[Senate Hearing 114-130]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-130
RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN EASTERN EUROPE: WHERE DOES PUTIN GO NEXT AFTER
UKRAINE, GEORGIA, AND MOLDOVA?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND REGIONAL
SECURITY COOPERATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 4, 2015
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Lester E. Munson III, Staff Director
Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND REGIONAL
SECURITY COOPERATION
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Blank, Stephen, Ph.D., senior fellow, American Foreign Policy
Council, Washington, DC........................................ 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Johnson, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator From Wisconsin................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Kasparov,Garry, chairman, Human Rights Foundation, New York, NY.. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Pifer, Hon. Steven, director of the Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Initiative, the Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC................................................. 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Saakashvili, Mikheil, former President of Georgia, and chairman,
International Advisory Council On Reforms of President of
Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine......................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire............ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Wilson, Damon, executive vice president, Atlantic Council,
Washington, DC................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Photos of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Submitted by Senator Ron
Johnson........................................................ 59
(iii)
RUSSIAN AGRESSION IN EASTERN EUROPE: WHERE DOES PUTIN GO NEXT AFTER
UKRAINE, GEORGIA, AND MOLDOVA?
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Europe and Regional
Security Cooperation,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Johnson, Gardner, Shaheen, Murphy, and
Kaine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON JOHNSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Johnson. This hearing is called to order. I want to
start off by thanking all the witnesses for taking the time,
traveling here, and preparing some thoughtful testimony. I also
want to offer my condolences to all of those who knew Boris
Nemtsov, who considered him a friend and comrade. A real
tragedy happened a day, I think, after we noticed this hearing.
It certainly was not one of the things I wanted to talk about,
certainly nothing we contemplated.
The purpose of this hearing is really to lay out a reality.
It is to tell a story, and the story that needs to be told is
what has become of Russia since Vladimir Putin has come to
power. I am not going to tell the story. These gentlemen are
going to be telling the story. Unless we understand the
reality, unless we are willing to face the reality, unless we
are willing to grapple with the reality, Vladimir Putin will
continue his aggression, and it will not only destabilize
Eastern Europe, it will destabilize the entire efforts of all
those who want to seek peace and prosperity in the world.
We have a couple of photographs that I want to highlight.
Starting to my right is a picture of Boris Nemtsov, a very
courageous man that I had the privilege of meeting in my
office, a man who brought to my office a longer list of people
who needed to be added to the Magnitsky list. Unfortunately in
the next picture right behind Senator Gardner is a picture of
Boris Nemtsov having been assassinated with the Kremlin in the
background. Now, that would be somewhat similar to an
assassination carried out on Constitution Avenue with the
Capitol in the background.
In my written opening statement, which I would ask to be
entered into the record, we have laid out a timeline that
starts with the fall of the Berlin Wall and then traces through
the history. But in particular, I want people to pay attention
to the history following the ascension of Mr. Putin to power in
Russia. And I think probably the most powerful part of that
timeline are the 29 assassinations of political figures, 29
assassinations and murders that have never been adequately
solved. I think people need to really contemplate that.
Next picture, and we do not have the quote on there. This
picture is actually a Ukrainian rebel talking about the number
of Russian troops that he was thankful for that had entered
Eastern Ukraine.
The next picture is one of tragedy, as Malaysian Flight
Number MH17 was shot down out of the sky on July 17 of 2014.
Two hundred and ninety-eight innocent civilians were murdered.
This shows a picture of that. And then we have scenes of the
devastation in Eastern Ukraine.
So that is a little pictorial history of the results of
Vladimir Putin's aggression, and that is the story that needs
to be told. That is the reality that needs to be faced.
[The prepared statement of Senator Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ron Johnson
Good morning and welcome.
Today's hearing--the subcommittee's first hearing in the 114th
Congress--is about documenting the history of Russian aggression in
Ukraine and Eastern Europe and making sure that we, here in America,
fully understand how dire the situation truly is. We need to face harsh
reality and the fact that Ukraine needs our help in the form of
defensive lethal military equipment, and it needs that help today.
In March 2014, with hardly any pushback from the West, Crimea was
annexed by Russia. Prime Minister Yatsenyuk came to America last year
asking for our help in his country's battle to ensure its territorial
integrity. We should have immediately provided a minimal level of
defensive lethal aid that Ukraine so desperately wanted. We should have
taken it a step further by asking, ``What else do you need?'' America
needed to show resolve then, and it desperately needs to show
leadership and strength now, not only in Ukraine but around the world.
On December 5, 1994, the Budapest Memorandum was signed by Ukraine,
Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom. In this agreement,
Ukraine gave up the world's third-largest nuclear weapons stockpile in
return for security assurances against threats or the use of force
against its territorial integrity and political independence. Only 20
years later, Russia has blatantly broken its promise by brazenly
violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
No one should be surprised by this behavior from Russian President
Vladimir Putin. Under his leadership, Russian aggression against its
neighbors has been building for years. The summarized timeline of
Russia's destabilizing actions detailed below clearly demonstrates the
threat Putin represents to neighboring democracies.
Date and Event
--Nov. 9, 1989: Berlin Wall falls.
--June 1991: Yeltsin wins first ever Russian presidential election.
--March 1997: Yeltsin appoints Boris Nemtsov first deputy Prime
Minister.
--July 1998: Putin is appointed head of the Russian Federal Security
Service (FSB).
--Nov. 20, 1998: Galina Starovoitova, a prominent liberal member of
Russia's Parliament, is shot to death in her St. Petersburg
apartment.
--Sept.-Oct. 1999: Putin sends Russian troops back into Chechnya in the
wake of a series of bomb explosions in Russia which are blamed on
Chechen extremists.
--Dec. 31, 1999: Yeltsin resigns, Putin becomes acting President.
--May 12, 2000: Igor Domnikov, a newspaper special-projects editor who
reported on corruption in the Russian oil industry, is hit in the
head and left lying unconscious in a pool of blood in his apartment
building.
--July 26, 2000: Sergey Novikov, owner of an independent radio station
that often criticized the provincial government, is shot four times
in his apartment building in Smolensk
--Sept. 21, 2000: Iskandar Khatloni, a reporter for the Tajik-language
service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, is attacked in his
apartment by an ax-wielding assailant.
--Oct. 3, 2000: Sergey Ivanov, director of an independent television
company, is shot five times in the head and chest in front of his
apartment building.
--Nov. 21, 2000: Adam Tepsurgayev, a cameraman who covered the Chechen
war, is shot dead.
--April 29, 2002: Valery Ivanov, editor-in-chief of a newspaper that
exposed government corruption, is shot eight times in the head at
point-blank range outside of his home.
--Aug. 21, 2002: Vladimir Golovlyov, a leader of the Liberal Russia
faction in the lower house of Parliament, is shot dead in Moscow.
--April 17, 2003: Sergei Yushenkov, a member of the lower house of
Russia's Parliament and an outspoken critic of Putin, is shot to
death outside of his Moscow apartment.
--June 2003: Russian Government cites financial reasons for axing last
remaining nationwide independent TV channel.
--July 3, 2003: Yuri Shchekochikhin, a vocal opposition journalist,
dies after falling ill with a mysterious disease.
--June 19, 2004: Nikolai Girenko, a prominent human rights defender, is
shot dead in his home in St. Petersburg.
--July 9, 2004: Paul Klebnikov, the first editor of Forbes magazine's
Russian edition, is shot dead as he leaves his Moscow office.
--Sept. 14, 2006: Andrei Kozlov, the First Deputy Chairman of Russia's
Central Bank who shut down banks accused of corruption, dies after
he was shot outside of a Moscow sports arena.
--Oct. 7, 2006: Anna Politkovskaya, a journalist and fierce critic of
the Kremlin, is shot and killed in her Moscow apartment building.
--Nov. 23, 2006: Alexander Litvinenko, a former KGB officer who was
critical of Putin, died after being poisoned with radioactive
polonium-210.
--March 2, 2007: Ivan Safronov, a journalist who embarrassed the
country's military establishment with a series of exclusive
stories, is found dead outside of his home.
--July 15, 2007: Marina Pisareva, deputy head of Bertelsmann AG's
Russian publishinghouse, is found stabbed to death in her home west
of Moscow.
--Aug. 2008: Russia invades Georgia; Medvedev signs an order
recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two
breakaway regions in Georgia.
--Aug. 31, 2008: Magomed Yevloyev, owner of a popular news site that
reported on human rights, dies from a gunshot wound to the head
sustained while in police custody.
--Nov. 2008: Russian Parliament votes overwhelmingly in favor of a bill
that would extend the next President's term of office from 4 to 6
years.
--Jan. 19, 2009: Stanslav Markelov, a human rights lawyer, and
Anastasia Barburova, a young journalism student, are shot dead
midday on a busy Moscow street.
--April 2009: Vyacheslav Yaroshenko, an editor at the newspaper
Corruption and Crime, is beaten outside of his home; he passed away
from his injuries weeks later.
--July 15, 2009: Natalia Estemirova, a prominent human rights
journalist, is abducted from her home in Chechnya and shot dead.
--Nov. 16, 2009: Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer who was jailed in revenge
for his uncovering of massive tax fraud, dies in prison; Olga
Kotovskaya, a TV journalist who critically reported on government
leaders, dies after falling from a window.
--Dec. 15, 2011: Gadzhimurad Kamalov, founder and publisher of a
Dagestani newspaper known for its editorial independence, is gunned
down outside of his office.
--March 23, 2013: Boris Berezovsky, once the richest of the so-called
oligarchs who dominated post-Soviet Russia and a close ally of
Yeltsin who helped install Putin as President, is mysteriously
found dead in his home outside of London.
--July 9, 2013: Akhmednabi Akhmednabiev, deputy chief editor of a
Dagestani newspaper, dies after sustaining multiple gunshot wounds.
--Dec. 2013-Feb. 2014: Amidst large proreform protests in Ukraine,
Putin offers to purchase $15 billion of Ukraine's debt and to
reduce the price of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine. Violent
protests flare, and by 2/22/2014 Yanukovych had fled Keiv.
--March 2014: President Putin signs a law formalizing Russia's takeover
of Crimea from Ukraine.
--May 11, 2014: Pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk declare
independence after unrecognized referendums.
--July 17, 2014: Malaysian flight MH17 is shot down and crashes near
the town of Torez in Ukraine's Donetsk region; 298 people die.
--July 31, 2014: Timur Kuashev, a journalist critical of Russian policy
in Ukraine, goes missing and is later found dead.
--Sept. 5, 2014: Ukraine and pro-Russian rebels sign a truce in Minsk.
--Nov. 5, 2014: Alexei Devotchenko, a popular Russian actor and
opposition activist, dies in unclear circumstances.
--Jan. 24, 2015: Russian-backed rebels launch an offensive in Mariupol,
Ukraine, killing 30 people and wounding 102 others.
--Feb. 11-12, 2015: Germany and France broker Minsk II cease-fire
between Russia and Ukraine.
--Feb. 19, 2015: Ukrainian soldiers retreat from Debaltseve after 13
are killed and 157 wounded.
--Feb. 27, 2015: Boris Nemtsov, a prominent critic of Putin's war in
Ukraine and a former Deputy Prime Minister under Yeltsin, is shot
in the back four times by an unidentified attacker in a car as he
crossed a bridge near the Kremlin.
Providing military equipment to Ukraine is not the only answer, but
it is a necessary part of the answer. Ukraine needs economic and
governance reforms, but those can succeed only in a peaceful and
independent nation.
We all heard President Poroshenko address a joint session of
Congress on September 18, 2014, and plainly state that his country
needs more military equipment. ``Blankets and night-vision goggles are
important,'' he said, ``but one cannot win a war with blankets.'' He
went on to say, ``Just like Israel, Ukraine has the right to defend her
territory--and it will do so, with all the courage of her heart and
dedication of her soul!'' The Ukrainian people are willing to fight for
their country. They just need a little help from their allies in
America.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on Russian
aggression in Eastern Europe and learning how we can best support our
allies in confronting this regional destabilization.
Thank you. I look forward to your testimony.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses, and I will turn it
over to Senator Shaheen for her opening comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for your focus and work to bring this hearing
together today. I want to echo your comments about the tragic
killing of Boris Nemtsov. He was a tireless voice for all
Russians and a firm believer in a bright future for the
country. And even as we focus here on the Russian Federation's
outward aggression, clearly we cannot ignore the repression
that is happening inside Russia.
In the interest of time, I will submit my full statement
for the record, and just want to end by welcoming all of our
witnesses here today, and it is nice to have former President
Saakashvili back with this committee today. And I look forward
to hearing what all of you have to say and your thoughts about
what more we can be doing to support the people of Ukraine.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Jeanne Shaheen
Thank you, Chairman Johnson. I want to commend you for your focus
and leadership on this critical foreign policy issue and for your work
to bring this hearing together today before the Subcommittee on Europe.
I also want to echo your comments about the tragic killing of Boris
Nemtsov, who was a tireless voice for all Russians and a firm believer
in a bright future for that country. Even as we focus here today on the
Russia Federation's outward aggression, clearly, we cannot ignore the
repression inside Russian today under President Putin. The Russian
people and the world demand a transparent investigation into Mr.
Nemtsov's murder and I sincerely hope we will see that. Russia's
refusal to allow some foreign officials to attend his funeral was not a
promising sign.
As the Chairman noted, we have five impressive witnesses here to
help us better understand Russia's pattern of interference and
aggression in Eastern Europe and think through appropriate responses. I
join the chairman in thanking you for appearing here today.
Today, we see a Russian foreign policy that flouts international
norms and responsibilities, a foreign policy that is based on
political, economic, and even military intimidation and aggression.
Airspace violations, disinformation and propaganda campaigns, energy
corruption and trade restrictions are just a few of the tools used by
Moscow.
Through Operation Atlantic Resolve and, the European Reassurance
Initiative, the U.S. is already providing substantial support to our
European partners, including Ukraine. That support should continue. In
fact, it should be increased. We should consistently look for
opportunities to assist our friends in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia,
including helping them strengthen their political systems and economies
through reform not for our benefit, but for the benefit of the people
of those sovereign nations.
Congress, and particularly this committee, has played a critical
role in this effort. Just last December, Congress passed the Ukraine
Freedom Support Act, which authorized the President to provide
defensive military assistance to Ukraine and tighten economic sanctions
on Russia. I hope the administration will make use of these
authorities.
I welcome your suggestions for what more we should be looking to do
in Congress. Once again, thank you all for being here, and we look
forward to hearing from each of you.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. We do have a
vote that is going to be called, and I believe that what is
going to happen with that vote is we are going to be sitting in
our chairs. So what we will do is when that vote is called, we
all will leave. We will put this hearing into recess, and we
will come back because I do not want anybody to miss the
testimony.
But we will start off with President Saakashvili, former
President of Georgia. He was the leader of Georgia from 2004 to
2013. Recently, he was appointed by Ukrainian President
Poroshenko to serve as chairman of the International Advisory
Council on Reforms of the President of Ukraine. President
Saakashvili?
STATEMENT OF MIKHEIL SAAKASHVILI, FORMER PRESIDENT OF GEORGIA,
AND CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON REFORMS OF
PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE, KIEV, UKRAINE
Mr. Saakashvili. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Senator
Johnson, thank you, Senator Shaheen, thank you, Senator
Gardner, for this wonderful initiative. I want to thank you,
the committee and subcommittee, for the invitation. Perhaps it
is a little unorthodox to find the former President
representing the interests of another nation before the U.S.
Senate, but I think the distinguished members of this committee
understand why I have gone from being President of one nation
to helping the President of another.
Ukraine and Georgia are on the front lines of the fight
that may seem far away, but it is very much the fight that the
American people and certainly the U.S. Congress understand more
than anybody else in the world. This is not a fight about
territory, about railway junctures, this or that town. This is
a fight about principles, ideals, a way of life. This is a
fight to determine whether we can escape from this curse of
Soviet corrupt, cronyist, inefficient societies to being
efficient democracies based on rule of law.
Ukraine, and here is the story of a Budapest memorandum,
which I have to remind the members of the committee, Ukraine
gave up 1,800 warheads, one-third of the Soviet nuclear
arsenal, to help secure peace in post-cold-war Europe. That was
on the insistence of United States. The United States, among
other big powers, was the guarantor of Ukraine's territorial
integrity and sovereignty and their statehood based on the
Ukraine giving up their weapons.
Even more than that, on the insistence of this country and
other great powers, the Ukraine has diminished its defense
capabilities from having almost 1 million people serving in the
military down to 120,000. Ukraine has neutralized the 120,000
tons of ammunition and mines. They have incapacitated 6,000
tanks for the last decades, and that was the time when they
were complying with all their treaty obligations, while Russia
was building up their military protection and propping up their
muscles.
And now here we are. Ukraine has given all this up hoping
that they will be guaranteed peaceful future. Certainly they
were not planning to attack anybody. And instead of giving up
several thousand nuclear warheads, they are asking basically
for several thousand antitank missiles to defend themselves and
to check Russian tanks deep into their territory, as well as
some of their weapons. And certainly, supporting Ukraine at
this moment means, first of all, in addition to all the other
support, also giving them means to defend their democracy, and
to support them building a viable, strong Ukrainian democracy.
And I think it is now imperative to U.S. security and the
world's security.
The old markers of Putin's reign are the gravestones of his
critics and opponents. Every marker we can think of at this
time is about increasing control of Russia or the Russian-
speaking world. In September 1999, as director of FSB, Putin
sent troops into Chechnya. Three months later he was Acting
President of Russia. In August 2008 he invaded my country,
Georgia. Three months later the constitution was changed to
assure that when Putin returned to the Presidency, it would be
a 6-year term. Putin's military excursions are always the
prelude to the centralization of his personal power. This has
made Russia more unpredictable and Europe and the United States
less secure.
One year ago as the corrupt regime of Yanukovych fell,
Russian forces moved into Crimea, then Ukraine, then there was
downing of a passenger jet, as you rightly pointed out,
Senator. In September of last year, President Poroshenko
addressed the Joint Session of the Congress, and we are
grateful for this opportunity. And he also asked that Ukraine
requires defensive assistance because if not given that, Russia
will continue to establish facts on the ground that will give
them stronger position in the kabuki of future negotiations,
and basically in the killing of Ukraine democracy. I think what
Russia is up to is seizing the whole southern flank of Ukraine,
seizing most of the east, and then going after the government
in Kiev, and killing the very idea of Ukraine democracy.
After the war in 2008, a de facto ban on arms sales to
Georgia was in place; as then, opponents were saying that
providing Ukraine with lethal weapons would provoke Russia to
escalate this conflict. But this appeasement ignores that
Putin's aim is destabilize Ukrainian democracy. Adequate forces
can stop aggression. In 1980, shoulder-fired Stinger missiles
raised the cost to the Soviets in Afghanistan. That was the
most decisive factor in the eventual defeat of the Soviet Army.
That is why it is very important that while there also
Europeans who are doing the negotiations, the United States
should take the lead empowering regional actors like Poland,
and joining with forces with supportive nations like U.K. and
the Baltics to create a coalition to help to arm and train the
Ukrainian Army.
Ukraine must reform. I have focused on the case for arming
Ukraine because without this there will not be a country to
rebuild. But its success will equally be determined by fighting
corruption, bringing the economy out of the shadows, increasing
revenues to the state budget, and delivering better lives to
the people of Ukraine. American support of all these efforts
for the Ukrainian economy is critical, but time is short, and
underneath the deception of the formation of war, the Russian
plan is clear. They will seize more of the Ukraine. As I said,
they will depose the government in Kiev if not checked in time.
Only the swift and the immediate action of the United States
Government to train and equip the Ukrainians can stop Putin's
strategy to deconstruct the transatlantic architecture, to
deconstruct the post-cold-war order.
America and the free world won Second World War, and
Americans won the First World War, and they won the cold war.
What we are seeing is a dramatic situation where all these
gains might be reversed. Georgia is a small country, but when
we were invaded in 2008, after the failed deal with the
Europeans, it took the United States and many members of this
very Congress to stop them by starting the humanitarian
military operation, which did not involve sending U.S. boots on
the ground, but certainly involved sending strong signals to
the Russians that they should stop.
This war is much more complex than just war on the ground.
This is a propaganda war. It is about controlling minds; and in
this war we have yet to begin to fight back, to empower the
Russian people to look at their own country and their own
region, and to prevent encroachment of the Russian narrative
into our politics and media. It was not just NATO army that saw
the spread of communism. It was a collection of strong ideals
with an army standing behind it. America, the origin of many of
these ideals, was always further away from the front, and,
thus, more able to resist the seeming appeal of realist moral
compromise. The same must be true today. A democratic, secure
Ukraine is the last nation between the revanchist Russia and
America, and, overall, the free world.
Thank you, Senator, for hearing my testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Saakashvili follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mikheil Saakashvili
Good afternoon. I want to thank the Foreign Relations Committee for
the invitation to speak here today. Perhaps it is a bit unorthodox to
find the President of one nation representing the interests of another
before the United States Senate, but I think the distinguished members
of this committee understand why I have gone from being a President to
serving one.
Ukraine and Georgia are on the front lines of a fight that may seem
far away from here. But Ukraine is what stands between America and
Russian aggression. Ukraine earned its right to aspire to Western
integration when it gave up over 1,800 warheads--one-third of the
Soviet nuclear arsenal--to help secure peace in post-cold-war Europe.
Twice since, the people of Ukraine have taken to the streets to defend
this right. Supporting Ukraine--including by giving them the arms they
need to fight for their future and by supporting their efforts to build
a viable, strong, Ukrainian democracy and state--is now imperative to
American security.
The road-markers of Putin's reign are the gravestones of his
critics and opponents. His years in power can be measured by the
rollback of federalization, rights, freedom, and opportunity. Every
marker we can think of in his timeline is about increasing control of
Russia and the Russian-speaking world.
In September 1999, as director of the FSB, Putin sent troops into
Chechnya. Three months later he was Acting President of Russia. In
August 2008, he invaded Georgia. Three months later the constitution
was changed to ensure that when Putin returned to the Presidency, it
would be for a 6-year term.
Putin's military excursions are always the prelude to the
centralization of his personal power. This has made Russia more
unpredictable, and Europe and the United States less secure in economic
and military terms.
We don't know yet what will follow the invasion of Ukraine. One
year ago, as the corrupt regime of President Yanukovich fell, Russian
forces moved into Crimea. Moscow later announced the annexation of the
peninsula. Russian military and intelligence operatives stirred up
unrest in the Donbass region of Ukraine, which grew into a full-blown
war including the participation of tens of thousands of Russian regular
forces. Russian involvement increased after the downing of a Malaysian
passenger jet by Russian air defenses that had been illegally brought
into Ukraine in August 2014.
In September, President Poroshenko addressed a joint session of
Congress with the request to provide Ukraine with defensive assistance.
In bilateral talks with the U.S., Ukrainian officials have continuously
submitted requests for assistance and defensive weapons. Ukraine has
been provided some nonlethal assistance, including radars to help
detect mortars, bulletproof vests, and some other basic aid and
equipment.
But what will strengthen Ukrainian defense is lethal weapons--
specifically, antitank weapons that can halt further Russian advance.
When Russia knows there will be little cost to them to take the
territory, they will take the territory. They will continue to
establish facts on the ground that will give them a stronger position
in the kabuki of future negotiations.
The arguments for withholding lethal aid are ones Georgia knows
well: after the war in 2008, a de facto ban on arms sales to Georgia
was in place. We couldn't even buy spare parts for our American rifles.
As then, opponents say that providing Ukraine with lethal weapons
will provoke Russia to step up its military involvement and escalate
the conflict. But this appeasement ignores that Putin's aim is to
unseat the government in Kiev and fully destabilize Ukrainian
democracy.
But adequate force can stop aggression: in the 1980s, shoulder-
fired Stinger missiles raised the costs for the Soviets in Afghanistan
so much that this was the single most decisive factor in the eventual
defeat of the Soviet Army. As Putin's popularity soars post-Crimea, the
one crack in his armor is the mounting, secret human cost of his war.
To raise the cost for the Kremlin--on the front line and at home--
further advances have to come with the fear of increased casualties.
The importance of maintaining a joint position with the Europeans
is also cited frequently. But Ukraine has little reason, historic or
contemporary, to hope for German support. The United States should take
the lead, empowering regional actors like Poland and other neighbors of
Ukraine, joining with supportive nations like the U.K. and the Baltics
to create a coalition to arm and train the Ukrainian Army.
Ukraine must reform. I have focused today on the case for arming
Ukraine because without this, there won't be a country to rebuild. But
this is not to say its success will not be equally determined by
fighting corruption, bringing the economy out of the shadows,
increasing revenue to the state budget, and delivering better lives to
the people of Ukraine.
American support of all those efforts, and support for the
Ukrainian economy during the war, is critical. But time is short, and
underneath the deception and the information war, the Russian plan
could not be more transparent. They will seize more of the east and
south of Ukraine; send defeated Ukrainian troops back to Kiev; and
attempt to destabilize the social and economic situation enough that
pressure mounts and the democratically elected President and Government
of Ukraine collapse or are overthrown.
Only the swift and immediate action of the U.S. Government to train
and equip the Ukrainians, as well as providing them with economic
assistance, can stop Putin's strategy to deconstruct Europe, the
transatlantic architecture, and transatlantic aspirations.
Putin is willing to fight in ways we are not. Georgia is a country
of 4 million people--and Putin sent tens of thousands of troops to
invade our country. Since 2008, Russia has spent well over a billion
dollars propping up the budgets of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2015,
while the Russian state budget is being cut by 10 percent across the
board, Russia's payments to South Ossetia have increased by 19 percent.
Add to that the costs of military deployments to, and arrangements
with, these regions. Add to that the costs of backing anti-European,
xenophobic groups in Tbilisi to whittle away support for Euro-Atlantic
integration under a government attempting rapprochement with an
aggressive and bullying neighbor. Add to that the costs of the media
and documentaries and reports Russia has funded to blame the 2008 war
on Georgia and its NATO aspirations. The list goes on.
This is what Putin is willing to commit to ensure Georgia will not
have a future that Russia does not dictate. He did this only to ensure
that NATO could not offer Georgia a concrete pathway to membership. He
did this so his narrative at home is secure.
And as Putin has made clear--Ukraine is a nearly divine cause for
him. We understand only shadows of the billions of dollars he has spent
to keep Ukraine in the ``Russian world.'' According to U.N., over 6,000
people have been killed in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. Up to 20
percent of the industrial capacity of Ukraine has been removed or
destroyed. A million people have been displaced.
In the past year, Russia has also backed political parties, heavy
propaganda, and sharp economic pressure to erode support for Europe in
Moldova, hoping to change the political landscape even before their
territorial conquests in Ukraine bring the Russian Army closer to
Moldova's door. And what Moldovans fear is that if Europe hasn't helped
Ukraine--a far larger, richer, and more strategically important
nation--Moldova will become a footnote of the regional conquest.
The price Putin is willing to pay, and to exact, is higher than we
want to imagine.
In Georgia, in 2008, we fought because if we didn't fight for our
sovereignty and our democracy and our independence, no one else ever
would. It was, to be sure, an emotional choice--but also the rational
one. We couldn't win a military war with Russia--but it is the
ideological war that we believed needed to be fought, and won.
Fighting for our beliefs made many uncomfortable. Ukraine fights
now for the same reason, and its Western friends are no less
uncomfortable with their war. But make no mistake: Putin attacks
Ukraine to weaken Europe, and to weaken NATO. When he makes the
calculation that the time is right, he will cross the Article 5 line,
probably in ways that are not expected. While we deliberate about
definitions--Russian or Russian-backed, vacation or invasion--Putin
will be fighting, and winning, an ideological war against the only
force that has ever been able to contain and turn back expansionist
Russian exceptionalism.
His war is a propaganda war. It is about controlling minds. And in
that war, we have yet to begin to fight back to help empower the
Russian people to look at their own country and their region--and to
prevent the encroachment of the Russian narrative into our own politics
and media.
It was not a NATO army that stopped the spread of communism. It was
a collection of strong ideals with an army standing behind it. America,
the origin of many of these ideals, was always further away from the
front, and thus more able to resist the seeming appeal of realist moral
compromise. The same must be true today. A democratic, secure Ukraine
is the last nation between revanchist Russia and America.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. President. Do we have time?
Voice. Votes just started.
Senator Johnson. Okay. We will recess at this point in time
and hopefully be back in about 10 to 15 minutes. So, again, I
apologize for that, but, again, this is an important hearing,
and we are looking forward to your testimony.
Thank you. This hearing stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Senator Johnson. This hearing is called back to order. Our
next witness will be Mr. Garry Kasparov. He is the chairman of
the International Council of the Human Rights Foundation. Mr.
Kasparov is a Russian pro-democracy leader, global human rights
activist, author, and former world chess champion.
Mr. Kasparov.
STATEMENT OF GARRY KASPAROV, CHAIRMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION,
NEW YORK, NY
Mr. Kasparov. My thanks to the subcommittee and to Senator
Johnson for inviting me here today. It has been a very
difficult last few days mourning the brutal murder of my long-
time friend and colleague, Boris Nemtsov, in front of the
Kremlin last Friday night, while also wanting to honor his
memory and his fight by pressing the case for ending the regime
of Vladimir Putin in Russia.
I have learned from painful experience that these first
days after an atrocity are very important because people
outside Russia quickly forget and move on. Boris was an
outspoken critic of a police state that has no tolerance for
critics. His imposing presence regularly embarrassed an
increasingly totalitarian dictatorship that could not permit
even the smallest amount of truth to leak out.
His latest report was to be on the presence of Russian
troops in Ukraine, fighting Putin's war against a fragile
democratic state in Europe. Boris also actively promoted the
Magnitsky Act, a piece of rare bipartisan 2012 legislation that
brought sanctions against Russian officials for not a brutal
murder, but that of anticorruption attorney Sergei Magnitsky in
2009.
Boris Nemtsov was killed because he could be killed. Putin
and his elites believe that after 15 years in power, there is
nothing they cannot do, no line they cannot cross. Their sense
of impunity, combined with an atmosphere of hatred and violence
and Putin's propaganda, has created in Russia a lethal
combination. Boris was not the first victim of this deadly mix.
Georgia, Ukraine, and the stability of the modern world order
is also under attack. Putin must justify his grip on power
somehow. With his oil- and gas-based economy failing, he is
following the path of Soviet dictators before him: propaganda,
division, and war.
Enemies are needed so that Putin may protect Russians from
them. Ukraine was always a tempting target, and the recent
leaks have shown that an invasion plan existed even before the
fall of Putin's puppet, Viktor Yanukovych. Inside Russia,
independent journalists and opposition activists are portrayed
as dangerous national traitors in language lifted directly from
the Nazis.
Of course, I feel deeply the loss of my friend, Boris
Nemtsov, and the prosecution of others who dare to speak
against Putin. But it is Ukraine and what it illustrates about
Putin and his regime that are more consequent to today's
hearing. Since Putin took power in 2000, one Western
administration after another declined to confront him on human
rights at home or even his increasing belligerence abroad. The
timeline of Russian repression circulated here today does an
excellent job of listing many of the worse moments of Putin's
crackdown. But there could also be a parallel timeline of all
the meetings, deals, and smiling photo ops the leaders of the
free world took with Putin while these atrocities were taking
place.
The Western engagement policy that should have been
abandoned as soon as Putin showed his true colors over a decade
ago was continued at every turn, which emboldened Putin and
delegitimized our opposition movement. Putin rebuilt the police
state in Russia in full view of the outside world, and now he
is confident enough of his power to attempt to export that
police state abroad to Georgia, to Ukraine, to Moldova. Where
next? He is testing NATO now, and he will test it further.
Putin also provides a role model for the rest of the world
dictators and thugs by proudly defying the superior forces of
the free world. From Iran to Syria to Venezuela, Putin's Russia
provides both materiel support and what I would call amoral
support.
Putin is not going away on his own. Ukraine is only his
latest target. Ukraine must be defended, supported, and armed
now. It may seem far away to you, but it is a front line of a
war the United States and the rest of the free world is
fighting whether it admits it or not. Sanctions are important,
but it is obvious 6 months ago that they were not enough to
deter Putin, and he must be deterred.
Stop treating Putin like any other leader who can be
negotiated with in good faith. Stop legitimizing his brutal
regime at the expense of the Russian people. The opposition
movement Boris and I believed in and that Boris died for should
also be openly supported, the way the West championed the
Soviet dissidents. Let the people of Russia know that they have
allies abroad the way Ronald Reagan told us--all of us behind
the Iron Curtain that he knew it was our leaders, not us, who
were his enemies.
Contrary to the widely circulated official polls, Putin
does not enjoy broad public support in Russia, as was proved by
hundreds of thousands of people mourning Boris in the street of
Moscow. If you are truly popular, you can allow free media and
free elections, and your critics are not gunned down in the
streets. Putin's oligarch supporters must be forced to choose
between giving him up and a doomed isolation. They cannot be
allowed to continue to live like Trump and rule Stalin. The
people of Russia want to be free, but defeating a globalized
and energy-rich, heavily militarized dictatorship that has the
tacit support of the free world is too much to ask.
You cannot negotiate with cancer. Like a cancer, Putin and
his elites must be cut out. He must be isolated and removed,
for only when Putin is gone can Russia be a free, strong, and
independent country Boris Nemtsov always dreamed it could be.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kasparov follows:]
Prepared Statement of Garry Kasparov
My thanks to the subcommittee and to Senator Johnson for inviting
me here today. It has been a very difficult last few days, mourning the
brutal murder of my friend and colleague Boris Nemtsov in front of the
Kremlin last Friday night, while also wanting to honor his memory and
his fight by pressing the case for ending the regime of Vladimir Putin
in Russia. I have learned from painful experience that these first days
after an atrocity are very important, because people outside of Russia
quickly forget and move on.
Boris was an outspoken critic of a police state that has no
tolerance for critics. His imposing presence regularly embarrassed an
increasingly totalitarian dictatorship that could not permit even the
smallest amount of truth to leak out. His latest report was to be on
the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, fighting Putin's war against
a fragile democratic state in Europe. Boris also actively promoted the
Magnitsky Act, a piece of rare bipartisan 2012 legislation that brought
sanctions against Russian officials for another brutal murder, that of
anticorruption attorney Sergei Magnitsky in 2009.
Boris Nemtsov was killed because he could be killed. Putin and his
elites believe that after 15 years of power there is nothing they
cannot do, no line they cannot cross. Their sense of impunity, combined
with the atmosphere of hatred and violence Putin's propaganda has
created in Russia, is a lethal combination.
Boris was not the first victim of this deadly mix. Georgia,
Ukraine, and the stability of the modern world order is also under
attack. Putin must justify his grip on power somehow. With his oil and
gas-based economy failing, he is following the path of so many
dictators before him: propaganda, division, and war. Enemies are needed
so that Putin may protect Russians from them. Ukraine was always a
tempting target, and recent leaks have shown that an invasion plan
existed even before the fall of Putin's puppet, Viktor Yanukovych.
Inside Russia, independent journalists and opposition activists are
portrayed as dangerous national traitors, in language lifted directly
from the Nazis.
Of course I feel deeply the loss of my friend Boris Nemtsov and the
persecution of others who dare to speak against Putin. But Ukraine and
what it illustrates about Putin and his regime that are more consequent
to today's hearing. Since Putin took power in 2000, one Western
administration after another declined to confront him on human rights
at home or over his increasing belligerence abroad. The timeline of
Russian repression circulated here today does an excellent job of
listing many of the worst moments of Putin's crackdown. But there could
also be a parallel timeline of all the meetings, deals, and smiling
photo-ops the leaders of the free world took with Putin while these
atrocities were taking place. The Western engagement policy that should
have been abandoned as soon as Putin showed his true colors over a
decade ago was continued at every turn, which emboldened Putin and
delegitimized our opposition movement.
Putin rebuilt a police state in Russia in full view of the outside
world and now he is confident enough of his power to attempt to export
that police state abroad. To Georgia, to Ukraine, to Moldova. Where
next? He is testing NATO now and he will test it further. Putin also
provides a role model for the rest of the world's dictators and thugs
by proudly defying the superior forces of the free world. From Iran to
Syria to Venezuela, Putin's Russia provides both material support and
what I would call ``amoral support.''
Putin is not going away on his own. Ukraine is only his latest
target. Ukraine must be defended, supported, and armed now. It may seem
far away to you, but it is the front line of a war the United States
and the rest of the free world is fighting whether it admits it or not.
Sanctions are important, but it was obvious 6 months ago they were not
enough to deter Putin, and he must be deterred.
Stop treating Putin like any other leader who can be negotiated
with in good faith. Stop legitimizing his brutal regime at the expense
of the Russian people. The opposition movement Boris and I believed in
and that Boris died for should also be openly supported, the way the
West championed the Soviet dissidents. Let the people of Russia know
that they have allies abroad, the way Ronald Reagan told those of us
behind the Iron Curtain that he knew it was our leaders, not us, who
were his enemies. Contrary to the widely circulated official polls,
Putin does not enjoy broad public support in Russia. If you are truly
popular you can allow a free media and free elections--and your critics
are not gunned down in the street.
Putin's oligarch supporters must be forced to choose between giving
him up and a doomed isolation. They cannot be allowed to continue to
live like Trump and rule like Stalin. The people of Russia want to be
free, but defeating a globalized and energy-rich dictatorship that has
the tacit support of the free world is too much to ask. You cannot
negotiate with cancer. Like a cancer, Putin and his elites must be cut
out. He must be isolated and removed, for only when Putin is gone can
Russia be the free, strong, and independent country Boris Nemtsov
always dreamed it could be.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Kasparov.
Our next witness is Dr. Stephen Blank. He is a senior
fellow for Russia at the American Foreign Policy Council. He is
an internationally known expert on Russia and the former Soviet
Union, and is the author of over 1,000 publications.
Dr. Blank.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN BLANK, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Blank. Senator Johnson, it is a great honor to testify
before your subcommittee with this exceptionally distinguished
group of witnesses. Because my written statement deals with
purely military issues, in my oral remarks I wish to talk about
the broader strategic issues involved.
Russia's invasion and occupation of Ukraine represent the
greatest threat to European security in a generation, the most
naked case of aggression since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in
1990, and arguably the most dangerous threat to international
security and order today. It is the fruit of a long-developed
plan whose origins can be traced back to 2005.
Russia has several objectives here. Many have already
noticed that in keeping with the rhythms of Russian history,
there is the belief that a little short victorious war can
buttress the regime at home around a program of Russian
imperialism and state nationalism. Further, it is an axiom of
Russian foreign policy that none of the post-Soviet states,
including those of Eastern Europe, really possess genuine
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, the treaties
guaranteeing that sovereignty and territorial integrity are
merely scraps of paper.
This sentiment applies with particular force to Ukraine for
it is clearly inconceivable to the Russian elite that Ukraine
can follow a different trajectory than does Russia. Moreover, a
Ukraine that looks westward is the greatest possible threat to
the security of Putin's regime because it will infect Russia
with the democratic virus. Indeed, the entire legitimacy of any
Russian state is bound up with its being the true heir of
Kievan Rus.
If Ukraine rebels against or rejects Russia's trajectory,
then the entire legitimacy of the Russian state is called into
question. This is especially the case because Putin and his
team believe that empire is the only acceptable form of a
Russian state, and Russia must, therefore, be an empire if his
autocracy and kleptocracy are to be preserved. For all these
reasons, a democratic revolution in Ukraine is anathema to
Moscow and a pretext for an invasion.
Operationally, Moscow still intends to seize Mariupol,
establish a land bridge to Crimea, and, if it could do so,
establish as well as land bridge all the way to Moldova. Plans
for this were already laid a year ago. Beyond destroying any
possibility of an independent Ukraine, Moscow intends to
overthrow the entire post-cold-war settlement of 1989 to 1991
in Europe and globally, and to do so by systematically applying
the synchronized instruments of pressure we now know as so-
called hybrid warfare. These policies predict more to any
competent analyst, but unfortunately this administration and
too many European governments do not take what happens in
Russia seriously enough. Neither do these governments think
Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states are sufficiently
important for us to have a real strategy regarding them.
This Russia-first strategy lies at the root of the
continuing and shameful Western failure to understand or
grapple with Russia and its aggressions seriously enough or to
provide assistance to Ukraine as needed. As administration
officials candidly admit, there is ``an asymmetry of will'' or
of importance whereby Ukraine is supposedly more important to
Moscow than it is to us or to European governments, and this
inhibits us helping Ukraine as needed.
Indeed as reported on February 27 by the Wall Street
Journal, the United States is slow rolling the provision of
intelligence to Ukraine. Given the stakes involved for Ukraine,
its neighbors, and partners, European and international
security, this is an unacceptable policy. It undermines the
credibility of NATO, of the United States, Europe, and beyond,
and encourages aggression, and not only by Putin, and not only
by Europe.
Therefore, the importance of these hearings should be clear
to everyone, and I welcome the opportunity to testify before
the committee today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Blank follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen Blank
Ukraine needs military help from abroad in terms of weapons,
training, and finances to help sustain its government and economy in
the face of Russian aggression. At a conference of the Potomac
Institute, U.S. analysts and Ukrainian military leaders reported that
the Ukrainian military continues to be severely disadvantaged by not
being equipped with a list of the items that are becoming well known to
those watching the current situation in eastern Ukraine: secure
communications systems; antitank guided weapons with tandem warheads;
counterbattery radars; UAVs for both reconnaissance and strike
missions; and the ability to stream multiple intelligence sources into
centralized command centers to get inside the ``decision loop'' of the
Russian-backed forces.\1\
Therefore, Ukraine needs and has requested these capabilities,
secure communications equipment, countermortar or counterbattery
weapons, antiair, and antitank weapons and missiles. Ukraine also
clearly needs UAVs or weapons to use against Russian drones. It also
needs weapons to counter Russian artillery fire by the use of
intelligence capabilities to determine the source and point of origin
of those fires and then take them out. Ukraine also needs to devise an
effective, democratic command and control structure that allows
competent officers to rise to positions of responsible command, to
train proficient officers whom men will follow and who understand
modern warfare, and create a basis for integrating volunteers into a
regular army commanded and led by proficient officers committed to
democracy. In American terms it needs both an Edwin Stanton and a
George Marshall. It also needs to sustain patriotic morale to counter
manifestations of draft dodging and to demonstrate to the world that it
is reforming. Right now it needs weapons as outlined above urgently as
well as financial assistance and a long-term plan of both energy and
financial assistance and steady support for (as well as pressure from
outside) to reform its government and economy.
At the same time, there is little doubt that the White House and
the NSC are holding up sending weapons to Ukraine at this point. But
whatever their reasons are, there is little doubt that the Ukrainian
Army will fight and with assistance can prevail over the rebels as long
as Russia cannot operate freely there. Indeed, the fighting to date
shows that only with substantial Russian help and the takeover of the
operation by the Russian Army can the so-called rebels prevail in
battle. If anything, this key fact justifies the provision of weapons
and training to Ukraine as part of a broader strategy to wrest the
strategic initiative away from Russia and give it to Ukraine and NATO.
The signs of this dependence on the Russian Army are evident
everywhere. According to the IHS consultancy firm, Ukrainian
authorities and the Potomac Institute, there are currently 14,400
Russian troops on Ukrainian territory backing up the 29,300 illegally
armed formations of separatists in eastern Ukraine. These units are
well equipped with the latest main battle tanks, armored personnel
carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, plus hundreds of pieces of
tube and rocket artillery. There are also 29,400 Russian troops in
Crimea and 55,800 massed along the border with eastern Ukraine.\2\
--Russian units have made heavy use of electronic warfare (EW) and what
appear to be high-power microwave (HPM) systems to jam not only the
communications and reconnaissance assets of the Ukrainian Armed
Forces but to also disable the surveillance unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) operated by cease-fire monitoring teams from the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Russian EW teams have targeted the Schiebel Camcopter UAVs operated
by the monitors and ``melted the onboard electronics so that drones
just fly around uncontrolled in circles before they crash to the
ground,'' said one of the briefers at the conference. Russian EW,
communications and other units central to their military operations
are typically placed adjacent to kindergartens, hospitals, or
apartment buildings so that Ukrainian units are unable to launch
any strikes against them without causing unacceptable and horrific
collateral casualties.
--The war against Ukraine is not a ``new'' strategy for Moscow; the
Russian general staff has been preparing for Ukraine-type combat
operations since 1999. Indeed, the Ukrainian operation has been
planned by Moscow at least since 2005 and it is incomprehensible
why the administration could not, or would not, formulate an
assessment of what was happening in February 2014.\3\ This speaks
to our willingness and capability to assess Russian moves correctly
and it is not encouraging.
--The Russian military's Zapad 2013 exercise (the word ``Zapad''
meaning ``West'' in Russian to denote that it was an operation
designed to practice operations against NATO) was a dress-rehearsal
for parts of the Ukraine campaign and future potential operations
against the Baltic States. The exercise involved 76,300 total
troops, 60 percent of which were drawn from the same Russian
Interior Ministry (MVD) units that were used in the Chechen
conflicts of the 1990s.
--Russia's information warfare campaign includes budgeting for the
state-run Russia Today network (more than USD300 million per annum)
and support for pro-Russian NGOs (USD100 million per annum).\4\
Russian casualties are much higher than imagined and reports of the
true number of dead, wounded, POW and/or MIAs would undermine Putin at
home. Second, Russian tactics are rather crude, essentially being
massive artillery and air shelling of enemy positions. Such tactics
mandate a traditional enormous output of ammunition and artillery. The
numbers of shells being expended periodically forces Russia to accept
truces in order to replenish its forces in Ukraine who are in full
command of this operation. There are an estimated 17-20,000 Russian
forces in Ukraine brought together or even cannibalized from many
different Russian military units in order to bring ground, air,
antiair, and support functions into the theatre. In addition, there is
a substantial reinforcement of the naval, air, and missile forces in
the Crimea, including nuclear-capable or so called dual use weapons
being brought to Crimea.
We can learn the following lessons from this analysis. First, Putin
cannot escalate the scale of conflict beyond present limits without
antagonizing NATO further into a full-scale protracted war and he
cannot afford that. He is also reputedly very afraid of media reports
of the true extent of what evidently are sizable numbers of Russian
casualties. For example, according to Ukrainian sources, at Debaltseve,
1,300 Ukrainians and 4,500 Russians were killed.\5\ Why we are not
publicizing Russian casualties escapes me. Third, there is every reason
to believe that if NATO mobilized its resolve and capabilities to give
Ukraine weapons and training as part of a comprehensive strategy that
Ukraine's morale and capabilities would improve to the point of
imposing much greater costs on Russia which is reaching the limit of
its capabilities. Putin is already bringing troops form Central Asia
and Siberia to Ukraine, indicating a manpower shortage and a lack of
desire inside Russia to fight Ukraine. There are also many reports of
disaffection within the Russian military. In other words, whereas NATO
has hardly engaged, Russia is already feeling the pressure.
Russian tactics and strategy have aimed to keep the fighting at a
level under NATO's ``radar'' to avoid a too protracted war. It appears
Putin aims to create his ``Novorossiia'' and present the EU with a fait
accompli by mid-year to persuade a divided Europe to remove sanctions
and thus escape the risk of a protracted war. We have it within our
power, if we can find the will to do so, not just to impose costs on
Putin but to regain the overall strategic initiative and take it away
for him by helping Ukraine to defend itself. What is needed here and in
Europe and Kiev is a comprehensive strategy that embraces not only
military but also strong economic and informational means to thwart
this effort to sustain Putin at home, destroy an independent Ukrainian
state, overturn the post cold war status quo in Europe, undermine
European integration, and hasten the rupture of the transatlantic
alliance. Our continuing passivity allows this shameful conquest and
the spread of state terrorism and criminality orchestrated by Moscow
and its subalterns in Crimea and Ukraine to spread with impunity. We
must realize that this is the most naked aggression since Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 and respond accordingly to what is the
greatest threat not just to European security but to international
order. For if we do not do so, others will be even more emboldened by
our inaction and confusion as we have seen with ISIL in the Levant and
we can see with China in the South China Sea, and with Iran in regard
to state-sponsored terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Continued
passivity invites more escalation, and not only by Putin, whereas
soundly conceived and implemented resistance upholds not only our
values but even more importantly, our interests, both in Europe and
across the globe.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ Reuben F. Johnson, ``Hybrid War Is Working,'' Jane's Defence
Weekly, February 26, 2015.
\2\ Ibid.
\3\ Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes, and Siobhan Gorman, ``U.S.
Scurries to Shore Up Spying on Russia,'' Wall Street Journal, March 24,
2014, www.wsjonline.com.
\4\ Johnson.
\5\ Conversations with Ukrainian officers and officials,
Washington, DC, February 26, 2015.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Dr. Blank.
Our next witness is Mr. Damon Wilson. He is executive vice
president of the Atlantic Council. His areas of expertise
include Central and Eastern Europe, NATO, and U.S. national
security issues. From 2007 to 2009, Mr. Wilson served as
special assistant to the President and senior director for
European affairs at the National Security Council.
Mr. Wilson.
STATEMENT OF DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Wilson. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Shaheen, and
members of the committee, President Putin today poses a direct
threat to American interests and values. His war in Ukraine
aims to tear up the post-cold-war order and undermine American
credibility. If we fail to stop Putin in Ukraine, we will face
a series of conflicts and crises in the months and years to
come.
At best, Putin may consolidate his autocratic grip at home
and subjugate 75 million in Europe's East to a fate determined
in Moscow. At worst, emboldened, Putin may be tempted to
challenge a NATO ally directly. The choice we face, however, is
not between fighting Russia or doing nothing. Rather, I believe
doing nothing may lead to our fighting Russia. In this context,
I would like to make five points.
This crisis began long before Crimea. Indeed, Russia's
annexation of Crimea was the natural outcome of a clear,
consistent policy dating back years. I detail this record in my
full testimony. Second, Putin will not stop until he encounters
serious pushback. Third, only the United States can galvanize
Europe and the international community around an effective
strategy to deter Putin for the long term. Fourth, any strategy
should urgently and decisively back Ukraine, as well as other
vulnerable states with significant economic and military
assistance in the short term, while keeping the door open to
the European Union or NATO. And fifth, we should neither
abandon the Russian people nor the vision that a democratic
Russia one day can find its peaceful place within a Europe
whole and free.
Putin's strategy has been to use this crisis to consolidate
his own hold at home through greater oppression of civil
society and independent media even as he fuels nationalist
fervor. He has created an environment of fear and intimidation
fostering the circumstances that led to the assassination of
Boris Nemtsov. Putin, of course, is also seeking to dominate
his neighbors, to drain them of resources to fuel his
kleptocracy, and to restore a sense of Russia's greatness in
the only way a bully knows. He aims to prevent his neighbors
from joining either NATO or the EU, achieving this through
coercion when possible and by dismemberment and occupation when
necessary.
Ultimately Putin knows that the best check on his power is
a united transatlantic community, and he has sought to divide
Europe, undermining the resolve for sustained sanctions. But
the most tempting objective for Putin is to call into question
the credibility of NATO's Article 5 mutual defense commitment
as doing so would effectively end NATO.
A Russian move against an ally, such as a Baltic State,
cannot be ruled out. Putin has demonstrated time and again that
if he senses an opportunity to act he will, convinced that the
West lacks the will or the ability to take decisive action.
That is why today's situation is dangerous. We have seen
repeatedly that Putin's objectives expand with success and
contract with failure. This means that the best determinant of
his action is Western action.
There is a tendency, however, to argue that the Europeans
should take the lead on Ukraine. After all, we have our hands
full with ISIS and other global responsibilities. But the
Ukraine crisis is a Russia crisis, and Russia is too big, too
strong, and too scary for Europe to resolve this without us.
Without U.S. leadership, Europe may feel forced to accommodate
a revanchist Russia, and we have seen throughout history this
is a dangerous formula.
The United States has the ability to rally its allies and
international partners around a comprehensive strategy that not
only deters Putin's aggression, but avoids an unstable gray
zone in Europe East. To do so, we should begin by articulating
what we want to achieve. We should more decisively increase the
cost to Russia, including by enacting sectorial sanctions and
targeting Gazprom and Putin directly.
The most effective response is Ukraine succeeding and
becoming a modern European state, and yet Western assistance to
date is modest. There is no governmentwide concerted effort to
assist Ukraine. There is no response commensurate with how we
react to support campaigns like Ebola or ISIS. The United
States is uniquely positioned to assist Ukraine to defend
itself and to raise the cost of further Russian military action
against Ukraine. Putin, after all, has lied to his own people
about Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. But by reassuring
Putin that we will either not provide or greatly constrain our
military and intelligence assistance, we signal to the Kremlin
what Russia can get away with.
Any assistance package should, therefore, be substantial,
including antiarmor missiles, as well as intelligence support.
Such a U.S. decision could unlock lethal military assistance
from many of our allies. The U.S. Congress could also endorse a
more substantial military presence along NATO's eastern flank,
call for a halt to any further U.S. force withdrawals from
Europe, and order a review of the U.S. force posture. Such a
package could be designed to leverage U.S. commitment to
European security to secure greater European commitments to
defense investment.
We should respond to aggression in Europe's East by
consolidating Europe's South. This would mean inviting
Montenegro to join NATO and intensifying efforts to build
United States strategic partnerships with Serbia and Cyprus. We
should harness America's energy prowess to increase global
supply while support European efforts to create a European
energy union that includes Ukraine. And we should be explicit
about our intention to negotiate a transatlantic trade and
investment partnership that is open to Ukraine, Moldova, and
Georgia.
As long as either KGB veterans retain their grip on the
Kremlin or the nations in between NATO and Russia remain
trapped in an insecure gray zone, we will face continued
challenges and conflict.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Damon M. Wilson
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Shaheen, members of the committee,
President Putin today poses a direct threat to American interests and
values. His war in Ukraine and his effort to sow division among our
allies are aimed at tearing up the post-cold-war order and undermining
American credibility and influence.
If we fail to stop Putin in Ukraine, we will face a series of
conflicts and crises in the months and years to come.
At best, Putin may consolidate his autocratic grip at home and
subjugate 75 million people in Europe's East to a fate determined in
Moscow. At worst, an emboldened Putin may be tempted to challenge a
NATO ally directly, hoping to deal a decisive blow to the alliance.
The choice we face, however, is not between fighting Russia or
doing nothing. Rather, I believe doing nothing may lead to our fighting
Russia.
We are better than that. The United States can take the lead in
galvanizing the transatlantic community behind a comprehensive
strategy, including ensuring that a well-functioning and well-armed
European Ukraine emerges from this crisis.
In this context, I would like to make five points:
(1) Russia's war in Ukraine today is the natural outcome of Putin's
policies in recent years (and the lessons he drew from our successive
lack of responses).
(2) Putin will not stop until he encounters serious pushback.
(3) Only the United States can galvanize Europe and the
international community around an effective, comprehensive strategy to
deter Putin for the long term.
(4) Any strategy should urgently and decisively back Ukraine as
well as other vulnerable states with significant economic and military
assistance in the short term, while keeping the door open to the
European Union (EU) or NATO for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.
(5) We should neither abandon the Russian people nor the vision
that a democratic Russia one day can find its peaceful place within a
Europe whole and free.
This crisis began long before Crimea. Indeed, Russia's annexation
of Crimea was the natural outcome of a clear, consistent policy dating
back years. As confrontation replaced cooperation with the West as a
source of legitimacy for the Kremlin, Russia meticulously laid the
groundwork for what we are witnessing today. Former President Medvedev
set out the doctrine of a ``privileged sphere of interests.'' Putin
articulated the ``compatriots policy'' in which Russia claimed the
right to defend the interests of Russian speakers outside its borders,
and it began distributing passports to strengthen its claims.
Russia undermined diplomatic efforts to resolve so-called frozen
conflicts, and maintained Russian occupying forces as ``peacekeepers.''
At the last NATO--Russia summit in 2008, Putin ridiculed the idea of
Ukraine as an independent state and questioned the status of Crimea in
front of NATO leaders who had just failed to agree to begin preparing
Ukraine for NATO. His creeping annexation of Georgia's breakaway
regions prompted the Russian-Georgian War, consolidating his
occupations. Russia both developed contingency plans and exercised
seizing its neighbors' territory. Putin increasingly began wrapping all
of his actions in a pseudo-ideology of Orthodox chauvinism.
He countered EU outreach with his own Eurasian Economic Union
premised on coercion rather than attraction. Putin's intimidation
tactics led Armenia first to abandon its EU association bid before
forcing former Ukrainian President Yanukovych's about-face. Russia
tried and failed to use economic coercion and energy threats to sway
Moldova.
In the Ukraine crisis, Putin first probed with little green men to
determine his freedom of maneuver in Crimea and, in the absence of
resistance, brazenly seized the territory. The Kremlin then stoked the
idea of a ``Russian Spring'' across southern and eastern Ukraine,
creating the myth of Novorossiya and seeking to spark spontaneous
revolts using ``political tourists'' from Russia. When that failed,
Russia introduced Special Forces and intelligence operatives in
Slavyansk, using the town as a base from which to seek to destabilize
eastern Ukraine. And once Ukrainian forces gained their footing, nearly
defeating the rebel forces, Russia opted for full-scale invasion.
Today, the so-called separatists--former miners and farmers according
to Putin--command greater quantities of the most advanced heavy
weaponry than most European NATO nations.
While Ukraine is ground zero in the current struggle, there is no
doubt that Putin's sights are firmly fixed on the two tiny nations that
have dared stand up to his bullying: Moldova and Georgia. Moscow
attempted to sway Moldova's recent elections with massive support for
new pro-Kremlin parties, is courting separatists, and is poised to
destabilize the nation. Despite Georgia's efforts to normalize
relations with Moscow, Russia has continued its creeping annexation of
Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In the first instance, Putin has used this crisis to consolidate
his own hold on at home, through greater repression of civil society
and independent media even as he fuels a nationalist fervor. He has
created an environment of fear and intimidation, at a minimum fostering
the circumstances that led to the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. After
all, the protests led by Nemtsov, much like the Maidan in Ukraine, pose
a potentially existential threat to Putin's regime.
Putin, of course, is also seeking to dominate his neighbors, to
drain them of resources to fuel his kleptocracy, and to restore a sense
of Russia's greatness in the only way a bully knows--intimidating the
weak, closest to him.
Furthermore, he aims to prevent any of his neighbors from joining
either NATO or the EU, achieving this through coercion when possible
and by dismemberment and occupation where necessary.
Ultimately, Putin knows that the best check on his power is a
united transatlantic community. Hence, he has sought to divide Europe,
undermining the resolve for sustained sanctions. But the most tempting
objective for Putin is to call into question the credibility of NATO's
Article 5 mutual defense commitment, as doing so would effectively end
both NATO and America's role as a great European power.
A Russian move against an ally such as a Baltic State cannot be
ruled out. Putin has demonstrated time and again that if he senses an
opportunity to act, he will, convinced that the West lacks the will or
ability to take decisive action. Debaltseve is only the latest case in
point.
This is why today's situation is so dangerous. Putin will not stop
and this crisis will not end until he encounters serious pushback.
We have seen repeatedly that Putin's objectives expand with success
and contract with failure, or even the increased chance of failure.
This means that the best determinant of his action is Western action.
There's a tendency, however, in Washington to argue that the
Europeans should take the lead on Ukraine--after all we have our hands
full with ISIS and other global responsibilities. This approach fails
to understand that only the United States can galvanize Europe and
other members of the international community around a tough-minded
comprehensive strategy to deter Putin.
The Ukraine crisis is a Russia crisis after all. And Russia is too
big, too strong, and too scary for Europe to resolve this without us.
Germany may be a political and economic powerhouse, but Putin knows
Chancellor Merkel cannot enforce European diplomacy. While the
Chancellor has done a remarkable job in holding Europe together in this
crisis, no European state can afford to get into a confrontation with
Russia.
Without U.S. leadership in this crisis, Putin might succeed in
creating a new dividing line in Europe. As he creates facts on the
ground, he shifts the goalposts of what becomes an acceptable outcome
in European diplomacy focused on ending violence. Europe may feel
forced to accommodate a revanchist Russia rather than check its power.
As we've seen throughout history, this is a dangerous formula.
Only U.S. leadership in this crisis provides the necessary
condition to ensure the sustained resolve of our allies, most of who
are bearing a far greater economic cost to their own economies.
Our strategy today is basically to raise the costs on Russia by
imposing sanctions, protect NATO, and count on the long-term
fundamentals, which are on our side and are working against Russia. The
problem is that we have an immediate crisis. Putin likely sees the
immediate future as his best window of opportunity. And in the short
term, we may see a group of nations lose their sovereignty and Russia
tempted to push further into NATO territory.
We can avoid this outcome. The United States has the ability to
rally its allies and international partners around a comprehensive
strategy that not only deters Putin's aggression, but also avoids an
unstable grey zone in Europe's east.
To do so, we should begin by articulating our vision--what we want
to achieve. I contend that should be a Europe whole, free, and at peace
that embraces democratic nations in Europe's east and in which Russia
can find its peaceful place in Europe.
We should more decisively increase the costs to Russia, including
by refusing to treat Putin (and the FSB) as normal interlocutors,
expanding the economic sanctions to include Putin and his inner circle,
targeting Gazprom directly, and letting Moscow know that we are
considering cutting off Russia from SWIFT financial transactions.
The most effective response is Ukraine succeeding in becoming a
modern European state. We very well may see a shift from the military
battlefields of the Donbas to the financial markets. Putin after all is
out to win all of Ukraine, not simply consolidate his hold on a slice
of territory in the east.
And yet U.S. and European assistance to date is modest. There is no
governmentwide concerted effort to assist Ukraine comparable to the
White House-led effort to implement the reset with Russia. There is no
response commensurate with how Congress reacted to support campaigns
against Ebola and ISIS. The amounts of assistance under consideration
are too small to serve as the catalyst for reform in a nation of over
50 million people. We are far more generous helping Jordan weather the
Syria crisis as we plan to provide $1 billion in assistance to a nation
of over 6 million. We provided $1 billion to 4.5 million Georgians
after Russia's invasion. While the IMF and EU can and will contribute
more to Ukraine, the U.S. sets the tone and for now the tone is
ambivalent.
Assistance to Ukraine should include substantial military
assistance. The United States is uniquely positioned to assist Ukraine
to defend itself and to raise the costs of further Russian military
action against Ukraine. There is no military solution in Ukraine and no
one wants Ukraine to suffer a full-scale war with Russia. But by
reassuring Putin that we will either not provide or greatly constrain
our military and intelligence assistance, we signal to the Kremlin what
Russia can get away with. Our current posture is escalatory as it gives
Russia the confidence it needs to believe it can achieve particular
means through military options at acceptable costs.
Any assistance package should therefore include substantial
military assistance, including lethal military assistance such as
antiarmor missiles, as well as intelligence support. Such a U.S.
decision could unlock lethal military assistance from Canada and
several other European and Asian allies. We should also support large-
scale training in civil resistance in Ukraine as part of creating a
deterrent state.
One vehicle for such assistance could be an expansion of the
European Reassurance Initiative and renaming it the European
Reinforcement Initiative to underscore its focus on building well-
armed, well-trained deterrent states including frontline allies, key
partners such as Finland and Sweden, and states under duress including
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
Within NATO, even as we continue to implement the good Wales summit
decisions, the alliance should also move away from ``reassurance,''
which focuses on the insecurities of our allies, and embrace
``deterrence,'' which underscores the threat. To this end, the U.S.
Congress could endorse a more substantial U.S. and NATO military
presence along NATO's Eastern flank until such time as Putin
demonstrates that Russia is no longer a threat or potential threat to
our allies; support a focused training effort to build frontline
states' military capacities; call for a halt to any further U.S. force
withdrawals from Europe; and order a review of U.S. force posture
including how to prioritize Russia in determining the availability of
forces to U.S. combatant commands. Such a package could be designed to
leverage such U.S. commitments to European security to secure greater
European commitments to defense investment.
Russia's aggressive new posture has translated into an intense
diplomatic effort to buttress Russian influence elsewhere, especially
in southeast Europe, and to disrupt ongoing European integration
processes. We should respond to aggression in Europe's East by
consolidating Europe's South. This would mean inviting Montenegro to
join NATO, undertaking a renewed push to resolve the Macedonia name
impasse, and intensifying efforts to build U.S. strategic partnerships
with Serbia and Cyprus.
A comprehensive transatlantic strategy to deter Putin should expand
the playing field to areas of strength for us--energy and trade. We
should harness America's energy prowess to increase global supply,
while supporting European efforts to create a European energy union
that includes Ukraine and Moldova from that start. At the same time, we
should be explicit that our intention is to negotiate a Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that is open to European
nations who have deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with the
EU, notably Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
At the same time, the United States must work much more closely
with its allies on how to mitigate Russian efforts to sow dissension
within the alliance. Such efforts begin with more transparency and
stronger financial disclosure laws and practices in our societies to
expose potential Russian manipulation of institutions, media, or
political parties.
Western leaders must also assume responsibility for countering the
Russian propaganda war by being willing to speak publicly and clearly
about Russia's actions. If we are unable to recognize the threat Putin
poses to our interests or challenge the misperceptions that surround
this conflict, we are unlikely to formulate an effective, sustainable
strategy sufficient to deter him for the long term--a strategy that is
pursued not with confrontational rhetoric, but with resolve and
determination.
As long as either KGB veterans retain their grip on the Kremlin or
the nations in between NATO and Russia remain trapped in an insecure
grey zone, we will face continued challenges and conflict. The Russian
people, as we saw on the streets of Moscow Sunday, will some day have a
say about their leaders. But the United States and its allies--along
with Ukrainians, Moldovans, and Georgians--have a say about the latter.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Our final witness
is the Honorable Steven Pifer. Am I pronouncing that correctly?
Ambassador Pifer. Yes, sir.
Senator Johnson. Good. Mr. Pifer is a senior fellow at the
Brookings Institute and was a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
from 1998 to 2000. He is a retired Foreign Service officer with
over 25 years at the State Department focused on United States
relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe.
Mr. Pifer.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEVEN PIFER, DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL
AND NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Pifer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
Senator Shaheen, Senator Gardner, thank you for the opportunity
to testify today on Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the
West's policy response. With your permission I will submit a
written statement for the record and summarize it now.
What began as an internal Ukrainian political dispute
became a conflict between Russia and Ukraine in early 2014.
Moscow has used military force to seize Crimea, supported armed
separatists, and sent regular Russian Army units into Eastern
Ukraine. After a September cease-fire agreement failed, a
second cease-fire, referred to Minsk II, was agreed to in
February. That agreement is fragile at best. Its implementation
will prove difficult.
Driving Russia's aggression has been a mix of geopolitical
and domestic political considerations, including the fear that
the Maidan demonstrations in Ukraine could provide a model that
the Russian people might emulate. The Kremlin's goal appears to
be to destabilize the Ukrainian Government and make it harder
for Kiev to address its urgent economic reform agenda and draw
closer to the European Union. The West has responded with
sanctions. While having a major impact on the Russian economy,
the sanctions have not yet achieved their political goal, to
effect a change in the Kremlin's policy toward Ukraine.
Beyond Ukraine, the United States and Europe face a broader
Russia problem. Moscow has operated its military forces in a
provocative manner, and asserts a right to protect ethnic
Russians and Russian speakers wherever they are located and
whatever their citizenship. That could pose a threat to other
states in the region, including Estonia and Latvia, both
members of NATO.
In response, the United States and the West should pursue a
multipronged strategy to deal with Russia's violations of
Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and Moscow's
generally more confrontational approach. That strategy should
have five vectors.
First, NATO should bolster its ability to deter Russian
threats to the alliance's members, particularly in the Baltic
region. This entails enhancing NATO conventional force
capabilities, including capabilities to deal with the hybrid
war techniques that Russia has used in Ukraine.
Second, the West should support Ukraine, including through
provision of substantial financial assistance if Kiev proceeds
with serious economic reforms. If the Minsk II cease-fire by
some chance holds and other terms of the agreement are
implemented, but the Ukrainian economy collapses, that will
hardly represent a success for Western policy.
Third, the West should maintain sanctions on Russia until
Moscow demonstrates a full commitment to a negotiated
settlement in eastern Ukraine and takes demonstrable and
substantive measures to implement that settlement. Should
Russia not do so, or should separatists and Russian forces
resume military operations, the United States and European
Union should rapidly move to impose additional sanctions. It is
important to make clear to Russia that its egregious behavior
will have significant costs so that the Kremlin does not come
to believe it can pursue hybrid warfare elsewhere at a
tolerable price.
Fourth, the United States should make preparations to
provide increased military assistance to Ukraine, including
defensive arms, particularly light antiarmor weapons. Provision
of that assistance should proceed if the separatists or
Russians violate the cease-fire, or if Moscow fails to
implement the full terms of the Minsk II agreement. The
assistance would fill gaps in the Ukrainian Army's ability to
defend Ukraine against attack. The rationale is to enable the
Ukrainian Army to impose costs on the Russian military, to
deter Moscow from further fighting, and to encourage it to
pursue a peaceful settlement.
Some express concern that U.S. provision of defensive arms
would lead Russia to escalate, but escalation would carry major
risks for Moscow. It would require more overt involvement by
the Russian Army in eastern Ukraine. That would be more visible
internationally, likely triggering additional sanctions, and to
the Russian public, from whom the Kremlin has sought to hide
the fact that Russian soldiers are fighting and dying in
Ukraine. Others worry that providing arms would split U.S.-
European unity. There is no evidence to back that. To be sure,
Chancellor Merkel says that Germany will not provide arms, but
during her visit in Washington on February 9, she did not give
the President a red light or threaten a breakdown in
transatlantic solidarity. And other allies would likely provide
Ukraine defensive weapons once the United States began to do
so.
Fifth, the United States should leave the door open for
Russia to change course and help settle the conflict, even if
expectations of such a change in Moscow's policy should be and
are modest at best. Finally, while Ukraine has correctly
deferred the issue of Crimea now, the West should continue to
not recognize Russia's illegal annexation of the peninsula.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Shaheen, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, Russia's actions on Ukraine and its more
confrontational approach represent a serious challenge to the
United States, Europe, and the West. Dealing with the Russian
challenge requires a multipronged strategy based on firmness,
patience, and solidarity with United States allies and friends
in Europe. But given the large differences in economic,
military, and soft power between the West and Russia, the West
should be fully able to meet that challenge.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pifer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven Pifer
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Senator Shaheen, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Russia's
aggression against Ukraine, and the U.S. and West's policy response.
What began as an internal Ukrainian political dispute became a
Ukraine-Russia crisis in early 2014. Since then, Moscow has used
military force to seize Crimea, supported armed separatists and
ultimately sent regular Russian army units into eastern Ukraine. A
cease-fire agreement was reached in Minsk last September, but the
separatists and Russians failed to implement its terms. The Minsk II
cease-fire agreed on February 12 may now be taking effect but seems
fragile at best. Implementing other terms of the agreement will prove
difficult.
Driving Russia's aggression has been a mix of geopolitical and
domestic political considerations. The Kremlin's goal over the past
year appears to have been to destabilize and distract the Ukrainian
Government, in order keep that government from addressing its pressing
economic, financial, and other challenges as well as from drawing
closer to the European Union through implementation of the EU--Ukraine
association agreement.
Beyond Ukraine, the United States and Europe face a broader Russia
problem. Moscow has operated its military forces in a more provocative
manner near NATO members and has asserted a right to ``protect'' ethnic
Russians and Russian speakers wherever they are located and whatever
their citizenship. That policy could pose a threat to other states,
including Estonia and Latvia, both members of NATO.
The United States and the West should pursue a multipronged
strategy to deal with Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity and Moscow's generally more confrontational
approach. First, NATO should bolster its ability to deter Russian
threats to the alliance's members, particularly in the Baltic region.
This means enhancing NATO conventional force capabilities there,
including capabilities to deal with the hybrid warfare techniques that
Russia has demonstrated in Ukraine.
Second, the West should support Ukraine, including through
provision of substantial financial assistance if Kiev proceeds with a
serious reform agenda. Avoiding a financial collapse of Ukraine will
require that the European Union and United States supplement the
International Monetary Fund's extended fund facility program.
Third, the West should maintain economic and other sanctions on
Russia until Moscow demonstrates a full commitment to a negotiated
settlement in eastern Ukraine and takes demonstrable and substantive
measures to implement that settlement. Should Russia not do so, or
should separatist and Russian forces resume military operations, the
United States and European Union should impose additional sanctions.
Fourth, the United States should make preparations to provide
increased military assistance to Ukraine, including defensive weapons.
Provision of that assistance should proceed if the separatists or
Russians violate the cease-fire, or if Moscow fails to implement the
terms of the Minsk II agreement.
Fifth, the West should leave the door open for Russia to change
course and help end the conflict in eastern Ukraine, even if
expectations of such a change in Moscow's course are modest at best.
Finally, while Ukraine has correctly deferred the issue of Crimea
for now, the West should continue to not recognize Russia's illegal
annexation of the peninsula. If Russian actions regarding eastern
Ukraine merit sanctions relief, the United States and European Union
nevertheless should maintain some sanctions, including measures
specifically targeted at Crimea, until the peninsula's status is
resolved to Kiev's satisfaction.
russia's aggression against ukraine
Russia and the other independent states that emerged from the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 agreed to respect the state
borders as they existed at the time. Unfortunately, Russia did not hold
to that commitment. The Kremlin has supported separatist efforts and
``frozen'' conflicts in Transnistria, a breakaway part of Moldova, and
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, breakaway regions from Georgia, whom Russia
recognized as independent states following the August 2008 Georgia-
Russia conflict. Moscow has again violated the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of another state, this time, Ukraine.
Ukraine went through a wrenching internal political crisis from
November 2013 to the end of February 2014, triggered by then-President
Yanukovych's surprise decision not to sign an association agreement
with the European Union. Following the security forces' use of deadly
force against demonstrators in Kiev on February 19-20, Mr. Yanukovych
signed a power-sharing agreement with the three main opposition party
leaders.
Given public anger over the killings the two previous days, it is
unlikely that the opposition leaders could have persuaded the
demonstrators to accept the agreement. In any case, they had little
chance. After signing the document, Mr. Yanukovych abandoned his post
and disappeared, later turning up in Russia.
What had been an internal political crisis became a Ukraine-Russia
conflict at the end of February 2014, when soldiers, in Russian combat
fatigues without insignia, seized Crimea. The Ukrainians referred to
them as ``little green men.'' In a March 3 press conference, President
Putin denied that they were Russian soldiers. Just weeks later, he
publicly admitted that they were and awarded commendations to their
commanders.
In April, armed separatists began to seize buildings in Donetsk and
Luhansk in eastern Ukraine. Many were pro-Russian locals, but more
``little green men'' appeared. Moscow supported the separatists with
funding, arms, and leadership. For example, last April, the self-
proclaimed Prime Minister and Defense Minister of the so-called
``Donetsk People's Republic'' came from Russia and had apartments in
Moscow. Further evidence that outsiders played a major role in the
early days was the seizure of the opera house in Kharkiv, which they
apparently mistook for the city administration building.
Over the course of the late spring and summer, as Ukrainian forces
conducted a counteroffensive in Donetsk and Luhansk (also referred to
as the Donbas), Russia provided the separatists with heavy arms, such
as tanks, artillery, and surface-to-air missile systems. These
apparently included the Buk (SA-11) surface-to-air missile that
tragically shot down Malaysia Air flight 17 in July.
The Ukrainian military nevertheless made progress against the
separatists during the summer, significantly reducing the amount of
territory they held. On or about August 23, regular units of the Russia
Army invaded Ukraine and attacked Ukrainian units in the Donbas. When a
cease-fire agreement was worked out in Minsk on September 5, Ukrainian
losses reportedly included between 50 and 70 percent of the armor the
Ukrainian Army had deployed in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
Unfortunately, the September cease-fire never took full hold. The
separatists and Russians did not implement key elements, such as the
requirements for withdrawal of foreign forces and military equipment,
or for securing the Ukraine-Russia border under observation by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Instead, the
Russian-backed separatists over the next 5 months took additional
territory in eastern Ukraine, adding more than 500 square kilometers to
what they had held on September 5.
Last month, with fighting escalating, German Chancellor Merkel and
French President Hollande met with Ukrainian President Poroshenko and
Russian President Putin in Minsk to seek a new settlement. After a
marathon all-night negotiation, they announced a new agreement (Minsk
II) providing for a cease-fire, withdrawal of heavy weapons away from
the line of contact, and a series of steps to regulate the political
and economic status of eastern Ukraine.
The terms of Minsk II are substantially worse for Kiev than the
terms of the unfulfilled September 2014 agreement. Implementing the
Minsk II agreement will require good faith and flexibility on all sides
that has not been shown previously during this conflict. Many analysts
expect the agreement to break down at some point.
It appears that Mr. Poroshenko agreed to Minsk II in the face of a
deteriorating military situation and an urgent need for breathing space
so that he could focus attention on a looming financial crisis and a
very necessary economic reform agenda. Given Mr. Poroshenko's
acceptance of Minsk II, Ukraine's supporters have little choice but to
support the agreement and its implementation, however difficult its
terms may appear.
Unfortunately, the separatist and Russian forces did not initially
observe the cease-fire, which was supposed to begin on midnight on
February 14. They attacked the Debaltseve salient occupied by Ukrainian
Army units, which withdrew on February 18. The Ukrainians then reported
ominous signs of preparations for a separatist/Russian attack on the
large port city of Mariupol in southern Donetsk province.
Greater restraint was shown after February 25. While some shelling
continues, the line of contact has been markedly quieter than it was
during the first week of the cease-fire. The sides have pulled some
heavy weapons back from the line of contact. The cease-fire, however,
remains fragile and shaky, and Kiev remains concerned about possible
preparations for an assault on Mariupol.
russian motives
Russia today is passing through a difficult and dark phase, as
evidenced by the tragic February 27 murder of opposition leader Boris
Nemtsov, virtually on the doorstep of the Kremlin. Russia's goal with
regard to Ukraine over the past year has been to destabilize and
distract Mr. Poroshenko and his government. That makes it far more
difficult for them to address the pressing economic, financial and
reform agenda that confronts Kiev, including implementation of the
reforms mandated by its program with the International Monetary Fund.
It also makes it more difficult for Kiev to pursue implementation of
the association agreement it signed last year with the European Union.
Moscow seems to calculate that a new ``frozen conflict'' in eastern
Ukraine--or perhaps a ``not so frozen conflict''--provides the
mechanism to put pressure on Kiev.
This policy appears to be driven by a mix of geopolitical and
domestic political considerations. Mr. Putin's concept of Russia as a
great power includes a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. He
does not seek to recreate the Soviet Union; the Russian economy does
not wish to subsidize those of other states. But Moscow does want its
neighbors to take account of and defer to its concerns, particularly as
regards relationships with Western institutions such as NATO and the
European Union.
Mr. Putin very much wanted Ukraine to join the Russian-led Eurasian
Union, along with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia. Even under Mr.
Yanukovych, however, Kiev made clear its preference for the European
Union. If Moscow cannot have Ukraine in the Eurasian Union, it is
working to hinder Ukraine's effort to draw closer to Europe.
Domestic political considerations factor heavily into the Kremlin's
Ukraine policy. First, the two countries have long historical and
cultural ties, and pulling Crimea and Ukraine back toward Russia plays
well with Mr. Putin's conservative political base. That said, polls
show that most Russians do not want the Russian Army fighting in
Ukraine--which explains the extraordinary and sometimes disgraceful
efforts taken by the Kremlin over the past 8 months to hide that fact
from the Russian people.
A related consideration is the Kremlin's fear that the Maidan
demonstrations that brought down Mr. Yanukovych might inspire Russians
to mount large civil protests of their own. A weak Ukrainian Government
incapable of meeting the challenges before it ensures that the Maidan
model will have little attraction for the Russian populace. This
consideration could mean that Mr. Putin wants a failed Ukrainian state.
If so, that does not bode well for the prospects for the current cease-
fire and Minsk II.
the west and a broader russia problem
Beyond Ukraine, the United States and Europe today face a broader
Russia problem. As the Ukraine-Russia crisis intensified from March
2014 onward, NATO observed a significant increase in provocative
behavior by Russian military forces, including nuclear exercises and
snap conventional force alerts. NATO military authorities reported a
marked jump in the number of cases of Russian bombers conducting
flights near the air space of NATO member states.
Such behavior is of concern, as NATO and Russian military forces
are increasingly operating in close proximity at a time of significant
West-Russia tensions. That raises the prospect of accidents,
miscalculation, or misunderstanding. For example, air traffic
controllers in Scandinavia have reported two instances in which Russian
intelligence-gathering aircraft recklessly switched off their radar
transponders when operating in or near commercial air lanes.
Moscow has for some years asserted a right to ``protect'' ethnic
Russians or Russian speakers wherever they are located and whatever
their citizenship. Protecting ethnic Russians was a reason that Mr.
Putin cited for seizing Crimea--once he admitted that the ``little
green men'' there were in fact Russian soldiers. He made that claim
even though there was no evidence of any threat to ethnic Russians on
the peninsula.
One must question whether the Kremlin might seek to apply this
self-proclaimed right elsewhere. Kazakhstan in Central Asia and Estonia
and Latvia in the Baltic region have populations that are about one
quarter ethnic Russian. The latter two states are members of NATO, to
whom the United States has an obligation to defend under Article 5 of
the 1949 Washington Treaty.
There may not be a significant likelihood of a Russian conventional
attack on the Baltics or even of the appearance of ``little green men''
in Estonia or Latvia. But, given recent events and the Kremlin's
hostile rhetoric, it would be prudent for NATO to assume that the
probability of those contingencies is not zero and take appropriate
measures.
Mr. Putin has displayed a deep antipathy toward NATO, for instance,
in his March 18, 2014, speech on Crimea's annexation. Imagine a
scenario in which 40-50 ``little green men'' seized a government
building in Estonia, citing ethnic Russian grievances, while Moscow
denied any connection. If Estonia asked NATO to treat that as an
Article 5 contingency, and the alliance debated the issue for a week or
two, that would be a major blow to confidence within NATO and a major
victory for Mr. Putin. It is in NATO's interest to minimize the odds
that the Kremlin might be tempted to try such a scenario.
the u.s. and the west's response
The United States should respond to Russia's belligerence against
Ukraine for three reasons. First, over the past 24 years, Ukraine has
been a responsive partner when asked by the United States. In the early
1990s, largely at U.S. behest, Ukraine rid itself of the world's third-
largest nuclear arsenal, including some 1,900 strategic nuclear
warheads targeted or targetable on the American homeland. By 1996,
Ukraine had transferred all the warheads to Russia for elimination. By
2001, it had eliminated the missile silos, intercontinental ballistic
missiles and heavy bombers on its territory. In 2003, following the
fall of Baghdad, Ukraine at U.S. request contributed three battalions
to the Iraq stabilization force. For a period, the Ukrainian contingent
was the fourth-largest in Iraq after the forces deployed by the United
States, Britain, and Poland.
Second, the United States is a signatory, along with Britain and
Russia, to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, which
among other things committed those countries to respect the
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine as well
as to not use force or the threat of force against Ukraine. That was a
key element of the arrangement that led to Kiev's decision to give up
nuclear weapons. Russia has grossly violated its commitments under the
memorandum. The United States should respond by supporting Ukraine and
taking steps against Russia.
Third, Russia's use of force against Ukraine egregiously violates
the cardinal rule of the European security order since the 1975
Helsinki Final Act: borders are inviolable, and states should not use
force to alter them or take territory from other states. The West
should push back against this, lest the Kremlin conclude that the kind
of hybrid warfare that it has conducted against Ukraine is a successful
tactic that could be applied at tolerable cost elsewhere.
Dealing with Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity and its generally more confrontational approach
toward the West will require a multipronged Western strategy. That
strategy should include measures to strengthen NATO, support Ukraine,
and penalize Russia with the objective of getting the Kremlin to pursue
and implement a negotiated settlement. Specifically, this means actions
along five vectors.
strengthening nato
NATO should strengthen its ability to deter Russian threats to the
alliance's members, particularly by bolstering its defenses in the
Baltic region and Central Europe. This entails prudent steps to enhance
NATO conventional force capabilities, including capabilities to deal
with Russian hybrid warfare techniques.
In order to assure Moscow that NATO enlargement would not entail
the movement of significant military forces toward Russia's border, the
alliance in 1997 said that there would be no ``additional permanent
stationing of substantial combat forces'' on the territory of new NATO
members. Although some allies have called for renouncing that policy in
the aftermath of Russia's seizure of Crimea, the alliance as a whole
has not agreed to a change. NATO has, however, begun strengthening its
military capabilities in the Baltic States and Central Europe.
Beginning last April, the U.S. Army deployed light infantry units
of about 150 personnel each in Poland and the three Baltic States. The
Pentagon has described these as a ``persistent'' deployment: when a
unit rotates out, another rotates in in its place. Other allies have
increased the size and frequency of their ground force exercises in the
region. The U.S. Army plans to deploy some 150 Abrams tanks and Bradley
fighting vehicles in Europe, possibly in Poland; that would be
sufficient to equip a heavy armored brigade.
The alliance's air presence for the Baltic air-policing mission has
been increased substantially since last March. NATO now deploys on
average at least three times the number of aircraft in the Baltics as
it did previously. On the southeastern flank, U.S. and NATO warships
make far more numerous entries into the Black Sea than before.
These actions have two principal goals. First, they aim to assure
allies in the Baltic region and Central Europe of the firm alliance
commitment to their defense. Second, they aim to make clear to Moscow
that NATO will defend the territory of all allies.
Meeting in Wales last September, NATO leaders agreed to take
additional measures. They decided to create a response force with the
capability to deploy 5,000 troops anywhere within the alliance on 48
hours notice. In February, NATO Defense Ministers announced that
headquarters elements would be established in the Baltic States,
Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. This step plus measures to enhance the
infrastructure to support incoming troops and equipment will strengthen
those countries' ability to receive reinforcements in a crisis.
Congress should support funds for these and other measures to
strengthen the U.S. and NATO conventional force presence in the Baltic/
Central European region. Specifically, the United States should
consider increasing the size of its ground force presence in the region
and seek the commitment of units from European allies to deploy on a
``persistent'' basis alongside U.S. units in the Baltic States and
Poland. NATO should develop and exercise capabilities to deal rapidly
with a ``little green men'' scenario on allied territory.
In overall conventional forces, the United States and NATO continue
to enjoy qualitative and quantitative advantages over the Russian
military. The Russian military, however, is engaged in a major
modernization and rearmament program. NATO must make the investments
needed to maintain its areas of advantage. The administration and
Congress should urge allies to devote greater resources to the
territorial defense of the alliance. Unfortunately, few allies
currently meet NATO's agreed standard of spending 2 percent of GDP on
defense.
The U.S. response should focus on strengthening conventional force
capabilities. The U.S. Air Force reportedly maintains some 200 B61
nuclear gravity bombs at airfields in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Turkey. Those suffice to meet the mission of the U.S.
nonstrategic nuclear arsenal in Europe, which is fundamentally
political: to assure allies of the commitment of U.S. nuclear forces to
their defense, and, if used, to signal the adversary to halt aggression
or risk a strategic nuclear response.
Some have suggested that, in answer to Russian aggression in
Ukraine, the United States should deploy nuclear weapons on the
territory of NATO members in Central Europe, who have joined the
alliance over the past 16 years. That would be unwise for three
reasons.
First, deploying nuclear weapons to the relatively new members in
the Baltic States or Central Europe would make the weapons more
vulnerable to a Russian preemptive attack in a crisis. For example, the
Iskander ballistic missiles reportedly deployed in Russia's Kaliningrad
can carry conventional or nuclear weapons. From Kaliningrad, Iskander
missiles could cover and rapidly strike targets in two-thirds of Poland
and virtually all of Lithuania and Latvia. U.S. nuclear assets are far
less vulnerable at their current bases.
Second, deploying nuclear weapons to the new members would violate
NATO policy. Many, probably most, allies would oppose such a move. In
1997, the alliance stated that it had ``no intention, no plan and no
reason'' to deploy nuclear arms on the territory of new member states.
While some allies have sought to have NATO renounce or alter its policy
of not permanently stationing substantial combat forces on the
territory of new members, no ally has seriously raised the idea of
changing the existing policy on no deployment of nuclear arms on the
territory of new member states.
Third, placing U.S. nuclear weapons so close to Russia would be
seen in Moscow as an extremely provocative act, on par with the attempt
by the Soviet Union in 1962 to place nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba. It
does not make sense to respond to Russian actions with a deployment
that would make American nuclear weapons more vulnerable, cause a major
rift within NATO, and unduly provoke Russia.
supporting ukraine financially
The United States and Europe should take substantial measures to
support Ukraine with grants and low interest loans as it proceeds with
difficult economic, rule of law and anticorruption reforms. The
International Monetary Fund has reached preliminary agreement with
Ukraine on a 4-year extended fund facility that will provide $17.5
billion. That will significantly help Ukraine, but it will not suffice.
Ukraine could need an estimated $20-$25 billion more over the next 2
years in grants and low interest financing. Much of that will have to
come from the European Union and United States.
EU officials and member states have shown no enthusiasm for
providing assistance on that scale. But the European Union may well do
more, as it does not wish to have to deal with a large failed Ukrainian
economy on its eastern border. The United States also should be ready
to contribute more than the loan guarantees promised for this year.
Finding this money on either side of the Atlantic will not be easy.
However, if the European Union and United States are serious about
helping Ukraine, they should provide the financial assistance. If the
Minsk II cease-fire by some chance holds and other terms of the
agreement are implemented but the Ukrainian economy collapses, that
will hardly represent a success for Western policy.
Of course, the International Monetary Fund, European Union, and
United States must, as a condition of their assistance, insist that
Ukraine take the necessary reform steps. Absent such reforms, Western
assistance would not go to good use. The leadership in Kiev hopefully
understands that, unless they put in place the needed critical mass of
reforms, the Ukrainian economy will remain mired in stagnation for
years, if not decades.
penalizing russia
Over the past year, the United States, European Union, and other
Western countries have imposed increasingly severe sanctions on Russia,
following its seizure of Crimea and subsequent actions in eastern
Ukraine, with the objective of effecting a change in Moscow's policy.
The sanctions began with visa bans and asset freezes on selected
individuals. They expanded to major sanctions targeting key Russian
companies in the finance, defense, and energy sectors, for example, by
barring new financing or the export of Western technology.
By all appearances, those sanctions are having a significant impact
on the Russian economy, multiplied by the effect of the fall in the
price of oil. For example, according to the Russian Central Bank,
capital flight from Russia totaled $150 billion in 2014. Over the
course of that year, Russian reserves fell from some $510 billion to
$385 billion, in part due to an attempt to prop up the falling ruble;
the ruble nevertheless has lost half of its value against the dollar
since last summer. The Russian economy is officially projected to
contract by 3 percent in 2015, while some economists predict a much
steeper contraction. Russian officials have responded by seeking to cut
most parts of the 2015 state budget by ten percent.
The sanctions, however, have not yet achieved their political
objective, which is to get Russia to make a genuine change in policy
course regarding Ukraine. If the cease-fire holds, that will be a
positive step, but Moscow must also implement all of Minsk II's terms
and use its significant influence with the separatists to achieve a
durable settlement.
Should Russia not implement Minsk II, or should separatist or
Russian forces resume military action, perhaps aimed at Mariupol, the
United States and European Union should immediately apply new economic
sanctions on Russia. U.S. and EU officials should consult now so that
they have a package of additional sanctions ready.
Some analysts question whether the sanctions will prompt a
different policy in Moscow. They argue that Mr. Putin will use the
sanctions to blame the West for Russia's economic woes and rally the
Russian people to resist. That has been his instinctive response.
If, however, the sanctions remain in place, Moscow's financial
reserves will drop precipitously, and the average Russian will see a
decline in his or her purchasing power. This could raise discontent
among the Russian populace and affect Mr. Putin's approval ratings,
something to which he pays close attention. Moreover, Mr. Putin almost
certainly wishes to avoid exhausting Russia's reserves. It is not yet
clear how he will respond if he faces this scenario.
In any event, even if one were not certain that sanctions would
deliver the desired result, they allow the West to impose a significant
cost on Russia commensurate with the nature of Russia's egregious
actions in Ukraine. Absent sanctions, and having ruled out use of
military force on Ukraine's behalf, the West would have few penalties
of any real consequence to levy.
Mr. Putin may be betting that Western resolve to maintain the
sanctions will flag, or that he can win sanctions relief with cosmetic
gestures. A key date will be July, when some of the major EU sanctions,
imposed last July, come up for renewal for another year. Maintaining
Western solidarity and persuading the Kremlin that the sanctions will
remain in place, or possibly increase, absent steps by Moscow to
facilitate a settlement in eastern Ukraine, could prove critical to
affecting the Kremlin's calculations.
U.S. sanctions to date have been imposed by Executive order, which
allows the administration the flexibility to increase or relax them,
depending on Russian actions. A threat of congressionally mandated (as
opposed to authorized) sanctions could have a useful effect on Moscow.
However, actually mandating congressional sanctions could well prove
counterproductive.
The Russian experience has been that Congress is slow to remove
sanctions, even when they achieve the desired Russian policy change.
Moscow met the requirements of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment in the
mid-1990s, but Congress did not graduate Russia from the provisions of
Jackson-Vanik and grant Russia permanent normal trade relations status
until more than 15 years later, in December 2012--and then only in the
Magnitsky Act, which leveled new sanctions on Russia. If Moscow
believes that congressionally mandated sanctions will never be lifted,
or if it believes that they will be lifted only years after Russia
meets the sanctions' requirements, those sanctions give the Kremlin no
incentive to change its policy.
assisting ukraine militarily
Over the past 10 months, the Ukrainian Army has had to face
separatists equipped with large numbers of Russian heavy arms as well
as regular Russian Army units. While the Ukrainian military has had
some success, it is underfunded, undermanned and undertrained, and it
faces an opponent that has better weapons and superior intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance assets. The Ukrainian Army has
significant gaps in capabilities that severely degrade its ability to
defend Ukrainian territory against further attack by separatist and
Russian forces.
The United States provided Ukraine $120 million in nonlethal
military assistance in 2014, and the U.S. Army will this month begin a
training program for Ukrainian National Guard units. The United States
should do more.
Seven other former U.S. Government officials and I one month ago
released a report entitled ``Supporting Ukraine's Independence;
Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do''
(http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2015/02/ukraine-
independence-russian-aggression). In preparing the report, a number of
us traveled in January to Brussels to meet NATO civilian and military
leaders and to Ukraine, where we met with senior government and
military officials, both in Kiev and at the Ukrainian army's field
headquarters in Kramatorsk, in Donetsk province.
The report advocates a significant increase in U.S. military
assistance to Ukraine--to $1 billion per year for 3 years. That is
serious money; it reflects a serious effort to support the Ukrainian
Army. While most of the recommended assistance would go to nonlethal
equipment, the report also recommends a change in U.S. policy to allow
provision of lethal defensive weapons.
In the nonlethal category, the report recommends providing
counterbattery radars to pinpoint the origin of long-range artillery
and rocket strikes, which the Ukrainians said cause 70 percent of their
casualties. The report proposes provision of unmanned aerial vehicles
for surveillance and reconnaissance purposes, electronic
countermeasures to jam enemy unmanned aerial vehicles, secure
communications equipment, armored Humvees and medical support
equipment.
The report also recommends providing light anti-armor weapons. We
were told in Kiev that the light antiarmor weapons in the Ukrainian
Army's inventory are more than 20 years old, and a large number of them
simply do not work.
Such assistance would help the Ukrainian military fill its gaps.
The objective is not to give Ukraine the capability to defeat the
Russian Army. That is beyond what a U.S. military assistance effort
could do. The goal instead is to give the Ukrainian military the
capability to inflict greater costs on the Russian Army should the
Russians resume or escalate the fighting--and thereby deter Moscow from
further military activity and encourage the Kremlin to work for a
peaceful settlement.
Several concerns have been expressed about the proposal to provide
Ukraine with defensive arms. One is that Russia will respond by
escalating the conflict. The Ukrainians understand that risk and
understand that they would bear the brunt of any escalation, yet they
still request military assistance and defensive arms so that they can
better defend their country.
Moreover, while the Kremlin might choose to escalate, that course
carries risks for Moscow. Significant escalation would require more
overt involvement by the Russian Army. That would be visible
internationally and likely trigger additional sanctions, an area where
the West has escalation dominance.
More overt escalation would also be visible to the Russian public,
from whom the Kremlin has done everything that it could to hide the
fact that Russian soldiers are fighting and dying in Ukraine. And
taking additional territory means occupying land that will likely be
more hostile to Russia, whose troops would face the prospect of
partisan warfare. Escalation thus would not necessarily be an easy
choice for the Kremlin.
Others worry that providing Ukraine defensive weapons would put the
United States on the path to a direct confrontation with Russia. But
there is nothing automatic or inexorable about that. The United States
should not send combat troops to fight in Ukraine, nor should it
provide advanced offensive weapons. The Ukrainians have asked for
neither. To be sure, Washington needs to be clear with Kiev on the
limits of U.S. military assistance, but the U.S. Government would
control any decision about how far to go. It can build in significant
firebreaks that would prevent a spiraling escalation.
Still others assert that a U.S. decision to provide defensive arms
will cause a rupture in trans-Atlantic solidarity toward Russia. There
is no evidence to suggest that. Our group was told at NATO that, if the
United States provided defensive arms, other allies--such as Poland,
the Baltic States, Canada, and Britain--might do so as well. During her
February 9 visit to Washington, Chancellor Merkel said that Germany did
not favor providing weapons but did not suggest that a U.S. decision to
do so would cause a split with Europe. While she did not give President
Obama a green light on this question, she had every opportunity to give
him a red light--but she did not do that.
Our report and recommendations were issued before the Minsk II
cease-fire agreement was concluded on February 12. The President may
have put off a decision regarding additional military assistance and
defensive arms to see whether Ms. Merkel's mediation efforts could
succeed. The cease-fire did not get off to a good start but appears
after February 25 to be taking better hold. Given Ukrainian concerns
about Mariupol, it bears a close watch.
It nevertheless would make sense for the administration and
Congress to proceed with preparations for providing Ukraine greater
military assistance and defensive arms, first by agreeing on the
necessary authorities and legislation. Doing that will take time.
Should the cease-fire break down and major fighting resume--
unfortunately, not an unlikely prospect--early preparations would
facilitate earlier delivery of assistance to Ukraine. U.S. preparations
to provide assistance and defensive arms might even bolster the cease-
fire, as the prospect of fighting a more capable Ukrainian military
could affect the calculation in Moscow of the costs and benefits of
resumed military action.
Should the cease-fire take full hold and the separatists and
Russians proceed in good faith to implement the other elements of the
Minsk II agreement, a decision could always be taken later to suspend
the actual delivery of defensive arms.
leaving the door open for a changed policy in moscow
The U.S. administration and other Western countries have talked of
leaving Russia a ``diplomatic off-ramp''--a way out of the current
crisis. Securing a settlement with Russian agreement is important, as
any settlement that provides for genuine peace and a degree of normalcy
needs Moscow's buy-in. Russia has many levers, including military and
economic, to destabilize Ukraine. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear
that the Kremlin is prepared to consent to such a settlement.
More broadly, Moscow's assault on Ukraine has brought U.S.-Russian
and West-Russian relations to their lowest point since the end of the
cold war. Whereas Western policy toward Russia in the 1990s and early
2000s was based on an assumption that Moscow wanted to integrate into
the West and was prepared to abide by a rules-based European security
order, it is clear that neither premise now holds.
This is not a desirable state of affairs. There remain issues on
which U.S. and Russian interests converge--such as preventing Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon, supporting the Afghan Government, and
implementing the New START Treaty. Cooperation makes sense on these
questions. The downturn in relations, whose onset predates the Ukraine
crisis, makes cooperation in other areas more difficult at present.
The West should leave the door open for a better relationship with
Moscow if the Kremlin changes the policies that have triggered and
deepened the current crisis--even if expectations of a change in
Russian policy are modest at best. More broadly, the West should, while
pushing back against Russian actions in Ukraine, make clear that a
restoration of a more positive general relationship is possible if
Russia shows that it is ready to again abide by rules that served
European security well for almost four decades.
do not forget crimea
The Ukrainian Government has correctly focused its attention on
resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine and said that the issue of
Crimea should be addressed in the longer term. That is a wise course,
especially as it is difficult to see how Kiev can muster the leverage
in the near term to restore Crimea's status as part of Ukraine.
While Crimea is not now the priority issue, it is important that
the United States and the West not forget or move to ``normalize'' the
question. Until such time as the status of the peninsula is resolved to
Kiev's satisfaction, the international community should sustain a
policy of not recognizing Crimea's illegal incorporation into Russia.
If Russian actions regarding eastern Ukraine merit some sanctions
relief, the United States and European Union nevertheless should
maintain sanctions on Russia, pending a satisfactory settlement on
Crimea's status. These would include sanctions that, among other
things, prevent trade with, investment in and international air routes
to Crimea.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Senator Shaheen, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, Russia's actions in Ukraine and its more confrontational
approach present a serious challenge to the United States, Europe, and
the West. Dealing with that challenge requires a multipronged strategy
that aims to bolster NATO and support Ukraine while taking steps to
constrain Moscow's possibilities to threaten other parts of Europe.
Getting this strategy right will require firmness, patience, and
solidarity with U.S. allies and friends in Europe. Doing so will be
difficult, no doubt. But given the significant differences in economic,
military, and soft power between the West and Russia, the West should
be fully able to meet this challenge.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Ambassador Pifer. I would like
to start my questioning with President Saakashvili. You
obviously have firsthand experience with Russian aggression.
Can you just describe the events of August 2008 and what
prompted Vladimir Putin to stop advancing into Georgia?
Mr. Saakashvili. Yes, Senator. What happened in 2008 was
that we were invaded by a full-blown Russian force, which
involved more than 100,000 ground troops. More than 1,000
armor, 200 combat planes on the Russian side took part in the
operation against basically what was a very small-sized
Georgian professional army. And in that respect, first we had
mediation--exactly the kind of mediation that you see now with
Presidents Hollande and Merkel by President Sarkozy.
And he came in. We signed the cease-fire agreement.
Georgian Army withdrew its forces from the contested area, the
invaded area, and Russia was supposed to withdraw as well.
Instead, Russian after several days said the situation on the
ground has changed. They no longer would abide by the agreement
and started toward the capital. And what really had stopped
back then was the United States proclaiming military
humanitarian operation, moving the 6th Fleet first to the
Georgian ports, and putting planes in Romanian base, and
putting the airbase in Turkey on high military alert, and
basically starting to patrolling skies close to Georgia.
The other day I was at the office of Senator Kirk, who told
me that he was--back then I did not know this story. He was on
duty in Patagon. Actually, the United States had to bring back,
based on our agreement because we were the second biggest--then
first biggest big capita contributor to operation contributors
to Iraq and Afghanistan, but at that moment it was Iraq. But
the agreement we had, the standby agreement with President of
the United States was that we could repatriate our troops.
So, what happened that the United States--the United States
told--first Russia told the United States to remove the
military cargo plane from the tarmac of Tbilisi International
Airport. The United States refused to do that, and that was
already a first important signal because they were told they
were going to bomb the Tbilisi International Airport, and they
did not want to move American plane. American plane stayed on
the tarmac, and that spared us at least that bombing.
And second thing, they had to bring back Georgian brigades,
and Georgian skies were fully under control of Russian military
jets, and they told me that they would not let through the
United States plane. And then the Pentagon and Senator Kirk
told me he called specifically the Russian Defense Minister and
said we are coming anyway. This is the U.S. plane, and you do
not ever dare to touch us. And they came in, and they did not
do it. And that was the key moment when after this launch of
military humanitarian operations just few miles away from our
capital. Vladimir Putin's clearly proclaimed goal to depose
democratic elected Government of Georgia, just like they have,
I think, more or less proclaimed goal to the post-government in
Ukraine.
They had to stop, and that was a clear sign that stepping
up and counting on who would blink first, Putin at that moment
blinked first. And I have to say I believe there is no--they
will try to depose government of Ukraine. They will not succeed
to do it, but that is clearly their plan. It is not their plan
to just hold to those two regions like it was never planned to
hold just the regions of Georgia. They wanted to get rid of
Georgian democracy because that was a dangerous precedent.
Exactly like having Ukraine succeed, it would just be a very
dangerous precedent for Russia.
So sometimes like in Western Berlin, Americans protected
West Berlin even from Stalin and Western allies, and they
protected it through all the decades of the cold war. And West
Berlin was a showcase of what democracy looks like--should look
like. And that really convinced all of us--I mean, we did not
need much of convincing. But they convinced, overall, the
nations that they had to revolt against the Communist system.
Exactly the same type for today's world like Georgia was in
2008, I think Ukraine is West Berlin of today, and it is much
more protectable than West Berlin ever was, and even more
protected than Georgia was, by the way, because Georgia did not
have that strategic depth. That is what the example of Georgia
clearly shows.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. Kasparov, we
hear frequently that we are trying to offer off ramps to
Vladimir Putin. Do you believe Vladimir Putin is looking for
any off ramps whatsoever?
Mr. Kasparov. Well, he is looking for--of course he is
looking for any negotiation because he is very successful using
them for his own purpose, but he has no interest in any
settlement. I believe for long time that his interest was
opposite to the interest of United States and the free world
because he always wanted to create conflicts. He needed
conflicts in the Middle East. You know, conflict was the
Iranian nuclear problem because these conflicts helped to push
oil prices up, and that was actually crucial for his regime.
And now, he needs conflicts because that is the only way
for him to sell his dictatorship in Russia. The Russian
propaganda machine is probably worse now than at any time of,
you know, that I can remember. My mother tells me that--she is
turning 78--that it is probably worse than Stalin because it is
more powerful. We have 24/7 propaganda that is anti-American,
anti-Semitic, anti-Ukrainian, and everybody. And this
atmosphere, you know, helps Putin to keep Russian subdued.
His goal, as was mentioned in two testimonies here, is not
even just to take over the territory of neighboring countries,
though of course he would love to enlarge Russia. But most
importantly, to destroy the system of international security
that has been created in Europe since 1945 and 1991 at the end
of the cold war. So that is why all these negotiations for him
are just, you know, a way to buy time, and to gain some more
ground, and to move forward because Putin does not ask why. He
always asks why not, and if the free world vacates a space,
Putin grabs it.
Senator Johnson. Thank you. You know, we have all heard of
the little green men. Do any of the witnesses have any kind of
intelligence estimates in terms of what Russia has committed to
Eastern Ukraine, how many troops, what type of equipment? Well,
let me go to Dr. Blank.
Dr. Blank. In my written testimony, I quote an article from
Jane's, which came out the other day, was based on conferences
between Ukrainian officers and American analysts. They say
there are 14 to 20,000 Russian troops. A report in today's
paper said that NATO estimates or that the Pentagon estimated
12,000. So I think we would be comfortable saying between 12
and 20,000 Russian troops--20,000 Russian troops are in
Ukraine, thousands more on the border. And a large-scale naval
and air buildup, including the deployment of nuclear capable
missiles, is taking place in Crimea as we sit.
Senator Johnson. President Saakashvili.
Mr. Saakashvili. Yes, I have photos, Senator, and this
clearly shows these are the weapons that are only given to
Russian special forces. This is highly sophisticated Russian
weapons, would never been given to any local rebels. They have
brand new infantry fighting vehicles that have an artillery
launching system. We hear that they were spotted in parades
inside Russia just 1 year before the invasion, obviously, so
that is the regular equipment of the Russian Army.
But besides, I mean, what we have to keep in mind here,
first, this is the war as you rightly said, Ambassador Pifer,
that Russia does not even recognize as fighting. So first, they
were sending in non-Caucasians, mostly Muslim population with
the hope that mainstream Russians would not really care if they
die. Now, they are mostly sending troops from beyond the Euros,
Far East, mostly from--many of them from ethnic minority areas
from there, and basically are very careful not to send in
Moscovites and St. Petersburg people. They had to send them
airborne in August of last year, and there was a political
scandal after it became known that a number of them died, and
that really spread in Russia.
So what this is telling you, that once you raise the cost
for Putin's invasion, there is no way he is going to pull up
with the stakes because there is a very thin layer of tolerance
Russians have toward human casualties. That is the structure of
his troops, clearly indicate to you that he is really in some
way here has very little maneuver. So that is so important to
take this decision on the weapons because that is going to
reverse many of the plans he has about that country.
Senator Johnson. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Pifer,
I understand that you and a number of your colleagues have
recently released a report on the Ukrainian crisis. And one of
the cases that you make in that report is the importance of
providing military assistance to Ukraine, including defensive
lethal weapons and light antiarmor weapons. Can you tell this
panel more about the case that you make in that report and why
you believe this is important?
Ambassador Pifer. Thank you very much, Senator. This was a
report that was issued by the Atlantic Council, Brookings, and
the Chicago Council on Global Affairs by seven other former
government officials and myself. Five of us went to NATO and
went to Ukraine in January to get an understanding of the
military situation in eastern Ukraine and also specific needs.
And, most importantly, we had a retired American four-star,
General Chuck Wald, with us who really could apply a military
mind.
The recommendations that we made were for serious
assistance, we proposed a billion a year for 3 years. And we
looked at what the Ukrainians both in Kiev, but we also went
out to the field headquarters at Kramatorsk and met with the
commander there, the sorts of requests that they had. Actually
most of their requests were for nonlethal assistance. They
wanted things like counterbattery radars that could pinpoint
the origin of rocket strikes and artillery 20 to 40 kilometers
out. We were told that 70 percent of Ukrainian casualties are
from rocket and artillery strikes. They wanted reconnaissance
unmanned aerial vehicles. They wanted the means to jam Russian
and separatist drones. They wanted secure communications.
The one item that they requested in terms of lethal
military assistance was light antiarmor weapons. We were told
in Kiev that basically their stockpile of these weapons are at
least 20-plus years old, and about three-quarters of them just
do not work. So that was the one item that they thought there
would be a very useful American contribution to filling a
significant gap that they have.
Senator Shaheen. And, Mr. Wilson, since the Atlantic
Council was part of that report, can I ask you to comment on
that, as well as respond to the concerns that have been raised
by Germany and France about the potential for escalation of the
situation in Ukraine if we provide defensive weapons?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. I
think of it in two respects. Strategically, if we are trying to
help support the Ukrainians in achieving a better political
outcome for this crisis in the East, the absence and the
clarity of the fact that we will not provide them weapons
actually undermines their hand at the negotiating table. So if
you do believe in a political resolution to what is happening
in the East, by strengthening the Ukrainian's ability to raise
the cost for Russians if they turn to further violence, it
actually puts President Poroshenko in a much better position in
negotiating an outcome, some type of outcome.
But there is also a moral argument that we should think
about, and that Ukraine is a sovereign independent nation that
is under attack from a neighbor. It is under attack from a
neighbor after recognizing that we were a party through the
Budapest Memorandum to helping to respect and preserve its
territorial integrity. So I think there is a moral aspect to
this as well, that Ukraine has an essential right to be able to
defend itself, and us standing back and not supporting it in
that effort I think carries a heavy strategic and moral burden.
We have heard from some of our European allies of concerns
about potential for escalation. The Russians could double down
and escalate more. It is hard for me to see how--President
Putin is already arguing to the Russian people that the United
States and other allies are sending weapons to Ukraine. He has
already demonstrated his willingness to frontally invade
Ukraine if he needs to. It is hard for me to see how this
measure actually is any more provocative than what he is doing
in Ukraine today.
There is concern that this will split the alliance. What is
important is that we do this in a way that brings many allies
on board with us. I think Ambassador Pifer has said that there
are at least six allies in Europe and Asia, Canada as well,
that would likely join the United States decision if it were a
clear decision.
There is nervousness about a somewhat ambivalent U.S.
decision to do this lightly, partially. But I think a serious
strategic decision to stand by Ukraine with support at the
level that this report recommends would demonstrate to our
allies that this was a serious strategy, and we would have some
of them stand with us, and others not openly opposed.
Senator Shaheen. And do you have any insights into at what
point, if at all, Germany and France might change their view
about the importance of providing weapons?
Mr. Wilson. I think the greatest likelihood is first United
Kingdom, Denmark, Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Canada,
Australia, a collection of countries that would stand with us
first. I do not think you are likely to see, certainly on the
German side, active participation in the supply of lethal
military equipment. However, at the Wales summit, Chancellor
Merkel and President Hollande did commit, as part of the NATO
commitment, to intensify NATO's support for Ukrainian defense
modernization.
And so I think there is a way not to exclude them, but
actually to include them in a broader strategic effort to stand
by Ukraine's building of its defense capacities. They likely
would not be coming around on the provision of lethal military
assistance, but they certainly would be partners, I think, in a
broader effort.
Senator Shaheen. So you do not see that if Russia continues
to violate this Minsk II agreement and continues to provide
material and people, that might encourage Chancellor Merkel and
President Hollande to change their view? Does anybody--I mean,
you are about to tell me that you do not think so, I assume.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I would not completely rule it out. You
have seen a remarkable evolution of Chancellor Merkel's
position on this. The incredible nature of what President Putin
is doing has actually turned German public opinion against
Russia, which was not something that you could have imagined.
And frankly, Chancellor Merkel has been the key to holding
European unity together on the sanctions.
I think this would be quite a big step for them to move to
providing lethal military assistance to Ukraine. However, you
have seen the Germans step forward this year in providing
lethal military assistance to the peshmerga in Iraq, which in
and of itself is a significant development in German defense
policy.
Senator Shaheen. And does everybody else on the panel agree
with that? Dr. Blank?
Dr. Blank. Well, the French Foreign Minister said the other
day that if Russia continues to break the agreement reached in
Minsk, that France will vote to expand sanctions. I think
Russia will continue to violate the Minsk Accords, and,
therefore, I expect France to follow what President Obama did
today, which is to extend sanctions and perhaps even enlarge
them. And I suspect that if Russia does continue to move
forward, that the French can be persuaded over time to support
the provision of lethal weapons. Germany I am less certain of
for the same reasons that Damon has given.
Mr. Saakashvili. Well, on France, I remember that in 2008
when they supplied the Mistral helicopter warships to Russia,
when we strongly protested to them because they were guarantors
of the cease-fire. Some very high level French officials
replied to us rather cynically that they would supply us with
the missiles to sink Mistrals, no problem with that. We would
like to buy them. So France could be very inventive in this
kind of an approach.
Now, in Germany, I saw Chancellor Merkel last month at the
European People's Party Summit in Brussels. And actually she
took the floor initially and she told, I know some people at
this table want to ease the sanctions. I am telling you out
right, Germany will not support it. And, certainly, she leads
the sanctions movement right now.
I do not see Germany, for a number of very historic and
psychologic reasons, ever supplying lethal equipment, but they
have been good on supplying nonlethal--I mean, in some other
cases. I think that might happen. But I do not think that
should be an impediment to the United States doing that
because, as I said, I mean, there is a moment when only the----
but the problem with not supplying weapon is of different sort.
Right now, and this was the case in the case of Georgia,
because there is no signal from Washington, Czechs, Slovaks,
Bulgarians, and number of others are refusing to provide even
spare parts for all Soviet equipment to Ukraine precisely for
the reason because they do not want to stand alone if
Washington is not on board. So Washington by not supplying the
lethal weapons is also blocking the others from doing it
because that has really become this cornerstone right now, and
we are at the crossroads. And it is really becoming very
counterproductive.
And finally on sanctions. Now, sanctions are always
helpful, but there is a moment after which a sanctions-only
policy can cause lots of risk because what might happen is that
Putin might think, ``I have very little time left, and I had
better seize the rest of it, go for it. And then, of course,
from the position of strength negotiate my way out of sanctions
because Europeans will not sanction anybody for a long time.
After some time they will come back to me.'' So there is a
moment when if there are only sanctions, those sanctions might
be not as helpful as before because you need something else.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. My time is up.
Senator Johnson. Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses who are here today. I think it was shortly after
the demise of the Soviet Union that President H.W. Bush had
said, ``Europe: whole, free, and at peace.'' And now we see the
complete rearrangement attempts by Russia to rearrange the
post-cold-war world international order.
We have seen a determined effort by brave soldiers in
Ukraine to stand strong, fight valiantly, but obviously
overwhelmed and over matched. We have seen questions in the
Baltic States about our commitment. You and I, President
Saakashvili, had a conversation about timing, promises made,
and concern within the region, concern about the promises that
the United States has made, morale within Ukraine, questions as
to the resolve of NATO or whether NATO could withstand a
challenge, if that is indeed the question before us.
And so, your experience in Georgia, you talked to the
chairman a little bit about your experience in Georgia. Mr.
Wilson talked a little bit about the commitment of the
international community. As President Poroshenko's advisor, as
the person who has taken this role on internationally, do you
believe that the international coalition exists and will stand
with the United States to step up our efforts?
Mr. Saakashvili. Well, Senator, you are absolutely right.
There was U.S. guarantee, first of all, for Budapest
Memorandum. But, you know, one of the things I omitted to
mention was that U.S. also--the Ukraine also gave, on U.S.
insistence, MANPADS. They do not have even MANPADS because the
United States strongly insisted they follow up on their promise
not only on nuclear warheads, but they also gave thousands of
MANPADS, which they now really need in that situation.
So, yes, on international coalition, certainly I agree with
Mr. Wilson. There are countries that are very much on board,
but they are right now--basically they are standing by because
they want for Washington to lead. There is no way they can do
something on their own. I still would imagine Poland might risk
doing something on their own, but for the others, I would not
bet on that. But once there is a signal coming from Washington,
I am sure there will be strong coalition also on supplying
weapons.
And one thing we should know also. There are number of
people, nationals from these countries, including my nation,
that are fighting as volunteers on the side of Ukrainian army.
We have Georgian officers dying for them there. You know, we
are proud that we are part of the operations, ISAF and the
others. We had lots of people that died in Afghanistan and
Iraq, fighting alongside of the Americans.
But also now, many of those people--many of the people that
went to Afghanistan with Americans, went to Iraq, they are
fighting in Ukraine. I have seen--we have a couple of hundred
Georgians from those operations that also went through the
training, now fighting there. You also see Poles there. You see
countries from people from Baltic countries.
So there is already coalition of citizens of the nations
around Ukraine fighting for Ukraine because they understand
that it is also their battle. There is also lots of sympathy in
those nations, but for that, you need for those countries to
get together. You need empowerment from Washington. And I am
sure there are countries that will be American allies on
military front. Nobody is asking for American boots on the
ground. That is out of question. Ukraine has enough fighting
manpower. They have people who will stand up for their nation.
But also--and there will be other countries that will be a kind
of second rank, like Germany, that might not be part of the
large-scale military efforts. But they are certainly an
important component of the sanctions.
So I think there is an overwhelming sympathy toward
Ukraine, and I do not see this falling apart unless something
dramatic comes from Washington.
Senator Gardner. Ambassador Pifer, you mentioned in your
testimony that the sanctions had not yet achieved their
political goal. And you also then followed it up with we need
to make it clear to Russia that its actions will have a cost.
So I want to talk about what do you envision--what would indeed
extract that political goal, and what would the cost be to
Russia--needs to be reached?
Ambassador Pifer. Well, I believe that if the West can
maintain unity on sanctions, the key point here is persuading
Moscow that the sanctions will remain in place until the
Russians change their policy course. You have already seen
significant damage to the Russian economy--$150 billion in
capital flight from Russia in 2014. Russian reserves fell by
about $140 billion over the course of the year, largely to
support the ruble, and it was not very successful. The ruble is
about 50 percent of the value against the dollar that it was
last summer.
So there has been a huge impact on the Russian economy. In
fact, the Russian Finance Minister, who about 3 weeks ago
recommended cutting every aspect of the Russian state budget by
10 percent, except for defense, is now saying they have to cut
defense. So there is an impact here.
But I think Mr. Putin is playing--he is making a bet, and
that bet is that the West will not be able to sustain the
sanctions. And there is a very key date here in July, which is
the European Union imposed sanctions for a 1-year duration. EU
practices are that if the goal of the sanctions is not
achieved, the sanctions are rolled over. They are extended for
another year. Mr. Putin, I think, is hoping that there will be
enough opposition among EU countries in July that those
sanctions will not be extended, and that he can basically
escape the economic pain without having to do the desired
course correction.
I think that if, in fact, the West can sustain those
sanctions and make it clear they are on through the end of the
year into 2016 until there is a policy change, he is going to
see his reserves probably run out within 1\1/2\ years or so,
and he is going to see the average Russian facing huge
inflation. I think 19 percent is the current figure, and the
possibility that their average purchasing power may decline 15
to 20 percent over the course of the year. That, I think, is
going to have an impact on Mr. Putin and his policy.
Senator Gardner. And, Dr. Blank, in your written statement
and in your testimony, how much time would we need in Ukraine
for proper training with equipment from the United States?
Dr. Blank. Well, that would depend on the nature of the
specific equipment, but I do not think it is really going to
take that long. Everything we have seen says that the
Ukrainians learn very quickly how to use the equipment. If we
send it over and we send over enough people who know how to use
it and train, I think it would be a matter of days or weeks at
the most.
But I have to argue that we should have been doing this
months ago because, like Ambassador Pifer, I believe that Putin
is going to try to use the spring and summer to create a fait
accompli in Ukraine and break up the sanctions regime on that
basis.
Senator Gardner. And that is another question I want to
ask. How much time do you think we have on this?
Dr. Blank. Not much because, frankly, my sources have told
me that basically the Pentagon has been told to go slow on
giving even the equipment that it has. There is no excuse for
saying that we are still doing a review of Ukraine needs. This
has been going on for a year, yet it is going on. So I think
there are people in the administration who are deliberately
undermining efforts to help Ukraine, and they need to be
stopped and the signal sent out that we will help Ukraine as
needed.
Mr. Saakashvili. Senator, last year, last March, when the
whole thing started, had already started, I have been telling
some of the administration officials why do you not target this
training, you know. There is framework for training. They told
me we do not have enough time. Now, Russia has done since then
six or seven rounds of training of the so-called separatist
troops. What it indicates to lots of time has been lost. We
know from Georgian experience, Americans are very good at
training. You put marines or some other troops on the ground,
they can train full brigade within 4 or 4 weeks.
Remember, the other point for U.S. training is that you do
not have this kind of disorganized troops when you have U.S.
trained soldiers that might be used for all kind of bad means,
like, you know, either moving against legitimate government.
When you have a U.S. element present, that also brings lots of
stability to constitutional systems of democracies. That is one
of the beauties of U.S. training.
And Ukraine also needs this kind of stability as badly as
it needs help with defending itself, because you know Russian
plan is, you know, to inflict defeat on Ukrainians. That is
their hope. And then send back disorganized troops to do some
nasty things back in Kiev. And that will never work if U.S.
training is already installed and in place.
I already have a list that Ukrainian Government has
submitted to the United States, which is really quite a need,
and that list has been circulated quite a lot. The U.S.
Government knows what is needed. It has been done after lot of
consultation with unofficial ones, with people in Pentagon.
This is very important, and by the way, I think it is very
modest. I looked at the list. It looks really modest. It
includes also some antitank TOW javelin missiles, but really
the numbers are so modest. And in terms of money, it is really
not much. What is really expensive, Ukrainians have antiair,
they have heavy artillery, they have lots of other things. It
is not matter of money. It is matter of political will right
now.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you to all of you for being here today. I am supportive of
extending defensive weapons to the Ukrainian Army, but I want
to express now some questions regarding some reservations that
I have about that position, but then just open with a comment
regarding my frustration on this conversation.
We are obsessed with this question of providing arms to the
Ukrainians, and it matters. But it is obsessive within the
American context because it is one of the few, if only, tools
that we have to try to blunt and combat Russian aggression in
the region. I was there at the height of the Maidan protests. I
spent 2 hours sitting, talking to President Yanukovych and
listening to him give a litany of perceived and real abuses
that Europe and the United States had perpetuated against
Ukraine.
And the reality is that we had a long time to try to stop
this from becoming a crisis, but because we are not resourced
as a nation, because we hamstring ourselves when it comes to
the tools that we could use to try to create greater
partnerships with countries that are at risk of falling into
the growing Russian sphere, we then are stuck with crises in
which we know how to respond to because we know we have the
ability to supply weapons.
And so, in the fall I was in Belgrade on the day that Putin
was coming into town to do an unprecedented display of military
prowess through the central streets while our Ambassador was
begging for a few thousand dollars from the Federal Government
here to increase exchange programs with the United States,
right? We are not doing what is necessary in and around the
region to try to stop these crises from happening in the first
place.
And so, I think this is an incredibly important
conversation, and I am glad that we are having this hearing.
But we had better adopt a strategy soon to stop the next
Ukraine from happening so that we are not caught in this
crisis, which is a hard one to unwind.
Here are the reservations that I have. First, let us admit
that what we are talking about would be relatively
unprecedented. We are talking about the overt arming of a
country that is under military threat and occupation and
invasion from the Russians. Let us just acknowledge that during
the cold war when the Soviets were a much bigger threat to the
United States than the Russians are today, we did not do this,
whether it was the invasion of Hungary or the invasion of
Afghanistan. Well, we used other tools. We did not at that time
make the choice to provide overt arms to the Afghans or the
Hungarians. I think the circumstances are different today, and
so I am supportive of defensive weapons. But this is not a no-
brainer. This would be a change in the policy that we have
traditionally observed over the long course of the last 100
years.
Here are my two reservations, and I will ask the first
question to Mr. Pifer. Your report and all of your
recommendations are predicated on the belief that the cost will
be so high to Putin that he will change behavior. Whether or
not this provokes him or not, what if the cost is not high
enough? What if he continues to move forward and the first
round of arms that we supply are not enough? What are you
recommending? Are you recommending one batch of defensive
weapons? Are you recommending that we stage our supply line to
them to respond to the moves that the Russians make? What is
our endgame? When is enough too much?
Ambassador Pifer. Senator, I think that is a very good
question, and let me break my answer down into two pieces.
First of all, we believe that providing these levels of
weapons, which I think are actually on the low end of the
military scale--we are not talking about F-16s, advanced
offensive weapons, and we are certainly not talking about
American combat troops. But the calculation here is that when
you go and you look at what the Russians have done over the
last 8 months to hide from their people the fact that Russian
soldiers have been killed in Ukraine, it is really
extraordinary.
And I would actually argue it is disgraceful. Reports of
Russian soldiers being buried at night, reports of Russian
casualties hidden. I head a story from a friend of my wife in
Moscow who said somebody lost their leg fighting in Donetsk in
August, and he has been told if you disclose that publicly, you
will lose your pension forever.
So I think there really is a real concern in Moscow that
casualties could have an impact. And I am not sure that Mr.
Putin cares per se about Russian soldiers and casualties, but I
think he does care a lot about the impact of that on the
Russian public's attitude and their attitudes towards him. And
this is against the background of 4 or 5 months of polls that
show that while the Russian people may support trying to pull
Ukraine back toward Russia, majorities do not want to see the
Russian Army fighting in Ukraine.
So I think there is--I would make the argument that there
is a good chance that, in fact, this could succeed in altering
that cost benefit calculation to the point where the Russians
would say military escalation makes no more sense because we
are going have casualties. It will require overt involvement by
the Russian Army, and, therefore, we want to pursue a peaceful
settlement.
We do in our report--nobody who wrote the report--we are
not recommending American combat troops. We even said that the
equipment that would be provided has to be operated by the
Ukrainians so you would not have American technicians there. I
would say we are not in a position to provide advanced
offensive arms. We are going to have some limit, and I would
argue that you need to make that limit clear to the Ukrainians
privately so that they know what to expect. But we can make a
firebreak that prevents us from getting caught into an endless
spiral of escalation with the Russians that, I would argue,
then keeps us safely on the side of not going into a direct
United States-Russian military confrontation.
Senator Murphy. Let me just ask my second question quickly,
Damon. You talk about the fact that some European allies would
support us, some would not. Putin has a lot of goals here, but
one of them is to break Europe. And so, this would be
convenient for him to have half of Europe supporting defensive
weapons, half not. What is the potential consequences of Europe
not being together on this? As many have said, the ultimate win
here is that the Russian economy suffers under the tremendous
weight of the sanctions such that it changes his position. But
are we not going to risk losing countries like the Czech
Republic, or the Hungarians, or the Greeks if we start to split
over issues of military arming, or can we hold folks together
on everything else besides the question of defensive weapons?
Mr. Wilson. I think many of our allies expect the United
States to actually lead here. And it would not be unusual if
you look at controversial decisions in the alliance where the
United States is out front, has key allies stand with it and
some others stand behind it. The United States is rarely in the
middle of the pack there. This is risky. It is not a no-brainer
as you say. I do not think it is the kind of thing that would
lead to an overt split within the alliance.
We saw even over something as sensitive as Iraq, which was
a very divisive issue within the alliance, we still were able
to craft an agreement of a NATO training mission in Iraq after
the fact and find something that brought the allies together.
And I think that would be an important part of this element to
this narrative that not only does the United States move
forward with some other allies in concert bilaterally, but
there is actually a NATO component in which all the allies are
playing a role in supporting Ukraine, not with arming, but with
a defense reform and a defense package.
Your original point I think, however, is right. We are
obsessed with the issue as the issue of the day. Putin, I
think, is looking to win right now financially. I think the
time sensitive part is the collapse of the economy. I think
that is a real danger right now even as we debate weapons. And
second, the weapons are effective if we have a strategy, part
of a broader strategy, where Putin looks up and he realizes
that we--I mean, we are far stronger across the board.
You mentioned Serbia, and American strategy that is moving
on NATO and Montenegro, and actually working to deepen the
partnership with Serbia to show that we actually pushed back in
asymmetric ways as well I think helps to fill out a more
comprehensive strategy, weapons being an essential element of
that, but not the only element.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Kasparov.
Mr. Kasparov. Senator Murphy mentioned Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, certain interventions in Eastern Europe. But I
do not think that we can compare the situation with Ukraine
because the Soviet Union, as much as I hate this kind of
action, operated within a sphere of influence agreed to in
Yalta in 1945, so the world was divided. Today it is totally
different because we can look at the collapse of the Soviet
Union or the collapse of Yugoslavia, all new states. Even
Yugoslavia has 7 new states, including Kosovo. They were all
formed within the territory of administrative borders created
within the empire. So all of them, whether they are right or
wrong, you know, there was an agreement.
And if you look at Ukraine, every Russian President, every
Russian Parliament signed or ratified one or another form of
treaty or agreement with Ukraine, and Russia never, ever
expressed any concerns about Ukrainian territorial integrity,
never raised an issue. Even Saddam Hussein raised an issue on
Kuwait. Hitler talked about Sudetenland or Danzig. Russia never
raised this issue, so that is why it is absolutely unique. And
this attack is unprecedented because it violated not only
agreements, but also the understanding of how the world would
be split after the end of the cold war.
Senator Murphy. I do not disagree. I think that is a very
good point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Saakashvili. Senator?
Senator Murphy. Sure.
Mr. Saakashvili. Senator, first of all, I need to thank you
for your intervention on Ukraine. I was there together with
group of European parliamentarians just before you came. And I
remember--and then we were proclaimed persona non grata, and
then your visit, by the way, together with the other U.S.
colleagues, really changed the equation that came at right
moment because they were really losing steam, you know. They
had this little bit of frustration were being abandoned. And
you being there, it really changed the whole idea of what the
Ukrainian revolution was about, and it made it very much value-
oriented.
Now, there is another story there which is not only just
weapons story in Ukraine, bit about United States involvement.
It is a good story. And it also has to do something with my
country because what happened in Ukraine that Georgia--that
some members of my government became members of Ukrainian
Government. That is also very unique experience. Our Minister
of Interior has become their first Deputy Minister of Interior
of Ukraine, and she is running the reform of Ukraine with the
United States, with USAID.
They fired the entire Kiev traffic police, and they go city
by city. And this is American money. This lady is Georgian, and
they are together creating new Ukrainian police that will show
how to work and operate without bribes. That had never happened
before in that part of the world, or at least in Ukraine.
Then there is another story. We have our Deputy Minister of
Justice from Georgia there who is working also with your
programs and also, by the way, with U.S. Congress funded NGOs
that are doing tremendous job in the regulation, you know.
Their bureaucracies like something that unimaginable in terms
of, you know, discretion of bureaucrats and, you know, how they
do this corruption thing. This is, again, the Americans doing
that together with that.
We have Minister of Health who just had long conference
together with American donors and U.S. Ambassadors involved
there on the spot. And they are doing now absolute new
transparent procedures, how to do these tenders and things
which never also happened in Ukraine. It was a major source of
corruption traditionally. We have deputy attorney general for
Ukraine, which is Georgian, foreign deputy attorney general of
Ukraine. And now we are bringing--we invited U.S. experts to
sit down together with them because they are working high
profile criminal cases. And, again, there is the anticorruption
bureau will be created where also there be activity for U.S.
expert participation.
So it is not only about weapons. I think long term
Ukraine's survival and Ukraine's strategy should be based on
the idea that they have something else to offer besides
military things. But this should all be just be packed up with
something else as well. Thank you.
Dr. Blank. I would like just to make two points very
quickly. The discussion about weapons is insufficient in the
sense that weapons, to realize their maximum benefit for
Ukraine, have to be sent urgently, but as part of a broader
strategy to rebuild the Ukrainian Government and economy, which
is also an urgent issue, and as an information strategy. I
mentioned in my paper no one is talking about the number of
casualties the Russians are taking, which are huge. We are
doing nothing informationally to counter the wave of
propaganda.
Furthermore, to the extent that the United States leads the
Atlantic alliance, not only will NATO members follow, or at
least accept what we are doing, we will have also changed the
balance of fear because right now the Russians are not afraid
of anything that Europe might do. As President Saakashvili has
pointed out, when the Russians understand that if they go
further they encounter United States directly, they stop. They
even on occasion retreat.
And finally, we have done this before. Let me remind you
about Afghanistan where we gave very sophisticated weapons to
people directly in the line of Soviet aggression, and it
worked. This is not the Soviet Union. This is an army that
cannot stand the protracted war or take that kind of risk, and,
therefore, providing weapons will, I think, help stabilize and
perhaps even turn the situation around if it is backed up by a
coherent strategy.
Senator Johnson. Senator Kaine. Thanks for your patience.
Senator Kaine. Absolutely. It has all been educational, and
thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all the witnesses.
Three topics. First on the sanctions and economic effect on
Russia right now, it sounds as if one of the takeaways from
today should be work that we need to do with Europe to make
sure the annual re-up of the sanctions, you know, the
continuity has got to be our message, our very strong message
to the Europeans. And I gather that everybody is on board with
that. We need to do more on our side. The President did more
today, and there is more that Congress can do.
But I am particularly interested in the low cost of oil as
a perennial problem for the Russian economy. And it is not just
a problem for the Russian economy. It is also a problem for the
Iranian economy, which is a separate topic. That is a very
important issue for us now.
What are other things we can do in the energy space,
whether it is sanctions or whether it is assisting European
nations with energy technologies? We have had a fairly
contentious debate on this committee about things like LNG
exports, even to send the signal that that would be something
we would contemplate into the region to help nations break
their need to rely too much on energy. Talk a little bit about
low energy costs and what we ought to be doing to continue to
pressure the Russian economy using that as a strategy, please,
Dr. Blank.
Dr. Blank. There are a number of things we can be doing. We
can increase the export of oil and of LNG, which would require,
of course, building infrastructure here, as well as amending
legislation. But oil can be already sent. It was reported last
year that we could send 40 million barrels a day for 6 months
without undermining the statute or without reversing the
meaning of the statute, guaranteeing the strategic petroleum
reserve. We could probably still do that. We can further
encourage much more strongly the building of the southern
corridor of gas across the Caspian Sea and provide strong
guarantees to countries like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and so
on, that want to make that happen.
And third, to promote not only the building of
interconnectors within Europe so that new terminals that are
being built in Northern Europe and the Baltic can then move gas
to the south, but also if we pass the TTIP, that makes every
European signatory of the treaty eligible to receive gas
exports from the United States on an expedited basis without
going through the very convoluted bureaucratic procedure. Once
that law is in place, they can then get gas from the United
States, and we can supplant a fair amount of the Russian gas
exports, which is what Russia uses for political purposes.
The problem is not Russia exports gas and oil to Europe.
The problem is that they can do so and use that for political
purposes. If it becomes a straight commercial transaction, well
and good. But to the extent that they have politicized this, we
need to take that weapon away from them.
Senator Kaine. Other thoughts on the energy space?
Ambassador Pifer. Yes. I would just, Senator, just add on
the LNG. My understanding is that the United States is now
building to the point where by about 2020 we could export
between $100 and $120 billion cubic meters of gas per year,
which would be, I think, a sizable increase in gas stocks.
Right now, my understanding is in most of Europe now, they
actually have significant capacity to import LNG. They have, in
fact, remained reliant on the Russians because the Russian gas
in the pipeline is cheaper.
Senator Kaine. Right.
Ambassador Pifer. But what we want to make sure is that
Europe has the capacity that if the Russians were ever to turn
the gas off, which I do not think is likely, and I will get
back to that in a moment. But that they, in fact, could
continue receiving LNG, and it gets to Dr. Blank's points about
building interconnectors, which are now pretty good in most of
Europe, but there are still areas--Romania, Bulgaria, Greece--
that are still vulnerable until they get some more
interconnectors that would allow gas to move from the West to
the East.
I think, though, at the end of the day, it is hard for me
to see the Russians, Gazprom, ever turning that gas off. It is
almost--it is a mutual deterrent relationship in that Europe
needs the gas, so they want the cheaper Russian gas because it
is cheaper than LNG. But if Gazprom turns that gas off, it is a
huge hole in the Russian budget because they use that large
amount of money that they make by exporting the gas to Europe.
I saw figures, and these are maybe about 4 years out of
date, where about 25 percent of Gazprom exports went to Europe,
but that accounted for about 70 percent of Gazprom revenues. So
Gazprom has a big incentive not to do this, but it still makes
sense for Europe to have a plan B in case the Russians ever
reach that point where they micht cut off the gas flow.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Kasparov, I wanted to ask you a
question. You want to comment on that before I ask you the
question?
Mr. Kasparov. Yes. It was said here numerous times about
the importance of keeping sanctions or even, you know,
increasing the sanctions. And, of course, that problem is in
Europe. But sanctions, apart from economic effect, they have
psychological effect, and so far Putin has succeeded in
convincing not only the Russian republic, but the Russian
elite, that these sanctions will not stand. So somehow, you
know--and he has enough friends, you know. Let us not forget,
Czech Republic, President Zeman, has been financed by Lukoil
openly. Open. Now, it is probably Russian subsidies. Greeks,
you know.
You can look around Europe and you will find so many traces
of Putin's actions, you know, and lobbying efforts that are
unfortunately quite successful. But it is very important, you
know, that Putin could point out multinational corporations
that are still operating, and in that sense, you know, a signal
of confidence. Just 2 days ago, Exxon-Mobil has announced about
expansion of its operations in Russia. I mean, that is a
fundamental, you know, argument for Putin--okay, Obama,
Presidents, you know, Prime Ministers, the business is still
here.
And as long as we have this presence in Russia, as long as
we have business as usual, it will be very difficult to win the
psychological war because expectations could actually destroy
the Russian economy even sooner than economic----
Senator Kaine. I agree with you. I think there is a
psychological impact. And even if you knew LNG would not get
there for 2 years, you start to do things that sends a message,
and similarly with energy sanctions. I am a big supporter of
sanctions in the energy space. That is the lever that is being
used. That is where we ought to sanction.
Mr. Kasparov, I wanted to switch to another topic, which
is, you know, we tend to look at these things through the eyes
of political people. From your experience, what will it take?
What are the kinds of conditions that will cause Vladimir Putin
to lose political support within his electorate, within Russian
citizens, because there is outside pressure, but the most
effective pressure is often the inside pressure when the
population starts to pull their support from you.
You talked about the propaganda regime, et cetera, makes it
difficult for the message to get through. But from your
experience, what will cause a decrease in the domestic
political support for Vladimir Putin?
Mr. Kasparov. Unfortunately, I do not see sort of a
positive outcome in the near future. Vladimir Putin is not
going to lose his powers through the normal election process,
so he is there. He is a dictator, and he made it very clear
that he would not leave the office. The good thing is that, you
know, a country so hyper-centralized as Russia does not have
much political activities outside of the capital. So basically
even if he enjoys this 80 percent plus support, which I do not
believe, across the country, what matters is Moscow, and we
know that numbers in Moscow are very different.
Even St. Petersburg, today has turned into some form of
political province. Whatever happens in Moscow could determine
the future of Russia. And we have a pretty sizable middle class
in Russia that is used to a relatively comfortable life. They
travel abroad, and I do not think this middle class will accept
sort of long-term decline of the standards that have been
established.
For quite a while--for many years actually--this middle
class has been relatively silent. So we saw some of the
protests in the 2011, 2012. People did not like what has
happened with the elections, but, again, it was not powerful
enough. The coalition was not there because the ruling elite
believed that that it was better to stay with Putin than to
join the protests.
What will change everything is that if people in the ruling
elite, some in the inner circle, and, of course, the Russian
middle class. They all recognize that Russia will have no
future with Vladimir Putin. Stop appealing to Putin. He is
irrelevant because he burned all the bridges. You have to look
for people who can end his rule with minimum bloodshed. And I
think it is--as long as Putin stays in office, we will see more
political assassinations, more attacks on neighboring countries
because that is the only algorithm where he can survive. I
think that America has many ways of demonstrating it, and
talking about European Union is exactly the opposite, you know.
Putin gained so much influence in Europe because America
walked away, so only American reappearance there will send a
signal because everybody wants to see leadership. And I know
Baltic States well. Forget Germany. I mean, remember in 2003,
it was rumored that someone in the Bush administration,
summarized the policy at the time as, ``Punish France, Ignore
Germany, and Forgive Russia.'' So basically ignore Germany,
because Angela Merkel is the head of the coalition government,
and her Foreign Minister belongs to Gerhard Schroeder's party.
So expecting from this fragile coalition government to lead
Europe is wrong.
So that is why America's presence is paramount. Without it,
nothing will happen. And it will send signal not only to
Ukraine, not only to Poles, but also to Russian people that,
you know, America is back to business.
Senator Kaine. Okay, Mr. Chairman, if others wanted to
weigh in on that question. I do not have any other questions,
but I would love to hear their responses.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Blank.
Dr. Blank. Yes, in response to your last question,
undermining Putin's domestic base of support is a long-term
operation. But it requires the systematic application of a
strategy to tell the truth, to use the information capabilities
that we have for maximum strategic effect, and broadcast to the
Russian people just how bad the situation is inside Russia and
where Putin is leading them. And that will in time do so.
Furthermore, as Mr. Kasparov said, it is essential for the
United States not only to lead in Europe, but to stop showing
fear and disengagement. And this will also have an encouraging
effect upon Europe as well. Third, we have to remember, if we
look at Russian history, that it is always the case that when
the Russian Government enters into a protracted war which it
cannot win, that creates domestic unrest at home. Therefore,
sending the weapons and making sure that the Ukrainian economy
and government survive is not only desirable as an urgent
remedy right now to impose costs on the war, but it transforms
not only the balance of fear in Europe and Ukraine, it
transforms the strategic calculations inside Russia because
then you create the pressures that have historically worked to
undermine this kind of government.
Senator Johnson. Ambassador Pifer.
Ambassador Pifer. Thank you, sir. I would like to just make
two points, one on sanctions. I would go back to the logic of
the sanctions and go back to something that was being said
about Russia and Vladimir Putin maybe in 2003, 2004 where
Russians talked about President Putin having an implicit social
compact with the Russian people, in which he says you are not
going to have any political say, but in return, you will have
economic security, rising living standards. You are going to
see the economy do well. Sanctions make it more difficult for
Mr. Putin to deliver on his part of that bargain, and that, I
think, may have an impact on how the Russian people look at
him.
The second point just briefly, I would give a little bit
more charitable analysis of Germany. I think actually
Chancellor Merkel has been remarkably successful in pulling
together the European Union, 28 diverse states with very
different views. And for her, at least what I hear from German
diplomats, at core, it is a principle. She really takes to
heart the idea that borders are inviolable, and that countries
should not use force to change those borders.
So with her taking that role, I think at some political
risk because this is not easy either internally or also dealing
with the Russians. But she has played a very good role, and it
makes a lot of sense for the United States to be working very
closely with her in that role to sustain the sort of unity that
we have built with Europe over the last year.
Senator Kaine. Mr. President.
Mr. Saakashvili. Yes. With regards to Russia, I mean, it is
very clear that, first of all, the idea of this hearing
obviously is what will happen next. And I can tell you, I met
with Putin dozens of times. He always told me three things
consistently, that he was menacing us with invasion, he will
always mention that Ukraine is not a real country, it is just a
territory, and, third, he always said that Baltic countries are
not defendable. He always says beforehand what he wants. People
have heard it.
And it is very clear that what--if he gets away with
Ukraine, then Baltic countries, which do not have even
strategic depth or manpower of Ukrainians, they just rely on
United States Article 5 guarantees, which is important stuff.
But still, I mean, there are many vulnerabilities that they
have, even more than the Ukrainians ever had. That is very
clear that he will continue on because that is the only way how
he sees he can maintain power inside Russia.
Now, when we talk about his 80 percent rating, we should
realize that this is a fear rating. This is not real in
population. People tend to measure it with measurements of
democracies, and that does not work this way in these kind of
systems. You know, I think North Korean leader has even higher
ratings. It does not mean that, you know.
So what it means is that basically people have been saying,
well, Russians cannot stand just any sanctions, you know, that
is the history of Russia. I think this is not true simply
because Russia has never had such a strong middle class. This
is combination first of the United States assistance, bailing
out the Russian economy in the 1990s, which really was the
decisive factor, and then, of course, the oil price and
redistributing it inside Russia.
This middle class has always lived with expanded living
standards. They are not used to living with a decline in living
standards. Nobody has seen them. So it makes Putin panic. It
makes Putin make mistakes and to become more aggressive. And I
think shale gas--generally U.S. shale gas--is the single most
important factor in what has brought him into this panic mode.
What United States did with its legal system, which does
not happen in Europe, is that in Europe you can, you know,
manipulate some environmental groups and others, block local
shale production because whatever is underground basically
belongs to the state. Here it belongs to the person who owns
the land. And that makes the U.S. system so much more open to
this kind of entrepreneurial enterprise. So that really changed
the whole logic of the event. Suddenly, good guys have energy
and bad guys have lower money for their energy. So from that
standpoint, it is absolutely deciding factor.
I think that it is not--it is a matter of not many years
that a thing has emerged, there is a physical fatigue. Every
leader, even the most autocratic one, has his time span. I
think Chinese have been smarter with that. They have been
changing the faces of their leaders, and they have a more
flexible system here. This is a one-man show. You know,
everything--there is no other political actor. He played around
a little bit with other ideas. Gone. Now, it is him. All credit
is taken by him. Every blame goes to him. And that is a very
dangerous system for no matter which politician. From that
standpoint, I am very optimistic.
The Russian people are well-read people, they are well-
traveled people. They certainly want to be respected
internationally, although until now they had it both ways. They
were getting away with playing around in the neighborhood. They
were being nasty. And at the time, they still kept some kind of
resemblance of respect. Now, those two are not compatible, and
people will understand it.
And, again, going back, I fully agree with Steven. The
Afghan syndrome is very important. When I was in the Soviet
Union, I remember what the combination of low oil prices and
MANPADS did. Until low prices, it would not have worked, but
now you have the lower prices suddenly, so budgetary income
went down, and then MANPADS reversed the logic on the ground.
That is exactly what we have now. We have lower oil and gas
prices, and we just need some Javelins, or whatever the
Ukrainians will be requesting, to change the cost of that
equation. After all, cost equation matters, maybe even not for
Putin, but for the Russians or the Russian public, whatever
elite is left there, security apparatus, it will certainly make
lots of difference, and that is my main hope. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Senator Kaine. I would like to
go back to the story. I would like somebody to talk to the
courage of the Ukrainian people. Senator Murphy talked about
being in the Maidan. I was heartened, I was encouraged by my
colleagues here in the Senate and the House unanimously passing
the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which did authorize lethal
defense weaponry for the courageous people of Ukraine. The
reason I think we did that is because so many of us went over
there. I was with Senator Murphy with a bipartisan delegation,
about eight U.S. Senators, and we walked the Maidan. We heard
the story of the sniper attack.
I would like to hear the story of the rebellion, the
pushback from the Ukrainian military that had been hollowed out
purposefully, but also the courage of the Ukrainian people
defending themselves, turning the tide, and then having that
tide turned back against them because of Russian involvement,
the Russia's invasion with 14,000 to 20,000 troops and heavy
weapons. I want to enter those pictures into the record.
[The photographs referred to by Senator Johnson are located
at the end of this hearing transcript, beginning on page 59.]
Senator Johnson. I want somebody to speak to that--somebody
to answer the question--to answer the plea of President
Poroshenko when he came before a joint session of this Congress
and said that blankets and night vision goggles are important,
he said, but one cannot win a war with blankets.
Can somebody here just talk about what has happened in the
military campaign against the rebels, how the tide had turned,
how it had been turned back again, and then how desperate the
situation is? One of the reasons I held this hearing this week,
kind of rushed it, is because we heard last week that there was
potentially an offensive being planned within the next few
weeks. We heard that earlier, potentially a spring offensive.
Can somebody just talk about the history of this military
conflict, this rebellion, what will likely happen and how
desperate the situation is?
Dr. Blank. Well, I can try to answer as much as possible
that question. The Russians have been behind the attempt to
squelch the revolution from the beginning, even when it was
just simply a demonstration on the Maidan. We know that Russian
advisors were telling Yanukovych's government to repress them
and use force if necessary. We also have good reason to
believe--I was told this by Ukrainian politicians in October
2013 when the issue was signing the association agreement with
the European Union, which led to the revolution, that Putin
threatened Ukrainian with invasion then if they signed. And
there were analysts in this town, myself among them, who warned
at that point that Putin was doing that. We were disregarded.
The fact of the matter is that the Ukrainian people have
sacrificed what the Declaration of Independence calls their
lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor--their sacred
honor, to live freely and independently, and to make it clear
that they wanted a better life, which meant that an association
with Europe and European forms of government.
This is intolerable to Moscow for the reasons we talked
about today. Empire is the only recourse Moscow has to save it
kleptocratic autocracy. It has become a criminalized regime, a
state that exports terror, as well as uses it at home, and
there is no denying that. He has done it in Georgia, he has
done it at home, and he is doing it in Ukrainian.
The operation to seize Crimea was started before February
21. We know this. For example, the medals that the Russian
President gave out to his troops dates the operation from
February 20, the day before the EU agreement with Yanukovych.
Yanukovych then fled that night anyway, but the Russians were
already active. And the only reason they did not go faster is
because the troops there were supposed to lead that operation
in Crimea, were guarding the Olympics in Sochi, which ended
only February 23.
This is a cold-blooded premeditated aggression. It caught
the Ukrainian Government and Army by complete surprise, and as
a result they lost Crimea. Then they started to use the
organizational tools they had previously set up in Donetsk and
Luhansk Cabanas and provinces to agitate there. They took
advantage of some ill-considered decisions by the new
government on language policy and created a pretext for an
invasion in March into April.
That went forward, but Putin thought he could get away with
doing that simply by giving the arms and some direction to
locally organized forces. That proved to be impossible. As a
matter of fact, they shot down MH317 as we know, and they were
in danger of losing in August when Putin then had to commit
Russian regular forces.
Since then, Putin has had to escalate his commitment and
basically take over the entire military operation. Now, the
entire military operation from start to finish was predicated
on creating on what this new Russia, Novorossiya, a term that
goes back to Catherine the Great 250 years ago. In fact, it is
an attempt to destroy Ukraine, create a land bridge from Russia
all the way across Southern Ukraine and Crimea to Transnistria,
and project Russian power not only through Ukraine, but into
the Balkans and Black Sea and beyond. Moscow has even sought
military and naval bases in Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia.
It is, I believe, using this truce to replenish its forces.
The amount of ammunition that the Russians have expended
because their tactics are essentially basically artillery
pounding, has been enormous. And they are surprised, according
to my sources, at how much they had to use in August and now
again in January to achieve their objectives. Therefore, they
have to call a halt, they signed onto Minsk, and are trying to
get a truce so they can replenish. But I have no doubt that
come springtime they will make a move on, if not earlier, on
Mariupol and the entire Black Sea coast of Ukraine, and perhaps
all the way through Odessa as well.
So, therefore, that is a kind of survey of the entire
military operation from start to finish. But the start was not
February 2014. The start is 2005 when the first attempt by
Moscow to seize Ukraine failed in 2004.
Senator Johnson. Anybody else just want to speak to the
courage of the Ukrainian people and why they need to be
supported?
Mr. Saakashvili. Well, I want to speak about a pilot, Nadia
Savchenko, who was kidnapped and is being held. She is a
military pilot, was active participant of the Maidan protests.
And she was kidnapped from the Ukrainian territory, brought to
Russia. She is now held in Moscow. And she is in grave medical
condition because she has been going through a hunger strike.
And, you know, there are many Ukrainians like that that
sacrifice their lives.
The remarkable story of Ukraine is not just heroism on the
battlefield, which was very obvious. You know, these are the
troops that were technological, that for 10 years or so they
were just plundering everything, giving up everything for legal
means, but also illegal means. There was lots of corruption
while Russia was building up things. So that reality came into
being totally. They were taken by surprise, unprepared,
untrained, and still, against all the odds, were holding out
for a long time against Russian forces and are continuing to do
so.
Now, the important thing to understand there is another
aspect to this fight. Most of these efforts of the Ukrainian
army have been done also by volunteers, supplying the troops,
medical supplies, even military supplies and the bulletproof
vests, you know, there have been thousands and tens of
thousands. And in the case of money, millions of Ukrainians
contributed. It is not just war of Putin versus Poroshenko or,
you know, it is against the Ukrainian Government. It is Putin's
war against the multiethnic Ukrainian nation.
The other thing people do not really know here is that most
of the troops fighting and protecting Ukraine are Russian
speakers, and basically big part of them are ethnic Russians.
This is not an ethnic issue. This is not, you know--this is not
a regional issue. This is not, as I said, government-to-
government issue. This is the multiethnic, multicultural nation
of Ukraine trying to defend its freedom, its values, and its
ideals. And the whole society's part of it, because as I said,
the government was almost bankrupt, and you had people
volunteering and basically supplying most of the things they
are getting there.
And I do not know any other country in the world where this
number of volunteers, so large a part for the population has
been engaged in what is an all-around national campaign for the
nation's survival. And that is something to be considered for
all of us because, you know, again, as I said, I told you about
Georgia volunteers fighting there. Basically most of them, you
know, they are not there for money. They are not paid anything,
but whatever they are supplied with, these are given by
ordinary Ukrainians. This is not the government that gives them
that.
Senator Johnson. I will let everybody else summarize. I
want to be respectful of Senator Shaheen. She has a question,
and then I will let everybody wrap up and give my final
thoughts.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
wanted to go back to the economic concerns because one of you I
think--I am not sure who--suggested that support for weapons
may be moot if the economy fails in Ukraine before that
happens. And I know that the IMF has pledged funding as has the
EU and the United States, of course.
But to what extent can the Ukrainian economy, and President
Poroshenko, and the government survive the reforms that are
being asked of it, and keep the economy afloat, and continue
this military conflict at the same time? And what more can the
United States do to help with that? Damon, do you want to
start?
Mr. Wilson. Senator, I think that is exactly one of my key
concerns right now is that there may be a rationale for the
military fighting to die down. Putin does not need to own two
slices of Donetsk and Luhansk. He needs all of Ukraine. And I
think part of the strategy that I am most concerned about right
now is which economy collapses first, and can he raise
Ukraine--can he push Ukraine's off the cliff first.
This is why I have been, on the one hand, alarmed at how
long and difficult it has been to get a significant
international package together that includes the U.S.'s
catalytic, but the IMF and the EU will add more. And at the
same time, we are asking Ukrainians to do some quite difficult
reforms. I think this is the moment.
President Poroshenko and Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, they
understand that they have had predecessors that had an
opportunity to build a new Ukraine, and they failed at the time
of independence, at the time of the Orange Revolution. They do
not have many other shots at it. And so, despite the
difficulty, I think being able to communicate to the Ukrainian
people that in this time of existential crisis is when they
need to take some pretty dramatic steps. And we just saw the
Rada pass very significant legislation which will begin to
raise overall energy prices and begin to address some
structural economic issues.
But the gap there I think is a much more robust and much
more decisive intervention on the part of the international
community providing that economic assistance and providing that
comfort because this is the race that I think--Putin can let it
sit for a while, allow his little project Sparta to build up
its weapons, and try to go for all of the Ukraine by driving
down the economy, after all, trying to drive the collapse of
this government.
Senator Shaheen. Anyone else want to comment on that?
Ambassador Pifer and then Dr. Blank.
Ambassador Pifer. Yes, Senator. No, I think this is why we
need to talk about a multipronged strategy. I mean, it is has
got to be not just providing arms. It has also got to be
maintaining sanctions. It has also got to be doing the economic
finance, which I think will be costly. The IMF program, as I
understand it, is for $17.5 billion over 4 years. I have heard
some economists suggest that in 2015 and 2016, above and beyond
that Ukraine could need an additional $20 to $22 billion.
If we provide all the weapons in the world, and they hold
the Russians off, and they stabilize line of contact, and the
economy collapses, the West has lost its policy goal. Likewise,
if we make the economy work, if we get them through the
reforms, but then they have the military collapse, that is a
loss. We have got to be doing both these pieces at the same
time. And I think we have to face up to it. It will require
probably an injection of serious resources both by Europe and
the United States.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Blank.
Dr. Blank. I would add to that, that while everything my
colleagues have said I agree with, that what is critical here
as well I think is the psychological dimension. We are asking
Ukrainians to do something of an extraordinarily difficult
nature, and they have not the sense that we stand behind them.
On the other hand, if they were aware and understood that they
had the full support of the United States and of Europe, and
that they were not alone, that would provide an enormous
psychological strength and reinforce other European states'
ability and willingness to help them. And it would undermine a
great deal of Russia's strategy.
Therefore, all these factors come together--the provision
of weapons and training, the economic and political assistance,
and the overwhelming psychological assurance that you are not
alone.
Senator Shaheen. I certainly agree with that. We have sent
mixed signals, and I would hope that Ukraine would know that we
are behind them 100 percent. I do hope that this Congress can
pass the reforms to the IMF, too, because that would allow us
additional assistance as we are looking where can we provide
economic assistance to Ukraine.
President Saakashvili.
Mr. Saakashvili. Well, I have just to add that besides $17
billion, overall pledge is $40 billion for the reform package.
It is very important United States--we are trying to now
jumpstart the reforms, but it is very important also this
committee and generally overall the U.S. Congress pays greater
attention. We need more CODELs coming, and specifically not
only with a focus on military issue, which is urgent issue
because it has become tantamount to the symbol of whether
Ukraine is abandoned or not, but it is beyond that. What is
really needed is real crackdown on corruption, real economic
changes, really for ordinary Ukrainians to see the difference.
And from that standpoint, from our own experience in
Georgia, the United States standing by the idea of reform, we
are steering in right direction, you know, giving incentives,
giving praise when necessary and sometimes offering friendly
criticism when it is also necessary. It is absolutely key for
reforms inside Ukraine to know what has been there for decades,
invested interests, you know, of plundering and basically
robbing that is potentially a very rich nation with very smart
people and very talented people.
And I think this is the best Parliament they ever had right
now. It is more clean of any previous legislatures, so it is
very easy to work through these parliamentarians. Many of them
are quite inexperienced, so they need to be introduced also to
the U.S. system. You need to bring them here as well. You need
to get know them--get to know them, you know.
And I think there is--that reminds of what--we were like
this in mid-1990s. And I remember our first--I was
parliamentarian back in 1996, fresh from GW law school here.
And I remember coming back every time, every 3, 4, 5, 6 months
together with a bunch of younger parliamentarians, not just to
talk to you or ask for help, but to learn, to get educated, you
know, and exchange ideas. That was absolutely the single
strongest factor behind Georgian democracy, somehow getting
stronger and also communication with people. And I think
Ukrainians see this more than ever. And I think you are all
here deciding--I think this hearing also has a key role to play
for that.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you all very much for your
compelling testimony and for your continued focus on Ukraine.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, and I want to thank all of my
colleagues for attending. I will just give everybody a chance
to quickly wrap up. We will go in reverse order. We will start
with Ambassador Pifer. If there is something that you have not
been able to get out, please say it.
Ambassador Pifer. Thank you, Senator. I guess I would come
back to one point about how far the Russians want to go. And
although I do not exclude that the Russians might try to go all
the way to Crimea to create the land bridge, I worry a little
bit less about that than I think Dr. Blank does. It has been
interesting that in the last 5 or 6 months, I do not think
Vladimir Putin has mentioned the term ``Novorossiya'' once. And
what I hope that means is he understands that the further West
the Russians go, the more they are going to encounter a hostile
population and the possibility of partisan warfare. Having said
that, I still think the Russians have a lot of possibilities
just fighting along the current line without a major offensive
to distract and destabilize the government in Kiev, and that
may be their cheaper option.
My final point would be whether we are concerned more about
the big option of going to Crimea or just having more of a not
so frozen conflict along the line of conflict. Providing
weapons in the context of sanctions and economic assistance to
Ukraine is a way to challenge or to change that calculation in
Moscow, and hopefully bring the Russians to conclude that
fighting no longer is worthwhile, and that they have to find a
way to finally take that diplomatic off ramp.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Wilson, one
final thought?
Mr. Wilson. Senator, I wanted to go back to your last
statement because I think it was one of the most important
things here about the Ukrainian people. I think that is one of
the most factors that outside actors actually under appreciate.
Ukraine is the victim of the tyranny of low expectations.
President Putin could not imagine that the Ukrainian people
could rise up and determine their future. They were skeptical
of the fact that the Ukrainians would even have a common
national identity. And the irony of his invasion of Ukraine has
more to consolidate and strengthen that sense of identity and
purpose than any single thing. If we play this right, this is
actually a 500-year defeat for Russia to have actually lost a
country like Ukraine, which is a natural partner, a natural
neighbor, and decisively having turned that country to the
West.
And yet the West also has a tyranny of low expectations
toward Ukraine. If you talk to our Treasury officials, IMF
officials, they are skeptical that Ukraine is a good
investment. We have seen this fail before. If you talk to
realists, they think, well, we can just cut a deal over the
Ukrainian people's heads, that this country will never go to
NATO. I do not think that works any more. That is not--
President Poroshenko himself has now real constraints. I was
there when protestors were outside his office because he was
willing to agree to a cease-fire. The Ukrainian people now have
a say in the future of what is going to happen, and I think
outsiders underestimate that factor that the Maidan was
genuine, and it is what drove this from the beginning.
So I would just conclude with, we should remember how all
of this started, that Ukrainians were actually willing to die
for this concept of Europe, for a Europe which is at best
skeptical about even wanting Ukraine as part of the European
Union. And so, that leads me back to where we fit into this.
The entire chapter of integration in Europe has been driven
by U.S. leadership, it is European integration, driven by the
United States, being a great European power, providing the
framework and helping that happen. If we stand back and think
of ourselves as an observer as this unfolds, as an observer of
what Europe and Ukraine will do together, I think this will
fail. But if we see ourselves as a driver of helping to support
the European aspirations of Ukraine, I think we can get this
right.
Senator Johnson. Thank you. President Obama said we are the
indispensable Nation. In addition to looking to Europe, the
other aspiration really was a corruption free Ukraine. It is a
combination of both of those elements that created that
courage.
Dr. Blank.
Dr. Blank. Thank you, Senator. I just want to leave the
committee with the thought that on March 12, 1947, President
Truman stood in the Capitol and said that it was the policy of
the United States to support free peoples. And at that time, he
was responding to a Soviet challenge in the Black Sea, Greece
and Turkey, in particular.
That mission has not changed, and as Damon has said, if we
are to see a Europe that is whole and free, we must help lead
the process. We cannot be disengaged or lead from behind
because then we just open up Europe to the ancient horrors that
we now see taking over, of autocratic warlike criminal
governments seizing territories at their whim.
The people of Ukraine have shed their own blood in order
get their freedom. As I mentioned, they have pledged their
sacred honor, their fortunes, and their lives, and we can do no
less. Thank you.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. Kasparov.
Mr. Kasparov. Yes. I think we should pay attention to
Putin's propaganda machine, and it is a fact that we could see
and hear in Europe and in the United States. Many people
believe, as President Saakashvili mentioned, that it is an
ethnic conflict. There were over 23 years of existence of
independent Ukraine, maybe with the exception of Crimea when it
was a rogue political group that made 4 percent of the
elections.
Ukraine did not have any political movement for secession
unlike Catalonia or Scotland. So those are examples that the
Russian Government wants to bring in, or Kosovo. There was
always a movement, even Ireland you had, you know, terrorist
groups, but also the political wing. So there were political
movements demanding independence. We never heard of the
existence of such groups in Ukraine. So that is why when I read
in the Minsk agreement about the political settlement, I still
do not understand who is going to settle on the opposite side,
the gangs supported by Putin because political groups in
Eastern Ukraine never created a core entity that specifically
asked for independence.
And, of course, it is important to mention that most of the
people fighting in East Ukraine, they are Russians on both
sides, ethnic Russians. And as Ambassador Pifer mentioned, the
term, Novorossiya, has disappeared completely because Putin
realized that his grandiose plan of bringing eight Ukrainian
regions all the way down from Luhansk from Odessa to have the
corridor to both Crimea and Moldova failed because ethnic
Russians did not want to embrace Russian troops. Moreover, he
could experience resistance even in Donetsk and Luhansk, so not
mentioning, you know, further south and west to Dnipropetrovsk
or Harikov.
So it is a war that has an aggressor who is trying to use
this ethnic card, but we have to reveal the true nature of the
conflict. A Ukrainian nation has been formed, and this is a
nation that wants to be in Europe, and it is a multi-ethnic
community. Russian has been widely spoken there. If I
understand correctly, more channels in Ukraine are using
Russian than Ukraine or major TV talk shows in Ukraine that are
run by journalists who have Russian as their first language. So
this Putin propaganda machine should be confronted with a
strong message that we are not going to buy these arguments,
which unfortunately are still being bought by Europeans.
And summarizing this. We talked about, you know, the
sanctions and about actions of Western governments vis-a-vis
the commercial or economic interests of Putin's Russia. But let
us not forget about the damage made by Russian propaganda
called Russian Roulette. It spreads lies to millions and
millions of homes around the world, and it is not a normal TV
station. It is a propaganda tool, well built, you know, well
paid. And as far as I understand, you know, alongside with
military and interior forces, those are protected items in the
budget because Putin knows that he needs his propaganda
machine, and we should confront him on this turf as well. Thank
you.
Senator Johnson. We have unilateral desires when it comes
to providing information and the truth. President Saakashvili,
any final thoughts?
Mr. Saakashvili. Yes. Yes. Senator, I wanted to thank you
for this hearing. We have now live feed to many Ukrainian
television channels. It is a country of more than 40 million
people, and I think many of them will be watching what is being
said in the U.S. Congress and this committee. More than that,
you know, I mean, in Georgia it is being watched. In Moldova it
is being watched. In Georgia they have the Saakashvili
presidential library, and actually after midnight. And I was
just told by my assistant there is a full hall. They are
assembled watching it live on television. And that can tell you
people come and showing up so late at night watching or trying
to watch this together, what kind of impact these kind events
have in our part of world.
And that is one part of it. So the other part of it is that
Putin never made secret that he is not after Poroshenko or
after any of this. He is after the United States. He has said
it publicly many times. He has depicted his confrontation with
the United States. So even if some elements in the United
States would not want to be part of it, but from Putin's point
of view they are, and he is striking at the U.S. interests.
So from that standpoint, it is very important that with all
the moral support the people have been getting, especially from
this building and from your committee and from you personally,
Senator, they now finally get also the ultimate decisions
because those decisions are going to make huge--will have
besides, like very concrete changes on the ground, huge moral
boosting effect because in these kind of confrontations, it is
very important, I know it from our experience, to know that you
are on the right side.
So, again, thank you, Senator, for being on the right side
today together with other members of the committee. And thank
you for all your support, and your impact, and your
contribution.
Senator Johnson. Well, again, I want to thank all of the
witnesses for your time, your thoughtful testimony, as Dr.
Blank said, for telling the truth, and for just fighting for
freedom.
The record will remain open until the close of business on
March 11, one week from today, for questions for the record.
Senator Johnson. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Photos of Russia's Invasion Submitted by Senator Ron Johnson
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