[Senate Hearing 114-218]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-218
UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY IN EUROPE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 28, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
99-668 PDF WASHINGTON : 2016
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
april 28, 2015
Page
United States Security Policy in Europe.......................... 1
Stavridis, ADM James G., USN [Ret.], Dean of the Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Ma............ 5
Brzezinski, Ian J., Resident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, Washington,
DC............................................................. 6
Sestanovich, Stephen, Ph.D., George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for
Russian and Eurasian Studies, Council on Foreign Relations..... 14
(iii)
UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY IN EUROPE
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:06 a.m., in SD-
G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Ayotte,
Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Well, good morning. This committee meets a
little earlier than usual today since we have a briefing at 11
a.m. today on the recent unfortunate tragedy of the deaths of
an American and another one in a drone strike. The committee
meets today to receive testimony on U.S. security policy in
Europe. I would like to thank each of our witnesses for
appearing before us.
Admiral James Stavridis, dean of the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy at Tufts University and former Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe; Ian Brzezinski, resident senior fellow at
the Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic Council; and Stephen
Sestanovich, the George Kennen senior fellow for Russian and
Eurasian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Just like the United States, Europe confronts a diverse and
complex array of crises that are making the world a more
dangerous place. Already this year radical Islamists attacked
Paris and Copenhagen. Last week in the Mediterranean, over 700
migrants perished tragically in a shipwreck fleeing the
conflict and instability of North Africa. Then there is Russia.
In 2012, the Defense Strategic Guidance argued that the
changing global security environment offered a chance to
rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe while building
a closer relationship with Russia.
The Obama administration eliminated two heavy brigades
stationed in Europe and pursued a so-called reset policy
towards Russia. Two years later, Russia's invasion and
dismemberment of Ukraine should remind everyone of the true
nature of Putin's ambitions and the fragility of peace in
Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward
Russia was based on a bipartisan assumption that the Russian
government sought to integrate peacefully into the
international order in Europe and to forego a constructive
relationship with the United States based on mutual national
interests.
The events of this past year have overturned that
assumption. For the first time in 7 decades on the European
continent, a state has sent its military forces across an
internationally recognized border and forcibly annexed the
sovereign territory of another state. Now, American strategy
must adjust to the reality of the revisionist Russia that is
undergoing a significant military modernization, and that is
willing to use force not only as a last resort, but as a
primary tool to achieve its neo-imperial objectives. In
Ukraine, Russia has continued to violate the February ceasefire
agreement. In fact, news today indicates an increase in the
conflict. Rather than comply and withdraw from Ukraine,
President Putin has maintained sizable numbers of artillery
pieces and multiple rocket launchers in Ukraine.
According to the State Department, the Russian military has
deployed additional air defense systems near the front lines in
Eastern Ukraine, the highest amount since last August, and a
disturbing sign that another offensive may be imminent. In
response, it is not that the United States and our European
allies have done nothing. It is that nothing we have done has
succeeded in deterring Putin's aggression and halted his slow
motion annexation of Eastern Ukraine.
The Ukrainian people do not want U.S. or western troops to
fight for them. They are simply asking for the right tools to
defend themselves and their country. Senator Reed and I, along
with members of this committee on both sides of the aisle, have
called on the administration to provide defensive lethal
assistance to Ukraine. Unfortunately, the President's continued
inaction incredibly for fear of provoking Russia is seen by
Putin as weakness and invites the very aggression we seek to
avoid.
Of course there is no military solution in Ukraine, but
there is a clear military dimension to achieving a political
solution. As three major think tanks wrote recently,
``Assisting Ukraine to deter attack and defend itself is not
inconsistent with the search for a peaceful political solution.
It is essential to achieving it.'' Only if the Kremlin knows
that the risks and costs of further military action are high
will it seek to find an acceptable political solution. The
failure to raise the cost of Putin's aggression in Ukraine only
increases and makes it more likely that this aggression could
expand to places like Moldova, Georgia, the Baltic States, and
Central Asia.
This is even more worrisome in light of Russia's increasing
emphasis on nuclear weapons. Putin has personally presided over
nuclear weapons drills in recent months, deployed Icelander
missiles to Kaliningrad capable of carrying nuclear warheads
and claiming the right to deploy nuclear weapons on the Crimean
peninsula. Russia continues to violate the IMF [Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces] treaty as nuclear weapons become more
prominent in its military doctrine.
Equally concerning, Russia's military buildup also appears
designed to deny the United States and NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] access to key parts of Europe, especially
the Baltic and Black Sea regions, as a way of trying to make
U.S. security commitments to our allies too costly to fulfill.
Russia is clearly learning from China in this regard.
Russia's intensifying military activity in contempt of
international law also extends to the Arctic where it has stood
up a new military command with more troops and aircraft
military infrastructure and increased military exercises. One
exercise last month included nearly 40,000 troops and more than
55 ships and submarines. The administration needs to address
this problem as the United States assumes the chairmanship of
the Arctic Council over the next 2 years.
In response to the broader challenge that Russia poses to
security in Europe hereto, it is not that the United States and
NATO have done nothing. We have created a modest rapid reaction
force, increased air policing and sea patrols, expanded
training and exercises, and deployed small numbers of
additional forces to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.
The problem is the actions we have taken seem inadequate to the
scope, scale, and seriousness of the challenges we face.
I would especially highlight the fact that too many of our
NATO allies continue to fail to provide for their own defense
despite promises at the Wales Summit to ``reverse the trend of
declining defense budget.'' Soon Poland and Estonia may be the
only other allies meeting our alliance's commitment to spend 2
percent of GDP on defense.
None of us want to return to the Cold War, but we need to
face the reality that we are dealing with a Russian ruler who
wants exactly that, especially as a way of enhancing Russian
relevance amid systemic demographic collapse and economic
crisis. The reason for maintaining a strong U.S. military
presence in Europe is the same as ever. To deter conflict and
aggression, we must forget this lesson at our peril.
Ultimately, we must lift our sights and recognize that we are
facing the reality of a challenge that many had assumed was
resigned to the history books: a strong militarily capable
state that is hostile to our interests and our values and seeks
to overturn the international order in Europe that American
leaders of both parties have sought to maintain since World War
II.
I hope today's hearings will help us to better understand
the magnitude of this challenge and what to do about it. I
thank each of our witnesses for joining us today, and I look
forward to their testimony. I would note in the audience we
have parliamentarians from Ukraine, Kosovo, and Nepal who are
with us today. I welcome them to our hearing. I especially want
to express my appreciation for our legislators from Ukraine who
are here on behalf of their country.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, gentlemen, Admiral Stavridis, Mr. Brzezinski, and Dr.
Sestanovich, welcome. Let me thank the chairman for setting up
this hearing to review the security situation in Europe. It
will inform our upcoming deliberations on the annual defense
authorization bill. On Thursday we will hear from General
Breedlove, the Commander of U.S. European Command and NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, and this hearing will be a wonderful
way to begin that discussion with General Breedlove.
The transatlantic relationship remains central to the
United States and global security. Our NATO allies and European
partners have been the primary contributors to the United
States-led coalition operations in the Middle East and South
Asia. In Afghanistan, European countries have deployed more
than 260,000 personnel since 2007, accounting for more than 90
percent of the non-U.S. forces participating in the ISAF
[International Security Assistance Force] mission that ended
last December.
Today, however, our European partners face security
challenges closer to home. As noted at the NATO Summit in Wales
last September, Russia's aggression against Ukraine has
challenged the alliance's vision of a Europe whole, free, and
at peace. Russia has engaged in hybrid warfare to seize Crimea
and back separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine in violation of
the ceasefire agreement signed in September of last year and
this February. According to the U.S. and military leaders,
Russia continues to flow heavy weapons and equipment into the
separatist areas, sparking fears of renewed heavy fighting
within the coming weeks.
One step this committee and Congress have supported is
providing Ukraine the military assistance, including defense
weapons, necessary for it to defend itself against further
attacks. A recent report by leading think tanks, which Dr.
Sestanovich co-authored, argues that ``Assisting Ukraine to
deter attack and defend itself is not inconsistent with the
search for a peaceful political solution. It is essential to
achieving it.''
I hope our witnesses will address whether they believe
there is a coalition of countries willing to provide assistance
to Ukraine, and whether preparing such a coalition effort would
help or harm compliance with the ceasefire agreements. At the
NATO Wales Summit, members approved a Readiness Action Plan to
enhance the alliance's ability to respond quickly to security
challenges. This year's budget request includes $800 million on
top of the $1 billion approved last year for the European
Reassurance Initiative, to enhance the United States' military
presence and activities in Europe.
A key issue over the coming years will be how U.S. forces
should be postured in Europe to reassure allies and provide for
a collective defense. This will depend in part on whether our
NATO allies live up to their pledges on defense spending and
the levels of host nation support for U.S. forces in Europe.
NATO is facing security challenges along its other borders
as well. Countries along the Mediterranean border are grappling
with the prospect of tens of thousands, possibly more, of
migrants fleeing instability in Libya, Syria, Eritrea, and
elsewhere. Efforts to respond to this crisis have been mixed to
date, and it is clear more must be done soon because the flow
of migrants is not likely to subside given increasing violence
in Libya and other conflict zones.
To the southeast, the flow of foreign fighters across
Turkey's border into Syria and back heightens the risk of
future anti-western attacks like those in Paris and Brussels,
and raises the question as to whether ISIL [the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant] has more broadly infiltrated Europe's
cities. In the north, Russia is expanding its military
activities in the Arctic, potentially challenging international
norms and laws governing that region.
I look forward to our witnesses' testimony on these and
other security challenges in Europe, and, again, I thank them
for their willingness to appear this morning. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. I welcome the witnesses. Admiral
Stavridis?
STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN [RET.], DEAN OF THE
FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY,
MEDFORD, MA
Admiral Stavridis. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
members of the committee, it is a delight to be back with you.
Last time I was dressed somewhat more glamorously than I am
today. It is a pleasure to share some ideas and thoughts on the
situation in Europe, which have, as we heard in those
statements from the chairman and the ranking member, have taken
a turn for the worse in a security dimension over the last 24
months since I left my post as the Supreme Allied Commander.
I want to just begin by saying, why does Europe matter? I
get that question. Does Europe really matter for the United
States? We talk a lot about a pivot to the Pacific and so on,
and we should globally. But I would argue Europe matters for a
wide variety of reasons.
First and foremost, we share enormous values, our values:
democracy, liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of religion.
These come from Europe, from the Enlightenment. Second, NATO,
this alliance, 28 nations, 52 percent of the world's GDP, 3
million men and women under arms, almost all of them
volunteers, 24,000 military aircraft. This is a terrific
partner for the United States in Europe. Third, the bases.
Sometimes people will say, oh, those are Cold War bases. Not so
in my view. These are forward-operating stations of the 21st
century. We need them to move our forces into Africa, into the
Levant, into the Middle East, into Central Asia. They are
irreplaceable.
Fourth, the economy. The largest trade flow in the world
goes across the Atlantic. It is about $5 trillion. So, this
economic bridge across the Atlantic is of enormous importance
to us. Then finally, as we look at Europe, it is a place full
of high tech, of well-trained military. It is a wealth of
resources. So for all those reasons, Europe matters.
I think the challenges were well laid out by the chairman
and the ranking member. It is Russia which has invaded a nation
and annexed its territory. We cannot understate the gravity of
that experience, and we should not understate how that ghost
rattles through the Europe zeitgeist.
The ranking member, I think, correctly drew a line under
ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and its threat to
Europe. I am deeply concerned about it not only across the NATO
borders in Turkey, but across the sea routes from Italy. Last
year, some 200,000 migrants; this year on track to double that.
Within those numbers will be some group of violent extremists,
Islamic radicals who come to strike at highly symbolic targets,
probably starting in Italy. The Arctic was well covered by the
opening statements.
I would add only the Balkans, which we tend not to think
about a great deal these days. They were a place of great
tension and danger 15 years ago, yet today tensions continue in
Kosovo, across its borders to Serbia, and, most notably, in
Bosnia, a very fragile tripartite structure. Yesterday Muslim
extremist terrorists struck in the Serbian portions of Bosnia.
That is still a place where we need to keep a weather eye.
So I will close by saying as we look at all this, our own
U.S. security presence in Europe is diminished greatly,
certainly since the end of the Cold War. We are down 75 percent
in personnel. We are down 75 percent in the number of bases
that we have. We have, in my view, come to a line that we
should not continue to diminish that presence further. I would
argue in the end we need to stay engaged in Europe for the
reasons about which I have spoken as well as for the challenges
so well articulated by the chairman and the ranking member.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you. Mr. Brzezinski?
STATEMENT OF IAN J. BRZEZINSKI, RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, BRENT
SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Brzezinski. Thank you, Chairman McCain, thank you,
Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee. I really
appreciate this opportunity to participate in this hearing on
the state of U.S. security interests in Europe.
NATO is the institutional cornerstone of transatlantic
security, and today that alliance faces challenges on multiple
fronts of unprecedented complexity and increasing urgency. To
the east, Europe confronts Russia's invasion of Ukraine and
increasingly provocative military conduct across the region. To
its north, the transatlantic community faces Russia's
militarization of the Arctic, a region rich in resources, but
also of contested sovereignty. To its south, the alliance faces
a treacherous combination of state sponsors of terrorism,
failed states, and extremist organizations in an arc stretching
from the Middle East across North Africa. ISIS atrocities and
refugee flows to Europe are tragic manifestations of that
front.
In an age of globalization, NATO cannot afford to be a
regionally focused alliance. It must address a global front. It
must remain prepared and ready to take on challenges well
beyond the North Atlantic area in a world that is increasingly
interconnected and volatile.
Allow me to focus my remarks on the first front, a sort of
returning back to the future driven by Russia's confrontational
approach toward the west. Putin's invasion of Ukraine has
disrupted the order that has kept peace in Europe since World
War II. It is a direct threat to the credibility of NATO and
the vision of a Europe whole, free, and secure. It is but one
element of a revanchist policy intended to reestablish Russian
hegemony, if not full control, over space akin to the former
Soviet Union.
Toward this end, Moscow has applied the full suite of
Russian power to weaken and dominate its neighbors: military
force, economic and energy embargos, political subterfuge,
information and cyber warfare, separatist groups, and frozen
conflicts. The campaign history includes Moscow's attempt to
subvert the 2004 Ukraine Orange Revolution, its 2007
cyberattack on Estonia, and the 2008 invasion of Georgia.
It is a campaign that pursues 20th century objectives
leveraging 21st century techniques, and old-fashioned brute
force. It rests on a $750 billion defense modernization plan
that is upgrading Russian conventional and nuclear forces. It
is a strategy that involves provocative military actions beyond
Ukraine intended to intimidate, divide, and test the
capabilities of members and partners of the NATO alliance. You
know well these actions: the increase in assertive naval and
air patrols; violations of allied and partner sea, air, and
ground space; harassment of military and civilian aircraft and
ships; and a steady stream of nuclear threats from Russian
officials, including President Putin himself.
Russian military exercises have been an important part of
these shows of force. They are notable for their magnitude and
the frequency of spot exercises, sudden and unannounced
mobilization deployment of forces. As indicated in the attached
chart and the ones I think are in the testimony I submitted,
over the last 3 years Russia has conducted at least 6 major
military exercises, and these have ranged from 65,000 personnel
to 165,000 personnel. They dwarf in comparison to the size of
NATO exercises, and raise in my mind questions about the
alliance's political and operational ability to mobilize
comparable forces.
The west's response to Russia's military assertiveness has
consisted of limited, incremental escalations of economic
sanctions and military deployments. This incrementalism conveys
hesitancy and the lack of unity and determination. It has
failed to convince Putin to reverse course. Indeed, it may have
actually emboldened him. For these reasons, continued
incrementalism not only promises continued conflict in Ukraine,
but also an increased danger of wider war.
This is underscored when one considers what will be the
likely state of Ukraine and Russia if the west holds to its
current policies. Where will Ukraine be in 6 to 12 months? It
is likely to experience a further loss of territory. Its
economy will be further crippled. Its population and government
will be at risk of being more disillusioned. This is a Ukraine
more vulnerable and more enticing to Putin's revanchist
ambitions.
Where will Russia be in 6 to 12 months? Its economy will
likely be somewhat weaker, its leaders marginally more
internationally isolated. Under such circumstances, President
Putin can be expected to be more irrationally nationalist and
more brazen. That is a Russia more likely to attempt incursions
further into Ukraine and escalate its provocative military
actions against the west. Under such a scenario, not only are
Ukraine's prospects more dire, the prospects of a collision,
albeit inadvertent, between Russian and western forces are
increased. The very risk of conflict escalation that current
policy has been designed to avert will actually be more likely.
Calibrated engagement with the Russian government is needed
to explore avenues by which to modulate tensions and to return
to Ukraine's territories. However, to be effective these
efforts will require more immediate and longer-term initiatives
that will impose higher economic costs on Moscow, deter it from
further provocative conduct, and reinforce the security of
Central Europe. Toward these ends, I recommended that U.S.
policy aim to do the following. First, we should impose
stronger economic sanctions on Russia. Sectorial sanctions are
needed to more aggressively shock the Russian economy by
shutting off its energy and financial sectors from the global
economy.
Second, the alliance should do more to reinforce NATO's
eastern frontier. I believe the alliance should station a
brigade-level combat capability permanently in Poland and
Romania. It should station battalion-level capabilities in each
of the Baltic states, and it should provide NATO's military
commander, SACEUR [the Supreme Allied Commander Europe], the
authorities necessary to deploy forces in real time in response
to provocative military actions. NATO has never responded to
any of the exercises and provocative actions I mentioned. It
has been passive.
More has to be done to reinforce Kiev's capability for
self-defense. The deployment of U.S. and allied military
trainers is a good step that occurred this last month, but it
is overdue. The west should also arm Ukraine with air defense
and anti-tank weapons and other capabilities it has been
requesting so it can better defend itself. The west should
deploy intelligence and surveillance capacities to Ukraine to
enhance Ukraine's situational awareness, and it should conduct
military exercises in Ukraine just as EUCOM [United States
European Command] did last summer to help train Ukraine's armed
forces, and to demonstrate the west's solidarity with Ukraine.
None of these recommendations present a territorial threat
to Russia. They would help erase the red line the west has
allowed Russia to redraw in Europe. They would present Moscow
the possibility of a costly and prolonged military conflict.
Let me add, the United States should be also front and center
with the Europeans in the negotiations addressing Russia's
invasion of Ukraine. Washington's absence from the Minsk
process is a clear opportunity cost in the effort to bring this
conflict to a peaceful and just end.
Fourth, similar security assistance should be offered to
other countries threatened by the shadow of Putin's assertive
policies. Here I am thinking particularly of Moldova and
especially of Georgia because of its strategic location.
Finally, the west needs to reanimate the vision of a Europe
whole and free. Because of NATO enlargement, Europe has been
better able to manage the aggression the continent has
experienced over the last year. We need to ensure the
alliance's open door policy has not devolved into a passive
phrase or empty slogan.
Let me close by a simple point--with a simple point. The
most effective way to counter hegemonic aspirations is to deny
them the opportunity for actualization. Security in Central
Europe is critical not only for peace in Europe, it is also a
key element of an effective strategy to forge a normal
relationship, if not eventually a partnership, with Russia.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]
Prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee, I
am honored to speak at this hearing on the state of U.S. security
interests in Europe.
We meet today some eight months after the September 4, 2014 NATO
summit in Wales, United Kingdom. That meeting of Allied heads of state
proved to be an important inflection point for the Alliance. When
planning for that summit began, its primary objective was to mark the
end of NATO's combat operations in Afghanistan. Some were even
concerned about the future relevance of NATO, anticipating that it was
about to enter a period of unprecedented operational inactivity
following decades of defending against the Soviet Union, managing
conflict in the Balkans, and, more recently, contributing to out-of
area undertakings in Afghanistan and even Iraq.
Instead, the Alliance's agenda that Fall was dominated by events
that most policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic failed to
anticipate. These, of course, include Russia's invasion of Ukraine and
the sudden and bloodthirsty rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq.
A read of the summit communique reflects other challenges
confronting the Alliance: missile proliferation, chaos in Libya, crises
in Mali and the Congo African Republic, threats to the global commons--
including its cyber and maritime domains, and Iran's nuclear program,
among others.
That list gives real credence to former NATO Secretary General Fogh
Rasmussen's repeated assertions that we face a more connected, more
complex, more chaotic and more precarious world. He is right. In this
world, the political and military capacities that NATO can leverage has
become only more vital to the shared interests and values that define
the transatlantic community.
I would like today to focus on four urgent and emergent fronts
before the NATO Alliance:
An Eastern Front driven by a Russia's provocative
military actions;
An emergent Arctic Front driven by Moscow's
militarization of the High North;
A Southern Front, a region stretching from Iran across
the Middle East and North Africa wrought by a dangerous combination of
failed states and extremist organizations; and,
A Global Front defined by the upheaval generated by the
rapidly evolving dynamics of globalization.
the eastern front: russia's invasion of ukraine
Let me start with the front that is sort of a return back to the
future. Fourteen months ago, President Putin launched his invasion of
Ukraine with the incursion of 20-30,000 Russian troops into the Crimean
peninsula. That was followed by the cross-border operation into Eastern
Ukraine involving Russian provocateurs and Special Forces who seized
buildings and armories and terrorized the local population. The latter
were soon reinforced by Russian conventional forces. Both operations
were backed by the massing of Russian conventional forces on Ukraine'
border, under the guise of a 150,000 man military exercise.
Russia's invasion caused over 6000 Ukrainians deaths in eastern
Ukraine and displaced over 1.6M people. More than 20% of Ukraine's
industrial capability has been seized or destroyed. Crimea and regions
of Donetsk and Luhansk remain occupied and are being politically
purged. Russia is reinforcing its presence in Crimea with Special
Forces, aircraft, and ships and has announced plans to deploy nuclear
capable SS-26 Iskander missiles. In Eastern Ukraine where fighting
continues, Putin violates the Minsk II peace accords by deploying
additional heavy combat equipment, personnel and military supplies to
his forces.
Russia's aggression against Ukraine presents a significant
challenge to the security and stability of Europe and to the
credibility of NATO. As an unprovoked aggression against the
territorial sovereignty of a European nation, the invasion of Ukraine
disrupts the order that has kept peace in Europe since World War II. By
asserting the unilateral right to redraw borders on the grounds he is
protecting ethnic Russians and by promoting the concept of a
``Novorossiya,'' Putin has reintroduced the principal of ethnic
sovereignty, a principal that wrought death and destruction across
Europe in the last century and those before.
Putin's invasion of Ukraine, one motivated significantly by his
opposition to the country's long-standing desire to be a fully
integrated part of Europe, is a direct threat to the vision of a Europe
whole, free and secure. If allowed to succeed, Putin's invasion of
Ukraine will create a new confrontational divide in Europe, between a
community defined by self-determination, democracy, and rule of law and
one burdened by authoritarianism, hegemony and occupation. In these
ways, Putin's aggression against Ukraine - and his increasingly
provocative military actions elsewhere in Europe - are direct
challenges to NATO and U.S. leadership, ones intended to portray the
Alliance and Washington as lacking the diplomatic, economic, and
military capacity to counter Russian power.
Putin's Revanchist Ambitions: The invasion of Ukraine is but one
element of a revanchist policy that President Putin has articulated and
exercised since taking office in 1999. His objective has been to
reestablish Russian hegemony, if not full control, over the space of
the former Soviet Union.
Toward this end, Moscow has applied the full suite of Russian power
to weaken and dominate its neighbors: economic embargoes, political
subterfuge, information and cyber-warfare, separatist groups, frozen
conflicts as well as military shows of force and incursions. Putin's
campaign history includes Moscow's attempt to subvert Ukraine's 2004
Orange Revolution, the 2007 cyber attack against Estonia, the
separatist movement in Moldova, energy embargoes against Lithuania and
Ukraine, and the 2008 invasion of Georgia.
President Putin's strategy is one that pursues 20th-century
objectives through 21st-century techniques and old-fashioned brute
force. With regard to the latter, Russia has undertaken a determined
modernization of its armed forces. Some $750B has been dedicated over
this decade to expand the Russian fleet, introduce 5th generation
aircraft, deploy new missiles, modernize his nuclear arsenal, increase
his nation's SOF capabilities, and militarize the Arctic. When one
compares the Russian forces that invaded Georgia in 2008 to those that
led the invasion of Crimea last year, the modernization campaign is
clearly yielding improved capabilities.
As part of his strategy, Putin has deployed his military forces in
provocative ways across the Baltic region, the Black Sea, the Arctic
and elsewhere to demonstrate capability, intimidate and divide Russia's
neighbors, and probe the resolve of the West. These actions have
steadily escalated over time, and include challenges to the airspace of
Sweden, the cross-border seizure of an Estonian law-enforcement
officer, harassment of military and civilian aircraft and ships in the
Baltic and Black Seas, and an exponential increase in assertive air and
sea patrols by Russian aircraft and ships on both sides of the
Atlantic.
Russian military exercises have been an important part of these
shows of force and are notable for their magnitude and for the
frequency of ``spot'' exercises - the sudden and unannounced
mobilization and deployment of forces. As indicated in the attached
chart, over the last three years, Russia has conducted at six major
military exercises involving between 65,000 and 160,000 personnel. In
comparison, these dwarf the size of NATO and Allied exercises, and
raise questions about the Alliance's comparable ability to mobilize
comparable forces in no-notice situations.
Russia's assertive military conduct has been complemented by an
increase in nuclear threats against the West made by senior Russian
commanders and civilian officials, including President Putin. In the
last several weeks, Moscow threatened to target Romania, Poland and
Denmark with nuclear weapons for their contributions to transatlantic
missile defense. The Times of London recently reported that in a
meeting with U.S. officials, Russian generals threatened ``a spectrum
of responses from nuclear to non-military'' if the Alliance deployed
additional forces to the Baltic states.
The West's Response: To date, the West's response to Russia's
territorial aggression and provocative military actions consists of
limited incremental escalations of economic sanctions and military
deployments. The failure of this response to convince Putin to reverse
course is rooted in this incrementalism which communicates hesitancy
and a lack of unity and determination. Indeed, it may have actually
emboldened Putin. Today, Moscow's provocative exercises and assertive
military conduct continue, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine remain occupied,
and Russia's forces appear poised to strike deeper into Ukraine.
Calibrated engagement with the Russian government is needed to
explore avenues by which to modulate tensions and return to Ukraine its
territories. However, to be effective these efforts will require more
immediate and longer-term initiatives that will impose economic costs
on Russia, deter Moscow from further provocative conduct, reinforce
Central and Eastern Europe's sense of security, enhance Ukraine's
capacity for defense, and help it transform into a successful,
democratic, and prosperous European state. These include:
1) Stronger economic sanctions on Russia. The current approach of
targeting specific Russian individuals and companies has not changed
Putin's course of action, not is it likely to do so. Russia is a
country that rightfully takes great pride in its history of enduring
economic and military hardship. An authoritarian regime will always be
more resistant to economic sanctions than a democratic system. Sectoral
sanctions are needed to more aggressively shock the Russian economy by
shutting off its energy and financial sectors from the global economy.
2) Stronger reinforcement of NATO's eastern frontier. Russia
repeatedly mobilized ten of thousands of troops for its invasion of
Ukraine and in its shows of force. NATO's response has been far more
limited, involving dozens of aircraft, company level deployments (and
the occasional battalion) and a few ships. The gap is noticeable to
Putin, our Allies and our partners. The Alliance should:
Base a brigade level combat capability permanently to
Poland and Romania;
Base battalion level capacities to each of the Baltic
states;
Provide NATO's top military commander, the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, authorities necessary to deploy forces in real time
against provocative Russian military operations; and,
Expand the mission of NATO missile defense and the U.S.
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to address the threat posed by
Russian ballistic missiles
3) Military Assistance to Ukraine: Greater effort must be made to
reinforce Ukraine's capability for self-defense. By denying Kyiv's
request for needed military weapons, the West not only precludes
Ukraine the ability to better defend itself, it is de facto accepting
Putin's effort to draw a new red line in Europe, allowing the
reemergence of a grey zone in Europe.
This has been deeply disillusioning for Ukrainians who so
courageously expressed their desire on the Maidan for freedom and a
place in Europe. It threatens to shatter the bipartisan/transatlantic
vision of a Europe whole, free and undivided that has guided U.S. and
European security policy for the last 25 years.
The United States and other keys allies are to be commended for the
long-overdue step of deploying military trainers to Ukraine, but they
should also:
Provide military equipment to Ukraine, including air
defense and anti-tank weapons as well as key enablers, such as drones,
that would enhance Ukraine's ability to leverage the capabilities of
its armed forces
Deploy intelligence and surveillance capabilities
Conduct military exercises in Ukraine, as EUCOM did in
the Summer of 2014, to help train Ukraine's armed forces and to
demonstrate solidarity with Ukraine
None of these recommendations would present a territorial threat to
Russia, but they would complicate Putin's ambitions regarding Ukraine.
They would help erase the red line that Moscow has been allowed to
redraw in Europe. They would assure Ukrainians that they are not alone
and demonstrate that Putin is unable to intimidate the West. They would
present Moscow the possibility of a costly and prolonged military
conflict.
The United States should also be front and center with the
Europeans in the negotiations addressing Russia's aggression against
Ukraine. The absence of the United States at the negotiating table
signals a lack of commitment to European security and thus devalues the
presentation of transatlantic solidarity against this invasion. It has
been an opportunity cost to the effort to bring this conflict to
peaceful and just end.
4) Support to Ukraine's economic transformation. In this regard,
the United States and the West has been constructive, providing
significant EU, IMF, and bilateral economic assistance packages.
However, the goals of such economic assistance are difficult if not
impossible to realize when Ukraine is subject to a violent invasion as
well as to political, economic and other pressures from Russia.
5) A Reanimation of the Vision of Europe Whole and Free: For much
of the post-Cold War period, U.S. policy was clearly guided by the
vision of a Europe, undivided, secure, and free. For over two decades,
Washington wisely supported the indigenous ambitions of Central
European democracies for membership in NATO and the European Union.
Those processes of enlargement have benefited all parties in Europe,
expanding the zone of peace, stability, and prosperity across the
continent.
The United States needs to reanimate the process of NATO
enlargement, making clear that the Alliance's ``open-door policy'' for
membership is no passive phrase or empty slogan. Doing so would be an
important way to underscore Washington's commitment to the security of
Central and Eastern Europe. For these reasons, no decision or
recommendation should be permitted or advanced that would in any way
limit its applicability to any country of Europe, including Ukraine.
The Risks of Incrementalism: There are real risks that flow from
the West's current strategy of incrementalism against President Putin's
aggression: Continued incrementalism not only promises continued
conflict in Ukraine but also an increased danger of wider war.
This is underscored when one considers what will be the likely
state of Ukraine and Russia if the West holds to its current course.
What will be the state of Ukraine in 6-18 months? It is likely to
experience a further loss of territory. Its economy will be further
crippled, thereby rendering the nation less able undertake reform. Its
population is at risk of being more disillusioned, and government
consequently weaker, if not divided. That is a Ukraine more vulnerable
and more enticing to Putin's revanchist ambitions.
What will be the state of Russia in 6-18 months? Its economy will
likely be somewhat weaker, if it is not bolstered by a rise in energy
prices. It may be marginally more isolated. Under such circumstances,
President Putin can be expected to be more irrationally nationalistic
and more brazen. That is a Russia more likely to attempt incursions
further into Ukraine and escalate its provocative military actions
against the West.
Under such a scenario, not only are Ukraine's prospects more dire,
the prospects of collision, albeit inadvertent, between Russian and
Western forces are increased. The very risk of conflict escalation that
the current policy has been designed to avert will be more likely.
the artic: an emerging front
The resource rich Arctic has become a high priority of President
Putin's security policy. Russia's ensuing militarization of the High
North has made it an emergent front affecting transatlantic security.
Moscow has established an Arctic Military command backed by a joint
Arctic task force. It has re-opened Cold War naval and air bases and is
building a string of new military facilities across the Arctic. It is
reinforcing the Northern Fleet with more ice-breakers, surface
combatants and submarines. Russia has stepped-up Cold War military
operations in the region, including the testing of missiles and
aggressive naval and air patrols that prod the territories of the U.S.
and other allies.
Enhancing NATO's role in the Arctic: If the High North is to remain
a zone defined by peace and stability, the West will have to introduce
a more robust security dimension into its Arctic policies, and a
centerpiece of that effort should include a greater role for NATO.
Indeed, as more non-Arctic nations start to operate in the Arctic, it
will be useful to leverage the geopolitical weight that comes with a
community of like-minded North Atlantic democracies.
NATO should expand its political and operational role in the
Arctic, leveraging its maritime and air capacities. The Alliance can
serve as a useful vehicle to coordinate and execute Arctic security
cooperation, including intelligence exchanges, surveillance operations,
military training and exercises, air policing, and disaster response.
It can also foster the development of capabilities necessary for Arctic
operations.
In these ways, NATO can fill a security gap that exists in the
Arctic and do so without undermine existing useful institutions like
the Arctic Council. This does not preclude Arctic cooperation with
Moscow, particularly in areas such as search and rescue and disaster
response. Indeed, the region can serve as an avenue of mutually
beneficial engagement with Russia, even in this time of increased
tension.
The bottom line is that if the Alliance plays a greater role in
Arctic security today, the transatlantic community is going to be able
to manage, if not prevent, a serious security crisis tomorrow.
the southern front: failing states and ideological upheaval
NATO faces a Southern front--an arc of instability stretching from
Iran to the shores of North Africa. It is a realm in which societal
upheavals and regional power struggles have generated challenges of
varying levels of urgency--from Tehran's nuclear programs, to the chaos
traumatizing Syria and Iraq to the tragic flood of refuges flowing to
Europe from Africa and Middle East.
Among the more urgent of these crises lies south of Turkey, caused
by the sudden and savage rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Because of the
links of ISIS and other violent groups in this region to Europe and
North America, this is an urgent threat to transatlantic security. The
West's goal must be more than the degradation or destruction of ISIS
and other like-minded groups. It must be the prevention of Iraq, Syria
and other areas from serving as havens and breeding grounds for such
extremism. That is going to require a comprehensive, long-term strategy
that will require considerable military, economic and political
resources.
That response will have to be a multi-lateral undertaking and not
just transatlantic undertaking. It must executed in partnership with
key powers of the Muslim world--Turkey, of course, but also Jordan,
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in addition to Iraq and moderate elements
within Syria. It should leverage the various capacities of NATO, the
European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab League,
among others. Only then will one be able to leverage the cumulative
strengths of the West and mitigate the historic baggage many Allies
have in the region.
It will require sustained military action and security assistance.
The tip of the spear addressing threats like ISIS has to be local
forces. The Iraqi security forces, the Peshmerga, and moderate Syrian
factions stand among these elements, but they will need to be backed by
foreign airpower, reinforced by foreign equipment, intelligence, combat
advisors and trainers as well as special forces prepared for direct
action.
The multi-lateral effort will require significant humanitarian
assistance. This is needed to assist not just those displaced in Iraq,
but also to assist the governments of neighboring countries--
particularly Turkey and Jordan--whose state structures and societies
are at risk of being overburdened, if not destabilized, by refugees
fleeing the region's violence.
The strategy will have to include a long-term effort to help enable
the crippled states and societies of Europe's North African and the
Middle Eastern periphery to benefit from economic growth and sound
governance. Those are the most powerful weapons against extremism.
Military strikes and humanitarian assistance may often be required, but
they are tactical actions, necessary but not sufficient to tackle a
strategic problem. Good governance and prosperity are ultimately the
best ways to ensure that these societies do not serve as breeding
grounds for extremism and terrorist recruits.
the global front
These aforementioned three fronts to Europe's East, North and South
are affected by a fourth NATO front--the front generated and sustained
by the dynamics of globalization.
Globalization clearly has it is positive sides. Advances in
transportation and communications have facilitated the spread of
prosperity, respect for human rights, and democratic principles of
governance, among other positive attributes of modernity.
However, these benefits have also been accompanied by challenges.
The proliferation of weapons technologies and the emergence non-state
actors with global reach--such as ISIS, al Qaeda and others--constitute
some of the threats facilitated by globalization.
The profusion of communications technologies, a key dynamic of
globalization, contributes to what Zbigniew Brzezinski (my father)
calls a global political awakening that has been evident in the velvet
revolutions of 1989, the orange revolution in Ukraine, and the Arab
Spring.
Communication technologies are empowering societies in ways can
bring down dictators, end corrupt autocracies, and create opportunities
for democracy, reform and accountability in government. However, a
political awakening can also be an impatient force, one prone to
destructive violence when it is driven primarily by sentiments flowing
from inequity and injustice and lacks leadership with a platform of
clear objectives. In those cases, societies are often left vulnerable
to organized groups leveraging dangerous ideologies.
Another key dynamic of globalization has been a profound shift in
the global balance of power. A more complex constellation of actors
with global reach and ambitions is emerging. These include China,
India, and Brazil, and could well include others in the future.
As a result, we are entering a world where the predominance of the
United States, even in collusion with Europe, is not what it was in the
past. The emergence of new powers with regional, if not global,
aspirations is often accompanied by territorial claims, historic
grudges, and economic demands that can drive geopolitical tension,
competition and collision.
Together these three dynamics increase the likelihood of regional
conflicts. They make consensual decision-making more difficult among
nation states, including within NATO, and they yield a world that is
more volatile and unpredictable.
Many of these tensions and collisions are and will occur both near
and far from the North Atlantic area, but in an age of globalization
their economic and security implications can be immediate to both sides
of the transatlantic community.
These global challenges make it all the more important for the
transatlantic community to work together on all fronts. A vital
underpinning of the NATO Alliance in this new century is the
Transatlantic Bargain, one in which the United States sustains its
commitment to European security and in return our Allies remain
steadfast in their commitment to address with the United States threats
and challenges that emanate from well beyond the North Atlantic area.
Protecting and promoting transatlantic security and values amidst
these four NATO fronts--the East, the Arctic, the South and the
challenges of global upheaval--stand among the defining challenges of
our time. They present complex, long-term and costly undertakings that
require:
Economic resources that can be readily mobilized to in
times of crisis and dedicated to economic development;
Military capabilities that are expeditious and can be
readily integrated with civilian efforts; and,
Political legitimacy that is optimized through
multilateral versus unilateral action.
In each of these requirements, the transatlantic community is
preeminent. Its economies account for over 50% of the global GDP--some
five times that of China and fourteen times that of Russia. Its
military establishments are second to none, and NATO remains the worlds
most successful and capable military Alliance
Above all, the transatlantic community presents a collective of
likeminded democracies--and herein lies a vision for its role in the
global order of today and tomorrow: NATO can and should serve as the
core of a geographically and culturally expanding community of
democracies that act collectively to promote freedom, stability and
security around in what is an increasingly dynamic globalized
environment. But it will require all of us to do more together.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much. Dr. Sestanovich?
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN SESTANOVICH, Ph.D., GEORGE F. KENNAN
SENIOR FELLOW FOR RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Dr. Sestanovich. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of
the committee, thank you for today's opportunity to join your
discussion.
Admiral Stavridis gave a number of reasons why Europe
matters. I agree with him. I would add one more: what it can
contribute to the global balance of power. A united west can
have more confidence in our ability to defend our interests
worldwide. Divided we can be much less sure.
The past year has been a frustrating one for anyone trying
to anticipate Russian moves. Time and again, many of us failed
to gauge Vladimir Putin's motives. Often we thought he would be
ready to unwind this crisis when he was just about to double
down. He made promises that he did not keep and created a
powerful case for western sanctions. Putin has personally
antagonized American and European leaders in a manner that has
few precedents in the history of Russia's relations with the
west.
After a year like this, where do we stand and what should
we think? I would like to focus on four issues that have
produced considerable debate. They bear directly on choices
that your committee must make. First is the question of Putin's
aims and calculations; second is the effectiveness of
sanctions; third is the question of helping the Ukraine
military; and finally a fourth, fear of where this
confrontation is heading. Many people worry that Putin will
turn against neighbors especially our Baltic allies.
Our debate on all of these issues has brought many truths
to the surface, but I think we have not got the whole story. To
develop the right strategy, we need a fuller picture. First, on
the nature of Putin's commitment to this--your phrase, Senator,
was neo-imperialist policy. We should neither minimize nor
exaggerate it. When separatist forces were about to be defeated
by the Ukrainian army last summer, we saw that Putin was not
prepared to let that happen, but he was also unwilling to
deploy large Russian units into Ukraine to defend the
separatists.
Why do he and his associates lie about having troops there
and about the casualties that they have taken? Because neither
foreign nor domestic audiences would be happy with the truth.
Putin's actions to date do not tell us what his future aims
will be. Saving the separatists and himself from defeat does
not mean that he is prepared to back them as they try to take
more territory. We know they want to do so. They are completely
open about this. But we should not assume that Putin will pay
any price to support them. We should not assume that Putin
cannot be deterred. Many people think he cannot be. This is a
misunderstanding.
Second, about sanctions, Putin and sophisticated Russian
economists are not of one mind about the impact that sanctions
have had. Some call it marginal. Others consider it
significant. But no one denies that sanctions have had some
impact or that over the past year Russia's economic outlook has
deteriorated. The only question is whether sanctions affect
Russian actions on the ground. I believe sanctions do affect
policy. Putin may well hope that if fighting in Eastern Ukraine
stays below the peaks it reached last year, the west will start
to roll back sanctions. There are many indications of this.
But he must also know that if fighting increases, new
sanctions are likely and a rollback will be impossible. It is
hard for me to believe that this awareness does not constrain
Russian support for separatist leaders, and we should make
clear how high the cost will be of further enlargement of the
separatist enclaves.
Third is the much disputed issue of whether and how to
support the Ukrainian military. A sudden infusion of western
arms will not turn the tide when fighting is in full swing. It
might even lead Russia to escalate its own involvement. Those
have been reasons that many have brought forward not to provide
lethal assistance to the Ukrainian military. But the problem
that the United States and its allies face now is somewhat
different. Their primary goal, as I said a moment ago, is to
keep the separatist enclaves from becoming a larger part of
Ukraine. Our goal now should be to deter a new wave of violence
in Ukraine, and in particular an effort by separatists to
expand their holdings.
That is a goal that western military aid can help to
achieve. Without its separatist enclaves, Eastern Ukraine will
grow. The country's political and economic disintegration will
continue, and Russia's involvement will increase. We have to be
smart about strengthening Ukraine's army, and we have to be
careful, but a Ukraine that can defend itself is essential to a
strategy of restabilization. Expecting the conflict in the East
to freeze itself is wishful thinking.
Finally, about where Putin will strike next. His Ukrainian
policy is a threat to the security of NATO members. The
alliance has been right to reinforce and reassure frontline
states, and it must do more. We cannot afford the luxury of
unpreparedness. All the same, as long as the Ukrainian crisis
continues, my judgment is that Russian military pressure
against other neighbors is remote. Being bogged down in Ukraine
makes it harder for Putin to pick other fights, yet the
unfolding conflict in Ukraine will surely affect his calculus
down the road. If Putin emerges the victor in this conflict, if
a pro-western government is kept from succeeding, if Russia's
nationalist mood deepens, if the rich and powerful countries--
democratic countries of Europe and the United States fail to
stay the course, if this is where we end up, Putin will draw
his own conclusions. The Putin we face in the future could be
even more dangerous than the one we face today, both for his
neighbors and for us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our discussion.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sestanovich follows:]
The prepared statement of Dr. Sestanovich
Chairman McCain, Senator Read, members of the Armed Services
Committee: Thank you for today's opportunity to discuss Russia's
confrontation with the West over Ukraine. This is a subject of
fundamental importance for the future of European--and indeed global--
security.
The past year has been a frustrating one for both policymakers and
policy analysts--in fact, for anyone trying to anticipate Russian
moves. Time and again, many of us failed to gauge Vladimir Putin's
motives. Often we thought he would be ready to unwind the crisis when
he was actually about to double down. He made promises that he did not
keep and created a powerful case for Western sanctions. Putin has
personally antagonized European and American leaders in a manner that
has few precedents in the history of Russia's relations with the West.
After a year like this, where do we stand and what should we think?
I'd like to focus on four issues that have produced considerable
debate. They bear directly on choices that your committee must make.
First is the question of Putin's aims and calculations. I
often hear it said that he cares more than we do about Ukraine. Because
he feels that the stakes for Russia are high, he may be hard to deter.
Second is the effectiveness of sanctions. Many say these
have not worked well. Putin, we hear, will not be swayed by economic
pressure; he has convinced the public that Russia must not be pushed
around.
A third much-debated issue has to do with helping Ukraine
militarily. Giving arms, it is said, will only escalate the fighting--
and bolster Putin's claim that the West is seeking to bring Russia
down.
Finally, a fourth fear, about where this confrontation is
heading. Many people worry that Putin will turn against other
neighbors, especially our Baltic allies.
There is a kernel of truth in each of these claims. But they do not
tell the whole story. To develop the right strategy, we need a fuller
picture.
First, on the nature of Putin's commitment: we should neither
minimize nor exaggerate it. When separatist forces were about to be
defeated by the Ukrainian army last summer, we saw that Putin was not
willing to let that happen. But he was also unwilling to deploy large
Russian units in Ukraine to defend the separatists. Why do he and his
associates lie about having troops there, and about the casualties they
have taken? Because neither foreign nor domestic audiences would be
happy with the truth.
Putin's actions to date do not tell us what his future aims will
be. Saving the separatists--and himself--from defeat does not mean he
is prepared to back them as they try to take more territory. We know
they want to do so; they are open about it. But we should not assume
Putin will pay any price to support them.
Second, about sanctions. Putin and sophisticated Russian economists
are not of one mind about the impact that sanctions have had. Some call
it marginal; others consider it significant. But no one denies that
sanctions have had some impact, or that over the past year Russia's
economic outlook has deteriorated. The only question is whether
sanctions affect Russian actions on the ground.
I believe sanctions do affect policy. Putin may well hope that, if
fighting in eastern Ukraine stays below the peaks it reached last year,
the West will start to roll back sanctions. But he must also know that,
if fighting increases, new sanctions are likely and a rollback will be
impossible. It is hard for me to believe that this awareness does not
constrain Russian support for separatist leaders.
Third is the much-disputed issue of whether and how to support the
Ukrainian military. A sudden infusion of Western arms will not turn the
tide when fighting is in full swing; it might even lead Russia to
escalate its own involvement. But the problem that the United States
and its allies face now is slightly different. Their primary goal
should be to deter a new wave of violence and, in particular, an effort
by separatists to expand their holdings.
This is a goal that Western military aid can help to achieve.
Without it, separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine will grow, the
country's political and economic disintegration will continue, and
Russia's involvement will increase. We have to be smart about
strengthening Ukraine's army, and we have to be careful. But a Ukraine
that can defend itself is essential to a strategy of re-stabilization.
Expecting the conflict in the east to freeze itself is wishful
thinking.
Finally, about where Putin will strike next: his Ukraine policy is
a threat to the security of NATO members. The alliance has been right
to reinforce and reassure front-line states, and it must do more. We
cannot afford the luxury of unpreparedness.
All the same, as long as the Ukrainian crisis continues, my
judgment is that Russian military pressure against other neighbors is
remote. Being bogged down in Ukraine makes it harder for Putin to pick
other fights. Yet the unfolding conflict in Ukraine will surely affect
his calculus further down the road. If Putin emerges the victor, if a
pro-Western government is kept from succeeding, if Russia's nationalist
mood deepens, if the rich and powerful democracies of Europe and the
United States fail to stay the course--if this is where we end up,
Putin will draw his own conclusions. The Putin we face in the future
could be even more dangerous than the one we face today--both for his
neighbors and for us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our discussion.
Chairman McCain. Well, thank you very much, and thanks to
all the witnesses for their very important comments and,
frankly, thought-provoking assertions. There is a Michael
Gordon piece on April 22nd: ``In a sign that the tense crisis
in Ukraine could soon escalate, Russia has continued to deploy
air defense systems and built up its forces near the border.''
``This is the highest amount of Russian air defense equipment
in Eastern Ukraine since August,'' Marie Harf, the State
Department spokeswoman said. ``Combined Russian separatist
forces continue to violate the terms of the Minsk II Agreement
signed in mid-February.'' Of course we are seeing indications
of renewed fighting, and there are many who believe that
Mariupol is the next target for Vladimir Putin. It also seems,
at least to this observer, that the price that Vladimir Putin
has paid is not very high, and the benefit, at least in Russian
public opinion, has been rather beneficial to him.
Mr. Brzezinski stated in his prepared statement and verbal
statement, ``We should provide military equipment, including
air defense and anti-tank weapons, as well as key enablers,
deploy intelligence surveillance capabilities, and conduct
military exercises in Ukraine as EUCOM did in the summer of
2014.'' Then in addition to that in your comments, Mr.
Brzezinski, you said we should increase sanctions and have
rapid response capability, and also assist other countries,
specifically you pointed out Georgia.
Admiral, do you and Dr. Sestanovich agree with those
comments, Admiral, or do you want to add or subtract from those
recommendations?
Admiral Stavridis. I certainly would not subtract at all. I
agree with them. I think that just to put specificity on it in
terms of the aid, we ought to be providing lethal, in
particular anti-tank weapons, anti-armor weapons. That is a
very visible, relatively easy to operate, and sensible system
in addition to all the other UAV and so forth, things we should
do. I will add one other, which is cyber. We should be
assisting the Ukrainians in cyber. They are under continuous
attack.
Chairman McCain. Dr. Sestanovich?
Dr. Sestanovich. I am broadly sympathetic with those ideas.
Let me mention, though, that I think in looking at the list of
measures, we should focus primarily right now on steps that
will increase the operational effectiveness of Ukrainian
forces. I am not so sure that having exercises in Ukraine is
going to do very much along those lines. I could be persuaded,
but I would really want to focus on what you can do to increase
the fighting capability of Ukrainian forces.
I mention this for a reason that goes beyond just the
deterrence factor and the ability to resist when separatists
push out from where they are. I think it also affects the
internal politics of Ukraine in an important way. If the
Ukrainian government cannot hold the line against separatist
offensives, they will lose ground--it will lose ground
politically, and the people who will gain politically are the
informal militias often with, to be honest, somewhat extreme
ideologies and aims of their own. That is an outcome that will
be terrible for Ukraine's future. So we are not looking simply
to produce a military result by offering assistance to the
Ukrainian military. We are trying to stabilize and support a
democratic government.
Second, I would add about sanctions. I think right now
increasing sanctions is going to be a very heavy lift. The
crucial aim has to be to prevent the rollback because that is
actually a rather pressing danger right now.
Chairman McCain. I agree, and as long as they are dependent
on Russian energy, I do not think you are going to see. We
forget Crimea. We forget the shoot-down of the Malaysian
airliner, et cetera. Mr. Brzezinski, first of all, there is one
other area, that is the intense propaganda campaign that Russia
is waging in the Baltics in particular, but also Moldova and
other countries. Do you have a response to that because I do
not think, frankly, that our Radio Free Europe and other
capabilities that we had during the Cold War is in the 21st
century. I think it more like 20th century.
My other question is, suppose the status quo remains and we
do not implement the procedures that you and the other members
of the panel have largely supported. What do you think Vladimir
Putin's next move is? Is it Mariupol? Is it Moldova? Is it
areas even further?
Mr. Brzezinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Regarding Russia's
information campaign, they are crushing us. Russia spends
billions of dollars in sending out cyber messages, TV messages,
radio messages. It has lobbyists all over western capitals
pushing out the Russian line, some of it accurate, some of it
blatantly false. We have nothing in comparison, and I actually
think this is where we need to go back to the Cold War and
think about lessons learned.
We actually had a very sophisticated information campaign.
It was led by the U.S. Information Agency, an independent
structure in the U.S. Government that actually was responsible
for doing nothing but messaging, and it has separate offices in
our embassies all around the world. That is the kind of level
of effort that we are going to have to put into if we are going
to counter this Russian information campaign, and it is a
campaign that is going to have to be mirrored by our allies.
Regarding Russia's next move, my sense is that Putin is
just positioning himself as an opportunist. I was struck by how
his strike, unsuccessful albeit, but his strike against
Mariupol earlier this year coincided with the Greek elections
because he clearly knew that the west was not going to really
be able to develop the consensus necessary to respond
forcefully to that violation of the Minsk Agreement. It was not
going to be able to generate the consensus necessary to impose
additional sanctions.
So when I look down the road, I actually think that the
most likely move by Putin will occur when there is another
economic crisis or political crisis in the west or in Ukraine,
and Putin will move quickly to seize and exploit that
opportunity. I think it will be towards Mariupol if not all the
way down towards Crimea. It is possible it could be other parts
of Donetsk and Luhansk.
A second contingency I keep my eyes on is Kharkiv. Kharkiv
is the technological center of Ukraine famous for its aviation
and aeronautics industry. There has been an ongoing campaign of
terrorist attacks by Russian proxies, by Russian forces
operating in that area, bombs going off in metro stops and
such. So I think what is happening there is Russia is
continuing to see they can soften up that region so it could
become like another Luhansk.
Looking beyond Ukraine, I am less worried about a strike
against the Baltics, but more against Georgia. Why Georgia?
Because Georgia is a weak state. It is a small state. We have
precedent in 2008 of Russia trying to take over Georgia. Also
Georgia is strategically important. It is the cork that goes
into the Caspian Sea of oil and gas. It is the pathway for the
southern corridor that is going to bring Caspian gas into
Europe. If Putin really wanted to do something strategically
significant to mitigate the southern corridor, well, you take
Georgia and you shut down the southern corridor that way. That
is what I keep my eyes on.
Chairman McCain. Thank you. Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. One of
the issues that arises along with sanctions is the declining
price of oil because of, frankly, the actions of the Saudis. I
might suggest it is more powerful than formal sanctions. There
are some indications--I have spoken to Dr. Sestanovich before--
of the effect within Russia where there are strikes. They are
building sort of. I think there is too much to suggest that we
have reached a turning point, but there is some indications of
turbulence because of this situation.
So, Admiral and your colleagues, comment on the
effectiveness of the sanctions, but also the effectiveness of
continued low oil prices.
Admiral Stavridis. I think Dr. Sestanovich has it about
right. They are neither catastrophic nor are they de minimus.
They are kind of in the middle. Mr. Brzezinski has it right in
that if you really want to get attention with sanctions, there
is another level you have to go to. He mentioned a couple of
things. I would throw into the mix more targeted individual
sanctions at high level individuals in the Putin circle.
In terms of the oil pries, anything that depresses oil
prices does, in fact, have, I think, perhaps a higher immediate
effect than the sanctions. The two in combination are powerful,
and I think over time will be possibly the way in which we
finally get Vladimir Putin's attention.
Senator Reed. Mr. Brzezinski?
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, my sense is that when we think of
sanctions in the west, we have a terrible tendency to try to
mirror our decision making and political processes upon Russia.
You know, when Russia suffers--when we suffer a negative 1,
negative half percent GDP growth, we have a political crisis.
Governments fall. When Russia suffers negative 2 or negative 3
percent growth, they look back on their history, a rich
history, a proud history, of enduring great economic and
military hardship: Napoleonic wars, Hitler's invasions, and
such.
They have a much heartier approach to economic endurance
than we do, in part because of history, in part also because of
the political structure. Russia is an autocracy. It is a one-
man state. Not a one-party state, a one-man state. It is much
more capable of enduring that kind of hardship that comes with
economic sanctions.
I have to say, if I could, that when I think about our
unwillingness to impose harsher sanctions, I am very, very
surprised. It is rooted very much, I think, in Europe's
unwillingness to suffer the blowback that would come with those
sanctions. But if you look at the economic balance between
Europe and Russia, between the west and Russia, it is pretty
surprising.
Senator McCain has described Russia as a $2 trillion gas
station. Well, that $2 trillion gas station has one customer.
It is the EU [European Union] primarily. The EU is a $12
trillion economy. It is backed by a $16 trillion economy, the
U.S. economy. How is it that a $2 trillion gas station is able
to intimidate an economic entity, the EU and the United States,
that is 15 times its size? I think that is rooted in strategy
shortsightedness, I think more fecklessness, allowing the
neighbor to be invaded and doing not as much as we could. To a
certain degree, corporate greed, an unwillingness to take on
the financial costs of what one needs to do for moral and
strategic reasons.
Senator Reed. Dr. Sestanovich?
Dr. Sestanovich. There is no doubt that Russia is an
autocracy, but I do not think we should exaggerate the
stability of that system. This is a strong but brittle
political order. The kinds of tremors that you referred to,
Senator, with the wave of strikes, for example, are a reminder
that the legitimacy of an order of that kind is always
precarious.
About sanctions. They have been much more powerful than we
expected because of their interaction with oil prices, just as
you suggest. The effect of the oil price drop would have been
less if Russian banks and corporations had had an easy option
of refinancing through the west. The partial closure of access
to western capital markets has made the problems of Russian
state corporations and other businesses that much greater.
It is probably right, at least many Russian friends of mine
say what Admiral Stavridis said. Just if you want to sharpen
the impact of sanctions, the easiest option available is to add
sanctions on individuals. We always think that the broader
sanctions are going to have the bigger bite, but people in
Putin's circle, who will see that sanctions against them are
their reward for being supporters, will, you know, have to
ask--whether the boss knows what is doing.
One other thing about individual sanctions is that they do
not require the same degree of unanimity to have an effect. We
can take actions of that sort ourselves, and that can send a
powerful message about where we are going with our policy.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for your testimony this morning. I would make two
assumptions, number one that the situation in the Ukrainian is
not acceptable in its current way. The status quo is not
acceptable, and that it should be reversed. The second
assumption would be that the United States should not go this
alone. If those two assumptions are correct, does NATO,
assuming that NATO is the appropriate entity to take action,
does NATO have the current capabilities to respond
appropriately to the aggression that has been shown by Mr.
Putin? Second of all, does NATO through the individual
membership, do they have the political will to get it done? Is
that what is slowing it down today?
Admiral Stavridis. I think the short answers are yes and
no. NATO has the military capability. It over matches Russia in
essential every military area, particularly in its high tech,
its number of troops, its combat aircraft, et cetera. But it
does not--because it is a consensus-built organization, which
means all 28 have to agree with anything, I think it is highly
unlikely that the alliance would step into Ukraine in a
significant way and respond to Vladimir Putin on the ground.
I do think if Putin came after a NATO country, Estonia
being the sort of classic scenario that is bandied about, I do
believe the alliance would respond strongly and aggressively to
that.
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, I would second what the Admiral said
fully. Let me go one step further and say that if the
alliance--not the alliance. If we in the west want to do some
of the things that the committee has supported, like arm the
Ukrainians, and some have argued more severe sanctions, I think
we are going to have to move out of institutions like NATO and
the EU and go into coalitions of the willing.
That has risks because it underscores a certain amount of
disunity, but it has the advantages of actually actions being
taken. I am confident that if the United States were able to
pull together a coalition of the willing, and I think it could,
for example, in arming Ukraine, I would look to the UK, I would
look to Poland, I would look to that Balts, I would look to
some of the Scandinavian countries.
Canada? Thank you. That coalition of the willing could
provide weapons that are needed by Ukraine. It would
demonstrate that such moves are actually constructive, and it
would eventually pull the alliance along.
Dr. Sestanovich. I would add only that we should not over
focus on military support for Ukraine. Military support is
extremely important, but the crisis that Ukraine faces is a
much broader one. Given the severity of the economic disaster
that is happening there, it is not too much to call it an
existential crisis.
We can build up the Ukrainian military and still find that
the Ukrainian economic order collapses. To deal with that
problem, we are, in fact, going to need, as you suggest and as
my colleague suggests, multilateral support. We need the IMF
[International Monetary Fund] to step up as it has, and
Congress should understand that what lies between the status
quo in Ukrainian and the unthinkable collapse of the Ukrainian
economy is probably going to be that institution, plus other
creditors helping out. This is going to have to be a pretty
broad-based international effort to rescue the Ukrainians, and
it is going to be expensive.
Senator Rounds. Which in this particular coalition does not
exist today.
Dr. Sestanovich. Well, I would not actually say that. The
core of it exists. There has been a good IMF response, and
western governments have been helpful, but it is probably going
to have to draw in Ukraine's creditors. The Ukrainian
Government is reaching out to try to reach understandings with
its creditors so as to build up its--strengthen its balance
sheet. But this is something that is an ongoing process, and I
do not mean to say that the business of the Armed Services
Committee is not the only element of saving Ukraine. I do mean
to say that actually. I think it is important for the Armed
Services Committee to understand how much the work of other
arms of the U.S. Government will be crucial in keeping Ukraine
afloat.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
you for being here today. I just came back from Berlin a few
weeks ago, and it was the Aspen Group that met with Ukraine and
Russian scholars and leaders. First of all, the thing I walked
away with is the Cold War today is colder than the Cold War
when we had declared a Cold War. If anybody could touch on
that, how we build the relations, if there is something we did
not know about or do not know about it. But seems like there is
a very little conversation, dialogue trying to build any
relations with the United States and Russia. First and foremost
that.
Next of all, exporting oil is something we are talking
about in our Energy Committee. Do we export crude? We have not
done it since the 1970s with the OPEC [Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries] situation we ran into back in
the early 1970s. Could we use this strategically for our
Nation? I think it would be hard for me to explain in West
Virginia that we ought to export more crude and it will make
prices cheaper at the gas pump. That is a hard lift to explain.
Strategically they would back it 100 percent if we knew that we
were putting--bring those nations who have oil that they have
used their energy for the wrong reasons. So to touch on that
one.
Finally, we were told at this conference we had for a week
that we should be very careful if we arm the Ukrainians, even
defensive weapons, because it gives Putin really a reason to do
what he would like to do anyway and be more aggressive. So they
were very cautious. I took the approach that in West Virginia
if a bully is picking on somebody who is undersized or taking
advantage, you just want to make sure they have the ability to
fight back. So I would have said let us give Ukrainian all the
weapons. I have a second thought and a pause button on that one
because of what I had heard, and it could just escalate things
much worse than what they are today. I do not know if they will
get much better, and maybe that is the only recourse we have.
So first of all, on the relationship of crude and then
basically the Ukraine arming--arming Ukraine.
Admiral Stavridis. I am going to go with West Virginia on
the approach. I have difficulty with this argument that says we
should not arm them because we will provoke Vladimir Putin. I
think he has demonstrated he is the bully in the neighborhood,
and I do not think acquiescing to a bully is ever the right way
to go. I say that as a guy who stands a towering 5-foot-5.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Sestanovich. I think, second, on the dialogue with
Russia, we still have zones of cooperation with Russia. We
cooperate with them to some degree in counterterrorism, a bit
in counter piracy. We have reasonable dialogue at the moment
with the Iranian nuclear negotiation. We will see. We have also
seen Russia turn around and give advanced anti-air warfare
weapons. So I would say that portion of the dialogue is
breaking or about to break further. But we do have some minor
areas where we can continue to talk, and we should do so.
In terms of the crude oil, I think it makes sense in the
broadest context of energy to try and alleviate others'
dependence on Russian gas and oil, back to the $2 trillion gas
station that the chairman has, I think, correctly identified.
Thanks.
Senator Manchin. Mr. Brzezinski?
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, thank you. Regarding energy security,
energy security remains a key vulnerability for Central Europe.
They are very dependent upon Russian oil and gas. In Poland I
think it is 80 percent, 90 percent of its oil from Russia, over
60 percent of its gas from Russia. Ukraine, of course, the
numbers are much higher. The same in the Balkans. So we have to
make addressing Central Europe and Europe's energy security a
key priority, and I think U.S. policy has done that. We helped
drive forward the southern corridor that will bring Caspian gas
to Europe.
I think the next big project really should be fostering the
infrastructure necessary to integrate the energy markets of
Central Europe together because they all remain certain
islands, separate nations, separate energy markets, and to
integrate them into that of a wider European energy market.
That is a key long-term project.
As for U.S. exports, I think it can only help Europe's
energy security situation if we unleash our oil and gas upon
the global market, but we should have also realistic
expectations of how that will affect European security. Most of
those exports probably would not go to Europe. They would
probably go to Asia and elsewhere where the prices are higher.
But by flooding the global market, it would actually push more
global oil and gas towards Europe, helping diversify Europe's
energy sources, and that has already been the case to a certain
degree with LNG [liquified natural gas].
Regarding arming Ukraine, I stand with West Virginia
without question. I look at not only is it a strategic
requirement because, you know, weakness can actually attract
aggression certainly when you have a neighbor like Putin, but I
also look at it as a moral imperative. I have to say I look
back prior to the attack and remember--the attack of Ukraine. I
remember how the Ukrainians actually sent a company of their
own soldiers to a NATO Article 5 exercise. They have actually
sent more soldiers than we have to Steadfast Jazz in Poland and
Latvia.
Then I think about the protestors on the Maidan who risked
their lives, some lost their lives, expressing their desire to
be part of Europe, their desire to be part of the EU, and their
desire to be part of NATO. For us to kind of stand and look at
our shoes in a way and limit our assistance to MREs [meals
ready-to-eat] and blankets when they are being attacked by an
aggressor I think is morally indefensible.
Dr. Sestanovich. Well, West Virginia seems to be carrying
the day here. But I would say, first of all, we are not
limiting our assistance to MREs and blankets, and you know
that, Ian. We do need to be smart and careful here because
getting involved with weapons assistance can be destabilizing.
We need to make sure that is not. I am completely in favor of
providing this assistance, but I think that it is silly to say
there are no risks involved. There are risks, and that is why
we have got to be smart about it. But the risks are very, very
great doing nothing, so we have got to watch it.
About a Cold War, Admiral Stavridis is right that there are
plenty of areas where we still can manage to sit across from
the Russians and talk to them. But this is a real Cold War
suddenly, and we need kind of strong nerves for it. The message
to the Russians has got to be you brought this on yourselves,
and the principal responsibility for finding a way out of it to
start with is not ours. It is yours because you began this.
That I think it is really quite important for us to have the
strength of that conviction.
Finally, about energy, I agree with a lot of what has been
said here. I would give you an operational suggestion.
Secretary Kerry last summer said it is a goal of American
policy to reverse--reduce European energy dependence on Russia.
How is it coming? I would like some regular progress reports. I
would say that is something to ask about in a persistent way to
make sure that our government does better here what it does not
always do, and that is follow through.
Chairman McCain. Well, Doctor, the risk of destabilization
assumes that the situation is stable. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, very much for being here today. We appreciate your
testimony. I would also like to extend my congratulations to
Senator Cotton, who is not with us today. Late last evening
they welcomed an addition to their family. Baby boy Cotton was
born last night. Anna is doing very well. So congratulations.
Chairman McCain. He should be here this morning then.
[Laughter.]
Senator Ernst. Yes, her work is over, at least for the time
being. Anyway, I would like to shift just a little bit and talk
a little bit about Turkey just while I have you here, Admiral,
if we could. It seems to me and to many others that Turkey has
been maybe not such a strong ally as they should have been. We
see that ISIL and al-Nusra seem to have extensive lines of
communication within Turkey, and I would contend that there are
those within the administration that tend to turn a blind eye
to those types of activities going on within their own country.
So, Admiral and others, if you could address Turkey and the
situation as it stands with these different terrorist
organizations. Maybe what the United States and others could do
to discourage this type of activity.
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, thank you. There is some good
news in the overall stature of Turkey in the Alliance, and we
should remember that. I am going to criticize Turkey
momentarily. But we should remember that in every NATO
operation--Afghanistan, Libya, the Balkans, counter piracy--
Turkey has been there. They have sent troops. They have been
very engaged and involved. What is happening now, you are
absolutely correct, is a different story. Despite having
obviously a lengthy and extensive border that abuts both Syria
and Iraq, among others, they have, in my view, failed to step
up in the anti-Islamic State campaign. They should be much more
involved at every level beginning with open access to their
bases, more intelligence sharing, more use of their military
capability against the Islamic State up and including ground
troops, which I think are inevitable against the Islamic State.
So in all of those dimensions Turkey is falling short.
The reason is they are conflicted about objectives. They
really want to see the end of the Assad regime. The Islamic
State is nominally fighting the Assad regime. They have failed
to recognize that the greater danger at this moment is, in
fact, the Islamic State, A, and B, we can do both of those
things. We can see the end of Assad and defeat the Islamic
State. It requires will, coordination, cooperation. Turkey
needs to do more.
Senator Ernst. Gentleman, any other input?
Mr. Brzezinski. I guess the only thing I would add, and I
completely agree with Admiral Stavridis' points about what we
could be expecting of Turkey. Also I think we have to take into
account Turkey's perspective in its relationship with the west,
which I think has caused it to kind of, to a certain degree,
and I do not want to overstate this, disenfranchise itself,
particularly within the European community. It has been
frustrated now by over a decade of basically a cold shoulder
from the EU and its aspirations. So, it has been almost kind of
let free to a certain degree, and it is pursuing, not
surprisingly, a more independent policy. Our challenge is how
to pull Turkey in a constructive way fully into the fold.
Senator Ernst. Very good.
Admiral Stavridis. May I add one point? It is simply that
we should give Turkey credit for dealing with an enormous
humanitarian challenge. There are 2 million Syrians who are
being--the bill for whom is being footed by Turkey, and that is
a contribution to humanity. It does not, in my view, diminish
their shortfall in reacting militarily.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. If we could turn back to Ukraine
and Russia just for a moment. We have talked extensively today
about arming the Ukrainians, and I take the West Virginia
approach also, very much so. But are there other types of
programs that maybe we could assist the Ukrainians with? We
have talked about, of course, energy. Are there agricultural
programs, other types of things where we can just continue to
assist them and build up their own economy in the meantime?
Dr. Sestanovich. Well, Ukraine could be an agricultural
powerhouse rivaling the greatest Midwestern producers. So watch
it.
Senator Ernst. Yes, they could.
Dr. Sestanovich. Watch out what you wish for.
[Laughter.]
Surely the failure to develop Ukrainian agriculture has
probably been as big as any failure of the past 25 years in
sort of unlocking the potential of the Ukrainian economy. The
Ukrainian economy is in such terrible shape that almost
anything would help. The good news is that you have a team in
place in Ukraine that really gets it, that understands what
needs to be done. It is not as though we need to go there and
tell them have you thought about Ukrainian agriculture. They
know what the potential is and they know what the problems are.
They need the resources. They need the political will. They
need the time to let some of their measures take hold. But they
are pretty serious about what they are doing, and they are
implementing the kinds of policies that make some of them
nervous actually about the political viability of it. That is
why the prime minister calls himself a kamikaze appointment. He
figures he ultimately is going to go up in flames. But I think
the most important ingredient in this is time. They need to be
able to hang in there long enough for the measures--the very
sensible and path-breaking measures that they are taking to
have some effect.
Senator Ernst. Great. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
very much for being here. Most of our discussion this morning
is focused on Russia, which is the elephant in the room. But as
we look at threats to Europe's security, how concerned should
we be about the economic situation that particularly parts of
Europe are facing, the rise of nationalist parties in some of
the--Greece, Spain, some of the other countries of Europe, and
the potential for that to provide fertile ground for ISIS and
terrorist attacks and Russia to agitate in a way that is a
threat to European security? How do you assess that with
respect to what is happening with Putin? Anybody.
Mr. Brzezinski. Senator, I think you have hit on an
underlying foundation element of Europe's security situation,
and that is the fragility of its economy. The fragility of its
economy is contributing to some of these emerging kinds of
nationalist xenophobic parties. They are certainly not
constructive.
When I think of how this relates to Russia, I watch very
much what is going on in Greece because I really feel that that
could have a powerful impact on the European economy. There is
a Grexit. There are going to be shutters, and they are going to
go particularly through Southern Europe. It could even push
Europe back into a recession.
A Europe that is back into recession is a Europe that is
going to be less able to mobilize as a whole to take on the
challenges that we are discussing today, be it Russia's
aggression to the East, be it the extremism we see in the
Middle East, the extremism we see in North Africa and the
refugee flows. It is going to be harder for us to act as a
transatlantic community in a unified way. I really believe that
I think Putin watches this closely. I think he times to a
certain degree his moves according to when he thinks the
alliance, the community, the transatlantic community, will be
least able to respond forcefully and cohesively.
Senator Shaheen. So what more--I am assuming that, Admiral
Stavridis and Dr. Sestanovich, that you both basically agree
with that assessment?
Admiral Stavridis. I do. If I could just add, I think this
is an area where we mentioned earlier that Putin was crushing
us in the social networks and strategic communications. The
Islamic State is crushing us as well.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Admiral Stavridis. We need a countervailing strategic
communications focus there along with all the other things that
Ian has talked about. I think it is extremely concerning.
Senator Shaheen. So that is what my next question was going
to be. What can we do to better shore up what is happening in
those areas? Obviously a better social media information
campaign that can help respond. What else?
Admiral Stavridis. The economic piece is enormous here, and
I would start with the T-TIP, the Transatlantic Trade [and
Investment] Partnership that is coming. I think that is a way
that we can help the European economy directly. Putin hates it
because it ties Europe to the United States, and I think it
would have a very salutary effect.
Thirdly, we ought to continue to do within the military
domain the NATO things that you know so well, Senator. I think
there is no single point solution here, but we need to continue
to be engaged militarily, politically, economically, and in a
communications sense. Otherwise, storm clouds ahead.
Dr. Sestanovich. Could I just add one kind of encouraging
word about----
Senator Shaheen. Please.
Dr. Sestanovich.--you know, these bumbling, passive----
Senator Shaheen. Encouragement would be helpful.
Dr. Sestanovich.--spineless, underperforming Europeans as
we tend to portray them. Putin does watch this carefully, but
he exaggerates the impact of it. That is why he has been so
surprised by the extent of the European reaction to what he has
done in Ukraine. He thought this would basically be forgotten
within months. His view has been the European cannot tie their
shoes. They cannot do anything collectively. In fact, the
European Union has regularly reaffirmed a sanctions policy that
Putin never saw coming.
It gets me to the question of marketing because what you
need from marketing is a good product. The most important part
of developing a consistent public relations line is having a
unified policy. So far we have been pretty good at that, and I
think if we can hold that we have the solid foundation on which
to build a more effective marketing policy. But the crucial
ingredient, and I think this is--this hangs in the balance over
the next 6 to 8 months is to keep a policy across the board--
military, economic, political support for Ukraine. That can
unravel. Putin may not turn out to be totally wrong about the
disunity of the west. But if by the end of the year he looks up
and discovers that actually he has not been able to divide
Europe and the United States, that will be a powerful message
for him.
Senator Shaheen. So when you say ``we,'' you are talking
about Europe and the United States together.
Dr. Sestanovich. I am, yes.
Senator Shaheen. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have
other questions, but I will----
Chairman McCain. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to be a
bit of a contrarian here and try to create an alternative
scenario. I am trying to figure out whether this is the
Sudetenland in 1938 or Sarajevo in 1914, and bear with me for a
minute.
Putin has a very weak economy. Domestically everything
stinks. He has got an 80 percent approval rating in Russia
principally because of nationalism and his strong man image of
standing up to the west. Is it not possible that arming the
Ukrainians, which would obviously be public in some way, shape,
or form, whether it is anti-tank weapons or something else,
would be playing into hands? It would be--he would say, see, I
am standing up against America. They are trying to invade our
region of the country--our region of the world. They are
putting their troops and arms--maybe not troops, but arms, and
it would embolden him.
The second piece of my question is, you guys, it seems to
me, are assuming a static universe. We arm the Ukrainians and
nothing else happens. He would obviously respond in some way,
and he is sitting on the side of the poker table with most of
the chips because this is on his turf.
I guess to throw one other historical analogy into the mix,
Cuba. We were willing to take the world to the brink of nuclear
because of perceived Russian, not aggression, but placement of
weapons in our sphere of influence off of our country. I think
we have got to think and put ourselves in his shoes, and I am
just concerned. I have not made any firm decision on this, but
I just do not think it is as easy as you say.
We arm the Ukrainians. Then what happens? That is my
question. Mr. Brzezinski, do you want to tackle that one?
Mr. Brzezinski. First, I would say that arming the
Ukrainians is not the sole answer. I think it is a critical
element of a strategy.
Senator King. But what does he do if we arm the Ukrainians?
What is the next--it is not just going to be, oh, they armed
the Ukrainians. What does he do next? What happens next?
Mr. Brzezinski. If he moves further into Ukraine after we
arm the Ukrainians, the Ukrainians will impose higher costs on
the aggressor forces, on the Russian forces. I think that is
going to be--
Senator King. But he controls the media in Russia. Does he
care--I mean, he is not responsive. As you said, if your
economy went down 1 percent we would have, you know, people in
the streets. Over there they are not even going to know that
there are more troops dying in the Ukraine.
Mr. Brzezinski. You know, again, it is not the sole answer,
but if there are more Russians, to put it crassly, dying in
Ukraine, I think it is going to cause a political problem for
Putin. One thing that I have been struck by watching this
crisis politically or this even in Russia, is the steadfast,
earnest, determined effort of the Russian Government to cover
up Russian deaths in Ukraine. They do not have the equivalents
of Faces of the Fallen. They deny that anyone has died. They
deny their forces are there. They intimidate families who have
lost their sons or their daughters in Ukraine telling them to
be quiet. They move them out of their homes. They threaten to
take away their death benefits. It is really interesting--
Senator King. So is it your position then that we arm the
Ukrainians and Putin does not respond. There are no further
weapons for the separatists. There are no further troops. I
mean, this is a fact--in fact a status universe. We arm--there
is no response. I find that impossible to believe.
Mr. Brzezinski. No, what happens is that, one, the Russians
face a more complex situation, a more lethal situation. They
face the prospect of a prolonged and costly conflict. That, I
think, will probably deter them trying to push further in
Ukraine. It also might make it possible they would be more
willing to back out of Ukraine, at least out of Eastern
Ukraine. It would also demonstrate to Putin the west is serious
about sustaining the post-World War II security order, that we
are not going to tolerate unilateral revisions of orders by
force. I think those are dynamics that we are not trying--we
are not leveraging, and we should be leveraging.
Senator King. Others have thoughts about my question? I
hope you appreciate that this is not easy.
Admiral Stavridis. I totally do, and I think the key word
Ian used was ``probably.'' This is a----
Senator King. Yes, I heard that word, too.
Admiral Stavridis. This is a calculus just like any
decision you make, particularly when you use lethal force in
any dimension. We always say in the Navy, when you release
ordnance, everything changes. You are taking a gamble. But my
assessment is that this is the right choice. In terms of what
happens, I think Putin then has a much harder choice. He can
either bring Russian forces under their flag into Ukraine and
face, I think, overwhelming world approbation, or I think at
that point he does start to unwind and reaches for the frozen
conflict solution. I think that is probably the best we get out
of this.
But, no, of course, it is not static, Senator. There will
be changes, and it is a risk, and it could go very badly. But I
still recommend that we do it.
Senator King. Sir?
Dr. Sestanovich. Senator, since I am the member of the
panel who has expressed the most unease about this, let me try
to bring you around to my way of thinking about it since I do
support it. I think you mentioned a static universe. You should
not assume that the universe is static as long as the United
States does not do anything. This is a fluid situation right
now in which separatists are trying to push out in all
directions, whether it is along the coast, to the north, to the
west. They only control about a third of Donetsk Province and
half of Luhansk, and they have said they want it all.
They are definitely going to try to get the rest of these
provinces, and they are going to try to expand their control
across along the coast. It is just a certainty. I mean, if
there is anything that one can regard as a law in this
universe, that is going to happen. So the question----
Senator King. I certainly understand that there are risks
on both sides. There is a risk of inaction, and the universe is
not static in either way. I do understand that. I am just
trying to assess the risks, the relative risks.
Dr. Sestanovich. The best scenario in which to try to have
some effect of bolstering the operational capabilities of the
Ukrainian forces is when there is a lull. The fact that Putin
has agreed, even while not abiding by it much, but there is
something of a lull. That is the moment in which we have to try
to make sure that when people start to challenge that lull, to
push out from what they hold now to what they want to hold,
that they will be stopped, that they will face more resistance.
I mean, the thing that finally makes me think, yes, of
course you have to support these forces is without greater
capability, there is no way that the separatists are not going
to push out. So here is the question I would put to you, and I
think you should put it to people in the administration because
they plainly do not want to do this. What is your plan for
stopping the separatist offensives that are going to go, you
know, west, north, and south from the land that they hold now?
What is your theory of the case?
Senator King. Right.
Dr. Sestanovich. If you have got a theory of the case that
enables the Ukrainian forces to hold the line, great, you know.
Let us hear it. I think if there were such a case that could
avoid the----
Senator King. The risk.
Dr. Sestanovich.--the uncertainty and the risk that you
identified, great. I just do not think there is that. But I
would say challenge people in the administration because my
sense is from your--what you said, that you do not want that to
happen. I think they do not want it to happen either, but I do
not think they have any answer to how they are going to keep it
from happening.
Senator King. It seems to me the answer is that we have to
game out what happens in both directions. Particularly I am
concerned, as I expressed, that when you are playing chess with
a Russian, you had better think three moves ahead, not just
react and no reaction, and I think that is a very important
point. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have gone over, but a very
important point that we also have to game out the results of
doing nothing, and see is there a strategy or is the strategy
just to not act.
Dr. Sestanovich. Gaming it out and doing nothing is totally
easy. The separatists will expand their territory.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Well, I think, Doctor, you have just
answered my question, and I would ask the other two witnesses,
and I am sure I know the answer. Is there any doubt that there
will be attempts and, for no reason to believe they are not
going to be successful under the present scenario to expand the
Russian influence through the separatists throughout Ukraine?
Admiral, is there any doubt in your mind?
Admiral Stavridis. None whatsoever, and I suspect sooner
rather than later. I think the mortars and the artillery are
shelling the villages outside of Mariupol right now.
Mr. Brzezinski. I completely agree with the Admiral. It is
going to happen.
Dr. Sestanovich. I think the separatists are determined to
have this happen. What we do not know is how much the Russians
really want it to happen. I think the Russians are unwilling to
let the separatists be defeated, and the game that is going on
between them is the separatists want to push out, and then when
there is a counter response, they want to say to the Russians
you have got to defend us. You have got to keep us from losing
any of the ground that we have taken. So what our interest is
is to make sure that they cannot actually take new ground
because once they do, that will draw in more Russian support.
Mr. Brzezinski. Could I follow up, sir?
Chairman McCain. Sure.
Mr. Brzezinski. Actually I get very concerned about what I
feel is a tendency to exaggerate the gap between the
separatists and Moscow. I never saw--was able to observe any
significant separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine prior to
this invasion. I firmly believe that ``the separatists'' are
not separatists. They are an extension of the Russian polity.
They were sent in to destabilize Eastern Ukraine. They were led
by Russian provocateurs. They were backed by Russian soft
[power], and they were ultimately backed by Russian
conventional forces.
So it is not really--there is not a tension that we can
really exploit between separatists and Moscow. They are one and
the same. It is an external invasion of Ukraine.
Chairman McCain. I would also add that apparently if I were
Vladimir Putin, and I do not pretend to understand him totally,
but it seems that you achieve a degree of success, and that
becomes the status quo. Things quiet down, then Europeans talk
about relaxing sanctions and trying to find that out, and
things are quiet for a while. Now, at least according to
General Breedlove, we are starting to see an increase in
activities after a period of lull. It seems to me that that has
been pretty successful so far for Vladimir Putin. Doctor, is
there anything to that theory, do you think?
Dr. Sestanovich. Putin thinks he has got more endurance
than the Europeans do and than the Americans do. You are right.
As I said to Senator Shaheen earlier, his gamble is that
whatever miscalculations he has made and how much greater the
resistance has been, we will crack first. So, that is the test
for us is not to crack first.
Chairman McCain. Thank you. Jack, did you want to----
Senator Reed. I just have just a brief comment. I think as
has been indicated by the panel and particularly Mr.
Brzezinski, that Putin is an opportunist. If there is an
opportunity, he takes it. But he is also--I think, his timing
is influenced by things like the Olympics. I think he was very
reluctant to get involved in the Ukraine while the Maidan
Square demonstrations were going on because he had another
audience he was playing to. He was the world leader.
I think similarly at his juncture we might be having a lull
because they are in the process of celebrating the end of the
Great Patriotic War, and he wants everyone to come and pay
homage to him, et cetera. But after that, which is within a few
weeks, there is no more, sort of him personally, reason to hold
back, so that might be a factor also.
But I think, and I will go in a second, I think your point,
Doctor, which is this becomes ultimately a test of wills
against this individual. He has the advantage of being an
individual. We have a collective will we have to sustain and
hold together. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I do not mean to prolong this dialogue too
much longer, but it seems to me energy is still a key item. We
could develop within a couple of years an ability to get energy
from the United States over to that part of the world, which I
think would have a significant impact. That has nothing to do
with arms or weapons. Finally, could I ask if there is an
agreement on that, Admiral?
Admiral Stavridis. I agree with that, Senator.
Mr. Brzezinski. Sure.
Dr. Sestanovich. Absolutely.
Chairman McCain. I thank the witnesses for a very----
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, can I----
Chairman McCain. No. Yes.
[Laughter.]
Senator Shaheen. Can I ask a couple more questions?
Chairman McCain. Absolutely.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I want to go back, Dr.
Sestanovich, to your comment about providing lethal weapons
because I think there is a lot of agreement on this committee
that we should provide those weapons, but you said we have to
do it very carefully. So you talked about doing it during the
lull. What other things do you think we should be doing as we
are looking at providing those weapons to do it carefully?
Dr. Sestanovich. Training is crucial. Intelligence
capabilities are crucial. Those are the two that would come to
my mind right off the bat. Then of course the economic backdrop
means that we have to make sure that while we are getting those
Ukrainians in smart formation on the front lines in good
looking new uniforms, and knowing their tasks, the home front
does not just collapse. That is--you know, if there is anything
that is more desperate than the military outlook, it is the
economic outlook.
Senator Shaheen. Yes. I certainly think that is pretty
clear to this committee. But let me ask because one of the
things that I think that you all have alluded to is the
importance of acting unilaterally with the United States and
Europe, being united in our approach to the crisis. One of the
reports about the European reaction to lethal weapons is that
they do not support that, and that, therefore, this could be a
potential area where we would disagree in a way that might have
an impact. So how do you assess that as you look at the need to
provide weapons? Admiral?
Admiral Stavridis. Disagreement within NATO is unknown
terrain at all, Senator, as you know quite well from your deep
experience in NATO. Think back on the Libyan operation where we
saw a group of nations leaning forward, very, very involved, a
group of nations supportive, and then some who were essentially
opposed, but willing to kind of come along. I think that is how
this would play out.
I do not accept the argument that this would somehow
shatter the Alliance. I think at the end of the day you can do
it within a NATO context with the Nations who want to, or as
Mr. Brzezinski has said, you could create a coalition of the
willing. He listed some states. I agree with that. I think
there are mechanisms to deal with that argument.
Senator Shaheen. Any other--Mr. Brzezinski?
Mr. Brzezinski. Yes, I would like to make two points,
Senator. First, I would add to the Admiral's list of how
coalitions fell together into NATO without collapsing the
Alliance. Missile defense is an example. Iran sanctions is
another. I have two words of caution on strategy for arming
Ukraine or two things we need to think about is, one, I think
it is important that we avoid incrementalism.
I am a little bit worried that our administration and our
European allies' approach is first we will do some MREs, then
we will do some Humvees, then we will do some counter-artillery
radar and such. I think that is a mistake because I think that
just maps out to Putin were the future is headed, and that
actually will encourage him, embolden him to act while he is
most effective, has the power balance most in his favor in
Ukraine.
Then second, I think we would be naive to assume just
arming the Ukrainians and the Russians will not do anything.
They are going to counter react. So we have to have a plan that
goes beyond just arming Ukraine, so that if we provide good,
robust security assistance to Ukraine, we are prepared for a
sudden Russian offensive. For example, one step half-cocked and
ready to go is really harsh economic sanctions that would be
driven in either by the EU or by coalition like-minded nations
to hit the Russians and then know in advance this is going to
happen if they all of a sudden try and counter react
aggressively to an effort to provide more needed security
assistance to Ukraine.
Admiral Stavridis. If I could, I would add, Senator, cyber.
We need to add that to our shopping list as we think about how
to help the Ukrainians. Thanks.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I want to switch topics for my
time that is left because one of the things that happened last
week is that European regulators imposed antitrust charges as
Gazprom. Do you think that is going to have any impact on the
energy situation?
Dr. Sestanovich. Yes. It has been a principle of Russian
policy that Europe does not get to impose its rules on its
energy trade with Russia. The result has been that Gazprom has
had a very advantageous negotiating position with all European
customers. It has been able to insist on separate negotiations
with all customers with the result that its prices across
Europe vary dramatically according to that bilateral
relationship.
For Europe to say we care about our policies and we are
going to enforce them in our energy trade would be of immense
importance. Europe has done that in kind of tentative ways, for
example, with respect to energy transportation and pipelines.
It has managed to block the Russian South Stream Pipeline by
saying this does not meet our rules. The Russians have time and
again laughed at that and said, oh, no, those rules are not in
effect because we can buy off this or that individual customer
or transit country.
If the Europeans are going to turn around their energy
relationship with Russia, they have got to start enforcing
their rules, and it is has got to go beyond transportation. If
it gets to the issue of negotiating about pricing, there will
have been an energy revolution, so that is fundamental. But as
you surely know from having EU events, one announcement does
make a policy. The Europeans have opportunities for many
procedural hurdles, reversals, and so forth.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank all of you for being here.
You know, having been to Ukraine twice last year and having had
the privilege of overseeing the presidential elections, you
know, I am just wondering, are we at a tipping point because
many of us have been calling, and on a very strong bipartisan
basis, for providing, you know, the lethal support for Ukraine
to defend itself, as well as economic assistance, as well as
increased NATO support, additional sanctions.
At some point, I mean, I have just--it is really appalling
to me. It is hard to express how I feel about it because we
have been in almost uniformity here in the Congress on this, on
things that, you know, we do not always agree on, so many
things. On this we have sort of on a bipartisan basis thought
this was the right thing to do, and I am just worried.
Are we not at a critical moment where--I feel like in
having listened to--I was at the Munich Security Conference
having listened to, for example, the Germans speak about their
objections to providing lethal arms. It is almost like I feel
like that in some ways Ukraine is being written off, and I hate
to be so cynical about it.
But if we do not act soon, where is this going? I mean, is
there not a huge urgency for this? I thought there was an
urgency last May. But can you help us understand how urgent is
this situation where you are--you know, we have got Ukraine
with the economic situation, and in addition having to defend
their territory.
Admiral Stavridis. I think we are at a critical point, and
I think what will happen in the next two to four weeks, maybe
the next two to four months, is going to be another bite out of
Ukraine by the separatists. I am hopeful that that will be the
tip that pushes us over to come in with not only the lethals,
but really the entire package of things we have talked about
today.
As of yesterday, as I mentioned to the chairman, mortar and
artillery fire at the villages outside of Mariupol. That is
what you do first when you soften up for a land advance. We may
be there now. We will know more in the next couple of weeks. We
have to get going on this if we are going to have impact.
Senator Ayotte. I just wanted to also follow up. One of the
things that struck me about this whole thing, and just correct
me if I am wrong in my thinking, and it has really bothered me
in terms of our foreign policy from the beginning, and that has
been the Budapest Memorandum. It seems to me that we are not
stepping up to help provide this kind of assistance that we
have talked about here. We signed this agreement. As we look
at, for example, even the context of Iran, other goals that we
have of nuclear nonproliferation, does this not in the big
picture undermine--I just still do not understand why other
countries would want to give up their nuclear weapons when
their territory is invaded, and yet we--you know, our signature
on that memorandum seems to mean nothing in this context. Are
you worried about that in the picture as we look at our larger
foreign policy here?
Mr. Brzezinski. Senator, I agree with you. I think there
are two important issues at stake here in the violation of the
Budapest Memorandum. I was a volunteer in Ukraine working in
Kiev when that was signed, and I remember the impressions in
Kiev intimately. It was celebrated in Ukraine as an affirmation
of the west's commitment to its independence and its
sovereignty. It was even seen as an affirmation of its attempts
to become a European--an integrated member of the Europe
``Community of Democracies'', because they were giving
something up that was recognized as kind of potentially very
important to their own security, nuclear weapons.
Now 25, 30 years later, we are in a situation in which that
Memorandum has been blatantly violated. Every country around
the world that has or is aspiring to weapons of mass
destruction is looking at it very carefully. What are the
consequences if you give up such aspirations or such weapons?
Well, you become more vulnerable? Will someone back you up? Not
necessarily clear that they would.
Then I think it is a real hit to the west's credibility
because it was really seen a document driven by the United
States and Great Britain, Europe and the United States. That is
what the Ukrainians back when I was there in 1994 were looking
to for assurances. Not to Russia, but to the United States and
to Europe, and they are not getting it. It has really undercut
our standing, the credibility of our security commitments.
Dr. Sestanovich. Senator, I agree with you, but if it does
not loom large in my thinking it is because it seems to me the
case for supporting Ukraine is so strong.
Senator Ayotte. Right. Well, it is compelling.
Dr. Sestanovich. No matter what.
Senator Ayotte. I mean, it is compelling.
Dr. Sestanovich. Yes. I do not think we should in any way
have the view that if there had been no Budapest Memorandum, we
would be less interested in this case, or that we would be less
interested in other cases where there is not that same issue.
You are right that the commitment of the United States has
been shown to have been made perhaps without full thought as to
what we really meant by it. But I think--to me it is not the
central issue. The broader question is the interest that we had
in the entire order that we were trying to create in Europe
after the Cold War.
This is--the reason this is a fundamental threat to that
interest has less to do with the disposition of Soviet nuclear
forces. The truth is the Ukrainians did not really want to keep
those things, and it has much more to do with more fundamental
considerations of war and peace and our future relations with
Russia.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I hope--I know my time is up, but I
know how dedicated the chairman has been to this issue, and how
passionate he is, and I share his passion for this. I hope
that--I hope that the administration is listening to the
testimony of all of you today. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. I want to thank the witnesses for being
here today. It has been very helpful. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:51 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[all]