[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-3]
THE STATE OF THE WORLD: NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS AND CHALLENGES
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 1, 2017
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fifteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
MO BROOKS, Alabama RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
PAUL COOK, California SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi (Vacancy)
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
MATT GAETZ, Florida
DON BACON, Nebraska
JIM BANKS, Indiana
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Britton Burkett, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
McLaughlin, John E., Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, Former Deputy Director and Acting
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.................... 8
Petraeus, GEN David H., USA (Ret.), Chairman, KKR Global
Institute, Former Commander of U.S. Central Command and
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
McLaughlin, John E........................................... 68
Petraeus, GEN David H........................................ 59
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 83
Mr. O'Rourke................................................. 85
Ms. Stefanik................................................. 84
THE STATE OF THE WORLD: NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS AND CHALLENGES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 1, 2017.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
I want to welcome our witnesses, members, and guests to the
first hearing of the House Armed Services Committee [HASC] in
the 115th Congress. It seems to me that a good place for us to
start this year is to ask the question: What is the state of
the world in which the U.S. military must operate and in which
U.S. national security must be protected?
Two years ago at a similar hearing, I quoted Dr. Henry
Kissinger, who said the United States has not faced a more
diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the Second
World War. I am not sure that anything has been simplified or
made easier in the last 2 years; in fact, I think the world has
only grown more dangerous.
What is indisputable is that our own military has grown
smaller and has been damaged by budget cuts and other factors
in recent years. I look forward to working with my colleagues
in the new administration to turn that around.
But, at the same time, we cannot just pour more money into
a system that may have served us well during the Cold War, but
does not have the agility necessary to meet the wide array of
complex challenges we face today and into the future.
This committee will continue to push defense reform related
to organization, acquisition, authorities, and personnel,
including the intellectual development of the outstanding men
and women who serve our country in the Department of Defense.
A challenge we all face, however, is sorting through which
issues are more and less important. To quote Dr. Kissinger
again, ``because information is so accessible and communication
instantaneous, there is a diminution of focus on its
significance or even on the definition of what is
significant.''
It is certainly true that 24-hour news and the internet can
make perspective hard to come by. That is the reason I am so
grateful to have our two witnesses today, each of whom have had
outstanding careers serving our country. They can help us to
sort through the torrent of news and information and to
identify the most important threats and the most important
trends affecting the national security of the United States.
Before turning to them, let me yield to the ranking member
for any comments he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with you; I
think this hearing is very appropriate. And I welcome our two
witnesses and their expertise, and I think this will be very
informative.
And I also agree with you that we face an incredibly
complex threat environment. Between North Korea and Iran,
Russia, China, obviously radical Islamist extremism in a
variety of different forms throughout the globe, it is a
complicated threat environment.
As far as the size of the military is concerned, just the
two issues that I want to raise that hopefully will be
addressed as we deal with that, we did spend $619 billion, or I
should say are spending $619 billion, for fiscal year 2017 on
our defense budget, which is, again, far and away more than any
other country in the world by a fairly comfortable margin. And,
yes, the size of our military has come down, but let's keep in
mind that it has come down from a military that I believe at
its peak had somewhere close to 200,000 of our troops deployed
in combat zones, primarily Afghanistan and Iraq, and that
number is now significantly smaller.
I will also agree with the chairman that we have to figure
out how to spend the money smarter, and that really gets me to
the points I want to raise.
As we look forward and if we are looking at the budget and
saying, oh, my goodness, we have this incredible threat
environment, we need to spend more on defense, we have to find,
you know, more troops, we have to find more ships, we have to
find more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and
on and on and on, we also have to look at the fact that we have
a debt that I believe is now close to $20 trillion and a
deficit that--I forget the exact number but I believe to this
year was $580 billion. And, ironically, we were kind of happy
about that because it was better than the $1 trillion that it
had been a few years ago, but it is projected to go up.
So if we look at all of this and even if we look at ways to
reform and get more out of our money and we still say, look, we
need more money for defense, we are going to have to look at
the entire budget to figure out how to do that. And I will
suggest that, you know, cutting taxes again by multi-trillion
dollars is not going to make that easier. If we look at our
country's needs and say we need more, to then say we are going
to bring in less revenue is a questionable approach.
I think the second thing that is really important when we
look at this complex threat environment and our finite amount
of resources is the incredible importance of alliances. And
that is what alarms me slightly about the ``America first''
approach. To a certain extent, of course, we are Americans; we
are always going to put ourselves first. But when we look at
what we are going to have to do to combat that threat
environment, we are going to need other countries. We are not
going to be able to get there if we continuously offend them
and push them away, and belittle alliances that have served us
quite well since World War II.
I mean, just to cite one example, on the Horn of Africa, we
have been quite successful, relatively speaking, in dealing
with Al Shabaab and the difficulties in Somalia and then the
difficulties right across the sea in Yemen, and we have done
that with a relatively low U.S. footprint. How have we done it?
We partnered with Kenya and Ethiopia and Uganda and Rwanda and
Djibouti. We have partnered with nations that were friendly to
us and willing to help us. So I think partnerships are going to
be enormously important.
So I hope to hear from the witnesses today their thoughts
on how we deal with the budget challenge. And I don't want to
hear we need 350 ships, we need, you know, 500--I want to hear
how we are going to get there, how are we going to make that
work financially and have a national security plan that fits
into what is likely to be our budget.
And, with that, I yield back and look forward to the
testimony and the questions from the panel. Thank you.
The Chairman. I am pleased to welcome two witnesses who
really don't need an introduction. You have detailed bios that
have been provided.
I would simply say General David Petraeus spent 37 years in
the Army, former commander of our coalition forces in Iraq,
Afghanistan, as well as commander of the U.S. Central Command,
Director of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and is now
chairman of KKR Global Institute.
Mr. John McLaughlin, career CIA analyst focusing first on
Europe and Russia, former Deputy Director and Acting Director
of the CIA, created the CIA's Senior Analytic Service and
founded the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, and
now is at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies.
Again, to both of you, thank you for being here. Without
objection, your full written statement will be made part of the
record, and we would be pleased to hear any comments you would
like to make at this point.
General Petraeus.
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA (RET.), CHAIRMAN, KKR
GLOBAL INSTITUTE, FORMER COMMANDER OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Ranking Member Smith, members of the committee, thanks for the
opportunity to testify today. It is a privilege to be with the
HASC once again and to be here with my friend John McLaughlin,
a former Deputy Director of the CIA, as was mentioned, and
someone whose counsel I sought on numerous occasions during my
time in government and beyond.
This morning, in fact, we will try to complement each
other's opening statements. I will highlight the increasingly
complex and serious threats--and I agree with Dr. Kissinger's
assessment, by the way--those threats to the international
order that has stood us in reasonably good stead since the end
of World War II. And John will provide a more detailed
accounting of the specific threats we face. And we will both be
ready to address questions on the debilitating effects on our
defense capabilities of sequestration, the failure to pass
defense budgets in a timely manner, and excess basing.
In thinking about the topic of today's hearing, the state
of the world, I was reminded of Winston Churchill's famous
adage, the farther back you can look, the farther forward you
are likely to see. So, before turning to where we are in the
world today, I think it would be useful to consider where we
have been and how we got to where we are now.
A little more than a century ago, at the dawn of the 20th
century, Americans had reason to be hopeful. The great powers
were at peace, economic interdependence among nations was
increasing, miraculous new technologies were appearing at
dizzying speed.
Yet this optimistic vision would soon fall to pieces.
Instead, the first half of the 20th century would prove to be
the bloodiest, most devastating period in human history, with
the two most destructive wars in history, the worst economic
collapse in history, and the near takeover of the planet by an
alliance of dictatorships responsible for the worst crimes
against humanity in history.
The United States came of age as a world power amidst the
rubble left by this succession of calamities and resolved, in
the wake of 1945, to try to prevent them from ever happening
again. To keep the peace, we led an effort to establish a
system of global alliances and security commitments
underwritten by U.S. military power and the deployment of our
forces to bases in Europe and Asia.
To create a foundation for prosperity, we put in place an
open, free, and rules-based international economic order
intended to safeguard against the spiral of protectionism that
would produce the impoverishment and radicalization of the
1930s. And to protect freedom here at home, we adopted a
foreign policy that sought to protect and, where possible,
promote freedom abroad, along with human rights and rule of
law.
These were the bipartisan foundations for the international
order that emerged after World War II. They were the product of
American leadership, American power, and American values. And,
while imperfect, on balance, they succeeded.
The extent of that success can be seen when we compare the
first half of the 20th century with the second half of that
century, a period that witnessed the longest stretch without a
great power war in centuries, the most dramatic expansion of
human prosperity in history, and the spread of democracy to
every inhabited continent on the planet.
To borrow a phrase from the historian Robert Kagan, this is
the world that America made. It is also the world that I fear
is now in danger of being unmade.
The international order that America created is now under
unprecedented threat from multiple directions, including by
increasingly capable revisionist powers--that is, countries
dissatisfied with the status quo--by Islamic extremist
organizations that want to destroy our way of life, and by
technologies and tactics that are reducing America's capacity
to defend ourselves and our interests.
As important as those various threats are, however, the
world order has also been undermined by something perhaps even
more pernicious: a loss of self-confidence, resolve, and
strategic clarity on America's part about our vital interest in
preserving and protecting the system we sacrificed so much to
bring into being and have sacrificed so much to preserve.
The major challenge to the U.S.-led international order,
the rise of a set of revisionist powers, is a development
Americans have recognized but been somewhat reluctant to
confront. Since the end of the Cold War, our hopeful assumption
has been that mutual self-interest could provide a pathway for
deepening partnership among the major powers while
globalization would gradually liberalize the internal policies
of all countries.
What we have seen instead, unfortunately, is that, as
certain countries have grown more powerful, so too has their
desire to challenge at least some elements of the status quo,
while domestically their authoritarianism has grown both more
entrenched and yet also more insecure.
In particular, we see several countries, including Iran,
Russia, and China, now working to establish a kind of sphere of
influence over their respective near-abroads, which include
areas of vital strategic importance to the U.S. and where we
have allies and partners to whom we are bound by shared
interests and values.
To be sure, each of the revisionist powers requires a very
different approach on America's part. China, for example, is
not just a rising great power and strategic competitor; it is
also our number-one trading partner, and our relationship with
it is the most important relationship in the world.
In fact, in each case, our relationship inevitably combines
some aspects of intensifying rivalry with other aspects of
shared interest, including the need to develop some concept of
mutual restraint and respect. The challenge for the U.S. is to
find the often elusive equilibrium, something that is likely to
occur only if we combine hardheaded diplomacy with an equally
hardheaded reinvestment in shoring up what has become a
deteriorating balance of power.
A very different, far more radical revisionist force
threatening the international order is Islamic extremism, the
ideology that animates the Islamic State and Al Qaeda and their
affiliates. The greatest weakness of Islamic extremism is also
its greatest strength, which is its protean ability to exist
and indeed thrive without inhabiting a conventional nation-
state. What it lacks in traditional power terms, it compensates
for in conviction, resilience, resourcefulness, and ferocity.
And in its hydra-like qualities, it is unlike any adversary we
have faced before.
What is still missing, in many cases, is the truly
comprehensive approach needed to combat these extremists,
though, to be fair, there has been progress in recent years in
developing an approach that enables local partners and allows
us to achieve a sustainable strategy, with sustainability being
measured in blood and treasure and sustainability being an
essential quality given the likely duration of the struggle in
which we are engaged, which I have characterized as
generational in nature.
The defeat of Islamic extremist groups does, of course,
require a vital military component. But even if we succeed
militarily in metaphorically putting a stake through the heart
of Daesh elements in Iraq and Syria, as I believe we will, that
success will be fleeting unless the underlying conflicts in
those countries and the greater Middle East that enabled the
ISIL's [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's] rise are
addressed and resolved.
We must also recognize that long-term success in this
conflict requires that the ideology of Islamic extremists is
itself discredited. And contending with the ideological
caliphate in cyberspace may well prove more challenging than
taking away the rest of what is now a shrinking physical
caliphate on the ground in Iraq and Syria.
Here I should note that our most important ally in this war
is the overwhelming majority of Muslims who reject Al Qaeda,
Daesh, and their fanatical, barbaric worldview. Indeed, it is
millions of Muslims who are fighting and dying in the greatest
numbers on the front lines of this war, including Arab and
Kurdish fighters bravely battling ISIL in Mosul, Gulf Arab
forces taking the fight to AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula] in Yemen, Afghans courageously struggling against a
resurgent Taliban and a nascent Islamic State affiliate, Somali
forces confronting Al Shabaab, and the Libyan elements that
recently drove another Islamic State entity from the enclave it
had seized on the North African coast.
We must also remember that Islamic extremists want to
portray this fight as a clash of civilizations, with America at
war against Islam. We must not let them do that. Indeed, we
must be very sensitive to actions that might give them
ammunition in such an effort.
Compounding the danger posed by revisionist forces are
technologies that are eroding America's conventional military
edge. In this respect, the wars of the post-9/11 period were,
in some respects, a preview of the future. While the U.S.
deployed forces into Iraq and Afghanistan that were superbly
constructed for rapid, decisive operations of the kind that we
waged during the Gulf war in 1991, our adversaries responded
with strategies that for a fraction of the cost nullified many
of our advantages.
What Islamic extremists demonstrated through insurgency and
terrorism, revisionist powers like Russia, China, and Iran
promise to take to a whole new level of sophistication and with
much more sophisticated weaponry as well.
Among the fast-developing tools in their arsenals are anti-
access area-denial weapons that will complicate our ability to
project power into vital regions and uphold our security
commitments; increasingly capable cyber weapons for employment
alone in attacks on infrastructure or in influence campaigns or
in support of conventional and unconventional force operations,
including so-called hybrid warfare; a renewed emphasis on
nuclear weapons and threats to U.S. primacy in space, a vital
sanctuary for U.S. military power that is increasingly
contested. These are all serious threats, and John will
enumerate them further in his opening statement.
Despite these challenges, I believe America is in a
commanding position to sustain and indeed bolster the
international order that has served us and, paradoxically, some
of those seeking to change it as well. We have an extraordinary
network of partners who are stakeholders in the current order
and can be mobilized far more effectively for its defense. Our
economy remains the largest in the world and an engine of
unsurpassed innovation. And as a result of America's values,
political pluralism, rule of law, our free and open society, we
can recruit the best and brightest from every corner of the
planet, a strategic advantage that none of our competitors can
match.
The paradox of the moment is that, just as the threats to
the world order we created have grown ever more apparent,
American resolve about its defense has become somewhat
ambivalent. To be clear, America cannot do everything
everywhere. Indeed, no one understands that better than the
individual who was privileged to command the surge in Iraq and
the surge in Afghanistan. But when the most egregious
violations of the most basic principles of the international
order we helped shape are tolerated or excused, that lack of
action undermines the entire system and is an invitation to
further challenges.
Americans should not take the current international order
for granted. It did not will itself into existence. We created
it. Likewise, it is not naturally self-sustaining. We have
sustained it. If we stop doing so, it will fray and eventually
collapse.
This is precisely what some of our adversaries seek to
encourage. President Putin, for example, understands that while
conventional aggression may occasionally enable Russia to grab
a bit of land on its periphery, the real center of gravity is
the political will of the major democratic powers to defend
Euro-Atlantic institutions like NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] and the EU [European Union]. That is why Russia
is tenaciously working to sow doubt about the legitimacy of
these institutions and our entire democratic way of life.
Perhaps because Russian civilization has a foot in the
West, Russia as a great power has always been well-positioned,
in a way that China and Iran are not, to wage ideological
warfare that eats at the Euro-Atlantic world from within.
In this respect, Mr. Chairman, I would argue that repulsing
this challenge is as much a test of America's faith in our best
traditions and values as it is of our military strength, though
our military strength obviously is a crucial component of our
national power and does need shoring up, as you and your Senate
counterpart have explained so clearly.
I began my remarks this morning by evoking a dark time in
the history of mankind. Yet it was only at our darkest hour in
the 1940s that we summoned the imagination and determination to
build the world order of which all of us here today have been
many lucky heirs. Perhaps it is in the nature of humanity that
only when we come to grasp fully how bad things could be were
we capable of galvanizing ourselves to set them right.
That is also the great responsibility and equally great
opportunity that those in positions of power have before them
now: to conjure out of the accelerating crises and deepening
challenges of the moment a world that is better than the one we
inherited. And it is my hope that we will demonstrate the will
and commit the resources needed to do just that.
Mr. Chairman, I have typically ended my testimony before
the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in the past by
thanking the committee members for their steadfast support of
our men and women in uniform, particularly during the post-9/11
period. I end my statement this morning the same way, repeating
the gratitude that those in uniform felt during the height of
our engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan for the committee's
extraordinary support for so many critical initiatives on and
off the battlefield, even when some members questioned the
policies we were executing.
I can assure you that this committee's unwavering support
of those serving our Nation in uniform means a great deal to
those on the battlefield and to those supporting them. And it
is with those great Americans in mind that I have offered my
thoughts here this morning.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Petraeus can be found in
the Appendix on page 59.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. McLaughlin.
STATEMENT OF JOHN E. McLAUGHLIN, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF
ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND
ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. McLaughlin. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Smith,
members of the committee, thanks so much for the opportunity to
testify to this great committee. And thanks so much for pairing
me with my friend, General David Petraeus, who has done so much
at home and abroad to advance American interests and keep our
Nation secure.
Your ambitious title, ``The State of the World,'' is enough
to make any briefer a little humble. You have a lengthy,
detailed written statement from me, so I am going to summarize
it quickly so we can get to your questions.
You know, as General Petraeus points out, the world is
going through a major transition toward one that more closely
resembles the great power politics, the balance-of-power period
that predates the Cold War. Meanwhile, the norms that make up
the global order, as General Petraeus has said, are under
challenge, as Russia, China, and others test the sanctity of
borders, the rules governing the maritime and air domains. And
without consensus on rules, the international order, the
international system, slips into chaos. This is the story of
the 20th century.
My testimony does two things to elaborate on this. First, I
sketch some of the broad global trends that will condition
everything else in coming years. And then I am going to look at
some specific issues, arraying them along a spectrum from those
that are urgent to those that are longer range or emerging.
First, global trends, big things that affect everything
else. First, we are witnessing a diffusion of power among
nations. The U.S. will remain, I am convinced, the single most
influential country in the world, but, as General Petraeus
suggested, success for us will center on our ability to manage
alliances and build coalitions.
Second, demographic trends over the next couple decades
will contribute to societal stresses and instability. By 2035,
world population will hit 8.3 billion, but less than 3 percent
of this growth is going to occur in the developed world. So
that means that demand for services will be rising precisely in
those parts of the world least able to handle that.
Third, we are seeing a growing discontent with governance
almost everywhere: our own election; populist movements in
Europe; Brexit in the U.K. [United Kingdom]; years ago the Arab
Spring, where those pressures are still just under the surface.
And, fourth and finally, a technology revolution greater in
speed and scope than anything we have experienced in the 20th
century or the 21st century so far. Last century, it was
physics and engineering; this century, it is information
technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology, robotics, and all of
these jammed together in a continuously inventive way, and not
always by the United States.
One symptom is the devolution of power to individuals,
asymmetric power you might say--social media, for example. And
they are free to use this for good or evil in measures beyond
anything we have experienced in the past.
So now let's turn to some specific issues and start with
the urgent. Now, ``urgent'' for me means those that threaten
the lives of Americans and our closest allies or the physical
security of the United States. Those are the things that are
urgent on an immediate and ongoing basis. So that takes me to
things like terrorism, nuclear weapons, cyber.
On terrorism, ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] is
still a very serious threat, but I think it is weaker on four
of the five measures that I mentioned the last time I testified
to this committee about a year ago. It has less territory, less
money, a slowing recruitment pipeline, and a less attractive
narrative. But it is still strong on the final measure that I
mentioned: access to us, to targets.
By virtue of having gathered so many more foreign fighters
from the West, close to 7,000 at its height, its jihadists can
filter back into Western societies and neighboring societies,
including Russia. Nineteen hundred have reportedly already
returned to Europe, where, based on my experience with those
security services, they have to be stretched to the limit.
Moreover, ISIS has a more robust international network than
Al Qaeda ever had and, if driven out of Syria and Iraq, can
shelter and plot in dozens of countries around the world.
Al Qaeda, meanwhile, is not out of business. It is working
to exploit ISIS's weakening position in Syria and Iraq. And its
Yemen branch, responsible for the Charlie Hebdo attacks in
Paris and for several attempts against the U.S. homeland, is
using the civil war there in Syria to seize additional
territory and sink deeper roots.
On the nuclear front, the most urgent issue facing us, as
you have already referred to, is North Korea. They have been
working on an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] since
the mid-1990s. They achieved staged separation at altitude in
1998. They have since launched 2 satellites with multistage
rockets, they have carried out 5 nuclear tests, and reportedly
have between 12 and 20 nuclear weapons, with the potential to
go to about 100 in the next 5 years. The bottom line here: The
odds are high that they will get to a nuclear ICBM capability
during this administration and possibly even during the current
Congress.
On cyber, the Russian hacking of our election, the reported
Chinese steal of OPM [Office of Personnel Management] data,
illustrate our vulnerability. We can tighten our defenses, of
course, but we need something more, possibly some international
agreements on what norms govern this domain on which the entire
world depends. Some work is underway on that in the G20 [Group
of Twenty], but it is very early.
Now, in today's world, everything can be seen as urgent,
but let's call this next batch of issues ongoing and vitally
important. And I am going to mention four.
First, the Middle East. All of its problems converge in
Syria. Syria's importance is in the long list of things that
will be affected by how it ends. Consider them: the durability
of ISIS; U.S. standing in the region; Russia's influence there;
Iran's reach beyond its borders; Turkey's clout in the region;
how Turkey balances its NATO commitments with its budding
partnership with Russia; the flow of migrants to Europe, where
perceptions of overload played into the U.K.'s Brexit decision
and have increased centrifugal pressures within the European
Union.
Second, Europe itself, contending simultaneously with at
least four destabilizing trends. We used to take Europe for
granted. No more. The volatility of the euro, the migration
crisis, the centrifugal forces strengthened by Brexit, the
challenges to existing borders flowing from Russians' actions
in the east--this at the very center of America's traditional
and most reliable alliance partnership.
Third, China is moving aggressively to check U.S. influence
and dominate Asia. China's economic growth, on the one hand, is
at a 25-year low, but President Xi has not stopped from
fielding potentially transformational initiatives like the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank most of our allies have
joined and the New Silk Road trade and transportation network
connecting China with the Middle East and Europe. Moreover, he
is moving into a vacuum created by our withdrawal from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership by pushing a competing initiative
that will pull in 16 of the world's fastest-growing economies,
comprising about one-half of the world's population.
Here is my point: Our Asian allies, whose trade is already
heavily oriented--30 percent for Australia, for example--are
deeply worried they will be pulled into China's economic orbit
if the U.S. does not stay heavily engaged.
Fourth, regarding Russia, I came away from a recent trip
there, in which I also stopped in Ukraine and Latvia, impressed
with the hostility of Russians' narrative and Putin's
domination of the media and the opposition. Meanwhile, there is
no let-up of Russian pressure on Ukraine; you can see it in The
Washington Post this morning. But Putin will still be
maneuvering to get Western sanctions lifted.
Now, let me say, there is no harm in seeking an improved
relationship with Russia. I remember times when we had such a
relationship. But in any bargaining we need to know our own
interests clearly and calculate them as dispassionately, as
coldly, as clinically as Putin will calculate his.
Historically, when Russia encounters weakness or hesitation, it
demands more. Then it blames the opponent for escalation when
the opponent resists. Then it calls for discussions, which it
uses to consolidate its gains. So deals with Russia will not
come easily.
Another batch of issues are those that will be emerging or
evolving in days ahead. Let me mention just two, one fairly
obvious, the other less so.
First, the Iran nuclear deal. As a compromise, it is by
definition not perfect, but Iran is giving up 98 percent of its
enriched stockpile of uranium and mothballing about 13,000
centrifuges--you know these things--and all of this buys time.
But we will have to stay alert for cheating and continuously
gauge what is in store when the provisions expire in 10 or 15
years.
So far, the U.N. [United Nations] organizations responsible
for monitoring all of this are not reporting major violations.
You may have seen reports of an Iran missile test in the last
several days--technically not a violation under the nuclear
agreement. And the U.N. resolution on this says it can be a
violation if there is a nuclear connection to it. So far, that
is not established.
Second, it is going to be important to keep track of an
ongoing revolution in the international energy market. This is
the one that is a little less obvious. Oil has been a key
driver of geopolitics for years and has determined the policies
and, I would say, the very character of many countries, such as
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Russia, to an extent Iran. But a
combination of fracking here in the United States,
conservation, battery technology, declining Chinese demand,
have created an oversupply and pushed crude oil prices
downward.
Now, OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries] is trying the old gambit of jacking prices up by
cutting supply, but I doubt this will work as it once did. And
this will introduce stresses into societies overly dependent on
oil revenue.
The U.S. is insulated from this, because North America is
heading for self-sufficiency in energy--natural gas--over the
next couple decades, with the U.S. becoming a net exporter of
oil. This could tempt us to pull back from engagement in areas
we have traditionally depended on for oil, but this would be a
mistake.
Let me conclude these remarks by returning to the humility
I expressed at the beginning of this testimony. I would say we
will probably be surprised in coming months by something
neither General Petraeus nor I have mentioned. That is almost
always the case. And it is the best argument for maintaining
high agility in our military, diplomatic, and intelligence
agencies.
So I want to thank you once again for the invitation to
testify in this committee. It is always a pleasure. And I think
we are ready to engage with your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McLaughlin can be found in
the Appendix on page 68.]
The Chairman. Well, thank you, sir.
Thank you both. I think you all have helped us frame our
work for the year very, very well, and I am grateful for your
comments and testimony.
My opinion is we have taken for granted the world America
made, and we have not helped the American people understand how
we Americans benefit from the world we have made. And I want to
ask a little more about that.
As you all well know, the National Intelligence Council
publishes an unclassified document every 4 years called
``Global Trends'' where they summarize a lot of the things that
we have been talking about. On the first page of the version
that came out January 2017, it says, ``For better and worse,
the emerging global landscape is drawing to a close an era of
American dominance following the cold war. So, too, perhaps, is
the rules-based international order that emerged after World
War II.''
To me, that has a tone of inevitability about it. And that
is my question. Is it inevitable that our relative power in the
world is declining, that the world America has made since the
end of World War II is no longer going to be there, or do we
have some say in it? Is it inevitable, or does it depend on the
choices we make, I guess?
General.
General Petraeus. Well, first of all, I think that,
certainly, further evolution is inevitable. China is going to
continue to grow. Interestingly, in dollar terms, in each of
the last couple of years, the U.S. has grown more in GDP [gross
domestic product]. So, again, it is not necessarily that coming
soon to a theater near us is the point where China, in dollar
terms--nominal, not purchasing power parity.
Nonetheless, eventually, a country of 1.3 billion people
which is rapidly modernizing and has benefited more from the
existing system than any other country has during that time or
in history--because no other country has ever in history had
two decades of double-digit GDP growth less maybe 1 year in
there.
So, clearly, there is going to be a relative rise--and,
relatively speaking, U.S. domination of the world, as we
enjoyed for a period after the end of the Cold War, the fall of
the wall, and Desert Storm--our relative dominance is obviously
going to be diminished.
The question, I think, is how does this evolve. And that is
where we have considerable influence. How do we have a
relationship with China that is based on mutual respect and so
forth, the foundation of which ultimately is the U.S. economy
and then our military, diplomatic, and other instruments of
power? And how do we accommodate, how do we work with China to
accommodate its understandable desires so that we can help
shape this world together rather than clash?
You know, there is a book coming out, in fact, by a
professor at Harvard, Graham Allison, the dean of the Belfer
Center, titled ``The Thucydides Trap.'' And it chronicles the
cases in history where there is a great power and then there is
a rising power and then, I don't know, 80 percent of the time,
they clash. Not always, but in many cases they do. And this
goes back to Thucydides chronicling the Peloponnesian War,
where you have Sparta and Athens is rising and of course they
ultimately clash.
Can we prevent that? Is there the kind of strategic
relationship that can be established between our two countries
that can avoid that kind of situation, while still preserving
those elements of the international structure, the order, the
norms, and so forth that have stood us in very good stead, have
helped our allies and partners flourish, despite all of the
challenges, despite all of the imperfections, and enable the
rise of China, our number-one trading partner as well as
arguably our biggest strategic competitor, in a way that,
again, avoids the kinds of clashes that Graham Allison
chronicles in this book that is about to come out?
Mr. McLaughlin. If I can add to that, Mr. Chairman. I don't
think it is inevitable that we are moving into a time when our
power will be somehow dramatically diminished.
We are facing more competitors, but let's think about power
for a minute. Power, typically, on the nation-state level,
consists of two big things: the natural things you can't
affect, like geography and possession of natural resources, but
then there are the things you can affect, like your culture,
your expenditure on military matters, your population policies,
your immigration policies, your demography. Those are things
you can affect. On all of the things that you can affect, I
think the United States remains the preeminent power in the
world.
Just anecdotally, for example, our culture remains more
appealing to the rest of the world than any other major nation-
state. Anecdotally, 70 percent of the box office receipts for
Hollywood movies are overseas, and a fair number of them are in
Russia and China, for example.
So I think we are going through another one of those
periods like, when Sputnik launched in 1957, we thought we were
losing the space race, but we didn't. When we struggled in
Vietnam, we thought that our military power was somehow
neutralized. It wasn't. In the 1980s, when Japan was surging,
Japan, Inc., was seen as taking over the world. It didn't.
Today, though, it is a little different. And China is a
rising power, not a declining one as the Soviet Union was. It
has many more people than Japan has. It is an innovative
society. So it is a competitor. We are facing more competition
than we have had in the past.
So that is how I see it. You know, we are still the most
influential country in the world, but the problems we are
dealing with are almost always problems we can't solve on our
own, whether it is terrorism, proliferation of weapons, the
Syria problem, Iran. Almost everything requires--and the
examples that were given by Mr. Smith, for example, about
Africa. Almost every problem we are dealing with requires us to
be in partnership with someone else.
The other thing I would mention is--and I will stop in a
second, but we have gone through stages here. The Cold War was
bipolar. Seventeen years after the Cold War, from 1991 to 2008,
we didn't have to check with many other people in the world
about what we wanted to do. China was still rising; Russia was
in chaos. From 2008 forward, I think there is some declining
confidence in the world in our model and more competition.
Russia has its act together now; it did not back then. China is
a rising power.
So a competitive world. We are still number one, but we
have to have the ability to work well with others in order to
lead. And American leadership, to me, is still, you know,
preferable to anyone else taking that role. We are the only
ones who lead with our own interests in mind and the interests
of others as well.
So it is not inevitable. It is challenging.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Just two areas of questioning.
One, General Petraeus, you mentioned how the Muslims are
our greatest allies. And I think, you know, one of two things
that is always troubling to me about the new----
General Petraeus. In the fight against Islamic extremism.
Mr. Smith. Yeah.
General Petraeus. Right.
Mr. Smith. Yes. And I think the thing that is most
troubling to me, as I see the new administration take shape--
and I have heard this from some of my conservative friends, not
in Congress directly, but constituents and others complaining
about how we are not standing up enough to violent Islamist
extremism. And, most notably, Mr. Bannon has expressed this
opinion. And from his seat on the National Security Council and
from his proximity to the President, his opinion is going to be
rather important.
And I hadn't really seen it clearly until I saw a quote
from him that basically said it is their view that Islam is not
a religion, it is an authoritarian viewpoint based on
subjugation, and that that is what--and they sort of lumped all
Muslims together in that viewpoint.
And, as you might imagine, I find that rather troubling.
Because if the U.S. viewpoint is, you know, Islam in and of
itself is a threat, then we are in for the very clash of
civilizations that I personally would like to avoid, I would
think most people would want to avoid.
You know, you have spoken with President Trump and spoken
with others. I will also add that I have not seen a similar
precise quote from our national security adviser, General
Flynn, but I know he feels similarly, based on some of the
comments he has made.
If we are really facing an executive branch that says Islam
is the enemy, period, not ISIS, not Al Qaeda, not Al Shabaab,
not the violent extremist groups, but the religion itself,
isn't that, A, a big problem? And, B, how can we go about
convincing the folks who are in power not to view it that way?
General Petraeus. Well, first of all, look, I am not
necessarily an expert on theology. I have certainly spent a lot
of time in the Muslim world, and there certainly are various
sects. And they do range, in some cases, from quite secular, if
you will, to certainly much more fundamental.
Islam is not, by definition, I don't think, our enemy.
Radical or extremist versions of Islam are what we are
combating and, frankly, what the Islamic world is combating.
Mr. Smith. Right.
General Petraeus. Again, this is not actually a clash
between civilizations as much as it is a clash within a
civilization. And this is an existential struggle for Muslim
countries around the world. The biggest target of all for
Islamic extremism is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia because that
is where you have--led by the Keeper of the Two Holy Mosques.
So, again----
Mr. Smith. Yeah, but those groups have killed more Muslims
than anybody else.
General Petraeus. Yes. The ongoing wars have indeed done
just that. And, again, that is why I emphasized the importance
of our Islamic country partners and the importance of Muslims,
who right now, indeed, are on the front lines.
And you can ask whether we moved quickly enough, whether we
were hesitant, or whether we didn't push rapidly enough, and I
would argue that--you have heard me actually argue that we
should have taken action sooner in a number of cases. But the
fact is we have evolved to an approach, a strategy, that in
Iraq has indeed rolled back the Islamic State and will
ultimately clear the Islamic State from Mosul, where I spent a
year, of course, as the commander of the 101st Airborne
Division, and indeed ultimately clear it from the rest of Iraq.
The question, then, is, actually: Can the Muslims of that
country and the other minority groups, can they develop
governance that is sufficiently inclusive that you avoid the
creation of fertile fields for the planting of the seeds of
extremism and ISIS 3.0? And that is indeed the big question
that is there, because you still have to have all of the
elements that we had present during the surge in Iraq.
Although, what is heartening is that the frontline
fighting, the politics, the reconciliation, the restoration of
basic services, reconstruction, all the rest of this is being
done by our partners, as we are enabling them very, very
impressively with the assets, frankly, that this committee and
your Senate counterpart and Appropriations Committees enabled
our military to have. We did not have this armada of unmanned
aerial vehicles, of all the precision weapons systems, the
industrial-strength ability to fuse intelligence even less than
a decade ago. And we do appreciate that very much.
Mr. Smith. I want to ask a quick question about Russia. But
I think that is why it is really, really important, I mean, the
whole controversy over the last few days over the, you know,
change in our refugee immigrant status. I mean, you can drill
down into the weeds of it and say, well, why shouldn't we be
more careful about who we let into the country, and that is
fine. But what I hope people understand is the language around
it, you know, the portion of it that said, well, we will give
preference to Christians over Muslims, the degree to which it
was called a, quote, ``Muslim ban,'' which did come out of some
people's mouths, the way we do that is deeply damaging to our
effort to rely on those allies in the Muslim world that we need
to defeat this extremism.
On Russia, I want to get your viewpoint, both of your
viewpoints, on just one quick thing. And I think you described
very well, you know, the way the Russians do things, Mr.
McLaughlin. I think that is what they are doing in Syria right
now, is, you know, they are negotiating, and then they are
breaking the negotiations, gaining ground.
And I think anyone who thinks that, you know, well, Russia
is just--you know, they view Assad as a problem, as well, and
eventually they are going to need to have him move on because
Assad is not going to need them--no, I think the Russians have
made a friend for life in Bashar Assad in basically saving his
bacon, and that this is the Russian viewpoint, that Putin is
basically starting--I don't know if you can call it a new Cold
War, but it is based more on fascism than communism. But he is
basically trying to undermine liberal democracies anyplace he
can and, at the same time, prop up authoritarian dictatorships.
And there are a bunch of reasons for it. I think, one, he
honestly believes that is the best way to run a country. Two,
obviously, that is the way he is running Russia, and he does
not want the people of Russia to start thinking that liberal
democracy is a good idea.
But I see this--and, you know, I am not one for conspiracy
theories or, you know, grand paranoia, but I see Putin as
having a very clear plan to push fascist authoritarian
governments wherever he can and to undermine liberal
democracies, like ours or Ukraine, wherever.
Am I overstating the case? Is there more room to work with
Russia on this? Or is he really that scheming about how he is
trying to reshape the world?
Mr. McLaughlin. I don't think you are overstating the case
by much, if at all. We don't know whether he is a strategic
genius or a tactician who exploits things smartly and luckily.
We don't know that. But with our own eyes we can see what he is
doing.
I think there are a lot of things involved here. I came
away from my time in Russia about 6 weeks ago, where I met with
people from the Kremlin and the foreign ministry, with a couple
of impressions that relate to the question you asked.
If you look at the first period of Putin's rule, from
roughly 1999 through roughly 2008 or so, he was lucky in that
time because oil prices were real high, and the Russian economy
is fundamentally based on exporting natural resources.
Oil prices have been diving, he has been under sanctions,
and he has now shifted his emphasis, to maintain the support of
the Russian people, to external adventures, which are quite
popular in Russia. Let me emphasize that. His popularity is
high. Russians believe what he says. He has total control of
the media. The media is, I would say, sycophantic with regard
to Putin, with one or two tiny exceptions.
So, I mean, the irony here is that he needs us as an enemy
in order to maintain his popularity. And it is working for him.
Now, on your broader point about what he is trying to
achieve, yeah, I think he has two or three major aims here.
First is to consolidate and keep his control and power in
Russia, and he is doing that quite effectively. Two, it is to
ensure Russia's freedom of action in the neighboring sphere
around him.
When you talk to someone from the Kremlin and you say,
``Why are you harassing NATO members like the Baltics?'', their
perspective, their narrative is, ``Why did you put NATO on our
border?'' So they have a narrative here that is deeply felt.
And we disagree, but I am just making the point that that is
how they think.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I am sorry. We will have to leave it
at that. I have taken more time than I should. I will let other
members get questions in.
Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General and Director, for being here today.
And, General Petraeus, I want to particularly thank you for
being an inspiration for young professionals to serve. It was
really heartwarming a moment ago to see Captain Seth Moulton
and you greet each other. And you certainly have contributed to
him being an effective Member of Congress. Thank you.
Additionally, it is personal. I have had three sons----
General Petraeus. A couple of others in the audience now
too--or in the seats now as a result of the latest election.
Mr. Wilson. And, General, they are multiplying. This is
good. And it is personal. I have had three sons serve in Iraq,
in Afghanistan--field artillery, Navy doctor, Corps of
Engineers. And, again, it has just been so meaningful for their
service, and thank you very much.
With your background, obviously, with Iraq, a country that
we hoped would be stable and prosperous for the people of Iraq,
they are still in crisis. Can you describe where they are
today? What can we do for the future?
General Petraeus. Well, first of all, I think what has
evolved has been a very impressive strategy that, by my
definition, it is sustainable. And, again, that is hugely
important, because this is a generational struggle. The blood
and treasure that we are committing there is, again, not the
kind of vast amount that we had to do to retrieve the country
from the brink of a civil war, say, during the surge.
The issue really is the battle after the battle. That is
the issue in Nineveh province, where you visited when we were
up in Mosul, and the most complex human terrain in all of Iraq.
And, again, the test is going to be can governance there be
sufficiently representative of all the people, sufficiently
responsive to them within the means available, and, above all,
guarantee minority rights as well as majority rule.
And then the same test will acutely have to be answered in
Baghdad. And there is an enormous challenge there. The Prime
Minister, Haider al-Abadi, is someone who knows that the
country has to have inclusive governance. He has reached out;
he knows that there has to be reconciliation, remembering that
the biggest achievement during the surge in Iraq was not
necessarily driving down the level of violence, it was actually
bringing the Sunni Arabs back into the fabric of society, which
actually did then help bring that level of violence down so
considerably.
He is challenged, however. There are Iranian-controlled
Shia militia, three of them that are among the most effective
fighting forces in the country. The former Prime Minister,
Nouri al-Maliki, who pursued the ruinous sectarian policies
that undid what we did during the surge some 3\1/2\ years after
its end, is out there trying to get his old job back. And it is
a very, very fractious situation.
So our effort there now has to be to help him in any way
that we can, without being so overt, without being--he cannot
ever appear to be, obviously, an American puppet. And yet we
have to provide the assistance that we can to him, to his
coalition, and to others who feel the same way that he does,
knowing what we do about the country: that, again, if you
cannot get that fabric of society back together, then you are
not going to be able to resolve the differences that have led
to this kind of situation.
There is one unique factor in Iraq that does help the
country enormously, a country with a tremendous number of
centrifugal forces pulling it apart: It has a centripetal
force, which is the central government's distribution of the
oil revenue. And that does bring the people back to the center,
and it is what will sustain the Sunni Arabs, whose areas no
longer have any major energy production in them as a result of
changes of control of the northern oil fields and the fact that
the big oil has always been in the south, the Shia-controlled
south.
Mr. Wilson. I appreciate in your testimony you addressing
the issue of sequestration. The American people need to know
about this. Just the word is confusing. But it affects
readiness and puts our troops at risk.
Can you give specific examples of what the American people
need to know, why we need to address sequestration right away?
General Petraeus. Well, I think it is the worst damage to
readiness that can possibly be imagined: the way it is
implemented, the lack of ability to plan for it, particularly
that first time. I was talking with the chairman before this
hearing. Services are still working their way out of the
challenges that were created during that time, where there were
very limited ways to take the kinds of substantial cuts that
were levied other than laying off civilian workers, others.
And readiness took a major hit, I think the single biggest
cause of those pockets of readiness challenge that still exist
out there and still need to be dealt with.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to both of you for being here and providing us
with that sweeping study of the international order.
General Petraeus, I wonder if you could just take us back
in many ways to your role of commanding in Iraq, in the theater
there, and if a travel ban had occurred during your time, how
do you see that affecting? And, today, as we continue to really
have relations with many of our interpreters there, how is that
being interpreted? What do you think the long-range effects for
that could be?
General Petraeus. Well, the long-range effects I think will
be determined by how quickly now whatever changes that are
identified can be implemented and we can get back to, if you
will, a routine conduct of business.
There are numerous individuals who, of course, put their
lives at risk and those of their families as well. A number of
them have been in various pipelines, have waited for years to
get the opportunity to leave the country, where they are at
risk because of their service alongside us. And so, clearly,
allowing that process to resume with whatever additional
safeguards I think will be very helpful.
I have been very heartened by Secretary Mattis, Secretary
Kelly, others, who have come out and identified where there
need to be exceptions and exemptions and so forth. But, I mean,
the paradox is that we have General Kenani, a four-star general
with whom I worked very closely in a number of different
positions in Iraq. He is the head of the Iraqi Counter
Terrorism Service, the most professional and most reliable and
finest fighting force that is in Iraq. It has borne the brunt
of much of this fighting throughout the time of the battle
against ISIS. And he is prevented from coming here to
coordinate with Central Command and others and, indeed, his
family, which is here because of the risk that he has incurred
there.
So, again, I think just the sooner that we can figure out
what additional steps need to be added to the process to ensure
that we double- and triple-check to ensure that individuals
coming to our country won't become engaged in terrorist acts.
Mrs. Davis. Mr. McLaughlin, would you agree? Does this give
Islamic extremists ammunition?
Mr. McLaughlin. Almost everything we do gives the Islamic
extremists ammunition. They can take almost anything, any
American policy, and turn it into propaganda. And they will do
that with this.
Mrs. Davis. If I could just turn to Russia for a moment as
well and thinking in terms of our NATO interests. And I know
that, General Petraeus, you mentioned how, obviously, President
Putin watches the political will of the major democratic powers
to defend Euro-Atlantic institutions like NATO. We certainly
are quite aware of the influence campaign that we just
experienced from Russia.
How do you see that going forward, in our ability to
continue sanctions, with our partners, as well as dealing with
cybersecurity issues? Should we be cooperating on that, in that
area? How would you move forward? What advice would you give
President Trump on that?
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, I would say we have to really first
figure out what are our interests, be as clear in our minds on
that as we can be, before we go into any kind of negotiation
with the Russians because they will be very clear about what
they want. So we have to know what we want. And we have to
understand where the trade space might be, if there is any.
And we have to be very clear that we will not put up with
aggression against NATO. NATO has done its most impressive
forward deployment--it is in the process of doing it now--
sending four battalions forward, three in the Baltics and one
in Poland. The one in Poland is led by Americans. And we have
to be firm on that score.
We have to guard against the Russians creating situations
of ambiguity, such as they did when they went into Crimea with
their little green men. And now we are very aware of that. This
is what makes strategy with the Russians, against the Russians
so difficult. They use this array--General Petraeus referred to
hybrid warfare. What that translates to in the Russian sense is
a mixture of conventional forces, special forces, information
operations, cyber operations, propaganda, and, to put a bald
face on it, lying. And we are not used to that. We are sort of
straightforward, this-is-it, put our cards on the table. So we
have to kind of become more subtle in the way we deal with
them.
The Latvians when I was there said something very
impressive, I thought. They are on the front line. They have
about 25 percent of their population ethnic Russians.
Those people are bombarded with propaganda from Russian TV
stations and so forth. They said: Our objective is to make sure
we do not allow them to create a situation of ambiguity here;
that is, they come in, they do something like take over a TV
station, and claim it is not Russians. Latvians said: If they
are Russians, we are going to take action right away. We can't
wait. And that will lead to an Article 5 in NATO if that ever
happens. And NATO will then have to be stepping up to that. And
that will be a very difficult moment for us. So I think this is
very dicey.
General Petraeus. May I just underscore something that John
mentioned I think is hugely important? And that is being firm
with respect to the Russians.
He highlighted that also in his opening statement. But when
we are not, they are going to push further. And the same is
true of some of the other, if you will, revisionist powers that
are out there.
I have been heartened to see the deployments of armored
forces in recent weeks to Europe, to the Baltic States, and to
eastern Poland; heartened by the calls by Secretary Mattis to
his NATO counterparts reiterating the inviolability of the
Article 5 commitment that we have made.
But there have been times where we have not been as
supportive. This committee and the Senate counterpart
authorized and appropriated by the Appropriations Committee,
shoulder-launched anti-tank guided missiles. These cannot be
interpreted as offensive weapons. You are not going to run to
Moscow with these on your shoulder. And yet we did not deliver
those to the Ukrainian forces that are battling the Russian-
supported separatists.
So, again, we have got to be very careful how we do this.
Firmness shouldn't get into provocation. Again, finding that
equilibrium, having strategic dialogue, understanding the
interests of each side. But at the end of the day, there has to
be a degree of firmness there, or, again, they will push
further and further and further until eventually they feel
that.
Mr. McLaughlin. Can I add one very brief point? When I was
in Ukraine, a Ukrainian Member of Parliament, the head of
their, I think foreign affairs committee, said something that
really stuck in my head. She said: Ukraine is the only former
member of the Soviet Union that can change Russia. That is why
Putin is so worried about it.
They think of Ukraine as, first, the origin of the Slavic
nation. They think of them as their kind of little brothers.
And if Ukraine actually achieves pluralism, democracy,
independence, prosperity, it is a threat to the system that
Putin has constructed in Russia. So that tells us that maybe
our greatest way to combat Russia is to help Ukraine, which
hasn't helped itself all that much in recent years. But I would
say there are positive trends underway in Ukraine. The
committee might actually have someone come and take a deep dive
into Ukraine for you because they are doing some good things
now, and they are becoming a smart political nation.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. And I might add, Mr. Chairman, that
the Democracy Partnership has been working with Ukraine for a
number of years. And so thank you very much.
The Chairman. Important discussion. I know some members are
going there before too long.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this
important hearing on the world's threats and challenges.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your contribution.
And, General Petraeus, good to see you again. I appreciate
your opening with the statement on Churchill of looking back
can allow us to see forward. So, with that theme, I am going to
take you back to the nineties and to the Balkans. Thank you for
your service as part of the NATO stabilization force in Bosnia.
I served as the mayor of Dayton during the negotiation of the
Dayton Peace Accords and traveled to Bosnia twice in 1996, once
with Commerce Secretary Mickey Kantor on the follow-on to the
tragic Ron Brown crash. And my community took part in helping
build democratic institutions with exchanges with hospitals,
government institutions, and schools.
The Dayton Peace Accords, as you know, were intended to be
a transition to peace. It was a great accomplishment by our
country where we ended the war and the disintegration of
Yugoslavia. It is an area that has been largely neglected,
though, since the Dayton Peace Accords. It has been left with
an unworkable constitution. The Republika Srpska continues to
talk about seeking independence, which, of course, has the
potential of resulting in conflict in the area.
The Prime Minister of Serbia continues to openly state that
he is concerned that conflict could result. General Hodges, as
he looks through the area, also identifies it as an area of
concern. Yesterday, I met with the president of the American
University in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denis Prcic.
General Petraeus. So did I.
Mr. Turner. That is what my transition was. He related to
me that he had met with you. As you know, his view is very
pessimistic, although his organization has been part of the
transition to a future for Bosnia. This is an area that I do
believe could result in conflict once again in the heart of
Europe and is just an absolute result of our neglect in
leadership.
So, with that, General, with your expertise and having
served in the area, I would love your thoughts on, as we look
forward, what does America need to do to ensure that conflict
does not result in the Balkans?
General Petraeus. Well, we need to stay with it, frankly,
not with vast sums of money, but, frankly, with very, very
assiduous counsel and constant pressure, if you will, which is
what is needed. I have actually been back there a number of
occasions. The financial firm in which I am privileged to be a
partner did the biggest private equity deal in the history of
the Balkans, which is not a long history and not very big, but
$1.5 billion in telecommunications in overall all the Balkans.
And I go to Bosnia two to three times a year to try to help
advance that particular effort.
The issue is, once again, about governance, as it often is
in countries like this. And it is the layering of governance.
It is the corruption that eats at the system. It is the
inability to push through the partisanship that there is
embedded in ethnic and sectarian differences and political
parties that then get into the economy and so forth and so on.
The declaration of the desire to join the EU is probably
the most hopeful sign I think that has taken place there in a
number of years. And, again, helping them to get down that
road, to meet the different requirements is hugely important.
If they can do that, by the way, if Serbia can do the same
thing, some of the other countries, this will be very, very
helpful to them and to their citizens. Failing that, they are
going to stay mired in this kind of internecine political
conflict that could actually result, once again, perhaps into
something more kinetic. And that is very worrisome, as you
know, to the Republika Srpska in that regard in particular.
Mr. Turner. General, I appreciate your saying that because
I think, whenever we have an item on our agenda that is being
neglected, it can be elevated by people understanding the
risks. And I truly believe, as you have stated, the risk in the
Balkans is not just inefficient government and continued
division, but it is the prospects of conflict in Europe. And I
appreciate your certainly involvement in the area to help on
the economic side and your advocacy to help the United States
identify this as a priority.
General Petraeus. As I have said to them, I felt privileged
to serve there for a year when Bosnia needed soldiers, and I am
privileged to be back there now when they need investors.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
The Chairman. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen. General, it is good to see you.
General Petraeus. Great to see you.
Ms. Bordallo. As a Congresswoman from Guam, we are acutely
aware of the state of Asia-Pacific and the threats that our
island and our country face in this region. And I am concerned
that the President's rhetoric and actions weaken our alliances,
undermining American leadership while creating a power vacuum
in the region that China and Russia appear eager to fill.
Just last week, we heard from the Prime Minister of
Australia that China may be welcomed into the TPP [Trans-
Pacific Partnership] trade agreement, which no longer includes
the United States. In a world where American leadership has
been challenged, you both know the value of building
coalitions.
And, General Petraeus, I agree with your assessment that
China is seeking a broader sphere of influence.
So, to you both, do you believe actions such as rejecting
negotiated trade agreements or antagonizing long-term treaty
allies in Japan and South Korea serve to deepen our
relationship in the region? Does this demonstrate positive
American leadership? And in your assessments, do you see our
allies shifting away from or toward China?
General.
General Petraeus. Thanks very much for that. First of all,
let me just note that I am heartened to see Secretary Mattis
traveling so quickly to Japan and to the Republic of Korea and
reassuring them, again, his phone calls, once again, with his
counterparts. It is interesting, because I just met with two
very senior Australian officials, and we discussed these kinds
of issues.
And I think it is important in the wake of the TPP being
shelved to immediately launch initiatives for bilateral
economic treaties. I think that is hugely important. There is a
degree of uncertainty out there. There is a degree of waiting.
In the past, individuals in Singapore, for example, have
publicly said that, you know, if we don't get TPP, you are
finished in the Pacific, this kind of thing. And I think we
have to show that that is wrong now at this point in time.
But China will be very happy to move out. They already have
an alternative economic council, if you will, that they are
constructing. They have the One Belt and One Road strategy. We
have to keep all of that in mind, and indeed, we have to
strengthen the ties that we have, very, very important allies
there, alliances there, and economic partners, who share our
values and our beliefs in the freedoms that we hold so dear.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Now, for you, Mr. McLaughlin, and General Petraeus just
mentioned it, the Secretary is heading to Japan and South
Korea. What is unclear, will Secretary Mattis be bringing a
message of reassurance and commitment to our historical
agreements, or will he have White House talking points that
retreat from our treaty obligations, for example, Article 5 of
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty?
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, I literally don't know what he has
got in his briefcase, but I am confident that he will not be
stepping back from those agreements.
At the same time, I would say, leaving politics aside, that
just, objectively, what my eyes tell me, what Asian contacts
tell me, is concern about having stepped back from TPP. Asian
nations have invested a great deal of their political capital
in getting to this point in the negotiations on that, and there
is palpable fear from our closest allies that they will be
swept into China's economic orbit if the United States is not
deeply engaged.
So, that said, I would share General Petraeus' confidence
and reassurance that at least we are stepping out--I am sure
General Mattis is doing this--stepping out to emphasize the
bilateral commitments remain, the treaty commitments remain.
And we are going to have to get--if we stay out of TPP--and it
is hard for me to see how we walk that back now. But if we stay
out, getting actively engaged in the economics of the region
through bilateral agreements, which will be hard to construct,
by the way, is essential.
Here is the point I would make about China, a broad point:
I could run through all of the things they are doing, and
General Petraeus just mentioned them. The stark fact is that
the initiatives they are putting forward have a more
transformational potential than practically anything the United
States has proposed in Asia in recent years--transformational.
So what we need here is either deep engagement or a really big
idea.
Now, the pivot toward Asia was a great idea, but it didn't
take material form. We were to get 60 percent of our naval
assets into the Asia-Pacific region. I don't know where we
stand on that. But we need to move ahead with--that is our
future, Asia, so we need to be really careful how we do it.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, gentlemen.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country.
General Petraeus, it was good to see you in Afghanistan.
And in 2011, several of us here came and visited with you and
saw the operations on the ground. I want to commend you for
your leadership there that enabled our training bases to be
taken out and the pushback on the Taliban to give the people of
Afghanistan an opportunity for freedom.
But as we are moving forward there, I would like your
insights into what you think we need to be doing. We had in our
Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee some hearings looking
at force management levels. What we found is that those levels
were causing a split in some of the brigades, with the
maintenance people being left home and contractors backfilling,
et cetera.
So the sense that I have gotten is that there hasn't been a
clear mission there. And I have been concerned about the
resurgence of the Taliban as well as Al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups, ISIL, coming in there, filling up the void as
we have pulled back.
So what would you advise, from your vast expertise there?
What should be our mission? What should be the force management
levels there moving forward?
General Petraeus. First of all, it was great to see you,
and thanks for visiting us with the other Members.
In two words, what we need to provide is a sustained
commitment. Now, let me explain. The mission I think is
actually still very clear. It is to prevent Afghanistan forever
once again becoming a sanctuary for transnational extremists,
the way it was when Al Qaeda had the bases there under the
Taliban rule in which the 9/11 attacks were planned and where
the initial training of the attackers was conducted.
The only way that you can accomplish that mission without
us doing it ourselves is obviously to enable the Afghans to
over time secure themselves and govern themselves to a good
enough fashion. We are not trying to turn Afghanistan into
Switzerland in 10 years or less or something like that.
``Afghan good enough'' was often the phrase. We sometimes
exceeded that, but I think we have learned that that is the
approach.
Now, I share your concerns about troop caps. I have all
along. I share your concern about time-phased force drawdowns.
I think that, in fact, there should be, and I believe there is,
a reexamination of these caps, of the effects that they have on
units. As you know, if a commander is given only a certain
number of forces, he is going to fill that number with those
who can do what only those in uniform can do, which is to go
outside the wire and help partners engage with the population
and occasionally, in this case, engage with the enemy because
we are now much more enablers than we are frontline fighters.
And that means that you are going to leave behind all those
that, you know, don't do that, but do the important maintenance
and other logistical tasks that are so critical to sustainment
of forces. And then you contract that out, which costs a vast
sum of money. And, of course, you have left part of your unit
behind, so you now have a readiness issue on your hands as
well.
So I think reexamining that kind of issue without getting
the numbers going wild, because, again, sustainability of our
strategy is crucial, blood and treasure, because this is going
to be a long effort. Also, again, the sustained commitment that
I envision reassures the Afghans. Still put the pressure on
them to make the changes, to get this pernicious corruption out
of some of the really critical areas in which they are causing
such problems and then also to have rules of engagement that
allow our forces to support our Afghan partners, who are
fighting and dying for their country in a mission that is
important for us to be there. But when we pulled our forces
back from the front lines, we also pulled our air cover. Now we
have relaxed some of that. General Nicholson has been given a
degree of greater freedom. I think there is probably still more
of that that needs to be done. And keeping in mind that it was
under the Taliban that Al Qaeda had those bases where the 9/11
attacks were planned.
Mrs. Hartzler. Absolutely. I want to switch gears quickly--
I only have 40 seconds left--but to Iraq, with your experience
there, what is the role that you see in Iran there doing a lot
of the fighting, the training, and what is it going to look
like afterwards? You talked about a coalition. I mean, that is
a tough sell.
General Petraeus. It is very difficult. On the one hand,
Iraq does not want to be the 51st state of Iran. On the other
hand, Iran is always going to be their neighbor to the east. It
is always going to be much bigger. It is always going to have a
certain degree of shared interest. And Iran, frankly, would
love to Lebanonize Iraq, using these three Shia militia, Asa'ib
Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, and the Badr Corps, which they
support and the Quds Force commander does selfies with on the
front lines. I mean, he went from being an invisible figure to
very visible on social media.
So that is the context in which this is going to play out.
And we have to help those Iraqis who--which is the bulk of the
country--do not want to be dominated by Iran, do not want to
become Lebanonized, and want to be able to determine their own
future, free of undue influence in that regard.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to both witnesses for your thoughtful
testimony today.
And I just want to go back again to Asia-Pacific. Mr.
McLaughlin, you raised the question about whether or not the
sort of pivot militarily and Navy-wise is actually taking
place. I mean, it actually has. Twelve of us last July visited
RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific Exercise] and actually got a really
good view of American leadership still in that region of the
world, 26 navies deploying collaboratively. And Admiral Harris,
you know, was the quarterback that was running those
operations.
Obviously, at that point, TPP was sort of a big question
mark and a big topic, but the other was that, in July, the
Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled against China in terms of
the South China Sea claim by the Philippines. And the
frustration that Admiral Harris as well as other combatant
commanders in other parts of the world have expressed is that
our nonparticipation in the U.N. Law of the Sea treaty really
does undercut our ability to tout what really was, I think, you
know, the perfect sort of rules-based international order, you
know, system response to the historic rights claim that China I
think has, you know, really outrageously asserted in that part
of the world and threatens international order as far as it
pertains to international commerce; $5 trillion of goods flow
through the South China Sea, and the whole world depends on it.
So I was wondering if you would comment, in terms of
whether you think we should get off the bench and become part
of the process of the international Law of the Sea treaty. And
I would ask that to both witnesses.
Mr. McLaughlin. Yes, I do think we should do that. I don't
know why we haven't. There probably is some argument against it
that makes sense in some quarters. But we observe the Law of
the Sea; we just haven't ratified it. And I think it does get
us on a lower high ground, not on a high ground when we have
these disputes.
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that what China has done in
the South China Sea is indefensible in terms of traditional
maritime law. You know, you are entitled to a certain amount of
territory off of your coast, 12 miles, as I recall. And what
they have done by building these islands is enabled themselves
to claim 90 percent of the South China Sea.
The larger issue here is the one you put your finger on,
that both General Petraeus and I referred to in our testimony,
and that is erosion of rules that typically have governed the
global order. And in this case, it is the freedom of the seas.
We have challenged that, as you know, with our forces, and that
is a good thing.
It is also interesting that the Russians have done a joint
exercise with the Chinese in the South China Sea. So there is a
lot of competition in that part of the world for who is going
to be the dominant power. And if we don't defend that, we will
pay in the long run, because 50 percent of the world's cargo,
container cargo, goes through that channel.
China reacted badly, as you know, to the decision of the
international court. Fortunately, they have not done anything
aggressive in response to that of note, but I think it is one
of those ongoing nagging problems in Asia that we have to keep
a constant eye on, both militarily and politically and
diplomatically, and make sure that we don't turn our attention
away from it.
General Petraeus. I agree that we ought to ratify the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and I would expand a bit on
what John was talking about where the rebalance to Asia, the
pivot I think had a lot of good conceptual value.
I think we should remember from that that what was
unhelpful at times was rhetoric that was very ringing about our
rights and freedom of navigation and so forth, say, the
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter at the Shangri-La Dialogue in
Singapore. And then we would wait 6 to 8 months before we
actually put a ship through the South China Sea. And perhaps
instead of the ringing rhetoric, just take ringing actions.
Again, it is time for a little of the, you know, ``speak softly
and carry a big stick.''
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you. Really quickly, General, I
was with you in 2007, Memorial Day. We lost 10 of our personnel
that day. It was a really rough time. And, you know, you
mentioned the sort of balancing act, in terms of the Prime
Minister not being perceived as an American puppet. The Iraqi
Parliament voted 2 days ago to suspend visas from U.S. citizens
into Iraq. He has publicly stated he won't enforce it.
General Petraeus. That is right.
Mr. Courtney. But I mean, that puts him in almost the worst
possible circumstance, in terms of trying to hold together the
alliance, but being, you know, politically internally viewed as
just simply a defender of the U.S.
General Petraeus. We had a sign on the operations center in
every headquarters that I was privileged to command. And we
always had a sign that asked: Will this operation or policy
take more bad guys off the street than it creates by its
conduct or implementation? I think it is always a good question
to ask.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, thank you for your noble service to the
country and to just, again, the cause of human freedom.
General, you mentioned earlier that it was important to
confront ISIS and just radical Islam in general on the
strategic level so that we were dealing with some of the
ideology that foments it. And do you think our current
countermessaging against the ideology of radical political
Islam is adequate at this point? What suggestions would you
make?
General Petraeus. I don't think it is adequate. I think it
is very, very challenging. I freely acknowledge that we are
making a lot more efforts, indeed, in that area. We tried this
when I was the commander of Central Command, so I have a lot of
firsthand experience with how difficult it is.
I think, at the end of the day, if there can be a solution,
as close as we can get to a solution is going to come from much
greater partnerships with the internet service providers and
those who oversee the social media platforms that are so
important in enabling Islamic extremists to communicate, to
proselytize, to share tactics, techniques and procedures, to
issue orders and so forth.
There is, with machine learning, with artificial
intelligence, much, much more opportunity now than in the past,
and yet these IT [information technology] firms have been able
to shut down a fair amount, for example, of child pornography.
Again, there is recognition software, there are apps and all
the rest of this that can be used to identify. And, again, with
the advent of machine learning--and I am actually engaged in
some of this in the private sector in a variety of different
fields--there are much greater opportunities.
I have discussed this with Eric Schmidt of Google, with
also Jared Cohen of what used to be called Google Ideas. I
think it is now Jigsaw or something. And, in fact, we are
meeting to discuss this further in a few weeks in New York,
where they have their big setup for it. There is progress in
this area, and that I think actually is going to be far more
important than what will prove to be--you know, we will be
whistling into the wind in our efforts if you are doing it just
with individuals, even if you can amplify that, magnify that
many different times.
So I think, again, the solution will be with the internet
service providers, social media platform firms, and their help
to this and their commitment that they should not allow this
on, again, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, whatever other means
are being used.
Mr. Franks. Well, certainly, I just want you to know a lot
of us strongly agree with you on that front. We think it is
extremely important, as important as it is to tactically deal
with ISIS, as we have had in some cases when we are serious
about it unprecedented success, but we still have to prevail.
And I guess the second question followup is that, as we
actually squeeze ISIS on the battlefield, there are some
concerns that I think are probably justified, that we will
create sort of a terrorist diaspora, for a lack of a better
term, and that it may increase small-scale terror attacks in
Europe and the U.S. And what would you suggest that we do to
try to prevent that?
General Petraeus. Let me just start with that, and then I
will hand off to John, who has been engaged with the European
services continuously.
Look, first of all, we can't play whack-a-mole. So you have
got to whack all the moles wherever they are. It takes a
network to destroy a network. We have that capacity to do that.
And we need to intensify that particular effort. We have to go
after them wherever they are.
We do have to recognize that, as they are defeated in Iraq
and Syria, again, if they are not killed and if they don't just
sort of melt into the population in those areas, retire from a
life of extremism, they may well go home. And they will go home
to European services that, in some cases, as John mentioned
earlier, are already stretched.
So let me hand off to you there.
Mr. McLaughlin. Yes. The problem, one of the problems--
first off, your broad point is absolutely correct, that the
likelihood is that they will spread. This will not be like
dealing with Al Qaeda. When we cornered Al Qaeda and basically
smashed the 9/11-era leadership, there weren't too many of them
left, and they didn't have too many places to go. This group is
very different. It has pretty well-developed nodes in five or
six countries overseas. I would point to the Sinai and Egypt as
a particularly developed node. They have been damaged in Libya,
but they have scattered in Libya. Libya is a highly ungoverned
area, so there are a lot of places to hide there, although we
have had some success in the last week.
In Europe, the problem that I see is the lack of sharing
and coordination among all of these services. It took us years
to figure out how to do that in the United States. We did it
reasonably well before 9/11, much better after 9/11. It took us
years to learn how to share classified, sensitive information.
The Europeans haven't figured that out yet, as best I can
determine. So we have to work with them to make sure that they
do that, because that is the launching pad for attacks here. If
we have terrorists in Europe with passports that don't require
the same sort of attention to visas, they can come here. And,
of course, they can come here anyway if we are not very careful
with our visa policy.
So I think I would leave it there other than to say the
classic formula for defeating terrorism to me has always had
three parts: destroy the leadership; deny it safe haven; change
the conditions that give rise to the phenomenon. We are pretty
good at destroying the leadership. They have more ungoverned
space than they used to have in the world, Arab Spring and all
of that. And, third, we are far from changing the conditions
that permit this thing to metastasize and grow.
Mr. Franks. Thank you both very much.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you both for being here. We certainly
appreciate your wide-ranging testimony over the many challenges
we face across the globe and as it is informed by your great
experience, and we are certainly the beneficiaries of that.
And in the course of your service, you have both served in
positions that have depended, to a great extent, about
partnerships with our allies around the world in the pursuit of
mutual goals. And both of you today have referenced a need to
maintain these global alliances in the face of diffuse threats,
that we can't do it alone.
So, with that in mind, to achieve U.S. goals, General
Petraeus, you spent many years working with our Iraqi partners
to defeat extremist groups seeking to plunge that country into
chaos. And to that end, today, American forces are working
alongside the Iraqi military to build their capacity to defeat
ISIL. And as you say in your testimony, this approach that
enables our local partners has allowed us to achieve a
sustainable strategy in our fight against ISIL.
So I would like to go back to the President's executive
order that included the ban on the entry of all Iraqis for 90
days, including, as it was first implemented, although now it
has been corrected, those who have directly aided our mission
in that country.
But how might that order confound our two countries' mutual
goals in Iraq and the region? And I am going beyond the
individual impact, the general who couldn't come here, the
translator who served us so well barred from entry. My question
really is, does it undermine the element of trust that must be
key to successfully working together?
And on the ground, I do have a concern about our American
soldier who is working side by side with an Iraqi counterpart.
What does that soldier say to that Iraqi counterpart who
wonders why, despite the fact that we are trying to work
together, that our newly elected President has enacted this
ban?
General Petraeus. Well, clearly, again, the message has to
be one that is going to reinforce and build these partnerships.
And I should also point out, of course, we are not just working
with the Iraqis alone. We are working with what I think is now
the largest coalition in history. I think the Afghan coalition
was the largest, but I think this has actually surpassed it in
fighting against the Islamic State.
Churchill was very right on this as on so many issues when
he said that the only thing worse than fighting with allies is
fighting without them. So we need them. And, as I mentioned, we
especially need Muslim allies. Our Muslim country partners are
the ones who are on the front lines. And it is, again, a
struggle within their civilization even more than it is between
our civilizations. And we don't want to heighten the
differences between those civilizations.
Beyond that, I feel that we have a moral obligation to
those who put their lives on the line and put their families at
risk to serve alongside us in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.
In fact, on Friday, I am doing an event at the American
Enterprise Institute that is titled ``Lost in Translation.''
And it is about these individuals that have been left behind
and have had such a very difficult time to get here. Again, how
we treat them will influence the willingness of others to put
their lives on the line and put their families at risk to serve
with us as well.
Ms. Tsongas. Mr. McLaughlin, would you like to comment at
all?
Mr. McLaughlin. I agree with what General Petraeus said. I
don't want to take a lot of your time other than to just say,
in my old world, the world of intelligence, which General
Petraeus has also led, the relationship we have with other
intelligence services is extraordinarily important. People
sometimes ask me: ``Why don't we do all this stuff ourselves?''
And when I would have a small intelligence service come into my
office from some tiny country, they would always say: ``Oh, you
are so big, and we are so small.'' And I would always say:
``No, where you are, you are so big, and we are so small. You
know your society. You know the culture. You know the
streets.''
So, in this world, globalized world, terrorism, you need a
worldwide coalition in the intelligence sphere just as
desperately as you do in the military and diplomatic arenas.
And I trust we will continue to work for that.
Ms. Tsongas. And I would say we need to be mindful of not
sending conflicting messages in order to maintain the
durability of those partnerships so that we can work together
to meet the common threats that we share.
Thank you, and I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McLaughlin, is there a solution in Syria that does not
include the Russians?
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, you know, isn't that the question? I
would say, if we went back 3 years, I might have said yes, but
let's face it: Putin has played his cards very well. He is now,
if not the kingmaker, he certainly has a seat at the table. It
is very hard for me to imagine a future circumstance in which
Russia does not have a voice in the outcome in Syria.
Mr. Scott. I agree with you 100 percent.
And, General Petraeus, whenever I have been overseas and
talking with our friends, they talk about the risk of terrorism
to Russia, to Putin, and to the Russian citizens.
And in dialogue with Russian generals, do they recognize
the threat from ISIS and terrorism to their country?
General Petraeus. Oh, absolutely. And they have combatted
it and have had huge challenges fighting it, of course.
Mr. Scott. And so, to us as Americans, we believe that the
instability in Syria increases the threat of and the risk of
terrorism actually impacting our country directly. Would they
share that same opinion?
General Petraeus. They would. I would actually highlight
that the even bigger issue for us is what it has done to our
European allies and partners.
Mr. Scott. I agree.
General Petraeus. A tsunami of refugees has caused the
greatest challenges in domestic political terms that they have
had in decades.
Mr. Scott. Absolutely. And so I think there is an area here
where the United States, our allies, and Russia and others who
are not our allies have a common interest. And I do think that,
sooner or later, the United States is going to have to sit
down, have a discussion with Russia, and see if we can come to
some common ground on how we resolve this situation.
General Petraeus. Of course, we have been sitting down with
them. And, unfortunately, what we have been trying to achieve
has obviously proved to be unobtainable.
Mr. Scott. Fair enough. Fair enough. But I don't buy into
Putin wanting Assad to stay. I think he is smart enough to
recognize that Assad is going to go. I think he wants an
organized, negotiated resolution that removes Assad and has
somebody in there that would be loyal to Russia. Obviously, we
don't want somebody that would be loyal to Russia.
I just wonder, as we go through the negotiations, the other
thing that keeps coming up is we have this area where we have
this common interest in finding a resolution to Syria because
the refugee crisis creates a tremendous number of problems for
our friends, especially many of our NATO allies.
I wonder, if we didn't go ahead, from our standpoint,
controlling the things that we can absolutely control, fully
fund the European Reassurance Initiative so that General Hodges
has what he needs to make sure that the Baltic States and the
others--I wouldn't say are not at risk--but certainly that
Putin understands that we are going to hold that alliance
together and protect our friends. So that shifts, take that
aspect out of it as best we can first: go ahead and commit to
fully funding the European Reassurance Initiative, and then
negotiate some type of Syria resolution.
I am just interested in your thoughts on----
General Petraeus. Well, there are a number of issues there.
Mr. Scott [continuing]. What steps we take.
General Petraeus. Those are a couple of those. I think one
of the questions is, do we seek to link Syria, for example, to
Ukraine or do we try to address it just as an issue, which I
think may be the better approach. Certainly, there needs to be
a strategic dialogue between the United States and Russia,
something that we have not had for some time, very cold-eyed
confrontation of each other's vital interests and so forth, red
lines.
But when it comes to Syria, I think, again, the objective
there needs to change somewhat from not--certainly, the common
objective that we will have is defeating the Islamic State and
the Al Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, but I don't know
that it is possible to negotiate a settlement that results in a
democratically elected pluralist democracy in Damascus for all
of the country.
And I think the question is whether the objective shouldn't
be ``stop the bloodshed''; and if the objective is ``stop the
bloodshed,'' then you will probably look at some alternative
methods of going about that.
Mr. Scott. Gentlemen, thank you. I am out of time.
Mr. Chairman, I just hope that we will fully fund the
European Reassurance Initiative and take the questions of our
resolve off the table as to whether or not we would defend our
allies.
General Petraeus. That is the issue of firmness. And
General Hodges is a great soldier and former Screaming Eagle of
the 101st Airborne.
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir. He is still screaming.
The Chairman. Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And thank you both, gentlemen, for your extraordinary
service and for your very insightful presentations this
morning. It was, I think, very helpful.
The former CIA Director Michael Hayden commented on the
President's Muslim ban. These are his words, quote: ``It is a
horrible move. It is a political, ideological move. And, in
fact, what we're doing now has probably made us less safe today
than we were on Friday morning before this happened, because we
are now living the worst jihadist narrative possible, that
there is undying enmity between Islam and the West. And,
frankly, at the humanitarian level, it is an abomination.''
These aren't words of an Obama administration official or the
ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union]; these are the words of a
four-star general and George W. Bush's appointee to the post of
CIA Director.
Do you agree with General Hayden's assessment, General
Petraeus?
General Petraeus. I might offer a slight bit more nuance
than his on Morning Joe or wherever that was. But, again, as I
mentioned earlier, it is always worth testing any policy by
asking whether it will take more bad guys off the street than
it creates. And I think this is one where, if you had done the
kind of staffing that perhaps might have been done, that would
have been identified earlier on.
Mr. Scott. Mr. McLaughlin.
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, ditto to what General Petraeus said.
I would only add the thought that, when I saw the reaction to
the EO [Executive order], my thought was, this is the action of
an administration that hasn't--I am leaving my politics out of
this. This is the action of an administration that doesn't yet
know how hard government is, because you always have to ask,
what are the secondary and tertiary consequences of what you
are about to do? This was the import of the sign that General
Petraeus had in his headquarters.
And probably the proper way to have done this--because
certainly our visa policy needs to be examined--would have been
to assemble all of the relevant players and ask, ``what are the
consequences of this thing we are about to do,'' and then build
into that assessment an implementation that would have avoided
a lot of these problems.
Ms. Speier. All right.
Mr. McLaughlin. I would like to think an administration
learns these lessons, but we will have to see.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
General Petraeus, the President has said that he has talked
to a lot of people in the intelligence community who are big
believers in torture. What is your opinion of the use of
torture in intelligence gathering?
General Petraeus. Well, and on that, I was pleased to see
that he has deferred to General Mattis, who believes as I do,
that, first of all, it is wrong. And if you don't buy that, it
is also generally not the best way of going about getting
information from a detainee.
Now, there is an exception, and I think we actually all
should realize that there is the so-called ticking time bomb
scenario. And in that scenario, I think that, frankly, the
policymakers owe those who might be the executors of policy to
address that. I tried to raise this in my confirmation hearing
for CIA Director, and no one wanted to touch it.
But for your normal detainee operations--and no one was in
charge of more detainees than the guy who commanded the surge
in Iraq. We had well over 20,000--I think it was 27,000
detainees at the height of that and then also during the surge
in Afghanistan. And our experience was that, along with General
Mattis' colorful line, ``Give me''--I think it was--``a beer
and a hot dog''----
Ms. Speier. A pack of cigarettes.
General Petraeus. A pack of cigarettes. Our view was a
little bit more to try to establish a relationship with the
detainee, have very skilled translators and interpreters and
interrogators. They understand the network, the organization.
And they establish a relationship, as we say, become the
detainee's best friend.
By the way, I published something on this when I was a
commander in Iraq. It was called, ``Living Our Values.'' I
said: Look, we can get very, very frustrated. The enemy visits
things on us that we find absolutely abhorrent and barbaric. We
cannot sink to their level.
You can argue whether enhanced interrogation techniques
will work or not. There is an argument. I don't buy it, but
there are those who argue it.
Ms. Speier. General, I want to get one more question in.
General Petraeus. But at the end of the day, you will pay a
much higher price for having done that than the value that you
will get from using those techniques.
Ms. Speier. Thank you. One last question to both of you.
NATO, do we need to stay in NATO, regardless of what our
colleagues and the various other countries contribute to it?
General Petraeus. That is a loaded question. We need to
stay in NATO, but we need our NATO partners to do more.
Interestingly, having just been in Europe in the last month or
so with a number of security leaders of NATO, they actually are
taking the challenge that President Trump has given them very
seriously, which they did not in many cases in the past when
Secretary Gates lectured them or President Obama did. And a
number of them said: You know, maybe we really need to do more.
So----
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, good to see you again. I am going to
refer to your written remarks. Quote: ``Our most important ally
in this world,'' referring to the conflict with Al Qaeda, the
Islamic State, Boko Haram and the like, ``is the overwhelming
majority of Muslims who reject Al Qaeda--and their fanatical
barbaric world view,'' end quote.
How confident are you today that the, quote, ``overwhelming
majority of Muslims,'' end quote, to which you refer will
defeat the Islamic State without a major world power's
intervention or support?
General Petraeus. Oh, no, they need our enabling. But they
are critical to this fight. Without them, again, if the
populations ever turn either very supportive of these
individuals or very rejecting of us, then, obviously, the
conditions change completely, and we are in a very, very big
world of hurt, as they say.
Mr. Brooks. The same question, but with respect to Boko
Haram. How confident are you that the, quote, ``overwhelming
majority of Muslims,'' end quote, will defeat Boko Haram
without a major world power's intervention or support?
General Petraeus. Oh, again, absolutely they need enablers.
The challenge in Nigeria, of course, was that we had a very
difficult time finding good partners to combat that when I was
in my final position in government.
Mr. Brooks. And would your answer be the same with other
entities, like Al Qaeda and the Taliban, that, without major
world power or support, the overwhelming majority of Muslims
would not be able to defeat them?
General Petraeus. I think in virtually every case, our
assistance is invaluable. I can certainly envision cases where
a country can do this on its own. I think that Saudi Arabia
defeated, if you will, Al Qaeda, say, a decade or so ago.
Certainly, there was a partnership there. There was
intelligence sharing. There was assistance in a variety of
ways. But they were the ones who defeated Al Qaeda in their
country. There are other examples of that, where countries have
also defeated Al Qaeda or held it back.
But, again, in the cases where this becomes I think hugely
important--i.e., it is spilling over the boundaries; it is
spreading extremism, instability, and refugees into neighboring
countries and even farther--then clearly there is a role for
the United States and a coalition of allies, noting that we
want as many as we can there, and we want Muslim partners in
this as well.
Mr. Brooks. Given your comments that, as I interpret them,
seem to say that the support of a major power is either much
needed, if not necessary, to defeat these Islamic terrorist
groups, is it your judgment that Islamic extremism is destined
to dominate Islamic nations unless the world powers intervene
with manpower, weaponry, and other material support?
General Petraeus. No. I think, again, there are certainly
many Muslim countries around the world that can either deal
with this themselves or with a modicum of sort of the
traditional sharing and so forth and perhaps some training and
assistance.
It is more the case in the ungoverned spaces where I think
we have to learn five very, very important reasons or lessons,
if I could, very quickly. First is ungoverned spaces----
Mr. Brooks. If I could interject.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Will be exploited by
extremists. It will be.
Mr. Brooks. General, thank you. You have answered my
question.
General Petraeus. Okay.
Mr. Brooks. Any additional comments you want to give,
please submit them in writing. But I want to move to a second
line.
You also state in your written remarks, quote: ``We must
also recognize that long-term success in this conflict requires
that the ideology of Islamic extremism is itself discredited,''
end quote.
What, in your judgment, is the source of the, quote,
``ideology of Islamic extremism,'' end quote, if it is not the
Koran and the imam or Islamic leader's interpretations of the
Koran?
General Petraeus. It is a very twisted interpretation and,
again, an interpretation that is rejected by the mainstream
religious scholars of Islam. But there are diabolically,
barbarically skillful uses of phrases from the Koran to justify
this very extremist behavior, and it is sufficiently convincing
to some who are in certain circumstances in life and so forth
that it motivates them to join them.
Mr. Brooks. Okay. If I could interject----
General Petraeus. Of course, one of the great ways to
discredit them is to defeat them on the battlefield because
nothing succeeds like success in the internet and so forth
where they are recruiting like success, and nothing is worse
than failure on that battlefield. And that is why it is so
important to beat them.
Mr. Brooks. Well, you answered my second question before I
even asked it. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman,
thank you for convening this panel. I cannot think of a more
ideal way for us to begin this session of Congress and the work
on this committee than to have your insight and experience and
guidance on the work before us. And I also want to thank you
both for your service to this country and the insight that you
provided to the committee today.
General Petraeus, I don't think I have heard a better
articulation of America's role in the world than the one that
you gave at the outset of this hearing and your reminder that
this international order, of which we are the lucky heirs, did
not will itself into being and did not sustain itself. There
has been a tremendous cost in lives and treasure in order to
achieve what we have today. As imperfect as it may be, it beats
the alternatives.
And I have got to tell you, I wish that previous Congresses
and our past administration took your guidance to heart when it
comes to having strategic clarity, when it comes to ensuring
that we don't excuse or tolerate the most egregious violations
of the international order. There are real costs to that that
we are bearing today.
And by that same token, I hope the current administration
hears you when you said today that there is a cost to this
spiral of protectionism to that international order, when you
underscored the importance of our alliances, and someone else
pointed out that NATO might be one of the most important, if
not the most important, and the importance of not alienating
our closest allies in the fight against ISIS, the majority of
Muslims, who absolutely abhor the fundamental ideology that
underpins ISIS. So, incredibly important for us to get those
messages today, but we don't control the administrations. We
are a separate, co-equal branch of government.
What is your advice for us on this committee in Congress
when it comes to how we authorize the use of military force,
the oversight and control of that force? And the fact that we
have what is approaching 16 years of an Authorization for the
Use of Military Force [AUMF] that has been used in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya, is it time for us to
write a new authorization more closely tailored to the needs
that we have today? Is this open-ended, fairly vague
authorization sufficient for the crises we face? And what kind
of additional oversight would you like to see and guidance
would you like to see from Congress going forward?
General Petraeus. I think it is long overdue. I think
Congress has failed in its responsibility in that regard. The
previous administration requested on a number of occasions.
Leaders of Congress pushed hard for that, and for some reason,
there was an inability to come to grips with this. So the
result has been that the previous administration had to
constantly test the elasticity of the authority to use military
force to, not just Al Qaeda, but Al Qaeda affiliates, and son
of Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda and ISIS, the grandson, the cousins, and
so forth, and this is where we are in the challenge. And to be
fair to the previous administration, relative to the use of
force against the Taliban, you know, is that explicitly covered
by the authority to use military force, which was about Al
Qaeda and 9/11 and those related to Al Qaeda? You know, you can
make a case for it, but why not have Congress perform the role
that it is supposed to perform and actually debate these
issues, hear from the Cabinet Secretaries and the White House,
and then provide what you believe those individuals need
within, you know, your own wisdom and judgment?
Mr. O'Rourke. Mr. McLaughlin, any thoughts on the 2001
AUMF, whether it should be amended, closed out, reopened under
a new authorization that is specific to the threats that we
face in 2017?
Mr. McLaughlin. I just completely agree with General
Petraeus on that.
General Petraeus. I participated as the Director of CIA,
and I think even before that, a couple of different efforts
where we sought to recast the AUMF, to update it, to bring it
into the, you know, the new decade, if you will. And there was
never sufficient traction up here to get that done, and I think
it really should be done to----
Mr. McLaughlin. I would only add that I was present in 2001
when all of that occurred. And we have to remember that was
done hastily and in emergency circumstances that the United
States had never faced before, and it served adequately for a
period of time, very adequately; but, again, I would just ditto
what General Petraeus said.
Mr. O'Rourke. I hope your presence today helps to create
the political will to do that because I agree it is very
necessary.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your testimony
today. You talked a lot about ISIS and radical extremism and
how to address this generational threat, and I appreciate your
insights on that.
As we are looking at going after the core ideology and the
roots of that, what are your thoughts on addressing some of
our--or working with some of our, quote-unquote, allies who
have historically been funding schools around the world that
are teaching fundamentalist versions of Islam? There is no
large leap between a fundamentalist version and then someone
taking the leap to extremism. It is like the frog in the, you
know, the water being turned up one temp--you know, 1 degree at
a time, or other countries that are our allies that have been,
you know, funding these types of organizations? Without naming
them, can I hear some of your thoughts on that as far as
getting to the very underlying issue of the ideology?
General Petraeus. No. I think we absolutely should engage
partners whose governments or indeed individual citizens are
doing what you described. That is not to say that there hasn't
been engagement on this in the past.
I would add, for example, that I had a lot of discussion in
relationship with individuals in Saudi Arabia over individual
citizens that were alleged to have been funding different
organizations, extremist organizations, and so forth. And I can
tell you that they were good to their word that, if we could
ever show true evidence of this taking place, that they would
deal with it. The challenge is that typically individuals have
learned how to move money without certainly using the SWIFT
system or something like that and were using Hawalas or other
means, and then it becomes much more difficult, although there
were interdictions as well in cases like that. And we engaged
those Gulf States in which that was taking place on a very
regular basis, as did our Treasury Department counterparts.
Ms. McSally. Great. And what about, Mr. McLaughlin, in the
madrassas and the funding of just the indoctrination of a
fundamentalist version that then is not a far leap to
extremism?
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, this is the toughest problem we face,
I think, because, on the one hand, you need these societies to
be working with you; on the other hand, they have within them
this problem, which manifests itself in the way you suggest. I
too had worked with the Saudis and with many others on this. I
agree with what General Petraeus said about their willingness
to help if you can document your point.
I see the way to do this in sort of two ways. First--it has
been a long time since I have had access to the data on
precisely who is funding and so forth, but I suspect it hasn't
changed all that much. And the two things you have to do are
aggressively attack what you can see and detect. So in terms of
supporting terrorism, you go after fundraisers, people who move
money, and people who raise the funds, those three categories.
And the latter two are easier, and you can go and find them,
and we were very successful with disrupting them. And then,
based on that evidence, you go to the countries where the
fundraisers are coming from and you present them with that
evidence. And you just keep battling this problem.
But these societies are like ours. They have strongly
discordant, different, divergent points of view, and you go to
the leadership, and they tell you that. They say, well, we
don't want this to happen, but we don't have complete control
over everyone in our society, just as we don't.
Ms. McSally. Right.
Mr. McLaughlin. And it is the toughest problem we face, I
think.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. Shifting gears towards Russia,
I mean, just looking at them as a country, they have got a
nondiversified economy; they have got a declining demographics;
yet they are still, you know, military buildup, foreign
adventurism, meddling all over the world. Is this sustainable,
and how do you see that playing out?
General Petraeus. It is not. They used to depend on export
of oil and gas to produce 60 percent of their government
revenue. Obviously, the price of each of those has declined
somewhere around a half or so. And, again, you mentioned the
other challenges that they have, also a relative degree of
dysfunction in their economy. To say that there are market
distortions would be a bit of an understatement. So, no.
Clearly, there are challenges there, and what Vladimir Putin
has done, as John explained, is shift from providing for the
people when the prices of oil and gas were high, to now
providing ``at least Russia's a great country again''----
Ms. McSally. But that can't last.
General Petraeus [continuing]. That kind of inspiration.
There are limits to how long that can go, and that is why he
wants to get out of the sanctions.
Mr. McLaughlin. It is not sustainable, but the one way that
they will keep it going is by deepening authoritarian policies,
and that is what we see happening. I was told in Russia, by
people who are well plugged into the society there: Don't make
the assumption that there will be some sort of uprising here
against this. It is not going to happen.
So it is not sustainable, but it is not going to crack
overnight.
General Petraeus. Yeah.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, it was an honor to serve with you. It is
an honor to have you here.
General Petraeus. Semper fi.
Mr. Moulton. All the way.
I have often said that you are the best boss I have ever
had, and I am grateful for your service.
And, Mr. McLaughlin, thank you so much for your service,
often much more behind the scenes, but so incredibly important
as well.
Taking the strategic view, General, when we look at getting
the big ideas right from this committee, would you say that our
challenge in fighting ISIS in the Middle East is more about
killing more bad guys on the ground and taking territory from
them or more with the fight against the underlying causes, the
political issues, their recruiting efforts and whatnot that
allow them to sustain their effort?
General Petraeus. It is, of course, all of the above, as
you know. Again, if you think back to the surge--and thanks
again for your great service during that time and in several
earlier tours--it was always a comprehensive approach.
Certainly----
Mr. Moulton. Right. If you look----
General Petraeus. Certainly, you have got to kill or
capture----
Mr. Moulton. Right.
General Petraeus [continuing]. A lot of the bad guys. You
have got to take away their terrain. You have also got to take
away their funding, their sanctuary, their ammo, their
explosive experts, their communications, command and control,
sanctuaries, and all the rest, but then to reinforce, to build
on the security gains is the other pieces of this.
Mr. Moulton. Which part are we doing well and which part
needs more work?
General Petraeus. We are clearly doing well at enabling our
Iraqi partners, who have now been reconstituted, retrained,
reequipped, and so forth, and taking away that territory from
them, killing or capturing a large number of the Islamic State
forces. We are killing a large number of them as well. The
question is the sustainability of this. Again, it is the battle
after the battle: What happens after Mosul is cleared, the rest
of Nineveh province is cleared? Can there be an inclusive
governance that guarantees minority rights as well as majority
rule? If that is the case, you won't see fertile fields for
planting of the seeds of extremism and ISIS 3.0. If not, I fear
that we may see that movie again.
Mr. Moulton. Unfortunately, that reaffirms my fears as
well, that we don't really have--we have been doing very well
at taking killers off the battlefield. We haven't been doing as
well at making sure we have a sustainable political solution to
come after.
Mr. McLaughlin, would you say that----
General Petraeus. What is interesting is I think we did
have that in Iraq for a good 3\1/2\ years----
Mr. Moulton. I agree.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Or 4 years. So----
Mr. Moulton. I agree.
General Petraeus [continuing]. In the second surge----
Mr. Moulton. It is not impossible, in other words. Yep. And
it can be done.
General Petraeus. It can be done, but it also can be
undone, tragically.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. McLaughlin, would agree with that
assessment?
Mr. McLaughlin. Yes. I would just add for emphasis that the
changing the conditions is the hardest part. When we testified
here about a year ago, I was with Ryan Crocker, and I remember
the term that Ambassador Crocker used over and over and over
again in talking about what we need to do in Iraq is engage,
engage, engage, engage, and he implied that we weren't engaging
as much as we should be with the government to keep moving
toward this reconciliation between the Sunni and Shia portions
of Iraq.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, General.
There has been a lot of testimony, a lot of questions asked
about the President's travel ban. And I appreciate your test
that it does not meet, which is taking more people off the
battle--more bad guys off the battlefield than it perhaps put
on, but let's get down to moving forward here. What can we do?
General Petraeus. I think it is already happening. I think
there has to be clarification. There have to be exceptions,
exemptions and so forth. And then let's determine what are the
additional steps or actions that need to be taken so that we
are reassured about those who are coming to our country and
then move forward and communicate this with our allies, with
our partners, especially, obviously, our Muslim country
partners.
Mr. Moulton. What can we in Congress do to change the
perception of the order and improve this communication with our
allies?
General Petraeus. Well, I think for those Members of
Congress in the oversight committees where this is most
applicable, certainly communicating with General Kelly,
especially in this case, since he is the organization that is
most engaged with this, but also State and Defense and others.
And then, I think, having satisfied yourself that there is a
solid approach going forward, there has been a good after-
action review, as we would have said in the wake of this, that
then I think you can offer reassuring words and note that this
is a temporary activity, and as soon as it is completed, we
will get back to business with perhaps some additional steps or
checks.
Mr. Moulton. General, one last question. There have been
reports coming out, quite a number of reports, about the role
of dissent in the administration. There has been a State
Department cable circulating expressing dissent with this
order, and the administration has made statements to the effect
that people should resign if they dissent.
In your view, in your experience, what is the role of
dissent in furthering our national security?
General Petraeus. It is a very interesting question. And,
obviously, I have thought a bit about it watching events of
recent days. I have generally felt that disagreement, dissent,
and so forth should be voiced behind closed doors and offered,
and that, generally, having had your say--I mean, there are a
number of cases publicly known where my advice was not followed
when I was a military commander or the Director of the CIA. And
my general view was the troops don't get to quit, so I
shouldn't get to quit, but there could come a point in time
where, if your advice is not taken over and over and over
again, then I think you actually have an obligation to your own
organization and to the country to say, ``Perhaps I should let
you get someone whose advice you might listen to, since mine is
not being regarded,'' and then, at a certain point, perhaps go
public as well, having had a principled position in that
regard.
I am a bit uncomfortable with the very public activities,
candidly. And I think that has to be very, very carefully
considered as Rex Tillerson, presumably, is confirmed
expeditiously and takes over at State.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, gentlemen.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing the
extra time.
The Chairman. Dr. Abraham.
Dr. Abraham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, both gentlemen, for keeping us safe over so many
years.
We have talked about several organizations of Islamic
terror that continue to have pretty good infrastructure. Some
have great social media, such as ISIS, and they are all, I
perceive as a continuing threat, albeit maybe not as great
sometimes as others.
What do we do? What is your advice, both of you, when we
have a terrorist group like Hezbollah that gets embedded into a
government like Lebanon? Where do we go from there? How do you
counter that, because that will continue to be a continuing
threat, because they are now in government positions?
General Petraeus. Well, this is why I highlighted the issue
of Lebanonization of Iraq. I think you could also highlight the
concerns about Lebanonization of Syria, situations where
militias get embedded in society and then take on a political
role. And it is the height of irony that the three militias in
Iraq that are supported and trained and equipped by Iran,
several of them are headed by individuals who were in detention
facilities back in our day for very, very good reasons,
ultimately served their time. They are not just militia
leaders; they are also now members of Parliament. So you now
get this linkage, and, of course, these are very religiously
linked militias as well. And you see the erosion of what we
would see as legitimate governance, and we have seen that
happen in Lebanon to the point where Lebanese Hezbollah at the
very least has a bit of a veto on any action, a very
significant check in the political world, and it should be a
cautionary tale.
We have also seen it, perhaps maybe more so, in the case of
Hamas, where a militia extremist organization has actually
taken over a slice of territory, albeit not a country.
So, again, I think we should be very concerned about these
developments, and this was what I was trying to highlight with
one of the threats that Iraq does indeed face.
Mr. McLaughlin. You know, the reason, among others, many
reasons why Hezbollah has become embedded in Lebanon, but one
of them is that Lebanon itself as a country was not able to
provide for the social welfare of many of its people. So, at
one point, I could document, when I was in government, that
Hezbollah was responsible for the social welfare, medical care,
schooling and so forth of about 250,000 citizens of Lebanon. So
we have to work with countries like that that are on the front
line to not necessarily give them money, but to help them
develop, help them with their civic society, help them with
their institutions in order to guard against that sort of
problem.
And the main reason Iran is so interested in Syria is not
just Assad. It is the fact that is their channel to keep
Hezbollah going. They traditionally have gone through Syria.
Dr. Abraham. No. I know. They have got to get to Lebanon
through Syria.
Mr. McLaughlin. Yeah.
Dr. Abraham. That is their highway. Just a quick followup--
--
Mr. McLaughlin. And you have to come back, Hezbollah when
it--you know, the other wing of Hezbollah is a militant
terrorist wing----
Dr. Abraham. Right. Very much so.
Mr. McLaughlin [continuing]. And before 9/11, they were the
principal source of trouble for the United States. So you have
got to combat them with intelligence and military and
diplomatic channels.
Dr. Abraham. And so, with you-all's testimony, and I think
everybody here would agree, we can't, as Americans, go it alone
anymore. It is just too great--too big a bite of the apple.
How do we get more buy-in from our allies to combat this?
You have got China and Russia, they are on the increase. You
have got the Middle East in chaos. What do we do to get our
allies to even buy in more so we can combat things like the
Lebanonization of these countries and issues such as this?
General Petraeus. For starters, we have to lead. And it is
not an alternative. Again, I was going to start the quick five
lessons, but ungoverned spaces will be exploited by extremists,
the effects will not be contained to the areas where they are.
Las Vegas rules don't apply. Something has to be done. The U.S.
has to lead, because only we have the assets that are capable
of doing what is necessary, but we don't go it alone. But if we
don't lead, no one else--or very seldom will you see someone
else step up to the plate. And then we have got to have, not
only in that coalition NATO and European and other members,
but, again, Muslim countries engaged in this as well. And then
it has to be a comprehensive effort, but without us doing all
of it ourselves as we are able now to do, we show that we can
do this kind of approach in Iraq. And we have to recognize this
is a generational struggle, so sustainability does matter, and
that is measured in blood and treasure.
Dr. Abraham. Thank you. I am out of time. Thank you so
much.
The Chairman. Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
And thank you both for being here. It has been very
informative.
General Petraeus, in your statement, you say, and I am
quoting you: ``As a result of America's values--political
pluralism, rule of law, a free and open society--we can recruit
the best and the brightest from every corner of the planet, a
strategic advantage that none of our competitors can match.''
I agree with you that this openness is a strategic
advantage, and that is why I am concerned about some of the
recent actions that we have seen this new administration take.
What is going to be the impact if we can't recruit from the
best and the brightest from every corner of the planet? Will
people who are looking to come here and bring their gifts and
their talents here look at this and say, ``Well, maybe they
will fix it this time, maybe the United States will back off a
little bit, but for long term, I am not sure that the United
States is going to welcome my particular family and the gifts
and the talents that I have''? Do you have concerns about that?
It is not just like the 120-day ban. I am looking forward,
saying, when people decide where they are going to live and
where they are going to, you know, bring their gifts and their
talents, what impact do you fear that might have, or don't you?
General Petraeus. Sure. This is a huge part of our economy.
By the way, as the Congress takes up the discussion of the H-1B
visa limit or not limit or raise the limit or whatever, this
will be a big issue there as well, and getting that right is
vitally important to certain sectors of our economy, in which--
sectors in which we lead the world, the IT revolution,
manufacturing revolution, life sciences, and so forth. So it is
critically important.
And, oh, by the way, if you ever fly into Canada, you will
see signs up there that literally say: ``Can't get an H-1B
visa? Happy to have you.'' So there is competition out there.
There are other countries that will welcome the best and
brightest of the world.
I still think that our beacon burns brightest. I think this
is the place where people want to go. Even those who criticize
our country typically fight to send their sons and daughters to
our universities. So I think that is going to continue. We will
get through the current kerfuffle here and then become once
again, I think, and as we are, the place where everyone would
like to go to school, work, and raise a family.
Ms. Shea-Porter. I agree with you.
Mr. McLaughlin. I just have to add, I teach at a university
down on Mass [Massachusetts] Avenue. We have about 50 different
nationalities represented in that little school, and I am
astonished at the diversity of experience and expertise when I
sit down with my students. So that is a vital part of America,
end of story.
Ms. Shea-Porter. And it is a great gift to us and a gift
that we give as well.
And then I want to shift a little bit and talk about
Russian Television. I was very shocked to go to a hotel in this
country and turn on the channel, and there was Russian
Television. So I watched it. And it was subtle, but it was
definitely propaganda. And so I have been asking other people
from other countries, you know, are they seeing it as well? And
the answer is yes, they are. And I think we have been rather
silent about it, you know, the impact that this could be
having, in addition to all the other steps that the Russians
have taken.
So I would like you both to address that. You know, are we
concerned enough or over-concerned or what?
General Petraeus. No. We should be concerned about it. It
is not unique to Russia. I mean, remember all the issues we had
with Al Jazeera. I remember as the CENTCOM [Central Command]
commander going into Qatar and saying: ``You know, you have got
to--you have our air base. You have my forward headquarters.
You have done all this. And you are allowing this state-funded,
by and large, to beat us up on television. So how about taking
it easier?'' So, again, this is an issue that is, again, not
unique just to those two countries either. And by the way,
Qatar did over time make adjustments and so forth.
But at the end of the day, this is about competition. It is
about, again, what people want to watch, what do they feel is
truly fair, and so forth. And I think, as a matter of fact,
that Al Jazeera English--or America went away. It is a
competitive process.
So, again, we have just got to make sure that we provide
the context in terms of the laws and so forth and the
regulation that ensure that those media that emanate from here
are ones that are seen as attractive to others abroad,
``attractive'' meaning in terms of objective, fair, honest, and
so forth.
Mr. McLaughlin. Yeah. When I was in Russia in October, it
wasn't so subtle. What you saw on the media there on television
were programs for the Russian population projecting war with
the United States and advising people to prepare their bomb
shelters. A little hard to believe, but that is what Russian
citizens were hearing at that time.
The television you are seeing here is much more subtle. It
is very effective. And there aren't a lot of things that Russia
does well, but this is one of the things that it does very
well. It comes out of having been a national security state for
so many decades. It is an inheritance of that. So they put a
lot of effort and emphasis into this. Smart people run it,
linguistically talented and well-trained.
So as General Petraeus says, it is a competitive world. We
have to just be aware of that. We should probably pay more
attention in the United States to our overall policy of
strategic communications with the world.
General Petraeus. Yeah.
Mr. McLaughlin. Maybe General Petraeus might want to
elaborate on that, but that is something where I think we have
dropped the ball a bit in recent years.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you. I would agree. And I yield
back.
The Chairman. Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to both of you for your enlightening
testimony here to us today. You have both described the
significant challenges facing us with Russian growth and
involvement in Europe, the Middle East, and even here at home.
I want to ask questions specifically related to NATO. You have
talked about our allies and the significance of our allies
around the world, but for a moment, I would like to turn our
attention to NATO.
General, you know firsthand how important NATO is as a
partner to the United States of America in combating the
threats that we face, but in my opinion, NATO serves today as
the prime target for Russia and Putin. At the same time, the
Trump administration, President Trump himself, has drawn some--
has indicated some interesting questions and rhetoric regarding
our future relationship with NATO, our involvement in NATO, and
that is really my question to both of you. What is your advice
to President Trump, your insight that you can direct there, and
what are some ways that we can strengthen our relationship with
NATO moving forward to combat the threats that we face?
General Petraeus. Well, I think, again, that Secretary
Mattis has spent a great deal of time on the telephone and
meeting visitors already here, and now on his travel, to
reassure our allies and partners around the world, and has
spent a lot of that particularly with NATO. You know, he held a
four-star billet in NATO. I was a one-star, three-star, and
four-star in NATO billets. It is a hugely important
organization. As General Mattis said, if it didn't exist, we
would have to invent. It is the most successful alliance in
history.
Having said that, NATO does need to continue to change with
the times. It does need to continue to evolve to address new
threats now in the cyberspace as a true battle space in
particular. Its members do need to spend more. They cannot
freeload in the way that they have in the past. And I think
that they are--the President has gotten their attention with
respect to that, as I mentioned my experience at the recent
gathering of security leaders from Europe.
So, look, we have got to sustain it. We also have to
encourage its members to do more for themselves but certainly
to stay together as well.
Mr. McLaughlin. Yeah. When George Shultz was Secretary of
State, he used to say about diplomacy that you have to
continually tend the garden, by which he meant you have got to
go there, you have got to talk to people, you have got to
listen to them. I think that is what I would--that is the way I
am thinking about NATO these days. General Mattis is off to a
great start on that point. But what I mean is that the Russians
are doing that. They are trying to get into our garden and tend
it. They are looking for opportunities among the NATO
countries, remember, NATO has gotten very big, just as the
European Union has gotten big, and they are looking for
opportunities in places where they traditionally have had good
relationships with locals, such as Bulgaria, some of the East
European countries, where they think they can peel members away
from NATO or make them less likely to be firm in the event of a
conflict. So we have to tend that garden. It isn't all in
Brussels. We have got to go to each of those NATO countries and
talk to them--Congress would be a great vehicle for that, our
administration and so forth--and strengthen NATO at the roots.
Mr. Banks. General, if I could turn my focus back to
Afghanistan. You spoke briefly much earlier about our role
there. Currently, in the news over the last couple of days, the
disintegration of the rule of law in Afghanistan is under siege
by Vice President Dostum, who appears to be a rogue operator
within the Afghan Government. Over the past year, we have seen
other examples of disintegration of the rule of law there just
by billions of dollars that we have spent and our efforts,
along with our NATO allies, in Afghanistan.
What evidence do you see that might give us some foresight
that we can turn that around and get Afghanistan back on the
right track in the future?
General Petraeus. Well, I think the most important
indicator there is the fact that Afghan forces are fighting and
dying for their country, unfortunately in larger numbers than
perhaps needed to be the case if we could support them more
effectively. And to be fair, now we have relaxed those rules of
engagement, and we are doing more than we have been able to in
the past. I know that General Nicholson is looking at what
adjustments could be made to the structure of his force, to the
numbers of his force, again, to the rules of engagement.
President Ashraf Ghani is someone who is committed to what I
would assess is all the right things, but it is a very, very
tough situation. And this is why, again, I think we have to
have a sustained commitment, not one that every single year you
are doing another relook and everyone gets very anxious about
whether or not there is going to be another drawdown and so
forth. Thanks.
Mr. Banks. Thanks again. I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Ms. Rosen.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you. I want to thank you both for being
here, for your thoughtful and thorough testimony today, and, of
course, your service to our Nation.
You know, just this past weekend, Iran tested a ballistic
missile, as we know, a violation of the agreement in the
international community. Some say overtly this aggressive
action does not violate the letter of the law, but it cannot be
denied that Iran's missile launch violates the spirit of the
law. That is why I am working with my colleagues to look
explicitly at the possibility of expanding sanctions against
Iran to include a prohibition on the acquisition and use of
ballistic missiles.
So, thankfully, the test failed, but my question is to you.
In the worst-case scenario--this missile went about 500 miles,
a distance from my home in Las Vegas to about Sacramento. In
the worst-case scenario, what happens if Iran does have a long-
range ballistic missile?
General Petraeus. First of all, Iran does have a variety of
different missiles of a variety of different ranges. The
concern in this case, I think, is the gradual development of
technology that would at some point down the road enable them,
if they can develop a nuclear weapon, miniaturize it, and put
it on the nose of this, to then threaten our partners and our
ally in the region or perhaps even farther, and that is the big
concern.
And, of course, this is a country that may or may not be
deterred by the traditional forms of deterrence that have
worked with other so-called rational powers in the past when we
have had thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other. So
I think that is the big concern. That is why there is a
determination not to allow them to have nuclear weapons.
And if I could offer something, as people are looking at,
you know, the nuclear deal and all the rest of this, however
imperfect it may be, it is a multilateral deal. If you tear
that up, you are probably more likely to isolate yourself than
Iran. And it appears that the President has concluded that,
based on his conversation with the King of Saudi Arabia, in
which he said there will be very strict enforcement of it,
which there should be.
Congress might actually consider working with the White
House at this point in time on a statement of national policy
that says that Iran will never be allowed to enrich uranium to
weapons grade. Now, this should not cause concern for Iran,
because it says it does not want nuclear weapons, so there
should be no big concern there. And then, by the way, then very
clearly maintain the capability of U.S. Central Command to
carry out whatever contingency plans it might have to have, and
which it does have, in fact, to ensure that it could act to
enforce that policy.
Mr. McLaughlin. I would augment that by pressuring Iran to
ratify the additional protocol of the NPT [Non-Proliferation
Treaty], which I don't think they have done yet formally. They
kind of accepted it in principle, but they have got to ratify
it in their Majlis [parliament], because once they do that,
they subject themselves to very intrusive monitoring beyond
what they have now in order to keep them from getting to that
point of a nuclear weapon.
Also, in my old field, I would keep an eye on how other
countries are working with them. Their medium-range missile,
the Shahab-3, is based on a North Korean design. So there is
probably some stuff going on there. The Russians back in the
nineties helped them with missile testing. We worked hard to
get the Russians off of that. I went to Russia many times and
made that point. And I think they backed off, but we need to
keep our eye on that Russian-Iranian relationship as well.
And, basically, I support what General Petraeus said about
the nuclear declaration. All of those things together kind of
reinforces the point we were making earlier. It is a
complicated world; you have got to work with a lot of other
countries to get this done.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Ms. Cheney.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much, General Petraeus and Mr. McLaughlin,
for your service and for being here today and for sticking it
out till the bottom row of questioning. So I appreciate that.
General Petraeus. Welcome to the bottom row.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you. I got a very close eyewitness view
of you guys. But thank you for your service. I want to ask
about two things.
A number of my colleagues have expressed real concern about
actions the administration has taken and the potential for
those actions to be recruiting tools. And I wanted to ask you,
General Petraeus, to expand on something you began to talk
about, which, in my view, is the largest recruiting tool of
all, and that is failing to defeat the terrorists. And in
particular, if you look at where the world stood, where Iraq
stood, where the Middle East stood in January of 2009, with Al
Qaeda in Iraq largely defeated because of what happened with
the surge, because of your efforts and your leadership, with
the Shia militias largely defeated, and you compare that to
where we are today--Al Qaeda in more nations than it has ever
been in the past, failed states across the region--it seems to
me that the recruiting tool we really need to be focused on and
concerned about is, what happens when terrorist organizations
survive, when we don't take the kind of extensive action that
is necessary to defeat them and they are then able to claim
that they are standing up against the United States, against
the West, that, in fact, isn't that perhaps the most effective
recruiting tool of all?
General Petraeus. No. Absolutely. Look, recruiting depends
on an attractive pitch. The pitch includes: Hey, come join us;
we are a winning team. You can--you know welcome to the
National Football League or whatever else.
And it is pretty hard to have that pitch if you are losing.
And so that is why I said for so many years that it is very
important to demonstrate that the Islamic State is a loser, not
a winner. And the faster we can do this, the better, because
that is the faster that they are no longer able to recruit as
effectively. So time has actually mattered. Now, we do have
them very much in the retreat. We have got to maintain that. We
have got to press it to the end, and then we have got to make
sure that the battle after the battle is successful as well.
And we have to follow them wherever they are in the world, and
we have the capability to do that.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And let me turn now to Iran.
Mr. McLaughlin, in your testimony, you talked about the
Iran agreement buying us time. And I wonder if you could just
explain your basis for that, given the real concern that many
people had and continue to have about the total inadequacy of
the inspections regime, where you have got the Iranians able in
some instances with respect to the former military sites, able
to actually to inspect themselves, where you have got the IAEA
[International Atomic Energy Agency] having stated that in some
instances they actually have less access now than they did pre-
agreement. I think we all, you know, would hope that that would
be the case in terms of buying us time, but I don't see any
evidence that we actually have any insight that could give us
comfort into what the Iranians are truly doing, given the
tremendous holes in the inspections regime in the agreement.
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, I don't really disagree with that. I
might have added the term ``warily'' to my observation that it
buys us some time. I fall back on the wisdom of Ronald Reagan
here: trust but verify. So a degree of trust is appropriate in
anything that we have negotiated this carefully, but in my old
business, and I assume, and this committee can certainly have
access to that, that people must have--in addition to the
formal monitoring that is going on through the IAEA, we must be
keeping a very--we should be keeping a very close eye on this
with intelligence means.
And I have some confidence that we will detect cheating
when it occurs. The professionals now in office can elaborate
on that, but I know we have detected it in the past. We
discovered the underground facility. We discovered Natanz,
actually, long before it was announced publicly by an Iraqi
dissident group. So I have some confidence that we will pick it
up if they cross the line.
Ms. Cheney. Well, I hope you are right. With all due
respect, with our history in that regard with respect to
actually being able to know about, to discover the existence of
other nations' nuclear programs has actually not been one where
we have been tremendously successful. As you know, it was
Israelis who brought us evidence of the Syrian--the North
Korean-built Syrian reactor.
Mr. McLaughlin. Yep.
Ms. Cheney. So I hope that is the case. And unfortunately--
--
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, we should be talking to the Israelis
about this one too.
Ms. Cheney. Yes. Exactly. Well, thank you very much.
And I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Mr. McEachin.
Mr. McEachin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you all for being here.
The Chairman. You might hit the button there.
Mr. McEachin. Might hit the button. There we go.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to associate my comments or
at least my thanks that Ms. Cheney gave for you all hanging out
for the rookies down here.
Gentlemen, in my estimation, we were attacked recently by
Russia when it determined that it was in its national interests
to try to intervene in our domestic elections. I am concerned
and disturbed that our Commander in Chief has barely
acknowledged that attack, much less condemned it. To my mind,
the so-called Russian bear is back on the prowl and being
exceedingly active now. And I am interested in your thoughts on
what this administration should do in terms of engaging Russia
in trying to limit its influence in the world.
And I appreciate, Mr. McLaughlin, your comments about
Ukraine, and I did hear those, but in addition to that, what
should we be doing?
And then, if you have time, I would also like you to talk
about the strategic importance of the Philippines and what we
need to do to sort of corral them back into our sphere of
influence, as they seem to be hell-bent on leaving it.
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, we have talked a lot about Russia,
and I think you have to start--I am going to say something I
said earlier, but I feel it strongly, which is that the first
thing we have to do is make sure we understand precisely what
we want out of the relationship. You know, I came back from my
time, recent trip to Russia saying to myself, the big question
for us is, how do we want this to end? What do we want this to
end up, because it is spiraling downward? They accept no
responsibility for the fact that the relationship has
deteriorated. Let's be clear about that. And, therefore, they
are very cold-eyed and hard when they evaluate their own
interests, and they press them aggressively. So we have to know
what we want first.
And I would say the things we have to want are observation
of the rules that govern the world order, particularly the
inviolability of borders. We cannot give that up. They have
broken at least three treaty agreements in what they have done
in Ukraine, one of them signed by 57 countries. So we have to
be hard over on that. That means we probably have to keep the
sanctions in place. We cannot reduce them. They will want to
bargain for the reduction of those sanctions.
And at the same time, we have to amp up our efforts in the
leadership realm. I think Putin has stolen a march on us in the
Middle East. Before he sent troops into Syria, I was keeping
track of their diplomatic effort, and I cannot think of a major
leader in that area who had not visited Moscow for diplomatic
consultations, including our allies, in the year or so
preceding their entry into Syria militarily.
So we have to match them diplomatically around the world
because they are playing a weak hand very well. We have got to
watch what they are doing with China because they are never
going to be natural allies, but they share an interest right
now in checkmating us in that part of the world.
So we are not in a new Cold War yet; that is the wrong
term. But we certainly are in a competition with a wily
opponent who has no opposition and total control, both of his--
can make decisions overnight. Putin basically meets with five
other people on a Friday afternoon and decides what they are
going to do next week. That is a little less complicated than
our government. So agility is what we need in dealing with
them.
General Petraeus. And with respect to the Philippines,
look, this is a strategically significant development that has
taken place with President Duterte taking control of that
government and, instead of continuing the policy of balancing
with the United States against China, who had picked so many
fights with them and with their other maritime neighbors, has
seemed to be bandwagoning, is the term, more with China, or at
least staying in-between. And so I think this is going to
require a great deal of patience, as we are going to have to
demonstrate capability, we are going to have to demonstrate our
system, example, determination, and so forth, and I think that
will be the key in the long term, but I think we are going--we
are in for some rocky seas in that particular neighborhood.
Mr. McEachin. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. And I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, thank you for your willingness to always
take a chance on young marines like Seth and myself. Thank
you--and your continued ability to out PT [physical training]
younger marines such as myself.
Thank you, Mr. McLaughlin, for your distinguished service
as well.
My colleague mentioned Iran's nuclear program, and
yesterday had seen the Iranians confirm that they conducted
another ballistic missile test. Ballistic missiles are wrongly,
in my view, not covered in many ways under the purview of this
deal, although they are covered by multiple U.N. Security
Council resolutions.
How do you suggest we respond to something like that, and
more broadly, can you talk about the difficulties of
disaggregating Iran's nuclear program, its missile program from
the other ways in which Iran advances its interests throughout
the Middle East and, indeed, throughout the world?
General Petraeus. Well, again, clearly what is happening is
already the U.N. Security Council is going to meet on this.
Unfortunately, there is a degree of ambiguity in the United
Nations Security Council Resolutions on that particular topic.
It is linked to the nuclear program. They claim this is not
linked to the nuclear program, and therefore, it is
permissible. So you are going to have some international
lawyering going back and forth. And certainly there should be
an effort to try to clarify that, to try to reduce that
ambiguity, to try to expand the scope of the resolution,
although I think that is going to prove to be very difficult.
And so, again, what we are going to have to do, I think we
have two huge interests with respect to Iran. One is to ensure
they never get a nuclear weapon. The other is to, with our
partners and our ally in the region, to counter the malign
activities that they have ongoing much more effectively than we
have been in recent years. The partners out there are eager to
see that kind of leadership from the United States, and they
will certainly welcome and be part of efforts along those
lines.
Mr. McLaughlin. I don't think I would add anything to that.
Mr. Gallagher. And then, secondly, there has been some talk
about safe zones in Syria today. I know we have heard that on
the call with King Salman of Saudi Arabia, the President
discussed the use of safe zones in Syria and Yemen, I believe.
Could you talk a bit more about the risks and rewards of
going down that path right now, and what questions do we need
to answer before we march forward with safe zones?
General Petraeus. Well, this is something that I have
actually recommended for a number of years, although once
Russia intervened, this became a much dicier proposition. And I
think the issue now is one of, if there is to be a safe zone,
then clearly you are going to have to have an agreement with
Russia on that, or you are going to have to be willing to
establish that you are going to fight for the security of that
safe zone, and if Bashar al-Assad's forces bomb innocent
civilians, that, you know, his Air Force is going to be
grounded.
I think it would be very important that everyone
understands what the ramifications, what essentially the rules
of engagement would be for such a safe zone. This is not a
place where I would want to leave a lot of ambiguities, for
fear that you could end up in an escalating situation.
At the end of the day, I think it is very possible that
these areas that are outside the control of the Bashar al-Assad
regime, supported by Iran and Hezbollah and the Russians and
other Shia militia, that these areas may actually begin to firm
into some zone, maybe one under the control of Turkey in the
northwest, a Syrian Kurdish--and that will be a tough issue
with the Turks; there will have to be assurances from us--and
then perhaps a Sunni Arab zone that could stretch from Daraa in
the south, perhaps all the way up to the Deir ez-Zor and maybe
even up to Raqqa, that these zones could ultimately become some
element in a future if there is a federal form of government
but, at an interim basis, could actually reduce this bloodshed,
which I highlighted earlier as being one of the overriding
objectives at this point, much more important than whatever
efforts are ongoing to get a pluralist democracy into Damascus,
which I think is very unlikely.
Mr. McLaughlin. If I could just add a little bit to that. I
recommended that we pursue a safe zone when I testified here
about a year ago. It has become harder. I think there is still
merit in considering doing this, in large part because it is
hard.
What I mean by that is that is what leaders do. Leaders
take on hard things. I am not lecturing this committee, but we
are now seen as being behind the curve in the Middle East, as
having allowed a vacuum to open up, and Putin has moved into
it. So taking on a really hard job like that would demonstrate
leadership that would put us back in the center of things.
And when I say it is hard, it is for all the reasons
General Petraeus mentioned. You would have to tell the
Russians: You stay out of there, or do it with us, but let's
not get in the clash in there.
You would have to have a way to ensure that it wasn't
infiltrated by terrorists. Hard, hard stuff.
And you would have to protect it. You would take risks, but
once again, it would show leadership in what I think is the
most consequential event taking place on the face of the Earth
today.
Mr. Gallagher. Well, thank you both for your leadership and
for a career of doing very hard things.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, Mr. McLaughlin, I wanted to ask you, you
know, obviously you can turn on any cable news station and
learn about some of the more dangerous places in the world as
far as Syria is concerned, different parts of the Middle East,
but are there parts of the undeveloped world or even some
suburb in Europe that should be getting attention and focus or
that we should be worried about that no one is talking about
right now?
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, that is kind of what I meant at the
end of my remarks when I said we will probably be surprised by
something that General Petraeus and I have not mentioned. It
could be--and I could give you so many examples from the past
on that score.
I would say Sub-Saharan Africa. Among other things, a large
portion, perhaps a majority of the refugees migrating to Europe
actually come from Africa, not from the Middle East, because of
conditions there. Not every country there is doing badly. In
fact, there are a lot of hopeful signs in Africa. But a number
of them are suffering from the kind of societal stresses that I
suggested would come about as a result of burgeoning population
and a huge youth bulge in those societies as distinct from the
pensioner bulge we have in the West. So that is one thing that
is not in the headlines particularly.
You know, oddly, Venezuela is not much in the headlines,
but that is a place that looks close to meltdown to me: a
shortage of goods, unpopular President, authoritarian steps
being taken in the country that has the largest proven oil
reserves in the world and that is a stone's throw from us. That
is another one.
Colombia, I think, needs a look, because they have come to
a really inventive agreement on how to stop a war that went on
for decades there, but it is not perfect. And the problems that
have devilled Colombia, in which the United States has played
an enormously important role moving forward--it is one of the
few successful, really totally successful partnerships to fight
both terrorism and narcotics, and very appreciated by the
Colombians.
So there are a lot of places in the world that we haven't
mentioned that--you could almost have a hearing here on parts
of the world that aren't in the headlines but which may hold
potential for trouble.
Mr. Veasey. You know, the Ivory Coast, about a year and a
half ago, there was an explosion there, and it got--it
dominated the news for maybe 24, 48 hours, and then, after
that, there was absolutely no talk about it, and I haven't
heard anything else about terrorism in that part of the world
since then, and so that kind of thing is very worrisome.
I also wanted to ask both of you, what is your assessment
of the administration's recent reorganization of the NSC
[National Security Council]? I know that was talked about a
lot. And what do you think the inclusion of political staff on
the NSC does to alter how that runs?
General Petraeus. First of all, my sense is that this has
been worked out. The idea that you would have an NSC meeting
and a meeting on national security where the individual
responsible for providing intelligence analysis might not be
there, I think, was, you know, very unlikely. The Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs has a statutory role as the senior military
adviser to the President and National Security Council. The CIA
Director has been added back. He, of course, by law is
responsible directly to the President for covert action, does
not go through the DNI for that, so he has to be at that table
as well. And, again, my sense is that they have worked this
out.
There have been individuals in the room from time to time
that were from more of the political strategy side of the
house. It is unprecedented, I think, to have someone explicitly
made a statutory member in this case. And so, again, as with
all of these, you are going to have to see how this works out.
Mr. McLaughlin. I would just add that someone needs to
think through what is the role of the Director of National
Intelligence. The CIA Director is always very prominent and
holds a special role, inevitably, but by law, 2004, by law, the
Director of National Intelligence is the Nation's chief
intelligence officer and the only one truly empowered to bring
together the view of the entire intelligence community. So,
unless they are going to change that and tell the CIA Director
to do it, I think the DNI--they have to figure out, where does
the Director of National Intelligence fit in the mix?
Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Our witnesses have a hard stop at 1 o'clock. And so I
apologize to the three of you, but I will tell you what. We
will put you all at the head of the queue for next week's
hearing with the Vice Chiefs on the state of our military,
which is the followup to this.
Thank you both for your patience, for your insights. It has
been terrifically helpful.
And, with that, the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
February 1, 2017
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 1, 2017
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 1, 2017
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. I am deeply disturbed by President Trump's executive
order freezing refugee resettlement from certain Muslim-majority
countries and ceasing the intake of any refugees from Syria. This
action is contrary to the very core principles of our democracy, and it
endangers our service members abroad.
In your opening statement, you noted that ``our most important ally
in this war is the overwhelming majority of Muslims who reject al
Qaeda, Daesh, and their fanatical, barbaric worldview.'' Do you believe
that this executive order--which bars these allies from the United
States, many of whom who have put their lives on the line to assist and
fight alongside our service members--undermines the critical
relationship you characterized in your opening statement? Does it
provide ammunition to terrorists who seek to portray this fight as a
war between America and Islam?
You also stated that the defeat of Islamic extremist groups
requires a military component. I believe this executive order
undermines our service members' security in theater and threatens the
goodwill among the coalition of the military components at work in our
fight against extremist organizations. Would you agree with that
assessment?
General Petraeus. The executive order referred to in the question
was, of course, blocked by court action, as has been the subsequent EO,
which contained a number of changes (e.g., exempting green card holders
and those already holding visas) and did not include Iraq. So, at this
point, it is difficult to assess whether the existing EO, if allowed by
the courts, or a subsequent EO with further changes, will undermine
critical relationships. Certainly, the whole endeavor has been
unhelpful in certain respects given the sentiments it may be depicted
as reflecting. And it is possible that terrorists may try to use this
effort to make the ongoing war against ISIS and AQ and their affiliates
a war between Islam and the U.S. or the western world. That underscores
the importance of U.S. policy clearly identifying that we and our
coalition partners (included in which are Islamic countries, of course)
are united in fighting Islamic extremists, not those of the Islamic
faith.
Mr. Langevin. I am very glad that in Mr. McLaughlin's opening
statement, he included cyber threats in your ``urgent bucket'' when
discussing the ongoing challenges we face in the world today. Like you,
threats in cyberspace concern me greatly. Rather than looking
retrospectively and instead looking ahead to the future both at home
and abroad, how should we ensure the Department of Defense is prepared
to combat information warfare operations, which are increasingly being
enabled by cyber attacks? What about when a foreign military is
conducting an operation targeting a domestic institution? Does DOD have
a role in such a scenario?
General Petraeus. I believe that DOD is moving ahead as quickly as
resources allow to be prepared for enemy combat operations in
cyberspace--to defend against them, identify the sources of them, and
respond to them. In a number of cases, however, it is important that
DOD efforts be complemented by those of DHS, domestic law enforcement
authorities, and assistance from internet service providers and social
media platforms. What about when a foreign military is conducting an
operation targeting a domestic institution? Does DOD have a role in
such a scenario? DOD assets certainly can have a role, as do elements
of the IC and the FBI and other law enforcement elements, but DHS has
been assigned the lead--the ``quarterback''--for guiding responses to
attacks on domestic institutions. While Congress finally passed
legislation on cyber security responsibilities and authorities in
recent years, there clearly is further legislation needed and, more
importantly, there clearly also are additional resources needed,
especially for DHS.
Mr. Langevin. As ranking member of the Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, I have been a long-time advocate for the
cultivation and operationalization of matured, advanced technologies to
assist our warfighter whenever and wherever we are able. In light of
all the threats we face that have been mentioned here today--many of
which will require non-traditional, innovative responses--would you
agree that it is critical the Department of Defense continue to
prioritize advanced technologies, such as directed energy and
autonomous systems, in order to provide for our warfighter and maintain
our technological superiority on the joint battlefield?
What do you believe must be done in order to make our warfighters
more comfortable utilizing these advanced technologies?
General Petraeus. Yes, I agree.
Provide them the resources needed to enable education and training
on advanced systems--and also, of course, to ensure that we
consistently put cutting edge technologies in the hands of our men and
women in uniform.
Mr. Langevin. I am very glad that in your opening statement, you
included cyber threats in your ``urgent bucket'' when discussing the
ongoing challenges we face in the world today. Like you, threats in
cyberspace concern me greatly. Rather than looking retrospectively and
instead looking ahead to the future both at home and abroad, how should
we ensure the Department of Defense is prepared to combat information
warfare operations, which are increasingly being enabled by cyber
attacks? What about when a foreign military is conducting an operation
targeting a domestic institution? Does DOD have a role in such a
scenario?
Mr. McLaughlin. 1. I believe DOD is reasonably well prepared to
combat information operations enabled by cyber. This said, I believe
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have given this a very high
priority over the years. This is an asymmetric way for them to
compensate for the superior conventional and other power possessed by
the U.S. But the need for dominance in this area is now well understood
in military and intelligence circles and that augurs well for our
future capabilities. The Russian cyber interference in our election has
in my view been a crystalizing event that drives home the need for
cyber superiority in exploitation, attack, and defense--the three
domains that come together in this field.
2. If a foreign military is targeting a U.S. domestic institution
with cyber techniques, my understanding is that DHS would be the
overall coordinator of U.S. response. But DHS would assuredly seek
assistance from both military and intelligence sources in scoping the
problem and organizing response.
Mr. Langevin. As ranking member of the Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, I have been a long-time advocate for the
cultivation and operationalization of matured, advanced technologies to
assist our warfighter whenever and wherever we are able. In light of
all the threats we face that have been mentioned here today--many of
which will require non-traditional, innovative responses--would you
agree that it is critical the Department of Defense continue to
prioritize advanced technologies, such as directed energy and
autonomous systems, in order to provide for our warfighter and maintain
our technological superiority on the joint battlefield?
Mr. McLaughlin. The short answer is yes of course. My conviction on
this score comes from the realization that we live in the midst of the
most revolutionary period of technological advance in history. Never
has the time between discovery of scientific principle and its
application been so short. In both military and intelligence endeavor
we always have to be ahead of the adversary technologically because the
adversary these days will always possess advanced capabilities that are
commercially available. Hence the need for advanced R&D and
technological innovation without peer.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
Ms. Stefanik. Russia and China have both exercised an increased use
of cyber capabilities to support their national security objectives.
This threat is also used by terrorist organizations. As General
Petraeus described it, the ``. . . ideological caliphate in cyber
space. . .'' As we continue to develop our own cyber defenses, how do
you anticipate this threat to evolve and how do you believe we can best
respond?
General Petraeus. I believe the breakthroughs in this arena will
come through a partnership between DOD, IC, and domestic law
enforcement elements with internet service providers and social media
platform providers who use AI to identify and remove what clearly are
extremist sites, messages, and other activities in cyberspace.
Ms. Stefanik. Russia and China have both exercised an increased use
of cyber capabilities to support their national security objectives.
This threat is also used by terrorist organizations. As General
Petraeus described it, the ``. . . ideological caliphate in cyber
space. . .'' As we continue to develop our own cyber defenses, how do
you anticipate this threat to evolve and how do you believe we can best
respond?
Mr. McLaughlin. Terrorist organizations have been slow to come to
cyber as a weapon per se--leaving aside the advantages they derive from
imaginative use of social media and the internet generally. But with
the increasing cyber literacy that marks all populations these days and
with the wealth that ISIS in particular has amassed, I believe we
cannot be at all complacent about terrorist progress in this arena. So
I anticipate that it is only a matter of time before we begin to see
cyber used as an offensive tool by terrorist organizations who will
realize that the danger they can do with key-strokes may equal in
impact what they can achieve with conventional bombs. This calls for
continued laser-like focus in developing intelligence on terrorist
capabilities, to include the sorts of skills they are prioritizing in
recruitment efforts. Once we understand these things we can prepare
appropriate offensive and defensive strategies to check mate developing
terrorist capabilities.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. O'ROURKE
Mr. O'Rourke. I very much appreciate your comments regarding an
updated Authorization for Use of Military Force for the wars we
currently wage. Of course, finding consensus on what a new AUMF should
include has proven challenging for Congress. Can the two of you provide
recommendations on how to improve our current AUMF?
General Petraeus. There is a classified model for a revised AUMF on
which we were working in the interagency before I left government. My
recommendation is that you use the existing draft in the IA (presumably
a copy can be obtained from the NSC Legal Counsel) as a departure
point.
Mr. O'Rourke. I very much appreciate your comments regarding an
updated Authorization for Use of Military Force for the wars we
currently wage. Of course, finding consensus on what a new AUMF should
include has proven challenging for Congress. Can the two of you provide
recommendations on how to improve our current AUMF?
Mr. McLaughlin. General Petraeus informs me that there was a
classified model for a revised AUMF being worked in the interagency
before he left government. My recommendation is that you use the
existing draft in the interagency records (presumably a copy can be
obtained from the NSC Legal Counsel) as a departure point. My only
thought is that which I always applied to guidance given to
intelligence agencies: that a revised AUMF be general enough to cover a
variety of contingencies in a very fluid world, so as not to require
constant revision or stimulate continuous debate--but specific enough
to leave little doubt about what U.S. forces are permitted to do.
[all]