[Senate Hearing 114-251]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-251
PIPELINE SAFETY: OVERSIGHT OF OUR
NATION'S PIPELINE NETWORK
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE,
SAFETY AND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 29, 2015
__________
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Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
MARCO RUBIO, Florida CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
TED CRUZ, Texas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
JERRY MORAN, Kansas EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska CORY BOOKER, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TOM UDALL, New Mexico
DEAN HELLER, Nevada JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
CORY GARDNER, Colorado GARY PETERS, Michigan
STEVE DAINES, Montana
David Schwietert, Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, General Counsel
Jason Van Beek, Deputy General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Clint Odom, Democratic General Counsel and Policy Director
--------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY AND SECURITY
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chairman CORY BOOKER, New Jersey, Ranking
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ROY BLUNT, Missouri CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
JERRY MORAN, Kansas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada TOM UDALL, New Mexico
STEVE DAINES, Montana
C O N T E N T S
------------
Page
Hearing held on September 29, 2015............................... 1
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Booker...................................... 2
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 48
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 50
Statement of Senator Daines...................................... 53
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 55
Statement of Senator Ayotte...................................... 57
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 58
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 60
Witnesses
Susan A. Fleming, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Michael Bellamy, General Manager, PII Pipeline Solutions......... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Donald F. Santa, President and CEO, Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America......................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Terry McCallister, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, WGL
Holdings and Washington Gas, on behalf of the American Gas
Association.................................................... 30
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Susan A. Fleming by:
Hon. Deb Fischer............................................. 65
Hon. Cory Booker............................................. 65
Hon. Joe Manchin............................................. 66
Hon. Gary Peters............................................. 67
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Christopher A.
Hart by:
Hon. Cory Booker............................................. 67
Hon. Joe Manchin............................................. 68
Hon. Gary Peters............................................. 69
Response to written questions submitted to Michael Bellamy by:
Hon. Cory Booker............................................. 69
Hon. Joe Manchin............................................. 70
Hon. Gary Peters............................................. 71
Response to written questions submitted to Donald F. Santa by:
Hon. Cory Booker............................................. 71
Hon. Joe Manchin............................................. 72
Hon. Gary Peters............................................. 72
Response to written questions submitted to Terry McCallister by:
Hon. Cory Booker............................................. 72
Hon. Joe Manchin............................................. 73
Hon. Gary Peters............................................. 74
PIPELINE SAFETY: OVERSIGHT OF OUR NATION'S PIPELINE NETWORK
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Deb Fischer,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Fischer [presiding], Ayotte, Moran,
Daines, Booker, Klobuchar, Blumenthal, Markey, Peters, and
Manchin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Good afternoon. I am pleased to convene
the Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant
Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security for our ninth
hearing titled ``Pipeline Safety: Oversight of Our Nation's
Pipeline Network.''
Pipeline infrastructure transports vital energy resources
to homes, businesses, schools, and commercial centers across
the United States. According to the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, or PHMSA, more than 2.5
million miles of pipeline traverse the United States. Half a
million miles of pipeline transports natural gas, oil, and
hazardous materials to critical infrastructure, including
powerplants, military bases, and airports. In addition,
pipelines move approximately 75 percent of our Nation's crude
oil and 60 percent of our refined petroleum products.
In order to protect the safety and natural resources of
Nebraskans and of all Americans, Congress must maintain robust
oversight over PHMSA's activities. State and Federal officials
must also ensure that pipelines across the country can continue
operating efficiently. After all, pipelines are renowned as the
safest way to transport crude oil and natural gas.
Two weeks ago, I traveled to Montana with Senators Daines
and Tester to convene a field hearing on the importance of
State and local perspectives in pipeline safety. With an
excellent panel of witnesses, our hearing focused on the safe
movement of liquid materials on rural pipelines. We heard from
the newly confirmed PHMSA administrator about the agency's
organizational assessment aimed at refocusing resources and
streamlining PHMSA's work. Thanks to an inquiry by Senator
Daines, we learned that the pipeline operators are seeking
faster turnaround times on the results of PHMSA inspections,
which can often take more than a year.
Today--today's hearing will focus on the transportation of
natural gas throughout our Nation's vast pipeline network. In
addition to natural gas pipeline operators, we're fortunate to
have pipeline inspections technology represented, as well as
officials from the Government Accountability Office and the
National Transportation Safety Board.
As many of you are aware, in 2010 a natural gas pipeline
exploded in San Bruno, California, killing eight people,
injuring 60 people, and destroying 37 homes. Most experts cite
this incident as among the worst pipeline accidents in recent
history.
In March 2014, a natural gas pipeline in Fremont, Nebraska,
exploded, burning nearly 4 hours. Fortunately, this accident
took place in the middle of a cornfield, and so no one was
injured.
Through stronger oversight and collaboration between
stakeholders, we can be better prepared for pipeline incidents.
I look forward to hearing how natural gas pipeline operators
are working with local communities and with PHMSA on risk-based
approaches to preventing pipeline accidents. Most importantly,
we must work to help PHMSA reprioritize and complete the
outstanding requirements from the 2011 PHMSA reauthorization
bill.
Although PHMSA has made substantial progress, the agency
must work to complete the remaining requirements to provide
regulatory certainty to industry and our local communities.
With regard to staffing, PHMSA is experiencing challenges
competing with the private sector for highly skilled labor. I
would like to explore the ways in which we can work together to
accelerate the agency's hiring practices. I hope to learn more
about PHMSA's work with pipeline operators on the agency's
risk-based integrity management assessment programs and
pipeline inspection requirements. Accurate and ample data is
key to the success of PHMSA's Integrity Management Program.
PHMSA should continue to work with stakeholders on best
practices for data-sharing to better educate ancillary
industries and the public on pipeline safety. This is
especially important when it comes to high consequent areas,
including drinking aquifers, environmentally delicate regions,
and population centers.
Thank you all again for being here today. And together, I'm
certain we can pass a bipartisan reauthorization bill that
enhances pipeline safety for all Americans.
I would now invite my Ranking Member, Senator Booker, for
his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. CORY BOOKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Booker. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer. It's
an honor to continue to be your Ranking Member on this very
important committee.
I know that this transcript will be a hot topic--hot item
later, and will be read for months to come, so let the record
show that the room is packed, and there are people waiting in
the wings. There are tons of press crowded around just to make
sure--hanging on every word that we have to say.
In many ways, pipelines remind me of my time serving as a
lineman on the Stanford field goal team. Nobody really notices
you at all unless something goes wrong, and then they zero in
on you. And that is the truth of pipelines. And, unfortunately,
we know that when things go wrong, they can go horribly wrong
and have consequences to our environment and to life itself.
And so, in many ways, that's why we're here, is to make
sure that we're doing everything we can to prevent something
going wrong. As we've seen in San Bruno, California, pipeline
accidents are--have devastating impacts. This is one of the
reasons why--and, because, in my home state of New Jersey, we
have a higher per-capita population than any other places in
the country, it's one of the reasons why I'm very concerned,
because, in my state especially, pipelines--pipeline problems
could have catastrophic consequences.
And so, while pipeline safety in recent years has gotten
much better--and I've heard and read now about a lot of things
that are being done--we will continue to stay vigilant. And I'm
sure there are always things we can do to be better.
While PHMSA has made substantial progress on pipeline
safety, there--more has to be done. We continue to see
devastating accidents like some were mentioned by Senator
Fischer. These incidents are worrisome. I look forward to
hearing from the NTSB and GAO on what steps we should be doing.
I think they have important things to contribute.
In addition, technology is rapidly advancing in the
industry, and this is something that both Senator Fischer and I
are very interested in. These changes can be--can dramatically
change how we use and analyze data, and, importantly, how we
can improve safety. I also look forward to hearing from the
industry on how they are working to implement new technologies
to address these safety challenges.
Today is a great opportunity to assess where we are and to
consider what steps we could be using to go forward.
With that, I again want to thank the Chairwoman, and I look
forward to today's testimony.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Booker.
I would like to welcome our panel today. I appreciate you
taking the time to be here and provide us with information that
will be very important to us as we work on this
reauthorization.
First, we will hear from Ms. Susan Fleming, the Director of
GAO. She manages GAO's surface safety, rail financing, and
airline competition work.
So, welcome.
STATEMENT OF SUSAN A. FLEMING, DIRECTOR,
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Fleming. Thank you. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member
Booker, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to participate in this hearing on pipeline safety
and PHMSA's reauthorization.
Pipeline safety is critical to our Nation's economy. We
rely on a pipeline network of over 2.6 million miles to
transport about two-thirds of our domestic energy supply in the
form of hazardous liquids and natural gas. Pipelines are a
relatively safe means of transporting these hazardous
materials, but these catastrophic incidents can and do occur.
PHMSA establishes regulation that pipeline operators must
follow to, first, prevent and, if needed, respond to incidents.
My statement today is based on our recent reports which cover
the following three issues: the safety of gathering pipelines,
particularly in light of the boom in oil and natural gas
production from shale sources; pipeline operator incident
response; and the current requirements for reassessing natural
gas transmission pipelines at least every 7 years. In response
to recommendations we made in those reports, PHMSA has begun,
but not completed, efforts to improve regulations, data, and
guidance in these three areas.
Let me begin with gathering pipelines. Gathering pipelines
transport products from production areas to processing
facilities. About 90 percent of these pipelines are not
federally regulated because they are in rural areas and
typically have smaller diameters and lower operating pressures.
States may regulate gathering pipelines, but most do not. While
gathering pipelines generally pose lower safety risk than other
types of pipelines, PHMSA does not collect comprehensive data
to identify these risks.
In 2014, we found that construction of larger, higher-
pressure gathering pipelines had increased due to the increased
production of oil and gas. This raises safety concerns, because
an incident from a larger gathering pipeline could affect a
greater area than an incident from one of the traditionally
smaller pipelines. At that time, we recommended that DOT move
forward with a proposed rulemaking to address safety risk,
including emergency response requirements as well as improved
data collection to help identify risk. PHMSA has sought comment
on expanding the regulation of gathering pipelines, including
collecting additional data and plans to issue proposed rules
this fall.
Next, pipeline operator incident response. 2013, we found
that, while PHMSA had a goal for operators to respond to
incidents in a prompt and effective manner, this goal was not
linked to performance measures. We further found that PHMSA's
data on operators' incident response times was not reliable. We
recommended that PHMSA improve its data, which would allow it
to determine appropriate response-time goals for different
types of pipelines based on location and other factors. PHMSA
plans to improve its incident response data and to develop a
performance-based response standard by the end of 2016.
Our work has also addressed the use of automated valves to
improve incident response. We've found that such valves can
help operators to quickly shut down a pipeline if a rupture
occurs, but it can also disrupt service to customers or even
cause a rupture in some cases. We concluded that deciding where
to install these valves should be done on a case-by-case basis,
and recommended that PHMSA improve guidance to assist operators
in making that decision. PHMSA plans to improve its guidance
and to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on this issue in
February 2016.
Finally, pipeline integrity assessment. There is a
statutory requirement for natural gas transmission pipeline
operators to reassess the integrity of their pipelines every 7
years. In June 2013, we found that this requirement provides a
safeguard that operators are regularly addressing problems, but
it is not fully consistent with risk-based practices. Such
practices could lead to more, or less, frequent assessments for
specific pipelines, depending on the situation. We also found
that guidance for calculating assessments intervals is lacking,
and, as a result, operators may perform a less rigorous
determination of reassessment intervals. PHMSA plans to issue
such guidance in 2016 and is researching the feasibility of
risk-based assessments less often than the current 7-year
requirement.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I'd be pleased
to answer any questions you or members of the Subcommittee may
have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Fleming follows:]
GAO Highlights
Why GAO Did This Study
The nation relies on a pipeline network of more than 2.6 million
miles to transport hazardous liquids and natural gas. This network
includes gathering pipelines that transport products to processing
facilities and transmission pipelines that transport products from
processing facilities to users (see figure). Pipeline safety oversight
from PHMSA, along with state partners, covers issues such as incident
response planning and integrity management. PHMSA uses a risk-based
approach to regulate pipelines, resulting in regulation of all
transmission pipelines and about 10 percent of gathering pipelines.
Specifically, PHMSA does not regulate gathering pipelines that are
smaller, operate at lower pressure, and are located in rural areas.This
statement addresses PHMSA's efforts in the areas of (1) gathering
pipeline safety, (2) pipeline operator incident response, and (3)
assessment of natural gas pipeline integrity. It is based on GAO's
March 2012, January 2013, June 2013, and August 2014 reports on
pipeline safety and July 2015 updates from PHMSA on its actions to
respond to the reports' recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
In its reports, GAO made seven recommendations to DOT to improve
pipeline safety data and guidance and to move forward with proposed
rulemaking to address safety risks. GAO recommended, for example, that
DOT move forward with proposed rulemaking to address risks from newer
gathering pipelines. DOT is taking actions to respond to the
recommendations.
Pipeline Safety--Department of Transportation Needs to Complete
Regulatory, Data, and Guidance Efforts
What GAO Found
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has begun but not completed
efforts to improve pipeline safety in response to GAO's prior
recommendations:
Gathering pipelines: In 2012, GAO found that while gathering
pipelines that are not regulated by PHMSA were generally
considered to present less safety risk than other pipelines,
PHMSA did not collect comprehensive data to identify such
risks. GAO concluded that such data could help pipeline safety
officials and pipeline operators increase the safety of these
pipelines by better identifying and quantifying safety risks.
In 2014, GAO found that construction of larger, higher-pressure
gathering pipelines had increased due to the increased
production of oil and gas, raising safety concerns because an
incident could affect a greater area than an incident from a
smaller, lower-pressure pipeline. PHMSA plans to issue proposed
rules in fall 2015 that include collecting data on unregulated
gathering pipelines.
Pipeline operator incident response: In January 2013, GAO
found that PHMSA's data on operators' incident response times
were not reliable, limiting the agency's ability to move to a
performance-based approach for incident response. Improved data
would allow PHMSA to determine appropriate response times for
different types of pipelines, based on location and other
factors. PHMSA plans to require changes in operator reporting
to improve its incident response data and develop a
performance-based standard as part of an upcoming rulemaking.
Gas pipeline assessment: In June 2013, GAO found that a
requirement for gas transmission pipeline operators to reassess
the integrity of their pipelines every 7 years provided a
safeguard that issues were regularly addressed, but was not
fully consistent with risk-based practices. A risk-based
approach based on individual pipeline characteristics could
call for assessments to occur more or less frequently than 7
years. However, implementing intervals longer than 7 years
could require additional inspection resources to verify that
operators appropriately assessed risk. GAO also found that
guidance for calculating assessment intervals was lacking.
PHMSA plans to issue guidance in 2016 and is researching the
feasibility of risk-based assessments occurring less frequently
than every 7 years.
______
Prepared Statement of Susan A. Fleming, Director, Physical
Infrastructure Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Booker, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing on
pipeline safety. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), working in
conjunction with state pipeline safety offices, oversees a vital
network of over 2.6 million miles of pipelines carrying oil and natural
gas products to refineries, businesses, and homes. This network
includes gathering pipelines that convey crude oil and natural gas from
production wells to processing facilities; transmission pipelines that
transport the processed products over long distances to communities and
large-volume users; and distribution pipelines that split off from
natural gas transmission pipelines to deliver gas to residential,
commercial, and industrial customers. As you know, pipelines are a
relatively safe means of transporting these hazardous materials;
however, catastrophic incidents \1\ can and do occur when pipelines
leak or rupture, resulting in death, injury, and environmental and
property damage. PHMSA establishes regulations that pipeline operators
must follow to construct and maintain pipelines, as well as prepare for
and respond to incidents. Since 2002, PHMSA has required operators to
follow a risk-based approach to pipeline safety. For example, the
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 required PHMSA to implement a
risk-based ``integrity management'' program for natural gas
transmission pipeline safety that required pipeline operators to
complete a baseline safety assessment of their pipelines and complete
reassessments of those pipelines at least every 7 years.\2\
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\1\ In its regulations, PHMSA refers to the release of natural gas
from a pipeline as an ``incident'' and a spill from a hazardous liquid
pipeline as an ``accident.'' (49 C.F.R. Part 195, Subpart B). For
simplicity, this statement will refer to both as ``incidents.''
\2\ Pub. L. No. 107-355, Sec. 14(a), 116. Stat. 2985, 3002 (2002)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60109(c)(3)(A)-(B)).
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My statement today highlights our past work on:
(1) the safety of gathering pipelines, particularly in light of the
boom in oil and natural gas production from shale sources;
(2) the ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to
incidents; and
(3) requirements for reassessing the integrity of natural gas
transmission pipelines.
For this statement, we drew from our reports on these topics issued
from 2012 through 2014.\3\ For these reports, we analyzed PHMSA
pipeline incident data; reviewed pipeline regulations; conducted
literature reviews; and interviewed selected pipeline operators,
representatives of safety and industry groups, state pipeline safety
officials, and PHMSA officials. For the 2012 report on gathering
pipelines, we also surveyed state pipeline safety officials in all 50
states and the District of Columbia. In addition, in July 2015, we
obtained updates from PHMSA on its actions to respond to the
recommendations we made in these reports. Additional information on the
scope and methodology for each report can be found in these reports.
Our work on each pipeline safety report was conducted in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
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\3\ GAO, Pipeline Safety: Collecting Data and Sharing Information
on Federally Unregulated Gathering Pipelines Could Help Enhance Safety,
GAO-12-388 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2012); Pipeline Safety: Better
Data and Guidance Needed to Improve Pipeline Operator Incident
Response, GAO-13-168 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 23, 2013); Gas Pipeline
Safety: Guidance and More Information Needed before Using Risk-Based
Reassessment Intervals, GAO-13-577 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013);
and Oil and Gas Transportation Safety: Department of Transportation Is
Taking Actions to Address Rail Safety, but Additional Actions Are
Needed to Improve Pipeline Safety, GAO-14-667 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
21, 2014).
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Background
Pipelines transport roughly two-thirds of domestic energy supplies
through over 2.6 million miles of pipelines across the United States.
These pipelines carry hazardous liquids and natural gas from producing
wells to end users, such as businesses and homes. Within this
nationwide system, there are three main types of pipelines--gathering,
transmission, and gas distribution--managed by about 3,000 operators.
(See fig. 1.)
Sources: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration;
and GAO. / GAO-15-843T
Gathering pipelines. Gas gathering pipelines collect natural gas
from production areas, while hazardous liquid gathering pipelines
collect oil and other petroleum products. These pipelines then
typically transport the products to processing facilities, which in
turn refine the products and send them to transmission pipelines.
Unlike the other types of pipelines, many of these pipelines have not
been subject to PHMSA regulation because they are generally located in
rural areas, are smaller in diameter than transmission pipelines
(traditionally about 2 to 12 inches), and operate at lower pressures,
ranging from about 5 to 800 pounds per square inch (psi).\4\ PHMSA
regulates gathering pipelines in nonrural areas, resulting in
regulation of approximately 10 percent of gathering pipelines.\5\
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\4\ PHMSA has limited statutory authority to regulate such
pipelines under 49 U.S.C Sec. 60101(b). The law authorizes PHMSA, if
deemed appropriate, to define which gathering pipelines are regulated
on the basis of factors such as location, length, operating pressure,
throughput, diameter, and composition of the transported gas or
hazardous liquid. Crude oil gathering pipelines with a diameter of not
more than 6 inches that operate at low pressure and are located in a
rural area that is not unusually sensitive to environmental damage are
specifically exempted from regulation.
\5\ 49 C.F.R. Part 192.5 and 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 195.1(a)(4) and
195.11(a)(2).
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Transmission pipelines. Transmission pipelines carry hazardous
liquid or natural gas, sometimes over hundreds of miles, to communities
and large-volume users (e.g., factories).\6\ For natural gas
transmission pipelines, compression stations located periodically along
the pipeline maintain product pressure. Similarly, pumping stations
along hazardous liquid transmission pipelines maintain product flow.
Transmission pipelines tend to have the largest diameters and pressures
of the three types of pipelines, generally ranging from 12 to 42 inches
in diameter and operating at pressures ranging from 400 to 1440 psi.
PHMSA's regulations cover all hazardous liquid and natural gas
transmission pipelines.
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\6\ For the purposes of this statement, we use the term
transmission pipeline to refer to both hazardous liquid and natural gas
pipelines carrying product over long distances to users.
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Gas distribution pipelines. Natural gas distribution pipelines
transport natural gas from transmission pipelines to residential,
commercial, and industrial customers. These pipelines tend to be
smaller, sometimes less than 1 inch in diameter, and operate at lower
pressures--0.25 to 100 psi.
PHMSA estimated that in 2014 there were about 200,000 miles of
hazardous liquid pipelines,\7\ 302,000 miles of gas transmission
pipelines, 18,000 miles of gas gathering pipelines, and 2.2 million
miles of gas distribution pipelines based on annual reports from
pipeline operators.
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\7\ PHMSA's data do not categorize hazardous liquid pipelines into
transmission and gathering pipelines.
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Transporting hazardous liquids and natural gas by pipelines is
associated with far fewer fatalities and injuries than other modes of
transportation. From 2010 to 2014, there was an average of about 14
fatalities per year for all pipeline incidents reported to PHMSA,
including an average of about 2 fatalities per year resulting from
incidents on hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission pipelines.
In comparison, in 2013, 3,964 fatalities resulted from incidents
involving large trucks and 703 additional fatalities resulted from
railroad incidents. Yet risks to pipelines exist, such as corrosion and
third-party excavation, which can damage a pipeline's integrity and
result in leaks and ruptures. A leak is a slow release of a product
over a relatively small area. A rupture is a breach in the pipeline
that may occur suddenly; the product may then ignite, resulting in an
explosion.\8\ According to pipeline operators we met with in our
previous work, of the two types of pipeline incidents, leaks are more
common but generally cause less damage. Ruptures are relatively rare
but can have much higher consequences because of the damage that can be
caused by an associated explosion.
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\8\ The risks and consequences posed by gas and hazardous liquids
incidents also differ. Natural gas tends to ignite more easily,
resulting in more explosions. Hazardous liquids ignite less easily, but
can spill and pollute the environment.
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PHMSA administers two general sets of pipeline safety requirements
and works with state pipeline safety offices to inspect pipelines and
enforce the requirements.\9\ The first set of requirements is minimum
safety standards that cover specifications for the design,
construction, testing, inspection, operation, and maintenance of
pipelines. Under PHMSA's minimum safety standards, operators are
required to have a plan for responding to an incident that addresses
leak detection, coordinating with emergency responders, and shutting
down the affected pipeline segment. The amount of time it takes to shut
down a pipeline segment depends on the type of valve installed on the
pipeline. For example, manual valves require a person to arrive on site
and either turn a wheel crank or activate a push-button actuator. In
contrast, automated valves generally take less time to close than
manual valves. They include remote-control valves that can be closed
via a command from a control room and automatic-shutoff valves that can
close without human intervention based on sensor readings.\10\ PHMSA's
minimum safety standards dictate the spacing of all valves, regardless
of the type of equipment installed to close them.\11\
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\9\ For pipelines, there are 48 states, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico in PHMSA's natural gas pipeline program and 17 states
in its hazardous liquid pipeline program (49 U.S.C. Sec. 60104(c)).
\10\ Hazardous liquid regulations refer to emergency flow
restriction devices, which include remote-control valves and ``check''
valves that automatically prevent product from flowing in a specific
direction. See 49 C.F.R. Sec. 195.452(i)(4). We refer to all of these
valves as automated valves.
\11\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 192.179, 195.260.
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The second set of requirements is part of a supplemental risk-based
regulatory program termed ``integrity management,'' whereby operators
are required to systematically identify and mitigate risks to pipeline
segments that are located in ``high-consequence areas'' where an
incident would have greater consequences for public safety or the
environment.\12\ For example, natural gas transmission pipeline
operators were required to assess the integrity of their pipelines
within high-consequence areas by December 2012, repair or otherwise
address anomalies found during the assessment, and reassess these
segments at least once every 7 years thereafter. Integrity management
regulations also require that all transmission pipeline operators
consider the use of automated valves when identifying and mitigating
pipeline risks. These requirements have been in effect for all
hazardous liquid pipelines since 2002, for natural gas transmission
pipelines since 2004, and for natural gas distribution pipelines since
2010.
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\12\ High-consequence areas are defined differently for hazardous
liquid and natural gas pipelines. For hazardous liquid pipelines, such
areas include highly populated areas (i.e., urban areas), other
populated areas (i.e., a city, town, or village), navigable waterways,
and areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage. For natural gas
pipelines, high-consequence areas typically include highly populated or
frequented areas, such as parks.
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Gathering Pipelines Pose Safety Risks That PHMSA Is Working to Address
In our 2012 and 2014 reports, we identified safety risks associated
with gas and hazardous liquid gathering pipelines that PHMSA was
planning to but had not yet addressed through regulatory proposals. In
2012, we found that PHMSA does not collect comprehensive data on safety
risks associated with gathering pipelines.\13\ Although gathering
pipelines generally pose lower safety risks than other types of
pipelines, our survey of state pipeline safety agencies found problems
including construction quality, maintenance practices, unknown or
uncertain locations, and limited or no information on current pipeline
integrity as safety risks for federally unregulated gathering
pipelines. Operators of federally unregulated gathering pipelines are
not required by Federal law to report information on such risk factors.
Furthermore, the survey, as well as interviews with other pipeline
industry stakeholders, identified land-use changes--namely urban
development encroaching on existing pipeline rights-of-way--and the
increased extraction of oil and gas from shale as changes in the
operating environments that could increase the safety risks for
federally unregulated gathering pipelines. Consequently, Federal and
state pipeline safety officials do not know the extent to which
individual operators collect such information and use it to monitor the
safety of their pipelines.
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\13\ GAO-12-388. Although PHMSA has the legal authority to collect
data on unregulated gathering pipelines, the agency is not required and
has not yet exercised its authority to do so.
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In our 2012 report, we found that the data PHMSA collects for
regulated pipelines help Federal and state safety officials and
pipeline operators increase the safety of these pipelines by better
identifying and quantifying safety risks, as well as by implementing
mitigation strategies, and addressing potential regulatory needs. We
concluded that collecting such data about gathering pipelines could
facilitate quantitatively assessing the safety risks posed by
unregulated gathering pipelines. We recommended that PHMSA collect data
from operators of federally unregulated onshore hazardous liquid and
gas gathering pipelines subsequent to an analysis of the benefits and
industry burdens associated with such data collection. We recommended
that data collected should be comparable to what PHMSA collects
annually from operators of regulated gathering pipelines (e.g.,
fatalities, injuries, property damage, location, mileage, size,
operating pressure, maintenance history, and the causes and
consequences of incidents). In July 2015, PHMSA officials told us that
regulatory proposals the agency plans to issue for both natural gas and
hazardous liquid pipelines will call for collecting data on unregulated
gathering pipelines through both annual reports and accident/incident
reports. As of September 2015, DOT estimated that Notices of Proposed
Rulemaking on these issues would be published in October 2015.
We also found in our 2012 report that a small number of state
pipeline safety agencies we surveyed reported using at least one of
five practices that were most frequently cited to help ensure the
safety of federally unregulated pipelines.\14\ However, we also found
that the sharing of information among states on the safety practices
used appeared to be limited, and that some state and PHMSA officials we
interviewed had limited awareness of safety practices used by other
states. We recommended that PHMSA establish an online clearinghouse or
other resource for sharing information on pipeline safety practices. In
response, PHMSA requested that the National Association of Pipeline
Safety Representatives develop an online resource document library for
states to obtain and post information related to gathering pipelines.
This online library was established in May 2014 and includes, among
other things, state-specific regulatory information for gathering
pipelines, such as rules, definitions, and inspection form examples.
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\14\ These practices include (1) damage prevention programs, (2)
considering areas of highest risk to target resources, (3) safety
inspections, (4) public outreach and communication, and (5) increased
regulatory attention on operators with prior spills or leaks.
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In our 2014 report, we examined the transportation impacts of
increased oil and gas extraction and found that construction of larger,
higher-pressure gathering pipelines had increased to meet the increased
oil and gas production.\15\ Such pipelines, if located in rural areas,
are generally not subject to DOT safety regulations that apply to other
pipelines. This includes requirements for emergency response planning
that apply to other pipelines but do not apply to rural unregulated
gathering pipelines. For example, transmission pipeline operators with
pipelines similar in size to the new gathering pipelines are required
to develop comprehensive emergency response plans and coordinate with
local emergency responders. Emergency response officials we spoke with
stated that without information about the location of some gathering
pipelines, responders--particularly in rural areas--may not be
adequately prepared to respond to an incident. Consequently, response
planning in rural areas with federally unregulated gathering pipelines
may be inadequate to address a major incident. Historically, gathering
pipelines were smaller and operated at lower pressure and thus posed
less risk than long-distance pipelines. However, state pipeline
regulators, PHMSA officials, and pipeline operators we spoke with said
that some newly built gathering pipelines have larger diameters and
higher operating pressures that more closely resemble transmission
pipelines than traditional gathering pipelines. For example, while
gathering pipelines have traditionally been 2 to 12 inches in diameter,
one company operating in a Texas shale region showed us plans to build
30-and 36-inch natural gas gathering pipelines, which is near the high
end of diameters for regulated transmission pipelines. The recent
increase in their size and pressure raises safety concerns because they
could affect a greater area in the event of an incident. Although
states may regulate some gathering pipelines in rural areas, a 2013
report on state pipeline oversight by an association of state pipeline
regulators showed that most states do not currently regulate gathering
pipelines in rural areas.\16\
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\15\ GAO-14-667. We found that the increase in pipeline mileage is
unknown because data on gathering pipelines are not systematically
collected by PHMSA or by every state. Technology advancements such as
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (pumping water, sand, and
chemicals into wells to fracture underground rock formations and allow
oil or gas to flow) have allowed companies to extract oil and gas from
shale and other tight geological formations. As a result, oil and gas
production increased more than fivefold from 2007 through 2012.
\16\ The National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives,
an association representing state pipeline safety officials, produced a
compendium of state pipeline regulations showing that most states with
delegated authority from PHMSA to conduct intrastate inspections do not
have regulations that cover oversight of gathering pipelines. Based on
our analysis, we determined that regulations vary by state, but the
compendium shows that at least 6 states have some form of gathering-
pipeline regulation. National Association of Pipeline Safety
Representatives, Compendium of State Pipeline Safety Requirements &
Initiatives Providing Increased Public Safety Levels compared to Code
of Federal Regulations, second edition (Sept. 9, 2013).
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PHMSA has been working to propose regulatory changes to address
safety risks of unregulated gathering pipelines, but this effort is not
yet complete. PHMSA issued Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemaking for
onshore hazardous liquid and gas pipelines in October 2010 and August
2011, respectively, seeking comment on whether to require operators to
report on federally unregulated gathering pipelines, as well as on
whether to establish a new, risk-based regime of safety requirements
for large-diameter, high-pressure gas gathering pipelines, including
those pipelines in rural locations.\17\ PHMSA also noted that
enforcement of current requirements has been hampered by the
conflicting and ambiguous language of the current regulation that can
produce multiple classifications for the same pipeline system, which
means that parts of a single pipeline system can be classified as rural
gathering pipelines and therefore be federally unregulated, while other
parts of the same pipeline with the same characteristics are regulated.
In our 2014 report, we recommended that PHMSA move forward with a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to address gathering pipeline safety that
addresses the risks of larger-diameter, higher-pressure federally
unregulated gathering pipelines, including subjecting such pipelines to
emergency response planning requirements that currently do not apply.
DOT generally concurred with the recommendation. In July 2015, PHMSA
officials told us the proposed regulations the agency expects to
publish in October 2015 will address this recommendation. Specifically,
officials said that the gas pipeline proposal will extend certain
requirements (including emergency response planning) to previously
unregulated gathering pipelines with a diameter greater than 8 inches.
PHMSA officials also said that in the hazardous liquid pipeline
proposal, they are planning on using the proposed annual report and
accident data collection from federally unregulated hazardous liquid
gathering pipelines to develop appropriate and relevant regulations for
certain hazardous liquid gathering pipelines that are currently
unregulated.
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\17\ 75 Fed. Reg. 63774 (Oct. 18, 2010) and 76 Fed. Reg. 53086
(Aug. 25, 2011).
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Better Guidance on Use of Automated Valves and a Performance-Based
Approach to Incident Response Could Improve Operators' Response
Times
In our January 2013 report on pipeline operator incident response,
we found that numerous variables influence the ability of transmission
pipeline operators to respond to incidents.\18\ For example, the
accuracy of a leak detection system, the location of response
personnel, the preparedness of emergency responders, and the use of
manual or automated valves can affect the amount of time it takes for
operators to respond to incidents, which can range from minutes to
days.\19\ However, even though the primary advantage of installing
automated valves is that operators can respond quickly to isolate the
affected pipeline segment and reduce the amount of product released,
automated valves can have disadvantages as well. Specifically,
accidental closures can lead to loss of service to customers or even
cause a rupture. Because the advantages and disadvantages of installing
an automated valve are closely related to the specifics of the valve's
location, it is appropriate that operators decide whether to install
automated valves on a case-by-case basis. However, not all operators we
spoke with were aware of existing PHMSA guidance designed to assist
operators in deciding when to use automated valves. Consequently, we
recommended that PHMSA use its existing information-sharing mechanisms
to alert all pipeline operators of inspection and enforcement guidance
that provides additional information on how to interpret regulations on
automated valves. PHMSA officials said they plan to address this
recommendation by highlighting existing guidance during public
presentations and in other forums pipeline operators attend and through
an upcoming rulemaking on rupture detection and valve rules. PHMSA
plans to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on this issue in
February 2016.
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\18\ GAO-13-168.
\19\ Variables outside of operators' control--such as weather
conditions--can also influence incident response time.
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In our January 2013 report, we concluded that PHMSA has an
opportunity to improve incident response times by developing a
performance-based approach for pipeline operators to improve incident
response times. We have also previously concluded that a performance-
based approach--including goals and associated performance measures and
targets--can allow those being regulated to determine the most
appropriate way to achieve desired outcomes. While PHMSA has
established a national goal for pipeline operators to respond to
incidents in a ``prompt and effective'' manner, it has not linked
performance measures or targets to this goal.
Defining performance measures and targets for incident response can
be challenging, but we identified a potential strategy for PHMSA to
move toward a more quantifiable, performance-based approach to improve
incident response based on nationwide incident response data. For
example, PHMSA could evaluate nationwide data to determine response
times for different types of pipeline (based on location, operating
pressure, and pipeline diameter, among other factors). First, though,
PHMSA must improve the data it collects on incident response times.
These data are not reliable both because operators are not required to
fill out certain time-related fields in the reporting form and because
operators told us they interpret these data fields in different ways.
Consequently, we found that some pipeline operators did not
consistently report the date and time for when the incident was
identified or for when operator resources arrived on the site of the
incident. Some operators also did not consistently report whether the
incident led to a shutdown of a pipeline or facility. Reliable data
would improve PHMSA's ability to measure incident response and assist
the agency in exploring the feasibility of developing a performance-
based approach for improving operator response to pipeline incidents.
We recommended that PHMSA improve the reliability of incident
response data and use these data to evaluate whether to implement a
performance-based framework for incident response times. In July 2015,
PHMSA officials told us they have taken several steps toward addressing
this recommendation, including making changes to its incident reports
and requiring that operators report specific pieces of information
regarding an incident. Additionally, PHMSA officials said that, later
this year, they plan to propose further changes to the report forms to
collect additional data that will allow the agency to better track
incident response times. PHMSA officials also said they plan to develop
a more specific performance-based standard for incident response as
part of the upcoming February 2016 rulemaking.
Guidance and More Information Needed for Use of Risk-Based
Reassessment Intervals
The current statutory requirement for natural gas transmission
pipeline operators to reassess pipeline integrity at least every 7
years provides a safeguard by allowing operators and regulators to
identify and address problems on a continual basis, but in our June
2013 report, we found that this requirement is not fully consistent
with risk-management practices, which are the basis for PHMSA's
integrity management program.\20\ The primary advantage of the 7-year
reassessment requirement is that it is more frequent than the intervals
found in industry consensus standards, which specify 10-, 15-, or 20-
year intervals depending on the characteristics of individual
pipelines.\21\ This conservative approach provides greater assurance
that operators are regularly monitoring their pipelines to address
threats before leaks or ruptures occur. However, this requirement is
not fully consistent with risk-based management practices. Under a
risk-based approach, operators could, for example, use information to
identify, assess, and prioritize risks so that resources may be
allocated to address higher risks first. While operators are currently
required to determine an appropriate reassessment interval based on the
threats to their pipelines in high-consequence areas, they must
reassess those pipelines at least every 7 years regardless of the risks
identified. If the operator's risk analysis indicates that
reassessments should be done at intervals shorter than 7 years, the
operator is required to do so.
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\20\ GAO-13-577.
\21\ The American Society of Mechanical Engineers developed an
industry consensus standard--subsequently approved by the American
National Standards Institute--on maximum reassessment intervals for all
safety risks (including corrosion damage) that PHMSA incorporated into
its regulations. See 49 C.F.R. Sec. 192.939.
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Implementing risk-based reassessment intervals that are longer than
7 years for natural gas transmission pipelines would require a
statutory change and could exacerbate current workload, staffing, and
expertise challenges for operators and regulators. For example, PHMSA
officials told us that allowing longer intervals could require
inspectors to spend more time and resources than they do currently to
verify that operators appropriately assessed risk, and state pipeline
safety offices we met with noted potential concerns with staffing and
training to effectively evaluate risk-based reassessment intervals.
Further, some operators told us that extending reassessment intervals
to be longer than 7 years would likely require additional data analyses
beyond those currently required. In our June 2013 report, we found that
operators we met with varied in the extent to which they calculated
reassessment intervals and used the results of data analyses. Further,
we found that guidance to calculate reassessment intervals was lacking,
and as a result, operators may perform a less rigorous determination of
their reassessment intervals. As a result, some operators could be
following the 7-year reassessment interval when their pipeline should
be reassessed more frequently (e.g., within 5 years). To improve how
operators calculate reassessment intervals, we recommended that PHMSA
develop guidance for operators to use in determining risks and
calculating reassessment intervals. PHMSA officials said the agency has
drafted guidance on calculating reassessment intervals that are shorter
than 7 years; this guidance is currently under internal review and
agency officials anticipate that it will be posted on PHMSA's website
by February 2016.
At the request of a congressional committee, in 2008, PHMSA
described how it would establish and enforce risk-based criteria for
extending the 7-year reassessment interval for natural gas transmission
pipelines. At that time, PHMSA proposed retaining the current 7-year
reassessment requirement, but also establishing a process by which
operators could use risk-based reassessment intervals that are longer
than 7 years if they met certain potential criteria, such as
demonstrating sound risk analysis. This process would be similar to
that used by PHMSA for hazardous liquid pipeline reassessment
intervals.\22\ While we and PHMSA have supported the concept of risk-
based reassessment intervals that are longer than 7 years, given the
breadth of potential challenges with implementation, more information
might help decision-makers better understand the resource requirements
and potential safety implications of such a change. For example, PHMSA
has used pilot programs to collect such information and study the
effects prior to rule changes. To better identify the resource
requirements needed to implement risk-based reassessment intervals that
are longer than 7 years for gas transmission pipelines, we recommended
that PHMSA collect information on the feasibility of addressing the
potential challenges of implementing risk-based reassessment intervals
that are longer than 7 years, for example by preparing a report or
developing a legislative proposal for a pilot program, in consultation
with Congress, that studies the impact to regulators and operators of a
potential rule change. PHMSA is studying the potential to implement
risk-based reassessment intervals that are longer than 7 years for gas
transmission pipelines; agency officials plan to complete this research
by March 2016.
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\22\ Reassessment interval requirements for hazardous liquid
pipelines were established by PHMSA rulemaking rather than through
legislation. The gas transmission pipeline reassessment interval
requirements were established in the 2002 Pipeline Safety Improvement
Act.
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Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Booker, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Ms. Fleming.
Next, we have the Honorable Christopher Hart, who is the
Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, sworn in
on March 17, 2015. He was originally sworn in as a member of
the Board in 2009 and designated by the President as Vice
Chairman a few days after that in 2009.
So, welcome, Mr. Hart.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. HART, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Hart. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Fischer,
Ranking Member Booker, and members of the Subcommittee. And
thank you for inviting the National Transportation Safety
Board.
Pipelines remain one of the safest and most efficient means
of transporting vital commodities that are used to power homes
and supply businesses. However, as we have observed during our
investigations, the consequences can be tragic when pipeline
operators do not follow safe operational practices, have
inadequate safety standards, or disregard safety standards.
High-pressure natural gas pipeline failures frequently result
in explosive releases that, if ignited, become intense jet
fires that can cause extensive damage, injuries, and deaths.
Hazardous liquid pipeline incidents, on the other hand, can
cause large-scale environmental damage even in the absence of
an explosion or fire. For example, in July 2010, an Enbridge
30-inch pipeline released about 844,000 gallons of crude oil
into the Kalamazoo River near Marshall, Michigan. To date,
cleanup costs have exceeded $1.2 billion, with a ``b.'' This is
the largest onshore oil spill and most costly cleanup in U.S.
history.
As the Nation's demand for oil and gas grows and pipeline
infrastructure ages, we must pay even more attention to the
transportation mode that lies buried beneath us. Safe operation
of natural gas and hazardous liquid transmission pipelines are
a shared responsibility among the operator, government
oversight agencies, and local communities.
The NTSB continues to investigate such accidents. In fact,
as recently as last week, we launched an investigation team to
a pipeline accident in Centreville, Virginia, where a pipeline
released an estimated 4,000 gallons of gasoline. Some of the
liquid accumulated in a storm water retention pond near the
pipeline right away, but fortunately the spill did not result
in deaths or injuries. However, the spill made it necessary to
ensure that nearby residents were not adversely affected.
As you're aware, there are three types of pipeline systems
through which natural gas is transported from its source to the
end users: gathering, transmission, and distribution systems.
Gathering lines transport gas from a production facility to a
transmission line, and transmission lines transport gas from a
gathering line to a distribution facility. There are almost
300,000 miles of onshore natural gas transmission pipelines in
the United States. Compared to gas distribution pipelines,
transmission pipelines typically have larger diameters and
significantly higher operating pressures; therefore, the
potential impact of a transmission pipeline accident on its
surroundings is very high.
Since 2004, the operators of these pipelines have been
required by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, PHMSA, to develop and implement integrity
management programs to ensure the integrity of their pipelines
in high-consequence areas, including populated areas, in order
to reduce the risk of injuries and property damage from
pipeline failures.
In the last 6 years, we have completed three major gas
transmission pipeline accident investigations where we
identified deficiencies in the operators' incident management
programs and PHMSA oversight. These three accidents, which
occurred at--in Palm City, Florida, San Bruno, California,
which has already been mentioned, and Sissonville, West
Virginia, resulted in eight deaths, more than 50 injuries, 41
homes destroyed, and many more damaged.
Earlier this year, the NTSB Safety Research Division
conducted a safety study to build upon the results from the
completed investigation, and used additional research to gauge
the effectiveness of integrity management programs for gas
transmission pipelines in high-consequence areas. As a result
of the safety study, we issued 28 new recommendations,
including 22 to PHMSA. The recommendations include developing
expanded and improved guidance for operators and inspectors
for: first, the development of criteria for threat
identification and elimination; second, consideration of
interactive threats; and finally, increased knowledge of the
critical components that are associated with risk assessment
approaches. We also recommended that PHMSA evaluate and improve
gas transmission pipeline integrity assessment methods,
including increasing the use of inline inspection and ensuring
that direct assessment is not the sole integrity assessment
method.
Since 2000, we have made 77 safety recommendations to
PHMSA, with about half in an open status. For only one
recommendation have we evaluated PHMSA's actions as
unacceptable. The NTSB recognizes the efforts that PHMSA has
undertaken, but our study of integrity management in gas
transmission pipelines in high-consequence areas showed no
evidence of a decline in incidents since 2004, when PHMSA
integrity management rule first went into effect. The accidents
and incidents that NTSB investigates attest to the fact that
additional safety enhancements are still necessary to prevent
future pipeline accidents.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
I'm happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hart follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good afternoon Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Booker, and Members
of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) to testify before you today.
The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress with
investigating every civil aviation accident and significant incidents
in the United States and significant accidents and incidents in other
modes of transportation--railroad, highway, marine and pipeline. We
determine the probable cause of accidents and other transportation
events and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future
accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning
transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the Federal
Government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and
their family members impacted by major transportation disasters.
Since its inception, the NTSB has investigated more than 140,500
aviation accidents and thousands of surface transportation accidents.
On call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, our investigators travel
throughout the country and internationally to investigate significant
accidents and develop factual records and safety recommendations with
one aim--to ensure that similar accidents don't occur in the future. To
date, we have issued over 14,000 safety recommendations to nearly 2,300
recipients, including 77 recommendations to the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) since 2000.\1\ Because we have
no formal authority to regulate the transportation industry, our
effectiveness depends on our reputation for conducting thorough,
accurate, and independent investigations and for producing timely,
well-considered recommendations to enhance transportation safety.
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\1\ Nine of the recommendations were made to PHMSA's predecessor,
the Research and Special Programs Administration.
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Each year, the NTSB releases its Most Wanted List, highlighting
safety-critical actions that the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT), United States Coast Guard, other Federal entities, states, and
transportation industry organizations need to take to help prevent
transportation accidents and save lives. We base our Most Wanted List,
which focuses on our top 10 areas for transportation safety
improvements, on safety issues we have identified as a result of our
accident investigations. Although the 2015 Most Wanted List did not
include a pipeline-specific issue, the 2014 most Wanted List included
``Enhance Pipeline Safety.'' Safe operation of natural gas and
hazardous liquid transmission pipelines is a shared responsibility
among the operator, government oversight agencies, and local
communities. As we pointed out,
Oversight agencies also play a role, especially when operators
are reluctant to initiate safety improvements. Regulators can
mandate specific safety program improvements to ensure pipeline
operators adopt and improve practices that reduce the risk and
consequences of pipeline failures. For example, given the gas
industry's reluctance to expand the use of automatic shutoff
valves and remote controlled valves, the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration should require this technology,
which can isolate a rupture within minutes and reduce the
volume of gas released and the duration of a fire. \2\
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\2\ NTSB, 2014 Most Wanted List: Enhance Pipeline Safety (2014),
http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl/Pages/mwl5_2014.aspx.
Pipeline safety remains a priority for the NTSB. Just last week we
launched an investigative team to a pipeline accident in Centreville,
Virginia, in which a pipeline released an estimated 4000 gallons of
gasoline. Some of the liquid had accumulated in a stormwater retention
pond near the pipeline right-of-way. Fortunately, the spill did not
result in fatalities or injuries, and precautions were taken to ensure
that nearby residents and businesses were not adversely affected by the
released gasoline.
Recent Investigations
Two recent NTSB pipeline investigations involved natural gas
explosions. On March 12, 2014, in East Harlem in New York City, two
multi-use, five-story buildings were destroyed by a natural gas
explosion and subsequent fire. Eight people died, more than 50 people
were injured, and more than 100 families were displaced from their
homes.
On December 17, 2013, natural gas leaking from a cast iron
distribution pipeline resulted in the explosion of a two-story
apartment building in Birmingham, Alabama. One person was killed and
eight people were injured.
These explosions are a grim reminder that efforts to improve
pipeline integrity management practices must continue, particularly for
pipelines located in high consequence areas.
The NTSB issued its final accident report on the East Harlem
explosion last June,\3\ and the Birmingham investigation is still
underway. The East Harlem accident investigation focused on the
following safety issues:
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\3\ NTSB, Natural Gas-Fueled Building Explosion and Resulting Fire,
New York City, New York on March 12, 2014, Rpt. No. NTSB/PAR-15/01
(June 9, 2015).
Adequacy of the Consolidated Edison Company of New York,
Inc. (Con Edison) quality assurance and quality control
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procedures for joining plastic pipes;
Effectiveness of Con Edison's public awareness program;
Adequacy of Con Edison's gas odor report response;
Effectiveness of the New York City Department of
Environmental Protection sewer integrity program; and
Effectiveness of Federal and state natural gas pipeline
oversight.
The investigation found that a Con Edison contractor had installed
a plastic gas main and service ``tee joint'' in 2011 using a Con Edison
heat fusion procedure for plastic pipe. Post-accident examination
showed that the surfaces of the service tee and the gas main had not
adequately been prepared before the tee was fusion welded to the gas
main, resulting in a defective joint that contained an area of
incomplete fusion.
The investigation also found a large hole in a sewer main in the
vicinity of the gas main, which had been identified by the New York
City Department of Environmental Protection in 2006 and again in 2011
but was not repaired. The supporting soil under the gas main was washed
into the sewer through the sewer wall breach over the course of many
years when groundwater accumulated in the area. Consequently, the soil
supporting the gas main had washed away in the vicinity of the service
tee, which caused the gas main to sag and overstressed the defective
service tee fusion joint. A crack opened in the defective joint,
allowing natural gas to escape into the subterranean area and migrate
into one of the nearby buildings.
Con Edison had conducted an extensive public awareness program that
included urging the public and gas customers to call Con Edison in the
event of a suspected gas leak. This information was included in
customer billings, in newspaper advertisements, and in flyers posted in
apartment buildings. However, the investigation found that people
smelled gas the day before the accident but had not called Con Edison,
the fire department, or 911.
About 25 minutes before the accident, Con Edison received a call
from a resident of an adjacent building who reported a gas odor both
inside and outside of his residence. The gas was coming from one of the
buildings that was later destroyed in the explosion. During the call,
the Con Edison customer service representative's computer stopped
responding, which delayed the notifications. Although a gas service
mechanic was dispatched, the fire department was not notified as
required by Con Edison's response procedure.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was (1)
the failure of the defective fusion joint at the service tee that
allowed natural gas to leak from the gas main and migrate into the
building where it ignited and (2) a breach in the sewer line that went
unrepaired since at least 2006, allowing groundwater and soil to flow
into the sewer, leading to a loss of support for the gas main, which
caused the line to sag and overstressed the defective fusion joint.
As a result of this investigation, the NTSB made six safety
recommendations: one to the New York State Public Service Commission,
one to the City of New York, and four to Con Edison.\4\ The safety
recommendation to the New York State Public Service Commission called
upon that agency to ensure that its 5-year audit plan for pipeline
operators effectively addresses all aspects of the state pipeline
regulations. The safety recommendation to the City of New York, if
acted upon, will result in better reporting of sewer line breaches and
better coordination among city agencies to identify and address soil
disruption and voids. We recommended that Con Edison better adhere to
standard practices for heat fusion joining of polyethylene pipe,
promptly notify the New York City Fire Department in the event of a gas
emergency, and perform more extensive and appropriate installation of
gas main isolation valves.
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\4\ P-15-33 through -38.
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While the East Harlem accident investigation did not result in our
issuing a safety recommendation to PHMSA, the NTSB pointed out in its
accident investigation report that PHMSA had failed to identify
deficiencies in the New York state pipeline safety regulations. The
state pipeline safety program certifications in Title 49 United States
Code section 60105(a) allow states to inspect and enforce intrastate
pipeline safety, provided the state adopts at least the minimum Federal
pipeline safety regulations. Our examination of the New York state
pipeline safety regulations revealed that they did not meet Federal
regulations in two areas: definition of service line and pipeline
pressure testing. These deficiencies had not been identified by PHMSA
during state program recertifications. In response to the NTSB's
investigation findings, the New York State Public Service Commission
corrected these deficiencies.
Pipeline Safety: Natural Gas Pipelines
Three types of pipeline systems are used to transport natural gas
from the source to end users; gathering, transmission, and distribution
systems. Gathering lines transport gas from a production facility to a
transmission line, and transmission lines transport gas from a
gathering line to a distribution facility.\5\ The United States has
approximately 298,000 miles of onshore natural gas transmission
pipelines. Compared to gas distribution pipelines, transmission
pipelines typically have larger diameters and significantly higher
operating pressures. Therefore, the potential impact of a transmission
pipeline incident on its surroundings is high.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 192.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 2004, PHMSA has required the operators of these pipelines to
develop and implement integrity management (IM) programs to ensure the
integrity of their pipelines in populated areas (defined as high
consequence areas [HCAs]) to reduce the risk of injuries and property
damage from pipeline failures.\6\ An operator's IM program is a
management system designed and implemented to ensure the operator's
pipeline system is safe and reliable. It consists of multiple
components, including procedures and processes for identifying HCAs,
determining likely threats to the pipeline within the HCA, evaluating
the physical integrity of the pipe within the HCA, and repairing or
remediating any pipeline defects found. These procedures and processes
are complex and interconnected. Effective implementation of an IM
program relies on continual evaluation and data integration. The IM
program is an ongoing program that PHMSA and state regulatory agencies
should periodically inspect to ensure operator compliance with
regulatory requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ PHMSA's gas transmission IM regulations are found at 49 CFR
Part 192, Subpart O.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the last six years, the NTSB has completed three major gas
transmission pipeline accident investigations in which deficiencies
with the operators' IM programs and PHMSA oversight were identified as
a concern.\7\ These three accidents--located in Palm City, Florida; San
Bruno, California; and Sissonville, West Virginia--resulted in eight
fatalities, more than 50 injuries, and 41 homes destroyed, with many
more damaged. We are also evaluating IM oversight in the ongoing
Birmingham investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ NTSB, Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation Pipeline Rupture
Sissonville, West Virginia on December 11, 2012, Rpt. No. NTSB/PAR-14/
01 (February 19, 2014); NTSB, Rupture of Florida Gas Transmission
Pipeline and Release of Natural Gas Near Palm City, Florida, Accident
Brief No. NTSB/PAB-13/01 (August 13, 2013); NTSB, Pacific Gas and
Electric Company Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Rupture and Fire San
Bruno, California on September 9, 2010, Rpt. No. NTSB/PAR-11/01 (August
30, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Earlier this year, the NTSB's Safety Research Division conducted a
safety study using the results from the completed investigations and
additional research to identify weaknesses in the implementation of gas
transmission pipeline integrity management programs in HCAs. The study,
Integrity Management of Gas Transmission Pipelines in High Consequence
Areas, found that, although PHMSA's gas IM requirements have kept the
rate of corrosion failures and material failures of pipe or welds low,
no evidence exists to show that the overall occurrence of gas
transmission pipeline incidents in HCA pipelines has declined.\8\
Rather, the study identified areas where improvements need to be made
to further enhance the safety of gas transmission pipelines in HCAs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ NTSB, Integrity Management of Gas Transmission Pipelines in
High Consequence Areas, No. NTSB/SS-15/01 (January 27, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We recognize that IM programs are complex and require expert
knowledge and integration of multiple technical disciplines including
engineering, material science, geographic information systems, data
management, probability and statistics, and risk management. This
complexity requires pipeline operator personnel and pipeline inspectors
to have a high level of practical knowledge and skill to adequately
perform their functions. This complexity can make IM program
development and implementation, and the evaluation of operators'
compliance with IM program requirements, difficult. The study
illustrated the need to expand and improve PHMSA resources in guiding
both operators and inspectors.
The effectiveness of an IM program depends on many factors,
including how well threats are identified and risks are estimated. This
information guides the selection of integrity assessment methods that
discover pipeline system defects that may need remediation. The study
found that aspects of the operators' threat identification and risk
assessment processes require improvement. Further, the study found that
of the four different integrity assessment methods (pressure test,
direct assessment, in-line inspection, and other techniques), in-line
inspection yields the highest per-mile discovery of pipe anomalies, and
the use of direct assessment as the sole integrity assessment method
has numerous limitations. Compared to their interstate counterparts,
intrastate pipeline operators rely more on direct assessment and less
on in-line inspection.
As a result of the safety study, the NTSB issued 28 new
recommendations.\9\ Of these, 22 were issued to PHMSA and one previous
recommendation issued to PHMSA was reiterated.\10\ The recommendations
include developing expanded and improved guidance for operators and
inspectors for----
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ P-15-1 through -28.
\10\ P-15-1 through -22, reiterated P-11-7.
The development of criteria for threat identification and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
elimination;
Consideration of interactive threats; and
Increased knowledge of the critical components associated
with risk assessment approaches.
The NTSB also recommended that PHMSA evaluate and improve gas
transmission pipeline integrity assessment methods, including
increasing the use of in-line inspection and ensuring that direct
assessment is not the sole integrity assessment method. Other
recommendations include evaluating the effectiveness of the approved
risk assessment approaches for IM programs; developing minimum
professional qualification criteria for all personnel involved in IM
programs; and improving data collection and reporting, including
geospatial data, to support the development of probabilistic risk
assessment models and the evaluation of IM programs by state and
Federal regulators.
All of the recommendations to PHMSA resulting from the safety study
are classified as open with an acceptable response, with the exception
of P-15-14. This recommendation asked PHMSA to revise Title 49 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) 192.915 to require all personnel involved in
integrity management programs to meet minimum professional
qualification criteria. PHMSA responded that operator personnel
involved in integrity management programs receive on-the-job training
(OJT) under the supervision of a qualified person and that OJT is an
integral component of integrity management training. PHMSA further
stated that operators should establish personnel qualification criteria
that are applicable to their unique operating environment and managers
should have the discretion to determine what minimum qualifications are
needed. To address the recommendation, PHMSA proposed to review options
for setting qualification criteria based on PHMSA and NTSB evaluations,
and to use this information and current regulations to issue an
advisory bulletin to clarify and reiterate the importance of the
requirements and place renewed emphasis on compliance in future IM
inspections. Although PHMSA's intended course of action may constitute
an improvement, it falls short of revising the regulations as
recommended. Accordingly, we requested that PHMSA reconsider the
current plan in order to adequately address the NTSB recommendation.
The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of
2011 \11\ (the 2011 Act) requires PHMSA to conduct an evaluation on (1)
whether IM should be expanded beyond current HCAs and (2) whether doing
so would mitigate the need for class location requirements for gas
transmission pipelines. Consequently, PHMSA began a series of
rulemaking activities to consider whether IM requirements should be
changed, including adding more prescriptive language in some areas, and
whether other issues related to system integrity should be addressed by
strengthening or expanding non-IM requirements. Among the specific
issues PHMSA is considering concerning IM requirements are whether the
definition of an HCA should be revised and whether additional
restrictions should be placed on the use of specific pipeline
assessment methods.\12\ The NTSB provided comments and will monitor
these rulemakings to ensure that PHMSA has the full benefit of the
lessons learned through our investigations and safety study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Public Law No. 112-90, section 5 (2012).
\12\ The two relevant notices are: (1) Pipeline Safety: Safety of
Gas Transmission Pipelines -Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 76
Fed. Reg. 5308 (Aug. 25, 2011); and (2) Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas
Transmission Pipelines -Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking;
Extension of Comment Period, 76 Federal Register 70953 (Nov. 16, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pipeline Safety: Hazardous Liquid Pipelines
As we learned from the July 25, 2010, pipeline rupture in Marshall,
Michigan, and the subsequent release of more than 840,000 gallons of
crude oil into nearby wetlands, Talmadge Creek, and the Kalamazoo
River, ensuring adequate integrity management programs for pipelines
transporting hazardous liquids remains critically important. No
fatalities were reported from the crude oil spill; however, local
residents self-evacuated from their houses and more than 300 people
reported symptoms consistent with crude oil exposure.\13\ The Marshall,
Michigan, spill is the costliest onshore oil spill ever to occur in the
United States, with current cleanup costs exceeding $1 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ NTSB, Enbridge Incorporated Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Rupture
and Release Marshall, Michigan on July 25, 2010, Rpt. No. NTSB/PAR-12/
01 (July 10, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the pipeline rupture
was corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from crack and
corrosion defects under disbonded polyethylene tape coating, producing
a substantial crude oil release that went undetected by Enbridge
Incorporated's control center for more than 17 hours. The rupture and
prolonged release were made possible by pervasive organizational
failures at Enbridge, and PHMSA's weak regulation for assessing and
repairing crack indications. Contributing to the accident was PHMSA's
ineffective oversight of pipeline integrity management programs,
control center procedures, and public awareness. The investigation also
determined that contributing factors to the severity of the
environmental consequences were (1) Enbridge's failure to identify and
ensure the availability of well-trained emergency responders with
sufficient response resources, (2) PHMSA's lack of regulatory guidance
for pipeline facility response planning, and (3) PHMSA's limited
oversight of pipeline emergency preparedness that led to the approval
of an inadequate facility response plan.
As a result of this investigation, the NTSB made safety
recommendations to the U.S. Secretary of Transportation, PHMSA,
Enbridge, the American Petroleum Institute, the Pipeline Research
Council International, the International Association of Fire Chiefs,
and the National Emergency Number Association.\14\ The NTSB also
reiterated a previous recommendation to PHMSA.\15\ All of the
recommendations to PHMSA are currently classified as not yet completed
but thus far acceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ P-12-1 through P-12-19.
\15\ P-11-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB is pleased that PHMSA has made progress in implementing
the recommendations from this investigation, including that agency's
development of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) titled Pipeline
Safety: Safety of On-Shore Hazardous Liquid Pipelines. Among other
things, the NPRM proposes to incorporate, by reference, consensus
standards governing conduct of assessments of the physical condition of
in-service pipelines using inline inspection, internal corrosion direct
assessment, and stress corrosion cracking direct assessment.
PHMSA is also considering revisions to the Control Room Management
regulations of the Pipeline Safety Regulations to more explicitly
require team training, through its NPRM titled Pipeline Safety:
Operator Qualification, Cost Recovery, and Other Proposed Changes. This
NPRM was published on July 10, 2015.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ 80 Fed. Reg. 39916 (Jul. 10, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, PHMSA issued two advisory bulletins. The first,
Advisory Bulletin 2014-01, published on January 28, 2014,\17\ notified
pipeline operators (1) of the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan,
pipeline accident, and (2) of the need to identify deficiencies in
facility response plans and to update these plans as necessary to
conform with the non-mandatory guidance for determining and evaluating
required response resources as provided in Appendix A of 49 CFR Part
194, ``Guidelines for the Preparation of Response Plans.'' The second,
Advisory Bulletin 2014-02, published on May 6, 2014,\18\ was directed
to all hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators, describing
the circumstances of the accident in Marshall, Michigan--including the
deficiencies observed in Enbridge's integrity management program--and
asking them to take appropriate action to eliminate similar
deficiencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ 79 Fed. Reg. 4532 (Jan. 28, 2014).
\18\ 79 Fed. Reg. 25990 (May 6, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
Since 2000, the NTSB has made 77 safety recommendations to PHMSA;
only one of these has been closed in an unacceptable status.\19\ We
recognize the progress PHMSA has made over the past 15 years; yet,
there will always be room for improvement, and the accidents and
incidents that the NTSB investigates attest to the fact that safety
improvements are still necessary to prevent future accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ P-15-14, discussed above at page 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I am happy to answer
your questions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Chairman Hart.
Next, we have Michael Bellamy, who is the General Manager
of PII Pipeline Solutions. Mr. Bellamy has over 23 years
experience in sales and marketing of technology solutions to
the oil and gas industry.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL BELLAMY, GENERAL MANAGER,
PII PIPELINE SOLUTIONS
Mr. Bellamy. Thank you very much. That's a good start.
Good afternoon. My name is Michael Bellamy, and I'm the
General Manager of PII Pipeline Solutions. PII is part of
General Electric's measurement and control business. We inspect
oil and gas pipelines, and, in the 35 years since the business
was founded, have inspected over a million miles of pipelines
worldwide. Over 40 percent of that work has been carried out
here in the United States.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today about
pipeline inspection technology, which is also referred to as
inline inspection, carried out using high-technology robotic
devices, also called ``smart pigs.'' These devices travel along
the inside of the pipeline at speeds up to 9 miles an hour,
propelled by the pressure of the product flowing through the
line. Equipped with sensors of various types, ``pigs'' collect
millions of measurements as they travel, covering every inch of
both the internal and external surface of the pipe steel,
recording the data onboard for subsequent download when
recovered at the end of the inspection run.
To help understand the role of inline inspection tools in
ensuring pipeline safety, perhaps a medical analogy will help.
In human medicine, data provided by MRI scanners, CT scanners,
X-Ray machines, and ultrasound devices is used by medical
specialists to develop a diagnosis and prescribe a course of
treatment. In the same way, pipeline operators use the
diagnostic capability afforded by inline inspection tools to
design integrity management programs that take into account the
age of the line, the way it's operated, the environment in
which it's situated, all of which determine the potential for
threats to pipeline safety.
Moreover, just as medical diagnostic technologies are used
to identify medical issues at the earliest stages in our
bodies, inline inspection tools can identify potential problems
in pipelines early enough to prevent them from developing into
a leak or rupture. By means of inline inspection, cracks the
size of a matchstick or corrosion half the diameter of a penny
can be identified and measured with confidence.
Inline inspection tools were first introduced in the 1970s
and have evolved tremendously since. As yet, there is no one
tool that can find all threats. Nevertheless, pipeline
operators today have access to a range of modern, high-
technology tools covering all the major threats to pipeline
safety, including dents, corrosion, cracking, and land movement
in both gas and liquid pipelines. The inline inspection
industry is now deploying its fourth generation of metal-loss
tools, its fourth generation of geometry tools, and third
generation of crack-detection tools. Our understanding of the
physics of these tools continues to evolve, and, coupled with
advances in algorithmic search and data manipulation
techniques, the inspection tools available today are providing
ever improving results.
Once a ``smart pig'' run is completed, the data recorded,
which is equivalent to looking at 70 football fields in grids
of one-eighth inch by one-eighth inch, is processed to
highlight suspected anomalies. The resulting output is then
reviewed by a trained data analyst, who verifies the assessment
and compiles a report on the condition of the pipeline to
submit to the operator. With this information, and in the
context of the PHMSA-approved integrity management program for
the pipeline, the pipeline operator can prioritize the issues
that need immediate attention.
In this way, inline inspection tools make a material
contribution to pipeline safety. For example, corrosion tools
have been in use for more than 45 years. Data gathered in the
U.S. continue to show a reduction in corrosion-related
incidents by 36 percent over the last 12 years. Crack
inspection tools have been around for less time than corrosion
tools. Nevertheless, a recent Pipeline Research Council study
compared over 40,00 cracks found by inline inspection tools
with actual measurements from field excavations. The results
gave a clear validation of the published tool specifications.
Additionally, the soon-to-be-published API-1176 industry
recommended practice document developed with PHMSA involvement
will provide guidance to operators on how to use the results
from inline inspection tools as part of a comprehensive crack-
management program. We look forward to seeing continued
improvement in pipeline safety, vis-a-vis cracks, as this
technology continues to mature and becomes more widely adopted
by pipeline operators.
We consider ourselves partners with our customers and PHMSA
in working to enhance pipeline safety. We support rules that
are clear and interpreted in such a way as to encourage
competition and innovation. However, the current U.S. rules
don't recognize the differences between inline inspection tool
technologies or in tool performance, nor do they encourage
operators to use the best available technology.
PHMSA has done a great job in stimulating the pipeline
industry to use inline inspection tools for dents and general
corrosion. The next step is to encourage the use of a broader
range of tool technologies capable of finding and
characterizing a broader range of pipeline anomalies.
I'd also like to mention risk management and risk models as
an accepted approach adopted by pipeline regulators globally.
Such models take inline inspection data and combine it with
contextual information about the pipeline, its construction and
operation, to help operators make better-informed diagnosis
concerning the ongoing health of their pipeline. We are
encouraged that PHMSA intends to put risk management at the
core of its proposed new pipeline integrity rules. We hope that
they will consider the kind of goal-setting approaches that we
see working effectively in Europe and Canada.
So, in summary, we believe that pipeline safety in the U.S.
can be enhanced by regulations that embody the following
principles:
Pipeline operators are best positioned to determine the
appropriate method to verify the ongoing integrity of their
pipeline.
Inline inspection provides the clearest assessment of the
condition of a pipeline, and can be used to prioritize those
features that need immediate attention and those that require
monitoring over time.
Regulation should encourage the development and adoption of
new technology that can further enhance pipeline safety.
Regulations should move operators toward a risk-based goal-
setting approach.
At PII Pipeline Solutions, we're committed to pipeline
safety and will continue to work with PHMSA and our customers
to advance the state-of-the-art for inline inspection.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bellamy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Bellamy, General Manager,
PII Pipeline Solutions
Good afternoon. My name is Michael Bellamy and I am the General
Manager of PII Pipeline Solutions. PII is part of General Electric's,
Measurement and Control business, headquartered in Billerica, MA. We
inspect oil & gas pipelines, and in the 35 years since the business was
founded have inspected over 1,000,000 miles of pipelines worldwide.
Over 40 percent of that work has been carried out in the United States.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today about pipeline
inspection technology, which is also referred to as in-line inspection,
carried out using high technology robotic devices, often called ``smart
pigs''. These devices travel along the inside of the pipeline at speeds
up to 9 miles per hour, propelled by the pressure of the product
flowing through the line. Equipped with sensors of various types, pigs
collect millions of measurements of the pipe wall as they travel,
covering every inch of both the internal and external surface of the
pipe steel, recording the data on board for subsequent download when
recovered at the end of the inspection run.
To help understand the role of in-line inspection tools in ensuring
pipeline safety, perhaps a medical analogy will help. In human
medicine, data provided by MRI scanners, CT scanners, x-ray machines
and ultrasound devices is used by medical specialists to develop a
diagnosis and prescribe a course of treatment.
In the same way, pipeline operators use the diagnostic capability
afforded by in-line inspection tools to design integrity management
programs that take into account the age of the line, the way in which
it is operated, and the environment in which it is situated, all of
which determine the potential for threats to pipeline safety.
Moreover, just as medical diagnostic technologies are used to
identify medical issues at their earliest stages in our bodies, in-line
inspection tools can identify potential problems in pipelines early
enough to prevent them from developing into a leak or rupture.
By means of in-line inspection, cracks the size of a match stick
and corrosion \1/2\ the diameter of a penny can be identified and
measured with confidence.
In-line inspection tools were first introduced in the 1970s and
have evolved tremendously since. As yet there is no one tool that can
find all threats. Nevertheless pipeline operators today have access to
a range of modern high technology tools covering all the major threats
to pipeline safety including dents, corrosion, cracking and land
movement, in both gas and liquid pipelines.
The in-line inspection industry is now deploying its 4th generation
of metal loss tools, 4th generation of geometry tools and 3rd
generation of crack detection tools. Our understanding of the physics
of these tools continues to evolve, and coupled with advances in
algorithmic search and data manipulation techniques, the inspection
tools available today are providing ever improving results.
Once a smart pig run is complete, the data recorded, which is
equivalent to looking at 70 football fields in grids of 1/8" x 1/8", is
processed to highlight suspected anomalies. The resulting output is
then reviewed by a trained data analyst, who verifies the assessment
and compiles a report on the condition of the pipeline to submit to the
operator.
With this information and in the context of the PHMSA approved
integrity management program for the pipeline, the pipeline operator
can prioritize the issues that need immediate attention.
In this way, in-line inspection tools make a material contribution
to pipeline safety.
For example, corrosion tools have been in use for more than 45
years. Data gathered in the U.S. continue show a reduction in
corrosion-related incidents by 36 percent over the past 12 years.
Crack inspection tools have been around for less time than
corrosion tools. Nevertheless, a recent Pipeline Research Council study
compared over 40,000 cracks found by in-line inspection tools with
actual measurements from field excavations. The results gave a clear
validation of the published tool specifications.
Additionally, the soon to be published API 1176 industry
recommended practiced document, developed with PHMSA involvement, will
provide guidance to operators on how to use the results from in-line
inspection tools as part of a comprehensive crack management program.
We look forward to seeing continued improvement in pipeline safety vis
a vis cracks as this technology continues to mature and becomes more
widely adopted by pipeline operators.
We consider ourselves partners with our customers and PHMSA in
working to enhance pipeline safety. We support rules that are clear and
interpreted in such a way as to encourage competition and innovation.
However the current U.S. rules don't recognize the differences
between in-line inspection tool technologies or in tool performance,
nor do they encourage operators to use the best available technology.
PHMSA has done a great job in stimulating the pipeline industry to
use in-line inspection tools for dents and general corrosion; the next
step is to encourage the use of a broader range of tool technologies
capable of finding and characterizing a broader range of pipeline
anomalies.
I'd like to also mention risk management and risk models as an
accepted approach adopted by pipeline regulators globally. Such models
take in-line inspection data and combine it with contextual information
about the pipeline, its construction and operation to help operators
make a better informed diagnosis concerning the ongoing health of their
pipeline. We are encouraged that PHMSA intends to put risk management
at the core of its proposed new pipeline integrity rules. We hope that
they will consider the kind of goal setting approaches that we see
working effectively in Europe and Canada.
Before I conclude, I would like to emphasize that in-line
inspection tools are very good at identifying features that they have
seen before, but they can't know what they don't know. We can only
learn what a specific signal represents by comparing that signal with
the real defect.
The creation of a ``no-fault'' environment, in which operators can
share dig verification data with their in-line inspection vendors,
without fear of regulatory penalty, would allow the entire industry to
grow more effective in identifying threats.
So, in summary, we believe that pipeline safety in the U.S. can be
enhanced by regulations that embody the following principles:
Pipeline operators are best positioned to determine the
appropriate method to verify the ongoing integrity of their
pipeline
In-line inspection provides the clearest assessment of the
condition of a pipeline and can be used to prioritize those
features that need immediate attention and those that require
monitoring over time
Regulations should encourage the development and adoption of
new technology that can further enhance pipeline safety
Finding an effective way to share dig verification data, in
a no-fault environment, will enhance tool learning and make in-
line inspection even more effective.
Regulations should move operators toward a risk based, goal
setting approach.
At PII Pipeline Solutions we are committed to pipeline safety and
will continue to work with PHMSA and our customers to advance the state
of the art for in-line inspection.
Thank you for your attention.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Bellamy.
Next, we have Mr. Donald Santa, who is the President and
CEO of the Interstate National Gas Association of America, the
North American association representing the interstate and
interprovincial natural gas pipeline industry.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF DONALD F. SANTA, PRESIDENT AND CEO, INTERSTATE
NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
Mr. Santa. Thank you. And good afternoon, Chairwoman
Fischer, Ranking Member Booker, and members of the
Subcommittee. My name is Donald Santa, and I am President and
CEO of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, or
INGAA.
INGAA represents interstate natural gas transmission
pipeline operators in the U.S. and Canada. The pipeline systems
operated by INGAA's 25 member companies are analogous to the
interstate highway system, transporting natural gas across
state and regional boundaries.
In the wake of the natural gas pipeline accident in
California in 2010, INGAA's board of directors committed the
Association and its member pipeline companies to the goal of
zero pipeline safety incidents. While this is a tough and, some
would say, impossible goal to meet, the emphasis is in the
right place: a pursuit of excellence.
While progress toward INGAA's goal of zero incidents must
continue, whether new regulations are issued, it is important
and desirable that there be consistency between the voluntary
commitments in the INGAA action plan and the regulations that
will implement the 2011 Pipeline Safety Act.
INGAA has engaged in an active dialogue with PHMSA and with
other stakeholders over the past 4 years to achieve this goal.
This has been constructive, and we have every reason to believe
that the comprehensive rule proposed soon will reflect INGAA's
input.
Still, these proposed regulations are behind the schedule
that Congress prescribed in the 2011 Act. INGAA acknowledges
that regulations should be thoughtfully considered and include
an analysis of costs and benefits. The practical consequence of
delay, however, is to erode the confidence of some pipeline
companies that proceeding with the dedication of resources
needed to implement the pipeline safety commitments will be
consistent with the final rules adopted by PHMSA. This
hesitancy is rooted in the perceived risk that the rules
ultimately might compel repeating certain steps in the pipeline
safety action plan. This is not insignificant. For example,
testing pipelines for material strength is both costly and
disruptive, because pipelines must be removed from operation to
complete the testing. This do-over risk for pipeline operators
and their customers creates the risk of more extensive
operational disruption that would be needed. This do-over risk
should not be permitted to hold us back when we as an industry
and our regulators should be moving forward.
Our purpose here is to work collaboratively with PHMSA.
Because the regulatory process, indeed, goes beyond what PHMSA
can control, INGAA wishes to make the point that it is critical
that these natural gas pipeline safety regulations be completed
in a workable and timely manner.
It is worth recalling that the title of the most recent law
reauthorizing the Pipeline Safety Act makes the point. It is
the Pipeline Safety Regulatory Certainty and Job Creation Act
of 2011. Regulatory certainty is necessary to move forward.
INGAA does support reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety
Program during this Congress. My written statement includes
some suggestions for legislation, including providing some more
definition for several key natural gas regulations. With
further definition from Congress, we believe the proposed rules
could be completed in a more timely fashion, and the pipeline
industry would have greater certainty about what the future
regulations would require. This would allow operators to start
working toward those requirements now, as opposed to just
waiting until regulations are final at an indeterminate future
date.
In addition, INGAA suggests that Congress direct PHMSA to
adopt regulations for underground natural gas storage
facilities by a date certain. We continue to believe that a
reauthorization bill, and the accountability and oversight that
comes from that, will help to get PHMSA back on track for
meeting the safety mandates required in 2011.
I would be happy to discuss this and other questions
subsequently. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Santa follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donald F. Santa, President and CEO,
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
Good afternoon Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Booker and
members of the Subcommittee. My name is Donald F. Santa, and I am
President and CEO of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America,
or INGAA. INGAA represents interstate natural gas transmission pipeline
operators in the U.S. and Canada. The pipeline systems operated by
INGAA's 25 member companies are analogous to the interstate highway
system, transporting natural gas across state and regional boundaries.
As you can see from the map below, this is an extensive energy
infrastructure system.
U.S. Interstate Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
INGAA and its members' core mission is the safe and reliable
transportation of natural gas. Through a variety of initiatives--
including best practices and standards development, regulatory
compliance and damage-prevention efforts--this association has been
committed to the continuous improvement of pipeline safety since its
founding in 1944. As part of this commitment, INGAA supported the most
recent reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act, enacted in 2011. We
also support implementation of the new law through regulations.
To date, however, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) has not yet implemented several of the key
regulatory mandates from the 2011 Act. INGAA hopes PHMSA will release
these proposed regulations for public comment soon, so stakeholders can
participate in a process that culminates in final rules within the next
year. Another important step for pipeline safety is reauthorization of
the Pipeline Safety Act during this Congress. Decisive action by
Congress and PHMSA will keep pipeline safety moving in the right
direction.
INGAA Safety Commitments
As mentioned, INGAA has a long history of engagement to improve
pipeline safety. This began with the development of construction and
operating standards during the early years of the natural gas
transmission pipeline industry. In 1968, Congress enacted the Natural
Gas Pipeline Safety Act, formalizing these standards and making them
enforceable. In the decades since, Congress has added new requirements
as technology has advanced and the ability to monitor safety
performance has improved.
We have long maintained--and regulators agree--that the natural gas
pipeline industry operates with a high degree of safety. Accidents are
rare, and the number of fatalities and injuries from pipeline accidents
is very low. The Department of Transportation states that pipelines are
the safest mode of energy transportation.
Still, the pipeline failure in San Bruno, California in 2010 was a
wake-up call for our industry. It reinforced for pipeline operators
that pipeline safety is not just a matter of regulatory compliance; it
is central to the industry's social license to operate. We recognize
that safety must be our highest priority.
In the wake of that pipeline failure, INGAA's board of directors
committed the association and its member pipeline companies to the goal
of zero pipeline safety incidents. INGAA identified the commercial
aviation sector as a model of an industry with a similar ``zero
incident'' goal. While this is a tough, and some would say, impossible,
goal to meet, the emphasis is in the right place--a pursuit of
excellence.
INGAA's overarching goal of zero incidents is anchored by four core
principles. These are: (1) commitment to a strong safety culture as a
critical dimension of continuous improvement; (2) relentless pursuit of
improving by learning; (3) commitment to apply integrity management
principles on a system-wide basis; and (4) commitment to engage with
stakeholders at all levels.
These core principles provided the basis for a nine-point pipeline
safety action plan that the INGAA board endorsed in early 2011. This
action plan--known as the INGAA Integrity Management Continuous
Improvement (or IMCI) initiative--addresses all of the major issues
raised in relevant reports by the National Transportation Safety Board
as well as the key natural gas pipeline issues addressed within the
Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty and Job Creation Act of 2011 (the
2011 Act). In connection with this, two items deserve specific mention:
(1) expanding integrity management beyond High Consequence Areas, and
(2) demonstrating that pre-regulation pipelines remain fit for service.
Consistent with our guiding principle of a relentless pursuit of
improvement, INGAA's members worked with our peers in the hazardous
liquid and gas distribution industries, as well as Federal and state
regulators, to develop a standard for pipeline safety management
systems, called API 1173. This standard consolidates best practices
within the industry and addresses a recommendation made by the National
Transportation Safety Board. Our members are now incorporating the
safety management system elements established in API 1173.
Recent Pipeline Safety Legislation
The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 incorporated a new,
risk-based approach to safety for natural gas transmission pipelines in
Federal pipeline safety law. The 2002 reauthorization law directed the
Secretary of Transportation to develop a regulation on ``integrity
management'' for natural gas transmission pipeline segments located in
populated areas. Regulations subsequently required the operators of
such pipelines to: (1) identify pipeline segments located in defined,
populated areas, known as High Consequence Areas or HCAs; (2) conduct
baseline inspection on such segments within 10 years; and (3) re-assess
those segments every seven years thereafter.
This integrity management directive emphasized achieving the
greatest enhancement to public safety by reducing risks in populated
areas. For interstate natural gas transmission pipelines, only about
six percent of total pipeline mileage is located in a defined HCA.
Still, because the majority of these segments were inspected using in-
line inspection tools (``smart pigs''), over 70 percent of INGAA's
membership mileage is now being inspected periodically with this
enhanced process in order to capture the six percent within HCAs. This
has resulted in a 72 percent reduction in leaks attributable to
corrosion, material or construction defects.
As part of its pipeline safety action plan, INGAA members committed
to the phased expansion of integrity management beyond HCAs. INGAA's
plan would cover 90 percent of pipeline segments located near people by
2020, and 100 percent of segments located near people by 2030. We
advocate a phased approach in part to minimize delivery service
disruptions. Testing some pipeline segments will be challenging because
the pipeline must be removed from service for inspection and possible
repair and replacement. INGAA's members are on schedule, and to date
have inspected segments located in proximity to over 70 percent of the
public along pipelines.
The 2011 Act directs PHMSA to examine the expansion of the
integrity management program beyond the 2002 requirements, report its
findings to Congress and issue any new rules that might be warranted.
The other major issue addressed in the 2011 Act involved whether
pipelines constructed before Federal pipeline safety regulations took
effect in 1970 remain ``fit for service.'' Many of the Nation's natural
gas transmission pipelines were constructed before 1970. Industry
standards then called for operators to test new pipe to confirm its
ability to operate safely at the system's maximum allowable operating
pressure prior to placing such pipe in service. Beginning in 1970,
operators were required by Federal regulations to conduct this testing
and retain related records for all new pipelines.
The accident in San Bruno highlighted the need for pipeline
operators to ensure that they have adequate testing records. INGAA's
members support the validation of testing records, as well as re-
testing segments located in populated areas if traceable, verifiable
and complete testing records cannot be produced.
The 2011 Act requires regulations on records/testing for pre-1970
pipe in highly populated areas. INGAA members have validated the
material strength records for approximately 85 percent of the pipeline
in HCAs and are far along in addressing the remaining segments. While
these regulations have not yet been proposed, PHMSA engaged in a robust
pre-rulemaking dialogue with pipeline safety stakeholders, including
INGAA and its members, to develop a process to implement this
requirement. We anticipate that PHMSA will address this topic, as well
as the proposed expansion of integrity management, in its comprehensive
natural gas rule currently under review by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB).
Natural Gas Safety Regulations--Importance of Certainty
INGAA's members remain committed to the goal of zero incidents, and
progress toward that target must continue whether new regulations are
issued, or not. Nonetheless, consistency between INGAA's voluntary
commitments and the regulations that will implement the 2011 Act is
both important and desirable. INGAA has engaged in an active dialogue
with PHMSA (and other stakeholders) over the past four years to achieve
this goal. This has been constructive, and we have every reason to
believe that PHMSA's proposed rule will reflect INGAA's input.
Still, these proposed regulations are behind the schedule
prescribed by Congress in 2011. INGAA acknowledges that regulations
should be considered thoughtfully and include an analysis of costs and
benefits. The practical consequence of this delay, however, is to erode
the confidence of some pipeline companies that their voluntary safety
commitments will be consistent with the final rules adopted by PHMSA.
Therefore, operators may be reluctant to dedicate the enormous
resources needed to implement the voluntary pipeline safety
commitments. This hesitancy is rooted in the perceived risk that the
rules ultimately might compel a repeat of certain steps in the pipeline
safety action plan. This is not insignificant. For example, testing
pipelines for material strength is both costly and disruptive to
service because pipelines are removed from operation to complete the
testing. Therefore, progressive pipeline operators are at risk if they
act while new regulations are pending.
Our purpose here is not to be critical of, but instead to work
collaboratively with, PHMSA. The regulatory process goes far beyond
what PHMSA can control, and policymakers should avoid assigning PHMSA
too much blame for the delays in implementing the 2011 Act. Indeed,
recent press articles have taken the simplistic view that PHMSA can
simply draft new regulations and unilaterally bring such regulations
into force. This narrative ignores the role of the Department of
Transportation and OMB in vetting proposed rules before they can be
published for public comment. This process is arduous at best. We need
to recognize that reality and work with the agencies to make this
difficult regulatory process as efficient as possible.
In the end, we need the regulatory certainty that will come with
completion of the regulations implementing the 2011 Act. The title of
that legislation makes the point. It is ``The Pipeline Safety,
Regulatory Certainty and Job Creation Act of 2011'' (emphasis added).
Without certainty, in the form of new safety regulations that clearly
define expectations, the path forward on natural gas transmission
pipeline safety will be far more disjointed.
Legislative Recommendations
INGAA encourages Congress to reauthorize the Pipeline Safety Act
during this Congress. Some have suggested that the upcoming
reauthorization should be for a limited term of two years rather than
the typical four or five years. INGAA questions the utility of such a
limited effort. Congress should gather the information needed and make
the legislative changes necessary to have confidence in enacting a
four-year reauthorization. PHMSA needs certainty too, and a shortened
reauthorization term would deprive the agency of the assurance needed
to devote its undivided attention to fulfilling its mission.
Finalize PHMSA Rulemakings Required by 2011 Reauthorization
As mentioned, several major natural gas rulemakings from the 2011
Act are incomplete. INGAA's highest priority for this next
reauthorization is providing greater certainty on what those
rulemakings will entail, such that industry can continue with
confidence its initiatives to fulfill the purposes of the 2011 Act and
other guidance even before regulations are finalized. Given how long it
has taken to send these proposed rules to OMB for review, and the
record of delay in other rulemakings across the executive branch, we
have good reason to be apprehensive that it may take several more years
to finalize these pipeline safety rules.
INGAA recommends that Congress add further details on expected
deadlines, testing levels and performance metrics, for the rulemakings
on integrity management expansion and pre-1970 pipeline fitness-for-
service. More clearly delineated expectations will provide pipeline
operators with the certainty to proceed confidently with and take
credit for initiatives to improve pipeline safety before the rules are
finalized.
Create Safety Regulations for Underground Natural Gas Storage
Facilities
There are approximately 425 underground natural gas storage
facilities in the U.S. The facilities use underground geologic
formations, such as depleted oil and gas wells, to store natural gas.
While PHMSA has the statutory authority to do so, to date it has not
promulgated Federal safety regulations for these facilities. In an
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on gas transmission safety
issues in 2011, PHMSA asked whether it should create safety standards
and regulation for natural gas storage. INGAA responded in the
affirmative, and over the past four years, we have worked with American
Gas Association, PHMSA and state officials to develop industry
consensus standards that could form the basis for future regulations.
These consensus standards, or ``recommended practices,'' were completed
this month.
INGAA believes PHMSA should undertake a rulemaking to adopt new
regulations for underground natural gas storage, and our hope is that
the new recommended practices will help to facilitate the more rapid
adoption of such rules. We recommend that Congress require the creation
of Federal regulations by a date certain. We also support the
appropriate delegation of oversight authority to state entities for
intrastate storage facilities, similar to the existing delegation of
authority for intrastate pipeline regulation. Finally, INGAA recommends
that Congress give PHMSA the authority to collect user fees from
storage operators to fund Federal and state oversight of storage
facilities. Closing this gap in safety oversight would be an important
step forward.
Eliminate Duplicative Requirements
Beginning with the Federal rules promulgated in 1970, natural gas
pipeline safety regulations always have prioritized achieving the
greatest margin of safety where pipelines are in close proximity to
population. At that time, regulators created four classes of pipe,
based on the number of buildings in close proximity to the pipeline
right-of-way. At one end of the scale are pipeline segments in rural
areas; at the other end are segments in urban areas. A pipeline's class
location changes if the number of structures along the pipeline
increases. This can trigger a requirement that the operator either
operate at a lower pressure--which is usually impractical from an
operations standpoint--or completely replace pipelines with thicker-
walled pipe.
Pipeline inspection technology now has advanced to a point where
operators can inspect pipes internally and assess integrity without
removing pipelines from service. This was not possible when the class
location rules were adopted in the 1970s. As mentioned, regulations now
require natural gas transmission pipeline operators to employ integrity
management programs designed to increase the margin of safety for pipe
segments located in populated areas. These programs include a thorough
risk assessment and detailed pipeline inspections on a regular
interval. Smart pig internal inspection technology is the principal
method that INGAA members use to comply with integrity management
regulations.
Consequently, pipeline operators now must comply with redundant
regulatory requirements (integrity management and pipe replacement
based on class location) that are intended to address the same problem.
Today's use of integrity management principles, and associated
inspection technology, is a more sophisticated approach to pipeline
safety in populated areas. If pipes can be inspected so that their
condition is known, there is no reason for replacing pipeline that
remains safe to operate. Eliminating unneeded pipeline replacement also
would reduce burdens on landowners and significantly reduce methane
emissions and service disruptions.
In the 2011 pipeline safety reauthorization, Congress required
PHMSA to assess ``whether applying the integrity management program
requirements, or elements thereof, to additional areas would mitigate
the need for class location requirements.'' Congress required a report
from PHMSA by January 2014. To our knowledge, PHMSA has not submitted
this report. We hope PHMSA and Congress will agree to eliminate the
overlap between these two regulations.
Update Outmoded PHMSA User Fee Funding
While not INGAA's top priority, the PHMSA user fee and funding
regime needs to be updated. The law authorizing the user fee, enacted
in 1986, has not kept up with the times. PHMSA's user fees need
scrutiny and a legislative update.
As part of the appropriations process, the Department of
Transportation recently advocated amending the statutory authority for
one of these user fees. To their credit, the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees refused to legislate on an appropriations
bill. The Senate Appropriations Committee also weighed in on another
PHMSA user fee matter, related to the allocation of the Pipeline Safety
Fund user fee. The committee's report on the Transportation/HUD
appropriations bill \1\ included the following statement:
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\1\ H.R. 2577, as amended; S.Rrpt. 114-75.
Pipeline Safety User Fee Allocation.--The pipeline safety
program is largely funded through user fees on natural gas
transmission pipelines, jurisdictional hazardous liquid
pipelines, and liquefied natural gas terminal operators. Recent
authorizations have increased the responsibilities for PHMSA
and the States with respect to the safety of our Nation's
pipelines. Given this change in scope of the pipeline safety
program, the Committee directs PHMSA to review the user fee
collection process to determine if it should be modified to
more equitably allocate the cost of the pipeline program across
the industry segments covered by Federal and State oversight.
PHMSA shall submit a report to both the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations within 60 days of enactment of
this act, that summarizes the agency's statutory authority to
revise the fee structure, its assessment of the current fee
structure, and any recommendations for changes to the fee
structure that should be considered by Congress as it considers
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reauthorization of PHMSA.
INGAA agrees, and urges that this be done in a comprehensive
fashion. The existing Pipeline Safety Fund fee is not assessed on all
regulated sectors of the natural gas industry, but rather only on gas
transmission operators. This gives rise to an important question: If a
large block of ``users'' are not paying the user fee, is it still a
``user fee'' under budget rules and precedent? The answer to this
question has implications for both Congressional committee jurisdiction
and whether the dollars raised must be sent to the Treasury rather than
reserved to offset PHMSA's costs.
We respectfully suggest that the authorizing committees review the
current state of this user fee, and amend the statute to make this a
true user fee assessed on all regulated sectors of the natural gas
industry. At the very least, Congress should clarify that PHMSA is
authorized to collect user fees from any new industry sectors added to
PHMSA oversight either by statute or regulation.
Collaborative Pipeline Safety Research and Development
For many years, the pipeline industry worked in a collaborative
fashion with DOT and PHMSA to identify and fund pipeline safety
research and development projects. This collaboration worked well in
identifying key priorities and avoiding duplication of effort. Many of
the pipeline inspection technology successes of the past were the
product of this process. In 2011, however, the Secretary of
Transportation suspended collaborative R&D efforts due to conflict-of-
interest concerns.
We do not believe that such a conflict of interest, in fact, exists
here. To the contrary, we contend that the government, public and
industry share an identical interest in a robust and successful
pipeline safety R&D effort. INGAA, therefore, suggests that PHMSA
return to a collaborative R&D effort. For example, the existing
pipeline safety advisory committees could serve as a forum for R&D
discussion and approval. These advisory committees include equal
representation from three different stakeholder groups--government,
industry and the public. The pipeline safety advisory committees are a
logical choice for establishing pipeline safety R&D priorities in a
transparent and inclusive manner.
Conclusion
INGAA urges Congress to pass a pipeline safety reauthorization bill
soon. Industry continues to make significant system-wide investments in
advancing its goal of zero pipeline incidents. Congress should provide
additional clarity to guide PHMSA on its comprehensive natural gas
pipeline rule, require action on storage safety, and address
duplicative and outdated provisions that do not contribute to enhancing
public safety. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for the opportunity to share
our views. I would be happy to answer questions at the appropriate
time.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Santa.
Next, we have Terry McCallister. He is the Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer of WGL Holdings,
Incorporated, the parent company of Washington Gas. He also
serves as Chairman and CEO of the Washington Gas and Natural
Gas Utility, serving over 1 million customers in the Washington
area and the surrounding region.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF TERRY McCALLISTER, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, WGL HOLDINGS AND WASHINGTON GAS, ON BEHALF OF THE
AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION
Mr. McCallister. Thank you very much. Good afternoon,
Chairman Fischer and members of the Committee.
My name is Terry McCallister. I'm Chairman and CEO of WGL
Holdings and Washington Gas. WGL provides natural gas,
electricity, green power, carbon reduction, and energy
services. Washington Gas has served the Nation's capital and
the surrounding region for more than 165 years. We are
committed to our customers, the communities we serve, and the
environment. Safety is paramount among our core values. I'm
proud of our safety track record. And we continuously strive to
enhance safety performance.
I am testifying today on behalf of the American Gas
Association, which represents more than 200 local distribution
companies, also known as LDCs, serving more than 72 million
customers. AGA members operate 2.4 million miles of underground
pipeline, safely delivering clean, affordable natural gas to
residential, commercial, and industrial customers. LDCs provide
that last critical link in the delivery chain, connecting
interstate pipelines directly to customers. Our focus every day
is to keep the gas flowing safely and reliably.
Most states assume primary responsibility for the safety
regulations of LDCs as well as intrastate transmission
pipelines. State governments are encouraged to adopt minimum
standards promulgated by the U.S. Department of Transportation.
Many states also choose to adopt standards that are more
stringent than Federal requirements. Our companies are also in
close contact with State pipeline safety inspectors, working in
a collaborative manner, which results in far more inspections
than required by Federal law.
LDCs aren't just compliance-focused. We have cultures of
proactive collaborative engagement. We employ trained safety
professionals, provide ongoing employee evaluation and safety
training, conduct rigorous system inspections, testing,
maintenance, repair, and replacement programs, and educate the
public on safety. AGA's commitment to enhancing safety, adopted
in 2011, provides a summary statement of commitments beyond
regulation. The Association has developed numerous pipeline
safety initiatives focused on raising the bar on safety and
sharing best practices.
Each year, LDCs spend approximately $19 billion on safety,
approximately half on efforts beyond Federal regulation,
including pipe replacement. This number continues to escalate
as work continues on newly approved accelerated pipeline
replacement programs.
The Pipeline Inspection Protection, Enforcement, and Safety
Act of 2006 and the Pipeline Safety Regulatory Certainty and
Jobs Creation Act of 2011 created numerous programs to further
improve industry safety. AGA member companies have implemented
these programs through DOT regulations or voluntarily. Many of
these programs are in the early stages, and we encourage
Congress to allow them to mature.
In the case of the unanimously packed--passed 2011 Act,
several required regulations have yet to be finalized. Progress
is being made, and we believe it would be premature to make
changes to the law at this time. For instance, the industry has
experienced significant uncertainty regarding PHMSA's pending
changes to transmission integrity management, maximum allowable
operating pressure, and implementation of the integrity
verification programs. We are prepared to act, but regulatory
certainty would serve our customers and the industry alike.
Layering on new laws and regulations before pending regulations
have been finalized and given time to work creates uncertainty
that undermines our shared safety goals.
PHMSA has issued a number of guidance documents, released
the results of congressionally mandated study on leak
detection, and created a database to track progress in
replacing cast iron and bare steel pipelines. Likewise, the
industry, NARUC, and State regulators, as well as State
legislators, have produced significant pipeline safety
improvements in recent years. We should continue to build on
this record.
The quantity of cast iron mains continues to steadily
decline and now makes up less than 3 percent of total mileage.
There are 29,358 miles of cast iron mains still in use, and the
industry estimates it'll cost nearly $83 billion to complete
this replacement. Utilities are working with legislators and
regulators to accelerate this process. Today, 39 States and the
District of Columbia have adopted specific innovative rate
mechanisms to accelerate pipeline replacement.
My written testimony expands on the industry's progress and
incident notification, data collection, and information-sharing
and research and development. I'm pleased to answer any
questions you have on this or other topics.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McCallister follows:]
Prepared Statement of Terry McCallister, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, WGL Holdings and Washington Gas on behalf of the American Gas
Association
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am
pleased to appear before you today. Pipeline safety is a critically
important issue, and I thank you for not only holding this hearing, but
for all the work that you and your colleagues have done over the years
to help ensure that America has the safest, most reliable pipeline
system in the world. My name is Terry McCallister and I am Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of WGL Holdings and of Washington Gas. WGL is a
diversified energy business that provides natural gas, electricity,
green power, carbon reduction and energy services.
Washington Gas has served the Nation's capital and the surrounding
region for more than 165 years. We are committed to our customers, the
communities we serve and the environment. Because of this commitment,
safety is paramount among our company's core values. I am proud of our
safety track record; we continuously strive to improve safety
performance in every aspect of our work at Washington Gas.
I am testifying today on behalf of the American Gas Association
(AGA). AGA, founded in 1918, represents more than 200 local energy
companies that deliver clean natural gas throughout the United States.
There are more than 72 million residential, commercial and industrial
natural gas customers in the U.S., of which 94 percent--over 68 million
customers--receive their gas from AGA members. Natural gas pipelines,
which transport approximately one-fourth of the energy consumed in the
United States, are an essential part of the Nation's infrastructure.
Indeed, natural gas is delivered to customers through a safe, 2.4-
million mile underground pipeline system. This includes 2.1 million
miles of local utility distribution pipelines and 300,000 miles of
transmission pipelines that stretch across the country, providing
service to more than 177 million Americans. The recent development of
natural gas shale resources has resulted in abundant supplies of
domestic natural gas, which has meant affordable and stable natural gas
prices for our customers. America needs clean and abundant energy and
America's natural gas provides just that. This has made the safe,
reliable and cost-effective operation of the natural gas pipeline
infrastructure even more critically important, as it is our job to
deliver the natural gas to the customer. Through an effective
partnership between America's natural gas utilities, state regulators,
Congressional and state legislators, governors and other key
stakeholders working together to advance important safety policies, we
have been able to both enhance system integrity and support increased
access to natural gas service for homes and businesses.\1\
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\1\ See Attachment 1: ``Natural Gas Pipelines across the U.S.''
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Distribution Pipelines
Distribution pipelines are operated by natural gas utilities,
sometimes called ``local distribution companies'' or LDCs. The gas
utility's distribution pipes are the last, critical link in the natural
gas delivery chain. Gas distribution utilities bring natural gas
service to their customers. To most customers, their local utilities
are the ``face of the industry.'' Our customers see our name on their
bills, our trucks in the streets and our company sponsorship of many
civic initiatives. We live in the communities we serve and interact
daily with our customers and with the state regulators who oversee
pipeline safety. We take very seriously the responsibility of
delivering natural gas to our communities safely, reliably, responsibly
and affordably.
AGA and its members support the development of reasonable
regulations to implement new Federal legislation as well as the
recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board, the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General, Government
Accountability Office, National Association of Pipeline Safety
Representatives (NAPSR) and the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners (NARUC). Within this testimony are actions that
are being, or will be, implemented by AGA or individual operators to
help ensure the safe and reliable operation of the Nation's 2.4 million
miles of natural gas pipelines. AGA and its individual operators
recognize the significant role that their state regulators or governing
body play in supporting and funding these actions to fulfill their
commitment to our customers.\2\
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\2\ See Attachment 2: ``Natural Gas Delivery System''
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Regulatory Authority
As part of an agreement with the Federal Government, in most
states, state pipeline safety authorities have primary responsibility
to regulate natural gas utilities as well as intrastate transmission
pipeline companies. Under these agreements, state governments adopt as
a minimum the Federal safety standards promulgated by the U.S.
Department of Transportation.
The states may also choose to adopt standards that are more
stringent than the Federal regulations, and many have done so. LDCs are
in close contact with state pipeline safety inspectors on a regular
basis. As a result of these interactions, distribution operator
facilities are subject to more frequent and closer inspections than
required by the Federal pipeline safety regulations.\3\
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\3\ See Attachment 3: ``Regulators and Stakeholders''
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Commitment to Safety
Our commitment to safety extends beyond government oversight.
Indeed, safety is our core value and top priority--a source of pride
and a matter of corporate policy for every company in our industry.
These policies are carried out in specific and unique ways. Each
company employs safety professionals; provides on-going employee safety
training; conducts rigorous system inspections, testing, and
maintenance, repair and replacement programs; distributes public safety
information; and complies with a wide range of Federal and state safety
regulations and requirements. Individual company efforts are
supplemented by collaborative activities in the safety and technical
committees of regional and national trade organizations. Examples of
these groups include AGA, the American Public Gas Association and the
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA).
On October 26, 2011, AGA released its Commitment to Enhancing
Safety, which highlights examples of the industry's commitment to
safety programs above and beyond regulations. It reflects industry
leadership and commitment to continuous improvement of pipeline safety
as our number one priority.\4\
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\4\ See Attachment 4: ``AGA's Commitment to Enhancing Safety''
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Outside of regulation and legislation, AGA members are striving to
improve pipeline safety:
Through AGA's Safety Culture Statement, each AGA member has
committed to promoting positive safety cultures among their
employees throughout the natural gas distribution industry. All
employees as well as contractors and suppliers providing
services to AGA members, are expected to place the highest
priority on employee, customer, public and pipeline safety.
In AGA's Commitment to Enhancing Safety, AGA and its member
companies state their dedication to the continued enhancement
of pipeline safety through their commitment to proactively
collaborate with public officials, emergency responders,
excavators, consumers, safety advocates and members of the
public to continue to improve the industry's longstanding
record of providing natural gas safely and effectively to 177
million Americans.
AGA has also developed numerous pipeline safety initiatives
focused on raising the bar throughout the natural gas
distribution industry. Two such programs are AGA's Peer Review
Program and AGA's Gas Utility Operations Best Practices
Program. Both allow subject matter experts from AGA member
companies to help improve industry practices through reviewing
and sharing individual company policies, procedures and
practices.
Natural gas utilities spend an estimated $19 billion a year in
safety-related activities. Approximately half of this money is spent in
complying with Federal and state regulations. The other half is spent
as part of our industry's voluntary commitment to pipeline system and
community safety. Moreover, we are continually refining our safety
practices to help improve overall safety and reliability.
Review of Legislation and Regulation
From a regulatory perspective, the past fifteen years have, by far,
included more pipeline safety mandates and rulemakings than any other
decade since the creation of the Federal pipeline safety code in 1971.
I want to assure the Committee that the natural gas distribution
industry has worked vigorously to implement those provisions that are
related to our sector. It takes considerable time for complicated rules
to be proposed, vetted, finalized and then implemented. We are
constantly working on ways to better manage the system and improve
safety.
The Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement and Safety Act of
2006 and the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty and Job Creation Act
of 2011 each outlined significant industry-changing pipeline safety
programs. While AGA members have implemented aspects of these programs
either through DOT regulation or voluntarily, it is important to
remember that many of the programs are still in their infancy. AGA
encourages Congress to allow these programs to develop and mature in
order to realize their full impact. Only after fully implementing new
safety programs and regulations, and allowing time for evaluation and
conclusive data to be gathered, can we determine what, if any, changes
need to made. In the case of the unanimously passed Pipeline Safety,
Regulatory Certainty and Job Creation Act of 2011, many of the required
regulations have yet to be completed. Therefore, we believe it would be
premature to make changes to the law at this time. The specifics of The
Act included substantive changes to the Federal pipeline safety laws,
including changes to incident notification timelines; testing of
certain gas transmission lines; and requirements for valves, gathering
lines, leak detection, integrity management, and class location. The
U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) is still working on a number of
significant final rules that will substantially change the Federal gas
pipeline safety regulations. These include expansion of transmission
integrity management, additional pressure testing requirements,
excavation damage prevention, rupture detection and valves, excess flow
valves beyond single family homes, and plastic pipe regulations. We
know that PHMSA is diligently working on these regulations and look
forward to the certainty that the final rules will bring. PHMSA has
issued a number of significant guidance documents, released the results
of a congressionally-mandated study on leak detection, and created an
online database to track progress in replacing cast iron and bare steel
pipelines.
We believe progress is being made to fully address all
Congressional mandates. We would respectively urge that we stay the
course in working on existing mandates before layering additional
responsibilities that will create regulatory uncertainty and undermine
work already underway. Natural gas distribution companies work every
day to improve the safety of their systems. It is critical that
progress on regulations keep that pace to help ensure that these safety
improvements are not negated. The work that PHMSA has completed to
date, and the important initiatives taken by industry on its own,
combined with the significant actions taken by NAPSR, NARUC, individual
public utility commissions and state legislatures around the country,
have produced significant improvement in pipeline safety over the last
several years. Natural gas distribution companies are eager to move
forward with other aspects of the 2011 Act, but the industry is
concerned about the uncertainty of future DOT regulations that could
negate or disrupt current pipeline investments and progress based on
the legislation as written. A change of course prompted by DOT
regulations that are inconsistent with the legislation would be paid
for by natural gas customers and could create significant public
disruption and inconvenience. AGA members desire a clear path forward
without duplicative actions or additional cost burdens on their
customers.
Review of Key Provisions of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty
and Job Creation Act of 2011 Impacting the Natural Gas
Distribution Sector
Pipeline Damage Prevention
Excavation damage represents the single greatest threat to
distribution system safety, reliability and integrity. A number of
initiatives have helped to prevent excavation damage and resulting
incidents. These include a three digit number, ``811,'' for excavators
to call before they dig, a nationwide education program promoting 811,
``best practices'' to reduce excavation damage and regional ``Common
Ground Alliances'' that are focused on preventing excavation damage.
Additionally, AGA and other partners established April as National Safe
Digging Month, encouraging individuals to dial 811 before embarking on
any digging or excavation project. Since the Call 811 campaign was
launched, excavation-related incidents have been reduced by
approximately a 40 percent. A significant cause for this reduction is
the work done by the pipeline industry in promoting the use of 811.
Regulators, natural gas operators, and other stakeholders are
continually working to improve excavation damage prevention programs.
This concerted effort, combined with the effort that states are
undertaking to create robust and effective state damage prevention
programs, based on the elements contained in the 2006 PIPES Act, is
having a positive impact. As always, more can be done. We will remain
vigilant and strengthen collaboration with other stakeholders and the
public to help ensure the safety of our pipeline systems.
Distribution Integrity Management
The 2006 PIPES Act required DOT to establish a regulation
prescribing standards for integrity management programs for
distribution pipeline operators. The DOT published the final rule
establishing natural gas distribution integrity management program
(DIMP) requirements on December 4, 2009. The effective date of the rule
was February 12, 2010. Operators were given until August 2, 2011 to
write and implement their program.
The DIMP final rule is a comprehensive regulation that provides an
added layer of protection to the already-strong pipeline safety
programs implemented by local distribution companies. It represents the
most significant rulemaking affecting natural gas distribution
operators since the inception of the Federal pipeline safety code in
1971. It impacted more than 1,300 operators, 2.1 million miles of pipe,
and 70 million customers. The final rule effectively took into
consideration the wide differences that exist between natural gas
distribution operators. It also allows operators to develop a DIMP plan
that is appropriate for the operating characteristics of their
distribution delivery system and the customers that they serve.
Public Education/Awareness
AGA appreciates DOT's work with the public, emergency responders,
and industry to improve the public's awareness of pipelines and natural
gas safety. The public awareness initiative has been successful and has
effectively improved the public and emergency responders' awareness of
pipeline infrastructure and appropriate actions to be taken in the
event of a pipeline emergency. We are eager to work with DOT to
identify performance metrics that are critical in assessing program
effectiveness. The industry is working to help ensure that 911
operators are identified as an important stakeholder audience and
receive all needed pipeline awareness information. AGA and the industry
look forward to continuing to work with all regulatory agencies to help
improve the methods utilized to educate the public regarding pipeline
awareness.
Cast Iron
Natural gas utilities remain ever vigilant and committed to
systematically upgrading infrastructure based on enhanced risk-based
integrity management programs. Indeed, there is a growing effort
underway to accelerate the replacement of pipelines that may no longer
be fit for service. This work is facilitated by regulatory and
legislative policies that establish innovative rate mechanisms which
allow for accelerated replacement and modernization of natural gas
pipelines.
The quantity of cast iron main continues to steadily decline.
Overall cast iron makes up less than three percent of the distribution
mileage and that number is decreasing annually. Today, PHMSA reports
that there are 29,358 miles of cast iron pipelines in use. The
approximate cost of removing these pipelines is nearly $83 billion.\5\
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\5\ See Attachment 5: ``Total Cast Iron Main''
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The specific costs associated with replacement vary depending on an
individual utility's regulatory structure and state. All utilities have
an infrastructure replacement program and seek to remove pipelines no
longer fit for service as rapidly as they are able through their
regulatory construct. Since former Secretary of Transportation Ray
LaHood's Call to Action, specific rate mechanisms that facilitate
accelerated replacement of pipelines no longer fit for service have
improved from 18, to 9 states and the District of Columbia. \6\
Clearly, the overall trend is positive. In 2013, nine states moved to
adopt programs and, NJ, MA, PA and DC adopted pipeline safety measures
in 2014. In 2015, West Virginia passed legislation while IL, MA, MI,
MS, NJ, NY and PA also moved to strengthen their replacement efforts.
Likewise, New Mexico's regulatory construct allows for more rapid
pipeline replacement. The cumulative result of these important actions
is that the industry is replacing cast iron pipe, as well as bare
steel, as quickly as possible in a safe, cost-effective manner.
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\6\ See Attachment 6: ``States with Accelerated Infrastructure
Replacement Programs''
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NARUC has always considered pipeline safety a leading priority and
has raised the bar by prioritizing the issue of accelerating
replacement of pipelines no longer fit for service. We commend NARUC
for having passed a resolution at its 2013 summer meeting calling on
commissions to explore, examine, and consider adopting alternative rate
recovery mechanisms as necessary to accelerate the modernization,
replacement and expansion of the Nation's natural gas pipeline
systems.\7\ Their leadership on this matter has been an important
catalyst for states approving accelerated replacement programs.
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\7\ See Attachment 7: ``NARUC Resolution''
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MAOP
There is significant uncertainty in the pipeline industry
surrounding the method by which PHMSA will implement provisions in the
2011 Act pertaining to Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) and
the Integrity Verification Process (IVP). AGA members have conducted a
verification of records, as proposed in the legislation, for class 3
and class 4 locations and class 1 and class 2 high consequence areas.
However because the MAOP and IVP regulations have not yet been
implemented, operators are uncertain if their actions to address
missing or incomplete records would be nullified by future DOT rules.
Incident Notification
AGA members are committed to finding new and innovative ways to
inform and engage stakeholders, including emergency responders, public
officials, excavators, consumers and safety advocates and members of
the public living in the vicinity of pipelines. AGA and INGAA sponsored
a workshop that was presented by the National Association of State Fire
Marshals. The workshop had approximately 60 emergency responders, PHMSA
staff and 40 operator personnel in attendance. There are also a number
of efforts at the state and local level to engage emergency responders,
government officials and the public in pipeline safety efforts.
Data Collection and Information Sharing
Collecting accurate data and data analysis are integral to
determining areas for potential pipeline safety improvement. AGA and
PHMSA co-chair a data quality and analysis team made up of
representatives from government, industry and the public. These are
similar to the PHMSA technical advisory committees. The team analyzes
the data that PHMSA collects and identifies opportunities to improve
pipeline safety. The team also works to improve gaps in the data
collected by PHMSA and others, data collection methods, and message
consistency based on pipeline incident data.
AGA has 16 technical committees and an Operations Managing
Committee focusing on a wide range of operations and safety issues. The
technical committees develop and share information, including those
issues raised by PHMSA, the National Transportation Safety Board, and
other pipeline safety stakeholders. In addition, AGA has a Gas
Utilities Operations Best Practices Program focused on identifying
superior performing companies and innovative work practices that can be
shared with others to improve operations and safety. AGA is also the
Secretariat for the National Fuel Gas codes, the Gas Piping Technology
Committee, and manages the Plastic Pipeline Database which includes
more than 45,000 records of plastic material and component failures
that have been voluntarily submitted by the industry.
Research and Development
More industry research is necessary to improve in-line inspection
tool quality and capabilities, operator use of tool data, direct
assessment tools, non-destructive testing and leak detection. Many
pipeline companies have direct memberships in research consortiums and
contribute towards this type of research. These research consortiums
include the Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI), NYSEARCH,
Operations Technology Development (OTD), Utilization Technology
Development (UTD) and Sustaining Membership Program (SMP). In the last
five years, hazardous liquid and gas pipeline operators have
contributed more than $115 million to research and development.
However, R&D cannot be successful without cooperative planning between
industry and government. As noted above, AGA is committed to improving
the transparent collaborative relationship with PHMSA that has
historically enhanced pipeline safety R&D.
Summary
The natural gas utility industry has a strong safety record.
Recognizing the critical role that natural gas can and should play in
meeting our Nation's energy needs, we are committed to working with all
stakeholders to consistently make improvements to the safety and
reliability of our systems. To that end, we applaud this committee's
focus on the common goal: to enhance the safe delivery of this vital
energy resource.
Recent pipeline safety reauthorizations contained significant
changes to pipeline safety programs. Many of these changes are not yet
in Federal regulation and others are in their infancy. PHMSA is working
on a number of significant rules that will substantially change the
Federal gas pipeline safety regulations and the industry looks forward
to the certainty that the final rules will bring.
Natural gas distribution companies are eager to implement aspects
of the 2011 Act that DOT has not finalized. However, concern exists
that their actions may be nullified if DOT's final regulations are
inconsistent with the legislation. These inconsistencies could result
in unnecessary cost to customers, repeat work and disruption to the
public. AGA members desire a clear path forward so that safety measures
can be implemented without risk of duplicative actions and additional
cost burdens on their customers.
We would urge that we stay the course in developing comprehensive,
risk-based rules to comply with the legislation and provide the
regulatory certainty that is essential to ensuring a safe and reliable
natural gas distribution system. Many of these rules have only recently
been implemented and need time to be evaluated before additional new
regulations are created.
Natural gas is a key to our energy future and America's natural gas
utilities are upgrading our delivery systems to meet this growing
demand. There is a tremendous opportunity for consumers and our Nation
as a whole through greater use of natural gas, and we see a future
where natural gas is the foundation fuel that heats our homes, runs our
vehicles, and supports renewable energy. We are building and
continually improving our infrastructure to deliver on this promise.
Attachment 1: Natural Gas Pipelines across the U.S.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Attachment 2: Natural Gas Delivery System
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Attachment 3: Regulators and Stakeholders
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Attachment 4: AGA's Commitment to Enhancing Safety
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Attachment 5: Overall Cast Iron Main
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Attachment 6: States with Accelerated Infrastructure Replacement
Programs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Attachment 7: NARUC Resolution
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
And thank you to all our panel members.
We'll begin our first round of questioning, and I will
begin.
Mr. Santa, as I referenced, in my opening statement, we
heard that there are often delays between the time of a PHMSA
inspection and receiving the report. I would assume that your
members face that similar challenge. And, if so, how do they
cope with it? What's the impact of that?
Mr. Santa. I would--Madam Chairman, I'd have to get further
data on the extent to which they have delays. However, I think
it just contributes to uncertainty. And I think, you know,
that's one of the themes here today, is greater regulatory
certainty. To the extent that the pipeline operators can have
the results of those audits, they'd be in a better position to
take whatever steps are necessary to improve pipeline safety
based on the results.
Senator Fischer. And we hear a lot about the uncertainty
and the challenges that pipeline operators are facing because
of that uncertainty from PHMSA. I guess I would like you to be
more specific on the challenges that the operators are facing.
And, Mr. McCallister, if you would like to answer that
question, as well.
Mr. Santa. With regard to the uncertainty, I think one of
the concerns that pipeline operators have got is that, while
INGAA's members have committed to a voluntary program to
improve pipeline safety, when it comes to making major
commitments, for example, to test pipelines, they are concerned
that they might do that. It's very expensive. It's disruptive.
And they're willing to do it, but, by the same token, they are
somewhat concerned about the risk that they may do that,
attempt to do the best thing, and then find out that the PHMSA
regulation, when it's ultimately adopted, requires them to do
something more, which then might cause them to have to repeat
that, which, of course, is costly, it would, in most instances,
require taking a pipeline out of service, so it disrupts the
flow of natural gas. And I think--you know, that's one of the
practical consequences of the uncertainty caused by the delay.
Senator Fischer. Mr. McCallister.
Mr. McCallister. Yes, I would echo that statement a bit.
Our utility companies go, I would say, far beyond just the
regulations that we get by PHMSA, but we work closely with
PHMSA on--all the stakeholders work together on what these
regulations that have yet to be developed, for example, what
they could look like, what's practical, what's the reasonable
and efficient way in which to go about implementation of these
regulations. And many of our companies, including ours, move on
forward with what we expect regulations to look like and what
the best things are.
Our concern is similar, in that new legislation that may
change the direction of the regulation that we expect will
cause our companies to have probably undertaken considerable
activities that may no longer be valid or may be nullified by
the new regulation, and then we'll have, in costs that would
have been incurred for not only our companies, but the
customers and your constituents.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Mr. Bellamy, you provided some great examples on new
technology and how that helps with inline inspections. So, I
thank you for that. I think it helps us to understand how
pipeline operators are able to manage those risks that they are
facing. I would ask you about something that you discussed in
your written testimony. You talked about the creation of a no-
fault environment to expand the data-sharing. And something
that I've worked on and advocated in transportation policy is
the implementation of a performance-based regulation so we can
focus on, really, the ultimate goal that we all have of safety.
So, how would your no-fault information-sharing environment
between PHMSA and pipeline stakeholders help to contribute to
a--advancing that goal-oriented regulatory regimes that I think
we need to get to?
Mr. Bellamy. I'm glad you asked the question.
Senator Fischer. Microphone.
Mr. Bellamy. I'll learn--I'll get the hang of this
eventually.
I'm glad you asked the question, because I skipped over
that in--under the tyranny of the countdown clock.
Senator Fischer. Oh, we're not tyrants.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Bellamy. The issue there really is that ``smart pigs''
learn as they go, meaning once we've seen a defect for the
first time, we can usually then see it again and again and
again, and we understand what the interpretation of that signal
picked up by the ``smart pig'' means. The challenge is to see
enough defects. And particularly when you're out on the long
tail, because there's a distribution of defects in any
pipeline, and some of them are extremely rare, the types of
morphologies you don't see very often. And occasionally, the
very first time you see it is when it fails.
Now, for us to be able to get access to those defects and
to be able to study those defects with our tools and learn what
those signals--what signals--the signal response to that defect
would allow us then to be able, as I say, to find that defect
forevermore. And I think the same would go for my competitors.
This is just how the industry learns.
Now, we do know that some of our customers are reluctant to
declare that they've found something new and bring it forward,
for fear of regulatory penalty. So, if there was some way in
which there could be a safe environment for these types of
issues to be brought forward so that the industry could learn,
that's really the kind of scenario that we're referring to.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Thank you, Chairwoman.
So, if there's a leak or some problem, every second
absolutely counts in getting it shut off. We had an incident in
New Jersey in 1994, when it took hours to get the--to shut off
the flow of gas that fed a pretty serious pipeline break. It
was--it destroyed a lot of property, apartment buildings and
the like. And, due to this accident, the NTSB has recommended
the use of automatic remote-control shutoff valves in high-
consequence areas. And the last pipeline build required them on
certain types of--certain types of pipes.
And so, to Ms. Fleming and Honorable Hart, what are--what
is it important that--why is it important that the
administration quickly move forward with this requirement? And
what factors should the administration consider to ensure the
rules--the rule improves safety?
Ms. Fleming. Sure. As you said, automated valves, you know,
have the ability to respond quickly and to isolate an incident.
However, you know, we believe that operators should also
consider disadvantages. There are some cases where, you know,
installing automated valves has led to accidental closures. For
instance, if--hazardous liquid operators have told us they're
reluctant to use those, because it can over-pressurize the
pipeline leading to a accidental closure.
So, we believe that operators should look at their
particular pipeline characteristics, the location of the valve,
and decide what's the best way to improve incident response.
They should look at the accuracy of their leak detection
systems, the location of response personnel, what's the
relationship like with the local emergency responders, how
about their control-room protocol. So, we believe that they
should look holistically. In some cases, an operator may decide
to install automated valves everyplace; in other cases, they
may decide that they need to do a number of things, including
looking at their process, procedures, their relationship with
some of the responders.
Senator Booker. Are there other things that we should be
thinking about with this reauthorization, in terms of closing
the gap on that response time?
Ms. Fleming. You know, we really wanted to try to come up
with an optimal response time. But, unfortunately, the data is
not reliable at PHMSA right now. So, part of the problem is
that operators are not required to provide information on when
the incident occurred, when response individuals showed up,
when they were able to make the area safe.
So, the first thing is to improve the data, which PHMSA
says they're working on. And then, the second thing is to then
use that data to tease out and to see, based on pipeline
characteristics and different pipelines, what is an appropriate
metric or target, and to move toward a performance-based
approach. So, first line is fix the data, and then move toward
a performance-based response time.
Senator Booker. So, more reporting----
Ms. Fleming. Yes.
Senator Booker.--by--more reporting.
Ms. Fleming. And, like, our colleagues here, you know,
INGAA kind of took this step and came up with a response time
for their industry to kind of get folks to move toward that.
So, I think what we're suggesting is that the data would help
drive what an appropriate response time would be.
Senator Booker. And then, just shifting to general safety
and consequences, you know, I'm just really concerned with the
most densely populated state in the Nation, lots of
populations, any problems, you know, virtually will cause
serious consequences. And so, there--are there other safety
things that we should be considering that are particular to
highly dense areas?
Ms. Fleming. I think that, you know, with integrity
management, it's been over 10 years, and I think it's probably
time--we believe that it's time to take a look at, Is this
framework working? Does it need to be tweaked in any regards? I
think unregulated gathering pipeline is another area that we're
concerned--only 90--I mean, only 10 percent of those gathering
pipelines are regulated in high-consequence areas.
But, as my statement said, you know, it's--there are some
game-changers there. You know, the increased extraction of
shale oil and gas has led to much larger, higher-pressure
gathering pipelines, almost more like transmission pipelines.
And then the other game-changer is that businesses and homes
are really moving out to areas that were formerly remote. So, I
think unregulated gathering pipelines could pose increased
safety risk, because more people could be impacted.
So, we recommended that the first line is to really
gather--believe it or not, states don't even know what they
have in their own state. So, trying to get some visibility on
what's out there, and then to look whether or not there are
some potential safety risks, and then to try to figure out how
to address those.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Booker.
Senator Moran.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Madam Chairman, thank you very much.
Let me ask a question and then give a little background.
I'd like to talk a moment about the issue of underground
natural gas storage. And the question I would ask is, Is there
a reason for the inspection of under---interstate underground
storage facilities, something that the Federal Government
should be interested in?
And I would set the stage by a bit of history. Back in
January 2001, natural gas migrated into caverns in and around
the community of Hutchinson, Kansas. Explosions ultimately
occurred. Deaths were a result. And the regulatory environment
in which we found ourselves in was that the Kansas Corporation
Commission attempted to step in and inspect and, ultimately,
regulate that underground storage of natural gas. A Federal
court determined there was no jurisdiction on the part of the
State. I assume that could be said plural, there is no
jurisdiction on the part of States to inspect the storage of
natural gas. And so--interstate natural gas--and so, my
colleague from Kansas and I have, on several occasions,
attempted to amend the law to allow for Federal jurisdiction to
prevail, in hopes--let me say that differently--and allow a
State jurisdiction to prevail and allow State inspections to
occur. And I would say that became important because there
hasn't been a Federal inspection.
We also, generally, in my view, is--we're better off with
State inspection than Federal, anyway. And so, we're trying to
fashion a solution to this that would have the ability for the
Federal jurisdiction to apply, but inspections occur by our
State or by other States. Not just a Kansas issue, I don't
think.
So, my question--as we look at reauthorization of this
legislation, it becomes an opportunity for us to pursue a
solution. And I would, again, just ask if anyone disagrees with
the premise that this is something that's important for the
Federal Government to focus on and for us to take a look at as
we reauthorize the Act.
Mr. Santa.
Mr. Santa. Yes. Senator Moran, INGAA, in our testimony, has
supported directing PHMSA to adopt Federal regulations for
regulating the safety of underground natural gas storage and,
in the case of intrastate storage, to delegate that inspection
and authority to the states.
PHMSA, back in 2010, put out an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and asked the question of whether they should
regulate underground storage. At that time, we filed comments
supporting it. While PHMSA has not acted, the industry has. The
industry storage operators, working with States, working with
regulators, have come up with standards that were adopted just
this last month, put out just this last month by the American
Petroleum Institute. We suggested that that would be a good
starting place for those regulations.
Senator Moran. Mr. Santa, when you say that's a ``starting
point,'' is it an ending point? Or that then becomes the basis
for governmental regulation?
Mr. Santa. As would happen with any Federal regulation,
those would be put out for public--for notice and public
comment. And it would be within PHMSA's discretion to--whether
or not to adopt those standards, to amend them, to adopt
something different. But, we think that there is a very good
starting place that hopefully could lead to some expedited
action on regulations.
Senator Moran. Before I ask another question, does anyone
else want to join in this conversation?
Mr. McCallister. Yes, I'll just echo that a little bit, in
that the American Gas Association also worked with INGAA on
that matter, and we adopted some recommended practices for the
integrity of storage fields. So, I think it's fine that PHMSA
would put together a rather broadbased program and that, like
most things, they would delegate the actual administration of
that to the State. And whether they use those as a pure
guideline or whether those are referenced directly, they're
more easily updated and upgraded, so to speak, over time if
they're a reference document than a direct rule from them. So--
--
But, I think it's going to work well if you can have PHMSA
oversee it.
Senator Moran. Anyone else?
[No response.]
Senator Moran. Madam Chairman, thank you very much.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Moran.
Senator Peters.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair, for that.
And thank you to our panelists.
I take this issue very seriously, given the fact that we
had a major disaster in the state of Michigan--and, Mr. Hart, I
appreciate your reference to that--given the fact that we've
had the most expensive pipeline break in the history of this
country, already spending over a billion dollars in cleanup in
Kalamazoo. And there is now increased concern in my State about
another pipeline that exists that's run by the same company
that had the other pipeline break, that runs underneath the
Straits of Mackinac, which connects the upper peninsula to the
lower peninsula, over 5 miles of water, freshwater in the Great
Lakes, freshwater that provides drinking water to over 40
million people, and also an incredible resource for the whole
region. And if there is a pipeline break in that stretch, it
would be catastrophic. I think it would--the Kalamazoo incident
would be dwarfed by what would happen in the Straits of
Mackinac. In fact, a recent study by the University of Michigan
says that the Straits of Mackinac is the absolute worst place
to have an oil disaster anywhere in the Great Lakes basin,
because of the volume of water that goes across the Straits,
back and forth. It can change directions almost daily. And my
understanding is, the volume of water is equal to ten times
Niagara Falls going through there, to put that in perspective
of what we're dealing with. So, we're very concerned about
that.
So, Ms. Fleming, I want to mention a couple of issues. One
is response plans. Obviously, we want to prevent an accident
from occurring to begin with, and we'll talk about that. But,
you made a big issue in your GAO report about response times.
We had a recent exercise--in fact, just completed last week--in
Mackinac. One of the principal responders was a Coast Guard
cutter that was 400 miles away from the Straits of Mackinac, so
it wouldn't be pre-positioned like it is in an exercise; it
would have to be called up. If it was wintertime, Lake Superior
may be completely frozen. It takes a long time for a cutter, if
has icebreaking capacity, to get there. And then we can talk
about the ice, as well. But, you talked about an optimal
response time. Given the fact that you're operating in straits
that have volumes of water ten times that of Niagara moving
very rapidly, is--how do you feel about that, in terms of a
response plan that obviously is probably inadequate, given the
distances that people have to traverse to even get there?
Ms. Fleming. It has to be--they obviously have to take that
in consideration. And, you know, each location, each operator,
each situation is different. And that's why, you know, we think
it's very important that the operator, you know, take a look at
the accuracy of its leak detection system, you know, really
look at where the valves are. Does it make sense to have
automated? Where are the personnel located?
We heard from one operator, the reason they went all
automatic valves is because they realized that, for their
response people, it would take them a minimum of two and a half
hours to get there, and 30 minutes to shut down the crank
wheel. So, they said, you know, that's just unacceptable.
Another operator told us that, you know, their control room had
a misunderstanding that they should never shut down a system.
They thought that that's just--you know, time is money, you
don't do that.
And so, just kind of going through these drills, really
having a relationship with the local responders. And, like we
said, once PHMSA has some robust data, then they can say,
``Well, what makes sense? What is--is an hour sufficient? Is
it?''--you know, we have a chart in our report that said, in
some cases it's minutes, in other cases it was days. Now,
obviously, if it's a slow leak, that's more acceptable than it
is if it's, obviously, in a catastrophic particularly deadly
issue.
So, we think it's very important that all of these things
are taken into account and that PHMSA really take a hard look
at the data and to really think about the pipeline, the
pressure, the location, the waterways, the environment that's
there, to really make sure that the response time is as
efficient and effective as possible.
Senator Peters. Well, thank you.
And, Mr. Hart, if I could ask you a question related to
this, too. In the fact that if we did have a disaster in the
Straits of Mackinac or anywhere in the Great Lakes, it would be
the Coast Guard that would have the primary responsibility for
cleaning that up. And one concern--major concern I have is in
the wintertime, because the Straits of Mackinac get completely
frozen over. It's difficult for a Coast Guard icebreaker to get
through there in the winter, and they would have to respond to
that. Does it make sense--and you talked about, in your
testimony, that we work with other agencies to have some
harmonization, some oversight--would it make sense to have the
Coast Guard have to sign off on a response plan saying that,
``We're the principal agency responsible for cleaning this
thing up. Our assets are hundreds of miles away. And, in the
wintertime, when we have thick ice that our icebreakers may
have a hard time getting through, the ability to even clean up
a site--it may be impossible.'' And, of course, that might lead
to a question, if it's impossible to clean up a site, does it
even make sense to be operating a pipeline that cannot be
cleaned up if something goes wrong?
But, to my question, Mr. Hart, does it make sense to have
the Coast Guard having that ability to oversee that and to sign
off on it in some way?
Mr. Hart. Thank you for the question. We work actively with
the Coast Guard on issues that involve maritime aspects. And
that--and we've seen that frequently, including in Marshall,
Michigan, and in Paulsboro, New Jersey. So, we see--we work
well with the Coast Guard and with the EPA, because they're all
involved in the response to that.
I would note, though, in response to your question about
response time, one of the things that has not yet been
mentioned--and also in response to Senator Booker's question--
is the importance not only of automatic valves, but sometimes,
in a situation where a shutoff can be catastrophic and maybe
you're not sure if your automatic software is working right,
you also want to have the possibility of having remotely
controlled valves. And we have recommended that some way to
shorten response time, not necessarily automatic, but look at
automatic or remote to help shorten that time before people
even know that there's a need to respond. So, we have been
looking at a number of those issues.
I would also mention that, in respect to that specific
event, our work with Enbridge has been very promising, in the
sense that they worked very well with us when we were
investigating Marshall, Michigan, they also have been one of
the ones that--to voluntarily undertake following the
recommended practice that API instituted, 1173 safety
management system. So, we've had a very positive experience
with them. And also, they're the ones--in Marshall, Michigan,
it took them 17 hours to realize that there even was a release.
So, that will feed into that learning curve and--to try to
figure out how to know that sooner.
So, these aren't direct answers to your question, but I
could just say, from our experience, we're--we go where the
accidents take us. From our experience, we are confident that
we would be able to handle that one as well as anybody could.
Senator Peters. Even in complete ice cover?
Mr. Hart. Well, I mean, under whatever circumstances--when
we were investigating Casselton, North Dakota, and it was 30
below, I mean, we go--we do what we have to do.
Senator Peters. Well, it's beyond--I'm sorry, Madam Chair--
but, it's--beyond the cold, it's underwater, as----
Mr. Hart. I understand----
Senator Peters.--well. And, as you mentioned, the spill we
had in Michigan was 17 hours. It wasn't the company that
discovered it. I think it was a guy driving his pickup truck
for a utility company that saw a bunch of oil spilling and
said, ``You know, I think there's a problem here.'' If it's
happening under water, under this ice, no one's going to see it
for a long time. And if the water volumes are equal to ten
times Niagara Falls, it's going to spread very rapidly, and
you're talking about a resource that provides drinking water
for 40 million people. So, we need to have more specific
answers to these--given the risk.
Mr. Hart. You raise a very good question that requires
consideration, as Ms. Fleming said, into the determination of
how best to do this.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Mr. Hart. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Before you begin your questions, Senator Daines, I wanted
to thank you again for hosting this subcommittee at a hearing
in Billings a couple of weeks ago. I thought we had a very
informative panel. We gathered a lot of information. And I
thank you personally for the warm welcome that we received from
the people of Montana. Thank you very much.
You may begin your questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE DAINES,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Daines. Well, thanks, Chairman Fischer. And thanks
for making the trip to Montana. I----
Senator Fischer. It was wonderful.
Senator Daines. It was truly--if you--if you don't believe
in field hearings, you ought to go to one. I think it really
promoted a better open and back-and-forth dialogue than we
often have here in Washington, D.C. So, thanks for making the
trip out. Your leadership was very appreciated.
And thank you for holding this hearing, as well as,
Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, for scheduling this
important series of hearings on PHMSA and also holding that
field hearing that we had a couple of weeks ago in Montana.
You know, at that field hearing, we focused on protecting
our pristine natural environment, especially our rivers and our
streams. Montana's proactive safety efforts and the local
economic impact of pipelines was discussed. PHMSA's
administrator testified and was able to hear firsthand from
Montana liquid pipeline operators, local safety experts, and
local elected officials on how Montana is leading this
industry.
PHMSA's jurisdiction covers approximately 2.6 million miles
of pipeline across our Nation. Nearly 20,000 miles crisscrosses
Montana, delivering natural gas to over 262,000 homes, gasoline
and diesel to the pumps, gas and oil to businesses, as well as
facilitating exports. In Montana, we produce about 30 million
barrels of crude oil, 63 billion cubic feet of natural gas, and
42 million short tons of coal annually. Our 19,000 miles of
pipelines play a vital enabling us to export 60 percent of our
energy production, and it supports the employment of over
43,000 Montanans in the oil and gas industry. That's about 7
percent of our total employment. Needless to say, it's
imperative to Montana that we continue to move these
commodities in a safe and environmentally responsible and an
efficient manner.
One of the issues that came up during our field hearing in
Billings was the inspection turnaround time from PHMSA. What we
heard was that the time--from the time that PHMSA's inspectors
will inspect a pipeline until a Montana operator receives that
inspection is sometimes up to a year. And I don't think that's
acceptable. And so, I'm curious--perhaps for Mr. McCallister
and Mr. Santa--have your members experienced similar kinds of
wait times, delays from the time the inspection occurs until
you receive the report and can start working on any kind of
corrective actions?
Mr. Santa. Senator Daines, I would need to check with our
members to see what that has been. I'm not aware of any that
have been up to a year. But, again, I would be happy to inquire
of our members and provide that to the Committee.
Senator Daines. OK.
Mr. McCallister?
Mr. McCallister. Yes, I would give the same answer. I--I'm
not aware that it's been that long. PHMSA sits here in our
backyard, so maybe we get to them a little quicker from our
company. But, I--I'm not aware. We'd have to check----
Senator Daines. All right.
Mr. McCallister.--and get back to you.
Senator Daines. We'll follow up with you on that, because
we want to actually get a sense, across the country. I'm sure
it probably--mileage varies, depending on, perhaps, inspection
workload and inspectors available, so forth. But, we heard
quite a range, quite a variation--several months, at a minimum,
and up to a year. And that is--that was why it raised a flag
for us. We'd love to work with you and see what you're finding
out in the field.
For Mr. Bellamy, in your testimony you state regulations
should encourage development and adoption of new technology.
Increasingly, this committee hears from witnesses that
performance and goal-based regulations--other words,
regulations that are a means to an end--you know, a safe
outcome--are worthwhile, given the proactive safety practices
of industry and the rapid evolution of technology. What hurdles
does industry face in implementing the best available safety
technology? And the second part of that question is, How would
performance-based regulations remove some of these obstacles?
Mr. Bellamy. Thank you. So, today, with respect to pipeline
inspection, ``smart pigging,'' the U.S. regulations for both
liquids and gas are somewhat prescriptive. When I think about
the difference between prescriptive regulations and goal-
setting, the story I tend to tell is that of someone trying to
protect people from falling off the edge of a cliff. A goal-
setting approach would be to put somebody--charge somebody with
the goal of protecting or preventing anybody falling off the
edge of a cliff. A prescriptive regulation would say, ``Build a
fence 3 feet high using 2-by-4 wood to stop someone falling off
the edge of a cliff.'' The difference between those two is, one
might not be sufficient--the latter may not be sufficient. The
prescriptive approach may not be sufficient for preventing
people fall off the edge of a cliff. The former puts a lot more
emphasis on finding out what's the very best way--what are all
of the risks associated with falling off the edge of a cliff,
and how do you put in place the measures, whatever they might
be, and how do you justify that you've done enough to do that?
Now, around the world, we see different models of pipeline
regulation. And so, for example, if I take the example of,
perhaps, Canada--Canada has a goal-setting regime. It was an
early adopter of crack-detection technology. There is more
crack detection done in Canada than anywhere else in the world.
Now, you could argue that's partly because Canada has a
propensity to--you know, the soil types and so on may be more
prone to cracking. But, then, what's the difference between the
soil types in southern Alberta and in northern Dakota? Not a
lot of difference. And it's also interesting to note that many
of the--many of the operators--sorry, the--much of the crack
detection done south of the border is done by Canadian
operators. So, there might be a coincidence there, or maybe
not. It might be a cause-and-effect. But, I think it's worth
PHMSA looking at whether or not a goal-setting approach might
make it easier for operators to adopt the best available
technology rather than just following a--you know, a
prescriptive approach.
Senator Daines. Thank you.
Thanks, Chairman Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Daines.
Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I want to start with you, Chairman Hart. You noted the U.S.
has approximately 298,000 miles of onshore natural gas
transmission pipelines. And PHMSA has required the operators to
develop and implement these integrity management programs. Do
you believe they're effective in reducing incidences? I know
you've completed--NTSB has completed three major investigations
in some deficiencies of the program. And do you think that
they're working?
Mr. Hart. Thank you for the question. The reason we did our
safety study recently on the integrity management of gas
transmission pipelines in high-consequence areas is because we
had three major events of that type that showed that things
weren't working the way they were supposed to. So, there's
clearly significant room for improvement.
Senator Klobuchar. And could you talk a little bit about
that improvement? And what do you think the practices should be
to reduce these incidences?
Mr. Hart. One of the areas that we recommended is
eliminating the grandfathering. Until the early 1970s, there
was no requirement to test installed--newly installed pipeline.
So, when the requirement to test newly installed pipeline came
into place, pipeline installed before 1970--for example, San
Bruno--was exempt. So, we're--we are--we have recommended to
PHMSA that they eliminate the grandfathering--that--the
grandfather clause so that pipeline installed before 1970 would
not be exempt from pressure testing. That's one of the biggest
ones.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you.
Ms. Fleming, you indicated that in 2012 the GAO found that
PHMSA does not collect comprehensive data on safety risks
associated with gathering pipelines. Collecting the data could
facilitate assessing the safety risks. Why do you believe it's
important for PHMSA to collect data from the operators of the
unregulated onshore hazardous liquid and gas gathering
pipelines?
Ms. Fleming. I think it's very important that PHMSA have a
understanding on the location, makeup, operation to determine
the extent of these safety risks. As I said earlier, there has
been some changes to gathering pipelines really related to the
increased extraction of shale. And the unregulated gathering
pipelines are much larger in diameter. In Texas, they told us
it could be as large as 36 inches and higher pressure, so more
like operating like a transmission line. So, I think it's very
important that not only does PHMSA, but the states have some
visibility as to what's out there and what are the potential
safety risks.
I think the other important point is that these unregulated
gathering pipelines, there is no requirement to have emergency
response plans. So, I think that's a very important point, too,
is that, for these 90 percent that are unregulated, we need a
little bit more visibility. We need them to come in line, in
terms of having emergency response plans, because there are
some important emerging trends out there that I think are
affecting larger populations than in the past.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Mr. McCallister, I think you know that maintaining a strong
relationship with emergency responders--industry and emergency
responders is critical for the safety of our communities. What
are the protocols in place now for energy companies to alert
first responders? And do you think there's something better we
could be doing?
Mr. McCallister. There are a number of regulations. They
vary state by state sometimes. There are certain requirements
that are required by PHMSA. Many of us exceed those
requirements. So, some of the States have more stringent
requirements. For example, here in the Nation's capital region,
our emergency response requirements are set by what is our
strictest jurisdiction, which is Virginia. So, within an hour,
we're going to be at any call, and we'll make that 98 percent
of the time. So--given traffic in the region--so they're--we
work closely with all of our first responders. We do training.
For example, we have one of the few facilities in the country,
which we call Pipetown, but it's one of the few facilities
where we can do live gas demonstrates, live leak detection, how
to get into vaults and stuff. And we bring emergency responders
in to train them on that.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
I just want to ask one more question to Ms. Fleming. It's
kind of related. I know that Senator Booker asked about the
automated valve and using that as a tool to get a quick
response for the affected segment of the pipeline. Do you think
that it's moving fast enough on that recommendation from the
GAO? And what other things could be done when there is an
incident--to move up the response time?
Ms. Fleming. PHMSA has told us that they are now--well,
they're moving toward requiring some of that important data,
which is, you know, when did the incident occur? When did
people show up? So, I think having those critical time
elements. And then, we really believe that it's important to
move toward a performance-based approach, because, you know
right now what the requirement is that incident response be
in--done ``in a prompt and effective manner.'' So, that's a
little bit squishy for us. So, we think it's more important to
really kind of take a look and see what the data shows. Maybe
there's a different time, whether it's transmission, depending
on if it's high-consequence area. It really needs to look at
the data first, and then to decide.
But, they've told us they're moving forward, so we're going
to take them on their word.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Ayotte.
STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I wanted to ask Director Fleming--we have a--there is a
project that Kinder Morgan has proposed in New Hampshire called
the Northeast Energy Direct Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline
Project. And many of my constituents have raised safety
concerns with the project itself. And one of the questions that
our entire delegation has written to FERC about is the question
about PHMSA's role. Because if you look at the FERC website,
FERC says, right on its website, ``The Commission has no
jurisdiction over pipeline safety or security, but actively
works with other agencies on safety and security
responsibility.'' So, one of the questions that we've asked
that we haven't gotten an answer from FERC on, but I wanted to
ask if you had done any analysis on, is this issue of the
involvement of PHMSA in actually siting pipelines, as opposed
to after they're already built and the role that PHMSA could
play with FERC, in terms of a safety analysis up front during
the pre-siting process. Have you looked at that issue at all?
Ms. Fleming. I'm not aware that we have looked at it, but a
colleague of mine handles the FERC area, and I would like to
get back to you with a written response, if that would be OK,
or maybe to set up a meeting to----
Senator Ayotte. I would really appreciate----
Ms. Fleming. Yes.
Senator Ayotte.--that. And--because this is a significant
issue for my constituents, and understandably so. And one of
the concerns they have is, they want safety assessed up front
with the siting of it, as opposed to after.
And so, I would ask you, Chairman Hart, with--as the lead
Federal agency with pipeline safety oversight, what is PHMSA's
role as we look at the actual permitting or siting of a new
natural gas pipeline, as opposed to after it's already in
existence?
Mr. Hart. We go where the accidents are, so I'm not sure
we're in a position to prospectively state what the situation
might be. But, your question does raise the issue of safety
regulators versus economic regulators. This is the only
industry we look at where we issue a safety recommendation, and
the safety recommendation will--may depend on what some
economic regulator does. So, we're struggling--again, that's
out of our lane--the economic side is out of our lane, but
we're struggling with how to get things done better on the
safety side, when the safety response depends on an economic
regulator. We don't have a good answer to that, but it's going
to take better collaboration, and maybe better collaboration
between PHMSA and FERC early on might be a step in that
direction. But, that's out of our lane.
Senator Ayotte. Well, have any of your safety
recommendations looked at the issue of requiring PHMSA to work
with FERC during the permitting process? Because I think
certainly where you site something like this could have a
direct impact on safety.
Mr. Hart. We have not, except to the extent that our--that
we look at high-consequence areas. And that--and siting
something in a high-consequence area brings a host of different
requirements than siting it in an area that is not high
consequence. But, other than that, no, we have not looped at
that.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I think this is something that should
be examined. And I would ask you to do that.
I also believe that, as we look at PHMSA's role in the
permitting process for pipelines, I think it does make sense to
have PHMSA play a role not only after the fact, but in FERC's
pre-filing process to ensure the safest--safety when you're
thinking about siting and proposing the project.
So, I appreciate--Director Fleming, I look forward to
following up with you on this.
And, Chairman Hart, I hope that's something that you will
look at, at NTSB, thinking about the whole process, as well,
including the siting, when it comes to safety.
Mr. Hart. Certainly, if we see that issue arising in an
accident investigation that we were doing, we will certainly
look at that.
Senator Ayotte. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Hart. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair, very much.
Beneath our streets across our country, we're facing a
crumbling natural gas pipeline infrastructure. A report
released by my staff found that aging and leaking natural gas
distribution pipelines are costing consumers money nationally.
Consumers have paid at least $20 billion for natural gas that
they likely never received over the last decade. These leaking
natural gas pipelines are also harming the environment and
contributing to climate change by releasing methane, a powerful
greenhouse gas, much more powerful than carbon dioxide.
But, these aging pipelines are also a significant threat to
public safety. Over the last decade, there have been almost 800
significant incidents on gas distribution pipelines, including
several hundred explosions which killed and injured hundreds of
people and caused more than $800 million in property damage.
The Obama administration's recently released Quadrennial
Energy Review also highlighted the safety threat posed by these
natural gas pipelines. The Quadrennial report found that,
quote, ``Aging, leak-prone natural gas distribution pipelines
and associated infrastructure prompt safety and environmental
concerns.'' Most safety incidents involving natural gas
pipelines occur on natural gas distribution systems. These
incidents tend to occur in densely populated areas.
Mr. Fleming, Mr. Bellamy, Mr. Hart, would you agree that
the findings of the administration's Quadrennial Energy Review
that aging and leaking natural gas distribution pipelines pose
a significant threat to public safety and that this is an issue
that the Committee should examine?
Ms. Fleming?
Ms. Fleming. I guess everybody's looking for me.
Senator Markey. Ms. Fleming, yes. Ladies first, they're
saying. They're very polite.
Ms. Fleming. We have not looked at this issue, but would be
happy to work with the Committee if that's an important issue
for us to undertake.
Senator Markey. Mr. Hart?
Mr. Hart. We've been looking at issues regarding iron
pipelines for quite--for several decades. And we know that
the--they need to be replaced, and they are being replaced. We
go there when there's an accident that results from it. So,
that's the best I can say at this point, is, when we see----
Senator Markey. Well, it says a lot that you've been
looking at it----
Mr. Hart. Oh, yes.
Senator Markey.--for decades.
Mr. Hart. We----
Senator Markey. So, you know it's a big issue.
Mr. Hart. Yes.
Senator Markey. Mr. Bellamy.
Mr. Bellamy. So, the challenge of inspecting low-pressure
distribution systems is quite--has been looked at for many,
many years. There are technologies that can allow such systems
to be inspected. Those technologies are--there are companies
actively investing in such technologies today, and deploying
them. And they're being used. It's not as straightforward as
inspecting carbon steel. Inspecting cast iron pipelines is a
more difficult challenge. But, that's not to say it cannot be
done. And there are companies working----
Senator Markey. All right, let me just follow up, then. So,
the--to the three of you again, if you would, would you agree
with the Quadrennial report that more needs to be done to
repair and replace our Nation's natural gas infrastructure and
to examine these issues that the Pipeline Safety
Reauthorization Act would give us an opportunity to do and
would be an appropriate place to do so, given the significant
safety threat posed by these pipelines?
Ms. Fleming.
Ms. Fleming. I know you're trying to back me in a corner,
here, but we have not looked at this issue. I mean, from what
you're saying, obviously it sounds like it's an important issue
for folks to get behind. GAO has not looked at this issue. And
so, it's hard for me to----
Senator Markey. I can't----
Ms. Fleming.--to validate it. But, obviously, we're willing
to work with the Committee if this is something that we can
help with.
Senator Markey. Mr. Hart.
Mr. Hart. Our experience has shown us that cast iron was
not such a bad idea, back in the days when natural gas had more
moisture content in it. But as we have intentionally removed
the moisture content, that's resulted in seals in those
pipelines failing, which now has created a huge problem. So, no
question there is a serious need for improvement.
Senator Markey. Is it--Mr. Bellamy, is it good for us to
look at something that saves people money and makes them more
safe? Is that something that we should perhaps take a look at
as we're reauthorizing this bill?
Mr. Bellamy. When you put it that way, how can I refuse?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Bellamy. How could I--but, the--my role here, we're a
provider of technology. What I can talk about with some
confidence is what's happening amongst my colleagues and
competitors in the industry to provide solutions for (a)
replacing pipe--and the replacement by polyethylene pipe is
known technology, it's used extensively around the world, not
just here in the United States. I think the other issue is for
those pipelines--cast iron pipelines that need to be inspected,
there are active programs underway, and there are people
offering services into the industry today, and they are being
used.
Senator Markey. Yes, we have these old cities up in Boston
that they were installing the stuff 100 years ago----
Mr. Bellamy. Yes.
Senator Markey. --120 years ago. It was a good idea then,
but you've got to update the idea once in a while. OK?
Especially if you know that the old idea might have a few holes
in it and might need some additional, you know, help--
replacement. And so, that's kind of where we are. We know it's
a problem. We know that the old was great, served well. But,
sometimes you just need, you know, to take a look at it. And
$20 billion is a lot of money to be losing in natural gas going
up into the--going up out of those holes, and methane, you
know, warming the planet, and explosions that are all related
to the very same issue. And we know that we can create jobs in
America by finding a mechanism by which we encourage the
industry to do this work. And we can put, you know, utility
workers and steel workers and plumbers and pipefitters and all
these people out there doing the work, which we know has to be
done. This thing is just growing as a problem as each and every
week and year goes by.
And I just hope, Madam Chair, that we can work together on
this issue, and especially the older, aging cities in New
Jersey, in Connecticut, in Massachusetts. It's just a growing
problem. And maybe in the, you know, the newer industrialized
cities it hasn't quite reached that same level yet. But, for
us, it's a big problem. And I'd just ask that it be put on the
table and we'd be able to work together on it.
So, I thank you.
I thank you all for your participation.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Senator Blumenthal.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Welcome. Thank you for being here.
Connecticut is expanding its pipeline gas transmission
capacity. And so, this hearing is very timely for us. For all
the reasons that have been well demonstrated at this hearing,
there is a very severe and serious problem with the current
system of oversight.
Chairman Hart, you've indicated in your testimony that,
since the year 2000, NTSB has made 64 recommendations for
safety. Only one has been closed in an unacceptable status. How
many have been closed in an acceptable status? How many have
been acted upon?
Mr. Hart. Approximately half.
Senator Blumenthal. So, that's about--close to 40.
Mr. Hart. Correct.
Senator Blumenthal. And are some of those serious?
Mr. Hart. Well, I mean, they range the--they fall on the
entire spectrum from very serious to not so serious, but the--
we have gotten good cooperation, in general, from PHMSA. We've
had some situations where pushing them is a little harder in
some areas than in others. But, in general, the--we're getting
good cooperation from them.
Senator Blumenthal. When you say ``good cooperation,'' they
haven't completed them.
Mr. Hart. Well, some----
Senator Blumenthal. So, they've been cooperative in giving
you excuses, but not in doing the work.
Mr. Hart. The reason that we have to recommend them is
because we know they're difficult, so, you know, we're working
with them to try to get the things done that we need to be
done.
Senator Blumenthal. They're difficult, but serious and
important.
Mr. Hart. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. They matter to public safety.
Mr. Hart. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. They matter to environmental
preservation.
Mr. Hart. Yes, but--that's not really our focus. But, I'm
sure they do, yes.
Senator Blumenthal. In October 2014, Senator Blunt and I
sent a letter to PHMSA inquiring about the agency's oversight
of gathering pipelines--I have a copy of it here; I don't know
whether you've seen it--inquiring about the agency's oversight
of these particular pipelines or pipes that transport oil and
gas to refining facilities. And that letter was in response to
the GAO's report--you've mentioned it today--where gathering
pipelines have traditionally been constructed at about 2 to 12
inches in diameter to handle 800 pounds per square inch of
pressure. In recent years, because of the recent gas boom in
the United States, those pipelines are now--those kinds of
pipelines now being constructed at, I believe, 24 to 36 inches,
and operating at approximately 1,400 psi. In other words, to be
real blunt, these gathering pipelines are being used well
beyond their capacity. That's a serious public safety threat,
is it not?
Mr. Hart. I'd have to get back to you with respect to
whether we've investigated any gathering pipeline accidents.
I'm not aware that we have, but I'd have to get back to you if
we have. That's--we go where the accidents are, basically.
Senator Blumenthal. If you have, I'd like to know about it.
Mr. Hart. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. If you haven't, I'd like to know
whether you consider it something that you should be----
Mr. Hart. We'll be glad to get back to you with our--with
respect to our accident investigation history on that one.
Senator Blumenthal. These bigger gathering pipelines pose a
greater threat because, if they rupture, obviously they can
contaminate a larger area. And PHMSA has the authority to
regulate those lines, but its oversight has been limited. In
fact, in November 2014, I received a response that said,
``PHMSA plans a 2015 rulemaking to begin gathering data on
operators of gathering pipelines.'' Has that rule been issued?
Mr. Hart. I don't know.
Senator Blumenthal. Well----
Mr. Hart. Were you asking me? I'm not aware of whether it
has, or not.
Senator Blumenthal. It has not been issued.
Mr. Hart. OK.
Senator Blumenthal. To my----
Ms. Fleming. It has not.
Senator Blumenthal. To my knowledge, the process of
rulemaking has not begun. I would be glad to be contradicted on
that point.
Long and short, as my time is expiring, it seems to me that
this agency, basically, is in need of serious reform. Whether
it is regulatory capture or lack of resources, lack of
determination and will, PHMSA needs an overhaul. Would you
agree, or not?
Mr. Hart. We haven't done an assessment of how well PHMSA
is working. All I can comment on is how well they have worked
with us on the accident that we have investigated.
Senator Blumenthal. And this point is not necessarily
personal in criticism of anybody there. If it's lack of
resources and authority, they should be given both. If there is
too much coziness with the industry, there should be an
investigation of it, would you agree?
Mr. Hart. Again, these are all questions that are not in
our lane, because we go where the accidents are. I hate to keep
harking back to that answer, but we go where the accidents are.
If we see----
Senator Blumenthal. Well, if----
Mr. Hart.--more accidents----
Senator Blumenthal.--if anyone else has thoughts about this
issue, I would welcome them.
Unfortunately, my time is expired. I'm willing to bet that
you could probably fit on the floor of the United States Senate
everybody in the United States of America who knows what PHMSA
is. And yet, its role in American energy production and
transmission is vitally important. We all should be on the same
side of safety in gas transmission--natural gas and, in fact,
all transmission facilities.
So, I welcome--and I express my thanks to each of you for
your participation today in this very important topic.
Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks. And,
during that time, Senators are asked to submit any questions
for the record. I know I'll be submitting some. Mr.
McCallister, you'll get some with regards to what your company
and other companies are doing to replace those pipelines that
are currently there and need replacing, and maybe to clarify
that gathering pipelines are there when we have refineries, as
well. So, upon receipt of those questions, I would ask that--
the witnesses are requested to submit their written answers to
the Committee as soon as possible.
With that, I will conclude the hearing. And I thank all of
you on the panel for being here today.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
Susan A. Fleming
Question. Ms. Fleming, in GAO's 2013 report, you found that PHMSA
should re-assess its requirements that pipeline operators inspect
pipeline every seven years. Your report found that a risk-based
approach would require, depending on the characteristics of the
pipeline, for PHMSA to require inspections on more or less frequent
intervals. Can you please elaborate on what a more risk-based system
would look like? Would this help PHMSA to provide better allocation of
its resources?
Answer. At the request of a congressional committee, in 2008 PHMSA
described how it would establish and enforce risk-based criteria for
extending the 7-year reassessment interval for natural gas transmission
pipelines. PHMSA proposed retaining the current 7-year reassessment
requirement, but establishing a process by which operators could use
risk-based reassessment intervals longer than 7 years if they met
certain potential criteria, such as demonstrating sound risk analysis.
This process would be similar to that used by PHMSA for hazardous
liquid pipeline reassessment intervals.
It is unclear whether moving toward a more risk-based system for
reassessing the integrity of natural gas transmission pipelines would
allow PHMSA to better allocate resources. In fact, implementing risk-
based reassessment intervals longer than 7 years could exacerbate
current workload, staffing, and expertise challenges for regulators and
operators. For example, PHMSA officials told us that allowing longer
intervals could require inspectors to spend more time and resources
than they do currently to verify that operators appropriately assessed
risk, and state pipeline safety offices we met with noted potential
concerns with staffing and training to effectively evaluate risk-based
reassessment intervals. In light of these uncertainties regarding the
impact of extending reassessment intervals to be longer than 7 years,
we recommended that PHMSA collect information on the resources needed
to implement such a change. PHMSA is studying the potential to
implement risk-based reassessment intervals that are longer than 7
years for natural gas transmission pipelines; agency officials plan to
complete this research by March 2016.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Cory Booker to
Susan A. Fleming
Question 1. Technology advancements are changing how business is
conducted in virtually every industry across this country and around
the globe. That said, I'm troubled by the fact that extremely dangerous
materials are travelling through communities every day, yet, in the
pipeline industry, we're still spray painting lines on the ground to
identify the location of pipelines. And we're also still seeing far too
many accidents where pipelines are inadvertently being hit. According
to PHMSA, pipeline incidents result in dozens of injuries and more than
$500 million in property damage each year. What are some of the
developing ideas and technologies companies should be considering to
make pipelines safer? How can we make pipelines more intelligent?
Answer. While our work has not specifically addressed developing
ideas and technologies to improve pipeline safety, our January 2013
report recommended that PHMSA improve its guidance to operators on
whether to install automated valves (see GAO-13-168). PHMSA plans to
publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on this issue in March 2016.
Question 1a. How can the Federal Government help advance the
adoption of developing technologies?
Answer. We have not conducted the work necessary to answer this
question.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Joe Manchin to
Susan A. Fleming
Question 1. Pipeline safety regulations are designed to protect the
public and the environment. Gathering pipelines associated with
horizontal wells being drilled in the active shale plays are much
larger in diameter and are operating at ``transmission pipeline''
pressures (in excess of 1000 psig). While many of these large diameter,
high pressure gathering lines are built to the safety standards of
pipeline regulations, they are not required to be built to these
standards. For example, there is a new gathering pipeline being built
in central West Virginia that is 30 inches in diameter and operating at
1250 psig. However, because of the current language in the gas pipeline
regulations, the majority of the pipeline is unregulated by either the
State or Federal Government.
In addition, several pipeline failures resulting in reportable
spills in these unregulated gathering pipelines have occurred in West
Virginia in 2015. But because these pipelines are unregulated by the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) or the
State, there is no requirement to investigate and determine failure
causes or take any corrective actions.
Should PHMSA update their rules and regulations to address the
growth of domestic shale production and the increased size and
pressures of the gathering lines in use today?
Answer. Yes, we believe that PHMSA should update its rules and
regulations to address the growth of domestic shale production and the
increased size and pressures of the gathering lines in use today. We
have previously recommended actions to improve PHMSA's ability to
identify and address risks posed by gathering pipelines, including
moving forward with proposed rulemaking. In 2012, we found that changes
in operating environments--including the increased extraction of oil
and gas from shale--could increase the safety risks for federally
unregulated gathering pipelines (see GAO-12-388). We recommended that
PHMSA collect data from operators of federally unregulated onshore
hazardous liquid and gas gathering pipelines to better identify the
safety risks posed by such pipelines. The data should be comparable to
what PHMSA collects annually from operators of regulated gathering
pipelines (e.g., fatalities, injuries, property damage, location,
mileage, size, operating pressure, maintenance history, and the causes
and consequences of incidents). In 2014, we found that construction of
larger, higher-pressure gathering pipelines had increased due to the
increased production of oil and gas, raising safety concerns because an
incident could affect a greater area than an incident from a smaller,
lower-pressure pipeline (see GAO-14-667). We recommended that PHMSA
move forward with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to address gathering
pipeline safety that considers the risks of larger-diameter, higher-
pressure federally unregulated gathering pipelines, including
subjecting such pipelines to emergency response planning requirements
that currently do not apply. In July 2015, PHMSA officials told us the
proposed regulations the agency expected to publish later in the year
would address these recommendations. PHMSA issued a proposed regulation
for hazardous liquid pipelines in October 2015 and plans to issue a
proposed regulation for gas pipelines in November 2015.
Question 1a. Should the regulations be updated with additional
requirements for siting or placement of new pipelines to help protect
the public?
Answer. Our 2012 and 2014 recommendations were designed to improve
PHMSA's ability to identify and address risks posed by gathering
pipelines, but did not specifically address the siting of new
pipelines. Nonetheless, we found in our 2012 report on gathering
pipeline safety that, according to responses to our survey of state
pipeline safety agencies and interviews with industry officials,
increased urbanization has caused rural areas to become more densely
populated and, in some cases, developments have encroached on existing
pipeline rights-of-way (see GAO-12-388). Additionally, in our 2014
report on oil and gas transportation, we found that a citizens'
awareness group in Pennsylvania had documented construction of several
unregulated gathering pipelines with diameters larger than that of
traditional gathering pipelines (see GAO-14-667). The group argued that
while these gathering pipelines were in rural areas, they were being
built unnecessarily close to homes.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
Susan A. Fleming
Question 1. To your knowledge, does DOT/PHMSA have the authority to
shut down a pipeline to prevent accidents from an imminent threat, or
has that ever happened in the past?
Answer. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 190.233 specifies that, if PHMSA determines
that operation of a particular pipeline facility would result in the
likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the environment, PHMSA
may require the owner or operator of the facility to suspend or
restrict use of the facility until PHMSA determines that the facility
is no longer hazardous. We have not conducted the work necessary to
determine the extent to which PHMSA has taken this action in the past.
Question 2. Would more transparency of response plans, including
the protocols for how PHMSA reviews and approves response plans, or
other information help federal, state, and local responders act more
effectively in the event of an incident?
Answer. Our prior work on pipeline operator incident response did
not address the transparency of response plans. However, in January
2013, we concluded that PHMSA has an opportunity to improve incident
response times and recommended that PHMSA improve the reliability of
data that could be used to evaluate whether to implement a performance-
based incident response framework (see GAO-13-168). In July 2015, PHMSA
officials told us they have taken several steps towards addressing this
recommendation, including requiring that operators report specific
pieces of information regarding an incident. Additionally, PHMSA
officials said that, later this year, they plan to propose further
changes that will result in the collection of additional data the
agency can use to better track incident response times. PHMSA officials
also said they plan to develop a more specific performance-based
standard for incident response as part of an upcoming rulemaking on
rupture detection and valve rules.
Question 3. What studies have been conducted and reports issued
(since the U.S. Department of Transportation's ``Common Ground Study'')
regarding the success or shortcomings of ``811'', ``call before you
dig'', ``miss-utility'', or ``one-call'' systems? What recommendations
for improvement have been made, particularly with regard to the
collection and maintenance of accurate location data?
Answer. Our 2012 report on gathering pipelines found that 16 state
agencies we surveyed reported that the unknown or uncertain location of
federally unregulated gathering pipelines presents a moderate or high
safety risk, and that knowing such information can be useful for ``Call
Before You Dig'' programs (see GAO-12-388). However, our work did not
specifically address the success or shortcomings of such programs.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Cory Booker to
Hon. Christopher A. Hart
Question 1. Technology advancements are changing how business is
conducted in virtually every industry across this country and around
the globe. That said, I'm troubled by the fact that extremely dangerous
materials are travelling through communities every day, yet, in the
pipeline industry, we're still spray painting lines on the ground to
identify the location of pipelines. And we're also still seeing far too
many accidents where pipelines are inadvertently being hit. According
to PHMSA, pipeline incidents result in dozens of injuries and more than
$500 million in property damage each year. What are some of the
developing ideas and technologies companies should be considering to
make pipelines safer? How can we make pipelines more intelligent?
Answer. Excavation damage is a leading cause of harm to people.
PHMSA regulations include requirements for installing permanent markers
along the right-of-way wherever necessary to identify the location of
the line or main to reduce the possibility of damage or interference
(49 CFR 192.707 and 195.410). Markers warn that a transmission pipeline
is located in the area, identify the product transported in the line,
and provide the name of the pipeline operator and a telephone number to
call in the event of an emergency.
49 CFR 192.616 and 195.440 require operators to have a written
program addressing public awareness, including use of a one-call
notification system prior to excavation and other damage prevention
activities. The regulation incorporates by reference the American
Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice API RP 1162 Public
Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators.
Operators use high-technology devices, similar to metal detectors,
to accurately locate the buried pipeline. They use spray paint or other
suitable indicators only to identify the buried pipeline. Pipeline hits
result when the operator is not notified of the intended work to locate
and mark the buried pipelines, and when powered excavating equipment is
incorrectly used in the vicinity of marked or unmarked pipelines.
The industry frequently evaluates and adopts improved methods for
informing the public of the legal requirements to notify the operator
using the national 811 ``call before you dig'' system to ensure the
buried pipeline and other utilities are properly marked.
Question 1a. How can the Federal Government help advance the
adoption of developing technologies?
Answer. A full array of technologies continues to be developed that
involve acoustical monitoring and other sensing methods, better leak
detection, and better pipeline assessment technologies using in-line
inspection.
Federal agencies can provide funding to research and development
(R&D) programs and incentivize the private industry, which owns the
bulk of the 2.6 million miles of pipelines in the United States, to
ramp up investment in R&D.
PHMSA must continue to work closely with independent organizations,
such as the API and other industry stakeholders, to advance technology
related to safe pipeline operations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Joe Manchin to
Hon. Christopher A. Hart
Question 1. Pipeline safety regulations are designed to protect the
public and the environment. Gathering pipelines associated with
horizontal wells being drilled in the active shale plays are much
larger in diameter and are operating at ``transmission pipeline''
pressures (in excess of 1000 psig). While many of these large diameter,
high pressure gathering lines are built to the safety standards of
pipeline regulations, they are not required to be built to these
standards. For example, there is a new gathering pipeline being built
in central West Virginia that is 30 inches in diameter and operating at
1250 psig. However, because of the current language in the gas pipeline
regulations, the majority of the pipeline is unregulated by either the
State or Federal Government.
In addition, several pipeline failures resulting in reportable
spills in these unregulated gathering pipelines have occurred in West
Virginia in 2015. But because these pipelines are unregulated by the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) or the
State, there is no requirement to investigate and determine failure
causes or take any corrective actions.
Should PHMSA update their rules and regulations to address the
growth of domestic shale production and the increased size and
pressures of the gathering lines in use today?
Answer. The NTSB has not investigated accidents involving gathering
lines and, therefore, has not issued any recommendations regarding
PHMSA's regulations regarding gathering lines. These accidents
typically occur in more rural areas and have not involved the injuries
or fatalities that would meet NTSB accident launch criteria.
The criteria for determining those onshore natural gas gathering
pipelines regulated by PHMSA are contained in 49 CFR 192.8 and vary
based on pipeline material, operating stress, and class location. PHMSA
is also collecting data to help it assess whether to expand the
regulations to gathering lines not currently regulated.
As with any rulemaking undertaken by agencies such as PHMSA, the
ultimate success or expansion of the regulations will largely be
determined by the ability to justify safety improvements against the
cost burden on the operator.
Question 1a. Should the regulations be updated with additional
requirements for siting or placement of new pipelines to help protect
the public?
Answer. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) oversees
new pipeline routing for interstate natural gas pipelines. State and
local agencies oversee intrastate pipeline and hazardous liquid inter/
intrastate pipeline routing. NTSB has not issued any recommendations to
the FERC or the states regarding pipeline routing because we have not
investigated accidents in which routing was a factor.
In January 2015, PHMSA and FEMA released a new hazard mitigation
guidance document prepared by the Pipelines and Informed Planning
Alliance (PIPA) Communication Team. Hazard Mitigation Planning:
Practices for Land Use Planning and Development near Pipelines outlines
best practices for communities to reduce risks from pipeline incidents,
including those caused by natural hazards.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
Hon. Christopher A. Hart
Question 1. Has NTSB looked at improvements in PHMSA spill response
criteria, and if so, do you see a need for elevated criteria in
demonstrating an effective response plan?
Answer. Yes, the NTSB closely examines operator spill response
plans and actions, as well as the local, state, and Federal actions
involved in a hazardous liquid accident. For example, the NTSB
identified numerous shortcomings in the Enbridge Marshal, Michigan,
crude oil accident spill response. Our investigation also identified
shortcomings in the PHMSA facility response plan regulations and the
PHMSA response plan review process. The Board issued recommendations to
the U.S. Department of Transportation, PHMSA, and Enbridge addressing
spill response (NTSB PAR-12/01).
Question 2. What has been NTSB's recent actions regarding location
issues, with regard to how surveying and mapping, or ``as-built''
drawings and records, and infrastructure location can enhance public
safety, environmental protection and the economy by strengthening the
accurate location (surveying and mapping) of such pipelines and other
forms of underground utility infrastructure?
Answer. In January 2015, the NTSB released a Safety Study, entitled
Integrity Management of Gas Transmission Pipelines in High Consequence
Areas (SS-15-01). The study findings discussed improving data
collection and reporting, including geospatial data. The Board issued
recommendations to PHMSA addressing the National Pipeline Mapping
System, improving standards addressing the use of geospatial data, and
the process for identifying high consequence areas.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Cory Booker to
Michael Bellamy
Question 1. Technology advancements are changing how business is
conducted in virtually every industry across this country and around
the globe. That said, I'm troubled by the fact that extremely dangerous
materials are travelling through communities every day, yet, in the
pipeline industry, we're still spray painting lines on the ground to
identify the location of pipelines. And we're also still seeing far too
many accidents where pipelines are inadvertently being hit. According
to PHMSA, pipeline incidents result in dozens of injuries and more than
$500 million in property damage each year.
The pipeline industry shares the Senator's concern regarding what
is referred to as ``third-party'' damage and the industry has gone to
great lengths to work with state and local officials to prevent this
damage. Rights-of-way for the interstate lines are clearly marked.
This problem extends to water and electric lines as well as gas and
oil transmission lines and the ``One-Call'' system has been adopted to
notify officials with ``one call'' when excavation is to take place so
that the location of the lines on that particular piece of property can
be marked.
The problem isn't that the operators don't know where the lines
are, rather it lies with those persons who start to dig without first
determining the pipeline's location.
The pipeline operators between them spend millions of dollars on
education programs, but if someone installing a septic system or a
farmer digging a pond doesn't use the ``One-Call'' system to have
underground utilities marked, tragedy can occur.
New technology in the form of surveillance data use from multiple
sensing systems both static and dynamic are being developed, utilizing
new imagery techniques to prevent encroachment of unauthorized
excavations. These need FAA approval as well as landowners permitting
to install the static sensors, which legislation could assist with.
What are some of the developing ideas and technologies companies
should be considering to make pipelines safer? How can we make
pipelines more intelligent?
Answer. The first step in making pipelines more intelligent is to
understand, assess and use the data collected over years of operation
and integrate it with current technology-driven data to understand how
the past can help make the future safer; moving towards a
``predictive'' approach to safety. GE's Intelligent Pipeline Solutions
program is a model of what can be done.
Our technology feeds critical data into an integrated solution so
operators have the data they need to safely manage their assets, manage
potential issues before they become an incident, and enhance
stakeholder communications. The technology integrates operational data
with external sources of data such as weather, seismic and repair
information, and combines them into one solution that delivers a
digital reference of all the assets in the pipeline network, plus
insight into the threat factors impacting performance. This current
information allows an organization to run dynamic modeling on threat
factors and mitigation strategies, with the outcome of optimizing
production while minimizing maintenance spend and risk exposure. It
provides a critical foundation for addressing enterprise data
organization and management, streamlining regulatory preparedness and
supports a proactive approach to pipeline safety management.
For example, advances in technology, such as ground motion sensors,
listening sensors, and unmanned aerial vehicles with high resolution
cameras and odor detection enable new surveillance methods that improve
security along and within the Right of Way (ROW). This provides a
``view'' of potential unauthorized or illegal digging activities on the
ROW.
Question 1a. How can the Federal Government help advance the
adoption of developing technologies?
Answer. API's recently published Recommended Practice 1173 provides
guidance for the industry to move to an Intelligent Pipeline System
platform. Incorporation of API1173 into regulations by reference will
encourage migration to more contemporary data management approaches.
Comparing the adoption of technologies between countries with goal-
based approaches to pipeline regulation that allow alternative ways of
achieving compliance, and those countries that have a more prescriptive
approach in that they specify the means of achieving compliance, GE
notes that those with a goal-based approach tend to have faster rates
of new technology adoption.
The encouragement of pipeline owners and operators to allow
developing technology to be tested on live systems (tariff or other
types of incentives of some kind) will help further advance progress.
Government grants for R&D to assist in the funding of such programs
will also add to the opportunity for partnerships with industry. For
many years, PHMSA was a funding participant in public-private
partnerships to develop advanced safety technology, but this practice
does not continue today. It should be reinstated. Deploying
computerized safety measures or operating intelligent pipeline
principals wherever practical should be used to drive the industry
forward. Perhaps commitments to use new technology could be used as
mitigants to operational risks or to optimize inspection intervals.
Operators should be encouraged to participate in pilot programs to
experiment with new technology approaches in a controlled and safe
manner.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Joe Manchin to
Michael Bellamy
Question 1. Pipeline safety regulations are designed to protect the
public and the environment. Gathering pipelines associated with
horizontal wells being drilled in the active shale plays are much
larger in diameter and are operating at ``transmission pipeline''
pressures (in excess of 1000 psig). While many of these large diameter,
high pressure gathering lines are built to the safety standards of
pipeline regulations, they are not required to be built to these
standards. For example, there is a new gathering pipeline being built
in central West Virginia that is 30 inches in diameter and operating at
1250 psig. However, because of the current language in the gas pipeline
regulations, the majority of the pipeline is unregulated by either the
State or Federal Government.
In addition, several pipeline failures resulting in reportable
spills in these unregulated gathering pipelines have occurred in West
Virginia in 2015. But because these pipelines are unregulated by the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) or the
State, there is no requirement to investigate and determine failure
causes or take any corrective actions.
Should PHMSA update their rules and regulations to address the
growth of domestic shale production and the increased size and
pressures of the gathering lines in use today?
Answer. The advent of the shale gas revolution in the U.S. has
precipitated the need for expanding gathering line systems. These
systems can be large and are generally under regulation by a state
agency.
While state regulatory frameworks vary, it is safe to say that
there is no significant move to make these gathering systems ILI
capable. Because the shale reserves are sometimes near communities and
other high consequence areas, a case can be made that some gathering
lines should require inspections using the best available technology.
PII is willing to work with any state jurisdiction interested in
understanding ILI technology and the nature of pipeline specifications
that will allow its use.
Question 1a. Should the regulations be updated with additional
requirements for siting or placement of new pipelines to help protect
the public?
Answer. The siting or placement of new pipelines is outside of the
scope of interest of GE Pipelines Solutions, we would therefore defer
to ``no comment'' on this question.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
Michael Bellamy
Question. Are there many pipelines that can't be inspected using
the best technology available, and for those pipelines that can't be
inspected using best available technology, do you think those pipelines
(and the surrounding area) should have a higher burden of proof when it
comes to safety?
Answer. Interstate gas and oil transmission lines are regulated by
PHMSA. Industry consensus estimates suggest that approximately 40
percent are unsuitable for inspection using currently available smart
pig technology for a variety of reasons. The vast majority of new
pipelines are constructed to be compatible with ILI tools, and many
pipeline operators continue to upgrade their pipelines so as to make
them ILI compatible, and thus benefit from application of the most
advanced technology as it continues to develop.
PII supports using the best available technology in high
consequence areas; that is we support inspecting those lines with In
Line Inspection (smart pig) equipment. Obviously, our first choice for
difficult to ILI pipelines in high consequence areas would be to make
those lines ILI compatible. Where that is not possible, on occasion we
might be able to modify the ILI tools to allow them to be used in
pipelines which were previously incompatible for ILI.
But, to the extent that pipelines cannot be made physically
compatible for ILI, a number of other less comprehensive inspection
methodologies are available. For example, operators can choose Direct
Assessment inspection and/or hydrostatic testing, and there may be
other operational opportunities to reduce risk. Further, some of the
data technology being developed by GE in regard to ``intelligent
pipeline solutions'' may be useful to monitor pipelines in high
consequence areas.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Cory Booker to
Donald F. Santa
Question 1. Technology advancements are changing how business is
conducted in virtually every industry across this country and around
the globe. That said, I'm troubled by the fact that extremely dangerous
materials are travelling through communities every day, yet, in the
pipeline industry, we're still spray painting lines on the ground to
identify the location of pipelines. And we're also still seeing far too
many accidents where pipelines are inadvertently being hit. According
to PHMSA, pipeline incidents result in dozens of injuries and more than
$500 million in property damage each year. What are some of the
developing ideas and technologies companies should be considering to
make pipelines safer? How can we make pipelines more intelligent?
Answer. Natural gas pipelines are safer today as a result of a
number of technological advances over the last 40 years. While there
have been advances in materials and equipment, perhaps the most
important advance has been the development of in-line inspection
technologies. These tools, commonly called ``smart pigs,'' have
developed from rudimentary devices 30 years ago, to much more
sophisticated tools today. This is partly a byproduct of the computer
and sensor technology advances that have occurred across the entire
economy, but also the result of pipeline industry focus on inspection
technology.
These technologies will continue to advance and will remain an
essential element of further improvements in pipeline safety. For
example, the current method for testing the material strength of a
pipeline is hydrostatic test--essentially, filling the pipeline with
water at high pressures to see if the pipe breaks. This type of testing
is expensive, disruptive to service, and actually may damage the
pipeline. Developing a non-destructive alternative that can test for
material strength is a current focus of pipeline safety research and
development.
Question 1a. How can the Federal Government help advance the
adoption of developing technologies?
Answer. As mentioned in our written testimony, INGAA supports re-
establishing collaborative pipeline safety research and development
involving PHMSA and pipeline industry groups. This was the practice
until a previous Secretary of Transportation changed the policy about
four years ago. Given the limited resources available within both
government and industry, a collaborative effort will help to avoid
duplication and will contribute to the more effective development and
deployment of new technologies to improve pipeline safety.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Joe Manchin to
Donald F. Santa
Question 1. Pipeline safety regulations are designed to protect the
public and the environment. Gathering pipelines associated with
horizontal wells being drilled in the active shale plays are much
larger in diameter and are operating at ``transmission pipeline''
pressures (in excess of 1000 psig). While many of these large diameter,
high pressure gathering lines are built to the safety standards of
pipeline regulations, they are not required to be built to these
standards. For example, there is a new gathering pipeline being built
in central West Virginia that is 30 inches in diameter and operating at
1250 psig. However, because of the current language in the gas pipeline
regulations, the majority of the pipeline is unregulated by either the
State or Federal Government.
In addition, several pipeline failures resulting in reportable
spills in these unregulated gathering pipelines have occurred in West
Virginia in 2015. But because these pipelines are unregulated by the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) or the
State, there is no requirement to investigate and determine failure
causes or take any corrective actions.
Should PHMSA update their rules and regulations to address the
growth of domestic shale production and the increased size and
pressures of the gathering lines in use today?
Answer. INGAA represents interstate natural gas transmission
pipeline operators. These pipelines have been subject to safety
regulation by the U.S. Department of Transportation since 1970. INGAA
does not represent gathering line owner/operators, and therefore has no
positon on gathering line regulation. It is our understanding, however,
that the upcoming comprehensive natural gas pipeline rule that PHMSA is
preparing will include some policy changes affecting gathering lines.
Question 1a. Should the regulations be updated with additional
requirements for siting or placement of new pipelines to help protect
the public?
See above.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
Donald F. Santa
Question. Despite a recent boost in appropriations for PHMSA
inspectors, it has been noted that it is extremely difficult to recruit
and retain quality engineers and professionals to carry out inspections
and other PHMSA program work. How can the oil and gas industry assist
in making sure we quality individuals that can work together with
companies to improve safety for everyone?
Answer. It is our understanding that PHMSA on several occasions has
sought ``direct hiring authority'' from Congress. This authority would
enable PHMSA to hire qualified personnel directly, without going
through the lengthy Office of Personnel Management process. Removing
this impediment would make it easier for PHMSA to hire qualified
individuals on a timely basis.
Another possible solution might be contract personnel. Given the
highly competitive market for engineers and other skilled
professionals, the salary and job location limitations for PHMSA remain
significant obstacles to hiring qualified individuals. The appropriate
use of private contractors might help to compensate for those
limitations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Cory Booker to
Terry McCallister
Question 1. Technology advancements are changing how business is
conducted in virtually every industry across this country and around
the globe. That said, I'm troubled by the fact that extremely dangerous
materials are travelling through communities every day, yet, in the
pipeline industry, we're still spray painting lines on the ground to
identify the location of pipelines. And we're also still seeing far too
many accidents where pipelines are inadvertently being hit. According
to PHMSA, pipeline incidents result in dozens of injuries and more than
$500 million in property damage each year. What are some of the
developing ideas and technologies companies should be considering to
make pipelines safer? How can we make pipelines more intelligent?
Answer. Although significant improvements have been made,
excavation damage continues to be a leading threat to the safe
operation of pipelines. And most of this damage is due to excavators
not calling before they dig, not due to a lack of technology. The
industry takes the threat of excavation damage very seriously. PHMSA
has collaborated with pipeline operators, other underground utilities,
excavators and other stakeholders to form the Common Ground Alliance
(CGA), which helped to launch the national 811 Call Before You Dig. The
creation of a national and regional CGAs, a national Call Before You
Dig number, and public awareness efforts have had a dramatic impact on
improving awareness around the importance of calling to get utility
lines marked prior to any excavation. In addition, CGA publishes a list
of best practices that can help reduce to risk of excavation damage.
As far as new technologies, the industry has several forums that
are intended to develop new tools and instruments which can improve the
accuracy of pipe locating, enhance the communication of pipe location
to the excavator, and provide notification of excavation activity that
is occurring in the vicinity of a major pipeline. Included in these
forums is PHMSA's annual R&D forum for pipeline safety: http://
phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/research-development, the CGA Technology
Committee, forums held by the industry research consortiums, and AGA's
technical committees and Operations Conference & Exhibition.
In summary, the industry and other stakeholders have worked, and
continue to work, diligently to reduce the threat of excavation
damages. New technologies can help, but I do not believe technology is
always the solution. Enforcement of state laws which will force
excavators to call 811 before they dig, and firming up state excavation
damage laws, will reduce excavation damages more than technology
improvements. Consistent and effective enforcement will result in
improved digging practices, particularly for the professional
excavators who utilize mechanized equipment.
Question 1a. How can the Federal Government help advance the
adoption of developing technologies?
Answer. There are several ways that Federal Government can help to
advance the adoption of developing technologies. The first is the
continued funding of PHMSA's R&D program and its partnership with
industry research consortiums, academia and independent research
groups. The second is quicker adoption of new or unconventional
technologies. Currently, operators must apply for a special permit to
use an alternative technology. PHMSA should be encouraged to review the
special permit requests in a timely manner, and encourage more special
permits to be filed in order to confirm new technologies meet
expectations. As a particular technology becomes more mature, PHMSA
should be encouraged to allow its usage so that special permits and
applications are no longer required from pipeline operators.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Joe Manchin to
Terry McCallister
Question 1. Pipeline safety regulations are designed to protect the
public and the environment. Gathering pipelines associated with
horizontal wells being drilled in the active shale plays are much
larger in diameter and are operating at ``transmission pipeline''
pressures (in excess of 1000 psig). While many of these large diameter,
high pressure gathering lines are built to the safety standards of
pipeline regulations, they are not required to be built to these
standards. For example, there is a new gathering pipeline being built
in central West Virginia that is 30 inches in diameter and operating at
1250 psig. However, because of the current language in the gas pipeline
regulations, the majority of the pipeline is unregulated by either the
State or Federal Government.
In addition, several pipeline failures resulting in reportable
spills in these unregulated gathering pipelines have occurred in West
Virginia in 2015. But because these pipelines are unregulated by the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) or the
State, there is no requirement to investigate and determine failure
causes or take any corrective actions.
Should PHMSA update their rules and regulations to address the
growth of domestic shale production and the increased size and
pressures of the gathering lines in use today?
Answer. The members of the American Gas Association deliver natural
gas to homes and businesses. Gathering lines are far upstream of these
local delivery lines. Therefore, we defer this question to other panel
members.
Question 1a. Should the regulations be updated with additional
requirements for siting or placement of new pipelines to help protect
the public?
Answer. PHMSA's current jurisdiction does not include siting or
placement of new pipelines. They have provided assistance to
communities building around existing pipelines.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
Terry McCallister
Question. Despite a recent boost in appropriations for PHMSA
inspectors, it has been noted that it is extremely difficult to recruit
and retain quality engineers and professionals to carry out inspections
and other PHMSA program work. How can the oil and gas industry assist
in making sure we quality individuals that can work together with
companies to improve safety for everyone?
Answer. The American Gas Association believe PHMSA inspectors and
state inspectors play a critical role in pipeline safety. AGA was
pleased to see Congress provide additional resources for PHMSA in the
prior Pipeline Safety reauthorization.
There are a number of initiatives on both the government side and
the industry side that are helping to create qualified inspectors,
engineers, and energy industry professionals that can work together to
improve safety:
Federal and state pipeline safety inspectors currently
receive training on pipeline safety regulations, compliance
requirements, inspection techniques, and enforcement
procedures. This includes classroom training at the PHMSA
Pipeline Safety Training Center in Oklahoma City, OK, and
General Pipeline Safety Awareness Course at Leak City in
Athens, AL. Federal and state inspectors also have
opportunities to participate in state and regional seminars and
industry workshops.
What could improve this training is additional hands on experience
of pipe materials, components, welding and joining procedures,
operations and maintenance activities, and emergency response
in both the classroom and the field.
In addition, many operators are willing to assist in educating
newer inspectors through field visits, participation in manufacturer
demonstrations and even participation in company training programs.
These educational opportunities should be outside of an inspector's
audit.
Industry has a number of initiatives underway pertaining to
workforce development. This includes the creation of a number of
company training facilities, new employee training programs, natural
gas boot camps, partnerships with technical schools and universities,
the Center for Energy Workforce Development, participation in the
Utilities Workforce Advisory Council, industry technical committees,
AGA's Operations Conference & Exhibition, industry workshops, and even
programs on diversity and inclusion. Several of these initiatives
actively encourage government's involvement and participation. This
includes partnerships with technical schools and universities,
participation in the Center for Energy Workforce Development,
participation in the Utilities Workforce Advisory Council,
participation in AGA's Operations Conference & Exhibition, and
participation in many industry workshops.
It should be noted that a number of individuals trained by pipeline
operators leave the natural gas company to work for state or Federal
Government and the knowledge they gain while working for a utility is
transferred to their government position.
There are additional opportunity for industry and government to
work together to create qualified individuals that can work together to
improve pipeline safety. Several of these opportunities are based on a
trust that information will not be used to fine or penalize an
operator. For example, as an operator identifies an issue, there is an
opportunity for the operator to openly share this information with
their Federal or state inspector. These are learning opportunities on
both the issue and how an issue is addressed. Operators are unwilling
to share these opportunities if they result in a fine or penalty.
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