[Senate Hearing 114-226]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-226
FAA REAUTHORIZATION:
AVIATION SAFETY AND GENERAL AVIATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 28, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
MARCO RUBIO, Florida CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
TED CRUZ, Texas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
JERRY MORAN, Kansas EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska CORY BOOKER, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TOM UDALL, New Mexico
DEAN HELLER, Nevada JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
CORY GARDNER, Colorado GARY PETERS, Michigan
STEVE DAINES, Montana
David Schwietert, Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, General Counsel
Jason Van Beek, Deputy General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Clint Odom, Democratic General Counsel and Policy Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire, MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
Chairman Ranking
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
ROY BLUNT, Missouri RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
TED CRUZ, Texas EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CORY BOOKER, New Jersey
JERRY MORAN, Kansas TOM UDALL, New Mexico
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin GARY PETERS, Michigan
DEAN HELLER, Nevada
CORY GARDNER, Colorado
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 28, 2015................................... 1
Statement of Senator Ayotte...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 3
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 58
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 59
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 61
Statement of Senator Manchin..................................... 64
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 68
Statement of Senator Daines...................................... 69
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 72
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 75
Letter to Hon. Gary Peters from Faye Malarkey Black, Interim
President, Regional Airline Association.................... 76
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 78
Witnesses
Margaret Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety,
Federal Aviation Administration................................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Chesley B. ``Sully'' Sullenberger III, Aviation Safety Expert and
Captain of Flight 1549, The Landing on the Hudson.............. 30
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Faye Malarkey Black, Interim President, Regional Airline
Association.................................................... 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Mark Baker, President and CEO, Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association.................................................... 46
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Appendix
Thomas L. Hendricks, President and CEO, National Air
Transportation Association, prepared statement................. 81
Response to written question submitted to Margaret Gilligan by:
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 83
Hon. Marco Rubio............................................. 83
Hon. Steve Daines............................................ 84
FAA REAUTHORIZATION:
AVIATION SAFETY AND GENERAL AVIATION
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and
Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Kelly Ayotte,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Ayotte [presiding], Wicker, Fischer,
Moran, Sullivan, Gardner, Daines, Cantwell, Nelson, Klobuchar,
Blumenthal, Schatz, Booker, Manchin, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Ayotte. Good afternoon, and welcome. Thank you all
for being here.
Today's hearing is one in a series we are holding in
preparation for this year's Federal Aviation Administration's
reauthorization effort. And last week, we heard from experts
and stakeholders on the certification process and airport
infrastructure financing.
Today, we have the opportunity to discuss the single most
important underlying issue for any reauthorization effort, and
that's safety, the safety of our national airspace system and
the safety of the flying public.
With that, I want to take a moment to recognize the family
members of the victims of Colgan Flight 3407, which crashed
near Buffalo in 2009, who I understand are here in the audience
today. So, your sustained efforts to improve safety of our
skies are very admirable, and we appreciate your coming to this
hearing today.
Safety is, and must remain, our top priority. The United
States national airspace system remains one of the safest in
the world, even while being one of the most complex systems in
the world. The safety record we enjoy is a product of hard work
of both government and industry alike, but it requires vigilant
and dedication to ongoing improvement and assessment.
Today's hearing covers a broad array of important issues,
and I appreciate all of our witnesses for being here today.
In 2010, Congress enacted the Airline Safety and Federal
Aviation Administration Extension Act. In 2012, Congress
enacted the FAA Modernization and Reform Act. Today, I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses about the safety
improvements that have been implemented since these laws were
enacted, and what still remains to be done.
The FAA has made significant progress in implementing
reforms mandated by the Airline Safety Act. And yet, some
initiatives are left undone. In particular, I'd like to focus
on the agency's progress in implementing the Pilot Records Data
base. This is an important tool to make sure airlines have all
the information needed to assess pilots applying for positions
in the cockpit. And I urge the FAA to move quickly in
implementing this reform.
More recently, some have noted a concern about the supply
of pilots. Acknowledging there is some point of disagreement
here, particularly with regard to the root cause of any real or
perceived shortage, I hope to hear from each witness today on
this issue so we can properly assess and understand the
situation.
As we review the issue, I'm confident that no one on this
committee, including me, wants to compromise passenger safety.
We want to make sure that we have, obviously, well-qualified
pilots to serve in our air system.
I also look forward to testimony on the mental and physical
fitness of airline pilots. Tragically, the recent Germanwings
crash has brought the aviation community's attention to the
mental health of pilots as well as safety measures with respect
to access to the flight deck. And we must learn from this
incident. And certainly, any thoughts you have today for us to
understand, we'd appreciate.
We will also have an opportunity to discuss safety
management systems, pilot commuting, commercial aircraft
tracking, flight data, recorder requirement modifications, and
airport surface movement safety. We all know the airports and
runways are complex areas with many moving parts. Again,
vigilance is required, and I look forward to hearing from the--
about the agency's ongoing efforts here to ensure the safety of
our runways.
We will also examine issues affecting the general aviation
community. General aviation is an important part of our civil
aviation system, and encompasses aviation enthusiasts,
recreational flyers, but, for a lot of rural communities, it
also serves as a key link for businesses and first responders,
especially in rural communities. And also, I know, for some of
my colleagues, for example, in Alaska and Hawaii, this is a
very important issue.
There are several pilots in my family, and I can certainly
attest to the enthusiasm for flying and dedication to safety
shown by the general aviation community.
A recent Government Accountability Office report indicated
that total general aviation operations and annual hours flown
by general aviation decreased between 2000 and 2010. Today, I
want to better understand the reasons for these declines and
what is happening in the general aviation industry, as well.
Today, we will hear from five witnesses: Ms. Margaret
Gilligan, Associate Administrator for the Aviation Safety--for
Aviation Safety at the FAA; the Honorable Christopher Hart,
Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board; Captain
Chesley Sullenberger, retired pilot and safety consultant and,
I think, well known to many of us as to--of his accomplishments
and background--we're honored to have you here, Captain; Ms.
Faye Malarkey Black, Interim President at the Regional Airline
Association; and Mr. Mark Baker, President and CEO of the
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.
Thank you for being here. I look forward to your testimony.
And, with that, I would like to turn it over to my Ranking
Member, Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Chairman Ayotte.
And thank you, to all the witnesses, for being here today.
I look forward to hearing your testimony.
I would especially like to acknowledge the families and the
victims of the Colgan Air Flight 3407 who are with us here
today. Thank you for your consistent advocacy and tireless work
on behalf of a safer aviation system.
The FAA has implemented a number of safety improvements in
the last 5 years, including pilot training, safety management
systems, flight and duty time requirements, and pilot
professionalism initiatives. We have moved the ball forward on
aviation safety, but we cannot be complacent with the progress
we've made. We've built on efforts from the past, leveraged
science and data and technology to make aviation safer, but we
have more work to do.
One area of work that remains is in the development of a
comprehensive Pilot Records Database, which was mandated by the
2010 Airline Safety FAA Reauthorization. This is an important
component of a data-driven safety regime to help prevent future
tragedies. And I hope the FAA can move the development of these
key safety tools forward more quickly.
The FAA's mission is to provide the safest, most efficient
airspace system in the world. As we engage with the aviation
stakeholders on the FAA reauthorization bill and discuss how to
balance and allocate limited resources, we must prioritize
safety above all else. There will always be competing
priorities for aviation and business, and government's
responsibility is to set and maintain the highest standards to
protect passengers, pilots, and the public.
This is important and necessary. And we can see, from
issues like the pilot fatigue rules, which will be discussed
today--and, unfortunately, in Seattle last week, we had a
maintenance crewmember fall asleep in the cargo hold of an
airplane that also caused somebody to return. These rules on
fatigue, and the latest research on sleep science and how
various work and rest schedules impact performance, are very
important. We've had hearings on this in the past, Madam Chair.
We want our pilots to benefit from this research. And,
unfortunately, the final regulations carved out cargo pilots.
In the last two Congresses, I've worked with many others here
to correct this divide between pilots, whether they're flying
passenger or cargo planes, and I hope this year we can bring
this to safety in our skies as we move forward on the FAA bill.
As we think about the national airspace's interconnected
system, we also need to look at general aviation and how to
make aviation safer. Next Gen will provide us with good data on
weather and traffic, but we also have to look for opportunities
in other ways for safety. One area we hope to see progress for
general aviation is improved certification of safety-related
equipment and technology. If we're able to accelerate the
certification timeline and reduce cost to operators, we can
help enable operators to equip the aging general aviation fleet
with cutting-edge safety technology and state-of-the-art
components.
At our manufacturing and air certification hearing last
Tuesday, we discussed the rewriting of the certification
purposes for general aviation aircraft, part 23. And I want to
underscore the potential safety benefits of this action for
general aviation, in addition to the economic and logistical
benefits.
As the FAA develops new general aviation certification
rules, we should consider other areas to improve existing
regulations. The FAA's reauthorization provides an opportunity
to identify areas where we can enhance and streamline and
refocus regulations into safety.
The National Transportation Safety Board has studied the
issue of medical requirements. And I'm sure that we're going to
hear about that today, as well, and recommendations to
strengthen medical certification of operators. This committee
engages in a conversation about ways to change pilot medical
standards. We should consider ways to strengthen and improve
those requirements, as well.
The FAA continues to study ways to improve safety through
its research programs. And I know that they're studying
everything from product on the plane, as well, like lithium ion
batteries. Airlines, air manufacturers, administration, all
have expressed concern over incendiary properties of lithium
batteries. And, despite leading in the global community in
research into hazardous fire proposed by bulk shipments of
batteries, U.S. regulation has lagged behind. So, fortunately,
the International Civil Aviation Organization has provided some
base guidelines in this area.
Another field where the international community is
directing significant attention is on flight tracking and
flight data records. The disappearance of Malaysia Flight 370
underscored the gaps in the flight tracking system, as well as
challenges posed in trying to locate a flight data recorder.
Without understanding what happened, we are disadvantaged to
try to prevent another situation. The NTSB has also studied
this area, so I look forward to hearing NTSB Chairman Hart, his
testimony on that.
Obviously, the security of our system is integral to the
backbone of aviation, so I hope we can move forward with more
safety, more implementation of Next Gen, and making sure that
we have the properly trained pilots to foster growth in
aviation.
So, thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this important
hearing.
And again, thank you, to the witnesses.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you so much, Senator Cantwell.
And we're very fortunate to have the overall Ranking
Member, Senator Nelson, here for this hearing.
Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. And let's get on with the witnesses. I'll
enter a statement in the record.
And, Madam Chairman, I'm very proud of the work of this
subcommittee. It's doing important stuff. And the subject
matter of this hearing underscores the importance of the work
of this subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator from Florida
Thank you to the witnesses for being here today to discuss safety
and general aviation. I want to acknowledge the Colgan Air Flight 3407
Families. Thank you for your contribution to aviation safety, and for
your continued commitment to protecting passengers.
Safe air transportation has enabled tremendous growth in this
nation, connecting communities large and small to each other, and to
the flow of Commerce.
Since the first commercial flight from Tampa to St. Petersburg in
1914, there have been tremendous advances in aviation that have
dramatically improved safety. Improved technology, pilot training, and
data-driven decision making have contributed to the safest period in
aviation history.
Our aviation system has grown even safer by thoroughly
investigating accidents so that we might learn from past mistakes and
find a way to prevent them in the future. The tragic Colgan Air Crash
in 2009 prompted an examination of the systems and circumstances that
led to that accident.
Since that time we have improved pilot training, updated 50 year
old fatigue rules, and mandated a comprehensive database for all
pilots.
But work remains, and we must continue to strengthen our safety
regime to protect lives.
The disappearance of Malaysia Air Flight 370 over a year ago and
the Germanwings Flight 9525 crash last month are somber reminders of
how critical this is.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about ways to make our
system even safer whether through improved flight tracking, commercial
pilot qualifications and medical evaluation, preventing lithium battery
fires, or helping reduce the accident rate in the general aviation
community.
Safety is the foundation upon which the entire aviation system is
built, and it is our responsibility to protect and strengthen that
foundation.
Senator Ayotte. Well, thank you so much, Senator Nelson.
And, with that, I would like to call on our witnesses. And
our first witness is Ms. Margaret Gilligan. Ms. Gilligan is the
Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety at the Federal
Aviation Administration.
Miss Gilligan.
STATEMENT OF MARGARET GILLIGAN,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you, Senator Ayotte, Senator Cantwell,
and members of the Subcommittee, not just for your commitment
to aviation safety, but for holding this series of hearings and
focusing on an issue of national importance.
Your guidance has had a tangible result. The United States
of America enjoys the world's safest and most efficient
aviation safety system.
We've been working for years to build on the trust that
you've exhibited in our efforts. Indeed, the United States is
doing much more than just holding steady at historically low
accident rates. Aviation safety cannot rest on the status quo,
regardless of how well things are going. By establishing strong
safety partnerships, we're accelerating the state of aviation
safety at a pace that is perhaps unrivaled in any industry.
The Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010 has
certainly contributed to our progress. With the support of the
Colgan families, and at your direction, we issued a final rule
to prevent pilot fatigue which became effective more than a
year ago. This sent a very clear message to industry that every
airline must provide pilots sufficient time to get the rest
needed for safe flight, and it underscored the point that every
pilot has a personal responsibility to arrive at work fit for
duty.
The Act triggered other rules, as well. With some very
limited exceptions, we required airline pilots to have 1500
hours of flight-time experience. We strengthened the
requirements for taking the Airline Transport Pilot Test,
requiring applicants to have completed additional training in
high-altitude operations and adverse weather. We published a
final rule that advances the way pilots are trained, and added
a requirement for training in the prevention and recovery from
full stalls and upset conditions. That rule also made air
carriers put remedial programs in place to track pilots with
performance deficiencies.
In a system as safe as ours, with an industry as safety
conscious as ours is, it is an extraordinary challenge to find
a game changer, an approach that really has the potential to
raise the safety bar even further. The requirement in the 2010
Act to publish a rule requiring Safety Management Systems did
just that.
Safety Management Systems are the next great frontier for
aviation safety. Until now, technology has driven safety
improvements, from radar to jet engines to collision avoidance
and now satellite navigation. SMS changes that landscape. SMS
is a comprehensive approach to managing safety throughout an
organization. It requires an organization-wide safety policy.
It has formal methods for identifying hazards, mitigating and
controlling risks, and continually assessing safety
performance. SMS stresses not only compliance with technical
standards, it puts increased emphasis on the overall safety
performance of the organization. SMS is not a slogan. It
requires establishing a safety culture, a culture that assures
hazards are identified, actions are taken, and results are
measured, and then it repeats the process again. In the
business of aviation, safety cannot be an add-on, it must be
built in through SMS. The airlines have learned that, and we
thank this committee for its support.
Safety Management Systems have become the foundation for
risk-based decisionmaking. Our resources will always be finite.
FAA must put those resources where they're needed most. Risk-
based decisionmaking allows us to make aviation safer and
smarter. Because commercial accidents are so rare, we're
focusing on mitigating risk that could lead to an accident.
Risk-based decisionmaking lets us tackle the highest risk
first, using our resources to improve safety where they will be
the most effective.
The lynchpin for risk-based decisionmaking is the safety
data shared throughout the industry. Safety data can come from
any of the dozens of public and proprietary data bases, such
ask the Air Traffic Control System, the airplane itself, or the
people who are involved in the operation. These data are fed
into the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
System. And it works. Safety professionals recognize that there
can be no secrets. This is a voluntary effort. And we, in
industry, are working with data that now represents 99 percent
of U.S. air carrier commercial operations.
Before closing, I wanted to acknowledge our outstanding
safety partnership with the general aviation community. GA
pilots are known for their love of aviation, but they are
equally committed to advancing safety. Their participation in
the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee is of particular
note. The Steering Committee meets quarterly to review accident
trends, establish areas of special emphasis, and share
information. In the past year alone, this group developed 29
separate safety enhancements to address loss-of-control
accidents, which is the most prevalent category of accidents
facing this community. Based on their recommendations, FAA has
made it easier to install angle-of-attack indicators and allow
pilots to better monitor stall margins. In short, they actively
pursue ways to enhance safety, and that's what this partnership
is all about.
This committee has given the FAA the authority to provide
the level of safety we enjoy today. We look forward to working
with you on the upcoming reauthorization to build on America's
enviable aviation safety record. I'd be pleased to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gilligan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Margaret Gilligan, Associate Administrator for
Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Senator Ayotte, Senator Cantwell, Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the
current state of aviation safety in the national airspace system.
Aviation safety is the FAA's top priority and, while commercial
aviation in the United States is holding steady at historically low
accident rates, we remain focused to ensure we continue to identify and
address risks to our system. Our progress over the last twenty years
has been impressive. In the past, our philosophy was 100 percent
compliance equals 100 percent safe but we were having accidents. We
needed more than regulations. Today, we're proactive and identify and
address risk to prevent accidents.
Our success in addressing risk and improving safety in aviation
over the past two decades is the result of strong safety partnerships
between government and industry to pursue safety improvement
collaboratively and in a proactive manner.
In 1997, the White House Commission on Safety and Security set a
goal of an 80 percent reduction in the fatal accident rate within 10
years and identified the need for strong government-industry
partnerships to enhance safety and support the aviation system of the
future. The National Civil Aviation Review Commission followed up with
a strong recommendation that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and industry work together to develop a comprehensive, integrated
safety plan to implement existing safety recommendations. The
Commission recommended performance measures and milestones be developed
to assess progress in meeting the safety goal. The Commission also
recognized the global nature of aviation demanded that aviation safety
also be addressed worldwide.
The FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and
industry determined their safety advocacy work was complementary,
because they all use accident data to determine top safety areas. As a
result, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) was formed in 1998.
The CAST model intended to use data to develop an understanding of the
best actions or interventions to prevent accidents. The goal was to
collaborate on identifying the top safety areas through the analysis of
past accident and incident data, charter joint teams of experts to
develop methods to understand the chain of events leading to accidents,
identify effective interventions to address these safety areas, and
remain focused on implementing these critical interventions.
The work of CAST has been extremely successful in the United
States. Safety experts report that by implementing the most promising
safety enhancements, along with new aircraft, improved regulations, and
other activities, the fatality risk for commercial aviation in the
United States was reduced by 83 percent from 1998 to 2008.
CAST is currently co-chaired by the Vice-President of Safety,
Security and Environment at American Airlines and me. Members include
domestic and international government and industry organizations.
Today, CAST has evolved and the group is moving beyond the
``historic'' approach of examining past accident data to a more
proactive approach that focuses on detecting risk and implementing
mitigation strategies before accidents or serious incidents occur. CAST
uses a disciplined, data driven approach to analyze safety information,
identify hazards and contributing factors and uses that knowledge to
continually improve the aviation system. Using data from non-accident
sources and voluntary reporting programs, CAST has adopted nearly 100
safety enhancements. CAST aims to further reduce the U.S. commercial
fatality risk by 50 percent from 2010 to 2025.
The work of this organization has been recognized with prestigious
awards, including the Robert J. Collier Trophy and the Laurel Award
from Aviation Week and Space Technology respectively.
The collaboration between government and industry, at all levels,
has been instrumental in the success we have achieved in the
improvement in aviation safety. Our continued success in advancing
aviation safety depends on these strong safety partnerships built on
trust and the ability to share safety information. As the work of CAST
has evolved, so has the agency's ability to collect and analyze safety
information for aviation.
In 2007, the FAA launched the Aviation Safety Information Analysis
and Sharing (ASIAS) program to help transform safety analysis from a
forensic approach, looking at accidents and incidents after they
occurred, to a risk management approach, allowing for proactive
discoveries of safety concerns before they lead to significant events.
ASIAS is a voluntary collaborative information sharing program
supported by the aviation community. It collects data from broad and
extensive sources of aviation safety information for the purposes of
advancing safety initiatives and discovering vulnerabilities in the air
transportation system. It took years to establish voluntary safety
programs and build trust within the aviation community. Congress has
been an important advocate in helping us protect vital safety
information. These safety information protections are imperative so
that we can continue to provide the environment in which personnel with
safety critical responsibilities are confident in voluntarily providing
safety information so that carriers and government have real-time
insight into potential systemic safety issues.
ASIAS partners with CAST to monitor known risk, evaluate the
effectiveness of deployed mitigations and detect emerging hazards.
There are currently 46 part 121 member air carriers, nine corporate/
business operators, two manufactures and two maintenance, repair and
overhaul organizations participating in ASIAS. It continues to evolve,
but has matured to the point that the FAA and industry can leverage
voluntarily provided safety data from operators that represent 99
percent of U.S. air carrier commercial operations. ASIAS has
established metrics that enable CAST to evaluate the effectiveness of
mitigations. It is also expanding to support other areas in aviation.
In another related effort, the FAA is working to reduce safety
challenges in general aviation (GA). Much like the CAST, the General
Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC), which was established in the
mid-1990s, established a data-driven, aviation-safety strategy to
reduce general aviation fatal accidents. The FAA's goal is to reduce
the GA fatal accident rate by 10 percent over a 10-year period (2009-
2018). Loss of control--mainly stalls--accounts for the most GA fatal
accidents.
Through GAJSC, the general aviation community is realizing the
benefits of collaboration. It is the key government-industry group
working to reduce GA accidents. It is working to obtain broader data
sources from the GA community to help better identify safety risks and
implement enhancements to mitigate hazards. GAJSC participants include
FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)--as an observer-Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association (AOPA), Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA),
General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), National Business
Aviation Association (NBAA) and National Air Transportation Association
(NATA).
The group meets quarterly to review GA accident trends, establish
areas for special emphasis, and share information. In the past year,
the group developed 29 safety enhancements to address loss of control
accidents, the most prevalent category of fatal GA accidents. For
example, GAJSC efforts are making it easier to install some types of
angle of attack indicators in GA aircraft, and allowing pilots to
better monitor the stall margins of the aircraft they are flying. The
GAJSC is also working on resources to help pilots better understand the
effects of over-the-counter and prescription medication and better
understand how long they should wait prior to flying after taking
different types of medication. As part of its continuing work, the
GAJSC is focusing its efforts on engine related accidents and is
working to adopt a set of safety enhancements aimed at these events.
The concept of collaborative, voluntarily shared safety information
has evolved a great deal since its inception. The FAA explored the SMS
concept as a component of system safety and collaborated closely with
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other
international stakeholders on the development of the SMS standards.
SMS is a formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing
safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. It
includes systemic procedures, practices, and policies for managing
safety risk. System safety is the application of both technical and
managerial principles and skills to identify hazards and control risk.
Most traditional regulations address technical issues. While these are
important and have formed the basis of current successes, we're now
increasing emphasis on how these technical processes are being managed.
Risk Based Decision Making (RBDM) is central to the processes of SMS.
The evolution of SMS is the RBDM strategic initiative, one of the
FAA Administrator's four strategic initiatives over the next five
years. The vision for RBDM is that decisions are made with a full
understanding of the safety impacts on the aerospace system. This means
collecting and using data, analyzing that data and sharing it with the
right people to ensure our decisions are better informed and take into
account who they will impact and how. We will use RBDM and our other
safety management activities to focus around high risk areas,
leveraging our resources around those high-risk areas. We must take
steps now to make sure that we are paying attention to the most
important things first.
In order to realize our vision for RBDM, we have activities focused
on ensuring that decision makers have the information regarding safety
risk necessary to make well-informed decisions. These activities are
necessary to increase data collection, sharing, and analysis to support
decision makers. We are developing processes and tools to support
decision makers and enable them to make better safety-informed
decisions. We will also ensure that the information is properly aligned
with and incorporated into FAA governance structures and processes
through which decisions are made. Finally, there is an initiative
focused on the FAA oversight model and implementation of SMS in
industry. This initiative will complete the picture to ensure that FAA
decisions affecting industry are made with safety risk fully considered
and that oversight models are properly aligned with SMS in industry
organizations.
Once we complete the activities that make up the RBDM strategic
initiative, we will have instituted the approach within our SMS that
will improve how we make decisions based on safety risk. The SMS will
further provide the structure to make and manage those decisions.
A challenge we faced with SMS was our collaboration with
stakeholders. We needed to evolve beyond the perception that the FAA
was an enforcer of safety or the ``Aviation Police.'' While enforcement
is a tool to ensure compliance, it is not a panacea. Enforcement, by
itself, can and does in many situations inhibit the open exchange of
information. This in turn leads to ineffective solutions to safety
problems. We must use our resources for oversight activities as
effectively as possible, and need to change our oversight approach as
we are limited in our ability to catch all safety hazards in the
system. For carriers that want to operate at the highest level of
safety, they know they will be able to get there more effectively with
SMS. Commercial operators have an incentive to invest in SMS because,
by addressing root causes of hazards before they occur, carriers can
avoid the stigma and financial consequences of accidents. In all cases,
though, we want to be sure that safety problems are fully addressed in
the most effective manner. We feel that this is best addressed through
coordinated and cooperative efforts on the part of both FAA and
industry.
The FAA recognizes our role in assuring the public of a safe
system, and we will not hesitate to use strict enforcement where
necessary. As a safety oversight organization, stakeholders that are
unwilling or unable to comply with our safety standards and pose an
unmitigated safety risk cannot be overlooked under the assumption that
collaboration should control in all circumstances. Regulations cover
broad areas of risk that are common to all aviation operations or large
sectors of these operations in the NAS. However, the product or service
providers are also faced with risks that are unique to their individual
situations and operational environments. Their safety management
systems, whether formally mandated in regulations or not, must develop
and implement approaches to identify hazards and control both types of
risks.
SMS is ubiquitous, it is a safety policy that brings benefits to
the aviation industry because it requires safety promotion to be put in
place and requires safety assurance measures, as well as risk
management application to succeed. While the vast majority of part 121
carriers voluntarily complied with SMS concepts, in January, FAA issued
a final rule that required all part 121 operators to develop and
implement SMS. This was done in response to Congressional direction,
and we appreciate that you agree that the concept is yielding the
desired results. As safety management systems mature and are
implemented, our reliance on sound safety analysis to identify risks to
the aviation system, mitigate hazards and track safety enhancements,
will be the core to sustaining a safe and efficient national airspace
system. This type of capability is achieved only through sustained
safety partnerships and the reporting of critical safety information
among aviation stakeholders. We must collaborate on safety analysis and
best practices, and monitor safety performance and implementation of
mitigation strategies. SMS, RBDM, and collaborative transparent
information sharing between the FAA and industry will be the
cornerstone for future FAA oversight and industry's management of the
safety risks that affect their operations.
The FAA SMS Executive Council is responsible for setting the
strategic direction for SMS implementation across the FAA. It provides
executive-level guidance for FAA SMS-related issues. The FAA SMS
Committee reports to the FAA SMS Executive Council and implements the
Executive Council's strategic direction and guidance. As key milestones
are met in the RBDM strategic initiative, the FAA SMS Executive Council
and the FAA SMS Committee will incorporate RBDM outputs into the
agency's safety management activities.
I understand that the series of hearings this Committee has been
having are in support of your drafting a bill reauthorizing FAA's
programs, which expire at the end of the Fiscal Year. I appreciate the
opportunity the FAA has been given to offer our views on the various
hearing topics. We look forward to working with your staff to provide
any assistance as you proceed to the drafting process.
This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any of your
questions at this time.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I would now like to call on the Honorable Christopher Hart,
the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board.
Mr. Hart.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. HART, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Hart. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Ayotte,
Ranking Member Cantwell, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank
you for inviting the NTSB to testify this afternoon on the
important topic of FAA reauthorization.
At the same time that we are enjoying an exemplary and
improving safety record for commercial aviation, as you've
heard from Ms. Gilligan, general aviation has not experienced
the same improvements. Through 2012, NTSB investigators
gathered facts and issued probable cause determinations in
about 1,500 general aviation accidents each year. The good news
is that, in 2013, the number was reduced to 1224 crashes. But,
221 of them were fatal and killed 387 people. Each of these
accidents is tragic, and we have a duty to learn from them to
help prevent other families from experiencing this loss.
Our 2015 Most Wanted List includes several important
priorities relating to aviation safety. These include
distraction, public helicopter operations, loss of control in
general aviation, procedural compliance, medical fitness for
duty, and ending substance impairment in transportation. Each
of these topics is discussed in more detail in my written
statement. Today I will focus, first, on the importance of
medical fitness for duty.
We have investigated accidents in every mode of
transportation that resulted from medical disorders. In
aviation, some medical conditions may result in the denial of
an Airman Medical Certificate, but many others can be treated
so that pilots can continue to fly. In order to help ensure
that disabling medical conditions can be distinguished more
reliably from those that are not, we have issued
recommendations asking for a more comprehensive medical
certification system in aviation and other modes of
transportation. In aviation, this review is conducted, in the
first instance, by a physician who is certified by the FAA to
be an Aviation Medical Examiner, or AME.
For example, we have recommended pilot screening for
obstructive sleep apnea (OSA). Experience has demonstrated that
pilots who are diagnosed with OSA and are receiving treatment
can operate safely.
Fatigue is a medical issue that can be caused by OSA or
other factors. The FAA has taken strong steps to institute
hours of service for commercial passenger pilots, but they have
not done the same for cargo pilots. Fatigue can affect
everyone, and all air operations should be treated the same,
whether carrying passengers or pallets.
Another issue that relates to our ability to learn safety
lessons from accidents and incidents is updating airplane
recorder technology. Recorders significantly enhance our
ability to determine what happened, and, from that, to make
recommendations to prevent recurrences. From the early days of
the NTSB, we have recommended that recorders be more robust
because of the lessons learned in safety investigations. And
today, more than 40 years later, we are again asking for more
improvements to recorder technology. In January, we asked the
FAA to require that commercial aircraft operating more than 50
nautical miles from shore be equipped to transmit their
location within 6 nautical miles in the event of a crash, and
to require that these aircraft be equipped with a low-frequency
location device that would transmit their underwater location
for at least 90 days. We also recommended a way to recover data
without requiring underwater retrieval, and that all these new
requirements should be harmonized internationally.
Also, accidents such as Silk Air, in 1997, Egypt Air, in
1999, and Air France, in 2009, remind us that seeing what is
happening in the cockpit would help us know more about what
caused an accident. So, the NTSB also recommended that cockpits
have image recorders to capture that information for at least 2
hours. The concern that image recorders may be abused is a
reminder of the unease from years ago that cockpit voice
recordings would be abused. But, the industry has abundantly
demonstrated its willingness and ability to use these
recordings to improve safety rather than to punish.
Finally, there has been some discussion about the NTSB
appeals process. We are committed to providing fair and speedy
hearings for individuals and entities facing FAA enforcement
actions. We have successfully implemented the changes to our
system, passed by Congress in the 2012 Pilot's Bill of Rights.
Among the changes are the removal of deference to the FAA and
the adherence by our law judges to the Federal Rules of
Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent
practicable. The safety of our airspace system depends on a
thoughtful, experienced, and timely review of the cases that
are brought before us, and I pledge to you that the NTSB will
continue to provide all of these.
This concludes my statement. I am happy to respond to your
questions. Thank you for inviting us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hart follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good afternoon Chairman Ayotte, Ranking Member Cantwell, and the
Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to testify before you today.
The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress with
investigating every civil aviation accident and significant incidents
in the United States and significant accidents and incidents in other
modes of transportation--railroad, highway, marine and pipeline. The
NTSB determines the probable cause of accidents and other
transportation events and issues safety recommendations aimed at
preventing future accidents. In addition, the NTSB carries out special
studies concerning transportation safety and coordinates the resources
of the Federal Government and other organizations to provide assistance
to victims and their family members impacted by major transportation
disasters.
Since its inception, the NTSB has investigated more than 140,500
aviation accidents and thousands of surface transportation accidents.
On call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, NTSB investigators travel
throughout the country and internationally to investigate significant
accidents and develop factual records and safety recommendations with
one aim--to ensure that such accidents never happen again. The NTSB's
annual Most Wanted List highlights safety-critical actions that the
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), United States Coast Guard,
other Federal entities, states, organizations, and others need to take
to help prevent accidents and save lives.
To date, we have issued over 14,000 safety recommendations to
nearly 2,300 recipients. Because we have no formal authority to
regulate the transportation industry, our effectiveness depends on our
reputation for conducting thorough, accurate, and independent
investigations and for producing timely, well-considered
recommendations to enhance transportation safety.
In January, the NTSB released its Most Wanted List for 2015.\1\ It
identifies our top 10 areas for transportation safety improvements.
Each year, we develop our Most Wanted List based on safety issues we
identify as a result of our accident investigations. This year our
priority areas include three multimodal items that affect aviation
safety as well as three aviation-specific issues----
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\1\ See www.ntsb.gov/mostwanted for more details.
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Preventing Loss of Control in Flight in General Aviation
Strengthening Crewmembers' Procedural Compliance
Requiring Medical Fitness for Duty
Ending Substance Impairment in Transportation
Disconnecting from Deadly Distractions
Enhancing Public Helicopter Safety
Each of these Most Wanted List issues emphasizes the need for
critical actions by the aviation safety regulator--the FAA-
manufacturers, operators, pilots, and airport authorities. The NTSB
readily acknowledges the impressive work and oversight performed by the
FAA, and its track record in ensuring that this country's aviation
system is the safest in the world. Yet, there will always be room for
improvement, and the accidents and incidents that the NTSB investigates
attest to the fact that safety improvements are still necessary to
prevent future accidents.
General Aviation Safety
The U.S. commercial aviation system is experiencing an
unprecedented level of safety. With regard to general aviation (GA)
accidents, there has been a decrease in all measures. The total number
of general aviation accidents decreased by 249 in 2013, bringing the
number to 1,222.\2\ The number of fatal accidents (221) and fatalities
(387) also declined from the previous year; however, the accident rate
per 100,000 flight hours (5.85) has remained relatively the same.
Although GA represented almost 50 percent of the estimated total flight
time of all U.S. civil aviation in 2013, it accounted for 94 percent of
fatal accidents. As required by statute, the NTSB determines the
probable cause of all aviation accidents, and one thing we have learned
is that unfortunately, the same factors continue to cause most of the
accidents.
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\2\ http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/data/SiteAssets/Pages/
Accident-data-review/2013%20
Preliminary%.
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The leading causes of GA accidents are loss of control, engine
failure, flying in conditions that are beyond the pilot or aircraft's
abilities, and collision with terrain. GA is essentially an airline of
one, which means the entire aviation community must work harder to
reach each pilot or mechanic who populates this community to address
these issues and prevent accidents. Preventing Loss of Control in
Flight in GA is on the NTSB's 2015 Most Wanted List in order to bring
attention to the issue.\3\
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\3\ http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl/Documents/
MWL_2015_Factsheet_07.pdf.
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Last month, the NTSB issued four Safety Alerts, which are included
with my testimony, and last week we issued a Video Safety Alert.\4\ The
NTSB's purpose in issuing these safety alerts and video is to increase
awareness, education, and training for private pilots and aviation
maintenance technicians. The alerts are brief information bulletins
that pinpoint particular safety hazards and offer practical remedies to
address these risks. They also serve to focus the NTSB's GA outreach
efforts during the coming year. Three of the safety alerts are geared
towards pilots and address mountain flying skills and survival
equipment considerations, transition training before flying an
unfamiliar aircraft with different flight characteristics or avionics,
and performing thorough and advanced preflight checks on aircraft that
have just received flight control or trim system maintenance. The
Safety Alert aimed at mechanics discusses flight control and trim
system misrigging problems. Each Safety Alert includes accident
summaries from some of our accident investigations and the role the
safety issue played in those accidents. The Video Safety Alert titled,
Airplane Misrigging: Lessons Learned from a Close Call, highlights an
inflight emergency that occurred near St. Louis in December 2014. The
video features interviews with the two pilots who experienced reversed
trim system control in a Cessna T182T and the mechanic who performed
the maintenance. Both the pilots and the mechanic provide important
insight to help other pilots and mechanics avoid becoming involved in a
similar situation. I'm pleased to report that within the first 24-hours
after we posted the video on the NTSB public website, the video
received over 44,000 separate ``hits.'' The Safety Alerts and video
provide general guidance on how to apply the lessons learned from
accidents and incidents and provide pilots and mechanics with free
educational resources to learn more about prevention strategies.
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\4\ Mastering Mountain Flying, SA-039; Understanding Flight
Experience, SA-040; Pilots: Perform Advanced Preflight After
Maintenance, SA-041; and Mechanics: Prevent Misrigging Mistakes, SA-
042.
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Additionally, over the past five years, the NTSB has conducted
several GA safety studies. In 2014, we examined the prevalence of drug
use by all pilots who died in crashes and found an upward trend in the
use of both potentially impairing medications and illicit drugs.\5\
Almost all of the crashes--96 percent--were in general aviation. I will
discuss this study in more detail later. Last year, NTSB also issued a
Special Investigation Report on the Safety of Agricultural Aircraft
Operations.\6\ As a result of the safety issues identified in the
study, the NTSB issued safety recommendations to the FAA and the
National Agricultural Aviation Research & Education Foundation urging
the two organizations to work together to develop and distribute
agricultural operations-specific guidance on fatigue management, risk
management, aircraft maintenance, and pilot knowledge and skills tests.
In 2012, we examined the safety of experimental amateur-built aircraft,
which represent about 10 percent of the GA fleet but are involved in a
higher proportion of GA accidents.\7\ The NTSB recommended expansion of
documentation requirements for initial aircraft airworthiness
certification, verification of the completion of Phase I flight
testing, improvement of pilots' access to transition training,
encouragement of the use of recorded data during flight testing,
ensuring that buyers of used experimental aircraft receive necessary
operating and performance documentation, and improvement of aircraft
identification in registry records. In a study of airbag restraints in
GA aircraft, the NTSB concluded that aviation airbags can mitigate
occupant injuries in some severe but survivable crashes.\8\ In 2010,
the NTSB looked at ``glass cockpits'' in GA, which are the newer
electronic displays in some planes.\9\ The results of this study
suggested at the time that the introduction of glass cockpits had not
yet resulted in a measurable improvement in safety when compared to
similar aircraft with conventional instruments. There is a need to
ensure pilots have system specific knowledge to safely operate aircraft
with glass cockpit avionics and to capture maintenance and operational
information to assess the reliability of glass cockpit avionics.
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\5\ NTSB, Drug Use Trends in Aviation: Assessing the Risk of Pilot
Impairment, No. NTSB/SS-14/01 (September 9, 2014).
\6\ NTSB, Special Investigation Report on the Safety of
Agricultural Aircraft Operations, No. NTSB/SIR-14/01 (May 7, 2014).
\7\ NTSB, The Safety of Experimental Amateur-Built Aircraft, No.
NTSB/SS-12/01 (May 22, 2012).
\8\ NTSB, Airbag Performance in General Aviation Restraint Systems,
No. NTSB/SS-11/01 (January 11, 2011).
\9\ NTSB, Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics into Light
Aircraft, No. NTSB/SS-10/01 (March 9, 2010).
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We will continue our efforts to improve the safety record of
general aviation, and we look forward to finding new and innovative
ways to communicate this message to more pilots and mechanics.
Strengthening Procedural Compliance
The NTSB continues to seek new ways to strengthen procedural
compliance, from identifying inadequate procedures, to ensuring
comprehensive training, to reemphasizing practices that reinforce crew
compliance. Recent accidents underscore the importance of procedural
compliance. In 2013 there were two major controlled flight into terrain
accidents in which crews did not follow standard operating procedures--
Asiana flight 214 in San Francisco, California, and UPS flight 1354 in
Birmingham, Alabama. The NTSB is examining whether procedural
compliance may have played a role in a number of other ongoing air
carrier accident and incident investigations as well. Over the last 10
years, the NTSB has investigated more than a dozen airline or
commercial charter accidents involving procedural, training or
compliance issues.
Sometimes crews do not comply with air carriers' standard operating
procedures, such as flying stabilized approaches, making required
callouts, maintaining quiet (or sterile) cockpits, and monitoring
critical flight parameters like airspeed. But other times, the
procedures themselves aren't good enough. For example, an airplane ran
off the end of the runway in a case in which an airline did not require
crews to calculate landing distance on arrival.\10\ This is only one of
many such cases. In other cases, training does not adequately prepare
crews.\11\
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\10\ NTSB, Runway Overrun and Collision Southwest Airlines Flight
1248, Boeing 737-7H4, N471WN, Chicago Midway International Airport,
Chicago, Illinois on December 8, 2005, Rpt. No. AAR-07-06 (October 2,
2007).
\11\ See e.g., NTSB, Runway Overrun During Rejected Takeoff, Global
Exec Aviation,Bombardier Learjet 60, N999LJ, Columbia, South Carolina
on September 19, 2008, Rpt. No. AAR-10-02 (April 6, 2010); NTSB, Loss
of Control and Crash, Marlin Air, Cessna Citation 550, N550BP,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin on June 4, 2007, Rpt. No. 09-06 (October 14,
2009).
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Aviation accidents and incidents can be prevented through
collaborative efforts by crews, operators, and regulators. Working
together, they can develop effective procedures and training, and
ensure that crews do what they are trained to do. I am a strong
believer in the power of collaboration to produce continuous
improvement because of the amazing safety improvement that this
industry has enjoyed as a result of its collaborative process known as
CAST, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team. The core of the CAST process
is very simple: everyone who is involved with this issue--in this case,
further reducing the risk of aviation fatalities and improving a safety
record that is already very good--should be involved in developing the
solution, including industry, organizations representing employees, and
government agencies. This model has more recently been extended to the
general aviation community through the General Aviation Joint Steering
Committee (GAJSC) which uses the CAST processes to improve GA safety
through data-driven risk reduction efforts that focus on education and
training. Similarly, GAJSC participants include the FAA and industry
stakeholders such as pilot organizations, instructors, mechanics,
builders and manufacturers. Collective and collaborative leadership is
needed to promote and reinforce a culture of continuous safety
improvement beyond mere compliance--a culture essential to safety.
Pilot Training and Professionalism and Disconnecting from Distractions
Colgan Air flight 3407 crashed on approach to the Buffalo Niagara
International Airport in Buffalo, NY on February 12, 2009.\12\ As a
result of that accident investigation, the NTSB issued recommendations
to address pilot and crew training, maintaining detailed training
records, making this information available to other airlines that are
considering hiring a pilot, and mentoring and professionalism
programs.\13\ Congress enacted some of these recommendations into law
in the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act
of 2010 (the 2010 Act), such as the requirement that FAA create a new
centralized database of FAA and air carrier pilot records that are
retained for the life of a pilot and that airlines review those records
during the hiring process.\14\ These recommendations \15\ remain open
as the FAA works to develop a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to
create a pilot records database (PRD), and we will determine if the
rulemaking meets the intent of the recommendations. While some of the
NTSB's recommendations have been or are being addressed by FAA, other
recommendations concerning pilot leadership training and
professionalism remain open with unacceptable responses.\16\ Also, in
the Colgan Air flight 3407 accident investigation, we found that
industry changes, including two-pilot cockpits, had resulted in
opportunities for pilots to upgrade to captain without having
accumulated significant experience as a first officer in a Part 121
operation. Without important opportunities for mentoring and
observational learning, which characterize time spent in journeyman
pilot positions, it was difficult for a pilot to acquire effective
leadership skills to manage a multicrew airplane.
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\12\ NTSB, Loss of Control on Approach: Colgan Air, Inc. Operating
as Continental Connection Flight 3407, Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ,
Clarence Center, New York on February 12, 2009, Rpt. No. AAR-10-01
(February 2, 2010).
\13\ A-10-10 through -34; reiterated recommendations A-05-1, A-05-
14, and A-07-13.
\14\ Pub. L. 111-216, August 1, 2010.
\15\ A-10-17 through -20.
\16\ Recommendations A-10-10, -16, and -30 have been closed with
unacceptable action. Recommendations A-10-13, -14, -15, and -22 remain
open with unacceptable responses.
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The 2010 Act included a mandate for the FAA to develop regulations
to encourage and promote airline flight crew professionalism and
mentoring. The FAA developed an NPRM and submitted it to the Office of
Management and Budget in May 2011. Three years later, in April 2014,
the NPRM was returned to the FAA for revisions. As of today, despite
the 2010 Act, the NPRM has not yet been published.
In addition to Colgan Air, we have seen other accidents and
incidents that are tragic reminders that more needs to be done to
improve aviation safety. As we have learned through our accident
investigations, when flight crews and controllers deviate from standard
operating procedures and established best practices, the consequences
can be tragic.
In the March 15, 2012, fatal crash following an in-flight
fire involving a Convair CV-440-38, N153JR, operated by Fresh
Air, Inc, the flight crew's failure to maintain adequate
airspeed after shutting down the right engine due to an in-
flight fire resulted in either an aerodynamic stall or a loss
of directional control.\17\
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\17\ NTSB, Crash Following In-Flight Fire Fresh Air, Inc. Convair
CV-440-38, N153JR, San Juan, Puerto Rico on March 15, 2012, Rpt. No.
AAR-14-04 (November 17, 2014).
In the July 31, 2008, accident involving East Coast Jets
flight 81, a Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 125-800A, N818MV,
crashed while attempting to go around after landing on runway
30 at Owatonna Degner Regional Airport, Owatonna, Minnesota.
The two pilots and six passengers were killed, and the airplane
was destroyed by impact forces. The captain allowed an
atmosphere in the cockpit that did not comply with well-
established procedures, and this atmosphere permitted
inadequate briefing of the approach and monitoring of the
current weather conditions; inappropriate conversation;
nonstandard terminology; and a lack of checklist discipline
throughout the descent and approach phases of the flight.\18\
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\18\ NTSB, Crash During Attempted Go-Around After Landing, East
Coast Jets Flight 81, Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 125-800A, N818MV,
Owatonna, Minnesota on July 31, 2008 7, Rpt. No. AAR-11-01 (March 15,
2011).
An engine fire on an American Airlines MD-80 in 2007
involved a crew engaged in non-pertinent discussion during taxi
and after landing ``indicating that a casual atmosphere existed
in the cockpit.'' This casual atmosphere ``before takeoff
affected and set a precedent for the pilots' responses to the
situations in flight and after landing, eroding the margins of
safety provided by the SOPs and checklists, and increased the
risk to passengers and crews.'' \19\
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\19\ NTSB, In-Flight Left Engine Fire American Airlines Flight
1400, McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, N454AA, St. Louis, Missouri on
September 28, 2007, Rpt. No. AAR-09-03 (April 7, 2009).
In the 2006 fatal wrong runway takeoff accident in
Lexington, KY, involving Comair, it was ``the flight crew's
noncompliance with standard operating procedures [which] . . .
most likely created an atmosphere in the cockpit that enabled
the crew's errors.'' Contributing to the probable cause was
``the flight crew's non-pertinent conversation during taxi,
which resulted in a loss of positional awareness.'' \20\
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\20\ NTSB, Attempted Takeoff From Wrong Runway, Comair Flight 5191
Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N431CA, Lexington, Kentucky on August 27, 2006,
Rpt. No. AAR-07-05 (July 26, 2007).
Another concern for the NTSB is the mode confusion that can result
from increasing automation. A classic accident of this type was the
crash of Asiana Airlines flight 214 in 2013 when it struck a seawall
while on approach to San Francisco International Airport.\21\ The
pilots relied too much on automation that they didn't fully understand
and mismanaged the landing as it went wrong. As the airplane reached
500 feet above the airport elevation, the approach was not stabilized
as the airplane was slightly above the desired glidepath. The descent
rate was too high, and the airspeed was decreasing. Based on these
indications, the flight crew should have determined that the approach
was unstabilized and initiated a go-around, but they did not do so. The
crew did not become aware of the problem until the airplane reached 200
feet, and did not initiate a go-around until the airplane was below 100
feet, at which point the airplane did not have the performance
capability to accomplish a go-around. The flight crew's insufficient
monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted in part
from over reliance on automation. Unfortunately, this manifests a
problem that is industry-wide, and not just limited to these pilots
having a bad day. The bottom line is that automation is very
beneficial, and it has a demonstrated history of improving safety,
reliability, and productivity. Unfortunately, however, the industry
still has a way to go to achieve a better understanding of the human/
automation interface.
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\21\ NTSB, Descent Below Visual Glidepath and Impact With Seawall,
Asiana Airlines Flight 214 Boeing 777-200ER, HL7742, San Francisco,
California on July 6, 2013, Rpt. No. AAR-14-01 (June 24, 2014).
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Last but not least, while new connectivity has enabled new safety
technologies, it has also enabled new forms of distraction, leading to
accidents, even in the most strictly regulated transportation
enterprise of aviation. As a result of the NTSB's investigation of both
Northwest Flight 188 that overflew its Minneapolis destination because
the pilot and co-pilot were distracted by their laptops and Colgan Air
Flight 3407, where the first officer sent a text message on her
personal cell phone during the taxi phase of the accident flight, we
issued a safety recommendation to the FAA to amend the Federal Aviation
Regulations (FAR) to require Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators
to incorporate explicit guidance to pilots prohibiting the use of
personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck.\22\ In
addition, Congress mandated that the FAA promulgate a rule which would
prohibit the use of personal wireless communications devices and laptop
computers by flight crewmembers during all phases of flight in Part 121
operations. The FAA issued an NPRM for this requirement in January
2013.\23\ The NTSB submitted comments to the docket in support of the
proposed rule but recommended that the final rule incorporate the
broader scope of its February 2010 safety recommendation by expanding
the proposed rule to Part 135 and 91 subpart K operators. The final
rule, published in February 2014,\24\ limited the prohibition to flight
crew members in operations under Part 121. While the final rule is a
step in the right direction, it is not enough and more needs to be done
to expand the applicability of the rule to Part 135 and 91 subpart K
operators. Accidents like that on August 26, 2011, near Mosby,
Missouri, involving an Emergency Medical Service helicopter and a
distracted pilot drive this fact home. All on board that helicopter
were killed in the accident.\25\
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\22\ A-10-30.
\23\ 78 Fed. Reg. 2912 (January 15, 2013).
\24\ 79 Fed. Reg. 8257 (February 12, 2014).
\25\ NTSB, Crash Following Loss of Engine Power Due to Fuel
Exhaustion Air Methods Corporation Eurocopter AS350 B2, N352LN, Near
Mosby, Missouri, August 26, 2011, Rpt. No. AAR-13-02 (April 9, 2013).
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Requiring Fitness for Duty, Ending Substance Impairment, and Addressing
Human Fatigue
Requiring Medical Fitness for Duty is on the NTSB's 2015 Most
Wanted List in order to bring attention to this critical issue in all
modes of transportation.\26\ Medical conditions and treatments that
impair transportation professionals' performance directly affect
safety. To mitigate the risk to the public, the NTSB has made
recommendations for a comprehensive medical certification system for
safety-critical transportation personnel, including these features:
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\26\ http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl/Documents/
MWL_2015_Factsheet_08.pdf.
a complete medical history of the applicant, taken at
prescribed intervals, that includes medications, conditions,
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and treatments as well as a physical examination
specific historical questions and physical examination
procedures to identify applicants at high risk for sleep
disorders
identification of specific conditions, treatments, and
medications that initially disqualify applicants for duty, with
certification contingent on further testing (specific to each
condition)
explicit and uniform processes and criteria for determining
when the applicant has a treated but otherwise disqualifying
condition
certificates that are good only for a limited time for
applicants with conditions that are currently stable but known
to be likely to deteriorate, to ensure appropriate retesting
medical examiners who
are licensed or registered to both perform
examinations and prescribe medication in a given state;
are specifically trained and certified to perform
medical certification exams; and
have ready access to information regarding
disqualifying conditions and required further evaluation
a review system for medical examiners' work product(s) with
both the information and capacity to identify and correct
errors and substandard performance
the capacity to prevent applicants who have been deferred or
denied certification from finding another provider who will
certify them
a process for dealing with conditions which could impair
safety and are diagnosed between certification exams.
The medical requirements for pilots are robust. These standards are
important because of the impact that accidents can have on public
safety and passengers, and we find in all modes that adverse health
conditions can lead to accidents. Some pilots are not medically fit to
operate aircraft, and those suffering from impairing medical disorders
should not be at the controls unless and until they receive medical
treatment that mitigates the risk to the public.
In addition, NTSB investigations have found impairment by various
substances as a cause or a contributing factor in transportation
accidents, and use of over-the-counter (OTC) and prescription
medications as well as illicit drugs is generally increasing. Since
there is a great amount of overlap among these groups--the same
substance may be available by prescription or over the counter and many
medications are also used illicitly by people without a prescription
for their psychoactive effects--I will use the term ``drugs'' broadly
to mean any of these substances. Aircraft are complex machinery that
require pilots to be at their best--not impaired by alcohol or drugs.
In September 2014, the NTSB issued a safety study that examined trends
in the prevalence of drugs identified by toxicology testing of fatally
injured pilots between 1990 and 2012.\27\ The goals of the study were
to describe the prevalence of OTC, prescription, and illicit drug usage
among fatally injured pilots over time and evaluate the need for safety
improvements related to pilots' use of drugs. Study results showed the
prevalence of potentially impairing drugs increased from an average of
11 percent of fatally-injured accident pilots during the period from
1990-1997 to an average of 23 percent of accident pilots during the
period 2008-2012. During the same time periods, positive marijuana
results increased from 1.6 percent to 3.0 percent. But the most
commonly found impairing substance in fatal crashes was
diphenhydramine, a sedating antihistamine and an active ingredient in
many OTC allergy formulations, cold medicines, and sleep aids. Of note,
96 percent of the pilots in this study were flying in general aviation
operations when their fatal accident occurred.
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\27\ NTSB, Drug Use Trends in Aviation: Assessing the Risk of Pilot
Impairment, No. NTSB/SS-14/01 (September 9, 2014).
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As a result of this safety study, the NTSB recommended that FAA:
(1) develop, publicize, and periodically update information to educate
pilots about the potentially impairing drugs identified in FAA
toxicology test results of fatally injured pilots, and make pilots
aware of less impairing alternative drugs if they are available; (2)
obtain information about the number and flight hours of pilots flying
without medical certificates because the FAA identifies ``active
pilots'' as those who maintain their medical certification; (3) develop
and distribute a clear policy regarding any marijuana use by airmen
regardless of the type of flight; and (4) conduct a study to assess the
prevalence of OTC, prescription, and illicit drug use among flying
pilots not involved in accidents, and compare those results with
findings from pilots who have died from aviation accidents to assess
the safety risks of using those drugs while flying.\28\ In addition,
the NTSB recommended that the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: (1) include in all state guidelines
regarding prescribing controlled substances for pain a recommendation
that health care providers discuss with patients the effect their
medical condition and medication use may have on their ability to
safely operate a vehicle in any mode of transportation and (2) enhance
communication among prescribers, pharmacists, and patients about the
transportation safety risks associated with some drugs and medical
conditions.\29\
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\28\ A-14-92 through -95.
\29\ I-14-1 and -2.
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In addition, fatigue remains an issue of concern. For more than 20
years, the issue of reducing accidents caused by fatigue was on the
NTSB's Most Wanted List of safety improvements. Since 1972, the NTSB
has issued more than 200 human fatigue-related safety recommendations
in all modes of transportation, including more than 53 recommendations
addressing fatigue in aviation.\30\ For example, we have recommended
that all pilots be appropriately evaluated for obstructive sleep apnea
and treated, if necessary.
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\30\ See, e.g., A-06-10, A-08-44, and A-09-61 through -66.
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We removed fatigue from our Most Wanted List in November 2012 to
acknowledge the new flight and duty time rules for commercial passenger
operations promulgated by the FAA. For the first time, the new rules
recognize the universal factors that lead to human fatigue such as time
of day, length of duty day, workload, whether an individual is
acclimated to a new time zone and the likelihood of being able to sleep
under different circumstances. However, flight and duty time rules
cannot control what employees do on their own time. In addition, we
remain concerned that the new rule does not apply to cargo pilots, nor
to Part 135 operations. Fatigue is fatigue, whether passengers or
pallets are being transported; it degrades every aspect of human
capability. Another fatigue issue not addressed by the new rules is
pilot commuting; a concern the NTSB identified in the Colgan Air
accident. We have seen the effects of fatigue in too many of our
accident investigations. We will continue working toward one level of
safety throughout the industry.
Enhancing Public Helicopter Safety
On September 27, 2008, a Maryland State Police (MSP) helicopter,
Trooper 2, received a medevac flight request to pick up two patients
involved in an automobile accident. Trooper 2 reached the accident
site, loaded the patients, but never reached the hospital. On June 9,
2009, a New Mexico State Police (NMSP) helicopter pilot received a
request for an aerial search for a lost hiker. The NMSP pilot landed
the helicopter, located the hiker, departed from the mountain, but did
not make it back to base. A very similar situation occurred on March
30, 2013. The Alaska Department of Public Safety (ADPS) helicopter
pilot received a request to rescue a stranded snowmobiler. The pilot
landed the helicopter, located the snowmobiler, departed from the
frozen lake, but did not reach the designated landing zone. Prior to
accepting their missions, both the MSP and NMSP pilots expressed
concern about weather conditions. Although the pilot of the ADPS
helicopter did not discuss the weather with anyone, he should have been
aware of the deteriorating conditions. However, all three pilots
accepted and attempted to complete the missions even when faced with
poor weather at night. And tragically, the helicopters crashed before
reaching their destinations, killing a total of nine people. Crashes
involving public helicopters are not just limited to those used by law
enforcement agencies. On August 5, 2008, a U.S. Forest Service (USFS)
helicopter conducting firefighting missions in California impacted
trees and terrain during the initial climb after takeoff. The pilot,
the safety crewmember and seven firefighters were killed in this
accident.
As a result of the 2008 USFS accident in California, the NTSB
recommended that FAA develop and implement a surveillance program
specifically for Part 135 civil aircraft operators that provides
contract support to government entities in order to maintain continual
oversight to ensure compliance with Part 135 requirements.\31\ The NTSB
also recommended the FAA take appropriate actions to clarify FAA's
authority over public aircraft and identify and document where such
oversight responsibilities reside in the absence of FAA authority.\32\
In 2014, the FAA published an Advisory Circular \33\ which sought to
clarify oversight responsibilities for civil aircraft operators
providing contract support to government entities, as recommended.
However, the Advisory Circular does not provide for continual FAA
oversight of the airworthiness of aircraft that hold civil
airworthiness certificates and that operate part of the time as public
aircraft and part of the time as civil aircraft--a position that is
contrary to current guidance in FAA Order 8900.1. We strongly encourage
FAA to revise the Advisory Circular to provide for this oversight.
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\31\ A-10-149.
\32\ A-10-150.
\33\ FAA, Advisory Circular 00-1.1A: Public Aircraft Operations
(February 12, 2014).
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Since 2004, the NTSB has investigated more than 130 accidents
involving federal, state, and local public helicopter operations,
including the 4 mentioned above. Fifty people lost their lives and
nearly 40 were seriously injured in these accidents. The lessons
learned as a result of these investigations have the potential to make
federal, state, and local public helicopter operations safer.
Aircraft Recorder Recommendations
Notwithstanding the NTSB's nearly 50 years of aviation accident
investigations and role in securing improvements in recorder
capabilities and locator technologies, the NTSB clearly recognizes that
sophisticated aircraft accident investigation and analysis cannot be
accomplished without recorded flight data. In order for our important
work to continue and make a difference in saving lives, we must ensure
that the technologies are available to locate aircraft wreckage and
recorders after an accident and that critical flight data can be
recovered.
The NTSB has long been concerned about rapid recovery of recorded
information to guide investigations, help determine accident causes,
and develop recommendations to prevent recurrences. To focus attention
on this issue, the NTSB convened its Emerging Flight Data and Locator
Technology Forum on October 7, 2014, in Washington, D.C.\34\ Forum
discussions among government, industry, and investigative experts
helped identify the following safety issues:
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\34\ Additional information about the forum is available at http://
www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/2014_Flight_Data_Locator_FRM.aspx.
The need for improved technologies to locate aircraft
wreckage and flight recorders following an accident in a remote
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location or over water
The need for timely recovery of critical flight data
following an accident in a remote location or over water
Other noteworthy information provided at the forum includes the
following:
Deployable recorder technologies: These technologies can be
used to recover flight data without the delay of a long and
expensive underwater recovery. Deployable recorders have been
used in military and over water helicopter applications since
the 1960s and are currently available from several
manufacturers. They combine traditional flight data recorder
and cockpit voice recorder functions into one unit and are
capable of providing a comparable amount of flight data. They
are designed to separate from the aircraft upon fuselage
structural deformation or when submersed in water. If in water,
they float indefinitely on the surface. These units are also
equipped with emergency locator transmitters that operate on
the 121.5 megahertz and 406 megahertz frequencies for location
and recovery. Standards already exist for automatically
deploying flight recorders.
Triggered flight data transmission: A manufacturer of flight
data transmission technology testified that triggered flight
data transmission was not only feasible, but already in service
on some aircraft. Additionally, at this time, manufacturers and
operators are equipping their aircraft with commercial
satellite communications systems that can support broadband
video, voice, and data transmissions. Commercial satellite
systems on the market today are primarily used for passenger
and crew connectivity and can support speeds of 200-400
kilobits per second. Higher speed capability is forthcoming.
Such bandwidth would enable real-time parametric flight data
transmission to begin after a triggering event as well as
transmission of a limited amount of stored flight data recorded
before the triggering event.
On January 22, 2015, the NTSB issued a series of safety
recommendations to the FAA \35\ calling for improvements in locating
downed aircraft and ways to obtain critical flight data faster and
without the need for immediate underwater retrieval. In issuing its
recommendations, the NTSB recognized that there are significant ongoing
international industry and regulatory efforts to develop and adopt
standards for enhanced aircraft position reporting and supplemental
methods for recovering flight data. Achieving these goals on a global
basis will demand a harmonized approach that addresses the needs of
many stakeholders and ensures that domestic and foreign parties operate
under equivalent standards. We also strongly support the need for
performance-based standards for emerging technologies and data
recovery. We applaud Ambassador Lawson and the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) for their continued important work in
addressing these issues.
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\35\ A-15-1 through -6.
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The NTSB recommendations urge the FAA to:
Require that all aircraft used in extended overwater
operations (i.e., operations that occur over water at a
distance of more than 50 nm from the nearest shoreline) and
operating under Part 121 or Part 135 of the FAR that are
required to have a flight data recorder and cockpit voice
recorder be equipped with
a tamper-resistant method to broadcast to a ground
station sufficient information to establish the location
where an aircraft terminates flight as the result of an
accident within 6 nautical miles of the point of impact,
and
an airframe low frequency underwater locating device
that will function for at least 90 days and that can be
detected by equipment available on military, search and
rescue, and salvage assets commonly used to search for and
recover wreckage.
Require that all newly manufactured aircraft used in
extended overwater operations and operating under Part 121 or
Part 135 of the FAR that are required to have a flight data
recorder and cockpit voice recorder be equipped with a means to
recover, at a minimum, mandatory flight data parameters; the
means of recovery should not require underwater retrieval. Data
should be captured from a triggering event until the end of the
flight and for as long a time period before the triggering
event as possible.
Coordinate with other international regulatory authorities
and ICAO to harmonize the implementation of the above-
identified requirements recommended by the NTSB for locating
where an aircraft terminates flight as the result of an
accident and recovery of mandatory flight data parameters.
Identify ways to incorporate adequate protections against
disabling flight recorder systems on all existing transport
category aircraft.
Require that all newly manufactured transport category
aircraft incorporate adequate protections against disabling
flight recorder systems.
In addition, the NTSB has continued to re-emphasize the need for
cockpit image recorders on commercial airplanes. In 2000, the NTSB
issued two safety recommendations to the FAA on cockpit image recording
systems and protection against deactivation of recording systems in
response to investigations of several accidents involving a lack of
information regarding crewmember actions and the flight deck
environment, including ValuJet Flight 592, SilkAir Flight 185, Swissair
Flight 111, and EgyptAir Flight 990. One recommendation \36\ asked the
FAA to require that that in-service aircraft operated under 14 CFR Part
121, 125, or 135 be equipped with a crash-protected cockpit image
recording system. The second recommendation \37\ asked for similar
action for newly manufactured aircraft that would be operated under 14
CFR Part 121, 125, or 135. Both recommendations also asked that the FAA
require placing recorder system circuit breakers in locations the
flight crew could not access in-flight.
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\36\ A-00-30. In 2006, the NTSB reiterated A-00-30 as a result of
its investigation of a 2004 accident involving Corporate Airlines
Flight 5966, a BAE-J3201 aircraft, in Kirksville, Missouri.
\37\ A-00-31.
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In the SilkAir and EgyptAir crashes, the flight data recorder and
cockpit voice recordings provided limited information about crew
actions and the status of the cockpit environment. Further, in the Air
France Flight 447 crash and the September 3, 2010, crash of a Boeing
747-44AF, operated by United Parcel Service while attempting to return
to Dubai International Airport following an in-flight cargo fire, the
accident aircraft were equipped with FDRs that greatly exceeded the
minimum parameter requirements. However, in these accidents, critical
information related to the cockpit environment conditions (for example,
crew actions and visibility), instrument indications available to
crewmembers, and the degradation of aircraft systems was not available
to investigators. Modern cockpit imaging systems can provide the
information needed to help determine the cause of these types of
accidents and to identify revisions needed to prevent a reoccurrence of
the accident.
Air Transportation of Lithium Batteries
There are two types of lithium batteries: primary and secondary.
Primary lithium batteries are non-rechargeable and are commonly used in
items such as watches and pocket calculators. They contain metallic
lithium that is sealed in a metal casing. The metallic lithium will
burn when exposed to air if the metal casing is damaged, compromised,
or exposed to sustained heating. Secondary lithium batteries, also
known as lithium-ion batteries, are rechargeable and are commonly used
in items such as cameras, cell phones, laptop computers, and hand power
tools. Secondary lithium batteries contain electrically charged lithium
ions, and a flammable liquid electrolyte. External damage or
overheating of the battery can result in thermal runaway or the
discharge of flammable electrolyte. Another type of secondary battery,
known as lithium polymer batteries, contains a flammable polymeric
material rather than a liquid, as the electrolyte. Halon suppression
systems, the only fire suppression systems certified for aviation, can
be used to help control flames in lithium battery fires but will not
extinguish the fire.
The demand for primary and secondary lithium batteries has
skyrocketed since the mid-1990s as the popularity and use of electronic
equipment of all types has grown. As the use of lithium batteries has
increased, the number of incidents involving fires or overheating of
lithium batteries, particularly in aviation, has likewise grown. The
NTSB has investigated three such aviation accidents: Los Angeles,
California (1999); Memphis, Tennessee (2004); and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (2006). In addition, the NTSB has participated in the
investigations of two accidents involving fires that may be related to
lithium batteries that occurred on cargo airline flights operating in
foreign countries: Dubai, United Arab Emirates (2010), and Jeju Island,
Republic of Korea (2011).
The fires in these accidents included both primary and secondary
lithium batteries, and the NTSB issued several recommendations as a
result of these investigations. As a result of its investigation of the
Los Angeles and Memphis incidents, the NTSB recommended that the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), with
the FAA, evaluate the fire hazards posed by lithium batteries in an
aviation environment and require that appropriate safety measures be
taken to protect the aircraft and occupants. The NTSB also recommended
that packages containing lithium batteries be identified as hazardous
materials, including appropriate labeling of the packages and proper
identification in shipping documents when transported on aircraft.
These recommendations have been closed with acceptable action by the
regulators.
Following the Philadelphia accident, the NTSB issued six safety
recommendations urging PHMSA to address the problems with lithium
batteries on a number of fronts, including reporting all incidents;
retaining and analyzing failed batteries; researching the modes of
failure; and eliminating regulatory provisions that permit limited
quantities of these batteries to be transported without labeling,
marking, or packaging them as hazardous materials. In January 2008, the
NTSB issued additional recommendations to PHMSA and the FAA to address
the NTSB's concerns about the lack of public awareness about the
overheating and ignition of lithium batteries. PHMSA issued an NPRM
\38\ in January 2010 to address some of these recommendations, and the
final rule was issued in August 2014.\39\ The final rule is discussed
in further detail below.
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\38\ 75 Fed. Reg. 1302 (January 11, 2010).
\39\ 79 Fed. Reg. 46012 (August 6, 2014).
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In September 2010, a Boeing 747-400F, operated by UPS, crashed on a
military base in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), while the crew was
trying to return to the airport for an emergency landing due to a fire
in the main deck cargo compartment. Both crewmembers died as a result
of injuries sustained during the crash, and the aircraft was a total
loss. The UAE led this investigation,\40\ and issued a final report on
July 24, 2013.\41\ The report found that at least three shipments of
lithium ion battery packs that meet Class 9 hazardous material
designation were onboard. In addition, in July 2011, a Boeing 747-400F,
operated by Asiana Cargo and transporting a large quantity of lithium
batteries, crashed about 70 miles west of Jeju Island, Republic of
Korea, after the flight crew declared an emergency due to a cargo fire
and attempted to divert to Jeju International Airport. Again, both
crewmembers died as result of injuries sustained during the crash, and
the aircraft was a total loss.
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\40\ Foreign investigative entities have authority equivalent to
the NTSB under ICAO Annex 13. For this accident, in particular, the
NTSB has been involved as the accredited representative as the State of
Operator, Registration, and Manufacturer. The operator, manufacturers,
and regulator (FAA) are technical advisors to the NTSB accredited
representative. The NTSB plans to issue recommendations based on the
findings of the UAE investigation.
\41\ General Civil Aviation Authority of the United Arab Emirates,
Uncontained Cargo Fire Leading to Loss of Control Inflight and
Uncontrolled Descent into Terrain, (July 24, 2013). Available at http:/
/www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/admin/iradmin/Lists/Incidents%20Inves
tigation%20Reports/Attachments/40/2010-
2010%20%20Final%20Report%20%20Boeing%20747-
44AF%20%20N571UP%20%20Report%2013%202010.pdf
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The NTSB held a public forum in April 2013 on lithium ion batteries
in transportation.\42\ We learned that lithium ion batteries are
becoming more prevalent in the various transportation modes, national
defense, and space exploration. Panelists stated that because of their
high energy density and light weight, these batteries are natural
choices for energy. These benefits, however, also are the source of
safety risks. We also heard about manufacturing auditing, robust
testing, and monitoring and protection mechanisms to prevent a
catastrophic event.
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\42\ Additional information about the forum is available at http://
www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/2013_Lithium_Batteries_FRM.aspx.
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When Congress enacted the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012,
it included a provision (section 828) that U.S. hazardous materials
regulations (HMR) on the air transportation of lithium metal cells or
batteries or lithium ion cells or batteries could not exceed the ICAO
Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by
Air. Consequently, in January 2013, PHMSA published an NPRM stating
that it was considering harmonizing requirements in the HMR on the
transportation of lithium batteries with changes adopted in the 2013-
2014 ICAO Technical Instructions and requested additional comments on
(1) the effect of those changes, (2) whether to require compliance with
the ICAO Technical Instructions for all shipments by air, both domestic
and international, and (3) the impacts if PHMSA failed to adopt
specific provisions in the ICAO Technical Instructions into the
HMR.\43\ In the NTSB's comments on the NPRM, we noted the disparity
between requirements in the HMR, which had weaker standards at the
time, and the ICAO Technical Instructions. We explained that failure to
require domestic shipments of lithium batteries to comply with
regulations equivalent to the ICAO Technical Instructions would place
the United States in an inexplicable position of having weaker safety
standards at a time when it should be leading the way in response to
serious safety concerns about transporting these materials. PHMSA's
final rule harmonized the HMR with the ICAO Technical Instructions as
well as with applicable provisions of the United Nations Model
Regulations and the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG)
Code.\44\
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\43\ 78 Fed. Reg. 1119 (January 7, 2013).
\44\ 79 Fed. Reg. 46012 (August 6, 2014).
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The NTSB notes the DOT has for some years worked to ensure that the
HMR are compatible with international standards and, accordingly, has
been very active in the development of international standards for the
transportation of hazardous materials. However, the DOT has never
relinquished its rulemaking authority to an international body. The
NTSB concurs with that position and firmly believes the DOT should
implement more stringent standards in U.S. regulations if deemed
necessary.
Update on Crash of Scaled Composites' SpaceShip Two
On October 31, 2014, Scaled Composites' SpaceShip Two crashed in
the Mojave Desert during a test flight. The NTSB launched a go team
under our authority to investigate the accident. This is not the first
commercial space investigation the NTSB has conducted, and we believe
there are important safety lessons to learn as a result of this
investigation. Our final report, which we expect to release later this
summer, will cover topics such as human factors, vehicle systems, and
operations. We will inform Congress and the public of our findings when
the investigation is completed.
Closing
Madame Chairman, the NTSB has a long record of support for
improving aviation safety. As you know, our mission is to promote
safety, and the implementation of our recommendations in these areas
would help promote and improve safety.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look
forward to responding to your questions.
______
NTSB Safety Alert, National Transportation Safety Board
Mechanics: Prevent Misrigging Mistakes
Verify correct directional travel of controls and trim
The problem
Incorrect rigging of flight control and trim systems has led
to in-flight emergencies, accidents, and even deaths.
Four such mishaps within a 2-year span share common safety
issues:
Maintenance personnel who serviced or checked the
systems did not recognize that the control or trim surfaces
were moving in the wrong direction.
Pilots who flew the airplanes did not notice the
control anomalies during their preflight checks.
Anyone can make mistakes. In some cases, the mechanics who
performed the work incorrectly were highly experienced.
Related incident and accidents:
In December 2014, the pilot of a Cessna T182T airplane
experienced extreme nose-down control forces on the yoke
shortly after takeoff. The airplane had just undergone
maintenance on the elevator trim system, and the mechanic
briefed the pilot about the work before the flight. Both the
pilot and the pilot-certificated passenger needed to pull hard
aft on the yoke to prevent the airplane from pitching down,
even though the elevator pitch trim indicator showed a nearly
full nose-up trim position. The pilot remembered that work had
been done on the elevator trim system, and he thought that
there might be some kind of control-reversal problem. While
maneuvering for the emergency landing, the pilot applied nose-
down trim control inputs and found that the extreme control
forces lessened, and he successfully landed the airplane. The
elevator trim control cables were misrigged such that the
elevator trim control was reversed. The mechanic who performed
the work had 26 years of experience and described that he had
carefully checked the trim tab deflection angles. However, he
did not recognize that the trim tab moved in the wrong
direction. The mechanic who checked the work had 24 years of
experience and noted that the cable rigging problem could not
be clearly visually identified through the airplane's access
panel. The maintenance manual provided the following
information: ``Make sure that the trim tab moves in the correct
direction when it is operated by the trim wheel. NOTE: Nose
down trim corresponds to the tab UP position.'' (CEN15IA079)
\1\
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\1\ These pilots and the mechanic are featured in the NTSB's safety
video, ``Airplane Misrigging: Lessons Learned from a Close Call,''
which is available on the NTSB's safety videos web page at http://
www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-alerts/Pages/Safety-Videos.aspx.
In May 2013, the pilot of a Schweizer SGS 2-33A glider
received serious injuries after the glider crashed due to
improper rigging of the rudder control cables. The glider had
just received an annual inspection, and its rudder had been
removed and reinstalled. The mechanic who conducted a flight
control check after the annual inspection with assistance from
another pilot seated in the cockpit stated that he confirmed
movement of the rudder while at the rear of the glider;
however, he did not see which pedal the pilot was pushing and
did not verbally confirm the corresponding position of the
rudder pedals. The mechanic had 35 years of experience and had
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assembled hundreds of gliders. (ERA13LA229)
In October 2013, the private pilot and passenger in a Piper
PA-22 received serious injuries when the airplane crashed
during takeoff on its first flight since an annual inspection
in which frayed elevator control cables were replaced. During
the takeoff roll, when the pilot applied forward stick controls
to raise the tail, the tail did not rise, and the airplane
instead ``jumped'' off the runway. The pilot reduced engine
power and attempted to control the airplane's pitch, but it
responded abnormally and crashed. The elevator control cables
were installed incorrectly such that the elevator moved in the
direction opposite to that commanded. (ERA14LA015)
In July 2014, the pilot of a Piper PA-12 airplane was
fatally injured after his airplane pitched up steeply during
takeoff and crashed after the airplane had undergone extensive
maintenance. The elevator control cables were installed
incorrectly such that the elevator moved in the direction
opposite to that commanded. (ANC14FA050)
What can maintenance personnel do?
Become familiar with the normal directional movement of the
controls and surfaces before disassembling the systems. It is
easier to recognize ``abnormal'' if you are very familiar with
what ``normal'' looks like.
Carefully follow manufacturers' instructions to ensure that
the work is completed as specified. Always refer to up-to-date
instructions and manuals--including airworthiness directives,
maintenance alerts, special airworthiness information
bulletins, and unapproved parts notifications--when performing
a task.
Be aware that some maintenance information, especially for
older airplanes, may be nonspecific. Ask questions of another
qualified person if something is unfamiliar.
Remember that well-meaning, motivated, experienced
technicians can make mistakes: fatigue, distraction, stress,
complacency, and pressure to get the job done are some common
factors that can lead to human errors. Learn about and adhere
to sound risk management practices to help prevent common
errors.
Ensure that the aircraft owner or pilot is thoroughly
briefed about the work that has been performed. This may prompt
them to thoroughly check the system during preflight or help
them successfully troubleshoot if an in-flight problem occurs.
Interested in more information?
The reports for the accidents referenced in this safety alert are
accessible by NTSB accident number from the Accident Database and
Synopses web page at http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/
index.aspx.\2\ Each accident's public docket is accessible from the
NTSB's Docket Management System web page at http://dms.ntsb.gov/
pubdms/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Less-recent fatal accidents that may also be of interest are
CHI05FA038, CHI08MA270, and DCA03MA002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Education and training are critical to improving GA safety. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Safety Team (FAASTeam) provides
access to online training courses, seminars, and webinars to provide
mechanics with recurrent training that focuses on accident and incident
causal factors, special emphasis items, and regulatory issues. The
courses listed below (and many others), as well as seminar and webinar
information, can be accessed from the FAASTeam website at
www.faasafety.gov. (Course access requires login through an existing
free FAASTeam account or creating a new one.)
Dirty Dozen: Human Error in Aircraft Maintenance
Human Factors Primer for Aviation Mechanics
Failure to Follow Procedures: Installation
Failure to Follow Procedures: Inspections
Aircraft Maintenance Documentation for AMTs
Fatigue Countermeasure Training
``Aviation Maintenance Technician Handbook--General'' (FAA-H-8083-
30) includes an ``Addendum/Human Factors,'' which discusses the human
factors-related conditions behind most maintenance errors. The addendum
(which is also called chapter 14) can be accessed from the FAA's
website at www.faa.gov.
``Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices--Aircraft
Inspection and Repair'' (FAA Advisory Circular 43-13-1B) contains a
Personal Minimums Checklist in chapter 13 that lists actions to reduce
maintenance errors.
Aircraft Safety Alerts, including airworthiness directives,
maintenance alerts, special airworthiness information bulletins, and
unapproved parts notifications, can be accessed from www.faa.gov/
aircraft/safety/alerts.
This NTSB safety alert and others can be accessed from the NTSB's
Safety Alerts web page at http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-alerts/
Pages/default.aspx or searched from the NTSB home page at http://
www.ntsb.gov/Pages/default.aspx.
______
NTSB Safety Alert, National Transportation Safety Board
Pilots: Perform Advanced Preflight After Maintenance
Be vigilant for flight control and trim anomalies
The problem
In-flight emergencies, accidents, and deaths have occurred
after pilots flew aircraft with incorrectly rigged flight
control or trim systems.
Four such mishaps within a 2-year span share common safety
issues:
Maintenance personnel who serviced or checked the
systems did not recognize that the control or trim surfaces
were moving in the wrong direction.
Pilots who flew the airplanes did not detect the
control anomalies during their preflight checks.
In many cases, although maintenance personnel made mistakes,
the pilots could have prevented the accidents by performing
thorough or advanced preflight checks.
Related incident and accidents:
In December 2014, the pilot of a Cessna T182T airplane
experienced extreme nose-down control forces on the yoke
shortly after takeoff. The airplane had just undergone
maintenance on the elevator trim system, and the mechanic
briefed the pilot about the work before the flight. Both the
pilot and the pilot-certificated passenger needed to pull hard
aft on the yoke to prevent the airplane from pitching down,
even though the elevator pitch trim indicator showed a nearly
full nose-up trim position. The pilot remembered that work had
been done on the elevator trim system, and he thought that
there might be some kind of control-reversal problem. While
maneuvering for the emergency landing, the pilot applied nose-
down trim control inputs and found that the extreme control
forces lessened, and he successfully landed the airplane. The
elevator trim control cables were misrigged such that the
elevator trim control was reversed. The airplane's checklist
for the exterior inspection of the empennage during preflight
included ``Trim Tab--CHECK security.'' (CEN15IA079)\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These pilots and the mechanic are featured in the NTSB's safety
video, ``Airplane Misrigging: Lessons Learned from a Close Call,''
which is available on the NTSB's safety videos web page at http://
www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-alerts/Pages/Safety-Videos.aspx.
In October 2013, the private pilot and passenger in a Piper
PA-22 received serious injuries when the airplane crashed
during takeoff on its first flight since an annual inspection
in which frayed elevator control cables were replaced. During
the takeoff roll, when the pilot applied forward stick controls
to raise the tail, the tail did not rise, and the airplane
instead ``jumped'' off the runway. The pilot reduced engine
power and attempted to control the airplane's pitch, but the
airplane responded abnormally and crashed. The elevator control
cables were installed incorrectly such that the elevator moved
in the direction opposite to that commanded. The pilot's
preflight check of the airplane was also inadequate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ERA14LA015)
In July 2014, the pilot of a Piper PA-12 airplane was
fatally injured after his airplane pitched up steeply during
takeoff and crashed. The investigation found that the elevator
control cables were installed incorrectly such that the
elevator moved in the direction opposite to that commanded. The
preflight checklist for the airplane required the pilot to
verify that the flight controls were free and correct.
(ANC14FA050)
In May 2013, the pilot of a Schweizer SGS 2-33A glider
received serious injuries after the glider crashed due to
improper rigging of the rudder control cables. The glider had
just received an annual inspection, and its rudder had been
removed and reinstalled. If the pilot had conducted a thorough
preflight inspection, he should have been able to detect that
the rudder control cables were rigged incorrectly. (ERA13LA229)
What can pilots do?
Become familiar with the normal directional movement of the
flight controls and trim surfaces of the aircraft you fly
before it undergoes maintenance. It is easier to recognize
``abnormal'' if you are already very familiar with what
``normal'' looks like.
After maintenance, check systems more thoroughly than the
normal preflight checklist implies. For example, if a preflight
checklist states, ``Trim--Set Takeoff,'' verify not only the
trim setting but also proper directional travel.
Be prepared to abort the takeoff if something does not seem
right.
Avoid interruptions and distractions during your preflight
inspection to ensure that you do not skip or misevaluate the
items you are checking.
If you suspect that there is a problem with a flight control
or trim system, ask qualified maintenance personnel to inspect
the aircraft. Do not attempt to perform such work yourself if
you are not appropriately qualified, certificated, and
authorized to do so.
Interested in more information?
The accident reports for each accident summarized in this safety
alert can be searched by accident number from the NTSB's Aviation
Accident Database web page at http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/
ntsb.aviation/index.aspx.\2\ Each accident's public docket is available
on the NTSB's Accident Dockets web page at http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Less-recent fatal accidents that may also be of interest are
CHI05FA038, CHI08MA270, and DCA03MA002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Safety Team (FAASTeam)
pamphlet, ``Advanced Preflight,'' (FAA-M-001) provides guidance to help
pilots develop the necessary knowledge and techniques to reduce the
risk of undetected maintenance problems, including how to:
Conduct a complete review of maintenance-related records and
data
Develop an ``additional items checklist'' to be used in
conjunction with the aircraft's preflight checklist
The pamphlet can be accessed (without login) from the FAASTeam
website at http://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/ALC/
libview_normal.aspx?id=63083.
The FAA's ``Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge'' (FAA-H-
8083-25A) discusses aeronautical decision-making and risk management in
chapter 17. It provides basic tools to help pilots assess risk and
manage it in a positive manner; proper preflight inspections are an
important part of risk management and risk intervention. The ``Risk
Management Handbook'' (FAA-H-8083-2) provides a more in-depth
discussion of risk management principles. Both handbooks can be
accessed from the FAA's website at www.faa.gov.
An online article in Flight Training (an Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association publication), ``How to Preflight an Airplane: Understanding
How is as Important as Actually Doing It,'' provides tips on checking
controls and other items. It is available at http://
flighttraining.aopa.org/students/presolo/skills/howtopreflight.html.
An online article, ``Things You Miss on Preflight,'' provides
several anecdotes about preflight-related mishaps. Originally from
Aviation Safety magazine, it can be found at http://www.avweb.com/news/
redundant/preflight_pilot_airplane_flight
_ntsb_inspection_207_912-091.html.
Related regulations:
Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 91.7 states, in
part, that ``the pilot in command of a civil aircraft is
responsible for determining whether that aircraft is in
condition for safe flight.''
Title 14 CFR 91.407 states, in part, that: ``No person may
operate any aircraft that has undergone maintenance . . .
unless . . . it has been approved for return to service.''
Also, ``no person may carry any person (other than crewmembers)
in an aircraft'' that has undergone certain maintenance until
the aircraft has received an operational check flight that is
logged in the aircraft records.
This NTSB safety alert and others can be accessed from the NTSB's
Safety Alerts web page at http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-alerts/
Pages/default.aspx or searched from the NTSB home page at http://
www.ntsb.gov/Pages/default.aspx.
______
NTSB Safety Alert, National Transportation Safety Board
Mastering Mountain Flying
Training is essential for mountain flying safety
The problem
Pilots with limited or no training in mountain flying can be
surprised about their aircraft's different performance at high
density altitude, often leading to serious or fatal accidents.
Wind and other weather phenomena interacting with
mountainous terrain often lead unsuspecting pilots into
situations that are beyond their capabilities.
Should a crash occur, a pilot who survives the crash but
does not have emergency or survival gear immediately accessible
may not survive the harsh environment until rescuers are able
to reach the location.
Related accidents
The NTSB has investigated numerous accidents in which limited or no
training resulted in accidents in mountainous terrain.
A pilot and two passengers of a Piper Cherokee 235 were
fatally injured when trying to follow an interstate highway
over a high mountain pass. Employees of the fixed base operator
(FBO) at the departure airport reported that the pilot had
asked about routes across the mountains. Based on the
conditions at the time of the accident, the airplane's climb
rate would have been reduced by more than 90 percent. It is
likely that, as the pilot attempted to cross over the
mountainous terrain near the pass, he raised the airplane's
nose to the point that he exceeded the airplane's critical
angle of attack. With the airplane's decreased performance,
this led to an aerodynamic stall and loss of control.
(CEN14FA328)
A private pilot and three passengers of a Mooney M20E were
fatally injured during takeoff in gusty wind conditions from an
airport located at an elevation of 8,380 feet. The pilot had no
prior experience flying out of the accident airport and limited
experience flying in mountainous terrain. Witnesses reported
that the pilot seemed confident about his ability to fly the
airplane and he was not concerned with the wind conditions. As
the airplane departed, the reported wind was 33 knots, gusting
to 47 knots. Later review of weather data showed mountain wave
activity in the area. After the airplane lifted from the
runway, it crabbed into the wind, and then rose and fell
repeatedly as its wings rocked, before coming to rest inverted.
(CEN13FA183)
The pilot and two passengers of a Cessna U206G were fatally
injured and two passengers sustained serious injuries when the
airplane collided with mountainous terrain. The pilot was
transporting the passengers to a remote back country airstrip.
As the airplane proceeded on the flight, ridgetops on both
sides of the valley became obscured with an overcast cloud
layer at 7,000 feet, and ragged clouds with mist were probably
present beneath the overcast. Local pilots reported that in
these types of weather conditions, numerous drainages can be
similar in appearance. Radar data showed that the airplane was
well short of the position reported by the pilot. Because of
this, the pilot misidentified the drainage he intended to reach
and instead turned into a drainage that ended in a box canyon.
After impact, all communication, survival, and foul-weather
gear aboard the airplane were destroyed in a postimpact fire.
Although the pilot's logbook indicated that the pilot had 2,723
hours total flight time, it showed minimal back country or
mountain flying experience. (SEA04GA192)
What can pilots and flight instructors do?
Through training, pilots can develop skills and techniques that
will allow them to safely fly in mountainous terrain. When planning
flights in mountainous terrain, pilots and flight instructors should do
the following to enhance safety:
Flight instructors should encourage their students to attend
a quality mountain flying course before attempting flight in
mountainous terrain or at high density altitudes.
Pilots should consult with local flight instructors before
planning a flight into mountainous terrain. Even experienced
mountain pilots may not be familiar with local conditions and
procedures for safe operations.
Pilots should be aware that weather interacting with
mountainous terrain can cause dangerous wind, severe
turbulence, and other conditions that may be unsafe for
aircraft, especially light GA aircraft.
Pilots should consider specialized emergency and survival
equipment (such as personal locator beacons in addition to a
406 emergency locator transmitter) before flying in mountainous
terrain, and develop a plan for immediate access to the
equipment in the event of a postaccident fire.
FBO staff should be alert for customers who appear to be
planning flight into mountainous terrain who could benefit from
mountain flying instruction.
Interested in more information?
The reports for the accidents referenced in this safety alert are
accessible by NTSB accident number from the Accident Database and
Synopses web page at http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/
index.aspx. Each accident's public docket is accessible from the NTSB's
Docket Management System web page at http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/.
For an overview of mountain flying and techniques, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) published Tips on Mountain Flying (FAA-P-
8740-60). Additionally, the May/June 2012 issue of FAA Safety Briefing
contains an article, Rocky Mountain High: The Zen of Mountain Flying
that discusses both the beauty and dangers of mountain flying. The
publications can be accessed from www.faa.gov.
Additionally, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) Air
Safety Foundation provides a Mountain Flying safety advisor that
highlights important considerations for mountain flying, A Pilot's
Guide to Mountain Flying that discusses weather factors and mountain
flying techniques, and the ASF--Mountain Flying resources web page that
lists preferred routes over mountainous terrain in addition to other
resources. AOPA also offers a Mountain Flying online course. These
resources can be accessed from www.aopa.org.
The Colorado Pilots Association provides mountain flying resources
to assist pilots when flying in Colorado. These include mountain pass
locations and names, certified flight instructors, and available
training. These can be accessed from http://coloradopilots.org/.
This NTSB safety alert and others can be accessed from the NTSB's
Safety Alerts web page at http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-alerts/
Pages/default.aspx or searched from the NTSB home page at http://
www.ntsb.gov/Pages/default.aspx.
______
NTSB Safety Alert, National Transportation Safety Board
Understanding Flight Experience
A rating alone cannot ensure safety: Training is key
The problem
Aircraft have different flight characteristics, performance,
and systems.
Pilots may have many hours of experience, but their
experience specific to the aircraft make/model and/or equipment
they are flying may be limited.
Although Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations
allow pilots to operate aircraft that are designated by a
specific category and class, differences among different types
of aircraft within the same category and class can be
significant.
Even if operating a specific type of aircraft is allowed by
regulations, it does not mean the practice is safe.
Related accidents
The NTSB has investigated many accidents in which pilots who met
the minimum Federal requirements for flight ultimately did not have
adequate experience and/or training in the aircraft they were flying to
operate it safely or to deal with an inflight emergency. The following
accident summaries illustrate some common--and preventable--accident
scenarios:
A 15,150-hour airline transport pilot was fatally injured
after losing control of a recently purchased Beechcraft KingAir
B200GT airplane shortly after departure. The pilot had
previously flown another similar model airplane and obtained
about 5,075 hours, but the airplane was slightly older and had
a different avionics package; the accident airplane's avionics
and flight management system were new to the pilot. During a
ferry flight just before the accident, a passenger who was also
a pilot was pointing out the avionics features of the new
airplane. Due to the pilot's unfamiliarity with the avionics,
he allowed the airplane to slow and then descend into a house
during departure. (CEN13FA326)
A 16,000-hour airline transport pilot was conducting the
Phase I flight test of the experimental Mustang II tailwheel
airplane and lost directional control. He had 2,130 hours in
single-engine airplanes, and 10 hours in the make and model
airplane. He had accrued 6 hours in tailwheel-configured
airplanes in the 3 months before the accident. Although the
pilot had thousands of flight hours, his lack of experience in
the accident airplane made him more susceptible to losing
control of the airplane. (CEN10LA255)
During a water landing in a Quest Aircraft Company Kodiak
100, a 1,650-hour commercial pilot, with 550 hours in seaplanes
and 232 hours in the accident airplane lost directional
control. The pilot had completed one 180-degree step turn
during her initial training, but she had not performed any
during her interagency pilot evaluation/qualification check
even though it was required. If the pilot had received thorough
training in performing step turns in the accident make and
model airplane, she would have been less likely to lose control
of the airplane. (ANC12GA114)
A private pilot was fatally injured following a loss of
engine power from a Cessna P337H airplane's rear engine. The
pilot had obtained a private pilot certificate in 1998 and,
over the next 15 years, accrued minimal flight experience, with
a total flight time leading up to the accident of 118 hours.
About 1 month before the accident, he obtained a multiengine
rating. His total multiengine time was 40 hours, with 18 hours
in the accident airplane; only 3 hours were acting as pilot-in-
command. The pilot's extended absence from flying, minimal
total flight time, and limited experience in high-performance
multiengine airplanes made him more vulnerable to errors when
addressing the loss of engine power. (WPR13FA289)
What can pilots do?
Obtain the necessary training from a flight instructor
experienced in the aircraft that you plan to fly so that you
understand the flight characteristics and emergency procedures
for that aircraft. Meeting the minimum requirements does not
mean that you are proficient.
Obtain refresher training if you have not flown for a long
period; long periods of no flying, even for high-time pilots,
can have an adverse impact on your ability to respond to
unusual situations and emergencies.
Seek out a qualified test pilot to assist in flight testing
homebuilt aircraft you are not familiar with.
Seek out instruction for advanced avionics and systems.
Identical make-and-model aircraft can have considerably
different cockpit panels.
Interested in more information?
The reports for the accidents referenced in this safety alert are
accessible by NTSB accident number from the NTSB's Accident Database &
Synopses web page at http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/
index.aspx. Each accident's public docket is accessible from the NTSB's
Docket Management System web page at http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/.
The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) Air Safety
Institute, a division of AOPA Foundation, offers an online educational
course, Transitioning to Other Airplanes, that provides information
about transitioning to different airplanes and avionics. This course
and other safety resources can be accessed from https://www.aopa.org/
Pilot-Resources/Air-Safety-Institute. (Course access requires creation
of a free account.)
A Personal Minimums Checklist can be a helpful tool in assessing
your capabilities and determining your readiness for flight. This
information can be accessed through the FAA's website at www.faa.gov.
``Beyond the Buttons: Mastering Our Marvelous Flying Machines''
published by FAA Aviation News (March/April 2007), contains valuable
resources and information related to the multiple considerations pilots
must take into account when moving to glass cockpit displays. This
information can also be accessed through the FAA's website at
www.faa.gov.
In 2012, the NTSB published a study titled, The Safety Of
Experimental Amateur-Built Aircraft, that led to recommendations
related to flight testing experience and using a second qualified pilot
during aircraft testing. Additionally, the NTSB published a study in
2010 titled, Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics into Light
Aircraft, that led to recommendations related to pilot knowledge of
aircraft equipment operations and malfunctions. These studies can also
be accessed through the NTSB's website at http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/
safety-studies/Pages/SafetyStudies.aspx.
This NTSB safety alert and others can be accessed from the NTSB's
Safety Alerts web page at http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-alerts/
Pages/default.aspx or searched from the NTSB home page at http://
www.ntsb.gov/Pages/default.aspx.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much, Mr. Hart.
And now I would like to call on Captain Chesley
Sullenberger. Captain Sullenberger is an aviation safety expert
and was captain of Flight 1549 who was able to land on the
Hudson. And so, we're happy to have you here, Captain.
STATEMENT OF CHESLEY B. ``SULLY'' SULLENBERGER III, AVIATION
SAFETY EXPERT AND CAPTAIN OF FLIGHT 1549, THE LANDING ON THE
HUDSON
Captain Sullenberger. Chairman Ayotte, Ranking Member
Cantwell, other members of the Committee, it's my great honor
to appear before this subcommittee.
As the airline pilot, as the professional pilot here, I'm
someone who has had 20,000 hours of flying time, much of that
as Part 121 jet captain time. Along with my first officer, Jeff
Skiles, who is also here, I was in the cockpit of an airliner
when we faced, suddenly, an ultimate challenge. I'm uniquely
qualified to tell you exactly how important pilot experience
is, and why we must not compromise it.
I deeply understand what's at stake in questions of
aviation safety. As you consider this FAA reauthorization bill,
I want to say it's critical that you maintain the requirements,
and that you not weaken them, that you not give further credits
for beyond what has already been allowed. Because, you see,
I've seen firsthand the real costs, the human costs, of not
having adequate levels of safety. And no one knows better than
that than the families of the victims of the Continental
connection Colgan Air Flight 3407 crash in Buffalo, New York,
on February 12, 2009, killing all 49 people aboard and one
person on the ground. It was a terrible tragedy that resulted
from the performance of the crew and safety deficiencies. But,
even more concerning, the National Transportation Safety Board
investigation into this crash revealed that these deficiencies
reflected a systemic problem among regional carriers. It
confirmed that the airline industry has a two-class system,
where major airlines reflect the gold standard, while some
regional airlines take shortcuts to save money wherever they
can, often potentially negatively impacting safety in their
seemingly endless race to the bottom.
These families have advocated for improved safety measures.
And, in the 111th Congress, in the passage of the Airline
Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of
2010, Congress got it right. One of the most important elements
of this Act was the establishment of the AT&P--ATP as a 1,500-
hour standard for airline pilots. And yet, just 2 years since
the safety standard went into effect, airline lobbyists are
trying to weaken the provision, because they consider it to be
inconvenient.
Let me correct the historical record. Let me correct some
of the misstatements that have recently been made. It has only
been in recent years that we have done something different in
the airline industry, or parts of it, than we have done for the
half-century prior to that. For much of the history of
commercial aviation, pilot applicants often had several
thousand hours of flying time before being considered to be an
airline pilot. It has only been more recently that airlines, in
their race to the bottom, have begun to recruit pilots with
near the minimum experience.
It's also important to note that there isn't a pilot
shortage. So, let me say that again. There is no pilot shortage
in this country. What there is, is a shortage of sufficient
working conditions and wages at certain carriers to attract the
most qualified applicants in the large numbers that they
sometimes need.
We have heard some of the others on the other side talk
about how the pilot licensing statistics have changed. What we
are seeing is statistics uncorrelated in a basis of fact. What
we're seeing are people talking about changes in pilot
applications, and not making a differentiation between
recreational pilots and professional pilots.
We also hear people talking about loss of air service to
certain areas of the country. Again, let me give those here a
history lesson on the history of the airline industry. Over the
years, public companies, for a variety of business reasons
totally unrelated to pilot supply, have changed levels of
service around the country. Let me give you just a few examples
from my own personal experience.
American Airlines has reduced service to Raleigh-Durham, to
Nashville; Northwest reduced service to Memphis; Delta reduced
service to Cincinnati; United reduced service to Cleveland. All
these business decisions had nothing to do with pilot supply.
And even if there are some carriers who are having a hard
time recruiting sufficient numbers of experienced pilots that
they need, let me give you an analogy. If, for example, in
parts of the country, we were having a hard time recruiting
enough physicians to serve rural areas, would we then advocate
having a 1-year or 2-year medical degree? Of course we would
not.
Those who say that we must have quality or quantity are
posing a false dichotomy. Of course, we must, we can, we need
to have both. Every pilot who sits in a pilot seat needs to be
a fully qualified pilot, not an apprentice, not someone
undergoing on-the-job training. They must be capable, at a
moment's notice, of being the absolute master of every part of
the airplane in every possible situation.
So, I'd ask you, please do not allow those who are calling
for concessions to enable them to continue to try to use an
obviously broken economic model. Hold fast. There are no
shortcuts to pilot experience. There are no shortcuts to
safety. The flying public demands nothing less.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Captain Sullenberger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chesley B. ``Sully'' Sullenberger III
Thank you, Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, Chair Ayotte,
Ranking Member Cantwell, and other members of the Committee. It is my
great honor to appear today before the Subcommittee on Aviation
Operations, Safety, and Security.
I have dedicated my entire adult life to aviation safety. I have
served as a pilot for more than 40 years, logging more than 20,000
hours of flight experience. In fact, just last month marked the 48th
anniversary of my first flying lesson. I have served as an airline
check airman (flight instructor) and accident investigator, and
continue to serve as an aviation safety expert.
And on January 15, 2009, I was the Captain on U.S. Airways Flight
1549, which has been called the ``Miracle on the Hudson.'' On that
flight, multiple bird strikes caused both engines to fail and, in
concert with my crew, including of course our First Officer Jeffrey
Skiles, I conducted an emergency landing on the Hudson River saving the
lives of all 155 people aboard. And Jeff is with us today in the
hearing room. Jeff, I could not have had a better colleague that day or
since.
I saw the birds just 100 seconds after takeoff, about two seconds
before we hit them. We were traveling at 316 feet per second, and there
was not enough time or distance to maneuver a jet airliner away from
them. When they struck and damaged both engines, we had just 208
seconds to do something we had never trained for, and get it right the
first time.
The fact that we landed a commercial airliner on the Hudson River
with no engines and no fatalities was not a miracle, however. It was
the result of teamwork, skill, in-depth knowledge, and the kind of
judgment that comes only from experience.
As a result of all of this, I deeply understand what is at stake in
questions of aviation safety; and I am uniquely qualified to talk about
what works, what doesn't, and why it is so important that we get these
rules right. The traveling public, whose lives we literally hold in our
hands, deserves and expects nothing less.
I appear before you today knowing that the airline industry has
their lobbyists and trade associations, but the traveling public does
not. I consider it my professional responsibility and my personal duty
to be an advocate for the safety of all air travelers. And as you
consider the FAA Reauthorization Bill, I want to say it is critical
that you maintain the requirement that newly hired commercial pilots--
at both major and regional airlines--have an Airline Transport Pilot
(ATP) certificate and a minimum of 1,500 hours of flight experience, as
Congress has mandated in Public Law. Public safety absolutely demands
it.
There are some who seek to roll back this requirement. They want to
weaken it by allowing more credits for some non-flying activities or
hours spent in flight school simulation to be counted as a substitute
for real-world experience. They also claim that this safety standard is
causing a pilot shortage among regional carriers and restricting
flights to smaller cities.
They could not be more wrong. There are no shortcuts to experience.
There is no shortcut to safety. The standards are the standards because
they are necessary.
There are some in the industry who look upon safety improvements as
a burden and a cost when they should be looking at them as the only way
to keep their promise to do the very best they can to keep their
passengers safe.
As airline professionals, aviation regulators, and legislators, we
must have the integrity and courage to reject the merely expedient and
the barely adequate as not good enough. We must not allow profit
motives to undermine our clear obligation to do what is right to ensure
public safety. And I assure you that public safety demands that every
newly hired pilot have a minimum of 1,500 hours of flying experience
before they are entrusted with protecting the lives of the traveling
public.
I have seen first-hand the real costs--the human costs--of having
inadequate levels of safety. These are costs that no family should ever
have to bear. And no one knows this better than the families here with
us today. These are some of the families of the victims of Continental
Connection/Colgan Air Flight 3407, a regional flight from Newark, NJ,
which crashed on approach to Buffalo, NY, on February 12, 2009, killing
all 49 people onboard and one person on the ground.
It was a terrible tragedy that resulted from the performance of the
crew and safety deficiencies. But even more concerning, the Federal
investigation into this crash revealed that these safety deficiencies
reflected a systemic problem among some regional carriers that lacked
the robust safety systems of major airlines.
This investigation confirmed what many of us know: that we have a
two-class system in the airline industry. Major airlines reflect the
gold-standard in best practices, training, and safety management
programs while some regional airlines, in a race to the bottom that
they seem to be winning, take shortcuts to save money wherever they
can, often potentially negatively impacting safety.
Early this year, my wife, Lorrie, and I visited the site of the
crash in Buffalo and met with the families of the victims, many of
whom--in the wake of these findings, went to Capitol Hill, to advocate
for improved safety measures. Knocking on doors at major Federal
agencies and meeting with hundreds of people, including President
Obama, their goal was to strengthen safety rules on behalf of all
members of the traveling public because they didn't want anyone else to
ever again pay the terrible price they did for lapses in regional
airline safety. Against insurmountable odds, they succeeded--inspiring
an overwhelming number of the 111th Congress to pass the Airline Safety
and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010. Every member
of the flying public owes them a debt of gratitude. We also owe you,
the members of Congress, our thanks for getting this right.
One of the most important elements of this Act was the
establishment of the 1,500-hour standard for airline pilots. Yet just
two years since this safety standard went into effect, airline
lobbyists are trying to weaken the provision because they consider it a
burden or cost.
With the immediacy of that 2009 tragedy having passed, they also
are appealing to new members of Congress and staffers who may not
remember the Buffalo crash. Putting self-interest over public safety,
they are trying to gain your support in rolling back the essential
progress that has been made for airline safety.
Some lobbyists would like you to significantly roll back the 1,500-
hour minimum. Short of that, they want the FAA to allow simulator and
academic training hours to count toward meeting the 1,500-hour minimum.
They see this as an easier, more convenient, less expensive path to
getting young pilots into regional airline cockpits.
But there are no shortcuts to experience. There is no shortcut to
safety. The standards are the standards because they are necessary.
Throughout the entire 112-year history of powered flight, one thing
has been true. The most important safety device in any airliner is a
well-trained, experienced pilot. That is even more true today,
especially as we transition from my generation of pilots to the next.
We must make sure that each generation of pilots has the same well
learned, deeply internalized fundamental flying skills, the in-depth
knowledge, experience, and judgment. And that is why pilot preparation,
qualifications, screening, training--and experience--are so important.
On behalf of traveling Americans, I want to thank you for the
Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of
2010. You got it right, and I urge you and all members of this
committee to continue to uphold these essential safety standards now
and reject the claims of those who would urge you to put profits over
the safety of the American people. We must all behave as if the victims
of the Continental Connection/Colgan Air Flight 3407 crash are watching
and judging our integrity and courage this very moment--as their
families are.
I now want to more specifically address the arguments that some
have made for undercutting these essential safety regulations--and why
each one is wrong, dead wrong.
First, lobbyists are seeking to roll back the experience
requirement that Congress wisely mandated in 2010 to protect the safety
of the traveling public. This is preposterous.
Let me tell you why we cannot have pilots with less than the
required experience flying passengers. Pilots with less than the
required experience may only have seen one cycle of the seasons of the
year as a pilot--one season of thunderstorms, one winter of ice and
snow. He or she may never have had a plane de-iced before, may never
have landed with a gusty crosswind exceeding 30 knots, and may never
have had to land on a rainy night when the glare off a wet surface
makes it difficult to tell exactly where you are. And if they received
all their flight training in a warm dry climate, they may never even
have flown in a cloud before! I would not want my family members in a
plane operated by someone with as little experience as that, and I
don't think you would either.
Some of these lobbyists go on to say there is nothing magical about
the 1,500-hour standard because, to earn the hours, pilots waste their
time, merely drag banners by the beach. This is a catchy sound bite but
it is a big lie. In the whole country, perhaps a few hundred pilots fly
banners; it is a miniscule percentage of the commercial aviation
industry. There are, and always have been, good and valuable pathways
to develop the experience required to fly a commercial airliner under a
variety of conditions, such as flight instruction, charter and cargo
operation, and corporate flying.
Those who argue to reduce the flight hours required of newly hired
pilots also imply that First Officers do not need to have the same
level of competence as the Captain. But it has been 80 years since the
airline industry has had apprentices in the right seat of airliners.
For all that time, we have had qualified pilots in both seats, and we
absolutely must continue to do so. The safety systems that the industry
has developed and implemented over the last twenty years are based on
the assumption of two fully trained, capable and experienced pilots in
the cockpit, with each pilot able to be the absolute master of the
aircraft in every possible situation at every moment. The value of
these practices cannot be questioned. The last fatal accident of a U.S.
carrier fully adopting these practices was in November 2001. We have
had fourteen years of perfect safety from major carriers employing two
fully trained and most importantly, experienced, pilots. The intent of
the 2010 safety language was to raise the level of safety in the
regional airline industry by requiring the adoption of proven safety
systems. Raising the basic requirement for pilot experience was central
to this effort.
I can tell you that U.S. Airways Flight 1549 would have had a very
different ending had my First Officer Jeff Skiles been a less
experienced pilot. Like me, Jeff had more than 20,000 hours of flying
experience when we lost the engines on that flight. His extensive
experience is what enabled him to intuitively know what he needed to do
in that emergency, when the work load and time pressure were so extreme
that we did not have time to talk about what had just happened and what
we needed to do about it, or for me to direct his every action. If he
were a relatively inexperienced pilot, we could not have had the same
outcome and people likely would have died. Experience is what made the
difference between death for some and life for all.
Recent events have also made tragically clear why it is so
important that newly hired pilots have a minimum of 1,500 hours of
flying experience. The First Officer on the Germanwings flight that
crashed in the Alps last month had only about 600 hours of flying time.
Under existing standards, he would not have qualified as an Air Carrier
pilot in the United States and would not have been in a position to
accomplish his dark and heinous act. By requiring more experience there
is an opportunity to evaluate a prospective candidate over time and in
many cases among several employers.
The point is this: Any reduction in today's standard reduces the
time a pilot can be observed as a competent, reliable, and trustworthy
person before being entrusted with the controls of a commercial
airliner full of passengers. With a 1,500-hour standard, employers are
able to know more about new pilots, able to have more people screening
and observing them over a longer period of time, and able to make a
more informed decision about whether they have proven themselves worthy
of the public's trust.
When I served as a check airman (an instructor responsible for
evaluating pilots) sometimes their performance would be just at the
threshold of acceptable. In those cases, I would ask myself this
question: When he or she is in the 14th hour of his or her duty day,
flying at night in bad weather into an airport he or she has never seen
before, would I want my family on that airplane? If the answer was yes,
then he or she met the standard. If the answer was no, he or she did
not. Those are the kinds of judgments that can only be made when there
is adequate time to observe someone in an operational environment. And
that is the kind of judgment that Congress made in mandating the ATP
with 1,500 hours.
A second tactic lobbyists are using to try to weaken the standard
is by suggesting that more non-flying training count toward the 1,500
hours in place of actual flying experience. Here's what's wrong with
this line of thinking: Training experiences are highly scripted, highly
supervised, and sterile environments where you know what is coming.
Real world experiences are not. They are messy and ambiguous and you
don't have anyone holding your hand every step of the way. To propose
that training situations are a substitute for real world experience is
like saying that studying driving in a classroom is the same as having
driven on a busy highway in inclement weather. There is just no
substitute for real world experience.
Third, lobbyists who want to weaken today's safety standards say
that they are creating a pilot shortage because regional carriers
cannot find enough qualified applicants. They also say that the 1,500-
hour requirement is threatening air service to small communities and
imposing an economic hardship. The implication is that you should
reduce the safety requirement so that they can hire less qualified
applicants.
This flies in the face of logic. Would we allow some airlines to
buy jet fuel that is below specification because it was too
inconvenient or costly to buy jet fuel that fully met all the critical
safety standards? Would we allow some airlines to underinsure because
they didn't want to pay so much for insurance? If there were not enough
doctors to serve rural areas, would we advocate a two-year medical
degree? Why would we ever allow less qualified pilots to serve small
communities? Are the lives of those from rural areas worth less than
passengers in large cities?
People traveling to small communities deserve to be no less safe
than people traveling to large cities. They must not be forced to
entrust their lives to less experienced pilots, or airlines that make
smaller investments in training or safety management programs than
those serving metropolitan areas.
What is really going on is this: There is not a pilot shortage, but
there is a shortage of pilots willing to enter, or continue employment
in, the airline industry under the current economic model. The standard
for entry to the airline cockpit is rightly a high bar and requires
significant personal and financial investment to achieve the standards
necessary to serve and protect the safety of the traveling public.
Currently the rewards of an airline career don't match the investment
required. This in turn makes other careers--in and outside of
aviation--more attractive, exacerbating airline pilot recruitment.
Worse yet, this untenable economic model turns away the best and
brightest at the door when they are first considering a career in
aviation. Like doctors, pilots make a significant financial investment
in their education and training, in some cases upwards of $200,000; and
like doctors, they should see a career path worthy of that investment.
A doctors, however, only hold one life in their hands at any given
moment. As the tragedy of the Germanwings accident shows, pilots hold
the responsibility for many more. Passengers entrust their lives to
pilots. Why would they not expect the same training and professional
experience from their pilot as they would from their surgeon? The First
Officer of the ill-fated Continental Connection/Colgan Air Flight 3407
earned $16,400 a year before taxes, clearly an unbelievably low salary
for someone who literally holds the lives of their passengers in their
hands.
Traditionally an airline career has attracted applicants with
experience well in excess of even today's minimum required hours. In
fact, pilots applying for a job with a commercial airline would
typically have had several thousand hours of flight experience. Only
recently have some regional carriers lowered their experience
requirements to meet the dictates of an unsustainable economic model.
As Gordon Bethune, former CEO of Continental Airlines said, ``You can
make a pizza so cheap, nobody will eat it. You can make an airline so
cheap, nobody will fly it.''
Since the regional airline industry has insisted on trying to use
this broken economic model, they have created their own problems. We
must not lower the required standards to enable them to continue to do
so.
It is not in anyone's best interest--not regional airlines, not
major airlines, and certainly not the traveling public--to have the
aviation industry lower commonsense safety requirements to meet an
unsupportable business model.
Regional carriers often compete on the basis of cost to be the
affiliate of major airlines. Let me tell you what that means to you as
a passenger: It means you are flying on the lowest bidder. Would you
want your surgeon to be the lowest bidder? But there is no shortcut to
safety. That is what FAA minimums have been designed to ensure. And
since many operators have lowered their standards to the FAA minimum,
we must make sure that those minimum standards are genuinely adequate
to protect our passengers.
Quality vs. quantity is a false dichotomy. When it comes to airline
safety, we need not and must not choose between quality and quantity,
because we can and must have both. There are existing methods for
pilots to get the requisite experience. There always have been. And
since the 1,500-hour standard has been put in effect, flight schools,
regional airlines and major airlines have been working together to
create a true career path that benefits the industry and most
importantly, the traveling public. This is being accomplished by
creating partnerships between aviation training academies and regional
carriers such as the career program at the aptly named ATP Flight
School where a beginning pilot is interviewed and provisionally hired
by a regional carrier early in their career. Once an airline makes an
offer of employment the pilot continues on at the flight school as a
flight instructor building time and experience while training the next
generation of pilots to enter the field. The regional carrier even
contributes financially to the pilot's education, and most importantly,
the prospective airline pilot can be observed, evaluated, and nurtured
while they attain the required flight time necessary for a restricted
ATP.
The second piece of the pathway is Flow Through agreements between
regional carriers and major airlines allowing pilots from the regional
to matriculate upwards to a major airline cockpit. Today a person
considering a career in aviation can see a defined path forward worthy
of the necessary personal and financial investment.
The industry has created these healthy pathways--not in spite of
the 1,500-hour standard--but because of it. It allows airlines the time
to make good judgments regarding the skills and temperament of a pilot
that are good for both pilots' career and for the safety of the
traveling public.
Finally, as aviation has become safer, some people seem to think
that being a pilot has become an easier job, requiring less skill,
knowledge, training, experience, and judgment. Nothing could be further
from the truth.
In spite of how commonplace air travel is today, we must never
forget that what we are actually doing is pushing a tube filled with
people through the upper atmosphere, seven or eight miles above the
earth, traveling at 80 percent of the speed of sound, in a hostile
environment with outside air pressure one-quarter that on the ground,
and outside temperatures to 70 degrees below zero; and we must return
it safely to the surface every time.
Professional pilots make it look easy but it's not. It's hard. If
it were easy, anyone, everyone could do it. And that is just not the
case. It takes deeply internalized well-learned fundamental skills, in-
depth knowledge, and the kind of judgment that comes only from
experience.
When pilots enter this noble profession that I consider a calling,
they make a tacit promise to all their future passengers that they will
keep them safe. And every airline executive, every aviation regulator,
every legislator who oversees aviation should feel the same obligation
and keep that same promise.
Honoring that promise requires us to acknowledge that there are no
shortcuts to experience. There is no shortcut to safety. The standards
are the standards because they are necessary. And, the traveling public
deserves and expects one level of safety: not one level for major
airlines, and another for regional airlines.
I urge you to stand with me in showing the right judgment by
upholding the 1,500-hour standard for the safety of all Americans.
Thank you.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Captain.
And I would now like to call on Ms. Faye Malarkey Black.
Miss Black is the Interim President of the Regional Airline
Association.
Ms. Black?
STATEMENT OF FAYE MALARKEY BLACK, INTERIM PRESIDENT, REGIONAL
AIRLINE ASSOCIATION
Ms. Black. Thank you, Chair Ayotte, Ranking Member
Cantwell, and members of the Subcommittee.
Regional airlines safely carried about 157 million
passengers last year, operating just under half the Nation's
passenger flights. We serve 623 airports; and, at 394 of those,
we provide the only source of scheduled air service. Regional
airlines have made continuing voluntary advancements in safety,
and have implemented or enhanced important safety programs
that, in fact, are now universal across the major regional
airline sector. These include gold-standard Safety Management
Systems, like FOQA, AQP, and the Aviation Safety Action
Program, to name a few. In fact, the most holistic safety
innovation has been the ongoing implementation of SMS, which,
as Ms. Gilligan reflects, ultimately focuses in an
organization's entire culture around safety. This defines the
modern regional airline.
As this committee knows well, Federal regulations enacted
in the past 6 years have brought about additional improvements.
Among these is the First Officer Qualification Rule requiring
airline first officers to hold an ATP. To be clear, this rule
has provided a framework to introduce enhanced training and
knowledge for pilots. It has carried many safety benefits.
However, we do continue to express concern over the narrow
provision requiring airline first officers to amass 1,500 hours
in flight before flying in Part 121. Historically, regional
airlines hired qualified pilots upon completion of an academic
aviation program, or shortly thereafter. Now there is a gap in
the path of pilot development, with pilots forced to suspend
their training at a critical juncture to spend time building
hours.
Most pilots build this time in unstructured environments.
This is generally not time spent flying under instrument flight
rules. This is not time spent in inclement weather conditions.
It's not time spent managing complex avionics or learning to
work as part of a team of professional crewmembers.
In fact, airlines are discovering that pilots with these
backgrounds face great difficulty adapting to structured
airline operations. Since the rule was implemented, airlines
have needed to screen far more applicants just to find pilots
who met their--who meet their own strict internal criteria. One
of our airlines, for example, seeking to hire 800 pilots,
successfully attracted 2,700 applicants. Of those, just 400 met
the airline's own internal criteria.
Overall, carriers report a diminishing quality of
applicants, given the forced time-building culture, with skills
deteriorating over time. One airline put it this way, ``We
waste a lot of time in training breaking bad habits pilots
acquire while trying to quickly get to 1,500 hours.''
A University of North Dakota study, paper under review,
highlighted these concerns, comparing pilots hired before the
rule with those hired after. The results show pilots hired
after the rule had a significantly higher number of total
flight hours, but were more likely to need additional training
and less likely to successfully complete training than those
hired before the rule. Far from wishing to weaken these
important safety measures, our objective is to strengthen
first-officer qualifications and provide for even better pilot
training.
Regional airlines will continue to do our part. We've
already offered wage increases, signing bonuses, enhanced
flowthroughs, and bridge programs. Airlines will continue
adjusting training programs and expending additional resources
to ensure that all new-hire pilots have the skills to move from
training into the ranks of qualified and competent line pilots.
We can prevent the unintended consequences that have
developed by placing pilots from accredited and structured
training programs into the professional ranks sooner, in a
thoughtful and intentional way. We are committed to enhancing
the post-hire environment in a way that ensures the highest
level of safety.
In addition to the unintended hiring consequences we're
seeing, airlines are reporting new constraints on flying.
Without pilots to operate all equipment, airlines will be
forced to up-gauge while parking smaller aircraft. As this
committee knows well, smaller aircraft are needed for smaller
communities. The impacts already seen are just the beginning.
Before I close, I'd like to discuss compensation. The
marketplace, and, to a great extent, collective bargaining,
determine pilot pay. We are seeing the marketplace react with
significant signing bonuses for new-hires that are increasing
compensation throughout the sector. However, most regional
airline wages are governed by collective bargaining agreements.
These determine how existing salary resources are allocated
among senior and entry-level pilots.
Overall, regional airline wages have been increasing, but
the problem with the availability and the quality of new pilot
candidates persists. We are proud that regional airlines have
contributed in important and in central ways to the
extraordinarily safe industry that we are today. We're grateful
for the steady oversight of this committee toward that end, and
all of its members. And I thank you for the opportunity to
participate today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Black follows:]
Prepared Statement of Faye Malarkey Black, Interim President,
Regional Airline Association
Opening statement
Good afternoon, Chairwoman Ayotte, Ranking member Cantwell and
Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to testify at
this hearing. I'm Faye Malarkey Black, Interim President of the
Regional Airline Association (RAA).
Regional airlines carried about 157 million passengers and served
623 U.S. airports last year. At 394 airports, 223 in the 48 contiguous
states, regional airlines provide the only source of scheduled air
service. Regional airlines operate 46 percent of the Nation's passenger
flights. I am proud that the safety of passengers and employees is the
number one priority of the RAA's member airlines--every day, and on
every single flight. The RAA's member airlines are constantly working
to evolve and advance safety.
Regional Airline Safety Commitment
Safety has progressed significantly for all airlines in the past
decade, and regional airlines have remained on the leading edge in this
effort. Much of the advancement in safety has been associated with the
continued implementation of specific programs and the proactive
implementation of safety management systems (SMS) in advance of FAA
rulemaking. All of the RAA's part 121 member airlines have fully
implemented Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP) safety reporting
programs, which are designed to bring forward information to allow
airlines to learn from incidents or errors in an effort to prevent
occurrence or reoccurrence. Flight data monitoring and analysis
programs, referred to as FOQA, are also in place at nearly all the RAA
member airlines, and provide a powerful window into flight operations
through aircraft data.
The most important aspect of these programs is that the collected
data is used in a meaningful and proactive manner to manage risk. To
facilitate use of the data, there are sophisticated systems in place
that promote the sharing of this safety information for the purpose of
continuously improving aviation safety. Programs like the Aviation
Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system enable
participants to understand and incorporate the lessons learned through
numerous voluntary programs, creating an enriched, industry-wide safety
culture supported by statistically significant data. This extensive
repository of information collected from airline voluntary safety
programs allows airlines to monitor and collaborate on known risk,
evaluate the effectiveness of risk mitigation efforts, and detect
emerging hazards. Today, regional airlines represent over 40 percent of
the ASIAS participants and provide nearly 50 percent of the data
analyzed.
Moreover, many regional airlines have implemented Advanced
Qualification Programs (AQP) that further enhance safety. With the goal
of achieving the highest possible standard of individual and crew
performance, these programs rely on multiple data sources, including
ASAP and FOQA, to tailor airline training to be responsive to changes
in aircraft technology, operations, and mitigations of any identified
hazards. The RAA member airlines are also represented on the Commercial
Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and implement the comprehensive Safety
Enhancements developed to continue reducing the commercial aviation
fatality rate in the United States. Additionally, the RAA's members
successfully complete a number of independent safety audits that are
designed to evaluate the operational management and control systems of
an airline. In conjunction with internal evaluations, rigorous
independent safety audits are an element of safety management which
subjects airline operations to a systematic, critical evaluation. These
audits determine whether system processes comply with regulatory
requirements, whether they are implemented effectively, and whether
they are suitable to achieve expected results.
Perhaps the most holistic safety innovation has been the ongoing
implementation of SMS, which combines numerous safety elements into a
cohesive company-wide system to proactively manage risk. While it
includes such programs already mentioned, like ASAP and FOQA, SMS is
far broader. SMS ultimately focuses an organization's culture around
safety. Policies, processes, systems, and culture combine to instill
safety and the objective to minimize risk as a core business value.
This, SMS, defines the modern regional airline. Most of the RAA members
proactively implemented SMS as part of a voluntary FAA pilot program in
advance of the new rule, putting the regional sector in a safety
leadership role.
There are many other specific areas of focus for regional airlines,
including studies and programs to address pilot fatigue, innovations to
reduce the risks during approach and landing, and a host of other
initiatives. For example, the regional airline industry has provided
key support and funding for an independent, four-phased study,
conducted by Washington State University, on the topic of pilot
fatigue. While the science supporting duty start time is well
established, there was a void in the science with respect to the type
of multi-segment operations typical to regional airlines. Seeking to
fill that science gap, the RAA and WSU launched the Fatigue Study by
comparing fatigue experienced by pilots in a duty day with multiple
take-offs and landings against a duty day of equal duration with a
single take-off and landing.
Each of these programs and initiatives independently, as well as
how they function together as a single enterprise system that governs
all operational areas, illustrates the tremendous progress and
continuous improvement the industry has made toward advancing airline
safety. These programs are the fundamental reason the United States
enjoys the safest air transportation system in the world.
Impact of First Officer Qualification (FOQ) regulations on Pilot
Workforce and Training
As this Committee knows well, Federal regulations enacted in the
past six years, alongside industry initiatives, have brought about
additional, important improvements in aviation safety. In 2010,
President Obama signed into law the Airline Safety and FAA Extension
Act, which contained a number of provisions of which this committee is
well aware. One of the notable rulemakings involved the requirement for
airline first officers to possess an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP)
certificate, and 1500 hours in flight, with some credit awarded to
military and academic structured training, in order to fly in FAR Part
121 operations. Formerly, the ATP requirement only applied to airline
captains.
The RAA believes that rulemaking, implemented in 2013, has provided
a framework to introduce enhanced knowledge and training for pilots
entering the cockpits of our airliners. The RAA agrees with the safety
enhancing rationale behind the rule, and strongly support changes such
as requiring pilots to undergo training in specific airline conditions,
like high-altitude and severe-weather operations, and a requirement
that a pilot spend 50 hours ``in class of airplane'' time. The RAA also
supported the requirement that first officers in 121 operations hold an
aircraft type rating. These are just some of the examples of the ways
this rule has meaningfully advanced safety.
Moreover, the experience we have obtained since implementation has
provided us useful insights into how to evolve FOQ further, focusing on
the unintended consequences the regional airlines are experiencing
under the rule. As we examine that process, we continue to voice our
deep concern over a specific element of the FOQ provision requiring
pilots to amass 1500 hours of flight time before FAA recognizes them as
being qualified airline first officers. Our job as professionals in
this industry is to promote continuous learning and improvement in all
aspects of training and operations. Although we believe the rule has
carried many benefits, we have identified areas that will benefit from
continued enhancements to the rule. In particular, regional airlines
are experiencing unintended consequences from a requirement of 1500
hours of flight time for first officers. To be sure this is a
contentious issue, but it need not be. We believe we can all agree that
the training, knowledge, and skills required under FOQ are beneficial
to safety. And we believe, as professionals, that this industry--both
airlines and the FAA--have continually approached challenges
collaboratively with facts and professional observations. And we have
always been willing to adapt to improve safety. Again, to be perfectly
clear--the FOQ rule and the opportunity to enhance it is a safety issue
for all of us, as is reversing the unintended negative impacts the rule
has had on pilot supply.
To that end, I want to discuss our observations related to the
unintended consequences of FOQ. And I know that anything labeled
``unintended'' will not be taken lightly in this room--safety is
intentional and anything that is ``unintended'' must be carefully
examined. As we do that, I know that any changes must be well thought-
out and part of a package, which, as a whole, further advances safety.
The stated intent of Congress in modifying the requirements for
pilots who fly in part 121 operations was to ``ensure that all pilots
entering air carrier operations have a background of training and
experience that will allow them to adapt to a complex, multi-crew
environment in a variety of operating conditions.'' However, the
reality is that the regional airlines are struggling to fill new hire
classes with pilots whose experience contains the background consistent
with the intended requirement. The FOQ provision has had far-reaching,
unintended consequences. Frankly, the FOQ places an emphasis on flight-
time that favors candidates who have amassed 1500 hours over candidates
who have undertaken academic pathways through their piloting career but
have not amassed 1500 hours. This has changed the quality of the
candidate pool considerably. Those candidates with 1500 hours may not
have a structured training background at all, and those candidates
coming from structured training programs are now forced to build
``unstructured'' hours after graduating. The process of building hours
takes significant time, and that time away from training is noticeable
to airlines evaluating new hires' training performance.
Historically, regional airlines hired qualified pilots directly
upon completion of an academic aviation program or shortly thereafter.
We know that this has changed--such pilots must gain either 1000 or
1250 hours, based on their academic qualifications--and military pilots
must gain 750 hours. These provisions of FOQ focus on the value of such
structured training programs. An unintended consequence of the 1500-
hour provision--even with credit for hours from academic credentials--
is a substantial gap in the path of pilot development, between
graduation and qualification for employment.
Instead, graduates from university programs seeking a career as an
airline pilot are now forced to suspend their training at a very
critical juncture in order to spend one or more years building hours,
potentially at their own, significant expense. Most of these pilots
build time in unstructured environments, which do not provide for the
development of skills relevant to a commercial airline pilot. For
example, a pilot might work as a crop duster or power/pipe line
patroller for hundreds of hours. This is generally not time spent
flying under instrument flight rules, in inclement weather conditions,
managing complex avionics, or learning to work as part of a team of
professional crewmembers.
Other pilots seek to build time by working as flight instructors,
although, naturally, flight instructor positions will diminish as fewer
students enter the pilot pipeline. Nonetheless, flight instructing has
been a traditional path for working toward an airline career, offering
valuable benefits such as learning leadership and communications
skills. However, the new rule has now created an unintended problem
with this path. Pilots are now required to work so many additional
hours as instructors that the benefits of doing so are outweighed by
negative impacts. These negative impacts are neither theoretical nor
insignificant. Rather, they go to the heart of a person's development
as a professional pilot. In particular, experience has shown that there
is a point of diminishing value as flight instructors surpass many
hundreds of hours of instruction. Instructors become increasingly
removed in time from focusing on their own skill development, have less
opportunity to fly, and the flights they make tend to be the same
flight repeated hundreds of times.
The growing pilot shortage has implications for the quality of pilot
candidates
According to the FAA's U.S. Civil Airman Statistics, between 1978
and 2014, a reduction of 24 percent in active pilot certificates took
place. Additionally, fewer students are entering the pipeline. In 1978,
student pilot certificates accounted for 26 percent of the total
certificates held. But in 2009, this number dropped to just 12 percent.
Following an FAA rule lengthening the period of time before student
certificates expire, the percent of total increased to 20 percent,
without necessarily introducing new student pilots to the mix.
Consequently, there have been fewer original certificates issued. From
2009 to 2013, there was a 10 percent reduction in original student
pilot certificates issued, a 21 percent reduction in original private
certificates issued, and a 28 percent reduction in original commercial
pilot certificates issued. When compared to 1990, these reductions are
considerably more dramatic with 44 percent fewer original student pilot
certificates issued, 62 percent fewer original private certificates
issued, and 47 percent fewer original commercial pilot certificates
issued. Furthermore, surveys of academic aviation program students
indicate that only about half of these certificate holders intend to
pursue a career as an airline pilot.
What's more, according to a recently-released RAND Corporation
report (Air Transport Pilot Supply and Demand: Current State and
Effects of Recent Legislation, March 2015) 45 percent of new Commercial
Certificates are issued to foreign students. Finally, Airline qualified
pilots are aging: Since 2009, the number of certified pilots (private/
commercial/ATP) older than 59 has increased more than 8 percent.
Certified pilots aged 20-59 (private/commercial/ATP) are not increasing
at the same rate, in fact, conversely to the 60+ group, there are 14.7
percent fewer pilots aged 20-59 in 2014 than in 2009.
The new hours-building element of the first officer requirements
contributes further, and significantly, to this growing pilot shortage
by dramatically increasing education costs and interrupting the
structured path for future airline pilots. Aviation students no longer
have a direct path to becoming an airline pilot; they must first
overcome years of uncertainty as they work to build hours. This creates
a barrier of entry for recent graduates of highly-regarded academic and
structured training programs and promotes movement to other industries.
This new career uncertainty will undoubtedly discourage potential
aviators from pursuing airline pilot careers. Universities have
reported that many pilots are simply leaving the career path before
they finish school, seeing no financial way to bridge the gap in flight
time to a career with a commercial carrier--regional or otherwise.
Amidst this challenging recruiting environment, airlines are seeing
another discouraging trend in newly-hired pilots; fewer and fewer new
hires have recent piloting experience as flight instructors, military
pilots, pilots for other airlines, or flying in 91/135 operations. A
recent survey of the RAA member airlines revealed that the percentage
of new hire pilots most recently employed as flight instructors dropped
from 40 percent in 2013 to 32 percent in 2015. In April 2015 alone, 38
percent of new hires had recent experience other than the
aforementioned (typically most successful in training) occupations. An
additional noteworthy outcome from this survey is that 17 percent of
pilots hired since January 2013 were most recently employed at other
regional airlines. This last point highlights a lack of new pilots in
the pipeline.
Although the regional airline industry has redoubled its recruiting
efforts, offered substantial signing and retention bonuses, and
implemented and strengthened existing pipeline programs with the
country's best universities, this fact remains: the number of pilots
qualified for hire has shrunken dramatically as airline industry demand
for pilots continues to rise. Furthermore, not all of these remaining
pilots can meet individual airline hiring requirements or make it
through airline training programs.
Demand, coupled with the changed criteria emphasizing 1500 hours of
flying time, has also caused different types of candidates to seek
employment with regional airlines. These pilots may have flown
recreationally for years, with no or limited commercial experience, but
they meet the 1500 hour requirement. These candidates are among the
roster of ATP holders listed, and some have suggested that these
pilots, who meet the flight-hour requirements, should be able to fill
pilot vacancies. Experience has shown that this is not often the case.
Unintended Training Outcomes
Airlines are discovering that pilots with backgrounds comprised
predominantly by hours of unstructured flying face great difficulty
adapting to structured airline operations, and the washout rate, an
industry term for the failure of candidates to pass airlines' initial
screening processes, has been disappointingly high for these
candidates.
The RAA's member airlines are highly selective about the candidates
they put through their training programs, which require strong skills
and airmanship. Unfortunately, the new rule is limiting access to the
best and most proficient aviators. Airlines have observed, since FOQ
implementation, a distinct change in the percentage of those applying
and interviewed versus those hired for pilot jobs. By this I mean, we
are screening far more applicants to find pilots qualified for the job.
Of course, we will not change our high standards in the face of these
challenges. One of our airlines has shared its story publicly: seeking
to hire 800 candidates, the airline successfully attracted 2,700
applicants. Of those applicants, only 400 met the airline's own
rigorous requirements.
Airlines' high evaluation standards are also reflected in training
failure rates, which have increased, despite enhanced training
protocols that regional airlines have put in place since the 1500 hour
provision went into effect. One airline reports a three-month period
where not one first officer candidate was able to successfully complete
training at the airline.
Moreover, carriers report an overall degradation in the quality of
applicants, citing the forced time-building culture has offered no
merits other than hours in a log book, and noting the very real concern
of skills slowly deteriorating over time, with bad habits developing.
Some pilots who spent time in unstructured flying environments seem to
have regressed in their instrument flying skills. The RAA member
airlines have had to expand training in order to bring pilots who have
been away from their training ``up to speed.'' One member airline put
it this way: ``proficiency remains a concern, as pilots are spending
more time building low-quality time and have to be re-trained on
procedures they learned in the solid aviation program they attended.
Our training programs are more than capable of bringing them up to
speed, but it does require more effort from the pilots and instructors
as valuable proficiency is lost in low-quality flight environments.''
Another notes, ``We waste a lot of time in training breaking bad habits
acquired during time spent trying to quickly get the 1,500 hours.''
We believe all of this reflects the unintended consequence of the
1,500 hours provision, with its focus on accumulated flight time. Of
course, our member airlines have upheld safety despite this additional
challenge, and have redoubled efforts to counter this observed
regression in proficiency by incorporating additional training sessions
for new hires, and, in some cases expanding initial operating
experience with a check pilot.
In addition to these shared stories, our airlines are participating
in ongoing data collection and research on pilot sourcing and
performance. In order to test whether or not the FOQ ruling improved
the quality of first officers flying for part 121 carriers as intended,
a University of North Dakota study (paper currently under review) at a
regional carrier compared pilots hired prior to the FOQ ruling with
those hired after the FOQ ruling. The study compared 232 pilots hired
from 2005-2008 with 184 pilots hired from August 2013-November 2014.
The pilots were compared in three areas: Total Flight Hours,
Training Completion and Extra Training Events. The results of the study
show that, while pilots hired after the FOQ ruling had a significantly
higher number of total flight hours, that group was more likely to need
additional training and less likely to successfully complete training
than those who were hired prior to FOQ. The average total flight hours
of a new hire pilot pre-FOQ were 1,654 and post-FOQ were 3,095. Prior
to FOQ, nine percent of new hire pilots required extra training events;
following the rule, that percentage had more than tripled, with 33
percent of post FOQ new hires requiring extra training. Additionally,
prior to the rule, four percent of new hire pilots failed to complete
training; and following the rule, ten percent of new hires failed to
complete training. Although more research is needed, the study
illustrates some of the unintended consequences of the FOQ ruling.
Enhancing the Pathway to Pilot Safety and Proficiency
It is imperative that the traveling public, from the smallest
communities to the largest, have confidence that they are flying with a
well-trained and proficient crew. It is also important that regional
airlines feel confident about our hiring pool so that we can continue
to provide safe service to communities large and small. Safety and
training experts within the airline industry must continue to innovate
and to suggest ways to enhance the training experience for our crews.
Our experience since the implementation of the FOQ can inform
meaningful dialogue for adaptation and change.
We believe the pathway to becoming a professional aviator works
best when it allows for a seamless transition between top-notch
professional aviation programs and the rigorous training programs
offered by regional airlines. But the building of a professional
aviator goes further still. A comprehensive approach to all aspects of
a pilot career--from the time he or she first dreams about flying,
until a captain's retirement flight--is needed. And mechanisms to
ensure quality, promote professionalism, and assess, adapt, and evolve
training based on real data will serve us well.
The RAA is working on a number of major initiatives and suggesting
others that we believe are needed to ensure that the goal of putting
the best possible pilots into the control seats is truly met. These
initiatives are mutually dependent and constitute a comprehensive
approach to the pilot training pathway. The intent is to strengthen FOQ
and provide for even better pilot training. We want to continue to work
with this Committee, the FAA, and our industry and employee partners
toward solutions that can accomplish all of these goals.
Successful solutions will be multi-faceted and include commitment
on many fronts. We need adjustments to eliminate that lapse of time
between training and hiring by allowing for addition credits toward the
1500 hours, overcome the notion that all flying time is equally
enriching, improve the quality of the new hire candidates at regional
airlines, and to allow for alternate civilian pathways to a career as
an airline pilot that permit airlines to hire pilots from structured
training programs before they begin amassing unstructured hours.
On our part, regional airlines are striving to promote and support
the airline pilot profession by showing and encouraging future aviators
the career is exciting and rewarding. The RAA, our members and their
stakeholders are involved in a number of different ways generating
enthusiasm and passion for a career in the sky. We are involved in the
Organization of Black Aerospace Professionals, Women in Aviation, the
University Aviation Association, and more, and both our Association and
individual members are participating in STEM outreach programs in order
to help introduce youngsters to the technical fields.
Partnerships between universities and regional airline partners are
critical. Those partnership are already strong, but getting stronger
every day. Pilots, mechanics and other aviation leaders are visiting
campuses each day to talk about their careers and to encourage and
mentor young students. Regional airlines readily provide samples of
their operational manuals, training curricula and even training devices
to schools. By providing airline training curricula, for example, the
students can be taught from day one with the course structure and
standards of professional aviators.
The RAA member airlines are also involved in professional
development for professors, offering opportunities to serve on their
staffs during sabbaticals, lending their own perspectives on enhancing
airline training, and gaining valuable experience in the process. The
RAA participates in the AABI Industry-Educator Collaboration Committee
and is continuing to assist in brokering partnerships between academia
and the regional industry. Regional airlines are now heavily plugged
into AABI and the collegiate scene, in recruiting, internships,
advisory boards, research collaboration and professional development,
with regional people speaking at universities and professors spending
extended periods of time at airlines.
We believe in the value of accreditation, for it sets standards
jointly agreed to by both industry and academia--and it sustains those
standards in periodic accreditation visits--holding such programs to a
quality level that is enviable worldwide. The RAA sits on the Board of
Aviation Accreditation Board International (AABI), which sets and
maintains the standards for aviation university programs worldwide.
AABI has always been jointly administered by both industry and academia
and it has provided superb results for enhancing professional education
and technical training. While accreditation is a means by which the
quality of collegiate training organizations can be evaluated,
providing a way to ensure compliance with appropriate standards and
outcomes, we also see the value of other structured training providers
working under the provisions of FAR Part 141. They, too, can provide
structure, oversight and professionalism to ensure a standardized and
qualified pilot who completes training. Such training providers could
well be considered for inclusions into the hour-reduction provisions of
FAR Part 61.160.
We must continue to define a clear career path so that those
already interested in and pursuing the profession see open doors and
opportunities. And most importantly, we must continue to work together
to ensure that the best, most qualified pilots are flying in airline
cockpits today and that airlines can hire from pools of the best, most
qualified pilots who have no lapse in their structured training
backgrounds and who are prepared to transition into the complex
environment of a commercial airline.
Regional airlines will continue to do our part. We have established
self-help measures currently in place, such as stepped up recruiting
efforts, wage increases, signing bonuses, flow-through and bridge
programs. Our member airlines have built ground-breaking professional
pathway programs and continue to build others with their mainline
partners. The RAA encourages and promotes such pathways, for, like any
profession, a defined path goes far in facilitating career entry to
aspiring professionals and the families who are contemplating funding
their training.
Airlines will have to continue adjusting training programs,
extending training footprints, and expending additional resources to
ensure that all cadres of new hire pilots have the knowledge, skills,
and abilities to move from training into the ranks of qualified,
competent, and proficient line pilots. The additional training
resources dedicated by airlines today are often to no avail and result
in training failures (washouts) when new hire pilots cannot meet the
airline's standards. Instead, these resources could be dedicated to an
alternate pathway that guarantees the creation of a highly-qualified
new pilot.
We would like to work collaboratively with lawmakers, regulators,
and stakeholders to develop a comprehensive pilot training pathway that
truly enhances safety.
Our job as professionals in aviation is to continue to focus on the
best training and the timing of that training. By continuing to refine
FOQ and to consider the enhancements we suggest, we can prevent the
unintended consequences that have developed in the past few years by
placing pilots from accredited and structured programs into the
professional ranks sooner, in a very thoughtful and intentional way.
And, as we continue to ask for an evaluation of the hour requirement
for accredited and structured programs, we want you to know that we are
committed, as an industry, to enhancing the post-hiring environment in
a way that ensures the highest levels of safety.
An Additional Unintended Consequence is Air Service
Although we wish to speak primarily about unintended training
consequences of the 1500 hours provision of the FOQ rule, the Committee
has asked us to address another unintended consequence of the rule,
which is unfortunately, already becoming well-known by many
communities.
The expected wave of pilot retirements at the mainline carriers is
formidable, with cumulative retirements projected at more than 16,000
between now and 2022. To offer perspective, the full contingent of
pilots in the regional aviation workforce numbers less than 18,000.
(Air Carrier Financial statements recorded by Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, Form 41, Schedule P-10, latest available CY2013). The
network carriers will continue to find the best and brightest pilots
working at regional airlines. This is how the professional pilot
pathway is supposed to work and represents a natural career
progression. However, given such high industry attrition, if the
commercial airline pilot pool remains static and a comprehensive pilot
training pathway is not restored, implications for small community air
service could be far-reaching.
According to industry analyst Bill Swelbar, Executive Vice
President for InterVISTAS Consulting, if the commercial airline pilot
pool remains fixed over time, the regional airline industry will shrink
to 20 percent of its present-day self within a decade. Swelbar further
observes that with 302 70 -seat aircraft on order, the industry would
need to park about 569 units just to staff this larger equipment.
Facing a scarcity of pilots, many regional airlines will be forced to
up-gauge to larger equipment in order to ration their flying and stay
in business. As this committee knows, these smaller jets and turboprop
aircraft predominantly serve small and medium-sized communities.
Without sufficient pilots to operate all of an airlines' equipment,
smaller communities across the Nation will unquestionably lose air
service. This air service represents a key economic driver by providing
direct and indirect jobs for Americans as well as ensuring the
connectivity needed to remain competitive.
While some stakeholders have referred to this as ``tomorrow's
problem,'' here are some examples of the 1500 hours provision playing
out on small community air service today, with carriers reporting new
constraints on every area of the flying schedules.
One airline has reduced flights scheduled and block hours
year-over-year by approximately 20-25 percent.
Another airline reports being 15--20 percent short on
pilots, leaving revenue flights uncovered every day.
Other airlines have not yet changed schedules, but have
needed to cancel individual flights due to lack of crew.
One airline reports no ability to cover sick calls or spare
aircraft protection, given limited crew resources.
Many airlines expect peak seasons to present particular
difficulty.
All regional airlines report that recruiting efforts are
becoming substantially more difficult.
Several regional airlines have already collectively grounded
more than 100 regional aircraft, and have announced plans to
remove many additional aircraft in the next 12-18 months, in
part due to insufficient pilot availability that meet their
stringent, internal hiring criteria.
Another airline was formerly serving 64 cities, but today
serves just 32--due to an inability to staff their former
schedule with qualified pilots.
These examples stretch on; these are just a few. And the
consequences are not limited to just the airlines and communities they
serve. As industry analysts predict, some airlines have changed their
fleet plans to account for fewer pilots already, others are still
evaluating long-term fleet plans. Some airlines are simply in ``growth
hold mode'' for now, despite plentiful new service opportunities,
because they cannot hire sufficient pilots. Airlines have even begun to
pull management and training pilots from their regular duties to
fulfill revenue flying, and the cascading effects have impacted
training throughput and focus on management initiatives. The effects on
small and medium-sized communities across America have been articulated
in the statistics, too. It is clear that small-town America is losing
its connectivity. In 2004, 862 U.S. airports had scheduled domestic
departures. In 2014, only 642 airports had scheduled domestic
departures, marking a 25.5 percent reduction in airports served. (T-100
Domestic Segment U.S. Carriers). Overall, since 2004, there has been a
19 percent reduction in domestic passenger departures performed.
And of course, even as pressures mount on small community air
service, no new communities may be added to the Essential Air Service
roles under the current statute in the event a community loses air
service altogether. And, among current EAS communities, the dearth of
Air Transport Pilots resulting from the rule change has pushed some
existing Essential Air Service communities into single-engine aircraft
that are operated in the program only by exemption from a multi-engine
requirement--a requirement imposed in EAS statutes because multi-engine
aircraft offer redundancy in case of engine failure. Because single-
engine aircraft do not require the pilot-in-command to hold an Air
Transport Pilot certificate, and multi-engine aircraft do, the new rule
creates an incentive for airlines to down-gauge service from multi-
engine to single-engine aircraft.
Pilot Wages
Before I close, I want to discuss pilot compensation. The
marketplace and, to a great extent, collective bargaining, determines
pilot pay. We are seeing the marketplace react in a number of areas,
with significant signing bonuses for new hires that, effectively, are
increasing compensation throughout the sector.
Generally, influences on pilot pay scales include position
(captain, first officer), seniority, the revenue potential of the
aircraft and market, passenger price sensitivity, structured fee-for-
departure agreements with major airline partners, and other external
constraints. Notably, most regional airline wages are governed by
collective bargaining agreements. Unions negotiate and then ratify
these agreements on behalf of all their members, including first
officers. Collective bargaining agreements determine how existing
salary resources are allocated among senior and entry-level pilots,
often favoring higher pay for captains at the expense of lower pay for
first officers. For example, in some cases, pilot groups have rejected
tentative labor agreements that would have improved first officer wages
or enhanced flow-up to a major airline.
It is typical at both regional and network airlines to see wages
for first officers in their first year notably lower than subsequent
years. At regional airlines, on average, first officer pay increases 32
percent between year one and year two, and on average 52 percent by
year five. Additionally, in year one, regional airlines make
additional, significant financial investments in a new hires, providing
airline systems and safety training, which represents an investment of
between $25,000-35,000 per pilot--during the first year. Notably, this
training is portable; the pilot will use it for the duration of his or
her career. Finally, elements of total compensation that should not be
dismissed include retirement benefits and 401K matching, medical
benefits, and profit sharing.
More to the point, most regional airline salaries have already been
increasing, and many airlines have offered significant signing bonuses,
yet, the problem persists. One regional airline has offered industry-
leading wages--wages that are higher than some mainline counterparts--
but nonetheless reports difficulty in attracting qualified candidates.
Even after instituting these dramatic pay increases, the carrier is not
fully filling new hire classes.
The RAA Supports the Swift Implementation of a Comprehensive Pilot
Records Database
This Committee has worked hard to drive improvements to pilot
recordkeeping, and the RAA thanks the Chair, the Ranking Member, and
the Committee for its interest in the pilot records database issue. The
RAA strongly supports Section 203 of the Airlines Safety and FAA
Extension Act of 2010 (Pub.L. 111-216), which directs the FAA to
establish a comprehensive pilot database. The Association urges the
Committee to continue its oversight of, and support and encouragement
for, the creation of a comprehensive pilot records database.
The RAA has long supported this initiative. In fact, the RAA
requested that FAA create a single, integrated database of pilot
records in the summer of 2009. The RAA stands ready to assist on this
effort and stands as a resource as we urge FAA to safely and swiftly
implement this important safety tool.
Conclusion
Regional airlines have continually embraced the industry-wide focus
on raising the safety bar and have seen considerable advancement in
recent years. We are proud that regional airlines have contributed in
important and essential ways to the extraordinarily safe industry we
are today. We are grateful for the steady oversight and contributions
this Committee has made to partner with us toward that end.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Ms. Black.
And we will now hear from Mr. Mark Baker, President and CEO
of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.
Mr. Baker.
STATEMENT OF MARK BAKER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND
PILOTS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Baker. Thank you, Chairman Ayotte, Ranking Member
Cantwell, members of the Subcommittee. And thank you for
inviting me here today.
As mentioned, my name is Mark Baker, and I'm President and
CEO of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, a not-for-
profit individual organization representing over 350,000
general aviation aircraft owners and pilots.
My testimony today will make three key points: first, that
general aviation is a national asset which is struggling partly
as a result of an overly prescriptive regulatory environment;
second, general aviation safety has improved significantly, and
can improve further if industry and government work together;
and third, general aviation is at a critical juncture where
regulatory and certification changes, medical reform, and
grassroots efforts can strengthen this important industry.
In 2013, general aviation, or GA, produced $219 billion in
economic output and support of 1.1 million American jobs. But,
GA has experienced a significant decline in recent years,
losing an average of 6,000 pilots per year. At the same time,
the number of single-engine piston aircraft produced in the
U.S. has fallen dramatically, from 14,000 in 1978 to just 700
in 2014. AOPA and others are working to reverse this trend, but
we need the support of Congress to create an environment that
fosters growth.
GA safety has dramatically improved in recent decades. We
strongly believe it will continue to improve through education
and technology, rather than more stringent government policies
and regulations.
Sixty-two percent of GA accidents result from three causes:
loss of control, controlled flight into terrain, and engine
failures. AOPA, along with the Air Safety Institute and
government and industry partners, is working to address these
causes. The AOPA Safety Institute provides free education,
analysis, and research regarding GA safety.
ASI produces the Nation's premier safety report, the annual
Nall Report, and offers more than 300 safety-educated products.
In 2014, the ASI educational outreach exceeded 2 million
interactions.
AOPA holds a leadership role on the General Aviation Joint
Steering Committee, which works to improve safety through data-
driven risk-reduction efforts. AOPA co-chaired the Joint
Steering Committee's two most recent working groups on loss of
control, and developed comprehensive safety enhancements that
are being implemented by government and industry.
Changing technology has made integrating UAS drones into
the flight environment increasingly important. AOPA has worked
closely with the FAA to ensure that the regulations protect
pilots, passengers, and bystanders. We appreciate the FAA's
current regulatory efforts and, last week, provided formal
comments designed to close some gaps in the proposed
rulemaking. We look forward to working with FAA to address
other types of UAS operations, including providing additional
education for recreational UAS operators.
The AOPA and others have also recognized the need to better
train and test new GA pilots. Following a multi-year industry
and government project, FAA's written tests are now being
reworked to ensure they are relevant in addressing knowledge
and skills in risk management.
Safety can be further enhanced with better and smarter
aircraft. A Cessna 172 manufactured today is, other than
avionics, essentially the same airplane that was designed and
produced in 1955. For good reason, Ford and Chevy no longer
produce 1955 fleets. But, the costs of certification and
economies of scale have slowed aircraft advancements.
Since 2008, FAA and Congress and the industry have been
working to streamline and simplify Part 23 certification
standards, which cover the manufacturing and alteration of
aircraft. Because the average age of the general aviation fleet
is now 45 years--compare that to a car that was built in 1970,
before safety features like airbags and crumple zones--we must
also make it easier to bring the new safety equipment into
older aircraft. Although change is underway, it's moving very
slowly.
General aviation is a critical point, as evidenced by the
trends I have presented here. Of the utmost importance to GA's
future is third-class medical reform. More than 3 years ago,
AOPA and the Experimental Aircraft Association petitioned the
FAA to expand a policy used successfully for more than a
decade. The fact that it has taken so long for the FAA and DOT
to review what is simply a limited expansion of an existing
standard highlights the need to reform the FAA's procedures. To
date, 100 bipartisan Members of Congress, including many of
you, have recognized the need for the reform, and have
cosponsored the legislation which would expand FAA's successful
sport pilot medical certification standard.
I'd like to say thanks to Senators Inhofe, Manchin, Ayotte,
Boozman, Casey, Daines, Donnelly, Heitkamp, King, Kirk,
Fischer, Hatch, Heller, Moran, Murkowski, Rand, Roberts,
Rounds, Shaheen, Sullivan, Tester, Ward, Wicker, and Wyden.
In summary, GA needs your help. We look forward to working
with you on the Pilot's Bill of Rights 2 and the upcoming FAA
reauthorization, both of which stand to put our industry in a
much needed climb.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Baker, President and CEO,
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
Statement Highlights
1. General Aviation (GA), a national asset, has experienced decades of
decline. An aging fleet of aircraft coupled with a decreasing
pilot population has put the future of GA at risk.
2. GA safety has experienced significant improvements over the past
few decades but we must work together to further mitigate the
known risks. Industry is leading several initiatives that have
the potential to positively transform aviation safety.
3. The future of GA is at a critical juncture. Years of decline can be
reversed through a right-sized regulatory environment as well
as grassroots programs that lower the cost of participating in
general aviation and encourage more people to become involved.
The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) has more than
350,000 members nationwide. As a not-for-profit individual membership
organization, AOPA's mission is to effectively represent the interests
of its members as aircraft owners and pilots concerning the economy,
safety, utility, and popularity of flight in general aviation (GA)
aircraft.
General Aviation, a national asset, has experienced decades of decline
General aviation is a quintessentially American industry that
comprises all flying outside of military and airline operations. In
2013, 255,000 full-and part-time workers were directly employed in
general aviation. Including indirect, induced, and enabled impacts,
general aviation, in total, supported 1.1 million jobs and $219 billion
in output. General aviation activity takes place from 5,200 public-use
airports, including 3,380 that are part of the National Plan of
Integrated Airport Systems and are eligible to receive Federal funding,
as well as some 13,000 privately owned landing facilities.
A national asset, GA must be not only protected but encouraged,
promoted, and fostered. Yet, far too often, it is viewed as unsafe,
only for the Nation's elite, or marred by those who operate well
outside the bounds of the existing regulatory structure or even common
sense. I'm here to tell you that GA is absolutely something to be
enjoyed by all--people of all ages and professions, from every walk of
life, background, culture, and location. But I will also tell you that
we are at a critical point if we are to ensure the future health of GA.
In a 1995 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the FAA published a
policy statement on General Aviation. In it, the FAA Administrator
recognized that the general aviation industry is a critically important
part of the Nation's economy and the national transportation system. He
went on to state that----
General aviation plays a crucial role in flight training for
all segments of aviation and provides unique personal and
recreational opportunities. It makes vital contributions to
activities ranging from business aviation, to agricultural
operations, to Warbird preservation, to glider and balloon
flights. Accordingly, it is the policy of the FAA to foster and
promote general aviation while continuing to improve its safety
record. These goals are neither contradictory nor separable.
They are best achieved by cooperating with the aviation
community to define mutual concerns and joint efforts to
accomplish objectives. We will strive to achieve the goals
through voluntary compliance and methods designed to reduce the
regulatory burden on general aviation.
But since that statement was made, those goals have been separated
and the mandate to foster and promote general aviation no longer
exists. We at AOPA and our partners in industry have since taken the
baton, but we must acknowledge that the removal of the dual mandate
has, inevitably, had negative consequences for our industry.
Over the past decade, the private pilot population has declined at
a rate of more than 6,000 pilots per year. In 2004, the FAA estimated
that there were 235,994 active private pilots. In 2013, the last year
for which we have data, that number had dropped to 180,214, a reduction
of more than 23 percent.
At the same time, the number of new single-engine piston-powered
aircraft being produced has fallen dramatically, from 14,398 in 1978 to
just 716 in 2014. As the number of new aircraft being produced has
declined, the purchase price has risen steeply while the value of the
aging fleet has fallen. Today, more than 81,000 of the 188,000
certified piston-powered aircraft on the FAA registry are worth $40,000
or less, and those aircraft have a weighted average value of $25,800,
yet a new, single-engine airplane will cost a pilot in excess of
$500,000--well outside the reach of most American families.
The numbers speak for themselves but AOPA and others are working
hard to turn the tide and once again grow general aviation.
Safety continues to improve
General Aviation safety continues to improve. Our community has
made great strides over the past several decades, and we will continue
to work collaboratively toward making our already safe system even
safer.
Unfortunately, we continue to see accidents resulting from similar
causes, many of which are easily preventable. We at AOPA strongly
believe that GA safety has and will continue to improve through better
education and technology advancements rather than as a result of more
stringent government oversight, policies, or regulations.
Starting in 1940, GA had an accident rate of 7.30 fatal accidents
for every 100,000 hours flown. Fast forward to 1960 and the rate was
cut by more than half to 3.27 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours flown.
Although many state that the GA accident rate is stagnant, even
over the past 10 years we've seen marked improvement. In the 2004
Fiscal Year, the FAA put the accident rate at 1.26 with a total of
1,617 accidents, 314 of which were fatal. In FY 2013 those numbers
improved to 1.11, one of the lowest rates ever recorded, with a total
of 1,299 accidents, 259 of which were fatal.
The majority of GA accidents, 62 percent, have three causes--(1)
loss-of-control (LOC), (2) controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), and
(3) engine failures. Loss-of-control alone accounts for more than 40
percent of the total accidents and has been a targeted focus of AOPA
and our government and industry partners, including the National
Transportation Safety Board, for the past several years.
We've made improvements but we must work to prevent similar
accidents from occurring in the future.
AOPA's Air Safety Institute
The AOPA Air Safety Institute (ASI) serves as a resource to all
pilots--not just AOPA members--by providing free safety education
programs, analyzing safety data, offering the premier study of general
aviation safety in the form of the annual Nall Report, and conducting
safety research.
A trusted and respected resource, no other entity has the breadth
and reach of the Air Safety Institute. ASI offers more than 300 online
safety education products for free, including courses, videos, quizzes,
and reports and works with industry and government partnerships to
provide educational materials on critical topics. In 2014, ASI's
educational outreach exceeded 2 million interactions with the pilot
community worldwide through various channels, including online courses,
accident case studies, publications, live seminars, and videos--all of
which help pilots take advantage of the collective wisdom of the GA
community.
General Aviation Joint Steering Committee
The General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) was launched
in 1997 as part of the industry-government Safer Skies initiative to
improve aviation safety. The program, which was revitalized in 2011,
works to improve general aviation safety through data-driven risk
reduction efforts that focus on education, training, and enabling the
installation of new equipment in general aviation aircraft.
GAJSC participants include the Federal Aviation Administration and
industry stakeholders including pilot organizations, instructors,
mechanics, builders and manufacturers.
AOPA has maintained a leadership role in the GAJSC since its
inception and co-chaired its two most recent working groups focused on
loss-of-control accidents. Using proven and effective data-driven
processes, the working groups developed comprehensive safety
enhancements that are actively being implemented by both government and
industry.
Harmonizing with the recent NTSB focus on loss of control, these
safety enhancements have the greatest potential to prevent similar
accidents from occurring in the future. Additionally, they represent a
partnership between government and industry to focus our limited
resources and come to an agreed upon strategy to best mitigate and
manage identified risks.
Integrating Unmanned Aircraft into Our Airspace
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) or drones have dramatically
increased in numbers in recent years. Safely integrating UAS into our
airspace in ways that will not compromise manned aircraft is a critical
issue now facing our community.
AOPA has worked closely with the FAA to ensure that regulations
governing the operation of drones protect pilots and their passengers
by adhering to key principals, including see-and-avoid requirements.
The FAA's notice of proposed rulemaking for small commercial UAS
includes important provisions to ensure safety, including limiting
aircraft to line-of-sight operations, limitations on altitude and
access to airspace, pilot certification and knowledge testing
requirements, and aircraft registration requirements.
AOPA appreciates the FAA's current regulatory efforts and last week
provided formal comments to the proposed rule that are designed to
close gaps in the NPRM. In its comments, AOPA asked the FAA to lower
the maximum altitude for small commercial UAS operations from 500 feet
to 400 feet to provide a small buffer between manned and unmanned
operations. AOPA also asked that UAS be excluded from operating in
Class G airspace near airports and that UAS meet certain equipment
requirements, such as having an altimeter, in order to help operators
comply with restrictions.
Taken together with the rules proposed by the FAA, AOPA believes
its recommendations will help minimize the potential for conflicts
between manned and unmanned aircraft. At the same time, however, much
work remains to be done on the issue of UAS operations. AOPA looks
forward to working with FAA to address other types of unmanned aircraft
and operations, including providing additional education for the
operators of recreational UAS.
Airman Certification System
Although there are many strategies and initiatives in place to
better reach, educate, and inform the existing pilot community, AOPA
and others recognized the need to better train and test new pilots.
Often viewed as a hurdle to get over on the path to a pilot
certificate, the FAA knowledge test encouraged rote memorization
without a solid understanding of why the material is important and how
it contributes to safety.
To act upon an Aviation Rulemaking Committee's recommendations,
AOPA and industry leaders embarked on a multi-year, multi-phase project
to fundamentally transform the way we train and test future pilots--
creating a holistic, integrated system which links the pilot
certification standards, guidance, and testing.
As a result of that process, FAA tests are currently being reworked
to ensure they are relevant and meaningful to today's aviator and
technology. Each new certification standard will incorporate all the
knowledge a pilot must have with the skills he or she must demonstrate
along with the risk management elements for each task which will give
the applicant the critical tools and knowledge needed to safely manage
known risks. Future pilots will clearly understand what is expected of
them for any certificate or rating.
Part 23 Reform
Although we, as pilots, need to ensure our flying skills are sharp
before each and every flight, we must also acknowledge that we can, and
must, design and produce better, smarter aircraft. The Cessna 172 being
manufactured today is, other than avionics, essentially the same
airplane that was designed and produced in 1955. For good reason, Ford
and Chevy are no longer producing their 1955 fleets. But the costs of
certification and economies of scale have slowed aircraft design
advancements and improvements.
Since 2008, the FAA, Congress, and industry have been working to
streamline and simplify Part 23 certification standards, which cover
the manufacturing and alteration of aircraft. Although change is under
way, it is moving slowly. Last year, the FAA announced that it would
not meet the deadline set by the Small Airplane Revitalization Act
(SARA). SARA requires the FAA to reform and streamline Part 23 by Dec.
15, 2015.
FAA regulations with regard to the manufacture and modification of
general aviation aircraft are highly prescriptive and designed to
address, in exhaustive detail, very specific situations or
circumstances. As a result, they offer little or no flexibility to
adapt to evolving technologies and new situations.
To illustrate the complexity of these rules, note that between 1994
and 1996, approximately 800 rule changes to Part 23 were enacted. These
changes largely addressed the needs of sophisticated aircraft, but
simultaneously added regulatory layers to the compliance process, which
increased the cost to certify a simple airplane while limiting the
possibility of introducing innovations or new technologies.
In part because of the increasingly complex and expensive
regulatory requirements facing manufacturers, the number of single-
engine piston-powered aircraft produced in the United States each year
has fallen precipitously. In 1978, U.S. manufacturers shipped 14,398
aircraft. In 2014, that number was just 716. By contrast, approximately
1,000 new experimental amateur built aircraft, which do not have to
comply with Part 23 regulations, are currently being registered each
year.
Because so few new aircraft are being produced each year, the
majority of the general aviation fleet does, and will continue to,
consist of older, legacy aircraft. In fact, the average general
aviation aircraft is now 45 years old. To envision how safety
technology has changed, imagine a car built in 1970, long before safety
innovations like airbags, crumple zones, and backup cameras were
standard equipment. To fully realize the benefits of increased safety
and reduced certification costs that Part 23 reform is intended to
achieve, the regulations, orders, and policies for retrofitting
existing aircraft with new equipment must also be streamlined and
transformed. Making modern safety equipment more widely available to
the owners and operators of older aircraft will have a significant
impact on safety.
While there are upgrade and modernization options available today,
most require extensive and lengthy FAA approval for design, production,
and installation into certified aircraft. Manufacturers must acquire
these approvals for individual makes and models of aircraft,
significantly increasing the cost and reducing the availability to the
consumer.
As an example of how regulatory requirements can slow the adoption
of safety equipment, consider that it took nearly three years for the
FAA to release a recent policy that streamlines the approval of angle
of attack (AOA) indicators for existing aircraft. An AOA indicator is
an important safety technology that could help reduce the number of
accidents caused by loss of control. Retrofit of this technology has
been slowed by the high cost, which in turn, has been largely driven by
regulations.
General Aviation's Future
General aviation and its future are at a critical point, evidenced
by the numbers and trends I have presented to you today. It not only
provides real economic value to our Nation but also offers the unique
experience of flight--an experience that brings delight to ``kids'' of
all ages.
AOPA is pushing hard on several fronts to turn around the downward
trend and, once again, start to grow general aviation.
Of the utmost importance to AOPA, our members and GA's future is
third-class medical reform. In 2013, the FAA issued 99,268 third class
medical certificates, down from 135,969 in 2004, which cost pilots more
than $23.5 million with little direct benefit to either aviation safety
or general health.
That money and time could be better spent in ways that have proven
safety benefits, including additional training and installation of
safety equipment in existing aircraft. By better educating pilots on
how to properly self-assess their medical fitness to fly and fostering
open and honest relationships with primary care doctors, third-class
medical reform will enhance aviation safety.
Under current rules, private pilots flying recreationally must
undergo an exam by an FAA Aviation Medical Examiner (AME) once every
five years for pilots under the age of 40 and once every two years if
the pilot is 40 or older. Although virtually all medical applications
are ultimately granted, thousands of applications are initially
deferred for additional review each year. Affected pilots must then go
through extensive testing and wait, often for months, for the FAA's
Medical Branch to review and approve their applications. This process
can cost pilots thousands of dollars in additional medical testing and
months of time grounded while they wait. The difficult and costly
process deters thousands of pilots who would ultimately be deemed
medically fit to fly from even applying for a medical certificate. Many
of these pilots stop flying altogether, further eroding the general
aviation pilot population and our industry.
Members of Congress, including many of you in this room, recognized
the need for reform and introduced legislation in both the House and
Senate, known as the Pilot's Bill of Rights 2 (PBR2)--S.571/H.R. 1062--
which would, among other things, expand the FAA's successful sport
pilot medical certification standard so that more pilots flying more
types of aircraft could take advantage of this standard which has been
in place for more than a decade.
Many in the aviation community have attested that medical reform
has the potential to improve safety by keeping pilots in the airplanes
they are most familiar with, giving them tools to assess their fitness
to fly, and fostering more honest and open interactions with their
primary care physicians.
We at AOPA and our members appreciate the support Congress has
given to initiate third class medical reform and we look forward to
crossing the finish line together.
In addition to third class medical reform, AOPA has several
initiatives to grow the pilot population and increase participation in
the fun side of aviation.
We are currently building a program that will launch aircraft and
pilots into the skies to carry the message of our ``You Can Fly''
program. Bright yellow, fully restored Cessna 152s will be piloted
throughout the country by AOPA Ambassadors who will help flying clubs
and schools obtain the resources they need to build new pilots and keep
existing pilots engaged in aviation.
Lastly, in order to help create the next generation of scientists,
aeronautical engineers, aircraft designers, and innovators, AOPA is
developing a program to introduce an aviation specific science,
technology, engineering, and math (STEM) curriculum into our Nation's
high schools. With only 16 percent of American high school seniors
proficient in mathematics and interested in a STEM career, we are doing
our part to present aviation as a viable career choice.
Conclusion
In summary, I have come here today to seek your help and
assistance. General Aviation and our industry need your help to right-
size the regulatory environment and create one that fosters innovation,
encourages participation, and inspires the next generation of aviators
while ensuring that safety remains our top priority. On behalf of the
more than 350,000 members of AOPA, we appreciate your leadership and we
look forward to working with you on the Pilots Bill of Rights 2, and
the upcoming FAA reauthorization,--both of which stand to put our
industry into a much needed climb.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Baker.
Ms. Gilligan, I wanted to ask you for an update on the
progress of the Pilot's Records Database and when that--where
the initiative stands and what we can expect, in terms of it
moving forward.
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you, Senator.
Development of this database has proven to be quite a
technical challenge. We have run a proof-of-concept, so we do
know, conceptually, what it is we need to do in order to meet
the requirements of the bill. What we've run into is that the
amount of records that the bill would have us incorporate into
the single pilot database is really creating the challenge.
Many records, now and going forward, will be automated
records, but the bill calls for the complete history of every
pilot who is currently in the commercial system. Many of our
pilots have been in the system for quite a long time, and their
records are on paper or microfiche, or a number of other media
that some of us may even remember, but most young people have
never heard of. Figuring out how to merge all of that data has
really created a challenge for us. In addition, the cost of the
system is going to be something that FAA will have to look at
as we go into future budget years, as well.
Having said that, I think we're making good progress on
trying to understand what are those challenges. In addition to
the mix of records, many of the records have personally
identifiable information, which we need to assure we are
protecting. Obviously, we want to build the security
protections against cyber attack in--for this database. So, as
we layer on all of these requirements, it has just been an
extreme challenge that we and the technical folks in FAA are
grappling with. We expect to have a proposal in executive
review, hopefully in the near future.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you for the update. And we look
forward to, as you put that proposal together, you know,
sharing what the plans are with the Committee, as well, as we
put together the authorization. So----
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ayotte.--I appreciate it, thank you.
I wanted to also follow up with you on--you know, one of
the things from the hearing we had last week on certification--
and this goes to Mr. Hart, as well--one of the things that the
certification process allows us to do is to ensure all the
technical and procedural steps are taken with the--obviously,
the airframes and everything that we need to do to make sure
there's aviation safety. At the same time, one of the things we
heard from stakeholders is that certification, itself, and
potentially long delays of getting new equipment, can actually
mean that pilots fly without the latest innovation in safety
equipment. So, how--can you comment on this? And how do you
approach the need to get our pilots the best tools while still
ensuring that we have the adequate review of that equipment?
But, to the extent we can use technology to improve the--what
our pilots are using, I think it's important that they have the
best technology at their hands.
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, Chairman, we agree. I think Mr. Baker
really hit on it. For the general aviation community, we are
actively pursuing opportunities to introduce current technology
into some of these older aircraft. One of the examples is the
angle-of-attack indicator. It's a piece of equipment that
allows a pilot to have much better situational awareness and,
we believe, will dramatically reduce loss-of-control types of
accidents. We worked with the community to find a way to assure
that it provided the pilot with an appropriate level of safety
without having to go back through the extensive certification
that some of those systems have historically required. We're
looking at the same approach for helicopters and rotocraft, to
be able to add what we're calling non-required safety
equipment. So, we don't require, by regulation, that it be on
the aircraft. We agree that the level of certitude we need to
provide is substantially less than we've had for required
equipment. And bringing that together, I think we're going to
see some good improvements.
Senator Ayotte. Great. Thank you.
I wanted to follow up on this issue of the pilots and the
pilot shortage issue, that there seems to be, obviously, a
little bit of a debate here on what's driving the shortage or
lack of shortage. And I also serve on the Armed Services
Committee, and one of the things we've heard from, for example,
the Air Force, is that they're worried that they're going to
see a shortage of pilots, going forward, in terms of making
sure that we can meet our needs on the military side, as well.
So, I wanted to get your thoughts, Captain, on--How do we
ensure--I know many of your counterparts probably came from the
military, and then, not all of them, but many of them, have
gone from military to commercial, and--so, how do we deal with
this issue to make sure that the junior pilots have the right
training coming through and the pipeline--it seems to me that
what you say on the pay issue, obviously that's something that
is an important issue, but, in the interim, we've got this
immediate issue that I think needs to be addressed. So, I just
wanted to get your thoughts on training, on how we get that new
talent pool coming in faster.
Captain Sullenberger. Chair, I certainly will address that.
May I just say one more thing before I answer?
I have in my hand a letter written by Anthony Foxx,
Secretary of Transportation, to the Buffalo News on March 12,
about safety standards, and are they, or not, creating a pilot
shortage. While I acknowledge that some view our pilot training
and qualifications rules as the sole or even the principal
reason for pilot shortages, I do not. We believe that low wages
and the scarcity of certain types of planes are likely the most
significant causes, not high safety standards. I just wanted to
get that on the record.
There are, and have always been, many pathways to
qualified, experienced pilots. And there continues to be. I
learned to fly in high school, at the age of 16. I became an
Air Force fighter pilot and served for six and a half years,
and then became an airline pilot for 30 years. Of course, that
pathway still exists. But, there are fewer military pilots than
there used to.
Senator Ayotte. I'm married to a Air Force pilot, so I
understand.
Captain Sullenberger. Yes, of course you do.
But, one of the most encouraging things that we've seen
since the Airline Safety Act of 2010 was passed, since the
enhancements were made, is the partnerships--the effective
partnerships that have developed between aviation schools,
between regional airlines and their major affiliate carriers.
For example, we have guaranteed interviews with regional
airlines for graduates of approved schools. We have flowthrough
agreements from the regionals to the majors. So, there are
clearly defined paths. We just need to make sure that, when we
set standards, that they are appropriate.
As I said in my earlier remarks, historically it's quite an
aberration for airlines to hire people with only a minimum
amount of time. Typically, we've had thousands of hours of
experience before you're considered even to be an airline
pilot. So, we need to fight this false dichotomy of quality or
quantity. We need to have people who have both. And there are
existing ways to do that.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. My time is up. And I know--so I
appreciate it.
Ranking Member Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I'm going to continue, Captain Sullenberger. And I want
to say, I think that your testimony guided the debate as
skillfully as you guided that plane to land in the Hudson, and
that is that this issue is about a broken economic model and
about whether we're going to pay pilots enough money. I think
that's the bottom line of your statement, is that, if you pay
them, they will come, and the fact that you hit on so many of
the issues that concerns me about the regional carriers who
take a brand name from a major corporation, everybody thinks
they're meeting the same standards as the brand. They're not.
They think that they are meeting the same qualifications. They
may not be. And this, to me, I think, is--we're here because
some people are suggesting that we take the 1,500-hour
requirement that is now required for pilots and for those who
want an airline transportation pilot certificate, and reduce
that. Prior to Colgan Air, we were at 250 hours. So, if you
could maybe talk a little bit about why it's so important to
have 1,500 hours, maybe that would help people understand. I
think people are trying to say, ``You know what? I've got a
business model. I've got to, like, drive down my price, so I
think the copilot ought to have a lot less hours.'' So, just
tell us why that's wrongheaded.
Captain Sullenberger. Again, a history lesson. It has been
80 years since there were apprentices in airline cockpits. For
every decade since then, we have had two fully qualified pilots
in the cockpit. And let me tell you from very personal
experience, for me and my first officer, Jeff Skiles, on that
sudden challenge-of-a-lifetime flight to the Hudson River, had
Jeff been less qualified, people would have died. Had he not
been so highly qualified that, in that intense moment, where
there wasn't time, in those 208 seconds we had from the time we
lost thrust in the engines until we had landed, to have a
conversation about what had just happened and what we must do.
I had to rely upon him, based upon his own long experience,
based upon having deeply internalized these well-learned
fundamental skills, having developed his own judgment and
understanding of our airline system and our machines and our
profession, to intuitively and immediately understand this
developing situation as I did, and then know what he should do
to assist me, with--I didn't have time to direct his every
action. So, we were able to do something that, outside the
industry, people find hard to understand. We collaborated
wordlessly. That's what I'm talking about.
If Air France 447 taught us anything, is that we must have
a pilot in each seat throughout the flight who is not a
multicrew pilot-licensed pilot, MPL, who's not a cruise pilot,
who's able to quickly and effectively intervene when things
suddenly go wrong after thousands of hours of them going right.
That's the challenge that we faced. How did we--what's the
secret sauce? And, as I said, there are no shortcuts here. We
must--we know what we must do. We just have to have the
integrity and the courage to follow through and make sure that
we do it.
When we don't do it, people die. It's----
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Captain Sullenberger. It's really that simple.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. I don't think I could have
said it better. But, I do want to point out, the same situation
happened with the Colgan Air flight. A young woman was the
copilot from Seattle, very little training, flew all night, I
think was even sick, ended up on that flight. And, you're
right----
Captain Sullenberger. I'll----
Senator Cantwell.--in a disastrous moment, the pilot has to
decide, the copilot has to help, and neither one of them
probably were prepared enough to help in that situation.
Captain Sullenberger. They were not. And I'll give you
specific reasons why. On the cockpit voice recorder, we hear
her say that she hadn't been in these kind of icing conditions
before. Colgan Air trained them on a flight simulator that was
not equipped to replicate an important safety device, the
activation of the stick pusher, a device that pushes their
controls forward to lower the nose when they approach a stall.
That obviously surprised Captain Renslow. He reacted
inappropriately.
And, in terms--I wanted to follow up on one more thing,
too, that was said earlier about the Regional Airline
Association advocating that people with fewer hours get credit
and go straight into a regional airline seat so they can
continue their education, continue their on-the-job training.
The captain on the Colgan Air flight was hired by Gulfstream at
600 hours, bypassing critical vetting processes at other
carriers, at other jobs, leading to a career of repeated
trained deficiencies and failures, and ultimately, a needless
and preventable tragedy.
And, for those who say that these rules in 2010 were the
result of a single crash, again, historically, not correct.
There was a whole litany of regional crashes--Kirksville,
Missouri, in Kentucky, and others--leading up to this. This was
just the most recent, most egregious one that finally helped us
to achieve the public awareness and the political will to
finally act to solve this series of systemic problems.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Captain Sullenberger.
My time is expired, Madam Chair.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Ms. Black, is it true that first officers
on regional airlines, for a starting salary, are paid $16,000 a
year?
Ms. Black. According to the industry statistics that I
have, the first-year first-officer wages are at an average of
between $22,000 and $24,000 per year.
Senator Nelson. Do any regional airlines pay a starting
salary of $16,000?
Ms. Black. I'm not aware that they do.
Senator Nelson. Well, I've been told that they do. And I
just wanted to point out that 138 percent of poverty, which
makes someone eligible for Medicaid, is just a little over
$16,000 for an individual. And to think that that's who we
would be putting into the right seat of the cockpit on a
regional airline does not build confidence, in the traveling
public.
Madam Chairman, what I want to do is let our members--I
just want to ask the Captain. Birds are attracted to water, and
many airports are next to water. Why don't we have more
accidents with birds, which you have encountered and have
become such a hero?
Captain Sullenberger. And, of course, Senator, that's
especially true in Florida and places like that.
Senator Nelson. Correct.
Captain Sullenberger. As populations of birds have grown,
and as the numbers of flights has increased, we are seeing
increasing numbers of bird strikes. Most bird strikes involve
only one or two usually small birds. Of course, what happened
to us what an entirely different event. We encountered a large
flock of large birds, migrating birds--Canada geese, several
dozen. We saw them about 2 and a half or 3 seconds before we
struck them, but clearly not enough time to avoid them. And
they struck the airplane all across the leading edges of the
wings, the nose, and into the center, the core, of both jet
engines, damaging them, it turns out, irreparably.
It's a matter of chance, quite frankly. Most of the
warnings that we get at airports are general in nature, and not
particularly useful. And, of course, migratory birds can
essentially be anywhere.
There are things that we can do, though. The good news is
that, for resident birds, that when they roost and flock in a
specific place, we can discourage them from being near
airports. That's by, you know, avoiding food sources, not
allowing large bodies of water, marshlands, wetlands to be near
an airport, sources of food, that sort of thing.
The problem in this country is that, while we have a
national air transportation system, airports typically are
owned and administered locally. And so, our entire safety
system for wildlife mitigation really is dependent upon local
authorities having the ability to stand up to powerful
interests, sometimes developers and others, who might want to
put incompatible uses near airports. And that's an ongoing
issue, and continues to be so, of great concern.
Senator Cantwell [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker. Well, thank you very much.
Let me follow up on the issue of pilot training
requirements. And I realize safety is paramount. But, at--a
number of constituent groups out there are asking how much is
enough, and how much training is--amounts to a disincentive and
a hindrance to the smaller areas.
In 2013, FAA issued a final rule requiring all airline
industry pilots and first officers hold Airline Transport
Pilot, ATP, certificates. This requires 1,000 hours.
Previously, it was 250 hours of flight time.
GAO observed that fewer students are entering pilot
training programs and that other opportunities, whether
overseas, in the military, or in corporate aviation, may be
steering pilots away from positions with the lower-paying
regional carriers.
So, Ms. Black, as a representative of the Regional Airline
Association, help us understand your perspective there. Of
course, realizing that safety is paramount, what types of
solutions could the Federal Government, whether the FAA or
Congress, implement to increase the number of pilots available
for hiring by regional airlines?
Ms. Black. Thank you.
What I think we need to focus on is a holistic approach,
really providing for the intent of getting the well-trained,
proficient first officers into the cockpits of our commercial
airliners. And that starts by looking at the kids when they're
children, and STEM outreach. And our organization has started
to do that. And, as Mr. Sullenberger reflected, some of the
other things that are important are bridge programs and
flowthrough programs that give a student a career--defined
career path with certainty from the beginning, when he first--
he or she first dreams of flight, until the retirement flight.
But, what's missing right now is a seamless pathway. Certainly,
the pilot certificates that the FAA are issuing are declining.
There are fewer students entering. There are fewer coming out.
And we are seeing that, at the regional airlines.
And now, since the rule--again, this very narrow portion of
it that requires 1,500 hours in flight--this has meant that,
after pilots graduate from their structured training program,
that they've got to go out and build additional time. And they
must do so at their own time and their own significant expense.
And so, this introduces more uncertainty. And so, we think it
has worsened a growing pilot shortage.
So, what we propose is to take the students earlier in
their time, after they graduate from these structured training
programs and build some time, and put them into the right seat
of our commercial airliners.
Now, I want to be clear, this isn't education. We're not
teaching them to fly. They come to us knowing how to fly. But
training is ongoing. Training is ongoing at both regional
airlines and mainlines. Training is constant when you upgrade
on equipment. And it's done right, and it's done
professionally. And regional airlines have world-class training
programs that rival that of our mainline partners.
So, we look to restore the pipeline--again, from the first
flight--to provide more certainty until the pilot is placed
into our well-structured airline safety and systems training
programs. And we think that that will restore a great deal of
career confidence for young people, looking forward.
Now, to be clear, the marketplace has to react. And we've
seen that. Pilot wages are increasing. We've got one airline
who has first-year signing bonuses and a retention bonus that
effectively raises their starting salary to higher than some
mainline airlines. And yet, that particular airline is still
unable to fill its new-hire classes right now. So, when I hear
that this is just an economic model, I think that economics
play a role there, and that's part of it, but we need to look
beyond that. We need to develop the pilot pipeline, and restore
it, and keep it seamless.
Senator Wicker. OK. Well, thank you.
I only have half a minute remaining. Ms. Gilligan, I think
I'll just submit a question on the record for you about the
Contract Tower Program, and stress that the Senate and the
House continue to strongly support the FAA Contract Tower
Program on a bipartisan basis, and request you to comment on
the record about any recommendations FAA may have for a
reauthorization bill to ensure that this program is enhanced
and protected.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ayotte [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Wicker. I
think, certainly after our hearing last week, it's important.
Many members of the Committee share their support for the
Contract Tower Program, so I look forward to the answer to
Senator Wicker's question. Thank you.
And now I would like to call on Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chair.
A lot of interest in the hearing. I'm pretending those are
lines of people trying to get in, that you just heard. But,
thank you so much.
And I also wanted to welcome the Colgan Flight 3407 people
that are here today, the members of the families. We've worked
with you especially on the bill on pilot fatigue.
And, Captain Sullenberger, I thought I would start with
that. I want to thank you for your continued attention to
improving the fatigue standards. And can you share your
perspective on why we should not continue to have two levels of
safety regulations for passenger and cargo planes?
Captain Sullenberger. Thank you, Senator. I'd be glad to
address that.
Just as much as the 2010 airline safety bill was a
regulatory success, the cargo carve-out, the exclusion of cargo
operators from the improvements in the new fatigue rule, is as
much a regulatory failure. And it's one that's hard to
understand. It's one that's clearly the result of economic
pressures, and not a safety argument.
We have learned, in the last decades, much about the
science of fatigue. We know how predictable it is, as
predictable as the sunrise and the sunset, obviously. And it
results in predictable negative effects on human awareness,
attention, short-term memory, performance, and judgment.
It's ironic in the extreme that the pilots who are doing
the flying, that require the most protection from fatigue, are
the ones who are specifically excluded from the rule. Every
night, all night, and much of the day, cargo pilots share the
same airspace, the same airports, with commercial passenger
flights. They fly all over the whole country, over each of our
houses at 2 a.m., 3 a.m., 4 a.m., 5 a.m., looking for the
airport. We owe it to every American to right this wrong, to--
--
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you so much, Captain.
And, Ms. Gilligan, is there any thought with the FAA of
changing this? I know that, basically, that wasn't the case
when you looked at this. But, is there any case of
reconsidering this after the decision was made to exempt cargo
pilots before?
Ms. Gilligan. Senator, we actually think there are other
ways that we are expecting the cargo carriers to address the
risk that's posed by fatigue. The bill itself required that all
carriers, including cargo carriers, have a fatigue risk-
management plan that required that the carrier look
specifically at their schedules and, using the current science
that we have for fatigue, determine if any elements of their
schedule provided the possibility that the pilots would be
fatigued. And they are required, through that plan, to address
that risk.
In addition, we now have the requirement for Safety
Management Systems, which is also applicable to the cargo
carriers. That broader system will require that they identify
whatever risks they have--in this case, the risk of fatigue.
Now, because cargo operations are very different from
passenger operations and the scheduling is very different, we
believe that the Safety Management Systems approach will
actually assure a better level of safety for the cargo
carriers. They will analyze their schedules. If any of those
fall into the red, they will have to address that risk.
Senator Klobuchar. OK, thank you. And, again, we'll
continue to pursue this with you.
Mr. Baker, I know you touched on this in your opening
statement, and I just want to let you know we--you know,
Senator Murkowski and I--did the bill on the Small Airplane
Revitalization Act. We're so happy it passed, signed into law.
And I'm as frustrated as you are that we don't have the FAA
meeting the timeline to get those rules out. They're very
important. I have Cirrus in my state, as you know. And we think
there are safety benefits. So, I just want you to know that
we're continuing to pursue that.
I just actually had one last question that I just sort of
came up with after being on a flight recently next to someone
who was a little bigger than me. And I know that there has been
some issues with some of the planes having smaller spaces. I
guess I'd ask you, Ms. Gilligan, about this. And we have rules
for space for pets, and we have no rules for space for humans.
And, over the past decade, seat pitch has decreased from 34 to
28 inches, as you know. When the FAA is testing the safety of
new aircraft, does the FAA also test for a variety of seat
sizes, particularly if it impacts the ability to evacuate an
aircraft? And is the FAA or the Department of Transportation
taking any action to examine any potential risk from limited
seat sizes on commercial aircraft?
Ms. Gilligan. We have done research on both seat size and
seat pitch. We do it based around what's called ``queuing
theory,'' the ability for people to get out quickly. We do set
those standards to assure the most even flow of passengers out
of the aircraft in the event of an emergency. So, any of the
aircraft that are approved do meet those standards.
Senator Klobuchar. And so, has there been any renewed look
at this, given that it appears that there are some smaller seat
sizes that we're starting to see lately?
Ms. Gilligan. I'm not aware that the seat sizes are
smaller. Whatever is installed does meet the standards that are
required to provide the appropriate level of safety for
emergency evacuation. And all of those seat----
Senator Klobuchar. And including the--well, we just--I
guess they've changed in the last decade, so--from 34 to 28
inches.
Ms. Gilligan. But, each new design must be tested to assure
that emergency evacuation can be accomplished.
Senator Klobuchar. All right. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte. Senator Moran.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Chairwoman, thank you very much.
Ms. Gilligan, the FAA's 2004 sport pilot rule allows
private pilots to fly small aircraft without a third-class
medical certificate under certain safety restrictions. The
issue I want to explore is altitude. Is there a clearly defined
safety benefit for one altitude over another? I think the
theory is that pilots maybe can fly lower than the 18,000 feet
that's the floor for Class A airspace. What should we know
about safety, based upon ability to fly at various altitude
levels?
Ms. Gilligan. Well, Senator, I think there are a couple of
elements to that. And I'm sure Mr. Baker can expand upon it, as
well. The one that you point out is that the structure within
the airspace tends to separate aircraft based on the technical
abilities of the aircraft. Lower airspace is not as conducive
to jet operation, for example, or to commercial operations.
Higher altitudes allow the aircraft to be more efficient. So,
there are some elements of the airspace design that suggest
separation of operations by altitude. There's also----
Senator Moran. My question is, Can we make safety
considerations different at lower altitudes because larger
commercial aircraft are at--flying at higher altitudes?
Ms. Gilligan. Well, of course, all of the commercial
aircraft pass through those lower altitudes, at least for
departure and arrival. But, there are some differences that we
do apply within those different airspaces, depending on exactly
what the operations are that are in that environment. Is that
helpful?
Senator Moran. It's helpful, although I guess what I was
trying to find is, What difference does it make whether the
threshold is 14,000 feet or 18,000 feet or 10,000 feet on these
safety considerations for private pilots?
Ms. Gilligan. One of the safety considerations is related
to 10,000 feet and below, because, at those altitudes, the
aircraft does not need to be pressurized. And so, you don't add
the added risk that you would lose pressurization and the pilot
would lose consciousness. That's separate from the airspace
issue that you raised initially.
So, there are some elements of the airspace design that
address safety risks, and there are some elements related to
altitude that assure the pilot a little more protection from
what might be a safety risk.
Senator Moran. Thank you very much.
Mr. Baker, anything you'd like for me to know about this
topic?
Mr. Baker. Well, to be more clear about it, I think the
idea that you need supplemental oxygen above 12,500 for any
length of time--and supplemental oxygen can be just cannulas in
your nose--to safely fly up to 18,000 feet. And then, above
18,000 feet, you're required to have a pressure mask on so
there's full-on oxygen as your supplemental. You can still fly
up to 27,000 or 30,000 feet with supplemental oxygen, but it's
a different type of mask.
So, I don't see any safety issue, as long as you're doing
what's required today, which is supplemental oxygen below
18,000 feet, pressurized or non-pressurized, as a safety issue.
Senator Moran. OK, thank you.
Let me turn to--I want to go--let me come back to you, Mr.
Baker. We're hearing about pilot shortage. What is it that AOPA
and others--what can pilot schools--what are we doing to
promote--when I was a kid in high school, we had Civil Air
Patrol, and all of us kids got interested in Civil Air Patrol.
I know it still exists. But, what is it that can be done for
another generation to address some of the issues that--that get
excited about flying and can address some of the issues about
pilot shortage and compensation? How do we make this a career
path for additional Americans?
Mr. Baker. It's a great question. And we're testing a
couple of programs now, called the You Can Fly Program, which
will be--150/152 Cessnas. If you've ever been around them,
that's what most people learned how to fly in--called the J-3--
--
Senator Moran. I know those.
Mr. Baker. Yes. The J-3 of our generation. And we've got a
number of those in states right now. We're trying to get people
actively involved in joining a flying club. But, even starting
a little bit earlier in the game, working with a number of high
schools, we have a program that we call STEM-A--you know,
Science, Technology, Engineering, Math, and Aviation. And so,
we've found some best practices that we're trying to share with
educators that gets people involved in education--career
decision or, frankly, if it's recreation flying, as well. But,
we want to get really involved with the high school training
programs and start sharing what we know what works around
certain parts of the country, and then remind people that they
can afford to fly with these flying clubs. It makes flying very
affordable if they just want to do it for recreation, as well.
So, we look at ourselves as a role to try and reenergize
general aviation.
Senator Moran. Well, if you--your organization or others
are interested, we'd love--Wichita, Kansas, other places in
Kansas--to be a part of that process. If I can help encourage
STEM-A and encourage people to have an interest in becoming
pilots, professionally or as a hobby, a sport, for personal
enjoyment, please include me in it, if there's any way I can be
of assistance. And----
Captain Sullenberger. Senator, may I quickly add? This is--
--
Senator Moran. Yes, I'm sorry.
Captain Sullenberger. My first officer on the Hudson
flight, Jeff Skiles, and I, for 4 years immediately after our
famous flight, were co-chair of the EAA Young Eagles Program,
which is a worldwide program to encourage youth to be
enthusiastic about flying and, in fact, to get them a first
flight with a volunteer pilot, you know, to connect the dream
with the reality. So, that's something we're very familiar
with, and EAA Young Eagles is a big program that encourages
thousands to do just that.
Senator Moran. Captain, great to know that. And you'd have
the standing, the stature that would excite young people today,
and I appreciate your----
Captain Sullenberger. Thank you.
Senator Moran.--interest and involvement in that program.
My time is expired.
I would only say, in concluding, Ms. Black, that the issue
of reliability of air service by regional companies in my state
of Kansas and, I assume, across the country, it's a serious
challenge. It's hard for people to make decisions about flying
a regional jet. I've been a champion of Essential Air Service
since I came to Congress. There was a commitment made to many
of my communities in our state, and we go out and fight, here
in Congress, for the financial support of Essential Air
Service, but, if we have a regional carrier that fails to
provide the reliability, the reliable service--people are
having a difficult time deciding whether to buy a ticket on
some scheduled regional airlines, with the uncertainty of
whether or not that flight is actually going to take off. And,
you know, the explanation is often that there's a pilot
shortage, but it sure makes it difficult for us to continue to
advocate for regional service, and Essential Air Service that's
a component of that, without that reliability.
Ms. Black. I think when we restore--may I respond?
Senator Moran. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Black. I think when we restore some certainty to the
pipeline, and we can get a little bit more stability on pilot
supply, a lot of those issues will be resolved. Frankly, we
have one major EAS carrier that formerly served 64 communities,
and is now serving 32 because it cannot staff all of its
flights. That's just one example of the impact of the pilot
shortage in those communities.
This is something that we're seeing--it's not just the EAS
carriers, but all of our carriers. Every day, carriers are
canceling revenue flights because of the pilot shortage. And we
know that impacts the reliability. I'm very close to the EAS
Program, and a shared advocate. And we think it is really
important. We know that that ability to use the service, and to
know that the flight is going to take off when you want it to,
for businesses especially, is essential. And so, I think that
this is critical--this is a very critical issue for Essential
Air Service.
Another issue that we have is, given the pilot supply
issues, carriers are unable to even bid on those routes. So you
get more and more carriers that are bidding under the Alternate
EAS Program. And so, in that case, you now have carriers who
aren't even required to meet the ATP regulations, fulfilling
this contract flying, because the other carriers who do have to
meet the ATP requirements can't fill the flying anymore.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
Thanks, Chairman.
Senator Ayotte. Senator Manchin.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOE MANCHIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And thank all of you for being here.
And, to all the family members and those of Flight 3407,
thank you for not wavering at all in trying to help us make the
skies safer. So, I thank you for being here.
Let me just say this. On the Pilot's Bill of Rights,
Senator Inhofe and I have introduced that, and I think, Mr.
Baker, you're very familiar with that. We've been working on
that for quite some time. And, you know, one of the fundamental
problems we tried to fix with the original Pilot's Bill of
Rights, was a flawed appeals process. So, I would just ask you,
since you've been working on this so hard: are the pilots today
getting a fair and unbiased review of the FAA decision in U.S.
District Court?
Mr. Baker. If I understand the question correctly, and as
you know, the process of appeals through the NTSB, a number of
years ago, was quite a bit worse, but has improved pretty
steadily. So, I'm still concerned, and not a lawyer, that there
are still some people hung up in the system and there should be
some type of circuit breaker, if you will, in how we approach
those kinds of legal issues. I think there's still room for
more improvement.
Senator Manchin. Well, being a pilot, myself, I have 3,000
hours, but, my hours were accumulated, Captain, over 40-some
years. So, I would ask, as far as from a safety standpoint, the
time, the 1,500 hours, I don't think--I have to agree with you,
I--going backward would not be a way for us to--respect for Ms.
Black--I'd just agree with the direction you're going on this,
from a safety standpoint. I know the decisions I've had to make
over the many years, but I'm asking, Does simulator time count?
Do they count simulator time toward 1500 hours?
Captain Sullenberger. No.
Senator Manchin. No simulator at all.
Captain Sullenberger. I think there's some credit for
university experience, classroom experience.
Senator Manchin. OK. Does the 1,500--do you accumulate when
you're a co-pilot, flying second seat? Does that accumulate?
Captain Sullenberger. It's----
Senator Manchin. Is it all pilot in command--1,500 hours
pilot in command?
Captain Sullenberger. Go ahead.
Ms. Gilligan. There are some circumstances where taking the
second seat can be counted as that flight time. It depends on
how the aircraft is designed and certified. So, if it is
certified for a two-man crew, that time does count. If it is
certified for a single pilot only, even though they may have a
second pilot, that time does not always----
Senator Manchin. Is it 1,500 hours----
Ms. Gilligan. I'm sorry.
Senator Manchin.--in the type they're flying, or just----
Ms. Gilligan. No.
Senator Manchin.--1,500 hours flying time?
Ms. Gilligan. You must have 1,500 hours of flight time
before you can apply for the----
Senator Manchin. So, I could apply.
Ms. Gilligan.--airline transport pilot----
Senator Manchin. I could apply, with the hours I have.
Ms. Gilligan. Correct.
Senator Manchin. OK. I don't think you want me in the left
seat right now----
[Laughter.]
Senator Manchin.--flying around----
Captain Sullenberger. You also----
Senator Manchin.--around the country.
Captain Sullenberger. You also need a type rating now.
Senator Manchin. Yes, a type rating, OK.
The other thing is, Is there any time period? So, a period
of time--1,500 hours within what period of time?
Ms. Gilligan. No, sir. The rules--the----
Senator Manchin. So, again----
Ms. Gilligan.--neither the statute----
Senator Manchin.--I've got 3-----
Ms. Gilligan.--nor the rule limit that.
Senator Manchin. I've got 3,000 hours. And if I go back and
get type rating, I could----
Ms. Gilligan. So--the 1,500 hours qualifies you to take the
airline transport pilot test, along with some additional
specific training in high altitude and----
Senator Manchin. I gotcha.
Ms. Gilligan.--and weather operations that you must
demonstrate that you had, as well. And then you must pass those
tests. And then, if you were to be hired by the airline, you'd
then receive training on the aircraft type and receive your----
Senator Manchin. No problem, I----
Ms. Gilligan.--type rating.
Senator Manchin.--I understand all that.
To both of you two, and I'll--Captain, I'll go to you
first. I know that you're saying that there's no pilot
shortage. There's people coming into the system. We'll call it
``into the queue,'' basically. They could be doing that. And
you're saying that the regionals are not paying the price to,
basically, get those quality of people in there. And I think
Ms. Black is saying completely different, because she's not
getting the pilots she needs, and she has to lower that
criteria for them to get the pilots. Am I correct in where I
heard both of you?
Ms. Black. No, we are not--if I could just----
Senator Manchin. Real quick, and then we'll----
Ms. Black.--recharacterize----
Senator Manchin.--have the Captain. OK.
Captain Sullenberger. Yes. There are, Senator, 110,000
pilots in this country with the airline transport pilot
certificate. There are another 65,000 who could quickly get it.
Really, the issue has been, for several years, that there are
some companies that just aren't good places to work. And the
word has gotten out. And the first officer on the Colgan Air
flight was making $16,400 a year. She was based in Newark,
could not afford an apartment, even to share one, where she was
based. She was commuting from her parents' home in Seattle, on
poverty-level wages, probably qualified for food stamps. That--
--
Senator Manchin. But, was that even----
Captain Sullenberger.--that is the--that's the reality of
that life.
Senator Manchin. OK. Even more disturbing than that is,
they put her on a flight where she had known icing conditions,
flying in winter weather, and not prepared. I can't--it's
unfathomable, for me, to think that----
Captain Sullenberger. Well, the--it's----
Senator Manchin.--that the----
Captain Sullenberger. To the extent that there----
Senator Manchin.--that anyone would--regional would put her
in that situation, knowing she wasn't----
Captain Sullenberger. Right.
Senator Manchin.--she even knew she wasn't qualified for
that, correct?
Captain Sullenberger. She obviously didn't feel comfortable
with that.
Senator Manchin. Yes, that's tough, because----
Captain Sullenberger. And so, the----
Senator Manchin.--she was flying a----
Captain Sullenberger--to the extent that there's a problem,
the--it has been self-inflicted by the industry for paying low
wages and having bad working conditions for so many years that
there is a perception that, if you want to have a successful
career, you might look elsewhere, in the financial world, for
example, and not become----
Senator Manchin. That's right.
Captain Sullenberger,--a pilot.
Senator Manchin. Ms. Black, giving you the final on that,
if you can.
Ms. Black. Thank you.
Senator Manchin. Explain to us why--or have they changed
their criteria of the quality of the pilot and what they're
prepared to fly in, what type of weather?
Ms. Black. I'm sorry?
Senator Manchin. Do you make determinations--I mean, are
you looking at the person's qualifications, how they got the
hours, where they accumulated the hours? Did they do it all
down in Florida and not up in the Northeast? Where the weather
conditions--I mean----
Ms. Black. Well, I think that question really speaks to the
heart of the matter. And, first of all, I want to say we do not
want to roll back safety. We do not want to move backwards.
We're proposing an alternative pathway. And we're doing so, in
large part, because we are seeing negative, unintended
consequences from the 1,500 hours provision, because flight
time does not equal experience. And so, when I hear that you
want to hire an experienced pilot, I agree, but I don't agree
that 1,500 hours in an unstructured environment, where you're
largely flying in fair weather, is going to provide experience.
And it actually speaks to the point.
Senator Manchin. What makes a difference if it's 1,000 or
1,500 or 500? They're going to get accumulated the same way,
quickly as they can.
Ms. Black. Well, we're seeing some data emerge that show
that, after about 500 hours or so, there is negative learning.
So, folks pick up bad habits when they're trying to fly----
Senator Manchin. You survive 1,500 hours, you had to make
some decisions.
Ms. Black. Indeed, you do. Indeed, you do. But, there is no
guarantee that that 1,500 hours is actually spent in a
scenario-based environment.
Senator Manchin. Yes.
Ms. Black. They're really--it's not contributing to what
you see in a commercial airline cockpit.
Now, that said, what I think we can do is propose an
alternate pathway that takes advantage of the scenario-based
training that you get through structured training. This
certainly does include some flying. But, that flying is done in
a structured environment. There is a room for flight
instruction. There's a room for the traditional pathway. But,
at some point, after around 500 or 750 hours, if you are away
from your time in training, you've come out of these great
structured training programs, and then we say to you, ``Now,
you now have to spend a year just building flight time, away
from your training'' I find it surprising that there is
disagreement--certainly seems commonsensical that one would
lose skill over time. It seems natural that one would--your
skills would deteriorate. And we're seeing that.
Our airlines are seeing a diminished quality of the
applicants. This is a very real situation. It gets to the heart
of a pilot's professional development. We're prepared to make
the investment. The characterization that we are trying to cut
costs or don't want to make the investment is just not correct.
Safety is an investment we willingly make, but we need to
restore a pathway that makes sense, that takes a pilot from
structured training, and prepares them, not just, as Ms.
Gilligan says, to respond to an emergency, but prevent it in
the first place.
Senator Manchin. Sure. You can understand if there's a
person who's been in the left seat for 20,000 hours telling us
one thing, and you're representing an organization, you would
think that maybe we might lean a little bit toward the
experience?
Ms. Black. I would ask you to look at the data.
Senator Manchin. I understand that, but, I mean----
Ms. Black.--don't take my word for it, look at the data.
Senator Manchin.--I'm a pilot, too, so I understand.
Ms. Black. Right.
Senator Manchin. And as--no disrespect. But, you know,
we're going to be leaning in that direction, probably, a little
bit more. Sorry.
My time is up. And I'm so sorry, Madam Chairman.
Senator Ayotte. We might forgive you this time. Thanks,
Senator Manchin.
[Laughter.]
Senator Ayotte. I would like to call on Senator Fischer.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Gilligan, you noted in your testimony that, between
1998 and 2008, the fatality risk for commercial aviation in the
United States fell by 83 percent. And I commend the FAA and the
aviation industry for this tremendous accomplishment. Can you
provide the Committee details on how the FAA has cooperated
with industry and other stakeholders to reach this goal? And
what has the role of technology been in reaching this goal?
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you, Senator.
We believe that the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, which
is a partnership between FAA, NASA, DOD, and the commercial
aviation industry, had a large role to play in the safety
improvements that we've seen. It's always very hard to say, as
an industry, we implemented X, and, because of that, we saved
this many accidents. You can't make that direct correlation.
But, we do know that, voluntarily, we and the industry
implemented a number of safety enhancements in that time
period. And we believe that the record speaks for itself, that
that kind of partnership, where you look at the data, you
understand where the hazards are, you agree on what will
mitigate the risks, and then implement and measure that
implementation, is what accounts for the improvements that
we've seen. Many of those safety enhancements included
technology improvements. Technology does allow the opportunity
for the pilot to be better informed, have better situational
awareness, and oftentimes provides additional time for the
pilot to respond to the hazardous event that's occurring. So,
that's been important. But, pilot training, standard operating
procedures, all of those pieces of the system have helped to
reach that record.
Senator Fischer. OK, thank you.
Mr. Baker, in your written testimony, you mentioned that
one of the major causes of general aviation accidents is loss
of control, which represents nearly 40 percent of all general
aviation accidents. So, how is the general aviation community--
how are you working to address the loss-of-control accidents?
And what specific challenges would you face in that?
Mr. Baker. Well, as Ms. Gilligan mentioned early on, one of
the great devices, I would call it kind of the first test
device on how we're going to make sure we move through the
pathway, is angle of attack. Angle of attack is a very simple
device that tells you if you're about to lose control of the
aircraft. While it has never been required in light GA
aircraft, they've now developed a product, for a couple
thousand dollars, that you can put into an airplane--that can
give you indications--if you're getting close to the stall,
either electronically or physically. So, it's a device that
we've been waiting for a long time. And then, we believe our
role is also continued training and reminding people that stall
training is really important, and fundamental to aviation. And
we've, as I mentioned before, had over 2 million, call it,
``hits'' on our site to make sure that we're really at the
forefront of training pilots and reminding them that that's the
number one issue.
Senator Fischer. OK, thank you.
Ms. Black, we've heard about the challenges for regional
airlines in recruiting pilots. I hear that all the time from my
airports in Nebraska. And what are some of the ways that the
regional airlines are working to recruit and retain pilots who
are returning from military service? Have you focused on that
at all? Are you looking at trying to bring those military
people into jobs within the industry?
Ms. Black. We have. And the first step toward that----
Senator Fischer. And what--I guess I would ask you, you
know, If you're doing it, what do we need to do, and how
Congress can help, and maybe what changes need to happen within
the FAA on that, as well?
Ms. Black. Well, certainly the rule and Congress reflects
the--you know, the importance and the great structure of
military training, by giving military training the 750 hours
credit. And so, I think that that has been helpful.
Unfortunately, there are fewer military pilots coming out. I
think there are more of those who are there that are staying in
the military for longer, and just fewer military pilot
operations, in general. So, we're seeing that.
In terms of our efforts as an industry looking at ways to
get more military pilots, the first step is really identifying
where our carriers are hiring the pilots. And so, we're in that
process now. And so, we'll reach back out to you as we get a
little further along.
Again, I think, with all pathways, to have certainty for
it, just so the aviator knows, coming out of a structured
training program, that they can go into the right seat of an
airline and flow through is going to be very important. We
talked earlier just a little bit about some of the flowthrough
programs that we have. We're proud of them. They're effective.
But, we need a little bit more help with the pathway.
Senator Fischer. OK. I hope you'll be in contact with my
office and let us know if we can help you in any way in getting
the former military personnel into that.
Thank you.
Ms. Black. We certainly will.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Senator Daines.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE DAINES,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Daines. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Baker, I'm a sponsor of the Pilot's Bill of Rights 2. I
do believe that a third-class medical reform will help reverse
this trend of a declining general aviation pilot population
while also maintaining the appropriate level of safety for
pilots who are flying for both private and recreational
purposes.
Your testimony mentions that medical reform has the
potential to improve safety by keeping pilots in the airplanes
they're most familiar with. Could you expand on that a little
further?
Mr. Baker. Yes. The FAA, about a dozen years ago, started
down this path with testing what we call light sport aircraft,
aircraft that are designed to be flown at under 1,320 pounds.
And, in many cases, some old airplanes, like the J-3 Cub of the
1930s, qualifies as a light sport aircraft. And then it evolved
into a large number of aircraft that were built with that
purpose in mind, just to be under 1,300 pounds. In many cases,
those airplanes are fine and they do well, but, in bigger
wind--and you get wind in Montana, I know--it's a little harder
to control those aircraft. So, we're forcing a pilot population
with the number-one most popular airplane, a 172--if a person
chooses not to go down the medical path and get it done, they
move downstream into a light sport aircraft, in an aircraft
they're not as familiar with, potentially, and not as capable
of an airplane to fly in conditions.
Senator Daines. That helps.
Do you think this will help prevent the decline of a pilot
population, which I believe is averaging about 6,000 pilots per
year?
Mr. Baker. I do. You know, there are over 350,000 pilots
under age 75 that are on the sidelines today. And there are a
number of reasons. Could be economic, could be family, could be
all kinds of--we believe a significant percentage of them would
stay in the game and play in the game longer if they weren't
burdened with this outdated regulatory issue.
Senator Daines. Thanks, Mr. Baker.
Ms. Gilligan, I want to shift gears now and go out to
eastern Montana. We had Administrator Huerta here recently, and
we were discussing the ongoing safety concerns from our general
aviation pilots relating to the expansion of the Powder River
Training Complex in eastern Montana, the MOA, that's a part of
Ellsworth Air Force Base. As the Administrator in charge of
safety of the FAA, I'd like to discuss the safety of the
airspace surrounding the Baker Airport in Montana. I think when
this idea was originally launched years ago, Baker was a pretty
sleepy little part of southeast Montana. Well, it has been
waking up with the energy boom, the Keystone Pipeline routes
right through the middle of it. The Baker on-ramp, which will
be 100,000 barrels a day of oil, is right there near the Baker
Airport. The FAA said they would take an adaptive management
approach to the implementation of this airspace. Could you
describe what ``adaptive management'' means? Maybe that's
something that's described at the FAA. What does ``adaptive
management'' look like?
Ms. Gilligan. Well, sir, I'm not fully familiar with all of
the details of this particular project. And we certainly can
provide that to you and your staff, to make sure that you have
a full understanding of it.
Ms. Gilligan. But, what we are looking at is how we can
best manage the airspace to accommodate both growth and assure
the appropriate levels of safety at the same time. Growth is a
risk factor. And so, we need to understand how the airspace--
air traffic, whatever--can manage that growth to assure an
appropriate level of safety. And the Air Traffic organization
does its safety risk analysis to be sure that that's being
properly handled.
Senator Daines. Yes, that Baker Airport has over 7,000
annual operations and I think that's the concern, where it's
all headed, with the growth. Would radar coverage, real time
communication between air traffic control military and civilian
aircraft, help reduce some of the risk, as I think about this
adaptive management approach?
Ms. Gilligan. It may well, sir. That's what the safety risk
analysis would have to address. I believe a safety risk
analysis either has been completed or is underway for that
particular project. And, through that, we'll identify if risks
or hazards are being introduced, and what the mitigations would
be required to address them.
Senator Daines. Along the lines, your testimony highlights
the FAA's proactive nature in identifying and addressing risks
to prevent accidents. As part of the flying public, I thank you
for that.
Specifically, the successful Commercial Aviation Safety
Team, the CAST model, which uses data to develop an
understanding of the best actions or interventions to prevent
accidents, do you know, and this may be getting in the weeds,
here, with the Power River MOA, but, do you know if the CAST
model has been used in active military operation areas, MOAs?
Ms. Gilligan. Well, the Department of Defense is a member
of the Commercial Aviation Safety Team. But, again, sir, we
tend, at that group, to look at systemic, broader issues that
perhaps individual members of the team can't really address on
their own.
Senator Daines. Would they----
Ms. Gilligan. So, that particular issue is not something
that the Commercial Aviation Safety Team has taken on.
Senator Daines. They're not necessarily taking that
methodology and using that with MOAs, that you know of?
Ms. Gilligan. I'm not aware that they are.
Senator Daines. OK. All right. Thank you.
I'm out of time.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Senator----
Captain Sullenberger. May I quickly add? I used to fly F-4
Phantoms out of the Nellis Air Force Base range complex. And,
while it was often restricted areas, as well as MOAs, I think
that realtime traffic that was provided, the realtime use
statistics of the airspace often made it available to
civilians. I think the Nellis Air Force Base range complex
would be a model that you might want to consider taking a look
at.
Senator Daines. Thank you for that.
By the way, I texted my son. I said I was in a hearing with
you. And he texted me back and said, ``A true American hero.''
Captain Sullenberger. Thank you. Thank you.
Senator Daines. That's saying something from a son I'm very
proud of. Thank you, Captain.
Senator Ayotte. Senator Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I would echo Senator Daines' comments. This is actually
a great panel. So, really, really appreciate everybody's
testimony. Very, very informative. It just--wide variety of
views. I really appreciate what you're doing. I think that
we're all in agreement on the importance of safety for our
citizens, for the flying public. You've made some very
important contributions already.
I want to talk about the issue of regulations with regard
to how we do this in a way that's most effective. And, Ms.
Gilligan, I want to start with you. We had a hearing last week
with regard to infrastructure, in terms of aviation. And, as
you know, a key part of safety is aviation infrastructure,
whether it's updates to runways and things. One of the things
that has been, I think, for many Americans, many Members of
Congress, a frustration, is just how long infrastructure
projects now take. We had the manager of the Seattle-Tacoma
Airport testifying last week, it took 15 years to permit an
additional runway at that airport, not the building--took 3
years to build it--15 years to permit it, simply permit it. Do
you think that the aviation infrastructure delivery process
needs reform, particularly on the upfront regulatory side? And
would you be willing to work with this committee on suggested
streamlining, particularly of infrastructure projects that
relate to aviation? We need those out there. And yet, we have a
system that pretty much inhibits the ability to do that.
Ms. Gilligan. Well, sir, as you're aware, we have an Office
of Airports, which is responsible for setting those design and
safety standards. But, I can assure you that the FAA is willing
to work with this committee and with your staff on any
initiatives that you believe are important to consider in the
reauthorization proposal. So, I am not as familiar with what
some of those safety and design standards are, as----
Senator Sullivan. Right.
Ms. Gilligan.--are airports organization. But, certainly
we'll be willing to work with the Committee on those kinds of
questions.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
I had a follow-up question for you and Mr. Baker. It is
relating to the ADSB plan. And, you know, that is something,
particularly--in many ways, was pioneered in Alaska and, right
now, leaves approximately one-third of Alaska without coverage
with regard to altitudes that our general aviation pilots fly.
I know it's not practical to have full coverage. But, do you
believe that there is a minimum operational network that we
could have with regard to ADSB coverage in the state that is
something that would provide safety but also a target to shoot
for, given, again, how important safety is, but also,
obviously, how large the state of Alaska is? I'd welcome
comments from either of you.
Mr. Baker. Senator Sullivan, I've flown in Alaska a number
of times, myself, in small airplanes, and I've seen the
advantages of ADSB, where it works, and the traffic, and other
things, and the weather that you can now see. So, I'm a big
supporter of ADSB. We want to get down the path. And we've now
started to encourage our members to start equipping in the
Lower 48. But, we also want to work with the FAA on pockets and
places as we go down the line----
Senator Sullivan. Right.
Mr. Baker.--that really need attention. But, we're fully on
board with supporting the growth of ADSB; and whatever it takes
to fill in the last pieces, we're going to be pushing for that.
Senator Sullivan. Great. And do you think that there is--I
mean, that we could get to a minimum operational network in a
place like Alaska, where obviously you're not going to have a--
you're not going to have coverage over the entire State, but
shooting for that kind of minimum that's helpful, in terms of
safety?
Ms. Gilligan. Well, Senator, as you point out, Alaska has
been a leader in ADSB and other technologies to enhance the
level of safety in those very difficult environments, like
Alaska. I don't know that we've committed to a particular level
of network service. And we certainly can provide that
information back to the Committee.
Again, we're always willing to work with any initiatives
that will enhance safety and make the system more efficient.
Senator Sullivan. Good. We would like to work on that and--
with our pilots on that initiative.
Finally, Mr. Baker, you mention in your testimony a lot--
you talk a lot about the importance and success of the
industry, working with the FAA to address many of the safety
issues. One of the things that struck me is that you're doing
that in a way that I think is very useful, but also doesn't go
through the rather formal and cumbersome rule process that can
take--again, back to my original question--years. Can you
highlight some of the examples where we--you've been working on
a more informal basis with the FAA to make progress on some of
the safety issues that get proper input from industry?
Mr. Baker. I think we've worked together well on a number
of issues including the angle of attack indicator, which we've
pretty much covered here today, as a device that will show if
you're near or close to a stall of your aircraft, and we are
excited about that technology. But, now, when you think
forward, you know, we've got over 40,000--almost 20 percent--of
our total airplanes that were built before 1965.
Senator Sullivan. Wow.
Mr. Baker. And so, we need to think further ahead about
safety devices, like inexpensive autopilots, that should be
part of the thinking as we go down the line. You know, iPads
have changed the way we think about navigation situational
awareness. And how we're using them today in the cockpits, it's
completely changed, you know, the old way of unfolding maps.
So, as we work through the future, we've got to think about the
inventory of these airplanes out there that are very important
transportation devices, in many cases, and certainly important
recreation. So, we've got a number of meetings set up to
determine how do we equip, further down the line, after we get
past ADSB.
Senator Sullivan. Right.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I want to thank the panel again for your excellent
testimony. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I'm going to call on Senator Cantwell, who has an
additional question.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I know we're trying to wrap up, here. And I just wanted to
get in a few things I wanted to be clear on.
Mr. Hart, you believe that we should close this loophole as
it relates to cargo pilots on the sleep rule. Is that correct?
Mr. Hart. That's correct. Medical fitness for duty is one
of our Most Wanted items, and a huge part of medical fitness is
fatigue. Fatigue applies to everybody who's operating complex
equipment.
Senator Cantwell. And, Miss Gilligan, did the FAA make this
recommendation before? And then it didn't get through the
process at OMB, or something of that nature?
Ms. Gilligan. The notice of proposed rulemaking in the
change to flight duty and rest rules did include the cargo
community. As we completed the process for that rule, it was
determined that we could not justify that requirement. But, as
I've pointed out, we do believe that there are other ways that
that risk is being fully addressed. Our inspectors are working
with the cargo carriers to make sure that, through their safety
management systems, the cargo carriers are looking at their
schedules to determine whether, in fact, fatigue is an element
of risk, and, if so, that they address----
Senator Cantwell. But, the FAA made the recommendation
before, right? So, it's just a matter of--we have NTSB, who has
made the recommendation, believes that we should make all
pilots under the same fatigue rules, and the FAA, you're
saying, is looking at this--had previously looked at closing
this loophole.
Ms. Gilligan. We had proposed it that way, but, as I said,
we could not sustain that proposal through the final rule.
Again, Safety Management Systems require that the carrier look
for risk. They have to identify if they have any part of their
operation where there's a hazard. When they find that, they
must address it. They'll do that----
Senator Cantwell. And what are we----
Ms. Gilligan.--in conjunction with our inspectors.
Senator Cantwell. And what are we supposed to think about
this issue that popped up in Seattle? A man falling asleep in
the--you know, the issue of outsourcing maintenance and
possibly, you know, saving dollars or something of that nature,
and finding somebody who falls asleep in the cargo hold. Should
we be looking at the entire maintenance crew and their
operations and their systems?
Ms. Gilligan. Again, through the safety----
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Hart?
Ms. Gilligan. Oh, I'm sorry, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Hart?
Mr. Hart. Our fatigue recommendations are broad in their
application. It's not only pilots. It's maintenance, it's air
traffic controllers, it's everybody in the system.
Senator Cantwell. OK. Thank you.
Ms. Gilligan, sorry, did you want to add something?
Ms. Gilligan. I'm sorry.
But, again, with the safety management system, the new rule
that we have that's going into place, the carriers will have
that responsibility. They need to analyze where they have
hazards in their system, whether it's a specific rule or it is
some operating procedure or process that they have which is
introducing a hazard. So, if there is fatigue in how they're
scheduling their maintenance workers or how the maintenance
work is completed, they will need to analyze that and correct
it.
Senator Cantwell. Well, it's certainly a wake-up call. And
people--I think we need to ask these questions. And FAA just
recently said to United Airlines, ``We have concerns about what
you're doing.'' So, I think we've got to make sure that
everybody is complying with what we believe are the best
conditions for flying.
Captain Sullenberger, did you want to add a comment to
that?
Captain Sullenberger. I certainly do. SMS and fatigue risk
management systems are important, but they are additional
layers, additional safeguards. What we need to do is close the
loophole, solve the fundamental problem, ensure that the cargo
carriers have to build schedules that comply with Federal
Aviation regulation 117, which is the fatigue rule that the
passenger airlines have to comply with, and not try to fix it
later with, quite frankly, a bandaid approach. We need to solve
the problem. Fatigue is fatigue, whether you're carrying
passengers or packages.
Senator Cantwell. And maintenance?
Captain Sullenberger. And maintenance.
Senator Cantwell. OK, thank you.
Captain Sullenberger. Thank you.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I would like to call on Senator Peters.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you,
Ranking Member Cantwell, for holding this hearing. And
certainly it has been a fascinating hearing, and I enjoyed the
conversation from our panelists.
I know there has been quite a bit of discussion on the
required hours and pilot experience prior to being a co-pilot.
So, I wanted to explore that a little bit further, if I may.
Ms. Black, you talked about the pay structure of regional
airlines in the $22,000 to $24,000 starting salary. How does
that compare to one of our major airlines? What do they pay
their pilots?
Ms. Black. I'm not as familiar with the mainline pay
scales. I can say that I have one airline that is paying more
than some mainline counterparts. But, at both regionals and
mainlines, that first-year pay is often lower. It jumps, in
both cases, by--or at least in the regional case, by about 32
percent by year 2, and then about 50 percent by year 5.
Senator Peters. Now, for most of these folks who are coming
out--because, as we've talked about earlier, we don't have as
many military pilots as we once had, which was a source of
pilots with significant hours--we now have folks who are
basically training themselves, in the fact that they have to
seek out training and pay for it on their own dime. Do you have
any numbers as to the amount of debt the average student has
when they come out after they've completed training?
Ms. Black. I don't, but I know that our university partners
do. And so, I'd like to get that back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Regional Airline Association
Hon. Gary Peters,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Peters,
On April 28, during the Senate Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on
Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security hearing entitled ``FAA
Reauthorization: Aviation Safety and General Aviation,'' you inquired
into the costs of flight training and the average debt a student
carries when they have completed training.
While the Regional Airline Association (RAA) does not collect this
information, during that hearing I offered to get the information from
the University Aviation Association. Unfortunately, the University
Aviation Association does not collect this information either, so we
extrapolated some cost estimates on our own.
Based on an examination of four year programs at six public and six
private Aviation Accreditation Board International (AABI) accredited
universities meeting the requirements of 14 CFR Sec. 61.160, we
determined a total cost of $220,557 for private universities and,
assuming out-of-state tuition, $176,328 for public universities. These
totals include four years of room and board rates and do not reflect
financial aid or scholarships.\1\ The above totals also include the
flight fees at these universities, which equate to an average of
$56,917 at private universities and $58,809 at public universities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Assumptions & Notes: Only 4 year AABI accredited bachelor's
programs meeting Sec. 61.160(b) included; 6 public and 6 private
universities included; Half of the universities include CFI, half do
not; When universities provided ranges as estimates, the high end of
the estimates is assumed; Assumed no prior flight experience, all
certificates and ratings earned at university; For public institutions,
assumed out-of-state tuition; Included room & board rates for 4 years
(8 semesters); Some universities include FAA examination fees in
tuition, others do not; Assumed no financial aid (scholarship or
otherwise).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We hope that these estimates are helpful, and we are happy to
answer any follow-up questions concerning methodology or otherwise.
Sincerely,
Faye Malarkey Black,
Interim President,
Regional Airline Association.
cc: The Honorable John Thune, Chairman
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate
The Honorable Bill Nelson, Ranking Member
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate
Senator Peters. Well, I'd like to know that.
Captain Sullenberger, you've had a long history in the
airlines. Do you have any idea the differential in pay between
a regional airline and somebody coming into one of the majors?
Captain Sullenberger. I would imagine at least 50 percent.
Senator Peters. A minimum of 50 percent----
Captain Sullenberger. Yes.
Senator Peters.--coming in.
Captain Sullenberger. And I would add that this widespread
perception that jobs--entry-level jobs at the regional carriers
are not good ones is deserved. And it's become more widely
known. And I think, to the extent that there are people who are
making other life choices for themselves and for their
families, it's because of that. This is something that they've
done to themselves, and it's easily reconcilable if they simply
offer starting wages and working conditions that will attract
qualified candidates, which are out there, but who are
currently doing other things.
Senator Peters. Ms. Black, it looks like you want to
respond.
Ms. Black. Yes, if I may. Regional airlines are part of the
natural career progression. I think that's a natural fact.
First-year first officer wages, in particular, are lower, for a
number of reasons. First of all, the marketplace; second, as
you know, in many cases, they are collectively bargained. I
have to point out, when we talk about wages, we have several
examples of regional airlines who attempted to unilaterally
raise first-year first entrant pay, and they were rejected by
the union. So, when we talk about pay--and I think we should--
we do need our labor partners to acknowledge that they share a
role in that process, too. We agree that it's important to
raise those salaries.
The good news is, we have raised the salaries. The
marketplace is reacting naturally, I think. And so, as part of
the natural career progression, pay jumps again and again. And
it's a--meant to be a seamless progression from regionals to
mainlines.
Senator Peters. But, still, I mean, with--the reason why a
young person's going to question whether or not to go into the
career, it's not because they don't love flying, because it's
a--I would have loved to have been a pilot, myself, but I wear
glasses; it was difficult to do, as a young man. It's changed,
I think, now. But, it's because of the economics. That is--very
expensive process. You have to pay for the structured flight
training. And what is the number of hours you come out of
structured training?
Ms. Black. Yes, between about 350 and 550.
Senator Peters. So, then you need to get----
Ms. Black. I mean, you----
Senator Peters.--another 1,000 hours of----
Ms. Black. That's----
Senator Peters.--flying time. And if you----
Ms. Black. That's true.
Senator Peters.--and if you are flying, you're probably--
well, different aircraft; you're not going to be flying a jet,
you're probably going to be an instructor and--does that
impact--Captain Sullenberger, does that impact--even though
someone may have 1500 hours, you know, if they're paying for it
on their own dime and they know they've got to minimize their
cost because they're not going to make a lot of money when they
first come out, does that alter the aircraft choice or the job
opportunities for them? And is that really adequate training
when you step into the cockpit of a jet?
Captain Sullenberger. There are several things I want to
make clear here. First is that pilot passion will only carry
you so far, the same as passion for any profession will. At
some point, like everyone else, like all of us, we are going to
want to be able to buy a car or have a family or eventually buy
a house and have a life. And we need to have career path that's
going to enable us to do that. That's why the regional airlines
have had so much trouble, because they've been offering, for so
many years, a substandard set of wages and working conditions
to try to continue to make fit in the real world a broken
economic model. So, simply by correcting that, the--all that
follows from it will be much better.
Let me also set the record straight. A lot has been talked
about structured versus unstructured training. They make it
seem that there are two things out there that exist that really
don't. And one thing that doesn't exist, it doesn't matter.
First of all, the regional airlines, as compared to the majors,
in spite of the improvements that they've made that have been
essentially forced on them by the Airline Safety Act of 2010,
still are not up to the same level as the large major airlines,
in terms of their training. They just don't have the same kind
of environment that the majors do.
The majors also depend upon having pilots show up who have
the qualifications. Again, it's important that everyone who
gets in the first officer's seat of a regional airliner or a
major airline as a pilot is fully qualified from the outset.
The other thing I want to clear up is that there's somehow
something wrong with having other flying jobs and having real-
world experience. Let me explain to you the difference between
the structured, you know, hand-holding training environment and
the often ambiguous and messy real world of operational flying.
In the real world of operational flying, you have to develop
the judgment, you have to have the skills, you have to have the
knowledge to do the job. And that is something that's built
over a period of time. That's as important as having the
training environment, which is really a much more sterile
environment. And when you--you aren't as able to make those
judgments, aren't as able to develop that skill.
So, both are important. Again, we're back to the false
dichotomy that they're trying to impose on this debate of
quality versus quantity. And, of course, we need, we must, we
can have both.
Senator Peters. Right. Thank you.
I think my time is expired. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte. Senator Blumenthal.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
I appreciated your comment just now, Captain Sullenberger,
about the difference between the real world and the training
environment and the qualities that are necessary to deal with
the real world, as there are in many endeavors and challenges,
which are different from what can be experienced in the
artificial environment in training. And you mentioned those
skills and experience and the passion for flying. And I think,
you know, one quality that sort of pervades all of them is
mental health. And I don't know whether you have given
thought--and I would invite the rest of the panelists, as
well--to whether there should be better screening for mental
health periodically, just as we do for physical health, because
mental health can impact those qualities of readiness and skill
and even fatigue. We're here today, in part, because, in 2009,
the tragic crash of Flight 3407 in Buffalo was the result of,
in part, fatigue. But, fatigue often masks mental health
issues.
So, my sort of open-ended question to you--and, by the way,
I appreciate that Beverly Eckert's sister is--Nancy--is here
today from--Beverly Eckert, of Stamford, perished in that
crash.
My question to you and maybe the other panelists, if they
wish to answer, is whether mental health should be a subject of
screening, whether it should be not only an issue that's put to
the pilot or co-pilot, but also to his fellow pilots and co-
pilots, because they're the ones who are likely to get to know
him or her and see whether that person continues to have a
passion for his or her work, a focus and concentration, a real
ability to function in those demanding circumstances when the
challenges are greatest.
So, I invite you to address that topic.
Captain Sullenberger. Senator, thank you. I'd be glad to.
This obviously is something I have not only thought about,
but I've recently written about. In fact, the Germanwings
crash--a shocking, horrific event that's unimaginable to
professional pilots; it flies in the face of everything that we
stand for, everything that we believe--is illustrative in
several ways. First of all, this particular pilot, who had just
over 600 hours, I believe, probably an MPL pilot, could not,
under current standards, have been an airline pilot in the
United States. Didn't have the requisite experience. And the
downside of not having had the requisite experience is that he
wasn't vetted repeatedly by a series of different employers in
a series of different flying jobs. He wasn't observed for a
longer period of time. And the 149 people on that airplane paid
a horrific price for those failures.
It's also important that we realize that, in any domain--
and we've known now for 40 years, in having a history of using
aviation safety self-reporting systems, that there is some
critical safety information that can only be gleaned by self-
reporting, and from no other source.
So, whatever choices we make, whatever improvements we
suggest, based upon whatever the findings are, ultimately, of
this crash, we need to be careful that we do not decrease self-
reporting. Because my understanding of medical knowledge is
that it doesn't quite yet enable us to predict when some one
person may have a break. In spite of the fact that we do
screening, we have regular medical examinations, and we're
required, on a regular basis, as part of our recurrent
training, to demonstrate our knowledge, our skill, our
judgment. And, in spite of how close the working relationship
is in a cockpit, where you're literally elbow's length from
each other, you spend sometimes 14 or more hours per day locked
in this little cockpit closet, where no interaction goes
unnoticed, it's really difficult to know exactly who that other
person is. In spite of the fact that we have professional
standards committees at our pilots unions, or we can go to our
peers, who are trained to intervene in cases like this, we can
go the official route, go to the chief pilot, the FAA can pull
someone in for a special evaluation, really self-reporting is
one of the most powerful ways, whether it's another pilot or
it's a family member or whether it's the person, themselves.
Senator Blumenthal. So, self-reporting really has to be
preserved and encouraged. The----
Captain Sullenberger. Yes. So----
Senator Blumenthal.--consequences for self-reporting,
should not deter self-reporting.
Captain Sullenberger. Yes, sir. Yes, Senator. So, what that
means is, we have to create and maintain a just culture, and
not a punitive one. There needs to be a clear pathway for the
pilot to say, ``I need help,'' to get the help they need; when
the condition is resolved, that then be able to get recertified
and eventually come back to work. But, pilots who are not fit
to fly should not fly.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
And thank you, to the panel's witnesses, for being here
today. We appreciate it very much.
The record will stay open for 2 weeks. My colleagues are
free to submit written questions, and we hope you'll comply in
answering them in that time period. I know I plan to submit a
couple to the FAA and Mr. Hart.
So, again, thank you, to all the witnesses. I know you'll
continue to follow our work on this issue.
We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Thomas L. Hendricks, President and CEO,
National Air Transportation Association
Chair Ayotte, Ranking Member Cantwell, members of the Aviation
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to submit comments on the
Subcommittee's review of aviation safety and general aviation. My name
is Thomas L. Hendricks and I serve as President and CEO of the National
Air Transportation Association (NATA).
NATA represents the interests of the general aviation business
community before the Congress as well as federal, state and local
government agencies. Representing nearly 2,300 aviation businesses,
NATA's member companies provide a broad range of services to general
aviation, the airlines and the military. Our members range in size from
large companies with international presence to smaller, single-location
operators that depend exclusively on general aviation for their
livelihood. Smaller companies account for the majority of NATA's
membership and most of our members have fewer than 40 employees and are
designated as small businesses by the U.S. Small Business
Administration.
As a result of the last FAA reauthorization bill, NATA member
companies have been able to confidently proceed with their own
investment plans, but that confidence to invest will be undermined by a
protracted reauthorization process.
FAA Structure/Funding
We understand the major reauthorization issue the Subcommittee will
consider this year is whether and how we might alter the FAA's
organization and funding stream. This is certainly an appropriate
discussion to have in light of the recent sequesters, government
shutdown and criticisms of the FAA's modernization plans.
NATA urges lawmakers to build on its work that began in the last
reauthorization and continue to assist the agency toward a more
efficient operating structure. However, changes in the relationship
between the agency's air traffic control operation and its safety
regulatory component should be carefully viewed in terms of the problem
to be addressed, and whether the solution will continue to maintain a
stable, safe and efficient system that protects access for all users of
our system.
While NATA supports the injection of more private sector practices
into the FAA, there is no safer air traffic control system in the world
or more efficient means of general aviation taxation than that already
in place. As Administrator Huerta has observed, we need to ensure there
are no unintended consequences from moving too quickly. NATA cannot
support any de facto ``leap of faith'' proposals that would put general
aviation's fate in the hands of undefined management structures or
leave unresolved its contribution to the system.
Consistency of regulatory interpretation
NATA appreciates the Subcommittee's review last week of
certification issues and hopes its reauthorization legislation will
also consider the impacts to aviation businesses created by the
inconsistent interpretation of FAA regulations. Aviation businesses are
constantly confronted by the varying requirements of eight FAA regions,
10 aircraft certification offices, and 80 flight standards district
offices, each of which issues individual approvals for a wide range of
maintenance and operational requests. When the FAA grants approval for
a certificate or process to one aircraft operator or maintenance
facility without giving the same approval to a similar business in
another area of the country, it directly affects the competitiveness of
companies. The 2012 FAA reauthorization created an FAA/Industry
Committee, the ``Consistency of Regulatory Interpretation Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (CRI ARC)'' to address this issue. It is important
the panel's recommendations, particularly the creation of a Master
Source Guidance System, be implemented as quickly as possible.
Maximizing use of existing FAA resources in support of aviation
business
Regardless of the resolution of the debate about the FAA's current
organizational structure and funding discussed above, it is unlikely
the regulatory functions of the agency can expect to see dramatic
increase to its funding. As a result, the agency must maximize the use
of its existing resources.
For example, the FAA uses Certificate Management Units (CMUs) and
Certificate Management Offices (CMOs) to provide a comprehensive
certificate management structure for monitoring airline operations. The
FAA should establish policy defining the criteria under which this
concept will apply to repair stations and other certificate holders. In
addition, Part 135 on-demand air carriers now face difficulty in
securing FAA inspectors to certify pilots. Expanded use of delegation
authority would better meet the needs of aviation businesses and free
up resources. Realigning the Flight Standards Service regional offices
to specialized areas of aviation safety oversight and technical
expertise, similar to the Aircraft Certification Service, would be
better aligned with the policy organizations in Washington D.C., and
provide for a more direct, streamlined flow of communication regarding
policy implementation.
Pro-Aviation Business Tax Policy
Finally, while not strictly within the Committee's direct purview,
there are issues of tax policy that also impact aviation businesses
that we offer for your consideration.
Clarify the Status of Aircraft Management Services--In March of
2012, an IRS Chief Counsel opinion concluded that aircraft owners
employing aircraft management services that allow the use of the
aircraft for occasional charter operations should be assessing the 7.5
percent commercial ticket tax on amounts paid for those management
services. Aircraft management services typically include hiring,
training, and scheduling pilots and other personnel; fueling the
aircraft; conducting weather and flight planning; and overseeing key
safety standards. The IRS interpretation is unprecedented as all
aviation taxes are movement based. If an owner is using an aircraft for
personal reasons, the fuel tax is assessed. The same aircraft, used by
a management company for charter services, assesses the commercial
ticket tax (i.e., Federal excise tax (FET)) on the charter customer.
After a significant number of operators successfully appealed audit
findings assessing the FET to aircraft management services, in May of
2013 the IRS suspended assessment collections based on that opinion.
Since then NATA has been in constructive dialogue with Treasury and IRS
and the issue has been placed on the agency's priority guidance list
for a second consecutive year. However, the Treasury/IRS is not
committing itself to a timeline for resolution and though the IRS has
put audit assessments on hold, these small businesses are still
vulnerable to potentially enormous assessments. Last Congress, Senators
Brown and Portman and Representative Tiberi introduced legislation to
address the issue and will reintroduce the legislation later this year.
We urge Subcommittee members to join Senators Brown and Portman's
efforts by becoming original cosponsors of this important legislation.
Cease Aviation Trust Fund Diversions
Since 2005, the tax rate applied to nearly all jet fuel sales is at
the highway fuel tax rate of 24.4c per gallon and all collected funds
are deposited into the Highway Trust Fund instead of the Airport and
Airway Trust Fund (AATF). The change was based on a suspicion of fraud
due to a slightly lower aviation fuel tax rate compared to the highway
tax and a belief that jet fuel could be used in diesel trucks. This
policy has increased Highway Trust Fund revenues at the expense of
those in the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.
The IRS provides no avenue for a noncommercial general aviation
end-user to apply for the refund. A fuel vendor may apply for refunds,
but only after completing an arduous IRS registration process and then
managing the substantial administrative burden to maintain records for
the IRS. There is no requirement for fuel vendors to register with the
IRS; it is purely voluntary and most fuel vendors are not participating
due to the additional workload. Thus the AATF receives no revenue from
the majority of non-airline jet fuel sales because noncommercial end
users are not permitted to apply for the refund themselves. NATA
believes the premises that led to enactment of this provision should be
reviewed as a precursor to its repeal.
Investment Policy--NATA recently provided Senate Finance Committee
Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Ranking Member Ron Wyden (D-OR) with
views on how to best stimulate aviation business investment. We urge
lawmakers to develop legislation that includes the full and immediate
expensing of capital investments.
NATA is one of the leading supporters of permanently extending
bonus depreciation and Section 179 expensing for small businesses at a
level of $500,000 and supports the ongoing efforts of the House of
Representatives to make these two pro-growth provisions permanent.
However, comprehensive tax reform legislation provides the opportunity
to go even farther. Many economists support NATA's belief that while
accelerated depreciation is helpful to investment and the overall
economy, the ultimate goal should be to fully write-off business
investment expenses immediately.
Thank you for your consideration of our views. While maintaining
the status quo risks our Nation's supremacy in aviation, it is equally
true that radical change to the FAA's management structure and funding
poses equal risks, including to the safe and stable nature of the
world's best air traffic control system. We look forward to working
with the Subcommittee and agency toward continuing to operate the
world's safest and most efficient aviation system.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Margaret Gilligan
Question. Ms. Gilligan, as you know, both the Senate and House
continue to strongly support the FAA contract tower program on a
bipartisan basis. This support stems from the belief that this program
is a cost-effective and proven way to enhance air traffic safety at
over 250 smaller airports across the country, including seven in my
state.
Members of Congress and the industry consistently point to this
program as one of FAA's most successful government/industry partnership
programs.
Given the program's successful track record, will the FAA have any
recommendations for the reauthorization bill to ensure this program is
protected and enhanced?
Answer. The FAA remains committed to the Federal Contract Tower
(FCT) Program as an important component of how we deliver safety and
efficiency in the NAS. There is a general consensus that the program
has been successful and it has created measurable efficiencies in the
system for both commercial and general aviation operators, while
delivering safety benefits to the traveling public. As such, the FAA
does not have any specific recommendations for the reauthorization bill
regarding the FCT Program.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Marco Rubio to
Margaret Gilligan
Question. Florida state law permits businesses and other entities
where food allergens may be present to possess and allow trained staff
to administer epinephrine auto-injectors to treat potentially fatal
anaphylactic reactions. Since food allergens are present frequently on
commercial airline flights, and an estimated 15 million Americans have
food allergies, would the FAA be open to exploring the inclusion of
epinephrine auto-injectors in airborne emergency medical kits?
Answer. Since 1986, all major passenger carrying air carriers have
been required to carry epinephrine in on-board Emergency Medical Kits.
Part 121, appendix A, required two quantities of epinephrine (1:1000)
in ``single dose ampule or equivalent.''
The FAA also requires that crewmembers must be trained regarding
location and use of the emergency medical equipment. However, we do not
require that air carriers or crewmembers provide medical assistance to
passengers. The emergency medical equipment and training requirements
provide air carriers the option of limited in-flight medical
assistance. The FAA does not have the authority, nor are the FAA
regulations intended, to mandate or regulate health care on board
commercial air carriers.
Additionally, in December 2002, the FAA published Advisory Circular
(AC) 121-36, ``Management of Passengers Who May be Sensitive to
Allergens. In the AC, we discuss the use of epinephrine to mitigate the
effects of an allergic reaction. The AC may be found here: http://
www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circu
lar/AC121-36.pdf
However, there is no regulation that would prevent air carriers
from voluntarily carrying an epinephrine auto-injector on each flight
as part of the emergency medical kit. Additionally, there is no
regulation that would prevent an air carrier or its agents from
voluntarily choosing to provide care to passengers.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Steve Daines to
Margaret Gilligan
Question. Ms. Gilligan, in a previous hearing I discussed with
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Michael Huerta
steps the FAA is taking to address rural airports' safety concerns
surrounding the expansion of the Powder River Training Complex (PRTC)
in eastern Montana. This has included a commitment by the FAA to remain
engaged with local general aviation stakeholders and to provide the
appropriate communications and radar equipment necessary to ensure a
high level of aviation safety. The term ``adaptive management''
continues to be used by the FAA. Would you please define ``adaptive
management'' and explain how it will be implement in the airspace
around PRTC?
Answer. The FAA remains committed to the Federal Contract Tower
(FCT) Program as an important component of how we deliver safety and
efficiency in the NAS. There is a general consensus that the program
has been successful and it has created measurable efficiencies in the
system for both commercial and general aviation operators, while
delivering safety benefits to the traveling public. As such, the FAA
does not have any specific recommendations for the reauthorization bill
regarding the FCT Program.
Adaptive Management for PRTC is managed by the U.S.A.F. and is not
an FAA initiative. The FAA is not responsible for the development or
implementation of the ``Adaptive Management'' program.
Background:
The Air Force is adopting an ``adaptive management'' approach for
the mitigation of airspace issues, which includes provisions for
determining the success of mitigation measures, as well as procedures
for making necessary adaptations to those measures. As part of this
approach, the Air Force would develop a process for communicating, at
least annually, with requesting agencies and organizations, including
those involved with airport operations (state aeronautical commissions,
local airport authorities, and fixed base operators); aviation, energy
and agro-business (e.g., air ambulance operations, energy and pipeline
operations, cloud seeding, aerial application and crop dusting,
ranching, flight training); and other activities (e.g., local units of
government, real estate organizations, tourism organizations, and
educational institutions). According to the Air Force's environmental
documentation the Air Force would ``strive to negotiate agreements that
include the flexibility to adapt to changing situations'' and
``collaborate with key aviation interests in the region to establish
professional lines of communication to minimize impact and balance the
needs of commerce and military readiness.''
The mitigations will be assessed as a part of the normal and
regular base outreach program. Ellsworth Air Force Base is the using
agency of the existing Powder River A & B Military Operations Area
(MOA). The base uses established practices of outreach to communities
and ranching operations to identify critical times and locations of
events that would be disrupted by overflights, such as existing steps
to avoid locations of branding, calving and weaning. The base will post
informational flyers and posters at public airports underlying the
airspace with annual updates by the safety office as a part of the Mid-
Air Collision Avoidance Program. For Large Force Exercises (LFE) the
base will publish scheduling and other information 30 days prior to the
exercise. The base's practices would also include establishment of
avoidance areas as necessary for airports, airfields, and communities
under the proposed airspace. These efforts encourage community
involvement to identify concerns, wherein the base adjusts the flight
operations procedures based on the results of these interactions.
Members of the affected communities can provide feedback to the base at
any time.
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