    [Senate Hearing 114-130]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 114-130

     RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN EASTERN EUROPE: WHERE DOES PUTIN GO NEXT AFTER
                         UKRAINE, GEORGIA, AND MOLDOVA?

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND REGIONAL
                              SECURITY COOPERATION

                                     OF THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 4, 2015

                                   __________

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                    COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                    BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman
    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
    MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 BARBARA BOXER, California
    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
    JEFF FLAKE, Arizona                  JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    CORY GARDNER, Colorado               CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
    DAVID PERDUE, Georgia                TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia              CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  TIM KAINE, Virginia
    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
                  Lester E. Munson III, Staff Director
               Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director

                             ------------

                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND REGIONAL
                          SECURITY COOPERATION

                    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman

    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
    CORY GARDNER, Colorado               TIM KAINE, Virginia
    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

                                  (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

    Blank, Stephen, Ph.D., senior fellow, American Foreign Policy
      Council, Washington, DC........................................    13
        Prepared statement...........................................    14
    Johnson, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator From Wisconsin...................     1
        Prepared statement...........................................     2
    Kasparov,Garry, chairman, Human Rights Foundation, New York, NY..    10
        Prepared statement...........................................    12
    Pifer, Hon. Steven, director of the Arms Control and
      Nonproliferation Initiative, the Brookings Institution,
      Washington, DC.................................................    21
        Prepared statement...........................................    23
    Saakashvili, Mikheil, former President of Georgia, and chairman,
      International Advisory Council On Reforms of President of
      Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine.........................................     5
        Prepared statement...........................................     8
    Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire............     4
        Prepared statement...........................................     5
    Wilson, Damon, executive vice president, Atlantic Council,
      Washington, DC.................................................    16
        Prepared statement...........................................    18

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

    Photos of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Submitted by Senator Ron
      Johnson........................................................    59

                                     (iii)

      RUSSIAN AGRESSION IN EASTERN EUROPE: WHERE DOES PUTIN GO NEXT AFTER
                         UKRAINE, GEORGIA, AND MOLDOVA?

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 2015

                               U.S. Senate,
            Subcommittee on Europe and Regional
                                  Security Cooperation,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in
    room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Johnson, Gardner, Shaheen, Murphy, and
    Kaine.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON JOHNSON,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

        Senator Johnson. This hearing is called to order. I want to
    start off by thanking all the witnesses for taking the time,
    traveling here, and preparing some thoughtful testimony. I also
    want to offer my condolences to all of those who knew Boris
    Nemtsov, who considered him a friend and comrade. A real
    tragedy happened a day, I think, after we noticed this hearing.
    It certainly was not one of the things I wanted to talk about,
    certainly nothing we contemplated.
        The purpose of this hearing is really to lay out a reality.
    It is to tell a story, and the story that needs to be told is
    what has become of Russia since Vladimir Putin has come to
    power. I am not going to tell the story. These gentlemen are
    going to be telling the story. Unless we understand the
    reality, unless we are willing to face the reality, unless we
    are willing to grapple with the reality, Vladimir Putin will
    continue his aggression, and it will not only destabilize
    Eastern Europe, it will destabilize the entire efforts of all
    those who want to seek peace and prosperity in the world.
        We have a couple of photographs that I want to highlight.
    Starting to my right is a picture of Boris Nemtsov, a very
    courageous man that I had the privilege of meeting in my
    office, a man who brought to my office a longer list of people
    who needed to be added to the Magnitsky list. Unfortunately in
    the next picture right behind Senator Gardner is a picture of
    Boris Nemtsov having been assassinated with the Kremlin in the
    background. Now, that would be somewhat similar to an
    assassination carried out on Constitution Avenue with the
    Capitol in the background.
        In my written opening statement, which I would ask to be
    entered into the record, we have laid out a timeline that
    starts with the fall of the Berlin Wall and then traces through
    the history. But in particular, I want people to pay attention
    to the history following the ascension of Mr. Putin to power in
    Russia. And I think probably the most powerful part of that
    timeline are the 29 assassinations of political figures, 29
    assassinations and murders that have never been adequately
    solved. I think people need to really contemplate that.
        Next picture, and we do not have the quote on there. This
    picture is actually a Ukrainian rebel talking about the number
    of Russian troops that he was thankful for that had entered
    Eastern Ukraine.
        The next picture is one of tragedy, as Malaysian Flight
    Number MH17 was shot down out of the sky on July 17 of 2014.
    Two hundred and ninety-eight innocent civilians were murdered.
    This shows a picture of that. And then we have scenes of the
    devastation in Eastern Ukraine.
        So that is a little pictorial history of the results of
    Vladimir Putin's aggression, and that is the story that needs
    to be told. That is the reality that needs to be faced.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Johnson follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Senator Ron Johnson

        Good morning and welcome.
        Today's hearing--the subcommittee's first hearing in the 114th
    Congress--is about documenting the history of Russian aggression in
    Ukraine and Eastern Europe and making sure that we, here in America,
    fully understand how dire the situation truly is. We need to face harsh
    reality and the fact that Ukraine needs our help in the form of
    defensive lethal military equipment, and it needs that help today.
        In March 2014, with hardly any pushback from the West, Crimea was
    annexed by Russia. Prime Minister Yatsenyuk came to America last year
    asking for our help in his country's battle to ensure its territorial
    integrity. We should have immediately provided a minimal level of
    defensive lethal aid that Ukraine so desperately wanted. We should have
    taken it a step further by asking, ``What else do you need?'' America
    needed to show resolve then, and it desperately needs to show
    leadership and strength now, not only in Ukraine but around the world.
        On December 5, 1994, the Budapest Memorandum was signed by Ukraine,
    Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom. In this agreement,
    Ukraine gave up the world's third-largest nuclear weapons stockpile in
    return for security assurances against threats or the use of force
    against its territorial integrity and political independence. Only 20
    years later, Russia has blatantly broken its promise by brazenly
    violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
        No one should be surprised by this behavior from Russian President
    Vladimir Putin. Under his leadership, Russian aggression against its
    neighbors has been building for years. The summarized timeline of
    Russia's destabilizing actions detailed below clearly demonstrates the
    threat Putin represents to neighboring democracies.
    Date and Event
    --Nov. 9, 1989: Berlin Wall falls.

    --June 1991: Yeltsin wins first ever Russian presidential election.

    --March 1997: Yeltsin appoints Boris Nemtsov first deputy Prime
        Minister.

    --July 1998: Putin is appointed head of the Russian Federal Security
        Service (FSB).

    --Nov. 20, 1998: Galina Starovoitova, a prominent liberal member of
        Russia's Parliament, is shot to death in her St. Petersburg
        apartment.

    --Sept.-Oct. 1999: Putin sends Russian troops back into Chechnya in the
        wake of a series of bomb explosions in Russia which are blamed on
        Chechen extremists.

    --Dec. 31, 1999: Yeltsin resigns, Putin becomes acting President.

    --May 12, 2000: Igor Domnikov, a newspaper special-projects editor who
        reported on corruption in the Russian oil industry, is hit in the
        head and left lying unconscious in a pool of blood in his apartment
        building.

    --July 26, 2000: Sergey Novikov, owner of an independent radio station
        that often criticized the provincial government, is shot four times
        in his apartment building in Smolensk

    --Sept. 21, 2000: Iskandar Khatloni, a reporter for the Tajik-language
        service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, is attacked in his
        apartment by an ax-wielding assailant.

    --Oct. 3, 2000: Sergey Ivanov, director of an independent television
        company, is shot five times in the head and chest in front of his
        apartment building.

    --Nov. 21, 2000: Adam Tepsurgayev, a cameraman who covered the Chechen
        war, is shot dead.

    --April 29, 2002: Valery Ivanov, editor-in-chief of a newspaper that
        exposed government corruption, is shot eight times in the head at
        point-blank range outside of his home.

    --Aug. 21, 2002: Vladimir Golovlyov, a leader of the Liberal Russia
        faction in the lower house of Parliament, is shot dead in Moscow.

    --April 17, 2003: Sergei Yushenkov, a member of the lower house of
        Russia's Parliament and an outspoken critic of Putin, is shot to
        death outside of his Moscow apartment.

    --June 2003: Russian Government cites financial reasons for axing last
        remaining nationwide independent TV channel.

    --July 3, 2003: Yuri Shchekochikhin, a vocal opposition journalist,
        dies after falling ill with a mysterious disease.

    --June 19, 2004: Nikolai Girenko, a prominent human rights defender, is
        shot dead in his home in St. Petersburg.

    --July 9, 2004: Paul Klebnikov, the first editor of Forbes magazine's
        Russian edition, is shot dead as he leaves his Moscow office.

    --Sept. 14, 2006: Andrei Kozlov, the First Deputy Chairman of Russia's
        Central Bank who shut down banks accused of corruption, dies after
        he was shot outside of a Moscow sports arena.

    --Oct. 7, 2006: Anna Politkovskaya, a journalist and fierce critic of
        the Kremlin, is shot and killed in her Moscow apartment building.

    --Nov. 23, 2006: Alexander Litvinenko, a former KGB officer who was
        critical of Putin, died after being poisoned with radioactive
        polonium-210.

    --March 2, 2007: Ivan Safronov, a journalist who embarrassed the
        country's military establishment with a series of exclusive
        stories, is found dead outside of his home.

    --July 15, 2007: Marina Pisareva, deputy head of Bertelsmann AG's
        Russian publishinghouse, is found stabbed to death in her home west
        of Moscow.

    --Aug. 2008: Russia invades Georgia; Medvedev signs an order
        recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two
        breakaway regions in Georgia.

    --Aug. 31, 2008: Magomed Yevloyev, owner of a popular news site that
        reported on human rights, dies from a gunshot wound to the head
        sustained while in police custody.

    --Nov. 2008: Russian Parliament votes overwhelmingly in favor of a bill
        that would extend the next President's term of office from 4 to 6
        years.

    --Jan. 19, 2009: Stanslav Markelov, a human rights lawyer, and
        Anastasia Barburova, a young journalism student, are shot dead
        midday on a busy Moscow street.

    --April 2009: Vyacheslav Yaroshenko, an editor at the newspaper
        Corruption and Crime, is beaten outside of his home; he passed away
        from his injuries weeks later.

    --July 15, 2009: Natalia Estemirova, a prominent human rights
        journalist, is abducted from her home in Chechnya and shot dead.

    --Nov. 16, 2009: Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer who was jailed in revenge
        for his uncovering of massive tax fraud, dies in prison; Olga
        Kotovskaya, a TV journalist who critically reported on government
        leaders, dies after falling from a window.

    --Dec. 15, 2011: Gadzhimurad Kamalov, founder and publisher of a
        Dagestani newspaper known for its editorial independence, is gunned
        down outside of his office.

    --March 23, 2013: Boris Berezovsky, once the richest of the so-called
        oligarchs who dominated post-Soviet Russia and a close ally of
        Yeltsin who helped install Putin as President, is mysteriously
        found dead in his home outside of London.

    --July 9, 2013: Akhmednabi Akhmednabiev, deputy chief editor of a
        Dagestani newspaper, dies after sustaining multiple gunshot wounds.

    --Dec. 2013-Feb. 2014: Amidst large proreform protests in Ukraine,
        Putin offers to purchase $15 billion of Ukraine's debt and to
        reduce the price of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine. Violent
        protests flare, and by 2/22/2014 Yanukovych had fled Keiv.

    --March 2014: President Putin signs a law formalizing Russia's takeover
        of Crimea from Ukraine.

    --May 11, 2014: Pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk declare
        independence after unrecognized referendums.

    --July 17, 2014: Malaysian flight MH17 is shot down and crashes near
        the town of Torez in Ukraine's Donetsk region; 298 people die.

    --July 31, 2014: Timur Kuashev, a journalist critical of Russian policy
        in Ukraine, goes missing and is later found dead.

    --Sept. 5, 2014: Ukraine and pro-Russian rebels sign a truce in Minsk.

    --Nov. 5, 2014: Alexei Devotchenko, a popular Russian actor and
        opposition activist, dies in unclear circumstances.

    --Jan. 24, 2015: Russian-backed rebels launch an offensive in Mariupol,
        Ukraine, killing 30 people and wounding 102 others.

    --Feb. 11-12, 2015: Germany and France broker Minsk II cease-fire
        between Russia and Ukraine.

    --Feb. 19, 2015: Ukrainian soldiers retreat from Debaltseve after 13
        are killed and 157 wounded.

    --Feb. 27, 2015: Boris Nemtsov, a prominent critic of Putin's war in
        Ukraine and a former Deputy Prime Minister under Yeltsin, is shot
        in the back four times by an unidentified attacker in a car as he
        crossed a bridge near the Kremlin.

        Providing military equipment to Ukraine is not the only answer, but
    it is a necessary part of the answer. Ukraine needs economic and
    governance reforms, but those can succeed only in a peaceful and
    independent nation.
        We all heard President Poroshenko address a joint session of
    Congress on September 18, 2014, and plainly state that his country
    needs more military equipment. ``Blankets and night-vision goggles are
    important,'' he said, ``but one cannot win a war with blankets.'' He
    went on to say, ``Just like Israel, Ukraine has the right to defend her
    territory--and it will do so, with all the courage of her heart and
    dedication of her soul!'' The Ukrainian people are willing to fight for
    their country. They just need a little help from their allies in
    America.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on Russian
    aggression in Eastern Europe and learning how we can best support our
    allies in confronting this regional destabilization.
        Thank you. I look forward to your testimony.

        Again, I want to thank the witnesses, and I will turn it
    over to Senator Shaheen for her opening comments.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
    thank you for your focus and work to bring this hearing
    together today. I want to echo your comments about the tragic
    killing of Boris Nemtsov. He was a tireless voice for all
    Russians and a firm believer in a bright future for the
    country. And even as we focus here on the Russian Federation's
    outward aggression, clearly we cannot ignore the repression
    that is happening inside Russia.
        In the interest of time, I will submit my full statement
    for the record, and just want to end by welcoming all of our
    witnesses here today, and it is nice to have former President
    Saakashvili back with this committee today. And I look forward
    to hearing what all of you have to say and your thoughts about
    what more we can be doing to support the people of Ukraine.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Senator Jeanne Shaheen

        Thank you, Chairman Johnson. I want to commend you for your focus
    and leadership on this critical foreign policy issue and for your work
    to bring this hearing together today before the Subcommittee on Europe.
    I also want to echo your comments about the tragic killing of Boris
    Nemtsov, who was a tireless voice for all Russians and a firm believer
    in a bright future for that country. Even as we focus here today on the
    Russia Federation's outward aggression, clearly, we cannot ignore the
    repression inside Russian today under President Putin. The Russian
    people and the world demand a transparent investigation into Mr.
    Nemtsov's murder and I sincerely hope we will see that. Russia's
    refusal to allow some foreign officials to attend his funeral was not a
    promising sign.
        As the Chairman noted, we have five impressive witnesses here to
    help us better understand Russia's pattern of interference and
    aggression in Eastern Europe and think through appropriate responses. I
    join the chairman in thanking you for appearing here today.
        Today, we see a Russian foreign policy that flouts international
    norms and responsibilities, a foreign policy that is based on
    political, economic, and even military intimidation and aggression.
    Airspace violations, disinformation and propaganda campaigns, energy
    corruption and trade restrictions are just a few of the tools used by
    Moscow.
        Through Operation Atlantic Resolve and, the European Reassurance
    Initiative, the U.S. is already providing substantial support to our
    European partners, including Ukraine. That support should continue. In
    fact, it should be increased. We should consistently look for
    opportunities to assist our friends in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia,
    including helping them strengthen their political systems and economies
    through reform not for our benefit, but for the benefit of the people
    of those sovereign nations.
        Congress, and particularly this committee, has played a critical
    role in this effort. Just last December, Congress passed the Ukraine
    Freedom Support Act, which authorized the President to provide
    defensive military assistance to Ukraine and tighten economic sanctions
    on Russia. I hope the administration will make use of these
    authorities.
        I welcome your suggestions for what more we should be looking to do
    in Congress. Once again, thank you all for being here, and we look
    forward to hearing from each of you.

        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. We do have a
    vote that is going to be called, and I believe that what is
    going to happen with that vote is we are going to be sitting in
    our chairs. So what we will do is when that vote is called, we
    all will leave. We will put this hearing into recess, and we
    will come back because I do not want anybody to miss the
    testimony.
        But we will start off with President Saakashvili, former
    President of Georgia. He was the leader of Georgia from 2004 to
    2013. Recently, he was appointed by Ukrainian President
    Poroshenko to serve as chairman of the International Advisory
    Council on Reforms of the President of Ukraine. President
    Saakashvili?

    STATEMENT OF MIKHEIL SAAKASHVILI, FORMER PRESIDENT OF GEORGIA,
      AND CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON REFORMS OF
                  PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE, KIEV, UKRAINE

        Mr. Saakashvili. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Senator
    Johnson, thank you, Senator Shaheen, thank you, Senator
    Gardner, for this wonderful initiative. I want to thank you,
    the committee and subcommittee, for the invitation. Perhaps it
    is a little unorthodox to find the former President
    representing the interests of another nation before the U.S.
    Senate, but I think the distinguished members of this committee
    understand why I have gone from being President of one nation
    to helping the President of another.
        Ukraine and Georgia are on the front lines of the fight
    that may seem far away, but it is very much the fight that the
    American people and certainly the U.S. Congress understand more
    than anybody else in the world. This is not a fight about
    territory, about railway junctures, this or that town. This is
    a fight about principles, ideals, a way of life. This is a
    fight to determine whether we can escape from this curse of
    Soviet corrupt, cronyist, inefficient societies to being
    efficient democracies based on rule of law.
        Ukraine, and here is the story of a Budapest memorandum,
    which I have to remind the members of the committee, Ukraine
    gave up 1,800 warheads, one-third of the Soviet nuclear
    arsenal, to help secure peace in post-cold-war Europe. That was
    on the insistence of United States. The United States, among
    other big powers, was the guarantor of Ukraine's territorial
    integrity and sovereignty and their statehood based on the
    Ukraine giving up their weapons.
        Even more than that, on the insistence of this country and
    other great powers, the Ukraine has diminished its defense
    capabilities from having almost 1 million people serving in the
    military down to 120,000. Ukraine has neutralized the 120,000
    tons of ammunition and mines. They have incapacitated 6,000
    tanks for the last decades, and that was the time when they
    were complying with all their treaty obligations, while Russia
    was building up their military protection and propping up their
    muscles.
        And now here we are. Ukraine has given all this up hoping
    that they will be guaranteed peaceful future. Certainly they
    were not planning to attack anybody. And instead of giving up
    several thousand nuclear warheads, they are asking basically
    for several thousand antitank missiles to defend themselves and
    to check Russian tanks deep into their territory, as well as
    some of their weapons. And certainly, supporting Ukraine at
    this moment means, first of all, in addition to all the other
    support, also giving them means to defend their democracy, and
    to support them building a viable, strong Ukrainian democracy.
    And I think it is now imperative to U.S. security and the
    world's security.
        The old markers of Putin's reign are the gravestones of his
    critics and opponents. Every marker we can think of at this
    time is about increasing control of Russia or the Russian-
    speaking world. In September 1999, as director of FSB, Putin
    sent troops into Chechnya. Three months later he was Acting
    President of Russia. In August 2008 he invaded my country,
    Georgia. Three months later the constitution was changed to
    assure that when Putin returned to the Presidency, it would be
    a 6-year term. Putin's military excursions are always the
    prelude to the centralization of his personal power. This has
    made Russia more unpredictable and Europe and the United States
    less secure.
        One year ago as the corrupt regime of Yanukovych fell,
    Russian forces moved into Crimea, then Ukraine, then there was
    downing of a passenger jet, as you rightly pointed out,
    Senator. In September of last year, President Poroshenko
    addressed the Joint Session of the Congress, and we are
    grateful for this opportunity. And he also asked that Ukraine
    requires defensive assistance because if not given that, Russia
    will continue to establish facts on the ground that will give
    them stronger position in the kabuki of future negotiations,
    and basically in the killing of Ukraine democracy. I think what
    Russia is up to is seizing the whole southern flank of Ukraine,
    seizing most of the east, and then going after the government
    in Kiev, and killing the very idea of Ukraine democracy.
        After the war in 2008, a de facto ban on arms sales to
    Georgia was in place; as then, opponents were saying that
    providing Ukraine with lethal weapons would provoke Russia to
    escalate this conflict. But this appeasement ignores that
    Putin's aim is destabilize Ukrainian democracy. Adequate forces
    can stop aggression. In 1980, shoulder-fired Stinger missiles
    raised the cost to the Soviets in Afghanistan. That was the
    most decisive factor in the eventual defeat of the Soviet Army.
        That is why it is very important that while there also
    Europeans who are doing the negotiations, the United States
    should take the lead empowering regional actors like Poland,
    and joining with forces with supportive nations like U.K. and
    the Baltics to create a coalition to help to arm and train the
    Ukrainian Army.
        Ukraine must reform. I have focused on the case for arming
    Ukraine because without this there will not be a country to
    rebuild. But its success will equally be determined by fighting
    corruption, bringing the economy out of the shadows, increasing
    revenues to the state budget, and delivering better lives to
    the people of Ukraine. American support of all these efforts
    for the Ukrainian economy is critical, but time is short, and
    underneath the deception of the formation of war, the Russian
    plan is clear. They will seize more of the Ukraine. As I said,
    they will depose the government in Kiev if not checked in time.
    Only the swift and the immediate action of the United States
    Government to train and equip the Ukrainians can stop Putin's
    strategy to deconstruct the transatlantic architecture, to
    deconstruct the post-cold-war order.
        America and the free world won Second World War, and
    Americans won the First World War, and they won the cold war.
    What we are seeing is a dramatic situation where all these
    gains might be reversed. Georgia is a small country, but when
    we were invaded in 2008, after the failed deal with the
    Europeans, it took the United States and many members of this
    very Congress to stop them by starting the humanitarian
    military operation, which did not involve sending U.S. boots on
    the ground, but certainly involved sending strong signals to
    the Russians that they should stop.
        This war is much more complex than just war on the ground.
    This is a propaganda war. It is about controlling minds; and in
    this war we have yet to begin to fight back, to empower the
    Russian people to look at their own country and their own
    region, and to prevent encroachment of the Russian narrative
    into our politics and media. It was not just NATO army that saw
    the spread of communism. It was a collection of strong ideals
    with an army standing behind it. America, the origin of many of
    these ideals, was always further away from the front, and,
    thus, more able to resist the seeming appeal of realist moral
    compromise. The same must be true today. A democratic, secure
    Ukraine is the last nation between the revanchist Russia and
    America, and, overall, the free world.
        Thank you, Senator, for hearing my testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Saakashvili follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Mikheil Saakashvili

        Good afternoon. I want to thank the Foreign Relations Committee for
    the invitation to speak here today. Perhaps it is a bit unorthodox to
    find the President of one nation representing the interests of another
    before the United States Senate, but I think the distinguished members
    of this committee understand why I have gone from being a President to
    serving one.
        Ukraine and Georgia are on the front lines of a fight that may seem
    far away from here. But Ukraine is what stands between America and
    Russian aggression. Ukraine earned its right to aspire to Western
    integration when it gave up over 1,800 warheads--one-third of the
    Soviet nuclear arsenal--to help secure peace in post-cold-war Europe.
    Twice since, the people of Ukraine have taken to the streets to defend
    this right. Supporting Ukraine--including by giving them the arms they
    need to fight for their future and by supporting their efforts to build
    a viable, strong, Ukrainian democracy and state--is now imperative to
    American security.
        The road-markers of Putin's reign are the gravestones of his
    critics and opponents. His years in power can be measured by the
    rollback of federalization, rights, freedom, and opportunity. Every
    marker we can think of in his timeline is about increasing control of
    Russia and the Russian-speaking world.
        In September 1999, as director of the FSB, Putin sent troops into
    Chechnya. Three months later he was Acting President of Russia. In
    August 2008, he invaded Georgia. Three months later the constitution
    was changed to ensure that when Putin returned to the Presidency, it
    would be for a 6-year term.
        Putin's military excursions are always the prelude to the
    centralization of his personal power. This has made Russia more
    unpredictable, and Europe and the United States less secure in economic
    and military terms.
        We don't know yet what will follow the invasion of Ukraine. One
    year ago, as the corrupt regime of President Yanukovich fell, Russian
    forces moved into Crimea. Moscow later announced the annexation of the
    peninsula. Russian military and intelligence operatives stirred up
    unrest in the Donbass region of Ukraine, which grew into a full-blown
    war including the participation of tens of thousands of Russian regular
    forces. Russian involvement increased after the downing of a Malaysian
    passenger jet by Russian air defenses that had been illegally brought
    into Ukraine in August 2014.
        In September, President Poroshenko addressed a joint session of
    Congress with the request to provide Ukraine with defensive assistance.
    In bilateral talks with the U.S., Ukrainian officials have continuously
    submitted requests for assistance and defensive weapons. Ukraine has
    been provided some nonlethal assistance, including radars to help
    detect mortars, bulletproof vests, and some other basic aid and
    equipment.
        But what will strengthen Ukrainian defense is lethal weapons--
    specifically, antitank weapons that can halt further Russian advance.
    When Russia knows there will be little cost to them to take the
    territory, they will take the territory. They will continue to
    establish facts on the ground that will give them a stronger position
    in the kabuki of future negotiations.
        The arguments for withholding lethal aid are ones Georgia knows
    well: after the war in 2008, a de facto ban on arms sales to Georgia
    was in place. We couldn't even buy spare parts for our American rifles.
        As then, opponents say that providing Ukraine with lethal weapons
    will provoke Russia to step up its military involvement and escalate
    the conflict. But this appeasement ignores that Putin's aim is to
    unseat the government in Kiev and fully destabilize Ukrainian
    democracy.
        But adequate force can stop aggression: in the 1980s, shoulder-
    fired Stinger missiles raised the costs for the Soviets in Afghanistan
    so much that this was the single most decisive factor in the eventual
    defeat of the Soviet Army. As Putin's popularity soars post-Crimea, the
    one crack in his armor is the mounting, secret human cost of his war.
    To raise the cost for the Kremlin--on the front line and at home--
    further advances have to come with the fear of increased casualties.
        The importance of maintaining a joint position with the Europeans
    is also cited frequently. But Ukraine has little reason, historic or
    contemporary, to hope for German support. The United States should take
    the lead, empowering regional actors like Poland and other neighbors of
    Ukraine, joining with supportive nations like the U.K. and the Baltics
    to create a coalition to arm and train the Ukrainian Army.
        Ukraine must reform. I have focused today on the case for arming
    Ukraine because without this, there won't be a country to rebuild. But
    this is not to say its success will not be equally determined by
    fighting corruption, bringing the economy out of the shadows,
    increasing revenue to the state budget, and delivering better lives to
    the people of Ukraine.
        American support of all those efforts, and support for the
    Ukrainian economy during the war, is critical. But time is short, and
    underneath the deception and the information war, the Russian plan
    could not be more transparent. They will seize more of the east and
    south of Ukraine; send defeated Ukrainian troops back to Kiev; and
    attempt to destabilize the social and economic situation enough that
    pressure mounts and the democratically elected President and Government
    of Ukraine collapse or are overthrown.
        Only the swift and immediate action of the U.S. Government to train
    and equip the Ukrainians, as well as providing them with economic
    assistance, can stop Putin's strategy to deconstruct Europe, the
    transatlantic architecture, and transatlantic aspirations.
        Putin is willing to fight in ways we are not. Georgia is a country
    of 4 million people--and Putin sent tens of thousands of troops to
    invade our country. Since 2008, Russia has spent well over a billion
    dollars propping up the budgets of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2015,
    while the Russian state budget is being cut by 10 percent across the
    board, Russia's payments to South Ossetia have increased by 19 percent.
    Add to that the costs of military deployments to, and arrangements
    with, these regions. Add to that the costs of backing anti-European,
    xenophobic groups in Tbilisi to whittle away support for Euro-Atlantic
    integration under a government attempting rapprochement with an
    aggressive and bullying neighbor. Add to that the costs of the media
    and documentaries and reports Russia has funded to blame the 2008 war
    on Georgia and its NATO aspirations. The list goes on.
        This is what Putin is willing to commit to ensure Georgia will not
    have a future that Russia does not dictate. He did this only to ensure
    that NATO could not offer Georgia a concrete pathway to membership. He
    did this so his narrative at home is secure.
        And as Putin has made clear--Ukraine is a nearly divine cause for
    him. We understand only shadows of the billions of dollars he has spent
    to keep Ukraine in the ``Russian world.'' According to U.N., over 6,000
    people have been killed in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. Up to 20
    percent of the industrial capacity of Ukraine has been removed or
    destroyed. A million people have been displaced.
        In the past year, Russia has also backed political parties, heavy
    propaganda, and sharp economic pressure to erode support for Europe in
    Moldova, hoping to change the political landscape even before their
    territorial conquests in Ukraine bring the Russian Army closer to
    Moldova's door. And what Moldovans fear is that if Europe hasn't helped
    Ukraine--a far larger, richer, and more strategically important
    nation--Moldova will become a footnote of the regional conquest.
        The price Putin is willing to pay, and to exact, is higher than we
    want to imagine.
        In Georgia, in 2008, we fought because if we didn't fight for our
    sovereignty and our democracy and our independence, no one else ever
    would. It was, to be sure, an emotional choice--but also the rational
    one. We couldn't win a military war with Russia--but it is the
    ideological war that we believed needed to be fought, and won.
        Fighting for our beliefs made many uncomfortable. Ukraine fights
    now for the same reason, and its Western friends are no less
    uncomfortable with their war. But make no mistake: Putin attacks
    Ukraine to weaken Europe, and to weaken NATO. When he makes the
    calculation that the time is right, he will cross the Article 5 line,
    probably in ways that are not expected. While we deliberate about
    definitions--Russian or Russian-backed, vacation or invasion--Putin
    will be fighting, and winning, an ideological war against the only
    force that has ever been able to contain and turn back expansionist
    Russian exceptionalism.
        His war is a propaganda war. It is about controlling minds. And in
    that war, we have yet to begin to fight back to help empower the
    Russian people to look at their own country and their region--and to
    prevent the encroachment of the Russian narrative into our own politics
    and media.
        It was not a NATO army that stopped the spread of communism. It was
    a collection of strong ideals with an army standing behind it. America,
    the origin of many of these ideals, was always further away from the
    front, and thus more able to resist the seeming appeal of realist moral
    compromise. The same must be true today. A democratic, secure Ukraine
    is the last nation between revanchist Russia and America.

        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. President. Do we have time?
        Voice. Votes just started.
        Senator Johnson. Okay. We will recess at this point in time
    and hopefully be back in about 10 to 15 minutes. So, again, I
    apologize for that, but, again, this is an important hearing,
    and we are looking forward to your testimony.
        Thank you. This hearing stands in recess.

    [Recess.]

        Senator Johnson. This hearing is called back to order. Our
    next witness will be Mr. Garry Kasparov. He is the chairman of
    the International Council of the Human Rights Foundation. Mr.
    Kasparov is a Russian pro-democracy leader, global human rights
    activist, author, and former world chess champion.
        Mr. Kasparov.

    STATEMENT OF GARRY KASPAROV, CHAIRMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION,
                              NEW YORK, NY

        Mr. Kasparov. My thanks to the subcommittee and to Senator
    Johnson for inviting me here today. It has been a very
    difficult last few days mourning the brutal murder of my long-
    time friend and colleague, Boris Nemtsov, in front of the
    Kremlin last Friday night, while also wanting to honor his
    memory and his fight by pressing the case for ending the regime
    of Vladimir Putin in Russia.
        I have learned from painful experience that these first
    days after an atrocity are very important because people
    outside Russia quickly forget and move on. Boris was an
    outspoken critic of a police state that has no tolerance for
    critics. His imposing presence regularly embarrassed an
    increasingly totalitarian dictatorship that could not permit
    even the smallest amount of truth to leak out.
        His latest report was to be on the presence of Russian
    troops in Ukraine, fighting Putin's war against a fragile
    democratic state in Europe. Boris also actively promoted the
    Magnitsky Act, a piece of rare bipartisan 2012 legislation that
    brought sanctions against Russian officials for not a brutal
    murder, but that of anticorruption attorney Sergei Magnitsky in
    2009.
        Boris Nemtsov was killed because he could be killed. Putin
    and his elites believe that after 15 years in power, there is
    nothing they cannot do, no line they cannot cross. Their sense
    of impunity, combined with an atmosphere of hatred and violence
    and Putin's propaganda, has created in Russia a lethal
    combination. Boris was not the first victim of this deadly mix.
    Georgia, Ukraine, and the stability of the modern world order
    is also under attack. Putin must justify his grip on power
    somehow. With his oil- and gas-based economy failing, he is
    following the path of Soviet dictators before him: propaganda,
    division, and war.
        Enemies are needed so that Putin may protect Russians from
    them. Ukraine was always a tempting target, and the recent
    leaks have shown that an invasion plan existed even before the
    fall of Putin's puppet, Viktor Yanukovych. Inside Russia,
    independent journalists and opposition activists are portrayed
    as dangerous national traitors in language lifted directly from
    the Nazis.
        Of course, I feel deeply the loss of my friend, Boris
    Nemtsov, and the prosecution of others who dare to speak
    against Putin. But it is Ukraine and what it illustrates about
    Putin and his regime that are more consequent to today's
    hearing. Since Putin took power in 2000, one Western
    administration after another declined to confront him on human
    rights at home or even his increasing belligerence abroad. The
    timeline of Russian repression circulated here today does an
    excellent job of listing many of the worse moments of Putin's
    crackdown. But there could also be a parallel timeline of all
    the meetings, deals, and smiling photo ops the leaders of the
    free world took with Putin while these atrocities were taking
    place.
        The Western engagement policy that should have been
    abandoned as soon as Putin showed his true colors over a decade
    ago was continued at every turn, which emboldened Putin and
    delegitimized our opposition movement. Putin rebuilt the police
    state in Russia in full view of the outside world, and now he
    is confident enough of his power to attempt to export that
    police state abroad to Georgia, to Ukraine, to Moldova. Where
    next? He is testing NATO now, and he will test it further.
        Putin also provides a role model for the rest of the world
    dictators and thugs by proudly defying the superior forces of
    the free world. From Iran to Syria to Venezuela, Putin's Russia
    provides both materiel support and what I would call amoral
    support.
        Putin is not going away on his own. Ukraine is only his
    latest target. Ukraine must be defended, supported, and armed
    now. It may seem far away to you, but it is a front line of a
    war the United States and the rest of the free world is
    fighting whether it admits it or not. Sanctions are important,
    but it is obvious 6 months ago that they were not enough to
    deter Putin, and he must be deterred.
        Stop treating Putin like any other leader who can be
    negotiated with in good faith. Stop legitimizing his brutal
    regime at the expense of the Russian people. The opposition
    movement Boris and I believed in and that Boris died for should
    also be openly supported, the way the West championed the
    Soviet dissidents. Let the people of Russia know that they have
    allies abroad the way Ronald Reagan told us--all of us behind
    the Iron Curtain that he knew it was our leaders, not us, who
    were his enemies.
        Contrary to the widely circulated official polls, Putin
    does not enjoy broad public support in Russia, as was proved by
    hundreds of thousands of people mourning Boris in the street of
    Moscow. If you are truly popular, you can allow free media and
    free elections, and your critics are not gunned down in the
    streets. Putin's oligarch supporters must be forced to choose
    between giving him up and a doomed isolation. They cannot be
    allowed to continue to live like Trump and rule Stalin. The
    people of Russia want to be free, but defeating a globalized
    and energy-rich, heavily militarized dictatorship that has the
    tacit support of the free world is too much to ask.
        You cannot negotiate with cancer. Like a cancer, Putin and
    his elites must be cut out. He must be isolated and removed,
    for only when Putin is gone can Russia be a free, strong, and
    independent country Boris Nemtsov always dreamed it could be.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Kasparov follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Garry Kasparov

        My thanks to the subcommittee and to Senator Johnson for inviting
    me here today. It has been a very difficult last few days, mourning the
    brutal murder of my friend and colleague Boris Nemtsov in front of the
    Kremlin last Friday night, while also wanting to honor his memory and
    his fight by pressing the case for ending the regime of Vladimir Putin
    in Russia. I have learned from painful experience that these first days
    after an atrocity are very important, because people outside of Russia
    quickly forget and move on.
        Boris was an outspoken critic of a police state that has no
    tolerance for critics. His imposing presence regularly embarrassed an
    increasingly totalitarian dictatorship that could not permit even the
    smallest amount of truth to leak out. His latest report was to be on
    the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, fighting Putin's war against
    a fragile democratic state in Europe. Boris also actively promoted the
    Magnitsky Act, a piece of rare bipartisan 2012 legislation that brought
    sanctions against Russian officials for another brutal murder, that of
    anticorruption attorney Sergei Magnitsky in 2009.
        Boris Nemtsov was killed because he could be killed. Putin and his
    elites believe that after 15 years of power there is nothing they
    cannot do, no line they cannot cross. Their sense of impunity, combined
    with the atmosphere of hatred and violence Putin's propaganda has
    created in Russia, is a lethal combination.
        Boris was not the first victim of this deadly mix. Georgia,
    Ukraine, and the stability of the modern world order is also under
    attack. Putin must justify his grip on power somehow. With his oil and
    gas-based economy failing, he is following the path of so many
    dictators before him: propaganda, division, and war. Enemies are needed
    so that Putin may protect Russians from them. Ukraine was always a
    tempting target, and recent leaks have shown that an invasion plan
    existed even before the fall of Putin's puppet, Viktor Yanukovych.
    Inside Russia, independent journalists and opposition activists are
    portrayed as dangerous national traitors, in language lifted directly
    from the Nazis.
        Of course I feel deeply the loss of my friend Boris Nemtsov and the
    persecution of others who dare to speak against Putin. But Ukraine and
    what it illustrates about Putin and his regime that are more consequent
    to today's hearing. Since Putin took power in 2000, one Western
    administration after another declined to confront him on human rights
    at home or over his increasing belligerence abroad. The timeline of
    Russian repression circulated here today does an excellent job of
    listing many of the worst moments of Putin's crackdown. But there could
    also be a parallel timeline of all the meetings, deals, and smiling
    photo-ops the leaders of the free world took with Putin while these
    atrocities were taking place. The Western engagement policy that should
    have been abandoned as soon as Putin showed his true colors over a
    decade ago was continued at every turn, which emboldened Putin and
    delegitimized our opposition movement.
        Putin rebuilt a police state in Russia in full view of the outside
    world and now he is confident enough of his power to attempt to export
    that police state abroad. To Georgia, to Ukraine, to Moldova. Where
    next? He is testing NATO now and he will test it further. Putin also
    provides a role model for the rest of the world's dictators and thugs
    by proudly defying the superior forces of the free world. From Iran to
    Syria to Venezuela, Putin's Russia provides both material support and
    what I would call ``amoral support.''
        Putin is not going away on his own. Ukraine is only his latest
    target. Ukraine must be defended, supported, and armed now. It may seem
    far away to you, but it is the front line of a war the United States
    and the rest of the free world is fighting whether it admits it or not.
    Sanctions are important, but it was obvious 6 months ago they were not
    enough to deter Putin, and he must be deterred.
        Stop treating Putin like any other leader who can be negotiated
    with in good faith. Stop legitimizing his brutal regime at the expense
    of the Russian people. The opposition movement Boris and I believed in
    and that Boris died for should also be openly supported, the way the
    West championed the Soviet dissidents. Let the people of Russia know
    that they have allies abroad, the way Ronald Reagan told those of us
    behind the Iron Curtain that he knew it was our leaders, not us, who
    were his enemies. Contrary to the widely circulated official polls,
    Putin does not enjoy broad public support in Russia. If you are truly
    popular you can allow a free media and free elections--and your critics
    are not gunned down in the street.
        Putin's oligarch supporters must be forced to choose between giving
    him up and a doomed isolation. They cannot be allowed to continue to
    live like Trump and rule like Stalin. The people of Russia want to be
    free, but defeating a globalized and energy-rich dictatorship that has
    the tacit support of the free world is too much to ask. You cannot
    negotiate with cancer. Like a cancer, Putin and his elites must be cut
    out. He must be isolated and removed, for only when Putin is gone can
    Russia be the free, strong, and independent country Boris Nemtsov
    always dreamed it could be.

        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Kasparov.
        Our next witness is Dr. Stephen Blank. He is a senior
    fellow for Russia at the American Foreign Policy Council. He is
    an internationally known expert on Russia and the former Soviet
    Union, and is the author of over 1,000 publications.
        Dr. Blank.

      STATEMENT OF STEPHEN BLANK, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN
                 FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC

        Dr. Blank. Senator Johnson, it is a great honor to testify
    before your subcommittee with this exceptionally distinguished
    group of witnesses. Because my written statement deals with
    purely military issues, in my oral remarks I wish to talk about
    the broader strategic issues involved.
        Russia's invasion and occupation of Ukraine represent the
    greatest threat to European security in a generation, the most
    naked case of aggression since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in
    1990, and arguably the most dangerous threat to international
    security and order today. It is the fruit of a long-developed
    plan whose origins can be traced back to 2005.
        Russia has several objectives here. Many have already
    noticed that in keeping with the rhythms of Russian history,
    there is the belief that a little short victorious war can
    buttress the regime at home around a program of Russian
    imperialism and state nationalism. Further, it is an axiom of
    Russian foreign policy that none of the post-Soviet states,
    including those of Eastern Europe, really possess genuine
    sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, the treaties
    guaranteeing that sovereignty and territorial integrity are
    merely scraps of paper.
        This sentiment applies with particular force to Ukraine for
    it is clearly inconceivable to the Russian elite that Ukraine
    can follow a different trajectory than does Russia. Moreover, a
    Ukraine that looks westward is the greatest possible threat to
    the security of Putin's regime because it will infect Russia
    with the democratic virus. Indeed, the entire legitimacy of any
    Russian state is bound up with its being the true heir of
    Kievan Rus.
        If Ukraine rebels against or rejects Russia's trajectory,
    then the entire legitimacy of the Russian state is called into
    question. This is especially the case because Putin and his
    team believe that empire is the only acceptable form of a
    Russian state, and Russia must, therefore, be an empire if his
    autocracy and kleptocracy are to be preserved. For all these
    reasons, a democratic revolution in Ukraine is anathema to
    Moscow and a pretext for an invasion.
        Operationally, Moscow still intends to seize Mariupol,
    establish a land bridge to Crimea, and, if it could do so,
    establish as well as land bridge all the way to Moldova. Plans
    for this were already laid a year ago. Beyond destroying any
    possibility of an independent Ukraine, Moscow intends to
    overthrow the entire post-cold-war settlement of 1989 to 1991
    in Europe and globally, and to do so by systematically applying
    the synchronized instruments of pressure we now know as so-
    called hybrid warfare. These policies predict more to any
    competent analyst, but unfortunately this administration and
    too many European governments do not take what happens in
    Russia seriously enough. Neither do these governments think
    Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states are sufficiently
    important for us to have a real strategy regarding them.
        This Russia-first strategy lies at the root of the
    continuing and shameful Western failure to understand or
    grapple with Russia and its aggressions seriously enough or to
    provide assistance to Ukraine as needed. As administration
    officials candidly admit, there is ``an asymmetry of will'' or
    of importance whereby Ukraine is supposedly more important to
    Moscow than it is to us or to European governments, and this
    inhibits us helping Ukraine as needed.
        Indeed as reported on February 27 by the Wall Street
    Journal, the United States is slow rolling the provision of
    intelligence to Ukraine. Given the stakes involved for Ukraine,
    its neighbors, and partners, European and international
    security, this is an unacceptable policy. It undermines the
    credibility of NATO, of the United States, Europe, and beyond,
    and encourages aggression, and not only by Putin, and not only
    by Europe.
        Therefore, the importance of these hearings should be clear
    to everyone, and I welcome the opportunity to testify before
    the committee today.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Blank follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen Blank

        Ukraine needs military help from abroad in terms of weapons,
    training, and finances to help sustain its government and economy in
    the face of Russian aggression. At a conference of the Potomac
    Institute, U.S. analysts and Ukrainian military leaders reported that
    the Ukrainian military continues to be severely disadvantaged by not
    being equipped with a list of the items that are becoming well known to
    those watching the current situation in eastern Ukraine: secure
    communications systems; antitank guided weapons with tandem warheads;
    counterbattery radars; UAVs for both reconnaissance and strike
    missions; and the ability to stream multiple intelligence sources into
    centralized command centers to get inside the ``decision loop'' of the
    Russian-backed forces.\1\
        Therefore, Ukraine needs and has requested these capabilities,
    secure communications equipment, countermortar or counterbattery
    weapons, antiair, and antitank weapons and missiles. Ukraine also
    clearly needs UAVs or weapons to use against Russian drones. It also
    needs weapons to counter Russian artillery fire by the use of
    intelligence capabilities to determine the source and point of origin
    of those fires and then take them out. Ukraine also needs to devise an
    effective, democratic command and control structure that allows
    competent officers to rise to positions of responsible command, to
    train proficient officers whom men will follow and who understand
    modern warfare, and create a basis for integrating volunteers into a
    regular army commanded and led by proficient officers committed to
    democracy. In American terms it needs both an Edwin Stanton and a
    George Marshall. It also needs to sustain patriotic morale to counter
    manifestations of draft dodging and to demonstrate to the world that it
    is reforming. Right now it needs weapons as outlined above urgently as
    well as financial assistance and a long-term plan of both energy and
    financial assistance and steady support for (as well as pressure from
    outside) to reform its government and economy.
        At the same time, there is little doubt that the White House and
    the NSC are holding up sending weapons to Ukraine at this point. But
    whatever their reasons are, there is little doubt that the Ukrainian
    Army will fight and with assistance can prevail over the rebels as long
    as Russia cannot operate freely there. Indeed, the fighting to date
    shows that only with substantial Russian help and the takeover of the
    operation by the Russian Army can the so-called rebels prevail in
    battle. If anything, this key fact justifies the provision of weapons
    and training to Ukraine as part of a broader strategy to wrest the
    strategic initiative away from Russia and give it to Ukraine and NATO.
        The signs of this dependence on the Russian Army are evident
    everywhere. According to the IHS consultancy firm, Ukrainian
    authorities and the Potomac Institute, there are currently 14,400
    Russian troops on Ukrainian territory backing up the 29,300 illegally
    armed formations of separatists in eastern Ukraine. These units are
    well equipped with the latest main battle tanks, armored personnel
    carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, plus hundreds of pieces of
    tube and rocket artillery. There are also 29,400 Russian troops in
    Crimea and 55,800 massed along the border with eastern Ukraine.\2\

    --Russian units have made heavy use of electronic warfare (EW) and what
        appear to be high-power microwave (HPM) systems to jam not only the
        communications and reconnaissance assets of the Ukrainian Armed
        Forces but to also disable the surveillance unmanned aerial
        vehicles (UAVs) operated by cease-fire monitoring teams from the
        Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
        Russian EW teams have targeted the Schiebel Camcopter UAVs operated
        by the monitors and ``melted the onboard electronics so that drones
        just fly around uncontrolled in circles before they crash to the
        ground,'' said one of the briefers at the conference. Russian EW,
        communications and other units central to their military operations
        are typically placed adjacent to kindergartens, hospitals, or
        apartment buildings so that Ukrainian units are unable to launch
        any strikes against them without causing unacceptable and horrific
        collateral casualties.
    --The war against Ukraine is not a ``new'' strategy for Moscow; the
        Russian general staff has been preparing for Ukraine-type combat
        operations since 1999. Indeed, the Ukrainian operation has been
        planned by Moscow at least since 2005 and it is incomprehensible
        why the administration could not, or would not, formulate an
        assessment of what was happening in February 2014.\3\ This speaks
        to our willingness and capability to assess Russian moves correctly
        and it is not encouraging.
    --The Russian military's Zapad 2013 exercise (the word ``Zapad''
        meaning ``West'' in Russian to denote that it was an operation
        designed to practice operations against NATO) was a dress-rehearsal
        for parts of the Ukraine campaign and future potential operations
        against the Baltic States. The exercise involved 76,300 total
        troops, 60 percent of which were drawn from the same Russian
        Interior Ministry (MVD) units that were used in the Chechen
        conflicts of the 1990s.
    --Russia's information warfare campaign includes budgeting for the
        state-run Russia Today network (more than USD300 million per annum)
        and support for pro-Russian NGOs (USD100 million per annum).\4\

        Russian casualties are much higher than imagined and reports of the
    true number of dead, wounded, POW and/or MIAs would undermine Putin at
    home. Second, Russian tactics are rather crude, essentially being
    massive artillery and air shelling of enemy positions. Such tactics
    mandate a traditional enormous output of ammunition and artillery. The
    numbers of shells being expended periodically forces Russia to accept
    truces in order to replenish its forces in Ukraine who are in full
    command of this operation. There are an estimated 17-20,000 Russian
    forces in Ukraine brought together or even cannibalized from many
    different Russian military units in order to bring ground, air,
    antiair, and support functions into the theatre. In addition, there is
    a substantial reinforcement of the naval, air, and missile forces in
    the Crimea, including nuclear-capable or so called dual use weapons
    being brought to Crimea.
        We can learn the following lessons from this analysis. First, Putin
    cannot escalate the scale of conflict beyond present limits without
    antagonizing NATO further into a full-scale protracted war and he
    cannot afford that. He is also reputedly very afraid of media reports
    of the true extent of what evidently are sizable numbers of Russian
    casualties. For example, according to Ukrainian sources, at Debaltseve,
    1,300 Ukrainians and 4,500 Russians were killed.\5\ Why we are not
    publicizing Russian casualties escapes me. Third, there is every reason
    to believe that if NATO mobilized its resolve and capabilities to give
    Ukraine weapons and training as part of a comprehensive strategy that
    Ukraine's morale and capabilities would improve to the point of
    imposing much greater costs on Russia which is reaching the limit of
    its capabilities. Putin is already bringing troops form Central Asia
    and Siberia to Ukraine, indicating a manpower shortage and a lack of
    desire inside Russia to fight Ukraine. There are also many reports of
    disaffection within the Russian military. In other words, whereas NATO
    has hardly engaged, Russia is already feeling the pressure.
        Russian tactics and strategy have aimed to keep the fighting at a
    level under NATO's ``radar'' to avoid a too protracted war. It appears
    Putin aims to create his ``Novorossiia'' and present the EU with a fait
    accompli by mid-year to persuade a divided Europe to remove sanctions
    and thus escape the risk of a protracted war. We have it within our
    power, if we can find the will to do so, not just to impose costs on
    Putin but to regain the overall strategic initiative and take it away
    for him by helping Ukraine to defend itself. What is needed here and in
    Europe and Kiev is a comprehensive strategy that embraces not only
    military but also strong economic and informational means to thwart
    this effort to sustain Putin at home, destroy an independent Ukrainian
    state, overturn the post cold war status quo in Europe, undermine
    European integration, and hasten the rupture of the transatlantic
    alliance. Our continuing passivity allows this shameful conquest and
    the spread of state terrorism and criminality orchestrated by Moscow
    and its subalterns in Crimea and Ukraine to spread with impunity. We
    must realize that this is the most naked aggression since Saddam
    Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 and respond accordingly to what is the
    greatest threat not just to European security but to international
    order. For if we do not do so, others will be even more emboldened by
    our inaction and confusion as we have seen with ISIL in the Levant and
    we can see with China in the South China Sea, and with Iran in regard
    to state-sponsored terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Continued
    passivity invites more escalation, and not only by Putin, whereas
    soundly conceived and implemented resistance upholds not only our
    values but even more importantly, our interests, both in Europe and
    across the globe.

    ----------------
    End Notes

        \1\ Reuben F. Johnson, ``Hybrid War Is Working,'' Jane's Defence
    Weekly, February 26, 2015.
        \2\ Ibid.
        \3\ Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes, and Siobhan Gorman, ``U.S.
    Scurries to Shore Up Spying on Russia,'' Wall Street Journal, March 24,
    2014, www.wsjonline.com.
        \4\ Johnson.
        \5\ Conversations with Ukrainian officers and officials,
    Washington, DC, February 26, 2015.

        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Dr. Blank.
        Our next witness is Mr. Damon Wilson. He is executive vice
    president of the Atlantic Council. His areas of expertise
    include Central and Eastern Europe, NATO, and U.S. national
    security issues. From 2007 to 2009, Mr. Wilson served as
    special assistant to the President and senior director for
    European affairs at the National Security Council.
        Mr. Wilson.

     STATEMENT OF DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, ATLANTIC
                        COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC

        Mr. Wilson. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Shaheen, and
    members of the committee, President Putin today poses a direct
    threat to American interests and values. His war in Ukraine
    aims to tear up the post-cold-war order and undermine American
    credibility. If we fail to stop Putin in Ukraine, we will face
    a series of conflicts and crises in the months and years to
    come.
        At best, Putin may consolidate his autocratic grip at home
    and subjugate 75 million in Europe's East to a fate determined
    in Moscow. At worst, emboldened, Putin may be tempted to
    challenge a NATO ally directly. The choice we face, however, is
    not between fighting Russia or doing nothing. Rather, I believe
    doing nothing may lead to our fighting Russia. In this context,
    I would like to make five points.
        This crisis began long before Crimea. Indeed, Russia's
    annexation of Crimea was the natural outcome of a clear,
    consistent policy dating back years. I detail this record in my
    full testimony. Second, Putin will not stop until he encounters
    serious pushback. Third, only the United States can galvanize
    Europe and the international community around an effective
    strategy to deter Putin for the long term. Fourth, any strategy
    should urgently and decisively back Ukraine, as well as other
    vulnerable states with significant economic and military
    assistance in the short term, while keeping the door open to
    the European Union or NATO. And fifth, we should neither
    abandon the Russian people nor the vision that a democratic
    Russia one day can find its peaceful place within a Europe
    whole and free.
        Putin's strategy has been to use this crisis to consolidate
    his own hold at home through greater oppression of civil
    society and independent media even as he fuels nationalist
    fervor. He has created an environment of fear and intimidation
    fostering the circumstances that led to the assassination of
    Boris Nemtsov. Putin, of course, is also seeking to dominate
    his neighbors, to drain them of resources to fuel his
    kleptocracy, and to restore a sense of Russia's greatness in
    the only way a bully knows. He aims to prevent his neighbors
    from joining either NATO or the EU, achieving this through
    coercion when possible and by dismemberment and occupation when
    necessary.
        Ultimately Putin knows that the best check on his power is
    a united transatlantic community, and he has sought to divide
    Europe, undermining the resolve for sustained sanctions. But
    the most tempting objective for Putin is to call into question
    the credibility of NATO's Article 5 mutual defense commitment
    as doing so would effectively end NATO.
        A Russian move against an ally, such as a Baltic State,
    cannot be ruled out. Putin has demonstrated time and again that
    if he senses an opportunity to act he will, convinced that the
    West lacks the will or the ability to take decisive action.
    That is why today's situation is dangerous. We have seen
    repeatedly that Putin's objectives expand with success and
    contract with failure. This means that the best determinant of
    his action is Western action.
        There is a tendency, however, to argue that the Europeans
    should take the lead on Ukraine. After all, we have our hands
    full with ISIS and other global responsibilities. But the
    Ukraine crisis is a Russia crisis, and Russia is too big, too
    strong, and too scary for Europe to resolve this without us.
    Without U.S. leadership, Europe may feel forced to accommodate
    a revanchist Russia, and we have seen throughout history this
    is a dangerous formula.
        The United States has the ability to rally its allies and
    international partners around a comprehensive strategy that not
    only deters Putin's aggression, but avoids an unstable gray
    zone in Europe East. To do so, we should begin by articulating
    what we want to achieve. We should more decisively increase the
    cost to Russia, including by enacting sectorial sanctions and
    targeting Gazprom and Putin directly.
        The most effective response is Ukraine succeeding and
    becoming a modern European state, and yet Western assistance to
    date is modest. There is no governmentwide concerted effort to
    assist Ukraine. There is no response commensurate with how we
    react to support campaigns like Ebola or ISIS. The United
    States is uniquely positioned to assist Ukraine to defend
    itself and to raise the cost of further Russian military action
    against Ukraine. Putin, after all, has lied to his own people
    about Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. But by reassuring
    Putin that we will either not provide or greatly constrain our
    military and intelligence assistance, we signal to the Kremlin
    what Russia can get away with.
        Any assistance package should, therefore, be substantial,
    including antiarmor missiles, as well as intelligence support.
    Such a U.S. decision could unlock lethal military assistance
    from many of our allies. The U.S. Congress could also endorse a
    more substantial military presence along NATO's eastern flank,
    call for a halt to any further U.S. force withdrawals from
    Europe, and order a review of the U.S. force posture. Such a
    package could be designed to leverage U.S. commitment to
    European security to secure greater European commitments to
    defense investment.
        We should respond to aggression in Europe's East by
    consolidating Europe's South. This would mean inviting
    Montenegro to join NATO and intensifying efforts to build
    United States strategic partnerships with Serbia and Cyprus. We
    should harness America's energy prowess to increase global
    supply while support European efforts to create a European
    energy union that includes Ukraine. And we should be explicit
    about our intention to negotiate a transatlantic trade and
    investment partnership that is open to Ukraine, Moldova, and
    Georgia.
        As long as either KGB veterans retain their grip on the
    Kremlin or the nations in between NATO and Russia remain
    trapped in an insecure gray zone, we will face continued
    challenges and conflict.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Damon M. Wilson

        Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Shaheen, members of the committee,
    President Putin today poses a direct threat to American interests and
    values. His war in Ukraine and his effort to sow division among our
    allies are aimed at tearing up the post-cold-war order and undermining
    American credibility and influence.
        If we fail to stop Putin in Ukraine, we will face a series of
    conflicts and crises in the months and years to come.
        At best, Putin may consolidate his autocratic grip at home and
    subjugate 75 million people in Europe's East to a fate determined in
    Moscow. At worst, an emboldened Putin may be tempted to challenge a
    NATO ally directly, hoping to deal a decisive blow to the alliance.
        The choice we face, however, is not between fighting Russia or
    doing nothing. Rather, I believe doing nothing may lead to our fighting
    Russia.
        We are better than that. The United States can take the lead in
    galvanizing the transatlantic community behind a comprehensive
    strategy, including ensuring that a well-functioning and well-armed
    European Ukraine emerges from this crisis.
        In this context, I would like to make five points:

        (1) Russia's war in Ukraine today is the natural outcome of Putin's
    policies in recent years (and the lessons he drew from our successive
    lack of responses).
        (2) Putin will not stop until he encounters serious pushback.
        (3) Only the United States can galvanize Europe and the
    international community around an effective, comprehensive strategy to
    deter Putin for the long term.
        (4) Any strategy should urgently and decisively back Ukraine as
    well as other vulnerable states with significant economic and military
    assistance in the short term, while keeping the door open to the
    European Union (EU) or NATO for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.
        (5) We should neither abandon the Russian people nor the vision
    that a democratic Russia one day can find its peaceful place within a
    Europe whole and free.

        This crisis began long before Crimea. Indeed, Russia's annexation
    of Crimea was the natural outcome of a clear, consistent policy dating
    back years. As confrontation replaced cooperation with the West as a
    source of legitimacy for the Kremlin, Russia meticulously laid the
    groundwork for what we are witnessing today. Former President Medvedev
    set out the doctrine of a ``privileged sphere of interests.'' Putin
    articulated the ``compatriots policy'' in which Russia claimed the
    right to defend the interests of Russian speakers outside its borders,
    and it began distributing passports to strengthen its claims.
        Russia undermined diplomatic efforts to resolve so-called frozen
    conflicts, and maintained Russian occupying forces as ``peacekeepers.''
    At the last NATO--Russia summit in 2008, Putin ridiculed the idea of
    Ukraine as an independent state and questioned the status of Crimea in
    front of NATO leaders who had just failed to agree to begin preparing
    Ukraine for NATO. His creeping annexation of Georgia's breakaway
    regions prompted the Russian-Georgian War, consolidating his
    occupations. Russia both developed contingency plans and exercised
    seizing its neighbors' territory. Putin increasingly began wrapping all
    of his actions in a pseudo-ideology of Orthodox chauvinism.
        He countered EU outreach with his own Eurasian Economic Union
    premised on coercion rather than attraction. Putin's intimidation
    tactics led Armenia first to abandon its EU association bid before
    forcing former Ukrainian President Yanukovych's about-face. Russia
    tried and failed to use economic coercion and energy threats to sway
    Moldova.
        In the Ukraine crisis, Putin first probed with little green men to
    determine his freedom of maneuver in Crimea and, in the absence of
    resistance, brazenly seized the territory. The Kremlin then stoked the
    idea of a ``Russian Spring'' across southern and eastern Ukraine,
    creating the myth of Novorossiya and seeking to spark spontaneous
    revolts using ``political tourists'' from Russia. When that failed,
    Russia introduced Special Forces and intelligence operatives in
    Slavyansk, using the town as a base from which to seek to destabilize
    eastern Ukraine. And once Ukrainian forces gained their footing, nearly
    defeating the rebel forces, Russia opted for full-scale invasion.
    Today, the so-called separatists--former miners and farmers according
    to Putin--command greater quantities of the most advanced heavy
    weaponry than most European NATO nations.
        While Ukraine is ground zero in the current struggle, there is no
    doubt that Putin's sights are firmly fixed on the two tiny nations that
    have dared stand up to his bullying: Moldova and Georgia. Moscow
    attempted to sway Moldova's recent elections with massive support for
    new pro-Kremlin parties, is courting separatists, and is poised to
    destabilize the nation. Despite Georgia's efforts to normalize
    relations with Moscow, Russia has continued its creeping annexation of
    Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
        In the first instance, Putin has used this crisis to consolidate
    his own hold on at home, through greater repression of civil society
    and independent media even as he fuels a nationalist fervor. He has
    created an environment of fear and intimidation, at a minimum fostering
    the circumstances that led to the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. After
    all, the protests led by Nemtsov, much like the Maidan in Ukraine, pose
    a potentially existential threat to Putin's regime.
        Putin, of course, is also seeking to dominate his neighbors, to
    drain them of resources to fuel his kleptocracy, and to restore a sense
    of Russia's greatness in the only way a bully knows--intimidating the
    weak, closest to him.
        Furthermore, he aims to prevent any of his neighbors from joining
    either NATO or the EU, achieving this through coercion when possible
    and by dismemberment and occupation where necessary.
        Ultimately, Putin knows that the best check on his power is a
    united transatlantic community. Hence, he has sought to divide Europe,
    undermining the resolve for sustained sanctions. But the most tempting
    objective for Putin is to call into question the credibility of NATO's
    Article 5 mutual defense commitment, as doing so would effectively end
    both NATO and America's role as a great European power.
        A Russian move against an ally such as a Baltic State cannot be
    ruled out. Putin has demonstrated time and again that if he senses an
    opportunity to act, he will, convinced that the West lacks the will or
    ability to take decisive action. Debaltseve is only the latest case in
    point.
        This is why today's situation is so dangerous. Putin will not stop
    and this crisis will not end until he encounters serious pushback.
        We have seen repeatedly that Putin's objectives expand with success
    and contract with failure, or even the increased chance of failure.
    This means that the best determinant of his action is Western action.
        There's a tendency, however, in Washington to argue that the
    Europeans should take the lead on Ukraine--after all we have our hands
    full with ISIS and other global responsibilities. This approach fails
    to understand that only the United States can galvanize Europe and
    other members of the international community around a tough-minded
    comprehensive strategy to deter Putin.
        The Ukraine crisis is a Russia crisis after all. And Russia is too
    big, too strong, and too scary for Europe to resolve this without us.
    Germany may be a political and economic powerhouse, but Putin knows
    Chancellor Merkel cannot enforce European diplomacy. While the
    Chancellor has done a remarkable job in holding Europe together in this
    crisis, no European state can afford to get into a confrontation with
    Russia.
        Without U.S. leadership in this crisis, Putin might succeed in
    creating a new dividing line in Europe. As he creates facts on the
    ground, he shifts the goalposts of what becomes an acceptable outcome
    in European diplomacy focused on ending violence. Europe may feel
    forced to accommodate a revanchist Russia rather than check its power.
    As we've seen throughout history, this is a dangerous formula.
        Only U.S. leadership in this crisis provides the necessary
    condition to ensure the sustained resolve of our allies, most of who
    are bearing a far greater economic cost to their own economies.
        Our strategy today is basically to raise the costs on Russia by
    imposing sanctions, protect NATO, and count on the long-term
    fundamentals, which are on our side and are working against Russia. The
    problem is that we have an immediate crisis. Putin likely sees the
    immediate future as his best window of opportunity. And in the short
    term, we may see a group of nations lose their sovereignty and Russia
    tempted to push further into NATO territory.
        We can avoid this outcome. The United States has the ability to
    rally its allies and international partners around a comprehensive
    strategy that not only deters Putin's aggression, but also avoids an
    unstable grey zone in Europe's east.
        To do so, we should begin by articulating our vision--what we want
    to achieve. I contend that should be a Europe whole, free, and at peace
    that embraces democratic nations in Europe's east and in which Russia
    can find its peaceful place in Europe.
        We should more decisively increase the costs to Russia, including
    by refusing to treat Putin (and the FSB) as normal interlocutors,
    expanding the economic sanctions to include Putin and his inner circle,
    targeting Gazprom directly, and letting Moscow know that we are
    considering cutting off Russia from SWIFT financial transactions.
        The most effective response is Ukraine succeeding in becoming a
    modern European state. We very well may see a shift from the military
    battlefields of the Donbas to the financial markets. Putin after all is
    out to win all of Ukraine, not simply consolidate his hold on a slice
    of territory in the east.
        And yet U.S. and European assistance to date is modest. There is no
    governmentwide concerted effort to assist Ukraine comparable to the
    White House-led effort to implement the reset with Russia. There is no
    response commensurate with how Congress reacted to support campaigns
    against Ebola and ISIS. The amounts of assistance under consideration
    are too small to serve as the catalyst for reform in a nation of over
    50 million people. We are far more generous helping Jordan weather the
    Syria crisis as we plan to provide $1 billion in assistance to a nation
    of over 6 million. We provided $1 billion to 4.5 million Georgians
    after Russia's invasion. While the IMF and EU can and will contribute
    more to Ukraine, the U.S. sets the tone and for now the tone is
    ambivalent.
        Assistance to Ukraine should include substantial military
    assistance. The United States is uniquely positioned to assist Ukraine
    to defend itself and to raise the costs of further Russian military
    action against Ukraine. There is no military solution in Ukraine and no
    one wants Ukraine to suffer a full-scale war with Russia. But by
    reassuring Putin that we will either not provide or greatly constrain
    our military and intelligence assistance, we signal to the Kremlin what
    Russia can get away with. Our current posture is escalatory as it gives
    Russia the confidence it needs to believe it can achieve particular
    means through military options at acceptable costs.
        Any assistance package should therefore include substantial
    military assistance, including lethal military assistance such as
    antiarmor missiles, as well as intelligence support. Such a U.S.
    decision could unlock lethal military assistance from Canada and
    several other European and Asian allies. We should also support large-
    scale training in civil resistance in Ukraine as part of creating a
    deterrent state.
        One vehicle for such assistance could be an expansion of the
    European Reassurance Initiative and renaming it the European
    Reinforcement Initiative to underscore its focus on building well-
    armed, well-trained deterrent states including frontline allies, key
    partners such as Finland and Sweden, and states under duress including
    Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
        Within NATO, even as we continue to implement the good Wales summit
    decisions, the alliance should also move away from ``reassurance,''
    which focuses on the insecurities of our allies, and embrace
    ``deterrence,'' which underscores the threat. To this end, the U.S.
    Congress could endorse a more substantial U.S. and NATO military
    presence along NATO's Eastern flank until such time as Putin
    demonstrates that Russia is no longer a threat or potential threat to
    our allies; support a focused training effort to build frontline
    states' military capacities; call for a halt to any further U.S. force
    withdrawals from Europe; and order a review of U.S. force posture
    including how to prioritize Russia in determining the availability of
    forces to U.S. combatant commands. Such a package could be designed to
    leverage such U.S. commitments to European security to secure greater
    European commitments to defense investment.
        Russia's aggressive new posture has translated into an intense
    diplomatic effort to buttress Russian influence elsewhere, especially
    in southeast Europe, and to disrupt ongoing European integration
    processes. We should respond to aggression in Europe's East by
    consolidating Europe's South. This would mean inviting Montenegro to
    join NATO, undertaking a renewed push to resolve the Macedonia name
    impasse, and intensifying efforts to build U.S. strategic partnerships
    with Serbia and Cyprus.
        A comprehensive transatlantic strategy to deter Putin should expand
    the playing field to areas of strength for us--energy and trade. We
    should harness America's energy prowess to increase global supply,
    while supporting European efforts to create a European energy union
    that includes Ukraine and Moldova from that start. At the same time, we
    should be explicit that our intention is to negotiate a Transatlantic
    Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that is open to European
    nations who have deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with the
    EU, notably Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
        At the same time, the United States must work much more closely
    with its allies on how to mitigate Russian efforts to sow dissension
    within the alliance. Such efforts begin with more transparency and
    stronger financial disclosure laws and practices in our societies to
    expose potential Russian manipulation of institutions, media, or
    political parties.
        Western leaders must also assume responsibility for countering the
    Russian propaganda war by being willing to speak publicly and clearly
    about Russia's actions. If we are unable to recognize the threat Putin
    poses to our interests or challenge the misperceptions that surround
    this conflict, we are unlikely to formulate an effective, sustainable
    strategy sufficient to deter him for the long term--a strategy that is
    pursued not with confrontational rhetoric, but with resolve and
    determination.
        As long as either KGB veterans retain their grip on the Kremlin or
    the nations in between NATO and Russia remain trapped in an insecure
    grey zone, we will face continued challenges and conflict. The Russian
    people, as we saw on the streets of Moscow Sunday, will some day have a
    say about their leaders. But the United States and its allies--along
    with Ukrainians, Moldovans, and Georgians--have a say about the latter.

        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Our final witness
    is the Honorable Steven Pifer. Am I pronouncing that correctly?
        Ambassador Pifer. Yes, sir.
        Senator Johnson. Good. Mr. Pifer is a senior fellow at the
    Brookings Institute and was a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
    from 1998 to 2000. He is a retired Foreign Service officer with
    over 25 years at the State Department focused on United States
    relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe.
        Mr. Pifer.

     STATEMENT OF HON. STEVEN PIFER, DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL
      AND NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
                             WASHINGTON, DC

        Ambassador Pifer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
    Senator Shaheen, Senator Gardner, thank you for the opportunity
    to testify today on Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the
    West's policy response. With your permission I will submit a
    written statement for the record and summarize it now.
        What began as an internal Ukrainian political dispute
    became a conflict between Russia and Ukraine in early 2014.
    Moscow has used military force to seize Crimea, supported armed
    separatists, and sent regular Russian Army units into Eastern
    Ukraine. After a September cease-fire agreement failed, a
    second cease-fire, referred to Minsk II, was agreed to in
    February. That agreement is fragile at best. Its implementation
    will prove difficult.
        Driving Russia's aggression has been a mix of geopolitical
    and domestic political considerations, including the fear that
    the Maidan demonstrations in Ukraine could provide a model that
    the Russian people might emulate. The Kremlin's goal appears to
    be to destabilize the Ukrainian Government and make it harder
    for Kiev to address its urgent economic reform agenda and draw
    closer to the European Union. The West has responded with
    sanctions. While having a major impact on the Russian economy,
    the sanctions have not yet achieved their political goal, to
    effect a change in the Kremlin's policy toward Ukraine.
        Beyond Ukraine, the United States and Europe face a broader
    Russia problem. Moscow has operated its military forces in a
    provocative manner, and asserts a right to protect ethnic
    Russians and Russian speakers wherever they are located and
    whatever their citizenship. That could pose a threat to other
    states in the region, including Estonia and Latvia, both
    members of NATO.
        In response, the United States and the West should pursue a
    multipronged strategy to deal with Russia's violations of
    Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and Moscow's
    generally more confrontational approach. That strategy should
    have five vectors.
        First, NATO should bolster its ability to deter Russian
    threats to the alliance's members, particularly in the Baltic
    region. This entails enhancing NATO conventional force
    capabilities, including capabilities to deal with the hybrid
    war techniques that Russia has used in Ukraine.
        Second, the West should support Ukraine, including through
    provision of substantial financial assistance if Kiev proceeds
    with serious economic reforms. If the Minsk II cease-fire by
    some chance holds and other terms of the agreement are
    implemented, but the Ukrainian economy collapses, that will
    hardly represent a success for Western policy.
        Third, the West should maintain sanctions on Russia until
    Moscow demonstrates a full commitment to a negotiated
    settlement in eastern Ukraine and takes demonstrable and
    substantive measures to implement that settlement. Should
    Russia not do so, or should separatists and Russian forces
    resume military operations, the United States and European
    Union should rapidly move to impose additional sanctions. It is
    important to make clear to Russia that its egregious behavior
    will have significant costs so that the Kremlin does not come
    to believe it can pursue hybrid warfare elsewhere at a
    tolerable price.
        Fourth, the United States should make preparations to
    provide increased military assistance to Ukraine, including
    defensive arms, particularly light antiarmor weapons. Provision
    of that assistance should proceed if the separatists or
    Russians violate the cease-fire, or if Moscow fails to
    implement the full terms of the Minsk II agreement. The
    assistance would fill gaps in the Ukrainian Army's ability to
    defend Ukraine against attack. The rationale is to enable the
    Ukrainian Army to impose costs on the Russian military, to
    deter Moscow from further fighting, and to encourage it to
    pursue a peaceful settlement.
        Some express concern that U.S. provision of defensive arms
    would lead Russia to escalate, but escalation would carry major
    risks for Moscow. It would require more overt involvement by
    the Russian Army in eastern Ukraine. That would be more visible
    internationally, likely triggering additional sanctions, and to
    the Russian public, from whom the Kremlin has sought to hide
    the fact that Russian soldiers are fighting and dying in
    Ukraine. Others worry that providing arms would split U.S.-
    European unity. There is no evidence to back that. To be sure,
    Chancellor Merkel says that Germany will not provide arms, but
    during her visit in Washington on February 9, she did not give
    the President a red light or threaten a breakdown in
    transatlantic solidarity. And other allies would likely provide
    Ukraine defensive weapons once the United States began to do
    so.
        Fifth, the United States should leave the door open for
    Russia to change course and help settle the conflict, even if
    expectations of such a change in Moscow's policy should be and
    are modest at best. Finally, while Ukraine has correctly
    deferred the issue of Crimea now, the West should continue to
    not recognize Russia's illegal annexation of the peninsula.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Shaheen, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, Russia's actions on Ukraine and its more
    confrontational approach represent a serious challenge to the
    United States, Europe, and the West. Dealing with the Russian
    challenge requires a multipronged strategy based on firmness,
    patience, and solidarity with United States allies and friends
    in Europe. But given the large differences in economic,
    military, and soft power between the West and Russia, the West
    should be fully able to meet that challenge.
        Thank you for your attention.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Pifer follows:]

                       Prepared Statement of Steven Pifer

                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Shaheen, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Russia's
    aggression against Ukraine, and the U.S. and West's policy response.
        What began as an internal Ukrainian political dispute became a
    Ukraine-Russia crisis in early 2014. Since then, Moscow has used
    military force to seize Crimea, supported armed separatists and
    ultimately sent regular Russian army units into eastern Ukraine. A
    cease-fire agreement was reached in Minsk last September, but the
    separatists and Russians failed to implement its terms. The Minsk II
    cease-fire agreed on February 12 may now be taking effect but seems
    fragile at best. Implementing other terms of the agreement will prove
    difficult.
        Driving Russia's aggression has been a mix of geopolitical and
    domestic political considerations. The Kremlin's goal over the past
    year appears to have been to destabilize and distract the Ukrainian
    Government, in order keep that government from addressing its pressing
    economic, financial, and other challenges as well as from drawing
    closer to the European Union through implementation of the EU--Ukraine
    association agreement.
        Beyond Ukraine, the United States and Europe face a broader Russia
    problem. Moscow has operated its military forces in a more provocative
    manner near NATO members and has asserted a right to ``protect'' ethnic
    Russians and Russian speakers wherever they are located and whatever
    their citizenship. That policy could pose a threat to other states,
    including Estonia and Latvia, both members of NATO.
        The United States and the West should pursue a multipronged
    strategy to deal with Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and
    territorial integrity and Moscow's generally more confrontational
    approach. First, NATO should bolster its ability to deter Russian
    threats to the alliance's members, particularly in the Baltic region.
    This means enhancing NATO conventional force capabilities there,
    including capabilities to deal with the hybrid warfare techniques that
    Russia has demonstrated in Ukraine.
        Second, the West should support Ukraine, including through
    provision of substantial financial assistance if Kiev proceeds with a
    serious reform agenda. Avoiding a financial collapse of Ukraine will
    require that the European Union and United States supplement the
    International Monetary Fund's extended fund facility program.
        Third, the West should maintain economic and other sanctions on
    Russia until Moscow demonstrates a full commitment to a negotiated
    settlement in eastern Ukraine and takes demonstrable and substantive
    measures to implement that settlement. Should Russia not do so, or
    should separatist and Russian forces resume military operations, the
    United States and European Union should impose additional sanctions.
        Fourth, the United States should make preparations to provide
    increased military assistance to Ukraine, including defensive weapons.
    Provision of that assistance should proceed if the separatists or
    Russians violate the cease-fire, or if Moscow fails to implement the
    terms of the Minsk II agreement.
        Fifth, the West should leave the door open for Russia to change
    course and help end the conflict in eastern Ukraine, even if
    expectations of such a change in Moscow's course are modest at best.
        Finally, while Ukraine has correctly deferred the issue of Crimea
    for now, the West should continue to not recognize Russia's illegal
    annexation of the peninsula. If Russian actions regarding eastern
    Ukraine merit sanctions relief, the United States and European Union
    nevertheless should maintain some sanctions, including measures
    specifically targeted at Crimea, until the peninsula's status is
    resolved to Kiev's satisfaction.
                      russia's aggression against ukraine
        Russia and the other independent states that emerged from the
    collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 agreed to respect the state
    borders as they existed at the time. Unfortunately, Russia did not hold
    to that commitment. The Kremlin has supported separatist efforts and
    ``frozen'' conflicts in Transnistria, a breakaway part of Moldova, and
    South Ossetia and Abkhazia, breakaway regions from Georgia, whom Russia
    recognized as independent states following the August 2008 Georgia-
    Russia conflict. Moscow has again violated the sovereignty and
    territorial integrity of another state, this time, Ukraine.
        Ukraine went through a wrenching internal political crisis from
    November 2013 to the end of February 2014, triggered by then-President
    Yanukovych's surprise decision not to sign an association agreement
    with the European Union. Following the security forces' use of deadly
    force against demonstrators in Kiev on February 19-20, Mr. Yanukovych
    signed a power-sharing agreement with the three main opposition party
    leaders.
        Given public anger over the killings the two previous days, it is
    unlikely that the opposition leaders could have persuaded the
    demonstrators to accept the agreement. In any case, they had little
    chance. After signing the document, Mr. Yanukovych abandoned his post
    and disappeared, later turning up in Russia.
        What had been an internal political crisis became a Ukraine-Russia
    conflict at the end of February 2014, when soldiers, in Russian combat
    fatigues without insignia, seized Crimea. The Ukrainians referred to
    them as ``little green men.'' In a March 3 press conference, President
    Putin denied that they were Russian soldiers. Just weeks later, he
    publicly admitted that they were and awarded commendations to their
    commanders.
        In April, armed separatists began to seize buildings in Donetsk and
    Luhansk in eastern Ukraine. Many were pro-Russian locals, but more
    ``little green men'' appeared. Moscow supported the separatists with
    funding, arms, and leadership. For example, last April, the self-
    proclaimed Prime Minister and Defense Minister of the so-called
    ``Donetsk People's Republic'' came from Russia and had apartments in
    Moscow. Further evidence that outsiders played a major role in the
    early days was the seizure of the opera house in Kharkiv, which they
    apparently mistook for the city administration building.
        Over the course of the late spring and summer, as Ukrainian forces
    conducted a counteroffensive in Donetsk and Luhansk (also referred to
    as the Donbas), Russia provided the separatists with heavy arms, such
    as tanks, artillery, and surface-to-air missile systems. These
    apparently included the Buk (SA-11) surface-to-air missile that
    tragically shot down Malaysia Air flight 17 in July.
        The Ukrainian military nevertheless made progress against the
    separatists during the summer, significantly reducing the amount of
    territory they held. On or about August 23, regular units of the Russia
    Army invaded Ukraine and attacked Ukrainian units in the Donbas. When a
    cease-fire agreement was worked out in Minsk on September 5, Ukrainian
    losses reportedly included between 50 and 70 percent of the armor the
    Ukrainian Army had deployed in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
        Unfortunately, the September cease-fire never took full hold. The
    separatists and Russians did not implement key elements, such as the
    requirements for withdrawal of foreign forces and military equipment,
    or for securing the Ukraine-Russia border under observation by the
    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Instead, the
    Russian-backed separatists over the next 5 months took additional
    territory in eastern Ukraine, adding more than 500 square kilometers to
    what they had held on September 5.
        Last month, with fighting escalating, German Chancellor Merkel and
    French President Hollande met with Ukrainian President Poroshenko and
    Russian President Putin in Minsk to seek a new settlement. After a
    marathon all-night negotiation, they announced a new agreement (Minsk
    II) providing for a cease-fire, withdrawal of heavy weapons away from
    the line of contact, and a series of steps to regulate the political
    and economic status of eastern Ukraine.
        The terms of Minsk II are substantially worse for Kiev than the
    terms of the unfulfilled September 2014 agreement. Implementing the
    Minsk II agreement will require good faith and flexibility on all sides
    that has not been shown previously during this conflict. Many analysts
    expect the agreement to break down at some point.
        It appears that Mr. Poroshenko agreed to Minsk II in the face of a
    deteriorating military situation and an urgent need for breathing space
    so that he could focus attention on a looming financial crisis and a
    very necessary economic reform agenda. Given Mr. Poroshenko's
    acceptance of Minsk II, Ukraine's supporters have little choice but to
    support the agreement and its implementation, however difficult its
    terms may appear.
        Unfortunately, the separatist and Russian forces did not initially
    observe the cease-fire, which was supposed to begin on midnight on
    February 14. They attacked the Debaltseve salient occupied by Ukrainian
    Army units, which withdrew on February 18. The Ukrainians then reported
    ominous signs of preparations for a separatist/Russian attack on the
    large port city of Mariupol in southern Donetsk province.
        Greater restraint was shown after February 25. While some shelling
    continues, the line of contact has been markedly quieter than it was
    during the first week of the cease-fire. The sides have pulled some
    heavy weapons back from the line of contact. The cease-fire, however,
    remains fragile and shaky, and Kiev remains concerned about possible
    preparations for an assault on Mariupol.
                                russian motives
        Russia today is passing through a difficult and dark phase, as
    evidenced by the tragic February 27 murder of opposition leader Boris
    Nemtsov, virtually on the doorstep of the Kremlin. Russia's goal with
    regard to Ukraine over the past year has been to destabilize and
    distract Mr. Poroshenko and his government. That makes it far more
    difficult for them to address the pressing economic, financial and
    reform agenda that confronts Kiev, including implementation of the
    reforms mandated by its program with the International Monetary Fund.
    It also makes it more difficult for Kiev to pursue implementation of
    the association agreement it signed last year with the European Union.
    Moscow seems to calculate that a new ``frozen conflict'' in eastern
    Ukraine--or perhaps a ``not so frozen conflict''--provides the
    mechanism to put pressure on Kiev.
        This policy appears to be driven by a mix of geopolitical and
    domestic political considerations. Mr. Putin's concept of Russia as a
    great power includes a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. He
    does not seek to recreate the Soviet Union; the Russian economy does
    not wish to subsidize those of other states. But Moscow does want its
    neighbors to take account of and defer to its concerns, particularly as
    regards relationships with Western institutions such as NATO and the
    European Union.
        Mr. Putin very much wanted Ukraine to join the Russian-led Eurasian
    Union, along with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia. Even under Mr.
    Yanukovych, however, Kiev made clear its preference for the European
    Union. If Moscow cannot have Ukraine in the Eurasian Union, it is
    working to hinder Ukraine's effort to draw closer to Europe.
        Domestic political considerations factor heavily into the Kremlin's
    Ukraine policy. First, the two countries have long historical and
    cultural ties, and pulling Crimea and Ukraine back toward Russia plays
    well with Mr. Putin's conservative political base. That said, polls
    show that most Russians do not want the Russian Army fighting in
    Ukraine--which explains the extraordinary and sometimes disgraceful
    efforts taken by the Kremlin over the past 8 months to hide that fact
    from the Russian people.
        A related consideration is the Kremlin's fear that the Maidan
    demonstrations that brought down Mr. Yanukovych might inspire Russians
    to mount large civil protests of their own. A weak Ukrainian Government
    incapable of meeting the challenges before it ensures that the Maidan
    model will have little attraction for the Russian populace. This
    consideration could mean that Mr. Putin wants a failed Ukrainian state.
    If so, that does not bode well for the prospects for the current cease-
    fire and Minsk II.
                     the west and a broader russia problem
        Beyond Ukraine, the United States and Europe today face a broader
    Russia problem. As the Ukraine-Russia crisis intensified from March
    2014 onward, NATO observed a significant increase in provocative
    behavior by Russian military forces, including nuclear exercises and
    snap conventional force alerts. NATO military authorities reported a
    marked jump in the number of cases of Russian bombers conducting
    flights near the air space of NATO member states.
        Such behavior is of concern, as NATO and Russian military forces
    are increasingly operating in close proximity at a time of significant
    West-Russia tensions. That raises the prospect of accidents,
    miscalculation, or misunderstanding. For example, air traffic
    controllers in Scandinavia have reported two instances in which Russian
    intelligence-gathering aircraft recklessly switched off their radar
    transponders when operating in or near commercial air lanes.
        Moscow has for some years asserted a right to ``protect'' ethnic
    Russians or Russian speakers wherever they are located and whatever
    their citizenship. Protecting ethnic Russians was a reason that Mr.
    Putin cited for seizing Crimea--once he admitted that the ``little
    green men'' there were in fact Russian soldiers. He made that claim
    even though there was no evidence of any threat to ethnic Russians on
    the peninsula.
        One must question whether the Kremlin might seek to apply this
    self-proclaimed right elsewhere. Kazakhstan in Central Asia and Estonia
    and Latvia in the Baltic region have populations that are about one
    quarter ethnic Russian. The latter two states are members of NATO, to
    whom the United States has an obligation to defend under Article 5 of
    the 1949 Washington Treaty.
        There may not be a significant likelihood of a Russian conventional
    attack on the Baltics or even of the appearance of ``little green men''
    in Estonia or Latvia. But, given recent events and the Kremlin's
    hostile rhetoric, it would be prudent for NATO to assume that the
    probability of those contingencies is not zero and take appropriate
    measures.
        Mr. Putin has displayed a deep antipathy toward NATO, for instance,
    in his March 18, 2014, speech on Crimea's annexation. Imagine a
    scenario in which 40-50 ``little green men'' seized a government
    building in Estonia, citing ethnic Russian grievances, while Moscow
    denied any connection. If Estonia asked NATO to treat that as an
    Article 5 contingency, and the alliance debated the issue for a week or
    two, that would be a major blow to confidence within NATO and a major
    victory for Mr. Putin. It is in NATO's interest to minimize the odds
    that the Kremlin might be tempted to try such a scenario.
                        the u.s. and the west's response
        The United States should respond to Russia's belligerence against
    Ukraine for three reasons. First, over the past 24 years, Ukraine has
    been a responsive partner when asked by the United States. In the early
    1990s, largely at U.S. behest, Ukraine rid itself of the world's third-
    largest nuclear arsenal, including some 1,900 strategic nuclear
    warheads targeted or targetable on the American homeland. By 1996,
    Ukraine had transferred all the warheads to Russia for elimination. By
    2001, it had eliminated the missile silos, intercontinental ballistic
    missiles and heavy bombers on its territory. In 2003, following the
    fall of Baghdad, Ukraine at U.S. request contributed three battalions
    to the Iraq stabilization force. For a period, the Ukrainian contingent
    was the fourth-largest in Iraq after the forces deployed by the United
    States, Britain, and Poland.
        Second, the United States is a signatory, along with Britain and
    Russia, to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, which
    among other things committed those countries to respect the
    sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine as well
    as to not use force or the threat of force against Ukraine. That was a
    key element of the arrangement that led to Kiev's decision to give up
    nuclear weapons. Russia has grossly violated its commitments under the
    memorandum. The United States should respond by supporting Ukraine and
    taking steps against Russia.
        Third, Russia's use of force against Ukraine egregiously violates
    the cardinal rule of the European security order since the 1975
    Helsinki Final Act: borders are inviolable, and states should not use
    force to alter them or take territory from other states. The West
    should push back against this, lest the Kremlin conclude that the kind
    of hybrid warfare that it has conducted against Ukraine is a successful
    tactic that could be applied at tolerable cost elsewhere.
        Dealing with Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and
    territorial integrity and its generally more confrontational approach
    toward the West will require a multipronged Western strategy. That
    strategy should include measures to strengthen NATO, support Ukraine,
    and penalize Russia with the objective of getting the Kremlin to pursue
    and implement a negotiated settlement. Specifically, this means actions
    along five vectors.
                               strengthening nato
        NATO should strengthen its ability to deter Russian threats to the
    alliance's members, particularly by bolstering its defenses in the
    Baltic region and Central Europe. This entails prudent steps to enhance
    NATO conventional force capabilities, including capabilities to deal
    with Russian hybrid warfare techniques.
        In order to assure Moscow that NATO enlargement would not entail
    the movement of significant military forces toward Russia's border, the
    alliance in 1997 said that there would be no ``additional permanent
    stationing of substantial combat forces'' on the territory of new NATO
    members. Although some allies have called for renouncing that policy in
    the aftermath of Russia's seizure of Crimea, the alliance as a whole
    has not agreed to a change. NATO has, however, begun strengthening its
    military capabilities in the Baltic States and Central Europe.
        Beginning last April, the U.S. Army deployed light infantry units
    of about 150 personnel each in Poland and the three Baltic States. The
    Pentagon has described these as a ``persistent'' deployment: when a
    unit rotates out, another rotates in in its place. Other allies have
    increased the size and frequency of their ground force exercises in the
    region. The U.S. Army plans to deploy some 150 Abrams tanks and Bradley
    fighting vehicles in Europe, possibly in Poland; that would be
    sufficient to equip a heavy armored brigade.
        The alliance's air presence for the Baltic air-policing mission has
    been increased substantially since last March. NATO now deploys on
    average at least three times the number of aircraft in the Baltics as
    it did previously. On the southeastern flank, U.S. and NATO warships
    make far more numerous entries into the Black Sea than before.
        These actions have two principal goals. First, they aim to assure
    allies in the Baltic region and Central Europe of the firm alliance
    commitment to their defense. Second, they aim to make clear to Moscow
    that NATO will defend the territory of all allies.
        Meeting in Wales last September, NATO leaders agreed to take
    additional measures. They decided to create a response force with the
    capability to deploy 5,000 troops anywhere within the alliance on 48
    hours notice. In February, NATO Defense Ministers announced that
    headquarters elements would be established in the Baltic States,
    Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. This step plus measures to enhance the
    infrastructure to support incoming troops and equipment will strengthen
    those countries' ability to receive reinforcements in a crisis.
        Congress should support funds for these and other measures to
    strengthen the U.S. and NATO conventional force presence in the Baltic/
    Central European region. Specifically, the United States should
    consider increasing the size of its ground force presence in the region
    and seek the commitment of units from European allies to deploy on a
    ``persistent'' basis alongside U.S. units in the Baltic States and
    Poland. NATO should develop and exercise capabilities to deal rapidly
    with a ``little green men'' scenario on allied territory.
        In overall conventional forces, the United States and NATO continue
    to enjoy qualitative and quantitative advantages over the Russian
    military. The Russian military, however, is engaged in a major
    modernization and rearmament program. NATO must make the investments
    needed to maintain its areas of advantage. The administration and
    Congress should urge allies to devote greater resources to the
    territorial defense of the alliance. Unfortunately, few allies
    currently meet NATO's agreed standard of spending 2 percent of GDP on
    defense.
        The U.S. response should focus on strengthening conventional force
    capabilities. The U.S. Air Force reportedly maintains some 200 B61
    nuclear gravity bombs at airfields in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the
    Netherlands, and Turkey. Those suffice to meet the mission of the U.S.
    nonstrategic nuclear arsenal in Europe, which is fundamentally
    political: to assure allies of the commitment of U.S. nuclear forces to
    their defense, and, if used, to signal the adversary to halt aggression
    or risk a strategic nuclear response.
        Some have suggested that, in answer to Russian aggression in
    Ukraine, the United States should deploy nuclear weapons on the
    territory of NATO members in Central Europe, who have joined the
    alliance over the past 16 years. That would be unwise for three
    reasons.
        First, deploying nuclear weapons to the relatively new members in
    the Baltic States or Central Europe would make the weapons more
    vulnerable to a Russian preemptive attack in a crisis. For example, the
    Iskander ballistic missiles reportedly deployed in Russia's Kaliningrad
    can carry conventional or nuclear weapons. From Kaliningrad, Iskander
    missiles could cover and rapidly strike targets in two-thirds of Poland
    and virtually all of Lithuania and Latvia. U.S. nuclear assets are far
    less vulnerable at their current bases.
        Second, deploying nuclear weapons to the new members would violate
    NATO policy. Many, probably most, allies would oppose such a move. In
    1997, the alliance stated that it had ``no intention, no plan and no
    reason'' to deploy nuclear arms on the territory of new member states.
    While some allies have sought to have NATO renounce or alter its policy
    of not permanently stationing substantial combat forces on the
    territory of new members, no ally has seriously raised the idea of
    changing the existing policy on no deployment of nuclear arms on the
    territory of new member states.
        Third, placing U.S. nuclear weapons so close to Russia would be
    seen in Moscow as an extremely provocative act, on par with the attempt
    by the Soviet Union in 1962 to place nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba. It
    does not make sense to respond to Russian actions with a deployment
    that would make American nuclear weapons more vulnerable, cause a major
    rift within NATO, and unduly provoke Russia.
                         supporting ukraine financially
        The United States and Europe should take substantial measures to
    support Ukraine with grants and low interest loans as it proceeds with
    difficult economic, rule of law and anticorruption reforms. The
    International Monetary Fund has reached preliminary agreement with
    Ukraine on a 4-year extended fund facility that will provide $17.5
    billion. That will significantly help Ukraine, but it will not suffice.
    Ukraine could need an estimated $20-$25 billion more over the next 2
    years in grants and low interest financing. Much of that will have to
    come from the European Union and United States.
        EU officials and member states have shown no enthusiasm for
    providing assistance on that scale. But the European Union may well do
    more, as it does not wish to have to deal with a large failed Ukrainian
    economy on its eastern border. The United States also should be ready
    to contribute more than the loan guarantees promised for this year.
        Finding this money on either side of the Atlantic will not be easy.
    However, if the European Union and United States are serious about
    helping Ukraine, they should provide the financial assistance. If the
    Minsk II cease-fire by some chance holds and other terms of the
    agreement are implemented but the Ukrainian economy collapses, that
    will hardly represent a success for Western policy.
        Of course, the International Monetary Fund, European Union, and
    United States must, as a condition of their assistance, insist that
    Ukraine take the necessary reform steps. Absent such reforms, Western
    assistance would not go to good use. The leadership in Kiev hopefully
    understands that, unless they put in place the needed critical mass of
    reforms, the Ukrainian economy will remain mired in stagnation for
    years, if not decades.
                               penalizing russia
        Over the past year, the United States, European Union, and other
    Western countries have imposed increasingly severe sanctions on Russia,
    following its seizure of Crimea and subsequent actions in eastern
    Ukraine, with the objective of effecting a change in Moscow's policy.
    The sanctions began with visa bans and asset freezes on selected
    individuals. They expanded to major sanctions targeting key Russian
    companies in the finance, defense, and energy sectors, for example, by
    barring new financing or the export of Western technology.
        By all appearances, those sanctions are having a significant impact
    on the Russian economy, multiplied by the effect of the fall in the
    price of oil. For example, according to the Russian Central Bank,
    capital flight from Russia totaled $150 billion in 2014. Over the
    course of that year, Russian reserves fell from some $510 billion to
    $385 billion, in part due to an attempt to prop up the falling ruble;
    the ruble nevertheless has lost half of its value against the dollar
    since last summer. The Russian economy is officially projected to
    contract by 3 percent in 2015, while some economists predict a much
    steeper contraction. Russian officials have responded by seeking to cut
    most parts of the 2015 state budget by ten percent.
        The sanctions, however, have not yet achieved their political
    objective, which is to get Russia to make a genuine change in policy
    course regarding Ukraine. If the cease-fire holds, that will be a
    positive step, but Moscow must also implement all of Minsk II's terms
    and use its significant influence with the separatists to achieve a
    durable settlement.
        Should Russia not implement Minsk II, or should separatist or
    Russian forces resume military action, perhaps aimed at Mariupol, the
    United States and European Union should immediately apply new economic
    sanctions on Russia. U.S. and EU officials should consult now so that
    they have a package of additional sanctions ready.
        Some analysts question whether the sanctions will prompt a
    different policy in Moscow. They argue that Mr. Putin will use the
    sanctions to blame the West for Russia's economic woes and rally the
    Russian people to resist. That has been his instinctive response.
        If, however, the sanctions remain in place, Moscow's financial
    reserves will drop precipitously, and the average Russian will see a
    decline in his or her purchasing power. This could raise discontent
    among the Russian populace and affect Mr. Putin's approval ratings,
    something to which he pays close attention. Moreover, Mr. Putin almost
    certainly wishes to avoid exhausting Russia's reserves. It is not yet
    clear how he will respond if he faces this scenario.
        In any event, even if one were not certain that sanctions would
    deliver the desired result, they allow the West to impose a significant
    cost on Russia commensurate with the nature of Russia's egregious
    actions in Ukraine. Absent sanctions, and having ruled out use of
    military force on Ukraine's behalf, the West would have few penalties
    of any real consequence to levy.
        Mr. Putin may be betting that Western resolve to maintain the
    sanctions will flag, or that he can win sanctions relief with cosmetic
    gestures. A key date will be July, when some of the major EU sanctions,
    imposed last July, come up for renewal for another year. Maintaining
    Western solidarity and persuading the Kremlin that the sanctions will
    remain in place, or possibly increase, absent steps by Moscow to
    facilitate a settlement in eastern Ukraine, could prove critical to
    affecting the Kremlin's calculations.
        U.S. sanctions to date have been imposed by Executive order, which
    allows the administration the flexibility to increase or relax them,
    depending on Russian actions. A threat of congressionally mandated (as
    opposed to authorized) sanctions could have a useful effect on Moscow.
    However, actually mandating congressional sanctions could well prove
    counterproductive.
        The Russian experience has been that Congress is slow to remove
    sanctions, even when they achieve the desired Russian policy change.
    Moscow met the requirements of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment in the
    mid-1990s, but Congress did not graduate Russia from the provisions of
    Jackson-Vanik and grant Russia permanent normal trade relations status
    until more than 15 years later, in December 2012--and then only in the
    Magnitsky Act, which leveled new sanctions on Russia. If Moscow
    believes that congressionally mandated sanctions will never be lifted,
    or if it believes that they will be lifted only years after Russia
    meets the sanctions' requirements, those sanctions give the Kremlin no
    incentive to change its policy.
                          assisting ukraine militarily
        Over the past 10 months, the Ukrainian Army has had to face
    separatists equipped with large numbers of Russian heavy arms as well
    as regular Russian Army units. While the Ukrainian military has had
    some success, it is underfunded, undermanned and undertrained, and it
    faces an opponent that has better weapons and superior intelligence,
    surveillance and reconnaissance assets. The Ukrainian Army has
    significant gaps in capabilities that severely degrade its ability to
    defend Ukrainian territory against further attack by separatist and
    Russian forces.
        The United States provided Ukraine $120 million in nonlethal
    military assistance in 2014, and the U.S. Army will this month begin a
    training program for Ukrainian National Guard units. The United States
    should do more.
        Seven other former U.S. Government officials and I one month ago
    released a report entitled ``Supporting Ukraine's Independence;
    Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do''
    (http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2015/02/ukraine-
    independence-russian-aggression). In preparing the report, a number of
    us traveled in January to Brussels to meet NATO civilian and military
    leaders and to Ukraine, where we met with senior government and
    military officials, both in Kiev and at the Ukrainian army's field
    headquarters in Kramatorsk, in Donetsk province.
        The report advocates a significant increase in U.S. military
    assistance to Ukraine--to $1 billion per year for 3 years. That is
    serious money; it reflects a serious effort to support the Ukrainian
    Army. While most of the recommended assistance would go to nonlethal
    equipment, the report also recommends a change in U.S. policy to allow
    provision of lethal defensive weapons.
        In the nonlethal category, the report recommends providing
    counterbattery radars to pinpoint the origin of long-range artillery
    and rocket strikes, which the Ukrainians said cause 70 percent of their
    casualties. The report proposes provision of unmanned aerial vehicles
    for surveillance and reconnaissance purposes, electronic
    countermeasures to jam enemy unmanned aerial vehicles, secure
    communications equipment, armored Humvees and medical support
    equipment.
        The report also recommends providing light anti-armor weapons. We
    were told in Kiev that the light antiarmor weapons in the Ukrainian
    Army's inventory are more than 20 years old, and a large number of them
    simply do not work.
        Such assistance would help the Ukrainian military fill its gaps.
    The objective is not to give Ukraine the capability to defeat the
    Russian Army. That is beyond what a U.S. military assistance effort
    could do. The goal instead is to give the Ukrainian military the
    capability to inflict greater costs on the Russian Army should the
    Russians resume or escalate the fighting--and thereby deter Moscow from
    further military activity and encourage the Kremlin to work for a
    peaceful settlement.
        Several concerns have been expressed about the proposal to provide
    Ukraine with defensive arms. One is that Russia will respond by
    escalating the conflict. The Ukrainians understand that risk and
    understand that they would bear the brunt of any escalation, yet they
    still request military assistance and defensive arms so that they can
    better defend their country.
        Moreover, while the Kremlin might choose to escalate, that course
    carries risks for Moscow. Significant escalation would require more
    overt involvement by the Russian Army. That would be visible
    internationally and likely trigger additional sanctions, an area where
    the West has escalation dominance.
        More overt escalation would also be visible to the Russian public,
    from whom the Kremlin has done everything that it could to hide the
    fact that Russian soldiers are fighting and dying in Ukraine. And
    taking additional territory means occupying land that will likely be
    more hostile to Russia, whose troops would face the prospect of
    partisan warfare. Escalation thus would not necessarily be an easy
    choice for the Kremlin.
        Others worry that providing Ukraine defensive weapons would put the
    United States on the path to a direct confrontation with Russia. But
    there is nothing automatic or inexorable about that. The United States
    should not send combat troops to fight in Ukraine, nor should it
    provide advanced offensive weapons. The Ukrainians have asked for
    neither. To be sure, Washington needs to be clear with Kiev on the
    limits of U.S. military assistance, but the U.S. Government would
    control any decision about how far to go. It can build in significant
    firebreaks that would prevent a spiraling escalation.
        Still others assert that a U.S. decision to provide defensive arms
    will cause a rupture in trans-Atlantic solidarity toward Russia. There
    is no evidence to suggest that. Our group was told at NATO that, if the
    United States provided defensive arms, other allies--such as Poland,
    the Baltic States, Canada, and Britain--might do so as well. During her
    February 9 visit to Washington, Chancellor Merkel said that Germany did
    not favor providing weapons but did not suggest that a U.S. decision to
    do so would cause a split with Europe. While she did not give President
    Obama a green light on this question, she had every opportunity to give
    him a red light--but she did not do that.
        Our report and recommendations were issued before the Minsk II
    cease-fire agreement was concluded on February 12. The President may
    have put off a decision regarding additional military assistance and
    defensive arms to see whether Ms. Merkel's mediation efforts could
    succeed. The cease-fire did not get off to a good start but appears
    after February 25 to be taking better hold. Given Ukrainian concerns
    about Mariupol, it bears a close watch.
        It nevertheless would make sense for the administration and
    Congress to proceed with preparations for providing Ukraine greater
    military assistance and defensive arms, first by agreeing on the
    necessary authorities and legislation. Doing that will take time.
    Should the cease-fire break down and major fighting resume--
    unfortunately, not an unlikely prospect--early preparations would
    facilitate earlier delivery of assistance to Ukraine. U.S. preparations
    to provide assistance and defensive arms might even bolster the cease-
    fire, as the prospect of fighting a more capable Ukrainian military
    could affect the calculation in Moscow of the costs and benefits of
    resumed military action.
        Should the cease-fire take full hold and the separatists and
    Russians proceed in good faith to implement the other elements of the
    Minsk II agreement, a decision could always be taken later to suspend
    the actual delivery of defensive arms.
              leaving the door open for a changed policy in moscow
        The U.S. administration and other Western countries have talked of
    leaving Russia a ``diplomatic off-ramp''--a way out of the current
    crisis. Securing a settlement with Russian agreement is important, as
    any settlement that provides for genuine peace and a degree of normalcy
    needs Moscow's buy-in. Russia has many levers, including military and
    economic, to destabilize Ukraine. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear
    that the Kremlin is prepared to consent to such a settlement.
        More broadly, Moscow's assault on Ukraine has brought U.S.-Russian
    and West-Russian relations to their lowest point since the end of the
    cold war. Whereas Western policy toward Russia in the 1990s and early
    2000s was based on an assumption that Moscow wanted to integrate into
    the West and was prepared to abide by a rules-based European security
    order, it is clear that neither premise now holds.
        This is not a desirable state of affairs. There remain issues on
    which U.S. and Russian interests converge--such as preventing Iran from
    acquiring a nuclear weapon, supporting the Afghan Government, and
    implementing the New START Treaty. Cooperation makes sense on these
    questions. The downturn in relations, whose onset predates the Ukraine
    crisis, makes cooperation in other areas more difficult at present.
        The West should leave the door open for a better relationship with
    Moscow if the Kremlin changes the policies that have triggered and
    deepened the current crisis--even if expectations of a change in
    Russian policy are modest at best. More broadly, the West should, while
    pushing back against Russian actions in Ukraine, make clear that a
    restoration of a more positive general relationship is possible if
    Russia shows that it is ready to again abide by rules that served
    European security well for almost four decades.
                              do not forget crimea
        The Ukrainian Government has correctly focused its attention on
    resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine and said that the issue of
    Crimea should be addressed in the longer term. That is a wise course,
    especially as it is difficult to see how Kiev can muster the leverage
    in the near term to restore Crimea's status as part of Ukraine.
        While Crimea is not now the priority issue, it is important that
    the United States and the West not forget or move to ``normalize'' the
    question. Until such time as the status of the peninsula is resolved to
    Kiev's satisfaction, the international community should sustain a
    policy of not recognizing Crimea's illegal incorporation into Russia.
        If Russian actions regarding eastern Ukraine merit some sanctions
    relief, the United States and European Union nevertheless should
    maintain sanctions on Russia, pending a satisfactory settlement on
    Crimea's status. These would include sanctions that, among other
    things, prevent trade with, investment in and international air routes
    to Crimea.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Shaheen, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, Russia's actions in Ukraine and its more confrontational
    approach present a serious challenge to the United States, Europe, and
    the West. Dealing with that challenge requires a multipronged strategy
    that aims to bolster NATO and support Ukraine while taking steps to
    constrain Moscow's possibilities to threaten other parts of Europe.
        Getting this strategy right will require firmness, patience, and
    solidarity with U.S. allies and friends in Europe. Doing so will be
    difficult, no doubt. But given the significant differences in economic,
    military, and soft power between the West and Russia, the West should
    be fully able to meet this challenge.

        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Ambassador Pifer. I would like
    to start my questioning with President Saakashvili. You
    obviously have firsthand experience with Russian aggression.
    Can you just describe the events of August 2008 and what
    prompted Vladimir Putin to stop advancing into Georgia?
        Mr. Saakashvili. Yes, Senator. What happened in 2008 was
    that we were invaded by a full-blown Russian force, which
    involved more than 100,000 ground troops. More than 1,000
    armor, 200 combat planes on the Russian side took part in the
    operation against basically what was a very small-sized
    Georgian professional army. And in that respect, first we had
    mediation--exactly the kind of mediation that you see now with
    Presidents Hollande and Merkel by President Sarkozy.
        And he came in. We signed the cease-fire agreement.
    Georgian Army withdrew its forces from the contested area, the
    invaded area, and Russia was supposed to withdraw as well.
    Instead, Russian after several days said the situation on the
    ground has changed. They no longer would abide by the agreement
    and started toward the capital. And what really had stopped
    back then was the United States proclaiming military
    humanitarian operation, moving the 6th Fleet first to the
    Georgian ports, and putting planes in Romanian base, and
    putting the airbase in Turkey on high military alert, and
    basically starting to patrolling skies close to Georgia.
        The other day I was at the office of Senator Kirk, who told
    me that he was--back then I did not know this story. He was on
    duty in Patagon. Actually, the United States had to bring back,
    based on our agreement because we were the second biggest--then
    first biggest big capita contributor to operation contributors
    to Iraq and Afghanistan, but at that moment it was Iraq. But
    the agreement we had, the standby agreement with President of
    the United States was that we could repatriate our troops.
        So, what happened that the United States--the United States
    told--first Russia told the United States to remove the
    military cargo plane from the tarmac of Tbilisi International
    Airport. The United States refused to do that, and that was
    already a first important signal because they were told they
    were going to bomb the Tbilisi International Airport, and they
    did not want to move American plane. American plane stayed on
    the tarmac, and that spared us at least that bombing.
        And second thing, they had to bring back Georgian brigades,
    and Georgian skies were fully under control of Russian military
    jets, and they told me that they would not let through the
    United States plane. And then the Pentagon and Senator Kirk
    told me he called specifically the Russian Defense Minister and
    said we are coming anyway. This is the U.S. plane, and you do
    not ever dare to touch us. And they came in, and they did not
    do it. And that was the key moment when after this launch of
    military humanitarian operations just few miles away from our
    capital. Vladimir Putin's clearly proclaimed goal to depose
    democratic elected Government of Georgia, just like they have,
    I think, more or less proclaimed goal to the post-government in
    Ukraine.
        They had to stop, and that was a clear sign that stepping
    up and counting on who would blink first, Putin at that moment
    blinked first. And I have to say I believe there is no--they
    will try to depose government of Ukraine. They will not succeed
    to do it, but that is clearly their plan. It is not their plan
    to just hold to those two regions like it was never planned to
    hold just the regions of Georgia. They wanted to get rid of
    Georgian democracy because that was a dangerous precedent.
    Exactly like having Ukraine succeed, it would just be a very
    dangerous precedent for Russia.
        So sometimes like in Western Berlin, Americans protected
    West Berlin even from Stalin and Western allies, and they
    protected it through all the decades of the cold war. And West
    Berlin was a showcase of what democracy looks like--should look
    like. And that really convinced all of us--I mean, we did not
    need much of convincing. But they convinced, overall, the
    nations that they had to revolt against the Communist system.
    Exactly the same type for today's world like Georgia was in
    2008, I think Ukraine is West Berlin of today, and it is much
    more protectable than West Berlin ever was, and even more
    protected than Georgia was, by the way, because Georgia did not
    have that strategic depth. That is what the example of Georgia
    clearly shows.
        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. Kasparov, we
    hear frequently that we are trying to offer off ramps to
    Vladimir Putin. Do you believe Vladimir Putin is looking for
    any off ramps whatsoever?
        Mr. Kasparov. Well, he is looking for--of course he is
    looking for any negotiation because he is very successful using
    them for his own purpose, but he has no interest in any
    settlement. I believe for long time that his interest was
    opposite to the interest of United States and the free world
    because he always wanted to create conflicts. He needed
    conflicts in the Middle East. You know, conflict was the
    Iranian nuclear problem because these conflicts helped to push
    oil prices up, and that was actually crucial for his regime.
        And now, he needs conflicts because that is the only way
    for him to sell his dictatorship in Russia. The Russian
    propaganda machine is probably worse now than at any time of,
    you know, that I can remember. My mother tells me that--she is
    turning 78--that it is probably worse than Stalin because it is
    more powerful. We have 24/7 propaganda that is anti-American,
    anti-Semitic, anti-Ukrainian, and everybody. And this
    atmosphere, you know, helps Putin to keep Russian subdued.
        His goal, as was mentioned in two testimonies here, is not
    even just to take over the territory of neighboring countries,
    though of course he would love to enlarge Russia. But most
    importantly, to destroy the system of international security
    that has been created in Europe since 1945 and 1991 at the end
    of the cold war. So that is why all these negotiations for him
    are just, you know, a way to buy time, and to gain some more
    ground, and to move forward because Putin does not ask why. He
    always asks why not, and if the free world vacates a space,
    Putin grabs it.
        Senator Johnson. Thank you. You know, we have all heard of
    the little green men. Do any of the witnesses have any kind of
    intelligence estimates in terms of what Russia has committed to
    Eastern Ukraine, how many troops, what type of equipment? Well,
    let me go to Dr. Blank.
        Dr. Blank. In my written testimony, I quote an article from
    Jane's, which came out the other day, was based on conferences
    between Ukrainian officers and American analysts. They say
    there are 14 to 20,000 Russian troops. A report in today's
    paper said that NATO estimates or that the Pentagon estimated
    12,000. So I think we would be comfortable saying between 12
    and 20,000 Russian troops--20,000 Russian troops are in
    Ukraine, thousands more on the border. And a large-scale naval
    and air buildup, including the deployment of nuclear capable
    missiles, is taking place in Crimea as we sit.
        Senator Johnson. President Saakashvili.
        Mr. Saakashvili. Yes, I have photos, Senator, and this
    clearly shows these are the weapons that are only given to
    Russian special forces. This is highly sophisticated Russian
    weapons, would never been given to any local rebels. They have
    brand new infantry fighting vehicles that have an artillery
    launching system. We hear that they were spotted in parades
    inside Russia just 1 year before the invasion, obviously, so
    that is the regular equipment of the Russian Army.
        But besides, I mean, what we have to keep in mind here,
    first, this is the war as you rightly said, Ambassador Pifer,
    that Russia does not even recognize as fighting. So first, they
    were sending in non-Caucasians, mostly Muslim population with
    the hope that mainstream Russians would not really care if they
    die. Now, they are mostly sending troops from beyond the Euros,
    Far East, mostly from--many of them from ethnic minority areas
    from there, and basically are very careful not to send in
    Moscovites and St. Petersburg people. They had to send them
    airborne in August of last year, and there was a political
    scandal after it became known that a number of them died, and
    that really spread in Russia.
        So what this is telling you, that once you raise the cost
    for Putin's invasion, there is no way he is going to pull up
    with the stakes because there is a very thin layer of tolerance
    Russians have toward human casualties. That is the structure of
    his troops, clearly indicate to you that he is really in some
    way here has very little maneuver. So that is so important to
    take this decision on the weapons because that is going to
    reverse many of the plans he has about that country.
        Senator Johnson. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Pifer,
    I understand that you and a number of your colleagues have
    recently released a report on the Ukrainian crisis. And one of
    the cases that you make in that report is the importance of
    providing military assistance to Ukraine, including defensive
    lethal weapons and light antiarmor weapons. Can you tell this
    panel more about the case that you make in that report and why
    you believe this is important?
        Ambassador Pifer. Thank you very much, Senator. This was a
    report that was issued by the Atlantic Council, Brookings, and
    the Chicago Council on Global Affairs by seven other former
    government officials and myself. Five of us went to NATO and
    went to Ukraine in January to get an understanding of the
    military situation in eastern Ukraine and also specific needs.
    And, most importantly, we had a retired American four-star,
    General Chuck Wald, with us who really could apply a military
    mind.
        The recommendations that we made were for serious
    assistance, we proposed a billion a year for 3 years. And we
    looked at what the Ukrainians both in Kiev, but we also went
    out to the field headquarters at Kramatorsk and met with the
    commander there, the sorts of requests that they had. Actually
    most of their requests were for nonlethal assistance. They
    wanted things like counterbattery radars that could pinpoint
    the origin of rocket strikes and artillery 20 to 40 kilometers
    out. We were told that 70 percent of Ukrainian casualties are
    from rocket and artillery strikes. They wanted reconnaissance
    unmanned aerial vehicles. They wanted the means to jam Russian
    and separatist drones. They wanted secure communications.
        The one item that they requested in terms of lethal
    military assistance was light antiarmor weapons. We were told
    in Kiev that basically their stockpile of these weapons are at
    least 20-plus years old, and about three-quarters of them just
    do not work. So that was the one item that they thought there
    would be a very useful American contribution to filling a
    significant gap that they have.
        Senator Shaheen. And, Mr. Wilson, since the Atlantic
    Council was part of that report, can I ask you to comment on
    that, as well as respond to the concerns that have been raised
    by Germany and France about the potential for escalation of the
    situation in Ukraine if we provide defensive weapons?
        Mr. Wilson. Yes, Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. I
    think of it in two respects. Strategically, if we are trying to
    help support the Ukrainians in achieving a better political
    outcome for this crisis in the East, the absence and the
    clarity of the fact that we will not provide them weapons
    actually undermines their hand at the negotiating table. So if
    you do believe in a political resolution to what is happening
    in the East, by strengthening the Ukrainian's ability to raise
    the cost for Russians if they turn to further violence, it
    actually puts President Poroshenko in a much better position in
    negotiating an outcome, some type of outcome.
        But there is also a moral argument that we should think
    about, and that Ukraine is a sovereign independent nation that
    is under attack from a neighbor. It is under attack from a
    neighbor after recognizing that we were a party through the
    Budapest Memorandum to helping to respect and preserve its
    territorial integrity. So I think there is a moral aspect to
    this as well, that Ukraine has an essential right to be able to
    defend itself, and us standing back and not supporting it in
    that effort I think carries a heavy strategic and moral burden.
        We have heard from some of our European allies of concerns
    about potential for escalation. The Russians could double down
    and escalate more. It is hard for me to see how--President
    Putin is already arguing to the Russian people that the United
    States and other allies are sending weapons to Ukraine. He has
    already demonstrated his willingness to frontally invade
    Ukraine if he needs to. It is hard for me to see how this
    measure actually is any more provocative than what he is doing
    in Ukraine today.
        There is concern that this will split the alliance. What is
    important is that we do this in a way that brings many allies
    on board with us. I think Ambassador Pifer has said that there
    are at least six allies in Europe and Asia, Canada as well,
    that would likely join the United States decision if it were a
    clear decision.
        There is nervousness about a somewhat ambivalent U.S.
    decision to do this lightly, partially. But I think a serious
    strategic decision to stand by Ukraine with support at the
    level that this report recommends would demonstrate to our
    allies that this was a serious strategy, and we would have some
    of them stand with us, and others not openly opposed.
        Senator Shaheen. And do you have any insights into at what
    point, if at all, Germany and France might change their view
    about the importance of providing weapons?
        Mr. Wilson. I think the greatest likelihood is first United
    Kingdom, Denmark, Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Canada,
    Australia, a collection of countries that would stand with us
    first. I do not think you are likely to see, certainly on the
    German side, active participation in the supply of lethal
    military equipment. However, at the Wales summit, Chancellor
    Merkel and President Hollande did commit, as part of the NATO
    commitment, to intensify NATO's support for Ukrainian defense
    modernization.
        And so I think there is a way not to exclude them, but
    actually to include them in a broader strategic effort to stand
    by Ukraine's building of its defense capacities. They likely
    would not be coming around on the provision of lethal military
    assistance, but they certainly would be partners, I think, in a
    broader effort.
        Senator Shaheen. So you do not see that if Russia continues
    to violate this Minsk II agreement and continues to provide
    material and people, that might encourage Chancellor Merkel and
    President Hollande to change their view? Does anybody--I mean,
    you are about to tell me that you do not think so, I assume.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, I would not completely rule it out. You
    have seen a remarkable evolution of Chancellor Merkel's
    position on this. The incredible nature of what President Putin
    is doing has actually turned German public opinion against
    Russia, which was not something that you could have imagined.
    And frankly, Chancellor Merkel has been the key to holding
    European unity together on the sanctions.
        I think this would be quite a big step for them to move to
    providing lethal military assistance to Ukraine. However, you
    have seen the Germans step forward this year in providing
    lethal military assistance to the peshmerga in Iraq, which in
    and of itself is a significant development in German defense
    policy.
        Senator Shaheen. And does everybody else on the panel agree
    with that? Dr. Blank?
        Dr. Blank. Well, the French Foreign Minister said the other
    day that if Russia continues to break the agreement reached in
    Minsk, that France will vote to expand sanctions. I think
    Russia will continue to violate the Minsk Accords, and,
    therefore, I expect France to follow what President Obama did
    today, which is to extend sanctions and perhaps even enlarge
    them. And I suspect that if Russia does continue to move
    forward, that the French can be persuaded over time to support
    the provision of lethal weapons. Germany I am less certain of
    for the same reasons that Damon has given.
        Mr. Saakashvili. Well, on France, I remember that in 2008
    when they supplied the Mistral helicopter warships to Russia,
    when we strongly protested to them because they were guarantors
    of the cease-fire. Some very high level French officials
    replied to us rather cynically that they would supply us with
    the missiles to sink Mistrals, no problem with that. We would
    like to buy them. So France could be very inventive in this
    kind of an approach.
        Now, in Germany, I saw Chancellor Merkel last month at the
    European People's Party Summit in Brussels. And actually she
    took the floor initially and she told, I know some people at
    this table want to ease the sanctions. I am telling you out
    right, Germany will not support it. And, certainly, she leads
    the sanctions movement right now.
        I do not see Germany, for a number of very historic and
    psychologic reasons, ever supplying lethal equipment, but they
    have been good on supplying nonlethal--I mean, in some other
    cases. I think that might happen. But I do not think that
    should be an impediment to the United States doing that
    because, as I said, I mean, there is a moment when only the----
    but the problem with not supplying weapon is of different sort.
    Right now, and this was the case in the case of Georgia,
    because there is no signal from Washington, Czechs, Slovaks,
    Bulgarians, and number of others are refusing to provide even
    spare parts for all Soviet equipment to Ukraine precisely for
    the reason because they do not want to stand alone if
    Washington is not on board. So Washington by not supplying the
    lethal weapons is also blocking the others from doing it
    because that has really become this cornerstone right now, and
    we are at the crossroads. And it is really becoming very
    counterproductive.
        And finally on sanctions. Now, sanctions are always
    helpful, but there is a moment after which a sanctions-only
    policy can cause lots of risk because what might happen is that
    Putin might think, ``I have very little time left, and I had
    better seize the rest of it, go for it. And then, of course,
    from the position of strength negotiate my way out of sanctions
    because Europeans will not sanction anybody for a long time.
    After some time they will come back to me.'' So there is a
    moment when if there are only sanctions, those sanctions might
    be not as helpful as before because you need something else.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. My time is up.
        Senator Johnson. Senator Gardner.
        Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    the witnesses who are here today. I think it was shortly after
    the demise of the Soviet Union that President H.W. Bush had
    said, ``Europe: whole, free, and at peace.'' And now we see the
    complete rearrangement attempts by Russia to rearrange the
    post-cold-war world international order.
        We have seen a determined effort by brave soldiers in
    Ukraine to stand strong, fight valiantly, but obviously
    overwhelmed and over matched. We have seen questions in the
    Baltic States about our commitment. You and I, President
    Saakashvili, had a conversation about timing, promises made,
    and concern within the region, concern about the promises that
    the United States has made, morale within Ukraine, questions as
    to the resolve of NATO or whether NATO could withstand a
    challenge, if that is indeed the question before us.
        And so, your experience in Georgia, you talked to the
    chairman a little bit about your experience in Georgia. Mr.
    Wilson talked a little bit about the commitment of the
    international community. As President Poroshenko's advisor, as
    the person who has taken this role on internationally, do you
    believe that the international coalition exists and will stand
    with the United States to step up our efforts?
        Mr. Saakashvili. Well, Senator, you are absolutely right.
    There was U.S. guarantee, first of all, for Budapest
    Memorandum. But, you know, one of the things I omitted to
    mention was that U.S. also--the Ukraine also gave, on U.S.
    insistence, MANPADS. They do not have even MANPADS because the
    United States strongly insisted they follow up on their promise
    not only on nuclear warheads, but they also gave thousands of
    MANPADS, which they now really need in that situation.
        So, yes, on international coalition, certainly I agree with
    Mr. Wilson. There are countries that are very much on board,
    but they are right now--basically they are standing by because
    they want for Washington to lead. There is no way they can do
    something on their own. I still would imagine Poland might risk
    doing something on their own, but for the others, I would not
    bet on that. But once there is a signal coming from Washington,
    I am sure there will be strong coalition also on supplying
    weapons.
        And one thing we should know also. There are number of
    people, nationals from these countries, including my nation,
    that are fighting as volunteers on the side of Ukrainian army.
    We have Georgian officers dying for them there. You know, we
    are proud that we are part of the operations, ISAF and the
    others. We had lots of people that died in Afghanistan and
    Iraq, fighting alongside of the Americans.
        But also now, many of those people--many of the people that
    went to Afghanistan with Americans, went to Iraq, they are
    fighting in Ukraine. I have seen--we have a couple of hundred
    Georgians from those operations that also went through the
    training, now fighting there. You also see Poles there. You see
    countries from people from Baltic countries.
        So there is already coalition of citizens of the nations
    around Ukraine fighting for Ukraine because they understand
    that it is also their battle. There is also lots of sympathy in
    those nations, but for that, you need for those countries to
    get together. You need empowerment from Washington. And I am
    sure there are countries that will be American allies on
    military front. Nobody is asking for American boots on the
    ground. That is out of question. Ukraine has enough fighting
    manpower. They have people who will stand up for their nation.
    But also--and there will be other countries that will be a kind
    of second rank, like Germany, that might not be part of the
    large-scale military efforts. But they are certainly an
    important component of the sanctions.
        So I think there is an overwhelming sympathy toward
    Ukraine, and I do not see this falling apart unless something
    dramatic comes from Washington.
        Senator Gardner. Ambassador Pifer, you mentioned in your
    testimony that the sanctions had not yet achieved their
    political goal. And you also then followed it up with we need
    to make it clear to Russia that its actions will have a cost.
    So I want to talk about what do you envision--what would indeed
    extract that political goal, and what would the cost be to
    Russia--needs to be reached?
        Ambassador Pifer. Well, I believe that if the West can
    maintain unity on sanctions, the key point here is persuading
    Moscow that the sanctions will remain in place until the
    Russians change their policy course. You have already seen
    significant damage to the Russian economy--$150 billion in
    capital flight from Russia in 2014. Russian reserves fell by
    about $140 billion over the course of the year, largely to
    support the ruble, and it was not very successful. The ruble is
    about 50 percent of the value against the dollar that it was
    last summer.
        So there has been a huge impact on the Russian economy. In
    fact, the Russian Finance Minister, who about 3 weeks ago
    recommended cutting every aspect of the Russian state budget by
    10 percent, except for defense, is now saying they have to cut
    defense. So there is an impact here.
        But I think Mr. Putin is playing--he is making a bet, and
    that bet is that the West will not be able to sustain the
    sanctions. And there is a very key date here in July, which is
    the European Union imposed sanctions for a 1-year duration. EU
    practices are that if the goal of the sanctions is not
    achieved, the sanctions are rolled over. They are extended for
    another year. Mr. Putin, I think, is hoping that there will be
    enough opposition among EU countries in July that those
    sanctions will not be extended, and that he can basically
    escape the economic pain without having to do the desired
    course correction.
        I think that if, in fact, the West can sustain those
    sanctions and make it clear they are on through the end of the
    year into 2016 until there is a policy change, he is going to
    see his reserves probably run out within 1\1/2\ years or so,
    and he is going to see the average Russian facing huge
    inflation. I think 19 percent is the current figure, and the
    possibility that their average purchasing power may decline 15
    to 20 percent over the course of the year. That, I think, is
    going to have an impact on Mr. Putin and his policy.
        Senator Gardner. And, Dr. Blank, in your written statement
    and in your testimony, how much time would we need in Ukraine
    for proper training with equipment from the United States?
        Dr. Blank. Well, that would depend on the nature of the
    specific equipment, but I do not think it is really going to
    take that long. Everything we have seen says that the
    Ukrainians learn very quickly how to use the equipment. If we
    send it over and we send over enough people who know how to use
    it and train, I think it would be a matter of days or weeks at
    the most.
        But I have to argue that we should have been doing this
    months ago because, like Ambassador Pifer, I believe that Putin
    is going to try to use the spring and summer to create a fait
    accompli in Ukraine and break up the sanctions regime on that
    basis.
        Senator Gardner. And that is another question I want to
    ask. How much time do you think we have on this?
        Dr. Blank. Not much because, frankly, my sources have told
    me that basically the Pentagon has been told to go slow on
    giving even the equipment that it has. There is no excuse for
    saying that we are still doing a review of Ukraine needs. This
    has been going on for a year, yet it is going on. So I think
    there are people in the administration who are deliberately
    undermining efforts to help Ukraine, and they need to be
    stopped and the signal sent out that we will help Ukraine as
    needed.
        Mr. Saakashvili. Senator, last year, last March, when the
    whole thing started, had already started, I have been telling
    some of the administration officials why do you not target this
    training, you know. There is framework for training. They told
    me we do not have enough time. Now, Russia has done since then
    six or seven rounds of training of the so-called separatist
    troops. What it indicates to lots of time has been lost. We
    know from Georgian experience, Americans are very good at
    training. You put marines or some other troops on the ground,
    they can train full brigade within 4 or 4 weeks.
        Remember, the other point for U.S. training is that you do
    not have this kind of disorganized troops when you have U.S.
    trained soldiers that might be used for all kind of bad means,
    like, you know, either moving against legitimate government.
    When you have a U.S. element present, that also brings lots of
    stability to constitutional systems of democracies. That is one
    of the beauties of U.S. training.
        And Ukraine also needs this kind of stability as badly as
    it needs help with defending itself, because you know Russian
    plan is, you know, to inflict defeat on Ukrainians. That is
    their hope. And then send back disorganized troops to do some
    nasty things back in Kiev. And that will never work if U.S.
    training is already installed and in place.
        I already have a list that Ukrainian Government has
    submitted to the United States, which is really quite a need,
    and that list has been circulated quite a lot. The U.S.
    Government knows what is needed. It has been done after lot of
    consultation with unofficial ones, with people in Pentagon.
        This is very important, and by the way, I think it is very
    modest. I looked at the list. It looks really modest. It
    includes also some antitank TOW javelin missiles, but really
    the numbers are so modest. And in terms of money, it is really
    not much. What is really expensive, Ukrainians have antiair,
    they have heavy artillery, they have lots of other things. It
    is not matter of money. It is matter of political will right
    now.
        Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Johnson. Senator Murphy.
        Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you to all of you for being here today. I am supportive of
    extending defensive weapons to the Ukrainian Army, but I want
    to express now some questions regarding some reservations that
    I have about that position, but then just open with a comment
    regarding my frustration on this conversation.
        We are obsessed with this question of providing arms to the
    Ukrainians, and it matters. But it is obsessive within the
    American context because it is one of the few, if only, tools
    that we have to try to blunt and combat Russian aggression in
    the region. I was there at the height of the Maidan protests. I
    spent 2 hours sitting, talking to President Yanukovych and
    listening to him give a litany of perceived and real abuses
    that Europe and the United States had perpetuated against
    Ukraine.
        And the reality is that we had a long time to try to stop
    this from becoming a crisis, but because we are not resourced
    as a nation, because we hamstring ourselves when it comes to
    the tools that we could use to try to create greater
    partnerships with countries that are at risk of falling into
    the growing Russian sphere, we then are stuck with crises in
    which we know how to respond to because we know we have the
    ability to supply weapons.
        And so, in the fall I was in Belgrade on the day that Putin
    was coming into town to do an unprecedented display of military
    prowess through the central streets while our Ambassador was
    begging for a few thousand dollars from the Federal Government
    here to increase exchange programs with the United States,
    right? We are not doing what is necessary in and around the
    region to try to stop these crises from happening in the first
    place.
        And so, I think this is an incredibly important
    conversation, and I am glad that we are having this hearing.
    But we had better adopt a strategy soon to stop the next
    Ukraine from happening so that we are not caught in this
    crisis, which is a hard one to unwind.
        Here are the reservations that I have. First, let us admit
    that what we are talking about would be relatively
    unprecedented. We are talking about the overt arming of a
    country that is under military threat and occupation and
    invasion from the Russians. Let us just acknowledge that during
    the cold war when the Soviets were a much bigger threat to the
    United States than the Russians are today, we did not do this,
    whether it was the invasion of Hungary or the invasion of
    Afghanistan. Well, we used other tools. We did not at that time
    make the choice to provide overt arms to the Afghans or the
    Hungarians. I think the circumstances are different today, and
    so I am supportive of defensive weapons. But this is not a no-
    brainer. This would be a change in the policy that we have
    traditionally observed over the long course of the last 100
    years.
        Here are my two reservations, and I will ask the first
    question to Mr. Pifer. Your report and all of your
    recommendations are predicated on the belief that the cost will
    be so high to Putin that he will change behavior. Whether or
    not this provokes him or not, what if the cost is not high
    enough? What if he continues to move forward and the first
    round of arms that we supply are not enough? What are you
    recommending? Are you recommending one batch of defensive
    weapons? Are you recommending that we stage our supply line to
    them to respond to the moves that the Russians make? What is
    our endgame? When is enough too much?
        Ambassador Pifer. Senator, I think that is a very good
    question, and let me break my answer down into two pieces.
    First of all, we believe that providing these levels of
    weapons, which I think are actually on the low end of the
    military scale--we are not talking about F-16s, advanced
    offensive weapons, and we are certainly not talking about
    American combat troops. But the calculation here is that when
    you go and you look at what the Russians have done over the
    last 8 months to hide from their people the fact that Russian
    soldiers have been killed in Ukraine, it is really
    extraordinary.
        And I would actually argue it is disgraceful. Reports of
    Russian soldiers being buried at night, reports of Russian
    casualties hidden. I head a story from a friend of my wife in
    Moscow who said somebody lost their leg fighting in Donetsk in
    August, and he has been told if you disclose that publicly, you
    will lose your pension forever.
        So I think there really is a real concern in Moscow that
    casualties could have an impact. And I am not sure that Mr.
    Putin cares per se about Russian soldiers and casualties, but I
    think he does care a lot about the impact of that on the
    Russian public's attitude and their attitudes towards him. And
    this is against the background of 4 or 5 months of polls that
    show that while the Russian people may support trying to pull
    Ukraine back toward Russia, majorities do not want to see the
    Russian Army fighting in Ukraine.
        So I think there is--I would make the argument that there
    is a good chance that, in fact, this could succeed in altering
    that cost benefit calculation to the point where the Russians
    would say military escalation makes no more sense because we
    are going have casualties. It will require overt involvement by
    the Russian Army, and, therefore, we want to pursue a peaceful
    settlement.
        We do in our report--nobody who wrote the report--we are
    not recommending American combat troops. We even said that the
    equipment that would be provided has to be operated by the
    Ukrainians so you would not have American technicians there. I
    would say we are not in a position to provide advanced
    offensive arms. We are going to have some limit, and I would
    argue that you need to make that limit clear to the Ukrainians
    privately so that they know what to expect. But we can make a
    firebreak that prevents us from getting caught into an endless
    spiral of escalation with the Russians that, I would argue,
    then keeps us safely on the side of not going into a direct
    United States-Russian military confrontation.
        Senator Murphy. Let me just ask my second question quickly,
    Damon. You talk about the fact that some European allies would
    support us, some would not. Putin has a lot of goals here, but
    one of them is to break Europe. And so, this would be
    convenient for him to have half of Europe supporting defensive
    weapons, half not. What is the potential consequences of Europe
    not being together on this? As many have said, the ultimate win
    here is that the Russian economy suffers under the tremendous
    weight of the sanctions such that it changes his position. But
    are we not going to risk losing countries like the Czech
    Republic, or the Hungarians, or the Greeks if we start to split
    over issues of military arming, or can we hold folks together
    on everything else besides the question of defensive weapons?
        Mr. Wilson. I think many of our allies expect the United
    States to actually lead here. And it would not be unusual if
    you look at controversial decisions in the alliance where the
    United States is out front, has key allies stand with it and
    some others stand behind it. The United States is rarely in the
    middle of the pack there. This is risky. It is not a no-brainer
    as you say. I do not think it is the kind of thing that would
    lead to an overt split within the alliance.
        We saw even over something as sensitive as Iraq, which was
    a very divisive issue within the alliance, we still were able
    to craft an agreement of a NATO training mission in Iraq after
    the fact and find something that brought the allies together.
    And I think that would be an important part of this element to
    this narrative that not only does the United States move
    forward with some other allies in concert bilaterally, but
    there is actually a NATO component in which all the allies are
    playing a role in supporting Ukraine, not with arming, but with
    a defense reform and a defense package.
        Your original point I think, however, is right. We are
    obsessed with the issue as the issue of the day. Putin, I
    think, is looking to win right now financially. I think the
    time sensitive part is the collapse of the economy. I think
    that is a real danger right now even as we debate weapons. And
    second, the weapons are effective if we have a strategy, part
    of a broader strategy, where Putin looks up and he realizes
    that we--I mean, we are far stronger across the board.
        You mentioned Serbia, and American strategy that is moving
    on NATO and Montenegro, and actually working to deepen the
    partnership with Serbia to show that we actually pushed back in
    asymmetric ways as well I think helps to fill out a more
    comprehensive strategy, weapons being an essential element of
    that, but not the only element.
        Senator Johnson. Mr. Kasparov.
        Mr. Kasparov. Senator Murphy mentioned Czechoslovakia,
    Hungary, Poland, certain interventions in Eastern Europe. But I
    do not think that we can compare the situation with Ukraine
    because the Soviet Union, as much as I hate this kind of
    action, operated within a sphere of influence agreed to in
    Yalta in 1945, so the world was divided. Today it is totally
    different because we can look at the collapse of the Soviet
    Union or the collapse of Yugoslavia, all new states. Even
    Yugoslavia has 7 new states, including Kosovo. They were all
    formed within the territory of administrative borders created
    within the empire. So all of them, whether they are right or
    wrong, you know, there was an agreement.
        And if you look at Ukraine, every Russian President, every
    Russian Parliament signed or ratified one or another form of
    treaty or agreement with Ukraine, and Russia never, ever
    expressed any concerns about Ukrainian territorial integrity,
    never raised an issue. Even Saddam Hussein raised an issue on
    Kuwait. Hitler talked about Sudetenland or Danzig. Russia never
    raised this issue, so that is why it is absolutely unique. And
    this attack is unprecedented because it violated not only
    agreements, but also the understanding of how the world would
    be split after the end of the cold war.
        Senator Murphy. I do not disagree. I think that is a very
    good point.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Saakashvili. Senator?
        Senator Murphy. Sure.
        Mr. Saakashvili. Senator, first of all, I need to thank you
    for your intervention on Ukraine. I was there together with
    group of European parliamentarians just before you came. And I
    remember--and then we were proclaimed persona non grata, and
    then your visit, by the way, together with the other U.S.
    colleagues, really changed the equation that came at right
    moment because they were really losing steam, you know. They
    had this little bit of frustration were being abandoned. And
    you being there, it really changed the whole idea of what the
    Ukrainian revolution was about, and it made it very much value-
    oriented.
        Now, there is another story there which is not only just
    weapons story in Ukraine, bit about United States involvement.
    It is a good story. And it also has to do something with my
    country because what happened in Ukraine that Georgia--that
    some members of my government became members of Ukrainian
    Government. That is also very unique experience. Our Minister
    of Interior has become their first Deputy Minister of Interior
    of Ukraine, and she is running the reform of Ukraine with the
    United States, with USAID.
        They fired the entire Kiev traffic police, and they go city
    by city. And this is American money. This lady is Georgian, and
    they are together creating new Ukrainian police that will show
    how to work and operate without bribes. That had never happened
    before in that part of the world, or at least in Ukraine.
        Then there is another story. We have our Deputy Minister of
    Justice from Georgia there who is working also with your
    programs and also, by the way, with U.S. Congress funded NGOs
    that are doing tremendous job in the regulation, you know.
    Their bureaucracies like something that unimaginable in terms
    of, you know, discretion of bureaucrats and, you know, how they
    do this corruption thing. This is, again, the Americans doing
    that together with that.
        We have Minister of Health who just had long conference
    together with American donors and U.S. Ambassadors involved
    there on the spot. And they are doing now absolute new
    transparent procedures, how to do these tenders and things
    which never also happened in Ukraine. It was a major source of
    corruption traditionally. We have deputy attorney general for
    Ukraine, which is Georgian, foreign deputy attorney general of
    Ukraine. And now we are bringing--we invited U.S. experts to
    sit down together with them because they are working high
    profile criminal cases. And, again, there is the anticorruption
    bureau will be created where also there be activity for U.S.
    expert participation.
        So it is not only about weapons. I think long term
    Ukraine's survival and Ukraine's strategy should be based on
    the idea that they have something else to offer besides
    military things. But this should all be just be packed up with
    something else as well. Thank you.
        Dr. Blank. I would like just to make two points very
    quickly. The discussion about weapons is insufficient in the
    sense that weapons, to realize their maximum benefit for
    Ukraine, have to be sent urgently, but as part of a broader
    strategy to rebuild the Ukrainian Government and economy, which
    is also an urgent issue, and as an information strategy. I
    mentioned in my paper no one is talking about the number of
    casualties the Russians are taking, which are huge. We are
    doing nothing informationally to counter the wave of
    propaganda.
        Furthermore, to the extent that the United States leads the
    Atlantic alliance, not only will NATO members follow, or at
    least accept what we are doing, we will have also changed the
    balance of fear because right now the Russians are not afraid
    of anything that Europe might do. As President Saakashvili has
    pointed out, when the Russians understand that if they go
    further they encounter United States directly, they stop. They
    even on occasion retreat.
        And finally, we have done this before. Let me remind you
    about Afghanistan where we gave very sophisticated weapons to
    people directly in the line of Soviet aggression, and it
    worked. This is not the Soviet Union. This is an army that
    cannot stand the protracted war or take that kind of risk, and,
    therefore, providing weapons will, I think, help stabilize and
    perhaps even turn the situation around if it is backed up by a
    coherent strategy.
        Senator Johnson. Senator Kaine. Thanks for your patience.
        Senator Kaine. Absolutely. It has all been educational, and
    thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all the witnesses.
        Three topics. First on the sanctions and economic effect on
    Russia right now, it sounds as if one of the takeaways from
    today should be work that we need to do with Europe to make
    sure the annual re-up of the sanctions, you know, the
    continuity has got to be our message, our very strong message
    to the Europeans. And I gather that everybody is on board with
    that. We need to do more on our side. The President did more
    today, and there is more that Congress can do.
        But I am particularly interested in the low cost of oil as
    a perennial problem for the Russian economy. And it is not just
    a problem for the Russian economy. It is also a problem for the
    Iranian economy, which is a separate topic. That is a very
    important issue for us now.
        What are other things we can do in the energy space,
    whether it is sanctions or whether it is assisting European
    nations with energy technologies? We have had a fairly
    contentious debate on this committee about things like LNG
    exports, even to send the signal that that would be something
    we would contemplate into the region to help nations break
    their need to rely too much on energy. Talk a little bit about
    low energy costs and what we ought to be doing to continue to
    pressure the Russian economy using that as a strategy, please,
    Dr. Blank.
        Dr. Blank. There are a number of things we can be doing. We
    can increase the export of oil and of LNG, which would require,
    of course, building infrastructure here, as well as amending
    legislation. But oil can be already sent. It was reported last
    year that we could send 40 million barrels a day for 6 months
    without undermining the statute or without reversing the
    meaning of the statute, guaranteeing the strategic petroleum
    reserve. We could probably still do that. We can further
    encourage much more strongly the building of the southern
    corridor of gas across the Caspian Sea and provide strong
    guarantees to countries like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and so
    on, that want to make that happen.
        And third, to promote not only the building of
    interconnectors within Europe so that new terminals that are
    being built in Northern Europe and the Baltic can then move gas
    to the south, but also if we pass the TTIP, that makes every
    European signatory of the treaty eligible to receive gas
    exports from the United States on an expedited basis without
    going through the very convoluted bureaucratic procedure. Once
    that law is in place, they can then get gas from the United
    States, and we can supplant a fair amount of the Russian gas
    exports, which is what Russia uses for political purposes.
        The problem is not Russia exports gas and oil to Europe.
    The problem is that they can do so and use that for political
    purposes. If it becomes a straight commercial transaction, well
    and good. But to the extent that they have politicized this, we
    need to take that weapon away from them.
        Senator Kaine. Other thoughts on the energy space?
        Ambassador Pifer. Yes. I would just, Senator, just add on
    the LNG. My understanding is that the United States is now
    building to the point where by about 2020 we could export
    between $100 and $120 billion cubic meters of gas per year,
    which would be, I think, a sizable increase in gas stocks.
    Right now, my understanding is in most of Europe now, they
    actually have significant capacity to import LNG. They have, in
    fact, remained reliant on the Russians because the Russian gas
    in the pipeline is cheaper.
        Senator Kaine. Right.
        Ambassador Pifer. But what we want to make sure is that
    Europe has the capacity that if the Russians were ever to turn
    the gas off, which I do not think is likely, and I will get
    back to that in a moment. But that they, in fact, could
    continue receiving LNG, and it gets to Dr. Blank's points about
    building interconnectors, which are now pretty good in most of
    Europe, but there are still areas--Romania, Bulgaria, Greece--
    that are still vulnerable until they get some more
    interconnectors that would allow gas to move from the West to
    the East.
        I think, though, at the end of the day, it is hard for me
    to see the Russians, Gazprom, ever turning that gas off. It is
    almost--it is a mutual deterrent relationship in that Europe
    needs the gas, so they want the cheaper Russian gas because it
    is cheaper than LNG. But if Gazprom turns that gas off, it is a
    huge hole in the Russian budget because they use that large
    amount of money that they make by exporting the gas to Europe.
        I saw figures, and these are maybe about 4 years out of
    date, where about 25 percent of Gazprom exports went to Europe,
    but that accounted for about 70 percent of Gazprom revenues. So
    Gazprom has a big incentive not to do this, but it still makes
    sense for Europe to have a plan B in case the Russians ever
    reach that point where they micht cut off the gas flow.
        Senator Kaine. Mr. Kasparov, I wanted to ask you a
    question. You want to comment on that before I ask you the
    question?
        Mr. Kasparov. Yes. It was said here numerous times about
    the importance of keeping sanctions or even, you know,
    increasing the sanctions. And, of course, that problem is in
    Europe. But sanctions, apart from economic effect, they have
    psychological effect, and so far Putin has succeeded in
    convincing not only the Russian republic, but the Russian
    elite, that these sanctions will not stand. So somehow, you
    know--and he has enough friends, you know. Let us not forget,
    Czech Republic, President Zeman, has been financed by Lukoil
    openly. Open. Now, it is probably Russian subsidies. Greeks,
    you know.
        You can look around Europe and you will find so many traces
    of Putin's actions, you know, and lobbying efforts that are
    unfortunately quite successful. But it is very important, you
    know, that Putin could point out multinational corporations
    that are still operating, and in that sense, you know, a signal
    of confidence. Just 2 days ago, Exxon-Mobil has announced about
    expansion of its operations in Russia. I mean, that is a
    fundamental, you know, argument for Putin--okay, Obama,
    Presidents, you know, Prime Ministers, the business is still
    here.
        And as long as we have this presence in Russia, as long as
    we have business as usual, it will be very difficult to win the
    psychological war because expectations could actually destroy
    the Russian economy even sooner than economic----
        Senator Kaine. I agree with you. I think there is a
    psychological impact. And even if you knew LNG would not get
    there for 2 years, you start to do things that sends a message,
    and similarly with energy sanctions. I am a big supporter of
    sanctions in the energy space. That is the lever that is being
    used. That is where we ought to sanction.
        Mr. Kasparov, I wanted to switch to another topic, which
    is, you know, we tend to look at these things through the eyes
    of political people. From your experience, what will it take?
    What are the kinds of conditions that will cause Vladimir Putin
    to lose political support within his electorate, within Russian
    citizens, because there is outside pressure, but the most
    effective pressure is often the inside pressure when the
    population starts to pull their support from you.
        You talked about the propaganda regime, et cetera, makes it
    difficult for the message to get through. But from your
    experience, what will cause a decrease in the domestic
    political support for Vladimir Putin?
        Mr. Kasparov. Unfortunately, I do not see sort of a
    positive outcome in the near future. Vladimir Putin is not
    going to lose his powers through the normal election process,
    so he is there. He is a dictator, and he made it very clear
    that he would not leave the office. The good thing is that, you
    know, a country so hyper-centralized as Russia does not have
    much political activities outside of the capital. So basically
    even if he enjoys this 80 percent plus support, which I do not
    believe, across the country, what matters is Moscow, and we
    know that numbers in Moscow are very different.
        Even St. Petersburg, today has turned into some form of
    political province. Whatever happens in Moscow could determine
    the future of Russia. And we have a pretty sizable middle class
    in Russia that is used to a relatively comfortable life. They
    travel abroad, and I do not think this middle class will accept
    sort of long-term decline of the standards that have been
    established.
        For quite a while--for many years actually--this middle
    class has been relatively silent. So we saw some of the
    protests in the 2011, 2012. People did not like what has
    happened with the elections, but, again, it was not powerful
    enough. The coalition was not there because the ruling elite
    believed that that it was better to stay with Putin than to
    join the protests.
        What will change everything is that if people in the ruling
    elite, some in the inner circle, and, of course, the Russian
    middle class. They all recognize that Russia will have no
    future with Vladimir Putin. Stop appealing to Putin. He is
    irrelevant because he burned all the bridges. You have to look
    for people who can end his rule with minimum bloodshed. And I
    think it is--as long as Putin stays in office, we will see more
    political assassinations, more attacks on neighboring countries
    because that is the only algorithm where he can survive. I
    think that America has many ways of demonstrating it, and
    talking about European Union is exactly the opposite, you know.
        Putin gained so much influence in Europe because America
    walked away, so only American reappearance there will send a
    signal because everybody wants to see leadership. And I know
    Baltic States well. Forget Germany. I mean, remember in 2003,
    it was rumored that someone in the Bush administration,
    summarized the policy at the time as, ``Punish France, Ignore
    Germany, and Forgive Russia.'' So basically ignore Germany,
    because Angela Merkel is the head of the coalition government,
    and her Foreign Minister belongs to Gerhard Schroeder's party.
    So expecting from this fragile coalition government to lead
    Europe is wrong.
        So that is why America's presence is paramount. Without it,
    nothing will happen. And it will send signal not only to
    Ukraine, not only to Poles, but also to Russian people that,
    you know, America is back to business.
        Senator Kaine. Okay, Mr. Chairman, if others wanted to
    weigh in on that question. I do not have any other questions,
    but I would love to hear their responses.
        Senator Johnson. Mr. Blank.
        Dr. Blank. Yes, in response to your last question,
    undermining Putin's domestic base of support is a long-term
    operation. But it requires the systematic application of a
    strategy to tell the truth, to use the information capabilities
    that we have for maximum strategic effect, and broadcast to the
    Russian people just how bad the situation is inside Russia and
    where Putin is leading them. And that will in time do so.
        Furthermore, as Mr. Kasparov said, it is essential for the
    United States not only to lead in Europe, but to stop showing
    fear and disengagement. And this will also have an encouraging
    effect upon Europe as well. Third, we have to remember, if we
    look at Russian history, that it is always the case that when
    the Russian Government enters into a protracted war which it
    cannot win, that creates domestic unrest at home. Therefore,
    sending the weapons and making sure that the Ukrainian economy
    and government survive is not only desirable as an urgent
    remedy right now to impose costs on the war, but it transforms
    not only the balance of fear in Europe and Ukraine, it
    transforms the strategic calculations inside Russia because
    then you create the pressures that have historically worked to
    undermine this kind of government.
        Senator Johnson. Ambassador Pifer.
        Ambassador Pifer. Thank you, sir. I would like to just make
    two points, one on sanctions. I would go back to the logic of
    the sanctions and go back to something that was being said
    about Russia and Vladimir Putin maybe in 2003, 2004 where
    Russians talked about President Putin having an implicit social
    compact with the Russian people, in which he says you are not
    going to have any political say, but in return, you will have
    economic security, rising living standards. You are going to
    see the economy do well. Sanctions make it more difficult for
    Mr. Putin to deliver on his part of that bargain, and that, I
    think, may have an impact on how the Russian people look at
    him.
        The second point just briefly, I would give a little bit
    more charitable analysis of Germany. I think actually
    Chancellor Merkel has been remarkably successful in pulling
    together the European Union, 28 diverse states with very
    different views. And for her, at least what I hear from German
    diplomats, at core, it is a principle. She really takes to
    heart the idea that borders are inviolable, and that countries
    should not use force to change those borders.
        So with her taking that role, I think at some political
    risk because this is not easy either internally or also dealing
    with the Russians. But she has played a very good role, and it
    makes a lot of sense for the United States to be working very
    closely with her in that role to sustain the sort of unity that
    we have built with Europe over the last year.
        Senator Kaine. Mr. President.
        Mr. Saakashvili. Yes. With regards to Russia, I mean, it is
    very clear that, first of all, the idea of this hearing
    obviously is what will happen next. And I can tell you, I met
    with Putin dozens of times. He always told me three things
    consistently, that he was menacing us with invasion, he will
    always mention that Ukraine is not a real country, it is just a
    territory, and, third, he always said that Baltic countries are
    not defendable. He always says beforehand what he wants. People
    have heard it.
        And it is very clear that what--if he gets away with
    Ukraine, then Baltic countries, which do not have even
    strategic depth or manpower of Ukrainians, they just rely on
    United States Article 5 guarantees, which is important stuff.
    But still, I mean, there are many vulnerabilities that they
    have, even more than the Ukrainians ever had. That is very
    clear that he will continue on because that is the only way how
    he sees he can maintain power inside Russia.
        Now, when we talk about his 80 percent rating, we should
    realize that this is a fear rating. This is not real in
    population. People tend to measure it with measurements of
    democracies, and that does not work this way in these kind of
    systems. You know, I think North Korean leader has even higher
    ratings. It does not mean that, you know.
        So what it means is that basically people have been saying,
    well, Russians cannot stand just any sanctions, you know, that
    is the history of Russia. I think this is not true simply
    because Russia has never had such a strong middle class. This
    is combination first of the United States assistance, bailing
    out the Russian economy in the 1990s, which really was the
    decisive factor, and then, of course, the oil price and
    redistributing it inside Russia.
        This middle class has always lived with expanded living
    standards. They are not used to living with a decline in living
    standards. Nobody has seen them. So it makes Putin panic. It
    makes Putin make mistakes and to become more aggressive. And I
    think shale gas--generally U.S. shale gas--is the single most
    important factor in what has brought him into this panic mode.
        What United States did with its legal system, which does
    not happen in Europe, is that in Europe you can, you know,
    manipulate some environmental groups and others, block local
    shale production because whatever is underground basically
    belongs to the state. Here it belongs to the person who owns
    the land. And that makes the U.S. system so much more open to
    this kind of entrepreneurial enterprise. So that really changed
    the whole logic of the event. Suddenly, good guys have energy
    and bad guys have lower money for their energy. So from that
    standpoint, it is absolutely deciding factor.
        I think that it is not--it is a matter of not many years
    that a thing has emerged, there is a physical fatigue. Every
    leader, even the most autocratic one, has his time span. I
    think Chinese have been smarter with that. They have been
    changing the faces of their leaders, and they have a more
    flexible system here. This is a one-man show. You know,
    everything--there is no other political actor. He played around
    a little bit with other ideas. Gone. Now, it is him. All credit
    is taken by him. Every blame goes to him. And that is a very
    dangerous system for no matter which politician. From that
    standpoint, I am very optimistic.
        The Russian people are well-read people, they are well-
    traveled people. They certainly want to be respected
    internationally, although until now they had it both ways. They
    were getting away with playing around in the neighborhood. They
    were being nasty. And at the time, they still kept some kind of
    resemblance of respect. Now, those two are not compatible, and
    people will understand it.
        And, again, going back, I fully agree with Steven. The
    Afghan syndrome is very important. When I was in the Soviet
    Union, I remember what the combination of low oil prices and
    MANPADS did. Until low prices, it would not have worked, but
    now you have the lower prices suddenly, so budgetary income
    went down, and then MANPADS reversed the logic on the ground.
    That is exactly what we have now. We have lower oil and gas
    prices, and we just need some Javelins, or whatever the
    Ukrainians will be requesting, to change the cost of that
    equation. After all, cost equation matters, maybe even not for
    Putin, but for the Russians or the Russian public, whatever
    elite is left there, security apparatus, it will certainly make
    lots of difference, and that is my main hope. Thank you.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Senator Kaine. I would like to
    go back to the story. I would like somebody to talk to the
    courage of the Ukrainian people. Senator Murphy talked about
    being in the Maidan. I was heartened, I was encouraged by my
    colleagues here in the Senate and the House unanimously passing
    the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which did authorize lethal
    defense weaponry for the courageous people of Ukraine. The
    reason I think we did that is because so many of us went over
    there. I was with Senator Murphy with a bipartisan delegation,
    about eight U.S. Senators, and we walked the Maidan. We heard
    the story of the sniper attack.
        I would like to hear the story of the rebellion, the
    pushback from the Ukrainian military that had been hollowed out
    purposefully, but also the courage of the Ukrainian people
    defending themselves, turning the tide, and then having that
    tide turned back against them because of Russian involvement,
    the Russia's invasion with 14,000 to 20,000 troops and heavy
    weapons. I want to enter those pictures into the record.

        [The photographs referred to by Senator Johnson are located
    at the end of this hearing transcript, beginning on page 59.]

        Senator Johnson. I want somebody to speak to that--somebody
    to answer the question--to answer the plea of President
    Poroshenko when he came before a joint session of this Congress
    and said that blankets and night vision goggles are important,
    he said, but one cannot win a war with blankets.
        Can somebody here just talk about what has happened in the
    military campaign against the rebels, how the tide had turned,
    how it had been turned back again, and then how desperate the
    situation is? One of the reasons I held this hearing this week,
    kind of rushed it, is because we heard last week that there was
    potentially an offensive being planned within the next few
    weeks. We heard that earlier, potentially a spring offensive.
        Can somebody just talk about the history of this military
    conflict, this rebellion, what will likely happen and how
    desperate the situation is?
        Dr. Blank. Well, I can try to answer as much as possible
    that question. The Russians have been behind the attempt to
    squelch the revolution from the beginning, even when it was
    just simply a demonstration on the Maidan. We know that Russian
    advisors were telling Yanukovych's government to repress them
    and use force if necessary. We also have good reason to
    believe--I was told this by Ukrainian politicians in October
    2013 when the issue was signing the association agreement with
    the European Union, which led to the revolution, that Putin
    threatened Ukrainian with invasion then if they signed. And
    there were analysts in this town, myself among them, who warned
    at that point that Putin was doing that. We were disregarded.
        The fact of the matter is that the Ukrainian people have
    sacrificed what the Declaration of Independence calls their
    lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor--their sacred
    honor, to live freely and independently, and to make it clear
    that they wanted a better life, which meant that an association
    with Europe and European forms of government.
        This is intolerable to Moscow for the reasons we talked
    about today. Empire is the only recourse Moscow has to save it
    kleptocratic autocracy. It has become a criminalized regime, a
    state that exports terror, as well as uses it at home, and
    there is no denying that. He has done it in Georgia, he has
    done it at home, and he is doing it in Ukrainian.
        The operation to seize Crimea was started before February
    21. We know this. For example, the medals that the Russian
    President gave out to his troops dates the operation from
    February 20, the day before the EU agreement with Yanukovych.
    Yanukovych then fled that night anyway, but the Russians were
    already active. And the only reason they did not go faster is
    because the troops there were supposed to lead that operation
    in Crimea, were guarding the Olympics in Sochi, which ended
    only February 23.
        This is a cold-blooded premeditated aggression. It caught
    the Ukrainian Government and Army by complete surprise, and as
    a result they lost Crimea. Then they started to use the
    organizational tools they had previously set up in Donetsk and
    Luhansk Cabanas and provinces to agitate there. They took
    advantage of some ill-considered decisions by the new
    government on language policy and created a pretext for an
    invasion in March into April.
        That went forward, but Putin thought he could get away with
    doing that simply by giving the arms and some direction to
    locally organized forces. That proved to be impossible. As a
    matter of fact, they shot down MH317 as we know, and they were
    in danger of losing in August when Putin then had to commit
    Russian regular forces.
        Since then, Putin has had to escalate his commitment and
    basically take over the entire military operation. Now, the
    entire military operation from start to finish was predicated
    on creating on what this new Russia, Novorossiya, a term that
    goes back to Catherine the Great 250 years ago. In fact, it is
    an attempt to destroy Ukraine, create a land bridge from Russia
    all the way across Southern Ukraine and Crimea to Transnistria,
    and project Russian power not only through Ukraine, but into
    the Balkans and Black Sea and beyond. Moscow has even sought
    military and naval bases in Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia.
        It is, I believe, using this truce to replenish its forces.
    The amount of ammunition that the Russians have expended
    because their tactics are essentially basically artillery
    pounding, has been enormous. And they are surprised, according
    to my sources, at how much they had to use in August and now
    again in January to achieve their objectives. Therefore, they
    have to call a halt, they signed onto Minsk, and are trying to
    get a truce so they can replenish. But I have no doubt that
    come springtime they will make a move on, if not earlier, on
    Mariupol and the entire Black Sea coast of Ukraine, and perhaps
    all the way through Odessa as well.
        So, therefore, that is a kind of survey of the entire
    military operation from start to finish. But the start was not
    February 2014. The start is 2005 when the first attempt by
    Moscow to seize Ukraine failed in 2004.
        Senator Johnson. Anybody else just want to speak to the
    courage of the Ukrainian people and why they need to be
    supported?
        Mr. Saakashvili. Well, I want to speak about a pilot, Nadia
    Savchenko, who was kidnapped and is being held. She is a
    military pilot, was active participant of the Maidan protests.
    And she was kidnapped from the Ukrainian territory, brought to
    Russia. She is now held in Moscow. And she is in grave medical
    condition because she has been going through a hunger strike.
    And, you know, there are many Ukrainians like that that
    sacrifice their lives.
        The remarkable story of Ukraine is not just heroism on the
    battlefield, which was very obvious. You know, these are the
    troops that were technological, that for 10 years or so they
    were just plundering everything, giving up everything for legal
    means, but also illegal means. There was lots of corruption
    while Russia was building up things. So that reality came into
    being totally. They were taken by surprise, unprepared,
    untrained, and still, against all the odds, were holding out
    for a long time against Russian forces and are continuing to do
    so.
        Now, the important thing to understand there is another
    aspect to this fight. Most of these efforts of the Ukrainian
    army have been done also by volunteers, supplying the troops,
    medical supplies, even military supplies and the bulletproof
    vests, you know, there have been thousands and tens of
    thousands. And in the case of money, millions of Ukrainians
    contributed. It is not just war of Putin versus Poroshenko or,
    you know, it is against the Ukrainian Government. It is Putin's
    war against the multiethnic Ukrainian nation.
        The other thing people do not really know here is that most
    of the troops fighting and protecting Ukraine are Russian
    speakers, and basically big part of them are ethnic Russians.
    This is not an ethnic issue. This is not, you know--this is not
    a regional issue. This is not, as I said, government-to-
    government issue. This is the multiethnic, multicultural nation
    of Ukraine trying to defend its freedom, its values, and its
    ideals. And the whole society's part of it, because as I said,
    the government was almost bankrupt, and you had people
    volunteering and basically supplying most of the things they
    are getting there.
        And I do not know any other country in the world where this
    number of volunteers, so large a part for the population has
    been engaged in what is an all-around national campaign for the
    nation's survival. And that is something to be considered for
    all of us because, you know, again, as I said, I told you about
    Georgia volunteers fighting there. Basically most of them, you
    know, they are not there for money. They are not paid anything,
    but whatever they are supplied with, these are given by
    ordinary Ukrainians. This is not the government that gives them
    that.
        Senator Johnson. I will let everybody else summarize. I
    want to be respectful of Senator Shaheen. She has a question,
    and then I will let everybody wrap up and give my final
    thoughts.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
    wanted to go back to the economic concerns because one of you I
    think--I am not sure who--suggested that support for weapons
    may be moot if the economy fails in Ukraine before that
    happens. And I know that the IMF has pledged funding as has the
    EU and the United States, of course.
        But to what extent can the Ukrainian economy, and President
    Poroshenko, and the government survive the reforms that are
    being asked of it, and keep the economy afloat, and continue
    this military conflict at the same time? And what more can the
    United States do to help with that? Damon, do you want to
    start?
        Mr. Wilson. Senator, I think that is exactly one of my key
    concerns right now is that there may be a rationale for the
    military fighting to die down. Putin does not need to own two
    slices of Donetsk and Luhansk. He needs all of Ukraine. And I
    think part of the strategy that I am most concerned about right
    now is which economy collapses first, and can he raise
    Ukraine--can he push Ukraine's off the cliff first.
        This is why I have been, on the one hand, alarmed at how
    long and difficult it has been to get a significant
    international package together that includes the U.S.'s
    catalytic, but the IMF and the EU will add more. And at the
    same time, we are asking Ukrainians to do some quite difficult
    reforms. I think this is the moment.
        President Poroshenko and Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, they
    understand that they have had predecessors that had an
    opportunity to build a new Ukraine, and they failed at the time
    of independence, at the time of the Orange Revolution. They do
    not have many other shots at it. And so, despite the
    difficulty, I think being able to communicate to the Ukrainian
    people that in this time of existential crisis is when they
    need to take some pretty dramatic steps. And we just saw the
    Rada pass very significant legislation which will begin to
    raise overall energy prices and begin to address some
    structural economic issues.
        But the gap there I think is a much more robust and much
    more decisive intervention on the part of the international
    community providing that economic assistance and providing that
    comfort because this is the race that I think--Putin can let it
    sit for a while, allow his little project Sparta to build up
    its weapons, and try to go for all of the Ukraine by driving
    down the economy, after all, trying to drive the collapse of
    this government.
        Senator Shaheen. Anyone else want to comment on that?
    Ambassador Pifer and then Dr. Blank.
        Ambassador Pifer. Yes, Senator. No, I think this is why we
    need to talk about a multipronged strategy. I mean, it is has
    got to be not just providing arms. It has also got to be
    maintaining sanctions. It has also got to be doing the economic
    finance, which I think will be costly. The IMF program, as I
    understand it, is for $17.5 billion over 4 years. I have heard
    some economists suggest that in 2015 and 2016, above and beyond
    that Ukraine could need an additional $20 to $22 billion.
        If we provide all the weapons in the world, and they hold
    the Russians off, and they stabilize line of contact, and the
    economy collapses, the West has lost its policy goal. Likewise,
    if we make the economy work, if we get them through the
    reforms, but then they have the military collapse, that is a
    loss. We have got to be doing both these pieces at the same
    time. And I think we have to face up to it. It will require
    probably an injection of serious resources both by Europe and
    the United States.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Dr. Blank.
        Dr. Blank. I would add to that, that while everything my
    colleagues have said I agree with, that what is critical here
    as well I think is the psychological dimension. We are asking
    Ukrainians to do something of an extraordinarily difficult
    nature, and they have not the sense that we stand behind them.
    On the other hand, if they were aware and understood that they
    had the full support of the United States and of Europe, and
    that they were not alone, that would provide an enormous
    psychological strength and reinforce other European states'
    ability and willingness to help them. And it would undermine a
    great deal of Russia's strategy.
        Therefore, all these factors come together--the provision
    of weapons and training, the economic and political assistance,
    and the overwhelming psychological assurance that you are not
    alone.
        Senator Shaheen. I certainly agree with that. We have sent
    mixed signals, and I would hope that Ukraine would know that we
    are behind them 100 percent. I do hope that this Congress can
    pass the reforms to the IMF, too, because that would allow us
    additional assistance as we are looking where can we provide
    economic assistance to Ukraine.
        President Saakashvili.
        Mr. Saakashvili. Well, I have just to add that besides $17
    billion, overall pledge is $40 billion for the reform package.
    It is very important United States--we are trying to now
    jumpstart the reforms, but it is very important also this
    committee and generally overall the U.S. Congress pays greater
    attention. We need more CODELs coming, and specifically not
    only with a focus on military issue, which is urgent issue
    because it has become tantamount to the symbol of whether
    Ukraine is abandoned or not, but it is beyond that. What is
    really needed is real crackdown on corruption, real economic
    changes, really for ordinary Ukrainians to see the difference.
        And from that standpoint, from our own experience in
    Georgia, the United States standing by the idea of reform, we
    are steering in right direction, you know, giving incentives,
    giving praise when necessary and sometimes offering friendly
    criticism when it is also necessary. It is absolutely key for
    reforms inside Ukraine to know what has been there for decades,
    invested interests, you know, of plundering and basically
    robbing that is potentially a very rich nation with very smart
    people and very talented people.
        And I think this is the best Parliament they ever had right
    now. It is more clean of any previous legislatures, so it is
    very easy to work through these parliamentarians. Many of them
    are quite inexperienced, so they need to be introduced also to
    the U.S. system. You need to bring them here as well. You need
    to get know them--get to know them, you know.
        And I think there is--that reminds of what--we were like
    this in mid-1990s. And I remember our first--I was
    parliamentarian back in 1996, fresh from GW law school here.
    And I remember coming back every time, every 3, 4, 5, 6 months
    together with a bunch of younger parliamentarians, not just to
    talk to you or ask for help, but to learn, to get educated, you
    know, and exchange ideas. That was absolutely the single
    strongest factor behind Georgian democracy, somehow getting
    stronger and also communication with people. And I think
    Ukrainians see this more than ever. And I think you are all
    here deciding--I think this hearing also has a key role to play
    for that.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you all very much for your
    compelling testimony and for your continued focus on Ukraine.
    And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.
        Senator Johnson. Thank you, and I want to thank all of my
    colleagues for attending. I will just give everybody a chance
    to quickly wrap up. We will go in reverse order. We will start
    with Ambassador Pifer. If there is something that you have not
    been able to get out, please say it.
        Ambassador Pifer. Thank you, Senator. I guess I would come
    back to one point about how far the Russians want to go. And
    although I do not exclude that the Russians might try to go all
    the way to Crimea to create the land bridge, I worry a little
    bit less about that than I think Dr. Blank does. It has been
    interesting that in the last 5 or 6 months, I do not think
    Vladimir Putin has mentioned the term ``Novorossiya'' once. And
    what I hope that means is he understands that the further West
    the Russians go, the more they are going to encounter a hostile
    population and the possibility of partisan warfare. Having said
    that, I still think the Russians have a lot of possibilities
    just fighting along the current line without a major offensive
    to distract and destabilize the government in Kiev, and that
    may be their cheaper option.
        My final point would be whether we are concerned more about
    the big option of going to Crimea or just having more of a not
    so frozen conflict along the line of conflict. Providing
    weapons in the context of sanctions and economic assistance to
    Ukraine is a way to challenge or to change that calculation in
    Moscow, and hopefully bring the Russians to conclude that
    fighting no longer is worthwhile, and that they have to find a
    way to finally take that diplomatic off ramp.
        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Wilson, one
    final thought?
        Mr. Wilson. Senator, I wanted to go back to your last
    statement because I think it was one of the most important
    things here about the Ukrainian people. I think that is one of
    the most factors that outside actors actually under appreciate.
    Ukraine is the victim of the tyranny of low expectations.
    President Putin could not imagine that the Ukrainian people
    could rise up and determine their future. They were skeptical
    of the fact that the Ukrainians would even have a common
    national identity. And the irony of his invasion of Ukraine has
    more to consolidate and strengthen that sense of identity and
    purpose than any single thing. If we play this right, this is
    actually a 500-year defeat for Russia to have actually lost a
    country like Ukraine, which is a natural partner, a natural
    neighbor, and decisively having turned that country to the
    West.
        And yet the West also has a tyranny of low expectations
    toward Ukraine. If you talk to our Treasury officials, IMF
    officials, they are skeptical that Ukraine is a good
    investment. We have seen this fail before. If you talk to
    realists, they think, well, we can just cut a deal over the
    Ukrainian people's heads, that this country will never go to
    NATO. I do not think that works any more. That is not--
    President Poroshenko himself has now real constraints. I was
    there when protestors were outside his office because he was
    willing to agree to a cease-fire. The Ukrainian people now have
    a say in the future of what is going to happen, and I think
    outsiders underestimate that factor that the Maidan was
    genuine, and it is what drove this from the beginning.
        So I would just conclude with, we should remember how all
    of this started, that Ukrainians were actually willing to die
    for this concept of Europe, for a Europe which is at best
    skeptical about even wanting Ukraine as part of the European
    Union. And so, that leads me back to where we fit into this.
        The entire chapter of integration in Europe has been driven
    by U.S. leadership, it is European integration, driven by the
    United States, being a great European power, providing the
    framework and helping that happen. If we stand back and think
    of ourselves as an observer as this unfolds, as an observer of
    what Europe and Ukraine will do together, I think this will
    fail. But if we see ourselves as a driver of helping to support
    the European aspirations of Ukraine, I think we can get this
    right.
        Senator Johnson. Thank you. President Obama said we are the
    indispensable Nation. In addition to looking to Europe, the
    other aspiration really was a corruption free Ukraine. It is a
    combination of both of those elements that created that
    courage.
        Dr. Blank.
        Dr. Blank. Thank you, Senator. I just want to leave the
    committee with the thought that on March 12, 1947, President
    Truman stood in the Capitol and said that it was the policy of
    the United States to support free peoples. And at that time, he
    was responding to a Soviet challenge in the Black Sea, Greece
    and Turkey, in particular.
        That mission has not changed, and as Damon has said, if we
    are to see a Europe that is whole and free, we must help lead
    the process. We cannot be disengaged or lead from behind
    because then we just open up Europe to the ancient horrors that
    we now see taking over, of autocratic warlike criminal
    governments seizing territories at their whim.
        The people of Ukraine have shed their own blood in order
    get their freedom. As I mentioned, they have pledged their
    sacred honor, their fortunes, and their lives, and we can do no
    less. Thank you.
        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Doctor.
        Mr. Kasparov.
        Mr. Kasparov. Yes. I think we should pay attention to
    Putin's propaganda machine, and it is a fact that we could see
    and hear in Europe and in the United States. Many people
    believe, as President Saakashvili mentioned, that it is an
    ethnic conflict. There were over 23 years of existence of
    independent Ukraine, maybe with the exception of Crimea when it
    was a rogue political group that made 4 percent of the
    elections.
        Ukraine did not have any political movement for secession
    unlike Catalonia or Scotland. So those are examples that the
    Russian Government wants to bring in, or Kosovo. There was
    always a movement, even Ireland you had, you know, terrorist
    groups, but also the political wing. So there were political
    movements demanding independence. We never heard of the
    existence of such groups in Ukraine. So that is why when I read
    in the Minsk agreement about the political settlement, I still
    do not understand who is going to settle on the opposite side,
    the gangs supported by Putin because political groups in
    Eastern Ukraine never created a core entity that specifically
    asked for independence.
        And, of course, it is important to mention that most of the
    people fighting in East Ukraine, they are Russians on both
    sides, ethnic Russians. And as Ambassador Pifer mentioned, the
    term, Novorossiya, has disappeared completely because Putin
    realized that his grandiose plan of bringing eight Ukrainian
    regions all the way down from Luhansk from Odessa to have the
    corridor to both Crimea and Moldova failed because ethnic
    Russians did not want to embrace Russian troops. Moreover, he
    could experience resistance even in Donetsk and Luhansk, so not
    mentioning, you know, further south and west to Dnipropetrovsk
    or Harikov.
        So it is a war that has an aggressor who is trying to use
    this ethnic card, but we have to reveal the true nature of the
    conflict. A Ukrainian nation has been formed, and this is a
    nation that wants to be in Europe, and it is a multi-ethnic
    community. Russian has been widely spoken there. If I
    understand correctly, more channels in Ukraine are using
    Russian than Ukraine or major TV talk shows in Ukraine that are
    run by journalists who have Russian as their first language. So
    this Putin propaganda machine should be confronted with a
    strong message that we are not going to buy these arguments,
    which unfortunately are still being bought by Europeans.
        And summarizing this. We talked about, you know, the
    sanctions and about actions of Western governments vis-a-vis
    the commercial or economic interests of Putin's Russia. But let
    us not forget about the damage made by Russian propaganda
    called Russian Roulette. It spreads lies to millions and
    millions of homes around the world, and it is not a normal TV
    station. It is a propaganda tool, well built, you know, well
    paid. And as far as I understand, you know, alongside with
    military and interior forces, those are protected items in the
    budget because Putin knows that he needs his propaganda
    machine, and we should confront him on this turf as well. Thank
    you.
        Senator Johnson. We have unilateral desires when it comes
    to providing information and the truth. President Saakashvili,
    any final thoughts?
        Mr. Saakashvili. Yes. Yes. Senator, I wanted to thank you
    for this hearing. We have now live feed to many Ukrainian
    television channels. It is a country of more than 40 million
    people, and I think many of them will be watching what is being
    said in the U.S. Congress and this committee. More than that,
    you know, I mean, in Georgia it is being watched. In Moldova it
    is being watched. In Georgia they have the Saakashvili
    presidential library, and actually after midnight. And I was
    just told by my assistant there is a full hall. They are
    assembled watching it live on television. And that can tell you
    people come and showing up so late at night watching or trying
    to watch this together, what kind of impact these kind events
    have in our part of world.
        And that is one part of it. So the other part of it is that
    Putin never made secret that he is not after Poroshenko or
    after any of this. He is after the United States. He has said
    it publicly many times. He has depicted his confrontation with
    the United States. So even if some elements in the United
    States would not want to be part of it, but from Putin's point
    of view they are, and he is striking at the U.S. interests.
        So from that standpoint, it is very important that with all
    the moral support the people have been getting, especially from
    this building and from your committee and from you personally,
    Senator, they now finally get also the ultimate decisions
    because those decisions are going to make huge--will have
    besides, like very concrete changes on the ground, huge moral
    boosting effect because in these kind of confrontations, it is
    very important, I know it from our experience, to know that you
    are on the right side.
        So, again, thank you, Senator, for being on the right side
    today together with other members of the committee. And thank
    you for all your support, and your impact, and your
    contribution.
        Senator Johnson. Well, again, I want to thank all of the
    witnesses for your time, your thoughtful testimony, as Dr.
    Blank said, for telling the truth, and for just fighting for
    freedom.
        The record will remain open until the close of business on
    March 11, one week from today, for questions for the record.
        Senator Johnson. This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

          Photos of Russia's Invasion Submitted by Senator Ron Johnson

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