[Senate Hearing 114-69]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-69
DEEPENING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
IN VENEZUELA: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTER-
ESTS AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 17, 2015
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Lester E. Munson III, Staff Director
Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona BARBARA BOXER, California
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Canton, Santiago, executive director, Partners for Human Rights,
Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights,
Washington, DC................................................. 38
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Farah, Douglas, president, IBI Consultants, Takoma Park, MD...... 52
Prepared statement........................................... 54
Lee, Alex, Deputy Assistant Secretary for South America and Cuba,
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Marco Rubio................................................ 74
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 6
Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement.. 1
Sabatini, Christopher, Ph.D., adjunct professor, School of
International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, New
York, NY....................................................... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Smith, John, Acting Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washinngton, DC...... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Written statement of Maria Eugenia Tovar, a Venezuelan citizen,
submitted by Senator Marco Rubio............................... 73
(iii)
DEEPENING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN VENEZUELA: IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S. INTERESTS AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 2015
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Transnational Crime, Civilian Security,
Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's
Issues, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Marco Rubio
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Rubio, Flake, Gardner, Perdue, Isakson,
Boxer, Menendez, Udall, Kaine, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. The committee will come to order. To start
this hearing, the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human
Rights, and Global Women's Issues will come to order, as I
said.
This hearing is titled ``The Deepening Political and
Economic Crisis in Venezuela: Implications for U.S. Interests
and the Western Hemisphere.''
I would like to begin by welcoming Mr. Alex Lee, who is the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South America and Cuba,
and Mr. John E. Smith, the Acting Director of Office of Foreign
Assets Control.
We had invited Assistant Secretary of State Roberta
Jacobson to participate. We were informed that she is in Havana
today so she will not be available. So we appreciate you being
here, Mr. Lee.
So with vast oil reserves, Venezuela is one of the richest
countries in Latin America, and the Venezuelan people are
intelligent, they are well educated, they are hardworking
people. The evidence of this can be found in my home State in
Miami and in Doral and in Weston, FL, where a vibrant
Venezuelan community has helped build quality and vibrant
communities.
And Venezuela is also the cradle of democracy in South
America. And that is why it is so tragic that Venezuela has
turned into a social, political, and economic disaster.
The reason for this is simple. Because today that nation is
increasingly in the iron grip of corrupt and incompetent
leaders. A rich country suffering from a massive and growing
shortage of food, medicine, and basic goods to the point where
Maduro has had to order supermarkets to install fingerprint
scanners to enforce food rations. Venezuela has an inflation
rate of over 60 percent, among the highest in the world. Price
controls in Venezuela have led to massive shortages of medicine
and medical equipment, has forced hospitals to suspend cancer
treatments and all but emergency surgical procedures. Shortages
of spare parts have grounded much of the bus and truck fleet,
and many airlines have stopped flying to Venezuela altogether.
The government, by the way, has also defaulted on several
large debts. Back when they were facing elections in 2012 and
2013, they authorized more imports than they could afford, but
when the bills came due, they stopped paying them, building up
tens of billions of dollars' worth of debt. The result is that
Venezuelan bonds are treated as among the riskiest in the
world, demanding premiums that are twice those of Bolivia, four
times those of Nigeria, and 13 times those of Mexico or Chile.
It is the incompetence of Nicolas Maduro and his
predecessor, Hugo Chavez, that have left Venezuela in the
position that it finds itself in. But instead of seeking out
reforms to improve these conditions, the response of the Maduro
regime has been to crack down on dissent, erode democracy, and
violently violate the human rights of their own people.
Here is just a brief recap of steps Maduro and his cronies
have taken to strengthen their grip on power.
In April 2013, the main opposition TV network, Globovision,
was forced to sell to a pro-government owner.
In July 2013, pro-government businessmen bought Cadena
Capriles, the owner of the largest daily in Venezuela, Ultimas
Noticias.
In August 2013, the most corrupt man in Venezuela--and that
is one heck of a title--Mr. Diosdado Cabello, the National
Assembly President, used a simple majority vote instead of the
required two-thirds vote to suspend an opposition deputy from
office, paving the way for a series of votes to grant Maduro
decree powers.
In September 2013 Maduro closes Voz de Orinoco, a radio
station. He closed it for, ``calling for rebellion.''
In October 2013, Maduro restricts bulk paper imports to
opposition newspapers, making it harder for them to go to
print.
In February 2014, security officials, working with armed
pro-government thugs, confront, beat, and even kill anti-Maduro
protestors.
That same month, the National Telecommunications Commission
prohibits local TV and radio from covering antigovernment
protests.
In May 2014, the Maduro government begins to routinely
block Web sites that are critical of the regime.
In July 2014, a Spanish investor group close to Maduro buys
El Universal, one of the nation's flagship daily newspapers,
and immediately the content of that newspaper changes to one of
supportive of Maduro.
In August 2014, the government begins proceedings against
Radio Caracas, and it suspends an opposition radio show from
broadcasting.
This is just a small sampling of the antidemocratic moves
and the violent moves taken by this regime just in the last
year and a half.
Now, faced with these long string of human rights
violations and the fact that many of these violators and the
people who enable them have strong economic links to the United
States and in particular south Florida, late last year Congress
passed and the President signed a law allowing the United
States to deny visas and freeze the assets of human rights
violators in Venezuela. And last week, the President applied
these sanctions against several human rights violators.
These sanctions are not against the Government of
Venezuela. These sanctions are not against the people of
Venezuela, nor do they aim to deny the people of Venezuela
anything. These sanctions, that the President has imposed, deny
known human rights violators the chance to use the money they
have stolen from the people of Venezuela to enjoy luxuries here
in the United States. These sanctions also deny human rights
violators the chance to travel freely to the United States.
Faced with an economic catastrophe and dwindling public
support, Nicolas Maduro has tried to use these sanctions as a
way to deflect from these problems and rally people around
anti-Americanism and nationalism. He has gone as far as to
absurdly claim that the United States is preparing an invasion
of Venezuela, and he has tried to place the opposition in a
position of either supporting him or being labeled as traitors.
So let me be very clear. The future of Venezuela belongs to
the people of Venezuela to decide via free and fair elections.
The United States has no interest and no plans of imposing or
encouraging what direction a free people of Venezuela freely
choose. The purpose of these sanctions is only this: to deny
corrupt officials and human rights violators the opportunity to
buy homes, make investments, and vacation in the United States
with the money they have stolen from the people of Venezuela.
Nevertheless, we can expect to see more of these theatrics
from Nicolas Maduro in the days and weeks to come. In fact, we
have just received word that he is shopping around an open
letter to the American people to be published any day now in
some major American media outlet or various media outlets,
encouraging the American people to stand up to their elected
officials and ask them to stop picking on him. By the way, in
the same letter, he accuses the United States of being involved
in a 2002 coup plot in Venezuela, another absurd claim.
This past weekend he asked for and was given absolute power
once again by the National Assembly. This grab for power
through decree powers that were given to him--you can expect to
see more of this because the declining economy and falling oil
prices has cut into his ability to buy support. Here are some
of the things we expect to see.
Unable to find credible evidence of coup plots between the
opposition and U.S. diplomats, I expect and predict that soon
you will see them produce fabricated evidence of coup plotting.
You will see clandestine assassination of opposition figures,
and you may even see Maduro and his cronies try to move up this
year's legislative elections to capitalize on this nationalism
before the popularity of his government fades even more.
But no amount of repression or theatrics will solve or
cover up the disaster that he has brought upon the people of
Venezuela. Food seized from private stores rot in warehouses
because of their incompetence. Maduro and his cronies continue
to manipulate currency to make money for themselves. Maduro and
his cronies will continue to force those doing business with
the government to use companies where they control the
subcontractors. And at some point this year, we may even see
the gas subsidies, long provided by the government, either
altered or removed altogether.
And we will also continue to see human rights violations.
The Defense Minister Vladimir, Padrino Lopez, has authorized
the use of force against peaceful demonstrators, which has led
to the murder of a 14-year-old boy. We will see more arrests
like the recent one of the elected Mayor of Caracas, Antonio
Ledezma, who was arrested last month. And sadly, we will see
more deaths such as one when opposition leader Rodolfo Gonzalez
took his own life when faced with the Maduro decision to move
the dissident leader to a cell block of common criminals.
It is also worth noting some other aspects of this regime.
First, the Cuban dictatorship has penetrated every aspect
of the Venezuelan Government. We will get into that today.
Second, Maduro has opened the door to closer military
relations with Iran, Russia, and China. In fact, the Venezuelan
military is currently conducting exercises with visiting
Russian troops and equipment.
Third, the Maduro regime continues to harbor vast elements
of the FARC within Venezuelan territory, offering this
terrorist group sanctuary and protection.
And fourth, along with Cuba, Maduro continues to aid
populist anti-American elements throughout Central and South
America.
The people of Venezuela deserve better than this, and while
the direction of their future belongs to them, we will be a
strong voice in firm support of their aspirations for a better
country and a better life. And we will not allow those who are
violating their rights and denying them this better future the
chance to come to Doral or Weston or to Miami or CocoPlum and
enjoy life with the money they have stolen from their own
people.
With that, I would like to thank and recognize our ranking
member, Senator Boxer, and I look forward to continuing to work
with you on these important issues.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much for holding this really
important and very timely hearing. And I also would like to
thank our witnesses for participating.
In February 2014, thousands of Venezuelans took to the
streets to protest against the administration of President
Nicolas Maduro and were met with a brutal crackdown by
government security forces and armed pro-government gangs.
Last month marked the 1-year anniversary of these
widespread antigovernment demonstrations, which lasted nearly 4
months and left more than 40 people dead.
Tragically, the grievances voiced by protestors--a failing
economy, chronic shortages of consumer goods, and high levels
of crime, violence, and corruption--have certainly not been
addressed. In fact, the political and economic situation in
Venezuela has continued to deteriorate over the past year.
According to official figures, Venezuela's economy shrank
2.8 percent in 2014 and inflation rose to 64 percent, the
highest rate in Latin America. Venezuela's murder rate is the
second-highest in the world behind Honduras. And Transparency
International ranks Venezuela as the most corrupt country in
Latin America.
The Maduro government continues its brutal repression of
dissent by systematically targeting opposition figures, human
rights defenders, journalists, and civil society activists for
violence, harassment, intimidation, and other human rights
abuses. Just last month, the mayor of Caracas was arrested and
jailed for allegedly, ``conspiring to organize and carry out
violent acts against the government,'' and a 14-year-old boy
was shot in the head and killed by a police officer during an
antigovernment protest.
In response to the deepening crisis in Venezuela, Congress
unanimously enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and
Civil Society Act of 2014, which President Obama signed into
law in December. This very important law requires the President
to impose sanctions on individuals or entities involved in
serious human rights violations against antigovernment
protestors, or on those who have ordered the arrest or
prosecution of individuals for their legitimate exercise of
freedom of expression or assembly. I applaud President Obama's
decision to implement this law by sanctioning seven Venezuelan
officials involved in human rights abuses and public
corruption, and I encourage him to continue that crackdown.
The United States has an obligation to shine a bright light
on the abuses being committed against the people of Venezuela,
and the President's action sends a strong message to the people
there and the government that we will not stay silent in the
face of violence, corruption, and the suppression of the
fundamental rights and freedoms of the Venezuelan people.
But it is also important to make clear that these sanctions
directly target the perpetrators of abuses. They do not target
the people of Venezuela. And as our chairman said, that is
critical. We want to hurt the people who are causing all this
hurt, not the ordinary people who are simply trying to survive.
Today's hearing will be an important opportunity to examine
the United States policy toward Venezuela and the role of
sanctions in addressing the current economic and political
crisis there. It will also help us chart a path forward in
support of the people of Venezuela and their aspirations; their
aspirations that are just like all people, a longing to be
truly free and truly democratic.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
The ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee and
someone who spends a tremendous amount of time on Western
Hemisphere issues is here with us today, and I would like to
recognize him for some comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you and
the ranking member for holding what I think is an incredibly
important hearing. There are many challenges in the world that
distract or diversify our attention, but this one in our own
hemisphere is incredibly important.
Last may, after 40 deaths, more than 50 documented cases of
torture, high profile political persecutions, and thousands of
arbitrary and unlawful detentions by the Venezuelan Government,
this committee met to review the shocking pattern of systematic
human rights violations by the Maduro government, its security
forces, and its judicial system which continues today and has
only gotten worse.
Venezuela is awash in a culture of gross impunity at every
level. Checks and balances on Executive power have completely
eroded. There is no accountability for the crimes against
Venezuelan citizens by an out-of-control regime.
It should come as no surprise, as Venezuela's fiscal and
economic crisis has deepened, that the Maduro government is
radicalizing its tactics. Last month, the Minister of Defense,
Padrino Lopez, signed a decree authorizing security forces to
use lethal force--lethal force--against civilians, and with
that decree came the tragic death of 14-year-old Kluiverth Roa,
who was shot in the head by the national police.
We saw, as has been said here, the elected mayor of
Caracas, Antonio Ledezma, forcefully removed from this office
and jailed on trumped-up charges. And more than a year after
his arrest, Leopoldo Lopez, the continent's most high profile
political prisoner, continues to languish in prison without a
trial, without any semblance of due process. And just last week
in an unacceptable and utterly grotesque statement,
Venezuelan's Ambassador to the OAS, Roy Chaderton, actually
joked about shooting members of the Venezuelan opposition in
the head.
Against this backdrop of persecution, violence, and
outrageous human rights violations, now even more disturbing
trends started to emerge. Just last week, the Treasury
Department announced that the Banca Privada d'Andorra, BPA, was
involved in a complex scheme to launder nearly $2 billion--let
me repeat that--$2 billion in funds from the Venezuelan state
oil company, PDVSA. BPA then moved these funds into the U.S.
financial system.
In December, a private jet trafficking millions of dollars
in cocaine was captured in Fort Lauderdale. In September, a
truck carrying $10 million in cash coming from the United
States was captured in Venezuela. All of this is on top of the
thousands of pounds--literally tons--of cocaine trafficked by
the Venezuelan National Guard that has been seized in Europe.
The United States and the international community cannot
tolerate such blatant violations of international law. I am
pleased that Treasury has named senior Venezuelan officials as
kingpins and acknowledged the Venezuelan National Guard is
deeply involved in drug trafficking. Obviously, in today's
Venezuela, we are not just watching the rise of an
authoritarian regime, we are watching the emergence of a drug
trafficking regime involved in networks that threaten and
endanger the hemisphere.
So finally, let me just say I welcome the President's
decision to move forward with implementation of the Venezuela
Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act, which, Mr.
Chairman, you and I authored and you were deeply involved in
helping us draft and ultimately move through the Senate. And I
appreciate that--and the announcement last week of targeted
sanctions against seven Venezuelan officials, including senior
members of the military, intelligence services, and judiciary.
In my view, we can go further, but this is an important first
step.
Let me reemphasize. These are targeted sanctions against
Maduro government officials, not sanctions against the people
of Venezuela.
I look forward to hearing the administration's strategy for
addressing the political, diplomatic, and security challenges
that Venezuela presents.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
And now we are going to get to our witnesses' testimony.
Just a brief housekeeping item. We will have votes, I
think, scheduled at 11 o'clock. There may be a need to go into
a brief recess for a few minutes while we go to and from the
vote, but we will continue the hearing until we conclude it.
With that, Mr. Lee, we are prepared for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF ALEX LEE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH
AMERICA AND CUBA, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Lee. Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, and members
of the committee, thank you for inviting me to speak to you
about Venezuela. I appreciate your interest in Venezuela and
your support for United States assistance and our policies
there.
We are deeply concerned about the situation in Venezuela
where last year legitimate political, economic, and social
grievances and a lack of adequate democratic space brought
protests and, unfortunately, violence. Tensions within
Venezuela continue to build and the government has intensified
its actions to repress dissent. The United States has called on
the Venezuelan Government to respect human rights, uphold the
rule of law, and engage in peaceful, inclusive dialogue with
Venezuelans across the political spectrum to alleviate the
current tension. We have called on the Venezuelan Government to
release Mayor Antonio Ledezma, opposition leader Leopoldo
Lopez, Mayor Daniel Ceballos, and others it has unjustly
jailed, including dozens of students. We have encouraged the
government to improve the climate of respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, including respect for the freedoms of
peaceful assembly and association. I know this committee shares
our concerns, and we welcome your strong support for democracy
in Venezuela.
Venezuela's problems cannot be solved by criminalizing
legitimate democratic dissent. These actions appear to be a
clear attempt by the Venezuelan Government to divert attention
from that country's economic and political problems. Rather
than imprisoning and intimidating its critics, we believe the
Venezuelan Government should focus on finding real solutions
through democratic dialogue.
We will not refrain from speaking out about human rights
abuses in Venezuela. We are joined in this by dozens of
individuals and entities, including the U.N. High Commissioner
on Human Rights, Organization of American States Secretary
General Insulza, the Peruvian, Costa Rican, and Colombian
Governments, and the Inter American Commission on Human Rights,
among others.
Advancing human rights and democratic processes are a key
U.S. foreign policy objective. The President's March 9
Executive order, ``Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of
Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela,''
which implements the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and
Civil Society Act of 2014, is a manifestation of our commitment
to advancing respect for human rights, safeguarding democratic
institutions, and protecting the United States financial system
from the illicit financial flows from public corruption in
Venezuela.
Executive Order 13692 is aimed at persons involved in, or
responsible for, certain conduct in Venezuela, including
actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions,
the use of violence or conduct that constitutes human rights
violations and abuses, including in response to antigovernment
protests, actions that prohibit, limit, or penalize the
exercise of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly, as well
as public corruption by senior government officials in
Venezuela. The Executive order does not--repeat--does not
target the people or the economy of Venezuela.
I want to be clear. It is not our policy or intent to
promote instability in Venezuela or to endorse solutions to
Venezuela's problems that are inconsistent with its own legal
system. The United States is not seeking the downfall of the
Venezuelan Government, nor trying to sabotage the Venezuelan
economy. We remain Venezuela's largest trading partner.
President Maduro has publicly expressed a desire to improve our
bilateral relationship, and we are open to direct communication
with the Venezuelan Government. We maintain diplomatic
relations and welcome conversations and debate. We remain
committed to maintaining our strong and lasting ties with the
people of Venezuela. We will not, however, refrain from calling
out human rights abuses and other actions and policies that
undermine democracy.
We hope the Venezuelan Government will focus its energy on
finding real solutions for the country's mounting economic and
political problems through democratic dialogue with the
political opposition, civil society, and the private sector.
This year's National Assembly elections present an opportunity
for Venezuelans to engage in legitimate, democratic discourse.
And credible election results could reduce tensions in
Venezuela. We have urged regional partners to encourage
Venezuela to accept a robust international electoral
observation mission, using accepted international standards,
for those elections. Now is the time for the region to work
together to help Venezuela to work toward a democratic solution
to the challenges the country faces.
We will also continue to work closely with Congress and
others in the region to support greater political expression in
Venezuela and to encourage the Venezuelan Government to live up
to its required commitments to democracy and human rights, as
articulated in the OAS Charter, the Inter American Democratic
Charter, and other relevant instruments.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward Alexander Lee
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me to speak with you about Venezuela. I
appreciate your interest in Venezuela and your support for U.S.
assistance and our policies there.
We are deeply concerned about the situation in Venezuela where last
year legitimate political, economic, and social grievances and a lack
of adequate democratic space brought protests and, unfortunately,
violence. Tensions within Venezuela continue to build and the
government has intensified its actions to repress dissent. The United
States has called on the Venezuelan Government to respect human rights,
uphold the rule of law, and engage in a peaceful, inclusive dialogue
with Venezuelans across the political spectrum to alleviate the current
tension. We have called on the Venezuelan Government to release Mayor
Antonio Ledezma, opposition leader Leopolda Lopez, Mayor Daniel
Ceballos, and others it has unjustly jailed, including dozens of
students. We have encouraged the government to improve the climate of
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect
for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. I know this
committee shares our concerns, and we welcome your strong support for
democracy in Venezuela.
Venezuela's problems cannot be solved by criminalizing legitimate,
democratic dissent. These actions appear to be a clear attempt by the
Venezuelan Government to divert attention from that country's economic
and political problems. Rather than imprisoning and intimidating its
critics, we believe the Venezuelan Government should focus on finding
real solutions through democratic dialogue. As I have mentioned, we
will not refrain from speaking out about human rights abuses. We are
joined in this by dozens of individuals and entities, including the
U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, Organization of American States
(OAS) Secretary General Insulza, the Peruvian, Costa Rican, and
Colombian Governments, and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, among others.
Advancing human rights and democratic processes are a key U.S.
foreign policy objective. The President's March 9 Executive order
``Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela,'' which implements
theVenezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, is
a manifestation of our commitment to advancing respect for human
rights, safeguarding democratic institutions, and protecting the U.S.
fmancial system from the illicit financial flows from public coruption
in Venezuela.
Executive Order 13692 is aimed at persons involved in, or
responsible for, certain conduct in Venezuela, including actions that
undermine democratic processes or institutions, the use of violence or
conduct that constitutes human rights violations and abuses, including
in response to antigovernment protests, actions that prohibit, limit,
or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly,
as well as public corruption by senior government officials in
Venezuela. The Executive order does not target the people or the
economy of Venezuela.
I want to be clear: it is not our policy or intent to promote
instability in Venezuela or to endorse solutions to Venezuela's
political problems that are inconsistent with its own legal system. The
United States is not seeking the downfall of the Venezuelan Government
nor trying to sabotage the Venezuelan economy. We remain Venezuela's
largest trading partner. President Maduro publicly expresses a desire
to improve our bilateral relationship, and we are open to direct
communication with the Venezuelan Government. We maintain diplomatic
relations and welcome conversations and debate. We remain committed to
maintaining our strong and lasting ties with the people of Venezuela.
We will not, however, refrain from calling out human rights abuses and
other actions and policies that undermine democracy.
We hope the Venezuelan Government will focus its energy on finding
real solutions for the country's mounting economic and political
problems through democratic dialogue with the political opposition,
civil society, and the private sector. This year's National Assembly
elections present an opportunity for Venezuelans to engage in
legitimate, democratic discourse. And, credible election results could
reduce tensions in Venezuela. We have urged regional partners to
encourage Venezuela to accept a robust international electoral
observation mission, using accepted international standards, for those
elections. Now is the time for the region to work together to help
Venezuela to work toward a democratic solution to the challenges the
country faces.
We will also continue to work closely with Congress and others in
the region to support greater political expression in Venezuela, and to
encourage the Venezuelan Government to live up to its required
commitments to democracy and human rights, as articulated in the OAS
Charter, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and other relevant
instruments.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to end by saying that we sincerely
appreciate the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's contributions to
the promotion of human rights in Venezuela. The strong, bipartisan
cooperation among this committee's members and staff to support the
State Department's championing of democracy, human rights, and freedom
of expression throughout the hemisphere is a credit to our great
country.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Mr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF JOHN SMITH, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Smith. Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
invitation to appear before you today at this important hearing
on political and economic developments in Venezuela, the human
rights situation in the country, and the implications of these
topics for regional stability and United States interests. I
will address the administration's implementation of the
sanctions measures in the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and
Civil Society Act of 2014, which was signed into law in
December.
On March 9, the President issued an Executive order
declaring a national emergency with respect to the situation in
Venezuela, which is a prerequisite for the imposition of
economic sanctions under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act. The Executive order, which implements the targeted
economic sanctions contained in the act and builds on them in
key respects, imposes economic sanctions on persons listed in
an annex to the order and any persons determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, to have engaged in, or to have been responsible for,
certain enumerated activities in relation to Venezuela such as
undermining democratic processes or institutions, committing
serious abuses or violations of human rights, limiting or
penalizing the exercise of freedom of expression or peaceful
assembly, or being involved in public corruption by senior
Venezuelan Government officials.
The Executive order also contains a status-based authority
targeting current and former officials of the Government of
Venezuela, which gives the Secretary of the Treasury additional
flexibility to go after targets of concern for which there may
be limitations on our ability to designate under the other
conduct-based authorities. The President named seven Venezuelan
individuals in the annex to the order. The property and
interests in property of these individuals are blocked, meaning
their assets within U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and U.S.
persons are prohibited from engaging in any transactions or
dealings with them.
Last week's action imposing sanctions on seven individuals
focused on those involved in human rights abuses and the
persecution of political opponents connected to the events
surrounding the February 2014 protests highlighted in the act.
Most of the individuals targeted are currently, or were
formerly associated with, Venezuela's National Guard, the Armed
Forces, the intelligence service, or the national police,
members of which played key roles in repression against
individuals involved in the protests. The Executive order also
targeted a national-level prosecutor who was charged, based in
part on implausible and/or fabricated information, several
opposition members with conspiring to assassinate or overthrow
President Maduro.
Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge the leadership you have
demonstrated on this issue, and I note that six of the seven
targets in the annex to the Executive order were included in
your list of individuals published last May.
In addition to implementing the act, the order expands the
designation criteria beyond the requirements of the act. This
will allow greater targeting flexibility and the highlighting,
targeting, and deterrence of additional problematic behavior
that is ongoing in Venezuela. We remain committed to defending
human rights, advancing democratic governance, and protecting
the U.S. financial system from abuse.
To be clear and as the chairman and ranking member and
fellow speakers have said, these sanctions are not aimed
against the country of Venezuela. They do not target the
Venezuelan people, nor do they sanction the Venezuelan
Government as a whole. To the contrary, this remains a targeted
sanctions program focused tightly and precisely on bad actors
undermining Venezuela's democracy, violating the human rights
of its citizens, and diverting much-needed economic resources
for personal gain, resources that could and should be invested
for the public good.
Turning specifically to the sanctions program's focus on
public corruption in Venezuela, I would echo President Obama,
who has said that fighting corruption is one of the great
struggles of our time. Corruption, beyond its unethical nature,
siphons off important resources that could be used to feed
children or build schools and infrastructure that promote
development.
It is also worth noting the long history of the application
of United States sanctions to foreign policy and national
security concerns with a Venezuelan nexus. Even before this
past year's events, we have not hesitated to designate
Venezuelan banks and other companies for their connections with
Iranian entities sanctioned for nuclear proliferation
activities, as well as designating Venezuelan targets for their
links to narcotics trafficking.
As I conclude these remarks, I want to emphasize that we
retain the ability to respond to events in Venezuela as they
unfold. We stand ready with a powerful financial tool to deter
abuses and target those who may choose to undermine democratic
processes or institutions or to violate human rights in
Venezuela.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of John E. Smith
venezuela sanctions program
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today at
this important hearing on political and economic developments in
Venezuela, the human rights situation in the country, and the
implications of these topics for regional stability and U.S. interests.
As the Acting Director of the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC), I will address the administration's
implementation of the sanctions measures in the Venezuela Defense of
Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (the Act), which was signed
into law on December 18, 2014.
Executive Order 13692
On March 9, the President issued Executive Order 13692 declaring a
national emergency with respect to the situation in Venezuela, which is
a prerequisite for the imposition of economic sanctions under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The Executive
order, which implements the targeted sanctions contained in the Act and
builds on them in key respects, imposes economic sanctions on persons
listed in an Annex to the Order and any persons determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
to have engaged in, or to have been responsible for, certain enumerated
activities in relation to Venezuela such as undermining democratic
processes or institutions, committing serious abuses or violations of
human rights, limiting or penalizing the exercise of freedom of
expression or peaceful assembly, or being involved in public corruption
by senior Venezuelan Government officials. The Executive order also
contains a ``status-based'' authority targeting current and former
officials of the Government of Venezuela, which gives the Secretary of
the Treasury additional flexibility to go after targets of concern for
which there may be limitations on our ability to designate under the
other ``conduct-based'' authorities. The President named seven
Venezuelan individuals in the Annex to the Order. The property and
interests in property of these individuals are blocked, meaning their
assets within U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and U.S. persons are
prohibited from engaging in any transactions or dealings with them. The
Executive order also suspends the entry into the United States of
individuals who are determined to meet the criteria for economic
sanctions.
Last week's action imposing sanctions on seven individuals focused
on those involved in human rights abuses and the persecution of
political opponents connected to the events surrounding the February
2014 protests highlighted in the Act. Most of the individuals targeted
are currently or were formerly associated with Venezuela's National
Guard, the Armed Forces, the intelligence service, or the national
police, members of which played key roles in repression against
individuals involved in the protests beginning in February 2014. The
Executive order also targeted a national-level prosecutor who has
charged--based in part on implausible and/or fabricated information--
several opposition members with conspiring to assassinate or overthrow
President Maduro. Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge the leadership
you have demonstrated on this issue, and I would note that six of the
seven targets in the Annex to the Executive order were included in your
list of individuals published in May of last year.
In addition to implementing the Act, the order expands the
designation criteria beyond the requirements of the Act. This will
allow for greater targeting flexibility and the highlighting,
targeting, and deterrence of additional problematic behavior that is
ongoing in Venezuela. We remain committed to defending human rights,
advancing democratic governance in Venezuela, and protecting the U.S.
financial system from abuse.
Building on the Legislation
While the Act focuses on human rights abuses specifically related
to last year's protests, the Executive order expands our targeting
authority to more broadly cover any significant acts of violence or
serious violations of human rights in relation to Venezuela, and
restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression or peaceful
assembly in Venezuela, allowing us to deter and address repression as
it may arise. The order also includes designation criteria related to
the undermining of democracy in Venezuela and to public corruption by
senior Venezuelan Government officials. Finally, the E.O. gives us the
discretionary authority to designate current or former Venezuelan
Government officials. As we have learned from experience across a
number of sanctions programs, this type of ``status-based'' authority
is a useful tool that allows us to go after targets of concern for
which there may be limitations to our ability to designate under
``conduct-based'' authorities.
To be clear, these sanctions are not aimed against the country of
Venezuela. They do not target the Venezuelan people or the economy, nor
do they sanction the Venezuelan Government as a whole. To the contrary,
this remains a targeted sanctions program focused tightly and precisely
on bad actors undermining Venezuela's democracy, violating and abusing
the human rights of its citizens, and diverting much-needed economic
resources for personal gain--resources that could and should be
invested for the public good.
Public Corruption
Turning specifically to this sanctions program's focus on public
corruption in Venezuela, I would echo President Obama, who has said
that fighting corruption is one of the great struggles of our time.
Corruption, beyond its unethical nature, siphons off important
resources that could be used to feed children or build schools and
infrastructure that promote development.
As the largest economy in the world, we remain Venezuela's primary
trading partner and maintain financial ties to Venezuela. These
relationships, while a natural outcome of our long-standing economic
engagement with the region, also potentially expose our financial
system to illicit financial flows from public corruption in Venezuela,
as Venezuelan Government officials who control access to scarce U.S.
dollars attempt to take advantage to reap illicit gains. This close
interaction with the U.S. financial system, however, also gives us
leverage from a sanctions perspective. Venezuela's heavy use of the
U.S. dollar and Venezuelans' frequent travel to the United States make
targets of our sanctions vulnerable. We expect our designations will
have bite.
In addition, Treasury is using the full range of its financial
tools to address the exploitation of the U.S. financial system in
furtherance of corruption schemes. Last week, for example, the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the Department of the
Treasury issued a public notice of finding that Banca Privada d'Andorra
(BPA) is a financial institution operating outside of the United States
that is of a ``primary money laundering concern.'' The finding that
accompanied this notice outlined how a third-party money launderer in
Venezuela worked with BPA to deposit the proceeds of public corruption,
some of which transited the U.S. financial system, into an account at
BPA. This network was well connected to Venezuelan Government officials
and facilitated the movement of at least $50 million through the United
States from 2011 to 2013 in support of this money laundering network.
Narcotics, Terrorism, and Iran
It is also worth noting the long history of the application of U.S.
sanctions to foreign policy and national security concerns with a
Venezuela nexus. Even before the past year's events, we have not
hesitated to designate Venezuelan banks and other companies for their
connections with Iranian entities sanctioned for nuclear proliferation
activities pursuant to our counterproliferation authorities. These
actions included the designation of the International Development Bank
in Caracas, a subsidiary of the Tehran-based Export Development Bank of
Iran.
Our actions to combat narcotics trafficking in Latin America
pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act have
proceeded to a steady drumbeat, and they have not overlooked Venezuelan
targets. For example, in September 2011, OFAC designated four
Venezuelan Government officials for acting for, or on behalf of, the
FARC, a designated narcoterrorist organization. The four officials
acted in direct support of the FARC's narcotics and arms trafficking
activities in Venezuela. In September 2012, shortly after his arrest in
Panama, OFAC designated a Venezuelan narcotics trafficker and his
company. The trafficker was previously indicted in the Southern
District of Florida on cocaine trafficking charges. And in August 2013,
OFAC designated a former Venezuelan National Guard captain as a
significant foreign narcotics trafficker. The captain had previously
been indicted in the Eastern District of New York in March 2011 on
multiple cocaine trafficking charges. He facilitated cocaine loads from
Colombia through Venezuela in partnership with well-known narcotics
traffickers in Colombia and Mexico.
We have also acted to constrain Lebanese Hezbollah activity in
Venezuela, designating in 2008 Hezbollah supporters and fundraisers
active in Venezuela pursuant to our counterterrorism sanctions
authorities. One of the targets was a senior Venezuelan diplomat who
had facilitated the travel of Hezbollah members to and from Venezuela.
conclusion
Before I conclude these remarks, I want to emphasize that we retain
the ability to respond to events in Venezuela as they unfold. We stand
ready with a powerful financial tool to deter abuses and target those
who may choose to undermine democratic processes or institutions. In
concert with this Congress, we have made clear that the United States
will not stand idly by and witness the repression that has occurred in
Venezuela this past year. We have demonstrated in numerous and diverse
scenarios across the globe that the United States has the ability to
target those involved in human rights abuses and the undermining of
democracy and to prevent them from accessing the United States
financial system. And when we do so, they will find themselves isolated
domestically, regionally, and globally.
Senator Rubio. Thank you both for being here and for your
opening testimony.
I will begin the questioning round. We will do 7 minutes
since I think we will have time to get through all of this.
Let me begin with you, Mr. Lee. I wanted to talk to you
about the political state in Venezuela. So as I have outlined
in my opening statements and so has the ranking member and the
ranking member of the full committee, in Venezuela there is an
increased encroachment on freedom of the press and
communication. There has been an increased encroachment on the
judiciary branch. It no longer truly operates as an independent
branch. We have seen the prosecutorial powers used to not just
fabricate evidence but to target political opponents. We have
seen members of the opposition expelled by simple majority
votes from the National Assembly. We have seen the jailing of
virtually every prominent--at some point, virtually every
prominent voice in Venezuela that opposes the Maduro
government. And there is now this pattern of decree powers that
have been given to Maduro, including the one this weekend.
Is Venezuela still a democracy?
Mr. Lee. The Venezuelan electoral system is actually quite
good in terms of the mechanical process. What the government
has done is used a variety of means, gerrymandering, massive
use of public funds, trumped-up charges against key opposition
people, a systematic undermining of the independence of the
media to tilt all the electoral ground in its favor. That still
does not change the reality of how Venezuelans view the
situation in Venezuela or how they perceive the government's
handling. And if you look at polling, the polling shows that
the majority of Venezuelans view the government mismanaging the
economy and things are getting worse.
We call on the Venezuelan Government to announce elections.
We call on the Venezuelan Government to hold those elections in
a way that provides the political space for the opposition, and
we believe that if that is done and, in particular, if the
international community can provide electoral monitoring of
those elections, the Venezuelan people will have an opportunity
to express their views.
Senator Rubio. Well, thank you, Mr. Lee. And I appreciate
your answer, and I understand it. I would just suggest that we
need to view this from a different perspective because in Latin
America, there is a troubling trend, and that is, people come
to power through an election and then begin to undermine all
the apparatus of a free society. So if I am a member of the
opposition and there is no free press that can cover my
activities, because they are not allowed to operate, so I have
no way to get my word out, Maduro has unfettered access to the
national airwaves, I have no access to the national airwaves.
If I speak out too vehemently against him in the National
Assembly, I could be removed and arrested. First they remove
you so they can strip you of the immunity of being a deputy,
and then they arrest you for it. And not to mention that there
is evidence of electoral fraud in the last elections.
You combine all these things--and just because you have an
election, or say you had an election, does not make it a free
and fair election. This is the pattern that has been followed
in places like Nicaragua and other places as well. There is
more to democracy than just holding an election. And certainly
they are capable of having a free and fair election
mechanically, but when the people running against you cannot go
on the airwaves, cannot have TV shows, cannot speak out or they
will be arrested, the entire media is owned by your cronies,
you have unfettered access to the airwaves, they have none, and
if you are part of the opposition and you oppose Maduro, you
can be arrested, in my mind that does not sound like a
democratic society.
And I think it is important for us to understand that this
is the new way tyrants are now operating. They dress themselves
up as democrat, but then they end up governing in much
different ways. And that is an important distinction for us to
point to.
I want to get to the issue of individuals. There are a
number of individuals that were not sanctioned that I would
encourage us to continue to look at. For example, last year
Generals Aref Jimenez and Julio Cesar Morales Prieto, who held
senior positions in Venezuela's directorate of armaments and
explosives, played a key role in their efforts to create and
support the government-affiliated colectivos. There was
basically already regular armed groups. The DAEX, by the way,
is currently led by Gen. Ignacio Velasquez Ramos. This is a
group that has been intricately involved in cracking down on
dissent.
Of the seven designated individuals that constitute a
national security threat to the United States, their bosses are
not represented. For example, Gen. Vladimir Padrino, the
Minister of Defense and as such, the highest ranking military
officer, has not been held responsible for human rights
violations committed by his subordinates. Some of the sanctions
were based on Venezuelan officials allegedly involved in
corruption and illicit activities, but we did not include
Diosdado Cabello, the head of the Parliament who has been
identified by defectors and others as the head of the cartel,
the Los Solis, a drug cartel operated by Venezuelan generals.
And then there is multiple print and broadcast reports,
articles, and even books detailing the presence in the United
States of Chavez and Maduro government officials that have
become fabulously wealthy from what are alleged to be corrupt
activities. They too use our financial system to transfer
funds. One example is an individual by the name of Alejandro
Andrade, who is a former army lieutenant and a fellow plotter
of Chavez in the 1992 attempted coup that cost the lives of
over 300 Venezuelans and who was later appointed by Chavez as
the treasurer of the country. He is reported to be living in
multimillion dollar equestrian estate in south Florida. And
there are many other former officials, bankers, and business
executives also living or owning property in the United States
that are alleged to have acquired fortunes illicitly with the
complicity of the Chavez/Maduro government. And I would
encourage you to look at some of them as well.
Mr. Smith, has the Treasury looked at certain financial
institutions in Venezuela or the Venezuelan banking system as a
whole to see who might qualify as financial institutions of
primary money laundering concern under section 311 of the USA
PATRIOT Act?
Mr. Smith. Senator, I can tell you that with respect to
many of the names that you talked about, we continue to
investigate vigorously under all of the prongs of the Executive
order. Unfortunately, you are asking me about authority, the
particular one with respect to the financial institution--you
are asking me about an authority that is administered by one of
my sister agencies, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
and I can take that question back to them.
Senator Rubio. Well, let me just encourage you to act on
information my office has received and to money laundering
carried out by the petroleum company, PDVSA--P-D-V-S-A. There
are close ties, according to these allegations and information
that I have received between this organization and money
laundering and drug trafficking activity. And there are a
number of names that have been forwarded to us as individuals
involved in this illicit activity: Rafael Ramirez, Nervis
Gerardo Villalobos, Omar Farias, Carlos Luis, Aguilera Borjas,
Alcides Rondon, and Rafael Jimenez Villaroel. We have received
significant information about their ties between the state-run
oil entity and drug trafficking and other laundering activities
within Venezuela. And I will have more on this topic in a
moment, but I want to recognize the ranking member.
Senator Boxer. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, whoever feels comfortable answering these
questions. President Obama's Executive order imposing sanctions
on Venezuelan officials implicated in human rights violations
and corruption was met with widespread criticism from Latin
American nations. This is very upsetting to a lot of us. At a
special meeting in Ecuador on Saturday, the 12-nation Union of
South American Nations issued a statement criticizing the U.S.
action as ``an interventionist threat to sovereignty and the
principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other
countries,'' and calling for the Executive order to be
rescinded.
In addition, President Maduro has said he will use next
month's Summit of the Americas in Panama to denounce the
sanctions.
What steps are we taking to engage with Latin American
nations about the recently announced sanctions? Have any
countries in the region expressed support for our action?
Mr. Lee. I will start and then my colleague will finish,
Senator.
Senator Boxer. Okay.
Mr. Lee. We need to balance our condemnation of the human
rights violations, which came through loud and clear with the
law and the Executive order, as well as the various U.S.
Government statements over the past 2 years, with the need to
convince the region to act----
Senator Boxer. Wait a minute. Just tell me. Are there any
nations who support what we did in Latin America, and what are
we doing to make sure they understand that what we did was the
right thing, the moral thing, the correct thing for the people
of Venezuela? So instead of reading me something, I know it is
diplomacy and I understand all that. But on the ground, are we
talking with our friends in region? Because it is upsetting to
me that we see so little support.
Mr. Lee. Senator, you are right that the Latin American
community has sharply criticized our sanctions against
individual Venezuelans. We have made a full court press to
explain that what we are doing represents our principles and
that we are exercising our own sovereignty in not allowing
human rights violators or corrupt actors to come into our
country or to enjoy our financial system.
At the same time, we point out that and we urge the other
Latin American countries to provide greater efforts with the
Venezuelan Government to try to bridge the differences within
Venezuela----
Senator Boxer. Okay. So just to cut through. We are working
with our friends in the region to get them to understand why
what we did was right. Yes or no?
Mr. Lee. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Okay. And will the crisis in Venezuela be a
priority for President Obama when he attends the Summit of the
Americas?
Mr. Lee. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Boxer. And how do United States sanctions fit into
a broader United States strategy to address the growing crisis
in Venezuela? In other words, what else are we doing besides
the sanctions, besides talking to other nations? Do we have
anything else that we are working on?
Mr. Lee. The greatest chance for Venezuela to solve its
problems is holding a credible electoral process, and for that,
we need to work with the international community, particularly
Venezuela's neighbors. And we were encouraged that UNASUR
recently, after its meeting in Quito, issued for the first time
a statement that has called on Venezuelans to engage in
dialogue and to hold an election to try to bridge the
differences, and we believe that is a positive step forward. We
would like our Latin American partners to more vigorously
champion the need for an electoral monitoring mission in
Venezuela. But, yes, we are constantly engaged with likeminded
countries, and we have seen a growing appreciation in Latin
America that the economic situation in Venezuela is untenable
and the Venezuelan Government's effort to try to control
political opposition to it through repression is only greatly
exacerbating the problem.
Senator Boxer. Well, I want to say thank you for that. I
agree with you that this upcoming election is critical. It is
absolutely critical. And I agree with the comments made by my
chairman here about having a vote and then having someone
elected and declaring martial law and taking over and saying I
can just decree this, that, and the other. That is what is
going on.
But later this year, Venezuela is expected to hold their
parliamentary elections, and opposition leaders view these
elections as an important chance to gain seats in the National
Assembly and enable the opposition to put pressure on Maduro,
particularly as his approval ratings have plummeted. So your
point of focusing on the election--I really appreciate that,
and I think that is what we should all focus on because I think
clearly, if you look at what the people are saying in terms of
their suffering and the rest, this could be a very important
turning point--this election--if it is free and fair.
And I am concerned about the lack of support in the region
for our sanctions, and I think we should tell, as you are
already, our friends in the region that it is our right as a
nation not to allow people to come here and hide their money
and all the rest of it. That is our right as a sovereign
nation. And if we can build support, pivot to this upcoming
election, I think it is absolutely crucial. And if it is not
free and fair and if there is suppression, it is very
dangerous.
So I want to again thank my chairman for these very
important hearings and thank both of you for your contribution.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you all to the witnesses for being
here today, and I join Chairman Rubio and other members of the
subcommittee in expressing my utmost concern about the state of
affairs in Venezuela.
Given his dwindling public support, it seems that President
Maduro has inherited all the authoritarian instincts of the
late Hugo Chavez but none of his charm.
I commend the administration for imposing additional
sanctions on Venezuelan officials last week, though that action
has predictively ushered in hysterical reaction from Caracas. I
look forward to working with the committee to ensure that
genuine democracy returns to Venezuela in our lifetime.
We have had a lot of conversations this morning about the
elections and the order. And so given the United States
sanctions announcement, the Venezuelan National Assembly has
granted President Maduro the power to govern by decree until
the end of 2015. Mr. Lee, you talked about the mechanical
process of elections being good or sound in Venezuela, at least
at this point. Do you see, leading up to the elections, this
decree power, and what should we look for? Do you see it
impacting the election, and what should we look for in terms of
their ability to tilt the playing field, as you mentioned some
of the things they have been trying to do in the past?
Mr. Lee. Well, we are clearly concerned that President
Maduro might use his decree powers in a way that would
complicate even more the ability to hold free and fair
elections. We will have to see how he uses his decree powers,
which last until the end of the year, or during the period in
which the elections are going to be held.
Again, I think that one of the most effective ways to
pressure the Venezuelan Government to do the right thing with
regard to elections is to encourage the international
community, and in particular Venezuela's Latin American
neighbors, to emphasize to the government the absolute
importance of holding free and fair elections. Democracy and
the commitment to support democracy is not only an obligation
by Venezuela under the OAS but in many of its other subregional
organizations that it is a member of, including MERCOSUR and
UNASUR. And so we very much want the other countries in the
region to try to help broker an understanding between the
government and the opposition to provide the conditions for an
election that is viewed as credible by all. We believe that is
as a solution would go a long, long way to addressing some of
the major, major problems that the country is facing.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Lee.
Mr. Smith, kind of following up on those comments, what has
the reaction been to our sanctions in the region, and have we
coordinated these sanctions with any of our allies in the
region such as Brazil or Colombia?
Mr. Smith. I will defer to my State Department colleague to
talk about the reaction in the region. I will say that we do
coordinate with allies in the region and allies around the
world as we can. And so most of the time, we have what is
called a prenotification process where we work with other
countries to give them notification of what we are going to do
so they may not be surprised and they can work with us.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Mr. Lee, do the anti-U.S. demonstrations on the streets of
Caracas and elsewhere represent a security threat to remaining
U.S. diplomatic and civilian personnel or their interests?
Mr. Lee. Clearly, you know, the safety of our staff in
Caracas is paramount just like the safety of American citizens
living in Venezuela is paramount. Up to now, we have not seen
targeting of Americans per se. So for that, we are encouraged.
Senator Gardner. Have we taken any precautions? Has the
State Department taken any precautions to protect our citizens
and diplomats?
Mr. Lee. Yes, sir. We have a system to notify Americans
residing in Venezuela whenever we are aware of information
suggesting that Americans may be targeted or there may be
disturbances. And so we have a network that we use to get that
information out.
Our Embassy also is constantly reviewing its posture with
respect to any possible disturbances. And so this is something
that we just do as a matter of course.
Senator Gardner. Mr. Chairman, I know we have votes coming
up. So I will yield back my time so that you can get some other
questions.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lee, I listened to your statement, and I have to
wonder. I do not know why one would even suggest or have to
feel the necessity to say that we are not trying to promote
instability in Venezuela. We clearly are not trying to promote
instability in Venezuela. But if we are going to make that
statement about human rights and democracy anyplace in the
world--forget about Venezuela--we are in a sad state of
affairs. This is not an American view. This is what the OAS
Charter says. This is what the Inter-American Democratic
Charter says. This is what the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights
entails.
So when you say that and then when you say--and I cannot
believe that you included it in your opening remarks,
suggesting that President Maduro wants to improve our bilateral
relationships. Yes, that is a good way to do it by unilaterally
striking at reducing our Embassy and taking a whole host of
other aggressive and active postures against the United States.
It boggles my imagination.
It also worries me when the State Department in a different
context--I know you were down in Cuba before all the
announcements. I guess I should have seen your effusiveness as
a sign of things to come. And then see that others in the
Department talked about it is not who you invite to the table,
speaking to the Summit of the Americas, but what you speak
about. Well, here we are with both Cuba, which of course has no
democracy and human rights, and Venezuela, under which
democracy and human rights are a deep threat. And I do not get
the sense that the State Department has the drive and the
conviction of these views by actions.
I think it would be fair to say that we allowed the Latin
Americans, when Senator Rubio and I were pursuing the
legislation, which we thought was necessary to do--we were
asked by the administration and told by the administration we
are trying to allow our Latin American partners to get Maduro
to move in a different direction. Is that not fair to say that
we did try? We gave them space and time to try to achieve that.
Mr. Lee. Yes, you did.
Senator Menendez. And they did not succeed.
Now, I look at the President's own declaration, which I
applaud, and I look at drug trafficking--where do drugs end up?
They end up on the streets of our cities. They end up addicting
our young people. That is a national security threat. That
would be whether it is Venezuela or any other part of the
world. When you look at the amount of drug trafficking by
Venezuela, when you look at the specifics of our own
administration, the naming the Venezuelan National Guard as
part of this process, I just do not quite get it as it relates
to the statements that are made by the Department. The
Venezuelan National Guard, members of the military directly
involved in narcotics trafficking.
Mr. Smith, we have this $2 billion--this comes after--$2
billion. Even here, that is not chump change. Two billion
dollars that ultimately works its way into the United States
financial system; $2 billion taken from the people of Venezuela
because PDVSA is, in essence, the national patrimony of
Venezuela. And I think the people of Venezuela, who are
suffering enormously as a result of the Maduro government,
would be far better off with having those $2 billion in
Venezuela helping their lives. So how are we acting as it
relates to these $2 billion that made its way into the United
States financial system?
Mr. Smith. So, sir, I can say the Treasury Department has
been engaged in vigorous actions across the board, and for many
of the activities that you have been talking about, we have
been working for years on narcotics trafficking. We have
designated across the board narcotics traffickers----
Senator Menendez. I appreciate it. Talk to me about the $2
billion.
Mr. Smith. When you asked about the $2 billion, that was an
action that one of my sister agencies, the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, took, and that is the agency that I would
have to refer this question back to.
Senator Menendez. Okay. So you have nothing to do with
that.
Mr. Smith. It is another part of my Department.
Senator Menendez. So you cannot speak to that.
Can you speak to that, Mr. Lee?
Mr. Lee. No, sir.
Senator Menendez. Oh, my God. We come to a hearing on
Venezuela. There are $2 billion siphoned out of PDVSA, and no
one is capable of responding to it. It is amazing. It is
amazing.
Let me ask you this. The actions that have been taken under
our legislation--while I recognize the convenience of
responding to Venezuelan sanctions against seven U.S. officials
with parity, the parameters set forth in our legislation and
their expansion under the President's Executive order leaves
many other Venezuelan officials eligible given their complicity
in human rights abuses, certainly more than the seven that have
been named. I and other members have specifically called for
Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez to be added to the list
of sanctioned individuals given his role in authorizing the use
of lethal force against unarmed citizens.
To that end, do you agree that current United States law
clearly leaves other Venezuelan officials eligible to be
targeted for sanctions?
Mr. Lee. Clearly we have, as a result of the law and the
Executive order, the authorities to use against human rights
violators and senior officials engaged in corrupt action.
Senator Menendez. It is a simple question. I am not asking
you who. I am asking you do you believe that the law allows you
to pursue other Venezuelan authorities who may, in fact, fall
in the categories as determined both by the law and the
President's Executive order.
Mr. Lee. Yes.
Senator Menendez. Or, Mr. Smith, if you are the appropriate
person----
Mr. Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. Yes. Okay.
And finally, can you tell me what we are doing about how
OFAC makes a kingpin designation? What are the implications and
consequences in pursuing kingpin designations, which several
people here have been in Venezuela?
Mr. Smith. Sure. OFAC works with a broad interagency group
that is specified in the statute to make kingpin designations.
We gather the evidence. We compile it. We run it through to
make sure that there are no law enforcement or intelligence
equities, and then we make the kingpin designations. The
President has the authority to make what are called the Tier 1
designations of significant foreign trafficking individuals or
entities, and then OFAC has the authority to make those that
are Tier 2, the material support and others. Last year we did
over 200 kingpin designations. It is one of our most active
programs, and we continue to pursue those vigorously.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very
brief. We have a vote coming up, and I would ask the panel to
be brief. I just have a couple questions.
First of all, the United States is enabling a dictatorial
regime in Venezuela in my mind as it continues to routinely
violate human rights affairs there in Venezuela, I would argue
primarily because we continue to rely on imports of oil
produced in their state-run enterprises. It seems somewhat
hypocritical to me to want to limit what others are doing in
Venezuela while we are quite happy to continue to import $30
billion of oil each year. It is another reason why projects
like Keystone continue to be critical to reduce our dependence
on oil from bad actors like Venezuela.
But I want to go to a separate issue and that is Cuba. You
know, last year Venezuelan President Maduro referred to
President Obama's shift in policy toward Cuba as ``a gesture of
courage.'' Will this opening of United States relations with
Cuba hurt or help our situation in trying to change behavior
with Maduro? And what impact will this change in Cuba policy
have on our long-term effort here to bring democracy back to
Venezuela?
Mr. Lee. Well, Senator, diplomacy is not a one-size-fit-
all. And so we basically have to kind of see where the
opportunities are, make our decisions on what will best advance
our national interests. And we have decided, for example, that
it advances our national interests to combine, with regard to
Venezuela, sanctions and reaching out to other Latin American
likeminded countries to urge the Venezuelan Government to meet
its democratic obligations. And so that is one strategy that we
have used toward----
Senator Perdue. I am sorry. Let me get to the point. We are
going to run out of time and we are going to have to bolt.
Specifically, if we move to a more liberal relationship
with Cuba, what specific impact will that have on Maduro in his
continuing dominance of his people in Venezuela?
Mr. Lee. I am not sure that there will be a direct
relationship.
Senator Perdue. Okay. Thank you.
The next is, you know, given the difficult situation in
Venezuela--they have an oil economy basically. And as I see it
down there, the consumer is really not able to bring their
economy back. But how is this going to hurt their financing
program, Petrocaribe, or its extensive support to Cuba?
Mr. Lee. I think Venezuela's mounting economic problems
manifest itself in a whole variety of ways, but one of them
clearly is an inability to sustain the support to Petrocaribe
like it had in the past. We have seen reports of Venezuela
cutting back its subsidized support through Petrocaribe to a
variety of Caribbean countries, and so that really puts into
question the ability of Venezuela to maintain the level of
support it had promised in the past.
Senator Perdue. So one last quick question. If we really
want to change behavior in Venezuela, oil is the way to do it.
I just do not believe these sanctions go far enough to really
change behavior. We see it in other parts of the world, Russia
particularly. When we started out with similar sanctions there,
it had no impact.
Mr. Smith, what do you believe would be the impact if we
really were to get serious about changing behavior in Venezuela
to go after the oil? And that means that we would have to pay a
price, too, because the oil that we bring in, the $30 billion,
is done in
JV's I think with U.S. corporations with their state-owned oil
enterprise.
Mr. Lee. May I answer?
Senator Perdue. Yes, please.
Mr. Lee. After consulting with a variety of civil society
actors and political actors in Venezuela, we have made the
decision that it really advances United States interests not to
use sectoral sanctions in Venezuela.
Senator Perdue. What is that? I am sorry.
Mr. Lee. To use like an oil sanction.
Senator Perdue. So specifically, we think that these
sanctions will change the behavior of this despot in Venezuela.
Mr. Lee. We believe the sanctions, under the authorities
that we have as a result, help highlight unacceptable
behavior----
Senator Perdue. How long do you think it will take to
change that behavior specifically?
Mr. Lee. I cannot say.
Senator Perdue. Well, what is a reasonable person's
estimate?
Mr. Lee. I really cannot say.
Senator Perdue. Let me ask it differently. So how long
would we be patient to watch the human rights violations in
Venezuela before we stiffen those sanctions?
Mr. Lee. We think that if Venezuela is going to stop this
downward slide, it is basically through more democracy and the
best way to express that is through holding elections that are
seen as credible. And we believe that the international
community can play a role toward that. I think we need to
combine the use of sanctions against individuals in order to
express our democratic principles----
Senator Perdue. I am sorry to interrupt. But those
sanctions against individuals--we have really very little
evidence around the world that sanctions against individuals
have ever really changed behavior. So, again, I think it is
more a question now let us see how long it is going to take. My
question is, What is a reasonable expectation on our part of
these sanctions relative to changing behavior? It is one thing
to have an election, as we just talked about, but to have a
credible election to give a free vote for the people down
there--I mean, what should be a reasonable timeframe while we
wait for these to take effect?
Mr. Lee. I cannot say, sir.
Senator Perdue. Thank you very much.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
I am going to wait for Senator Kaine to return because we
are in the middle of this vote, and I appreciate your
questions.
So let me, Mr. Lee, just touch on the issue of human
rights. They have been well documented, we know, some of them
that have already happened. I want to inform you of a couple
more that I hope the State Department will look at closely as
we continue to examine other people that can be sanctioned.
The first is--have you been made aware of a facility that
is colloquially referred to as La Tumba, The Tomb? Have you
heard that term?
Mr. Lee. No, sir.
Senator Rubio. Okay. Well, let me tell you about it based
on the information we have received. It is a detention area
that is located four stories below the Plaza Venezuela, which
is a SEBIN station where detainees are held captive in 2-to-3-
meter-sized rooms.
They are subjected to minimum temperatures and permanent neon
lighting and denied sunlight so that they can become
disoriented and suffer physical and psychological
deterioration. We have also received information that Gabriel
Valles, Gerardo Caredo, and Lorent Saleh have been held captive
in that facility and are subjected to this torture. The purpose
of this treatment is to coerce from them false testimony
against members of the opposition.
I also want to make you aware of the circumstances
surrounding the death of Rodolfo Gonzalez. The information we
have received--obviously, he was an opposition activist, a
senior citizen, and he was jailed in a SEBIN facility beginning
in April 2014, supposedly for conspiring against the
government, which was actually false. During this time, he was
visited by Iris Varela, who is the minister of the national
prison system days before his apparent suicide while in
custody.
And according to the information we have received, Varela
threatened to transfer him to a general population prison,
basically with other common criminals--with common criminals--
not other common criminals. He was instructed to gather his
personal belongings and he was even taken to a prison medic for
an examination prior to this transfer.
According to the information provided to us, Mr. Gonzalez's
lawyer has confirmed that he was visited by one of the
individuals that is sanctioned. It is a prosecutor, Katherine
Harrington, who offered to improve the conditions of his
detention in exchange for testimony which would incriminate
Antonio Ledezma in a conspiracy against the government.
So these are just two recent pieces of information we have
been made aware of just in the last few days that call to light
the sort of human rights violations that are occurring in
Venezuela. And I would encourage the State Department to take
seriously, as this information comes in, because it gives us
more and more people that we can look at for sanctions and also
to shame them publicly.
One day we are going to have freedom in Venezuela. There
will be a functional government again and hopefully a better
future for the Venezuelan people, and these individuals
responsible for the human rights abuses are going to have to be
accountable for what they are doing. So that is why it is so
critical that these human rights abuses be documented now so
that in the future these individuals will be held to account
for the crimes they are committing against the people of
Venezuela.
Senator Kaine, I will leave you in charge while I go vote,
and I will be back. So you probably have 10 minutes of
questions.
Senator Kaine. I will easily occupy that, Mr. Chair. Thank
you.
And thanks to the witnesses and all.
The questions that I have been here to hear and your
testimony I think has answered questions that I was going to
ask about the internal situation in Venezuela and the relations
of our sanctions to that situation and the human rights abuses.
I want to talk about the relationship of what is happening
in Venezuela with neighbors, so in particular, Colombia, which
is such a strong ally of the United States.
I was in Colombia in the middle of February, and I was
actually there on a day when President Maduro came out with a
fairly incendiary set of statements not only against the United
States but also against Colombia. I mean, it just appeared, the
classic situation where when things are going bad at home, find
somebody else to blame. That he was blaming the United States
did not strike me as that unusual. That is a classic page out
of the playbook. But it was a little bit unusual I thought, the
degree of some of the rhetoric that he was leveling against
Colombia.
Now, that relationship is an important one. It is a
complicated one. A lot of Venezuelans live in Colombia and vice
versa. Venezuela has at times been sort of a haven for the FARC
and at other times has helped advance the peace discussions
between the Colombian Government and the FARC. Economic
challenges in Venezuela could at an important time in Colombia,
even kind of a fragile time in these negotiations, push folks
across the borders in ways that would be destabilizing.
So I was just wondering, especially you, Mr. Lee, if you
would talk about the situation in Venezuela now as it might
affect Colombia, who has got to be one of our best partners in
the world right now.
Mr. Lee. Well, I think one of the reasons why--of the three
Foreign Ministers that UNASUR countries sent to Venezuela, one
of them was the Foreign Minister of Colombia. And that reflects
Colombia's important stake in what happens in Venezuela as a
commercial partner, as a place, in the past, that had received
large numbers of Colombians, and a preoccupation that has grown
over time over what is going to be the impact of Venezuela's
chronic mismanagement of its economy and how will that spill
over into Colombia.
An additional element in all of this is the Colombian
Government, particularly under President Santos, was greatly
appreciative of the Venezuelan Government's support for the
peace process in Colombia, which has been kind of a central
focus of President Santos.
And so the various examples that you talked about highlight
this cross-cutting sensitivity, and I think probably the best
way of summarizing it is the Colombian Government is very
conscious that if conditions continue to deteriorate in
Venezuela, this will have an adverse and a direct adverse
impact on Colombia. So that is one of the reasons why you have
seen the Colombian Government trying to champion the region to
focus along with Brazil and Ecuador. But in a sense, out of the
three countries, what happens for good or bad in Venezuela has
a far more direct impact on Colombia.
Senator Kaine. How do you interpret the statements of
President Maduro kind of blasting Colombia for some of their
own internal problems?
Mr. Lee. Well, President Santos like President Obama and
Secretary Kerry is in good company because there is a certain
theatrical element in the statements of President Maduro. The
incident that you are referring to was basically President
Santos coming to the defense of a former Colombian President
that in his view had not been accorded with the respect due to
a former Colombian President who was basically trying to
demonstrate concern for the human rights of a key political
prisoner.
Senator Kaine. This question may have been asked when I was
over voting, out of the room. Talk a little bit about the
current status of the situation with the reduction of U.S.
Embassy personnel in Venezuela and how those discussions are
ongoing with respect to the presence of Venezuela Embassy and
consulate personnel in the United States.
Mr. Lee. We have proposed to the Venezuelan Government the
need for bilateral discussions. We have proposed a team to meet
with them so they can appreciate why we staff our mission the
way they do and also for us to share with them how we see their
staffing up here. Staffing in our respective diplomatic
missions is essentially a function of what the host government
agrees to and our operational requirements. And I think it is
important for the Venezuelan Government to understand that we
need a certain level of staffing in order to ensure the
protection of our mission, in order to provide the level of
consular services for Americans, and also to provide travel
documents to Venezuelans who wish to come to the United States.
Last year our Embassy in Caracas adjudicated 250,000 Venezuelan
submissions for travel documents. We might not be able to
support all of those functions if our staffing is reduced to
certain numbers.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Smith, I would like to ask about the
impacts of the sanctions thus far. Obviously, Venezuela is
dealing with huge issues because of years of economic
mismanagement, and then low oil prices themselves impose a
significant cost on an economy that has really leaned heavily
on that resource instead of having a more diverse economy. Talk
a little bit about, to the extent that you can, what is the
marginal effect of the sanctions from our side compared to the
overall economic challenges, most of their own making, that
Venezuela is dealing with.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Senator. I think one of the most
important things to understand about the sanctions and to
remember and that we emphasize is that these were targeted
sanctions just against the seven individuals. So I think to the
extent that it would affect Venezuela as a whole would be any
kind of concern about the idea that we could do further
sanctions with respect to the country there, I think our
financial institutions in the United States and around the
world may be a little bit more hesitant to deal with some of
the potential bad actors in the Venezuelan society in the
government because of the impact of the sanctions.
But one of the things that we also emphasize with these
sanctions is they were not targeted at the Government of
Venezuela. They were not targeted at the country of Venezuela,
and they were not targeted at the people of Venezuela. So there
has been the mix of--the impact--I think it would have been
felt mostly on the individuals targeted and others that might
believe they are to be targeted next.
Senator Kaine. And just kind of thinking down the road in
terms of the strategic challenge you have in a situation like
this, while some would say sanctions against just a few
individuals, that is not showing the strength that they might
want to see. Another argument would be, look, if there is an
economic kind of collapse underway because of the mismanagement
of the current government, to do bigger sanctions against the
government would enable them to better say, oh, look, we are
just having problems because the United States is doing bad
things. Instead, by doing the sanctions against individuals,
hopefully there would be more of an understanding among the
Venezuelan population that the economic challenges they are
facing are because of a government that is mismanaging the
economy rather than because of the effect of the external
sanctions. So I am kind of thinking through. That has to be, I
guess, one of the balancing acts that you are using as you
decide whether to make these sanctions just against individuals
or against financial institutions or against the government
itself. Am I correct in analyzing it that way?
Mr. Smith. I can start. I would say, yes, you are right. I
think one of the things that people do not recognize with
sanctions is that more is not always better, that there could
be some disadvantages to going out with the broad sanctions
that would have significant disadvantages to the U.S. national
security-foreign policy relationship not just with Venezuela
but in the region. And so what we try to do is do the correct
balance to make sure that in this case what we were doing was
focusing on the bad actors, those that were undermining
democratic institutions and that were abusing human rights. And
the purpose of the sanctions--this first salvo was to actually
show our concern with the human rights situation in Venezuela
and really call attention to that.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Lee.
Mr. Lee. I would just add the action that we took against
the seven--and we focused on seven very emblematic individuals
who clearly had significant ties to human rights violations or
corruption, and we were very confident in being able to
highlight that. And that message was clearly heard.
But we believe that we need to combine a statement of
principle and one of the ways of demonstrating those principles
are the use of targeted sanctions against individuals but also
trying to work, as best we can, with likeminded countries in
the region to use their influence to try to help the Venezuelan
opposition broker a relationship with the Venezuelan Government
that would allow the political space for a credible electoral
outcome in the next National Assembly elections. This
particular message of working and trying to promote that
discussion is much more effectively done by other countries
than ourselves, and so we have to work somewhat indirectly
through other countries to help that process.
So it is a combination of these statements of sanctions
against specific individuals but this is all in the context of
working collaboratively with likeminded countries in the region
to try to influence the behavior of the Venezuelan Government.
Senator Kaine. We have been having, obviously, and will
continue to have, significant discussions about Iran in this
committee and in this chamber. Talk a little bit about the
current Iranian-Venezuelan relationship, the degree of Iranian
influence that you see in Venezuela these days.
Mr. Lee. Well, we are very vigilant about this particular
relationship, which basically came into full fruition under
previous Iranian and Venezuelan Presidents. Most parts of the
agreements that have been reached by the two countries or
statements have been mostly on economic or trade sets of
issues. The overwhelming majority do not seem to have gone
anywhere. Those joint ventures that have been established--we
hear indirectly that lots of the Iranian companies complain of
the conditions to operate in Venezuela like just about any
other company finds itself in Venezuela.
But our particular attention is on Iranian activities,
whether of their intelligence services or engaging in possible
activities in money laundering or possible actions for avoiding
sanctions on Iran. So these are all areas that we pay
particularly close attention to on an ongoing basis.
So I would say, yes, this is a source of concern, and this
is a relationship that we pay a lot of attention to.
Senator Kaine. And the last question I would like to ask is
a little bit about Venezuela's influence in the region. Senator
Gardner was, I think, being comical when he said the current
Venezuelan leader had some of President Chavez's weaknesses but
none of the charm. Clearly Venezuela was a regional player
because of the strong personality of the previous leader but
also because of the ability to use the resource of oil to win
friends and influence people. Their own economic challenges
have made that harder to do. Lower oil prices have complicated
that situation, and I think the point that Senator Gardener was
making that at least in terms of sort of the charismatic
outreach to other nations, that is not the current President's
strong suit. But that is my perception from afar.
Talk a little bit about Venezuela's ability to project
influence in the Americas during this time of deepening
economic crisis.
Mr. Lee. Well, I think Venezuela's ability to exercise
influence has been gravely undermined by its serious economic
problems and its ongoing efforts to try to stave off a balance
of payments crisis. And you see this being played out in a
variety of areas. Venezuela is unable to support Petrocaribe in
a way that it had before. It has cut back significantly on some
countries. Venezuela no longer can exercise the financial
largesse that it could before. If anything, Venezuela is
essentially staggering from one financial crisis to another
trying to scrounge up enough money in order to pay for
desperately needed imports for its population. And for the
first time, we are hearing serious concerns about Venezuela's
ability to have enough reserves to pay for food imports.
So all of these things conspire to basically put Venezuela
very much on a defensive. It is one of the reasons for the
Venezuelan Government trying ever so hard to obfuscate what is
going on in Venezuela, to try to shed and put the blame on
outside actors, of which we are only one. There are a variety
of other countries or Presidential leaders from other countries
that have been identified as doing a variety of imaginary bad
things to Venezuela. So all of this is, I think, a reflection
of the turmoil that Venezuela is finding itself.
Senator Kaine. And just kind of order of magnitude, you
know, lower oil prices has been a very good thing for the world
and for the United States generally. It does not mean every
aspect of it is good. So Colombia, a great ally--lower oil
prices hurts them. But they have a more diverse economy. Talk
about oil revenues as a chunk of the Venezuelan economy or a
chunk of the Venezuelan governmental budget. Give me an order
of magnitude so that I can understand how much this drop and
likely somewhat long-term low price is going to be affecting
them.
Mr. Lee. Well, Venezuela depends--95 percent of its
earnings from its oil sector. And chronic undercapitalization
of its oil industry, wasteful government policies, price
controls, labor controls, a three-tiered exchange system that
puts a premium on insiders taking advantage of it, all of these
have conspired to make the Venezuelan economy go into recession
last year, even at a time when oil prices were about $100 a
barrel. Now, with oil prices half of that, Venezuela is facing
a really major foreign exchange problem. And Venezuela imports
now far more than it did 10 years ago. So it imports virtually
everything, all of its foodstuff, almost all of its consumer
goods. And so you have seen kind of a progressive deterioration
of Venezuelan companies to manufacture things because they
cannot get the dollars necessary for the inputs to manufacture
things in the country. And so that is one of the reasons why
you are seeing widespread shortages and chronic shortages in
the country.
Now with the drop of the oil prices to $50, that can only
get infinitely worse. The IMF, for example, projects that
Venezuela will suffer a contraction of 7 percent this year.
Already the inflation rate is projected to go from 64 to over
80 percent. So we are dealing with a very chaotic Venezuelan
economy and a Venezuelan Government that seems struggling to
try to take any effective measures to arrest this downward
economic slide.
Senator Kaine. And I just wanted to underline. I think I
heard you right--kind of the statistic--95 percent of
Venezuelan Government revenues are derived from the oil
industry?
Mr. Lee. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. Last question. You know, talking about the
prospects for a parliamentary or assembly--the legislative
elections, again from afar, but just given the recent activity,
the imprisonment of political opposition leaders, even some
with significant posts, mayorships of major cities, the
emergency decree entered into earlier in the month giving the
President nearly complete power--I mean, you would have to be
pessimistic. We got to keep pressing, but I mean, we should not
be sugar-coating and suggesting that there is a high likelihood
of elections that we will feel are free and fair. I mean, given
all of the actions that are being undertaken right now, would
not the prospects of elections that the global would look to be
free and fair happening this year happening this year seem
really, really slim?
Mr. Lee. Well, Senator, this is obviously a major concern
of ours because we do see free and fair elections as a
necessary first step for Venezuela to try to dig itself out of
the situation it is in. And so that is the reason why we
highlight the importance of these elections. We fully recognize
and are concerned about President Maduro's acquisition of
emergency decree powers. We will have to see how he utilizes
those. But this is why we go to all of the countries in the
region to emphasize that the region as a whole has an
obligation to champion a democratic solution to Venezuela's
problems.
Senator Kaine. I want to thank you both for your testimony.
There is an ongoing vote, and so we will have a brief pause
before the second panel is called up for their testimony. But
to both of you, thank you very much. We will stand in a brief
recess until the chair returns from voting, and then we will
begin with the second panel. Thank you.
Excuse me. I excused you too soon. You almost got out the
door. But I was informed that the chair may have some
additional questions for the panel. There is a second vote and
he is on his way back. So if you could just hang close before
you are dismissed, but then we will move right into panel two.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator Rubio. Thank you. I appreciate your patience. The
committee will come back into order.
Members may come in and out. We just finished the second
vote, so hopefully some folks will be able to make it back
here. There are some other committee meetings going on as well.
Before I dismiss this panel, I appreciate your time and
your patience indulging us here with these votes that are
coming in.
Mr. Smith, I wanted to touch upon a couple issues with you
in regards to the nature of this regime. So Ambassador
Brownfield, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, has been
quoted as saying that recent media reports about the Venezuelan
Government's complicity with cartels were not inconsistent with
the evidence with regards to their work in drug trafficking.
And I wanted to share with you something that I hope we
will continue to look at. Actually this is for both of you that
I hope you will continue to look at.
There is a law enforcement advisory that went out in
February of this year, and I want to read from it or paraphrase
from it. But basically it said that there is reporting that
indicates that government officials in Venezuela coordinate
flights carrying bulk cash to the Syrian regime of Bashar al-
Assad, that the source of these funds include funds that are
donated by the Venezuelan Arab expatriate community, but the
bulk of the cash includes money that Venezuelan officials
collect for the trafficking of drugs and exacting bribes from
other drug traffickers who land cash-loaded planes in
Venezuela.
This, by the way, is part of a longer standing Venezuelan
support of the Assad regime, as was reported back in 2012. The
state-owned company, Petroleos de Venezuela, PDVSA, P-D-V-S-A--
it was discovered that there were tankers in Syrian ports. This
was discovered and disclosed, by the way, by an economic
research firm that tracks maritime satellite data.
What do we know or what can any of you tell us about the
links between the Maduro regime and the Government of Syria
under Assad? Do we have any information on that you could
share?
Mr. Smith. I do not have any information I can share. We
have been tracking the disturbing activities of members of the
Government of Venezuela, and we have linked them publicly to
narcotrafficking activities, and we have also linked them to
other disturbing activities that we have been able to highlight
in a variety regimes we have not designated pursuant to our
Syria authorities.
Senator Rubio. Well, this information again is produced by
U.S. law enforcement agencies. They are obviously available to
you. I would encourage you to look at them as we move forward.
These are important pieces of information that we should not be
ignoring and should certainly figure into our calculus.
There are also links to Iran and Venezuela. My office has
received reports that there is a collusion between the Maduro
regime and Argentina regarding an operation that could
facilitate a transaction with Iran that would violate U.N.
stipulations. Do you have any information on Venezuela
providing Argentina with licit or illicit financial incentives
in exchange for procuring Argentinean support toward this help
toward Iran abating sanctions?
Mr. Lee. We are aware of those press reports and reports,
but I have nothing to add to it at the moment.
Senator Rubio. Okay. Well, there is a report by the
Washington, DC-based Center for a Secure, Free Society and from
Canada's Institute for Social and Economic Analysis which
raises concerns about the use of Venezuela as a bridge to
smuggle Iranian agents into North America. It states that
Venezuelan authorities provided at least 173 passports, visas,
and other documentation controlled by Cuba state-owned Albet to
Islamist extremists seeking to slip unnoticed into North
America. Have you followed up on those reports?
Mr. Lee. I have not. There may be others who have, but I am
not in a position to comment on it.
Mr. Smith. Senator, I would just add that we have sanctions
investigators that work across our sanctions programs,
including Iran, Syria narcotrafficking and now Venezuela, and
they follow up on all of the law enforcement and intelligence
reporting to try to build cases where they can.
Senator Rubio. Now, I want to go through Venezuela's
connection to Cuba. According to high-level military defectors
from Venezuela's Government, there are between 2,700 and 3,000
Cuban intelligence agents in the South American nation embedded
in sectors such as the military, agriculture, finance, and
petroleum refining. According to high-level military defectors
from Venezuela's Government, the Cubans have modernized
Venezuela's intelligence services, both the SEBIN, which is the
Bolivarian National Intelligence Service that reports directly
to the President, and also military intelligence. They have
also set up a special unit to protect Nicolas Maduro.
Last year, former Venezuelan intelligence agents and
sources with direct access to active officers of the Bolivarian
Armed Forces told El Nuevo Herald newspaper that Cuba plays a
leading role in the repression unleashed by Maduro against
Venezuelan protestors. The Cubans are in charge of operations
which range from security around the Presidential palace to
planning of arrests of opponents. These Venezuelan sources told
El Nuevo Herald that Cubans have planned the operations of
between 600 and 1,000 armed men who comprise the Chavista
paramilitary group known as the colectivos.
In 2007, Juan Jose Rabilero, head of Cuba's Committee for
the Defense of the Revolution, the CDR, very similar to the
colectivos, claimed that there were over 30,000 members of
Cuba's Committee for the Defense of the Revolution in
Venezuela.
According to investigations by independent Venezuelan
journalists, the Cubans have computerized Venezuela's public
records giving them control over the issue of identity papers
and voter registration. The Cubans have representatives in the
ports and airports and have taken part in the purchases of
military equipment. A state-owned Cuban company, Albet
Ingenieria y Sistemas, received $170 million to develop
electronic data systems in Venezuela. Through Albet, the Cuban
Government has been given access to Venezuelan databases from
which it can modify and even issue documents to citizens of
other countries. Its portfolio includes the Maduro
communications office and operating systems for prisons,
emergency services, hospitals, and police.
Are you aware of the links between Venezuela and Cuba that
go as deep as what I have just outlined, and if so, what have
we done or are we doing to continue to monitor that and call
attention to it?
Mr. Lee. Senator, the links between Cuba and Venezuela and
the links between Cuba and Venezuela's intelligence services
and military and a variety of other social missions is well
known. Many of the things that you have said I am very familiar
with. Some of them I am not. But the fundamental reality that
there is a close relationship between both countries is very
evident.
Senator Rubio. Well, let me ask you this. You would agree
that the Venezuelan Government under Maduro is repressing its
own people. Right?
Mr. Lee. Yes.
Senator Rubio. You would agree that the Cubans are helping
the Venezuelans and putting in place the systems of repression.
Mr. Lee. I think that the kind of advice the Cubans provide
is not necessarily the most democratic.
Senator Rubio. Well, what does that mean? Are the Cubans
helping the Venezuelans repress their own people? Are the
Cubans assisting the colectivos, these armed groups, irregular
groups on the ground that are used to confront protestors and
other such activity?
Mr. Lee. I am personally not aware of a link between the
Cubans and the colectivos. I am aware of the link between the
colectivos and the use by the Maduro government of the
colectivos to repress peaceful demonstrators. I think that is
very clear.
Senator Rubio. Are you aware that the Cubans are
intricately involved in issuing documents in Venezuela such as
voter registration, passports, and not just to Venezuelans but
to noncitizens of Venezuela as well? Would you acknowledge that
that is happening?
Mr. Lee. I am aware of some levels of cooperation that you
are talking about.
Senator Rubio. Mr. Lee, is Venezuela in your portfolio?
Mr. Lee. Yes, it is, sir.
Senator Rubio. And the Cubans--everyone in Venezuela--in
fact, anyone who looks at it realizes the Cubans are crawling
all over the place in Venezuela. There are tens of thousands,
perhaps hundreds of thousands of Cubans all over the country
embedded in every sector of the government. I mean, anyone who
comes back from Venezuela tells you that repeatedly. How can
this be part of your portfolio and you not be aware of the
enormous Cuban presence that exists in Venezuela?
Mr. Lee. Senator, I did not deny that Cuba has an outsized
influence in Venezuela. It is clear that they have a long-
standing and deep relationship in a variety of areas, including
in the intelligence services, including in the military,
including a wide variety of government agencies that we are
perfectly aware of.
Senator Rubio. So if you acknowledge that they have an
outsized influence and they are involved in intelligence and
security agencies, why can you not just state today what
everyone knows, and that is that the Cuban Government is
actively assisting the Venezuelan Government in suppressing its
people?
That is what the Cubans are expert at in Venezuela. What
else could they be contributing to the effort? That is what
they are best known for on the island. That is what they have
most established expertise at doing to their own people in
Cuba. So you have a repressive regime in Cuba that for over 55
years has actively repressed its own people and cut down on all
sorts of activity on the island. They have an outsized
influence in Venezuela. They have an outsized influence in both
its intelligence gathering and its security agencies. Why is
that not a logical thing, even if you did not have specific
facts, which I am sure you do, but even if we did not have it,
why is it not a reasonable assumption that the Cubans are
actively assisting the Venezuelan Government in suppressing the
people of Venezuela?
Mr. Lee. The fundamental responsibility for what happens in
Venezuela is the Venezuelan Government's. And really, if we are
going to focus on where the blame is, it should be for the
Venezuelan Government's own actions against its own people. And
I think we need to focus on holding the Venezuelan Government
responsible for its actions.
Senator Rubio. No one disputes that, Mr. Lee, but the
question is not whether the Venezuelans are ultimately
responsible. Ultimately they are the ones that asked for the
assistance and are putting it into place. The question is
whether the Cubans are assisting the Venezuelan Government in
putting in place the mechanisms that the Venezuelan Government
is using to repress the people of Venezuela. You cannot answer
that question today?
Mr. Lee. I think the Venezuelan Government charts its own
course, takes advice from the Cubans on certain things, but
fundamentally it is the Venezuelan Government that charts its
own course, for good, for ill, whether effectively or feckless.
Senator Rubio. Mr. Lee, I think what is obvious here is
that you cannot say what everyone knows, and that is that the
Cuban Government is helping the Venezuelan Government do this
because, on the one hand, while we are sanctioning Venezuelan
Government officials, we are lifting sanctions on Cuban
officials that have made this possible. And so at the end of
the day, it truly is amazing to me that in this hearing, the
individual responsible for this portfolio on behalf of the U.S.
Government refuses to state on the record that the Cuban
Government is intricately involved in helping the Venezuelan
Government to repress its own people.
This is a claim we have been willing to make about multiple
countries around the world. This is a claim we have made about
the Cubans in the past. This is a claim that we have made about
the Cubans and that the State Department has acknowledged up
until December of last year when suddenly they stopped talking
about it.
I just find it unbelievable that we cannot get somebody
from the Department of State who is responsible for this
portfolio to openly acknowledge that the Cuban Government is
providing extraordinary assistance to the Venezuelan Government
in suppressing the people of Venezuela.
And I hope that you will reconsider. I hope the State
Department will reconsider acknowledging that because it
undermines our credibility as a nation to turn a blind eye to
the role that the Cuban Government is playing in the
suppression of the Venezuelan people.
The people of Venezuela are fully aware of it. There is not
anyone that gets off a plane from Venezuela that does not tell
you there are Cubans everywhere, and there are Cubans
everywhere on the island involved in governmental functions.
Multiple people from Venezuela will tell you that when you go
get a passport or any document, it is oftentimes a Cuban behind
the counter that is coordinating it all. And to somehow think
they are there as a benign force for purposes of providing
moral support is quite frankly absurd.
And so I hope that you will reconsider your answer in the
days to come because it is clear to everyone who knows anything
about this--and you know a lot about this--that the Cubans are
helping the Venezuelans carry out these operations that they
are taking against their own people.
With that, I think we are done with questions, and I
appreciate both of you being here today.
We will call up our second panel.
Before we welcome the second panel, I would like to
unanimous consent that a letter by Ms. Maria Eugenia Tovar, who
is the mother of Genesis Carmona Tovar, who was murdered by a
gunshot on February 18, 2014, while participating at a peaceful
demonstration in Venezuela be included in the record.
Now, let me welcome the panel. Douglas Farah is the
president of IBI Consultants and a senior (non-resident)
associate of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies. He works as a consultant and
subject-matter expert on security challenges, terrorism, and
transnational organized crime in Latin America both for the
U.S. Government and the private sector.
Santiago Canton is an executive director of Partners for
Human Rights at the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and
Human Rights. Mr. Canton manages programs around the globe that
promote and protect human rights and strengthen democratic
processes through strategic litigation, capacity building, and
advocacy initiatives.
Dr. Christopher Sabatini is the senior director of policy
at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas and founder
and editor in chief of the hemispheric policy magazine,
Americas Quarterly. Dr. Sabatini chairs the AS/COA Rule of Law
Working Group. He has served as an advisor to the World Bank
and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
I welcome all three of you here, and I will begin with you,
Dr. Sabatini.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER SABATINI, PH.D., ADJUNCT PROFESSOR,
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS AT COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NY
Dr. Sabatini. First of all, thank you, Senator for the
invitation. Thank you also for your dedicated commitment to
speaking out on human rights violations in Venezuela and your
commemoration just recently of the start of the peaceful
protests a year ago, and of course, the legislation that led to
the Executive orders.
I am going to talk about three things today. The first is
the political and economic situation in Venezuela. The second
is the very sad lack of a regional response to the
deterioration in that situation. And the last is the recent
U.S. Executive orders that came and caused such a commotion, if
you will, in the region.
First, the political and economic situation in Venezuela.
As all of the people said, it is likely to get worse. Sixteen
years of economic mismanagement and incompetence have wreaked
havoc on the Venezuelan economy. There is greater concentration
in the economy on oil--it now represents 95 of exports--and
lower productivity of that oil. In addition there is a huge
public sector deficit. There are over $8 billion the Venezuelan
Government will have to pay to foreign creditors this year
alone, with only about $20 billion in the central bank. And
according to different estimates, oil has to be anywhere
between $100 to $120 per barrel to be able to meet the
government's expectations when, of course, it is around $50 a
barrel.
The IMF, as you mentioned, Senator, is expecting
contraction of the economy this year of 7 percent on top of the
contraction of 2.8 percent, and in addition to the inflation
rates we have talked about, people are now actually saying by
the end of this year, inflation may reach triple digits.
What makes this worse is the level of political
confrontation. At every turn when things have gotten worse with
this government, people hope and expect it to moderate, whether
it was when Chavez lost a referendum or whether it was the
close election with Maduro who only won by about 1.5 percent of
the vote, people thought he could follow a more moderate
course. He did not. When the going gets tough, he confronts,
and that has been precisely the problem. And I expect because
of that, the economic and political situation will get worse,
which brings me to the regional response.
Despite multiple commitments among multilateral
organizations to defend and protect human rights, the regional
community in Venezuela has been mute. What that means is by
standing aside as this President disarticulates democratic
institutions, attacks political opponents and jails mayors, the
regional community has been an enabler to the violation of
human rights in Venezuela. That has to be recognized. They are
violating their own commitments to a number of multilateral
organizations.
The only voices that have spoken up are Juan Manuel Santos,
the President of Colombia, and five former Presidents who
signed a letter just last week expressing their concern about
the confrontation, including Oscar Arias Sanchez, including
former President Zedillo, Calderon, and Fernando Henrique
Cardoso.
Which brings to the Executive order. It is important to
distinguish, as everyone has so far, that these are only very
targeted sanctions against people. Unfortunately, the language
that was used as a result bureaucratic boilerplate became a red
herring. But what is really sad about this is that in 2009 the
United States pulled the visas of 15 Honduran officials of the
de facto government of Micheletti. At that time, they did not
use the language they are using now of calling it intervention
or impertinent intervention in the internal affairs of a
country and respecting national sovereignty. They applauded
that decision. I think it is worth asking regional leaders in
the hemisphere why is it okay to pull visas of a de facto
government that came to power in a coup in Honduras, but why
are they not willing to stand by the United States when it does
the exact same thing in Venezuela. And what is wrong with
allowing a government to be able to say to human rights abusers
we do not want you to come to Disneyland? We do not want you to
do your banking in our--again, I would like to say that I think
this is a very, very sad moment in terms of the regional
commitment to democracy which has eroded when only 15 years ago
they stood up collectively and denounced violations, the very
same violations by Alberto Fujimori and rolled them back?
I am also concerned about the way the media has portrayed
this. Again, the language around the Executive order was
problematic, but the media has presented this as giving Maduro
steam, as giving him sort of bait to be able to roll back
democratic institutions and build political momentum. The truth
is that is not true. His disapproval rating still stands at 70
percent, and his approval rating still stands at 23 percent. In
other words, this has not become a political boon to the
President, but yet, regional leaders and the media insist on
that it is.
I will end on one last point. While the language about
Venezuela--national security risk may have been a little
overblown, I would argue that it is a security risk in the
region. For the first time, we face the specter of a failed
state in a large South American country just south of us, and
that is unprecedented. And getting out of it and how you would
rebuild eventually is unimaginable.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sabatini follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Christopher Sabatini
The confluence of Venezuela's fast deteriorating economy, the
increased targeting of political opponents, the National Assembly's
granting decree powers to President Nicolas Maduro, and the
mobilization of the military make it impossible to predict what will
happen for the remainder of Maduro's term, which ends in 2019. As
things stand today, though, it's impossible to see this ending well.
I say this for four reasons.
First, 16 years of severe economic mismanagement--public fiscal
profligacy; the economy's greater concentration on oil exports (which
now represent 95 of the country's exports); pervasive corruption; a
complicated, severely overvalued exchange rate; and the arbitrary
expropriation of select industries--combined now with the drastic drop
in the price of oil (to under $50 a barrel)--have left the country
teetering on the brink of an economic meltdown. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) has predicted that Venezuela's GDP will contract by
7 percent this year, after contracting by more than 2 percent last year
and inflation is hovering around 70 percent, though most now believe it
will reach triple digits by the end of the year. And the stories of
shortages of basic foods and goods are well known. People are suffering
economically, and it will only increase.
Second, in the 16 years that the Bolivarian Revolution has been in
power, it has systematically taken apart the checks and balances of
democratic government and politicized the state. This has included
packing the judicial system (including the supreme court) and the
electoral commission with political allies, tearing down the
independence of the Central Bank, closing down or buying out
independent media, creating parallel local governments and police
forces, cracking down on political opponents--including one former
mayor, Leopoldo Lopez, who has been in prison for more than 1 year and
the mayor of Caracas, Antonio Ledezma, who was jailed earlier this
month--and politicizing the armed forces.
More than just a violation of fundamental democratic principles,
what has occurred is that the very institutions that would be necessary
to mediate political disputes and manage conflict have become
completely vitiated and distrusted by a large portion of the
population.
Which brings me to the third point, this government--both that of
former President Hugo Chavez and his successor Maduro--has never shown
any tendency to moderate. If anything, when faced with difficulty and
adversity, their reaction has been the opposite: to double down on
their policies and pursue a more confrontational strategy. That
tendency has become more pronounced and worsened under Maduro, who,
even as the country clearly veers toward economic collapse and faces
broad popular protests, answers by toughening his position: cracking
down on opponents, blaming others--the opposition, economic elites and,
of course, the United States--and accumulating more power under the
executive and for the party, the United Social Party of Venezuela
(PSUV). This does not appear likely to change, and will--as it has--
only worsen the country's economy and its political divisions.
Fourth, despite multiple multilateral commitments to defend human
rights and representative democracy the regional community has been
practically mute on this issue. Venezuela's neighbors, such as Brazil,
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile, have shown no inclination to
become involved to defend basic human rights and democratic norms.
There was a brief effort last year by the South American Union (UNASUR)
to try to mediate the dispute between the government and the political
opposition after street protests had swept the country over political
and economic conditions, resulting in more than 40 dead and the arrest
of three opposition leaders, including Leopoldo Lopez. Those efforts at
mediation produced nothing, Perhaps worse--I would argue--they were
conducted under a value-neutral calculus. Rather than attempting to
defend the right of peaceful democratic protests and secure the release
of what were clearly politically motivated arrests, the South American
Union's delegation intervened to mediate the dispute, treating both
sides as moral equals.
By standing aside as the Maduro government attacks democratic
institutions and the opposition, the regional community has enabled the
violation of human rights of Venezuelan citizens. The lack of effective
collective action has not only allowed the conditions in Venezuela to
fester, they have loosened the region's overall commitment to
democratic standards. The question is who will stand up? Unfortunately,
other than Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos' statement after the
arrest of Antonio Ledezma and the other mayors, no sitting President
has--though four former Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil,
Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, Alejandro Toledo of Peru, and Ernest Zedillo
and Felipe Calderon of Mexico recently wrote a letter public letter
expressing their concern.
Perhaps even more curious, the countries of the South American
Union issued a statement after President Barack Obama's Executive order
to pull the visas of seven Venezuelan public officials and froze their
assets, criticizing the action.
Which brings me to the last point on the White House and Treasury
Department's Executive order last week.
Unfortunately, the language calling Venezuela a national security
risk to the U.S. that accompanied the announcement revoking the visas
of the seven officials and freezing any assets they may have in the
U.S. has become a red herring, provoking a ridiculous ramping up of
military preparedness of Venezuelan troops for an imaginary U.S.
invasion, justifying a power grab by Maduro for decree powers and even
provoking South American nations through UNASUR to denounce the
policies.
A few clarifying points are in order, though.
First, the Executive order was only to pull the visas of these
officials, basically denying them the right to travel to the United
States. These are not sanctions on the country or sanctions on the
general population. They are an effort to deny those who were involved
in human rights abuses from entering the U.S. territory. Dare I ask,
what's wrong with denying human rights abusers the right to travel to
your country?
Second, there has emerged an unremarked contrast between Latin
American reactions to the denial of Venezuelan Government officials
U.S. visas and their reactions to a similar U.S. action in 2009 on
officials in Honduras. In the summer of 2009, the U.S. pulled the visas
of 15 high-level officials of the de facto government of then-President
Roberto Micheletti. Far from calling it ``an interventionist threat to
the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
countries'' (the language used by the South American Union last week),
the U.S. decision was applauded by the regional community. Today, it is
being denounced as impertinent intervention. Why? Either sympathies
toward the target government are different or the region has changed. I
suspect both, but in either case it smacks of hypocrisy from our
partners in the hemisphere, and a egregious betrayal of Venezuelan
citizens' human rights
Third, it was the absence of action from regional partners that
prodded the U.S. to action. Whatever you may think of the actions the
U.S. took, they have occurred in a vacuum when the Venezuelan
Government's actions only 15 years ago would have provoked expressions
of concern and even action among elected governments in the region.
Today, it is only the former, elected, democratic Presidents that I
mentioned earlier who are willing to speak up. But clearly Venezuela's
teetering economy and human rights situation are a immediate regional
issue that demands a regional response.
Which brings me to my last point. While Venezuela doesn't represent
a national security risk to the U.S. in the alarmist way hinted at in
last week's Executive order, it is a risk, more regional perhaps, but a
risk.
For one, the disarticulation of institutions and the politicization
of the state described above, given the economic and political crisis
the country finds itself, raise the specter of a failed state in the
Western Hemisphere. This level of economic calamity and lack of
institutionality has not existed in a major Latin American country/
economy in recent history. The question of how to end this downward
spiral and rebuild the country is unprecedented . . . not to mention
unimaginable.
Then there are also the well substantiated allegations of the
Venezuelan state's involvement in narcotics trafficking. Evidence has
grown that segments of the country's armed forces, including the
National Guard, and elected officials are involved in transporting
cocaine from Colombia and money laundering. Regarding the latter, the
recent case opened up by the U.S. Treasury Department accusing the
Banco Popular de Andorra of laundering $4.2 billion points to the level
of corruption and nefarious activities occurring in Venezuela today.
Are we to believe that the government isn't aware of this?
One need only look at the map of flights ferrying cocaine from
South America to northern markets in which Venezuela is arched with
overflights or dotted with take off points to see the central place the
Andean country has taken in the drug trade. With the three countries
that border it (Colombia, Guyana, and Brazil), numerous countries
affected by its alleged role in narcotrafficking, and Venezuela
teetering on economic and political collapse, Venezuela would seem to
be more of a risk to regional security than to the United States.
Unfortunately, Venezuela's neighbors have chosen to focus on a
hyperbolic U.S. statement rather than how the looming crisis in the
country could affect them and their responsibility and role to prevent
it.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Sabatini.
Mr. Canton.
STATEMENT OF SANTIAGO CANTON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PARTNERS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, ROBERT F. KENNEDY CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Canton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the
opportunity to appear before you today to share some
information regarding the human rights situation in Venezuela.
I have presented a 20-page written statement with very detailed
information about the human rights situation. So in this brief
presentation, I will just refer to the most important
violations.
The rule of law in Venezuela has been in a downward spiral
for the last 15 years. The signs of this decline have been
unequivocal: increasing concentration of power; lack of
independence of the judiciary; restricting freedom of
expression; excessive and lethal use of force and other forms
of restrictions to peaceful assembly; widespread use of
torture; restricting civic space and financing of NGOs; and
prosecuting under false charges political opposition leaders;
and closing the door to any outside monitoring.
Violations for freedom of expression. Journalists face
constant threats and harassment. The state exercises tight
control of our media outlets and has been ranked 137 out of 180
countries in the 2015 World Press Freedom Index. The U.N.
Secretary General, the High Commissioner of Human rights of the
U.N., and the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression of the U.N. have criticized the
Venezuelan Government for limiting free expression. Over 259
incidents of threats and harassment of journalists were
reported between January and April 2014.
In recent years, state authorities have tightened
restrictions on television and radio through forced closures,
fines, judicial cases, and economic pressures. From 2013 to
2014, 13 newspapers stopped operating and many more are at risk
of closure now due to print paper shortages that the government
is responsible for.
Violations to freedom of association and assembly. Peaceful
opposition protestors are routinely violently assaulted by the
Venezuelan police and military, the latter of which was
recently granted explicit power to use force to control
peaceful demonstrations. Law prohibits Venezuelan human rights
defenders from receiving international support if they defend
political rights or monitor the performance of public bodies.
Protests have reignited since last February of this year.
Violent repression and the use of military force during these
demonstrations have already resulted in a fatal victim. On
February 24, Kluiverth Roa Nunez, a 14-year-old high school
student, was killed by a gunshot to the head.
Lack of judicial independence. Since the National Assembly
passed a law that increased the membership of the Supreme Court
from 20 to 32 justices, its members have publicly rejected the
principle of separation of powers and the judiciary has acted
as another arm of the executive branch to advance the
government's political agenda.
Arbitrary arrests and detentions. According to the Office
of the High Commissioner of Human rights of the U.N., more than
70 people have been arbitrarily detained or arrested in
Venezuela over the last year alone. According to official
information, approximately 3,000 people were arrested between
February and June 2014 in the context of the public protests
that took place across the country. Many were denied access to
a lawyer, and some remained in pretrial detention for several
months. Dozens of students remain also in detention.
One of the individuals that were arrested in connection to
the February 2014 protests is Leopoldo Lopez, leader of the
opposition party, Voluntad Popular. He has remained in pretrial
detention with fabricated charges.
A month after, the mayor of San Cristobal, Daniel Ceballos,
from the same party was also arrested.
In August 2014, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary
Detentions concluded that the detention of both Lopez and
Ceballos was arbitrary and demanded its release. Recently a
couple of months ago, the Committee Against Torture of the U.N.
also demanded the release of them.
One year after Leopoldo Lopez's arrest, Caracas Mayor
Antonio Ledezma, the second most-voted person in Venezuela
after Maduro, was also arrested on fabricated charges.
Torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment in
prisons. The U.N. Committee Against Torture expressed alarm
regarding reported acts of torture and ill-treatment of persons
arrested in connection with the demonstrations of February of
last year. These acts of torture include beatings, electric
shocks, burns, suffocation, sexual violence, and threats.
Just earlier this month, the Inter-American Commission of
Human rights granted protective measures in favor of two
political prisoners in ``the tomb'' prison that you referred
to, Senator. It is important to note that these type of
measures are only granted
in extreme cases of urgency, gravity, and threats of
irreparable harms.
Then there is the violation of political participation. I
am running out of time, so I am going to finish very quickly
with this presentation.
There is a violation of the right to political
participation. As you know, Leopoldo Lopez was not allowed to
run in the election, and in addition to Leopoldo Lopez, just
recently Julio Borges, another member of the opposition, was
also expelled from Congress. Maria Corina Machado was expelled
a few months ago. So it is very difficult for the opposition to
participate freely in politics.
Mr. Chairman, the disregard by the Venezuelan Government of
the human rights of its people is absolute. The human rights
situation in Venezuela is critical and not only for opposition
leaders but for the population in general. The report by the
U.N. Committee Against Torture from last December indicates
that almost 1,300--and I insist, 1,300--extrajudicial killings
took place in Venezuela between 2012 and 2013. And the
prevailing impunity does not contribute to improve the
situation. According to government information, of the
approximately 30,000 human rights violations reported to the
authorities between 2011 and 2014, only 3 percent have been
prosecuted.
The account I have just presented is only but a fraction of
the grave and systematic violations that are taking place in
Venezuela. It is time for the international community to ensure
through multilateral and bilateral efforts that democracy and
the rule of law are respected. In 2001, the hemisphere adopted
the Democratic Charter to address challenges such as the ones
Venezuela is going through. The U.S. Government should work
together with the OAS and UNASUR and the leaders of the region
to ensure that the Democratic Charter is respected.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Canton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Santiago A. Canton
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, and members of the
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today to share critical information impacting
United States policy toward Venezuela, in particular regarding the
human rights and security situation in that country. I commend the
committee for holding this important and timely hearing.
introduction
Democracy and rule of law in Venezuela have been on a downward
spiral for the past 15 years, with great consequences not only for the
country's economy and security, but also for the human rights of the
Venezuelan people. I would like to focus on this generalized disregard
for the respect of basic human rights that has become the state-
sanctioned rule in Venezuela.
The signs of this decline have been unequivocal: increasing
concentration of power in the executive branch, debilitating the
independence and autonomy of the judiciary; restricting freedom of
expression and shutting down dissenting media outlets; excessive--
sometimes lethal--use of force and other forms of restrictions to
peaceful assembly; widespread use of torture and horrid detention
conditions; restricting civic space and financing of NGOs; imposing
administrative sanctions or even prosecuting under false charges
political opposition leaders; and closing the door to any outside
monitoring or criticism, among others.
The current human rights violations in Venezuela are not isolated
instances. On the contrary, they are the product of a pattern of
systematic violations that started more than a decade ago. To
understand what is currently happening in Venezuela it is necessary to
know the context that gives rise to today's violations. Instead of
reversing this trend, the assumption of power by Nicolas Maduro after
president Chavez's death has only increased the government's repression
of the Venezuelan people in a desperate attempt to hold on to power in
the midst of growing popular discontent.
Chavez and Maduro have repeatedly disregarded all the accusations
of human rights violations as an international conspiracy of right wing
individuals and NGOs. However, respected institutions and groups of the
international community have consistently denounced the human rights
violations taking place in Venezuela.
International human rights bodies and officials, including the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Torture, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the
U.N. Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, as well as regional
bodies such as the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, have made strong calls of concern over the last years
regarding the intentional disregard by the Venezuelan Government of its
human rights obligations under international law.
Openness to dissent and criticism has not only been lacking with
regard to local actors. In fact, since 1996 no special procedure of the
United Nations has been allowed to visit the country.\1\ Likewise,
there have been several instances of international human rights
delegations of nongovernmental organizations being expelled from the
country, including a Human Rights Watch's delegation.\2\
Widespread human rights abuses are committed daily in total
impunity. The Venezuelan Government itself admits the shockingly low
levels of violations that end up being prosecuted. In its most recent
reports to the U.N. Committee Against Torture, the government informed
the committee that of the 31,096 human rights violations reported to
the authorities between 2011 and 2014, only in 3.1 percent did a
prosecutor present criminal charges.\3\
Meanwhile, the government continues amassing authority and
completely eroding the separation of powers. Indeed, since 2010 the
Government has adopted a series of so-called Enabling Laws (Leyes
Habilitantes), which authorize the President of the Republic to issue
decrees with the rank, value, and force of statute on those matters
that are so delegated. Many of these laws are overly broad and have
been used by the Executive to imposed restrictions on human rights
without appropriate controls. Following his predecessor's steps, just a
few months after assuming power, President Maduro requested the
National Assembly to enact a law granting him special powers for 12
months to address the economy and combat corruption. On November 19,
2013, a law was passed which allow the President to reform--by decree--
norms to strengthen punishment in criminal, administrative, civil and
disciplinary areas ``to avoid damage to or inadequate management of the
public patrimony, and to prevent acts of corruption'' and norms that
punish ``attacks on the Security and Defense of the Nation, the
institutions of the State, Public Powers, and the provision of public
services indispensable to the development and the quality of life of
the people''; among other areas generally reserved to Congress.\4\ On
Sunday, February 15, the National Assembly started discussing a new
``Enabling law'' requested by President Maduro to receive special
decree powers for at least the next 6 months, allegedly in response to
the most recent U.S. sanctions.\5\
Authorities at several levels openly disregard the Venezuelan
Constitution, as has been recently the case with the Minister of
Defense's authorization to the armed forces to potentially use lethal
force if needed to control public protests.\6\ This authorization to
use lethal force is even more concerning taking into consideration the
existing pattern of extrajudicial executions that has taken place in
Venezuela over the last decade. According to information collected by
the U.N. Committee Against Torture, 667 homicides at the hands of state
agents were committed in 2012 and 600 in 2013.\7\
While openly restricting civil and political rights, the government
of Venezuela has also made an effort to portray itself as a promoter of
economic, social and cultural rights both domestically and throughout
the region by providing economic assistance through Petrocaribe \8\ and
other foreign assistance programs. Indeed, in June 2013, Venezuela
received recognition from the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) for the early achievement of one of the Millennium
Development Goals and the World Food Summit (WFS) goal of halving the
number of hungry people by 2015.\9\ However, there have been growing
reports over the past few years on the increasing difficulties for the
Venezuelan population to access food and other basic necessities,\10\
which President Maduro attributes to ``an economic war by sectors who
seek to destabilize the country . . . through the undersupply of food
products.'' \11\
This situation has motivated a series of measures against private
distributorships of food and other basic supplies, including the
adoption in 2011 of the Law on Costs and Fair Prices that regulates a
``maximum'' sales price for certain foods and other goods.\12\ Such
measures have included, in extreme cases, taking over a toilet paper
factory,\13\ the authorization to occupy supermarket chain accused of
``hoarding'' and more recently, putting Venezuela's food distribution
under military protection.\14\
major human rights violations
I. Violations of Freedom of Expression
Violations of the right to freedom of expression are rampant in
Venezuela. Journalists face constant threats and harassment. The State
exercises tight control over media outlets, including through
restrictive telecommunications laws. There is overall repression of
dissenting views. Peaceful protesters are violently attacked. A review
of the analysis of leading human rights and press freedom organizations
reveal a shockingly bad situation.
The United Nations Secretary General, High Commissioner for Human
Rights, and Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the
right to freedom of opinion and expression have strongly criticized the
Venezuelan Government for severely limiting free expression in the
country, and have urged authorities ``to ensure that people are not
penalized for exercising their rights to peaceful assembly and freedom
of expression.'' \15\
Venezuelan media outlets are governed by the 2004 Law on Social
Responsibility in Radio, Television, and Electronic Media (Resorte),
amended in 2010. CONATEL has used this law to impose heavy fines on
television and print media outlets, which have criticized the
government.\16\ It is also through this law that the Venezuelan
Government gave itself the authority to require all broadcasters to air
the obligatory broadcasts previously mentioned.\17\
Furthermore, changes to the Organic Law of Telecommunications in
December 2010 declared broadcast media and the Internet to be public
services reserved for the State. These changes gave the Venezuelan
Executive the power to suspend and revoke broadcasting concessions and
to take control over privately owned stations or channels whose
operating licenses were allowed to expire or were terminated.\18\
In recent years, State authorities have gradually tightened
restrictions on television and radio through forced closures, fines,
judicial cases, and economic pressures.\19\ The most famous examples of
this trend are with regard to Venezuela's oldest private television
channel, Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), and main opposition channel,
Globovision. In May 2007, the Government of Venezuela decided not to
renew RCTV's license, forcing it to close down. Globovision was taken
over in 2010 and then sold to pro-government owners in 2013,
essentially eliminating the primary media voice critical of the Chavez
and Maduro governments.
Numerous other media outlets have been forced to shut down because
of government pressure as well. Various sources reported the closure of
34 radio stations in 2009 and 27 in 2011. From 2013 to 2014, 13
newspapers stopped operating according to El Nacional \20\ and many
more are at risk of closure now due to newsprint shortages. The
Venezuelan Government has decreed that media organizations can only
import newspaper if it is purchased with dollars provided through
government currency exchange, but independent media sources are
systematically denied this option.\21\
The Venezuelan Government also continues to use ``obligatory
national radio and television broadcasts to transmit government
messages,'' according to information received by Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights.\22\
In response to the February 2014 protests, the IACHR issued a press
release in which it noted with concern the fact that CONATEL, the
Venezuelan National Telecommunications Commission, had issued an
official statement in which it advised media outlets that coverage of
the protest-related violence could be considered a violation of the
Resorte Law, for which they would be sanctioned accordingly.\23\ The
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression expressed particular
concern at the continuing and worsening pattern of government actions
resulting in the loss of opportunities for public debate, noting the
lack of guarantees for the free and independent exercise of the right
to freedom of expression in conformity with Venezuela's international
obligations.\24\
Since 2003 and continuing until today, Freedom House, an
independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom
around the world, has rated Venezuela as ``not free'' given that ``the
ability of independent journalists and media outlets to operate freely
and impartially'' has been seriously impeded by the political and
economic crises which have evolved under the leadership of Hugo Chavez
and Nicolas Maduro.\25\ In its most recent analysis, it states that
``Maduro's administration hampered the opposition media by arbitrarily
fining outlets, enforcing licensing requirements without respecting due
process rights, and excluding certain outlets from access to public
information.'' \26\ Furthermore, ``high-level government officials
constantly demonized opposition-aligned outlets and exerted systematic
pressure on the tone and content of reporting.'' \27\ Human Rights
Watch has likewise noted with grave concern that ``over the past
decade, the [Venezuelan] government has expanded and abused its powers
to regulate media.'' \28\
Reporters without Borders has also expressed its grave concern at
the rapidly eroding press freedoms in Venezuela, and has ranked it 137
out of 180 countries on the 2015 World Press Freedom Index.\29\ This
marks a significant decline from its ranking of 116 in 2014, and
demonstrates the continued and rapid deterioration of press freedoms in
Venezuela.\30\ The organization notes that ``local and foreign
journalists were the targets of threats, insults, physical attacks,
theft, destruction of equipment and arrests during a succession of
protests'' and places the blame for the majority of these with the
Bolivarian National Guard.\31\
The Committee to Protect Journalists details the shutting down of
critical radio and television stations, the shortage of newsprint as
the government seeks to control imports, and the resignations of
multiple journalists who have complained of censorship.\32\ The CPJ
characterizes these actions on the part of the Venezuelan Government as
``a campaign to silence the critical media.'' \33\
With regards to threats and harassment of journalists, over 259
incidents between January and April 2014 were reported to the U.N.
Committee Against Torture.\34\ The Venezuelan National Association of
Journalists reported more than 50 incidents of violence or threats
against reporters between 12 and 21 February 2014 alone.\35\
In its 2013 annual report, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, published
details of the almost 80 reports it received during the previous year
of threat and assaults of journalists.\36\ Likewise, the Commission
compiled information on almost 40 attacks on newspaper offices and
radio stations during the same time period.\37\ In a September 2014
press release, the Commission once again called on the Government of
Venezuela to respect the right to freedom of expression, citing reports
that President Maduro had publicy accused CNN en Espanol, El Nuevo
Herald, NTN24, and other media outlets of engaging in ``media
terrorism.'' \38\
In the Case of Perozo et al. v. Venezuela, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights considered a series of attacks against and harassment
of Globovision Television Channel staff, including hostile public
remarks and physical and verbal attacks by state officials. The State
was found to have violated its obligations under the American
Convention on Human Rights to ``ensure the right to freely seek,
receive ad impart information and the right to humane treatment.'' \39\
Despite this judgment, Globovision would ultimately succumb to pressure
and fall under State control, as detailed below.
II. Violations to freedom of association and assembly
Examples of violations of the rights to freedom of association and
assembly are also abundant. Peaceful opposition protesters are
routinely violently assaulted by the Venezuelan police and military,
the latter of which was recently granted explicit power to use force to
control peaceful demonstrations.\40\ Indeed, on January 27, 2015, the
Minister of Defense authorized the use of ``potentially lethal force,
be it with a firearm or with another potentially lethal weapon'' as a
last recourse [. . .], ``to avoid public disorder, to support the
legitimate authority, and to immediately reject aggression using any
necessary means,'' \41\ in direct contradiction with article 68 of the
Venezuelan Constitution, which explicitly prohibits the use of firearms
and toxic substances as a means of containing public protests.
A legal framework has been put in place that has incrementally more
severely restricted freedom of association and assembly in Venezuela.
For example, under the Law for the Defense of Political Sovereignty and
National Self-Determination, passed in 2010, Venezuelan human rights
defenders are prohibited from receiving international support. As Human
Rights Watch noted in a December 2010 press release, the law bars
Venezuelan NGOs ``that `defend political rights' or `monitor the
performance of public bodies' '' from receiving money from foreign
sources.\42\ Furthermore, the law permits the expulsion of foreigners
invited by NGOs ``if they express opinions that `offend the
institutions of state, top officials or attack the exercise of
sovereignty.' ''\43\ Venezuelan civil society organizations liaising
with foreign donors would also be sanctioned, facing high fines and
individual prohibitions against running for public office.\44\ Under
the ``Organic Law on Social Control,'' adopted by the National Assembly
at the same time, individuals are obligated to adhere to Venezuela's
socialist principles and values or face civil, administrative, or
criminal sanctions.\45\ Both of these laws aggressively limit the
activities of human rights defenders.
The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, for its part, has
also detailed the dire legal situation in which Venezuelan civil
society finds itself. It characterizes the enactment of the laws
mentioned thus far, as well as Decree No. 458, which created the
Strategic Center of Security and Protection of the Country (CESPPA), as
having an overall chilling effect on freedom of assembly.\46\
Opposition leaders have concluded that the goal of CESPPA is to control
and censor the worsening political, economic, and social crisis
enveloping the country.\47\
Even prior to the passage of these laws, in its 2009 Annual Report,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted a ``trend toward
the use of criminal charges to punish people exercising their right to
demonstrate or protest against government policies.'' \48\ During the 5
years prior to the publication of that report, the Inter-American
Commission received information regarding 2,200 individuals who faced
criminal charges in connection with their involvement in public
demonstrations.\49\ These crimes, which include ``blocking public
highways, resisting the authorities, damage to public property, active
obstruction of legally established institutions, offenses to public
officials, criminal instigation and criminal association, public
incitement to law-breaking, conspiracy, restricting freedom of
employment, and breaches of the special secure zones regime, among
others, carry prison sentences of up to 20 years.\50\ More recently,
Freedom House and PROVEA (Programa Venezolano de Educacion-Accion en
Derechos Humanos) have echoed the concerns of the Inter-American
Commission, reporting that at least 10 protesters were put on trial
before military courts in 2012.\51\
The same groups have tracked the continually increasing repression
of peaceful protests in Venezuela. According to Freedom House, ``PROVEA
described a sharp rise in suppressed protests in 2007, including a 300-
percent increase in the number of injuries sustained during
demonstrations, many caused by beatings, rubber bullets, and tear gas.
The group also reported a 250-percent increase in the number of cases
in which charges were brought against protesters, a sign of the ongoing
criminalization of protest.'' \52\
The use of force by law enforcement during a protest must be
considered in the context of the human rights to freedom of association
and assembly. The principal purpose of a law enforcement presence at
demonstrations should be to ensure public safety and protect the rights
of protesters and bystanders.\53\ The use of force by police is only
permissible if it is strictly or absolutely necessary to protect an
individual from harm or to enable a lawful arrest,\54\ not for the
purpose of infringing upon a protester's right to freedom of assembly
and association. Use of force must be strictly necessary and
proportional to the danger to the physical integrity or life of the law
enforcement agent or other individual.\55\ Whenever the lawful use of
force is unavoidable, it must minimize damage to property and injury to
persons, and respect and preserve human life.\56\ Furthermore, law
enforcement must ensure that medical aid is rendered to any injured
protesters and that their next of kin are notified.\57\
Despite these internationally recognized principles, Venezuelan
authorities have deployed excessive use of force against protesters in
violation of multiple human rights, including the rights to freedom of
assembly and association. At the outbreak of violence against
protesters in February 2014, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights declared that it was ``profoundly disturbed by various
complaints alleging violations of the demonstrators' rights to peaceful
protest and their rights to life and humane treatment, personal
liberty, freedom of association and freedom of expression.'' \58\ Human
Rights Watch (HRW) found that Venezuelan security forces repeatedly
resorted to force, including lethal force, against peaceful, unarmed
protesters and bystanders ``in situations in which it was wholly
unjustified.'' \59\ HRW noted that these abuses included ``severely
beating unarmed individuals; firing live ammunition, rubber bullets,
and teargas canisters indiscriminately into crowds; and firing rubber
bullets deliberately, at point-blank range, at unarmed individuals.''
\60\ Amnesty International (AI) corroborated these accounts and noted
that, contrary to international standards, state security forces used
firearms against protesters without providing adequate warning.\61\ AI
also reported on the ``excessive and indiscriminate'' use of tear gas
by police.\62\
In its December 2014 review of Venezuela, the U.N. Committee
Against Torture noted ``with concern that 43 people died in the context
of the demonstrations that occurred between February and June 2014, and
878 were wounded, of which 68 percent were civilians,'' \63\ noting
consistent reports regarding the excessive use of force. The Committee
also expressed concern regarding the abuse of firearms and riot control
agents against demonstrators and in residential areas, as well as the
involvement of the National Guard in controlling demonstrations as
opposed to civilian police forces.\64\
The Committee Against Torture also reported a total of 437 attacks
by armed pro-government groups against protesters during demonstrations
between February and April 2014, noting that a large number of these
attacks were carried out with the complicity and acquiescence of the
state security forces, and went unpunished.\65\ Human Rights Watch also
noted that armed pro-government groups attacked protesters,
journalists, and persons perceived to be opposed to the government in
the presence of security forces and with impunity. In some cases, state
security forces openly collaborated with pro-government groups in
committing these attacks.\66\ The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights condemned attacks of this nature and noted that they occurred in
many parts of the country.\67\
Protests have reignited since February of this year after the
arrest of the Caracas Metropolitan Mayor Antonio Ledezma. Violent
repression and the use of military force during these demonstrations
have already resulted in new fatal victims, wounded persons and
arbitrary arrests. On February 24, Kluiverth Roa Nunez, a 14-year-old
high school student was killed by a gunshot wound in the head during
the clashes between students of the Catholic University of Tachira
(UCAT) and security forces. Reports indicate that the boy was not even
participating in the protests.\68\
III. Lack of judicial independence
In May 2004 the National Assembly passed a new Organic Law of the
Supreme Court, which completely weakened Venezuela's judicial
branch.\69\ This Organic Law increased the membership of the Supreme
Court from 20 to 32 justices and established that the new Justices
could be designated with a simple majority vote of the National
Assembly, making it easier for the Government and its majority in the
legislative to take control of the country's highest Court. Since this
political takeover of the Supreme Court of Justice, its members have
publicly rejected the principle of separation of powers and the
judiciary has acted as another arm of the executive branch to advance
the government's political agenda by legitimizing its policies and
decisions, consistently ruling in its favor and ``validating the
government's disregard for human rights.'' \70\
But the weakness of the judiciary precedes 2004 and is also a
consequence of the inadequate transition in the Judicial branch
following the adoption of the 1999 Constitution, which has resulted in
the practice of appointing provisional or interim judges. For over a
decade, the Judicial Commission of the Supreme Court has been
discretionally ordering the removal of hundreds of provisional judges
without a prior disciplinary proceeding, denying Venezuelan's judges
one of the most basic safeguards for their independence: security of
tenure.
It is estimated that 62 per cent of the judges in Venezuela are
provisional, and therefore can be easily appointed and removed.\71\ As
underscored by the IACHR, the high number of provisional appointments
``weakens the judicial branch and strips it of its independence and
impartiality, thereby adversely affecting the right of access to
justice.'' \72\ The Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges
and lawyers has also expressed his concern over the high number of
judges and prosecutors who are provisional, considering that they are
``subject to various mechanisms of political interference that affect
their independence,'' in particular bearing in mind that their removal
is ``absolutely discretional: without cause, or procedure, or an
effective judicial remedy.'' \73\
One of the most notorious examples of interference by the Executive
in the administration of justice has been the case of Maria Lourdes
Afiuni. A judge at the 31st control Court of Caracas, in December 2009
Afiuni granted conditional release to a businessman critic of the
government who had been awaiting trial on corruption charges for almost
3 years. She was immediately arrested and President Chavez called Judge
Afiuni a ``bandit'', asking for her to be given a 30-year prison
sentence despite her compliance with U.N. standards and Venezuelan law.
Afiuni was formally accused of corruption, abuse of authority, and
favoring evasion of justice.\74\ After over a year in a women's prison
in Caracas under deplorable conditions and where she repeatedly
suffered to threats and acts of intimidation by other inmates,\75\ she
was put under house arrest in February 2011. On June 14, 2013, the
judicial authorities lifted the house arrest but her trial
continues.\76\
The case of Judge Afiuni has captured the international attention
and generated calls from U.N. experts and the inter-American System of
human rights urging for her ``immediate and unconditional release.''
\77\ However, as denounced by Human Rights Watch in a comprehensive
report on this issue, the arrest of Judge Afiuni has had a powerful
impact on lower court judges who have been afraid to issue rulings that
may upset the government, and ``whereas in the past they only feared
losing their jobs, now they also fear being criminally prosecuted for
upholding the law.'' \78\
As recently as last month, Ali Fabricio Paredes, another judge--who
incidentally presided over Afiuni's case at some point--was arrested by
national intelligence agents, less than 24 hours after he had convicted
Walid Makled to 14 years in prison for drug-trafficking and money-
laundering. The Attorney General ordered Judge Paredes' arrest for
considering that he had unduly favored Makled with a lenient prison
sentence.\79\
IV. Arbitrary arrests and detentions
The Venezuelan Constitution prohibits the arrest or detention of an
individual without a judicial order and provides that any detained
individual has the right to immediately communicate with family and
lawyers. But in practice, it is estimated that more than 70 people have
been arbitrarily detained or arrested in Venezuela over the last year
alone.\80\
The use of arbitrary arrest and detention in Venezuela is not
recent. However, international human rights organizations have
registered an increase in the number of people arbitrarily detained
since 2014, particularly around the protests against the Government.
According to official information, 3,306 people were arrested,
including 400 adolescents, between February and June of 2014 in the
context of the public protests that took place across the country.\81\
It was reported that of the thousands of people arrested many were
denied access to a lawyer of their choice and to medical assistance
during the first 48 hours of their detention before appearing before a
judge. Some of the people arrested remained in pre-trial detention for
several months, in spite of the absence of solid evidence against
them.\82\ Even the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed
concern over the prolonged and arbitrary detention of political
opponents and protestors in Venezuela, and stated that it was only ``
exacerbating the tensions in the country.'' \83\
Notably, one of the individuals that were arrested in connection to
the February 2014 protests is Leopoldo Lopez, leader of the opposition
party Voluntad Popular. After been accused of promoting violence in the
antigovernment demonstrations that started a few days later, on 18
February 2014 Leopoldo Lopez handed himself in to the National Guard.
He has remained in pre-trial detention since, with charges of
incitement and conspiracy to commit arson and damages to property,
among other offences, which could carry a maximum penalty of 10 years
of prison.\84\
A month after Leopoldo Lopez' detention, members of the
Intelligence Security Services (SEBIN) arrested Daniel Ceballos, mayor
of San Cristobal (Tachira State) and also a member of opposition party
Voluntad Popular on suspicion of rebellion and conspiracy to commit a
crime for his involvement in the antigovernment protests that had taken
place in February. No arrest warrant was produced at the time of his
arrest and shortly after, the Minister of Justice and Interior of
Venezuela posted several messages on Twitter claiming that justice had
been done and accusing Ceballos of promoting violence, anarchy, and
civil rebellion.\85\
In August 2014, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary
Detentions adopted an opinion concerning Leopoldo Lopez, concluding
that his detention was arbitrary. It considered that ``Mr. Lopez's
participation in a march for political reasons or the exercising of his
right to freedom of expression during the same march, such as which
took place on February 12, 2014, does not constitute an illicit
justification for the deprivation of liberty of a speaker or
participant.'' It further stated that in his case ``there are no
elements that allow the concluding of a cause-and-effect relationship
between the call for a political demonstration, speaking during the
same demonstration, and the resulting deaths, wounds, and material
damage.'' \86\ The Working Group also found that ``the detention of Mr.
Lopez in a military compound seems based on a motive of discrimination
based on his political opinions.'' \87\ The Working Group also found
the detention of Daniel Ceballos to be arbitrary.\88\
The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, also expressed serious
concern at the continued detention of Venezuelan opposition leader
Leopoldo Lopez, as well as more than 69 other people who were arrested
in the context of the public protests that started in February 2014. He
further called on the Venezuelan authorities ``to act on the opinions
of the Working Group and immediately release Mr Lopez and Mr Ceballos,
as well as all those detained for exercising their legitimate right to
express themselves and protest peacefully.'' \89\ Both Lopez and
Ceballos remain in detention to date, despite repeated calls from the
international community for their immediate release.
Exactly 1 year after Leopoldo Lopez's arrest, on February 19, 2015,
Caracas Metropolitan mayor, Antonio Ledezma, was arrested and thereby
expelled from office. Mr. Ledezma is an opposition leader and ally of
Leopoldo Lopez. According to Mr. Ledezma's wife, intelligence agents
forcibly entered his office and beat the mayor before dragging him
away. Soon afterward, President Nicolas Maduro publicly denounced Mr.
Ledezma as a ``vampire'' and accused him of conspiring with the United
States and other foreign governments to foment a coup.\90\ President
Maduro said he would respond ``with an iron fist.'' \91\ The evidence
presented of this alleged conspiracy is a statement that Mr. Ledezma
signed along with other opposition leaders published in a national
newspaper, which highlighted the multiple challenges facing the country
and called for an agreement to reach a peaceful and democratic
transition. As such, his arrest was clearly politically motivated and
arbitrary.
V. Torture and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment in prisons
Political prisoners in Venezuela have been subject to torture and
other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment while in custody. The
scale of these human rights violations seems to have increased since
antigovernment protests began last year, but follows a long-standing
pattern. Reports to this end have been issued from multiple
international and regional organizations including the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights; the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights; and the United Nations Committee Against Torture; as well
as countless nongovernmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch
and Amnesty International.
The U.N. Committee Against Torture expressed alarm regarding
reported acts of torture and ill-treatment of persons arrested in
connection with the demonstrations which occurred in Venezuela between
February and June 2014. These acts include beatings, electric shocks,
burns, suffocation, sexual violence and threats, apparently to punish
protesters and obtain confessions.\92\ Similarly, in most cases
documented by Human Rights Watch in its report regarding last year's
protests, security forces subjected those arrested for protesting to
severe physical abuse, including beatings with fists, helmets, and
firearms; being forced to squat or kneel, without moving, for hours at
a time; and extended exposure to extreme temperatures.\93\ Human Rights
Watch also reported cases of torture including a pattern of firing
rubber bullets point blank at protesters, withholding medical treatment
despite life-threatening injuries, and psychological abuse.\94\ Amnesty
International reported similar horrific accounts of abuse against
detainees in its report and highlighted that inhuman and degrading
treatment of detainees appeared to be in retaliation for their
involvement in protests. For example, both male and female detainees
reported being raped or threatened with rape by security agents. Other
reports of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment include
detainees being repeatedly and intentionally run over or hit by police
officers on motorcycles; being doused in gasoline; and being subjected
to severe beatings with batons.\95\
Inhumane treatment of detainees continues to this day. Last week,
Rodolfo Gonzalez, a political prisoner and former aviation pilot,
committed suicide in prison. He was reportedly suffering from extreme
physical and emotional distress due to the conditions of his detention
at the headquarters of the State Intelligence Service (SEBIN) and the
news that he would soon be transferred to an extremely dangerous prison
known as ``Yare.'' \96\
In the heart of Caracas is a prison known as ``La Tumba'' (``the
tomb''). Located five stories below ground are holding cells for
protesters and political prisoners. Prisoners of La Tumba are not only
confined to tight spaces and constantly exposed to subfreezing
temperatures, but are also deprived of sunlight, sanitary conditions,
and ventilation. The conditions of detention have reportedly caused all
inmates to become extremely ill, with symptoms including severe
vomiting, diarrhea, fever, and hallucinations. However, they are denied
access to adequate medical treatment.\97\
Just earlier this month, the IACHR granted precautionary measures
for the protection of political prisoners, Lorent Saleh and Gerardo
Carrero.\98\ These measures, which are only granted in extreme cases of
urgency, gravity, and threats of irreparable harm, were issued based on
reliable reports that the detention conditions of Mr. Saleh and Mr.
Carrero put their lives and safety at risk. These deplorable conditions
have resulted in injuries and illness, for which no adequate medical
treatment is provided. In issuing the precautionary measures, the IACHR
referred to multiple reports it had investigated and received in recent
years regarding serious violations of the human rights of detainees in
Venezuela.\99\
The inhumane conditions in Venezuelan prisons are not only suffered
by political prisoners are exacerbated by extreme overcrowding. During
the first half of 2014, jails were reported to be at 190 percent
capacity.\100\ Additionally, as noted by the Committee Against Torture,
detainees were deprived of medical care, potable water, food,
sanitation, and ventilation.\101\ Further, 309 prisoners died in
Venezuelan prisons during 2014 alone,\102\ but the numbers of inmates
that have died in prison since 2004 is 4,791 and 9,931 have been
wounded in the last decade.\103\
The CAT Committee highlighted reports that political prisoners such
as Leopoldo Lopez, have been held in solitary confinement.\104\ There
have been numerous reports regarding the cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment of Mr. Lopez, who is detained in Ramo Verde prison. For
example, in October guards ordered Mr. Lopez and other detainees to
defecate into plastic bags, and subsequently threw the same bags of
human excrement at them and prevented them from bathing.\105\
Last February 13, Mr. Lopez's cell was forcibly broken into for the
apparent purpose of attacking and intimidating him. Since then, Mr.
Lopez has been held in isolation, and deprived of communication with
his lawyers and family, in direct violation of his rights.\106\ The
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture recently expressed that Venezuela
had violated international law ``by failing to take measures to prevent
mistreatment'' and ``torture'' of demonstrators and detainees,
including the imposition of solitary confinement to opposition leader
Leopoldo Lopez and the recent violent searches in the cells of other
political prisoners such as Daniel Ceballos, Enzo Scarano, and
Salvatore Luchesse.\107\
VI. Violations of the right to political participation
The right to participate in one's political system is a fundamental
right, which not only gives citizens a voice in their own government,
but also protects human rights defenders, supports underrepresented and
vulnerable populations, and prevents violent political
transitions.\108\ The rights to vote, participate in, and benefit from
public service are protected by international instruments such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) \109\ and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).\110\
Article 21 of the UDHR provides that ``Everyone has the right to take
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely
chosen representatives.'' ICCPR article 25 affirms that ``Every citizen
shall have the right and the opportunity . . . (a) To take part in the
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections . . . (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to
public service in his country.'' Likewise, the American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man \111\ states in Article XX: ``Every person
having legal capacity is entitled to participate in the government of
his country, directly or through his representatives, and to take part
in popular elections, which shall be by secret ballot, and shall be
honest, periodic, and free.''
Despite these legal obligations enshrined in international law and
freely accepted by the state of Venezuela, the government has
repeatedly stymied the right to political participation for opposition
leaders, thereby repressing the rights of individuals as well as
limiting free discourse and debate about matters in the public
interest. Specifically, opposition leaders have both been denied the
right to run for office and arbitrarily expelled from their positions.
Leopoldo Lopez, leader of the opposition party Voluntad Popular
(Popular Will), was elected mayor of the Chacao municipality of Caracas
in July 2000. Mr. Lopez was recognized for his commitment to
transparency and accountability.\112\ However, in August and September
2005 the government imposed sanctions for alleged corruption which had
the effect of disqualifying Mr. Lopez from public office for a period
of 3 and 6 years, respectively.\113\ Mr. Lopez was thus prevented from
running for mayor in 2008. In 2011, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights issued a unanimous decision on this matter in favor of Mr.
Lopez.\114\ The Inter-American Court found that the alleged charges of
corruption brought against Mr. Lopez, which he maintained were
baseless, were never adjudicated by a competent tribunal and that Mr.
Lopez was never charged with a crime. The Inter-American Court held
that Mr. Lopez's human right to political participation had been
violated. However, the Venezuelan regime refused to abide by the
ruling, and Mr. Lopez was thus prevented from running in the 2012
Presidential election.\115\ As described above, Leopoldo Lopez has been
arbitrarily detained since February 18, 2014, in the military prison of
Ramo Verde, specifically for exercising his rights to political
participation and other human rights.
Multiple elected officials who are opposition party members have
been arbitrary expelled or threatened with expulsion from their
positions. For example, Maria Corina Machado, an opposition leader and
the founder, former vice president, and former president of the
Venezuelan volunteer civil organization Sumate, was stripped of her
seat in the National Assembly after being accused of treason by
President Maduro in 2014. She had previously been charged with
conspiracy for funds Sumate received from the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED).\116\
Ms. Machado ran for the National Assembly in 2010 and received the
highest number of votes in the country.\117\ Ms. Machado has been one
of the most vocal critics of President Maduro and the late President
Chavez. She has repeatedly called for the removal of Mr. Maduro by
legal means. In March 2014, after she accepted Panama's invitation to
speak about repression in Venezuela at the Organization of American
States General Assembly, and in response to her vocal support of the
antigovernment protests last year, she was expelled from the National
Assembly.\118\ By arbitrarily ousting Ms. Machado, the government
violated her right to political participation and inhibited free
expression and dissent among the legislature. The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights expressed concern about the reported ``lack
of guarantees to ensure due process in the investigations and
prosecutions'' of Ms. Machado and other members of the opposition.\119\
Further evidence of the government's campaign to silence dissent
and violate the right to political participation came last month, when
the ruling party in the National Assembly moved to strip opposition
party Congressman Julio Borges of his seat.\120\ Legislators called for
an investigation into Mr. Borges, accusing him of conspiring along with
Mr. Ledezma to foment a coup to overthrow President Maduro. The
National Assembly President, Diosdado Cabello, also accused him of
planning to murder Leopoldo Lopez to create chaos.\121\ Like other
opposition leaders accused of plotting to overthrow the government, Mr.
Borges would lose his legislative immunity if expelled from Congress,
and thus could be prosecuted.\122\ The pattern of repression of the
right to political participation thus has a chilling effect on all
Venezuelans who hold dissenting views and wish to advocate for
democratic change.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Boxer, and members of the Subcommittee
on the Western Hemisphere, the disregard by the Venezuelan Government
of the human rights of its people is absolute. The account I have just
presented is only but a fraction of the grave and systematic violations
that are taking place in that country but show the speedy deterioration
of the security and enjoyment of the most basic rights and freedoms of
the Venezuelan people. It is time for the international community to
ensure through multilateral and bilateral efforts that democracy and
the rule of law are respected in Venezuela. In 2001, the hemisphere
adopted the Democratic Charter to address challenges such as the ones
Venezuela is going through. The U.S. Government should work together
with the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR) and the leaders of the region to ensure that
the Democratic Charter is respected.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ According to the information published by the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), only a visit by the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Food was accepted by the Government of
Venezuela in 2011 but it has not yet taken place.
\2\ HRW, ``Venezuela: Human Rights Watch Delegation Expelled,''
September 19, 2008.
\3\ Committee Against Torture (CAT), Concluding Observations:
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, UN Doc. CAT/C/VEN/CO/3-4 (in
Spanish), December 12, 2014, para. 8.
\4\ Law authorizing the President of the Republic to Issue Decrees
with the Level, Strength and Validity of Laws on delegated matters.
Articles 1 and 2. Published in Extraordinary Official Gazette No. 6.112
of November 19, 2013.
\5\ Reuters, ``Venezuela's Maduro seeks decree powers to face U.S.
`imperialism' '', March 10, 2015.
\6\ Resolution No. 008610 of the Ministry of Defense published in
the Official Gazette on January 27, 2015.
\7\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
para. 15.
\8\ The Petrocaribe program established in 2005 by Venezuela is
described as a development cooperation program through energy supply
assistance. Official page of Petrocaribe: http://www.petrocaribe.org/.
\9\ FAO, Progress is proof that hunger can be eliminated, press
release of June 16 2013.
\10\ IACHR, Annual Report 2013, para. 667.
\11\ Aporrea.org, ``Venezuela pide a la FAO apoyo para sistema de
oferta de alimentos,'' June 16, 2013, as cited in IACHR, Annual Report
2013, para. 669.
\12\ Decree No. 8,331 with rank, value and force of Law on Costs
and Fair Prices. Published in Official Gazette No. 39,715, of July 18,
2011.
\13\ CNN, ``Facing shortages, Venezuela takes over toilet paper
factory,'' September 21, 2013.
\14\ Bloomberg, ``Venezuelans Throng Grocery Stores Under Military
Protection,'' January 9 2015.
\15\ U.N., ``Venezuela: U.N. Human Rights Chief Urges Halt to
Violence, Inflammatory Rhetoric,'' Feb. 28, 2014.
\16\ Freedom House.`` Venezuela: Freedom of the Press 2014.''
\17\ Id.
\18\ HRW, ``Venezuela: Legislative Assault on Free Speech, Civil
Society,'' Dec. 22, 2010.
\19\ Freedom House, ``Venezuelan Government Silencing Media During
Protests, Undermining Free Expression,'' Feb. 21, 2014.
\20\ El Nacional, ``300 desempleados ha dejado cierre de
periodicos,'' Feb. 8, 2014.
\21\ Freedom House, ``Venezuelan Government Silencing Media During
Protests, Undermining Free Expression,'' Feb. 21, 2014.
\22\ IACHR ``Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression: 2013,'' OEA/Ser.L/V/II.149 Doc. 50 Dec. 31,
2013.
\23\ IACHR, ``IACHR Expresses Deep Concern over Acts of Violence in
Venezuela and Urges the State to Ensure Democratic Citizen Security,''
press release No. 13 of Feb. 14, 2014.
\24\ Id.
\25\ Freedom House, ``Freedom of the Press 2003: Venezuela.''
\26\ Id.
\27\ Id.
\28\ HRW, ``World Report 2014: Venezuela.''
\29\ Reporters without Borders, ``Venezuela.''
\30\ Reporters without Borders, ``World Press Freedom Index 2014:
Venezuela.''
\31\ Reporters without Borders, ``Venezuela.''
\32\ Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), ``In Venezuela,
Campaign to Silence Press.''
\33\ Id.
\34\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 14.
\35\ Freedom House, ``Venezuelan Government Silencing Media During
Protests, Undermining Free Expression,'' Feb. 21, 2014.
\36\ IACHR., ``Annual Report of the Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression: 2013,'' OEA/Ser.L/V/II.149, Doc.
50, Dec. 31, 2013.
\37\ Id.
\38\ IACHR, ``Office of the Special Rapporteur Expresses Concern
over the Situation of the Freedom of Expression in Venezuela,'' Sept.
22, 2014.
\39\ IACtHR., ``Case of Perozo et al. v. Venezuela'', Series C No.
195, January 28, 2009.
\40\ HRW, ``Venezuela: Unarmed Protestors Beaten, Shot,'' May 5,
2014.
\41\ Resolution No. 008610 of the Ministry of Defense published in
the Official Gazette on January 27, 2015.
\42\ HRW, ``Venezuela: Legislative Assault on Free Speech, Civil
Society,'' Dec. 22, 2010.
\43\ Id.
\44\ Id.
\45\ Id.
\46\ Int'l. Ctr. for Not-for-Profit Law, ``NGO Law Monitor:
Venezuela,'' Dec. 1, 2014.
\47\ See, e.g. Vision Global, ``Capriles: ``Cespa busca ocultar
realidad de los venezolanos,'' 2013. Available (in Spanish). Manzana
Mecanica, ``Venezuela censura Twitter y fortalece CESPA: duro golpe a
la libertad de informacion,'' Feb. 28, 2014.
\48\ IACHR, ``Annual Report 2009: Chapter IV, Human Rights
Developments in the Region: Venezuela,'' OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 51, corr.
1, Dec. 30, 2009.
\49\ Id.
\50\ Id.
\51\ Freedom House, ``Venezuela: Freedom in the World 2013.'' See
also PROVEA, ``Provea rechaza la criminalizaci"n de la protesta y
dvierte sobre la institucionalizaci"n de la mentalidad represiva en la
acci"n de gobierno,'' Feb. 7, 2014.
\52\ Freedom House, ``Freedom of Association Under Threat: The New
Authoritarians' Offensive Against Civil Society.''
\53\ See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[hereinafter ICCPR] art. 21, art. 22(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976; Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 487-488 (2005). See generally Basic
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials (1990), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/
firearms.htm [hereinafter ``Use of force principles"].
\54\ Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials art. 3, G.A.
Res. 34/169 (1979).
\55\ Code of Conduct, art. 3.
\56\ Use of force principles, at 5.
\57\ Use of force principles, at 5.
\58\ IACHR, ``IACHR expresses deep concern over the situation with
respect to the right to peaceful protest, freedom of association and
freedom of expression in Venezuela,'' press release No. 17 of February
21, 2014.
\59\ HRW, ``World Report 2012: Venezuela,'' p. 9.
\60\ Id. at p. 8.
\61\ Amnesty International, ``Venezuela: Human rights at risk amid
protests'' (AMR 53/009/2014), April 1, 2014, p. 5.
\62\ Id. at p. 6.
\63\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 12.
\64\ Id.
\65\ Id. at para. 13.
\66\ HRW, ``World Report 2012: Venezuela,'' p.12.
\67\ IACHR, ``IACHR expresses deep concern over the situation with
respect to the right to peaceful protest, freedom of association and
freedom of expression in Venezuela,'' press release No. 17 of February
21, 2014.
\68\ IACHR, ``IACHR Laments the Death of a Student during Protests
in Venezuela,'' press release no. 22 of March 3, 2015. See also Amnesty
international, public declaration of February 25, 2015 (in Spanish).
\69\ ``Ley Organica del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (2004).
\70\ HRW, Submission to the Human Rights Committee in advance to
its presessional review of Venezuela, July 29 2014.
\71\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 16.
\72\ IACHR, Annual Report 2013, para. 441.
\73\ OHCHR, ``Preocupante la situacion de la justicia en Venezuela,
advierte experto de la ONU,'' July 30, 2009.
\74\ HRW, ``Tightening the Grip: Concentration and Abuse of Power
in Chavez's Venezuela,'' July 2012, pp. 30-36.
\75\ ID at p. 36.
\76\ BBC, ``Venezuela ends house arrest of Judge Maria Afiuni,''
June 14, 2013.
\77\ U.N. News Centre, ``Venezuelan leader violates independence of
judiciary--U.N. rights experts,'' 16 December 2009.
\78\ HRW, ``Tightening the Grip: Concentration and Abuse of Power
in Chavez's Venezuela,'' July 2012, p. 5. See also IACHR, Annual Report
2013, para. 660.
\79\ International Bar Association, ``IBAHRI expresses grave
concern at arrests and further deterioration of rule of law in
Venezuela,'' 18 February 2015.
\80\ OHCHR, U.N. Human Rights Chief urges Venezuela to release
arbitrarily detained protestors and politicians, 20 October 2014.
\81\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 9.
\82\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 9. See also Amnesty International,
Report 2014/15, Venezuela.
\83\ OHCHR, U.N. Human Rights Chief urges Venezuela to release
arbitrarily detained protestors and politicians, 20 October 2014.
\84\ Amnesty International, Venezuela: Trial of opposition leader
Leopoldo Lopez raises concerns about the independence of the justice
system in Venezuela, 21 July 2014.
\85\ Amnesty International, Venezuela: Arrest of local mayor
signals potential ``witch hunt,'' 20 March 2014.
\86\ Opinion Number 26/2014 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)
adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its seventieth
session, August 25-29, 2014, para. 54.
\87\ Id. at para. 55.
\88\ OHCHR, U.N. Human Rights Chief urges Venezuela to release
arbitrarily detained protestors and politicians, 20 October 2014.
\89\ OHCHR, U.N. Human Rights Chief urges Venezuela to release
arbitrarily detained protestors and politicians, 20 October 2014.
\90\ El Pais, ``La policia de Maduro detiene al alcalde opositor de
Caracas,'' February 20, 2015. Available (In Spanish).
\91\ Id.
\92\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 10. See also U.N. Human Rights
Chief urges Venezuela to release arbitrarily detained protestors and
politicians, October 20, 2014.
\93\ Human Rights Watch, ``Punished for Protesting: Rights
Violations in Venezuela's Streets, Detention Centers, and Justice
System'' 2014, pp. 15.
\94\ Id. at p. 17
\95\ Amnesty International, ``Venezuela: Human rights at risk amid
protests'' (AMR 53/009/2014), April 1, 2014.
\96\ ``Muere en prision Rodolfo Gonzalez, opositor detenido en
manifestaciones en Venezuela,'' BBC Mundo, March 13, 2015. Available
(in Spanish).
\97\ ABC.es, `` `La tumba,' siete celdas de tortura en el corazon
de Caracas,'' February 10, 2015.
\98\ IACHR, Resolution 6/2015, Precautionary Measure No 223-13,
``Matter of Lorent Saleh y Gerardo Carrero regarding Venezuela,'' March
2, 2015.
\99\ Id. at para. 16.
\100\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 18.
\101\ See generally CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, December 12, 2014.
\102\ Venezuelan Prisons Observatory. See more information (in
Spanish) at: http://elimpulso.com/articulo/violencia-en-carceles-
venezolanas-dejo-309-reclusos-muertos-en-2014.
\103\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 19.
\104\ Id. at para. 18.
\105\ Juan Carlos Vargas, ``Caso Leopoldo L"pez: Situaci"n actual
del juicio, violaciones de DDHH y pronunciamientos internacionales,''
Acci"n por la Libertad, January 30, 2015 (in Spanish, on file with
author).
\106\ Americas Quarterly, ``Meeting with Vice President Biden
Triggers Alleged Retaliation from Venezuelan Government,'' February 13,
2015.
\107\ El Heraldo, ``Venezuela no previno actos de torturas,"
relator de ONU, March 12, 2015. Available (in Spanish) at:http://
www.elheraldo.co/internacional/venezuela-no-previno-actos-de-torturas-
relator-de-onu-187298.
\108\ See ``Political Participation: A Fundamental Right in Need of
Protection,'' submission by Human Rights Advocates and University of
San Francisco School of Law's International Human Rights Clinic to the
U.N. Human Rights Council.
\109\ U.N. General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
10 December 1948, 217 A (III).
\110\ ICCPR. Ratified by Venezuela on May 10, 1978. Ratified by the
United States of America on June 8, 1992.
\111\ American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S.
Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American
States (1948)
\112\ See, e.g. ``Premio Transparencia 2008 para Leopoldo Lopez,''
October 6, 2008.
\113\ IACtHR, ``Case of Lopez Mendoza v. Venezuela,'' Judgment of
September 1, 2011 (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), Series C No. 233.
\114\ Id.
\115\ See, e.g., Jeremy McDermott, ``Chavez accused of behaving
like `dictator' ahead of elections,'' The Telegraph (UK), November 21,
2008.
\116\ HRW, ``Venezuela: Court Orders Trial of Civil Society
Leaders,'' July 8, 2005.
\117\ Mery Mogollon and Chris Kraul, ``Venezuela elections weaken
Chavez's hold,'' Los Angeles Times, September 28, 2010.
\118\ ``Venezuela opposition congresswoman's mandate revoked,'' BBC
News, March 24 2014.
\119\ IACHR, ``IACHR Expresses Deep Concern over the Situation
regarding the Rule of Law in Venezuela,'' press release No. 15 of
February 24, 2015.
\120\ Sara Schaefer Munoz and Ezequiel Minaya, ``Venezuela Cracks
Down on Dissent,'' Wall Street Journal, February 24, 2015.
\121\ The Star, ``Venezuela's Ruling Socialists Target Another
Opposition Leader,'' February 24, 2015.
\122\ The New York Times, ``Clashes, Tear Gas After Police Kill Boy
at Venezuela Protest'', February 25, 2015.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Mr. Farah.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS FARAH, PRESIDENT, IBI CONSULTANTS, TAKOMA
PARK, MD
Mr. Farah. Thank you, Chairman Rubio, for the chance to be
here today to discuss the accelerating crisis in Venezuela and
its implications for the United States and regional security. I
speak only on behalf of myself, and my views are not
necessarily those of CSIS or IASC.
I want to focus on Venezuela's regional role rather than
its internal problems because I believe this is where the
strategic threat to the United States actually resides.
There is little doubt that Venezuela has, for a decade now,
posed a significant threat not only to U.S. security interests
in the Western Hemisphere but to the survival of democracy and
the rule of law in the region. A recent investigation by Veja,
a respected Brazilian magazine, shows that Venezuela, with the
help of Argentina, actively tried to help Iran's nuclear
program in violation of international sanctions. More than a
dozen Venezuelan officials have been publicly identified by
U.S. law enforcement as being directly involved in drug
trafficking or the support of terrorist groups.
The threat originating in Venezuela is not confined to
Venezuela. The late Hugo Chavez, acting in concert with his
allies, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia,
Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner
in Argentina, set out to redefine the political landscape in
Latin America. And to a large degree, they have been
successful. Unfortunately, the changes wrought under the banner
of ``Socialism for the 21st Century''
have brought massive corruption, rising violence, and
repression. Venezuela is the indisputable leader and primary
axis around which the others revolve.
Venezuela and its allies have moved perilously close to
becoming criminalized states, that is, states where the senior
leadership is involved with, and act in concert with,
transnational organized crime groups as a matter of statecraft.
The Maduro administration is the central component of a
multistate, ongoing criminal enterprise, carried out in concert
with Iran and a growing Russian presence, whose primary
strategic objective is to cling to power by whatever means
necessary and harm the United States and its allies. In this
endeavor, it has embraced the FARC, Hezbollah, ETA of Spain,
the Sinaloa Cartel, and other terrorist and drug trafficking
organizations and--I repeat--as a matter of state policy, not
as rogue elements acting on their own.
The stakes in the unfolding crisis in Venezuela for United
States interests and the survival of democracy in Latin America
are high. The consequences of the growth of this poisonous
Bolivarian criminal enterprise is lethal.
Few understood this better than Alberto Nisman, the
courageous Argentine prosecutor who was investigating the 1994
Iran-backed bombing of the AMIA Jewish Center in Buenos Aires.
Before being murdered on January 18, Nisman had documented the
Bolivarian-Iran ties across the Western Hemisphere, including
two attempted attacks backed by Iran in the United States.
Iran, identified by successive U.S. administrations as a state
sponsor of terror, has expanded its political alliances,
diplomatic presence, trade initiatives, military and
intelligence programs in the Bolivarian axis primarily through
its deep ties with Venezuela.
The Iranian Constitution, first pointed out by Prosecutor
Nisman, is an extraordinary document in which Iran stakes its
claim to world domination in the name of Allah. The preamble to
the Iranian Constitution states: ``With due consideration for
the Islamic Element of the Iranian Revolution, which has been a
movement for the victory of all oppressed peoples who are
confronted with aggressors, this Constitution shall pave the
way for the perpetuation of this revolution within and outside
the country. This Constitution seeks to lay the groundwork for
the creation of a single world nation and perpetuate the
struggle to make this nation a reality for all the world's
needy and oppressed nations.'' That is quite a statement for a
constitution.
This is the country with whom Venezuela and the Bolivarian
states have chosen to align themselves while seeking to
eradicate U.S. influence. U.S. influence is being replaced by a
lethal doctrine of asymmetrical warfare inspired by an
authoritarian government seeking perpetual power and nurtured
by Iran in its overt desire to violently spread its brand of
Islamic revolution.
In addition to serving as a gateway for Iran's presence in
the region, Venezuela has also been the primary conduit for
Russia's growing presence in the region, something that is of
growing concern in our national security community. And I deal
with this at length in my written statement.
In my written testimony, I detail many of the other cases
to substantiate the statements that I make here.
But I want to close with the words of the legendary
Manhattan district attorney, Robert Morgenthau, as he retired
in 2009 after decades of public service, including the pursuit
of numerous and ongoing criminal investigations into the
Venezuelan Government's criminal activities. He said: ``Let
there be no doubt that Hugo Chavez leads not only a corrupt
government but one staffed with terrorist sympathizers. The
government has strong ties to narcotrafficking and money
laundering, and reportedly plays an active role in the
transshipment of narcotics and the laundering of narcotics
proceeds in exchange for payments to corrupt government
officials.'' Under the even less competent hands of Nicolas
Maduro, the situation described by Morgenthau 6 years ago has
grown considerably worse, as has the threat.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas Farah
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer and members of the committee,
thank you for the invitation today to discuss the ongoing and
accelerating crisis in Venezuela and its implications for the United
States and regional security issues. I speak on behalf of only IBI
Consultants and myself. The views are mine and do not necessarily
reflect those of CSIS or IASC.
There is little doubt that Venezuela has for a decade now posed a
significant threat not only to U.S. security interests in the Western
Hemisphere, but to the survival of democracy and the rule of law in the
region. A recent investigation by Veja, a respected Brazilian magazine,
shows that Venezuela, with the help of Argentina, actively tried to
help Iran's nuclear program in violation of international sanctions.\1\
More than a dozen senior Venezuelan officials have been publicly
identified by U.S. officials as being directly involved in supporting
and participating in drug trafficking and support of designated
terrorist groups.
The threat originating in Venezuela is not confined to Venezuela.
The late Hugo Chavez, acting in concert with his allies Rafael Correa
in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua,
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner in Argentina, set out to redefine the
political landscape in Latin America. And to a large degree they have
been successful. Unfortunately the changes wrought under the banner of
``Socialism for the 21st Century'' have brought massive corruption;
rising violence; a disdain for the rule of law; the rise of equating an
individual leader as the state (``Chavez is Venezuela''); a significant
and ongoing, concerted effort to silence peaceful opposition and
independent media; and collapse of institutions designed to guarantee
oversight and transparency of public individuals and entities.
My testimony will focus on this alliance, of which Venezuela is the
indisputable leader and primary axis around which the others revolve.
However, and this is what presents the greater strategic threat
emanating from Venezuela, it is not acting alone, but in concert with
multiple other nations.
Venezuela and its allies have moved perilously close to being
``criminalized states,'' that is, states where the senior leadership is
aware of and involved and act on behalf of the state, with
transnational organized crime (TOC), where TOC is used as an instrument
of statecraft, and where levers of state power are incorporated into
the operational structure of one or more TOC groups.\2\ The Maduro
administration is the central component to a multistate ongoing
criminal enterprise, carried out in concert with Iran and a growing
Russian presence, whose primary strategic objective is to cling to
power by whatever means necessary and harm the United States and its
allies.
Democracy was far from perfect before the advent of the
``Bolivarian Revolution,'' as Chavez defined his movement. Many of the
region's countries were emerging from years of brutal and repressive
military dictatorship, many of them backed by the United States. The
new electoral systems were often rigid, exclusive and corrupt. However,
rather than bringing about necessary reforms, Chavez created a system
that has completely corrupted the electoral system, institutionalized
massive corruption, criminalized nonviolent dissent, and made common
cause with transnational terrorist and drug trafficking organizations.
Beginning with the Chavez government and continuing into the Maduro
administration Venezuela has actively pursued an official military
doctrine that embraces the use of weapons of mass destruction against
the United States.\3\
The stakes in the unfolding crisis in Venezuela for U.S. interests
and the survival of democracy in Latin America are high. The
consequences of the growth of the poisonous Bolivarian criminal
enterprise are lethal.
Few understood this better than Alberto Nisman, the courageous
Argentine prosecutor who was investigating the 1994 Iran-backed bombing
of the AMIA Jewish center in Buenos Aires. Before being murdered on
January 18 Nisman had documented the Bolivarian-Iran actions across the
Western Hemisphere, including two attempted attacks backed by Iran in
the United States. The week before his death, Nisman had formally
accused Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and senior
members of her inner circle of illegally seeking to cut to hide Iran's
role in the AMIA case in exchange for oil to relieve Argentina's
chronic fuel shortages. The warming relationship between Iran and
Argentina was directly brokered by Venezuelan leaders. Whether or not
the Argentine or Iranian government had direct roles in the unsolved
murder of Nisman, the three nations together clearly created a climate
in which he could be killed with impunity.\4\
As the Veja investigation shows, Venezuela was a key player in the
efforts of Iran to reestablish nuclear ties to Argentina, and that such
a relationship was of primary interest to the Iranians.\5\ Because of
the high value Iran placed on the acquisition of nuclear technology,
Chavez promised to personally request Argentina's help, and to do so
immediately.\6\
In addition nuclear overtures, Venezuela and Argentina have
developed an elaborate and opaque mechanism for transferring millions
of dollars in funds between the two nations with no oversight or
accountability. One of the primary mechanisms was a program called
``200 Socialist Factories,'' (200 Fabricas Socialistas). Venezuelan
Government documents show that this program, although producing few
functioning factories and even fewer economic benefits, allowed for
direct Iranian participation in the ventures, most likely as a way of
moving money that otherwise would be frozen under international
financial sanctions.\7\
Of concern to the United States should be the stated policy of the
Bolivarian bloc of nations to break the traditional ties of the region
to the United States. To this end, the Bolivarian alliance has formed
numerous organizations and military alliances--including a military
academy in Bolivia to erase the vestiges of U.S. military training--
which explicitly exclude the United States.\8\
U.S. influence is being replaced by a lethal doctrine of
asymmetrical warfare, inspired by authoritarian governments seeking
perpetual power and nurtured by Iran. Through an interlocking and
rapidly expanding network of official Web sites, publishing houses,
think tanks and military academies, the governments of Venezuela,
Argentina, and Cuba have created a dominant narrative that identifies
the United States as the primary threat to Latin America.
A constant in the narrative, and a particular favorite of the late
Chavez, is that a U.S. invasion is imminent and unavoidable. This is
because the alleged United States policy is based on pillaging the
region's natural resources, toppling the revolutionary regimes leading
the march to Latin American independence, and subjugating its citizens.
This preposterous narrative is often used by Maduro to justify the
repressive and illegal arrest of opposition leaders who are held for
months and years without trial or charges, as alleged accomplices in
the fabricated crimes.
This narrative has long been a part of the Latin American
landscape, shaped by mass movements, armed insurgencies and Marxist
ideologies, and based on the turbulent history of relations between the
United States and the region. What is different now is the overt
multigovernment sponsorship of the effort and the official adoption of
these positions as policy and doctrine. This gives the current campaign
deeper roots and access to levers of state power.
As discussed at length below, Iran, identified by successive U.S.
administrations as a state sponsor of terrorism, has expanded its
political alliances, diplomatic presence, trade initiatives, and
military and intelligence programs in the Bolivarian axis, primarily
through the deep ties with Venezuela.
In 2012 the United States intelligence community assessed that
Iranian leadership was more willing to launch a terrorist attack inside
the Homeland in response to perceived threats from the United
States.\9\
In 2013 the Argentine prosecutor Nisman released a report
documenting through little-studied reports, informants, and the Iranian
media, how official Iran state policy embraced assassination and
terror, something which it never tried to hide and has never recanted,
and the role of Venezuela in Iran's strategy.
Many of the assumptions undergirding Prosecutor Nisman's work were
drawn directly from the Iranian Constitution, an extraordinary document
in which Iran stakes its claim to world domination in the name of
Allah. It is worth a somewhat extended review here, given the repeated
statements of solidary with Iran and its revolution by Venezuelan
leaders. The preamble to the Iranian Constitution states:
With due consideration for the Islamic Element of the Iranian
Revolution, which has been a movement for the victory of all
oppressed peoples who are confronted with aggressors, the
constitution shall pave the way for perpetuation of this
revolution within and outside the country, particularly in
terms of the expansion of international relationships with
other Islamic and popular movements. The Constitution seeks to
lay the groundwork for the creation of a single world nation .
. . and perpetuate the struggle to make this nation a reality
for all the world's needy and oppressed nations.
It goes on to say that:
In establishing and equipping the country's defense forces,
we will allow for the fact that faith and ideology constitute
the foundation and the criterion we must adhere to. Therefore,
the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran and troops of the
Revolutionary Guard will be created in accordance with the
objective mentioned above, and will be entrusted with the task
not only of protecting and preserving our borders, but also an
ideological mission, that is to say, Jihad in the name of Allah
and the world.\10\
Shortly after Nisman's 2013 report the U.S. Department of State
issued a congressionally mandated report on Iran's activities in Latin
America which completely ignored Nisman's fieldwork, as well as
dissenting views within the U.S. government--most notably U.S. Southern
Command, which has military responsibility for the region. Instead the
State Department concluded that, while Iran's interest in Latin America
``is of concern,'' Iranian ``influence in Latin America and the
Caribbean is waning.'' \11\ In September 2014 the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) issued a sharp critique of the State
Department effort, noting the report only fully addressed 2 of the 12
issues raised, while partially addressing 6 issues, and leaving 4
completely unaddressed.\12\
In addition to serving as a gateway for Iran's presence in the
region, Venezuela has also been the primary conduit for Russia's
growing presence in the region, something of growing concern.
Riding on the wave of radical anti-U.S. populism sponsored by
Venezuela, Russia is now firmly allied with the ranks of Latin
America's populist, authoritarian and virulently anti-American leaders
of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America--(Alianza
Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America--ALBA). The Putin
government is providing ALBA nations with weapons, police and military
training and equipment, nuclear technology, oil exploration equipment,
financial assistance, and an influential friend on the United Nations
Security Council and other international forums.
In return, these allies are shielding Russia from international
isolation, providing political and diplomatic support, and an important
regional media network--both traditional and social--that offers
unstinting support for Putin while casting the United States as the
global aggressor. At the same time, ALBA countries are increasing
Russia's access to the hemisphere's ports and airspace, and ultimately,
increasing Russia's sphere of influence in a region where the United
States has seldom been so challenged.\13\
Gen. John Kelly, the commander of the U.S. Southern Command, in his
2015 testimony before Congress, noted Russia's growing activities in
Latin America were part of a global strategy of using ``power
projection in an attempt to erode U.S. leadership and challenge U.S.
influence in the Western Hemisphere . . . Russia has courted Cuba,
Venezuela and Nicaragua to gain access to air bases and ports of supply
for Russian naval assets and strategic bombers operating in the Western
Hemisphere.'' \14\
Where the Russian state establishes a presence, Russian organized
crime invariably follows. The immediate consequence is the rapid
increase in cocaine flows from Latin America to Russia, and the former
Soviet Union, with almost all of the cocaine originating from countries
that Russia vehemently supports--Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and
Bolivia.\15\
The FARC,\16\ the hemisphere's oldest and largest insurgency and
designated drug trafficking and terrorist organization by both the
United States and European Union \17\, remains at the center of a
multitude of criminal enterprises and terrorist activities that stretch
from Colombia south to Argentina, and northward to Central America and
into direct ties to the Mexican drug cartels, primarily the Sinaloa
organization. Despite ongoing peace talks with the government over the
past 2 years, the insurgency remains involved in the massive laundering
of drug money, and recent cases by the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) have shown the direct and growing criminal drug ties of the FARC
and Hezbollah.
Following the model pioneered by Iran and Hezbollah, senior
Venezuelan military and political leaders have allowed the FARC to
traffic cocaine through Venezuela to West Africa, sharing in the
profits. Almost every major shipment of cocaine to West Africa that
U.S. law enforcement officials have been able to trace back have
originated from or passed through Venezuelan territory.\18\
Under the protection of the Governments of Venezuela, Ecuador,
Nicaragua and Bolivia--as well as powerful friends in El Salvador and
Panama--the FARC maintains a robust international infrastructure that
is producing and moving thousands of kilos of cocaine and laundering
hundreds of millions of dollars. It has emerged as a pioneer hybrid
criminal-terrorist insurgency, using drug money to sustain an
ideological movement. Over time the ideology has faded and the FARC has
become much more of a business enterprise, helping to enrich its
leadership and the leadership of the regional governments it supports.
As one study of internal FARC documents, noted: ``When Chavez
became President of Venezuela in February 1999, FARC had not only
enjoyed a relationship with him for at least some of the previous seven
years but had also penetrated and learned how to best use Venezuelan
territory and politics, manipulating and building alliances with new
and traditional Venezuelan political sectors, traversing the Colombia-
Venezuela border in areas ranging from coastal desert to Amazonian
jungle and building cooperative relationships with the Venezuelan armed
forces. Once Chavez was inaugurated, Venezuelan border security and
foreign policies shifted in the FARC's favor.'' \19\
In this context there is also growing evidence that the Venezuela
Government under Chavez and Maduro is actively promoting drug
trafficking and TOC/terrorist groups, particularly the FARC and
Hezbollah.\20\ Perhaps the strongest public evidence of the importance
of Venezuela to the FARC is the public designation of three of senior
government officials by the U.S Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC).
OFAC said the three--Hugo Armando Carvajal, director of Venezuelan
Military Intelligence; Henry de Jesus Rangel, director of the
Venezuelan Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services; and
Ramon Emilio Rodriguez Chacin, former Minister of Justice and former
Minister of Interior--were responsible for ``materially supporting the
FARC, a narcoterrorist organization.'' It specifically accused Carvajal
and Rangel of protecting FARC cocaine shipments moving through
Venezuela, and said Rodriguez Chacin, who resigned his government
position just a few days before the designations, was the ``Venezuelan
Government's main weapons contact for the FARC.'' \21\
In November 2010, Rangel was promoted to the overall commander of
the Venezuelan Armed Forces \22\ and in January 2012 was named Defense
Minister as part of Chavez's promotion of close associates tied to drug
trafficking and the FARC.\23\ In July 2014 Carvajal was detained in
Aruba because of a U.S. indictment against him for drug trafficking in
support of the FARC. Aruban authorities released him before he could be
extradited. He received as a conquering hero when he returned to
Venezuela.\24\
As legendary Manhattan district attorney Robert M. Morgenthau
warned as he left public service in 2009 after decades of public
service, including pursuit of numerous (and ongoing) criminal
investigations into the Chavez government's role in TOC: ``. . . [L]et
there be no doubt that Hugo Chavez leads not only a corrupt government
but one staffed by terrorist sympathizers. The government has strong
ties to narcotrafficking and money laundering, and reportedly plays an
active role in the transshipment of narcotics and the laundering of
narcotics proceeds in exchange for payments to corrupt government
officials.'' \25\
OFAC charges were buttressed by three other developments: A public
presentation of Colombian intelligence on FARC camps in Venezuela and
the meeting of high-level FARC commanders with senior Venezuelan
officials, delivered at a session of the Organization of American
States in July 2010; \26\ the public release of an analysis of all the
FARC documents--captured by the Colombian military from the March 1,
2008, killing of senior FARC commander Raul Reyes--by a respected
British security think that outlined some of the same ties; \27\ and
the public statements of Walid Makled, a Venezuelan who was formally
designated a drug kingpin by the U.S. Government.
Arrested by Colombian police after he fled Venezuela, Makled was
eventually extradited back to Venezuela. Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York, dubbed Makeld, also known as
``The Turk,'' a ``king among kingpins.'' While in Colombian custody
Makled gave multiple interviews and showed documents that he claimed
showed he acquired control of one of Venezuela's main ports, as well as
an airline used for cocaine trafficking, but paying millions of dollars
in bribes to senior Venezuelan official.
According the U.S. indictment against him, Makled exported at least
10 tons of cocaine a month to the United States by keeping more than 40
Venezuelan generals and senior government officials on his payroll.
``All my business associates are generals. The highest,'' Makled said.
``I am telling you, we dispatched 300,000 kilos of coke. I couldn't
have done it without the top of the government.'' \28\ What added
credibility to Makled's claims were the documents he presented showing
what appear to be the signatures of several generals and senior
Ministry of Interior officials accepting payment from Makled. ``I have
enough evidence to justify the invasion of Venezuela'' as a criminal
state, he said.\29\
There is growing evidence of the merging of the Bolivarian
Revolution's criminal-terrorist pipeline activities and those of the
criminal-terrorist pipeline of radical Islamist groups (Hezbollah in
particular) supported by the Iranian regime. The possibility opens a
series of new security challenges for the United States and its allies
in Latin America.
Among the cases that provide evidence of these ties are:
In 2008, OFAC designated senior Venezuelan diplomats for
facilitating the funding of Hezbollah.
One of those designated, Ghazi Nasr al Din, served as the charge
d'affaires of the Venezuelan Embassy in Damascus, and then
served in the Venezuelan Embassy in London. According to the
OFAC statement in late January 2008, al Din facilitated the
travel of two Hezbollah representatives of the Lebanese
Parliament to solicit donations and announce the opening of a
Hezbollah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela.
The second individual, Fawzi Kan'an, is described as a
Venezuela-based Hezbollah supporter and a ``significant
provider of financial support to Hezbollah.'' He met with
senior Hezbollah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational
issues, including possible kidnappings and terrorist
attacks.\30\
In April 2009, police in the island country of Curacao
arrested 17 people for alleged involvement in cocaine
trafficking with some of the proceeds being funneled through
Middle Eastern banks to Hezbollah.\31\
A July 6, 2009, indictment of Jamal Yousef in the U.S.
Southern District of New York alleges that the defendant, a
former Syrian military officer arrested in Honduras, sought to
sell weapons to the FARC--weapons he claimed came from
Hezbollah and were to be provided by a relative in Mexico.\32\
Such a relationship between nonstate and state actors provides
numerous benefits to both. In Latin America, for example, the FARC
gains access to Venezuelan territory without fear of reprisals; it
gains access to Venezuelan identification documents; and, perhaps most
importantly, access to routes for exporting cocaine to Europe and the
United States--while using the same routes to import quantities of
sophisticated weapons and communications equipment. In return, the
Venezuelan Government offers state protection, and reaps rewards in the
form of financial benefits for individuals as well as institutions,
derived from the cocaine trade.
Iran, whose banks, including its central bank, are largely barred
from the Western financial systems, benefits from access to the
international financial market through Venezuelan, Ecuadoran, and
Bolivian financial institutions, which act as proxies by moving Iranian
money as if it originated in their own, unsanctioned financial
systems.\33\ Venezuela also agreed to provide Iran with 20,000 barrels
of gasoline per day, leading to U.S. sanctions against the state
petroleum company.\34\
There is now a significant body of evidence showing the FARC's
operational alliance with Hezbollah and Hezbollah allies based in
Venezuela under the protection of the Maduro government, to which
relatively little attention has been paid.
A clear example of the breadth of the emerging alliances among
criminal and terrorist groups was Operation Titan, executed by
Colombian and U.S. officials beginning in 2008. Colombian and U.S.
officials, after a 2-year investigation, dismantled a drug trafficking
organization that stretched from Colombia to Panama, Mexico, West
Africa, the United States, Europe and the Middle East. The operation
then continued on for several more years as part of the Lebanese-
Canadian National Bank case.
Colombian and U.S. officials say that one of the key money
launderers in the structure, Chekry Harb, AKA ``Taliban'' acted as the
central go-between among Latin American drug trafficking organizations
(DTOs) and Middle Eastern radical groups, primarily Hezbollah. Among
the groups participating together in Harb's operation in Colombia were
members of the Northern Valley Cartel, right-wing paramilitary groups
and the FARC.
While there has been little public acknowledgement of the Hezbollah
ties to Latin American transnational organized crime (TOC) groups,
recent indictments based on DEA cases point to the growing overlap of
the groups. In December 2011, U.S. officials charged Ayman Joumaa, an
accused Lebanese drug kingpin and Hezbollah financier, of smuggling
tons of U.S.-bound cocaine and laundering hundreds of millions of
dollars with the Zetas cartel of Mexico, while operating in Panama,
Colombia, the DRC and elsewhere.
``Ayman Joumaa is one of top guys in the world at what he does:
international drug trafficking and money laundering,'' a U.S. antidrug
official said. ``He has interaction with Hezbollah. There's no
indication that it's ideological. It's business.'' \35\ Joumaa was tied
to broader case of massive money laundering case that led to the
collapse of the Lebanese Canadian Bank, one of the primary financial
institutions used by Hezbollah to finance its worldwide activities.
Another little-studied aspect of Venezuela's vast financial network
is the use of PDVSA, the state oil company, to move hundreds of
millions of dollars, with no legal financial backing, through its
friends and allies in the Petrocaribe association, which was
established by Chavez as a way to provide subsidized oil to poorer
countries in the region. Under the construct, the receiving country is
supposed to pay for 50 percent of the oil deliveries at market prices
on delivery and pay for the other 50 percent over a 22-year period at a
2-percent interest rate.
Yet the numbers don't add up in Central America's strongest
Bolivarian members, Nicaragua and El Salvador. Hundreds of millions of
dollars are received and spent with no auditing, no accountability and
generally no trace.
The decision made by the leadership of the governing Sandinista
party (FSLN )in Nicaragua and the governing Farabundo Marti (FMLN) in
El Salvador, to work with the ALBA bloc of nations \36\ and their
nonstate allies such as the FARC in Colombia to move hundreds of
millions of dollars in untraceable ways through interconnected state
oil companies, sets them apart from other Central American nations.
While Venezuela's oil exports plummet and the price of oil has
collapsed, these two governments receive ever-larger amounts of cash
that is untraceable.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In El Salvador, the governing FMLN controls ALBA Petroleos, which
is 60 percent owned by PDVSA. President Salvador Sanchez Ceren is a
member of the ALBA leadership and former guerrilla commander with close
ties to the FARC. According to public statements of FMLN leaders such
as Jose Luis Merino, \37\ ALBA Petroleos began with $1 million from
PDVSA in 2007 and by the end 2013 had revenues of $862 million, with no
explanation for the massive growth.\38\ Merino, who is a senior ALBA
Petroleos advisor, publicly stated that he knew that ``many people are
nervous because ALBA Petroleos was born 6 or 7 years ago with $1
million and now has $400 million. Let me correct myself, $800 million,
and we are trying to change the lives of Salvadorans.'' \39\
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
One of the signature programs of ALBA in Nicaragua was to have been
the construction of a large oil refinery. Named the ``Supreme Dream of
Bolivar'' (Sueno Supremo de Bolivar), the refinery received $32 million
in startup funding in 2008 and an additional $60 million over the
following 3 years. In 2012 the program received an additional $141.2
million.
Yet all that is visible of the $237.2 million dollar investment is
an empty field of compact earth with the flagstaffs bearing the flags
of Nicaragua, Venezuela, Cuba, and ALBA. Construction machinery has
remained idle at the site for 3 years.\40\
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
These last few cases, though far afield from Venezuela, constitute
a key part of Venezuela's reach across the hemisphere and its ability
to create corrupt structures, move well over $1 billion a year in
unaccounted funds, and support criminal and terrorist organizations.
These massive financial flows serve to corrupt the state, shield
officials from accountability, create enormous ``slush funds'' for the
governments to act without transparency, and are undermine the rule of
law. They may also be of significant aid to drug trafficking and
terrorist organizations.
As I noted earlier, Venezuela's ongoing state-sponsored criminal
activities and ties to terrorist organizations are not confined to
Venezuela. Rather, Venezuela has made itself the hub of a multinational
criminal enterprise that has tentacles across the hemisphere, and that
receives the active support of Iran, Russia and other nations that have
a declared hostile intent toward the United States. This is the direct
threat posed by Venezuela and its ongoing crisis.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ Leonardo Courinho, ``Chavistas confirmam conspiracao denuciada
por Nisman,'' Veja, March 14, 2015.
\2\ This definition is drawn from my study of transnational
organized crime in Latin America. For a full discussion see: Douglas
Farah, Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized
States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security
Priority (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, August 2012).
\3\ The primary text outlining this philosophy, from which Chavez
adopted his military doctrine is Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary
Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerra
Periferica y el Islam Revolucionario: Origenes, Reglas y Etica de la
Guerra Asimetrica ) by the Spanish politician and ideologue Jorge
Verstrynge. The tract is a continuation of and exploration of convicted
terrorist Ilich Sanchez Ramirez's thoughts, incorporating an explicit
endorsement of the use of weapons of mass destruction to destroy the
United States. Verstrynge argues for the destruction of United States
through series of asymmetrical attacks like those of 9/11, in the
belief that the United States will simply crumble when its vast
military strength cannot be used to combat its enemies.
Although he is not a Muslim, and the book was not written
directly in relation to the Venezuelan experience, Verstrynge moves
beyond Sanchez Ramirez to embrace all strands of radical Islam for
helping to expand the parameters of what irregular warfare should
encompass, including the use of biological and nuclear weapons, along
with the correlated civilian casualties among the enemy.
\4\ For a fuller discussion of the Nisman murder see: Douglas
Farah, ``The Murder of Alberto Nisman: How the Government of Cristina
Fernandez de Kirchner created the environment for a perfect crime,"
International Assessment and Strategy Center, March 2015. For a fuller
discussion of the triangulation efforts of Iran, Venezuela and
Argentina in the nuclear program, see: Courihno, op cit.; Douglas
Farah, ``Back to the Future: Argentina Unravels," International
Assessment and Strategy Center, February 2013.
\5\ It is important to remember that throughout the 1970s until
1993 Argentina had a robust nuclear relationship with Iran, and the
current Iranian reactors were retrofitted and upgraded with Argentine
nuclear technology. Nisman, in his indictment of Iranian leaders for
planning the AMIA bombing, stated that a major trigger for Iran's
decision to blow up the AMIA building was the decision by Argentina,
under pressure from the U.S. and Europe, to pause its nuclear
cooperation with Iran. In addition to the Veja article, see: Kaveh L.
Afrasiabi, ``Iran Looks to Argentina for nuclear fuel," Asia Times,
November 6, 2009.
\6\ Courinho, op. cit.
\7\ Documents in possession of the author.
\8\ These include recently founded Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribenos-
CELAC), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
(Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America-ALBA).
\9\ James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence,
``Unclassified Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of
the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, January 31, 2012, p. 6.
\10\ Translation of the Iranian Constitution of 1979 provided by
the University of Nevada Las Vegas.
\11\ U.S. Department of State, ``Annex A: Unclassified Summary of
Policy Recommendations,'' June 2013. Most of the seven-page report was
classified.
\12\ United States Government Accountability Office, ``Combatting
Terrorism: Strategy to Counter Iran in the Western Hemisphere Has Gaps
that State Department Should Address,'' September 2014, p. 8.
\13\ Douglas Farah and Liana Eustacia Reyes, ``Russia in Latin
America: A Strategic Challenge,'' University of Miami, Center for
Hemispheric Policy, January 15, 2015.
\14\ ``Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States
Marine Corps, Commander United States Southern Command Before the 114th
Congress Senate Armed Services Committee,'' March 12, 2015.
\15\ For the most comprehensive look at Russian Organized Crime in
Latin America, see: Bruce Bagley, ``Globalization, Ungoverned Spaces
and Transnational Organized Crime in the Western Hemisphere: The
Russian Mafia,'' paper prepared for International Studies Association,
Honolulu, Hawaii, March 2, 2005.
\16\ ``Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia'' (Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia).
\17\ ``FARC Terrorist Indicted for 2003 Grenade Attack on Americans
in Colombia,'' Department of Justice Press Release, September 7, 2004,
and: Official Journal of the European Union, Council Decision of Dec.
21, 2005.
\18\ Author interviews with Drug Enforcement Administration and
National Security Council officials. For example two aircraft carrying
more than 500 kilos of cocaine that were stopped in Guinea Bissau after
arriving from Venezuela. See: ``Bissau Police Seize Venezuelan cocaine
smuggling planes,'' Agence France Presse, July 19, 2008.
\19\ ``The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives
of `Raul Reyes,' '' International Institute for Strategic Studies,''
May 2011.
\20\ The strongest documentary evidence of Chavez's support for the
FARC comes from the Reyes documents, which contained the internal
communications of senior FARC commanders with senior Venezuelan
officials, discussing everything from security arrangements in hostage
exchanges to the possibility of joint training exercises and the
purchasing of weapons. For full details of these documents and their
interpretation, see: ``The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the
Secret Archives of `Raul Reyes,' '' op cit.
\21\ ``Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Support of
the FARC,'' U.S. Treasury Department Office of Public Affairs, Sept.
12, 2008. The designations came on the heels of the decision of the
Bolivian Government of Evo Morales to expel the U.S. Ambassador,
allegedly for supporting armed movements against the Morales
government. In solidarity, Chavez then expelled the U.S. Ambassador to
Venezuela. In addition to the designations of the Venezuelan officials,
the United States also expelled the Venezuelan and Bolivian Ambassadors
to Washington.
\22\ ``Chavez Shores up Military Support,'' Stratfor, November 12,
2010.
\23\ ``Venezuela: Asume Nuevo Ministro De Defensa Acusado de Narco
por EEUU,'' Agence France Presse, January 17, 2012.
\24\ ``Venezuela gives `hero's welcome' to freed Carvajal,'' BBC
News, July 28, 2014.
\25\ Robert M. Morgenthau, ``The Link Between Iran and Venezuela: A
Crisis in the Making,'' speech at the Brookings Institution, September
8, 2009.
\26\ ``Colombia, Venezuela: Another Round of Diplomatic Furor,''
Strafor, July 29, 2010.
\27\ The FARC Files: ``Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives
of `Raul Reyes,' '' An IISS Strategic Dossier, International Institute
for Strategic Studies, May 2011.
\28\ The Colombian decision to extradite Makled to Venezuela rather
than the United States caused significant tension between the two
countries and probably means that the bulk of the evidence he claims to
possess will never see the light of day. Among the documents he
presented in prison were checks of his cashed by senior generals and
government officials and videos of what appear to be senior government
officials in his home discussing cash transactions. For details of the
case see: Jose de Cordoba and Darcy Crowe, ``U.S. Losing Big Drug
Catch,'' The Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2011; ``Manhattan U.S.
Attorney Announces Indictment of one of World's Most Significant
Narcotics Kingpins,'' United States Attorney, Southern District of New
York, November 4, 2010.
\29\ ``Makled: Tengo suficientes pruebas sobre corrupcion y
narcotrafico para que intervengan a Venezuela,'' NTN24 TV (Colombia),
April 11, 2011.
\30\ ``Treasury Targets Hizbullah in Venezuela,'' United States
Department of Treasury Press Center, June 18, 2008.
\31\ Orlando Cuales, ``17 arrested in Curacao on suspicion of drug
trafficking links with Hezbollah,'' Associated Press, April 29, 2009
\32\ United States District Court, Southern District of New York,
The United States of America v Jamal Yousef, Indictment, July 6, 2009.
\33\ For a look at how the Ecuadoran and Venezuelan banks function
as proxies for Iran, particularly the Economic Development Bank of
Iran, sanctioned for its illegal support of Iran's nuclear program, and
the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, see: Farah and Simpson, op cit.
\34\ Office of the Spokesman, ``Seven Companies Sanctioned Under
Amended Iran Sanctions Act,'' U.S. Department of State, May 24, 2011.
\35\ Sebastian Rotella, ``Government says Hezbollah Profits From
U.S. Cocaine Market via Link to Mexican Cartel,'' ProPublica, December
11, 2011.
\36\ The name is derived from former Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez's desire to recreate the original country created by South
American liberator Simon Bolivar, which included Venezuela, Colombia,
Panama, Bolivia and Ecuador. Chavez dubbed his movement, which has
relied heavily on the FARC both for financing and as a nonstate armed
actor, the Bolivarian Revolution. The radical populist bloc is formally
known as ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
or Alianza Bolivariana Para los Pueblos de Nuestro America. It members
include Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Jamaica, the Dominican
Republic and El Salvador.
\37\ Merino, better known by his nom de guerre Ramiro Vasquez, was
a Communist Party urban commando during El Salvador's civil war and
carried out a number of high profile kidnappings both during and after
the war. He was a well-known weapons provider to the FARC. His
relationship with the FARC leadership, as well as the Chavez
government, were well documented in captured FARC documents, where he
is identified as ``Ramiro the Salvadoran.''
\38\ These figures are taken from ALBA Petroleos official financial
filings.
\39\ ``Jose Luis Merino defiende a Alba Petroleos por ataques de
ANEP,'' Verdad Digital, October 31, 2013.
\40\ For an more comprehensive look at the refinery project and
interesting graphics see: Jose Denis Curz, ``El Supremo Sueno de
Bolivar no avanza,'' La Prensa (Nicaragua), March 25, 2013.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, all three, for being here.
Let me start with you, Dr. Sabatini. I wanted to ask you
why--you have shared in your testimony something that Senator
Boxer brought up earlier, and that is the silence of
communities in Latin America and in the Western Hemisphere to
what is happening in Venezuela. You compared it to the Honduran
case that occurred back in 2009, if I am correct, and how that
was met. Why, in your mind, is--why the silence from virtually
everyone in the hemisphere with the exception of President
Santos who condemned a specific arrest. But why the silence?
Dr. Sabatini. It is a good question, Senator. I have
several theories.
I think first there has occurred in the last 10 years a
proliferation of new regional organizations, led primarily by
Brazil. There is a South American union, UNASUR. Then there is
the Latin American-Caribbean union, CELAC. Both of those are
intended to sort of marginalize the United States from those
discussions. And not to wax too academic here, but those
institutions actually lack a fundamental element of a
multilateral institution. They do not ask their member
countries to surrender any part of their sovereignty for a
larger collective good. If you look at their founding
documents, if you look at their statements, they always talk
about how national sovereignty is supreme.
So I actually think that we have gone backward in the
region. We talk about popular sovereignty. We are back to the
point when Latin American countries assert this principle of
nonintervention, which can have very dangerous consequences
because that principle of popular sovereignty evolved after
World War II to protect the horrendous things that happened in
Nazi Germany. So I think, first of all, there has been actually
a philosophical institutional shift within the region.
Second, I think that the region simply does not want to
have the United States involved, and it is actively seeking to
marginalize to do that. To give an example and to refer to what
was said earlier about the need for election observation, be
very careful. UNASUR's election observation program explicitly
says that they are there to accompany--to accompany--the
electoral commission which, if your electoral commission is
vitiated or politicized, means you are just going there as a
rubber stamp. So it is very important who monitors those
elections.
And on the last point, there is certainly a level of
ideological sympathy and affinity with a number of these
governments which is a shame because while I believe Dilma
Rousseff and the PT may be genuinely leftist, even a social
democratic government, basically Venezuela is a military
government led by a group of thugs. But unfortunately, they
cannot make that distinction.
And last point, there are also very tight economic
relations between--Brazil benefits deeply from agricultural
exports, investment in infrastructure, and other things that
sort of have made it very, very difficult to break its ties
with Venezuela.
Senator Rubio. Dr. Sabatini, you also talked and touched
upon the drug trade. And as we know, if you watch the flights
that come out of Colombia and South America and inner Central
America and ultimately are transited into the United States,
many of them over-fly Venezuela. It is hard to believe that
those flights are occurring without the knowledge of someone in
Venezuela. In fact, the allegations and some of the proof is
very clear that the Venezuelan Government actually allows these
flights to pay for protection money in exchange for being able
to use airspace in Venezuela. If you do not pay the protection
money, you may be shot down. If you pay the protection money to
either a corrupt individual or to the Maduro government, you
can over-fly that airspace. Is that an accurate assessment of
the role Venezuela is playing in the drug trade?
Dr. Sabatini. That is a very accurate assessment. If you
look at a map, basically Venezuela is crosshatched by flights
that are coming from Colombia or leaving from Venezuela mostly
to go to West Africa but now increasingly going to the
Caribbean, again raising two points. One is why Venezuela is--
as you say, since it is so closely tied to the drug trade at a
state level and particularly at a military level, why this is a
security risk to the region. And so Brazil and other countries
ignore what is going on at their own peril. They will be most
affected. And not coincidentally, one of the highest per capita
consumers of cocaine today is Brazil.
Senator Rubio. Mr. Canton, you described a Venezuela where
there is no freedom of expression, where there is no freedom of
assembly and association, where there is a lack of any sort of
judicial independence, where there are arrests and detentions
of opponents of the government, where there is degrading and
cruel treatment of those opponents when imprisoned. Going
deeper than that, we know that if you are a member of the
opposition, you have virtually no access to the airwaves, no
independent press. They are denied things like bulk paper
imports. So they cannot even print. You are forced to sell to
owners that are friendly to the regime.
Just a moment ago, I struggled to get the Department of
State of the United States to acknowledge that Venezuela was no
longer a democracy. In essence, democracy is more than just
elections. Why should I continue to consider what they have in
Venezuela today as a democracy given the fact that beyond
having an election, which may or may not be even valid in some
cases because of manipulation of the ballot, all the other
underlying conditions of a democracy are not present? In
essence, there cannot be a democracy unless both sides have
free and fair access to the people who vote. Is Venezuela still
a democracy?
Mr. Canton. That is an excellent question. It is more
academic than practical to some extent.
Maduro is the President elected by the popular vote, and
nobody can argue against that. Maybe someone can argue that the
elections were not free and fair. That is a possibility because
he won only for 1.5. But he was elected by the popular vote.
All the other conditions of democracy are not there. I
completely agree with you on that aspect. There is no
independence of the judiciary. Legislation is just a rubber
stamp institution. And there is constantly violations of human
rights in the country.
Senator Rubio. I am sorry. Let me rephrase my question this
way. And I get your point.
Let us assume--and I do not. I do not accept this, but let
us assume that the election was free and fair. Is Nicolas
Maduro today governing Venezuela as a democrat?
Mr. Canton. No, absolutely not. And rather than using the
word ``democracy'' that can give space for ambiguity, I would
say there is absolutely no rule of law in Venezuela.
Senator Rubio. So formally on paper and institutionally,
Venezuela has a democratic form of government. In how it is
being governed today, it is no longer being governed as a
democracy.
Mr. Canton. Correct.
Senator Rubio. And then, Mr. Farah, I wanted to talk to you
about the national security aspects of this. Actually before I
go to you, let me just finish this with Mr. Canton.
I know you did not get to it or could not get to it in your
written statement because of the limited amount of time. Can
you briefly describe, as you wrote in your testimony, the
conditions that Leopoldo Lopez now faces in captivity?
Mr. Canton. Everybody in jail in Venezuela is in a very
serious situation and very grave situation on personal
integrity and right to life.
Senator Rubio. Is he in solitary confinement?
Mr. Canton. He is in solitary confinement. And only a few
weeks ago, there was an attempt to get into his cell by a gang
of thugs in the prison. Nothing, fortunately, happened. I spoke
with Leopoldo's mother only a week ago. He is in okay
condition, but being in a jail in Venezuela, everybody, and
particularly Leopoldo Lopez, your life is at risk.
Senator Rubio. Is he allowed visits from his family on a
regular basis?
Mr. Canton. Not on a very regular basis. His mother can
visit him once in a while, as well as his wife, but it is not
very regular.
Senator Rubio. Mr. Farah, I wanted to talk about the
national security components. First of all, I think it is
important at the outset to point to something that you did, and
that is that throughout the 1970s until 1993, Argentina had a
robust nuclear relationship with Iran and the current Iranian
reactors were retrofitted and upgraded with Argentine nuclear
technology. That is accurate.
Mr. Farah. Yes, sir.
Senator Rubio. Can you describe the nexus that exists today
in your mind between Argentina, Iran, and Venezuela?
Mr. Farah. Well, I think that Iran desperately wants to get
its nuclear program up and running, and until the 1994 AMIA
bombing, there was a very close exchange program between
Iranian scientists and Argentinean scientists, et cetera.
Prosecutor Nisman identified the cutting off of that
relationship under U.S. and European pressure in 1993 as the
trigger factor that set off the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires in
1994.
So when Iran needed to get back in the game or wanted
desperately to get back in the game, they approached Venezuela,
Hugo Chavez specifically, with Nestor Kirchner, Cristina's
husband and predecessor, to begin opening the dialogue. As the
recent Veja investigation shows, President Chavez said
immediately, yes, let me do this, get on it.
Nestor Kirchner was not particularly interested. In 2009,
with Cristina they revisited it, and there was a steady flow or
there has been a steady flow of Argentine scientists, nuclear
folks, going to Venezuela. My understanding, from talking to
people very familiar with Argentina's nuclear program, is that
Iran has been interested in trying to recruit the entire team
of scientists. They do not ones or twos. They want an entire
team. And they are simply not willing to go. So that has not
happened yet.
But I think Venezuela was the necessary bridge to bring the
Kirchner government into contact with Iran, and then you had
the whole ongoing scandal with the memorandum of understanding
and other things that happened in Argentina as a result of that
growing closeness. And ultimately you have Prosecutor Nisman's
accusation that the President Kirchner and her Foreign Minister
and others had illegally agreed with Iran to get the Interpol
red notices dropped against senior Iranian officials in
exchange for oil, et cetera. And you end up with Prosecutor
Nisman dead.
But I think that in that entire process, the main
interlocutor, the bridge between Iran and Argentina, has been
and was very active was Venezuela, particularly President
Chavez while he was alive, and ongoing with President Maduro.
Senator Rubio. Okay. So we have established that there is a
nexus there.
Let me ask you about this group called the FARC, which is
largely operational within Colombia. This is a drug
trafficking, narcoguerilla group currently engaged in peace
negotiations with the Colombian Government. But they do things
like extortion and kidnapping and bombings and so forth, in
addition to their narcotrafficking activities. Correct?
Mr. Farah. Yes, sir. They are one of three organizations
that is both designated as a major drug trafficking
organization and a terrorist organization by the U.S.
Government.
Senator Rubio. So the FARC is treated by the United States
Government as both a terrorist organization and a
narcotrafficking organization. Do they not have a presence in
Venezuela today, and if so, what is the nature of it?
Mr. Farah. They have a significant presence. I think
captured FARC documents beginning in 2008 with the death of
Raul Reyes, the FARC commander who was killed in Ecuador--we
got about 600 gigabytes of data for the first time on the
internal FARC communications. And what was shocking in that--I
worked with both the Colombian Government and others on
analyzing a chunk of those documents. And what was really eye-
opening was the intense level of senior contact between the
FARC Secretariat, the General Secretariat, and not only
President Chavez directly but his entire Cabinet including
Diosdado Cabello, Maduro, and all the others who are still
there and the very intense relationship at the same level with
the Ecuadorian Government of Rafael Correa. Those were the two
sort of really significant findings.
But you see there the Venezuelan Government not only gave
them shelter, it offered to set up joint businesses with them.
It helped finance many of their activities. It carried their
political water for them as far as trying to set up these
different front groups. It hosted their main front group, which
is the Bolivarian--the CCB, Coordinadora Continental
Bolivariana. And the founding documents are in the FARC
documents that were captured where the FARC complains that no
one knows that this front group is a FARC group, but they
describe how it was founded in the basement of the Presidential
palace with President Chavez personally present.
So it is a very, very organic link that goes to the highest
levels, and there is nothing nonstate about that relationship.
The FARC is viewed much like Iran views Hezbollah, as a matter
of state policy, as a nonstate actor that responds directly to
them.
Senator Rubio. What about the links between Venezuela and
Hezbollah?
Mr. Farah. I think that you have seen over time something
that was initially largely dismissed, thanks to the Drug
Enforcement Administration and the cases that have become
public over the last few years. You see very, very tight links.
You have Imad Muginyah and other very specific cases where the
Hezbollah operatives were buying cocaine from the FARC, and
much of that money is ending up back in places like the
Lebanese Canadian Bank that have since been closed because that
money was detected.
And it is often not as direct a link as people I discuss
with in the policy world would like to see, but the money in my
mind--they say, well, are they card-carrying Hezbollah people
that are buying the cocaine? Who cares? The money ends up in
Hezbollah in accounts back in Lebanon. Does it really matter
whether the person who brokered that deal with the FARC has an
ID card that says ``FARC'' or whether he is sympathetic enough
to move that money back to Hezbollah? In my mind there is no
distinction necessary there. But it becomes a very intense
policy debate within this administration over what constitutes
Hezbollah. My argument is that you simply need to look where
the money ends up and who benefited from it, and it does not
matter who the intermediaries were, identified specifically as
that group.
Senator Rubio. And my last question is about the state-
owned company, PDVSA, Petroleos de Venezuela. How does the
Venezuelan Government under the Maduro regime use PDVSA as the
source of influence, activity, laundering, et cetera? How is
that entity used both in the region and around the world?
Mr. Farah. Well, I think the Bank of Andorra findings are
extraordinarily important because I have been hearing for the
last 3 or 4 years that Andorra was where PDVSA siphoned its
money into. They have incredibly tough bank secrecy laws, and
nothing had come out for a significant period of time.
I think that PDVSA has become sort of the piggybank that no
longer has much cash in it. But what you see is an architecture
created around the region, particularly with Maduro's allies in
Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, and Salvador Sanchez Ceren, and the
remnants of the Communist Party in El Salvador, where you have
architectures built up in which no oil is actually moved, but
which they use to launder hundreds of millions of dollars a
year. And simply looking at the financials of those companies,
they are absurd. There are almost no legal imports coming in.
For example, ALBA Petroleos in El Salvador began with $1
million as this joint state enterprise with PDVSA owning 60
percent of the company and ALBA Petroleos owning 40. They had
$1 million in 2007. Their earnings statement for 2013 was $863
million with no visible legitimate imports. That is a rather
significant increase in your earnings. Daniel Ortega has said
publicly that he gets $500 million a year from PDVSA
essentially as a personal slush fund. And they set up with that
an architecture which allows the FARC, the Sinaloa Cartel,
Hezbollah, many other groups to launder money through the
architecture that PDVSA has established.
Senator Rubio. Let me just ask you one more, and I alluded
to this earlier, a law enforcement report about the use of
shipments from Venezuela to Syria to send bulk cash, both cash
raised from the Arab expatriate community but also cash
collected through trafficking of drugs and exacting bribes from
drug traffickers and that money being sent to Assad. Are you
aware of that report? Are you aware of those allegations? And
if not, would that surprise you knowing the nature of the
regime?
Mr. Farah. I have heard the allegations. I have not seen
documentation on it. I think that given the fact that when
Chavez was most active in his direct engagement with Iran, the
direct flight they set up went from Caracas to Damascus to
Tehran back to Caracas, it is clear that there is a very strong
link. If you look at the literature, Chavez had a very robust
relationship with Assad. That has not changed. Maduro does not
have the money, but clearly he is carrying on the same
commitments that Chavez entered into. And I think that we have
seen numerous cases of massive amounts of bulk cash being
shipped back usually on Iranian ships which are untraceable
once they get to Iran, and that some of that money would end up
with Assad is not remotely----
Senator Rubio. Is there still a direct flight between
Caracas and Tehran?
Mr. Farah. No, sir. That ended in 2011.
Senator Rubio. So my last question--and I do not know who
to direct this to, but any of you feel free to answer. I asked
at the end of the last panel about Cuba's influence in
Venezuela or its presence in Venezuela. And while I was able to
get admission that there is an outsized influence, I could not
get them to admit that the Cubans were actually involved in
directing or helping the Venezuelan regime, the Maduro regime,
oppress their own people.
So let me just ask all of you to comment on both the size,
the scope of the Cuban presence in Venezuela. I hear from
Venezuelans that are traveling back and others that it is an
extraordinary presence, that you cannot miss it. And secondly,
the nature of that to the extent you are able to comment. I
guess, Dr. Sabatini, if you have anything to add to that.
Dr. Sabatini. I will start first. It is real. And I am
going to tell perhaps an anecdote which illustrates it. I have
a regular annual dinner with Cubans in the U.N. mission who, as
we all know, are spies. And one time I was sort of chiding them
a little bit, saying it must be difficult to be a client-state
of Venezuela because they are so incompetent. They, of course,
took umbrage at being called a ``client-state,'' and they
pushed back. And I said, but yes, they cannot manage it. You
guys are real professionals. You are good spies. You do things
very well. And there was a long pause, and finally literally
they said, yes, but we are training them, which I think is
precisely the point.
They are training. They are deeply embedded in the
intelligence services. They are deeply embedded in the foreign
ministry. I love that they often talk about they are sharing
sports trainers. I do not know what sports trainers are, but
clearly that is a euphemism for something else that is there.
Of course, they also have the medical doctors which, by the
way, helps underwrite the Cuban pharmaceutical industry. When I
was recently on a trip to Cuba, something I had never thought
of, is the doctors that are being sent to Venezuela are writing
prescriptions for Cuban drugs that are then shipped. So it sort
of also benefits the pharmaceutical industry in Cuba.
It is real, and as I say, I have a firsthand account that
they are there to train and they are there to advise.
Mr. Canton. I agree it is real. In the particular case of
the Inter-American System of Human Rights, the information I
had when I was at the Inter-American Commission of Human rights
was that all the movement of Venezuela to withdraw from the
Inter-American System of Human Rights was orchestrated by Cuba.
And over the last 2 years, as you know, Venezuela left the
Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, and
that was because Cuba initiated all the process.
Mr. Farah. I would just add one thing. I agree with both of
my colleagues. One of the things that the Cubans were brought
in to do--and you see it not only in Venezuela but certainly in
Bolivia and Ecuador, perhaps more pronounced because they are
smaller societies--is that in those countries--and I grew up in
Bolivia--
if you were someone of stature and you got arrested, you had a
social network that would get you out of prison. I never
worried during the military dictatorships in Bolivia. If I was
picked up--I was going to school with the sons of colonels--
there was a social network that would get those people out.
The Cubans were brought in to break that social network.
They do not care who your uncle went to school with. They do
not care who you went to class with. They do not care about any
of that. And that has facilitated in all three of these
countries the ability to throw people like Leopoldo Lopez in
prison with no social network that can mobilize to get them
out. The Cubans were brought in to essentially slice through
those existing sort of safety net cords that had survived
through the dictatorships and helped a lot of people get
sanctuary because they are beholden to no one and they know it
and they can just tell you to walk away and that is it. So it
is a very important function they play besides, as was pointed
out, being incredibly active at the very senior levels.
Senator Rubio. Well, I guess I ask all these questions
because while a lot of people were taken aback by the language
of the President's announcement last week that Venezuela poses
a national security threat, perhaps a better way to have
phrased it--and I understand they are constrained by
bureaucratic necessities, but--is not that Venezuela poses a
threat per se. The people of Venezuela have no animosity toward
the United States, at least the vast majority, the enormous and
overwhelming majority, and certainly do not pose a threat to
the country.
But the Maduro regime, as has been described here today, is
an anti-American one, is a serial human rights violator, is one
that governs undemocratically. It is one that is helping--has
and may continue to be helping Iran try to evade international
sanctions and advance its nuclear program. It is one that is
involved aiding both a terrorist and narco group called the
FARC by giving them safe haven and support within their own
territory. It is one that is involved, by the way, in openly
providing safe passage for drug traffickers for drugs that are
ultimately destined for the United States. It is one that
actively supports financially Hezbollah, and it is one that
uses its state-owned enterprise to foment and support anti-
American governments in the region. And last by not least, it
is one that is completely infected by a foreign government that
has flooded it with sports trainers or, as they are more
accurately known, spies and agents of repression that allow it
to crack down on its own people and also further the interests
of that country over that of the people of Venezuela.
That sounds like the Maduro regime is not an insignificant
threat to the national security of the United States when you
view it in this context. This is not just a nation that is
failing economically because of incompetent leaders, and it is
certainly that. But it is also one in the grips of a regime
that actively supports global terrorism, that actively supports
one of the most dangerous developments of the last 20 years,
which is Iran's nuclear ambition, that actively supports a
group that is both a narcoterrorism group and also just a flat-
out terrorist group. It is one that represses its own people
brutally with the assistance of the Cuban Government.
This does not sound to me like something that should be
taken lightly despite the fact that it does not receive the
attention it deserves. It does sound like not Venezuela, but
the Maduro regime poses a real national security risk not just
to the United States but to the region.
Would anyone disagree with that assessment or elaborate on
it?
Mr. Canton. I agree. But the issue is how to address that
problem. And I believe it is better if the United States acts
together with the other countries of the region, with the OAS,
with UNASUR, not being alone. I am in agreement--we were
discussing with Chris this before. I am in agreement with the
sanctions, but it is important for the United States to have
very active diplomacy with the OAS and UNASUR.
Over the next few months, there are very important issues
happening in the region. There is a new change of the Secretary
General of the OAS. The last Secretary General, Jose Miguel
Insulza, failed during 10 years, his tenure at the OAS, at the
same time of the destruction of democracy in Venezuela. There
is the Summit of the Americas in just a couple of weeks, and
there is the election internally in Venezuela.
So I think it is important for the United States to work
together with the other countries of the region. I know it is
not easy. I know it is not the best timing, but it is the best
way to approach the situation in Venezuela.
Senator Rubio. And, Mr. Canton, I would not disagree. I
would love nothing more than to see the nations of the region
condemn what is happening in Venezuela. I would love to see
nothing more than at least one country, at least one, come
forward and say what is going on in Venezuela is outrageous and
as a neighboring country, we are outraged by it. The problem is
that we have not seen any of that occur, and in the interim
U.S. national security is at stake.
In fact, as Senator Menendez pointed earlier, about a year
ago, the administration did not want to do sanctions because
they wanted to give time for his UNASUR process to work. And
the problem with that process, of course, was that they went in
and basically treated both sides as moral equals when they were
not. One side was unarmed civilians protesting conditions in
Venezuela, and the other side were armed with sticks and clubs
and guns and were beating them. And they also happened to have
the power of government on their side.
So while I agree with you and I share with you the hope
that we would be joined by other nations, recent history does
not hold much hope that that is going to happen. And I think it
is to the great shame of the nations in this hemisphere who
stand by silently and are watching this happen.
Anyone else care to elaborate on my statement?
Mr. Farah. I would fully agree. I wrote a paper that the
Army War College published in 2012 saying that the criminalized
states of Latin America should be considered a Tier 1 national
security threat. And I think that that has been--because not
only, as I said in my testimony, is it Venezuela, it is a
network of countries now acting in concert with extra-regional
actors with the primary unifying factor in all of their
ideologies is a hatred for the United States and a firm belief
in their public doctrine that the use of WMD against the United
States is acceptable military doctrine and necessary military
doctrine. I think because we do not take people seriously when
they tell us what they want to do, that that is a serious
oversight on our part, and that as they move forward, that
strategic goal on their end has not changed.
Dr. Sabatini. I will just add quickly I agree with you. And
for so long, this administration, which I support, has first
talked about the new era of partnership in the hemisphere. The
truth is partners do not treat partners like Brazil and others
are treating us. They do not denounce--perhaps inflammatory
language but an action that, in fact, they embraced only a few
years earlier when it came to Honduras. I think we need to find
who our allies are in the region and work with them carefully
to find a comfort zone where they can start to engage in this
because, I agree with you, Venezuela is a national security
threat probably more to the region than it is the United
States, which makes it all the ironic that they are the ones
who are criticizing us for saying it.
Senator Rubio. Well, I appreciate your insights today. I
think, if anything, this hearing I hope will remind my
colleagues and the American people about what we are facing in
our own hemisphere. Number one is just an astronomical level of
human rights abuses and an erosion of democracy which, by the
way, is not only contained to Venezuela. You find that erosion
of democracy in Bolivia and in Ecuador and in Nicaragua and
certainly the total absence of it in Cuba. It is one of those
startling new developments we have seen after 20 years of
democratic progress where people come to power through an
election and then immediately undermine all of the institutions
necessary for a vibrant democracy. It is one we have ignored
for far too long.
The second point is I hope people realize that in our own
hemisphere there is a regime that is actively supporting and
profiting from the trafficking of drugs that ultimately wind up
in our streets, that is actively supporting, openly supporting
elements that are both narcoterrorists but also just flat-out
terrorists who have killed and maimed not just people in this
region but oftentimes Americans, that in this region, there is
a regime that is an active supporter of Iran's nuclear
ambitions, that in this region, there is a regime surrounded by
a level of enablers and cronies who steal all this money from
the Venezuelan people, who benefit from access to power in
Venezuela, and then spend weekends and holidays parading up and
down the streets of Miami enjoying their ill-found gains.
So that is why I am supportive of the bill we passed last
year and supportive of the President's decisions. And I hope
people realize that all the problems of the world are not in
the Middle East. All problems of the world are not only in Asia
or in Europe. There are real and significant problems in our
own hemisphere that impact life in America.
And the last point I hope people will take away from today
is that we believe that the future of Venezuela belongs to the
people of Venezuela. In a perfect and ideal world, the world
that we are pushing toward, the Venezuelan people through the
ballot box will replace these leaders with ones of their own
choosing, which will help Venezuela fulfill its destiny as a
prosperous, peaceful, and free country. That is not the
direction it is headed in today.
And while we cannot mandate the conditions in Venezuela,
nor should we try and that is not our intention to do so, we
certainly should lift our voice anytime human rights are being
violated, especially in such a grotesque manner, and we will
certainly condemn those who are benefiting and profiting from
these abuses and then coming to our own shores to enjoy those
benefits from the money they have stolen from their own people.
And last but not least, we cannot ignore, despite the
recent opening, the Cuban influence in Venezuela and the role
that they are playing. Nicolas Maduro recently said that the
United States was planning to invade Venezuela, which anyone
familiar with United States policy just knows how absurd it is
and how ridiculous a statement that is. But I would say to you
that there is an invasion going on in Venezuela and it is an
invasion of Cubans--of Cuban agents and Cuban Government
officials--that have infiltrated the highest levels of its
government who provide personal protection to Nicolas Maduro
and Chavez before him, who control the official documents of
the government, who are training their sports department better
known as their repressive regime. And these things are
happening as well and it should give us insight into the true
nature of the Cuban Government.
With that, again, I appreciate you being here today, your
insights, the work that went into your statements.
The record is going to remain open until the close of
business on Thursday, March 19, for any future submissions. You
may receive questions from other members, and I would encourage
you to answer those so we can get them officially in the
record.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Written Statement of Maria Eugenia Tovar, a Venezuelan Citizen,
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Honorable Senators, my name is Maria Eugenia Tovar, Venezuelan
citizen in the process of obtaining political asylum in this country
because of the political persecution I suffered in Venezuela due to
what happened to my daughter, Genesis Carmona Tovar, who was murdered
in the city of Valencia, Carabobo State, Venezuela, by a gunshot to the
head on February 18, 2014, while we were participating in a pacific
protest. I would like to respectfully greet you, and to thank the
United States Congress, for being able to pass the law, Venezuela
Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, sanctioning
those who violated the human rights of the pacific demonstrators in
Venezuela last February.
I respectfully ask the committee to process the inclusion of those
who murdered Genesis Carmona Tovar, into the list of people sanctioned
for ordering and doing these horrific crimes. This crime still goes
unpunished.
On February 18 of 2014, I, Maria Eugenia Tovar, along with my
children, Christian Carmona Tovar, who is 15 years old; Alejandra
Carmona Tovar, 19 years old; and Genesis Carmona Tovar, 22 years old,
were participating in the pacific demonstration in the Cedeno Avenue in
the city of Valencia, Carabobo State, when we were caught by surprise
by armed groups known as ``Los Colectivos,'' who shot us, murdering my
daughter, Genesis.
One of the people responsible of such a vile and despicable act is
the governor of Carabobo State, Francisco Ameliach, who in his Twitter
account, @ameliachpsuv, the day before Genesis was shot dead, wrote
calling all members of the Unit of the Bolivar-Chavez Battle (UBCH) to
prepare the ``immediate counterattack" against the ``fascists.''
Besides Ameliach, members of the UBCH are also responsible. They
are led by Samuel Martinez Garcia, bearer of the ID number 17,824,120,
Coordinator of the ``Juventud Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela
(Youth of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela), who lives in the
2nd Street, house number 2,neighborhood Guanabanillo, in the
municipality of Juan Jose Mora, Carabobo State; and Juan Jose Maza
Seijas, ID Number 19,425,960, leader of the oganization ``Juventud del
PSUV'' (PSUV Youth) of Carabobo State, and a public official that works
in the Ministry of Youth.
With an arrest warrant, only Juan Jose Maza Seijas appeared before
a judge, once he got captured while he was staying in his residence.
The district attorneys 44th and 146th of the Metropolitan Area of
Caracas (AMC), Ruben Perez and Yackeline Mata, respectively, ratified
the accusation against Maza Seijas due to his complicity in the felony
of intentional homicide characterized with malice aforethought and
ignoble motives, as well as his association to commit a crime.
The preliminary hearing was held in the Trial Court 36th of Control
of the AMC, which admitted the introduction of the charges from the
prosecutors, and ordered the trial of the Maza Seijas case, agreeing on
an interim measure of a consistent presentation every 15 days before
said judicial instance, requested by the above mentioned district
attorneys and agreed on by the judge of the case.
However, the prosecutors, as well as the judge of this case acted
by omission, leaving this case to go judicially unpunished. The duties
of the prosecutors Perez and Mata were not held in accordance to their
duty as guarantors of the due process; they did not continue with the
judicial investigation to identify the hooded armed men that murdered
Genesis Carmona; and considering the extent of such an aberrant crime,
they should not have requested an interim measure to the judge. As
prosecutors, they should have continued the process to make Samuel
Martinez appear before the judge, but they did not do it. The judge,
also, should have denied the interim measure, and do the necessary
procedures, but he did not do it either.
Therefore, the prosecutors Ruben Perez and Yackeline Mata, as well
as the judge of this case, should be held responsible for the impunity
of the murder of Genesis Carmona, especially since Martinez and Maza
still have their jobs at the Mayor's office, and they are enjoying full
freedom.
In the following videos, it can be seen both men, who allowed
themselves to be thoroughly identified in it, unhooded, and giving
orders to hooded men to shoot and murder my daughter, Genesis Carmona
Tovar:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Humx3BvFQjo
www.youtube.com/watch?v=zX9Bx7iYzyU
www.youtube.com/watch?v=EOdDPTiriyM
Samuel Martinez Garcia, who appears in the video with long hair,
and Jose Maza Seijas coordinate and manage the violent groups, the
armed ``Colectivos," whom have been dedicated to suppress the protests
in Valencia.
Also, in the video the mayor, Maxum Caldera, and Guilmer Benitez
were identified but never investigated. In that same event, 8 people
were wounded.
I would like to mention Hector Breiia, Coordinator of Economic
matters of the Governor's Office of the State of Carabobo and one of
the most loyal for the dirty jobs of Governor Ameliach, who is another
one of the leaders of the Collectives in Valencia and also he dedicates
himself to persecute, threaten, track communications and order the
monitoring of the opposition people he threatens with death. Mr. Breiia
spent the December holidays of 2014 in the city of New York.
This case can be found, nowadays, in the Criminal Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ), where still nothing has
happened.
Finding ourselves in the District of Senator Marco Rubio, and he
being the person who represents us before the Senate, and knows this
case thoroughly, we feel deeply grateful because he raised his voice
before the corresponding bodies. We beg for you to follow up on this
case, and help us bring it to justice, since in Venezuela this is not
possible.
We are deeply grateful for having fulfilled the mission of passing
the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014.
Now, we are counting on your support so the Department of State can
continue with the implementation and execution of this law, finding the
culprits, and sanctioning them as violators of human rights.
We are absolutely certain that with the sanctions achieved by
Congress all those guilty of the murder of Genesis Carmona will be
sanctioned. And even though it does not fix the loss of her life, it
would comfort us, the family members that hold the ideals of peace and
justice.
______
Responses of Alex Lee to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Mr. Lee, during this committee's last hearing on
Venezuela in May 2014, Assistant Secretary Roberta Jacobson stated that
``We do think that right now they (sanctions) would be
counterproductive, that they would enable the Venezuelan Government to
go back to that sort of victim mentality of using us. But there may
well come a time at some point in the future when they would be useful
if there has not been movement at the table.''
What has changed in Venezuela in the last 10 months that
has made the administration feel now is the right time for
targeted sanctions? Why did it take so long?
What process did the administration use in picking who
would be targeted for sanctions?
Why are only seven names on the list?
Are there additional members of the Venezuela Government
who will be targeted in the future?
Answer. Over the course of the last year, we have taken several
steps in response to human rights concerns in Venezuela. On July 30,
2014, and again on February 2, 2015, the Department imposed visa
restrictions on certain Venezuelans believed to be responsible for, or
complicit in, human rights abuses and undermining democratic
governance. Certain family members of such individuals were also
affected by these actions.
The Secretary of State took these steps pursuant to Section
212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
On March 9, 2015, the President issued an Executive order imposing
sanctions on seven designated individuals and authorizing the Secretary
of the Treasury to impose sanctions on additional individuals and
entities, in part to implement the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights
and Civil Society Act of 2014 (the ``Act''). The interagency culled
through various public and nonpublic sources to identify candidates
that meet the criteria provided for in the Executive order. These names
were thoroughly vetted by the interagency.
When considering targeted measures, including visa restrictions or
asset blocking, we routinely take into account a variety of factors
including the particular facts of each case, the overall political
context, law enforcement considerations, and consultations with our
regional partners. We do not take such actions precipitously or without
serious deliberation and they are always done consistent with relevant
applicable laws or regulations.
We will continue our investigations pursuant to the authorities
established by the Act and the President's Executive order and we stand
prepared to take action against others, where appropriate, as we assess
additional information.
Every situation is unique; our actions must be guided by the
approach most likely to succeed in advancing respect for democracy and
human rights for the benefit of the Venezuelan people.
Question. Recently, Venezuela has requested that the United States
Embassy reduce its diplomatic staff to 17, to match their staff numbers
in the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington.
How many diplomatic personal does Venezuela have registered
in the United States? (Consulate and Embassy)
What is the latest development regarding Venezuela's
request for the United States to develop a plan to downsize the
U.S. Embassy to a staff of 17?
What would be the impact of such a staff reduction on U.S.
interests in Venezuela and services provided by the Embassy?
What type of response is the State Department considering
for Venezuela's diplomatic representation in the United States?
Answer. According to State Department records, Venezuela has 74
individuals accredited and/or registered with its Embassy and eight
Consulates. On March 16, we sent a diplomatic note to the Venezuelan
Government that extended an offer to send a team of technical experts
to discuss the size of both our missions. We have not yet received a
response. The size of the Venezuelan mission to the United States will
be an important part of those discussions.
We have made clear to the Venezuelans that they need to comply with
their international obligations to protect diplomats. Under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Venezuela committed to take steps
to protect our diplomatic mission and our personnel at the mission, and
the Department has made clear, and will continue to insist, that
Venezuela provide such protection as the host government.
A top priority for us remains the ability to ensure the welfare of
American citizens in Venezuela. We will work to ensure the Embassy can
continue to provide that assistance. Further, we have advised the
Venezuelan Government that a reduction in our staff could negatively
affect our ability to meet the demand for U.S. visas in Venezuela. It
could also impact our public outreach efforts and the size and scope of
cultural and educational exchanges.
Question. The ``Anti-Imperialist Enabling Law'' was passed by the
Venezuelan Legislature on Sunday and gives President Nicolas Maduro the
ability to enact laws without congressional authorization through the
rest of this year.
With the passage of the ``Anti-Imperialist Enabling Law,''
is President Nicolas Maduro now essentially Dictator Nicolas
Maduro?
Are there any checks on Maduro's power? Anything to prevent
him from beginning mass arrest of opposition leaders?
Has there been any outcry from the international community
about the gross injustice to the democratic process in that has
just occurred?
Has any South American country called out for a return to
democratic process?
Answer. We are concerned by the weakening of democratic
institutions in Venezuela and have called for a clear separation of
powers. Political interference in both the legislature and the judicial
branch has undermined the ability of those institutions to provide a
significant check on the Executive. There is a process in the
Venezuelan Constitution for Venezuela's National Assembly to grant a
Venezuelan President the power to rule by decree.
As underscored in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which all
democracies of the region have committed to uphold, the separation of
powers and the independence of the branches of government are essential
elements of representative democracy. An independent legislature has an
essential role to play in the political system in order to meet the
principles laid out in the Charter.
This year's National Assembly elections present an opportunity for
Venezuelans to engage in legitimate, democratic discourse. Transparent
election processes and credible election results could also reduce
tensions in the country. We have urged regional partners to encourage
Venezuela to accept a robust international electoral observation
mission, using accepted international standards, for those elections.
Now is the time for the region to cooperate and help Venezuela work
toward a democratic and inclusive solution to the challenges it faces.
We will also continue to work closely with others in the region to
support greater political expression in Venezuela, and to encourage the
Venezuelan Government to live up to its commitments to democracy and
human rights, as articulated in the OAS Charter, the Inter American
Democratic Charter, and other relevant instruments.
Foreign Ministers from the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)
released a March 14 statement announcing support for the upcoming
parliamentary elections, the importance of the maintenance of the
constitutional order, as well as democracy and the full expression of
all human rights.
Question. To what extent is there genuine independence between the
Venezuelan executive, legislative, and judiciary powers?
Answer. In Venezuela today, there is an increasingly authoritarian
Executive exercising significant control over the legislative,
judicial, and electoral branches of government as well as the human
rights ombudsman.
As underscored in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which all
democracies of the region have committed to uphold, the separation of
powers and the independence of the branches of government are essential
elements of representative democracy. We will continue to work closely
with others in the region to support greater political expression in
Venezuela and to encourage the Venezuelan Government to live up to its
required commitments to democracy and human rights, as articulated in
the OAS Charter, the Inter American Democratic Charter, and other
relevant instruments.
Question. Is Venezuela a democracy today?
Answer. Venezuela is formally a multiparty constitutional republic,
but unfortunately, in recent years, political power has been
concentrated in a single party with an increasingly authoritarian
Executive exercising significant control over the legislative,
judicial, and electoral branches of government as well as the human
rights ombudsman. The government's actions have not met its required
commitments to democracy and human rights, as articulated in the OAS
Charter, the Inter American Democratic Charter, and other relevant
instruments.
Question. Do you agree that financial and visa sanctions could be a
strong deterrent against further brutality against demonstrators?
If so, why has the administration been so slow to deploy
these tools as a deterrent?
Answer. Our efforts to sanction the individuals listed in the annex
to the March 9 Executive order, and cut them off from the U.S.
financial system, exposes their objectionable behavior. We hope this
increased pressure will prompt authority figures to change their ways
or face further isolation from the international community.
In addition, the United States is sending a clear message that it
does not welcome money or travel of those who may be involved in human
rights violations and abuses, undermining democratic governance, or
engaging in public corruption.
The Department has stated in the past that a balanced approach
toward targeted measures, including visa restrictions or asset
blocking, must account for a variety of factors such as the overall
political context, law enforcement considerations, and consultations
with our regional partners. With that in mind, the Department first
took steps to impose visa restrictions for certain Venezuelans believed
to be responsible for, or complicit in, human rights abuses and
undermining democratic governance, including public corruption on July
30, 2014, and again February 2, 2015. Certain family members of such
individuals may also be affected by these actions.
Any sanctions efforts should be seen as a tool in the context of a
broader diplomatic strategy that must include working with allies in
the region, those defending democracy within countries, and partners
outside the region as well as multilateral organizations.
Question. How many Active Duty military officers lead civilian
agencies in the Government of Venezuela?
Answer. Currently, five out of Venezuela's 28 ministries are headed
up by active military personnel, by our estimate. These military
officers lead the ministries of the Presidency (Admiral Carmen Melendez
Rivas); defense (General Vladimir Padrino Lopez); economy and finance
(Brigadier General Rodolfo Clemente Marco Torres); interior, justice,
and peace (Major General Gustavo Gonzalez Lopez); and aquatic and
aerial transport (Mayor General Giuseppe Yoffreda). In his last
Cabinet, President Hugo Chavez only had three active military officers,
including the Defense Minister, although in some of his previous
Cabinets, Chavez had as many as seven Active-Duty ministers.
President Nicolas Maduro has also appointed Active-Duty military
officers to lead the National Police (General Manuel Eduardo Perez
Urdaneta) and the state-run supermarket cooperatives, Mercal
(Lieutenant Coronel Tito Gomez) and Abastos Bicentenarios (Major
Anderson Medina). In addition to being Minister of Interior, Justice
and Peace, Major General Gustavo Gonzalez Lopez also serves as the
director general of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service
(SEBIN).
Question. How does that number [of Active-Duty military officers
leading civilian agencies] compare to other countries in the Western
Hemisphere?
Answer. Venezuela has one of the highest rates of Active-Duty
military officers in civilian cabinet positions, according to our
estimates. Most other countries in the region--with the exception of
Cuba--have all civilian cabinets or only have military officers heading
the Ministry of Defense or defense-related agencies.
Question. Does the Venezuelan military pose a threat to peace and
the return of democracy in Venezuela?
Answer. Elected civilian authorities' decisions have led to the
significant economic, social, and political challenges in Venezuela. We
believe the long-term solution in Venezuela will require meaningful
dialogue among Venezuelans that yields concrete results and this year's
National Assembly elections are an important part of that process. In
general, we believe civilian leadership should handle the civilian
functions of a government along with overseeing a nation's military.
Question. Would you agree that, in Congress passing the ``Venezuela
Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014'' (113-278) and
in the President of the United States signing and implementing this law
the United States acted entirely within its sovereign right to protect
the integrity of its financial system and national security?
Answer. Yes, the United States, like all states, can decide who may
use its financial system or enter its territory. Executive Order 13692
and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014
embodied this decision by the United States in relation to individuals
that meet the criteria for sanctions under those authorities. The visa
restrictions and asset blocking against individuals who meet the
criteria in the Executive order signaled that those Venezuelans who
violate or abuse human rights or undermine democracy are not welcome in
the United States, nor are they allowed to use our financial system.
These actions made clear the U.S. Government's concerns about the
erosion of human rights and democracy in Venezuela.
Question. Would you say that it is hypocritical for the United
States to be criticized for acting within its sovereign rights while
other countries hide behind this principle in order to avoid taking a
stance regarding human rights in Venezuela?
Answer. We believe that all actors should focus their efforts on
promoting democratic dialogue and free and fair elections in Venezuela.
Other states and international organizations have highlighted the
importance of democracy in the region and have called for Venezuela to
respect democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
The long list of international actors who have voiced concerns
about the human rights situation in Venezuela over the past year
includes the Governments of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru; the former
Presidents of Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and
Uruguay; as well as respected international bodies such as the United
Nations Committee against Torture, and the Secretary General of the
Organization of American States.
Ultimately, Venezuela's political and economic problems will be
solved by Venezuelans talking to one another in a climate of respect
for human rights and democracy, and we should all encourage moves in
that direction.
Question. Would you agree that the United States deserves the same
respect for its sovereignty as other nations in the world, and
specifically in the Western Hemisphere?
Answer. Yes.
Question. I find it hypocritical that the administration has
supported sanctions in Venezuela but yet relaxed them in Cuba. We have
seen the influx of Cuban military and state security in repressing
activists in Venezuela. After Cuba's history of supporting violence in
Latin America and Africa when it was heavily subsidized by the U.S.S.R.
Does the administration want, by weakening sanctions
against the Castro regime, to help that dictatorship spread its
repression even more into Venezuela and beyond?
Answer. The United States imposes sanctions on both countries out
of concern for human rights. But those sanctions are applied
differently according to an evolving and unique set of challenges that
each country presents.
We constantly reevaluate the implementation of these policies and
whether we need to change our course. In the case of Venezuela, the new
sanctions are aimed at persons involved in or responsible for the
erosion of human rights guarantees, persecution of political opponents,
curtailment of press freedoms, use of violence and human rights
violations and abuses in response to antigovernment protests, and
arbitrary arrest and detention of antigovernment protestors, as well as
the significant public corruption by senior government officials in
Venezuela. In the case of Cuba, the new measures allowing for greater
travel and commerce are intended to support the ability of the Cuban
people to gain greater control over their own lives and determine their
country's future.
Question. According to high-level military defectors from
Venezuela's Government, there are between 2,700 and 3,000 Cuban
intelligence agents in the South American nation, embedded in sectors
such as the military, agriculture, finance, and petroleum refining.
Is this assessment correct?
How many Cuban intelligence agents in Venezuela is the U.S.
Government aware of?
Answer. Cuba and Venezuela have a long-standing and wide-ranging
partnership. They cooperate in areas ranging from intelligence services
to medical services. In light of the close ties between the two
countries, it should come as no surprise that Cubans are involved in
the military, agriculture, finance, and petroleum refining sectors.
However, we are not able to comment in a public manner about the
estimates of the number of Cuban intelligence agents in Venezuela that
may be provided by Venezuelan defectors or other open sources.
Question. According to high-level military defectors from
Venezuela's Government, the Cubans have modernized Venezuela's
intelligence services, both the Sebin (Bolivarian National Intelligence
Service) that reports directly to the President, and military
intelligence. They also set up a special unit to protect Nicolas
Maduro.
Do you have any reason to doubt this assessment?
Answer. According to Venezuelan Government-associated media, an
estimated 40,000 Cuban advisers and aid workers are in Venezuela,
including doctors, teachers, and Cuban military personnel. While both
governments have stated that the Cuban presence in Venezuela is limited
to these areas, we are also aware of reports of Cuban-Venezuelan
cooperation in the intelligence services. We can provide you a more
detailed explanation in a classified briefing.
Question. Last year, former Venezuelan intelligence agents and
sources with direct access to active officers of the Bolivarian Armed
Forces told El Nuevo Herald newspaper that Cuba plays a leading role in
the repression unleashed by Maduro against Venezuelan protesters. The
Cubans are in charge of operations, which range for security around the
Presidential palace to the planning of arrests of opponents. These
Venezuelan sources also told El Nuevo Herald that Cubans have planned
the operations of between 600 and 1,000 armed men who comprise the
Chavista paramilitary groups, known as ``colectivos.''
Do you have any reason to doubt this assessment?
Answer. We are aware of media reports indicating that Cuban
security and military advisers played a role in activities against
Venezuelan protesters, including training pro-government vigilante
groups, which subsequently attacked peaceful protesters during
demonstrations. However, we have not seen further evidence establishing
a direct link between Cuban advisers and these acts of violence. We can
provide you a more detailed explanation in a classified briefing.
Question. In 2007, Juan Jose Rabilero, head of Cuba's Committees
for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) claimed that there were over
30,000 members of Cuba's Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
in Venezuela.
Do you have any reason to doubt this assessment?
Answer. Cuba and Venezuela have a long-standing and wide-ranging
partnership. They cooperate in areas ranging from intelligence services
to medical services. We have seen a range of estimates regarding the
presence and activities of Cubans in various fields in Venezuela, and
are unable to publicly comment on the quality of this information.
Question. According to investigations by independent Venezuelan
journalists, the Cubans have computerized Venezuela's public records,
giving them control over the issue of identity papers and voter
registration. The Cubans have representatives in the ports and
airports, and have taken part in the purchases of military equipment. A
state-owned Cuban company Albet Ingenieria y Sistemas, received US$170
million to develop electronic data systems in Venezuela. Through Albet,
the Cuban Government has been given access to Venezuelan databases,
from which it could modify and even issue documents to citizens of
other countries. Its portfolio includes the Maduro's communications
office, and operating systems for prisons, emergency services,
hospitals and police.
Do you have any reason to doubt this assessment?
Answer. Cuba and Venezuela have a long-standing and wide-ranging
partnership. They cooperate in areas ranging from intelligence services
to medical services. We have seen a range of reports regarding the
presence and activities of Cubans in various fields in Venezuela,
including the Albet case that you cite. Venezuela is ultimately
responsible for the identity documents issued by its agencies.
Question. The Cuban regime has rushed to the side of Venezuela
after the administration began to implement the financial sanctions
portion of our law. No surprise there given their alliance. But in your
normalization talks with Cuba, does the administration categorically
rule out putting U.S.-Venezuela policy options on the table, should the
regime demand them?
When the President announced his changes to U.S. Cuba policy in
December, administration officials touted the changes this would bring
to perceptions regarding U.S. policy in the region?
Answer. We have not accepted any preconditions in our talks with
the Cuban Government. The current focus of talks with Cuba is on the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations and reopening of embassies.
Once diplomatic relations are reestablished and embassies reopened, we
will be better able to press the Cuban Government on a full range of
issues, including human rights, claims, and the return of fugitives
from U.S. justice.
The response from partners throughout the region and around the
globe to our new approach toward Cuba has been overwhelmingly positive.
The updated approach gives us a greater ability to engage other nations
in the hemisphere and around the world to join us in promoting respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba and throughout the
hemisphere.
Question. What has the administration done to rally regional
support for U.S. policy toward Venezuela?
Answer. Our policy toward Venezuela reflects our commitment to
advance respect for human rights and safeguard democratic institutions,
not only in Venezuela, but also across the hemisphere and the world. We
have expressed our concerns to governments in the region about the
worsening situation in Venezuela. We have urged our partners to speak
out in meetings of the Organization of American States and the U.N.
Human Rights Council. We have encouraged their support for the release
of Mayor Antonio Ledezma, opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez, Mayor
Daniel Ceballos, and others unjustly jailed, including dozens of
students, by the Venezuelan Government.
We have also called on regional partners to encourage Venezuela to
accept a robust international electoral observation mission, using
accepted international standards, for this year's National Assembly
elections. We have emphasized to them that the region has an
opportunity to play a productive role to support free and fair
elections, which will help Venezuela steer toward a democratic solution
to tackle its challenges.
We have countered inaccurate claims by the Maduro government and
other governments in the hemisphere about the March 9 Executive order
and sanctioning of seven individuals and have explained that our
actions were within our right to protect U.S. immigration prerogatives
and the U.S. financial system. We have stressed that our actions are
not against the economy of Venezuela nor the people of Venezuela. We
appreciate your remarks on March 17 that helped reinforce this.
We will continue to work closely with others in the region to
support greater political expression in Venezuela and to encourage the
Venezuelan Government to live up to its shared commitment to democracy
and human rights, as articulated in the OAS Charter, the Inter American
Democratic Charter, and other relevant instruments.
Question. What regional countries have spoken out against the
ongoing human rights abuses in Venezuela?
Answer. The United States is joined by dozens of governments and
individuals from the region in calling for the release of Mayor Antonio
Ledezma, opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez, Mayor Daniel Ceballos, and
others unjustly jailed, including dozens of students, by the Venezuelan
Government. These include the Chilean, Colombian, and Peruvian
Governments; former Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil),
Sebastian Pinera (Chile), Oscar Arias (Costa Rica), Felipe Calderon
(Mexico), Ricardo Martinelli (Panama), Alejandro Toledo (Peru), and
Jorge Batlle (Uruguay); and Chilean Senators Isabel Allende, Juan Pablo
Letelier, and Ignacio Walker. The Costa Rican Government called for a
dialogue between the Venezuelan Government and the opposition and also
noted that the OAS should play a role in observing the Venezuelan
National Assembly elections. In mourning the death of a student,
reportedly at the hands of government forces, OAS Secretary General
Jose Miguel Insulza called for ``inclusive dialogue that leads to
reconciliation between Venezuelans.''
Question. What regional organizations have done so [spoken out
against the ongoing human rights abuses in Venezuela]?
Answer. The OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza called on the
Venezuelan Government to respect the due process of the law in Mayor
Antonio Ledezma's case while noting the importance of Venezuela holding
National Assembly elections with the ``required democratic character.''
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) expressed
``deep concern'' on the investigations and prosecutions of Mayor
Ledezma, opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez, and Mayor Daniel Ceballos.
The body also called on the Venezuelan Government not to criminalize
opposition political leaders and to pursue a dialogue with the
opposition.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Zeid Ra'ad Al
Hussein, expressed concern over the continued detention of opposition
leaders and demonstrators and the government's harsh response to
criticism and peaceful expressions of dissent. The European Union (EU)
called on the Venezuelan Government to work with the opposition and
civil society to meet the legitimate concerns of the Venezuelan people
while highlighting that it is important that freedom of expression and
fundamental rights are respected in an electoral year. The Canadian,
Italian, Norwegian, and Spanish Governments called on the Venezuelan
Government to demonstrate its commitment to human rights, including
freedom of expression and peaceful protest. Pope Francis urged
Venezuelans to refuse violence and called for a sincere and
constructive dialogue between the government and the opposition.
On March 14, Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) issued a
statement expressing support for a dialogue between all the
``Venezuelan democratic forces'' respecting human rights, rule of law,
and institutional order. UNASUR also expressed support for this year's
National Assembly elections while emphasizing the importance of
respecting the constitutional order and human rights.
Question. Ambassador Brownfield, the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, has been quoted as
saying that recent media reports about the Venezuelan government's
complicity with cartels were ``not inconsistent'' with the evidence.
Can you elaborate on Venezuela's interaction with the
cartels?
Please describe some of the evidence you have seen that
would support this.
What is Cartel de los Soles or the ``Cartel of the Suns''
relationship with the Venezuelan Government.
Does the Venezuelan Government have a relationship
(narcotics trafficking/armed support) with the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)? What is the extent of that
relationship?
Answer. In Venezuela, public corruption is a major problem that
makes it easier for drug-trafficking organizations to move and smuggle
illegal drugs, according to Venezuelan nongovernmental organizations.
Media reports alleged that some military and law enforcement personnel
directly assisted Colombian drug trafficking organizations, including
not only the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), but also
the National Liberation Army (ELN), Clan Usuga, and Los Rastrojos.
There are also media reports alleging that Mexican drug-organizations,
including the Sinaloa cartel and Los Zetas, operate in Venezuela.
The term ``Cartel de los Soles'' is used to describe a collection
of groups within the Venezuelan Armed Forces that are allegedly
involved in drug trafficking. Press reports indicate that elements of
the military believed to be most deeply involved in Venezuelan drug
trade are concentrated along the western border with Colombia,
especially in the states of Apure, Zulia and Tachira.
An indication that some officials at the top level of the military
have been involved in drug trafficking are the Treasury Department's
designations of current and former Venezuelan Government officials
under the Kingpin Act for materially assisting the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) in trafficking narcotics. The Venezuelan
Government has yet to take action against these government and military
officials who have engaged in drug trafficking activities with the
FARC.
Question. A recent report by the Washington DC-based, Center for a
Secure Free Society, and Canada's Institute for Social and Economic
Analysis, raises concerns about the use of Venezuela as a ``bridge'' to
smuggle Iranian agents into North America. It states that Venezuelan
authorities provided at least 173 passports, visas, and other
documentation--controlled by Cuba's state-owned Albet--to Islamist
extremists seeking to slip unnoticed into North America.
Do you have any reason to doubt this assessment?
Answer. We take any allegations that threaten our national security
seriously. The Department closely watches all signs of activity of
Iranian influence in the Western Hemisphere. We share your concern that
Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents are easy to
obtain, making Venezuela a potentially attractive source of
documentation for terrorists. International authorities remain
suspicious of the integrity of Venezuela documents and their issuance
process. We can provide you a more detailed explanation in a classified
briefing.
Question. Last month, Nicolas Maduro ordered the arrest of the
Mayor of Caracas, Antonio Ledezma, and ordered a further crackdown
against student protesters, upon returning from a previously
undisclosed trip to Cuba, where Maduro met with both Raul and Fidel
Castro.
Do you find the timing curious?
Answer. We have publicly condemned the detention of Caracas
Metropolitan Mayor Antonio Ledezma by Venezuelan security forces, as
well as the systematic intimidation of other leading opposition
figures. It is difficult to speculate on the direct precipitating
factors leading to Ledezma's arrest, but the arrest of opposition
figures appear to be a clear attempt by the Venezuelan Government to
divert attention from the country's economic and political challenges
and to destabilize the opposition. Rather than imprisoning and
intimidating its critics, the Venezuelan Government should focus on
finding real solutions through democratic dialogue.
Venezuela's problems cannot be solved by criminalizing legitimate,
democratic dissent. These tactics violate the Venezuelan people's basic
human rights and civil liberties as well as the principles and values
set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
The Venezuelan Government should release those it has unjustly
jailed and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the
freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly. The United
States calls on other countries, leaders, and organizations to urge the
Venezuelan Government to cease these efforts to silence the political
opposition and further weaken democratic institutions.
Question. What consideration do you give Cuba's continued efforts
to subvert democratic institutions in Latin America, including within
your review of the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, on which Cuba was
placed in 1982 precisely for its subversive tactics in the Western
Hemisphere?
Answer. The Department of State is undertaking a serious review of
Cuba's designation based on all relevant, applicable information and
the statutory standard. We will not prejudge that process.
Question. Why hasn't the State Department publicly denounced the
role that Cuba's Government has played in subverting Venezuela's
democratic institutions?
Answer. We should not let the potential influence of outside
parties like Cuba distract our attention from the need to hold the
Venezuelan Government accountable for its actions. The Venezuelan
Government alone is responsible for the actions of its officials and
institutions, including those that undermine democracy and the
protection of human rights in Venezuela.
The repression and abuses of human rights that occur in Venezuela
are the responsibility of the Venezuelan Government.
Question. A July 2009 GAO report (GAO-09-806) stated that the so-
called Bolivarian National Guard is deeply involved in the trafficking
of illicit narcotics. Please provide an assessment of the Venezuelan
National Guard's involvement in illicit trafficking and other
transnational criminal activities.
Answer. According to public reports, members of the Bolivarian
National Guard continue to facilitate or are directly involved in drug
trafficking. Corruption among some members of the Bolivarian National
Guard poses a significant threat because of this organization's role in
controlling Venezuelan airports, borders and ports. This concern is
coupled with the fact that Venezuelan law enforcement does not
effectively prosecute drug traffickers, in part due to political
corruption.
It is a concern not only for the United States, but also for the
rest of the hemisphere, that Venezuela remains a key transit country
for the shipment of illegal drugs from South America. The U.S.
Government and its regional partners have repeatedly said more
effective counternarcotics efforts are necessary to curb the flow of
drugs into and out of the region. Since the Venezuelan Government ended
formal cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in 2005,
bilateral counternarcotics cooperation has been conducted on a case-by-
case basis, including informal information exchanges and maritime
interdiction activities with the U.S. Coast Guard. However, a lack of
sustained, high-level cooperation reduces the ability of our U.S. law
enforcement partners to investigate and prosecute violators of U.S. law
residing or operating in Venezuela. We nonetheless encourage our
partners to work as closely with their Venezuelan counterparts as is
permitted by the Venezuelan Government.
We will continue to support drug interdiction programs throughout
the region, including programs in Colombia, Peru, Central America, and
the Caribbean. We will urge those partners to encourage the Venezuelan
Government to step up its efforts and fulfill regional commitments and
responsibilities to combat drug trafficking.
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