[Senate Hearing 114-90]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-90
THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION
TO USE FORCE AGAINST ISIS: MILITARY AND
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 2015
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Lester E. Munson III, Staff Director
Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
Defense, Washington, DC........................................ 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Responses of Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter to questions
submitted by Senator Bob Corker............................ 58
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Dempsey, General Martin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC..................... 11
Response of General Martin Dempsey to question submitted by
Senator Bob Corker......................................... 59
Kerry, Hon. John F., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 3
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared statement submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer............ 57
(iii)
THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO USE FORCE AGAINST ISIS:
MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room 106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Corker, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Flake,
Gardner, Perdue, Isakson, Paul, Barrasso, Menendez, Boxer,
Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Murphy, Kaine, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order. I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses today, and
thank you for taking the time to be here. This is an important
topic. We know that each of you has been traveling extensively,
and again want to thank you for being with us today to share
your insights.
I think everybody on this committee cares first and
foremost that we have a policy, a strategy, to deal with ISIS
that is in relation to our national interests, that the two are
aligned. And I think that is paramount, and what most people in
America care about, and certainly everyone on this committee.
Secondarily to that, from my perspective, is the
authorization process itself, and yet we find ourselves in an
interesting place. The President, which I appreciate, has sent
to us an authorization for the use of military force. That was
welcomed I think by both sides of the aisle. As we have
received that authorization for the use of military force, what
we have come to understand is that, and this is not a
pejorative statement, it is an observation: we do not know of a
single Democrat in Congress--in the United States Senate
anyway--that supports that authorization for the use of
military force.
On the other hand, the authorization for the use of
military force that has been sent up is one that is limited in
some ways, both in duration and relative to the activities that
the Commander in Chief, through you, can carry out. And so,
what that does on this side of the aisle is put Republican
Senators in the position of looking at a limited authorization
for the use of military force that in some ways ratifies a
strategy, especially in Syria, that many people do not believe
is effective--one that does not show the commitment necessary
to really be successful in the short term.
So I think this hearing today will be very helpful in
trying to come together and to understand, number one, that we
have a strategy in Syria that is in our national interests,
that we have a strategy in Iraq that is in our national
interests, and we understand that ISIS obviously is
promulgating in many other places.
I was in Baghdad and Erbil 3 weeks ago, and regardless of
how we have gotten to where we are today, and I know a lot of
things have been said about decisions that have been made along
the way, one of the things that jumped out at me, very
glaringly, is that in many ways every single thing the United
States is doing right now in Iraq, things that I support, I
might add, to deal with ISIS, every single thing that we are
doing is really inuring to the benefit of Iran. In other words,
we are making Iraq a better place for Iran.
No doubt Abadi wants one foot in our country and one foot
in Iran, and no doubt he is looking for our assistance, and no
doubt he looks to us as a balance. But when you look at the way
Iran has permeated the Parliament there, when you look at
Suleimani and the fact that he is a celebrity in Iran now and
leading the efforts of the Shia militia, it is something that
jumps out. And I hope that during today, all of you will be
able to illuminate how we should feel about that. Should we
care? I know we have had numbers of people getting exercised
about the fact that we have Iranian-led Shia militia dealing
with ISIS.
Because of the observations that I have made, I am not sure
that that should even be an issue. In essence, we are working
toward the same end, but I would love to hear your thoughts on
that. And what may occur after March 24 in the event there is
not an agreement with Iran over the nuclear program, how will
that affect how the Shia militia--that is very close in
proximity to our own men and women in uniform--how that might
affect them.
And in closing, I hope that what you will do today also is
to illuminate to us why some of the decisions we know are key.
After being in Erbil and Baghdad, I was in Ankara with our
Turkish friends. I know a decision memo has been in front of
the President for some time relative to an air exclusion zone
in Aleppo, and decisions about how we may or may not deal with
protecting those that we are training and equipping right now
to come in against ISIS. I do not think we have made those
decisions yet. And I think to many of us here, what that shows
is potentially a lack of commitment, if you will, to really
deal with ISIS in a more significant way. That may not be the
case, and I hope today during your testimony we will be able to
understand more fully the lack of those decisions being made,
what that means relative to the overall effort.
So I welcome you here. And I think all three of you have
been highly regarded by members of the United States Senate on
both sides of the aisle. And we trust your testimony today will
be very beneficial to us as we move ahead. And with that, I
will turn to our very, very distinguished ranking member,
Senator Robert Menendez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
Secretaries Kerry and Carter and Chairman Dempsey, for being
here with us today.
Last December, this committee reported a resolution to
authorize the use of military force to counter ISIL. We acted
because many of us shared a view then and now that we stood
with the President to defeat ISIL, that the 2001 AUMF was not
and is not intended to apply to our current engagement in Iraq
and Syria. We believed then as now that it is imperative that
Congress authorize any further military action against ISIL. It
is imperative that we do not shoehorn this conflict into an old
AUMF. And it may be convenient, but it is not right. We have an
obligation to the families who are sending their children into
harm's way to understand our goals, what is achievable and what
is not, and ultimately to vote to authorize or not authorize
the use of force.
The committee had extensive discussions of many of these
issues last year, and the AUMF we passed had a restriction on
the deployment of ground troops, allowing for all potential
uses that the administration had so far identified, including
the use of special operations forces to go after high value
ISIL targets, search and rescue of downed pilots, the use of
forward air controllers with Iraqi units to better direct
coalition airstrikes. It also repealed the 2002 AUMF in Iraq
and set a 3-year timeframe for Congress to reconsider the 9/11
AUMF.
What it did not do, and what I think Democrats are not
willing to do, is to give this or any other President an open-
ended authorization for war, a blank check. And as someone who
opposed the 2002 Iraq AUMF, and who has seen the 2001
authorization that I did support go far beyond where anyone
would have contemplated, this is the critical question moving
forward.
So I look forward to getting some answers from our
witnesses that will allow us to move forward in writing and
passing an authorization. But we need to know what combat
operations may be undertaken by United States troops on the
ground in Syria and Iraq. We need to know whether associated
forces that come under this agreement could include forces
affiliated with ISIL in Libya, Nigeria, or elsewhere. We need
to know whether a new administration could revert to relying on
the 2001 AUMF in 3 years if this AUMF, if passed, were to
expire. And we need to know how long we expect to be there and
what our exit strategy will be, what metrics will indicate
success, or tell us it is time to bring troops home.
We heard from General Allen 2 weeks ago that under the
President's proposed language prohibiting enduring offensive
combat forces, that U.S. troops could be deployed for as little
as 2 weeks or as long as 2 years before they would trigger the
restriction on no enduring offensive operations. On the other
hand, General Dempsey said last week that he does not view this
language as time restrictive, but as mission specific. So
General Dempsey believes the language in this AUMF would allow,
for example, United States ground forces to accompany Iraqi
forces into Mosul. Clearly, there is a need to define exactly
what would be allowed. And it would seem to me that legally
there is at least the potential for large numbers of United
States troops to be deployed in Iraq and Syria, and maybe
beyond, with the authorization as submitted.
So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the answers to
these and other questions from our distinguished witnesses, and
I thank you for this opportunity.
The Chairman. Absolutely. Thank you for your comments. And,
again, we have three outstanding witnesses. We want to welcome
you here. As I understand it, Secretary Kerry is going to
begin, followed by Secretary Carter, followed by Chairman
Dempsey. We are honored that you are here before us. Look
forward to your testimony, and I think you all know the drill.
If you will, keep it to about 5 minutes if that is possible,
and we will ask questions after. Thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Kerry. Well, Chairman Corker and Ranking Member
Menendez, members of the committee, we are pleased to be here.
I am pleased to return here, and particularly so in the
distinguished company of Defense Secretary Ash Carter and our
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marty Dempsey.
From my 29 years of service on this committee, I have
nothing but respect for the committee's prerogatives, and
particularly the role that it can play on a critical issue like
this. We are very simply looking for, as I think both of you,
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Menendez, have said, the
appropriate present-day authorization, not, as you said,
Senator Menendez, 2001, but a 2015 statement by the United
States Congress about the authority with which we should be
able to go after, degrade, and destroy, as the President has
said, the group known as ISIL or Daesh.
Now, Mr. Chairman, in our democracy, there are many views
about the challenges and the opportunities that we face, and
that is appropriate. That is who we are. But I hope we believe
that there is an overwhelming consensus that Daesh has to be
stopped. Our Nation is strongest, always has been, when we act
together. It is a great tradition in this country of foreign
policy having a special place, that politics ends at the
water's edge, and that we will act on behalf of our Nation
without regard to party and ideology.
We simply cannot allow this collection of murderers and
thugs to achieve, in their group, their ambition, which
includes, by the way, most likely the death or submission of
all those who oppose it, the seizure of land, the theft of
resources, the incitement of terrorism across the globe, the
killing and attacking of people simply for what they believe or
for who they are. And the joint resolution that is proposed by
the President provides the means for America and its
representatives to speak with a single powerful voice at this
pivotal hour.
When I came here last time, I mentioned that----
[Disturbance in hearing room.]
Voice. The American people are speaking out, Secretary
Kerry. We are tired of an endless war. We do not want go into
war with no----
The Chairman. The committee will be in order. Look, we
appreciate----
Voice [continuing]. In another endless war and killing of
innocent people.
The Chairman. Okay. If this happens again, I would ask the
police to immediately escort people out of the room.
Voice [continuing]. Creating more terrorism, killing more
innocent people.
Secretary Kerry. Killing more innocent people. I wonder how
our journalists who were beheaded and a pilot who was fighting
for freedom who was burned alive, what they would have to say
to their efforts to protect innocent people.
ISIL's momentum has been diminished, Mr. Chairman. It is
still picking up supporters in places obviously. We have all
observed that. But in the places where we have focused and
where we are asking you to focus at this moment in time, it is
clear that even while savage attacks continue, there is the
beginning of a process to cut off their supply lines, to take
out their leaders, to cut off their finances, to reduce the
foreign fighters, to counter the messaging that has brought
some of those fighters to this effort. But to ensure its
defeat, we have to persist until we prevail in the broad-based
campaign along multiple lines of effort that have been laid out
over the course of the last months.
The President already has statutory authority to act
against ISIL, but a clear and formal expression of this
Congress' backing at this moment in time would dispel doubt
that might exist anywhere that Americans are united in this
effort. Approval of this resolution would encourage our friends
and our partners in the Middle East. It would further energize
the members and prospective members of the global coalition
that we have assembled to oppose Daesh. And it would constitute
a richly deserved vote of confidence in the men and women of
our Armed Forces who are on the front lines prosecuting this
effort on our behalf. Your unity would also send an
unmistakable message to the leaders of Daesh. They have to
understand they cannot divide us. Do not let them. They cannot
intimidate us, and they have no hope of defeating us.
The resolution that we have proposed would give the
President a clear mandate to prosecute the armed component of
this conflict against Daesh and associated persons or forces
which we believe is carefully delineated and defined. And while
the proposal contains certain limitations that are appropriate
in light of the nature of this mission, it provides the
flexibility that the President needs to direct a successful
military campaign. And that is why the administration did
propose a limitation on the use of ``enduring offensive ground
combat operations.'' I might add, that was after the
committee--then committee chair, Senator Menendez, and the
committee moved forward with its language, and we came up here
and testified, and responded basically to the dynamics that
were presented us within the committee and the Congress itself.
So the proposal also includes no geographic limitation, not
because there are plans to take it anywhere, but because it
would be a mistake to communicate to ISIL----
[Disturbance in the hearing room.]
Voice. The United States in the world. The United States is
killing innocent civilians----
The Chairman. I would just remind those in the audience--we
live in a country where people have the opportunity to express
themselves in democratic ways. We would hope that you would
allow this hearing to proceed in an orderly way and respect
other citizens' rights to be here and to observe what is
happening in a civil manner. I would say that I do not think
you are helping your cause. I would say you are hurting your
cause, and hopefully you will remain in an appropriate manner.
Thank you.
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The point of the
no geographic limitation is not that there are any plans or any
contemplation. I think the President has been so clear on this.
But what a mistake it would be to send a message to Daesh that
there are safe havens, that there is somehow just a two-country
limitation, so they go off and put their base in a third
country, and then we go through months and months of
deliberation. Again, we cannot afford that. So that is why
there is no limitation.
And, Mr. Chairman, we know that there are groups in the
world, affiliated terrorist groups, who aspire to harm the
United States, our allies, our partners. Daesh is, however,
very distinctive in that because it holds territory, and it
will continue if not stopped to seize more because it has
financial resources, because of the debilitating impact of its
activities in the broader Middle East, because of its
pretensions to worldwide leadership, and because there have
been culpable and violent deaths of Americans and others.
And I do not need to preview for this committee the full
litany of the outrages that are committed by Daesh. But let me
just say that just among them, scratching the surface, are
atrocities against Syrian Christians and Yazidi religious
communities, the crucifixion of children, the sale and
enslavement of women and girls, the hideous murder of captives
from as near as Jordan and as distant as Japan, and the
destruction of irreplaceable cultural and historical sites, the
plunder and destruction of cities and towns in which followers
of Islam worship and raise their families.
Now, I testified before this committee just a couple of
weeks ago regarding our strategy for disrupting and defeating
ISIL. That strategy continues to move forward on all fronts.
Secretary Carter and General Dempsey will touch on the military
elements. But I can say from a diplomatic perspective that the
world is strongly united in seeking Daesh's defeat. Our
coalition is receiving help from governments throughout and
beyond the Middle East, governments that may disagree on other
issues, but not about the need to take decisive action against
Daesh.
And to date, we have a coalition of some 62 members,
including 14 nations that are contributing directly to the
operations against Daesh in Iraq or in Syria, 16 of which have
committed to help train or otherwise assist Iraqi security
forces. Since the coalition came together less than half a year
ago, we have stopped ISIL's surge, we have degraded its
leadership, we have forced it to change its communications and
its movement and its tactics, and heavily damaged its revenue
generating oil facilities. And if you have a classified
briefing, I think you will get a very good grounding in the
progress that is being made to date.
We continue to see progress in governance in Iraq where new
leaders are working to strengthen and reform the country's
security forces through the purging of incompetent or corrupt
officers and the more extensive inclusion of Sunni fighters. In
Tikrit right now, there are nearly a thousand Sunni taking
part. There is a cross section of engagement.
So, Mr. Chairman, just to respond--move rapidly here.
The Chairman. We are not moving that rapidly actually.
Secretary Kerry. Well, that is why I am cutting--I am going
to cut to the chase.
The Chairman. Okay, good.
Secretary Kerry. Responding to the threat posed by ISIL is
just not a partisan issue, at least it should not be. It is not
even a bipartisan issue. It is really a test that transcends
political affiliations, and it is a tremendous challenge to the
security of our Nation and to the values of our citizens. And
so, it is really the kind of challenge that this committee is
here to deal with. And my hope is that we will live up to the
tradition that we have never failed to meet in the past, that
when we had this kind of challenge, the Congress came together,
the Senate particularly, I think, in this format. And I am
confident that we can do so here again today and in the next
few days.
So I am happy to respond to your questions, but first I
will turn to Secretary Carter.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Kerry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State John F. Kerry
Chairman Corker and members of the committee, I'm pleased to return
here and to do so in the distinguished company of Defense Secretary Ash
Carter and General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
This panel is looked to for leadership--and justifiably so--on the
full range of international issues, but few topics are of such
paramount importance as the one that brings us together today. The
administration seeks the committee's support and that of the entire
Congress for a joint resolution to authorize the use of military force
against the terrorist organization known as ISIL.
Mr. Chairman, in our democracy, there are many views about the
challenges and opportunities we face, but I hope and believe that there
is an overwhelming consensus that ISIL must be stopped. Our Nation is
strongest when we act together--and we simply cannot allow this
collection of murderers and thugs to achieve its ambitions--which
include the death or submission of all who oppose it, the seizure of
land, the theft of resources, and the incitement of terrorist acts
across the globe.
The joint resolution proposed by the President provides the means
for America and its representatives to speak with a single powerful
voice at this pivotal hour, when ISIL's momentum has diminished amid
signs of fragmentation--but its savage attacks continue. To ensure its
defeat, we must persist until we prevail in the broad-based campaign
along multiple lines of effort that is now underway.
The President already has statutory authority to act against ISIL,
but a clear and formal expression of your backing would dispel any
doubt anywhere that Americans are united in this effort. Approval of
this resolution would encourage our friends and partners in the Middle
East; it would further energize the members and prospective members of
the global coalition we have assembled to oppose ISIL; and it would
constitute a richly deserved vote of confidence in the men and women of
our Armed Forces. Your unity would also send an unmistakable message to
the leaders of ISIL--who must understand that they cannot divide us;
they cannot intimidate us; and they have no hope of defeating us.
The resolution we have proposed would give the President a clear
mandate to prosecute armed conflict against ISIL and associated persons
or forces. And while the proposal contains certain limitations that are
appropriate in light of the nature of our mission, it provides the
flexibility the President needs to direct a successful military
campaign.
That is why the administration has proposed a limitation on the use
of ``enduring offensive ground combat operations.'' The administration
sees no need for U.S. Forces to engage in enduring offensive ground
combat operations against ISIL. That is the responsibility of our local
partners--a task they are determined and preparing to meet.
The proposal includes no geographic limitation, although we do not
anticipate conducting operations against targets in countries other
than Iraq and Syria at this time. It would be a mistake to communicate
to ISIL that there are safe havens for them outside of Iraq and Syria,
by limiting the authorization to specific countries.
Mr. Chairman, we know that there are many terrorist groups in the
world that aspire to harm the United States, our friends, and our
partners. ISIL is distinctive, however, because it holds territory and
will continue--if not stopped--to seize more; because of its financial
resources; because of the destabilizing impact of its activities on the
broader Middle East; because of its pretentions to worldwide
leadership; and because it has already been culpable in the violent
death of Americans. I don't need to review for this committee the full
litany of outrages committed by ISIL, but I will say that among them
are atrocities against the Assyrian Christian and Yazidi religious
communities; the crucifixion of children; the sale and enslavement of
women and girls; the hideous murder of captives from as near as Jordan
and as distant as Japan; the destruction of irreplaceable cultural
sites; and the plunder and destruction of cities and towns in which
followers of Islam worship, work, and raise their families.
Just 2 weeks ago--as part of our budget presentation--I testified
before this committee regarding our strategy for disrupting and
defeating ISIL. That strategy continues to move forward on all fronts.
Secretary Carter and General Dempsey will touch on the military
elements, but I can say--from the diplomatic perspective--that the
world is strongly united in seeking ISIL's defeat. Our coalition is
receiving help from governments throughout and well beyond the Middle
East--governments that may disagree on other issues but not about the
need to take decisive action against ISIL. To date, we have assembled a
coalition of 62 members, including 14 nations contributing to air
operations against ISIL in Iraq or Syria, and 16 which have committed
to help train or otherwise assist Iraqi security forces. Since the
coalition came together less than half a year ago, we have stopped
ISIL's surge, degraded its leadership, forced it to change its
communications and tactics, and heavily damaged its revenue-generating
oil facilities.
We also continue to see progress on governance in Iraq, where the
new leaders are working to strengthen and reform the country's security
forces through the purging of incompetent or corrupt officers and the
more extensive inclusion of Sunni fighters.
Have no doubt, marginalizing and defeating ISIL in Iraq will be a
difficult and time-consuming process. Defeating ISIL in Syria--with
Syria's brutal and repressive government--will be even harder and take
more time. But the principles at stake in each country are the same and
so is our determination. In Syria, as in Iraq, our goal is to support
effective and inclusive leadership and a more stable country where
violent extremism is no longer a major threat and refugees are able to
return home and live normal lives.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I hope that in thinking
about this issue, we will all bear in mind the difference between a
future in which ISIL is on the rampage, gobbling up land, attracting
recruits, and striving to sow terror beyond every boundary--and a
future in which that loathsome organization has been defeated on the
battlefield, plunged into bankruptcy, and is widely seen on social
media and in the court of public opinion as the loser that it is.
Between those two futures; there can be only one choice.
Responding to the threat posed by ISIL is obviously not a partisan
issue. It is not really even a bipartisan issue. It's a test that
transcends political affiliations altogether; it's a tremendous
challenge to the security of our Nation, the values of our citizens,
and the well-being of friends and allies across the globe; it's the
kind of challenge that this committee and our country have never in the
past failed to meet--and that I am confident we will embrace today with
courage and unity.
I will be pleased to respond to your questions but with your
permission, Mr. Chairman, I will yield first to my colleague and
friend, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter.
The Chairman. Thank you. Secretary Carter, thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Carter. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Menendez,
all the members of the committee, thank you for giving me the
opportunity to be with you today on this important subject.
Before I begin, I am sure you are all aware that a UH-60
Blackhawk helicopter was involved in an accident last night
near Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. We know there were four
air crew, Army, from a National Guard Unit in Hammond, LA, and
seven marines assigned to Camp Lejeune, NC, on board that
helicopter. And I know that with me--our thoughts and prayers
are with them and their families as the search and rescue
continues.
Just as I know we are all proud to have the finest fighting
force the world has ever known. That is why at the end of my
first week as Secretary of Defense I traveled to Afghanistan
and Kuwait where I thanked our men and women in uniform for
their contributions to important missions. And in Kuwait, I
talked with our ambassadors and our military leaders in the
region about the campaign against ISIL.
The trip confirmed for me that ISIL represents a serious
and complex threat, especially in our interconnected and
networked world. But it also confirmed to me that the enemy can
be defeated, and we will deliver ISIL a lasting defeat. And I
am happy to share my thoughts about that campaign with you, but
let me turn to the subject of this hearing, which is the
authorization for the use of military force.
And in reviewing the President's AUMF as Secretary of
Defense, I asked myself two questions. First, does it provide
the necessary authority and flexibility to wage our campaign,
allowing for a full range of likely military scenarios? And
second, will it send the message to the people I am responsible
for, our brave men and women in uniform and the civilian
personnel who will wage this campaign, that the country is
behind them? I believe the President's AUMF does both, and I
urge Congress to pass it. And let me explain why I judge that
the proposed AUMF gives the authority and flexibility needed to
prevail in this campaign.
First, the proposed AUMF takes into account the reality, as
Secretary Kerry has noted already, that ISIL is an
organization--as an organization is likely to evolve
strategically, morphing, rebranding, and associating with other
terrorist groups, while continuing to threaten the United
States and our allies. Second, the proposed AUMF wisely does
not include any geographical restriction because ISIL already
shows signs of metastasizing outside of Syria and Iraq.
Third, the President's proposed authorization provides
great flexibility and the military means we need as we pursue
our strategy with one exception. The proposed AUMF does not
authorize long-term, large-scale offensive ground combat
operations like those we conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan
because our strategy does not call for them. Instead, local
forces must provide the enduring presence needed for an
enduring victory against ISIL.
And fourth and finally, the proposed AUMF expires in 3
years. I cannot tell you that our campaign to defeat ISIL would
be completed in 3 years, but I understand the reason for the
proposed sunset provision. It derives from the important
principle stemming from the Constitution that makes the grave
matter of enacting an authorization for the use of military
force a shared responsibility of the President and Congress.
The President's proposed authorization affords the American
people the chance to assess our progress in 3 years' time and
provide the next President and the Congress the opportunity to
reauthorize it if they find it necessary. To me, this is a
sensible and principled provision of the AUMF, even though I
cannot assure that the counter-ISIL campaign will be completed
in 3 years.
Now, in addition to providing the authority and flexibility
to wage a successful campaign, I said I had another key
consideration as Secretary of Defense, and that is sending the
right signals, most importantly to the troops. Passing the
proposed AUMF will demonstrate to our personnel that their
government stands behind them. And as Secretary Kerry
explained, it will also signal to our coalition partners and
our adversaries that the United States government has come
together to address a serious challenge.
We all took an oath to protect the Nation and its
interests, but to do so we must work together. I know everyone
on this committee takes the ISIL threat seriously, and
President Obama and everyone at this table does as well. We
encourage a serious debate, but I urge you to pass the
President's AUMF because it provides the necessary authority
and flexibility to wage our current campaign, and because it
will demonstrate to our men and women in uniform, some of whom
are in harm's way right now, that all of us stand unflinchingly
behind them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ash Carter
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and members of the
committee, as you know, I recently returned from my first trip abroad
as Secretary of Defense.
My last stop was in Kuwait, where I thanked our men and women in
uniform for their contributions to an important mission and talked with
our Ambassadors and military leaders in the region about our campaign
against ISIL.
The trip confirmed for me that ISIL represents a serious and
complex threat, especially in our interconnected and networked world.
But it also confirmed the enemy can be defeated. We will deliver ISIL a
lasting defeat.
Let me take a few moments to share with you my view of this fight.
First, defeating ISIL will require a combined U.S. diplomatic and
military effort, and I believe DOD's partners in the U.S. Government,
at this table, and in the region, are unified and working together
effectively. Second, while the 62-member coalition the United States is
leading is a great strength, we can--and we will--do a better job
leveraging the individual contributions of each member. Third, while we
are conducting the current campaign in Iraq and Syria, it has clear
ramifications for other parts of the Middle East and other regions of
the world. Fourth, ISIL's sophisticated communications strategy,
including its use of social media, requires us to be more creative in
combating it in the information dimension.
Our counter-ISIL strategy for enduring success calls for U.S.
military and coalition forces to conduct a systematic air campaign in
Iraq and Syria, and counts on local forces to conduct ground
operations. While our program to train and equip vetted elements of the
Syrian opposition is just getting off the ground, our strategy is
already having effect in Iraq, where America and our coalition partners
have helped local forces--the key to a lasting victory against ISIL--
seize the initiative.
In reviewing the President's proposed Authorization for the Use of
Military Force, as Secretary of Defense, I asked two questions:
First, does it provide the necessary authority and flexibility to
wage our current campaign, allowing for a full range of likely military
scenarios?
Second, will it send the message to the people I am responsible
for--our brave men and women in uniform, and civilian personnel who
will wage this campaign--that the country is behind them?
I believe the President's proposed AUMF does both. And I urge this
Congress to pass it.
Let me explain why I judge that the proposed AUMF gives the
authority and flexibility needed to prevail in this campaign.
First, the proposed AUMF takes into account the reality that ISIL
as an organization is likely to evolve strategically . . . morphing,
rebranding, and associating with other terrorist groups, while
continuing to threaten the United States and our allies.
Second, the proposed AUMF wisely does not include any geographical
restriction because ISIL already shows signs of metastasizing outside
of Syria and Iraq.
Third, the President's proposed authorization provides great
flexibility in the military means we need as we pursue our strategy,
with one exception: the proposed AUMF does not authorize long-term,
large-scale offensive ground combat operations like those we conducted
in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . because our strategy does not call for
them. Instead, local forces must provide the enduring presence needed
for an enduring victory.
Fourth and finally, the proposed AUMF expires in 3 years. I cannot
tell you our campaign to defeat ISIL will be completed in 3 years. But
I understand the reason for the proposed sunset provision. It derives
from the important principle, stemming from the Constitution, that
makes the grave matter of enacting an authorization for the use of
military force a shared responsibility of the President and Congress.
The President's proposed authorization affords the American people the
chance to assess our progress in 3 years' time, and provides the next
President and the next Congress the opportunity to reauthorize if they
find it necessary. To me, this is a sensible and principled provision
of the AUMF, even though I cannot assure that the counter-ISIL campaign
will be completed in 3 years.
In addition to providing the authority and flexibility to wage a
successful campaign, I said I had another key consideration as
Secretary of Defense: sending the right signals, most importantly, to
the troops.
Passing the proposed AUMF will demonstrate to our personnel that
their government stands behind them. And, as Secretary Kerry explained,
it will signal to our coalition partners and to our adversary that the
United States Government has come together to address a serious
national challenge.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we have all learned
lessons--many of them hard won--from the past 13-plus years of war. Our
experience informs our strategy, just as I am sure it informs all our
opinions on this issue. I know that some worry the proposed
authorization places too many limitations on DOD. And I know others are
concerned that the authorization does not impose enough constraints. I
am confident that the proposed AUMF gives DOD the authority and
flexibility required to execute our strategy and stamp out ISIL.
We all want Congress in this important fight. That is why President
Obama committed to an ISIL AUMF, even though existing AUMFs provide the
necessary legal authority for our ongoing military operations in Iraq
and Syria. It is also why the administration has worked closely with
members of this committee and the Congress to develop the proposed
language before you. And the discussion we are engaging in today helps
the American people understand the stakes in this fight, just as our
civil deliberation stands in sharp contrast to the discourse of our
barbaric and oppressive enemy.
We all took an oath to protect the Nation and its interests. But to
do so, we must work together. I know everyone on this committee takes
the ISIL threat seriously. President Obama--and everyone at this
table--does as well.
We encourage a serious debate. But I urge you to pass the
President's AUMF because it provides the necessary authority and
flexibility to wage our current campaign. Because it is the best next
step in our work together to degrade and defeat ISIL. And because it
will demonstrate to our men and women in uniform--some of whom are in
harm's way right now--that all of us stand unflinchingly behind them.
STATEMENT OF HON. GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
General Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. Let me begin by adding
my personal thoughts and prayers to those of the Secretary of
Defense at the loss of the folks on that helicopter, a reminder
to us that those who serve put themselves at risk both in
training and in combat. And we will work with the services to
assure those survivors or, I should say, their family members
will be well cared for.
The Chairman. And if I could, the committee will join in
that. Thank you.
General Dempsey. Yes, sir. Thank you. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today with Secretary Kerry and Secretary
Carter. I just returned yesterday from a trip to the Middle
East. I spent a day in Baghdad with Iraqi and U.S. leaders
discussing our strategy against ISIL. I also spent a day with
my French counterpart and 2,000 of France's sailors and marines
aboard the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the Arabian
Gulf. Our U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Carl Vinson was just off
the starboard side. These two great vessels sitting side by
side, their combat aircraft, and importantly their crews, are a
powerful image of partnership and commitment in this fight. It
is actually the solidarity of all of our coalition members that
is fundamental to the strength of our campaign against this
transregional threat that ISIL represents. The Government of
Iraq has a lot of work yet to do with the help of the coalition
to ensure ISIL is defeated and, importantly, stays defeated,
and that will take time.
I have been consulted on the proposed authorization for the
use of military force against ISIL and its associated groups.
It is suitable to the campaign as we have presently designed
it. We should expect our enemies will continue to adapt their
tactics, and we will adapt ours.
Bipartisan support for an AUMF would send an important
signal of national support to those who are serving in harm's
way conducting this mission. I met with some of them over this
past weekend, and they are performing magnificently as you
would expect.
I thank you for your commitment to our men and women in
uniform, and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you all for your testimony. And let me
just begin with Secretary Carter and Chairman Dempsey. I know
that Secretary Kerry mentioned that he feels that currently the
AUMF that we have from 2001 and the one from 2002 gives the
United States the legal authority in what is now occurring. I
just wonder if both of you would answer ``yes'' or ``no''
whether you believe that to be the case.
Secretary Carter. I do, yes.
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator.
The Chairman. Every witness who has come before us on
behalf of the administration believes that currently we are
operating under a legal premise with what we are doing against
ISIS today.
Let me ask you this question, Secretary Carter, Chairman
Dempsey. Has there been any indication to the people we are
dealing with as part of our coalition or the troops that
Congress today is not behind what is happening on the ground
with ISIS?
Secretary Carter. I cannot speak to that, Mr. Chairman. I
think that the folks I have talked to of ours do, in fact,
believe that the outrages that Secretary Kerry described on the
part of ISIL warrant the operation that they are involved in.
And, of course, we do not do anything that is not lawful. I am
not a lawyer, so I cannot tell you----
The Chairman. Sure, but they do not--there is no one that
you deal with that does not believe that Congress is
wholeheartedly behind the effort to deal with ISIS. Is that
correct?
Secretary Carter. I have not talked to people who have the
view one way or the other. They know that a hearing like this
is going on. I think they know its purpose, and I presume, like
me, they welcome a good outcome of it.
The Chairman. Chairman Dempsey.
General Dempsey. I have no data to suggest that they have
any doubt about the support of the Congress of the United
States or the American people.
The Chairman. Chairman Dempsey, we have had some great
conversations, and I always appreciate your candor. I know you
have responded to this in other committees or at least
publicly. Should there be any concern by people here that Iran
is influencing the outcome against ISIS, has Shia militia on
the ground, has some of its own personnel helping command and
control? Is that a concern that anyone that cares about U.S.
national interests should have?
General Dempsey. Yes, of course. There are six things from
the military's perspective that concern us about Iranian
influence. Four of them are regional, and two of them are
global. The four regional concerns are surrogates and proxies,
some of which are present in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, and
other places in Yemen, weapons trafficking, ballistic missile
technologies, and mines that they have developed with the
intent to be able to close the Strait of Hormuz if certain
circumstances would cause them to do it. And then the two
global threats, of course, are their nuclear aspirations, not
their nuclear aspirations for a peaceful nuclear program, but
for a weapon, which is being dealt with in the negotiations on
a diplomatic track. And then cyber is the other global threat
they pose.
So Iran's activities across the region and, in the cases of
nuclear aspirations and cyber activities, are concerning, of
course.
The Chairman. But as it relates to dealing with Tikrit or
Mosul--should we care that Iran's militias and others are
involved in helping move ISIS out of those areas, or will help
ISIS move out those areas when we begin the Mosul attack?
General Dempsey. I think there is general consensus both
inside of our own forces and also with the coalition partners
with whom I engage that anything anyone does to counter ISIL
is, in the main, a good outcome. In other words, the activities
of the Iranians to support the Iraqi Security Forces is a
positive thing in military terms against ISIL. But we are all
concerned about what happens after the drums stop beating and
ISIL is defeated, and whether the Government of Iraq will
remain on a path to provide an inclusive government for all of
the various groups within it. We are very concerned about that.
The Chairman. And so, the concern is that once we hit that
witching hour, if you will, when it appears that ISIS
definitely is toward its end, all of a sudden the Shia militias
and others would potentially turn on our own military, and
other very negative things could occur at that time.
General Dempsey. We have no indications that they intend to
turn on us, but what we are watching carefully is whether the
militias that call themselves the popular mobilization forces,
whether when they recapture lost territory, whether they engage
in acts of retribution and ethnic cleansing. There is no
indication that that is a widespread event at this point, but
we are watching closely.
The Chairman. So if we could move to Syria, I know we
talked a little bit about this. But this is, again, a term I
think even the administration has begun to utilize themselves.
It would appear that in Syria we are sort of in a containment
mode, that we are really not taking aggressive steps to turn
the tide there. We are obviously involved in some aerial
attacks, but that it is more of a containment mode. When we say
``Iraq first,'' Syria is more containment.
We have a train and equip program right now, and I wonder
if you could talk to us about two major decisions. One would be
if we are going to train and equip folks in other countries
that are being trained against ISIS--I know there has been an
alleged ``other'' program that is against Assad himself. But if
we are going to have an overt program that is going to deal
with ISIS, I would assume that we would consider it only moral
that if we are going to train them in other countries and bring
them in, that we would supply air power and other support to
protect them, especially from Assad's barrel bombs.
I know that Senator Graham may have asked a question about
whether this AUMF itself provides that legal authority. And I
would just like to ask you: does the AUMF that the President
has sent forth provide the legal authority for our military to
protect those that we are training in other places against ISIS
to protect them against Assad? In other words, take Assad on?
And I would also like for you to, if you would, talk to us a
little bit about why we have not yet agreed to the air
exclusion zone that Turkey has asked us to approve that would
more fully bring them in on the ground in Syria and actually
get something much more positive occurring, at least as it
relates to having some ground effort there.
General Dempsey. I take it, Senator--you are looking
straight at me, so I assume the question is for me.
The Chairman. Yes.
General Dempsey. So let me just briefly describe the way
militarily we characterize our campaign against ISIL in Iraq
and in Syria. I would not say that our goal is simply to
contain ISIL inside of Syria, but rather we have got at this
point militarily a main effort and a supporting effort. Our
main effort is in Iraq because we have a credible ground
partner for whom we supply this air power to distribute it and
to degrade and eventually defeat ISIL inside of Iraq. We do not
have that credible partner inside of Syria yet. We are taking
steps to build that partner.
In the meantime, we are attacking ISIL where we can using
ISAR and close air support, both U.S. and some coalition
partners, and it is intended to disrupt their activities so
that they cannot complement each other. It was formally before
we began this effort that ISIL could transit freely across that
Syrian and Iraqi border and reinforce efforts on both sides.
They are no longer able to do that. They are isolated and
degraded in Syria while we conduct our main effort inside of
Iraq.
To your other question about whether the AUMF provides
legal authority to protect the new Syrian forces as we have
called them, the answer to that is no. We have not--the
administration has not added a Syrian regime or an Assad
component to the AUMF, although we are in active discussions
within the interagency about what support we would supply once
the new Syrian forces are fielded. Now, militarily there is a
very pragmatic reason. You mentioned the moral obligation, I
suppose. Let me not speak to that, but rather let me speak to
the----
The Chairman. Well, if I could, Congress has approved a
significant amount of money to train and equip people to go
against ISIS, and yet we know Assad will barrel bomb them in
all likelihood, or at least members of their----
General Dempsey. Right.
The Chairman. So the President has actually sent us an AUMF
that does not allow us to protect them against what we know
they will be facing down the road. That, to me, is somewhat odd
and does not seem congruent, if you will, with previous steps
relative to train and equip. Can you understand why?
General Dempsey. No, I understand completely, and I am not
discounting the moral obligation. I am rather suggesting that--
I am giving you military advice under Article 1 responsibility.
And militarily, there is a very pragmatic reason to support
them, and that is we are not going to be able to recruit men
into that force unless we agree to support them at some level.
The Chairman. So militarily, I know we have had a pretty
good crop that have signed up on the front end, or at least
that is my understanding, but we cannot recruit more if we are
not going to protect them. And yet the AUMF that we have before
us does not allow us to protect them. Is that clearly what you
are saying?
General Dempsey. We are under active discussion about
whether and how to support them, and part of that discussion is
the legal authority to do so. And I would defer to those with
that expertise.
The Chairman. And I know I am way over, but the air
exclusion zone, what is keeping us from those types of----
General Dempsey. Yes. We have been in two rounds of
discussions with our Turkish counterparts about that, and we
are continuing to develop that option should it be asked for.
The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Boxer is
the ranking member on the Environment and Public Works and had
to go be part of that hearing. So I ask that her statement be
included in the record.
[Editor's note.--Senator Boxer's prepared statement can be
found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record''
section at the end of this hearing.]
Senator Menendez. And I have heard all of you several times
refer to ``no geographic limitation.'' And so, for the purposes
of the record, let it reflect that the AUMF that was passed out
last year that Democrats put together has no geographic
limitations, so I think there is--although there was a subject
of debate. Nonetheless, it came to a conclusion to have no
geographic limitations. So to that extent, you know, I know you
have all raised it, and I want to deal with it.
Let me ask you, General Dempsey, is it fair to say that for
Iran-sponsored Shia militias in Iraq, fighting ISIL is
definitely their immediate interest. But would it also be fair
to say they have other designs beyond that?
General Dempsey. It would be fair to say that that has not
become evident, but it is of great concern to us who have
served in Iraq since 2003. Iran is not a new entrant into the
crucible of Iraq. They have been there since 2004. And in some
cases, their economic influence in other ways has contributed
to the future of Iraq, and in other ways it has absolutely been
disruptive to the inclusiveness or the potential for an
inclusive governance. So, I mean, believe me, I share your
concerns, and we are watching carefully.
The Tikrit operation will be a strategic inflection point
one way or the other in terms of easing our concerns or
increasing them.
Senator Menendez. Well, I know that Suleimani is a cause
celebre these days there, so I would like to believe that it is
only to fight ISIL. But I do not believe that their purposes at
the end of the day--we have different goals as it relates to
Iraq, both in the short term as it relates to ISIL, and then in
the long term of a Democratic multiethnic government. So it is
a continuing concern.
Now, Chairman Dempsey, you said in your remarks, and I do
not have a copy of your statement, so correct me if I am wrong
here. Something to the extent that the authorization as
proposed by the administration basically or substantially, I
think was the word, deals with our campaign as we have
presently devised it. Is that a fair statement?
General Dempsey. That is a fair statement, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Does it also deal with a campaign that
may alter more than you have presently devised it?
General Dempsey. It deals with the campaign as presently
designed, and has statements in there--I do not know which part
of it you might be reacting to.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me perfect my question. If, in
fact, your campaign as presently designed needs to morph,
change, to the realities of what is happening, do you believe
the authorization will allow you to do that?
General Dempsey. Yes, I do, and that is because as most of
us who have both studied and served against these kind of
threats over the past now almost 14 years, we believe that the
primary way you defeat these groups is by, with, and through
partners in the region, and through sustainment of a broad
coalition. And that the U.S. Forces involved should principally
be enabling, not necessarily leading the effort, although the
AUMF does provide----well, first of all, I will always go back
to the Commander in Chief through Secretary of Defense and
recommend whatever I think is necessary to accomplish the task.
But as I presently conceive--as we presently conceive of this
threat and how to defeat it, this AUMF is adequate to the task.
Senator Menendez. Well, and I appreciate that answer
because it underlies the challenge that members of the
committee have in getting to the right point, to support the
President, this and any future one, to degrade and defeat ISIL,
and at the same time not to provide the open-endedness so that
if, in fact, it meets your present criteria, but you believe it
has the wherewithal to meet a future criteria that may morph,
that is the essence of the challenge.
And so, last week before the Armed Services Committee,
General Dempsey, you, in response to questions, said that your
view of what no enduring offensive combat operations would mean
would be mission specific. Is that fair to say?
General Dempsey. Yes, and I also said that it was--it not a
doctrinal term. There is no word ``enduring'' in military
doctrine, but it is a statement of the Commander in Chief's
intent.
Senator Menendez. Right. And we all know that it may be the
intent of someone not to have any large-scale or long-term
offensive combat troops, but that intention can honestly change
along the way. And so, that is part of our challenge here.
General Allen testified before this committee last week
when we asked him what does no enduring offensive combat
operations means to you, and he said, well, that could mean as
long as 2 weeks or 2 years. And considering his experience, it
was not an insignificant statement. So, Secretary Carter, what
does it mean to you as ultimately the Secretary of Defense who
oversees all of the armed forces under your Department, of
course under the President's command? What does ``no enduring
offensive combat operations'' mean to you?
Secretary Carter. There are two ingredients to this, the
how and the when. And the AUMF as proposed is, as I noted,
provides for a wide range of activities to defeat ISIL, but it
has one significant limitation, which is the one you referred
to, which essentially it does not authorize the kind of
campaign that we conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is not
what we foresee as necessary for the defeat of ISIL, so it
meets my objective of having necessary flexibility, but there
is that limitation. That is what is written in, and that is
what the meaning of those words is.
As regards to the 3-year limit, as I indicated, that is not
based on an assessment of how long the campaign will take. That
is based upon how our system works here at home, and it does
not have anything to----
Senator Menendez. And I appreciate that, and that is what
we did in our authorization. But even without an Iraq or
Afghanistan-sized commitment still can commit thousands of
troops for a long period of time, and so it may not be the size
of Afghanistan or Iraq. So that is part of our challenge.
Two very quick final questions. Secretary Kerry, one of the
criticisms of the President's proposed AUMF is that it does not
make clear that it is, in fact, this AUMF and not the 2001 AUMF
that governs this conflict. If we passed an ISIL-specific AUMF,
would the administration have any objection to specifically
saying that the ISIL AUMF supersedes any preceding
authorization for the use of military force in this engagement?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, only if it was absolutely clear
that there was no limitation whatsoever with respect to the
other activities authorized by the 2001 AUMF, because that is
the principal authorization with respect to al-Qaeda and other
efforts. So the President has made it clear that if the
Congress passes an authorization specifically, that is what he
will rely on with respect to ISIS.
Senator Menendez. And if that is the case, there is no
reason not to have language that says that this is only an
authorization.
Secretary Kerry. As long as it is clear that----
Senator Menendez. ISIS specific.
Secretary Kerry. As long as it is clear it does not reach
any of the other activities authorized by the 2001, correct.
Senator Menendez. Finally, Secretary Carter, over the
weekend, Boko Haram in Nigeria declared its allegiance to ISIL.
Would Boko Haram be considered a legitimate target under the
language of the President's proposed authorization?
Secretary Carter. The language of the proposed
authorization anticipates, as I indicated, the possibility of
other groups aligned with ISIL. And what the text means is that
the AUMF would cover such groups that associate with or fight
alongside if they also have the intent of threatening
Americans. So both of those tests would be applied under the
proposed AUMF by----
Senator Menendez. Just saying that with what you have--
swearing allegiance will be enough then.
Secretary Carter. No, it is not enough. It also has to be a
threat to Americans.
Senator Menendez. Okay.
Secretary Carter. That is what the language says. It is
says ``associated with,'' et cetera, ISIL and threatening
Americans.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. At the outset, I want to thank
you all as well for recognizing what happened this morning--
last night in my home State of Florida. It is a reminder that
the dangers to our service men and women face is not just when
they are deployed, but it is inherently dangerous work even in
their training. And so, our thoughts and prayers go out to
them, and to their families, and loved ones.
Secretary Carter, I wanted to begin by asking you about
Iran. Iran's goal is to become the regional--most dominant
regional power. Is that accurate?
Secretary Carter. I am sorry, Iran's?
Senator Rubio. Iran's goal is to become the regional
hegemony----
Secretary Carter. Probably true, yes.
Senator Rubio. And in that realm, they see American
military presence in the region as a threat or an impediment to
that goal, correct?
Secretary Carter. Probably to the achievement of some of
their goals, yes.
Senator Rubio. And certainly they are never excited to see
additional American troops present anywhere in the Middle East.
That is a fair statement.
Secretary Carter. I cannot tell what excites them. I cannot
imagine that our bombing ISIL is unwelcome to them, but I do
not know that because I do not know what they are thinking.
Senator Rubio. Well, bombing ISIL is unwelcome to them.
General Dempsey, you agree the Iranians are not fans of U.S.
military presence in the Middle East.
General Dempsey. I think they have the same suspicion about
us that we have of them.
Senator Rubio. But in general, they are not--when they see
us in the region, they are not necessarily fans of U.S.
military deployments anywhere in the Middle East.
General Dempsey. No, I would not think so.
Senator Rubio. Okay. Well, that is why I want to turn to
you, Secretary Kerry. I believe that much of our strategy with
regards to ISIS is being driven by a desire not to upset Iran
so that they do not want walk away from the negotiating table
on the deal that you are working on. Tell me why I am wrong.
Secretary Kerry. Because the facts completely contradict
that, but I am not at liberty to discuss all of them here for a
lot of different reasons. In a classified session I could, but
at this delicate stage of the negotiations, I am not sure that
is advisable.
Senator Rubio. So are you----
Secretary Kerry. The fact is, let me just----
Senator Rubio. Well, but for the record, can you state that
Iran's feelings about our military presence in the region and
the fact that they would be upset if we increase military
personnel on the ground----
Secretary Kerry. Senator, let me----
Senator Rubio [continuing]. Would increase--targeting, for
example, Assad and Syria. Could you tell me today that under no
circumstances is how Iran would react to an increase of U.S.
military action against ISIS, because as we heard from
Secretary Carter, they are not fans of us bombing ISIS because
it involves our presence in the region. Are you telling me that
that is a nonfactor in terms of how it would impact the
negotiations, or is that something you cannot discuss in this
setting?
Secretary Kerry. They would welcome our bombing
additionally ISIS actually. They want us to destroy ISIS. They
want to destroy ISIS. ISIS is a threat to them. It is a threat
to the region. And I think you are misreading it if you think
that there is not a mutual interest with respect to Daesh
between every country in the region.
Senator Rubio. So they are supportive of more ground--if
the U.S. sent more military personnel into Iraq as trainers,
advisers, logistical support, they would support that? Iran
would support that?
Secretary Kerry. Well, they are not going to come out and
openly support it, and they obviously would be nervous about
it, but they are not going to object if that it is what it is.
But the point is you have bigger problems than that with that
particular scenario because the Shia militia within Iran might
have something to say about it. Mukhtar Al Sadr, and Hadi al-
Amiri, other people might obviously react very adversely to
that.
But what is important, Senator, with respect to your
question is to understand this, and I think this has been
misread by a lot of people up here on the Hill to be honest
with you. There is no grand bargain being discussed here in the
context of this negotiation. This is about a nuclear weapon
potential. That is it. And the President has made it completely
clear they will not get a nuclear weapon.
Now, the presumption by a lot of people up on the Hill here
has been that we somehow are not aware of that goal even as we
negotiate that goal. Our negotiation is calculated to make sure
they cannot get a nuclear weapon, and it is really almost
insulting that the presumption here is that we are going to
negotiate something that allows them to get a nuclear weapon.
Senator Rubio. Well, I have not discussed about the nuclear
weapon. What I have--and I am not saying there is a grand
bargain. What I am saying is that I believe that our military
strategy towards ISIS is influenced by our desire not to cross
red lines that the Iranians have about U.S. military presence
in the region.
Secretary Kerry. Not in the least, no. Absolutely not in
the least.
Senator Rubio. Okay.
Secretary Kerry. There is no consideration whatsoever as to
how they or anybody else feels. We will do what is necessary in
conjunction with our coalition--remember we have 62 countries,
including five----
Senator Rubio. Okay. Well, I want to talk about the
coalition.
Secretary Kerry [continuing]. Five Sunni countries that for
the first time ever are engaged in military action in another
country in the region.
Senator Rubio. And I want to touch on that point because
General Dempsey a moment ago outlined the need to have a broad
coalition, and I imagine it involves these Sunni countries, for
example, the Jordanians, the Saudis, the UAE, and others. These
are also countries, by the way, that are deeply concerned about
Iran, and they feel--is it not right that they feel that we
have kept them in the dark about our negotiations with Iran? In
essence, the way we have proceeded with our negotiations in
Iran have impacted our trust level with these critical allies
in this coalition? Is that accurate?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, that actually is flat wrong also.
Flat wrong.
Senator Rubio. They said so----
Secretary Kerry. Just it is flat wrong. I just came back
from a meeting in the Gulf in Riyadh. I met with King Salman,
who completely supported what we are doing. I met with all of
the GCC members. They all sat around the table, and they all
articulated their support for what we are doing, and they
believe we are better off trying to prevent them from getting a
bomb diplomatically first, providing, of course, that it
actually prevents them from getting that bomb. That is the test
of this. And a whole bunch of people are trying to give this a
grade before the test has even been taken.
Senator Rubio. So you are saying here today that our allies
in the region, our Sunni allies, the Saudis, the UAE, the
Egyptians, and others, are perfectly comfortable with where the
negotiations stand at this moment.
Secretary Kerry. I did not say that. I did not say that.
They are not perfectly comfortable. They are nervous. They are
apprehensive. Of course they are. They want to make sure that,
in fact, just as Members of Congress want to make sure, that
the deal that is struck, if one can be struck now, will, in
fact, prevent them from getting a weapon.
Senator Rubio. Have you shared with them the details of
where it stands right now?
Secretary Kerry. We have shared considerable details with
them, absolutely.
Senator Rubio. And are they apprehensive about that, or are
they comfortable with what you shared with them?
Secretary Kerry. They are comfortable with what we shared
with them, and Saud al-Faisal, the senior Foreign Minister in
the world, I might add, publicly sat with me at a press
conference in which he articulated their support for what we
are doing.
Senator Rubio. Okay. General Dempsey, I want to ask you
because we talked about this a moment ago. Part of what is
happening here is a second concentric circle that ISIS is
pursuing beyond its core in Syria and Iraq, and we have seen
that emerge in Libya. We are starting to signs of it emerge in
Afghanistan. First, if you can comment about what ISIS, or if
any of you could comment, about what we are seeing with ISIS
with regard to the competition between them, and al-Qaeda, and
the Taliban to absorb groups in Afghanistan. And second, how
does this AUMF that is proposed before us today allow us to
form a strategy that allows us to deal with that second ring of
threats of ISIS absorbing other groups in the region?
General Dempsey. The TTP is notably that splinter group of
the Taliban, who has rebranded themselves to the ISIL ideology.
And the--to answer your question on the AUMF, the AUMF would
give me the authority to make recommendations to the Commander
in Chief how to deal with ISIL wherever it shows up if the two
conditions that the SecDef mentioned exists, number one, that
they have affiliated themselves with the ideology, but number
two, that they demonstrate an intent to threaten U.S. interests
either regionally or globally.
Senator Rubio. And just my last point here. In Afghanistan,
we still have a significant presence of service men and women
among other Americans, and much more so than in other parts of
the world where they are now getting groups to align
themselves. The growth of an ISIS affiliate and/or pledged
group in Afghanistan could potentially pose a significant
threat to American personnel in Afghanistan potentially.
General Dempsey. It will initially pose a threat to the
government of Afghanistan, and could over time pose a threat to
us.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
and I thank the three of you for your incredible service to our
country. We very much appreciate it during this extremely
challenging time.
First, let me say I supported the use of force resolution
that was reported from this committee in the last Congress, as
did every Democrat. And as I was listening to Secretary Carter
explain the objectives of and authorization for the use of
military force and thought about what we have recommended, it
satisfied, I think, every one of your concerns.
And I was somewhat surprised because I think some
Republicans were reluctant to support a use of force in the
last Congress because the administration had not come forward
with a request. In fact, that was said by many of my Republican
colleagues. So I was somewhat surprised that the administration
did not bring a resolution that was more consistent with what
we developed in the last Congress, and would have accomplished
every one of the objectives that Secretary Carter pointed out.
So let me bring up three concerns in the time I have. Some
have already been raised, but I will try to get through as much
of this as possible. First, dealing with the 2001 authorization
and why there is nothing included in your request that deals
with the 2001 authorization. Secondly, to deal with the
interpretation of ``enduring offensive ground combat
operations.'' And third, how you will determine associated
forces. All three give me concern.
In regards to the 2001 authorization, as it has been
pointed out, that was an authorization passed rather easily by
Congress to go after those that were responsible for the attack
of our country on September 11, 2001. That is what the
resolution says. I think many of us are surprised that that
authorization could be used today against ISIS in Syria.
The 2001 authorization is now the longest running use of
force in American history, 4 years longer than the Vietnam War,
8 years longer than the Revolutionary War, 10 years longer than
World War II. About one-third of the authorizations for use of
military force passed by Congress have included limitations of
time, so that is not an unusual provision to be placed in a
resolution. As Secretary Carter pointed out, the circumstances
can change and it is important that Congress and the
administration speak with a united voice.
And, Secretary Carter, I was very impressed by your
comments about the constitutional responsibilities between
Congress and the administration, and you fully understand a 3-
year sunset on the ISIS-specific authorization for the use of
force. And quoting from your statement, ``To me, this is a
sensible and principled provision of the AUMF, even though I
cannot assure that the counter-ISIL campaign will be completed
in 3 years.''
So Senator Murphy and I have introduced a bill that would
limit the 2001 authorization to the same 3-year provision that
you have in the ISIS-specific resolution. And if Congress
choses to include a 3-year sunset on the 2001 authorization,
would it be your view that that would be a sensible and
principled provision for Congress to include, even though you
could not assure that the military operation against those
responsible for the attack on our country on September 11, 2001
can be completed in that time, that it would be up to the next
administration to come back, as it would in the ISIS campaign?
Secretary Carter. Senator, thank you for that. I cannot
give you a clear answer to that question, and let me say why.
The 2001 authorization on the use of military force covered al-
Qaeda and its successive generations, which have now extended
for 14 years. There is still an al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula. They call themselves that, and they intend to attack
this country, and we need to protect ourselves. And we need the
authority to protect ourselves.
Senator Cardin. Is that not also true of ISIS?
Secretary Carter. Well, there is a difference. There is now
a 14-year history of the tenacity of al-Qaeda and its offshoots
and their intent to attack our country. And I think you have to
take that into account about whether it makes sense to put a
sunset on that one. This one that we are embarking on with ISIL
is a new campaign, a new group.
And so, as I said in my statement, I respect the desire to
have a sunset clause that does not derive from any
characteristic of the campaign that I know of yet that would
predict that it will wrap up within 3 years. But I think we
have history in the case of al-Qaeda that it has endured--it
has lasted quite a long time. And I think that ought to inform
whether a sunset for the authorities contained in the AUMF
makes sense.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Secretary, if this is a new campaign, I
do not understand how you can use a 2001 authorization to
justify the use of force. I think you cannot have it both ways.
So I do not understand the distinction there when you are
saying it is a new campaign, we do not know what is going on,
and yet we still can use a 2001 authorization that was specific
against the attack on our country.
Secretary Carter. Well, I think maybe another way of
getting at your question, Senator, is the President has
indicated a desire and a willingness to revisit the 2001----
Senator Cardin. And we are trying to help that along.
Secretary Carter [continuing]. AUMF, which I also think
makes sense in view of what you have said. It has been 14
years. The only thing that I would say, and the only reason I
am hesitating here is that we have to protect ourselves against
al-Qaeda and its successors.
Senator Cardin. And the Congress----
Secretary Carter. Those guys are still out there 14 years
after 9/11.
Senator Cardin. And our Congress will meet again and can
always take up, as they will, I assume, if this resolution was
passed in the next Congress with the next administration. I
want to just get one more question in on the enduring offensive
ground combat troops. I looked at my app on my phone here to
get a definition of what ``enduring'' is, and it came up as
``lasting, permanent.''
So would you tell me why the term ``enduring offensive
ground combat operations'' could not be interpreted to include
operations such as our military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan since we did not intend our troops to be there on a
permanent basis, that instead we were liberating, we were not
offensive? Why could you or the administration not interpret
that language to include a ground campaign similar to what we
saw in Iraq?
Secretary Carter. I will let Senator Kerry. I am not a
lawyer, but the interpretation that I gave to that phrase is
the interpretation that those who drafted the AUMF make of it.
And it is intended in the first instance clearly to rule out
the kind of campaign we waged in Iraq and Afghanistan because
we do not foresee that kind of campaign as necessary. And that
is one of the things that those words are supposed to cover.
Let me ask Secretary Kerry to add to that.
Secretary Kerry. Well, I think the President, Senator, has
been particularly clear about this. And there is a huge
distinction between the kinds of operations that were conducted
in Afghanistan and Iraq where clearly we committed a very
significant number of troops for a long period of time to
offensive actions on the ground. The President has ruled that
out, and what he has done is, I think, offered you confining
definitions that provide the limitations here. And I think the
English language provides them also frankly.
I do not happen to agree with General Allen's comment here
about 2 weeks to 2 years. I do not think anybody contemplates
years or a year. That is not in the thinking of the President
nor any of the considerations he has said. What he has thought
of only, and what General Dempsey has been particularly clear
about it, is not giving up the option under some particular
circumstances where you might want somebody on a special forces
nature or embedded nature somehow to be accompanying people, to
be assisting in some way.
I do not want to go into all the parameters of that, but I
think it has been very clear how limited it is, or an effort to
protect or defend U.S. personnel or citizens, which is
momentary, an effort to rescue people in some particular
instance. Perhaps a specific targeted operation against Daesh
leadership for instance. Perhaps intelligence collection and
sharing.
I mean, there is a range that has been laid out, but the
whole purpose here is to kind of have a concept that is well
understood that is extremely limited, but not so limiting that
our military cannot do what it needs to do in some situations
to protect America's interests or American personnel. But it is
not contemplating years, not even months to my knowledge. What
it would contemplate is some current operation along the lines
that I just described.
Senator Cardin. I would just point out that the language we
used in 2001--I think most of us would not have thought it
would be used today. This authorization goes to the next
administration, so the next administration would have the
authority and may have a totally different view on that.
Secretary Kerry. It may indeed, Senator, which is precisely
why President Obama said I am going to put it in the 3-year
range, and he specifically thought that through. He said, you
know, I do not want the new President to come in and face the
kind of choice that I faced on my desk day one, which had to be
made within 30 days with respect to Afghanistan. So he gave it
the distance of the year to allow the administration to get its
people in place, to evaluate and make a decision.
But most importantly, this is where there is a broadly
accepted and absolutely clear congressional responsibility.
Congress will step in. You will have the authority. I mean, I
would think you would be welcoming this opportunity to double
check the next administration, to be able to make sure this is
accomplishing the precise goals you want. In fact, you know, I
would think it would be undebated by Congress in that respect,
although I understand there are principles where people say,
you know, we do not want any limitations at all.
But this certainly fits within the capacity to get a major
vote out of Congress. And may I say to everybody, you know,
that is something else you have got to think about here. When I
testified in December and when I testified 2 weeks ago, I think
I made it clear that our interests are best served if there is
a very powerful vote in support of this. We do not have a
message of America's commitment and of our willingness to stay
at it and get the job done if this is, you know, a marginal
vote in the Congress.
The Chairman. Thank you. We do welcome this opportunity--we
also welcome the opportunity to weigh in on any final Iran deal
and look forward to that. And with that, Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Words matter, and I know we are here
really discussing specific language on authorization for the
use of military force, but this is puzzling. Secretary Kerry,
you said this authorization needs to be extremely limited, but
show the commitment of the United States. I do not see how you
reconcile those two terms. There have been an awful lot of
loose statements here.
Let us talk about the joint resolution passed on September
18, 2001, and why the current activity is tenuously connected
to that at best. That joint resolution was to authorize the use
of the United States Armed Forces against those responsible for
the recent attacks launched against the United States
specifically. It said that ``The President is authorized to use
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons
in order to prevent any future attacks of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations, or persons.'' I did not hear anything about
successor organizations.
So, again, I am puzzled by the fact that the administration
is firmly of the view that they already have statutory
authority to conduct what they are conducting, and I guess
there is really nobody pushing back that hard on that. But now
we are talking about a new authorization, and I am puzzled by
the fact that any Commander in Chief, if they already believe
they have the authority to do what is being conducted, why they
would want to limit that in any way, shape, or form,
particularly when, Secretary Kerry, you said you want to dispel
any doubt, and send an unmistakable message.
Let me just read two other authorizations. This is the
authorization we are discussing because we are talking about
it, but let us talk about the specific words. It says ``The
President is authorized, subject to the limitations in
Subsection (c), to use the Armed Forces of the United States as
the President determines to be necessary and appropriate
against ISIL or associated persons or forces as defined in
Section 5.'' Man, this sounds like a contract. (C),
limitations. ``The authority granted in Subsection (a) does not
authorize the use of United States Armed Forces in enduring
offensive ground combat operations.'' Okay, that is not a real
dispelling of doubt. Duration of, ``this authorization for the
use of military force shall terminate three years after the
date of the enactment of this joint resolution, unless
reauthorized.'' I do not know. I am not seeing that sending an
unmistakable message.
Let me read you one other authorization. This was passed on
December 8, 1941. ``The President is hereby authorized and
directed to employ the entire naval and military force of the
United States and the resources of the Government to carry on
war against the Imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the
conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of
the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United
States.''
Now, if we are discussing language to dispel all doubt, to
send an unmistakable message, General Dempsey, which
authorization, as a military man, would you want to have at
your back?
General Dempsey. Senator, I am not going to compare
something from 1941, which is a state-on-state global conflict,
to a conflict with a non-state actor. I was consulted on this
AUMF.
Senator Johnson. Secretary Carter, it has always puzzled me
why anybody would want to pick a fight with the United States.
Why is ISIS putting out on videotape the barbaric beheadings of
Americans and of other Westerners? Why would they do that? Why
would anybody want to pick a fight with the United States?
Secretary Carter. Senator, I can only say and read as you
can hear and read what they say, which is that they intend to
create an Islamic state, and they regard us and our friends and
allies as standing in the way of that. And, therefore, they
have shown their willingness to attack Americans and attack our
allies and interests.
Senator Johnson. But, again, I would never pick a fight
with Chairman Dempsey's military. So the only way I would pick
that fight is----
Secretary Carter. Well, as I think I said in my statement,
we will defeat them.
Senator Johnson. The only way I would pick that fight is if
I really did not think America would be serious about coming
back to defeat me, to try and accomplish that goal that
President Obama established.
I do want to talk a little bit about the current ground
forces allied against ISIS. General Dempsey, do we know
basically what the force structure is? How many Iraqi Security
Forces are there? How many Kurds? How many in the Shia militias
sponsored by Iran? What is the current force structure of boots
on the ground?
General Dempsey. I have to get back to you for the record
on the exact number, Senator.
[Editor's note.--The information supplied to Senator Johnson
was classified.]
Senator Johnson. Well, I am happy to get ballpark figures.
General Dempsey. Okay. Well, let us talk about the Tikrit
operation for example. There are approximately a thousand Sunni
tribal folks. There is one brigade of the Iraqi Security
Forces, which numbers approximately 3,000, a couple hundred of
their CTS, their counterterrorist service. Those are the MOD-
sponsored forces. And there are approximately 20,000 of the
popular mobilization forces, which are the Shia militia.
Senator Johnson. So the Shia militia dramatically outnumber
the Iraqi Security Forces in this?
General Dempsey. They do.
Senator Johnson. And the Shia militias are pretty much
Iranian-sponsored, correct?
General Dempsey. I would describe them as Iranian trained
and somewhat Iranian equipped.
Senator Johnson. Secretary Carter, I think you said that
the outcome of Tikrit will explain an awful lot of things. What
did you mean by that?
Secretary Carter. I believe it was General Dempsey who made
that statement, so I will let him explain it himself, but I
agree with it.
General Dempsey. What did I mean by that? [Laughter]
Here is what I meant by that, Senator. There is no doubt
that the combination of the popular mobilization forces and the
Iraqi Security Forces, they are going to run ISIL out of
Tikrit. The question is what comes after in terms of their
willingness to let Sunni families move back into their
neighborhoods, whether they work to restore the basic services
that are going to be necessary, or whether it results in
atrocities and retribution. That is what I meant.
Senator Johnson. Well, Senator Rubio's line of questioning
was laying out our concern that if it is Iran that is at the
tip of the spear here, if they are the one sponsoring the
victories, they are going to have influence in Iraq, then that
is going to be very difficult, very tenuous, very dangerous for
the regional peace, correct? Secretary Kerry, do you want to
address that one? Are you not concerned about Iran's growing
influence in Iraq?
Secretary Kerry. I am concerned about Iran's growing
efforts in the region, and we have made it very clear that it
is an administration concern, their influence in Yemen, their
influence in Beirut and Lebanon, their influence in Syria, in
Damascus, and Hezbollah, and of course their influence in Iraq.
But I think you have to look historic--I mean, a lot of things
are happening in the region, to be honest with you. And the
history between Persian Shia and the Arab world and Arab Shia
is complicated.
Remember, Iraq and Iran had a 10-year--8 to 10-year war.
People were gassed. Iranians did not respond with gas. There
were a lot of sort of interesting facets of how that played
out. And, yes, Iran's influence has spread at this moment, and
we are deeply concerned about it. But if you are concerned
about it now, think of what happens, and I hear this--we heard
on the floor of the House recently, and you hear it elsewhere--
if they had a nuclear weapon and they were doing that.
That is why this administration believes the first step is
to prevent the access to the nuclear weapon or prevent their
ability to develop a nuclear weapon, and that is our goal,
first to try to do that diplomatically. And if it cannot be
achieved diplomatically, then we all have a lot of options
available to us, but we are eyes wide open with respect to what
is happening.
And all of those issues, we have made it clear to our
friends in the region, and elsewhere in the world, they do not
disappear. If we were to get an agreement to stop them from
getting a nuclear weapon--and we are all satisfied that that,
in fact, will be the conclusion--we still have all these other
issues with Iran, and we all need to be working on the ways in
which, and this is exactly what we are doing. GCC members, in
fact, will be coming here to Washington in the next month to
continue the dialogue we had in the region last week. And I am
confident that we will, all of us together, take the steps
necessary to counter what Iran is doing in other ways.
Senator Johnson. My final point quickly is I am not seeing
the full commitment out of this administration, and as a
result, we are seeing the growing influence and very dangerous
influence of Iran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses. We are now in the 8th month of a war that began
on the 8th of August. There has not been a congressional
authorization of the war, except for the Foreign Relations
Committee vote in December. No committee has taken it up. There
has been no floor debate. And I view that as highly, highly
challenging and disturbing in terms of the way the Nation makes
the most grave decision we are supposed to make.
I do agree completely this authorization is needed. Count
me among many Members of Congress and others who believe that
both the 2001 and 2002 authorizations are not sufficient to
cover this military action. If, however, we act to authorize
it, there is precedent for congressional authorizations after
the beginning of military conflicts. There is that precedent.
But if we do not act to authorize it, I think from a legal and
precedential standpoint, it would be somewhat catastrophic.
I also agree completely with the testimony of the witnesses
that the authorization should be strong and it should be
bipartisan for those who are fighting this battle, who have
been fighting it without Congress weighing in to indicate
whether they think it is in the national interest or not. I
cannot imagine asking people to risk their lives with us not
having done our job, and if we were to pass it in a narrow way
or a partisan way that would not send a message that would make
people who risking their lives feel very good about the risk
that they are taking.
I want to talk about the ground troop provision from a
definitional standpoint, from a mission standpoint. The
language, ``no enduring offensive ground combat operations,''
is in the proposed authorization, and it is given some tone and
coloration by the President's transmittal letter. The
President's transmittal letter says, ``My administration's
draft AUMF would not authorize long-term, large-scale ground
combat operations like those our Nation conducted in Iraq and
Afghanistan.'' And you have used that as sort of a limitation,
``not like Iraq or Afghanistan.''
Let me ask you this. In the first gulf war, 697,000
American troops were deployed overseas for up to 7 months.
Would that be an enduring ground combat operation under this
definition?
Secretary Carter. Senator, I think an operation that large,
a state-on-state operation is not something that we foresee as
the kind of campaign we would mount against ISIL and not
foreseen by this AUMF. If I can just say, the fundamental
nature of this campaign, and General Dempsey made this clear,
is one in which, and Secretary Kerry also, in which we are
seeking the lasting defeat of ISIL. To get a lasting defeat of
ISIL, we need to have somebody on the ground who sustains the
victory after the ISIL forces are defeated. That is why we are
relying--that is why our fight is basically an enabling fight.
Senator Kaine. And, Secretary Carter----
Secretary Carter. And we are trying to develop the ground
forces that would do it. It is very different from the Iraq and
Iran--the U.S. assault on----
Senator Kaine. I want to ask you about that very point, but
I am trying to figure out is there some meaning to this
definition that we could apply to say, no, this is not
contemplated. That is what I would like to ask General Dempsey
and Secretary Kerry. Six hundred and ninety-seven thousand
American troops for 7 months, is that an enduring ground combat
operation?
General Dempsey. That is not contemplated, to use the words
you--the way you characterize them, and it would not lead to
the defeat of ISIL. And so, I can say with credibility, no.
Senator Kaine. That that would not be allowed under this
language.
General Dempsey. That is correct.
Senator Kaine. Secretary Kerry.
Secretary Kerry. I agree.
Senator Kaine. It would not be allowed under this language.
With respect to the concept that Secretary Carter raised, and I
have raised this with some of you before, the Foreign Relations
Committee has had two meetings recently with some of our very
strong allies in this mission, King Abdullah of Jordan and
Sheikh Tamim, the Emir of Qatar. Qatar is the location of the
current combined air operations center at al-Waleed Air Force
Base.
The King of Jordan said, ``this is not your fight, it is
our fight,'' when we were asking about the ground troops.
``This is not your fight, it is our fight. ISIL is born and
bred in this region. It is a terrorist threat that is born and
bred in this region. They are claiming the mantle of a religion
that we revere and they are perverting it for a horrible
perverted end, so it is not America's fight. We want your help,
but we have to be all in in battling this ourselves.''
Sheikh Tamim was even a little clearer when he said, ``We
do not want American ground troops. We do not want American
ground troops because it could send the message that this is
the United States against ISIL, or this is the West against
ISIL, which could be a recruiting bonanza for ISIL. This needs
to be our battle, our ground effort, and we appreciate your
support on the airstrike side.''
So I am looking for metrics in terms of if we all agree
with the proposition that this needs to be a region policing
itself with the assistance of the United States, and tell me
what that means with respect to what ground troops levels could
be appropriate or inappropriate. I mean, just as an example, on
the airstrike campaign, of the 2,800 airstrikes, the United
States has done 80 percent of the airstrikes. The airstrikes is
the not in the region with the United States helping a little
bit. We have done 80 percent of the airstrikes.
So what I am worried about with respect to the ground
troops is less the words, but the concept, and, Secretary
Carter, you were getting at it. This has got to be the region's
fight against its own terrorism. If they are willing to be all
in, then we should help. But if it gets to the point where we
have to contemplate a significant number of ground troops, it
almost means that it has been lost from the beginning. If the
region will not weigh in to battle their own terrorist threat,
there is no amount of ground troops we could put in to Iraq or
Syria to win the battles there. We can keep Americans safe
here, but we cannot create a recruiting bonanza for ISIL.
So talk to me a little bit about--I understand because the
President said in his letter how he would like to use ground
troops, and I would rather have an authorization that said
that. But I see a real danger of a ground troop creep here
converting this into not the region policing its own terrorism,
but like the airstrike campaign that is 80 percent U.S. It is a
U.S. mission, and I would love your thoughts about how we guard
against that, both as a mission matter and as a matter of
thinking about how to potentially give them some flesh in the
definition.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, I think that everything the
President has said, I think this authorization itself in its
current form guards against that. But the most significant
guard against that is what King Abdullah said and I think
General Dempsey, and Secretary Carter, and all of our belief
that, you know, the enduring transformation that has to take
place here is not going to take place if the United States just
comes in and we knock out ISIL and that is it, go away. It is
not going to happen. We could do that actually. We have that
capacity. But we are not asking to do that, nor are they asking
us to do that because I think they understand that the
implications of that would be actually to aid in the
recruitment to create a bigger problem than we face today.
And in answer to the question that was asked earlier, why
does--why do these guys like taking us on to some degree,
because if it is just us, that is how they grow, and that is
what they want, and we are not getting suckered into that. That
is why we built the 62-member coalition. That is why we worked
so hard to get these five Arab countries engaged in the kinetic
activities with us. It is precisely to deny them that
narrative.
And so, as we go forward here, we think the best thing that
can happen is what is happening now. This is, in fact, you
know, indigenous. It is springing up. The Sunni are gaining
confidence in Anbar. There are several battles taking place
right now, in fact, not just in Tikrit. There are two others,
two out of three where, in fact, we are playing a central role
in the other two. It has not been as heralded, but it is making
a difference, and the Sunni are prosecuting that.
So as long as we continue to work on the integration, the
internal inclusivity of Iraq and its government, as long as we
continue to help the Iraqis to be able to do this themselves,
help the region to feel empowered by it, that is a long-term
recipe for the United States not to have as much risk and not
to have to put ourselves on the line in the way we have
historically. So we think we are on the right track here. And,
in fact, the very strategy we are pursuing adheres to the very
standards that you most want to have in place in order to
protect against the mission creep.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
the testimony. This committee had asked, particularly the
chairman. The committee had asked months and months ago for
AUMF language to come from the administration. We are glad that
it is here. I think that it is overdue. I think it would have
been useful to have that language or some kind of language from
the administration early on. I know that the administration was
uncomfortable with the language that was passed by this
committee in December. I think many of us were uncomfortable
with the limitations that were there.
But I think at the same time, we all recognize that we may
have to endure some degree of ambiguity in the language, and we
are seeing it expressed or manifested here when we talk about
what would be considered or what would not in exchange for a
resolution that can pass with a bipartisan majority. And that
is what I want to just explore for a minute, is at what point
does it become--since the administration believes that you have
the legal authority to move under the AUMF, at what point does
it become not useful to have an AUMF that would be passed
simply with a partisan vote, for example? Would that not be
useful? Is that worse than no AUMF at all? Secretary Kerry?
Secretary Kerry. Well, is that worse than no AUMF now?
Absolutely. I mean, look, we are convinced we have the
authority. That is not the issue here, and Senator Johnson
asked about that earlier. I mean, we have the authority because
ISIL was al-Qaeda. What they changed was their name, and then
grew worse. But for years, I think it was about 13 years,
somewhere in that vicinity, going back to 2011, it called
itself Al Qaeda in Iraq. That is who they were, Al Qaeda in
Iraq.
And they have an extensive history of conducting attacks
against the U.S. coalition going way back during that period of
time. They have had a long relationship between al-Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden. They viewed themselves, and still do actually,
as the legitimate heirs of the Osama bin Laden mantle. They
still view that. They just see themselves in a more aggressive
term, and that is why they have some disagreement in tactics
with al-Qaeda, whom they separated from. But separating does
not change where they came from and who they were when we first
engaged in the fight with them. And so, you know, there is a
legitimacy to the 2001 effort because it began a long time ago
against this very group that simply changed its name and some
of its tactics. It does not change the threat to the United
States.
So we could obviously and we will continue to prosecute
that. But, you know, senators themselves have raised this
concern that we are operating under this longest AUMF ever. So
there is a much greater clarity and a much greater force that
comes from a statement from the Congress that this reincarnated
entity and this current metastasizing that is taking place is
not going to be tolerated specifically. And that is important.
And frankly, to also answer an earlier question, are there
some questions from some people about the staying power of the
United States, sometimes you hear that. I hear it in the course
of diplomacy, and I think it is important to answer that in
this context at this time.
Senator Flake. I like Secretary Carter's formulation of
what this AUMF needs to do. It needs to provide the necessary
flexibility to wage this campaign, and it needs to send a
message to our allies and to our adversaries that we are in
this for the long haul, and we will back up the efforts of our
allies. And frankly, we need to make clear what the roles of
those allies will be.
And so, just to end it, I do believe that an AUMF is
certainly needed here if we have a campaign that is going to go
on for a long time and believe it will go on longer than 3
years. But I am not troubled by the sunset provision, and
certainly we can come back after 3 years and revisit this with
a new administration. And I might wish for more firm language
with regard to what an enduring force or whatever else, but I
think we need to value also language that can get a good
bipartisan majority to send that message. That is important,
too, and as we know, in this body, we never get everything we
want.
So I commend the administration for coming forward, for
listening to us on this committee as this AUMF was formulated,
and for consulting and listening to others as well. So I hope
we can move forward, and I appreciate the testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you to all of our witnesses. Thank you for your extraordinary
gestures to come back to this committee over and over again
both in private and in public to work with us on this the most
important question that the Foreign Relations Committee and the
Congress takes up, the question of when to commit U.S.
personnel into war.
I remain as frustrated as many of my colleagues with this
question over these definitions. I think the problem is in part
every different member of the administration we talk to does
seem to have a slightly different interpretation of what these
words mean. And I cannot blame them because, as I think
Secretary Carter said, there is no historical operational
definition of these words. But I think the lack of consistency
has hampered our efforts to get on the same page together.
And if we resort to just an understanding that these words
mean something less than what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan,
then that really is no limitation at all. And I am barely a
lawyer. I practiced for about 4 years, but I do remember the
concept of statutes being void for vagueness. I fear that this
would suffer that same problem if we were not able to get a
consistent understanding of what those terms mean.
I want to ask one point of clarification on a piece of this
terminology, and that is back to Secretary Carter. I was
pleased at the language in the draft from the administration
defining ``associated forces,'' including this limitation that
it would be restricted to organizations that were actively
engaged in fights against the United States. But I just want to
clarify, you said in your testimony that it would be limited to
associated forces that were actively engaged against the United
States, but the language actually says ``engaged in hostilities
against the United States or our coalition partners.''
So as to this question of whether Boko Haram is covered
under this, it is not really a question as to whether they are
actively engaged in hostilities against the United States so
long as they are engaged in hostilities against a coalition
partner. Is it not true that this authorization would give the
United States the ability, subject to the other restrictions in
the authorization, to engage in hostilities against that
organization?
Secretary Carter. I think you are reading it right.
Senator Murphy. And so, given that reading, let me just ask
Senator Menendez's question again. Would Boko Haram, pledging
allegiance to ISIS, be covered if the country in which they
were engaging in hostilities was a coalition partner of the
United States?
Secretary Carter. Well, I cannot give you a legal answer,
but I can give you a common sense answer to that. This is an
AUMF that really focuses on the fight against ISIL. We have
other authorities, which have already been alluded to in the
2001, which also cover other situations, including some that
may involve Boko Haram, that allow us to take action to protect
ourselves in that case. But this is really focused on ISIL and
the associated forces there when they engage in operations
against us or our coalition partners as the text says. And that
can be interpreted, but has not yet been interpreted, to cover
other groups like Boko Haram.
But just to be clear, under the 2001 authority, and this is
important to me because, you know, we have really got to
protect ourselves. There are authorities under the 2001 also
that could extend to Boko Haram depending upon their behavior
and the kind of actions that we needed to take to protect
ourselves. So these are always in my experience, and, again, I
am not a lawyer. I am just observing this as Secretary of
Defense. Our counsels try to interpret the law in such a way
that we are acting lawfully and consistent with the intent of
the enabling legislation, and that we are able to take actions
to protect ourselves. And they do not always--sometimes they
get to those determinations when a particular instance arises.
But I think it is important when we have this, and this is
the last point I will make, to err on the side of flexibility.
I think someone said earlier, well, this language could seem to
allow an awful lot, the how part of the provision, and it does.
The President--I think if you are hearing different things, the
thing I would listen to is what the President said, and he said
that this--he does not foresee, and this language does not
authorize, the kind of thing that Iraq and Afghanistan
represented. And then he gave some examples of the kind of
campaign that we intend to wage, which Secretary Kerry noted
earlier, ones in which we are enabling a force which provides
the lasting victory against ISIL. That is our approach because
that is the right approach to getting a lasting victory against
ISIL.
But I think in my role and in the chairman's role, some
latitude there in the language is appreciated because we need
to be able to do what we need to do to protect ourselves. And
this encompasses the campaign against ISIL as we now foresee it
and I think one can reasonably foresee it, and that is
essential because we need to in this campaign.
Senator Murphy. I have just got a minute remaining. There
has been a lot of talk about sending consistent bipartisan
messages to our enemies, and I agree. I do not think there has
been much division on the message that we have been sending to
ISIS. Whether or not we have an authorization, we stand united
in our belief that we should take the fight to them.
In the last few days there has been significant division
between our two parties on the message that we are sending to
Iran, an exceptional, I would argue, unprecedented letter from
47 of our colleagues to the Ayatollah himself that many of us
believe will have the effect and has the intention of
undermining the authority of the President. Secretary Kerry,
you are here before us. This is a subject of great debate
within the Senate today. What do you believe are the
ramifications of this letter? What do you believe is your
interpretation of the facts of that letter, which state
essentially that any agreement signed by the United States
expires the minute a new President is sworn into office? Share
with us your thoughts on whether this is helpful or hurtful to
our efforts to try to divorce Iran from any future nuclear
ambition.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator and members of the
committee, my reaction to the letter was utter disbelief.
During my 29 years here in the Senate, I never heard of nor
even heard of it being proposed anything comparable to this. If
I had, I could guarantee you that no matter what the issue and
no matter who was President, I would have certainly rejected
it.
No one is questioning anybody's right to dissent. Any
Senator can go to the floor any day and raise any of the
questions that were raised in that. But to write to the leaders
in the middle of a negotiation, particularly the leader that
they have criticized other people for even engaging with or
writing to, to write them and suggest that they are going to
give a constitutional lesson, which, by the way was absolutely
incorrect, is quite stunning.
This letter ignores more than two centuries of precedent in
the conduct of American foreign policy. Formal treaties
obviously require the advice of the United States Senate. That
is in the Constitution. But the vast majority of international
arrangements and agreements do not. And around the world today
we have all kinds of executive agreements that we deal with:
protection of our troops, the recent agreement we just did with
Afghanistan, any number of noncontroversial and broadly
supported foreign policy goals. The Executive agreement is a
necessary tool of American foreign policy. It has been used by
Presidents of both parties for centuries literally, and it is
recognized and accepted by Congress from the earliest period of
American history.
Now, with respect to the talks, we have been clear from the
beginning. We are not negotiating a ``legally binding'' plan.
We are negotiating a plan that will have in it a capacity for
enforcement. We do not even have diplomatic relations with Iran
right now, and the Senators' letter erroneously asserts that
this is a legally binding plan. It is not. That is number one.
Number two, it is incorrect when it says that Congress could
actually modify the terms of an agreement at any time. That is
flat wrong. They do not have the right to modify an agreement
reached executive to executive between leaders of the
countries.
Now, sure, could another president come in with a different
attitude? No President, I think, if this agreement meets its
task and does what it is supposed to do in conjunction with
China, Russia, France, Germany, Great Britain, all of whom are
going to either sign off or not sign off on an agreement. I
would like to see the next President, if all of those countries
have said this is good and it is working, turn around and just
nullify it on behalf of the United States. That is not going to
happen.
So I have to tell you that, you know, knowing what we know
about this, this risks undermining the confidence that foreign
governments in thousands of important agreements commit to
between the United States and other countries. And it purports
to tell the world that if you want to have any confidence in
your dealings with America, they have to negotiate with 535
Members of Congress, and that is both untrue and a profoundly
bad suggestion to make, I think.
But aside from the legalities, this letter also raises
questions of judgment and policy. We know that there are people
in Iran who are opposed to any negotiated arrangement with the
P5+1. And we know that a comprehensive solution is not going to
happen if Iran's leaders are not willing to make hard choices
about the size, and scope, and transparency of their nuclear
program. And we know that a nuclear armed Iran is unacceptable.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I know this is a well written
speech, but you have been at this for 5 minutes.
Secretary Kerry. It is not a speech, my friend. This is not
a speech. This is a statement about the impact of this
irresponsible letter.
The Chairman. And you have a lot of forums----
Secretary Kerry. And the letter does not have legal
authority, and, you know, I think you have to ask what people
are trying to accomplish. The author of the letter says he does
not want these agreements to be made, and he thinks before the
judgment is even made that it is a mistake. So we will see
where we wind up.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Kerry. But I am asked by one Senator the impact,
and I am laying out to the committee what the impact is. And I
am sorry if people up here do not want to hear it.
The Chairman. And 5 minutes and 26 seconds later you
finished. I will say that I did not sign the letter. I am very
disappointed, though, that you have gone back on your statement
that any agreement must pass muster with Congress. The way we
pass muster here is we vote, and I think all of us are very
disappointed with the veto threat and the stiff-arming that has
taken place. But with that----
Secretary Kerry. But, Senator, let me--Mr. Chairman, let me
just----
The Chairman. Senator Gardner.
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kerry. You have the right to vote any day you
want.
Senator Gardner. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time.
Secretary Kerry. You can----
Senator Gardner. Secretary Carter, Secretary Kerry, General
Dempsey, I want to thank you all for testifying today. This
issue of an authorization for the use of military force is one
of the most serious issues that Congress can consider, and I
look forward to our committee's hearings and consideration of
the President's draft AUMF.
I am concerned about perhaps mixed messages from the
administration regarding the ISIL threat. On March 3, General
Austin stated that ISIL is losing its fight against us, yet
only a week earlier on February 26, Director of National
Intelligence Clapper said the organization remains, ``a
formidable and brutal threat and is increasing its influence
outside of Iraq and Syria.''
The threat from ISIL is real and requires a carefully
coordinated strategy to ensure their complete destruction. I
look forward to hearing from you today on defining the breadth
and scope of our mission and how we can work together in
ensuring its bipartisan success. I remain open-minded as to
what gets the most support, but I want to understand the
details and to fully know that we are not unnecessarily
restraining or restricting our ability to win.
To Secretary Carter, in your remarks you state that, again,
I quote from your statement--your remarks, excuse me. ``I
cannot tell you our campaign to defeat ISIL will be completed
in 3 years,'' that you believe that the sunset clause proposed
by the President is a sensible and principled provision. You
have heard Senator Johnson, Senator Flake, Senator Cardin,
Secretary Kerry all talk about this. If the AUMF is not
authorized within 3 years, the next President could continue
using other legal authority, such as the 2001 AUMF. Is that
correct?
Secretary Carter. That is correct. That is the legal
interpretation of the AUMF, although I should note that the
intent--stated intent--of the President is to revisit the 2001
AUMF after this one as well. He has said that, and that is a
totally different subject. But I would just note it.
Senator Gardner. In your verbal comments here, you stated
that what a shame it would be to have a safe haven for ISIL.
And I believe you were referring to the geographic limitation.
Could the 3-year time limitation, though, be interpreted as a
safe haven as well?
Secretary Carter. It certainly should not be. It is not by
anyone involved in drafting the AUMF. As I said, it is not a
number or time period derived from our thinking about the
campaign. It is derived from our Constitution and from the
election cycle, and it is for sure in our system that there
will be a new President in 3 years. It is for sure that he or
she will have had 1 year, as Secretary Kerry said, to get
themselves on their feet, and, therefore, it foresees--it
leaves latitude for this to be revisited.
That is something I respect as a consequence of our
political system. It is not a consequence of the battlefield
dynamics or the campaign we are waging. Obviously we hope to
wrap it up as soon as possible, but I specifically said, and I
believe I cannot tell you it will be over in 3 years.
Senator Gardner. And I think we have had testimony from
others who have talked about the ability to go for 3 years,
that we would not be able to actually defeat in 3 years, but
what we would be able to do in 3 years. And so, is 3 years the
right time? If you are going to put a time limit, should it be
4? Should it be no time limit?
Secretary Carter. Again, the number three has to do with
our political system, not with the defeat of ISIS. Now, you can
argue--I respect people who want to not have a sunset or
something, but I do not think--I think the logic of 3 years
derives from the nature of our political system. There is no
foreseeing, in my judgment, how long it will take to defeat
ISIL any more than you can begin any kind of military campaign
and be sure exactly how long it will take.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. And, Secretary Carter, you said
in your comments, too, that ``enduring,'' and I believe it was
in response to Senator Cardin, that ``enduring'' is not Iraq
and Afghanistan. Can you give any more of a clear definition
than that, the term ``enduring?''
Secretary Carter. The President when he explained the
provision which describes how the campaign is authorized to be
waged, explained that there--he was not telling--he was not
saying, and this is very sensible to me, enumerating the things
that we could do. He was setting a limit, which is the language
of ``enduring offensive ground combat operations,'' to mean
something like Iraq and Afghanistan, not foreseen in our
campaign, not asking for authority for it. He also gave some
illustrations of what it meant.
Senator Gardner. Just to follow--just to go back on that,
and I am sorry to interrupt. So, I mean, that is the definition
of the best we can get, though, is not Iraq or Afghanistan on
the term ``enduring.''
Secretary Carter. Well, it is an important principle, I
think, that the AUMF reflects that makes sense to me not to try
to enumerate everything that we may find it necessary to do in
the course of this campaign. Instead, the text sets an outer
limit. It does not try to enumerate everything. The President's
language did illustrate some things, and Secretary Kerry cited
them, but it does not try to say everything that we might have
to do. And that is a good, sensible thing for a military
campaign. You cannot know everything you are going to do.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Secretary Carter. I have two
more questions I want to follow up. Secretary Kerry, in
response to Senator Rubio, you had said that, I believe, that
several of the Middle East counterparts that you have been
talking to, you have shared with them details or some details
of the negotiations with Iran. Am I misunderstanding your
response?
Secretary Kerry. We have shared with them an outline of it.
We have not shared with them--actually we have briefed them. We
had our team go down and brief them and give them----
Senator Gardner. On the details of at least----
Secretary Kerry. Well, some of the details, yes.
Senator Gardner. Are those the same details that we have
been briefed on?
Secretary Kerry. You have gotten a much greater in-depth--
--
Senator Gardner. Okay. I was just making sure. Thank you.
And to--I believe to General Dempsey, talking about the
peshmerga a little bit, in terms of percentage, if you look at
the ISF overall, if you look at some of the fighting that is
taking place and the efforts to undertake it against ISIL, what
weight of effort would you say that the peshmerga or other
fighting in the region are we currently pursuing against ISIL?
General Dempsey. The early successes against ISIL were
largely through the peshmerga, and that will evolve over time.
But they have been carrying the majority of the effort thus
far.
Senator Gardner. And by ``majority of effort,'' is there a
way--are they carrying out a third, three-quarters, 90 percent,
the weight of effort?
General Dempsey. No, Senator, I cannot actually put a
percentage on it. But the early effort to blunt ISIL's momentum
were in the north, and, therefore, with the peshmerga.
Senator Gardner. And reports in the news and other places
have stated that the peshmerga are only getting about 10
percent of the arms that have been routed through Baghdad. Is
that correct?
General Dempsey. Again, I do not have the percentage. I can
certainly take it for the record. But there was some friction
early on with the willingness of the Government of Iraq to
provide weapons to the peshmerga, but we think we have managed
our way through that.
[The written response to the question above follows:]
The peshmerga are receiving a higher percentage of arms and
ammunition delivered to Iraq then the reported 10 percent. As of 14
April 2015, the Ministry of Peshmerga has received approximately 41
percent of the munitions and 61 percent of the weapon's systems
delivered to Iraq. These numbers include all USG programs (Foreign
Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, Iraq Train and Equip Fund,
Excess Defense Articles, Presidential Drawdown Authority) as well as
coalition donations.
Senator Gardner. And so, right now you feel confident that
the problem we faced in seeing that arms reach Erbil has now
been settled and resolved?
General Dempsey. I am confident that we broke through the
initial friction, but it does not mean it will not recur.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Secretary Kerry, and Secretary Carter, and General Dempsey, for
being here.
I was very pleased when the administration sent over
language for the AUMF. I supported the AUMF that passed out of
this committee in the last Congress because I think, as you all
have said, that it is very important for our men and women who
may be putting themselves at the risk in the fight against ISIL
to know that they have the support of Congress. I think it is
very important for the American public to know--to hear this
debate and to have--to know that Congress is supporting
whatever action that we take.
And with respect to that, one of the places where I think I
would have issue with the language that was sent over by the
administration is with respect to the reporting on the ongoing
actions. As you all know, the language in the AUMF that the
administration sent over says that the President shall report
to Congress at least once every 6 months on specific actions
taken pursuant to this authorization.
In looking at the AUMF that passed the committee in
December, the reporting requirements are much more robust and
much more comprehensive. So it requests reporting every 60
days. It also requests a comprehensive strategy report that
would be clear to Congress and, therefore, to the American
people, the specific political and diplomatic objectives of the
United States in the region. It asks for clearly defined
military objectives, and the list goes on.
And while I appreciate that there may be concern on the
part of the executive branch and the military about the level
of detail that is requested in that AUMF, it still seems to me
that there is a benefit from providing additional detail about
the mission and more frequent periodic reporting. I think that
is important not just for Congress. I think there are also some
benefits to the operation because it makes it very clear in
writing at some level what the plan is. And, you know, I was
always taught that a plan is not a plan unless you have written
it down somewhere, unless you have got something that you can
refer to.
So can I ask you first, I think, Secretary Kerry, if you
would respond to that, and then perhaps Secretary Carter and
General Dempsey might want to as well.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, of course--I mean, first of all,
believe me, the plan is reduced to writing, and the President
reviews it, and there are an enormous amount of analysis that
goes into this. So you are right certainly that, you know, it
needs to be specific. But I think there is a balance between
the amount of time and the numbers of efforts that are put into
reporting versus fighting the war, getting the job done.
Senator Shaheen. Sure.
Secretary Kerry. And I think you do not want to tie
people--I mean, I have asked the State Department to do a
review of all the reports that we have to do, and the numbers
of people, and the person hours that are put into reports that
frankly do not often do not get thoroughly read or digested.
And so, I think there is a briefing process that my memory
here works pretty well, and 6 months, when you think of it, is
a pretty fair amount of time. It is not so much time in the
course of this in terms of the review that it does not do the
job when you mix it also with the numbers of classified
briefings, hearings that will take place, and so forth.
So, look, we are not trying to resist accountability, I
assure you. But surely we could find a way to balance so that
there is not, you know, an excess of paper turning and process
that actually gets in the way of getting things done. I think
there is a balance personally. I have not talked to my
colleagues about it, but I would assume, I think, they might
feel the same way.
Senator Shaheen. And certainly I would agree that there is
a balance. I am just questioning whether the balance in the
language that has been sent over is the right balance. I do not
know, Secretary Carter, if you or General Dempsey want to add
anything.
Secretary Carter. I think ``balance'' is the right word,
and you are both seeking that. And I agree with the principle.
General Dempsey. And I would just add, Senator, it is for
you to determine how to exercise your oversight authority. But
it was aligned somewhat with the way we do our war powers
reporting, and that may--there was a logic to that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I want to make sure I
understood something that I think you said, Secretary Carter,
and that was that--I did not get this quote down exactly
correct--But you said something about believing that the 2001
AUMF gives us the ability to protect ourselves if we are
attacked. Did I understand that accurately?
Secretary Carter. Well, it is more specific than that, and,
of course, the legal interpretation is more specific than that.
But I was simply saying that the existence of that since 2001
has provided the authority under which we have protected
ourselves, and it is quite clear that we have needed to protect
ourselves. And it is as simple as that.
Senator Shaheen. But the question I have is did we need
that AUMF to protect ourselves if attacked. What I am trying to
figure out is why--is whether we should put--insert specific
language in this AUMF that acknowledges that the fight that we
are engaged in now is one that is covered by this AUMF, and,
therefore, the 2001 is not part of the action that we are doing
now.
Secretary Carter. I will explain my understanding, and then
ask Secretary Kerry to add. The text of the AUMF that has been
submitted explicitly states that this supersedes the 2002 AUMF.
And the President has also indicated his willingness----
Senator Shaheen. Right. That I understand.
Secretary Carter [continuing]. His willingness and, I
think, his desire to revisit the 2001 AUMF. The only thing I
would say is that it is important that as we do that, I
understand the desire to revisit the 2001 AUMF. We do need the
continuing authority that this new one does not provide to
continue to protect us against others, not ISIL. We need some
authority to do that in order to protect the country. And if we
replace the 2001, that is fine with me as long as it gives us
the authority to protect ourselves.
Senator Shaheen. Can we just get a clarification, Mr.
Chairman? I have seen press reports that the White House is
open to Congress inserting language--legislative language on
this point as we did when we passed out of the committee the
AUMF in December. Secretary Kerry, do you have--do you know if
that is correct, if the administration would accept that kind
of language?
Secretary Kerry. I do not specifically know if the decision
had been made to accept language, though I do know specifically
that the President has said that, and it would sort of invite
the notion of language because he has said that if you pass an
AUMF with respect to ISIL now, he will rely on his authority
for ISIL on that AUMF and not the 2001, so that would seem to
leave it open. I just do not want to conclusively say they
would accept language because I have not personally heard that
signed off.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a question
for Chairman Dempsey. But first, I just want to thank you
personally for your lifetime of service, and I hope that you
will take my echo of the request earlier to give our
condolences to these heroes that lost their lives last night.
In his recent address before Congress, the Israeli Prime
Minister Netanyahu stated, ``So when it comes to Iran and ISIL,
the enemy of your enemy is your enemy.'' Would you respond to
that from a military perspective for me?
General Dempsey. Well, I will not respond to the Prime
Minister's choice of words or how he determines his national
interests. But in terms of our national interests, as I
mentioned, we have six things that concern us about Iran. One
of them happens to be their nuclear program.
Senator Perdue. Thank you. A followup on that is after two
wars and 14 years later, as Secretary Carter reminded us
earlier this morning, al-Qaeda still exists. That is not a
criticism. It is just a reality. I would like for you to help
me define what we seek from a military point of view, what a
victory is with ISIL in this--with regard to this AUMF and our
current task ahead of us.
General Dempsey. Yes, thanks for asking, Senator. We
actually rarely have the chance to talk about the overall
scheme here, if you will. So ISIL is transregional, which is to
say they are not just confined to Iraq and Syria. They are
generational, which is to suggest the duration of this campaign
will be prolonged. We are seeking to find a sustainable level
of effort.
And when I say that, you know, I did not have the chance to
respond to the difference in AUMFs from 1941 to 2015. It is
important to note that the use of military force in a state-on-
state conflict is very different than the use of military force
in a state on a nonstate actor. And so, the military brings
three things, and we own two lines of effort out of nine
against ISIL. The other lines of effort are governance,
countermessaging, counter foreign financing, humanitarian
relief, and so forth.
The two things that we are doing is, of course, using
direct action, and notably with our airstrikes. And the other
is building partner capacity, which is to say building up the
ability of the Peshmerga, the Iraqi security forces, and the
Sunni tribal leaders to reject ISIL because it will only be
permanently defeated if they reject the ideology, not simply by
us cutting off its head. It has actually got to be rejected
from within, and that requires a different application of the
military instrument than it would be if we were fighting a
state-on-state actor.
One last thing, and then in the interest of time I will
stop. The military does three things for this Nation: direct
action, build partners, and enable others. The best example we
have right now of enabling others is what we are doing with the
French in Mali against al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb. So that
is what we are doing. That is what this AUMF allows. And the
limiting principle, I sense we are looking, or some of us in
the room are looking, for a limiting principle. The limiting
principle is the way this particular enemy will be defeated. It
will not be defeated by U.S. military power alone.
Senator Perdue. Thank you. You mentioned last week, Mr.
Chairman, that you were concerned about what happens with
regards to sectarian violence and so forth. And if we are
victorious against ISIL in Iraq, it looks to me like that Iran
is also victorious because of their efforts there behind the
Shia militia. Can you speak to that just a minute in terms of
that part of the definition of victory? And then what do we do
from a military standpoint once we declare victory over ISIL in
Iraq and Syria, by the way?
General Dempsey. There is a lot in that question.
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
General Dempsey. Look, Iran is going to be influential in
Iraq, has been influential in Iraq, and I am concerned about
the way they wield that influence. There are ways they could
wield it to promote a better Iraq economically, for example,
and there are ways they can wield that influence to create a
state where the Sunni and the Kurds are no longer welcome. And
it is my concern about the latter that we are watching
carefully as this Tikrit event unfolds.
As far as declaring victory against ISIL, that is not for
us to declare. As I said, very much we can enable it. We can
support a coalition, hold the coalition together. We can build
into the region. We can harden the region against it
militarily. But the ideology has to be defeated by those in the
region.
Senator Perdue. Well, I am concerned about Iran's stature
in the region, particularly relative to Assad and Hezbollah as
well as the Shia militia. And so, this looks like that if we
are successful, we have a partner in crime here where Iran is
also going to be successful and strengthen their position.
Let me echo one thing that I heard both sides say this
morning, and I want you to pass this along to your men and
women in service, if you will, is that we hope we will end up
unified. I absolutely believe we have to be like-minded in
this. This is bigger than any partisan position. This is about
the security of our country. And the lesson we heard from the
speech from last week was simply this, and that is this is
bigger than the Middle East. It is bigger than our national
security. This is about global security all of a sudden.
I would like to follow up real quick if I could on this
symmetric versus asymmetric conversation, though. You are
talking about the symmetric or the asymmetric question with
regard to Iraq, Syria, and the Middle East right now. I am a
concerned a little bit, and I would like to have you respond,
if you will, and maybe Secretary Carter as well. What impact
does this have on our long-term strategy relative to the
symmetric threats? And I know that we do not talk a lot about
the People's Republic of China. We do not talk about Russia in
this conversation. But it is all interrelated, and I would like
to see how this in your mind relates to the longer term
strategy.
General Dempsey. Thanks, Senator. So for the first time in
my 40 years, we have both state and nonstate threats to our
national interests because in my first 25 years it was all
about state threats, notably the Soviet Union. For the last 15
years, it is all about nonstate actors. We live now in an
environment where we have threats emanating from both states
and nonstates, and it makes--we are actually adapting quite
well to that. And I do not want to turn this into a budget
hearing, but if we do not get some budget help on this issue of
sequestration, it is going to be very difficult to manage both
threats.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. For you not to get a word
in about your budget would be a remissful thing on your part.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
thank Secretary Kerry for his strong words about the letter
that was sent by our 47 colleagues to the Government of Iran. I
think that was a serious breach of protocol and exercise in bad
judgment, especially at this very sensitive time. And I thank
the Secretary for taking that very strong position in this
hearing.
Secretary Carter, what I would like to ask you is how this
extends to Libya, and what this authorization could mean given
the increasing stronghold that ISIS has in many parts of Libya,
and what it could portend in terms of U.S. commitment to the
removal of ISIL from Libya.
Secretary Carter. Senator, thank you. There are those in
Libya who are, I will use the term, rebranding themselves as
ISIL. That is not the only place we see that, but it is
certainly going on in Libya. And, therefore, this AUMF could
apply to operations in and around Libya against those groups,
depending upon their behavior and whether they have met this
criteria of this AUMF. And also because the 2001 AUMF is extant
as well, that could also cover actions we might need to take in
Libya as it has in the past if there are successor groups to
al-Qaeda. So both of those might apply to Libya, and these are
the kinds of things, determinations that are made as these
cases arise.
But you do see in this social media fueled movement called
ISIL people who are wannabes or want to join or have been
associated with al-Qaeda or some other group who are putting up
the flag of ISIL. And we need to recognize that that is a
characteristic of the campaign, and that is why the AUMF has
the language that it does.
Senator Markey. And if I may move back over to Syria in
terms of what all of this means for a long-term American
commitment, our goal is to remove Assad. The goal of Iran and
Russia is to keep Assad in office, Iran most prominently given
their now Crescent move from Baghdad over through Tehran into
Damascus.
What does this mean in terms of the commitment that we are
making to have the moderate Syrians depose, take out, Assad?
That is their goal. Are we committing to back them in their
effort to depose Assad because that is their stated public
goal. So how do we square up this AUMF potentially with that
longer term goal, which our principal allies inside of Syria
would have?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, this is ISIL specific. There are
those who wish it would include Assad, but it does not. We are
supporting the moderate opposition, however, very directly in
the efforts that are focused on Assad. And the Congress, and we
are grateful for it, has approved the training and equip
program. Some $500 million have been appropriated. And that
program is about to be up and running. In addition to that,
there are other activities, as you know, that are focused on
the issue of President Assad. But specific to the AUMF, the
AUMF is ISIL specific, and it does not authorize activities
against Assad.
Senator Markey. But in helping to fight ISIL inside of
Syria and strengthening the moderate Syrians, whose goal is to
remove Assad, are we not at a minimum indirectly helping that
goal to be achieved by potentially eliminating the threat of
ISIL to that goal of the moderate Syrians? And are we
contemplating as a result then a longer stay in Syria to
accomplish that goal as well?
Secretary Kerry. No, I think when you say ``a stay in
Syria,'' we are not in Syria.
Senator Markey. No, I mean, stay in terms of our military
support for----
Secretary Kerry. The military support is----
Senator Markey [continuing]. Taking out ISIL and
strengthening the moderate Syrians.
Secretary Kerry. We are committed to strengthening the
moderate Syrians. We are committed to help train and equip. We
are committed to other activities that are specifically focused
on the Assad regime. But this authorization and the efforts to
deal with ISIL are focused on degrading and destroying ISIL.
And that particular military activity, should that goal be
accomplished, would then cease and desist. But the effort to
support the moderate opposition will continue.
Now, obviously if ISIL is eliminated and the moderate
opposition has gained capacity as a consequence of that
particular fight, they are going to be strengthened in their
other activities. And we have made that argument openly and
publicly.
Senator Markey. How long, in your opinion, General, do you
think it will take for Assad to be removed militarily or
politically given his current state?
General Dempsey. Well, it is two very different questions.
I mean, the diplomatic line of effort is the primary line of
effort right now. I have not been asked to apply military--the
military line of effort to the removal of Assad, so I think I
would actually defer to others on how long it might take. I
mean, the position of the United States was clear, and that is
that he has given up the legitimacy of governing people who he
is oppressing.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
The Chairman. If I could, and just to respond to Senator
Markey and Secretary Kerry's previous comment, I would like to
ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a copy of
Congress.gov where then-Senator Kerry and then-Senator Obama
cosponsored a bill to ensure that Congress had a vote on the
agreement that we reach with Iraq. I understand that in this
world sometimes where you stand is where you sit, but I would
like to balance out some of the discussion today and understand
that certainly positions change sometimes depending on which
side of the table you are sitting.
[The information referred to was not available when this
transcript went to press.]
The Chairman. And with that, Senator Isakson.
Senator Markey. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I was referring to
the timing of the delivery of that letter given the
negotiations which Secretary Kerry is right now engaged in.
And, again, I continue to believe that was an inappropriate
document for the time at which it was delivered, just not
timely.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
your service to the country. We appreciate your patience here
today. I had a college professor who once said the mind can
only absorb what seat can endure. You have been enduring a lot
of time, and we hope we will not keep you much longer.
I have one question, and it is for Secretary Kerry, and it
is not a deference to you that I am asking the question. I want
to thank you for your service. You do a great job for the
American people, and you work--you have a job that has a
Commander in Chief who is a politician, who is subject to 535
other politicians and your funding. So any question I ask you
would not be really fair if it had a political connotation to
it.
But, Secretary Kerry, you and I have served together a long
time. You served the country in Vietnam. You have been a great
leader for our country. And you know this is really a political
issue in part, and has political overturns in terms of the
AUMF, which I do support. And I believe that Senator--the
remarks made by Senator Menendez, Senator Flake, Senator
Perdue, and others about the need to come together as a
Congress and have a meaningful AUMF are important.
Here is what I want to ask you, Secretary Kerry. The first
President to ever mention radical Islam was Thomas Jefferson
and the Barbary pirates. General Dempsey has talked about this
being an enduring conflict, and talked about it being
regionally--evolving regionally and being transregional. We
know that ISIL is in the Maghreb through Boko Haram. They are
in the Levant. We have had attacks in Paris. We have had
attacks in Brussels. So it is a growing threat.
Here is my question. If, in fact, we have had problems all
the way dating back to Thomas Jefferson, and, in fact, this is
a growing regional threat, having a time limitation on the AUMF
does not make a lot of sense to me because I think we have a
united commitment as a country and as a Nation to fight ISIL
and to defeat ISIL. But as General Dempsey has said, that
definition is not the easiest definition to write into words.
It is a combination of a lot of things happening together, one
of which is an enduring commitment.
On the term of ``enduring,'' I think enduring in terms of
the AUMF means it does not mean special forces, but it probably
would mean 672,000 troops being deployed. And I can understand
that is something the President would probably want to come
back to the Congress and get an authorization for. But if we
took off the 3-year limitation so that this was a commitment
until we accomplish our goal of degrading and destroying ISIL,
would we not be better off to send the clear signal that there
is no end to this conflict as we are concerned until we win the
victory? And that was probably a disjointed question and more
of a statement, but I would appreciate your response.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you, Senator. No, it is a very
important one actually, and I appreciate it.
Senator Isakson. And you do not have to commit yourself on
behalf of the administration, but thought-provoking comments, I
would like to hear them.
Secretary Kerry. Well, thank you. First of all, let me
thank you personally because I am delighted you stayed on the
committee. I see you gave up a couple of seats of seniority to
do so, and I well know why you did. And I certainly want to
express my appreciation because I know you will be a strong and
critical voice for some of the things that do not always get
paid attention to, particularly in Africa. So I thank you for
that.
I do not think there is any doubt--I mean, I believe that
the 3 years, if they are accompanied by the vote that is
necessary here, and by the accompanying commitments by each
senator who goes to the floor and speak and define why we are
doing this and what we are doing, I think would be a healthy
debate. I am confident coming out of that will be an absolute
understanding by everybody in the region and in the world that
we are deeply committed to this and committed for more than the
3 years.
I think the 3 years will be respected, as Secretary Carter
said, as a reflection of the kind of political process here,
and not as a diminishment of the fundamental commitment to
achieve our goal. Every country in the region is committed to
defeat ISIL, every country. And that is particularly what has
prompted some of the questions here because of Iran's
commitment to do that.
So I really think that the 3 years is more of a statement
of respect by President Obama of personal choice for him to say
to the next President and to the Congress, review this, take a
look at it, see how it is going, tweak it if necessary. I do
not think he has any doubt about the readiness and willingness
of Congress to continue that forward, but perhaps with some,
you know, state-of-the-art refinements.
So I do not think it is a problem. I think we can deal with
that, and I think in order to achieve the vote that is
necessary, the experience of Iraq and the experience of
Afghanistan, you know, create a sufficient cloud over the
potential of this vote that I think everybody can say, okay,
what is the matter with doing--you know, reviewing it in three
years, but let us go do it. And I think that is the commitment
that we need, and that gets us the stronger vote to do that.
Senator Isakson. Well, I appreciate your response. I would
just ask you to take that message back and massage it a little
bit and think about what I said, because I think the
unequivocal commitment to see it to the end is important to be
sent. And I think the enduring presence gives you a chance to
come back and revisit it if we expand our military operations.
But in the meantime that we have a common ground to get the
vote out necessary to send a clear signal that Congress and the
White House are united. Thank you for your time and your
service.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Corker. I want to start
by thanking General Dempsey and Secretary Carter and Secretary
Kerry for your service, for your testimony, your engagement
with us today. We recently heard of tragic news of 11 service
members, four soldiers, seven marines currently missing and, I
believe, presumed lost in a training accident at Elgin Air
Force Base. And I just think it is worth a moment of prayerful
reflection on the enormous sacrifice that they have and that
their families--the loss that they are facing. Dover Air Force
Base will be the place to which those families now go and their
remains returned. And I think all of us who are contemplating
the undertaking we are about to authorize, that I pray we are
about to authorize, is one that will involve a great deal of
sacrifice across many countries and many years.
A question I wanted to raise is about who bears the cost.
In addition to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their
families, I think we need to be putting on the table in our
conversation about authorizing the conflict against ISIS the
financial cost. General Dempsey was right to raise the concerns
about DOD's budget for maintenance of effort across many
different fields. The need to pay for this war is, for me, a
central concern going back to 1961 when President Eisenhower
said America could choke itself to death piling up military
expenditures just as surely as it can defeat itself by not
paying enough for protection.
We have used a combination of either spending cuts or
increased revenue to pay for every conflict before the 2003
Iraq war, and the two post-9/11 engagements added literally
trillions of dollars toward the Nation's debt.
So I think we cannot write another blank check for a war.
We have to pay for it. I think it is not only fiscally
responsible, but morally responsible, and engages every
American in bearing the cost of the conflict. And I am aware
this is not directly within the purview of this committee, but
I think it is the responsibility of all of Congress.
So I am intending to renew this conversation. In the last
Congress I introduced an amendment to the AUMF that was debated
and considered, and I will do so in this debate and
consideration, and also in the upcoming budget process. I
wondered if any of you cared to comment on behalf of the
administration on an amendment that would call for a temporary
war surtax that raises revenues, or one that is a mix of
raising revenues and cutting spending, to offset the cost of
the conflict against ISIL. Secretary Carter, I will start with
you, if I might.
Secretary Carter. You are raising a very important
question. My own view is that question is not best associated
with the authorization for the use of military force, although
it is a very important question. The AUMF principally covers
the kind of campaign required and the support and authority of
the President to engage in that.
With respect to the expenditures, we are in a situation,
and Chairman Dempsey referred to this, and I believe the State
Department also in terms of its own budget, of one in which we
have had year after year of turmoil, which is disruptive, which
is wasteful, which causes all of us, and I think this is
probably true in the State Department budget and any of my
other colleagues, to have a very difficult time managing
appropriately and efficiently. So that is a very important
problem.
And I appreciate your attention to it, and agree with what
you said. Again now, I am offering a view off the top of the
head here, but I think that that is best dealt with and needs
to be dealt with, but best dealt with in another way than by
incorporating the funding situation in the AUMF. And I will say
one more thing. Well, I think that is----
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The point I am
simply trying to raise is that at the same time that the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs raises appropriately, enduring
budget concerns. As a former member of the Budget Committee
myself, I feel uncomfortable that we continue to use OKO
contingency funding for more and regions, more and more
functions. And I would like to see us take on perhaps in other
committees the responsibility of clearly shouldering the
responsibility of paying for this and not just asking for
sacrifice from those who wear the uniform.
Secretary Kerry, if I might, two questions in the time I
have left. There has been some back and forth and a number of
questions by senators about what ``associated forces'' mean.
Both Senator Isakson and I have long been engaged in issues
relating to Africa, as you well know, and whether in Libya or
in Nigeria. There have recently been organizations pledging
their allegiance to ISIL. Just this past Saturday Boko Haram
leader, Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance in a statement that
they posted to their Twitter account. And I think the conflict
with Boko Haram and Nigeria is another frankly good example of
a situation where an American boots on the ground presence is
not what is called for. An American effort to facilitate and
support efforts by the Nigerians and their regional allies is
the best strategy going forward.
But in your view, if that began to take off and their
conflict began to engage some of our coalition partners, would
this AUMF qualify for us to go after any groups that have
pledged allegiance? And then what are the actions they need to
take against coalition partners or Americans in order to be
covered by the AUMF in its current language?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, thank you for the question,
an important one. As of now at this moment in its current
state, merely by pledging as they have pledged, or flying the
flag, or, you know, saying that they are now affiliated, there
is no decision made nor any contemplated that they would be
covered under this at this moment. I mean, that is not
adequate. But if, as Secretary Carter said, they start to
attack the United States or join with ISIL in a specific
strategy to attack coalition partners, that would raise a
legitimate question, and this authorization could, in fact,
under those circumstances cover them. It would have to be--you
know, there would be a lot of internal scrubbing of exactly
what those activities were, what the implications are and so
forth. It would not be automatic, but it would be open to
judgment.
Senator Coons. Let me ask one last question, if I might,
Mr. Secretary, on the topic of the negotiations with Iran. I
will make a statement, and if you care to comment, that would
be great. It is my hope that if a long-term agreement is
reached, that the inspection obligations, the IAEA inspection
obligations will be enduring and will not simply sunset at the
end of whatever that term is. And I think knowing that there
was a continuing inspection obligation would give some comfort
to those of us who do not trust Iran and are not confident that
at the end of the window they will not simply immediately
return to their previous illicit nuclear weapons activities. Do
you care to make a comment?
Secretary Kerry. I will make a very quick comment, and it
addresses a lot of the comments that we have been hearing from
the Hill over the course of the last weeks and months. I keep
hearing people say we do not trust Iran, we do not trust Iran.
Nothing in this agreement contemplated, if it gets reached, is
based on trust. Nothing. In fact, it is based on distrust, and,
therefore, would have to be accompanied by an adequate level of
verification, whatever that may be. I am not going to discuss
at all what might or might not be contemplated, but I will just
simply say to you whatever agreement is reached is not on the
basis of some words in a document and trust. It has to be
verified. It has to be accountable.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Dempsey,
this question is for you. First of all, let me state this as a
statement. I appreciate what you are doing here. I think all of
us agree that we need a strong vote on this AUMF, and I
appreciate your efforts, Senator Kerry--or, excuse me,
Secretary Kerry, to put this together. And this is a very
difficult needle to thread because of the wide variance of
views in Congress. So I appreciate your efforts to do that, and
I am hoping at the end of the day that we do have this strong--
a strong vote in support of this. So I urge you to continue
those efforts.
General Dempsey, this question is for you. If this passes,
how will things be different after this passes than they are
now? What is this going to change?
General Dempsey. I do not think there will be any
difference in our activities. I think there will be potentially
a difference among our coalition partners in the way they view
our commitment to the fight. But in terms of the way we apply
military force either directly through partners or enabling
others, it will not change.
Senator Risch. Okay. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman,
this--what I am going to say now is a statement for the record.
It is not a question. And I want to respond to some of the
comments that were made here today.
I am one of the 47 senators that signed the letter that
there has been all this talk about in recent days. You know,
this indignation and breast beating over this letter is
absolute nonsense. Each of us that signed that is an elected
Member of the United States Senate, and as such is a member of
the first branch of this government. To say that we should not
be communicating is nonsense.
Members of Congress every single day communicate with
members of other countries, with Presidents, and heads of other
countries, with Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers from
other countries. It is done regularly. Every time Congress has
a recess, loads of airplanes leave Andrews Air Force Base with
dozens of Members of Congress who go directly and meet face-to-
face with these heads of state. This letter was nothing more.
We have constitutional responsibilities, that we as elected
officials of this first branch of government, are required to
meet.
The problem we have got here is we have a real disagreement
over the talk regarding this treaty. And let there be no
mistake, this is a treaty that is being negotiated. Secretary
Kerry and I were on opposite sides when we were debating the
New START agreement. That was a treaty, an agreement, between
two nations regarding their nuclear capabilities. This is the
exact same thing. It is an attempt to reach an agreement over
nuclear weapons capability with another nation. It is a treaty
and should be treated as such. I hope an agreement is reached.
I really hope we get a good agreement. If we do not get a good
agreement, there should be no agreement.
I will say in regards to what Secretary Kerry said about
other countries in the region and their view of what is
happening here, he conceded that they were nervous. I would go
further than that. I meet with the same people. I would
classify their feeling about this as queasy, very queasy, and
anybody who doubts that should get the transcript of what Prime
Minister Netanyahu said about it last week. I think the
characterization that he made of how he feels, his country
feels, is very representative of how other countries in the
region feel.
Mr. Chairman, that is a statement for the record. I yield
back my time. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
panel for coming today. Madison wrote that history demonstrates
what the Constitution supposed that the executive branch is
most prone to war, and, therefore, the Constitution, with
studied care, vested that power in the legislature. Madison
also went on to further write that the separation of powers
would be protected by pitting the ambitions of one branch
against the ambitions of another. There will be points of
dispute. These points of dispute are important, and no one side
will monolithically be able to declare victory.
But I can tell you I am not particularly happy with being
lectured to by the administration about the Constitution. This
is an administration who I believe has trampled the
Constitution at many turns. This is an administration that
seeks to legislate when it is not in their purview, whether it
be immigration, whether it be health care, or whether it now be
a war that has been going on for 8 months without congressional
authorization. This administration is in direct defiance of
what Senator Obama ran on and what he was elected upon. He said
no country should go to war without the authority of Congress
unless under imminent attack. This is a great debate.
I signed the letter to Iran, but you know what? The message
I was sending was to you. The message was to President Obama
that we want you to obey the law. We want you to understand the
separation of powers. If this agreement in any way modifies
legislative sanctions, it will have to be passed by Congress.
That is why I have supported Senator Corker's legislation that
says exactly this. However, I have told Senator Corker
privately I think that is the law anyway, that this will have
to be passed. You cannot undo legislation.
So why did I sign this letter? I signed this letter because
I signed it to an administration that does not listen, to an
administration that at every turn tries to go around Congress
because you think you cannot get your way. The President says,
oh, the Congress will not do what I want, so I have got a pen
and I have got my phone, and I am going to do what I want. The
letter was to you. The letter was to Iran, but it should have
been cc'd to the White House because the White House needs to
understand that any agreement that removes or changes
legislation will have to be passed by us.
Now, people can have different interpretations of things,
but I will go through a couple of things that bother me about
the AUMF. The AUMF in 2001 says that ``nations or organizations
that planned, authorized, committed, or aided in the attacks on
9/11'' are the target. That is what the authorization is about.
I do not read Boko Haram into that. I mean, if we are going to
read Boko Haram into that, that is such a stretch that it is
meaningless.
Senator Murphy talked about vagueness. It is pretty
specific in 2001 what we were supposed to do. I was all in
favor of that. We had to do what we had to do with Afghanistan,
with those who attacked us. If we have to go other places, we
should have authorizations. I am not saying I will not vote for
the authorizations. We just need to have them.
So we have a new authorization that says we do not
authorize enduring and offensive operations. The problem is it
is so vague--I trust the military. When the military says this
is not what we are contemplating, I trust you. But the thing is
there will be another President who I may or may not trust, who
may have a certain degree of lack of trust in this President
saying that it is not being contemplated.
So we say it is not 697,000, but the next President could
say it is, you know. Is it 100,000? You know, that would be my
question, I guess, to Secretary Carter. We are saying it is not
697,000. Is it 100,000 troops, or could it be?
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator. Well, it does not
have a number in it, and that reflects the basic approach that
this draft AUMF or proposed AUMF takes, which is to not attempt
to enumerate or number, but to set a scope and a limit, a very
meaningful limit----
Senator Paul. But could it mean 100,000----
Secretary Carter [continuing]. A meaningful limit referring
to it, and the President specifically referred to the campaigns
in Iraq and Afghanistan. And it just gets back to the whole
logic of the campaign, which is to enable those in the region
who can make a victory stick. That is the basic approach----
Senator Paul. Right, and I understand not wanting--I
understand not wanting to put a number on it. And when the
authorization was passed in December, it did not put a number
on it. It defined sort of the mission more precisely. In doing
so, it basically defined what we are doing over there now. I
see nothing that we are doing there now that would not have
flown under the definition from December.
The problem is that without a geographic limit, we now have
Boko Haram. People are saying it is sort of like, it is
disdainful to say, well, you know, we want you all to pass
something, but it does not really matter because we will just
use 2001, which is just absurd. And it just means that Congress
is inconsequential and so are the people in the country, that
basically we will do what we want, and Boko Haram can be
included under 2001. If Boko Haram is a threat to the country,
bring it to me and we will vote, and I will listen honestly on
whether we need to attack Boko Haram in Nigeria.
But the thing is that I understand how things change over
time and how people transmute words to mean things that they
really were not intended to mean. If 2001 can be applied to
Boko Haram, I am very concerned about voting for this as it is
worded because if we are going to go to war in Libya, I want to
vote for war in Libya. If we are going to go to war in Nigeria,
I want to vote for war in Nigeria. And I am not talking about
an isolated small episode where we have to go knock out a cell
of people that are organizing to attack us. You may be able to
interpret that under the imminent attack sort of clause of the
Constitution.
But I am concerned, that is why we get to numbers. Under
this resolution, I believe you could have unlimited numbers of
troops in Iraq. I understand you say it is not contemplated. I
also believe you could have unlimited numbers of troops in
Libya and in Nigeria, and now there are 30 nations that have
pledged allegiance to ISIS. So words are important, and people
worry about the danger of being too confining. We are not even
anywhere close to that, because even when we thought we were
confining in 2001, people have interpreted that to mean
anything.
And so, really, I guess, Secretary Carter, do you
understand that if it were to pass as it is now, there are
those of us who would worry that this would be authorizing
unlimited troops in 30 different nations if the administration
saw fit to send them?
Secretary Carter. Senator, I think that any AUMF, and
certainly this proposed AUMF, tries to strike a balance between
anticipating a wide enough range of contingencies that we can
react in the way that we need to protect ourselves and that we
anticipate the nature of this enemy, while being restrictive
enough to suggest to not just the law, but to you and our
force, the force for which I am responsible and General Dempsey
is responsible, what we are contemplating here. We are trying
to strike that balance.
It is always hard to strike a balance in language. I have
said before I am not a lawyer. But in common sense terms, that
is the balance that we are trying to strike. And I respect that
different people might use different language to that effect,
and I have learned enough in studying for this hearing about
authorities for the use of military force to know that there
are several avenues to do that. But I think that what is being
done here is in recognition of a new chapter opening, namely
the ISIL threat which opened last summer, the recognition that
there is a new chapter in our effort to protect ourselves, and
out of respect for that, a request for a specific
authorization.
And I think--I understand that. I do not think that--I
think the lawyers have said there is a legal necessity for it.
It does not come from legal necessity. It comes from a
recognition of a practical fact, which is something happened
last summer, which created a new danger to which--the defeat of
which we need to participate. We are not going to do it by
ourselves. We are going to enable others to do it, and that is
the principal insurance against it turning into an Iraq and
Afghanistan. That is not what is needed here. That is not what
will succeed here. So just speaking as the Secretary of Defense
and, again, not a lawyer, it seems to me that is the logic that
brought us here. And I understand it.
Senator Paul. Thank you. And I just want to say I do not
question your sincerity, and when you say it is not
contemplated, I truly do believe you, that it is not
contemplated. But I have to deal with words that 15 years from
now I have to explain to my kids, and their friends, and their
kids' kids, that something I voted for in 2015 still has us at
war in 2030 in 30 different countries, okay?
It is an ongoing threat, but we need to keep the separation
of powers. We need to vote on these things. And the reason it
has to be precise is I cannot vote for something that is going
to enable war in Libya, and Nigeria, and Yemen, and all these
places with 100,000 troops. There has to be some kind of
limitation. And it is not your sincerity I question. It is the
politicians, and the next politician, and the next politician
after you. But thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you. I have one followup question for
Chairman Dempsey and Secretary Carter. I understand that
Secretary Kerry has a hard stop, and if you felt like you
wanted to miss my last question, I would not consider it rude,
and would like for you to get on with your business if you need
to do. If you want to stay, that would be fine.
Secretary Kerry. I really appreciate that. I do have a hard
stop. Can I just take 1 minute for thing? I just wanted you to
know that today the Treasury Department has authorized--has
initiated additional sanctions on eight Ukrainian separatists,
a Russian pro-separatist organization, three of its leaders, a
Crimean bank, and additionally on some Yanukovych folks,
supporters.
In addition to that, we are today providing immediately
some $75 million of additional nonlethal assistance immediately
to Ukraine in order to help them in nonlethal assistance. And
as you know, other things are currently under consideration.
But I just wanted you to be aware of that, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, it is very timely. We thank you for
that. We had a Ukraine-Russia hearing yesterday, and I know
there is still the push to provide the lethal support. I know
this--there were a lot of questions and some statements made
today, but the fact is all of us deeply appreciate the
tremendous amount of effort you put forth in your job. And we
thank you for taking the time to be with us today with the many
other demands that you have. Thank you.
If I could, gentlemen, Chairman Dempsey, if I could just
follow up a little bit on the AUMF and the issue of being able
to protect those that we train and equip against Assad's
assaults, and the fact that it is your belief that the AUMF
does not cover that, nor does the 2001 AUMF, and I assume
Secretary Carter agrees with that assumption. Is that correct?
Secretary Carter. I do. I do, yes. I am told separately
just to get to your question, if the forces that we train and
equip come under attack from Assad, would we have the legal
authority to help them defend themselves. And my understanding
of that question is that we do not foresee that happening any
time soon, but a legal determination, I am told by the lawyers,
has not been made whether we would have authority to do that or
not. Again, I am not lawyer, but that is what I am told.
The Chairman. Yes, and I think that is what you may have
said--someone said to Senator Graham last week. First of all,
we thank you both for being here, and I know that coming before
Senate panels is not first on your priority list in your
current day jobs, but we appreciate the time here. So this is
just really to tease this out a little bit.
It is a pretty big issue when you think about the fact that
we have authorized the training and equipping, and that the
administration apparently did talk some with you all. If I
understand correctly, for there to be a clear legal
determination, then that would mean that an additional
authorization would need to be approved by Congress for you all
to be able to protect, to train, and to equip folks against
Assad.
That seems to me very problematic. I mean, you see the kind
of consternation that takes place over the one that is now
offered. To come back later with another one does not seem to
me to be a particularly appropriate way to go about things. And
so, Chairman Dempsey, what should be our thinking in that
regard, and what is yours?
General Dempsey. First, Senator, I actually chuckled when
you said how much we enjoy coming over here. But the truth is
over the course of my 4 years as chairman, I have come to a
deep appreciation of the fact that we do have an Article 1
responsibility to have these kind of conversations with you
about our national security interests and the strategy to
deliver them. So I actually want to thank you for running a
very cordial hearing today on the topics.
As far as the--what are we going to do about protecting the
new Syrian forces as they are fielded, that question is--I
mentioned the term ``active.'' We are in an active discussion.
From the very beginning, though, we knew that we would come to
the point where we had to make a decision about whether or not
to protect them, and it was always my advice that we had to
come to some conclusion to assure them that they would be
protected. Now, the scope and scale of that protection is the
part of this that is being actively debated. But the program
will not succeed unless they believe themselves to have a
reasonable chance of survival.
The Chairman. Let me just follow up, and, again, I
appreciate the fact that you are not just looking at these
issues in your role, but other issues in the Pacific and all
around the world. And you have got to balance the resources
that we have available to us. But back to that issue, can you
understand why many of us here, knowing that getting Turkey
involved in some way on the ground, probably matters some to
our success over time? If we are going to continue on the
policy path that we are on and the strategy, it is important.
So knowing that the President did not seek the authority to
go against Assad--solely again, I am talking about not
necessarily to take him on directly, but to be able to protect
the train and equip personnel that will be reentering, and also
to deal with some humanitarian issues and, let us face it, the
Northwest Triangle right above Aleppo. That would give many of
us, who certainly want to support this, some concern that there
really is not a commitment level there to create, if you will,
an effective ground effort. And I just wonder if you could
respond to that a little bit.
General Dempsey. I cannot ease your concerns, but I can
tell you that when I provide my military advice, it is key to
the success of the new Syrian forces that they will have a
degree of protection. And that, as Secretary Carter has said,
is under active discussion.
The Chairman. Well, I assume then since that is key to
success, those that are actually carrying out these activities
would not be offended if Congress gave that authorization
today.
General Dempsey. I leave that to you, our elected
officials.
The Chairman. I wonder if Secretary Carter wants to respond
to that, and I have one followup for you.
Secretary Carter. Again, the practical answer to your very
practical question is the one given by the chairman, namely
that there can--there could be circumstances in which the
forces that we train and equip come under attack from Assad's
forces. And it is important to them or will be important to
them to know whether and in what manner they will be supported.
That is something under active discussion.
I do not believe that the legal aspect of that has been
determined, so I cannot tell you. You would have to ask the
White House counsel or our DOD counsel whether anything
additional was required in the way of formal authorities to do
that. I simply cannot answer that question for you. But I do
think it is a very meaningful practical question, and I give
the same answer to it that the chairman does.
The Chairman. And I will just--and I know that you all are
in active discussion, and you have your own concerns, and those
are not necessarily always addressed quickly, if you will, by
those that make decisions in other places, and I understand
that. I will say that from my perspective it does show a degree
of lack of commitment from the White House that they would not
go ahead on the front end, knowing that there is no way you can
continue to recruit the folks that are involved in this train
and equip program if they know they are going to come into the
country and immediately be barrel bombed, and we are not going
to support their efforts. It would be very difficult to recruit
additional folks, as you have mentioned.
And it does cause me to be concerned about the
administration's overall commitment if that is not being dealt
with in this authorization when we have authorized the train
and equip program several months ago. So this is just something
I raise.
Secretary Carter, the reason for the question was the
Persian Gulf war and the 600, almost 700,000 troops that were
involved. To me, the enduring offensive ground combat language
that was in the AUMF that was sent over would have allowed for
that. It was a 7-month operation. That to me was not enduring--
and very successful I might add. And so, you are saying that a
7-month operation from your standpoint would not qualify per
the President's language? That would be too long.
Secretary Carter. The reference you are using is to a
campaign intended to destroy the military forces of another
State. That is a fundamentally different kind of conflict from
this one.
The Chairman. I got that.
Secretary Carter. So the ability to compare them eludes me.
The Chairman. I understand you are making a difference
there, and I understand the difference between going against a
country and going against an entity like ISIS or Daesh. I guess
what troubled me just a hair, and, again, we all respect deeply
the way you have come in and taken charge. But talking about a
seven-month operation being too long, that goes beyond, if you
will, an enduring offensive. I just wish you would clarify that
to some degree for the record. If it takes 2 or 3 years, I
would assume you would not consider that to be enduring.
Secretary Carter. What I have--I will just repeat what I
said earlier about the time scale. We do not know how long it
will take to defeat ISIL, and I explained earlier that I would
not tell you that it was 3 years, which is the only duration
included in this authorization of the use of military force.
And it does not derive from any expectation of how long the
campaign will last. It derives from the political calendar of
our country.
So that is the time scale named and specified in the
proposed AUMF, and that is its origin. And that is the only
period of time that is specifically named in the AUMF, and that
is its derivation.
The Chairman. I know that Senator Menendez indicated he did
not have any questions. Okay, go ahead.
Senator Menendez. I do not have any questions, Mr.
Chairman. I just have a comment. First of all, I want to share
with--along with what, I think, every member of this committee
and of the Senate, our thoughts and prayers are with these
service members who were lost. This underlines that there is
risk once you don the uniform, even if you are not under enemy
fire. And so, our thoughts and prayers are with the families.
Also it reminds me as someone who did not vote for the
process of sequester that we cannot ask you to do everything we
ask you to do if we do not find relief from sequester here
along the way. We seem to somehow ignore that, but I do not
think both of you have that luxury. We have to deal with that.
Finally, I do hope that we can get to a point to find the
right balance, and that is not easy in this proposition, to
give you an AUMF that gives you the wherewithal to degrade and
defeat ISIL, but by the same token does not provide an open-
ended check. And I think that the real concern here is for some
of us who lived under shock and awe and were told Iraqi oil was
going to pay for everything, and so a lot of lives and national
treasure were spent, that even well-intentioned efforts can
move in a totally different direction.
And this is the most critical vote that any Member of the
Congress will take, which is basically a vote on war and peace
and life and death. And so, for those of us who have been
pursuing this to try to find the right spot, the one thing I
want you to take away from the hearing is that I do not think
there is a Democrat or Republican who does not believe that we
have to degrade or defeat ISIL. We stand collectively with you.
And as we struggle to get to the right wording with the
right authorization, I just hope you can go back to the men and
women who served this country with great sacrifice, and in that
spirit we are united. And so, our only cause here is to find
out how is the best way to ensure that and at the end not
ensure, you know, an endless war, which is the concern of many.
Secretary Carter. Thank you for saying that. It means a
lot.
Senator Menendez. Thank you both.
The Chairman. Thank you. I was just handed a note just as I
think you all were a minute ago. I just want to end--my last
statement before thanking you by saying it is my understanding
the DOD senior lawyers are sitting behind you. And it is my
understanding as we leave here that the authorization that has
been put before us and the 2001 authorization--neither one give
clear cut authority for you all to be able to defend the train
and equip program against Assad's assaults. I just want to
state that. I do not think anybody is disagreeing with that. Is
that correct?
Secretary Carter. That is my understanding, and I would be
happy to have our legal team speak to you about that. That is
my understanding, Senator.
The Chairman. Well, since I do not see them waving their
hands back there, I am assuming they are speaking now. So I
would just like to close also by telling you how much we
respect you both and how much we appreciate your service to
your country, how much we appreciate you taking the time to
come up here. I think this has been very helpful to all of us.
We wish you well.
And the record will be open until the close of business
Friday. I hope if questions come, you will answer them as
promptly as possible.
The Chairman. Again, thank you for your service and for
being here today. The meeting is adjourned.
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator Barbara Boxer
Chairman Corker, Senator Menendez--thank you for holding this
important hearing today.
I would also like to thank our panel of distinguished witnesses for
appearing before the committee and for their service to our country.
This hearing will focus on the most difficult and somber
responsibility of this committee--authorizing the use of military
force.
Committing American service men and women to fight in a conflict
overseas is not a decision I take lightly. That is why I have deep
reservations about President Obama's proposed authorization for the use
of military force--or AUMF--against the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL), which he submitted to Congress last month.
I fear that the President's proposal leaves open the door for
American combat troops to be sent to fight another ground war in the
Middle East.
The restriction on ``enduring offensive ground combat operations''
is no restriction at all. The language is vague, confusing, and overly
broad. And it gives this President and the next one the sole discretion
to interpret the phrase as they see fit.
In fact, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) came to this same
conclusion in a legal brief completed at my request. In the brief, CRS
states that, ``It seems doubtful that a limitation on `enduring
offensive ground combat operations' would present sufficient judicially
manageable standards by which a court could resolve any conflict that
might arise between Congress and the executive branch over the
interpretation of the phrase or its application to U.S. involvement in
hostilities.''
I cannot and will not support such an AUMF.
If we have learned anything over the last decade, it is that we
cannot commit tens of thousands of American service men and women to
another open-ended ground conflict in the Middle East.
This is the commitment President Obama reiterated in his State of
the Union Address, saying: ``Instead of getting dragged into another
ground war in the Middle East, we are leading a broad coalition,
including Arab nations, to degrade and ultimately destroy this
terrorist group.''
I believe that an AUMF against ISIL should better reflect the
President's promise and the strategy he has laid out to the American
people to work with a broad international coalition to confront these
ruthless terrorists.
As Congress works to debate and craft a new AUMF, I hope we will
revisit the AUMF that passed out of this committee in December under
the leadership of Senator Menendez. I voted for that AUMF because it
supported the President's strategy of building a broad coalition to
combat ISIL and reflected his commitment that American combat troops
would not be sent back to the Middle East to fight another ground war.
We must learn from the tragic foreign policy mistakes of the past.
We cannot afford to make them again.
______
Responses of Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
assessment of isis strategy
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the
military and political strategy against ISIS?
Answer. Militarily, the administration's counter-Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) strategy is making progress. U.S. and coalition
airstrikes are taking out ISIS's command and control, supply lines,
fighters, and their military and economic infrastructure. The
airstrikes have debilitated ISIS's oil producing, processing, and
transportation infrastructure.
There have been some successes on the ground in Iraq, where some
organized forces--Iraq security forces or peshmerga--worked in
coordination with the coalition and reclaimed areas once controlled by
ISIS. Efforts to train and advise Iraq security forces are ongoing at
four sites across Iraq, with cooperation from our coalition partners.
There has also been some slow progress by the Government of Iraq (GOI)
to integrate Sunni tribal forces in Anbar province into the Iraq
Security Forces. The coalition is committed to continue working with
both the GOI and the tribes to facilitate this integration of forces.
Military means, however, will not be sufficient to counter ISIS.
Iraq will be stable and secure only when it has a stable and inclusive
government that addresses the needs of Iraq's diverse society. Prime
Minister Abadi has taken steps to demonstrate his commitment to
reconciliation and inclusive governance, but I refer you to the State
Department for a more detailed assessment of the GOI's political
progress.
The situation is more complex in Syria due to the absence of a
national military or civilian partner, and the lack of a cohesive
opposition. Nonetheless, there has been success in Kobani, where a
combination of airstrikes and local defenders forced ISIS to withdraw
from the area. This is why the effort to train and equip appropriately
vetted Syrian opposition forces to counter ISIS is so essential.
However, to stop the conflict that has fuelled the rise of ISIS,
there must ultimately be a political solution in Syria. This will take
time and perseverance.
authority and resources
Question. Do you feel you have the authority and resources today to
achieve the goal of defeating ISIS both in Syria and Iraq?
Answer. Yes. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 and the DOD Appropriations Act, 2015, provide
authority and funding for ongoing operations in support of Operation
Inherent Resolve. The Iraq Train and Equip Fund, authorized by the NDAA
for FY 2015, provides the authority and resources to train and equip
Iraq security forces, including Kurdish and Sunni tribal forces. These
statutes also enable a parallel effort against the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria, authorizing and funding a program to
train and equip appropriately vetted Syrian opposition forces.
It is my belief that the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF) provides adequate legal authority to use U.S. military
force against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria. I also believe that the 2002
Iraq AUMF provides legal authority for military operations against ISIS
in Iraq and, in some circumstances, against ISIS in Syria.
It is also my belief that the President's proposed ISIS-specific
AUMF would give the Department the flexibility it needs to carry out
the military campaign against ISIS, and would send a strong signal to
our military, our coalition partners, and our adversaries that the
United States is united in its effort to destroy ISIS.
The Department's efforts have degraded ISIS, but the defeat of ISIS
in Iraq and Syria will depend not only on the Department's continuing
efforts, but also on political solutions both in Iraq and Syria.
title 10 train and equip program
Question. Do you anticipate forces trained under the Title 10 Train
and Equip program to one day fight Assad?
Answer. The intent and focus of our Train and Equip program is to
prepare appropriately vetted Syrian opposition forces to fight against
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). I recognize, though, that
many of these groups now fight on two or three fronts, including
against ISIS, other violent extremists, and the Syrian Government. The
administration has always said that Assad must go as he has lost the
legitimacy to lead, and that a political solution is necessary to end
the war and stop the chaos that has fuelled the rise of ISIS.
______
Response of GEN Martin Dempsey to Question
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
best military advice
Question. Are U.S. forces today conducting operations in the fight
against ISIS that are in line with your best military advice for
achieving the administration's stated goals?
Answer. Yes, operations involving U.S. forces are in line with my
best military advice. In Iraq, the coalition is conducting operations
that enable Iraqi forces to conduct offensive operations against ISIL.
In recent months the coalition has blunted ISIL's momentum in Iraq,
trained and equipped Iraqis and enabled Iraqis to retake lost terrain
from ISIL. I believe the Government of Iraq must own this fight. We
cannot do it for them--but we can help them to be successful. That is
what our campaign plan in Iraq is designed to do.
In Syria we continue to degrade ISIL through our air campaign and
have made significant progress with our coalition partners in setting
the stage for the train and equip program. Our comprehensive effort in
both Iraq and Syria continues to depend upon a strong network of
partnerships.
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