    [Senate Hearing 114-69]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                             S. Hrg. 114-69

                 DEEPENING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
                  IN VENEZUELA: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTER-
                  ESTS AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE
                    TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
                          DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
                             GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES

                                     OF THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 17, 2015

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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                    COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                     BOB CORKER, TENNESSE, Chairman
    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
    MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 BARBARA BOXER, California
    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
    JEFF FLAKE, Arizona                  JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    CORY GARDNER, Colorado               CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
    DAVID PERDUE, Georgia                TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia              CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  TIM KAINE, Virginia
    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
                  Lester E. Munson III, Staff Director
               Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director

                             ------------

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE
                TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
                      DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
                         GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES

                     MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman

    JEFF FLAKE, Arizona                  BARBARA BOXER, California
    CORY GARDNER, Colorado               TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    DAVID PERDUE, Georgia                TIM KAINE, Virginia
    JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia              EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

                                 (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

    Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, opening
      statement......................................................     4
    Canton, Santiago, executive director, Partners for Human Rights,
      Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights,
      Washington, DC.................................................    38
        Prepared statement...........................................    41
    Farah, Douglas, president, IBI Consultants, Takoma Park, MD......    52
        Prepared statement...........................................    54
    Lee, Alex, Deputy Assistant Secretary for South America and Cuba,
      Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
      Washington, DC.................................................     7
        Prepared statement...........................................     9
        Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
          Marco Rubio................................................    74
    Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
      statement......................................................     6
    Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement..     1
    Sabatini, Christopher, Ph.D., adjunct professor, School of
      International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, New
      York, NY.......................................................    35
        Prepared statement...........................................    36
    Smith, John, Acting Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
      Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washinngton, DC......    10
        Prepared statement...........................................    12

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

    Written statement of Maria Eugenia Tovar, a Venezuelan citizen,
      submitted by Senator Marco Rubio...............................    73

                                     (iii)

    DEEPENING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN VENEZUELA: IMPLICATIONS FOR
                   U.S. INTERESTS AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 2015

            U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
                Transnational Crime, Civilian Security,
                Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's
                Issues, Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
    room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Marco Rubio
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Rubio, Flake, Gardner, Perdue, Isakson,
    Boxer, Menendez, Udall, Kaine, and Markey.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

        Senator Rubio. The committee will come to order. To start
    this hearing, the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
    Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human
    Rights, and Global Women's Issues will come to order, as I
    said.
        This hearing is titled ``The Deepening Political and
    Economic Crisis in Venezuela: Implications for U.S. Interests
    and the Western Hemisphere.''
        I would like to begin by welcoming Mr. Alex Lee, who is the
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South America and Cuba,
    and Mr. John E. Smith, the Acting Director of Office of Foreign
    Assets Control.
        We had invited Assistant Secretary of State Roberta
    Jacobson to participate. We were informed that she is in Havana
    today so she will not be available. So we appreciate you being
    here, Mr. Lee.
        So with vast oil reserves, Venezuela is one of the richest
    countries in Latin America, and the Venezuelan people are
    intelligent, they are well educated, they are hardworking
    people. The evidence of this can be found in my home State in
    Miami and in Doral and in Weston, FL, where a vibrant
    Venezuelan community has helped build quality and vibrant
    communities.
        And Venezuela is also the cradle of democracy in South
    America. And that is why it is so tragic that Venezuela has
    turned into a social, political, and economic disaster.
        The reason for this is simple. Because today that nation is
    increasingly in the iron grip of corrupt and incompetent
    leaders. A rich country suffering from a massive and growing
    shortage of food, medicine, and basic goods to the point where
    Maduro has had to order supermarkets to install fingerprint
    scanners to enforce food rations. Venezuela has an inflation
    rate of over 60 percent, among the highest in the world. Price
    controls in Venezuela have led to massive shortages of medicine
    and medical equipment, has forced hospitals to suspend cancer
    treatments and all but emergency surgical procedures. Shortages
    of spare parts have grounded much of the bus and truck fleet,
    and many airlines have stopped flying to Venezuela altogether.
        The government, by the way, has also defaulted on several
    large debts. Back when they were facing elections in 2012 and
    2013, they authorized more imports than they could afford, but
    when the bills came due, they stopped paying them, building up
    tens of billions of dollars' worth of debt. The result is that
    Venezuelan bonds are treated as among the riskiest in the
    world, demanding premiums that are twice those of Bolivia, four
    times those of Nigeria, and 13 times those of Mexico or Chile.
        It is the incompetence of Nicolas Maduro and his
    predecessor, Hugo Chavez, that have left Venezuela in the
    position that it finds itself in. But instead of seeking out
    reforms to improve these conditions, the response of the Maduro
    regime has been to crack down on dissent, erode democracy, and
    violently violate the human rights of their own people.
        Here is just a brief recap of steps Maduro and his cronies
    have taken to strengthen their grip on power.
        In April 2013, the main opposition TV network, Globovision,
    was forced to sell to a pro-government owner.
        In July 2013, pro-government businessmen bought Cadena
    Capriles, the owner of the largest daily in Venezuela, Ultimas
    Noticias.
        In August 2013, the most corrupt man in Venezuela--and that
    is one heck of a title--Mr. Diosdado Cabello, the National
    Assembly President, used a simple majority vote instead of the
    required two-thirds vote to suspend an opposition deputy from
    office, paving the way for a series of votes to grant Maduro
    decree powers.
        In September 2013 Maduro closes Voz de Orinoco, a radio
    station. He closed it for, ``calling for rebellion.''
        In October 2013, Maduro restricts bulk paper imports to
    opposition newspapers, making it harder for them to go to
    print.
        In February 2014, security officials, working with armed
    pro-government thugs, confront, beat, and even kill anti-Maduro
    protestors.
        That same month, the National Telecommunications Commission
    prohibits local TV and radio from covering antigovernment
    protests.
        In May 2014, the Maduro government begins to routinely
    block Web sites that are critical of the regime.
        In July 2014, a Spanish investor group close to Maduro buys
    El Universal, one of the nation's flagship daily newspapers,
    and immediately the content of that newspaper changes to one of
    supportive of Maduro.
        In August 2014, the government begins proceedings against
    Radio Caracas, and it suspends an opposition radio show from
    broadcasting.
        This is just a small sampling of the antidemocratic moves
    and the violent moves taken by this regime just in the last
    year and a half.
        Now, faced with these long string of human rights
    violations and the fact that many of these violators and the
    people who enable them have strong economic links to the United
    States and in particular south Florida, late last year Congress
    passed and the President signed a law allowing the United
    States to deny visas and freeze the assets of human rights
    violators in Venezuela. And last week, the President applied
    these sanctions against several human rights violators.
        These sanctions are not against the Government of
    Venezuela. These sanctions are not against the people of
    Venezuela, nor do they aim to deny the people of Venezuela
    anything. These sanctions, that the President has imposed, deny
    known human rights violators the chance to use the money they
    have stolen from the people of Venezuela to enjoy luxuries here
    in the United States. These sanctions also deny human rights
    violators the chance to travel freely to the United States.
        Faced with an economic catastrophe and dwindling public
    support, Nicolas Maduro has tried to use these sanctions as a
    way to deflect from these problems and rally people around
    anti-Americanism and nationalism. He has gone as far as to
    absurdly claim that the United States is preparing an invasion
    of Venezuela, and he has tried to place the opposition in a
    position of either supporting him or being labeled as traitors.
        So let me be very clear. The future of Venezuela belongs to
    the people of Venezuela to decide via free and fair elections.
    The United States has no interest and no plans of imposing or
    encouraging what direction a free people of Venezuela freely
    choose. The purpose of these sanctions is only this: to deny
    corrupt officials and human rights violators the opportunity to
    buy homes, make investments, and vacation in the United States
    with the money they have stolen from the people of Venezuela.
        Nevertheless, we can expect to see more of these theatrics
    from Nicolas Maduro in the days and weeks to come. In fact, we
    have just received word that he is shopping around an open
    letter to the American people to be published any day now in
    some major American media outlet or various media outlets,
    encouraging the American people to stand up to their elected
    officials and ask them to stop picking on him. By the way, in
    the same letter, he accuses the United States of being involved
    in a 2002 coup plot in Venezuela, another absurd claim.
        This past weekend he asked for and was given absolute power
    once again by the National Assembly. This grab for power
    through decree powers that were given to him--you can expect to
    see more of this because the declining economy and falling oil
    prices has cut into his ability to buy support. Here are some
    of the things we expect to see.
        Unable to find credible evidence of coup plots between the
    opposition and U.S. diplomats, I expect and predict that soon
    you will see them produce fabricated evidence of coup plotting.
    You will see clandestine assassination of opposition figures,
    and you may even see Maduro and his cronies try to move up this
    year's legislative elections to capitalize on this nationalism
    before the popularity of his government fades even more.
        But no amount of repression or theatrics will solve or
    cover up the disaster that he has brought upon the people of
    Venezuela. Food seized from private stores rot in warehouses
    because of their incompetence. Maduro and his cronies continue
    to manipulate currency to make money for themselves. Maduro and
    his cronies will continue to force those doing business with
    the government to use companies where they control the
    subcontractors. And at some point this year, we may even see
    the gas subsidies, long provided by the government, either
    altered or removed altogether.
        And we will also continue to see human rights violations.
    The Defense Minister Vladimir, Padrino Lopez, has authorized
    the use of force against peaceful demonstrators, which has led
    to the murder of a 14-year-old boy. We will see more arrests
    like the recent one of the elected Mayor of Caracas, Antonio
    Ledezma, who was arrested last month. And sadly, we will see
    more deaths such as one when opposition leader Rodolfo Gonzalez
    took his own life when faced with the Maduro decision to move
    the dissident leader to a cell block of common criminals.
        It is also worth noting some other aspects of this regime.
        First, the Cuban dictatorship has penetrated every aspect
    of the Venezuelan Government. We will get into that today.
        Second, Maduro has opened the door to closer military
    relations with Iran, Russia, and China. In fact, the Venezuelan
    military is currently conducting exercises with visiting
    Russian troops and equipment.
        Third, the Maduro regime continues to harbor vast elements
    of the FARC within Venezuelan territory, offering this
    terrorist group sanctuary and protection.
        And fourth, along with Cuba, Maduro continues to aid
    populist anti-American elements throughout Central and South
    America.
        The people of Venezuela deserve better than this, and while
    the direction of their future belongs to them, we will be a
    strong voice in firm support of their aspirations for a better
    country and a better life. And we will not allow those who are
    violating their rights and denying them this better future the
    chance to come to Doral or Weston or to Miami or CocoPlum and
    enjoy life with the money they have stolen from their own
    people.
        With that, I would like to thank and recognize our ranking
    member, Senator Boxer, and I look forward to continuing to work
    with you on these important issues.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

        Senator Boxer. Thank you so much for holding this really
    important and very timely hearing. And I also would like to
    thank our witnesses for participating.
        In February 2014, thousands of Venezuelans took to the
    streets to protest against the administration of President
    Nicolas Maduro and were met with a brutal crackdown by
    government security forces and armed pro-government gangs.
        Last month marked the 1-year anniversary of these
    widespread antigovernment demonstrations, which lasted nearly 4
    months and left more than 40 people dead.
        Tragically, the grievances voiced by protestors--a failing
    economy, chronic shortages of consumer goods, and high levels
    of crime, violence, and corruption--have certainly not been
    addressed. In fact, the political and economic situation in
    Venezuela has continued to deteriorate over the past year.
        According to official figures, Venezuela's economy shrank
    2.8 percent in 2014 and inflation rose to 64 percent, the
    highest rate in Latin America. Venezuela's murder rate is the
    second-highest in the world behind Honduras. And Transparency
    International ranks Venezuela as the most corrupt country in
    Latin America.
        The Maduro government continues its brutal repression of
    dissent by systematically targeting opposition figures, human
    rights defenders, journalists, and civil society activists for
    violence, harassment, intimidation, and other human rights
    abuses. Just last month, the mayor of Caracas was arrested and
    jailed for allegedly, ``conspiring to organize and carry out
    violent acts against the government,'' and a 14-year-old boy
    was shot in the head and killed by a police officer during an
    antigovernment protest.
        In response to the deepening crisis in Venezuela, Congress
    unanimously enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and
    Civil Society Act of 2014, which President Obama signed into
    law in December. This very important law requires the President
    to impose sanctions on individuals or entities involved in
    serious human rights violations against antigovernment
    protestors, or on those who have ordered the arrest or
    prosecution of individuals for their legitimate exercise of
    freedom of expression or assembly. I applaud President Obama's
    decision to implement this law by sanctioning seven Venezuelan
    officials involved in human rights abuses and public
    corruption, and I encourage him to continue that crackdown.
        The United States has an obligation to shine a bright light
    on the abuses being committed against the people of Venezuela,
    and the President's action sends a strong message to the people
    there and the government that we will not stay silent in the
    face of violence, corruption, and the suppression of the
    fundamental rights and freedoms of the Venezuelan people.
        But it is also important to make clear that these sanctions
    directly target the perpetrators of abuses. They do not target
    the people of Venezuela. And as our chairman said, that is
    critical. We want to hurt the people who are causing all this
    hurt, not the ordinary people who are simply trying to survive.
        Today's hearing will be an important opportunity to examine
    the United States policy toward Venezuela and the role of
    sanctions in addressing the current economic and political
    crisis there. It will also help us chart a path forward in
    support of the people of Venezuela and their aspirations; their
    aspirations that are just like all people, a longing to be
    truly free and truly democratic.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        The ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee and
    someone who spends a tremendous amount of time on Western
    Hemisphere issues is here with us today, and I would like to
    recognize him for some comments.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

        Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you and
    the ranking member for holding what I think is an incredibly
    important hearing. There are many challenges in the world that
    distract or diversify our attention, but this one in our own
    hemisphere is incredibly important.
        Last may, after 40 deaths, more than 50 documented cases of
    torture, high profile political persecutions, and thousands of
    arbitrary and unlawful detentions by the Venezuelan Government,
    this committee met to review the shocking pattern of systematic
    human rights violations by the Maduro government, its security
    forces, and its judicial system which continues today and has
    only gotten worse.
        Venezuela is awash in a culture of gross impunity at every
    level. Checks and balances on Executive power have completely
    eroded. There is no accountability for the crimes against
    Venezuelan citizens by an out-of-control regime.
        It should come as no surprise, as Venezuela's fiscal and
    economic crisis has deepened, that the Maduro government is
    radicalizing its tactics. Last month, the Minister of Defense,
    Padrino Lopez, signed a decree authorizing security forces to
    use lethal force--lethal force--against civilians, and with
    that decree came the tragic death of 14-year-old Kluiverth Roa,
    who was shot in the head by the national police.
        We saw, as has been said here, the elected mayor of
    Caracas, Antonio Ledezma, forcefully removed from this office
    and jailed on trumped-up charges. And more than a year after
    his arrest, Leopoldo Lopez, the continent's most high profile
    political prisoner, continues to languish in prison without a
    trial, without any semblance of due process. And just last week
    in an unacceptable and utterly grotesque statement,
    Venezuelan's Ambassador to the OAS, Roy Chaderton, actually
    joked about shooting members of the Venezuelan opposition in
    the head.
        Against this backdrop of persecution, violence, and
    outrageous human rights violations, now even more disturbing
    trends started to emerge. Just last week, the Treasury
    Department announced that the Banca Privada d'Andorra, BPA, was
    involved in a complex scheme to launder nearly $2 billion--let
    me repeat that--$2 billion in funds from the Venezuelan state
    oil company, PDVSA. BPA then moved these funds into the U.S.
    financial system.
        In December, a private jet trafficking millions of dollars
    in cocaine was captured in Fort Lauderdale. In September, a
    truck carrying $10 million in cash coming from the United
    States was captured in Venezuela. All of this is on top of the
    thousands of pounds--literally tons--of cocaine trafficked by
    the Venezuelan National Guard that has been seized in Europe.
        The United States and the international community cannot
    tolerate such blatant violations of international law. I am
    pleased that Treasury has named senior Venezuelan officials as
    kingpins and acknowledged the Venezuelan National Guard is
    deeply involved in drug trafficking. Obviously, in today's
    Venezuela, we are not just watching the rise of an
    authoritarian regime, we are watching the emergence of a drug
    trafficking regime involved in networks that threaten and
    endanger the hemisphere.
        So finally, let me just say I welcome the President's
    decision to move forward with implementation of the Venezuela
    Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act, which, Mr.
    Chairman, you and I authored and you were deeply involved in
    helping us draft and ultimately move through the Senate. And I
    appreciate that--and the announcement last week of targeted
    sanctions against seven Venezuelan officials, including senior
    members of the military, intelligence services, and judiciary.
    In my view, we can go further, but this is an important first
    step.
        Let me reemphasize. These are targeted sanctions against
    Maduro government officials, not sanctions against the people
    of Venezuela.
        I look forward to hearing the administration's strategy for
    addressing the political, diplomatic, and security challenges
    that Venezuela presents.
        And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        And now we are going to get to our witnesses' testimony.
        Just a brief housekeeping item. We will have votes, I
    think, scheduled at 11 o'clock. There may be a need to go into
    a brief recess for a few minutes while we go to and from the
    vote, but we will continue the hearing until we conclude it.
        With that, Mr. Lee, we are prepared for your opening
    statement.

      STATEMENT OF ALEX LEE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH
     AMERICA AND CUBA, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S.
                  DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

        Mr. Lee. Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, and members
    of the committee, thank you for inviting me to speak to you
    about Venezuela. I appreciate your interest in Venezuela and
    your support for United States assistance and our policies
    there.
        We are deeply concerned about the situation in Venezuela
    where last year legitimate political, economic, and social
    grievances and a lack of adequate democratic space brought
    protests and, unfortunately, violence. Tensions within
    Venezuela continue to build and the government has intensified
    its actions to repress dissent. The United States has called on
    the Venezuelan Government to respect human rights, uphold the
    rule of law, and engage in peaceful, inclusive dialogue with
    Venezuelans across the political spectrum to alleviate the
    current tension. We have called on the Venezuelan Government to
    release Mayor Antonio Ledezma, opposition leader Leopoldo
    Lopez, Mayor Daniel Ceballos, and others it has unjustly
    jailed, including dozens of students. We have encouraged the
    government to improve the climate of respect for human rights
    and fundamental freedoms, including respect for the freedoms of
    peaceful assembly and association. I know this committee shares
    our concerns, and we welcome your strong support for democracy
    in Venezuela.
        Venezuela's problems cannot be solved by criminalizing
    legitimate democratic dissent. These actions appear to be a
    clear attempt by the Venezuelan Government to divert attention
    from that country's economic and political problems. Rather
    than imprisoning and intimidating its critics, we believe the
    Venezuelan Government should focus on finding real solutions
    through democratic dialogue.
        We will not refrain from speaking out about human rights
    abuses in Venezuela. We are joined in this by dozens of
    individuals and entities, including the U.N. High Commissioner
    on Human Rights, Organization of American States Secretary
    General Insulza, the Peruvian, Costa Rican, and Colombian
    Governments, and the Inter American Commission on Human Rights,
    among others.
        Advancing human rights and democratic processes are a key
    U.S. foreign policy objective. The President's March 9
    Executive order, ``Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of
    Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela,''
    which implements the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and
    Civil Society Act of 2014, is a manifestation of our commitment
    to advancing respect for human rights, safeguarding democratic
    institutions, and protecting the United States financial system
    from the illicit financial flows from public corruption in
    Venezuela.
        Executive Order 13692 is aimed at persons involved in, or
    responsible for, certain conduct in Venezuela, including
    actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions,
    the use of violence or conduct that constitutes human rights
    violations and abuses, including in response to antigovernment
    protests, actions that prohibit, limit, or penalize the
    exercise of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly, as well
    as public corruption by senior government officials in
    Venezuela. The Executive order does not--repeat--does not
    target the people or the economy of Venezuela.
        I want to be clear. It is not our policy or intent to
    promote instability in Venezuela or to endorse solutions to
    Venezuela's problems that are inconsistent with its own legal
    system. The United States is not seeking the downfall of the
    Venezuelan Government, nor trying to sabotage the Venezuelan
    economy. We remain Venezuela's largest trading partner.
    President Maduro has publicly expressed a desire to improve our
    bilateral relationship, and we are open to direct communication
    with the Venezuelan Government. We maintain diplomatic
    relations and welcome conversations and debate. We remain
    committed to maintaining our strong and lasting ties with the
    people of Venezuela. We will not, however, refrain from calling
    out human rights abuses and other actions and policies that
    undermine democracy.
        We hope the Venezuelan Government will focus its energy on
    finding real solutions for the country's mounting economic and
    political problems through democratic dialogue with the
    political opposition, civil society, and the private sector.
    This year's National Assembly elections present an opportunity
    for Venezuelans to engage in legitimate, democratic discourse.
    And credible election results could reduce tensions in
    Venezuela. We have urged regional partners to encourage
    Venezuela to accept a robust international electoral
    observation mission, using accepted international standards,
    for those elections. Now is the time for the region to work
    together to help Venezuela to work toward a democratic solution
    to the challenges the country faces.
        We will also continue to work closely with Congress and
    others in the region to support greater political expression in
    Venezuela and to encourage the Venezuelan Government to live up
    to its required commitments to democracy and human rights, as
    articulated in the OAS Charter, the Inter American Democratic
    Charter, and other relevant instruments.
        Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lee follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Edward Alexander Lee

        Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, members of the committee,
    thank you for inviting me to speak with you about Venezuela. I
    appreciate your interest in Venezuela and your support for U.S.
    assistance and our policies there.
        We are deeply concerned about the situation in Venezuela where last
    year legitimate political, economic, and social grievances and a lack
    of adequate democratic space brought protests and, unfortunately,
    violence. Tensions within Venezuela continue to build and the
    government has intensified its actions to repress dissent. The United
    States has called on the Venezuelan Government to respect human rights,
    uphold the rule of law, and engage in a peaceful, inclusive dialogue
    with Venezuelans across the political spectrum to alleviate the current
    tension. We have called on the Venezuelan Government to release Mayor
    Antonio Ledezma, opposition leader Leopolda Lopez, Mayor Daniel
    Ceballos, and others it has unjustly jailed, including dozens of
    students. We have encouraged the government to improve the climate of
    respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect
    for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. I know this
    committee shares our concerns, and we welcome your strong support for
    democracy in Venezuela.
        Venezuela's problems cannot be solved by criminalizing legitimate,
    democratic dissent. These actions appear to be a clear attempt by the
    Venezuelan Government to divert attention from that country's economic
    and political problems. Rather than imprisoning and intimidating its
    critics, we believe the Venezuelan Government should focus on finding
    real solutions through democratic dialogue. As I have mentioned, we
    will not refrain from speaking out about human rights abuses. We are
    joined in this by dozens of individuals and entities, including the
    U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, Organization of American States
    (OAS) Secretary General Insulza, the Peruvian, Costa Rican, and
    Colombian Governments, and the Inter-American Commission on Human
    Rights, among others.
        Advancing human rights and democratic processes are a key U.S.
    foreign policy objective. The President's March 9 Executive order
    ``Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons
    Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela,'' which implements
    theVenezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, is
    a manifestation of our commitment to advancing respect for human
    rights, safeguarding democratic institutions, and protecting the U.S.
    fmancial system from the illicit financial flows from public coruption
    in Venezuela.
        Executive Order 13692 is aimed at persons involved in, or
    responsible for, certain conduct in Venezuela, including actions that
    undermine democratic processes or institutions, the use of violence or
    conduct that constitutes human rights violations and abuses, including
    in response to antigovernment protests, actions that prohibit, limit,
    or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly,
    as well as public corruption by senior government officials in
    Venezuela. The Executive order does not target the people or the
    economy of Venezuela.
        I want to be clear: it is not our policy or intent to promote
    instability in Venezuela or to endorse solutions to Venezuela's
    political problems that are inconsistent with its own legal system. The
    United States is not seeking the downfall of the Venezuelan Government
    nor trying to sabotage the Venezuelan economy. We remain Venezuela's
    largest trading partner. President Maduro publicly expresses a desire
    to improve our bilateral relationship, and we are open to direct
    communication with the Venezuelan Government. We maintain diplomatic
    relations and welcome conversations and debate. We remain committed to
    maintaining our strong and lasting ties with the people of Venezuela.
    We will not, however, refrain from calling out human rights abuses and
    other actions and policies that undermine democracy.
        We hope the Venezuelan Government will focus its energy on finding
    real solutions for the country's mounting economic and political
    problems through democratic dialogue with the political opposition,
    civil society, and the private sector. This year's National Assembly
    elections present an opportunity for Venezuelans to engage in
    legitimate, democratic discourse. And, credible election results could
    reduce tensions in Venezuela. We have urged regional partners to
    encourage Venezuela to accept a robust international electoral
    observation mission, using accepted international standards, for those
    elections. Now is the time for the region to work together to help
    Venezuela to work toward a democratic solution to the challenges the
    country faces.
        We will also continue to work closely with Congress and others in
    the region to support greater political expression in Venezuela, and to
    encourage the Venezuelan Government to live up to its required
    commitments to democracy and human rights, as articulated in the OAS
    Charter, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and other relevant
    instruments.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to end by saying that we sincerely
    appreciate the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's contributions to
    the promotion of human rights in Venezuela. The strong, bipartisan
    cooperation among this committee's members and staff to support the
    State Department's championing of democracy, human rights, and freedom
    of expression throughout the hemisphere is a credit to our great
    country.

        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        Mr. Smith.

       STATEMENT OF JOHN SMITH, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
       FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
                             WASHINGTON, DC

        Mr. Smith. Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer,
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    invitation to appear before you today at this important hearing
    on political and economic developments in Venezuela, the human
    rights situation in the country, and the implications of these
    topics for regional stability and United States interests. I
    will address the administration's implementation of the
    sanctions measures in the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and
    Civil Society Act of 2014, which was signed into law in
    December.
        On March 9, the President issued an Executive order
    declaring a national emergency with respect to the situation in
    Venezuela, which is a prerequisite for the imposition of
    economic sanctions under the International Emergency Economic
    Powers Act. The Executive order, which implements the targeted
    economic sanctions contained in the act and builds on them in
    key respects, imposes economic sanctions on persons listed in
    an annex to the order and any persons determined by the
    Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
    of State, to have engaged in, or to have been responsible for,
    certain enumerated activities in relation to Venezuela such as
    undermining democratic processes or institutions, committing
    serious abuses or violations of human rights, limiting or
    penalizing the exercise of freedom of expression or peaceful
    assembly, or being involved in public corruption by senior
    Venezuelan Government officials.
        The Executive order also contains a status-based authority
    targeting current and former officials of the Government of
    Venezuela, which gives the Secretary of the Treasury additional
    flexibility to go after targets of concern for which there may
    be limitations on our ability to designate under the other
    conduct-based authorities. The President named seven Venezuelan
    individuals in the annex to the order. The property and
    interests in property of these individuals are blocked, meaning
    their assets within U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and U.S.
    persons are prohibited from engaging in any transactions or
    dealings with them.
        Last week's action imposing sanctions on seven individuals
    focused on those involved in human rights abuses and the
    persecution of political opponents connected to the events
    surrounding the February 2014 protests highlighted in the act.
    Most of the individuals targeted are currently, or were
    formerly associated with, Venezuela's National Guard, the Armed
    Forces, the intelligence service, or the national police,
    members of which played key roles in repression against
    individuals involved in the protests. The Executive order also
    targeted a national-level prosecutor who was charged, based in
    part on implausible and/or fabricated information, several
    opposition members with conspiring to assassinate or overthrow
    President Maduro.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge the leadership you have
    demonstrated on this issue, and I note that six of the seven
    targets in the annex to the Executive order were included in
    your list of individuals published last May.
        In addition to implementing the act, the order expands the
    designation criteria beyond the requirements of the act. This
    will allow greater targeting flexibility and the highlighting,
    targeting, and deterrence of additional problematic behavior
    that is ongoing in Venezuela. We remain committed to defending
    human rights, advancing democratic governance, and protecting
    the U.S. financial system from abuse.
        To be clear and as the chairman and ranking member and
    fellow speakers have said, these sanctions are not aimed
    against the country of Venezuela. They do not target the
    Venezuelan people, nor do they sanction the Venezuelan
    Government as a whole. To the contrary, this remains a targeted
    sanctions program focused tightly and precisely on bad actors
    undermining Venezuela's democracy, violating the human rights
    of its citizens, and diverting much-needed economic resources
    for personal gain, resources that could and should be invested
    for the public good.
        Turning specifically to the sanctions program's focus on
    public corruption in Venezuela, I would echo President Obama,
    who has said that fighting corruption is one of the great
    struggles of our time. Corruption, beyond its unethical nature,
    siphons off important resources that could be used to feed
    children or build schools and infrastructure that promote
    development.
        It is also worth noting the long history of the application
    of United States sanctions to foreign policy and national
    security concerns with a Venezuelan nexus. Even before this
    past year's events, we have not hesitated to designate
    Venezuelan banks and other companies for their connections with
    Iranian entities sanctioned for nuclear proliferation
    activities, as well as designating Venezuelan targets for their
    links to narcotics trafficking.
        As I conclude these remarks, I want to emphasize that we
    retain the ability to respond to events in Venezuela as they
    unfold. We stand ready with a powerful financial tool to deter
    abuses and target those who may choose to undermine democratic
    processes or institutions or to violate human rights in
    Venezuela.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of John E. Smith

                          venezuela sanctions program
        Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, distinguished members of the
    committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today at
    this important hearing on political and economic developments in
    Venezuela, the human rights situation in the country, and the
    implications of these topics for regional stability and U.S. interests.
    As the Acting Director of the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
    Assets Control (OFAC), I will address the administration's
    implementation of the sanctions measures in the Venezuela Defense of
    Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (the Act), which was signed
    into law on December 18, 2014.
    Executive Order 13692
        On March 9, the President issued Executive Order 13692 declaring a
    national emergency with respect to the situation in Venezuela, which is
    a prerequisite for the imposition of economic sanctions under the
    International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The Executive
    order, which implements the targeted sanctions contained in the Act and
    builds on them in key respects, imposes economic sanctions on persons
    listed in an Annex to the Order and any persons determined by the
    Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
    to have engaged in, or to have been responsible for, certain enumerated
    activities in relation to Venezuela such as undermining democratic
    processes or institutions, committing serious abuses or violations of
    human rights, limiting or penalizing the exercise of freedom of
    expression or peaceful assembly, or being involved in public corruption
    by senior Venezuelan Government officials. The Executive order also
    contains a ``status-based'' authority targeting current and former
    officials of the Government of Venezuela, which gives the Secretary of
    the Treasury additional flexibility to go after targets of concern for
    which there may be limitations on our ability to designate under the
    other ``conduct-based'' authorities. The President named seven
    Venezuelan individuals in the Annex to the Order. The property and
    interests in property of these individuals are blocked, meaning their
    assets within U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and U.S. persons are
    prohibited from engaging in any transactions or dealings with them. The
    Executive order also suspends the entry into the United States of
    individuals who are determined to meet the criteria for economic
    sanctions.
        Last week's action imposing sanctions on seven individuals focused
    on those involved in human rights abuses and the persecution of
    political opponents connected to the events surrounding the February
    2014 protests highlighted in the Act. Most of the individuals targeted
    are currently or were formerly associated with Venezuela's National
    Guard, the Armed Forces, the intelligence service, or the national
    police, members of which played key roles in repression against
    individuals involved in the protests beginning in February 2014. The
    Executive order also targeted a national-level prosecutor who has
    charged--based in part on implausible and/or fabricated information--
    several opposition members with conspiring to assassinate or overthrow
    President Maduro. Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge the leadership
    you have demonstrated on this issue, and I would note that six of the
    seven targets in the Annex to the Executive order were included in your
    list of individuals published in May of last year.
        In addition to implementing the Act, the order expands the
    designation criteria beyond the requirements of the Act. This will
    allow for greater targeting flexibility and the highlighting,
    targeting, and deterrence of additional problematic behavior that is
    ongoing in Venezuela. We remain committed to defending human rights,
    advancing democratic governance in Venezuela, and protecting the U.S.
    financial system from abuse.
    Building on the Legislation
        While the Act focuses on human rights abuses specifically related
    to last year's protests, the Executive order expands our targeting
    authority to more broadly cover any significant acts of violence or
    serious violations of human rights in relation to Venezuela, and
    restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression or peaceful
    assembly in Venezuela, allowing us to deter and address repression as
    it may arise. The order also includes designation criteria related to
    the undermining of democracy in Venezuela and to public corruption by
    senior Venezuelan Government officials. Finally, the E.O. gives us the
    discretionary authority to designate current or former Venezuelan
    Government officials. As we have learned from experience across a
    number of sanctions programs, this type of ``status-based'' authority
    is a useful tool that allows us to go after targets of concern for
    which there may be limitations to our ability to designate under
    ``conduct-based'' authorities.
        To be clear, these sanctions are not aimed against the country of
    Venezuela. They do not target the Venezuelan people or the economy, nor
    do they sanction the Venezuelan Government as a whole. To the contrary,
    this remains a targeted sanctions program focused tightly and precisely
    on bad actors undermining Venezuela's democracy, violating and abusing
    the human rights of its citizens, and diverting much-needed economic
    resources for personal gain--resources that could and should be
    invested for the public good.
    Public Corruption
        Turning specifically to this sanctions program's focus on public
    corruption in Venezuela, I would echo President Obama, who has said
    that fighting corruption is one of the great struggles of our time.
    Corruption, beyond its unethical nature, siphons off important
    resources that could be used to feed children or build schools and
    infrastructure that promote development.
        As the largest economy in the world, we remain Venezuela's primary
    trading partner and maintain financial ties to Venezuela. These
    relationships, while a natural outcome of our long-standing economic
    engagement with the region, also potentially expose our financial
    system to illicit financial flows from public corruption in Venezuela,
    as Venezuelan Government officials who control access to scarce U.S.
    dollars attempt to take advantage to reap illicit gains. This close
    interaction with the U.S. financial system, however, also gives us
    leverage from a sanctions perspective. Venezuela's heavy use of the
    U.S. dollar and Venezuelans' frequent travel to the United States make
    targets of our sanctions vulnerable. We expect our designations will
    have bite.
        In addition, Treasury is using the full range of its financial
    tools to address the exploitation of the U.S. financial system in
    furtherance of corruption schemes. Last week, for example, the
    Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the Department of the
    Treasury issued a public notice of finding that Banca Privada d'Andorra
    (BPA) is a financial institution operating outside of the United States
    that is of a ``primary money laundering concern.'' The finding that
    accompanied this notice outlined how a third-party money launderer in
    Venezuela worked with BPA to deposit the proceeds of public corruption,
    some of which transited the U.S. financial system, into an account at
    BPA. This network was well connected to Venezuelan Government officials
    and facilitated the movement of at least $50 million through the United
    States from 2011 to 2013 in support of this money laundering network.
    Narcotics, Terrorism, and Iran
        It is also worth noting the long history of the application of U.S.
    sanctions to foreign policy and national security concerns with a
    Venezuela nexus. Even before the past year's events, we have not
    hesitated to designate Venezuelan banks and other companies for their
    connections with Iranian entities sanctioned for nuclear proliferation
    activities pursuant to our counterproliferation authorities. These
    actions included the designation of the International Development Bank
    in Caracas, a subsidiary of the Tehran-based Export Development Bank of
    Iran.
        Our actions to combat narcotics trafficking in Latin America
    pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act have
    proceeded to a steady drumbeat, and they have not overlooked Venezuelan
    targets. For example, in September 2011, OFAC designated four
    Venezuelan Government officials for acting for, or on behalf of, the
    FARC, a designated narcoterrorist organization. The four officials
    acted in direct support of the FARC's narcotics and arms trafficking
    activities in Venezuela. In September 2012, shortly after his arrest in
    Panama, OFAC designated a Venezuelan narcotics trafficker and his
    company. The trafficker was previously indicted in the Southern
    District of Florida on cocaine trafficking charges. And in August 2013,
    OFAC designated a former Venezuelan National Guard captain as a
    significant foreign narcotics trafficker. The captain had previously
    been indicted in the Eastern District of New York in March 2011 on
    multiple cocaine trafficking charges. He facilitated cocaine loads from
    Colombia through Venezuela in partnership with well-known narcotics
    traffickers in Colombia and Mexico.
        We have also acted to constrain Lebanese Hezbollah activity in
    Venezuela, designating in 2008 Hezbollah supporters and fundraisers
    active in Venezuela pursuant to our counterterrorism sanctions
    authorities. One of the targets was a senior Venezuelan diplomat who
    had facilitated the travel of Hezbollah members to and from Venezuela.
                                   conclusion
        Before I conclude these remarks, I want to emphasize that we retain
    the ability to respond to events in Venezuela as they unfold. We stand
    ready with a powerful financial tool to deter abuses and target those
    who may choose to undermine democratic processes or institutions. In
    concert with this Congress, we have made clear that the United States
    will not stand idly by and witness the repression that has occurred in
    Venezuela this past year. We have demonstrated in numerous and diverse
    scenarios across the globe that the United States has the ability to
    target those involved in human rights abuses and the undermining of
    democracy and to prevent them from accessing the United States
    financial system. And when we do so, they will find themselves isolated
    domestically, regionally, and globally.

        Senator Rubio. Thank you both for being here and for your
    opening testimony.
        I will begin the questioning round. We will do 7 minutes
    since I think we will have time to get through all of this.
        Let me begin with you, Mr. Lee. I wanted to talk to you
    about the political state in Venezuela. So as I have outlined
    in my opening statements and so has the ranking member and the
    ranking member of the full committee, in Venezuela there is an
    increased encroachment on freedom of the press and
    communication. There has been an increased encroachment on the
    judiciary branch. It no longer truly operates as an independent
    branch. We have seen the prosecutorial powers used to not just
    fabricate evidence but to target political opponents. We have
    seen members of the opposition expelled by simple majority
    votes from the National Assembly. We have seen the jailing of
    virtually every prominent--at some point, virtually every
    prominent voice in Venezuela that opposes the Maduro
    government. And there is now this pattern of decree powers that
    have been given to Maduro, including the one this weekend.
        Is Venezuela still a democracy?
        Mr. Lee. The Venezuelan electoral system is actually quite
    good in terms of the mechanical process. What the government
    has done is used a variety of means, gerrymandering, massive
    use of public funds, trumped-up charges against key opposition
    people, a systematic undermining of the independence of the
    media to tilt all the electoral ground in its favor. That still
    does not change the reality of how Venezuelans view the
    situation in Venezuela or how they perceive the government's
    handling. And if you look at polling, the polling shows that
    the majority of Venezuelans view the government mismanaging the
    economy and things are getting worse.
        We call on the Venezuelan Government to announce elections.
    We call on the Venezuelan Government to hold those elections in
    a way that provides the political space for the opposition, and
    we believe that if that is done and, in particular, if the
    international community can provide electoral monitoring of
    those elections, the Venezuelan people will have an opportunity
    to express their views.
        Senator Rubio. Well, thank you, Mr. Lee. And I appreciate
    your answer, and I understand it. I would just suggest that we
    need to view this from a different perspective because in Latin
    America, there is a troubling trend, and that is, people come
    to power through an election and then begin to undermine all
    the apparatus of a free society. So if I am a member of the
    opposition and there is no free press that can cover my
    activities, because they are not allowed to operate, so I have
    no way to get my word out, Maduro has unfettered access to the
    national airwaves, I have no access to the national airwaves.
    If I speak out too vehemently against him in the National
    Assembly, I could be removed and arrested. First they remove
    you so they can strip you of the immunity of being a deputy,
    and then they arrest you for it. And not to mention that there
    is evidence of electoral fraud in the last elections.
        You combine all these things--and just because you have an
    election, or say you had an election, does not make it a free
    and fair election. This is the pattern that has been followed
    in places like Nicaragua and other places as well. There is
    more to democracy than just holding an election. And certainly
    they are capable of having a free and fair election
    mechanically, but when the people running against you cannot go
    on the airwaves, cannot have TV shows, cannot speak out or they
    will be arrested, the entire media is owned by your cronies,
    you have unfettered access to the airwaves, they have none, and
    if you are part of the opposition and you oppose Maduro, you
    can be arrested, in my mind that does not sound like a
    democratic society.
        And I think it is important for us to understand that this
    is the new way tyrants are now operating. They dress themselves
    up as democrat, but then they end up governing in much
    different ways. And that is an important distinction for us to
    point to.
        I want to get to the issue of individuals. There are a
    number of individuals that were not sanctioned that I would
    encourage us to continue to look at. For example, last year
    Generals Aref Jimenez and Julio Cesar Morales Prieto, who held
    senior positions in Venezuela's directorate of armaments and
    explosives, played a key role in their efforts to create and
    support the government-affiliated colectivos. There was
    basically already regular armed groups. The DAEX, by the way,
    is currently led by Gen. Ignacio Velasquez Ramos. This is a
    group that has been intricately involved in cracking down on
    dissent.
        Of the seven designated individuals that constitute a
    national security threat to the United States, their bosses are
    not represented. For example, Gen. Vladimir Padrino, the
    Minister of Defense and as such, the highest ranking military
    officer, has not been held responsible for human rights
    violations committed by his subordinates. Some of the sanctions
    were based on Venezuelan officials allegedly involved in
    corruption and illicit activities, but we did not include
    Diosdado Cabello, the head of the Parliament who has been
    identified by defectors and others as the head of the cartel,
    the Los Solis, a drug cartel operated by Venezuelan generals.
        And then there is multiple print and broadcast reports,
    articles, and even books detailing the presence in the United
    States of Chavez and Maduro government officials that have
    become fabulously wealthy from what are alleged to be corrupt
    activities. They too use our financial system to transfer
    funds. One example is an individual by the name of Alejandro
    Andrade, who is a former army lieutenant and a fellow plotter
    of Chavez in the 1992 attempted coup that cost the lives of
    over 300 Venezuelans and who was later appointed by Chavez as
    the treasurer of the country. He is reported to be living in
    multimillion dollar equestrian estate in south Florida. And
    there are many other former officials, bankers, and business
    executives also living or owning property in the United States
    that are alleged to have acquired fortunes illicitly with the
    complicity of the Chavez/Maduro government. And I would
    encourage you to look at some of them as well.
        Mr. Smith, has the Treasury looked at certain financial
    institutions in Venezuela or the Venezuelan banking system as a
    whole to see who might qualify as financial institutions of
    primary money laundering concern under section 311 of the USA
    PATRIOT Act?
        Mr. Smith. Senator, I can tell you that with respect to
    many of the names that you talked about, we continue to
    investigate vigorously under all of the prongs of the Executive
    order. Unfortunately, you are asking me about authority, the
    particular one with respect to the financial institution--you
    are asking me about an authority that is administered by one of
    my sister agencies, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
    and I can take that question back to them.
        Senator Rubio. Well, let me just encourage you to act on
    information my office has received and to money laundering
    carried out by the petroleum company, PDVSA--P-D-V-S-A. There
    are close ties, according to these allegations and information
    that I have received between this organization and money
    laundering and drug trafficking activity. And there are a
    number of names that have been forwarded to us as individuals
    involved in this illicit activity: Rafael Ramirez, Nervis
    Gerardo Villalobos, Omar Farias, Carlos Luis, Aguilera Borjas,
    Alcides Rondon, and Rafael Jimenez Villaroel. We have received
    significant information about their ties between the state-run
    oil entity and drug trafficking and other laundering activities
    within Venezuela. And I will have more on this topic in a
    moment, but I want to recognize the ranking member.
        Senator Boxer. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, whoever feels comfortable answering these
    questions. President Obama's Executive order imposing sanctions
    on Venezuelan officials implicated in human rights violations
    and corruption was met with widespread criticism from Latin
    American nations. This is very upsetting to a lot of us. At a
    special meeting in Ecuador on Saturday, the 12-nation Union of
    South American Nations issued a statement criticizing the U.S.
    action as ``an interventionist threat to sovereignty and the
    principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other
    countries,'' and calling for the Executive order to be
    rescinded.
        In addition, President Maduro has said he will use next
    month's Summit of the Americas in Panama to denounce the
    sanctions.
        What steps are we taking to engage with Latin American
    nations about the recently announced sanctions? Have any
    countries in the region expressed support for our action?
        Mr. Lee. I will start and then my colleague will finish,
    Senator.
        Senator Boxer. Okay.
        Mr. Lee. We need to balance our condemnation of the human
    rights violations, which came through loud and clear with the
    law and the Executive order, as well as the various U.S.
    Government statements over the past 2 years, with the need to
    convince the region to act----
        Senator Boxer. Wait a minute. Just tell me. Are there any
    nations who support what we did in Latin America, and what are
    we doing to make sure they understand that what we did was the
    right thing, the moral thing, the correct thing for the people
    of Venezuela? So instead of reading me something, I know it is
    diplomacy and I understand all that. But on the ground, are we
    talking with our friends in region? Because it is upsetting to
    me that we see so little support.
        Mr. Lee. Senator, you are right that the Latin American
    community has sharply criticized our sanctions against
    individual Venezuelans. We have made a full court press to
    explain that what we are doing represents our principles and
    that we are exercising our own sovereignty in not allowing
    human rights violators or corrupt actors to come into our
    country or to enjoy our financial system.
        At the same time, we point out that and we urge the other
    Latin American countries to provide greater efforts with the
    Venezuelan Government to try to bridge the differences within
    Venezuela----
        Senator Boxer. Okay. So just to cut through. We are working
    with our friends in the region to get them to understand why
    what we did was right. Yes or no?
        Mr. Lee. Yes.
        Senator Boxer. Okay. And will the crisis in Venezuela be a
    priority for President Obama when he attends the Summit of the
    Americas?
        Mr. Lee. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Boxer. And how do United States sanctions fit into
    a broader United States strategy to address the growing crisis
    in Venezuela? In other words, what else are we doing besides
    the sanctions, besides talking to other nations? Do we have
    anything else that we are working on?
        Mr. Lee. The greatest chance for Venezuela to solve its
    problems is holding a credible electoral process, and for that,
    we need to work with the international community, particularly
    Venezuela's neighbors. And we were encouraged that UNASUR
    recently, after its meeting in Quito, issued for the first time
    a statement that has called on Venezuelans to engage in
    dialogue and to hold an election to try to bridge the
    differences, and we believe that is a positive step forward. We
    would like our Latin American partners to more vigorously
    champion the need for an electoral monitoring mission in
    Venezuela. But, yes, we are constantly engaged with likeminded
    countries, and we have seen a growing appreciation in Latin
    America that the economic situation in Venezuela is untenable
    and the Venezuelan Government's effort to try to control
    political opposition to it through repression is only greatly
    exacerbating the problem.
        Senator Boxer. Well, I want to say thank you for that. I
    agree with you that this upcoming election is critical. It is
    absolutely critical. And I agree with the comments made by my
    chairman here about having a vote and then having someone
    elected and declaring martial law and taking over and saying I
    can just decree this, that, and the other. That is what is
    going on.
        But later this year, Venezuela is expected to hold their
    parliamentary elections, and opposition leaders view these
    elections as an important chance to gain seats in the National
    Assembly and enable the opposition to put pressure on Maduro,
    particularly as his approval ratings have plummeted. So your
    point of focusing on the election--I really appreciate that,
    and I think that is what we should all focus on because I think
    clearly, if you look at what the people are saying in terms of
    their suffering and the rest, this could be a very important
    turning point--this election--if it is free and fair.
        And I am concerned about the lack of support in the region
    for our sanctions, and I think we should tell, as you are
    already, our friends in the region that it is our right as a
    nation not to allow people to come here and hide their money
    and all the rest of it. That is our right as a sovereign
    nation. And if we can build support, pivot to this upcoming
    election, I think it is absolutely crucial. And if it is not
    free and fair and if there is suppression, it is very
    dangerous.
        So I want to again thank my chairman for these very
    important hearings and thank both of you for your contribution.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
        Senator Gardner.
        Senator Gardner. Thank you all to the witnesses for being
    here today, and I join Chairman Rubio and other members of the
    subcommittee in expressing my utmost concern about the state of
    affairs in Venezuela.
        Given his dwindling public support, it seems that President
    Maduro has inherited all the authoritarian instincts of the
    late Hugo Chavez but none of his charm.
        I commend the administration for imposing additional
    sanctions on Venezuelan officials last week, though that action
    has predictively ushered in hysterical reaction from Caracas. I
    look forward to working with the committee to ensure that
    genuine democracy returns to Venezuela in our lifetime.
        We have had a lot of conversations this morning about the
    elections and the order. And so given the United States
    sanctions announcement, the Venezuelan National Assembly has
    granted President Maduro the power to govern by decree until
    the end of 2015. Mr. Lee, you talked about the mechanical
    process of elections being good or sound in Venezuela, at least
    at this point. Do you see, leading up to the elections, this
    decree power, and what should we look for? Do you see it
    impacting the election, and what should we look for in terms of
    their ability to tilt the playing field, as you mentioned some
    of the things they have been trying to do in the past?
        Mr. Lee. Well, we are clearly concerned that President
    Maduro might use his decree powers in a way that would
    complicate even more the ability to hold free and fair
    elections. We will have to see how he uses his decree powers,
    which last until the end of the year, or during the period in
    which the elections are going to be held.
        Again, I think that one of the most effective ways to
    pressure the Venezuelan Government to do the right thing with
    regard to elections is to encourage the international
    community, and in particular Venezuela's Latin American
    neighbors, to emphasize to the government the absolute
    importance of holding free and fair elections. Democracy and
    the commitment to support democracy is not only an obligation
    by Venezuela under the OAS but in many of its other subregional
    organizations that it is a member of, including MERCOSUR and
    UNASUR. And so we very much want the other countries in the
    region to try to help broker an understanding between the
    government and the opposition to provide the conditions for an
    election that is viewed as credible by all. We believe that is
    as a solution would go a long, long way to addressing some of
    the major, major problems that the country is facing.
        Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Lee.
        Mr. Smith, kind of following up on those comments, what has
    the reaction been to our sanctions in the region, and have we
    coordinated these sanctions with any of our allies in the
    region such as Brazil or Colombia?
        Mr. Smith. I will defer to my State Department colleague to
    talk about the reaction in the region. I will say that we do
    coordinate with allies in the region and allies around the
    world as we can. And so most of the time, we have what is
    called a prenotification process where we work with other
    countries to give them notification of what we are going to do
    so they may not be surprised and they can work with us.
        Senator Gardner. Thank you.
        Mr. Lee, do the anti-U.S. demonstrations on the streets of
    Caracas and elsewhere represent a security threat to remaining
    U.S. diplomatic and civilian personnel or their interests?
        Mr. Lee. Clearly, you know, the safety of our staff in
    Caracas is paramount just like the safety of American citizens
    living in Venezuela is paramount. Up to now, we have not seen
    targeting of Americans per se. So for that, we are encouraged.
        Senator Gardner. Have we taken any precautions? Has the
    State Department taken any precautions to protect our citizens
    and diplomats?
        Mr. Lee. Yes, sir. We have a system to notify Americans
    residing in Venezuela whenever we are aware of information
    suggesting that Americans may be targeted or there may be
    disturbances. And so we have a network that we use to get that
    information out.
        Our Embassy also is constantly reviewing its posture with
    respect to any possible disturbances. And so this is something
    that we just do as a matter of course.
        Senator Gardner. Mr. Chairman, I know we have votes coming
    up. So I will yield back my time so that you can get some other
    questions.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        Senator Menendez.
        Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Lee, I listened to your statement, and I have to
    wonder. I do not know why one would even suggest or have to
    feel the necessity to say that we are not trying to promote
    instability in Venezuela. We clearly are not trying to promote
    instability in Venezuela. But if we are going to make that
    statement about human rights and democracy anyplace in the
    world--forget about Venezuela--we are in a sad state of
    affairs. This is not an American view. This is what the OAS
    Charter says. This is what the Inter-American Democratic
    Charter says. This is what the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights
    entails.
        So when you say that and then when you say--and I cannot
    believe that you included it in your opening remarks,
    suggesting that President Maduro wants to improve our bilateral
    relationships. Yes, that is a good way to do it by unilaterally
    striking at reducing our Embassy and taking a whole host of
    other aggressive and active postures against the United States.
    It boggles my imagination.
        It also worries me when the State Department in a different
    context--I know you were down in Cuba before all the
    announcements. I guess I should have seen your effusiveness as
    a sign of things to come. And then see that others in the
    Department talked about it is not who you invite to the table,
    speaking to the Summit of the Americas, but what you speak
    about. Well, here we are with both Cuba, which of course has no
    democracy and human rights, and Venezuela, under which
    democracy and human rights are a deep threat. And I do not get
    the sense that the State Department has the drive and the
    conviction of these views by actions.
        I think it would be fair to say that we allowed the Latin
    Americans, when Senator Rubio and I were pursuing the
    legislation, which we thought was necessary to do--we were
    asked by the administration and told by the administration we
    are trying to allow our Latin American partners to get Maduro
    to move in a different direction. Is that not fair to say that
    we did try? We gave them space and time to try to achieve that.
        Mr. Lee. Yes, you did.
        Senator Menendez. And they did not succeed.
        Now, I look at the President's own declaration, which I
    applaud, and I look at drug trafficking--where do drugs end up?
    They end up on the streets of our cities. They end up addicting
    our young people. That is a national security threat. That
    would be whether it is Venezuela or any other part of the
    world. When you look at the amount of drug trafficking by
    Venezuela, when you look at the specifics of our own
    administration, the naming the Venezuelan National Guard as
    part of this process, I just do not quite get it as it relates
    to the statements that are made by the Department. The
    Venezuelan National Guard, members of the military directly
    involved in narcotics trafficking.
        Mr. Smith, we have this $2 billion--this comes after--$2
    billion. Even here, that is not chump change. Two billion
    dollars that ultimately works its way into the United States
    financial system; $2 billion taken from the people of Venezuela
    because PDVSA is, in essence, the national patrimony of
    Venezuela. And I think the people of Venezuela, who are
    suffering enormously as a result of the Maduro government,
    would be far better off with having those $2 billion in
    Venezuela helping their lives. So how are we acting as it
    relates to these $2 billion that made its way into the United
    States financial system?
        Mr. Smith. So, sir, I can say the Treasury Department has
    been engaged in vigorous actions across the board, and for many
    of the activities that you have been talking about, we have
    been working for years on narcotics trafficking. We have
    designated across the board narcotics traffickers----
        Senator Menendez. I appreciate it. Talk to me about the $2
    billion.
        Mr. Smith. When you asked about the $2 billion, that was an
    action that one of my sister agencies, the Financial Crimes
    Enforcement Network, took, and that is the agency that I would
    have to refer this question back to.
        Senator Menendez. Okay. So you have nothing to do with
    that.
        Mr. Smith. It is another part of my Department.
        Senator Menendez. So you cannot speak to that.
        Can you speak to that, Mr. Lee?
        Mr. Lee. No, sir.
        Senator Menendez. Oh, my God. We come to a hearing on
    Venezuela. There are $2 billion siphoned out of PDVSA, and no
    one is capable of responding to it. It is amazing. It is
    amazing.
        Let me ask you this. The actions that have been taken under
    our legislation--while I recognize the convenience of
    responding to Venezuelan sanctions against seven U.S. officials
    with parity, the parameters set forth in our legislation and
    their expansion under the President's Executive order leaves
    many other Venezuelan officials eligible given their complicity
    in human rights abuses, certainly more than the seven that have
    been named. I and other members have specifically called for
    Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez to be added to the list
    of sanctioned individuals given his role in authorizing the use
    of lethal force against unarmed citizens.
        To that end, do you agree that current United States law
    clearly leaves other Venezuelan officials eligible to be
    targeted for sanctions?
        Mr. Lee. Clearly we have, as a result of the law and the
    Executive order, the authorities to use against human rights
    violators and senior officials engaged in corrupt action.
        Senator Menendez. It is a simple question. I am not asking
    you who. I am asking you do you believe that the law allows you
    to pursue other Venezuelan authorities who may, in fact, fall
    in the categories as determined both by the law and the
    President's Executive order.
        Mr. Lee. Yes.
        Senator Menendez. Or, Mr. Smith, if you are the appropriate
    person----
        Mr. Smith. Yes, sir.
        Senator Menendez. Yes. Okay.
        And finally, can you tell me what we are doing about how
    OFAC makes a kingpin designation? What are the implications and
    consequences in pursuing kingpin designations, which several
    people here have been in Venezuela?
        Mr. Smith. Sure. OFAC works with a broad interagency group
    that is specified in the statute to make kingpin designations.
    We gather the evidence. We compile it. We run it through to
    make sure that there are no law enforcement or intelligence
    equities, and then we make the kingpin designations. The
    President has the authority to make what are called the Tier 1
    designations of significant foreign trafficking individuals or
    entities, and then OFAC has the authority to make those that
    are Tier 2, the material support and others. Last year we did
    over 200 kingpin designations. It is one of our most active
    programs, and we continue to pursue those vigorously.
        Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        Senator Perdue.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very
    brief. We have a vote coming up, and I would ask the panel to
    be brief. I just have a couple questions.
        First of all, the United States is enabling a dictatorial
    regime in Venezuela in my mind as it continues to routinely
    violate human rights affairs there in Venezuela, I would argue
    primarily because we continue to rely on imports of oil
    produced in their state-run enterprises. It seems somewhat
    hypocritical to me to want to limit what others are doing in
    Venezuela while we are quite happy to continue to import $30
    billion of oil each year. It is another reason why projects
    like Keystone continue to be critical to reduce our dependence
    on oil from bad actors like Venezuela.
        But I want to go to a separate issue and that is Cuba. You
    know, last year Venezuelan President Maduro referred to
    President Obama's shift in policy toward Cuba as ``a gesture of
    courage.'' Will this opening of United States relations with
    Cuba hurt or help our situation in trying to change behavior
    with Maduro? And what impact will this change in Cuba policy
    have on our long-term effort here to bring democracy back to
    Venezuela?
        Mr. Lee. Well, Senator, diplomacy is not a one-size-fit-
    all. And so we basically have to kind of see where the
    opportunities are, make our decisions on what will best advance
    our national interests. And we have decided, for example, that
    it advances our national interests to combine, with regard to
    Venezuela, sanctions and reaching out to other Latin American
    likeminded countries to urge the Venezuelan Government to meet
    its democratic obligations. And so that is one strategy that we
    have used toward----
        Senator Perdue. I am sorry. Let me get to the point. We are
    going to run out of time and we are going to have to bolt.
        Specifically, if we move to a more liberal relationship
    with Cuba, what specific impact will that have on Maduro in his
    continuing dominance of his people in Venezuela?
        Mr. Lee. I am not sure that there will be a direct
    relationship.
        Senator Perdue. Okay. Thank you.
        The next is, you know, given the difficult situation in
    Venezuela--they have an oil economy basically. And as I see it
    down there, the consumer is really not able to bring their
    economy back. But how is this going to hurt their financing
    program, Petrocaribe, or its extensive support to Cuba?
        Mr. Lee. I think Venezuela's mounting economic problems
    manifest itself in a whole variety of ways, but one of them
    clearly is an inability to sustain the support to Petrocaribe
    like it had in the past. We have seen reports of Venezuela
    cutting back its subsidized support through Petrocaribe to a
    variety of Caribbean countries, and so that really puts into
    question the ability of Venezuela to maintain the level of
    support it had promised in the past.
        Senator Perdue. So one last quick question. If we really
    want to change behavior in Venezuela, oil is the way to do it.
    I just do not believe these sanctions go far enough to really
    change behavior. We see it in other parts of the world, Russia
    particularly. When we started out with similar sanctions there,
    it had no impact.
        Mr. Smith, what do you believe would be the impact if we
    really were to get serious about changing behavior in Venezuela
    to go after the oil? And that means that we would have to pay a
    price, too, because the oil that we bring in, the $30 billion,
    is done in
    JV's I think with U.S. corporations with their state-owned oil
    enterprise.
        Mr. Lee. May I answer?
        Senator Perdue. Yes, please.
        Mr. Lee. After consulting with a variety of civil society
    actors and political actors in Venezuela, we have made the
    decision that it really advances United States interests not to
    use sectoral sanctions in Venezuela.
        Senator Perdue. What is that? I am sorry.
        Mr. Lee. To use like an oil sanction.
        Senator Perdue. So specifically, we think that these
    sanctions will change the behavior of this despot in Venezuela.
        Mr. Lee. We believe the sanctions, under the authorities
    that we have as a result, help highlight unacceptable
    behavior----
        Senator Perdue. How long do you think it will take to
    change that behavior specifically?
        Mr. Lee. I cannot say.
        Senator Perdue. Well, what is a reasonable person's
    estimate?
        Mr. Lee. I really cannot say.
        Senator Perdue. Let me ask it differently. So how long
    would we be patient to watch the human rights violations in
    Venezuela before we stiffen those sanctions?
        Mr. Lee. We think that if Venezuela is going to stop this
    downward slide, it is basically through more democracy and the
    best way to express that is through holding elections that are
    seen as credible. And we believe that the international
    community can play a role toward that. I think we need to
    combine the use of sanctions against individuals in order to
    express our democratic principles----
        Senator Perdue. I am sorry to interrupt. But those
    sanctions against individuals--we have really very little
    evidence around the world that sanctions against individuals
    have ever really changed behavior. So, again, I think it is
    more a question now let us see how long it is going to take. My
    question is, What is a reasonable expectation on our part of
    these sanctions relative to changing behavior? It is one thing
    to have an election, as we just talked about, but to have a
    credible election to give a free vote for the people down
    there--I mean, what should be a reasonable timeframe while we
    wait for these to take effect?
        Mr. Lee. I cannot say, sir.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you very much.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        I am going to wait for Senator Kaine to return because we
    are in the middle of this vote, and I appreciate your
    questions.
        So let me, Mr. Lee, just touch on the issue of human
    rights. They have been well documented, we know, some of them
    that have already happened. I want to inform you of a couple
    more that I hope the State Department will look at closely as
    we continue to examine other people that can be sanctioned.
        The first is--have you been made aware of a facility that
    is colloquially referred to as La Tumba, The Tomb? Have you
    heard that term?
        Mr. Lee. No, sir.
        Senator Rubio. Okay. Well, let me tell you about it based
    on the information we have received. It is a detention area
    that is located four stories below the Plaza Venezuela, which
    is a SEBIN station where detainees are held captive in 2-to-3-
    meter-sized rooms.
    They are subjected to minimum temperatures and permanent neon
    lighting and denied sunlight so that they can become
    disoriented and suffer physical and psychological
    deterioration. We have also received information that Gabriel
    Valles, Gerardo Caredo, and Lorent Saleh have been held captive
    in that facility and are subjected to this torture. The purpose
    of this treatment is to coerce from them false testimony
    against members of the opposition.
        I also want to make you aware of the circumstances
    surrounding the death of Rodolfo Gonzalez. The information we
    have received--obviously, he was an opposition activist, a
    senior citizen, and he was jailed in a SEBIN facility beginning
    in April 2014, supposedly for conspiring against the
    government, which was actually false. During this time, he was
    visited by Iris Varela, who is the minister of the national
    prison system days before his apparent suicide while in
    custody.
        And according to the information we have received, Varela
    threatened to transfer him to a general population prison,
    basically with other common criminals--with common criminals--
    not other common criminals. He was instructed to gather his
    personal belongings and he was even taken to a prison medic for
    an examination prior to this transfer.
        According to the information provided to us, Mr. Gonzalez's
    lawyer has confirmed that he was visited by one of the
    individuals that is sanctioned. It is a prosecutor, Katherine
    Harrington, who offered to improve the conditions of his
    detention in exchange for testimony which would incriminate
    Antonio Ledezma in a conspiracy against the government.
        So these are just two recent pieces of information we have
    been made aware of just in the last few days that call to light
    the sort of human rights violations that are occurring in
    Venezuela. And I would encourage the State Department to take
    seriously, as this information comes in, because it gives us
    more and more people that we can look at for sanctions and also
    to shame them publicly.
        One day we are going to have freedom in Venezuela. There
    will be a functional government again and hopefully a better
    future for the Venezuelan people, and these individuals
    responsible for the human rights abuses are going to have to be
    accountable for what they are doing. So that is why it is so
    critical that these human rights abuses be documented now so
    that in the future these individuals will be held to account
    for the crimes they are committing against the people of
    Venezuela.
        Senator Kaine, I will leave you in charge while I go vote,
    and I will be back. So you probably have 10 minutes of
    questions.
        Senator Kaine. I will easily occupy that, Mr. Chair. Thank
    you.
        And thanks to the witnesses and all.
        The questions that I have been here to hear and your
    testimony I think has answered questions that I was going to
    ask about the internal situation in Venezuela and the relations
    of our sanctions to that situation and the human rights abuses.
        I want to talk about the relationship of what is happening
    in Venezuela with neighbors, so in particular, Colombia, which
    is such a strong ally of the United States.
        I was in Colombia in the middle of February, and I was
    actually there on a day when President Maduro came out with a
    fairly incendiary set of statements not only against the United
    States but also against Colombia. I mean, it just appeared, the
    classic situation where when things are going bad at home, find
    somebody else to blame. That he was blaming the United States
    did not strike me as that unusual. That is a classic page out
    of the playbook. But it was a little bit unusual I thought, the
    degree of some of the rhetoric that he was leveling against
    Colombia.
        Now, that relationship is an important one. It is a
    complicated one. A lot of Venezuelans live in Colombia and vice
    versa. Venezuela has at times been sort of a haven for the FARC
    and at other times has helped advance the peace discussions
    between the Colombian Government and the FARC. Economic
    challenges in Venezuela could at an important time in Colombia,
    even kind of a fragile time in these negotiations, push folks
    across the borders in ways that would be destabilizing.
        So I was just wondering, especially you, Mr. Lee, if you
    would talk about the situation in Venezuela now as it might
    affect Colombia, who has got to be one of our best partners in
    the world right now.
        Mr. Lee. Well, I think one of the reasons why--of the three
    Foreign Ministers that UNASUR countries sent to Venezuela, one
    of them was the Foreign Minister of Colombia. And that reflects
    Colombia's important stake in what happens in Venezuela as a
    commercial partner, as a place, in the past, that had received
    large numbers of Colombians, and a preoccupation that has grown
    over time over what is going to be the impact of Venezuela's
    chronic mismanagement of its economy and how will that spill
    over into Colombia.
        An additional element in all of this is the Colombian
    Government, particularly under President Santos, was greatly
    appreciative of the Venezuelan Government's support for the
    peace process in Colombia, which has been kind of a central
    focus of President Santos.
        And so the various examples that you talked about highlight
    this cross-cutting sensitivity, and I think probably the best
    way of summarizing it is the Colombian Government is very
    conscious that if conditions continue to deteriorate in
    Venezuela, this will have an adverse and a direct adverse
    impact on Colombia. So that is one of the reasons why you have
    seen the Colombian Government trying to champion the region to
    focus along with Brazil and Ecuador. But in a sense, out of the
    three countries, what happens for good or bad in Venezuela has
    a far more direct impact on Colombia.
        Senator Kaine. How do you interpret the statements of
    President Maduro kind of blasting Colombia for some of their
    own internal problems?
        Mr. Lee. Well, President Santos like President Obama and
    Secretary Kerry is in good company because there is a certain
    theatrical element in the statements of President Maduro. The
    incident that you are referring to was basically President
    Santos coming to the defense of a former Colombian President
    that in his view had not been accorded with the respect due to
    a former Colombian President who was basically trying to
    demonstrate concern for the human rights of a key political
    prisoner.
        Senator Kaine. This question may have been asked when I was
    over voting, out of the room. Talk a little bit about the
    current status of the situation with the reduction of U.S.
    Embassy personnel in Venezuela and how those discussions are
    ongoing with respect to the presence of Venezuela Embassy and
    consulate personnel in the United States.
        Mr. Lee. We have proposed to the Venezuelan Government the
    need for bilateral discussions. We have proposed a team to meet
    with them so they can appreciate why we staff our mission the
    way they do and also for us to share with them how we see their
    staffing up here. Staffing in our respective diplomatic
    missions is essentially a function of what the host government
    agrees to and our operational requirements. And I think it is
    important for the Venezuelan Government to understand that we
    need a certain level of staffing in order to ensure the
    protection of our mission, in order to provide the level of
    consular services for Americans, and also to provide travel
    documents to Venezuelans who wish to come to the United States.
    Last year our Embassy in Caracas adjudicated 250,000 Venezuelan
    submissions for travel documents. We might not be able to
    support all of those functions if our staffing is reduced to
    certain numbers.
        Senator Kaine. Mr. Smith, I would like to ask about the
    impacts of the sanctions thus far. Obviously, Venezuela is
    dealing with huge issues because of years of economic
    mismanagement, and then low oil prices themselves impose a
    significant cost on an economy that has really leaned heavily
    on that resource instead of having a more diverse economy. Talk
    a little bit about, to the extent that you can, what is the
    marginal effect of the sanctions from our side compared to the
    overall economic challenges, most of their own making, that
    Venezuela is dealing with.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Senator. I think one of the most
    important things to understand about the sanctions and to
    remember and that we emphasize is that these were targeted
    sanctions just against the seven individuals. So I think to the
    extent that it would affect Venezuela as a whole would be any
    kind of concern about the idea that we could do further
    sanctions with respect to the country there, I think our
    financial institutions in the United States and around the
    world may be a little bit more hesitant to deal with some of
    the potential bad actors in the Venezuelan society in the
    government because of the impact of the sanctions.
        But one of the things that we also emphasize with these
    sanctions is they were not targeted at the Government of
    Venezuela. They were not targeted at the country of Venezuela,
    and they were not targeted at the people of Venezuela. So there
    has been the mix of--the impact--I think it would have been
    felt mostly on the individuals targeted and others that might
    believe they are to be targeted next.
        Senator Kaine. And just kind of thinking down the road in
    terms of the strategic challenge you have in a situation like
    this, while some would say sanctions against just a few
    individuals, that is not showing the strength that they might
    want to see. Another argument would be, look, if there is an
    economic kind of collapse underway because of the mismanagement
    of the current government, to do bigger sanctions against the
    government would enable them to better say, oh, look, we are
    just having problems because the United States is doing bad
    things. Instead, by doing the sanctions against individuals,
    hopefully there would be more of an understanding among the
    Venezuelan population that the economic challenges they are
    facing are because of a government that is mismanaging the
    economy rather than because of the effect of the external
    sanctions. So I am kind of thinking through. That has to be, I
    guess, one of the balancing acts that you are using as you
    decide whether to make these sanctions just against individuals
    or against financial institutions or against the government
    itself. Am I correct in analyzing it that way?
        Mr. Smith. I can start. I would say, yes, you are right. I
    think one of the things that people do not recognize with
    sanctions is that more is not always better, that there could
    be some disadvantages to going out with the broad sanctions
    that would have significant disadvantages to the U.S. national
    security-foreign policy relationship not just with Venezuela
    but in the region. And so what we try to do is do the correct
    balance to make sure that in this case what we were doing was
    focusing on the bad actors, those that were undermining
    democratic institutions and that were abusing human rights. And
    the purpose of the sanctions--this first salvo was to actually
    show our concern with the human rights situation in Venezuela
    and really call attention to that.
        Senator Kaine. Mr. Lee.
        Mr. Lee. I would just add the action that we took against
    the seven--and we focused on seven very emblematic individuals
    who clearly had significant ties to human rights violations or
    corruption, and we were very confident in being able to
    highlight that. And that message was clearly heard.
        But we believe that we need to combine a statement of
    principle and one of the ways of demonstrating those principles
    are the use of targeted sanctions against individuals but also
    trying to work, as best we can, with likeminded countries in
    the region to use their influence to try to help the Venezuelan
    opposition broker a relationship with the Venezuelan Government
    that would allow the political space for a credible electoral
    outcome in the next National Assembly elections. This
    particular message of working and trying to promote that
    discussion is much more effectively done by other countries
    than ourselves, and so we have to work somewhat indirectly
    through other countries to help that process.
        So it is a combination of these statements of sanctions
    against specific individuals but this is all in the context of
    working collaboratively with likeminded countries in the region
    to try to influence the behavior of the Venezuelan Government.
        Senator Kaine. We have been having, obviously, and will
    continue to have, significant discussions about Iran in this
    committee and in this chamber. Talk a little bit about the
    current Iranian-Venezuelan relationship, the degree of Iranian
    influence that you see in Venezuela these days.
        Mr. Lee. Well, we are very vigilant about this particular
    relationship, which basically came into full fruition under
    previous Iranian and Venezuelan Presidents. Most parts of the
    agreements that have been reached by the two countries or
    statements have been mostly on economic or trade sets of
    issues. The overwhelming majority do not seem to have gone
    anywhere. Those joint ventures that have been established--we
    hear indirectly that lots of the Iranian companies complain of
    the conditions to operate in Venezuela like just about any
    other company finds itself in Venezuela.
        But our particular attention is on Iranian activities,
    whether of their intelligence services or engaging in possible
    activities in money laundering or possible actions for avoiding
    sanctions on Iran. So these are all areas that we pay
    particularly close attention to on an ongoing basis.
        So I would say, yes, this is a source of concern, and this
    is a relationship that we pay a lot of attention to.
        Senator Kaine. And the last question I would like to ask is
    a little bit about Venezuela's influence in the region. Senator
    Gardner was, I think, being comical when he said the current
    Venezuelan leader had some of President Chavez's weaknesses but
    none of the charm. Clearly Venezuela was a regional player
    because of the strong personality of the previous leader but
    also because of the ability to use the resource of oil to win
    friends and influence people. Their own economic challenges
    have made that harder to do. Lower oil prices have complicated
    that situation, and I think the point that Senator Gardener was
    making that at least in terms of sort of the charismatic
    outreach to other nations, that is not the current President's
    strong suit. But that is my perception from afar.
        Talk a little bit about Venezuela's ability to project
    influence in the Americas during this time of deepening
    economic crisis.
        Mr. Lee. Well, I think Venezuela's ability to exercise
    influence has been gravely undermined by its serious economic
    problems and its ongoing efforts to try to stave off a balance
    of payments crisis. And you see this being played out in a
    variety of areas. Venezuela is unable to support Petrocaribe in
    a way that it had before. It has cut back significantly on some
    countries. Venezuela no longer can exercise the financial
    largesse that it could before. If anything, Venezuela is
    essentially staggering from one financial crisis to another
    trying to scrounge up enough money in order to pay for
    desperately needed imports for its population. And for the
    first time, we are hearing serious concerns about Venezuela's
    ability to have enough reserves to pay for food imports.
        So all of these things conspire to basically put Venezuela
    very much on a defensive. It is one of the reasons for the
    Venezuelan Government trying ever so hard to obfuscate what is
    going on in Venezuela, to try to shed and put the blame on
    outside actors, of which we are only one. There are a variety
    of other countries or Presidential leaders from other countries
    that have been identified as doing a variety of imaginary bad
    things to Venezuela. So all of this is, I think, a reflection
    of the turmoil that Venezuela is finding itself.
        Senator Kaine. And just kind of order of magnitude, you
    know, lower oil prices has been a very good thing for the world
    and for the United States generally. It does not mean every
    aspect of it is good. So Colombia, a great ally--lower oil
    prices hurts them. But they have a more diverse economy. Talk
    about oil revenues as a chunk of the Venezuelan economy or a
    chunk of the Venezuelan governmental budget. Give me an order
    of magnitude so that I can understand how much this drop and
    likely somewhat long-term low price is going to be affecting
    them.
        Mr. Lee. Well, Venezuela depends--95 percent of its
    earnings from its oil sector. And chronic undercapitalization
    of its oil industry, wasteful government policies, price
    controls, labor controls, a three-tiered exchange system that
    puts a premium on insiders taking advantage of it, all of these
    have conspired to make the Venezuelan economy go into recession
    last year, even at a time when oil prices were about $100 a
    barrel. Now, with oil prices half of that, Venezuela is facing
    a really major foreign exchange problem. And Venezuela imports
    now far more than it did 10 years ago. So it imports virtually
    everything, all of its foodstuff, almost all of its consumer
    goods. And so you have seen kind of a progressive deterioration
    of Venezuelan companies to manufacture things because they
    cannot get the dollars necessary for the inputs to manufacture
    things in the country. And so that is one of the reasons why
    you are seeing widespread shortages and chronic shortages in
    the country.
        Now with the drop of the oil prices to $50, that can only
    get infinitely worse. The IMF, for example, projects that
    Venezuela will suffer a contraction of 7 percent this year.
    Already the inflation rate is projected to go from 64 to over
    80 percent. So we are dealing with a very chaotic Venezuelan
    economy and a Venezuelan Government that seems struggling to
    try to take any effective measures to arrest this downward
    economic slide.
        Senator Kaine. And I just wanted to underline. I think I
    heard you right--kind of the statistic--95 percent of
    Venezuelan Government revenues are derived from the oil
    industry?
        Mr. Lee. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kaine. Last question. You know, talking about the
    prospects for a parliamentary or assembly--the legislative
    elections, again from afar, but just given the recent activity,
    the imprisonment of political opposition leaders, even some
    with significant posts, mayorships of major cities, the
    emergency decree entered into earlier in the month giving the
    President nearly complete power--I mean, you would have to be
    pessimistic. We got to keep pressing, but I mean, we should not
    be sugar-coating and suggesting that there is a high likelihood
    of elections that we will feel are free and fair. I mean, given
    all of the actions that are being undertaken right now, would
    not the prospects of elections that the global would look to be
    free and fair happening this year happening this year seem
    really, really slim?
        Mr. Lee. Well, Senator, this is obviously a major concern
    of ours because we do see free and fair elections as a
    necessary first step for Venezuela to try to dig itself out of
    the situation it is in. And so that is the reason why we
    highlight the importance of these elections. We fully recognize
    and are concerned about President Maduro's acquisition of
    emergency decree powers. We will have to see how he utilizes
    those. But this is why we go to all of the countries in the
    region to emphasize that the region as a whole has an
    obligation to champion a democratic solution to Venezuela's
    problems.
        Senator Kaine. I want to thank you both for your testimony.
    There is an ongoing vote, and so we will have a brief pause
    before the second panel is called up for their testimony. But
    to both of you, thank you very much. We will stand in a brief
    recess until the chair returns from voting, and then we will
    begin with the second panel. Thank you.
        Excuse me. I excused you too soon. You almost got out the
    door. But I was informed that the chair may have some
    additional questions for the panel. There is a second vote and
    he is on his way back. So if you could just hang close before
    you are dismissed, but then we will move right into panel two.
    Thank you.

    [Recess.]

        Senator Rubio. Thank you. I appreciate your patience. The
    committee will come back into order.
        Members may come in and out. We just finished the second
    vote, so hopefully some folks will be able to make it back
    here. There are some other committee meetings going on as well.
        Before I dismiss this panel, I appreciate your time and
    your patience indulging us here with these votes that are
    coming in.
        Mr. Smith, I wanted to touch upon a couple issues with you
    in regards to the nature of this regime. So Ambassador
    Brownfield, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of
    International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, has been
    quoted as saying that recent media reports about the Venezuelan
    Government's complicity with cartels were not inconsistent with
    the evidence with regards to their work in drug trafficking.
        And I wanted to share with you something that I hope we
    will continue to look at. Actually this is for both of you that
    I hope you will continue to look at.
        There is a law enforcement advisory that went out in
    February of this year, and I want to read from it or paraphrase
    from it. But basically it said that there is reporting that
    indicates that government officials in Venezuela coordinate
    flights carrying bulk cash to the Syrian regime of Bashar al-
    Assad, that the source of these funds include funds that are
    donated by the Venezuelan Arab expatriate community, but the
    bulk of the cash includes money that Venezuelan officials
    collect for the trafficking of drugs and exacting bribes from
    other drug traffickers who land cash-loaded planes in
    Venezuela.
        This, by the way, is part of a longer standing Venezuelan
    support of the Assad regime, as was reported back in 2012. The
    state-owned company, Petroleos de Venezuela, PDVSA, P-D-V-S-A--
    it was discovered that there were tankers in Syrian ports. This
    was discovered and disclosed, by the way, by an economic
    research firm that tracks maritime satellite data.
        What do we know or what can any of you tell us about the
    links between the Maduro regime and the Government of Syria
    under Assad? Do we have any information on that you could
    share?
        Mr. Smith. I do not have any information I can share. We
    have been tracking the disturbing activities of members of the
    Government of Venezuela, and we have linked them publicly to
    narcotrafficking activities, and we have also linked them to
    other disturbing activities that we have been able to highlight
    in a variety regimes we have not designated pursuant to our
    Syria authorities.
        Senator Rubio. Well, this information again is produced by
    U.S. law enforcement agencies. They are obviously available to
    you. I would encourage you to look at them as we move forward.
    These are important pieces of information that we should not be
    ignoring and should certainly figure into our calculus.
        There are also links to Iran and Venezuela. My office has
    received reports that there is a collusion between the Maduro
    regime and Argentina regarding an operation that could
    facilitate a transaction with Iran that would violate U.N.
    stipulations. Do you have any information on Venezuela
    providing Argentina with licit or illicit financial incentives
    in exchange for procuring Argentinean support toward this help
    toward Iran abating sanctions?
        Mr. Lee. We are aware of those press reports and reports,
    but I have nothing to add to it at the moment.
        Senator Rubio. Okay. Well, there is a report by the
    Washington, DC-based Center for a Secure, Free Society and from
    Canada's Institute for Social and Economic Analysis which
    raises concerns about the use of Venezuela as a bridge to
    smuggle Iranian agents into North America. It states that
    Venezuelan authorities provided at least 173 passports, visas,
    and other documentation controlled by Cuba state-owned Albet to
    Islamist extremists seeking to slip unnoticed into North
    America. Have you followed up on those reports?
        Mr. Lee. I have not. There may be others who have, but I am
    not in a position to comment on it.
        Mr. Smith. Senator, I would just add that we have sanctions
    investigators that work across our sanctions programs,
    including Iran, Syria narcotrafficking and now Venezuela, and
    they follow up on all of the law enforcement and intelligence
    reporting to try to build cases where they can.
        Senator Rubio. Now, I want to go through Venezuela's
    connection to Cuba. According to high-level military defectors
    from Venezuela's Government, there are between 2,700 and 3,000
    Cuban intelligence agents in the South American nation embedded
    in sectors such as the military, agriculture, finance, and
    petroleum refining. According to high-level military defectors
    from Venezuela's Government, the Cubans have modernized
    Venezuela's intelligence services, both the SEBIN, which is the
    Bolivarian National Intelligence Service that reports directly
    to the President, and also military intelligence. They have
    also set up a special unit to protect Nicolas Maduro.
        Last year, former Venezuelan intelligence agents and
    sources with direct access to active officers of the Bolivarian
    Armed Forces told El Nuevo Herald newspaper that Cuba plays a
    leading role in the repression unleashed by Maduro against
    Venezuelan protestors. The Cubans are in charge of operations
    which range from security around the Presidential palace to
    planning of arrests of opponents. These Venezuelan sources told
    El Nuevo Herald that Cubans have planned the operations of
    between 600 and 1,000 armed men who comprise the Chavista
    paramilitary group known as the colectivos.
        In 2007, Juan Jose Rabilero, head of Cuba's Committee for
    the Defense of the Revolution, the CDR, very similar to the
    colectivos, claimed that there were over 30,000 members of
    Cuba's Committee for the Defense of the Revolution in
    Venezuela.
        According to investigations by independent Venezuelan
    journalists, the Cubans have computerized Venezuela's public
    records giving them control over the issue of identity papers
    and voter registration. The Cubans have representatives in the
    ports and airports and have taken part in the purchases of
    military equipment. A state-owned Cuban company, Albet
    Ingenieria y Sistemas, received $170 million to develop
    electronic data systems in Venezuela. Through Albet, the Cuban
    Government has been given access to Venezuelan databases from
    which it can modify and even issue documents to citizens of
    other countries. Its portfolio includes the Maduro
    communications office and operating systems for prisons,
    emergency services, hospitals, and police.
        Are you aware of the links between Venezuela and Cuba that
    go as deep as what I have just outlined, and if so, what have
    we done or are we doing to continue to monitor that and call
    attention to it?
        Mr. Lee. Senator, the links between Cuba and Venezuela and
    the links between Cuba and Venezuela's intelligence services
    and military and a variety of other social missions is well
    known. Many of the things that you have said I am very familiar
    with. Some of them I am not. But the fundamental reality that
    there is a close relationship between both countries is very
    evident.
        Senator Rubio. Well, let me ask you this. You would agree
    that the Venezuelan Government under Maduro is repressing its
    own people. Right?
        Mr. Lee. Yes.
        Senator Rubio. You would agree that the Cubans are helping
    the Venezuelans and putting in place the systems of repression.
        Mr. Lee. I think that the kind of advice the Cubans provide
    is not necessarily the most democratic.
        Senator Rubio. Well, what does that mean? Are the Cubans
    helping the Venezuelans repress their own people? Are the
    Cubans assisting the colectivos, these armed groups, irregular
    groups on the ground that are used to confront protestors and
    other such activity?
        Mr. Lee. I am personally not aware of a link between the
    Cubans and the colectivos. I am aware of the link between the
    colectivos and the use by the Maduro government of the
    colectivos to repress peaceful demonstrators. I think that is
    very clear.
        Senator Rubio. Are you aware that the Cubans are
    intricately involved in issuing documents in Venezuela such as
    voter registration, passports, and not just to Venezuelans but
    to noncitizens of Venezuela as well? Would you acknowledge that
    that is happening?
        Mr. Lee. I am aware of some levels of cooperation that you
    are talking about.
        Senator Rubio. Mr. Lee, is Venezuela in your portfolio?
        Mr. Lee. Yes, it is, sir.
        Senator Rubio. And the Cubans--everyone in Venezuela--in
    fact, anyone who looks at it realizes the Cubans are crawling
    all over the place in Venezuela. There are tens of thousands,
    perhaps hundreds of thousands of Cubans all over the country
    embedded in every sector of the government. I mean, anyone who
    comes back from Venezuela tells you that repeatedly. How can
    this be part of your portfolio and you not be aware of the
    enormous Cuban presence that exists in Venezuela?
        Mr. Lee. Senator, I did not deny that Cuba has an outsized
    influence in Venezuela. It is clear that they have a long-
    standing and deep relationship in a variety of areas, including
    in the intelligence services, including in the military,
    including a wide variety of government agencies that we are
    perfectly aware of.
        Senator Rubio. So if you acknowledge that they have an
    outsized influence and they are involved in intelligence and
    security agencies, why can you not just state today what
    everyone knows, and that is that the Cuban Government is
    actively assisting the Venezuelan Government in suppressing its
    people?
        That is what the Cubans are expert at in Venezuela. What
    else could they be contributing to the effort? That is what
    they are best known for on the island. That is what they have
    most established expertise at doing to their own people in
    Cuba. So you have a repressive regime in Cuba that for over 55
    years has actively repressed its own people and cut down on all
    sorts of activity on the island. They have an outsized
    influence in Venezuela. They have an outsized influence in both
    its intelligence gathering and its security agencies. Why is
    that not a logical thing, even if you did not have specific
    facts, which I am sure you do, but even if we did not have it,
    why is it not a reasonable assumption that the Cubans are
    actively assisting the Venezuelan Government in suppressing the
    people of Venezuela?
        Mr. Lee. The fundamental responsibility for what happens in
    Venezuela is the Venezuelan Government's. And really, if we are
    going to focus on where the blame is, it should be for the
    Venezuelan Government's own actions against its own people. And
    I think we need to focus on holding the Venezuelan Government
    responsible for its actions.
        Senator Rubio. No one disputes that, Mr. Lee, but the
    question is not whether the Venezuelans are ultimately
    responsible. Ultimately they are the ones that asked for the
    assistance and are putting it into place. The question is
    whether the Cubans are assisting the Venezuelan Government in
    putting in place the mechanisms that the Venezuelan Government
    is using to repress the people of Venezuela. You cannot answer
    that question today?
        Mr. Lee. I think the Venezuelan Government charts its own
    course, takes advice from the Cubans on certain things, but
    fundamentally it is the Venezuelan Government that charts its
    own course, for good, for ill, whether effectively or feckless.
        Senator Rubio. Mr. Lee, I think what is obvious here is
    that you cannot say what everyone knows, and that is that the
    Cuban Government is helping the Venezuelan Government do this
    because, on the one hand, while we are sanctioning Venezuelan
    Government officials, we are lifting sanctions on Cuban
    officials that have made this possible. And so at the end of
    the day, it truly is amazing to me that in this hearing, the
    individual responsible for this portfolio on behalf of the U.S.
    Government refuses to state on the record that the Cuban
    Government is intricately involved in helping the Venezuelan
    Government to repress its own people.
        This is a claim we have been willing to make about multiple
    countries around the world. This is a claim we have made about
    the Cubans in the past. This is a claim that we have made about
    the Cubans and that the State Department has acknowledged up
    until December of last year when suddenly they stopped talking
    about it.
        I just find it unbelievable that we cannot get somebody
    from the Department of State who is responsible for this
    portfolio to openly acknowledge that the Cuban Government is
    providing extraordinary assistance to the Venezuelan Government
    in suppressing the people of Venezuela.
        And I hope that you will reconsider. I hope the State
    Department will reconsider acknowledging that because it
    undermines our credibility as a nation to turn a blind eye to
    the role that the Cuban Government is playing in the
    suppression of the Venezuelan people.
        The people of Venezuela are fully aware of it. There is not
    anyone that gets off a plane from Venezuela that does not tell
    you there are Cubans everywhere, and there are Cubans
    everywhere on the island involved in governmental functions.
    Multiple people from Venezuela will tell you that when you go
    get a passport or any document, it is oftentimes a Cuban behind
    the counter that is coordinating it all. And to somehow think
    they are there as a benign force for purposes of providing
    moral support is quite frankly absurd.
        And so I hope that you will reconsider your answer in the
    days to come because it is clear to everyone who knows anything
    about this--and you know a lot about this--that the Cubans are
    helping the Venezuelans carry out these operations that they
    are taking against their own people.
        With that, I think we are done with questions, and I
    appreciate both of you being here today.
        We will call up our second panel.
        Before we welcome the second panel, I would like to
    unanimous consent that a letter by Ms. Maria Eugenia Tovar, who
    is the mother of Genesis Carmona Tovar, who was murdered by a
    gunshot on February 18, 2014, while participating at a peaceful
    demonstration in Venezuela be included in the record.
        Now, let me welcome the panel. Douglas Farah is the
    president of IBI Consultants and a senior (non-resident)
    associate of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic
    and International Studies. He works as a consultant and
    subject-matter expert on security challenges, terrorism, and
    transnational organized crime in Latin America both for the
    U.S. Government and the private sector.
        Santiago Canton is an executive director of Partners for
    Human Rights at the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and
    Human Rights. Mr. Canton manages programs around the globe that
    promote and protect human rights and strengthen democratic
    processes through strategic litigation, capacity building, and
    advocacy initiatives.
        Dr. Christopher Sabatini is the senior director of policy
    at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas and founder
    and editor in chief of the hemispheric policy magazine,
    Americas Quarterly. Dr. Sabatini chairs the AS/COA Rule of Law
    Working Group. He has served as an advisor to the World Bank
    and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
        I welcome all three of you here, and I will begin with you,
    Dr. Sabatini.

     STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER SABATINI, PH.D., ADJUNCT PROFESSOR,
        SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS AT COLUMBIA
                        UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NY

        Dr. Sabatini. First of all, thank you, Senator for the
    invitation. Thank you also for your dedicated commitment to
    speaking out on human rights violations in Venezuela and your
    commemoration just recently of the start of the peaceful
    protests a year ago, and of course, the legislation that led to
    the Executive orders.
        I am going to talk about three things today. The first is
    the political and economic situation in Venezuela. The second
    is the very sad lack of a regional response to the
    deterioration in that situation. And the last is the recent
    U.S. Executive orders that came and caused such a commotion, if
    you will, in the region.
        First, the political and economic situation in Venezuela.
    As all of the people said, it is likely to get worse. Sixteen
    years of economic mismanagement and incompetence have wreaked
    havoc on the Venezuelan economy. There is greater concentration
    in the economy on oil--it now represents 95 of exports--and
    lower productivity of that oil. In addition there is a huge
    public sector deficit. There are over $8 billion the Venezuelan
    Government will have to pay to foreign creditors this year
    alone, with only about $20 billion in the central bank. And
    according to different estimates, oil has to be anywhere
    between $100 to $120 per barrel to be able to meet the
    government's expectations when, of course, it is around $50 a
    barrel.
        The IMF, as you mentioned, Senator, is expecting
    contraction of the economy this year of 7 percent on top of the
    contraction of 2.8 percent, and in addition to the inflation
    rates we have talked about, people are now actually saying by
    the end of this year, inflation may reach triple digits.
        What makes this worse is the level of political
    confrontation. At every turn when things have gotten worse with
    this government, people hope and expect it to moderate, whether
    it was when Chavez lost a referendum or whether it was the
    close election with Maduro who only won by about 1.5 percent of
    the vote, people thought he could follow a more moderate
    course. He did not. When the going gets tough, he confronts,
    and that has been precisely the problem. And I expect because
    of that, the economic and political situation will get worse,
    which brings me to the regional response.
        Despite multiple commitments among multilateral
    organizations to defend and protect human rights, the regional
    community in Venezuela has been mute. What that means is by
    standing aside as this President disarticulates democratic
    institutions, attacks political opponents and jails mayors, the
    regional community has been an enabler to the violation of
    human rights in Venezuela. That has to be recognized. They are
    violating their own commitments to a number of multilateral
    organizations.
        The only voices that have spoken up are Juan Manuel Santos,
    the President of Colombia, and five former Presidents who
    signed a letter just last week expressing their concern about
    the confrontation, including Oscar Arias Sanchez, including
    former President Zedillo, Calderon, and Fernando Henrique
    Cardoso.
        Which brings to the Executive order. It is important to
    distinguish, as everyone has so far, that these are only very
    targeted sanctions against people. Unfortunately, the language
    that was used as a result bureaucratic boilerplate became a red
    herring. But what is really sad about this is that in 2009 the
    United States pulled the visas of 15 Honduran officials of the
    de facto government of Micheletti. At that time, they did not
    use the language they are using now of calling it intervention
    or impertinent intervention in the internal affairs of a
    country and respecting national sovereignty. They applauded
    that decision. I think it is worth asking regional leaders in
    the hemisphere why is it okay to pull visas of a de facto
    government that came to power in a coup in Honduras, but why
    are they not willing to stand by the United States when it does
    the exact same thing in Venezuela. And what is wrong with
    allowing a government to be able to say to human rights abusers
    we do not want you to come to Disneyland? We do not want you to
    do your banking in our--again, I would like to say that I think
    this is a very, very sad moment in terms of the regional
    commitment to democracy which has eroded when only 15 years ago
    they stood up collectively and denounced violations, the very
    same violations by Alberto Fujimori and rolled them back?
        I am also concerned about the way the media has portrayed
    this. Again, the language around the Executive order was
    problematic, but the media has presented this as giving Maduro
    steam, as giving him sort of bait to be able to roll back
    democratic institutions and build political momentum. The truth
    is that is not true. His disapproval rating still stands at 70
    percent, and his approval rating still stands at 23 percent. In
    other words, this has not become a political boon to the
    President, but yet, regional leaders and the media insist on
    that it is.
        I will end on one last point. While the language about
    Venezuela--national security risk may have been a little
    overblown, I would argue that it is a security risk in the
    region. For the first time, we face the specter of a failed
    state in a large South American country just south of us, and
    that is unprecedented. And getting out of it and how you would
    rebuild eventually is unimaginable.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Sabatini follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Dr. Christopher Sabatini

        The confluence of Venezuela's fast deteriorating economy, the
    increased targeting of political opponents, the National Assembly's
    granting decree powers to President Nicolas Maduro, and the
    mobilization of the military make it impossible to predict what will
    happen for the remainder of Maduro's term, which ends in 2019. As
    things stand today, though, it's impossible to see this ending well.
        I say this for four reasons.
        First, 16 years of severe economic mismanagement--public fiscal
    profligacy; the economy's greater concentration on oil exports (which
    now represent 95 of the country's exports); pervasive corruption; a
    complicated, severely overvalued exchange rate; and the arbitrary
    expropriation of select industries--combined now with the drastic drop
    in the price of oil (to under $50 a barrel)--have left the country
    teetering on the brink of an economic meltdown. The International
    Monetary Fund (IMF) has predicted that Venezuela's GDP will contract by
    7 percent this year, after contracting by more than 2 percent last year
    and inflation is hovering around 70 percent, though most now believe it
    will reach triple digits by the end of the year. And the stories of
    shortages of basic foods and goods are well known. People are suffering
    economically, and it will only increase.
        Second, in the 16 years that the Bolivarian Revolution has been in
    power, it has systematically taken apart the checks and balances of
    democratic government and politicized the state. This has included
    packing the judicial system (including the supreme court) and the
    electoral commission with political allies, tearing down the
    independence of the Central Bank, closing down or buying out
    independent media, creating parallel local governments and police
    forces, cracking down on political opponents--including one former
    mayor, Leopoldo Lopez, who has been in prison for more than 1 year and
    the mayor of Caracas, Antonio Ledezma, who was jailed earlier this
    month--and politicizing the armed forces.
        More than just a violation of fundamental democratic principles,
    what has occurred is that the very institutions that would be necessary
    to mediate political disputes and manage conflict have become
    completely vitiated and distrusted by a large portion of the
    population.
        Which brings me to the third point, this government--both that of
    former President Hugo Chavez and his successor Maduro--has never shown
    any tendency to moderate. If anything, when faced with difficulty and
    adversity, their reaction has been the opposite: to double down on
    their policies and pursue a more confrontational strategy. That
    tendency has become more pronounced and worsened under Maduro, who,
    even as the country clearly veers toward economic collapse and faces
    broad popular protests, answers by toughening his position: cracking
    down on opponents, blaming others--the opposition, economic elites and,
    of course, the United States--and accumulating more power under the
    executive and for the party, the United Social Party of Venezuela
    (PSUV). This does not appear likely to change, and will--as it has--
    only worsen the country's economy and its political divisions.
        Fourth, despite multiple multilateral commitments to defend human
    rights and representative democracy the regional community has been
    practically mute on this issue. Venezuela's neighbors, such as Brazil,
    Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile, have shown no inclination to
    become involved to defend basic human rights and democratic norms.
    There was a brief effort last year by the South American Union (UNASUR)
    to try to mediate the dispute between the government and the political
    opposition after street protests had swept the country over political
    and economic conditions, resulting in more than 40 dead and the arrest
    of three opposition leaders, including Leopoldo Lopez. Those efforts at
    mediation produced nothing, Perhaps worse--I would argue--they were
    conducted under a value-neutral calculus. Rather than attempting to
    defend the right of peaceful democratic protests and secure the release
    of what were clearly politically motivated arrests, the South American
    Union's delegation intervened to mediate the dispute, treating both
    sides as moral equals.
        By standing aside as the Maduro government attacks democratic
    institutions and the opposition, the regional community has enabled the
    violation of human rights of Venezuelan citizens. The lack of effective
    collective action has not only allowed the conditions in Venezuela to
    fester, they have loosened the region's overall commitment to
    democratic standards. The question is who will stand up? Unfortunately,
    other than Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos' statement after the
    arrest of Antonio Ledezma and the other mayors, no sitting President
    has--though four former Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil,
    Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, Alejandro Toledo of Peru, and Ernest Zedillo
    and Felipe Calderon of Mexico recently wrote a letter public letter
    expressing their concern.
        Perhaps even more curious, the countries of the South American
    Union issued a statement after President Barack Obama's Executive order
    to pull the visas of seven Venezuelan public officials and froze their
    assets, criticizing the action.
        Which brings me to the last point on the White House and Treasury
    Department's Executive order last week.
        Unfortunately, the language calling Venezuela a national security
    risk to the U.S. that accompanied the announcement revoking the visas
    of the seven officials and freezing any assets they may have in the
    U.S. has become a red herring, provoking a ridiculous ramping up of
    military preparedness of Venezuelan troops for an imaginary U.S.
    invasion, justifying a power grab by Maduro for decree powers and even
    provoking South American nations through UNASUR to denounce the
    policies.
        A few clarifying points are in order, though.
        First, the Executive order was only to pull the visas of these
    officials, basically denying them the right to travel to the United
    States. These are not sanctions on the country or sanctions on the
    general population. They are an effort to deny those who were involved
    in human rights abuses from entering the U.S. territory. Dare I ask,
    what's wrong with denying human rights abusers the right to travel to
    your country?
        Second, there has emerged an unremarked contrast between Latin
    American reactions to the denial of Venezuelan Government officials
    U.S. visas and their reactions to a similar U.S. action in 2009 on
    officials in Honduras. In the summer of 2009, the U.S. pulled the visas
    of 15 high-level officials of the de facto government of then-President
    Roberto Micheletti. Far from calling it ``an interventionist threat to
    the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
    countries'' (the language used by the South American Union last week),
    the U.S. decision was applauded by the regional community. Today, it is
    being denounced as impertinent intervention. Why? Either sympathies
    toward the target government are different or the region has changed. I
    suspect both, but in either case it smacks of hypocrisy from our
    partners in the hemisphere, and a egregious betrayal of Venezuelan
    citizens' human rights
        Third, it was the absence of action from regional partners that
    prodded the U.S. to action. Whatever you may think of the actions the
    U.S. took, they have occurred in a vacuum when the Venezuelan
    Government's actions only 15 years ago would have provoked expressions
    of concern and even action among elected governments in the region.
    Today, it is only the former, elected, democratic Presidents that I
    mentioned earlier who are willing to speak up. But clearly Venezuela's
    teetering economy and human rights situation are a immediate regional
    issue that demands a regional response.
        Which brings me to my last point. While Venezuela doesn't represent
    a national security risk to the U.S. in the alarmist way hinted at in
    last week's Executive order, it is a risk, more regional perhaps, but a
    risk.
        For one, the disarticulation of institutions and the politicization
    of the state described above, given the economic and political crisis
    the country finds itself, raise the specter of a failed state in the
    Western Hemisphere. This level of economic calamity and lack of
    institutionality has not existed in a major Latin American country/
    economy in recent history. The question of how to end this downward
    spiral and rebuild the country is unprecedented . . . not to mention
    unimaginable.
        Then there are also the well substantiated allegations of the
    Venezuelan state's involvement in narcotics trafficking. Evidence has
    grown that segments of the country's armed forces, including the
    National Guard, and elected officials are involved in transporting
    cocaine from Colombia and money laundering. Regarding the latter, the
    recent case opened up by the U.S. Treasury Department accusing the
    Banco Popular de Andorra of laundering $4.2 billion points to the level
    of corruption and nefarious activities occurring in Venezuela today.
    Are we to believe that the government isn't aware of this?
        One need only look at the map of flights ferrying cocaine from
    South America to northern markets in which Venezuela is arched with
    overflights or dotted with take off points to see the central place the
    Andean country has taken in the drug trade. With the three countries
    that border it (Colombia, Guyana, and Brazil), numerous countries
    affected by its alleged role in narcotrafficking, and Venezuela
    teetering on economic and political collapse, Venezuela would seem to
    be more of a risk to regional security than to the United States.
        Unfortunately, Venezuela's neighbors have chosen to focus on a
    hyperbolic U.S. statement rather than how the looming crisis in the
    country could affect them and their responsibility and role to prevent
    it.

        Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Sabatini.
        Mr. Canton.

    STATEMENT OF SANTIAGO CANTON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PARTNERS FOR
     HUMAN RIGHTS, ROBERT F. KENNEDY CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND HUMAN
                         RIGHTS, WASHINGTON, DC

        Mr. Canton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the
    opportunity to appear before you today to share some
    information regarding the human rights situation in Venezuela.
    I have presented a 20-page written statement with very detailed
    information about the human rights situation. So in this brief
    presentation, I will just refer to the most important
    violations.
        The rule of law in Venezuela has been in a downward spiral
    for the last 15 years. The signs of this decline have been
    unequivocal: increasing concentration of power; lack of
    independence of the judiciary; restricting freedom of
    expression; excessive and lethal use of force and other forms
    of restrictions to peaceful assembly; widespread use of
    torture; restricting civic space and financing of NGOs; and
    prosecuting under false charges political opposition leaders;
    and closing the door to any outside monitoring.
        Violations for freedom of expression. Journalists face
    constant threats and harassment. The state exercises tight
    control of our media outlets and has been ranked 137 out of 180
    countries in the 2015 World Press Freedom Index. The U.N.
    Secretary General, the High Commissioner of Human rights of the
    U.N., and the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of
    Opinion and Expression of the U.N. have criticized the
    Venezuelan Government for limiting free expression. Over 259
    incidents of threats and harassment of journalists were
    reported between January and April 2014.
        In recent years, state authorities have tightened
    restrictions on television and radio through forced closures,
    fines, judicial cases, and economic pressures. From 2013 to
    2014, 13 newspapers stopped operating and many more are at risk
    of closure now due to print paper shortages that the government
    is responsible for.
        Violations to freedom of association and assembly. Peaceful
    opposition protestors are routinely violently assaulted by the
    Venezuelan police and military, the latter of which was
    recently granted explicit power to use force to control
    peaceful demonstrations. Law prohibits Venezuelan human rights
    defenders from receiving international support if they defend
    political rights or monitor the performance of public bodies.
    Protests have reignited since last February of this year.
    Violent repression and the use of military force during these
    demonstrations have already resulted in a fatal victim. On
    February 24, Kluiverth Roa Nunez, a 14-year-old high school
    student, was killed by a gunshot to the head.
        Lack of judicial independence. Since the National Assembly
    passed a law that increased the membership of the Supreme Court
    from 20 to 32 justices, its members have publicly rejected the
    principle of separation of powers and the judiciary has acted
    as another arm of the executive branch to advance the
    government's political agenda.
        Arbitrary arrests and detentions. According to the Office
    of the High Commissioner of Human rights of the U.N., more than
    70 people have been arbitrarily detained or arrested in
    Venezuela over the last year alone. According to official
    information, approximately 3,000 people were arrested between
    February and June 2014 in the context of the public protests
    that took place across the country. Many were denied access to
    a lawyer, and some remained in pretrial detention for several
    months. Dozens of students remain also in detention.
        One of the individuals that were arrested in connection to
    the February 2014 protests is Leopoldo Lopez, leader of the
    opposition party, Voluntad Popular. He has remained in pretrial
    detention with fabricated charges.
        A month after, the mayor of San Cristobal, Daniel Ceballos,
    from the same party was also arrested.
        In August 2014, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary
    Detentions concluded that the detention of both Lopez and
    Ceballos was arbitrary and demanded its release. Recently a
    couple of months ago, the Committee Against Torture of the U.N.
    also demanded the release of them.
        One year after Leopoldo Lopez's arrest, Caracas Mayor
    Antonio Ledezma, the second most-voted person in Venezuela
    after Maduro, was also arrested on fabricated charges.
        Torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment in
    prisons. The U.N. Committee Against Torture expressed alarm
    regarding reported acts of torture and ill-treatment of persons
    arrested in connection with the demonstrations of February of
    last year. These acts of torture include beatings, electric
    shocks, burns, suffocation, sexual violence, and threats.
        Just earlier this month, the Inter-American Commission of
    Human rights granted protective measures in favor of two
    political prisoners in ``the tomb'' prison that you referred
    to, Senator. It is important to note that these type of
    measures are only granted
    in extreme cases of urgency, gravity, and threats of
    irreparable harms.
        Then there is the violation of political participation. I
    am running out of time, so I am going to finish very quickly
    with this presentation.
        There is a violation of the right to political
    participation. As you know, Leopoldo Lopez was not allowed to
    run in the election, and in addition to Leopoldo Lopez, just
    recently Julio Borges, another member of the opposition, was
    also expelled from Congress. Maria Corina Machado was expelled
    a few months ago. So it is very difficult for the opposition to
    participate freely in politics.
        Mr. Chairman, the disregard by the Venezuelan Government of
    the human rights of its people is absolute. The human rights
    situation in Venezuela is critical and not only for opposition
    leaders but for the population in general. The report by the
    U.N. Committee Against Torture from last December indicates
    that almost 1,300--and I insist, 1,300--extrajudicial killings
    took place in Venezuela between 2012 and 2013. And the
    prevailing impunity does not contribute to improve the
    situation. According to government information, of the
    approximately 30,000 human rights violations reported to the
    authorities between 2011 and 2014, only 3 percent have been
    prosecuted.
        The account I have just presented is only but a fraction of
    the grave and systematic violations that are taking place in
    Venezuela. It is time for the international community to ensure
    through multilateral and bilateral efforts that democracy and
    the rule of law are respected. In 2001, the hemisphere adopted
    the Democratic Charter to address challenges such as the ones
    Venezuela is going through. The U.S. Government should work
    together with the OAS and UNASUR and the leaders of the region
    to ensure that the Democratic Charter is respected.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Canton follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Santiago A. Canton

        Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, and members of the
    Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, thank you for the opportunity
    to appear before you today to share critical information impacting
    United States policy toward Venezuela, in particular regarding the
    human rights and security situation in that country. I commend the
    committee for holding this important and timely hearing.
                                  introduction
        Democracy and rule of law in Venezuela have been on a downward
    spiral for the past 15 years, with great consequences not only for the
    country's economy and security, but also for the human rights of the
    Venezuelan people. I would like to focus on this generalized disregard
    for the respect of basic human rights that has become the state-
    sanctioned rule in Venezuela.
        The signs of this decline have been unequivocal: increasing
    concentration of power in the executive branch, debilitating the
    independence and autonomy of the judiciary; restricting freedom of
    expression and shutting down dissenting media outlets; excessive--
    sometimes lethal--use of force and other forms of restrictions to
    peaceful assembly; widespread use of torture and horrid detention
    conditions; restricting civic space and financing of NGOs; imposing
    administrative sanctions or even prosecuting under false charges
    political opposition leaders; and closing the door to any outside
    monitoring or criticism, among others.
        The current human rights violations in Venezuela are not isolated
    instances. On the contrary, they are the product of a pattern of
    systematic violations that started more than a decade ago. To
    understand what is currently happening in Venezuela it is necessary to
    know the context that gives rise to today's violations. Instead of
    reversing this trend, the assumption of power by Nicolas Maduro after
    president Chavez's death has only increased the government's repression
    of the Venezuelan people in a desperate attempt to hold on to power in
    the midst of growing popular discontent.
        Chavez and Maduro have repeatedly disregarded all the accusations
    of human rights violations as an international conspiracy of right wing
    individuals and NGOs. However, respected institutions and groups of the
    international community have consistently denounced the human rights
    violations taking place in Venezuela.
        International human rights bodies and officials, including the
    United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the U.N. Special
    Rapporteur on Torture, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the
    U.N. Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, the U.N. Special
    Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and the U.N.
    Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, as well as regional
    bodies such as the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court
    of Human Rights, have made strong calls of concern over the last years
    regarding the intentional disregard by the Venezuelan Government of its
    human rights obligations under international law.
        Openness to dissent and criticism has not only been lacking with
    regard to local actors. In fact, since 1996 no special procedure of the
    United Nations has been allowed to visit the country.\1\ Likewise,
    there have been several instances of international human rights
    delegations of nongovernmental organizations being expelled from the
    country, including a Human Rights Watch's delegation.\2\
        Widespread human rights abuses are committed daily in total
    impunity. The Venezuelan Government itself admits the shockingly low
    levels of violations that end up being prosecuted. In its most recent
    reports to the U.N. Committee Against Torture, the government informed
    the committee that of the 31,096 human rights violations reported to
    the authorities between 2011 and 2014, only in 3.1 percent did a
    prosecutor present criminal charges.\3\
        Meanwhile, the government continues amassing authority and
    completely eroding the separation of powers. Indeed, since 2010 the
    Government has adopted a series of so-called Enabling Laws (Leyes
    Habilitantes), which authorize the President of the Republic to issue
    decrees with the rank, value, and force of statute on those matters
    that are so delegated. Many of these laws are overly broad and have
    been used by the Executive to imposed restrictions on human rights
    without appropriate controls. Following his predecessor's steps, just a
    few months after assuming power, President Maduro requested the
    National Assembly to enact a law granting him special powers for 12
    months to address the economy and combat corruption. On November 19,
    2013, a law was passed which allow the President to reform--by decree--
    norms to strengthen punishment in criminal, administrative, civil and
    disciplinary areas ``to avoid damage to or inadequate management of the
    public patrimony, and to prevent acts of corruption'' and norms that
    punish ``attacks on the Security and Defense of the Nation, the
    institutions of the State, Public Powers, and the provision of public
    services indispensable to the development and the quality of life of
    the people''; among other areas generally reserved to Congress.\4\ On
    Sunday, February 15, the National Assembly started discussing a new
    ``Enabling law'' requested by President Maduro to receive special
    decree powers for at least the next 6 months, allegedly in response to
    the most recent U.S. sanctions.\5\
        Authorities at several levels openly disregard the Venezuelan
    Constitution, as has been recently the case with the Minister of
    Defense's authorization to the armed forces to potentially use lethal
    force if needed to control public protests.\6\ This authorization to
    use lethal force is even more concerning taking into consideration the
    existing pattern of extrajudicial executions that has taken place in
    Venezuela over the last decade. According to information collected by
    the U.N. Committee Against Torture, 667 homicides at the hands of state
    agents were committed in 2012 and 600 in 2013.\7\
        While openly restricting civil and political rights, the government
    of Venezuela has also made an effort to portray itself as a promoter of
    economic, social and cultural rights both domestically and throughout
    the region by providing economic assistance through Petrocaribe \8\ and
    other foreign assistance programs. Indeed, in June 2013, Venezuela
    received recognition from the United Nations Food and Agriculture
    Organization (FAO) for the early achievement of one of the Millennium
    Development Goals and the World Food Summit (WFS) goal of halving the
    number of hungry people by 2015.\9\ However, there have been growing
    reports over the past few years on the increasing difficulties for the
    Venezuelan population to access food and other basic necessities,\10\
    which President Maduro attributes to ``an economic war by sectors who
    seek to destabilize the country . . . through the undersupply of food
    products.'' \11\
        This situation has motivated a series of measures against private
    distributorships of food and other basic supplies, including the
    adoption in 2011 of the Law on Costs and Fair Prices that regulates a
    ``maximum'' sales price for certain foods and other goods.\12\ Such
    measures have included, in extreme cases, taking over a toilet paper
    factory,\13\ the authorization to occupy supermarket chain accused of
    ``hoarding'' and more recently, putting Venezuela's food distribution
    under military protection.\14\
                         major human rights violations
    I. Violations of Freedom of Expression
        Violations of the right to freedom of expression are rampant in
    Venezuela. Journalists face constant threats and harassment. The State
    exercises tight control over media outlets, including through
    restrictive telecommunications laws. There is overall repression of
    dissenting views. Peaceful protesters are violently attacked. A review
    of the analysis of leading human rights and press freedom organizations
    reveal a shockingly bad situation.
        The United Nations Secretary General, High Commissioner for Human
    Rights, and Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the
    right to freedom of opinion and expression have strongly criticized the
    Venezuelan Government for severely limiting free expression in the
    country, and have urged authorities ``to ensure that people are not
    penalized for exercising their rights to peaceful assembly and freedom
    of expression.'' \15\
        Venezuelan media outlets are governed by the 2004 Law on Social
    Responsibility in Radio, Television, and Electronic Media (Resorte),
    amended in 2010. CONATEL has used this law to impose heavy fines on
    television and print media outlets, which have criticized the
    government.\16\ It is also through this law that the Venezuelan
    Government gave itself the authority to require all broadcasters to air
    the obligatory broadcasts previously mentioned.\17\
        Furthermore, changes to the Organic Law of Telecommunications in
    December 2010 declared broadcast media and the Internet to be public
    services reserved for the State. These changes gave the Venezuelan
    Executive the power to suspend and revoke broadcasting concessions and
    to take control over privately owned stations or channels whose
    operating licenses were allowed to expire or were terminated.\18\
        In recent years, State authorities have gradually tightened
    restrictions on television and radio through forced closures, fines,
    judicial cases, and economic pressures.\19\ The most famous examples of
    this trend are with regard to Venezuela's oldest private television
    channel, Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), and main opposition channel,
    Globovision. In May 2007, the Government of Venezuela decided not to
    renew RCTV's license, forcing it to close down. Globovision was taken
    over in 2010 and then sold to pro-government owners in 2013,
    essentially eliminating the primary media voice critical of the Chavez
    and Maduro governments.
        Numerous other media outlets have been forced to shut down because
    of government pressure as well. Various sources reported the closure of
    34 radio stations in 2009 and 27 in 2011. From 2013 to 2014, 13
    newspapers stopped operating according to El Nacional \20\ and many
    more are at risk of closure now due to newsprint shortages. The
    Venezuelan Government has decreed that media organizations can only
    import newspaper if it is purchased with dollars provided through
    government currency exchange, but independent media sources are
    systematically denied this option.\21\
        The Venezuelan Government also continues to use ``obligatory
    national radio and television broadcasts to transmit government
    messages,'' according to information received by Inter-American
    Commission on Human Rights.\22\
        In response to the February 2014 protests, the IACHR issued a press
    release in which it noted with concern the fact that CONATEL, the
    Venezuelan National Telecommunications Commission, had issued an
    official statement in which it advised media outlets that coverage of
    the protest-related violence could be considered a violation of the
    Resorte Law, for which they would be sanctioned accordingly.\23\ The
    Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression expressed particular
    concern at the continuing and worsening pattern of government actions
    resulting in the loss of opportunities for public debate, noting the
    lack of guarantees for the free and independent exercise of the right
    to freedom of expression in conformity with Venezuela's international
    obligations.\24\
        Since 2003 and continuing until today, Freedom House, an
    independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom
    around the world, has rated Venezuela as ``not free'' given that ``the
    ability of independent journalists and media outlets to operate freely
    and impartially'' has been seriously impeded by the political and
    economic crises which have evolved under the leadership of Hugo Chavez
    and Nicolas Maduro.\25\ In its most recent analysis, it states that
    ``Maduro's administration hampered the opposition media by arbitrarily
    fining outlets, enforcing licensing requirements without respecting due
    process rights, and excluding certain outlets from access to public
    information.'' \26\ Furthermore, ``high-level government officials
    constantly demonized opposition-aligned outlets and exerted systematic
    pressure on the tone and content of reporting.'' \27\ Human Rights
    Watch has likewise noted with grave concern that ``over the past
    decade, the [Venezuelan] government has expanded and abused its powers
    to regulate media.'' \28\
        Reporters without Borders has also expressed its grave concern at
    the rapidly eroding press freedoms in Venezuela, and has ranked it 137
    out of 180 countries on the 2015 World Press Freedom Index.\29\ This
    marks a significant decline from its ranking of 116 in 2014, and
    demonstrates the continued and rapid deterioration of press freedoms in
    Venezuela.\30\ The organization notes that ``local and foreign
    journalists were the targets of threats, insults, physical attacks,
    theft, destruction of equipment and arrests during a succession of
    protests'' and places the blame for the majority of these with the
    Bolivarian National Guard.\31\
        The Committee to Protect Journalists details the shutting down of
    critical radio and television stations, the shortage of newsprint as
    the government seeks to control imports, and the resignations of
    multiple journalists who have complained of censorship.\32\ The CPJ
    characterizes these actions on the part of the Venezuelan Government as
    ``a campaign to silence the critical media.'' \33\
        With regards to threats and harassment of journalists, over 259
    incidents between January and April 2014 were reported to the U.N.
    Committee Against Torture.\34\ The Venezuelan National Association of
    Journalists reported more than 50 incidents of violence or threats
    against reporters between 12 and 21 February 2014 alone.\35\
        In its 2013 annual report, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
    Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, published
    details of the almost 80 reports it received during the previous year
    of threat and assaults of journalists.\36\ Likewise, the Commission
    compiled information on almost 40 attacks on newspaper offices and
    radio stations during the same time period.\37\ In a September 2014
    press release, the Commission once again called on the Government of
    Venezuela to respect the right to freedom of expression, citing reports
    that President Maduro had publicy accused CNN en Espanol, El Nuevo
    Herald, NTN24, and other media outlets of engaging in ``media
    terrorism.'' \38\
        In the Case of Perozo et al. v. Venezuela, the Inter-American Court
    of Human Rights considered a series of attacks against and harassment
    of Globovision Television Channel staff, including hostile public
    remarks and physical and verbal attacks by state officials. The State
    was found to have violated its obligations under the American
    Convention on Human Rights to ``ensure the right to freely seek,
    receive ad impart information and the right to humane treatment.'' \39\
    Despite this judgment, Globovision would ultimately succumb to pressure
    and fall under State control, as detailed below.
    II. Violations to freedom of association and assembly
        Examples of violations of the rights to freedom of association and
    assembly are also abundant. Peaceful opposition protesters are
    routinely violently assaulted by the Venezuelan police and military,
    the latter of which was recently granted explicit power to use force to
    control peaceful demonstrations.\40\ Indeed, on January 27, 2015, the
    Minister of Defense authorized the use of ``potentially lethal force,
    be it with a firearm or with another potentially lethal weapon'' as a
    last recourse [. . .], ``to avoid public disorder, to support the
    legitimate authority, and to immediately reject aggression using any
    necessary means,'' \41\ in direct contradiction with article 68 of the
    Venezuelan Constitution, which explicitly prohibits the use of firearms
    and toxic substances as a means of containing public protests.
        A legal framework has been put in place that has incrementally more
    severely restricted freedom of association and assembly in Venezuela.
    For example, under the Law for the Defense of Political Sovereignty and
    National Self-Determination, passed in 2010, Venezuelan human rights
    defenders are prohibited from receiving international support. As Human
    Rights Watch noted in a December 2010 press release, the law bars
    Venezuelan NGOs ``that `defend political rights' or `monitor the
    performance of public bodies' '' from receiving money from foreign
    sources.\42\ Furthermore, the law permits the expulsion of foreigners
    invited by NGOs ``if they express opinions that `offend the
    institutions of state, top officials or attack the exercise of
    sovereignty.' ''\43\ Venezuelan civil society organizations liaising
    with foreign donors would also be sanctioned, facing high fines and
    individual prohibitions against running for public office.\44\ Under
    the ``Organic Law on Social Control,'' adopted by the National Assembly
    at the same time, individuals are obligated to adhere to Venezuela's
    socialist principles and values or face civil, administrative, or
    criminal sanctions.\45\ Both of these laws aggressively limit the
    activities of human rights defenders.
        The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, for its part, has
    also detailed the dire legal situation in which Venezuelan civil
    society finds itself. It characterizes the enactment of the laws
    mentioned thus far, as well as Decree No. 458, which created the
    Strategic Center of Security and Protection of the Country (CESPPA), as
    having an overall chilling effect on freedom of assembly.\46\
    Opposition leaders have concluded that the goal of CESPPA is to control
    and censor the worsening political, economic, and social crisis
    enveloping the country.\47\
        Even prior to the passage of these laws, in its 2009 Annual Report,
    the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted a ``trend toward
    the use of criminal charges to punish people exercising their right to
    demonstrate or protest against government policies.'' \48\ During the 5
    years prior to the publication of that report, the Inter-American
    Commission received information regarding 2,200 individuals who faced
    criminal charges in connection with their involvement in public
    demonstrations.\49\ These crimes, which include ``blocking public
    highways, resisting the authorities, damage to public property, active
    obstruction of legally established institutions, offenses to public
    officials, criminal instigation and criminal association, public
    incitement to law-breaking, conspiracy, restricting freedom of
    employment, and breaches of the special secure zones regime, among
    others, carry prison sentences of up to 20 years.\50\ More recently,
    Freedom House and PROVEA (Programa Venezolano de Educacion-Accion en
    Derechos Humanos) have echoed the concerns of the Inter-American
    Commission, reporting that at least 10 protesters were put on trial
    before military courts in 2012.\51\
        The same groups have tracked the continually increasing repression
    of peaceful protests in Venezuela. According to Freedom House, ``PROVEA
    described a sharp rise in suppressed protests in 2007, including a 300-
    percent increase in the number of injuries sustained during
    demonstrations, many caused by beatings, rubber bullets, and tear gas.
    The group also reported a 250-percent increase in the number of cases
    in which charges were brought against protesters, a sign of the ongoing
    criminalization of protest.'' \52\
        The use of force by law enforcement during a protest must be
    considered in the context of the human rights to freedom of association
    and assembly. The principal purpose of a law enforcement presence at
    demonstrations should be to ensure public safety and protect the rights
    of protesters and bystanders.\53\ The use of force by police is only
    permissible if it is strictly or absolutely necessary to protect an
    individual from harm or to enable a lawful arrest,\54\ not for the
    purpose of infringing upon a protester's right to freedom of assembly
    and association. Use of force must be strictly necessary and
    proportional to the danger to the physical integrity or life of the law
    enforcement agent or other individual.\55\ Whenever the lawful use of
    force is unavoidable, it must minimize damage to property and injury to
    persons, and respect and preserve human life.\56\ Furthermore, law
    enforcement must ensure that medical aid is rendered to any injured
    protesters and that their next of kin are notified.\57\
        Despite these internationally recognized principles, Venezuelan
    authorities have deployed excessive use of force against protesters in
    violation of multiple human rights, including the rights to freedom of
    assembly and association. At the outbreak of violence against
    protesters in February 2014, the Inter-American Commission on Human
    Rights declared that it was ``profoundly disturbed by various
    complaints alleging violations of the demonstrators' rights to peaceful
    protest and their rights to life and humane treatment, personal
    liberty, freedom of association and freedom of expression.'' \58\ Human
    Rights Watch (HRW) found that Venezuelan security forces repeatedly
    resorted to force, including lethal force, against peaceful, unarmed
    protesters and bystanders ``in situations in which it was wholly
    unjustified.'' \59\ HRW noted that these abuses included ``severely
    beating unarmed individuals; firing live ammunition, rubber bullets,
    and teargas canisters indiscriminately into crowds; and firing rubber
    bullets deliberately, at point-blank range, at unarmed individuals.''
    \60\ Amnesty International (AI) corroborated these accounts and noted
    that, contrary to international standards, state security forces used
    firearms against protesters without providing adequate warning.\61\ AI
    also reported on the ``excessive and indiscriminate'' use of tear gas
    by police.\62\
        In its December 2014 review of Venezuela, the U.N. Committee
    Against Torture noted ``with concern that 43 people died in the context
    of the demonstrations that occurred between February and June 2014, and
    878 were wounded, of which 68 percent were civilians,'' \63\ noting
    consistent reports regarding the excessive use of force. The Committee
    also expressed concern regarding the abuse of firearms and riot control
    agents against demonstrators and in residential areas, as well as the
    involvement of the National Guard in controlling demonstrations as
    opposed to civilian police forces.\64\
        The Committee Against Torture also reported a total of 437 attacks
    by armed pro-government groups against protesters during demonstrations
    between February and April 2014, noting that a large number of these
    attacks were carried out with the complicity and acquiescence of the
    state security forces, and went unpunished.\65\ Human Rights Watch also
    noted that armed pro-government groups attacked protesters,
    journalists, and persons perceived to be opposed to the government in
    the presence of security forces and with impunity. In some cases, state
    security forces openly collaborated with pro-government groups in
    committing these attacks.\66\ The Inter-American Commission on Human
    Rights condemned attacks of this nature and noted that they occurred in
    many parts of the country.\67\
        Protests have reignited since February of this year after the
    arrest of the Caracas Metropolitan Mayor Antonio Ledezma. Violent
    repression and the use of military force during these demonstrations
    have already resulted in new fatal victims, wounded persons and
    arbitrary arrests. On February 24, Kluiverth Roa Nunez, a 14-year-old
    high school student was killed by a gunshot wound in the head during
    the clashes between students of the Catholic University of Tachira
    (UCAT) and security forces. Reports indicate that the boy was not even
    participating in the protests.\68\
    III. Lack of judicial independence
        In May 2004 the National Assembly passed a new Organic Law of the
    Supreme Court, which completely weakened Venezuela's judicial
    branch.\69\ This Organic Law increased the membership of the Supreme
    Court from 20 to 32 justices and established that the new Justices
    could be designated with a simple majority vote of the National
    Assembly, making it easier for the Government and its majority in the
    legislative to take control of the country's highest Court. Since this
    political takeover of the Supreme Court of Justice, its members have
    publicly rejected the principle of separation of powers and the
    judiciary has acted as another arm of the executive branch to advance
    the government's political agenda by legitimizing its policies and
    decisions, consistently ruling in its favor and ``validating the
    government's disregard for human rights.'' \70\
        But the weakness of the judiciary precedes 2004 and is also a
    consequence of the inadequate transition in the Judicial branch
    following the adoption of the 1999 Constitution, which has resulted in
    the practice of appointing provisional or interim judges. For over a
    decade, the Judicial Commission of the Supreme Court has been
    discretionally ordering the removal of hundreds of provisional judges
    without a prior disciplinary proceeding, denying Venezuelan's judges
    one of the most basic safeguards for their independence: security of
    tenure.
        It is estimated that 62 per cent of the judges in Venezuela are
    provisional, and therefore can be easily appointed and removed.\71\ As
    underscored by the IACHR, the high number of provisional appointments
    ``weakens the judicial branch and strips it of its independence and
    impartiality, thereby adversely affecting the right of access to
    justice.'' \72\ The Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges
    and lawyers has also expressed his concern over the high number of
    judges and prosecutors who are provisional, considering that they are
    ``subject to various mechanisms of political interference that affect
    their independence,'' in particular bearing in mind that their removal
    is ``absolutely discretional: without cause, or procedure, or an
    effective judicial remedy.'' \73\
        One of the most notorious examples of interference by the Executive
    in the administration of justice has been the case of Maria Lourdes
    Afiuni. A judge at the 31st control Court of Caracas, in December 2009
    Afiuni granted conditional release to a businessman critic of the
    government who had been awaiting trial on corruption charges for almost
    3 years. She was immediately arrested and President Chavez called Judge
    Afiuni a ``bandit'', asking for her to be given a 30-year prison
    sentence despite her compliance with U.N. standards and Venezuelan law.
    Afiuni was formally accused of corruption, abuse of authority, and
    favoring evasion of justice.\74\ After over a year in a women's prison
    in Caracas under deplorable conditions and where she repeatedly
    suffered to threats and acts of intimidation by other inmates,\75\ she
    was put under house arrest in February 2011. On June 14, 2013, the
    judicial authorities lifted the house arrest but her trial
    continues.\76\
        The case of Judge Afiuni has captured the international attention
    and generated calls from U.N. experts and the inter-American System of
    human rights urging for her ``immediate and unconditional release.''
    \77\ However, as denounced by Human Rights Watch in a comprehensive
    report on this issue, the arrest of Judge Afiuni has had a powerful
    impact on lower court judges who have been afraid to issue rulings that
    may upset the government, and ``whereas in the past they only feared
    losing their jobs, now they also fear being criminally prosecuted for
    upholding the law.'' \78\
        As recently as last month, Ali Fabricio Paredes, another judge--who
    incidentally presided over Afiuni's case at some point--was arrested by
    national intelligence agents, less than 24 hours after he had convicted
    Walid Makled to 14 years in prison for drug-trafficking and money-
    laundering. The Attorney General ordered Judge Paredes' arrest for
    considering that he had unduly favored Makled with a lenient prison
    sentence.\79\
    IV. Arbitrary arrests and detentions
        The Venezuelan Constitution prohibits the arrest or detention of an
    individual without a judicial order and provides that any detained
    individual has the right to immediately communicate with family and
    lawyers. But in practice, it is estimated that more than 70 people have
    been arbitrarily detained or arrested in Venezuela over the last year
    alone.\80\
        The use of arbitrary arrest and detention in Venezuela is not
    recent. However, international human rights organizations have
    registered an increase in the number of people arbitrarily detained
    since 2014, particularly around the protests against the Government.
    According to official information, 3,306 people were arrested,
    including 400 adolescents, between February and June of 2014 in the
    context of the public protests that took place across the country.\81\
    It was reported that of the thousands of people arrested many were
    denied access to a lawyer of their choice and to medical assistance
    during the first 48 hours of their detention before appearing before a
    judge. Some of the people arrested remained in pre-trial detention for
    several months, in spite of the absence of solid evidence against
    them.\82\ Even the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed
    concern over the prolonged and arbitrary detention of political
    opponents and protestors in Venezuela, and stated that it was only ``
    exacerbating the tensions in the country.'' \83\
        Notably, one of the individuals that were arrested in connection to
    the February 2014 protests is Leopoldo Lopez, leader of the opposition
    party Voluntad Popular. After been accused of promoting violence in the
    antigovernment demonstrations that started a few days later, on 18
    February 2014 Leopoldo Lopez handed himself in to the National Guard.
    He has remained in pre-trial detention since, with charges of
    incitement and conspiracy to commit arson and damages to property,
    among other offences, which could carry a maximum penalty of 10 years
    of prison.\84\
        A month after Leopoldo Lopez' detention, members of the
    Intelligence Security Services (SEBIN) arrested Daniel Ceballos, mayor
    of San Cristobal (Tachira State) and also a member of opposition party
    Voluntad Popular on suspicion of rebellion and conspiracy to commit a
    crime for his involvement in the antigovernment protests that had taken
    place in February. No arrest warrant was produced at the time of his
    arrest and shortly after, the Minister of Justice and Interior of
    Venezuela posted several messages on Twitter claiming that justice had
    been done and accusing Ceballos of promoting violence, anarchy, and
    civil rebellion.\85\
        In August 2014, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary
    Detentions adopted an opinion concerning Leopoldo Lopez, concluding
    that his detention was arbitrary. It considered that ``Mr. Lopez's
    participation in a march for political reasons or the exercising of his
    right to freedom of expression during the same march, such as which
    took place on February 12, 2014, does not constitute an illicit
    justification for the deprivation of liberty of a speaker or
    participant.'' It further stated that in his case ``there are no
    elements that allow the concluding of a cause-and-effect relationship
    between the call for a political demonstration, speaking during the
    same demonstration, and the resulting deaths, wounds, and material
    damage.'' \86\ The Working Group also found that ``the detention of Mr.
    Lopez in a military compound seems based on a motive of discrimination
    based on his political opinions.'' \87\ The Working Group also found
    the detention of Daniel Ceballos to be arbitrary.\88\
        The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, also expressed serious
    concern at the continued detention of Venezuelan opposition leader
    Leopoldo Lopez, as well as more than 69 other people who were arrested
    in the context of the public protests that started in February 2014. He
    further called on the Venezuelan authorities ``to act on the opinions
    of the Working Group and immediately release Mr Lopez and Mr Ceballos,
    as well as all those detained for exercising their legitimate right to
    express themselves and protest peacefully.'' \89\ Both Lopez and
    Ceballos remain in detention to date, despite repeated calls from the
    international community for their immediate release.
        Exactly 1 year after Leopoldo Lopez's arrest, on February 19, 2015,
    Caracas Metropolitan mayor, Antonio Ledezma, was arrested and thereby
    expelled from office. Mr. Ledezma is an opposition leader and ally of
    Leopoldo Lopez. According to Mr. Ledezma's wife, intelligence agents
    forcibly entered his office and beat the mayor before dragging him
    away. Soon afterward, President Nicolas Maduro publicly denounced Mr.
    Ledezma as a ``vampire'' and accused him of conspiring with the United
    States and other foreign governments to foment a coup.\90\ President
    Maduro said he would respond ``with an iron fist.'' \91\ The evidence
    presented of this alleged conspiracy is a statement that Mr. Ledezma
    signed along with other opposition leaders published in a national
    newspaper, which highlighted the multiple challenges facing the country
    and called for an agreement to reach a peaceful and democratic
    transition. As such, his arrest was clearly politically motivated and
    arbitrary.
    V. Torture and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment in prisons
        Political prisoners in Venezuela have been subject to torture and
    other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment while in custody. The
    scale of these human rights violations seems to have increased since
    antigovernment protests began last year, but follows a long-standing
    pattern. Reports to this end have been issued from multiple
    international and regional organizations including the Inter-American
    Commission on Human Rights; the Office of the High Commissioner for
    Human Rights; and the United Nations Committee Against Torture; as well
    as countless nongovernmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch
    and Amnesty International.
        The U.N. Committee Against Torture expressed alarm regarding
    reported acts of torture and ill-treatment of persons arrested in
    connection with the demonstrations which occurred in Venezuela between
    February and June 2014. These acts include beatings, electric shocks,
    burns, suffocation, sexual violence and threats, apparently to punish
    protesters and obtain confessions.\92\ Similarly, in most cases
    documented by Human Rights Watch in its report regarding last year's
    protests, security forces subjected those arrested for protesting to
    severe physical abuse, including beatings with fists, helmets, and
    firearms; being forced to squat or kneel, without moving, for hours at
    a time; and extended exposure to extreme temperatures.\93\ Human Rights
    Watch also reported cases of torture including a pattern of firing
    rubber bullets point blank at protesters, withholding medical treatment
    despite life-threatening injuries, and psychological abuse.\94\ Amnesty
    International reported similar horrific accounts of abuse against
    detainees in its report and highlighted that inhuman and degrading
    treatment of detainees appeared to be in retaliation for their
    involvement in protests. For example, both male and female detainees
    reported being raped or threatened with rape by security agents. Other
    reports of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment include
    detainees being repeatedly and intentionally run over or hit by police
    officers on motorcycles; being doused in gasoline; and being subjected
    to severe beatings with batons.\95\
        Inhumane treatment of detainees continues to this day. Last week,
    Rodolfo Gonzalez, a political prisoner and former aviation pilot,
    committed suicide in prison. He was reportedly suffering from extreme
    physical and emotional distress due to the conditions of his detention
    at the headquarters of the State Intelligence Service (SEBIN) and the
    news that he would soon be transferred to an extremely dangerous prison
    known as ``Yare.'' \96\
        In the heart of Caracas is a prison known as ``La Tumba'' (``the
    tomb''). Located five stories below ground are holding cells for
    protesters and political prisoners. Prisoners of La Tumba are not only
    confined to tight spaces and constantly exposed to subfreezing
    temperatures, but are also deprived of sunlight, sanitary conditions,
    and ventilation. The conditions of detention have reportedly caused all
    inmates to become extremely ill, with symptoms including severe
    vomiting, diarrhea, fever, and hallucinations. However, they are denied
    access to adequate medical treatment.\97\
        Just earlier this month, the IACHR granted precautionary measures
    for the protection of political prisoners, Lorent Saleh and Gerardo
    Carrero.\98\ These measures, which are only granted in extreme cases of
    urgency, gravity, and threats of irreparable harm, were issued based on
    reliable reports that the detention conditions of Mr. Saleh and Mr.
    Carrero put their lives and safety at risk. These deplorable conditions
    have resulted in injuries and illness, for which no adequate medical
    treatment is provided. In issuing the precautionary measures, the IACHR
    referred to multiple reports it had investigated and received in recent
    years regarding serious violations of the human rights of detainees in
    Venezuela.\99\
        The inhumane conditions in Venezuelan prisons are not only suffered
    by political prisoners are exacerbated by extreme overcrowding. During
    the first half of 2014, jails were reported to be at 190 percent
    capacity.\100\ Additionally, as noted by the Committee Against Torture,
    detainees were deprived of medical care, potable water, food,
    sanitation, and ventilation.\101\ Further, 309 prisoners died in
    Venezuelan prisons during 2014 alone,\102\ but the numbers of inmates
    that have died in prison since 2004 is 4,791 and 9,931 have been
    wounded in the last decade.\103\
        The CAT Committee highlighted reports that political prisoners such
    as Leopoldo Lopez, have been held in solitary confinement.\104\ There
    have been numerous reports regarding the cruel, inhuman, and degrading
    treatment of Mr. Lopez, who is detained in Ramo Verde prison. For
    example, in October guards ordered Mr. Lopez and other detainees to
    defecate into plastic bags, and subsequently threw the same bags of
    human excrement at them and prevented them from bathing.\105\
        Last February 13, Mr. Lopez's cell was forcibly broken into for the
    apparent purpose of attacking and intimidating him. Since then, Mr.
    Lopez has been held in isolation, and deprived of communication with
    his lawyers and family, in direct violation of his rights.\106\ The
    U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture recently expressed that Venezuela
    had violated international law ``by failing to take measures to prevent
    mistreatment'' and ``torture'' of demonstrators and detainees,
    including the imposition of solitary confinement to opposition leader
    Leopoldo Lopez and the recent violent searches in the cells of other
    political prisoners such as Daniel Ceballos, Enzo Scarano, and
    Salvatore Luchesse.\107\
    VI. Violations of the right to political participation
        The right to participate in one's political system is a fundamental
    right, which not only gives citizens a voice in their own government,
    but also protects human rights defenders, supports underrepresented and
    vulnerable populations, and prevents violent political
    transitions.\108\ The rights to vote, participate in, and benefit from
    public service are protected by international instruments such as the
    Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) \109\ and the
    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).\110\
    Article 21 of the UDHR provides that ``Everyone has the right to take
    part in the government of his country, directly or through freely
    chosen representatives.'' ICCPR article 25 affirms that ``Every citizen
    shall have the right and the opportunity . . . (a) To take part in the
    conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
    representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
    elections . . . (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to
    public service in his country.'' Likewise, the American Declaration on
    the Rights and Duties of Man \111\ states in Article XX: ``Every person
    having legal capacity is entitled to participate in the government of
    his country, directly or through his representatives, and to take part
    in popular elections, which shall be by secret ballot, and shall be
    honest, periodic, and free.''
        Despite these legal obligations enshrined in international law and
    freely accepted by the state of Venezuela, the government has
    repeatedly stymied the right to political participation for opposition
    leaders, thereby repressing the rights of individuals as well as
    limiting free discourse and debate about matters in the public
    interest. Specifically, opposition leaders have both been denied the
    right to run for office and arbitrarily expelled from their positions.
        Leopoldo Lopez, leader of the opposition party Voluntad Popular
    (Popular Will), was elected mayor of the Chacao municipality of Caracas
    in July 2000. Mr. Lopez was recognized for his commitment to
    transparency and accountability.\112\ However, in August and September
    2005 the government imposed sanctions for alleged corruption which had
    the effect of disqualifying Mr. Lopez from public office for a period
    of 3 and 6 years, respectively.\113\ Mr. Lopez was thus prevented from
    running for mayor in 2008. In 2011, the Inter-American Court of Human
    Rights issued a unanimous decision on this matter in favor of Mr.
    Lopez.\114\ The Inter-American Court found that the alleged charges of
    corruption brought against Mr. Lopez, which he maintained were
    baseless, were never adjudicated by a competent tribunal and that Mr.
    Lopez was never charged with a crime. The Inter-American Court held
    that Mr. Lopez's human right to political participation had been
    violated. However, the Venezuelan regime refused to abide by the
    ruling, and Mr. Lopez was thus prevented from running in the 2012
    Presidential election.\115\ As described above, Leopoldo Lopez has been
    arbitrarily detained since February 18, 2014, in the military prison of
    Ramo Verde, specifically for exercising his rights to political
    participation and other human rights.
        Multiple elected officials who are opposition party members have
    been arbitrary expelled or threatened with expulsion from their
    positions. For example, Maria Corina Machado, an opposition leader and
    the founder, former vice president, and former president of the
    Venezuelan volunteer civil organization Sumate, was stripped of her
    seat in the National Assembly after being accused of treason by
    President Maduro in 2014. She had previously been charged with
    conspiracy for funds Sumate received from the National Endowment for
    Democracy (NED).\116\
        Ms. Machado ran for the National Assembly in 2010 and received the
    highest number of votes in the country.\117\ Ms. Machado has been one
    of the most vocal critics of President Maduro and the late President
    Chavez. She has repeatedly called for the removal of Mr. Maduro by
    legal means. In March 2014, after she accepted Panama's invitation to
    speak about repression in Venezuela at the Organization of American
    States General Assembly, and in response to her vocal support of the
    antigovernment protests last year, she was expelled from the National
    Assembly.\118\ By arbitrarily ousting Ms. Machado, the government
    violated her right to political participation and inhibited free
    expression and dissent among the legislature. The Inter-American
    Commission on Human Rights expressed concern about the reported ``lack
    of guarantees to ensure due process in the investigations and
    prosecutions'' of Ms. Machado and other members of the opposition.\119\
        Further evidence of the government's campaign to silence dissent
    and violate the right to political participation came last month, when
    the ruling party in the National Assembly moved to strip opposition
    party Congressman Julio Borges of his seat.\120\ Legislators called for
    an investigation into Mr. Borges, accusing him of conspiring along with
    Mr. Ledezma to foment a coup to overthrow President Maduro. The
    National Assembly President, Diosdado Cabello, also accused him of
    planning to murder Leopoldo Lopez to create chaos.\121\ Like other
    opposition leaders accused of plotting to overthrow the government, Mr.
    Borges would lose his legislative immunity if expelled from Congress,
    and thus could be prosecuted.\122\ The pattern of repression of the
    right to political participation thus has a chilling effect on all
    Venezuelans who hold dissenting views and wish to advocate for
    democratic change.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Boxer, and members of the Subcommittee
    on the Western Hemisphere, the disregard by the Venezuelan Government
    of the human rights of its people is absolute. The account I have just
    presented is only but a fraction of the grave and systematic violations
    that are taking place in that country but show the speedy deterioration
    of the security and enjoyment of the most basic rights and freedoms of
    the Venezuelan people. It is time for the international community to
    ensure through multilateral and bilateral efforts that democracy and
    the rule of law are respected in Venezuela. In 2001, the hemisphere
    adopted the Democratic Charter to address challenges such as the ones
    Venezuela is going through. The U.S. Government should work together
    with the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South
    American Nations (UNASUR) and the leaders of the region to ensure that
    the Democratic Charter is respected.

    ----------------
    End Notes

        \1\ According to the information published by the Office of the
    High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), only a visit by the Special
    Rapporteur on the Right to Food was accepted by the Government of
    Venezuela in 2011 but it has not yet taken place.
        \2\ HRW, ``Venezuela: Human Rights Watch Delegation Expelled,''
    September 19, 2008.
        \3\ Committee Against Torture (CAT), Concluding Observations:
    Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, UN Doc. CAT/C/VEN/CO/3-4 (in
    Spanish), December 12, 2014, para. 8.
        \4\ Law authorizing the President of the Republic to Issue Decrees
    with the Level, Strength and Validity of Laws on delegated matters.
    Articles 1 and 2. Published in Extraordinary Official Gazette No. 6.112
    of November 19, 2013.
        \5\ Reuters, ``Venezuela's Maduro seeks decree powers to face U.S.
    `imperialism' '', March 10, 2015.
        \6\ Resolution No. 008610 of the Ministry of Defense published in
    the Official Gazette on January 27, 2015.
        \7\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
    para. 15.
        \8\ The Petrocaribe program established in 2005 by Venezuela is
    described as a development cooperation program through energy supply
    assistance. Official page of Petrocaribe: http://www.petrocaribe.org/.
        \9\ FAO, Progress is proof that hunger can be eliminated, press
    release of June 16 2013.
        \10\ IACHR, Annual Report 2013, para. 667.
        \11\ Aporrea.org, ``Venezuela pide a la FAO apoyo para sistema de
    oferta de alimentos,'' June 16, 2013, as cited in IACHR, Annual Report
    2013, para. 669.
        \12\ Decree No. 8,331 with rank, value and force of Law on Costs
    and Fair Prices. Published in Official Gazette No. 39,715, of July 18,
    2011.
        \13\ CNN, ``Facing shortages, Venezuela takes over toilet paper
    factory,'' September 21, 2013.
        \14\ Bloomberg, ``Venezuelans Throng Grocery Stores Under Military
    Protection,'' January 9 2015.
        \15\ U.N., ``Venezuela: U.N. Human Rights Chief Urges Halt to
    Violence, Inflammatory Rhetoric,'' Feb. 28, 2014.
        \16\ Freedom House.`` Venezuela: Freedom of the Press 2014.''
        \17\ Id.
        \18\ HRW, ``Venezuela: Legislative Assault on Free Speech, Civil
    Society,'' Dec. 22, 2010.
        \19\ Freedom House, ``Venezuelan Government Silencing Media During
    Protests, Undermining Free Expression,'' Feb. 21, 2014.
        \20\ El Nacional, ``300 desempleados ha dejado cierre de
    periodicos,'' Feb. 8, 2014.
        \21\ Freedom House, ``Venezuelan Government Silencing Media During
    Protests, Undermining Free Expression,'' Feb. 21, 2014.
        \22\ IACHR ``Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur
    for Freedom of Expression: 2013,'' OEA/Ser.L/V/II.149 Doc. 50 Dec. 31,
    2013.
        \23\ IACHR, ``IACHR Expresses Deep Concern over Acts of Violence in
    Venezuela and Urges the State to Ensure Democratic Citizen Security,''
    press release No. 13 of Feb. 14, 2014.
        \24\ Id.
        \25\ Freedom House, ``Freedom of the Press 2003: Venezuela.''
        \26\ Id.
        \27\ Id.
        \28\ HRW, ``World Report 2014: Venezuela.''
        \29\ Reporters without Borders, ``Venezuela.''
        \30\ Reporters without Borders, ``World Press Freedom Index 2014:
    Venezuela.''
        \31\ Reporters without Borders, ``Venezuela.''
        \32\ Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), ``In Venezuela,
    Campaign to Silence Press.''
        \33\ Id.
        \34\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
    Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 14.
        \35\ Freedom House, ``Venezuelan Government Silencing Media During
    Protests, Undermining Free Expression,'' Feb. 21, 2014.
        \36\ IACHR., ``Annual Report of the Office of the Special
    Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression: 2013,'' OEA/Ser.L/V/II.149, Doc.
    50, Dec. 31, 2013.
        \37\ Id.
        \38\ IACHR, ``Office of the Special Rapporteur Expresses Concern
    over the Situation of the Freedom of Expression in Venezuela,'' Sept.
    22, 2014.
        \39\ IACtHR., ``Case of Perozo et al. v. Venezuela'', Series C No.
    195, January 28, 2009.
        \40\ HRW, ``Venezuela: Unarmed Protestors Beaten, Shot,'' May 5,
    2014.
        \41\ Resolution No. 008610 of the Ministry of Defense published in
    the Official Gazette on January 27, 2015.
        \42\ HRW, ``Venezuela: Legislative Assault on Free Speech, Civil
    Society,'' Dec. 22, 2010.
        \43\ Id.
        \44\ Id.
        \45\ Id.
        \46\ Int'l. Ctr. for Not-for-Profit Law, ``NGO Law Monitor:
    Venezuela,'' Dec. 1, 2014.
        \47\ See, e.g. Vision Global, ``Capriles: ``Cespa busca ocultar
    realidad de los venezolanos,'' 2013. Available (in Spanish). Manzana
    Mecanica, ``Venezuela censura Twitter y fortalece CESPA: duro golpe a
    la libertad de informacion,'' Feb. 28, 2014.
        \48\ IACHR, ``Annual Report 2009: Chapter IV, Human Rights
    Developments in the Region: Venezuela,'' OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 51, corr.
    1, Dec. 30, 2009.
        \49\ Id.
        \50\ Id.
        \51\ Freedom House, ``Venezuela: Freedom in the World 2013.'' See
    also PROVEA, ``Provea rechaza la criminalizaci"n de la protesta y
    dvierte sobre la institucionalizaci"n de la mentalidad represiva en la
    acci"n de gobierno,'' Feb. 7, 2014.
        \52\ Freedom House, ``Freedom of Association Under Threat: The New
    Authoritarians' Offensive Against Civil Society.''
        \53\ See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
    [hereinafter ICCPR] art. 21, art. 22(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into
    force Mar. 23, 1976; Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and
    Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 487-488 (2005). See generally Basic
    Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
    Officials (1990), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/
    firearms.htm [hereinafter ``Use of force principles"].
        \54\ Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials art. 3, G.A.
    Res. 34/169 (1979).
        \55\ Code of Conduct, art. 3.
        \56\ Use of force principles, at 5.
        \57\ Use of force principles, at 5.
        \58\ IACHR, ``IACHR expresses deep concern over the situation with
    respect to the right to peaceful protest, freedom of association and
    freedom of expression in Venezuela,'' press release No. 17 of February
    21, 2014.
        \59\ HRW, ``World Report 2012: Venezuela,'' p. 9.
        \60\ Id. at p. 8.
        \61\ Amnesty International, ``Venezuela: Human rights at risk amid
    protests'' (AMR 53/009/2014), April 1, 2014, p. 5.
        \62\ Id. at p. 6.
        \63\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
    Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 12.
        \64\ Id.
        \65\ Id. at para. 13.
        \66\ HRW, ``World Report 2012: Venezuela,'' p.12.
        \67\ IACHR, ``IACHR expresses deep concern over the situation with
    respect to the right to peaceful protest, freedom of association and
    freedom of expression in Venezuela,'' press release No. 17 of February
    21, 2014.
        \68\ IACHR, ``IACHR Laments the Death of a Student during Protests
    in Venezuela,'' press release no. 22 of March 3, 2015. See also Amnesty
    international, public declaration of February 25, 2015 (in Spanish).
        \69\ ``Ley Organica del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (2004).
        \70\ HRW, Submission to the Human Rights Committee in advance to
    its presessional review of Venezuela, July 29 2014.
        \71\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
    Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 16.
        \72\ IACHR, Annual Report 2013, para. 441.
        \73\ OHCHR, ``Preocupante la situacion de la justicia en Venezuela,
    advierte experto de la ONU,'' July 30, 2009.
        \74\ HRW, ``Tightening the Grip: Concentration and Abuse of Power
    in Chavez's Venezuela,'' July 2012, pp. 30-36.
        \75\ ID at p. 36.
        \76\ BBC, ``Venezuela ends house arrest of Judge Maria Afiuni,''
    June 14, 2013.
        \77\ U.N. News Centre, ``Venezuelan leader violates independence of
    judiciary--U.N. rights experts,'' 16 December 2009.
        \78\ HRW, ``Tightening the Grip: Concentration and Abuse of Power
    in Chavez's Venezuela,'' July 2012, p. 5. See also IACHR, Annual Report
    2013, para. 660.
        \79\ International Bar Association, ``IBAHRI expresses grave
    concern at arrests and further deterioration of rule of law in
    Venezuela,'' 18 February 2015.
        \80\ OHCHR, U.N. Human Rights Chief urges Venezuela to release
    arbitrarily detained protestors and politicians, 20 October 2014.
        \81\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
    Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 9.
        \82\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
    Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 9. See also Amnesty International,
    Report 2014/15, Venezuela.
        \83\ OHCHR, U.N. Human Rights Chief urges Venezuela to release
    arbitrarily detained protestors and politicians, 20 October 2014.
        \84\ Amnesty International, Venezuela: Trial of opposition leader
    Leopoldo Lopez raises concerns about the independence of the justice
    system in Venezuela, 21 July 2014.
        \85\ Amnesty International, Venezuela: Arrest of local mayor
    signals potential ``witch hunt,'' 20 March 2014.
        \86\ Opinion Number 26/2014 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)
    adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its seventieth
    session, August 25-29, 2014, para. 54.
        \87\ Id. at para. 55.
        \88\ OHCHR, U.N. Human Rights Chief urges Venezuela to release
    arbitrarily detained protestors and politicians, 20 October 2014.
        \89\ OHCHR, U.N. Human Rights Chief urges Venezuela to release
    arbitrarily detained protestors and politicians, 20 October 2014.
        \90\ El Pais, ``La policia de Maduro detiene al alcalde opositor de
    Caracas,'' February 20, 2015. Available (In Spanish).
        \91\ Id.
        \92\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
    Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 10. See also U.N. Human Rights
    Chief urges Venezuela to release arbitrarily detained protestors and
    politicians, October 20, 2014.
        \93\ Human Rights Watch, ``Punished for Protesting: Rights
    Violations in Venezuela's Streets, Detention Centers, and Justice
    System'' 2014, pp. 15.
        \94\ Id. at p. 17
        \95\ Amnesty International, ``Venezuela: Human rights at risk amid
    protests'' (AMR 53/009/2014), April 1, 2014.
        \96\ ``Muere en prision Rodolfo Gonzalez, opositor detenido en
    manifestaciones en Venezuela,'' BBC Mundo, March 13, 2015. Available
    (in Spanish).
        \97\ ABC.es, `` `La tumba,' siete celdas de tortura en el corazon
    de Caracas,'' February 10, 2015.
        \98\ IACHR, Resolution 6/2015, Precautionary Measure No 223-13,
    ``Matter of Lorent Saleh y Gerardo Carrero regarding Venezuela,'' March
    2, 2015.
        \99\ Id. at para. 16.
        \100\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
    Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 18.
        \101\ See generally CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian
    Republic of Venezuela, December 12, 2014.
        \102\ Venezuelan Prisons Observatory. See more information (in
    Spanish) at: http://elimpulso.com/articulo/violencia-en-carceles-
    venezolanas-dejo-309-reclusos-muertos-en-2014.
        \103\ CAT, Concluding Observations: Bolivarian Republic of
    Venezuela, December 12, 2014, para. 19.
        \104\ Id. at para. 18.
        \105\ Juan Carlos Vargas, ``Caso Leopoldo L"pez: Situaci"n actual
    del juicio, violaciones de DDHH y pronunciamientos internacionales,''
    Acci"n por la Libertad, January 30, 2015 (in Spanish, on file with
    author).
        \106\ Americas Quarterly, ``Meeting with Vice President Biden
    Triggers Alleged Retaliation from Venezuelan Government,'' February 13,
    2015.
        \107\ El Heraldo, ``Venezuela no previno actos de torturas,"
    relator de ONU, March 12, 2015. Available (in Spanish) at:http://
    www.elheraldo.co/internacional/venezuela-no-previno-actos-de-torturas-
    relator-de-onu-187298.
        \108\ See ``Political Participation: A Fundamental Right in Need of
    Protection,'' submission by Human Rights Advocates and University of
    San Francisco School of Law's International Human Rights Clinic to the
    U.N. Human Rights Council.
        \109\ U.N. General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
    10 December 1948, 217 A (III).
        \110\ ICCPR. Ratified by Venezuela on May 10, 1978. Ratified by the
    United States of America on June 8, 1992.
        \111\ American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S.
    Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American
    States (1948)
        \112\ See, e.g. ``Premio Transparencia 2008 para Leopoldo Lopez,''
    October 6, 2008.
        \113\ IACtHR, ``Case of Lopez Mendoza v. Venezuela,'' Judgment of
    September 1, 2011 (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), Series C No. 233.
        \114\ Id.
        \115\ See, e.g., Jeremy McDermott, ``Chavez accused of behaving
    like `dictator' ahead of elections,'' The Telegraph (UK), November 21,
    2008.
        \116\ HRW, ``Venezuela: Court Orders Trial of Civil Society
    Leaders,'' July 8, 2005.
        \117\ Mery Mogollon and Chris Kraul, ``Venezuela elections weaken
    Chavez's hold,'' Los Angeles Times, September 28, 2010.
        \118\ ``Venezuela opposition congresswoman's mandate revoked,'' BBC
    News, March 24 2014.
        \119\ IACHR, ``IACHR Expresses Deep Concern over the Situation
    regarding the Rule of Law in Venezuela,'' press release No. 15 of
    February 24, 2015.
        \120\ Sara Schaefer Munoz and Ezequiel Minaya, ``Venezuela Cracks
    Down on Dissent,'' Wall Street Journal, February 24, 2015.
        \121\ The Star, ``Venezuela's Ruling Socialists Target Another
    Opposition Leader,'' February 24, 2015.
        \122\ The New York Times, ``Clashes, Tear Gas After Police Kill Boy
    at Venezuela Protest'', February 25, 2015.

        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        Mr. Farah.

    STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS FARAH, PRESIDENT, IBI CONSULTANTS, TAKOMA
                                PARK, MD

        Mr. Farah. Thank you, Chairman Rubio, for the chance to be
    here today to discuss the accelerating crisis in Venezuela and
    its implications for the United States and regional security. I
    speak only on behalf of myself, and my views are not
    necessarily those of CSIS or IASC.
        I want to focus on Venezuela's regional role rather than
    its internal problems because I believe this is where the
    strategic threat to the United States actually resides.
        There is little doubt that Venezuela has, for a decade now,
    posed a significant threat not only to U.S. security interests
    in the Western Hemisphere but to the survival of democracy and
    the rule of law in the region. A recent investigation by Veja,
    a respected Brazilian magazine, shows that Venezuela, with the
    help of Argentina, actively tried to help Iran's nuclear
    program in violation of international sanctions. More than a
    dozen Venezuelan officials have been publicly identified by
    U.S. law enforcement as being directly involved in drug
    trafficking or the support of terrorist groups.
        The threat originating in Venezuela is not confined to
    Venezuela. The late Hugo Chavez, acting in concert with his
    allies, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia,
    Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner
    in Argentina, set out to redefine the political landscape in
    Latin America. And to a large degree, they have been
    successful. Unfortunately, the changes wrought under the banner
    of ``Socialism for the 21st Century''
    have brought massive corruption, rising violence, and
    repression. Venezuela is the indisputable leader and primary
    axis around which the others revolve.
        Venezuela and its allies have moved perilously close to
    becoming criminalized states, that is, states where the senior
    leadership is involved with, and act in concert with,
    transnational organized crime groups as a matter of statecraft.
    The Maduro administration is the central component of a
    multistate, ongoing criminal enterprise, carried out in concert
    with Iran and a growing Russian presence, whose primary
    strategic objective is to cling to power by whatever means
    necessary and harm the United States and its allies. In this
    endeavor, it has embraced the FARC, Hezbollah, ETA of Spain,
    the Sinaloa Cartel, and other terrorist and drug trafficking
    organizations and--I repeat--as a matter of state policy, not
    as rogue elements acting on their own.
        The stakes in the unfolding crisis in Venezuela for United
    States interests and the survival of democracy in Latin America
    are high. The consequences of the growth of this poisonous
    Bolivarian criminal enterprise is lethal.
        Few understood this better than Alberto Nisman, the
    courageous Argentine prosecutor who was investigating the 1994
    Iran-backed bombing of the AMIA Jewish Center in Buenos Aires.
    Before being murdered on January 18, Nisman had documented the
    Bolivarian-Iran ties across the Western Hemisphere, including
    two attempted attacks backed by Iran in the United States.
    Iran, identified by successive U.S. administrations as a state
    sponsor of terror, has expanded its political alliances,
    diplomatic presence, trade initiatives, military and
    intelligence programs in the Bolivarian axis primarily through
    its deep ties with Venezuela.
        The Iranian Constitution, first pointed out by Prosecutor
    Nisman, is an extraordinary document in which Iran stakes its
    claim to world domination in the name of Allah. The preamble to
    the Iranian Constitution states: ``With due consideration for
    the Islamic Element of the Iranian Revolution, which has been a
    movement for the victory of all oppressed peoples who are
    confronted with aggressors, this Constitution shall pave the
    way for the perpetuation of this revolution within and outside
    the country. This Constitution seeks to lay the groundwork for
    the creation of a single world nation and perpetuate the
    struggle to make this nation a reality for all the world's
    needy and oppressed nations.'' That is quite a statement for a
    constitution.
        This is the country with whom Venezuela and the Bolivarian
    states have chosen to align themselves while seeking to
    eradicate U.S. influence. U.S. influence is being replaced by a
    lethal doctrine of asymmetrical warfare inspired by an
    authoritarian government seeking perpetual power and nurtured
    by Iran in its overt desire to violently spread its brand of
    Islamic revolution.
        In addition to serving as a gateway for Iran's presence in
    the region, Venezuela has also been the primary conduit for
    Russia's growing presence in the region, something that is of
    growing concern in our national security community. And I deal
    with this at length in my written statement.
        In my written testimony, I detail many of the other cases
    to substantiate the statements that I make here.
        But I want to close with the words of the legendary
    Manhattan district attorney, Robert Morgenthau, as he retired
    in 2009 after decades of public service, including the pursuit
    of numerous and ongoing criminal investigations into the
    Venezuelan Government's criminal activities. He said: ``Let
    there be no doubt that Hugo Chavez leads not only a corrupt
    government but one staffed with terrorist sympathizers. The
    government has strong ties to narcotrafficking and money
    laundering, and reportedly plays an active role in the
    transshipment of narcotics and the laundering of narcotics
    proceeds in exchange for payments to corrupt government
    officials.'' Under the even less competent hands of Nicolas
    Maduro, the situation described by Morgenthau 6 years ago has
    grown considerably worse, as has the threat.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Douglas Farah

        Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer and members of the committee,
    thank you for the invitation today to discuss the ongoing and
    accelerating crisis in Venezuela and its implications for the United
    States and regional security issues. I speak on behalf of only IBI
    Consultants and myself. The views are mine and do not necessarily
    reflect those of CSIS or IASC.
        There is little doubt that Venezuela has for a decade now posed a
    significant threat not only to U.S. security interests in the Western
    Hemisphere, but to the survival of democracy and the rule of law in the
    region. A recent investigation by Veja, a respected Brazilian magazine,
    shows that Venezuela, with the help of Argentina, actively tried to
    help Iran's nuclear program in violation of international sanctions.\1\
    More than a dozen senior Venezuelan officials have been publicly
    identified by U.S. officials as being directly involved in supporting
    and participating in drug trafficking and support of designated
    terrorist groups.
        The threat originating in Venezuela is not confined to Venezuela.
    The late Hugo Chavez, acting in concert with his allies Rafael Correa
    in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua,
    Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner in Argentina, set out to redefine the
    political landscape in Latin America. And to a large degree they have
    been successful. Unfortunately the changes wrought under the banner of
    ``Socialism for the 21st Century'' have brought massive corruption;
    rising violence; a disdain for the rule of law; the rise of equating an
    individual leader as the state (``Chavez is Venezuela''); a significant
    and ongoing, concerted effort to silence peaceful opposition and
    independent media; and collapse of institutions designed to guarantee
    oversight and transparency of public individuals and entities.
        My testimony will focus on this alliance, of which Venezuela is the
    indisputable leader and primary axis around which the others revolve.
    However, and this is what presents the greater strategic threat
    emanating from Venezuela, it is not acting alone, but in concert with
    multiple other nations.
        Venezuela and its allies have moved perilously close to being
    ``criminalized states,'' that is, states where the senior leadership is
    aware of and involved and act on behalf of the state, with
    transnational organized crime (TOC), where TOC is used as an instrument
    of statecraft, and where levers of state power are incorporated into
    the operational structure of one or more TOC groups.\2\ The Maduro
    administration is the central component to a multistate ongoing
    criminal enterprise, carried out in concert with Iran and a growing
    Russian presence, whose primary strategic objective is to cling to
    power by whatever means necessary and harm the United States and its
    allies.
        Democracy was far from perfect before the advent of the
    ``Bolivarian Revolution,'' as Chavez defined his movement. Many of the
    region's countries were emerging from years of brutal and repressive
    military dictatorship, many of them backed by the United States. The
    new electoral systems were often rigid, exclusive and corrupt. However,
    rather than bringing about necessary reforms, Chavez created a system
    that has completely corrupted the electoral system, institutionalized
    massive corruption, criminalized nonviolent dissent, and made common
    cause with transnational terrorist and drug trafficking organizations.
    Beginning with the Chavez government and continuing into the Maduro
    administration Venezuela has actively pursued an official military
    doctrine that embraces the use of weapons of mass destruction against
    the United States.\3\
        The stakes in the unfolding crisis in Venezuela for U.S. interests
    and the survival of democracy in Latin America are high. The
    consequences of the growth of the poisonous Bolivarian criminal
    enterprise are lethal.
        Few understood this better than Alberto Nisman, the courageous
    Argentine prosecutor who was investigating the 1994 Iran-backed bombing
    of the AMIA Jewish center in Buenos Aires. Before being murdered on
    January 18 Nisman had documented the Bolivarian-Iran actions across the
    Western Hemisphere, including two attempted attacks backed by Iran in
    the United States. The week before his death, Nisman had formally
    accused Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and senior
    members of her inner circle of illegally seeking to cut to hide Iran's
    role in the AMIA case in exchange for oil to relieve Argentina's
    chronic fuel shortages. The warming relationship between Iran and
    Argentina was directly brokered by Venezuelan leaders. Whether or not
    the Argentine or Iranian government had direct roles in the unsolved
    murder of Nisman, the three nations together clearly created a climate
    in which he could be killed with impunity.\4\
        As the Veja investigation shows, Venezuela was a key player in the
    efforts of Iran to reestablish nuclear ties to Argentina, and that such
    a relationship was of primary interest to the Iranians.\5\ Because of
    the high value Iran placed on the acquisition of nuclear technology,
    Chavez promised to personally request Argentina's help, and to do so
    immediately.\6\
        In addition nuclear overtures, Venezuela and Argentina have
    developed an elaborate and opaque mechanism for transferring millions
    of dollars in funds between the two nations with no oversight or
    accountability. One of the primary mechanisms was a program called
    ``200 Socialist Factories,'' (200 Fabricas Socialistas). Venezuelan
    Government documents show that this program, although producing few
    functioning factories and even fewer economic benefits, allowed for
    direct Iranian participation in the ventures, most likely as a way of
    moving money that otherwise would be frozen under international
    financial sanctions.\7\
        Of concern to the United States should be the stated policy of the
    Bolivarian bloc of nations to break the traditional ties of the region
    to the United States. To this end, the Bolivarian alliance has formed
    numerous organizations and military alliances--including a military
    academy in Bolivia to erase the vestiges of U.S. military training--
    which explicitly exclude the United States.\8\
        U.S. influence is being replaced by a lethal doctrine of
    asymmetrical warfare, inspired by authoritarian governments seeking
    perpetual power and nurtured by Iran. Through an interlocking and
    rapidly expanding network of official Web sites, publishing houses,
    think tanks and military academies, the governments of Venezuela,
    Argentina, and Cuba have created a dominant narrative that identifies
    the United States as the primary threat to Latin America.
        A constant in the narrative, and a particular favorite of the late
    Chavez, is that a U.S. invasion is imminent and unavoidable. This is
    because the alleged United States policy is based on pillaging the
    region's natural resources, toppling the revolutionary regimes leading
    the march to Latin American independence, and subjugating its citizens.
    This preposterous narrative is often used by Maduro to justify the
    repressive and illegal arrest of opposition leaders who are held for
    months and years without trial or charges, as alleged accomplices in
    the fabricated crimes.
        This narrative has long been a part of the Latin American
    landscape, shaped by mass movements, armed insurgencies and Marxist
    ideologies, and based on the turbulent history of relations between the
    United States and the region. What is different now is the overt
    multigovernment sponsorship of the effort and the official adoption of
    these positions as policy and doctrine. This gives the current campaign
    deeper roots and access to levers of state power.
        As discussed at length below, Iran, identified by successive U.S.
    administrations as a state sponsor of terrorism, has expanded its
    political alliances, diplomatic presence, trade initiatives, and
    military and intelligence programs in the Bolivarian axis, primarily
    through the deep ties with Venezuela.
        In 2012 the United States intelligence community assessed that
    Iranian leadership was more willing to launch a terrorist attack inside
    the Homeland in response to perceived threats from the United
    States.\9\
        In 2013 the Argentine prosecutor Nisman released a report
    documenting through little-studied reports, informants, and the Iranian
    media, how official Iran state policy embraced assassination and
    terror, something which it never tried to hide and has never recanted,
    and the role of Venezuela in Iran's strategy.
        Many of the assumptions undergirding Prosecutor Nisman's work were
    drawn directly from the Iranian Constitution, an extraordinary document
    in which Iran stakes its claim to world domination in the name of
    Allah. It is worth a somewhat extended review here, given the repeated
    statements of solidary with Iran and its revolution by Venezuelan
    leaders. The preamble to the Iranian Constitution states:

              With due consideration for the Islamic Element of the Iranian
            Revolution, which has been a movement for the victory of all
            oppressed peoples who are confronted with aggressors, the
            constitution shall pave the way for perpetuation of this
            revolution within and outside the country, particularly in
            terms of the expansion of international relationships with
            other Islamic and popular movements. The Constitution seeks to
            lay the groundwork for the creation of a single world nation .
            . . and perpetuate the struggle to make this nation a reality
            for all the world's needy and oppressed nations.

        It goes on to say that:

              In establishing and equipping the country's defense forces,
            we will allow for the fact that faith and ideology constitute
            the foundation and the criterion we must adhere to. Therefore,
            the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran and troops of the
            Revolutionary Guard will be created in accordance with the
            objective mentioned above, and will be entrusted with the task
            not only of protecting and preserving our borders, but also an
            ideological mission, that is to say, Jihad in the name of Allah
            and the world.\10\

        Shortly after Nisman's 2013 report the U.S. Department of State
    issued a congressionally mandated report on Iran's activities in Latin
    America which completely ignored Nisman's fieldwork, as well as
    dissenting views within the U.S. government--most notably U.S. Southern
    Command, which has military responsibility for the region. Instead the
    State Department concluded that, while Iran's interest in Latin America
    ``is of concern,'' Iranian ``influence in Latin America and the
    Caribbean is waning.'' \11\ In September 2014 the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) issued a sharp critique of the State
    Department effort, noting the report only fully addressed 2 of the 12
    issues raised, while partially addressing 6 issues, and leaving 4
    completely unaddressed.\12\
        In addition to serving as a gateway for Iran's presence in the
    region, Venezuela has also been the primary conduit for Russia's
    growing presence in the region, something of growing concern.
        Riding on the wave of radical anti-U.S. populism sponsored by
    Venezuela, Russia is now firmly allied with the ranks of Latin
    America's populist, authoritarian and virulently anti-American leaders
    of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America--(Alianza
    Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America--ALBA). The Putin
    government is providing ALBA nations with weapons, police and military
    training and equipment, nuclear technology, oil exploration equipment,
    financial assistance, and an influential friend on the United Nations
    Security Council and other international forums.
        In return, these allies are shielding Russia from international
    isolation, providing political and diplomatic support, and an important
    regional media network--both traditional and social--that offers
    unstinting support for Putin while casting the United States as the
    global aggressor. At the same time, ALBA countries are increasing
    Russia's access to the hemisphere's ports and airspace, and ultimately,
    increasing Russia's sphere of influence in a region where the United
    States has seldom been so challenged.\13\
        Gen. John Kelly, the commander of the U.S. Southern Command, in his
    2015 testimony before Congress, noted Russia's growing activities in
    Latin America were part of a global strategy of using ``power
    projection in an attempt to erode U.S. leadership and challenge U.S.
    influence in the Western Hemisphere . . . Russia has courted Cuba,
    Venezuela and Nicaragua to gain access to air bases and ports of supply
    for Russian naval assets and strategic bombers operating in the Western
    Hemisphere.'' \14\
        Where the Russian state establishes a presence, Russian organized
    crime invariably follows. The immediate consequence is the rapid
    increase in cocaine flows from Latin America to Russia, and the former
    Soviet Union, with almost all of the cocaine originating from countries
    that Russia vehemently supports--Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and
    Bolivia.\15\
        The FARC,\16\ the hemisphere's oldest and largest insurgency and
    designated drug trafficking and terrorist organization by both the
    United States and European Union \17\, remains at the center of a
    multitude of criminal enterprises and terrorist activities that stretch
    from Colombia south to Argentina, and northward to Central America and
    into direct ties to the Mexican drug cartels, primarily the Sinaloa
    organization. Despite ongoing peace talks with the government over the
    past 2 years, the insurgency remains involved in the massive laundering
    of drug money, and recent cases by the Drug Enforcement Administration
    (DEA) have shown the direct and growing criminal drug ties of the FARC
    and Hezbollah.
        Following the model pioneered by Iran and Hezbollah, senior
    Venezuelan military and political leaders have allowed the FARC to
    traffic cocaine through Venezuela to West Africa, sharing in the
    profits. Almost every major shipment of cocaine to West Africa that
    U.S. law enforcement officials have been able to trace back have
    originated from or passed through Venezuelan territory.\18\
        Under the protection of the Governments of Venezuela, Ecuador,
    Nicaragua and Bolivia--as well as powerful friends in El Salvador and
    Panama--the FARC maintains a robust international infrastructure that
    is producing and moving thousands of kilos of cocaine and laundering
    hundreds of millions of dollars. It has emerged as a pioneer hybrid
    criminal-terrorist insurgency, using drug money to sustain an
    ideological movement. Over time the ideology has faded and the FARC has
    become much more of a business enterprise, helping to enrich its
    leadership and the leadership of the regional governments it supports.
        As one study of internal FARC documents, noted: ``When Chavez
    became President of Venezuela in February 1999, FARC had not only
    enjoyed a relationship with him for at least some of the previous seven
    years but had also penetrated and learned how to best use Venezuelan
    territory and politics, manipulating and building alliances with new
    and traditional Venezuelan political sectors, traversing the Colombia-
    Venezuela border in areas ranging from coastal desert to Amazonian
    jungle and building cooperative relationships with the Venezuelan armed
    forces. Once Chavez was inaugurated, Venezuelan border security and
    foreign policies shifted in the FARC's favor.'' \19\
        In this context there is also growing evidence that the Venezuela
    Government under Chavez and Maduro is actively promoting drug
    trafficking and TOC/terrorist groups, particularly the FARC and
    Hezbollah.\20\ Perhaps the strongest public evidence of the importance
    of Venezuela to the FARC is the public designation of three of senior
    government officials by the U.S Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
    Assets Control (OFAC).
        OFAC said the three--Hugo Armando Carvajal, director of Venezuelan
    Military Intelligence; Henry de Jesus Rangel, director of the
    Venezuelan Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services; and
    Ramon Emilio Rodriguez Chacin, former Minister of Justice and former
    Minister of Interior--were responsible for ``materially supporting the
    FARC, a narcoterrorist organization.'' It specifically accused Carvajal
    and Rangel of protecting FARC cocaine shipments moving through
    Venezuela, and said Rodriguez Chacin, who resigned his government
    position just a few days before the designations, was the ``Venezuelan
    Government's main weapons contact for the FARC.'' \21\
        In November 2010, Rangel was promoted to the overall commander of
    the Venezuelan Armed Forces \22\ and in January 2012 was named Defense
    Minister as part of Chavez's promotion of close associates tied to drug
    trafficking and the FARC.\23\ In July 2014 Carvajal was detained in
    Aruba because of a U.S. indictment against him for drug trafficking in
    support of the FARC. Aruban authorities released him before he could be
    extradited. He received as a conquering hero when he returned to
    Venezuela.\24\
        As legendary Manhattan district attorney Robert M. Morgenthau
    warned as he left public service in 2009 after decades of public
    service, including pursuit of numerous (and ongoing) criminal
    investigations into the Chavez government's role in TOC: ``. . . [L]et
    there be no doubt that Hugo Chavez leads not only a corrupt government
    but one staffed by terrorist sympathizers. The government has strong
    ties to narcotrafficking and money laundering, and reportedly plays an
    active role in the transshipment of narcotics and the laundering of
    narcotics proceeds in exchange for payments to corrupt government
    officials.'' \25\
        OFAC charges were buttressed by three other developments: A public
    presentation of Colombian intelligence on FARC camps in Venezuela and
    the meeting of high-level FARC commanders with senior Venezuelan
    officials, delivered at a session of the Organization of American
    States in July 2010; \26\ the public release of an analysis of all the
    FARC documents--captured by the Colombian military from the March 1,
    2008, killing of senior FARC commander Raul Reyes--by a respected
    British security think that outlined some of the same ties; \27\ and
    the public statements of Walid Makled, a Venezuelan who was formally
    designated a drug kingpin by the U.S. Government.
        Arrested by Colombian police after he fled Venezuela, Makled was
    eventually extradited back to Venezuela. Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney
    for the Southern District of New York, dubbed Makeld, also known as
    ``The Turk,'' a ``king among kingpins.'' While in Colombian custody
    Makled gave multiple interviews and showed documents that he claimed
    showed he acquired control of one of Venezuela's main ports, as well as
    an airline used for cocaine trafficking, but paying millions of dollars
    in bribes to senior Venezuelan official.
        According the U.S. indictment against him, Makled exported at least
    10 tons of cocaine a month to the United States by keeping more than 40
    Venezuelan generals and senior government officials on his payroll.
    ``All my business associates are generals. The highest,'' Makled said.
    ``I am telling you, we dispatched 300,000 kilos of coke. I couldn't
    have done it without the top of the government.'' \28\ What added
    credibility to Makled's claims were the documents he presented showing
    what appear to be the signatures of several generals and senior
    Ministry of Interior officials accepting payment from Makled. ``I have
    enough evidence to justify the invasion of Venezuela'' as a criminal
    state, he said.\29\
        There is growing evidence of the merging of the Bolivarian
    Revolution's criminal-terrorist pipeline activities and those of the
    criminal-terrorist pipeline of radical Islamist groups (Hezbollah in
    particular) supported by the Iranian regime. The possibility opens a
    series of new security challenges for the United States and its allies
    in Latin America.
        Among the cases that provide evidence of these ties are:

       In 2008, OFAC designated senior Venezuelan diplomats for
            facilitating the funding of Hezbollah.
          One of those designated, Ghazi Nasr al Din, served as the charge
            d'affaires of the Venezuelan Embassy in Damascus, and then
            served in the Venezuelan Embassy in London. According to the
            OFAC statement in late January 2008, al Din facilitated the
            travel of two Hezbollah representatives of the Lebanese
            Parliament to solicit donations and announce the opening of a
            Hezbollah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela.
            The second individual, Fawzi Kan'an, is described as a
            Venezuela-based Hezbollah supporter and a ``significant
            provider of financial support to Hezbollah.'' He met with
            senior Hezbollah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational
            issues, including possible kidnappings and terrorist
            attacks.\30\
       In April 2009, police in the island country of Curacao
            arrested 17 people for alleged involvement in cocaine
            trafficking with some of the proceeds being funneled through
            Middle Eastern banks to Hezbollah.\31\
       A July 6, 2009, indictment of Jamal Yousef in the U.S.
            Southern District of New York alleges that the defendant, a
            former Syrian military officer arrested in Honduras, sought to
            sell weapons to the FARC--weapons he claimed came from
            Hezbollah and were to be provided by a relative in Mexico.\32\

        Such a relationship between nonstate and state actors provides
    numerous benefits to both. In Latin America, for example, the FARC
    gains access to Venezuelan territory without fear of reprisals; it
    gains access to Venezuelan identification documents; and, perhaps most
    importantly, access to routes for exporting cocaine to Europe and the
    United States--while using the same routes to import quantities of
    sophisticated weapons and communications equipment. In return, the
    Venezuelan Government offers state protection, and reaps rewards in the
    form of financial benefits for individuals as well as institutions,
    derived from the cocaine trade.
        Iran, whose banks, including its central bank, are largely barred
    from the Western financial systems, benefits from access to the
    international financial market through Venezuelan, Ecuadoran, and
    Bolivian financial institutions, which act as proxies by moving Iranian
    money as if it originated in their own, unsanctioned financial
    systems.\33\ Venezuela also agreed to provide Iran with 20,000 barrels
    of gasoline per day, leading to U.S. sanctions against the state
    petroleum company.\34\
        There is now a significant body of evidence showing the FARC's
    operational alliance with Hezbollah and Hezbollah allies based in
    Venezuela under the protection of the Maduro government, to which
    relatively little attention has been paid.
        A clear example of the breadth of the emerging alliances among
    criminal and terrorist groups was Operation Titan, executed by
    Colombian and U.S. officials beginning in 2008. Colombian and U.S.
    officials, after a 2-year investigation, dismantled a drug trafficking
    organization that stretched from Colombia to Panama, Mexico, West
    Africa, the United States, Europe and the Middle East. The operation
    then continued on for several more years as part of the Lebanese-
    Canadian National Bank case.
        Colombian and U.S. officials say that one of the key money
    launderers in the structure, Chekry Harb, AKA ``Taliban'' acted as the
    central go-between among Latin American drug trafficking organizations
    (DTOs) and Middle Eastern radical groups, primarily Hezbollah. Among
    the groups participating together in Harb's operation in Colombia were
    members of the Northern Valley Cartel, right-wing paramilitary groups
    and the FARC.
        While there has been little public acknowledgement of the Hezbollah
    ties to Latin American transnational organized crime (TOC) groups,
    recent indictments based on DEA cases point to the growing overlap of
    the groups. In December 2011, U.S. officials charged Ayman Joumaa, an
    accused Lebanese drug kingpin and Hezbollah financier, of smuggling
    tons of U.S.-bound cocaine and laundering hundreds of millions of
    dollars with the Zetas cartel of Mexico, while operating in Panama,
    Colombia, the DRC and elsewhere.
        ``Ayman Joumaa is one of top guys in the world at what he does:
    international drug trafficking and money laundering,'' a U.S. antidrug
    official said. ``He has interaction with Hezbollah. There's no
    indication that it's ideological. It's business.'' \35\ Joumaa was tied
    to broader case of massive money laundering case that led to the
    collapse of the Lebanese Canadian Bank, one of the primary financial
    institutions used by Hezbollah to finance its worldwide activities.
        Another little-studied aspect of Venezuela's vast financial network
    is the use of PDVSA, the state oil company, to move hundreds of
    millions of dollars, with no legal financial backing, through its
    friends and allies in the Petrocaribe association, which was
    established by Chavez as a way to provide subsidized oil to poorer
    countries in the region. Under the construct, the receiving country is
    supposed to pay for 50 percent of the oil deliveries at market prices
    on delivery and pay for the other 50 percent over a 22-year period at a
    2-percent interest rate.
        Yet the numbers don't add up in Central America's strongest
    Bolivarian members, Nicaragua and El Salvador. Hundreds of millions of
    dollars are received and spent with no auditing, no accountability and
    generally no trace.
        The decision made by the leadership of the governing Sandinista
    party (FSLN )in Nicaragua and the governing Farabundo Marti (FMLN) in
    El Salvador, to work with the ALBA bloc of nations \36\ and their
    nonstate allies such as the FARC in Colombia to move hundreds of
    millions of dollars in untraceable ways through interconnected state
    oil companies, sets them apart from other Central American nations.
    While Venezuela's oil exports plummet and the price of oil has
    collapsed, these two governments receive ever-larger amounts of cash
    that is untraceable.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        In El Salvador, the governing FMLN controls ALBA Petroleos, which
    is 60 percent owned by PDVSA. President Salvador Sanchez Ceren is a
    member of the ALBA leadership and former guerrilla commander with close
    ties to the FARC. According to public statements of FMLN leaders such
    as Jose Luis Merino, \37\ ALBA Petroleos began with $1 million from
    PDVSA in 2007 and by the end 2013 had revenues of $862 million, with no
    explanation for the massive growth.\38\ Merino, who is a senior ALBA
    Petroleos advisor, publicly stated that he knew that ``many people are
    nervous because ALBA Petroleos was born 6 or 7 years ago with $1
    million and now has $400 million. Let me correct myself, $800 million,
    and we are trying to change the lives of Salvadorans.'' \39\

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        One of the signature programs of ALBA in Nicaragua was to have been
    the construction of a large oil refinery. Named the ``Supreme Dream of
    Bolivar'' (Sueno Supremo de Bolivar), the refinery received $32 million
    in startup funding in 2008 and an additional $60 million over the
    following 3 years. In 2012 the program received an additional $141.2
    million.
        Yet all that is visible of the $237.2 million dollar investment is
    an empty field of compact earth with the flagstaffs bearing the flags
    of Nicaragua, Venezuela, Cuba, and ALBA. Construction machinery has
    remained idle at the site for 3 years.\40\

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        These last few cases, though far afield from Venezuela, constitute
    a key part of Venezuela's reach across the hemisphere and its ability
    to create corrupt structures, move well over $1 billion a year in
    unaccounted funds, and support criminal and terrorist organizations.
    These massive financial flows serve to corrupt the state, shield
    officials from accountability, create enormous ``slush funds'' for the
    governments to act without transparency, and are undermine the rule of
    law. They may also be of significant aid to drug trafficking and
    terrorist organizations.
        As I noted earlier, Venezuela's ongoing state-sponsored criminal
    activities and ties to terrorist organizations are not confined to
    Venezuela. Rather, Venezuela has made itself the hub of a multinational
    criminal enterprise that has tentacles across the hemisphere, and that
    receives the active support of Iran, Russia and other nations that have
    a declared hostile intent toward the United States. This is the direct
    threat posed by Venezuela and its ongoing crisis.

    ----------------
    End Notes

        \1\ Leonardo Courinho, ``Chavistas confirmam conspiracao denuciada
    por Nisman,'' Veja, March 14, 2015.
        \2\ This definition is drawn from my study of transnational
    organized crime in Latin America. For a full discussion see: Douglas
    Farah, Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized
    States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security
    Priority (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
    College, August 2012).
        \3\ The primary text outlining this philosophy, from which Chavez
    adopted his military doctrine is Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary
    Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerra
    Periferica y el Islam Revolucionario: Origenes, Reglas y Etica de la
    Guerra Asimetrica ) by the Spanish politician and ideologue Jorge
    Verstrynge. The tract is a continuation of and exploration of convicted
    terrorist Ilich Sanchez Ramirez's thoughts, incorporating an explicit
    endorsement of the use of weapons of mass destruction to destroy the
    United States. Verstrynge argues for the destruction of United States
    through series of asymmetrical attacks like those of 9/11, in the
    belief that the United States will simply crumble when its vast
    military strength cannot be used to combat its enemies.
          Although he is not a Muslim, and the book was not written
    directly in relation to the Venezuelan experience, Verstrynge moves
    beyond Sanchez Ramirez to embrace all strands of radical Islam for
    helping to expand the parameters of what irregular warfare should
    encompass, including the use of biological and nuclear weapons, along
    with the correlated civilian casualties among the enemy.
        \4\ For a fuller discussion of the Nisman murder see: Douglas
    Farah, ``The Murder of Alberto Nisman: How the Government of Cristina
    Fernandez de Kirchner created the environment for a perfect crime,"
    International Assessment and Strategy Center, March 2015. For a fuller
    discussion of the triangulation efforts of Iran, Venezuela and
    Argentina in the nuclear program, see: Courihno, op cit.; Douglas
    Farah, ``Back to the Future: Argentina Unravels," International
    Assessment and Strategy Center, February 2013.
        \5\ It is important to remember that throughout the 1970s until
    1993 Argentina had a robust nuclear relationship with Iran, and the
    current Iranian reactors were retrofitted and upgraded with Argentine
    nuclear technology. Nisman, in his indictment of Iranian leaders for
    planning the AMIA bombing, stated that a major trigger for Iran's
    decision to blow up the AMIA building was the decision by Argentina,
    under pressure from the U.S. and Europe, to pause its nuclear
    cooperation with Iran. In addition to the Veja article, see: Kaveh L.
    Afrasiabi, ``Iran Looks to Argentina for nuclear fuel," Asia Times,
    November 6, 2009.
        \6\ Courinho, op. cit.
        \7\ Documents in possession of the author.
        \8\ These include recently founded Community of Latin American and
    Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribenos-
    CELAC), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
    (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America-ALBA).
        \9\ James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence,
    ``Unclassified Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of
    the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on
    Intelligence, January 31, 2012, p. 6.
        \10\ Translation of the Iranian Constitution of 1979 provided by
    the University of Nevada Las Vegas.
        \11\ U.S. Department of State, ``Annex A: Unclassified Summary of
    Policy Recommendations,'' June 2013. Most of the seven-page report was
    classified.
        \12\ United States Government Accountability Office, ``Combatting
    Terrorism: Strategy to Counter Iran in the Western Hemisphere Has Gaps
    that State Department Should Address,'' September 2014, p. 8.
        \13\ Douglas Farah and Liana Eustacia Reyes, ``Russia in Latin
    America: A Strategic Challenge,'' University of Miami, Center for
    Hemispheric Policy, January 15, 2015.
        \14\ ``Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States
    Marine Corps, Commander United States Southern Command Before the 114th
    Congress Senate Armed Services Committee,'' March 12, 2015.
        \15\ For the most comprehensive look at Russian Organized Crime in
    Latin America, see: Bruce Bagley, ``Globalization, Ungoverned Spaces
    and Transnational Organized Crime in the Western Hemisphere: The
    Russian Mafia,'' paper prepared for International Studies Association,
    Honolulu, Hawaii, March 2, 2005.
        \16\ ``Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia'' (Revolutionary
    Armed Forces of Colombia).
        \17\ ``FARC Terrorist Indicted for 2003 Grenade Attack on Americans
    in Colombia,'' Department of Justice Press Release, September 7, 2004,
    and: Official Journal of the European Union, Council Decision of Dec.
    21, 2005.
        \18\ Author interviews with Drug Enforcement Administration and
    National Security Council officials. For example two aircraft carrying
    more than 500 kilos of cocaine that were stopped in Guinea Bissau after
    arriving from Venezuela. See: ``Bissau Police Seize Venezuelan cocaine
    smuggling planes,'' Agence France Presse, July 19, 2008.
        \19\ ``The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives
    of `Raul Reyes,' '' International Institute for Strategic Studies,''
    May 2011.
        \20\ The strongest documentary evidence of Chavez's support for the
    FARC comes from the Reyes documents, which contained the internal
    communications of senior FARC commanders with senior Venezuelan
    officials, discussing everything from security arrangements in hostage
    exchanges to the possibility of joint training exercises and the
    purchasing of weapons. For full details of these documents and their
    interpretation, see: ``The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the
    Secret Archives of `Raul Reyes,' '' op cit.
        \21\ ``Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Support of
    the FARC,'' U.S. Treasury Department Office of Public Affairs, Sept.
    12, 2008. The designations came on the heels of the decision of the
    Bolivian Government of Evo Morales to expel the U.S. Ambassador,
    allegedly for supporting armed movements against the Morales
    government. In solidarity, Chavez then expelled the U.S. Ambassador to
    Venezuela. In addition to the designations of the Venezuelan officials,
    the United States also expelled the Venezuelan and Bolivian Ambassadors
    to Washington.
        \22\ ``Chavez Shores up Military Support,'' Stratfor, November 12,
    2010.
        \23\ ``Venezuela: Asume Nuevo Ministro De Defensa Acusado de Narco
    por EEUU,'' Agence France Presse, January 17, 2012.
        \24\ ``Venezuela gives `hero's welcome' to freed Carvajal,'' BBC
    News, July 28, 2014.
        \25\ Robert M. Morgenthau, ``The Link Between Iran and Venezuela: A
    Crisis in the Making,'' speech at the Brookings Institution, September
    8, 2009.
        \26\ ``Colombia, Venezuela: Another Round of Diplomatic Furor,''
    Strafor, July 29, 2010.
        \27\ The FARC Files: ``Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives
    of `Raul Reyes,' '' An IISS Strategic Dossier, International Institute
    for Strategic Studies, May 2011.
        \28\ The Colombian decision to extradite Makled to Venezuela rather
    than the United States caused significant tension between the two
    countries and probably means that the bulk of the evidence he claims to
    possess will never see the light of day. Among the documents he
    presented in prison were checks of his cashed by senior generals and
    government officials and videos of what appear to be senior government
    officials in his home discussing cash transactions. For details of the
    case see: Jose de Cordoba and Darcy Crowe, ``U.S. Losing Big Drug
    Catch,'' The Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2011; ``Manhattan U.S.
    Attorney Announces Indictment of one of World's Most Significant
    Narcotics Kingpins,'' United States Attorney, Southern District of New
    York, November 4, 2010.
        \29\ ``Makled: Tengo suficientes pruebas sobre corrupcion y
    narcotrafico para que intervengan a Venezuela,'' NTN24 TV (Colombia),
    April 11, 2011.
        \30\ ``Treasury Targets Hizbullah in Venezuela,'' United States
    Department of Treasury Press Center, June 18, 2008.
        \31\ Orlando Cuales, ``17 arrested in Curacao on suspicion of drug
    trafficking links with Hezbollah,'' Associated Press, April 29, 2009
        \32\ United States District Court, Southern District of New York,
    The United States of America v Jamal Yousef, Indictment, July 6, 2009.
        \33\ For a look at how the Ecuadoran and Venezuelan banks function
    as proxies for Iran, particularly the Economic Development Bank of
    Iran, sanctioned for its illegal support of Iran's nuclear program, and
    the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, see: Farah and Simpson, op cit.
        \34\ Office of the Spokesman, ``Seven Companies Sanctioned Under
    Amended Iran Sanctions Act,'' U.S. Department of State, May 24, 2011.
        \35\ Sebastian Rotella, ``Government says Hezbollah Profits From
    U.S. Cocaine Market via Link to Mexican Cartel,'' ProPublica, December
    11, 2011.
        \36\ The name is derived from former Venezuelan President Hugo
    Chavez's desire to recreate the original country created by South
    American liberator Simon Bolivar, which included Venezuela, Colombia,
    Panama, Bolivia and Ecuador. Chavez dubbed his movement, which has
    relied heavily on the FARC both for financing and as a nonstate armed
    actor, the Bolivarian Revolution. The radical populist bloc is formally
    known as ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
    or Alianza Bolivariana Para los Pueblos de Nuestro America. It members
    include Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Jamaica, the Dominican
    Republic and El Salvador.
        \37\ Merino, better known by his nom de guerre Ramiro Vasquez, was
    a Communist Party urban commando during El Salvador's civil war and
    carried out a number of high profile kidnappings both during and after
    the war. He was a well-known weapons provider to the FARC. His
    relationship with the FARC leadership, as well as the Chavez
    government, were well documented in captured FARC documents, where he
    is identified as ``Ramiro the Salvadoran.''
        \38\ These figures are taken from ALBA Petroleos official financial
    filings.
        \39\ ``Jose Luis Merino defiende a Alba Petroleos por ataques de
    ANEP,'' Verdad Digital, October 31, 2013.
        \40\ For an more comprehensive look at the refinery project and
    interesting graphics see: Jose Denis Curz, ``El Supremo Sueno de
    Bolivar no avanza,'' La Prensa (Nicaragua), March 25, 2013.

        Senator Rubio. Thank you, all three, for being here.
        Let me start with you, Dr. Sabatini. I wanted to ask you
    why--you have shared in your testimony something that Senator
    Boxer brought up earlier, and that is the silence of
    communities in Latin America and in the Western Hemisphere to
    what is happening in Venezuela. You compared it to the Honduran
    case that occurred back in 2009, if I am correct, and how that
    was met. Why, in your mind, is--why the silence from virtually
    everyone in the hemisphere with the exception of President
    Santos who condemned a specific arrest. But why the silence?
        Dr. Sabatini. It is a good question, Senator. I have
    several theories.
        I think first there has occurred in the last 10 years a
    proliferation of new regional organizations, led primarily by
    Brazil. There is a South American union, UNASUR. Then there is
    the Latin American-Caribbean union, CELAC. Both of those are
    intended to sort of marginalize the United States from those
    discussions. And not to wax too academic here, but those
    institutions actually lack a fundamental element of a
    multilateral institution. They do not ask their member
    countries to surrender any part of their sovereignty for a
    larger collective good. If you look at their founding
    documents, if you look at their statements, they always talk
    about how national sovereignty is supreme.
        So I actually think that we have gone backward in the
    region. We talk about popular sovereignty. We are back to the
    point when Latin American countries assert this principle of
    nonintervention, which can have very dangerous consequences
    because that principle of popular sovereignty evolved after
    World War II to protect the horrendous things that happened in
    Nazi Germany. So I think, first of all, there has been actually
    a philosophical institutional shift within the region.
        Second, I think that the region simply does not want to
    have the United States involved, and it is actively seeking to
    marginalize to do that. To give an example and to refer to what
    was said earlier about the need for election observation, be
    very careful. UNASUR's election observation program explicitly
    says that they are there to accompany--to accompany--the
    electoral commission which, if your electoral commission is
    vitiated or politicized, means you are just going there as a
    rubber stamp. So it is very important who monitors those
    elections.
        And on the last point, there is certainly a level of
    ideological sympathy and affinity with a number of these
    governments which is a shame because while I believe Dilma
    Rousseff and the PT may be genuinely leftist, even a social
    democratic government, basically Venezuela is a military
    government led by a group of thugs. But unfortunately, they
    cannot make that distinction.
        And last point, there are also very tight economic
    relations between--Brazil benefits deeply from agricultural
    exports, investment in infrastructure, and other things that
    sort of have made it very, very difficult to break its ties
    with Venezuela.
        Senator Rubio. Dr. Sabatini, you also talked and touched
    upon the drug trade. And as we know, if you watch the flights
    that come out of Colombia and South America and inner Central
    America and ultimately are transited into the United States,
    many of them over-fly Venezuela. It is hard to believe that
    those flights are occurring without the knowledge of someone in
    Venezuela. In fact, the allegations and some of the proof is
    very clear that the Venezuelan Government actually allows these
    flights to pay for protection money in exchange for being able
    to use airspace in Venezuela. If you do not pay the protection
    money, you may be shot down. If you pay the protection money to
    either a corrupt individual or to the Maduro government, you
    can over-fly that airspace. Is that an accurate assessment of
    the role Venezuela is playing in the drug trade?
        Dr. Sabatini. That is a very accurate assessment. If you
    look at a map, basically Venezuela is crosshatched by flights
    that are coming from Colombia or leaving from Venezuela mostly
    to go to West Africa but now increasingly going to the
    Caribbean, again raising two points. One is why Venezuela is--
    as you say, since it is so closely tied to the drug trade at a
    state level and particularly at a military level, why this is a
    security risk to the region. And so Brazil and other countries
    ignore what is going on at their own peril. They will be most
    affected. And not coincidentally, one of the highest per capita
    consumers of cocaine today is Brazil.
        Senator Rubio. Mr. Canton, you described a Venezuela where
    there is no freedom of expression, where there is no freedom of
    assembly and association, where there is a lack of any sort of
    judicial independence, where there are arrests and detentions
    of opponents of the government, where there is degrading and
    cruel treatment of those opponents when imprisoned. Going
    deeper than that, we know that if you are a member of the
    opposition, you have virtually no access to the airwaves, no
    independent press. They are denied things like bulk paper
    imports. So they cannot even print. You are forced to sell to
    owners that are friendly to the regime.
        Just a moment ago, I struggled to get the Department of
    State of the United States to acknowledge that Venezuela was no
    longer a democracy. In essence, democracy is more than just
    elections. Why should I continue to consider what they have in
    Venezuela today as a democracy given the fact that beyond
    having an election, which may or may not be even valid in some
    cases because of manipulation of the ballot, all the other
    underlying conditions of a democracy are not present? In
    essence, there cannot be a democracy unless both sides have
    free and fair access to the people who vote. Is Venezuela still
    a democracy?
        Mr. Canton. That is an excellent question. It is more
    academic than practical to some extent.
        Maduro is the President elected by the popular vote, and
    nobody can argue against that. Maybe someone can argue that the
    elections were not free and fair. That is a possibility because
    he won only for 1.5. But he was elected by the popular vote.
        All the other conditions of democracy are not there. I
    completely agree with you on that aspect. There is no
    independence of the judiciary. Legislation is just a rubber
    stamp institution. And there is constantly violations of human
    rights in the country.
        Senator Rubio. I am sorry. Let me rephrase my question this
    way. And I get your point.
        Let us assume--and I do not. I do not accept this, but let
    us assume that the election was free and fair. Is Nicolas
    Maduro today governing Venezuela as a democrat?
        Mr. Canton. No, absolutely not. And rather than using the
    word ``democracy'' that can give space for ambiguity, I would
    say there is absolutely no rule of law in Venezuela.
        Senator Rubio. So formally on paper and institutionally,
    Venezuela has a democratic form of government. In how it is
    being governed today, it is no longer being governed as a
    democracy.
        Mr. Canton. Correct.
        Senator Rubio. And then, Mr. Farah, I wanted to talk to you
    about the national security aspects of this. Actually before I
    go to you, let me just finish this with Mr. Canton.
        I know you did not get to it or could not get to it in your
    written statement because of the limited amount of time. Can
    you briefly describe, as you wrote in your testimony, the
    conditions that Leopoldo Lopez now faces in captivity?
        Mr. Canton. Everybody in jail in Venezuela is in a very
    serious situation and very grave situation on personal
    integrity and right to life.
        Senator Rubio. Is he in solitary confinement?
        Mr. Canton. He is in solitary confinement. And only a few
    weeks ago, there was an attempt to get into his cell by a gang
    of thugs in the prison. Nothing, fortunately, happened. I spoke
    with Leopoldo's mother only a week ago. He is in okay
    condition, but being in a jail in Venezuela, everybody, and
    particularly Leopoldo Lopez, your life is at risk.
        Senator Rubio. Is he allowed visits from his family on a
    regular basis?
        Mr. Canton. Not on a very regular basis. His mother can
    visit him once in a while, as well as his wife, but it is not
    very regular.
        Senator Rubio. Mr. Farah, I wanted to talk about the
    national security components. First of all, I think it is
    important at the outset to point to something that you did, and
    that is that throughout the 1970s until 1993, Argentina had a
    robust nuclear relationship with Iran and the current Iranian
    reactors were retrofitted and upgraded with Argentine nuclear
    technology. That is accurate.
        Mr. Farah. Yes, sir.
        Senator Rubio. Can you describe the nexus that exists today
    in your mind between Argentina, Iran, and Venezuela?
        Mr. Farah. Well, I think that Iran desperately wants to get
    its nuclear program up and running, and until the 1994 AMIA
    bombing, there was a very close exchange program between
    Iranian scientists and Argentinean scientists, et cetera.
    Prosecutor Nisman identified the cutting off of that
    relationship under U.S. and European pressure in 1993 as the
    trigger factor that set off the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires in
    1994.
        So when Iran needed to get back in the game or wanted
    desperately to get back in the game, they approached Venezuela,
    Hugo Chavez specifically, with Nestor Kirchner, Cristina's
    husband and predecessor, to begin opening the dialogue. As the
    recent Veja investigation shows, President Chavez said
    immediately, yes, let me do this, get on it.
        Nestor Kirchner was not particularly interested. In 2009,
    with Cristina they revisited it, and there was a steady flow or
    there has been a steady flow of Argentine scientists, nuclear
    folks, going to Venezuela. My understanding, from talking to
    people very familiar with Argentina's nuclear program, is that
    Iran has been interested in trying to recruit the entire team
    of scientists. They do not ones or twos. They want an entire
    team. And they are simply not willing to go. So that has not
    happened yet.
        But I think Venezuela was the necessary bridge to bring the
    Kirchner government into contact with Iran, and then you had
    the whole ongoing scandal with the memorandum of understanding
    and other things that happened in Argentina as a result of that
    growing closeness. And ultimately you have Prosecutor Nisman's
    accusation that the President Kirchner and her Foreign Minister
    and others had illegally agreed with Iran to get the Interpol
    red notices dropped against senior Iranian officials in
    exchange for oil, et cetera. And you end up with Prosecutor
    Nisman dead.
        But I think that in that entire process, the main
    interlocutor, the bridge between Iran and Argentina, has been
    and was very active was Venezuela, particularly President
    Chavez while he was alive, and ongoing with President Maduro.
        Senator Rubio. Okay. So we have established that there is a
    nexus there.
        Let me ask you about this group called the FARC, which is
    largely operational within Colombia. This is a drug
    trafficking, narcoguerilla group currently engaged in peace
    negotiations with the Colombian Government. But they do things
    like extortion and kidnapping and bombings and so forth, in
    addition to their narcotrafficking activities. Correct?
        Mr. Farah. Yes, sir. They are one of three organizations
    that is both designated as a major drug trafficking
    organization and a terrorist organization by the U.S.
    Government.
        Senator Rubio. So the FARC is treated by the United States
    Government as both a terrorist organization and a
    narcotrafficking organization. Do they not have a presence in
    Venezuela today, and if so, what is the nature of it?
        Mr. Farah. They have a significant presence. I think
    captured FARC documents beginning in 2008 with the death of
    Raul Reyes, the FARC commander who was killed in Ecuador--we
    got about 600 gigabytes of data for the first time on the
    internal FARC communications. And what was shocking in that--I
    worked with both the Colombian Government and others on
    analyzing a chunk of those documents. And what was really eye-
    opening was the intense level of senior contact between the
    FARC Secretariat, the General Secretariat, and not only
    President Chavez directly but his entire Cabinet including
    Diosdado Cabello, Maduro, and all the others who are still
    there and the very intense relationship at the same level with
    the Ecuadorian Government of Rafael Correa. Those were the two
    sort of really significant findings.
        But you see there the Venezuelan Government not only gave
    them shelter, it offered to set up joint businesses with them.
    It helped finance many of their activities. It carried their
    political water for them as far as trying to set up these
    different front groups. It hosted their main front group, which
    is the Bolivarian--the CCB, Coordinadora Continental
    Bolivariana. And the founding documents are in the FARC
    documents that were captured where the FARC complains that no
    one knows that this front group is a FARC group, but they
    describe how it was founded in the basement of the Presidential
    palace with President Chavez personally present.
        So it is a very, very organic link that goes to the highest
    levels, and there is nothing nonstate about that relationship.
    The FARC is viewed much like Iran views Hezbollah, as a matter
    of state policy, as a nonstate actor that responds directly to
    them.
        Senator Rubio. What about the links between Venezuela and
    Hezbollah?
        Mr. Farah. I think that you have seen over time something
    that was initially largely dismissed, thanks to the Drug
    Enforcement Administration and the cases that have become
    public over the last few years. You see very, very tight links.
    You have Imad Muginyah and other very specific cases where the
    Hezbollah operatives were buying cocaine from the FARC, and
    much of that money is ending up back in places like the
    Lebanese Canadian Bank that have since been closed because that
    money was detected.
        And it is often not as direct a link as people I discuss
    with in the policy world would like to see, but the money in my
    mind--they say, well, are they card-carrying Hezbollah people
    that are buying the cocaine? Who cares? The money ends up in
    Hezbollah in accounts back in Lebanon. Does it really matter
    whether the person who brokered that deal with the FARC has an
    ID card that says ``FARC'' or whether he is sympathetic enough
    to move that money back to Hezbollah? In my mind there is no
    distinction necessary there. But it becomes a very intense
    policy debate within this administration over what constitutes
    Hezbollah. My argument is that you simply need to look where
    the money ends up and who benefited from it, and it does not
    matter who the intermediaries were, identified specifically as
    that group.
        Senator Rubio. And my last question is about the state-
    owned company, PDVSA, Petroleos de Venezuela. How does the
    Venezuelan Government under the Maduro regime use PDVSA as the
    source of influence, activity, laundering, et cetera? How is
    that entity used both in the region and around the world?
        Mr. Farah. Well, I think the Bank of Andorra findings are
    extraordinarily important because I have been hearing for the
    last 3 or 4 years that Andorra was where PDVSA siphoned its
    money into. They have incredibly tough bank secrecy laws, and
    nothing had come out for a significant period of time.
        I think that PDVSA has become sort of the piggybank that no
    longer has much cash in it. But what you see is an architecture
    created around the region, particularly with Maduro's allies in
    Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, and Salvador Sanchez Ceren, and the
    remnants of the Communist Party in El Salvador, where you have
    architectures built up in which no oil is actually moved, but
    which they use to launder hundreds of millions of dollars a
    year. And simply looking at the financials of those companies,
    they are absurd. There are almost no legal imports coming in.
        For example, ALBA Petroleos in El Salvador began with $1
    million as this joint state enterprise with PDVSA owning 60
    percent of the company and ALBA Petroleos owning 40. They had
    $1 million in 2007. Their earnings statement for 2013 was $863
    million with no visible legitimate imports. That is a rather
    significant increase in your earnings. Daniel Ortega has said
    publicly that he gets $500 million a year from PDVSA
    essentially as a personal slush fund. And they set up with that
    an architecture which allows the FARC, the Sinaloa Cartel,
    Hezbollah, many other groups to launder money through the
    architecture that PDVSA has established.
        Senator Rubio. Let me just ask you one more, and I alluded
    to this earlier, a law enforcement report about the use of
    shipments from Venezuela to Syria to send bulk cash, both cash
    raised from the Arab expatriate community but also cash
    collected through trafficking of drugs and exacting bribes from
    drug traffickers and that money being sent to Assad. Are you
    aware of that report? Are you aware of those allegations? And
    if not, would that surprise you knowing the nature of the
    regime?
        Mr. Farah. I have heard the allegations. I have not seen
    documentation on it. I think that given the fact that when
    Chavez was most active in his direct engagement with Iran, the
    direct flight they set up went from Caracas to Damascus to
    Tehran back to Caracas, it is clear that there is a very strong
    link. If you look at the literature, Chavez had a very robust
    relationship with Assad. That has not changed. Maduro does not
    have the money, but clearly he is carrying on the same
    commitments that Chavez entered into. And I think that we have
    seen numerous cases of massive amounts of bulk cash being
    shipped back usually on Iranian ships which are untraceable
    once they get to Iran, and that some of that money would end up
    with Assad is not remotely----
        Senator Rubio. Is there still a direct flight between
    Caracas and Tehran?
        Mr. Farah. No, sir. That ended in 2011.
        Senator Rubio. So my last question--and I do not know who
    to direct this to, but any of you feel free to answer. I asked
    at the end of the last panel about Cuba's influence in
    Venezuela or its presence in Venezuela. And while I was able to
    get admission that there is an outsized influence, I could not
    get them to admit that the Cubans were actually involved in
    directing or helping the Venezuelan regime, the Maduro regime,
    oppress their own people.
        So let me just ask all of you to comment on both the size,
    the scope of the Cuban presence in Venezuela. I hear from
    Venezuelans that are traveling back and others that it is an
    extraordinary presence, that you cannot miss it. And secondly,
    the nature of that to the extent you are able to comment. I
    guess, Dr. Sabatini, if you have anything to add to that.
        Dr. Sabatini. I will start first. It is real. And I am
    going to tell perhaps an anecdote which illustrates it. I have
    a regular annual dinner with Cubans in the U.N. mission who, as
    we all know, are spies. And one time I was sort of chiding them
    a little bit, saying it must be difficult to be a client-state
    of Venezuela because they are so incompetent. They, of course,
    took umbrage at being called a ``client-state,'' and they
    pushed back. And I said, but yes, they cannot manage it. You
    guys are real professionals. You are good spies. You do things
    very well. And there was a long pause, and finally literally
    they said, yes, but we are training them, which I think is
    precisely the point.
        They are training. They are deeply embedded in the
    intelligence services. They are deeply embedded in the foreign
    ministry. I love that they often talk about they are sharing
    sports trainers. I do not know what sports trainers are, but
    clearly that is a euphemism for something else that is there.
        Of course, they also have the medical doctors which, by the
    way, helps underwrite the Cuban pharmaceutical industry. When I
    was recently on a trip to Cuba, something I had never thought
    of, is the doctors that are being sent to Venezuela are writing
    prescriptions for Cuban drugs that are then shipped. So it sort
    of also benefits the pharmaceutical industry in Cuba.
        It is real, and as I say, I have a firsthand account that
    they are there to train and they are there to advise.
        Mr. Canton. I agree it is real. In the particular case of
    the Inter-American System of Human Rights, the information I
    had when I was at the Inter-American Commission of Human rights
    was that all the movement of Venezuela to withdraw from the
    Inter-American System of Human Rights was orchestrated by Cuba.
    And over the last 2 years, as you know, Venezuela left the
    Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, and
    that was because Cuba initiated all the process.
        Mr. Farah. I would just add one thing. I agree with both of
    my colleagues. One of the things that the Cubans were brought
    in to do--and you see it not only in Venezuela but certainly in
    Bolivia and Ecuador, perhaps more pronounced because they are
    smaller societies--is that in those countries--and I grew up in
    Bolivia--
    if you were someone of stature and you got arrested, you had a
    social network that would get you out of prison. I never
    worried during the military dictatorships in Bolivia. If I was
    picked up--I was going to school with the sons of colonels--
    there was a social network that would get those people out.
        The Cubans were brought in to break that social network.
    They do not care who your uncle went to school with. They do
    not care who you went to class with. They do not care about any
    of that. And that has facilitated in all three of these
    countries the ability to throw people like Leopoldo Lopez in
    prison with no social network that can mobilize to get them
    out. The Cubans were brought in to essentially slice through
    those existing sort of safety net cords that had survived
    through the dictatorships and helped a lot of people get
    sanctuary because they are beholden to no one and they know it
    and they can just tell you to walk away and that is it. So it
    is a very important function they play besides, as was pointed
    out, being incredibly active at the very senior levels.
        Senator Rubio. Well, I guess I ask all these questions
    because while a lot of people were taken aback by the language
    of the President's announcement last week that Venezuela poses
    a national security threat, perhaps a better way to have
    phrased it--and I understand they are constrained by
    bureaucratic necessities, but--is not that Venezuela poses a
    threat per se. The people of Venezuela have no animosity toward
    the United States, at least the vast majority, the enormous and
    overwhelming majority, and certainly do not pose a threat to
    the country.
        But the Maduro regime, as has been described here today, is
    an anti-American one, is a serial human rights violator, is one
    that governs undemocratically. It is one that is helping--has
    and may continue to be helping Iran try to evade international
    sanctions and advance its nuclear program. It is one that is
    involved aiding both a terrorist and narco group called the
    FARC by giving them safe haven and support within their own
    territory. It is one that is involved, by the way, in openly
    providing safe passage for drug traffickers for drugs that are
    ultimately destined for the United States. It is one that
    actively supports financially Hezbollah, and it is one that
    uses its state-owned enterprise to foment and support anti-
    American governments in the region. And last by not least, it
    is one that is completely infected by a foreign government that
    has flooded it with sports trainers or, as they are more
    accurately known, spies and agents of repression that allow it
    to crack down on its own people and also further the interests
    of that country over that of the people of Venezuela.
        That sounds like the Maduro regime is not an insignificant
    threat to the national security of the United States when you
    view it in this context. This is not just a nation that is
    failing economically because of incompetent leaders, and it is
    certainly that. But it is also one in the grips of a regime
    that actively supports global terrorism, that actively supports
    one of the most dangerous developments of the last 20 years,
    which is Iran's nuclear ambition, that actively supports a
    group that is both a narcoterrorism group and also just a flat-
    out terrorist group. It is one that represses its own people
    brutally with the assistance of the Cuban Government.
        This does not sound to me like something that should be
    taken lightly despite the fact that it does not receive the
    attention it deserves. It does sound like not Venezuela, but
    the Maduro regime poses a real national security risk not just
    to the United States but to the region.
        Would anyone disagree with that assessment or elaborate on
    it?
        Mr. Canton. I agree. But the issue is how to address that
    problem. And I believe it is better if the United States acts
    together with the other countries of the region, with the OAS,
    with UNASUR, not being alone. I am in agreement--we were
    discussing with Chris this before. I am in agreement with the
    sanctions, but it is important for the United States to have
    very active diplomacy with the OAS and UNASUR.
        Over the next few months, there are very important issues
    happening in the region. There is a new change of the Secretary
    General of the OAS. The last Secretary General, Jose Miguel
    Insulza, failed during 10 years, his tenure at the OAS, at the
    same time of the destruction of democracy in Venezuela. There
    is the Summit of the Americas in just a couple of weeks, and
    there is the election internally in Venezuela.
        So I think it is important for the United States to work
    together with the other countries of the region. I know it is
    not easy. I know it is not the best timing, but it is the best
    way to approach the situation in Venezuela.
        Senator Rubio. And, Mr. Canton, I would not disagree. I
    would love nothing more than to see the nations of the region
    condemn what is happening in Venezuela. I would love to see
    nothing more than at least one country, at least one, come
    forward and say what is going on in Venezuela is outrageous and
    as a neighboring country, we are outraged by it. The problem is
    that we have not seen any of that occur, and in the interim
    U.S. national security is at stake.
        In fact, as Senator Menendez pointed earlier, about a year
    ago, the administration did not want to do sanctions because
    they wanted to give time for his UNASUR process to work. And
    the problem with that process, of course, was that they went in
    and basically treated both sides as moral equals when they were
    not. One side was unarmed civilians protesting conditions in
    Venezuela, and the other side were armed with sticks and clubs
    and guns and were beating them. And they also happened to have
    the power of government on their side.
        So while I agree with you and I share with you the hope
    that we would be joined by other nations, recent history does
    not hold much hope that that is going to happen. And I think it
    is to the great shame of the nations in this hemisphere who
    stand by silently and are watching this happen.
        Anyone else care to elaborate on my statement?
        Mr. Farah. I would fully agree. I wrote a paper that the
    Army War College published in 2012 saying that the criminalized
    states of Latin America should be considered a Tier 1 national
    security threat. And I think that that has been--because not
    only, as I said in my testimony, is it Venezuela, it is a
    network of countries now acting in concert with extra-regional
    actors with the primary unifying factor in all of their
    ideologies is a hatred for the United States and a firm belief
    in their public doctrine that the use of WMD against the United
    States is acceptable military doctrine and necessary military
    doctrine. I think because we do not take people seriously when
    they tell us what they want to do, that that is a serious
    oversight on our part, and that as they move forward, that
    strategic goal on their end has not changed.
        Dr. Sabatini. I will just add quickly I agree with you. And
    for so long, this administration, which I support, has first
    talked about the new era of partnership in the hemisphere. The
    truth is partners do not treat partners like Brazil and others
    are treating us. They do not denounce--perhaps inflammatory
    language but an action that, in fact, they embraced only a few
    years earlier when it came to Honduras. I think we need to find
    who our allies are in the region and work with them carefully
    to find a comfort zone where they can start to engage in this
    because, I agree with you, Venezuela is a national security
    threat probably more to the region than it is the United
    States, which makes it all the ironic that they are the ones
    who are criticizing us for saying it.
        Senator Rubio. Well, I appreciate your insights today. I
    think, if anything, this hearing I hope will remind my
    colleagues and the American people about what we are facing in
    our own hemisphere. Number one is just an astronomical level of
    human rights abuses and an erosion of democracy which, by the
    way, is not only contained to Venezuela. You find that erosion
    of democracy in Bolivia and in Ecuador and in Nicaragua and
    certainly the total absence of it in Cuba. It is one of those
    startling new developments we have seen after 20 years of
    democratic progress where people come to power through an
    election and then immediately undermine all of the institutions
    necessary for a vibrant democracy. It is one we have ignored
    for far too long.
        The second point is I hope people realize that in our own
    hemisphere there is a regime that is actively supporting and
    profiting from the trafficking of drugs that ultimately wind up
    in our streets, that is actively supporting, openly supporting
    elements that are both narcoterrorists but also just flat-out
    terrorists who have killed and maimed not just people in this
    region but oftentimes Americans, that in this region, there is
    a regime that is an active supporter of Iran's nuclear
    ambitions, that in this region, there is a regime surrounded by
    a level of enablers and cronies who steal all this money from
    the Venezuelan people, who benefit from access to power in
    Venezuela, and then spend weekends and holidays parading up and
    down the streets of Miami enjoying their ill-found gains.
        So that is why I am supportive of the bill we passed last
    year and supportive of the President's decisions. And I hope
    people realize that all the problems of the world are not in
    the Middle East. All problems of the world are not only in Asia
    or in Europe. There are real and significant problems in our
    own hemisphere that impact life in America.
        And the last point I hope people will take away from today
    is that we believe that the future of Venezuela belongs to the
    people of Venezuela. In a perfect and ideal world, the world
    that we are pushing toward, the Venezuelan people through the
    ballot box will replace these leaders with ones of their own
    choosing, which will help Venezuela fulfill its destiny as a
    prosperous, peaceful, and free country. That is not the
    direction it is headed in today.
        And while we cannot mandate the conditions in Venezuela,
    nor should we try and that is not our intention to do so, we
    certainly should lift our voice anytime human rights are being
    violated, especially in such a grotesque manner, and we will
    certainly condemn those who are benefiting and profiting from
    these abuses and then coming to our own shores to enjoy those
    benefits from the money they have stolen from their own people.
        And last but not least, we cannot ignore, despite the
    recent opening, the Cuban influence in Venezuela and the role
    that they are playing. Nicolas Maduro recently said that the
    United States was planning to invade Venezuela, which anyone
    familiar with United States policy just knows how absurd it is
    and how ridiculous a statement that is. But I would say to you
    that there is an invasion going on in Venezuela and it is an
    invasion of Cubans--of Cuban agents and Cuban Government
    officials--that have infiltrated the highest levels of its
    government who provide personal protection to Nicolas Maduro
    and Chavez before him, who control the official documents of
    the government, who are training their sports department better
    known as their repressive regime. And these things are
    happening as well and it should give us insight into the true
    nature of the Cuban Government.
        With that, again, I appreciate you being here today, your
    insights, the work that went into your statements.
        The record is going to remain open until the close of
    business on Thursday, March 19, for any future submissions. You
    may receive questions from other members, and I would encourage
    you to answer those so we can get them officially in the
    record.
        And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                                  ----------

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

        Written Statement of Maria Eugenia Tovar, a Venezuelan Citizen,
                        Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

        Honorable Senators, my name is Maria Eugenia Tovar, Venezuelan
    citizen in the process of obtaining political asylum in this country
    because of the political persecution I suffered in Venezuela due to
    what happened to my daughter, Genesis Carmona Tovar, who was murdered
    in the city of Valencia, Carabobo State, Venezuela, by a gunshot to the
    head on February 18, 2014, while we were participating in a pacific
    protest. I would like to respectfully greet you, and to thank the
    United States Congress, for being able to pass the law, Venezuela
    Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, sanctioning
    those who violated the human rights of the pacific demonstrators in
    Venezuela last February.
        I respectfully ask the committee to process the inclusion of those
    who murdered Genesis Carmona Tovar, into the list of people sanctioned
    for ordering and doing these horrific crimes. This crime still goes
    unpunished.
        On February 18 of 2014, I, Maria Eugenia Tovar, along with my
    children, Christian Carmona Tovar, who is 15 years old; Alejandra
    Carmona Tovar, 19 years old; and Genesis Carmona Tovar, 22 years old,
    were participating in the pacific demonstration in the Cedeno Avenue in
    the city of Valencia, Carabobo State, when we were caught by surprise
    by armed groups known as ``Los Colectivos,'' who shot us, murdering my
    daughter, Genesis.
        One of the people responsible of such a vile and despicable act is
    the governor of Carabobo State, Francisco Ameliach, who in his Twitter
    account, @ameliachpsuv, the day before Genesis was shot dead, wrote
    calling all members of the Unit of the Bolivar-Chavez Battle (UBCH) to
    prepare the ``immediate counterattack" against the ``fascists.''
        Besides Ameliach, members of the UBCH are also responsible. They
    are led by Samuel Martinez Garcia, bearer of the ID number 17,824,120,
    Coordinator of the ``Juventud Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela
    (Youth of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela), who lives in the
    2nd Street, house number 2,neighborhood Guanabanillo, in the
    municipality of Juan Jose Mora, Carabobo State; and Juan Jose Maza
    Seijas, ID Number 19,425,960, leader of the oganization ``Juventud del
    PSUV'' (PSUV Youth) of Carabobo State, and a public official that works
    in the Ministry of Youth.
        With an arrest warrant, only Juan Jose Maza Seijas appeared before
    a judge, once he got captured while he was staying in his residence.
    The district attorneys 44th and 146th of the Metropolitan Area of
    Caracas (AMC), Ruben Perez and Yackeline Mata, respectively, ratified
    the accusation against Maza Seijas due to his complicity in the felony
    of intentional homicide characterized with malice aforethought and
    ignoble motives, as well as his association to commit a crime.
        The preliminary hearing was held in the Trial Court 36th of Control
    of the AMC, which admitted the introduction of the charges from the
    prosecutors, and ordered the trial of the Maza Seijas case, agreeing on
    an interim measure of a consistent presentation every 15 days before
    said judicial instance, requested by the above mentioned district
    attorneys and agreed on by the judge of the case.
        However, the prosecutors, as well as the judge of this case acted
    by omission, leaving this case to go judicially unpunished. The duties
    of the prosecutors Perez and Mata were not held in accordance to their
    duty as guarantors of the due process; they did not continue with the
    judicial investigation to identify the hooded armed men that murdered
    Genesis Carmona; and considering the extent of such an aberrant crime,
    they should not have requested an interim measure to the judge. As
    prosecutors, they should have continued the process to make Samuel
    Martinez appear before the judge, but they did not do it. The judge,
    also, should have denied the interim measure, and do the necessary
    procedures, but he did not do it either.
        Therefore, the prosecutors Ruben Perez and Yackeline Mata, as well
    as the judge of this case, should be held responsible for the impunity
    of the murder of Genesis Carmona, especially since Martinez and Maza
    still have their jobs at the Mayor's office, and they are enjoying full
    freedom.
        In the following videos, it can be seen both men, who allowed
    themselves to be thoroughly identified in it, unhooded, and giving
    orders to hooded men to shoot and murder my daughter, Genesis Carmona
    Tovar:

        www.youtube.com/watch?v=Humx3BvFQjo
        www.youtube.com/watch?v=zX9Bx7iYzyU
        www.youtube.com/watch?v=EOdDPTiriyM

        Samuel Martinez Garcia, who appears in the video with long hair,
    and Jose Maza Seijas coordinate and manage the violent groups, the
    armed ``Colectivos," whom have been dedicated to suppress the protests
    in Valencia.
        Also, in the video the mayor, Maxum Caldera, and Guilmer Benitez
    were identified but never investigated. In that same event, 8 people
    were wounded.
        I would like to mention Hector Breiia, Coordinator of Economic
    matters of the Governor's Office of the State of Carabobo and one of
    the most loyal for the dirty jobs of Governor Ameliach, who is another
    one of the leaders of the Collectives in Valencia and also he dedicates
    himself to persecute, threaten, track communications and order the
    monitoring of the opposition people he threatens with death. Mr. Breiia
    spent the December holidays of 2014 in the city of New York.
        This case can be found, nowadays, in the Criminal Appellate
    Division of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ), where still nothing has
    happened.
        Finding ourselves in the District of Senator Marco Rubio, and he
    being the person who represents us before the Senate, and knows this
    case thoroughly, we feel deeply grateful because he raised his voice
    before the corresponding bodies. We beg for you to follow up on this
    case, and help us bring it to justice, since in Venezuela this is not
    possible.
        We are deeply grateful for having fulfilled the mission of passing
    the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014.
    Now, we are counting on your support so the Department of State can
    continue with the implementation and execution of this law, finding the
    culprits, and sanctioning them as violators of human rights.
        We are absolutely certain that with the sanctions achieved by
    Congress all those guilty of the murder of Genesis Carmona will be
    sanctioned. And even though it does not fix the loss of her life, it
    would comfort us, the family members that hold the ideals of peace and
    justice.
                                     ______

                      Responses of Alex Lee to Questions
                        Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

        Question. Mr. Lee, during this committee's last hearing on
    Venezuela in May 2014, Assistant Secretary Roberta Jacobson stated that
    ``We do think that right now they (sanctions) would be
    counterproductive, that they would enable the Venezuelan Government to
    go back to that sort of victim mentality of using us. But there may
    well come a time at some point in the future when they would be useful
    if there has not been movement at the table.''

       What has changed in Venezuela in the last 10 months that
            has made the administration feel now is the right time for
            targeted sanctions? Why did it take so long?
       What process did the administration use in picking who
            would be targeted for sanctions?
       Why are only seven names on the list?
       Are there additional members of the Venezuela Government
            who will be targeted in the future?

        Answer. Over the course of the last year, we have taken several
    steps in response to human rights concerns in Venezuela. On July 30,
    2014, and again on February 2, 2015, the Department imposed visa
    restrictions on certain Venezuelans believed to be responsible for, or
    complicit in, human rights abuses and undermining democratic
    governance. Certain family members of such individuals were also
    affected by these actions.
        The Secretary of State took these steps pursuant to Section
    212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
        On March 9, 2015, the President issued an Executive order imposing
    sanctions on seven designated individuals and authorizing the Secretary
    of the Treasury to impose sanctions on additional individuals and
    entities, in part to implement the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights
    and Civil Society Act of 2014 (the ``Act''). The interagency culled
    through various public and nonpublic sources to identify candidates
    that meet the criteria provided for in the Executive order. These names
    were thoroughly vetted by the interagency.
        When considering targeted measures, including visa restrictions or
    asset blocking, we routinely take into account a variety of factors
    including the particular facts of each case, the overall political
    context, law enforcement considerations, and consultations with our
    regional partners. We do not take such actions precipitously or without
    serious deliberation and they are always done consistent with relevant
    applicable laws or regulations.
        We will continue our investigations pursuant to the authorities
    established by the Act and the President's Executive order and we stand
    prepared to take action against others, where appropriate, as we assess
    additional information.
        Every situation is unique; our actions must be guided by the
    approach most likely to succeed in advancing respect for democracy and
    human rights for the benefit of the Venezuelan people.

        Question. Recently, Venezuela has requested that the United States
    Embassy reduce its diplomatic staff to 17, to match their staff numbers
    in the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington.

       How many diplomatic personal does Venezuela have registered
            in the United States? (Consulate and Embassy)
       What is the latest development regarding Venezuela's
            request for the United States to develop a plan to downsize the
            U.S. Embassy to a staff of 17?
       What would be the impact of such a staff reduction on U.S.
            interests in Venezuela and services provided by the Embassy?
       What type of response is the State Department considering
            for Venezuela's diplomatic representation in the United States?

        Answer. According to State Department records, Venezuela has 74
    individuals accredited and/or registered with its Embassy and eight
    Consulates. On March 16, we sent a diplomatic note to the Venezuelan
    Government that extended an offer to send a team of technical experts
    to discuss the size of both our missions. We have not yet received a
    response. The size of the Venezuelan mission to the United States will
    be an important part of those discussions.
        We have made clear to the Venezuelans that they need to comply with
    their international obligations to protect diplomats. Under the Vienna
    Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Venezuela committed to take steps
    to protect our diplomatic mission and our personnel at the mission, and
    the Department has made clear, and will continue to insist, that
    Venezuela provide such protection as the host government.
        A top priority for us remains the ability to ensure the welfare of
    American citizens in Venezuela. We will work to ensure the Embassy can
    continue to provide that assistance. Further, we have advised the
    Venezuelan Government that a reduction in our staff could negatively
    affect our ability to meet the demand for U.S. visas in Venezuela. It
    could also impact our public outreach efforts and the size and scope of
    cultural and educational exchanges.

        Question. The ``Anti-Imperialist Enabling Law'' was passed by the
    Venezuelan Legislature on Sunday and gives President Nicolas Maduro the
    ability to enact laws without congressional authorization through the
    rest of this year.

       With the passage of the ``Anti-Imperialist Enabling Law,''
            is President Nicolas Maduro now essentially Dictator Nicolas
            Maduro?
       Are there any checks on Maduro's power? Anything to prevent
            him from beginning mass arrest of opposition leaders?
       Has there been any outcry from the international community
            about the gross injustice to the democratic process in that has
            just occurred?
       Has any South American country called out for a return to
            democratic process?

        Answer. We are concerned by the weakening of democratic
    institutions in Venezuela and have called for a clear separation of
    powers. Political interference in both the legislature and the judicial
    branch has undermined the ability of those institutions to provide a
    significant check on the Executive. There is a process in the
    Venezuelan Constitution for Venezuela's National Assembly to grant a
    Venezuelan President the power to rule by decree.
        As underscored in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which all
    democracies of the region have committed to uphold, the separation of
    powers and the independence of the branches of government are essential
    elements of representative democracy. An independent legislature has an
    essential role to play in the political system in order to meet the
    principles laid out in the Charter.
        This year's National Assembly elections present an opportunity for
    Venezuelans to engage in legitimate, democratic discourse. Transparent
    election processes and credible election results could also reduce
    tensions in the country. We have urged regional partners to encourage
    Venezuela to accept a robust international electoral observation
    mission, using accepted international standards, for those elections.
    Now is the time for the region to cooperate and help Venezuela work
    toward a democratic and inclusive solution to the challenges it faces.
    We will also continue to work closely with others in the region to
    support greater political expression in Venezuela, and to encourage the
    Venezuelan Government to live up to its commitments to democracy and
    human rights, as articulated in the OAS Charter, the Inter American
    Democratic Charter, and other relevant instruments.
        Foreign Ministers from the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)
    released a March 14 statement announcing support for the upcoming
    parliamentary elections, the importance of the maintenance of the
    constitutional order, as well as democracy and the full expression of
    all human rights.

        Question. To what extent is there genuine independence between the
    Venezuelan executive, legislative, and judiciary powers?

        Answer. In Venezuela today, there is an increasingly authoritarian
    Executive exercising significant control over the legislative,
    judicial, and electoral branches of government as well as the human
    rights ombudsman.
        As underscored in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which all
    democracies of the region have committed to uphold, the separation of
    powers and the independence of the branches of government are essential
    elements of representative democracy. We will continue to work closely
    with others in the region to support greater political expression in
    Venezuela and to encourage the Venezuelan Government to live up to its
    required commitments to democracy and human rights, as articulated in
    the OAS Charter, the Inter American Democratic Charter, and other
    relevant instruments.

        Question. Is Venezuela a democracy today?

        Answer. Venezuela is formally a multiparty constitutional republic,
    but unfortunately, in recent years, political power has been
    concentrated in a single party with an increasingly authoritarian
    Executive exercising significant control over the legislative,
    judicial, and electoral branches of government as well as the human
    rights ombudsman. The government's actions have not met its required
    commitments to democracy and human rights, as articulated in the OAS
    Charter, the Inter American Democratic Charter, and other relevant
    instruments.

        Question. Do you agree that financial and visa sanctions could be a
    strong deterrent against further brutality against demonstrators?

       If so, why has the administration been so slow to deploy
            these tools as a deterrent?

        Answer. Our efforts to sanction the individuals listed in the annex
    to the March 9 Executive order, and cut them off from the U.S.
    financial system, exposes their objectionable behavior. We hope this
    increased pressure will prompt authority figures to change their ways
    or face further isolation from the international community.
        In addition, the United States is sending a clear message that it
    does not welcome money or travel of those who may be involved in human
    rights violations and abuses, undermining democratic governance, or
    engaging in public corruption.
        The Department has stated in the past that a balanced approach
    toward targeted measures, including visa restrictions or asset
    blocking, must account for a variety of factors such as the overall
    political context, law enforcement considerations, and consultations
    with our regional partners. With that in mind, the Department first
    took steps to impose visa restrictions for certain Venezuelans believed
    to be responsible for, or complicit in, human rights abuses and
    undermining democratic governance, including public corruption on July
    30, 2014, and again February 2, 2015. Certain family members of such
    individuals may also be affected by these actions.
        Any sanctions efforts should be seen as a tool in the context of a
    broader diplomatic strategy that must include working with allies in
    the region, those defending democracy within countries, and partners
    outside the region as well as multilateral organizations.

        Question. How many Active Duty military officers lead civilian
    agencies in the Government of Venezuela?

        Answer. Currently, five out of Venezuela's 28 ministries are headed
    up by active military personnel, by our estimate. These military
    officers lead the ministries of the Presidency (Admiral Carmen Melendez
    Rivas); defense (General Vladimir Padrino Lopez); economy and finance
    (Brigadier General Rodolfo Clemente Marco Torres); interior, justice,
    and peace (Major General Gustavo Gonzalez Lopez); and aquatic and
    aerial transport (Mayor General Giuseppe Yoffreda). In his last
    Cabinet, President Hugo Chavez only had three active military officers,
    including the Defense Minister, although in some of his previous
    Cabinets, Chavez had as many as seven Active-Duty ministers.
        President Nicolas Maduro has also appointed Active-Duty military
    officers to lead the National Police (General Manuel Eduardo Perez
    Urdaneta) and the state-run supermarket cooperatives, Mercal
    (Lieutenant Coronel Tito Gomez) and Abastos Bicentenarios (Major
    Anderson Medina). In addition to being Minister of Interior, Justice
    and Peace, Major General Gustavo Gonzalez Lopez also serves as the
    director general of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service
    (SEBIN).

        Question. How does that number [of Active-Duty military officers
    leading civilian agencies] compare to other countries in the Western
    Hemisphere?

        Answer. Venezuela has one of the highest rates of Active-Duty
    military officers in civilian cabinet positions, according to our
    estimates. Most other countries in the region--with the exception of
    Cuba--have all civilian cabinets or only have military officers heading
    the Ministry of Defense or defense-related agencies.

        Question. Does the Venezuelan military pose a threat to peace and
    the return of democracy in Venezuela?

        Answer. Elected civilian authorities' decisions have led to the
    significant economic, social, and political challenges in Venezuela. We
    believe the long-term solution in Venezuela will require meaningful
    dialogue among Venezuelans that yields concrete results and this year's
    National Assembly elections are an important part of that process. In
    general, we believe civilian leadership should handle the civilian
    functions of a government along with overseeing a nation's military.

        Question. Would you agree that, in Congress passing the ``Venezuela
    Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014'' (113-278) and
    in the President of the United States signing and implementing this law
    the United States acted entirely within its sovereign right to protect
    the integrity of its financial system and national security?

        Answer. Yes, the United States, like all states, can decide who may
    use its financial system or enter its territory. Executive Order 13692
    and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014
    embodied this decision by the United States in relation to individuals
    that meet the criteria for sanctions under those authorities. The visa
    restrictions and asset blocking against individuals who meet the
    criteria in the Executive order signaled that those Venezuelans who
    violate or abuse human rights or undermine democracy are not welcome in
    the United States, nor are they allowed to use our financial system.
    These actions made clear the U.S. Government's concerns about the
    erosion of human rights and democracy in Venezuela.

        Question. Would you say that it is hypocritical for the United
    States to be criticized for acting within its sovereign rights while
    other countries hide behind this principle in order to avoid taking a
    stance regarding human rights in Venezuela?

        Answer. We believe that all actors should focus their efforts on
    promoting democratic dialogue and free and fair elections in Venezuela.
    Other states and international organizations have highlighted the
    importance of democracy in the region and have called for Venezuela to
    respect democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
        The long list of international actors who have voiced concerns
    about the human rights situation in Venezuela over the past year
    includes the Governments of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru; the former
    Presidents of Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and
    Uruguay; as well as respected international bodies such as the United
    Nations Committee against Torture, and the Secretary General of the
    Organization of American States.
        Ultimately, Venezuela's political and economic problems will be
    solved by Venezuelans talking to one another in a climate of respect
    for human rights and democracy, and we should all encourage moves in
    that direction.

        Question. Would you agree that the United States deserves the same
    respect for its sovereignty as other nations in the world, and
    specifically in the Western Hemisphere?

        Answer. Yes.

        Question. I find it hypocritical that the administration has
    supported sanctions in Venezuela but yet relaxed them in Cuba. We have
    seen the influx of Cuban military and state security in repressing
    activists in Venezuela. After Cuba's history of supporting violence in
    Latin America and Africa when it was heavily subsidized by the U.S.S.R.

       Does the administration want, by weakening sanctions
            against the Castro regime, to help that dictatorship spread its
            repression even more into Venezuela and beyond?

        Answer. The United States imposes sanctions on both countries out
    of concern for human rights. But those sanctions are applied
    differently according to an evolving and unique set of challenges that
    each country presents.
        We constantly reevaluate the implementation of these policies and
    whether we need to change our course. In the case of Venezuela, the new
    sanctions are aimed at persons involved in or responsible for the
    erosion of human rights guarantees, persecution of political opponents,
    curtailment of press freedoms, use of violence and human rights
    violations and abuses in response to antigovernment protests, and
    arbitrary arrest and detention of antigovernment protestors, as well as
    the significant public corruption by senior government officials in
    Venezuela. In the case of Cuba, the new measures allowing for greater
    travel and commerce are intended to support the ability of the Cuban
    people to gain greater control over their own lives and determine their
    country's future.

        Question. According to high-level military defectors from
    Venezuela's Government, there are between 2,700 and 3,000 Cuban
    intelligence agents in the South American nation, embedded in sectors
    such as the military, agriculture, finance, and petroleum refining.

       Is this assessment correct?
       How many Cuban intelligence agents in Venezuela is the U.S.
            Government aware of?

        Answer. Cuba and Venezuela have a long-standing and wide-ranging
    partnership. They cooperate in areas ranging from intelligence services
    to medical services. In light of the close ties between the two
    countries, it should come as no surprise that Cubans are involved in
    the military, agriculture, finance, and petroleum refining sectors.
    However, we are not able to comment in a public manner about the
    estimates of the number of Cuban intelligence agents in Venezuela that
    may be provided by Venezuelan defectors or other open sources.

        Question. According to high-level military defectors from
    Venezuela's Government, the Cubans have modernized Venezuela's
    intelligence services, both the Sebin (Bolivarian National Intelligence
    Service) that reports directly to the President, and military
    intelligence. They also set up a special unit to protect Nicolas
    Maduro.

       Do you have any reason to doubt this assessment?

        Answer. According to Venezuelan Government-associated media, an
    estimated 40,000 Cuban advisers and aid workers are in Venezuela,
    including doctors, teachers, and Cuban military personnel. While both
    governments have stated that the Cuban presence in Venezuela is limited
    to these areas, we are also aware of reports of Cuban-Venezuelan
    cooperation in the intelligence services. We can provide you a more
    detailed explanation in a classified briefing.

        Question. Last year, former Venezuelan intelligence agents and
    sources with direct access to active officers of the Bolivarian Armed
    Forces told El Nuevo Herald newspaper that Cuba plays a leading role in
    the repression unleashed by Maduro against Venezuelan protesters. The
    Cubans are in charge of operations, which range for security around the
    Presidential palace to the planning of arrests of opponents. These
    Venezuelan sources also told El Nuevo Herald that Cubans have planned
    the operations of between 600 and 1,000 armed men who comprise the
    Chavista paramilitary groups, known as ``colectivos.''

       Do you have any reason to doubt this assessment?

        Answer. We are aware of media reports indicating that Cuban
    security and military advisers played a role in activities against
    Venezuelan protesters, including training pro-government vigilante
    groups, which subsequently attacked peaceful protesters during
    demonstrations. However, we have not seen further evidence establishing
    a direct link between Cuban advisers and these acts of violence. We can
    provide you a more detailed explanation in a classified briefing.

        Question. In 2007, Juan Jose Rabilero, head of Cuba's Committees
    for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) claimed that there were over
    30,000 members of Cuba's Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
    in Venezuela.

       Do you have any reason to doubt this assessment?

        Answer. Cuba and Venezuela have a long-standing and wide-ranging
    partnership. They cooperate in areas ranging from intelligence services
    to medical services. We have seen a range of estimates regarding the
    presence and activities of Cubans in various fields in Venezuela, and
    are unable to publicly comment on the quality of this information.

        Question. According to investigations by independent Venezuelan
    journalists, the Cubans have computerized Venezuela's public records,
    giving them control over the issue of identity papers and voter
    registration. The Cubans have representatives in the ports and
    airports, and have taken part in the purchases of military equipment. A
    state-owned Cuban company Albet Ingenieria y Sistemas, received US$170
    million to develop electronic data systems in Venezuela. Through Albet,
    the Cuban Government has been given access to Venezuelan databases,
    from which it could modify and even issue documents to citizens of
    other countries. Its portfolio includes the Maduro's communications
    office, and operating systems for prisons, emergency services,
    hospitals and police.

       Do you have any reason to doubt this assessment?

        Answer. Cuba and Venezuela have a long-standing and wide-ranging
    partnership. They cooperate in areas ranging from intelligence services
    to medical services. We have seen a range of reports regarding the
    presence and activities of Cubans in various fields in Venezuela,
    including the Albet case that you cite. Venezuela is ultimately
    responsible for the identity documents issued by its agencies.

        Question. The Cuban regime has rushed to the side of Venezuela
    after the administration began to implement the financial sanctions
    portion of our law. No surprise there given their alliance. But in your
    normalization talks with Cuba, does the administration categorically
    rule out putting U.S.-Venezuela policy options on the table, should the
    regime demand them?
        When the President announced his changes to U.S. Cuba policy in
    December, administration officials touted the changes this would bring
    to perceptions regarding U.S. policy in the region?

        Answer. We have not accepted any preconditions in our talks with
    the Cuban Government. The current focus of talks with Cuba is on the
    reestablishment of diplomatic relations and reopening of embassies.
    Once diplomatic relations are reestablished and embassies reopened, we
    will be better able to press the Cuban Government on a full range of
    issues, including human rights, claims, and the return of fugitives
    from U.S. justice.
        The response from partners throughout the region and around the
    globe to our new approach toward Cuba has been overwhelmingly positive.
    The updated approach gives us a greater ability to engage other nations
    in the hemisphere and around the world to join us in promoting respect
    for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba and throughout the
    hemisphere.

        Question. What has the administration done to rally regional
    support for U.S. policy toward Venezuela?

        Answer. Our policy toward Venezuela reflects our commitment to
    advance respect for human rights and safeguard democratic institutions,
    not only in Venezuela, but also across the hemisphere and the world. We
    have expressed our concerns to governments in the region about the
    worsening situation in Venezuela. We have urged our partners to speak
    out in meetings of the Organization of American States and the U.N.
    Human Rights Council. We have encouraged their support for the release
    of Mayor Antonio Ledezma, opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez, Mayor
    Daniel Ceballos, and others unjustly jailed, including dozens of
    students, by the Venezuelan Government.
        We have also called on regional partners to encourage Venezuela to
    accept a robust international electoral observation mission, using
    accepted international standards, for this year's National Assembly
    elections. We have emphasized to them that the region has an
    opportunity to play a productive role to support free and fair
    elections, which will help Venezuela steer toward a democratic solution
    to tackle its challenges.
        We have countered inaccurate claims by the Maduro government and
    other governments in the hemisphere about the March 9 Executive order
    and sanctioning of seven individuals and have explained that our
    actions were within our right to protect U.S. immigration prerogatives
    and the U.S. financial system. We have stressed that our actions are
    not against the economy of Venezuela nor the people of Venezuela. We
    appreciate your remarks on March 17 that helped reinforce this.
        We will continue to work closely with others in the region to
    support greater political expression in Venezuela and to encourage the
    Venezuelan Government to live up to its shared commitment to democracy
    and human rights, as articulated in the OAS Charter, the Inter American
    Democratic Charter, and other relevant instruments.

        Question. What regional countries have spoken out against the
    ongoing human rights abuses in Venezuela?

        Answer. The United States is joined by dozens of governments and
    individuals from the region in calling for the release of Mayor Antonio
    Ledezma, opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez, Mayor Daniel Ceballos, and
    others unjustly jailed, including dozens of students, by the Venezuelan
    Government. These include the Chilean, Colombian, and Peruvian
    Governments; former Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil),
    Sebastian Pinera (Chile), Oscar Arias (Costa Rica), Felipe Calderon
    (Mexico), Ricardo Martinelli (Panama), Alejandro Toledo (Peru), and
    Jorge Batlle (Uruguay); and Chilean Senators Isabel Allende, Juan Pablo
    Letelier, and Ignacio Walker. The Costa Rican Government called for a
    dialogue between the Venezuelan Government and the opposition and also
    noted that the OAS should play a role in observing the Venezuelan
    National Assembly elections. In mourning the death of a student,
    reportedly at the hands of government forces, OAS Secretary General
    Jose Miguel Insulza called for ``inclusive dialogue that leads to
    reconciliation between Venezuelans.''

        Question. What regional organizations have done so [spoken out
    against the ongoing human rights abuses in Venezuela]?

        Answer. The OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza called on the
    Venezuelan Government to respect the due process of the law in Mayor
    Antonio Ledezma's case while noting the importance of Venezuela holding
    National Assembly elections with the ``required democratic character.''
        The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) expressed
    ``deep concern'' on the investigations and prosecutions of Mayor
    Ledezma, opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez, and Mayor Daniel Ceballos.
    The body also called on the Venezuelan Government not to criminalize
    opposition political leaders and to pursue a dialogue with the
    opposition.
        The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Zeid Ra'ad Al
    Hussein, expressed concern over the continued detention of opposition
    leaders and demonstrators and the government's harsh response to
    criticism and peaceful expressions of dissent. The European Union (EU)
    called on the Venezuelan Government to work with the opposition and
    civil society to meet the legitimate concerns of the Venezuelan people
    while highlighting that it is important that freedom of expression and
    fundamental rights are respected in an electoral year. The Canadian,
    Italian, Norwegian, and Spanish Governments called on the Venezuelan
    Government to demonstrate its commitment to human rights, including
    freedom of expression and peaceful protest. Pope Francis urged
    Venezuelans to refuse violence and called for a sincere and
    constructive dialogue between the government and the opposition.
        On March 14, Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) issued a
    statement expressing support for a dialogue between all the
    ``Venezuelan democratic forces'' respecting human rights, rule of law,
    and institutional order. UNASUR also expressed support for this year's
    National Assembly elections while emphasizing the importance of
    respecting the constitutional order and human rights.

        Question. Ambassador Brownfield, the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
    International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, has been quoted as
    saying that recent media reports about the Venezuelan government's
    complicity with cartels were ``not inconsistent'' with the evidence.

       Can you elaborate on Venezuela's interaction with the
            cartels?
       Please describe some of the evidence you have seen that
            would support this.
       What is Cartel de los Soles or the ``Cartel of the Suns''
            relationship with the Venezuelan Government.
       Does the Venezuelan Government have a relationship
            (narcotics trafficking/armed support) with the Revolutionary
            Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)? What is the extent of that
            relationship?

        Answer. In Venezuela, public corruption is a major problem that
    makes it easier for drug-trafficking organizations to move and smuggle
    illegal drugs, according to Venezuelan nongovernmental organizations.
    Media reports alleged that some military and law enforcement personnel
    directly assisted Colombian drug trafficking organizations, including
    not only the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), but also
    the National Liberation Army (ELN), Clan Usuga, and Los Rastrojos.
    There are also media reports alleging that Mexican drug-organizations,
    including the Sinaloa cartel and Los Zetas, operate in Venezuela.
        The term ``Cartel de los Soles'' is used to describe a collection
    of groups within the Venezuelan Armed Forces that are allegedly
    involved in drug trafficking. Press reports indicate that elements of
    the military believed to be most deeply involved in Venezuelan drug
    trade are concentrated along the western border with Colombia,
    especially in the states of Apure, Zulia and Tachira.
        An indication that some officials at the top level of the military
    have been involved in drug trafficking are the Treasury Department's
    designations of current and former Venezuelan Government officials
    under the Kingpin Act for materially assisting the Revolutionary Armed
    Forces of Colombia (FARC) in trafficking narcotics. The Venezuelan
    Government has yet to take action against these government and military
    officials who have engaged in drug trafficking activities with the
    FARC.

        Question. A recent report by the Washington DC-based, Center for a
    Secure Free Society, and Canada's Institute for Social and Economic
    Analysis, raises concerns about the use of Venezuela as a ``bridge'' to
    smuggle Iranian agents into North America. It states that Venezuelan
    authorities provided at least 173 passports, visas, and other
    documentation--controlled by Cuba's state-owned Albet--to Islamist
    extremists seeking to slip unnoticed into North America.

       Do you have any reason to doubt this assessment?

        Answer. We take any allegations that threaten our national security
    seriously. The Department closely watches all signs of activity of
    Iranian influence in the Western Hemisphere. We share your concern that
    Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents are easy to
    obtain, making Venezuela a potentially attractive source of
    documentation for terrorists. International authorities remain
    suspicious of the integrity of Venezuela documents and their issuance
    process. We can provide you a more detailed explanation in a classified
    briefing.

        Question. Last month, Nicolas Maduro ordered the arrest of the
    Mayor of Caracas, Antonio Ledezma, and ordered a further crackdown
    against student protesters, upon returning from a previously
    undisclosed trip to Cuba, where Maduro met with both Raul and Fidel
    Castro.

       Do you find the timing curious?

        Answer. We have publicly condemned the detention of Caracas
    Metropolitan Mayor Antonio Ledezma by Venezuelan security forces, as
    well as the systematic intimidation of other leading opposition
    figures. It is difficult to speculate on the direct precipitating
    factors leading to Ledezma's arrest, but the arrest of opposition
    figures appear to be a clear attempt by the Venezuelan Government to
    divert attention from the country's economic and political challenges
    and to destabilize the opposition. Rather than imprisoning and
    intimidating its critics, the Venezuelan Government should focus on
    finding real solutions through democratic dialogue.
        Venezuela's problems cannot be solved by criminalizing legitimate,
    democratic dissent. These tactics violate the Venezuelan people's basic
    human rights and civil liberties as well as the principles and values
    set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
    and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
        The Venezuelan Government should release those it has unjustly
    jailed and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the
    freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly. The United
    States calls on other countries, leaders, and organizations to urge the
    Venezuelan Government to cease these efforts to silence the political
    opposition and further weaken democratic institutions.

        Question. What consideration do you give Cuba's continued efforts
    to subvert democratic institutions in Latin America, including within
    your review of the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, on which Cuba was
    placed in 1982 precisely for its subversive tactics in the Western
    Hemisphere?

        Answer. The Department of State is undertaking a serious review of
    Cuba's designation based on all relevant, applicable information and
    the statutory standard. We will not prejudge that process.

        Question. Why hasn't the State Department publicly denounced the
    role that Cuba's Government has played in subverting Venezuela's
    democratic institutions?

        Answer. We should not let the potential influence of outside
    parties like Cuba distract our attention from the need to hold the
    Venezuelan Government accountable for its actions. The Venezuelan
    Government alone is responsible for the actions of its officials and
    institutions, including those that undermine democracy and the
    protection of human rights in Venezuela.
        The repression and abuses of human rights that occur in Venezuela
    are the responsibility of the Venezuelan Government.

        Question. A July 2009 GAO report (GAO-09-806) stated that the so-
    called Bolivarian National Guard is deeply involved in the trafficking
    of illicit narcotics. Please provide an assessment of the Venezuelan
    National Guard's involvement in illicit trafficking and other
    transnational criminal activities.

        Answer. According to public reports, members of the Bolivarian
    National Guard continue to facilitate or are directly involved in drug
    trafficking. Corruption among some members of the Bolivarian National
    Guard poses a significant threat because of this organization's role in
    controlling Venezuelan airports, borders and ports. This concern is
    coupled with the fact that Venezuelan law enforcement does not
    effectively prosecute drug traffickers, in part due to political
    corruption.
        It is a concern not only for the United States, but also for the
    rest of the hemisphere, that Venezuela remains a key transit country
    for the shipment of illegal drugs from South America. The U.S.
    Government and its regional partners have repeatedly said more
    effective counternarcotics efforts are necessary to curb the flow of
    drugs into and out of the region. Since the Venezuelan Government ended
    formal cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in 2005,
    bilateral counternarcotics cooperation has been conducted on a case-by-
    case basis, including informal information exchanges and maritime
    interdiction activities with the U.S. Coast Guard. However, a lack of
    sustained, high-level cooperation reduces the ability of our U.S. law
    enforcement partners to investigate and prosecute violators of U.S. law
    residing or operating in Venezuela. We nonetheless encourage our
    partners to work as closely with their Venezuelan counterparts as is
    permitted by the Venezuelan Government.
        We will continue to support drug interdiction programs throughout
    the region, including programs in Colombia, Peru, Central America, and
    the Caribbean. We will urge those partners to encourage the Venezuelan
    Government to step up its efforts and fulfill regional commitments and
    responsibilities to combat drug trafficking.

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