range of options for the President to deter and achieve his objectives
    if deterrence fails.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Given the significant modernization needs of the
    Triad, particularly the deterrent abilities of our ICBMs and our bomber
    fleet, how or why do you assume that fully modernizing the entire Triad
    system is the threshold we need to meet? If we are figuring out the
    best way to modernize our capabilities, shouldn't we focus on how our
    adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea will arm and develop
    and how we can best counter them?
        Admiral Moran. Our nation's nuclear triad of intercontinental
    ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and submarine launched ballistic
    missiles are essential to our nation's security because they have been
    proven over time and we assess they will remain a necessary deterrent
    as long as nuclear weapons exist. Sea-based strategic deterrence is the
    Navy's #1 investment priority and is the bedrock of our ability to
    deter aggression by major adversaries and to assure our partners and
    allies. Maintaining our ability to deter threats against the U.S., our
    allies, and partners is critical to our national security and strategy.
    Recommendations for adjustments to the U.S. nuclear force structure and
    stockpile should be addressed after careful consideration of the
    current security environment and potential threats in the pending
    Nuclear Posture Review.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Given the significant modernization needs of the
    Triad, particularly the deterrent abilities of our ICBMs and our bomber
    fleet, how or why do you assume that fully modernizing the entire Triad
    system is the threshold we need to meet? If we are figuring out the
    best way to modernize our capabilities, shouldn't we focus on how our
    adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea will arm and develop
    and how we can best counter them?
        General Wilson. Sustaining the Triad will best maintain the U.S.'s
    ability to preserve strategic stability, deter major conventional and
    nuclear attack against the homeland or our allies and partners in the
    21st century security environment. Combined, the distinct attributes
    and capabilities of each of the Triad's legs creates valuable
    synergistic deterrence effects that provide superior risk-mitigation
    against geopolitical uncertainty and technical surprise. Multiple
    studies conducted by multiple administrations have shown that the triad
    is the best way to provide an effective nuclear deterrent and assurance
    to our allies. Accordingly, this structure has allowed the U.S. to make
    significant reductions in nuclear force posture over the decades while
    preserving confidence in the reliability, credibility and effectiveness
    of the nuclear force.
        We are not modernizing the Triad to keep parity with modernization
    efforts of other nuclear weapon states. We are modernizing because it
    is long overdue and our capabilities must remain credible and effective
    in the eyes of potential adversaries.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. WENSTRUP
        Dr. Wenstrup. How do developments in foreign nuclear weapon
    programs, or other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into your
    recommendations and military assessments on the future of our nuclear
    deterrent? Specifically:
        a) What developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign
    nations concern you, and how does that factor into your planning and
    programs for the U.S. nuclear deterrent?
        b) Over the long term, when other countries continue to build new
    military nuclear capabilities, will our nuclear deterrent remain
    credible if we don't also continue to improve our nuclear capabilities?
        General Selva. In recent years, Russia has rejected our overtures
    to take the next step in arms control and is in the midst of
    modernizing its entire strategic triad, along with developing new
    nonstrategic nuclear systems and weapons. Russia is also violating the
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and has threatened to
    use nuclear weapons against our NATO Allies. Nuclear weapons have been
    assigned increased prominence in Russian strategy and doctrine.
    Meanwhile, China continues to modernize and increase its nuclear
    forces, and North Korea continues its drive towards a nuclear weapon
    capability that can reach the United States. These threats underscore
    the urgency behind our nuclear modernization program of record, and the
    need to avoid further delays that would have severe impacts on the
    credibility and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent.
        Dr. Wenstrup. How do developments in foreign nuclear weapon
    programs, or other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into your
    recommendations and military assessments on the future of our nuclear
    deterrent? Specifically:
        a) What developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign
    nations concern you, and how does that factor into your planning and
    programs for the U.S. nuclear deterrent?
        b) Over the long term, when other countries continue to build new
    military nuclear capabilities, will our nuclear deterrent remain
    credible if we don't also continue to improve our nuclear capabilities?
        General Hyten. a) The pursuit of offensive cross-domain and/or
    asymmetric capabilities (cyber, hypersonic, counterspace. . .) designed
    to challenge U.S. national security strategy drive the need to
    continuously evaluate and re-prioritize assumptions within existing
    plans and programs, to include the nuclear deterrent.
        b) The U.S. nuclear deterrent will remain credible if we ensure
    sufficient flexibility, responsiveness, and survivability in the force
    structure. The current, Congressionally-funded modernization program is
    designed to achieve these ends. I anticipate the upcoming NPR will
    provide additional clarity and guidance on this subject.
        Dr. Wenstrup. How do developments in foreign nuclear weapon
    programs, or other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into your
    recommendations and military assessments on the future of our nuclear
    deterrent? Specifically:
        a) What developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign
    nations concern you, and how does that factor into your planning and
    programs for the U.S. nuclear deterrent?
        b) Over the long term, when other countries continue to build new
    military nuclear capabilities, will our nuclear deterrent remain
    credible if we don't also continue to improve our nuclear capabilities?
        Admiral Moran. The assumptions of Russia and other potential
    adversaries now and in the future on nuclear force structures,
    capability developments, and doctrines play a major role in our
    assessments of the current and future threat environment. Our
    assessments directly contribute to the strategy and force structure
    decisions of the future. Maintaining our ability to deter and, if
    deterrence fails, respond to future threats underpins our national
    strategy and is critical to this nation, our allies, and partners
    security. The results of the Nuclear Posture Review will inform any
    recommendations to the existing nuclear TRIAD program of record that
    will ensure our deterrent forces remain credible.
        Dr. Wenstrup. How do developments in foreign nuclear weapon
    programs, or other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into your
    recommendations and military assessments on the future of our nuclear
    deterrent? Specifically:
        a) What developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign
    nations concern you, and how does that factor into your planning and
    programs for the U.S. nuclear deterrent?
        b) Over the long term, when other countries continue to build new
    military nuclear capabilities, will our nuclear deterrent remain
    credible if we don't also continue to improve our nuclear capabilities?
        General Wilson. I am concerned about Russian, Chinese, and North
    Korean military modernization efforts, continued aggression seeking to
    annex international borders or waters, and the increase in ballistic
    missile development from regional actors such as Iran. To maintain a
    credible deterrent against this ever-evolving threat, our planning and
    programs must provide flexible options for the President across the
    entire spectrum of conflict.
        The credibility of our nuclear deterrent relies on the capability
    of our nuclear weapons; our Nation's will to use them; and also the
    perception of potential adversaries regarding our capabilities and
    will.
        Foregoing modernization would send a strong message to potential
    adversaries that we are not serious about maintaining any strategic
    advantage or technological superiority. This will weaken our
    credibility and may incentivize other nations to challenge U.S.
    influence and the ability to operate around the globe. Furthermore, any
    changes in U.S. nuclear force structure directly impacts U.S.
    commitment to our allies.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN
        Ms. Rosen. Given Russia's threats towards its neighbors, NATO, and
    the United States, its openly discussed doctrine to use nuclear weapons
    early in a conflict to ``de-escalate'' and get the United States to
    back down, its use of ``hybrid warfare'' against neighbors and
    potentially against NATO member states--what are the risks of a
    conflict in Europe involving the U.S. and Russia? What are the risks of
    such a conflict escalating to the use of nuclear weapons? Why has
    Russia adopted such a doctrine?
        General Selva. The risk of a conflict in Europe involving NATO and
    Russia is a function of the credibility of NATO's deterrence posture.
    U.S. and U.K. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees are critically
    important elements of that posture. This posture is designed to help
    convince the Russian leadership that they cannot escalate their way out
    of a failed conventional conflict. Exactly why Russia is pursuing its
    current defense doctrine is uncertain, but I believe it reflects a
    desire to compensate for Russia's perceived conventional inferiority
    vis-a-vis the United States and NATO. The President has directed a
    Nuclear Posture Review to ensure our nuclear policies, strategies, and
    capabilities continue to address an increasingly complex security
    environment.
        Ms. Rosen. Do you believe the U.S. should have parity with Russia
    in terms of numbers or capabilities regarding nuclear weapons? Why?
    What are the differences between U.S. and Russian nuclear force
    structures, sizes, and doctrine? How do they compare to those of other
    nuclear powers?
        General Selva. I believe maintaining rough parity with Russia in
    terms of nuclear capability is the surest way to maintain strategic
    stability. The United States and Russia have each designed their
    nuclear force structure and doctrine to meet their own perceived
    security needs. The Russians tend to rely more heavily on
    intercontinental ballistic missiles and non-strategic nuclear weapons,
    while the United States relies more heavily on submarine-launched
    ballistic missiles. The nuclear forces of the United States and Russia
    remain far larger than those of other nuclear powers.
        Ms. Rosen. What advice would you offer to the Nuclear Posture
    Review that President Trump has tasked Secretary Mattis to carry out?
    What threats, risks, or opportunities have changed since the Obama
    administration's Nuclear Posture Review was written in 2010?
        General Selva. I anticipate the review will consider the changes in
    the global security environment since the previous NPR (2010), and
    assess U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and capabilities against the
    current and future current threat environment. Once we complete this
    NPR, we will provide informed recommendations on U.S. nuclear policy,
    strategy, and capabilities for the Secretary to present to the
    President for consideration. There have been significant changes in the
    security environment since 2010. Russia has been found in violation of
    the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; invaded its
    neighbor, Ukraine; and publicly threatened nuclear use against our NATO
    Allies--all while continuing a comprehensive modernization of its
    nuclear forces. Additionally, China has become increasingly assertive
    in the South China Sea and is also modernizing and expanding its
    nuclear forces. North Korea continues its drive towards a nuclear
    weapon that can reach the United States, and the Iranian ballistic
    missile program, which is not covered under the Joint Comprehensive
    Plan of Action, continues to make progress on weapon systems that
    threaten our allies and partners in the region.
        Ms. Rosen. President Obama indicated that he was willing to further
    reduce U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third--to
    around 1,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated at that time that it
    would support these reductions if they are bilateral and verifiable. Do
    you believe we should pursue such reductions while Russia is in
    violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other
    arms control obligations?
        General Selva. We are conducting a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
    which will include a review of our nuclear arms control policy. Even if
    the results of the NPR indicate that further reductions are desirable,
    we need to consider Russia's current non-compliance with several arms
    control agreements as well its disregard for other international
    obligations before pursuing new negotiations with Russia. Additionally,
    I would only support an effort to pursue further reductions if the
    resulting agreement was verifiable.
        Ms. Rosen. Given Russia's threats towards its neighbors, NATO, and
    the United States, its openly discussed doctrine to use nuclear weapons
    early in a conflict to ``de-escalate'' and get the United States to
    back down, its use of ``hybrid warfare'' against neighbors and
    potentially against NATO member states--what are the risks of a
    conflict in Europe involving the U.S. and Russia? What are the risks of
    such a conflict escalating to the use of nuclear weapons? Why has
    Russia adopted such a doctrine?
        General Hyten. Russia's aggressive actions towards its neighbors
    and confrontational posture towards NATO have heightened the risk of
    conflict in Europe. U.S. and NATO actions are meant to deter further
    destabilizing Russian behavior and reduce the risk of conflict in
    Europe. Russia's ``escalate to deescalate'' doctrine is based on a
    belief that increasing the costs to an adversary, to include use of
    nuclear weapons, will induce termination of a conflict. Russia's
    assessment of American resolve in such a scenario and Russia's belief
    in its ability to manage escalation dynamics following any nuclear
    employment are deeply flawed.
        Ms. Rosen. Do you believe the U.S. should have parity with Russia
    in terms of numbers or capabilities regarding nuclear weapons? Why?
    What are the differences between U.S. and Russian nuclear force
    structures, sizes, and doctrine? How do they compare to those of other
    nuclear powers?
        General Hyten. I believe there is no distinction between the use of
    tactical and strategic nuclear weapons--anybody who employs a nuclear
    weapon in the world has created a strategic effect. While I acknowledge
    Russia maintains significantly more tactical nuclear weapons, I believe
    we have strategic parity and our current force structure is sufficient
    to maintain strategic stability and manage risk. Russian doctrine
    incorporates a broader range of nuclear employment scenarios, which is
    also expressed through its acquisition of non-strategic and novel
    nuclear weapons--this is the main difference in our doctrine and
    capabilities. Both Russia and the U.S. employ a nuclear Triad. However,
    Russia fields mobile ICBMs and configures their ICBM and SLBM forces
    with multiple warheads. Rough parity exists in the size of strategic
    forces as outlined by New START. Both Russian and U.S. nuclear
    stockpiles are larger than those of other nuclear armed nations
        Ms. Rosen. Please describe the force structure changes the Navy and
    Air Force are making to implement the New START Treaty.
        General Hyten. The Air Force is reducing 450 ICBM silos with
    missile bodies to 400, retaining the 50 empty silos. The Air Force
    reduced the number of nuclear-capable heavy bombers to 60, with 6
    additional bombers for training and maintenance considerations. Each
    SSBN originally configured with 24 SLBM launch tubes now has 20 with 4
    tubes sealed and inoperable.
        Ms. Rosen. What advice would you offer to the Nuclear Posture
    Review that President Trump has tasked Secretary Mattis to carry out?
    What threats, risks, or opportunities have changed since the Obama
    administration's Nuclear Posture Review was written in 2010?
        General Hyten. NPR assumptions and analysis should encompass the
    full range of variables associated with the external threat
    environment, Administration guidance, policy and strategy, the nation's
    industrial might, defense priorities and budget considerations to
    ensure the nation is properly positioned to address any future threat.
    Since 2010, potential adversaries have pursued qualitative
    advancements, quantitative, or both; while also broadening the range of
    scenarios with which they might consider nuclear employment.
        Ms. Rosen. President Obama indicated that he was willing to further
    reduce U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third--to
    around 1,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated at that time that it
    would support these reductions if they are bilateral and verifiable. Do
    you believe we should pursue such reductions while Russia is in
    violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other
    arms control obligations?
        General Hyten. Any reductions must be bilateral and fully
    verifiable under transparent treaty inspection regimes. These
    violations are very concerning and must be fully accounted for in any
    future arms control discussions. We will also address them in the
    upcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). A full and deliberative process
    is required to determine whether future strategic arms control
    agreements are in the best interests of the United States
        Ms. Rosen. Given Russia's threats towards its neighbors, NATO, and
    the United States, its openly discussed doctrine to use nuclear weapons
    early in a conflict to ``de-escalate'' and get the United States to
    back down, its use of ``hybrid warfare'' against neighbors and
    potentially against NATO member states--what are the risks of a
    conflict in Europe involving the U.S. and Russia? What are the risks of
    such a conflict escalating to the use of nuclear weapons? Why has
    Russia adopted such a doctrine?
        Admiral Moran. With the recent actions and rhetoric by Russia, the
    potential risk of conflict arguably is at its highest since the end of
    the Cold War. Maintaining our ability to deter this threat and, if
    deterrence fails, respond to Russian action is critical to NATO and the
    U.S. So the assumptions of Russian doctrine, the risks associated with
    their doctrine, and our intelligence assessments of the current and
    future threat environment will be central to a proper understanding of
    the security environment for the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review. The
    results of the NPR will inform a strategy and future force structure
    decisions along with recommendations on how to best address the future
    threat environment.
        Ms. Rosen. Do you believe the U.S. should have parity with Russia
    in terms of numbers or capabilities regarding nuclear weapons? Why?
    What are the differences between U.S. and Russian nuclear force
    structures, sizes, and doctrine? How do they compare to those of other
    nuclear powers?
        Admiral Moran. Russian nuclear forces represent an existential
    threat to the United States. Maintaining the capacity of our nuclear
    arsenal provides the ability to deter this threat against the U.S., our
    allies, and partners is critical to our national security and strategy.
    Therefore, an analysis of Russian or other nuclear powers' force
    structures, capabilities, and doctrines will be a key to understanding
    the threat environment and informing the nuclear force needs in the
    upcoming Nuclear Posture Review.
        Ms. Rosen. Please describe the force structure changes the Navy and
    Air Force are making to implement the New START Treaty.
        Admiral Moran. In accordance with the nuclear force structure
    announced by the Secretary of Defense on April 8, 2014, the Navy has
    been reducing the number of SLBM launchers on SSBNs and warheads on
    deployed SLBMs in order to support U.S. security requirements and New
    START Treaty central limits.
        The number of submarine launched ballistic missile launchers will
    be reduced from 24 to 20 launchers per SSBN, with no more than 240
    deployed SLBMs and 280 deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers total
    at any time. In addition, the Navy will reduce the overall number of
    deployed SLBM warheads on the OHIO class SSBNs to comply with New START
    Treaty central limits. The Navy is converting launchers pursuant to the
    Treaty so that they are incapable of launching an SLBM.
        The Navy is aligning conversion efforts with the existing OHIO
    Class SSBN operational schedule to minimize the impact to the fleet. As
    of March 2017, conversions have been completed on eleven out of 14
    SSBNs (a total of 44 converted SLBM launchers), and the Navy remains on
    track to complete conversions prior to the February 2018 Treaty
    deadline. Once the New START Treaty limits are achieved in 2018, the
    Navy will responsible for approximately 70% of the U.S. nuclear
    warheads deployed under the New START Treaty.
        Ms. Rosen. What advice would you offer to the Nuclear Posture
    Review that President Trump has tasked Secretary Mattis to carry out?
    What threats, risks, or opportunities have changed since the Obama
    administration's Nuclear Posture Review was written in 2010?
        Admiral Moran. The advice I would offer to the Nuclear Posture
    Review is to ensure a fresh review of the threats and assumptions made
    in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and how they have changed. The
    assumptions of adversary force structure, intents, and doctrines should
    be reviewed and if need, adjusted to match the current security
    environment. The review of changes in the underlying security
    environment will be a central aspect of how the next NPR will be
    performed and the conclusions that will be made.
        Ms. Rosen. President Obama indicated that he was willing to further
    reduce U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third--to
    around 1,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated at that time that it
    would support these reductions if they are bilateral and verifiable. Do
    you believe we should pursue such reductions while Russia is in
    violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other
    arms control obligations?
        Admiral Moran. Potential continued reductions of nuclear forces
    should only be undertaken after a complete assessment of the current
    security environment, particularly in regards to our nuclear armed
    adversaries. Any future force adjustments based on arms control regimes
    should take into account prior actions, verifiability, and the arms
    control agreements contribution to maintaining strategic stability.
    These things, along with a full intelligence assessment of the present
    and future threat environment will be central to the upcoming Nuclear
    Posture Review. The results of the NPR will inform any decisions on
    adjustments to strategy, force structure, and recommendations on how to
    best address the future threat environment.
        Ms. Rosen. Do you believe the U.S. should have parity with Russia
    in terms of numbers or capabilities regarding nuclear weapons? Why?
    What are the differences between U.S. and Russian nuclear force
    structures, sizes, and doctrine? How do they compare to those of other
    nuclear powers?
        General Wilson. The size and capabilities of U.S. strategic forces
    are a function of National policy and combatant commander requirements.
    Historically, the Air Force has pursued technological advancements to
    win wars and maintain dominance in air, space, and cyber domains.
        The United States and Russia both rely on a nuclear Triad
    consisting of strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles,
    and submarine launched ballistic missiles. Strategic warheads are
    limited to 1,550 operationally deployed warheads under the New START
    Treaty. However, Russia maintains a stockpile of tactical nuclear
    weapons that is an order of magnitude larger than that of the U.S. and
    NATO. These numbers are troubling--especially considered in light of
    Russia's continued non-compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
    Forces Treaty.
        Ms. Rosen. Please describe the force structure changes the Navy and
    Air Force are making to implement the New START Treaty.
        General Wilson. To comply with New START Treaty requirements, the
    Air Force converted 29 operational and 12 non-operational B-52H
    strategic bombers to conventional only. In addition, the Air Force
    transitioned 50 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
    silos to operational non-deployed status, a process that involves
    removing the missile and maintaining the silo in a configuration that
    allows a missile to be reinstalled. Another 103 ICBM silos that were in
    ``caretaker'' or inactive test status were also destroyed. The Air
    Force is on track to meet its obligations well in advance of the
    February 5, 2018 Treaty deadline.
        Ms. Rosen. What advice would you offer to the Nuclear Posture
    Review that President Trump has tasked Secretary Mattis to carry out?
    What threats, risks, or opportunities have changed since the Obama
    administration's Nuclear Posture Review was written in 2010?
        General Wilson. The Air Force remains actively engaged and ready to
    support the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) directed by the President.
    Since the 2010 NPR release, the strategic environment has evolved as a
    result of rapidly advancing technology, geopolitical instability,
    constrained resources, challenges to global commons, and hybrid
    warfare. I believe the U.S. nuclear posture must account for these
    changes to the strategic environment to safeguard the security of our
    Nation now and in the future.
        Ms. Rosen. President Obama indicated that he was willing to further
    reduce U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third--to
    around 1,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated at that time that it
    would support these reductions if they are bilateral and verifiable. Do
    you believe we should pursue such reductions while Russia is in
    violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other
    arms control obligations?
        General Wilson. The President has called for a comprehensive review
    of our entire nuclear posture which should take into account the
    totality of current and future threats, strategy, policy, programs,
    readiness postures, infrastructure, nonproliferation and counter
    proliferation objectives, arms control goals, implementation and
    compliance, technology opportunities and the like. I fully support this
    review. The overall assessment of all these considerations should form
    the basis by which we judge the advisability of future strategic
    nuclear weapon reductions with Russia. Thus, I believe it is wise to
    await the results of this review before rendering a decision.

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