[Senate Hearing 114-125]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-125
PASSENGER RAIL SAFETY: ACCIDENT PREVENTION
AND ON-GOING EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT
TRAIN CONTROL TECHNOLOGY
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 10, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
97-741 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
MARCO RUBIO, Florida CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
TED CRUZ, Texas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
JERRY MORAN, Kansas EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska CORY BOOKER, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TOM UDALL, New Mexico
DEAN HELLER, Nevada JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
CORY GARDNER, Colorado GARY PETERS, Michigan
STEVE DAINES, Montana
David Schwietert, Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, General Counsel
Jason Van Beek, Deputy General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Clint Odom, Democratic General Counsel and Policy Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on June 10, 2015.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 1
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Blunt....................................... 30
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 33
Statement of Senator Manchin..................................... 35
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 38
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 39
Statement of Senator Booker...................................... 42
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 43
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 45
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 47
Statement of Senator Gardner..................................... 48
Statement of Senator Johnson..................................... 49
Witnesses
Hon. T. Bella Dinh-Zarr, PhD, MPH, Vice Chairman, National
Transportation Safety Board.................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
DJ Stadtler, Vice President of Operations, Amtrak................ 15
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Robert C. Lauby, Associate Administrator for Safety and Chief
Safety Officer, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S.
Department of Transportation................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Charles Mathias, Associate Chief, Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau, Federal Communications Commission...................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Steve Daines to:
DJ Stadtler.................................................. 53
Charles Mathias.............................................. 53
PASSENGER RAIL SAFETY: ACCIDENT
PREVENTION AND ON-GOING EFFORTS TO
IMPLEMENT TRAIN CONTROL TECHNOLOGY
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 10, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John Thune,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Thune [presiding], Blunt, Ayotte,
Fischer, Johnson, Gardner, Nelson, Cantwell, McCaskill,
Klobuchar, Blumenthal, Markey, Booker, Manchin, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
The Chairman. This hearing will come to order.
As Ranking Member Nelson and I noted after the tragic
derailment of Amtrak train 188 in Philadelphia last month, the
victims, their families, and all those affected by the accident
remain in our thoughts and prayers.
We convene today's hearing to evaluate how we can assist
railroads and passenger rail operators to prevent derailments
like Amtrak 188 in the future.
While the cause of this accident has not been officially
determined, preliminary data from NTSB show that Amtrak 188 was
traveling through the curve at Frankford Junction at a speed of
106 miles per hour, despite the maximum authorized speed of 50
miles per hour on that curve. Without question, speed was a
factor in this derailment and human error may have contributed
to the excessive speed, underscoring the importance of train
control technology and other strategies to address this
accident risk.
Today we will hear from a panel of experts on accident
prevention and train control, focusing in particular on
positive train control. We know that automatic train control
and older automatic braking technology was in effect on the
southbound tracks at Frankford Junction, but not on the
northbound tracks where the derailment occurred. Automatic
train control protections, which are cheaper and quicker to
implement than positive train control systems, may have made a
critical difference in the Amtrak 188 derailment and have since
been implemented by Amtrak at Frankford Junction.
Amtrak is engaged in a complete survey of the Northeast
Corridor to identify and implement other necessary automatic
train control modifications. While additional automatic train
control protections must be implemented immediately, where
feasible and appropriate, positive train control is a more
advanced, transformative safety technology that, when properly
configured and fully operational, will more effectively prevent
accidents. When it comes to more robust overspeed derailment,
train-to-train collision prevention and work zone incursion,
and misplaced switch protection, PTC offers critical safety
benefits that are simply not achieved through any other
existing technology.
While I fully support the implementation of PTC, for years
I have noted the complexity of its full implementation for both
passenger and certain freight railroads. The mandate covers
over 60,000 miles of track and over 20,000 locomotives, and the
complexity is compounded by the challenges of achieving
seamless interoperability across passenger and freight
railroads with differing systems.
Among other things, PTC has required the formulation of 26
new technical standards facilitating the development of new
communications equipment, on-board displays, back office
servers, the acquisition and integration of radio spectrum and
the mapping of 400,000 field assets.
Many challenges were not fully understood or appreciated
when PTC was mandated in 2008 following the tragic Metrolink
accident in California or when railroads drafted their initial
PTC implementation plans following the final implementing rule
in 2010. The technical complexity is why. As implementation
progressed, the FRA in 2012 and GAO in 2013 warned that most
railroads would not meet the December 31, 2015 statutory
deadline to implement PTC. FRA found that railroads encountered
extensive and unexpected technical and programmatic challenges,
and GAO found that railroads could encounter operational risks
from trying to meet the deadline while components were still in
development.
That being said, railroads have made progress on
implementation. Over 13,000 locomotives are equipped or
partially equipped and over 8,000 signals have been replaced.
Railroads have also committed significant funds. Passenger
railroads have spent over $1 billion, and freight railroads
have spent over $5 billion. But due to the complexity and
implementation challenges with PTC, the vast majority of
railroads will not meet the deadline.
As a result of this reality, the question in Congress has
not been whether to extend the deadline, but rather how to
extend the deadline.
Senator Feinstein, with original cosponsors Boxer,
Blumenthal, Schumer, and Gillibrand, introduced a bill, Senate
Bill 1006, that would extend the deadline to 2018 on a case-by-
case basis in one-year increments.
The Administration proposes giving the Secretary of
Transportation discretion to extend the deadline with no hard
end date on a case-by-case basis. The Administration also
proposes to allow the Secretary to exempt track from the PTC
mandate altogether if a railroad implements alternative
strategies that meet certain criteria.
Senator Blunt, with 13 cosponsors, 10 of which are on this
committee, including me, introduced a bipartisan bill, Senate
Bill 650, that was successfully reported out of this committee
granting an extension to 2020 with case-by-case extensions for
testing, certification, or extenuating circumstances for up to
2 additional years. As amended by Senator Blumenthal, the bill
would require annual progress reports submitted to the
Secretary.
There is merit in ensuring that railroads focus their time
and resources on installing and testing PTC appropriately so
that the systems work as intended, especially given the $6
billion investment to date and the great need to put that
investment to use. But there is also merit in providing
additional oversight to ensure expeditious implementation.
Understanding that there is broad agreement on the need for
deadline extension, I hope Congress can soon come together on a
thoughtful, revised implementation framework for this important
safety technology. Otherwise, there could be some potentially
significant effects when each railroad that cannot meet the
deadline must decide whether to stop service or operate in
violation of the law, subject to penalties and unknown
liability risk.
After December 31, each railroad must evaluate the legality
of allowing passenger operations over their tracks and the
legality of shipping toxic-by-inhalation materials that are
nevertheless critical to so many parts of our economy, from
ammonia for our fertilizer to chlorine for our water.
Alternative modes of transportation may not be as efficient or
as safe.
In the course of our hearing today, in addition to PTC, I
expect that we will discuss other noteworthy, ongoing safety
initiatives. Without question, we must improve the safety of
our Nation's passenger rail system.
To that end, I commend Senators Wicker and Booker for their
leadership on the passenger rail bill, which will be introduced
later this month and has a dedicated safety title that
addresses many of these important issues. The Committee looks
forward to considering their bipartisan bill later this month.
With that, I will yield to our distinguished Ranking
Member, the Senator from Florida, Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And you are right. Tragically, the reason we are here for
this hearing is that our rail safety efforts have not worked.
And while this investigation is ongoing, the solution is
apparent. We need positive train controls installed and
activated as soon as possible.
Now, we have heard about the technical challenges and
reasons for delay, and undoubtedly, the installation of PTC is
complex, but just talking about the technical challenges will
not make them go away. We need to get this technology installed
quickly, and then we must do some more. We must make sure that
we prevent further delays. And we must also consider whether
additional technologies or changes in operations could prevent
these kinds of crashes. While we know that PTC is, we think,
the best solution, I would like to hear from you all today if
there are other measures that can be put into place in the
meantime to protect passengers.
We must also make sure that our passenger and commuter
railroads have the funding that they need to install PTC.
According to the American Public Transportation Association,
commuter rail needs between $2 billion to $3 billion to
implement and install these systems. But what are we facing?
Instead of looking at these increases, we are facing cuts. I
think we are going to have to reverse that course.
And finally, we would like for no accidents to occur at
all, which is the standard, but we know that they will. So we
need to protect the victims when those accidents occur. The
victims and their families ought to receive appropriate
compensation, but an arbitrary cap on compensation enacted
nearly 2 decades ago is unrealistic. It is time to reevaluate
the cap and to ensure that the victims of these crashes are
adequately compensated.
And compared to other modes of transportation, rail
obviously will continue to be a very safe way of moving people
and freight. But this committee has the responsibility to learn
from this crash and to examine whether additional safety
measures should be put into place.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
I want to turn now to our panel. We have with us today Mr.
Robert Lauby. He is the Chief Safety Officer at the U.S.
Department of Transportation. Mr. DJ Stadtler. Mr. Stadtler is
the Chief Operations Officer of Amtrak. Mr. Charles Mathias. He
is the Bureau Chief of the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
at the Federal Communications Commission. And the Honorable
Bella Dinh-Zarr. Ms. Dinh-Zarr is the Vice Chairman of the
National Transportation Safety Board.
Welcome to all of you. Thank you for taking the time to
share with us your thoughts. We look forward to your input and
the opportunity to ask you some questions. I believe we will
start on my left and your right with Ms. Dinh-Zarr. Please
proceed with your remarks, and if you can all confine it as
close as possible to five minutes, it will be greatly
appreciated. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. T. BELLA DINH-ZARR, PhD, MPH, VICE CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Thune, Ranking
Member Nelson, and members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to speak to you today.
I would like to start by telling you about an incident that
occurred in Connecticut when two commuter trains collided head
on after one of the trains failed to follow operating orders.
Four people were killed and 43 people were injured as a result
of this accident.
This accident occurred on August 20, 1969 in Darien,
Connecticut, and led to the NTSB's first train control
technology recommendation in 1970. While it occurred over 45
years ago, the same story, the story of tragedies that could
have been prevented, is repeated again and again in too many of
the rail accidents that we have investigated now.
Since that first recommendation, the NTSB has investigated
over 140 PTC-preventable accidents in which nearly 300 people
died and over 6,500 people were injured. The complete list of
these accidents is attached to my full written statement.
As we all know, the May 12 accident in Philadelphia would
have been prevented by PTC, and sadly eight people were killed
and more than 200 people were seriously injured. I was there. I
was at the scene of that accident. I saw firsthand the terrible
aftermath and the damage, and I had the opportunity to speak
with some of the families who were affected by this tragedy. So
on behalf of the entire NTSB, I would first like to offer my
deepest condolences to those who lost their loved ones in this
accident, and our thoughts still remain with those who are
recovering from their injuries. And we would like to assure
them that we are working to prevent future such tragedies.
Simply stated, PTC, or positive train control, is a system
that prevents or mitigates accidents, accidents involving
overspeeding, train-to-train collisions, incursions into
roadway work zones, and misaligned switches. PTC is really the
safeguard against human factors like distraction, fatigue, or
simply human error. It does not take away from the
responsibility of the operator, but what it does do is provide
an additional layer of safety, an additional layer of safety
should something, whatever it is, go wrong.
After the deadly accident in Chatsworth, California in
2008, Congress mandated the implementation of PTC by the end of
this year, 7 years after the bill was signed into law. Those
railroads that have made the difficult decisions and invested
in this proven safety enhancement should be commended for their
leadership. For those that will not meet the deadline, there
should be a transparent accounting of the steps taken, and the
steps not taken, to implement this mandate.
We at the NTSB understand that there are challenges and
complexities associated with implementing PTC, but there are
rail lines that will meet the deadline. And in other
industries, we have seen technologies implemented that were
considered initially to be too difficult or too expensive, but
ultimately these lifesaving technologies were implemented, they
were accepted, and they were welcomed by the American public.
For example, in cars, electronic stability control, or ESC,
can detect when a car is about to lose traction and
automatically apply the brakes. Congress mandated stability
enhancing technologies in 2005, and just 7 years later by 2012,
all new cars were equipped with ESC. And NHTSA reports a 60
percent reduction in fatal rollovers and a 31 percent reduction
in single-vehicle crashes as a result of ESC.
There are always challenges and complexities and costs
associated with new lifesaving technologies, but we need to
move beyond thinking about the short-term transactional costs
and focus on, as the Chairman eloquently put it, the long-term
transformational benefits that technologies like PTC will
provide to save lives and prevent injuries. We have the latest
technology, and even if it is difficult, we should use it to
save lives.
As we state in our Most Wanted List, each death, each
injury, and each accident that PTC could have prevented
testifies to the vital importance of implementing PTC now. And
I feel it is my responsibility to all of you, to Chairman
Thune, to the good Senators of this committee, and to the
American people to add that for every day that passes without
PTC, we run the risk of another deadly and very preventable,
PTC-preventable, accident.
Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dinh-Zarr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. T. Bella Dinh-Zarr, PhD, MPH, Vice Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good morning Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and the Members
of the Committee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) to testify before you today.
The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress with
investigating every civil aviation accident and significant incidents
in the United States and significant accidents and incidents in other
modes of transportation--railroad, highway, marine and pipeline. The
NTSB determines the probable cause of accidents and other
transportation events and issues safety recommendations aimed at
preventing future accidents. In addition, the NTSB carries out special
studies concerning transportation safety and coordinates the resources
of the Federal Government and other organizations to provide assistance
to victims and their family members impacted by major transportation
disasters.
Since its inception, the NTSB has investigated more than 140,500
aviation accidents and thousands of surface transportation accidents.
In addition, the NTSB has completed 553 major investigative reports in
the areas of railroad, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety,
including 150 accidents involving Amtrak. On call 24 hours a day, 365
days a year, NTSB investigators travel throughout the country and
internationally to investigate significant accidents and develop
factual records and safety recommendations with one aim--to ensure that
such accidents never happen again.
To date, we have issued over 14,000 safety recommendations to
nearly 2,300 recipients. Because we have no authority to regulate the
transportation industry, our effectiveness depends on our reputation
for conducting thorough, accurate, and independent investigations and
for producing timely, well-considered recommendations to enhance
transportation safety.
The NTSB's annual Most Wanted List highlights safety-critical
actions that the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), United States
Coast Guard, other Federal entities, states, and organizations need to
take to help prevent accidents and save lives. In January, the NTSB
released its Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements for
2015. Each year, we develop our Most Wanted List based on safety issues
we identify as a result of our accident investigations. This year's
Most Wanted List includes ``Implement Positive Train Control in 2015.''
As we pointed out:
Without Positive Train Control (PTC), real-world results have
been tragic. PTC is a system of functional requirements for
monitoring and controlling train movements to provide increased
safety. While the NTSB has called for a system like this for
over 45 years, it still has not been fully implemented in our
commuter, intercity, and freight trains. Without it, everybody
on a train is one human error away from an accident.
Congress enacted the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008
[RSIA]. The Act requires each Class I rail carrier and each
provider of regularly-scheduled intercity or commuter rail
passenger service to implement a PTC system by December 31,
2015. Progress is being made toward this lifesaving goal.
Metrolink became the first commuter rail system to implement
PTC, when it began a revenue service demonstration on the BNSF
Railway. This demonstration project is a step in the right
direction, and Metrolink reports it will implement PTC fully
throughout its entire system before the Congressionally
mandated deadline.
It has been more than 45 years since the NTSB first recommended
the forerunner to PTC. In the meantime, more PTC-preventable
collisions and derailments occur, more lives are lost, and more
people sustain injuries that change their lives forever.
Yet there is still doubt when PTC systems will be implemented
nationwide as required by law.
Each death, each injury, and each accident that PTC could have
prevented, testifies to the vital importance of implementing
PTC now.
For over 45 years, the NTSB has investigated numerous train
collisions and over speed derailments caused by operational errors
involving human performance failures. The NTSB attributed these human
performance failures to a variety of factors, including fatigue, sleep
disorders, medications, loss of situational awareness, reduced
visibility, and distractions in the operating cab. Many of these PTC-
preventable accidents occurred after train crews failed to comply with
train control signals, follow operating procedures in non-signaled or
``dark'' territories, observe work zone protections, or adhere to other
specific operating rules such as returning track switches to normal
position after completing their work at railroad sidings.
The first NTSB-investigated accident that train control technology
would have prevented occurred in 1969, when four people died and 43
were injured in the collision of two Penn Central commuter trains in
Darien, Connecticut.\1\ The NTSB recommended, based upon its
investigation of that accident, that the FRA study the feasibility of
requiring railroads to install an automatic train control system, the
precursor to today's PTC systems.\2\ The appendix to this prepared
statement provides a chart showing that since the NTSB issued the first
safety recommendation concerning train control technology in 1970,
there have been more than 140 accidents across the country resulting in
nearly 300 fatalities, more than 6500 injuries, and costing millions of
dollars, that could have been prevented or mitigated by PTC.
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\1\ NTSB, Penn Central Company, Collision of Trains N-48 and N-49
on August 20, 1969, Rpt. No. RAR-70-03 (October 14, 1970).
\2\ R-70-020, Dec. 18, 1970.
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Older cab signaling and speed control systems, such as automatic
train control (ATC), have been in use for nearly a century. In 1919, a
system that could automatically stop a train in violation of a signal
was tested on the Buffalo, Rochester, and Pittsburgh Railway. That same
system was commercially applied to the Chicago and North Western
Railway in 1923. ATC is designed to enforce restrictive and stop
signals by applying a penalty brake application to slow or stop the
train to prevent or mitigate the results of train-to-train collisions,
but ATC will not prevent all train collisions and was not designed to
prevent over speed derailments.\3\ Although ATC is still in use today,
the nearly century-old technology is obsolete and insufficient to
provide an acceptable level of rail safety today. PTC systems are
designed to prevent derailments caused by over speeding and train-to-
train collisions by slowing or stopping trains that are not complying
with the signal systems, track authorities and speed limits. They are
also designed to protect track workers from being struck by trains by
preventing train incursions into designated work zones and prevent
train movement through misaligned switches.
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\3\ Penalty braking is a brake application that is initiated after
the train engineer fails to comply with a signal or to acknowledge an
alerter alarm.
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Congress enacted RSIA in the aftermath of the 2008 accident in
Chatsworth, California in which a Metrolink commuter train and a Union
Pacific freight train collided head-on, killing 25 people and injuring
102 others.\4\ The NTSB's investigation concluded that the Metrolink
engineer's use of a cell phone to send text messages distracted him
from his duties and that PTC could have prevented or mitigated this
accident. This Committee's report accompanying the Senate bill under
consideration prior to the enactment of the RSIA also pointed to the
NTSB's investigation of a 2005 train derailment in Graniteville, South
Carolina, in which an employee failed to properly line a track switch,
resulting in the death of nine individuals due to the release of
chlorine gas.\5\ \6\
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\4\ NTSB, Collision of Metrolink Train 111 With Union Pacific Train
LOF65-12 Chatsworth, California September 12, 2008, Rpt. No. NTSB/RAR-
10/01 (Jan. 21, 2010).
\5\ S. Rpt. No. 110-270, accompanying S. 1889, the Railroad Safety
Enhancement Act of 2007, at 6 (March 3, 2008).
\6\ NTSB, Collision of Norfolk Southern Freight Train 192 With
Standing Local Norfolk Southern Train P22 With Subsequent Hazardous
Materials Release at Graniteville, South Carolina, January 6, 2005,
Rpt. No. NTSB/RAR-05/04 (Nov. 29, 2005).
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RSIA requires the implementation of a PTC system by December 31,
2015, on each line over which intercity passenger or commuter service
is operated or over which poison-or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous
materials are transported .\7\ Several rail carriers have stated that
they will not meet the 2015 deadline, and we know that Congress is
considering extending the PTC implementation deadline. We urge Congress
not to extend the RSIA deadline and require full PTC implementation
without delay. NTSB accidents are filled with files containing PTC
preventable accidents, and every day that PTC is delayed, the risk of a
PTC-preventable accident remains.
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\7\ Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432,
Sec. 104 (2008).
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The most recent PTC-preventable accident occurred last month on May
12, 2015, when Amtrak Northeast Regional Train 188 derailed. The
accident train, operating northbound from Washington to New York,
departed Philadelphia's 30th Street Station on time bound for New
York's Penn Station. The train derailed while traveling through a four-
degree left curve at Frankford Junction. Maximum speed through the
curve is 50 miles-per-hour (mph), but NTSB's preliminary data analysis
determined that moments before the derailment, the train was traveling
at 106 mph when the engineer applied the emergency brake system. Eight
people were killed and more than 200 were injured.\8\
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\8\ NTSB, Preliminary Report: Railroad DCA15MR010 (2015).
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Another PTC-preventable accident occurred on December 1, 2013, when
a Metro-North commuter train derailed in the Bronx after entering a
curve with a 30 mph speed limit at 82 mph.\9\ Four people lost their
lives and 61 others were injured. We determined the probable cause of
the derailment was the engineer's noncompliance with the 30 mph speed
restriction because he had fallen asleep due to undiagnosed severe
obstructive sleep apnea. A contributing factor was the absence of a
positive train control system that would have automatically applied the
brakes to enforce the speed restriction.
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\9\ NTSB, Metro North Railroad Derailment, Accident Brief No. RAB-
14/12 (October 24, 2014).
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Other accidents that could have been prevented by PTC include:
In September 2010, near Two Harbors, Minnesota, human error
and fatigue contributed to the collision of two freight trains,
injuring five crewmembers.
In April 2011, near Red Oak, Iowa, fatigue contributed to
the rear-end collision of a coal train with a standing
maintenance-of-way equipment train, killing two crewmembers.
In May 2011, in Mineral Springs, North Carolina, human error
contributed to the rear-end collision of two freight trains,
killing two crewmembers and injuring two more.
In May 2011, in Hoboken, New Jersey, human error contributed
to the collision of a train with the bumping post at the end of
the track.
In January 2012, near Westville, Indiana, inattentiveness
contributed to the collision of three trains, injuring two
crewmembers.
In June 2012, near Goodwell, Oklahoma, human inattentiveness
contributed to the collision of two freight trains, killing
three crewmembers.
In July 2012, near Barton County, Missouri, human error
contributed to the collision of two freight trains, injuring
two crewmembers.
In May 2013, near Chaffee, Missouri, inattentiveness and
fatigue contributed to the collision of two freight trains,
injuring two crewmembers and causing the collapse of a highway
bridge.
In December 2013, near Keithville, Louisiana, human error
contributed to the collision of two freight trains, injuring
four crewmembers.
Since 2004, in the 30 PTC-preventable freight and passenger rail
accidents that the NTSB investigated, 69 people died, more than 1,200
were injured, and damages totaled millions of dollars.
Thus far, some PTC systems have been successfully deployed. For
example, one of the deployed PTC systems is the Amtrak Advanced Civil
Speed Enforcement System (ACSES). Amtrak has deployed ACSES along
portions of the Northeast Corridor that are owned by Amtrak.\10\ ACSES,
a transponder-based system approved by FRA, enforces maximum track
speed limits, permanent and temporary speed limits, and positive stop
at interlocking and controlled point signals displaying stop. In
addition, Amtrak has deployed the Incremental Train Control System
(ITCS) on more than 60 route miles along Amtrak owned Michigan Line
between Chicago and Detroit.\11\ ITCS has been in revenue service since
September 2000.
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\10\ The area of track where the May 12, 2015 derailment occurred
near Philadelphia is not yet equipped with ACSES. Amtrak has indicated
it expects to have ACSES operational in this area by the end of 2015,
if possible.
\11\ See http://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0287.
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Extending RSIA's deadline may result in a patchwork of PTC systems
in operation across U.S. rail systems. Without a fully implemented and
PTC system, railroads that complied with the 2015 deadline would not be
able to fully utilize their PTC functionality if they operate on track
used by a carrier that has not met the law.
In February 2013, the NTSB held a forum called ``Positive Train
Control: Is it on Track?'' in order to bring together a wide range of
experts to examine the technological, regulatory, and operational
status of PTC.\12\ Challenges hindering the full implementation of PTC
were discussed, including cost, standardization of technologies, and
availability of radio spectrum. Despite these challenges, the NTSB
believes it is crucial that the Congressionally-mandated goal of PTC by
the end of 2015 remain in place.
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\12\ Information concerning the NTSB's PTC Forum on is available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/2013_Train-Control_FRM.aspx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
Early forerunners of PTC have been in existence since the 1920s.
Yet, more than a decade into the 21st century, we are still hearing
that PTC cannot be implemented this year--it is too costly and too
difficult. This type of response would not have been tolerated
concerning automobile seatbelt or airbag technology, and it should not
be acceptable here. The NTSB strongly supports full PTC implementation
without delay. Many railroads that have made the difficult decisions
and invested millions of dollars to implement PTC in 2015 should not be
penalized for their leadership. For each and every day that PTC
implementation is delayed, the risk of a PTC-preventable accident
remains.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look
forward to responding to your questions.
Attachment
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Dinh-Zarr.
Mr. Stadtler?
STATEMENT OF DJ STADTLER, VICE PRESIDENT OF OPERATIONS, AMTRAK
Mr. Stadtler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning and
thanks very much for the invitation to testify on behalf of the
men and women of Amtrak and on behalf of our CEO, Mr. Boardman.
Amtrak has played a prominent role in the development of
positive train control, and in partnership with industry, we
developed two of the first three systems approved by FRA for
operation in the United States. Our Advanced Civil Speed
Enforcement System, or ACSES, was introduced in 2000. It is the
only PTC system that is approved by the FRA for 150 mile per
hour operation. The Incremental Train control System, or ITCS,
is currently in service on the 97 miles of Amtrak-owned
railroad on our Michigan Line between Porter and Kalamazoo.
That was the third such system to be approved and the only
system, other than ACSES, that is currently approved for the
operation at speeds in excess of 90 miles per hour.
The type of PTC system installed on any given rail line
segment is determined by the owning railroad, which installs
the necessary wayside equipment. Thus, while Amtrak uses ACSES
and ITCS on our own territory, when we are operating on host
railroads, our onboard PTC equipment must be compatible with
the wayside PTC system used by the host. Interoperable
Electronic Train Management System, or I-ETMS, is used by
essentially all of our host responses. So our diesel fleet will
be equipped with I-ETMS for operation on host rails by the
mandatory deadline of December 2015.
The owning railroad is legally responsible for PTC
installation. But terminal railroads such as KCT, Kansas City
Terminal, and the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis
deserve mention, because questions about the cost of PTC will
likely affect passenger service. As Class III railroads, KCT
and TRA are exempt from the PTC installation requirement except
if a line is used by passenger trains. Those hosts have
maintained that because Amtrak's trains are the trains that
trigger the PTC requirement, Amtrak will be responsible for the
cost of PTC installation, which amounts in the case of KCT to
about $30 million. Because Amtrak cannot afford this and
neither can the State of Missouri, we have notified KCT that
Amtrak service over KCT territory will terminate by the end of
the year unless an alternative is found. We do not wish to
cease service, but, if this issue is not resolved soon, it
could end in either the rerouting or termination of the
Southwest Chief and the River Runner.
PTC systems typically enforce both speed restrictions and
stops at signals. ACSES has an extra degree of redundancy for
enforcing stops at interlocking signals, and the speed
regulation is based on transponders installed in the track.
Because the Michigan Line for which ITCS was developed has many
grade crossings, ITCS includes a different feature to activate
gates and flashers early in advance of high speed trains,
providing a better margin of safety. Both ACSES and ITCS are
overlay systems, which work in conjunction with the existing
signal system and provide an additional level of protection.
The base for both is a conventional railroad automatic block
signal, or ABS system, which is what is installed on the vast
majority of the freight railroad-owned lines over which Amtrak
operates. ABS signals tell an engineer whether to proceed at
full speed or at restricted speed or to stop, but it does not
incorporate any enforcement mechanism or speed control. ACSES,
on the other hand, works in conjunction with the existing
system on the Northeast Corridor, the automatic train control
system, or ATC, and enforces stop indications at signals. ITCS
has to provide some of the features that ATC provides, since it
is designed to work with systems that do not already provide
signal enforcement, which our Northeast Corridor ATC system
does. ITCS is designed to operate those crossings in advance of
a train arrival, because the basic signal system on the
Michigan Line, which is powered by circuits in the tracks, is
built on a physical infrastructure spaced for slower trains.
PTC installation is currently complete on the Amtrak-
controlled segments of the Northeast Corridor, although it is
only operational in certain segments. By December 2015, ACSES
will be in operation throughout the NEC sections that Amtrak
operates and maintains. We are working with the State of
Michigan, which owns the Michigan Line segment between
Kalamazoo and Dearborn that adjoins the Amtrak-owned segment,
to complete ITCS installation there.
One issue that has slowed the implementation of ACSES on
the Northeast Corridor has been the matter of radio spectrum
acquisition. ACSES currently operates with radios in the 900
megahertz bandwidth, but our experience and the rail industry
consensus suggested that we need to migrate to a bandwidth in
the 220 megahertz range. Amtrak attempted to purchase the
necessary bandwidth in the open market, but the acquisition
proved to be a challenging and time-consuming process, and our
several requests to the FCC for a bandwidth allocation out of
its inventory were not accepted. After 5 years of procurement
efforts, we were able to complete the necessary commercial
transactions to purchase spectrum on the open market. We have
been testing our system on the North End for many months, and
we sought special temporary authority from the FCC to test on
the South End, which we received on May 29. With that
authority, we can test all of our wayside base stations from
D.C. to New York at their full designated power to be sure that
they communicate appropriately with the trains along the entire
South End from New York to Washington and then to assure that
the data that needs to be passed between the trains and the
wayside computers will also work without causing interference
to any nearby household television reception. Once that testing
demonstrates that our system settings are appropriate, we will
go into full operation on all equipped trains on the NEC.
Again, I thank you for the invitation, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stadtler follows:]
Prepared Statement of DJ Stadtler, Vice President of Operations, Amtrak
Good morning, and thanks very much for the invitation to testify on
behalf of the men and women of Amtrak and our CEO, Mr. Boardman. Amtrak
has played a prominent role in the development of Positive Train
Control (PTC), and in partnership with industry, we developed two of
the first three systems approved by the FRA for operation in the U.S.
Our Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES), introduced in
2000, is the only PTC system approved by FRA for 150mph operation. The
Incremental Train Control System (ITCS), currently in service on the 97
mile Amtrak-owned segment of our Michigan Line between Porter and
Kalamazoo was the third such system to be approved, and is the only
system other than ACSES currently approved for operation at speeds in
excess of 90 mph.
The type of PTC system installed on any given rail line segment is
determined by the owning railroad, which installs the necessary wayside
equipment such as radios, transponders, or wayside interface units, as
well as the radio and server networks, which tie in to the existing
dispatching system. Amtrak owns relatively little of the infrastructure
we operate over--about 97 percent of our route mileage is owned by host
railroads. Thus, while Amtrak uses ACSES and ITCS on its own territory,
when operating on host railroads Amtrak's onboard PTC equipment must be
compatible with the wayside PTC system used by the host. Interoperable
Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS) is used by essentially all
of Amtrak's host railroads, so Amtrak's diesel fleet will be equipped
with I-ETMS for operation on host rails by the mandatory deadline.
Amtrak plans to install I-ETMS on certain Amtrak-owned trackage such as
Chicago Union Station, where our tracks connect with host railroad-
owned lines.
The owning railroad is legally responsible for PTC installation,
but the Kansas City Terminal (KCT) and Terminal Railroad Association of
St Louis (TRRA) deserve mention, because questions about the cost of
PTC will likely affect passenger service. As Class III railroads, KCT
and TRRA are exempt from the PTC installation requirement, except if a
line is used by passenger trains. Both KCT and TRRA are owned by Class
I railroads. This distinction is important, because even though they
handle significant quantities of hazardous material and PTC would be
required if they were considered Class I; because they're considered
Class III, the PTC requirement is triggered by the operation of
passenger trains. These hosts have maintained that because Amtrak's
trains trigger the PTC requirement, Amtrak is responsible for the cost
of PTC installation, which amounts in the case of KCT to $30 million.
Because Amtrak cannot afford this, and neither can the state of
Missouri, we have notified KCT that Amtrak service over KCT territory
will terminate by the end of the year unless an alternative is found.
We do not wish to cease service, but if this issue is not resolved
soon, it could end in either the rerouting or termination of the
Southwest Chief and the River Runner.
PTC systems typically enforce both speed restrictions and stops at
signals. ACSES has an extra degree of redundancy for enforcing stops at
interlocking signals, and the speed regulation is based on transponders
installed in the track, a necessary feature for the level of
reliability needed at very high speeds. Because the Michigan Line for
which ITCS was developed has many grade crossings, ITCS includes a
feature to activate gates and flashers early in advance of high speed
trains, to provide a better margin of safety. Both ACSES and ITCS are
``overlay'' systems, which work in conjunction with the existing signal
system and provide an additional level of protection. The base for both
is a conventional railroad automatic block signal (ABS) system, which
is what is installed on the vast majority of the freight railroad-owned
lines over which Amtrak operates. ABS signals tell an engineer whether
to proceed at full speed or restricted speed, or to stop, but it does
not incorporate any enforcement mechanism or speed control. ACSES, on
the other hand, works in conjunction with the existing (Automatic Train
Control) ATC system which is already in service on the NEC, and
enforces stop indications at signals. ITCS has to provide some of the
features that ATC provides, since it is designed to work with systems
that don't already provide signal enforcement, which our NEC ATC system
does. ITCS is designed to operate those crossings in advance of a train
arrival because the basic signal system on the Michigan Line, powered
by circuits in the tracks, is built on a physical infrastructure spaced
for slower trains. ITCS is approved by FRA for 110mph operations.
PTC installation is currently complete on the Amtrak-controlled
segments of the NEC, although it is operational only in certain
segments. By December 2015, ACSES will be in operation throughout the
NEC sections Amtrak operates and maintains. There will, however, be a
56 mile gap on the segment owned by the states of New York and
Connecticut, and maintained and operated by Metro-North Railroad; there
is also a small gap in Queens, New York at Harold Interlocking, which
is owned and maintained by the Long Island Rail Road. We are working
with the state of Michigan, which owns the Michigan Line segment
between Kalamazoo and Dearborn that adjoins the Amtrak-owned segment,
to complete ITCS installation there. That ITCS installation will
probably be operated and maintained by Amtrak under contract, but the
state is responsible for the cost of installation, since it owns the
railroad.
One issue that has slowed the implementation of ACSES on the
Northeast Corridor has been the matter of radio spectrum acquisition.
ACSES currently operates with radios in the 900MHz bandwidth, but our
experience (and rail industry consensus) suggested that we needed to
migrate to a bandwidth in the 220MHz range. Amtrak attempted to
purchase the necessary bandwidth on the open market, but the
acquisition proved to be a challenging and time consuming process, and
our several requests to the FCC for a bandwidth allocation out of its
inventory were not accepted. After five years of procurement efforts,
we were able to complete the necessary commercial transactions to
purchase spectrum on the open market. We have been testing our system
on the North End for many months and we sought Special Temporary
Authority from the FCC to test on the South End, which we received on
May 29. With that authority, Amtrak can test all of its wayside base
stations from DC to New York at their full designated power to be sure
that they communicate appropriately with the trains along the entire
south end (New York to Washington), and then to assure that the data
that needs to be passed between the trains and the wayside computers
will also work without causing interference to any nearby household
television reception. Once that testing demonstrates that our system
settings are appropriate we can go into full operation on all equipped
trains on the NEC.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Stadtler.
Mr. Lauby?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT C. LAUBY, ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR SAFETY AND CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER,
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Lauby. Thank you, Chairman Thune and Ranking Member
Nelson, for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss
passenger rail safety.
I want to start by extending our deepest sympathies to the
victims and their loved ones of the May 12 Amtrak accident in
Philadelphia. Safety drives everything that we do at FRA, and I
can assure you that we will take every step we can to prevent
this type of tragic accident from ever happening again.
FRA continues to investigate this accident, along with
NTSB. While it will take time to complete the investigation,
FRA will not hesitate to take any actions that will improve the
safety of Amtrak or other passenger rail operations in the
interim.
There has been a significant amount of public discussion
about what could have prevented this accident, which
technology, which new regulations. The reality is that positive
train control is specifically designed to prevent overspeed
accidents. If we believe the cause of this incident was
overspeed, then it would have been prevented by positive train
control.
As this committee is well aware, PTC is absolutely
essential to achieve the kind of safety that we expect on our
rail system. Despite the challenges facing full implementation
of PTC--and there certainly are many--FRA's role is to enforce
the December 31, 2015 deadline that Congress imposed.
FRA has been actively pushing the railroads to have PTC
fully implemented before the deadline. We have met with the
railroads for years on this particular issue. We have provided
technical assistance to assist the railroads in understanding
the PTC requirements and the methods to implement it. We have
hired staff to assist and oversee the implementation of the
technology. We have urged the timely submission of PTC
development plans and safety plans, and we have monitored
progress with individual railroads and with the Association of
American Railroads. We have worked directly with the FCC to
assist on issues related to spectrum, and as you see, FRA has
been fully engaged with the industry to make PTC implementation
a reality. Acting Administrator Feinberg also established a PTC
Implementation Team that is aggressively managing this
critical, congressionally mandated safety technology.
For more than 3 years, FRA has been sounding the alarm that
most railroads have not made sufficient progress to meet the
December 2015 deadline. FRA highlighted its concerns about PTC
implementation in its August 2012 PTC report to Congress, as
well as in the GROW AMERICA Act.
We have also urged year after year that more funding be
directed at commuter railroads and Amtrak to implement PTC
systems. For the past 2 years, FRA has requested $825 million
to assist commuter railroads with implementation of PTC, as
well as additional funding to aid with PTC implementation on
the Amtrak network.
Despite a lack of Federal funding directed at commuter
railroads, FRA is using the resources it has available now to
assist railroads in implementing PTC. For example, FRA has just
issued a $967 million Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement
Financing program loan to the New York Metropolitan Transit
Authority. This MTA authority is one of the Nation's largest
commuter railroad providers.
We have also focused over $400 million of our high speed
intercity passenger rail program on PTC installation.
Additionally, our budget request for rail development
programs have consistently made PTC installation an eligible
activity.
If on January 1, 2016, railroads required to implement PTC
systems are in violation of the statutory deadline, FRA will
take appropriate enforcement actions to achieve compliance as
quickly as possible. To address those concerns, the GROW
AMERICA Act proposes that FRA be granted authority to review,
approve, and provisionally certify PTC plans and grant merit-
based extensions to the current statutory deadline on a
railroad-by-railroad basis.
Provisional certification would give FRA the authority to
establish conditions to ensure that railroads raise the bar on
safety while they work toward full PTC implementation.
The public policy implications of railroads failing to meet
the PTC deadline are very serious. If Congress provides FRA the
authority and flexibility, as requested in the GROW AMERICA
Act, then implementation of PTC can be managed safely,
efficiently, and effectively.
We appreciate this committee's attention and focus on this
issue, and we look forward to working with the Committee to
make the American rail network as safe as possible.
Thank you for your attention. I will be happy to answer
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lauby follows:]
Prepared STATEMENT of Robert C. Lauby, Associate Administrator
for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer, Federal Railroad
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
Thank you, Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson for inviting me
to appear before you today to discuss passenger rail safety. I want to
start by extending our deepest sympathies to the victims and their
loved ones of the May 12th Amtrak accident in Philadelphia. Safety
drives everything we do at the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
and when an accident claims innocent lives and injures from so many it
is truly painful for the FRA family. I assure you that FRA will take
every step it can to prevent accidents like this from happening again.
FRA continues to investigate the circumstances surrounding the
accident. While it will take time to complete the investigation, FRA
has not and will not wait to take actions that will improve the safety
of Amtrak and other passenger rail operations. For example, on May 16,
4 days after the accident, Acting Administrator Sarah Feinberg directed
Amtrak to take several actions before allowing its operations to resume
north of Philadelphia. We followed those directives with an Emergency
Order (Emergency Order 31) on May 21. Amtrak has complied with those
directives thus far, and FRA will ensure that Amtrak follows through to
fully implement them.
When we released the May 21 Emergency Order, we also stated that we
were considering taking additional steps at other passenger railroads
that may have similar curve and speed issues. We continue our work on
those directives and plan to release additional information about that
work.
And while the cause of this accident has not been officially
determined, we know that overspeed was a significant factor and that
human error may be involved. Human error, or human factor, accidents as
described in our accident database remain the leading cause of all rail
accidents.
They are also the most difficult to address. Despite those
difficulties, FRA is preparing a package of actions that we will
finalize in the coming weeks and months aimed at addressing human
factor safety issues--safety issues such as speeding, distraction,
fatigue and training. These actions may include additional emergency
orders, safety advisories, rulemakings, voluntary agreements, or other
initiatives.
Beyond those next steps, I want to assure you that FRA is firmly
committed to taking additional actions--as many as it takes--to
mitigate the risks and hazards identified in the ongoing investigation.
There has been a significant amount of public discussion about what
could have prevented this accident. Which specific technology? Which
new regulation? The reality is that Positive Train Control (PTC) is
specifically designed to prevent overspeed accidents. If the cause of
this incident was overspeed, it would have been prevented by PTC. As
this Committee is well aware, PTC is the single most important railroad
safety technological development in more than a century, and it is
absolutely necessary to ensuring the kind of safety that we expect on
our rail system. Safety is FRA's highest priority and despite the
challenges facing full implementation of PTC, FRA's role is to enforce
the December 31, 2015, deadline that Congress imposed, and to ensure
that railroads implement PTC as safely and efficiently as possible.
When railroads submitted their Initial PTC Implementation Plan
(PTCIP) in 2010, they stated they would meet the 2015 deadline per the
requirements of the Railroad Safety Improvement Act (RSIA). All the
submitted plans assumed that there would be few, if any technical and
programmatic issues related to the design, development, integration,
deployment, and testing that would require resolution.
In 2013, U.S. Class I \1\ railroads operated approximately 162,000
miles of track, 60,000 miles of which potentially require the
installation of PTC \2\ under the current laws and regulations.
Intercity passenger and commuter railroad operations account for an
additional estimated 8,400 \3\ miles of track that is required to be
equipped with PTC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ BNSF Railway, CSX Transportation, Grand Trunk Corporation
(Canadian National Railway U.S. subsidiary), Kansas City Southern
Railway, Norfolk Southern Railway Combined Railroad Subsidiaries, Soo
Line Corporation (Canadian Pacific Railway U.S. subsidiary), and Union
Pacific Railroad.
\2\ ``Class I Railroad and U.S. Freight Railroad Statistics''
Association of American Railroads, 2014. This equates to roughly 95,700
miles of the U.S. rail network of roughly 140,000 miles.
\3\ 2012 Transit Way Mileage-Rail Modes, American Public
Transportation Association, http://www.apta.com/resources/statistics/
Pages/NTDDataTables.aspx, accessed 15 Dec 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRA has been actively pushing the railroads to have PTC fully
implemented by the deadline. We have met with the railroads for years
on this issue, we have hired staff to assist and oversee the
implementation of the technology, we have urged the timely submission
of PTC development and safety plans, we have discussed progress with
individual railroads and with the Association of American Railroads
(AAR), and we have worked directly with the FCC to resolve issues
related to spectrum. Acting Administrator Feinberg also established a
PTC Implementation Team that is aggressively managing this critical,
Congressionally-mandated safety technology that will reduce the risk of
human factor caused accidents and save lives.
For more than three years, FRA has been sounding the alarm that
most railroads have not made sufficient progress to meet the December
2015 deadline. We have noted that the certification and installation of
PTC systems are significant undertakings. FRA highlighted its concerns
about PTC implementation in its August 2012 PTC report to Congress, as
well as in the GROW AMERICA Act.\4\ Among those are the following
challenges:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The Secretary of Transportation submitted the GROW AMERICA Act
to Congress on March 30, 2015. ``GROW AMERICA'' stands for ``Generating
Renewal, Opportunity, and Work with Accelerated Mobility, Efficiency,
and Rebuilding of Infrastructure and Communities throughout America.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Design Specification Availability
Back office Servers and Dispatch System Availability
Track Database Verification
Installation Engineering
Communications Spectrum Availability
Radio Availability
Reliability and Availability
Funding
FRA has long stated that a lack of public sector funding may cause
unwanted delays in fully implementing PTC. FRA has requested funding
for PTC development and implementation grants in every budget request
dating back to Fiscal Year (FY) 2011. For the past two years, as part
of the GROW AMERICA Act, FRA has requested $825 million to assist
commuter railroads with the implementation of PTC, as well as
additional funding to aid with the implementation of PTC on Amtrak's
national network.
Despite a lack of Federal funding directed to commuter railroads,
FRA is using the resources it has available now to assist railroads in
implementing PTC. For example, FRA issued a $967.1 million loan through
the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) program to
the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the Nation's
largest commuter railroad provider, to facilitate the deployment of the
technology.
In addition to the same practical and logistical project management
challenges affecting the freight railroads, intercity and commuter
passenger railroads face other challenges due to their public sector
nature and heavy reliance upon operating subsidies. These railroads
must advance PTC system implementation within a fiscal environment
already constrained by the limited availability of capital funds. FRA
expects that when PTC technology is fully mature, it will have a
positive, transformative impact on railroad safety and operating
efficiency in the decades to come.
If, on January 1, 2016, railroads required to implement PTC systems
are in violation of this statutory deadline, FRA will take appropriate
enforcement actions consistent with its statutory authority and
regulatory oversight responsibilities to achieve compliance.
Stakeholders and the Congress have asked FRA for guidance on how to
approach concerns about railroads not meeting the mandated deadline. To
address those concerns, the GROW AMERICA Act the Department submitted
to Congress in April 2014 and March 2015 proposed that FRA be granted
authority to review, approve, and provisionally certify PTC plans on a
railroad-by-railroad basis. FRA asked for this authority so that it
could continue to assist the railroads to get PTC implemented as
quickly as possible for it is only through implementation of PTC that
accidents like the derailment of Amtrak train 188 can truly be
prevented.
Provisional certification would also give FRA the authority to
establish conditions to ensure railroads raise the bar on safety and
establish appropriate back stops even as they continue to work towards
full PTC implementation. GROW AMERICA would also provide FRA the
authority to establish implementation milestones, use alternative
methods of protection in lieu of PTC systems to achieve safety
improvements and require coordination between the U.S. Department of
Transportation and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
assess required spectrum needs and availability to implement PTC
systems. GROW AMERICA also proposes to provide more than $3 billion
over 6 years to help pay for PTC implementation on publicly-funded
commuter railroads and Amtrak routes.
To summarize, FRA has actively supported deployment of PTC through
the issuance of performance-based regulations and technical assistance
documents to aid railroads, manufacturers, and suppliers to achieve
full PTC functionality and interoperability. Over the course of several
decades, FRA and the railroad industry have sponsored and conducted
numerous research and technology demonstration projects to evaluate or
improve upon signal and train control technologies that have evolved
into what is now known as PTC. Since 2000 FRA has published over 50
technical reports, several Research Results, and numerous other reports
to support its rulemaking activities. FRA has also built a PTC system
test bed at its Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, CO. This
facility is available to the railroad industry as they work to
successfully integrate and test all of component technologies necessary
to achieve implementation.
The difficulties being encountered, while not insurmountable, are
highly complex and require a significant investment of time, people,
and resources to successfully resolve. The public policy implications
of railroads failing to meet the PTC deadline are serious. FRA has been
dedicating resources and working diligently to support the industry for
years to achieve full PTC implementation where required by the
statutory deadline. If Congress provides FRA the authority and
flexibility as requested in the GROW AMERICA Act, then PTC
implementation can be managed safely, efficiently, and effectively.
In conclusion, safety will always be FRA's first priority. We
appreciate this Committee's attention and focus on issues related to
railroad safety. Again, I want to express our deepest sorrow for the
victims and their families. We look forward to working with this
Committee to improve our programs and make the American rail network as
safe, reliable, and efficient as possible. I am happy to respond to
your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Lauby.
Mr. Mathias?
STATEMENT OF CHARLES MATHIAS, ASSOCIATE CHIEF,
WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS BUREAU,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Mr. Mathias. Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and
distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me today to testify.
Like the rest of the Nation, we at the FCC are deeply
saddened by the tragic Amtrak derailment in Philadelphia.
Promoting the safety of life and property through the use
of wire and radio communication is a top FCC priority. As the
Nation's communication agency, the FCC helps coordinate
spectrum acquisition by freight and commuter railroads. We also
manage the statutorily required historic preservation and
environmental reviews of poles, antennas, and associated
infrastructure to be used to support positive train control, or
PTC, systems.
In the absence of specific statutory direction for the FCC
to clear and reallocate spectrum for PTC purposes, the FCC has
been working closely with the railroads since 2008 to identify
spectrum available on the secondary market. The FCC has acted
swiftly upon request to approve multiple spectrum transactions,
including the freight railroads' acquisition of spectrum
nationwide, Amtrak's acquisition of spectrum in the Northeast
Corridor, as well as requested waivers to better enable and
test PTC deployment.
To be clear, the Commission plays no role in designing or
assessing the railroads' choice of PTC technology. Overseen by
the Federal Railroad Administration, the railroads are
responsible for PTC design and deployment, and the FRA has sole
oversight authority to approve those systems and ensure they
are rigorously tested and working properly.
The country's major freight railroads have led the way in
securing spectrum for PTC. Through private transactions, they
acquired nationwide spectrum in the commercial 220 to 222
megahertz spectrum band just months before the act became law.
These railroads quickly focused on utilizing the spectrum when
the PTC mandate was established. When they did, the freight
railroads effectively drove other railroads, including Amtrak
and the commuter rails, to spectrum in and around the 220 band
for their PTC operations as well.
For most of the country, this strategy appears to have been
successful. The FCC has proactively facilitated and continues
to facilitate freight and passenger railroads' successful
acquisition and lease of spectrum on secondary markets. We have
also granted the railroads extensive technical waivers, for
example, for more transmitter power to use spectrum for PTC
purposes.
Spectrum acquisition in the Northeast Corridor differs from
the rest of the country because Amtrak and the freights are
deploying two different PTC systems that were not from the
outset engineered to be compatible in the same spectrum band.
So unlike in a market such as Chicago where the railroads
intend to share the same block of spectrum and use a single PTC
system, in the Northeast Corridor the choice to deploy two
systems requires spectrum far enough from the others to avoid
interference.
On May 29, 2015, Amtrak and the freight railroads advised
FCC staff that using their separate PTC radio systems on the
Boston to New Haven portion of the Northeast Corridor in the
same spectrum block could result in harmful interference that
could cause both systems to function improperly or stop working
altogether. FCC staff will continue to work with Amtrak, the
commuter rails that use the Amtrak system in the Northeast
Corridor, and the freights to help identify solutions to these
problems.
PTC infrastructure deployments are also an FCC priority.
Federal environmental and historic preservation law requires
the FCC to assess the potential impacts of agency undertakings,
including the potential impact on property significant to
tribal nations. To facilitate this process, in May 2014 the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation issued fast-track
rules for future PTC pole deployments.
Under the fast-track approach, the majority of proposed
poles are exempt from historic preservation review. The
Commission has the capacity to receive 1,400 exempt and non-
exempt pole applications every 2 weeks. By the beginning of
June, the freight railroads could have submitted as many as
40,000 poles for our review. In fact, the railroads have only
submitted around 8,100 poles, or about 21 percent of our total
capacity.
Going forward, issues in the Northeast Corridor are complex
and pose significant challenges. We stand ready to work with
Amtrak, the commuter rails, and the freight rails to facilitate
resolution of their evolving deployment of the two systems.
We appreciate the Committee's interest in this issue and
its efforts to ensure the successful deployment of PTC systems.
The FCC is committed to working collaboratively with all
parties to get PTC deployed.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have, and
thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mathias follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles Mathias, Associate Chief, Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications Commission
Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before the
Committee today. Like the rest of the nation, we at the FCC are deeply
saddened by the tragic Amtrak derailment in Philadelphia. We send our
condolences to the families of those who lost their loved ones and our
gratitude to the first responders for their efforts. I want to assure
you that the FCC is doing--and will continue to do--its part to
facilitate the implementation of Positive Train Control, or PTC.
Promoting the safety of life and property through the use of wire
and radio communication is a top FCC priority. Since passage of the
Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (Act), we have worked directly with
freight, passenger, and commuter rails to help them obtain spectrum
licenses and complete statutorily-required historic preservation and
environmental reviews prior to deploying infrastructure to implement
PTC. We have also worked closely with existing spectrum licensees, our
Federal partners, including the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) and the Department of Transportation's Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), as well as Tribal Nations and state officials to
facilitate the implementation of Positive Train Control.
The FCC'S Role in PTC
As the Nation's expert agency on communications, the FCC helps
facilitate spectrum acquisition by freight and passenger railroads. We
also manage the statutorily required historic preservation and
environmental reviews of the poles, antennas, and associated
infrastructure used to support PTC systems.
PTC requires spectrum for communications between the stationary PTC
radios along the railway and moving trains on the tracks. The railroads
have targeted previously-allocated commercial spectrum to deploy PTC.
In the absence of specific statutory direction for the FCC to clear and
reallocate this spectrum away from its current use for PTC purposes,
which would be a time-consuming and potentially litigious process under
any circumstances, the Commission has encouraged railroads to acquire
the targeted commercial spectrum from existing licensees who previously
purchased spectrum licenses in FCC auctions. Since Congress passed the
Act in 2008, the FCC has been working closely with the railroads,
including Amtrak, to identify available spectrum on the secondary
market and to approve secondary market transactions quickly.
The Commission plays no role in designing or assessing the
railroads' choice of PTC technology. The railroads, overseen by the
FRA, are responsible for designing and deploying PTC systems. The FRA
has sole authority to approve those systems and ensure they are
rigorously tested and working properly.
PTC is a Priority for Chairman Wheeler
Since his arrival at the FCC in November 2013, Chairman Wheeler has
made facilitating PTC deployment a top priority. Under his direction,
the Commission staff developed a more streamlined process for required
historic preservation and environmental reviews. It also crafted a one-
of-a-kind settlement to allow the freight railroads to use the PTC
facilities they had already constructed without required approvals.
Chairman Wheeler has also encouraged Commission staff to develop
creative approaches to meet the railroads' spectrum needs, such as
facilitating an efficient secondary market by matching existing
licensees with railroads needing spectrum, encouraging the freight and
commuter rails to develop interoperable systems, examining spectrum
sharing and lease arrangements, and waiving power level limits to
enable PTC systems to operate more effectively.
Overall PTC Challenges
All of us share the goal of successful PTC implementation from
coast to coast. Significant progress has been made, and the FCC stands
ready to act swiftly and effectively within our statutory authority.
But it is important to acknowledge key, structural challenges. I would
like to touch on them briefly.
As you know, the Act does not designate specific spectrum bands for
PTC, nor does it direct the FCC to allocate specific spectrum for PTC.
Absent such direction from Congress--and consistent with decades of
successful, market-driven spectrum policy--the FCC encouraged the
railroads to turn to secondary markets for spectrum, especially given
that much of the spectrum the rails chose for PTC had previously been
auctioned and licensed to other private parties in major rail markets.
In addition, the Act does not provide a funding mechanism for PTC
spectrum acquisition, which can make acquiring spectrum in the private
market expensive and challenging, especially for smaller railroads,
like commuter lines, and also for Amtrak.
Freights Establish Primary PTC Spectrum Band
While challenges exist, it is instructive to take a brief look at
the country's major freight railroads, which have targeted and secured
channels in the commercial 220-222 MHz spectrum band for PTC. Because
of their complex communication needs, the freight railroads have been
active participants in the Nation's secondary spectrum markets for many
years.
The country's major freight railroads acquired nationwide spectrum
in the commercial 220-222 MHz spectrum band just months before the Act
became law through transactions with private parties that had
previously acquired spectrum licenses in FCC auctions or through
secondary market transactions. The freight railroads quickly focused on
utilizing this spectrum when the PTC mandate was established. Several
of the major freights collectively acquired an ownership interest in a
company that is developing PTC technology and equipment, and also
created a spectrum coordinator--known as ``PTC-220''--to manage the
spectrum. In doing so, the freight railroads effectively drove other
railroads, including Amtrak and commuters, to spectrum in and around
the 220 MHz band for their PTC operations as well.
For most of the country, this strategy appears to have been
successful. Whether through secondary market purchases or leases with
PTC-220, the freights, Amtrak and the commuter rails have cooperated to
find spectrum to meet their needs. They have reached agreements that
address several challenges related to PTC, including sharing both
spectrum and infrastructure as well as achieving interoperability. A
good example of this collaboration is the planned PTC deployment in
Chicago. There, 11 railroads, including the freights, Amtrak, and
commuter rails, will use common PTC-220 spectrum and infrastructure to
ensure the safe transport of passengers and cargo across the Nation's
busiest rail market.
Our work in facilitating spectrum access across the country is
ongoing. For example, we are actively reviewing recently proposed
spectrum transactions in several markets, and we continue to assist
railroads in their efforts to identify partners for secondary market
transactions.
Northeast Corridor
The Northeast Corridor is a difficult and congested spectrum
market. The freights largely met their anticipated needs in this area
through their initial 220-222 MHz Band license purchases. Amtrak
approached the FCC on several occasions beginning in 2011 about
obtaining spectrum to deploy PTC in the Northeast Corridor. The FCC has
had similar interaction with commuter rails in the area.
In the absence of sufficient inventory or specific statutory
direction, FCC staff encouraged the railroads operating in the
Northeast Corridor to investigate obtaining spectrum from existing
licensees in the secondary market.
In fact, Amtrak and several commuter rails have been successful in
obtaining spectrum through the secondary market. Once Amtrak and the
existing private party licensees finalized their commercial agreements,
FCC staff quickly approved the spectrum transactions and related
requests for waiver of certain FCC rules. In the case of Amtrak, the
FCC approved its use of spectrum from Boston to New Haven overnight,
and its use of spectrum from Washington, D.C., to New York City in two
days.
Interference Concerns
Spectrum acquisition in the Northeast Corridor is more complicated
than in the rest of the country because Amtrak and the freight
railroads are deploying two different PTC systems that were not
engineered to be compatible. The systems can operate without difficulty
when geographically separate from each other, but when operating in
close proximity on the same spectrum, as in the Northeast Corridor, the
systems can encounter significant challenges. So, unlike in a market
such as Chicago, where the railroads will share the same block of
spectrum and use a single PTC system, in the Northeast Corridor each
PTC system requires spectrum far enough from the other's to avoid the
interference that could affect proper operations.
Amtrak and the freight railroads assured the FCC that they would
design their respective systems to operate with respect to each other
on a non-interference basis. However, on May 29, 2015, Amtrak and the
freight railroads advised FCC staff in a joint meeting that using their
separate PTC radio systems on the Boston to New Haven portion of the
Northeast Corridor in the same spectrum block would result in harmful
interference. This could degrade or disable communications on both
systems, causing either or both to function improperly or stop
functioning altogether.
FCC staff will continue to work with Amtrak, the commuter rails
that use the Amtrak system in the Northeast Corridor, and the freights
to help identify and review possible solutions to these recently
identified problems arising out of the railroads' system design
choices.
Infrastructure
PTC infrastructure concerns played no role in the accident in
Philadelphia. Amtrak's physical infrastructure in the Northeast
Corridor is already in place.
PTC-related infrastructure review has been a priority in other
areas of the country, however. Long-standing Federal environmental and
historic preservation laws--the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),
respectively--require the FCC (and every Federal agency) to assess the
potential impacts of agency ``undertakings,'' including possible impact
on properties significant to Tribal Nations. This means the FCC must
ensure that PTC deployments are reviewed by Tribal Nations and State
Historic Preservation Offices in a manner that allows for appropriate
consideration of potential impacts.
In 2013, FCC staff became aware that the freight railroads had
installed approximately 10,000 PTC poles around the country without
complying with the FCC's review requirements under NEPA and NHPA.
Recognizing the need for railroads to comply with the PTC mandate, the
agency worked as required by statute with all stakeholders--freight
railroads, Tribal Nations, state officials, the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation (ACHP), and other Federal agencies--to resolve
the deployed pole issue and develop a ``fast track'' review process for
future pole deployments.
This process was made more complex by the fact that Tribal Nations
in key deployment areas resisted discussions about future PTC
deployments until the deployed pole issues were resolved. In May 2014,
the FCC signed agreements with all seven major freight railroads that
created a $10 million Cultural Resource Fund to account for previous
non-compliant deployments. The fund is providing direct support to
Tribal Nations and State Historic Preservation Offices to support
cultural and historic preservation projects.
Also in May 2014, the ACHP issued a set of ``fast track'' rules for
future PTC pole deployments. Under this approach, the majority of
proposed PTC poles are presumptively exempt from historic preservation
review, subject only to basic checks on their eligibility for the
exemption. The Commission has the capacity to receive 1,400 pole
applications (including exempt and non-exempt poles) every two weeks.
As of June 3, 2015, the freight railroads could have submitted as many
as 38,500 poles for Tribal and state review. The railroads have
actually submitted a total of only 8,143 poles, or about 21 percent of
the system's capacity.
Going Forward
The PTC spectrum situation in the Northeast Corridor is complex and
poses significant technical challenges for the railroads. We stand
ready to work with Amtrak, the commuter rails, and the freight
railroads to facilitate resolution of the technical and spectrum issues
arising from the decision to deploy separate PTC systems in the same
frequency band in the Northeast Corridor.
Conclusion
We appreciate the Committee's interest in this issue and its
efforts to ensure the successful deployment of PTC systems. The FCC is
committed to working collaboratively with all parties to facilitate the
deployment of PTC.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Attachment
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Mathias. I appreciate all your
remarks and testimony.
I want to direct a couple of questions to Mr. Lauby, and as
I mentioned in my opening remarks, in recent years the FRA and
the GAO have issued reports stating that most railroads are not
going to meet the December 31, 2015 statutory deadline for PTC.
The FRA safety team reviewed 41 PTC implementation plans, and
it ultimately has responsibility for approving any final PTC
safety plans necessary for railroads to receive the full
certification and to be able to operate in revenue service.
So I want to kind of get, just as a metric of where we are
on some of the various railroads around the country, passenger,
freight, et cetera, and ask just a few questions.
One is of the roughly 28 commuter railroads that are
required to have PTC, how many do you expect will have a fully
functional, interoperable, and certified PTC system by the
December 31, 2015 deadline?
Mr. Lauby. Thank you for your question, Senator.
We have been working closely with APTA to get information
on the different commuter railroads to see where they are. APTA
reports that 71 percent of the commuter railroads will not make
the December 31, 2015 date, which means that 29 percent will.
They have also indicated that 71 percent of the commuter
railroads--about half of those will be able to make a 2018
implementation date.
Another way to look at the situation on commuter railroads
is to look at the money expended. APTA is reporting that the
total cost of PTC will be about $3.48 billion, and as of today,
the commuter railroads have spent about $950 million. So you
can see that at least on spending, they are not even a third of
the way through.
Beyond that, there are additional costs related to PTC that
APTA has reported to us. The estimate is about $83 million a
year is required to maintain that system.
The Chairman. OK. Let us shift over to Class I freight
railroads, which do host commuter, Amtrak, and short-line
operations. How many of those do you expect to have a fully
functional, operational, and certified PTC system by the
statutory deadline?
Mr. Lauby. According to the Association of American
Railroads and our work with the individual railroads, we do not
expect any of the Class I's to be in a position to have fully
functional PTC across the board by December 31, 2015. The
information we have to date is that installing wayside
interface units, which is the part of positive train control
that needs to be installed in the switches and the signals
along the right-of-way, will not be completed until 2018, and
that full operation of PTC is not expected until December 31,
2020.
The Class I railroads have estimated that the total cost
will be about $9 billion, and their spending to date has been
$5 billion. So they are a little bit over halfway from what we
can tell.
The Chairman. All right.
Now, shortline railroads, as I understand it, do not have
to have PTC installed until December 31, 2020, which is when
you mentioned the freight railroads would have it fully. So how
would you plan to certify PTC interoperability when different
railroads, using the same track, are deploying PTC at different
rates and have different regulatory deadlines?
Mr. Lauby. It is difficult. Amtrak faces that challenge
right now. They can equip their locomotives, but they cannot
operate in PTC mode on their long distance lines until the host
railroads actually equip the lines with positive train control.
So that has got to be in place first before the system will
work.
The Chairman. The FRA's 2012 report on implementation I
thought was highly useful in evaluating the statutory deadline.
A little less than 2 months ago, Sarah Feinberg stated that FRA
is working to complete and transmit an updated PTC
implementation report to Congress before June 2015. We have not
received that yet. I am wondering if the Committee can expect
to receive the updated report sometime this month.
Mr. Lauby. We are working on that report. Right now it is
in internal clearance. We expect to have it done shortly.
Just to give you some highlights of the report, the issues
that we identified in 2012 are still there, but at this point,
we feel that the items that we identified in GROW AMERICA are
the types of authorities that we need moving forward and that
with those authorities, we will be able to manage
implementation of PTC in a manner that is both efficient and
gets us to a compliant system as soon as possible.
The Chairman. My time has expired. I turn to the Ranking
Member, Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Lauby, the American people are not
going to put up with waiting for 5 years. So what is the magic
number of years?
Mr. Lauby. Senator, I think Congress has to determine what
the magic number of years is, and as they have done with the
Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, December 31, 2015 was
indicated as the date. The only authority that FRA has moving
forward is to enforce that particular date to require that
railroads meet that date, and if they are not, to take
enforcement action. And that is pretty much what we are facing
right now. Our authority is only to enforce the Rail Safety
Improvement Act and the related regulations. We have no
authority to change the date.
Senator Nelson. OK. Let me ask you this. Mr. Lauby and Ms.
Dinh-Zarr, if there is going to be an extension, what do we do
to make sure that the railroads are aggressively moving to
implement the PTC? Ms. Dinh-Zarr?
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. Thank you, Ranking Member Nelson.
As you know, the NTSB would like to see PTC implemented as
soon as possible because every day that passes, we are fearful
of another deadly crash happening.
Senator Nelson. OK. But that is the question.
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. Yes, sir. So as you stated, I think it is
very important to be very transparent in knowing what steps
were taken by each railroad and what steps were not taken by
each railroad, should the mandate, which has come forth from
Congress, which if the deadline is not met by the railroad.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Lauby, do you have some suggestions?
Mr. Lauby. If we want to prevent these tragic accidents
like what we experienced in Philadelphia on Amtrak 188, we need
to get PTC in place as quickly as possible on as much track as
possible. As we begin to roll out PTC and implement it on
different lines, we will be able to prevent those types of
accidents. To do that, we need to be fully engaged with the
railroads. We need to have the ability to extend the deadline.
We need to have the ability to negotiate the deadline. We need
to have the ability to put interim safety measures in place. We
need to have the railroads' full attention going forward in
order to get this done as quickly as possible. And to FRA, that
is absolutely key.
Senator Nelson. And you do not have that ability now?
Mr. Lauby. We do not have that authority. The only
authority we have is to enforce the December 31, 2015 deadline.
Senator Nelson. Then that is something that is the
responsibility of us.
And you mentioned your ability to track the progress of the
implementation. Any suggestions there?
Mr. Lauby. We need to receive realistic implementation
plans from the railroad industry. We received 41 implementation
plans back in 2010, which were approved, but because of the
mandate for December 31, 2015, every one of those show
successful implementation of PTC at that date.
Senator Nelson. Do either one of you have any suggestions?
We have heard things like two-man crews or inward-facing
cameras as a way to prevent the accidents. Do you believe these
measures would have prevented this Amtrak crash?
Mr. Lauby. I would like to talk a little bit about two-
person crews. We think at FRA that multiple-person crews
enhance the safety. What we have in a train crew is we have an
expert crew that depends on teamwork and depends on crew
resource management in order to properly operate that train. So
we think multiple-person crews are important but also realize
that they are already in place on the passenger railroads in
this country. The emphasis that was shown in our safety
advisory needs to be communication between a conductor and a
locomotive engineer to----
Senator Nelson. Ms. Dinh-Zarr, what about inward-facing
cameras?
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. Yes, Senator Nelson. Inward-facing cameras
are very important in determining the reason for a crash
afterwards, and two-person crews--there are many crashes that
we have investigated and we try to base all of our
recommendations on evidence and data. And there are many
crashes that involved two-person crews that have not been
prevented that would have been prevented by PTC.
Senator Nelson. Thanks.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Blunt?
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
Ms. Dinh-Zarr, in terms of cause of the Philadelphia
accident, do we know any more about that yet, and was there a
determination made by your organization in the last day that
cell phone usage appears not to have happened?
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. Yes, thank you, Senator, for that question.
Yes, sir. We have determined that there was no talking or
texting or data usage involved. However, as you are aware,
there are 400,000 pieces of data involved in the analysis. And,
because of the extent of that, things like use of an app or
other use of the phone has not been determined. But we have
determined that much. And we are working with the records to
find----
Senator Blunt. And I think that determination had not been
made when there was a House hearing. So that is new information
about----
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. That is, yes.
Senator Blunt.--using a cell phone as a phone. We believe
that did not happen.
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. Yes, sir. As of today.
Senator Blunt. Mr. Stadtler, you mentioned that people who
own the railroad are responsible for implementing these new
safety measures, positive train control, or whatever the
alternative is. How much railroad does the Government own or
does Amtrak own?
Mr. Stadtler. Amtrak owns the portion of the Northeast
Corridor--pretty much all of the Northeast Corridor from Boston
down to Washington, D.C., with the exception of about 56 miles
from New Rochelle to New Haven. We also own a stretch of the
railroad in Michigan.
Senator Blunt. And how much of the passenger traffic in the
country occurs on the Northeast Corridor?
Mr. Stadtler. From a mileage point of view, a very small
portion of it.
Senator Blunt. How much of it in terms of passengers?
Mr. Stadtler. I do not have that answer.
Senator Blunt. You do not know how many of the passengers
use the Northeast Corridor as opposed to every other part of
Amtrak?
Mr. Stadtler. I do not have that off the top of my head,
no, sir.
Senator Blunt. I cannot believe that. But I would like to
know that. So will you find out and get that back to us?
Mr. Stadtler. Certainly.
Senator Blunt. Do you have a guess?
Mr. Stadtler. I would say at least a third is on the
Northeast Corridor, in fact, probably even more than a third.
In fact, I would say if you talk about touching the Northeast
Corridor, it is----
Senator Blunt. I am talking about--yes, the commuters that
touch the Northeast Corridor. That would be right.
Mr. Stadtler. I am only going to speak for Amtrak. I do not
have the commuter number. But more than half of our ridership
would touch the Northeast Corridor.
Senator Blunt. OK.
Do you have a reason why the northbound lane did not have
the improvements that the southbound lane had where the
accident occurred?
Mr. Stadtler. Yes. So the system that is in place now in
that area is automatic train control, and automatic train
control is designed to prevent train collisions. And what that
basically does is it takes the signal and it lets the engineer
know if the railroad ahead is clear of other trains. It is not
designed to enforce speed control.
Senator Blunt. So coming south on that same stretch of the
railroad, there would have been nothing that would have
impacted the speed?
Mr. Stadtler. What happened was in 1990, there was an
accident in Back Bay, Boston, and after that accident, a group
of safety experts, Amtrak, FRA, the freights, got together and
said what can we do to prevent this type of overspeed accident
from occurring again. We did an inventory of the curves, and
anywhere where the overturn speed in the curve--so when you go
through the curve--and the curve in Frankford is a 50 mile an
hour curve, but the train is not expected to derail at 50. It
is 98 or 96 miles an hour that the train would derail.
So what we did--this group looked at every curve where the
approach speed was greater than the overturn speed, and at
those places, we used the automatic train control system to
force the engineer to slow down. If you're approaching this
curve coming southbound, as you point out, the approach speed
is 110 miles an hour. So at that speed, the train would
overturn if the engineer failed to slow down. Going northbound,
the approach speed is only 80. So if you went into that curve
at 80, you would not derail.
Senator Blunt. Has anything been done to change the speed
control on the northbound part of this curve since the
accident?
Mr. Stadtler. Yes. Immediately after the accident, the FRA
issued directives that had us implement that same control at
the northbound.
Senator Blunt. And that has been done already?
Mr. Stadtler. That was done before we returned it to
service, yes.
Senator Blunt. So that could have been done in any 60-day
period before the accident as well.
Mr. Stadtler. That is correct.
Senator Blunt. Mr. Lauby, do you know what the original
estimate of your organization was of what the implementation
year should have been for positive train control?
Mr. Lauby. I was not in this position at FRA. I do not know
exactly what the recommendation was at the time.
Senator Blunt. Do you have any idea what it was?
Mr. Lauby. No.
Senator Blunt. So you came to this hearing to talk about
this and nobody told you the history of what your organization
had said on positive train control?
Mr. Lauby. Well, I know the history of the Rail Safety
Improvement Act, which we have been working on for 4 years, and
we know----
Senator Blunt. I think your organization--I have been told
at least--said originally it would be 2018 before this could be
implemented.
I think Mr. Mathias also--we have had FCC in here before.
One of the big obstacles to most of the system is changing to
essentially a tower-based system with some of the challenges at
the FCC. Have those challenges now been dealt with?
Mr. Mathias. Yes, sir. We have implemented a fast-track
system that was adopted by the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, which would be the agency responsible for this
that enables the railroads to process their pole deployments
quickly. We have the capacity----
Senator Blunt. When did you implement that?
Mr. Mathias. We implemented that a year ago in 2014.
Senator Blunt. A year ago. And the law was originally
passed when, Mr. Chairman? Somebody help me on this.
The Chairman. 2008.
Senator Blunt. 2008. So a year ago, you fast-tracked the
essential tower sitings at FCC.
Mr. Mathias. Yes, sir.
Senator Blunt. And prior to that, how long did every
tower--give me an estimate of how long every tower took to
approve.
Mr. Mathias. I think we had a national programmatic
agreement in effect that required several months or more,
depending upon the individual approving parties, and we have
reduced that in many instances down to 30 days, and for certain
poles that need to have a more comprehensive review, it is 50
days.
Senator Blunt. And there are over 32,000 towers?
Mr. Mathias. We were told by the railroads that that was
the total expectation for their pole deployment.
Senator Blunt. But you are now doing that much quicker than
you were a year ago.
Mr. Mathias. Yes, we were. About 11,000 poles were deployed
without the required review, and we dealt with that.
Subsequently the railroads have submitted around 8,100 poles to
us for deployment. We have the capacity to have received up to
40,000. So we are ready for business and we can take more work.
Senator Blunt. And the end date--Mr. Stadtler, as I
understand it--my last question will be, if I understand this
right, there is a different system that will be put in place in
the Northeast Corridor than most of the rest of the country
where you use freight rail. Is that right?
Mr. Stadtler. That is correct.
Senator Blunt. And your obstacle has been spectrum?
Mr. Stadtler. On the Northeast Corridor, that has been a
big----
Senator Blunt. And have you announced when you are going to
have the Northeast Corridor completed?
Mr. Stadtler. The portion of the Northeast Corridor that we
own and maintain from Boston to Washington----
Senator Blunt. All but 50 miles. Is that right?
Mr. Stadtler. Correct, 56--will be done by the statutory
deadline of December 2015.
Senator Blunt. Have you ever announced before that it would
be done by a specific date?
Mr. Stadtler. We have, since the legislation, been working
toward the deadline of 2015.
Senator Blunt. There was never a prior announcement that
you would be done at the end of another year except this year?
Mr. Stadtler. Not to my knowledge, no, sir.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator McCaskill?
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. So, Mr. Lauby, what happens if we do not
extend the deadline of December 2015? What position will you
take in terms of enforcement? Will they just continue to
operate in violation of the law, or will you force all of these
rail lines just to shut down?
Mr. Lauby. Senator, thank you for that question.
I think that it would be problematic if we shut down every
rail line. When I talk about enforcement, we have a full raft
of authorities that we can use, everything from an emergency
order that could be used to shut down a railroad to compliance
agreements----
Senator McCaskill. I know you can, but I am asking what is
going to happen. What will you do if we do not extend the
deadline? What will you do on December 15 with the railroads
that are operating without PTC?
Mr. Lauby. We are going to have an enforcement strategy
that leads us to implementation of PTC as quickly as possible.
Senator McCaskill. So, I do not understand the answer to
that question.
Mr. Lauby. Well, we will use our authorities that we have,
everything from emergency orders to fines to enforcement
discretion, to negotiate with the railroads and make sure that
PTC is implemented as quickly as possible.
Senator McCaskill. You know, I think you get my question.
Right?
Mr. Lauby. I do.
Senator McCaskill. If we do not do this, the day is going
to come and then people are going to be calling your office and
say, what are you going to do? Are you going to start by fining
them? Are you going to start by warning them? Are you going to
start by--have you all discussed what you are going to do?
Obviously, I would hope you have discussed it at this point,
because this deadline is looming, and obviously they are not
going to be in compliance. I mean, that is as obvious as the
nose on my face.
Mr. Lauby. Senator, we discuss our enforcement options
every day on what we are going to do on January 1. We are also
preparing as part of our report to Congress, this latest status
report, some options on how we would approach this.
Senator McCaskill. I think we really need to talk about it,
because as we are trying to figure out whether to extend this
deadline, none of us wants the railroads to not work at this as
hard as they know now and all of you to work at it as hard as
you know how. But I think we need to understand what are the
consequences of us not acting. Are we helping safety if we do
not delay the deadline? Are we hampering safety if we do not
delay the deadline? Are we diverting resources away from what
should be going toward the implementation into fines or other
kinds of things? I think the scenario of what will occur if we
do not needs to be more fleshed out.
So whatever help you can give us with that in terms of
being more specific about what you would do, because you all
pretty much know right now, if we do not delay it, who is going
to not be in compliance and to what extent. So whatever plans
you have--it would be great if you would share it with us.
Maybe it would spur us to more thoughtful action.
Mr. Lauby. Senator, we will cover that in our status
report. We do consider these situations on every enforcement
action that we take and our enforcement is not to punish the
railroads. It is to get them into compliance as quickly as
possible.
Senator McCaskill. That is great.
Mr. Lauby. All that is considered.
Senator McCaskill. On the FCC stuff, this problem we had
figuring out the phone records--this is not the first time that
we have had a problem. I think we had a Coast Guard captain
that was--it came out that he was using his cell phone. As it
turns out, it was not true because the text messages and the
phone calls were in different time zones, and this notion that
all of the calls are routed to the same tower--it depends on
capacity. All of this you know better than I do.
Has there been any thought at the FCC about talking to the
carriers about having their records more uniform? I mean, this
has gotten to be a real labyrinth of figuring out whether or
not someone was using either text or an app or a phone call at
the time of some kind of accident or crime, or something that
is the subject of a thorough investigation. Have you all
thought about that at the FCC?
Mr. Mathias. Senator, I appreciate your concern, and
unfortunately, I am not the right person at the FCC to ask.
What I would like to do is to get back to you with an answer
with the right people.
Senator McCaskill. Yes, that would be great because I think
we kind of need to know that. It took 4 weeks for them to
figure out whether or not this conductor was using his phone.
That is a long time to figure that out. I think we just found
out earlier this morning.
And then finally, quickly I would like something for the
record, because my time is up. I am really worried about
passenger traffic in Kansas City, in St. Louis, Amtrak service.
This is a big problem. As you know, both of those trains are
being widely used. Ridership is way up in Missouri. It is a
vital link between Kansas City and St. Louis for tens upon
thousands of Missourians. And we have a standoff here that I do
not know how we are going to get resolved. You referenced it in
your testimony where you have got Class I railroads that own
Class III railroads that are not required to put it in, but
because Amtrak goes through there, they are required to put it
in. So, therefore, they are saying they do not have to pay for
it and there is no way Amtrak in Missouri can pay $30 million
for this. I mean, they are scraping pennies every year to get
by and have to take a subsidy from the Missouri State
legislature to do so.
So I am hoping that big Amtrak has some ideas on how we can
get everybody to the table and get this resolved quickly,
because I have a feeling that Senator Blunt and I are going to
be blamed, not that we do not deserve a lot of blame for a lot
of things. But I have a feeling that if all of a sudden over
the Christmas holidays, everyone starts learning there is no
more Amtrak service in Missouri, that is going to be a big
deal.
Mr. Stadtler. I agree. There are a lot of riders there and
it is an issue we do need to get resolved.
Senator McCaskill. So I know that I can speak for Senator
Blunt in this regard, that both of us stand ready to be helpful
anyway we can.
Mr. Stadtler. Thank you.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Manchin is up next.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOE MANCHIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There is so much going on here and what has happened. First
of all, my deepest sympathy goes out to the families of the
loved ones and all those who were injured and those that lost
their lives from this tragic accident.
I want to focus more on from flying an airplane--and
basically we are moving anywhere from 10,000 feet and below at
250 miles an hour legally. Above 10,000, it is uncontrolled.
But we are in total control of the atmosphere.
So now on the trains, we are seeing like it is almost
impossible for us to have this positive control. And what it
sounds like to me is situational awareness. I do not know. In a
train, do you all have GPS screens, situational awareness, like
I know where I am at, the same as I do in my car?
Mr. Stadtler. Right now on the passenger trains, we do not
have that, no.
Senator Manchin. That is the simplest, cheapest thing. It
is in every car, if you know what I am talking about. You set
your GPS. It tells you where you are. I think the guy just lost
his situational awareness thinking he was out of the turn
before he was into the turn, it sounds like. I mean, just
everything leads to that.
So do you all have any plans of putting just situational
awareness into your trains?
Mr. Stadtler. We have an extensive training program where
all of the engineers must be certified on the physical
characteristics of the railroad that they are allowed to
operate on.
Senator Manchin. I know that. But I am just saying the
technology is so simple and it is so advanced. It just baffles
me.
I have got to be honest with you. It looks like you all,
for the sake of budget constraints, bottom line, profit
margins, return on investments--is making decisions that
basically should never have been made without us putting the
hammer on you all to do it differently. And, we should not have
to. It is advancing technology. It advances so rapidly. We are
talking about positive train control.
My goodness, when I am flying, I am in control. I am the
pilot in command responsible. I understand that. But you got to
give me the wherewithals. I got TCAS. I got everything going
on. I know where everybody is. I know what I am supposed to do.
But, you talk at night and you are up there and it is bad
weather, and he is supposed to know every little crook and turn
in the train track?
Mr. Stadtler. I would strongly disagree that we are making
any decisions that would impact safety for business reasons.
Senator Manchin. I would hope you would.
Mr. Stadtler. Safety is the most important thing at Amtrak,
and the safety of our passengers, our crews is the most
important thing.
Senator Manchin. And I ask you this question. Have you all
ever at a high level--at your level, have you ever spoke about
the technology that is available that could make it much safer
at a very low cost?
Mr. Stadtler. Two answers to that. The first one is what
the engineer does have in the cab now is the signal that they
are operating under shows up right in the cab. So that goes
right into the cab. But, we have been focused at the highest
levels of Amtrak on getting positive train control in place on
our network.
Senator Manchin. Well, you can imagine the frustration you
are hearing from everybody on this panel right now. Until this
deadly accident, you were able to do it before you put it back
in service. It could have been done before and prevented the
accident.
Mr. Stadtler. That is using the automatic train control
system, which is not designed to enforce speed. And what we did
back in 1990, the safety group got together and determined
where the highest risk----
Senator Manchin. I am just saying that until--you know, we
have a timetable for this to be put in. Until we meet that
timetable, you can meet it. The most inexpensive way,
situational awareness, is a visual screen that everybody pretty
much has on their automobile today. Something as simple as
that, sir, might be a solution that could maybe really saving
lives.
Let me just go into another area that I want to talk to.
Should we add trains carrying crude by rail to the list of PTC-
required systems?
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
Absolutely that is a recommendation of the NTSB.
Senator Manchin. What timetable do we have on that?
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. That is up to the Congress. Just as for
passenger rail and any other rail, crude-carrying rail--we
support the fastest implementation of PTC possible.
And I should mention, Senator, that PTC is in a way a type
of situational awareness technology because we leave the
technology up to the railroad companies to use, but it provides
a system of knowing where the train is at all times for both
the engineer, and should an emergency situation happen.
Senator Manchin. My time is running out, and I want to be
reasonable with this in this request. Could you report back to
this committee--if I could ask officially from the Committee,
Mr. Chairman--what evaluations you have on immediate safety
procedures you could put in with technology or anything that is
available that you could consider? I am not asking you to spend
money on redundancies or things that will be outdated. But with
the technology that is available now that might make the whole
rail system much safer than what we have. Because I know we are
talking about the time element, can we meet the time element
with the PTC, is that possible, or on a case-by-case approach
versus an extension quickly as humanly possible on PTC. It
seems like we are going to be missing all these deadlines
anyway. Can you get back with us and tell us what you are
considering, what the discussions and what your timetable would
be to implement other technologies that might be a heck of a
lot safer for you?
Mr. Stadtler. If you are directing that to Amtrak, Amtrak
can certainly----
Senator Manchin. I would say Amtrak. Passenger too. But I
would also say from NTSB basically on train and rail safety, if
you can do it on freight trains too? The crude has increased
5,500 percent.
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. Yes, sir. Senator, we would be happy to
provide you any information you'd like.
Senator Manchin. I would really like to. I mean, the
timetables that you are going to be able to meet on this
because we have an awful lot of crude moving through West
Virginia. We just had an accident there. It could have been
devastating. Thank God we had no deaths or injuries, but it
could have been devastating. So we are very much concerned
about that. And these are happening at low speeds.
I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. My time is up. But I would like
to get with you all further in details on this.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
I mistakenly overlooked Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Blumenthal, you are up.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
having this hearing, which I think is profoundly important.
I want to begin where Senator McCaskill ended, just to say,
in terms of blame, that Congress should be and will be blamed
if we postpone the deadline for 5 or 7 years as right now the
proposal is to do. And let me just suggest very strongly--Ms.
Dinh-Zarr, you used the term ``transparent accountability''--if
there is any postponement, my strong feeling is that it ought
to be in accordance with the alternative legislation that has
been proposed, which would be a year-by-year postponement in
that deadline with the burden on railroads to show why they are
failing to meet that deadline, meeting a burden of proof that
is stringent and strong and requires them to show how they are
going to meet that deadline in the future, and a maximum
postponement for only 3 years.
I think most of the riders who are beginning the journey
from Washington, D.C. to New York today just a few blocks from
here would be absolutely dumbfounded and outraged by a lot of
this discussion. We are a nation that put a man on the moon. We
are operating a vehicle remotely on Mars, but our railroads
have not yet implemented a technology that is existing, it is
feasible and practical and affordable.
The kind of tragedy at Philadelphia is not only
preventable, but predictable. It is predictable in every one of
our states not only for commuters and rail riders, but also for
freight. The tanker cars that are being transported now with
potentially lethal and explosive materials also need this kind
of positive train control.
So I think that the FRA has been as much part of the
problem as the solution. And, Mr. Lauby, I would like a
commitment from you that the FRA will, in fact, impose fines on
railroads that have failed to implement positive train control
if they fail to do so by 2015. We are talking about fines, not
shutting down railroads, but fines that you have the power to
do, $25,000 a day up to $105,000 a day in the event that there
is grossly negligent failure to implement this technology,
fines that are appropriate. I would like a commitment from your
agency that you will enforce this law.
Mr. Lauby. Senator, I cannot make that commitment today.
Senator Blumenthal. Why can you not make that commitment
today, that the FRA will implement and enforce a law?
Mr. Lauby. I can make a commitment that we will enforce the
law.
Senator Blumenthal. So you will impose those fines where
appropriate?
Mr. Lauby. We will use all the tools that we have at our
discretion in order to make sure that we get compliance as
quickly as possible. And that can include fines. That can
include everything that is in our toolbox.
Senator Blumenthal. Will you make a commitment that you
will implement other recommendations for rail safety that have
been made by the NTSB? I think there are 60 or 70 outstanding.
Is that correct, Ms. Dinh-Zarr?
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. That is correct.
Senator Blumenthal. That is correct. Will you make that
commitment?
Mr. Lauby. Senator, we take every one of those
recommendations seriously. We are working through them and
trying to satisfy as many of those recommendations as possible.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, if I were a rider listening to
this testimony, I would be dumbfounded and outraged. The
recommendations have been outstanding for years, and they have
not yet been implemented. Why is that?
Mr. Lauby. Senator, we look at all our work. We prioritize
our work. We try to move forward where we can make progress on
issues that we feel have the biggest safety impact. And we have
a long list of initiatives that we move forward with, and we
prioritize them and we move forward as quickly as we can. We
look at every one of NTSB's recommendations. We see how it can
be implemented. We also see if it has any other safety
implications that need to be considered or if we need to do
research to better understand the issue and make sure we have--
--
Senator Blumenthal. I know, Mr. Lauby, since my time is
about to expire--I apologize for interrupting. I know that you
are the messenger, and you are coming to us with a message that
I find completely unacceptable about delay and nonfeasance, as
I have said repeatedly. And we have heard much the same
language from witnesses in your position in the past.
But I think the overriding fact here is that there is
nothing new or novel about these accidents. As Ms. Dinh-Zarr
said so eloquently, going back to Darien, Connecticut 45 years
ago, the need for this technology was clear. There is nothing
new or novel about the crashes and derailments, and there is
nothing new or novel about the technology. What we have seen
here is a failure of will.
And I think that the blame will be on Congress and on the
agencies in the Federal Government that have responsibility for
enforcing this law. Enforcement is about expectations. Right
now, the expectation is that this law will not be enforced. And
my fear is that that expectation will be self-fulfilling.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Peters?
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Nearly 3 weeks ago, I rose on the Senate floor to
commemorate the life of Rachel Jacobs. Earlier that morning, I
had attended her funeral. It was an incredibly sad event, one
of the saddest I have ever attended. Rachel was tragically
killed in the horrific Amtrak crash that we are here to talk
about here today. She was only 39 years old when her life was
tragically cut short. She was the beloved daughter to dear
friends of mine, Gilda and John Jacobs. She was a wife. She was
a mother to a beautiful 2-year-old son and the CEO of an
education startup in Philadelphia. And although she lived in
New York, she never forgot her roots in the Detroit area. She
was the cofounder of Detroit Nation, an organization that
engages former residents of the Detroit area in cities and
communities across our great country. We have suffered an
incredible loss in our area and our families with the passing
of Rachel Jacobs, and my heart certainly goes out to her family
and to the families of the seven other victims of this tragedy.
This accident was likely caused by human error. We are
still grappling to get more information as a result of that.
And certainly, positive train control is designed to address
the kind of human error that may have been the contributing
factor to this error, which means that it could have prevented
this accident.
And what is so troubling to me is the NTSB has been saying
since 1990--since 1990--that we need PTC on our rail networks
in order to prevent accidents, like the one that we just saw
and to save lives. And I know implementing this is costly and I
know it is complicated, as we have heard here, but we have to
move forward with the utmost haste to get this job done.
Every day we delay, we increase the odds of another tragic
accident. And anybody here who is advocating for a delay in
PTC, I would just ask them to put themselves in the shoes if
they have to look in the eyes of that father, her mother who
lost a child or a spouse or to see that young kid. This is an
issue that we cannot accept failure at. We have to deal with.
And it is clear from the testimony today that we have a
ways to go, but what is really troubling to me is that we had a
situation with the automatic train control from Amtrak that
potentially could have prevented this accident as well. It is
my understanding and what I have heard from the testimony today
is that back in 1991, 400 people were injured in an overspeed
derailment. So Amtrak then took steps to address speed on
various curves. And to think that even though we do not have
positive train control, that this ATC could have prevented this
accident--and the fact it was installed on the southbound track
and not on the northbound is even more disturbing that it could
have been prevented.
My question to you, Mr. Stadtler--and we have heard that
you have since made these corrections on that curve--what the
expense, time commitment necessary to make that change on that
curve?
Mr. Stadtler. First, let me respond. The safety of our
passengers and our crew is the most important thing to Amtrak,
and we deal with it and talk about it every day. We are
heartbroken and saddened by the incident, and it was
devastating to us as well. And from the beginning we took
responsibility for our part in the accident. And I too--my
heart and thoughts and prayers go out to all the families of
the deceased and the victims injured.
I do not have the cost of putting that in. I will say that
the limitation of the system is such that it is designed for
avoiding train collisions and not for overspeed. The
limitations make it so you can only do certain reductions. So
you can only force the engineer to go down to 45 miles an hour,
30 miles an hour, or 20 miles an hour. So it is not a feasible
system to use for speed control up and down the corridor. Part
of the reason why when we looked at the curves back in 1990-
1991 was the limitation of the system made it so we only
identified the highest risk curves. The railroad was safe for
28 years. It has been 28 years since a fatal derailment. Again,
this tragic event made us relook at the criteria under which we
applied those corrections. We have worked with the FRA through
their emergency order to identify other curves. There are about
six more that we have protected.
But to your point, positive train control is the system
that will prevent these accidents.
Senator Peters. But this system could have slowed this
train down had it been identified?
Mr. Stadtler. Had we put a code correction in place at that
curve----
Senator Peters. Which is a pretty minor change to put a
code correction in?
Mr. Stadtler. It is. At that particular location, it is
pretty minor. I would say that is a fair statement.
Senator Peters. So a minor correction on this track could
have prevented this accident and saved these lives?
Mr. Stadtler. Again, there are numerous places up and down
the corridor that have the high risk curves that were
identified by this safety group with Amtrak.
Senator Peters. Why was this not identified as a high risk
curve when, obviously, we had a terrible tragedy on this curve?
Mr. Stadtler. The methodology, when we made those
decisions, looked at the approach speed and if the approach
speed was high enough to cause the derailment in the curve
because the approach speed going northbound was 80, and the
speed of 80 in that curve would not have caused a derailment.
It was not deemed to be a high risk curve.
Senator Peters. So you do not consider the fact there might
be human error or an engineer is traveling faster than the
speed limit?
Mr. Stadtler. At the time of the decision, the theory was
we thought the human error--we assumed the human error would
not be slowing down for the curve. We did not take into account
the fact that the person may be speeding--the engineer could be
speeding going into it.
Senator Peters. So now you are correcting that matrix
throughout the system on the corridor?
Mr. Stadtler. We have complied with the emergency order and
we are working on identifying the curves where the situation
exists that the FRA identified, and we are making additional
corrections.
Senator Peters. And when will all those be completed?
Mr. Stadtler. Some of them are completed now. We are
working with the FRA on a mitigation plan, but it will be soon.
Senator Peters. When do you expect that? You say soon. What
does that mean?
Mr. Stadtler. I do not have the answer for all of them, but
it is within weeks.
Senator Peters. Obviously, it has to be as soon as
possible, and then we have to work on positive train control.
I know I am out of time, but, Chairman Thune, I would
certainly hope that we need to have another hearing after the
NTSB has come back with their findings, if we could have a
hearing to really delve into this because this is, obviously,
of extreme importance to so many people.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Booker?
STATEMENT OF HON. CORY BOOKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We are obviously here with heavy hearts, and everyone has
expressed that from our people giving testimony to other
Senators about the regret and condolences we give to the
families of those that were killed, and all those who were
injured and are still recovering.
I would like to really just drill down to some of what the
key issues are in preventing us from getting PTC implemented.
And the first is, Mr. Lauby, you highlighted in your
testimony that people are having trouble or railroads are
having trouble, implementing PTC because of the cost. The cost
of funding PTC is a big challenge, and I guess I am wondering
do commuter railroads have enough money to implement positive
train control? What are the concerns you are hearing from them
with their limited budgets?
Mr. Lauby. Thank you for that question, Senator.
The cost is certainly a driving factor for the commuter
railroads. The commuter railroads are public agencies. They
operate budgets similar to the way the Federal Government does
where they have to look 3 years ahead to get funds. The cost of
PTC is quite high, $3.48 billion for the public commuter
agencies, and at this point they have spent $950 million. So
they have a long way to go. We feel that the Government has a
role in funding this positive train control improvement.
Senator Booker. I am sorry to interrupt you. The Federal
Government has a role to play.
Mr. Lauby. We have asked for $825 million specifically to
support positive train control implementation on public
commuter rail agencies. We have asked for that in 2015 and
2016.
Senator Booker. So Amtrak along the Northeast Corridor will
have their PTC implemented by the end of this year. Correct?
Mr. Lauby. Correct.
Senator Booker. And were they able to do that, Mr. Lauby,
in your estimation by robbing Peter to pay Paul in preventing
investments in other areas? How did they get it done in the
Northeast Corridor by the deadline or by the end of this year
and other folks are not able to?
Mr. Lauby. Well, to Amtrak's credit, Amtrak started long
ago with the voluntary application of the ACSES system. They
were developing it before the PTC mandate was ever issued on
RSIA. We have been working with them for years on that.
Senator Booker. And financing mechanisms. The MTA was
recently approved by the FRA, about $987 million in rail
financing. I am looking at this myself with some legislation we
are looking to introduce to make this program more accessible.
Is that a possible way to help finance PTC implementation?
Mr. Lauby. It is. It is based on loans. Someone has to pay
those loans, but the more funds that are accessible to the
commuter railroads, the quicker we will get this in place.
Senator Booker. Right. And I guess I share a lot of the
frustrations as expressed, and I appreciate the panelists for
enduring what is understandable frustration amongst my
colleagues and I, but I also do not want to shirk the
responsibility that we have. We are debating right now more
than a half a trillion dollars for national defense, and when I
think of defense of this country, it is also this idea that we
should be defending people in the homeland from tragedies that
are occurring because of an infrastructure that has fallen way
behind our global competitors. America is number one. That is
what I believe. But yet, we have an infrastructure that is
ranked well out of the top 10 compared to other nations that
have faster moving trains, more efficient, safer, faster ports,
better aviation infrastructure, and roads and bridges are
crumbling, threatening our Nation.
And so I understand that there is a lot of responsibility,
frankly, that is represented by the people that are giving
testimony here, but the fact that one of the biggest reasons I
am hearing is because of a lack of resources, often small
changes that could be being made that we are not investing.
That is very frustrating to me.
Two more quick questions in the limited time.
As soon as the accident happened, Amtrak was ordered to put
a lot of other safety measures in place. And that should not be
isolated, obviously, to just the Northeast Corridor. Our entire
Nation should do the common sense safety implementation. The
things that were done post-accident could have been done pre-
accident, and I want to make sure they are being done all
across our commuter rail systems in America.
Mr. Lauby. Senator, we issued a safety advisory yesterday
that takes many of the solutions that improve safety on the
Amtrak corridor and asked the other commuter railroads to
consider making changes to implement those same types of
solutions.
Senator Booker. Just real quick, Mr. Mathias. The
congestion within the Northeast Corridor in the New York-New
Jersey region or in the Northeast Corridor in general--are you
concerned about interference as an issue for the implementation
of positive train control? Is that a real issue that we in
Congress should be focusing on as well?
Mr. Mathias. Thank you, Senator. Interference is a concern
in any spectrum-related activities. It is a concern in this
case not only train to train, but also potentially trains
interfering with adjacent TV stations. For this reason,
spectrum licensees engineer their systems carefully. They work
these problems out. And in this case, Amtrak, as well as the
freight rails, have assured us that they are designing their
systems to operate so that they do not interfere with each
other. To the extent that they do, we stand ready to engage
with them, to help them find solutions.
Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Booker.
Senator Cantwell?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
holding this important hearing.
And I do too want to express my sympathies to the families
who have lost loved ones in these accidents.
I wanted to go to you, Mr. Lauby, because in the State of
Washington, operating entities for both the commuter and
passenger rail service expect to be ready to operate the PTC by
the end of the year. So I know my colleagues have talked about
a couple of different issues, but I am talking now about the
actual testing, because the Federal Railroad Administration
will have to do the testing to get that operational. So are we
going to be ready to have that testing done with those entities
so that this can be operational by the end of the year?
Mr. Lauby. The testing itself is conducted by the
individual railroads. The process is that the railroads provide
the test plans to FRA. FRA approves the test plans. The tests
are conducted with some oversight by FRA. We are not on every
train, but we are engaged with the test engineers. Once the
tests are completed, the results of those tests are used to
support system certification and the safety plan that moves
forward to certifying the entire system.
Senator Cantwell. So has the FRA laid out the type of
testing that will be required for both the commuter and the
freight rails?
Mr. Lauby. The type of testing is laid out in the
regulation, and the type of testing--we have technical experts
that work with all the authorities to help them make that
determination and understand those requirements.
Senator Cantwell. So you do not believe that FRA is any
part of an issue that would be a delay in this implementation
by the end of the year?
Mr. Lauby. No, Senator, I do not.
Senator Cantwell. And what about--my colleague from West
Virginia mentioned this issue, particularly as it related to a
larger emergency concern on the movement of crude by rail,
which is voluminous both in his state and in mine. And in
Washington, BNSF is part--since they own so much of the track,
is a part of the partnership in the system implementation of
positive train control. So you do not see any delay in being
able to apply that either on the crude by rail system?
Mr. Lauby. Many of the crude by rail routes are going to be
on track that would be PTC-equipped, because these are really
on the high capacity tracks. It is not true in all cases. We
have talked about potentially a requirement for PTC on the
crude by rail routes. The accidents that we have had, even in
Senator Manchin's State, have not been caused by train-to-train
collisions. They would not have been PTC-preventable so far,
but there is a risk of train-to-train collisions with crude oil
and any type of train. So that is something to be considered.
But again, many of the crude oil routes are already covered or
will have PTC installed on them.
Senator Cantwell. But in a runaway train scenario, they
would be very helpful. Correct?
Mr. Lauby. In a runaway train where we have a failure of
the brakes or failure to control the train, PTC will not stop
that collision either.
Senator Cantwell. In a locked mechanic type of situation
where--for whatever safety procedures were not followed and
then the train started moving down the track?
Mr. Lauby. If the brakes will not hold the train on a
grade, PTC basically relies on the train brakes to enforce the
signal restrictions or the speed restrictions. If the brakes do
not work, PTC would not be effective.
Senator Cantwell. So back to BNSF and the Northwest. So you
believe by the end of this year, there is no reason why the
Pacific Northwest, both on commuter and on freight, should not
be able to operate positive train control?
Mr. Lauby. I can give you some details and update, but I do
not know of any specific challenges that we have in not
supporting that program. If BNSF is ready to implement there,
if the commuter railroads are ready to implement there, then I
do not see anything standing in the way.
Senator Cantwell. Certainly not FRA's testing?
Mr. Lauby. Not FRA's test, and again, it is not FRA's
testing. It is the railroads' testing. They have to complete
it. They have to provide a safety plan so that that system can
be certified.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Senator Markey?
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Right now, every one of us, all of us, in this room,
Senators, Amtrak, the Federal Railroad Administration, NTSB,
the FCC--we need to do everything we can to facilitate the
quick installation of positive train control, PTC, along our
Nation's railroads.
PTC really stands for protecting train customers,
preventing train collisions. That is what it really stands for.
And it has not been implemented fully and it has to be in a
timely fashion.
And that is why I have cosponsored with Senators Feinstein
and Blumenthal and Nelson the Positive Train Control Act, which
would hold railroads accountable for implementing PTC systems
as quickly as possible.
A recent study estimates that Amtrak needs $21 billion in
capital investments just to get the corridor to a state of good
repair and lay the foundation for future demand.
Well, last night, the House Republicans voted to cut
Amtrak's budget by over $200 million, and that is unacceptable
because by cutting Amtrak funding, they are playing a dangerous
game of railway Russian roulette, making tough decisions
necessary by the people who are sitting at this table in terms
of what will, in fact, get funded.
So, Mr. Stadtler, how important is it that we see continued
investment in Amtrak to ensure continued upgrade of the
Northeast Corridor and throughout the country? If the
appropriations bill the House passed last night becomes law,
what types of critical safety technology tradeoffs will Amtrak
have to make, and what other negative impacts will customers
experience as a result of these misguided cuts?
Mr. Stadtler. Thank you, sir.
Continued funding is obviously critical. Consistent funding
is critical as well. As has been well documented up and down
the corridor, we have aging infrastructure that has been under-
invested in. We have 100-year-old bridges all up and down the
corridor, and we have lacked the resources to upgrade them and
maintain them on a regular basis. We have always put safety
first. We have used the limited funding we have to make sure
that we will have positive train control in place by the
legislated deadline. We have used the funding we have to equip
our locomotives off the corridor to ensure that we are ready
when the freights are ready to have train control in place. But
you are right. With limited funding, it presents us with very
difficult decisions moving forward.
Senator Markey. Well, Mr. Stadtler, you mentioned concerns
that there are places where Amtrak and the freight railroads
use different potentially interfering spectrum for their PTC
systems, including on the crowded Northeast Corridor between
New Haven and Boston. What steps has Amtrak taken to ensure
that that interference will not be a problem?
Mr. Stadtler. We are working very closely with the FCC. We
are working very closely with the freight railroads that have
the I-ETMS system on their right-of-way that is in close
proximity to our right-of-way. We are doing significant testing
and working closely so when there are interference issues, we
use one of the many mitigating tools to reduce the risk there.
Senator Markey. Well, let me go to you, Mr. Mathias. What
is the FCC doing in order to make sure that these separate
systems do not wind up interfering with each other?
Mr. Mathias. Senator, we are fully engaged with all the
parties, including with Amtrak and the freights, to encourage
their discussions and the work of their engineers to work out
these issues. Should those issues not be able to be engineered
away, we are standing ready to help them find additional
spectrum, if that is required, either through acquisition or,
potentially, through exchanges of comparable spectrum.
Senator Markey. So how close are we to making the decision
as to whether or not the engineering issues can be resolved,
and as a result, you would have to move on to finding
additional spectrum?
Mr. Mathias. Senator, we had our first discussions about
this issue with both Amtrak and freight rail officials less
than 2 weeks ago. We have already had follow-up meetings. It is
too early to say, but we are clearly moving quickly on this. We
understand the importance and the criticality to PTC
deployment.
Senator Markey. Do you have a goal, Mr. Stadtler or others,
in terms of when this issue should be finally resolved?
Mr. Stadtler. We are using the 220 megahertz now frequency
on the North End between New Haven and Boston, and we will have
that implemented by December. Because the freights are a little
bit behind us, we do not envision any issues that will prevent
us from putting our system in place, and we will just work
closely with them as they implement to ensure that issues are
mitigated.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Senator Klobuchar?
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you to all of you.
I was at an export meeting, and I saw Secretary Foxx there.
And I think everyone is very focused on what happened with this
crash and the sad, tragic loss of life. And it just puts a
renewed focus on our Nation's infrastructure. We, of course,
had this already in Minnesota years ago with our bridge
collapse, and we have seen a number of derailments in the
Midwest because of increased use. We just had a bridge just
fall down in the middle of--a very small bridge near
International Falls, Minnesota. There were no injuries, but a
train went right into the river just because we have
infrastructure needs. So my focus right now honestly is on
infrastructure funding, our transportation bill.
But beyond that, I know a lot of my colleagues have
specifically asked about the PTC issues, and I want to go back
to something that Senator Markey was just talking about with
you, Mr. Mathias, and that is spectrum. As more and more
consumers and technologies come to rely on wireless
technologies, whether it is PTC or connected cars or increased
demand for mobile broadband, are we going to continue to see
demand for more spectrum? And as we know, it is a competitive
market in terms of auctions, and how do you see the FCC
balancing the spectrum of needs from safety enhancements like
PTC and the other commercial demands? And do you think the PTC
system currently has enough spectrum to operate national?
Mr. Mathias. Senator, thank you for that question.
Obviously, the FCC is fully engaged in finding and making
available to the public the spectrum that everybody needs for
these advancing systems.
With respect to PTC, we believe--we have been informed by
the freight railroads, that they have met their needs across
the country. We understand that Amtrak as well has their needs
in the Northeast Corridor, and we believe that the commuter
rails in many locations, including in Puget Sound and San
Francisco and Los Angeles and San Diego and Chicago, where 11
railroads are using the same system and the same spectrum, and
even in the Northeast Corridor--we think that they do have the
spectrum or certainly are close to getting it.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Mr. Stadtler, Amtrak operates a 21,300-mile system that
provides service to vibrant communities in 46 States, and the
network reaches about 40 percent of America's rural population.
What is Amtrak doing to ensure it continues to provide reliable
service and safe service in rural America?
Mr. Stadtler. Safety is our number one priority every day.
We are working very hard to put positive train control in place
on the infrastructure that we own and have responsibility for.
And in the areas where we do not have the responsibility for
the wayside infrastructure, we do have the responsibility to
equip our fleet with interoperable radios and electronics, and
we are committed to doing that and we will have that done by
December of 2015.
Senator Klobuchar. So you think that it will be the same in
the urban and rural areas, or do you think there will be a
difference?
Mr. Stadtler. Where there are requirements for PTC under
the rule that applies in the rural areas, absolutely.
Senator Klobuchar. A December 13 GAO report found that FRA
faces several rail safety challenges, including that the
inspectors only have the capacity to inspect less than 1
percent of all railroad activities. The FRA, as you know,
partners with states to oversee the inspections of the tracks
and the signals. We only have a handful of inspectors in our
state, and I know there is a specific need for more track
inspectors. I have tried to get increased funding for more rail
inspectors, because I believe it will help with derailments. In
your view, is there a sufficient number of track inspectors to
oversee the tracks that we have in our country, Mr. Stadtler?
Mr. Stadtler. We do not actually own the track inspectors.
So I would defer that to FRA.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
Mr. Lauby. Yes. We can always use more track inspectors. As
the report said, we were able to touch 1 percent of the
railroad system. Additional track inspection is important. We
have initiatives going on right now to try to address some of
the track issues that we have seen with the crude oil routes
and some of the more recent derailments. But we are taking a
more active look at crude oil routes. We are hiring additional
track inspectors right now to dedicate to those routes to
provide a higher level of safety.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much. Thank you to all of
you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Gardner?
STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing today.
I just want to go back over some of Mr. Stadtler's
testimony. Just so you know, Mr. Stadtler, I think in May of
this year, the State of Colorado committed to spending $1
million for track maintenance along the Southwest Chief line. I
think the State of New Mexico has matched Colorado's effort by
also committing $1 million to track maintenance. Kansas has
also agreed to support the effort. There are other efforts
ongoing to support this line.
In your testimony, you state that the dispute between the
Kansas City terminal and Amtrak over who is required to take on
the cost may lead to closure of the line. Have you actually
exhausted all options? Have you looked at every nook and cranny
of your budget? Have you taken every step possible to avoid
having the line rerouted or closed?
Mr. Stadtler. I would say we have not exhausted all
options. We are working closely with KCT and with the Class I
railroads that own KCT. Even though KCT is a Class III, it is
owned by Class I's. As you know, KCT has hundreds of freight
trains that go through there every day, and we have about a
half a dozen passenger trains. I would not say, though, we have
exhausted all options. We have already contributed $5 million
toward PTC at the Kansas City Terminal, and we continue to
actively search a resolution.
Senator Gardner. Could you provide my office with a list of
the steps and measures that you have discussed and looked into
and then possible solutions as well that you are considering?
Mr. Stadtler. Certainly.
Senator Gardner. And do you believe that an extension of
the deadline for implementation would assist in resolving this
dispute of some kind?
Mr. Stadtler. I do not believe that this specific situation
has anything to do with the deadline. No.
Senator Gardner. Why not?
Mr. Stadtler. Because KCT has been pretty active in getting
train control in place. I cannot speak to their schedule, but I
do not believe there is a deadline issue there.
Senator Gardner. Maybe we could continue the conversation
on that, because I think there are alternatives that we could
pursue to make sure that the outcome of what you outlined in
your statement does not actually materialize in regards to this
particular line.
Do you believe that long-distance lines--I mean, if you go
to Colorado, if you go to southwest Kansas, if you look at the
impact this has on those communities, and the Arkansas Valley
in Colorado, southwest Kansas, do you believe that this line
has a positive economic impact on those communities?
Mr. Stadtler. Absolutely, and it is one thing, to your
point, that you see when you ride the long-distance trains. You
get to these small cities, and you see such a large percentage
of folks that rely on the train every single day to get to
where they need to go. They have no other transportation
options. So I think it is vital, yes.
Senator Gardner. And has that been part of the
consideration that you have made when talking about your
alternatives and possible actions you could take?
Mr. Stadtler. It is absolutely part of the equation. There
is no doubt.
Senator Gardner. I think this is important that we find a
solution to this, that we find a way that we can make this
work. It would be devastating in the case of these communities
to have the consequences of your testimony indeed come to
fruition.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Gardner.
Senator Johnson?
STATEMENT OF HON. RON JOHNSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
not being here. We were actually having a confirmation hearing
on the next TSA Administrator, which was reasonably important.
But I really want to explore technology. I am not sure who
the best person is to ask this question. But now that we have
got Google Maps, we have got Google's driverless car--PTC was
passed back in 2008, 7 years ago. That is almost an eon ago in
terms of the technology advancements. Are we really looking at
the right technology? Are we spending money on something that
is already obsolete before we implement it? Whoever feels
capable of answering it, please do.
Mr. Lauby. You know, it is very valuable technology. When
we look at the types of accidents that it can prevent, what PTC
really does is it is a backup for the locomotive engineer. Our
railroad system in this country is very manual. It depends on
the locomotive engineer to stay awake, stay alert, and make the
right decisions, control the train appropriately. And if he
makes a mistake, there is no backup without this positive train
control system. So if we are interested in preventing accidents
and putting technology in place that can prevent accidents,
this technology is the right one to take care of human error,
which is 38 percent of the accidents we see.
Senator Johnson. But again, one of the issues has been the
assigning of spectrum. This does not need spectrum. Does it?
One of these map functions--this tied in with the Governor on a
locomotive. Is there a simple way of addressing this problem?
Are we just tied into an old technology solution and just
continue to barrel down this path when there is better
technology, there is more advanced technology that could be
implemented far cheaper and far more quickly? Go ahead.
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. Thank you, Senator. I will be very brief.
PTC is actually a performance standard. It is a performance
measure. So the railroad companies can use any technology they
would like, and they have chosen to use this type of
technology, which we also believe at the NTSB will save lives
if it is implemented in a timely manner.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Mathias, you were wanting to hop in
here.
Mr. Mathias. I was pointing, not to hop in, but thank you,
Senator. I would just add that the device that you held up does
use spectrum to communicate with the satellites. It tells it
where it is. So it is not a----
Senator Johnson. But it is already assigned, and we are not
having to wait for additional. Again, I am no technologist
here, but in numerous hearings here we are always talking about
the assignment of spectrum. And there seems to be an awful lot
of complication involved in setting up the PTC. Am I just
missing something here?
Mr. Mathias. The FCC's role is to work with the railroads
to help them find the spectrum they need. They have chosen to
deploy their system in a commercial band in the neighborhood of
around 220 megahertz. There are licensees in there already. So
what we have had to do is had to help them find people who
would be willing to work with them on a market basis to give
them the spectrum so that they could use it. It seems to be
working well, and in most of the country, we understand that
the railroads have the spectrum they need. So we do not think
that that is an issue.
Senator Johnson. But it does not seem particularly working
well. This was mandated to be completed by 2015, and a lot of
people are not going to be able to do it. I mean, this is 7
years in implementation. It does not seem that easy.
Again, I am still not getting an answer to the question. Is
there a better technology that would be easier, cheaper, or
something that would work as well, if not better, than what was
contemplated, again 7 years ago?
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. So the simple answer to that, Senator, is
no. PTC is the best answer. It is the safety measure that will
prevent these type of crashes, these type of accidents. There
are other alternative measures, but they are reactive rather
than predictive. So they may take place after someone has
passed the red signal, for example, you know, when there is
about to be a collision. So that is the importance of PTC is
that it is a predictive type of technology or technologies that
will prevent these crashes before they happen.
Senator Johnson. Anybody else have anything to add?
Mr. Lauby. Senator, I think that the spectrum issue has
largely been worked out for the Class I's. There are still
challenges with the commuter railroads. The information I have
had from APTA shows that about 54 percent of the commuter
railroads still do not have all the spectrum they need to
operate. We have a good relationship with FCC. We will continue
to work with them to make sure that those issues are addressed.
Senator Johnson. OK, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
Just as a couple of closing notes--and by the way, I would
ask this maybe one last quick question because there are lots
of safety measures that can and should be taken, and this was
referenced a little bit earlier today, but I am just curious
and perhaps, Ms. Dinh-Zarr, you could respond to inward-looking
cameras and their effectiveness, not only when it comes to
determining after the fact what has happened, but also as a
preventive measure just to keep folks paying attention in the
locomotive. So could you comment on that safety measure and
whether or not you see that as something that could be
implemented that would be very effective at least in the near
interim until some of these other technologies are able to be
implemented?
Dr. Dinh-Zarr. Thank you, Chairman. Thanks for the good
question about the inward-facing cameras.
The NTSB has recommended that inward-facing cameras are
implemented along with audio recordings as well. And that is
absolutely an implementation that would make trains safer. It
would record, obviously, the happenings that we are not able to
observe directly. It also provides more information so that we
can prevent crashes, so we can see what happens, as you
mentioned. So absolutely we recommend it and we think it is a
good safety advancement to have that.
The Chairman. Mr. Lauby, can you comment on that?
Mr. Lauby. Yes. I believe that inward-facing cameras are
something that can be used to enhance safety. We have been
working with the industry as they have rolled out some of their
systems.
We have had a railroad safety advisory committee group that
has tried to draft some regulations around that. Unfortunately,
we were not able to reach consensus with that group, and so at
this point, FRA is continuing to move forward and has, at least
in headquarters, a draft rule that would require inward-facing
cameras in the future.
The Chairman. What percentage of rail accidents are human-
caused?
Mr. Lauby. About 38 percent, Senator.
The Chairman. And can you break down others? Equipment,
rail?
Mr. Lauby. Track is the second big one. That is about a
third, 35 percent or so. Equipment and other types of issues,
signals--that takes up the last third. But human factors is
really the driving factor.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Lauby, it is pretty critical that
we get this updated PTC report as soon as possible. That would
be very helpful in terms of shaping the discussions we have
about what is reasonable in terms of this technology and its
implementation.
Mr. Stadtler, if you would continue to update the Committee
on your progress on the necessary ATC modifications as well.
We want to do everything we can, obviously, to make sure
something like this never happens again. And obviously, we know
that there are technologies like PTC that are available. The
question I guess is, again, how do we get those implemented and
certified in a way that ensures that we are promoting safety
and not making things less safe? And I think that is going to
require a good amount of coordination from a lot of folks. So
we look forward to hearing that report, Mr. Lauby, and hope you
can get that to us as soon as possible, because this is
something we are going to have to deal with in the very near
future.
The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks, during
which time Senators are asked to submit any questions for the
record, and upon receipt, the witnesses are requested to submit
their written answers to the Committee as soon as possible.
I want to thank our panel today for their responses, for
their insights, and I think this has been very helpful.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Steve Daines to
DJ Stadtler
Question. In your testimony, you mention Amtrak anticipates it will
meet the Positive Train Control (PTC) deadline of December 31 along the
Northeast Corridor (NEC). You also mention hurdles Amtrak faces in the
Midwest. In my home state of Montana, the Empire Builder, connecting
Chicago with Seattle and Portland, is a critical part of our
transportation infrastructure along the highline. More than 118,000
people boarded and alighted in Montana last year (FY 2014). Would you
discuss the time frame for PTC deployment on western passenger rail
lines, specifically the Empire Builder? What hurdles remain and how is
Amtrak coordinating with freight railroads who own the track?
Answer. Thank you for your comments regarding the importance of the
Empire Builder to the State of Montana. As you are probably aware, the
host railroads that own the tracks used by the Empire Builder are BNSF
(in Montana) and Canadian Pacific and Metra (east of St. Paul, MN and
in the Chicago area). PTC requires wayside components installed along
the tracks by the host, and on-board components installed on the train.
Amtrak expects to have our locomotives equipped to operate the Empire
Builder and all our other routes nationwide by the December 31, 2015
congressionally mandated PTC deadline. However, we cannot comment on
the readiness of other railroads' PTC installations. The primary
hurdles that remain for PTC operations on host railroads are completion
of the wayside installations by the hosts, training of Amtrak crews,
and completion of PTC back-office servers to coordinate communications
among all the PTC components. Amtrak requests periodic updates from our
host railroad partners on their plans for installation and operation of
PTC.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Steve Daines to
Charles Mathias
Question 1. Amtrak's Office of Inspector General (OIG) report found
Amtrak's most serious challenge in implementing Positive Train Control
(PTC) was acquiring radio frequency spectrum along the Northeast
Corridor (NEC). Mr. Stadtler mentioned in his testimony the need for
Amtrak to migrate from the 900MHz to the 220MHz bandwidth along the
Northeast Corridor in his testimony.
As you stated, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
facilitates spectrum acquisition. What is the FCC doing to facilitate
spectrum acquisitions outside of the NEC? Would you please discuss
spectrum issues for PTC in rural areas, such as along the Empire
Builder?
Answer. We understand from Amtrak that Amtrak will be relying on
PTC-220, the spectrum management entity established by the Class I
Freight Railroads, for its spectrum needs outside the Northeast
Corridor. We understand from PTC-220 that there is adequate spectrum
for this purpose. In particular, Amtrak has confirmed that it will be
using spectrum from a PTC-220 member to support PTC service for the
Empire Builder.
Question 2. At times, obtaining spectrum from existing licenses in
secondary markets has been unsuccessful. What are the challenges to
acquiring the necessary spectrum while also protecting property rights
of the spectrum holder?
Answer. The Commission respects the rights of all spectrum holders.
For this reason, we have directed the railroads to the secondary
spectrum market where they can negotiate at arm's length with existing
spectrum holders to meet their PTC spectrum requirements. The
Commission continues to be actively engaged with all parties to
facilitate these transactions and ensure that PTC spectrum needs are
met.
[all]