[Senate Hearing 114-124]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-124
REVIEW OF RESOURCES, PRIORITIES AND PROGRAMS IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2016
STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 24, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
97-627 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Lester E. Munson III, Staff Director
Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Bob Corker, U.S. Senator From Tennessee..................... 1
Hon. John F. Kerry, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions Submitted
by Senator Bob Corker...................................... 52
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions Submitted
by Senator Robert Menendez................................. 56
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions Submitted
by Senator James E. Risch.................................. 107
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions Submitted
by Senator Marco Rubio..................................... 108
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions Submitted
by Senator Barbara Boxer................................... 110
Response of Secretary John F. Kerry to Question Submitted by
Senator Jeanne Shaheen..................................... 112
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions Submitted
by Senator Edward J. Markey................................ 112
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions Submitted
by Senator John Barrasso................................... 115
Hon. Robert Menendez, U.S. Senator From New Jersey............... 2
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Statement From Administration on No Boots on the Ground Submitted
by Senator Barbara Boxer....................................... 134
CRS Memorandum on the Meaning of ``Enduring'' Submitted by
Senator Barbara Boxer.......................................... 135
(iii)
REVIEW OF RESOURCES, PRIORITIES AND PROGRAMS IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2016
STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Corker, Risch, Johnson, Flake, Gardner,
Perdue, Barrasso, Menendez, Boxer, Cardin, Shaheen, Udall,
Murphy, Kaine, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Mr. Secretary, I know you have been doing a lot of
traveling around the world and have a lot of important issues
to deal with, and we appreciate very much you coming in today
to talk about your budget.
As you know, the purpose of this hearing is to learn more
about the State Department's fiscal year 2016 budget request. I
know that these hearings also become a time, in many cases, to
talk about public policy issues. I think you know there may be
some questions about the AUMF and other issues that you are
dealing with at this time. So we appreciate you answering all
of those.
One of our top priorities is to complete a State Department
authorization that helps the Department become more efficient
and effective within a sustainable budget. Chairman Perdue will
be taking on that effort. We met yesterday with Heather
Higginbotham from the State Department, and had a good meeting
to launch the authorization process. And I think all of us want
to make sure, as we are dealing with the many crises around the
world, that the State Department is set up in a way to leverage
our efforts and to ensure that we are doing on a daily basis
everything we can to continue to pursue our national interests.
And that is the purpose of doing the authorization.
Obviously, the President has sent forth a budget that
increases spending $74 billion, and I think all of us
understand that is not where we are going to be. I know you are
here today to talk about your component of that, but we all
know that that is not where the budget is going to end up. It
is going to be at a greatly reduced number. So we know we have
some challenges in front of us, and we appreciate again you
being here for us to be able to talk with you about those.
The State Department is also proposing some increases in
foreign aid, not just in State ops. And yet, in many cases,
there is difficulty in trying to evaluate the effectiveness of
the aid. Again, I think that is one of the important reasons
for having an authorization. Our overseas contingency
operations funding still compose about 14 percent of spending,
and at some point I think we all know we have got to move away
from funding through OCO to getting things on an enduring
budget. And again, that is something that through the budget
process we are going to look closely at this year.
I do have four things I would like to highlight. The State
Department right now has an over-reliance on OCO and carryover
balances, and I think there is a great concern that those
carryover balances create a lack of discipline within the
Department. The budget's misalignment with strategic planning
efforts such as the quadrennial diplomacy and development
review process--those not being linked up seems to miss an
opportunity to make sure that we are aligned properly. We have
a massive increase in peacekeeping that betrays previous
agreements with the United Nations on the U.S. share of
funding. And we have a failure to reprioritize resources in
line with the Asia rebalance. There has been a lot of
discussion about that, but it is very difficult to see the
resources that are being put forth to deal with it.
So we look forward to your testimony. I know there will be
a number of questions not just about the budget but other
activities that you have been dealing with. We thank you for
your service to our country. We thank you for taking time out
to be with us today.
And with that, I would like to recognize the distinguished
ranking member, Senator Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, welcome back to the committee. I see you
have a big binder there, so hopefully it has all the good
answers that we want to hear.
As we meet, it is a challenging time for State's budget and
for the Nation. Negotiations are continuing with Iran even as
it perpetuates the war in Syria. ISIL is expanding its
territory and sphere of influence in the Middle East and North
Africa, and Putin has again reneged on his commitments to solve
the Ukrainian crisis. At the same time, China is rising,
pressing for its own political and territorial advantages. In
Africa, Ebola has caused nearly 10,000 deaths and remains a
threat due in part to a lack of an adequate medical
infrastructure and delivery system.
So we have many challenges in the world, and I know that
the State Department is at the forefront of trying to meet
those challenges.
The fact is that world history has taught us that no matter
what the threat or challenge, dealing from a position of
weakness is always a greater provocation than dealing from a
position of strength.
So I appreciate your total engagement, as evidenced by the
fact that in 306 travel days, you have logged over 700,000
miles to 59 countries, and we will be looking forward to being
able to hear what we have accomplished in some of that travel.
I just want to take one or two moments to talk about one or
two issues as a framework.
On Iran, I stand second to no one in my desire to see a
negotiated solution that rolls back and dismantles Iran's
illicit nuclear program. But a deal that allows Iran to
continue as a nuclear threshold state, gives it relief from
sanctions, potentially allows it to go from being a threshold
to an actual nuclear weapons state is no deal at all. I am very
concerned about the news that is leaking from the negotiations
and that this entire deal will hinge on inspection and
verification regimes while leaving Iran with the vast majority
of its nuclear infrastructure. And if the facts--and we do not
know whether they are facts or not, but various reports
suggested in a matter of time that is far less than anybody
would have envisioned.
On Cuba, I think the deal was one-sided. The regime has not
changed tactics. In fact, it is flaunting its success in the
negotiations. Last week's congressional visits, which did not
include any visits with human rights activists, political
dissidents, or independent journalists, were followed by the
arrests of more activists across the island. In Havana, 70
members of the Ladies in White were arrested. Several dozen
more were arrested for accompanying them. Prominent civil
society leaders, Antonio Rodiles, Angel Moya, as well as
independent labor leaders, Alexis Gomez Rodriguez, Pavel
Herrera Hernandez, were also arrested. On the same day, in
eastern Cuba, over 90 activists from the Cuban Patriotic Union
were arrested in Santiago. Another 13 Ladies in White were
arrested in Santa Cruz, along with Sakharov Prize winner,
Guillermo Farinas. But that is not all. One of the Ladies in
White was actually splashed with tar. Clearly the regime has
not changed and, if anything, it seems that they can do this
with impunity notwithstanding our engagement.
And finally, on Ukraine, the most recent diplomatic efforts
seem to have only emboldened Putin. Since Minsk II, there have
been hundreds of cease-fire violations and the city of
Debaltseve has fallen under rebel control. Putin's forces now
threaten Mariupol, which could provide a land bridge to Crimea,
and his intentions are clear. On February 9, the President said
that providing lethal defensive weapons is one option being
considered by his team. I look forward to hearing whether this
option is more likely, given the failure of Minsk II. It is
something that this committee in a bipartisan fashion sent to
the President, signed by the President. I hope that we will
help the Ukrainians be able to defend themselves. You know,
sending them night vision goggles and being able to see your
enemy does not do very much for you if you cannot stop them.
And that is where we are at right now.
I do want to say one very supportive thing in addition to
recognizing your most recent comments on Ukraine, which I
applaud. For the past several years, I have complained,
cajoled, encouraged, pleaded, and pushed in every way I know
how the United States needs to direct additional resources to
foreign policy priorities in our own hemisphere. And the budget
request for Central America focuses on the right priorities and
is a very good start. We need to work with these countries and
help create opportunities, which is in our own national
security interests.
I look forward to discussing those and other issues with
you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
And again, we want to thank you for being here. I think you
know the drill. Your comments will be entered into the record,
with no objection, your full comments. If you could keep your
comments to about 5 minutes, I know there is going to be robust
questioning. And with that, thank you again. We look forward to
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Kerry. Well, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Menendez and my good former colleagues. And I guess one person
that I did not have a chance, Senator, Senator Perdue, to
welcome this great committee. I am delighted to be have a
chance to be here to share an important dialogue.
I appreciate the comments that both of you have made. I am
not going to pick up on all of them now because I am confident
that during the questions, we will have a chance to dig into
most of the things that you raised. And I will summarize to try
to maximize our time and respect yours.
But I want to just make it clear that since leaving the
perch up there that you sit in, Senator Corker, as chair and
having spent--what--29 years on this committee, beginning way
over here, even further than my friend Ed Markey, I watched a
lot of events unfold in the course of my service on this
committee and in the Senate, a number of wars, major debates.
It is interesting for me to see now serving as Secretary the
reality, the degree to which what we choose to do is really
important. And how the Congress acts makes just a gigantic
difference to the sense of unity of purpose about our country.
And this is about our country. It really should not be about
party, the old saying that, you know, foreign policy concerns
and national security interests should end at the water's edge.
And what has come home to me more than anything is the
degree to which we, the United States, are privileged and
sometimes burdened with the responsibility of leading. I mean
leading, making things happen, stepping in where others do not
or cannot or will not. And I will say to you that I believe we
legitimately--I mean, you may disagree with how we are doing in
Libya at this particular moment or you may think something more
should have been going on in Syria. But I will tell you I
cannot think of a time--and I hear this from former colleagues;
from former Secretaries--when we have had to deal with as many
explosive, transformational moments historically than now.
And I just want to respectfully suggest to all of you--and
I will say this at some point and I will talk it at length. I
hope I can get a chance to do so in classified session where I
could say more about it. But we ask for 1 percent--1 percent of
the Federal budget. One percent of the total budget of the
United States of America goes into everything we do abroad. All
of our efforts for our citizens, our visas, our embassies, our
counterterrorism, our aid, our assistance, everything, 1
percent. But I absolutely guarantee you that well more than 50
percent of the history of this era will be written off that 1
percent and off the things we do or do not choose to do in
terms of foreign affairs.
And when you look today at the challenge of Daesh--ISIS--
when you look at the clash of modernity with opportunity and
culture and youth populations and bad governance, corruption,
all the challenges that are out there, we have got our work cut
out for us.
Now, we are leading in putting together this unprecedented
coalition. I say unprecedented because this is the first time
in anybody's memory that anybody knows about five Arab
countries, Sunni, engaging in proactive military operations in
another country in the region, Syria, in order to go after a
terrorist organization. And we have five major channels of
effort, on foreign fighters, on humanitarian, on
countermessaging, on counterfinancing, on the kinetic, all of
which are geared to try to win this. And we will win it. I am
confident of that, providing we all make the right choices. We
certainly have the tools.
In Iraq, we worked diplomatically to implement the
President's policy to make certain that we did not take over
that effort before there was a transitional government in
place. And I am telling you we spent an amazing amount of time
and hours and good diplomacy to help the Iraqis to make their
own decisions about their leadership for the future, to
transition away from Maliki to Prime Minister Abadi and a new
inclusive, proactive, capable governance.
We got, as you know, last year all the chemical weapons out
of Syria. No small feat, particularly when you consider that if
we had not done that, they would be in the hands of ISIL today.
We have been leading the effort to curb Ebola. We took the
risk. President Obama took the risk of sending 4,000 young
American troops to build the infrastructure so we could deal
with that. It was risky at the time he did it because nobody
had all of the answers. But it worked. And America led an
effort to bring people to the table to help keep this from
providing the 1 million people dying that were predicted if we
did not have the response that was provided.
In Ukraine, we have worked hard to hold together a complex
array of partners in the sanctions, and the sanctions have had
a profound effect. The ruble is down 50 percent. Russia's
economy is predicted to go into recession this year. There has
been a capital flight of $151 billion. They may be able to
pursue this short-term goal of stirring the waters of Ukraine,
but in the long term, Russia is writing itself out of the
future as a consequence of the choices it is making, falling
behind in technology, in production, and a whole lot of other
things.
The fact is on Iran, sure, it is controversial and may have
some risks. But we are daring to believe that diplomacy may be
able to provide a better alternative to ridding Iran of the
possibility of a nuclear weapon than war or then going first to
the threats that lead you to confrontation. So we are trying. I
cannot make a prediction what the outcome will be, but we are
leading in that effort to try to help make that happen,
together with our P5+1 partners.
In the Western Hemisphere, the Senator from New Jersey
mentioned what we are trying to do.
In Korea, we are working--North Korea--we are working with
the Chinese. We have been able to make certain changes I would
rather talk about in classified session.
On Afghanistan, we rescued a very complicated election
process, negotiated a BSA, got a unified government, and now we
are working on a transition with the potential even of some
talks taking place with the Taliban.
On global trade, we are pursuing two of the biggest trade
agreements in memory: 40 percent of GDP in the TPP and 40
percent of GDP in the TTIP.
And the Asia Rebalance.
In Africa, we hosted the summit of African leaders.
AIDS and PEPFAR we have continued. We have ramped up.
President Obama made a deeper commitment, and the result is
that we are on the cusp of perhaps having the first AIDS-free
generation in history in Africa.
And in China, we came through with a historic climate
agreement by which both of us have agreed what we can try to do
within our executive powers to lower emissions and to begin to
prepare to get an agreement in Paris this December. And that is
leadership because by getting the two of us together and
leading in that effort, we have about 45 percent of the world's
emissions at the table agreed to reduce in a way that leads
others to the table.
So I had more prepared comments. These comments I am giving
you are not the prepared comments, and I will submit them all
for the record, Mr. Chairman. But there are other policies we
need to talk about, and I am prepared to do so.
But I want to just make the point to all of you.
Sequestration. I was here when it happened, and I do not like
it. And I did not like it then and I do not like it now.
Sequestration is depriving the United States of America, the
world's most powerful nation on the face of the planet and the
world's richest nation. It is institutionalizing the notion
that Congress is either unwilling or incapable of making a
decision and choices. And it is arbitrarily winding up doing
things to our budget that historically knocked our GDP down and
lost a lot of jobs, not to mention that it deprives us of
making the decisions about what we are going to do to make that
1 percent--or hopefully more--have a greater impact in
providing for the security and protecting the interests of our
country. So I would plead with all of you to think about how we
are going to meet this moment of challenge.
I will end on this. We had a counterterrorism summit this
past week, last week, which really underscored how big a
challenge this is. It is a generational challenge. My parents,
our parents' generation rose to the challenge of World War II.
We spent the then-equivalent of about $3.--whatever--$9
trillion. Today maybe about $30 trillion. But we rose to the
occasion. We did what we had to do to beat back fascism. And I
think it is a legitimate question to ask whether or not the
rule of law, the norms of behavior that we fought for for all
those years since World War II, that we are going to do our
part to uphold them and to make it possible for other countries
to not be subjected to the fascism and dictatorship and tyranny
of a group like ISIL that rapes young girls and imprisons
people, women, and burns books, and destroys schools and
deprives people of their liberty, burns pilots, cuts off the
heads of journalists and basically declares a caliphate that
challenges all of the nations in the Middle East and elsewhere
and threatens all of us with violence.
So we face a challenge, and I hope everybody here will stop
and think about all of the components of how we respond to
that. It is not just kinetic. The next Secretary of State will
be back here with a new acronym. The next President will be
asking you to deal with somebody somewhere unless we start to
think about how the world joins together to drain the pool of
recruits that are readily accessible to people with such a
warped and dangerous sense of what life ought to be like.
So that is what this meeting--that is what these
discussions about the budget are about. And I hope we are going
to kind of pull ourselves together in a way that facilitates my
visits with a lot of leaders around the world when I walk in
and say how are you doing on your budget, and they look at me
and I can tell what they are thinking. Or we say to them, hey,
we ought to be doing this or that, and we advocate democracy.
And we have to say, well, how is yours working. I have been
asked that.
So it is up to us, and that is my message for my opening
statement. And I look forward to the hearing.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Kerry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State John F. Kerry
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today regarding America's international
leadership and the administration's budget request for the State
Department and related agencies for the 2016 fiscal year.
Last month, in his State of the Union Address, President Obama said
that we ``lead best when we combine military power with strong
diplomacy; when we leverage our power with coalition building; [and]
when we don't let our fears blind us to the opportunities that this new
century presents.''
It is with that guidance in mind that we submit our budget to you
this year and ask for its fair consideration and approval. We do so at
a time and in a world that is marked both by stark tragedy and by great
promise, a world where America's role is critical as are the resources
that only Congress can provide. So we ask for your help. America must
lead, but cannot do so on the cheap. The money we devote to the entire
range of foreign policy programming, everything from embassy security
to our counterterrorism and nonproliferation initiatives, amounts to
only about 1 percent of the federal budget, yet it may impact 50
percent of the history that will be written about this era. So we all
have a job--to do everything we can, working together, to shape that
history in ways that advance our Nation's interests and uphold the
values of the people we represent.
Mr. Chairman, within the FY 2016 President's budget request, the
Department of State and USAID are seeking a total of $50.3 billion in
discretionary funding, including $7.0 billion for Overseas Contingency
Operations. Our requests for all accounts include:
$3.5 billion to counter the terrorist network known as ISIL,
address the crisis in Syria, bolster regional security, and
respond to the humanitarian catastrophe brought on by the
crises in Syria and Iraq;
$3.1 billion in continued support for our democratic
partner, Israel;
$639 million to help our friends in Ukraine, Georgia, and
Moldova as they seek to strengthen their democracies, withstand
pressure from Russia, and to integrate more closely into
Europe;
$1.4 billion to support our activities in and to implement
the President's strategy to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific
region;
$1 billion to address the root causes of illegal migration
from Central America to the United States, including the
inhumane and perilous migration of unaccompanied children;
$5.4 billion to finance our leadership and support for
international organizations and peacekeeping efforts and
thereby ensure that other nations will share the costs and
burdens of maintaining global stability and strengthening
consensus principles and norms;
$3.4 billion to reinforce our partnerships and diplomatic
engagement with Afghanistan and Pakistan;
$4.8 billion for Embassy Security that will enable the
Department to support overseas security requirements for our
personnel and facilities, and continue implementing the
recommendations of the Benghazi Accountability Review Board.
These critical investments make possible the work of our
diplomats to advance American interests worldwide, assist our
citizens, and promote our ideals;
$1.2 billion to support public diplomacy and exchanges;
$8.2 billion for global health, including programs to end
preventable child and maternal deaths; combat infectious
disease through the Global Health Security Agenda; and create
an AIDS-free generation;
$808 million to invest in clean energy, sustainable growth,
and measures to curb the harmful impacts of global climate
change; and
$978 million for the President's Feed the Future initiative
to promote agriculture-led development and help reduce poverty
and hunger.
$390 million for the President's Counterterrorism
Partnerships Fund to support counterterrorism activities,
countering violent extremism, and crisis response, as well as
provide enabling support to partners engaged on the front lines
against terrorism.
Over $2 billion for democracy, human rights, and governance
programs thatsupport governments and citizens to build
societies where people can address through strong civil
societies.
Mr. Chairman, decades ago, in the aftermath of World War II, Dean
Acheson wrote that the problems that bedevil American foreign policy
are not like headaches that can be cured by taking an aspirin and
getting a good night's sleep. ``They will,'' he asserted, ``stay with
us until death. We have got to understand that all our lives the
danger, the uncertainty, the need for alertness, for effort, for
discipline will be upon us. This is new to us. It will be hard for us.
But we are in for it and the only real question is whether we shall
know it soon enough.''
Secretary Acheson's words remind us that we long ago entered into
an era of virtually nonstop danger, whether in one part of the world or
another or regarding one type of challenge or another. The test for our
leadership has never been to entirely eliminate those risks, because
that is not possible; the test has been whether we can manage them
decisively over time in ways that reduce the peril and strengthen the
forces of democracy, humanity, justice, and law.
That is precisely the task that confronts us today just as it has
confronted earlier administrations and generations. And I believe that,
once again, our country is answering the call. We can see that
leadership in the brave service of our fighting men and women on duty
in strategic outposts and waterways across the planet. We can see it in
our citizens who contribute to international civil society and who work
hard every day to address and ease global challenges from extreme
poverty to women's rights and the protection of religious liberty and
other precious freedoms. We can see it in the work of our development
professionals who are helping millions of people overseas to build
strong communities, expand markets, and contribute to shared
prosperity. We can see it in the Members of Congress from both parties
who devote countless hours to meeting with international partners and
to thinking about how best to harness our resources and relationships
to address shared problems. And we can see it in the daily efforts of
our diplomats to defend America's interests, advocate our principles,
and strengthen our country's position in the world.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, there can be no question
that our diplomatic engagement around the globe today is as deep and as
strong as it has ever been. Let me point to just a few examples of
where our leadership backed by our resources is making an important
difference.
To begin, our country's leadership is on display in mobilizing
actions across the globe to counter and prevent violent extremism. Just
last week, the White House convened a landmark conference to build
solidarity and identify concrete plans to address both the immediate
and long-term challenges. The United States is committed to helping
countries in vulnerable regions to enhance their capacity to defeat
terrorist networks and to rebut the radical ideologies that drive those
networks. We have also taken the lead in a robust international effort
to combat the terrorist group known as ISIL. Frankly, coalition-
building is a natural fit for the State Department--we're in the
business of bringing other countries to the table to support mutual
interests. And because ISIL is a threat to us all, this menace has
galvanized a coalition with more than 60 members, a coalition that is
as diverse as it is dedicated.
Already, nine countries are contributing to air strike operations
in Iraq and a dozen have committed to train security forces there.
Coalition partner pilots are also flying strike missions in Syria, and
hosting the train and equip program for the moderate opposition.
Meanwhile, we're pooling information and resources to cut ISIL's
profits from smuggling and to block access to banks. Our air strikes
have reduced ISIL's ability to profit from oil sales. To slow
recruiting of foreign terrorist fighters, we're engaged in capacity-
building in the Balkans, criminal justice reform in North Africa,
helping high-risk communities in the Middle East, and tightening
security at airports. These efforts are in addition to the humanitarian
aid that the United States and many other countries have contributed to
care for refugees and displaced persons in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and
elsewhere in the region.
We are doing much; but we're still in the early stages of a
multiyear campaign. Going forward, we must turn up the heat. Thus far,
whenever our local partners have engaged the enemy on the ground with
coalition support from the air, we have prevailed. And the fact is that
ISIL's momentum--which some called unstoppable just a few months ago--
has dissipated. A key supply line has been severed. Terrorist fighters
can no longer mass and maneuver in large convoys due to coalition
airstrikes.
Throughout, the coalition has been working closely with the
Government of Iraq and with moderate elements of the Syrian opposition.
Success on the ground will depend on strong and legitimate local
partners. That's why this year's request includes $355 million to
support critical governance and security reforms in Iraq. Nothing will
contribute more to the defeat of ISIL than an Iraqi Government that
governs inclusively, respects the rights of and protects all of its
citizens with the help of a professional security force, and as a
result enjoys the full support of its people.
Success will also be more likely if America is able to speak with
one voice in our determination to defeat ISIL. Earlier this month, the
President transmitted to Congress a draft Authorization to Use Military
Force that provides just such an opportunity. As someone who served on
Capitol Hill for almost 30 years, I welcome this step and look forward
to discussing all aspects of this very important proposal with you. The
approval of this authorization would provide a clear and powerful
signal of American unity and resolve.
The fight against violent extremism also continues in Central and
South Asia.
This year, Afghanistan will exercise full responsibility for its
security forces, making possible a significant reduction in the U.S.
military presence. We will, however, continue to consult with Kabul on
security matters, and to administer a robust train, advise, and assist
mission. We are also requesting $1.5 billion to support the new Afghan
unity government as it strives to implement reforms and improve
economic performance. This aid will be targeted at helping Afghanistan
to move ahead through better governance, investments in health,
education, and infrastructure, and the equitable treatment of women and
girls.
In Pakistan, the United States is working with the government to
counterterrorist groups that threaten our shared security. Last month,
I met with the country's leadership for our annual Strategic Dialogue
and found--in the wake of the December 16 terrorist attack on the
military school that murdered 132 children--a vigorous commitment to
take on and defeat violent extremist groups. In recognition of our
long-term engagement with the Pakistani people, we're also helping to
promote development, energy security, health, and education.
At the same time, through constant diplomacy and the exchange of
historic visits by our heads of government, we've strengthened our ties
with India, the world's largest democracy, on economic issues, security
cooperation, science, and clean energy.
Closer to home, in Europe, we have been steadfast in supporting
Ukraine's recently elected government against illegal intervention by
Moscow and violence from the armed separatists that Moscow backs.
Working closely with our international partners, we have approved
targeted sanctions--including against Russia's financial, energy, and
defense sectors--that have imposed a clear cost on the Russian economy
and brought Kremlin leaders back to the bargaining table. The package
of measures signed earlier this month to implement the September 2014
Minsk Protocol mandated a cease-fire and the pullback of heavy weapons.
We have called for full implementation of the Minsk documents,
including the withdrawal of all foreign equipment and troops from
Eastern Ukraine, the full restoration of Ukrainian control of the
international border, and the release of all hostages. To date, neither
Russia nor the forces it is supporting have come close to complying
with their commitments. If that failure continues, there will be
further consequences--consequences that would place added strains on
Russia's weakened economy.
Meanwhile, the United States is backing Ukraine's economic reforms
through a $1 billion loan guarantee (and the possibility of another if
reforms continue) and support for a $17.5 billion financial package
from the IMF. Although the situation in eastern Ukraine remains very
difficult, we are working to help the country emerge from this crisis
united, and with the chance to decide its own future in a Europe where
NATO is reinvigorated and leaders in the Kremlin are judged solely by
their actions, not their words.
Mr. Chairman, President Obama has made it clear that Iran will not
obtain a nuclear weapon. Since late 2013, we have been testing whether
that goal can be achieved through determined multilateral diplomacy.
The so-called P5+1 talks have made considerable progress but have not
yet reached a satisfactory consensus on all critical questions. During
our deliberations, for the first time in a decade, we've halted the
progress of Tehran's nuclear program and even rolled it back in key
respects. We will know soon whether we will be able to reach a
verifiable and comprehensive plan to ensure that Iran's nuclear program
is wholly peaceful. We will continue to consult closely with you as our
efforts progress. Although I cannot predict the outcome, I do believe
that an agreement of the type we seek would advance America's interests
and that of our allies in the Middle East, strengthen the global
nonproliferation regime, and serve the cause of international stability
and peace.
In our own hemisphere, we are requesting $1 billion to help our
friends in Central America make the difficult reforms required to
address the region's interlocking security, governance, and economic
problems. In recent years, the combination of limited educational and
employment opportunities, epic levels of violence, a lack of sufficient
investment, and corruption have held these countries back while also
spurring attempts at illegal migration to the United States. An
estimated 6 million young Central Americans will enter the work force
in the next decade. If opportunity isn't there, our entire hemisphere
will feel the consequences.
Last December, President Obama announced a change in U.S. policy to
increase communications, commerce, and travel between our country and
Cuba and to initiate the process--supported by this budget--of
normalizing diplomatic relations with Havana for the first time since
1961. In January, Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson went to
the island for a first round of meetings with government officials and
representatives of independent civil society. She conveyed the
message--reinforced before and since by many Members of Congress--that
America's support for democratic reforms, human rights, Internet
freedom, and the release of political prisoners is absolutely firm. We
believe very strongly that the time is right to deprive Cuban
authorities of their long-standing crutch--so that they can no longer
blame U.S. policy rather than their own failures for the hardships
faced by the brave people of Cuba.
This budget also supports the President's rebalance to the dynamic
region of East Asia and the Pacific. Based on President Obama's
strategic commitment, we have modernized our alliances with Japan and
South Korea, strengthened our partnerships with other regional powers,
and supported democratic progress and respect for human rights in
Thailand and Burma. A key element of our policy has been to build a
comprehensive relationship with China that supports its rise in a
manner compatible with international law and respectful of the concerns
and rights of its neighbors. The United States remains committed to the
peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and will continue--in
close consultation with our allies--to bring pressure to bear on North
Korea in support of that goal.
Last August, President Obama hosted a summit attended by some 50
African leaders, during which we discussed plans for future cooperation
and progress. U.S. policy toward the region reflects the continent's
diversity and includes the promotion of investment and trade, energy
access, youth leadership, and the economic participation of women.
Mr. Chairman, American leadership has also been evident in the
fight to halt the deadly spread of Ebola--and it was a team effort. The
State Department, the U.S. military, USAID, the Department of Health
and Human Services (including the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, and the National Institutes of Health, and the U.S. Public
Health Service Commissioned Corps), state and city governments, civil
society, citizen volunteers, and Members of Congress all contributed.
Together, we worked with international partners and with the brave
communities and caregivers of West Africa to confront and contain this
virus. The struggle won't be over until new infections are reduced to
zero. But consider that 5 months ago, experts predicted that the number
of active cases in West Africa would be 1.4 million. The actual level
is less than 2 percent of that number. This is still a terrible human
tragedy--but it is also an impressive demonstration of what
international partnerships can accomplish. We have committed over the
next 3 years to build on these partnerships, through the Global Health
Security Agenda, to strengthen health systems in these vulnerable
countries to prevent a tragedy of this scale from happening again.
We also serve our interests when we exercise leadership within the
U.N. and other international organizations. The United States isn't
everywhere and we shouldn't be everywhere, and so it's a great help to
us when the U.N. is able to contribute to international security and
stability through its peacekeeping and political missions, conflict-
resolution, development, and humanitarian activities. As we continue to
press for reforms within the U.N. system, it is essential that we meet
our own obligations to pay our bills in full and on time. We demand
that of others; we should be consistent in meeting that standard
ourselves.
These are just some of the issues that we're focused on each and
every day. But they're not the only ones. Programs to support
democratic governance contribute to the development of societies that
are peaceful, more prosperous and stable, and better partners for the
United States. As more people around the world stand up for their
fundamental freedoms, demands for U.S. support grow. Unfortunately,
this has coincided with declining funding in recent years. This year,
to meet the growing needs and advance our interests, the President has
requested over $2 billion, a significant increase in democracy and
governance funding.
Our military training and education enhances our security
relationships while exposing students from friendly nations to U.S.
values and respect for internationally recognized human rights.
Training foreign law enforcement and counterterrorism officials in
American investigative techniques increases their capability and our
security. Implementing stricter export controls, training weapons
inspectors, improving global nuclear, biological and chemical security,
and securing our borders allows us to guard against the most pernicious
of threats: the possibility that terrorists might one day attack our
homeland or our allies with a weapon of mass destruction.
Our global presence does something else: it creates jobs. Through
our contributions to international financial institutions like the
World Bank, we don't just lift the economies of low-income countries;
we open markets for American businesses. Foreign policy is economic
policy, and so the State Department is fully geared toward helping
American entrepreneurs to build prosperity at home and across the
globe. To that end, we're pursuing ambitious, 21st century trade
agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership that will establish landmark labor
and environmental standards and help our manufacturers, farmers,
ranchers, and service providers to increase what they are able to sell
abroad.
We're also leading on the environment, on the oceans and marine
sanctuaries, and in addressing the potentially devastating consequences
of climate change. In November, the leaders of the United States and
China, the world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, came
together to announce ambitious targets to limit carbon emissions in the
post-2020 period. Our budget and our diplomacy are focused on helping
nations to grow in sustainable ways, and to mobilize countries
everywhere to achieve a truly meaningful agreement on climate change in
Paris this December. And here I want to stress the connection between
climate change and other goals. For example, our investments to protect
global food and water supplies are critical. But none of those efforts
will succeed over time if we don't also concern ourselves with what we
put in the air; food security simply will not happen if we fail to curb
the harmful effects of climate change.
All this speaks to why our budget proposals aren't just a
collection of numbers--they're the embodiment of our values and
priorities. After serving in public life for over three decades, I am
aware that there are few more reliable--or damaging--applause lines
than promising to slash the budgets of the State Department and USAID.
President Reagan once lamented that, ``Foreign aid suffers from a lack
of domestic constituency.'' And it's true that, in Washington, long-
term goals can often lose out to more visible short-term projects. But
that's exactly why we need your help--to take the long view and to
recognize how the relatively modest investments we make now can improve
the world and enhance our own security for generations to come.
As we have learned through history, the success or failure of
America's international leadership is not only relevant; it will be a
determining factor in the quality of the lives of our citizens. Foreign
policy can help our workers to find a job or lose one; it can start a
war or forge a peace; it can safeguard our families or expose them to
grave risk; it can enable us to look forward with confidence or it can
place a shadow over the future in which our children and their children
will grow up.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, even though the globe
seems at times to be awash in difficulties, the truth is that many
international vital signs today are positive. Worldwide, extreme
poverty is down and so is child mortality. More babies are being born
healthy; more boys--and girls--are attending and staying in school; and
with U.S. contributions leading the way, we are making welcome progress
in protecting the vulnerable from HIV/AIDS and other infectious
disease.
Meanwhile, each day in diplomatic outposts across the globe,
America's representatives make known the high value our people place on
democratic institutions, human rights, religious liberty, and the
freedoms of speech and press.
So make no mistake, America is leading--with partners when
possible, but alone when necessary. Leading against terror and
proliferation. Leading in support of embattled friends from Ukraine and
Afghanistan to Central America and Somalia. Leading to promote peace in
the Middle East and Africa. Leading to create jobs domestically and
protect the environment globally. Leading against the axis of
suffering--hunger, ignorance, and disease. Leading to build a more
free, just, and humane world. We are leading as one country, including
the administration, Congress, our Armed Forces, our businesspeople, our
citizen activists, and our volunteers.
Scanning the horizon, we are under no illusions about how difficult
the demands of leadership are. Like Secretary Acheson, we have had our
share of headaches. Setbacks along the way are inevitable. Engagement
on all fronts will be required. But we draw strength from our
democratic ideals, inspiration from the example of our predecessors,
and courage from the conviction that the values guiding us are the
right ones. In an era of uncertainty, one thing remains sure: America
will continue to answer the call.
Thank you and now I would be pleased to respond to any questions
you might have.
The Chairman. Well, we appreciate those opening comments.
And I know that people understand this is more of a budget
hearing, but since you have moved into other policy issues, I
am going to feel very free to move into those also.
I would just ask a question. I assume if we only spend 1
percent of our budget on State Department and foreign aid
operations, you would think we need to do that in the most
efficient way possible. Do you agree with that?
Secretary Kerry. Of course, obviously.
The Chairman. And I would think you would support then an
authorization being put in place. We have not done one since
2003. We actually did not do one the entire time you were
chairman for reasons that I am not aware of. But you do support
that now as head of the State Department. Is that correct?
Secretary Kerry. We actually made a run at an authorization
bill, Mr. Chairman. I would have loved to have passed one. In
fact, the last authorization bill I think was passed--I did it
when Senator Pell was chairman, and he deputized me to try to
get an authorization bill through and we did.
And I am delighted to see you take this bull by the horns.
We have not seen a State authorization, I guess, enacted into
law in 2002. It lapsed in 2004. There are the reasons of the
way the Senate came to work that literally made it impossible
to do. So I would love it if you can do it.
The Chairman. I hear that, and I think that probably we
will spend a lot more quality time, if you will, with Heather
and others in the Department. I know you are dealing with a lot
of other issues. We had a very good meeting yesterday, and I do
sense that you support that and we appreciate that very much.
And I am aware of the history regarding some of the
complications, and certainly that was not meant as a criticism.
Let us move on to then. I spent the last week in Baghdad
and in Erbil up in Kurdistan and Ankara talking with Turkish
officials along with ours.
You have sent a request for an authorization for use of
military force--the President has. But it is your belief today
that the administration has the legal authority to conduct
operations against ISIS with existing authorities. Is that
correct?
Secretary Kerry. Yes.
The Chairman. That is correct.
Secretary Kerry. We are looking for a separate authority
under the AUMF.
The Chairman. But you believe that you have the authority.
Secretary Kerry. We believe we have the authority under the
2001. That is the testimony that I gave you in December.
Absolutely. And we do believe that.
The Chairman. So one of the things that I know people are
going to be looking for, if you are asking for a separate
authorization--I know there is some debate among the committee
here as to whether you do or do not have the legal authority.
You believe you do. But one of the things that people are going
to be looking to is, is there a real commitment by this
administration to deal with ISIS? And I have to tell you, as I
look at the authorization and I visit Turkey and understand
what is happening in Syria, I have to ask this question. Do you
believe that it is moral? Do you believe that it is pragmatic
to spend a lot of money training and equipping people in far-
off places to come back into the fight in Syria and not protect
them from the barrel bombs that Assad will be dropping against
them? Do you believe that is a moral place for us to be in the
country and a pragmatic place for us to spend money training
people and yet not protecting them from the barrel bombs that
Assad will be dropping on them?
Secretary Kerry. I think it goes beyond morality, frankly,
Senator. I think it is a matter of practicality. If we are
training people and they have a goal and we are committed to
the goal, I think it is important for them to be successful.
And I think it is important since the Title 10 program that we
have now joined into together, which is going to train folks
partly to go after ISIL particularly, it seems to me that if
Assad were to attack them or somebody attacks them in the
course of the time that they are going after ISIL, that is part
of the fight. And so we need to provide that.
The Chairman. So our authorization should actually
authorize the administration to go against Assad when they are
doing things that take on the Free Syrian opposition that we
are training.
Secretary Kerry. That is not what I said. Assad is an
entirely different component of this which then raises all
kinds of challenges with respect to the management of the
coalition itself. What I said was they have to be authorized--
the authorization is such that defending those who are engaged
in the fight of ISIL, it seems to me, is an important part of
defeating ISIL. But that is a debate as to how that is
implemented that is taking place in the administration right
now. The President has not made a final decision on that. I
think we need to be discussing that as the AUMF comes together.
But what is important is that the President have as much
leeway as possible within the 3 years that he has asked for to
be able to get the job done. Now, he has asked for 3 years
partly because when he came in----
The Chairman. If you could--I understand about the time
limit.
Let me just say this. On the ground and dealing with those
people that we want to bring into this coalition in a more
serious way, the fact that we are not willing to talk about an
air exclusion zone above Aleppo or we are not willing to
provide air support for Free Syrian folks that we are training
against ISIL, by the way--this is what this Title 10 program is
about--makes it appear that we are not serious in this effort,
and it makes many of us on this committee concerned about the
administration's commitment to this effort. And you can
understand why that is the case.
And I know that they are holding back--and you know this--
what they are doing until they find out whether we are
committed to doing those things that would actually allow these
people to be successful on the ground. And if we are not
willing at this front end to say that we are going to protect
them, after they are trained and coming in, especially around
the Aleppo area, which is likely where they will enter, if we
are not willing to protect them, it speaks to the fact that the
administration does not really seem serious about taking ISIS
on as it relates to Syria.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, let me make it as clear as I
possibly can. This President is absolutely determined to
accomplish the goal that he set out, which is to degrade and
destroy ISIS. Now, he has begun with a particular focus on Iraq
because of the fragility of Iraq originally, because there is
an army that is significantly trained and available but needs
more training, and because there is an urgency, an immediate
urgency, to try to restore Iraq in Anbar and in the Sunni
province because of the impact on holding the integrity of the
country together and ultimately driving ISIS out. That is what
we believe we will do.
At this point in time, we have flown some 2,500 strikes,
about half and half in Syria and Iraq. At least huge numbers of
ISIL top leaders have been taken off the battlefield. Almost
1,000 ISIL fighters were killed in the course of the Khobani
fight, which you may recall everybody heralded as the test of
America's commitment, the test of the war. It was about to
fall, and we, on the other hand, upped our strikes and
negotiated diplomatically to be able to create a corridor to
get the Peshmerga to come in and ultimately reinforce the
people there and won. And ISIS had to admit it lost, and it
admitted so publicly.
So I think we have demonstrated a powerful commitment. We
have already reclaimed--we--the Iraqis and their coalition
folks on the ground have already reclaimed about 30 percent of
the territory that had been held by ISIL. And ISIL can no
longer move as easily. They cannot drive in convoys. They
cannot communicate the way they were. We have gone after their
financing. We had more than 60 countries here for the counter
violent extremism meeting. We have major initiatives underway
to deal with the foreign fighters, the counter-finance, so
forth.
So all I can say to you is every one of those things is a
manifestation of the administration's total commitment to
defeat and destroy ISIL.
Now, as you move out of Iraq, then there is more to do in
Syria. We understand, Senator, that it is going to take more on
the ground and more capacity to do that. As you have seen,
there has been some discussion of an Arab force in the region.
There is also a discussion going on about how fast we can train
up some of our opposition to be on the ground. And there are
additional efforts going on with respect to what weapons, what
methodologies may be undertaken, and those are the purview of a
classified briefing. I can guarantee you no one in the region
will have any doubt about our commitment to defeating ISIL.
The Chairman. Well, I can guarantee you--and I am sorry
this has taken so long. I appreciate your full answer. But I
can guarantee you that today there are concerns. There are
concerns about those most majorly needed in this coalition
because of the very point that I just mentioned. I think you
know that. I know the White House knows that. And I just hope
that very soon the White House will not only make statements
but make agreements relative to what I just discussed so that
those who are going to be working with us in this fight
understand that there is a real commitment and that
negotiations about the Iran nuclear deal and other issues are
not in some way holding us back from making those commitments.
But I thank you for being here and I will turn it over to
Senator Menendez.
Secretary Kerry. Just 10 seconds, Senator. I would just say
to you I really think if we get into classified session, then
we can go through more of this. I think you will have a sense
of the upgrading that has been taking place and the pressure
that we have placed that will answer a lot of those questions.
And I will be attending a GCC meeting this Friday--I think
it is Friday--in London, and we will be discussing all of this
with our friends.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, based on some recent press reports, which I
have found on more than one occasion on this issue seems to
have more meat than not--I often learn more about it through
them. I want to share my deep concerns about where we appear to
be headed in our negotiations with Iran if those reports are
true.
The essence that I have gleaned from reading various
reports is that one variation being discussed with the Iranians
would place a 10-year regime of strict controls on Iran's
uranium enrichment, but if Iran complied, the restrictions
would be gradually lifted over the final 5 years. The core idea
would be to reward Iran for good behavior over the last years
of any agreement, gradually lifting constraints on both its
uranium enrichment and easing more economic sanctions, which in
essence in my mind does not make it a 10-year deal. It really
makes it a 5-year deal if you are going to ease up on the
ability of them to pursue enrichment capabilities.
Can you give us a sense? Are those reports accurate?
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I am absolutely going to
answer your question.
Senator Menendez. And you are not going to take all my time
to do it.
Secretary Kerry. I promise you unless the chairman might
give an extra minute here.
But I just wanted to say--because you raised the issue--
strike that. It was raised by the chairman. So I will wait and
come back and I will not chew up your time.
The answer is the proverbial do not believe what you read.
And I am not going to go into the details of where we are and
what we are doing.
Senator Menendez. Okay. Since you are not going to go into
the details, could you fathom doing something like that?
Secretary Kerry. Let me make it clear to you. We are
looking for a deal that will prove over the long term that each
pathway to a bomb is closed off. There are four pathways. One
is through Natanz with enrichment. One is through Arak through
plutonium production. One is through Fordow through enrichment
that is partly underground. And finally, the other is covert.
Covert, of course, is the hardest. You need to have
verification and intrusive inspection to be able to find
covert.
President Obama has made the pledge that Iran will not get
a nuclear bomb.
Senator Menendez. I have heard that pledge, and I believe
that that is what he means. The question is for how long, under
what set of circumstances, and when you let Iran ratchet back
up and, in essence, give some future President maybe no choices
but to pursue a military action--and it is very hard to try to
get a global community together again when the sanctions have
been released.
Secretary Kerry. Sure.
Senator Menendez. So I get you are not going to give us the
specifics. But I want to raise my saber with you that I
thought--and every time we have talked, we were talking about a
20-year timeframe. Now we are talking about a 10-year
timeframe, if it is true, and with relief in the 5 latter years
of the 10 years. If that happens to be in the universe, that is
problematic, and I just want you to take that back with you
because I think it is really a great problem.
Secretary Kerry. But the only thing I would say to you,
Senator, is, first of all, I have told you it is not true. But
secondly, I am not going to go into what is or is not the
situation.
But the one thing I would say to everybody on this
committee--the Bush administration, George W. Bush
administration, had a policy of no enrichment. And Iran in 2003
had 164 centrifuges. With a policy of no enrichment--that would
have been for 5 years, 6 years--they moved up to a place where
they now have perhaps 27,000 centrifuges, 19,000 installed and
you know the numbers that may be running. What happened? Who
did what? Where was that administration with respect to the
enforcement of a no enrichment policy?
So guess what. They learned how to enrich. They are now
enriching. And the question is whether or not one can now
create a system where they have a peaceful nuclear program like
other people who enrich that is manageable, controllable,
verifiable, accountable, sufficient that they are living under
the----
Senator Menendez. Well, I am certainly not an advocate of
what the Bush administration did. I criticized it during its
period of time that Iran was pursuing this program, and that,
in fact, the world was not responding in the aggressive way
that we needed to which has now put us at this threshold
position.
Secretary Kerry. I know.
Senator Menendez. But I just want to leave with you,
because I want to move on to another subject, that if the
parameters that are out there--you have said they are not true.
Fine. It could be elements of it that are not true. It could be
elements of it that are. If those are the parameters, that is
problematic.
Let me move to Ukraine. Putin took Crimea. He took Donetsk.
He took Luhansk. He took Debaltseve. While he has paid somewhat
of a price--and you mentioned it--in terms of sanctions, the
price has not changed his behavior.
The question is under the Ukrainian Freedom Support Act, we
gave the President significant powers. We supported an effort
of, yes, sanctions but also helping the Ukrainians be able to
defensively protect themselves and I would argue change Putin's
equation where there are consequences beyond economic sanctions
to his continuous engagement. He is on a process that he is
going to have a land bridge to Crimea, and when that happens,
for all our talk of not forgetting Crimea, it will be gone.
And so the question is, Is the administration ready to
assist the Ukrainians in providing them with the wherewithal to
defend themselves as the Ukrainian Freedom Support Act, passed
by a broad bipartisan vote in the Congress, provides for?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, that is under active
consideration. I think you know that.
Senator Menendez. I do not know that, but I am glad to hear
that.
Secretary Kerry. Well, it has been written in the New York
Times and elsewhere that this discussion is going on.
Senator Menendez. Well, you just told me not to believe
everything I read. [Laughter.]
I do not know when it is good and when it is bad.
Secretary Kerry. Of course, but it is the New York Times.
Right? [Laughter.]
Senator Menendez. Well, that is a whole other thing.
Secretary Kerry. What I wanted to say is that I just talked
over lunch with the German Foreign Minister who had just
finished meeting in Paris with the Russian Foreign Minister,
the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, and the French Foreign
Minister. And they had a discussion about where they are in the
implementation of Minsk. Whether or not the very aggressive
breaches of the Minsk agreement are going to now be shifted
into a compliance mode is critical to any decisions that are
made by anybody as to what the next step is.
The separatist movement is in our judgment a de facto
extension of the Russian military and it is an instrument of
Russian national power and that has been exercised in ways that
we obviously have objected to.
What we have done in our sanctions have had a profound
impact. The ruble is down 50 percent. Capital flight is in the
total of about $151 billion. The predictions are the Russian
economy will be in recession this year. I think they are down
to----
Senator Menendez. I do not disagree with you. But I would
also say----
Secretary Kerry. The point I am making is they are paying
the price now.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. That he continues to send
troops, armaments, and other assistance, heavy, significant
assistance, to the rebels and sends people across the border.
And at some point, you have to give the Ukrainians the
wherewithal to defend themselves. I am glad to hear it is under
consideration.
Secretary Kerry. Well, it is under consideration. As you
know, there are pros and cons on both sides of that argument,
obviously. It is under consideration.
Senator Menendez. Okay.
Secretary Kerry. We will see where we wind up in the next--
you know, in the short term----
Senator Menendez. One final followup on Ukraine. I know
that there is a list of individuals, including individuals on
the EU and Canadian-targeted sanctions list as it relates to
the Ukraine, that do not appear on the American list. The most
egregious example in my mind is Alexander Bortnikov, the head
of the Russian FSB. He is not on the United States list in
relation to either Ukraine or Magnitsky, but is on the EU and
Canadian list. He was here, as a matter of fact, in the United
States last week during President Obama's CVE conference. So I
am puzzled, and could you shed any light on that?
Secretary Kerry. Yes. We each had different choices about
who we thought might be more effective to have a sanction on
and what entity to sanction--individuals and entities. So we
both agreed that each would take their steps, and that would
place pressure on all. And the next step I think, if we take
one in the next days, which is under consideration depending on
what unfolds, will bring us into sync. So not only will we come
into sync, but there will probably be additional sanctions to
boot.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, welcome again.
I want to go back to ISIL. I just want to ask a pretty
simple question. What does defeat look like? What does
``destroy'' mean specifically?
Secretary Kerry. ``Destroy'' means eliminate their presence
on the field of battle and their ability to threaten the United
States and other people.
Senator Johnson. Over what period of time?
Secretary Kerry. As fast as possible. I cannot tell you
what that will be, and most people have predicted it will take
a fair amount of time.
Senator Johnson. In Iraq only or in Syria as well?
Secretary Kerry. Everywhere, wherever they are. That is
what the President has said and that is what his policy is and
that is why he has asked for no geographical limitation.
Senator Johnson. Everybody, I think, has read ``The
Atlantic'' article by Graeme Wood talking about really what
ISIL is all about. They require territory. Does that defeat
mean denial of territory?
Secretary Kerry. Of course it does.
Senator Johnson. So what number would be left? I am trying
to get some sort of sense here.
Secretary Kerry. I mean, I cannot tell you. Were there a
few Nazis left after World War II? Sure. Did the war end and
was there unconditional surrender? Yes. Did it eliminate the
threat? Yes. Did we rebuild Germany and move on with Japan?
Yes. But were there some Nazis around? You bet. Will there be
some members lingering around as there are of other extremist
groups? Most likely, but they will suffer the same fate.
The point is as an organization, as an entity, as a viable
sort of conglomerated threat to the United States and the West
and the rest of the world, it will be destroyed.
Senator Johnson. Pretty well decimated. Okay.
Do you agree with, I think, most military experts that in
order to achieve that decimation, that defeat, that
destruction, it is going to require ground forces of some type?
Secretary Kerry. I believe it will require some type of
forces on the ground. Not ours, but some type.
Senator Johnson. There are 30,000-40,000 members of ISIL
right now. We are hearing reports that their numbers are
growing faster than we are destroying them. They are not being
degraded. They may be degraded in some places but growing and
spreading in other places. How many ground troops do you think
it is going to take realistically to decimate them, to defeat
them?
Secretary Kerry. It is not up to me to prognosticate on the
numbers of ground troops. That is something that General
Dempsey and Sandy Winnefeld and others----
Senator Johnson. Fair enough.
Secretary Kerry. But one thing I know is it is doable, and
there are a number of different ways to do it. And we are
looking at exactly what that structure and format may be, and
there are a number of ways to come at it, by the way, some of
which mix kinetic with diplomatic. You know, we have to see
what happens in the course of the decisions that are made over
the course of the next weeks and months as to what shape that
approach takes.
Senator Johnson. So we obviously have Arab states
participating in airstrikes. Do you have commitments of other
Arab states other than the Iraqi Security Forces and the
Kurdish Peshmerga? Do you have commitments from any other
states in terms of ground troops to join that coalition?
Secretary Kerry. I have personally listened to affirmations
of a willingness to do it under the right circumstances or
under certain circumstances. I am not going to call them
commitments until they are in a context, but it clearly is a
potential under certain circumstances.
Senator Johnson. Who would lead that ground effort?
Secretary Kerry. Well, these are all the details that have
to be worked out and an order of battle and a structure.
Senator Johnson. I understand the details. But is there
really somebody targeted in terms of one of those Arab states
that would actually lead that ground effort, somebody capable
of doing it?
Secretary Kerry. Absolutely.
Senator Johnson. Let me go on to Ukraine.
President Poroshenko gave a very impassioned speech here in
front of a joint session of Congress where he said that we do
not need to provide the ground troops. They will take care of
defeating the rebels but they have to have more than blankets.
I know from discussions with a number of people that one
reluctance of providing defensive weaponry is that if we
provide defensive lethal weaponry, Russia will just up the
ante. Is that one of the cons? Is that one of the things the
administration is concerned about?
Secretary Kerry. Well, I am not going to articulate the
parameters of the debate in terms of what they are concerned or
not concerned about. But an argument is certainly made by
people that whatever you put in--not even Poroshenko, who I met
with a week or so ago, a couple weeks ago--not even he believes
that they can get enough material that they can win. He
believes they might be able to raise the cost and do more
damage. But there is not anybody who believes that Ukraine with
the size of its military and its current structure is going to
have the ability on its own to win a war against Russia. So
there is an imbalance to start with here, and you have to try
to sort of pin that in. Now, that does not mean it is not worth
raising the cost, and there are plenty of people advocating
that you ought to raise the cost no matter what. So those are
the things that have to be balanced here.
Senator Johnson. Another concern I have heard voiced--and I
agree with this--is that the weaker Russia becomes, the more
dangerous they are. Is that a calculation you agree with as
well?
Secretary Kerry. Not necessarily. It is certainly one of
the theories that is put on the table. It is a calculation you
have to analyze and weigh, but it does not necessarily have to
be true, no. There are elements internally within Russia that
ultimately could come to play. Who knows when and how? An
economy by the summer that is still hurting could be an economy
that some people predict could create internal dissention and
different kinds of problems. There is chatter today about a
very isolated Putin with an isolated group of people advocating
this and people scared. I mean, there are different parameters
to this. I am not going to sit here and analyze it at this
moment except to say there are lots of different
considerations.
Senator Johnson. A quick budget-related question. I think
everybody that has gone over to Ukraine and Eastern Europe is
dismayed at really how effective Russian propaganda is. There
is really no pushback. We have unilaterally disarmed in terms
of the propaganda war. Is that something within your State
Department budget that you are looking to increase and try to
counter?
Secretary Kerry. It is. You bet it is. But I have to tell
you it is within the constraints that we are operating in and
it is nowhere near what it ought to be. We are engaged in a
major initiative. We are working with the Emiratis. There is a
new center for disseminating information that is being put
together that the Emiratis are helping to pay for--are paying
for. And this will be a major center for use of social media to
counter some of the propaganda that is being put out by ISIL
itself. But Russia has resorted to a level--and you all see it.
I mean, it floods the Baltic States. It floods Poland. It
floods the frontline states, Bulgaria, et cetera, et cetera. It
has a major impact. And we just frankly are not allocating the
money to counter the way we ought to be. And we are fully
prepared to go out there and undertake this.
Senator, you mentioned at the beginning why we use OCO.
This is one of the reasons. We rely on OCO because, frankly,
the appropriations are not on time. And so we need multiyear
authority to do multiyear tasks. And we need to get the
resources to be able to respond to this kind of thing. We have
about $7 billion in OCO, and we are putting a fair amount of
that into Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria, humanitarian
assistance, Counterterrorism Partnership, countering Russian
pressure. We have $350 million. So that is how we are
bolstering Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia to actually go after this.
It is not enough. I am just telling you bluntly. It is not
enough.
And they are spending hugely on this vast propaganda
machine, which people believe in the places they get them
because there is nothing countering it. So according to people
in many of those states, we are the problem. Russia is there
defending Russian-speaking people. There is no sense of Russian
transgression across the border. The people in Russia do not
even know how many soldiers are dying. It is completely hidden
from them. And we need to be able to counter this and tell the
story.
Senator Johnson. My point exactly. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it is always a pleasure to have you before
our committee.
Just on Ukraine, one point. Some of us have been there. We
have seen the problems in the country. They have been asking
for a capacity to defend their own borders. They know that they
cannot stand up to the Russian military, but they do need the
capacity in order to protect their borders from Russian
incursion. And that is why we passed the authorization in this
Congress.
And I would just urge the administration with some urgency
to look at an aid package that will allow the Ukrainians
greater capacity to protect against the incursions continuing
to be made by Russia. We cannot believe anything President
Putin says about his intentions. He has shown by his actions a
willingness to counter all the agreements that he has entered
into. So I would just urge the administration to be more
aggressive in providing the help to the Ukrainian people.
The second point I want to make is that we had a hearing
here on trafficking in persons, and we will have a markup later
this week. During that hearing, we had Assistant Secretary
Sewall who offered to help us in regards to using the leverage
we have in the trade negotiations on the TPP to deal with
improved labor conditions particularly in countries that we are
negotiating with that have less than acceptable rights. I
mentioned Malaysia, which is a Tier 3 country under the TIP
Report, and I would just urge your personal attention as we get
close to these negotiations to use that leverage to improve
labor conditions on trafficking and all issues on trafficking
in the countries that we are negotiating with the TPP.
But the question I want to ask you about is the Summit of
the Americas that will be taking place in April. President
Obama, I understand, intends to participate in it. And there is
a lot happening in our hemisphere. One of the initiatives that
is included in the President's budget is a billion dollars of
aid to three Central American countries to try to deal with the
crisis that we experienced last year with the unaccompanied
children. We have seen a law but I think most of us know that
the conditions are still there and we are likely to see a rise
of matters on our border as the weather changes.
My question to you is we cannot just continue to layer aid
programs. We need to make sure that our aid programs really are
effective. And in conversations with some of the leaders in our
hemisphere, they hope to use the Summit of the Americas to deal
with the opportunity challenges in the region so that the
people of our hemisphere have hope in their own countries for
economic growth.
Can you just share with us the role that the United States
plans to take in the Summit of the Americas and how we can help
try to provide real opportunities within not just the three
Central American countries that are targets for emigration but
also dealing with the security issues dealing with the areas
that have been at the root cause of so many children leaving
Honduras and El Salvador and Guatemala?
Secretary Kerry. Absolutely. Thank you, Senator Cardin,
very, very much, and thank you for your constant vigilance on
these kind of critical issues of rights, human rights, and of
security and opportunity.
We are very, very focused on the Summit of the Americas. I
went down to the Panamanian President's inauguration. We talked
then about the lead-in. We have had any number of conversations
since then. The Vice President has been engaged in this. We
want to make sure there is a civil society component to the
discussion there and human rights, and we pushed that. And that
has been a sine qua non of our willingness to have any presence
of Cuba or some others there. It has got to be an upfront
discussion of these issues and it has got to be engaged in.
That is number one.
Number two, when I was in Mexico last year, I took
advantage of that to have a meeting personally with the three
presidents, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. And it was at
the height of the unaccompanied children problem. And we had a
very frank discussion in which we talked about the need for
enforcement frankly for their help to close borders, to prevent
people from moving. But obviously, in exchange, we also had to
talk about reducing the incentives for people to want to do
that, and they were very frank about that part of it. One of
the principal reasons for those departures was the
circumstances within which those folks were living, the
violence, the fear, the narcotrafficking, the criminality, the
bad governance, the corruption, and all of those pieces.
So that is why we have put this $1 billion request together
for you, and we are doing it with, I think, a healthy dose of
humility and wisdom acquired through mistakes in the past--in
other words, how you manage that money, where it goes, what the
support system is underneath it, what the transparency and
accountability is with respect to how and where it is spent.
We have targeted three key areas.
Security. So we will work with police. We will work with
the judicial system. We will work with the parental and
education and other components of trying to make sure we are
reaching the kids and creating the security structure
necessary.
The second piece of it is governance itself.
Senator Cardin. I would urge on the governance piece, which
I think is going to be the most challenging considering the
history of corruption, et cetera, that there be ways that we
can evaluate whether progress, in fact, is being made. I think
we all support the effort of safer countries and opportunity in
the countries and good governance, but we have to have
accountability in these programs. We have had many programs in
Central America, and the results have been less than
consequential.
Secretary Kerry. You are absolutely correct. I do not
disagree with that at all. And one of the first conversations I
had with Rasha when I came in was how do we improve our
development delivery system, how do we sort of blend the
Millennium Challenge Corporation kind of goals without
defeating the notion that sometimes you are going to have to do
assistance that is not as economic-based, but it is more
humanitarian. It has a genuine sort of other kind of purpose.
And there will be some economic. There will be assistance like
that.
But what we decided is to put about $250 million in to
reinforcing the democratic institutions, to increasing
transparency and accountability, for instance, like making
information available to people through Internet where it is
available or a publication or otherwise, targeting corrupting
specifically, which we can be particularly helpful with given
our knowledge and law enforcement community input. We can
strengthen efficiency, accountability of the judicial
institutions. We know we can help them with improvement of the
management of their funds by creating tracking systems,
accounting systems, computerized systems, accountability, and
so forth. And all of that is part of our goal.
The key is who is doing it underneath. You are not just
giving them money and saying go do it. You have got mentoring
and implementers and experienced people coming in and working
side by side and helping to make it happen. It is labor-
intensive, but it is probably the only way to have the
accountability that I think everybody wants.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to Secretary Kerry.
You quoted in your testimony Dean Acheson from decades ago.
I thought it was an apt quote saying that these problems that
we have in foreign policy will stay with us until death. It is
hardly a surprise or should be a surprise when contingencies
come up. You said that his words remind us that, ``we long ago
entered into an era of virtually nonstop danger, whether in one
part of the world or another or regarding one type of challenge
or another.''
So that tells us that we have a lot of issues and we will
continue to have. Yet, we are requesting OCO funds as if these
are unforeseen, that pulling out of Afghanistan or out of Iraq
or new problems in Syria or Iraq are somehow unforeseen and we
cannot plan for them. If we have been in this kind of period
since World War II, why is it that only now since 2012 has the
State Department started requesting OCO funds? Now, prior to
that, I understand there were supplemental appropriations that
went to State for various contingencies, but it is only since
2012 that these OCO funds have been requested.
And in my view and I think the view that all of us has is
that the State Department is becoming overly reliant on OCO
funding. You have described these as temporary, as unforeseen,
and something that we need to move away from. Yet, we seem to
be overly reliant on them.
Do you want to comment on that?
Secretary Kerry. You are right. We are and it is because we
cannot get the budget increase we need to institutionalize it.
Put it in the budget. I mean, we are already asking for what I
think is tantamount to--if you take all of our foreign
assistance, because of the OCO, it is about a 14-percent
increase--or an 8-percent increase. If you take just the parts
of the USAID and State Department, which is about $50.3
billion, that represents a 6-percent increase I guess.
The point I am making is, Are you prepared to give us what
would then amount, if we institutionalized OCO, the larger
increase? That is how simple it is. If you want to
institutionalize it, please do. And while you are at it, up it
to the amounts we need to do the other things I have talked
about.
Senator Flake. And if we were to do that, then no more OCO
funds would be requested? Is that what you are saying?
Secretary Kerry. Well, no. Look, you are always going to
have an emergency.
Senator Flake. No. I understand.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, there is no way for me to come in
front of you and tell you that----
Senator Flake. I understand that.
Secretary Kerry. And that is going to require a kind of
OCO.
Senator Flake. And those have been dealt with with
supplemental appropriations.
Secretary Kerry. So I think it is important to have. I do
not want to be flippant about this. I do think it is important
to have an overseas contingency fund.
Senator Flake. We have always dealt with issues like that
with a supplemental. But the problem is with OCO, as I think
all of us recognize, is it is kind of just an offline budgetary
amount that we deal with and we just increase OCO funds. And so
it is a layer that we should not have.
Secretary Kerry. No argument from me. You know the way to
deal with it is pass the authorization, and we will work with
you to do it. And then we got to get the approps people to fill
out the authorization, otherwise we will be right back here
with another OCO request. And by the way, it would help if we
had an actual budget rather than a continuing resolution, I
think.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Moving on, with regard to Cuba, as you know, I have been
very supportive of what the administration has done. I am
pleased that we are going to establish diplomatic relations.
You mentioned that that is accounted for in the budget. It is
not an increased budgetary amount, is it, to establish an
embassy in Havana?
Secretary Kerry. No. No, it is not.
Senator Flake. Good. A lot of people do not realize we
have----
Secretary Kerry. We could find a prepainted sign in the
basement of the current interest section and just put it up.
Senator Flake. I say that only because some people do not
realize that we have quite a vibrant mission there now that has
been operating for quite a while.
Secretary Kerry. And by the way, Senator, thank you for
your thoughtfulness on this and your support for it. We
appreciate it and we appreciate Senator Udall likewise being
involved in this.
Senator Flake. Well, I appreciate that, and I do think that
there are still severe problems in Cuba, obviously, in human
rights issues, but I think that they can most effectively be
pursued if we have diplomatic relations. So I agree with the
administration there.
With regard to Iran for a minute, I have been also
supportive of the administration pursuing negotiations, and I
have withheld support for increased sanctions during that time
because I think the administration needs and deserves the space
to pursue every opportunity for an agreement. And I still am
hopeful that a good agreement will come.
Having said that, as one who served in the Senate for
nearly 30 years, do you feel that the Senate and the House, the
Congress, should have a vote on that agreement in the end or
some kind of approval or disapproval as the chairman has
suggested with legislation?
Secretary Kerry. Well, I have no doubt that Congress will
find plenty of ways to approve or disapprove. You have a vote
because ultimately the sanctions that Congress has put in place
will not be lifted unless Congress lifts them.
Senator Flake. But they can be provisionally lifted or
waved for a significant period of time.
Secretary Kerry. Well, the President can wave them, but you
ultimately are the ones who have to terminate them, and at some
point in time, they have to make a decision whether that has to
happen or not.
But let me just go one step further philosophically and
practically. This is much like a sort of labor agreement and
TPA and things like that. If you are hanging out there as the
sort of approval people, then that is another layer of
negotiation. And fundamentally it complicates it. It hardens
positions, makes the negotiating more difficult. There is this
looming other entity out there.
I think the President feels very strongly that you will
have a sense of whether it is a good agreement or a bad
agreement, and there are plenty of ways that Congress can weigh
in on that. But we do not think it needs to be formalized in
some prearranged way that makes the negotiation more difficult.
By the way, you know, when we finish this, if we finish
it--look, I am telling you we have got some tough issues in
front of us. There are no guarantees here. Some very tough
issues. And we are adamant about not doing a deal that cannot
withstand scrutiny. And it is not just going to be your
scrutiny. Every other country in this--we have France, Germany,
Britain, China, Russia all at the table, all with powerful
feelings about nonproliferation and what ought to be done here.
That is sort of a first barrier.
In addition, we have scientists all over the world. Our
nuclear scientist community is going to have to look at this
and say does it make sense. If they are clobbering this, then
we have got a problem obviously.
So we are being very thoughtful and very careful. We are
running things by people. We are talking to them, what works,
what does not. We are taking advice. We have had exchanges with
all of you through this process. We are well warned as to sort
of where the thresholds are and what is difficult. In the end,
the President will have to make a tough judgment, if we get an
agreement. But it is not certain yet that they are prepared to
meet whatever we think this important standard is that has to
be met to meet all of these judgments and conclude.
But I am not going to go into all the pluses and minuses of
this right now. There are powerful, powerful reasons for why
this is better done diplomatically than otherwise, and there
are powerful reasons for how this winds up being a better way
to prevent them from getting a bomb than some other way. And
when we get into that discussion, I look forward to it. But
this is not the moment for it nor the place for it.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And I would just say that as you have said in the past, it
does have to pass muster with Congress. You have been on the
record in that way. And I doubt there is any body of any of
these other countries that have actually passed through their
parliament--we pass through Congress. It is a very unique
situation, and I hope we will figure out a way to have a role
in saying grace over this before the regime totally dissipates.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to Secretary Kerry for all of the great work
that you have been doing and for being here today.
I want to start first with asking about our humanitarian
efforts to assist Syria in particular and Jordan and also
Lebanon as we look at the threat from ISIS and the support that
we have gotten particularly from partners like Jordan and
Lebanon who are really struggling under the refugees in their
countries and ask if you could talk a little bit about what we
are requesting in the budget to address that and what we hope
that will do.
Secretary Kerry. Sure. Senator, I am really glad you asked
that because I think this is one of the reasons why we all have
to really buckle down and figure out how we are going to come
together around the Syria component of this because the truth
of the matter is that as Syria is disintegrating under the
pressure of the sectarian struggle, three-quarters of the
people of Syria are now displaced. And about half of those
three-quarters are displaced in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.
Turkey can assimilate more effectively. Lebanon has a problem.
Jordan has an even bigger problem. And this has a major impact
on Jordan's economy, on its social structure, its politics. You
know, you have these vast numbers, many of whom are in the
camps, but many of whom are not in the camps. And so they are
permeating Jordanian society and they go out and get a job.
They work for a heck of a lot less. That puts pressure on the
labor market, creates a lot of dissent. They come in 10 to an
apartment and they all throw in whatever they have and they
rent the apartment, but they will rent it for more than it
would have been rented for to a normal person or family. So all
of these distortions are taking place, not to mention that with
them can come some dangerous politics in these places.
So we believe that this pressure on Jordan is a reason to
really try to work harder to find the way forward to get some
kind of political resolution out of Syria.
Now, we continue to believe and adamantly there is no
military solution here. If you pursue some sort of real
scatterbrain military solution, you could have a total
implosion and ISIL could wind up with Syria or ISIL and Nusra
together. You could have any number of outcomes that are very,
very dangerous.
So what we are trying to figure out is what is the road to
that diplomatic outcome, and we are pursuing that. I will not
go into the details with you, but we are actively talking with
the players in the region. One of topics we will have at the
GCC meeting this Friday is sort of how do we get there. And
beating ISIL is a key part of that.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that and certainly agree with
what you are saying. My question really is more about what our
humanitarian efforts look like. For example, just recently the
State Department announced an additional $125 million in
assistance to the U.N. World Food Programme, which as we know
ran out of funding at the end of last year at a time when that
funding was particularly critical to some of the humanitarian
efforts in places like Jordan and Lebanon. So how can we avoid
having that kind of situation happen again, and what kind of
negotiations, pressure, whatever we want to call it are we
entering into with the U.N. so that that does not happen again?
Secretary Kerry. Well, the shortfall itself to the U.N.
World Food Programme?
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Secretary Kerry. Unfortunately, people who have made
pledges are not stepping up, and the demand is increasing. It
is the largest humanitarian crisis on the planet today and it
is going to get worse. And I am sitting here--this is part of
the frustration. It is going to get worse.
Now, we are the largest single donor in the world and we
should be proud of that. More than $3 billion we have put on
the table since 2011. It is more than any other donor, and we
have got $2 million that just recently went into the Red
Crescent, the Turkish Red Crescent, to provide hot meals to
Syrians, the refugees from Khobani. We put $133 million into
the World Food Programme and other partners because of the
emergency needs. It is not sustainable, and it is one of the
reasons why we are looking at this question of Syria and other
things with great urgency right now as to what other
alternatives may be available.
Senator Shaheen. The 2016 budget requests $2.2 billion for
work at our embassies, and I understand that that is in
response to the recommendations of the ARB following the
Benghazi attack. Can you talk about how that will get
prioritized if sequestration goes into effect? Where does that
happen or fall out on the list of priorities?
Secretary Kerry. Our highest priority in the State
Department is protecting our people. And we have closed on 25
of the 29 ARB recommendations. There are four Benghazi ARB
recommendations that remain open. We are actively working to
close them. There are things that take longer to implement. It
is not that they have not been attended to. It is just that
they do not close because it takes a lot longer to do them.
We have a major number of high-threat locations that are
undergoing renovation in various places. Huge expenditures in
Kabul right now to harden down that place, particularly given
the drawdown. You know, you can run the list of places easily
in your heads as to where most of this work is going.
But I made the decision with the President's consent to do
the drawdown in Yemen because we were not able to do diplomacy,
and most of the people we had there were people protecting the
few people who were trying to do diplomacy. It just did not
make sense. So we are doing it from a distance. We are not
going away.
And by the way, our facilities are being used by the U.N.
and protected. Our computers are not accessible. We destroyed
all the classified information. It was done in a very orderly
way over a period of 4 to 5 days with a very well managed exit
that was done through commercial air not in some panic. You
know, I am really proud of the people who pulled that off.
But we are not going to leave people at risk in these
chaotic kind of situations, which is the same thing we did in
Tripoli. But in many of these places, before you get to that
stage, we have got to take steps to increase perimeters, harden
buildings, do things so that there is no risk of negligence
with respect to anything that might flow. And that is where
those priorities are going, into that subset.
I would rather not talk about specific places in public
because it begins to flag things.
Senator Shaheen. Sure. I understand that.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here and
thank you for your illustrious service here over 30 years. It
puts you in a unique perspective to talk to us today.
I want to come back to your comments in your opening. I
agree with you so much. I just believe we are at a moment of
challenge. I see this as a very dangerous world. I respect so
much what you are doing in this position to try to deal with
that.
You also mentioned that we need to lead, and I could not
agree with that more.
But I see two things you have also mentioned as well that
really create challenges. And I sense the frustration in your
testimony today relating to one of these. First of all, this
national security crisis relative to the threats not just
abroad but even here at home relative to the threats abroad
between a nuclear Iran, an ISIL that is really running rampant
around the Middle East and threatening even our homeland, and
of course, what is going on in the Ukraine and Russia.
But you mentioned also our fiscal irresponsibility and the
questions that raises around the world relative to our ability
to back up our agreement, our ability to fund our military, and
our ability to really live up to the leadership role that has
been thrust upon us.
You know, you mentioned budget constraints. Listen, I
recognize that frustration. As an outsider, I see this fairly
uniquely as someone new to the process. But I would like to get
your sense of priorities particularly--and just one example of
how you see in this budgeting process relative to all that we
just mentioned and all that you talked about--how do you
determine priorities and our ability to really do what we have
got to do against your objectives?
And one is specific. I spent last week in Israel. And I
stood on the Golan Heights and I looked across into Syria. I
saw these three villages where fighting is going on, and it is
a very confused space.
But then I went to the West Bank and I saw both sides of
that equation. You know, in the 2016 budget, the administration
is requesting almost a half a billion dollars in aid to the
Palestinian territories of both Gaza and the West Bank. Earlier
this year, the Palestinian Authority was allowed access to the
International Criminal Court. And this is a troubling position
that they will, no doubt, attempt to use to bring charges
against Israel.
But independently yesterday--and this leads to my
question--a Federal district court in Manhattan ruled that the
Palestinian Authority independently and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization were both liable for their role in
knowingly supporting six terrorist attacks in Israel between
2004 and 2006 actually in which Americans were killed.
So my question is that half a billion dollars that is being
requested there--could that be used in different ways to deal
with some of the things that you are talking about, certainly
one some of the social media counterbalance with ISIL and some
of the cybersecurity issues you have talked about? It is a
small number but it is the principle of the thing. And my
question is, how do you see that very complex priority set as
you try to develop the highest and best use for your budget?
Secretary Kerry. Great question, Senator, and I want to
tackle both parts of it.
With respect to the $450 million that you talked about to
the Palestinians, you asked bluntly could it better go to
something else, and the answer is, no. Of the $450 million
budget support for the Palestinian Authority, $425 million goes
to Israeli institutions, including utilities and creditors of
the PA. So effectively it is going to Israel. It is not going
to the Palestinians, but it helps Palestinians to survive.
Now, why is that important? It is critical. If the
Palestinian Authority were to fail--and I warned about this in
London the other day because they are not getting the transfer
of the tax revenues because of their going to the ICC. But if
they were to fail, what takes their place? Hamas, jihad? I do
not know. I just know that as troublesome as they have been in
certain respects at many times, that President Abbas remains
committed to a nonviolent, peaceful approach to a two-state
solution and he remains committed to the two-state solution.
Now, that has to be put to the test at some point in time,
and I understand the difficulties Israel has had with them and
him and so forth having taken part in those negotiations for a
long period of time. We objected. We do not believe
Palestinians have the right to accede to the ICC because we do
not believe they are a state in standing to be able to go the
ICC. We made that argument, as did other countries, by the way.
A number of other countries made that argument. But we lost.
And we also forcefully advocated to the Palestinian
leadership do not do this. It is a mistake. You are going to
create all kinds of hurdles to the possibilities in the future.
This is a mistake. But they are out of patience and we could
not contain that. And as you know, they went to the U.N. And I
spent 3 weeks over the Christmas holiday working to keep people
that we would like to be working with constructively from doing
something negative, and in the end by a vote--they did not get
he nine votes at the U.N. And so we never had to exercise a
veto.
But there is a great deal of frustration building, and this
is not the moment to go into it in any depths. We are very
anxious not to get dragged into the election process. We are
not going to. Israel has this important election coming up, and
they need to do it without us kibitzing from the sidelines. So
I am not going to go further on this.
I will just say to you that we wish the Palestinians had
behaved differently. And that is why they are not getting aid
right now. We think others are going to step up and try to help
bridge the gap in order to get them over the hurdle. But when
the Israeli elections are over, there is going to be a need to
quickly begin to try to decide where everybody is going
thereafter so that there is not an irretrievable clash that
takes place with respect to the ICC or otherwise and prevents
any further activity.
On the first part of your question, a very important part
of the question, the Golan Heights--and you sort of talked
about the budget as a whole and where we need to go. The need
for the United States to--I went through that list of things in
the beginning, Ebola, ISIL, Afghanistan, the Maghreb, the
Sahel, Somalia, Mali, Boko Haram, Yemen, Houthis, the region,
still al-Qaeda in the western part of Pakistan. I mean, you can
run through the gamut of these challenges, and you got to
recognize that it is the United States who usually helps to
convene or becomes a central part of the convening, working
with our key allies, Britain, France, Germany, other members of
the P5.
But we need to be able to make a difference to some of
these countries. There is a different world we are living in
now. After World War II, most of the world's economies were
destroyed, and we were in great debt but we came out of the
recession by virtue of the war machine that was built up. And
for 50 years or so, there was a pretty polarized east-west--you
know, a bipolar decision-making process. And it was a lot
easier.
Ever since the Berlin Wall fell and nations sprung up
reclaiming their individuality and their personal aspirations
and defining themselves differently and free and democratic,
the economies of the world have changed. And now you have the
BRICS. You have China, India, Brazil, Mexico, others, South
Korea people all playing a different role with a different
impact. And many of them are donor countries.
So others are playing a more mercantilistic, voracious game
in the marketplace of ideas and products than we are. And we
have been hamstrung by this budgeting process here in
Washington that is not allowing us to actually meet our own
priorities and serve our own interests. And I could make a much
longer--and I will not do it now--argument of how it
specifically affects us in instance after instance.
I will give you just one example. Recently the Prime
Minister of a great country was here. I will not go into the
details of who. The most we were able to do is provide a loan
guarantee when what they really needed were billions of dollars
to help them move forward and make a difference. And if they
get them from other places, other places will actually wind up
having greater impact and influence than we do.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know
it has been a long day of testimony. Some of us are getting our
second shot at you today, those of us who are on the
Appropriations Committee.
Secretary Kerry. More than any Senator should go through.
[Laughter.]
Senator Murphy. We had the chance to have a good dialogue
this morning about my belief that we need to be having a more
holistic conversation about the ways in which your lack of
capacity to fight corruption, build up rule of law in and
around the Russian sphere of influence is preventing us from
doing the real work to combat their march across their
periphery, and I hope our committee will focus on that.
But this may be the only chance that we get to talk to you
before we have a fulsome debate about the authorization of
military force that is pending before Congress. And so I wanted
to just ask you a question or two to try to help us understand
some of the terminology in the proposed draft that I think we
are having trouble getting our hands wrapped around.
Secretary Gates, I believe shortly after he left the
Department of Defense, said that if any future Secretary of
Defense advised a President to deploy major numbers of combat
troops back to the Middle East, that they should have their
head examined. And there are a number of reasons for that. The
lessons that we learned from the Iraq war are that when
hundreds of thousands of American troops are there, we let our
allies in the region off the hook, that we kill a lot of bad
guys, but we frankly allow for our enemies to recruit more than
we kill into the fight because of the presence of American
troops. And it is why many of us really believe in this
prohibition or restriction within this AUMF on another major
deployment of ground troops to the Middle East. And I know you
agree and I know the President agrees, and I think our new
Secretary of Defense agrees. That is why the authorization
draft that you gave us has that restriction in it.
But I think we are struggling to understand these two words
in it, ``enduring'' and ``offensive,'' and trying to get a
better understanding of when the next President--because I do
not think this President will make the mistake of deploying new
ground troops to the Middle East--crosses that line.
So can you give us a little bit more color on what your
understanding of those two words mean? What is the number of
ground troops that trips the ``enduring'' limitation? What are
the kinds of actions that would trip the defensive versus
offensive juxtaposition? I know that you are not the Secretary
of Defense, but you are intimately involved in these
discussions and the ramifications, would we ever commit troops
to the region. Help us just understand a little bit more about
what those words mean and if they are true limitations because,
as you know, many of us believe that those words are so
malleable to actually be no limitations at all, and I trust
that you believe something different.
Secretary Kerry. I am not going to suggest to you that
there is not in any terminology latitude for interpretation
because there always is unless there is an absolute,
horrendously proscriptive, broad prohibition, which everybody
would counsel against I think. We are seeking to destroy this
entity, and it is not a good message nor a good policy to place
such constraints on yourself that you cannot do that.
At the same time, the President wants to make certain that
those who feel burned by prior votes or by prior experiences
are not fearful that he is somehow opening up Pandora's box to
that possibility again.
So our feeling is--and we give kudos to you on this
committee. I mean, I think Senator Menendez as chair is the one
who produced this concept from your deliberations, and I would
have hoped you would have said, God, they listened to us. I
mean, we came up here. I testified in December and we did
listen to you. And I think the President tried to come back to
you with something that he felt did not constrain his ability
to exercise his constitutional authority as President but at
the same time respected Congress' role and right to shape this.
And that is what you have done and what you are doing.
Now, ``enduring'' in our mind means no long-term offensive
combat of a large scale, which is what the President has
defined. In other words, we are not asking you for
authorization to give us the ability to build up to a new Iraq
or a new Afghanistan. It is not what we are doing. What we are
asking for--and offense versus defense--when a large number,
you know, a battalion or whatever of forces are directed to go
have a firefight with ISIL in a proactive way, that is offense.
And that is prohibited and that is not what we are seeking to
do. But it does not mean that there might not be instances
where you have advisors who are helping people to understand
how to properly do fire control or properly call in air support
or something else. There is a special force operation that
might be necessary for one thing or another to try to rescue
somebody or close something. I mean, there are things that are
not part of the larger offensive operation where you may well
have reasons to have some people there. I would not consider
that--even though they may be in a hostile area and on some
occasion conceivably inadvertently take fire or something, they
are not in proactive, offensive actions, and certainly not
enduring. I mean, what we do not want to do is get into a
ground war.
Gates--I think he said it was Gates who said that. You
know, the President is trying to make sure that he does not
have to have his head examined. This is a pretty
straightforward prohibition without curtailing exigencies and
leaving that sufficient level of fuzz that the other side
cannot decide, oh, we got a safe haven here. We can do whatever
want. Or they are not going to be able to whack us if we go do
this or that or the other thing. So I think there has to be a
little bit of leeway there.
But rest assured there is in our judgment no way possible
for this language to be misinterpreted and allow a kind of
mission creep that takes us into a long-term war.
Senator Murphy. And speaking for myself, I do not have any
doubt that you will live within the confines that you and the
President believe to have limited yourself publicly and within
your interpretation of these words. I think that we are just
going to be debating the amount of fuzz that is created here,
and if there is so much so that the next President, who may not
believe in the same strategic limitations that this President
believes in, has an interpretation that is much more expansive
than yours is, I think that is why we want to entertain further
discussion.
Secretary Kerry. And let me just say, Senator, there have
been authorizations previously which have had restraints in
them, some more limiting than this. Obviously, there is a
constitutional argument, which is powerful and important, to
the effect that there should not be any, and the President
ought set limits. And you can deal with the funding. You cut
off the funding. You are managing what is going on, and you
have the power of the purse.
But it seems to me that what is important here also is for
the world to see that the United States Congress is uniting in
a significant vote to make it clear we are committed to degrade
and destroy ISIL. That is critical. And so whatever you do--I
think everybody is going to have to compromise a little bit.
And I went through all your various positions, and there are
little nuances of differences between almost everybody. And so
it does require people kind of finding the common ground and
coming together here. And we hope we can get the strongest vote
possible that indicates the United States of America is
committed to this policy.
The Chairman. Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary, for being here today, your
service to the country as Secretary of State, as well as in
this body.
I just wanted to follow up quickly on my colleague's
question. You mentioned that there had been other AUMF's,
authorizations, with restraints. Which ones were you referring
to and what were those restraints?
Secretary Kerry. On the chemical weapons recently passed
authorization, there were restraints put into that.
Senator Gardner. What were those restraints?
Secretary Kerry. Let me check. There was a restraint of
time limit of months and a limitation on a certain use of
force.
Senator Gardner. And what was the other example you said?
Secretary Kerry. There was multinational force in Lebanon,
1983, where there was a time limit. There were limitations on
the use of force, et cetera.
So I think what the President has tried to do here is
tailor something, based on the AUMF hearing we had in December,
that reflected the sensitivities of the committee. And
obviously, you guys have to tackle that now, and the
administration is prepared to sit and work with you and work it
through.
Senator Gardner. I want to follow up on the questions that
Senator Flake had asked. When you were talking about the formal
role of Congress and approval of any agreement, I believe you
said that there was this other looming entity out there, that
you were concerned about a possible approval by this other
looming entity. Well, to me, that other looming entity is
Article 1, the United States Congress.
So two questions. Do you believe there should be a formal
approval role by the United States Congress for the agreement?
And two, will you be coming back to the United States Congress
and asking us to lift sanctions against the regime?
Secretary Kerry. No. I do not think there ought to be a
formal approval process. I think there is a formal process of
consulting and of input, and ultimately you have to vote to
lift the sanctions.
Senator Gardner. Will you be making that request to us?
Secretary Kerry. Not immediately in our current notion of
what we would be doing. There would have to be some period, I
would think, of compliance and other kinds of things, and this
is yet to be determined.
Senator Gardner. And the reports--I believe I came in from
a Commerce Committee hearing right as you were telling Senator
Menendez you cannot believe everything that you read. So the
reports in the AP and other places that have said this would be
a 10-year agreement with a 5-year ramp-down--it is simply not
true?
Secretary Kerry. I already said that that is not our view
of it, but we have not reached an agreement yet.
Senator Gardner. Is that one of the considerations that you
are making, a 10-year timeframe with 5 years out----
Secretary Kerry. I do not want to get into what we are or
are not. I am just telling you that is not where it is at
today.
Senator Gardner. Have you had conversations perhaps with
Speaker Boehner and Majority Leader McConnell about the terms
of the agreement?
Secretary Kerry. I have not had direct conversations with
them.
Senator Gardner. Do you think that is appropriate, to speak
to the leadership of Congress?
Secretary Kerry. Well, what we are doing, Senator, is we
are having very regular consultations. Wendy Sherman and the
team have been up here in classified session with many of you.
That has been going on for almost 2 years now. We have been
consulting on a regular basis in a classified forum. I have
personally telephoned the chairs and ranking members at the
conclusion of negotiations, given them some indication of what
we are doing, where we are. So there is a regular consultation
taking place under the normal order of the U.S. Senate. And
when the briefings take place down in the classified room, if
the practice is continued, when I was here, the leaders are
usually there and part of those briefings.
Senator Gardner. Do you believe that that consultation is
what will fulfill the role that Congress plays in this
agreement?
Secretary Kerry. I do.
Senator Gardner. Just the hearings downstairs in the
basement. That is basically our role.
Secretary Kerry. In terms of the ongoing negotiating
portion, yes. You certainly have a right to have whatever
hearings and whatever further examinations you want to have if
a deal is struck. I mean, that is your prerogative at any point
in time, and ours is to respond to you and to----
Senator Gardner. But no other role and feedback on this
than straight congressional hearings.
Secretary Kerry. No. I believe this falls squarely within
the Executive power of the President of the United States in
the execution of American foreign policy, and he is executing
thoroughly all his responsibilities of consultation. But in the
end, this is the President's prerogative. You can always decide
to oppose it one way or the other, as you might. Our hope is
that we will consult, work together, not set up predetermined
barriers that make it difficult to get to an agreement. I mean,
every nuance of what we do here, folks, I am telling you gets
interpreted and usually in ways that make our negotiating life
harder. I am very serious----
Senator Gardner. Will you commit to us that you will not be
asking us to lift sanctions?
Secretary Kerry. I beg your pardon?
Senator Gardner. Is there any commitment that you can make
that would involve a commitment that you would not be asking
Congress to lift sanctions?
Secretary Kerry. I do not want to bind that at this moment.
I know of nothing at this moment in time, but I am not going to
bind myself. I do not know how this proceeds. I do not know
where we wind up, and I am not going to take away, depending on
what we got for it, some option. But that is not our current--
--
Senator Gardner. I am running out of time here. I want to
switch to the Asia rebalance. One of the signature policies or
initiatives of the administration was the pivot or the
rebalance in Asia announced November of 2011 in Australia. The
President said that our new focus on this region reflects a
fundamental truth the United States has been and always will be
a Pacific nation. And I agree.
I am serving as the new chairman of the East Asia and
Pacific Subcommittee. I look forward to working with you and my
colleague, Senator Cardin from Maryland, to ensure that our
policies reflect the growing strategic importance of this
region covering nearly two-thirds of the earth's population.
But I am concerned that the administration's efforts to
apply this whole-of-government approach to the Asia-Pacific
region are faltering. Last year, this committee issued a report
that highlighted some of these shortcomings, noting that the
administration--and this is the quote from the report. The
administration can improve the effectiveness and sustainability
of the rebalance policy by increasing civilian engagement,
strengthening diplomatic partnerships, and empowering U.S.
businesses.
I understand that the fiscal year 2016 request for
diplomatic engagement within the East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Bureau is up 6 percent this year, but is still 11 percent below
2014 fiscal year levels.
How do you explain the disparity in the administration's
rhetoric and the seeming discrepancy in the budget request?
Secretary Kerry. I am not sure I followed you completely on
the what is up.
Senator Gardner. So basically the East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Bureau is up 6 percent, but that is still 11 percent
below what the fiscal year 2014 funding levels were. So despite
the efforts of the Asian pivot or the talk or the rhetoric of
an Asian pivot, are we actually reaching that and does that
remain a top priority for the administration?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, I am not sure what figure you are
balancing against what to come up with that because the 2016
budget has a $1.4 billion increase not total in support of the
rebalance, and that includes a 6-percent increase over 2014.
And we are pursuing the Trans-Pacific Partnership
voraciously. I mean, we have a major effort going with respect
to the region. Under Secretary Wendy Sherman was over there
about a month ago. Deputy Secretary Tony Blinken was over there
2 weeks ago following that visit. I am going over in about a
month to follow up on that visit. We have President Ji coming
here for a visit in the fall. We have major presence with our
negotiations right now with Vietnam, Malaysia. I have been
talking personally with the Prime Ministers and Foreign
Ministers of these countries.
So we are deeply, deeply engaged in this rebalance. We have
never had that many high-level visits taking place. We have had
a revamping of our defense policy with Japan, with South Korea.
We are engaged. The President was over there for his fifth
trip. I think I have made seven since I have been Secretary. So
I think that every step the East Asian and Pacific Bureau is
taking and every step the higher level of the State Department
is taking and the administration is following up on this notion
of the rebalance and of its importance.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
I would say on the consultation--I hate to jump in here.
But at every one of these meetings where the numbers of
centrifuges are generally laid out and we express concern, the
next report, the numbers of centrifuges increase. And I would
say that every time we get concerned about the length of time
of the agreement being too short, at every report, the length
of the agreement shortens.
So I do hope we will have an opportunity to weigh in on the
totality of the deal prior to sanctions being lifted. I do not
think that is an undue burden when Congress put those in place
in the first place.
With that, Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
First of all, Mr. Secretary, I want to congratulate you on
your naming of a special envoy for LGBT rights in the State
Department. I think it is a historic moment. And I am just
wondering what response you may have received over the past few
days from other countries in your announcement.
Secretary Kerry. Well, to be honest with you, Senator, I
have been wrapped in the negotiations. I just got back late
last night. So I have not had personally any response. I am
told a very, very positive response. I read one article in the
paper this morning which was very positive about it, but I have
not seen----
Senator Markey. I think it is an important step forward.
Al-Shabaab has threatened the Mall of America, and that is
clearly linking foreign policy to domestic homeland security.
The President is constantly talking about countering violent
extremism. And so I am just wondering if you could give us a
little bit of an insight into what actions your Department--the
Obama administration generally--is taking to counter this
threat coming out of Somalia in terms of its potential threat
to the homeland.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, we are engaged in the most
massive day-to-day counterterrorism efforts that one could
imagine, and it is consuming every aspect of Government. The
President regularly convenes a national security meeting to get
updates on where we are and what we are doing and particularly
when we are in a moment of a particular threat or challenge.
I think what the Department of Homeland Security was really
talking about is sort of a generic set of threats and
challenges that are out there that we are working to respond
to. We have an unprecedented level of communication and
information sharing and intelligence sharing taking place now
with other countries. We have the Counterterrorism Partnership
Fund, which we are requesting money from all of you to
implement, and that is $390 million, which will be used to
enhance border security among our foreign partners. We are
working with the Europeans to move them now to sharing lists on
passengers which they had not been doing. We are trying to
increase the scrutiny of people moving in between countries and
share more information about it. We are trying to stem the
financial flow to these groups through nations and increased
scrutiny of who is giving money how and how it flows.
There is a Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications which has been set up, and that is at the State
Department. It is playing a key role in our efforts to counter
violent extremism, and it is coordinating and informing the
whole-of-government public communications structure that is
able to pass on information and counter rumors and deal with
social media in Arabic, in Urdu, in Somali, and more recently
English because of English-speaking countries which are at
risk.
So there is just a whole-of-government effort going on. It
is taking shape. It is growing almost by the day and week.
The counterterrorism, counterextremism session that we just
had in the last 2 or 3 days--the first day of it at the White
House was almost exclusively civil society, law enforcement,
NGOs, people who are engaged in grassroots efforts to see how
they can be augmented to this.
Now, one thing I do not want to have come out of this. This
is a challenge and it is a legitimate threat. And indeed, there
are risks in certain places at certain times. But no one should
doubt that notwithstanding that, we are actually living in the
least loss-of-life, violent period in our history. There is an
anomaly here. So I think what people need to do is be vigilant
but not scared. People need to be always attentive but never
fearful of doing something or going somewhere. And I think
travel today is safer than it has ever been. I think people's
ability to move--our SWAT teams are better, our sharing of
information, FBI, all of our units. People have really gotten
pretty good. It does not mean a lone wolf cannot come along and
do something. If somebody wants to die, you can hurt people. I
think it is important for people to recognize this is not a
moment of turning inward and getting frightened.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The United States-China climate agreement was historic,
though not universally well received. Could you tell the
committee why this agreement serves America's interests and
what you believe it contributes toward reaching a positive
result in Paris later on this year?
Secretary Kerry. Well, look, you are absolutely correct. Of
course, it is not universally well received. On one side, you
have people who do not receive it well because there are still
people who do not think we have to do anything. On the other
side, you have people who believe we ought to be doing more. I
happen to be one of those. And I helped negotiate this deal. I
would have loved to have seen it do more, but this is the most
we could get. And we took a country--most people thought it was
foolish and how could you possibly try to get China. Up until
last year--you know this better than anybody--China was on the
opposite side of the table and stopping us from doing anything.
And we turned that around in a year to have a China that has
publicly committed to set a standard for reduction of a
dependency on fossil fuel by 2030 and begin to have a 20-
percent commitment internally to alternative renewable energy,
clean energy. That is huge.
And in our case, we set a goal of somewhere between 26 and
28 percent reduction in our emissions by 2025 with the hope
that we are going to actually do better and hit the 28 and do
it sooner. China likewise committed to try to do it sooner if
possible.
Now, we believe the technology is going to help us do it
sooner. If we get moving down that road, the technology curve
always winds up producing faster and spinning out new ways of
doing things cheaper and you get to your goal faster. So that
is our bet.
But we are still behind the curve of where we need to be in
terms of meeting our obligation to deal with climate change and
keep the rise of temperature on planet earth to 2 degrees
Centigrade. We are not going to make it right now. And that is
why we are still talking--a lot of people are talking about
mitigation and dealing with the effects.
But I will tell you this. I run into the effects of climate
change in various parts of the world all the time now. There
are tribes fighting each other over water in places that there
used to be water, and there is not anymore. There are record-
level droughts, 500-year droughts. By the way, in California,
as Senator Boxer knows better than anybody, not just in deserts
in other parts of the world, we have had record levels of storm
damage, of fires, the hottest year. Each year now is the
hottest year since the last year for the last 10-12, whatever
number of years. You know this better than anybody in the
Senate, Senator Markey.
So we are behind the curve, but what we are trying to do is
create a critical mass of countries out of the major emitting
nations that will then have an impact on everybody gathering in
Paris. And when they see that the major countries are doing
it--and the reason others have to do it is less developed
countries now equal over 50 percent of all emissions. So they
have to start coming on board because no one country can reduce
completely. If everybody rode a bicycle tomorrow and nobody
drove to work and had public transportation and if we did not
emissions, we would still be in deep, deep trouble because of
the rate of the promulgation of coal-fired power plants in
various countries around the world.
So we have a huge distance to travel and the great
benefit--you asked about the benefit. The market we are looking
at for clean, renewable, efficient energy is a $6 trillion
market with 4 billion to 5 billion users, and that will rise to
9 billion users as the population grows up to 2050 or so. The
market that created the great wealth of our Nation, when every
quintile saw their income go up in the 1990s, was a $1 trillion
market with 1 billion users.
So that is what we got: $6 trillion versus $1 trillion; 1
billion users versus 4 billion to 5 billion now and more
growing. This is the biggest market in all of human history.
Countless people could be put to work. Countless technologies
put in place, new grids, smart energy, all of these things. And
the sooner we move to it, the sooner a lot of economies start
to move and the sooner we deal with the crisis.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member, for this.
Thank you, Secretary Kerry. You are serving in very
challenging times and you are doing it so well. You are making
us proud whether we agree or disagree with you. And I think a
lot of us agree with you sometimes and disagree with you
sometimes. And I have to say you are a great diplomat, and
those skills were on display today. And so I am very pleased to
see you.
You know, in light of the threats that you have laid out, I
am not going to ask you about the looming shutdown of the
Department of Homeland Security because that is not your
bailiwick, that is Secretary Johnson's. But I think it ought to
be another message to everybody that this is a ridiculous way
to run a country at this difficult time.
I also want to say I agree with your overarching comments
at the beginning that there is not enough of a priority placed
on the work of the State Department and the very brave men and
women out there representing our great Nation and how important
it is. And that is why I so strongly supported what the
President did on Cuba because I find that when people meet
Americans, they fall in love with America. And that is the way
we are going to influence people--to have contact with them. I
know that we are divided on this issue even within our own
party and on the other side, which is okay. It is fine.
But from my perspective, when I went there years ago, what
I remember is that Cubans were so afraid to be seen with us,
they ran away--ordinary folks. It had to be straightened out
with the top people there because they were afraid that they
would get harassed for even talking to us. So I just want you
to know that I back what you did there.
On Iran, this is a chance of a lifetime to do something so
important. And I know how difficult it is. And I know you have
said--and so has Wendy Sherman--in many of our meetings that
this is a difficult thing, and it may not work. Maybe it is 50/
50. I do not know today if you would still say it is 50/50. But
I think trying to get a deal here is a once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity. And we have done it with other countries.
And the most important thing to me--and I spoke with
Senator Risch about this once--is the verifiability. We cannot
trust these people in that government for 1 second. We can
trust the people, but we cannot trust the government. So it
must be verifiable. And for me, that is what I am looking for:
the inspections, the unfettered ability to see if this is real.
And also I would demand that there be constant reports to the
Congress as to whether Iran is living up to the agreement.
Now, I am working on something--I just want to know if you
could make time for me in your busy life--that takes us
somewhere between where some want to go, where I think Congress
gets overinvolved, and where some others want to go, where they
want Congress to be underinvolved. I think there is a sweet
spot here that does deal with Congress getting involved on the
sanctions we put in place and also on demanding reporting
requirements. Would you make time for me or would your staff
make time for me so I can go over some legislation I have been
working on with Senator Paul?
Secretary Kerry. Sure.
Senator Boxer. Okay.
Secretary Kerry. And by the way, Senator, thank you for
flying back especially to do the hearing on Cuba with Senator
Rubio. We really appreciate it.
Senator Boxer. Listen, I was very happy to be part of that.
Let me just close with this argument, and it gets to the
AUMF. You and I are very close friends and allies most of the
time. The one time we had a real difference was on the war in
Iraq, and you remember that. And it had to do with wording and
it had to do with approaches to an issue. And you were working
on wording with Senator Biden and Senator Lugar, and it was a
difficult meeting and we did not reach agreement on wording on
the Iraq war.
I asked the Congressional Research Service--CRS--if they
could analyze this word ``enduring,'' and I want to say I asked
my ranking member--when he put forward the idea of
``enduring,'' he had a list of what it meant. The way you have
approached this, Mr. Secretary, you do not have any definition.
And the CRS--and I ask unanimous consent to put this report in
the record, if I can, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Senator Boxer. Here is what they say. This is incredibly
important for you to hear. ``It seems doubtful that a
limitation on, `enduring offensive ground combat operations,'
would present sufficient judicially manageable standards by
which a court could resolve any conflict that might arise
between Congress and the executive branch over the
interpretation of the phrase or its application to U.S.
involvement in hostilities.'' This is the CRS. They do not have
a dog in the fight.
And this is really very important because I am not going to
support this language. It is as open-ended as you can imagine.
It is ridiculous. No one can define what it means. You said it
is extended hostilities. CRS says it cannot be defined. I say
it cannot be defined. This is just common sense because what is
an enduring relationship to one person is not an enduring
relationship to another. ``Enduring'' is a subjective term and
it is not tested.
So I am saying to you as someone who agrees with you and
the President when you and he have said in the most beautiful,
unequivocal terms--and I quote the President from June 19,
2014, ``American combat troops are not going to be fighting
again in Iraq.'' The President said in September 2014, ``these
American forces will not have a combat mission--we will not get
dragged into another ground war in Iraq.'' He also said, ``nor
do we intend to send U.S. troops to occupy foreign lands.'' And
in January 2015, the President said, ``instead of getting
dragged into another ground war in the Middle East, we are
leading a broad coalition . . . ''
And Mr. Secretary, you have said the same thing: ``I think
that is a redline for everybody here, no boots on the ground.''
You said that in September 2014. And then you said, ``President
Obama has said repeatedly that U.S. ground troops will not
engage in combat roles.'' And you said in December 2014, ``The
President has been crystal-clear that his policy is that U.S.
military forces will not be deployed to conduct ground combat
operations against ISIL and that will be the responsibility of
local forces.''
So this is your clear statement of policy. Today you
affirmed that that is the current policy.
I would ask to put these statements in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Senator Boxer. And yet, you send up here an AUMF with this
giant loophole you could drive a combat truck through. And it
is not going to get a lot of support among, I think, the
Democrats on this committee. I do not speak for every one of
them, but we have had many discussions.
I am hopeful that you can take back to the President some
of these comments.
Now, on the other side of the aisle, you are facing another
problem. I cannot speak for them. They want very few
limitations.
And I know this puts you in a bind, but the most important
thing to me, when you send up an AUMF, is to have it reflect
your own strategy. And I do not think this AUMF reflects your
strategy. I think it reflects an attempt to bring people
together to get something passed, but at the end of the day, I
do not know what a future President is going to do. I know what
this President is going to do, and I support that strategy
strongly. I voted for an AUMF that was put together by our
then-chairman. Every Democrat supported it, if I could say,
Senators from the left to far left supported it. And then you
come in with this one.
I am just saying, I hope you will take back to the
President the fact that the CRS says it cannot be--it is not a
term that is definable and that many of us feel it is an open-
ended commitment. Will you take that back to him and tell him
some of us feel that way?
Secretary Kerry. Sure. I think he is well aware of that
position among some people here, Senator. And you are
articulate and clear about it as always.
But I would just say to you that I think the policy that
the President has defined--and all of the statements that you
just articulated are contained within the language that Senator
Menendez and the committee produced previously. We believe
that.
Now, you know, I think when you get into this process--and
I am consistent with what I said here in December--of trying to
list things, it gets difficult because of something that gets
left out or something that was meant--you know, it just gets
more complicated. But that is why there is a sunset----
Senator Boxer. My time is running out. My time is running
out.
Secretary Kerry. Let me just finish.
Senator Boxer. Nothing gets more complicated than the use
of a word that no one can define. It is a disaster. The
President is not going to be here after a year and a half or
two.
Secretary Kerry. Well, the President will be here for
another year and three-quarters.
Senator Boxer. And this would go for 3 years. So you are
not talking about just this President.
Secretary Kerry. Right. But I think that the language is
such and the process is such with the sunset that the sunset
could be executed in a way that you protect minority rights so
that there has to be a coming together and a conclusion on it
with respect to how that vote takes place so that a future
President really cannot abuse it per se. They are going to have
to deal with it. And I think in my judgment that is a strong
protection because if you cannot get it renewed because there
is not a willing majority to be able to do that, you have
effectively asserted your rights and your position.
Senator Boxer. Well, we just disagree. Thank you, though.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Secretary Kerry. Let me just finish one other thought. As
we have said to you, this is an open process. I mean, this is
now in the legislative arena. I think the goal is to get as
many votes as you can, Senator Boxer. I think if you think you
can bring 40-50 Republicans on board with language that is
absolute prohibitory or more declarative, as long as it is not
restrictive of things the President thinks he needs to guard,
that is the give and take here. I doubt you can get there, but
if you can, more power to you.
Senator Boxer. You are not going to get there with this
one.
The Chairman. If we could, I mean, I think you all have had
a chance to discuss it fully, and I appreciate the views of
both of you. And I think Senator Udall would like to weigh in.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Chairman Corker, and thank you,
Senator Menendez.
And not to beat a dead horse here, but on the specific
subject that Senator Boxer brought up, I just want to tell you
how much I appreciate you coming in December and outlining what
it is that you felt the administration needed. And as you saw,
with Senator Menendez at the chair, we did some very serious
work, and we came up with a lot of what was very close to what
you talked about. You know, on my part, I wanted to be more
limiting, but I voted for the final product. Chairman Corker, I
do not know the dynamic because we were in the majority at the
time, but I think we all worked seriously. And there were
Republicans that wanted to be more limiting. And so I think
there is a lot of room to take that product and move forward
and work with it.
Secretary Kerry. That is what we are looking for, Senator.
This is not a closed-out--this is not a take it or leave it,
obviously. So we look forward to your work on it and ask you
simply to work with us also to make sure that we are not put in
a place that does not allow us to pursue the policy per se.
Senator Udall. You have spoken several times about Cuba and
what has happened in Cuba. And I just want to applaud the
administration for normalizing relations. And Senator Flake and
I were down there together just before--within about 6 weeks of
when Alan Gross was released and then when the big
announcements were made. And what I am wondering is what do you
think. We know there are serious problems with this
authoritarian government and all the things that they do. But
what is your recommendation of the best steps forward to
normalize and how we move down a path. There are all sorts of
things that are being explored, but what is your----
Secretary Kerry. The normalization process is effectively
announced and now needs to be implemented. The theory of the
normalization is that it is getting it in place that in fact
begins to put us in a different position to be able to advance
our interests. I mean, Senator Menendez and others are
absolutely correct about what the problems are there. We all
agree. There is maybe a slight difference about how you are
going to get them to change. Our theory of the case is that the
best change is going to come through families, through people,
through travel, through information, through access and that
normalization in fact leverages our ability to do what 50 years
of isolation has not achieved. Now, obviously, the proof will
be in the pudding. But we have seen what has not happened for
this long period of time. So effectively we think we ought to
try this difference.
Now, we will have a meeting this Friday here in Washington
that will take place which will basically be negotiating the
normal pieces of negotiating the entry into normal diplomatic
relations, in other words, how do your diplomats react, what
are their rights of movement, you know, the visa situations,
the travel, the access to equipment, goods. All those kinds of
things have to be negotiated. And the components of the
agreement which we understood were critical like the Internet
and the business and so forth has to be articulated. That is
being done now, at which point we hopefully are in a position
to actually sign memorandums of--exchange diplomatic notes and
engage in the process.
Senator Udall. Shifting over to Iran, you talked earlier
about the execution of American foreign policy. And I cannot
think of a more dramatic area of the collision between the
executive branch and the legislative branch than when a foreign
leader--and the Constitution talks about who deals with foreign
leaders--than what has happened here with this speech on March
4 by Prime Minister Netanyahu. And I have said publicly that I
believe that he should postpone that speech.
Could you describe to people what is at issue here? You are
the Secretary of State. You understand this issue. Do you think
is a wise move on the part of the prime minister to come here
when we are in the middle of these very delicate negotiations?
Was it a wise move on his part to ignore the administration in
terms of appearing in front of a joint session of Congress?
What are your thoughts on that?
Secretary Kerry. Well, my thoughts are that you as Senators
have all the leeway in the world to make up your own minds
about how you feel about this decision. My job is to work with
the Prime Minister of Israel and with Israel to maintain its
security, to honor our very, very strong relationship.
I speak with the prime minister more than any other leader.
I speak with him regularly, and it is an important part of our
security and his security--I mean the security of Israel and
the enduring relationship that we have, and nobody should
question that relationship.
You all have to make up your own minds about the propriety
of the way this unfolded or what happened. We are going to
proceed about our business which is protecting the country and
maintaining the integrity of these relationships, and that
includes Israel.
You know, I have been focused on, obviously, Iran
negotiations and Ukraine and Afghanistan and a bunch of other
things, and actually I will be leaving I think on Saturday for
meetings with Foreign Minister Lavrov on Syria and other
things, then the Human Rights Council. I will not be here. I
will be negotiating with Iran for the rest of that week, as a
matter of fact. So during that period of time, I will actually
be sitting there trying to get an agreement.
Senator Udall. Secretary Kerry, just to conclude, I tried
to have my staff research this. So I do not know of any other
time that the administration has been ignored. Can you in your
memory at all? And if you cannot answer that now, I hope you
will try to answer that for me in terms of the history of our
foreign relations.
Secretary Kerry. I think that your staff should do some
research for you, and I am not going to get into the history
here now, one way or the other. As I said to you, my focus is
on protecting the relationship between us and Israel and
dealing with important issues in the region, and I do not want
anything coming in between that.
Senator Udall. And I understand that and I believe it is a
tremendously important relationship, but I also believe what
the Prime Minister has done by taking this action--he has
created a very divisive situation.
Thank you, Secretary Kerry, for all your hard work.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have a lot of questions
about ISIL AUMF, but I am going to hold on those for the
hearings that we will have on that.
I want to talk to you about strategy, and I want to talk to
you about security.
On the strategy side, having been on this committee for
about 2 years and just even as a citizen reading the news, it
seems like we are always in crisis management mode because
there are always crises. But just because there have always and
will always be crises, it does not mean we need to define our
job as crisis managers. And I think we ought to look big-
picture strategy and take advantage of some successes. I am
going to commend you in both senses, thank you but also
encourage you on one.
I just got back from a CODEL to Mexico, Honduras, and
Colombia. Mexico is now our number three trade partner. Net
migration from Mexico is now zero. As many Americans migrate to
Mexico as Mexicans migrate to the United States, which is a
very dramatic thing. Even with significant security
challenges--and we are working with Mexico on those--the
increase in the Mexican middle class has been sizeable, and the
trade relationship between the United States and Mexico has
gone a long way in 20 years.
Honduras, a very challenging situation. The administration
has put on the table a significant Plan Central America
investment, that is based on a plan the northern triangle
nations put together. And this kind of investment, if we do it
the right way, has the capacity to be a significant improvement
in life for folks in that region and also slow the
unaccompanied minor migration to this country.
And then I went to Colombia, and I was there on the day
that you announced Bernie Aaronson as the United States Special
Envoy to the peace talks between the Colombian Government to
accompany our ally Colombia in the negotiations with the FARC
to end a 50-year civil war in Colombia. Colombia was a failed
state in the late 1990s, but because of the U.S. investments--
and they will say because of the U.S. investments--and their
own hard work, they have now become, next to Canada, our
primary security partner in the hemisphere. They provide
security on the border between Egypt and Israel. They provide
security assistance to Central American nations, and their
economy has grown in a significant way.
People who have done your job as Secretary of State--you
spend all your time traveling east and west, all your time on--
I am exaggerating a little bit. American foreign policy is
about Europe and it was about the Soviet Union. Then it is
about the Middle East. Now we are pivoting to Asia. It is as if
the world has an east-west axis only when we know it has got a
north-south axis. And what the Latin countries have told me on
this visit and others when I lived there is that you pay
attention to us when there is a crisis, but you ought to pay
more attention to us because there are a lot of good things
going on.
I think from the big-picture strategic standpoint, I would
commend you for the work that you have done with respect to
Cuba, with respect to the Plan Central America, with respect to
Colombia, but I would also encourage you to really focus on
that north-south axis. We are 35 countries. We are a billion
people. We share a name. We are all Americans, North Americans,
Central Americans, South Americans. We have a unique culture
that was formed by indigenous and European and African. We
share that from the Yukon to Patagonia, and that unique culture
has made us who we are, but it has also made us open to other
cultures as the immigration to the Americas from Asia has
shown.
Trade is booming in this region between our nations. The
prosperity of the continents has dramatically improved. It just
not just Canada, the United States, and the 33 dwarfs anymore.
It is significant, major economies that are doing some
wonderful things. There are challenges, sure. But if this civil
war in Colombia ends, we will be two continents at peace. There
will not be a war in North or South America. You cannot say
that about Europe with what is going on in Ukraine. You cannot
say that about Africa. You cannot say that about Asia. But we
are close to being able to say it about the Americas.
So I just want to commend you for the work that you have
already done. But let us not just focus on the Americas when
there is a crisis and then turn our attention back to the east-
west axis. This billion people, 35 countries, two continents
that could potentially be continents of peace could be some of
the best inoculation that we would have against global security
challenges if we are persistent, if we stick with it. And I
would encourage you to do that.
The last thing I will say I want to thank you on something
else. The first time we had a hearing together after your
confirmation and I was sitting as the newest guy on the
committee, I asked you about the ARB recommendation with
respect to embassy security. The State Department had had a
multiyear search and had decided that they needed to do an
embassy security facility to keep our people safe. And they had
come up with that conclusion and picked a site in Virginia in
the summer of 2012. A few months after the choice of the site,
we had the horrible attack at Benghazi, and in the aftermath,
the ARB report suggested that this site was needed.
And yet, here we are. We are now nearly 3 years after the
selection of the site, 2\1/2\ years after the horrible tragedy
at Benghazi, and it has not really moved forward. But I was
happy to see in the President's fiscal year 2016 budget a
proposal to finally invest $99 million to build this embassy
security facility.
You mentioned that there are ARB recommendations that have
been done and there are ARB recommendations that have not been
done. One of the ones that has not been done was to provide
state-of-the-art security training for those who serve in
dangerous embassies around the world. And given that the State
Department wisely recommended in the summer of 2012 that we
needed to make this investment, I am a little chagrined but
still excited to see that in fiscal year 2016 we might finally
start to act on that awareness within the State Department.
And I do not know if you have comments either about the
strategy or the security point. Thank you.
Secretary Kerry. I have comments about both, Senator.
Let me just tell you on the latter, we are very, very
excited about this. The Department of State and the General
Services Administration looked at over 70 properties. There was
a major property, obviously, down in Georgia that was
considered. It is the enforcement training center, the Federal
law enforcement training center, and there was a lot of talk
about going there. But we made the right decision to go to Fort
Pickett. Over a 10-year period, we will literally save--the
cost would have been $91 million to do it in Georgia. It is $9
million to do it and the cost of transportation back and forth
to do it in Virginia. So this is a good decision. It is going
to get implemented now. We are ready to go, and we are very
excited about it. All the due diligence has been done and it is
going to happen.
On the policy, I could not agree with you more. And in
fact, I think it was about a month ago--early January--I
invited the Foreign Minister of Mexico and the Foreign Minister
of Canada to come and join me in Boston for a day and a half/2
days. And we had dinner at my house, and then we had a full day
of meetings. I took them to a hockey game and had a lot of fun.
And we talked about North America. We talked about the ability
of Canada, the United States, Mexico, which are a huge part of
the global economy, by the way, when you combine then, to be
able to have a much greater impact and have a greater impact,
by the way, on Central America and Latin America. So we have
committed to that.
And in fact, I have had a meeting in the State Department
within the last month at which we sat with our Western
Hemisphere Assistant Secretary, Roberta Jacobson, who is doing
a great job, and others and talked about how we are going to
implement a greater north-south complement over the course of
the next 2 years of this administration.
And the appointment of the special envoy to Colombia came
out of my second visit to Colombia and my discussions with
President Santos who asked us to get engaged and to become
involved. And President Obama agreed to do that, and together
we decided that Bernie is the fellow to help get the job done
because he was intimately involved in the Nicaragua-El Salvador
peace process and has great experience, served previously as an
Assistant Secretary for the Western Hemisphere. In fact, I
worked with him on the committee when I was chairman of that
subcommittee.
So we think we got something cooking and that, together
with the Central America initiative and efforts to deal with
Petrocaribe, with the fuel problems that the Caribbean may have
depending on what happens with fuel prices in Venezuela and so
forth--we are now putting together an entire energy connection
strategy, which involves Mexico and others, which could begin
to really change the economies of the region.
So I appreciate your focus. We should work on it. Next time
we head down there, maybe you want to come with me. And I will
be heading down there shortly. We are very excited about the
possibility of really defining this North America access, and
you are right on target.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Very briefly. I want to thank Senator Kaine because as
someone who for 23 years has been trying to create this focus
on Latin America and the Caribbean, it is great to have another
voice who is as equally as passionate about it.
Mr. Secretary, three quick questions.
One, speaking about Latin America, the situation in
Venezuela continues to deteriorate. The Venezuelan Government
arrested Caracas Mayor Antonio Ledesma on trumped-up charges.
There are high-profile political prisoners in Venezuela like
Leopoldo Lopez who have languished in prison for over a year.
We had legislation passed, signed by the President, that calls
for including mandatory implementations of certain sanctions.
Can you give us an update of where the administration is at
and how they intend to move forward?
Secretary Kerry. Yes. We are perplexed by and disturbed by
what is going on in Venezuela, Senator. I reached out to the
Foreign Minister when I traveled the year before to Panama. I
think it was in Guatemala I saw him. And we met. It was
supposed to be a 15-minute meeting. It turned out to be 45. We
agreed we were going to try to follow on and begin a new
period. And the next thing I knew a couple of weeks later we
were being attacked for this or that and accused of this and
that.
This seems to be the pattern. Whenever President Maduro or
someone in Venezuela at the high level of their government gets
into trouble or something is pressing politically, they blame
America. And it is a repeated effort to trump up notions of
coups which do not exist and to play to, frankly, a very old
script. I mean, this is regrettable.
So our policy is we are very supportive. You know, we
continue to meet with and we encourage meaningful dialogue
between all the sectors of Venezuelan society, political
opposition, society, business, government, et cetera. We call
on the government to release political prisoners, including
dozens of students, and opposition leaders, Leopoldo Lopez and
Mayor Daniel Ceballos and Enzo Scarano. And we are working with
others to try to get them to live up to their defense of
democracy. So we are working with the National Security Council
right now and the Department of the Treasury and other agencies
to implement the provisions of the law on sanctions and we are
moving ahead as fast as we can.
I have raised the issue of Venezuela in all my
conversations with leaders in the surrounding countries.
Senator Menendez. When we were proposing this, we were
asked to withhold because there was an attempt by Colombia and
others to try to engage. And unfortunately, that did not
produce results. And it seems that President Maduro only
continues to arrest those that either create opposition to his
government and/or who he uses as scapegoats. At some point, I
just hope that we can use the provisions of the law sooner
rather than later, and I recommendation your attention to it.
Secretary Kerry. Well, we are pushing that.
Senator Menendez. Secondly, Turkey has gone into the
exclusive economic zone of Cyprus. It put its ships there,
followed with warships. It is pretty outrageous. And it is a
country--Cyprus--that is part of the European Union. If this is
the way we are going to have countries in that region affect
others' economic exclusive zones, which are internationally
recognized, and at the same time pressure a country which is in
the midst of good faith negotiations to try to solve their
longstanding problem in terms of the division of the country,
it is a horrible set of circumstances.
I hope we can be stronger with the Turkish Government that
this just simply--I have read some statements and they have
been positive in terms of criticizing what they have done. But
they are still there. And at some point, there has to be--this
is another one of these elements of violating international
norms and not having any real consequence, and the message you
send globally is you can do that if you happen to be the
stronger party.
Secretary Kerry. And we have raised this issue. I have
raised this issue. I met with the President of Cyprus--the
Prime Minister, and we have had various conversations. It has
been raised with Turkey. I do not know when but in the not too
distant future, I think I am slated to head in that direction,
and this would be one of the conversations, is how do we move
on Cyprus more effectively.
Senator Menendez. Well, I hope we can be vigorous about the
part that if you want to get a negotiation for it, you cannot
have your warships off the coast of the country. That is just
not a way in which to get parties--and I must say I have
followed this issue as well for a long time. This Cypriot
Government is more advanced, more forward-leaning in trying to
get to a negotiated settlement, but you cannot do it at the
point of a gun in essence. And it creates a real problem to try
to move forward. So I hope when you are in the region or an
Assistant Secretary----
Secretary Kerry. We have been doing it even outside the
region. I had meetings in Munich on it. We had meetings prior
to that. I had meetings in New York on it. We have met
frequently with all the players. We have people deeply engaged.
We have an ambassador to the talks who is deeply engaged in it.
And it did get in a bad place partly because of this but other
ingredients also. I have had conversations with the Turkish
Foreign Minister about it previously. Now Prime Minister
Davutoglu and I are working quite closely on it. My hope is we
could get back to an equilibrium that would allow us to move
forward. But we specifically discussed the economic zone, the
ship presence, and the gas rights, and so forth.
Senator Menendez. One final comment. On Cuba, I noticed
your comment about what did not work for 50 years and how we
can apply leverage. What also has not worked for 50 years is
the leverage of the international community that was all
engaged with Cuba, and the Castro regime has had more political
prisoners, more beatings, more repression, and no openings
whatsoever. So the Europeans, the Latin Americans, the
Canadians, and others who have traded with Cuba, visited Cuba,
done all of those things that we think are going to be the
turning point did absolutely nothing to change the course of
events there.
I hope--and I understand that at the President's direction,
you are conducting a review of Cuba on the State list of
terrorist sponsors. So as Assistant Secretary Jacobson was
before the committee at that hearing, she confirmed that the
Castro regime continues to provide sanctuary to Joanne
Chesimard, who is on the FBI's top 10 list of wanted
terrorists. We also know that Basque terrorists from ETA are
there. We also know that even while negotiations are being
hosted by Cuba with the FARC, that the FARC continues to
conduct terrorist organizations even as they are in the midst
of negotiations inside of Colombia, and the Colombian
Government pushes back on them. And we know that Cuba sent the
most significant violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions
on North Korea--sent Migs, missiles, and tons of other military
equipment to North Korea in violation of those sanctions.
So when you are looking at removing Cuba from the list of
terrorists, I am going to look at the provision of the law that
specifically comes from the Export Administration Act that
defines the term ``repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism, to include the recurring use of any
part of a territory of the country as a sanctuary for
terrorists or terrorist organizations.'' And I will be looking
forward to how you are going to meet that threshold to remove
Cuba from the list.
Secretary Kerry. That is all part of the analysis that has
to be made.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. I
want to raise just a couple of small issues relative to some of
the bigger issues that you have been talking about, and I will
do so briefly. I know we all have places to go.
I know hundreds of American families have adopted young
ones in the DRC. They have suspended the process of those
children leaving. I know it is an incredibly difficult thing
for us to deal with the government that is in place there. But
I want to raise this at this meeting just so that your
Department will continue to work with us and others to try to
break that loose and to also get some kind of lever in place to
cause the DRC to act appropriately. I know there is a note that
has just been slid to you there. But the fact is that these are
kids that are actually adopted today by U.S. families and yet
they are unable to get them out. I do not know if you want to
respond to that or not.
Secretary Kerry. Well, I have raised it personally with
President Kabila, and Russ Feingold raised it with him. We have
not had a result yet, but we are mindful of it.
The Chairman. Obviously, in comparison to some of the other
issues we have discussed today, it is minor. It is everything,
obviously, to the families who are involved, and I hope that
you will continue to raise that issue.
Secretary Kerry. We agree, and we raise these, let me tell
you, with the Iranians whether it is Saeed Abedini or Hekmati
or Levinson or Jason Rezaian. I mean, these names are all in
the front of my head because we constantly raise people who
have been held in one place or another. We do not always talk
about the names publicly because sometimes that works to a
disadvantage. But there are folks in Pakistan, places where we
are highly focused on these situations. And it is a daily
concern of the State Department.
The Chairman. We appreciate your commitment to the
authorization process, and I think that in many ways it can
help you significantly in what you are doing to leverage
efforts and get Congress far more bought into some of the
issues you are talking about today. And yet, there is almost no
knowledge of those activities because of the lack of
involvement that has taken place. So I look forward to working
with you on that.
Secretary Kerry. Okay.
The Chairman. I appreciate very much your comments
regarding the modern slavery initiative, and Senator Menendez
and I introduced legislation today that hopefully will move
through the committee later this week and on to the Senate
floor. And I know you are committed to the same.
And I just want to close with this. I think there is a
concern, and I know we are going to have a lot of testimony. I
know there is a concern. We are going to have a lot of
testimony over the next several weeks regarding Syria. There is
a sense of a lack of commitment. You are not going to dispel
that today. But I do hope as witnesses come forth they will be
open and transparent about the things that are underway because
today I think there is a sense that, in essence, we have a
containment strategy, that we are, in essence, riding the clock
out until this President leaves office.
We have the same concerns right now in Ukraine where we
lured them West. They gave up 1,240 nuclear weapons. Obviously,
Russia would not be moving into their territory today had they
not done that. And yet, together with them and with the U.K.,
we made comments about their territorial sovereignty, and yet
those are being invaded. And it does appear that the
administration is not committed to doing those things that are
necessary to cause Ukraine to be able to at least defend
itself. We were slow on intelligence. We are providing
blankets. We are providing MRE's, but we are not providing some
of the defensive lethal support that is necessary. Let me just
finish.
Secretary Kerry. We have provided some counterbattery
radars and other kinds of things that are defensive. But,
Senator, I understand the debate.
The Chairman. So I just want to say where it takes us on
Iran is there is a strong sense of a lack of commitment, of a
not willing to hold the line. And so I hope that we as a
committee are going to be able to move forward on legislation
that allows us to see that, to cause us to force a process
where you will submit what it is you are doing with Iran. I
know you have been working on it very heavily. I know you must
be proud of that effort. And in the event you come to a
resolution with Iran, I do think it is important that it is
submitted, that we have the opportunity to approve it prior to
sanctions being lifted and the regime actually dissipating. And
I think the role of Congress to make sure that they are
continuing to adhere to it is important.
So those are comments I would leave you with. We thank you
for your service. I do not know of anybody who has worked
harder to try to deal with the many crises that we have around
the world. We thank you for your service here as a former
chairman, and we wish you well.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be
with you. Thank you.
The Chairman. Members will have until close of business
Thursday to submit questions.
The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
Question #1. This request seeks to compensate for depleted
carryover balances from previous budget years. Doesn't this practice of
relying on carryover balances breed poor fiscal discipline? How do you
know the true budget requirement for a particular year if there are
always carryover balances to dip into?
Answer. The FY 2016 budget request for the Department of State and
USAID prioritizes resources to support the U.S. foreign policy and
national security interests. In formulating the budget request many
factors are considered to identify the appropriate request level,
including carryover balances relative to the timing and level of annual
appropriations. The funds requested in the FY 2016 request will be
executed in the year appropriated if there are no delays in the budget
process outlined in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended.
Question #2. OCO seems to have taken the place of making difficult
choices in the enduring budget. I do understand that Congress has been
part of the problem, and I am working to reverse that trend in my new
assignment on the Budget Committee. I also commend you for transferring
some enduring requirements out of OCO in this request. But how are you
preparing for the eventual end of OCO and what are you doing to
identify the enduring requirements that remain in OCO and move them to
the base budget?
Answer. The administration will release a plan this year that
describes which OCO costs should endure as the United States shifts
from major combat operations, how the administration will budget for
the uncertainty surrounding unforeseen future crises, and the
implications for the base budgets of the Department of Defense, the
Intelligence Community, and the Department of State/Other International
Programs. This plan is still in development, and will include a
strategy to transition enduring costs currently funded in the OCO
budget to the base budget beginning in FY 2017 and ending by FY 2020.
For a transition strategy to be viable, congressional support is vital.
Any transition of enduring OCO to base could only work if the caps on
discretionary spending were lifted so as not to jeopardize ongoing,
enduring efforts.
Question #3. The second Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review (QDDR) was supposed to be completed in fall 2014, and we now
hear it is delayed until the spring. When can we expect it? How well,
if at all, does this budget request reflect the strategic direction
established in the forthcoming QDDR?
Answer. The report is near completion and will be released this
spring. The process for this QDDR has been informed by the reforms
initiated by the first QDDR, by the 2014-2017 State Department/USAID
Joint Strategic Plan, and by the 2015 National Security Strategy. We
also appreciate thoughtful input from your committee staff, and from
others on the Hill. The current budget request is aligned with the
strategic priorities identified in the forthcoming QDDR, which advances
a set of recommendations to bolster our capabilities to prevent and
mitigate conflict and violent extremism; promote inclusive economic
growth; advance open, resilient and democratic societies; and reduce
and adapt to the effects of climate change. The QDDR also addresses
areas for strengthening our internal operations, with a focus on
innovation, knowledge management, and investing in our workforce. Our
QDDR team looks forward to briefing you on the report at your
convenience.
Question #4. You have requested a 38-percent increase in U.S.
Contributions for International Peacekeeping, compared to FY 2015. This
is also a 66-percent increase compared to FY 2014. The request includes
arrears and a higher U.N. assessment. What steps is the United States
taking at the U.N. General Assembly's Fifth Committee to reduce the
U.S. peacekeeping assessment and the broader U.N. peacekeeping budget?
Your peacekeeping request includes an additional $150 million for
the proposed Peace Operations Response Mechanism in OCO for ``off-
budget cycle needs.'' Given the billions of dollars we already spend on
peacekeeping, why do you feel the need for this additional fund,
especially since extensive transfer authority already exists? And with
reference to question 2, what is the justification for proposing that
such a fund exist outside of the enduring budget, when it appears to be
conceived as an enduring solution to an enduring challenge--that of
unanticipated peacekeeping needs?
Answer. The request is $2.93 billion (based on the 2015 assessment
rate of 28.36 percent), of which $2.55 billion would fund the U.S.
share of U.N. peacekeeping assessments during FY 2016 for 14 ongoing
U.N. peacekeeping missions, a war crimes tribunal, and logistical
support for U.N. Support Office for the African Union Mission in
Somalia (UNSOA), as well as the monitoring of mission effectiveness. An
additional $380 million is included to partially cover projected FY
2015 shortfalls.
The Department recognizes that this request represents an increase
of $811 million (or 38.2 percent) over the amount appropriated in the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2015 (``FY 2015 Act'') for the Contributions for
International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account. However, the FY
2016 request is based on an assumption that our U.N. peacekeeping
assessment will be about equal to the FY 2015 estimated requirements of
$2.55 billion.
Peacekeeping missions are critical tools to maintain international
peace and security, and to advance U.S. interests around the world,
including in Somalia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Mali, Lebanon, and Haiti. International peacekeeping efforts are
cost-effective means for countries to work together toward the same
ends, resolve conflicts, contribute to international stability, and
mitigate humanitarian crises. We continue to regularly review missions
to determine where we may be able to downsize, close, or transition
them to a peace-building or other arrangement, as appropriate, as well
as encourage the U.N. to further pursue cost saving measures and
efficiencies.
A priority of the administration is to seek favorable changes to
U.N. regular budget and peacekeeping assessment rates, which the U.N.
General Assembly will set later this year. We will seek to make the
scales methodology fairer, so that emerging powers that have an
increasing share of the global economy pay their fair share of the
U.N.'s expenses. We also will seek to reduce discounts that relatively
wealthy developing countries receive on their peacekeeping assessments,
which have contributed to the recent increases in the U.S. peacekeeping
assessment rate.
Having the Peace Operations Resource Mechanism (Peace Ops
Mechanism) account in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) will ensure
funding is available to respond expeditiously to unforeseen
requirements without the risk of endangering critical, ongoing,
budgeted peacekeeping efforts or other national security priorities.
Existing authorities are limited in scope and require that funding for
new peacekeeping efforts come at the expense of existing peacekeeping
efforts or other high priority programs funded by Congress--such trade-
offs are not in the long-term strategic interest of the United States.
The Peace Ops Mechanism would provide funding for transfer to the
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and CIPA accounts to meet urgent and
unexpected global peacekeeping requirements. The account limits
availability of funds to new or expanded peace operations or activities
above the level recommended in the President's budget. Funding for
these types of contingencies is appropriate for OCO, with funding
regularized where necessary in future year CIPA and PKO budgets.
Additionally, the use of Peace Ops Mechanism funds would be subject to
congressional notification procedures and we plan to consult with
Congress on the use of this mechanism.
Question #5. The Asia Rebalance is supposed to prioritize
political, economic and diplomatic initiatives in the Asia-Pacific. But
yet again, the budget requests for regional operations and foreign aid
do not reflect this reprioritization. How do you justify not
reprioritizing funds toward the Asia Rebalance in this request?
Answer. The rebalance is built on a simple premise: the Asia-
Pacific is integral to the United States growth, and the United States
is necessary for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Over
the last 6 years, we've established that the ``new normal'' of U.S.
relations with the Asia-Pacific region is extensive collaboration with
our Asian allies and partners on important global issues and a high
tempo of sustained engagement by the President, me and my team, and
other Cabinet, and senior officials.
We have dedicated significant diplomatic, public diplomacy,
military, and foreign assistance resources to the region in a way that
is commensurate with the growing importance of the region to the United
States. The President's FY 2016 budget provides $1.4 billion in support
of the rebalance, which includes Diplomatic Engagement and Foreign
Assistance funding, representing a $75.4 million (6 percent) increase
over FY 2014.
This is a landmark year for this administration and for the United
States. In 2015, finalizing TPP is the most important way to advance
the rebalance. That's why the President, the U.S. Trade Representative,
and the rest of the administration, including me, have repeatedly
called for movement on TPA, and we're hopeful for movement on this in
Congress at the earliest possibility.
Question #6. Can you please describe your plans to more fully
integrate economic policy interests and decisionmaking throughout the
Department, particularly within the regional bureaus and between the
regional bureaus and the E family? How do we ensure that economic
policy interests and concerns are prioritized?
Answer. Since the beginning of my tenure, I have said ``foreign
policy is economic policy'' and the Department has worked hard to make
his vision a reality. This vision of fully integrating economic policy
throughout the Department includes leveraging the work of the entire E
family, which encompasses economic growth, energy, and the environment.
Tight coordination among regional bureaus and the E family is
essential for prioritizing economic policy interests and concerns
across all of our diplomatic efforts. Regional bureaus help E family
bureaus advance economic interests in specific countries, and the E
family bureaus help regional bureaus address the economic, energy, and
environmental concerns that matter to our bilateral, multilateral and
regional relationships.
In addition to regular coordination at the working level among
regional bureaus and the E family, the Under Secretary for Economic
Growth, Energy, and the Environment meets every other week with Deputy
Assistant Secretary-level officials in each regional bureau who lead
for their bureaus on economic issues. These meetings ensure that the
economic and political sides of the Department are knitted up across an
exceptionally wide range of economic, environmental and energy related
issues.
E family bureaus also have internal programs to coordinate planning
and strategy with the regional bureaus at the working levels. For
example, each E family bureau has designated teams of experts on
particular regions to track events and plan economic, energy, and/or
environmental policy efforts, meeting regularly with regional bureau
counterparts to share information and ideas.
The recently released Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
(QDDR) further institutionalizes E family/regional bureau cooperation.
The QDDR (on page 40) formalizes the designation of a Deputy Assistant
Secretary (DAS) in each regional bureau to lead on E family issues and
notes, ``To facilitate coordination, each designated DAS will be
expected to liaise regularly with the three ``E family'' assistant
secretaries, while continuing to be supervised by the regional
assistant secretary.''
Another key part of my economic focus is the Shared Prosperity
Agenda, led by Senior Advisor to the Secretary David Thorne. The Shared
Prosperity Agenda includes several active working groups that seek to
elevate and improve how we conduct economic diplomacy at the
Department, including work on entrepreneurship, knowledge platforms,
and human resources. These groups include representation from the E
family and regional bureaus, and the Shared Prosperity Agenda is an
important means of integrating economic diplomacy across the entire
Department.
Question #7. The State Department is negotiating with the member
states of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change toward a goal
of reaching an agreement by the December Paris Conference of Parties
meeting (COP/ 21). The Lima Ministerial Declaration from December 2014,
which provides a work plan for the next 10 months of these
negotiations, refers to a ``protocol, another legal instrument or an
agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention.'' As you know,
the State Department's regulations and practice require you to consult
with the Senate regarding the form of ``significant international
agreements.''
A protocol is clearly a treaty but can you please explain what the
Lima Declaration means by ``another legal instrument or an agreed
outcome with legal force''? Will such an agreement be legally binding
on the U.S.?
If a legally binding agreement is reached at the COP/21 in
December, will it be referred to the Senate as a treaty under the
Constitution requiring the Senate's advice and consent, yes or no?
Answer. The 2014 decision of the Parties to the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, taken in Lima, Peru, recalls a 2011
decision of the Parties adopted in Durban, South Africa. That decision
launched a process to develop a ``protocol, another legal instrument,
or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable
to all Parties . . . .''
The Durban mandate makes clear that the Paris agreement is to
further the objective of the Convention (i.e., to avoid dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate), yet leaves the Parties
with substantial flexibility regarding its form and the legal nature of
its provisions. At this stage, the international discussions are more
focused on the substance of the agreement than on whether it should be
a protocol, etc., or whether particular provisions should be legally
binding.
The United States seeks an agreement that is ambitious in light of
the climate challenge; that reflects nationally determined mitigation
efforts in line with national circumstances and capabilities; that
provides for accountability with respect to such efforts; that takes
account of evolving emissions and economic trends; and that promotes
adaptation by parties to climate impacts.
It is not possible to say at this stage whether the Paris agreement
will be referred to the Senate as a treaty under the Convention. The
appropriate domestic form of the Paris outcome, whether a protocol,
another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force, will
depend upon several factors, including its specific provisions.
The administration will continue to consult with the committee
regarding the negotiations. As I testified during my confirmation
hearing, any international agreement brought into force for the United
States will be done so consistent with the United States Constitution.
Question #8. Is the USG going to meet its commitment to full
compliance with the International Aid Transparency Initiative by
December? If not, which agencies/departments are lagging behind? What
will the Secretary be doing to speed up progress?
Answer. The USG takes its IATI commitments seriously and has been
making efforts to improve IATI reporting and compliance. Although no
agency will be fully compliant by December 2015 over 90 percent of U.S.
foreign assistance is reported to the IATI standard.
Each USG agency that implements or funds foreign assistance is
responsible for reporting qualitative and quantitative information
about its programs to Foreign
Assistance.gov (FA.gov) in accordance with OMB Bulletin 12-01 which
incorporates the main elements of the IATI standard.
All data reported to FA.gov is converted into and published in the
IATI format. Reporting to FA.gov is the responsibility of each agency.
Ten agencies are currently reporting some data to FA.gov, but at
varying degrees of completeness and comprehensiveness. Under the
Secretary's leadership, agencies are working toward better reporting.
State, MCC and USAID, which constitute the bulk of U.S. Government
foreign assistance, are all taking concrete steps to improve reporting.
Others will be further behind, especially those agencies whose foreign
assistance activities are only a small percentage of the agencies'
portfolios, which are primarily domestic.
Question #9. How will the Secretary ensure that the evaluations now
being conducted under the International Aid Transparency Initiative
will (a) be scientifically rigorous and of good quality; (b) be made
public in their entirety, and not just their summaries; and (c) be used
to guide decisionmaking?
Answer. In November 2011, the U.S. became a signatory to the
International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). As a voluntary,
multistakeholder initiative that includes donors, partner countries,
and civil society organizations whose aim is to promote a single global
transparency standard and format to enable comparability of foreign
assistance data, IATI is a common, open standard for the timely
reporting of aid information. It does not create or suggest standards
for evaluations. The U.S. published its IATI Implementation Schedule
and the first set of IATI-formatted data in December 2012 on
ForeignAssistance.gov. We continue to collect, format and publish data
to meet our commitments under IATI through ForeignAssistance.gov.
Evaluations are not conducted under IATI, but reported in a specified
format agreed to by the signatories.
(a) Regarding scientifically rigorous, good quality evaluations,
both State and USAID have evaluation policies, USAID since 2011 and
State since 2012. These policies set forth accepted standards and best
practices for evaluation. Both policies emphasize that evaluations must
use methods that generate the highest quality and most credible
evidence that corresponds to the questions being asked, given time,
budget and other practical considerations.
(b) USAID publishes its evaluations in their entirety on the
Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC). State's policy requires
every evaluation funded with foreign assistance that are not already
available through other public Web sites, such as the DEC, to have a
summary containing the elements listed in the bill to be made available
for public posting on http://www.state.gov/f/evaluations/index.htm.
This site is searchable by title, sector, bureau or region, and year
published. A number of State bureaus were already posting full
evaluation reports on their public Web sites. They will continue to do
so. Those that were not posting full evaluations are now required to
make summaries available.
(c) State and USAID both have annual planning, budgeting and
performance management cycles that use monitoring and evaluation
results to inform decisionmaking. Bureaus and missions that have
performed evaluations are also using them effectively to make
improvements, plan program adjustments, and inform future program
design.
Question #10. According to U.S. and Azerbaijani NGOs, there are
approximately 100 hundred political prisoners in Azerbaijan. How does
the budget reflect our support for democracy and human rights activists
at a time when the government is intensifying its crackdown on civil
society?
Answer. The United States is working with nongovernmental
organizations to strengthen their ability to advocate for citizen
interests, safeguard civil and political rights, and increase public
participation in governance, especially at the regional level. The
United States is assisting independent media to increase citizens'
access to objective information, including through the use of web-based
and mobile device news platforms. The funding level for programs that
support democratic reforms and help improve the environment in which
civil society can operate currently accounts for just over 40 percent
of the FY 2014 State/USAID bilateral assistance budget for Azerbaijan,
more than any other sector. The President's FY 2016 Request includes
5.4 million for democracy programs, which is approximately 47 percent
of the total request for Azerbaijan.
Question #11. USAID has been funding a contract to clear areas of
Nagorno-Karabakh from World War II era mines. What is the status of the
demining program? Will the demining contract associated with this
program be extended beyond 2016?
Answer. The demining program has cleared nearly 27,500 hectares of
the active mine fields within the Soviet-era boundary. It is estimated
that 95 percent of antipersonnel and antitank mines have been cleared.
While no decision has yet been made about specific funding beyond FY
2016, USAID remains committed to providing humanitarian assistance to
the people of Nagorno-Karabahk.
______
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Some have compared the Obama administration's policy
toward Iran as an attempt to duplicate U.S. efforts in the early 1970s
to open up China.
Is a nuclear deal a first step in a reorientation of our
policies in the Middle East away from combating and containing
Iranian influence?
Answer. Our negotiations with Iran are solely focused on Iran's
nuclear program. We remain extremely concerned about Iran's support for
terrorism, threats against our friends and partners, and violations of
human rights. Even if we do reach a nuclear deal with Iran, we will not
turn a blind eye to Iran's destabilizing activities and human rights
abuses. As the President said after the Joint Plan of Action was
signed, ``As we go forward, the resolve of the United States will
remain firm, as will our commitment to our friends and allies--
particularly Israel and our gulf allies, who have good reason to be
skeptical about Iran's intentions.''
Question. Iranians already prioritizes funding for armed proxy
groups which are destabilizing governments from Bahrain to Yemen to
Lebanon. The Iranians are also directly funding and militarily backing
the brutal dictatorship of Beshar Assad in Syria. Sanctions relief and
improvements in Iran's economy associated with a nuclear deal will
increase Iran's ability to fund terrorism and violence.
What actions can we take to counter an economically
empowered Iran's destabilizing and malign activities across the
region?
Answer. Iran's destabilizing activities in the region are a top
concern of the administration. An Iran with a nuclear weapon would make
this aggressive behavior even more concerning. This is why the
administration believes the first step is to prevent Iran from
developing a nuclear weapon.
Our ongoing efforts to combat Iran's destabilizing and malign
activities across the region fall in the following broad categories:
First, we continue to improve our ability to defend against
any attacks by Iran or its proxies;
Second, we continue to restrict Iran's ability to move money
and material for illicit purposes;
Third, we remain committed to Israel's security and that of
our other regional allies and we continue to build up partners'
capacity to defend themselves against Iranian aggression;
Fourth, we are working unilaterally and with allies to
weaken Hezbollah's financial networks;
Finally, we publicize Iran's meddling wherever we can.
Question. Anti-ISIL Coalition.--The military campaign against ISIL
in Iraq has met with some promising success: ISIL's advance has been
halted, in many places ISIL is in retreat, and in other places it is
struggling to maintain the territory it holds. We also are hearing
reports that ISIL's brutality and failure to govern has caused friction
with communities in Iraq and Syria, opening the aperture for the United
States and its coalition partners to peel away local support empower a
moderate middle, and set the conditions for ISIL's defeat. However,
there is a risk of catastrophic success--that the timeline for ISIL's
defeat will outpace reconciliation efforts and before moderates are
effectively empowered. Iraq's Prime Minister Abadi is saying the right
things on reconciliation with Iraq's Sunni community, but there are
powerful forces aligned against him from Iran to Shia politicians and
militias to former Prime Minister Maliki who want reconciliation to
fail.
(a) What can we do to accelerate and build support for a
program of national reconciliation in Iraq?
Answer (a). Addressing the root causes of this conflict and
supporting the GOI's effort to promote national reconciliation will be
the only effective method to cement again battlefield gains against
ISIL. As the President has stressed, this battle cannot be won by the
military alone. Our Ambassador in Baghdad engages regularly with the
senior-most officials in the Iraqi Government on these issues and
regularly highlights national reconciliation as a precursor to long-
term stability in Iraq.
We have seen Prime Minister Abadi's government make significant
strides in improving governance as outlined in Iraq's National Program
for reform and reconciliation and we continue to hold the Prime
Minister accountable to the timelines his government set for reform.
Through a combined strategy of steady diplomatic engagement, civil
society and democracy promotion--which relies heavily on our foreign
assistance programs--and prioritizing inclusion of Sunnis, Kurds, Shia,
and minorities in the military offensive, we are building
reconciliation into our entire counter-ISIL strategy.
On February 3, Iraq's Council of Ministers approved two key pieces
of draft reform legislation with significant implications for national
reconciliation currently being reviewed by Parliament:
1. A revision of the country's de-Baathification law; and
2. A restructuring of Iraq's Security Forces (ISF) to
integrate local-community volunteers, including Sunni tribal
fighters, into provincially based ``National Guard'' (NG)
units.
The GOI has sought our assistance in developing the National Guard
concept and our policy and military advisors continue to play an active
role in helping the Iraqis to develop their security infrastructure in
a manner which would facilitate the inclusion of all religious and
ethnic groups into the counter-ISIL campaign. We also continue to meet
with Iraqi leaders and tribal sheikhs to ensure that all parties have a
seat at the table. A senior delegation of Sunni Sheikhs from Anbar
province traveled to the United States just weeks ago, meeting with
Vice President Biden and senior officials at the Department of State
and the Department of Defense and we stressed the importance of all
groups working in coordination on the counter-ISIL strategy.
On February 10, Iraqi President Massum, a Kurd, signed Iraq's new
budget law that included an important agreement on energy exports and
revenue-sharing between the central government and Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG). The Department played a significant role in brokering
the agreement between the central government and the KRG officials to
reach the deal and continues to serve as a key interlocutor on
reconciliation matters between both parties. Our commitment to Iraq's
national unity has helped foster better coordination between the KRG
and central government on the current military campaign against ISIL
through joint planning sessions, effective transfers of military
assistance, and shared intelligence; it is critical that we continue to
work through the central government to further build this trust.
Additionally, Prime Minister Abadi has issued a number of Executive
orders to initiate other critical reforms, such as devolving authority
over certain public services to local communities and expediting the
release of prisoners held without charge--a key concern of the Sunni
community, to the extent possible within his constitutional authority
as Prime Minster. As part of our strategy, we continue to work
aggressively to pressure the GOI to enact further reforms to unify
Iraqis and promote human rights and the rule of law. The State
Department's Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL),
Embassy Baghdad through the Ambassador's Fund, and USAID continue to
carry out targeted interventions to promote reconciliation, the
protection of minority communities, and respect for human rights.
Notably, we are targeting over $10 million in FY 2014 DRL funding for
programs which include activities to address human rights and rule of
law as well as atrocities prevention and accountability issues--key
areas for building reconciliation.
(b) In Syria, we need programs and policies that seek to
reach those who reject ISIL and empower them as a moderate
alternative in an eventual, post-Assad Syria. Do you agree and
if so, what more should we be doing to reach these communities
immediately?
Answer (b). We wholeheartedly agree. The United States continues to
support the Syrian people's aspirations for an inclusive,
representative, and unified Syria free of terrorism and violence, and
the extremist groups that promote it. The United States is seeking a
negotiated political solution to the Syria crisis that brings Syrians
together to support the center against the extremes of terrorism or
dictatorship. Assad cannot be a part of that solution. The United
States continues to support the moderate Syrian opposition, including
the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC)--which the United States
recognizes as a legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
We are increasing our support to the moderate opposition to counter
the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and
other extremists, as well as to enhance the capacity of the moderate
opposition to establish the conditions for a political solution to this
conflict. To date, the United States has committed more than $330
million in transition and nonlethal assistance to the Syrian
opposition. This assistance includes support to the Syrian Opposition
Coalition (SOC), including its interim governance structures, as well
as local and provincial councils, civil society organizations and local
security actors. U.S. assistance also include nonlethal support to
vetted units of the moderate, armed opposition to help enhance their
operational capabilities as they seek to protect their communities
against the regime and extremist groups. Examples of assistance in
Syria that counters ISIL and empowers moderate voices include:
Support for independent media through the training of
journalists and operational support for nine radio stations,
two satellite TV stations, and one media production studio
countering regime and extremist narratives and promoting free
speech.
Providing civil society actors, community and religious
leaders, women's networks, youth groups with advocacy, conflict
management and prevention tools to prevent sectarian violence
and foster reconciliation. U.S. programs work to mediate local
conflicts and equip members of communities to advance respect
for freedom of religion or belief and other civil and political
rights and promote an environment free from violence all to
prevent sectarian strife.
Assistance to Syrian governance structures and civil society
organizations at the national, provincial, and local levels.
This assistance connects moderate civilian opposition groups to
each other and to the citizens that they represent. These
activities include support to provide essential services and
robust outreach components to amplify the efforts of these
moderate governing bodies delivering assistance, to increase
their recognition and boost their legitimacy. Assistance to
dozens of local councils has resulted in the development of a
small network of provincial councils now functioning in Aleppo,
Idlib, and Hama governorates. U.S. assistance also includes the
provision of civil defense equipment that has contributed to
civil defense teams' ability to save over 12,000 lives. Civil
defense teams act as emergency responders to everything from
indiscriminate regime barrel bombings to winter storm relief
and firefighting. Education assistance has allowed moderate
civilian bodies to provide more than 55,000 backpacks filled
with supplies to students along with office and recreational
equipment for 73 schools. We have also provided food baskets,
winterization materials, and heavy equipment as a means to
demonstrate moderate civil authorities' governance capacity.
In early Spring the Department of Defense plans to begin its train
and equip (T&E) program for vetted members of the Syrian armed
opposition to defend themselves and other Syrians from attacks, to
prevent ISIL advances, to stabilize and strengthen secure opposition-
held areas of Syria, to provide protection for the Syrian people and to
advance conditions for a political solution. Department of State and
USAID assistance programs will complement the DOD T&E program by
helping build a civilian structure into which the DOD-trained forces
can integrate. The T&E program will encourage civilian-military
cooperation and teaching armed actors how to interact constructively
with and in support of civilian governance bodies. This will increase
the likelihood that moderate civilian actors will be able to provide
services to their constituents, preventing the return of extremist
forces, and that newly trained forces will operate under civilian
leadership.
Question. Last year security conditions compelled us to suspend
Embassy operations in Libya, this year we did the same in Yemen. In
Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain our Embassies operate every day at a
reduced level. In Iraq and Lebanon our diplomatic teams work under
stringent security requirements without the opportunity to bring their
families with them to their assigned posts. This trend demands that we
take a step back and take a hard look at political and security
developments over the past several years, and how we engage with the
governments and people of the region going forward.
Four years after the Arab Spring, what trends do you see
across the region? How do we continue U.S. engagement in a
region that is increasingly unsafe for our diplomats,
development experts, and nongovernment organizations?
Answer. The tremendous instability we see across the MENA region
today has been a consequence of the widespread anger among the region's
people at governments that have proven unable to meet popular
aspirations for democracy and economic development. The inaction by
sclerotic and corrupt governments and economies that produced few jobs
and little confidence in opportunities for the future. The rapid
decline in the security environment that has ensued as grievances--new
and old--have opened across the region has presented serious challenges
for our diplomatic engagement. Regrettably, countries throughout the
Middle East will be struggling to face security challenges for the
foreseeable future. Yet because our vital national security interests
are at stake in the Middle East, American engagement and leadership
will continue to be foreign policy priority.
We have been working both bilaterally and multilaterally to extend
a range of security, economic, and governance institution-building
programs to governments in transition. And we remain ready to work with
those governments that are willing to tackle these challenges.
Despite the challenges to diplomatic engagement in the region, the
Department has, and will continue, to find ways to advance U.S.
interests. First, the Department has refined its process to assess and
manage risk and to determine appropriate staffing by balancing threats,
mitigating measures, and program implementation. This is not easy. But
we must continue to weigh our national security interests and policy
priorities against evolving security threats. In countries like Iraq,
Lebanon, Tunisia, and Egypt, we are constantly mindful of security
concerns for our personnel. We are continually assessing threats, and
have taken a variety of security measures to allow our personnel to
continue their important work on the ground while avoiding unnecessary
risks. Nevertheless our diplomatic personnel fully understand the
importance of our work to protecting U.S. national security--it is an
assignment nearly everyone in the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau has taken
on at one time or another. Our country can take great pride in their
commitment to advancing U.S. foreign policy, sometimes in conditions of
considerable risk.
We also continue to advance our interests to bring stability in the
region by working closely with our bilateral, regional, and
international partners--this is especially true for countries where the
security environment restricts or prohibits normal engagement work. By
cooperating with our partners throughout the region, we strengthen our
engagement strategy, achieve stronger results, and are able to better
advance our interests.
We have also learned to be more flexible in how we conduct
diplomacy in the region. For example, our Ambassadors to Libya and
Yemen are forward deployed in close proximity to both countries to
continue engagement with key players and to shape productive outcomes
to the ongoing conflicts there. We remain strongly committed to Yemen's
democratic political transition. However Yemen's political actors,
especially the Houthis, must commit to inclusivity, to negotiations
without preconditions, and to a peaceful transition consistent with the
Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, National Dialogue Conference
Outcomes, UNSC Resolutions, and Yemeni law. We continue to work with
our regional and international partners to press all sides in Yemen to
put the country back on the path to a peaceful transition.
Regarding Syria, we suspended operations in 2012 due to security
concerns as a result of the civil war. Nonetheless, our Special Envoy
for Syria, Daniel Rubinstein, is actively engaged in diplomacy with a
wide range of Syrian opposition actors, the members of the London 11,
the United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and others.
Question. Prime Minister Abadi is saying the right things on
reconciliation with Iraq's Sunni community, but there are powerful
forces aligned against him from Iran to Shia politicians and militias
to former Prime Minister Maliki who want reconciliation to fail.
(a) What specific policies, actions, and programs are you
considering to accelerate and build support for a program of
national reconciliation in Iraq?
Answer (a). Addressing the root causes of this conflict and
supporting the GOI's effort to promote national reconciliation will be
the only effective method to cement again battlefield gains against
ISIL. As the President has stressed, this battle cannot be won by the
military alone. Our Ambassador in Baghdad engages regularly with the
senior-most officials in the Iraqi Government on these issues and
regularly highlights national reconciliation as a precursor to long-
term stability in Iraq.
We have seen Prime Minister Abadi's government make significant
strides in improving governance as outlined in Iraq's National Program
for reform and reconciliation and we continue to hold the Prime
Minister accountable to the timelines his government set for reform.
Through a combined strategy of steady diplomatic engagement, civil
society and democracy promotion--which relies heavily on our foreign
assistance programs--and prioritizing inclusion of Sunnis, Kurds, Shia,
and minorities in the military offensive, we are building
reconciliation into our entire counter-ISIL strategy.
On February 3, Iraq's Council of Ministers approved two key pieces
of draft reform legislation with significant implications for national
reconciliation currently being reviewed by Parliament:
1. A revision of the country's de-Baathification law; and
2. A restructuring of Iraq's Security Forces (ISF) to
integrate local-community volunteers, including Sunni tribal
fighters, into provincially based ``National Guard'' (NG)
units.
The GOI has sought our assistance in developing the National Guard
concept and our policy and military advisors continue to play an active
role in helping the Iraqis to develop their security infrastructure in
a manner which would facilitate the inclusion of all religious and
ethnic groups into the counter-ISIL campaign. We also continue to meet
with Iraqi leaders and tribal sheikhs to ensure that all parties have a
seat at the table. A senior delegation of Sunni Sheikhs from Anbar
province traveled to the United States just weeks ago, meeting with
Vice President Biden and senior officials at the Department of State
and the Department of Defense and we stressed the importance of all
groups working in coordination on the counter-ISIL strategy.
On February 10, Iraqi President Massum, a Kurd, signed Iraq's new
budget law that included an important agreement on energy exports and
revenue-sharing between the central government and Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG). The Department played a significant role in brokering
the agreement between the central government and the KRG officials to
reach the deal and continues to serve as a key interlocutor on
reconciliation matters between both parties. Our commitment to Iraq's
national unity has helped foster better coordination between the KRG
and central government on the current military campaign against ISIL
through joint planning sessions, effective transfers of military
assistance, and shared intelligence; it is critical that we continue to
work through the central government to further build this trust.
Additionally, Prime Minister Abadi has issued a number of Executive
orders to initiate other critical reforms, such as devolving authority
over certain public services to local communities and expediting the
release of prisoners held without charge--a key concern of the Sunni
community, to the extent possible within his constitutional authority
as Prime Minster. As part of our strategy, we continue to work
aggressively to pressure the GOI to enact further reforms to unify
Iraqis and promote human rights and the rule of law. The State
Department's Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL),
Embassy Baghdad through the Ambassador's Fund, and USAID continue to
carry out targeted interventions to promote reconciliation, the
protection of minority communities, and respect for human rights.
Notably, we are targeting over $10 million in FY 2014 DRL funding for
programs which include activities to address human rights and rule of
law as well as atrocities prevention and accountability issues--key
areas for building reconciliation.
(b) Human Rights Watch reports that Shia militias, allied
with Iraqi Security Forces, are inflaming sectarian tensions
and committing abuses against local populations. On December
17, the Wall Street Journal and other media reported that
militias were carrying out evictions, disappearances, and
killings in the Baghdad Belt after conducting military
operations against ISIL. What ground truth can you share about
the activities of Iraqi Shia militias? Has the U.S. Government,
at any point in the past year, received credible and accurate
evidence that U.S. military equipment provided to the Iraqi
Security Forces has been transferred to militias, or groups or
individuals outside the command of the Iraqi security force? If
so, what actions were taken in response to these developments?
Answer (b). We share your concern about human rights abuses
committed by the Shia militias and unregulated armed groups. However,
Shia volunteers have been an important element of the fighting force
against ISIL inside Iraq. Many of these volunteer forces formed last
summer when Baghdad and other major cities were under an imminent
threat from ISIL. We have heard reports that militias and other groups
have razed civilian homes, conducted extrajudicial killings, and in
some cases prevented the return of civilians to their communities. Such
abuses are intolerable, threaten any gains made against ISIL, and will
have a significant impact on post-conflict stabilization.
We have stressed to the Government of Iraq, at all levels, the need
for the militias to fall under the command and control of the Iraqi
Security Forces. Prime Minister Abadi has stated that he has a zero
tolerance policy of human rights abuses, perpetrators must be held
accountable, and all armed groups and militias should be incorporated
under state security structures. PM Abadi has launched several high-
level investigations into allegations of abuse. Grand Ayatollah
Sistani, Iraq's senior-most Shia cleric, has also supported the Prime
Minister's efforts by issuing repeated calls and religious edicts
prohibiting such human rights abuses and sectarian violence.
We have no credible information to indicate that the GOI has
officially transferred U.S. military equipment to individuals outside
the command of the Iraqi Security Forces. We take end use monitoring of
all U.S.-provided equipment seriously. Our Office of Security
Cooperation (OSC) works closely with senior Iraqi Ministry of Defense
leadership to stress the importance of responsible use and stringent
management of all weapons systems, and the Government of Iraq continues
to strengthen its relevant security procedures. The OSC regularly
conducts inspections on U.S.-provided systems already fielded in Iraq.
We also continue to clearly and consistently communicate to the Iraqi
leadership that any violations of any end-use agreement will have
serious repercussions that will negatively affect not only our security
cooperation, but our relationship, as well.
We have urged Iraqi forces to avoid and prevent abuses of human
rights, both because it is the moral thing to do, but also because
abusive tactics will fuel sectarian fears and promote sectarian
divides.
(c) Planning for the offense to retake Mosul is underway,
and, according to Defense officials, could begin as early as
May. Is the training we're providing in Iraq with coalition
partners appropriate for the heavily urban environment of
Mosul? Will Iraqi Shia militias participate in the Mosul
offensive? Will Sunni tribal fighters? What are the
implications for the broader anti-ISIL fight if the Iraqi and
Kurdish security forces lose the battle for Mosul?
Answer (c). Ongoing coalition training efforts, to include Advise
and Assist and Building Partner Capacity, is intended to generate an
Iraqi security force ready to face the challenges of defeating ISIL,
and restore Iraqi sovereignty. Along with our coalition partners, we
are currently focused on getting these forces adequately trained and
equipped for this mission. This training is not only critical in the
short term, but also to generate an Iraqi Security Forces that are
sustainable beyond our direct military engagements.
We defer to DOD and the Government of Iraq for any details on Mosul
operational planning, to include the potential composition of the
force.
The inability of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to retake Mosul
could negatively impact military morale, undercut PM Abadi's ability to
successfully command his forces, and could potentially damage the
coalition's cohesion. This underscores the importance that any action
on Mosul must be deliberately planned and the execution well-
coordinated, only when the Iraqis are adequately prepared. Regardless
of timing, our shared goal is clear: the defeat of ISIL and ensuring
that ISIL can no longer pose a threat to the people of Iraq and to
other countries in the region.
(d) I remain extremely concerned about the safety of the
residents of Camp Liberty. Ultimately, the safest place for
them is outside Iraq. What is the current condition of Camp
Liberty? When was the last time a U.S. official visited the
camp and inspected conditions? When will the resettlement
process resume and where would the residents be resettled? How
many residents are eligible to be resettled in the United
States?
Answer (d). The relocation of the remaining 2,474 residents of Camp
Hurriya outside of Iraq is a priority for the State Department and the
Obama administration. On January 23, the Department of Homeland
Security authorized 15 residents for parole into the United States,
adding to two residents already paroled into the United States. The 15
authorized candidates received their travel documents February 25 and
are expected to have arrived in the United States by March 25. An
interagency team has recently completed a deployment to Albania to
interview the next group of candidates. The interagency process is on
track to identify and vet additional candidates and to meet the
administration's target of at least 100 individuals by September 2015.
To date, 13 countries have accepted Camp Hurriya residents for
resettlement. Albania has accepted 476 residents and has signaled
willingness to accept more. Albania has also offered to allow countries
to interview Camp Hurriya residents who have already been relocated to
Albania for relocation elsewhere, substantially reducing the cost and
logistical challenges for third countries associated with identifying
candidates for relocation. Albania has offered to replace any residents
who move on to a third country with new residents from Camp Hurriya.
State Department Senior Advisor for MeK Resettlement Jonathan Winer is
actively engaging the international community to accept Camp Hurriya
residents. While countries that have already accepted some residents
are logical possibilities for additional relocations, the State
Department performed a strategic review in February to identify new
options for resettlement and has begun the process of negotiating with
those countries.
U.N. monitors make daily visits to Camp Hurriya to inspect the
facility and provide reports on those visits for the State Department.
The monitors regularly observe the camp's stocks of supplies including
food, water, fuel, and other essential items. The monitors consistently
report that the camp is abundantly supplied with fresh food, potable
water, fuel for generators and vehicles, and other supplies. The
monitors regularly observe the Camp's medical and dental clinic and
consistently report that Camp Hurriya residents have sufficient access
to basic and specialized care.
State Department personnel most recently visited Camp Hurriya on
March 9 to assess the welfare of the camp. The observations made during
the unannounced visit regarding supply stocks and access to medical
care were consistent with U.N. daily reporting. State Department
personnel are in regular contact with representatives of the Camp
Hurriya residents and held discussions with them during the March 9
visit. When appropriate, U.S. Embassy Baghdad conveys concerns over
issues related to Camp Hurriya to senior leaders in the Government of
Iraq.
Question. What are the biggest risks facing Tunisia's democratic
transition? How would the administration's increased request for
Tunisia support that country in overcoming those risks?
Answer. The Department's assistance seeks to support Tunisia's
successful democratic transition by helping it build a participatory
and pluralistic society supported by a growing economy, responsive
government, and capable security services. Economic and security
challenges pose the greatest risks to Tunisia's stability in the coming
years and, if not addressed, could undermine the country's hard won
democratic gains. Long-standing economic grievances and stagnation that
sparked the 2011 revolution remain drivers of radicalization and
widespread public frustration. The Department's increased foreign
assistance seeks to fund programs that will complement and build on
work we and other donors have done to address a range of economic
challenges in Tunisia, programs which aimed to improve economic
competitiveness, make better use of Tunisia's existing trade
preferences, and promote legal and regulatory reforms needed to bolster
foreign investment by improving Tunisia's business environment. We need
to continue our work on expanding SME participation in public
procurement, liberalizing and expanding franchising, as well as working
with the Tunisian Government to promote more streamlined and consistent
company registration laws. Our programs also seek to continue our
sucessful demand-driven job training targeting Tunisian youth, whose
unemployment rate (30 percent) is double the national average, and
expand successful job creation models. Assistance programs will also
sustain efforts to develop Tunisian democratic institutions at national
and local levels, which will be key to continued stability by creating
mechanisms for greater transparency, accountability, social inclusion,
and citizen participation.
Our requested increase in Foreign Military Financing in FY 2016
will assist the country in reorienting its military forces to face a
growing terrorist threat both within Tunisia and along its borders.
These funds will bolster Tunisian security forces' capacity to
effectively monitor Tunisia's borders, combat terrorism, and prevent
the travel of foreign fighters. We also aim to improve the technical
capacity and professionalism of the criminal justice system by
improving crime scene investigations and criminal intelligence
analysis, court administration, community relations, and crisis
response.
Question. How long will the United States support the U.N. process
in Libya and what options are available if this process hits a dead
end? What tools are you considering, including sanctions, to compel
parties to participate in the political dialogue?
Answer. The United States Government continues to support the
efforts of the United Nations and Special Representative of the
Secretary General Bernardino Leon strongly to facilitate formation of a
national unity government in Libya and bring a political solution to
the ongoing political, security, and institutional crisis in the
country. The United Nations-led process provides the best hope for
Libyans to return to building the strong and representative state
institutions that can most effectively address the terrorist threat and
to confront all violence and instability that impedes Libya's political
transition and development.
The United States urges all parties to come to the table to engage
in constructive national dialogue. Those who choose not to participate
are excluding themselves from discussions which are critical to
combating terrorism as well as to the overall peace, stability, and
security of Libya. At the same time, the United States is exploring a
range of other options, including targeted sanctions under UNSCR 2174,
to deter spoilers and encourage participation in the U.N.-led process
from a broad spectrum of Libyan society.
Question. Some Arab countries, including Egypt and Jordan, are
calling for lifting the U.N. arms embargo on Libya. What impact should
we expect to see on the ground in Libya if the arms embargo were to be
lifted?
Answer. The United States is concerned by the illicit flow of
weapons in and out of Libya and continues to support implementation of
the existing arms embargo to prevent illicit arms transfers. The
existing U.N. arms embargo is not a ban on weapons transfers to the
Libyan Government; rather, it allows the Security Council to guard
against risks that weapons may be diverted to nonstate actors. We are
engaged with our Council colleagues in looking at how to ensure that
the existing U.N. sanctions regime can address concerns about the
threat posed by unsecured arms and ammunition in Libya and their
proliferation, which poses a risk to stability in Libya and the region,
including through transfer to nonstate actors and terrorist groups in
Libya, and best support the U.N.'s efforts to facilitate a political
solution.
Question. General Khalifa Heftar was named Chief of the Libyan Army
by the Tobruk-based House of Representatives. Currently, U.S.
assistance to build a Libyan General Purpose Force is on hold. How
might General Heftar's new position factor into decisionmaking with
respect to the disposition of U.S. assistance for the General Purpose
Force?
Answer. While the United States remains committed to training
Libyan security forces, our GPF training program is necessarily being
delayed as we reevaluate how to effectively work with the Libyans to
advance this effort in light of the current situation on the ground.
This delay predates the House of Representatives' decision to appoint
Khalifa Hifter as General Commander of its armed forces.
Question. The U.N. has brokered a ``People's Transitional Council''
to prevent Yemen from sliding into civil war and Yemeni President Abd
Rabuh Mansour Hadi has escaped his house arrest under the Houthis and
rescinded his resignation. The State Department has said on several
occasions that it considers Hadi to be Yemen's legitimate president.
Is this still the case? If so, how will the U.S. Government
support him going forward?
Answer. We still consider President Hadi to be Yemen's legitimate
leader. The initial agreement on the formation of a transitional
council is only one element within a broader political agreement that
is still being negotiated by all Yemeni parties, under the auspices of
the United Nations. We support these ongoing U.N.-mediated negotiations
consistent with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and the
National Dialogue Conference Outcomes as the best way to solve the
current crisis peacefully and return Yemen to its political transition.
Although Embassy Sana'a's operations were suspended on February 10,
our Ambassador to Yemen, Matthew Tueller, has since met with Hadi twice
in Aden to underscore our support for Yemen's peaceful transition and
to discuss issues of mutual interest. In addition, we are continuing
senior level diplomatic engagement with key regional partners to help
support President Hadi and press for a political transition.
Question. The human rights situation in Bahrain remains troubling,
an example being the recent decision of the Bahraini Government to
strip citizenship from democracy activists under the clause of
``causing harm to the interests of the kingdom'' and the arrest of
Wefaq Secretary General Sheikh Salman on questionable charges.
What is your assessment of the Bahraini Government's
efforts to implement the recommendations of the 2011 Bahraini
Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI)?
Answer. The Government of Bahrain (GOB) has taken some important,
initial steps in line with the recommendations in the 2011 BICI report,
to include:
Rebuilding mosques;
Establishing the Ombudsman's Office;
Establishing a Special Investigative Unit;
Adopting a National Preventative Mechanism on Torture;
Allowing independent prisons monitoring;
Establishing the Commission on the Rights of Prisoners and
Detainees;
Reestablishing the National Institution on Human Rights;
Rescinding the Bahrain National Security Agency's law
enforcement/arrest capabilities;
Training police in human rights standards;
Reinstating dismissed workers;
Welcoming a U.N. OHCHR technical team;
Endorsing school reconciliation programs in cooperation
with UNESCO.
We have not seen the GOB make meaningful progress on media
incitement, accountability for abuses committed by security forces, or
antitorture safeguards. The GOB has much more to do on BICI
implementation, and we continue to press them on this. We also remain
concerned about the arrest of individuals on charges relating to
freedom of expression.
Question. I understand that the Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime
Minister Salman has formally requested that the administration lift the
holds on the sale of certain military items.
Is this true? Why does the Crown Prince believe it is
necessary to lift these holds? Are you supportive of responding
favorably to the Crown Prince's request?
Answer. We have made no decision at this time to resume the
shipment of restricted items. We have maintained the same arms transfer
policy toward Bahrain since 2012. The United States and Bahrain have a
strong and long-standing defense partnership, and we will continue to
work to advance our strong security partnership in the face of serious
threats in the region.
Question. I remain concerned about the well-being of Mohamad
Soltan, an Egyptian-American who has been on hunger strike for over a
year to protest his detention on questionable charges by the Egyptian
Government. It was recently reported that Mr. Soltan had suffered a
serious decline in his health. The State Department previously asked
the Egyptian Government to release Mr. Soltan on bail on humanitarian
grounds.
What else is the U.S. Government doing to bring about that
release and ensure that Mr. Soltan receives proper medical
care?
Answer. We remain deeply concerned about Mr. Soltan's health and
continue to provide Mr. Soltan with all possible consular assistance. A
consular officer last visited him on April 2. We understand that Mr.
Soltan is currently in the Intensive Care Unit in prison and receiving
necessary care. We have raised Mr. Soltan's case at the highest levels
in both Washington and Egypt requesting that he be granted parole on a
humanitarian basis. Unfortunately, Mr. Soltan was given a life sentence
on April 11. We are urging the Government of Egypt to take all measures
to redress this verdict.
Question. The FY15 Appropriations Act requires that you certify and
report to Congress that Egypt has met benchmarks on democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law.
Can you provide examples of cases where the Egyptian
Government has released individuals who you determine to be
political prisoners, has implemented laws or policies to govern
democratically, has taken consistent steps to protect and
advance the rights of women and religious minorities, and/or
has provided detainees with due process of law?
Answer. In 2014, Egypt held a constitutional referendum and
Presidential elections. Domestic and international observers concluded
that the constitutional referendum and subsequent Presidential election
were administered professionally and in line with Egyptian laws, while
also expressing concerns that government limitations on association,
assembly, and expression constrained broad political participation.
Parliamentary elections under the new constitution were scheduled to be
held in March, 2015, but an Egyptian court recently declared
unconstitutional a redistricting law governing those elections. This
has meant that the government must delay elections while the law is
redrafted.
The new constitution provides increased human rights protections as
compared to the previous constitution, including a stipulation of
equality before the law irrespective of religion, and provides for more
seats to women and Christians than any other Parliament in Egyptian
history. It also requires that Parliament pass a new law facilitating
the construction and renovation of Christian churches, which is without
precedent, and provides for the establishment of an antidiscrimination
commission to eliminate all forms of discrimination. Al-Sisi became the
first Egyptian President to attend Mass on Coptic Christmas. There have
been some convictions for anti-Christian violence, which is also almost
without precedent.
However, the government continues to prosecute individuals for
``denigrating religions,'' and accountability for former sectarian
crimes remains problematic. The government has also issued new
legislation that criminalizes peaceful dissent and imposes onerous
restrictions on civil society.
In an effort to combat incidents of sexual abuse, al-Sisi
implemented a new law with penalties of prison and fines for sexual
harassment; as a result, at least nine police officers were arrested in
2014. He visited a rape victim in the hospital 2 days after being sworn
in as Egypt's President.
The Egyptian courts have issued hundreds of mass death sentences,
mostly to Muslim Brotherhood supporters. Capital punishment cases are
automatically reviewed by the Mufti and the Court of Cassation, which
have commuted the majority of death sentences.
Over 16,000 Egyptians remain in detention, primarily on charges
related to membership in the now outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. Hundreds
of others, including prominent secular activists, have been detained
for violating the Demonstrations Law. In January, the public prosecutor
ordered the release of 100 detained students ``out of concern for their
academic future.'' In February, a prosecutor ordered the release of an
additional 130 students, juveniles who had either been pardoned by
al-Sisi or met the conditions of parole according to prison
regulations.
Australian Al Jazeera journalist, Peter Greste, was released in
February 2015; the remaining two Al Jazeera journalists are out on bail
pending a retrial. Al-Sisi has promised publicly to release these two
after the trial is complete.
The Government of Egypt has not enforced an NGO registration law
that many members of the NGO community fear is meant to restrict or
shut down NGO activities.
Question. Recently, potential natural gas deals between Israel,
Egypt, and Jordan have come undone as the Israeli Antitrust Authority
announced a proposal that would require Noble Energy and Delek Group to
sell some of their largest joint offshore gas holdings and to compete
on gas sales with the rest of their current partners.
What impact might the current regulatory environment in
Israel have on potential energy deals with Egypt and Jordan?
Answer. Prospective energy deals between Israel and Egypt and
Jordan are an opportunity to strengthen peaceful relations between
Israel and its neighbors, and demonstrate the potential for energy to
be a key source of realignment and interdependence in the broader
Eastern Mediterranean. Countries facing severe energy shortages like
Egypt and Jordan now have regional options for meeting their energy
needs with natural gas that is both cheaper and greener than heavy fuel
oil. Israeli gas, therefore, remains critical to Jordan's continued
economic growth and political and economic stability. Equally
important, Egypt recognizes the political and commercial necessity of
increasing domestic energy supplies, which could include gas from
Israel.
Since the Israeli Anti-Trust Authority's December 22 announcement,
senior officials at the Department of State, including Secretary Kerry,
Under Secretary Sherman, Special Envoy Hochstein, and U.S. Ambassador
to Israel Dan Shapiro, have engaged the most senior leadership of the
Government of Israel on this issue. While acknowledging the importance
of not interfering with the independent Anti-Trust Authority, these
officials have shared concerns over the potential negative impact on
Israel's strategic interests if Israel fails to develop and export its
gas to regional markets including Egypt and Jordan.
The United States is not involved in the legal debate in Israel,
but continues to believe that it is important for all countries to have
a strong investment climate, including a consistent and predictable
regulatory framework. Energy discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean
can and should be used to strengthen collaboration and cooperation in
the region. We continue to closely monitor the situation as well as
engage and support all parties to move forward with the natural gas
deal signed between Noble Energy and partner entities in Jordan and
Egypt.
Question. Palestinian efforts to seek unilateral recognition at the
United Nation Security Council through imbalanced resolutions, and the
bid to join the International Criminal Court (ICC), call into question
President Mahmoud Abbas' commitment to direct negotiations for a two-
state solution. In response to these and other actions, the Israeli
Government is withholding the transfer of tax revenue to the
Palestinian Authority (PA).
(A) Without this revenue, how much longer will the PA be
able to operate?
Answer. We have strongly opposed the Palestinians bid to join the
ICC and we have opposed one-sided resolutions in the UNSC. We are,
however, deeply concerned by Israel's decision to withhold the transfer
of monthly tax revenue to the PA for December 2014 and January 2015.
These transfers of tax revenue historically have averaged $150 million
per month, or about 75 percent of all regular PA revenues. In the
absence of revenues, the PA had only been paying 60 percent of
employees' salaries from January to February 2015.
According to the PA, it is unclear how they will be able to pay
salaries in April and beyond unless Israel resumes transferring PA tax
revenues or international donors significantly advance their planned
2015 budget support to the PA. Local borrowing is effectively
exhausted, as the PA already reached its borrowing limit of $1.47
billion. In the continued absence of tax revenue transfers, Palestinian
officials maintain the PA may have to resort to furloughs and staggered
work schedules for its employees, including security forces. The
payment of partial salaries and shortages of food and fuel has already
impacted the operational readiness and morale of the security forces.
We are concerned that financial damage to the PA can undermine security
for both Israelis and Palestinians.
(B) What is the impact of withholding this revenue on
Palestinians living in the West Bank?
Answer. Rising poverty rates, food insecurity, and private sector
layoffs are just some of the economic and humanitarian impacts of the
PA's financial difficulties that are already being felt by
Palestinians. A continuation or deepening of the financial crisis will
likely result in the PA no longer being able to pay even partial
salaries, provide services, or carry out the normal functions of a
government authority. These difficulties are building upon an already
deteriorating economic and political environment, generating a crisis
in the West Bank that threatens to unravel the economic, security, and
humanitarian gains of the past 10 years. Given that the PA makes up
about one quarter of the Palestinian economy, its demise--or even its
reduction--will have severe negative economic and humanitarian
consequences.
(C) If the Palestinians introduce another resolution to the
U.N. Security Council this year, will the United States use its
veto?
Answer. The United States has consistently opposed every effort to
delegitimize Israel or undermine its security, including at the United
Nations. We uniformly and firmly oppose one-sided actions designed to
punish Israel in international bodies and will continue to do so.
In most cases of unfair and unbalanced texts introduced in the
Security Council, we have been able to advocate successfully for the
U.S. position during negotiations and, if necessary, form a coalition
of like-minded countries to stop such resolutions from moving forward.
For example, on December 30, 2014, the United States successfully
rallied a coalition to join us in voting against an unbalanced draft
resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that was hastily put
before the Security Council. We made clear to the other members that
the draft text was deeply imbalanced and should not be supported.
Through outreach by Secretary Kerry to multiple leaders represented on
the Security Council, as well as Ambassador Power's tireless work in
New York, the resolution failed to achieve the nine UNSC member votes
in favor required for adoption. Separately, the administration used its
veto power to defeat another one-sided resolution in 2011.
We will continue to work with our partners, including in the
Council, to advance the prospect for future negotiations and provide a
horizon of hope for Israelis and Palestinians, while opposing all
efforts that would undermine that goal.
(D) Given his recent efforts at the U.N. and ICC, is
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas still a partner that Israel
and the United States can work with to reach a negotiated
peace?
Question. We have made very clear our opposition to Palestinian
action at the ICC. We also worked hard to defeat a one-sided
Palestinian UNSCR this past December. These actions damage the
atmosphere with the very people with whom they ultimately need to make
peace, and will do nothing to further the aspirations of the
Palestinian people for a sovereign and independent state. We will
continue to oppose such counterproductive actions at the ICC and U.N.
We do believe that President Abbas remains a partner for peace, and he
continues to reaffirm the PA's commitment to the principles of
nonviolence and recognition of the State of Israel.
We will continue to consult with you as we move forward on these
issues.
Question. Current U.S. law prohibits economic assistance to the
Palestinian Authority if the Palestinians initiate an ICC investigation
of Israeli nationals or ``actively support such an investigation.'' I,
along with other Members of Congress, have called for a review of U.S.
assistance in light of these legal requirements.
Please describe the process and methodology by which the
State Department is undertaking this review, what conclusions
(if any) have been reached, and when you expect to complete
this review.
Are Palestinian security forces still committed to
cooperating with Israel?
Answer. The State Department, in conjunction with USAID, is
examining U.S. assistance to the Palestinians to determine how it can
best be used moving forward. Although our view is that the legislative
restrictions related to Palestinian initiation or active support for an
ICC judicially authorized investigation have not been triggered to
date, we intend to maintain pressure on the PA not to take additional
destabilizing action at the ICC.
Any decisions related to assistance will be made in consultation
with Congress, as we remain committed to maintaining an open dialogue
with lawmakers. We continue to believe that U.S. assistance to the
Palestinian people is an important tool in promoting regional
stability, economic development, and increased security for both
Palestinians and Israelis. U.S. assistance to the Palestinian Authority
is fundamental to support U.S. national security interests.
Both Israeli and Palestinian leaders attest that the Palestinian
security forces' remain committed to security coordination. As
President Abbas has said many times, security coordination between
Israel and the Palestinian Authority serves the interests of the
Palestinian people. It has been instrumental in preserving security in
the West Bank and in reducing threats to Israelis and Palestinians
alike.
Our support and engagement has helped to strengthen security
coordination. Although we continue to see a political will to maintain
security coordination, we are very concerned about the continued
viability of the Palestinian Authority--including the security forces--
if they do not receive their tax revenues soon. If we cannot find a
solution and the Palestinian security forces can no longer operate
effectively, the result could be the breakdown of basic law and order
in the West Bank--and a real danger that extremists could exploit the
situation.
Question. Turkey remains a linchpin to turning off the flow of
foreign fighters into the region, as well as to a significant portion
of ISIL's financing--along with the Assad regime--based on sales by
ISIL of confiscated petroleum.
What more can the Turkish Government do to contribute to
degrading ISIL?
Why hasn't Turkey joined the coalition's air campaign
against ISIL?
Is Turkey stemming the flow of foreign fighters through its
territory to Syria and Iran?
Considering Turkey's geostrategic importance, what strategy
are you putting in place to deal with the increasingly
authoritarian actions of President Erdogan, including cowing of
the Turkish judiciary, imprisonment of critical journalists,
and propagation of anti-Semitic rhetoric, which put them in a
divergent position relative to our other NATO allies?
Answer. Turkey is a NATO ally and valuable partner in the counter-
ISIL coalition. Turkish leaders have made clear that they reject ISIL.
For example, on March 5, President Erdogan criticized the terrorist
group for ``destroying everything in Islamic civilization, culture and
roots.'' Turkey has made significant contributions to coalition
efforts, including:
Hosting a Department of Defense train and equip program
for the moderate Syrian opposition;
Providing an overland corridor to the Syrian city of
Kobane for Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga and Free Syrian Army
units defending against ISIL attacks;
Providing military, economic, and humanitarian assistance
to support the Iraqi Government and Kurdistan Regional
Government in their fight against ISIL;
Taking increased measures to restrict oil smuggling;
Cochairing with the United States a Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) initiative to address how ISIL raises, moves,
and uses its funds;
Hosting nearly 1.7 million refugees from Syria and 130,000
from Iraq. Turkish officials report having spent over $5
billion caring for the refugees, through 23 high-quality
camps and provision of social services such as health care
and education.
On foreign fighters, Turkey has made noteworthy progress in
improving screening procedures, including implementing an expanded ``no
entry list'' and turning back or detaining suspected foreign terrorist
fighters. Turkey continues to work with the United States and other
coalition partners to enhance intelligence cooperation on terrorism.
For example, on March 12, we signed a declaration of intent with Turkey
to negotiate in coming months an agreement to share foreign terrorist
fighter identity information.
Turkish leaders have stated their intention to contribute even
further to coalition military operations. As each partner country
brings unique capabilities, we will continue to work with Turkey and
the other 61 members of the coalition as part of a broad international
campaign against ISIL.
As NATO allies, the United States and Turkey share many strategic
interests. In this context, we continue to encourage Turkey to take the
necessary steps to uphold its own stated democratic commitments. We are
concerned by government actions that weaken the independence of the
media and judiciary, and we have conveyed these concerns through
private meetings with Turkish officials, public statements, and our
annual human rights report.
We are deeply concerned by anti-Semitic statements made by Turkish
leaders and engage directly at all levels to express our disapproval of
such statements. For example, President Obama discussed the importance
of building tolerant and inclusive societies and combating the scourge
of anti-Semitism with President Erdogan during their September 5, 2014,
meeting in Wales. Our Ambassador and Embassy officers also meet
regularly with the Jewish community and other representatives of
religious minorities in Turkey to discuss their concerns over religious
freedom and security, and to promote interfaith dialogue.
Question. Property Claims and Judgments in U.S. Courts.--I am very
troubled by the fact that the administration has seemed to downplay the
fact that there are thousands of American citizens and businesses that
hold over $6 billion in unresolved claims for properties confiscated by
the Castro regime, and that there is an additional $2 billion in
unsettled judgments rendered by U.S. courts. Furthermore, Section
103(a) of the LIBERTAD Act states ``Notwithstanding any other
provisions of law, no loan, credit, or other financing may be extended
knowingly by a United States national, a permanent resident alien, or a
United States agency to any person for the purpose of financing
transactions involving any confiscated property the claim to which is
owned by a United States national as of the date of the enactment of
this act, except for financing by the United States national owning
such claim for a transaction permitted under United States law.''
What assurances can you, given the American citizens and
businesses hold these claims and judgments, that the
administration will use all means necessary to pressure the
Castro regime and ensure their prompt resolution? What specific
steps will the administration take?
Answer. The Department is committed to a resolution of claims and
firmly believes the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, including
opening an embassy in Havana, will allow the United States to engage
more effectively on a range of important issues, including claims.
During the January talks in Havana with the Cuban Government, we
proposed, and the Cubans agreed, to begin a dialogue on claims in the
months following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and
reopening of our respective embassies.
The discussion of claims will be part of our broader normalization
efforts, and may take some time. As in all claims settlement
discussions, there is a range of issues that will need to be
considered.
Question. When the U.S. interested [SIC] into a process of
normalization with Libya during the last decade, Secretary Rice
committed that she would not travel to Libya until there was a complete
resolution of the claims held by the families of the victims of the
Lockerbie bombing.
Will you make that same commitment to the U.S. citizens
that have been victims of the Castro regime?
Answer. The Department is committed to pursuing a resolution of
claims and firmly believes the reestablishment of diplomatic relations,
including opening an embassy in Havana, will allow the United States to
engage more effectively on a range of important issues, including
claims. During the January talks in Havana with the Cuban Government,
we proposed, and the Cubans agreed, to begin a dialogue on claims in
the months following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and
reopening of our respective embassies.
Claims are not necessarily addressed as part of the reestablishment
of diplomatic relations. In fact, diplomatic relations are generally in
place when governments embark on claims discussions. In Libya, we had
not severed diplomatic relations; claims discussions were simply part
of normalizing our bilateral relationship, along with discussing other
pressing matters such as weapons of mass destruction.
Question. On Sunday February 22, the Cuban Government arrested
nearly 200 activists across Cuba, including over 80 members of the
Damas de Blanco (Ladies in White), 90 members of the Union Patriotica
de Cuba (Cuban Patriotic Union), and prominent democratic activists
such as Sakharov prize winner Guillermo Farinas, Angel Moya and Antonio
Rodiles.
What is the State Department's assessment of these arrests?
Will U.S officials raise this unacceptable wave of arrests in
their talks with the Cuban Government on February 27?
Answer. The Department consistently monitors human rights in Cuba
and, as the President said on December 17, we will continue to raise
our differences on issues related to democracy and human rights
directly with the Cuban Government. We have no illusions that the Cuban
Government will change its behavior overnight. We want to work closely
with Congress on such arrests and on bringing positive change on human
rights in Cuba. Human rights are central to our discussions with the
Cuban Government and we will continue to press for greater respect of
fundamental freedoms and an end to these practices.
Question. February 24, 2015, marks the 19th anniversary of the
shoot-down of two civilian aircraft over international waters by Cuban
MiG fighter jets, which resulted in the murder of three Americans and a
permanent resident of the United States. This shoot-down over
international waters has been named an act of state terrorism,
including by the United States Congress. An August 2003 federal
indictment remains open for three senior Cuban military officials for
the murder of these Americans.
Should Cuba be removed from the list of State Sponsors of
Terrorism prior to these senior Cuban military officials facing
justice for an act of terrorism that resulted in the murder of
three Americans?
Answer. The Department is reviewing Cuba's designation as a State
Sponsor of Terrorism (SST). We are undertaking a serious review of
Cuba's designation based on all relevant, applicable information and
the statutory standard. We will not prejudge the outcome of that
process.
Question. In May 2003, the U.S. Government expelled 14 Cuban
diplomats for having engaged in espionage against the United States,
including diplomats stationed at Cuban mission to the United Nations
and the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC.
As the U.S. State Department prepares to host talks with
Cuba on February 27, will any of the 14 Cuban diplomats
expelled in 2003 participate in these discussions?
Answer. None of the 14 Cuban diplomats expelled in 2003
participated in the February 27 discussions with the Cuban Government
in Washington, DC.
Question. On December 17, 2014, President Obama announced that, as
a result of negotiations between the United States and Cuba, the Cuban
Government would permit greater access to the Internet. On February 20,
Cuba's First Vice President Miguel Diaz-Canel announced that a process
to increase Internet access would take place under the leadership of
Cuba's Communist Party, and include the full involvement of all
institutions of the Cuban Government. Diaz-Canel also said that any
such process would include close collaboration with the Governments of
Russia and China, which are known to censure and limit access to
internet content.
What is the State Department's assessment of Diaz-Canel's
call for Internet access governed by the Communist Party of
Cuba? Would such access meet the United States expectation for
the Cuban people to have greater access to the Internet, as it
was set forth by President Obama on December 17, 2014?
Answer. Internet access in Cuba is expensive, of very poor quality,
and available to a relatively limited number of people. According to
Cuban press reporting, the Cuban Government used the country's first
national ``computerization and cybersecurity'' workshop in February to
publicize its new information and communication technology (ICT)
strategy, which includes upgrading 70 percent of the country's telecom
equipment, increased training, and greater access to technology by
Cubans, i.e., easing import restrictions and digitizing public
registries, services, and payments.
Greater access to information through the Internet and other means
is a U.S. priority in Cuba and around the world. Greater connectivity
for the Cuban people is essential to empower them in their efforts to
build a democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba. Ambassador Daniel
Sepulveda, U.S. Coordinator for International Communications and
Information Policy, will travel to Cuba at the end of March to begin a
dialogue on broadening telecommunications and Internet on the island
with the objective of expanding Internet access for the Cuban people.
In addition, we continue to work with Cubans, including independent
civil society actors, to promote the free flow of information to, from,
and within the island. This is an important part of our efforts to
enhance and strengthen the fundamental rights of all Cubans to freely
exercise their freedom of speech and expression.
In January, the Department of Treasury promulgated regulatory
changes authorizing transactions incidental to the establishment of
telecommunications facilities not just directly linking the United
States and Cuba, but also within Cuba and linking Cuba to third
countries. Under a new Department of Commerce license exception, the
export of items for Cuba's telecom infrastructure is also permitted
under certain conditions. Under the new policies, U.S. companies may
also export personal communication devices and software (e.g.,
telephones, computers, and Internet technology/applications) to Cuba
for commercial sale or donation, and can also export certain tools,
equipment, and supplies to private enterprises in Cuba. We are
informing U.S. companies of these changes and continuing to work to
address their questions.
Question. In his op-ed in the New York Times, Vice President Biden
noted that one of the challenges facing Central America today is
pervasive corruption, often linked to transnational drug trafficking
syndicates and organized crime. Guatemala has addressed corruption by
hosting the U.N.'s International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala (CICIG, pronounced SEE-sig) and Honduras recently signed an
agreement with Transparency International.
What steps will the administration take to encourage that
CICIG's mandate be renewed, and that the Honduran agreement
with Transparency International is successful? What other steps
will the administration take to help Central American
governments confront corruption?
Answer. Citizens and investors will trust Central American
institutions after these institutions establish a pattern of
transparency, accountability, and effectiveness. The result will be
improved security and broad-based economic growth. The quality of
institutions will determine the quality of results.
The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG)
has been a vital institution for promoting accountability and justice.
We have raised the importance of a CICIG extension past September 2015
at the highest levels of the Guatemala governments and emphasize that
an extension would be a crucial demonstration of Guatemala's commitment
to the objectives outlined in the Alliance for Prosperity.
We are pleased that the Government of Honduras, on its own
initiative, signed an agreement with Transparency International to
promote public sector transparency and accountability as well as to
reduce corruption. We will coordinate closely with the international
community, civil society, and the Government of Honduras to ensure that
this agreement is fully implemented.
We are committed to combating corruption throughout the region.
CICIG and Honduras' agreement with Transparency International are two
examples where these countries are working to address these complex
issues. Our support to the region under the U.S. Strategy for
Engagement with Central America will include working with Central
American governments to implement internal control systems and
institutional checks and balances that reduce the potential for
corruption. In addition to working with audit and fiscal control
bodies, we will work with the police, prosecutors, and judges to help
ensure transparency in the justice system. Likewise, we will work with
the executive branch and electoral management bodies to identify and
limit illicit funding in political and campaign finance systems.
Civil society must be involved in efforts to improve accountability
and fight corruption. We will support the work of citizen watchdogs,
civil society, and the media. An engaged, informed, independent civil
society is an important accountability mechanism and government
motivator. We look forward to working with all sectors of society to
improve the effectiveness, accountability, and transparency of
institutions in Central America.
Question. Growing Narco Threat.--The U.S. Department of Treasury
has designated over 10 senior Venezuelan Government officials as drug
kingpins, members of Venezuela's National Guard and military act as a
de facto cartel, and in testimony before this committee in May of 2014,
Assistant Secretary Jacobson stated that the situation in Venezuela
constitutes a national security threat to the United States.
Can you please provide your assessment of this threat and
describe U.S. strategy to address it?
Answer. It is a concern not only for the United States, but also
for the rest of the hemisphere, that Venezuela remains a key transit
country for the shipment of illegal drugs from South America. The
majority of illicit narcotics that transited Venezuela in 2014 were
destined for the Eastern Caribbean, Central America, the United States,
West Africa, and Europe. Colombian drug-trafficking organizations
facilitate the transshipment of narcotics through Venezuela and media
reports indicate that Mexican drug-trafficking organizations also
operate in Venezuela.
Venezuelan authorities do not effectively prosecute drug
traffickers, in part due to political corruption. Additionally,
Venezuelan law enforcement officers lack the equipment, training, and
resources required to impede the operations of major drug trafficking
organizations. The U.S. Government and its regional partners have
repeatedly said more effective counternarcotics efforts by the
Venezuelan Government are necessary to curb the flow of drugs into and
out of the region.
Since the Venezuelan Government ended formal cooperation with the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in 2005, bilateral counternarcotics
cooperation has been conducted on a case-by-case basis, including
informal information exchanges and maritime interdiction activities
with the U.S. Coast Guard. However, a lack of sustained, high-level
cooperation reduces the ability of our U.S. law enforcement partners to
investigate and prosecute violators of U.S. law residing or operating
in Venezuela. We nonetheless encourage our U.S. law enforcement
partners to work as closely with their Venezuelan counterparts as is
permitted by the Venezuelan Government.
We will continue to support drug interdiction programs throughout
the region, including programs in Colombia, Peru, Central America, and
the Caribbean. We will urge those partners to encourage the Venezuelan
Government to step up its efforts and fulfill regional commitments and
responsibilities to combat drug trafficking.
Question. For many years U.S. foreign policy--under Presidents of
both parties--has paid insufficient attention to the countries in the
Western Hemisphere--whether it is Canada to the north or Latin America
to the south. Yet 12 of the 20 countries with which we currently have
free trade agreements are located here in our hemisphere. And,
throughout the last decade, as the region posted strong growth figures,
U.S. economic integration with Latin America and the Caribbean also
rose sharply. By 2012, the United States exported more products to
Latin America than to Europe, almost twice as much to Mexico as to
China, and more to Chile and Colombia than to Russia. U.S. natural gas
is increasingly sold to Mexico, with natural gas exports increasing
tenfold since 1999.
Given these trends and the fact the well-being of the U.S.
economy is inherently linked to our ability to identify and
gain access to overseas markets, in your opinion, should our
neighbors in the Western Hemisphere receive a greater degree of
our time and attention? And, what can be done to galvanize
greater focus on the opportunities here in our own hemisphere?
Answer. The United States seeks a hemisphere that is a model of
economic prosperity, education and social inclusion, citizen security,
and democracy and human rights. In order to remain competitive globally
we are also working with regional partners to build the Americas into a
shared, integrated platform for global success with a market of nearly
1 billion people.
U.S. partnership is based on jobs, education, energy, prosperity,
innovation, democratic values, and keeping our people safe. We are
focusing our diplomatic engagement and assistance resources where they
can have an enduring impact. Addressing issues of citizen insecurity,
economic opportunity, economic integration (especially in the energy
sector), and effective governance with Central American partners could
be transformative. We are supporting the Colombian Government's efforts
to seek a durable peace. High-level meetings and working groups are
strengthening the United States-Mexico partnership and driving a more
competitive North America. We are working to reenergize our
relationship with Brazil. Negotiations to reestablish diplomatic
relations with Cuba have seen our partners in the region reengage on
issues previously off limits. Our drive on energy reform in the
Caribbean will help these countries adapt to reductions in PetroCaribe
assistance. Efforts to expand trade and investment opportunities
through broader initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and
increased cooperation with the Pacific Alliance also hold great
potential for forming stronger economic partnerships in the region.
Finally, the United States is also firmly committed to advancing reform
of the Organization of American States (OAS) in order revitalize and
strengthen the institution and preserve its leadership role as this
hemisphere's premier multilateral organization, and bolster OAS'
ability to promote and uphold the values at the core of this
hemispheric union, consistent with the principles enshrined in the
Inter-American Democratic Charter.
Question. As you're aware, our economic statecraft agencies--like
the Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),
and the Trade & Development Agency (TDA)--play vital roles in promoting
U.S. economic and political goals abroad while helping foreign
countries achieve their development objectives. One particularly
interesting case is that of a New Jersey company which was awarded a
contract to build a facility in Ukraine to store the used nuclear fuel
from its commercial nuclear reactors. When complete, this facility will
free Ukraine from its current dependence on Russia to accept current
annual rail shipments of Ukraine's used fuel without which Ukraine
would be forced to shut down its nuclear fleet. Ex-Im had originally
been a sponsor of this project, but recently had to withdraw given the
instability in the country. But in any case, you can clearly see how
these kinds of projects, backed by our economic statecraft agencies,
can generate U.S. exports, and achieve critical foreign policy
objectives, while simultaneously promoting economic development and
security abroad.
My question to you is: How do you think we should best use
these institutions to further our foreign policy objectives and
how could this Congress strengthen them?
Answer. In today's world, foreign policy and economic policy are
mutually reinforcing. That's why business and economics are top
priorities. We're taking a number of steps to facilitate more trade and
investment. We know that when American businesses invest abroad, we
benefit here in the United States. Our firms cannot survive without
exports. Fully 95 percent of the world's market is outside the United
States. We know that U.S. business leaders are some of the finest
ambassadors that we have, sharing their practices in transparency,
innovation, technology, social responsibility with every country in
which they invest.
U.S. companies have some of the world's most competitive products
and services. Our embassies around the world advocate on a daily basis
for U.S. companies, helping them find opportunities, supporting their
bids on projects, helping in disputes, and promoting legal and
regulatory reforms that create a level playing field on which they can
compete on quality and service. But when they go after sales and
contracts internationally, their European, Japanese--and increasingly
Chinese and Brazilian--competitors are armed with their own
governments' financing and other support, which they build directly
into their sales pitches.
That is why the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im), is critical for
helping U.S. businesses succeed. In FY 2014, it supported 164,000
American jobs and $27.5 billion in U.S. exports, and provided $675
million in revenue to the Treasury to reduce the budget deficit.
While Ex-Im is not an aid or development agency, its funding often
has the added benefit of contributing to economic development and
security abroad. Ex-Im provides financing support for the purchase of
U.S. goods and services by foreign buyers. Its lending fills market
gaps by assuming credit and country risks that the private sector is
unable or unwilling to accept without support. To support a level
playing field for U.S. businesses, Ex-Im matches financing that other
governments within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) provide to their exporters. Ex-Im can also match
financing terms that are outside the OECD Arrangement when there is
documentation on the offers by foreign export credit agencies.
We cannot afford to unilaterally disarm in the international trade
arena, which is what we would be doing if we did not reauthorize the
U.S. Export-Import bank. For Ukraine, we are encouraging an economic
reform process that will help restore stability and enable Ex-Im to
reopen in support of U.S. exports and Ukrainian growth and prosperity.
Another federal agency that is actively helping out in Ukraine is
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), whose mission is to
advance U.S. development, foreign policy, and national security goals
by facilitating U.S. investments in developing countries. OPIC operates
on a self-sustaining basis at no net cost to American taxpayers. OPIC-
supported projects address critical development challenges--clean
water, sustainable energy, infrastructure, education and access to
finance. OPIC is focused on lending for long-term, commercial projects
and can also insure U.S. investment against political risks--currency
inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence. Operating in
over 160 countries, OPIC has financed more than $200 billion of
investment in more than 4,000 projects, generating $76 billion in
exports and supporting 278,000 American jobs.
A third agency, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA),
helps companies create U.S. jobs through the export of U.S. goods and
services for priority development projects in emerging economies. USTDA
links U.S. businesses to export opportunities in sectors where U.S.
expertise is particularly strong: energy, transportation, and
telecommunications. Examples include early-stage project planning
activities--such as feasibility studies, pilot projects, and other
technical assistance--as well as reverse trade missions that bring
foreign buyers to the United States in order to observe the design,
manufacture, and demonstration of U.S. products and services in
operation. USTDA's programs are responsible for generating over $25
billion in U.S. exports to emerging markets--supporting an estimated
110,000 U.S. jobs--over the last 10 years. That equates to $76 in
exports of U.S.-manufactured goods and services for every $1
programmed.
Congress can strengthen the trade and investment facilitation
agencies by fully funding the President's request for FY 2016.
Moreover, Congress should provide reliability to U.S. businesses and
our partners overseas by reauthorizing the Export-Import Bank for 5
years or longer, in order to assure predictability and confidence that
their vital support will be available when opportunities are on the
line.
Question. For the second year in a row now, the administration did
not request funding to pay our arrears to the Inter-American
Development Bank's Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF). This lack of
funding is sure to undermine the MIF's operations. The MIF does
critical work in promoting private sector-led economic development in
Latin America and the Caribbean and I believe it deserves the full
support of the U.S. Government.
Could you please explain why the administration did not
request any funding at all for the MIF?
Answer. The MIF currently has sufficient resources. The
administration did not request funding for unmet commitments to the MIF
for FY16, as we prioritized reducing unmet commitments to other
multilateral development banks where we are at risk of losing
shareholding.
Question. I greatly appreciated Secretary Clinton's focus on
economic statecraft and bolstering the State Department's ability to
grow U.S. jobs and exports and fully applaud your work in continuing
this effort through the Shared Prosperity Agenda. Efforts like these
are a clear example of how the State Department can contribute to
strengthening our economic recovery at home.
Given the tremendous importance of exports in generating
American jobs and economic growth, could you please explain the
status of the State Department's Shared Prosperity Agenda and
what concrete steps the Department plans to take over the
coming year to elevate the importance of economic issues in our
diplomatic engagement?
Answer. My commitment to elevating economic issues in our
diplomatic engagement focuses on both policy priorities and reforms
within the Department of State. Our policy priority is to promote
inclusive, job-rich, sustainable economic growth in the United States
and overseas. Internal reforms emphasize the increased use of data and
advanced analytics, better knowledge management tools, strengthened
internal and interagency cooperation, and improved incentives and
training to better inform the Department's decision making. These
priorities and initiatives will be reflected in detail in the
forthcoming 2014 Quadrennial Diplomacy Development Review document.
Inclusive Growth
Trends in inequality and structural underemployment around the
world compel us to define the goal of our economic diplomacy as
sustainable, job-rich, inclusive economic growth pursued in an
environmentally responsible manner. This approach complements our
current commercial advocacy efforts, which aim to expand foreign market
opportunities for U.S. companies. American companies conducting
business abroad provide jobs (at home and abroad) as well as social and
environmental benefits. State is an active partner with USTR in the
effort to negotiate new trade agreements such as TPP and TTIP, as well
as Trade and Investment Framework Agreements, and Bilateral Investment
Treaties.
At U.S. embassies and consulates around the world, State continues
to collaborate closely with our Foreign Commercial Service (FCS)
colleagues as we work to grow U.S. jobs and exports. Where the FCS is
not present, State Department economic officers fill in at over 56
posts, offering the same package of support services to U.S. exporters
and investors as FCS officers do.
We also support accountable governance and continue to combat
corruption in economies abroad: the World Economic Forum (WEF)
estimates corruption reduces global GDP by more than 5 percent each
year. We are using a variety of tools, including bilateral diplomacy,
multilateral engagement, enforcement, and capacity building assistance,
to advance our anticorruption agenda. Through initiatives such as the
Ukraine and Arab Forums on Asset Recovery, we help build capacity to
ensure motivated governments have the ability, and in some cases, the
resources to effectively combat corruption. Beyond providing technical
assistance, we also work to generate the political will to respond to
corruption by creating trade incentives for reform, celebrating good
performers in venues like the Open Government Partnership, and
supporting citizen organizations, journalists, and prosecutors holding
public officials accountable.
Finally, we are specifically promoting entrepreneurship and
innovation as drivers for the creation of new businesses and increased
employment abroad. Academic research reveals that while small and
medium sized businesses contribute approximately half of U.S. GDP, it's
actually new and young businesses which create all net new jobs in the
United States. This is true abroad as well: SMEs account for 97 percent
of all jobs in emerging markets according to the World Economic Forum.
We are doing this work with specific emphasis on the next generation of
economic actors, on skill building, but also on making sure that the
environment for doing business is strong and vibrant.
State Department Reforms
Addressing several key cultural, process, and technological
challenges within the Department will help accelerate progress toward
the above goals. The forthcoming QDDR will address these in detail,
focusing on the following themes:
Our strategic and tactical decisions in pursuit of inclusive growth
need to be informed by the best data, diagnostic tools, and research
available. We are working to improve State's capacity and resources in
these areas and in doing so are aligning with best practices on data
already adopted by MCC, USAID, and many multilateral institutions.
We are also pursuing improved knowledge management practices and
systems so that we can better build on and benefit from the
institutional knowledge of the Department. This includes an effort to
modernize our contact relationship management systems and improving our
capacity to archive, discover, and search our work products.
Finally, we are pursuing a refreshed emphasis on performance
outcomes and training for our Civil and Foreign Service colleagues,
including recognizing and rewarding economic expertise. We are also
expanding opportunities for private sector details for Department
employees, and more short-term but impactful Department opportunities
for the best and brightest from the private sector.
Question. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Quota Reforms.--About
this time last year, the Foreign Relations Committee passed a bill with
a strong bipartisan vote, which in addition to providing aid to Ukraine
authorized U.S. acceptance of the 2010 IMF reforms. When that bill
ultimately reached the Senate floor, however, the IMF reform provisions
were removed due to the opposition of some members who apparently
disagree that these reforms are in the interest of the United States.
I'm glad to see that the administration reiterated its request for
congressional approval of the 2010 reform package in its FY16 budget,
but several of my colleagues and I wish the administration would do
more to advance this issue.
Could you please state for the record the administration's
position on why approving the 2010 IMF reform package is in our
national interest, and what you think the impact of our failure
to approve the reforms would be--to U.S. credibility and
international leadership and to the IMF's ability to respond to
global financial crises?
Does the administration plan making passage of the 2010 IMF
reform package a priority for this year?
Answer. The administration strongly calls for congressional
approval of the 2010 IMF quota reform. The U.S. delay in ratifying the
2010 reform has eroded our leadership and capacity to influence
international development financing. Giving important developing
economies a greater vote in the IMF would preserve the integrity of the
existing international financial infrastructure without increasing U.S.
monetary commitments or endangering the U.S. veto over important IMF
decisions. To preserve U.S. influence, we need to work to recognize the
legitimate aspirations of several growing economies to become
responsible pariticpants in the Bretton Woods institutions. Delay will
ultimately affect the IMF's ability to respond to geopolitical and
economic crises in a way that serves our vital national interests.
Despite the fact that the United States championed the 2010 IMF
quota and governance reforms, we are now the only major IMF member
country that has not yet ratified them. The U.S. failure to ratify IMF
reforms is generating criticism abroad and eroding our credibility in
the G20, with emerging economies, and with international financial
institutions. At the 2014 World Bank/IMF spring and fall meetings, an
increasing number of countries called for moving forward on IMF quota
and governance reforms without the United States. The November G20
Brisbane Summit Joint Communique stated that the G20 will begin to
engage the IMF in 2015 to discuss how to advance the reform process if
the United States fails to ratify the proposed reforms by the end of
2014. The International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), the
policy advisory arm of the IMF, and G20 communiques over the last year
tasked the IMF with discussing options for next steps, and significant
work has been done to date to outline interim steps to move in the
direction of the 2010 reforms. Participants at the April 17-19, 2015,
World Bank and IMF Spring Meetings criticized the United States for our
inability to agree to quota reform, and discussed other ways to
implement quota reform.
Our inaction has fueled momentum for alternative institutions.
While we recognize the need for additional development financing around
the world, we believe it is also important that all such efforts
advance standards for governance and environmental and social
safeguards that institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have
helped establish over the decades.
The administration will continue to make passage of the 2010 IMF
reform package a priority for this year.
Question. I want to commend you and the administration for the
historic climate announcements with China and India. I believe these
agreements have forever changed the dynamic of international climate
negotiations and developed and developing countries will henceforth act
in tandem to lower climate emissions. It is truly a remarkable
accomplishment and one that deserves universal praise. Unfortunately,
we have already seen efforts in the Senate to undermine the
administration's efforts to work with developing nations to lower their
emissions.
If the majority were to somehow block the United States-
China announcement, and other such efforts, how would U.S.
interests be harmed?
Answer. Blocking U.S. implementation of elements of the joint
announcement would harm U.S. interests at home and abroad and
dramatically weaken our ability to encourage strong commitments from
other major economies. Specifically, the United States-China joint
climate change announcement has had a profound effect on the
international climate talks. As the world's largest economies, the
United States and China sent an unmistakable signal to the world that
the Paris agreement would be forged by both developed and developing
nations alike. For example, the announcement has helped catalyze action
from other developing economies like Mexico, which on March 27 made a
strong pledge to peak emissions by 2026 and emit 22 percent less carbon
in 2030 compared to a business-as-usual baseline. Without the momentum
created by the United States-China announcement, the United States
would lack a powerful tool with which we can shape the commitments and
attitudes of other nations around the world.
The joint announcement also benefited our bilateral relationship
with China. The United States-China relationship is one of our most
important bilateral relationships. If Congress were to walk back
implementation of the pledges embodied in the announcement, it would
give China an opening to backpedal on its historic climate pledge. For
China to achieve its carbon emissions peak around 2030 or earlier,
China will need to take significant additional action now.
Additionally, in the joint announcement, China said that it intends to
strive to peak even earlier than 2030, which will require a more
targeted effort. Before this announcement, many major academic analyses
predicted that China would peak emissions in 2040 or later.
Further, achieving China's announced goal of a 20-percent nonfossil
energy share by 2030 will require China's large-scale deployment of
nonfossil energy capacity on the order of 800-1000 GW. These are
remarkably substantial goals, even for China. The entire U.S.
generation capacity in 2012 was a bit less than 1000 GW, and the
Chinese have committed to add that much clean energy capacity over the
next 15 years. Action by China on climate change and clean air will
ultimately reduce the costly effects of climate change, thus benefiting
the United States and our ability to protect the public health of
American citizens.
Question. Over 1.3 billion people worldwide lack access to reliable
electricity, including nearly 600 million people in sub-Saharan Africa
and over 300 million people in India. This is a major barrier to
development. The most successful projects to provide electricity to
these communities in recent years have been private companies selling
or leasing off-grid solar panels. For instance, a company in Kenya
called M-KOPA has provided nearly 100,000 customers access to
electricity in the last year.
(a) What more can be done to provide financing and break
down regulatory barriers for these new, successful, sustainable
companies and help them grow even faster?
Answer (a). Power Africa is focused on removing the barriers that
have long impeded or stalled energy project and private sector
development across the African Continent and limited the number of
people who have access to electricity. Using a ``toolkit'' approach
Power Africa offers the combined technical and financial resources of
12 U.S. Government agencies, the World Bank Group, the African
Development Bank, the Government of Sweden, our partner governments,
and many other Power Africa public and private sector partners. Power
Africa also provides technical advice and transactional support through
regional- and country-focused transaction advisors.
Different from other initiatives, Power Africa is headquartered in
the field with teams located in several locations in sub-Saharan
Africa. U.S. Government officials from several agencies are focused on
identifying specific obstacles to power deals and to recommend tools to
overcome these obstacles in order to advance President Obama's
ambitious electricity access and generation goals. These field teams
and transaction advisors have already assisted with regulatory reform
to enable the first instance of private sector power generation in
Ethiopia, regularization of tariff structures for small off-grid
producers in Tanzania, and tariff reform to better support the recently
privatized electric utilities in Nigeria.
Through these field teams and the interagency coordination team in
Washington, Power Africa also facilitates private sector access to
numerous finance tools offered by the U.S. Government. These include
USAID's Development Credit Authority, the U.S.-African Clean Energy
Finance initiative funded by State Department and executed by OPIC and
USTDA, as well as the more conventional OPIC and Ex-Im financing and
risk mitigation tools. This coordinated access to technical assistance
and financing has led to successful private sector ventures ranging
from off-grid access via stand-alone solar photovoltaic systems, to
grid integrated multimegawatt solar installations, to large-scale
natural gas fired generation.
(b) I applaud the President's Beyond the Grid initiative to
get private sector commitments from the private sector for off-
grid energy investments in Africa, but when will we see large
financing commitments from EXIM or OPIC in this sector in
Africa?
Answer (b). Ex-Im and OPIC are dedicated to supporting the types of
small-scale transactions critical to energy development in emerging
markets. In partnership with the State Department, USTDA, and USAID,
OPIC has implemented the U.S.-African Clean Energy Finance Initiative
to support early-stage projects and catalyze private sector investment
in the renewable energy sector in sub-Saharan Africa. Since the
program's launch, OPIC and USTDA have committed funds to 30 renewable
energy projects across 10 African countries that span a wide breadth of
activities designed to address Africa's energy challenges, including
small-scale projects that serve rural, off-grid communities.
(c) Is the State Department committed to continued strong
funding of the U.S.-Africa Clean Energy Finance Initiative
(ACEF) to facilitate small, clean energy projects getting into
the OPIC pipeline?
Answer (c). The State Department is committed to funding the U.S.-
ACEF initiative. In June 2012, former Secretary Clinton announced the
U.S.-ACEF at the U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20)
with an initial funding of $20 million for OPIC and USTDA to provide
grant funding to support 25-30 African renewable energy projects. The
initial round of the U.S.-ACEF program received funding from FY11 and
FY12 ESF funds, with $15 million from FY11 funds obligated to OPIC and
$5 million from FY12 funds to USTDA.
U.S.-ACEF has seen strong demand, with more than 400 project
applications received. While original estimates were that it would take
5 years to deploy the original $20 million commitment, the initial
tranche has already been deployed to support 30 projects across 10
African countries. During the U.S. African Leaders Summit in
Washington, DC (August 2014), Secretary of State Kerry announced an
additional $10 million in funding, bringing total State Department
support to date to $30 million. This $10 million pledge represents a
commitment to continued funding of the initiative.
Question. Last year, the President committed to ``increasing
electricity access by at least 60 million household and business
connections'' as part of the Power Africa Initiative. Some have
expressed concerns that large, centralized power plants might count
toward that goal even if they are not associated with any new
connections to the grid.
Will the Power Africa initiative count power plants that
provide energy ``equivalent'' to a certain number of households
being connected to the grid or will Power Africa only count
those who are actually receiving first-time access to
electricity whether on or off grid?
Answer. Power Africa is setting out to add 30,000 megawatts (MW) in
generation capacity and--as you note--increase access with 60 million
new household and business connections. All new generation in sub-
Saharan Africa is linked to access because it will help remove capacity
as a constraint to grid expansion, thereby enabling utilities to
increase access more than would otherwise be possible. Estimating how
many new connections would result from each new MW of generation--i.e.,
the inferred access--is not an exact science, especially because people
tend to consume more power as grids gain access to additional
generation and costs come down. Also, power consumption rates vary from
country to country.
Power Africa makes an inferred access calculation by estimating the
average number of households that can be served with additional MWs of
new generation capacity. The methodology is based on World Bank
estimates and takes into account existing residential and per capita
consumption, household size, capacity factors for various forms of
generation, and other relevant metrics to derive these estimates.
Additionally, in June 2014 Power Africa launched the Beyond the
Grid (BTG) subinitiative, under which millions of households and
businesses are expected to achieve varying levels of new electricity
service. BTG is focused exclusively on unlocking investment and growth
for off-grid and small-scale energy solutions on the African Continent.
The subinitiative is defining access in line with the United Nations'
Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) definitions for access, which
starts with a minimum level of ``task lighting'' and cell phone/radio
charging. While that first electron or light source is the most
valuable, BTG also strives to achieve community level solutions that
will offer ``access'' above that first tier of task lighting. As BTG
develops and Power Africa continues to expand, Power Africa will
further refine and develop in a transparent manner the methodology for
assessing progress toward meeting the access goals, both on and beyond
the grid.
Question. The rapid fall in oil prices over the past year from
increased production, lower demand, and increased efficiency has
profound geopolitical implications. Increased U.S. energy security, for
example, may lead some to reconsider some of our obligations and
commitments around the globe. And while falling oil prices are putting
pressure on Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, who now find themselves in
extreme financial distress and less power, it is far from clear whether
each country will react by lashing out further, or by seeking
reconciliation with others in the international community. Further,
falling oil prices have contributed to U.S. economic growth, but they
have also helped contribute to deflationary pressure in the Eurozone,
and may undermine Europe's ability to play a robust role on the world
stage.
What is your assessment of how these changes in world
energy markets will affect geopolitical cooperation and
competition in the years and decades to come?
Answer. The integrated nature of global energy flows creates a
shared interest in stable and well-supplied markets. The shale
revolution certainly helps the U.S. economy through greater production
but the benefits to energy security are shared worldwide instead of
being isolated to just the United States. New U.S. supply has already
helped make up for geopolitical supply disruptions, which are still at
historic highs due to instability in Libya, Iraq, Syria, Sudan and
South Sudan, Nigeria, Venezuela, and due to international sanctions on
Iran. Now, in a time of lower oil prices and greater global economic
integration, it is more important than ever that we work diligently to
ensure that energy resources are used to drive economic growth,
stability, and cooperation, rather than conflict.
Question. Arctic Council.--The United States has assumed the
chairmanship of the Arctic Council for 2-years, presenting an
opportunity to engage with our Arctic partners on a wide variety of
issues, including a changing climate, maritime transportation, fishing,
and protection of indigenous peoples, among others.
What are your priorities for the U.S. chairmanship? What
opportunities does our chairmanship provide for increased
geopolitical cooperation with our Arctic partners?
Answer. The United States is assuming the chair of the Arctic
Council at a critical time. Changes in the Arctic have created
significant challenges and opportunities for every Arctic nation and
the region is quickly becoming a global focus for scientific and
academic research, trade, and tourism. The Arctic Council has proven
itself to be an effective and cooperative forum where the eight Arctic
States and the Permanent Participants, who represent the interests of
indigenous peoples of the Arctic, come together to address circumpolar
issues. International cooperation in this region is essential, which is
why the theme for the United States Arctic Council chairmanship is One
Arctic: Shared Opportunities, Challenges, and Responsibilities. We have
developed a robust program for our chairmanship in line with the
priorities laid out in the National Strategy for the Arctic Region and
its subsequent Implementation Plan. Priority initiatives of our
chairmanship fall generally under three main areas.
Arctic Ocean Safety, Security, and Stewardship
The acceleration of maritime activity in the Arctic enhances risk
in an already harsh and challenging environment. We plan to prioritize
collaborative search and rescue and oil pollution preparedness and
response exercises. Our chairmanship will build upon the existing
science of ocean acidification in the Arctic and raise awareness of
this important global change. We will also seek to improve
international coordination in the Arctic Ocean through a regional seas
program similar to regional seas programs in other oceans.
Improving Economic and Living Conditions
During the U.S. chairmanship, we will strive to bring tangible
benefits to communities across the Arctic. In particular, we will seek
to assist remote Arctic communities to adapt to the rapid changes that
are altering traditional ways of life. The United States aims to
increase water security for remote Arctic communities through a better
understanding of freshwater availability and community vulnerability,
as well as through improved community sanitation. We plan to work
toward better access to renewable energy sources to reduce community
dependence on diesel generators while at the same time reducing
emissions of black carbon in the Arctic. The United States also plans
to continue advancing suicide intervention and awareness programs to
reverse disturbing trends that disproportionately affect Arctic
communities.
In addition, as indicated in the Implementation Plan for the
National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the United States hopes to see
an Arctic telecommunications infrastructure assessment that would serve
as the basis for the eventual build-out of the telecommunications
infrastructure necessary to support ever-increasing human activity
throughout the Arctic region. Building telecommunications
infrastructure across the Arctic will provide critical support to
navigation, offshore development activities, search and rescue
operations, environmental and humanitarian emergencies, and will make
online tools for Arctic communities, such as telemedicine, education,
and adaptation, more accessible and useful.
Addressing the Impacts of Climate Change
Our chairmanship will continue the ongoing, high-level focus on the
impacts of climate change, especially the drivers of change and the
ways and means of addressing on-the-ground impacts. To minimize the
prospect of irreparable, long-term harm to the Arctic--and the globe,
as changes in the Arctic reverberate around the world--we need to take
sustained, quantifiable measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
increase community resilience and preparedness.
During our chairmanship, we will continue the Council's work on the
subject of black carbon, and we will press for full implementation of a
new, voluntary arrangement that will include development of national
black carbon emission inventories, national reporting on domestic
mitigation efforts, and data collection efforts. Another path forward
is to examine key industrial practices, such as oil and gas flaring, to
share best practices, policies and technologies among technical
experts, industry and policymakers. The Department of State aims to
lead the Arctic Council through an assessment of how we can improve
emissions estimates of black carbon and other air pollutants from gas
flares.
Finally, we hope to be joined by other Arctic States in efforts
that build climate resilience into national policies and promote
community- and ecosystem-based climate adaptation through improved
information, tools, and best practices. The U.S. chairmanship program
will further underpin these climate change efforts through science
initiatives that will allow for remote access to high-resolution
mapping information and indices of future climate in the Arctic.
Question. A week in advance of Nigeria's general elections, the
head of the Independent National Elections Commission, Attahiru Jega,
announced a 6-week delay in the face of pressure from the nation's
security chiefs who cited the inability to provide security due to the
focus on ongoing operations against Boko Haram. And just last week, Dr.
Jega told members of the Nigerian Senate that the new March 28 date may
not hold. These delays significantly threaten the legitimacy of the
contest. You personally met with both Presidential candidates in
January and urged INEC to hold the elections as scheduled.
What is the administration doing to discourage further
delays, and what actions will we take if the Presidential polls
are not held on March 28?
Answer. The United States, in a whole of government effort, has
engaged at the highest levels with Nigerian candidates, political party
leadership, civil society, business leaders, and other prominent
individuals to promote peaceful and credible elections in March and
April 2015. In a statement following the announcement of the 6-week
delay in February, I expressed that the ``United States is deeply
disappointed by the decision to postpone'' the elections. It is
imperative that the new elections timeline holds. Through frequent
outreach to key stakeholders in Nigeria, the State Department has
continued to press for the adherence to March 28 and April 11 for the
national and state-level elections, respectively. Our outreach extends
beyond Nigeria as well. We work closely with British, European Union,
and other African counterparts to maintain focus on this critical issue
of timely elections.
While a further short delay from March 28 and April 11 is
permissible under Nigeria's Constitution, we have advised against any
additional postponements. In any case, we have received multiple
assurances from senior members of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party
that the May 29 inauguration date, which is set by the constitution, is
``sacrosanct.''
Question. Boko Haram has threatened to disrupt elections at all
costs, but there is also the threat of ordinary civilians engaging in
election-related violence should they believe the polls results are
flawed, or their candidate is not declared the winner. Given past
instances of fraud and political violence as well as the contentious
nature of the Presidential race, elections violence is likely to occur.
Are you concerned about sustained widespread electoral
violence, and what--if anything--has the administration been
doing to support efforts to prevent and mitigate such violence?
Answer. We have emphasized the importance for the Nigerian people
that Nigeria's 2015 elections be peaceful and credible, and that the
results reflect the will of the Nigerian people. Given Nigeria's
political and economic importance within Africa, as well as Nigeria's
increasingly prominent role on the global stage, the quality of these
elections will have serious implications for Nigeria's and Africa's
future. It is vital that the outcome reinforce citizens' confidence in
the legitimacy of their elected representatives.
Nigeria historically has had election-related violence and could
again. But the degree of violence could be determined by how fair and
free the elections are. That is why we opposed the postponement of the
elections from February 14 and I met with Presidential candidates
Jonathan and Buhari in Nigeria in January to caution against violence.
We also have engaged civil society, business leaders, and other
prominent individuals to promote peaceful and credible elections in
March and April 2015. Mindful of the risk of political violence in
Nigeria, U.S. funded programming incorporates measures intended to
prevent and mitigate as much conflict as possible.
The U.S. mission has conducted intensive outreach throughout the
country, resulting in widespread Nigerian press coverage of numerous
speeches, round tables, and interviews on the subject of elections,
particularly emphasizing the message regarding antiviolence. The
Ambassador has called upon all members of the political leadership,
Nigerian Government, and civil society to publicly eschew violence on
many occasions, including direct discussions with the main candidates--
President Jonathan and General Buhari.
We have been providing assistance to Nigeria to strengthen its
electoral systems since 1999, and have been consistently working toward
this objective since the last Nigerian General Elections in 2011. U.S.
Government assistance has been provided in three basic areas: (1)
strengthening of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
to organize and carry out elections; (2) training of civil society
organizations (CSOs) to conduct domestic election observation, engage
with INEC to ensure proper voter education and information, and monitor
electoral processes to see that they are fair and adequate; and (3)
supporting major political parties to enhance their inclusiveness and
to develop strong issues-based platforms.
Mindful that inaccurate and sensationalist reporting may contribute
to post-electoral violence, as in 2011 when an estimated 800 Nigerians
were killed over the course of 3 days, the U.S. Government funds
programs to help professionalize the media and strengthen the reporting
skills of journalists. Additionally, U.S. Government entities have
partnered on a conflict prevention and mitigation initiative to reduce
the risk of destabilizing election-related violence in the Niger Delta.
The U.S. Government has engaged the Nigerian Government, the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and civil society to
emphasize the need for a clear and well-coordinated elections security
plan, and to offer assistance. The U.S. Government has provided a full-
time elections security consultant to directly support INEC security
operations, supplemented by an additional expert who is regularly
deployed to Abuja to support elections security planning. We are also
funding a program to strengthen the capacity of target communities and
leaders to prevent and respond to religious, ethnosectarian, and
political conflict before, during, and after the 2015 elections.
Question. Boko Haram.--The African Union recently authorized an
8,700-strong force to combat Boko Haram. What material support, if any,
does the United States plan to provide to this force? How does this
assistance fit in with our overall counterterrorism strategy for the
region? How will this AU-authorized force be funded and sustained and
what financial support is the United States planning to provide?
Answer. The countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (Cameroon,
Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) and Benin agreed on February 27, 2015, to
establish a 10,000-strong Multilateral Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to
combat Boko Haram. The MNJTF was earlier authorized by the African
Union. The United States is committed to supporting the MNJTF once it
is stood up.
Meanwhile, the United States is providing bilateral support to
MNJTF countries Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, including
information-sharing, advisors, equipment, and training. We are
identifying remaining gaps and engaging our P3 (Permanent UNSCR members
United Kingdom and France) and other partners to determine how best to
fill those gaps and whether such assistance will be through
contributions to a potential voluntary U.N. trust fund, contributions
from a potential donors conference, or from the MNJTF countries
themselves, especially Nigeria.
To date, State has obligated approximately $4.5 million of
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds to provide equipment and/or
training support to the following countries by amounts ($1 million for
Cameroon, $2.4 million for Chad, and $1.1 million for Niger).
Separately, State has identified $15.5 million in PKO funds, which is
currently notified to Congress and is in the process of identifying
additional funding.
This approach supports our existing counterterrorism strategy to
focus on building the capacity of willing partners to address regional
threats. The region has experienced a series of security challenges
during the past several years spilling over from North Africa, Mali,
and Nigeria, but the collective and individual country responses to
United States support, for the most part, have been positive and
receptive. Primarily through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership (TSCTP), the United States has provided bilateral and
regional counterterrorism assistance to: (1) enable and enhance the
capacity of North and West African militaries to conduct
counterterrorism (CT) operations; (2) promote and facilitate regional
CT cooperation; (3) enhance border security capacity to monitor,
restrain, and interdict terrorist movements; (4) strengthen the rule of
law, including access to justice, law enforcement service delivery, and
law enforcement's ability to detect, disrupt, respond to, investigate,
and prosecute terrorist activity; (5) counter the financing of
terrorism; and (6) reduce sympathy and support within communities for
violent extremism. Separately, DOD, with State concurrence, has
provided bilateral assistance through section 1206 (now 2282) funds to
increase the capabilities of military partners in North and West Africa
to counter the various terrorist threats. Finally, the Global Security
Contingency Fund (GSCF) program is contributing training and equipment
to bolster regional border patrol operations, CT efforts and logistics
capabilities for Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.
Question. Talks held on the margins of the African Union summit at
the end of last month did not yield a final peace accord between
President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar. Final
negotiations for a comprehensive settlement--led by the Inter-
Government Authority on Development--resumed on February 20, with a
deadline to resolve all out-standing issues by March 5.
What can the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan
and his team do to ensure that substantive issues--such as the
objectives and tasks of the transitional government, a plan for
the demobilization of forces, and the timeline for an inclusive
reconciliation process--are discussed rather than focusing
solely on how the two main actors will divvy up positions among
themselves in the transitional government?
Answer. Since the beginning of the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) mediation efforts to broker peace between the
Government of South Sudan and the opposition, the United States has
worked to ensure that substantive issues beyond power-sharing
arrangements are fully integrated into the peace talks.
We believe that the path to real, broad-based and lasting peace in
South Sudan cannot be obtained without fundamental reforms to the
security sector, public financial management and the constitutional
process, as well as a firm commitment to a robust reconciliation
process that focuses on healing the deep wounds caused by the current
crisis.
We will continue to work in close coordination with IGAD, the
African Union and other key partners to support the peace process, and
to continue to use all means available to us to apply collective
pressure on the parties to focus on broad-based reforms and to overcome
the remaining obstacles to a comprehensive agreement and agreement on
the formation of a transitional government.
Question. I met with South Sudan President Salva Kiir in August and
was shocked by his apparent lack of concern for suffering his people
are enduring due to the conflict. I hear that the same can be said of
Mr. Machar. President Obama issued an Executive order last April
authorizing sanctions against those who obstruct the peace process, yet
only four low ranking individuals have been named. IGAD and the African
Union (AU) Peace and Security Council have proposed asset freezes,
travel restrictions, and other punitive measures should Kiir and Machar
fail to reach an agreement, and I understand that a U.N. Security
Council resolution calling for such is in the works.
Is the administration planning to put additional bilateral
sanctions in place? In your estimation, what in addition to
sanctions can be done to encourage a sustainable peace
agreement?
How robustly is the administration engaging IGAD member
states on the imposition of sanctions? Should March 5 pass
without a peace agreement, do you believe the regional states,
particularly Kenya and Uganda, will follow through with their
efforts to pursue punitive measures?
Answer. The United States has utilized its targeted sanctions
Executive order to designate four individuals to date, two from the
Government of South Sudan and two from opposition forces. We will
continue to use the authority under the Executive order to hold
accountable those who commit human rights abuses or obstruct the peace
process, and can provide more detail on these plans in a classified
staff briefing. This has been a necessary and effective tool to
demonstrate the importance that the U.S. Government places on resolving
this conflict and our commitment to hold accountable those who
undermine peace and security in South Sudan.
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) regional
leadership requested that increased external international pressure be
brought to bear on the parties in order to support their mediation
efforts. Based on our extensive engagement with regional leadership and
other international partners, we drafted a U.N. Security Council
sanctions regime that allows for asset freezes and travel bans on those
who hinder the South Sudanese peace process or commit human rights
violations, mirroring our own Executive order. The resolution passed
unanimously on March 3, an important step in demonstrating the
international community's resolve in helping end the needless suffering
of millions of South Sudanese.
This Security Council resolution is specifically designed to
enhance the IGAD mediation efforts by coordinating deadlines with those
established in the IGAD process, and to allow for the adoption of
further punitive measures beyond targeted sanctions as deemed
necessary. This incremental approach increases the efficacy of measures
imposed and ensures continued buy-in and support from IGAD regional
leaders. The resolution was designed so that the Council can gradually
ratchet up the pressure on the parties over a period of time. According
to the resolution, the United National Security Council will closely
monitor the situation in South Sudan and impose calibrated measures as
needed, including consideration of an arms embargo.
Question. The President's Budget includes funding to support the
``Asia Rebalance'' which among its major initiatives is the Trans-
Pacific Partnership free trade agreement. Ambassador Froman has
repeatedly told the Congress that the agreement will have strong labor
rights provisions in it.
Can you tell me how the State Department and USAID programs
will build the capacity of local civil society including trade
unions to take advantage of these provisions so as to ensure
that international labor standards are enforced and that gains
from trade are widely shared?
Answer. Targeted technical assistance on labor issues, including
capacity-building of trade unions to promote internationally recognized
labor rights, supports our broader diplomatic engagement through
bilateral and multilateral channels and is an integral part of the
State Department's and USAID's labor diplomacy and assistance efforts.
The State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
(DRL), for instance, supports several programs in the Asia-Pacific
region that foster the development of democratic and representative
worker organizations as well as the promotion of internationally
recognized labor rights. In Malaysia, DRL supports a program to empower
migrant workers and local organizations to take effective action to
protect and promote their rights by strengthening outreach and
communication mechanisms; in Vietnam, DRL supports efforts to assist
union officials, women union leaders, and workplace-level unions in
developing the practical knowledge and skills needed to support workers
in organizing grassroots unions. USAID is supporting labor rights and
trade union capacity-building programming in one Trans-Pacific
Partnership country, Mexico, through its Global Labor Program. USAID
also is working with USTR to develop new labor programming in a second
TPP country, Vietnam.
Trade capacity-building programs in these areas have been key to
supporting the implementation of previous trade agreements, in
particular the CAFTA-DR. As we look toward the completion of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, we anticipate growing demand for technical
assistance on legal and institutional reform, the training of trade
union leaders, and the training of legal experts to support trade union
activities, among other matters. We look forward to working with
Congress and other stakeholders to support its implementation and build
off of the State Department's, USAID's, and the Department of Labor's
ongoing labor diplomacy and assistance efforts.
Question. As I look at China's track record over the past several
years I am increasingly concerned that China's foreign policy
orientation is not, in fact, that of a state supporting the
international order but rather one seeking to overturn it. Whether in
the South China Sea or in its trade practices--let alone in its human
rights practices at home--we see a nation that is aggressively seeking
to overturn the accepted tenets of the international system, and not
afraid to use coercion and force to get its way.
How do you characterize Chinese foreign policy and assess
these actions that appear, in some respects, to be aggressive
and potentially revisionist in their tendencies?
How should the United States construct its approach to
China--including both incentives but also making clear
potential costs--if we hope to see the emergence of a China
that plays a positive and constructive role on the world stage?
Answer. The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful,
prosperous China that adheres to international norms and standards.
There are some security concerns in Asia that require our sustained
engagement with China, however. These concerns include tension between
China and its neighbors over territorial and maritime disputes, respect
for human rights, and adherence to the principles of free trade. Our
most senior leaders consistently and frankly discuss these issues with
Chinese leaders, and the United States is clear-eyed about growing U.S.
and regional concerns in these areas.
The United States-China relationship contains elements of both
cooperation and competition. The United States will continue to make
clear and promote our values, interests and principles; work with China
to manage our differences; and seek to build a cooperative partnership
across the range of bilateral, regional, and global issues that
confront us today. U.S. actions will inevitably continue to include
both costs and incentives to shape Chinese behavior.
Question. Given its ``whole of government'' approach to human
rights, how is the administration preparing to raise human rights in
the forthcoming U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, to be held
in Washington this June? Or in the context of Chinese President Xi
Jinping's visit to Washington, tentatively expected in September? Have
senior State Department officials continued to ask their Chinese
counterparts about the individual cases President Obama raised with
President Xi in November 2014 and if so, to what end?
Answer. The President and the administration remain committed to
raising human rights across the spectrum of U.S. Government engagement
with the Chinese Government. The United States is fundamentally
committed to the universal rights of all people--including freedom of
speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of the press,
and freedom of expression--including online. The President believes
that respect for these rights strengthens nations, and that respect for
the rule of law and protection of universal human rights will enhance
China's prosperity, security, and stability.
Senior U.S. officials regularly raise both systemic concerns and
individual cases with Chinese counterparts. The administration will
continue to press for individuals such as Gao Zhisheng and Dhondup
Wangchen to be permitted to leave China. We will continue to press for
Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo to be freed from his 11-year
sentence for ``subversion of state power.'' We also will continue to
call for Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti's release from prison. The
administration will continue to voice its concern for the human rights
activists, lawyers, journalists, bloggers, and all others who have been
arrested or detained for peacefully questioning official policies and
actions in China.
As is customary, the administration also will use upcoming senior-
level exchanges to press for progress on broad human rights and rule of
law concerns, including at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S&ED) and President Xi's planned state visit to the United
States later this year. Also this summer in Washington, women's rights
will be on the agenda for the Consultation on People to People
Exchange. Ahead of this year's S&ED, Special Advisor for Disability
Rights Judith Heumann will host a Chinese delegation in April for the
first U.S.-China Coordination Meeting on Disability--an agreed upon
outcome from the 2014 S&ED. While we continue to have key differences
with China on human rights issues, we also have demonstrated our
ability to address these issues frankly and directly with Chinese
counterparts, and will continue to do so.
Question. Can you share your understanding of why President Obama
recently chose not to meet with, or speak directly to, the Dalai Lama
at the National Prayer Breakfast? Doesn't that undercut U.S. support
for Tibet?
Answer. The President has a good relationship with the Dalai Lama.
They have met three times, including in February 2014. The President is
a strong supporter of the Dalai Lama's teachings and preserving Tibet's
unique religious, cultural, and linguistic traditions. The President's
strong support was evident at the National Prayer Breakfast, where he
acknowledged from the dais the Dalai Lama's presence and stated in his
remarks that the Dalai Lama is ``a powerful example of what it means to
practice compassion [who] inspires us to speak up for the dignity and
freedom of all.''
The President and the administration remain committed to protecting
Tibet's distinct religious, cultural, and linguistic identity. We
continue to urge China to resume dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his
representatives, without preconditions. We also urge China to reform
counterproductive policies that are a primary cause of grievances among
Tibetans and allow Tibetans to express their grievances freely,
publicly, and without fear of retribution. The United States also
supports Tibet through our humanitarian assistance and educational
exchange programs.
Question. During the last Congress, our committee held two hearings
on labor rights and safety practices in the Bangladesh garment
industry. I and many others in the Congress continue to pay great
attention to these issues as serious concerns remain. One of the things
that we learned during the hearings is that labor rights abuses do not
stop at one country's border but are found throughout the global
economy and that they are not just present in one sector. Recent
hearings held by the Chair on forced labor, trafficking, and migration
speak to this point. My understanding is that the multiyear USAID
Global labor program will conclude next January.
What is the State Department's understanding as to the
timing to compete a new 5-year grant? Can you assure us there
will be no gap between the old and new programs, and given the
needs that are present, and that USAID is now willing to commit
to funding the new award at no less than $10 million a year?
Answer. The State Department and USAID have a strong tradition of
supporting international labor programs designed to foster democratic
development and inclusive economic growth. Our ongoing priorities for
U.S. foreign assistance include the promotion of labor rights in
context of our trade priorities. Our labor programming directly serves
these priorities by strengthening independent and democratic trade
unions and promoting international labor standards. USAID will release
the solicitation for a follow-on award to USAID's current Global Labor
Program (GLP) on a timeline that will avoid any programming gaps
between the end of the current award and the start of the new 5-year
GLP. The final estimated total value of the award will be determined
based on FY15 and FY16 actual funding levels as well as projected
future funding requests. USAID will continue robust support for global
labor programs when the current GLP expires in January 2016.
Question. We know that among the major administration goals in the
coming months for Africa is the reauthorization of the Africa Growth
and Opportunity Act which has bipartisan support in the Congress. Can
you lay out for us how State and USAID will support the role of civil
society to ensure the gains from this trade preference program are
widely shared among nations that are to benefit from it. We know for
example that only a few sectors have benefited from the program in the
past and that with regard to the garment industry, while workers
secured new jobs, wages, and conditions of work were often substandard.
Answer. While we recognize that civil society must necessarily
operate autonomously from U.S. and African Governments, the U.S.
interagency has actively supported both American and African civil
society, particularly labor groups, in better taking advantage of AGOA
and ensuring labor has a strong voice. Our Trade Hubs have also been
active in addressing African supply-side barriers and promoting
economic diversification, value addition, and greater utilization of
AGOA, in sectors such as shea butter, horticulture, and cut flowers.
Trade Africa and USAID's East Africa Trade Hub, with input from the
private sector, has already helped to lower trade barriers, promote
investment in regionally interlinked infrastructure, and streamlined
regional border administration to facilitate increased exports from the
East African Community (EAC). On February 28 the United States and EAC
member states signed a technical cooperation agreement that provides
for U.S. Government assistance to harmonize agricultural and industrial
trade standards and implement the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, and
agreed to negotiate their first ever Regional Investment Treaty. As
announced at the U.S.-Africa Leaders summit, we are further enhancing
trade and investment capacity-building (TICB) to support trade
facilitation and export growth through Trade Africa and our regional
trade hubs.
The Department of State coordinates closely with the Department of
Labor and USTR on a whole-of-government effort to monitor respect for
workers' freedom of association and assembly, child labor, the vestiges
of slavery, and human trafficking in AGOA member countries. In the last
year the team has visited Swaziland, Niger, and Mauritania, engaging
intensely with host government decisionmakers and labor unions to
develop benchmarks for progress toward better fulfilment of AGOA's
labor-related criteria. We have seen success in Niger, where the
government has taken concrete action to prosecute instances of slavery
and provide legal and material redress for former victims. Swaziland
was suspended from AGOA last year due to the government's failure to
take committed action to fully implement the benchmarks we had laid out
over the course of more than a year addressing workers' freedom of
association. We continue to engage with these and other governments via
our Ambassadors and Labor Officers in the field. State's Office of
International Labor Affairs (ILA) in the Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor (DRL) bureau funds various civil society organizations to
implement projects aimed at addressing labor rights violations in AGOA
beneficiary countries, raising awareness among all stakeholders about
AGOA eligibility criteria, developing trade union leadership capacity,
and encouraging beneficiary countries to adhere to the statutory AGOA
requirements. DRL/ILA also coordinates annually with the American AGOA
Civil Society Network in the United States to organize civil society
side events at the annual AGOA Forum, where a range of topics relevant
to benefiting from AGOA are discussed, resulting in better-informed
AGOA stakeholders.
As USAID's trade programs have matured and expanded, the agency has
prioritized building industry alliances, such as the African Cotton &
Textile Industries Federation, African Cashew Alliance, and Global Shea
Alliance, which have implemented certification schemes for standards
such as quality, organic, labor, women-owned, etc. State, USAID, and
Commerce have coordinated on efforts to bring African suppliers to U.S.
trade shows and facilitate matchmaking with potential U.S. customers.
USAID continues to subsidize the cost of bringing qualified and vetted
African civil society leaders to the AGOA Forum each year as resources
permit, and helps to facilitate dialogue between U.S. and African civil
society, especially in the lead-up to the civil society side event at
the Forum. At this year's Forum, we plan to address the needs
articulated by African and American civil society with concrete
programming to facilitate business matchmaking, professional
networking, better design and marketing to the U.S. consumer, and
navigation of U.S. import regulations, in order to help drive increased
African utilization of AGOA. We also plan to address labor standards at
the Forum, and have already solicited input from civil society
stakeholders such as the ILO, Solidarity Center, the Global Fairness
Initiative, and the International Labor Rights Forum.
State's African Affairs Bureau engages frequently with the American
AGOA Civil Society Network to share information, promote action and
input toward the renewal of AGOA, and solicit feedback. We will host
members, in particular small, minority-owned, and diaspora businesses
at an event March 27 to promote awareness of, and participation in, the
AGOA Forum. We also regularly convene African civil society
stakeholders with their American counterparts via digital video
conference in order to facilitate dialogue and planning for the civil
society component of the AGOA Forum.
State has also driven the impressive growth of the African Women's
Entrepreneurship Program, AWEP, through visitor exchange programs,
public-private mentoring and supplier development initiatives, and
expert speaker programs, with excellent results in terms of diversified
sales, impactful business networking, and healthy profits for the women
members.
The concerns of African civil society are taken into consideration
during the annual AGOA eligibility review process, and the U.S.
Government requests countries that are not meeting the AGOA standards
to develop a plan to address and correct those issues. Last year
several warning letters and demarches were delivered to AGOA countries
to convey U.S. Government concerns about political pluralism; human
rights, including equal protection for LGBT citizens; and freedom of
assembly and expression for workers and other citizens. The U.S.
Government regularly meets with trade unionists, civil society,
journalists, and opposition members throughout the year to monitor and
measure AGOA governments' commitment to upholding the AGOA criteria.
Question. U.N. humanitarian agencies are currently dealing with a
number of emergency situations around the world. In addition to their
ongoing work in Syria, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic,
the U.N. is also working to reach hundreds of thousands of civilians
who have been displaced this year by violence in Iraq.
Given the current strains on the U.N. humanitarian system
caused by these crises, can you describe how the United States
is working to support them in their work, and what are the
current funding shortfalls in these crises? What gaps are not
being met in these emergency situations and what more can we do
to ensure a robust global response?
Answer. The U.S. Government is the largest single donor to global
humanitarian needs, providing over $6 billion in FY 2014 in
humanitarian assistance to the U.N. and other international and
nongovernmental partners for needs around the world. While generous
congressional appropriations have allowed the USG to respond to an
unprecedented number of mega-crises, global needs continue to rise. In
2014, U.N. appeals, which are based on assessments of humanitarian
need, totaled nearly $17 billion, the highest total ever.
Despite strong USG financial support, the international community
faces significant challenges. In 2014 some of the U.N.'s largest
operations were only partially funded. For example:
In Syria, 2014 appeals were only 58 percent funded;
2014 appeals for South Sudan were 54 percent funded;
The 2014/2015 Iraq Strategic Response Plan is only 38
percent funded; and
2014 appeals for the Central African Republic were 71
percent funded.
Funding shortfalls translate into insufficient shelter and food, and
limited provision of health services, education, and livelihoods
opportunities for people displaced by conflict.
Cultivating new donors is crucial to making a dent in underfunded
U.N. appeals. The USG has ramped up outreach to potential donors. After
several years of diplomatic engagement, the State Department and USAID
are pleased to see the Gulf States making sizeable contributions to
U.N. agencies to support L3 crises. In 2014, Kuwait hosted a second
Syria pledging conference and contributed $300 million; a third
conference will be held on March 31, 2015. The UAE pledged and
contributed $60 million to the U.N. for Syria last year. Saudi Arabia
has contributed $500 million to the U.N. for the crisis inside Iraq.
In addition to providing significant financial resources, the USG
has been a leader in working with other donors to strengthen leadership
and coordination within and among U.N. organizations to improve the
overall response to these crises. Through our influence on U.N.
executive boards, we urge U.N. agencies to implement their
responsibilities under the ``Transformative Agenda'' aimed broadly at
improving coordination and overall effectiveness. For example, we have
championed efforts to reform and improve the U.N. Humanitarian
Coordinator system so that the most effective and qualified leaders are
deployed. Similarly, the USG is strengthening partnerships with local
and national NGOs, particularly in places where international NGOs face
serious barriers to operating.
Question. On November 2014, the Government Accountability Office
published a report on efforts to combat trafficking on U.S. Government
contracts overseas--``Human Trafficking: Oversight of Contractors' Use
of Foreign Workers in High-Risk Environments Needs to Be
Strengthened.'' GAO investigators spoke to migrant workers on U.S.
contracts overseas who had paid an equivalent of 1 year's wages to
unsavory recruiters in order to secure their jobs.
(a) How does the Department of State ensure that U.S.
Government contracts overseas are not used as a vehicle for
trafficking workers?
Answer (a). The State Department takes seriously its responsibility
to ensure that its contracts overseas are not being used as a vehicle
for trafficking workers. Since 2011, the State Department has issued
Procurement Information Bulletins (PIBs) to provide guidance to its
Contracting Officers (COs) and Contracting Officer Representatives
(CORs) on how to monitor contracts for compliance with antitrafficking
provisions, and it has enhanced its training as well. The State
Department and the Department of Homeland Security developed online
training for acquisition professionals across the U.S. Government; a
35-minute course is currently available on the Federal Acquisition
Institute's Web site. (Federal agencies are working to update this
training now that the FAR rule implementing Executive Order 13627,
Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in Federal
Contracts (E.O. 13627), has been released.)
The State Department revised its COR course to include a detailed
discussion on COR responsibilities for managing antitrafficking
requirements, and updated its COR Handbook in the Foreign Affairs
Handbook to reflect these requirements. A webinar on preventing
trafficking in persons was developed specifically to target posts
identified by the GAO as needing additional guidance.
The State Department strengthened contract review and staff review
of procurement files at posts during periodic visits to verify that an
antitrafficking clause is included. Contracts sent to Washington from
posts for approval are reviewed by Washington staff for inclusion of
the antitrafficking clause.
The State Department was an early advocate of prohibiting the
charging of recruitment fees to employees because of the potential for
abuse. This prohibition was incorporated into E.O. 13627. The Federal
Acquisition Regulation rule implementing E.O. 13627, and similar
provisions in laws make clear that federal contractors and
subcontractors (and their employees) are prohibited from deceiving
employees about key terms and conditions of employment; charging
employees' recruitment fees; and denying employees' access to identity
documents. They are also prohibited from using forced labor and from
procuring commercial sex acts during the period of the performance of a
contract or subcontract. Federal contractors performing work outside of
the United States worth over $500,000 need to maintain compliance plans
and certify to the best of their knowledge that neither they, nor any
of their subcontractors, have engaged in trafficking or trafficking-
related activities. The State Department was instrumental in
implementing the GAO report's recommendation to define recruitment fees
more clearly through the development of a new government-wide FAR
definition. That change will be promulgated through a pending FAR case.
Finally, the U.S. Government is using all available tools to better
assist procurement officers, federal contractors, and other interested
corporations. For example, this includes a global project the State
Department has funded to Verite, an award-winning labor rights NGO, to
research the key sectors and commodities at risk for human trafficking,
draft an extensive report summarizing its findings, and develop a set
of online, public-facing tools. These resources will enable federal
contractors and other businesses to adopt responsible sourcing
guidelines and compliance plans that align with E.O. 13627, and will be
available in 2015.
(b) How is the Department of State working with transit
countries, such as in the Middle East and the gulf, to improve
conditions for workers and oversight of contractors recruiting
and employing workers in these countries? How much funding is
the Department of State providing to these efforts?
Answer (b). It is the responsibility of governments to hold
employers accountable for adhering to labor laws and prevent the
trafficking of workers. Visa sponsorship systems, including the kafala
system in effect in many countries in the Middle East, can place
significant leverage in the hands of employers and recruitment agencies
and create the potential for exploitation. Additionally, labor laws in
many parts of the region do not fully apply to migrant workers, in
particular migrant domestic workers. The Department continues to
encourage governments to pursue reforms of such systems and labor laws.
Some governments in the region have announced plans to make such
reforms. The Department also continues to encourage governments to
better enforce existing laws that prohibit employers from withholding
workers' passports and restricting workers' movements, including by
denying exit visas, as a means of preventing trafficking abuses.
In 2012, sending and receiving countries agreed--through the Abu
Dhabi Dialogue, a collaboration between gulf countries and South and
Southeast Asian nations involved in the Colombo Process--to a framework
that aims to increase intergovernmental partnerships in a number of
areas, including through guidelines on labor recruitment, enforcement
of labor standards, and training and support throughout the migration
process. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) funds
technical assistance efforts to improve labor governance and respect
for internationally recognized worker rights as a key part of
preventing extreme abuses, such as trafficking in persons. DRL funds a
$2.5 million, multicountry, regional program in the Middle East to
strengthen workers' organizations through social, economic, and legal
literacy and is reviewing submissions for a $500,000 labor migration
program to protect the human and labor rights of workers migrating from
the Asia-Pacific Region to the gulf.
The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP
Office) is currently providing $500,000 to the American Center for
International Labor Solidarity (Solidarity Center) to implement a 2-
year project in Jordan to reduce the risk of forced labor for
vulnerable migrant workers in the textile and domestic work sectors.
The program links a rights-based approach to victim protection and
partners with trade unions in the key sectors to conduct outreach and
education activities to identify victims, to create effective referral
networks for services, and to advocate for improved migrant worker
legal protections, increased prosecutions, and enhanced prevention
efforts.
The TIP Office also funds the Daem Observatory for Consultation and
Training ($650,000) to implement a 3-year project in Jordan to increase
the protection of vulnerable migrant workers. The project is analyzing
existing antitrafficking frameworks and drafting recommendations to
enhance protections for migrant workers, conducting awareness and
capacity-building activities, and providing direct services to victims.
Additionally, DRL provides $198,000 in funding for an ILO project that
works to protect the rights of migrant workers through organizing,
empowerment activities, enhanced cooperation and trade union support in
several countries, including Nepal.
In Nepal, USAID is funding a 5-year project that includes creating
Safe Migration Networks and training Network members to increase their
ability to promote safe migration. The Department has coordinated with
other government and private donors to enhance use of foreign
assistance funding and reduce duplication--to more effectively work
toward ending these practices that contribute to human trafficking from
the region.
(c) How is the Department of State working with its
partners to strengthen source country policies, such as in
Bangladesh and Nepal, including the regulation of recruiting
agencies?
Answer (c). In source countries, the Department advocates, as a key
priority, that governments sharply reduce and eventually prohibit
recruitment fees charged to workers and criminally prosecute those
suspected of fraudulent recruitment--two practices that increase the
vulnerability of migrant workers to forced labor. The Department also
advocates for governments to take action to ensure that those intending
to migrate for work are informed of their rights and protected
throughout the migration process. The Department is currently exploring
ways to empower sending countries to have more leverage to protect
their workers overseas, for example through effective and transparent
MOUs.
Programmatically, the Department targets foreign assistance
programming toward these objectives. In Bangladesh, the TIP Office is
funding the Solidarity Center, which in partnership with local
implementing partners has integrated basic antitrafficking training
into the curriculum of the Dhaka Technical Training Center for Migrant
Workers, disseminating valuable information on the rights and
obligation of migrant workers, the telltale signs of trafficking, and
mechanisms for recourse if they find themselves in exploitative and
abusive situations overseas. Every month an estimated 1,000 migrant
workers receive such training, and so far more than 7,000 migrant
workers have benefited from the program.
DRL is reviewing submissions for a program in Bangladesh that will
promote core labor standards, including freedom of association and
occupational safety and health, and raise the standard of living and
promote inclusive economic growth for all Bangladeshi citizens.
Additionally, DRL provides $198,000 in funding for a program that works
to protect the rights of migrant workers through organizing,
empowerment activities, enhanced cooperation and trade union support in
several countries, including Nepal.
In Nepal, USAID is funding a 5-year project that includes creating
Safe Migration Networks and training Network members to increase their
ability to promote safe migration. The Department has coordinated with
other government and private donors to enhance use of foreign
assistance funding and reduce duplication--to more effectively work
toward ending these practices that contribute to human trafficking from
the region.
(d) How much funding is the Department of State providing
to programs working in source countries to address these
issues?
Answer (d). The TIP Office is currently providing more than
$3,650,000 to fund programs in source countries aimed at strengthening
governments' antitrafficking policies, including on policies that
address the regulation of recruiting agencies.
South and Central Asia Region:
$500,000 to Solidarity Center for work in Bangladesh, and
$450,000 to IOM for work in Sri Lanka.
Africa Region:
$500,000 to IOM for work in Ethiopia;
$750,000 to UNODC for regional work with Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Member States;
Global Programs (Projects to Implement the Executive order
re Supply Chains): $500,000 to ILO for work on global
recruitment;
$500,000 to UNODC for work on global recruitment; and
$1,400,000 to Verite for work on supply chains and global
recruitment.
DRL funds programs to protect the rights of migrant workers in the
following source countries through worker organizing, empowerment
activities, enhanced cooperation, and trade union support:
Southeast and South and Central Asia Regions:
$495,000 for activities in Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, and
Laos, and
$198,000 for activities in Indonesia, Burma, and Nepal.
Question. How are we utilizing our humanitarian assistance dollars
to graduate programs from relief to early recovery, particularly in
chronic crises such as DRC and Sudan? Throughout the Obama
administration, OMB has been advocating for greater emphasis on relief
to development transitions (RTDT) to increase the efficiency of U.S.
assistance dollars. In chronic crises such as DRC and Sudan (two of the
largest recipients of U.S. humanitarian assistance in Africa over the
last decade), we need to be shifting toward resilience building efforts
that start to change the status quo rather than repeating the same
humanitarian interventions year after year. How are we doing this?
In DRC specifically, do USAID and State have the funding
necessary to implement their new country strategy? What could
Congress do to be more supportive of the new mission strategy?
Answer. The State Department's Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance
Resources and USAID's Bureau of Resource Management work together to
identify U.S. aid recipient countries ripe for Relief to Development
Transitions (R2DT). These countries receive humanitarian assistance
coupled with forward-leaning developmental assistance in underserved
areas.
Sudan
The Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, Ambassador Donald
Booth, has pressed the Sudanese Government and the armed and unarmed
opposition to reach a negotiated resolution to Sudan's conflicts. The
African Union High Level Implementation Panel's (AUHIP) ``one process,
two tracks'' mediation presents the best opportunity to secure
synchronized Cessations of Hostilities (CoH) agreements in Darfur and
the ``Two Areas'' (Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States) which would
open the way to a fuller discussion of the root causes of Sudan's
conflicts, of political and economic reform, and of national identity
through an inclusive and comprehensive National Dialogue. We continue
to encourage the political leadership to deliver on their promise of a
genuine, holistic, and truly inclusive dialogue that will include the
armed and unarmed opposition, as well as civil society.
Even as we pursue peace, conflict continues in Darfur and the Two
Areas. For this reason, the U.S. Government continues to provide
lifesaving humanitarian assistance to people in need.
The humanitarian environment in Darfur has deteriorated over the
past 2 years. Conflict between government forces and armed groups, as
well as intercommunal conflict over limited resources, forced more than
450,000 people from their homes in Darfur in 2014, bringing the total
number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to over 2.5 million. We
also remain gravely concerned about the worsening humanitarian
situation in the Two Areas, where hundreds of thousands of Sudanese
have been displaced and over 1.7 million people are in dire need of
humanitarian assistance.
Increased conflict and insecurity have diminished optimism and the
chances for early recovery in Sudan. Nevertheless, USAID will continue
to support efficient, feasible, and appropriate early recovery
activities. Most of these will be small-scale and build on established
activities in areas that are secure and accessible.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
In the DRC, USAID and State are implementing a new country
strategy. It seeks to build a durable peace in eastern DRC by
identifying solutions to specific drivers of conflict, fostering
stability, and providing humanitarian aid and protection programs where
still needed.
The persistent insecurity in eastern DRC has forced almost 440,000
refugees
and more than 2.7 million IDPs to flee over the last two decades. The
Congolese Armed Forces have started the final campaign to disarm and
eradicate rebel groups, namely the Democratic Forces for the Liberation
of Rwanda (FDLR), operating in the region. The fighting may take place
near areas inhabited by unarmed civilian populations, posing a threat
to refugees in the region. Moving Rwandan civilian refugees from FDLR-
controlled territory would protect them and weaken the FDLR's false
claim to be defending them. To protect vulnerable populations, the
State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)
is supporting the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) program
to register and accelerate the voluntary repatriation of Rwandan
refugees in the east. In addition, State/PRM directly contributes to
UNHCR's and the International Committee of the Red Cross' country-wide
efforts to protect and aid refugees, refugee returnees, IDPs, and other
victims of conflict.
Though the Congolese Government has made gains in eliminating some
of the causes of instability in the region, coordinated and targeted
humanitarian programs will help set a solid foundation for a successful
transition to economic development. The United States and the
international community, in support of the Congolese Government, must
remain engaged to ensure that security prevails in the region and that
civilians can resume their lives in a safe and stable environment.
Question. Funding.--How much funding are the Department of State
and USAID committing to atrocities prevention programming globally?
Which offices and bureaus implement this funding and how?
Question. The FY 2016 State/USAID Request includes support for
atrocity prevention and response programs. Funding to address these
important efforts is incorporated within both bilaterally budgeted and
centrally managed programs that target prevention, response, and
recovery, which makes it difficult to disaggregate a specific funding
request for atrocity prevention programs. Programs are context-specific
and may be included within those that advance security sector reform;
support peacekeeping operations; build law enforcement capacity;
provide humanitarian assistance; promote conflict prevention,
mitigation, and resolution; support post-conflict stabilization and
reconstruction; and strengthen the democratic institutions and
processes that help to ensure good governance, citizen participation,
and redress of grievances that might otherwise lead to violent
conflict. Conflict mitigation, human rights monitoring, and atrocity
prevention programs are integrated into these activities as
appropriate. In addition to these planned and ongoing efforts, State/
USAID contingency resources provide a mechanism to respond to, emerging
needs, unanticipated crises, and critical periods of transition.
Precise funding levels for atrocity prevention from contingency
accounts are not determined in advance due to the unknown, specific
needs.
The State Under Secretary of Civilian Security, Democracy, and
Human Rights (J), the J bureaus, and USAID's Bureau of Democracy,
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/DCHA) constantly work to
integrate atrocity risk assessment, prevention, and early warning
systems work with technical leadership in conflict management and
mitigation assistance. An example of recent atrocity prevention
programming is the almost $5 million of FY 2014 CCF provided for
Burundi. The programs were designed to discourage political violence
and provide a counterweight to political parties' manipulation of
Burundian youth through the promotion of leadership and constructive
engagement for youth in their communities.
As part of a comprehensive strategy to improve foresight,
prevention, and response to mass atrocities, the Department also leads
quarterly consultations with senior staff of the U.N. Secretariat and
ongoing diplomatic efforts during U.N. Security Council and Human
Rights Council sessions to work with member states and seek to better
protect civilian populations, including by strengthening the capacity
of the U.N. system to prevent and respond to atrocities, and by
improving women's participation in political transitions to reinforce
their contributions to atrocity prevention.
Question. Diplomatic Training.--What training is in place to train
our Foreign Service officers as it relates to atrocities detection,
early warning, and prevention, including materials available through
the Foreign Service Institute?
Answer. The FSI courses listed below include training on atrocities
detection, early warning, and prevention.
A 2-day classroom course on the protection of civilians and
atrocity prevention within a multilateral framework. The
course, ``Policy Priorities in Multilateral Diplomacy: The
Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities (PP230),'' responds
directly to Presidential Study Directive 10 on the Prevention
of Mass Atrocities and Genocide, and the QDDR.
A 5-day classroom course titled ``Promoting Human Rights and
Democracy (PP530).'' This course focuses on broad range of
human rights issues, including atrocity prevention. The
training includes a half-day training exercise called
``Shrouded Horizons.'' Developed by the National Defense
University, this experiential exercise focuses on an escalating
ethnic conflict in two fictitious countries. Participants work
collaboratively to identify tools/strategies for U.S.
engagement, mobilize effective international action, prevent
mass atrocities and reduce the risk of a growing humanitarian
crisis.
A 4-day classroom course on ``Diplomacy at High Threat Posts
(RS251).'' Many of the designated high threat/high risks posts
are similarly on the watch lists for potential mass atrocities.
As part of this course, designed to prepare personnel for
service in high threat/high risk posts, FSI incorporates
instruction on the mass atrocities prevention board, warning
signs, and techniques for identifying the potential for mass
atrocities.
Question. President Obama released the PSD-10 in 2011. What
elements of the directive have been implemented? What has yet to be
implemented?
Answer. Since the release of PSD-10, a number of elements of the
directive have been implemented, including the establishment of the
interagency Atrocities Prevention Board (APB). Since the Board first
convened in April 2012, State and USAID have helped oversee a number of
lines of effort in support of PSD-10, including:
Building our civilian surge capacity and enhancing our
bilateral and multilateral partnerships for purposes related to
atrocities prevention. For example, we have established
quarterly dialogues with U.N. partners, including the U.N.
Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and with
civil society partners, including the Prevention and Protection
Working Group.
The development of an atrocity assessment framework tool for
decisionmakers and field officers to analyze and understand the
atrocity risk factors and dynamics that could lead to
atrocities.
The piloting of a system to ensure that lessons-learned
reviews are performed following any significant mass atrocity
prevention or response engagement.
New training modules to existing curricula at the State
Department and a library of resources on atrocities prevention,
including lessons learned from past cases. A new online
training, which will be required for all USAID technical
officers working in high-risk countries, as well as a field
guidance manual.
Increased authority to offer financial rewards for
information leading to the arrest or conviction of persons
indicted by international criminal tribunals for atrocities,
thanks to bipartisan legislation signed by the President in
2013, which expanded the War Crimes Rewards Program.
The launch of a technology challenge to identify innovative
uses of technology in the service of atrocity prevention.
There is still significant work to be done. State and USAID
are continuing to work to reduce atrocity risk in a targeted
set of countries through robust diplomatic engagement with our
bilateral and multilateral partners, as well as programmatic
interventions focused on reducing risk and building
resiliencies in communities where risks are present. We also
continue to institutionalize atrocities prevention by expanding
our tools, lessons learned, and training opportunities for
those officers in countries at risk.
Question. What early warning systems to mitigate potential mass
atrocities are in place across the agencies?
Answer. To identify emerging risks, the Atrocities Prevention Board
(APB) relies upon a range of resources to identify countries at
different levels of risk and assess opportunities for impact. The
National Intelligence Estimate on the Global Risk of Mass Atrocities
(and Prospects for International Response), completed in 2013, and
other resources provides a rigorous analytical framework that allows
the Board to anticipate and prepare for mass atrocities in the coming
years.
The State Department shares concerns and raises awareness about
countries at risk across the most appropriate channels of government.
The State Department and USAID have also developed an atrocities
assessment framework, which helps identify and assess countries at
risk. In addition, we have developed training specifically aimed at
sensitizing officers to early warning signs for atrocities. As in other
agencies, channels have been identified to allow Department officials
in the field or in Washington to share relevant unreported information
about mass atrocity risks with others in the Department and with
interagency colleagues.
Outside of the U.S. Government, we have strong relationships with
partner nations, the U.N., and the NGO community to share resources,
tools, and information on atrocity prevention and countries of concern.
The State Department has been the focal point for U.S. Government
support of the U.N.'s Human Rights up Front initiative, which aims at
improving the U.N.'s capacity to assess and respond to risks of mass
atrocities. The State Department and USAID also meet quarterly with the
NGO community to discuss countries and situations of concern and to
share early warning information, to the extent possible.
Question. Aside from the Atrocities Prevention Board as an
interagency process, how is the U.S. Government collaborating across
agencies to undertake early warning and prevention programming?
Answer. State and USAID collaborate across agencies to develop
joint assessments of countries at risk for atrocities and plans that
respond to this risk. Agencies play an important role in helping U.S.
missions identify the ways in which existing policies and programs may
be used to support prevention in specific contexts. This whole-of-
government approach has resulted in more comprehensive early warning
and prevention programming since we have access to information about
risk from different agencies. For example, State and USAID coordinate
closely to identify diplomatic engagement and programming on the ground
that is complementary. The Intelligence Community assists with analytic
support; DOD provides support relating to the security sector, and DOJ
the justice sector.
Question. How is the State Department utilizing money appropriated
to the Complex Crises Fund through Overseas Contingency Operations to
address unforeseen crises, particularly the prevention of atrocities
and violent conflict?
Answer. The $20 million in FY 2014 funding and $30 million in FY
2015 funding Congress appropriated to the Department of State in the
Complex Crises Fund (CCF) account via the Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) title has been held in reserve with funds from other
accounts to support the U.S. Government's response to unanticipated
contingencies and opportunities where additional resources are needed
to achieve important foreign policy, development, or national security
objectives. In the past, we have used such reserves to enable a quick
response to crises, for example, emergency peacekeeping requirements in
Mali, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan; immediate
reconstruction needs in the Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan; and
loan guarantees for Jordan and Ukraine.
The Department's intention is to use the FY 2014 and FY 2015 CCF
resources held in reserve consistent with the purposes of this account.
We are in the process of making final deliberations on the disposition
of the FY 2014 funds and intend to notify Congress in the near future
regarding the programs they will be used to fund.
Question. With the high-level prioritization on preventing violent
extremism, how does the State Department see this work intersecting
with the prevention of mass atrocities, recognizing that the drivers of
conflict are often the same? How are you working to ensure that both
are being prioritized?
Answer. The State Department views violent extremism and mass
atrocities as overlapping areas of concern that often share many of the
same underlying drivers. Both challenges are best addressed through a
preventive approach that mitigates the underlying conditions that give
rise to these problems before they grow and spread. We are working to
hone our understanding of the drivers of extremism and atrocities in a
wide range of countries, and to implement targeted, effective
interventions to prevent and mitigate them, whether these acts are
motivated by religious beliefs, ethnic or other political conflict, or
other factors.
Both issues are priorities of the President and the Department, and
our work on both is coordinated closely among the relevant bureaus,
particularly the country-specific experts and the functional bureaus
focused on various aspects of these prevention challenges. The
existence of policy processes and mechanisms focused on each of these
distinct, but related, challenges helps us ensure we do not neglect
either in a given country or region.
Our atrocities prevention agenda is advanced at the interagency
level through the whole-of-government Atrocities Prevention Board,
which helps us ensure that emerging risks are given appropriate
attention and consideration, as well as through numerous efforts within
State and USAID to reduce risk in a targeted set of countries and to
institutionalize atrocities prevention in our agencies through the
development of tools, lessons learned, and training.
Building on the success of the White House summit in February,
preventing violent extremism is being prioritized through the
international action agenda launched by delegates from more than 60
governments, civil society representatives from more than 50 countries,
and more than two dozen private sector leaders. This process is
building toward a Leaders' summit on the margins of the U.N. General
Assembly, where heads of governments, organizations, and corporations
will announce the programs and policies they have undertaken to address
the drivers of violent extremism and implement the action agenda.
Question. The new National Security Strategy elevates the need to
increase U.S. efforts to ``Build U.S. Capacity to Prevent Conflict''
and highlights conflict prevention as a core pillar of U.S. foreign
policy. Does the FY 2016 budget request increase funding for conflict
prevention? What bureaus or offices are primarily responsible for
elevating the U.S. efforts to ``Build U.S. Capacity to Prevent
Conflict?
Answer. Our FY 2016 request of $342.6 million for conflict
mitigation and reconciliation is an increase of $101.5 million (42
percent) above the FY 2014 level of $241.1 million, which reflects the
administration's increased support for conflict prevention. The request
includes funding in the Complex Crises Fund, Development Assistance,
Economic Support Fund, and Transition Initiatives accounts. There are
large increases requested for Burma, Central Asia, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Georgia, Lebanon, Somalia, Syria, and Ukraine, countries at
elevated risk of conflict.
The Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human
Rights (J) and constituent bureaus, along with USAID's Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), have primary
responsibility for U.S. Government efforts in building capacity to
prevent conflict. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development review
specifically created the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations (CSO)--part of the J family--to advance conflict prevention,
including analysis and planning, in support of U.S. policy and program
development. Mass atrocity prevention is a special area of focus. State
and USAID conflict prevention efforts, as requested in FY 2016, advance
U.S. national security by breaking cycles of violent conflict and
mitigating crises in priority countries, aiming to address the
underlying causes of destabilizing violence. Conflict prevention is a
key pillar of our work, and reinforces effectiveness in other security
challenges ranging from human trafficking to preventing and combating
violent extremism.
Question. In FY14, the U.S. Government mobilized a rapid and robust
response to prevent mass atrocities against civilians in the Central
African Republic under the auspices of Presidential Study Directive-10
to Prevent Genocide and Mass Atrocities (PSD-10). I am concerned that
U.S. attention to CAR has waned and that if efforts are not sustained
in this critical transition period, the Congress will be asked to once
again mobilize huge amounts of resources to prevent atrocities and save
human lives.
How are we sustaining engagement in the Central African
Republic to ensure that we build the foundations necessary for
sustainable recovery once and for all?
Answer. Our national interest is in seeing the Central African
Republic (CAR) become a stable, well-governed regional partner whose
citizens live in peace with one another and without the specter of
violence and hate has intensified, not waned. We are working with the
people and leaders of CAR and other international partners to stabilize
the country and put it on a trajectory toward long-term recovery and
prosperity, understanding that this effort requires helping CAR to
tackle the root causes of conflict, including intolerance and impunity,
lack of governance, and lack of economic development.
In support of these goals, we resumed operations at U.S. Embassy
Bangui in September 2014, after American staff had been absent for
almost 2 years due to security concerns. Our Embassy plays a key role
in establishing contacts and engaging with the CAR Government and
political, religious, civil society, and business leaders to promote
national reconciliation, a democratic political transition process, and
economic revitalization. In addition, senior U.S. Government leaders
remain closely engaged in CAR, including through the U.S. Special
Representative for the Central African Republic. USUN Ambassador
Samantha Power has visited the country and other high-level visits are
anticipated in the near future.
Major U.S. investments in humanitarian aid and peacekeeping support
in CAR have already saved lives, alleviated human suffering, and helped
address the current crisis. In FY 2014 and 2015, the United States
provided $195.7 million in humanitarian aid to address the CAR crisis.
We have provided $100 million to support the force contributing
countries of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
CAR (MINUSCA), in addition to our assessed contributions for the
mission.
To promote longer term national reconciliation and good governance,
we have invested $7.5 million in local-level peacebuilding and
community cohesion work to help reknit the communal ties that once held
disparate communities in CAR together. We have invested over $600,000
to support and expand the courageous work of CAR's faith leaders, who
have come together across religious lines to advocate for peace and
tolerance. We have dedicated $7 million to a CAR peace-building
partnership that will leverage additional private sector funding for
community-level peace and reconciliation work. We are investing $15.5
million to help reestablish CAR's criminal justice system, including
bolstering its capacity to address sexual and gender based violence. We
will continue to support CAR's planning for and execution of security
sector reform.
To support accountability and avoid repeating the long history of
impunity that has contributed to cycles of violence in CAR, the United
States supported the establishment of a U.N. Commission of Inquiry, and
supports the urgent consideration by the CAR Government of legislation
which would establish a domestic Special Penal Court to investigate and
hold accountable those responsible for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide.
I note that the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
(ICC), at the request of national authorities, will investigate
atrocities allegedly committed in the country since August 2012. The
United States has also implemented U.N. Security Council and targeted
U.S. sanctions against key individuals responsible for obstructing the
political process and violating human rights. These sanctions send a
powerful message that impunity will not be tolerated and that those who
threaten the stability of the CAR will face consequences.
To help support the political transition process leading to
elections, we have provided $300,000 to help CAR implement needed
technical fixes to its electoral code. A separate $300,000 program is
helping ensure that CAR's constitutional reform efforts--another key
element of the transition process--are as inclusive as possible.
We will continue to work with CAR and its international partners to
ensure that while addressing the crisis and saving lives, we help CAR
build the foundations for sustainable peace and prosperity by
addressing the underlying drivers of conflict.
Question. Embassy Management.--Agencies operating overseas continue
to express concerns about rising ICASS costs and low satisfaction with
the service provided. As ICASS costs are spread across numerous
agencies, many of which no longer can ``opt out,'' there is minimal
incentive to reduce costs.
What changes are being made to establish incentives to
manage ICASS cost increases for State and all agencies? What is
State doing to continually improve the quality of ICASS service
provision for its customers? How is State expanding the
utilization of alternative service providers where it may be
more cost effective for some or all agencies at post?
Answer. Survey data show that customers at post are satisfied with
the quality of ICASS services. The average customer satisfaction score
for the last 5 years is 4.09 on a scale of one to five, with five being
the highest. Satisfaction is trending up over the same period from 4.03
in 2011, to 4.16 in 2015. The average number of responses is 52,864 per
year over the last 5 years. The annual survey, sponsored by the
interagency funded ICASS Service Center, is administered by an
independent nonprofit quality management organization to all ICASS
customers worldwide. Policy supervision on the survey instrument is
provided by the interagency ICASS Working Group.
ICASS is a cooperative cost distribution system intended to lower
overall costs for the U.S. Government. It is a voluntary system with
the exception of medical, security, badging and credentialing, and
family support services. That being said, most agencies opt in to the
majority of services, including building operations, financial
management, building and residential security, and others, because they
lack the interest or the expertise to provide these services. The
system, according to GAO, produces positive economic benefits for the
U.S. Government. GAO's analysis of ICASS cost and workload data shows
that significant economies of scale can be achieved through greater
participation in ICASS.
The GAO concluded in 2012 (http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-
09317) that agencies opting out of ICASS because they believe they can
obtain less costly services on their own may actually increase the
overall cost to the U.S. Government. The GAO found that agencies that
withdraw from services do not usually provide any formal rationale to
ICASS management and often have not conducted any cost analysis to
justify their decisions; a September 2014 policy decision by the ICASS
Executive Board now requires agencies to complete an analysis before
withdrawing from services.
There are very strong incentives for the Department of State, as
the principal bill-payer, to contain the cost of services. The
Department of State accounts for an average of 72 percent of the annual
ICASS invoice. Thus, 72 cents of every dollar of cost containment
benefits the Department of State.
The Department has a history of innovating in order to provide
cost-effective, high quality administrative services around the world,
often in dangerous, remote, or inhospitable locations that may lack
basic infrastructure. The GAO closed a recommendation (effective March
14, 2014) in its duplication tracker concerning the issues of cost,
quality, and innovation. For example, State implemented a furniture
pool policy in 2012 that was adopted by the interagency in 2014, which
allowed for greater consolidation, and has already reduced or
eliminated warehouse facilities at six posts abroad. In addition, State
has contained the number of American and locally employed service
providers at high-threat posts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan--
where services are more expensive than at other posts within the
region--by expanding regional support models to provide administrative
services from safer and less expensive locations. Specific examples
include a unit created to provide administrative services for personnel
in Iraq from the U.S mission in Amman, Jordan, and providing some
information technology support services to the U.S. mission to
Afghanistan remotely from the U.S. mission in New Delhi, India. State
is promoting further consolidation of some human resource and
vouchering activities.
Along with interagency participation, State continues to improve
its processes through an ongoing initiative that involves reviewing the
levels of transactions and customer feedback for services. To date, an
interagency committee has recalibrated 10 service standards--or
criteria for effectively delivering services--for the four service
areas that represent the most highly requested services in the field
based on data collected over the last 4 years. State officials
indicated that these efforts are intended to ensure maximum
transparency to users regarding ICASS services, increasing customer
satisfaction and cost-effectiveness.
The option to select an alternative service provider (ASP) is a
customer-driven decision that is a long-standing policy in ICASS.
Interagency ICASS councils at overseas posts select and evaluate
service providers. Any agency can make a proposal to post-level ICASS
councils provided that they can service all agencies at that location.
This long-standing policy was restated in an official cable to all
missions in February 2012. State supports the use of ASPs when it is in
the best interest of the U.S. Government. USAID began providing
building services at a facility it recently opened in Pretoria, though
recent experience in Juba and Almaty--two posts that are converting to
State ICASS--indicate the challenges that smaller agencies have
providing the full spectrum of cost-effective, high-quality
administrative services to the entire USG population in remote
locations.
Question. In 2010, GAO reported that the comparatively larger size
of new embassy compounds and the complexity of their building systems
have resulted in higher operations and maintenance costs than at the
facilities they replaced. However, State's Long Range Plan does not
provide insight into operating costs, such as the costs for utilities,
which would be paid for through ICASS.
What actions has State taken to provide better information
on the operating costs of embassy buildings?
Answer. Providing safe, secure, and functional facilities for the
U.S. Government overseas requires the colocation of all U.S. Government
staff onto one secure compound. In many cases these posts had
previously been working in scattered, leased properties. In addition,
the modern security systems required in our new embassy and consulate
facilities operate 24-hours a day and require significant energy to
operate.
Despite these challenges, the Department has analyzed options and
implemented actions to reduce facility operating costs. For all new
construction, the Department requires a minimum Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design (LEED') silver certification and,
where possible and cost effective, gold and platinum are the goal. By
Earth Day (April 22) we will reach a milestone of 31 LEED Certified
facilities, which are modeled to use 27 percent less energy, 35 percent
less potable water, and 75 percent less irrigation water than industry
standard benchmarks as well as produce 41 percent less waste during
construction. For existing facilities we have implemented cost-
effective technologies for renewable energy sources such as solar and
wind power and rainwater harvesting and have provided more efficient
lighting and devices for reducing water use.
As noted, State and other agencies at overseas posts are
responsible for funding operations through the International
Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) process. The Bureau
of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) as part of the planning/design
process provides estimated costs to operate an NEC to its stakeholders
prior to opening a new facility.
Three major cost components are used in the development of the
buildings operating expense estimates for NEC/NCCs: 1. Local
Maintenance Labor Costs; 2. Local Service Contract Costs; and 3.
Utility Cost Estimates.
Question. Terrorists' ability to use fraudulent travel documents to
travel to the United States remains a national security concern. State
and other agencies try to address this by training foreign partners to
identify and interdict fraudulent travel documents. However, in 2011
GAO found that these training efforts are sometimes fragmented and not
well coordinated, including in key countries such as Pakistan.
What steps has State taken to improve coordination
regarding improving our foreign partners' capacity to identify
fraudulent travel documents?
Answer. The Department works closely on an ongoing basis with our
partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities to review
the tools at our disposal to hinder the use of fraudulent documents and
foreign fighter travel, while not interrupting legitimate travel.
The State Department, together with these interagency partners, has
in particular identified a mechanism for coordinating interagency
fraudulent document training efforts, in accordance with GAO findings.
At the same time, the U.S. Government continues to work closely with
our foreign partners--including our Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
partners--to resolve the identities of known or suspected violent
extremists and potential foreign fighter threats emanating from Syria
and Iraq, and continues to prioritize USG coordination of foreign
partner trainings abroad to ensure coordination of our diplomatic
efforts. Conducting trainings such as these improves the capacity of
partner countries to stem the flow of foreign fighters, identify them
in transit, and apprehend those who facilitate their travel.
Question. State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program is a
critical component of U.S. efforts to build our foreign partners'
capacity to combat terrorist organizations including al-Qaeda, Boko
Haram, and al-Shabaab. State is requesting $165 million in new funding
for this program. However, this past year, GAO reviewed
counterterrorism efforts in East and Northwest Africa and found that
State managers were unaware of unobligated balances in ATA funding over
several years, totaling millions of dollars.
Has State taken steps to address these deficiencies so we
can be confident that the ATA funds are well spent?
Answer. In order to enhance assurance that ATA program funds are
being spent wisely and delivering effective outcomes in building
civilian sector counterterrorism capacity, the Department has enhanced
its program management and monitoring and evaluation efforts, including
improved financial tracking and assessment of program outcomes.
Specifically, the Department is now collecting semiannual financial
data, as well as quarterly narrative reports to track results. It is
worth noting that a significant percentage of the ATA funding
referenced in the GAO reviews of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa
Counterterrorism (PREACT) was ultimately deobligated due to factors
beyond the Department's control, including security challenges and
political turmoil.
Question. Mr. Secretary, last year Congress passed substantial
legislation on both Ukraine and Venezuela, both bills calling for the
imposition of significant new sanctions as part of a broader U.S.
policy response to the significant acts of violence and human rights
abuses that were at play in both nations. I am concerned that in both
cases the situation has continued to deteriorate--and challenges to
U.S. interests and values continue to mount--yet the administration has
not yet availed itself of the tools that Congress, in these pieces of
legislation, has provided. While I would not suggest that these
sanctions are, or can be, the entirety of U.S. policy, surely they
represent an approach and effective leverage that must be part of the
U.S. response.
Can you please tell us where things stand with
implementation of these bills (the Venezuela sanctions were
mandatory, I would note) and what more the administration
intends to do to use the authorities Congress has provided--and
wants to see used?
Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned by Russia's
continued violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity,
and its increasing support for pro-Russia separatists in eastern
Ukraine. Additionally, we remain opposed to Russia's efforts to
increase its administrative, political, and economic control over the
Crimean peninsula. Crimea is sovereign Ukrainian territory and the
United States does not recognize Russia's attempted annexation.
The United States stands with Ukrainians as they forge a brighter
future for their nation and succeeding generations. In their October
2014 parliamentary elections, the people of Ukraine made a bold and
clear choice for democracy, reform, and European integration, showing
enthusiasm and support for parties with strong proreform agendas. The
United States remains committed to Ukrainian sovereignty and
territorial integrity and to increasing the costs for Russia should it
fail to implement its Minsk agreements fully. In close cooperation with
our international partners, we enacted a strong regime of targeted
sanctions on key sectors of the Russian economy including energy,
financial services, and defense. These sanctions, combined with
structural weaknesses in Russia's economy and low oil prices, have
produced undeniably negative effects--Russia suffered approximately
$150 billion of capital flight in 2014, the ruble is trading at all-
time lows against the dollar, and Russia's credit rating is at junk
level. Foreign investors are being frightened away and Russian economic
growth remains near zero and is projected to go into recession in 2015.
With respect to additional sanctions mandated by the Ukraine
Freedom Support Act (UFSA), President Obama determined that the
sanctions already imposed, including those against Rosoboronexport and
other Russian defense companies, satisfy the requirements of this
statute. We will continue to assess the situation in Ukraine to
determine whether additional sanctions are warranted, including under
the UFSA.
On March 9, the President announced a new Executive Order (E.O.)
``Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela,'' which implements and goes
beyond the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of
2014 (the Act) signed into law by President Obama on December 18, 2014.
We are committed to advancing respect for human rights, safeguarding
democratic institutions, and protecting the U.S. financial system from
the illicit financial flows from public corruption in Venezuela.
This measure targets persons involved in or responsible for:
actions that limit or prohibit freedom of expression or peaceful
assembly; significant acts of violence and human rights violations; and
abuses in response to antigovernment protest. It also covers those
involved in actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or
institutions, and public corruption within the Government of Venezuela.
The E.O. neither targets the people nor the economy of Venezuela.
Individuals sanctioned under the E.O., including the seven named in
the Annex to the E.O., will have their property and interests in
property, subject to U.S. jurisdiction, blocked. U.S. persons, wherever
located, are generally prohibited from engaging in any dealings with
listed individuals. The E.O. suspends the entry into the United States
of any individual designated pursuant to the E.O.
We will continue our investigations pursuant to these authorities
and stand prepared to take action against others as additional
information becomes available and is assessed.
We will continue to work closely with Congress and others in the
region to support greater political expression in Venezuela, and to
encourage the Venezuelan Government to live up to its commitment to
democracy, as articulated in the OAS Charter, the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, and other relevant instruments related to democracy
and human rights.
Question. With respect to Ukraine, I understand that there are
individuals on the EU and Canadian targeted sanctions list who do not
appear on the American list. Why is this the case? Perhaps the most
egregious example is Alexander Bortnikov, the head of the Russian FSB.
Mr. Bortnikov is not on the U.S. lists in relation to either Ukraine or
the Magnitsky act, but is on EU and Canadian lists. To make matters
worse, Mr. Bortnikov was in the United States last week for President
Obama's CVE conference.
Could you please explain the administration's policy as it
relates to Mr. Bortnikov and others who clearly belong on the
U.S. targeted sanctions list?
Answer. The United States has been working closely with our G7 and
European partners and allies to design measures that are coordinated
and well-aligned. Together we have already enacted a strong regime of
sectoral sanctions on key sectors of the Russian economy including
energy, financial services, and defense that are imposing serious costs
on Russia.
While we do not comment on specific cases, we have designated many
of those directly involved in destabilizing Ukraine, including senior
Russian officials such as FSB Colonel-General Sergey Beseda, head of
the FSB's Fifth Service, also known as the Service for Operational
Information and International Communications.
While the measures the EU has taken are not identical to ours, the
clear message is that both we and the EU have determined that Russia's
actions require us to impose costs. EU travel restrictions do not apply
to U.S. travel, much in the same way that U.S. travel restrictions
would not apply to travel to the EU. We continue to consult with our
European partners on further sanctions pressure should Russia fail to
implement Minsk.
Question. The new IMF program for Ukraine will bring the Fund's
total assistance to that country to more than $22 billion. The IMF has
indicated that it expects foreign assistance for Ukraine to total $40
billion over the next 4 years.
Where concretely is the rest of that money coming from? How
confident are you that Ukraine will actually receive the full
sum?
If Congress was to make additional funding available for
assistance to Ukraine, how do you believe the money would best
be allocated between economic and military assistance?
Answer. On February 12 the IMF announced a 4-year Extended Fund
Facility (EFF) of $17.5 billion. The IMF expects its program will be
complemented by additional $10 billion in bilateral and multilateral
assistance, including from the World Bank, the European Union, and the
United States. The United States has pledged up to $2 billion in loan
guarantees in 2015 to contribute to this effort, contingent upon
Ukraine's continued progress implementing its IMF program and the
support of Congress. The United States will work with various
stakeholders to ensure Ukraine receives the assistance it needs to
implement its reform agenda.
Ukraine also anticipates that upcoming consultations with creditors
will free up $12.5 billion or more through the 4-year EFF, though
details of the arrangements are not yet known.
If Congress were to make additional funding available, the
administration could use it to help Ukraine meet its financing needs as
well as to address a range of other urgent priorities. This would
include assistance to help Ukraine strengthen its sovereignty and
territorial integrity, address pressing humanitarian needs, enhance its
economic resilience, increase its energy security, fight corruption,
and advance key democratic and economic reforms.
Question. There are reports that the administration is using back
channels to Russia as a means toward finding areas of common interest
and perhaps an ``off ramp,'' as they call it, for Russia with respect
to sanctions over its aggression in Ukraine.
Do you think there is an appropriate ``off ramp'' to the
current tension between the United States, Europe, and Russia?
Have you seen any indication that the Russian position on
Ukraine has changed, or that it will be less assertive in its
so-called ``near abroad''?
How do we both find an off-ramp and at the same time uphold
the proposition, which I agree with strongly, that a country
can't simply be allowed to slice off a part of another country?
I am concerned that sanctions pressure, particularly among the
Europeans, will diminish before we see a significant change in the
Russian stance in Ukraine, across Eastern Europe or elsewhere in the
former Soviet space . . . and that unless we see a change and a
willingness by Putin and Russia to be part of the solution, not the
cause of the problem, the broader implications for stability in Europe
are deeply troublesome.
Answer. Our focus from the outset of the crisis has been on
supporting Ukraine and on pursuing a diplomatic solution that respects
Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. What we have clearly
seen over the past year is activity by Russia that flagrantly violates
the territorial integrity of the sovereign nation of Ukraine, including
Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of the Crimean peninsula,
and its actions in support of pro-Russia separatists in eastern
Ukraine.
Russia and the separatists continue to fail to fulfill all of the
commitments to which they have signed up in the Minsk agreements and
the February 12 implementation plan, which is simply unacceptable. If
their failure to comply with these commitments continues, there will be
further consequences that would place added strains on Russia's already
troubled economy. We will work closely with our allies and partners to
ensure that additional costs are imposed together, which greatly
magnifies their impact.
If, on the other hand, Russia and the separatists it backs fully
implement their commitments under the Minsk agreements of September
2014 and the commitments under the February 12 implementation plan, we
will begin to roll back sanctions. This includes the complete
withdrawal of all heavy weapons and foreign fighters from Ukraine, full
and unfettered access by international monitors to separatist-
controlled territory to verify cease-fire and withdrawal compliance,
and the release of all hostages. Crucially, the conditions for rolling
back sanctions also include the restoration to Kiev the control of its
side of the border with Russia.
Question. As a Senator, you condemned the recall of U.S. Ambassador
to Armenia, John Evans, in 2006, after he spoke honestly about the
Armenian Genocide. I understand that at the business meeting to confirm
Ambassador Evans' replacement, you voted against the nominee on
principle stating, ``For us to recall an ambassador because he utters
the word ``genocide,'' is to cow-tow, to cave-in to those who change
history, something we are witnessing today with [President] Ahmadinajad
in Iran who says the Holocaust didn't exist. So it is even more
important that we say something to the contrary. We are not going to
allow revisionism. We are not going to allow people to push the United
States of America around and say what you can and can't say about
what's happening with respect to history. We honor history and we honor
the truth. I don't think we do so if we allow this administration to
take the contrary policy.''
On this 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, will
you allow our U.S. Ambassador to Armenia, Richard Mills, to
``honor history'' and ``honor truth'' by allowing him to speak
frankly, openly and honestly about the Armenian Genocide?
Answer. The United States recognizes the events of 1915 as one of
the greatest tragedies of the 20th century. This year's commemoration
will have special resonance, as Armenia and the world mark the
centenary of the atrocities, when 1.5 million Armenians were massacred
or marched to their deaths in the final days of the Ottoman Empire. Our
objective is to honor this centenary by standing in solidarity with the
Armenian people to acknowledge the tragic events of 1915, honoring
those--including the many Americans--who reached out to assist the
victims. Acknowledging the painful elements of the past will help lead
to the reconciliation needed to heal the wounds of the past so the
Turkish and Armenian peoples can move forward together in a shared
future of security and prosperity in the region. No decision has yet
been made on who will officially represent the U.S. Government at this
year's memorial events in Yerevan, but Ambassador Mills will certainly
participate.
Question. The renewal of the mandate for the U.N. Peacekeeping
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) will occur in July 2015. The United States
contributes funding to support this and other important U.N.
peacekeeping operations globally. As part of the U.N.'s mandate in
Cyprus, it participates in the peace negotiations between the Greek and
Turkish Cypriots, which restarted in February 2014 but have been
suspended until Turkey withdraws its research vessel Barbaros from
Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone.
What is the administration's policy on Turkey's continued
provocations in Cyprus' EEZ? How is the administration working
with all parties to create an environment that is conducive to
restarting peace talks aimed at fulfilling the bizonal,
bicommunal federation that was agreed to by both parties in the
joint communique of February 2014?
Answer. The Obama administration remains strongly committed to
supporting efforts to reach a just and lasting settlement to reunify
the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation. We support the Republic
of Cyprus' right to develop its hydrocarbon resources in its exclusive
economic zone and believe that revenues from the resources should be
shared equitably between both communities within the context of an
overall settlement. Reducing tensions and getting the parties back to
the negotiating table as soon as possible are critical to advancing the
peace process.
The administration continues to engage actively with all
stakeholders, and in support of United Nations Special Advisor Espen
Barth Eide's efforts to reduce tensions, move past the current impasse,
and resume talks. Recent senior-level engagement includes Vice
President Biden's November 2014 visit to Turkey, where he discussed
Cyprus with government leaders. Following a meeting with Turkish
President Erdogan, the Vice President emphasized the need to ``focus on
de-escalating tensions and returning to the negotiating table.'' In
addition, Secretary Kerry met with Cypriot President Anastasiades on
the margins of the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2015.
Question. How much does the United States spend on anti-Semitism
programs in Europe? Please provide information on programs conducted
through the Special Envoy's office as well as those conducted by all
other U.S. Government-funded implementers. Which countries in Europe
have appointed Special Envoys to combat anti-Semitism abroad and within
their own countries? Which countries in Europe have dedicated funding
to confront anti-Semitism internally and abroad?
Answer. DRL is currently spending approximately $796,000 on
programs worldwide that seek to: combat public and online anti-Semitic
rhetoric; create coalitions of NGOs to combat anti-Semitism; and
promote Holocaust education. We do not delineate this data by region.
In order to protect program participants, DRL does not share details
about the programs it is funding in writing. However, DRL would be
happy to provide an in-person briefing on all of its activities related
to monitoring and combating anti-Semitism.
The Special Envoy for Anti-Semitism, Ira Forman, routinely travels
to Europe to meet with elected officials, religious leaders, and
leaders within civil society to discuss ways to monitor and combat
anti-Semitism in Europe. Furthermore, the Office of the Special Envoy
for Holocaust Issues works with European-based international
organizations, such as the European Shoah Legacy Institute, the
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, and the International
Tracing Service, and it manages the State Department's $15 million
contribution to the Auschwitz-Birkenau Foundation. The Special Envoy
for Holocaust Issues engages these organizations to ensure they are
effective multipliers in teaching the lessons of the Holocaust and in
using Holocaust education to combat anti-Semitism. The European members
of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance include: Austria,
Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
The Department of State is aware of special envoys that focus on
the Holocaust and anti-Semitism in the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Spain, and Greece. Additionally, the European Parliament has a Working
Group on Freedom of Religion or Belief and anti-Semitism. Through the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United
States actively supports the Chairmanship's Personal Representatives on
Tolerance and other programs to combat anti-Semitism and other forms of
intolerance throughout the OSCE area. In November 2014, the United
States sent a Presidential delegation led by Samantha Power, the U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, to attend the 10th
anniversary commemoration of the OSCE Berlin Conference on Anti-
Semitism. This was followed by the adoption of a declaration to enhance
efforts to combat anti-Semitism during the OSCE foreign ministerial
meeting in Basel, Switzerland, in December 2014.
Question. When Turkey entered Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
last October with its seismic vessel the Barbaros accompanied by
Turkish warships, I sent a letter to Vice President Biden calling on
the administration to join the European Union and the United Nations in
publicly condemning Turkey's actions and call for the immediate
withdrawal of the Barbaros from Cyprus' EEZ. I have not yet received a
response to my letter. As stated in your testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on February 24, you have had several
meetings on this issue. Unfortunately there has been no discernable
progress. Peace negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots
have been suspended until Turkey withdraws its ships.
What is the administration's policy on Turkey's continued
provocations in Cyprus' EEZ? What specific diplomatic steps
will the administration take to encourage Turkey's withdrawal
from Cyprus' EEZ?
Answer. The Obama administration remains strongly committed to
supporting efforts to reach a just and lasting settlement to reunify
the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation. We support the Republic
of Cyprus' right to develop its hydrocarbon resources in its exclusive
economic zone and believe that revenues from the resources should be
shared equitably between both communities within the context of an
overall settlement. Reducing tensions and getting the parties back to
the negotiating table as soon as possible are critical to advancing the
peace process.
The administration continues to engage actively with all
stakeholders, and in support of United Nations Special Advisor Espen
Barth Eide's efforts to reduce tensions, move past the current impasse,
and resume talks. Recent senior-level engagement includes Vice
President Biden's November 2014 visit to Turkey, where he discussed
Cyprus with government leaders. Following a meeting with Turkish
President Erdogan, the Vice President emphasized the need to ``focus on
de-escalating tensions and returning to the negotiating table.'' In
addition, Secretary Kerry met with Cypriot President Anastasiades on
the margins of the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2015.
Question. How do you evaluate the socioeconomic impact on the
countries of Central Asia of the economic downturn in Russia? Will the
United States provide additional assistance to help ameliorate these
consequences and, if so, will any new assistance include human rights/
democratization conditionality?
Answer. We recognize the impact that the economic downturn in
Russia is having on the peoples and economies of Central Asia and are
working with our Central Asian partners to support strong and
diversified economic development. Central Asian economies are closely
linked to the Russian economy--from business and financial ties to the
remittances many Central Asian migrant workers send home to their
families. Russia's downturn, coupled with the depreciation of the
ruble, has reduced Russian demand for imports from Central Asia and
made Russian nonoil exports more competitive in Central Asian markets.
It has also reduced remittance flows, particularly to Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, where governments must deal not only with
the challenge of reduced financial flows but also with providing social
support and employment opportunities for workers returning from Russia.
To address these challenges, we have encouraged Central Asian
countries to adopt economic reforms to make their markets more
competitive and attractive to foreign investment, while also supporting
efforts to build diverse trade linkages among Central Asian economies
and with the growing economies of South Asia. This is a key goal of our
New Silk Road initiative, including support for projects like CASA-
1000. USAID's Regional Economic Cooperation program (REC) has organized
successful trade fairs and forums to introduce businesses from Central
Asia to those in South Asia.
Through a U.S. grant to the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), we assisted 76 small and medium enterprises of the
region in meeting requirements of more sophisticated markets, including
those in Western Europe and North America. Companies receive mentorship
from local and international experts in their sector. As a result of
this project, these companies successfully raised $87 million of
external financing, including $26 million from EBRD.
Membership in the World Trade Organization can also deepen Central
Asia's links to the global economy, and we welcome Kazakhstan's efforts
to join Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as a WTO member, as well as
expressions of interest from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. We regularly
address these and other issues through the Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement discussions with Central Asia and through working
groups targeting customs reform, nontariff barriers to trade and
phytosanitary standards.
Additional resources have been requested in the President's FY 2016
budget to build on past programs and further increase the economic
resiliency of the Central Asian countries. The additional funds will
focus on supporting job creation activities to address the growing
number of unemployed returned migrant workers from Russia, and the
decreasing flow of remittances.
Meanwhile, human rights and good governance will remain central
components of our bilateral relationships with our Central Asian
partners. We consistently press our partners to take an approach that
is more responsive to human needs and more accountable to the
citizenry. Those goals will be integral to any assistance we provide in
response to the current economic downturn as well and, in fact, built
into program design. For example, to address concerns about
transparency and accountability in the Central Asian states, we prefer
to utilize technical assistance, training and exchanges in these
countries, rather than providing budget support to government agencies.
We also use our programs to promote constructive interaction between
government and civil society organizations, as a way of providing
models for government transparency and illustrating the useful role
civil society plays in a developed, democratic society.
Question. Sri Lanka.--The recent historic elections in Sri Lanka
could serve as an important inflection point for U.S. relations with
the country, but concerns remain with respect to accountability
following the end of the country's brutal civil war. I am concerned
that pressure on Sri Lanka for accountability will diminish in the
coming months. I am very cognizant of the pressures that the new
government is under, but the United States cannot in any way diminish
the constructive role that it has played in recent years in support of
human rights and the democratic process.
(a) Will the United States continue to support the U.N.'s
investigation into Sri Lanka's civil war?
Answer (a). The United States fully supports the U.N.'s
investigation, and we look forward to reviewing the investigation's
findings and recommendations.
(b) Does the administration support the release of UNHRC's
report in September? Are there any circumstances under which
the United States would not support the release of the report
in September?
Answer (b). The administration supports the release of the U.N.
investigation's report in August, as well as the presentation of the
report to the U.N. Human Rights Council during the September 2015
session. We have emphasized to U.N. High Commissioner Zeid, U.N. Human
Rights Council member states, and the Sri Lankan Government that the
report must be presented at the September 2015 session.
(c) If the Sri Lankan Government does not implement a
credible domestic investigation, how would this impact U.S.
relations with the country?
Answer (c). We commend the important steps already taken by the
Sirisena Government and welcome its pledges to address reconciliation
and accountability issues. The United States will continue to encourage
and support credible, transparent, and independent justice mechanisms.
We will not waver from our commitment to supporting efforts to ensure
respect for human rights and the promotion of justice, accountability,
and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans.
(d) How much funding does the USG and NED currently provide
for democracy programs in Sri Lanka? Will the administration
increase democracy and governance programs to Sri Lanka in the
wake of this political opening?
Answer. The United States Government currently provides $1.6M in
FY14 assistance for democracy and governance programs that support
training for investigative reporting with a focus on the parliamentary
elections and post-election accountability, as well as advocacy for the
Right to Information Act. USAID currently provides $1M in FY14 within
the democracy and governance sector, primarily supporting civil
society's work with vulnerable groups to protect human rights, enhance
civic dialogue and peace-building, combat gender-based violence,
document land claims, and provide legal aid services. USAID is
currently reviewing its FY15 contributions based on the changed
political environment after January's change in government.
NED is providing $670,000 in FY 2014 assistance on grants in Sri
Lanka. The Endowment grants will focus on the rollback of authoritarian
practices and reestablishment of institutions that promote democratic
governance. NED will continue to focus on programs promoting a
democratic reform agenda within both majority and minority communities,
including promoting tolerance; addressing wartime accountability and
reconciliation; encouraging greater civic participation in political
processes; promoting good governance at the local level; and
strengthening the rule of law and independence of the judiciary. The
U.S. Government continues to assess the situation in Sri Lanka to
determine what additional resources are necessary to support democracy
and governance and how they might best be directed.
(e) I am very concerned that the United States will move
too quickly in enhancing security assistance and programming
with the Sri Lankan military in the wake of these political
changes. Please provide a full summary of current U.S.
programming in this area. Are there plans to expand this
programming in FY15 or FY16? If so, please provide a detailed
description of what is planned.
Answer (e). There is no Foreign Military Financing programmed for
Sri Lanka in FY15 or FY16. Decisions have not yet been made about out-
year funding. We continue investing in the enhanced International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program in Sri Lanka to deepen
respect for democracy and human rights in the military. For FY15 we
requested $500,000 IMET for Sri Lanka and for FY16 the OMB submission
was also $500,000.
Current defense engagement with Sri Lanka is limited to a few key
areas, including maritime security, human rights education, demining
support, and classroom training focused on peacekeeping and disaster
response. The United States is closely monitoring changes to the Sri
Lankan military under the Sirisena administration, including changes to
personnel, policies, and military culture. We can envision benefits to
both our countries, and to peace and security in the Indian Ocean
region as a result of a strengthened military relationship in tandem
with progress on reconciliation, accountability, and human rights.
Future security assistance and programming will also be greatly
influenced by efforts to hold human rights violators accountable as
well as greater institutional reforms, and Leahy and other human rights
vetting procedures will continue. We will continue to urge reforms to
ensure the Sri Lanka military functions as a professional, peacetime
force.
(f) Will the United States continue to support the U.N.'s
investigation into Sri Lanka's civil war?
Answer (f). The United States fully supports the U.N.'s
investigation, and we look forward to reviewing the investigation's
findings and recommendations.
(g) Does the administration support the release of UNHRC's
report in September? Are there any circumstances under which
the United States would not support the release of the report
in September?
Answer (g). The administration supports the release of the U.N.
investigation's report in August, as well as the presentation of the
report to the U.N. Human Rights Council during the September 2015
session. We have emphasized to U.N. High Commissioner Zeid, U.N. Human
Rights Council member states, and the Sri Lankan Government that the
report must be presented at the September 2015 session.
(h) If the Sri Lankan Government does not implement a
credible domestic investigation, how would this impact U.S.
relations with the country?
Answer (h). We commend the important steps already taken by the
Sirisena Government and welcome its pledges to address reconciliation
and accountability issues. The United States will continue to encourage
and support credible, transparent, and independent justice mechanisms.
We will not waver from our commitment to supporting efforts to ensure
respect for human rights and the promotion of justice, accountability,
and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans.
(i) How much funding does the USG and NED currently provide
for democracy programs in Sri Lanka? Will the administration
increase democracy and governance programs to Sri Lanka in the
wake of this political opening?
Answer (i). The United States Government currently provides $1.6M
in FY14 assistance for democracy and governance programs that support
training for investigative reporting with a focus on the parliamentary
elections and post-election accountability, as well as advocacy for the
Right to Information Act. USAID currently provides $1M in FY14 within
the democracy and governance sector, primarily supporting civil
society's work with vulnerable groups to protect human rights, enhance
civic dialogue and peace-building, combat gender-based violence,
document land claims, and provide legal aid services. USAID is
currently reviewing its FY15 contributions based on the changed
political environment after January's change in government.
NED is providing $670,000 in FY 2014 assistance on grants in Sri
Lanka. The Endowment grants will focus on the rollback of authoritarian
practices and reestablishment of institutions that promote democratic
governance. NED will continue to focus on programs promoting a
democratic reform agenda within both majority and minority communities,
including promoting tolerance; addressing wartime accountability and
reconciliation; encouraging greater civic participation in political
processes; promoting good governance at the local level; and
strengthening the rule of law and independence of the judiciary. The
U.S. Government continues to assess the situation in Sri Lanka to
determine what additional resources are necessary to support democracy
and governance and how they might best be directed.
(j) I am very concerned that the United States will move
too quickly in enhancing security assistance and programming
with the Sri Lankan military in the wake of these political
changes. Please provide a full summary of current U.S.
programming in this area. Are there plans to expand this
programming in FY15 or FY16? If so, please provide a detailed
description of what is planned.
Answer (j). There is no Foreign Military Financing programmed for
Sri Lanka in FY15 or FY16. Decisions have not yet been made about out-
year funding. We continue investing in the expanded International
Military Education and Training (e-IMET) program in Sri Lanka to deepen
respect for democracy and human rights in the military. For FY15 we
requested $500,000 IMET for Sri Lanka and for FY16 the OMB submission
was also $500,000.
Current defense engagement with Sri Lanka is limited to a few key
areas, including maritime security, human rights education, demining
support, and classroom training focused on peacekeeping and disaster
response. The United States is closely monitoring changes to the Sri
Lankan military under the Sirisena administration, including changes to
personnel, policies, and military culture. We can envision benefits to
both our countries, and to peace and security in the Indian Ocean
region as a result of a strengthened military relationship in tandem
with progress on reconciliation, accountability, and human rights.
Future security assistance and programming will also be greatly
influenced by efforts to hold human rights violators accountable as
well as greater institutional reforms, and Leahy and other human rights
vetting procedures will continue. We will continue to urge reforms to
ensure the Sri Lanka military functions as a professional, peacetime
force.
Question. I am very concerned about the political deadlock and
associated violence in Bangladesh. I strongly support a robust dialogue
between the two main parties in order for political disagreements to be
discussed around a table and not violently fought in the streets.
How are you using all the democracy and governance
programming tools at your disposal to ensure that the United
States can play an objective, nonpartisan, and constructive
role in supporting more nonviolent and constructive Bangladeshi
political process?
Do I have your commitment that the State Department and
USAID will continue to conduct robust programming in support of
freedom of association in Bangladesh?
I have been a strong supporter of the deployment of a
Department of Labor attache to work on freedom of association
issues in Bangladesh. The State Department should continue this
important program and I urge you to consider it elsewhere in
posts where freedom of association is under assault. Is the
State Department considering similar arrangements elsewhere? If
so where and in what capacity?
Answer. We share your concerns and are working to foster an end to
the current political violence, which has killed innocent Bangladeshis
and disrupted daily life throughout the country. We condemn violence by
any party toward political objectives, which is unacceptable in a
democracy. We also urge the Government of Bangladesh to ensure the
necessary space for peaceful political disagreement. Such space for
free association and expression must be used responsibly by the
opposition.
We continue to use all of the tools at our disposal to support
Bangladesh's democratic traditions. Our democracy and governance
programs bolster the independent institutions and civil society
organizations that underpin a democracy and empower youth to serve as
agents of positive social change. Following the January 5, 2014,
elections, USAID restructured the Bangladesh Election Support
Activities project to withdraw direct support for members of the
government and promote constructive engagement of civil society and
media, as well as women and youth across the political spectrum.
USAID's $12 million, 5-year Democratic Participation and Reform project
works to improve leadership roles by women and youth in political
parties; helps political parties with research-based data in
decisionmaking; and assists parties in messaging and media outreach,
organizational best practices, and compliance with electoral law.
The administration remains committed to robust programming in
support of freedom of association in Bangladesh. U.S. programs on labor
empower Bangladeshi workers to organize, help strengthen the
independence and good governance of trade unions, and facilitate modern
industrial relations.
The State Department and Department of Labor work together closely
on labor diplomacy, including the labor attache program in Bangladesh.
The State Department has over 30 designated labor officer positions
overseas who promote respect for labor rights, but the State Department
and Department of Labor are looking to further expand the labor attache
program. We have established a labor attache position at U.S. Embassy
Bogota, whose duties will include helping to facilitate full
implementation of the Labor Action Plan, and we will continue to
identify future positions.
Question. Over the last year it has become clear that the GOB has
refused to protect the rights of garment workers to organize
independent unions and has instead blamed outside conspirators and
foreign elements for trying to destroy the country's garment industry.
We know that our Embassy has worked with other Embassies in Dhaka to
press the GOB to enforce its labor laws but progress has been slow.
What strategy does the State Department have to increase
pressure on the GOB? For example, would the Department consider
a joint mission with Assistant Secretary level envoys from
Europe to press the issue with officials in Dhaka?
We know the problems of the Bangladeshi garment industry
did not arise over night and will not be solved easily.
Congress over the past 2 years has made it clear that the State
Department and USAID need to have a long-term commitment to
fighting worker exploitation--we know that conditions in other
countries will not improve as long as Bangladesh sets the floor
for global garment production. Has the State Department adopted
a strategic approach to fighting worker exploitation?
How is this reflected in the State Department and USAID
budget?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Dhaka is working closely with our
partners in the international community toward greater progress on
worker safety and labor rights by engaging with the Ministries of
Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Labor. In Washington, the State
Department is working strategically with counterparts in USAID, USTR,
and the Department of Labor to provide technical expertise and funding
for Bangladesh. Together with the EU we are exploring the options for a
joint high level meeting in Dhaka to follow up on the commitments
Bangladesh made in the EU-U.S.-Bangladesh-International Labor
Organization (ILO) Sustainability Compact. We will continue to use the
Compact and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Action Plan to
urge the Government of Bangladesh to ensure free association and
protect workers' rights and safety.
Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Nisha
Biswal regularly raises labor issues in her meetings with senior
government officials, including her visit to Dhaka in November 2014 and
during the visit of Foreign Minister Ali in February 2015, and will
continue to do so on future trips to Dhaka. Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs Charles H. Rivkin traveled to Bangladesh
in November 2014 to encourage labor, business, and government leaders
to address labor rights. Newly appointed State Department Special
Representative for International Labor Affairs, Sarah Fox, will play an
important role to promote workers' rights and improve economic security
and working conditions, and stands ready to visit Bangladesh as needed.
In accordance with FY14 appropriations legislation, the State
Department, through our Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Rights (DRL), and USAID have allocated funding for programs to carry
out a strategy based primarily on a 2014 joint USAID-Department of
State-Department of Labor assessment to address worker exploitation.
USAID is in the process of evaluating proposals for a new $5 million 3-
year ``Workers' Empowerment Program'' on labor concerns such as
protection of labor organizers, workplace safety, mitigation of
environmental hazards, and lack of enforcement for accurate and timely
payment of wages. The $3.2 million USAID Global Labor Program trained
workers and provide legal and technical assistance on labor laws and
organizing, while $4.7 million from USAID and the Department of Labor
supports the ILO's efforts to improve workers' rights and factor
safety. DRL is reviewing submissions for a program to promote core
labor standards, including occupational safety and health, in
Bangladesh.
Beyond Bangladesh, the U.S. Government globally advances freedom of
association and respect for internationally recognized labor rights by
promoting inclusive economic growth, supporting freedom of association
and healthy industrial relations systems, pursuing trade policies that
support more widely shared prosperity, and advocating for business to
respect human rights.
Question. What further steps can we take to ensure a more stable
operating environment for international civil society groups in
Pakistan?
Answer. The ability of civil society groups to operate in a
predictable, transparent, and legal basis in Pakistan is important for
Pakistan's stability and democratic growth, and is an issue we take
very seriously. A handful of U.S.-based INGOs have sought U.S.
intervention with the Ministry of Finance's Economic Affairs Division
(EAD), which is responsible for implementing the Government of
Pakistan's relatively new policy on international nongovernmental
organization (INGO) registration that came into force in 2013. In
recent meetings with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Interior Minister
Chaudhry Nisar, I raised issues faced by INGOs. Other U.S. officials,
including Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Feldman
and Ambassador Olson, have also raised specific concerns, including the
slow registration process and the need for timely issuances of No
Objection Certificates (NOCs), with relevant Pakistani officials on a
number of occasions over the last several months. The Department, in
all appropriate channels, will continue to engage on this issue.
While the registration process is unacceptably slow, it is moving.
As of late February, the Pakistani Government has finalized memoranda
of understanding with 19 out of 59 INGOs that have applied under the
2013 Registration Policy. While it is likely all INGOs are undergoing
additional scrutiny under the current registration process, we have no
reason to believe the Pakistani Government is targeting specific INGOs
only due to their particular work in-country. Pakistani officials have
also stated this position clearly to us, in response to our specific
questions. The bureaucracy associated with the new policy has
absolutely resulted in a slowdown in the registration process for all
INGOs operating in Pakistan. We recognize the importance of this issue,
will monitor further developments as they unfold, maintain close
contact with affected INGOs, and continue to work with like-minded
countries to push for a positive resolution.
Question. With the U.S.-Pakistan partnership now on better footing
and the war in Afghanistan over, it would seem the administration's
need to maintain the status quo with Uzbekistan has diminished. As you
know, that country has a particularly appalling record on religious
freedom and human rights, which has led the State Department
designating it a ``Country of Particular Concern'' (CPC) annually since
2006. Despite the tools available, there's been no further action
outside the annual designation due to a waiver that's been in place
since January 2009. In light of the larger geopolitical changes, how do
you justify the continued use of this waiver given that Uzbekistan
still regularly arrests, imprisons, and tortures people for the
peaceful exercise of their religious beliefs?
Answer. The United States has enduring national security interests
in Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, that go beyond the effort to
stabilize Afghanistan. We seek to ensure that the region does not
become a safe haven for terrorists that could threaten the United
States. As with the rest of the Central Asian states, we support
Uzbekistan's independence and sovereignty, and would like to see it
develop as a stable and prosperous nation, better integrated into the
broader region. Our strongly held belief is that these goals can only
be achieved if Uzbekistan also develops a more open, accountable, and
democratic system, that respects fundamental human rights, including
the right of its citizens to worship freely. For this reason, we
constantly raise human rights concerns with the highest levels of the
Government of Uzbekistan.
CPC designations and accompanying sanctions are a valuable tool to
advance our religious freedom agenda, but in addition to sanctions,
there are many other tools at our disposal, such as our bilateral and
multilateral engagement. We frequently recommend policy and legislative
changes, and offer our support to achieve these changes. Progress has
been very slow, but Uzbekistan is aware of our priorities and that,
without progress, we cannot realize the full potential of our bilateral
relationship. Religious freedom equities are an integral component of
our U.S.-Uzbekistan Annual Bilateral Consultations, where we discuss
opportunities for progress in the coming year. This year, we anticipate
some exchanges that should allow us to discuss the technical aspects of
our recommendations in further detail.
One recent positive development was the release of a number of
religious prisoners in February 2015 as part of Uzbekistan's annual
humanitarian amnesty, including journalist Khayrullo Khamidov, whose
case has been mentioned in the State Department's International
Religious Freedom Report. Additionally, based on the latest reports
from the human rights community, we have also heard reports of up to 50
religious prisoners released in this year's general amnesty.
On July 28, 2014, the Secretary of State waived sanctions for
Uzbekistan pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998,
determining that ``the important national interest of the United States
requires the exercise of such waiver authority.'' Though our relations
with Pakistan have improved since the disruption of the supply lines
for our troops in Afghanistan in 2012, it is critical that the United
States maintain alternative routes for supplies to and from Afghanistan
for as long U.S. troops remain on the ground there. Although the U.S.
combat mission has concluded, we continue to have roughly 10,000 U.S.
troops in Afghanistan supporting the NATO mission to train, advise, and
assist the Afghan National Security and Defense Forces (ANSDF). It is
also important that the United States maintain the ability to support
the ANSDF with supplies and equipment. Uzbekistan remains a vital link
in the Northern Distribution Network, and as such, is an important
partner in the region.
Question. Overall declining funding levels for democracy and
governance assistance by USAID--from $2.2 billion in FY 2009 to $1.4
billion in FY 2014--are deeply concerning. It is good to see that this
year's budget includes a $1 billion initiative to address root causes
of social, political, and economic instability in Latin America,
including democracy, human rights and governance (DRG) funding as well
as proposed doubling of the DRG budget for Africa from FY 2014 levels.
In advance of FY 2016, the administration is now determining the FY
2015 653(b) level and we hope to see $1.8 billion for DRG funding which
is the level that was provided for the Omnibus appropriations bill. If
the global decline is not reversed, the United States will forfeit its
leadership role on democracy issues, resulting in further democratic
setbacks in the developing world. Our overall foreign aid objectives
are going to suffer unless our programming reflects the direct linkages
between political and economic development.
What levels do you expect to see for global DRG funding
through the FY16 request? How would you propose to ensure to
match these resources with the areas where they can make the
greatest impact in mitigating crises and solidifying democratic
progress?
Answer. For FY 2016, the administration has requested $2.9 billion
for global DRG assistance, the same as the FY 2014 request, but an
increase of nearly $1.0 billion (50 percent) over the FY 2014 Actuals,
reflecting a strong support for democracy, human rights, and governance
around the world. As in past years, once the FY 2016 appropriation is
finalized, the Department of State and USAID will develop an allocation
of FY 2016 resources that balances foreign policy priorities, including
DRG programs, while ensuring we have met statutory congressional sector
directives included within the bill. In the past, annual appropriations
bills have reduced funding for the key foreign assistance accounts that
support DRG programs, which has made it difficult to fully fund DRG
programs included within the President's Request.
When formulating the FY 2016 request, the administration leveraged
knowledge from experts to match resources to areas where strategies
have identified opportunities to make the most impact. We also apply
this analysis to develop 653(a) allocations for DRG programs to ensure
that available funds are used in the highest priority and highest
impact areas.
We know that it requires many years of strategic effort on the part
of countries, with the assistance and support of the United States and
other nations, to achieve well-functioning democracies and market-based
economies. The FY 2016 DRG funding request corresponds to the reality
that a country's success in democracy and governance is a crucial
underpinning to its security, its development, and to our initiatives.
More robust democracy programs will be better placed to promote
democratic institutions, support transparent and accountable
governments, and protect and expand civil and political rights and
freedoms around the world.
To ensure that resources are matched with areas that will have the
greatest impact in mitigating crises and solidifying democratic
progress, each overseas mission creates a whole-of-government,
multiyear Integrated Country Strategy, a coordinated and collaborative
effort among all U.S. Government agencies in each mission that
incorporates the USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy. These
strategies enable us to align foreign assistance programming to the
specific needs and challenges of a country, reflect the development
agenda of the host nation itself, and align U.S. efforts with host
nation, international, and other bilateral donor programs working in
the country. Nearly every strategic planning document includes a
country-specific DRG strategy that takes into account the particular
country context, resources, political system, key actors and
institutions, and other relevant factors that may influence the
determination of the most appropriate approach to solidifying
democratic progress.
______
Responses of John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Ukraine.--Corruption has been a central concern of the
Ukrainian people since the beginning of protests in 2013. Western
nations have provided substantial support to the Ukrainian Government,
but we have seen little movement from the European Union or others to
help the Ukrainians tackle this issue.
What do you believe the European Union and the United
States can do to help the Ukrainians begin to tackle this
endemic problem?
Answer. The Ukrainian Government has set an ambitious reform agenda
in response to the economic crisis brought on by Russian aggression and
decades of corrupt mismanagement. We will continue our diplomatic
engagement with the Government of Ukraine, partners, and the
international donor community to assist Ukraine in implementing its
reform agenda and to fight corruption.
We are providing $38 million in assistance to help Ukraine counter
corruption and strengthen the rule of law. This includes deploying
technical advisers for reform of the Ministries of Justice and Internal
Affairs; support for the new anticorruption agencies (National Agency
for Prevention of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Bureau), reform of the
Prosecutor General's Office and recovery of stolen assets; police
reform and the establishment of the new Patrol Police; civil society
and media to monitor and publicize the government's anticorruption
efforts. In addition to these efforts, we are also providing technical
advisors to the financial sector and the state oil and gas company.
We are working with European partners through international
financial institutions to help Ukraine address corruption by
conditioning financial support on reforms and to involve Ukraine more
closely in multilateral institutions that counter corruption and offer
guidance on reforms and best practices. In addition, the EU bases its
anticorruption efforts on the principles of openness, accountability,
and effectiveness, and is providing a total of =365 million in
development assistance over the period of 2014-2020 to support
Ukraine's transition, including anticorruption efforts. The European
Commission also is committed to helping Ukraine build institutions that
promote a healthy social contract between the people and accountable
government at all levels by fighting corruption. Among other things,
the Commission is discussing with Ukrainian authorities the creation of
a joint, independent body to investigate fraud and corruption-related
matters.
Question. In recent months, we have seen an increasingly assertive
Russia challenge our Eastern European allies, from kidnapping an
Estonian officer on Estonian soil, warning Latvian officials of
``unfortunate consequences'' for alleged mistreatment of ethnic
Russians, increasing probes by Russian military aircraft of NATO
countries' airspace, to holding extensive military exercises along the
borders of NATO countries.
Do you believe Russia has violated the NATO-Russia Founding
Act with these and other provocative actions?
Is President Putin's strategic objective to undermine the
credibility of NATO's Article V guarantee?
Answer. The greatest responsibility of the NATO alliance is to
protect and defend our territories and our populations against attack,
as set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
If President Putin's goal is to undermine NATO's credibility, he
has failed. NATO's actions in the face of Russia's aggressive actions
against Ukraine and elsewhere in the region demonstrate the allies are
united, our commitment to Article 5 remains ironclad, and we are ready
and able to defeat any attack against any of the 28 allies.
At the September NATO summit in Wales, allied leaders agreed to
measures to ensure NATO will be able to respond quickly and effectively
to current and future threats to the NATO space, wherever those threats
may arise. Allied leaders also decided that in view of Russia's
continuing aggression against Ukraine and its breach of the commitments
it made under the NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO will continue to
suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia;
the sole exception to the suspension is political dialogue that is
first and foremost about the situation in Ukraine.
Question. European Energy Security.--While South Stream was
cancelled by Gazprom, there is still a need to assure a more diverse
supply of energy sources for Europe away from Russia. What sources and
routes do you believe provide the best opportunity to increase European
energy security?
Answer. Energy security in Europe has been a long-standing U.S.
foreign policy priority. Efforts to establish the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline in the 1990s, steadfast support for a Southern Gas Corridor in
recent years, and our current work to assist Ukraine end the gas crisis
with Russia and address Ukraine's immediate and long-term energy needs
attest to our commitment.
We continue to advocate for increased energy security in Europe
through diversification of fuel types, supply sources, and delivery
routes. We advocate a project-based approach to energy diversification
in Europe; our top priorities include: the completion of the southern
Corridor to bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe, the construction of
the Greece-Bulgaria Interconnector which would allow Bulgaria, and
possibly also Serbia, Romania, and Hungary, to access to non-Russian
pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) via Greece, an LNG
terminal in Croatia, and completion of interconnections to interconnect
Baltic electricity infrastructure with Sweden and Poland.
We also support full implementation of the EU's Third Energy
Package, which provides a legal basis for deeper power and gas sector
integration in Europe, and we are following the EU's new Energy Union
proposals with interest.
Additional information:
Vice President Biden noted the strong role of U.S. energy
diplomacy and the need for Europe to identify and build the
most important infrastructure projects in his November 22,
2014, speech in Istanbul (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/22/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-european-
energy-security-atlantic-counc).
In the Joint Statement of the U.S.-EU Energy Council on
December 3, 2014, Secretary Kerry and his European counterparts
noted the joint U.S.-EU prioritization of many of these
projects (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234638.htm).
______
Responses of John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Last Tuesday, Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro visited
Cuba for consultations with the Castro brothers. Upon his return,
Maduro began a new wave of repression, including the violent arrest of
Caracas Mayor Antonio Ledezma.
What consideration do you give Cuba's continued efforts to
subvert democratic institutions in Latin America, including
within your review of the state-sponsors of terrorism list, on
which Cuba was placed in 1982 precisely for its subversive
tactics in the Western Hemisphere?
Answer. The Department is reviewing Cuba's designation as a State
Sponsor of Terrorism. We are undertaking a serious review of Cuba's
designation based on all relevant, applicable information and the
statutory standard. We will not prejudge the outcome of that process.
Question. Do you believe FARC, ELN and ETA should remain listed as
``Foreign Terrorist Organizations'' by the U.S. Government? If so, how
would you justify removing Cuba from the state-sponsors of terrorism
list while it continues to provide sanctuary to members of these FTOs?
Wouldn't you be putting the cart before the horse?
Answer. The FARC, ELN, and ETA are Foreign Terrorist Organizations
as designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended.
The Department is reviewing Cuba's designation as a State Sponsor
of Terrorism (SST). We are undertaking a serious review of Cuba's
designation based on all relevant, applicable information and the
statutory standard. We will not prejudge the outcome of that process.
Question. February 24 marked the 19th anniversary of the shoot-down
of two civilian aircraft over international waters by Cuban MiG fighter
jets, which resulted in the murder of three Americans and a permanent
resident of the United States. This shoot-down over international
waters has been named an act of state terrorism, including by the U.S.
Congress. A 2001 federal indictment remains open for three senior Cuban
military officials for the murder of these Americans.
Do you think Cuba should be removed from the State Sponsors
of Terrorism list prior to these senior Cuban officials facing
justice for an act of state terrorism that resulted in the
murder of three Americans?
Answer. The Department is reviewing Cuba's designation as a State
Sponsor of Terrorism. We are undertaking a serious review of Cuba's
designation based on all relevant, applicable information and the
statutory standard. We will not prejudge the outcome of that process.
Question. In the last two weekends, over 300 Cuban dissidents have
been arrested by the Castro regime. Yet, you have issued no
condemnation. Can you explain if this silence is because you don't want
to ``offend'' the Castro regime before the new rounds of talks this
week or is such silence part of the administration's new Cuba policy?
Answer. We frequently speak out on human rights issues in Cuba and
other countries, and we will continue to do so. The Department is
constantly monitoring reports of arrests of human rights activists.
Human rights are central to our discussions with the Cuban Government
and we continue to press for an end to practices that contravene
international human rights commitments in our conversations with the
Cuban Government.
We have no illusions that the Cuban Government will change its
behavior overnight. At the same time, we are convinced that, through a
policy of sustained engagement, we can more effectively stand up for
our values and help the Cuban people help themselves.
Question. Secretary Kerry, would you provide our office with
written confirmation that the U.S.'s Cuba democracy programs will
continue to be executed independently from the Castro regime--as
mandated by law--pursuant to the administration's changes in U.S.-Cuba
policy?
Answer. We will continue to use U.S. foreign assistance funds to
support democratic principles, human rights groups, and the free flow
of information to, from, and within Cuba and to provide humanitarian
assistance to the victims of political repression and their families.
Our efforts are aimed at empowering independent civil society and
promoting the independence of the Cuban people and reducing their
reliance on the Cuban state, if they so choose.
Question. Will the United States guarantee the direct participation
of Cuba's independent civil society in the Summit of the Americas
scheduled in April in Panama?
Answer. The United States strongly supports the participation of
independent civil society from throughout the hemisphere in the summit,
including from Cuba. We are working closely with the Panamanian
Government, the host of the 2015 summit of the Americas, to ensure it
reflects our hemisphere's continued efforts to support democracy,
promote human rights and social inclusion, and empower an active,
independent, and vibrant civil society.
The Department has held extensive discussions with the Panamanian
hosts and other governments on the need to focus on core democratic
principles and the role of civil society at the summit, and have
established a Civil Society Forum that promotes an agenda ensuring
meaningful engagement among government leaders and civil society
representatives. The United States, Panama, and our key partners are
committed to the participation of independent Cuban civil society at
the summit, along with civil society from all other countries in the
hemisphere. Panama has made clear that the Organization of American
States(OAS) registration guidelines for civil society organizations do
not apply to the summit; therefore, governments are unable to block--in
effect--the registration of NGOs or social actors to attend the summit.
Any civil society representatives may apply for registration,
regardless of their registration status before the OAS. Cuban civil
society groups have already begun applying to attend the Civil Society
Forum.
Question. Can you please provide an update on whether Argentina has
done anything to normalize relations with its private creditors, and if
so, what it has done?
Answer. Following its approximately $100 billion sovereign default
in 2001, the Argentine Government made attempts to normalize its
relationship with its private creditors. In all, an estimated 92
percent of its bondholders participated in debt restructurings in 2005
and 2010.
Argentina has failed to agree on terms with creditors who did not
exchange their bonds, including investors who initiated litigation
against Argentina in U.S. Federal Courts. The United States is not a
party to that litigation, which remains active, nor to any discussions
with the special master appointed by the Federal District Court to
conduct and preside over settlement negotiations.
______
Responses of John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. On October 2, 2014, I led eight of my Senate colleagues
in a letter to you urging the United States to resume funding for the
United Nations Trust Fund to End Violence against Women. While I was
pleased that the President's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request proposes
an increase in funding for U.N. Women, I was disappointed it did not
include funding for the Trust Fund.
Can you address why the administration did not include
funding for the Trust Fund in its budget request?
Does the administration support the resumption of funding
for the United Nations Trust Fund to End Violence against Women
in fiscal year 2016?
Answer. The administration strongly supports U.N. efforts to end
violence against women, including the work of U.N. Women and the U.N.
Trust Fund to End Violence against Women. The creation of U.N. Women in
2010 was part of the U.N. reform agenda, bringing together resources
and mandates for greater impact. It merged and built on the important
work of four previously distinct parts of the U.N. system, which
focused exclusively on gender equality and women's empowerment. U.N.
Women works for, among other things, the elimination of discrimination
and violence against women and girls.
For this reason, following the creation of U.N. Women, the
Department has focused on supporting efforts to eliminating violence
against women through our annual contributions to U.N. Women's core
budget. So while the FY 2016 IO&P request does not include a
contribution to the U.N. Trust Fund to End Violence against Women, our
support for eliminating violence against women and girls is reflected
in our request for $7.7 million for U.N. Women. The FY 2016 IO&P
request for U.N. Women is an increase of $200,000 from the level that
the Appropriations Committees specified in the Statement of Managers
explaining agreement by House-Senate conferees on the FY 2015
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act.
Question. Azerbaijan has threatened to shoot down any aircraft that
fly into the airport in Nagorno-Karabakh. What has the State Department
done to respond to this threat and to any new acts of aggression from
Azerbaijan?
Answer. The United States opposes any steps by the sides that would
escalate tensions or increase the risk of violence in the region. As a
cochair of the OSCE Minsk Group, along with Russia and France, the
United States has consistently urged the sides bilaterally and through
the Minsk Group process to avoid provocations and threats of violence.
We remain committed to working with the sides to reach a peaceful and
lasting settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Question. I was proud when in August 2012 President Obama announced
the release of the first-ever U.S. Strategy to Prevent and Respond to
Gender-based Violence Globally. The Strategy states that it will
provide ``Federal agencies with a set of concrete goals and actions to
be implemented and monitored over the course of the next 3 years'' and
that ``At the end of the 3-year timeframe, the agencies will evaluate
the progress made and chart a course forward.''
With the 3-year deadline fast approaching, how will the
administration continue to build on and enhance efforts to
combat gender-based violence?
Will you commit to updating and continuing to implement the
Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-based Violence
Globally after the expiration of its 3-year timeframe?
Answer. Preventing and responding to gender-based violence (GBV) is
a cornerstone of the Obama administration's commitment to advancing
gender equality. The United States recognizes that GBV significantly
hinders the ability of individuals to fully participate in and
contribute to their families, communities, and societies--economically,
politically, and socially. This is why the administration launched the
U.S. Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally
in August 2012.
In December 2013, the White House launched three interagency
committees to implement the strategy and the accompanying Executive
order from President Obama. The Department of State and USAID are
playing a leading role in these committees in collaboration with other
government agencies. The committees are currently working to identify
pilot countries, which will be critical to ensuring that GBV prevention
and response efforts are holistic, multisector, and based on best
practices. Department of State and USAID are also working on an
evaluation of the strategy, which we hope to submit to the White House
later in 2015. The Department continues to be committed to preventing
and responding to GBV globally and will look to incorporate lessons
learned into future updates to the Strategy.
Question. How will you work to ensure that this year's
comprehensive review of the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace,
and Security includes an evaluation of the metrics being used to
monitor and evaluate the State Department's implementation plan?
How will the State Department's review of the U.S. National
Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security incorporate the
perspectives of local women-led civil society organizations
that have received U.S. support to evaluate the strategy's
effectiveness?
Answer. Recognizing the influential role women can play in
advancing international security, the Department of State is fully
committed to supporting the United States unqualified commitment to
protect and empower women in countries threatened and affected by war
and conflict, violence, and insecurity. Given the Department's
leadership role in U.S. diplomatic engagement, its foreign assistance
programming, and robust relationships with civil society across the
globe, it remains a key U.S. Government implementer of the United
States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (NAP).
In line with Executive Order 13595, the Department and several
other interagency actors, including the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD), will lead a
periodic review of the NAP, informed by consultations with women and
relevant civil society organizations throughout 2015.
Moreover, the year 2015 marks several opportunities to take stock
of global commitments on gender equality, development, and conflict
resolution. In addition to an interagency review the NAP, several
multilateral events and processes will elevate gender in international
security and development in 2015, including the 15th anniversary of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325, the 20th anniversary of the
Beijing Platform for Action, and the ongoing process to develop a new
set of Sustainable Development Goals (to succeed the Millennium
Development Goals). Given this backdrop, 2015 is truly the year for the
Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda--and it must be a year of
resounding affirmation that including women in decisionmaking is not
just a nice thing to do; it is the strategic thing to do.
The Department plans to leverage the review to identify gaps,
challenges, and recommendations regarding NAP implementation. An
important part of this process will be a survey of metrics used to
monitor, evaluate, and track implementation--measuring not only foreign
assistance activities but also diplomatic engagement.
Additionally, the Department accords high priority to incorporating
the perspectives of international civil society and grassroots civil
society groups, especially women, in countries affected by conflict and
insecurity in its efforts to advance peace and security. In
collaboration with USAID and DOD, the Department has already launched
consultations with international civil society constituencies and U.N.
actors, including women, and plans to host further in-depth, issue-
specific consultations with international civil society groups and
grassroots civil society in conflict-affected countries to inform a
review of the NAP.
Question. A legacy of this administration has been its focus on
women and girls as a cornerstone of foreign policy. I was pleased that
the President's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request continues to prioritize
investments in international family planning and reproductive health.
How is the United States working to expand access to
voluntary family planning services as part of broader efforts
to support the goals of equality and empowerment of women and
girls worldwide?
Answer. With the help of Congress, the United States continues to
be the largest bilateral donor for voluntary family planning around the
world. This further demonstrates the U.S. Government's firm commitment
to helping men and women across the globe meet their reproductive
health needs. Enabling an individual or couple to decide whether, when,
and how often to have children is vital to safe motherhood, healthy
families, and prosperous communities. USAID-supported research shows
that voluntary family planning could prevent up to 30 percent of the
estimated 287,000 maternal deaths that occur every year, because women
can delay their first pregnancy and space later pregnancies at the
safest intervals.
Through USAID, the U.S. Government advances and supports voluntary
family planning and reproductive health programs in more than 45
countries around the globe. As a core partner in the Family Planning
2020 Initiative, USAID is committed to working with the global
community to reach an additional 120 million women and girls with
family planning information, commodities, and services by 2020. These
services empower individuals to choose the timing and spacing of their
pregnancies, bear children during their healthiest years, prevent
unintended pregnancies, and nurture healthier families and communities.
The U.S. Government will continue to show leadership on this issue
in multilateral fora such as the U.N. Commission on Population and
Development, the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, and the U.N.
Human Rights Council. We persistently make the argument at these venues
and elsewhere that sexual and reproductive health services, especially
voluntary family planning, are essential to promote sustainable
economic development, advance gender equality, and contribute to the
U.S. Government's goals of Ending Preventable Child and Maternal Deaths
and Creating an AIDS-free Generation.
Additionally, the U.S. Government actively supports the U.N.
Population Fund (UNFPA), the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and many other development and humanitarian organizations to
provide reproductive health services in crisis settings. This includes
training staff, offering community education, establishing client
followup, providing a variety of family planning methods, and
maintaining a contraceptive supply chain system. These life-saving
interventions help women, girls, and entire communities recover from
crises and conflict.
Furthermore, as we take stock of the 20-year review of the
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) Program
of Action and focus on the 20-year review of the 1995 Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action and the review of the Millennium
Development Goals in 2015, the U.S. Government will continue to work
toward advancing these goals.
______
Response of John F. Kerry to Question
Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
Question. Each year, an estimated 22 million women and girls have
an unsafe abortion, almost all in the developing world. As a result,
the World Health Organization estimates that 47,000 lose their lives,
and millions more suffer serious injuries. In places where women cannot
get a safe abortion, they end their unwanted pregnancies unsafely.
Furthermore, according to WHO, legal restrictions, in addition to other
barriers, contribute to the likelihood of women seeking unsafe abortion
care. The Helms amendment, appended to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act
in 1973, prohibits the use of U.S. funds for the performance of
abortion ``as a method of family planning.'' Under the law, foreign
assistance funds could legally be used to support abortion services in
the cases of rape, incest, or where the pregnancy threatens a woman's
life--as these cases do not constitute a family planning act. However,
relevant U.S. Government agencies, including the State Department and
USAID, will not fund abortion services in these cases, even where local
law allows it. This is particularly disheartening for the 30 million
women and girls around the world who access U.S.-funded programs for
their reproductive health care.
What steps is the administration taking to apply the Helms
amendment correctly and allow foreign assistance funds to
support abortion services in the cases of rape, incest, or if
the life of the woman is in danger due to pregnancy?
Answer. The administration takes this issue very seriously. We know
the value of providing survivors of sexual violence with much-needed
sexual and reproductive health and psychosocial services and believe it
essential to helping them recover from trauma so that they can rebuild
their lives and their communities. As such, the administration
regularly reviews our policies to ensure we are taking all appropriate
measures to improve the health and status of women and girls around the
globe, including survivors of sexual violence.
______
Responses of John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. You recently named Randy Berry to serve in the newly
established position of ``Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBT
Persons'' at the Department of State. I have expressed the need for
such a position for some time, having reintroduced S. 302 the
``International Human Rights Defense Act of 2015'' on January 29, 2015,
with support from 26 original cosponsors. I am pleased that the
position is coming to fruition.
What resources are now available to support this position
that will ensure foreign policy includes a coordinated effort
to defend LGBT rights around the world?
How many full-time employees will be dedicated to the
Special Envoy's efforts?
What additional resources do you anticipate will be needed
in the future to ensure that the Special Envoy is adequately
equipped to advance LGBT rights abroad?
Answer. The Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBT Persons will
coordinate the Department's diplomatic engagement on advancing the
human rights of LGBT persons. Within the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor, four employees are engaged full-time on LGBT issues
and approximately a dozen other staff spend a significant portion of
their time on these issues. There are numerous others within the
Department and at our overseas missions who also work to advance this
agenda in the context of the U.S.'s bilateral and multilateral
relationships. The Special Envoy will continue and deepen the efforts
already underway in the State Department, including coordinating and
shepherding implementation
of the Department's strategy on human rights for LGBT persons, adopted
in 2011,
and the Presidential Memorandum issued later that year. He will also
work to strengthen our relationship with like-minded countries,
including through coordinated diplomacy and programming, and with those
governments that see things differently. The Department's work with
LGBT persons, allies, and activists abroad will be an important
component as well.
The Special Envoy will have a direct role in leading assistance
efforts as part of the DRL-managed Global Equality Fund, which since
its founding in 2011 has programmed over $17 million in 50 countries.
He will play an integral part in identifying needs of LGBT communities
and developing appropriate programmatic responses. While a number of
governments, including our own, have made substantial contributions to
the Fund, the number of viable program applications well exceeds the
budget available, so the Special Envoy will also seek additional
resources as part of his overall outreach.
Question. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)
is regarded as one of the most successful global health programs in
history. It is currently helping to provide lifesaving HIV treatment to
7.7 million people and has provided HIV testing and counseling for more
than 56.7 million people. The UNAIDS has set up some laudable targets
that call for 90 percent success rates in three categories by the year
2020:
(1) 90 percent of all people living with HIV should know their
status;
(2) 90 percent of all those who are diagnosed HIV positive to be
on antiretroviral treatment (ART); and
(3) 90 percent of those on antiretroviral treatment should have an
undetectable viral load.
Do you expect that the current U.S. investments will
achieve the UNAIDS target of 90-90-90 in that timeframe? If
not, what is needed to meet these goals by 2020?
Answer. Achieving the Joint Unite Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS) global goals of 90-90-90 by 2020 requires a shared
responsibility by partner countries, PEPFAR, and the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund). PEPFAR is shifting
the way it does business to help reach the UNAIDS ambitious 90-90-90
global targets, have the greatest impact, and accelerate progress
toward an AIDS-free generation. PEPFAR can best contribute to achieving
the UNAIDS targets of 90-90-90 and controlling the epidemic by
employing a data-driven approach that strategically focuses resources
on geographic areas, at the subnational level and populations that have
the highest burden of HIV/AIDS.
In FY 2016, PEPFAR's efforts will be driven by five action agendas:
Impact, Efficiency, Sustainability, Partnership, and Human Rights.
These agendas--combined with PEPFAR's overriding commitment to
transparency, accountability, and impact--will continue to guide our
work.
PEPFAR will focus on doing the right things, in the right places,
and at the right time to control the HIV/AIDS epidemic and, ultimately,
achieve an AIDS-free generation. This will entail using the best
available data to direct PEPFAR resources toward bringing evidence-
based interventions (e.g., ART, prevention of mother-to-child
transmission [PMTCT], voluntary medical male circumcision [VMMC], and
condoms) to scale for populations at greatest risk and in geographic
areas of greatest HIV incidence. PEPFAR will prioritize reaching scale
quickly and with quality because an expanding HIV epidemic is not
financially sustainable.
Question. I continue to be concerned by the number of families in
the United States who are trying to bring home their legally adopted
children from the Democratic Republic of the Congo but are being denied
exit permits. Secretary Kerry has engaged on this matter personally,
and yet our partners in the DRC Government have made limited progress
on the existing cases.
Please explain what steps we are taking to resolve this
issue, including any consideration of limiting the issuance of
U.S. visas for visiting members of the DRC Government?
Answer. Our strategy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
has been threefold. First, we have pressed the DRC Government at every
opportunity and at the very highest levels, including during Secretary
Kerry's meetings with President Kabila last May and August, to lift the
suspension immediately for families who have already completed the
adoption process in good faith under existing Congolese adoption laws.
Second, we have pressed the DRC Government to consider the issuance of
exit permits on an expedited basis for those adopted children requiring
urgent, life-saving medical care abroad. Third, to address Congolese
concerns about significant flaws in their current system, we have
offered technical consultations aimed to improve the Congolese
intercountry adoption process.
Since the start of the suspension in September 2013, our efforts
have led to the issuance of exit permits to more than 30 families that
had completed their adoptions prior to the start of the suspension or
had children with life-threatening medical conditions that required
immediate treatment outside of the DRC. However, the list of families
adopting in the DRC despite the suspension continues to grow, and the
Department will not cease its efforts until all the families receive
relief.
Ambassador Swan and the team at Embassy Kinshasa continue to engage
regularly on this issue with the DRC Government as well as with the
families. We are pressing the DRC Government to hold a previously
promised interministerial meeting to address the adoption suspension,
including the question of how to manage already completed adoptions
once new adoption legislation is enacted. Embassy Kinshasa recently
submitted to the DRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs a list of children
whose adoptions were final prior to the suspension. The accompanying
diplomatic note reiterates that our families have already legally
adopted their children, and that the rigorous process and
investigations completed by the State Department and USCIS mitigate any
deficiency in the DRC system. The note requests that these children
receive exit permits to join their adoptive families in the United
States immediately. In December 2014, Special Advisor for Children's
Issues, Ambassador Susan Jacobs, led a delegation to the DRC to discuss
pending adoption cases and proposed adoption reforms. In March 2015,
the State Department and USCIS plan to send a followup technical team
to consult on adoption reforms in the DRC and to encourage the DRC
Government to pass and implement new adoption-related legislation.
The Department continues to press the DRC Government at every
opportunity to lift the suspension. We do not believe unilateral
restrictions of visas for Congolese officials would be effective in
helping to resolve the complex issues underlying the adoptions
suspension and could, in fact, trigger reciprocal restrictions against
U.S. officials seeking to visit the DRC. We also have specific treaty
obligations for individuals traveling to the United Nations. Broad visa
restrictions imposed by the DRC in response to U.S. restrictions on
visas could harm vulnerable populations by affecting the travel of U.S.
aid workers and even the adoptive families themselves, who need
Congolese visas to visit their children.
Question. 2015 marks the final year of the Millennium Development
Goals. While we have made incredible and important progress in the last
15 years, there is still so much work to be done--especially to improve
the health and well-being of women. The world has not yet achieved MDG5
to improve maternal health by reducing maternal mortality and providing
universal access to reproductive health.
How are U.S. global health programs working to deliver on
this unfinished business of preventing maternal mortality and
expanding reproductive health access?
Answer. USAID and other U.S. Government global health programs
remain committed to ending preventable maternal mortality and
increasing access to reproductive health services. Maternal and
reproductive health programs are key to achieving the U.S. Government's
goal of Ending Preventable Child and Maternal Deaths. USAID focuses its
maternal and reproductive health programs in countries where the need
is the greatest. With the support of Congress, the United States
continues to be the world's largest bilateral donor for international
family planning. USAID supports voluntary family planning and
reproductive health programs in more than 45 countries around the
globe, and to date, has helped 24 countries increase their modern
contraceptive use and decrease fertility rates to levels that qualify
them for graduation from family planning assistance. Our 24 priority
countries for maternal health and voluntary family planning and
reproductive health programs represent 70 percent of the burden of
maternal deaths, and approximately half of the unmet need for family
planning, worldwide. In the USAID 24 priority countries, the percentage
of births in a facility have increased from 20 percent in 1990 to 47
percent in 2013, and skilled birth attendance in both home and facility
deliveries has increased from 32 percent in 1990 to 60 percent in 2014.
The Millennium Development Goals have an end date of 2015, and the
international community is in the process of developing the Post-2015
Development Agenda--likely to be called the Sustainable Development
Goals, which will be adopted at a Presidential summit in September 2015
in New York. The U.S. Government has strongly advocated for a focus on
sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as part of any
stand-alone gender goal, recognizing the crucial link with maternal
health outcomes. USAID has aligned with partners to ensure that
maternal and reproductive health continue to be global development
priorities. USAID, with other international organizations, has proposed
two key benchmarks for maternal and reproductive health to be achieved
by 2030: (1) a global maternal mortality ratio of less than 70 per
100,000 live births, with no country level greater than 140 per 100,000
live births; and (2) at least 75 percent of demand for family planning
is satisfied with modern contraceptives in all countries.
USAID will continue to harness proven high-impact practices and
innovative approaches to: empower individuals to choose the timing and
spacing of their pregnancies; bear children during their healthiest
years in a clean, safe, and respectful environment; prevent unintended
pregnancies; and nurture healthier families and communities. In
addition to our maternal health and voluntary family planning programs,
USAID supports a range of related reproductive health interventions,
including post-abortion care, transformation of gender norms,
elimination of female genital mutilation/cutting, and fistula
prevention and repair.
______
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
Question. Lethal Assistance to Ukraine.--On February 3, 2015, I
joined 14 U.S. Senators in sending a bipartisan letter to President
Obama on Ukraine. It explains that Ukraine needs an immediate infusion
of effective defensive military equipment including antitank weapons,
counterbattery radars, armored Humvees and increased training.
The Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which passed Congress and was
signed into law in December, authorizes military equipment to Ukraine.
On February 21, 2015, you responded to a question about lethal
assistance to Ukraine by stating, ``No decision has been made by the
President at this time, and I think we have to see what happens in the
next few days with respect to the events that are taking place now on
the ground.''
In light of the recent events on the ground, is the
administration now willing to provide lethal assistance to the
Ukraine? If not, what additional economic sanctions does the
administration plan to impose on Russia?
Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned by Russia's
continued violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity,
its continuing occupation of Crimea, and its support for pro-Russia
separatists in eastern Ukraine. Russia and the separatists it backs
continue to fail to fulfill the commitments they made in the September
Minsk agreements and the February 12 implementation plan.
The United States has provided significant nonlethal defensive
security assistance to Ukraine to help address the crisis, committing
over $120 million in 2014, but our focus remains on finding a
diplomatic solution. We continue to monitor the situation closely and
remain in constant contact with our Ukrainian counterparts on our next
steps in defense cooperation.
If Russia fails to implement Minsk agreements, there will be
further consequences. If, on the other hand, Russia and the separatists
it backs fully implement their commitments under the Minsk agreements
of September 2014 and the commitments under the February 12
implementation plan, we will roll back significant sanctions.
Fulfilling Minsk commitments includes the complete withdrawal of all
heavy weapons and foreign fighters from Ukraine, full and unfettered
access by international monitors to separatist-controlled territory to
verify cease-fire and withdrawal compliance, and the release of all
hostages. Crucially, the conditions for rolling back sanctions also
include restoring to Kiev the control of its side of the border with
Russia.
Question. International Climate Change Negotiations.--In November
2014, President Obama announced a pledge of $3 billion to create a
brand new Global Climate Fund. His fiscal year 2016 budget request asks
for $500 million to start funding that pledge.
a. What was the process the administration used for
determining the appropriate commitment to the Global Climate
Fund? What consultations did the administration have with
Congress on this commitment?
Answer (a). The United States pledged to contribute $3 billion to
the GCF, not to exceed 30 percent of total confirmed pledges to the
GCF. The GCF has so far received pledges totaling $10.2 billion from 31
countries, including eight non-traditional donors: Chile, Colombia,
Indonesia, Mexico, Mongolia, Panama, Peru, and Republic of Korea. More
are expected to pledge in the future. The U.S. pledge currently
represents 29% of all pledges. We expect that to decrease as more
contributors make pledges, possibly later this year or in 2016.
The amount of the U.S. commitment to the GCF is calculated to build
on prior support to similar multilateral funds (i.e. Global Environment
Facility (GEF) and Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)) while remaining
within a percentage range traditionally provided by the U.S. to such
funds. By way of example, in 2008, the Bush administration spearheaded
the establishment of the CIFs, a set of World Bank trust funds with
nearly $8 billion in total contributions, of which $2 billion was
pledged by the Bush administration. The CIFs were intended as a
transitional mechanism until the GCF becomes fully operational.
Developed countries established the GCF in recognition that the kind of
support provided by the CIFs would need to continue and would require a
more inclusive governance structure.
Prior to the President's announcement of the pledge, staff from the
Department of the Treasury and the Department of State met with HACFO
staff to consult on the pledge.
b. What impact evaluations have been completed on the
previous $2 billion in U.S. funding for international climate
change already provided to the Climate Investment Funds? Why is
it responsible for the administration to recommend closing down
the current Climate Investment Funds and creating a larger
brand new Global Climate Fund if no evaluations have been done
on the impact and results of U.S. funding to the current
international climate change programs?
Answer (b). The establishment of the GCF was a central provision of
the Copenhagen Accord, an important agreement that recognized the need
for developing countries to take action to reduce their carbon
emissions and combat climate change. In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol,
in which only developed countries have emission-reduction obligations,
the Copenhagen Accord contains commitments by a wide range of emerging
economies, including major emitters like China, India, Brazil, and
Indonesia.
The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) were intended as a transitional
mechanism and are expected to sunset once the GCF is fully operational
and our obligations to the CIFs are complete. The U.S. has an
outstanding $230 million commitment to the CIFs. Beyond this, the
administration is not planning to make additional pledges to the CIFs,
and if our FY 2016 request is fully appropriated, we do not plan to
make a funding request in FY 2017. Treasury, through the CIF Trust Fund
Committees, is already engaged in a discussion with the CIFs'
Administrative Unit and Trustee as to when and how to sunset the CIFs.
Once the sunset is decided, the CIFs will stop accepting new funds and
will only approve new projects to the extent that they have funds on
hand.
An independent evaluation of the CIFs was released in June 2014 and
is available on the Internet at http://www.cifevaluation.org. Because
of the early stage of most CIF investments (many of which are of very
long duration), the evaluation focused more on institutional issues
such as the process for developing country investment plans. We expect
further CIF level evaluations to be conducted in the future. Each
multilateral development bank that participates in the CIFs is
including CIF programs or projects into their evaluation work program.
Question. On August 26 of last year, the New York Times had a story
entitled ``Obama Pursuing Climate Accord in Lieu of Treaty.'' The
article states, ``The Obama administration is working to forge a
sweeping international climate change agreement to compel nations to
cut their planet-warming fossil fuel emissions, but without
ratification from Congress.'' It also talks about the administration
working on a ``politically binding'' deal to cut emissions rather than
a legally binding treaty that would require approval by two thirds of
the Senate.
a. What form of an international agreement is the United
States pursuing at the international climate change
negotiations?
Answer (a). The 2014 decision of the Parties to the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, taken in Lima, Peru, recalls a 2011
decision of the Parties adopted in Durban, South Africa. That decision
launched a process to develop a ``protocol, another legal instrument,
or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable
to all Parties. . . .''
The Durban mandate makes clear that the Paris agreement is to
further the objective of the Convention (i.e., to avoid dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate), yet leaves the parties
with substantial flexibility regarding its form and the legal nature of
its provisions.
At this stage, the international discussions are more focused on
the substance of the agreement than on whether it should be a protocol,
etc., or whether particular provisions should be legally binding. The
United States seeks an agreement that is ambitious in light of the
climate challenge; that reflects nationally determined mitigation
efforts in line with national circumstances and capabilities; that
provides for accountability with respect to such efforts; that takes
account of evolving emissions and economic trends; and that promotes
adaptation by parties to climate impacts.
b. Will the agreement be legally binding on the United
States and other countries, including funding commitments for
any provision contained within the agreement?
Answer (b). See answer to question (a) above.
c. Can the administration enter into a ``politically
binding'' international agreement without congressional
approval?
Answer (c). To the extent that the referenced NY Times story used
the term ``politically binding'' to describe a nonlegally binding
outcome, it would follow that such an outcome would be within the
authority of the executive branch to conclude.
d. What state, local governing entity, or community would
not be subject to a ``politically binding'' treaty?
Answer (d). To the extent the question refers to a nonlegally
binding outcome, such an outcome would not take the form of a treaty.
e. Why would this administration bypass the Senate on any
climate change deal?
Answer (e). The appropriate domestic form of the Paris outcome,
whether a protocol, another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with
legal force, will depend upon several factors, including its specific
provisions.
As Secretary Kerry testified during his confirmation hearing, any
international agreement brought into force for the United States will
be done so consistent with the United States Constitution.
f. If Congress is not going to be allowed to ratify any
climate change agreement that results from the Paris
negotiations, what role, if any, do you see for Congress to
play in this international process?
Answer (f). As noted above, it is an open question whether the
Paris outcome will be of a nature that requires Senate approval before
the President may ratify it. In any event, the administration will
continue to consult with the committee regarding the negotiations.
Question. What progress has been made on the ballistic missile
issue? Has Iran even been willing to engage on its missile program?
Answer. The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) has created time and space
for the negotiation of a comprehensive deal that would prevent Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapon and ensures that its nuclear program is
exclusively peaceful. During these negotiations, all U.N. Security
Council resolutions (UNSCR) prohibitions and sanctions related to
Iran's ballistic missile program, as well as relevant U.S. sanctions on
Iran's ballistic missile program, remain in full force.
We have taken up the issue of how to deal with ballistic missiles
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead as part of the P5+1
negotiations. This issue has been discussed and will continue to be
discussed.
Even as we work to achieve a comprehensive solution, the United
States will continue to vigorously enforce all sanctions not covered by
the narrow categories of relief provided for under the JPOA. Moreover,
we will continue to work with our allies and partners to enforce the
proliferation-related sanctions against Iran's nuclear and ballistic
missile programs.
Question. Democratic Republic of Congo.--In September 2013, the
Democratic Republic of Congo stopped issuing exit permits for Congolese
children adopted by foreign parents. The suspension of exit permits for
legally adopted children is having a terrible impact on hundreds of
American families. In fact, there are several families in Wyoming who
have shared their experiences with me and are still trying to bring
their children home. In July 2014, 167 Members of Congress sent a
letter to President Obama asking for his direct engagement on this
issue and to press for an expeditious resolution. In October 2014, 183
Members of Congress wrote to the President of the DRC asking to
expedite the process of medical fragile children and allowing the
hundreds of American families who have legally completed the adoption
process to bring their children home.
Will you commit to providing the resources and focus needed
to resolve this terrible situation?
What is the administration's strategy to get these adopted
children home to their loving American families?
What is being done to ensure that these families are
grandfathered into the new adoption legislation being
considered by the Parliament of the DRC?
Answer. Our strategy in the DRC has been threefold. First, we have
pressed the government at every occasion and at the very highest
levels, including during my meetings with President Kabila last May and
August, to lift the suspension immediately for families who have
already completed the adoption process in good faith under existing
Congolese adoption laws. Second, we have pressed the DRC Government to
consider the issuance of exit permits on an expedited basis for those
adopted children requiring urgent, life-saving medical care abroad.
Third, to address Congolese concerns about significant flaws under
their current system, we have offered technical consultations aimed to
improve the Congolese intercountry adoption process.
Since the start of the suspension in September 2013, our efforts
have led to the issuance of exit permits to over 30 families that had
completed their adoptions prior to the start of the suspension or had
children with life-threatening medical conditions that required
immediate treatment outside of the DRC. But the list of families that
are adopting in the DRC despite the suspension continues to grow, and
the Department will not cease its efforts until all the families
receive relief.
Ambassador Swan and the team at Embassy Kinshasa continue to work
regularly on this issue with the government as well as with the
families. They are currently pressing the DRC Government to hold a
previously promised interministerial aimed at addressing the adoption
suspension, including the question of how to manage already completed
adoptions once new adoption legislation is enacted. Embassy Kinshasa
recently submitted to the DRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs a list of
children whose adoptions were full and final prior to the enactment of
the exit permit suspension. The accompanying diplomatic note reiterates
that our families have already legally adopted their children and that
the rigorous process and investigations completed by the State
Department and USCIS mitigate any deficiency in the DRC system. The
note requests that these children receive exit permits to join their
adoptive families in the United States immediately. Special Advisor for
Children's Issues, Ambassador Susan Jacobs, led a delegation in
December to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to discuss
pending adoption cases and proposed adoption reforms. In March, the
State Department and USCIS plan to send a followup technical team to
consult on adoption reforms in the DRC and to encourage the DRC
Government to pass and implement new adoption-related legislation.
Consular Affairs and Embassy Kinshasa also continue to press for
already completed adoption cases to move forward without restarting the
DRC process from the beginning.
Question. Accountability Review Board's Recommendations.--In a
response to a question for the record during the confirmation process,
you stated that ``Secretary Clinton accepted all 29 recommendations
from the Benghazi Accountability Review Board.'' You also assured this
committee that you would personally oversee the implementation of the
Accountability Review Board's recommendation and have your senior
leadership make it a top priority.
How many of the Accountability Review Board's
recommendations have not been completed and why have they not
been completed? What budgetary resources are needed to complete
those recommendations? What is your timeline and plan to ensure
they are completed quickly?
Answer. The Department has closed 26 of 29 Benghazi ARB
recommendations and has made significant progress in implementing the
remaining 3. One recommendation is expected to be closed shortly, while
the other two involve long-term overseas construction projects. As we
move to close these remaining recommendations, we remain focused on the
enduring implementation of all closed Benghazi ARB recommendations.
Recommendation 7, which we expect to close shortly, stated, ``All
State Department and other government agencies' facilities should be
collocated when they are in the same metropolitan area, unless a waiver
has been approved.''
To implement this recommendation, the Department conducted a
worldwide review of all facilities to determine which could be
collocated and which could not. For those that could not, the
Department worked to ensure that a collocation waiver was warranted and
on file. It was determined that collocation waivers were needed for
several facilities; those waivers are almost completed. Before closing
this recommendation, the Department is reviewing its policies,
procedures, communications, and training to ensure that the
institutional processes are in place to maintain the waiver process
going forward.
Implementation of recommendation 20 is still in progress. This
recommendation stated, ``Diplomatic Security (DS) should upgrade
surveillance cameras at high threat, high risk (HTHR) posts for greater
resolution, nighttime visibility, and monitoring capability beyond
post.''
The Department is upgrading all High Threat, High Risk facilities
with more modern surveillance cameras. The Department does not require
additional funding to implement this recommendation.
The third recommendation that is still in progress is classified.
Implementation requires a multiyear construction effort, and design and
procurement details are still being assessed. The Department can brief
the Congress on implementation in an appropriate location.
Question. What is the total amount spent on professional,
educational and cultural exchange programs in fiscal year 2014 and
fiscal year 2015 by the U.S. Government?
Answer. The Department of State's FY 2014 Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs (ECA) was $576.4 million in FY 2014 and FY 2015
enacted level is $589.9 million. These figures do not include exchange
programs conducted by other agencies, such as USAID, the Department of
Defense, the Department of Agriculture, or the Department of Commerce.
Question. Why is the U.S. Department of State requesting a $33
million increase in the educational and cultural exchange programs?
What gap would this money fill in the current programming?
Answer. As the world becomes ever more networked, and youth
movements increasingly influence the course of their nations' policies,
the U.S. Government has greater needs and opportunities to reach
growing and increasingly activist audiences to advance U.S. policies
and exert lasting influence. Exchanges are a powerful tool of foreign
policy--often the most effective in reaching those key audiences
outside of governments. We can advance many of our highest priority
policy goals most substantially with exchanges, for example, in
countries and regions undergoing profound transformations. We often
don't have enough exchanges capacity to meet the high demand from our
own senior policymakers as well as from partner governments,
international civil society groups, and the U.S. educational and
nonprofit sectors. ECA's FY 2016 request of $33.2 million is a 5.6-
percent increase over last year's budget. Such a level would allow us
to continue strong U.S. support for Fulbright, the International
Visitor Leadership Program, the Citizen Exchange programs, the Mandela
Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders, the Young Southeast
Asian Leaders Initiative, and the J. Christopher Stevens Virtual
Exchange Initiative. It would provide new funding to support a Young
Leaders Initiative in the Americas. We also request funding for an
Exchanges Rapid Response (ERR) capability to allow ECA to respond
quickly when a crisis like Crimea, a transition like the Arab Spring,
or a transformation like Burma opens opportunities for the U.S.
Government to engage quickly and support policy objectives. The
Department of State's exchanges funding is mostly granted out to U.S.
partners a year and more in advance of the exchange program. This long
lead time does not give us sufficient agility to respond to immediate
and critical priorities. This increased funding request also places a
high priority on supporting the policy rebalance to Asia.
ECA's FY 2016 request also includes $66.8 million for Exchanges
Support, a $8.6 million increase from the FY 2015 enacted level. While
Congress has generously funded programs, ECA's operational budget has
not kept pace and inflation has also eroded the bureau's operational
capabilities. In FY 2015, Congress cut ECA's operational budget by $1.7
million, requiring the bureau to use a great deal of recoveries money
on basic operational expenses. (ECA normally uses the great majority of
recoveries to fund pilot or experimental exchanges.) The drastic cut in
administrative funding means that ECA does less monitoring of the
health and welfare of young participants who come from various corners
of the world, less oversight of the contributions of foreign
governments to the Fulbright program, less use of new technologies for
virtual exchanges, and less interaction with program participants and
more ceding of the connections to participants to the U.S. program
partners (which decreases the participants' perception that the U.S.
Government is responsible for the benefits which accrue from the
exchange program).
Question. In order to prepare for a U.S. Department of State
reauthorization, please provide the following information regarding the
professional, educational, and cultural exchange programs for fiscal
year 2014 and fiscal year 2015. Please identify and provide the
following information on every academic program, professional and
cultural exchange, and youth leadership initiative funded by the U.S.
Department of State or jointly with other U.S. agencies.
For each of the programs and exchanges, please provide:
a. The official name of the program or exchange;
b. The objective and goal;
c. Total amount of funding;
d. Number of participants;
e. Length of time; and
f. Countries represented and number of people from each country in
the program or exchange.
Answer. The goal of Department of State's exchange programs is to
bring Americans together with people from across the world to build
lasting relationships that bridge political and cultural divides, in
support of U.S. foreign policy. These exchanges range from 10-day
professional exchange programs, to 1-year high school exchanges and
full graduate degree programs. Please see the two documents attached
for details. The first document lists the budget by program for FY 2014
and FY 2015, a description of each program, length of time, number of
participants and countries. The second document is a list of exchange
participants by country.
EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS (ECE)
Detailed Allocation--FY 2014-2015
($in thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2014 FY 2015 Program Description Participants* Length of time Regions
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Academic Programs $316,511 $331,636 ....................................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fulbright Program $236,974 $236,485 ....................................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fulbright Program $185,074 $184,585 The Fulbright Program offers grants to study, teach 8,000 2 weeks to 1 year Global (150+
and conduct research for U.S. citizens to go abroad countries)
and for non-U.S. citizens to come to the United
States.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hubert H. Humphrey $11,000 $11,000 One-year program of non-degree academic study, 150 1 year Global (100+
Fellowship Program leadership training, and professional development countries)
for young and mid-career professionals from
developing countries.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Teacher Exchanges $10,600 $10,600 Professional development programs for K-12 teachers 350 2 weeks to 1 year Global (75
focused on improving teaching and language skills, countries)
leadership development, and integrating educational
best practices
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Study of the U.S. $8,600 $8,600 Five- to six-week academic programs focusing on U.S. 700 5 to 6 weeks Global (80
Institutes studies for groups of foreign undergraduate countries)
students, scholars, and secondary educators.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UGRAD $6,800 $6,800 One semester and academic year scholarships to 250 1 semester to 1 Global (60
outstanding undergraduate students from year countries)
underrepresented sectors in many countries for non-
degree full-time study combined with community
service internship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Community College $5,900 $5,900 One-year scholarships at U.S. community colleges to 150 1 year Global (12
Initiative talented, underserved students and young countries)
professionals overseas and builds international
capacity at U.S. host institutions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Critical Language $9,000 $9,000 Intensive summer language institutes in thirteen 550 8 to 10 weeks EAP, EUR, SCA,
Scholarships critical foreign languages. NEA (13 countries)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Academic $55,017 $58,351 ....................................................
Exchanges
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Educational Advising and $12,241 $12,241 400+ EducationUSA advising centers in 170 countries na na Global (170+
Student Services provide accurate info to international students countries)
about U.S. higher education through in-center,
virtual and outreach sessions. EducationUSA also
assists the 4500+ accredited U.S. institutions with
recruitment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
English Access $25,750 $24,250 After-school English language and American cultural $5,000 2 years Global (80+
Microscholarships programming for bright, economically disadvantaged countries)
13- to 20-year-olds in-country
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
English Language $10,000 $10,000 Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages 240 2 weeks to 10 Global (100+
Fellows/Specialists Fellows are sent overseas to strengthen teaching months countries)
and promote English language learning
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELOs $5,100 $5,260 Local programming, travel and mandatory expenses for na na Global
Regional English Language Officers overseas
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-Teacher $1,800 $2,500 Uses innovative distance learning technology to virtual 1,200 10 weeks Global (150+
improve the quality of English Language Teaching countries)
overseas
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Materials $126 $100 Online and print resources for English language na na Global
teachers and learners overseas
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
American Overseas $4,000 American Overseas Research Centers are located na na Global (x
Research Centers throughout the world -- in Europe, Latin America, countries)
the Near and Middle East, South and Southeast Asia,
and West Africa -- and provide services to
scholars, including assistance with research and
publication.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Academic $24,520 $36,800 ....................................................
Exchanges
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
American Overseas $4,000 American Overseas Research Centers are located na na Global (x
Research throughout the world -- in Europe, Latin America, countries)
Centers the Near and Middle East, South and Southeast Asia,
and West Africa -- and provide services to
scholars, including assistance with research and
publication.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
South Pacific $435 $350 The USSP Scholarship Program was established by the 4 four years EAP (South
Exchanges United States Congress to provide opportunities for Pacific)
U.S. study to students from the sovereign island
nations of the South Pacific in fields important
for the region's development. Public Law 103-236
authorized academic scholarships to qualified
students to pursue undergraduate and graduate study
at institutions of higher education in the U.S.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Timor Leste Scholarship $435 $350 The USTL Scholarship Program was created in FY 1999 3 four years EAP (Timor Leste)
Program in response to Public Law 103-236, which directed
the Bureau to provide scholarships for Timorese
students. The objective of the program is to
provide academic scholarships to potential leaders
from Timor-Leste for undergraduate study at U.S.
universities in selected areas of critical
development to help strengthen the human resource
capacity of the Timorese people
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mobility (Disability) $450 $450 The Clearinghouse works to encourage people with na na Global
Exchange disabilities to participate in international
Clearinghouse exchange and to provide technical assistance to
international exchange practitioners, including
colleges and universities and other institutions/
organizations, on how to increase the number of
people participating with disabilities in their
exchange programs and ensure that they have
successful experiences.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gilman Scholarship Program $12,100 $12,500 The Benjamin A. Gilman International Scholarship 2,850 2 weeks to 1 year Global (100+
Program offers grants for U.S. citizen countries)
undergraduate students of limited financial means
to pursue academic studies or credit-bearing,
career-oriented internships abroad.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Young African Leaders $5,000 $15,000 The Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders 500 6 weeks study + 6 AF (49 countries)
Initiative is the flagship program of the Young African weeks internship
Leaders Initiative (YALI) that empowers young
people through academic coursework, leadership
training, and networking. Fellowships provide
outstanding young leaders from Sub-Saharan Africa
with the opportunity to hone their skills at a U.S.
university and support for professional development
in the U.S. and after they return home.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Youth South-East Asian na $5,000 YSEALI includes academic and professional exchanges 250 4 to 5 weeks study EAP (10 countries)
Leaders Initiative for Southeast Asian youth to deepen their knowledge or internship
about economic development, education, environment
and civic engagement issues and to develop a
regional network.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fulbright University: na $2,500 Fulbright University Vietnam (FUV) will be the first na na EAP (Vietnam)
Vietnam independent, non-profit, U.S. affiliated university
in Vietnam, and will embody core principles of good
governance, including academic freedom,
meritocracy, transparency, and equal access.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tibet Fund $710 $650 The program's goal is to foster mutual understanding 16 1 to 2 years SCA (India/Nepal)
between the Tibetan people and the people of the
United States and to educate future Tibetan
leaders.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Study Abroad Capacity $1,390 na Awards to U.S. institutions to help develop new na na Global
Building study abroad programs and opportunities
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Professional and $192,617 $195,240
Cultural
Exchanges
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Visitor $91,007 $89,665 ....................................................
Leadership Program
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Visitor $91,007 $89,665 A short term professional exchange for foreign 4,665 2 to 21 days Global (181
Leadership Program participants to travel to the U.S. to network with countries)
their counterparts.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Citizen Exchange $101,035 $100,000
Program
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Professional Fellows $18,049 $18,049 ECA's Professional Fellows Division provides grants approx. 844
to U.S. non-profit organizations to conduct two-way
exchange programs that provide substantive
professional development and support to emerging
leaders from the U.S. and foreign countries. The
purpose of each exchange program is to engage with
foreign leaders in critical professions, to
demonstrate respect for foreign cultures and to
promote mutual understanding between the people of
the United States and other countries.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Youth Programs $67,292 $66,257 The Youth Programs division primarily programs approx. 4190 3 weeks to 1 Global (100+
academic-year and short-term exchanges with U.S. academic year countries)
and international high-school aged youth that
promote leadership skills, civil society and
democratic ideals, volunteerism, and community
service.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cultural Programs $10,199 $10,199 The Cultural Programs Division partners with the approx. 800 5 days to 9 months Global (x
American arts community and U.S. missions abroad in countries)
the creation of arts-based people-to-people
exchanges that advance a variety of U.S. foreign
policy goals, including outreach to youth and
promoting opportunities for women and girls and
underserved audiences.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sports Programs $5,495 $5,495 SportsUnited works with public and private partners approx. 530 4 to 30 days Global (x
to provide international exchanges for athletes and countries)
coaches. These exchanges address key themes such as
countering violent extremism and HIV/AIDS education
and reach key audiences including women and girls,
underserved/underprivileged youth, and persons with
disabilities in an effort to bring people together
and foster greater understanding through sports.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Professional and $575 $5,575
Cultural
Exchanges
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ngwang Choephel $575 $575 This grant competition supports exchange projects Tibet 27
Fellows (Tibet) involving ethnic Tibetans in Tibet and in the U.S. 16
Tibetan regions of China.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
J. Christopher Stevens na $5,000 A virtual exchange for youth in the Middle East/ na
Virtual Exchange North Africa and the U.S.
Initiative
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program and $3,500 $4,752
Performance
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alumni Affairs $2,282 $3,500 Advances U.S. foreign policy by programs that are > 1 million
mutually beneficial to the people of the United > 140,000
States and the people of other countries. The registered on IEA
International Exchange Alumni website (https:// website
alumni.state.gov) is among these programs. Alumni
engagement is integral to public diplomacy and
generates maximum return on the U.S. government's
investment in exchange programs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Evaluation $1,218 $1,252 The Evaluation Division is dedicated to enhancing na
the effectiveness of ECA's exchange programs
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Please outline the total U.S. contributions to the United
Nations from the U.S. Department of State and all other U.S.
Departments and agencies including the total amount of all assessed and
voluntary contributions, including in-kind, of the United States
Government to the United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies
and related bodies.
For each such contribution, please provide:
a. The amount of the contribution;
b. A description of the contribution (including whether assessed or
voluntary);
c. The department or agency of the United States Government
responsible for the contribution;
d. The purpose of the contribution; and
e. The United Nations or United Nations affiliated agency or
related body receiving the contribution.
Answer. The Department is currently preparing a report to Congress
that will provide this information, as directed by House Report 133-
499, which accompanied the House State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Bill, 2015. The Department is also preparing an
annual report to Congress on U.S. contributions to international
organizations as required by section 405(b) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003. The Department is planning to
submit these reports by July 1, 2015.
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)
U.S. and Foreign Participants*
Country/Regional Summary
FY 2013
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Foreign Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
East Asia and Pacific ............... ............... ...............
Australia 78 61 139
Brunei ............... 10 10
Burma 32 251 283
Cambodia 45 193 238
Federated States of 5 14 19
Micronesia
Fiji 4 29 33
French Polynesia 1 ............... 1
Hong Kong 46 27 73
Indonesia 205 875 1,080
Japan 360 155 515
Kiribati 1 ............... ...............
Korea, Democratic ............... ............... 8
People's Republic
of
Laos 17 166 183
Macau 8 ............... ...............
Malaysia 147 230 377
Marshall Islands 6 8 14
Mongolia 30 129 159
New Zealand 48 55 103
Niue ............... ............... 1
Palau 9 6 15
Papua New Guinea 1 13 14
People's Republic 760 664 1,424
of China
Philippines 38 436 474
Republic of Korea 423 197 620
Samoa 37 14 51
Singapore 34 39 73
Solomon Islands ............... ............... 1
Taiwan 111 74 185
Thailand 117 299 416
Timor-Leste 6 103 109
Tonga 1 3 4
Vanuatu ............... ............... 1
Vietnam 59 375 434
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 2,629 4,437 7,066
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Europe/Eurasia ............... ............... ...............
Europe/Eurasia 3,513 5,465 8,978
Albania 8 38 46
Andorra 5 3 8
Armenia 20 225 245
Austria 53 48 101
Azerbaijan 38 338 376
Belarus 20 89 109
Belgium 18 53 71
Bosnia and 39 221 260
Herzegovina
Bulgaria 48 74 122
Croatia 22 35 57
Cyprus 17 86 103
Czech Republic 62 62 124
Denmark 40 28 68
Estonia 14 40 54
Finland 41 59 100
France 156 117 273
Georgia 22 260 282
Germany 688 558 1,246
Greece 40 54 94
Hungary 39 58 97
Iceland 14 24 38
Ireland 61 59 120
Italy 151 95 246
Kosovo, Republic of 15 86 101
Latvia 26 25 51
Lithuania 21 29 50
Luxembourg 5 7 12
Macedonia 16 46 62
Malta 7 7 14
Moldova 21 199 220
Montenegro 4 33 37
Netherlands 41 47 88
Norway 35 60 95
Poland 44 109 153
Portugal 12 37 49
Romania 24 66 90
Russia 341 1,136 1,477
Serbia 26 120 146
Slovakia 17 37 54
Slovenia 22 22 44
Spain 287 90 377
Sweden 38 40 78
Switzerland 17 21 38
Turkey 253 251 504
Ukraine 48 645 693
United Kingdom 243 112 355
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 6,692 11,314 18,006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Near Eastern Affairs ............... ............... ...............
Algeria 40 347 387
Bahrain 5 170 175
Egypt 33 647 680
Gaza Strip ............... 1,382 1,382
Iran ............... 7 27
Iraq 27 555 582
Israel 86 755 841
Jordan 165 670 835
Kuwait 3 115 118
Lebanon 10 749 759
Libya 1 302 303
Morocco 292 975 1,267
Oman 107 176 283
Qatar 4 27 31
Saudi Arabia 14 124 138
Syria ............... 5 35
Tunisia 12 521 533
United Arab 25 28 53
Emirates
West Bank 21 154 175
Yemen 1 496 497
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 846 8,255 9,101
------------------------------------------------------------------------
South Central Asia ............... ............... ...............
Afghanistan 24 1,025 1,049
Bangladesh 64 248 312
Bhutan 4 11 15
India 445 1,450 1,895
Kazakhstan 37 458 495
Kyrgyzstan 36 382 418
Maldives ............... 3 63
Nepal 62 251 313
Pakistan 29 986 1,015
Sri Lanka 28 138 166
Tajikistan 86 284 370
Turkmenistan 5 70 75
Uzbekistan 22 248 270
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 842 5,614 6,456
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub-Saharan Africa ............... ............... ...............
Angola 2 55 57
Benin 6 47 53
Botswana 20 30 50
Burkina Faso 10 189 199
Burundi 6 39 45
Cabo Verde ............... ............... 5
Cameroon 4 120 124
Central African ............... ............... 5
Republic
Chad ............... 45 145
Comoros 1 8 9
Congo 1 19 20
Congo, Democratic 9 123 132
Republic of the
Cote d'Ivoire 7 118 125
Djibouti ............... ............... 9
Equatorial Guinea 1 3 4
Eritrea ............... 1 11
Ethiopia 27 234 261
Gabon 1 25 26
Gambia, The 4 13 17
Ghana 132 118 250
Guinea 5 27 32
Guinea-Bissau ............... ............... 3
Kenya 30 164 194
Lesotho 1 8 9
Liberia 6 53 59
Madagascar 7 85 92
Malawi 22 55 77
Mali ............... 3 93
Mauritania 1 138 139
Mauritius 7 21 28
Mozambique 11 76 87
Namibia 13 22 35
Niger 1 93 94
Nigeria 24 212 236
Reunion 1 ............... ...............
Rwanda 29 107 136
Sao Tome and ............... ............... 6
Principe
Senegal 33 74 107
Seychelles 1 2 3
Sierra Leone 4 39 43
Somalia ............... ............... 3
South Africa 172 483 655
South Sudan, 1 20 21
Republic of
Sudan 1 66 67
Swaziland 2 15 17
Tanzania, United 38 104 142
Republic of
Togo 4 82 86
Uganda 35 96 131
Zambia 24 62 86
Zimbabwe 43 144 187
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 747 3,677 4,424
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Western Hemisphere ............... n ...............
Affairs
Antigua and Barbuda ............... ............... 1
Argentina 127 459 586
Bahamas, The ............... 8 18
Barbados 7 8 15
Belize 28 16 44
Bolivia 43 194 237
Brazil 325 729 1,054
Canada 50 66 116
Chile 115 279 394
Colombia 93 440 533
Costa Rica 142 189 331
Cuba 4 8 12
Dominica ............... ............... 1
Dominican Republic 23 108 131
Ecuador 79 201 280
El Salvador 9 247 256
Grenada 1 1 2
Guatemala 30 646 676
Guyana 9 5 14
Haiti 20 76 96
Honduras 12 252 264
Jamaica 19 32 51
Mexico 104 593 697
Netherlands 2 1 3
Antilles
Nicaragua 19 402 421
Panama 25 412 437
Paraguay 47 171 218
Peru 77 287 364
St. Lucia ............... ............... 2
Suriname 14 13 27
Trinidad and Tobago 15 25 40
Turks and Caicos 1 ............... ...............
Islands
Uruguay 31 211 242
Venezuela 43 243 286
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 1,514 6,336 7,850
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Participant totals include support from foreign partner governments.
Question. United Nations Peacekeeping.--Why is the administration
requesting a significant increase of almost 38 percent above fiscal
year 2015 funding for the Contributions for International Peacekeeping
Activities Account for Fiscal Year 2016? What other countries have
committed to a similar increase in their peacekeeping contributions,
and what is the dollar amount for those additional commitments?
Answer. The request is $2.93 billion, of which $2.55 billion would
fund the U.S. share of U.N. peacekeeping assessments during FY 2016 for
14 ongoing U.N. peacekeeping missions, a war crimes tribunal, and
logistical support for U.N. Support Office for the African Union
Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) as well as the monitoring of mission
effectiveness. An additional $380 million is included to partially
cover projected FY 2015 shortfalls.
The Department recognizes that this request represents an increase
of $811 million (or 38.2 percent) over the amount Congress appropriated
in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2015 (``FY 2015 Act'') for the Contributions for
International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account. However, the FY
2016 request is based on an assumption that our U.N. peacekeeping
assessment will be about equal to the FY 2015 estimated requirements of
$2.55 billion.
Peacekeeping missions are critical tools to maintain international
peace and security, and to advance U.S. interests around the world,
including in Somalia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Mali and Haiti. International peacekeeping efforts are cost-effective
means for countries to work together toward the same ends, resolve
conflicts, contribute to international stability, and mitigate
humanitarian crises. We continue to regularly review missions to
determine where we may be able to downsize, close, or transition them
to a peace-building or other arrangement, as appropriate, as well as
encourage the U.N. to further pursue cost saving measures and
efficiencies.
Every U.N. member state pays a percentage share of the U.N.'s
peacekeeping costs according to the U.N. peacekeeping scale of
assessments. Overall U.N. peacekeeping costs are increasing
significantly, not just for the United States. Every member state is
committed to paying its share of the peacekeeping costs under Article
17 of the U.N. Charter.
Question. Evaluations.--In January 2015, the U.S. Department of
State made changes to its program evaluation policy and guidance.
Please explain the changes, why they were made, and how the
agency plan to effectively evaluate both foreign assistance and
diplomacy programs at the U.S. Department of State.
Answer. After analysis of the first 2 years of implementation, the
Department's evaluation policy has been updated to simplify its
language and structure and to clarify requirements for evaluation. The
policy update clarifies that the evaluation requirement is not bound by
dates and that it covers the full spectrum of activities, projects and
programs the Department engages in. As a result, it will be more
sustainable than the original policy.
The updated policy makes plain that efforts and interventions
funded by Diplomatic-Engagement (DE), such as those carried out by CA,
FSI, HR, R/PPR, OBO, H, L, IRM, etc., are covered. In addition, other
types of DE-funded evaluations, such as an organizational assessment
carried out by a regional bureau, would also be covered. The intent is
for bureaus and independent offices to look at the full spectrum of
activities, programs and processes they perform and determine where
more information is needed for improvements, developing priorities, or
making decisions. The policy sets a consistent threshold for each
bureau and independent office to conduct at least one evaluation per
year and does not include any new requirements from the previous
policy. It does:
Include a general requirement for all bureaus and
independent offices to conduct at least 1 evaluation per year,
with more expected of offices managing more than $1 million;
Clarify that it includes not only programs, but the
activities and processes most prevalent in the Department;
Include all bureaus and offices, with the expectation that
all have a process or activity that could benefit from review;
Expand the kinds of evaluations and methods available,
including low and no cost evaluations done internally;
Introduce collaborative evaluation to minimize duplication
of effort;
Incorporate the new foreign assistance policy guidance on
transparency and public dissemination of evaluation report
summaries as a requirement;
Eliminate the requirement for overseas post to comply with
the policy; and
Include expanded guidance, which will be issued annually.
______
Statement From Administration on No Boots on the Ground
Submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer
PRESIDENT OBAMA
--``I think we always have to guard against mission creep, so let me
repeat what I've said in the past: American combat troops are not
going to be fighting in Iraq again.''
June 19, 2014
--``As I have said before, these American forces will not have a combat
mission--we will not get dragged into another ground war in Iraq.''
September 10, 2014
--``. . . nor do we intend to send U.S. troops to occupy foreign
lands.''
September 24, 2014
--``Instead of getting dragged into another ground war in the Middle
East, we are leading a broad coalition, including Arab nations, to
degrade and ultimately destroy this terrorist group.''
January 20, 2015
SECRETARY KERRY
--``That is to say that we need to do kinetic, we need to attack them
in ways that prevent them from taking over territory, that bolster
the Iraqi security forces, others in the region who are prepared to
take them on, without committing troops of our own, obviously. I
think that's a redline for everybody here, no boots on the
ground.''
September 5, 2014
--``This is not the prelude to another U.S. ground war in the Middle
East. President Obama has said repeatedly that U.S. ground troops
will not engage in combat roles. He means it. I volunteered to
serve and fought in a war I came to believe was a mistake. I take
that lesson seriously. This will not be another one of those
interventions.''
September 26, 2014
--``The President has been crystal-clear that his policy is that U.S.
military forces will not be deployed to conduct ground combat
operations against ISIL and that will be the responsibility of
local forces, because that is what our local partners and allies
want, that is what we learned works best in the context of our Iraq
experience, that is what is best for preserving our coalition, and
most importantly, it is in the best interest of the United
States.''
December 9, 2014
______
CRS Memorandum on the Meaning of ``Enduring''
Submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer
[all]