[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 28, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-23
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MO BROOKS, Alabama NORMA J. TORRES, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Ms. Sally Yearwood, executive director, Caribbean-Central
American Action................................................ 7
Mr. Joseph M. Humire, executive director, Center for a Secure
Free Society................................................... 16
Mr. Jose Cardenas (former Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau
for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for
International Development)..................................... 30
Mr. Peter Quilter, non-resident senior fellow, Ash Center for
Democratic Governance and Innovation, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University................................. 41
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Ms. Sally Yearwood: Prepared statement........................... 10
Mr. Joseph M. Humire: Prepared statement......................... 19
Mr. Jose Cardenas: Prepared statement............................ 32
Mr. Peter Quilter: Prepared statement............................ 43
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 62
Hearing minutes.................................................. 63
ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Duncan. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will
come to order. I would now like to recognize myself for an
opening statement.
I would like to begin by extending a warm welcome to the
returning members on the subcommittee. Over the years this
subcommittee has been fortunate to operate in a bipartisan
fashion and I look forward to continuing the work that we have
done and working hand in hand with my good friend, the
gentleman from New Jersey, our ranking member, Albio Sires, and
all the members of the subcommittee, as the new Trump
administration begins to lay out their policy priorities for
the Western Hemisphere. I look forward to seeing what those
priorities are.
I'd now like to introduce the new members. They are not
here but I'll go ahead and read their names and hopefully they
will trickle in after votes, this is the way it goes sometimes.
We have got Mr. Mo Brooks from Alabama, Mr. Francis Rooney
of Florida, Ms. Norma Torres of California and Mr. Adriano
Espaillat of New York.
They each have their own unique background and experiences
and we look forward to them being strong contributors to our
work during this 115th Congress.
Today's hearing should provide subcommittee members with a
comprehensive look at the lay of the land in the Western
Hemisphere, give us some food for thought as the new Trump
administration begins to reveal their priorities for 2017.
I am particularly interested in what our witnesses think
that policy priorities should be in Cuba and Venezuela, and in
places that continue to receive large amounts of U.S. taxpayer
funding like Colombia, Haiti, and the Northern Triangle in
Central America.
Clearly, the administration will need to work on a
bilateral relationship with Mexico, but the United States is
certainly right to seek to enforce our borders and protect our
precious sovereignty. I thank today's distinguished panel of
witnesses for being here and sharing their thoughts and
insights with us. Many of them have testified before our
committee before and I welcome them back.
In my opinion, the prior administration did little to
advance U.S. interests in this hemisphere, and, in fact, did
harm to traditional U.S. policies of standing up for human
rights, and the rule of law under repressive regimes that
currently plague countries like Cuba and Venezuela.
In Cuba, the Obama administration gave the Castros pretty
much everything they wanted without asking Congress to remove
the embargo as required by U.S. law.
Furthermore, the Obama administration didn't even insist
upon the most basic human rights protections as political
dissidents were rounded up, beaten, and jailed in record
numbers. And in their Cuba policy shift, the all-important
issue of resolving the thousands of property rights claims were
barely even mentioned.
The pain and suffering that the Chavez-Maduro regime
inflicted upon Venezuela has been well documented, and our
hearts go out to the Venezuelan people who deserve so much more
than hyperinflation, rolling blackouts, widespread shortages of
medicine and, literally, scrounging for food every day just to
survive. Recent reports of canines and flamingoes and other
animals being slaughtered for food is disheartening and our
thoughts and prayers go out to the folks in Venezuela.
I was encouraged by early signs from the new administration
last week, including the decision to slap sanctions on the new
Venezuelan Vice President for his participation in drug
trafficking, and President Trump's taking of an impromptu
meeting with Lilian Lopez, the wife of wrongfully jailed
opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez.
We also had the opportunity to meet with her as well and
Leopoldo Lopez remains in our thoughts and prayers.
Under my chairmanship this subcommittee has traveled
extensively in the region. I intend to continue to do my part
in this session of Congress to advance our interests in the
hemisphere.
It has been said that our region does not get the attention
that it deserves. In fact, when Secretary Kerry made his famous
speech at the OAS in November 2013 that the era of the Monroe
Doctrine is over, the administration admitted as much.
But I would maintain that because of our region being
largely peaceful, the lack of major wars for several years, a
healthy flow of trade and commerce, and an abundance of common
heritage and religious beliefs, these are things to be
celebrated and built upon rather than overlooked.
Of course, that is not to say that we don't have much work
to do. The important task of finishing Plan Colombia by making
Peace Colombia work going forward will surely present many
challenges to U.S and Colombian policy makers, but is work in
which both our countries have invested much blood and treasure
so as to successfully turn that country around. As a result,
they remain our best ally in the hemisphere.
In Haiti, it has now been more than 7 years since the
devastating earthquake that resulted in so much damage and loss
of life. Much progress has been made thanks to the generosity
of U.S. taxpayers and many other international donors, but
there is still much work to be done there. It certainly didn't
help that they were hit by Hurricane Matthew last fall and
experienced another uptick in cases of cholera.
Like many regional observers, nearly 14 months after the
elections began, I was hopeful when Haiti finally
democratically elected a new President and a Congress. We at
least now have a government partner to work with going forward,
and I plan to do my part in keeping a healthy dialogue open
when I meet with the new President sometime later this year.
Obviously, all this is not to say the hemisphere doesn't
still suffer from the seemingly intractable problems of drug
trafficking, transnational gains in criminal organizations,
corruption, poverty, and lack of opportunity for many.
We have been experiencing the results of these problems
first hand with the continual wave of illegal immigration,
especially of unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle
in Central America coming to our southern border every day. I
support the Trump administration and stand with those who
believe we must enforce our borders and protect our
sovereignty. As Ronald Reagan said, ``If we do not we are not a
country at all.'' We are a kind and generous nation but we
cannot become the orphanage to the world.
When I assumed the chairmanship of this subcommittee I
pointed out in our first hearing that I have three simple
priorities and I'll restate those for this Congress: Create
jobs for the American people, promote U.S. energy security and
U.S. exports, and return to the wisdom of our Founding Fathers.
That's an acronym--jobs, energy, Founding Fathers--that spell
JEFF and I think JEFF is a winning message.
It is through that prism that I'll continue to view the
issues and priorities that we will focus on going forward. The
Western Hemisphere presents abundant opportunities for success
in all of these areas for the United States as well as for our
allies here in the hemisphere.
With that, I will turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sires,
for his opening statement, and I will restate again that I have
enjoyed our work together and I look forward to working with
you again and so I yield with you.
Mr. Sires. I just want to start by saying thank you, and I
had nothing to do with Mr. Meeks going down below.
[Laughter.]
Good afternoon and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing. I'd like to start by welcoming everyone to our
first hearing of the 115th Congress and give a special welcome
to the new members of our subcommittee.
I look forward to working with all of you in the new
Congress. I am grateful to be back as ranking member of this
subcommittee once again and serving alongside our chairman and
my friend from South Carolina, Jeff Duncan.
Many countries in the Western Hemisphere are at a
crossroad. Throughout the region, the anti-corruption wave has
taken hold and we have seen indictments, arrests, and
resignations as a result. While these revelations have caused a
stir in the region, they have also created the opportunities to
bring real and lasting change to these institutions long in
need of reform.
In the Northern Triangle, efforts are underway to
strengthen to rule of law and address human rights concerns.
Though Brazilian officials are facing accusations of bribery,
Brazilian people are insisting their government uses democratic
institutions to hold them accountable.
Partners like Argentina are taking steps to reform their
economies and play a larger role addressing regional
challenges. That is why I am proud to sponsor H. Res. 54,
reaffirming our strong relation with the Argentine people and
commending the government of President Macri for his economic
reform and commitment to holding the perpetrators of the 1994
AMIA bombing accountable.
Additionally, our friends in Colombia signed a peace
agreement with the FARC, taking the first steps in ending a 52-
year-long war that has claimed the lives of over 200,000
people.
We must remember that this agreement is just the beginning
of the peace, not the end result. It is now more important than
ever to continue our bipartisan backing of Colombia as they
work to implement the peace deal, fight back against criminal
groups, work to take over the FARC's territory, and deter
further coca cultivation.
Despite these opportunities for growth, challenges still
abound. The repression of the Cuban people is only escalating,
with innocent women continuing to regularly be beaten in the
streets while peacefully marching.
The Venezuelan people are, unfortunately, continuing to
languish at the hands of Maduro, who continues to stifle
democracy and violently fight back against pro-democracy
advocates.
My experience with the Western Hemisphere has taught me
that any approach to Latin America needs to be a regional one.
Piecemeal approaches will not tackle the region's most pressing
challenges such as strengthening the rule of law and respect
for human rights, increasing transparency and combating drug
trafficking.
That is why I am concerned about the rhetoric that is
already coming out of the Trump administration with regards to
our allies like Mexico, who has been a strong partner of the
U.S. under both Republican and Democratic administrations. I
hope that President Trump soon realizes how much these
relationships have enhanced the security and prosperity of the
United States, and that the only way to make the region
stronger is by working together.
I thank the witnesses for their testimony. I look forward
to discussing how we can improve relations in the coming year.
Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. Okay.
This being our first subcommittee meeting, I am going to
kind of step out of the norm and recognize the former
chairwoman of the subcommittee--of the full committee and now
the subcommittee chairman of the Middle East and North Africa,
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, for a brief opening statement.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman,
and thank you to the ranking member for this timely hearing.
I'll be traveling to the region with Ranking Member Sires. We
are going to Honduras and Guatemala this weekend.
We have seen those countries make significant progress in
fighting corruption, but the attorneys general of these
countries need our support. They face tremendous propaganda
campaigns to undermine the progress they've been making. In
Nicaragua we see the Ortega regime immersed in corruption,
denying human rights to its people, and undermining our
interests in the region by placating the Russians.
So much work needs to be done in Venezuela, as you pointed
out, Mr. Chairman. Thank goodness we have got new sanctions
against these human rights violators.
We have seen the dialogue in Venezuela is not working and
the U.S. position must be that Josh Holt and all the political
prisoners including Leopoldo Lopez and Antonio Ledezma must be
released immediately and unconditionally.
And in my native homeland of Cuba we need to prioritize our
focus to the Communist island and be on the side of human
rights, on the side of return of fugitives like Joanne
Chesimard, on the side of U.S. citizens whose properties were
confiscated.
There is so much going on, but hopeful signals too. We have
got a new election cycle in Ecuador, Mr. Chairman, in April.
That's going to, hopefully, bring back election democratic
norms to that country. And in Haiti, lastly, after years of
stalling elections finally occurred and we have a new
President.
So good things can happen. Thank you for your leadership,
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the lady, and I want to go now to Mr.
Meeks, who is probably the senior member of the subcommittee,
for a brief opening statement.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and
the ranking member for holding this very important hearing on
issues and opportunities in the Western Hemisphere.
Our relationship with our neighbors, partners and friends
must be a high priority for the United States. I am hopeful,
you know, that the cuts that we are seeing through the State
Department that the President is proposing do not jeopardize
some of the things that we do.
I am very concerned about that and maybe some of the other
statements that he has made, particularly in regards to Mexico
where we have spent decades investing in a relationship that
works collaboratively on all fronts.
And the question or not--the question is now whether or not
all of that is in jeopardy following inflammatory and audacious
statements regarding Mexican migrants, orders to increase
deportations that would tear families apart, and efforts to
build a border wall at Mexico's expense.
You know, Mexico is a big important country for us and
there is no question that NAFTA should be updated to meet the
needs and changes of the 21st century. However, it has enabled
a strong trade relationship between our countries and the
subject of withdrawal by any of the three countries should not
be used and taken lightly or used as a political tool.
It is, unfortunate, as I have heard both you, Mr. Chairman,
and the ranking member say, that the political situation in
Venezuela has become detrimental to the Venezuelan people.
The Venezuelan people are deserving of safety, security and
prosperity and their well-being must take center stage.
Positive changes across the hemisphere are welcoming, including
in the Caribbean where we are encouraged by Haiti's commitment
to the peaceful transfer of power to a new President.
The Haitian people have endured countless natural and
manmade disasters and it is their resilience that will restore
and rejuvenate a democratic Haiti. Changes to the hemisphere
are constant.
But I also wanted to say I am pleased that we have enacted
last year the U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act, which I
think helps a stronger engagement with the Caribbean. It is
critical to our national security.
And also I could not stop without talking about--and I
think I have heard everyone mention this--the ratified peace
agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC which
showcased to the world what Colombia's perseverance looks like,
and serves as the model to others that getting to the table and
talking through legitimate concerns and next steps is possible
for our support for Peace Colombia and that should be as strong
as it was for Plan Colombia.
And, you know, I am a big trade guy but I have got to end--
I want to conclude by highlighting an issue that is near and
dear to me: The social inclusion of persons of African descent
in indigenous and marginalized communities. It's crucial to the
advancement of our hemisphere. I would like to spotlight Brazil
and Colombia as leaders in their respective efforts to dissolve
barriers of race discrimination.
Our joint action plans with Brazil and Colombia to
eliminate racial and ethnic discrimination, and to promote
equality highlight our mutual commitment to the issues.
I fear that if we fail to acknowledge the necessity of
social inclusion across the hemisphere it will be to the
detriment of all of us in the hemisphere including the United
States. As Dr. King said, ``Injustice anywhere is a threat to
justice everywhere.''
So the political, economic, social, and environmental
advancement of our hemisphere requires earnest and genuine
social inclusion to combat systemic discrimination and
injustice. And if any government in the hemisphere including
the United States fails to address this it will do so at its
own peril.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, for giving me this
opportunity.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.
I am going to go ahead and recognize the witnesses. The
rest of the committee members, if you would like to make a
brief opening statement during the question period I will allow
a little leniency on our time and not adhere to the strict 5
minutes. But keep those statements brief when we get into the
question time. I just want to try to make it fair with this
being our first subcommittee meeting. But I would like to go
ahead and start hearing from the witnesses in the time
allotted. So we will now proceed with that.
Each witness will be given 5 minutes to present testimony.
There is no lighting system in here so I will give a brief
indication when you're time is getting close, if you can wrap
it up at that point.
Members have been given the bios of all the witnesses and
that's how we will run this committee. We will not introduce
each witness by their bio and long lengthy introduction.
I will just recognize them to go ahead with their
testimony. You can read about them beforehand. We should
provide that beforehand.
So Ms. Sally Yearwood, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Welcome back.
STATEMENT OF MS. SALLY YEARWOOD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CARIBBEAN-
CENTRAL AMERICAN ACTION
Ms. Yearwood. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Duncan,
Ranking Member Sires and members of the subcommittee. Thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today.
The countries of the Caribbean and Central America are
America's third border, and while they do not always figure
front and center in discussions on hemispheric policy, they
include 22 of the hemisphere's 35 independent nations and are
therefore of significant strategic importance.
With limited exceptions, the countries of the region have
strong and longstanding relationships with the U.S. and share
common values, intertwined histories, and often common
challenges.
The important thing about challenges, however, is that
solutions and opportunities for all partners are found in
collaboration, clear priorities and shared commitment.
At the end of 2016, the bipartisan bill, the United States-
Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016 was passed into law.
I would like to go on the record thanking Congressman Engel and
Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen for their co-sponsorship of the bill
and ongoing support to the region. Its passage has immediately
afforded an opportunity for Caribbean stakeholders to dialogue
with counterparts in the United States on areas of mutual
importance.
Where Central America figures in the United States foreign
policy and what this means for tackling such areas as crime and
corruption in a volatile environment is particularly important
and ongoing commitment and partnership is necessary.
There is a lot at stake, particularly for the countries of
the Northern Triangle where uncertainty could have
repercussions across the social, political, and economic fronts
including the vibrant trade relationship.
The U.S. has consistently had a surplus with both
subregions for the trade of goods, while the balance of trade
with the hemisphere overall shows the U.S. running a deficit of
$36.9 billion in 2014. The balance of trade with CBI countries
recorded a surplus of $3.6 billion that year and in 2015 the
U.S. had a trade surplus of $5 billion with DR-CAFTA countries.
This trade supports hundreds of thousands of jobs here and has
a correlated effect of creating and supporting hundreds of
thousands of jobs in the region.
There are a number of issues today that have broad
implications for growth in the region. The weight of each
factor varies by country. But I will point to some areas that
have general resonance and are often relate.
One--crime is one of the most pervasive issues that
governments and societies are confronting. The tentacles of
drugs, gangs, and violence bleed into politics and the
economies in ways that many of the countries are unable to
address in isolation.
Related to the ability to manage crime in many of the
countries is the weak nature of the judicial process. The court
systems are often bogged down and people who are arrested are
held without trial for extended periods of time, not to mention
those who are in and out of the system after payoffs.
Collaborative and security programs in the region can have
a positive impact on the cost of managing border security in
the United States. As an example, customs and immigration pre-
clearance facilities are an instruments for building mutually
beneficial partnerships for protecting borders.
Two--corruption has different implications, depending on
the type and scale of the problem. But it is important to note
that there are significant efforts being undertaken throughout
the region to combat it and to increase transparency and
accountability.
These are yielding important results and ongoing support
from international partners including the United States will
serve to strengthen political will and will have lasting
results.
Three--reforms that can drive for more productive policy
environment for trade and investment are necessary. Indeed,
institutional inertia in both the Caribbean and Central America
has been a barrier to more dynamic business communities.
A strong business climate with clear rules and with rule of
law has implications for job creation and economic growth and
is an area that will impact competitiveness and productivity
for the better.
Four--there are strong legal migrant communities from
Central America and the Caribbean throughout the United States
and as U.S. policy evolves, there will be concerns about the
possible effects on the region.
One would be about the general economic impact which could
be triggered by a drop in remittances, and second is the
absorptive capacity if there is a wave of returning migrants
and/or deportees.
This could put extreme socioeconomic pressure on nations
unless national or international resources are directed toward
managing this influx.
Five--the correspondent banking crisis in the Caribbean is
considered a threat to stability. Small markets and high costs
of compliance with global regulations have led to the derisking
phenomenon, which is an outflow of foreign banks that manage
cross-border transactions.
The U.S., together with other bilateral partners and
multilateral institutions, is working with the region to
address compliance issues and the related unintended
consequences.
This cooperation must continue as a matter of national and
regional security.
Six--the entire region is vulnerable to natural disasters
and the cost of a disaster can reach up to 30 percent of GDP.
Linked to this vulnerability is the impact of rising sea levels
that are threatening the coastlines. Resilient infrastructure
development is a key to an economically sound and secure
region.
Seven--it is difficult to capture the importance of
regional energy security in a paragraph. Venezuela's
relationship with many in the region and the influence of
Petrocaribe is its own book. Some highlights on progress in the
region include the important work on the Central American
electrical interconnection system, Guyana being on the brink of
becoming a regional and global energy leader, and the
deployment of technology for transportation and delivery of
natural gas, which is making this fuel a more accessible and
cost-efficient option for small islands. The U.S. and other
partners have been working with the region with a focus on
sustainable energy development. This has had positive results
for economies where the high cost of energy can negatively
impact economic activity.
And finally, a few words on Haiti, where the new President
was recently inaugurated. Haiti's social and economic
development will require substantial public and private sector
investment. Haiti's stability needs to be secured and it will
take well planned domestic strategies coupled with targeted
thoughtful international involvement to achieve this.
In conclusion, fragile states are unreliable neighbors. So
it is valuable to underscore the importance of a strong
collaborative relationship with the countries of our third
border.
This subcommittee has been very mindful of this fact and I
appreciate the attention it has given to the smaller nations of
the hemisphere and to the issues impacting the systemic
challenges to their economic growth.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be here.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Yearwood follows:]
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Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Ms. Yearwood.
I now will recognize Joseph Humire for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH M. HUMIRE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER
FOR A SECURE FREE SOCIETY
Mr. Humire. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Sires,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. I
thank you once again for inviting me to testify before you
today and thank you for your leadership on a region that is
near and dear to my heart and where I spend a lot of time
through my work.
We are in an important period of transition, both in the
world but, more particularly, in the Western Hemisphere. The
rise of pro-U.S. governments in Argentina, Peru, Brazil,
Guatemala and, potentially, other nations in the region very
soon, combined with what appears to be a renewed focus from the
White House with the appointment of General John Kelly. Along
with the leadership of this Congress, I believe there are ample
opportunities to increase our engagement throughout the
Americas.
Capitalizing on these opportunities, however, is going to
require a strategic approach that's informed by our partners in
the Latin America and Caribbean area.
Through my work, I primarily focus on national security
issues, but I spend a lot of time on the ground. I travel to
the region probably more than I want.
I spend a lot of time dealing with different actors and
different partners that are--express different challenges that
they are experiencing in their respective countries. With that,
I can say that any regional strategy must take into account the
growing transnational threats that are active in both Central,
South America, and the Caribbean, along with the regional and
extra regional actors that are exacerbating these challenges,
many of which are identified in my written testimony.
In my written remarks, I provide a series of
recommendations, five recommendations in particular that I
believe are areas where the Congress and the new administration
can collaborate to further U.S. interests in the hemisphere.
I'd like to highlight three of them.
The first is immigration security. Border security begins
beyond the border. There is a series of networks that are
permeating all throughout Latin America from the southern tip
of Argentina all the way up north through Mexico, passing
through countries like Venezuela and Central America.
The ability to capitalize on our immigration security is
encompassed in our ability to strengthen our human intelligence
collection.
It is no longer sufficient to simply rely on law
enforcement or immigration officials to wait until they get to
the border or to the airport to be able to identify what is a
threat. We must be able to augment our Embassies and consulates
abroad who are literally our first line of defense when it
comes to immigration security and I believe with the
prioritization of the administration on this issue this
provides a tremendous opportunity for the Congress to
collaborate on this and Latin America.
The second is counterterrorism. We are--in about less than
a month we are about to embark upon a historic legal precedent
in Latin America, both in Brazil and in Peru.
For the first time in the region there is a strong
potential that we will have the first conviction of a member of
an Islamic terrorist organization, both a Sunni Salaafist
organization and that of ISIS as well as a Shi'a extremist
organization and that of Hezbollah.
The case in Peru is set to be adjudicated before the end of
March. The case in Brazil of 12 sympathizers to ISIS that
plotted to blow up several sites before the summer Olympics
this past--this past year is set to adjudicate even sooner.
If these cases are convicted and sentenced, this is the
first time in Latin America's history that a member of an
Islamist terrorist organization is convicted for being a member
of an Islamic terrorist organization.
That creates a legal precedent, because in Latin America
there is a legal vacuum in that about half the countries have
anti-terrorism legislation but even the countries that have
this legislation they never took into account foreign terrorist
organizations. It was mostly domestic terrorism threats that
they were dealing with when they addressed this problem.
The influx of foreign terrorist organizations into the
region creates a different challenge for these countries and
being able to convict these individuals are de facto
designations. I believe that will create a tremendous
opportunity for the United States to cooperate with these
countries to provide technical assistance, legal assistance and
other so that they can create a bigger robust counter terrorism
coalition.
The final recommendation--not the final recommendation in
my written remarks but the one I'd like to address in my
opening statement is looking at a particular phenomenon in
Latin America that goes beyond corruption. Many countries in
Latin America are facing informal markets, illicit markets that
override a lot of times the formal markets, free enterprise
oftentimes being overrun by criminal enterprise.
However, there are select few countries that have gone
beyond that to essentially use criminalization as a way to
empower state policy and to project their influence both within
their country and abroad.
A colleague of mine, regional security expert Douglas
Farah, has called these countries criminalized states. I
believe that's a concept that we need to develop, and we need
to discuss all countries using transnational organized crime,
terrorism, and proliferation of illicit products as a method to
empower their governments, control their people, and eventually
promote their influence regionally.
I believe if we can assess that and determine that we need
to establish a strategy to deter it and neutralize it because
that can essentially become a bigger threat if you combine it
with the component of extraregional actors.
With that, I will just conclude by saying that, you know, I
agree with your assessment, Mr. Chairman, that Latin America is
largely a zone of peace, if you want to call it that.
My colleagues in the defense community often tell me that
while we have headaches in Latin America we have migraines in
the Middle East.
But what I would like to couch the committee to think about
is that those headaches can turn into migraines if we don't
anticipate the problems that are coming our way. Warfare--war
is nothing more than compulsion, and there are many ways to
compel your adversaries. And I believe in Latin America we are
in a asymmetric war for legitimacy in the region, and that we
have not yet begun to fight.
In my written testimony I have identified these
recommendations about how to advance these interests but it has
to be couched among the concept that if we lose in our
hemisphere we are going to lose everywhere.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Humire follows:]
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Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Humire.
Now the chair will recognize Jose Cardenas.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOSE CARDENAS (FORMER ACTING ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT)
Mr. Cardenas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Sires, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is both an
honor and a privilege to appear before you today to discuss
U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.
As my colleague, Joseph Humire, mentioned, after more than
a decade after the rise of populist governments in the region
uninterested in productive relations with the United States,
the political pendulum has begun to swing the other way with
the election of a number of pragmatic governments open to
reestablishing normal relations. This creates significant
opportunities to pursue new initiatives for the benefit of our
and our neighbors' security and prosperity.
To begin with, I suggest that the new administration and
the new Congress focus on four issues, out of the gate--Mexico,
Venezuela, Cuba and Central America, plus two longer-term
plays, if you will.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S.-Mexico relationship is one of the
most important bilateral relationships the United States has in
the world. It is equally true that President Trump has a
mandate to make border security and reviewing NAFTA priorities.
These, however, should be carried out in a collaborative
way that encourages vital cooperation. It doesn't have to be
confrontational.
Smoothing over some of the rough edges from the 2016
campaign is key to wider progress in the Americas without
compromising on U.S.--core U.S. interests. Such an approach
will likely deliver the stronger border security and a modern
NAFTA that better serves U.S. interests.
Secondly, on Venezuela, President Trump will encounter a
different hemisphere, which creates opportunities for more
diplomatic engagement to hold Venezuela accountable for its
anti-democratic behavior. The President has already
demonstrated an interest in defending democracy by meeting with
the wives of two high-profile political prisoners, as you
mentioned, Mr. Chairman. President Trump has also sanctioned
senior Venezuelan officials implicated in narcotics trafficking
in the United States.
This two-track approach of working multilaterally,
specifically through the Organization of American States, while
increasing pressure by continuing to expose the crimes of
Venezuelan officials, would be a welcome change to U.S. policy.
On Cuba, Mr. Chairman, the Trump administration should
seize the opportunity to bring energy and creativity to truly
empowering the Cuban people to decide their own destiny, which
President Obama articulated as the goal of his policy.
First off, however, we need to immediately reestablish
common cause with Cuba's persecuted dissidents and human rights
activists. Secondly, the administration should review all
executive orders and commercial deals signed under the previous
administration and judge them by a single standard--do they
help the Cuban people or do they empower the Castro regime. I
suggest that any activity found to be more sustaining of the
regime's control rather than directly benefiting the Cuban
people should be ended.
On Central America, President Trump can bring a new
commitment and funding for our beleaguered neighbors attempting
to cope with the transnational crime and gang activity.
To that end, Mr. Chairman, we have to be guided by several
assumptions. Number one, in Central America, as we try to
placate and stabilize these societies, preventing their--the
push factor from sending people to our borders, we have to
recognize there are no silver bullets. It is not a question of
the hard side or the soft side. It is going to take all sides.
Secondly, Mr. Chairman, we cannot want it more than they
do. We can only help if they are truly committed to helping
themselves and that means tackling the twin evils of corruption
and impunity.
Three, we must be clear on sequencing. Security doesn't
follow from resolving social and economic problems. You have to
create security first before anything else.
And lastly, a strong commitment to human rights is not a
hindrance. It is essential. It creates legitimacy and trust
among the very people we are trying to help.
Beyond those imperatives, the longer-term play is
realigning U.S. relations with two of the most important
countries in the Western Hemisphere--Brazil and Argentina.
Both are undergoing profound course corrections and we need
to take advantage of the situation. Both of those countries can
be essential partners after many years of less than cordial
relations in support of consolidating democratic and free
market development in the region, enhancing both U.S. security
and prosperity.
The table is set. All it requires is political will. Mr.
Chairman, despite the myriad challenges, I remain optimistic
about U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean in
the next 4 years.
It will not be all smooth sailing. It never is. But the key
is to move past the 2016 Presidential campaign by pursuing
serious initiatives with tangible benefits to both the United
States and those who want to work with us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cardenas follows:]
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Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
And the chair will recognize Mr. Quilter for 5 minutes.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. PETER QUILTER, NON-RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, ASH
CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION, JOHN F.
KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Mr. Quilter. Thank you very much, Chairman Duncan, Ranking
Member Sires, for the opportunity to testify today. Good to see
you, Mr. Meeks.
I will summarize my statement. I ask that the full
statement be made part of the record.
I would like to concentrate on three different issues which
I think are intimately connected--Mexico, Venezuela and the
Organization of American States.
Mexico--what we have seen in the past week--the takeaway
from what we have seen in the past week is that the dynamic
that we are now seeing between Mexico and the U.S. is not
business as usual.
In 30 years of looking at this relationship I have never
seen it this messy. The Tillerson-Kelly visit, which was
intended to smooth things over, I think, in fact laid bare that
1 year away from Mexican elections we have a lot on the table
between us, Mexico and the United States.
We have a big agenda. But the maneuvering room is
constricting. It is getting smaller rather than widening.
That's not good.
What can be lost? A lot. I am not going to talk about the
trade issue because we know that between Canada and Mexico the
trade relationship is huge. I am going to talk about security,
drugs and migration.
What if Mexico were to look the other way on Central
American migration going north? What would it look like if
Mexico loosened its resolve on the drugs issue with us? What
would it look like if Mexico stopped cooperating on terrorism
intel with us? And I am talking about Middle Eastern countries.
Lots of intel but I am talking specifically about that.
Number two--there is a winner out of the past couple of
weeks and that's Lopez Obrador, the perennial Leftist
Presidential candidate in Mexico. His stock is going through
the roof. He is a year away from the election, the front
runner. This is not the consummation devoutly to be wished for
the United States.
Number three, this dynamic we are seeing right now with
Mexico is the canary in the coal mine for our relationship with
the rest of the hemisphere.
We need to fix this because we have serious problems in the
region, case in point, Venezuela. Venezuela remains the
ulcerating sore of the region.
In my statement I talk about two scenarios--a soft landing
where Maduro basically limps his way to elections next year,
which may or may not occur. He is good at buying time. That
could happen.
The second one is a hard landing. A hard landing will
certainly involve bloodshed, will involve the Venezuelan
military, will be a security nightmare for Venezuela's
neighbors and will very likely unleash a refugee crisis.
What to do? We need both these things. We need Venezuelans
to lead the solution and we need the international community to
accompany.
Maduro does care about his international reputation. He
doesn't care so much about what the U.S. says but he cares very
much about what happens in the rest of the international
community. We got to go there.
Sanctions on individuals such as we just had with the Vice
President work. They work. We should do more of those. What not
to do? Bristly rhetoric. We have tried that before.
Didn't work. We are not doing it now but we shouldn't do
it. Second, and most critically, the U.S. can't do Venezuela
alone and it can't lead on Venezuela.
The lesson now from the Mexican dynamic is that U.S. needs
partners. Unfortunately, trust in our partnerships is eroding.
Maduro is exploiting that erosion. We need tools to galvanize
those partnerships. The main one we have is the Organization of
American States--the OAS.
Let me quickly move to the OAS. The OAS is very weak. It's
actually close to a breaking point. This is not an accident.
This is a campaign that Venezuela and its friends have waged
since Chavez. Unfortunately, I think the U.S. has let this
happen.
It has allowed a foreign policy asset to weaken that now we
need more than ever. The good news is the OAS is worth saving.
The time is fix it is now.
Latin America in the past 15 years has been a good news
story. It is less poor and more middle class than it has been.
2017 and 2018 we will have eight different Presidential
elections.
This dynamic with Mexico bodes ill. The regional problems
such as Venezuela require concerted effort, which now looks
more difficult than ever, and the tools to do it, such as the
OAS, are in trouble.
There are significant U.S. policy equities that hang in the
balance. Without a serious course correction from the Trump
administration, I hope it comes in time.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Quilter follows:]
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Mr. Duncan. I want to thank the witnesses, and I am pleased
that there are several regional Ambassadors in attendance
today.
If you're an Ambassador from a Latin American country, if
you could raise your hand and be recognized.
All right. Thank you. Thank you all for attending.
So I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes and then we
will go through the order between majority and minority side.
And so I will put the same clock on me as I did you guys but I
may not adhere as strongly to it as I did you.
Ms. Yearwood, since Congress passed the Caribbean strategy
legislation late last year, and given our continued focus on
the best way forward in dealing with the thorny issues of
corruption, lawlessness, and migration in the Northern Triangle
countries--El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras--what do you see
as the best strategies for engagement in the hemisphere? Kind
of elaborate on some of your opening statement as well.
Ms. Yearwood. Thank you for the opportunity to talk a
little bit more about 4939. Forty-nine thirty-nine is kind of a
little bit unique insofar as there is no money attached to the
bill but what it does is it creates a vehicle for regional
engagement with the United States and I think, according to
some of the other statements from the--from the witnesses, the
need for having this engagement, particularly, as I mentioned,
22 of the 35 countries--independent nations in the region are
in that--in the Caribbean and Central America--having the
ability to dialogue with them and taking advantage of 4939 to
create stakeholder dialogue where the U.S. is a partner with
the region on these critical issues of corruption, economic
development, diplomatic engagement, energy, being able to help
pull away the influence of Petrocaribe, which I think is going
to be important going forward, and finding ways for the region
to advance as self-reliant and self-sustaining nations is going
to be important.
So I think having vehicles both within the Caribbean and
within Central America where the U.S. is engaging productively
will be an excellent way to make that vehicle work with the
region.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you. Shift gears a little bit.
Mr. Humire, I know you are an expert on security in the
region and you have written extensively on the Iranian activity
in the hemisphere. I have been engaged in that since I came.
A story broke this week in the Argentine press that exposed
some of the tape recordings of Argentine prosecutor Alberto
Nisman before his death where he seemed sure of the guilt of
former Foreign Minister Timmerman and other top government
officials in covering up the AMIA bombing.
And he is quoted as saying, ``Although they want to kill me
and take me out of the picture, that won't be a setback. Many/
some of the involved already know and are pleading for their
lives but all of them know what they did, what they said, and
it is their problem.''
So that was the words of Albert Nisman. Can you expand on
this revelation and give us a sense of the status of the
investigation into his death and also what he was working on
with regard to AMIA?
Mr. Humire. Mr. Chairman, in Argentina, related to the case
of Alberto Nisman, there's actually three separate cases that
are connected.
There is, obviously, the case of the AMIA bombing from 1994
that is still active. It is still around. It needs to be
pursued in advance.
There is the case that he presented at the--Alberto Nisman
presented before the Argentine courts about the criminal
conspiracy between the former President, Christina Kirchner,
and her complicitness with the Iranian Government to grant
impunity to those accused of the AMIA bombing.
And, finally, there is the case on his death. Those three
cases are currently active in the Argentine judiciary and I
believe the most important case of the three is the middle
one--the case that he presented before the court a week before
his death to say that the Argentine Government was colluding
with the Iranian Government to grant impunity.
That court--that case was all but thrown out of the
courtroom in Argentina. Repeatedly it went through various
appeal processes and we have an opportune moment in that some
of the obstacles--the judicial obstacles that were presented in
that court--in that case have been removed.
So that case is now active. The DAIA--the Jewish
community--the sister of the AMIA has become a part of that
case and so they can now present additional evidence.
I actually participated in examining a lot of the evidence
that was involved in that case--the wiretaps that Nisman had
presented as part of the evidence of making that accusation,
and there is a lot more than what he was able to present.
Obviously, he was never able to present that because he was
killed. Having that case open suggests that he was killed in
the line of duty--that he was actively pursuing a judicial
matter and then was found dead in his apartment shortly after.
The case on his death is also an opportune moment because
now it has been graduated to a Federal court because of the
preceding actions on the other case.
This presents a tremendous opportunity in advancement on
the Macri administration to be able to help and lend support as
needed and as requested to be able to come to a conclusion in
either one of those two cases.
Having a conclusive judicial action in either one of those
two cases can help us advance the AMIA, and at the end of the
day that is what Alberto Nisman was trying to do.
He was trying to seek closure for the victims of the AMIA
attack and to--and to pursue those that he believed that were
behind that attack.
I think that's there is advancements on that. I think there
are a lot of opportunities for the U.S. to help. But it is
still--it is still in process.
Mr. Duncan. Do you have any sort of time line idea of when
they may come to some conclusion on that?
Mr. Humire. I would like to say that it would happen this
year. I couldn't say that with any certainty, Mr. Chairman. But
what I will say is that there--if there is a time to advance
the case it is now.
Last year, obviously, Macri was his first year as
President. There was a lot of struggles and challenges to get
one of those cases open and to get the other case moved to the
Federal court. That was a very difficult obstacle. They've
overcome those obstacles so now is the--now is the time to lend
whatever support, whatever assistance is needed so that they
can adjudicate these properly. There is still a lot of
adversarial forces in the country that don't want to see these
cases ever see the light of day, which is why you are seeing
those wiretaps come and be leaked.
Mr. Duncan. But in your opinion, is the Macri government
being very accommodating with the prosecutor?
Mr. Humire. I believe that they are--the Macri
administration is supportive to these cases. However, I believe
there's more that could be done. I believe that if the U.S.
Government----
Mr. Duncan. President Macri, I would say, campaigned on
it--that it was part of his promise to get----
Mr. Humire. Correct.
Mr. Duncan [continuing]. To the bottom of it, from what I
understood.
Mr. Humire. Correct. But I believe with the change of the
administrations in the U.S.--I think in the past he might not
have got a clear signal from the U.S. that they were very
cooperative on this particular issue. It's not an issue that
the U.S. would say that we were involved or had any stake in
seeing the outcome or the resolution.
That might change, and if that were to change I think you
would see a much more rapid advancement and the Macri
administration would be--I think would welcome that change.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you. We went a little further into that
than I anticipated. Let me just finish up with Mr. Cardenas.
You know, your role with the Bush administration--you have
had a lot of experience. What are some of the other diplomatic
tools other than the sanctions that we just recently saw with
the Trump administration? What are the other diplomatic tools
you might recommend that the Trump administration use toward
Venezuela?
Mr. Cardenas. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we need to take
a good look at the energy relationship, and that is, of course,
Venezuelan oil shipments to the United States.
I think that what I am talking about, of course, is really
an expansion of targeted sanctions. Nobody is arguing for the
type of wide application of economic sanctions that would only
make the lives of individual Venezuelans even worse. But I
think that within the realm of authorities that both Treasury
and State Department have that we can do a lot more in terms of
sending signals and creating disarray within the leadership of
the Venezuelan Government, I can't imagine who wants to be the
last Venezuelan sanctioned by the United States on behalf of a
government that most Venezuelans have long ago lost any faith
in.
I think that the diplomatic route is key, as my colleague,
Mr. Quilter, stated within the Organization of American States.
I think that the changed environment in the region presents
some opportunities that didn't exist before for other countries
to get active on the Venezuela issue within the context of
the--of the OAS.
Of course, we have a very spirited Secretary General, Luis
Almagro, who is looking for diplomatic support. We, of course,
as the United States, don't want to be out there bearhugging
him with love. But we can, through our offices, our good
offices around the region and here in Washington, work with
these other governments to support Mr. Almagro in what he wants
to accomplish on Venezuela.
So I guess the most fruitful avenues, I believe, that exist
out there are continuing on the diplomatic regional approach--
multilateral approach and then let us start looking at very,
very--specifically at pressure points in the Venezuelan
Government's economic wherewithal to start upping the pressure.
Pressure, combined with the multilateral diplomacy, I believe,
is the way to go and, frankly, we just did not see that for
many years, including both administrations.
Mr. Duncan. I appreciate your frankness and I hope our
subcommittee will bear with me because I am going to make
Venezuela a focus of this subcommittee on what we can do for
the people of Venezuela and end the oppression. And so we will
have multiple hearings, I am sure, in this Congress on this.
With that, I will yield to the gentleman, Ranking Member,
Mr. Sires, for as much time as he wants.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There is a newspaper report out today that the new budget
looks to cut 37 percent of the State Department's budget. This
is the--it just came out.
I was just wondering what you think the impact is going to
do with our relationship to the region if this were to come to
fruition.
Ms. Yearwood. Thank you, Mr. Sires.
I think Mr. Humire said it very well, in terms of working
with the State Department and U.S. agencies in countries goes a
long way toward helping identify and deal with threats as they
occur and I think the State Department is the front line in the
region when it comes to dealing with problems, when it comes to
nurturing the relationships.
I think taking the State Department out of the equation
creates a void. It means other countries would be able to step
in and nurture relationships that the U.S. should be leading
on, and so I would--I would strongly advocate against it.
Mr. Sires. Mr. Humire.
Mr. Humire. Yes, Mr. Sires. I believe, obviously, it will
have a detrimental effect and any cuts--any budget cuts in a
particular part of the world where the U.S. Government,
particularly U.S. State Department, still struggles to have the
level of engagement that they think they would wish to have, it
will hurt.
But I think--and I lived also through the cuts in the
Defense Department during the sequester that, obviously, then-
General John Kelly, commander of SOUTHCOM, obviously complained
a lot about because he didn't feel like he had the adequate
resources to go after the threats.
But I think both of these cuts--there is a reality--a
fiscal reality that as legislators you know very well. However,
it is also a consequence of priorities or lack of priorities
and this is a point I just want to emphasize.
A lot of challenges we are addressing throughout the world
are converging in Latin America, be it the aggressions or
resurgence of Russia, the expansions and aggression of China,
or the belligerence of Iran.
Those challenges are becoming closer to our shores in Latin
America in places like Venezuela, and if our policy makers
don't prioritize the region that's going to become a bigger
problem.
That is going to become a bigger threat. Dealing with that
requires money. It requires appropriations. It requires us to
give our authorities the capabilities that they need to address
it.
Mr. Sires. Mr. Cardenas.
Mr. Cardenas. Thank you, Mr. Sires.
As the chairman noted--Mr. Duncan noted, I did serve in the
Bush 43 administration and both at the State Department and
USAID.
So I have been in the belly of the beast and I have--I
recall it was very, very shocking or, certainly, sobering to
compare the resources that we had at our disposal with those
that our colleagues in DoD had at their disposal. So that was--
is an ongoing challenge.
But it--at the same time, there is waste, fraud, and abuse
in any Federal bureaucracy that can be--that can be addressed,
that more efficiency and better prioritization of objectives
can be achieved. I think it has to be an effort, I think,
whereby one has to be cognizant of a new environment whereby we
have to be leaner and meaner.
Maybe it will not wind up where the President's opening bid
established and the figure could result in a higher number. But
I think that the bureaucracies involved need to be prepared
for--to participate in leaner, meaner operations.
Mr. Sires. Mr. Quilter.
Mr. Quilter. The American people, apparently, believe that
25 percent of our budget goes to foreign aid. The number is
less than 1 percent, as you know.
I think this would be penny-wise and pound foolish. Any
cuts to the 150 account would be more expensive in the long
run.
General Mattis himself said that if you--if you don't fully
fund the State Department I think he said, I have to buy more
ammunition, and I think that is absolutely right. Buying
ammunition is much more expensive than fully funding the State
Department. Thank you.
Mr. Sires. And my topic that I always raise, you know,
partners in the region long maligned the United States for its
treatment of Cuba and used it as an excuse to stay silent.
Now that we have this opening and we have all this counter
back and forth, what is the principal reason that these
countries don't speak up about the human--the abuses in Cuba? I
mean, it is well documented--human rights abuses, people
getting beat up. Why is it that they don't speak up? I mean,
they don't have to now worry about us. Mr. Cardenas.
Mr. Cardenas. Mr. Sires, I have--as a long time student of
U.S.-Cuba relations I do have some impressions, if I could
share with you.
I think that in most cases in many of these countries they
are afraid, domestically, of their own left. The left in Latin
America is not like the left in this country.
The left movements, many of them having been widely
infiltrated by Cuba, can be violent. They can be disruptive.
And to push against Cuba, to speak out for the most humane
topics that any American wouldn't think twice about, they
remain reluctant for fear--for fear of the trouble that Cuba
can cause in their own countries.
Mr. Sires. Mr. Humire, would you agree with that?
Mr. Humire. I do agree. Let me just add to that, it is also
not a accident that you have seen this in particular countries
because what the Cubans are very good at is working with host
governments to be able to influence public opinion, and it is
that center of gravity--public opinion--that we need to tackle
to be able to get it more on the side of U.S. influence or U.S.
activity.
In my written testimony, I examine public opinion polls
through Latino Barometer, a respected Chilean polling firm, and
what you see is a negative trend in favorable U.S. public
opinion in 10 countries throughout the hemisphere.
Now, I am not going to say that Cubans are behind all of
that, but they are definitely pushing that narrative. It is the
ability to get a narrative, to grab a narrative, that helps
solidify our ability to sell the U.S. as a legitimate partner
in the region.
We don't have the narrative. The U.S. does a lot of good
actions. The Defense Department does a lot of good. Whenever
there's a humanitarian crisis they are some of the first people
to respond. But that action isn't all of a sudden--that action
isn't accompanied by a story, and it is those stories that need
to be told to be able to push back against what the Cubans have
done throughout the region.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the ranking member.
Now going back and forth, we are going to go to Mr. Rooney
from Florida for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rooney. This testimony has been a very thorough
overview of what's going on in Latin America right now and I
appreciate it.
I have spent a fair amount of time down there myself over
the years. So I am trying to find a couple of things that
haven't been mentioned yet to be productive.
So, Mr. Humire, if you could comment--the chairman
commented on the role of Iran in the Nisman case in Argentina.
If you could comment on the current activities of Iran in
Venezuela and Nicaragua.
Mr. Humire. Thank you, Mr. Rooney.
Iran--let me just start by saying that Iran, along with
their proxy, Hezbollah, is present in every country in Latin
America. In some cases they are more subterranean.
They are working out of an informal network. In other
cases, such as Venezuela, they have a full seat at the table
with the current government. The recent appointment of the
current Venezuelan Vice President, Tareck El Aissami, to me was
a clear indicator of the level of control and influence that
Iran has in that country.
I have studied the Iranian presence in Venezuela for
several years and it has graduated. It started as cultural
presence, moved over to become a diplomatic presence with more
economic engagement. It has now fully graduated into a military
presence. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, along with their
subordinate elements through the Ministry of Defense and armed
forces logistics, has complete presence and activities within
Venezuela including territories that are not within control of
the Venezuelan Government.
Tareck El Aissami was one of the individuals that
controlled a lot of that network or at least was one of the--
the man on the ground partners for Tehran in that activity. My
understanding is that as the executive Vice President he's been
granted executive powers that are essentially Presidential
powers that can be used by Iran to foment more instability and
conflict.
What I worry about with Venezuela--and think of this within
the context of Syria--what are we dealing with Syria? We are
dealing with a proxy conflict with many parties where the
Iranians, the Russians, and other actors are essentially
fomenting instability and violence so that they can engage the
United States.
If you take that lens, that optic, and you apply that to
Venezuela, you have the same actors. Obviously, not to the
level that you see them in Syria, but the potential for that is
there, especially with an individual like Tareck El Aissami at
the helm. His connections with Damascus, with Russia, with
Tehran could potentially create a conflict where the military
gets into a war with the militias and that only benefits the
folks in the Middle East.
Mr. Rooney. I am glad you brought up about that because you
know we know how from they fly in and out of there what kind of
aircraft they use.
Similar to that, assuming that we don't get into a Cold
War-Guatemala situation, Venezuela finally--we are in the final
innings of an opportunity to put the 15 years of the Chavez-
Maduro behind us--could you comment on what the impact to the
smaller Caribbean countries is going to be with the end of
Petrocaribe?
I don't know who would be the best for that. Maybe Ms.
Yearwood would because she is the Central American expert.
Ms. Yearwood. Well, I mean, Venezuela, because of
everything that is going on in Venezuela, obviously,
Petrocaribe--the influence of Petrocaribe is waning and what we
are seeing is the push toward greater energy diversity and
sustainability in the region.
The U.S. is engaging in various programs throughout the
Caribbean and Central America and basically the hope is that
Petrocaribe will become a--not as influential at the--at the--
at the end of the day. I think, given everything that's going
on in Venezuela, we can expect to see the Petrocaribe program
come to an end at some point in the not too distant future.
From a Caribbean perspective, for the countries that are a
part of the Petrocaribe program, the important thing is that
they are ready to deal with the move away from Petrocaribe,
which I think opens a lot of opportunities for collaboration
with the United States, and I referenced earlier the discovery
of oil in Guyana, and the cooperation between Guyana and
Trinidad and Tobago in terms of exploiting that opportunity.
So----
Mr. Rooney. Time for one more, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Duncan. We have got time for one more.
Mr. Rooney. One brief, and I'd like to ask Mr. Quilter and
perhaps Mr. Cardenas about the Pacific Alliance. That is one
thing that hadn't been mentioned here. And, you know, we have
got four very important countries working together and looking
west while we don't know sometimes where we are looking, right,
and you both touched on some of those.
So maybe you could give us some comment on the negative
aspects of that for the United States, and the positive aspects
of that for Chile, Mexico, Colombia, and Peru vis-a-vis China
and Asia.
Mr. Quilter. The Pacific Alliance is an amazingly effective
integration mechanism. Right now, trade is a bad word. We are
sort of falling over ourselves trying to understand how it fits
into our bigger picture. But that is precisely the kind of
integration mechanism that we would need to work with. We need
to work with it in some manner. The fact that the TPP is now
off the table means that we need a new way to engage with that
group because they are going to move without us. There is no
doubt that they are going to move without us. And another thing
we have to think about are opportunity costs of all these
things.
So are we creating a strategic opportunity for China as we
step back from these relationships? The same question really
applies to Russia, although not as urgently, I believe.
Another opportunity cost, which was mentioned by the
chairman which I would like to flag, is what we really should
be talking about right now with Mexico is energy integration in
this region.
We can do it. That is the next item on the agenda. We are
just not getting to that item because we are talking about a
bunch of other things that I think we should have left behind.
Mr. Cardenas. Ambassador Rooney, if I could just add to
Peter's comments. The Pacific Alliance is something that was an
achievement of U.S. foreign policy, an objective policy that
has spanned Democratic and Republican administrations that is
advocating on behalf of trade integration, open economies, free
trade, and now that we have this entity that is borne of
itself--it wasn't like the United States came and put them
together. They, unilaterally, came together. But it was after
many years of things that we had pushed for, bipartisan support
in the region.
So I think that we have to quickly figure out what our
approach is going to be. President Trump has been very clear on
his points about multilateral agreements. But he is for
bilateral agreements. So we have to figure out how this all
fits together.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman. Just I hope--you know, 5
weeks into this I hope energy is a part of the conversation as
NAFTA is renegotiated.
We do know with natural gas pipelines, with constitutional
changes in Mexico with regard to nationalization--
denationalization of the energy sector, there's a lot of
opportunity with Mexico that I think ought to be on the table,
and I can promise you I will be conversing with the Trump
administration on energy policy and with regard to Western
Hemisphere countries because I think there is--I used to talk
about American energy independence and I broadened that to
North American energy independence.
Now I broaden that to hemispheric energy independence where
we can work with our allies here that are hungry for energy,
hungry for American technology. There is just a heck of a lot
of opportunity here--bilateral opportunity in so many ways.
So with that, I will go to the gentlelady from Illinois,
Ms. Kelly, and for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
At the community of Latin American and Caribbean states
summoned on January 25th, President Castro expressed Cuba's
willingness to continue negotiating a bilateral agreement with
the U.S. President Trump has continually repeated his America
first mantra about creating jobs and increasing exports.
Lifting the embargo would open up a new market for American
companies and the potential to add $366 million annually in
U.S. exports.
In Illinois alone, which I represent, the removal of U.S.
travel and financial restrictions would increase Illinois
agricultural exports to Cuba by $6.6 million annually.
In my opinion, expanding trade opportunities for American
farmers is putting America first. Given the economic benefits
and regional support for lifting the outdated Cuban embargo,
what are the next steps that Congress and the Trump
administration should consider?
And also, how should we balance trying to bring opportunity
to the Cuban people without emboldening the Castro regime?
And if we could start with Mr. Cardenas and Mr. Quilter.
Mr. Cardenas. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I would say that opportunities--unfortunately, what I have
seen over the last 2 years is the Cuban Government taking
advantage of the very generous outreach of the Obama
administration to put the past history behind us, and to move
forward in a cooperative manner for the benefit of the Cuban
people, has resulted in the Castro regime manipulating and
using those overtures to solidify its own control over the
people.
And specifically, I would say that the Cuban military
takeover of the Cuban tourism industry--the hotels, the
restaurants and other institutions--means that this has
translated into a windfall--a financial windfall for the
government at the expense of the people.
I have seen very little true market openings whereby Cubans
truly have the freedom to open businesses, to conduct them as
they see fit without fear of the government deciding that they
are making too much money.
So I would find ways to review the relationship with more
stipulations, more conditionality on benefits for the Cuban
people, rather than simply this open-ended new path that was
opened up by President Obama that doesn't account, or doesn't
demand or expect any reciprocal action from the Cuban
Government.
Mr. Quilter. I would agree that a metric here is benefit to
the Cuban people. I think that is absolutely correct. I don't
think lifting the embargo is on the table. I don't think there
are votes for it right now.
I do not believe we need to go any farther than what
President Obama has done for now. My take on the changes that
President Obama made are a little bit different and I see them
as things inherent to us as Americans and that is a part of it
that sometimes gets lost in the discussion. It is not only a
foreign policy move to give Americans back their rights to
travel, to engage in commerce, to help their families in Cuba
if they have them, et cetera. But all through this we must keep
our compass true. This is about democracy. This is about human
rights. It is about fugitives from justice, as Mr. Sires knows
well--something very close to his heart. That should still be
the north of our relationship with Cuba. That should not
change.
Mr. Duncan. Gentlelady's time has expired.
I am going to go ahead to Ms. Torres and I am going to ask
if you could just limit your to maybe one good question because
they have called votes. And then I will move on to your
colleague and just allow the new members to ask. Ms. Torres.
Ms. Torres. Great. Thank you so much for the opportunity to
participate. It has been quite interesting hearing all the
different perspectives.
I am new to the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, new to
Foreign Affairs Committee. But the work in, certainly, the
Northern Triangle is not new to me.
I am very, very involved in addressing the issues,
specifically the issues of government corruption and ensuring
that the U.S. is not just throwing good money after, you know,
good money--it is all our taxpayers' dollars--but ensuring that
once our work there is done we leave a government, you know,
that--with a traditional process that actually works for the
people.
You know, my goal is that the next Norma Torres will have
an opportunity to be a Member of Congress in Guatemala and not
have to be sent to live with a, you know, a relative in the
U.S. because it was too dangerous for her to grow up there.
On the issue of Mexico, I am from California. Mexico is our
number-one trading partner. Mr. Quilter, I really appreciate
your comments. Diplomatic engagement, I absolutely agree, is
the key to solving some of our problems. A lot of the problems
have been created with this new administration, I believe, in
my opinion.
Some of the very loose comments that have been stated by
this administration have certainly hurt us there. We don't have
an Ambassador to help clean up some of the mess that we have
created there and that poses a problem, not just to all of the
states that trade, you know, with Mexico.
On the issue of weapons, I am curious to know as to what
more--what policies could be effective to help stem the tide of
guns across the border into Mexico.
I have to go back to some of the comments. I think it was
your comment that stated that Mexico has fortified their
borders and even within Central America. They used to have sort
of a brotherhood. There were no borders. You know, people from
the region can travel across. That is no longer, you know, what
is happening there. People are stopped.
Ninety-seven percent of the migrants that are--that cross
to the Mexico border are sent right back to their home
countries without refugee status. So what more can we do to
ensure that we don't destabilize Mexico as we have done in some
of the areas--other areas where we have no business conducting
ourselves the way we have been in the past?
Mr. Quilter. Very quickly--thank you very much for your
letter of February 27th on Mexico. I think it is a wonderful
letter. It was great to see it.
On guns, lost a little bit in the--in the trip right now of
Secretary Tillerson was that he brought up the issue of guns
and bulk cash, which is, of course, what the Mexicans want out
of the other side of the drug equation--just that specific
item.
This has been on the table for a long time. We have just
never--we have just never really gone there. We need a
strategy. We have the smarts to do it. We have State. We have
ICE. We have ATF and we have ONDCP, which is really good on the
numbers. We need to engage them all on that. To do it, we need
better information. We need better reporting. We need better
transparency about the guns.
We need a very good record of what guns are eventually
found down in Mexico, where do they end up, where are they
recovered and what for. Those are the kinds of things we need.
Ms. Torres. Is it true 70 percent of those weapons found in
Mexico are--you know, have a U.S. point of origin?
Mr. Quilter. Yes, and we need to make sure our numbers are
really good because we have these discussions about whether it
is really 70 percent or some number that is smaller.
Honestly, it doesn't matter. These numbers are way too big.
So we need--but we need good numbers.
Ms. Torres. On the issue of Central America,
congratulations, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. I think, you
know, you have been around for a while and the work they have
done with Plan Colombia has been wonderful.
But what lessons learned from Plan Colombia can we apply to
the Northern Triangle? I truly believe that we have sort of
done such a great job in Colombia that a lot of the drug
cartels have moved north to the region and are the cause--part
of the cause of what has happened in the Northern Triangle
specifically.
Mr. Cardenas. I would just, very quickly, think that--say
that the essential lesson is political leadership in the
region.
We have to find, frankly, three or four President Uribes
among the Northern Triangle countries--somebody who is willing
to go against vested interests.
As you noted, Congresswoman, the narcos and the gangs have
so permeated these societies that you don't know who is dirty
and who is clean. But you can find out and there are ways to
find out. We need to help them expose the insidious
infiltration of the narco traffickers and they need to be
rounded up and we need to, as I briefly stated in my testimony,
the twin evils of corruption and impunity--we need to push and
stand behind and help those administrations counter those evils
within those societies in order to make real progress against
the narco traffickers.
Ms. Torres. I agree with that. I just--I disagree that
security should be our only point of business there. I also
believe that ensuring that we are supportive of CSIG or MOXI
continues to be a priority for us and ensuring that educational
opportunities for the future leaders of these countries, that
there is an investment outside of military training or police
training in the region.
Mr. Humire. Mr. Chairman, if I can just really quickly
address.
Mr. Duncan. Quickly, please.
Mr. Humire. Congresswoman, just to--just to encapsulate
Central America so you understand, to deal with the insecurity
situation there--and I do a lot with the Department of Defense
on countering transnational organized crime--there has to be an
economic solution as well. The idea of doing security measures
without doing any type of economic empowerment or economic
trade is not going to work.
If you look at the crisis in El Salvador, if you overlay--
just a small anecdote--if you overlay where all the gangs have
greater control or were given territories in El Salvador and
you overlay that with where they have lack of property rights,
it is the same territories.
So essentially what I am saying is we have to understand
what are the drivers of economic growth and if you look at the
drivers of economic growth they are mostly economic freedom,
and I think that's where we have to go.
Mr. Duncan. I hate to do it. There is less than 5 minutes
on the clock for votes that they have called.
Members of the subcommittee can submit their questions for
the record. We would ask that you respond to those so that
members can have their question asked.
I apologize, I don't have the vote schedule. But I want to
appreciate the participation and, Mr. Espaillat, I will make it
up to you in a future committee hearing.
Before we adjourn, I want to give a special thanks to James
Randaccio, our current Western Hemisphere Subcommittee intern.
James has been a real asset to the subcommittee. We've been
happy to have his significant contributions to our team.
We have got a great staff on the minority and majority
sides. Look forward to working with you. I thank the witnesses
and with that we will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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