[Senate Hearing 114-214, Part 4]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-214, Pt. 4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1376
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
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PART 4
AIRLAND
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MARCH 19 AND APRIL 14, 2015
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Airland
TOM COTTON, Arkansas , Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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march 19, 2015
Page
Air Force Structure and Modernization............................ 1
LaPlante, Dr. William A., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
For Acquisition................................................ 4
Holmes, Lt. Gen. James M., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air
Force for Strategic Plans and Requirements..................... 18
Wolters, Lt. Gen. Tod D., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air
Force for Operations........................................... 21
Questions for the Record......................................... 43
april 14, 2015
Army Modernization............................................... 51
Williamson, LTG Michael E., USA, Military Deputy and Director,
Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
the Army, Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology............... 55
McMaster, LTG Herbert R., Jr., USA, Director, Army Capabilities
Integration Center/Deputy Commanding General, Futures, U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command............................. 65
Ierardi, LTG Anthony R., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army,
G-8............................................................ 67
Cheek, MG Gary H., USA, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the
Army, G-3/5/7.................................................. 67
Questions for the Record......................................... 91
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
AIR FORCE FORCE STRUCTURE AND MODERNIZATION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Cotton
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Lee, Manchin, and Donnelly.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TOM COTTON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Cotton. The hearing will come to order.
I want to thank everyone for their attendance.
The Airland Subcommittee convenes today to hear testimony
regarding Air Force structure and modernization in review of
the defense authorization request for fiscal year 2016 and the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). I welcome the witnesses
from the Air Force and thank them for their service to our
country.
As repeatedly stated by many expert and well-respected
witnesses before the full committee in numerous recent
hearings, our country is facing the most diverse, complex, and
potentially dangerous threats to our national security in
recent history. However, instead of strengthening our military
and ensuring our men and women in uniform have the
comprehensive training and world-class equipment they need,
sustained defense budget cuts, in combination with mindless
sequestration, are damaging our military's force structure,
modernization, and readiness.
In their testimony before the full committee, Secretary of
the Air Force Deborah Lee James and Chief of Staff of the Air
Force General Mark A. Welsh III described how the Air Force is
both the smallest and oldest it has ever been, even while the
demand for airpower continues to increase. They also stated
that the qualities of capability and capacity are inextricably
linked, that the Air Force cannot get any smaller and still
provide the airpower capabilities the country needs and expects
from the Air Force. I could not agree more.
This conundrum comes at the same time as our hard-earned
gains in the Middle East are challenged by the extremists of
the Islamic State, President of Russia Vladimir Putin's
aggressive activities to test the resolve of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance in Eastern Europe, and
China continues a massive arms buildup to threaten the
stability of the Asian-Pacific region and beyond. As Senator
John McCain and Representative Mac Thornberry, chairmen of the
Senate and House Armed Services Committees, stated in a recent
op-ed, these increasingly aggressive activities by our
adversaries is no coincidence as they observe our fiscal
struggles, and therefore Congress must act to repeal the
damaging effects of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011
funding caps and sequestration.
Turning to Air Force operations, plans, and programs, I am
deeply concerned with the Air Force's ability to execute the
administration's stated defense strategy with its current
inventory of combat squadrons. The Air Force today has 54
fighter squadrons. The fiscal year 2016 budget proposes to
reduce that number even further to 49 by retiring the venerable
A-10 fleet and before the F-35A reaches full operational
capability. When compared to the Air Force of Operation Desert
Storm, today it has less than one-third of the combat power
mustered for that air campaign. By your Chief of Staff's own
statement, less than half of today's already insufficient
number of fighter squadrons are fully combat ready and will not
return to full readiness until 2023 due to the damaging effects
of sequestration suffered in 2013 and will only be able to
achieve those readiness levels barring another destructive
round of sequestration in fiscal year 2016.
With regard to the proposed A-10 fleet retirement, I hope
our Air Force witnesses can explain to the subcommittee their
plan for how to mitigate the loss of such a critical capability
and reducing capacity even further and whose brave men and
women are prosecuting the air war against the Islamic State as
we speak. The retirement of 164 A-10s in fiscal year 2016 takes
another five combat-coded squadrons out of the rotation,
putting even more stress on the remaining force by increasing
the frequency of their deployments, decreasing their dwell time
at home station, and in turn reducing overall full spectrum
readiness of combat forces even further. It is a capacity and
readiness death spiral the Air Force can help avoid by
deferring the retirement of these critical warplanes until the
F-35 is fully operational and crews sufficiently trained and
certified to replace the critical missions these aircraft
perform.
With regard to modernization, the Air Force is facing many
large procurement programs over the next decade: the F-35A; the
KC-46A; the long-range strike bomber (LRSB); the T-X T-38
trainer replacement; the presidential aircraft replacement; the
Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
replacement; next generation air dominance. The list is long
and represents hundreds of billions of dollars required to
recapitalize and modernize the force.
While Congress only looks at one budget year at a time and
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Services formulate a
Future Years Defense Plan covering 5 years of projected
funding, I will be interested to hear how the Air Force will
take a longer view on how to fit all of these required
capabilities into its future budgets and how the fiscal year
2016 budget proposal supports your plan.
Additionally, the subcommittee is looking forward to
hearing what actions the Air Force is taking to ensure this
multitude of expensive programs keep cost growth under control,
deliver on schedule, and make sure they deliver the
capabilities our combatant commanders need to carry out their
responsibilities.
Finally, the committee received the Air Force's responses
to the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force
report with its 42 recommendations for optimizing the use of
the Reserve component. I understand your initial response is
the first in a series of four annual Air Force reports on
implementation of the commission's recommendations required by
law. I understand that you agree with all but one of the
recommendations and are in the process of either implementing
or reviewing the other recommendations for potential
implementation.
However, I am concerned that while several of the
commission's recommendations addressed the optimization of the
force mix balance between the active and Reserve components, in
your responses you refer to results of high velocity analyses
that you have not yet shared with the subcommittee. I urge you
to bring the results of your analytical reviews to us soon,
prior to us beginning deliberations on the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2016.
Again, I thank the witnesses for appearing before the
subcommittee. I look forward to hearing your testimony.
Senator Manchin?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE MANCHIN
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since this is
your first hearing in the chair, I want to congratulate you on
being named chairman of the subcommittee. I know that you and I
both are looking forward with our entire subcommittee this
coming year.
I too want to extend a welcome and thank each of our
witnesses for appearing here before the subcommittee today. I
also want to thank each of you, representing the men and women
of our armed forces, for the wonderful jobs they are performing
in Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world. We keep all of
those who are serving right now in our thoughts and prayers and
also remember that both they and their families are serving and
sacrificing for each one of us every day.
Our witnesses this afternoon face huge challenges as they
strive balance the need to support ongoing operations and
sustain readiness with the need to modernize and keep the
technological edge so critical to military success. These
challenges have been made particularly difficult by the
spending caps imposed in the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011,
caps that were modestly relieved for fiscal year 2015 in the
Bipartisan Budget Act that we enacted earlier this year.
However, these caps are scheduled to resume full blast in
fiscal year 2016 and beyond. These caps already seriously
challenge our ability to meet our national security needs and
have already forced the military departments to make painful
tradeoffs. Unless modified for fiscal year 2016 and later
fiscal years, these caps will threaten our long-term national
security interests.
Every year we are challenged to make decisions balancing a
number of competing demands for resources, including resources
for current operations and investment in future modernization.
In this case, we will be assessing plans and programs regarding
the current status and future prospects for tactical aviation
programs.
We meet today to talk about a range of Air Force programs,
including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and aviation
programs. Previous Air Force witnesses at our aviation hearings
have also projected a potential shortfall of Air Force tactical
fighters in excess of 800 aircraft around 2025. Several years
ago, the Air Force, as part of the new defense strategy reduced
Combat Air Forces (CAF) fighter force structure under the so-
called CAF Redux. Again this year, the Air Force is proposing
further reductions, including eliminating the entire A-10
aircraft fleet to generate savings of more than $3 billion.
There are several other force structure adjustments that
are of concern. The Air Force plans to eliminate seven Compass
Call EC-30H aircraft in fiscal year 2016. There are other
reductions, including the Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) and JSTARS, that are planned for later in the FYDP.
While there is a plan to recapitalize the JSTARS with a new
aircraft and radar program, I am concerned that the Air Force
plans to retire aircraft like AWACS and Compass Call with no
planned replacement in sight.
There is also the continuing disagreement between Congress
and the Air Force over modernization of the existing C-130H
aircraft, including the C-130 avionics modernization program,
or C-130 the Avionics Modernization Program (AMP). I believe
that there are two issues within this discussion. The first is
what should be done on the overall avionics modernization for
the C-130H aircraft. The second issue relates to whether C-130H
aircraft will be modified in time to comply with the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) rules governing access to
controlled airspace that take effect in 2020. The Air Force has
established a program called the Viability and Airspace Access
Program to deal with meeting the FAA deadline. This program
would install automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast out,
or ADS-B Out, avionics on C-130H aircraft. Whatever we do, I
believe that we should ensure the Air Force can continue to
operate the fleet of C-130H aircraft in the FAA-controlled
airspace after 2020.
There are a number of other issues that we may discuss, but
in the interest of time, I am going to stop here. Again, I want
to thank our witnesses for being here. I look forward to
hearing your testimony.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. Dr. LaPlante?
STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM A. LaPLANTE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION
Dr. LaPlante. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Manchin. Thank you, distinguished members of
this panel. Thank you for holding the hearing.
It is always an honor to be here and I thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the subject of force structure and
modernization. These are two things, obviously, that are
critical to the force of our Air Force.
It is also an honor to be here with two incredible general
officers, General Mike Mobile Holmes next to me on my left,
your right, who is our Air Force planning and strategy. On my
right is General Tod Wolters who is our A-3 operations, and so
it is just a privilege to serve with great airmen like these
two leaders.
With your permission, I would like to submit my written
statement for the record----
Senator Cotton. Without objection.
Dr. LaPlante. Thank you, and then just make some opening
remarks.
As you said, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement better
than I can say, the global security environment is incredibly
complex, dynamic, changing. We have the fight today, the
situation today which you described, but then we also have the
issue that we have to deal with, which is not lose sight of
modernization. For the pure adversary--and it is not even so
much the pure adversary of the future, it is really even the
pure adversary of today. That is kind of what our world is.
I am privileged to say that we are the greatest air force
in the world and remain so. But, to be honest--and I think this
is true not just for the Air Force but this is true at the
technology and systems level in the Department--many of us are
growing concern that we are losing our margin. The enemies and
potential adversaries of the United States have been watching
us fight certainly for 15 years, but really, if you think about
it, since the first Gulf War they have been watching what we
have done, watching very carefully. They have watched and they
understand where our seams are. They understand how to apply
asymmetries against us, other large quantity against our
quality, whether exploiting cyber, whether it is looking at EW
[electronic warfare] as its own domain, and also, frankly, the
effects of space. This has all been happening right in front of
our eyes over the last few years, and we are all watching this.
We are all concerned.
It has often been said that one of the best things and most
important ways our American military power is used is in the
ability to shape and deter, what people call phase zero, phase
one ops typically. The concern that some of us have is that is
going both ways. In other words, there is shaping and deterring
going on and it is not all one way. So this is a situation we
are all very concerned about.
But let me be clear. Again, we are the world's greatest air
force. So what are we doing about some of these issues?
First of all, we must protect our science and technology
(S&T). We must protect our S&T. That is our future. We must
learn and be able to innovate and we must rapidly bring in
ideas and concepts and new players and work on this issue that
is developing. You have heard the Deputy Secretary talk about a
third offset strategy. That is the kind of thing we are all
beginning to talk about and focus on, all in this environment,
actually very difficult fiscal environment.
So last year, last summer, Secretary James and Chief Welsh
put out a strategy about the Air Force called A Call for the
Future. The strategy was centered around a concept called
Strategic Agility. Basically in my words, strategic agility is
how do you build adaptability not just into your people, which
you need, and your leaders but into your systems that you
apply, how you fight, how you learn. It basically is about
speed. We have to be faster than the adversary and we have to
be faster than the technology that is breaking up. That is the
fundamental metric of agility.
So we are building this into how we are thinking, but we
also have to innovate. We also have to assume that we are going
to be operating and fighting our wars and fighting in ways we
cannot predict, ways where the operator is going to be as
inventive as always and learning new ways to operate the
system. We have to assume we are going to discover things. We
cannot build things assuming exquisite knowledge of the threat
that then we have to change. We have to figure out how to
change it.
So what does that mean in our world? Well, in our world
what it means is we, first of all, have to protect our high
priority programs to make sure they are built that way. That is
the whole strategy behind the LRSB, and I can talk about that
later. But also for our new capitalizations. Mr. Chairman, you
mentioned JSTARS recapitalization. We are building that right
from the start assuming we are going to discover new
technology. It is going to be an open architecture and new
processing can go into it. We are not just assuming it is going
to be a prime that is going to just have subs and it is going
to be a closed system that is going to be the same for 30
years. We are going to build it in at the very beginning. We
are also going to build in sustainment considerations. 70
percent of costs in the lifecycle of the program is not in the
development, not in the procurement, but in the sustainment. So
you have to build that in at the very beginning. So we are
putting that into our programs. We are also doing with the new
trainer.
I also want to talk a little bit about the Air Force's 2016
budget. The Air Force's number one mission priority--indeed,
the Department's number one mission priority--is our nuclear
deterrent. We use our nuclear deterrent every day and have had
so for 50 years. It is the number one priority. We have to
strengthen that. We have to invest in it. We also have to keep
these high priority programs on track. We talked about the
LRSB, but there is also, of course, F-35 and the tanker, and we
have to protect them even in a sequester environment. I can
answer questions about the protection of those programs and
which ones we do not think we can protect in the sequester.
We also have to put investment into space. We have to put
investment into space. So this Call to the Future eloquently
speaks for our need to stand--for our service to innovate and
get at what stands between us and this future and to rapidly
adapt. The gentlemen here at this table, along with our
counterparts at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), are
embarking on that kind of an effort related to the third offset
called ``developmental planning.'' We are getting back to our
roots in the Air Force. We are going to work--the first subject
we picked was air dominance, air superiority, say, in the 2030
timeframe. What are the technologies, what are the concept of
operations (CONOPS), tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP),
how do we experiment, and how do we make sure that we are the
superior Air Force in 2030? I remind everybody this is not
about the next platform only. Air dominance has everything to
do with--yes, it has stealth but it has weapons. It has
electromagnetic warfare. It involves space, cyber all together.
So we have to think about this and the whole kill chain. So we
are all getting on with that and we are also going to do the
same thing on the future of the nuclear ground-based deterrent.
So let me just finally say a few comments about the
taxpayer and then turn it back over to the chairman and my
other colleagues here.
Obviously, we have to be a good steward of the taxpayer
resources. Every dollar must count. We are implementing better
buying power. We are having actually huge successes in better
buying power. We are on 3.0 right now, huge savings and
something called `should cost.' But we have to do more. We also
have to do more in collaborations with industry. We have many
projects under a ``bending the cost curve'' initiative over the
last year with industry that are actually quite exciting. So we
have to do that as well.
So I look forward to answering your questions, Mr.
Chairman, and with your committee's help, I think working
together we can do this. We can do this and we will remain the
best, greatest Air Force in the future. So, again, thank you
very much.
[The prepared joint statement of Dr. LaPlante, General
Holmes, and General Wolters follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Dr. William LaPlante, Lt. Gen. James M.
``Mike'' Holmes, USAF, and Lt. Gen. Tod D. Wolters, USAF
i. introduction
Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member Manchin, and distinguished members
of the Airland Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide
an update on the United States Air Force's Force Structure and
Modernization. Effectively balancing our scarce budget resources across
readiness, modernization, and force structure accounts is arguably now
more important than ever before. We need your help; without bold
leadership today--difficult decisions and a commitment to air, space,
and cyberspace investment--America's airpower advantage is increasingly
at risk.
The U.S. Air Force is the most globally engaged air force on the
planet. Whether dropping bombs, commanding satellites in space,
delivering humanitarian relief, or protecting the homeland with an
array of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities, American Airmen are
in constant defense of our national interests. Alongside its Sister
Services, the Air Force delivers the power, influence, agility, and
global reach no other country currently possesses. But 24 years of
continual combat operations, coupled with constrained and unstable
budgets, has taken its toll. America needs a force ready for a spectrum
of operations more global and complex than ever before. Instead, a
relentless operations tempo, with fewer resources to fund, coordinate,
and execute training and exercises, has left a force proficient in only
those portions of the mission necessary for current operations. While
the fiscal year 2016 President's Budget takes a critical step toward
recovery, we remain stressed to deliver what the Nation asks of our Air
Force. We must reverse this trend.
ii. strategic approach to meeting 21st century defense challenges
After more than 2 decades of nonstop combat operations, dominant
trends point to a complex future that will challenge the Air Force in
new and demanding ways. Adversaries are emerging in all shapes and
sizes, and the pace of technological and societal change is
increasing--with a corresponding increase in the demand for airpower.
Furthermore, we cannot buy our way out of this one; we realize that it
is time for the Air Force to think differently. Accordingly, senior Air
Force leaders have developed a single, integrated strategy to guide the
way our service organizes, trains, and equips the force to conduct
future operations. Our strategy points the way forward and does not
limit us to an intractable view of the future. It is actionable, with
clear goals and vectors for implementation, assessment, and revision. A
strategy-driven, resource-informed plan that emphasizes strategic
agility will enable the Air Force to meet 21st century defense
challenges.
The Air Force's new strategic framework will guide us as we move
forward. Last summer, we released the Air Force's strategic vision in
America's Air Force: A Call to the Future. We are about to release the
Air Force Strategic Master Plan (SMP), which translates the conceptual
strategy in A Call to the Future into comprehensive guidance, goals,
and objectives. Together these documents will drive the Strategy,
Planning, and Programming Process that will arm and empower the Air
Force, in collaboration with our partners, to defeat adversaries and
defend the Nation and our allies in a complex future. An upcoming Air
Force Future Operating Concept will further illuminate this strategy by
broadly depicting how an agile, inclusive, and innovative Air Force
should employ capabilities in the future.
Understanding that we cannot ``see'' into the future, four emerging
trends provide a strategic context for the strategy. The Air Force will
need to win in complex battlespaces characterized by: rapidly changing
technological breakthroughs, geopolitical instability, a wide range of
operating environments, and an increasingly important and vulnerable
global commons. These trends will shape the operational environment,
and highlight the broader strategic issues for national defense.
The Air Force will be proactive in meeting these challenges. As A
Call to the Future states, ``We must commit to changing those things
that stand between us and our ability to rapidly adapt.'' Faster
adaptation and response--what we call strategic agility--will sustain
the Air Force's unique contributions that are critical to the Nation.
Agility is the counterweight to the uncertainty of the future and its
associated rate of change. We will take significant, measurable steps
to enhance our ability to wield innovative concepts and advanced
capabilities in unfamiliar, dynamic situations.
By embracing strategic agility, the Air Force will be able to move
past the twentieth century's industrial-era processes and paradigms and
be ready for the globally connected, information-based world of the
coming decades. This approach requires an inclusive Air Force culture
that fosters diversity of thought and inculcates a multi-domain mindset
to solve challenges that span across traditional Air Force mission
sets. We will become more agile in the ways we cultivate and educate
airmen and in how we develop and acquire capabilities. Our operational
training, employment, organizational structures, and personnel
interactions will also become more agile to suit the dynamic security
environment.
The soon-to-be released Strategic Master Plan (SMP) describes what
we will do to implement strategic agility. It translates strategic
vision into action by providing authoritative direction for service-
wide planning and prioritization. The SMP includes four annexes--
``Human Capital,'' ``Strategic Posture,'' ``Capabilities,'' and
``Science and Technology''--that provide more specific guidance and
direction, further aligning the SMP's goals and objectives to future
resource decisions. An ambitious and far-reaching undertaking, the base
SMP will be updated every 2 years, with the annexes reviewed annually,
to ensure a consistent and relevant connection between today's
realities and tomorrow's potential. Certain sections will remain
classified to ensure critical elements of the future force stay linked
to the overall strategy.
The Air Force strategy and the SMP provide authoritative guidance
to planners across the Air Staff and major commands. These planners
will align their supporting plans with the goals and objectives of the
SMP as they apply their expertise to inform planning and resourcing.
The guidance and direction in the SMP are designed to enable better
enterprise-wide solutions to challenges and close the gaps that can
form in execution. In this more robust strategy-driven environment,
commanders and staffs will have proper direction and the necessary
authority to reach goals by working discrete but connected actions--
epitomizing the balance of centralized control with decentralized
execution.
This summer, the Air Force will release a new Air Force Future
Operating Concept that will further inform strategic planning by
describing how we will use future Air Force forces to accomplish our
five core missions across the range of military operations. A natural
companion to the SMP, this document will provide an innovative
portrayal of how an agile, multi-domain Air Force will operate in 20
years' time. It will describe future integrated operations in terms of
broad capabilities and the key competencies we desire in future airmen,
and explain how these capabilities and competencies will address
anticipated challenges in the future environment. The concept will
depict a desired future Air Force that is the product of two decades of
successful evolution in strategy-informed planning and resourcing;
furthermore, it will serve as a baseline for continued concept
development, experimentation, and refinement.
Because strategy is not prescient, it must be adaptive as it seeks
to balance the present with the future. There are no easy choices, and
there is no time to lose--but the Air Force must make the right
prioritization decisions now in order to be prepared to respond in the
face of uncertainty. Our strategy-driven, resource-informed approach
will enable us to achieve the strategic agility we need to meet twenty-
first century defense challenges in a complex world.
iii. operations update
The Air Force flies and fights in air, space, and cyberspace--
globally and reliably--as a valued member of our Joint and Coalition
teams. Approximately 205,000 Total Force Airmen are ``committed in
place'' supporting daily Combatant Command (COCOM) operations to defend
the homeland, provide command and control of our nuclear forces,
operate remotely piloted aircraft, provide rapid global mobility, and
many other requirements. Approximately 23,000 airmen are deployed
across the globe, including more than 16,000 in the U.S. Central
Command area of responsibility. The Air Force is an active partner in
Department of Defense planning that will shift our emphasis from
today's wars to a broader range of challenges and opportunities. The
Department of Defense is currently reassessing the strategic guidance
issued last year, but we anticipate continued emphasis on and planning
for a rebalance to the Asia Pacific region. Our challenge is to provide
those who deploy in support of our global commitments an Air Force that
is capable, agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced.
During 2014, Air Force aircraft flew over 87,000 sorties in support
of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). On the home front, Air Force
fighter, air refueling, and early warning aircraft have flown over
67,000 total sorties supporting Operation Noble Eagle since September
11, 2001. As a testament to the capability of our Total Force, the Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve have flown more than 65 percent of
these sorties.
Today, the Air Force is actively engaged in two major efforts;
providing training and operational support to strengthen the Afghan
Security Forces and Afghan Air Force in Afghanistan as part of
Operation Freedom Sentinel (OFS) and the United Nations' International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Resolute Support mission, and
conducting operations against the Islamic State (ISIL) in Iraq and
Syria as part of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR).
Our objectives as part of OFS are a counterterrorism (CT) mission
against the remnants of al Qaeda and the NATO Resolute Support Train,
Advise, and Assist (TAA) mission in support of Afghan security forces.
The CT and TAA efforts are concurrent and complementary. While the U.S.
and Afghan forces continue to attack the remnants of al Qaeda, we are
also building the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
so that they can secure the Afghan people and contribute to stability
throughout the region. Both of these efforts will contribute to a more
secure and productive Afghanistan and prevent the re-emergence of
terrorist safe havens.
The U.S. Air Force has helped develop the Afghan Special Mission
Wing (SMW), which provides the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF)
with the operational reach and manned Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance (ISR) capability to support counter terrorism and
counter narcotics missions. The SMW is now executing long-range, full-
mission profiles in low illumination. Working together with the ASSF,
the commando units and SMW are consistently running unilateral direct
action missions against insurgent leaders and facilitators.
The ISAF Resolute Support mission provides training, advice and
assistance in eight key areas: multi-year budgeting; transparency,
accountability and oversight; civilian oversight of the Afghan Security
Institutions; force generation; force sustainment; strategy and policy
planning, resourcing and execution; intelligence; and strategic
communications. U.S. Air Force advisors work to develop the Afghan Air
Force across their entire air enterprise--from fixed and rotary wing
operations and maintenance, to engineering and logistics, to force
development and helping them build a budget. The Afghan Air Force
operates the Mi-17 transport helicopter, Mi-35 attack helicopter,
Cessna 208B basic trainer and light lift aircraft, MD-530 light attack
helicopter and the C-130 medium lift Hercules. Additional efforts are
underway to include the A-29 Super Tucano light air support fighter,
with future Afghan pilots currently in training in the United States.
In the last year, the Afghan Air Force has taken over much of the
mission, providing casualty evacuation and aerial attack in support of
Afghan ground forces and are providing the majority of helicopter and
much of the fixed wing maintenance.
Our objectives as part of OIR are to support Iraqi and Kurdish
forces on the ground as they take the fight to ISIL and to disrupt
ISIL's use of Syria as a safe haven and degrade its ability to sustain
itself via resupply, finance, and command and control. U.S. Airpower
has already achieved positive effects in Iraq and Syria. By virtue of
the pressure we're putting on ISIL from the air, we've changed their
tactics and the way they communicate: they've dispersed, they're hiding
among the population more, they aren't as free to operate as they once
were. In Iraq and Kobani, Syria, airstrikes and resupply efforts have
helped Iraqi and Kurdish forces to retake and hold key territory,
although the situation on the ground remains dynamic. In Syria,
airstrikes have attacked ISIL command and control (ex: headquarters
buildings), logistics (training camps and vehicle staging areas), and
revenue sources (modular oil refineries), making it harder for ISIL to
sustain itself as a fighting force.
The U.S. Air Force takes great care in everything from our
intelligence collection and analysis to our choice of weapons used for
targeting to minimize the chance of harming civilians. No other
military in the world takes the responsibility to protect civilians
more seriously than we do. In addition, the U.S. Air Force has
alleviated civilian suffering in Iraq through delivery of 131,000
meals, 58,000 gallons of water, and other vital supplies via airdrops
in the vicinity of Mount Sinjar and Amirli--and, more importantly, by
providing advice and training that have enabled the Iraqi air force to
continue independent humanitarian relief and operational resupply
efforts.
Despite differences, the United States and our International
Coalition partners are united over the long term against the common
threat posed by ISIL. More than a dozen nations are supporting air
operations against ISIL, where they are responsible for more than 20
percent of all sorties and more than 15 percent of all strikes. More
than 40 nations have expressed willingness to participate in the effort
against ISIL, and more than 30 nations have indicated their readiness
to offer military support. All 22 nations of the Arab League have
adopted a resolution calling for comprehensive measures to combat ISIL.
Despite these successes, we recognize there are limits to what U.S.
Airpower can accomplish. Airstrikes alone will not achieve our full
military objectives. The forces that matter most are indigenous ground
forces. We have an Iraq-first strategy: air operations in Syria help
shape conditions in Iraq. This is going to be a long, difficult
struggle that requires strategic patience.
iv. force structure and modernization
Fighters
Air Force fighter force structure is dependent on both fighter
aircraft and rated manning. Four years ago, the Air Force determined
through extensive analysis that a force structure of 1,200 primary
mission aircraft and 2,000 total aircraft was required to execute the
NMS with increased operational risk. Three years ago, based on the 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and fiscal constraints, the Air Force
rebalanced our force structure across core functions. Analysis showed
the Air Force could decrease fighter force structure by approximately
100 aircraft with higher risk, resulting in the current fighter
requirement of 1,100 primary mission aircraft and 1,900 total aircraft.
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report also advances an
updated national defense strategy that embodies and builds on the DSG
priorities. The Chairman's assessment of the QDR strategy states we
will continue to need capabilities that can operate effectively in
contested environments. During the build of the fiscal year 2015
Presidents budget, fiscal constraints led to a plan for force structure
divestments of 334 fighters, leaving a fighter force structure
significantly below the 1900 total aircraft requirement. Fiscal
pressures continue to drive these tough choices--balancing today's
needs against tomorrows--and accepting near-term risk today to be ready
and viable tomorrow.
The Air Force's fighter fleet is approaching an average age of 30
years--the oldest in the history of the Air Force. At 55 combat coded
squadrons, moving to 49, it is also our smallest force ever--by
comparison, there were 134 combat coded fighter squadrons in Operation
Desert Storm. Beyond this capacity shortfall, this primarily fourth-
generation fleet also lacks the combat capability to prevail in future
contested environments. Accordingly, across the fiscal year 2016 PB, we
pursue efforts to recapitalize with new fifth-generation aircraft, and
modernize and extend the service life of select aircraft in the
existing fleet. This includes recapitalization through procurement of
the F-35 Lightning II, and modernization programs like F-22 Increments
3.2A and 3.2B and F-16 and F-15 avionics upgrades.
Unfortunately, even with funding assigned to these critical
investments, the President's budget funding levels do not provide the
resources to retain aircraft force structure capacity needed to execute
all COCOM requirements without risk to our ability to execute the
defense strategy.'' Furthermore, beyond this ``risk to mission,'' or
operational risk, our aircraft capacity shortfalls also present ``risk
to force'' challenges, risks to the management of our rated force.
Currently well short of our total fighter aircraft manning requirement,
projections under current funding levels indicate this deficit will
continue to grow, deficits that degrade vital air-operations, test and
training expertise.
The Active component Air Force is currently 520 fighter pilots
short of the total fighter pilot manning requirement and our
projections indicate this will worsen in the future. This shortfall is
predicated on multiple factors, to include issues such as force
structure changes and airline hiring. The Air National Guard and Air
Force Reserve also have fighter pilot shortages which are helped by
airline hiring. However, both Reserve components have an aged fighter
pilot inventory and the new pilots affiliating now are replacing this
older inventory. The impact of airline hiring is still being analyzed
and these estimates will be refined. The shortfall evolved from force
structure reductions that cut active duty fighter squadrons and fighter
training squadrons to a number that cannot sustain billet requirements.
As a result, the Air Force is currently unable to produce and
experience the required number of fighter pilots across the total
force. The Air Force is prioritizing overall available rated manpower
to fill our operational cockpits, at significant risk to institutional
requirements. Projected impacts include reductions in air-operations
expertise during the development of war plans and a gradual erosion of
fighter pilot experience in test and training. Without these fighter
pilots, the Air Force will be very challenged to continue to provide
the air supremacy upon which all our other forces depend.
A-10
The A-10 provides our Joint Force Commanders with responsive,
lethal, precise and persistent firepower for close air support and
combat search and rescue. It has been a steady, stellar performer in
all recent conflicts. Nevertheless, the A-10 is simply unaffordable in
today's fiscal environment. Consistent with fiscal year 2015 Department
of Defense Fiscal Guidance favoring multi-role aircraft to satisfy the
DSG, the fiscal year 2016 PB again reflects the difficult decision to
divest the A-10. Divesting the entire A-10 fleet frees up $4.7 billion
across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), funding higher priority
capacity, capability and readiness needs.
Additionally, the A-10 cannot survive or operate effectively in a
highly contested environment where there are more advanced aircraft or
air defenses. Other weapon systems, from multi-role fighters to B-1
bombers to remotely piloted aircraft, demonstrated in Iraq and
Afghanistan that they can provide effective Close Air Support (CAS).
These decisions, however, do come with certain risks and potential
impacts to the mission. One of the impacts to using other platforms for
CAS is that use of these platforms for CAS must be balanced with their
other missions, putting stress on the force in certain scenarios.
Divesting the entire fleet enables us to harvest savings we could then
apply to efforts that allow us to be ready and viable tomorrow.
The fiscal year 2016 budget does not fund future modernization
efforts for A-10 aircraft; however, we will continue to sustain the
aircraft and keep it operationally viable until 2019.
F-16
The F-16, the Air Force's primary multi-role fighter aircraft,
comprises 50 percent of our fighter fleet. The fiscal year 2016 PB
invests $1.0 billion across the FYDP for F-16 modernization and service
life extension, meeting critical warfighter needs beyond 2025. This
investment funds key investments like avionics software enhancements
for the integration of new weapons, avionics and improved targeting
pods. Unfortunately, there are important capabilities we were not able
to fund. These include major upgrades like the F-16 Combat Avionics
Programmed Extension Suite (CAPES) program originally planned to
upgrade 300 aircraft, and a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to
extend by approximately 25 percent, from 8,000 hours to over 10,000
hours, the airframe structural service life for 300 F-16s, adding 8 to
10 years of service life to the Block 40-52 fleet. To partially
mitigate the impact of terminating CAPES, the Air Force will upgrade
the F-16's electronic attack pod, bringing self-protection capability
in line with current and emerging threats. While the fiscal year 2016
PB resumes many of the highest priority F-16 modernization efforts, the
absence of the aforementioned modernization programs will adversely
impact the F-16's effectiveness in future contested environments.
F-15 C/D
Presently, we project the F-15C/D fleet will remain viable until at
least 2040, with the potential for an airframe service life extension
following full-scale fatigue testing concluding in 2015. The fiscal
year 2016 PB invests approximately $1.7 billion across the FYDP for F-
15C/D fleet modernization and sustainment. This investment continues
modernization of the F-15C/D with Active Electronically Scanned Array
(AESA) radars, a more capable aircraft mission computer, a new
electronic warfare self-protection suite, and the Eagle Passive/Active
Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS). While the EPAWSS is crucial to
ensuring F-15C/D operations in future contested environments, fiscal
constraints forced a 2-year delay in fiscal year 2016 PB. Nevertheless,
we believe currently funded modernization and sustainment programs will
facilitate safe and effective operations for all 196 F-15C/D aircraft
through at least 2040, pending results of the full-scale fatigue test.
F-15E
The Air Force expects the F-15E to be an integral part of the
Nation's force through at least 2040. Similar to the F-15C program, a
full-scale fatigue test, due for completion in 2016, will provide
insight into the need for, and feasibility of, a service life extension
program. The fiscal year 2016 PB invests approximately $2.2 billion
across the FYDP for F-15E modernization and sustainment. This includes
integration of the latest precision weapons, a helmet mounted cueing
system for all front seat cockpits, a state-of-the-art AESA radar
system to advance target identification, a more capable aircraft
mission computer, and a self-protection electronic warfare system
(EPAWSS). As with the F-15C/D, the EPAWSS is crucial to ensuring F-15E
operations in future contested environments.
Fifth Generation Fighters
The F-22 and F-35 aircraft are absolutely essential to America's
global superiority, ensuring air, sea, and ground force's freedom of
action. Each aircraft possesses exclusive, complimentary and
indispensable capabilities that provide synergistic effects across the
spectrum of conflict. As future adversaries modernize, the F-22 and F-
35 will become even more critical as legacy fourth generation aircraft
will have increasingly limited capability to operate in contested
environments.
Our Air Force must rapidly re-capitalize our tactical fighter fleet
with sufficient capacity in fifth generation capability in order to
maintain our ability to execute our National Defense Strategy in the
near- to mid-term, and begin looking even further into the future at
further modernization efforts that ensure continued dominance of
American Airpower.
F-22
The F-22 attributes of stealth, super cruise, integrated avionics
and sensors combine to deliver the Raptor's unique operational
capability, and F-22 modernization will counter advancing threats that
specifically target the F-22. The F-22 is operating safely across the
globe, averaging about 26,000 flying hours per year since its return to
flight in September 2011. It has been over 36 months since the last
unknown-cause hypoxia-like event occurred. Notably, the retrofit of the
Automatic Back-up Oxygen System to the entire fleet is on track for
completion by mid-April 2015.
Focused on maintaining operational superiority against the evolving
threat, the fiscal year 2016 PB includes $403.2 million in Research,
Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $202.4 million in
procurement for F-22 modernization. Increment 3.1 is fielding now and
is scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2017; it is designed to
deliver advanced air-ground capabilities including Synthetic Aperture
Radar (SAR) ground mapping, threat geolocation, and a Small Diameter
Bomb (SDB) carriage. Increments 3.2A and 3.2B remain on track for
fielding in 2015 and 2018, respectively. These increments will deliver
advanced electronic protection and combat identification, AIM-120D and
AIM-9X missile capability, and significantly-improved ground threat
geolocation.
F-35
During fiscal year 2016, the Air Force will continue to manage risk
across the global precision attack portfolio by prioritizing investment
in fifth-generation aircraft while sustaining legacy platforms as a
bridge to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
The multi-role F-35A is the centerpiece of future fighter precision
attack capability. In addition to complementing the F-22's world class
air superiority capability, the F-35A is designed to penetrate air
defenses and deliver a wide range of precision munitions. This modern,
fifth-generation aircraft also brings the added benefit of increased
allied interoperability and cost-sharing across the Services and eight
partner nations. The fiscal year 2016 PB includes $4.9 billion for
continued development and procurement of 44 F-35A, conventional take-
off and landing (CTOL) aircraft. The program continues to make steady
progress in overcoming software development delays and technical issues
and is on track to meet its Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in
2016.
The F-35 program reached several training milestones in 2014. May
28, 2014 marked delivery of the 26th and final F-35A CTOL to Eglin Air
Force Base, making the 58th Fighter Squadron the first complete Air
Force F-35 unit. Earlier in the year, the Pilot Training Center at Luke
Air Force Base received its first F-35A, and through the end of 2014,
Luke's inventory included 17 U.S. F-35A aircraft. On July 24, 2014, AU-
1, Australia's first F-35A rolled off Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth
assembly line. AU-2 was delivered in late 2014, joining AU-1 in the
inventory at Luke. On August 7, 2014, the inaugural F-35A Crew Chief
Mission Ready Airman class graduated nine airmen, paving the way for
thousands of future F-35 maintainers.
Like every developmental program over the past 50 years, the F-35
program has made discoveries during test and development that have been
and continue to be addressed and corrected. This is to be expected, and
the Air Force remains confident in the program, as it continues to make
solid and steady progress toward fielding the required capabilities to
meet the Air Force's IOC criteria in 2016. In May 2014, the test team
completed an AIM-120 weapons delivery accuracy test that was the first
live fire Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) mission for
the F-35B STOVL and the first dual AIM-120 launch for any variant. Also
in May, the program completed its first test missions with Block 3i
software, a critical step for Air Force IOC. In late Summer 2014, the
first F-35A night CAS tests occurred at the National Training Center at
Fort Irwin. A Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) used a laser
designator to interact with the F-35 electro-optical targeting system,
and the JTAC communicated with the F-35 pilots via electronic and voice
messaging systems, successfully identifying ground targets. This
successful demonstration of CAS capability was a major step toward IOC.
To close out 2014, the test team successfully conducted multiple Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and AMRAAM weapons delivery accuracy
tests and accomplished multiple SDB I weapons releases during a single
delivery pass, a first for the program.
While the program achieved substantial development and test
progress in 2014, the test program experienced delays due to an engine
anomaly at Eglin Air Force Base in June. Throughout the summer and into
the fall, the Joint Program Office, Service System Commands and
industry worked diligently to analyze the problem, prioritize test
assets and return to flying status in a safe, methodical fashion. The
program was subsequently able to determine root cause and developed an
interim solution: a ``pre-trenched'' rub material that will be
implemented in the field later this year. Pratt and Whitney has agreed
to cover the costs for the repairs to engines in the field and the cut-
in of the solution to the production line, while the program office
will pay for the design activity as per the development contract. The
program continues its work on a long-term fix to the engine and expects
to review and select from the design solutions this spring, followed by
design and qualification testing, and finally, incorporation of the
solution into the production line. This work is expected to be
completed in 2015.
Today, the program is on the road to IOC for the Air Force, and we
expect the warfighter to be able to declare IOC as planned in 2016.
Flight test for Block 2B is nearing completion and is underway for
Block 3i, formal training operations at Luke Air Force Base are set to
begin in May, and first aircraft arrival is projected for Hill Air
Force Base in August. The first two F-35A aircraft are in place at
Nellis Air Force Base to support tactics development for the
warfighter, and we project over 25 more F-35A aircraft to deliver
through the end of 2015, including the first deliveries for our
Norwegian and Italian partners. Going forward, we will continue to
closely monitor progress toward IOC, including completion of
development and flight test for Block 2B/3i, final resolution to the
engine issue, and continued maturation of Autonomic Logistics
Information System (ALIS), a system that is critical to F-35 operations
at home and abroad. The Air Force will also continue to watch progress
for Block 3F (full warfighting capability), currently projected to
complete 4-6 months later than planned. In fiscal year 2016, the Air
Force plans to procure 44 F-35A CTOL aircraft. Sequestration did not
affect Air Force procurement quantities in 2015. Affordability remains
a major priority, and the F-35 program continues to make great strides
on this front. The price of F-35s continues to decline steadily Lot
after Lot. For example, the price of a Lot 7 F-35A was 4.3 percent less
than a Lot 6 F-35A aircraft and a Lot 8 F-35A aircraft was 3.6 percent
less than a Lot 7 F-35A, including the engine and profit for both
contractors. Reductions are expected to continue into the future,
leveraging the program's on-going affordability initiatives. By 2019,
the expected price of an F-35A, with an engine and including profit, is
expected to be between $80 and $85 million, in 2019 dollars.
Air-to-Surface Weapons
All three air-to-surface weapon mission areas--Stand-Off, Direct
Attack, and Penetrator--are short of inventory objectives. Joint Air-
to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and SDB weapons, employed by Low
Observable platforms, provide unsurpassed force multiplier capability
in a highly contested environment. In the event of a conflict,
insufficient inventory of these weapons could result in the inability
to target adversary critical capabilities, increasing aircraft
attrition and driving a higher level of effort to attack critical
targets.
Combat operations and support for our coalition partners in Iraq
and Syria are reducing the direct attack munitions (JDAM) inventories
faster than we are procuring them. These combat operations are expected
to continue long term (3+ years). Combat expenditures have been being
replaced under OCO funding, however it takes over 3 years before the
assets make it back to the Air Force inventory. Direct attack munition
shortages drive the use of non-preferred munitions with decreased
effectiveness and resulting in increased time and Air Force attrition
to accomplish combatant commander objectives.
JASSM and JASSM-ER
JASSM and JASSM-ER (Extended Range) are currently the Nation's only
stealthy, conventional, precision, launch-and-leave, standoff missiles
capable of fighter and bomber aircraft employment. Both are capable of
penetrating next generation enemy air defenses to strike high value,
hardened, fixed, or mobile targets. The JASSM (baseline) has a range
greater than 200nm while the JASSM-ER has a range greater than 500nm.
The JASSM (baseline) weapon is in full rate production; the 13th
production contract for 100 baseline missiles is expected to be awarded
in March 2015. fiscal year 2016 represents the last JASSM (baseline)
buy, a total procurement of 2,034 missiles. JASSM-ER will start Full
Rate Production in fiscal year 2015 with a March 2015 contract award
for 115 JASSM-ER. The combined JASSM production line transitions to
JASSM-ER only at the maximum and most efficient rate of 360 missiles
per year. The last JASSM-ER procurement is planned for fiscal year
2023, culminating a total JASSM ER buy of 2,866 missiles.
SDB I and II
SDB I is a legacy weapon planned to help achieve mandated cluster
munition reduction by 2019. In fiscal year 2016, the Air Force plans to
procure an additional 1,960 SDB I weapons utilizing OCO funding; fiscal
year 2015 OCO replenishes 268 weapons expended in combat. The follow-on
SDB II weapon will be capable of attacking mobile targets at standoff
ranges in any environment. SDB II will increase the number of targets
an individual platform can attack per sortie while inherently limiting
collateral damage. SDB II will provide a four-fold payload increase and
allow a more limited number of combat forces to achieve operational
objectives early in future conflicts. SDB II is an Acquisition Category
(ACAT) ID program, with the Air Force as the lead service, in
partnership with the Navy. Initial aircraft integration of the SDB II
is planned for the F-15E, F-35B & C, F/A-18E/F and AC-130W.
Currently, SDB II is in Engineering, Manufacturing and Development
with an LRIP decision planned by the end of this fiscal year. In fiscal
year 2015, SDB II will continue developmental testing, complete live
fire testing, and conduct government confidence test shots. fiscal year
2015 procurement plans are to buy 144 weapons with deliveries starting
in fiscal year 2017, and total planned procurement for SDB II is 12,000
weapons. Current projections call for SDB II fielding on the F-15E in
January 2017.
Air-to-Air Weapons
AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the
AIM-9X enable the joint force to achieve Air Superiority by providing a
first look, first kill capability. The current shortage of Air-to-Air
missiles may increase the number of days it takes to gain and maintain
Air Superiority in any future conflict. Meanwhile, adversary
capabilities and capacity continue to challenge the Joint Force's
historical advantage in the air superiority arena.
AIM-120D AMRAAM
The AIM-120D AMRAAM is the Department of Defense's premier beyond-
visual-range missile to counter existing and emerging air vehicle
threats, operating at high or low altitude with electronic attack
capabilities. AMRAAM is a key enabler for gaining air superiority and
providing F-15, F-16, F/A-18, F-22 and eventually F-35 aircraft the
ability to achieve multiple kills per engagement. The latest evolution
of AMRAAM is the AIM-120D, which delivers increased range, improved
targeting, and an enhanced two-way data link for improved accuracy and
lethality at range. AIM-120D is an ACAT 1C joint program, with the Air
Force as lead service in partnership with the Navy. The AIM-120D
completed operational testing in July 2014. The Navy fielded the
missile and declared IOC for the F/A-18E/F on January 7, 2015. The Air
Force fielding decision was released on January 26, 2015 for the F-15,
F-16, and F-22 aircraft, with IOC expected the third quarter of fiscal
year 2015. Total procurement for fiscal year 2015 is 200 units with
increases in future procurement quantities for both the Air Force and
Navy. The program will continue to update the AMRAAM technical data
package to ensure a viable, producible design through the expected
production life of the AMRAAM program.
Space
We view our national security as inextricably dependent on space-
enabled capabilities. Space is no longer simply an enabler for other
domains; it directly impacts the calculus of national security. At the
same time, space has become contested, congested and competitive, with
our space capabilities today facing advanced, demonstrated, and
evolving threats, which require fundamental changes in the way we
organize, train, and equip our forces. Congestion has increased the
complexity of maintaining space situational awareness. There are over
60 active space-faring nations, 9 of which have indigenous space launch
capability. Almost any nation or state actor can access space services
globally and globalization has made the latest technology available to
our competitors and enemies.
Legacy space acquisitions relied on packing as much as possible
into few systems making them critical vulnerabilities. Budget realities
have driven reliance on legacy systems, with few new acquisition
programs employing the latest technologies, while warfighter demands
have driven the need for more capable systems.
Future acquisitions should focus on providing capabilities/services
cheaper, faster, and more resilient. We must provide space capabilities
that assure performance of military space functions, regardless of the
hostile action or adverse condition. We must invest smartly in the
highest payoff capabilities that enhance space domain mission assurance
to include resilience, defense operations, and reconstitution of our
space systems and architectures to ensure U.S. and Allied use of space
through all phases of conflict. We seek to balance military and
commercial systems and leverage international partner capabilities to
allow the United States to share the cost of space power; provide
additional coverage in areas the U.S. requires assistance in, and
create a coalition structure that can promote deterrence.
We recognize a conflict in space would hurt world economies and
global stability; therefore, to address growing space threats, we are
focusing on sustaining our space capabilities, deterring threatening
activity, and if necessary, pursuing means to mitigate counterpace
threats.
Cyber
The Air Force is building its Cyber Mission Forces. We must
continue to execute defense plans, adding manpower for offensive and
defensive cyber operations, but we are doing more. We will ensure cyber
forces are equipped with the right capabilities to ensure effective
operations. We are building a standard cyber mission platform to
simplify training and enable full-spectrum operations. We are investing
in converged cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. We are working
with others across the Department of Defense to build a persistent
training environment, consisting of jointly-interoperable ranges,
dedicated operating forces, and supporting structures. We are enhancing
our capacity to test our critical weapon, intelligence, and business
systems for survivability in the increasingly hostile cyber
environment.
Further we are leading the effort, in partnership with the other
Services and Department of Defense agencies, to build Joint Regional
Security Stacks. When fielded, this defensive boundary will provide
global insight into activity, enabling rapid, coordinated Joint
defensive operations. The standardized approach will enable sharing of
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) across the Department of
Defense, so that detection of an attack on one Service, and the
resultant mitigations, can be seamlessly applied across the entire
Department of Defense. This reduces operational response times and
mission impact. No individual service could have afforded this level of
capability with its own resources; it's only by pooling funding across
the entire department can we get the level of capabilities we require
to counter the growing cyber threats. This new defensive boundary is
the foundational step toward a trustworthy, efficient Joint Information
Environment.
In short, we are on the path to put Cyber on par with Air and Space
forces to achieve a multi-domain approach to mission accomplishment.
Airborne Electronic Attack
The Air Force is committed to providing airborne electronic attack
capability in support of operations across all operational warfighting
domains. The decision to divest half of the fleet of EC-130H Compass
Call's in fiscal year 2016 was a difficult decision driven by U.S. Air
Force topline reductions and the need to balance current capacity
against the need to modernize. The EC-130H Compass Call is required in
multiple war plans; the divesture incurs and accepts the risk of
nonsupport to all but the current operations. The Air Force will
continue to investigate alternatives for airborne electronic attack
capabilities in support of the Joint Airborne Electronic Attack Family
of Systems concept.
Rapid Global Mobility and Personnel Recovery
The Rapid Global Mobility fleet continues to pursue capability
enhancements balanced by recapitalization and required modifications to
operate in international airspace and avoid diminishing manufacturing
source issues. The KC-46A Pegasus tanker acquisition program is fully
funded and the first 18 of 179 tankers are slated for delivery in
fiscal year 2017. Production of the C-130J continues; we plan to field
142 total aircraft. Our C-130H is being outfitted with FAA and European
compliance modifications to ensure the tactical airlift fleet is able
to respond to future tasking's. The strategic airlift fleet of C-5s and
C-17s is capable of supporting the million ton miles per day metric
established in our most stressed response scenarios.
To meet our Personnel Recovery mission, the Combat Rescue
Helicopter program of record of 112 aircraft will replace our aging HH-
60G fleet. Four test aircraft are on contract with IOC targeted in
2021, and full operational capability in 2029.
Air Force efforts toward acquisition reform to ensure the best
value for the American taxpayer The Air Force Acquisition community is
committed to providing winning warfighter capabilities while being
mindful of limited resources and being responsible stewards of American
taxpayers. The acquisition community has been challenged to achieve
five priorities: get programs right, increase transparency to external
stakeholders, own the technical baseline, continue our efforts on
Better Buying Power (BBP), and build our systems towards a future Air
Force. All of these initiatives contribute to a stronger, cost
conscious acquisition community.
The Air Force Acquisition community has a commitment to getting
programs right and exhibiting strong program management is the lynchpin
of what we do. While our top three acquisition programs, F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter, KC-46 Tanker, and Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B),
continue to receive the most attention and scrutiny, we remain
committed to keeping all of our programs on track. Effective execution
of these programs, along with stable funding will keep us from having
to make difficult tradeoffs such as delivering reduced capabilities or
reduced quantities.
Under our transparency initiative, we are working with OSD (AT&L)
to delegate Milestone Decision Authority to the Air Force Service
Acquisition Executive on ACAT ID programs where appropriate, increasing
our efficiency and streamlining requirements. The Air Force is also
engaged in a new initiative, Bending the Cost Curve (BTCC), which
facilitates strategic agility in our acquisition efforts. Its hallmark
is a collaboration with our industry partners to identify, evaluate,
and implement transformational cost saving reforms.
Owning the technical baseline requires the government to understand
and exert leadership in the technical aspects of its programs,
therefore enabling it to be a more effective weapons system acquirer.
This is not to be confused with or limited to government-owned data
rights as we know our industry partners need to own their intellectual
property to remain profitable. But by working together to strengthen
our technical capabilities within our program offices, we are helping
ourselves become better stewards of taxpayers' dollars.
BBP is the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics)'s (OSD(AT&L) compilation of tools and best
practices designed to strengthen the Department of Defense's buying
power, productivity, and affordability, while improving capabilities
for the warfighter. One of our many success stories from BBP, which is
currently in its third iteration, is our adoption of Should Cost
Management. Should Cost is a management tool designed to proactively
target cost reduction and drive productivity improvement into programs.
The Air Force's fiscal year 2014 Realized Savings were $1.4 billion.
While that is a tremendous start, we will continue to challenge all
PEOs and Program Managers to seek out additional Should Cost
opportunities.
The fifth priority is to continue building our systems for the
future Air Force. The Air Force Acquisition 20 year Flight Plan is
fully aligned with ``America's Air Force: A Call to the Future'',
General Welsh's 30 year strategy. In our Flight Plan, we are guiding,
facilitating, and resourcing workforce initiatives across the
acquisition enterprise. At the core of our mission is our workforce--
our world-class workforce is paramount to achieving and maintaining
acquisition excellence. To accomplish these ends, we heavily rely on
the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund established by
Congress.
A number of legislative initiatives are underway to achieve these
priorities. In concert with Congress and OSD(AT&L), we are reviewing
statutory requirements imposed on acquisition programs with a focus on
streamlining them while trying to maintain their original intent. By
reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and red tape, we hope to eliminate
redundant requirements for information, and enable tailored reviews and
documentation while emphasizing sound planning and risk reduction. We
are also working to ensure the delegation of acquisition authority to
the lowest appropriate level, modifying requirements for specific
contract types for major development programs, and requiring
acquisition strategies for each Major Defense Acquisition Program.
Together, we believe these efforts will ensure the acquisition
community remains committed to providing essential capabilities to the
warfighter while respecting the taxpayer.
Industrial Base
When considered in its entirety, the Nation's aerospace industrial
base is a bright spot in the economy with a favorable trade balance in
2014 of $61.2 billion. However, this success is primarily due to the
commercial aircraft sector. The concerns and challenges we expressed in
our testimony last year over the future of the aerospace industrial
base supporting the Air Force remain. If anything, the Nation is 1 year
closer to abdicating its historic role as the global technical leader
in military aerospace. As a nation, we can no longer take for granted
the widespread availability of engineering and design teams, production
workers, facilities, and equipment required to meet emergent national
security requirements. The observations made by Secretary James and
General Welsh in the Air Force Posture Statement concerning the
capability and capacity of our Air Force apply as well to the aerospace
industrial base supporting the Air Force.
The result of the difficult decisions driven by budget reductions
and fiscal uncertainties is that as a nation, we have been giving up
industrial capacity to design, develop, produce, and sustain the next
generation of military aerospace systems while attempting to maintain
some level of capability in those areas. In a few areas, we have
accepted risk and have allowed a gap between former and future
capability. One highly visible example is the Nation's use of the
Russian-made liquid rocket engine on one of the vehicles that launches
defense satellites, but this will not come without significant
technological challenges. Simply replacing the Russian-made RD-180 with
a new engine is not the answer. We know from our prior experience in
developing rockets throughout the past several decades that a rocket
engine and its associated launch vehicle must be designed concurrently.
In essence, we build the rocket around the engine. Further complicating
this effort, we will also attempt to maximize competition in an
environment where the inventory of our current provider's most cost
competitive launch vehicle is limited. One of the Air Force's top
priorities has been to reinvigorate competition in the launch arena by
reaching our ultimate goal of two domestic commercially viable launch
service providers able to support the entire National Security Space
manifest. We are refining a four-step approach to meet this goal, and
the $220 million addition in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2015 for a new rocket propulsion system will help to
transition off of the RD-180. In other areas, for example advanced
turbine engines, Air Force investments to maintain capacity and develop
future capability have continued. In the case of advanced turbine
engines, our investments are cost shared with industry, prudently
leveraging our limited resources.
Our strategy-based fiscal year 2016 budget submission supports
investments in key programs (KC-46, F-35, and Long-Range Strike
Bomber), in the critical requirements of the combatant commanders and
in capabilities for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance,
nuclear, space and command and control. These focused investments,
while propping up elements of the aerospace industrial base, do not
fully address the national commitment required to sustain our global
aerospace leadership.
v. conclusion
The Air Force continues to be the world's finest across the
spectrum of conflict, but the gap is closing. A return to
sequestration-level funding would result in a less ready, less capable,
less viable Air Force that is unable to fully execute the defense
strategy. At fiscal year 2015 Balanced Budget Act level funding, the
Air Force has some ability to manage risk in supporting the strategy,
but significant challenges will remain. In order to defeat advancing
threats, the Air Force must continue investments in top
recapitalization and key modernization programs, and gain and maintain
full-spectrum readiness.
Our sister services and allies expect the Air Force to provide
critical warfighting and enabling capabilities. We remain focused on
delivering Global Vigilance, Reach and Power, through our core missions
of Air Superiority, Space Superiority, Global Strike, Rapid Global
Mobility, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Command and
Control. We look forward to working closely together as we address the
challenges of near-term uncertainty and risk to provide the ability to
deliver combat air power for America when and where we are needed.
Senator Cotton. General Holmes?
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES M. HOLMES, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS
General Holmes. Thank you, Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member
Manchin, ladies and gentlemen of the committee. Thank you for
your continued support to the U.S. Air Force, our airmen, and
their families. It is an honor to be here in front of you, and
it is an honor to be here.
I want to speak for just a second about Dr. Bill LaPlante
and Lieutenant General Ellen Pawlikowski, his military deputy.
In my time in the Air Force, the Air Force is very fortunate
now to have the best team I think we have had in that
acquisition office. They have made great strides in changing
the way we acquire, develop, and build new technologies, and I
think it is going to pay off for us in the future.
I am also proud to be here with Lieutenant General Wolters,
my old friend and one of my heroes, and it is a pleasure to
work with him in the building every day.
Our Air Force remains the most globally engaged air force
on the planet, and we continue to do our best to deliver global
vigilance, global reach, and global power for America every
day.
However, after more than 24 years of sustained combat
operations and years of constrained budgets, it has become more
and more difficult to achieve our mission. As the Air Force's
budget planner, we talk about sequestration and we talk about
the effects of the 1-year budget that we are working, but part
of the factors that influence the position we are in is because
of the 3 years of reduced budgets from the baseline we had
planned in 2012 to the baseline of where we are now, we have
lost $25 billion to $30 billion worth of buying power. It is
the difference when you add up those years. That $25 billion to
$30 billion leaves a hole in our ability to modernize the
forces we have and our ability to maintain our readiness and
our ability to plan for the future. So as we look at another
year of constrained budget, it is not just this year's
constraint. It is adding up the cumulative effect of those 3
years in the past.
The fiscal year 2016 President's budget provides additional
funding above budget caps. It allows us to reinforce our
investments in nuclear deterrence and space control operations,
to emphasize our global long-range and non-permissive
capabilities, to maximize the contributions of the total
force--and, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to discussing the
report and our response to it with you--and to preserve the Air
Force's top three procurement programs, the F-35, the KC-46,
and the long-range strike bomber.
It also gives us the ability to halt reductions in total
force end strength and relieve the pressure on our most
important weapon, our airmen, and to continue efforts to regain
full spectrum readiness, and to lay the groundwork for future
innovation efforts with seed investments, as Dr. LaPlante
talked about.
After subtracting pass-through, the Air Force's share of
the 2016 defense budget is roughly 22 percent. Within this
share of defense resources, the Air Force submission attempts
to balance risk driven by shortfalls in three areas, capacity,
readiness, and modernization, again to continue to provide
global vigilance, reach, and power in support of the strategy
today and in the future.
The shortfalls in capacity mean we must accept some risk in
our ability to everything that we are expected to do if we had
to do it all at the same time. The first of many difficult
capacity decisions we faced was the decision to divest the A-
10. There is no question that the A-10 has been a steady and
stellar performer in recent conflicts. The A-10 provides our
joint force commanders with responsive and lethal fire power
for close air support, particularly in the permissive
environments we operate in today.
Nevertheless, our current force structure was simply
unaffordable in today's fiscal environment. Within the limits
that are placed on us on where we can take force structure
risk, some provided by Congress to safeguard capabilities, we
have a limit in strategic airlift and a limit in C-130s and a
limit in some other capacities, and the guidance provided to us
by DOD--our fighter force structure was the area that we
focused on to make reductions. Consistent with that DOD fiscal
guidance to accept risk in current force structure and to favor
multi-role aircraft to satisfy Defense Strategic Guidance, the
fiscal year 2016 President's budget again reflects the hard
choice to divest the A-10. Divesting the entire A-10 fleet
would free up $4.7 billion across the FYDP, providing funding
for other priority capacity, capability, and readiness
shortfalls.
Next, budget realities have forced the Air Force to make
the decision to reduce the EC-130 Compass Call fleet by nearly
half after fiscal year 2015, providing an additional $470
million in savings across the FYDP that we have applied toward
enterprise capability upgrades. While the Air Force will
maintain essential capabilities to support current combat
operations, this decision is not without risk, and once the
fleet size drops to eight aircraft in fiscal year 2016, we will
only be able to support the current operational obligations for
the C-130 Compass Calls engaged every day.
We face another significant capability challenge in
preferred munitions where 3 years of constrained budgets have
left the Air Force thousands of weapons short in both air-to-
surface and air-to-air weapon inventories. The joint air-to-
surface standoff missile (JASSM) and small diameter bomb (SDB)
employed by low observable platforms provide unsurpassed force
multiplier capability in a highly contested environment. In the
event of a conflict, insufficient inventory of these weapons
could limit our ability to target critical adversary
capabilities. The AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air
missiles and AIM-9X infrared air-to-air missiles enable the
joint force to achieve air superiority by providing the first
look, first kill advantage against improving threats. The
current air-to-air missile inventory shortage may increase the
number of days it would take to gain and maintain air
superiority in any future conflict. To begin to address these
munitions capacity shortfalls, the fiscal year 2016 PB provides
$1.8 billion in fiscal year 2016 and $7.3 billion over the FYDP
to increase procurement rates, so above what we planned to buy
in 2015.
The shortfalls in readiness that General Wolters will
highlight in his statement continue to exacerbate the effect of
capacity shortfalls. Your forces are also less ready. In
addition to shortfalls in capacity in readiness, the Air Force
faces shortfalls in critical capabilities, as Dr. LaPlante
described. This means that potential adversaries are closing
the capability gaps that separate the U.S. military from
potential foes, and this narrow gap adds future risk to both
mission and to the forces that would fight.
The Air Force's fighter fleet is approaching an average age
of 30 years, the oldest in the history of the Air Force. The
fourth generation F-15s and F-16s that comprise the majority of
our fighter fleet require upgrades to both extend their
lifespan and provide the improved combat capability required to
prevail in today's increasingly contested environments. The
advanced capabilities of fifth generation fighters, the F-22
and the F-35, are critical to ensuring our ability to fight and
win in contested environments.
The savings generated by divesting the A-10 help us invest
$1 billion and $3.9 billion across the FYDP for F-16 and F-15
modernization and service life extensions and $600 million
across the FYDP to ensure we maintain the superiority of the F-
22 against rapidly improving threats.
The multi-role F-35 is the centerpiece of our future
fighter precision attack capability. It is designed to
penetrate air defenses and deliver precision-guided munitions
in a contested high-end threat environment. The fiscal year
2016 budget includes $4.9 billion for procurement and
development of 44 F-35As.
24 years of continual operations, coupled with constrained
and unstable budgets, have taken their toll on our Air Force
and our airmen. In anticipation of even greater challenges over
the next 2 decades, we have developed a strategy-driven,
resource-informed plan to guide the way our Service organizes,
trains, and equips to prepare for future operations. Mr.
Chairman, we built a 20-year plan at a resource-constrained
level based on zero real growth from the 2013 budget, kind of a
worst case scenario, to make sure that we could fit the
programs that you talked about into that long-range plan. At
your convenience, I would be happy to come down sometime and
walk you through that and have a discussion with you about your
views on that.
In order to achieve the strategic agility necessary to meet
the ever-evolving changes of the century, we must be able to
adapt to changing conditions faster than our potential
adversaries. When we think about a third offset strategy, I
believe that is what it is. It is building a military and a
force and a DOD that regains its ability to do things faster,
to rapidly change our abilities, to rapidly change our
capabilities. That will mean we will have to think faster. We
will have to acquire weapons faster, and we will have to be
able to build decision points into our programs so we can
decide to change them or, if they do not work out, to abandon
them.
Our fiscal year 2016 budget takes steps to balance the many
challenges we face in capacity, capability, and readiness, but
any return to sequestration level funding will directly impact
all three areas, leaving a smaller, less ready, and with less
of an advantage over potential adversaries.
Although our Nation has reduced its presence in
Afghanistan, we continue to face evolving threats to our
security in a world that seems to become less and less stable.
Given our current challenges, we must still remain ready to
respond quickly and effectively across the spectrum of
conflict. Our airmen are proud to serve alongside soldiers,
sailors, and marines and will continue to respond quickly and
effectively within the constraints imposed at any budget level.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Manchin, and ladies
and gentlemen of the committee, for your continued support of
the Air Force and the chance to discuss with you as we work
together to face these challenges. I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Cotton. General Wolters?
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. TOD D. WOLTERS, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE FOR OPERATIONS
General Wolters. Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member Manchin,
and distinguished members of this subcommittee, it is truly an
honor to have the opportunity to testify before you today and
also an honor to appear alongside my colleagues, our Chief of
Acquisition, Dr. LaPlante, and my dear friend over the last 3
decades, Lieutenant General Holmes.
The U.S. Air Force is unquestionably the best and the most
globally engaged air force on the planet, and the demand for
what we do is at an all-time high. But 24 years of continual
combat operations and recent budget constraints have taken
their toll on our readiness. We have the smallest and oldest
Air Force since our inception in 1947. Less than half of our
combat-coded squadrons are sufficiently ready for the high-end
fight. There is no excess. There is no bench. Everything is
committed.
The Air Force cannot respond in one corner of the Earth
without diluting its presence elsewhere. America needs a force
ready for a full spectrum of operations. Approximately 205,000
total force airmen are committed in place, supporting daily
operations to defend the homeland, control our nuclear forces,
operate remotely piloted aircraft, provide rapid global
mobility, and many other requirements. Approximately 23,000
airmen are deployed across the globe, including over 16,000 in
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
On the eve of 2014, we expected to draw down combat forces
in Afghanistan and reset the force. Instead, we faced a
resurgent Russia in the Ukraine, an Ebola epidemic in Africa,
and aggressive expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), demonstrating just how unpredictable world conditions
can be.
In spite of drawing down forces, the Air Force is still
engaged in Afghanistan, conducting counterterrorism operations
and providing training and operational support to strengthen
the Afghan national defense and security forces as part of
Operation Freedom Sentinel and NATO's Resolute Support mission.
These efforts will contribute to a more stable and secure
Afghanistan and deny terrorists safe havens in the region. Air
Force advisors are working to develop the Afghan air force
across their entire air enterprise, from fixed wing and rotor
wing operations and maintenance, engineering, and logistics to
force and budget development. In the last year, the Afghan air
force has taken over much of the mission, providing casualty
evacuation, aerial attack, and aircraft maintenance.
Since August of 2014, the Air Force has been conducting
operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria as part
of Operation Inherent Resolve. U.S. airpower has already
achieved positive effects. We have forced them to change their
tactics and the way they communicate. They have dispersed. They
are hiding among the population and they are not as free to
operate as they were before. Air strikes and resupply efforts
have helped Iraqi and Kurdish forces to retake and hold key
terrain. In Syria air strikes have attacked their command and
control, logistics, and revenue sources, making it harder for
them to sustain themselves and weakening their resolve.
In addition, the Air Force has alleviated civilian
suffering in Iraq through delivery of 131,000 meals, 58,000
gallons of water, and other vital supplies via airdrops and by
providing advice and training that enabled the Iraqi air force
to continue independent humanitarian relief and operational
resupply efforts.
The Nation deserves a ready Air Force that can not only
outmatch its most dangerous enemies but also maintain an
uncontested sky over our ground forces. While the fiscal year
2016 President's budget takes a small step towards recovery, it
only preserves the minimum requirement to meet current strategy
and reach our goal of an 80 percent ready Air Force by 2023.
American airpower requires sustained commitment, stability, and
the resolve to invest where it can best deliver the most combat
power. We need your help to be ready for today's fight and
still win in 2025.
Again, Chairman Cotton, congratulations, and I thank each
and every one of you for your persistent support of our U.S.
Air Force.
Senator Cotton. Thank you all for your testimony, and thank
you again for your service, as well as the thousands of airmen
you represent all around the world. I had a chance to serve
with many myself on provincial reconstruction team Laghman in
2008 and 2009 where I had the privilege of meeting General
Holmes in his earlier incarnation as the wing commander out of
Bagram.
As an infantryman, as you might imagine, I would like to
talk about the A-10. I fortunately never had to call in A-10
fire in Iraq or Afghanistan, but it was something on which we
were prepared from the earliest days at Fort Benning.
General Wolters, General Holmes, the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2015 allowed the Air Force to place up to 36 A-10 aircraft into
backup inventory status to free up maintenance personnel to
start the transition to the F-35. I understand that you opted
to do this with 18 aircraft from three different bases, also
that the aircraft in backup status must still fly to avoid the
so-called 21-day hangar queen status which requires periodic
maintenance and other repairs as required. Furthermore, the Air
Force currently has an A-10 squadron from the Indiana Air
National Guard deployed to the Middle East in support of the
fight against the Islamic State, and an A-10 squadron in
Arizona is currently deployed to Europe to reassure our allies
and partners in light of recent Russian aggression.
If the A-10 fleet were not available, what aircraft would
the Air Force then have to deploy?
General Wolters. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity
to comment on the A-10. As you well know, sir, it wound up
being the less ugly of ugly choices in order to divest as a
result of the fiscal year challenges.
At this time, our arsenal consists of F-15Es and F-16s and
B-1s that possess the capability to supplement and complement
the A-10 aircraft in its close air support role.
Senator Cotton. General Holmes, do you have anything to
add?
General Holmes. General Wolters flew the A-10, Mr.
Chairman. I commanded the A-10 twice in two different wing
commands. It is not a question of is it a great airplane with
great capability. It is. It is a question of how can we fit all
the capabilities that are requested into the budget that we
have.
When we looked at the alternatives where we could reduce
force structure, we dialogued with the combatant commands
(COCOM) and we asked what is most valuable to you of the things
the Air Force presents. One hundred percent of the COCOMs
valued our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
resources and asked us to expand those resources and to buy
back any places that we had taken cuts there, and they would
rather have that than the A-10.
We like the airplane. We would like to keep it, but we
could not find a way to work it into our budget level.
Senator Cotton. General Wolters, from a pure combat
capability perspective, do you view the fighters and the B-1 as
an adequate substitute for the A-10 to ground forces in need of
close air support?
General Wolters. Mr. Chairman, I do. As you well know,
there are certain situations with a show of force and show of
presence opportunities over soldiers where the A-10 is one of
those insertion resources in combat that produces positive
effects on the battle space. That is one area where the A-10
probably outmatches some of our others. But the F-15E, the F-16
and the B-1 can adequately perform the close air support
mission and satisfy the requirements of our combatant
commanders.
Senator Cotton. The long-term plan is to replace all those
with the F-35's capabilities. Right?
General Wolters. Mr. Chairman, that is correct. As you well
know, the F-35 will possess a level of close air support
capability and initial operation capability, and by its fully
operational capability in 2021, we suspect it will contain all
of the capabilities that currently reside in the close air
support (CAS) force requirements today for the combatant
commander.
Senator Cotton. So I have to say then that if today is
2015, 2021--you said that those other fighters and the bomber
are adequate to replace, but adequate in my opinion is not
necessarily enough when it comes to supporting the troops on
the ground that are in need of close air support.
General Holmes. Mr. Chairman, as a wing commander at Bagram
during our year there, I flew the F-15E. I flew the F-15E
completely in a CAS role. I flew 83 combat missions. I employed
20 weapons. We took modifications to that airplane starting
about 7 or 8 years ago. We added an advance targeting pod so
that you can see things from altitude and distance that you
could see with your eyes if you were closer. We added the
radios to the airplane that the A-10 has so that I could talk
directly to a ground commander. I could talk to the battalion
commander and his Tactical Air Control Party Specialist (TACP)
on one radio to the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) on
the ground on another radio and to the command and control
authority on a third radio. I had the range of weapons that
allowed me to do almost everything.
There were certainly situations where if I was without a
JTAC on the ground and I was caught with troops up very close
to me, that if I was the guy on the ground, I would prefer to
have the A-10. But there were certainly situations where if I
got into trouble and the closest airplane to help me was 300
miles away, then I would like to have that F-15E come in to get
to me.
We will provide a CAS capability and we will continue to do
so in the future. We are accepting risk in capacity between now
and when we start to build up in F-35 squadrons and we are
doing that to pay bills.
Senator Cotton. While we are talking about solutions that
are good enough or better than nothing, let us shift for a
moment to the macro budget picture. You can read the headlines
just like we can. Both Budget Committees of the Senate and the
House have proposed legislation that would keep the base budget
at $498 billion, which is the sequestration number, but include
so-called OCO funding, overseas contingency operations, of as
much as $90 billion. Without commenting on any particular
budget, could you give us quickly your thoughts on that
approach?
General Holmes. So, Mr. Chairman, as again the guy with the
team that plans what goes into the Air Force program, our
preference would be to have a reliable, predictable budget
stream out there so that we can plan in multi-years as you
outlined in your introductory comments there. But our second
best choice would we would be able to get the resources we need
to continue to do the things that people expect us to do from
year to year. So we need more money. We would prefer to have it
in the base budget so that we can count on it and predict it
across the FYDP, but we want to work with Congress to see what
we can do to get the money we need to do what we are asked to
do.
Dr. LaPlante. Just to add on from an acquisition
perspective, any additional money is good and is useful for the
system. Where it affects us, particularly with, let us say, if
you have the base budget being fixed and then OCO, it still is
harmful for us because we need some level of predictability on
a long-term program--I mean by long-term just in the next 3
years--or it would be irresponsible for us to start the
program. So we cannot in good conscience--we are not in good
conscience going to start a JSTARS recapitalization, for
example, even assuming OCO somehow would cover it. That would
be actually irresponsible.
So what I see happening by this uncertainty in acquisition
is a lot of times you are forced to do things that are short-
term, in other words, not do a bigger buy, not do a multiyear.
If we are going to retire this thing, we do not know if we are
going to retire it. Okay. We will fund it enough this year and
then do it again next year. Actually it would be much better
for us to know we are definitely retiring it, we are definitely
not because then you would actually put the right plan in
place.
We are now having to tell our folks, even if the thing that
you are working on is supposed to be retired, put in place a
budget and a plan as if it was not because we need to know how
we would long term sustain it. So it is our way of having to
deal with the uncertainty. It is actually costing us more
money.
We had a program last year called Space Fence, which was a
new program, a very important program for space situational
awareness. We had gone through the source selection, ready to
award it. This was in September 2013. It was right--if you guys
remember the 2013, September-October was a very uncertain time.
Rightfully so, we do not award the contract because we had no
idea what the budget was going to be. We do not want to start a
program that we are going to have to turn around a year later
and cancel and waste that money. Right? So we rightfully--and
the leadership of the Department--held it off. We had to stop
the competition, stop the award, wait until after the dust
settled. Ryan-Murray (Bipartisan Budget Act) came in. So in
February, we had to start over again with the request for
proposal (RFP). We did the source selection in June, and we
awarded the contract and the program is underway.
But here is the thing. We calculated it. It cost us $70
million more because of all the gyrations. The warfighter will
get the Space Fence a year later than they were originally
going to get it because when you have to stop something, then
restart it and reask for proposals, the industry teams are
spending.
So I can go through lots of stories where--we do not do
performance-based logistics contracts. Usually they are about
10 years to get the cost savings. It is harder to do them on a
1 year-to-1 year basis. So we really crave stability in our
world.
Senator Cotton. So my time has elapsed. But if I could make
an attempt to synthesize what I have heard, this approach,
keeping sequestration in effect for fiscal year 2016, plusing
up OCO spending, not good, better than nothing. It depends on
the details and in any regard, modernization and
recapitalization will continue to suffer.
General Holmes. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
again.
It gets quite confusing from the standpoint--and I said
this before. We have to go home and explain to our constituents
how we spend their tax dollars, how we commit their tax dollars
short-range, long-range, and also how we defend them. When you
look at the cost factor, what we are dealing with, basically I
think that when you look at the gross domestic product (GDP) of
the United States of America, we are $17 trillion and growing,
which is good. We are the largest by far. We spend about 3.8
percent on military. When you look at Russia, Russia is a
little over $2 trillion Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and they
spend I think about 4.2 percent. Then you look at China, about
$9 trillion, and they spend I think in the 2.6-2.8.
In a nutshell, they say, well, why are they getting a
bigger bang for their buck than we are. Why are we so costly as
a military? What are we not doing efficiently? What can we do?
How much redundancy do we do? I have had people ask me a simple
question. We have the National Guard and we have the Reserve.
They both do the same thing. Is there a way to work this out
more efficiently? Why does every branch of the military have an
air force? Procurement, getting something to market.
The F-35 strike fighter is going to be the one and done.
Right? It is going to do it all. Do you all truly believe that
it will replace all of the platforms you are taking off?
General, we will start with you.
General Holmes. Thank you, Senator Manchin. I think on the
issue with the other countries and their investment, what makes
us unique is that we have global responsibilities or we believe
that we must be able to act globally that Russia and China do
not necessarily take on. It is difficult to know exactly how
much they spend, where we know pretty much exactly how much we
spend--
Senator Manchin. These figures come from the World Bank. So
they are watching it pretty close.
General Holmes. Yes, sir. But the difference I think is
that our military, your military--we are expected to be able to
operate all around the globe and be able to get there and back
on short notice.
As far as the--
Senator Manchin. I am sorry to interrupt. Those two
countries we are most concerned about. Cybersecurity, cyber
warfare, basically platform capabilities and what they are
investing into. They are investing in this direction here. We
are pretty much flat or going this way. Those are concerns, 10,
20, 30 years out where they are going to be and where we are
going to be. I think that is what we are asking. Where is our
cost? Where can we as Congress help you in a more efficient,
streamlined, lack of redundancies, if you will? I know we put
all of our eggs in one basket. Here is an infantry combat
person who says I kind of like that A-10. But we bought into
the Joint Strike Fighter.
Dr. LaPlante. So clearly there is a lot to think about
under that question and it is a great question.
To start with, I think in the Air Force--and I am not the
expert on this. So you can ask me two or three questions. Then
I will have to defer you to someone else.
But my understanding is we have about 30 percent excess
capacity in terms of our infrastructure that we carry.
Senator Manchin. Excess capacity?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. There is no way a private business would
carry 30 percent extra capacity in their infrastructure. Maybe
5 percent, you might do it. 30 percent? I know Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) is a four-letter word, but we have to
start--and I am not a BRAC expert. We have to take that stuff
head on.
We also have to do things like recognize the fact--it is
the analogy maybe perhaps to the third world. Did you ever hear
the story of somebody who is in a part of the third world,
Africa or something, and you have better cell phone coverage
than you do in Washington, DC? Part of the reason that some of
the infrastructure in new countries is because it is new. We
are still living with our old. But we have that issue with the
Air Force, for example. Many of our airplanes are older than
the pilots flying them.
I was in a meeting yesterday down at the Reagan building
where the head of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), civilian
head of DLA, who was sitting next to me said, boy, we got a
request for 707 parts. I did not even know we still had 707s. I
turned to him and I said, yes, AWACS. I mean, we are keeping
airplanes around that--unbelievable.
Senator Manchin. Speaking of AWACS, you are going to retire
seven AWACS and seven Compass Call EC-130Hs.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. I can speak quickly to the AWACS and
then turn it to my colleagues.
To the credit of General Welsh, the Chief, his philosophy--
and I will give you the logic of it--is to say, okay, let us
take AWACS, for example. All right. We need to recapitalize
AWACS, 707. We talked about that. Okay. Where am I going to get
the money? Where am I going to get the money? Well, maybe what
I do is I take down the fleet now at some level with--it is
going to be all the risk you are taking to the warfighter, the
unhappiness of the warfighter to take that money and pump it
back into building a new thing. It is the equivalent of
living--while your house is getting the addition put on, you
live somewhere cheaply and you try to cut your costs and hope
you can get through the few years. I mean, generally, that is
what General Welsh has thought of doing here. Now, of course,
there are pros and cons of that approach, but that is what he
is coming up with with these ideas.
In the case of JSTARS recap, remember JSTARS had its
introduction in the first Gulf War. Those were used airplanes
then. Some of those airplanes had been flying cattle around. We
still are flying JSTARS today in the fight, and the price to
keep those going every year is going up. So we can sit and let
this happen, or we can take risk today to try to recapitalize.
But that is why you are driven in those directions.
Anyway, I will stop and turn it over to my colleagues here.
Senator Manchin. General Wolters?
General Wolters. Ranking Member Manchin, I think that is a
fantastic question, and we do not refute the challenges that
you posed with respect to procurement. We are in the business,
as are you, sir, to squeeze every penny out of every dollar.
Some of the decent initiatives that are currently taking place
that I think you would agree with with respect to the be all/
end all F-35, it is an aircraft that is multi-role. It
possesses the capability and capacity to work in the close air
support environment, to work in the interdiction environment,
to also work in the strike environment. Those attributes are
ones that are not present in other aircraft.
With respect to getting the most bang for the buck, with
respect to the dollars, I have to go back to the chairman's
comment. When you take a look at warfighting, as you well know,
sir, wars do not occur on 1-year intervals. What we would like
to do is impose a strategy with the appropriate planning and
prosecute fights, but they do not occur on 1-year intervals. As
we work with the budget and we are in a position to where we do
not possess the capability to have the stability to plan for
next year's funding level and the following year's funding
level, it becomes challenging with respect to the munitions
that you use, the platforms that you require, and the attempt
to impose a strategy upon the enemy. So all those factors
together put us in a position to where it is a challenge, sir.
One of the good things the U.S. DOD has done with your
assistance since 1986 is pushed very, very hard for joint
integration and coalition integration. Today, as we attempt to
prosecute the fight in Operation Inherent Resolve, we are
reaping significant benefits as a result of our joining at the
hip with our coalition partners to prosecute that campaign.
Senator Cotton. Senator Manchin, thank you very much for
the important points, as well as the relatively closing gap
between Russia and the United States. I would point out that
Russia, because of the falling price of oil, has implemented
its own version of sequestration. Their finance minister
recently announced across-the-board, government-wide cuts with
the exception of their military.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I have appreciated the candor with which you
have responded. With regard to the current proposals for
funding, I do not think there is anybody on this committee that
does not want to see the appropriate funding levels offered and
maintained.
Part of the discussion that we have had, as you are well
aware, is the use of OCO funding, and part of your concern is
the fact that it does not provide you anything in a base. But
would it not be appropriate with appropriate direction with the
OCO funds that you would be able to perhaps reconsider the way
that you would view the use of those funds? But you are asking
for a specific direction within the legislation. Fair
statement?
Dr. LaPlante. I do not know that I would say we are asking.
I would say this and I will turn it over----
Senator Rounds. Perhaps suggesting?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. Where an example might be--and I will
turn it over to General Holmes here in a second. For example,
what is the criteria that you could use OCO for? Is it for
procurement, is it--I mean the traditional thing in the last
few years is if you lose an aircraft like an F-16 crashes or
something, that tends to be something that OCO rules would
apply for a loss replacement. Well, are the rules willing to be
widened and changed from that, for example?
Senator Rounds. Precisely, but what you are saying is under
the existing OCO rules, as you have had them presented to you
in the past, it presents a problem.
Dr. LaPlante. I will defer to General Holmes. He is the
expert.
General Holmes. Yes, sir, it does. I mean, there has been
some creative use of funds. We funded some Army end strength
for several years to control their drawdown through OCO. So
there are ways to use it and to use it effectively. Our concern
is more the 1-year nature of OCO and not being able to plan
ahead into the future.
Senator Rounds. I understand. Thank you.
Now, let me turn very quickly to the long-range strike
bomber. Dr. LaPlante, the Air Force leaders have consistently
stated that the aircraft per-unit cost of the LRSB would be at
or below $550 million. The House Armed Services Subcommittee on
Seapower and Projection Forces hearing on March 4th, you seemed
to intimate the cost today when accounting for inflation would
be somewhat higher. Extrapolating annual inflation out to 2025
would indicate that the then-year cost would be well over $640
million per aircraft. Do you believe sticking by the $550
million unit cost without always qualifying it with the 2010
base year dollars is somewhat misleading to the American
public? Where do we go?
Dr. LaPlante. I am really glad I got the question. I just
wish I had a chance to be in my classroom because I love this.
This is great. With 3 minutes on the clock, I am going to have
to figure this out.
So nothing has changed in LRSB. We have completely designed
the program around affordability. Nothing has changed. It is do
everything exactly the way all of us who have researched it--we
have looked at what has gone wrong in acquisition. We are
addressing every one. The requirements are completely
unchanged. We actually baked in as a key performance parameter
the cost per airplane. At 100 airplanes, the cost is $550
million. Ironically because we are so paranoid about changing
the requirement--the document was signed in 2010--we are like
can we adjust it for inflation. So we should remind everybody.
We know and the budgeteers know that inflation happens just
like you know with your constituents and people with their
salaries. You could do an Internet calculator and see that $55
in 2010 is $57 today. We know that. It is all taken into
account.
Do I think we probably need to change it so people are not
confused? Sure. I am sure it is not going to stop the
questions.
We did the same thing in the F-35 about 2 years ago. I
guess in 2013, we were still quoting 12 numbers, and we found
then that some people were using then-year dollars. Finally, we
said stop, stop. Here are the rules. The F-35 is always going
to be talked about in price per plane in then-year dollars with
the engine. So now everybody is saying the same thing. Lockheed
says the same thing.
It is now 2015, so yes, we probably should do it. But there
should not be a lot of intellectual energy I spent on that
other than we just need to be clear.
Let me make one other point. Again, I am really sensitive
of our time. This is really important.
There are three pots of money and ways you fund phases of
an acquisition program. The first is when you develop the
program. It is typically research and development (R&D), and
that is what you do. We do not have the privilege of letting
industry develop on their own nickel most of the time. We have
to develop it ourselves. So that is called development. Then
you switch, hopefully pretty reasonably, into production. That
is when you produce the airplanes, and then you sustain them.
As I said earlier, most of the money, when you look at the
lifecycle of a program, is in that sustainment phase. In fact,
that is the biggest risk, by the way, of the F-35 of getting
the costs. It is sustainment.
So let us talk about what is the right contracting strategy
in each one. We have been trying to really show people--and
Frank Kendall has been doing this very well--of getting people
to think and understand the literature. There is not a
checklist. You do not use a checklist. You actually have to
think. It turns out in the data 70 percent of development
programs--and this is actually intuitive to me. It makes
perfect sense--are cost-type programs. They are reimbursable
costs, and that is typical in R&D because what happens is you
have a goal of what you want to get done in the development,
but you oftentimes do not have enough precision on exactly how
much it is going to cost. So you just do cost reimbursable.
Now, if you just left it alone at cost reimbursable and did
nothing, that might be a problem. But then what you do is you
put incentives in, and this is what we are teaching people. An
example of an incentive. You would put in and say, okay, the
target you are going to spend in that development is this much.
This is your target. It is cost reimbursable. You go above that
target, we are going to start whacking your profit. You go even
this higher, you are going to get zero profit. So that is what
we are teaching people.
Now, still sometimes you want to do fixed price in
development. We are doing the tanker fixed price in development
for certain reasons. We are doing the combat rescue helicopter
fixed price.
Senator Rounds. Let me just--I am out of time, but let me
just ask this. What you are saying is that we are on target.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes.
Senator Rounds. You are on top of it.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes.
Senator Rounds. This very, very valuable long-range piece
of machinery that we are looking at is moving ahead without any
surprises so far.
Dr. LaPlante. No. This is really important. If I could, Mr.
Chairman, give 20 seconds.
Okay. Here is LRSB, procurement, procurement, fixed price,
fixed price. By the way, 100 airplanes. Even the first one that
comes off the line is going to be fixed price. That is
unprecedented in this kind of a program. So you better believe
we have this thing controlled. I do not know if people are
confused or they are bringing up inflation, but it is actually
pretty straightforward and nothing has changed.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
Senator Cotton. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all of
you who are here with us today.
I wanted to ask about some specific programs, the weather
satellites. We were counting on the European Union (EU), and
the EU's decision not to launch a replacement for the Meteosat-
7 is causing concern in our ability to collect certain weather
data over CENTCOM's region. How are we adjusting our plans to
compensate for that?
General Holmes. So we have the--and I may get my acronyms
wrong, but we have a weather satellite that we have not
launched. There have been different views on whether we should
launch it or not from different places in the Government, and
as a result, we have not. We know there is congressional
language that tells us to launch it by the end of 2016 or
retire it. We want to launch it, but it takes longer than that
to get it on contract and launch it. So our plan is to work
with Congress to see if we can get language that would allow us
to do it and then launch that satellite to provide that
capability.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. Just let me add to that from an
acquisition perspective. The general rule--there are
differences from when you get the satellite on contract, it
takes nominally 2 years of integration work. This is
engineering work to integrate it with the launch vehicle. So we
have a general rule of thumb that we have to award 2 years
prior to a launch. So if you are saying in the language that we
have now that it has to be launched by December 2016, that kind
of does not work. So we could do it if directed. It just will
not be before December.
Senator Donnelly. Well, here is another operational
question. We are moving F-35s into Hill Air Force Base. What
are we going to do with the F-16s?
General Holmes. Well, we cannot ask the same people to
maintain both of them. So the plan that we had built would take
those F-16s and make them available as A-10 replacements for
Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units at Fort Wayne,
IN, and at Whiteman in Missouri. If we are not able to come to
an agreement with Congress on what we are going to do with the
A-10, then we will have to look at what we do with those
airplanes, as we have to bring them down to make maintenance
people available.
What we would like to do is to move them on and to replace
those A-10s at those units with block 40s that have a lot of
service life left and have a lot of length left.
Senator Donnelly. Terrific.
I just want to ask one more operational question, and then
I want to ask about drones.
The KC-46--and this is more of an installations question.
When can we expect an announcement on the candidate bases for
the Reserve-led operating parts?
General Holmes. Sir, we expect to make that announcement in
September 2016 I believe is the last information I got. So for
OPS-3, which should be a Reserve base, we expect that in
September 2016.
Senator Donnelly. Now, in regards to drones, how much more
would you need if you had the optimal plan for yourself on
drones, the number of drones, the number of operators? In order
to meet what you think is the threats you need to meet, the
things you face, would you be at the present number or would
you be much higher?
General Holmes. Sir, I am going to defer that question to
General Wolters.
General Wolters. Senator, that is a great question.
As you well know, we as services provide resources to the
combatant commanders on their request. Typically the number one
request item from our combatant commanders is ISR followed by
ISR followed by more ISR, and that typically equates to medium-
altitude remotely piloted aircraft that we possess in the U.S.
Air Force. Right now, our U.S. Air Force will be postured in
fiscal year 2016 to support 60 CAPs, and the CAPs stands for
combat air patrol. It can best be described as aerospace
vehicles overhead to targeted medium altitude that possess the
capacity to surveil from 18 to 24 hours.
We believe, given the other elements of the enterprise in
DOD and of our coalition partners that 60 is the correct number
for the near term. It is that way because in the U.S. Air
Force, we need to freeze the stick, establish a force that can
innovate with 60 CAPs, let that settle for several years to
where we have the appropriate number of pilots per CAP per
vehicle so that the enterprise will be in a position to where
we can keep the force for the long term and then in the out-
years we will be in a position, as we work with our partners,
to feed the fight.
Senator Donnelly. Let me ask you this. You mentioned that
the requests are for ISRs and then the next highest is ISRs and
then the next highest is ISRs. In terms of the actual vehicles,
how many more do you think you need to meet all the requests
that are out there?
General Wolters. Senator, that is a great question.
We know that what we currently possess is not enough to
meet the demands of the combatant commander in the Air Force,
in the other services, and in the enterprise that services
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Dr. LaPlante. I am not a warfighter, but as somebody who
has been around the analysis community for a long time, I am at
the point where I hear people say we need to do analysis on how
much ISR we need. I just say I will tell you the answer. More.
Every time they do the analysis of warfighters coming back, it
is just insatiable just watching this.
Senator Donnelly. Would that also reflect on the number of
pilots that you need as well?
General Wolters. Senator, it does. This goes back to the
challenge that we face in the U.S. Air Force with the number of
airmen that we possess and the capacity and capabilities that
we need to deliver for the joint fight.
The second largest area that our combatant commanders asked
for support is in command and control and air superiority. So
we are threading the needle between the size of our ISR force
and the size of the force to serve those requirements that are
given to us by the combatant commanders.
Senator Donnelly. Dr. LaPlante, I am out of time now, but
one of the most striking things to me, since I have been on
this committee, is the need for drones and drone vehicles and
the constant statements of every single vehicle we have--there
are three or four people who want to get their hands on it for
the next trip it takes. So as you said, as you look at this
acquisition system and you look at what we really need the
most, it is like the old saying of the simplest explanation is
often the best. What you need the most is probably the thing
they are asking for the most.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. Here is the problem with us in
acquisition particularly the last 10 years. Most of the ISR
demands come in through these things called Joint Urgent
Operational Needs. So what it is, is basically take things like
Predator or Reaper and put this sensor or that sensor on it. It
is a rapid acquisition thing with the CENTCOM.
So what was happening was a lot of our ISR that was getting
this big demand was being run basically in this urgent need
area, and none of the regularity, which is good and bad, of
acquisition was being done. So we are trying to figure out what
is normal in ISR. For a while there, I kept saying, well, the
demand in all this crazy, urgent operational need stuff will
end as soon as we get out of Iraq. It did not happen.
Senator Donnelly. It will not happen.
Dr. LaPlante. I think you are right, and so here is what we
are doing on Predator and on Reaper. We are saying, guys,
accept that this is always going to be this way. Build a
baseline and then build a rapid part of the acquisition that
will assume this stuff will keep dropping in. Just to get
exactly at your point, because this is not normal. It is not a
classic thing. The demand signal just keeps going up. So you
are right.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations.
Thank you, gentlemen for being here today. I appreciate
your testimony and your candor.
The good Senator Cotton took a lot of my A-10 line of
questioning, but I would like to just go back a little bit
because maybe this has been provided to previous committees. I
am not certain. But when we are comparing the cost of A-10
sorties versus the F-35 as a replacement, I have not seen any
numbers on that. In my simple Army National Guard mind, I know
that the A-10 flies a lot slower. I know it is preferred by
ground troops. The F-35 might be a lot faster. I do not know.
The F-15 is a lot faster. But time spent in the air--how long
do the replacement aircraft stay in the air before they have to
see the tanker? What kind of payload can they carry as far as
munitions? All of that matters to those troops on the ground.
That is very important. Most of the ground pounders that I have
talked to, the men and women that I served with, when you ask
them, they say they would rather see an A-10 in the air.
I know that is, again, unqualified by numbers. I would like
to see those numbers so that if we are proposing we make this
change, that I can defend it because right now I cannot, and in
my mind I am not prepared to defend it. I do not want to defend
it at this point. I would love to see the A-10s remain. So if
you would just comment briefly to that.
General Holmes. Yes, ma'am. Senator, thank you.
I think we like the A-10 too. It is not just that the guys
on the ground do. We do too. We like the airplane. It was built
to shoot tanks in the Fulda Gap to stop a Russian invasion of
Europe is what it was built to do. Over time, it has been
modified and updated, and it is a very good platform for the
environment that it is operating in now where there is almost
no ground threat, there is no air threat, and so it can use its
advantages of long loiter time and being able to fly close and
carry a large weapon load and be effective. It is not the only
airplane that can be effective, as we talked about.
It certainly costs less to operate than an F-35 will, and
there is no set of math that would tell you anything different.
The A-10 is always going to be cheaper to operate than an F-35
will be, and I would stipulate that.
The question is that in the environments of the future, can
it get there. So what we are trying to do is make sure that we
have a way to support soldiers in the future as well that may
be operating in a place where there are sophisticated surface-
to-air defenses.
We estimated that the loss rate of the A-10 in the Fulda
Gap scenarios back in the 1970s was really, really high. They
were not going to last through the conflict and they were going
to take a really high attrition rate. If you looked at the
places that they employed in the first Iraq War, if they got up
into a sophisticated ground threat, they took a pretty good
beating. It is a tough airplane and they were able to fly a lot
of those home with the damage they took, but they could not fly
them again. So they could not support ground troops the next
day because of the damage that they took.
So what we are trying to do is balance our ability to
support our brothers and sisters on the ground today, make sure
we have the capability to do it 20 years from now if they are
operating in place where they may be on the defensive, for once
where the enemy is bringing their fire power with them like the
Russians were going to do and they have sophisticated defenses
with them. We think it is worth paying a little bit more, cost
per flying hour, to be able to get there instead of having a
cheaper airplane that you cannot use. I think that is the
simple part of it.
We would love to keep the A-10 until the wings fall off of
them if we could afford to do it. It is just how do we fit that
capability in and plan to support the ground troops of the
future within the same limited budget.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Yes, General Wolters.
General Wolters. Senator, if I could. I served as the Air
Chief in Afghanistan for a year and had the good fortune to
command A-10s, F-15Es, F-16s, and B-1s in harm's way. All were
referred to as fantastic CAS platforms depending upon which
soldier you talked to who happened to be in the middle of a
troops in contact scenario.
One of the challenges that we faced with the A-10 was the
fact if we had multiple engagements separated by distances
greater than 100 nautical miles, you are potentially in a
position to where some of the other aircraft that possessed the
capability to dash quicker between targets would be able to
serve multiple targets. That is a classic illustration to where
the A-10 was slightly challenged due to its inability to
achieve a high-end speed.
But I could not agree more with what General Holmes said
and with what your candid observations are about the A-10. It
is a wonderful close air support aircraft. I have flown it. I
have flown its predecessor, the OV-10, in the early 1980s. But
there are some things that become challenging certainly in a
non-permissive environment, and there are still things that
occur in today's combat permissive environment where other
aircraft possess a little bit better ability to dash to other
targets.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I do appreciate that, gentlemen.
I know we had spent some money modernizing the A-10s, and
now I see in part of the discussion with the C-130 fleet,
another aircraft that is well beloved by many members of our
armed services. My husband took off in a lot of C-130s, did not
land in a whole lot of C-130s. So just a little bit of
discussion, if you would please. Talk through the modernization
plan with the avionics. If we spend this money, then are we
going to turn around and in another 5 years say the C-130 is
not good enough, we need a different aircraft?
General Holmes. Thank you again, Senator, for that question
as well.
We had some very productive meetings with staffers this
week on both your staff and with your House counterparts, and
we think we understand the intent of Congress in the 2015 NDAA
language and we are going to move that and execute that intent.
So our intent is to spend the AMP money in the budget on AMP,
as we were directed to do. There is prior year money there that
we can spend to begin buying radios required for the Avionics
Modernization Program (AMP) and to finish the research,
development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) for AMP that would
do a tech refresh on the avionics modernization program, the
program that we are having a hard time finding the money to pay
for because in the years since, we have let that pause, there
are newer components and there are manufacturers that are not
making them anymore. It will take a little R&D money, and we
will expend that money to do that.
We believe the NDAA also gave us the authority with the
certification by the Secretary of Defense to take the money we
had in there for airspace compliance, the communications,
navigation, surveillance, and air traffic management money that
Ranking Member Manchin talked about, and start to apply that to
make sure that the airplanes are compliant and able to fly in
the airspace. We have to do both.
We had brought a plan for a couple years that would do a
modernization plan that was compatible with a very quick effort
to go make those airplanes compliant. The time has delayed now
to where we are going to go ahead and move ahead with the
avionics modernization program as our modernization program,
and then we hope to work with a lesser program to make them
compliant in the airspace, and then at some point those
programs will meet.
What we found is when we took another look, after the time
that we had been stuck deciding on the way forward--we took
another look at it and as we reduce the C-130 fleet down, we
are down to about 328. If we are able to get down to 300 next
year, which we think still exceeds the requirement, then the
costs start to come together between the aviation modernization
program and the program that we had proposed to the point that
the costs were close to the same. So we are going to move
forward and follow the direction of the 2015 NDAA.
Now, it will still be hard to come up with that money. We
will need help to do that. It is multiple billion dollars over
a couple of FYDPs, and that means there is something else that
will not get done in the defense budget. But we are going to
budget the money for the compliance part. We are going to move
out with the prior year money in AMP and then we want to work
with Congress to figure out how we are going to pay for that
modernization program.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I understand
we have a need to protect our taxpayers, but we have a need to
protect not only our men and women in uniform but also all of
our Americans here in our homeland.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. Senator Lee?
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to each of you for joining us. Thanks for all you do
to keep our armed services running well. I am a big fan of the
Air Force and appreciate what you do.
Late last year, the Air Force began a study into the future
needs of test ranges and their infrastructure on those ranges,
a key to maintaining readiness and innovation within the Air
Force. What would you say--and this is open to all of you and
any of you who want to answer it. What do you believe are the
most critical needs for Air Force test ranges in order to make
sure that those ranges are able to adequately test fifth
generation aircraft and weaponry against the threats that they
are likely to be facing in the next few decades.
General Holmes. Yes, sir. So we dealt this year--as we
start to build our 2017 budget, we took a brief that you may
have seen from our test and evaluation people that outlined the
state of our test and evaluation enterprise. As we know that we
are contemplating, as the chairman said, spending hundreds of
billions of dollars on the Air Force here over the next 20
years in the modernization effort, that we need to make sure
that we have the test and evaluation enterprise that will
support testing those things and making sure that they work.
So we spent a multiyear project kind of bringing together
exactly what needs to be done to accomplish that. The kinds of
things we are talking about are simulated threat emitters so
that you can go out and fly against a particular surface-to-air
missile (SAM) system and see if it works or not, the test
stands where you can put aircraft on a test stand and look at
different wavelengths of energy against them so to see whether
they are detectable or not by different radars and to test
those capabilities that we are bringing forward. Then there are
also some S&T issues of things like wind tunnels and test
facilities and those areas.
We have put a plan together. We think we have a plan to
start going toward to pay for it. As we start talking about our
test and evaluation enterprise, because of those programs that
we are going to test and evaluate, it gets difficult to talk
about in an open session. But we can come back and provide you
some more information.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Holmes. Fifth generation aircraft and weapons need to be
tested on updated open air ranges and in ground test facilities that
present the system under test with an environment that represents
existing and emerging threat systems world-wide, including Pacific
theater threat systems. Further, our ranges need to be upgraded to
address the increased distances for air-to-air and air-to-ground
weapons employment inherent in our 5th generation systems. There are
also enhancements required to our sensor, datalink, and propulsion
facilities to fully accommodate development for 5th generation systems
and beyond. Finally, we will need to make investments in our test and
evaluation infrastructure to support continued relevance in testing.
This would include technology updates for data collection and
instrumentation systems in addition to basic facility sustainment,
repair, and modernization.
Dr. LaPlante. I would say many of us are keenly aware, as
we move to this next generation, whatever you call it, Anti-
Access Area Denial (A2AD), fifth generation air superiority, we
need the testing and then the accompanying modeling and SAM
because of the scales we are going to be doing to make this
realistic so those of us an feel confident we really understand
these systems. If you really look at the scales that are now
involved--and we have multiple platforms. One of the things
that the F-35 brings F-22 is the fact that the forward ship and
all that and the fusion. We would love to be able to test that
robustly over large areas, at least somewhat to validate it
against, as General Holmes said, realistic emitters, realistic
threats. We do not want to be testing against 2-foot tall
adversaries potentially. We need to test against modern stuff,
and it is a challenge.
Just as somebody who comes out of testing in my heritage is
that it is increasingly harder to test things because our
ranges get more encroached on. Our restrictions become closer.
But we have to do it. There is no substitute for a test. As we
say, all models are wrong. Some are useful. You have to test.
Senator Lee. That is right. Thank you for that insight. I
hope you know how much support there is in Utah for the great
work that you do in the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR).
One of the great assets that we have is the UTTR, given the
sheer expanse of land that we have there, uninterrupted land
that can help with the very things you are describing.
Dr. LaPlante, the Air Force is migrating the logistics
function under your office in an attempt to create better
efficiencies and cost benefits between acquisition programs and
the sustainment and lifecycle processes. Can you give us an
update on this process and tell us about what provisions exist
within the structure to ensure that the logistics deputy has an
opportunity to adequately influence the process of acquisition
so that sustainment considerations are built into the weapons
systems from the beginning?
Dr. LaPlante. So this has actually been really exciting. It
is March now. We did it on October 1st. What we did, just for
the chairman and for the rest of the committee, we brought in
the headquarters of the Air Force, the logistic policy experts,
into the acquisition. Now, the risk was, for people who really
know how good the Air Force does logistics and how wonderful
our depots are, hey, you acquisition people, you better not
screw up what is going really, really well. But on the other
hand, if you could pull this thing off and you can get
acquisition experts in at the beginning of these programs--as I
said earlier, 70 percent is in the cost--it could be a pretty
wonderful thing. It is a pretty wonderful thing.
I ran into my two-star equivalent who leads that part of my
organization just last week, Daniel A. Fri, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Logistics and Product Support,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition. I said, Dan, how is it going? Because remember,
that organization was picked up down the hallway and moved into
mine. He goes, we are so busy. We are overwhelmed. I said, was
it more than it used to be? Yes. Why? What is going on? All the
acquisition people are bringing us in to all their meetings at
the beginning of the acquisition process. It is like it has
changed the culture. So I think it is really, really exciting.
Senator Lee. Exactly what you wanted to hear.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, yes. All the signs are really good. I
have to give a shout out to General Bruce Litchfield at the Air
Force Sustainment Center. You see it at Ogden. We see it at
Tinker. We see it at Warner-Robbins, just remarkable stuff. So,
hey, the fact that we can cozy up and bring some of that magic
together with acquisition, I mean, I think it is really
awesome. So far so good.
Senator Lee. I am pleased to hear it. Everyone was nervous
when it happened, but it seems to be good so far.
Mr. Chairman, if I can ask one more short question if I
promise to make it short.
There was an article published on military.com last week
indicating that the F-35 will not be able to fire the SDB 2,
the close air support weapon, until 2022. Can you tell us about
what other close air support capabilities the F-35 will be
capable of prior to that 2022 time horizon?
General Holmes. Yes, sir. So when we talk about having an
initial CAS capability, it means that the airplane when it
starts that initial operating capability (IOC)--it will have
the ability to use the GBU-12 or a laser-guided weapon. It will
have the ability to use Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM),
the drop on coordinates, and it will have the radios and the
messaging required to be able to operate with a JTAC to take
both digital CAS messages that come through without words, that
pass coordinates and instructions or it will have the right
radios to talk to the guys on the ground to do that. Later on
in the models that we get to by full operational capability
(FOC), we will integrate a small diameter bomb (SDB) as you
said.
I saw the article. The article I saw said it will not fit
in the marine bay. I am not sure if that carries over to us or
not. We will have to get back to you.
But it will start out with that initial capability, and
then it will add larger JDAM, the 2,000 pound JDAM, the ability
to carry GBU-12s outside of the wing, and the ability to carry
SDB inside and maintain its stealthiness while it does it.
Senator Lee. Great. Thank you.
General Wolters. Just one addition, sir. In between IOC and
FOC, the F-35 will gain the capacity to shoot the 25-millimeter
gun, which will also enhance its capability in the CAS
environment.
Senator Lee. Great, great. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Very quickly, one question. This, I think,
is for General Holmes. In the Air Force report on the
recommendation of the National Commission on the Structure of
the Air Force, the Air Force indicates that the Air Force is 7
percent short of meeting demands for fighters with the current
force structure. The report asserts that shifting more effort
to the National Guard and Air Force Reserve, as recommended by
the commission, would result in a shortage of 10 percent in
fighter forces available.
Several years ago, the Air Force, as a part of the new
defense strategy, reduced combat air force, the CAF fighter
force structure under the so-called CAF Redux.
So I guess I would ask, General, why did the Air Force fail
to inform us that by approving the CAF Redux, that we would be
approving a force that was 7 percent short of meeting its
requirements? I do not think we were notified at that time. I
guess now with the A-10, would that add to the 7 percent
shortfall?
General Holmes. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
So there are several different kind of requirements that we
look at. The first one we talk about is the surge capacity, its
ability. We are all in. We are taking Active, Guard, Reserve,
everybody goes. Everybody gets mobilized, and it is kind of the
worst case scenario in the defense guidance. It would be to
defeat in one area, to deny in another area, to provide
homeland defense and nuclear deterrent all at the same time.
Within that area, at the force structure we are now, we are on
the ragged edge of being able to meet that worst case scenario,
and as we make this drawdown, that risk gets worse.
What the report is talking about is the rotational ability
to support what we do with COCOMs every day. So because when we
rotate forces forward, if you rotate active forces on what we
would call a 1 to 3 deployed to dwell, that means for every
unit you have down range, you have to however three back home
that are in the dwell period training, resting, getting ready
to go back.
The active force we would like to deploy on a 1 to 4
deployed to dwell so that they can have enough training time to
regain the full spectrum readiness that General Wolters talked
about. But in reality, we are closer to a 1 to 2 deployed to
dwell or a 1 to 3 deployed to dwell.
For the Reserve component, to mobilize them, we looked at a
mobilization to dwell of 1.5 or 1 to 5. So for every one period
they are deployed or mobilized, there are five units that are
not deployed.
So if you move things from active over into the Reserve
component, now you have cut down on your ability to support
that rotational requirement within the dwell rate. That is what
our response talked about. If you move more force from active
into the Guard, then because of the longer time we have to give
them because of the different place they are in their life and
as citizen soldiers, they cannot deploy as much, then you have
a decrease in your ability to meet that rotational requirement
or what we do every day to support COCOMs around the world.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
Senator Cotton. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Wolters--first I want to thank all of you for your
service and the men and women you lead.
I would like to focus a little bit on the ISIS mission. I
have heard talk about, hey, we do not have combat troops over
there. I know that is obviously a mistaken assumption. The men
and women flying those close air supports are definitely combat
troops risking their lives on a daily basis. Who is calling in
those strikes right now?
General Wolters. Senator, the majority of those strikes are
being called in by ground component commanders of different
sectarian nature that are joined by our forward forces, some of
our U.S. special forces on the ground. That data is
subsequently passed back to a headquarters either as far back
as Qatar or down to Kuwait where in a command and control
center we examine the target----
Senator Sullivan. Do we have JTACs on the ground there
calling in air strikes?
General Wolters. We have JTACs assisting individuals, but
they are not calling in the air strikes.
Senator Sullivan. So are they out there on the ground?
General Wolters. There are some in forward headquarters in
Baghdad and in Kuwait.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think we have a robust capability
in terms of marines or Air Force or special forces on the
ground in the event we need to go kick in a door or two to go
get a downed pilot?
General Wolters. Sir, we do. In the event that we have a
downed pilot, we possess the capability to bring in the
appropriate size force to accomplish a successful personal
recovery mission.
Senator Sullivan. Good.
I want to switch. You were talking about resources to the
combatant commander. You probably saw in the news today the
Russian exercise in the Arctic this past week, 38,000 soldiers,
50 surface ships, 110 aircraft. This is in addition to the four
new combat brigades they are putting in the Arctic, a new
Arctic command, 13 new airfields. If you look at a map of what
the Russians are doing in the Arctic, it is pretty significant.
A huge icebreaker fleet that they are dramatically increasing.
You have served in Alaska. You have served in Elmendorf. I
know Senator Lee was talking about Utah's open airspace, but I
think the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) is
probably the most open airspace in terms of training maybe in
the world.
Yet, with regard to resources in the Arctic, there is no
Arctic Operational Plan (OPLAN). In terms of your ability to
resource combatant commanders, do you think we need an Arctic
OPLAN, particularly given the threat that the Russians are
posing and the buildup in the Arctic and, to be honest, the
fact that some of your sister Services are talking about
reducing forces in the Arctic?
General Wolters. Senator, I would like to carry more of
this conversation in a different environment so we could speak
at a different level. But as you well know, sir, we do possess
the capability to allocate current assigned forces between
combatant commands to put them in a position to where we have
the access to help support some of the challenging areas that
you are alluding to.
The good news about one of your references, certainly the
UTTR is a fantastic range. The JPARC is a fantastic range. In
and around that vicinity, it gets us good access to be in a
position to help thwart the threat that you are alluding to.
Senator Sullivan. But if we do not know as kind of the
services that are sourced and the requirements, what the
requirements are according to the combatant commanders, it
makes it a little tougher to plan. Does it not?
General Wolters. It does.
Senator Sullivan. Do you have any thoughts on that, General
Holmes?
General Holmes. Nothing to add, sir.
Senator Sullivan. General Welsh has talked very positively
about barring any major issues that the first F-35As would be
scheduled to arrive at Eielson late 2019. Do you have any idea
when the production line will begin building F-30s for Alaska?
General Wolters. Sir, typically we pay for airplanes 2
years before they are delivered. So the airplanes that will be
delivered in fiscal year 2019 would be paid for in 2017, and
they would start the construction then after that, and they
would roll off the line, if everything works right, in about 2
years after the time that we appropriate the money and obligate
the money.
Senator Sullivan. So that is about 2017.
General Wolters. Yes, sir.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, and at the right time you can go to Fort
Worth and pick the first tail number that is going to go there.
We did that in January. The first tail number that is going to
Hill, General Herbert J. ``Hawk'' Carlisle, Commander of Air
Combat Command, wants to fly it into Hill because Hill, of
course, is where we are going to have the IOC. So, yes, you can
go by tail number and find your airplane and sign your name----
Senator Sullivan. If you keep us posted on that, we will be
in Fort Worth, the earlier, the better.
I also want to talk about, in terms of training. I know we
have talked a lot about sequester and the effect that will
have. I know you gentlemen believe that the most important
thing we can do to take care of our troops is to train them
hard, rigorously so they come home after they have real-world
contingencies or go to combat.
One of the things that I did not see in the testimony was
the development of any new generation of aggressor platforms
for particularly our fourth and fifth generation fighter
fleets. So specifically, do you think the F-16 is too expensive
to fly as an aggressor platform, and is the Air Force looking
at developing a more capable, less costly aggressor platform
that can serve in places like Alaska where we have a fourth and
fifth generation fleet?
General Wolters. Senator, I will start with this. We
certainly think that the F-16 is a capable platform of
appropriately representing the threat. As we speak, we will be
working in the next several years to improve our operational
training infrastructure, and part of that improvement will
include some additional avionics packages that can be placed on
board the F-16 to better replicate fourth and fifth generation
threats. We will also leverage the capability on great ranges
like JPARC where we can invoke live, virtual, and constructive
into the environment so that we can better replicate some of
the existing capabilities that exist in our potential
adversaries.
Senator Sullivan. So the cost of the F-16, in terms of an
aggressor platform, is not something that is concerning?
General Holmes. In the short term, it is what we have,
Senator. In the long term--thanks for the question. We have
looked at several options. It is really too early for any
decision. But as we look at our T-X airplane that we are
building as a replacement for the T-38 and is an advanced
trainer, we are setting those requirements and being careful to
limit them to the requirements we need for the trainers so we
do not make a system that is too expensive to be able to fit
into our 20-year plan, as Chairman Cotton talked about.
But we are also going to write a requirement in for that
airplane that it has excess growth capacity inside it. It will
have extra room. It will have extra electrical power and extra
cooling air so that if in some point in the future we want to
take that much-cheaper-to-fly airplane and modify it to do some
other roles like companion trainer for the bomber pilots or
potentially maybe an adversary airplane--we have not made any
decisions about that, but we are thinking about ways to do that
mission cheaper in the future. But for right now, the F-16 is
the most cost-effective adversary platform that we have.
Dr. LaPlante. I just wanted to close the loop on something
we said earlier. The strategic agility and build adaptability
in the platform, what General Holmes just went through with the
T-X, knowing that we may want to use this thing in other places
we are not going to lift requirements. Let us build some margin
in to take on what you are saying in the future. Let us not
limit our future options.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Cotton. Dr. LaPlante, one final question. Last
month on February 4th, the Dowty propeller factory in
Gloucester, England was destroyed by fire. The Air Force
subsequently informed Congress that Dowty was the single
manufacturer of the C-130J propeller. Can you tell us about the
impact of the loss of this factory on the C-130J production and
readiness?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, indeed, and it was serious. It was a
real fire that destroyed equipment production equipment.
We have enough propellers to keep the production line going
through about November, and then after November, we are going
to have to come up with a mitigation plan. They are working
that right now to try to understand how to do it. I cannot
promise you that there is not going to be an impact on
production. I do not know that there is not going to be. I am
concerned. But we have enough to continue the production
through November, and then I think what we need to do is when
we have a fuller understanding of the mitigation plan, we need
to come back to you and show you what we think the impact is.
But it was a pretty serious event for us.
Senator Cotton. Do you have any projections on when you
might have that mitigation plan or what the course----
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. I think within a month I think we should
know. I would be happy to get back with you all and get our
staff to show you how we are planning to get around it because
we need to keep the production line going for the 130Js,
obviously.
Senator Cotton. Moving beyond this specific incident, is it
best practice to have a single manufacturer of such a critical
component?
Dr. LaPlante. Obviously, it should not be. But, I would say
this.
Senator Cotton. Not just a single manufacturer, a single-
site manufacturer.
Dr. LaPlante. Right. Yes. I mean, there is no way to answer
your question other than saying it should not be a best
practice to do it. It is not a best practice.
On the other hand, I would say that there are a lot of
critical suppliers. Typically they are subcontractors that we
worry a lot about exactly this kind of thing happening. The
same kind of thing--it sounds less dramatic than a propeller,
but it is just as impactful--some of the suppliers that make
our very precision inertial navigation measurement systems. I
can give you a list of suppliers that do one-of-a-kind thing
that we always are trying to keep up a backup. But that is what
we worry about all the time with our industrial base.
Absolutely.
Senator Cotton. I want to ask, mindful that this is a
public hearing--so I will be cautious in asking and ask you to
be cautious in answering--if there are other such single-site
capabilities of which Congress should be aware. If you are not
comfortable discussing them here, you can submit your answer in
a classified setting to this committee or the Intelligence
Committee, on which I also sit.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. I would very much like to do that. We
need to follow up and let you guys know where we think it is
really an industrial base question. It is one of the critical
components, where they are being made, and are there single
points of failure. You need to see where these are. We have
some of this already.
The other thing is--and the 130J is kind of like this I
suppose--sometimes these are things that multiple services rely
on. We find out that the Navy and us rely on the same
subcontractor on an inertial navigation system. It is kind of a
mom and pop shop. We were looking for these all the time. We
will get back to you. Thank you.
Senator Cotton. Yes, please do submit that list through the
appropriate channels.
Dr. LaPlante. Will do.
Senator Cotton. The hearing is adjourned. Thank you,
gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
munitions
1. Senator Cotton. Secretary LaPlante and General Wolters, over the
past several years, munitions development and procurement programs have
been used as billpayers for other priorities, and therefore negatively
impacting munitions inventories needed for wartime operations. Does the
Air Force have sufficient inventory and procurement plans for air-to-
air and air-to-ground munitions necessary to meet combatant commander
objectives?
Dr. LaPlante and General Wolters. No, after 3 years of Budget
Control Act constraints and over a decade of sustained contingency
operations, the Air Force is thousands of weapons short of Defense
Strategic Guidance requirements. The Air Force simply has not been
resourced to achieve required munitions inventory levels.
2. Senator Cotton. Secretary LaPlante and General Wolters, if there
are not sufficient air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions in your
inventory needed for wartime operations, what actions are you taking to
address shortfalls?
Dr. LaPlante and General Wolters. To address these shortfalls, the
fiscal year 2016 President's budget achieves maximum annual production
capability for Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range and
improves Hellfire, Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), SDB, AIM-9, and
AIM-120 procurement rates. However, higher expenditure rates, coupled
with limited industrial base capacity and diminishing manufacturing
sources, means it will take years, or even a decade, to achieve
required levels. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding
procedures limit our capacity to reduce shortfalls. One-for-one
replacement of expended munitions results in a time lag between budget
authorization and munition delivery, driving a nearly 4-year gap
between munition expenditure and replacement. At Budget Control Act
levels, all weapons procurement quantities are reduced. Munitions
(rockets, general purpose bombs, flares and fuzes) are similarly
reduced. More importantly, OCO cannot be used to fund forecasted
weapons requirements.
3. Senator Cotton. Secretary LaPlante, are any of your mature
munitions programs likely candidates for multi-year procurement
contracts to help reduce unit costs?
Dr. LaPlante. There are currently no Air Force weapons programs on
multi-year procurement contracts, but a number of cost-reducing
initiatives are in place (pricing bands, bundling and competition) that
are paying dividends. Multi-year contracts have traditionally not been
viewed as a realistic option as weapons procurements have historically
faced a number of challenges to include test issues/delays during
development, buy-in on joint procurement profiles, and commitment from
FMS partners. However, MALD-J is one program that could easily benefit
from a multi-year contract as the Air Force is currently the only
customer. We could certainly look at other candidates such as Advanced
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, Hellfire, JDAM, and Joint Air-to-
Surface Standoff Missile as long as we have support from Congress, our
joint partners and the rest of the Department for multi-year contracts.
rated aircrew capacity
4. Senator Cotton. General Wolters, the Air Force has experienced a
chronic shortage of fighter pilots, currently forecasted as increasing
to nearly 500 pilots by fiscal year 2020, as well as experiencing
difficulty providing sufficient manning for MQ-1 and MQ-9 Remotely
Piloted Aircraft (RPA) units, yet your rated manning forecasts show
over 1,400 excess mobility pilots in fiscal year 2016, and carries more
than 1,000 excess mobility pilots throughout the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP). Additionally, your forecasts show over 500 excess
Command & Control/Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(C\2\ISR) and electronic warfare pilots through the FYDP. While it is
understood it takes time to train pilots in complex weapons systems,
how do you reconcile shortages in some areas with significant excesses
in other systems that are carried throughout your 5 year planning
period?
General Wolters. In weapon systems with a pilot shortfall (fighters
and RPA), we cut back on staff positions, test community, outside
career field career-broadening opportunities, and finally the
schoolhouse manning in order to ensure our combat lines are manned to
100 percent. In weapon systems that we have overages (such as mobility
and C\2\ISR, we cover the shortages of the other weapon systems in
staff, test, schoolhouse (undergraduate pilot training (UPT) bases for
example), and other outside primary weapon systems rated bills (like
teaching at the Air Force Academy). The major airline pilot hiring
situation is going to affect the entire Department of Defense pilot
pool. We are taking measures at this time to ensure we can meet future
requirements such as preparing to ramp up UPT production, and to seek
authority to increase the pilot bonus from $25,000 a year to $35,000 in
the event airline hiring outpaces our ability to grow new pilots.
Additionally, most airframes are much easier to produce and absorb
(gain experience) than fighters. The single seat nature requires a
higher number of aircraft to grow the pilot force. Cuts in maintenance
and flying hours have impacted the fighter enterprise more than other
categories. Add to this an unsustainable deploy to dwell ratio and
inability to train to full spectrum readiness, and the result is a
fighter force too small to accomplish assigned missions and adequately
train the next generation. With these challenges, the Air Force is
intentionally overproducing in other aircraft to offset the fighter
pilot shortage. To be clear, there are no excess pilots in any
projections.
Our current operations overseas also mean that the professional
development of our airmen as leaders and as tactical experts is lost as
opportunity cost. We are developing a cadre of leaders who have not had
the time to be seasoned, and aircrews that have not had the time to
train to full spectrum readiness.
5. Senator Cotton. General Wolters, are there funding or
legislative language issues at play that Congress can assist you with
in correcting your imbalances in the rated force?
General Wolters. Yes, you can support the Air Force's submitted
legislative proposal (#2) to allow the Air Reserve component (ARC)
full-time support to train the Active component as a primary duty.
Particularly in the fighter enterprise, we need the ARC experience. We
are exploring more ARC involvement due to a shortage of Active
component fighter pilot experience. In general, increased ARC use
drives ops tempo up beyond traditional rates, which is detrimental to
ARC retention. There are already pressures to increase ARC use in the
fighter enterprise just to fulfill combat capacity. Increasing
operations tempo for training purposes would add another layer of
stress. More use of full-time ARC fighter pilots allows the total force
to leverage the experience available in the ARC without undue stress to
the Traditional Reservist and Drill Status Guardsmen ranks.
In addition, you can support the Air Force's legislative proposal
(#11) to modify title 37, subsection 334, of the U.S. Code to improve
the Department of Defense's ability to incentivize aviators to remain
in the Service. This proposal is supported by all four services and
will allow the Department the latitude to modestly increase current
incentives to posture against an improving economy and the increasing
demand for pilots by the major airlines.
kc-46a tanker bed down
6. Senator Cotton. General Holmes, the Air Force is planning to
soon ramp up the delivery of a total of 176 KC-46A tanker aircraft as
replacements for your aging KC-135 fleet, and will require a
replacement plan for your current tanker fleet. Are you planning on a
one-for-one swap with KC-135 aircraft within current units, or will you
transition by taking down and standing up entire squadrons?
General Holmes. The planned purchase of 179 KC-46A aircraft will
allow the replacement of roughly one third of the Air Force air
refueling fleet. The retirement of legacy tanker aircraft is planned to
take place on a one for one basis while working towards and maintaining
a total tanker inventory of 479 aircraft. Operational transition will
be accomplished by converting entire squadrons from their legacy
platform to the KC-46A, with a planned aircraft delivery schedule of 15
aircraft per year.
7. Senator Cotton. General Holmes, will the Air Force experience
the same maintenance manning shortfall challenges as you are
experiencing with the F-35 bed down?
General Holmes. The Air Force does not expect to experience the
same maintenance manning shortfalls on the KC-46A as we are with the F-
35. As currently planned, KC-135 units will convert to KC-46A units
with no additive requirements and their maintenance personnel will be
retrained to perform maintenance actions on the KC-46A. However, if the
legacy KC-135 aircraft are not permitted to retire as planned, we may
see manning challenges similar to those we are experiencing with the F-
35.
8. Senator Cotton. General Holmes, when will Congress see your
detailed plan for retirement of KC-135 aircraft as you start
transitioning to the KC-46A?
General Holmes. The timeline for retirement of KC-135 aircraft will
depend on a variety of factors. These include combatant commander
requirements and current and future fiscal conditions, especially if
sequestration compels the Air Force to divest the KC-10 fleet. As the
Air Force prepares to transition the KC-135 out of the fleet, a
comprehensive divestiture plan and timeline will be submitted to
Congress via the President's budget.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
long range strike-bomber
9. Senator Rounds. Secretary LaPlante, you stated that the Long
Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) program is on track and on schedule with no
major problems, and you also mentioned that because of the cost overrun
and schedule delay issues with the F-35 program, the Department of the
Air Force began to use then-year dollar cost estimates for clarity when
discussing that program. However, you did not directly respond to my
question of whether sticking by the $550 million unit cost for the LRS-
B without always qualifying it with the 2010 base year dollars is
somewhat misleading to the American public. Can you provide a direct
response to the question?
Dr. LaPlante. The LRS-B's average procurement unit cost (APUC)
target of $550 million in base year 2010 dollars for 100 aircraft was
established in 2010 when the Department of Defense decided to go
forward with the program. This target allowed us to make meaningful
trades during the system's design to ensure we can build LRS-B in
sufficient numbers.
Our use of 2010 dollars allows consistency in the affordability
requirement and allows meaningful comparisons to other programs by
adjusting programs to a common base year. We fully recognize the impact
of inflation and have carefully budgeted and planned to ensure we can
afford LRS-B in then-year dollars when it comes to procure the
aircraft. The Air Force has never intended to mislead the American
public. Rather it is attempting to acquire LRS-B in a very responsible
manner.
10. Senator Rounds. Secretary LaPlante, what is the estimated APUC
for the first LRS-B production aircraft in then-year dollars in the
year of procurement?
Dr. LaPlante. During our classified sessions with Committee staff
and the Chairman of the Airland Subcommittee, we shared our development
and production cost estimates presented at the Development RFP Release
Defense Acquisition Board. We have also shared that these estimates
will continue to mature until the program sets its Acquisition Program
Baseline (APB) at Milestone B. The APB will be influenced by the
outcome of the ongoing source selection. Following the source selection
and Milestone B decisions the program intends to provide a classified
briefing to the appropriate defense committee staff with further
details regarding the APB.
11. Senator Rounds. Secretary LaPlante, what is the estimated
program acquisition unit cost for your planned buy of 100 aircraft?
Dr. LaPlante. During our classified sessions with committee staff
and the chairman of the Airland Subcommittee, we shared our development
and production cost estimates presented at the Development RFP Release
Defense Acquisition Board. We have also shared that these estimates
will continue to mature until the program sets its Acquisition Program
Baseline (APB) at Milestone B. The APB will be influenced by the
outcome of the ongoing source selection. Following the source selection
and Milestone B decisions the program intends to provide a classified
briefing to the appropriate defense committee staff with further
details regarding the APB.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
retirement without replacement
12. Senator Manchin. Secretary LaPlante and General Holmes, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, the Air Force is planning to retire
some aircraft, including seven Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) aircraft and seven Compass Call EC-130H aircraft, without
replacement. My understanding is that these aircraft have been in heavy
demand by the combatant commanders and that retiring them without
replacing that capability would mean either failing to meet combatant
commander demands, or placing additional strain on the aircraft and
crews by keeping them deployed for longer periods of time. Why would
the Air Force plan to retire aircraft in high demand without planning
to replace them?
Dr. LaPlante and General Holmes. Budget realities have forced the
Air Force to make difficult decisions while attempting to cut costs and
maintain capabilities. The decision to reduce the EC-130H Compass Call
fleet by nearly half after fiscal year 2015 was one of those difficult
decisions. This decision was not without risk, as the Air Force cannot
support combatant commander requirements beyond current operational
obligations.
The Budget Control Act and resultant sequestration-level funding
constraints also compelled the Air Force to assume additional risk by
reducing the E-3 AWACS fleet in order to fund critical modernization of
the aging Command and Control (C2) Theater Air Control System. These
modernization initiatives include the E-3 AWACS Block 40/45 upgrade,
the new 3-Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar, the Air Force's
Control and Reporting Center Operations Module Modernization, the Air
and Space Operations Center 10.2 upgrade, and the Deployable Radar
Approach Control program. This decision is key to critical C2
modernization for highly-contested environments.
13. Senator Manchin. Secretary LaPlante, has the Air Force produced
any requirement for replacing these unique, high-demand Air Force
systems?
Dr. LaPlante. The Air Force has a comprehensive plan to replace
both the EC-130H and E-3 AWACS capabilities that are to be divested. In
the near-term, seven EC-130H aircraft will be divested in fiscal year
2016, leaving eight EC-130Hs in the Air Force until the capability is
replaced. The reduced number of EC-130H aircraft will still meet the
requirements of the current fight and U.S. Special Operations Command.
For the mid-term, 2020 to 2030 or as needed, we are evaluating options
including re-hosting jamming systems on a more effective and efficient
platform to bridge the gap to the far-term. For the long-term (2031-
plus timeframe), we envision a system of systems approach, to be
determined based on results of an Analysis of Alternatives, due to
report out in 2017. To address future AWACS capability requirements,
the Air Force has begun activities towards an Airborne Battle
Management and Surveillance Analysis of Alternatives, to be completed
by 2018. These development planning activities will identify next-
generation AWACS options to bridge both capability and capacity gaps at
lower costs by 2030.
predator/reaper combat air patrol reductions
14. Senator Manchin. General Wolters and General Holmes, the Air
Force had wanted to reduce the number of Predator and Reaper remotely
piloted aircraft (RPA) Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) it will support but
has been unable to do so due to demand from the combatant commanders.
These continued operations of Predator and Reaper CAPs have placed
great strain on the ground crews that support these operations, so much
so that the Commander of the Air Combat Command (General Carlisle)
recently sounded an alarm that we are near the point of breaking the
force. Unfortunately, we have been facing the prospect of breaking the
RPA force for at least the past 6 years, while demand has continued to
exceed supply. I know that the Air Force leadership announced previous
efforts to fix this problem, but, during those 6 years, it appears that
we have made little or no progress. How does the Air Force intend to
fix this problem once and for all? What changes in legislation, policy,
and personnel management are you proposing in this budget to solve this
problem?
General Wolters and General Holmes. The long-term solution to
fixing the RPA manning problem is to man the RPA crew schoolhouses to
100 percent and protect schoolhouse instructors from future surges. The
Air Force is working very close with the Secretary of Defense to
implement a new ``RPA Get-Well'' plan by the end of fiscal year 2016.
The Secretary of Defense already approved a four CAP reduction that is
in effect with an additional single CAP reduction in October 2015 to
support Air Force efforts to fix our schoolhouse and to fix our line
crew manning by the end of fiscal year 2016. The plan takes advantage
of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve to fly more CAPs, the
previously mentioned 5 CAP reduction (to 60 CAPs), increased use of
contractors (to conduct takeoffs and landings and to instruct at our
schoolhouses), and to initiate retention pay incentives for our newest
RPA pilots. Please support funding the Air Force at President's budget
request levels, and the Air Force effort to modify title 37, subsection
334, of the U.S. Code to improve the Department of Defense's ability to
incentivize aviators to remain in the Service. This proposal is
supported by all four Services and will allow the Department the
latitude to modestly increase current incentives to posture against an
improving economy and the increasing demand for pilots by the major
airlines.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
total force
15. Senator Heinrich. General Holmes, the 58th Special Operations
Wing has a highly successful classic association with the New Mexico
National Guard's 150th Special Operations Wing. It is my understanding,
however, that there is not ``legal sufficiency'' for the Guard to
provide training to Active Duty personnel by flying CV-22s. In fact,
there are only four or five folks with the 150th that are given waivers
by name to provide training on the CV-22, despite the fact that the CV-
22 is understaffed, Air Force-wide. Can you describe this situation
further?
General Holmes. Under current law, AGRs and technicians must
organize, administer, recruit, instruct, or train the Reserve component
as their primary duties. Technicians may also maintain aircraft of the
Armed Forces--regardless of component--as a primary duty. The Air Force
seeks to expand these primary duties to make flight training more like
maintenance; so that AGRs and technicians can instruct and train
students of all components as a primary duty. This would not make the
Reserve component the source of all training, but rather, would allow
the active component and Reserve component to more efficiently partner
together to train all airmen of all components.
The Air Force is working to eliminate barriers to more
comprehensive integration of our three components. We currently have
proposed legislation (OLC-002--V4 (Expansion Of Authorized Primary
Duties Of Air Force Reserve component full-time support personnel) that
seeks to expand the primary duties of full-time Reserve component
support personnel--namely Active Guard Reserve (AGR) members and
technicians--including instructor pilots. Our proposal to eliminate
these ``legal sufficiency'' barriers was deferred last year and is
under review by the Office of Management and Budget for the fiscal year
2016 Omnibus.
16. Senator Heinrich. General Holmes, how can this committee help
Air Force move toward a more efficient, unified, and integrated Total
Force training model?
General Holmes. The Air Force is studying 28 human capital related
initiatives that may require legislation in order to fully implement,
supporting full integration and returning the greatest efficiencies. As
an example, we currently have an Air Force only training proposal
submitted to the Office of Management and Budget that we hope will be
included in the legislative omnibus. This proposal will allow the Air
Force to use Reserve Component instructor pilots more efficiently.
Congressional approval of this initiative is vital to enabling further
integration at flying training units. Another example of important
legislative change incudes an amendment allowing the services to
provide the same benefits for Reserve components (RC) members on
inactive duty training who die in the line of duty, as RC members on
active duty who die in the line of duty.
helicopter fleet
17. Senator Heinrich. General Wolters and General Holmes, Kirtland
Air Force Base in New Mexico is home to the 58th Special Operations
Wing which trains 22,000 students a year who conduct critical search
and rescue missions, saving countless lives of men and women every
year. These brave airmen conduct their training flying 12 HH-60G Pave
Hawks and 10 Vietnam era Bell UH-1 Iroquois. Can you describe for the
committee the nature of our aging helicopter fleet and the Air Force's
current effort to recapitalize and modernize that fleet?
General Wolters and General Holmes. The Air Force is committed to
maintaining our HH-60G and UH-1fleets, which have an average age of
24.4 and 47 years, respectively. The HH-60Gfleet is being recapitalized
under a program called Operational Loss Replacement (OLR), which adds
21 Combat Search and Rescue configured aircraft to the fleet by fiscal
year 2019. Additionally, the Combat Rescue Helicopter program will
replace the legacy HH-60G fleet with the HH-60W. This program is in
development and scheduled to achieve full operational capability in
fiscal year 2029.
The Air Force will also replace the UH-1N fleet to resolve existing
capability gaps. The fiscal year 2016 President's budget request funds
to establish a UH-1N Replacement program office and develop an
acquisition strategy.
18. Senator Heinrich. General Wolters and General Holmes, has the
Air Force conducted a cost-benefit analysis on recapitalization versus
replacement?
General Wolters and General Holmes. The Air Force has and will
conduct a cost-benefit analysis on recapitalization versus replacement
for the HH-60G and UH-1 fleets, respectively. The Air Force conducted a
thorough analysis of the cost-benefit trades for various courses of
action prior to the June 2014 Combat Rescue Helicopter contract award.
Currently, the Air Force is conducting UH-1 replacement analyses to
inform cost-benefit decisions and capability trades within the broader
recap versus replacement discussion.
cv-22
19. Senator Heinrich. General Wolters and General Holmes, our
military finds itself engaged in areas involving vast distances in
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Can you please share what is being
done to ensure the optimal configuration of our combat search and
rescue fleet between helicopters and CV-22s?
General Wolters and General Holmes. The Air Force is reviewing a
combat search and rescue force mix study by the RAND Corporation as
well as force mix options and concepts of operations developed by Air
Force Air Combat Command for possible future consideration.
20. Senator Heinrich. General Wolters and General Holmes, the
ongoing demands of our special operations forces have severely strained
the low-density but very high-demand CV-22 fleet. It is my
understanding that Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) has
identified a preference for four additional CV-22s to serve as
attrition Reserve for an already-limited and over-stressed fleet. What
is being done to provide AFSOC with those highly-necessary attrition
Reserve airframes?
General Wolters and General Holmes. While AFSOC has discussed the
need for attrition reserve in the CV-22 fleet with the Commander, U.S.
Special Operations Command, there has been no formal request for the
additional aircraft. If/when this request is made, it will go through
the normal Air Force vetting process for consideration and fulfillment.
21. Senator Heinrich. General Holmes, in the event of sequester
relief, what value would additional CV-22s provide to Air Force Special
Operations Command?
General Holmes. Given that the approved program of record of 50
aircraft satisfies current combat capability requirement, the Air Force
has no plans to procure additional CV-22s after delivery of the final
aircraft in December 2016.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 14, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ARMY MODERNIZATION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Tom
Cotton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Cotton, Inhofe, Rounds,
Ernst, Sullivan, Manchin, Donnelly, and Hirono.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TOM COTTON
Senator Cotton. The hearing will come to order.
The Airland Subcommittee convenes today to hear testimony
regarding Army modernization in review of the National Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2016 and the Future Years
Defense Program.
On behalf of Senator Manchin and myself, I welcome all the
witnesses from the U.S. Army and thank each of you for your
years of dedicated service oftentimes overseas in hostile
environments.
The full committee in numerous hearings to date has heard
from many witnesses testifying to the many challenges and
threats our country and armed services face today. The United
States is facing the most diverse, complex, and dangerous
threats to our national security in recent memory.
However, instead of strengthening our forces and ensuring
our men and women in uniform have the training, equipment, and
logistical support they need, sustained defense budget cuts, in
combination with senseless sequestration, are damaging our
military's force structure, modernization, and readiness.
In testimony before the full committee, Secretary of the
Army John M. McHugh described that despite volatility and
instability around the world, America's Army is faced with an
enemy here at home: the return of modernization. Your Army
faces a dark and dangerous future unless Congress acts now.
General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army,
emphasized sequestration would force another 70,000 soldiers
over the next 5 years from the Active component and another 10
to 12 additional combat brigades by 2020.
Does it really makes sense to cut the Army that is
presently operating in 144 countries around the world with over
140,000 soldiers deployed to meet all mission requirements? Our
soldiers, after fighting for over a decade in two separate
theaters of war, are still very busy, indeed.
Regardless of our Army's operational tempo and the load our
soldiers bear, the force must also modernize. It must do so to
keep the world's preeminent ground force relevant and ready to
meet the challenges of the 21st century. The Army's Operating
Concept (AOC), win in a complex world, envisions an Army that
is expeditionary, tailorable, scalable, and prepared to meet
the challenges of the global environment. For our soldiers to
be successful in their missions to shape, deter, and win, they
need the best equipment and weapons our country and its
citizens can provide.
One of my highest responsibilities as a Senator is to
ensure our military has the resources it needs to protect and
defend this country. To fulfill that responsibility, Congress
has the authority to oversee military spending, to ensure the
Department of Defense (DOD) invests in programs that meets the
needs of the warfighter, and all at a cost that is affordable
to the American taxpayer.
In order to exercise effective oversight on military
spending, Congress and the military must be able to exchange
information about which programs are most important to the
success of our men and women in uniform and which programs are
not living up to their promises.
That is why the prospect of continued sequester of the
Pentagon budget is so damaging to our national security. The
blunt mechanism of sequestration does not afford lawmakers and
the Pentagon the ability to drive a budget from a sound
strategy, but rather imposes strategic decisions across the
board, many of which damage our military's readiness and long-
term investments.
But I want to be clear that my opposition to sequester does
not mean that there is no room for reform or efficiency in the
military's budget. Ultimately I believe one of the best ways to
remove the threat of sequester is to identify areas where there
is obvious room for reform in the system and to encourage
senior military leaders to justify continued spending in those
areas.
Today's hearing will only begin to touch on Army
modernization. There are several areas that I hope we can begin
a substantive dialogue with our Army acquisition leaders. Today
I hope to cover in particular three important Army programs:
the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), the Distributed Common
Ground System (DCGS), and the Aviation Restructuring Initiative
(ARI).
The JLTV recently completed limited user testing and is now
with the source selection committee to determine an award of
one to three vendors: Oshkosh, Lockheed Martin, and AM General.
This is an important procurement program for the mobility of
our infantry in modern operational environments. I have
concerns that the Army's tactical wheeled vehicle strategy
lacks operational detail about the fielding of JLTV for Active
and Reserve components.
In addition, I want to emphasize good acquisition practices
as the Army moves ahead with this program. because this is a
large program that will directly impact operations across the
force, it is important the Army gets the program right. As the
subcommittee examines programs like JLTV, I am prepared to hold
future hearings that look at the details of each of the Army's
acquisition programs to evaluate the risks to success and
ensure the Army spends taxpayer money wisely.
Another area this hearing hopes to examine more fully is
the battlefield intelligence system, known as the DCGS-Army, or
DCGS-A. The U.S. Army has spent 10 years and more than $3
billion developing DCGS-A. The purpose of DCGS-A is to collect
and process information from a variety of military and
intelligence sources and share that information seamlessly to
sites around the world. Despite these investments, the failures
of DCGS-A are well documented. They include a series of testing
failures, program delays, cost overruns, and negative reports
from deployed commanders and soldiers. The Army has promised
that the next version of the software would fix the problems
with the system, but units continue to report that it does not
meet their needs in theater or their home stations. Instead of
leveraging existing technologies, the Army continues with an
approach to delivering a major software platform. They continue
to try to build core functions of a DCGS-A system according to
customer requirements rather than adopting commercial
components that work today.
In addition, today we will examine the Army's other
important priorities for providing the best and most modern
force: the Apache AH-64, UH-60 modernization, production and
fielding of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV), JLTV, and
Abrams, Bradley, and Paladin upgrades. In regard to developing
science and technology initiatives, Army leadership has
emphasized the importance of key investments, including the
joint multi-role helicopter, combat vehicle prototyping,
assured position navigation and timing, and enhanced cyber
operations and network protection. Integrated into these
efforts is the Army's aviation restructure initiative. The ARI
is intended to both retain our best and most capable aircraft
and to divest our least capable. Its aim is to field a total
force of 10 fully equipped and modernized Active component
combat aviation brigades and 12 National Guard Reserve brigades
by 2019. It will divest a total of 798 aircraft, 687 from the
regular Army and 111 from the Reserve component. It is
targeting $12 billion in cost savings but will require a total
Army effort to be successful.
Ever-increasing demands of a smaller Army translates into
increased risk for our operational plans and unforeseen
contingencies. Army operations in an increasingly unstable
world are vital to shaping the strategic landscape in favor of
U.S. interests.
General Odierno has emphasized the uncertainty of strategic
security, characterized by an increasing velocity of global
instability. This means risk to our soldiers, those deployed
and those on the bench prepared to deploy on short notice. To
mitigate these risks, our troopers need to be armed and
equipped with the best equipment that we can provide. This will
require sustained funding, effective management of acquisition
programs, fully resourced unit set fielding, and strategic
vision. Army leaders must ensure unity of effort to ensure our
modernization programs meet cost, schedule, and performance
objectives. They must demand these programs produce equipment
that give our soldiers a decisive edge on tomorrow's
battlefield, and we must provide our soldiers with improved
situational awareness, assured communications, sustained
mobility, better protection, and overmatching fire power.
Getting these things right will save lives and ensure mission
success.
Again, I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing
today. Thanks for your flexibility in coming back after we had
to postpone 2 weeks ago because of the budget votes. I look
forward to hearing your testimony and having our conversation.
Senator Manchin?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also want
to thank you all for your service and welcome you here today.
Over the last 14 years, the Army has done everything we
have asked of them and more. They have performed with selfless
devotion and courage. The Nation could not be more proud or
more grateful, and I can assure you the people in West Virginia
feel the same.
We owe them much, but most importantly, the Army deserves
the resources necessary for what they are doing today and for
what they will be asked to do again tomorrow. Regrettably, if
caps under the Budget Control Act (BCA) or sequestration are
allowed to stand, we may struggle to meet these obligations.
The arbitrary drop in defense funding over the last 3 years
has already hurt Army readiness and modernization, indeed, has
undermined the welfare of soldiers and their families and
eroded their trust that we will keep our promises that they
will be well trained, well equipped, and well served.
The fiscal year 2016 request proposes further reductions to
the end strength of the Army. If approved, at the end of fiscal
year 2016, active Army end strength will be down to 475,000
soldiers and combat brigades to 30. Our National Guard will
drop to 342,000, and Army Reserve to 198,000. We are interested
to learn how the Army's request this year would manage
reductions and still continue to build the strategic depth
necessary to respond to unforeseen contingencies.
I read with interest the speech last week by Deputy
Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work at the Army War College in
Pennsylvania. He spoke in concrete terms about operating
environment and technologies needed to retain our land force's
edge into the future. We would be interested to hear our
witnesses' views on Secretary Work's vision relative to the
Army's recently released Army Operating Concept: Winning in a
Complex World. What are the Army's most important capabilities,
capacities, and readiness issues and how does this request
address them to meet the missions of today and tomorrow? How
will BCA caps impact the Army's management of these changes and
the associated strategic risk in readiness to meet urgent
contingencies?
Over the last several years, DOD and the Army have made
tough choices in its major modernization programs due to the
high cost and performance shortfalls in new technologies and
the realities of declining resources. For the most part, the
process of making these choices has resulted in an arguably
more reliable, technically achievable, and affordable
modernization program. However, this is not apparent for the
tactical network. Chronic performance of reliability problems
have plagued every aspect of the network's development. The
Army has over time lowered network performance requirements,
lowering the bar, if you will, for program of record
technologies. Evidence from operational testing and feedback
from field units raises legitimate questions that a truly
mobile, ad hoc technical network is technologically achievable.
The requirement for an air-ground tactical communications
network is indisputable but can the current state-of-the-art
achieve it?
The fiscal year 2016 request includes a modest increase
over last year for research, development, and acquisition
emphasizing aviation and science and technology programs while
deferring for several years any large investment for a next
generation combat vehicle or replacement for the OH-58D Kiowa
Warrior armed scout helicopter. Under the circumstances, this
appears to be a prudent approach, but we need to know what
risks we may face tomorrow if we are not investing today in the
next generation technologies that our next generation soldiers
will need and deserve.
Mr. Chairman, it is apparent that a smaller Army only
partially ready and with a dwindling technology edge cannot
meet the current defense strategy of this country. We need an
Army that is large enough, well trained enough, well led,
ready, rapidly deployable, and technologically dominant to
respond to the crises we will likely face in the foreseeable
future.
So I look forward to this hearing and how the Army will
handle strategic risk in this fiscal environment and what the
impact of threatened BCA caps could be on the Army's readiness
and modernization and perhaps even more importantly on the
welfare of our soldiers, civilians, and their families.
I also am very much concerned about how do we handle this
as far as new procurement of equipment that is going to be
needed in the field, how we can get a fast track on that, if
you will, how our efficiencies will work for all of our
benefit. These are things I have been very interested in.
But I want to thank you all again, and I look forward to
your testimony.
Mr. Chairman?
Senator Cotton. Generals, we have your written testimony.
General Williamson, do you care to add anything?
STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL E. WILLIAMSON, USA, MILITARY DEPUTY
AND DIRECTOR, ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY
General Williamson. So, sir, I think you have covered the
challenges that we have.
I think the only thing that I would offer is that we have
taken a very balanced approach to our modernization strategy.
We have looked at that in terms of really five categories.
So the first is the preservation of the science and
technology investment. So we view that as the seed corn, and
without that investment, we are not going to be able to take
advantage of the new technologies when resources become
available.
The second would be procuring new items where needed, and
so as we have identified existing gaps in capabilities, we are
going to use our limited modernization funds to address filling
those gaps.
The third part of that would be tied to improving our
existing systems where we find, because of obsolescence,
because of gaps in the capability, that if we make an
improvement to an existing system, it extends the life or
provides more capability than what we have today.
There are two other aspects that people do not normally
think about as we talk about modernization. The first is the
reset of the existing equipment. So as equipment is coming back
from theater, we have to bring that back up to standard in
order to support near-term contingency missions.
Then finally, it is the notion of divestiture. So in order
to free up space in our modernization strategy and in order to
address the continuing costs, we have to divest ourselves of
legacy systems that are no longer in use by our force. It
reduces our operational and sustainment costs.
Sir, as was mentioned, there are a number of challenges
that are there. What we are trying to do as an Army, in light
of the AOC, as you have mentioned in your statement, is how do
we now adjust our procurement in order to support the goals of
the Army.
Sir, I stand by, prepared to answer any of your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Williamson,
General McMaster, General Ierardi, and General Cheek follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by LTG Michael E. Williamson, USA; LTG Herbert
R. McMaster, Jr., USA; LTG Anthony R. Ierardi, USA; and MG Gary H.
Cheek, USA
introduction
Chairman Cotton, Senator Manchin, distinguished members of the
Subcommittee on Airland, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
Army's fiscal year 2016 budget request as it pertains to Army strategy,
readiness, and equipment modernization.
The Army must remain prepared to protect the Homeland, foster
security globally, project power, and win wars now and in the future.
To protect the homeland, the Army deters and defeats attacks and
mitigates the effects of attacks and natural disasters. To foster
security, the Army engages regionally and prepares to respond globally
to compel enemies and adversaries. To project power and win decisively,
the Army, as the Nation's principal land force, organizes, trains, and
equips forces for prompt and sustained combat on land. American
military power is joint power. The Army both depends on and supports
air and naval forces across the land, air, maritime, space, and
cyberspace domains. The Army depends on the other Services for
strategic and operational mobility, fires, close air support, and other
capabilities. The Army supports other Services, combatant commands,
multinational forces, and interorganizational partners with
foundational capabilities such as communications, intelligence, rotary
wing aviation, missile defense, logistics, and engineering.
Army forces are uniquely suited to shape security environments
through forward presence, regionally aligned forces, and sustained
engagement with allied and partner land forces. Army forces defeat
enemy land forces and seize, hold, and defend land areas. Army forces
are prepared to do more than fight and defeat enemies; they must also
possess the capability to translate military objectives into enduring
political outcomes. Army forces, operating as part of joint,
interorganizational, and multinational teams, provide the President,
Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders with multiple options to
prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win wars. Army
forces must have the capability (ability to achieve a desired effect
under specified standards and conditions) and capacity (capability with
sufficient scale and endurance) to accomplish assigned missions while
confronting increasingly dangerous threats in complex operational
environments.
The combination of expanding threats to national and international
security, reductions in the size of the Army, decreasing investment in
Army modernization, and fiscal uncertainty have increased risk to
missions and committed forces. We recognize that, in our democracy, we
get the Army that the American people are willing to pay for. It is our
job to do the best we can with the resources provided. We will give you
our best assessment of the risks and opportunities associated with the
resources Congress provides that allow Army leaders to man, train, and
equip our Army.
On behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John McHugh, and our
Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno, we look forward to discussing with
you the Army's fiscal year 2016 budget request as it pertains to Army
strategy, readiness, and equipment modernization.
Threats, enemies, and adversaries are becoming increasingly capable
and elusive. State and nonstate actors employ traditional,
unconventional, and hybrid strategies that threaten U.S. security and
vital interests. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) is an example of how nonstate actors seize upon
opportunities created by communal conflict and weak governance. ISIL's
military organization; ideological base; willingness to use murder and
other forms of brutality against innocents; and ability to mobilize
people, money, and weapons have enabled it to seize territory and
establish control of populations and resources. The wider problem is
ISIL's success, combined with weaknesses of Middle Eastern governments,
has caused violent extremism and terrorism to metastasize across much
of the Middle East and North Africa.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is expanding its
nuclear arsenal and improving its ballistic missile force to complement
an aging but still large and capable conventional force. The DPRK's
military possesses cyber and chemical-biological warfare capabilities.
Key government facilities, military installations, and weapons are
located in underground shelters. Because economic, social, and
political pressures on the DPRK leadership could lead to war or a
collapse of the regime, the United States prepares for the deployment
of substantial ground, air, and maritime forces to operate as part of a
coalition alongside Republic of Korea (South Korea) forces and in
defense of South Korea.
Iran, as it reacts to expanding sectarian conflicts in the greater
Middle East, poses a continued threat to U.S. interests and allies in
the region. As it diversifies its activity in the region and seeks to
enhance its influence while supplanting U.S. power, Iran uses
combinations of economic and diplomatic overtures with irregular
forces. Iran avoids direct military confrontations while developing
advanced capabilities and pursuing comprehensive military
modernization. Iran's modernization efforts include the use of
automated systems on land, sea, and air; ballistic missiles; and the
development of nuclear enrichment capability.
Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and use of conventional
and unconventional land forces in Ukraine indicate that Russia is
willing to use force to achieve its goals. Russia deployed and
integrated a range of diplomatic, information, military, and economic
means to conduct what some analysts have described as ``non-linear'' or
hybrid operations. In addition, Russia used cyberspace capabilities and
social media to influence perceptions at home and abroad. Due to the
nature of the conflicts Russia has chosen, it has demonstrated the
centrality of land forces in its effort to assert power and advance its
interests in former Soviet states. Without a viable land force capable
of opposing the Russian army and its irregular proxies, such
adventurism is more challenging to deter. Russia's actions highlight
the value of land forces to deter conflict as well as special
operations and conventional force capability to project national power
and exert influence in political contests.
Chinese doctrinal writings and professional military education
teaching materials suggest that the PRC may be considering training and
equipping the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for a range of military
operations. The PLA has opened six combat training centers where it
emphasizes combined arms operations and joint training. Chinese actions
and force modernization efforts highlight the need for Army forces to
be positioned forward in the region to strengthen alliance and partner
relationships, deter adversaries, and ultimately prevent conflict.
Emerging Chinese military capabilities also highlight the need for Army
forces to be able to project power from land into the air, maritime,
space, and cyberspace domains.
Our Army must balance manpower, readiness, and modernization not
only to cope with increased capabilities of enemies and adversaries,
but also to prevail in increasingly complex operational environments.
That complexity is due, in part, to increased momentum of human
interaction, threats that emanate from dense and weakly governed urban
areas, the availability of lethal weapon systems, and the proliferation
of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive
threats. Determined and capable enemies in complex environments will
challenge U.S. competitive advantages not only on land, but also in the
air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. Advanced technologies
transfer readily to state and nonstate actors. Enemies possess the
capability to threaten the U.S. homeland and project power from land
into all other domains. Because these threats may originate in urban
areas or remote safe havens, long-range strikes will prove insufficient
to defeat them. The complexity of future armed conflict, therefore,
will require Army forces capable of conducting missions in the homeland
or in foreign lands including defense support to civil authorities,
international disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, security
cooperation activities, crisis response, or large-scale operations.
Trends in threats, the operating environment, and technology highlight
the enduring need for ready Army forces operating as part of joint,
interorganizational, and multinational teams to prevent conflict, shape
security environments, and win in a complex world.
The size of the Active and Reserve component of our Army matters.
At the time of the mass murder attacks on our Nation on September 11,
2001, our active Army strength was 480,801, the National Guard was
351,829, and the Army Reserve was 205,628 for a total Army strength of
1,038,258. Due to the strain on the force associated with sustained
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as other worldwide
commitments, Congress authorized expansion of the Army by 95,073 by
2010 to 566,045 Active Duty soldiers, 362,015 National Guardsmen, and
205,281 Army reservists for a total of 1,133,341. Despite that
increase, our Army was stressed to sustain a per month commitment of
117,000 active duty soldiers and 170,000 total Army commitment to these
missions between 2003 and 2011. That is because the Army must also
sustain other commitments overseas, remain prepared for unforeseen
contingencies, and sustain an institutional Army capable of manning,
training, and equipping the force. Currently, in an active force of
498,400 soldiers, the Army has 40,860 soldiers committed to various
missions in U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa
Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command, and an
additional 83,610 soldiers forward stationed and committed in areas
vital to deterring conflict. Based on increased risks to national
security and the significant decrease in size of our Army to the
smallest Active Force since the post World War I period, we do all we
can in the areas of readiness and modernization to ensure that our
smaller Army maintains our differential advantage over current and
future enemies. In short, a smaller Army must be a more capable Army.
The U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC): Win in a Complex World,
describes how future Army forces operate to accomplish campaign
objectives and protect U.S. national interests. It describes the Army's
contribution to globally integrated operations in support of the
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. The AOC recognizes the need for
Army forces to provide foundational capabilities required by the Joint
Force and to project power onto land, and from land, across the air,
maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. The AOC is grounded in a
vision of future armed conflict that considers national defense
strategy; missions; emerging operational environments; advances in
technology; and anticipated enemy, threat, and adversary capabilities.
Ultimately, the AOC guides future force development through the
identification of first order capabilities that the Army must possess
to accomplish missions in support of policy goals and objectives.
A key tenet of future joint combined arms operations is innovation,
which is the result of critical and creative thinking and the
conversion of new ideas into valued outcomes. Innovation drives the
development of new tools or methods that permit Army forces to
anticipate future demands, stay ahead of determined enemies, and
accomplish the mission. Innovation is particularly important in
organizations that develop capabilities as well as those that train,
equip, and sustain forces.
We are committed to keeping Combat Training Centers (CTC) a
priority. The CTC program is addressing life cycle technology
refreshment of the Maneuver CTCs' (National Training Center, Joint
Readiness Training Center, and the Joint Multi-National Readiness
Center) Instrumentation and Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and
Simulations (ITADSS) in support of Unified Land Operations executed
through Decisive Action (Wide Area Security/Combined Arms Maneuver
against a hybrid threat). The ITADSS enables production of doctrinally-
based feedback, facilitating leader development and unit collective
training in support of building Brigade Combat Team (BCT) readiness
through trained and ready combat units, leaders, and soldiers prepared
for Decisive Action Operations. The CTC program is addressing
technology obsolescence at its Maneuver CTCs by refreshing its
instrumentation data and Observer/Controller Communications System
infrastructure that has not been updated since the early 2000s. The
network infrastructure in place predominately supports Forward
Operating Base operations and Mission Rehearsal Exercises conducted
from 2001 to the recent transition to Decisive Action Operations
training. The instrumentation upgrades will not only prevent network
outages currently being experienced, but also allow for the transition
back to combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Sequestration
will force the Army to make difficult choices with regard to
modernization and we should expect this to impact our CTC modernization
as well. While the Army plans to preserve all CTC rotations,
sequestration will result in units arriving at lower levels of
readiness and CTC instrumentation obsolescence will degrade capturing
unit performance during key events. Both will contribute to lower unit
readiness levels at the completion of rotations.
With the Army's budget at a historic low, we risk becoming a
smaller, less-capable force. Decreases to the Army's overall budget
over the last several years have had a significant impact on
modernization and threaten our ability to retain overmatch (overmatch
is the application of capabilities or use of tactics in such a way that
renders an adversary unable to respond effectively) through the next
decade. From fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016, Research,
Development, and Acquisition (RDA) investments declined roughly 28
percent. In fiscal year 2012, the Army's RDA budget was $32 billion. In
fiscal year 2016, the RDA budget request is $23 billion. The proposed
increase of $2.6 billion for procurement, over the fiscal year 2015
budget request, is vitally important to ensure that our soldiers retain
overmatch over current and future enemies and our Nation retains
critical parts of our industrial base.
Because of reductions both in manpower and modernization, our
soldiers are likely to engage in fights in which they lack significant,
qualitative advantages against numerically superior enemies. Should the
uncertainty of the Budget Control Act lead to another round of defense
sequestration, the Army would suffer a blow to combat effectiveness
from which it would be difficult to recover. Soldiers and units would
be disadvantaged in the near-term through delays in equipping and
weapons modernization. Long-term effects would include lost investments
in cancelled programs, higher unit costs, and increased sustainment
costs for obsolete equipment.
To reduce that risk, our Army must prioritize those capabilities
that permit us to maintain overmatch. The Army will: (1) protect S&T
investments in key technologies that will enable next-generation
capabilities when resources become available; (2) selectively invest in
new capabilities for priority areas; (3) incrementally upgrade existing
platforms; (4) reset equipment returning from current contingency
operations; and (5) divest select platforms to reduce operations and
sustainment costs. This prioritization will permit the Army to enable
mission command, conduct joint combined arms maneuver, and, most
importantly, optimize soldier and team performance.
The Army emphasizes the integration of advanced technologies with
skilled soldiers and well-trained teams. We will have to invest in non-
developmental and developmental capabilities. Non-developmental
capabilities will integrate commercial technologies that do not require
significant Army Science and Technology (S&T) or Research and
Development (R&D), such as information technology, in order to save
time and money. Our Army will prioritize developmental capabilities in
areas where we must maintain a differential advantage such as combat
vehicle technology; lethality; rotary aviation; watercraft; and
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). To sustain
overmatch in these areas, we must reward our industrial base for
reducing costs and increasing quantity during national emergencies
while retaining the ability to affordably produce smaller quantities
between major conflicts. The Army must take advantage of existing
technologies, while investing in research to sustain technological
advantages and the overmatch that comes from combinations of skilled
soldiers and well-trained teams with that technology.
The Army must also prioritize modernization efforts. Force 2025 and
Beyond is the Army's comprehensive effort for changing the Army and
improving land power capabilities for the Joint Force. Force 2025 and
Beyond efforts produce recommendations that help Army leaders direct
modernization and force development. Force 2025 Maneuvers are the
physical (experimentation, evaluations, exercises, modeling,
simulations, and wargames) and intellectual (studies, analysis,
concept, and capabilities development) activities that help leaders
integrate future capabilities and develop interim solutions. The Army
Warfighting Assessment (AWA) is the cornerstone event of Force 2025
Maneuvers. During an AWA, at Fort Bliss, TX, the Army evaluates
doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education,
personnel and facilities (DOTMPF) solutions. Driven by operational
scenarios, the AWA provides a joint and multi-national venue to adapt,
evolve, and innovate.
equipment objectives
Enhance the Soldier for Broad Joint Mission Support.
The centerpiece of Army modernization continues to be the soldier
and the squad. The Army's objective is to facilitate incremental
improvements by rapidly integrating technologies and applications that
empower, protect, and unburden the soldier and our formations. This
provides the soldier and our formations with the mobility, protection,
situational awareness, and lethality to accomplish assigned missions.
The fiscal year 2016 budget supports this priority by investing in
technologies that provide the soldier and squad with advanced
warfighting capabilities. We are pursuing enhanced weapons effects,
next generation optics, night vision devices, advanced body armor and
individual protection equipment, unmanned aerial systems, ground based
robots, and soldier power systems.
Enable Mission Command.
Joint combined arms operations will be enabled by a network that
meets the commander's requirements to understand, visualize, describe,
direct, lead, and assess from homestation, enroute, and from agile and
expeditionary command posts in deployed locations. The network achieves
uninterrupted mission command through intuitive, secure, and standards-
based capabilities adapted to the commander's requirements and
integrated into a common operating environment. Network capabilities
are assured, interoperable, tailorable, collaborative, identity-based
and accessible at the point of need in operations that include unified
action partners. This will enable globally responsive joint combined
arms teams to conduct expeditionary maneuver across domains and
locations. The fiscal year 2016 budget request supports this priority
by resourcing essential mission command, software applications for the
Common Operating Environment, operations/intelligence network
convergence efforts, and platform integration of network components in
support of Operational Capability Sets in expeditionary tactical
command posts.
Remain Prepared for Joint Combined Arms Maneuver.
The Army's objective is to facilitate fleet capabilities to
increase lethality and mobility while optimizing survivability by
managing the full suite of capabilities to enable the most stressing
joint warfights. The fiscal year 2016 budget request continues to
support the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, Paladin Integrated
Management program, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and critical Aviation
programs.
budget priorities
The Army has identified critical programs that provide overmatch
capabilities at the tactical and operational levels of combat
operations. These critical programs are discussed below:
Family of Networked Tactical Radios is the Army's
future deployable mobile communications family of radio
systems. It provides advanced joint tactical end-to-end
networking data and voice communications to dismounted troops,
ground, and aircraft platforms. Fiscal year 2016 funding
supports the operational test assets for 240 Manpack radios,
and the continued ramp up of production for 300 Rifleman Radio
Secret and below. Fiscal year 2016 funding also supports the
remaining portion of Project Management Administration costs,
supports the purchase of generic ancillary components for
continued platform integration efforts, and sustainment as the
program readies for fielding Capability Sets 17 and 18.
Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) is the next
generation of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below/Blue
Force Tracking and is the foundation for achieving affordable
information interoperability and superiority on current and
future battlefields. JBC-P is the principal command and
control/situational awareness system for the Army and Marine
Corps at the brigade level and below. Fiscal year 2016 funding
supports the procurement of 2,988 vehicle platform computer
systems, 300 command post systems, satellite receivers,
encryption devices, ancillary equipment, program management
support, training, fielding, publications, support equipment,
and post deployment software support.
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T)
provides broadband communications for the tactical Army. It
extends an Internet Protocol based satellite and line-of-sight
communications network throughout the tactical force supporting
voice, data, and video. Fiscal year 2016 funding supports
upgrade of 31 WIN-T Increment 1 units to enhance
interoperability with units fielded with WIN-T Increment 2,
procurement of 248 communications nodes for WIN-T Increment 2,
and continues fielding and support for previously procured WIN-
T Increment 2 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) equipment.
Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A)
provides integrated ISR Processing, Exploitation and
Dissemination of airborne and ground sensor platforms providing
commanders, at all levels, access to the Defense Intelligence
Information Enterprise and leverages the entire national,
joint, tactical, and coalition ISR community. Fiscal year 2016
funding will correct issues identified during the May 2015
Limited User Test and support the Increment 2 Request for
Proposal and milestone decisions. This includes efforts to
begin Increment 2 development, modernize and procure commercial
off-the-shelf software and hardware components for DCGS-A
(fixed, mobile, and data centers), integrate hardware and
software, and equip and train next deployers and high priority
units.
Nett Warrior is a dismounted soldier worn mission
command system that provides unprecedented command, control,
and situational awareness capabilities supporting the
dismounted combat leader. The design incorporates operational
unit mission needs and leverages operational lessons learned,
while maintaining power requirements in austere environments.
Fiscal year 2016 funding supports fielding an additional 3,016
units.
Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) replaces the
obsolete M113 family of vehicles within the Armored Brigade
Combat Teams and provides required protection, mobility, and
networking capability for the Army's critical enablers
including mortars, medical evacuation, medical treatment,
general purpose, and mission command vehicles. Fiscal year 2016
funding supports entry into the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) phase to integrate the Mission Equipment
Package and technologies in development in Army programs and
produce prototypes for use in testing.
Patriot is a high-demand/low-density program,
currently deployed in multiple theaters supporting operational
and strategic requirements. Patriot provides the capability to
defeat Air and Missile threats while protecting Combatant
Commands' critical assets, including soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines. Fiscal year 2016 funding supports procurement of
80 Missile Segment Enhancement missiles to increase Patriot's
capability against the current threat, as well as evolving
threats.
M109A7 Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) replaces
the current M109A6 Paladin and M992A2 Field Artillery
Ammunition Supply Vehicle with a more robust platform
incorporating Bradley common drive train and suspension
components in a newly designed hull. Fiscal year 2016 funding
supports the final EMD testing and LRIP of 30 PIM vehicle sets.
Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV), a Joint program
with the U.S. Marine Corps, is the centerpiece of the Army's
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle modernization strategy replacing
49,099 of the light wheeled vehicle fleet by 2041. This multi-
mission vehicle will provide protected, sustained, and
networked mobility for personnel and payloads across the full
range of military operations. Fiscal year 2016 funding will
support a LRIP decision in July 2015. A single vendor will be
selected to produce vehicles that provide the most capabilities
at a $250,000 or less average unit manufacturing cost.
Maneuver Support Vessel-Light (MSV-L) represents a
modernization of current Army watercraft capabilities provided
by the aging Vietnam war era landing craft. The MSV-L adds new
capabilities intended to meet the Army's future tactical and
operational movement and maneuver requirements. The MSV-L is
intended to access austere entry points, degraded ports, and
bare beaches without dependency on support ashore, in support
of land maneuver support and/or maneuver sustainment
operations. Fiscal year 2016 funding supports extending the
service life of the Landing Craft Utility (LCU-2000), as well
as to begin early plans to extend the service life of the
Modular Warping Tug and Causeway Ferry until new procurement.
AH-64 Apache is the Army's world-class heavy attack
helicopter for the current and future force, assigned to Attack
Helicopter Battalions and Armed Reconnaissance Squadrons. The
AH-64E provides the capability to conduct simultaneously close
combat, mobile strike, armed reconnaissance, security, and
vertical maneuver missions across the full spectrum of warfare,
can operate in day, night, obscured battlefield, or adverse
weather conditions. Fiscal year 2016 funding supports
procurement of 64 remanufactured AH-64E aircraft and associated
modifications to the AH-64D fleet.
UH-60 Black Hawk is the world's premier utility
aircraft and the Army's largest helicopter fleet. The Black
Hawk is vital in supporting lift and medical evacuation
missions in the current and future force operational plans. It
is critical to the homeland defense mission and a key component
of the Army National Guard's forest fire, tornado, hurricane,
and earthquake relief missions. Fiscal year 2016 funding
supports procurement of 70 UH-60M and 24 HH-60M, purchases
mission equipment packages, and upgrades the UH-60V, which will
help to reduce life cycle costs while digitizing the last
analog aircraft in the operational fleet.
other aviation priorities
The Army will continue to incrementally modernize the existing
fleet while investing in the next generation of rotary wing
capabilities. These aviation programs and efforts are discussed below:
CH-47 Chinook will provide the Army's heavy lift
capability through 2060, making it the Army's first 100 year
aircraft. Fiscal year 2016 funding supports procurement of a
base quantity of 27 remanufactured aircraft and 12 new build
aircraft, along with associated modifications to the CH-47
fleet. The CH-47 Block II is the first increment of a potential
multi-block strategy designed to insert incremental technology
upgrades into the Chinook fleet and to maintain the platform's
relevance and affordability over time while meeting warfighter
requirements. The CH-47 Block II upgrade seeks to buy-back
performance that eroded over time due to the addition of
mission equipment packages since system fielding in 2007.
Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) will be a new
3,000 Shaft Horse Power (SHP) turbo shaft engine that will
replace the T700 family of engines for the UH-60 Black Hawk and
AH-64 Apache fleets, which comprise 75 percent of the total
Army helicopter fleet. As increasing demands continue to add
weight to the aircraft, the T700, originated in the 1970s as a
1600 SHP engine, no longer retains the significant power growth
potential necessary to meet the required capabilities. ITEP
provides significantly increased operational capability, fuel
efficiency, range, and payload to meet Army mission
requirements.
Joint Multi-Role (JMR) Technical Demonstrator (TD) is
intended to investigate and demonstrate selected vertical lift
aircraft design and performance technologies. JMR is an Army
S&T program to develop, expand, and demonstrate new
capabilities in vertical lift technology and aircraft
capabilities.
Future Vertical Lift (FVL) is an Army lead joint
procurement effort to set joint requirements, develop, and
procure the next generation of vertical lift aircraft that will
replace the current Department of Defense vertical lift fleet.
The focus of FVL is based on three major tenets: (1) improve
the performance; (2) improve the survivability; and (3)
significantly reduce the operating cost. The FVL Family of
Systems capability desires 90 percent common components/parts
to reduce overhead and logistical footprint, as well as enable
mission flexibility.
Future Utility Aircraft (FUA) will enable the Army to
replace worn out or retired Operational Support Airlift (OSA)
aircraft with a more technologically advanced aircraft better
suited to support the needs of commanders in current and future
operations. FUA will reduce the amount of resources required to
train pilots and sustain the aircraft. The Fixed Wing Utility
Aircraft will be a commercial off-the-shelf solution that will
be Instrument Flight Rules capable and equipped with Civil and
Military Communications, Navigation, Surveillance, and
Survivability Systems that enable the aircraft to operate in
civil and military environments throughout the world.
aviation restructure initiative
The Army introduced the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) last
year because we simply cannot afford to maintain our aviation structure
and sustain modernization while providing trained and ready aviation
units across all three components. The Army will simplify sustainment
for fewer systems, reduce pilot training course loads over time, and
facilitate retirement of old aircraft the Army cannot afford to
replace. ARI requires cross-leveling and divestiture of aircraft among
all components--Active, Guard, and Reserve. Fully implemented, the
Active and Reserve aviation force mix will generate better and more
capable formations which are able to respond to contingencies at home
and abroad. The Army estimates ARI will save about $12 billion in
procurement and $1 billion per year in operations and sustainment
costs. The initiative is not an ideal situation, but with reduced
resources, the Army must make difficult decisions to ensure meet
combatant commander requirements.
The ARI divests the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior (KW) fleet and cancels the
OH-58D upgrade and fleet replenishment programs, enabling re-purposing
of funding to support other Army priorities. The Army terminated the
OH-58D KW upgrade program and the OH-58D KW Wartime Replacement
Aircraft (WRA) efforts in March 2014. In early April 2014, the Army
issued an execution order (EXORD) directing PEO Aviation to begin
planning for the divestment of the OH-58D KW fleet over fiscal years
2014-2017. In accordance with the EXORD, the Army divested 81 KWs from
units in 2014 including aircraft from the 6th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Regiment in Fort Wainwright, AK, the U.S. Army Aviation Center of
Excellence, Fort Rucker, AL, prototype aircraft from Redstone Arsenal,
AL, and aircraft returning from combat deployment. The majority of
aircraft have entered 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration
Group (AMARG), Davis-Monthan AFB, in Tucson, AZ (AMARG) for storage. A
small group of aircraft deemed uneconomically repairable were inducted
for parts-harvest into either the Regional Aviation Sustainment
Maintenance West, Fort Hood, TX or the Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX.
The entire divestment mission will be conducted over a 4-year period.
The majority of remaining KW divestment is planned for fiscal year
2015-2016, with the final unit scheduled to stand down in fiscal year
2017. The Army has divested 27 KWs from one unit, 2nd Squadron, 6th
Cavalry Regiment, Wheeler Army Airfield, HI, so far in 2015. The Army
will also divest aircraft from six additional units this calendar year.
Sixty aircraft will require divestment from units in calendar years
2016-2017. In total, the Army will divest 340 OH-58D aircraft.
other major programs in fiscal year 2016
The Army has carefully prioritized our efforts to ensure we
maximize every dollar toward putting the best equipment in the hands of
our soldiers. The Army will continue S&T investment in combat vehicle
technologies, ITEP, and JMR-TD to inform FVL efforts. We will also
focus our modernization efforts on procurement of AMPV and incremental
upgrades to the Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker families of vehicles.
Last year, the Army was forced to make a difficult choice between
continuing the development of the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program
or addressing near-term readiness with modest improvements to the
current Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). Faced with fiscal
constraints and competing budget priorities, the Army concluded the GCV
program in June 2014, at the completion of the Technology Development
phase. Developing a new IFV remains a requirement, however, and until
resources become available, the Army is focused on refining concepts,
requirements, and key technologies in support of a future IFV
modernization program. The Army is investing in S&T to refine concepts
and mature technologies to inform future combat vehicle requirements
and reduce technology integration risk. The effort will support future
IFV while maximizing opportunities to transition these technologies to
current and future combat vehicles. This effort will focus on maturing
and demonstrating key, leap-ahead technologies related to vehicle
survivability, enhanced mobility, and lethality. Specifically, the
Army's Future Fighting Vehicle effort is currently conducting vehicle
studies based on trades to GCV operational requirements to explore
platform reductions to size, weight, and power versus performance. This
effort ensures that potential new IFV designs take advantage of
maturing technologies, and keeps industry design and research teams
aligned with ongoing Army combat vehicle efforts.
The Army also maintains a valid requirement for the development of
an Armed Aerial Scout (AAS), but currently lacks the fiscal resources
to pursue a new procurement program. Apaches teamed with Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) will provide the AAS capability under current Army
plans.
The Army is continuing the development of The Joint Air to Ground
Missile (JAGM) which increases the lethality of the Army's attack
aircraft by increasing the performance of our aircraft-launched
precision munitions in degraded environments and against advanced
threats. Investments in the Army's current air to ground missile,
Hellfire, continue during JAGM development to ensure sufficient
stockpiles are maintained and customers from outside the Army (other
Services and allied nations) can continue to have access to the best
and newest missiles currently available.
The Army continues to invest in the MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS with JAGM
integration, increased survivability efforts, and achieving acceptance
into the national airspace. In fiscal year 2016, the Army added another
company to U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)
formations thereby increasing globally allocable ISR capabilities. The
program continues to field to Army Divisions, U.S. Special Operations
Command, and INSCOM with completion scheduled for fiscal year 2018.
Network dominance and defense is an integral part of our national
security. The Army is focused on proactively providing increased
capabilities to the Joint Force. The evolving Cyber environment is
forcing the Army to adapt to cyber threats by transforming processes,
organizations, and operating practices to mitigate vulnerabilities. In
terms of new and emerging initiatives, the U.S. Army Cyber Command at
Fort Gordon, GA, and the Army acquisition community are pursuing ways
to bring ``big data'' analytic capabilities to Army operations in order
to improve our cyber defense capability. These efforts, as well as
cyber S&T initiatives focused on the enabling technologies for future
capabilities, will generate resourcing requirements which will compete
against other modernization priorities.
The Army's Network Integration Evaluations continue to provide
valuable soldier-driven performance evaluations and suitability
assessments of network technologies which the Army continues to
leverage as a means of focusing Tactical Network modernization efforts.
The Army is committed to developing and fielding the Army Tactical
Network as part of a modernized Army network that improves
effectiveness, security, and efficiency while providing the same basic
capabilities from home station to the deployed tactical unit.
With respect to small arms procurement, the Army's paramount
objective for our soldiers is to maintain lethal overmatch against any
adversary. Efforts include requirements development, and Science and
Technology (S&T) investments in new enabling technologies to support
future capabilities. Development efforts include the XM25, which
provides the individual soldier with the capability to engage defilade
targets with a high degree of accuracy, while imposing minimal burden
in terms of size and weight. The Small Arms Ammunition Configuration
Study is evaluating commercially available small arms ammunition,
emerging ammunition capabilities, and developmental ammunition
technologies to address conventional and non conventional calibers used
in carbines, rifles, and light or medium machine guns. The Modular
Handgun System Full and Open competition will replace the more than 30-
year-old M9 with a system that is more lethal, accurate, ergonomic,
reliable, durable, and maintainable.
Production efforts include: M320A1 Grenade Launcher Module that is
replacing the M203 series grenade launchers currently mounted on M4A1
Carbine, M4 Product Improvement Program (PIP), M2A1 Quick Change Barrel
Kits, M205 tripods, and sniper upgrades and accessories. The Army is
pure fleeting its service rifle inventory from a mix of M16A2/A4 Rifles
and M4 Carbines to an inventory of fully automatic 5.56mm M4A1
Carbines. The M2A1 is a modification to the M2 machine gun with a Quick
Change Barrel Kit, and fixed headspace and timing configuration. In
addition, the M205 Lightweight Tripod is for use on the M2/M2A1 and MK-
19 Grenade Launcher.
defense industrial base
As lower funding levels for the Army continue, we are concerned
about the availability of needed skills and capabilities in the defense
manufacturing and supplier base. Teaming and collaboration with our
industrial base, early in the process, will help reduce risk. In
crafting our equipment modernization strategy, we carefully assessed
risks across all portfolios to ensure balanced development of new
capabilities, incremental upgrades to existing systems, and protection
of ongoing production and manufacturing to sustain the industrial base.
The Army has initiated studies to independently assess the health
and risk to key industrial base sectors. Based on the results to date,
the Army is making investments in specific portfolios to mitigate risk.
In the aviation portfolio, multi-year contracts for Black Hawk and
Chinook helicopters provide stability and predictability to the
industrial base while achieving significant cost savings for the Army.
In the combat vehicle portfolio, new production of PIM and AMPV, as
well as incremental upgrades to Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker help to
ensure that a sufficient workload will sustain critical workforce
skills and suppliers. The Army also continues to advocate for Foreign
Military Sales (FMS), extend production in certain programs, and invest
in key suppliers on a case-by-case basis.
The Army is equally concerned about the health of the organic
industrial base, including our depots, arsenals, and ammunition plants.
We are evaluating how to preserve needed skills and capabilities by
modernizing facilities with new technology and plant equipment,
promoting arsenal manufacturing capabilities across the Department of
Defense, and conducting personnel training. The Army will maintain
critical skills sets in our depots by identifying workload to preserve
capabilities, exploring FMS opportunities, and encouraging depots and
arsenals to partner with commercial firms and other Army and DOD
organizations such as the Defense Logistics Agency to meet future
requirements.
closing comments
The Army's capabilities and capacity provide combatant commanders
with multiple options, including the ability to conduct prompt and
sustained combat operations on land. As the Army continues to adapt and
innovate, we will continue to provide the foundational capabilities
that enable the Joint Force to prevent conflicts, shape the security
environment and, when necessary, win in a complex world.
We appreciate the generous support from Members of Congress for
strengthening the Defense acquisition workforce, which is the critical
component for the success of a well-equipped force. With more than
38,000 Army military and civilian acquisition professionals worldwide,
this dedicated component of the Defense acquisition workforce is
comprised of engineers, scientists, logisticians, contract specialists,
testers, program managers, cost estimators, and many other acquisition
career field specialties who effectively manage the Army RDA enterprise
in a challenging budget environment.
Army equipment modernization enables the U.S. Army to remain the
world's decisive land force. Soldiers and units operate as part of
joint, interorganizational, and multi-national teams that are
tailorable and scalable to the mission. As we continue to examine how
to achieve effective balance among manpower, readiness, and
modernization, we must have stable, predictable, long-term funding to
modernize our force to meet evolving threats and fully execute our
mission.
The security challenges of tomorrow will be met with the equipment
we develop, modernize, and procure today. Because adversaries will
continue to invest in technology to counter or evade U.S. strengths,
resource reductions and insufficient force modernization place at risk
the U.S. ability to overmatch its opponents. Smaller and less capable
adversaries could restrict U.S. military options and impose serious
risks to mission and committed forces. Under sequestration the Army may
be reduced to a level that puts U.S. war plans and crisis response
abilities at significant risk. Efforts to compensate for less forces
with stand-off capabilities, special operations forces, and use of
allied or partner armies may prove insufficient. To mitigate risks, the
Army must maintain high levels of readiness while also investing in
future force modernization. The Army must retain sufficient
institutional Army capabilities to expand the force. Improved
interoperability with joint, interorganizational, and multinational
partners provides additional methods to mitigate this risk by improving
synergy across all domains and fully realizing the potential of joint
combined arms maneuver.
With the possible return of sequestration in fiscal year 2016, Army
equipment modernization faces significant risks. Those risks include
fewer mitigation options, aging fleets, eroding overmatch, higher
sustainment costs, longer timelines to regenerate battle lost
equipment, and higher costs, which will leave our soldiers less
prepared for future conflicts.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, we thank you again for
your steadfast and strong support of the outstanding men and women of
the U.S. Army, Army civilians, and their families. We look forward to
your questions.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, General Williamson.
Does anybody else have any opening statement they would
like to add to your joint written statement? General McMaster?
STATEMENT OF LTG HERBERT R. McMASTER, JR., USA, DIRECTOR, ARMY
CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION CENTER/DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL,
FUTURES, U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
General McMaster. Sir, thank you. I just want to say thanks
to you and Ranking Member Manchin and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, really in both of your opening statements--
most of the content I have exed out in my opening statements
because I think you covered it much more fully than I can.
But I just want to tell you that I appreciate the
opportunity to talk with you about the Army Operating Concept,
its relationship to Army modernization, and the enduring
importance of ready land forces in sufficient capacity to
accomplish the mission.
To prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win
in a complex world, Army forces must have both the capability
and the capacity to accomplish assigned missions while
confronting, as you both pointed out, increasingly dangerous
threats in complex operational environments. The Army Operating
Concept will guide our modernization efforts and help us do the
best we can with the resources that we are provided and with
the strength of our Army. It prioritizes the integration of
advanced technologies with skilled soldiers and well trained
teams and adaptive leaders. That is what we believe is our
differential advantage over enemies today and in the future.
The AOC also establishes first principles for the
integration of new technologies and for the design of the
future force. Most importantly, I think it integrates our
learning activities, how we learn and adapt through Force 2025
maneuvers, which are both physical exercises and assessments,
as well as intellectual exercises associated with Army war-
gaming and seminars, to develop solutions to problems
associated with armed conflict. Force 2025 maneuvers are
oriented on 20 fundamental or first-order questions, the
answers to which will improve current and future force combat
effectiveness.
Our Army develops interim solutions to these warfighting
challenges and identifies requirements to improve the combat
effectiveness of the current and future force. This is how we
intend to do our best to prioritize efforts in force
modernization and make sure that we maintain overmatch over
future enemies. ``Overmatch'' we define as the application of
capabilities or the use of tactics in a way that renders an
adversary unable to respond effectively.
As both of you have mentioned, budgetary pressures
associated with the BCA in particular could make it tempting to
overlook or undervalue the capacity of ready land forces to
accomplish current and future missions. But strong, sufficient,
and capable land forces are vital to national security. Army
forces are critical to deterring conflict because they are
capable of compelling outcomes without the cooperation of the
enemy. Importantly, ready land forces are essential to compel
sustainable outcomes in war. The consolidation of gains is an
integral part of armed conflict and is essential to retaining
the initiative over determined enemies and adversaries. To
consolidate gains, Army forces often play a supporting role by
reinforcing and integrating the efforts of multiple partners.
Replacing capacity with a strategy centered on technology
alone or on the rapid regeneration of forces is risky. History
provides evidence of the challenges inherent in rapidly
regenerating effective land forces. As I mentioned earlier, our
Army's differential advantage comes from combinations of
skilled soldiers, adaptive leaders, and well trained teams with
technology. Growing the Army while maintaining overmatch is a
complex endeavor requiring policy decisions, dollars, soldiers,
infrastructure, advanced weapons systems, and most importantly
time.
Efforts to compensate for reduced capacity alone or with
technology alone are also likely to prove insufficient. Recent
and ongoing conflicts reinforce the need to balance the
technological focus of modernization with a recognition of the
limits of technology. As we know, there are no technological
silver bullets in war, and although advances in technology will
continue to influence the character of warfare, the effective
technologies on land are often not as great as in other domains
due to geography, the interaction with adaptive enemies, the
presence of noncombatants, and other complexities and
uncertainties of war. Our challenge, as you have already
mentioned, is to mitigate these risks. Our Army must maintain
high levels of readiness and sufficient capacity while also
investing in future force modernization.
The Army Operating Concept is a starting point for
developing the future force. But as historian Sir Michael
Howard observed, no matter how hard we think, how clearly we
think, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character
of future conflict. The key is to not be so far off the mark
that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is
revealed. If we base our future force development efforts on
flawed assumptions or wishful thinking, we will increase the
risk of being far off the mark and are likely to pay a high
price in blood and treasure.
Thank you for the opportunity to be with you today, and I
look forward to your questions.
Senator Cotton. General? '
STATEMENT OF LTG ANTHONY R. IERARDI, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY, G-8
General Ierardi. Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member Manchin,
ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today. I have a very brief statement to open with.
Our soldiers remain significantly engaged, leading and
contributing to the joint force in missions in complex
environments in multiple theaters of operation. As always, they
are performing magnificently.
The Army's top priorities are to care for these soldiers
and their families and to provide them and their units with the
training and equipment they need to accomplish their tasks.
With significantly reduced budgets and the drawdown in the
size of the Army, the Army is carefully balancing the
allocation of resources among end strength, readiness, and
modernization. The Army will preserve current force readiness
to ensure units and our soldiers are prepared for the demands
they will encounter as they execute their missions.
Conversely, we are being forced to invest less in the
modernization of the force to meet the strategic and
operational demands of the future. In this context, we must
carefully evaluate all programs to ensure our overall
modernization effort properly meets the needs of the Army into
the future to increase the lethality, protection, mobility, and
situational awareness of our soldiers and units.
We ask for your continued support for the required,
sustained, and predictable funding to ensure we are able to
deliver our soldiers the capability they need and deserve.
I want to thank you and the committee for your steadfast
and generous support to our Army and our soldiers, and I look
forward to taking your questions today.
Senator Cotton. General Cheek?
STATEMENT OF MG GARY H. CHEEK, USA, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE ARMY, G-3/5/7
General Cheek. Thank you, Senator. Major General Gary
Cheek, Deputy G-3, and I do operations, plans, and policy for
the Army.
Just to add a couple of things to some of your great
opening comments, yes, we are an Army coming out of 14 years of
war. There is a lot of goodness in that for our Army. We have a
wealth of combat-experienced leaders throughout our force.
Surprisingly, the Army is really where it needs to be at
appropriate skills and grades across the Army in our
noncommissioned officers and officers. We are also very well
equipped with many of the resources provided by Congress to
give us some great equipment and, really, within the Reserve
component, maybe never as strong as their equipping status is
now.
The thing that we lack, of course, are resources to
continue to train that force and then to continue to modernize
that force because that is where we have to take risk given the
constraints of sequestration.
The thing that I would offer to you is that if you were to
go back a year and see some of the world events that have
occurred, for example, in Russia, the U.S. Army responded, and
we have 2,500 soldiers in Eastern Europe under the leadership
of the 4th Infantry Division and 3rd Infantry Division training
with our Eastern European partners in about 13 different
countries.
When the crisis if Ebola struck West Africa, the 101st
Infantry Division deployed in support of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) to assist in that effort
there.
Then, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) emerged in
this past year. We have the 1st Infantry Division and 3rd U.S.
Army leading that effort in support of the Iraqis there.
I bring that up because I think those events could easily
leave Members of Congress and the American public with the
impression that the Army is still ready to go, and we do very
well at meeting our current obligations that are given to us by
combatant commanders. But what you do not see is our
contingency force and the readiness of that force, which is
what General Odierno often refers to, where we have about 50
percent of the readiness that we believe we need to respond to
a major contingency. This is where we get very concerned about
the effects of sequestration because it leaves us with a lack
of training of those teams and soldiers and leaders to be able
to respond to those really unforeseen major crises that may be
out there.
At any rate, we understand the commitment of Congress for
fiscal responsibility within our Government, but we also have a
strong commitment to our soldiers. We appreciate your
leadership and efforts to assist the Army through this
challenging period for the Nation. Like my fellow general
officers, I look forward to your questions.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your statements,
again for your service.
Ten years ago, I was in officer candidate school. As a
young officer candidate, I had a training, advising, and
counseling officer (TAC) who used to always tell us we can do
things the smart Ranger way or the hard Ranger way. I do not
think I need to elaborate on those two choices for anyone. I
have to say that I probably chose the hard Ranger way more
often than I would like to confess. But I want to make sure
that the Army, to the greatest extent we can, does things the
smart Ranger way since the Army can accomplish any mission
given to it, but let us accomplish the mission in the most
efficient and effective way.
I want to start talking about our wheeled vehicle programs.
This is obviously something that is very important to all of
us. We all lived through the challenges we faced 9, 10, 11
years ago getting vehicles to our troops down-range in Iraq
that could sustain major roadside bomb blasts. By the time I
was in Iraq in 2006, our Humvees could stop pretty much
anything except the largest buried bombs and Iranian-supplied
improvised explosive devices (IED). That is part of why we have
the JLTV to replace the Humvee program.
I do have some concerns, though, about the strategy and the
operational detail it provides. General Williamson, I will
direct these questions to you first.
So the strategy says that the first units will receive
JLTVs sometime in fiscal year 2018. Full fielding will occur
sometime in fiscal year 2035. Also I understand it says the
JLTVs will not replace all Humvees in the Army. So it is
unclear to me what the basis of issue plan is for units. When
will specific units at, say, the division level begin to
receive JLTVs? What is the plan for the complete fielding, and
how will we integrate JLTVs with legacy Humvee systems?
General Williamson. So, sir, thank you for the question.
I hate to be evasive. So I can talk to the programmatics,
and I think the timeline that you described and the
capabilities of the JLTV are absolutely on target.
I would also offer that this is one of those programs that
I think, as you look at the three vendors who are providing
solutions, we probably have one of the best vehicle programs
that I have witnessed during my acquisition career.
In terms of how those vehicles will flow, though, I am
going to defer to the operational side and the programmatics in
terms of the units that they go to first and the timing to
field those vehicles.
General Cheek. So I think the best way to capture it is the
priority for these vehicles will be those most susceptible to
those threats that you mentioned. So we will probably focus
initially on our combat arms formations, and then for our
echelons above brigade that are less likely to be in those
threat areas, there will still some, but that is probably where
you will see a residual Humvee fleet.
Senator Cotton. Could you elaborate on what you mean
specifically by combat arms formations below the brigade level?
General Cheek. Well, it would be our brigade units but also
some of the supporting units that accompany them. I will use
like a fires brigade, for example, and others. But we can get
you more specific information on that if you would like to
follow up.
Senator Cotton. At what level or what echelon do you see
units having a mix of both JLTVs and Humvees, and what level do
you see them having pure JLTVs?
General Cheek. Well, I do not have the exact answer. My
belief is that our tactical battalions--infantry, armor,
artillery--you are going to see JLTVs there. I think above the
brigade, you are going to see some mix of those dependent on
that.
But again, I probably owe you to check that specifically
and come back to you with that.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Cheek. The priority fielding of the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle (JLTV) is to the Manuever Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)
(Infantry, Armored, and Stryker) and the multi-functional brigades that
directly support the BCTs: Combat Aviation Brigades, Fires Brigades,
Military Intelligence Brigades, Maneuver Enhancement Brigades, and
Sustainment Brigades. JLTV requirements in these eight brigade types
were determined based on LTV mission roles, operational mode mission
summary / mission profile, and threat. In the BCTs, the JLTV will be a
one-for-one replacement of the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) with the exception of the ground
ambulance. In the five multi-functional brigades, the JLTV will replace
more than 93% of all HMMWV/UAH requirements. In addition, over 1,000
JTLVs are slated for United States Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC); another 1,400 are slated for the training base, and two
Infantry Brigade Combat Team sets are designated for Army Preposition
Stocks.
The Army continues to analyze JLTV and HMMWV requirements in the
Army's functional support formations such as: Air Defense, Chemical,
Engineer, Medical, Military Police, and Signal formations. This
analysis will be complete later this year. We anticipate a mixed fleet
of JLTV and HMMWV in these functional support formations. We also
anticipate a mixed fleet or a pure fleet of HMMWVs at the Division,
Corps, and higher echelons in the near and mid-term.
The plan is to prioritize JLTV to those Soldiers and units exposed
to the greatest threat, and to provide them with the best protection,
performance, and payload capabilities within the tactical wheeled
vehicle fleet.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
General Ierardi?
General Ierardi. Sir, I would just add that I believe it
will be a total force issue plan from the outset based on the
operational requirements that the Army has. The idea that we
would replace Humvees as we go and as JLTVs are manufactured
and then integrated into the force I think is right. We will
have fewer Humvees as time goes on, and we field these JLTVs to
increase the performance, the payload, and the protection for
our units according to the operational demands that we have.
But I also believe we will intend it to be a total force
fielding across the total Army.
Senator Cotton. General Williamson, if can come back. An
acquisition question. I know the request for proposal (RFP) has
laid out several criteria: survivability, mobility, and so
forth. Three vendors are competing along that. Sometimes the
Army, like all Services, also prioritizes protection of the
industrial base. Is that a criteria in this program?
General Williamson. So, sir, not in terms of the actual
selection of the vehicle, but as you look at how we identified
the requirements, the timing in terms of the production of
those, the goal is to make sure that we support the industrial
base in our capacity to build tactical light vehicles.
So, again, I would like to point out that as I look at the
three vendors who have done this, each has brought an
innovative approach to protection, an innovative approach to
energy, the transmissions. So from an industrial base
standpoint, I think you are seeing the best of what we can do
with current capabilities, and our ability to sustain that over
the production lifecycle I think will be a real boon for our
industrial base and a boon to our soldiers.
Senator Cotton. So I hear that as not protecting an
industrial base per se, but taking into account past
performance of the vendors as one component of risk?
General Williamson. Yes, sir. We are in that source
selection right now. That is going to happen. So the criteria
for how we are going to pick the vehicle. So past performance
is normally one of those criteria that we use in any source
selection.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Gentlemen, thank you. My time has
nearly expired.
Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, just out of the chute, I would like to talk
about when the sequestering first took place, I was here just
kind of fresh out of the State. When that came under the BCA,
we talked about flexibility. At that time, everybody was
pushing back. I mean, to me that would have been something you
would have embraced--the flexibility that you would have had
with the money that we already had in the system. Not being
able to move the money siloed, it would have made it much more
difficult for you all to manage.
I do not know if you all feel any different about the
flexibility of the budgets you have to work with or the way the
money is siloed. If we could work with you there and give you
some freedom, would that help? Because money I think is going
to be a concern we are all going to have. You can see it every
day here basically. We have a lot of needs, and I think
everyone is going to have to look at how we work more
efficiently. So I do not know how flexibility--if any one of
you--General Ierardi?
General Ierardi. Sir, if I could. I would open by saying
that the stable, predictable nature of funding is important for
our modernization programs. The sequester law, as I understood
it, would make across-the-board cuts if it was implemented, and
that is something that would take away the discretion that we
need as a Service to make the decisions that are appropriate to
provide our soldiers and our units what ultimately they
require.
Senator Manchin. Are your hands still tied right now? I
mean, basically how you all are able to use your budget funds.
General Ierardi. Right at this moment, I do not feel that
that is the case, sir, no.
Senator Manchin. Any of you?
General McMaster. Sir, I will just say I do not do the math
job that General Ierardi does, but I think that more
flexibility seems like it would be better.
Senator Manchin. It makes all the sense in the world. But I
am just saying politically you understand you did not get the
flexibility because everybody wanted to make sure that the
sequester would hurt so bad that we would get rid of it. Well,
we did not. So by not getting rid of sequestering and not
having flexibility, it was a double whammy on you.
General Ierardi. Right. So, sir, if I could. The BCA cap--
the funding levels--we really essentially have been there with
the legislative relief we received over the past couple years.
That has certainly impacted us adversely. The flexibility in
how we administer the funding, at least to this point, has been
sufficient for us to have some decisions base in what we needed
to do.
Senator Manchin. This will be, I think, General McMaster.
What does it mean when you talk about sustaining employing our
Reserve components as an operational reserve? What are your
views of the resource implications or your definition of
operational reserve?
General McMaster. Sir, operational reserve obviously
entails a higher degree of readiness, the ability to respond
more quickly than a strategic reserve in the context of
mobilization. The critical factor is just time. It is time and
your ability to maintain a high degree of readiness at the
collective level. Of course, our Army fights as teams, and we
conduct combined arms operations and integrate joint
capabilities. So these are all competencies that take time and
resources to sustain. So we are limited in terms of the amount
of the force that can retain the level of readiness necessary
to be a viable operational reserve.
I think, sir, as small as our Active Force is getting, we
have to do everything we can to maintain the National Guard at
the highest possible level of readiness.
Senator Manchin. How do you all factor in the Guard and the
Reserves? The only thing I could ever put between the two--why
do we have both--is that when I was Governor, I had control of
the Guard and the President had control of the Reserves. Other
than that, it is kind of the same. I do not know why we could
not have worked out something more amicable. Governor Rounds
would understand that also I think.
General McMaster. Well, sir, there are different
authorities, as you already mentioned, in terms of the ability
to mobilize the Reserves. These are policy issues that deal
with responsiveness as well. Our Reserves provide some critical
capabilities that are essential very early in a conflict, and
many of the competencies that they provide are competencies
that are oftentimes compatible with their civilian skill sets
and so forth. These are units that are specialized for port
opening and----
Senator Manchin. Well, here is the other problem I have. It
is contractors. I cannot get an accurate answer on contractors.
The cost of contracting is unbelievable, and I cannot get
anybody to speak towards the cost effectiveness or efficiencies
of doing more what we can do with our Service and our Service's
personnel and our Guard and our reservists than what we are
doing with outside contractors. Anybody want to touch that?
General Cheek?
General Cheek. So one challenge we have is there are force
management levels that we have for the different theaters we
operate in. So a lot of times, a contractor allows us to stay
under that. Or contractors are very good if we only need the
requirement for a short amount of time rather than grow that
within the structure of the Guard or the Reserve. So there are
places where I think there are great advantages of contracting,
but over the long term, it is very expensive. It is very
difficult for us to predict the number of personnel that are
associated with a contract because we purchase a service, not
necessarily the numbers of people. So that is another part that
complicates it.
General Ierardi. Sir, we have worked and will continue to
work to reduce contracted support in the force. At Fort Hood
and command of 1st Cavalry, we by and large had moved to
soldiers maintaining our ground equipment and our helicopters,
not in every case, but as we move forward, it is the Army's
intent to bring soldiers back into the business of maintaining
and sustaining our equipment and our forces to the greatest
extent possible.
Senator Manchin. My time is up. There may be a time for
another round and we will go through that. Thank you very much.
Senator Cotton. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to take a little about cyber liability and
about the exposures that are out there and what the Army is
doing. It seems to me an important consideration of your
modernization efforts would be its cyber capabilities. I
understand that the Army is undertaking a number of significant
initiatives in this regard. This includes the creation of 11
cyber protection brigades in the National Guard, a cyber center
of excellence at Fort Gordon, GA, and a separate cyber branch
for officers, the same level as the Army's other branches.
What is the current status of that initiative or that
series of initiatives or the current state of play, if you
would?
General McMaster. Sir, just a few things. I mean, first of
all, this is a huge priority for us. As we have become more
reliant on network capabilities and communications, that has
become a vulnerability, and we can see harbingers of really
future threats in what just has happened with Sony Pictures and
so forth. But as Lieutenant General Edward C. Cardon,
Commander, U.S. Army Cyber Command, who is testifying right now
separately in a separate forum, can tell you, this is a
contested battle space every single day.
So what we are doing is making this really a key
consideration for the design of obviously our communications
systems but really every weapons system to ensure that we have
weapons systems that can operate degraded, that can degrade
gracefully under some sort of a cyber or electromagnetic
attack, and that these are the environments that we consider,
these degraded environments, under this kind of duress as we
design our force.
In the 1990s, we had based a lot of Army modernization on
the belief that advances in communications technology and
information technologies, automated decisionmaking tools had
shifted war fundamentally from the realm of uncertainty to the
realm of certainty. I remember some of the language of dominant
battle space, knowledge, full spectrum dominance, and so forth.
We have essentially turned that assumption on its head, and
we are now assuming that actually the advances in technology
are going to move more into greater uncertainty. So we have to
design a force that can fight for information, that can develop
situations and understanding in close contact with the enemy
and civilian populations, that can operate widely dispersed
while maintaining mutual support. A lot of this has to do with
communications and our systems that can degrade, that can
operate degraded.
In terms of the cyber support teams that Army is
generating, I will ask General Cheek to give you the statistics
on those.
But I think if you look at innovation, military innovation,
I think a case study of this will be our Army cyber and what
they have done. I think under General Cardon and his
predecessor, they have done a tremendous job of providing a new
capability to the force, designing it, training and developing
that expertise. So what we have now is the ability to support
forces tactically in these contested environments, to
understand better what the threats are to the organization and
defend against those threats, but then also to develop the
knowledge and the intelligence of that space, as well as, if
necessary to do so, conduct offensive operations.
Senator Rounds. I will let General Cheek respond to this as
well, but what I am asking is, where are we? Are we on target
with it? Are we behind? Do you have the resources to do it?
General Cheek. I would say, Senator, we are on track with
where we would expect to be. We are fielding cyber protection
teams, for example. In many cases we are getting these to an
initial capability, as many of these as we can, and through all
three of our components. So it is a full effort. We are also
standing up the school. We are developing the training
mechanisms which are very unique for cyber. We have rifle
ranges for all of our soldiers. We have cyber ranges that we
are developing as part of the joint force, and then we are also
working at the highest level for U.S. Cyber Command and its
future, which I am sure is going to grow and expand as well.
So we are not complete by any stretch. I wish General
Cardon were here because he could give you much more eloquent
specifics on this. But we are well on our way, and I would say
we probably have about 2 to 3 more years of continuing to build
this force to flesh out these teams and maybe a little longer
with the Reserve component.
General McMaster. Sir, just quickly on the stats. From
fiscal year 2013 when the Army had zero cyber teams, we now
have 24 Army cyber mission teams that have reached, as Gary
said, the initial operational capacity. By the end of fiscal
year 2016, the Army will have 41 cyber mission teams at initial
or full operational capacity. As you mentioned, we continue to
evolve and mature that over time. When we get to 41, it will be
approximately 1,900 personnel, sir. The quality, education of
those personnel is probably more important than the exact
numbers.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for your service.
As we are talking about cybersecurity, it cuts across so
many different--it comes up in the Judiciary Committee. It
comes up in the Energy and Natural Resources Committee. It
comes up in all of our committees. So as you develop these
teams, of which you will end up with 41 by the end of 2016, how
important is the coordination within the DOD to make sure that
we are doing what we need to do and what we are learning from
each other and we are basically working together across all of
our Services?
General Cheek. It is absolutely critical. We communicate
with each other continuously at multiple levels. So for General
Cardon who leads the Army Cyber Command, he has counterparts in
the other Services that he works with directly, and they are
also all underneath Admiral Michael S. Rogers, Commander, U.S.
Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency/Chief,
Central Security Service
Also at the highest levels on the Joint Staff within the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the operational deputies, of which I
am a part of, we also review the policies, the future, the way
ahead routinely, and we have just done that here recently.
So there is a lot of dialogue, especially given the threats
that emerge continuously. So it is something we take very
seriously, and we also want to make sure that we empower those
organizations to be able to operate effectively and not over-
control it or over-supervise it in a way that would inhibit
their effectiveness.
Senator Hirono. Does your coordination also include the
National Guard?
General Cheek. It does. In fact, the National Guard's first
three States are standing up their teams, and over the next
several years, many others, to include Hawaii, will stand up
their cyber protection teams as well. Then we have to just work
through the authorities of how they work when they are in a
State status versus a Federal status. So there is a little more
work to do with that, but we are pushing forward on all of
these things. A lot of new thinking has to go into how this
works with the existing policies and statutes to be effective.
Senator Hirono. Would you all agree that cybersecurity is
an ever-changing environment? It is like the new arms race.
Every time we do something, somebody else is thinking of how to
penetrate our systems and wreak havoc.
General Ierardi. Ma'am, exactly right. The environment
changes very rapidly. Our task is to exceed that change in some
way, to become as flexible as we possibly can to adapt the
allocation of our resources and our activities to be able to
effectively exploit opportunities and to counter the challenges
that are present. Your question, the premise of it, that there
are multiple capabilities involved in this is exactly right.
There are human capabilities, human capacity capabilities, that
are very important, mostly important, but there is also
software and how we operate. In a modernization hearing in the
G-8 where I am, we talk about modernization in terms of
hardware. This is a different concept for how we operate, and I
think it is important for us to keep that in mind.
Senator Hirono. Are you going to be facing some shortages
in people with the appropriate backgrounds to work in this area
of cybersecurity?
General Ierardi. We are certainly oriented on attracting
the right people for this mission set and to leverage the folks
that are currently in these units and in these activities to
the greatest extent possible. But it is an important task for
us to recruit and retain individuals with the skills and
attributes that we need for this mission.
Senator Hirono. In this regard, you will be competing with
the private sector because they also need people who are able
to deal in this arena.
General Ierardi. Yes.
Senator Hirono. We had an Armed Services Committee hearing
this morning talking about how important the Asia-Pacific area
is to national security and the stability of that part of the
world, as other parts of the world continue to be unstable.
General McMaster, I know that soldiers from the 25th
Infantry Division and other units participate in Pacific
Pathways and other important military-to-military training
opportunities with our allies in the Asia-Pacific region. This
morning's hearing reiterated how important those kinds of
opportunities are.
So can you talk briefly about the importance of having a
modernized Army in the Asia-Pacific region projecting forward
from Hawaii, Alaska, Korea, and Japan?
General McMaster. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for that question.
Our Army Operating Concept is different, I think, from
previous concepts in that it really looks at the range of
operations and the range of missions for our Army, which is to
prevent conflict, shape security environments, and then also to
win an armed conflict if deterrence fails. The positioning
forward and rotational presence of Army forces provides a very
credible commitment to our allies. You can accomplish quite a
bit from standoff range in terms of deterring conflict and
responding to conflict, but really, you cannot do the positive
things often from standoff range, which is to reassure allies
and partners.
In the Pacific region, five of the largest armies in the
world are there. So our engagement with those armies is
immensely important in that connection in terms of theater
security, architecture, and ability to deter conflict.
We are also emphasizing really two key concepts in our Army
Operating Concept. One is expeditionary maneuver, which is the
ability to deploy forces rapidly, but not just any forces,
forces that possess the appropriate combination of mobility,
protection, and lethality to accomplish the mission and to also
be able to deploy forces of sufficient scale to get that
mission done. That is really what deterrence, I think, comes
from is really our ability to compel an outcome consistent with
our vital interests.
To do that, we are emphasizing some key modernization
initiatives that I think would be very helpful to forces in the
Pacific, and that is combat vehicle modernization. It is also
what we want to do with Army aviation and then also, in
particular, because of the contested domains of the maritime,
airspace, and cyberspace domains, we are saying that Army
forces have to deploy rapidly and transition into operations
with the right capabilities and in the right capacity to defeat
enemy organizations, deter conflict obviously, but if that
fails, defeat enemy organizations, to establish control of
territory and protect populations, to consolidate gains, but
now we think--and this is very relevant to the Pacific--project
our outward from land into the maritime, airspace, and
cyberspace domains to ensure our freedom of movement in these
increasingly contested domains, but then also to restrict an
enemy's freedom of movement in those domains. I think our
ability to do that could have a very significant deterrent
effect.
So we are working, for example, on the development of new
capabilities with a unit that can deploy rapidly, a fires unit,
but a fires unit that can do a lot of different things. It can
work surface to air. It can work shore to ship, and it can help
restrict, again, enemy movement and then ensure our freedom of
movement.
Senator Hirono. So there is a much more diverse capability
on our part, but at the same time, as you say, in projecting
our strength in that area, we need to do, I think, exercises
with our allies, the Japanese, the Philippines. Those are
important sort of manifestations of our presence in that part
of the world. Would you agree?
General McMaster. Yes, ma'am. But I will ask Gary maybe to
comment on this as well. In the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S.
Army Pacific, that is our largest contingent of Army forces of
any of the combatant commands.
Senator Hirono. I would like to keep it that way, coming
from Hawaii as I do. [Laughter.]
General McMaster. Pacific Pathways has been immensely
important to the development of our future force capabilities.
One of these 21st order questions that we ask and warfighting
challenges is how to improve our interoperability with other
nations. U.S. Army Pacific is going to cosponsor our Army
warfighting assessment, which will be at Fort Bliss, TX,
beginning in 2016 but in fiscal year 2017. Partner nations that
are involved already this October at Fort Bliss include the
Australians. So we are hoping to expand that--we are confident
we will--further to other Pacific partners for 2017.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the additional
time. Thank you.
Senator Cotton. Senator Sullivan who, I caution the
witnesses, remains a marine to this day. [Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that
reminder.
General McMaster, good to see you again, sir.
General McMaster. Good to see you, sir.
Senator Sullivan. I think you might remember I bumped into
you in Tal Afar, and then I worked for you when you were the
Joint Strategic Assessment Team commander. So I understand my
chain of command here, Mr. Chairman.
So for all you gentlemen, I wanted to talk a little bit
about kind of the troops in Alaska and how they play into both
what Senator Hirono was talking about in terms of the
rebalance, but also what I think is becoming an increasingly
important area for the United States and that is the Arctic. We
have some great Army units up there, the 1st Stryker Brigade,
the 425. I was at the National Training Center with the 1st
Stryker Brigade recently and saw their fantastic training. I
was with the 425 soldiers just last week as they were getting
ready to go do a jump.
But I know that you have been focused on what the Russians
have been doing in the Arctic, and it is a pretty aggressive,
pretty significant development of force capacity. General
Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
testified recently that four of the new six combat brigades in
the Russian military are going to be Arctic-based. They have a
new Arctic command. They have dramatically increased their
icebreaker fleet. They undertook an exercise that I know a lot
of us took a look at. I think it caught a lot of people by
surprise in some ways. 45,000 troops, 41 ships, 110 aircraft,
all in the northern fleet, their Arctic capacity.
In your testimony, you talk about viable land forces
capable of opposing the Russian army and its irregular proxies.
Such adventurism is more challenging to deter.
So I am wondering. One of the things the Army is looking at
doing, in terms of future force structuring, is possibly
removing one and maybe even two combat brigades from Alaska. My
sense on this is it would be lunacy from the perspective of
America's national security to be decreasing even one combat
soldier, particularly the soldiers we have in Alaska in terms
of their capability for Arctic training.
I asked General Odierno about Spartan Pegasus recently, if
any other airborne unit in the U.S. military could have
undertaken that Arctic airborne exercise. He said no.
Could you just tell us how you are thinking through the
Arctic? Right now there is no operational plan (OPLAN) at all.
The U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) commander does not have an
OPLAN. I think we need an OPLAN, particularly as you help us
help you think through requirements. Can you give me a sense of
how you are thinking about the Arctic and our laydown in terms
of Army forces there?
General McMaster. Well, sir, based on your summary of the
threat, I would sum it up by saying probably not enough. I
mean, we are not thinking enough about it. So I know that we
have some venues that we can bring this right into, Unified
Quest, which is our annual war game. I mean, I think it would
be easy for us to develop a scenario that would have us
operating in the Arctic and other cold weather environments and
to understand better what the threats are there.
We have been thinking in general terms about the deterrent
quality of land forces. As I mentioned, in particular what we
see with Russia is we see a country that is using limited war
for limited objectives to make, in effect, a land grab as we
have seen in Ukraine, and to do that at low or no cost almost,
and then to portray any responses escalatory. I mean, I think
it is plausible to think of an analogous scenario in the
Arctic, for example.
We know that a way to deal with a force that is using this
sort of limited war for limited objectives is forward
deterrence of land forces. This is where I think we get into
the capacity issue. It was the forward positioning of 500,000
U.S. military personnel in Europe from the 1950s to the 1980s
and 1990s that deterred a great power conflict over 70 years,
sir, and then, of course, the 28,500 soldiers in Korea.
Now, if you look at an Active Force that is planned to go
to 450,000 total in the Army and just do then Army math, in
terms of a 90,000 generating force with 60,000 soldiers in
training all the time, providing that ability to expand that
within the institutional Army, if you look at global response
forces that just have to be prepared for any contingencies--and
those which were mentioned today--nobody planned on the
deployment to West Africa or the ones that Gary was
summarizing. So if you just do that basic math, you recognize
that we are out of capacity to do what the Nation may need us
to do.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think it makes sense to remove any
combat brigades from Alaska, given what the Russians are doing?
Also in terms of our rebalancing to the Pacific, that is
another area where the President--and I agree with him--has
committed to look at optimizing our force structure, obviously,
Alaska forces, our Asia-Pacific forces, as well as Arctic
forces. Do you believe it makes sense to be removing any combat
units, even one soldier, from Alaska given our Arctic
challenges and given the rebalance to the Pacific, which
Senator Hirono talked about?
General McMaster. Well, sir, it is a question of risk and
how you can best manage that risk with severely diminishing
resources. So just again for just some context--and again, I
mean, this would be a fully open effort to look at how we
manage that risk in consultation with your committee and
others.
But if you think about just in recent years, in recent
years we had to sustain a commitment overseas to Afghanistan
and Iraq of about 170,000 in those peak years. Of those 170,000
that we deployed, 117,000 were active duty and the remainder,
about 53,000, were Reserve component. That placed an Army,
which at the time was at 482,000 that is in severe strain, and
then thanks to you and to the Senate and our Congress, we
expanded that Army to 560,000.
We are now in a global conflict. I mean, if you look around
the globe, several conflicts around the globe seeing harbingers
of potential future conflict. We are now down to about 492,000
today I think, Gary, and going to 450,000. So I mean, just the
basic math I think you can see that we are taking risk today
already somewhere.
To answer your question, I do not think--certainly it is
not a good idea to pulling soldiers out of Alaska, but it will
be a question of how to manage risk with severe reductions in
Army capacity.
General Cheek. If I could just add. So we do not want to
take anything out of Alaska. We do not want to take any more of
our brigades. So the unfortunate part that we face is, under
sequestration, we are looking at having to remove two brigades
from our structure. We have a process, as all of you are aware,
both listening to communities and in weighing through that. So
there are some very, very difficult choices there.
The one thing I will add, though, in recognition that we do
see how important this area is. So we are bringing in Apache
aircraft as part of the aviation restructure initiative. So
that is one positive thing that we can add there.
The other one is our Gray Eagle unmanned aerial system
which is unique in its ability to operate in that environment.
So I think there are a couple things that we are doing that
we recognize both the need and opportunity for us to operate up
there. If you left it up to all of us, we would say we do not
need to cut any more anywhere. So that is where we would be on
this.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Williamson, I know you in particular have been
briefed on my concerns regarding what I see as hesitation by
the Army to allow competition for tracked vehicle transmissions
particularly among the Bradley family of vehicles. Last year's
ATK study emphasized the transmission production is one of the
most fragile elements of the tracked vehicle industrial base. I
appreciate what the Army has done to mitigate risks to the
transmission industrial base in recent years with funding
provided by Congress.
But there is a long-term issue here. There have been
performance issues with Bradley transmissions. We know the Army
wants to move toward moving a common transmission across the
Bradley family of vehicles. That drive toward commonality is
motivated by the desire to drive down costs and improve value.
If affordability is such a critical factor, my difficulty
is understanding why you would hesitate to allow competition
for a component as critical as vehicle transmissions.
Competition is good for improved performance. It is good for
driving down costs, and it is good for ensuring we retain the
strongest possible industrial base.
So having said that, can I have your commitment that the
Army will take every appropriate action to ensure that testing
and other necessary analyses are completed on the alternate
Bradley transmission in a timely manner?
General Williamson. Sir, thank you for your question and
your concern about the industrial base.
As you stated, this Congress has been a huge supporter of
the industrial base and the transmission portion of that
industrial base. So this notion of competition is one that we
fully support, and as we have engaged with the primes, we have
asked them to look at where are there opportunities to bring
competition in to drive down the cost and the efficiency
associated with the procurement of those powertrains and with
transmissions.
Sir, I think the challenge that we have, though, is that as
we look at this particular portion of the industrial base--and
it was mentioned in the very beginning of this hearing--we also
have to look at efficiencies. So as we look at the
manufacturers and we look at the kit as it is going to be put
into these different vehicles, where are the opportunities for
us to, one, support the industrial base but, two, ensure that
they are driving in efficiencies so that we get transmissions
at the best cost so that we can reduce the overall cost of the
platform. So, sir, we are committed to driving towards that
level of competition and that level of efficiency.
Senator Donnelly. Well, if other transmissions demonstrate
a better value to the Army, will we move forward with the value
engineering change proposal on the Bradley?
General Williamson. Yes, sir. Sir, absolutely. I think the
only thing that I would be disingenuous if I did not say to you
is that as you look at a value engineering change proposal, it
is the timing associated when you put that into the production.
So in many cases, sir, it is not a buy an engine and just drop
it in. In some cases, you have to see how you integrate that if
that transmission has changed, if the connections have changed,
if the seating of that transmission. So as we look and work
with the prime, we have to ensure what is the best opportunity
to insert this into their production runs.
Senator Donnelly. So it is value plus the logistics of
using the particular transmission.
General Williamson. Yes, sir. I would assure you it is not
just in transmissions. It is in all aspects of a platform. We
look for opportunities where competition would allow us to
drive down the price.
Senator Donnelly. Could you provide me with a monthly
update on testing and analysis in the transmission area as we
move forward?
General Williamson. Sir, we can do that. As that testing
starts, we will be able to do that. Sir, I would also add that
in many cases the original equipment manufacturer, as they are
doing their testing and that data becomes available, we can
ensure that that is provided to you.
Senator Donnelly. Because my concern is, obviously--and it
is what I say about a lot of things in the industrial area,
which is, look, if we do not have the best at the most
reasonable cost that provides the greatest safety, that seems
to be the combination that we would be looking for more than
anything.
General Williamson. Sir, your instincts are absolutely----
Senator Donnelly. Then whoever wins wins.
General Williamson. Yes, sir, and that is what I was going
to say. Your instincts are absolutely on target. I think as we
look at probably the three main providers of transmissions,
their ability to go to the platform owners and say, look, here
is a better mousetrap is something that we encourage both to
the prime and also to the providers of those transmissions.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much, and thank you to all
of you for your hard work, for your hard work in maximizing
value and, maybe more importantly, for your hard work in
protecting our men and women and protecting our Nation. Thank
you.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Senator.
What we will do is start a second round now, if you all are
okay with that. I will start it off.
I say the Army is trying to create a mobile ad hoc tactical
network for over 10 years. Results from operational tests,
however, are still mixed for all technologies both hardware and
software.
So, General McMaster, late last year you expressed your
views on the Army's progress on developing and delivering a
truly mobile ad hoc technical network. What is your assessment
of the tactical network's operating concept and tactical
performance to date? To both General McMaster and General
Cheek, what are the leaders and soldiers in the field saying
about the tactical network? So, General McMaster?
General McMaster. Sir, as you mentioned, the way the
network developed, it developed in a way that kludge together
battle command systems and systems from across our--which we
say somewhat derisively--cylinders of excellence across our
Army. So the network was fielded in a way that it has never
been completed. It was incomplete. As you mentioned, we are
trying to kluge it together over time.
We have made some significant progress in doing that in
recent years and see a way ahead through what is called the
common operating environment, which will allow us to integrate
what we have and address really the three fundamental problems
with the network, which is its incompleteness is the first. The
second is its complexity, and the third that is related to that
and it is also related to Senator Rounds? question about the
network also--its vulnerability based on operational security
concerns and cyber attack and electronic warfare (EW)
capabilities.
So what we have done is we have developed a network vision
and way ahead and a strategy that will aim to address these
three fundamental issues. The first is to complete it. So we
are in a situation now where we are halfway down the path, and
until we can begin to field this network, we cannot fix a lot
of the issues that we have identified and now see solutions.
For example, the common operating environment part of this
which will simplify the network and integrate the multiple
systems.
In terms of the complexity of the network, we are working
very hard on user interface capabilities and the reduction of
what is needed to maintain these systems, to simplify them as
part of these programs.
On the vulnerability side of this as well, we are looking
at tactics that we can use to use it differently, and then
placing it in contested environments so that we can develop
solutions to the vulnerability for the network. That is,
obviously, the network integration environment. We will be able
to get even more at some of these outside of testing certain
equipment during the Army warfighting assessment.
But the bottom line is, I mean, your characterization of
the network is correct. I mean, it is incomplete. It is too
complicated, and it is vulnerable. We believe that General
Williamson's team has worked extremely well in developing
solutions to these problems. From a requirements perspective,
what we have done for the first time is we have looked across
all of the network and said, okay, what are the common
requirements across all the network and how do we build to
those. So that is near- or mid-term.
Long-term, we need to go to a system that will address all
three of these fundamental issues, and that is really going
from thick client to thin client-based networks to be able to
simplify the network by divesting a lot of the hardware
associated with the current systems. I mean, that is sort of
the longer-term approach.
I will ask General Williamson to comment on this as well.
General Williamson. Sir, the only thing I would add--and I
think General McMaster's characterization is on target. Because
we took fairly complex systems, new technologies, and
introduced these new software defined radios with very
sophisticated software and we introduced it piecemeal without
also addressing the tactics, the techniques, and the training
associated with those new systems, I think there was a media
perception, some of it very real, that these radios did not
provide the same level of capability that they had in older
systems.
I think the work that has been done over the last 2 years
where we have brought these systems together, conducted the
testing and the training so that we understand the performance
parameters, and then went back to address those shortfalls--and
you will see that in a series of engagements over these next 2
years where we have pushed radios down to the dismounted
soldier all the way back up to the brigade command post, so you
have a very resilient network that provides connectivity with
these new capabilities.
But I do not want to tell you that it is perfect. It will
continue to take improvements as you look at, again, the
sophisticated waveforms and the changes in hardware. So what I
would offer to you, sir, is that what you have are very high
speed computers running software now for communications
systems. So getting those two to work very well together, the
hardware and the software, has been part of the challenge, and
then add the new complexity associated with those two things.
So as we move forward, we have now put these systems into our
network integration exercises so that we see the pluses and
minuses with our engineers, with the warfighters there so that
we can now take and leverage the learning that occurs to update
those systems.
Senator Manchin. Thank you both.
Mr. Chairman?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Senator Manchin, for filling in
for me while I was absent.
I want to talk now about DCGS. Over the past 5 years, the
current version of DCGS has struggled to provide its promised
capabilities. It has failed its own tests, the head assessor of
the Army's Test and Evaluation Command calling it not
operational, not suitable, and not survivable in 2012. Maybe
most important, though, it seems to have continued to fail
wartime commanders who have continued to file operational needs
statements to this day for a commercial alternative that is
successfully in use today by the Marine Corps and Special
Operations Forces. Even with more than 20 units calling for the
alternative, because of flaws in the current program of record,
taxpayers are continuing to spend hundreds of millions of
dollars on the DCGS program, and it does not seem to be getting
much better.
General Williamson, is there a point at which the Army is
going to cut its losses and look at alternatives?
General Williamson. Sir, I do not know if this forum will
give me the opportunity to give you a really detailed response
to the performance of DCGS, but I would like to address some of
your immediate concerns.
So what I would offer initially is that we have fielded
over 11,000 DCGS systems into the Army, and the Army has been
fighting with DCGS in very tough environments and providing
commanders with geospatial information and intel which has
allowed them to conduct their operations.
I will absolutely acknowledge that for some formations the
DCGS system, as large as it is and the requirements for very
well trained personnel to use, has not been optimal. So those
requests that you see for a lighter weight, very specific
capability that we have provided to those units is being
addressed in the subsequent increments of the DCGS program.
One of those things, sir, I would tell you to start, is an
ease of use. We have acknowledged that the complexity
associated with the buttonology bringing that information
together has been difficult. So we have tried to invest a lot
of time, and we have also engaged with over 150 vendors through
a series of industry days to find out how we can improve the
existing system.
But there are some pieces here that I think we often
disregard. So the completeness of the DCGS program is what
makes it so valuable. It is the range of capabilities that it
provides, not a very specific piece in terms of situational
awareness, that makes the DCGS tool so powerful.
I think as we go into the May timeframe where we go through
our next set of evaluations, I think you will see a completely
different perception of how that tool is provided.
Senator Cotton. But it is being used by the Marine Corps
and Special Operations Forces. What capabilities does this
commercially available alternative lack that the Marine Corps
does not need that the Army needs?
General Williamson. So, sir, what I have seen is that they
use a very specific piece for situational awareness enhanced by
contractors who do the detailed work behind, not soldiers or
marines, in terms of taking information. I might add that comes
from the DCGS system. They take that information and present it
in a faster, less complex way for them to make decisions.
Senator Cotton. I mean, the information just comes from any
intelligence sensor. Whether it is a Joe out on the beach or
whether it is a satellite in the sky, I mean, it is ultimately
a database and then you have ways to manipulate and understand
and present the database.
General Williamson. If you have access to that information,
sir. So in some cases as you look at national assets that come
in, these systems do not have access to that level of
information.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Well, I mean, the National Assessment
Group says that Palantir, the commercial system we are talking
about, meets all requirements for advanced analytics. It also
says that our own Testing and Evaluation Command found that 96
percent of soldiers said Palantir was effective in supporting
their mission. The Government Accountability Office reported
that it meets all the needs of the Marine Corps and the Special
Operations Forces.
I would just say that in the Cold War, when we were
fighting a heavy mechanized war against the Soviet Union, we
produced unique capabilities that were not available in the
commercial space like tanks. In the post-Cold War era, as the
information technology revolution has taken over, we have to
rethink the wisdom of trying to create these systems in the
Federal Government rather than using commercially available,
off-the-shelf systems.
General McMaster, when you were in Afghanistan most
recently on the Anti-Fraud Task Force, did you submit an
operational needs statement?
General McMaster. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Cotton. Could you explain why you did that?
General McMaster. Well, sir, we were looking for a system
that could provide the capabilities you just described, and we
did not have DCGS at the time either. So we had neither the
other alternative to DCGS or DCGS available to us. Essentially
what we needed was a tool to access multiple databases and then
to be able to help us understand using big data analytical
tools, really connections between, for example, nodes through
networks and the ability to see flows, for example, of people,
money, weapons, narcotics through those networks that were
influencing our mission. So, as General Williamson mentioned,
this was a test of a certain capability, and what we were
limited by was the ability to access all the various databases.
I mean, that is really, I think, the key issue here.
I am not familiar with DCGS personally because again, as I
mentioned, it was just getting fielded as I was departing our
task force in Afghanistan.
There will be a limited user test in May, next month, that
we will conduct, and I think the conditions are set for that.
There is funding as well too, if we do identify any
deficiencies in terms of ease of use, which has been I think
the principal criticism of the system up to this point, that we
have the funds available to address those deficiencies.
Senator Cotton. I apologize. I do not know if this is
better directed towards General Williamson or the G-3s. Can we
get an update on where these operational needs statements
responses stand? It is my understanding there are about 20 of
them, maybe a little more. For the record. I do not expect you
to do it right now.
General Cheek. Well, I am not tracking that many, but I can
tell you for any unit that requests a Palantir or whatever the
operational need is, we look at all those very thoroughly. For
Palantir we are pretty much at about 100 percent approval for
those.
There are some that between the unit and the headquarters
Department of the Army, their intermediate headquarters may
determine that they do not require that. I will just give an
example. A unit could request one that is not deploying, and
for some other reason they believe they need it. That
intermediate headquarters may say no.
What we do with them, though, we will be aware of that
request, and we will work it in parallel so we do not wait
sequentially for this thing to come to us. But for any
commander in war that needs something that submits an
operational needs statement, we pretty much do everything we
can to get that to them. So it is not something that we say no
to unless there is probably a recommendation that comes with
that that this is not needed.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. Just for the record, if we can
get an update on that for my staff and the committee staff.
General Cheek. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. I appreciate it.
[The information referred to follows:]
As of April 2015, 19 deploying units have submitted 28 requests for
commercial, advanced analytic capabilities, to include Palantir.
Requesting units used the Operational Needs Statement (ONS) process ten
times and the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) 10-Liner process on eighteen
occasions. Of the ten ONS requests, seven were endorsed by intermediary
Commanders and passed to the Department of the Army for decision. In
those cases, the requirements were validated and the requests approved.
The remaining three ONS are still being reviewed by subordinate,
intermediary headquarters. Of the eighteen requests submitted through
the 10-Liner process, six were approved. Of those approved, REF
equipped four units with the Palantir capability, supported one unit
with Field Support Representatives and reachback capability, and one
unit declined the Palantir equipment once it was available for
delivery. REF did not support six 10-Liner requests and redirected four
others into the ONS process. The final two 10-Liners were passed to PM
DCGS-A for action.
Senator Cotton. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I just wanted to follow up quickly again on the
issue of the Arctic OPLAN. I did not get a direct answer. Do
you think there is a need for that?
Let me give you just one kind of specific resource example.
The U.S. Army in Alaska has just over 50 small unit support
vehicles (SUSVs). As a matter of fact, in the Spartan Pegasus
operation, they actually jumped some of these SUSVs. I am sure
you have traveled in them. They are outstanding vehicles. But
to my understanding, right now that program--these are 30/40-
year-old vehicles. The program is no longer under development
in any way. Again, I worry about this being a bit of a symptom
of us not being Arctic-minded.
General McMaster, back to you. Knowing the ability to
actually resource what the Army needs can be generated by
OPLANs. That is what we do around the world. Do you think there
is a need for an Arctic OPLAN to help you think through some of
these issues like SUSV replacement?
General McMaster. Well, sir, what we will do is work with
the Army staff and the G-3 in particular and engage NORTHCOM
and ask them what their assessment is, and working together
with them, we can offer our campaign of learning under Force
2025 maneuvers, the experimentation that we do, the wargaming
we do as a venue to start thinking about future threats along
with NORTHCOM. Then in terms of the requirements, falling out
of the OPLAN and the integrated priority lists of the combatant
commanders, we can make an assessment of how well prepared Army
forces are for Arctic and related contingencies and then work
with the Army staff on prioritization and resourcing strategies
for those.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
General McMaster. But I will definitely take this on as
part of our campaign of learning and work with the Army staff
and NORTHCOM.
Senator Sullivan. I appreciate it.
General Cheek, your comments about limited resources, tough
choices, strategic choices--we appreciate that. We know that
all of you are working hard, all the Armed Forces, we are on
the committee. I think part of what we also need to be doing in
terms of oversight in terms of the different Services is
looking at the possibility not only of strategic choices but
redundancies.
I was just in Asia as part of our oversight
responsibilities in terms of the rebalance, redeployment of
forces throughout the Asia-Pacific mostly relating to the
Marine Corps, Air Force in Guam and Okinawa, Australia, Hawaii.
General McMaster, you talked about issues such as
expeditionary forces from the sea on ships. I know there has
been some discussion on Pacific Pathways. Do you think that
that, in terms of redundancies, starts to bump up against the
mission of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Pacific? How does the
Pacific Pathways initiative differ from the Marine Corps'
mission in the Pacific? Is that redundancy that we need to look
at, particularly given that we are looking at possibly cutting
forces elsewhere, or is there room for both? You mentioned how
important the Pacific is. I agree with that. But can you speak
to that issue? I know that that is something that we heard a
little bit when I was out in the Pacific.
General Cheek. Yes, sir. We have been working with Marine
Corps leaders every step of the way in the development of our
concept work and especially working on Pacific scenarios and so
forth. We recently had a visit by the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., and Lieutenant General
Kenneth J. Glueck, Jr., Commander, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command. He and I work together on all these
issues.
We believe that based on the lack of capacity in ready land
forces, the diminishing capacity in ready land forces, both
Marine Corps and Army, that there is no redundancy at all. In
fact, there is a lot more work to do across prevent, shape, and
win than there are forces maybe to do it.
So the question is how do we work together to ensure that
we are complementary, and we think we can do that in a number
of ways. First of all, to complement the Marine Corps
expeditionary capabilities, we have to make sure that we know
how to use Navy sea-basing capabilities and Marine Corps sea-
basing capabilities in the context of expeditionary maneuver
with Army watercraft and joint logistics over the shore. That
is work that we are doing with Marine Corps Combat Development
Command right now. We should have some tentative answers on a
new concept, implications for doctrine, organization, training
that will be done by the end of the summer.
The other key thing, sir, that we are looking at is a new
evolution of Army expeditionary maneuver which, because of
anti-access/area denial capabilities, that we need to go into
an offset objective. If we go into an offset objective to
bypass the enemy area denial capabilities, how do we ensure
that force has the mobility, protection, and lethality then to
transition into an offensive operation? We think that the
Army's ability to operate deep in land with that kind of early
entry force is complementary because the forces could then be
critical in defeating enemy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
capabilities or disrupting them such that an amphibious assault
could occur more effectively. So we are, I think,
complementary.
Then if you look at really the need to engage with the land
forces of Asian armies and marine corps, I mean, certainly
there is much more demand there than there is capacity.
So I know that sometimes the Marine Corps--when you say the
word ``expeditionary,'' they are like, hey, you are in my
territory. But it is us and the Marine Corps working together
to ensure this kind of capability, the ability to deploy
rapidly in crises, transition quickly to operations, and to
operate in sufficient scale and for ample duration to
accomplish the mission.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you. I just want to make sure
we are not creating redundancies when, General Cheek, as you
mentioned, we are also looking at tough choices about removing
forces from critically strategic locations like Alaska. Thank
you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
I have a question about history, and I have a Ph.D. in
history in front of me, General McMaster. Can you talk to us a
little bit about the so-called Abrams Doctrine that developed
in the late stages right after Vietnam, that the civilian
leadership of this country should not be able to go to war
without mobilizing the Reserves? (A) have I accurately stated
it? (B) what do you think of the doctrine as a matter of
history and policy?
General McMaster. Sir, as my advisor told me when I
graduated, he said, congratulations. You now know more history
than you will ever know.
But, sir, I think that this is important because it was an
important legacy of the Vietnam war in that the belief was that
our armed forces must be connected with the people in whose
name we fight, and the best way to do that would be to ensure
mobilization when U.S. forces are committed. The way that
General Abrams approached this was to put critical capabilities
that were needed early in a crisis into the Reserve component.
Sir, I think what we have to look at today is how do we
ensure that the capabilities within each of the components are
complementary to each other and that together, that we provide
the kind of responsiveness we need and the operational
strategic depth that we need.
So this is a constant effort to assess our forces under
total Army analysis and to understand better how we can build
or grow or reduce capabilities in each of those components
relative to one another to be as responsive as possible. So
this is an ongoing effort. We do it in the context of our
experimentation and our war games to inform policy decisions.
Again, the key element I think for us is to continue to
reassess it and we do, to some extent, still see the legacy of
that approach, but of course, there have been a lot of years
between that and organization, structure. Each of the
components has changed significantly since that time.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, General McMaster.
I ask because the Abrams Doctrine is something about which
I and I assure you all of my colleagues on this committee hear
about from their TACs in the context of the ARI, which would,
as I understand it, move all Apaches into the active duty,
replace them with utility helicopters, and save about $12
billion, which even in Washington and even in the Army is still
a lot of money. The TACs that we hear from express reservations
that this would violate the Abrams Doctrine. They think it is
not sound for our national defense.
General Ierardi, would you like to comment on the ARI kind
of in general and also address that specific term, what is its
goals, objectives, how are we going to see the impact played
out on the total Army--Active Duty and Reserve?
General Ierardi. Sir, the aviation restructure initiative
really is borne from a high demand for a critical capability
that our Army provides and that is Army aviation. In the
context of reduced budgets and the reduced size of the Army and
pressure on modernizing the aviation force----
Senator Cotton. When you say ``Army aviation,'' are you
talking about all----
General Ierardi. I am talking total Army aviation.
So this plan is really intended to enhance the readiness in
the future and the ability of the Army to respond to needs of
the combatant commanders in the future. It focuses on ensuring
that we are able to meet these needs by having the capabilities
required. One of these is the armed reconnaissance mission that
is important for us to have. There are emerging abilities of
the Army to accomplish this through the use of manned/unmanned
teaming, which is a tactic, a capability that would be employed
in lieu of a Kiowa Warrior aircraft in order for us to be able
to manned/unmanned team Apache aircrafts with Gray Eagles, for
example.
The move of Apache aircraft from the National Guard to the
Active Army was decided as we are proceeding, intend to gain
the movement of those Apache aircraft in order to have the
Apaches necessary while we bring down the number of Active
component combat aviation brigades to effect that mission set
in the Active component.
Conversely as part of this plan, the Army intends to move a
number of aircraft to the National Guard, and this would
include UH-60 aircraft which would enhance the warfighting
capabilities, if you will, the combat capabilities, of the
National Guard to perform a number of tasks in support of our
Army in difficult places. My own personal experience with the
National Guard while deployed in Afghanistan was nothing but
favorable. There is no question that the missions that they are
assigned and will be assigned will be done to the highest
standard.
So taking those two considerations, the need for the Army
to conduct armed reconnaissance using manned/unmanned teaming,
creating an opportunity for us to do that with Apaches, also
created a concurrent opportunity for us to have in the National
Guard enhancement in the capabilities there using UH-60s.
So this also allowed us to divest of three aviation
platforms, the Kiowa Warrior, the OH-58 Alpha Charlie, and the
TH-67 training aircraft that we use to train our initial entry
aviators. As part of this plan, Lakota aircraft, which are
aircraft that are dual-engine aircraft, replicate the kind of
aircraft that future aviators will operate with, moved into the
training base and remain in large part in the National Guard to
conduct the kinds of missions that are required there.
So on balance, the aviation restructure initiative intends,
will enhance readiness. It will allow us to modernize and
create opportunities from not having Kiowa Warriors, a legacy
aircraft that was reaching its shelf life, for us to then take
those dollars which are harvested from the divestment of the
Kiowa Warrior and invest in other important aviation programs
such as the improved Turbine Engine Program, continued
improvements in our Apache fleet, and other aviation
enhancements, future vertical lift, and joint technology work
that would allow us to see a future aviation. It created
opportunities for the Army.
To your first question that you asked General McMaster and
you asked me to comment on, I understand the idea that there is
an idea for interchangeability in capabilities between our
components. I will tell you that we really need to seek to be
interdependent and that we bring all of the components of the
total force--bring a professionalism and a character to a
number of different mission sets that match the needs of the
Nation. So interdependence is a very important part of this,
not interchangeability.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, General.
One more question for you, General McMaster. Your
immediately preceding assignment was at the Maneuver School
down at Fort Benning. This is obviously focused on the land
aspect of the Airland Subcommittee's jurisdiction, but an
ongoing topic with our friends in the air is the A-10. I have
serious reservations, as does Senator McCain and many other
Senators, about the plans to stop using the A-10 especially
before the F-35 has been demonstrated as an adequate close air
support platform for our troops on the ground in contact.
Do you care to give your perspective on the A-10?
General McMaster. Well, sir, even independent of what kind
of platform, we do believe that close air support is going to
be more important in the future than ever. The reason is that
our enemies are really doing four fundamental things as they
interact with our forces.
The first is they are evading our standoff capabilities. I
mean, they are using traditional countermeasures of dispersion,
concealment, intermingling with civilian populations, and
deception.
The second thing that we see them doing in terms of our
advanced capabilities is they are disrupting them. We see the
threat of cyber attacks and electromagnetic pulse, maybe even
attacks on--other EW sort of attacks on our network
capabilities.
The third is increasingly we see them emulating our
capabilities where we may have contested domains that were not
contested in the past and then they are expanding onto other
battlegrounds.
So to cope with this, we are going to have to develop the
situation we think in close contact with the enemy and civilian
populations, and that will put a premium on our ability to
fight in three dimensions and to conduct close air support in
particular. We think that in the future, Army forces are going
to have to operate as joint and combined arms teams in smaller
levels. We may operate while they disperse, but we need the
mobility to be able to rapidly concentrate, and for us to have
mutual support between these dispersed formations, we are going
to have to see and fight across wider areas.
So we know that close air support will be more important
than ever in the future, and what we are doing is working with
the Air Force in what will be a sustained effort over the next
several years. General Herbert J. ``Hawk'' Carlisle, Commander,
Air Combat Command, is leading the effort on the Air Force side
to ensure that we maintain this critical differential advantage
for our armed forces, which is the ability to conduct close air
support, to pose that enemy with multiple dilemmas, force the
enemy to respond to multiple forms of contact simultaneously,
and to win in this game of rock, paper, scissors, where if the
enemy's countermeasure to our standoff capability is
dispersion, the answer is concentrated operations on the
ground. Then the enemy, to protect something of value to them,
as we encounter them with land forces, is going to have to
concentrate, which then makes them vulnerable to those standoff
capabilities.
So we know that we have to integrate our efforts more
closely than ever, and this close air support assessment and
sustained work with the Air Force is going to be immensely
important in that connection.
Senator Cotton. Does the A-10 provide that kind of
advantage and capability at present in your opinion?
General McMaster. The A-10 provides some very important
capabilities, the ability to sustain presence over our forces
and the ability to use multiple weapons systems. I mean,
turning radius has something to do with it, and obviously
mindset of pilots, the training. I mean, there are so many
aspects to this, and this is what we want to--what we are
working with with our Air Force teammates who are committed to
maintaining that close air support capability.
Senator Cotton. Do any of the other three witnesses have
any comments about the A-10, not just in your current positions
but in previous lives in the Army?
General McMaster. So just to echo, we are working pretty
closely with the Air Force. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force
General Mark A. Welsh III invited the Army in and other
Services to talk close air support.
I will add one thing. The A-10 also, by operating at lower
altitudes, I think can discriminate friend/foe much easier than
another platform. It is a good platform. I think the Air Force
has concerns about its survivability depending on the
environment that it is in.
So we will continue to work with the Air Force. We are not
going to let them off the hook, not to provide us close air
support, and we will work closely with them. So I think the
concerns are well placed, but we are confident the Air Force
will come up with the right platform and capabilities to
support us.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Gentlemen, thank you again for your
time. Most importantly, thank you for your service to your
country and everything you do to serve those soldiers
underneath your command. Thank you for your families for the
sacrifices they have made.
As you have heard today, I would say all of the members of
this subcommittee, as the full committee, are intent on
increasing our defense budgets. That is the most immediate
thing that we can do to help. Even if we can accomplish that,
some of the important reforms, initiatives that we have
discussed today still need to move forward in an efficient
manner because we all want to be good stewards of taxpayer
dollars.
So thank you all very much. I appreciate your time and your
service.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
ground vehicles
1. Senator Inhofe. General Cheek, what is the Army doing to keep
the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and Armored Multi-Purpose
Vehicle (AMPV) programs on schedule and within costs?
General Cheek. The Army engaged industry frequently before the
release of JLTV and AMPV Request for Proposals and has carefully
considered the performance requirements for both programs. In cases
where industry identified cost driving requirements or requirements
that presented additional technical risk, the Army reduced the
requirements to keep the programs within schedule and cost baselines.
The Army will continue to review these programs through Configuration
Steering Boards and adjust programs as necessary to keep them within
their Acquisition Program Baselines. In addition, AMPV and JLTV are
managed within affordability limits established by the Army and
enforced by the Defense Acquisition Executive.
2. Senator Inhofe. General Cheek, what initiatives has the Army
taken to reduce acquisition costs and have they been effective?
General Cheek. The Army has carefully considered its requirements
to keep technical risks low and will continue to closely monitor
contractor costs, review programs through Configuration Steering
Boards, and adjust programs as necessary to keep them within their
Acquisition Program Baselines. AMPV and JLTV have thus far demonstrated
effective control of costs while meeting the most important
requirements of their respective programs.
3. Senator Inhofe. General Cheek, do you need anything from the
Senate Armed Services Committee to assist you with further cost
reductions and acquisition efficiencies?
General Cheek. While it is understood and expected that there will
be constraints imposed on the Services to execute their acquisition
objectives, I believe Congress could provide more flexibility by
accepting recent legislative proposals aimed at reducing bureaucracy.
These proposals will (1) reduce redundant documentation; (2) place
greater emphasis on sound acquisition planning early in the process;
(3) clarify roles and responsibilities; (4) broaden the processes
congress established for risk reductions in programs.
These efforts will ultimately streamline processes and reduce or
eradicate the red tape associated with the acquisition process.
Increasing opportunities for acquisition professionals, consolidating
documentation related to acquisition strategies, simplifying decision
making, and reducing the regulatory burden, are just a few of the
things that will undoubtedly enable Program Managers to meet the
demands of the Warfighter. It is my hope that through these efforts, we
will foster more transparency and reduce the burdens placed on our
acquisition workforce.
4. Senator Inhofe. General Cheek, how is the Army balancing the
need to modernize its weapons systems with need to sustain and upgrade
its legacy systems?
General Cheek. The Army is balancing the need to modernize its
weapons systems with the need to sustain and upgrade its legacy
systems. This will be accomplished by protecting Science and Technology
investments in key technologies that will enable next-generation
capabilities when resources become available, selectively investing in
new capabilities for priority areas, incrementally upgrading existing
platforms, resetting equipment returning from current contingency
operations, and divesting select platforms to reduce operations and
sustainment costs. These principles allow the Army to Enable Mission
Command, Remain Prepared for Joint Combined Arms Maneuver and most
importantly, Enhance the Soldier for Broad Mission Support. The Army is
addressing current and emerging threats to ensure every Soldier
deployed is equipped to achieve decisive overmatch regardless of the
situation.
impact of sequestration
5. Senator Inhofe. General Cheek, how would a fiscal year 2016
budget capped at Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) levels impact
programs such as Paladin Integrated Management (PIM), upgrades to
wheeled troop carriers, purchase of drones, Patriot Guided Missile
improvements, and the Army's aviation modernization portfolio?
General Cheek. The President's Budget request for 2016 (PB16) is
the absolute minimum needed to meet the defense strategy at significant
risk. We cannot sustain any reduction in funding less than what was
requested without severely degrading our end strength, readiness, or
modernization programs.
The Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) and Patriot Guided Missile
improvements are two of the Army's critical programs, but reductions to
the PB16 request will prevent the Army from executing these programs
efficiently and prevent us from meeting the requirements of the
National Defense Strategy.
The Army currently has no programs to upgrade wheeled troop
transports; we only have modernization programs. These are the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle to replace the aging High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle s and armor capable Medium Tactical Vehicles to replace
trucks that cannot take armor. In terms of production, both programs
would be impacted; and fielding of modernized vehicles will be delayed.
Procurement quantities and delivery timelines would have to be
reassessed following any changes to PB16.
Finally, the modernization of Army Aviation is imbedded in the
Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI). The PB16 request is aligned to
ensure our ability to meet operational requirements, restructure of
forces, and critical modernization efforts for the UH-60 Blackhawk, CH-
47 Chinook, and AH-64 Apache helicopter fleets. Delaying or stopping
ARI reduces readiness, slows aviation modernization in all components,
and requires funding cuts elsewhere.
6. Senator Inhofe. General Cheek, how has the industrial base been
impacted by 6 years of budget cuts and what would be the impact of a
fiscal year 2016 budget capped at BCA levels?
General Cheek. As a result of an overall decrease of Defense
spending, Army's Total Obligation Authority has been declining in
recent years, as well as our Research, Development and Acquisition
(RDA) budget. The sharp decrease in our RDA budget has created
significant challenges for small companies that must diversify quickly.
Today's industrial base includes a large population of highly skilled
technical and knowledge workers mostly employed by specialized third-
and fourth-tier subcontractors. Keeping these skilled employees within
the industrial base has the added benefit of enhancing support for the
Army's small business partners.
The impact of six years of budget cuts and of a fiscal year 2016
budget capped at BCA levels directly relate to the ability of the
industrial base to support the engineering, manufacturing, development,
and production of weapon systems. The impacts of sequestration and
reduced investment will be significant as:
Companies may view non-defense sectors as more attractive
and direct their own modernization, research, and production capacity
away from the defense sector.
Longer term reductions in funding will threaten the
Army's future modernization efforts and place major acquisition
programs at risk.
Perceived uncertainty in future modernization will
discourage potential vendors. Early actions needed to compete for major
programs may be seen as too costly to offset long-term benefits.
Companies may be less likely to invest in business
initiatives in the defense sector.
Companies may experience challenges in retaining skilled
engineers experienced in designing complex weapon systems.
7. Senator Inhofe. General Cheek, how does a shrinking industrial
base impact the Army's ability to acquire new weapon systems?
General Cheek. Significant reductions in the defense budget and the
corresponding decrease in Research and Development (R&D) investment and
procurement affect the industrial base across all portfolios. Major
defense firms are responding by reducing excess capacity, streamlining
processes, and revamping supplier relationships, while some smaller
suppliers are exiting or dramatically reducing their investment in the
defense industry. The Army carefully assessed risks across all
portfolios and developed a modernization strategy that balances
development of new capabilities, incremental upgrades to existing
platforms, and protection of ongoing production and manufacturing to
sustain the industrial base.
The Army remains concerned about the availability of needed skills
and capabilities in the defense manufacturing and supplier base.
Mitigation of adverse impacts is being addressed through extended
production in certain programs, investment in key suppliers on a case-
by-case basis, and advocacy for Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
Should budgetary reductions continue, fragile lower-tier supplier
companies could be at great risk and may be unable to remain in the
defense industry resulting in severe impacts to the Army's acquisition
efforts.
To better understand the risk, the Army has initiated studies to
take an independent look at specific portfolios within the industrial
base to assess their health, identify critical capabilities, assess
potential supplier risk, and recommend strategies to mitigate the risks
to acquire new weapon systems.
8. Senator Inhofe. General Cheek, the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Heidi Shyu, said the
Army's research and development budget has declined twice the rate as
the overall cuts to the Army budget. How does this impact the Army's
ability to modernize and procure new capabilities needed to address
future combat requirements?
General Cheek. Decreases to the Army's overall budget over the last
several years have had a significant impact on modernization and
threaten our ability to retain overmatch through the next decade. Since
2011, the Army has ended 20 programs, delayed 125, and restructured
124. The velocity of instability around the world has forced the Army
to take risk in modernization to ensure the readiness and capacity of
our current force. From fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016, Research,
Development and Acquisition investments declined roughly 28 percent.
The Budget Control Act continues to cause significant instability
to our programs across all portfolios. Major impacts include delays in
equipping to support expeditionary forces, delays in combat vehicle and
aviation modernization, increases in sustainment costs to fix older
equipment, and increases in capability gaps. This would mean that
Soldiers are at risk to engage in fights in which they lack
significant, qualitative advantages.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
arctic plan
9. Senator Sullivan. General Williamson, General McMaster, General
Ierardi, and General Cheek, what is the Army's plan for the Arctic, and
if we do not have one, what should the Army's plan be?
General Williamson, General McMaster, General Ierardi, and General
Cheek. Within its Title 10 responsibilities, the Army works to sustain
capabilities and readiness to support Combatant Commanders, to include
the Commander of United States NORTHCOM Command. Currently the Army has
two Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) stationed in Alaska and a Global
Response force (GRF) prepared to deploy in support of the NORTHCOM
Commander if required.
arctic resourcing
10. Senator Sullivan. General Williamson, General McMaster, General
Ierardi, and General Cheek, given the military activity from a
resurgent Russia, what strategic guidance do you use that informs your
decision to reduce Arctic forces in Alaska and what strategic guidance
do you use to inform your resourcing decisions for arctic capabilities
and equipment?
General Williamson, General McMaster, General Ierardi, and General
Cheek. The Army considers a broad array of criteria when assessing
which forces and which installations will be impacted by in-
activations. Criteria are based on strategic considerations,
operational effectiveness, geographic distribution, cost and the
ability to meet statutory requirements.
Strategic Considerations: Aligns Army Force Structure to
the Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance.
Operational Considerations: Seeks to maximize training
facilities, deployment infrastructure and facilities to support the
well-being of Soldiers and their Families. Aligns appropriate
oversight/leadership by senior Army headquarters for better command and
control.
Geographic Distribution: Seeks to distribute units in the
United States to preserve a broad base of support and linkage to the
American people.
Cost: Considers the impacts of military personnel,
equipment, military construction, and transportation costs.
Statutory Requirements: Complies with the provisions of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as appropriate, including
an environmental and socio-economic analysis.
The Army recently completed Listening Sessions at the Army posts
that may be affected by the drawdown. The Army is evaluating comments
and will use them to make a decision on where to reduce in the future.
An announcement is not expected before the end of June 2015.
Regarding resourcing decisions for Arctic capabilities and
equipment, the Army continuously reviews its force structure and design
as conditions change. To meet fiscal constraints today, the Army has
had to sacrifice end-strength and modernization, which has placed
limitations on our ability to address existing and potential demands in
the Arctic to the extent that we would prefer. Our goal remains to
ensure that the Army is optimized for a broader range of missions in
support of the Joint Force.
small unit support vehicle
11. Senator Sullivan. General Williamson, General McMaster, General
Ierardi, and General Cheek, how does the Army plan to enable Arctic
mobility in the future, and does that plan include a replacement for
the Small Unit Support Vehicle (SUSV)?
General Williamson, General McMaster, General Ierardi, and General
Cheek. The Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) is the Army's most
numerous, and rapidly deployable, combat formation. IBCTs can conduct
entry operations or deploy by ground, air-land, airborne, and air
assault. The Army recognizes the mobility limitation of our BCTs once
deployed, to all environments, including the Arctic. We are looking at
possible solutions to increase the ability for these units to seize key
terrain or facilities swiftly to establish a lodgment for follow-on
forces, however, at this time, there is no plan to replace the Small
Unit Support Vehicle.
12. Senator Sullivan. General Williamson, General McMaster, General
Ierardi, and General Cheek, does not having an Arctic Operation Plan
(OPLAN) make it difficult--or impossible--to resource important arctic
capabilities like the SUSV?
General Williamson, General McMaster, General Ierardi, and General
Cheek. No, not having an Arctic Operation Plan does not make it
difficult or impossible to resource arctic capabilities like the Small
Unit Support Vehicle (SUSV). All Army requirements compete for funding
among other validated requirements, however at this time there is no
plan to replace the SUSV.
arctic camouflage
13. Senator Sullivan. General Williamson, General McMaster, General
Ierardi, and General Cheek, what is the status of our Arctic
camouflage, and has it kept pace with advancements in thermal imagining
and radar detection? does not having an Arctic OPLAN make it
difficult--or impossible--to resource important arctic capabilities
like camouflage?
General Williamson, General McMaster, General Ierardi, and General
Cheek. The existing Arctic camouflage system has not been upgraded
since its inception in the mid-1970s. The Army's current camouflage
system, the Ultra-Lightweight Camouflage Net System (ULCANS) was
developed in the late 1990s and only included Woodland and Desert
patterns. Due to improvements in technology, these variants are now
ineffective against current and emerging advanced sensor threats and
are in need of updates.
The next-generation ULCANS capabilities add three new variants
(Arctic, Urban, and Aviation) and upgrade the existing systems
(Woodland and Desert). The next-generation ULCANS will provide
concealment from visual, near infrared, short-wave infrared through
long-wave infrared, ultraviolet, radar, and multi-spectral/hyper-
spectral detection. Ultimately, these systems will provide U.S. forces
detection avoidance and sensor defeat capabilities as a low-cost force
multiplier.
The next-generation ULCANS Capability Development Document is
awaiting approval from the Joint Staff to begin the acquisition
process. This requirement will compete for funding in Program Objective
Memorandum for fiscal years 2017-2021.
14. Senator Sullivan. General Williamson, General McMaster, General
Ierardi, and General Cheek, does not having an Arctic OPLAN make it
difficult--or impossible--to resource important arctic capabilities
like camouflage?
General Williamson, General McMaster, General Ierardi, and General
Cheek. No, the lack of an Arctic Operational Plan (OPLAN) does not
prevent arctic capabilities like camouflage from consideration for
resourcing. The Army is currently validating a modernized camouflage
system requirements document, the Ultra-Lightweight Camouflage Net
System, which includes Arctic camouflage. If approved, this requirement
will compete for funding among other validated requirements.
exercise spartan pegasus and the 4th brigade combat team (airborne),
25th infantry division
15. Senator Sullivan. General Williamson, General McMaster, General
Ierardi, and General Cheek, where would this Army's Arctic training,
equipment, and force projection come from, if not from the two brigade
combat teams (BCT) in Alaska? could Spartan Pegasus have been done with
any other Army Airborne unit in the Pacific or in the contiguous United
States?
General Williamson, General McMaster, General Ierardi, and General
Cheek. Under the Army's force generation model, at any given time,
there are between one to three airborne-capable IBCT units ready and
available for retasking. Given sufficient funding and time to prepare
any Army unit can be ready, trained, and equipped to perform Arctic
missions such as Exercise Spartan Pegasus.
16. Senator Sullivan. General Williamson, General McMaster, General
Ierardi, and General Cheek, could Exercise Spartan Pegasus have been
done with any other Army airborne unit in the Pacific or in the
contiguous United States?
General Williamson, General McMaster, General Ierardi, and General
Cheek. Given sufficient funding and time to prepare, any Army unit
could conduct operations in the Arctic or Pacific regions.
17. Senator Sullivan. General Williamson, General McMaster, General
Ierardi, and General Cheek, Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond
T. Odierno in January 2012 said in a trip to Joint Base Elmendorf
Richardson, ``It is critical to sustain Army capabilities in Alaska. If
anything ever happens in the world that demands operations in this type
of environment, this is where we will come for the expertise.'' Just
over a month ago, U.S. Army Alaska's 4th Brigade Combat Team
(Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, the only airborne brigade in the
Pacific, conducted the largest airborne mission north of the Arctic
Circle in more than a decade. This Joint and Total Force exercise
called Spartan Pegasus, involved U.S. Army Alaska, the U.S. Air Force
in Alaska, and Alaskan National Guardsmen. What do you think President
of Russia Vladamir Putin or Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong-Un
would think if we got rid of one of Alaska's unique Arctic-combat
brigades, like the one that did this mission?
General Williamson, General McMaster, General Ierardi, and General
Cheek. In order to answer the above question the Army would have to
speculate on the thoughts of President Putin and Kim Jong-Un. Currently
the Army uses strategic guidance such as the National Security Strategy
and the Chairman's Risk Assessment to guide force shaping decisions.
Our analysis, currently ongoing, aims to produce the best, most
capable Army we can within the constraints of the budget and authorized
end strength. In the face of considerable end strength reductions and
budget limitations, the Army must determine which capabilities are most
important for meeting the Nation's defense requirements and for
providing a credible deterrence. This means the Army will accept risks
in some areas in order to preserve other, more critical capabilities.
We expect to announce the next round of force structure reductions
later this summer.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
armored multi-purpose vehicle
18. Senator Manchin. General McMaster, the Army budget request
provides funds to continue development of the AMPV to replace the M113
family of armored personnel carriers and support vehicles in the
armored brigades. What is the importance of the AMPV to armored brigade
modernization?
General McMaster, The M113 Family of Vehicles (FOV) is obsolete.
The M113 has been in service for over forty years and all variants lack
the mobility, speed, force protection, and survivability to operate on
the modern battlefield. The M113 also lacks the Space, Weight, Power,
and Cooling (SWaP-C) capabilities necessary to accept the Army's
mission command network.
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) will replace the M113
Family of Vehicles, which accounts for 30 percent (137 vehicles) of the
ABCT's armored vehicle fleet. The AMPV will perform the five mission
roles currently performed by the M113 in the ABCT: Mortar Carrier,
Medical Evacuation, Mission Command, and General Purpose, and Medical
Treatment variants.
The ABCT requires the AMPV to successfully perform its combat
mission. Not fielding AMPV as part of ABCT modernization would cause
the ABCT to either use significantly less capable vehicles or place
Soldiers at extremely high risk or divert combat vehicles to perform
AMPV mission roles and place mission accomplishment at risk.
19. Senator Manchin. General McMaster, what is the importance of
the mobility requirements of the M113 replacement vehicle in the
armored brigade?
General McMaster, The Maneuver Center of Excellence developed the
Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) requirements after a holistic
review of the Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT) combat requirements
in order to fill critical mobility, protection, and Space, Weight,
Power, and Cooling (SWaP-C) capability gaps.
The AMPV must directly support, and maneuver across the same
terrain as, the M1 Abrams tank, and M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles in
the ABCT. The AMPV will perform the missions of resupplying the
formation, evacuating casualties from the main battle area, providing
indirect fires, and providing mission command functions on the move.
These capabilities require the AMPV to maintain position within the
formation as the ABCT executes mounted operations. Therefore, The AMPV
requires the same mobility capabilities as the combat vehicles
formation it supports.
20. Senator Manchin. General McMaster, what are your views on using
wheeled armored ambulances in armored brigades?
General McMaster, Wheeled medical vehicles are unsuitable for
Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) due to the inability to maneuver
with highly mobile combat vehicles and provide protection against the
challenging threats that the ABCTs are designed to fight. The M113
Congressional Inquiry final report (Jan 15) showed that wheeled
ambulances could not maintain nor provide the mobility needed to
maintain the pace in an ABCT.
The assessment found the Stryker Double V Hull (DVH) although
better than the current M113A3, fails to meet 50 percent of the Key
Performance Parameters (KPP) of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV) Capabilities Development Document (CDD) and fails to deliver
sufficient mobility to maneuver within the ABCT combat vehicles
formation or provide the force protection/survivability against the
range of ABCT threats. No existing medical vehicles are suitable
candidates as a medical evacuation or medical treatment vehicle within
the ABCT formation based on performance results compared against the
threshold AMPV capability requirements.
21. Senator Manchin. General Williamson, how are you using the
latest acquisition management policies to ensure that AMPV is a stable,
achievable, and affordable program?
General Williamson. The Army has been closely monitoring the AMPV
program since its contract award in December of 2014. Over the coming
months the Army will conduct a series of Knowledge Point Reviews to
assess the Preliminary Design Review outcomes in preparation of a
Configuration Steering Board (CSB) in early Fall. During this CSB the
Army will consider adjusting requirements as necessary to keep the AMPV
affordable and on track to deliver this important capability to our
Soldiers.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
bradley second phase engineering proposal
22. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, General Ierardi, General
Cheek, looking at the Bradley program, what is the justification behind
the second phase engineering proposal (ECP2)?
General Williamson, General Ierardi, General Cheek. As the Bradley
has been armored to increase protection, it has lost mobility and
agility. The ECP2 will upgrade key components of the power train to
reclaim these lost capabilities and accommodates the growth in
electrical requirements from upgrading its network to improve
situational awareness and command and control.
23. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, General Ierardi, General
Cheek, why do we need upgrades to the Bradley power train?
General Williamson, General Ierardi, General Cheek. The Bradley's
power train requires upgrades for two reasons. First, as we have added
protection to Bradley, it has become slower and less maneuverable.
Secondly, we have increased the power demands on the vehicle by adding
networked capabilities and other equipment that draws electricity and
has increased power generation requirements. Upgrading the power train
will increase the Bradley's ability to power the new equipment and
reclaim some of the maneuverability lost from the added weight of
greater protection.
24. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, when did ECP2 begin and
when will it end?
General Williamson. The Bradley ECP2 developmental contract was
awarded in September 2012. The critical design review was completed in
August 2014, and a production decision is planned for second quarter
fiscal year 2017 (2QFY17) with a production contract award in the same
quarter. Installation of the Bradley ECP2 modifications is due to begin
2QFY17 and complete in 4QFY33 at a production rate of 180 vehicles per
year until all 2,574 A3 Bradley's have been modified and fielded.
25. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, how much will ECP2 cost
from start to finish?
General Williamson. The Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)
development cost for the Engineering Change Proposal 2 is $542 million
in base year 2012 dollars (BY2012$). The procurement cost to update all
2,574 A3 Bradley vehicles to ECP2 configuration is $5,251 million in
BY2012$. Using base year dollars creates a commonality that accurately
compares costs across the entire time period.
bradley second phase engineering proposal transmission
26. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, looking at the fiscal
year 2016 budget request, upgrading the Bradley power train will entail
the development of a new transmission. What is the status of that
development effort?
General Williamson. The ECP2 power train upgrade includes the
upgrade of the legacy transmission rather than the development of a new
transmission. This approach has been used successfully with the X1100
series of transmissions in the Abrams program in the past and is
similar to the effort ongoing for the current Abrams ECP1 upgrade. The
transmission component design qualification test is complete (2QFY14),
with qualification of improved brakes in process to be complete 4QFY15.
Also, the ECP2 program will begin system level qualification testing in
2QFY16.
27. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, when was it begun and
what are your key milestones going forward?
General Williamson. Hydromechanical Power Train (HMPT) 800 system
integration for Bradley began in fiscal year 2011 as an upgrade to the
legacy Bradley transmission (HMPT 500-3ECB). HMPT 800 was already
fielded in foreign vehicles and began production for Bradley and M109A7
FOV applications in fiscal year 2014. Key milestones going forward are
completion of component qualification for the brake improvements
(4QFY15); production decision for brake improvement (3QFY17) in
conjunction with Bradley ECP2 production decision.
28. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, how much do you expect
the development of a new Bradley transmission to cost and what costs
does that estimate include?
General Williamson. The upgrade development of the legacy
transmission, not the development of a new transmission, is expected to
cost $40.8 million. This estimate includes the direct cost to the
supplier for development engineering, component qualification, quantity
of 12 transmissions for contractor testing, and 15 transmissions to
support system level government testing for ECP2.
bradley transmission performance
29. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, have there been
performance issues with the Bradley transmission in the past?
General Williamson. In the case of the Hydromechanical Power Train
(HMPT), there were demonstrated reliability issues during Operation
Iraqi Freedom in fiscal year 2004. The issues were attributed to
component quality and inconsistent manufacturing process between
organic and contractor manufacturing sites. By fiscal year 2008, these
issues were resolved and reliability exceeded requirements resulting in
pure fleet release of the HMPT 500-3ECB.
30. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, under the current plans
for ECP2, are you working with the supplier of the legacy transmission?
General Williamson. Yes, in March 2012, the Army conducted a
sources sought notice for an 800 hp cross-drive transmission for ECP2
that could be dropped into the Bradley hull without major modifications
to the baseline platform. The supplier of the legacy transmission (L-3
Combat Propulsion Systems) was the only company that responded to the
government's inquiry.
31. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, when was the last time
there was an Army or independent assessment of the performance of the
legacy transmission?
General Williamson. The Extended Follow-on Production Test (EFPT),
which is a full reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM)
assessment was done June 2009 - July 2010. Additionally, HMPT 500-3ECB
qualification tests were also completed in 2010.
update of legacy bradley transmission
32. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, has the new transmission
planned for ECP2 been fielded in any other vehicles in the United
States or abroad?
General Williamson. HMPT 800 is fielded in foreign vehicles and
began production for Bradley and M109A7/M992A3 Paladin Family of
Vehicles applications in fiscal year 2014.
33. Senator Donnelly. General McMaster, how different is the new
transmission developed for ECP2 from the legacy?
General McMaster, The legacy transmission is the HMPT 500-3ECB
(ECB). The HMPT 800 is an upgrade of the legacy transmission and is 77
percent common with it. The net power input has been increased to 800
horsepower from 600 horsepower with an associated increase in output
and steering torque. Heat rejection and brake capacity are also
increased resulting in a slight increase in overall weight. However,
the overall transmission volume has been retained allowing the improved
transmission to drop directly into the platform without additional
modifications as was required in the original solicitation.
34. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, where are you with
testing the planned ECP2 transmission, and what are your schedule and
significant milestones?
General Williamson. The transmission component design qualification
test is complete (2QFY14), with qualification of improved brakes in
process to be complete 4QFY15. Also, the ECP2 program will begin system
level qualification testing in 2QFY16.
alternative bradley transmission
35. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, I understand an
alternative was offered to the transmission currently planned for ECP2.
When did the supplier of this alternative transmission first approach
the Army seeking the opportunity to compete for the future of the
Bradley program?
General Williamson. The Bradley office conducted an Industry Day in
February 2012 where alternative transmission suppliers presented what
they had currently available. Then in March 2012, the Army queried
industry sources for an 800 hp cross-drive transmission. L-3
Communications Combat Propulsion System was the only company that
responded. Allison Transmission Incorporated (ATI) signed a Cooperative
Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with the Tank Automotive
Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) in April 2012,
then this CRADA was updated to modify Bradley vehicles to integrate the
ATI transmission in October 2013 following a presentation by ATI in
August at HQDA.
36. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, how did the Army consider
this alternative transmission in planning ECP2?
General Williamson. The Product Manager Bradley conducted an
Industry Day in February 2012 where alternative transmission suppliers
presented what they currently had available. Only the legacy
transmission upgrade was determined to meet performance (form, fit, and
function), cost, and schedule requirements for ECP2. In March 2012, the
Army conducted a sources sought notice for an 800 hp cross-drive
transmission. The legacy supplier, L-3 Communications Combat Propulsion
System, was the only company that responded. Follow-on Market Research
was conducted in January 2013, for a similarly configured cross drive
transmission. The research evaluated transmissions previously submitted
by Allison Transmissions Incorporated and other manufacturers; however,
none were found to be capable of meeting the Bradley Fighting Vehicles'
maneuver and power requirements.
37. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, was there a competitive
bidding process, and did the Army conduct some type of business case
analysis?
General Williamson. In Fiscal Year 2005, Product Manager Bradley
conducted a Business Case Analysis to determine an economical solution
to the reliability issues discussed previously. The result of this
study determined that improvements to the legacy transmission were more
economical than total replacement of the legacy transmission. In March
2012, the Army conducted a sources sought notice for an 800 hp cross-
drive transmission. The legacy supplier, L-3 Communications Combat
Propulsion System, was the only company that responded. Follow-on
Market Research was conducted in January 2013, for a similarly
configured cross drive transmission. The research evaluated
transmissions previously submitted by Allison Transmission
Incorporation and other manufacturers; however, but none were found to
be capable of meeting the Bradley Fighting Vehicle's maneuver and power
requirements.
development and testing of alternative bradley transmission
38. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, it is my understanding
that the supplier of the alternative transmission has tailored their
system to the Bradley at their own expense. Is that accurate?
General Williamson. The supplier is modifying an existing
transmission (X300) that is in production by Caterpillar Defense in the
UK and manufactured under license from Allison Transmission
Incorporated. The transmission is used in the British Army's Warrior
Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), the Kuwait Army's Desert Warrior IFV,
and in the Swedish V90 IFV. Both the UK based transmission and the
Bradley power train compartment must be modified to incorporate the
transmission into the vehicle. The supplier did perform all vehicle
modifications and optimizations at their own expense using two Bradley
vehicles on loan from the Army. Government personnel have attended
various meetings and design reviews. Some of the major modifications
done to the Army supplied Bradley A3 vehicles by the supplier include:
development of a new Power Take-Off (PTO) unit for the cooling fan and
alternator, recalibration of unit of the engine to match their
transmission speeds, development of a new final drives, removal of an
existing transmission mount to fit the transmission into the vehicle,
modification of the braking and steering, and replacement of the shift
selector. The Allison Transmissions Incorporation vehicle prototype
modifications are likely to introduce new proprietary data restrictions
and consequences for aspects of the vehicle Technical Data Package
(TDP) that are currently wholly owned by the government.
39. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, it is also my
understanding that the supplier has completed that integration into two
prototype vehicles and will begin contractor testing in the coming
weeks at their own expense, with the Army monitoring. Is that correct?
General Williamson. The supplier has completed the integration into
one prototype vehicle to date. All vehicle road course testing is
funded by the supplier. Calibration and optimization testing is
currently underway at the Northern Indiana Proving Ground, New
Carlisle, Indiana test facility. In July 2015, performance and
efficiency testing will begin at the Army's Aberdeen Proving Grounds,
Aberdeen, Maryland. The Army will be present to view the testing and
all data is expected to be delivered to the Tank Automotive Research,
Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC). Based on the test
results, the supplier will then integrate a second prototype vehicle
which will then be delivered to TARDEC in January 2016 for vehicle
testing in a test laboratory. The Army will fund the testing of the
vehicle in TARDEC's Power and Energy Vehicle Environmental Laboratory
(PEVEL).
40. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, the Carl Levin and Howard
P. ``Buck'' McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2015 required the Army to report to Congress on your Armored Vehicle
Transmission Industrial Base strategy. That report states that the Army
is supporting the effort to install and test an alternative
transmission in Bradley test vehicles. How is the Army involved in
supporting that installation and contractor testing process?
General Williamson. A Cooperative Research and Development
Agreement (CRADA) was developed between the Tank Automotive Research,
Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC) and Allison Transmissions
Incorporation (ATI) for transmission and vehicle integration. PM
Bradley loaned two vehicles to ATI for transmission integration and
vehicle level testing, and TARDEC has completed transmission testing in
their test facility.
41. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, the Army's February 2015
report notes that if the results of contractor testing are positive,
the Army will conduct follow up testing. What are you looking for in
the contractor testing, and what is a positive result?
General Williamson. The Army expects that the contractor testing
will provide sufficient data to validate that there is no degradation
of automotive performance with the substitute transmission and that
critical sustainment data such as reliability and fuel economy support
an assessment of expected Operations and Support (O&S) costs. The O&S
cost assessment in conjunction with the contractors' estimated
acquisition costs are required to judge the validity of the
contractor's previously submitted cost savings claims to the Army. A
positive result of contractor testing would be indicated if a business
case analysis of these acquisition and sustainment costs corroborates
that a Value Engineering Change Proposal is justified. The Army will
conduct follow-on testing to verify the business case for the change.
42. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, what is involved in the
Army's follow-up testing, and how long should that take?
General Williamson. The Army will be performing vehicle testing in
the Tank and Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center's
Power & Energy Vehicle Environmental Laboratory. The supplier is
scheduled to deliver the vehicle in January fiscal year 2016. Testing
will take about three months.
43. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, if the Army testing goes
well, what other analysis must the Army perform in order to determine
whether you will use this alternative transmission going forward?
General Williamson. With the data obtained from the testing, as
well as manufacturing cost estimates, the Value Engineering Change
Proposal analysis will assess if the functionality (performance,
reliability, quality, safety, etc.) of the vehicle is maintained or
enhanced and that there are sufficient life-cycle savings available to
justify making such a change.
44. Senator Donnelly. General Williamson, are there elements of the
cost and schedule analyses that the Army could be doing now, while
contractor testing is underway?
General Williamson. The Army is conducting an informal cost benefit
analysis on the value of competing the Bradley transmission.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
jungle operations training center
45. Senator Hirono. General McMaster, Jungle Warfare training is an
important capability which the United States has not had since the
closure of the Jungle Training School in Panama. The U.S. Army Pacific
(USARPAC) runs a Jungle Operations Training Center at Schofield
Barracks, training soldiers and marines in skills important within the
jungle environments of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Are there plans to
formally budget and program for this school and to bring it into the
Army's training structure with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC)?
General McMaster. There are no plans to formally budget or program
the USARPAC Jungle Operations Training Center at Schofield Barracks and
to bring it into the Army's training structure with the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC has provided USARPAC
assistance with the development of training products to support USARPAC
with the establishment of their Jungle Operations Training Center.
TRADOC, through the US. Army Infantry School as the course proponent
for Jungle Operations, will continue to support the Jungle Operations
Training Center at Schofield Barracks with training products. TRADOC
will work with USARPAC to determine the feasibility of a multinational
training center in the region. The 25th ID is not requesting JOTC
become an approved and accredited TRADOC course.
aviation restructure initiative
46. Senator Hirono. General Cheek, as the Army moves forward with
its Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI), is it considering bringing
Apaches to Hawaii?
General Cheek. If the fiscal year 2015 NDAA is executed and the
transfer of AH-64 Apaches from the Army National Guard (ARNG) to the
Active Component (AC) is not delayed or hindered in any way, AH-64
Apaches will arrive in Hawaii in May 2016.
If the current law is changed and transfers are delayed, Fort
Riley, Kansas, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and Fort Drum, New York will
lose 24 AH-64 Apaches and approximately 1500 Soldiers and family
members for an indefinite period of time.
A delay in fiscal year 2016 will cause the 1st Infantry Division at
Fort Riley, KS, the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, HI,
and the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY, to be short 50 percent
of their AH-64 Apache helicopters (the loss of one of two Attack
Helicopter Battalions). Failure to transfer AH-64s from the National
Guard to Hawaii will result in zero AH-64 Apaches being available to
train with the 25th Infantry Division's Brigade Combat Teams in Hawaii.
Delays will cause readiness issues in 3 of 10 Regular Army Divisions
and leave the assigned Attack Reconnaissance Squadrons unready for
operational employment in fiscal year 2017.
Prohibiting future transfers beyond the initial 48 aircraft will
require $5.52 billion in additional procurement and $350M annually in
operations & sustainment funding; disrupt or delay nearly all aviation
modernization programs to include UH-60A Blackhawk upgrades in the
Guard; create up to a five-year readiness hole and insufficient ready
forces to meet demands; and/or cause additional Regular Army aviation
reductions.
renewable biofuels power plant
47. Senator Hirono. General Williamson, energy is vital to our
national security and an expensive commodity particularly for an island
state. I applaud the Army's intent to partner with Hawaiian Electric on
Oahu for the development of a 50-megawatt power plant using renewable
biofuels that would provide energy security to Army installations and
stability for the wider electrical grid. Can you provide an update on
where the Army stands in the process of completing the necessary
environmental and historic studies to move forward with this project?
General Williamson. The Army is continuing to move forward with the
necessary environmental and cultural resource studies as required under
Federal regulations. On 24 April 2015, the Army published the Notice of
Availability of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the
proposed lease of land and granting of easements on Schofield Barracks
and Wheeler Army Airfield to Hawaiian Electric Company (Hawaiian
Electric) for a 50-megawatt (MW) capacity, biofuel-capable power
generation plant. The publication in the Federal Register marks the
beginning of a 45-day public and agency comment period. In addition to
taking written comments from the public during this period, the Army
and Hawaiian Electric will host public meeting forums on Oahu on 20 and
21 May 2015 in order to solicit remarks on the Draft EIS. The public
comment period will end 8 June 2015. Following the public comment
period, the DEIS will be revised to address any remarks received. The
Army expects to reach a Record of Decision for the EIS in December
2015.
In addition to the DEIS, the Army is conducting the Section 106
consultations required by the National Historic Preservation Act and
has sought consultation with the Hawaii State Historic Preservation
Officer (SHPO), numerous Native Hawaiian Organizations and the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation, among others as part of that process.
Army has reached a tentative agreement with SHPO, Hawaiian Electric,
and Historic Hawaii Foundation for a determination of `no adverse
affect, with conditions'. The project proponent has agreed to use
vegetation screening of the power poles to avoid the adverse visual
impact to historic districts located on the installation and Army
anticipates written concurrence from SHPO within two weeks.
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