[Senate Hearing 114-214]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-214
MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 17, 2015
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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march 25, 2015
Page
Ballistic Missile Defense Programs............................... 1
Shear, The Honorable David B., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense. 4
Harris, Admiral Harry B., Jr., USN, Commander U.S. Pacific
Command........................................................ 10
Questions for the Record......................................... 37
(iii)
MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2015
U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators McCain [presiding],
Inhofe, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee,
Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Senator McCain. Well, good morning.
The Senate Armed Services meets today to receive testimony
on the U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region.
I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing
before us today and for your continued service to the Nation.
America's national interests in the Asia-Pacific region are
deep and enduring. We seek to maintain a balance of power that
fosters a peaceful expansion of free societies, free trade,
free markets, and free commons, air, sea, space, and cyber.
These are values that we share with increasing numbers of
Asia's citizens. For 7 decades, administrations of both parties
have worked with our friends and allies in the region to uphold
this rules-based order and to enlist new partners in this
shared effort, an effort that now extends to states like
Indonesia and Vietnam.
No country has benefited more from a peaceful regional
order in the Asia-Pacific region than China. I am betraying my
advanced age when I say that I still remember being in the
Great Hall of the People on the occasion of the normalization
between our countries. Since then, China's social and economic
development has been remarkable, and it has added to the
prosperity of the world.
Unfortunately, we increasingly see a pattern of behavior
from China that suggests that some of our highest hopes for our
relationship are not materializing and that call into question
for nations across the Pacific whether China's rise will, in
fact, be peaceful. Indeed, many of these troubling activities
have only increased under the leadership of the new president,
who will arrive here next week for a state visit.
China's military modernization continues with its emphasis
on advanced systems that appear designed to project power,
counter U.S. military capabilities, and deny the United States
the ability to access and operate in the western Pacific. At
the same time, cyber attacks against the United States are
growing in scope, scale, and frequency. Billions of dollars'
worth of intellectual property, including sensitive defense
information, have been stolen. Many of these attacks,
especially the recent breach at the Office of Personnel
Management, are believed by everyone to have originated in
China despite the administration's unwillingness to say so.
These growing threats are compounded by China's assertion
of vast territorial claims in the East and South China Seas,
which are inconsistent with international law. In 2013, Beijing
proclaimed an air defense identification zone over large
portions of the East China Sea, including over territory
claimed by Japan and South Korea. More recently China has
reclaimed nearly 3,000 acres of land in the South China Sea,
more than all other claimants combined and at an unprecedented
pace. Last month, China's foreign minister said it had halted
these activities, but recently released satellite images show
clearly that this is not true.
What's more, China is rapidly militarizing this reclaimed
land, building garrisons, harbors, intelligence and
surveillance infrastructure, and at least three airstrips that
could support military aircraft. With the addition of surface-
to-air missiles and radars, these new land features could
enable China to declare and enforce an air defense
identification zone in the South China Sea and to hold that
vital region at risk.
China is incrementally and unilaterally changing the status
quo through coercion, intimidation, even force. Its goal
appears clear: the assertion of sovereignty over the South
China Sea, a key economic artery through which approximately $5
trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year. As one Chinese
admiral recently told a conference in London about the South
China Sea, quote, it belongs to China.
The United States has rightly rejected this view. As
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter said in May, ``turning an
underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the
rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international
air or maritime transit." Secretary Carter vowed that ``the
United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever
international law allows, as U.S. forces do all over the
world."
Unfortunately, it has been 4 months since that speech, but
the administration has continued to restrict our Navy ships
from operating within 12 nautical miles of country's reclaimed
islands. This is a dangerous mistake that grants de facto
recognition of China's manmade sovereignty claims. These
restrictions have continued even after China sent its own naval
vessels within 12 nautical miles of the Aleutian Islands as
President Obama concluded his recent visit to Alaska.
After that incident, United States officials emphasized
that the Chinese ships did not violate international law, which
allows countries to transit other nations' territorial seas
under what is called innocent passage. That is true, but we
have not been asserting our rights just as forcefully. We must
uphold the principle of freedom of the seas for commercial and
military purposes on, under, and below the water. The best sign
of that commitment would be to conduct freedom of navigation
operations within 12 nautical miles of China's reclaimed
islands in the South China Sea.
More broadly, the United States must continue to sustain a
favorable military balance in the Asia-Pacific region. We must
remain clear-eyed about the implications of China's rapid
military modernization. We must take advantage of new and
emerging technologies to preserve our ability to project power
over long distances and operate in contested environments. We
must invest in enhancing the resilience of our forward-deployed
forces. We must continue to help our allies and partners in the
Asia-Pacific region to build their maritime capacity, an
initiative that this committee seeks to further in the fiscal
year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA]. None of
this will be possible, however, if we continue to live with the
mindless sequestration and a broken acquisition system.
All of us want to ensure that we avoid miscalculation, but
we only encourage miscalculation when there is a gap between
our words and our actions. It is that gap that China has
exploited to assert vast territorial claims, bully its
neighbors, destabilize the region, and challenge the freedom of
the seas.
Ultimately, we need to think anew about deterrence. When it
comes to China's destabilizing activities, it is not that the
United States is doing nothing. It is that nothing we are doing
has been sufficient to deter China from continuing activities
that the United States and our allies and partners say are
unacceptable, the cyber attacks, the economic espionage and
theft, the land reclamation, the coercion of its neighbors, and
the assertion and attempted enforcement of vast, unlawful
territorial claims. We need to develop options and act on them
to deter these admittedly unconventional threats or else they
will continue and grow. They will do so at the expense of the
national security interests of the United States, the peace and
stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and a rules-based
international order.
With that, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses
today.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me first thank you for calling this important hearing on
maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region and also thank the
witnesses for appearing today. Thank you, gentlemen, for your
service to the Nation, to the Navy. Thank you both.
When Senator McCain and I were in Vietnam, we heard concern
from almost every single government official about the
heightened tension in the South China Sea caused by China's
activities. Vietnam is not alone in this regard. For the last 2
years, China has undertaken extraordinary and unprecedented
reclamation activities on disputed land features in the South
China Sea that have alarmed all of the countries in the region,
most of which would prefer to resolve these territorial
disputes through legal means under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. These activities appear to
have just been the beginning as China has now turned to
militarizing these features by building airstrips and
surveillance towers that I believe will further destabilize the
region.
While there has been some progress on the bilateral
strategy to decrease tension between the United States Navy and
the Chinese Navy for the establishment of new risk reduction
mechanisms, such as engagement rules to air and maritime
safety, our efforts to date do not seem to have had an impact
on China's aggressive tactics in the South China Sea. I would
like to hear from the witnesses on what the Department believes
is the best way forward to address this activity and whether
current efforts are sufficient to deescalate tension and
convince the Chinese Government to pursue a legal and
diplomatic solution to its territorial disputes with its
neighbors.
I am also quite concerned with North Korea's recent
rhetoric that it is improving its nuclear arsenal in, quote,
quality and quantity, further contributing to the heightened
tensions in the region. Admiral Harris, I would especially like
to get your assessment and update on the threat posed by the
North Koreans and how we are addressing it.
With that, gentlemen, I look forward to your testimony.
Senator McCain. I welcome the witnesses. Secretary Shear,
it is nice to see you again and thank you for your continued
outstanding service, including as our Ambassador to Vietnam.
Admiral Harris, I know that you are relatively new in your job,
and we thank you for the great job you are doing. We look
forward to your testimony. We will begin with you, Mr.
Secretary.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID B. SHEAR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Shear. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, thank
you, Ranking Member Reed, and all the members of the committee
for inviting me to join you today.
I am particularly pleased to be here discussing the Defense
Department's maritime security strategy for the Asia-Pacific
region and to be alongside our very capable U.S. Pacific
Commander, Admiral Harry Harris.
Last month, the Department of Defense released a report
detailing its Asia-Pacific maritime security strategy, which
reflects both the enduring interest the United States has in
the Asia-Pacific and the premium we place on maritime peace and
security in this critical part of the world. This strategy is
one element of the United States Government's larger
comprehensive strategy to uphold maritime security in the Asia-
Pacific region and protect America's principle interests in
international law, freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful
commerce, and peaceful resolution of disputes.
For 70 years, United States military presence in the Asia-
Pacific has played an indispensable role in undergirding
regional peace, stability, and security and will continue to
protect these interests in the future.
There are, as you know, growing challenges in maritime
Asia, trends and behaviors that we detailed in the strategy
report. Regional military modernization has increased
significantly the potential for dangerous miscalculations or
conflict in the maritime domain. Strong nationalist sentiments
inflame passions over territorial disputes and discourage good
faith negotiations to resolve them. Competition abounds over
significant but finite natural resources. In the South China
Sea, China has almost completed large-scale efforts to reclaim
land and construct artificial islands on disputed features in
the Spratly Islands.
While land reclamation is not new and China is not the only
claimant to have conducted reclamation, as the chart to my
right shows, China's recent activities far outweigh other
efforts in size, pace, and effort. We are concerned about
China's long-term intentions for these features and the
potential for further militarization of the South China Sea. As
we have stated clearly to the Chinese, these actions are not
only unilaterally altering the status quo, they are also
complicating the lowering of tensions and the peaceful
resolution of disputes.
Let me be clear. The Defense Department is not standing
still in the face of these challenges. We are systematically
implementing a long-term strategy aimed at preserving United
States interests and military access, building the capability
of our allies and partners, and preserving the stability of the
Asia-Pacific domain. The Department's strategy comprises four
lines of effort.
First, we are strengthening our military capacity to ensure
the United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion
and respond decisively when needed. DOD [Department of Defense]
is investing in new cutting-edge capabilities, deploying our
finest maritime capabilities forward, and distributing these
capabilities more widely across the region.
Second, we are working together with our allies and
partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their
maritime capacity. We are building greater interoperability and
developing more integrated operations with our allies and
partners. We are also expanding our regional exercise program
with a particular focus on developing new multilateral
exercises and expanding training with Southeast Asian partners.
The Defense Department is also implementing a new Southeast
Asia maritime security initiative. This effort will increase
training and exercises, personnel support, and maritime domain
awareness capabilities for our partners in Southeast Asia.
On that note, I would like to express our thanks and
appreciation to the members of this committee for their work to
include a South China Sea-focused maritime capacity- building
authority in their draft of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA. I cannot
emphasize enough how important maritime capacity-building is to
our overarching strategy.
Third, we are leveraging defense diplomacy and building
greater transparency. We are trying to reduce the risk of
miscalculation or conflict and promoting shared maritime rules
of the road. The Department is actively seeking to mitigate
risk in maritime Asia both for bilateral efforts with China, as
well as region-wide risk reduction measures.
These and other elements of United States-China defense
diplomacy have yielded some positive results. United States and
PLA [People's Liberation Army] Navy vessels have now
successfully employed the code for unplanned encounters at sea
on multiple occasions during recent interactions. I would note
that while the United States operates consistent with the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], we
have seen positive momentum in promoting shared rules of the
road. Our efforts would be greatly strengthened by Senate
ratification of UNCLOS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you
and other members for your support on this issue.
Finally, we are working to strengthen regional security
institutions and encourage the development of an open and
effective regional security architecture. ASEAN [Association of
Southeast Asian Nations] is an increasingly important DOD
partner, and the Department is enhancing its engagement in
ASEAN-based institutions. This includes efforts such as our
decision to host ASEAN defense ministers for their 2014 U.S.-
ASEAN Defense Forum, as well as Secretary Carter's recent
announcement of DOD's commitment to deploy a technical advisor
in support of ASEAN's maritime security efforts.
Throughout its history, the U.S. has relied upon and
advocated for freedom of the seas. This freedom is essential to
our economic and security interests and nowhere more so than in
the Asia-Pacific. The Department is constantly working to
evaluate the strategic environment to ensure we have the
necessary strategy, resources, and tools to meet the challenges
we face. We are clear-eyed about the growing complexity of this
task. Yet, we are making progress that, over the long term,
will be significant in shaping the regional security
environment. We are making calculated and careful investments.
We are gaining unprecedented access in the region. Our
relationships and interoperability with allies and partners are
stronger than ever before. Moreover, partners across the region
are enhancing their defense cooperation with each other in
unprecedented ways.
In short, we are deeply committed to the maritime security
of the Asia-Pacific region. We do not discount the extent of
the challenges, but we are undertaking a comprehensive effort
to ensure that maritime Asia remains open, free, and secure in
the decades ahead.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Shear follows:]
prepared statement by hon. david b. shear
introduction
Thank you very much Chairman McCain. Thank you also to Ranking
Member Reed and other members of the committee for inviting me to be
here to speak with you today.
I am pleased to be here to discuss maritime issues in the Asia-
Pacific and the Department of Defense's new Asia-Pacific Maritime
Security Strategy, which we released last month. This strategy reflects
the enduring interests the United States has in the region and the
premium we place on maritime peace and security in this critical part
of the world. Throughout its history, the United States has relied upon
and advocated for freedom of the seas, and this freedom is essential to
our economic and security interests, nowhere more so than in the Asia-
Pacific.
It is important to note that while this strategy reflects the
Defense Department's maritime objectives and activities in the Asia-
Pacific, DOD's efforts are simply one aspect of a much broader U.S.
strategy to protect America's principled interests in upholding
international law, freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce,
and peaceful resolution of disputes. The United States has a
comprehensive strategy to uphold maritime security in the region--one
that leverages diplomacy, multilateral institutions, commitment to
international law, maritime capacity building, trade, and continued
engagement across the region.
The Department of Defense plays an important part in supporting
these goals. For seventy years, our robust maritime capabilities, and
the presence of U.S. sailors, soldiers, Marines, and airmen, have
helped protect the freedom of navigation and commerce upon which the
United States and all Asia-Pacific nations rely. As we note in the
Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy report, ``freedom of the seas''
reflects far more than simply freedom of navigation for commercial
vessels. It also implies all of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses
of the sea and airspace, including for military ships and aircraft,
recognized under international law.
Unfortunately, in recent years, we have seen a number of changes
take place in the maritime security environment that have the potential
to undermine the freedoms and the peace and security the region has
enjoyed for decades. So before I discuss the details of our strategy,
allow me to offer some thoughts on the strategic context for this
report.
strategic context
Over the past several decades, the Asia-Pacific has experienced one
of the most tremendous economic transformations in modern history,
thanks in no small part to the growth of free and open trade across the
region's sea lanes. As Secretary Carter noted, this growth has been the
result of a peaceful security environment. While regional trade and
prosperity continue to grow, recent developments in the maritime
domain, if left unaddressed, could challenge the stable security
environment that has enabled this historic progress. These include
rapid military modernization, growing competition for resources, and
intensifying territorial and maritime disputes.
In recent years, Asia-Pacific nations have significantly increased
their surface, subsurface, and air capabilities, leading to a dramatic
increase in the number of military planes and vessels operating in
close proximity in the maritime domain. At the same time, this military
modernization has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in
regional law enforcement capabilities, which have become increasingly
relevant as some countries, particularly China, are using their
civilian assets to assert claims over disputed maritime areas.
While military modernization efforts are a natural and expected
element of economic growth, they also increase the potential for
dangerous miscalculations or conflict. This places a premium on the
need for Asia-Pacific nations to adhere to shared maritime rules of the
road, such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), and to
pursue increased transparency and risk reduction mechanisms to ensure
safe behavior in the maritime domain.
The potential for instability is also exacerbated by the existence
of long-standing territorial and maritime disputes across the region,
most notably in the South China Sea. While we do not take a position on
conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea, we do emphasize
that all maritime claims must be derived from land features in
accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea
Convention, and any disputes should be settled peacefully and in
accordance with international law. We have called for all claimants to
reciprocally and permanently halt land reclamation, the construction of
new facilities, and the further militarization of outposts on disputed
features. We have also encouraged all claimants to conclude a Code of
Conduct by the time of the East Asia Summit in November, one that would
create clear rules of the road in the South China Sea.
China's large-scale land reclamation on disputed features over the
past two years has brought concerns about regional stability into
sharper focus. While land reclamation is not a new development, and
China is not the only claimant to have conducted reclamation, China's
recent activities significantly exceed other efforts in size, pace, and
effect. China has now reclaimed more than 2,900 acres, amounting to 17
times more land in 20 months than the other claimants combined over the
past 40 years, and accounting for approximately 95 percent of all
reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands. China has clearly stated that
the outposts will have a military component to them, and by undertaking
these actions, China is not only unilaterally altering the status quo
in the region, they are also complicating the lowering of tensions and
the resolution of South China Sea disputes. We continue to encourage
all claimants to commit to reciprocally and permanently halt further
land reclamation, construction, and militarization of outposts in the
South China Sea, in order to create space for diplomatic solutions to
emerge.
dod's maritime strategy
The Department has devised a comprehensive and systematic maritime
strategy to meet these challenges. Our strategy is focused on three
fundamental goals: safeguarding the freedom of the seas; deterring
conflict and coercion; and promoting adherence to international law and
standards.
In pursuit of these goals, the Department is: strengthening United
States military capacity; building the maritime capabilities of allies
and partners in maritime Asia; reducing the risk of potential conflicts
by leveraging military diplomacy; and strengthening regional security
institutions.
Strengthening U.S. Military Capacity
As part of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, we are strengthening
our military capacity to ensure the United States can successfully
deter conflict and coercion and respond decisively when needed. To
achieve this objective, the Department is investing in new cutting-edge
capabilities, deploying our finest maritime capabilities forward, and
distributing these capabilities more widely across the region.
We also are enhancing our regional force posture--particularly air
and maritime assets--to ensure our ability to execute key missions. We
are deploying some of our most advanced surface ships to the Asia-
Pacific, including replacing the aircraft carrier USS George Washington
in 2015 with the newer USS Ronald Reagan; sending our newest air
operations-oriented amphibious assault ship, the USS America, to the
region by 2020; deploying two additional Aegis-capable destroyers to
Japan; and home-porting all three of our newest class of stealth
destroyers, the DDG-1000, with the Pacific fleet. Through these and
other efforts, the U.S. Navy will increase the size of Pacific Fleet's
overseas assigned forces by approximately 30 percent over the next five
years.
This enhanced military capacity will allow the Department to
maintain a higher tempo of routine and persistent maritime presence
activities across the Asia-Pacific. In short, you will see more of the
U.S. Navy in the region in the coming years. United States Pacific
Command maintains a robust shaping presence in and around the South
China Sea, with activities ranging from training and exercises with
allies and partners to port calls to Freedom of Navigation Operations
and other routine operations. These activities are central to our
efforts to dissuade conflict, preserve our access to the region,
encourage peaceful resolution of maritime disputes and adherence to the
rule of law, and to strengthen our relationships with partners and
allies.
A key component of DOD operations falls under the Freedom of
Navigation (FON) program, conducted in conjunction with our interagency
partners. The Department is placing new emphasis on these operations,
which challenge excessive maritime claims around the world and directly
support adherence to international maritime law. Between 2013 and 2014,
we increased global FON operations by 84 percent, the majority of which
were conducted in the Asia-Pacific. As Secretary Carter has stated, the
United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever
international law allows, as U.S. forces do all around the world, and
our FON Operations are a critical example of this.
The Department is also enhancing its forward presence by using
existing assets in new ways, across the entire region, with an emphasis
on operational flexibility and maximizing the value of U.S. assets
despite the tyranny of distance. This is why the Department is working
to develop a more distributed, resilient, and sustainable posture. As
part of this effort, the United States will maintain its presence in
Northeast Asia, while enhancing defense posture across the Western
Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. The cornerstone of our
forward presence will continue to be our presence in Japan, and in an
effort to ensure that this presence is sustainable, we have worked
within the alliance to develop a new laydown for the U.S. Marine Corps
in the Pacific. Through the bilateral Force Posture Agreement (FPA)
with Australia and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
with the Philippines, the Department will be able to increase our
routine and persistent rotational presence in Southeast Asia for
expanded training with regional partners.
Through these efforts, there should be no doubt that the United
States will maintain the necessary military presence and capabilities
to protect our interests and those of our allies and partners against
potential threats in the maritime domain.
Building Ally and Partner Capacity
However, our strategy involves far more than U.S. capacity and
presence. The bedrock of our approach in the region is our strong
network of allies and partners, and the combined capabilities these
relationships can bring to bear. Through regular and close
consultations with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the
Indian Ocean, the Department of Defense is working to bolster the
maritime capacity and capabilities of countries in the region.
First, we are building greater interoperability and developing more
integrated operations with our allies and partners. For example, with
our close ally Japan, we are working to improve the maritime-related
capabilities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. As Japan acquires
advanced capabilities such as V-22 Ospreys, E-2D Hawkeyes, and Global
Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, we are building a stronger and more
interoperable alliance. Our expanded bilateral cooperation will now
encompass a range of activities, from peacetime cooperation on shared
maritime domain awareness, up to cooperation across a range of
contingencies. In Southeast Asia, the Department is assisting the
Philippines to more effectively establish a minimum credible defense,
and we have established new bilateral working groups with Vietnam,
Indonesia, and Singapore to support their maritime defense
requirements. In South Asia, we are working with the Indian Navy on
aircraft carrier technology sharing and design; the United States-India
Joint Aircraft Carrier Working Group (JACWG) had its first formal
meeting in August, led by Vice ADM Cheema, the Commander in Chief of
India's Western Fleet.
We also are increasing the size, frequency, and sophistication of
our regional exercise program, with a particular focus on developing
new exercises with Southeast Asian partners and expanding our
multilateral exercise program. A large contingent of United States,
Philippine, and Australian military personnel participated in this
year's exercise Balikatan in the Philippines, including observers from
Japan. DOD is continuing to expand its maritime engagements elsewhere
in Southeast Asia, with important partners like Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Vietnam. In Indonesia, the April 2015 iteration of the Sea
Surveillance Exercises included a flight portion over the South China
Sea for the first time, and the United States Marine Corps participated
in an amphibious exercise with the Malaysian Armed Forces. In Vietnam,
we are rapidly growing our maritime training, and in just six years,
our naval cooperation has grown from a simple port visit to multi-day
engagements that allow our sailors to better understand each other's
operations and procedures.
Our maritime capacity building efforts in Southeast Asia do not
stop there. As Secretary Carter announced at the Shangri-La Dialogue,
the Department is implementing a new Southeast Asia Maritime Security
Initiative (MSI) that will increase training and exercises, personnel
support, and maritime domain awareness capabilities for our partners in
Southeast Asia. As part of MSI, DOD, in coordination with the
Department of State, will consult with our allies and partners to
define the requirements needed to accomplish the goals of MSI and
explore other enduring opportunities for maritime collaboration. In the
near term, we are focused on several lines of effort: working with
partners to expand regional maritime domain awareness capabilities and
develop a regional common operating picture; providing the necessary
infrastructure, logistics support, and operational procedures to enable
more effective maritime response operations; strengthening partner
nation operational capabilities through expanded maritime exercises and
engagements; helping partners strengthen their maritime institutions,
governance, and personnel training; and identifying modernization and
new system requirements for critical maritime security capabilities. I
not only thank you for remaining focused on this important effort, but
also urge your continued support as we move forward to implement this
strategy.
Reducing Risk
In addition to our efforts to improve regional capabilities, the
Department is also leveraging defense diplomacy to build greater
transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and
promote shared maritime rules of the road. The Department is pursuing a
two-pronged approach to achieve this objective, one focusing on our
bilateral relationship with China, and the other focused on region-wide
risk reduction measures.
In recent years, we have reinvigorated efforts to expand bilateral
risk reduction mechanisms with China, including the Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement (MMCA) and the establishment of an historic
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Rules of Behavior for Safety of
Air and Maritime Encounters in 2014. This MOU established a common
understanding of operational procedures for air and maritime encounters
to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding between the United States
and Chinese militaries. The MOU currently includes an annex on ship-to-
ship encounters and we are working to expand it further by the end of
2015. Already, United States-China defense diplomacy has yielded
positive results; there have been no unsafe intercepts since August
2014. In further efforts to reduce risk, U.S. Navy and PLA Navy vessels
have successfully employed CUES during recent interactions, lowering
the likelihood of miscalculations that could lead to dangerous
escalation.
Of course, reaching agreement on bilateral risk reduction measures
with China is necessary, but not sufficient. The Department is also
working to help the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
other regional partners establish regional risk reduction mechanisms,
such as operational-level hotlines to establish more reliable and
routine crisis communication mechanisms. As I mentioned, MSI will help
develop a regional common operating picture to reduce risk, but we also
encourage the efforts of countries that seek to reduce tensions through
their own initiatives--such as Indonesia and Malaysia--who recently
announced their intention to exchange maritime envoys in an effort to
increase mutual transparency. We also have supported the efforts
between China and Japan to do the same in the East China Sea.
Building Regional Architecture
Finally, we are working to strengthen regional security
institutions and encourage the development of a transparent,
integrated, and diversified effective regional security architecture.
ASEAN is an increasingly important DOD partner, and the Department is
continuing to enhance its engagement in ASEAN-based institutions such
as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). To this end,
Secretary Carter will travel to Kuala Lumpur in November for the next
ADMM-Plus meeting. This will follow a host of new initiatives and
engagements with various ASEAN-related institutions. For example, at
the May 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the Secretary of Defense
announced DOD's commitment to deploy a technical advisor to augment the
U.S. Mission to ASEAN in support of ASEAN's maritime security efforts,
and we are making progress toward that goal. We are also leveraging
informal opportunities to strengthen regional cooperation, such as the
first United States-ASEAN Defense Forum then-Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel hosted in Hawaii in April 2014. Through these venues, we aim to
promote candid conversations about ongoing challenges in the maritime
domain, and encourage greater information sharing and cooperative
solutions.
At its core, any discussion about the future of the Asia-Pacific
naturally involves a discussion about maritime security, given the
defining characteristic of the maritime domain in the region. Our
strategy enables countries in the region to have confidence in our
conviction to uphold our principled maritime interests. Our strategy
also is designed to strengthen the rules-based order, where laws and
standards, not size and strength, determine outcomes to disputes. We
are not alone in seeking to advance this vision for the region, which
aligns our interests with our values; indeed, it is widely shared by
countries across the region that eagerly support our efforts. Even as
we address immediate challenges to our interests and those of our
allies and partners, we remain committed to this longer term goal.
conclusion
The Asia-Pacific and its maritime waterways remain critical to
United States security. The Department is actively working to stay
ahead of the evolving maritime security environment in the Asia-Pacific
by implementing a comprehensive strategy that will protect peace and
stability in the maritime domain. Together with our interagency
colleagues and regional allies and partners, the Department will help
ensure that maritime Asia remains open, free, and secure in the decades
ahead.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Admiral Harris?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Harris. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Senator Reed,
and distinguished members. It is my honor to appear once again
before this committee. I am pleased to be here with Assistant
Secretary Shear to discuss the Asia-Pacific maritime
strategies.
The United States is a maritime nation and the importance
of the Asia-Pacific region to our Nation's security and
prosperity cannot be overstated. Almost 30 percent of the
world's maritime trade, as the chairman said, over $5 trillion,
transits the South China Sea annually. This includes $1.2
trillion in ship-borne trade bound for the United States. The
Asia-Pacific region is critical for our Nation's economic
future.
For decades, this region has remained free from major
conflicts, allowing the United States and other Pacific
nations, including China, to enjoy the benefits of its vast
maritime spaces. However, the security environment is changing,
potentially placing this stability at risk. Rapid economic and
military modernization and a growing demand for resources have
increased the potential for conflict. Peacetime freedom of
navigation is under pressure.
If not handled properly, territorial and maritime disputes
in the East and South China Seas could disrupt stability
throughout the region. Claimants to disputed areas routinely
use maritime law enforcement and coast guard vessels to enforce
their claims while nominally keeping these issues out of the
military sphere. While no country appears to desire military
conflict, tactical miscalculations can lead to strategic
consequences.
The United States does not take sides on issues of
sovereignty with respect to these territorial disputes, but we
do insist that all maritime claims be derived from naturally-
formed land features in accordance with customary international
law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. The United
States also emphasizes the importance of peacefully resolving
maritime and territorial disagreements in accordance with
international law, and we oppose the use of intimidation,
coercion, or aggression. The U.S. believes every nation, large
or small, should have the opportunity to develop and prosper in
line with international laws and standards. If one country
selectively ignores these rules for its own benefit, others
will undoubtedly follow, eroding the international legal system
and destabilizing regional security and the prosperity of all
Pacific states. Part of PACOM's [United States Pacific Command]
role in the Asia-Pacific maritime strategy will be ensuring all
nations have continued access to the maritime spaces vital to
the global economy.
International recognition and protection of freedom of
navigation is vital to the world's economy and our way of life.
To safeguard the freedom of the seas, PACOM routinely exercises
with allies and partners, executes freedom of navigation
operations, and maintains a robust presence throughout the
region. These activities help build partner capacity to
contribute to the region's stability, enhance relationships,
improve understanding of shared challenges, and message the
U.S.'s resolve.
The Asia-Pacific maritime security strategy outlines our
plan to safeguard freedom of the seas, deter conflict, and
promote adherence to international laws and standards. It
reaffirms our commitment to the principles found in UNCLOS, and
in accordance with this strategy and in pursuit of these goals,
Pacific Command's forces fly, sail, and operate wherever
international law allows, while continuing to strengthen the
relationships and rule of law that enabled the peaceful rise of
every nation in the region.
A fundamental factor in the feasibility of this new
strategy has been the rebalance to the Pacific. The rebalance,
initiated almost 4 years ago by President Obama, set the
conditions for the implementation of this strategy. The
rebalance strengthened treaty alliances and partnerships,
increased partner capacities and cooperation, improved
interoperability, and increased security capabilities in the
region. DOD's new maritime strategy capitalizes on the momentum
of the rebalance and continues with its initiatives.
In executing the new maritime strategy, PACOM will continue
to employ the most advanced and capable platforms as they are
deployed or assigned to the Pacific; use the forward presence
of military forces to engage allies and partners to deter
aggression; reinforce internationally accepted rules and norms,
including the concepts of freedom of navigation and innocent
passage; train and exercise with allies and partners to
increase interoperability and build trust; implement risk
reduction mechanisms such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters
at Sea and the United States-China Confidence Building Measures
to help prevent accidents and tactical miscalculations; and
continue deepening alliances and partnerships through strategic
efforts in places like Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and
the Philippines, while building new and deeper relationships in
places like Singapore, India, Vietnam, and other likeminded
friends and partners.
Thank you for your continued support to USPACOM and our men
and women in uniform and their families who live and work in
the vast Asia-Pacific region. I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr.
Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and distinguished members, it's my
honor to appear once again before this committee. I am pleased to be
here with Assistant Secretary Shear to discuss the Asia Pacific
Maritime Security Strategy.
The United States is a maritime nation and the importance of Asia-
Pacific region to our Nation's security and prosperity cannot be
overstated. Almost 30 percent of the world's maritime trade--$5.3
trillion--transits the South China Sea annually. This includes $1.2
trillion in ship-borne trade bound for the United States. The Asia-
Pacific region is critical for our nation's economic future.
For decades, this region has remained free from major conflicts,
allowing the United States and other Pacific nations, including China,
to enjoy the benefits of its vast maritime spaces. However, the
security environment is changing, potentially placing this stability at
risk. Rapid economic and military modernization and a growing demand
for resources have increased the potential for conflict. Peacetime
freedom of navigation is under pressure.
If not handled properly, territorial and maritime disputes in the
East and South China Seas could disrupt stability throughout the
region. Claimants to disputed areas routinely use maritime law
enforcement and coast guard vessels to enforce their claims while
nominally keeping these issues out of the military sphere. While no
country appears to desire military conflict, tactical miscalculations
can lead to strategic consequences.
The United States does not take sides on issues of sovereignty with
respect to these territorial disputes, but we do insist that all
maritime claims be derived from naturally-formed land features in
accordance with customary international law, as reflected in the Law of
the Sea Convention. The United States also emphasizes the importance of
peacefully resolving maritime and territorial disagreements in
accordance with international law, and we oppose the use of
intimidation, coercion, or aggression. The U.S. believes every nation,
large or small, should have the opportunity to develop and prosper, in
line with international laws and standards. If one country selectively
ignores these rules for its own benefit, others will undoubtedly
follow, eroding the international legal system and destabilizing
regional security and the prosperity of all Pacific states. Part of
PACOM's role in the Asia-Pacific Maritime Strategy will be ensuring all
nations have continued access to the maritime spaces vital to the
global economy.
International recognition and protection of freedom of navigation
is vital to the world's economy and our way of life. To safeguard the
freedom of the seas, USPACOM routinely exercises with allies and
partners, executes Freedom of Navigation operations, and maintains a
robust presence throughout the region. These activities help build
partner capacity to contribute to the region's security, enhance
relationships, improve understanding of shared challenges, and message
the U.S.'s resolve.
The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy outlines our plan to
safeguard freedom of the seas, deter conflict, and promote adherence to
international law and standards. It reaffirms our commitment to the
principles found in UNCLOS. In accordance with this strategy and in
pursuit of these goals, Pacific Command's forces will fly, sail, and
operate wherever international law allows, while continuing to
strengthen the relationships and rule of law that enabled the peaceful
rise of every nation in the region.
A fundamental factor in the feasibility of this new strategy has
been the Rebalance to the Pacific. The Rebalance, initiated almost four
years ago by President Obama, set the conditions for the implementation
of this strategy. The Rebalance strengthened treaty alliances and
partnerships, increased partner capacity and cooperation, improved
interoperability, and increased security capabilities in the region.
DOD's new maritime strategy capitalizes on the momentum of the
Rebalance and continues with its initiatives. In executing the new
maritime strategy, PACOM will continue to:
Employ the most advanced and capable platforms as they
are deployed or assigned to the Pacific.
Use the forward presence of military forces to engage
allies and partners and deter aggression.
Reinforce internationally accepted rules and norms
including the concepts of freedom of navigation and innocent passage.
Train and exercise with allies and partners to increase
interoperability and build trust.
Implement risk reduction mechanisms such as the Code for
Unplanned Encounters at Sea and the United States-China Confidence
Building Measures to help prevent accidents and tactical
miscalculations.
Continue deepening alliances and partnerships through
strategic efforts in places like Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand and
the Philippines, while building new and deeper military relationships
in places like Singapore, India, Vietnam, and with other like-minded
friends and partners.
Thank you for your continued support to USPACOM and our men and
women in uniform, and their families, who live and work in the vast
Asia-Pacific region. I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator McCain. Well, thank you, Admiral.
Maybe I can begin with this news report out of Defense One,
Defiant Chinese Admiral's Message: South China Sea Belongs to
China. There was a gathering I think in London, and there was
Chinese and American and Japanese, as well as other military
leaders. The admiral who commands the North Sea fleet for the
People's Liberation Army and Navy, South China Sea is the name
indicated as a sea area. It belongs to China.
What is our response to that, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Shear. Thank you, Senator.
The Chinese have said that before. It was nothing new for
the admiral to have said that. If he was referring to the area
of the South China Sea demarcated by the so-called nine-dash
line, it is clear to us that that nine-dash line is not
consistent with international law, and we do not recognize the
Chinese claim to the area encompassed by the nine-dash line.
With regard to our operations in that area, we sail and we
fly and we operate within that area on a daily basis. Every
time we do so----
Senator McCain. You operate within that area, but you have
not operated within 12 miles of these reclaimed features. Have
you?
Secretary Shear. We have conducted freedom of navigation
operations.
Senator McCain. Have we gone within the 12 miles of the
reclaimed area? The answer I believe is no.
Secretary Shear. We have not recently gone within 12 miles
of a reclaimed area. However----
Senator McCain. When was the last time we did?
Secretary Shear. I believe the last time we conducted a
freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea was
April of this year.
Senator McCain. Within the 12-mile limit. Come on, Mr.
Secretary. I am very interested in the 12-mile limit because if
you respect the 12-mile limit, then that is de facto
sovereignty agreed to tacitly to the Chinese.
Now, have we or have we not operated within the 12-mile
limit in recent years?
Secretary Shear. I believe the last time we conducted a
freedom of navigation operation within 12 nautical miles of one
of those features was 2012.
Senator McCain. 2012, 3 years ago.
Secretary Shear. I might add, Senator, if I may, that
freedom of navigation operations are one tool in a larger
toolbox that we are going to need to use in fixing this issue.
We are in the process of putting together that toolbox. As we
move forward, we are going to consider freedom of navigation
operations, along with a variety of other options to ensure
that both the Chinese and the region understands that we can
operate and we do operate anywhere we can.
Senator McCain. Then it seems to me that we ought to do it
because you see the area that has now been filled in. Since the
last time we operated within the 12-mile limit, that number of
acres has been dramatically increased, and we have watched it
and really--well, the best sign of respecting freedom of the
seas is not to de facto recognize a 12-mile limit, and the best
way you can make sure that that is not recognized is to sail
your ships in international waters, which it clearly is--these
are artificial islands--and pass right on by. That then puts
the lie to the admiral who said the South China Sea is--he
indicated it belongs to China. It does not belong to China. It
belongs to the international waterways. If people are allowed
to fill in islands and so, therefore, then they are subject to
a 12-mile limit. The best way to prove that they are not is to
go ahead and go in it. We have not done that since 2012. I do
not find that acceptable, Mr. Secretary. With all the other
tools you have in the toolbox, the most visible assertion of
freedom of the seas is to peacefully sail inside the 12-mile
limit of artificial islands, which in any version of
international law is not allowed to be sovereign territory of
any nation.
Secretary Shear. Well, I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that
the South China Sea does not belong to China. We have in recent
years conducted freedom of navigation operations in the
vicinity of those features, and doing so again is one of the
array of options we are considering.
Senator McCain. Well, it is an option that has not been
exercised in 3 years.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Admiral Harris, what do you feel about it?
Admiral Harris. Sir, I agree that the South China Sea is no
more China's than the Gulf of Mexico is Mexico's. I think that
we must exercise our freedom of navigation throughout the
region. Part of my responsibility as the Pacific Command
Commander is to give options to the President and to the
Secretary, and those options are being considered and we will
execute as directed by the President and the Secretary.
Senator McCain. I have gone over my time, but just very
quickly, Mr. Secretary, with respect to China, do you agree
with DNI [Director of National Intelligence] Clapper's comments
that the United States has no effective policy to deter China
in cyberspace? Last week, he testified before the House
Intelligence Committee. The United States lacked, quote, both
the substance and the mindset of deterrence in cyberspace.
Secretary Shear. I would refer to what the President said
last Friday when he stated that we can have a competition in
cyberspace with China or with other countries, but we will win.
What we are seeking is understandings.
Senator McCain. Are we winning now?
Secretary Shear. I agree with General Clapper that
deterring actions in cyberspace is very difficult.
Senator McCain. Are we winning now?
Secretary Shear. I think everybody knows that we have the
capability to----
Senator McCain. You know, Mr. Secretary, we have known each
other a long time. I mean, are we winning now in your view?
Secretary Shear. I think it is too early to tell, Mr.
Chairman. We are doing our best.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just to clarify the type of operations, have we conducted
flyovers of these artificial facilities recently? When is the
most recent flyover?
Secretary Shear. I defer to the Admiral on that question,
sir.
Admiral Harris. Senator Reed, we have not conducted a
flyover--a direct flyover--overfly of any of the reclaimed
lands and territories that China has reclaimed recently.
Senator Reed. That is another option that you have, but you
have not exercised that option.
Admiral Harris. You are correct, sir. We have a lot of
options that are on the table.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, just stepping back a bit, one
of the things that is happening in China now is extraordinary
economic volatility, growth rates that are being challenged,
which if you have an insight, if you do not, then let me know.
This economic--and it may be long-term. It may be just
something that is cyclic. Is it encouraging them or
discouraging them when it comes to these policies in the South
China Sea? Your insight. Is it something that--you know, they
felt several years ago that they had sort of turned the corner,
that their economic power was so great that they could begin to
move forward. Are any of those questions being raised
internally now in China about their capacity? Or the
alternative would be are they going to double down because they
have had economic problems at home, and therefore, we can
expect them to be even more provocative? Any insights.
Secretary Shear. Those are all extremely relevant
questions, Senator. I am not an economist and I am not an
expert on the Chinese economy, but I think to the extent that
the Communist Party relies on economic performance for its
legitimacy, then I would suspect it is very concerned about
recent overall economic performance. I think we have to be
alert to the possibility that the Chinese might use a problem
in foreign affairs to distract people's attention from their
domestic problems.
On the subject of Chinese assertiveness, I think it is only
natural for a country like China that is growing in wealth to
turn to military modernization. I think Chinese military
modernization and the growth of their defense budget has been
extremely robust. We remain very concerned about the pace of
growth in the Chinese defense budget and the lack of
transparency and the overall effect that has on regional
stability. Of course, as they modernize, one would expect them
to become more assertive abroad, and that is just what we are
doing and that is something that we are addressing with this
regional security strategy.
Senator Reed. Admiral Harris, as I indicated in my opening
remarks, there is concern about North Korea. In fact, I recall
when we met in Singapore, you expressed significant concern.
Can you just briefly give us your latest update about North
Korean activities? Also I might add since China shares a border
with North Korea, are they at all being helpful or do they
recognize the threats that are posed by the regime in North
Korea?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I believe, as I have said before,
that North Korea is the greatest threat that I face in the
Pacific as a Pacific Command commander. I think that you have a
leader in North Korea who has nuclear weapons and is seeking
the means to miniaturize them and deliver them
intercontinentally, and that causes me great concern. He has
got 20,000 to 30,000 artillery pieces within a range of Seoul,
amounting to several hundred thousand rockets that place the
28,000 American troops plus their families and the 700,000
American citizens who live on the Korean peninsula in danger.
So I view the threat from North Korea very seriously.
I think that China's influence on North Korea is waning, or
China does not have the influence on North Korea that it had in
the past. So that is also an area of concern. There are many
areas globally where we cooperate with China, and one of the
areas in the past where we have received cooperation from China
has been to mitigate the behavior of North Korea. We are not
seeing that today. That causes me great concern.
Senator Reed. So one of the initiatives that we have with
the Chinese is not just checking their disregard for
international law of the sea, et cetera, but also reengaging
them to work together to face a very significant threat in
North Korea. Is that accurate?
Admiral Harris. You are correct, sir. I have been very
critical of Chinese behavior in the last 2 years, but I have
also been--I have acknowledged where China has been helpful.
They have been helpful in removal of chemical weapons from
Syria, in the counter-piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa,
and the search for the Malaysia airliner MH370 off of
Australia, and the support to the Philippines in the November
2013 typhoon that hit that country. So we should acknowledge
those good things that China has done. At the same time, I
would be critical and hold them to account for those negative
things they do.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, do you have a quick comment?
Secretary Shear. Sir, if I may add to that. We exchange
views with the Chinese on North Korea regularly. I did so in
Beijing with my Chinese PLA counterparts just 10 days ago. The
Chinese reiterated to me, as they have in the past, that their
influence with North Korea is limited, particularly under the
new regime. During the recent crisis related to the North
Korean provocation on August 4, it was not clear to us that the
Chinese had a lot of contact with the North Koreans or were
able to significantly influence them.
Senator Reed. Are they worried about that?
Secretary Shear. I think they are.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator McCain. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let us talk about assets, current and future. Admiral
Harris, one of the DOD lines of effort in our Asia-Pacific
maritime security strategy says by 2020, 60 percent of naval
and overseas air assets will be home-ported in the Pacific
region. Okay?
Now, when you say that, right now in terms of our vessels,
we have a fleet of 270. It should be 305. You are projecting
now saying 60 percent of what it will be in 2020. What kind of
figures are you looking at in calculating that?
Admiral Harris. Senator, the numbers you cited are correct.
We have in the 270 range now, and by 2020, we should have a
little over 300 ships, around 310. So we are talking 60 percent
of actually a larger number, not a smaller.
Senator Inhofe. A larger number that we would anticipate
would be available by that time, and I hope you are right.
Now, the source of those have to come up through other
commands. Is that correct? If you increase to 60 percent, you
will have to be taking some assets away from EUCOM [United
States European Command], CENTCOM [United States Central
Command], and other commands. Correct?
Admiral Harris. Right. Those commands now have assigned
naval forces. Only the Pacific has forces that are assigned to
the Pacific Command.
Senator Inhofe. They are using those assets.
Admiral Harris. That is correct.
Senator Inhofe. Are you coordinating with those when you
make these assumptions and predictions as to what we should be
doing in 2020 with the combatant commanders?
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. As I have said before, the world
gets a vote. So activities in Russia or other places could draw
assets away.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that.
Admiral Harris. 60 percent of the Navy's combatants will be
based in the Pacific at large by 2020.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, you have been around for
quite awhile. You might remember what I refer to, sometimes not
too affectionately, the Battle of Vieques. At that time--that
was during the Clinton-Gore administration. At that time, the
only place that we could identify in the world for integrated
training was the Island of Vieques. You might remember that we
had this big fight right here in this room. I will never forget
it. It was primarily driven by Vice President Gore to do away
with the live range down there.
Now, interestingly enough, those things that we said were
going to happen to Roosey Roads [Roosevelt Roads Naval Station]
and other assets there became a reality, and now they are
begging us to come back.
Nonetheless, the point I am making is I went all over the
world looking for areas where you can have this kind of
integrated training. Where are we today in terms of our areas
that we have available to us for the type of training that you
have to have?
Admiral Harris. Senator, in the Pacific, we have integrated
ranges. In Hawaii, the Pacific missile range facility is one of
the finest in the world. In Guam. We are building new range
facilities in the Guam operating area. These ranges, as you
said, are vital to our ability to train. We are working with
the countries involved, the states involved, and
environmentalists that are involved in order to do this in the
right way to satisfy all of the constituencies that are there
and get our training done.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. You talked, Secretary Shear, a little
bit about some of our exercises that we have out there. RIMPAC
[The Rim of the Pacific Exercise] is one of the big ones. 22
nations were involved in that, 49 surface ships, 67 marines,
2,200 aircraft, some 25,000 personnel. It is a great exercise.
I understand that. Do we have the assets now to continue that
type of exercise for the near future?
Secretary Shear. I believe we do, sir. You are absolutely
right that RIMPAC is a vital and important exercise not only
for the U.S. but for the region. We believe we have the
resources we need to continue conducting that.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I would hope that would be the case.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McCain. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for testifying today.
Admiral Harris, in your testimony, you point out that we
insist that all maritime claims be derived from naturally
formed land features in accordance with international laws
reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. Are we in any kind
of a disadvantage because we have not been a signatory to the
Law of the Sea Convention?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I believe we are at a disadvantage
because we do not have the moral high ground that other
countries who are signatories, including China and Russia,
have. So when China makes these outrageous claims in the South
China Sea, and the Philippines, for example, challenges one of
those claims in the international tribunal for Law of the Sea,
and we support the Philippines right to make that claim, at the
same time we are not a signatory. So that looks kind of
strange.
When Russia makes these outrageous claims in the Arctic
region in the Arctic Circle, and they tell us you have no
standing on which to complain because you are not a signatory
to the Law of the Sea, it puts us at a disadvantage.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I certainly agree. I would hope
that we would reevaluate our position and become a signatory
with most of the rest of the world of the Law of the Sea
Convention.
Senator Reed raised the threat from North Korea. Secretary
Shear, earlier this year, Admiral Gortney assessed that North
Korea has the ability to launch an intercontinental ballistic
missile that could be capable of hitting the United States from
a mobile launcher, and we saw right before Secretary Carter
visited Japan that they launched two short-range missiles. You
talk about China and their waning influence with North Korea.
Are there other measures that we ought to be taking with
respect to North Korea? Should we have any sense of optimism
about the recent overtures between North and South Korea where
they seem to be talking a little more?
Secretary Shear. Thank you, Senator. That is an important
question.
We certainly support the efforts by the North and South to
conduct senior-level dialogue. As with past efforts to conduct
such dialogue, I think we need to be very cautions in how we
view the prospects. I view this current effort to be a direct
outcome of the very robust position the ROK took in
negotiations with the North at Panmunjom to resolve the issue
precipitated by the North Korean provocation of August 4th. So
I think it is very important that they have embarked on this
effort, but we are just going to have to be very cautious. We
support the ROK very strongly in these effort.
More generally, our approach to North Korea is a
combination of diplomacy and pressure, and as we go forward
toward a possible North Korean missile launch, for example, we
are going to be engaging our Six Party partners, and we are
going to be considering what extra pressure we might put on
North Korea should they decide to conduct that missile launch.
Senator Shaheen. I assume you do not want to talk publicly
about what those additional pressures might be?
Secretary Shear. Well, we put a great many sanctions on
North Korea, and further sanctions would be one possibility.
Senator Shaheen. Did you want to add anything, Admiral
Harris?
Admiral Harris. Sure, Senator. I will just add that I think
the key is to be ready for all outcomes regarding North Korea
from a position of strength. So I tend to be a pessimist when
it comes to dealing with the capabilities of other countries.
So, again, it is best to be cognizant of all outcomes, and that
is why things like ballistic missile defense are important and
we strengthen South Korea's ability in their BMD [Ballistic
Missile Defence] systems. I personally believe the THAAD
[Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] on the peninsula is
important as well, the terminal high altitude missile defense
system.
Senator Shaheen. There has been a lot of discussion today
and earlier this year. Admiral Roughead, for example, noted
that for the last decade, the United States has flown with
impunity in Iraq and Afghanistan with no threat to anti-air
weapons. He noted that our capabilities to do that will be
threatened in the future as China has been able to field more
capabilities.
I guess I would first say do you agree with that
assessment. Then can you talk about what that new technology
that China is developing and our ability to stay ahead--how
that is going to be affected by sequestration? I do not know
which one of you wants to----
Admiral Harris. Well, I will start. China fields a very
modern military and they are growing in capability and
capacity. We have a technological edge over them in almost
every way, if not in every way. I am confident in our ability
to take the fight to China, if it should come to that, and I
certainly hope it does not.
That said, we have to maintain that technological edge, and
they are growing in their technological capability and that is
of concern to me. I think we need to have fifth generation
fighters, for example, and we need to have a lot of them. That
is the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35. We need to continue to
upgrade our fourth generation fighters with fifth generation
capabilities because we have a lot of them, and I think that is
important.
Senator Shaheen. Secretary Shear, I know I am out of time,
but you just may want to add what you think, if cuts go back
into effect for fiscal year 2016, what that would do to our
ability to continue to have that technology.
Secretary Shear. Well, we are certainly concerned about the
possible effects cuts may have both on current operations and
our ability to develop the new technologies we need to maintain
our military dominance in the region. That is something that
Secretary Carter is extremely interested in. Our defense
innovation initiative is designed to develop those capabilities
we are going to need to counter area access and denial
strategies and to maintain our security already in the region.
So we are committed not only to deploying our best capabilities
to the region now, we are committed to devising the
technologies we need to maintain our edge.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. We appreciate
it very much.
It was reported earlier this week that Japan will be
providing $832 million in infrastructure aid to Vietnam and
another $1.7 million worth of ships and equipment to them as
well to help counter the rising of China. So I am very glad
that our allies are improving their relationships to counter
the Chinese aggression. Both Japan and Vietnam are key allies
for us here in the United States, and developing that strong
security and economic partnership with both Japan and Vietnam
will allow us to better check China's aggression in that
region.
So for both of you, if you would, please, how will this new
agreement between Vietnam and Japan improve that security
situation in that region and also, under the Southeast Asia
Maritime Security Initiative, what specifically is the
Department doing to build partner capacity and capability in
Vietnam and in other Southeast Asia nations?
Secretary Shear. Thank you, Senator. That is a great point.
We strongly support Japanese efforts to coordinate with us
in building partner capacity, particularly with countries like
Vietnam, the Philippines, and probably in the future Malaysia.
This is something that I worked on with my Japanese colleagues
while I was Ambass ador in Hanoi, and I am delighted to see
that it has come to fruition for the Japanese side.
We are interested in taking similar actions, as you state,
in our maritime security initiative which is in the fiscal year
2016 NDAA. That is a 5-year, $425 million program, and we
greatly appreciate the committee's support on this effort.
Under that initiative, we hope to not only improve physical
capacity of our partners in, say, providing, for example, coast
guard vessels, but we want to improve their institutional
capacity. We want to improve their sustainability, and that is
something very important with the Philippines. We want to
improve their professionalism. So this would be a very broad
program designed to raise the level particularly of the
maritime law enforcement capabilities of our partners in the
region.
Admiral Harris. Senator, I was in Vietnam in my previous
assignment as the Pacific Fleet commander, and I just returned
from the Philippines a few weeks ago.
I welcome Japan's overtures and their efforts to improve
the capacity of both countries, Vietnam and the Philippines. I
think Vietnam presents an ideal opportunity for us as we work
more closely with them. I think that that is another indication
of the response of the region to China's bad behavior in the
South China Sea where countries that previously were at odds
with us or actually leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement are now
coming to us for assistance and are opening themselves up to
us. That is one of the costs that China has to bear for its bad
behavior in the South China Sea region.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you.
You have mentioned, both of you, the Philippines several
times, and they have proven to be a great ally, whether it is
the Global War on Terror, hurricane humanitarian relief
efforts, and so forth. Are there specific steps that we can
take or should be taking with the Philippines at this time to
further develop those relationships?
Secretary Shear. You are right, Senator. More can be done.
When the President was in Manila last year, he stated publicly
that our commitment under the Mutual Defense Treaty to the
Philippines is ironclad, that no one should have any doubt
about the extent of our commitment under that treaty. We are
working with the Philippines both in terms of--we are already
working with the Philippines, even before we implement the
maritime security initiative, to increase their capabilities to
train and operate with them and to overall strengthen their
ability to resist Chinese coercion.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, gentlemen, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator McCain. Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. Admiral Harris, thank you so much for
the briefing you gave me last month in Honolulu.
You mentioned, Admiral, that North Korea is the greatest
threat that you face as Pacific Commander, and you noted that
China's influence in North Korea is waning. Is there another
country, i.e., Russia, that is stepping into this vacuum in
relationships with North Korea?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I do not know of any Russian
overtures with North Korea other than what I have read in open
sources where they have always had some relationships with them
because of their histories.
I believe that today the greatest threat I face is North
Korea. North Korea today in my opinion is not an existential
threat to the United States as Russia is. In the Pacific, as
you know well, Russia has a long coastline. They have at least
two major naval bases, including one for their ballistic
missile submarines, two major air bases, and then a host of
smaller operating bases in the Pacific. So these are things
that I worry about as I look at the panoply of threats that the
United States faces in the Pacific.
Senator Hirono. Secretary Shear, we read recently that the
Russians have recently approved significant infrastructure
projects in what the Japanese call the ``Northern Territories."
There have been numerous visits to these remote locations by
Russian leaders. So they are becoming active in that part of
the world, not to mention in the Arctic.
I do share the concern that Admiral Harris raised that we
are at a disadvantage by not being signatories to the Law of
the Sea. Would you share that assessment?
Secretary Shear. I agree with you, Senator, on the
importance of ratification of the Law of the Sea. I agree with
the Admiral on his assessment of Russian activities in the
Asia-Pacific. Let me stress that our maritime strategy is
designed to encompass Russia, as well as China, as well as
other challenges in the region.
Senator Hirono. What do you make of Russia's activities in
the Northern Territories? Is this for our domestic consumption,
or does it have further reaching consequences?
Secretary Shear. Well, I confess, Senator, that I am not
familiar with all the details on the kinds of infrastructure
that Russia is building in the Northern Territories, but we
support the Japanese claim to the Northern Territories. We
would be concerned if the Russians used this infrastructure to
further militarize or to bolster their military strength in the
region.
Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, I was in Okinawa last month
because, of course, part of the Indo-Asia-Pacific rebalance to
this part of the world involves closing our Futenma facility.
Most recently on Monday, Governor Onaga of Okinawa Prefecture
proclaimed the he will proceed with canceling the landfill
permit required for developing the alternative facility in
Henoko. So for both of you, what does this proclamation mean
for the Government of Japan and the Futenma replacement
facility project that we need to get on with?
Admiral Harris. Senator, we have a longstanding treaty,
mutual security treaty, with Japan. Our obligation in that
treaty is to provide the security for Japan. One of Japan's
obligations under that treaty is to provide us bases from which
to operate and do that. Okinawa is critical to our ability to
defend Japan and our posture in the Asia-Pacific region. It is
a Japanese national effort and a decision whether to override
or overcome Governor Onaga's objections to the Futenma
replacement facility. They are working on that and I have
confidence that they will achieve their national aims because
that is their obligations under the treaty for us.
Secretary Shear. If I may add to that briefly, Senator. We
greatly appreciate the support the Government of Japan has
given to the effort to find a replacement for the Futenma
facility. We appreciate their effort to get construction going
for the Futenma replacement facility, and we were glad this
week when we were informed by the Japanese Government that
construction-related activities have begun at the Henoko site
for the Futenma replacement facilities.
Senator Hirono. So while there may be delays as a result of
the Governor of Okinawa's actions, you expect that the Japanese
Government will continue to proceed with the replacement
facility.
Secretary Shear. I do, Senator. I want to stress that as we
move forward on construction of the Futenma replacement
facility, we, of course, as we always do, will continue to
consider Okinawan sensitivities with regard to the general
issue of our presence and our operations in Okinawa.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator McCain. Senator Lee?
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral Harris and Secretary Shear, for all you
do. Thanks for being here to answer our questions.
Admiral Harris, you have said that we need to ratify the
Law of the Sea Treaty in order to acquire some type of moral
high ground particularly relative to Russia and China. I am
having a hard time seeing why it is that a country like the
United States that has used its power, its blood, and its
treasure to protect navigation all over the world for 200 years
has to, in order to gain some moral high ground, ratify this
particular treaty. Can you help me understand that?
Admiral Harris. Sure, Senator.
The lack of signing the treaty does not affect our ability
to be the strongest nation on the earth, but the lack of
signing that treaty puts us at a disadvantage in discussions
with most of the other countries of the world that have signed
the treaty and moral standing, if you will. So we lose nothing
by signing off on the treaty, but we lose a lot by not signing
it.
Senator Lee. What is the ``it" that we lose? Part of what I
would ask in connection with that, you know, one of the claims
is that it might help us solve the South China Sea territorial
disputes. All the nations in the South China Sea, including
China, that have coastline along the South China Sea are
members of the treaty. They are all parties to the treaty. The
Philippines has brought a lawsuit against China under the
treaty, and China, as I understand it, has basically ignored
it. So how does that mean that this fixes the problem if we
suddenly ratify the treaty?
Admiral Harris. Well, I do not think it would suddenly fix
the problem, but as you said, the Philippines has brought a
case against China in The Hague in the International Tribunal
for Law of the Sea on two issues: one, on the veracity of the
nine-dash line claim itself. Then the second issue is whether
the tribunal has jurisdiction to even judge that case. We have
supported the Philippines? right to take the claim to the
international tribunal, and in fact, we have praised them for
doing so. Yet, we are not a signatory to the treaty itself.
If you shift to the Arctic, if you look at the outrageous
claims that Russia has made in the Arctic Ocean, they are
making those claims under their interpretation of the Law of
the Sea Convention. When we criticize them for those claims,
they say that we have no standing to do so. I would submit that
most of the rest of the world, who also has signed off on the
treaty, would probably share that opinion or at least part of
it.
On the other side, we have agreed as a policy to follow the
precepts in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea. So we have that for us, but we are not a signatory to it.
Again, I would say that in my opinion we lose nothing by
signing it and we lose a lot of moral high groundedness, if you
will, by not signing it.
Senator Lee. If we are following the precepts in the
treaty, notwithstanding the fact that we have not ratified it
and we, therefore, are not formally a party to it, I struggle
with how that changes the moral high ground, particularly when
I do not think there is any country on earth that has a greater
claim to moral high ground, particularly when it comes to
navigational issues, when it comes to naval issues, than the
United States, which for 200 years has kept shipping lanes open
and safe.
Can you tell me what navigational rights, if any, does the
Navy lack today that it would suddenly have if we were to
ratify that treaty?
Admiral Harris. Sir, the Navy would lack nothing whether we
ratify the treaty or not. The United States would gain standing
by signing off on the treaty.
Senator Lee. How would that standing benefit us in a
material way relative to our interests in that part of the
world?
Admiral Harris. Well, in some cases, under the--the
convention sets up a framework for ocean exploration, for
example, and it says that--we will not get into some of the
real particulars--you go out to 200 miles and that is your
exclusive economic zone, and then out beyond that is the open
ocean zone, if you will. There are American companies today
that will not explore out in that region beyond the 200-mile
exclusive economic zone because they are not sure whether any
competing claim will have an effect on them or whether they
will lose in this international tribunal or other places. So I
think that we lose an economic opportunity by not signing off
on the treaty because it places in jeopardy the legal question,
not the military or the strength question, but it places in
jeopardy the legal question of what happens out beyond the
exclusive economic zone. For our companies, they will gain an
economic benefit from that.
Senator Lee. I see my time is expired.
I do not doubt the sincerity of your feelings on this. I
would take issue with one aspect of what you said, though, that
regardless of what benefits you might see from this, I would
not say that signing onto a treaty is without any cost on our
part without us giving up anything particularly, whereas here
the treaty sets up a system that would, however incrementally,
erode our national sovereignty.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McCain. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Gentlemen, thank you for your public
service.
Admiral, where we have had the near misses in the 200- mile
area that China is challenging us both in ships and in
airplanes, we have successfully avoided those near misses where
they have challenged us. Do you want to give us some insight
into what your instructions are to our pilots and our ship
captains with regard to those kind of incursions?
Admiral Harris. Sure, Senator. What I have told the
component commanders, the Pacific fleet and Pacific air forces,
to tell their pilots and crews to do is to continue to insist
on our right to operate in international airspace and in
maritime space. When challenged by Chinese fighter aircraft,
our aircraft are to maintain professional flight profiles,
predictable flight profiles, and we have means to record that
activity and then we will see what happens. So the last time we
saw a very dangerous event was in the middle of last year where
the Chinese flew an aircraft over a P-8. They did a barrel roll
over the top, which is a dangerous maneuver in acrobatic
circles let alone in an intercept regime in the open ocean. We
most recently have seen that again. I will give the system
credit. For that intervening period of time, we have seen very
few dangerous activities by the Chinese following that August
2014 incident. I think that is a tribute to the mil-to-mil
relationship and the political relationship where we have
worked with the Chinese to come to an agreement on the maritime
and in the air spaces for confidence building measures.
Senator Nelson. Well, that is good news.
Now, is it going to be all the more strained given the 200-
mile out from the China area? Now when you look at that map
where they are filling in all of those islands and now they are
claiming almost that entire ocean as theirs, are we going to
see more and more of these incidents well beyond their 200-mile
limit?
Admiral Harris. Certainly the potential exists for more
incidents. If they finish building the airfields, of which
there is one there on Fiery Cross Reef on the side and up to
two additional airfields of 10,000-foot length, then that gives
me great concern in the South China Sea. You know, if you look
at National Airport, for example, National Airport is only
6,700 feet long, capable of landing any commercial airplane
that we have, and China is building three runways of 10,000
foot length, which is only 1,000 foot shorter than would be
required to land the Space Shuttle. So I think that that gives
me great concern militarily.
They are also building deep water port facilities there,
which could put their deep water ships, their combatant ships
there, which gives them an extra capability.
If you look at all of these facilities and you can imagine
a network of missile sites, runways for their fifth generation
fighters and surveillance sites and all of that, it creates a
mechanism by which China would have de facto control over the
South China Sea in any scenario short of war. These are
obviously easy targets in war. They will be what we call in the
military ``grapes," if you will. Short of that, they pose a--
militarization of these features poses a threat, and certainly
it poses a threat against all other countries in the region.
Senator Nelson. Speaking of those countries, to what degree
are they vigorously stepping up with us to object to that kind
of stuff?
Admiral Harris. Well, I think they are stepping up to the
limits of their capabilities. So if you look at the
Philippines, for example, they are doing it in probably the
best way. They are taking it to an international tribunal for
adjudication. I do not know how the tribunal is going to act or
decide, and if they decide in the Philippines? favor, as
Senator Lee said, I do not know if China is going to follow
that. It puts China in a quandary if the international tribunal
rules against China and China is a signatory to UNCLOS. So it
gives the Philippines at least a moral high ground to make a
claim.
The other countries are doing what they can also. You know,
Chinese behavior in the South China Sea has enabled us to have
a closer relationship with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia,
and I think that is very important. Those are costs that China
is having to expend because of its bad behavior in the South
China Sea.
Secretary Shear. Sir, if I could just reinforce what the
admiral just said. I, of course, share the admiral's concern
about the military implications of Chinese activities in the
South China Sea. That is why we are calling for a halt to
further reclamation, a halt to construction, and a halt of
further militarization of those facilities. The Chinese have
not yet placed advanced weaponry on those features, and we are
going to do everything we can to ensure that they do not. This
is going to be a long-term effort. There are no silver bullets
in this effort. We are certainly complicating Chinese
calculations already.
If you pull back for a minute and look at our goals, which
include safeguarding freedom of navigation and deterring
coercion, I think we have made some gains in both these areas.
We continue to operate freely in the South China Sea and we
continue to prevent the Chinese from coercing our allies and
partners into concluding deals that are not in their interests
and not in our interests with regard to claims in the South
China Sea.
Senator McCain. That we freely operate in the South China
Sea is a success? It is a pretty low bar, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
I think it is clear just from the testimony here and
previous statements that we have a confused policy within the
South China Sea with regard to the built-up islands. As you
know, confusion can cause miscalculations. Let me just give you
kind of the one example of it.
We were in Singapore for the Shangri-La Dialogue, the
Secretary and Senator Reed, Senator Ernst, the chairman.
Secretary Carter I thought had a forceful statement at the
time. You know it, we have seen it. We will fly, sail anywhere.
Then he stated, quote, after all, turning an underwater rock
into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of
sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or
maritime transport. A pretty strong statement in a very
critical place.
Admiral Harris, you later stated I think at the Aspen Forum
it is United States policy to afford a 12-mile limit around all
the islands that are in the South China Sea, and it has been
longstanding policy not because they are occupied or built up
by China, but just in general. So to me that is a dramatic
contrast. You have the PACOM Commander saying something very
different than the Secretary of Defense. That is confusion.
We obviously have three policymaking centers going on here,
the uniformed military, DOD civilians led by Secretary Carter,
and the White House. In your professional opinion, Admiral
Harris, should we sail or fly inside the 12-mile area with
regard to those islands as Secretary Carter stated we should?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I believe that there is only one
policymaking center, not three, and that runs through the
Secretary of Defense and the President.
Senator Sullivan. No, but I am asking your professional
opinion as a military----
Admiral Harris. I believe that we should exercise--be
allowed to exercise freedom of navigation and maritime and
flight in the South China Sea against those islands that are
not islands.
Senator Sullivan. Inside the 12-mile limit.
Admiral Harris. Depending on the feature.
Senator Sullivan. What about that one?
Admiral Harris. That one, yes.
Senator Sullivan. Have you or Secretary Carter asked the
White House for permission to do that?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I have given policy options--
military options to the Secretary, and I would leave it to the
Secretary or the Ambassador to address----
Senator Sullivan. What has the White House said when you
have asked permission to go within the 12-mile zone of a
feature like that?
Secretary Shear. Senator, PACOM, along with the Department
of Defense, are options-generating institutions, and the
Secretary is particularly interested in options with regard to
the South China Sea in general.
Senator Sullivan. I just asked a simple question. What did
the White House say if you asked for permission to go within
inside the 12-mile limit? What did the White House say?
Secretary Shear. Conducting that kind of freedom of
navigation operation is one of the operations we are
considering.
Senator Sullivan. You are not answering my question. Did
you ask the White House for permission to do this, and what did
they tell you?
Secretary Shear. Sir, I am not able to discuss current
policy deliberations, but I can assure you that that is one of
the options that the administration is considering.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. I appreciate you just answering the
question.
Secretary Shear. Again, I am just not able to go into the
details of policy----
Senator Sullivan. Well, I think when the Secretary of
Defense makes a definitive statement like that at a very
important meeting of defense ministers in Asia and then we do
not follow up on it, it undermines our credibility. That is
something that we cannot afford anymore. Our credibility is
undermined everywhere in the world, and we do it here.
It would be good if you could give me an answer to that
question. You are obviously dodging it right now.
Secretary Shear. Sir, I would be delighted to give you the
best possible answer, and I think that is that I am just not
able to----
Senator Sullivan. I want to turn real quick to the Alaska
incident that the chairman mentioned. I thought our reaction
was almost--it was immediate. It was muted. It was almost
apologetic relative to the way the Chinese respond when we come
within 12 miles of one of their islands.
The President of the United States was in Alaska at the
time. Do you believe that that was a coincidence that he was
there, or do you believe that was a provocation that the
Chinese were aggressively off the coast of Alaska when the
President of the United States was visiting?
Secretary Shear. Well, I am not in a position to describe
Chinese thinking on this, but----
Senator Sullivan. What is our analysis, either of you, from
your perspective?
Admiral Harris. Senator, they were conducting an exercise
with the Russians in the northern Pacific. I believe--my
opinion--is they went into the Bering Sea to demonstrate their
capability to operate that far north, and then they decided to
go home.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think it was timed to coincide
with the President of the United States----
Admiral Harris. No, I do not think it was--my opinion. I
mean, I am not going into any intelligence matters at all. They
were having an exercise with the Russians, and I think that
exercise was long-planned. Then they decided to go into the
Bering Sea. They were near there anyway. Then they turned south
and headed home. I think it was coincidental, but I do not know
that for a fact. Their transit south was an expeditious
transit, innocent passage through two Aleutian Islands. That is
their right to do under international law, as is our right to
do in international law wherever we operate.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I thought it was more of a provocation and a
demonstration of their interest in the Arctic. I am not sure
that this White House would recognize a provocation if it was
slapped in the face, and we need to be aware of that. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
On behalf of the chairman, Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Admiral Harris, thank you for the time that I was allowed
to spend with you out in headquarters. We got a very thorough
brief, so I am not going to cover that ground, but I appreciate
it and I know that in your public statement, or your opening
statement, and in the conversation you covered some of it.
I do want to get back and maybe build on questions that
Senator Inhofe asked, and it had to do with the rebalancing
where we are going out and saying that we are putting more
assets as a percentage of the base into your area of command.
We continue to miss the point that the base is shrinking. So
part of what I am trying to do is get my head around a number
of different variables that really let us measure the gap
between China and the United States and our allies. You said
when we were out there in the briefing that quantity has a
quality of its own, so that right now we still continue to
enjoy an advantage over the Chinese in terms of the assets we
have in the region.
When you start trending out to 2020 and beyond and you take
into account that they may have more ships but their
survivability does not compare to our own and the technology
onboard does not compare to our own, at what point does the
gap, if you were projecting assuming sequestration was going to
be in place--I hope that that is not true, but let us assume
that we are and the current plans for downsizing. At what point
do we really reach a point to where it is a fair fight or we
may be at a disadvantage? I do not want us to be in a fair
fight, incidentally. So I want to know when it is and then at
what point does it erode to where we have a quantitative or
qualitative disadvantage against China.
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. I am all for having unfair
fights, and I think that those fights out to be unfair in our
advantage. I believe that if we are continued to be sequestered
through 2021, 2022, and China continues the pace of its
building, that their quantitative advantage will be significant
in the mid-2020's.
Senator Tillis. To overcome our qualitative advantage?
Admiral Harris. I think we will always have a qualitative
advantage if we maintain the trajectory we are on. We have
better trained people, better equipment, and all of that. As
you said, quantity has a quality all its own. Their weapons
systems and their ships and airplanes bristle with weapons, and
they probably view them--view the loss of those ships in a much
different way than we would view the loss of our ships and the
sailors on them. So I am worried about the pace of the Chinese
buildup against the likelihood or the possibility that we will
continue to be sequestered, and I think that will pose a very
real problem for us in the 2020's. I think that we should look
at that very closely, sir.
Senator Tillis. Has there been work done to try and put
that on paper? It may not be appropriate for an open setting,
but to take into account our own unilateral capabilities in the
region, the added capacity of our allies. That is another
advantage that we share there. We have allies. They do not
really. Has there been anything at that level that I can put my
hands on to really understand that and then the trending out
into the mid-2020's? Secretary?
Secretary Shear. I think with regard to China, we put out
the annual China military power report, and I think that is a
good measure of where the Chinese have been and where they are
going with regard to military modernization and their
capabilities.
Senator Tillis. Does that include a match-up against our
projected capabilities assuming sequestration and the other
policies that are the givens right now?
Secretary Shear. It does not, sir.
Senator Tillis. That is more or less what I am talking
about to try and figure out where the gap is and where we
really have to sound the alarm that we are letting the margin
of advantage erode.
Admiral Harris. Senator, the United States-China
Commission, a body that is chartered by Congress, puts out an
annual report that is exceptional in reading about China's
capabilities. So I would commend that to you as well.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Admiral Harris. As far as the allies go, we have five
treaty allies in the Pacific of varying degrees of capability,
but whether they would be with us in every fight is a matter
for them to decide in the fight at hand. So while I count the
delta in numbers between us and China, I try not to count the
quantity of assets our allies have because, depending on the
situation at hand and their own national decisions, we might
have to fight alone.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Senator Reed, if I may. I do not think it came up in the
discussion, but either for the Ambassador or for Admiral
Harris, to what extent do you believe that the trade
agreement--in this particular case, the TPP [Trans-Pacific
Partnership] and the partners there--is another key part of our
military strategy down in the South China Sea and the Pacific?
Secretary Shear. It is definitely a key part of our
strategy, Senator. The TPP is not just economically beneficial,
but it is strategic, and I think our partners understand that.
The Vietnamese certainly understand it. When I was Ambassador
in Vietnam through last year, the Vietnamese had an acute
understanding of the strategic importance of TPP. It will be
one of the ways in which we further knit together Southeast
Asian integration and ASEAN strength. Not all ASEAN members are
TPP partners, but TPP will certainly raise economic activity
through the region, and countries like Vietnam are among those
TPP partners which will benefit the most.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
I have been informed that some of our colleagues are
returning from a vote on the floor and would like to ask
questions. That gives me the opportunity to ask a few questions
until they return.
So, Admiral Harris, we have spent a great deal of time
talking about the South China Sea, but India and Australia are
actually conducting joint maritime exercises in the Indian
Ocean, actually anti-submarine exercises, and presumably that
is because of the presence more and more often of Chinese
submarines in that area.
So can you describe these operations? Does this represent
another challenge to the existing security arrangements in the
area?
Admiral Harris. Senator, we are seeing Chinese submarine
deployments extend further and further, almost with every
deployment. It has become routine for Chinese submarines to
travel to the Horn of Africa region, the north Arabian Sea in
conjunction with their counter-piracy task force operations. We
are seeing their ballistic missile submarines travel in the
Pacific at further ranges. Of course, all of those is of
concern.
With regard to India and Australia, Australia is one of our
principal allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, certainly an
ally with tremendous capability. India presents a terrific
opportunity for us, and one of the PACOM lines of effort is an
improved mil-to-mil relationship with India. I am excited by
the opportunities that we have with India by the work that the
Secretary of Defense has done and Assistant Secretary of
Defense Kendall has done with regard to the DTTI [Defense
Technology and Trade Initiative], the defense initiative with
India, to help them build up their military and help them build
an aircraft carrier capability. So India presents a wonderful
opportunity for us. They share out values and our norms, and
one of my objectives is to improve that relationship with
India.
Senator Reed. This increased activity by Chinese
submarines, both attack submarines and ballistic submarines--is
that further stressing your submarine fleet in the Pacific,
those ships that are available to you?
Admiral Harris. It is. It is clearly stressing it. The new
Russian submarines that are moving into the Pacific fleet
area--their Pacific fleet area also places a stress on limited
assets that we have.
Senator Reed. So we have to continue, obviously, to keep a
robust submarine fleet, both attack submarines and ballistic
submarines.
Admiral Harris. Absolutely.
Secretary Shear. Sir, I would like to----
Senator Reed. Please.
Secretary Shear. If I may, I would like to add a little
more on India.
When President Obama was in India for meetings with Prime
Minister Modi in January, they issued a joint strategic vision
on the Indian Ocean and East Asia. We are in the process of
devising ways of implementing that joint strategic vision. I
was in India through last Saturday for discussions with my
counterparts on how to implement that vision. We already have a
robust program, a robust bilateral cooperation with the
Indians. The admiral mentioned DTTI. We also have a carrier
cooperation working group that has begun to meet. I think
cooperation in carrier technology and design, as well as in
carrier operations, offers us a terrific opportunity to improve
our ability to work with the Indians.
We will be looking at other ways of strengthening our
partnership. We conduct an annual exercise, the Malabar
Exercise, in which we and the Indians have just decided to
include the Japanese. So that will be every year now. That will
be a strong trilateral exercise in the region. We are looking
at other ways, particularly in maritime domain awareness, to
strengthen what we do with the Indians because we have very
strong common interests.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Just a further point--I have Senator Ayotte. If she is
ready, I would be happy to yield.
Senator Ayotte. That would be great. If you want to finish
your questioning----
Senator Reed. No. Thank you. At this point, let me, on
behalf of chairman McCain, recognize Senator Ayotte.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the ranking member. I
appreciate it.
First of all, Admiral Harris, I want to thank you for
following through and visiting the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. I
know that everyone at the shipyard was very appreciative of
your taking the time to see the incredible work being done
there on our attack submarine fleet. So thank you. We are
grateful.
I wanted to ask in follow-up on some of the questions that
you have been asked, Admiral. I think I understand from the
testimony you have given, but I want to make sure that we are
clear because I know that you have been asked about the Asia-
Pacific maritime security strategy, that China's artificial
islands could at most generate a 500- meter safety zone and
that, of course, the Department of Defense had released a
statement saying that these features under international law do
not generate any maritime zones because you believe that they
are not legitimate. What this means in practice is that the
Navy actually can, as you know, sail its ships within 500
meters of these new land masses without violating the law
because they are not legitimately there under international
law.
So I wanted to understand. Is the Navy sailing within 500
meters of China's artificial islands at this point?
Admiral Harris. No, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Has the Pacific Command at least sent Navy
surface ships within 12 miles of China's artificial islands?
Admiral Harris. We have not.
Senator Ayotte. So I guess the big question I think many of
us are trying to get at at this point--and I do not know,
Admiral Harris, whether you or Secretary Shear are the
appropriate person to answer the question. Why not? Saying we
are going to sail and fly where international law permits and
then not doing it I am concerned leaves China with the
impression that we are again going to say something but not
follow through on our actions, and we are going to invite more
aggression by the Chinese with the activities they have been
taking that are in violation of international law and building
these artificial islands. So I wanted to get your answer to
that.
Secretary Shear. Let me elaborate a little on what the
admiral said. In recent years, we have challenged every
category of Chinese claim in the South China Sea, as recently
as this year. We will continue to conduct freedom of navigation
operations in the South China Sea.
Let me be clear on this point. Freedom of navigation
operations are important for demonstrating our rights under
international law, but freedom of navigation operation alone
will not stop Chinese activities on these features. Preventing
the Chinese from further militarizing those features is going
to take a range of options, including freedom of navigation
operations, and we are in the process of considering those
options now.
Senator Ayotte. Admiral, did you want to add to that?
Admiral Harris. I will just add that PACOM presents
military options to the Secretary, and those options come with
a full range of opportunities in the South China Sea. We are
ready to execute those options when directed.
Senator Ayotte. So you are waiting for, obviously, the
administration to make the call on that.
Admiral Harris. Well, I mean, the freedom of navigation
operation itself, as Secretary Shear said, is not a military-
only device. It has a military component obviously because the
military executes it. It has other elements to it which are
derived by the Secretary and the White House. So we are waiting
for direction, and I am comfortable and confident that the
options that we presented are being considered equitably.
Senator Ayotte. Well, as I look at the situation, though, I
appreciate, obviously, Admiral, that PACOM--as the Commander,
you would be waiting for direction from the White House. As I
look at it, the Chinese have to be looking at this situation
saying the United States has declared that under international
law this is not legitimate and that we have the right to,
obviously, put our vessels in these areas, but the Navy has not
sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Chinese artificial
islands at this point. So I think they get it both ways. So
they are saying we are saying one thing, but we are certainly
not willing to address where we have a free right to navigate.
So I hope that we follow up with our actions on our words on
this, otherwise I fear that the Chinese will continue their
actions because otherwise they think, hey, why not?
My time is up, but I am going to submit for the record,
Admiral Harris----
Senator Reed. Senator, if you would like to take some more
time.
Senator Ayotte. Oh, thank you. I just had a follow-up on a
totally different topic. Thank you. I appreciate it.
I wanted to ask both of you on a different topic, which is
about our POW-MIAs [Prisoner of War-Missing-in-Action] and our
recovery efforts. This is a very important issue. I know
Senator McCain and Senator McCaskill have been focused on this
as well, and I have been appreciative of working with them.
Obviously, the Department of Defense has reorganized its
recovery efforts and stood up the new Defense POW-MIA
Accounting Agency, the DPAA, in January of 2015, just the
beginning of this year. One of the explicit purposes of this
new organization is to effectively increase the number of
missing service personnel accounted for from past conflicts.
So I wanted to ask--of course, with your mission in PACOM,
this is incredibly important because of our fallen heroes in
the Asia-Pacific region including, according to DOD, over
83,000 Americans are missing in action, 73,000 from World War
II, 7,500 from the Korean War. In New Hampshire, we had someone
who was able to welcome home the remains of his uncle. This
really moved me because we know how important it is to family
members to have that kind of closure. Also 1,600 from Vietnam,
including 42 from my State.
So, Admiral Harris, I know this came up in your advance
policy questions. Can you give me an update on how DPAA is
doing, what efforts we are taking? If both of you could let me
know your commitment, as we look at this. China has a very
important role here in helping us recover our fallen heroes. So
could you help me on this?
Admiral Harris. Yes, ma'am. As you stated at the beginning,
the Joint POW Accounting Command, JPAC, the chain of command
was changed, and now it is DPAA. The chain of command--now it
no longer reports to PACOM. It reports directly to an agency
under DOD.
My responsibility as PACOM is to be in support of DPAA. The
people in Hawaii who actually work at the facility there, the
DPAA facility now, are the same people, and I think they are
doing a great job. They just recovered a bunch of remains in
one of the Pacific island battles, including the remains of a
Medal of Honor recipient. PACOM's responsibility was to provide
support for the airlift and all of that. I think that is a
tremendous effort by them.
I acknowledge the importance of going after every POW- MIA
case that is extant. I think China--we need to continue to work
with China and with North Korea and the other countries over
which our fallen are from all the wars.
Senator Ayotte. One thing I wanted to also clarify,
Secretary Shear--and I appreciate, Admiral Harris, your
commitment to this--is I understand we do have an agreement
that was formalized with the Chinese. At this point, we have
been somewhat stymied of getting information that they may have
about Korean War POW camp records. I understand that Mr.
Linnington, who is the director of the DPAA, has or will be
interacting with the Chinese Government. I wanted to know what
efforts the administration will be making in supporting his
efforts to facilitate that communication, as Admiral Harris
says, to be able to bring those, our soldiers, home.
Secretary Shear. Ma'am, I strongly support the efforts of
the DPAA to make the fullest possible accounting of our missing
personnel. As Secretary to Vietnam, I participated. I visited
recovery sites. I participated in recovery ceremonies. As
Assistant Secretary, I support the efforts of the DPAA just as
strongly. I am aware of Director Linnington's efforts in regard
to China and more broadly. I support those efforts in
discussions with my counterparts.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you both for that commitment. I
appreciate it. We do not want to ever forget and make sure that
we can bring as much closure to our families and bring our
soldiers home.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you for
your testimony this morning, and on behalf of Chairman McCain,
let me now adjourn the hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Wicker
quality of life
1. Senator Wicker. In March 2012, I expressed concern to Admiral
Willard that certain below standard dormitory buildings at Osan Air
Base did not receive military construction funding in the fiscal year
2013 budget. I was specifically concerned about significant plumbing,
lead concerns, and mold issues at Building 746, Building 708, and
Building 475.
Will you provide the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate
Appropriations Committee with an update on the overall status of
enlisted dormitory housing at Osan Air Base as well as the specific
status of Building 746, Building 708, and Building 475?
Admiral Harris. Building 475 has been demolished and Building 746
is unoccupied and scheduled for demolition. I am pleased to report that
Building 708 has no record of lead or mold issues and its current HVAC
and plumbing systems are fully mission capable. Additionally, all rooms
in building 708 meet Air Force standards and are either occupied or
ready for occupancy. The building is scheduled for a major overhaul in
2017 as part of a $4M dormitory refurbishment.
2. Senator Wicker. Also, what is the wing commander's assessment of
the enlisted dormitory situation at Osan Air Base (active mission
assigned personnel as well as support / tenant units)?
Admiral Harris. Overall, the 51st Fighter Wing commander assesses
the condition of the unaccompanied housing at Osan Air Base as adequate
to good. The commander additionally assesses there is no difference in
the quality of dorms between those assigned to the 51st Fighter Wing
and those assigned to tenant units. For context, Osan Air Base has 35
dormitories, including 33 for the Air Force and 2 assigned to the Army.
Osan recently opened two new dormitories--a Senior NCO dormitory with
277 rooms and an Airman dormitory with 156 rooms. The base has an
extensive facility repair and renovation program, with at least one
dormitory under renovation per year, and a very robust dormitory
furniture replacement program. Some of the dormitories were constructed
in the late 1980s, and some individual rooms are closed for
maintenance, however, none of the rooms are substandard. Individual
rooms continue to have normal wear and tear issues, and residents are
relocated as needed. At this time, all major systems are functional.
The wing commander stated they are heading in the right direction and
expects significant improvements to continue. I will personally visit
one of the dormitories when I next travel to Osan Air Base.
3. Senator Wicker. Are there any plans to correct any substandard
rooms remaining?
Admiral Harris. Today, 100 percent of dormitory rooms on Osan Air
Base meet Air Force standards. At any given time, roughly 5 percent of
rooms are empty for maintenance. However, these issues are addressed
directly and residents are not moved into a dormitory room until it is
ready for occupancy. The 33 dormitories on Osan Air Base, totaling
4,697 rooms, are managed through a robust 5-year plan incorporating
both routine maintenance and major refurbishment. In total, there is
$166M programmed for Osan Air Base dormitory projects over the next 10
years, with $79M of those projects programmed within the next 5 years.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lee
modernization efforts
4. Senator Lee. Admiral Harris, one of the themes of this week's
Air Force Association conference that is taking place just down the
road is the need to modernize our nation's air fleet to outpace the
technological advances made by potential adversaries. In your opinion,
looking at the current threat spectrum in the Pacific Command area of
responsibility and the technological developments of militaries within
that area, how important is it that the service branches are given the
funding and flexibility to modernize and address these threats? If you
and future PACOM commanders are not receiving, training with, and
maintaining the weapons systems that are designed to counter the types
of military technology you will be facing in the future, what kind of
risks will you be taking?
Admiral Harris. Funding, in many respects, defines our total
military capability. I appreciate the support of Congress, and the
opportunity to comment on this important issue. Continuous changes in
fiscal assumptions due to budget uncertainty hamper our ability to
plan. The result is poor use of resources. These uncertainties affect
our people, as well as our equipment and infrastructure by reducing
training and delaying needed investments. They directly affect our
ability to pace threats by slowing investments in future capabilities.
Services must have predictable and persistent funding to properly man,
train, and equip a ready force. Additionally, Services must have the
flexibility to develop and execute long-range programs for
modernization while meeting current readiness needs. Funding
uncertainties reduce warfighting capabilities, further reduce
contingency response force readiness, and jeopardize our ability to
meet the Defense Strategic Guidance. Uncertainty over funding
ultimately risks the DOD's ability to fulfill USPACOM's commitment to
the President's defense strategies. It jeopardizes our reach, and the
lethality and technological edge we have today. It degrades our
credibility as a reliable partner and imposes increased strain and risk
to our service members.
regional commerce
5. Senator Lee. Secretary Shear, you are well aware of the
importance that Western Pacific maritime access is to U.S. commercial
interests. More than $5 trillion worth of international trade traverses
the South China Sea annually and the area is a significant site for the
exploration and transportation of energy resources. What impact has
Chinese action in the South and East China Seas had thus far on the
free flow of commerce through that area, and what future actions could
negatively impact this commerce?
Mr. Shear. Maritime Asia is a vital thruway for global commerce,
and it will be a critical part of the expected regional economic
growth. The importance of the Asia-Pacific sea lanes for global trade
cannot be overstated. Eight of the world's 10 busiest container ports
are in the Asia-Pacific region, and almost 30 percent of the world's
maritime trade transits the South China Sea annually. Approximately
two-thirds of the world's oil shipments transit through the Indian
Ocean to the Pacific, and in 2014, more than 15 million barrels of oil
passed through the Malacca Strait per day.
China is using a steady progression of small, incremental steps to
increase its control over disputed areas East and South China Seas.
This includes increasingly deploying the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) to
enforce its claims. For instance, China has used maritime law
enforcement ships to restrict Philippine commercial fishing in the area
of Scarborough Reef. The growing efforts of claimants, including China,
to assert their claims has also led to an increase in air and maritime
incidents in the recent years. Furthermore, China's land reclamation
operations and infrastructure development over the last few years will
enable it to establish a more robust power projection presence in the
South China Sea. Broadly speaking, this has the potential to create
uncertainty for not only the regional governments, but also for
commercial entities operating in the region.
6. Senator Lee. Admiral Harris, does the Chinese military have the
ability to close down some of these maritime routes in the event of a
conflict, and what do you think could spark such an action from the
Chinese navy? How would the United States respond to such an event?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
cyber security
7. Senator Lee. Admiral Harris, the Chinese and North Korean
governments have both been involved in cyber-attacks and cyber-
espionage against the United States Government and American businesses,
and we are aware that cyber warfare will only become further engrained
into future military doctrines. As a Combatant Commander, with these
specific cyber threats in your area of responsibility, what do you view
as your role in detecting, defending against, and deterring cyber
attacks on the military personnel and assets under your command? What
resources and authorities are you in need of to enable you to address
this threat more effectively and proactively?
Admiral Harris. My role is to identify capability requirements that
lead to military dominance in every domain, including cyber. To that
end, I coordinate with United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and
United States Cyber Command (USCC) in the employment of cyber warfare
teams to deliver the needed capabilities in the context of a broader
military effort. In ongoing operations, my role is ensuring that
cyberspace operations are integrated, synchronized, and coordinated
between USPACOM, Service components, the Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA), USSTRATCOM, USCC, and interagency partners who
contribute authorities, capabilities, and insights critical to
protecting infrastructure and information, detecting attacks, and
deterring adversaries in cyberspace. I appreciate Congress' efforts to
provide the resources that deliver technologies to provide strong,
layered security and protection against the latest cyber threats. I am
not aware of any unmet authority requirements that require
Congressional attention at present. However, I urge Congress to
continue to fund all cyber mission teams. While this may prove
difficult under sequestration, it is vital to maintaining our ability
to dominate in the cyber domain.
pacific pivot
8. Senator Lee. Secretary Shear, one of the key elements of the
military's strategy for shifting focus to the Pacific is having 60
percent of our naval and air fleets deployed to that region by 2020.
Are we currently on schedule to meet this goal, and if the conflict
against Islamic extremism continues at the same or an increased pace
over the next 5 years, what impact will that have on the manpower and
equipment levels available for operations in the Pacific?
Mr. Shear. The Department of Defense has worked to consistently
implement President Obama's strategy of rebalancing toward the Asia-
Pacific region. Over the past six years, we have made our engagement
and investments in the Pacific a top priority, even in the face of
budget constraints. The rebalance is first and foremost a whole-of-
government approach, and we view our efforts as working hand-in-hand
with the many political, economic, and development initiatives underway
across the region.
To answer your question, the Air Force has already rebalanced to
station 60 percent of its overseas air assets in the Asia-Pacific and
Navy is on track to home-port 60 percent of the fleet in the region by
2020. Still, the hallmark of the rebalance is the emphasis on the
quality, and not the quantity of our military presence in the Asia-
Pacific region. We are actively investing in the future capabilities
that we will need in the Asia-Pacific, including high-end capabilities.
We are pushing our most advanced existing technology to the Pacific and
we're finding new ways to use it. We're adapting our overall defense
posture in the Asia-Pacific to be geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. We are increasing
the tempo of training and exercises in the region. We are modernizing
the alliances and reinforcing the partnerships that are the bedrock of
everything we do in the Asia-Pacific. All of this continues to occur
amid a context of continued engagement in Afghanistan, as well as
emergent efforts to counter Islamic extremism in the Middle East and
strengthen defenses in Europe in response to renewed Russian
aggression.
9. Senator Lee. Admiral Harris, the United States has longstanding
alliances with many countries in eastern Asia from South Korean to
India, and we participate in many military exercises, training events,
military exchanges, and military assistance with these countries. What
further benefit will the continuation of the pivot strategy offer the
United States and our regional allies, considering the many engagements
in which we are already involved?
Admiral Harris. One of America's key asymmetric advantages is that
we have allies, partners and friends in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Our
principal adversaries do not. The Rebalance is key to this. The
Rebalance is a strategic, whole of government effort that recognizes
the vital interest that Pacific nations play in our future. The world
is inextricably interconnected--the best way to maintain security,
prosperity, and prepare for the future security environment is to
maintain the positive momentum of the Rebalance and actively shape our
national interests. The Rebalance is building trust and deepening our
partnerships in the region, and it is always in our interest to have
more friends. Surveys and opinion polls in the region indicate a strong
desire for continued U.S. leadership and engagement in the region.
In recent years we have developed new or enhanced security
relationships with most countries in the region, helped in no small
part by our being a trustworthy alternative partner to offset China and
North Korea's coercive and often unpredictable behavior. We have also
helped improve the effectiveness of regional organizations and
associated working groups under the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting
Plus and ASEAN Regional Forum. These achievements, resulting from
redoubled efforts under the Rebalance, are enhancing regional security
and enabling regional militaries to contribute more in providing
security in a region where complexity continues increasing.
As an example, our friends and allies across the Indo-Asia-Pacific
are investing their own resources toward increased United States
access. Of the four largest United States military construction efforts
since the end of the Cold War--all in the Asia Pacific--Korea and Japan
are contributing 82 percent of the cost: $30 Billion of $37B (Camp
Humphreys, Korea; MCAS Iwakuni, Japan; Futenma Replacement Facility
Okinawa Consolidation; Guam). Elsewhere Japan is providing 97 percent
of Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) construction funding in
Japan ($16.9 B of $17.4B). U.S. investment in regional security is
being reciprocated further by growing investments in U.S. military
systems such as AEGIS ships, C-17, V-22, P-8, AH-64, UH-60, UH-72 and
other aircraft, and other major hardware acquisitions that come with a
decades-long partnership ``tail'' in training and logistics
investments. The Rebalance is a sound investment that is paying
dividends in terms of relationships, access, interoperability,
stability and prosperity.
China continues its unprecedented military modernization, as
demonstrated in South China Sea land reclamation and military
acquisitions. North Korean nuclear development and provocations
continue. Global terrorist networks are evolving faster than our allies
and partners can counter them. Given the expanding threat, there is
growing demand from allies, partners, and regional institutions such as
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for engagement,
partnering, training, and leadership from the United States. We must
maintain our capacity to lead, further strengthen essential U.S.
relationships, and shape the security environment. The Rebalance
fulfills that need and is vital to our strategic future.
10. Senator Lee. Secretary Shear, how have the Chinese reacted so
far to our pivot strategy in the Pacific and the Asia-Pacific Maritime
Security Strategy? Do they perceive this as a threat, and as we
continue towards PACOM's force structure goals, what further reaction
can we expect from the Chinese?
Mr. Shear. For the past 15 years, China's military has pursued a
comprehensive military modernization program focused on increasing its
capabilities to conduct missions on its periphery and beyond to protect
its perceived national interests and deter adversaries. We can expect
this trend to continue for the foreseeable future, particularly because
China's leadership views the strengthening and modernization of the
People's Liberation Army as essential to China's broad objectives of
achieving great power status.
The U.S. presence in the region has been a stabilizing factor since
the end of World War II. Our presence is welcomed in the region by many
because the military steps we are taking as part of the Rebalance to
the Asia-Pacific region are intended to reinforce a rules-based
regional order that is conducive to stability and prosperity for
everyone in the region, including China. China's aspirations and the
United States enduring presence in the Asia-Pacific region are not
incompatible. We recognize that the United States-China relationship,
as well as the military-to-military relationship, is characterized by
elements of both competition and cooperation. Since 2012, China has
responded positively to military-to-military engagement, resulting in
improvements in the pace and scope of sustained and substantive
exchanges that focus on risk reduction, as well engagements that expand
our ability to cooperate in areas of mutual interest, such as
counterpiracy, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. We will
continue to focus our military-to-military engagements in ways that
ensure that China acts in a manner consistent with international norms,
resulting in outcomes that best serve the interests of the United
States and our allies and partners in the region.
As the United States builds a stronger foundation for the military-
to-military relationship with China, we will continue to monitor
closely China's evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force
development. Furthermore, we will continue to work with our allies and
partners in the region to sustain the regional rules-based security
order that has resulted in unprecedented peace and prosperity in the
region for the past 70 years.
11. Senator Lee. Secretary Shear, how do you account for the
possibility that such a large shift in military resources could inflame
already tense regional problems? What will be our reaction if the
Chinese military increases its military build-up in an attempt to
offset our efforts?
Mr. Shear. The relationship between the United States and China is
the most consequential in the world today. Pursuing a productive
relationship with China is a critical element of the larger United
States strategy for the Asia-Pacific region. The United States is a
Pacific power that has vital interests in region, which we will protect
through critical investments in our own capabilities, and the
investments of our allies and partners.
United States leadership in the Asia-Pacific region is grounded in
our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines,
and Thailand. We have been modernizing these essential partnerships to
tackle a full range of regional and global challenges. These alliances
are powerful platforms for advancing a rules-based international
system. The United States insists upon and will continue to underscore
its fundamental national interest--one shared by our allies and
partners--in preserving freedom of navigation and commerce through some
of the world's busiest sea lanes. The United States will continue to
sail, fly, and operate in accordance with international law in pursuit
of our interests and those of our allies and partners.
We also have been working across the region to invest in regional
institutions to strengthen the development of an open and effective
regional architecture with the capacity to resolve conflict, support
development and economic prosperity, advance human rights, and ensure
that all countries in the region play by the same rules. United States
support and participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the East Asia
Summit (EAS), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PAF) groupings are
examples of our commitment to managing and reducing regional
challenges.
The United States-China relationship is an integral component of
our overall approach to the Asia-Pacific region. We recognize that
there are elements of cooperation as well as competition in the
relationship, which we will seek to manage through sustained and
substantive dialogue and practical engagement in areas of mutual
interest. The points of friction between China and the United States
cannot be ignored, and we will continue to deal forthrightly with our
differences.
12. Senator Lee. Secretary Shear, the United States officially does
not take positions on sovereignty issues with respect to territorial
and maritime disputes in the East and South China Sea. However, we are
obligated by defense treaties to a number of countries that are
currently involved in territorial disputes in this region. How would
the United States respond to a hypothetical conflict over the Senkaku
Islands, given our treaty obligations to Japan?
Mr. Shear. United States policy toward the Senkaku Islands, which
was clearly stated by President Obama in April 2014, has not changed:
Article 5 of our security treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands because
they are under the administrative control of Japan. We consult
regularly with our Japanese allies, and will oppose any attempts to
change the status quo unilaterally.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Cruz
chinese missile capabilities
13. Senator Cruz. In his opening remarks, Chairman McCain said that
the United States needs to ``think anew about deterrence'' in our
relationship with China. This admonition is especially timely in light
of China's recent military parade, an event which the People's
Liberation Army used to unveil a number of new and updated ballistic
missiles. Among them was the DF-26C, an Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missile (IRBM) with a range of 3,000-4,000 km. Although concealed with
a tarp during the rehearsal, reports indicate that the DF-26C appears
to have three stages and a lengthy nose-cone. The latter feature
suggests that the warhead may have a terminal guidance system,
increasing its target accuracy. If true, this also introduces the
possibility that China could introduce a fourth modification of the DF-
26 similar to their ``carrier killer'' ballistic missile, the DF-21D.
In 2012, The Diplomat highlighted the difficulty of AEGIS ballistic
missile defense interceptors to engage a DF-21D in its midcourse flight
due to possible decoys and in its descent phase due to its ability to
maneuver at high speed. China reportedly tested the DF-21D successfully
in 2014. The potential that the DF-26 now has a modification with
terminal guidance introduces the troubling possibility that the United
States is not only losing the anti-access/area denial competition in
the South China Sea, but is actually ceding additional maneuvering
space to the PLA.
Are you concerned about the ability of U.S. missile defenses to
intercept the DF-21D and DF-26C throughout their course of flight?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
14. Senator Cruz. In Chapter 2, section 2 of the 2014 Annual Report
to Congress, the United States-China Economic and Security Review
Commission notes the observation of Hans Kristensen, director of the
Nuclear Information Project and the Federation of American Scientists,
that the Department of Defense (DOD) began reducing information
regarding an estimate of the number of ballistic and cruise missiles in
the 2010 ``Military and Security Developments Involving the People's
Republic of China'' report to Congress. By 2013, this estimate had been
completely removed from the annual report.
Why did the Pentagon begin removing its estimates of China's
ballistic missile capacity in its 2010 report?
Mr. Shear. The Department of Defense's annual report to Congress on
``Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of
China'' continues to summarize the size, location, and capabilities of
Chinese strategic land, sea, and air forces. This report is provided to
Congress in both classified and unclassified form.
Details on China's missile systems in the Department's report have
decreased as China has stopped publishing accurate figures on the
numbers and types of its ballistic and cruise missiles. There are
various unclassified estimates of China's missile inventory we could
draw from, but those sources are not authoritative and may be
inaccurate. The Department aims to provide the most accurate
information possible to Congress; however, we must also weigh the
potential risks to intelligence sources and methods should we reveal
details regarding our knowledge of specific numbers of China's missile
systems.
The 2015 annual report noted that China possesses at least 1,200
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in its inventory, and has an
arsenal of 50-60 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The
report summarizes the estimated range, key developments, and
implications of China's ballistic missile systems.
The report also describes China's investment in anti-ship cruise
missiles (ASCMs) and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). ASCM and LACM
systems are further described by system type, operating units, and
delivery platforms.
15. Senator Cruz. Shouldn't Congress have an unvarnished estimate
of China's military capabilities, particularly given their recent
aggressive stance in the South China Sea and willingness to intrude
into United States territorial waters off the coast of Alaska?
Mr. Shear. In addition to recurring testimony before defense
oversight committees by senior Department of Defense officials, DOD
provides an annual report to Congress on ``Military and Security
Developments Involving the People's Republic of China.'' This report is
produced in partnership by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Policy and the Defense Intelligence Agency. We coordinate the report
with the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Energy, Commerce, and
Treasury, and with the Intelligence Community and the National Security
Council staff, so it reflects views that are held broadly across the
United States Government.
We intend the report to be factual, descriptive, and analytical. We
try not to speculate, but we let the facts speak for themselves. This
report highlights China's military strengths and weaknesses, as well as
the opportunities and the challenges that we see going forward.
Although the most recent Chinese movement of ships off the coast of
Alaska occurred outside the period covered by the 2015 annual report to
Congress, the 2015 DOD report did present a special topic section on
``China's Reclamation in the South China Sea.'' That section described
the size and potential uses of the reclaimed sites, and noted that
``most analysts outside China believe that China is attempting to
change facts on the ground by improving its defense infrastructure in
the South China Sea.''
red flag and rimpac exercises
16. Senator Cruz. On June 25, Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson
Yang Yujun expressed strong concerns at a monthly briefing about an
amendment I introduced with Senators Inhofe and Wicker that called on
DOD to invite Taiwan to Red Flag military exercises. In Yang's words,
``We are firmly opposed to any country's military contact with Taiwan.
Our position is consistent and clear.'' I believe that further military
integration with Taiwan is imperative in reassuring our friends and
allies and deterring the PLA from using force against Taiwan. Red Flag
affords Taiwan an opportunity to participate in military exercises that
will improve their self-defense capabilities and their ability to
operate jointly with the United States, should that ever be required.
Do you plan to invite Taiwan to participate in the 2016 RIMPAC
exercises? Do you plan to invite China?
Admiral Harris. (U//FOUO) We invited China to RIMPAC 2016, but
reserve the right to cancel that invitation should our relationship
deteriorate. We did not invite Taiwan to RIMPAC 2016, nor do we plan
to. The nature of the relationship between United States Pacific
Command and Taiwan's armed forces is not dependent on whether or not
Taiwan is part of RIMPAC. Having said that, we will continue to
maintain and deepen our strong military relations with Taiwan through
continued exchanges and engagements in accordance with United States
policy and the Taiwan Relations Act. I am a firm believer in, and
supporter of, the Taiwan Relations Act.
17. Senator Cruz. Does DOD intend to invite Taiwan to participate
in Red Flag exercises?
Mr. Shear. The United States Government's approach to Taiwan has as
its foundation the three joint United States-China Communiques and the
Taiwan Relations Act. This approach has been a constant for eight U.S.
administrations and will not change. Maintaining and deepening strong
unofficial relations with Taiwan is an important part of United States
engagement in Asia, a region of great and growing importance to the
United States.
The Department of Defense engages closely with its Taiwan
counterparts to support Taiwan's development of defensive capabilities
to deter and, if necessary, resist coercion today and in the future.
The United States has made available to Taiwan defense equipment and
services in order to enable the island to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability.
This includes reviewing training opportunities for Taiwan to
improve and maintain its readiness and operational capabilities. The
Taiwan Air Force currently participates in several realistic and
complex training scenarios each year at Luke Air Force Base with its F-
16 aircraft that are designed to exercise defense counter-air tactics,
formation flying, and attacks under simulated combat conditions. We do
not believe it is necessary to invite Taiwan to Red Flag exercises at
this point in time.
We believe this tailored training meets Taiwan's needs. We will
continue to reassess Taiwan's capabilities and readiness levels to
ensure that it receives the necessary training to maintain an effective
defensive capability.
chinese land reclamation
18. Senator Cruz. Admiral Harris, when asked in Thursday's hearing
for your opinion on whether the United States should sail or fly within
12 nautical miles of China's artificial islands in the South China Sea,
you answered in part that the decision would ``depend on the feature''
of the land formation, referencing ``islands that are not islands.''
The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative lists seven Chinese outposts
within the Spratly Islands that exist on reclaimed reefs, specifically
Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson South, Hughes Reef, Gaven
Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef.
What is DOD's definition of what is and isn't an island?
Admiral Harris. The Department of State, through its Office of the
Geographer, establishes U.S. policy on the legal status of geographic
features. The DOS-Office of the Geographer has not yet released an
official position on the South China Sea features. There are certain
features, such as Mischief Reef, that we believe were originally below
water at high tide, prior to China's massive reclamation. If that
feature was originally underwater, then we can legally conduct normal
operations, such as overflight and navigation in the vicinity of the
features, including within 12 nautical miles. For other features that
are legally characterized as either islands or rocks, we could not
overfly within 12 nautical miles, but we could sail within 12 nautical
miles in innocent passage.
The DOD definition of an ``island'' conforms to the definition
stated in 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). Although the U.S. is not a party to UNCLOS, it considers the
navigation and overflight provisions reflective of customary
international law and therefore acts in accordance with UNCLOS.
According to Article 121 of UNCLOS, an island is ``a naturally formed
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.''
An island is capable of sustaining human life and the status of a
feature is determined by its natural formation and not by man-made
alterations. An island is entitled to a territorial sea, an exclusive
economic zone and a continental shelf. A rock is defined in Art 121 as
a natural feature above water at high tide, which cannot sustain life
on its own. A rock is entitled to a territorial sea, but not an
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. A low-tide elevation is a
naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at
low tide but submerged at high tide. A low-tide elevation is not
entitled to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf. Article 60 of UNCLOS clearly states that artificial islands,
installations, and structures do not possess the status of islands and
have no territorial sea of their own. Therefore DOD has the legal right
to conduct normal operations within the vicinity of reclaimed features
which were originally underwater.
19. Senator Cruz. Do these seven reclamation sites fall under DOD's
definition of an island?
Admiral Harris. The Department of State, Office of the Geographer
is responsible for determining the official U.S. position with respect
to the legal characterization all features, including reclamation
sites. The U.S. currently takes no official position on the legal
character of these seven reclamation sites, however we do not believe
that all of them meet the legal definition of an island. We encourage
the Department of State to take a position on the status of these
reclamation sites and other features in the South China Sea. I would
like to reiterate my point in question 18 that as a matter of
international law, artificial islands and structures are not entitled
to a territorial sea. We will conduct military operations in the
vicinity of all features in accordance with international law.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Shaheen
electronic warfare
20. Senator Shaheen. Assured communications, particularly for
command and control (C2) networks, is critical for our maritime forces.
Our adversaries are becoming increasingly capable in electronic warfare
technology, threatening our military effectiveness. Can you comment on
the need to upgrade systems like the Link-16 with more advanced and
adaptable anti-jam technologies while maintaining interoperability with
legacy radios?
Admiral Harris. It is critically important; highly resilient, anti-
jam encrypted communication technologies are necessary for command and
control of forces operating within the air, land, and maritime domains
and today's systems do not sufficiently repel efforts by adversaries to
jam, exploit, or penetrate our legacy networks. Since Tactical Data
Links (TDL) 16 and 22 are both based on technology developed decades
ago, there is a pressing need to update or replace their technologies
with new ones that will continue to be jam-resistant, provide
cryptographic protection, and remain interoperable.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hirono
philippines
21. Senator Hirono. The Philippines is one of the United States
defense treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific and also a party to the South
China Sea dispute with China. United States and Philippine armed forces
regularly conduct joint land and sea exercises to boost security
cooperation. How does the United States alliance in the Philippines fit
in the overall maritime security strategy in the Asia-Pacific?
Admiral Harris. The United States-Philippines Alliance is a
cornerstone of the Indo-Asia-Pacific security architecture,
demonstrating the United States's commitment to peace and security for
over 65 years, and it has a bright future in regional security. Through
our historically close ties, we have developed a strong and cooperative
relationship, which enables United States training and operational
access to the South China, Sulu and Celebes Seas. I appreciate the
Congress' creation of the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative,
which will significantly enhance our partnership by enabling greater
investment in the regional security architecture, including
improvements to the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP). The AFP's modernization will not only contribute to the security
of the Philippines, but also provide substantive support and
collaboration toward a regionally shared Maritime Domain Awareness.
Furthermore, we continue to applaud and encourage the Philippines' use
of international courts and arbitration to resolve maritime disputes.
Mr. Shear. A key element of DOD's approach to maritime security in
Southeast Asia is to work alongside capable regional allies and
partners. Through initiatives such as the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines, the Department will be able to
increase our routine and persistent rotational presence in Southeast
Asia for expanded training with the Philippines and other regional
partners. We are conducting more than 400 planned events with our
treaty ally, the Philippines in 2015, and there is broad regional
agreement on the importance of improving maritime security and maritime
domain awareness capabilities in an effort towards promoting peace,
stability, and prosperity in Asia. In conjunction with the Department
of State and the United States Coast Guard, we have dramatically
expanded our maritime security assistance and capacity building efforts
in recent years. In the Philippines, the Department is providing
coastal radar systems and assisting the Department of State with naval
maintenance capacity building as well as providing interdiction
vessels, naval fleet upgrades, communications equipment, and aircraft
procurement. The Department is also working with our allies, Japan and
Australia, in a coordinated fashion to maximize the efficiency and
effectiveness of our maritime security capacity building efforts in
Southeast Asia, beginning with the Philippines.
22. Senator Hirono. Could you elaborate on how our recent sales of
patrol vessels to the Philippine navy will enhance their capabilities
and improve regional security?
Admiral Harris. The recent sale of Hamilton Class patrol vessels to
the Philippines provides an initial credible maritime security
capability, enabling the Philippine Navy to monitor and respond to
maritime incidents and crises in their territorial waters and economic
exclusion zone (EEZ). In tandem with their improving maritime domain
awareness assets and sensors, Hamilton Class patrol vessels will extend
their patrol range and improve situational awareness within their EEZ
and adjacent waters enabling them to better protect their interests. In
fact, I support the sale of a third Hamilton Class patrol vessel to the
Philippines, should the opportunity arise. I had the opportunity to
visit their new National Coast Watch Center (NCWC) in Manila (funded
largely by DTRA) and was impressed by the potential that exists there.
I believe that linking the Hamilton Class cutters to the NCWC will
dramatically improve Maritime Domain Awareness.
Mr. Shear. The two United States Coast Guard High-Endurance Cutters
(WHEC) that the Department of Defense transferred as excess defense
articles to the Philippines in 2011 and 2013 supported a major non-NATO
treaty ally and key alliance partner in the Asia Pacific region. The
cutters' patrol capabilities have enhanced the Philippines' ability to
contribute to humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR),
respond to maritime domain awareness concerns, enhance interoperability
with United States forces, and strengthen regional relationships by
participating in multinational exercises. The United States and the
Philippines also share the goal of ensuring freedom of navigation and
unimpeded lawful commerce. By allowing the Philippines to patrol its
Exclusive Economic Zone, the WHECs also support these shared principles
and contribute to regional security. A combination of foreign military
financing and Philippine national funds are being used to continue to
enhance the capabilities of the WHECs.
23. Senator Hirono. In July I introduced a bipartisan bill that
would include the Philippines in the group of allied nations eligible
for expedited consideration provided by law of foreign military sales.
Currently that group includes just NATO, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
South Korea and Israel. Would you agree that the Philippines should be
included in this group?
Admiral Harris. Yes. I strongly support adding the Philippines to
the select group of allied nations eligible for expedited foreign
military sales (FMS). The Philippines has been a staunch ally in
enhancing regional security and supporting PACOM regional presence.
Reducing United States Government processing time for government to
government sales and commercially licensed arms sales would deepen our
relationship and further improve our military ties, while accelerating
progression in the capabilities of an important ally and partner.
Mr. Shear. Yes, the Department of Defense would fully support
including our Philippine ally in the category of NATO countries for the
purpose of congressional notification for foreign military sales.
Although the Philippines is already designated a major non-NATO ally,
inclusion in the NATO category would enable the Department, working
with the State Department, to process Philippine foreign military sales
cases more quickly by both increasing the threshold for congressional
notification and shortening the timeframe of the required notification.
Further, inclusion in this category would demonstrate the value and
strategic importance of our Philippine ally.
guam energy
24. Senator Hirono. On July 14th, the Energy and Natural Resources
Committee on which I serve held a hearing to examine the energy
challenges that come from living in places that are not connected to
the rest of the country, including Hawaii, Alaska, and the U.S.
Territories. We heard from Robert Underwood, the Former Guam Delegate
to the House of Representatives. He explained that Guam relies on
imported petroleum to serve most of its energy needs and that the local
power companies are challenged to keep power constant. I visited Guam
last month and heard similar concerns. What plans does the Navy have to
enhance the resilience of the energy infrastructure needed to support
the expanded military capabilities needed to develop Guam into a
strategic hub in the region?
Admiral Harris. I appreciate the investments that Congress
continues supporting on behalf of our national security interests in
Guam, and I welcome every improvement that mutually benefits Guam and
DOD. To that end, the Navy continues working with Guam Power Authority
through master planning and partnerships that enhance the resilience of
the Guam energy infrastructure. The Navy continues improving energy
efficiency, reducing consumption, and partnering on renewable energy
projects with Guam Power Authority, the responsible agency for Guam
energy infrastructure.
Mr. Shear. The demand for electrical power under the military
build-up can be met by the current generation capacity on Guam. No
power generation upgrades will, therefore, be required. However,
consistent with Navy sustainability goals, a portion of the power
demand will be satisfied by power generated from renewable energy
sources, including photovoltaic solar panels on rooftops and acreage
within the cantonment and/or family housing areas.
We also plan to upgrade transmission lines and construct a new on-
site substation.
Additionally, both the Navy and the Marine Corps recognize the need
to reach and maintain security and resilience of the energy
infrastructure. The Marine Corps is actively pursuing suitable ways of
achieving that goal as well as providing a sensible approach to
implementing renewable energy, with an objective of identifying
practical and feasible energy measures that are reliable and
financially reasonable.
freely associated states
25. Senator Hirono. Last year I had the opportunity to speak with
Secretary Carter, prior to his confirmation, about my concerns
regarding our compacts of free association with the freely associated
states (FAS) of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. We began our relationship
with these nations after World War II, when we began testing nuclear
weapons in the Marshall Islands. The U.S. was tasked with governing the
region, then referred to as the Trust Territory of the Pacific, by the
United Nations. It is worth noting that at one point the region was
exclusively under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy. In 1986 these
three nations gained their independence but remained strong allies of
the United States through our compacts of free association.
The compacts ensured the United States would retain exclusive
military jurisdiction over the region. It also allowed FAS citizens the
opportunity to enlist in the military and freely travel between our
nations. Recognizing that certain jurisdictions would be more likely to
see an influx of FAS citizens, Congress provided dedicated funding to
Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands (CNMI) to defray the costs associated with this
``compact impact.''
In 2010, the United States concluded renegotiating the terms of our
compact with Palau, in which we promised to provide $215 million to
Palau through fiscal year 2024. While the compact is now in place, the
United States has not ratified this agreement due to Congressional
budgetary rules requiring a pay-for--in essence, the United States must
find roughly $13 million annually to offset the costs of this promise.
According to the Department of Defense, FAS citizens generally, and
Palauans specifically, enlist in the military at a higher rate than
citizens of any State in the United States. I have met with Palauan
President Tommy Remengesau, who has enumerated his concerns about
China's growing economic influence and expansion in the Pacific and our
seemingly lax attitude toward our compact with Palau. His concerns were
clear: if the United States does not live up to its promises to Palau,
how we will keep the region clear of China's influence?
I am sincerely concerned that our lack of action in this matter may
pose a threat to our position in the region. This is especially
worrying as China's influence in the region continues to grow -a
concern which I believe provided the most compelling reason for the
Department to rebalance its forces to the Asia-Pacific region. I would
like to continue my conversation with Secretary Carter, as well as
Admiral Harris, and Secretary Shear on this issue, and ask the
Department to please consider the following questions:
Given the above, can you please elaborate on whether, and how, the
FAS play a role in the Department's plans for its rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific?
Admiral Harris. Assured and exclusive access to the Freely
Associated States (FAS) plays an important supporting role in United
States efforts to maintain much-needed influence from San Diego all the
way to Southeast Asia which would be of vital importance in a
contingency or conflict. The FAS are home to strategic facilities such
as the Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site on Kwajalein, as well
as key capabilities such as our Civic Action Team in Palau. FAS
citizens are serving honorably in the U.S. military and beginning in
2010, are graduating from U.S. service academies. The FAS are
strategically located and it is in our national interest to maintain
strong ties with the FAS. The FAS will play an important role in the
event of regional conflict as hubs to maintain open sea lines of
communication. I support Congress' efforts to ensure our relationships
remain steadfast.
Mr. Shear. Maintaining strong relationships with the Freely
Associated States sends a strong signal about our commitment to the
rebalance. As a whole, our three Compact agreements ensure that the
United States has what essentially amounts to continuous air and sea
access from the Philippines to Hawaii, which is important in supporting
our ability to move forces in and out of the region freely.
26. Senator Hirono. Does the Department share my concerns, which
echo those of President Remengesau, about China's expansion into this
region?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
Mr. Shear. The Department of Defense is concerned with any
activity, including Chinese activity, directed at disrupting United
States relationships and access to the region. We welcome the
appropriate involvement of other parties to address regional concerns,
so long as their activities are conducted with transparency,
accountability, and respect for international standards.
27. Senator Hirono. Has the Department given any consideration to
what losing the support of Palau or the other freely associated states
would mean for the security of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (CNMI), Guam, or Hawaii?
Admiral Harris. Losing the support of Palau and/or the other two
Freely Associated States (FAS) would create an opportunity for another
nation to offer increased assistance to these countries and build
additional influence which, over time, can only work to the U.S.'s
strategic disadvantage. China is clearly pursuing a strategy to that
end through offers of loans and economic development. The Compact
agreements are individual and bilateral, and, because of geography,
losing the support of any one of the three FAS would reduce our ability
to protect the remaining two--something the U.S. promised to do in the
Compacts. The defense relationship that USPACOM built with the Palauan
Government through semiannual bilateral meetings has improved my
confidence that Palau would support United States defense interests in
a contingency situation. I welcome and support efforts by Congress to
further deepen our relationship with the FAS, to ensure that our
commitment remains unquestioned.
Mr. Shear. As a whole, our three Compact agreements provide the
United States with what amounts to ensured air and sea access from
Hawaii to the Philippines. Losing the support of Palau or the other
Freely Associated States would lessen the broader strategic value of
those arrangements in supporting our ability to pursue United States
interests in the Asia Pacific region.
28. Senator Hirono. Does the Department have any plans to work with
other agencies, such as the State Department or the Department of the
Interior, to come up with a comprehensive strategy to ratify our
compact with Palau and secure our standing in the region?
Admiral Harris. DOD and USPACOM have a strong working relationship
with Palau, and with both the Department of State and Department of
Interior. I recognize Palau's strategic importance and will continue
working to ensure that our relationship remains strong.
Mr. Shear. Congressional approval and implementation of the
Agreement has been a priority for the Administration since the
agreement was signed on September 3, 2010. The Department of Defense
has worked with the Department of State and the Department of the
Interior on developing a strategy to obtain approval of the agreement
and will continue working toward that end state in support of State and
Interior efforts.
29. Senator Hirono. Are there areas in which the Department can
assist jurisdictions impacted by migration from the FAS to States and
territories, specifically Hawaii and Guam, in providing housing,
economic development, or employment solutions for this population?
Admiral Harris. As you noted, we are fortunate that citizens of the
Freely Associated States (FAS) take advantage of their opportunity to
enlist in the United States military, serving honorably while
supporting their families with military housing and other benefits.
There is not a specific Department of Defense program directed towards
the housing, economic development, or employment challenges facing the
FAS population, but military commanders will continue their close
coordination with local community leaders to explore mutually
beneficial opportunities.
Mr. Shear. DOD does not have efforts underway directed specifically
toward housing, economic development, or employment solutions for
Freely Associated States (FAS) populations migrating to U.S. States and
territories. However, many FAS citizens do take advantage of the
opportunity to seek employment and housing benefits by joining the U.S.
military.
30. Senator Hirono. I've also recently met with businessmen from
the CNMI, who discussed concerns with Chinese economic expansion in
their territory--the same United States territory that is still without
full power more than a month after a typhoon wiped out its power grid.
I'm told that Chinese economic expansion in the region has been
substantial. Would the Department consider economic expansion to CNMI a
threat to security in the Pacific region?
Admiral Harris. Yes. PACOM is concerned by the growing influence
China may be gaining through its economic engagement in the Pacific
Island Nations. Current Chinese economic engagement could facilitate
Chinese strategic interests in the region (particularly in the FAS),
leaving the United States with reduced levels of access and influence.
Chinese economic investment can drive growth, but it has also left
countries, particularly small countries, with unmanageable debt.
Mr. Shear. The United States Government supports sustainable
economic development for Palau. The Department of Defense is concerned
about the possibility of any country, including China, using economic
engagement to facilitate its strategic interests in a way that reduces
United States access and influence. Although Chinese economic
investment can potentially create growth, it may also burden countries,
particularly small ones with unmanageable debt. Investment in CNMI by
private Chinese enterprises obligations can be beneficial for economic
development there, and in our view, would be compatible with our
proposed military activities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator King
military capabilities in the asia-pacific
31. Senator King. What additional capabilities will the DDG-1000
class destroyer bring to our Pacific Fleet once in service, and how do
you anticipate future commanders in the Pacific will employ these
capabilities?
Admiral Harris. As extremely capable multi-mission combatants, the
DDG-1000 class will provide future Pacific commanders a wide range of
employment options to meet the challenging sets of warfighting and
Theater Security Cooperation missions both on the open ocean and within
the littorals.
The DDG-1000 class is under construction, and the first ship, DDG-
1000, is expected to be operational in Fiscal Year 2019. Once
operational, DDG-1000s will provide the next-generation multi-mission
surface combatant capabilities tailored to provide land attack and
littoral dominance to defeat current and projected threats. In the
littoral region, the DDG-1000's two Advanced Gun Systems firing Long-
Range Land Attack Projectiles will triple naval surface fires coverage
to meet validated Marine Corps fire support requirements. Employing
active and passive sensors and a SPY-3 X-Band Multi-Function Radar,
DDG-1000 will conduct area air surveillance, including over-land
coverage, in the traditionally difficult and cluttered sea-land
interface region. Its Integrated Undersea Warfare suite coupled with
reduced acoustic output will significantly enhance the ships' mine
avoidance capability when operating in the littorals. DDG-1000 will
also employ a composite superstructure which reduces radar cross
section 50-fold. This, along with reduced acoustic output will make
these ships harder to detect and improve survivability in an anti-
access/area denial environment. I am excited about the operational
capability these ships will bring to the Pacific.
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