[Senate Hearing 114-70]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-70
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT
OF U.S. POLICY CHANGES ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN CUBA
AND
U.S. CUBAN RELATIONS_
THE WAY FORWARD
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
February 3, 2015 and May 20, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey \1\
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Lester E. Munson III, Staff Director
Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director
----------
\1\ On April 1, 2015, Senator Menendez temporarily stepped down as
the committee's ranking member; Senator Cardin became ranking member on
April 2, 2015.
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona BARBARA BOXER, California
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
February 3, 2015
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator From California, opening
statement...................................................... 2
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee, opening statement. 4
Jacobson, Hon. Roberta S., Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Responses of Roberta S. Jacobson to questions submitted by
Senator Marco Rubio........................................ 65
Leiva, Miriam, human rights activist and independent journalist,
Havana, Cuba................................................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Malinowski, Hon. Tomasz, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Responses of Tomasz Malinowski to questions submitted by
Senator Marco Rubio........................................ 73
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Morua, Manuel Cuesta, spokesperson for Progressive Arc and
coordinator of New Country, Havana, Cuba....................... 49
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Paya, Rosa Maria, Cuban Christian Liberation Movement and
daughter of slain dissident, Oswaldo Paya Sardinas............. 46
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator From Florida, opening statement.. 1
Soler, Berta, president, Cuban Ladies in White, Cuba............. 53
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Resolution N.6/2013
submitted by Berta Soler, President, Cuban Ladies in White,
Cuba....................................................... 100
Udall, Tom, U.S. Senator From New Mexico, prepared statement..... 29
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
additional material submitted by senator marco rubio
Internet in Cuba Only for the Rich--Or Resourceful, by Alexandre
Grosbois, AFP, Business Insider................................ 74
U.S. Products Help Block Mideast Web, by Paul Sonne and Steve
Steclow, Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2011................... 75
Cuba's $6B Debt to Americans for Seized Properties Hangs Over
U.S. Talks, by Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, FoxNews, January 27, 2015 78
Cuba-U.S. Relations, Neo-Castroism, and Regional
Authoritarianism, by Antonio G. Rodiles........................ 95
(iii)
additional material submitted by senator barbara boxer
Dec. 17: A Day of Triumph for Cuban Americans, op-ed from the
Miami Herald, Dec. 29, 2014.................................... 80
Open Letter to President Obama: Support for a New Course on Cuba,
multiple signers............................................... 82
Letter submitted by the Committee on International Justice and
Peace.......................................................... 85
White House letter regarding White House staff attendance at
committee hearings............................................. 87
Statement submitted by Alan P. Gross, U.S. citizen imprisoned in
Cuba from 2009 until 2014...................................... 94
Letter submitted by Dagoberto Valdes Hernandez, director,
Convivencia magazine........................................... 94
additional material submitted by senator robert menendez
Letter submitted by the State Troopers' Fraternal Association of
New Jersey, Inc................................................ 89
Resolution by the New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of
Police......................................................... 91
Letter submitted by Armando B. Fontoura, Sheriff, Essex County,
New Jersey..................................................... 93
U.S. Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices in
China (2013)................................................... 104
--------------
May 20, 2015
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland, opening
statement...................................................... 148
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee, opening statement. 147
Jacobson, Roberta S., Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC... 151
Prepared statement........................................... 152
Responses of Roberta S. Jacobson and Thomas A. Shannon to
questions submitted by Senator Marco Rubio................. 198
Responses of Roberta S. Jacobson and Thomas A. Shannon to
questions submitted by Senator David Perdue................ 203
Shannon, Hon. Thomas A., Jr., Counselor of The Department, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 154
Prepared statement........................................... 156
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared statement of Senator Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator from
California..................................................... 191
Statement of Alan P. Gross submitted for the record by Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin............................................. 191
Daily Beast Article submitted for the record by Senator Robert
Menendez....................................................... 192
Two letters to Marco Rubio submitted for the record.............. 195
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT
OF U.S. POLICY CHANGES ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN CUBA
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2015
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Transnational Crime, Civilian Security,
Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's
Issues, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Marco Rubio
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Rubio, Corker, Flake, Gardner, Boxer,
Menendez, Udall, Cardin, Kaine, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. This hearing of the Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security,
Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues will come to
order.
Today's hearing is titled ``Understanding the Impact of
U.S. Policy Changes on Human Rights and Democracy in Cuba.''
And I want to begin by welcoming Assistant Secretary of
State for the Western Hemisphere, Roberta Jacobson, and
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, Tom Malinowski. We appreciate your service to our
country and your attendance here today.
I would like to note that the committee invited two other
administration witnesses to appear today, the reported
negotiators of this deal with the Castro government, Mr. Ben
Rhodes and Mr. Ricardo Zuniga from the National Security
Council. Unfortunately, the White House Counsel's Office
informed us that they would not be allowed to testify at this
hearing. And I find this concerning given the fact that these
are the two individuals who the administration put forward in
negotiating the deal, but we will move forward from there.
We have two excellent panels today. The first, of course,
is the official panel that you see seated and ready to go, and
then we are going to hear from a number of human rights
activists, democracy activists on the island of Cuba who will
talk to us about the changes.
Let me preface this by saying that I believe every member
of this committee this morning, as I do the vast majority of
Americans and policymakers, share the goals of democracy and
freedom on the island of Cuba. In fact, the administration, in
announcing this policy, stated that the purpose of this new
policy is to support the Cuban people to freely determine their
own future, to freely determine their political future, and by
that, I take it to mean democracy, which we all share, and also
to freely determine their economic future. I would point out
that a free Cuban people have a right to choose any economic
model they want, although there is one that I would suggest. It
is up to them to choose that future. So this is a goal we all
share.
And the question for us here today, as we review these
policy changes, is how effective will these policy changes be
in bringing about this shared goal. And so today, we are going
to analyze both the process by which this arrangement was
arrived at, and we are also going to talk about how effective
these policies may, or may not, be in achieving the stated
goals.
I think it is no secret and I have publicly stated that I
have deep reservations and in many instances direct opposition
to many of the changes that we are going to review here today
for the simple reason that I believe that they will not be
effective at bringing about the sort of political opening on
the island of Cuba that all of us desire for the Cuban people.
You know, the Cuban people are the only people in this
hemisphere that have not had a free and fair election in the
last decade and a half. They deserve the right to have that
just like any other people do. They are no less deserving of
freedom and democracy than the people of Guatemala, Honduras,
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and a host of other nations, all
of whom at some point over the last decade, have at least once
had the ability to freely choose their leaders. And the notion
that somehow we should be more patient with Cuba than all these
other societies is quite frankly unfair and offensive.
And so the goal of this hearing here today is to understand
these changes, to understand, first of all, how it came about,
what was the process by which they were negotiated, and second,
how effective could these policies be in effectuating the
change that we all want for the island of Cuba.
With that, I recognize the ranking member, Senator Boxer.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this crucial
hearing.
I want to give a warm welcome to our distinguished
witnesses, some of whom have traveled a very long way to be
with us today. I am very pleased to see Miriam Leiva, whom I
first met on a trip to Cuba in 2002.
President Obama's announcement in December that the United
States would begin the process of normalizing relations with
Cuba will have wide-ranging impacts. But today's hearing will
focus specifically on its impact on human rights and democracy
in Cuba. By the way, a very legitimate concern.
For more than 50 years, the United States pursued a
sanctions policy designed to isolate Cuba. The goal was to
undermine the Castro regime and promote human rights and
democratic reform. And I well remember when that policy went
into place, and I did not have gray hair at that time. That is
how long ago it was.
This policy has failed to achieve any of these goals. In
fact, I believe it has done just the opposite. Instead of
isolating Cuba, America has isolated itself--alienating
regional and international partners. For the past 23 years, the
United Nations General Assembly has voted to condemn the United
States unilateral embargo against Cuba. So rather than
undermining the Castro regime, America's embargo has helped the
Castros maintain authoritarian control over Cuba by restricting
the free flow of information and contacts between Americans and
Cuban citizens. And it has given the Castro regime a very
convenient scapegoat for the suffering of the Cuban people. Far
from ushering in democratic change and improved human rights
for Cuba's 11 million citizens, Cuba remains a one-party
Communist state that continues to restrict the most basic
rights of its citizens and targets its opponents using
intimidation, harassment, surveillance, and arbitrary arrest
and detention.
It is long past time to abandon this failed policy of the
past. And that is why I strongly support President Obama's
decision to chart a new course in United States-Cuba relations.
Now, it is important to note that President Obama follows
in a long line of United States leaders who pursued diplomatic
breakthroughs after years of isolation and conflict, whether it
was President Nixon going to China or President Reagan working
toward peace with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev or Senator
McCain and then Senator Kerry working with President Clinton to
normalize relations with Vietnam. These breakthroughs did not
result in immediate change, and even years later, as we speak,
these efforts have not brought an end to repression or
corruption or human rights abuses, but they did provide an
opening, a chance for dialogue and real engagement with the
people of these nations.
So I strongly agree with the President that the best way to
promote American values and ideals and to empower Cuban
citizens, as they work toward a free and democratic Cuba, is
through a policy of engagement, not isolation. And I believe
polls show that the American people agree.
A letter signed by 74 Cuban citizens, including prominent
political prisoners, bloggers, independent journalists,
clerics, and intellectuals in May 2010 underscores this point.
It states that lifting U.S. restrictions would allow Americans
to, ``first, serve as witnesses to the suffering of the Cuban
people; second, be even more sensitized to the need for changes
in Cuba; and third, offer solidarity and a bridge to facilitate
the transition we Cubans so greatly desire.''
Now, I know not everybody in Cuba agrees with that, but
these were 74 Cuban citizens, some of whom are prominent
political prisoners and clerics. Independent journalist
Lilianne Ruiz recently said that, ``This flow of people who are
going to come, along with the increase in the remittances,
means the country's return to normalcy. The Cuban Government is
going to weaken; the only thing left is the repression and the
restrictions. This will make people more accurately identify
the origin of our difficulties.''
So as the United States furthers its engagement with the
Cuban people, we will continue to press leaders in Cuba on
human rights because all Cubans deserve the right to live
without fear of violence or intimidation. That is a right of
all people--all people--not just the people of Cuba, but
certainly the people of Cuba who have been so repressed. And we
will mobilize our regional and international partners in this
effort.
And we know this policy is not going to change Cuba
overnight, but we have spent the past five decades pursuing a
policy that has not worked. I still remember my trip to Cuba in
2002. We would approach people to ask them their views. They
would literally run away from us. They were too afraid to speak
to us. How is our Nation well served by a policy that does not
even allow us to engage with the people we seek to empower?
Now, in closing, I want to leave you with a thought. There
is an old saying: ``The definition of insanity is doing the
same thing, over and over, and expecting a different result.''
Now, I know no one here is insane. We are all quite sane, and
we are all working toward the same thing. And I hope we can
unite around this. We owe it to the Cuban citizens who truly
aspire to see a free and democratic Cuba to give this new
policy a chance.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
We are joined today by both the chairman and the ranking
member of the full Foreign Relations Committee. I wanted to
recognize them for any comments they might have.
Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. I just want to thank the leadership of this
committee, the chairman and ranking member. I know that we
expect the subcommittee leadership, which we have outstanding
leadership on all of our subcommittees, to have robust
hearings, which you are doing today. I thank you for the way
you framed this. I know there are a lot of divergent views on
what has happened relative to the administration's changes in
policy on Cuba. And I hope that through these hearings we will
converge on a policy that is good for America.
Thank you for your leadership.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding the hearing along with the ranking member, and thank
you for this opportunity on an issue that I have followed for
some time.
Let me be as clear today on this issue as I was in December
that 18 months of secret negotiations produced a bad deal, a
bad deal for the Cuban people while it may have been done with
the best of intentions, in my view with compromised bedrock
principles for virtually no concessions.
And I would just say I do not want to relive 50 years of
engagement with China that has brought us forced abortions,
prison camp labor, one-child policy, ethnic cleansing in Tibet,
exile of the Dalai Lama, and most recently repression in Hong
Kong's democracy, as well as arrests of human rights activists
and political dissidents--50 years of those engagements. Maybe
we can say that we are doing business with China, but we cannot
really hold up democracy and human rights as a great success
story of that engagement. If that is what we hope for the Cuban
people, then it is a sad day.
At the end of the day, 53 political prisoners were released
while so many more remain in jail. And the Cuban people, who
have suffered most under the regime, still have zero guarantees
for any basic freedoms.
I am also concerned that the 53 prisoners were not released
unconditionally and continue to force legal hurdles, and that
several of them have been rearrested, including Marcelino Abreu
Bonora, who was violently beaten by Cuban security the day
after Christmas and detained for 2 weeks.
I am concerned that the President announced that the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations
would be granted access in Cuba. Yet, we know from the State
Department briefings that they will be allowed to travel to
Havana but only to discuss prison conditions with regime
officials and will not be given access to Cuban jails or Cuban
prisoners, which does nothing to improve human rights
conditions in Cuba.
I am concerned that there was not one substantial step
toward transparent democratic elections, improved human rights,
freedom of assembly, or the ability to form independent
political parties and independent trade unions. Ironically just
2 weeks after the announcement, the regime arrested more than
50 people who tried to speak about the hopes for the future of
their country. That is all they tried to do.
The deal achieved nothing for Americans whose family
members have been victims of the Castro regime's crimes and
terrorism or for the thousands of United States citizens that
hold over $6 billion in claims for properties and businesses
confiscated by the Castros or the Americans that are still
waiting for Cuba to settle the $2 billion in judgments rendered
by United States courts against the Castro regime.
I am concerned that we released a Cuban spy convicted of
conspiracy to commit murder. He gets to go back to Cuba, and we
get no movement on the dozens of United States fugitives living
under asylum in Cuba, including Joanne Chesimard who is still
on the FBI's list of most wanted terrorists for killing a New
Jersey State trooper. Why was her return not part of the deal?
And I am concerned that on December 17 of this past year,
in an article in Politico, Congressman James McGovern said that
Raul Castro admitted to giving the order to shoot down two
private airplanes with U.S. citizens on board in 1996. Quote.
``He said, `I gave the order.' Castro said, `I'm the one
responsible.' And yet, this is who we are negotiating with.''
And now Raul Castro is demanding the return of Guantanamo,
a full list of U.S. concessions, including compensation for the
impact of the embargo, eliminating our democracy programs, at
least in today's press accounts that I was reading. And he
concedes nothing.
So how much more are we willing to give? How much more are
we willing to do to help the Castro regime fill the coffers of
its military monopolies while the Cuban people still struggle
to make ends meet.
And that is why, among many other reasons, Mr. Chairman, I
think this is a bad deal.
And I ask unanimous consent that the rest of my statement
be included in the record.
Senator Rubio. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Menendez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Robert Menendez
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. Let me be as
clear on this issue as I have been since December--18 months of secret
negotiations produced a bad deal, bad for the Cuban people. While it
may have been done with the best of intentions, in my view, we've
compromised bedrock principles for minimal concessions.
At the end of the day, 53 political prisoners were released while
so many more remain in jail, and the Cuban people--those who suffered
most under the regime--still have zero guarantees for any basic
freedoms.
I'm also concerned that the 53 prisoners were not released
unconditionally and continue to face legal hurdles and that several of
them have been re-arrested including Marcelino Abreu Bonora who was
violently beaten by Cuban Security the day after Christmas and detained
for two weeks.
I'm concerned that the President announced that the International
Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations would be granted
increased access in Cuba. Yet, we know from the State Department
briefings that they will be allowed to travel to Havana, but only to
discuss prison conditions with regime officials, and won't be given
access to Cuban jails or Cuban prisoners, which does nothing to improve
human rights conditions in Cuba.
I'm concerned that there was not one substantial step toward
transparent democratic elections, improved human rights, freedom of
assembly, or the ability to form independent political parties and
independent trade unions... Ironically, just two weeks after the
announcement, the regime arrested more than 50 people who tried to
speak about the hopes for the future of their country.
The deal achieved nothing for the Americans whose family members
have been victims of the Castro regime's crimes and terrorism. Or for
the thousands of U.S. citizens that hold over $6 billion in claims for
properties and businesses confiscated by the Castros. Or the Americans
that are still waiting for Cuba to settle the $2 billion in judgments
rendered by U.S. courts against the Castro regime.
I'm concerned that we released a Cuban spy convicted of conspiracy
to commit murder. He gets to go back to Cuba, and we can get no
movement on the dozens of U.S. fugitives living under asylum in Cuba,
including Joanne Chesimard, who is still on the FBI's list of Most
Wanted Terrorists. Why was her return not part of the deal?
And I'm concerned that--in a December 17, 2014 article in
Politico--Congressman James McGovern said that Raul Castro admitted to
giving the order to shoot down two private airplanes in 1996. ``I gave
the order,'' Castro said. ``I'm the one responsible.'' This is who we
are negotiating with.
And now Raul Castro is demanding the return of Guantanamo and a
full list of U.S concessions including compensation for the impact of
the embargo; and yet, he will concede nothing. How much more are we
willing to give? How much more are we willing to do to help the Castro
regime fill the coffers of its military monopolies while the Cuban
people still struggle to make ends meet?
It was a bad deal, and I will oppose any further changes to U.S.
policy, any additional sanctions relief, that are not conditioned on
clear, upfront concessions from the Castro regime that moves the Cuban
people toward a free and open democratic government.
And, Mr. Chairman, on a personal note, I'm amazed when people say:
``Senator, you seem so `passionate' about Cuba.'' Yes, I am passionate.
I will always be passionate, but no more passionate than many Irish are
passionate about Northern Ireland, no more passionate than Armenians
who care about the genocide in Armenia, no more passionate than Jewish-
Americans about the preservation of the state of Israel. Yes, I am
passionate about Cuba, and I will remain passionate until the Cuban
people are free.
I will insist that there be no concessions to the Castro regime
that do not bring human rights, freedom of assembly, and transparent
democratic elections to the people of Cuba.
Finally, I would note that a deal like this is what can happen when
members of Congress are notified about the administration's policy
decisions, rather than consulted as part of a process. I find it
incredibly disconcerting that President Obama made his announcement on
December 17th, and I still have not been granted a private discussion
with the White House negotiating team, despite weeks of requests.
With that, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
subcommittee hearing. I look forward to hearing our witnesses' views on
exactly what additional freedoms the people of Cuba hope to enjoy with
the administration's new Cuba policy.
Senator Rubio. Okay, we are ready to move to our testimony.
And with that, I recognize Secretary Jacobson. Your full
statement is in the record, and we would ask if you could keep
the statement to about 5 minutes or so so we can get into the
questioning. Thank you for being here today.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERTA S. JACOBSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Boxer, and members of the committee for the opportunity to
testify today on the new approach to the United States-Cuba
policy.
I appreciate your engagement on issues related to Cuba and
to the Western Hemisphere, and I know your strong commitment to
democratic values, human rights, and expanding social and
economic opportunity in the Americas.
I also want to thank this committee for its assistance in
welcoming the long overdue return of Alan Gross to his family.
Mr. Gross' 5 long years of detention--during that time, the
administration worked closely with many Members of Congress
from both Chambers and both parties to secure his release. As
the President and the Secretary have said, we are also grateful
for the essential roles of Canada, Pope Francis, and the
Vatican in reaching an agreement that made Mr. Gross' freedom
possible.
On December 17, the President announced the new policy
toward Cuba. Our previous approach to relations with Cuba over
a half a century, though rooted in the best of intentions,
failed to empower the Cuban people. Instead, it isolated us
from democratic partners in this hemisphere and around the
world and was used by the Cuban Government as an excuse for
restrictions on its citizens. As a result, those most deprived
were the Cuban people.
The President's initiative looks forward, and it is
designed to promote changes that support universal human rights
and fundamental freedoms for every Cuban. We also seek to
promote our other national interests. These steps emphasize the
value of people-to-people contact and very specific forms of
increased commerce. We are already seeing indications that our
updated approach gives us a greater ability to engage other
nations in the hemisphere and around the world in promoting
respect for fundamental freedoms in Cuba.
From the beginning of this administration, we have sought
to support the Cuban people in freely determining their own
future, their own political and their own economic future,
because ultimately it will be the Cuban people themselves who
drive political and economic reforms. That is why we lifted
restrictions to make it easier for Cuban Americans to travel
and send remittances to their families in Cuba and opened new
pathways for academic, religious, and people-to-people
exchanges. And these changes created powerful new connections
between our two countries. Our new steps build on this
foundation by increasing authorized travel and commerce and the
flow of information to, from, and within Cuba. The regulatory
changes will increase the financial resources to support the
Cuban people and the emerging Cuban private sector. They will
also enable United States companies to expand
telecommunications and Internet access into Cuba. United States
policy will no longer be a barrier to connectivity in Cuba.
Two weeks ago, I made a historic trip to Cuba, one that
helped me understand the burden and hope embodied in this
policy when average Cubans and Cuba Americans wished me luck or
said God bless you and encouraged our efforts. During talks, we
were clear that our governments have both shared interests and
sharp differences. On practical issues such as establishing
direct mail, counternarcotics cooperation, and oil spill
mitigation, among others, we agreed to continue dialogue and
increase cooperation.
But this administration is under no illusions about the
nature of the Cuban Government. I also raised with our Cuban
interlocutors our concerns about its harassment, use of
violence, and arbitrary detention of Cuban citizens peacefully
expressing their views. I met with dissidents, entrepreneurs,
and independent media voices to talk about what they need from
their government and what they need from us.
I raised several elements that presently inhibit the work
of our U.S. interest section, including travel restrictions on
our diplomats, limits on staffing and local access to the
mission, and problems receiving shipments. The successful
resolution of these issues will enable the future U.S. Embassy
to provide services commensurate with our other diplomatic
missions around the world.
Having just seen our diplomats in Havana in action, I hope
you will not object if I take this opportunity to salute their
tireless work to advance U.S. interests on the island. These
dedicated public servants have done their jobs under often
difficult circumstances.
We have only just begun the official talks on normalizing
relations, which will take considerably longer than this first
step of the reestablishment of relations. But even while we do
so, we will continue to encourage our allies to take every
public and private opportunity to support respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba, and I encourage
Members visiting Cuba to expand their engagement with the
independent voices in Cuban civil society and to engage
effectively on human rights and democracy.
We know there is a diversity of views in the Congress on
this issue, and we hope we can work together to find common
ground toward our shared goal of enabling the Cuban people to
determine their own future.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roberta S. Jacobson
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, and members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today on our new approach to
U.S.-Cuba policy. I know many of you have a deep interest in U.S.
policy toward Cuba and have closely followed the President's
announcement on December 17 and subsequent events, including my
meetings in Havana 2 weeks ago. I appreciate the committee's engagement
on issues related to Cuba and the Western Hemisphere and applaud your
strong commitment to democratic values, human rights, and expanding
social and economic opportunity in the Americas.
I also want to thank the committee for its assistance in welcoming
the long-overdue return of Alan Gross to his family. During Mr. Gross'
5 long years of detention, the administration worked closely with many
Members of Congress--from both Chambers and from both parties--to
secure his release. As the President and the Secretary have said, we
are also grateful for the essential roles of Canada, Pope Francis, and
the Vatican in reaching an agreement that made Mr. Gross' freedom
possible.
Our previous approach to relations with Cuba over a half century,
though rooted in the best of intentions, failed to empower the Cuban
people and isolated us from our democratic partners in this hemisphere
and around the world. Additionally, the Cuban Government has used this
policy as a rationale for restrictions on its people. As a result,
unfortunately and unintentionally, those most deprived were the Cuban
people.
The President's initiatives look forward and are designed to
promote changes that support universal human rights and fundamental
freedoms for every Cuban, as well as changes that promote our other
national interests. They emphasize the value of people-to-people
contact and very specific forms of increased commerce. We are already
seeing indications that our updated approach gives us a greater ability
to engage other nations in the hemisphere and around the world in
promoting respect for fundamental freedoms in Cuba. It has also drawn
considerably greater attention to the actions and policies of the Cuban
Government.
From the beginning of this administration, our approach has been to
implement policies toward Cuba that support the Cuban people in freely
determining their own future--their own political and economic future.
Because ultimately, it will be the Cuban people themselves who drive
political and economic reforms. That is why we lifted restrictions to
make it easier for Cuban Americans to travel and send remittances to
their families in Cuba, and opened new pathways for academic,
religious, and people-to-people exchanges. These changes created
powerful new connections between our two countries. The steps we are
implementing now build on this foundation by increasing travel,
authorized commerce, and the flow of information to, from, and within
Cuba. The regulatory changes we announced will increase the financial
resources to support the Cuban people and the emerging Cuban private
sector. They also enable U.S. companies to expand telecommunications
and Internet access within Cuba. U.S. policy will no longer be a
barrier to connectivity in Cuba.
This administration is under no illusions about the continued
barriers to internationally recognized freedoms that remain for the
Cuban people, nor are we under illusions about the nature of the Cuban
Government. When we sat down with our counterparts in Havana, we were
clear that our governments have both shared interests and sharp
differences. From mail service to counter narcotics to oil spill
mitigation, we owe our people a diplomatic relationship that allows an
effective pursuit of their interests. On these types of practical
issues, we agreed to continue dialogue and increase cooperation. At the
same time, I raised with the Cuban Government our concerns about its
harassment, use of violence, and arbitrary detention of Cuban citizens
peacefully expressing their views. I met with dissidents,
entrepreneurs, and independent media voices to talk about what they
need from their government and from us.
I talked with my Cuban counterpart about several elements that
presently inhibit the work of our U.S. Interests Section, including
travel restrictions on our diplomats, limits on staffing and local
access to the mission, and problems receiving timely shipments to the
mission. The successful resolution of these issues will enable a future
U.S. Embassy to provide services commensurate with our other diplomatic
missions around the world and on a par with the many foreign diplomatic
missions in Cuba. We began a useful discussion and intend to meet again
this month.
Having just seen our U.S. diplomats in Havana in action, I would
like to take this opportunity to salute their tireless work to advance
U.S. interests on the island by conducting educational and cultural
diplomacy, monitoring significant political and economic developments,
and promoting respect for democracy and human rights, including
engaging with Cuba's independent civil society. These dedicated public
servants have done their jobs under often very difficult circumstances.
Our diplomats unite families through our immigration processing,
provide American citizen services, and issue visas for qualified
visitors to the United States. Our Refugee Processing Center provides
assistance to victims of political repression. Our public diplomacy
officers work in partnership with a range of journalists, including
those from civil society, and provide hundreds of Cubans each week with
uncensored Internet access through our three Information Resource
Centers. Our consular officers issue tens of thousands of travel
documents annually to Cubans traveling to the United States for the
purposes of emigrating or visiting friends and family. These efforts
will continue and expand once we establish diplomatic relations with
Cuba.
We have only begun the official talks on normalizing relations--
which will take considerably longer than the first step, which is the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations. But even while we do so, we
will continue, both directly and through diplomatic channels, to
encourage our allies to take every public and private opportunity to
support increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in
Cuba. We will continue to use funds appropriated by Congress to support
the exercise of political and civil liberties in Cuba, facilitate the
free flow of information, and provide humanitarian assistance. We also
look forward to increased engagement to empower the Cuban people
through authorized contact with Members of Congress, U.S. Government
officials, and American travelers. We encourage Members visiting Cuba
to expand their engagement with the independent voices in Cuban civil
society and, whenever possible, to engage effectively on human rights
and democracy with the Cuban Government.
We will continue our discussions with our oversight and
appropriations committees as we move toward a new relationship. We
appreciate that there is a diversity of views in the U.S. Congress on
the new direction toward Cuba. However, we hope that we can also work
together to find common ground toward our shared goal of enabling the
Cuban people to freely determine their own future.
We appreciate your attention to these important issues. Thank you
and I welcome your questions.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Secretary Malinowski.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOMASZ MALINOWSKI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Boxer, members, for having us today.
It is plain from the debate that we are having that people
who care passionately about the cause of freedom in Cuba can
disagree, sometimes passionately, about the best way to advance
it. I have been working on this cause for many years myself,
and I believe with all my heart that the President made the
right decision. I have also listened with great respect and
care to those who disagree, and I certainly do not dismiss
their concerns.
I want to start, though, by making a few points on which I
hope we all do agree.
First of all, all of us agree that human rights and the
empowerment of the Cuban people must be the bedrock of our new
policy toward Cuba, and it will be. As to how we will take our
cues from the Cuban people, supporting their vision for Cuba's
future, Secretary Kerry has explicitly said that we endorse the
objectives that Cuban civil society groups have rallied around.
Second, I trust we all agree that the most immediate result
of this new policy, the release of 53 activists who are now
back with their families, able to continue their brave work, is
a good thing. The released men and women include virtually
everybody known to my Bureau for having been prosecuted in Cuba
for the peaceful exercise of their political views. And I can
assure you that we will spare absolutely no effort to ensure
that everybody in this category is free in Cuba, not just from
prison but from harassment, threats, and restrictions.
Third, we all agree that the release of these prisoners
does not change the fundamental nature of a state that tries to
stifle everything it does not control. We have no illusions
about the current leadership's desire to keep things just as
they are, and we fully agree that none of this, neither Cuba's
repression, nor its poverty, nor its isolation is the fault of
the United States or of the embargo. The responsibility lies
with the Cuban Government. Period.
At the same time, after 50 years of experience with the
embargo, we have to face the hard truth that it has not
weakened the repressive apparatus of the Castro government or
strengthened Cuban civil society. The dominant feature of life
in Cuba these last 50 years has been the complete absence of
change and of hope day after day, year after year.
I say this as someone who often supports economic
sanctions, and I totally agree with you, Senator Rubio, when
you say that no country ever became a democracy simply because
of trade or tourists.
At the same time, we have all seen how the Castro
government has succeeded around the world in making our embargo
a bigger issue than its own repression, making it extremely
hard to mobilize international pressure for human rights on the
island. To its own people, the government has justified Cuba's
isolation and poverty as a product of American hostility. These
were terrible excuses. They justified nothing. But we have to
acknowledge that this has worked for the Castros over the
years.
What has changed is that it is not going to work anymore.
Every country knows now that the United States is not the
obstacle to Cuba's integration or prosperity. Every citizen of
Cuba knows that the United States is willing to have normal
relations with their country, help them connect with the world.
These steps have raised the Cuban people's expectations and
shifted the burden for meeting those expectations to the Cuban
state.
The state can now respond in one of two ways. It can begin
the reforms needed for its people to benefit from this opening
to the United States, in which case the Cuban people will be
less dependent on their government and have more power to shape
their future, or it can keep resisting those reforms, in which
case everyone will know who is to blame.
So that is the opportunity. We now have to work together to
try to seize it by getting more information to the Cuban
people, more resources, by urging other countries to join us in
pressing the Cuban Government on human rights and democracy. I
was in Bolivia a couple of weeks ago for the inauguration of
the new President there, but I went for the express purpose
also of meeting with leaders and Foreign Ministers from
throughout the hemisphere to urge them to do just that.
We are working to ensure that civil society from Cuba can
engage with governments at the Summit of the Americas in
Panama. The Cuban Government has also proposed government-to-
government talks on human rights, and I will lead our
delegation to that effort. And we will continue our programs
that promote the realization of human rights in Cuba just as we
do in scores of other countries around the world.
Now, look, none of us can say what will happen next. Some
of Cuba's bravest dissidents, people who we profoundly respect
for their sacrifices, believe little good is likely to come
from these changes. Others who have sacrificed for the cause of
democracy believe just as strongly that we have done the right
thing. There are different views because the future is
uncertain.
But I will close by suggesting that this uncertainty after
decades of absolute depressing certainty that nothing can
change in Cuba carries with it a sense of possibility. Our task
is to seize that opportunity and to realize that possibility.
And I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to working with you and
other members to do that in the coming months. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Malinowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tom P. Malinowski
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today, and to share my thoughts
about how we can best stand up for the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of the Cuban people.
It is plain from the debate that followed the President's
announcement of our new policy that people who feel passionately about
freedom for the Cuban people can disagree passionately about how best
to advance it. I have long been committed to this cause, and I believe
with all my heart that the President chose the right course. I have
listened with great care and respect to those who disagree, and while I
will try to address their concerns today, I want to be clear that I do
not dismiss them.
I want to start by making a few points on which I hope we all
agree.
First, the promotion of universal human rights and the empowerment
of all Cubans must be the bedrock of our policy toward Cuba. President
Obama has made clear that it will be. And here, we will take our cues
from the Cuban people, supporting their vision for Cuba's future. As
Secretary Kerry has said, we support the key points around which Cuban
civil society groups have rallied:
Cuban ratification and compliance with various U.N. human
rights treaties;
Recognition of independent civil society;
Implementation of constitutional and legal reforms to ensure
full respect for labor rights, freedoms of expression,
association, peaceful assembly, and expression, and to allow
for free elections;
Release of prisoners arrested for political reasons; and
An end to government-sponsored harassment of independent
civil society.
Second, the most immediate result of this policy shift--the release
from prison of 53 activists who are now back with their families and
able to continue their brave work--is unambiguously a good thing. The
released men and women included all Cubans designated by Amnesty
International as ``prisoners of conscience,'' and many known to my
Bureau to have been prosecuted for peaceful expression, association,
and assembly in Cuba. Among them is independent rapper ``El Critico,''
arrested after a government-organized counterprotest retaliated against
him for painting antigovernment messages on his home and distributing
pro-democracy pamphlets; Ivan Fernandez Depestre, arrested for the
absurd offense of ``precriminal dangerousness,'' a label the government
uses to detain people in anticipation of crimes that supposedly are yet
to be committed; and Sonia Garro, who can march again on Sundays with
her fellow Ladies in White. We will spare no effort to ensure that
everyone still detained for simply exercising their rights to freedom
of expression, association, or peaceful assembly is free, not just from
prison but from harassment, threats and restrictions on their movement
and their work.
Third, we agree that the release of these political prisoners does
not of itself change anything in Cuba. Cuba remains a one-party state
that tries to stifle virtually all political, cultural, and economic
activity that it does not control. The government continues to crack
down on everything from art performances in Havana squares, to
independent meetings by civil society out in the provinces. It
continues to employ short-term detentions--at times with violence--to
disrupt free expression and peaceful assembly, and has used this tactic
since President Obama's announcement, including against recently
released political prisoners. No one should have any illusions about
the nature of this system, or about the determination of the current
leadership to keep things just as they are for as long as possible.
And let's be clear: none of this, Cuba's repression, its poverty,
its isolation, is the fault of the United States or of the embargo. The
responsibility lies with the Cuban Government, period.
At the same time, after 50 years of experience with the embargo, we
have to face the hard truth that it has not weakened the repressive
apparatus of the Castro government. It has not strengthened Cuba's
civil society. It has not given us the leverage we need to press for
change, or the Cuban people the hope they crave. The Castro government
has been happy in its isolation. The Cuban people have not.
I say this as someone who often supports economic sanctions to
leverage progress for human rights. I completely agree with Senator
Rubio that no country ever became a democracy simply because of trade
and tourists.
At the same time, over many years of working on this issue, I have
seen how the Castro government has turned our policy against us, and
how this has helped an authoritarian form of government survive so
close to our shores long after walls of repression from Berlin to
Moscow to our own hemisphere came tumbling down.
For decades, in capitals around the world, the Cuban Government has
succeeded in making our embargo and its isolation from the United
States a bigger issue than its own repression, making it difficult to
mobilize international pressure to improve respect for human rights on
the island. To its own people, the government has justified Cuba's
isolation, poverty and lack of democracy as being a result of American
hostility. These were bad excuses; they justified none of what the
Cuban people have suffered all these years. But we have to acknowledge
that, over the years, shifting the blame to America has worked for the
Castro government.
It is not going to work any more.
Now, every country in Latin America and the Caribbean, and indeed
around the world, knows that the United States is not the obstacle to
Cuba's integration with the hemisphere and its prospects for economic
development. Cuban policies are the obstacle. Now every citizen of Cuba
knows that the United States is willing to have improved relations with
their country, to support private business on the island, and to help
connect them to the world. These steps have raised the Cuban people's
expectations, and shifted the burden of meeting those expectations back
upon the Cuban state.
The Cuban Government can respond in one of two ways. It can begin
the reforms needed for its people to benefit from the opening to the
United States--by allowing greater Internet access, for example, and
easing restrictions on private businesses, on travel, and on civil
society--in which case the Cuban people will be less dependent on their
government and will have more power to shape their future. This is what
we hope will happen. Or it can keep resisting those reforms, in which
case it will further lose domestic and international legitimacy,
because Cubans and others in the international community will know
exactly who is to blame for their country's problems.
Critics of our new policy have argued that we gave away leverage by
easing restrictions on engagement with Cuba without demanding
democratic reforms up front. But the Cuban Government did not ask for
and is not necessarily eager for us to take the steps the President
announced, which involve efforts to get more information and resources
to Cuban civil society and private citizens, and greater access to Cuba
and its people for our diplomats. It should go without saying that the
Cuban Government wasn't going to stop repressing its people in exchange
for Americans connecting its people to the Internet. These steps were
not tradable commodities, but actions we took in our own interest, to
help ordinary Cubans, and to shift the attention of the world to the
embargo that matters--the one the Cuban Government has imposed on its
own people.
Our new policy has opened these new opportunities to engage with
the Cuban people; we will now work energetically to seize them and to
advance them. In doing so, we will continue to consult with independent
Cuban civil society to hear their views and plans for the future
activities. And we will urge other countries to join us in pressing the
Cuban Government on human rights and democracy.
We have reengaged nations throughout our hemisphere on the
importance of supporting genuine progress on human rights and
democratic principles in Cuba as a means to advance meaningful and
principled regional integration. Last week, I attended the inauguration
of Bolivian President Morales where I had the opportunity to meet with
leaders and Foreign Ministers from throughout the hemisphere to stress
the importance of ensuring we speak with a united voice on Cuba. The
common reaction was that we had taken a giant step for the hemisphere
and that the time had come to encourage Cuba to do its part.
We are also working with our friends in the region, and directly
with the Government of Panama, to ensure that independent civil
society, including independent voices from Cuba, can engage
meaningfully with governments at the coming Summit of the Americas. I
hope to be at the summit and meet with Cuban civil society, as well as
other civil society representatives, particularly those who find
themselves threatened by repressive governments.
We are also deepening our engagement with Europe to encourage
partners there to push for advances in human rights and democratic
principles with their Cuban counterparts. We have engaged with European
delegations here, and I plan to travel to Europe personally to further
these discussions. As you know, efforts by the Vatican were critical to
the successful negotiation that secured the release of Alan Gross and
of the 53 imprisoned Cuban activists, and we will continue to work with
the Vatican to encourage the Cuban Government to follow through on its
other commitments. We will also encourage the EU to press for concrete
improvements in human rights in their discussions with Havana and to
support the agenda of independent civil society on the island. No
government--neither that of the Castros nor those of third countries--
can credibly make the case that pushing the Cuban Government to respect
universal human rights is taking sides in a dispute between Cuba and
the United States.
We are also looking for new and innovative ways to responsibly
support the emergence of a Cuban private sector as a critical component
of civil society. We also envision a role for Latin American and
European countries to create links between private small businesses in
Cuba and the small businesses in their regions.
Cubans are also entitled to access uncensored information,
including through the Internet. As Assistant Secretary Jacobson noted,
the administration's regulatory changes will help U.S. and
international telecommunications companies provide Internet service to
the island. These regulatory changes respond directly to requests made
to the administration by civil society to facilitate greater access to
telecommunications equipment on the island. The Castro government can
no longer argue that its failure to provide Internet access to all
Cuban citizens is somehow the responsibility of the United States. And
we hope Latin American and European companies can cooperate in our
efforts to promote the free flow of information to, from, and within
the island.
We are also asking other countries to encourage the Cuban
Government to allow greater access by the United Nations and other
international organizations. These actors will provide much-needed
transparency and are widely seen as credible, objective observers.
Cuban dissidents have emphasized the important role that the United
Nations can play in advancing human rights in Cuba, and we will use the
new opportunities presented by our Cuba policy to mobilize others in
the U.N. and other multilateral fora in support.
The Cuban Government has proposed bilateral talks on human rights,
and I look forward to leading the U.S. team to these talks. Our
objective in such talks will be to develop an agenda of specific
reforms that will bring about concrete improvements in compliance with
applicable international human rights obligations and commitments. The
Cuban side will of course raise its usual allegations about problems in
the United States, and I will be proud to defend our record. But we are
not interested in an abstract debate; we will continue such talks only
if they chart a course for concrete progress on human rights and
democratic principles in Cuba. And we will insist that the most
important dialogue the Cuban Government should have on human rights is
with its own people.
President Obama has also made it clear that the U.S. Government
will continue programs that promote the realization of human rights and
fundamental freedoms such as freedoms of peaceful expression,
association, and assembly in Cuba, just as we do in 95 countries around
the world. These programs are a fundamental part of our human rights
policy and national security interests around the world. The Cuban
Government may continue to object to these efforts, and to try to crack
down on those involved with their implementation. But it will find it
harder to treat contacts with the U.S. Government and with
international NGOs as criminal when Cubans see their own leaders
engaging in diplomatic relations with us. In any case, we will continue
to manage our programs in Cuba with appropriate discretion to protect
human rights activists from further reprisal, even as we ask the Cuban
Government to stop punishing its citizens for activities considered a
normal part of life in most other countries. We greatly value the input
and coordination of this committee on our programs and we look forward
to further conversations.
Of course, none of this will be easy. If I am right, and our new
policy succeeds in empowering the Cuban people to shape their political
destiny, then the Cuban Government may respond by cracking down harder
in the short run but the Cuban people will have the best opportunity in
more than half a century to freely determine their own future in the
long run.
None of us can say what will happen next. Some of Cuba's bravest
dissidents--voices we profoundly respect--believe that we've made a
mistake and that nothing good is likely to come from these changes. I
hope critics of our policy will acknowledge that others in Cuba who
have sacrificed for the cause of democracy believe just as strongly
that we have done the right thing. There are many different views on
this question, because the future is uncertain.
I'll close by suggesting that this sudden uncertainty, after
decades of absolute, depressing certainty that nothing can change,
constitutes progress. It carries with it a sense of possibility; an
opportunity for debate. This is what most of the Cubans we've heard
from in recent days are saying; they don't know if the changes we've
announced will bring better days or not, but they feel that something
better is at least possible now.
Reinaldo Escobar, a journalist who began his career writing for
official Cuban Government media and now writes for the independent
Cuban news outlet 14ymedio, summed up this feeling in an essay he
titled ``A New Dawn.''
``The entire world,'' he wrote, ``now has its eyes set on the
government of Cuba . . . They know it and will have to choose between
loosening the repression or letting the world down. I am betting that
they will let the world down, but I am hoping to lose the bet. All the
signs and accumulated experience clearly say that this is only a new
maneuver to win some time and to allow them to get away with their
schemes, but this is also an unprecedented move and things can always
turn out differently. The most important thing is that the domino game
has been shaken up and it is time to move the pieces.''
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, having shaken up the game,
we have a chance now to help things turn out differently for the Cuban
people. I hope we can work together to seize that chance.
Senator Rubio. Thank you both for your testimony.
We will begin now the first round of questions. My hope is
to get at least two rounds in. We are going to go 5-minute
segments on questions, and we will go by seniority on the
committee--or 7 minutes I guess; 7 minutes. So let me begin.
Secretary Jacobson, when did you first learn about these
negotiations with regards to a change of policy toward Cuba?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, I knew throughout the period that there
were efforts underway to secure the release of Alan Gross.
Senator Rubio. When did you know about the policy changes
being negotiated?
Ms. Jacobson. I knew about the policy changes that
accompanied that effort some weeks--probably about a couple of
months before they were announced.
Senator Rubio. In the 2 months that you knew about it, were
you involved in the negotiations?
Ms. Jacobson. I was not.
Senator Rubio. Was anybody in the State Department involved
in the negotiations?
Ms. Jacobson. I cannot speak for the Secretary of State. I
know that no one in my Bureau was involved.
Senator Rubio. Who were the lead negotiators for the United
States?
Ms. Jacobson. To the best of my knowledge, they were the
NSC personnel that you mentioned at the beginning of the
hearing.
Senator Rubio. And who were the lead negotiators for the
Cuban Government? Were they diplomats or members of the
military or intelligence?
Ms. Jacobson. I do not know that.
Senator Rubio. Were you consulted or regularly briefed by
the negotiators for your input on the policy changes?
Ms. Jacobson. What I can say is that when we were talking
about securing the release of Alan Gross, the State Department
was in the lead on that part of the Gross detention. We were in
the lead on the conditions of confinement. We were in the lead
in contacting his family and working with his family.
Senator Rubio. But what about the policy changes?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, there had been a process of looking at
potential policy changes with Cuba that had been going on
throughout the administration that had brought many agencies
together. Much of that discussion was the basis for the
conversation.
Senator Rubio. But as the negotiations were ongoing with
the two individuals that I have identified, who are not here
today, were you personally contacted? As the person who is now
in charge of making this come about, were you involved in
interaction with the negotiators giving them input and advice
during the last 2 months?
Ms. Jacobson. In the last 2 months, as we were preparing
for--on the policy changes, I was not. As we were preparing to
implement the effect of those changes, I was.
Senator Rubio. So it is fair to say that this negotiation
occurred through NSC personnel. The State Department was not in
charge or involved--unless the Secretary of State was--in
providing advice and counsel on negotiating the policy changes.
Ms. Jacobson. To the best of my knowledge, most of the
preparation on the policy changes had been done through the
policy committee that was an interagency policy committee prior
to those negotiations, but during that process, we were not.
Senator Rubio. Now, Secretary Malinowski, when did you
learn about these negotiations on the policy changes?
Mr. Malinowski. Like Assistant Secretary Jacobson, I was
aware that there were discussions with respect to Alan Gross,
but in terms of the policy changes----
Senator Rubio. Did the negotiators reach out to you as
someone in charge of the human rights portfolio for the State
Department for a suggestion on who should be on the list of the
53 political prisoners?
Mr. Malinowski. We were involved in every conversation
interagency about political prisoners in Cuba about who----
Senator Rubio. But were you consulted about how the 53 or
what the list should be and who should be----
Mr. Malinowski. The list was based on inputs that were
provided over time by Cuban civil society organizations.
Senator Rubio. Were you consulted?
Mr. Malinowski. Not personally, but I can tell you that
they asked for exactly the right people to be released.
Senator Rubio. Which civil society groups in Cuba or
opposition figures were consulted, to the best of your
knowledge, about the list?
Mr. Malinowski. There are a number of Cuban civil society
organizations, Senator, as you know, who document who is in
prison in Cuba for the peaceful exercise of their political
views. All of those lists from a variety of human rights
organizations were consulted and incorporated, and the list was
exactly the right list.
Senator Rubio. So the administration, during these
negotiations, consulted with civil society in Cuba about who
should be on the list?
Mr. Malinowski. We have been consulting as an
administration for years with Cuban civil society and human
rights groups.
Senator Rubio. But specifically with regards to these
negotiations, were groups within Cuba consulted and asked who
should be the people that are on the list, who should we
prioritize, what is the status of each individual on the list?
Mr. Malinowski. Not specifically with respect to the
negotiations, which as we all know----
Senator Rubio. Just in general.
Mr. Malinowski. But in general we based our knowledge of
who is in prison in Cuba on their work.
Senator Rubio. Secretary Jacobson, that takes me back to
another question. Which civil society groups in Cuba were in
the loop, so to speak, consulted during the process of this
negotiation? I know you were not involved, but subsequently you
have talked to some of them. Which groups within Cuba, which
pro-democracy groups within Cuba were aware of these
negotiations and consulted about the subject matter of the
negotiations during the negotiations?
Ms. Jacobson. I think you would probably have to ask some
of those groups, but to the best of my knowledge, we continued
to consult with those groups throughout that period through our
interest section and through Tom and my work in the Bureau, as
we always consult with them. But as part of the negotiations, I
do not know that any were specifically consulted. The input
that we get through our interest section and through our own
work was certainly known to the negotiators.
Senator Rubio. Okay. Let us talk about something you are
involved in negotiating now. You traveled to Havana last week--
the week before. The lead negotiator for the Cubans is an
individual by the name of Josefina Vidal. Correct? You have
interacted with her in the past.
Ms. Jacobson. Yes.
Senator Rubio. Do you find her to be, as you said, a
serious person?
Ms. Jacobson. Yes.
Senator Rubio. So when she speaks, you take what she says
with some level of authority and seriousness. I mean, she
obviously has some level of authority from the government to be
at that table and speak on their behalf.
Ms. Jacobson. Yes.
Senator Rubio. I wanted to ask you about yesterday. She has
a statement. It says, ``Cuba's lead negotiator said in an
interview broadcast on state television that if the United
States want free movement for its diplomats in Cuba, it must
stop using them to support the political opposition.'' This is
her quote.
``The way those diplomats,'' meaning the United States,
``act should change in terms of stimulating, organizing,
training, supplying, and financing elements within our country
that act against the interests of the government of the Cuban
people. The total freedom of movement, which the U.S. side is
posing, is tied to a change in the behavior of its diplomatic
mission and its officials.''
Would we accept an embassy in Cuba where our diplomats are
not allowed to meet with democracy activists on the island?
Ms. Jacobson. We would not curtail the activities we are
doing now, which is meeting with democracy activist and----
Senator Rubio. One of the things that we are trying to
negotiate is opening an embassy in Cuba.
Ms. Jacobson. Correct.
Senator Rubio. And she is saying in order for us to open an
embassy in Cuba--and as you have said, she is a serious person
who speaks with authority. She made very clear yesterday that
in order for us to open an embassy in Cuba and allow our
personnel greater freedom than they have now, we would have to
agree not to allow them to interact with democracy activists.
Can you categorically say today we will never accept that
condition on our personnel?
Ms. Jacobson. What I can say is that I do not yet know
whether that is a real condition on their part, but we could
not accept that condition----
Senator Rubio. What do you mean it is not a real condition?
You just said she is a serious person who speaks with authority
on behalf of the government.
Ms. Jacobson. I also think that sometimes things are said
in public that are not necessarily a position in private, and I
do not know that they have made that a condition yet. You have
to ask them.
Senator Rubio. But, in fact, that is their position in
public today. Is it not?
Ms. Jacobson. I saw what she said in public. But what I am
saying is----
Senator Rubio. But in practice that is their position.
Ms. Jacobson [continuing]. We could not accept not meeting
with democracy activists and with the broadest swath of Cubans
possible. That is the point of this policy. So, yes.
Senator Rubio. My time is up. I want to get to Senator
Boxer.
I guess what I am trying to get today is the following. Can
you say today to people watching this broadcast and here in the
audience and to the members of this committee that under no
circumstances will the United States ever agree to limit--agree
to limit--the ability of our personnel to interact with
democracy activists and civil society in Cuba as a condition of
expanding our embassy operation?
Ms. Jacobson. We want to have the greatest possible ability
to interact with everybody, including democracy activists all
over the island. That is the point of our getting the
geographic restrictions lifted.
Senator Rubio. So we will never agree with the Cuban
Government that in order to open an embassy, we will agree to
limit our personnel.
Ms. Jacobson. We are going to keep pushing to get those
restrictions lifted as part of getting an embassy in Cuba.
Senator Rubio. Secretary Jacobson, it is a pretty
straightforward question. Would we ever agree in a negotiation
to the Cubans that in order to open an embassy, we will agree
not to send our people to meet with democracy activists? Yes or
no. Will we ever agree to that?
Ms. Jacobson. I cannot imagine that we would go to the next
stage of our diplomatic relationship with an agreement not to
see democracy activists. No.
Senator Rubio. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
On this question of the White House staff not coming here,
I would ask unanimous consent to place in the record a White
House counsel letter which points out that the administrations
of both political parties do not have White House staff at
these hearings. I would like to put that in the record.
Senator Rubio. Without objection.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
[Editor's note.--The document referred to can be found on page
87.]
My friend, the ranking member, seems to say--and I do not
know that he meant to say this--that Nixon going to China and
normalizing relations was really not a good thing to do. That
is what I heard him say. And as I said in my opening statement,
clearly whether it is relations with China or Vietnam or
Russia, all of which were normalized by Democratic and
Republican Presidents, we know human rights abuses are still a
heart-wrenching problem. And Assistant Secretary Malinowski--I
mean, that is his middle name, ``human rights.'' And we know
these countries are tough.
And the question really is what about the citizens of those
countries. Does it help them to be isolated from Americans,
whether it is through trade or talking on the street or the
ability to interact? You know, I think having a policy in which
Americans cannot interact with the people that we care about is
not only, I think, unintelligent but it does not work. And for
50 years, we have seen it does not work. And I hope that nobody
here is considering revisiting relations we have had with other
countries that still have human rights abuses. These abuses are
a sin against humanity. But I believe if we have contact with
the people, we give them hope. We give them the possibility of
being empowered.
So I have to say with all my heart and deep respect for my
ranking member and my subcommittee chairman, whom I
congratulate on the chair--even though I regret that we lost
control, I do think he deserves congratulations. The fact of
the matter is they represent the status quo and the status quo
in Cuba has not worked. And I do not think there is anyone who
could argue that it has worked, although we will probably hear
a couple of people suggesting that it continue.
I think President Obama had courage, just as Nixon had
courage to go to China, just as Reagan had courage to deal with
Gorbachev, just as Bill Clinton and John Kerry and John McCain
had courage to fight for normalization with Vietnam.
And I ask unanimous consent to place into the record 46
statements by foreign governments in support of this policy
change, including Brazil, Mexico, the European Union, and the
Vatican. May I do that, sir?
[Editor's note.--The volume of statements mentioned above was
too voluminous to include in the printed hearing. It will be
retained in the permanent record of the committee.]
Senator Rubio. Without objection.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
And so in light of that, can I ask our panel in either
order what effect has the President's new Cuba policy had on
our relationship with other countries in the region, and the
world?
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
I think that the reaction to this was immediate and
extremely positive. We saw, certainly as you have noted,
widespread throughout Latin America for the policy change. And
frankly, there was shock by some of Cuba's allies in the
region, Venezuela and others, who were not quite sure what to
make of it, and that I think also was a very positive thing. My
counterpart in the European Union reached out to me
immediately. They are negotiating with Cuba, and he wanted to
make sure that we were in sync because he felt immediately that
we could work more closely together now, including on democracy
and human rights issues.
Senator Boxer. Right. So if I can interrupt you. So our new
policy is in line with our allies' policy.
Ms. Jacobson. Yes, but just as importantly, when I was in
Cuba 2 weeks ago, for the first time when we held a large
reception for democracy and human rights activists, to which we
invited European and Asian and other diplomats, they all came.
Senator Boxer. Where was this held?
Ms. Jacobson. This was at our principal officer's
residence. They never came in the past, not wanting to be
associated with our policy.
Senator Boxer. This is in Cuba.
Ms. Jacobson. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Well, I think that kind of answers the
question----
Ms. Jacobson. Having the opportunity to meet dissidents.
Senator Boxer. Could I hear from you, Mr. Malinowski?
Mr. Malinowski. Certainly. And I have had the same
experience. As I mentioned, when Assistant Secretary Jacobson
was in Cuba, I was in La Paz in Bolivia where there was this
gathering of leaders and ministers from throughout the
hemisphere for the inauguration. And I met with probably a
dozen of them, again for the express purpose of talking about
human rights in Cuba. And I have to say the overwhelming
reaction I got was ``you have done a great thing for the
hemisphere. How can we help?'' And for the first time, I think
we were able to have conversations at that level about what
these countries can do for human rights in Cuba by raising key
cases, by urging no more harassment of dissidents, by urging
Cuba to meet the commitments that it has made on allowing the
U.N. and the ICRC, including, to prisons, which I agree with
you, Senator Rubio, is very, very important. On meeting Cuban
dissidents themselves, for the first time, we can have a
conversation about that without the overhang of the embargo,
without anyone being able to say it is your policy that is to
blame.
Senator Boxer. Let me just say because I am running out of
time. To me, one of the most important statements came from the
Vatican and it said, ``the Holy See will continue to assure its
support for initiatives which both nations will undertake to
strengthen their bilateral relations and promote the well-being
of their respective citizens.''
Now, having this statement from the Vatican is a big deal.
I am just wondering. Were you aware that the Vatican was going
to make that statement, or was this just a reaction? Was there
any discussion with the Pope just to get his views on this
prior to this policy?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, the Vatican's involvement in this
policy change was crucial. The support of the Vatican and Pope
Francis was something that was crucial to both sides. The
respect for this Pope, because he is Latin American, and his
importance in Cuba and throughout the hemisphere, I think is
part of the reason it is so well-respected not just in and of
itself, as Tom said, but because of the emphasis that the Pope
has put behind it. And I do think that our work with the
Vatican and the Pope has been instrumental in this.
Senator Boxer. Do you think that the Pope's strong support
for this is resonating in Cuba itself?
Ms. Jacobson. Absolutely. I heard about it everywhere from
Cardinal Ortega and from others in the church, as well as from
Cubans I met while I was there, independent private
entrepreneurs and independent media. This has galvanized them
as well. They are also encouraged by the fact that the Pope's
continuing involvement and the Vatican's continuing involvement
as a facilitator and to some extent as a guarantor gives them
greater hope that compliance will be assured.
Senator Boxer. I will close with this. I think that is
critical. And I am going to write a letter to Pope Francis
thanking him for his leadership on this. But he has got to stay
involved. And I do not think there is any doubt we are going to
have problems with the government there, just like we do, as my
friend pointed out, in China. Of course, this is not going to
change everything overnight. So I think his involvement,
calling it the way he sees it, and being sincere and honest
about what is happening is going to help us move forward.
I just want to thank you both of you very much, and I would
conclude.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you. Thanks for having this hearing.
The chairman and I agree on a lot of things in the Senate.
We even agree on taste in ties apparently. [Laughter.]
Senator Flake. But we do disagree on this subject.
One of the first pieces of legislation I introduced 14
years ago when I entered the House of Representatives was
legislation to lift the travel ban. I have always felt that we
ought to have more Americans traveling to Cuba, not fewer.
Cuban American families in particular ought to be able to visit
family members. I was pleased to see the President loosen those
restrictions a couple of years ago and then take the further
step of allowing more people to travel to Cuba. It is not an
acknowledgement that things are better in terms of human rights
in Cuba or any more democracy. It is a recognition, as was said
in your testimony, that we hope that we can improve the
situation.
So following on that, Ms. Jacobson, you mentioned in your
testimony that you differentiate between normalization of
relations and diplomatic relations. Can you expand on that
briefly?
Ms. Jacobson. Certainly, Senator. Full normalization of
relations is a process that will take years and has to include
a range of issues--and I want to be very clear here--including
the issues of claims and expropriations. And that was made very
clear to the Cuban Government.
The reestablishment of diplomatic relations is a first step
in that process in the nearer term and enables us to have the
conversations that can get us to a full normalization. And so
those two things I think really have to be understood because
sometimes people talk about normalization and things that they
may demand in normalization, which is a much longer process
than this initial step.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
With regard to diplomatic relations, there is some
confusion about what we have in Cuba right now. Can you
describe our mission in Cuba as it stands, what facilities we
have, the number of personnel? I think a lot of people would be
surprised to know what a presence that we have had for a while.
Ms. Jacobson. We have a U.S. interest section. We are under
the protection of the Swiss and have been since 1977. The
building is the same one that we had as an embassy. We have
about 360 people working in that interest section, of whom
about 70, 60-something, are Americans. A number of agencies are
in that building. I believe we are one of the larger diplomatic
presences in Havana. They do extraordinary work processing
refugees to come to the United States, obviously, visa
processing, protection of Americans who travel there, outreach
to dissidents and civil society, and general support for the
emerging private sector in Cuba. So it is as much of a range of
activities as we can do within Cuba today.
Senator Flake. So establishing a formal embassy is not so
much a budget issue as it is a change in policy.
Ms. Jacobson. That is correct. It would not be a budget
issue in changing our presence. Over time, there might be other
agencies that would be interested in a fuller relationship. It
would enable us to do more, pursue additional things, for
example, in our law enforcement in getting fugitives returned.
There might be a need to have additional presence. But for now,
it would be not a major budgetary exercise.
Senator Flake. I was glad to see the chairman raise--we
have spoken about this previously--that a fully functioning
embassy will be expected to have the same requirements and
protocols that fully functioning embassies elsewhere in the
world have in terms of a diplomatic pouch and being able to
travel freely. Those are part of the negotiations that you are
talking about right now to make sure that we have those items.
This will be a fully functioning embassy.
Ms. Jacobson. Right, absolutely. And there are a number of
things: that ability to see the entire range of Cuban civil
society, including democracy activists; also the fact that free
access to the interest section has been controlled by Cuban
security. We request security, obviously, to protect our
embassy, but that does not mean screening, and right now people
are, in essence, screened and their names are taken. That is a
feature that we would undertake in the future, as we do in
other embassies. But we basically want to ensure that the
embassy runs commensurate with embassies all over the world.
Senator Flake. Mr. Malinowski, you were talking about the
issues that obviously still remain in the area of human rights.
Do you believe that with normalized relations or diplomatic
relations or improved relations that you can more effectively
press on those issues than we have been able to over the past
couple of decades?
Mr. Malinowski. Absolutely, with the strong caveat that we
have no illusions about this. This is going to be hard.
Authoritarian regimes do not just give up their power
voluntarily. But change comes by empowering people to demand
change. It comes by making the Cuban people less dependent on
the Cuban state for their livelihood, for their survival. It
comes through information coming from the outside and less
control by the Cuban state. And it comes from international
pressure, and we will be able to generate more international
pressure on the Cuban Government as a result of this policy.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Ms. Jacobson, do you view the policy changes that have been
made as a concession to the Cuban Government?
Ms. Jacobson. Absolutely not, Senator. I think that is a
really important point. There is nothing in the policy that we
undertook that was not something done in our national interest.
Indeed, some of these things are things the Cuban Government
would not have asked for, and certainly we do not see them as
concessions. They are designed to empower the Cuban people more
effectively than we have been able to in the past and to enable
us to cooperate on those areas where our interests and the
Cuban Government's may overlap.
Senator Flake. Well, thank you. I have seen that for a long
time, and people see that normalization of relations or
allowing Americans to travel to Cuba is somehow a concession to
the Cuban regime.
Ms. Jacobson. Many regimes do not consider U.S. embassies a
gift. We are pretty active and pretty outspoken.
Senator Flake. And I would view it the same way in terms of
travel. We have had various programs. We spend, I think, about
$20 million a year on democracy programs trying to give more
Cubans access to the Internet, for example. And the way I see
it, as Americans travel freely, more freely, and hopefully
ultimately completely freely, that we can do more in a week by
just allowing Americans to travel than we could spending tens
of millions of dollars in untold resources and trouble with the
policy that we have had in trying to promote democracy to Cuba.
So thank you for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, you know, based on your answers to the
chairman, in which largely, it seems to me, the State
Department as an institution which is responsible for
conducting our Nation's diplomacy was kept in the dark. And you
can imagine that I was particularly concerned when your deputy
informed my office that the changes to U.S. policy were not
used as leverage at the negotiating table, that they were not
used to secure any concessions from the Castro regime, that
this was not ``a transactional process.''
Now, I see you made no mention of fugitives in Cuba, no
mention of law enforcement issues in your statement, no mention
of $6 billion in property rights, no mention of $2 billion in
judgments, no mention of indictments in Federal courts in the
United States of Cuban officials for the purposes of committing
murder. And the same deputy informed my office that the U.S.
Government is conducting a review of Cuba's status as a state
sponsor of terror in response to a request from the Castro
regime.
So despite that everything that we have heard from the
regime and its surrogates here who operate relatively freely in
this country is that they wanted exactly what you have largely
given them. You elicited nothing in return. Even your list of
53, 14 of those 53 were released before the list was ever
composed, and several were rearrested. The Red Cross cannot get
into Cuban jails. You know, this is my problem in understanding
the nature of the decision here not to elicit anything at the
end of the day.
So let me ask you, since you are conducting a review at the
Cuban Government`s petition as it relates to their being on the
state sponsor of terrorism, is it not true that the Castro
regime provides sanctuary to Joanne Chesimard who is on the
FBI's list of most wanted terrorists for murdering a New Jersey
State trooper?
Ms. Jacobson. It is, sir.
Senator Menendez. Is it not true that the Castro regime is
providing sanctuary to members of organizations that the State
Department has named as foreign terrorist organizations?
Ms. Jacobson. That has certainly been the case.
Senator Menendez. Is it not true that the State Department
considers a foreign government providing sanctuary to a
terrorist that has committed a terrorist in another country to
be support for international terrorism?
Ms. Jacobson. Certainly in that past we have used that
sanctuary, as that has been clearly noted in our reports on
Cuba in our terrorist----
Senator Menendez. And just beyond that in general, that is
a standard that you have used, providing sanctuary to a
terrorist, because here is what the law says.
Ms. Jacobson. Yes, yes.
Senator Menendez. Let me read from the Export
Administration Act of 1979, which establishes part of the legal
foundation for designating a country as a sponsor of terrorism.
It defines the term sponsor of terrorism, ``repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism to include the
recurring use of any part of the territory or the country as a
sanctuary for terrorists for terrorist organizations as a
sanctuary.'' And that is exactly what we have here, among
others.
Now, let me ask you this. The 18-month-long secret
negotiations began in June 2013. The next month Cuba and North
Korea got caught smuggling 240 metric tons of weapons through
the Panama Canal, the single largest violation of U.N. Security
Council resolution sanctions to date. Was this issue, to your
knowledge, discussed during the negotiations?
Ms. Jacobson. I do not know if it was discussed.
Senator Menendez. Has it been discussed since?
Ms. Jacobson. Has it been discussed with the Cuban
Government? It certainly has been discussed with the Cuban
Government, since the revelation of that, repeatedly.
Senator Menendez. But since your engagement.
Ms. Jacobson. It has been discussed with other governments
and then with the U.N. with the Cuba Government. Since my
engagement, has it been discussed with them? We have certainly
discussed the need to comply with international law and
requirements of that.
Senator Menendez. Well, good. I am glad we are talking
about following international law because in the aftermath of
this incident, the United Nations acted forcefully and applied
strong sanctions against North Korea----
Ms. Jacobson. Correct.
Senator Menendez. Let me finish, Madam Secretary. Against
North Korea but Cuba got off with nothing more--nothing more--
than a slap on the wrist. So you wonder if having the Cubans
have the biggest U.N. Security Council violation of sending
Migs and missiles and tons of equipment to North Korea--so
North Korea gets further sanctions and Cuba gets nothing maybe
because that would have upset the secret negotiations that were
taking place.
Let me ask you this. You talk about connectivity. Is it not
true that Cuba has had Venezuela lay a fiber optic cable to
Cuba, that an Italian telecommunications company partnered with
ETECSA for several years, and yet dissidents on the island
still do not have access to the Internet and other forms of
communication? Because even if you think the law allows the
investment of U.S. dollars to provide the link to the island,
there is no guarantee, as we see in China and other places,
that the Government of Cuba will permit such linkages to
ultimately take place to the average Cuban. Do you have any
guarantees of that in your negotiation?
Ms. Jacobson. We have no guarantees, but that is why, as
Assistant Secretary Malinowski said, it will be clear who is
keeping the Cuban people from having that connectivity when
they can no longer blame any barrier on us.
Senator Menendez. Well, they do not have a barrier. They
already have a fiber optic line directly laid by Venezuela into
Cuba. They had an Italian company participating with them. And
yet, there is no connectivity for the Cuban people because the
Castro regime will not permit that connectivity to take place.
If not, I would be the first one to say let us go ahead and do
that. But at the end of the day, you got no concessions from
the regime that even if you allow the fiber optic or other
technological connections to take place, that they will allow
the Cuban people to have access to it.
So this is replete with challenges that we have in terms of
not getting anything on behalf of the Cuban people.
And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to include statements in
the record by the New Jersey Association of Chiefs of Police, a
letter to President Obama from the New Jersey State Troopers
Fraternal Association and by various sheriffs of New Jersey as
it relates to Joanne Chesimard.
Senator Rubio. Without objection.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Editor's note.--The submissions referred to can be found
beginning on page 89.]
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Malinowski and Secretary Jacobson,
for your attendance today.
In announcing the policy change, the President stated that
this is fundamentally about freedom and openness. While I agree
with the President's words and vision, I have questions about
the Castro regime which continues to wield absolute power on
the island, and I am concerned that they may not see it the
same way.
In the briefing material that we received for this hearing,
it stated, short-term detentions in Cuba for political reasons
have increased significantly over the past several years, a
reflection of the government's change of tactics in repressing
dissent. The Havana-based Cuban Commission on Human Rights and
National Reconciliation reports that there were at least 2,074
such detentions in 2010, 4,123 in 2011, 6,602 in 2012, and
6,424 in 2013. For 2014, the group reported that there were
8,899 such detentions, almost 39 percent higher than the
previous year. Since the announcement of this policy, have
those detentions lessened or increased?
Mr. Malinowski. Since the announcement, from December to
January, we have actually seen a significant decrease, but I do
not want to say that 1 month represents a trend. We want to be
very, very precise and realistic here, and even a single one of
these detentions is too many. We are going to be watching this
very, very closely.
Senator Gardner. Has there been a single detention since
the announcement of this policy?
Mr. Malinowski. There have been short-term detentions,
absolutely, yes.
Senator Gardner. How many?
Mr. Malinowski. The number for January--this has not come
out publicly yet, but I believe it is about 140 or so.
Senator Gardner. So since the announcement of this opening,
this overture, there have been roughly 140 new detentions.
Mr. Malinowski. The nature of the Cuban regime has not
changed. Absolutely.
Senator Gardner. I am sorry. What was that?
Mr. Malinowski. The nature of the Cuban regime has not
changed, and we have not claimed so.
Senator Gardner. Do you believe that it will change?
Mr. Malinowski. I am absolutely confident that the Cuban
people who have been fighting for change in Cuba are going to
prevail, and I think they will be more empowered to prevail as
a result of this new policy.
Senator Gardner. And do you believe the Castro regime will
become your partner in that empowerment?
Mr. Malinowski. I have no indication that they have any
desire to become our partner in that. That is not the way this
works in any authoritarian state.
Senator Gardner. Going back to the issue of the political
dissidents, Secretary Jacobson, you mentioned that there were
divisions with the civil rights community, those people who
support the changes being made and those people who do not. The
people who do not support these changes that we have been
talking about today--why do they not support those changes?
Ms. Jacobson. Senator, I hesitate to speak for them, but I
certainly listened to them when I was there. And it was very
important for me to hear from all sides while I was there. Many
believe that it was not the right thing to do because they fear
that the Cuban Government will not respond to our willingness
to have a dialogue. As Assistant Secretary Malinowski said, the
policy is not based on the Cuban Government changing or
necessarily being our partner here. We would like that to
happen. We have no illusions about whether or not it will. It
is based on trying to empower them. They also may have felt
that we did not get enough in the deal. It was not really a
deal. It was what was in our national interests. It was a
policy in which we do not believe we conceded anything to the
government.
But there are differing views. I would let them speak for
themselves, some in the next panel and elsewhere, to the best
of their ability. But I heard from them differences in tactics
and the way we go about this, but not differences in goals or
what we are all hoping to achieve. And I certainly respected
their views enormously and learned a great deal from some of
them about things we might be able to do together going
forward.
Senator Gardner. Following up on Chairman Rubio's questions
on the State Department and the State Department's role in the
negotiations. You stated the policy committee is where these
policy changes came from. Is that correct?
Ms. Jacobson. Certainly within an interagency policy
committee, many of these changes were discussed broadly before
the negotiations began.
Senator Gardner. And who from the State Department is on
that policy committee?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, either myself or my deputy who works on
Cuban affairs or the experts in our Cuba affairs office when we
are talking about regulatory changes.
Senator Gardner. And so are they a part of the
conversations you--or the two that you mentioned a part of
these changes----
Ms. Jacobson. We are certainly part of the interagency
policy committee when those kind of--yes, when that whole
regulatory change conversation was taking place. Yes.
Senator Gardner. Secretary Jacobson, some critics of the
policy have stated that the administration, ``threw an economic
lifeline to the Castro regime, especially as its two top
international backers, Russia and Venezuela, are struggling
financially.'' Do you agree with this assessment?
Ms. Jacobson. I know that there is concern over the Cuban
Government gaining resources in the future because of this.
What I can say is that the Cuban Government has been through
extremely difficult economic times before, one of which they
lost 30 percent of their GDP. They have survived those. In
addition, we strongly believe that the benefits of what the
Cuban people will gain in resources through this policy
outweigh any benefit to the Cuban Government that may be gained
in a policy like this, and those will be greater, we think,
than what the Cuban Government gains.
Senator Gardner. How has this affected traditional
alliances of Cuba?
Ms. Jacobson. Their alliances with other countries?
Senator Gardner. Right, correct.
Ms. Jacobson. Well, I think that I do not know exactly how
it will affect their alliances, whether it is with Russia or
Venezuela.
But certainly what our hope is that we can empower the
small entrepreneurs, the conversation with the emerging
entrepreneurial class separating from the state, gaining access
to information. I think that is very powerful. And obviously,
the more people who are not reliant on the state for their
economic future, make their own economic decisions, I think
politically and economically the more it empowers people to
think twice about those old alliances.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much, Chairman Rubio and
Senator Boxer, and thank you for calling us together in this
very important hearing. I really appreciate having the
witnesses here.
For over 50 years, the United States has followed a failed
policy in Cuba, a policy that has done nothing to lift up the
lives of ordinary Cubans. And I think that has been one of the
points that has been made over and over again, is that our
thrust with an embargo has hurt the Cuban people while it has
probably done more to enrich the Cuban Government.
I believe President Obama, with his actions in December,
has taken the courageous step toward true change here by
opening up the island to Americans, increasing opportunities
for business and agriculture, and taking the steps needed to
improve telecommunications and access to Internet on the
island. We will finally be able to engage Cuba in a way we have
not been able to since the embargo.
We, of course, need to go further. And I have been pleased
to work with Senator Flake on his legislation and Senator Leahy
and others to end the travel ban for Americans. In my mind, the
best ambassadors we have or the best diplomats we have are the
American people going and directly interacting with Cubans. And
that is what we would do by ending this travel ban.
I strongly believe that these new policies will help. A
growing number of Cuban entrepreneurs can connect with
Americans and Cuban Americans and support the free market. I
met with these new business owners last November when I
traveled with Senator Flake down to Cuba. There is an
entrepreneurial spirit there which we can help foster through
partnerships and interaction with U.S. businesses.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask consent to put the rest of my
statement in the record.
Senator Rubio. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Udall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tom Udall,
U.S. Senator From New Mexico
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, thank you for putting this
hearing together--to discuss an issue of great importance to this
committee. For over 50 years the United States has followed a failed
policy in Cuba--a policy that has done nothing to lift up the lives of
ordinary Cubans.
President Obama--with his actions in December--has taken the
courageous step toward true change. By opening up the island to
Americans. Increasing opportunities for business and agriculture. And
taking the steps needed to improve telecommunications and access to the
Internet on the island. We will finally be able to engage with Cuba--in
a way we have not been able to since before the embargo.
We, of course, need to go further. I have been pleased to work with
Senator Flake on legislation to end the travel ban on Americans--so
that our best diplomats, U.S. citizens, can interact with the Cuban
people.
I strongly believe these new policies will help. A growing number
of Cuban entrepreneurs can connect with Americans and Cuban Americans--
and support the free market. I met with these new businessowners last
November when I traveled with Senator Flake. There is an
entrepreneurial spirit which we can help foster--through partnerships
and interaction with U.S. businesses.
We can also help create the tools for ordinary Cubans to
communicate with their families and the world via the Internet. Even
the Cuban Government realizes the importance of this. For their economy
to be successful--and to attract overseas investment--they have to
improve their telecommunications capabilities. Being the least wired
country in Latin America is a dead end--and fails to help democracy,
human rights, or a free market economy in the 21st century.
The President's regulatory changes take a step in the right
direction toward--giving U.S. telecommunications companies the ability
to do business in Cuba. But we need to make these changes permanent. I
hope to work with members interested in bringing the Internet to Cuba--
by passing such legislation in the future.
The Embargo has been used as an excuse by the Castro regime for too
long. It has not helped the Cuban people. Instead, it has left them cut
off from the world and their families--and prevented change on the
island.
Senator Udall. And I would ask specifically, with regard to
these interactions and entrepreneurship down there, what are
the things that both of you contemplate in terms of
interactions between Americans and Cubans in terms of
furthering business interests?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, Senator, I think you know that in the
regulations that have been announced that were implemented in
January and were announced by the President in December, the
regulations state that support for private entrepreneurs, this
emerging class in the 200 or so areas that the Cuban Government
permits private businesses, small businesses, to exist, are now
permitted, whether it is building materials or other forms of
support.
I met with a group of about seven private entrepreneurs
when I was there from restaurateurs to barbers to a woman
making soap, and their sense of optimism and freedom and
independence was really quite inspiring. Their difficulty at
getting reliable supplies was also clearly the biggest part of
their challenge. And so the hope is that people can now,
whether it is small businesses here or corporations or
individuals, connect with some of those small businesses and
try and support their work, whether it is equipment or goods,
to help them get more reliable supplies. There may be
foundations and other organizations that can do that as well,
but it is clear that more people may be able to take advantage
of the rather Byzantine rules that exist for these
entrepreneurs with the new regulations.
And I would also hope--and we have talked about this with
some of the partners in the hemisphere--that this is an area
where others throughout the hemisphere can support this
emerging class and they are keen to do so.
Mr. Malinowski. Let me just add.
Senator Udall. Please, go ahead.
Mr. Malinowski. This is important because this gets us back
to, I think, the central question on the table today, and that
is what Assistant Secretary Jacobson just described is not
anything that the Cuban Government wanted or asked for. And
this gets us back to the issue of leverage. These are steps,
the steps that we have announced that are designed to get more
resources and information to the Cuban people. And imagine what
would have happened if we had gone to the Castro government and
said open up your political system or else we will not help
connect Cuba to the Internet or else we will not help these
small business people. How much do you think we could have
gotten for that, even on the question of diplomatic relations?
As Senator Rubio pointed out, they are now, at least
rhetorically, trying to put conditions on that. This is not
something that they themselves are very comfortable with. They
are nervous about it because it does create these
possibilities, not guarantees because Senator Menendez is also
absolutely right. It now depends on them, on their willingness
to unleash this stuff, and they may not be willing to do that.
But it does put the burden on them, and that makes them
nervous. And that is the point of the strategy.
Senator Udall. And the important point here is we are
trying to empower the Cuban people, and we do that in the
business area. We do that in a number of areas with these new
policies. And I think that is the thrust of this policy, and it
is a very important thrust in terms of moving us forward.
Ms. Jacobson. If I could, Senator. The other thing I think
is critical is, you know, when we held our press conferences
after the first round of talks, the Cuban Government held a
press conference and I did as well at the talks themselves. But
Cuban independent media were not able to come to that press
conference, which is why the next day I held a larger one in
our principal officer's residence because all of the Cuban
independent media that we knew of was invited. We made sure
they were there.
But the Cuban Government actually broadcast my press
availability in Spanish live for the first time. And so I felt
it was important to talk about things like human rights, to
talk about things like private businesses because they were
airing it live. Cuban people were able to hear from an American
official for the first time live. And then to have Cuban
independent media be at the principal officer's residence to
empower them directly that way as well.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to our panelists on both panels and all the
members of the committee.
Just a moment of personal privilege. This is a subcommittee
on the Western Hemisphere, and there was an interesting
announcement earlier today from the Vatican that I just wanted
to comment on. The Vatican has declared Archbishop Oscar
Romero's death a martyrdom, a spiritual martyrdom, which is the
first step toward potential beatification. He was killed by
death squads in El Salvador in 1980. I think he was one of the
towering figures in human rights in the 20th century. I was
living in Honduras and El Salvador during this period and came
to see the enormous influence that he had for good, standing
against violence, standing for advocacy for the least of these.
And we are here in a Western Hemisphere Subcommittee meeting,
and I think it is an important thing to acknowledge that this
just happened a couple of hours ago.
This is a very important hearing and a very important
debate. And I have dear friends who are kind of on both sides
of it, and it has caused me to grapple both with the United
States-Cuba relationship, but also with the whole concept of
what do diplomatic relationships mean, what do they stand for,
why do we have them.
You know, I conclude, as I grapple with that question, that
diplomatic relationships--they are not a Good Housekeeping Seal
of Approval. They are not a validation as a star student or a
gold star for good behavior. That is not what they are because
we clearly have diplomatic relationships with so many nations
that we disagree with so strongly about human rights or other
issues. They are merely a normalized opportunity to create a
channel so that we can raise issues of importance.
Recently seven of us took a trip, under the leadership of
Senator McCain, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee,
to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel. In Saudi Arabia, we had an
opportunity to raise a very important human rights issue. Saudi
Arabia had sentenced a political blogger to a thousand lashes,
administered 50 at a time, 1 day a week for 20 weeks, followed
by 10 years in prison for something that in this country, you
know, it might annoy us what the blogger had to say but would
not be punishable in any means, especially in any way so
barbaric.
When we arrived in Saudi Arabia, they knew we were going to
raise this issue. They had done the first day of the flogging,
but they postponed the second day of the flogging the day that
we arrived. And when we sat down with the officials, we raised
it and we told them that this is an alliance. We are allies in
many ways, but this is so counter to our culture. This is so
counter to standards of human rights that we just urge you and
encourage you to rethink this because it makes the relationship
so much more difficult if you do things like this.
The announcement came on Friday they were postponing the
second proposed day of the flogging. That does not mean that
they are going to not still do it. Just because we raise issues
does not mean that anybody will do it because we ask. But we
have a channel at the highest level when we have normalized
diplomatic relationships to put on the table the things that
really bother us and to encourage nations to be better. And
whether or not we do, having that channel and that ability to
push it is something that I think is very, very important.
These human rights in Cuba are very, very severe. There are
human rights issues. I read Oscar Romero's statements about the
level of repression in El Salvador that he was dealing with,
and he could be talking about El Salvador in 1982. He could be
speaking about Cuba in 2015. He could be speaking about a lot
of places in the world. These are very serious issues.
But I tend to come down on the side that a more normal
relationship will give us more angles and levers to play to
promote better behavior.
This was alluded to only briefly. Let me ask you this
question. Senator Boxer put into the record a statement of
nations that had expressed support. What about the regional
reaction? I have worried over time that the United States
position vis-a-vis Cuba has put sort of a ceiling on our
relationships in the region in ways that could be a challenge,
and whether it is in international institutions like the
Organization for American States or even in bilateral
diplomacy, I think there is so much up-side for more American
engagement in the Americas. And we always give the Americas
short shrift. We always are paying attention to the Middle East
or now we are going to pivot to Asia. It was about Europe, then
about the Middle East, and now we are going to pivot to Asia.
It seems like we are always--always--making the Americas be the
caboose on this train.
But I have felt, to some degree, that our Cuba policy has
put a little bit of a ceiling on our relationships in the
region. Maybe I am wrong about that. What has been the reaction
of regional allies in the Americas about this announcement?
Ms. Jacobson. I think, Senator, the policy toward Cuba had,
in fact, always been--some have called it an irritant in the
Western Hemisphere, in our relationships with countries in the
Western Hemisphere. Some have called it a weight. I think it
has been a problem.
We will always stand for our principles, talk about, and
promote and seek to advance human rights. We are not going to
give up on that for a moment. And we are going to do that as
effectively as we can. But the hostility toward the way in
which we have done it in the past five decades vis-a-vis Cuba
was a real problem with the countries of this hemisphere. And
they sought to distance themselves from us in ways that impeded
us getting other things done with them, getting other things
done on Cuba, but also getting other things done on human
rights elsewhere in the hemisphere, whether it was press
freedom throughout the hemisphere or other human rights issues.
So as Tom said, the biggest reaction we got is this has
changed--President Santos of Colombia said this has changed the
history of United States-Latin American relations, that it will
be really a change throughout the hemisphere. President Roussef
in Brazil as well. We see it give lift to our policy objectives
throughout the hemisphere.
Senator Kaine. Secretary Malinowski, any additional
thoughts on that?
Mr. Malinowski. Sure. You know, let us be clear. There have
been too many excuses made for Cuba in the hemisphere over too
many years, and I do not like it. And I do not think they were
good excuses. To the extent that they used the embargo and our
policy as an excuse for being silent about human rights abuses
in Cuba, that was not justified.
But we have to be ruthlessly disciplined in analyzing what
has been happening and why. The fact is it has been an excuse
that has worked for Cuba, and we have now taken that away.
And I think both Assistant Secretary Jacobson and I have
already noted in our interactions with Latin leaders and
Foreign Ministers over the last few weeks--we talked about that
a little bit previously--that there is a completely new
reaction from those folks when we ask them to help us on human
rights in Cuba. So we are now going to take full advantage of
that with your help.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Chairman, if I could just close. Let me
just read a quick quote to challenge us all, all Americans, all
Cubans, all over the world from Archbishop Romero. ``Peace is
not the product of terror fear. Peace is not the silence of
cemeteries. Peace is not the silent result of violent
repression. Peace is the generous, tranquil contribution of all
to the good of all. Peace is dynamism. Peace is generosity. It
is a right and it is a duty.''
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
I think we all understand that Cuba is not going to change
overnight. We are at the beginning of a process to change the
dynamic between the two countries but also to change the
dynamic between the United States and Latin America in general.
And Cuba has historically been a centerpiece, a reference point
that has been used by Latin America in our discussions on many
issues. There is no question about that.
Back in the 1980s as the chairman of telecommunications in
the House of Representatives, I worked extensively on the issue
of Radio Marti and TV Marti, that was a recognition of the role
that communications play in opening the minds of Cubans to a
world that was outside of their boundaries. And it was a
central part of foreign and diplomatic policy in the United
States.
What heartens me in the new announcement is this initiative
that can deal with greater access to telecommunications for the
people of Cuba. Right now, there is only one fiber optic cable
coming into Cuba. In the Dominican Republic, a country with
almost the same population, they have five fiber optic cables
coming in.
So this whole issue of an increase in consumer
communications devices, software applications, hardware,
updating communications and Internet services, is something
that could play a big role in giving information to the
ordinary Cuban citizen that right now is not available to them.
For example, it is $5 an hour in Internet cafes in Havana right
now for the use of the Internet, and when the average income in
Cuba is only $20 a month, that does not lend itself to the use
by ordinary Cubans.
So could you talk a little bit about that and what your
hopes are for expanded telecommunications policy in Cuba in
terms of the impact that it can have upon that country's
people?
Ms. Jacobson. Certainly, Senator. And I think that this is
and really can be--and I do not know whether it will have the
impact we all want. I know that Senator Rubio, the chairman,
and Senator Menendez and I have talked a lot about trying to
get more information into Cuba. It has been one of the things
we have wanted most.
You know, it allows telecommunications companies for the
first time to make commercial sales of things like
communications devices, whether that is cell phones or iPads or
other forms of equipment, not just to donate them but to make
those sales. They can also sell--and I do not want to get
myself too far into this because I will get into Commerce or
Treasury's regulations and get them wrong. But they also are
able to sell other Internet-related items to improve the free
flow of information without a license, without a specific
license, under general license, without a license from the
Commerce Department.
They are also allowed to consolidate gift parcels. They are
allowed to sell all sorts of things that the private sector can
sell in terms of equipment and hardware that were not allowed
before, telecommunications hardware.
Now, the Cuban Government, including Raul Castro, has said
they want telecommunications equipment. They want to upgrade
their infrastructure in telecommunications. They know that they
need that in order for their economic modernization. I do not
know whether they really mean that. The point of these
regulations is that we believe that they need that to offer
more access to their people. We want to push them on that. They
need it for their economic modernization. They need it to get
economic progress. With that we believe will come an opening of
information to more people, even if they are not intending
that. And if they resist that, we want to be in the forefront
of having made that offer aggressively.
Now, telecommunications firms are just looking at this, and
we have been in touch with quite a few. There are some that
have already visited and many more that are now interested, as
this plays out. So we are optimistic about the interest but not
necessarily yet about how the Cuban Government will respond.
Senator Markey. And I appreciate that. But I think because
we are so close to them, because there are economic synergies
that could be created from a telecommunications perspective
between our two countries, understanding that it is a threat to
an authoritarian regime, you still have this other component
where there is a natural yearning, especially among young
people, no matter where they are in the world, to have greater
access to this modern technology. Americans did not have these
devices in their pockets going into 1995, but in Africa in
2001, only 12 million had cell phones. Today in Africa, 1
billion people have cell phones.
And so you can see how a huge paradigm shift can occur in a
very brief period of time with access to these technologies and
with the change in the access to technologies. It changes the
relationship between the people and the government,
notwithstanding their intents to completely control the
people----
Ms. Jacobson. And we have seen that in cell phone. Even
though Internet penetration is very low, cell phone use has
grown enormously and potentially could grow even more as an
information tool.
Senator Markey. So I think that trying to engage on that
one issue gives us an opportunity to really make a difference.
Actually I would add energy as well. There is, I understand, a
huge effort to move to wind and solar in Cuba at a very
significant level, which would further reduce their need for
imports of oil from other countries that then kind of tie them
into agendas in other countries as well.
I know I am running out of time, but I do think that
ultimately the more that we engage them at the economic level,
it tends to then change the country in ways that were
unanticipatable by the political leaders of that country.
I thank you so much.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
So we still have a second panel that I desperately want to
get to. It is important that we hear from them. I am going to
recognize for a second round of questions. I would ask that
they be limited to 4 minutes. I know not all the members have a
question.
But I wanted to begin basically with the following, and I
will focus on this. You talk about travel as a key component of
this plan because you believe the benefits of travel to the
island to the Cuban people outweigh the benefits to the
government. So in Cuba, the largest owner of tourist facilities
is a group. It is called Grupo de Turismo Gaviota. Recently
``Hotel'' magazine called it the largest hotel conglomerate in
Latin America. In Cuba, they own well over 52 hotels and the
largest resorts on the island, 19,000 rooms. Their revenues are
estimated at over $650 million a year. They plan 47,000 rooms
by the year 2017. They also own marinas, car rentals,
restaurants. You name it. They are the single largest player
not just in Cuba but in Latin America.
The CEO of that company is an individual by the name of
General Luis Perez Rospide. He is also a general in the armed
forces.
Mr. Malinowski, let me ask you. Is the armed forces of Cuba
a tool of repression?
Mr. Malinowski. Yes.
Senator Rubio. So the CEO of this company that owns all
these hotels on the island is also a general of this repressive
government.
But this company Gaviota is actually owned by a larger
company, a holding company by the name of GAESA, G-A-E-S-A.
GAESA owns various companies including this one, but basically
it has a monopoly on the island of Cuba on telecommunications,
hotels, restaurants, shops, and gas stations. The CEO of the
holding company that owns all of these hotels is an individual
by the name of Luis Alberto Rodriguez Lopez Calleja. That is
not just an individual with a long name. He is also a general
in the repressive armed forces.
Do you know who he is married to, Ms. Jacobson?
Ms. Jacobson. I do not.
Senator Rubio. He is married to a lady by the name of
Debora Castro Espin. Do you venture to guess who that is?
Ms. Jacobson. I can venture a guess that it is a member of
the Castro family.
Senator Rubio. It is. It is actually Raul Castro's
daughter. So the CEO of the monopoly holding company in Cuba
that owns all of these hotel rooms, the single largest
conglomerate in Latin America of tourism, is not just a general
in the repressive military. He is also the son-in-law of the
dictator of Cuba.
So is it not fair to say that if tomorrow an American gets
on an airplane and travels to Cuba and stays at a hotel and
rents a car and fills up the tank of their rental car at a gas
station and eats at a restaurant and shops at his stores, in
essence every penny they are spending in those facilities are
more likely than not to wind up in the hands of the repressive
Cuban military and its officials? Is that not a fair statement
given the facts I have just given you here?
Mr. Malinowski. Let me try to address that, Senator Rubio.
I was born in a Communist country, and I have been studying
these systems all my life. And what you just described is a
common feature of every repressive, corrupt, Communist or
otherwise, totalitarian system in the world. When you actually
look at the numbers, you find that these hotels that they run,
these businesses that they run--they earn hard currency, but
they also seep hard currency because they run them
inefficiently and that is why they fail. So we actually do not
know--none of us know--exactly what the net is.
Senator Rubio. But whatever the net is----
Mr. Malinowski. But whatever the net is, in all of my
experience advocating human rights and as someone who often
supports targeted sanctions against the bad guys, I know of no
example where we have successfully promoted democratic change
somewhere by going after travel and tourism, by going after
little people who travel and interact with each other. When we
do go after people with those kinds of measures, we go after
people at the top.
Senator Rubio. Give me an example of a policy like this
that you are implementing here today that has led, in the 20th
or 21st century, into a reluctant tyranny becoming a democracy.
Mr. Malinowski. I cannot think of any policy that we have
successfully pursued in which we have gone after remittances
and travel. There are plenty of situations where we have used
diplomatic engagement. Sometimes we use diplomatic engagement
plus sanctions, as we did in Burma, but we did not do it this
way. We did it in a smarter way. This is a policy that is
modeled----
Senator Rubio. Is there an example of a country in the
modern era that has gone from a tyranny to a dictatorship
because of these sorts of economic openings that then have led
the government to make political changes?
Mr. Malinowski. In many ways, when I look at Cuba today, it
reminds me of my home country Poland in the 1980s where you
have a growing black market fed by growing interaction with the
outside world with a movement at home that was backed by
strong, moral pressure from the United States and the
international community and a state that was increasingly
corrupt and shrinking and shrinking all of the time because it
could not manage any of this. So, yes, I think the answer is,
yes.
Senator Rubio. So Poland is the example. We will examine
that further at a later date.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
I would ask unanimous consent to place in the record the
full statement of Alan Gross, an open letter to President Obama
from 78 foreign policy thinkers and leaders, a statement--and I
apologize if I do not pronounce this right--Dagoberto Valdes
Hernandez, Director--can you help me with this magazine?
Senator Rubio. Convivencia.
Senator Boxer. As I was saying, Convivencia magazine.
[Laughter.]
Senator Boxer. I would ask that those be placed in the
record, along with an op-ed in the Miami Herald, ``December 17,
A Day of Triumph for Cuban Americans,'' by Rick Herrero,
Executive Director of ``Cuba Now,'' a letter from Bishop Oscar
Cantu, Chair of the Committee on International Justice and
Peace, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. I ask that they go
into the record. Is that all right?
Senator Rubio. Without objection.
[Editor's note.--The documents referred to can be found
beginning on page 80.]
Senator Boxer. I thank you.
And I would close with this. I know I want us to get to the
panel so much. So I will just close with a partial quote from
Alan Gross. And we have to remember that he was held for 5 long
years in prison in Cuba. And we are all so glad, no matter what
our views are on Cuba, that he is out. And he submitted a
written statement for today's hearing, and I am going to read
this little part of it now and put the rest of the statement in
the record.
He says, ``In my opinion''--remember this is someone who
was in prison there for 5 years--``In my opinion, access to
information is itself a fundamental human right and is
essential to empowering the Cuban people . . . Access to
information enables people to make better-informed decisions
and to give informed consent . . . Insufficient access to
information is unhealthy for any citizenry and it materially
impacts human rights issues on all levels . . . Reestablishing
diplomatic relations with the Government of Cuba is only a
first step in reestablishing freedom of information for those
who live on that island. However, it is an essential step. Why
would anyone not want to take that step?''
And, Mr. Chairman, I so respect all the views. I really do.
But I just think this sums it up from someone who suffered at
the hands of this corrupt dictatorship. And I stand with him on
his views.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Assistant Secretary Jacobson, do we prohibit
travel to any other country in the world, restrict it in this
way? I know we discourage travel sometimes, sometimes for
security reasons or others. But do we restrict travel to any
other country?
Ms. Jacobson. I am going to turn to my colleague to make
sure, but I think the answer is, no.
Mr. Malinowski. No. I mean, there are plenty of
dictatorships that restrict our travel. North Korea is a good
example.
Ms. Jacobson. The sanctions on Cuba are harsher than on
many other countries in the world over the years.
Senator Flake. There is no guarantee that if we completely
got rid of the travel ban--I know the President went about as
far as he could statutorily go--correct--in terms of loosening
travel, but Congress needs to move to----
Ms. Jacobson. Correct. He went as far as he felt he could
within Executive authority.
Senator Flake. But there is no guarantee that if we throw
open travel for Americans, allowing them--there is no guarantee
that the Cuban Government will allow all travel. They still
have control.
Ms. Jacobson. I think that is exactly right. I think being
overwhelmed is a big part of their concern.
Senator Flake. They obviously want the revenue that is
associated with travel.
Ms. Jacobson. They want the revenue associated with many of
these new measures and are very concerned at how they balance
that with control.
Senator Flake. I have always said if somebody is going to
restrict my travel, it should be a Communist. [Laughter.]
Senator Flake. Not my own government unless there is a
compelling national security reason otherwise.
It would be untrue and it would certainly be a stretch for
me to say that every travel dollar goes into the hand of an
ordinary Cuban citizen, a bellhop or a taxi cab driver or
somebody else, when Americans travel. Certainly some of that
money does end up in the hands of the Cuban Government. Is that
true?
Ms. Jacobson. Yes.
Senator Flake. But it would also not be accurate to say
that every dollar goes to the Cuban Government, that there is
not some kind of seepage. I mean, when you, yourself--you have
lived in these kinds of systems--you take the writings of
Hernando de Soto, ``The Mystery of Capital,'' and find out how
black markets work and how the unofficial economy works. There
is tremendous seepage that occurs. Is that not right?
Mr. Malinowski. Absolutely. This kind of interaction
encourages the development of a black market in which people,
most important, in addition to enriching themselves, become
more independent and less dependent on the state. And that is
how change happens.
Ms. Jacobson. Well, and I think Hernando de Soto's point
was of entrepreneurship, that individuals become entrepreneurs
if the system will not let them do that themselves.
Senator Flake. Precisely. That is another point of this
policy in some of the changes in unlimited remittances. How
much of a change has there been on the island just in the last
couple of years as a result of ordinary citizens having access
to some of that capital?
Ms. Jacobson. I mean, that has been a huge difference
certainly in the ability of people to start their own
businesses. That is the single reason that people have been
able to start their own businesses. It is capital from abroad
in remittances and in the growth of cell phones and the ability
of people to get information via SMS and other information. And
we think that is a crucial part of this, which is why we wanted
to accelerate those areas.
Senator Flake. We have seen, as you mentioned, a growth in
cell phones. The average wage for a Cuban worker is about $20 a
month. That is not enough to have a cell phone.
Ms. Jacobson. Correct, which is why both cell phones and
phone cards to charge them to get minutes are critical.
Senator Flake. Thank you so much.
Senator Rubio. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Malinowski, will you commit to this committee
that human rights and democracy programs in Cuba will not be
cut?
Mr. Malinowski. We certainly will not cut them and I trust
you will not. So, yes.
Senator Menendez. Secondly, I have here the last human
rights report for China. It is dozens of pages long. It talks
about, among so many other things, enforced disappearance,
strict house arrests, preventing public expression, repression
of freedoms against ethnic Uighurs and Tibetans, extrajudicial
killings, including executions without due process, enforced
disappearance and incommunicado detention, widespread
corruption, intense scrutiny and restrictions against NGOs,
discrimination against women, minorities, persons with
disabilities, a coercive birth limitation policy, and the list
goes on and on. So I would like to enter into the record the
State Department's human rights report on China.
[Editor's note.--The State Department report mentioned above
can be found beginning on page 104.].]
Senator Rubio. Without objection.
Senator Menendez. And certainly you would not hold that as
a standard after 43 years of democracy and human rights. Would
you?
Mr. Malinowski. If Cuba resembles what you just described
in 20 years, we will have failed. At the same time, if I may
add, Senator, if I had a choice right now to say that we should
not have diplomatic relations with China or there should be no
Internet in China or no private businesses in China, I would
certainly not take that choice. So the question is the balance
of possibilities is on our side.
Senator Menendez. If 43 years from now this reality is
China is the reality in Cuba----
Mr. Malinowski. We will have failed.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. We will have failed.
Mr. Malinowski. Yes.
Senator Menendez. And I agree with you on that.
Now, I do not want to join the ``blame America'' crowd. So
can you tell me is it not fair to say that the difficulties
that the Cuban people face is a result of a command and control
economy and political repression inside of Cuba?
Mr. Malinowski. Absolutely.
Senator Menendez. It is not because of the United States.
Mr. Malinowski. I explicitly said in my opening statement
it is not----
Senator Menendez. Because, you know, the suggestion that
the embargo has created this problem--Cuba can buy from many
places in the world. It has been able to do so. It just does
not have the resources to do so effectively.
Mr. Malinowski. I totally agree.
Senator Menendez. Let me ask you about this economic
freedom that we hear all the time. Is it not true, as the
chairman referred to--just a couple of items--that in Cuba most
of the businesses are monopolies? It is either a monopoly of
the Cuban Government and/or its military or a coowner in most
cases. You just do not get to have an independent free
business, unless it is a small one, of any consequence. Is that
not a fair statement?
Mr. Malinowski. That is correct, and we are trying to break
that monopoly.
Senator Menendez. Oh, yes, but you cannot break a monopoly
unless the regime allows a monopoly to be broken. Even in the
former Soviet Union, it was Glasnost and Perestroika, which
were internal openings that allowed things to break forward.
Now, you get a dollar from a remittance. And it is true
that you get that dollar after the government takes a
percentage of it for its transmission. Is it not also true that
if you really want to buy anything of value, you have to go to
a dollar store inside of Cuba?
Ms. Jacobson. It is certainly true that the dollar stores
are where the goods are.
Senator Menendez. And who owns the dollar stores?
Ms. Jacobson. The government.
Senator Menendez. So the ultimate flow of that money ends
up in the Cuban Government's hands at that dollar store.
Now, is it not true that tourism is the second-largest
driver of Cuba's economy?
Ms. Jacobson. It may be, yes.
Senator Menendez. I can assure you it is.
And so, therefore, when we think about sanctioning any
entity in the world, we sanction that which ultimately drives
the greatest resources to a country to move them in a different
direction.
And finally, the elements of the whole regional reality. Is
it not true, Mr. Secretary, that, in fact, many countries in
the region violate their own human rights and democratic
principles and like to use that as a cover, using the Cuba
situation as a cover for their own short-failings? So I would
expect then that the democratic charter of the OAS, which talks
about the commitment of all the countries in the Western
Hemisphere to human rights and democracy is now going to
flourish as a result of us changing this policy. Is that a fair
statement?
Mr. Malinowski. I think we have a much better chance of
advancing our human rights objectives in the hemisphere. We
will continue to stand up for them in Cuba. We will stand up
for them in Venezuela. You saw yesterday we announced our
latest visa ban list for Venezuela. We have the wind at our
backs today like we did not several months ago in part because
of these changes.
Senator Menendez. And I look forward to those results.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
We do have a vote at noon, but I will continue to sit here
so our second panel's testimony can be entered into the record.
And, of course, I will come back after the vote and preside
over the questions that we are going to ask them.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much.
Obviously, the Pope felt very strongly about this. I
believe he had a discussion with President Obama when he was at
the Vatican. When Senator Flake and I went down, we talked with
Cardinal Ortega.
Could you tell us a little more about what--I mean, he felt
this was a moral issue and wanted to speak out--more about what
activities he took or Cardinal Ortega took in terms of weighing
in on this issue?
Ms. Jacobson. I cannot tell you too much of the details. I
can tell you--because I do not know all of the details of the
Pope's involvement.
What I can tell you is that Cardinal Ortega was important
in conveying messages from the Vatican and from the Pope to
both of the leaders, and at crucial moments when it was not
clear that this was going to be able to work, I think the
Vatican's involvement and the trust that both sides place in
the Vatican and in this Pope was crucial.
But I also think that the role that the church has played,
whether it is stimulating private sector training or education
or at the time working on human rights issues, whether it was
Pope John Paul's visit, which was so electrifying, or
subsequently the release of 75 political prisoners in 2010, has
been a very important fact. And it is also important that in
the future the church remain engaged and as part of our own
civil society engagement with the church moving forward.
The importance of the Pope in the rest of the hemisphere
cannot also be discounted. The importance of Pope Francis as a
figure in Latin America just cannot be overstated. Coming from
the region, his moral support and encouragement for this deal
is critically important.
But I also think that we all now feel an even greater sense
of obligation to see it through. Certainly we expect that the
Cuban Government will move forward on the basis of respect for
the Pope and his imprimatur on this. And that is why we would
also like to see the human rights groups within Cuba, many of
them affiliated with the church--Dagoberto Valdes who was just
referred to has been very involved in the church movement.
Moving forward, this is a very important part of civil society
and its growth.
Senator Udall. Secretary Malinowski, did you have anything
to say there?
Mr. Malinowski. I have nothing to add to that.
Senator Udall. Okay, thank you.
Is it not true that in talking about businesses and small
entrepreneurs that there has been dramatic growth in the last 6
or 7 years in terms of the small entrepreneurs on the island of
Cuba?
Ms. Jacobson. There has been dramatic growth, but it is
from a very small base and it is still relatively small. But
there are over 200 professions now authorized for small
business. And, Senator Menendez, you are right. The government
still has a monopoly in many, many areas. Small businesses
still feel as if they sort of get the leftovers, what is left
of production or supply. But that is what we are trying to
expand. If we can help provide inputs for those small
businesses, they will not always be relying on the state for
the leftovers because they are authorized to operate.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Senator Rubio. Senator Kaine, do you have a question?
Senator Kaine. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. All right. Well, thank you both for being
here today. We are very grateful. We are going to get our
second panel to come forward. Thank you very much for your
testimony.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you.
Senator Rubio. Before we welcome the second panel of
courageous human rights activists and members of the democratic
opposition in Cuba, I would like unanimous consent that a
statement by Mr. Antonio Rodiles be included in the record. The
subcommittee has received a statement from Mr. Rodiles, but he
could not attend the hearing because the Cuban regime denied
him his travel documents. Without objection, show that entered
into the record.
Senator Rubio. He is a political activist who has achieved
international visibility for his work and created a forum in
July 2010 to encourage debate on social, cultural, and
political issues in Cuba.
[Editor's note.-- The statement referred can be found on page
95.]
Now, our second panel. As they come forward, I will
introduce them briefly. Rosa Maria Paya studied physics in
Cuba. She was forced into exile in 2013 due to threats
following the death of her husband, Oswaldo Paya Sardinas, and
her friend, Harold Cepero, in what appears to have been a state
security-engineered extrajudicial killing. She is a member of
the Christian Liberation Movement and is dedicated to the
struggle for a democratic Cuba.
Berta Soler is a hospital technician from Havana. Her
husband, Angel Moya Acosta, is a member of the democratic
opposition in Cuba and became one of the 75 peaceful activists
arrested during the March 2013 crackdown, known as the Black
Spring. Berta is founding member and the current president of
the Ladies in White, Damas de Blanco. This movement of wives
and relatives of the Cuban political prisoners demands the
immediate release of the loved ones and advocates for human
rights in Cuba. In 2005, the European Parliament awarded the
Ladies in White its Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought.
Miriam Leiva is a human rights activist and an independent
journalist. She is a founding member of the Ladies in White,
although she left the organization in 2008 and since then has
concentrated on writing as an independent journalist in the
defense of human rights in Cuba. And we mourned the death of
your husband in 2003, the late Oscar Espinosa Chepe.
And lastly I would like to welcome Mr. Manuel Cuesta Morua,
an anthropologist, philosopher, and historian. He is the
secretary general of the Socialist Democratic Current, a
dissident movement in Cuba, and he chairs the progressive
Circle Party.
We welcome your insights. And I will begin with Ms. Leiva.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF MIRIAM LEIVA, HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST AND
INDEPENDENT JOURNALIST, HAVANA, CUBA
Ms. Leiva. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators, dear Rosa
Maria Paya, whose inspiring father was my friend, dear members
of the peaceful Cuban opposition and dissidents within the
island nation and abroad, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for
granting me the opportunity of bringing my voice from Cuba to
this important hearing.
I have been a dissident for over 22 years, and I have been
subjected to surveillance, interrogations, harassment, and
searches of my home. Like my late husband, Oscar Espinosa
Chepe, I lost my job and right to a pension.
In 2003, Oscar was imprisoned with 74 other peaceful Cubans
and was sentenced to 20 years. Our only crimes have been
speaking out, writing, and seeking the well-being of the Cuban
people. For us, that means equal opportunities without
discrimination and regardless of political opinions and
economic prosperity.
As you well know, we have lived under a totalitarian regime
since 1959 that brought suffering and exile.
In the United States, 2 million Cubans found that by
working hard they could have the opportunity to enjoy the life
they were denied in their own country. In return, they have
contributed to this society, and today in this room we can
address prestigious Cuban American lawmakers.
Meanwhile, for 56 years, the government had been hammering
Cubans' minds, depriving them of food, clothes, money,
entertainment, and Internet and closely watching and
repressing. Because the regime found in the United States the
suitable culprit for all its failures, wrongdoings and
repression, it said the perils and shortages were due to
American imperialism and the embargo.
Despite all this, change has taken place in the minds of
the people and not only due to the government's unfulfilled
promises and their hopelessness. Since the Obama administration
started its proactive people-to-people policy in 2009,
beginning with Cuban Americans, a lot has changed. Remittances
from relatives and friends help Cubans to survive and even open
small businesses.
More important, Cubans are increasingly empowered as they
exchange views with Cuban Americans coming to visit and with
other Americans on people-to-people programs. The impact on
Cubans from all walks of life traveling to the United States is
overwhelming. Here they discover the opportunities offered by
democracy and work.
It is still hard to describe the amazement Cubans felt on
December 17, 2014, when we watched the so-called enemy
announcing the new measures and read President Obama's speech
published next to Raul Castro's in the newspapers. Now
everywhere one goes, there is one main issue in conversations
and hopeful expectations broadly shared.
Yet, there is more to be done. How could anyone understand
that you can visit North Korea but not Cuba? The ability of
Americans to interact with Cubans is impeded by restrictions to
travel to our country, and this must be ended.
Raul Castro is stepping down in 3 years, and currently he
is paving the way for new leaders. This period is crucial for
the transition and the future of Cuba, both for civil society
and foreign partners.
Brazil, Russia, and China are already positioned in Cuba.
Yet, Americans and Cuban Americans are still prevented by their
government from participating in economic and commercial
relations with Cuba and from contributing to startups in self-
employment that offer independence from state-owned economy.
While many dissidents and opponents support the new
American approach, others do not. Nevertheless, our objectives
are the same: defense of human rights, democratic values, and
friendship and assistance to the Cuban people.
The path to liberty, respect of human rights, and democracy
is arduous, and we must always keep in mind that we must not
depart from those goals.
We welcome advice and support from our friends as we
explain to them how Cuba is now and what can serve it better. I
believe that is the reason we gather here now. American policy
towards the Cuban Government has failed for 56 years. So it
must be changed. The embargo must be lifted to the benefit of
our people and nations.
You can only get to know what is going on within the island
nation, assist the civil society, and offer expertise of your
commercial and economic entrepreneurs by being there.
Reestablishing diplomatic relations will grant a better
environment for American diplomats in Cuba to contact the Cuban
people and the civil society. Normalizing a 56-year-long
estrangement will take a long time. But there is now a unique
opportunity to assist the people of Cuba and it must be not
wasted.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Leiva follows:]
Prepared Statement of Miriam Leiva
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators, dear Rosa Maria Paya,
whose inspiring father was my friend, dear members of the peaceful
Cuban opposition and dissidence within the island-nation and abroad,
ladies and gentlemen, thank you for granting me the opportunity of
bringing my voice from Cuba to this important hearing.
I have been a dissident for over 22 years. I have been subjected to
surveillance, interrogations, harassment, and searches of my home. Like
my late husband, Oscar Espinosa Chepe, I lost my job and right to a
pension.
In 2003, Oscar was imprisoned with 74 other peaceful Cubans, and
was sentenced to 20 years. Our only crimes have been speaking out,
writing and seeking the well-being of the Cuban people. For us, that
means the quest for equal opportunities without discrimination and
regardless of political opinions, economic prosperity and a good
quality of life. In short, freedom and democracy, and respect for all
human rights.
As you well know, we have lived under a totalitarian regime since
1959 that brought suffering and exile.
In the United States 2 million Cubans found that by working hard
they could have the opportunity to enjoy the life they were denied in
their own country. In return, they have contributed to this society,
and today, in this room, we can address one of many prestigious Cuban-
American lawmakers.
Meanwhile, 77 percent of Cuba's population was born after 1959. The
utopia turned into a nightmare. For 56 years, the government had been
hammering Cubans' minds, sending them to trenches through the island-
nation and abroad, depriving them of food, clothes, money,
entertainment and Internet, and closely watching and repressing.
Because the regime found in the United States the suitable culprit for
all its failures, wrongdoings, and repression, it alleged the perils
and shortages were due to American imperialism and the embargo.
Despite all of this, change has taken place in the minds of the
people, and not only due to impoverishment, disbelief in the
government's unfulfilled promises, and hopelessness. Since the Obama
administration started its proactive people-to-people policy in 2009,
beginning with Cuban Americans, a lot has changed.
Remittances from relatives and friends help thousands of Cubans to
survive and even open small businesses.
More important, Cubans are increasingly empowered as they exchange
views with Cuban-Americans coming to visit and with other Americans on
cultural, academic, scientific, religious, sport, and trade activities.
The impact on Cubans from all walks of life traveling to the United
States is overwhelming; here, they discover the opportunities offered
by democracy and work.
It is still hard to describe the amazement we felt on December 17,
2014. On that date, Cubans watched the so-called ``enemy'' announcing
the new measures, and read President Obama's speech published next to
Raul Castro's in the newspapers. Now, anywhere one goes there is one
main issue in conversations and hopeful expectations broadly shared.
Yet, there is more to be done. Americans are the best assets in
people-to-people diplomacy, but we cannot fully benefit from an
exchange of ideas, values, and expertise with them. How could anyone
understand that you can visit North Korea but not Cuba? The ability of
Americans to interact with Cubans is impeded by restrictions to travel
to our country, and these must end.
Raul Castro is stepping down in 3 years, and currently is paving
the way for the new leaders. This period is crucial for the transition
and the future of Cuba, both for the civil society and foreign
partners.
Mainly, it is Brazil, Russia, and China who are already positioned
in Cuba. Yet, Americans and Cuban-Americans are still prevented by
their government from participating in economic and commercial
relations with Cuba, and from contributing their know-how and
technology to the startups in self-employment that offer independence
from the state owned economy.
President Obama has expressed his unwavering commitment to
democracy, human rights, and civil society; the continuation of U.S.
programs aimed at promoting positive change in Cuba; and the
encouragement of reforms in high-level engagement with Cuban officials.
While many dissidents and opponents support the new approach of the
American administration in the relations with the Cuban government,
others do not. Nevertheless, the objective is the same: defense of
human rights, democratic values, and friendship and assistance to the
Cuban people. Likewise in the opposition and dissidence, we all seek
the well-being and progress of the Cuban people and our country.
The path to liberty, respect of human rights and democracy is
arduous, and we must always keep in mind that we must not depart from
those goals.
We must also keep on leaving aside personal interests, while we
devise programs that reflect the needs and aspirations of Cubans to
whom we aspire to reach out.
We welcome advice and support from our friends as we explain to
them how Cuba is now and what can serve it better. I believe that is
the reason we are gathered here now. The American policy toward the
Cuban government has disserved it for 56 years, so it must be changed.
The embargo must be lifted for the benefit of our peoples and nations.
You can only get to know what is going on within the island-nation,
assist civil society, bring your values, knowledge, and expertise, and
offer your commercial and economic entrepreneurs by being there.
Reestablishing relations will grant a better environment for the
American diplomats in Cuba, their contacts with the Cuban population
and the civil society, and their ability to access a direct channel to
the national officials, among other issues. Normalizing the 56 years
long estrangement will take a long time. But there is now a unique
opportunity to assist the Cuban people and it must not be wasted.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Just to remind the witnesses as well, your full statements
are entered into the record. We, obviously, are not going to
cut you off, but to the extent we can keep to the 5 minutes,
which you did--it was excellent because it allows us to get all
the statements in and then the questions.
The vote will start momentarily. I will stay here
obviously. At some point, I may have to briefly recess to go
vote and then return, but we are going to continue until we
hear from everyone.
With that, welcome, Ms. Rosa Maria Paya.
STATEMENT OF ROSA MARIA PAYA, CUBAN CHRISTIAN LIBERATION
MOVEMENT AND DAUGHTER OF SLAIN DISSIDENT, OSWALDO PAYA SARDINAS
Ms. Paya. Thank you for your invitation and thanks to the
whole committee for taking their time to listen to my friends
and I.
In recent years, my country has been engaged in a
deception. The Cuban Government is changing the law, but
ignoring the rights of the people, which were sequestered over
half of a century ago.
More people are allowed to enter and leave the country, but
the regime decides who can enjoy this privilege. The migratory
reform was established as a control mechanism. For instance,
the government has invalidated the passport of the artist Tania
Bruguera just for attempting a performance in Havana.
The Cuban Government has permitted more people to operate
small businesses, but due to the Cuban laws, entrepreneurs
cannot be a factor to foster democracy because their existence
as private owners depends on their submission to the
government. There cannot be free markets where there are not
free persons.
The Cuban Government said it would free 53 political
prisoners, but instead it released them on parole. Meanwhile,
many others were not freed at all. Yosvani Melchor was
transferred to a maximum security prison last December. He was
put in prison 4 years ago just for being the son of a member of
the Christian Liberation Movement, who refused to cooperate
with state security.
As my father did 4 months before he was killed, I denounced
the regime's attempts to impose a fraudulent change, and I
denounced the interests that hamper a real transition. My
father also denounced the attempt to link groups of exiles to
this fraudulent change. He said, ``The diaspora is a diaspora
because they are Cuban exiles to whom the regime denied all
rights, as they do to all Cubans. In such a context of
oppression, without rights and without transparency, the
insertion of the diaspora would only be part of the fraudulent
changes.''
As the engagement would be fraudulent, if the United States
were to accept the rule of the Cuban Government. We have never
asked our people to be isolated or embargoed, but engagement
will only be real if it occurs between free peoples.
We urge you to truly open up to Cuba, but to advance a
helping hand is essential to solidarity with the Cuban
citizenry. It is essential to support the peaceful and legal
changes that thousands of Cubans have presented to their fellow
citizens and to the Cuban Parliament, an alternative that
allows our people to decide their own future.
There is no respect for the self-determination of the Cuban
people when negotiations are a secret deal between elites or
when there is no mention that Cubans can participate or be
represented in their own society.
I know that the U.S. Congress and the administration will
do what you think is best for this country, which has served as
refuge for nearly 20 percent of our population. But only a real
transition to democracy in Cuba can guarantee stability for the
hemisphere. We, the Cubans, are not the Chinese. We are not
Vietnamese, and we definitely will not accept a Putin-like
model towards despotism.
The strategy to prevent a mass exodus from Cuba is not by
saving the interests of the group now in control. This is an
unstable equilibrium that could end in more social chaos and
violence. In fact, this country is already facing a Cuban
migratory crisis despite the record number of United States
visas granted. More than 6,500 Cubans arrived in the United
States via the Mexican border since last October, and more than
17,000 did so in the previous year.
With or without the Cuban Adjustment Act, the situation
will get worse because of the attempts of those in power in
Cuba for self-preservation of the status quo.
We Cubans want real changes, to design the prosperous
country that we deserve and we can build.
The way that you can promote stability in the region is
through supporting strategies that engage popular will, to
reach the end of totalitarianism with dignity for everyone. You
have the opportunity to support the petition for a
constitutional plebiscite in favor of multiparty and free
elections, already signed by thousands of citizens in the
Varela Project.
The Cuban Government would not have dared to carry out its
death threat against my father if the U.S. Government and the
democratic forces of the world had been showing solidarity. If
you turn your face, impunity rages. While you slept, the regime
was conceiving their cleansing of pro-democracy leaders to
come. While you sleep, a second generation of dictators is
planning with impunity their next crimes.
That is why we hope that this Congress demands that the
petition for an independent investigation regarding the attack
against my father be included in the negotiations with the
Cuban Government and that we hear publicly what response is
given to this point.
Do not turn your backs on Cubans again. Do not earn the
distrust of the new actors of our inevitably free future in
exchange for complicity with a gerontocracy who belongs to the
cold war era.
I want to conclude with the words that my father wrote to
President Obama 5 years ago: ``Your government must move
forward and extend a hand to the people and the Government of
Cuba, but with the request that the hands of Cuban citizens not
be tied. Otherwise, the opening will only be for the Cuban
Government and will be another episode of an international
spectacle for hypocrisy. A spectacle that reinforces oppression
and plunges the Cuban people deeper into the lie and total
defenselessness, seriously damaging the desire of Cubans for
the inevitable changes to be achieved peacefully. The pursuit
of friendship between the United States of America and Cuba is
inseparable from the pursuit of liberty. We want to be free and
be friends.''
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Paya follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rosa Maria Paya
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, and members of the committee,
in recent years my country has been engaged in a deception. The Cuban
Government is changing the Law, but ignoring the rights of the people,
which were sequestered over half a century ago.
More people are allowed to enter and leave the country, but the
regime decides who can enjoy this ``privilege.'' The migratory reform
was established as a control mechanism. For example, the government has
invalidated the passport of the artist, Tania Bruguera, for attempting
a performance in Havana. Sonia Garro, a member of the Ladies in White,
and one of the political prisoners released during the Washington-
Havana secret deal, cannot travel abroad and thus she is still a
hostage of the government, as Alan Gross was for 5 years. The same
applies to the former prisoners of the Cause of the 75 from the spring
of 2003.
The Cuban Government has permitted more people to operate small
businesses, but due to the Cuban laws, entrepreneurs cannot be a factor
to foster democracy because their existence as ``private'' owners
depends on their submission to the government. There cannot be free
markets where there are no free persons.
The Cuban Government said it would free 53 political prisoners, but
instead it released them on parole. Meanwhile, many others were not
freed at all. Yosvani Melchor was transferred to a maximum security
prison last December. He was put in prison 4 years ago for being the
son of a member of the Christian Liberation Movement, who refused to
cooperate with State Security. The young artist Danilo Maldonado, known
as El Sexto, was imprisoned after December 17 without committing any
crime. The regime turns political prisoners into pieces to be
exchanged, because they can catch-and-release at will more political
prisoners, and democratic nations accept this blackmail with innocent
citizens.
As my father did, 4 months before he was killed, I denounce the
regime's attempt to impose a fraudulent change, and I denounce the
interests that hamper a real transition and the recovery of our
sovereignty. My father also denounced the attempt to link groups of
exiles to this fraudulent change. He said, ``The diaspora is the
diaspora because they are Cuban exiles to whom the regime denied all
rights, as they do to all Cubans. In such a context of oppression,
without rights and without transparency, the insertion of the diaspora
would only be part of the fraudulent changes.''
As the engagement would be fraudulent, if the United States were to
accept the rule of the Cuban Government. We have never asked our people
to be isolated or embargoed, but engagement will only be real if it
occurs between free peoples.
We urge you to truly open up to Cuba, but to advance a helping hand
is essential the solidarity with the Cuban citizenry. It is essential
to support the peaceful and legal changes that thousands of Cubans have
presented to their fellow citizens and to the Cuban Parliament, an
alternative that allows our people to decide their own future.
There is no respect for the self-determination of the Cuban people
when negotiations are a secret pact between elites, or when there is no
mention that the Cubans can participate or be represented in their own
society.
I know that the U.S. Congress and the administration will do what
you think is best for this country, which has served as refuge for
nearly 20 percent of our population. But only a real transition to
democracy in Cuba can guarantee stability for the hemisphere. We the
Cubans are not Chinese, we are not Vietnamese, and we definitely won't
accept a Putin-like model toward despotism.
The strategy to prevent a mass exodus from Cuba is not by saving
the interests of the group now in control, this is an unstable
equilibrium that could end in more social chaos and violence. In fact,
this country is already facing a Cuban migratory crisis, despite the
record numbers of U.S. visas granted. More than 65 hundred Cubans
arrived in the United States via the Mexican border since last October,
and more than 17 thousand did so in the previous year.
With or without the Cuban Adjustment Act, this situation will get
worse because of the attempts of those in power in Cuba for self-
preservation of the status quo.
We Cubans want real changes, to design the prosperous country that
we deserve and can build. The only violence here comes from the Cuban
military against Cubans, that's way the solution is a peaceful
transition, not an appeasement.
The way that you can promote stability in the region is through
supporting strategies that engage the popular will, to reach the end of
totalitarianism with dignity for everyone. You have the opportunity to
support the petition for a constitutional plebiscite in favor of
multiparty and free elections, already signed by thousands of citizens
in the Varela Project, as is allowed for the Cuban Constitution.
There is an active campaign by Cubans from all over the globe,
asking for rights for all Cubans and the Plebiscite, which is a first
vote for the long-lasting changes that Cuba needs.
On 22 July 2012, Cuban State Security detained the car in which my
father, Oswaldo Paya, and my friend Harold Cepero, along with two young
European politicians, were traveling. All of them survived, but my
father disappeared for hours only to reappear dead, in the hospital in
which Harold would die without medical attention.
The Cuban Government wouldn't have dared to carry out its death
threats against my father if the U.S. Government and the democratic the
world had been showing solidarity. If you turn your face, impunity
rages. While you slept, the regime was conceiving their cleansing of
the pro-democracy leaders to come. While you sleep, a second generation
of dictators is planning with impunity their next crimes.
That is why we hope that this Congress demands that the petition
for an independent investigation, regarding the attack against Oswaldo
Paya and Harold Cepero, be included in the negotiations with the Cuban
Government, and that we hear publicly what response is given to this
point. Knowing the whole truth is essential in any transition process,
and to tolerate impunity is to endanger the lifes of all Cubans
wherever we live.
Don't turn your backs on Cubans again; don't earn the distrust of
the new actors of our inevitably free future, in exchange for
complicity with a gerontocracy who belongs to the cold war era.
I want to conclude with the words my father wrote to President
Obama 5 years ago: ``Your government must move forward and extend a
hand to the people and government of Cuba, but with the request that
the hands of Cuban citizens not be tied. Otherwise, the opening will
only be for the Cuban government, and will be another episode of an
international spectacle full of hypocrisy. A spectacle that reinforces
oppression, and plunges the Cuban people deeper into the lie and total
defenselessness, seriously damaging the desire of Cubans for the
inevitable changes to be achieved peacefully. The pursuit of friendship
between the United States of America and Cuba is inseparable from the
pursuit of liberty. We want to be free and be friends.''
God bless and protect our peoples. Thank you.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
We have 5 minutes left on the vote. So what I think I am
going to do is briefly recess for 10 minutes, let the members
vote because they do want to hear your testimony, and then we
will continue in 10 minutes with you, Mr. Morua and Ms. Soler.
We will be back in 10 minutes. The committee stands adjourned.
[Recess.]
Senator Rubio. The committee will come to order.
We are expecting our colleagues to return momentarily from
their vote. And the witnesses are taking their seats. I will
give them a moment to do that.
So just by point of process for our witnesses, my
colleagues have left to take a vote which should have
concluded. They are on their way back I know. And we are going
to continue, out of respect for your time, to take your
testimony. So if we are ready, Mr. Morua.
STATEMENT OF MANUEL CUESTA MORUA, SPOKESPERSON FOR PROGRESSIVE
ARC AND COORDINATOR OF NEW COUNTRY, HAVANA, CUBA
Mr. Morua. Thank you all for inviting me to this hearing
here in the United States. Thank you to Senator Boxer who
especially invited me here to stay and to share views with you.
And especially I want to thank Senator Menendez who supported
me in a hard and difficult moment in Cuba under the oppression
of the Cuban Government.
But I am going to continue reading my speech in Spanish
because I do not want to see myself smashing the English
language. So I ask you to open your ears and try to understand
my views.
Mr. Morua [through the interpreter]. My name is Manuel
Cuesta Morua. I am a historian and I tried to be a lawyer until
the regime determined that I could not be one. Imagine why. I
am 52 years old, 24 of which I have dedicated to fighting for
democratic change, establishing fundamental liberties, the
struggle for social equity and also racial equality. I am what
in Europe and Latin America is called a social democrat. This
is someone who believes in liberties, the rule of law, justice,
equality, and minority rights. Many things to be accomplished
in only one life, but I will persevere.
I am, above all, a Cuban. I have faith that things can be
accomplished if we fight hard enough and if we act according to
our moral compass and if we put reason above passion.
I am also a politician who believes that politics can
change things and that emotions can destroy the best of
intentions. I am a politician and I am one in Cuba. Today this
means putting the Cuban nation above ideological
considerations. This means looking at what I consider to be in
the best interest of my country before what I consider to be in
the best interest of my party.
Having said that, I believe that in many ways my
compatriots here today can have a different focus on how to
achieve democracy in Cuba but not a different purpose for the
nation and the destiny we share. We are absolutely united on
this.
My focus after December 17 is the following. The policy
change announced by the U.S. Government, first of all, allows
for fostering to make way for political action. That means that
all actors are obliged to act according to policy and not
epics.
Secondly, this places democratic debate on the main stage
in Cuba.
Three, this eliminates the burden of always having the
external conflict between states trumping internal conflicts
for democracy within the current framework of international
relations.
Four, this allows the open discussion about citizens'
political sovereignty above the discussion focused on the
sovereignty defended by states.
Five, this destroys the narrative that has been peddled by
the Cuban state to its society, a narrative that has been based
pedagogically, on the natural confrontation between Cuba and
the United States.
This disarms the Latin American foreign policy that has
allowed in the hemisphere the democratic debate to be disguised
by the conflict between north and south.
Seven, regarding the evasive Cuban state and its bad
policies towards its citizens, this makes the public discussion
over the error and horror of the state more possible.
Eight, this eliminates the alibi of the failed economic
model, if such a thing ever existed.
Nine, this frames the debate over human rights in Cuba on
the basis of a conflict about values, not a conflict among
states.
Ten, this opens the possibility of the soft power of
culture and diplomacy and not the hard power of war or civil
strife.
Eleven, hyperventilates a closed regime that has been able
thus far to control their own dose of oxygen that has allowed
it to survive.
Twelve, opens the way for the legitimization of civil
society among actors in both Latin America and the United
States.
Thirteen, destroys the Cuban regime's victim-tormentor
ambiguity, clearly exposing it as the tormentor not only of
political and human rights activists but also of 99 percent of
its citizens.
There is a premise that I would like to share in order to
put my analysis in perspective: Cuban authoritarianism cannot
survive an opening the same way that Chinese authoritarianism
can and has.
And, of course, the impact of diplomatic normalization can
be debated profusely, which is not the same as normalization
among two countries, over the structural well-being of the
country, which is what should matter the most if a clear vision
by the state is assumed.
In this sense, I do not believe that we should confuse
economic liberty with economic liberalization. We cannot also
confuse freedom of expression and information with greater
access to information and better technological infrastructure
for citizens to be informed, and moreover, we should not hide
the economic lack of productivity with the trade deficit that
would come with an avalanche of corn, soy, rice, oil, chicken,
and potatoes from the United States to Cuba. However, I believe
that it allows the conditions for Cubans to get involved in the
struggle for fundamental rights. At the end of the day, the
force of example goes a long way to push for change.
I do not believe that the change in U.S. policy will bring
us freedom, which would be the best outcome. The freedom of
Cuba is exclusively a matter for Cubans. But believe me, that
new policy will give us better options for us to obtain it by
ourselves.
Obviously, one thing is a new policy and the other is what
is perceived about that new policy. The way in which the
democratic community in Cuba learned of the new policy
introduced by the administration created the sense that the
normalization of diplomatic relations between states also
supposed an international normalization for the Cuban regime.
This immediately led to a new division, an artificial one and
one in which in my view between those with a soft focus and
those with a hard one, as if this was the equivalent of a
division among those who defend human rights and basic freedoms
in Cuba.
I would like to break the news to you that this is not the
case. My experience in the last few days, together with Cubans
on the island, in the United States and Puerto Rico is that we
walk and can walk together precisely thanks to our differences.
In the past few days, many people have adopted a new mantra:
differences enrich nations instead of weakening them.
Miriam Leiva, Berta Soler, Rosa Maria, and Manuel Cuesta
are together in the greater goal for democracy and the well-
being of Cuba, thanks to the fact that they are all different.
Allow me to make a suggestion. The United States can engage
the Cuban democratic community with all its plurality and
sustain a frank, measured, and honest conversation with it. You
will see that reason prevails.
Mr. Morua. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Morua follows:]
Prepared Statement of Manuel Cuesta Morua (English Translation)
My name is Manuel Cuesta Morua. I am a historian and I tried to be
a lawyer until the regime determined that I could not be one. Imagine
why. I am 52 years old, 24 of which I have dedicated to fighting for
democratic change, establishing fundamental liberties, and the struggle
for social and racial equality. I am what Europeans and Latin Americans
call a social democrat; which is someone who believes in liberties, the
rule of law, justice, equality, and minority rights. Many things to be
accomplished in only one life. But I persevere.
Yet above all, I am Cuban. With faith in the things that can be
accomplished if we fight hard enough, if we act according to our moral
compass, and if we put reason above passion.
I am also a politician who believes that politics can change
things, and that emotions can destroy the best of intentions.
I am a politician, and I am one in Cuba. Today this means putting
the Cuban nation above ideological considerations.
This means looking at what I consider to be in the best interest of
my country, before what I consider to be in the best interest of my
party.
Having said that, I believe that in many ways my compatriots here
today can have a different focus on how to achieve democracy in Cuba,
but not a different purpose for the nation and the destiny we share. In
that we are absolutely united.
My focus after December 17 toward that nation that we share is as
follows. The policy change announced by the United States Government:
1. Allows for posturing to make way for political action. This
means that all actors are obligated to act according to policy, not
epics.
2. It places the democratic debate on the main stage: Cuba.
3. Eliminates the burden of always having the external conflict
between states trumping internal conflicts for democracy, within the
current framework of international relations.
4. Allows the open discussion about citizens' political sovereignty
above the discussion centered on the sovereignty defended by states.
5. Destroys the narrative peddled by the Cuban state to its
society, a narrative that has been based, pedagogically, on the natural
confrontation between Cuba and the United States.
6. Disarms the Latin American foreign policy that has allowed the
democratic debate to be disguised by the conflict between North and
South.
7. Regarding the evasive Cuban state and its bad policies toward
its citizens, this makes the public discussion over the error and
horror of the state more possible.
8. Eliminates the alibi of the failed economic model, if such a
thing ever existed.
9. Frames the debate over human rights in Cuba on the basis of a
conflict about values, not a conflict among states.
10. Opens the possibility of the soft power of culture and
diplomacy, and not the hard power of war or civil strife.
11. Hyperventilates a closed regime that has been able thus far to
control their own dose of oxygen that has allowed it to survive.
12. Opens the way for the legitimization of civil society among
actors in both Latin America and the United States themselves.
13. Destroys the Cuban regime's victim-tormentor ambiguity, clearly
exposing it as the tormentor, not only of political and human rights
activists, but also of 99 percent of citizens.
There is a premise that I would like to share in order to put my
analysis in perspective: Cuban authoritarianism cannot survive an
opening the same way Chinese authoritarianism can and has.
And of course the impact of diplomatic normalization can be debated
profusely, which is not the same as normalization among two countries,
over the structural well-being of the country--which is what should
matter the most if a clear vision by the state is assumed.
In this sense, I do not believe that we should confuse economic
liberty with economic liberalization. We cannot also confuse freedom of
expression and information with greater access to information and
better technological infrastructure for citizens to be informed, and,
moreover, we should not hide the economic unproductivity with the trade
deficit that would come with an avalanche of corn, soy, rice, oil,
chicken, and potatoes from the United States to Cuba. On the short run,
what is good for U.S. industry and stomachs on the Island, will
probably not be good on the long run for our country's project.
However, I believe that it allows the conditions for Cubans to get
involved in the struggle for fundamental rights. At the end of the day,
the force of example goes a long way to push for change.
I do not believe that the change in U.S. policy will bring us
freedom, which would be the best outcome. The freedom of Cuba is
exclusively a matter for Cubans. But believe me, that new policy will
give us better options for us to obtain it by ourselves.
Obviously, one thing is a new policy and the other is the way it is
percieved. The way in which the democratic community in Cuba learned of
the new policy introduced by the administration created the sense that
the normalization of diplomatic relations between states also supposed
an international normalization for the Cuban regime. This immediately
led to a new division--an artificial one in my view--between those with
a soft focus and those with a hard one, as if this was the equivalent
of a division among those who defend human rights and basic freedoms in
Cuba.
I should break the news to you that that is not the case. My
experience in the last few days together with Cubans on the Island, in
the United States and Puerto Rico is that we walk and can walk together
precisely thanks to our differences. In the last few days many people
have adopted a new mantra: differences enrich nations, instead of
weakening them.
Miriam Leyva, Berta Soler, Rosa Maria, and Manuel Cuesta are
together in the greater goal for democracy and the well-being of Cuba,
due to the fact that they are different.
Allow me to make a suggestion: the United States can engage the
Cuban democratic community, with all its plurality, and sustain a
frank, measured, and honest conversation with it. You will see that
reason prevails.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
And Ms. Soler.
STATEMENT OF BERTA SOLER, PRESIDENT,
CUBAN LADIES IN WHITE, CUBA
Ms. Soler [through the interpreter]. Senator Marco Rubio,
distinguished Members of the Senate, before all, I want to
thank you for listening.
We live presently a particularly defining moment for the
future of our country in the wake of the recent announced
reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the
United States.
I am appearing here as the leader of the Ladies in White, a
group of women activists who support change toward democracy in
our country through nonviolent means, inspired by the example
of women such as Rosa Parks and Coretta King, among others, who
with courage and determination blazed paths for the full
enjoyment of civil rights in this country. Now 50 years after
the events in Selma, AL, and testifying before a subcommittee
whose mandate includes global women's issues, it is a great
honor and an historic opportunity for me to appear before you.
I also speak on behalf of numerous leaders and activists
from Cuban civil society who have entrusted me with speaking
for them before you. It is a civil society that is particularly
repressed by the intolerance of a government whose exercise of
power consists of systematic violation of the human rights of
the Cuban people. Just before I left Cuba in order to prepare
for this event, last January 28th, we celebrated the birth of
our founding father, Jose Marti, and just before I left Cuba,
dozens of activists were arrested in Havana and other provinces
for attempting to place offerings of flowers at statues of Jose
Marti. In its totalitarian vision, the dictatorship seeks a
monopoly on our national identity through the use of force
against all independent activists.
The most respected international human rights organizations
have documented violations of human rights in Cuba. On October
28, 2013, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued
an injunction on behalf of members of the Ladies in White to
afford protection in the face of systematic repression by Cuban
authorities. I submit the official Precautionary Measure issued
by the commission for these purposes, as well as the report
submitted to the commission by the Association of Independent
Cuban Lawyers, Cubalex, which initiated the case before the
commission. I request that these reports be made part of the
record of this hearing as documentary evidence of our
testimony.
These documents demonstrate that the subject of political
prisoners, one of the most sensitive issues in Cuba today,
reaches far beyond the occasional or periodic release of some
of them. Resolving this matter requires the unconditional
freeing of everyone who has been jailed for political reasons
on the island and the elimination of all legal restrictions
used to repress those who think differently from the regime.
Cuba continues to be a country with a one-party government
where fundamental freedoms that are an absolute right in North
American society are crimes against what they regard as state
security. Separation of powers does not exist in Cuba. Freedom
of expression and association continue to be repressed and the
constitution establishes the Communist Party as the driving
force for society. The right to strike is regarded as a crime,
with workers on and off the island subject to conditions of
labor slavery which have been denounced by international
organizations. While these conditions prevail, it is not
possible to speak of a willingness to change on the part of the
Castro regime.
That same January 28, during his appearance before the
third Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States, CELAC, held in San Jose, Costa Rica, the dictator, Raul
Castro, stated that Cuba will not give up one millimeter. For
us, this signals the continuation of beatings, jailing, forced
exile, discrimination against our children at school, and
again, all manner of patterns of intimidation we suffer daily
for wanting to see a pluralistic society, democratic, and
inclusive in Cuba.
Our aspirations are legitimate because they are undergirded
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which Cuba is a
party, and the signed international pacts on civil and
political rights which have not been ratified by the
dictatorship. Our demands are quite concrete: freedom for
political prisoners, recognition of civil society, the
elimination of all criminal dispositions that penalize freedom
of expression and association, and the right of the Cuban
people to choose their future through free, multiparty
elections.
We believe these demands are just and valid. Even more
importantly, for us they represent the most concrete exercise
of politics, a step in the direction of democratic coexistence.
Cuba will change when the laws that enable and protect the
criminal behavior of the forces of repression and corrupt
elements that sustain the regime change.
In the name of those who have been executed by firing
squads, in the name of Cuban political prisoners, in the name
of the pilots from the humanitarian organization, Brothers to
the Rescue, murdered on Fidel Castro's orders, in the name of
the victims from the March 13th tugboat, in the name of the
victims of Cuba's Communist regime, Cuba yes, Castro no.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Soler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Berta Soler (English Translation)
Honorable Senator Marco Rubio, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy,
Human Rights and Global Women's Issues, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, above all, I want to thank you for listening to me and
also to thank all of the people and organizations who have made it
possible for me to testify on the human rights situation in my country,
Cuba. We are presently living through a particularly defining moment
for the future of our country in the wake of the recent announced
reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United
States.
I am appearing here as the leader of the Ladies in White, a group
of women activists who support change toward democracy in our country
through nonviolent means, inspired by the example of women such as Rosa
Parks and Coretta King, among others, who with courage and
determination blazed paths for the full enjoyment of civil rights in
this country. Now 50 years after the events in Selma, Alabama, and
testifying before a subcommittee whose mandate includes Global Women's
Issues, it is a great honor and an historic opportunity for me to
appear before you.
I also speak on behalf of numerous leaders and activists from Cuban
civil society who have entrusted me with speaking for them before you.
It is a civil society that is particularly repressed by the intolerance
of a government whose exercise of power consists of the systematic
violation of the human rights of the Cuban people. Just before I left
Cuba to be here, last January 28th, the day we celebrate the birth of
our Founding Father Jose Marti, dozens of activists were arrested in
Havana and other provinces for attempting to place offerings of flowers
at statutes of Jose Marti. In its totalitarian vision, the dictatorship
seeks a monopoly on our national identity through the use of force
against all independent activists.
The most respected international human rights organizations have
documented violations of human rights in Cuba. On October 23, 2013, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued an injunction on
behalf of members of the Ladies in White, to afford protection in the
face of systematic repression by Cuban authorities. I submit the
official Precautionary Measure issued by the Commission for these
purposes, as well as the report submitted to the Commission by the
Association of Independent Cuban lawyers (Cubalex) which initiated the
case before the Commission. I wish also to submit a report prepared by
Cubalex on Cuba's prison system.
I request that these reports be made a part of the record of this
hearing as documentary evidence for our testimony.
These documents demonstrate that the subject of political
prisoners, one of the most sensitive issues in Cuba today, reaches far
beyond the occasional or periodic release of some of them. Resolving
this matter requires the unconditional freeing of everyone who has been
jailed for political reasons on the island and the elimination of all
legal restrictions used to repress those who think differently from the
regime.
Cuba continues to be a country with a one-party government where
fundamental freedoms that are an absolute right in North American
society are crimes against what they regard as ``State Security.''
Separation of powers does not exist in Cuba, freedom of expression and
association continue to be repressed and the constitution establishes
the Community Party as the ``driving force'' for society. The right to
strike is regarded as a crime with workers on and off the island
subject to conditions of labor slavery which have been denounced by
international organizations. While these conditions prevail, it is not
possible to speak of a willingness to change on the part of the
Castroite regime.
That same January 28, during his appearance before the third Summit
of the [Community of Latin American and Caribbean States] (CELAC), held
in San Jose, Costa Rica, the dictator Raul Castro stated that [Cuba]
``. . . will not give up one millimeter . . .'' of its system of
government as negotiations between Cuba and the United States begin,
and that it would make no sense to demand that he make changes to a
military, dynastic dictatorship that has been in power for more than
half a century. For us, this signals the continuation of beatings,
jailing, forced exile, discrimination against our children at school,
and all manner of patterns of intimidation and abuse we suffer daily
for wanting to see a pluralistic, democratic, and inclusive Cuba.
Honorable Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the subcommittee, our
aspirations are legitimate because they are undergirded by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which Cuba is a party, and the
signed international pacts on civil and political rights which have not
been ratified by the dictatorship. Our demands are quite concrete:
freedom for political prisoners, recognition of civil society, the
elimination of all criminal dispositions that penalize freedom of
expression and association and the right of the Cuban people to choose
their future through free, multiparty elections.
We believe these demands are just and valid. Even more importantly,
for us they represent the most concrete exercise of politics, a step in
the direction of democratic coexistence. Cuba will change when the laws
that enable and protect the criminal behavior of the forces of
repression and corrupt elements that sustain the regime change.
In the name of those who have been executed by the firing squads.
In the name of Cuban political prisoners.
In the name of the pilots from the humanitarian organization,
Brothers to the Rescue, murdered on Fidel Castro's orders.
In the name of the victims from the ``March 13th'' tugboat.
In the name of the victims of Cuba's Communist regime.
Cuba yes, Castro no.
Thank you very much.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, and that last sentenced needed no
translation. It was well understood.
Thank you all for being here today.
I have some questions. I know that my colleagues do as
well. So let me begin.
For all four members of the panel, this is in respect to
time. If you wish to elaborate, of course, you can, but this is
a pretty straightforward question. No matter how you feel about
the new policy toward Cuba, do I take it that all four of you
agree that it would be a mistake to move forward on these
policies without direct consultation and step-by-step
partnership with civil society and the democratic opposition on
the island?
Ms. Leiva. If I understand you is that if the American
Government has to ask to talk with us for each step it takes.
Is that what you mean?
Senator Rubio. No. My question is would it be a mistake to
move forward on changes with policy toward Cuba without direct
and ongoing consultation with civil society and the democratic
opposition on the island.
Ms. Leiva. I still see it the same way.
Senator Rubio. Okay. Anybody else?
Ms. Paya. Yes. If I understand, you are putting the step of
talking with us, of consultation with civil society and with
the opposition. And I think that, of course, that is important
for the future of this engagement if this engagement is going
to be for the good of the Cuban citizens, but not just. What I
want to be clear is that I think it is important to talk with
the civil society, to talk with the opposition, and also to put
onto the table of negotiations the voices of the citizenry. We
are not just asking for recognition for the civil society and
the opposition. This is not a partition scene. But the Cuban
citizens have very specific demands, which are the demands of
the Varela Project but are elemental demands that we share with
the democratic countries. And I hope that the demands also be
on the table of negotiation.
Thank you.
Senator Rubio. Mr. Morua.
Mr. Morua [through the interpreter]. I believe that it is
very important to maintain a continuous channel, a systematic
approach for communication with the Cuban community both within
and outside of Cuba in this process.
Ms. Soler [through the interpreter]. I believe it is very
important to note that really the Government of Cuba is not
sovereign because it was not elected. It is the people who are
the owners or the possessors of the sovereignty of the nation.
And so it is very important that we, the Cuban people, be
listened to and heard during this process.
Senator Rubio. My second question of the panel is there are
some in American politics who believe the democracy program and
aid on behalf of the United States to the opposition in Cuba
and civil society is an irritant that complicates and poisons
the relationship between the United States and Cuba. Do you
agree or disagree with my position that these democracy
programs are essential to help the civil society and the
democratic opposition in Cuba flourish and be prepared to take
part in what hopefully will be a free and democratic Cuba in
the future?
Ms. Leiva. Well, I think that the programs should be
directed directly to the Cuban civil society. The problem is
that a great budget has been destined to these goals and most
of them, most of the money has not gone directly to the
opposition. And the problem is again that the Cuban Government
says that we are mercenaries. We are paid by the American
imperialists and the American Government, and we have been
taken to prison because of that.
So I think the best is to analyze what would be the best to
support, to help the civil society. Listen to us. It is a very
wide range. I think up to now, the exchange of views, the way
we have been having relations with the interest section, with
the government, and with delegations from Senate, Congress, et
cetera, and also the way the new measures of the administration
can take place, can be promoted--well, I think it should be the
whole idea, not only we will send money through channels and
maybe some get to you and you go to prison. That is what I felt
all these years.
My husband, Oscar Espinosa Chepe, was sentenced to 20 years
in jail, and some of the crimes he was supposed to be
committing was receiving money from the American Government,
which was not true. So that is why I think it is very, very
serious. It is a very serious matter and it should be very well
treated and analyzed.
Senator Rubio. Ms. Paya.
Ms. Paya. Yes. I think that if the Government of the United
States were to accept all the repressive rules of the Cuban
Government, that is not going to be good for our people. This
engagement would be another part of the fraudulent changes if
the United States just said all this repressive and unfair
rules that the Cuban Government has with their own citizenry. I
think that you have the opportunity to support the real demands
of the citizens, but this approach, this engagement only be
true, only be good if it is performed between free persons.
Mr. Morua [through the interpreter]. I believe that it is
very important to maintain global solidarity with regard to
helping Cuba with this struggle. It is very important to help
the people within the country and outside of the country. And
we see examples of how different states do this with programs,
et cetera involved with the people.
Senator Rubio. And my final question for you, Ms. Soler----
The Interpreter. Excuse me. The interpretation.
Senator Rubio. I am sorry. I understood it, but I am sorry.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Soler. It is very important that the U.S. Government
continues to help Cuba but that the aid be directed to the
people, to civil society and not to the government because,
unfortunately, the government uses the resources that are sent
to repress the people. So this is a problem when the funds go
to help the government. Things like cell phones and the
contributions made by the exiles are a very good will and this
is helpful. And the information that we receive from TV Marti
and Radio Marti is wonderful because it lets us know what is
going on in the world. It helps civil society. So it is very
important that the resources go directly to the people and
civil society because in Cuba they will always say that we are
mercenaries and that we are anti-Communist and anti-
imperialist. But the truth is I am anti-Communist but not anti-
imperialist.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. And what I have told Senator
Flake is do not worry about the translation. I will let him
know later what they are saying. [Laughter.]
Senator Rubio. My final question, Ms. Soler. You have met
President Obama before. Correct?
Ms. Soler [through the interpreter]. Yes, correct.
Senator Rubio. And I believe it was in November of 2013?
Ms. Soler [through the interpreter]. Yes, correct.
Senator Rubio. At that time, did President Obama indicate
to you that any changes of policy toward Cuba would first be
consulted with groups like yourselves, like the Ladies in
White?
Ms. Soler [through the interpreter]. No, that is really not
the way it was. I am actually just another woman, another Cuban
woman. There is no reason for a government to count on me for
any type of opinions and things like that.
The important point is that the Government of Cuba is
really not sovereign because they are not elected. They are a
totalitarian government. They were not elected by the people.
And what is important is for the people to be listened to. That
is what really needs to be happening. And you cannot do
business with a tyrant. It just does not work that way. And
rather than establishing conditions from the United States to
Cuba, Raul will be establishing conditions for the United
States if you let him.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is
regretful, the way the time has gone, that so many of our
colleagues cannot be here because this is the part of Cuba that
members need to hear because there is this romanticism but not
the harsh reality of heroic individuals like these who every
day languish inside of Cuba to create a greater space for civil
society, human rights, and democracy. And we sweep that away.
And people will say, oh, yes, I know there are violations and
then we go on to let us do business. Let us travel. Let us do
everything else. And this needs to have, in my mind, the equal
stature. And so I appreciate you continuing the hearing and
making sure all of these people are heard.
I have a great deal of respect for all of you because it is
easier to talk about democracy and human rights outside of a
country that represses it. It is much more difficult to fight
and languish inside of a country that ultimately does not allow
its citizens their basic rights.
And, Mrs. Leiva, you have my deep condolences on the loss
of your husband, who I greatly admired.
Mrs. Paya, you have my condolences on the loss of your
father, who I also admired.
And Mr. Cuesta Morua, I appreciate that you acknowledge my
recognition of what you did in creating a parallel effort in
civil society when Central and Latin American leaders were
meeting, even though your efforts were repressed. But I am
really thankful to individuals like you who actually tried to
do that under a repressive system and tried to create an
independent voice for civil society. So my thanks go to you,
not to me.
Now, I want to just take a couple of minutes here because
those of us who follow these issues are deeply immersed in it,
but I do not know necessarily that others are.
So, Mrs. Paya, your father led a civil society effort
inside of Cuba by seeking to petition the government under the
existing Cuban Constitution for a redress of certain grievances
and got thousands of signatures. Is that a fair statement?
Ms. Paya. Yes, it is.
Senator Menendez. Basically, what he was trying to do is
create greater openings for the Cuban people within the context
of the Cuban constitution. Is that fair to say?
Ms. Paya. It would be, yes.
Senator Menendez. And can you briefly describe what some of
those openings that your father was petitioning for were?
Ms. Paya. Of course. The most elemental ones. We--when I
said ``we,'' it is because even when my father was the center
of the Varela Project, the Varela Project does not belong to my
father or to the opposition. It belonged to the citizenry, to
the Cuban citizens. And more than 25,000 of Cuban citizens in
the middle of the culture of fear and facing repression dared
to put their names, their address, and their ID number and
asked the Cuban Parliament for ask to the rest of the Cubans in
a plebiscite for changing the law, to guarantee free
association, free expression, the liberation of the political
prisoners, the real right to have free and private enterprises,
and change the electoral law in order to have free,
competitive, and multiparty elections.
Senator Menendez. So 25,000 Cubans signed onto this
petition.
Ms. Paya. The constitution asks for 10,000 of Cubans and
more than 25,000 signatures were delivered.
Senator Menendez. To seek those basic democratic and human
rights principles that we enjoy here at home and observe
throughout most of the world. And he did this with others
following him under the existing Cuban Constitution. Is that
right?
Ms. Paya. Yes. We are actually still waiting for the answer
of the Cuban Parliament. They are obligated by the constitution
to answer, and they have not.
Senator Menendez. And there was an answer in one respect,
and that was you believe that your father was assassinated.
Ms. Paya. I know that my father was assassinated.
Senator Menendez. And can you say why you believe that?
Ms. Paya. Well, we have accumulated a lot of evidence. We
have talked with the survivors. One of them actually has
published a book talking about how the state security hit their
car and then moved the two survivors--first hid the survivors
and then moved them away. And they just know that my father and
Harold Cepero were alive and, I think, pretty much uninjured
after the car was hidden. And 4 hours later, my father was dead
and my dear friend, Harold Cepero, died in the hospital. We
know that it was without medical attention.
Senator Menendez. So that was the regime's answer.
Mrs. Soler, the Ladies in White march every Sunday on their
way to church in a peaceful manner. Is that fair to say?
Ms. Soler [through the interpreter]. Yes, correct.
Senator Menendez. And the purpose of your peaceful march is
to protest the arrests of your sons or husbands who have been
arrested simply because of their political views or statements
or activities.
Ms. Soler [through the interpreter]. Well, no, that is not
exactly how it was. The truth is that the Government of Cuba
represses our right to religious freedom, represses our right
to movement, freedom of movement and association. Every Sunday
the Ladies in White are going out to participate in religious
activities.
One example would be on the 18th of January, on Sunday two
Ladies in White were detained in a patrol car and kept there
for 4 hours without oxygen. The government is constantly
repressing not only the Ladies in White but many activists who
are trying to exercise these rights of gathering together to
discuss matters of importance to them.
For example, on December 10, Ladies in White who wanted
again to exercise their right to freedom of association were
thrown in jail by the repressive forces of the Cuban Government
just because they said ``long live human rights.''
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, I have one final question
if I may.
Mr. Cuesta Morua, this effort at creating a parallel civil
discourse of civil society of Cuba, which you tried with the
last Latin American summit of CELAC--are you going to try to do
that at the upcoming Summit of the Americas? And how can we be
helpful if there is any way to be helpful without impinging on
it? Because I assume even your testimony here today can be
considered mercenaries if the Castro regime wants to claim it
as such. So that is a challenge. But I am interested in your
continuous effort to create a parallel civil society. The
voices of all of you and many others can be heard in these
discussions in the days ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Morua [through the interpreter]. Yes, of course.
The Cuban Government does not have much credibility. People
do not pay much attention to what they say.
We did try to carry out a parallel summit.
The Interpreter. The interpreter corrects.
Mr. Morua [through the interpreter]. We are going to try to
carry out a parallel summit following the tradition of the time
when we tried to do the same when CELAC was held in Panama. We
tried to do the same thing there following that tradition. In
fact, we are going to attempt to have two parallel summits, one
in Cuba and the other in Panama. We are working with democratic
society groups in New Jersey, Miami, Puerto Rico, and other
places to be able to attend and to have one voice and also to
carry out a summit, a parallel one, in Havana for those Cubans
who cannot go to Panama in order to participate as well and
have their voices heard with the OAS.
And, of course, we welcome the solidarity of the United
States. It is welcomed in the manner in which this solidarity
can be accomplished.
Senator Menendez. My admiration to all of you.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding
this hearing. And this has been very enlightening. I wish, as
was said, that all of our colleagues could hear what you said.
I am sure they are following it and their staff is as well.
But I just want to say how much I admire all of you for
what you are doing. I have traveled to Cuba a number of times
and have met with Ms. Leiva and your husband in prior years,
and I have seen what the Ladies in White have done and the work
of your father was just inspiring to everyone. And I just
cannot say enough about what you do and continue to do in the
face of very trying circumstances.
But, Ms. Leiva, in a letter to the ``New York Times,'' you
noted that, ``since the Obama administration started people-to-
people policy or expanded the people-to-people policy in 2009,
encouraging exchanges between Americans and Cubans, a lot has
changed and that Cubans are feeling empowered by exchanges of
views with Cuban Americans coming to visit and Americans on
cultural, academic, scientific, religious, sports, and other
trade trips.''
How do trips like that, particularly since Cuban Americans
can travel freely back to Cuba--how has that changed things?
Ms. Leiva. Well, not only because they have sent
remittances or they bring presents, but mainly because they
talk to the families, to the friends of how, working hard, they
have great possibilities of improving their lives and also
helping the Cubans in Cuba. And also, these remittances help
open the new businesses, the very small businesses. It is true.
But I think, let us say, the seed for a future bigger business
in Cuba, and that is what we expect.
So when somebody has a small business, then he has to hire
others or he has to sell. And it is like a web. They get to be
independent. And now, after these new measures taken by the
President, there is a sense of happiness, of hope in Cuba among
the population, most of the people, because there is not going
to be this atmosphere of confrontation but also because they
sense that there could be opportunities for everyone.
Of course, there was a great frustration because the
government of Raul Castro promised a lot of changes and almost
nothing was fulfilled. And people said, well, this is the same
and we are not going to be able to build our future. At
present, we are not going to have a future.
So now people see other possibilities. Of course, they know
that this depends on how the Cuban Government is willing to
admit the new measures of the United States because you can
open for someone to send tools for a new business and maybe in
the customs you cannot get them in. So, of course, people are
afraid and also people are afraid that if here in the United
States you change the law--how do you call it--for coming to
Cuba--Cuba to the United States----
Senator Rubio. The Cuban Adjustment Act.
Ms. Leiva. The Cuban Adjustment Act is changed or if this
dry/wet----
Senator Rubio. Wet foot/dry foot.
Ms. Leiva [continuing]. Is cancelled, they are afraid that
they will not be able to get to the United States, those that
want to get here. So I think that that is one of the causes
that is increasing the flow of Cubans coming more rapidly since
December because they are afraid that if it is closed, they
would not be able to get here. So I think this is also
something that should be thought because this could create a
tense atmosphere between the governments. And imagine a new
flow of Cubans coming to the United States, a tough situation
in the United States.
So I think that all this is very complex, I know, and we
are hoping that we can help solve all.
Senator Flake. Well, thank you. Thank you.
Mrs. Paya, as I mentioned, I am a huge admirer of your
father and what he did. I have quoted him often in a piece in
the ``New York Times'' in 2003 I think. And then I was fond of
a quote that ran in the ``Time'' story on him. It said Paya
reiterated his opposition to the U.S. trade embargo against
Cuba because he said it gave Castro the convenient excuse for
his economic failures. I think that is something that a lot of
us have always believed. But he also pointed out. He said I am
for all Americans traveling to Cuba, but he said please do not
think that Cuba will be democratized by people coming to dance
salsa and smoke cigars. And so I think that is certainly true
as well.
For Americans who are able now--more Americans--to travel
to Cuba, what would be your advice to how they can help the
Cuban people?
Ms. Paya. Well, with mojitos and Cuba Libres, we are not
going to free our island. I think that it would be great if
there are more relations with the real Cubans, with the people
that are suffering the repression of the Cuban Government,
which are all the citizenry. But what is also important to pay
attention to is it is not the American Government and not the
Americans laws, the ones who have kidnapped the strides of the
citizenry. And there are no more opportunities for the Cuban
people because the Cubans know how things change.
I think that this new policy--I think that this new
dialogue could be good if it is addressed with responsibility
and with transparency, not more secrets. And I actually hope
that the voice of the Cuban citizens that has been rising in
the past for very specific and concrete demands be on that
table of negotiation. Otherwise, mojitos, Cuba Libres, and
salsa--that is just going to be more of this long history.
Senator Flake. Well, thank you. My time is up. I appreciate
this.
Senator Rubio. Thank you all for your patience today. I
know it has been a long hearing. We have spent more time today
on Cuba than we have the 4 years that I have been here, and if
there is a silver lining in all this, it is that for the first
time, certainly in my time in the Senate and probably in a
decade, when something is going on in Cuba now, a human rights
abuse, any sort of outrage, it now is news in the United
States. And I hope that today's hearing served not just to
educate my colleagues but a broader sector of the American
public about the Cuban reality, what the people of Cuba are
facing, and hopefully what the opportunities are moving
forward.
But I want to thank all four of you for being here. I
recognize that being here today--and we take this for granted.
We have witnesses before this committee all the time who may
something that leads them to criticism in a blog or in the
press. But appearing here today, testifying here today puts
many of you in real danger of being detained or being harassed
and the people who you love, the same. In fact, all of you have
experienced that in the past as well. It is a liberty that
sometimes those of us who have been born and raised here in
this country take for granted. And we should not. Just 90 miles
from our shores is a place where the sorts of things that we do
here as a matter of course, disagree in open with our
Government, with our leaders, is punishable by imprisonment
and, throughout its history, death on the island of Cuba.
All of us share the same goal. I do not think that is in
dispute. Every single member of this committee, I believe the
vast majority of American people, and this administration, as
well as my leadership of my party, all share the goal of a free
and democratic Cuba. What we are having now is a debate about
the best way to bring that about, and differences of opinion,
as exhibited not just by our panel but by those here today on
this committee, as to best way to achieve it.
The good thing is that those of us on the American side of
the debate are able to debate those differences openly,
democratically. And we hope that in a future Cuba, all of civil
society and all Cubans will be able to disagree with their
leaders and do so without risking imprisonment or jail, but
also to be represented by elected representatives who will work
for you, who are accountable to you in the votes that they take
and the decisions that they make. I hope that in a future Cuba
there will be a free press so that you can gather news from any
sources you want. I hope that in a future Cuba, you will be
able to organize yourselves into political parties if you so
choose. I hope that in a future Cuba everyone will be able to
participate in the future of the country.
And that is our hope here, to see what we can do with
American foreign policy to bring that day about soon. It has
been a very long time. Many generations, many people have seen
mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters pass away without
being able to be reunited. Many people hope that future will
come soon. We have been waiting a long time.
Thank you. God bless all of you for being here. Muchisimas
gracias. Thank you.
[Applause.]
Senator Rubio. The record will remain open until the close
of business tomorrow, February 4.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
______
Responses of Roberta S. Jacobson to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken has committed to
provide a list of Members of Congress consulted about the negotiations
with Cuba.
What Members of Congress were consulted prior to the
President's announcement on December 17?
Answer. The administration has and will continue to regularly brief
and consult with Congress regarding its Cuba policy.
Prior to the President's announcement on December 17, the
administration briefed the congressional leadership, key committees,
and other Members.
We will continue to work closely with Congress in a bipartisan
manner to bring positive change to Cuba.
Question. It appears that the administration secured no concessions
on key issues of interest to the United States.
What commitments were secured regarding return of fugitives
from justice, property claims, and political reforms in Cuba?
Were these issues raised with the Castro regime? What was
their response?
Answer. Reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba is in the
U.S. national interest. This new approach is not about what the Cuban
Government will do for us, but rather what we can do for the Cuban and
American people. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations, including
reopening our Embassy in Havana, will allow us to more effectively
represent U.S. interests, including property claims, fugitives, human
rights, and needed political reforms and increase our engagement with
the Cuban people. Cuba remains a one party, authoritarian state. We
have no illusions about the nature of the Cuban Government. We will
continue to condemn any example of Cuban Government-sponsored
harassment, use of violence, or arbitrary detention of Cuban citizens
peaceably exercising their freedoms of expression and association.
We proposed to the Cubans starting discussions of outstanding
claims, in the event we reestablish diplomatic relations. Although
reaching agreement on the resolution of outstanding claims is often a
lengthy process, the Department is strongly committed to advancing this
effort. On the issue of fugitives, the Department repeatedly raises
fugitive cases with the Cuban Government and will continue to do so at
every appropriate opportunity. We raised several cases with the Cubans
when we met with them January 22.
Question. A month after the beginning of the secret negotiations,
Cuba was found smuggling 240 tons of weapons to North Korea (DPRK) in
violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Was this issue discussed during the negotiations?
Did Cuba agree to halt its illicit relationship with North
Korea as part of the negotiations?
Did the U.S. negotiators asked the Cuban Government to do
so?
When the next North Korean ship docks in Havana, carrying
weapons or other illicit cargo, what action does the United
States plan to take?
Has the United States made any commitments to not interfere
in Cuban-North Korea relations?
Answer. The United States remains concerned about attempts by North
Korea (DPRK) to circumvent international sanctions and strongly
condemn, and will continue to condemn, any efforts by states such as
Cuba to assist in the illegal evasion of binding decisions of the U.N.
Security Council.
At the same time, the administration believes that through a policy
of engagement with Cuba, we can more effectively stand up for our
values and those shared by the international community, promote human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and help the Cuban people help
themselves.
With respect to the Chong Chon Gang shipment to the DPRK, the
administration has worked to ensure that those responsible for this
egregious violation of U.N. sanctions pay a price for their wrongdoing.
The United States pushed for the U.N. DPRK sanctions committee to
designate the Ocean Maritime Management Company, a DPRK entity that
played a key role in managing the Chong Chon Gang. The committee
designated Ocean Maritime Management Company for sanctions last year.
The administration worked to maximize the diplomatic cost to Cuba
for its role in the incident, including by using meetings of the U.N.
Security Council to repeatedly condemn Cuba's role in the violation. We
applauded the U.N. DPRK Sanctions Committee's release of an
Implementation Assistance Notice to publicize the facts of the case and
advise states on how to protect themselves from future arms smuggling
attempts. The United States ensured that this Implementation Assistance
Notice also highlighted Cuba's role. The international community has
unequivocally refuted Cuba's claim that this arms shipment was allowed
under U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Question. Since the President's announcement of his unilateral
changes to Cuba policy, Gen. Raul Castro has made a series of demands
that he believes the United States should agree to as part of this
``normalization'' process.
Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba
changes to U.S. immigration policy, specifically the Cuban
Adjustment Act?
Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba U.S.
assistance to Cuban dissidents and human rights activists?
Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba Radio
and TV Marti broadcasting to Cuba?
Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba the
U.S. immigration program that allows Cuban medical personnel
forced to work overseas the opportunity to emigrate to the
United States?
Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba the
lifting the broader U.S. embargo of Cuba, which requires an act
of Congress?
Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba the
return of the U.S. naval facility at Guantanamo Bay?
Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba the
$181 billion in reparations that Castro demanded in 1999 for
the claimed ``damages'' brought by the embargo?
Answer. Reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba will
strengthen our ability to press the Cuban Government on important
issues, including human rights, democratic governance, and property
claims. Reestablishing diplomatic relations is a first step toward
normalization, a long-term process that will address long-standing
issues that have complicated our bilateral relationship for the last
half-century. Through a policy of engagement, we can more effectively
stand up for our values, and those shared by the entire hemisphere, and
help the Cuban people better help themselves.
Safe, orderly, and legal migration remains a top policy priority
for the United States and is also shared by the Government of Cuba. The
administration has no immediate plans to alter its Cuba migration
policy and recognizes that the Cuban Adjustment Act is a law that can
only be altered by Congress. We support Cuban nationals' ability to
freely travel and will continue to monitor how Cuba implements its
January 2013 migration reforms, specifically with respect to medical
professionals and their families as well as peaceful civil society
actors.
We will continue to use U.S. foreign assistance funds to support
adherence to democratic principles and norms, the promotion and
protection of human rights, the exercise of political and civil
liberties, and the free flow of information to, from, and within Cuba,
and to provide humanitarian assistance. We will also continue Radio and
TV Marti broadcasting to provide the Cuban people with the uncensored
news and information they are denied due to Cuban Government policies.
As the President said in his State of the Union Address, he
believes Congress should begin working to lift the embargo.
Reaching agreement on resolving outstanding claims is often a
lengthy process, but the Department is committed to pursuing a
resolution. We proposed to the Cubans starting discussions of
outstanding claims once we have established diplomatic relations. In
our discussions with the Cubans, we have made it clear that there are
no plans to alter the existing lease agreement for the Naval Station at
Guantanamo Bay.
Question. Raul Castro has been clear about his demands for
normalization of relations with the United States. So, what are our
demands of this dictator?
Is the administration demanding free and fair elections of
the only country in our hemisphere that has not been elected
for the last 53 years?
Is the administration demanding full respect for human
rights and that the regime honors their obligations under
international law?
Is the administration demanding that the regime release all
political prisoners and that they furthermore not arrest any
further prisoners for exercising their basic human rights?
Is the administration demanding freedom of information,
assembly, and expression, and restitution for confiscated
American property, and restitution for those who have suffered
for years at the hands of that oppressive regime?
Many of these are codified in U.S. law as preconditions for
normalization of relations. If the administration has not made
these demands, why not?
Answer. The administration fully recognizes that the Cuban people
have long been deprived of the freedom that they deserve, and the
fundamental goal of our policy is to advance a Cuba that is democratic,
prosperous, and well-governed. We also recognize, however, that our
previous approach over a half century, though rooted in the best of
intentions, did not work. Our new approach is not about what the Cuban
Government would do for us, but rather what we can do for the Cuban and
American people. Reestablishing diplomatic relations and reopening
embassies are just the first steps in the complex, long-term process of
normalization of relations.
This administration is under no illusions about the continued
barriers to internationally recognized freedoms that remain for the
Cuban people, but we are convinced that, through a policy of
engagement, we can more effectively promote our interests and values,
and help the Cuban people begin to enjoy more independence from the
Cuban state. Diplomatic relations will provide us the opportunity to
engage more effectively on a range of important issues, including
claims, fugitives, and human rights. Our discussions with the Cuban
Government will include promoting respect for universal human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
Question. You may be aware that the President of the Fraternal
Order of Police recently sent a letter to President Obama saying, ``The
blood of American law enforcement officers doing their job on American
soil is too high a price to pay for closer ties with the Cuban
regime.''
Do you agree with this statement?
Do you have any qualms about allowing a convicted accessory
to murder out of prison?
Are you aware of any other cases where a foreign national
convicted by a U.S. court and sentenced to life in prison for
crimes that led to the murder of American citizens, was traded
in a hostage negotiation?
What steps did the administration take to contact the
families of the Americans who lost their lives in 1996 at the
hands of the Cuban regime before an individual involved in
their family member's murder was set free?
What steps did the administration take to consult the
families of the law enforcement officers who were murdered by
fugitives currently in Cuba as you negotiated with the people
harboring those who killed their love ones?
Answer. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations will allow us
to more effectively represent U.S. interests, including pressing for
the return of fugitives, and increase our engagement with the Cuban
people. The Department repeatedly raises fugitive cases with the Cuban
Government and will continue to do so at every appropriate opportunity.
We raised several cases with the Cubans in Havana January 22, and we
will continue to press for resolution. Our repeated efforts to address
fugitive issues with the Cuban Government have met with limited success
in recent years. Cuba has expelled to the United States at least four
U.S.-national fugitives since 2011.
When it is deemed to be in the U.S. national interest, the United
States has exchanged imprisoned intelligence agents with other
countries in the past, including those countries where we have
historically had difficult or limited relations. In the exchange of
intelligence agents that took place with Cuba on December 17, the
United States released three Cuban intelligence agents to secure the
release of an important intelligence asset, a man that provided key
information to the United States about systematic Cuban espionage and
efforts to penetrate the U.S. Government. In light of his sacrifice on
behalf of the United States, securing his release from prison after
nearly 20 years is fitting closure to this chapter of U.S.-Cuban
relations.
Question. The Cuban regime confiscated U.S. private property and
owes damages exceeding $8 billion in restitution to rightful owners and
more than $2 billion in judgments awarded in U.S. courts.
What progress was made on this issue during 18 months of
secret negotiations?
Will you commit to not open an embassy or normalize
relations with Cuba until a process has been established for
these claims to be addressed, as has been the case in past
instances when the United States restored diplomatic relations
with countries with outstanding claims, such as Libya?
If not, why would Cuba have any motivation to settle the
claims at all if the embargo is already lifted or Americans can
freely travel to Cuba and diplomatic ties exist?
Can you cite another instance where the United States
normalized relations with a country that had billions of
dollars in outstanding claims and judgments without an agreed
process in place for resolution of those claims?
What protections is the administration willing to provide
current American citizens who had stolen property in Cuba so
that U.S. and foreign entities do not exploit and traffic in
their stolen property? Would it be fair to allow these
Americans full access to U.S. courts to prosecute traffickers,
foreign and domestic?
As you may know, many licenses granted by OFAC result in
the trafficking by Americans in the stolen property of other
Americans, which includes hotels and even the art in Havana's
major museums. Is trafficking not a violation of U.S. law, or
at least the American moral and ethical principles? Should we
allow American visitors and business interests to have
commercial relations with Cuba without any concern that this
involves the stolen property, brands and trademarks of
Americans? Should traffickers be liable for these acts?
Did you traffic in stolen U.S. property at all when you
were in Cuba? If not, how are you sure? Has the U.S. Interests
section and any diplomats serving there ever trafficked in
stolen property, even if unintentionally?
Answer. Following the President's December 17, 2014, announcement
of a new course in Cuba policy, Assistant Secretary Jacobson raised the
need to resolve outstanding property claims with the Cuban Government
during January 22 talks in Havana. The Department is committed to
pursuing a resolution of claims and firmly believes the reestablishment
of diplomatic relations will provide the United States and Cuba the
opportunity to engage more effectively on a range of important issues,
including claims.
With Cuba, the discussion of claims will be part of our broader
normalization efforts, a long-term process. As in all claims settlement
discussions, a range of issues will need to be considered. The Cuban
Government agreed to begin a dialogue on claims in the months following
the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and reopening of our
respective embassies.
Claims are not necessarily addressed as part of the reestablishment
of diplomatic relations. In fact, diplomatic relations are generally in
place when governments embark on claims discussions. We did not resolve
claims with Libya or Iraq as part of establishing diplomatic relations.
In both cases, we already had diplomatic relations before we began
discussing claims. In Libya, we had not severed diplomatic relations;
claims discussions were simply part of normalizing our bilateral
relationship, along with discussing other pressing matters such as
weapons of mass destruction.
Title III of Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act
of 1996 (Public Law 104-114; 22 U.S.C. 6021-6091) creates a private
cause of action and authorizes U.S. nationals with claims to
confiscated property in Cuba to file suit in U.S. courts against
persons purported to be trafficking in that property. The President has
repeatedly exercised the authority under the act to suspend the lawsuit
provisions for periods of 6 months, as necessary to the national
interest of the United States and to expedite a transition to democracy
in Cuba. At this juncture, we continue to believe that claims
discussions with the Cuban Government will afford the best opportunity
to address issues regarding claims for property.
Question. There have been many press reports in recent weeks about
what the administration would like to see happen in Cuba as a result of
the President's announcement, but very little on how it intends to get
there.
What benchmarks or metrics has the administration developed
to determine your progress in achieving its objectives with its
new Cuba policy?
In other words, how will the administration determine
whether the policy is working or not?
Answer. Our enduring objective remains the emergence of a
democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba that respects and adheres to
human rights norms. The President's new approach to Cuba moves beyond
decades of unsuccessful efforts to isolate Cuba and is designed to
empower the Cuban people. Over time, the success of our policy can be
judged in terms of its success in empowering the Cuban people to
determine freely their own future, including in the areas of greater
political space to express dissent, democratic accountability, access
to information, and respect for human rights. The intensive discussions
between the United States and the Cuban Government in January on the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations were only the initial step in
what is likely to be a long and complex process of normalization of
relations.
Question. The administration announced that the Cuban Government
released 53 political prisoners as part of the President's new approach
toward Cuba. However, according to reports from various independent
groups, the Cuban Government has jailed over 250 other individuals for
peacefully demonstrating against the dictatorship. These include two
new long-term political prisoners, Cuban artist Danilo Maldonado ``El
Sexto'' and rapper Maikel Oksob ``El Dkano.''
According to news reports and independent organizations, Danilo
Maldonado, known as El Sexto (the Sixth one, is a satirical reference
to the five Cuban spies portrayed as heroes by the Cuban Government)
was arrested on December 26 as he was on his way to Havana's Central
Park to do an art performance with two pigs, named Fidel and Raul. The
Cuban regime is accusing El Sexto of ``disrespect'' and he has been
sent to the Valle Grande prison to await trial. Thus, Cuba is clearly
refilling its jails to continue using political prisoners as pawns.
Does the administration believes that the Cuban Government
will stop detaining and imprisoning those who advocate for
freedom and democracy?
If not, why did the administration encourage them to
continue taking more political prisoners as pawns by succumbing
to the regime's coercion?
A/S Malinowski, the President has signed into law sanctions
imposed on human rights abusers in Venezuela and we have human
rights sanctions against other rogue regimes around the world.
Would it be appropriate to impose sanctions on Cuban officials
involved in human rights abuses? If not, why?
Why did your delegation to the recent normalization talks
not include A/S Malinowski or someone from his bureau?
Does the administration plan to raise human rights in any
sustained and direct way with Cuba in the months to come?
How will you implement your public commitment to not
abandon the Cuban opposition when the regime has expressed
disapproval of a simple breakfast you shared with some of the
democratic leaders, and the regime snubbed CODEL Leahy because
it met with dissidents on its recent trip to Cuba?
Josefina Vidal says the dissidents do not represent Cuban
society. Do you agree?
Answer. The United States is committed to promoting universal human
rights and democratic reforms in Cuba. We condemn any example of Cuban
Government-sponsored harassment, use of violence, or arbitrary
detention of Cuban citizens peaceably expressing their views. We
continue to call on the Cuban Government to end these practices. We
have no illusions the Cuban Government will change its behavior
overnight. We believe reestablishing diplomatic relations will help
remove a pretext the Cuban Government has used, for many years, to
successfully counter pressure from the Cuban people for more freedom,
access to information, economic prosperity, and other legitimate
demands. We encourage all Members of Congress to engage all Cubans,
including those who may have significant differences with their
government.
We expect that Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor Malinowski will lead the U.S. delegation to the planned bilateral
dialogue on human rights. Our objective in such talks will be to
advance an agenda of specific reforms that will bring about concrete
improvements consistent with applicable international human rights
commitments. Regarding targeted sanctions, we are willing to consider
those tools that we deem most effective for achieving our national
interests.
Question. Even as you were negotiating in secret with the Cuban
regime, that regime stepped up its repression and incarceration of
peaceful pro-democracy activists. Your Cuban interlocutors have yet to
allow an international investigation into the murders, at the hands of
the Cuban regime, of Oswaldo Paya and Harold Cepero, which the Cuban
regime has prevented from taking place. By not investigating this
tragedy, and by not requiring that the Cuban regime allow for such an
investigation, we are sending a signal that they can enjoy impunity for
these murders, and we are endangering the lives of every single pro-
democracy activist on the island, who tell us that they are at the
mercy of that lawless regime.
Will you pledge to require the regime to allow these
international investigations to take place, as well as
investigations into the mysterious deaths of Laura Pollan,
founder of the Ladies in White, and Orlando Zapata Tamayo,
among many other innocent victims of that regime, as pre-
conditions for normalization of relations with the United
States?
Answer. We have the greatest respect for all democracy activists in
Cuba who are working to create a better future for the Cuban people.
Furthermore, we continue to call for an independent and credible
investigation into the deaths of Oswaldo Paya and Harold Cepero,
including giving the Paya family access to the autopsy report. An
independent investigation would help address concerns about lack of
transparency and possible involvement of Cuban security officials in
their deaths. Our policy of engagement and empowerment of the Cuban
people is better positioned to help Cubans to develop, over the long
term, an independent judicial system that could address in a
transparent, impartial manner cases like the ones you raise.
Question. The administration has couched many of its changes in
U.S. travel, banking, and trade with Cuba as part of an effort to
empower the supposed Cuban ``private sector'' and
``microentrepreneurs.''
What is the administration's definition of the ``private
sector'' in Cuba?
Will it define enterprises run by the Cuban military or
operated by the offspring of Cuban regime officials to be the
``private sector''?
Will it define entities owned by the Cuban Government, but
operated by an individual with a ``self-employment'' license to
be the ``private sector''?
Answer. The policy changes announced December 17, 2014, which build
on President Obama's 2009 and 2011 Cuba policy changes, create new
opportunities for Cuba's nascent private sector. These measures are
intended to support the ability of the Cuban people to gain greater
control over their own lives and freely determine their country's
future.
We consider the private sector in Cuba to encompass economic
activity generated by private individuals and enterprises for profit as
well as nonprofit organizations and charities. For example, Cubans who
are self-employed, own independent small businesses, or form private
cooperatives that are not part of Cuba's state sector are included in
this category. We do not consider entities owned or operated, in whole
or in part, by the Cuban Government or military to be part of the
private sector.
Question. Article 18 of the Cuban Constitution states that all
foreign trade and commerce must be owned and operated by the state.
How are U.S. exports to benefit the Cuban people if they
must all be funneled through the state?
Do you believe the Cuban Government will provide the Cuban
people access to these goods?
Did the Cuban regime share the billions worth of goods from
the former Soviet Union and Venezuela with the Cuban people?
Why would it act differently now?
Answer. U.S. exports in authorized areas will benefit the Cuban
people. For example, while Cuban Government import agencies and other
government owned, operated, or controlled companies and corporations
may act as consignees to receive and effect delivery of certain
eligible items to the private sector, the Cuban Government may not be
the end user of such items. U.S. exporters would be subject to civil
and/or criminal penalties if they were to export, with prior knowledge,
ineligible items to Cuban Government end users. The Department of
Commerce's new license exception ``Support for the Cuban People (SCP)''
would not apply to items exported to Cuban Government end users, except
in the area of telecommunications. Similarly, consumer communications
devices may be sold to Cuban Government owned, operated, or controlled
companies and corporations for resale to the Cuban people.
While most U.S. exports to Cuba remain prohibited under the
embargo, past practice under the Department of Commerce's licensing
exception for agricultural products and the general policy of approval
for medicines and medical devices similarly permitted Cuban Government
entities to import and effect delivery of certain products to the
benefit of the Cuban people. In these cases, the Cuban Government did
provide the Cuban people access to these goods, per the terms and
conditions of those export authorizations. The Department of Commerce
will continue to investigate and take appropriate action against any
U.S. exporters that violate the terms of their licenses or the Export
Administration Regulations.
Question. The administration has stated a desire to see Cuban
residents have access to Internet. The Cuban Government is one of the
most oppressive in the world and the rate of Internet penetration in
Cuba is among the lowest in the world. The Internet in Cuba is
controlled by a state monopoly, ETECSA. This monopoly has clearly shown
that the only obstacle to connectivity is the regime's unwillingness to
do so. Despite the new fiber optic cables (Venezuela and Jamaica) and
investments by foreign companies (Telecom Italia and Alcatel), ETECSA
has yet to provide more access to the Cuban people. The only reason the
Cuban people are unable to access the Internet is because the Castro
regime won't allow them to.
What specific commitments has the administration obtained
from the Cuban regime about how U.S.-provided
telecommunications equipment will be utilized?
Has the Cuban regime pledged to allow unrestricted access
to the Internet as a result of this change in U.S. policy?
If not, what makes you think that even more cables and
investments will increase the Cuban people's connectivity?
Did Telecom Italia help the Cuban people access the
Internet through its investment in ETECSA?
Has France's Alcatel-Lucent helped the Cuban people access
the Internet? If not, why?
Is the administration willing to move forward with
authorizing the provision of telecommunications infrastructure
in Cuba without the guarantee that the Cuban people will have
the ability to speak freely over that infrastructure?
Instead of providing telecommunications infrastructure in
ways that will only enrich the Cuban regime, why not push for
companies like Google to provide Internet connectivity via
satellite or other programs that circumvent the regime?
Answer. Unrestricted access to information through the Internet and
other means is a U.S. priority in Cuba and around the world. The
President announced in December our intention to facilitate
telecommunication and Internet development and access in Cuba. In
January, the Departments of Commerce and Treasury released amended
regulations allowing U.S. companies to engage in more activities with
Cuba to support better communications and access to information for the
Cuban people. These regulatory changes respond directly to requests
made to the administration by civil society to enable greater access to
telecommunications equipment on the island.
Internet access in Cuba remains extremely limited, in large part,
because the Cuban Government has chosen not to offer its public
widespread access to a high-speed fiber-optic cable from Venezuela. It
is also true that U.S. sanctions made it difficult for U.S. telecom
companies to engage with Cuba. While we cannot address what non-U.S.
companies have done on the island, we are encouraging U.S. companies to
consider the Cuban market and continuing to work to address their
concerns. In addition, we will work with Cubans, including civil
society actors, to promote uncensored Internet access.
We are aware that efforts to facilitate access to uncensored
information in Cuba have been, and will likely continue to be, opposed
in various ways, including government censorship of the Internet. In
those areas of the world where repressive governments have attempted to
restrict Internet freedom, the U.S. Government has implemented programs
to help promote such freedom. The U.S. Interests Section provides free,
uncensored access through its Internet Resource Centers.
The Cuban Government indicated it would like to develop
communications and Internet on the island. We and our partners will
encourage it to follow through. We proposed that Ambassador Daniel
Sepulveda, U.S. Coordinator for International Communications and
Information Policy, travel to Cuba to begin a dialogue on broadening
telecommunications and Internet on the island with the objective of
advancing unfettered Internet access for the Cuban people. We do not
know if the Cuban Government will follow through on its stated
intention of expanding Internet access in Cuba, but we want to be clear
that we support and are doing all we can to facilitate that access.
Question. The Cuban regime has been contracting monitoring
technologies through state-entities, Albet, Xetid, and Datys. These
companies have obtained lucrative contracts and operate in Venezuela,
Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.
Why are they able to export software and technology, but
not provide basic connectivity to their people?
Answer. Internet access in Cuba is expensive, of very poor quality,
and available to a small number of people due to deliberate choices of
the Cuban Government which, among other things, has chosen not to offer
its citizens widespread access to a high speed fiber-optic cable from
Venezuela. It is revealing that Cuba both limits its citizens' access
to the Internet and devotes resources to developing monitoring
technologies.
Unrestricted access to information through the Internet and other
means is a U.S. priority in Cuba and around the world. The United
States supports greater connectivity for the Cuban people. In January,
the Department of Treasury promulgated regulatory changes authorizing
transactions incidental to telecommunications and Internet linkages
between the United States and Cuba, including telecommunications
facilities in Cuba under an OFAC general license, as opposed to the
more restrictive specific license. Under a Department of Commerce
license exception, the export of items for Cuba's telecom
infrastructure is also permitted under certain conditions. Under new
policies, U.S. companies may also make commercial sales of personal
communication devices and software (e.g., telephones, computers, and
Internet technology/applications) to Cuba, and can also send certain
tools, equipment, and supplies to private enterprises in Cuba. These
regulatory changes respond directly to requests made to the
administration by civil society to enable greater access to
telecommunications equipment on the island.
We are encouraging U.S. companies to consider the Cuban market and
continuing to work to address their concerns. We proposed that
Ambassador Daniel Sepulveda, U.S. Coordinator for International
Communications and Information Policy, travel to Cuba to begin a
dialogue on broadening telecommunications and Internet on the island
with the objective of advancing unfettered Internet access for the
Cuban people. In addition, we will work with Cubans, including civil
society actors, to promote uncensored Internet access. This is an
important part of our efforts to enhance and strengthen the fundamental
right to freedom of speech and expression.
Question. General Castro has launched a public diplomacy campaign
with other Latin American countries defending his interests in
normalizing relations with the United States. The administration said
it wanted to remove ``the Cuba distraction'' in order to improve
relations with the countries of the Western Hemisphere.
Can you provide a detailed administration strategy to
capitalize on its Cuba policy shift as part of its diplomatic
engagements in the Western Hemisphere?
In what specific ways do you expect countries in the
Western Hemisphere to qualitatively modify their efforts to
support political freedom in Cuba, especially in the runup to
the April Summit of the Americas in Panama?
What specific commitments has the administration obtained
from any government, anywhere in the world, to join the United
States in support of greater political freedom in Cuba?
Answer. As was the case before the administration's change in
policy toward Cuba, we will continue to engage our hemispheric partners
intensively in an effort to promote human rights, prosperity, and
democracy not only in Cuba, but throughout the region at every
appropriate opportunity. We have reinforced with other countries in the
hemisphere the importance of supporting genuine progress on human
rights and democratic principles in Cuba as a means to advance
meaningful and principled regional integration. Assistant Secretary for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Malinowski carried this message to
Bolivia during his attendance at the Presidential inauguration in
January, as I did with numerous Foreign Ministers in Brazil at the
Presidential inauguration, and indeed the Vice President did with heads
of state as well. We will continue to engage regional partners at
events including the Summit of the Americas and the associated Youth,
Business, Civil Society, and Educators forums in April, the World
Economic Forum for Latin America in April, the OAS General Assembly in
June, and the Pathways to Prosperity Ministerial in October. We are
confident our efforts will no longer be blunted by discussions of
whether our own Cuba policy is effective.
We cannot speculate on the diplomatic stance others will take going
forward, but we have already seen indicators that with our Cuba policy
more closely aligned with others in the hemisphere, we are in a much
better position to seek cooperation from our partners both in the
Americas and elsewhere.
Announcing our new policy in December, the President said,
``Through these changes, we intend to . . . begin a new chapter among
the nations of the Americas.'' The response from partners throughout
the region and around the globe has been overwhelmingly positive. We
are already seeing signs that the updated approach will give us a
greater ability to engage other nations in the hemisphere and around
the world to join us in promoting respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Cuba. Canada, our closest ally and neighbor,
said ``the more American values and American capital that are permitted
into Cuba, the freer the Cuban people will be.'' The common reaction
from leaders at the Brazilian inauguration was that the President's
announcement was historic, and changed the nature of U.S.-Latin
American relations for the better. Many leaders offered strong support
and their assistance in advancing our common objectives. The same was
heard at the Bolivian President's inauguration, underscoring that the
time had come to encourage Cuba to do its part. The OAS, along with the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, also expressed support for
the updated approach the President announced. We appreciate these
statements, and look to continued support from the entire Inter-
American system and community as we implement these historic changes
and continue to promote democracy, human rights, and fundamental
freedoms in Cuba.
Question. We are nearing the 1-year anniversary of the political
protests in Venezuela and the jailing of opposition leader Leopoldo
Lopez. President Obama signed the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and
Civil Society Act of 2014 on December 18.
Why has the administration not yet imposed the financial
sanctions authorized under the act?
Now that the administration is engaging the Castro regime,
do you plan to pressure the Cuban regime to end its support for
the Maduro government and its involvement in the ongoing
repression of the Venezuelan people?
Answer. We are expeditiously working with the National Security
Council, the Department of the Treasury, and other relevant agencies to
implement the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act
of 2014. Fully implementing this law is a complex undertaking. A
determination to sanction someone under this law must be supported by
credible information and meet certain legal thresholds.
Separate from requirements outlined in the sanctions law, the
Department took steps in February to impose visa restrictions against
individuals believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, human
rights abuses and public corruption pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act. These actions may also affect
family members of some of these individuals. We will not publicly
identify these individuals because of U.S. visa confidentiality laws,
but we are sending a strong message that human rights abusers, those
who profit from public corruption, and their families are not welcome
in the United States.
We continue to call on the Venezuelan Government to release
Leopoldo Lopez, Mayor Daniel Ceballos, and others it has unjustly
jailed and to improve the climate of respect for human rights and
democratic norms. We firmly believe the enjoyment of fundamental
freedoms, such as the freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, is
essential to a functioning democracy and Venezuela must protect these
fundamental freedoms.
In our engagement with countries throughout the region, including
Cuba, we press governments to live up to the hemisphere's shared
commitment to democracy and convey our view that Venezuela is falling
short of what is articulated in the OAS Charter, the Inter American
Democratic Charter, and other fundamental instruments related to
democracy and human rights.
Question. Almost 2 months ago, the United States transferred six
detainees from Guantanamo Bay to Uruguay. The President of Uruguay has
downplayed the backgrounds of these men, raising concerns about how
seriously Uruguay takes its responsibility to ensure they don't return
to the fight. I have been asking for our agreement with the Government
of Uruguay governing their acceptance of these detainees for several
weeks now but the Department has been unresponsive.
Will you make this document available to interested Members
of Congress, especially in light of the news that members of
the so-called ``Taliban Five'' are attempting to circumvent the
restrictions imposed on them?
Answer. The Department has consistently informed Congress, and
represented to U.S. courts, that disclosing foreign government
assurances pertaining to Guantanamo detainee transfers outside limited
channels within the executive branch would likely have a chilling
effect on the U.S. Government's ability to negotiate detainee transfers
and the willingness of foreign governments to continue cooperating on
these sensitive matters. As required by the NDAA, each detainee
transfer notification letter sent to Congress provides a description of
the arrangements to be implemented.
______
Responses of Tomasz Malinowski to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. It appears that the administration secured few, if any
protections for the 53 political prisoners who were eventually
released.
(a) A number of the released prisoners have been rearrested
and harassed since their releases. What commitments did the
Cuban regime make regarding treatment of prisoners after their
release?
(b) In your long career working on human rights issues, is
it standard for the release of political prisoners to be
negotiated by the United States that does not result in
complete freedom of movement and actions after their release?
Answer. We condemn any conditions or restrictions placed on
citizens who peacefully exercise their fundamental freedoms, whether
they are recently released political prisoners or not. Neither these 53
individuals, nor other Cubans, should be subjected to harassment,
arrest, or violence for simply exercising their universal human rights.
We have no illusions the Cuban Government will change its behavior
simply because of our new policy approach. The purpose of our new
approach is to better equip us and Cuban independent civil society to
press the Cuban Government for real change. We are constantly
monitoring reports of arrests of human rights defenders. I also said in
my statement that we will spare no effort to ensure that everyone still
detained for simply exercising their rights to freedoms of expression,
association, or peaceful assembly is free, not just from prison but
from harassment, threats, and restrictions on their movement and their
work.
When discussing prisoners of concern with repressive governments,
we always push for full freedom of movement and actions, but those
governments often do not fulfill that request. In Burma, for example,
after the administration succeeded in obtaining the release of hundreds
of political prisoners, it took months of more work for the Burmese
Government to issue them passports; and most were released under a rule
that allowed the government to put them back in jail at any time to
finish their original sentence if they did anything out of line.
Indeed, no one released from prison, or any person for that matter, in
a country that is not free has complete freedom of movement and action.
Our goal is to get dissidents out of prison, then push for the next
step, and the next one after that.
We will continue to raise prisoners of concern and object to any
conditions attached to release, and we look forward to working with you
and your committee to press for the release of all political prisoners
in a Cuba that respects human rights.
Question. The Cuban regime has yet to follow through on the other
supposed human rights concessions--visits by ICRC and U.N. agencies.
(a) How many ICRC or U.N. visits have occurred, to Cuba,
since December 17 to discuss human rights?
(b) If none, when will the first visits occur?
(c) Which prisons will the ICRC be able to visit?
(d) We have been told by several of the relevant U.N.
agencies that in the wake of the President's announcement in
December, they engaged the Cuban regime and were told that they
were not able to visit the island. Can you explain why the
administration would herald this as a Cuban concession when the
Cubans appear to deny any agreement on this issue?
Answer. The Cuban Government agreed to talk to the U.N. and other
international organizations. They have not yet agreed to allow them to
do all of the important work in Cuba we would like to see them carry
out on human rights. So we need to work to take advantage of this
development. The administration, including Assistant Secretary Jacobson
during her January 22 visit to Cuba, has urged the Cuban Government to
provide access to the U.N. and other international organizations. We
have urged others to also press them in this regard. We will continue
to press for greater access--and for the Cuban Government to live up to
Raul Castro's statement that ``Cuba reiterates its willingness to
cooperate in multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations.''
______
additional material submitted by senator marco rubio
Internet in Cuba Only for the Rich--or Resourceful, by
Alexandre Grosbois, AFP, Business Insider
Havana (AFP).--With smartphones and tablet computers, they look
much like young people anywhere, but Cubans have to go to extremes just
to get an Internet connection and somehow get around the strict control
of the Communist authorities.
In the capital Havana, clusters of young Cubans can be spotted at
weekends in groups near hotels, embassies, and business centers in a
desperate attempt to get online--somehow.
``Some people capture wireless signals after getting the codes from
friends who work here, but I know there are others who manage to crack
passwords with special software,'' one computer enthusiast said,
speaking on condition of anonymity at the foot of an office block.
Lurking down a small street abutting a hotel, another strategy is
at work. Several youngsters tap away furiously on their devices--they
are online thanks to a shared connection courtesy of a classmate posted
at hotel reception.
Suffice it to say that in Cuba, wireless signals--or failing that,
any Internet connection--are highly coveted.
They are under strict control, reserved for companies,
universities, and institutions. A privileged few--journalists, artists,
and doctors, in particular--are entitled to a particular connection.
And that's it.
prohibitive prices
In 2013, only 3.4 percent of Cuban households were connected to the
Internet, according to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
which rates the connectivity of countries.
Since June last year, the Cuban authorities have gone a small way
to affording the island's 11.3 million population a rare chance to
access the Internet, opening about 100 centers for the public to get
online.
But at $4.5 per hour, rates are prohibitively expensive in a
country where the average monthly wage is around $20.
Previously, only hotels could offer the Internet to the public, but
again with a prohibitive rate of up to $10 an hour that only foreign
visitors could afford.
The state telecommunications service provider, ETECSA, does not
offer mobile Internet to its customers, while the 3G network is only
for foreign visitors using roaming and offers often patchy performance.
ETECSA has now allowed subscribers to access their mail from their
smartphones, but it only applies to the domain @nauta.cu. The company
has also opened a service to send pictures from phones to any email
address.
They are minor concessions in a country where foreign-branded
smartphones are increasingly visible.
``among most restrictive''
``Cuba remains one of the most restrictive countries in the world
in terms of Internet freedom,'' Sanja Tatic Kelly, project director for
Freedom on the Net, at the American NGO Freedom House, told AFP.
``Rather than relying on the technically sophisticated filtering
and blocking used by other repressive regimes, the Cuban Government
limits users' access to information primarily via lack of technology
and prohibitive costs,'' she said.
The Cuban authorities do censor certain websites--press and blogs
that are against the Castro leadership, pornography, and Skype--but
Tatic Kelly noted: ``The total number of blocked websites is relatively
small when compared to many other authoritarian states like China,
Iran, or Saudi Arabia.''
The more tech-savvy Cubans have found a way around that too,
downloading software that can hide their IP addresses to avoid
detection and mislead snooping eyes into thinking they are surfing the
net in another country.
For those who are less tech-smart, they can always rely on the
``paquete''--USB sticks packed with pirated films, TV shows, pop music,
and games and sold on the black market for a few U.S. dollars.
Cuba's rulers say they need to keep a tight rein on the Internet to
protect the island from cyberattacks.
Over 18 months, Havana has been the victim of cyberattacks from
thousands of addresses registered in over 150 countries, according to
deputy minister of communications Wilfredo Gonzalez.
That brooks no argument with Tatic Kelly.
``Cuba does not register as one of the leading countries
experiencing cyberattacks,'' she said, citing data from online security
experts Kaspersky Lab, which ranks Cuba 199th in terms of countries hit
with counterattacks.
At number one, the most targeted, is Russia, it says, with the
United States third.
______
U.S. Products Help Block Mideast Web, by Paul Sonne and Steve
Stecklow, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 28, 2011
As Middle East regimes try to stifle dissent by censoring the
Internet, the U.S. faces an uncomfortable reality: American companies
provide much of the technology used to block websites.
McAfee Inc., acquired last month by Intel Corp., has provided
content-filtering software used by Internet-service providers in
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, according to interviews with buyers
and a regional reseller. Blue Coat Systems Inc. of Sunnyvale, Calif.,
has sold hardware and technology in Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates
and Qatar that has been used in conjunction with McAfee's Web-filtering
software and sometimes to block websites on its own, according to
interviews with people working at or with ISPs in the region.
A regulator in Bahrain, which uses McAfee's SmartFilter product,
says the government is planning to switch soon to technology from U.S.-
based Palo Alto Networks Inc. It promises to give Bahrain more blocking
options and make it harder for people to circumvent censoring.
Netsweeper Inc. of Canada has landed deals in the UAE, Qatar and
Yemen, according to a company document.
Websense Inc. of San Diego, Calif., has a policy that states it
``does not sell to governments or Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
that are engaged in government-imposed censorship.'' But it has sold
its Web-filtering technology in Yemen, where it has been used to block
online tools that let people disguise their identities from government
monitors, according to Harvard University and University of Toronto
researchers.
Websense's general counsel said in a 2009 statement about the
incident: ``On rare occasion things can slip through the cracks.''
Web-filtering technology has roots in the 1990s, when U.S.
companies, schools and libraries sought to prevent people from surfing
porn, among other things.
Today, that U.S. technology is now among the tools used in the
clampdowns on uprisings across the Middle East. In Egypt, Syria,
Tunisia, and elsewhere, bloggers have been jailed and even beaten as
governments try to repress online expression.
In Bahrain, Nabeel Rajab, head of the banned Bahrain Human Rights
Center, which runs a website the government blocks, says he was briefly
thrown in a car and roughed up after authorities raided his house last
week. The men threatened him with a pipe, he says, and slapped him when
he refused to say he loved Bahrain's king and prime minister.
For the U.S., the role of Western companies in Internet censorship
poses a dilemma. In a speech last year, Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton said, ``Censorship should not be in any way accepted by
any company from anywhere. And in America, American companies need to
take a principled stand.''
Lately the State Department has spent more than $20 million to fund
software and technologies that help people in the Middle East
circumvent Internet censorship that is sustained by Western technology.
Asked about that policy, a senior State Department official said
the U.S. is responding to ``a problem caused by governments abusing
U.S. products.'' When governments repurpose U.S.-made tools ``to filter
for political purposes, we are involved in producing and distributing
software to get around those efforts.''
A Bahrain official defended censorship. ``The culture that we have
in the Middle East is much more conservative than in the U.S.,'' says
Ahmed Aldoseri, director of information and communication technologies
at the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority.
Freedom of speech is guaranteed in Bahrain, Mr. Aldoseri says, ``as
long as it remains within general politeness.''
Makers of Web-filtering technology say they can't control how
customers use their products. ``You can add additional websites to the
block list,'' says Joris Evers, a McAfee spokesman. ``Obviously what an
individual customer would do with a product once they acquire it is
beyond our control.'' A spokesman for Blue Coat made similar points.
There are no special export restrictions on Web-filtering
technology. Anti-censorship advocates say there needs to be a way for
companies to track how their filtering software is used.
``They could build into the software something that signals and, in
fact, sends back to them exactly what kind of filtering is taking
place,'' says Jonathan Zittrain, a professor of law and computer
science at Harvard Law School. ``There's no rocket science there, it's
just their customer wouldn't like it.''
Web-blocking companies declined to name their Middle Eastern
customers, but The Wall Street Journal identified a number of them
through interviews with ISPs, a reseller and former employees. In
addition, OpenNet Initiative, made up of Harvard and University of
Toronto researchers who study Internet filtering, identified three ISPs
in Yemen, Qatar, and the UAE that were using Netsweeper in January.
ISPs provide Internet access to households and companies.
A Netsweeper official said the company doesn't comment on its
clients.
According to a forthcoming report from OpenNet, ISPs in at least
nine Middle East and North African countries have used ``Western-made
tools for the purpose of blocking social and political content,
effectively blocking a total of over 20 million Internet users from
accessing such websites.''
Employees at ISPs in the Middle East said in interviews that
government ministries give them databases of Internet addresses,
including, at times, antigovernment sites, for blocking and that they
must comply. The number of requests varies by country.
Mishary Al-Faris, quality assurance manager at Qualitynet in
Kuwait, says his ISP, which uses SmartFilter, receives several requests
a year from the government to block content deemed religiously
offensive. ``It's kind of a gentlemanly understanding: 'We're going to
honor your requests,''' he says.
Web filtering isn't exclusively a tool of Internet censorship. As
companies like McAfee, Blue Coat, and Netsweeper note, their technology
can prevent youngsters from encountering pornography and protect ISPs
from malicious cyber attacks.
In recent years, American companies aggressively have sought new
customers abroad.The global Web-security market, including filtering,
was valued at $1.8 billion in 2010, according to Phil Hochmuth of
market-research firm IDC. The Middle East and Africa accounted for
about $46 million and is growing at about 16 percent a year, he says.
China is considered the king of Web filtering, with its elaborate
censorship system dubbed the ``Great Firewall.'' China's technology
remains unclear but its reach is vast: Local Chinese sites must be
licensed and are required to remove any content the government deems
objectionable. In addition, some major foreign sites, including
Facebook, Twitter, and Google Inc.'s YouTube, have been blocked for
more than a year.
Middle East Web blocking has some differences. Government licenses
for websites typically aren't required. Another difference: In the
Middle East the ISP will generally show an explicit notice saying a
site has been blocked, whereas in China it is often unclear why a site
becomes inaccessible.
Blocking websites can be done with hardware, specialized software
or a combination of the two. On a basic level, Web filtering works this
way: First, a list is built that groups websites into categories such
as ``gambling,'' ``dating'' or ``violence.'' Netsweeper says it has
categorized more than 3.8 billion Web addresses and adds 15 million a
day. Then, a user of the software can use that list to block access to
specific sites or categories.
Companies like Websense and Netsweeper can now scan and categorize
the content of an uncategorized page in real time. They can also block
pieces of a site, rather than whole pages, if only a certain image or
text is considered objectionable.
The use of filtering to block websites could be seen this month in
Bahrain, where a group of mostly Shia protesters took aim at the
country's Sunni ruling family and met a violent crackdown. Batelco,
Bahrain's main ISP, filters the Web using McAfee SmartFilter software
and Blue Coat technology, according to Ali AbuRomman, who works on the
network team. He says the government regularly uploads lists of
websites to block, including some political sites, to the country's
ISPs.
In a test on a Batelco connection in Bahrain in recent days, The
Wall Street Journal found that online-community forums for Shia
villages and the websites of at least two human-rights groups were
censored.
``Site blocked,'' the screen read in English and Arabic when a
Journal reporter tried to view the sites. ``This website has been
blocked for violating regulations and laws of Kingdom of Bahrain.''
Since 2009, Bahrain has had the power to order the blocking of
websites for ``transgressing local values and impairing national
unity,'' according to the U.S. State Department.
Also blocked during the Journal test was Malkiya.net, a news site
and discussion forum for Malkiya, a mostly Shia fishing town that has
seen antigovernment protests in recent years. Its owner, Ali Mansoor
Abbas, says the site also was blocked after it covered protests over
the seizure of part of a local beach by a cousin of Bahrain's king.
Mr. Aldoseri, the Bahrainian telecom official, says his country
plans to switch in the next few months from SmartFilter to technology
from Palo Alto Networks. It can block activities within websites, like
video or photo uploading, or Internet tools that let users bypass
blocking altogether, which are illegal in Bahrain.
Middle East Web filtering has sparked a cat-and-mouse game to
outfox the censors. Website owners like Mr. Abbas of Malkiya.net
sometimes create ``mirror'' sites, with slightly different names.
Walid Al-Saqaf, a graduate student and former journalist from Yemen
who now lives in Sweden, engineered his own circumvention tool after
his news-aggregation site, YemenPortal.net, which included
antigovernment content, was blocked by the country's filters. Known as
Alkasir, the Arabic word for ``circumventor,'' his free program has
attracted at least 16,000 users in Yemen, China, Iran and elsewhere, he
says.
Two years ago, OpenNet Initiative researchers found that Yemen was
using filtering software from Websense to block privacy tools. In
response, the company said it stopped providing the ISPs involved with
its latest website-block lists since the ISPs violated its
anticensorship policy.
The new OpenNet report says Websense tools and services appeared to
still be used in Yemen as recently as August. The company declined to
comment. The report also found that in January, new filtering software
was being used in Yemen from Canadian firm Netsweeper.
``Filtering decisions are made by the entity that decides to
filter,'' says Scott O'Neill, Netsweeper's director of sales and
marketing. ``Much as Ford Motor Co. can't decide how [its customers]
are going to drive their cars.''
An informational company document says telecom companies can use
Netsweeper to ``block inappropriate content using [a] pre-established
list of 90+ categories to meet government rules and regulations--based
on social, religious or political ideals.''
Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Co., or Du, one of the UAE's
main ISPs, decided last year to switch to Netsweeper from the filtering
system it had been using with Blue Coat devices, says Abul Hasan
Jafery, a technical consultant who helped implement Netsweeper's
filtering system there.
``We block malware, alternative lifestyles, profanity,'' says Mr.
Jafery. ``If something is offensive to the religion, we block it.''
Until recently, Tunisia had some of the most pervasive Internet
filtering in the world, according to OpenNet. Then, a January popular
revolt forced the resignation of the country's president--triggering
the wave of protests that have spread across the Middle East.
Tunisia has since pulled the plug on its Web-blocking gear. The new
head of the Tunisian Internet Agency, Moez Chakchouk, says he was
astounded when he recently visited a secured room at the state
telephone company where the filtering equipment was kept.
The room was full of unfamiliar gear, says the 36-year-old computer
engineer, who took the job last month. ``I don't know'' what it all
does, he says. Mr. Chakchouk says the Interior Ministry controlled the
filtering equipment since 2004, and the entire country's Internet
traffic flowed through it.
For several years, according to Mr. Chakchouk, the Tunisian
government used SmartFilter, which McAfee acquired in 2008. The McAfee
spokesman confirmed the product has been sold in Tunisia, but declined
to disclose its customers.
For better or worse, says Mr. Chakchouk, part of the legacy of
Tunisia's former regime has been to leave Tunisia with some of the most
sophisticated Internet-filtering equipment in the world. ``I had a
group of international experts from a group here lately, who looked at
the equipment and said: `The Chinese could come here and learn from
you.' ''
______
Cuba's $6B Debt to Americans for Seized Properties Hangs Over
U.S. Talks, by Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, FoxNews, Jan. 27, 2015
A $6 billion sticking point could create headaches for the U.S.-
Cuba talks.
Though concerns over human rights, press freedoms and U.S.
fugitives living free on the island have dominated debate over the
Obama administration's negotiations on restoring diplomatic ties, the
Castro regime also still owes Americans that eye-popping sum.
The $6 billion figure represents the value of all the assets seized
from thousands of U.S. citizens and businesses after the Cuban
revolution in 1959. With the United States pressing forward on
normalizing relations with the Communist country, some say the talks
must resolve these claims.
``The administration has not provided details about how it will
hold the Castro regime to account for the more than $6 billion in
outstanding claims by American citizens and businesses for properties
confiscated by the Castros,'' Sen. Robert Menendez, D-Fla., top
Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote in a letter
to Secretary of State John Kerry ahead of historic talks in Havana last
week.
Menendez urged the U.S. to ``prioritize the interests of American
citizens and businesses that have suffered at the hands of the Castro
regime'' before moving ahead with ``additional economic and political
concessions.''
Beginning with Fidel Castro's takeover of the Cuban Government in
1959, the Communist regime nationalized all of Cuba's utilities and
industry, and systematically confiscated private lands to
redistribute--under state control--to the Cuban population.
The mass seizure without proper compensation led in part to the
U.S. trade embargo.
Over nearly 6,000 claims by American citizens and corporations have
been certified by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
totaling $1.9 billion.
Today, with interest and in today's dollars, that amount is close
to $6 billion.
U.S. sugar, mineral, telephone and electric company losses were
heavy. Oil refineries were taken from energy giants like Texaco and
Exxon. Coca-Cola was forced to leave bottling plants behind. Goodyear
and Firestone lost tire factories, and major chains like Hilton handed
over once-profitable real estate for nothing in return.
Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson, after leading the
talks in Havana last week, did not mention the U.S. property claims at
a press briefing. But a State Department spokesperson later told
FoxNews.com the claims ``were addressed'' in the talks and ``will be
subject to future discussions.''
In Dec. 18 remarks, Jacobson said, ``registered claims against the
Cuban government'' would be part of the ``conversation.''
She also noted Cuban claims of monetary losses due to the 50-year-
old U.S. embargo.
``We do not believe those things would be resolved before
diplomatic relations would be restored, but we do believe that they
would be part of the conversation,'' she said. ``So this is a process,
and it will get started right away, but there's no real timeline of
knowing when each part of it will be completed.''
The billions are owed, in part, to an array of major companies.
U.S. banks ranging from First National City Bank (which became
Citibank) to Chase Manhattan lost millions in assets. According to the
list of claimants, the Brothers of the Order of Hermits of St.
Augustine even lost $7.8 million in real estate when they were expelled
from the island.
According to a government study commissioned in 2007, however, some
88 percent of the claimants are individual American property and asset
owners, many of whom would probably like to see some sort of
compensation out of the diplomatic deal-making.
``I think this is a significant issue and it has more resonance
today than it would have had 20 years ago,'' as nationalization has
seen a resurgence throughout Latin America in recent years, said Robert
Muse, a Washington, DC, attorney who has represented corporate clients
whose assets were seized. ``You have to take seriously the notion that
a government must support their companies when their [property] is
expropriated. You have to have some consistency on that.''
Experts who spoke to FoxNews.com agree that fully compensating
everyone on the list would be a complicated, if not impossible,
endeavor.
First, the Cuban Government, even if it did agree in spirit to pay,
probably would not be able to afford it.
Some individual claimants may be long dead. Further, some of the
original corporations no longer exist, thanks to mergers, buyouts, and
bankruptcies over the years.
Such is the case with the Cuban Electric Company, which has the
largest claim--$267.6 million in corporate assets (1960 dollars). The
company was part of the paper and pulp manufacturer, Boise Cascade
Company (which also has a claim for $11.7 million), at the time of the
seizures.
But Boise Cascade has since spun off and the part of it that held a
subsidiary with a majority stake in Cuban Electric became Office Max--
which later merged with Office Depot in 2013. Company officials reached
by FoxNews.com had no comment on the original Cuban Electric claims.
Muse and others, like Cuba analyst Elizabeth Newhouse at the Center
for International Policy, say that companies that still have an active
interest in getting compensated might agree to more creative terms--
whether it be for less money, or tax breaks or other incentives on
future investments if and when the U.S. embargo is lifted.
``My sense is that some corporations are more interested in having
a leg up in any trade arrangements than they are in getting their money
back,'' Newhouse said.
Thomas J. Herzfeld, who heads the 20-year-old Herzfeld Caribbean
Basin Fund which trades shares of firms that would have an interest in
Cuba if the embargo is lifted, said his life-long goal has been ``to
rebuild Cuba.'' He has approached claimants about taking their claims
in exchange for investment shares. He said his fund is ``well-
prepared'' for when normalization resumes.
But others warn about popping the corks too soon, particularly if
the Castro regime is unwilling to take the compensation seriously.
According to the Helms-Burton Act, which enforces the sanctions, the
embargo cannot be lifted until there is ``demonstrable progress
underway'' in compensating Americans for their lost property. (Congress
also would have to vote to lift the embargo.)
``This is an issue where they are going to have to put their heads
together and figure out how to resolve it,'' Newhouse said. ``I think
everyone wants to see it resolved.''
Jacobson, at the close of last week's opening talks, said there was
some progress on opening up embassies, but there continue to be ``areas
of deep disagreement,'' particularly on Cuban human rights and
fugitives from U.S. justice in Cuba.
``Let me conclude,'' said Jacobson, the highest-ranking U.S.
diplomat to visit Cuba in more than three decades, ``it was just a
first step.
______
additional material submitted by senator barbara boxer
Dec. 17: A Day of Triumph for Cuban Americans, by Ric Herrero,
op-ed from the Miami Herald, Dec. 29, 2014
The most damaging legacy of the Helms-Burton Act is not that it
codified the bulk of U.S. sanctions into law, but that it codified the
way we are supposed to think about solving the Cuban puzzle. It zapped
our creativity and told us we must consider only one zero-sum, all-or-
nothing course of action to foster change in Cuba--a course that never
had a serious chance of succeeding.
Far worse, it codified our identity as victims. It denied us the
freedom to take credit for the ground we've gained until the day the
Castros are driven from power and there is a functional democracy in
Cuba. It blinded us to the series of small victories that freedom
advocates have won in Cuba over the past five years, and from
recognizing the historic victory that the Cuban-American community won
on Dec. 17.
Cuban Americans played a key role in the negotiations
Some claim that Cubans and Cuban Americans were left out of the
negotiations between our two countries. While I can't speak for what
may have transpired in Havana, on the American side, that is not true.
Over the better part of the last two years, Obama administration
officials sought out the advice of prominent Cuban-American
professional, civic and religious leaders on how to best chart a new
course on Cuba policy. These talks often included members of
distinguished organizations such as the Cuba Study Group, Roots of
Hope, the Cuban American National Foundation and our own #CubaNow.
A priority for the White House was that any new measures had to
advance the cause of human rights in Cuba. To that end, they started
meeting with visiting Cuban opposition leaders, including Yoani Sanchez
and Berta Soler, shortly after the Cuban government reformed its
migratory policy in February 2013.
From the beginning it was clear that these officials understood
something we all knew, but many refused to accept: Our policy wasn't
working. They were particularly receptive to calls for a new approach
that advanced three objectives: empower the Cuban people so they could
become the authors of their own destinies; place the right kind of
pressure on the Cuban government to improve human-rights conditions;
and promote the interests of the United States in the region.
Those Cuban Americans and visiting Cubans who shared creative and
constructive ideas during these talks saw their recommendations
reflected to varying degrees in the policy changes. Those who called
for more of the same received less attention. Perhaps if Sens. Marco
Rubio and Robert Menendez had spent less time defending a failed
``moral'' policy and more time working with the President to develop an
effective moral policy, they might have held more sway over the
outcome.
The Cuban government did not set the terms of the prisoner swap
Others are complaining that the United States allowed the Cuban
regime to set the terms of the negotiations and received nothing in
return. Again, this is wrong. For years the Cubans called for a three-
for-one prisoner swap as the only option, and the United States
repeatedly rejected it. This was largely because of pressure from the
Cuban-American community. While the rest of the country seemed
accepting of a three-for-one, our community wouldn't settle. Some of us
instead called for a more creative approach, one that went beyond the
fates of Alan Gross and the Cuban Three--one that called for a larger
bargain that would place us on the road to better relations. There are
more than 50 years of unresolved conflicts, grievances and restrictions
between our two nations. We said, let's put some of those on the table.
In the end, the Cubans did not get the deal that they wanted.
Instead, they agreed to release Gross, plus a CIA spy and 53 political
prisoners. They also agreed to allow the International Red Cross and
United Nations to monitor human rights inside the island and to re-
establish diplomatic relations, something that must have rattled their
hardliners as much as it did ours. Had it not been for the pressure
exerted by Cuban Americans, it is quite possible that the United States
might have opted for the easy swap to bring Gross home.
All eyes are now on Cuba
What Dec. 17 has taught us is that as long as we are willing to
recognize when something has failed and remain open to exploring new
ways of promoting democratic values in Cuba, Cuban Americans will
always have a seat at the table.
It will be increasingly difficult for Havana to explain to the
Cuban people--and to the rest of the world--why it must maintain or
tighten its internal embargo now that the United States has opened up.
Our job as a community is to be flexible, creative and, most of
all, strategic. We have to explore the wealth of new opportunities
presented by this era of diplomatic relations and expanded travel,
trade and telecommunications flows to help empower Cubans.
Every Cuban who is actively seeking to increase his or her
autonomy--from artists and entrepreneurs, to religious groups and
democracy advocates--deserves our help. As barriers continue to be
lifted, let's do more to contribute to their success.
In the process, we do not have to trust Cuban officials to get them
to take steps in the direction we'd like to see. But we must trust that
they, too, want a better future for their children and that they can
recognize a good deal when they see one.
Our goal has been, and always will be, to facilitate peaceful
changes that lead to a free and pluralistic Cuba. Let's be smart about
how we seize new opportunities to advance this goal. But by all means,
let's not give into despair and let's shed the veil of victimhood,
because small victory by small victory, the Cuban-American community is
winning.
Ric Herrero is executive director of #CubaNow. He lives in Miami.
______
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
White House Letter Regarding White House Staff
Attendance at Committee Hearings
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
additional material submitted by senator robert menendez
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Additional Statements Submitted for the Record
statement submitted by alan p. gross, u.s. citizen
imprisoned in cuba from 2009 until 2014
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, and members of the
subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to submit this brief
statement for the record. As the members of the subcommittee know, I
recently concluded 5 years of imprisonment in Cuba due to my
participation in a USAID-sponsored program authorized and funded
pursuant to the Helms-Burton Act. Prior to my incarceration, I spent
more than 30 years in 54 countries working to bring about positive
change through USAID and other development programs. Much of my work
involved increasing the availability of information access to
populations around the world. Indeed, this was the fundamental purpose
of the project in Cuba for which I ultimately was forced to forfeit 5
years of my life. I fully support what the President is doing to
meaningfully improve international relations, particularly with Cuba.
My 5 years in Cuba did not deter me from wanting to bring about change
through development and engagement. To the contrary, I believe more
strongly than ever that the President's decisive first steps need to be
followed by congressional action ultimately repealing Helms-Burton and
related statutes.
I understand that this hearing is to focus on Cuba and human
rights. In my opinion, access to information is itself a fundamental
human right and is essential to empowering the Cuban people.
It bears emphasis that all people are decisionmakers in various
ways, even if their decision is to do nothing. Decisions are made,
correctly or not, on knowledge and perceptions derived from information
to which individuals have access. Access to information enables people
to make better-informed decisions and to give informed consent. The
accuracy of such decisions depends upon the availability of
information, and the quality, timeliness, and cost of access to that
information. Based on my experience, the citizens of Cuba could, and
likely would, be more decisive if they had better access to
information. Information is food for the brain; nothing can reach its
full capabilities without food. Insufficient access to information is
unhealthy for any citizenry and it materially impacts human rights
issues on all levels.
If access to information is considered a human right, the Govemment
of Cuba's legalization of access to the Internet in June of 2013
represented a step forward for Cubans in this regard. The Internet,
that information highway, is one of the most impactful paths an
individual can take in order to obtain and communicate information.
It is probable that the Government of Cuba is finally recognizing
that the intellectual and competitive capabilities of its population
will be enhanced with less-restrictive practices involving information.
It is probable that the Government of Cuba is beginning to understand
that Cubans cannot compete in world markets without the same tools that
nearly everyone who competes has at his or her disposal, and that Cuba
must compete if it is to survive economically.
By easing Internet restrictions, even if ever so slightly, the
Cuban Government is beginning to show some new-found respect for the
fundamental right of its people to access information, even if the
Government does not necessarily like it. Reestablishing diplomatic
relations with the Government of Cuba is only a first step in
reestablishing freedom of information for those who live on that
island. However, it is an essential step. Why would anyone not want to
take that step?
______
letter submitted by dagoberto valdes hernandez,
director, convivencia magazine
Esteemed Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the
United States of America. Honorable Senators, my name is Dagoberto
Valdes Hernandez and for more than 20 years I have led a Civic
Education project to prepare citizens for democracy in Cuba. I am also
the founder and editor of two magazines: Vitral and Convivencia
(www.convivenciacuba.es). Currently, I live and work in Cuba.
The purpose of this letter is to convey to you my opinion and that
of the Convivencia project's team regarding the current negotiations
between the Governments of the United States and Cuba.
1. Convivencia magazine welcomes the reestablishment of diplomatic
relations between the Republic of Cuba and the United States of
America.
We hope that this climate of dialogue and negotiation would also be
established between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and
independent Cuban civil society, respecting both unity and diversity,
the right to self-determination, and the exercise of citizens'
sovereignty.
2. Convivencia magazine is happy for the liberation of political
prisoners and feels that all political prisoners should be freed,
including those who are free on bail or parole in Cuba.
Similarly, all acts of political repression must stop. The Cuban
Government should ratify the U.N.'s Human Rights Treaties and the
Conventions of the ILO, as outlined under the four consensus points
identified by a growing and significant group of Cuban civil society.
3. Convivencia magazine is grateful for His Holiness Pope Francis'
mediation efforts to reestablish diplomatic relations between the
Republic of Cuba and the United States of America.
4. Convivencia magazine believes that the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations between the Republic of Cuba and the United States
of America removes a serious obstacle so that the world can clearly see
that the fundamental differences exist between the Cuban Government and
its citizens, not between Cuba and the United States. That way, people
will understand that the most important thing for our people is
inclusion, civil, political, economic, social, and cultural liberties,
and the exercise of an ever more participatory democracy in Cuba.
5. Convivencia magazine also hopes that this historic milestone,
and the lifting of all embargos--especially the one that the Cuban
Government inflicts upon the initiative and entrepreneurial character
of its citizens--creates the necessary conditions for the Cuban people
to write their own history and that it can lead the entire nation,
including our compatriots on the island and the diaspora, to a future
of peace, liberty, progress, and social justice.
I appreciate your attention to this important matter, and remain
respectfully yours.
______
Cuba-U.S. Relations, Neo-Castroism, and
Regional Authoritarianism, by Antonio G. Rodiles
When the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989, many
sociologists and analysts shared in the vision of the end of history.
It appeared that liberal democracies would triumph over any other
system that opposed the modernization of nations; 25 years later we see
a different reality.
After a period in which the number of democracies increased on a
global scale, we have seen a revival of authoritarianism, with some
market freedoms, particularly in Latin America. It is not a return to
crude military dictatorship, but it is a return to the structures that
subject fundamental rights and freedoms to the interests of strongmen
and populist groups.
The argument that certain economic freedoms always allow for the
development of civil and political liberties is false. The use of state
institutions to dismantle democratic mechanisms has become a very
useful and effective machinery.
In this sense, the situation of Venezuela in our region is most
alarming. Unfortunately, the mechanisms that have been tested there
have become models for others. Electoral processes are now tools that
are used to legitimize the power of these groups. The use of
paramilitary members as a method of ensuring social control permits
that the violation of fundamental rights and liberties have no legal
consequences for the authorities.
Furthermore, the formation of regional organizations such as ALBA
and CELAC provide the necessary international support to said regimes
to pressure democratic nations to accept these spurious democracies.
The case of Cuba is very symbolic, as the regime in Havana managed
to survive the collapse of the Communist bloc. Poor decisions made by
the international community and a fragmented society allowed Fidel
Castro to manipulate the situation and prevent the end of the
dictatorship. One of these decisions, made by the Clinton
administration, facilitated the drainage of all internal pressure
through a mass exodus at a moment when Cubans demonstrated a clear
sense of being fed up with the regime. The subsequent appearance of
Hugo Chavez and his oil guaranteed the survival of the Castro regime
for the next 15 years, amid a regional context more favorable to
dictatorship.
Twenty years later, Castroism dies. Neo-Castroism, which for some
time now has been pressing for greater legitimacy, has found a path in
President Barack Obama's measures. The presumed family and political
heirs of Castro begin to find the urgent legitimacy they need.
The outlook on the island is complex. The transition from
totalitarianism to authoritarianism will have to muddle through an
already miserable situation, a nation completely de-capitalized,
growing social unrest, and widespread corruption. To sustain the
transfer of power, they utilize repressive bodies trained in impunity,
judicial power subject to State Security, structures that influence
peddling, and social groups prostituted to political power.
There are other warning signs, such as the significant increase in
the human trafficking of Cubans through Mexico in coordination with
organized crime, especially the Zetas narcotrafficking group. There is
strong evidence of a possible connection between the Cuban military and
intelligence services with a Venezuelan military involved in the
growing drug trade. However, suspicions of this link begin to appear,
above all, due to the great influence that the former group has over
these military institutions.
The opposition on the island and in exile has to prevent that the
regime achieves a transfer of power. Our work is focused on seeking a
democratic transition and the establishment of the rule of law in the
midst of a very complex external and internal environment. Internally,
we confront a regime that enjoys full impunity in abusing its
population. Externally, we are in a situation where democratic
principles have taken a serious hit.
In the international arena we have made some progress regarding the
demand that the regime ratify and implement the United Nations'
Covenants on Human Rights, especially those on civil and political
rights. Such ratification would oblige a change in key elements of the
judicial and legal system prevailing on the island and that violate,
even in writing, fundamental freedoms. This demand has already been
heard by the European bloc that is presently working on a bilateral
agreement with the regime.
In the present context, the steps taken by President Obama are not
wise and prove very dangerous. They grant legitimacy and additional
resources to a regime that has shown ample capacity to adapt at crucial
moments. For this reason we have expressed our disagreement with the
lack of transparency, the unconditional character, and the ignoring of
vital players both in the internal opposition and in exile during these
discussions.
A change of direction is fundamental in this political process;
that concrete demands are made to the regime and that the process
involves the active participation of indispensable leaders of the
opposition. Recently, the ``Forum for Rights and Freedoms'' was created
in Havana and brought together an important assembly of leaders and
groups within the island and in exile, who demanded a Roadmap with
seven points that we consider to be of vital importance. The logic of
this document lies in the ratification and implementation of the
Covenants on Human Rights of the United Nations.
The upcoming Summit of the Americas in April will be a defining
moment. Raul Castro expects to arrive with the support of all regional
allies. His hopes are pinned on that President Barack Obama, in a
second and symbolic handshake, provides him with the necessary support
for the new authoritarian monstrosity that has its essential core based
around his family and political descendants.
We are convinced that the United States, with its global leadership
in the promotion of democracy, will provide great support to those on
the island and in exile who ask for real and measurable changes toward
a true democracy.
The future of the region will have much to do with the
democratization or nondemocratization of Cuba. Prioritizing rights and
fundamental freedoms, and promoting the idea that these are key
elements in the structuring of our nations, is vital at this crucial
moment in time. We are debating the next 20 or 30 years as a country
and region. Taking steps toward the consolidation of Neo-Castroism
implies tacit validation of authoritarianism as an alternative to
democracy throughout the region.
ATTACHMENT
forum for rights and freedoms
The announcements made by U.S. President Barack Obama and his
administration have triggered an intense debate about the Cuban
problem. Many of those in the opposition and activists from civil
society, both inside the island and in exile, have lamented, above all,
the lack of transparency and unilateral and unconditional character of
the new measures announced.
It is indisputable and indispensable that Cubans be primarily
responsible for the fate of our nation, but we also expect an effective
commitment from the democratic community for the defense of fundamental
freedoms and the establishment of the rule of law in Cuba.
Those of us who experience the abuses of the Cuban regime daily and
those in exile who suffer and have suffered from the totalitarianism in
their home country, are vital players in the process of transition.
Ignoring many of our voices and acting from only one perspective of the
problem weakens objectivity and endangers any political dialogue.
We are faced with two options. First, to accept the transformation
of the regime to authoritarian capitalism where Cubans will have to
settle for meager handouts, while the inheritors of Castroism dispose
of our rights and wealth. Second, to demand concrete and measurable
changes that are conducive to the establishment of a true democracy.
The demand for the restoration of our freedoms is a necessary
prerequisite for achieving a successful political transition. During
these 56 long years of one-party dictatorship, activists and the
opposition have repeatedly demanded the full exercise of freedoms
inherent to human beings, often paying a high price for such claims.
The violation of fundamental rights in our country is validated
under the current legal system. We therefore believe that the
ratification and particularly the legal implementation of the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, with their optional protocols, serves as a key
instrument and roadmap for solving the Cuban problem. Similarly, the
guidelines of the International Labor Organization will provide us with
an accurate idea of how to work on the legal system regarding labor
issues and trade union freedoms.
We hope that Latin American countries, the European Union, Canada,
the Holy See and the United States, as important political actors in
the Cuban issue, join us in this fair and urgent demand. We have used
as a reference the association agreement signed between the EU and
Central America in 2012, with a clear emphasis on respect for human
rights and democracy promotion.
Upon ratification of these agreements, we propose the following
roadmap to ensure the effective and prompt implementation of the
commitments made:
The immediate release and cancellation of sentences against
all prisoners arrested for political reasons (to decree
amnesty).
On the Constitution, laws, regulations, procedures and
administrative practices: the abolition of all articles that
violate the International Covenants and restrict liberties on
freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement,
conscience and religion, economic and cultural rights. To
establish full guarantees for the exercise of those freedoms.
On the Penal Code: the elimination of the clause of pre-
criminal dangerousness, as well as all rules that can
contribute to arrests, arbitrary detentions and acts of
harassment that violate the agreements made.
The restoration of constitutional-level judicial guarantees
and the right to due process.
New Law of Association that includes a multiparty system and
guarantees for freedom of assembly. Concerning trade union
rights, standards set by the International Labor Organization
should be taken into account.
New Media Law guaranteeing freedom of expression and the
free flow of information.
New Election Law (Restoration of National Sovereignty).
We believe that every step should be conditioned on the progressive
advance of the roadmap indicated above, sustained on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
Our ultimate goal is to move toward becoming a true democracy, with
political pluralism, judicial independence, freedom and human rights.
Where a Cuban, through consultations and a process of free and
transparent elections, as well as the creation of a constitutional
assembly, can define the destiny of our nation.
All genuine actors of the opposition and civil society, through
their projects and demands both on the island and in exile, must play
an active role in any process that seeks a solution to the Cuban
problem. At stake is the very future of the nation. We exercise this
great responsibility which has fallen to us.
Ada Maria Lopez Canino; Adelma Guerra; Adis Niria Dallet Arguelles;
Adnaloy Rodriguez Diaz; Adonis Salgado Perez; Adrian Perez Mendoza;
Agustin Lopez Canino; Aida Norma Roque; Aide Gallardo Salazar; Ailer
Gonzalez Mena; Alberto Sanchez Martiatu; Alejandro Garcia Arias;
Alejandro Raga; Alexander Perez Rodriguez; Alexis Jardines; Alexis
Perez Lescailles; Alfredo Guillermo Rodriguez; Aliette Padron Antigua;
Alina Brouwer; Alina de la C Garcia; Aliuska Gomez Garcia; Amelia
Suarez Naranjo; Ana Maria Socarras Pinon; Ana Olema; Ana Torricella
Morales; Anay Penalver Subit; Andres Perez Suarez; Angel De Fana; Angel
Luis Diaz; Angel Luis Martin; Angel Moya Acosta; Angel Santiesteban
Prats; Anislay Escalona Polo; Antonio G. Rodiles; Antonio Jose Ponte;
Arelis Blanco Coello; Arelis Rodriguez Silva; Ariadna Mena Rubio; Ariel
Gonzalez Cuevas; Ariobel Castillo Villalba; Armando Abascal Serrano;
Armando Peraza Hernandez; Barbara Rodriguez Vizcaino; Barbara Viera
Rodriguez; Benito Fojaco Iser; Berta Soler Fernandez; Boris Larramendi;
Camilo Ernesto Olivera Peidro; Caridad Ramirez; and Caridad Valdes
Soriano.
Carlos Lazaro Tamayo Frias; Carlos M Figueroa Alvarez; Carlos M
Hernandez; Carlos Manuel Figueroa; Carlos Orlando Olivera Martinez;
Carlos Rodriguez Seruto; Cecilia Guerra Alfonso; Cesar Reynel Gomez;
Ciro Javier Diaz Penedo; Claudio Fuentes Madan; Cristina Xiomara
Duques; Dairon Moises Torre Paz; Dairy Coello Basulto; Daisy Artiles
del Sol; Damaris Reve Rodriguez; Damarys Moya Portieles; Damian Albert
Suviaut; Danai Lopez Perdomo; Danaise Munos Lopez; Dandy Lazo; David
Aguila Montero; Delises Gonzalez Borrego; Digna Rodriguez Ibanez;
Duvier Blanco Acosta; Edely Orlando Suarez; Eduardo Gonzalez Molina;
Eduardo Marcos Pacheco Ortiz; Egberto Angel Escobedo Morales; Elena
Larrinaga; Elias Amor; Enrico M. Santi; Enrique del Risco; Enrique Diaz
Rodriguez; Enrique Martinez Marin; Enrique Rafael Valido; Eralidis
Frometa Polanco; Ernesto Fonseca Garcia; Ernesto Gutierrez; Ernesto
Hernandez Busto; Esteban Ajetes Abascal; Eugenia Diaz Hernandez;
Eugenio Hernandez Hernandez; Evelin Pineda Concepcion; Felix Navarro;
Felix Perez Palenzuela; Francisco Rangel Manzano; Francisco Valido;
Frank Calzon; Frank Cosme Valdes; Gisela Sanchez and Banos.
Gladis Capote Roque; Gloria Samper Oliva; Gorki Aguila; Guillermo
Farinas Hernandez; Guillermo Garcia V; Gustavo Garabito Gomez; Haymee
Moya Montes de Oca; Hugo Damian Prieto Blanco; Igdariz Perez Ponciano;
Ignacio Blanco Jimenez; Iris Quindelan; Ivan Founier Costa; Ivonne de
las Mercedes Abreu; Jaime Suchlicki; Jaqueline Bone Hechevarria;
Jaqueline Cutino Leite; Jeovani Diaz Lopez; Jeovany Jimenez Vega; Jesus
Aristides Hernandez Perez; Joel Brito; Jordanca Borquinelis; Jorge
Enrique Carbonell; Jorge Luis Artiles Montiel; Jorge Luis Garcia Ostia;
Jorge Luis Romero Becerra; Jorge Luis Trujillo Gonzalez; Jorge Olivera
Castillo; Jorge Rodriguez Rivero; Jose Agustin Benitez Lopez; Jose
Alberto Gutierrez; Jose Azel; Jose Diaz Silva; Jose G. Ramon Castillo;
Jose Hernandez Lopez; Jose Ignacio Brito; Jose Luis Leon Perez; Jose
Ramon Polo Borges; Jose Raul Rodriguez Rangel; Juan Alberto de la Nuez
Ramirez; Juan Antonio Blanco; Juan Carlos Linares Balmaseda; Juan
Gonzalez Febles; Juan Manuel Lora Vidal; Julia Herrera Roque; Julio
Aleaga Pesant; Julio Antonio Ramirez; Julio Herrera Roque; Julio Rojas
Portal; Kessell Rodriguez Rodriguez; and Kirenia Molina.
Laritza Olivares Dinza; Laudelina Alcalde Garcia; Laura Marante;
Laura Marante Delgado; Lazara B. Sendina Recalde; Lazara M Borrego
Guzman; Lazaro Diaz Sanchez; Lazaro Fresneda Fernandez; Lazaro Luis
Ruiz Hechevarria; Lazaro Mendoza Garcia; Lazaro R Armenteros Martorel;
Lazaro Yosvani Montesino; Lazaro Yuri Valle Roca; Leon Padron Azcuy;
Lia-Lianelis Villares; Liset Naranjo; Lismeirys Quintana Avila; Liu
Santiesteban; Livan Serafin; Lourdes Esquivel; Lucia Molina Villegas;
Lucinda Gonzalez Gomez; Luis Alberto Cruz Silva; Luis Barbaro Ortega
Avenza; Luis Cino Alvarez; Luis Enrique Labrador Diaz; Luis Jesus
Gutierrez Campos; Luis Trapaga; Luisa R Toscano; Lupe Busto; Maikel
Norton Cordero; Mailen Gonzalez Gonzalez; Manuel Aguirre Labarrere;
Manuel Zayas Martinez; Marcelino Lorenzo Fernandez; Margarita Rodriguez
Diaz; Maria Acon Sardinas; Maria cristina Labrada Varona; Maria Josefa
Sardinas; Maria Rosa Rodriguez Molina; Marislaidys Sanchez Vargas;
Maritza concepcion Salmiento; Mark Alonso Parada; Marta Belquis
Rodriguez Gonzalez; Mayelin Pena Bullain; Mayelin Santiesteban Lopez;
Maylin Gonzalez Gonzalez; Melvia Aguilera; Mercedes Perez; and Merenis
Herry Garcia.
Miguel Angel Tamayo Frias; Miguel Daniel Borroto Vazquez; Miguel
Farinas Quey; Mijail Bonito; Mista Ricardo Torres; Nelson Rodriguez
Chartrand; Nilo Gilbert Arencibia; Noelvis Leon Lopez; Normando
Hernandez; Odelin Alfonso Torna; Olaida del Castillo Trujillo; Olga
Lidia Torres Iglesias; Omar Suarez Campo; Orlando Rodriguez Rodriguez;
Orlando Villar de Armas; Oscar Luis Milian Reinoso; Oslien Noda
Fonseca; Osmal Laffita Rojas; Osmani Diaz Cristo; Oylin Hernandez
Rodriguez; Paquito de Rivera; Paulino Estevez Jimenez; Pedro Fontanal
Miranda; Pedro Roig; Quirenia Diaz Arguelles; Rachel Gamboa Campos;
Rafael Hernandez Blanco; Rafael Rodriguez Rivero; Raisel Rodriguez
Rivero; Ramon Alejandro Munoz Gonzalez; Ramon Jimenez Arencibia; Ramon
Mor Hernandez; Ramon Zamoza Rodriguez; Raquel Maria Rodriguez Morejon;
Raul Borges Alvarez; Regla Rios Casado; Reinaldo Figueros; Reinaldo
Martinez; Ricardo Almira; Roberto Arsenio Lopez Ramos; Roberto Pupo
Tejeda; Rogelio Fabio Hurtado Rodriguez; Rolando Ferrer Espinosa;
Rolando Pulido; Rolando Reyes Rabanal; Rolando Rodriguez Rivero; Ronny
Gamez Luna; Rosalinda Visiedo Gomez; Roxilene Sotolongo Cruz; and
Santiago Jordan Rios.
Saul Gonzalez; Sebastian Arcos; Serafin Moran Santiago; Serafin
Moran Santiago; Sergio Girat Estrada; Smith Cantillo Perez; Sodrelis
Torruella Poncio; Sonia Alvarez Campello; Sonia Garro Alfonso; Stewe
Maikel Pardo Valdez; Tamara Rodriguez Quesada; Ubaldo Herrero
Hernandez; Vicente Campanioni; Vicente Sebastian Borges; Virgen Coello
Basulto; Vladimir Ortiz Suarez; Vladimir Turru Paez; Xiomara de las M
Cruz Miranda; Yadelys Montano Leon; Yaimel Rodriguez Arroyo; Yamile
Borges Hurtado; Yamile Garro Alfonso; Yamile Naranjo; Yaneisi Herrera
Cabrales; Yanisel Bosa Garrido; Yanitza Estrada Liranza; Yasil
Fernandez Denis; Yasmani Barroso Bergolla; Yasmani Barroso Pergolla;
Yasmani Cuesta Gonzalez; Yelky Paez Rodriguez; Yeniset Aguilera; Yoan
Guzman Diaz; Yoisy Jaramillo Sanchez; Yolanda Santana Ayala; Yoraida
Pena Padilla; Yosbani Arce Blanco; Yuleidis Ortiz; Yuliet Margarita
Rodriguez Baez; Yulinne Tamayo Frias; Yuneisis Coto Casino; Yuniesqui
Gainza; Yuniset Amores Aguilera; Yurineisi Aleman; Yurleani Tamayo
Martinez; Yuslaidis Balero Concepcion; Zaqueo Baez Guerrero; Zenen
Daniel Cruz; Zulema Lay; and Ivan Garcia Quintero.
______
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Resolution N.6/2013,
Submitted by Berta Soler, President, Cuban Ladies in White, Cuba
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Department of State Report Submitted for the record
by Senator Robert Menendez
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE REPORT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN CHINA (2013)
Executive Summary
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state in
which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitutionally is the
paramount authority. CCP members hold almost all top government and
security apparatus positions. Ultimate authority rests with the 25-
member Political Bureau (Politburo) of the CCP and its seven-member
Standing Committee. China completed its once-in-a-decade leadership
transition in March, and Xi Jinping holds the three most powerful
positions as CCP general secretary, state president, and chairman of
the Central Military Commission. Civilian authorities generally
maintained control of the military and internal security forces.
Security forces committed human rights abuses.
Repression and coercion, particularly against organizations and
individuals involved in civil and political rights advocacy and public
interest issues, ethnic minorities, and law firms that took on
sensitive cases, were routine. Increasingly officials employed
harassment, intimidation, and prosecution of family members and
associates to retaliate against rights advocates and defenders.
Individuals and groups seen as politically sensitive by authorities
continued to face tight restrictions on their freedom to assemble,
practice religion, and travel. Authorities resorted to extralegal
measures such as enforced disappearance and strict house arrest,
including house arrest of family members, to prevent public expression
of independent opinions. Authorities implemented new measures to
control and censor the internet and particularly targeted bloggers with
large numbers of followers, leading some to close their online
accounts. Public-interest law firms continued to face harassment,
disbarment of legal staff, and closure. There was severe official
repression of the freedoms of speech, religion, association, and
assembly of ethnic Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
(XUAR) and of ethnic Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and
other Tibetan areas. These minorities also faced harsh restrictions on
movement. Abuses peaked around high-profile events, such as the visit
of foreign officials, national meetings, and commemorations.
As in previous years, citizens did not have the right to change
their government, and citizens had limited forms of redress against
official abuse. Other human rights problems during the year included
extrajudicial killings, including executions without due process;
enforced disappearance and incommunicado detention, including prolonged
illegal detentions at unofficial holding facilities known as ``black
jails''; torture and coerced confessions of prisoners; detention and
harassment of lawyers, journalists, writers, bloggers, dissidents,
petitioners, and others who sought to exercise peacefully their rights
under the law; a lack of due process in judicial proceedings; political
control of courts and judges; closed trials; the use of administrative
detention; restrictions on freedom to assemble, practice religion, and
travel; failure to protect refugees and asylum seekers; pressure on
other countries to return PRC citizens forcibly; widespread corruption;
intense scrutiny of and restrictions on nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs); discrimination against women, minorities, and persons with
disabilities; a coercive birth-limitation policy that in some cases
resulted in forced abortion (sometimes at advanced stages of pregnancy)
or forced sterilization; trafficking in persons; prohibitions on
independent unions; lack of protection for workers' right to strike;
forced and child labor; and poor enforcement of wage, overtime, and
occupational safety and health laws.
Although authorities prosecuted a number of abuses of power,
particularly with regard to corruption, in many cases the internal
disciplinary procedures of the CCP were opaque and only selectively
applied to senior officials. Citizens who promoted efforts to combat
corruption were themselves detained and arrested. For example,
throughout the year, NGO sources reported that authorities arrested at
least 29 persons associated with the New Citizens Movement on charges
stemming from activities to promote good governance.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
During the year security forces reportedly committed arbitrary or
unlawful killings. In many instances few or no details were available.
It was not clear to what extent impunity was a problem. Following
cases of killings by police, there often was an announcement that an
investigation was to be conducted, but it was not clear whether there
were any findings of police malfeasance or any cases in which police
were disciplined.
For example, on October 24, plainclothes police arrested Shanghai
petitioner Shen Yong for trespassing and, according to media reports,
beat him. Hours later police returned Shen to his family, and he died
shortly thereafter. Shen's family maintained he died as a result of the
police beating. Police asserted he suddenly fell ill in their custody.
Local media reported that the death was under investigation but by
year's end provided no further information. Authorities detained more
than 100 petitioners at a protest following Shen's death.
A number of violent incidents in the XUAR resulted in multiple
deaths. Official accounts of these events generally blamed
``terrorists,'' ``separatists,'' and ``religious extremists'' for what
were portrayed as violent terrorist attacks on community members and
security personnel. Human rights organizations, on the other hand,
asserted that security forces often shot at groups of Uighurs in their
homes or during worship. The government's control of information coming
out of the XUAR, together with its increasingly tight security posture
there, made it difficult to verify the conflicting reports. (See also
the Tibet annex for violent incidents in the TAR and other Tibetan
areas.)
For example on April 24, at least 21 persons were killed in a clash
in Barchuk County, XUAR: nine bystanders, six police, and six Uighurs
(described in the official press as ``thugs''). According to the
official account, gunfights broke out when police entered persons'
homes to search for ``illegal knives.''
In April, Yu Qiyi, a chief engineer at a state-owned enterprise in
Wenzhou, died after being interrogated for corruption. Authorities
arrested six CCP investigators and convicted them of intentional
assault (see section 1.d.).
Defendants in criminal proceedings were executed following
convictions that lacked due process and adequate channels for appeal.
b. Disappearance
In September authorities detained Cao Shunli at Beijing Airport as
she was attempting to travel to Geneva to attend a training session in
advance of China's Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights
Council. Five weeks after her disappearance, authorities at the
Chaoyang District Detention Center confirmed that Cao had been
criminally detained on charges of unlawful assembly. According to
various media reports, her family did not received a detention notice
in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Law.
At year's end the government had not provided a comprehensive,
credible accounting of all those killed, missing, or detained in
connection with the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen
demonstrations. It is estimated that fewer than a dozen remained in
prison, although some accounts suggest the number may be higher. Many
activists who were involved in the demonstrations continued to suffer
from official harassment.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
The law prohibits the physical abuse of detainees and forbids
prison guards from extracting confessions by torture, insulting
prisoners' dignity, and beating or encouraging others to beat
prisoners. Amendments to the criminal procedure law that exclude
evidence, including confessions, obtained through illegal means,
including under torture in certain categories of criminal cases, took
effect on January 1.
Numerous former prisoners and detainees reported that they were
beaten, subjected to electric shock, forced to sit on stools for hours
on end, deprived of sleep, and otherwise subjected to physical and
psychological abuse. Although ordinary prisoners were subjects of
abuse, prison authorities singled out political and religious
dissidents for particularly harsh treatment. In some instances close
relatives of dissidents also were singled out for abuse.
Human Rights Watch reported that police beat and tortured suspected
prostitutes.
According to news reports Xiao Yong, a Guangzhou-based activist
detained by police in April 2012 and remanded to two years of re-
education through labor (RTL) in Shaoyang, Hunan Province, was released
in February and allowed to return to his home. Authorities charged him
with illegal assembly for staging a demonstration calling on officials
to disclose publicly their financial assets. During his initial
detention authorities reportedly prevented Xiao from sleeping for up to
five days, causing multiple medical complications.
On May 18, police arrested a group of Fujian activists. Police held
petitioner Lin Yingqiang for 33 hours, deprived him of food, and
chained him to a ``tiger seat,'' a device meant to prevent the prisoner
from sleeping during his detention.
In May authorities in Sichuan Province detained and beat lawyers
Tang Jitian and Jiang Tianyong as they attempted to visit a black jail
in Ziyang that reportedly holds followers of the banned Falun Gong
movement.
On June 8, the Dongcheng District People's Court tried Peng Lanlan
in closed proceedings. The court's decision was not available at year's
end. Beijing police arrested Peng in August 2012, charged him with
obstructing official business, and tortured him by binding him to a
tiger seat.
There were widespread reports of activists and petitioners being
committed to mental-health facilities and involuntarily subjected to
psychiatric treatment for political reasons. According to Legal Daily
(a state-owned newspaper covering legal affairs), the Ministry of
Public Security directly administered 24 high-security psychiatric
hospitals for the criminally insane (also known as ankang facilities).
From 1998 to May 2010, more than 40,000 persons were committed to
ankang hospitals. In 2010 an official of the Ministry of Public
Security stated that detention in ankang facilities was not appropriate
for patients who did not demonstrate criminal behavior. Nonetheless,
political activists, underground religious adherents, persons who
repeatedly petitioned the government, members of the banned Chinese
Democracy Party (CDP), and Falun Gong practitioners were among those
housed in these institutions.
In October 2012 the government passed legislation banning
involuntary mental health examinations and inpatient treatment except
in cases in which patients expressed an intent to harm themselves or
others. Critics maintained, however, that the law still does not
provide meaningful legal protections for persons sent to psychiatric
facilities. The March 2012 amendments to the criminal procedure law
require a procuratorate (the agency responsible for both prosecution
and investigation) review and a court decision for the psychiatric
commitment of persons who have committed serious offenses but are
exempt from criminal responsibility under the law. The amendments went
into effect in April and include a provision for appealing compulsory
medical treatment decisions.
On April 7, a new mainland China magazine Lens carried an article
reporting abuses including torture with electric batons, forced
feeding, and prolonged solitary confinement at the Masanjia Detention
Center in Liaoning Province.
Advocacy groups continued to report organ harvesting from
prisoners. Former vice health minister Huang Jiefu, who in March 2012
reportedly pledged to abolish taking organs for transplant from
executed prisoners within three to five years, stated that organs from
executed prisoners accounted for 64 percent of transplants in 2012 and
for 54 percent in mid-2013.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Conditions in penal institutions for both political prisoners and
criminal offenders were generally harsh and often degrading.
Forced labor remained a serious problem in penal institutions (see
section 7.b.) as well as in RTL facilities. On December 28, the
National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee passed legislation
that formally abolished the RTL system. State media announced that all
inmates would be released beginning December 30 and clarified that all
pre-abolition penalties would be considered legitimate. On December 17,
Amnesty International reported that authorities relabeled many RTL
camps as ``drug rehabilitation centers'' and ``legal education
centers.''
Physical Conditions: Prisoners and detainees were regularly held in
overcrowded conditions with poor sanitation. Food often was inadequate
and of poor quality, and many detainees relied on supplemental food,
medicines, and warm clothing provided by relatives. Prisoners often
reported sleeping on the floor because there were no beds or bedding.
Adequate, timely medical care for prisoners remained a serious problem,
despite official assurances that prisoners have the right to prompt
medical treatment.
Information on the prison population was not made public. In an
April 2012 report to the NPC Standing Committee, the minister of
justice stated that the country had 681 prisons with 1.64 million
inmates. The International Center for Prison Studies (ICPS) reported
that in 2009, in addition to sentenced prisoners, 650,000 persons were
held in detention centers, and it estimated there were between 100,000
and 260,000 pretrial detainees. The ICPS reported that in mid-2010
female prisoners made up approximately 5.1 percent of the prison
population, and in 2005 juveniles made up 1.4 percent. The law requires
juveniles be held separately from adults, unless facilities are
insufficient, but children were sometimes held with adult prisoners and
required to work. Political prisoners were held with the general prison
population and reported being beaten by other prisoners at the
instigation of guards. Some dissidents were not allowed to receive
supplemental food, medicine, and warm clothing from relatives.
The law mandates that a prison shall be ventilated, allow for
natural light, and be clean and warm. The law further provides that a
prison ``shall set up medical, living, and sanitary facilities and
institute regulations on the life and sanitation of prisoners.'' It
also states that the medical and health care of prisoners shall be put
into the public health and epidemic prevention program of the area in
which the prison is located. In many cases provisions for sanitation,
ventilation, heating, lighting, basic and emergency medical care, and
access to potable water were inadequate.
Conditions in administrative detention facilities, such as RTL
camps, were similar to those in prisons. Beating deaths occurred in
administrative detention and RTL facilities. Detainees reported
beatings, sexual assaults, lack of proper food, and limited or no
access to medical care.
Administration: It was unclear whether recordkeeping on prisoners
was adequate. Authorities employed alternatives to incarceration for
both violent and nonviolent offenders. According to Vice Minister of
Justice Zhao Dacheng, more than one million convicts served their
sentences in community corrections programs since 2003. There were no
prison ombudsmen per se, but prisoners and detainees are legally
entitled to submit complaints to judicial authorities without
censorship and request investigation of credible allegations of inhuman
conditions. The law states that letters from a prisoner to higher
authorities of the prison or to the judicial organs shall be free from
examination, but it was unclear to what extent the law was implemented.
While authorities occasionally investigated credible allegations of
inhuman conditions, the results were not documented in a publicly
accessible manner. Many prisoners and detainees did not have reasonable
access to visitors and could not engage in religious practices. Under
Article 52 of the prison law, ``considerations shall be given to the
special habits and customs of prisoners of minority ethnic groups.''
Article 23 of the Detention Center Regulation has similar requirements.
Little information was available about the implementation of these
regulations.
The law requires the government to investigate and monitor prison
and detention center conditions, and an official from the Prosecutor's
Office is responsible for investigating and monitoring prison and
detention center conditions.
Independent Monitoring: Information about prisons, including
associated labor camps and factories, was considered a state secret,
and the government did not permit independent monitoring of prisons or
RTL camps. Prisoners remained inaccessible to local and international
human rights organizations and media groups. Authorities did not allow
the International Committee of the Red Cross to have access to
prisoners or perform prison visits in the country.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
Arbitrary arrest and detention remained serious problems. The law
grants police broad administrative detention powers and the ability to
detain individuals for extended periods without formal arrest or
criminal charges. Throughout the year human rights activists,
journalists, unregistered religious leaders, and former political
prisoners and their family members continued to be among those targeted
for arbitrary detention or arrest.
In January the official media reported that authorities in
Heilongjiang Province confined petitioner Chen Qingxia to a deserted
mortuary for three years. Chen previously served 18-months' in RTL, was
allegedly paralyzed by repeated beatings, and separated from her then
12-year-old son by local authorities. After the media report the local
government reportedly found a house for Chen and pledged to help her
look for her son.
From June 3 to 25, in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, plainclothes
police reportedly detained prodemocracy activist Jiang Lijun on
suspicion of inciting subversion of state authority and disturbing the
social order. Jiang previously served a four-year sentence for
``inciting subversion of the state power.''
In July, Guangdong activist Wu Bin, also known as Xiucai Jianghu,
was detained for allegedly ``sabotaging electric power equipment.'' Wu
previously filed a lawsuit against Shenzhen's Futian District Public
Security Bureau (PSB) for illegally detaining him. He was released on
bail in early August, rearrested in Zhejiang Province on September 12,
and given 10 days' administrative detention for ``spreading rumors.''
Many activists were subjected to extralegal house arrest, denied
travel rights, or administratively detained. Shanghai dissidents Feng
Zhenghu and Zheng Enchong were under unofficial house arrest at their
apartments in Shanghai. Both were allowed to move around Shanghai on
occasion but were kept under constant surveillance. Outsiders were
often prevented from visiting them, and they were not allowed to leave
Shanghai. Zheng Enchong was denied permission to travel to Hong Kong to
accept a fellowship teaching law. Authorities also reportedly kept
other dissidents under unofficial house arrest. Officials sentenced
Shanghai activists Wang Kouma and Wei Qin to 30 months and 27 months in
prison, respectively, for ``creating a disturbance'' related to their
lawful petitioning. Mao Hengfeng was released from RTL on February 8
and was serving the remainder of her 18-month sentence under house
arrest.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus
The main domestic security agencies include the Ministry of State
Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the People's Armed
Police. The People's Liberation Army is primarily responsible for
external security but also has some domestic security responsibilities.
Local jurisdictions also frequently used civilian municipal security
forces, known as ``urban management'' officials (chengguan), to enforce
administrative measures. The Ministry of Public Security coordinates
the country's civilian police force, which is organized into
specialized police agencies and local, county, and provincial
jurisdictions. Procuratorate oversight of the police was limited.
Corruption at the local level was widespread. Police and urban
management officials engaged in extrajudicial detention, extortion, and
assault. In 2009 the Supreme People's Procuratorate acknowledged
continuing widespread abuse in law enforcement. In 2009 domestic news
media reported the convictions of public security officials who had
beaten to death prisoners or suspects in their custody.
In May 2012 the Ministry of Supervision, Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security, and Ministry of Justice jointly issued
regulations stating that police in prisons and RTL facilities face
dismissal if they are found to have beaten, applied corporal
punishment, abused inmates, or instigated such acts.
There were several media reports on deaths under the shuanggui
system - the CCP internal disciplinary system used to investigate party
members suspected of corruption. In April, Yu Qiyi, a chief engineer at
a state-owned enterprise in Wenzhou, died after being interrogated for
corruption. Authorities charged six investigators from the Communist
Party's Disciplinary Committee in Wenzhou. The BBC reported they were
sentenced to between four and 14 years in prison. They reportedly
appealed their sentence.
Oversight of civilian municipal security forces was highly
localized and ad hoc. By law the officials can be criminally prosecuted
for abuses of power, but such cases were rarely pursued. There were
multiple reports of conflicts erupting between these officials and
street vendors in Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces. For
example, on June 19, civilian municipal security forces reportedly beat
a family of fried-chicken vendors in the Beihang night market in
Shenyang, Liaoning Province, who refused to turn over their equipment.
In protest more than one thousand Shenyang residents gathered at the
scene and blocked traffic, and some reportedly retaliated by beating
the officials. In some cases mediation resulted in compensation being
paid to victims of these officials.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
Police detention beyond 37 days requires prosecutorial approval of
a formal arrest. After arrest police are authorized to detain a suspect
for up to an additional seven months while the case is investigated.
After the completion of a police investigation, an additional 45
days of detention are allowed for the procuratorate to determine
whether to file criminal charges. If charges are filed authorities can
detain a suspect for an additional 45 days before beginning judicial
proceedings. Police sometimes detained persons beyond the period
allowed by law, and pretrial detention periods of a year or longer were
common.
The law stipulates that detainees be allowed to meet with defense
counsel before criminal charges are filed. Some criminal defense
attorneys noted that under the newly revised criminal procedure law
their ability to meet with clients improved significantly. In some
cases defense attorneys were able to arrange visits at any time and to
have private meetings with their clients in detention centers. This
generally did not apply to cases considered politically sensitive.
The criminal procedure law requires a court to provide a lawyer to
a defendant who has not already retained one; who is blind, deaf, mute,
or a minor; or who may be sentenced to death. Revisions that took
effect on January 1 added defendants facing a life sentence or who are
mentally ill. This law applies whether or not the defendant is
indigent. Courts may also provide lawyers to other criminal defendants
who cannot afford them, although courts often did not appoint counsel
in such circumstances.
Criminal defendants are entitled to apply for bail (also translated
as ``a guarantor pending trial'') while awaiting trial, but the system
does not appear to operate effectively and few suspects were released
on bail.
The law requires notification of family members within 24 hours of
detention, but individuals were often held without notification for
significantly longer periods, especially in politically sensitive
cases. Under a sweeping exception officials are not required to provide
notification if doing so would ``hinder the investigation'' of a case.
The revised criminal procedure law limits this exception to cases
involving state security or terrorism.
The law allows for residential surveillance rather than detention
in a formal facility under certain circumstances. Under the revised
criminal procedure law, with the approval of the next higher-level
authorities, officials can enforce ``residential surveillance'' on a
suspect at a designated place of residence (i.e., a place other than
the suspect's home) for up to six months, when they suspect crimes of
endangering state security, terrorism, or serious bribery and believe
that surveillance at the suspect's residence would impede the
investigation. Authorities must notify relatives of individuals placed
under formal arrest or residential surveillance in a designated abode
within 24 hours, unless notification is impossible. They are not
required to specify the grounds for or location of the detention.
Authorities can also prevent defense lawyers from meeting with suspects
in these categories of cases.
The law provides for the right to petition the government for
resolution of grievances, but citizens who traveled to Beijing to
petition the central government were frequently subjected to arbitrary
detention, often by police dispatched from the petitioner's hometown.
Some provincial governments operated facilities in Beijing or in other
localities where petitioners from their districts were held in
extrajudicial detention. Some local governments took steps to restrict
petitioning. According to a 2010 Shanxi provincial government report,
the Shanxi Province People's Congress adopted regulations that listed
eight types of ``prohibited'' petitioning, including: ``illegally
gathering, encircling, or rushing into government offices or important
public spaces, stopping cars or hindering public transportation,
linking up with others to petition,'' and similar acts. The Shanxi
regulations also stated that petitioners suspected of ``misrepresenting
facts to frame others'' could be subject to criminal charges.
Online reports claimed local officials in Zengcheng City, Guangdong
Province, sealed off two villages in March during the People's Congress
and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
sessions to prevent residents from petitioning.
On April 17, Shenzhen-based lawyer Jiang Yuanmin was arrested and
charged with ``gathering a crowd to disrupt social order'' in
connection with his work on behalf of Hainan farmers' land rights,
according to online reports. Family members claimed he was denied
medical treatment.
Fujian petitioner Luo Xianying was reportedly arrested in Beijing
in fall 2012 and forcibly returned to Sanming in November 2012. At
year's end she was detained in a government building, and her family
claimed she had not received adequate treatment for her medical
problems.
Before the December 28 NPC Standing Committee decision to abolish
RTL, nonjudicial panels, known as ``labor re-education panels,'' could
remand persons to RTL camps for up to three years without trial. Labor
re-education panels were authorized to extend these administrative
sentences for up to one year. Detainees were technically allowed to
challenge administrative RTL sentences and appeal for sentence
reduction or suspension, but appeals were rarely successful.
Other forms of administrative detention include ``custody and
education'' (for women engaged in prostitution and those soliciting
prostitution) and ``custody and training'' (for minor criminal
offenders). The law establishes a system of ``compulsory isolation for
drug rehabilitation.'' The minimum stay in such centers is two years,
and the law states that treatment can include labor. Public security
organs authorize detention in these centers, and it often was meted out
as an administrative rather than criminal measure. Authorities used
administrative detention to intimidate political activists and prevent
public demonstrations.
Arbitrary Arrest: In February police began detaining and arresting
dozens of activists, lawyers, and other citizens in an apparently
coordinated crackdown on a loose grouping of activists known as the New
Citizens Movement. The Beijing Municipality Traffic Security Division
detained Beijing University of Post and Telecommunications lecturer and
legal scholar Xu Zhiyong on July 16 on suspicion of ``gathering a crowd
to disturb public order.'' He was formally arrested on August 22 and
formally charged in December. On September 13, authorities detained
venture capitalist and popular microblogger Wang Gongquan on charges of
``gathering a crowd to disturb public order,'' after he used his
microblog to decry Xu's arrest.
Other New Citizens Movement associates arrested for peaceful
advocacy of good governance included Liu Ping, Wei Zhongping, Li Sihua,
Yuan Dong, Ma Xinli, Zhang Baocheng, Hou Xin, Li Wei, Wang Yonghong,
Ding Jiaxi, Sun Hanhui, Zhao Changqing, Qi Yueying, Zhang Xiangzhong,
Li Gang, Li Huanjun, and Song Guangqiang.
Authorities arrested persons on allegations of revealing state
secrets, subversion, and other crimes as a means to suppress political
dissent and public advocacy. These charges - including what constitutes
a state secret - remained ill defined. Authorities also detained
citizens and foreigners under broad and ambiguous state secrets laws
for, among other actions, disclosing information on criminal trials,
meetings, commercial activity, and government activity. Authorities
sometimes retroactively labeled a particular action as a violation of
the state secret laws. According to a Radio Free Asia (RFA) report,
local officials in Dujiangyan, Sichuan Province, detained Zhou
Xingrong, whose child died in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, for nine
hours in April 2012 for allegedly revealing ``state secrets'' by
microblogging about efforts by bereaved parents to obtain compensation
for their children's earthquake-related deaths. According to a western
media report, authorities continued to harass her during the year.
Authorities placed numerous dissidents, activists, and petitioners
under house arrest during the October National Day holiday period and
at other sensitive times, such as during the visits of senior foreign
government officials or in the period preceding the annual plenary
sessions of the NPC and the CPPCC, the anniversary of the Tiananmen
massacre, and sensitive anniversaries in Tibetan areas and the XUAR.
Conditions faced by those under house arrest varied but sometimes
included complete isolation in their homes under police guard. In some
instances security officials were stationed inside the homes of
subjects under house arrest. Others under house arrest occasionally
were permitted to leave their homes to work or run errands but were
required to ride in police vehicles. In some cases police or
plainclothes security officers escorted the children of politically
sensitive individuals to and from school. When permitted to leave their
homes, subjects of house arrest were usually under police surveillance.
Authorities in the XUAR used house arrest and other forms of arbitrary
detention against those accused of supporting the ``three evils'' of
religious extremism, ``splittism,'' and terrorism.
After serving one year at an RTL camp for staging protests calling
for political reforms and attempting to visit prominent activist Ai
Weiwei, Fujian petitioner Wang Weizhu was released in July. She went to
a foreign embassy compound in Beijing after her release to distribute
leaflets about her grievances, after which Beijing Police reportedly
detained her for five days.
According to the RFA, in June authorities detained members of the
Guizhou Human Rights Symposium, including Wu Yuqin, Li Renke, and Mo
Jiangang, and forced them to leave the provincial capital for the
duration of the two-day EU-China meeting on human rights there.
Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detention can last as long as one
year. Defendants in ``sensitive cases'' reported being subjected to
prolonged pretrial detention.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The law states that the courts shall exercise judicial power
independently, without interference from administrative organs, social
organizations, and individuals. The judiciary did not exercise judicial
power independently. Legal scholars interpreted former president Hu
Jintao's doctrine of the ``Three Supremes'' as stating that the
interests of the CCP are above the law. Judges regularly received
political guidance on pending cases, including instructions on how to
rule, from both the government and the CCP, particularly in politically
sensitive cases. The CCP Law and Politics Committee has the authority
to review and influence court operations at all levels of the
judiciary.
During the year media sources indicated public security authorities
used televised confessions of foreign and domestic bloggers,
journalists, and business executives in an attempt to establish guilt
before their criminal trial proceedings began.
A CCP-controlled committee decides most major cases, and the duty
of trial and appellate court judges is to craft a legal justification
for the committee's decision.
``Judicial independence'' was reportedly one of the off-limit
subjects that the CCP ordered university professors not to discuss (see
section 2.a., Academic Freedom).
Corruption also influenced court decisions. Safeguards against
judicial corruption were vague and poorly enforced. Local governments
appoint and pay local court judges and, as a result, often exerted
influence over the rulings of judges in their districts.
Courts are not authorized to rule on the constitutionality of
legislation. The law permits organizations or individuals to question
the constitutionality of laws and regulations, but a constitutional
challenge can be directed only to the promulgating legislative body.
Lawyers have little or no opportunity to rely on constitutional claims
in litigation.
Trial Procedures
The criminal justice system was biased toward a presumption of
guilt, especially in high-profile or politically sensitive cases.
According to the Supreme People's Court, in 2011 the combined
conviction rate for first- and second-instance criminal trials was 99.9
percent. Of 1,051,638 criminal defendants tried in 2011, only 891 were
acquitted.
In many politically sensitive trials courts handed down guilty
verdicts immediately following proceedings with no deliberation. Courts
often punished defendants who refused to acknowledge guilt with harsher
sentences than those who confessed. The appeals process rarely reversed
convictions. Appeals processes failed to provide sufficient avenues for
review, and remedies for violations of defendants' rights were
inadequate.
Regulations of the Supreme People's Court require all trials to be
open to the public, with the exceptions of cases involving state
secrets, privacy issues, and minors. Authorities used the state-secrets
provision to keep politically sensitive proceedings closed to the
public, sometimes even to family members, and to withhold access to
defense counsel. Court regulations state that foreigners with valid
identification should be allowed to observe trials under the same
criteria as citizens, but foreigners were permitted to attend court
proceedings only by invitation. As in past years, foreign diplomats and
journalists unsuccessfully sought permission to attend a number of
trials. In some instances the trials were reclassified as ``state
secrets'' cases or otherwise closed to the public. During the year
foreign diplomats attempted to attend nearly one dozen public trials
throughout the country. In each instance court officials claimed that
there were no available seats in the courtroom and that foreigners
needed prior permission to attend trials.
Some trials were broadcast, and court proceedings were a regular
television feature. A few courts published their verdicts on the
internet.
The revised criminal procedure law makes clear that a criminal
suspect may retain a lawyer immediately after an initial police
interrogation or after his or her freedom has been officially limited.
Investigators are required to inform suspects of their right to retain
counsel. Police must also arrange meetings between a defense lawyer and
his or her client within 48 hours of a request from defense counsel.
Individuals facing administrative detention do not have the right
to seek legal counsel. Criminal defendants were eligible for legal
assistance, although more than 50 percent of criminal defendants went
to trial without a lawyer. According to the Ministry of Justice, in
2012 there were more than one million legal aid cases. The revised
criminal procedure law expanded requirements for legal aid to include
cases that could result in life imprisonment and cases involving
individuals suffering from mental illness.
Human rights lawyers reported that authorities did not permit them
to defend certain clients or threatened them with punishment if they
chose to do so. The government suspended or revoked the licenses of
lawyers or their firms to stop them from taking sensitive cases, such
as defending prodemocracy dissidents, house-church activists, Falun
Gong practitioners, or government critics.
The CCP continued to require law firms with three or more CCP
members to form a CCP unit within the firm. Firms with one or two CCP
members may establish joint CCP units with other firms. In smaller
counties and cities with few lawyers, CCP members may join local
Justice Bureau CCP units. This rule also applies to private companies
and other organizations.
Some lawyers declined to represent defendants in politically
sensitive cases, and such defendants frequently found it difficult to
find an attorney.
Authorities detained Guangzhou-based activist Yang Maodong (also
known under the pen name Guo Feixiong) on August 8 on suspicion of
``gathering a crowd to disrupt order of a public place.'' According to
several Western media sources, officials repeatedly denied him access
to lawyers. International media speculated he was detained in
connection with his participation in protests surrounding the incident
in January involving censorship of the Guangzhou newspaper Southern
Weekend and his association with the New Citizens Movement (see section
2, Freedom of Speech and Press).
When defendants were able to retain counsel in politically
sensitive cases, government officials sometimes prevented attorneys
from organizing an effective defense. Tactics employed by court and
government officials included unlawful detentions, disbarment,
harassment and physical intimidation, and denial of access to evidence
and to clients.
In April a court in Jiangsu Province placed Beijing rights lawyer
Wang Quanzhang under a 10-day judicial detention for ``serious
violations of court procedure.'' The violations consisted of using his
mobile telephone to copy a set of original documents he was submitting
to the court during the trial of a Falun Gong practitioner.
Online reports indicated that on June 25 riot police in Wenchang,
Hainan Province, intercepted a group of Guangzhou-based lawyers who had
come to represent detained dissident Zheng Qiuwu and his wife. The riot
police scuffled with the lawyers and forced them to return to the
provincial capital of Haikou.
The annual licensing review process administered by the Beijing
Lawyers Association was used to withhold or delay the renewal of
professional lawyers' licenses, which restricted the ability of a
number of human rights and public interest lawyers to practice law.
Government officials continued to harass lawyers for their
involvement in high-profile, rights-related cases.
Defense attorneys may be held legally responsible if their client
commits perjury, and prosecutors and judges have wide discretion to
decide what constitutes perjury. In some sensitive cases lawyers had no
pretrial access to their clients, and defendants and lawyers were not
allowed to communicate with one another during trials. Criminal
defendants were frequently not assigned an attorney until a case was
brought to court. According to a Ministry of Justice official, in 2011
lawyers represented fewer than half of criminal defendants, and in some
provincial-level administrative regions, only an estimated 12 percent
of criminal suspects had lawyers.
Mechanisms allowing defendants to confront their accusers were
inadequate. Only a small percentage of trials involved witnesses, and
fewer than 10 percent of subpoenaed witnesses appeared in court. A
provision of the revised criminal procedure law compels witnesses to
appear in court and includes protections for witnesses and financial
allowances for performing the duties of a witness. In most criminal
trials, prosecutors read witness statements, which neither the
defendants nor their lawyers had an opportunity to rebut. Although the
law states that pretrial witness statements cannot serve as the sole
basis for conviction, prosecutors relied heavily on such statements.
Defense attorneys had no authority to compel witnesses to testify or to
mandate discovery, although they could apply for access to government-
held evidence relevant to their case. Defense attorneys received
minimal pretrial access to information.
The criminal code contains 55 capital offenses, including
nonviolent financial crimes such as embezzlement and corruption. There
was no publicly available government information on how many defendants
were either sentenced to death or executed during the year. Official
figures on execution are classified as a state secret. An international
human rights NGO estimated that 4,000 persons were executed annually in
recent years, a marked decrease in the years following the 2007 Supreme
People's Court retrieval of its authority to conduct final reviews of
death sentences. Lethal injection and shooting were employed as
execution methods.
Chen Youxi, the attorney for street vendor Xia Junfeng, who was
convicted of killing two urban management officials in Shenyang,
Liaoning Province, and executed on September 25, argued that the
Supreme People's Court failed to consider evidence supporting Xia's
claims of self-defense during its review of his sentence. According to
a report, the presiding judge refused to admit the testimony of several
eyewitnesses and relied on the statements of other urban management
officials.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
Government officials continued to deny holding any political
prisoners, asserting that authorities detained persons not for their
political or religious views but because they violated the law.
Authorities, however, continued to imprison citizens for reasons
related to politics and religion. Tens of thousands of political
prisoners remained incarcerated, some in prisons and others in RTL
camps or administrative detention. The government did not grant
international humanitarian organizations access to political prisoners.
Foreign NGOs estimated that several hundred persons remained in
prison for ``counterrevolutionary crimes,'' which were removed from the
criminal code in 1997. Thousands of others were serving sentences under
state security statutes. The government apparently neither reviewed all
cases of those charged before 1997 with counterrevolutionary crimes nor
released persons jailed for nonviolent offenses under repealed
provisions of the criminal law. The government maintained that
prisoners serving sentences for counterrevolutionary crimes and
endangering state security were eligible to apply for sentence
reduction and parole. Political prisoners, however, were granted early
release at lower rates than other prisoners. Observers believed that
persons remained in prison for crimes in connection with their
involvement in the 1989 Tiananmen prodemocracy movement, although the
number was unknown because related official statistics were never made
public.
Rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng remained in prison in Xinjiang for
allegedly violating the terms of a suspended prison sentence.
Authorities sharply limited access to him and at times concealed his
whereabouts. Democracy activist Hada remained in unofficial detention
in Inner Mongolia three years after reportedly completing a 15-year
sentence in 2010. Hada's wife and sons also faced periods of extralegal
house arrest.
Many political prisoners remained in prison or under other forms of
detention at year's end, including rights activists Wang Bingzhang and
Liu Xianbin; Ablikim Abdureyim, son of Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer;
Zhou Yongjun; labor activist Kong Youping; Roman Catholic bishop Su
Zhimin; and Tibetan Buddhist reincarnate lama Tenzin Delek Rinpoche,
who was reportedly in poor health.
Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, coauthor of the Charter `08
manifesto that called for increased political freedoms and human
rights, remained in Jinzhou Prison in Liaoning Province. Beijing-based
human rights attorney Mo Shaoping, whose firm represented Liu, reported
that Liu's wife Liu Xia was allowed to travel from Beijing to Jinzhou
to see him monthly. She remained under 24-hour surveillance, and police
escorted her whenever she was allowed to leave her home. Media reports
in December indicated that Liu Xia might be suffering from depression
due to her long-term isolation and deprivation of access to books and
the internet.
On August 16, a Beijing court sentenced Liu Hui, Liu Xiaobo's
brother-in-law, to 11 years' imprisonment on spurious charges of
contract fraud by. Liu Xia was allowed to attend the trial on April 23
and told onlookers outside the court that she was not free.
At year's end reliable information was not available as to whether
the following individuals remained in detention: Abdulla Jamal, Uighur
activist Dilkex Tilivaldi, Feng Xinchun, Gonpo Lhundrub, Gonpo Thar,
Jalo, Tselo, and Wang Diangang.
Criminal punishments continued to include ``deprivation of
political rights'' for a fixed period after release from prison, during
which time the individual was denied rights of free speech,
association, and publication. Former prisoners reported that their
ability to find employment, travel, obtain residence permits, rent
residences, and access social services was severely restricted. Former
political prisoners and their families frequently were subjected to
police surveillance, telephone wiretaps, searches, and other forms of
harassment or threats.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
Courts deciding civil matters faced the same limitations on
judicial independence as criminal courts. The State Compensation Law
provides administrative and judicial remedies for plaintiffs whose
rights or interests government agencies or officials have infringed.
The law also allows compensation for wrongful detention, mental trauma,
or physical injuries inflicted by detention center or prison officials.
Citizens seldom applied for state compensation because of the high cost
of bringing lawsuits, low credibility of courts, and citizens' lack of
awareness of the State Compensation Law. Victims' claims were difficult
to assess because of vague definitions in the law and difficulties in
obtaining evidence of injury or damage. Judges were reluctant to accept
state compensation cases, and government agencies seldom implemented
court judgments in favor of plaintiffs.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
While the law states that the ``freedom and privacy of
correspondence of citizens are protected by law,'' authorities often
did not respect the privacy of citizens. Although the law requires
warrants before law enforcement officials can search premises,
officials frequently ignored this requirement. The Public Security
Bureau and prosecutors are authorized to issue search warrants on their
own authority without judicial review. Cases of forced entry by police
officers continued to be reported.
Authorities monitored telephone conversations, fax transmissions,
e-mail, text messaging, and internet communications. They also opened
and censored domestic and international mail. Security services
routinely monitored and entered residences and offices to gain access
to computers, telephones, and fax machines.
According to foreign media reports, the Ministry of Public Security
used tens of millions of surveillance cameras in the country.
Authorities justified the security cameras as a way to improve public
safety, crime fighting, traffic management, and ``social stability.''
Human rights groups stated authorities increasingly relied on the
cameras to monitor and intimidate political dissidents, Tibetans, and
Uighurs.
The monitoring and disruption of telephone and internet
communications were particularly widespread in the XUAR and Tibetan
areas. Authorities frequently warned dissidents and activists,
underground religious figures, and former political prisoners
throughout the country not to meet with foreign journalists or
diplomats, especially before sensitive anniversaries, at the time of
important government or CCP meetings, and during the visits of high-
level foreign officials. Security personnel harassed and detained the
family members of political prisoners, including following them to
meetings with foreign reporters and diplomats and urging them to remain
silent about the cases of their relatives.
Family members of activists, dissidents, Falun Gong practitioners,
journalists, unregistered religious figures, and former political
prisoners were targeted for arbitrary arrest, detention, and harassment
(see section 1.d.).
In April four unidentified men forcibly removed 10-year-old Zhang
Anni, the daughter of prodemocracy activist, Zhang Lin, from school and
detained her at the Hefei city police station for several hours. Under
government pressure, Hupo Elementary School refused to enroll Zhang
Anni for seven weeks.
Chen Kegui, nephew of activist Chen Guangcheng, remained in prison
at year's end. In April media reported that Kegui was suffering from an
unknown health condition in prison following allegations of torture by
prison authorities. Authorities denied his family's request for medical
parole.
On August 16, Guangzhou police prohibited activist Tang Jingling
and his wife Wang Yanfang from attending the funeral of well known
house church pastor Samuel Lamb. Security officials reportedly put many
pastors under house arrest to prevent them from attending the funeral.
Guangzhou security personnel had previously detained Wang Yanfang for
10 days in December 2011 and January 2012 in connection with protests
in the Guangdong village of Wukan.
On May 31, police in Wenchang, Hainan, arrested dissident Zheng
Qiuwu's wife. On June 4, Zhejiang authorities detained Zheng himself
and sent him home to Hainan. Both Zheng and his wife reportedly were
charged with ``illegal business activity.''
Forced relocation because of urban development continued and in
some locations increased during the year. Protests over relocation
terms or compensation were common, and some protest leaders were
prosecuted. In rural areas infrastructure and commercial development
projects resulted in the forced relocation of millions of persons.
Property-related disputes between citizens and government
authorities, which often turned violent, were widespread in both urban
and rural areas. These disputes frequently stemmed from local
officials' collusion with property developers to pay little or no
compensation to displaced residents, combined with a lack of effective
government oversight or media scrutiny of local officials' involvement
in property transactions, as well as a lack of legal remedies or other
dispute resolution mechanisms for displaced residents. The problem
persisted despite the central government's efforts to impose stronger
controls over illegal land seizures and to standardize compensation.
Redevelopment in traditional Uighur neighborhoods in cities throughout
the XUAR, such as the Old City area in Kashgar, resulted in the
destruction of historically or culturally important areas. Some
residents voiced opposition to the lack of proper compensation provided
by the government and coercive measures used to obtain their agreement
to redevelopment. There were several reports of herders in Inner
Mongolia complaining of confiscation of traditional pastoral lands for
development.
Foreign media reported that at least 53 persons had self-immolated
since 2009 to protest destruction of their homes.
For information on the government's family planning policies and
their consequences, see section 6, Women.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The law provides for freedom of speech and press, although
authorities generally did not respect these rights. Authorities
continued to control print, broadcast, and electronic media tightly and
used them to propagate government views and CCP ideology. During the
year authorities imposed censorship and manipulated the press and the
internet, particularly around sensitive anniversaries.
Freedom of Speech: With significant exceptions, especially speech
that challenged the government or the CCP, political topics could be
discussed privately and in small groups without official punishment.
During the year some independent think tanks, study groups, and
seminars reported pressure to cancel some sessions on sensitive topics.
Those who made politically sensitive comments in public speeches,
academic discussions, and comments to the media remained subject to
punitive measures.
In March the government merged the State Administration of Radio,
Film, and Television with the General Administration of Press and
Publication to create a new broadcast and press regulatory body, the
General Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and
Television.
On September 9, the Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's
Procuratorate issued a judicial interpretation that made online
rumormongering a punishable offense. Under the interpretation the
author of a libelous internet post that is reposted more than 500 times
or read more than 5,000 times, or of an internet post that led to mass
protests, instigated ethnic or religious clashes, damaged the country's
image or caused ``a bad international effect,'' is subject to a maximum
of three years in prison. By year's end this interpretation had a
chilling effect on online discourse.
The government frequently monitored gatherings of intellectuals,
scholars, and dissidents where political or sensitive issues were
discussed. In 2008, to commemorate International Human Rights Day, a
group of 303 intellectuals and activists released a petition entitled
Charter `08, calling for the CCP to respect human rights and implement
democratic reforms. Since then Charter `08 signers continued to report
official harassment, especially around sensitive dates.
According to Western media reports, Shenzhen activist Yang Mingyu
(also known as Yang Lin) was arrested July 19 for ``inciting subversion
of state power'' in connection with his democracy activism,
participation in Charter `08, and efforts to disclose official
corruption.
On August 12, activist Liu Jiacai, who served two years
administrative detention sentence on a charge of ``inciting subversion
of state power'' in 2002, was detained in Hubei Province on criminal
charges of ``inciting subversion of state power.'' Police reported that
he was detained for posting and disseminating online writings and views
about legal reform in China. NGO sources reported that the charges
stemmed from the fact that Liu had gathered activists in Yichang, Hubei
Province for dinner parties, where they discussed corruption and other
sensitive topics.
Press Freedoms: All books and magazines require state-issued
publication numbers, which were expensive and often difficult to
obtain. Nearly all print media, broadcast media, and book publishers
were affiliated with the CCP or a government agency. There were a small
number of print publications with some private ownership interest but
no privately owned television or radio stations. The CCP directed the
domestic media to refrain from reporting on certain subjects, and all
broadcast programming required government approval.
In November the General Administration of Press, Publication,
Radio, Film, and Television began requiring news organizations to hold
weekly lectures on the CCP's journalistic principles, and journalists
applying to renew their media credentials are required to take an
examination on Marxist journalistic ideals.
Foreign journalists based in the country found a challenging
environment for reporting. According to the annual ``Reporting
Conditions'' survey of the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China
(FCCC), ``98 percent of respondents do not think reporting conditions
in China meet international standards, and 70 percent feel conditions
have worsened or stayed the same as the year before.''
On July 8, journalist and documentary filmmaker Du Bin was released
from a Beijing jail on bail after being detained for five weeks for
allegedly ``disturbing order at a public place.'' In May, Du had posted
an online documentary about the Masanjia Women's RTL Camp in Liaoning
Province (see section 1.c.), and also in May a publisher with offices
in Hong Kong and New York published his book on the Tiananmen massacre.
Violence and Harassment: On July 15, law enforcement officers in
Baita District of Liaoyang, Liaoning Province, allegedly beat a Chinese
Business Morning View journalist who was reporting on a dispute between
residents and developers at a construction site and destroyed his
interview recordings.
Restrictions on foreign journalists by central and local CCP
propaganda departments remained strict, especially during sensitive
times and anniversaries. Foreign press outlets reported that local
employees of foreign news agencies were also subject to official
harassment and intimidation. During the year the FCCC ``found 63 cases
in which police officers or unknown persons impeded foreign reporters
from doing their work, including nine cases in which reporters were
manhandled or subjected to physical force.'' The report adds that while
``this represents a welcome drop from last year,'' such intimidation
``remains unacceptable.''
According to Western media reports, in February a group of
unidentified men in four vehicles assaulted a German television crew
filming in a village near Beijing. According to a German correspondent
present at the scene, the men ran the crew's minivan off the road and
then smashed its windshield with baseball bats.
In December, Chinese authorities prevented a Western reporter from
attending a press event with UK Prime Minister David Cameron and
Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang.
The FCCC reported that, although routine delays in the provision of
journalist visas appear to have shortened in recent months, 10 percent
of survey respondents reported difficulties in obtaining official press
accreditation or a journalist visa because of their reporting or that
of their predecessors. While some reporters who authored particularly
controversial news articles ultimately had their visas renewed, their
news organizations experienced difficulty obtaining visas for new
journalists and staff, even when these individuals previously held
journalist visas for China.
Additionally, among the correspondents surveyed, 30 percent stated
their Chinese assistants encountered pressure from officials or
experienced harassment.
The government limited attendance at official press briefings to
domestic media. Foreign media and diplomats were allowed to attend only
briefings conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a handful of
press briefings held around special events.
Authorities continued to enforce tight restrictions on citizens
employed by foreign news organizations. The code of conduct for Chinese
employees of foreign media organizations threatens with dismissal and
loss of accreditation Chinese employees who engage in ``independent
reporting'' and instructs them to provide their employers information
that projects a good image of the country.
Official guidelines for domestic journalists were often vague,
subject to change at the discretion of propaganda officials, and
enforced retroactively. Propaganda authorities forced newspapers to
fire editors and journalists responsible for articles deemed
inconsistent with official policy and suspended or closed publications.
The system of postpublication review by propaganda officials encouraged
self-censorship by editors seeking to avoid the losses associated with
penalties for inadvertently printing unauthorized content. Officials
can be punished for unauthorized contact with journalists.
Government officials used criminal prosecution, civil lawsuits, and
other punishments, including violence, detention, and other forms of
harassment, to intimidate authors and journalists and to prevent the
dissemination of controversial writings. A domestic journalist can face
demotion or job loss for publishing views that challenge the
government.
In January a group of current and former journalists from the
Guangzhou newspaper Southern Weekend (also translated as Southern
Weekly), part of the Nanfang Daily Group, accused provincial propaganda
officials of altering the newspaper's traditional New Year's message,
which called for increased respect for constitutional rights. Southern
Weekend journalists went on strike January 6 to protest editorial
censorship, and students and activists began holding supportive
demonstrations in front of the newspaper offices in Guangzhou. The
protests turned into a broader public backlash against press censorship
and were supported by editors, reporters, and social media. An
agreement between the newspaper's staff and party overseers ended the
strike January 8 and allowed the newspaper to resume publication
January 10, but a clampdown on dissent reportedly followed. According
to media reports, local authorities forcibly dispersed anticensorship
protests, detained several activists for expressing solidarity with the
newspaper, and blocked and deleted all references to the controversy
from the internet.
Journalists who remained in prison at year's end included Yang
Tongyan, and Dhondup Wangchen. Uighur webmasters Dilshat Perhat and
Nijat Azat continued to serve sentences for ``endangering state
security.'' Uighur journalist Memetjan Abdulla was sentenced to life in
prison in 2010, reportedly for transmitting ``subversive'' information
related to the 2009 riots. During the year journalists working in
traditional and new media were also imprisoned. In December 2012 the
Prison Census of the Committee to Protect Journalists reported that, of
32 known journalists imprisoned in the country, 12 were ethnic Tibetan,
seven were ethnic Uighur, and one was ethnic Mongolian. The committee
documented two new imprisonment cases in 2012.
Censorship or Content Restrictions: Authorities continued to
confiscate ``unauthorized publications.'' According to the National
Office Against Pornographic and Illegal Publications, 45 million
illegal publications were confiscated and more than 3.7 million pieces
of online information involving pornography or other illegal content
were deleted in 2012.
Foreign journalists were denied permits to travel to the TAR,
except for a very few highly controlled, government-organized press
visits. Travel to Tibetan areas outside the TAR became increasingly
difficult for foreign journalists. While foreign journalists were
allowed access to Urumqi, XUAR, local and provincial authorities
continued to control strictly the travel, access, and interviews of
foreign journalists, even forcing them to leave cities in parts of the
XUAR. After French news station France 24 broadcast journalist Cyril
Payen's documentary about Tibet on May 30, Chinese embassy personnel
went to the channel's headquarters in Paris to demand the withdrawal of
the documentary from the station's website. The Chinese embassy in
Bangkok also threatened Payen by telephone, according to Reporters
Without Borders.
Media outlets received regular guidance on topics that should not
be covered from the CCP's Central Propaganda Department. For example,
in April the department issued censorship instructions to mainland
media prohibiting them from reusing, reporting, and commenting on Lens
magazine's April article on the Masanjia Women's Labor Re-education
Camp in Liaoning Province (see section 1.c.).
Following an October typhoon in Yuyao, Zhejiang Province, that
killed 10 persons and sparked protests about the government response,
the State Council Information Office issued instructions to media
outlets and internet companies not to report a local newspaper's story
about the protests.
In December 2012 the Central Propaganda Department ordered media
outlets to adhere strictly to the information provided by authoritative
departments when reporting on officials suspected of involvement in
graft or bribery. Throughout the year the Central Propaganda Department
issued similar instructions regarding the election of Hong Kong's chief
executive, the self-immolation of Tibetans, and the Bo Xilai scandal.
The orders included instructions for media outlets not to investigate
or report on their own.
Authorities continued to ban books with content they deemed
controversial. The law permits only government-approved publishing
houses to print books. The State Press and Publications Administration
(PPA) controlled all licenses to publish. Newspapers, periodicals,
books, audio and video recordings, or electronic publications may not
be printed or distributed without the approval of the PPA and relevant
provincial publishing authorities. Individuals who attempted to publish
without government approval faced imprisonment, fines, confiscation of
their books, and other sanctions. The CCP exerted control over the
publishing industry by preemptively classifying certain topics as state
secrets.
Many intellectuals and scholars exercised self-censorship,
anticipating that books or papers on political topics would be deemed
too sensitive to be published. The censorship process for private and
government media also increasingly relied on self-censorship and, in a
few cases, postpublication sanctions.
The General Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and
Television, and the CCP remained active in issuing restrictive
regulations and decisions constraining the content of broadcast media.
Authorities continued to jam, with varying degrees of success,
Chinese-, Uighur-, and Tibetan-language broadcasts of the Voice of
America (VOA), the BBC, and RFA. English-language broadcasts on the VOA
generally were not jammed. Internet distribution of streaming radio
news and podcasts from these sources often was blocked. Despite the
jamming of overseas broadcasts, the VOA, the BBC, RFA, Deutsche Welle,
and Radio France International had large audiences, including human
rights advocates, ordinary citizens, and government officials.
Overseas television newscasts, largely restricted to hotels and
foreign residence compounds, were occasionally subject to censorship.
Such censorship of foreign broadcasts also occurred around the
anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and during the 18th Party
Congress in 2012. Individual issues of foreign newspapers and magazines
were occasionally banned when they contained articles deemed too
sensitive. After two U.S. media websites published articles on
Bloomberg.com and in the New York Times detailing the family wealth of
Xi Jinping and Wen Jiabao, websites for both media outlets were
blocked.
Politically sensitive coverage in Chinese, and to a lesser extent
in English, were censored more than coverage in other languages. The
government prohibited some foreign and domestic films deemed too
sensitive or selectively censored parts of films before they were
released.
Internet Freedom
In 2010 the Information Office of the State Council released its
first White Paper on the internet outlining the government's endeavors
to allow certain freedoms of speech on the internet as long as the
speech did not endanger state security, subvert state power, damage
state honor and interests, jeopardize state religious policy, propagate
heretical or superstitious ideas, or spread rumors and other content
forbidden by laws and administrative regulations, among other caveats.
The internet was widely available and widely used. The China Internet
Network Information Center (CNNIC) reported that by the end of 2012 the
number of internet users reached 564 million, including 420 million
mobile telephone internet users. The CNNIC reported that 50.9 million
new users were added in 2012 - a 3.8 percent increase from 2011. The
International Telecommunication Union reported that 39 percent of
individuals used the internet and 41 percent of households had access
to the internet by the end of the year.
The CCP underscored the importance of maintaining security and
promoting core socialist values on the internet in its official
decision adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the 17th CCP Congress in
October 2011. The document called for developing a ``healthy and
uplifting network culture'' that entails measures such as ``step[ping]
up guidance and management over social networks and instant messaging
tools, standardiz[ing] the transmission order of information on the
internet, and foster[ing] a civilized and rational network
environment.''
The CCP continued to increase efforts to monitor internet use,
control content, restrict information, block access to foreign and
domestic websites, encourage self-censorship, and punish those who ran
afoul of political sensitivities. According to news sources, more than
14 government ministries participated in these efforts, resulting in
the censorship of thousands of domestic and foreign websites, blogs,
cell phone text messages, social networking services, online chat
rooms, online games, and e-mail. These measures were not universally
effective. In addition to its own extensive system of internet
censorship, the government imposed more responsibilities on internet
companies to implement online censorship and surveillance regimes, and
it sought to prohibit anonymous expression online.
A State Council regulation deems personal blogs, computer bulletin
boards, and cell phone text messages to be part of the news media,
which subjects these media to state restrictions on content. Internet
service providers were instructed to use only domestic media news
postings, to record information useful for tracking users and their
viewing habits, to install software capable of copying e-mails, and to
end immediately transmission of ``subversive material.''
Under guidance from the CCP, the government employed thousands of
persons at the national, provincial, and local levels to monitor
electronic communications. Official monitoring focused on such tools as
social networking, microblogging, and video-sharing sites. Internet
companies also employed thousands of censors to implement CCP
directives.
In 2011 central government authorities ordered all public spaces
offering free wireless internet access to install costly software that
would enable police to identify users of the service. Authorities
warned Beijing cafe and restaurant owners they would face a fine of
20,000 renminbi (RMB) ($3,270) if they offered wireless internet access
without installing the software. In December 2012 the NPC ratified a
law requiring persons to give their real names when signing up for
internet, fixed telephone line, or mobile telephone services. Providers
must also require persons' names when allowing them to post information
publicly.
Major news portals require users to register using their real names
and identification numbers to comment on news articles. Individuals
using the internet in public libraries are required to register using
their national identity card, and usage reportedly was monitored at all
public library terminals.
The government consistently blocked access to websites it deemed
controversial, especially those discussing Taiwan, the Dalai Lama,
Tibet, underground religious and spiritual organizations, democracy
activists, and the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. The government also at
times blocked access to selected sites operated by foreign governments,
news outlets, health organizations, educational institutions, NGOs, and
social networking sites, as well as to search engines that allow rapid
communication or organization of users.
In June 2012, following the publication of an expose on the
financial affairs of Xi Jinping's family, the government blocked access
to a Western media website. In October 2012 the government blocked
access to the English- and Chinese-language versions of a U.S. media
website after it published an article on Wen Jiabao's family fortunes.
At year's end, several Western media and social media websites were not
accessible.
Some websites included images of cartoon police officers that warn
users to stay away from forbidden content. Operators of web portals,
blog-hosting services, and other content providers engaged in self-
censorship to ensure their servers were free from politically sensitive
content. Domestic websites that refused to self-censor political
content were shut down, and many foreign websites were blocked.
Millions of citizens had Twitter-like microblogs that circulated some
news banned in the national media. The microblogs themselves were
censored but often hours or days after the posting.
In July 2012 the State Internet Information Office and the State
Administration of Radio, Film and Television issued a circular
requiring online video content providers to review videos before making
them available online and holding them responsible for the content.
Authorities employed an array of technical measures to block
``sensitive'' websites based in foreign countries. The ability of users
to access such sensitive sites varied from city to city. The government
also automatically censored e-mail and web chats based on a list of
sensitive key words, such as ``Falun Gong,'' ``Dalai Lama,'' and
``Tibetan independence.'' While such censorship was effective in
keeping casual users away from sensitive content, it was defeated
through the use of various technologies. Information on proxy servers
outside China and software for defeating official censorship was
readily available inside the country, but the government increasingly
blocked access to the websites and proxy servers of commercial virtual
private network providers. Despite official monitoring and censorship,
dissidents and political activists continued to use the internet to
call attention to political causes such as prisoner advocacy, political
reform, ethnic discrimination, and corruption. Internet users spanning
the political spectrum complained of censorship. Authorities sometimes
blocked or closed the blogs of a number of prominent activists,
artists, scholars, and university professors during the year.
There were numerous press reports of purported cyber-attacks
against foreign websites, foreign journalists, and foreign media
organizations that carried information deemed offensive by the
government.
Authorities continued to jail numerous internet writers for
peaceful expression of political views.
According to online reports, in June police in Fujian detained an
online activist for 10 days for her microblog comments about a June 7
bus explosion in Xiamen. Police previously detained this same blogger
in January 2012 for her comments about alleged corruption behind forced
home evictions and demolitions in Xiamen's Jimei district.
The blog of environmental writer Liu Futang remained inaccessible.
His blog, which exposed environmental problems caused by government-
backed projects, was shut down in late 2012 after a Hainan Province
court found him guilty of illegally profiting from self-published
books.
The State Secrets Law obliges internet companies to cooperate with
investigations of suspected leaks of state secrets, stop the
transmission of such information once discovered, and report the crime
to authorities. Furthermore, the companies must comply with
authorities' orders to delete such information from their websites, and
failure to do so is punishable by relevant departments such as the
police and the Ministry of Public Security.
Regulations prohibit a broad range of activities that authorities
interpret as subversive or slanderous to the state.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
The government continued restrictions on academic and artistic
freedom, and political and social discourse at colleges, universities,
and research institutes. The General Administration of Press,
Publications, Radio, Film, and Television and the Central Propaganda
Department issued restrictive regulations and decisions that
constrained the flow of ideas and persons. In May the media reported
that the CCP issued secret instructions to university faculty
identifying seven ``off-limits'' subjects including universal values,
freedom of the press, civil society, civil rights, an independent
judiciary, elite cronyism, and the historical errors of the CCP. Some
academics self-censored their publications, faced pressure to reach
predetermined research results, or were unable to hold conferences with
international participants during politically sensitive periods. Peking
University economics professor Xia Yeliang came under government
criticism for calling for public discussion of reform among
intellectuals, and in October he was dismissed from his university
position.
In December the East China University of Political Science and Law
in Shanghai dismissed law professor Zhang Xuezhong for criticizing one-
party rule in an online publication. According to reports, the school
administration decided Zhang was unfit to teach after he refused to
admit any wrongdoing.
Censorship and self-censorship of artistic works was common,
particularly those artworks deemed to involve politically sensitive
subjects.
Authorities on a few occasions blocked entry into the country of
individuals deemed politically sensitive and declined to issue
passports to Chinese citizens selected for international exchange
programs who were considered ``politically unreliable,'' singling out
ethnic Tibetans and Uighurs and individuals from other minority
nationality areas.
A number of other foreign government-sponsored exchange selectees,
particularly those from minority provinces, encountered difficulties
gaining approval to travel to participate in their programs.
The government used political attitudes and affiliations as
criteria for selecting persons for the few government-sponsored study
abroad programs but did not impose such restrictions on privately
sponsored students. The government and the party controlled the
appointment of high-level officials at universities. While CCP
membership was not always a requirement to obtain a tenured faculty
position, scholars without CCP affiliation often had fewer chances for
promotion.
Foreign researchers, authors, and academics residing abroad
reported they were subject to sanctions, including denial of visas,
from authorities when their work did not meet with official approval.
Thirteen foreign academics asserted that they were blacklisted and
blocked from obtaining visas to travel to China for having contributed
scholarly essays to a book on Xinjiang published in 2004. Other
scholars continued to be blacklisted or faced difficulties obtaining
visas because of their politically sensitive work on China.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association Freedom of Assembly
While the law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, the
government severely restricted this right. The law stipulates that such
activities may not challenge ``party leadership'' or infringe upon the
``interests of the state.'' Protests against the political system or
national leaders were prohibited. Authorities denied permits and
quickly suppressed demonstrations involving expression of dissenting
political views.
Citizens continued to gather publicly to protest evictions,
relocations, and compensation in locations throughout the country,
often resulting in conflict with authorities or other charges (see
section 1.f.).
Guangdong police worked aggressively to curtail free speech and
preempt peaceful assembly during the anniversary of the Tiananmen
Square incident. Authorities ordered 15-day administrative detention
for the organizers of one event. Police placed other activists under
surveillance or house arrest, encouraged some to leave town on
``vacation,'' or invited them to police stations for ``tea'' and
questioning. Police also reportedly restricted the freedom of Foshan
rights activist Chen Qitang and Guangzhou rights activists Wang Aizhong
and Tang Jingling in late May and early June in advance of and during
the anniversary of the Tiananmen incident.
In January, Guangzhou police detained numerous persons involved in
public demonstrations against the provincial propaganda department's
censorship of Southern Weekend's New Year's greeting. In addition to
administrative detentions and formal arrests, police reportedly held a
number of participants in irregular detention facilities including a
movie theater and a military base (see section 2.a.).
On January 2, police in the Luoxi neighborhood of Guangzhou
preemptively detained dozens of activists, including organizer Xu Lin,
for planning a musical performance and poetry recitation at a public
square to celebrate the New Year.
On February 23, Liu Yuandong, Sun Desheng, and 12 others were
detained in Guangdong for their participation in protests directed at
North Korea's nuclear test. Most of the protesters were freed or given
administrative detentions, but police formally arrested and charged Liu
on April 3. According to media reports, police subjected Liu and Sun to
mistreatment in custody including sleep deprivation. On April 12,
authorities in Dongguan, Guangdong Province, gave four activists
administrative detentions after they held up banners calling for Liu's
release. On August 13, authorities in Guangzhou again detained Sun
Desheng for the crimes of gathering crowds and disrupting public order.
In May, Chengdu authorities preemptively deployed 170,000 security
personnel throughout the city on the date of a planned protest against
the construction of a nearby petrochemical plant and its production of
paraxylene. Authorities also detained suspected activists in the days
leading up to the planned protest.
Also in May, Changsha authorities in Hunan Province detained Xiang
Yuhan following his organization of a peaceful march of 100 persons in
commemoration of the International Day Against Homophobia. Xiang was
confined for 12 days in administrative detention on a charge of
``illegal protest.''
In February the Nanjing NGO Tianxiagong (Justice for All) won a
lawsuit against a hotel in Suzhou that in 2012 had canceled its
conference reservations at the last moment on order from the local PSB.
In May another NGO's legal rights conference in Hangzhou faced similar
obstructions when hotels canceled reservations. The hotels informed the
NGO that Zhejiang and Jiangsu province security officers ordered
authorities not to permit holding the gathering anywhere in the
provinces.
All concerts, sports events, exercise classes, or other meetings of
more than 200 persons require approval from public security
authorities. Although peaceful protests are legal, police rarely
granted approval. Despite restrictions there were many demonstrations,
but those with political or social themes were broken up quickly,
sometimes with excessive force. The number of ``mass incidents'' and
protests, including some violent protests, against local governments
increased during the year. According to an international NGO, a former
leading member of the CCP's Politics and Law Commission stated that the
country experienced 30,000 to 50,000 mass incidents every year. As in
past years, the vast majority of demonstrations concerned land
disputes; housing problems; industrial, environmental, and labor
matters; government corruption; taxation; and other economic and social
concerns. Others were provoked by accidents or were related to personal
petitions, administrative litigation, and other legal processes.
Disputes over land expropriation continued to trigger large-scale
clashes between police and protesters.
The law protects an individual's ability to petition the
government, but persons petitioning the government faced restrictions
on their rights to assemble and raise grievances (see section 1.d.).
Most petitions addressed grievances about land, housing, entitlements,
the environment, or corruption. Most petitioners sought to present
their complaints at national and provincial ``letters and visits''
offices.
Although banned by regulations, retaliation against petitioners
reportedly continued. This was partly due to incentives the central
government provided to local officials to prevent petitioners from
raising complaints to higher levels. Incentives included provincial
cadre evaluations based in part on the number of petitions from their
provinces. This initiative aimed to encourage local and provincial
officials to resolve legitimate complaints but also resulted in local
officials sending security personnel to Beijing and forcibly returning
the petitioners to their home provinces to prevent them from filing
complaints against local officials with the central government. Such
detentions often went unrecorded. Rules issued by the General Office of
the State Council mandate sending officials from Beijing to the
provinces to resolve petition problems locally, thereby reducing the
number of petitioners entering Beijing. The rules also mandate a 60-day
response time for petitions and provide for a single appeal in each
case.
Petitioners faced harassment, illegal detention, and even more
severe forms of punishment when attempting to travel to Beijing to
present their grievances.
On January 5, authorities prevented 13 petitioners from Fujian
Province from requesting assistance with their petitions from a foreign
embassy in Beijing. According to online reports, police detained six of
the petitioners for five days and one petitioner for 10 days.
Freedom of Association
The law provides for freedom of association, but the government
restricted this right. CCP policy and government regulations require
that all professional, social, and economic organizations officially
register with, and receive approval from the government. These
regulations prevented the formation of truly autonomous political,
human rights, religious, spiritual, labor, and other organizations that
the government believed might challenge its authority.
The government maintained tight controls over civil society
organizations.
According to regulations issued by the State Administration for
Foreign Exchange, foreign exchange donations to or by domestic
institutions must ``comply with the laws and regulations.and shall not
go against social morality or damage public interests and the
legitimate rights and interests of other citizens.'' For donations to a
domestic organization from a foreign NGO, the regulations require all
parties and the banks to approve additional measures prior to
processing a transaction. Application of the regulation varied, with
some NGOs successfully navigating the requirements, others identifying
other options by which to receive funds, and some severely limiting or
shutting down operations.
To register, an NGO must find a government agency to serve as its
organizational sponsor, have a registered office, and hold a minimum
amount of funds. Some organizations with social or educational purposes
that previously registered as private or for-profit businesses
reportedly were requested to find a government sponsor and reregister
as NGOs during the year. Finding a government sponsor was often very
difficult, since the government department can be held responsible if
the NGO engages in sensitive behavior. In March the NPC announced
changes for NGO registration that waived the requirement to find a
government sponsor. However, these changes only apply to four types of
NGOs - industrial associations, charities, community services, and
organizations dedicated to the promotion of technology. NGO sources
reported that the new regulations do not apply to organizations
primarily focused on advocacy or rights promotion.
In July the Ministry of Civil Affairs announced the intention to
pass legislation that would allow international NGOs to register with
provincial civil affairs authorities instead of the ministry. By year's
end the legislation had not been promulgated.
In 2012 Guangdong provincial government officials initiated
proposals aimed at facilitating the operations and work of many NGOs,
including, for example, simplifying registration procedures so that
certain categories of NGOs could register directly with the Ministry of
Civil Affairs. Implementation of regulations associated with these
proposals was often inconsistent. Although some NGOs perceived to be
working in nonpolitically sensitive areas enjoyed increased
opportunities, others continued to face interference from authorities,
for example, through increased financial scrutiny. Labor NGOs in
Shenzhen continued to face a challenging environment, including
registration hurdles and occasional government interference with their
activities.
Although registered organizations all came under some degree of
government control, some NGOs were able to operate with a greater
degree of independence.
The number of NGOs continued to grow, despite the restrictions and
regulations. The government used the term ``social organization'' to
categorize social groups (shehui tuanti), such as trade and
professional associations; civil noncommercial units (minban fei qiye
danwei), which are the equivalent of nonprofit service providers; and
foundations (jijinhui). The last category included two types of
foundations: public fundraising and private fundraising foundations.
The government continued to impose fundraising limits on private
foundations.
According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, by the end of 2012
there were at least one million NGOs either operating without legal
status or registered as companies. The country had approximately
462,000 legally registered social organizations, including 255,000
social groups, 204,000 civil noncommercial units, and 2,614
foundations. In 2012 an official of the Ministry of Civil Affairs
wrote, ``In 2007 China started to use the term `social organization'
instead of `civil organization' because `civil' contrasts with
`official' and reflected the opposing roles of civil society and
government in the traditional political order. The 16th and 17th CCP
Congresses changed the name to `social organization.' NGOs existed
under a variety of formal and informal guises, including national mass
organizations created and funded by the CCP, known as `government
NGOs.'''
The lack of legal registration created numerous logistical
challenges for NGOs, including difficulty opening bank accounts and
receiving foreign funding, hiring workers, fundraising, and renting
office space. NGOs that opted not to partner with government agencies
could register as commercial consulting companies, which allowed them
to obtain legal recognition at the cost of forgoing tax-free status.
Security authorities routinely warned domestic NGOs, regardless of
their registration status, not to accept donations from the foreign-
funded National Endowment for Democracy and other international
organizations deemed sensitive by the government.
In July officials from the Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau raided,
closed, and confiscated materials from the think tank Transition
Institute for not registering properly. The institute registered as a
business, and its head, Guo Yushan, was associated with the New
Citizens Movement and activists such as Chen Guangcheng and Xu Zhiyong.
Authorities supported the growth of some NGOs that focused on
social problems such as poverty alleviation and disaster relief, but
remained concerned that these organizations might emerge as a source of
political opposition. NGOs working in the TAR and other Tibetan areas
faced an increasingly difficult operating environment, and many were
forced to curtail their activities altogether due to travel
restrictions, official intimidation of staff members, and the failure
of local partners to renew project agreements.
No laws or regulations specifically govern the formation of
political parties. The Chinese Democracy Party remained banned, and the
government continued to monitor, detain, and imprison current and
former CDP members.
c. Freedom of Religion
See the Department of State's International Religious Freedom
Report at www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/.
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of
Refugees, and Stateless Persons
The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel,
emigration, and repatriation, but the government generally did not
respect these rights. While seriously restricting its scope of
operations, the government occasionally cooperated with the Office of
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which maintained an
office in Beijing, to provide protection and assistance to refugees,
asylum seekers, and other persons of concern.
Increasingly the government silenced activists by denying them
permission to travel, both internationally and domestically, or keeping
them under unofficial house arrest. In the spring officials denied
Jiangsu environmental activist Wu Lihong a passport to travel abroad to
accept a human rights award, although his wife and daughter were
eventually permitted to travel and accepted the award on his behalf.
Uighur economist Ilham Tohti was detained at Beijing airport and
prevented from traveling abroad to accept a position as a visiting
scholar.
In-country Movement: Authorities heightened restrictions on freedom
of movement, particularly to curtail the movement of individuals deemed
politically sensitive, before key anniversaries, visits by foreign
dignitaries, or major political events and to forestall demonstrations.
Freedom of movement continued to be very limited in the TAR and other
Tibetan areas. Police maintained checkpoints in most counties and on
roads leading into many towns, as well as within major cities such as
Lhasa. Tibetans from other provinces reported that authorities
subjected them to onerous documentation requirements to enter the TAR
and required Tibetans who were not residents of Lhasa to obtain
permission to enter the city, often forcing them to stay in specially
designated accommodations, requirements not imposed on Han Chinese
visitors to the TAR.
In 2012 prominent Tibetan poet and blogger Woeser, a Beijing
resident, was required to leave Beijing and return to Lhasa for three
months before and during the 18th Party Congress in Beijing. Uighur
economics professor Ilham Tohti was also required to leave Beijing
during the Party Congress. Feng Zhenghu, Mao Hengfeng, and other
Shanghai activists reported being repeatedly detained upon arrival in
Beijing when attempting to visit other activists or petition the
national government.
Although the government maintained restrictions on the freedom to
change one's workplace or residence, the national household
registration system (hukou) continued to change, and the ability of
most citizens to move within the country to work and live continued to
expand. Rural residents continued to migrate to the cities, where the
per capita disposable income was more than four times the rural per
capita income, but many could not change their official residence or
workplace within the country. Most cities had annual quotas for the
number of new temporary residence permits that could be issued, and all
workers, including university graduates, had to compete for a limited
number of such permits. It was particularly difficult for rural
residents to obtain household registration in more economically
developed urban areas.
The household registration system added to the difficulties rural
residents faced even after they relocated to urban areas and found
employment. According to the 2012 Statistical Communique of the
People's Republic of China on 2012 National Economic and Social
Development published in February by the Ministry of Human Resources
and Social Security, 279 million persons lived outside the jurisdiction
of their household registration. Of that number, 236 million
individuals worked outside their home district. Many migrant workers
and their families faced numerous obstacles with regard to working
conditions and labor rights. Many were unable to access public
services, such as public education or social insurance, in the cities
where they lived and worked because they were not legally registered
urban residents. Poor treatment and difficulty integrating into local
communities contributed to increased unrest among migrant workers in
the Pearl River Delta. Migrant workers had little recourse when abused
by employers and officials. Some major cities maintained programs to
provide migrant workers and their children access to public education
and other social services free of charge, but migrants in some
locations reported difficulty in obtaining these benefits due to the
onerous bureaucratic processes involved in obtaining access to urban
services.
Under the ``staying at prison employment'' system applicable to
recidivists incarcerated in RTL camps, authorities denied certain
persons permission to return to their homes after serving their
sentences. Some released or paroled prisoners returned home but were
not permitted freedom of movement.
Foreign Travel: The government permitted legal emigration and
foreign travel for most citizens. Some academics and activists
continued to face travel restrictions, especially around sensitive
anniversaries (see section 1.d.). The government exercised exit control
for departing passengers at airports and other border crossings and
utilized this exit control to deny foreign travel to dissidents and
persons employed in sensitive government posts. Throughout the year
lawyers, artists, authors, and other activists were at times prevented
from freely exiting the country. Border officials and police cited
threats to ``national security'' as the reason for refusing permission
to leave the country. Authorities stopped most persons at the airport
at the time of the attempted travel. Wuxi environmental activist Wu
Lihong was prevented from traveling abroad to accept a human rights
award in July. Shanghai activist Zheng Enchong was prevented from
accepting a teaching fellowship in Hong Kong in August. Shanghai
activist Chen Jianfang was prevented from traveling to a UN human
rights training course in Geneva in September. Well known artist Ai
Weiwei was denied a passport to attend exhibitions of his work abroad.
Other activists also reported being blocked from traveling abroad.
Most citizens could obtain passports, although those government
deemed potential threats, including religious leaders, political
dissidents, petitioners, and ethnic minorities, reported routinely
being refused passports or otherwise prevented from traveling overseas.
Ethnic Uighurs, particularly those residing in the XUAR, reported
that it was very difficult to get a passport application approved at
the local level. They were frequently denied passports to travel
abroad, particularly to Saudi Arabia for the haj, other Muslim
countries, or Western countries for academic or other purposes.
Authorities reportedly seized valid passports of some residents of the
XUAR and other citizens.
In the TAR and Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan
provinces, ethnic Tibetans experienced great difficulty acquiring
passports. The unwillingness of Chinese authorities in Tibetan areas to
issue or renew passports for ethnic Tibetans created, in effect, a ban
on foreign travel for a large segment of the Tibetan population. Han
residents of Tibetan areas did not experience the same difficulties.
Authorities denied Tibetan blogger and poet Woeser's passport
application, preventing her from receiving the Secretary of State's
International Women of Courage award in person. According to an RFA
report, in June authorities placed Woeser and her husband under house
arrest for speaking up about conditions in Tibet ahead of a state-
sponsored trip by foreign journalists to the TAR.
Exile: The law neither provides for a citizen's right to repatriate
nor addresses exile. The government continued to refuse reentry to
numerous Chinese citizens who were considered dissidents, Falun Gong
activists, or ``troublemakers.'' Although authorities allowed some
dissidents living abroad to return, dissidents released on medical
parole and allowed to leave the country often were effectively exiled.
Authorities imprisoned some activists residing abroad upon their return
to the country.
Emigration and Repatriation: The government continued to try to
prevent many Tibetans and Uighurs from leaving the country and detained
many who were apprehended in flight (see Tibet Annex). During the year
171 Tibetans transited the UNHCR reception center in Kathmandu. There
also were reports of the forcible return of Uighur asylum seekers from
Malaysia in 2012. Of a group of 20 Uighurs returned from Cambodia in
2009, three persons, a woman and two children, were reportedly freed,
and in 2011, 16 others received prison sentences ranging from 16 years
to life. Chinese authorities continued to refuse to provide information
regarding the whereabouts of the remaining individual.
Protection of Refugees
Access to Asylum: The law does not provide for the granting of
refugee or asylee status, and the government did not establish a system
for providing protection to refugees. Although the government does not
grant refugee or asylee status, it allowed the UNHCR more latitude in
assisting non-North Korean and non-Burmese refugees. The UNHCR office
in Beijing recognized approximately 100 refugees from Pakistan, Iraq,
Somalia, and Eritrea and was processing approximately 100 additional
individuals who requested refugee status. Because the PRC did not
officially recognize these individuals as refugees, they remained in
the country as illegal immigrants unable to work, with no access to
education, and subject to deportation at any time.
Refoulement: The government did not provide protection against the
expulsion or forcible return of vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers,
especially North Korean and Kachin refugees, to countries where their
lives or freedom would be threatened on account of their race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. The government continued to consider all North
Koreans ``economic migrants'' rather than refugees or asylum seekers,
and the UNHCR continued to have no access to North Korean or Burmese
refugees inside China. The lack of access to durable solutions and
options, as well as constant fear of forced repatriation by
authorities, left North Korean refugees vulnerable to human
traffickers. Reports of various exploitation schemes targeting North
Korean refugees, such as forced marriages, forced labor, and
prostitution, were common. The government continued to deny the UNHCR
permission to operate along its borders with North Korea and Burma.
Some North Koreans who entered diplomatic compounds in the country
were permitted to travel to foreign countries after waiting for periods
of up to two years.
On May 27, there were reports that the government of Laos
coordinated with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to
deport nine North Korean asylum seekers from Laos to China. On June 3,
the Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated the nine individuals entered
China on May 27 and subsequently left Beijing bound for the DPRK
holding valid travel documents and visas.
After two-time North Korean defector and South Korean citizen Kim
Kwang-ho defected from North Korea to China for the second time,
Chinese security officials in Yanji, Jilin Province, detained Kim, his
wife Kim Ok-sil, and their daughter in July and held them until August
before allowing them to return to South Korea. Chinese authorities
reportedly repatriated to North Korea Kim's North Korean brother- and
sister-in-law, who defected with him.
Refugee Abuse: The intensified crackdown begun in 2008 against
North Korean asylum seekers and refugees reportedly extended to
harassment of religious communities along the border. The government
arrested and detained individuals who provided food, shelter,
transportation, and other assistance to North Koreans. According to
reports some activists or brokers detained for assisting North Koreans
were charged with human smuggling, and in some cases the North Koreans
were forcibly returned. There were also reports that North Korean
agents operated clandestinely within the country to repatriate North
Korean citizens forcibly. According to press reports, some North
Koreans detained by Chinese police faced repatriation unless they could
pay bribes to secure their release.
Access to Basic Services: Undocumented children of some North
Korean asylum seekers and of mixed couples (i.e., one Chinese parent
and one North Korean parent) did not have access to health care, public
education, or other social services due to lack of legal status.
Durable Solutions: The government largely cooperated with the UNHCR
when dealing with the resettlement of ethnic Han Chinese or ethnic
minorities from Vietnam and Laos who resided in the country since the
Vietnam War era. During the year the government and the UNHCR continued
discussions concerning the granting of citizenship to these long-term
residents and their children, many of whom were born in China.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The constitution states that ``all power in the People's Republic
of China belongs to the people'' and that the organs through which the
people exercise state power are the NPC and the people's congresses at
provincial, district, and local levels. While the law provides citizens
the right to change their government peacefully, citizens cannot freely
choose or change the laws or officials that govern them. In fact the
CCP controlled virtually all elections and continued to control
appointments to positions of political power.
Elections and Political Participation
Recent Elections: The NPC, composed of up to 3,000 deputies, elects
the president and vice president, the premier and vice premiers, and
the chairman of the State Central Military Commission. The NPC Standing
Committee, which consisted of 175 members, oversaw these elections and
determined the agenda and procedures for the NPC.
The NPC Standing Committee remained under the direct authority of
the CCP, and most legislative decisions require the concurrence of the
CCP's seven-member Politburo Standing Committee. Despite its broad
authority under the state constitution, the NPC did not set policy
independently or remove political leaders without the CCP's approval.
According to Ministry of Civil Affairs statistics, almost all of
the country's more than 600,000 villages had implemented direct
elections for members of local subgovernmental organizations known as
village committees. The direct election of officials by ordinary
citizens remained narrow in scope and strictly confined to the local
level. The government estimated that serious procedural flaws marred
one-third of all elections. Corruption, vote buying, and interference
by township-level and CCP officials continued to be problems. The law
permits each voter to cast proxy votes for up to three other voters.
The election law governs legislative bodies at all levels, although
compliance and enforcement was uneven across the country. Under this
law citizens have the opportunity every five years to vote for local
people's congress representatives at the county level and below,
although in most cases higher-level government officials or CCP cadres
controlled the nomination of candidates in those elections. At higher
levels legislators selected people's congress delegates from among
their ranks. For example, provincial-level people's congresses selected
delegates to the NPC. Local CCP secretaries generally served
concurrently within the leadership team of the local people's congress,
thus strengthening CCP control over legislatures.
In 2012 the local governments kept most independent candidates -
those without official government backing - off the ballots despite
their meeting nomination criteria. No declared independent candidates
won election in 2012. Election officials pressured independent
candidates to renounce their candidacies, manipulated the ballot to
exclude independent candidates, refused to disclose electorate
information to independent candidates, and sometimes adjusted electoral
districts to dilute voter support for independent candidates.
In September an independent People's Congress candidate from Foshan
City, Guangdong Province, who was detained in 2011 during the People's
Congress representative elections that year on a charge of undermining
elections, was tried and found guilty of ``disrupting elections.''
According to open source websites, hundreds of her supporters who
wanted to observe her trial were denied access to the court.
Political Parties: Official statements asserted, ``The political
party system [that] China has adopted is multi-party cooperation and
political consultation under'' CCP leadership. The CCP, however,
retained a monopoly on political power, and the government forbade the
creation of new political parties. The government officially recognized
nine parties founded prior to 1949, and parties other than the CCP held
30 percent of the seats in the NPC. Activists attempting to support
unofficial parties were arrested, detained, or confined.
In 2009 in Hunan Province, dissident Xie Changfa, who tried to
organize a national meeting of the banned CDP, was sentenced to 13
years in prison. Guo Quan, a former Nanjing University professor and
founder of the China New Democracy Party, remained imprisoned following
his 2009 sentence to 10 years in prison and three years' deprivation of
political rights for ``subversion of state power.'' Guo published
articles criticizing the country's one-party system. Other current or
former CDP members, including Yang Tianshui, remained in prison or in
RTL camps for their calls for political reform and their affiliation
with the CDP.
Participation of Women and Minorities: While the government placed
no special restrictions on the participation of women or minority
groups in the political process, women held few positions of
significant influence in the CCP or government structure. Among the
2,987 delegates of the 11th NPC (term 2008-13), 637 were women (21
percent).
Ten women occupied ministerial or higher-ranked positions.
According to government-provided information, there were more than
230 female provincial and ministerial officials, 10 percent of the
overall total; 670 female mayors and vice mayors, twice the number from
1995; and one provincial governor, Li Bin in Anhui Province (until
June). A total of 37 women were members of provincial standing
committees, constituting 9 percent of standing committee members.
Following the 18th Party Congress in November, two women were members
of the CCP's 25-member Politburo. There were no women in the Standing
Committee of the Politburo. There were approximately 15 million female
CCP cadres, approximately one-fifth of the party's membership.
The government encouraged women to exercise their right to vote in
village committee elections and to run in those elections, although
only a small fraction of elected members were women. In many locations
a seat on the village committee was reserved for a woman, who was
usually given responsibility for family planning. The election law
provides a general mandate for quotas for female and ethnic minority
representatives, but achieving these quotas often required election
authorities to violate the election procedures specified in the
election law. During the 2011-12 local people's congresses elections,
many electoral districts in which independent candidates campaigned
used these quotas as justification to thwart the independent
candidacies.
A total of 411 delegates from 55 ethnic minorities were members of
11th NPC, accounting for 14 percent of the total number of delegates.
All of the country's officially recognized minority groups were
represented.
The 18th Communist Party Congress elected 10 members of ethnic
minority groups as members of the Central Committee.
The only ministerial-level post held by an ethnic minority member
was in the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, headed by Yang Jing, an
ethnic Mongol from Inner Mongolia. Until November 2012 Hui Liangyu of
the Hui ethnic group was a member of the Politburo. Minorities held few
senior CCP or government positions of significant influence (see also
section 6, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities).
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government
Although according to the law officials face criminal penalties for
corruption, the government did not implement the law effectively, and
officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Many
cases of corruption involved areas heavily regulated by the government,
such as land-usage rights, real estate, and infrastructure development,
which were susceptible to fraud, bribery, and kickbacks. Court
judgments often could not be enforced against powerful special
entities, including government departments, state-owned enterprises,
military personnel, and some members of the CCP.
While corruption remained a serious problem, there were increasing
indications that the government recognized the seriousness of the
problem.
In January the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI),
the CCP's leading body for countering corruption among members,
reported that it had investigated 155,144 corruption-related cases and
closed 153,704 of them and that the CCP and government had disciplined
160,718 officials.
In October the Supreme People's Procuratorate reported that
prosecutors nationwide had investigated 18,283 cases involving bribery
and major embezzlement from January to August. Among the suspects were
129 officials at the director general level and above.
In December the CCP Central Committee unveiled a five-year plan to
punish and prevent corruption. On December 26, the CCDI reported it had
punished 25,855 individuals for breaches to antibureaucracy and
formalism rules during the year, including 6,247 CCP officials.
In February 2012 the NPC's Standing Committee amended the criminal
law to make citizens and companies paying bribes to foreign government
officials and officials of international public organizations subject
to criminal punishments of up to 10 years' imprisonment and a fine.
In October 2012 the government established a ``frugal working
style'' rule barring government officials from spending public money on
luxury items such as lavish banquets and luxury cars and from accepting
expensive gifts. In September the government banned officials from
using public money to send mooncakes as gifts and in December published
regulations that banned dishes containing shark fin, bird nests, and
wild animal products from official banquets. In December the government
issued guidelines forbidding officials from chartering planes or flying
in private or corporate jets overseas.
In 2012 the Supreme People's Court urged local courts to ban family
members of officials and judges from being lawyers under the local
court's jurisdiction. Also in 2012 the Higher People's Court of Fujian
Province forbade judges from meeting privately with representatives in
a case.
In February 2012 the Supreme People's Procuratorate announced the
availability of a national bribery database listing individuals and
companies found guilty of certain offenses, including bribing an
individual or entity, and facilitating bribery. Companies and
individuals must apply in writing to have the procuratorate check
nationwide to determine whether a particular individual or company has
been convicted of bribery offenses in the PRC. Companies must provide a
copy of their business license.
In June 2012 the Supreme People's Procuratorate stated it would
strengthen measures to recover and freeze illegal assets transferred
abroad by corrupt officials.
Corruption: In numerous cases during the year, public officials and
leaders of state-owned enterprises, who generally hold high CCP ranks,
were investigated for corruption. In June the CCDI announced that Guo
Yongxiang, a former deputy governor of Sichuan Province, was under
investigation for suspected disciplinary violations.
In July a Beijing court sentenced former railroads minister Liu
Zhijun to death, with a two-year reprieve. Liu came under scrutiny for
his mismanagement of the country's high-speed train network.
On August 26, the Ministry of Supervision announced that Wang
Yongchun, a vice president at state-owned China National Petroleum
Corporation and the general manager of Daqing oilfield in Heilongjiang
Province, was being investigated for ``severe disciplinary
violations.''
In September the Beijing Municipal People's Procuratorate confirmed
that it had indicted former Jilin vice governor Tian Xueren on
corruption charges but did not provide a trial date or information
about the specific charges against him. Tian was reported to have been
stripped of both his party membership and government position for
taking bribes.
In December the CCDI investigated Vice-Minister of Public Security
Li Dongsheng for ``suspected serious law and discipline violations.''
Notable organizations that worked to address official corruption
included the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Ministry
of Supervision, the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention, the
International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities, and the Anti-
Corruption and Governance Research Center at Tsinghua University.
Whistleblower Protection: In 1991 the Supreme People's
Procuratorate published the Regulation to Protect Citizen's
Whistleblowing Rights. Whistleblowing protections are also included in
various criminal and labor laws. Legal experts opined, however, that
the constellation of laws and regulations did not provide adequate
protections to whistleblowers. In September the government created an
official website for citizens to report fraud, graft, and government
mismanagement, with priority given to those who provide their real
names and contact information. The government does not provide legal
protection for whistleblowers who do not use official channels.
Financial Disclosure: A 2010 regulation requires officials in
government agencies or state-owned enterprises at the county level or
above to report their ownership of property, including that in their
spouses' or children's names, as well as their families' investments in
financial assets and enterprises. According to Article 23 of the
regulations, the monitoring bodies are the CCDI, the Organization
Department of the CCP, and the Ministry of Supervision. The regulations
do not state that declarations are to be made public. Instead, they are
to go to a higher administrative level and a human resource department.
Punishments for not declaring information vary from education on the
regulations, warning talks, and adjusting one's work position to being
relieved of one's position. Regulations further state that officials
should report all income, including allowances, subsidies and bonuses,
as well as income from other jobs such as giving lectures, writing,
consulting, reviewing articles, painting, and calligraphy. Officials,
their spouses, and the children who live with them also should report
their real estate properties and financial investments. Government
officials should report their marriage status, records of private
travel abroad, marriage status of their children, and whether their
spouses are from Hong Kong, Taiwan, or a foreign country. They must
report whether their children live abroad, as well as the work status
of their children and grandchildren (including those who live abroad).
Officials are required to file reports annually and must report changes
of personal status within 30 days.
In December 2012 officials announced that Guangdong Province would
pilot a program in select districts requiring all CCP and government
officials to report their assets publicly, with officials who refuse to
do so to be relieved of their posts and subjected to further
investigations. This program was not put into practice by year's end.
Public Access to Information: Open-government information
regulations allow citizens to request information from the government.
The regulations require government authorities to create formal
channels for information requests and to include an appeal process if
requests are rejected or not answered. They stipulate that
administrative agencies should reply to requests immediately to the
extent possible. Otherwise, the administrative agency should provide
the information within 15 working days, with the possibility of a
maximum extension of an additional 15 days. In cases in which third-
party rights and interests are involved, the time needed to consult the
third party does not count against the time limits. According to the
regulations, administrative agencies may collect only cost-based fees
(as determined by the State Council) for searching, photocopying,
postage, and similar expenses when disclosing government information on
request. Citizens requesting information can also apply for a fee
reduction or exemption. The regulations include exceptions for state
secrets, commercial secrets, and individual privacy.
Publicly released provincial- and national-level statistics for
open-government information requests showed wide disparities across
localities, levels of government, and departments in numbers of
requests filed and official documents released in response.
If information requestors believe that an administrative agency has
violated the regulations, they can report it to the next higher-level
administrative agency, the supervision agency, or the department in
charge of open-government information. In 2011 the Supreme People's
Court ruled that citizens can sue any government department that
refused to provide unclassified information. Shortly thereafter a
Tsinghua University graduate student sued three government ministries
after her requests for information regarding the duties of 14
ministries for use in her thesis were denied. A court delayed
consideration of her case pending further research, and she withdrew
her lawsuit after the ministries provided the requested information.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The government sought to maintain control over civil society
groups, halt the emergence of independent NGOs, hinder the activities
of civil society and rights' activist groups, and prevent what it
called the ``Westernization'' of the country. The government did not
permit independent domestic NGOs to monitor openly or to comment on
human rights conditions, and it harassed domestic NGOs. The government
tended to be suspicious of independent organizations and scrutinized
NGOs with financial and other links overseas. Most large NGOs were
quasi-governmental, and many official NGOs had to be sponsored by
government agencies. The NPC introduced new registration procedures in
March that allowed certain types of nonadvocacy NGOs to register
directly with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (see section 2.b., Freedom
of Association).
An informal network of activists around the country continued to
serve as a credible source of information about human rights
violations. The information was disseminated through organizations such
as the Hong Kong-based Information Center for Human Rights and
Democracy, the foreign-based Human Rights in China, and Chinese Human
Rights Defenders and via the internet.
The government remained reluctant to accept criticism of its human
rights record by other nations or international organizations. It
criticized reports by international human rights monitoring groups,
claiming that such reports were inaccurate and interfered with the
country's internal affairs. Representatives of some international human
rights organizations reported that authorities denied their visa
requests or restricted the length of visas issued to them. The
government continued to participate in official diplomatic human rights
dialogues with foreign governments although some governments
encountered problems scheduling such dialogues.
Government Human Rights Bodies: The government did not have a human
rights ombudsman or commission. The government-established China
Society for Human Rights was an NGO whose mandate is to defend the
government's human rights record. The government maintained that each
country's economic, social, cultural, and historical conditions
influenced its approach to human rights.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in
Persons
While there were laws designed to protect women, children, persons
with disabilities, and minorities, some discrimination based on
ethnicity, sex, disability, and other factors persisted.
Women
Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape is illegal, and some persons
convicted of rape were executed. The penalties for rape can range from
three years in prison to a death sentence with a two-year reprieve and
forced labor. The law does not address spousal rape. The government did
not make available official statistics on rape or sexual assault,
leaving the scale of sexual violence difficult to determine. Migrant
female workers were particularly vulnerable to sexual violence.
Violence against women remained a significant problem. According to
reports at least a quarter of families suffered from domestic violence,
and more than 85 percent of the victims were women. Domestic violence
against women included verbal and psychological abuse, restrictions on
personal freedom, economic control, physical violence, and rape. The
government supported shelters for victims of domestic violence, and
some courts provided protections to victims, including through
restraining orders prohibiting a perpetrator of domestic violence from
coming near a victim. In March, Shaanxi Province designated the Number
Two People's Hospital as an antidomestic violence service station to
treat victims of domestic violence, the first designation of its kind.
Nonetheless, official assistance did not always reach victims, and
public security forces often ignored domestic violence. In 2010 the All
China Women's Federation (ACWF) reported that it received 50,000
domestic violence complaints annually. Spousal abuse typically went
unreported, and an ACWF study found that only 7 percent of rural women
who suffered domestic violence sought help from police. Almost 30
percent of respondents in a recent study felt that domestic violence
should be kept a private matter.
While domestic violence tended to be more prevalent in rural areas,
it also occurred among the highly educated urban population. The ACWF
reported that approximately one-quarter of the 400,000 divorces
registered each year were the result of family violence.
According to ACWF statistics nationwide in 2008 there were 12,000
special police booths for domestic violence complaints, 400 shelters
for victims of domestic violence, and 350 examination centers for women
claiming injuries from domestic violence. Many domestic violence
shelters had inadequate facilities, required extensive documentation,
or went unused. The government operated most shelters, some with NGO
participation. In 2012 the government provided 680,000 office spaces in
government buildings for women's resource centers.
There was no strong legal mechanism to protect women from domestic
abuse. According to the ACWF, laws related to domestic violence were
flawed since there was no national provision for dealing with
offenders. During the year the creation of such mechanisms was added to
the NPC's legislative agenda, the fifth time the ACWF submitted such a
proposal. Both the marriage law and the law on the protection of
women's rights and interests have stipulations that directly prohibit
domestic violence, but some experts complained that the stipulations
were too general, failed to define domestic violence, and were
difficult to implement. Because of standards of evidence, even if
certain that domestic violence was occurring, a judge could not rule
against the abuser without the abuser's confession. Only 10 percent of
accused abusers confessed to violent behavior, according to 2009 data
from the Institute of Applied Laws. The institute reported that,
although 40 to 60 percent of marriage and family cases involved
domestic violence, less than 30 percent were able to supply indirect
evidence, including photographs, hospital records, police records, or
children's testimony. Witnesses seldom testified in court.
Public support increased in the fight against domestic violence. A
recent survey found that more than 85 percent of respondents believed
that further antidomestic violence legislation was needed. A high-
profile case, Kim Lee's case against her celebrity husband, Li Yang,
led to public outcry when she posted pictures of her injuries on a
social networking site. After months of waiting, Lee was granted a
civil protection order forbidding her husband from approaching within
200 yards of her. In February a Beijing court granted Lee a divorce on
the grounds of domestic abuse and issued a three-month protection order
against her former husband. This case set a precedent because the court
acknowledged domestic violence as grounds for divorce, granted a
protection order, and ordered the former husband to pay compensation
for the violence she had endured during their marriage.
Sexual Harassment: The law bans sexual harassment, and the number
of sexual harassment complaints increased significantly. A 2009 Harvard
University study showed that 80 percent of working women in the country
experienced sexual harassment at some stage of their careers. The same
study found that only 30 percent of sexual harassment claims by women
achieved favorable resolutions. In November an NGO published its survey
of female manufacturing workers in Guangzhou, which indicated that as
much as 70 percent of Guangzhou's female workforce had been sexually
harassed. Approximately half did not pursue legal or administrative
actions, while 15 percent of respondents reported leaving the workplace
to escape their harasser.
Sexual harassment was not limited to the workplace. According to a
China Youth Daily survey reported in September, approximately 14
percent of women had been sexually harassed while riding the subway,
and 82 percent of those polled believed the problem existed. At a
Hainan Province festival in 2012, a dozen women were pinned down by a
crowd of men who mauled the women and stripped off their clothes in
broad daylight. Police escorted the women away and, according to press
reports, subsequently detained six suspects in the assault.
According to information on the ACWF website, the internet and
hotlines made it easier for women who were sexually harassed to obtain
useful information and legal service. A Beijing rights lawyer told the
ACWF that approximately
100-200 million women in the country had suffered or were suffering
sexual harassment in the workplace but that very few legal service
centers provided counseling.
Reproductive Rights: The government restricted the rights of
parents to choose the number of children they have. Although national
law prohibits the use of physical coercion to compel persons to submit
to abortion or sterilization, intense pressure to meet birth-limitation
targets set by government regulations resulted in instances of local
family-planning officials' using physical coercion to meet government
goals. Such practices included the mandatory use of birth control and
the abortion of unauthorized pregnancies. In the case of families that
already had two children, one parent was often pressured to undergo
sterilization.
The National Population and Family Planning Commission reported
that 13 million women annually underwent abortions caused by unplanned
pregnancies. An official news media outlet also reported at least an
additional 10 million chemically induced abortions or abortions
performed in nongovernment facilities. Government statistics on the
percentage of all abortions that were nonelective was not available.
According to Health Ministry data released in March 2012, a total of
336 million abortions and 222 million sterilizations had been carried
out since 1971.
The national family-planning authorities shifted their emphasis
from lowering fertility rates to maintaining low fertility rates and
emphasized quality of care in family-planning practices. In 2010 a
representative of the National Population and Family Planning
Commission reported that 85 percent of women of childbearing age used
contraception. Of those, 70 percent used a reversible method. A survey
taken in September, however, found that only 12 percent of women
between the ages of 20 and 35 had a proper understanding of
contraceptive methods. The country's birth-limitation policies retained
harshly coercive elements in law and practice. The financial and
administrative penalties for unauthorized births were strict.
The 2002 national population and family-planning law standardized
the implementation of the government's birth-limitation policies,
although enforcement varied significantly. The law grants married
couples the right to have one birth and allows couples to apply for
permission to have a second child if they meet conditions stipulated in
local and provincial regulations. The one-child limit was more strictly
applied in urban areas, where only couples meeting certain conditions
were permitted to have a second child (e.g., if both of the would-be
parents were an only child). In most rural areas couples were permitted
to have a second child in cases where their first child was a girl.
Ethnic minorities were subject to less stringent rules. Nationwide 35
percent of families fell under the one-child restrictions, and more
than 60 percent of families were eligible to have a second child,
either outright or if they met certain criteria. The remaining 5
percent were eligible to have more than two children. According to
government statistics, the average fertility rate for women nationwide
was 1.8, and in the country's most populous and prosperous city,
Shanghai, the fertility rate was 0.8. In December the NPC Standing
Committee amended the one-child policy to allow couples in which at
least one spouse is an only child to have two children.
The National Population and Family Planning Commission reported
that all provinces eliminated the birth-approval requirement before a
first child is conceived, but provinces may still continue to require
parents to ``register'' pregnancies prior to giving birth to their
first child. This registration requirement could be used as a de facto
permit system in some provinces, since some local governments continued
to mandate abortion for single women who became pregnant. Provinces and
localities imposed fines of various amounts on unwed mothers.
Regulations requiring women who violate family-planning policy to
terminate their pregnancies still exist in Liaoning and Heilongjiang
provinces. Other provinces - Fujian, Guizhou, Guangdong, Gansu,
Jiangxi, Qinghai, Shanxi, and Shaanxi - require unspecified ``remedial
measures'' to deal with unauthorized pregnancies. A number of online
media reports indicated that migrant women applying for household
registration in Guangzhou were required to have an intrauterine
contraceptive device (IUD) implanted.
In October, Western media reported that officials from the Shandong
Province Family Planning Commission forced their way into the home of
Liu Xinwen, dragged her to a nearby hospital, and injected her with an
abortion-inducing drug. Shandong officials reportedly forced Liu, who
was six months into her pregnancy, to sign a document stating that she
had agreed to the abortion.
The government continued to impose ``child-raising fees'' on
violators of the one-child policy. In the first half of the year, for
example, Guangzhou City collected more than RMB 300 million ($49
million) in such fees without disclosing how the money was used.
Guangdong Province reportedly refused to disclose the amount of fees it
had collected from one-child policy violators. Family planning
officials in Tunchang County, Hainan Province, used fines and
terminated employment as punishment for one-child policy violators.
On December 30, overseas media reported that officials at Nurluq
Hospital in Keriye County of Xinjiang's Hotan Prefecture carried out
forced abortions on four pregnant women. According to the report, the
deputy chief of Hotan's Arish Township confirmed that authorities had
carried out four of six planned abortions utilizing abortion-inducing
drugs. One woman escaped and another was in the hospital awaiting the
procedure, the report stated. The head of the township's Family
Planning Department stated the abortions were carried out following
orders from higher authorities. The husband of one victim stated that
his wife had been seven months' pregnant when the procedure was
performed and that the baby had been born alive before succumbing to
the effects of the chemical toxins hours later.
The law requires each parent of an unapproved child to pay a
``social compensation fee,'' which can reach 10 times a person's annual
disposable income.
Social compensation fees were set and assessed at the local level.
The law requires family-planning officials to obtain court approval
before taking ``forcible'' action, such as detaining family members or
confiscating and destroying property of families who refuse to pay
social compensation fees. This requirement was not always followed, and
national authorities remained ineffective at reducing abuses by local
officials.
The population control policy relied on education, propaganda, and
economic incentives, as well as on more coercive measures. Those who
had an unapproved child or helped another do so faced disciplinary
measures such as social compensation fees, job loss or demotion, loss
of promotion opportunity, expulsion from the CCP (membership is an
unofficial requirement for certain jobs), and other administrative
punishments, including in some cases the destruction of private
property.
It continued to be illegal in almost all provinces for a single
woman to have a child, with fines levied for violations. The law states
that family-planning bureaus conduct pregnancy tests on married women
and provide them with unspecified ``follow-up'' services. Some
provinces fined women who did not undergo periodic pregnancy tests.
Officials at all levels remained subject to rewards or penalties
based on meeting the population goals set by their administrative
region. Promotions for local officials depended in part on meeting
population targets. Linking job promotion with an official's ability to
meet or exceed such targets provided a powerful structural incentive
for officials to employ coercive measures to meet population goals. An
administrative reform process initiated pilot programs in some
localities that removed this criterion for evaluating officials'
performance.
Although the family-planning law states that officials should not
violate citizens' rights in the enforcement of family-planning policy,
these rights, as well as penalties for violating them, are not clearly
defined. By law citizens may sue officials who exceed their authority
in implementing birth-planning policy, but few protections for
whistleblowers against retaliation from local officials exist (see
section 4, Whistleblower Protection). The law provides significant and
detailed sanctions for officials who help persons evade the birth
limitations.
According to online reports, women who registered newborns in
Nanhai District, Foshan, Guangdong Province, were requested to insert
an IUD. Many posted online complaints that officials threatened not to
register the baby if the mother did not comply, even when the newborn
was the mother's only child. Other reports indicated that a mother
could not enroll her child in school if she was unwilling to insert an
IUD.
Discrimination: The constitution states that ``women enjoy equal
rights with men in all spheres of life.'' The Law on the Protection of
Women's Rights and Interests provides for equality in ownership of
property, inheritance rights, access to education, and equal pay for
equal work. The ACWF was the leading implementer of women's policy for
the government, and the State Council's National Working Committee on
Children and Women coordinated women's policy. Many activists and
observers expressed concern that discrimination was increasing. Women
continued to report that discrimination, sexual harassment, unfair
dismissal, demotion, and wage discrepancies were significant problems.
Authorities often did not enforce laws protecting the rights of
women. According to legal experts, it was difficult to litigate sex-
discrimination suits because of vague legal definitions. Some observers
noted that the agencies tasked with protecting women's rights tended to
focus on maternity-related benefits and wrongful termination during
maternity leave rather than on sex discrimination, violence against
women, and sexual harassment.
Despite government policies mandating nondiscrimination in
employment and remuneration, women reportedly earned 66 percent as much
as men. The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and the
local labor bureaus are responsible for ensuring that enterprises
complied with the labor law and the employment promotion law, each of
which contains antidiscrimination provisions.
Many employers preferred to hire men to avoid the expense of
maternity leave and childcare (paid paternity leave exists for men in
some localities, but there is no national provision for paternity
leave). Work units were allowed to impose an earlier mandatory
retirement age for women than for men, and some employers lowered the
effective retirement age for female workers to 50. In general the
official retirement age for men was 60 and for women 55. Lower
retirement ages also reduced pensions, which generally were based on
the number of years worked. Job advertisements for women sometimes
specified height and age requirements.
Women's rights advocates indicated that in rural areas women often
forfeited land and property rights to their husbands in divorce
proceedings. Rural contract law and laws protecting women's rights
stipulate that women enjoy equal rights in cases of land management,
but experts argued that this was rarely the case due to the complexity
of the law and difficulties in its implementation. A 2011
interpretation of the country's marriage law by the Supreme People's
Court exacerbated the gender wealth gap by stating that, after divorce,
marital property belongs solely to the person registered as the
homeowner in mortgage and registration documents - in most cases the
husband. In determining child custody in divorce cases, judges make
determinations based on the following guidelines: Children under age
two should live with their mothers; custody of children two to nine
years of age should be determined by who can provide the most stable
living arrangement; and children 10 and over should be consulted when
determining custody.
A high female suicide rate continued to be a serious problem. There
were approximately 590 female suicides per day, according to a report
released in September 2012 by the Chinese Center for Disease and
Control and Prevention. This was more than the approximately 500 per
day reported in 2009. The report noted that the suicide rate for women
was three times higher than for men. Many observers believed that
violence against women and girls, discrimination in education and
employment, the traditional preference for male children, birth-
limitation policies, and other societal factors contributed to the high
female suicide rate. Women in rural areas, where the suicide rate for
women was three to four times higher than for men, were especially
vulnerable.
The World Bank reported that in 2009, 99 percent of women between
the ages of 15 and 24 were literate, with a literacy rate of 91 percent
for women above 15 compared with 97 percent for men above 15.
Women faced discrimination in higher education. The required score
for the National Higher Entrance Exam was lower for men than for women
at several universities. According to 2010 Ministry of Education
statistics, women accounted for 49.6 percent of undergraduate students
and 50.3 percent of master's students in 2012 but only 35 percent of
doctoral students. Women with advanced degrees reported discrimination
in the hiring process, since the job distribution system became more
competitive and market driven.
Gender-based Sex Selection: According to the 2010 national census,
the national average male-female sex ratio at birth was 118 to 100. Sex
identification and sex-selective abortion were prohibited, but the
practices continued because of traditional preference for male children
and the birth-limitation policy.
Children
Birth Registration: Citizenship is derived from parents. Parents
must register their children in compliance with the national household
registration system within one month of birth. Unregistered children
cannot access public services. No data was available on the number of
unregistered births.
Education: Although the law provides for nine years of compulsory
education for children, in economically disadvantaged rural areas many
children did not attend school for the required period; some never
attended. Although public schools were not allowed to charge tuition,
faced with insufficient local and central government funding, many
schools continued to charge miscellaneous fees. Such fees and other
school-related expenses made it difficult for poorer families and some
migrant workers to send their children to school.
In 2010 the official literacy rate for youth (defined as persons
between the ages of 15 and 24) was 99 percent. The proportion of girls
attending school in rural and minority areas was reportedly smaller
than in cities. In rural areas 61 percent of boys and 43 percent of
girls completed education at a grade higher than lower middle school.
The government reported that nearly 20 million children of migrant
laborers followed their parents to urban areas. Denied access to state-
run schools, most children of migrant workers who attended school did
so at unlicensed and poorly equipped schools.
Medical Care: Female babies suffered from a higher mortality rate
than male babies, which was contrary to the worldwide norm. State media
reported that infant mortality rates in rural areas were 27 percent
higher for girls than boys and that neglect was one factor in their
lower survival rate.
Child Abuse: The physical abuse of children can be grounds for
criminal prosecution. Kidnapping, buying, and selling children for
adoption increased during the past several years, particularly in poor
rural areas. There were no reliable estimates of the number of children
kidnapped, but according to media reports as many as 20,000 children
were kidnapped every year for illegal adoption. Most children kidnapped
internally were sold to couples unable to have children. Those
convicted of buying an abducted child may be sentenced to three years'
imprisonment. In the past most children rescued were boys, but
increased demand for children reportedly drove traffickers to focus on
girls as well. The Ministry of Public Security maintained a DNA
database of parents of missing children and children recovered in law
enforcement operations in an effort to reunite families.
Forced and Early Marriage: The legal minimum age for marriage is 22
for men and 20 for women. Child marriage was not known to be a problem,
but there were reports of babies sold to be future brides. For example,
families would adopt and raise babies for eventual marriage to their
sons.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: By law those who force young girls
under age 14 into prostitution may be sentenced to 10 years to life in
prison, in addition to a fine or confiscation of property. If the case
is especially serious, violators can receive a life sentence or be
sentenced to death, in addition to confiscation of property. Those
inducing girls under age 14 into prostitution can be sentenced to five
years or more in prison in addition to a fine. Those who visit female
prostitutes under age 14 are subject to five years or more in prison in
addition to paying a fine.
According to the law the minimum age for consensual sex is 14.
Pornography of any kind, including child pornography, is illegal.
Under the criminal code, those producing, reproducing, publishing,
selling, or disseminating obscene materials with the purpose of making
a profit may be sentenced up to three years in prison or put under
criminal detention or surveillance in addition to paying a fine.
Offenders in serious cases may receive prison sentences of three to 10
years in addition to paying a fine. In especially serious cases
offenders are to be sentenced to 10 years or more in prison or given a
life sentence in addition to a fine or confiscation of property.
Persons found disseminating obscene books, magazines, films, audio or
video products, pictures, or other kinds of obscene materials, if the
case is serious, may be sentenced up to two years in prison or put
under criminal detention or surveillance. Persons organizing the
broadcast of obscene motion pictures or other audio or video products
may be sentenced up to three years in prison or put under criminal
detention or surveillance in addition to paying a fine. If the case is
serious they are to be sentenced to three to 10 years in prison in
addition to paying a fine.
Those broadcasting or showing obscene materials to minors less than
age 18 are to be ``severely punished.''
Infanticide or Infanticide of Children with Disabilities: The Law
on the Protection of Juveniles forbids infanticide, but there was
evidence that the practice continued. According to the National
Population and Family-planning Commission, a handful of doctors were
charged with infanticide under this law. Female infanticide, sex-
selective abortions, and the abandonment and neglect of baby girls
remained problems due to the traditional preference for sons and the
coercive birth-limitation policy.
Displaced Children: There were between 150,000 and one million
urban street children, according to state-run media. This number was
even higher if the children of migrant workers who spent the day on the
streets were included. In 2010 the ACWF reported that the number of
children in rural areas left behind by their migrant-worker parents
totaled 58 million, 40 million under the age of 14.
Institutionalized Children: The law forbids the mistreatment or
abandonment of children. The vast majority of children in orphanages
were girls, many of whom were abandoned. Boys in orphanages were
usually disabled or in poor health. Medical professionals sometimes
advised parents of children with disabilities to put the children into
orphanages.
The government denied that children in orphanages were mistreated
or refused medical care but acknowledged that the system often was
unable to provide adequately for some children, particularly those with
serious medical problems. Adopted children were counted under the
birth-limitation regulations in most locations. As a result, couples
who adopted abandoned infant girls were sometimes barred from having
additional children.
International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the
1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction. For information see the Department of State's report at
travel.state.gov/abduction/resources/congressreport/congressreport--
4308.html.
Anti-Semitism
There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts during the year. The
government does not recognize Judaism as an ethnicity or religion.
According to information from the Jewish Virtual Library, the country's
Jewish population was 2,500 in 2012.
Trafficking in Persons
See the Department of State's Trafficking in Persons Report at
www.state.gov/j/tip/.
Persons with Disabilities
The law protects the rights of persons with disabilities and
prohibits discrimination, but conditions for such persons lagged far
behind legal dictates and failed to provide persons with disabilities
access to programs intended to assist them.
According to Article 3 of the Law on the Protection of Disabled
Persons, ``disabled persons are entitled to enjoyment of equal rights
as other citizens in political, economic, cultural and social fields,
in family life and other aspects. The rights of disabled persons as
citizens and their personal dignity are protected by law.
Discrimination against, insult of, and infringement upon disabled
persons is prohibited.''
The Ministry of Civil Affairs and the China Disabled Persons
Federation (CDPF), a government-organized civil association, are the
main entities responsible for persons with disabilities. In June the
CDPF stated that, based on 2010 census figures, 85 million persons with
disabilities lived in the country. According to government statistics,
in 2011 there were 5,254 vocational training facilities, which provided
training for 299,000 persons with disabilities. Of the 32 million
persons with disabilities of working age, more than 22 million were
employed. Government statistics stated that 7.4 million persons with
disabilities enjoyed ``minimum-life-guarantee'' stipends, and nearly
three million had social insurance.
The law prohibits discrimination against minors with disabilities
and codifies a variety of judicial protections for juveniles. In 2007
the Ministry of Education reported that nationwide there were 1,618
schools for children with disabilities. According to NGOs, there were
approximately 20 million children with disabilities, only 2 percent of
whom had access to education that could meet their needs.
According to the CDPF, in 2010 more than 519,000 school-age
children with disabilities received compulsory education, 68 percent of
them in inclusive education, and 32 percent in 1,705 special schools
and 2,775 special classes. NGOs claimed that, while the overall school
enrollment rate was 99 percent, only 75 percent of children with
disabilities were enrolled in school. Nationwide, an estimated 243,000
school-age children with disabilities did not attend school. In 2011 a
total of 7,150 persons with disabilities were admitted to standard
colleges and universities.
Nearly 100,000 organizations existed, mostly in urban areas, to
serve those with disabilities and protect their legal rights. The
government, at times in conjunction with NGOs, sponsored programs to
integrate persons with disabilities into society.
Misdiagnosis, inadequate medical care, stigmatization, and
abandonment remained common problems. According to reports doctors
frequently persuaded parents of children with disabilities to place
their children in large government-run institutions where care was
often inadequate. Those parents who chose to keep children with
disabilities at home generally faced difficulty finding adequate
medical care, day care, and education for their children. Government
statistics showed that almost one-quarter of persons with disabilities
lived in extreme poverty.
In part as a result of discrimination, unemployment among adults
with disabilities remained a serious problem. The law requires local
governments to offer incentives to enterprises that hire persons with
disabilities. Regulations in some parts of the country also require
employers to pay into a national fund for persons with disabilities
when the employees with disabilities do not make up the statutory
minimum percentage of the total workforce.
Standards adopted for making roads and buildings accessible to
persons with disabilities are subject to the Law on the Handicapped,
which calls for their ``gradual'' implementation. Compliance with the
law was limited. The law permits universities to exclude candidates
with disabilities who were otherwise qualified.
The law forbids the marriage of persons with certain mental
disabilities, such as schizophrenia. If doctors find that a couple is
at risk of transmitting congenital disabilities to their children, the
couple may marry only if they agree to use birth control or undergo
sterilization. The law stipulates that local governments must employ
such practices to raise the percentage of births of children without
disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Most minority groups resided in areas they traditionally inhabited.
Government policy calls for members of recognized minorities to receive
preferential treatment in birth planning, university admission, access
to loans, and employment. Nonetheless, the substance and implementation
of ethnic minority policies remained poor, and discrimination against
minorities remained widespread.
Minority groups in border and other regions had less access to
education than their Han counterparts, faced job discrimination in
favor of Han migrants, and earned incomes well below those in other
parts of the country. Government development programs often disrupted
traditional living patterns of minority groups and included, in some
cases, the forced relocation of persons. Han Chinese benefited
disproportionately from government programs and economic growth. As
part of its emphasis on building a ``harmonious society'' and
maintaining social stability, the government downplayed racism and
institutional discrimination against minorities, which remained the
source of deep resentment in the XUAR, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region (IMAR), the TAR, and other Tibetan areas.
Ethnic minorities represented approximately 14 percent of delegates
to the NPC and more than 15 percent of NPC Standing Committee members,
according to an official report issued in 2011. A 2011 article in the
official online news source for overseas readers stated that ethnic
minorities comprised 41 percent of cadres in the Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region, 25 percent of cadres in Ningxia Hui Autonomous
Region, and 51 percent of cadres in the XUAR. According to a July 2012
article from the official Xinhua News Agency, 32 percent of cadres in
Yunnan Province were members of an ethnic minority. A June 5 government
report stated that, of the 296 civil servants Guangxi Province
recruited in 2012, almost 60 percent were ethnic minorities. During the
year all five of the country's ethnic minority autonomous regions had
chairmen (equivalent to the governor of a province) from minority
groups. The CCP secretaries of these five autonomous regions were all
Han. Han officials continued to hold the majority of the most powerful
CCP and government positions in minority autonomous regions,
particularly the XUAR.
The government's policy to encourage Han Chinese migration into
minority areas significantly increased the population of Han in the
XUAR. In recent decades the Han-Uighur ratio in the capital of Urumqi
reversed from 20/80 to 80/20 and continued to be a source of Uighur
resentment. Discriminatory hiring practices gave preference to Han and
reduced job prospects for ethnic minorities. According to the 2010
national census, 8.75 million, or 40 percent, of the XUAR's 21.8
million official residents were Han. Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uighur, and
other ethnic minorities constituted approximately 13 million XUAR
residents, or 60 percent of the total population. Official statistics
understated the Han population, because they did not count the tens of
thousands of Han Chinese who were long-term ``temporary workers.'' As
the government continued to promote Han migration into the XUAR and
filled local jobs with domestic migrant labor, local officials coerced
young Uighur women to participate in a government-sponsored labor
transfer program to cities outside the XUAR, according to overseas
human rights organizations.
The XUAR government took measures to dilute expressions of Uighur
identity, including reducing the use of ethnic minority languages in
XUAR schools and instituting Mandarin Chinese language requirements
that disadvantaged ethnic-minority teachers. The government continued
to apply policies that prioritized standard Chinese for instruction in
school, thereby reducing or eliminating ethnic-language instruction.
The dominant use of Mandarin Chinese in government, commerce, and
academia disadvantaged graduates of minority-language schools who
lacked Mandarin Chinese proficiency.
Authorities continued to implement repressive policies in the XUAR
and targeted the region's ethnic Uighur population. Officials in the
XUAR continued to implement a pledge to crack down on the government-
designated ``three forces'' of religious extremism, ``splittism,'' and
terrorism, and they outlined efforts to launch a concentrated
antiseparatist re-education campaign. Some raids, detentions, and
judicial punishments ostensibly directed at individuals or
organizations suspected of promoting the ``three forces'' appeared to
be targeted at groups or individuals peacefully seeking to express
their political or religious views. The government continued to repress
Uighurs expressing peaceful political dissent and independent Muslim
religious leaders, often citing counterterrorism as the reason for
taking action.
According to the 2013 China Law Yearbook, authorities in 2012
arrested 1,105 individuals for ``endangering state security,'' a 19
percent increase from 2011. The NGO Dui Hua estimated that arrests from
Xinjiang accounted for 75 percent of ``endangering state security''
charges.
Uighurs continued to be sentenced to long prison terms, and in some
cases executed without due process, on charges of separatism and
endangering state security. The government pressured foreign countries
to repatriate Uighurs, who faced the risk of imprisonment and
mistreatment upon return. Some Uighurs refouled to China have simply
disappeared.
Freedom of assembly was severely limited during the year in the
XUAR. For information about violations of religious freedom in
Xinjiang, please see the Department of State's International Religious
Freedom Report at www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/.
Reportedly at year's end one son of exiled Uighur leader Rebiya
Kadeer, president of the World Uighur Conference, whom the government
blamed for orchestrating the 2009 riots in Urumqi, remained in prison.
Possession of publications or audiovisual materials discussing
independence, autonomy, or other sensitive subjects was not permitted.
Uighurs who remained in prison at year's end for their peaceful
expression of ideas the government found objectionable included
Abduhelil Zunun. Reportedly, Uighur poet Nurmuhemmet Yasin, originally
imprisoned in 2005, died in prison in 2011.
XUAR and national-level officials defended the campaign against the
three forces of religious extremism, ``splittism,'' and terrorism and
other policies as necessary to maintain public order. Officials
continued to use the threat of violence as justification for extreme
security measures directed at the local population, journalists, and
visiting foreigners.
The law criminalizes discussion of separatism on the internet and
prohibits use of the internet in any way that undermines national
unity. It further bans inciting ethnic separatism or ``harming social
stability,'' and requires internet service providers and network
operators to set up monitoring systems or to strengthen existing ones
and report violations of the law.
Han control of the region's political and economic institutions
also contributed to heightened tension. Although government policies
continued to allot economic investment in and brought economic
improvements to the XUAR, Han residents received a disproportionate
share of the benefits. Job advertisements often made clear that Uighur
applicants would not be considered.
Reuters News Agency reported that in November police used electric
batons to prevent approximately 100 ethnic Mongols from attending the
trial of six nomadic herders charged with sabotaging production and
intentionally destroying property. Authorities arrested the six herders
in June after a confrontation with employees of a state-owned forestry
company. Protests against land seizures occurred throughout the year
across the IMAR, resulting in detentions and police abuse, as the
regional government sought to implement Beijing's policy of resettling
China's nomadic population.
Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
No laws criminalize private consensual same-sex activities between
adults. Due to societal discrimination and pressure to conform to
family expectations, most gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) persons refrained from publicly discussing their sexual
orientation. Individual activists and organizations working on LGBT
problems continued to report discrimination and harassment from
authorities, similar to other organizations that accept funding from
overseas.
In June 2012 the Beijing LGBT center was notified by property
management that its lease would be terminated early due to complaints
that it was too noisy. Neighbors reportedly pressured management to
terminate the lease after learning that it was an LGBT organization.
The center was able to recoup only less than one-half of its investment
of RMB 11,000 ($1,800) for the move.
In September organizers of the China Charity Fair in Shenzhen,
Guangdong Province, told two gay rights advocacy groups that they could
not display their advertisements and informational brochures because
they were not registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. One of the
advocacy groups attempting to participate reported that his
organization unsuccessfully sought to register with the ministry for
several years, despite making dozens of visits to local government
offices.
In contrast with 2012, there reportedly was no government
interference with the seventh Beijing Queer Film Festival. Organizers
kept a low profile.
Other Societal Violence or Discrimination
The law prohibits discrimination against persons carrying
infectious diseases and allows such persons to work as civil servants.
The law does not address some common types of discrimination in
employment, including discrimination based on height, physical
appearance, or ethnic identity.
Despite provisions in the law, discrimination against persons with
HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B carriers (including 20 million chronic
carriers) remained widespread in many areas, and local governments
sometimes tried to suppress their activities. In August 2012 a man who
was refused employment after it was discovered he had hepatitis was
awarded RMB 8,000 ($1,310) in damages by a Xi'an court.
HIV/AIDS activist Wan Yanhai, founder and director of the Beijing-
based NGO Aizhixing, remained overseas after leaving the country in
2010. The organization continued to come under pressure from the
government.
Western media reported that on May 30, Guangxi activist Ye Haiyan,
who advocated for the rights of prostitutes and persons infected with
HIV/AIDS, was beaten in her home by a group of 10 police officers
before being detained at the local police station in Bobai County.
While in the past, persons with HIV/AIDS were routinely denied
admission to hospitals, discrimination was less overt, and some
hospitals came up with excuses for not being able to treat them. The
hospitals feared that, should the general population find out that they
were treating HIV/AIDS patients, patients would choose to go elsewhere.
It was common practice for general hospitals to refer patients to
specialty hospitals working with infectious diseases
International involvement in HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and
treatment, as well as central government pressure on local governments
to respond appropriately, brought improvements in many localities. Some
hospitals that previously refused to treat HIV/AIDS patients had active
care and treatment programs because domestic and international training
programs improved the understanding of local health-care workers and
their managers. In Beijing dozens of local community centers encouraged
and facilitated HIV/AIDS support groups.
In March 2012 Zhejiang Province eliminated its mandatory HIV
testing for suspects arrested for drug charges, a move seen as a step
in protecting the privacy of the individuals.
On July 1, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region implemented new
legislation requiring real name registration for HIV testing and
obliging individuals who tested positive inform their spouses.
Despite a 2010 nationwide rule banning mandatory hepatitis B virus
tests in job and school admissions applications, 61 percent of state-
run companies in 2011 continued to use hepatitis B testing as a part of
their preemployment screen.
A 2011 report from a Beijing-based NGO stated that 32 percent of
kindergartens surveyed would refuse to enroll children infected with
hepatitis B.
In July 2012 a widely used public health website for persons
infected with hepatitis was blocked within the country. The website had
been blocked two times earlier, in 2007 and 2008. The website's main
goal is to eliminate discrimination of hepatitis carriers and provide a
social forum to build awareness of the disease.
In October the Ministry of Commerce posted online for public
consultation draft regulations that would ban individuals with AIDS
from entering public bathhouses. The draft regulations stipulated a
fine of RMB 30,000 ($4,910) for violators and mandated that all spas,
hot springs, and bathhouses post anti-HIV/AIDS visitor signs on their
premises. At year's end the draft regulations remained under review.
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining
The law does not provide for freedom of association, and workers
are not free to organize or join unions of their own choosing.
Independent unions are illegal, workers are not free to organize, and
the right to strike is not protected in law.
The Trade Union Law gives the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) control over all union organizations and activities, including
enterprise-level unions. The ACFTU is a CCP organ chaired by a member
of the Politburo and is tasked to ``uphold the leadership of the
Communist Party.'' The ACFTU and its provincial and local branches
continued aggressively to organize new constituent unions and add new
members, especially in large, multinational enterprises. According to
the ACFTU the total trade union membership reached 280 million during
the year, 109 million of whom were rural-urban migrant workers.
The law provides specific legal protections against antiunion
discrimination and specifies that union representatives may not be
transferred or terminated by enterprise management during their term of
office. While there were no publicly available official statistics on
the enforcement of these laws, there were periodic domestic media
reports of courts awarding monetary compensation for wrongful
terminations of union representatives.
The Trade Union Law specifically assigns the ACFTU and affiliated
unions the responsibility to ``coordinate the labor relations and
safeguard the labor rights and interests of the enterprise employees
through equal negotiation and collective contract system'' and to
represent employees in negotiating and signing collective contracts
with enterprises or public institutions. The law states that trade
union representatives at each level should be elected.
The Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law provides for labor
dispute resolution through a three-stage process: mediation between the
parties, arbitration by officially designated arbitrators, and
litigation. A key article of this law requires employers to consult
with labor unions or employee representatives on matters that have a
direct bearing on the immediate interests of their workers.
The Labor Contract Law provides that labor unions ``shall assist
and direct the employees'' in establishing ``a collective negotiation
mechanism'' and that collective contracts can include ``matters of
remuneration, working hours, breaks, vacations, work safety and
hygiene, insurance, benefits, etc.'' It further provides that there may
be industrial or regional collective contracts ``in industries such as
construction, mining, catering services, etc. in the regions at or
below the county level.''
The labor law allows for collective bargaining for workers in all
types of enterprises, and collective contract regulations provide
protections against discrimination and unfair dismissal for employee
representatives during collective consultations. Regulations require a
union to gather input from workers prior to consultation with
management and to submit collective contracts to workers or their
congress for approval. There is no legal obligation for employers to
negotiate, and some employers refused to do so.
If collective bargaining negotiations do begin, there is no
requirement for employers to bargain in good faith. If no agreement is
reached, the employer does not have a right to lock out the workers,
and the workers do not have a right to strike. While work stoppages are
not expressly prohibited in law and it is not illegal for workers to
strike spontaneously, Article 53 of the constitution has been
interpreted as a ban on labor strikes by obligating all citizens to
``observe labor discipline and public order.''
Although the ACFTU, especially at provincial levels, often played
an important role in advocacy for improved labor protections during
2012, this activism stalled during the year, in part due to a lack of
clear direction from the Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang administration.
During the ACFTU's 16th National Congress in October, high-level
officials called on participants to improve the lives of workers
through proactive employment policies, a better social safety net, and
attention to safety in the workplace. They noted the need for both
increased government enforcement and supervision and responsibility by
trade unions and the public.
In November the CCP concluded a high-level meeting by issuing a
resolution that outlined reforms with the potential to affect freedom
of association and collective bargaining, including expanding the use
of employees' representative committees and innovating channels for
workers to make appeals. The role of the ACFTU in a strike is primarily
limited to involvement in investigations and assistance to the Ministry
of Human Resources and Social Security in resolving disputes.
ACFTU constituent unions were generally ineffective in representing
and protecting the rights and interests of workers. This was
particularly true in the case of migrant workers, who generally have
less interaction with the ACFTU, who tend to work in foreign-invested
enterprises, and for whom, especially among second-generation migrant
workers, expectations of working conditions have increased. The ACFTU
and the CCP maintain a variety of mechanisms to influence the selection
of trade union representatives. Although the law states that trade
union officers at each level should be elected, most factory-level
officers were appointed by ACFTU-affiliated unions, often in
coordination with employers, and were drawn largely from the ranks of
management. Direct election by workers of union leaders continued to be
rare, occurred only at the enterprise level, and was subject to
supervision by higher levels of the union or the CCP. In enterprises
where direct election of union officers took place, regional ACFTU
officers and local CCP authorities retained control over the selection
and approval of candidates. Even in these cases, workers and NGOs
expressed concern about the sustainability of elections and the
knowledge and capacity of elected union officials who often lacked
collective bargaining skills.
In March 2012 the Fair Labor Association (FLA) and Apple drafted an
action plan for remediation at Foxconn supplier facilities. A key
component of this action plan was the establishment of union elections.
In its final report the FLA verified that no workplace elections had
been conducted in the three facilities (Guanlan, Longhua, and Chengdu)
since the beginning of the year.
In a joint open letter to the Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions
(SFTU) in October, a group of students from nine universities in China
outlined their findings in five Shenzhen factories at which the SFTU
had purportedly adopted direct elections. While the elections did occur
in many cases, the students found that trade union committees were
still composed of members of company management. They also found that
the union continued to fail to protect workers from basic labor law
violations.
Many autonomous regions and municipalities enacted local rules
allowing collective wage negotiation, and some limited form of
collective bargaining was more or less compulsory in 25 of 31
provinces, according to the ACFTU. The Guangdong provincial government
guidelines on enterprise collective wage bargaining require employers
to give employee representatives information regarding a company's
operations, including employee pay and benefits, to be used in wage
bargaining. The guidelines also allow the local labor bureau, if
requested by the employees and employers, to act as a mediator to help
determine wage increases.
Despite the Labor Contract Law's provisions for collective
consultation related to common areas of dispute such as wages, hours,
days off, and benefits, noncompliance with this provision, even at the
minimum levels required by law, was common. Instead, tactics used by
management included forcing employees to sign blank contracts and
failing to provide workers a copy of their contract. Lack of government
resources also undermined effective implementation and enforcement of
the Labor Contract Law.
The number of labor disputes nationwide continued to rise as
workers' awareness of the laws increased. According to figures from the
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, as of September 2012,
there were more than 3,000 labor arbitration units and 25,000 labor
arbitrators. Through 2011 the Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security handled 1.3 million ``labor and personnel disputes.'' Of
these, 589,000 were registered arbitration cases, of which 93.9 percent
were resolved. Most formal dispute resolution continued to occur
between individual workers and employers, rather than managing
collective disputes. The relevant regulations and rules address
predominantly rights-based, rather than interest-based, disputes.
Strikes primarily continued to be resolved directly between workers
and management without the involvement of the ACFTU or its constituent
local trade unions. In order to avoid strikes or address minor labor
relations disputes, factory management continued to prefer to engage
directly with workers via labor-management committees, rather than
through the legally approved ACFTU-affiliated trade union. The Ministry
of Human Resources and Social Security voiced support for the expansion
and establishment of labor-management committees throughout all
enterprises. Labor NGOs often provided information, training, and legal
support to workers on collective bargaining and dispute resolution, in
lieu of effective support by the ACFTU.
There continued to be reports of workers throughout the country
engaging in strikes, work stoppages, and other protest actions.
Although the government restricted the release of figures for the
number of strikes and protests each year, the frequency of
``spontaneous'' strikes remained high, especially in Shenzhen and other
areas with developed labor markets and large pools of sophisticated,
rights-conscious workers. Local government responses to strikes varied,
with some jurisdictions showing tolerance for strikes while others
continued to treat worker protests as illegal demonstrations.
In January, Hong Kong media reported that thousands of workers from
the Panzhihua Iron and Steel Group in Chengdu took to the streets to
demand wage increases. Authorities deployed 1,000 police to suppress
the march and to disperse the crowd after a confrontation with the
protesters. On November 7, police dispersed 200 striking workers at a
Dongguan toy factory. Reports indicated that authorities beat and
arrested numerous workers.
Workers engaged in collective action for a number of reasons. In
many cases striking workers called attention to wage arrears,
insufficient pay, and poor working conditions. New areas of disputes
included factory closure or relocation, severance pay and other
compensation, and benefits such as pensions. Although a large number of
the major strikes reported in the media occurred in the Pearl River
Delta, labor unrest was widespread throughout the country. Small-scale
worker protests and strikes regularly occurred in Shanghai and
Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui provinces.
Workers increasingly went on strike to demand payment of past
wages, as an economic downturn led to diminishing profits, more factory
closures, and abandoned construction projects. On March 6, nearly 1,000
workers at an electronics factory in Dongguan, Guangdong Province,
protested and blocked roads over compensation problems.
Strikes also occurred in an increasingly broad range of sectors.
While many strikes occurred in manufacturing, reports increased of
strikes in the transport, sanitation, and service industries similarly
stemming from failure to gain adequate compensation. In August a
hospital in Guangzhou attempted to impose a management-dictated
settlement for unpaid overtime on a group of hospital security guards.
Despite threats of dismissal, the guards went on strike. Management
refused to negotiate with the guards, and local authorities detained
them for staging an illegal demonstration.
In August an estimated 3,000 workers at a toy factory in Shenzhen
conducted a solidarity strike in support of 551 long-term migrant
workers also at the factory. Despite having employed the workers for
well over the 15 years required for pension eligibility, the company
had failed to make mandatory contributions to their pension funds prior
to 2008. Facing retirement, these workers were not able to claim the
pensions to which they were entitled.
In May informally elected workers' representatives at Shenzhen
Diweixin furniture factory led a protest against their employers over
the company's refusal to discuss compensation for a planned relocation.
On May 23, authorities detained worker leader Wu Guijun after
protracted strikes and petitions to the city government to intervene in
fruitless negotiations. According to independent labor organizations,
Wu was formally charged with ``assembling a crowd to disturb social
order'' on September 28, but later reports indicated that the
procuratorate refused to accept the charges due to lack of evidence and
sent the case back to the public security officials for further
investigation. Wu remained in detention as of year's end.
Other labor activists detained in previous years reportedly
remained in detention at year's end, including Chen Yong, Kong Youping,
Liu Jian, Liu Jianjun, Memet Turghun Abdulla, Wang Miaogen, Xing Shiku,
Zhou Decai, Zhu Chengzhi, and Zhu Fangming.
b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law prohibits forced and compulsory labor, but there were
reports that forced labor of adults and children occurred (see section
7.c.).
There were reports that employers withheld wages or required
unskilled workers to deposit several months' wages as security against
the workers departing early from their labor contracts. These practices
often prevented workers from exercising their right to leave their
employment and made them vulnerable to forced labor. Implementation of
amended labor laws, along with workers' increased knowledge of their
rights under these new laws, continued to reduce these practices.
International NGOs alleged that provincial and local governments
were complicit in some cases of forced labor of university students as
``interns'' at facilities managed by the Taiwanese electronics giant
Foxconn. Local governments, in order to encourage Foxconn to establish
operations in their cities, promised to help recruit workers for
Foxconn's labor-intensive operations. In September the media reported
that students in Shandong and Jiangsu provinces complained that their
universities made it mandatory that they serve 45-day internships on
assembly lines in Foxconn factories to meet Foxconn's production
demands. A December 12 FLA report of Foxconn facilities in Guanlan,
Longhua, and Chengdu indicated that no student interns had been
employed at those sites during the year.
Forced labor in penal institutions remained a serious problem,
according to the International Trade Union Confederation. Many
prisoners and detainees were required to work, often with no
remuneration. Compulsory labor of detainees in RTL facilities, who had
not been tried and convicted in a competent court, also constituted
forced labor.
In both cases detainees reportedly experienced harsh and
exploitative conditions of work, including long periods without a rest
day and often working more than 10, and sometimes 12 or 14, hours per
day to meet informal ``quotas'' imposed by facility management.
Detainees who did not meet their quota were threatened with physical
violence and other forms of punishment.
In addition there were credible allegations that prisoners were
forced to work for private production facilities associated with
prisons. These facilities often operated under two different names, a
prison name and a commercial enterprise name. No effective mechanism
prevented the export of goods made under such conditions. Goods and
materials likely to be produced by forced labor included toys, garments
and textiles, electronics, bricks, and coal.
The Ministry of Justice discussed allegations of exported prison-
labor goods with foreign government officials, but information about
prisons, including associated labor camps and factories, was tightly
controlled. Although the ministry has official control over the RTL
system, police and other local authorities had a great degree of
influence on a case-by-case basis.
In November 2012 a Chongqing court rejected the wrongful
imprisonment suit brought by Ren Jianyu, who had been released from an
RTL center one year into his two-year sentence for ``incitement to
subvert state power'' for posting online statements critical of the
political system. In July, Ren submitted an application to the
Chongqing RTL committee requesting compensation totaling RMB 167,762
($27,440) to cover the wages he lost while in the camp and the
psychological harm he suffered.
After the Standing Committee of the NPC voted to abolish the RTL
system in December (see section 1.d.), media and NGO reports indicated
that many of the RTL facilities were converted to drug rehabilitation
centers or prisons. It is not clear whether forced labor continued in
these facilities.
Also see the Department of State's Trafficking in Persons Report at
www.state.gov/j/tip/.
c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment
The law prohibits the employment of children under the age of 16.
It refers to workers between the ages of 16 and 18 as ``juvenile
workers'' and prohibits them from engaging in certain forms of
dangerous work, including in mines.
The law specifies administrative review, fines, and revocation of
business licenses of those businesses that illegally hired minors and
provides that underage children found working should be returned to
their parents or other custodians in their original place of residence.
The penalty for employing children under 16 in hazardous labor or for
excessively long hours ranges from three to seven years' imprisonment,
but a significant gap remained between legislation and implementation.
Child labor remained a problem. Print media and online reports most
frequently documented the use of child labor in the electronics
manufacturing industry, although many reports indicated it occurred in
a number of sectors.
The government does not publish statistics on the extent of child
labor, but rising wages and a tightening labor market led some
companies to seek to hire underage workers in violation of the law.
Some local authorities also ignored the practice of child labor or even
facilitated it to prevent employers from moving to other areas.
Reports of child labor persisted in areas suffering from labor
shortages and in smaller enterprises that compensated workers on a
piece-rate basis. For example, in Dongguan, Guangdong Province, a
manufacturing hub hit hard by labor shortages and rising wages, local
employers admitted that the use of child labor on a temporary basis was
common. Although Dongguan Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security
statistics showed an increase in child labor cases, the bureau did not
have sufficient resources to increase enforcement operations among the
thousands of small enterprises operating in the area.
In May a 14-year-old boy working at an electronics factory in
Dongguan died suddenly in the factory dormitory. The boy used a false
identity card to gain employment, and local officials cited the company
for violating child labor laws.
In an open letter to the Guangdong Province Communist Party
secretary posted on the internet, the mother of a 15-year-old boy from
Henan, burned badly in 2012 while working in a Zhuhai electronics
factory, appealed for help in obtaining compensation for the injury.
The employer had refused to pay both the compensation sought by the
family and the award subsequently determined by the labor arbitration
board. Provincial authorities fined the employer and urged the local
labor bureau to expedite the case, but compensation for the injury was
still pending at year's end.
On December 27, the Guangzhou-based Southern Metropolis Daily
reported that approximately 70 underage workers were discovered working
at an electronics company in Shenzhen's Baoan District. The alleged
underage workers were all from the Yi ethnic minority group, and all
were from a remote mountainous region of Liangshan, Sichuan Province,
the origin of several recent child-labor trafficking cases. This
followed incidents in 2011 and 2008 involving underage workers from the
same region. Although in each instance local labor authorities
intervened after the Southern Metropolis Daily notified them of the
underage workers, the three similar cases reflect a systemic inability
to deter trafficking of underage workers or to identify child labor
through regular labor inspections. In the most recent case the Shenzhen
company posted a notice on its website blaming the company's labor
dispatch service provider for providing worker identity cards
purporting to show all of them to be older than age 16.
Abuse of the student-worker system continued as well. One
international labor NGO reported that most students working in domestic
companies in the supply chains of multinational electronics
manufacturers, where there was greater scrutiny, did not have the
formal written contracts required by law. After an internal audit, one
multinational electronics company admitted it had violated the labor
law after interns between the ages of 14 and 16 were discovered working
at its subsidiary in Yantai, Shandong Province.
As in past years, there continued to be allegations that schools
and local officials improperly facilitated the supply of student
laborers. Some reports indicated that schools supplied factories with
illegal child labor under the pretext of vocational training, in some
cases making this labor compulsory for the student.
d. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There was no national minimum wage, but the law requires local and
provincial governments to set their own minimum wage according to
standards promulgated by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security. Average wage levels continued to increase. Monthly minimum
wages varied greatly with Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, reaching RMB
1,600 ($262) from March 1 and towns in remote Ningxia Province the
lowest at RMB 750 ($123). During the year the country increased its
``rural poverty level'' to RMB 192 ($31.40) per month.
The law mandates a 40-hour standard workweek, excluding overtime,
and a 24-hour weekly rest period. It also prohibits overtime work in
excess of three hours per day or 36 hours per month and mandates
premium pay for overtime work.
A regulation states that labor and social security bureaus at or
above the county level are responsible for enforcement of labor law.
The law also provides that where the ACFTU finds an employer in
violation of the regulation, it shall have the power to demand that the
relevant local labor bureaus deal with the case.
Many vulnerable workers, including those older workers laid off as
a result of restructuring of state-owned enterprise, as well as many
rural-urban migrants, were employed in the informal economy. In 2012
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' researchers estimated that the
prevalence of informal employment ranged from 20 to 37 percent overall,
based on the definition used, with between 45 and 65 percent of
migrants employed in the informal sector. UN experts reported that
women were particularly active in the informal economy, often as
domestic workers or petty entrepreneurs. Micro- and small businesses
with fewer than seven employees also meet the international criteria
for informality. Workers in the informal sector often lacked coverage
under labor contracts, and even with contracts migrant workers in
particular had less access to benefits, especially social insurance.
Workers in the informal sector worked longer hours and earned one-half
to two-thirds as much as comparable workers in the formal sector.
The State Administration for Work Safety (SAWS) sets and enforces
occupational health and safety regulations. The Law on Prevention and
Control of Occupational Diseases requires employers to provide free
health checkups for employees working in hazardous conditions and to
inform them of the results. Companies that violate the regulation have
their operations suspended or are deprived of business certificates and
licenses.
Effective May 2012 the SAWS and the Ministry of Finance jointly
issued the Measures on Incentives for Safe Production Reporting, which
authorize cash rewards to whistleblowers reporting companies for
violations, such as concealing workplace accidents, operating without
proper licensing, operating unsafe equipment, or failing to provide
workers with adequate safety training. The measures warn against false
accusations but also stipulate protection under the law for legitimate
whistleblowers who report violations.
While many labor laws and regulations on worker safety were fully
compatible with international standards, implementation and enforcement
were generally poor due to a lack of adequate resources. Compliance
with the law was weak, and standards were regularly violated. While
excessive overtime occurred, in many cases workers encouraged
noncompliance by requesting greater amounts of overtime to
counterbalance low base wages and increase their overall wages.
Inadequately enforced labor laws, occupational health and safety laws,
and regulations continued to put workers' livelihoods, health, and
safety at risk.
Almost all local and provincial governments raised minimum wage
levels significantly during the year as a result of changing economic
and demographic conditions. As the average tenure of workers in the
Pearl River Delta increased, their skills improved, adding more upward
pressure on wages. Spot shortages of skilled labor, increased inland
investment, and successful strikes led to generally increased wage
levels for workers in all parts of the country.
Nonpayment of wages remained a problem in many areas. Governments
at various levels continued efforts to prevent arrears and to recover
payment of unpaid wages and insurance contributions. It remained
possible for companies to relocate or close on short notice, often
leaving employees without adequate recourse for due compensation. In
some extreme cases, workers who feared that they would be deprived of
adequate compensation or severance engaged in actions such as taking
managers hostage.
Although creative strategies by some multinational purchasers
provided new approaches to reducing the incidence of labor violations
in supplier factories, insufficient government oversight of both
foreign affiliated and purely domestic supplier factories continued to
contribute to poor working conditions. Questions related to acceptable
working conditions, especially overtime, continued to plague
electronics manufacturers such as Foxconn.
On December 12, the FLA released the third and final verification
report on conditions at Foxconn facilities in China, tracking progress
on that action plan through July 1. The report documented that nearly
100 percent of all actions recommended by the FLA had been completed at
three key facilities in Guanlan, Longhua, and Chengdu, resulting in
clear changes in company policy. Nonetheless, FLA assessors documented
numerous violations of domestic law. While some workers received an
average of one day off per week, others went for a month or more
without these breaks. In some cases workers worked more than 60 hours
per week, and for a six-month period, more than one-half of the workers
in the Longhua and Guanlan facilities exceeded the legal overtime limit
of 36 hours per month. In Chengdu from July to October more than 75
percent of workers exceeded this limit.
Although SAWS reported that the rate of industrial accidents
continued to decline, there were several high-profile instances of
industrial accidents. On June 3, a total of 121 workers died in a fire
that swept through a poultry-processing plant in the northeastern
province of Jilin. In that incident most of the exits at the plant had
been locked from outside, and none of the 395 employees working at the
time had received fire safety training. SAWS responded by dispatching
teams to assess safety standards at factories. Although inspections
routinely identified existing problems that increased the risk of
industrial accidents, ensuring that companies acted on the findings of
the inspections remained a challenge.
Authorities continued to press mines to improve safety measures and
mandated greater investments in safety. In August 2012 SAWS announced
its goal of closing hundreds of small coal mines during the year in an
attempt to reduce the number of deadly accidents.
Despite consistent reductions in mining deaths, there continued to
be many coalmine accidents throughout the country.
In Jilin Province, gas explosions at coalmines on March 29 and
April 1 killed 53 workers. An third explosion on April 21, also in
Jilin, killed 18 workers - despite an order for all coal mines in the
province to suspend operations and undergo safety inspections following
the earlier two explosions.
ACFTU occupational disease experts estimated that 200 million
workers worked in hazardous environments. According to the Chinese
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, only an estimated 10 percent
of eligible employees received regular occupational health services.
Small- and medium-sized enterprises, the largest employers, often
failed to provide the required health services. They also did not
provide proper safety equipment that could help prevent disease, and
were rarely required to pay compensation to victims and their families.
Instances of pneumoconiosis, or black lung disease, remained high. A
charitable NGO that helped to treat migrant workers estimated the
disease affected approximately six million rural residents.
__________
U.S. CUBAN RELATIONS--THE WAY FORWARD
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senator Corker, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Flake,
Perdue, Cardin, Boxer, Menendez, Shaheen, Udall, Murphy, Kaine,
and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will
come to order. Thank you. Thanks for your interest.
Today, we will hear from the State Department's Assistant
Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs on the strategy behind
the President's significant shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba.
Assistant Secretary Jacobson is joined at the witness table by
the Counselor of the State Department, Ambassador Thomas
Shannon. We welcome you both.
Cuba has been left behind politically and economically, a
far cry from a time decades ago when it was among the most
prosperous countries in the region.
The administration's Cuba policy initiative has been
welcomed in Latin America and the Caribbean. But significant
differences of opinion, which we will hear today, exist in the
United States over the extent to which this change in policy
will advance U.S. interests and improve circumstances for the
Cuban people.
Today, we look forward to our witnesses speaking to how our
Nation can best engage strategically with the region and beyond
to help Cuba rejoin the mainstream of the Americas and offer
its citizens the same rights and freedoms enjoyed by citizens
of other countries in the region.
To this end, our witnesses can help us understand the
administration's policy goals with regard to Cuba. What do they
intend to achieve in restoring full diplomatic relations and
relaxing sanctions? We would also like to hear their assessment
of what the Cuban Government's goals are for engaging in this
diplomatic process with the United States.
Every policy initiative will inevitably come into contact
with the reality that the Cuban state and, most importantly,
the Cuban state's relationship with its own citizens, have not
yet changed. In truth, we have to define what a normal
relationship with Cuba looks like bilaterally, but also in the
context of our relationship with the Americas more broadly.
Our overall relations with Latin America and the Caribbean
have evolved significantly over past decades. The last
unilateral U.S. military intervention in the region occurred
more than 20 years ago in Haiti.
U.S. trade with Latin America and the Caribbean has more
than doubled from 2000 to 2012. In the process of opening to
increased trade with the United States and each other, Latin
American countries have taken steps to adopt market reforms and
create more transparent legal and investment standards.
The norm in the region is for regular multiparty elections
and, more broadly, inter-American institutions today reflect
the commitment by the region to more democratic, inclusive
governments. The U.S. relationship with Latin America is very
different than it was during the Spanish-American War in 1898
or during the cold war in 1959. This is the larger strategic
context in which the way forward for our relations with Cuba
will be defined.
And we thank you both very much for being here. I look
forward to the opening comments of our distinguished ranking
member, Senator Cardin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I,
certainly, welcome our witnesses today. I thank you very much
for conducting this hearing.
There is no question that the December 17th speech by
President Obama marked a watershed moment in our relationship
toward Cuba. There are members of this committee who believe it
went too far. There are members of this committee who think it
did not go far enough.
But one thing I think is critically important is that we
have an open committee hearing and discussion on these issues.
That is why I particularly thank the chairman for bringing
forward this hearing, so that we can begin a discussion on the
new direction with Cuba.
On December 17 we also--we celebrated the long overdue of
Maryland resident Alan Gross to the United States.
Mr. Chairman, by consent, I would ask that his statement be
included in our record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[Editor's note.--The Alan Gross written statement mentioned
above can be found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for
the Record'' section at the end of this hearing.]
Senator Cardin. We all are interested to hear from our
witnesses. Today's hearing provides an important opportunity to
review the advances achieved under the administration's new
Cuba policy and to understand the strategy for moving forward.
Without a doubt, this is a complicated process, and it will
take time to achieve the progress we all want.
I want to underscore that there is one issue that I think
unites us, even though we all may have different views as to
where we should move with our policy on Cuba. That one area
that I think unites every member of this committee and the
United States Senate is that we all stand together in our
aspirations to see the Cuban people have the opportunity to
build a society where human rights and fundamental freedoms are
respected, where democratic values and political pluralism are
tolerated, and where individuals can work unobstructed to
improve their living conditions. This is particularly true with
the Afro-Cuban population.
We also share concerns about critical issues such as the
Cuban Government's ongoing human rights abuses and the presence
of American fugitives in Cuba, especially those wanted for the
murder of U.S. law enforcement officers.
But the central question is, how can we best advance these
aspirations while also addressing our concerns? Our previous
policy did not achieve the progress that we wanted to see, so a
new approach is needed.
President Obama has laid out a new path based on the belief
that principled engagement will bring more results. I think
that this is the right path to follow for the following
reasons.
First, for far too long, the Cuban Government has used U.S.
policy as an excuse to justify its shortcomings and the
hardships of the Cuban people. The Cuban Government has also
exploited U.S. policy for diplomatic gains, focusing
international debate about what the U.S. should do rather than
about what Cuba needs to do to better to provide for its
citizens. This has been a particular challenge here in our own
hemisphere where governments, including some of our closest
partners, have long preferred to speak out critically about
U.S. policy rather than about the conditions on the island.
The President's policy has reset the geopolitical calculus
in the region and will provide new opportunities for
cooperation with our Latin American and Caribbean partners.
The recent Summit of the Americas in Panama showcased this
point clearly, and both President Obama and the United States
were praised widely for their leadership.
In one particularly important development, the Presidents
of Costa Rica and Uruguay joined President Obama in meeting
with Cuban dissidents. This was an incredibly important moment
in what it showed the international community. Seeing Latin
American Presidents joining the U.S. President to meet with
members of the Cuban opposition was unthinkable just 6 months
ago.
I also want to thank Senator Boxer. Senator Boxer and the
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee had a chance to hear from Mr.
Cuesta Morua at that hearing. I think that was an important
point also.
Second, despite differences we may have with the
government, our foreign policy should always endeavor to
support the country's people to the greatest degree possible.
When President Obama first came to office in 2009, he created
greater flexibility for Cuban-Americans to visit their families
in Cuba and to send remittances to the island. These early
policy changes have provided important support to the emerging
class of Cuban entrepreneurs that have been able to launch new
economic initiatives, often working out of their own homes.
While the Cuban Government still limits their activities
widely, and not all Cubans are able to take advantage of them,
U.S. policy is directly responsible for helping the Cuban
people improve their living conditions and achieve a new degree
of independence from the Cuban Government.
The President's December announcement went one step further
and has made it easier for U.S. citizens to engage in
purposeful travel to Cuba. Whether for academic, philanthropic
or business reasons, U.S. citizens will now have greater
opportunities to take part in people-to-people programs that
provide increased interaction with the people of Cuba.
I have no doubt that the dynamism of American society will
make a positive contribution to empowering the Cuban people and
provide them with the information they need to build the future
of their country.
While the President's policies have made important changes
to U.S. travel regulations, there are some things that only
Congress can do. For that reason, I am a cosponsor of Senator
Flake's Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act. I think we must do
everything we can to promote robust ties between the citizens
of the United States and Cuba, and I hope we will have the
opportunity to discuss that bill during this hearing.
Then third, the administration's new Cuba policy will
provide U.S. diplomats with new tools to engage directly with
the Cuban Government, to have principled and frank discussions
about the issues we disagree about, and how we might work
together to resolve these issues.
Every day, our diplomats around the world demonstrate their
ability to engage foreign governments and advance U.S. national
interests. It is not unreasonable to think that we will have a
better chance to address the outstanding claims held by U.S.
citizens for property confiscated by the Cuban Government or to
secure the return of American fugitives to face justice in the
United States if we actually engage in direct dialogue with the
Cuban Government and articulate our demands.
When it comes to issues of confronting the illicit
narcotics trade or addressing migration issues, it is in the
national interest of both the United States and Cuba to have
channels of communication between our two governments.
Diplomacy will make this possible.
The President's Cuba policy puts the United States on the
right path. But we must remain clear-eyed about several issues,
and we must continue to speak out about them.
We cannot ignore the Cuban Government's record of human
rights abuses or human trafficking. Every month, there are way
too many instances where the Cuban Government jails political
activists for what they believe, what they say publicly. Human
rights and freedom of expression must be central to all of our
engagements with the Cuban Government.
I know that Assistant Secretary Tom Malinowski led a human
rights dialogue with the Cuban Government earlier this year. I
welcome our witnesses' comments on this development.
Mr. Chairman, as I said initially, we do welcome the
witnesses that are going to testify today. I thank you again
for this opportunity for our committee.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Our first witness is the honorable Roberta Jacobson. She is
the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs. Assistant Secretary Jacobson has led the State
Department discussions with the Cuban Government regarding
establishing diplomatic relations.
Our second witness is Ambassador Thomas Shannon. He is the
Counselor of the State Department. Most recently, he served as
American Ambassador to Brazil. Among his duties, he has also
served as senior director for the Western Hemisphere at the
National Security Council.
We thank you both for being here. You can keep your
comments fairly brief, if you wish, and we will accept your
written testimony into the record. We look forward to the
questions. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF ROBERTA S. JACOBSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member Cardin, for the opportunity to testify on United States-
Cuba policy today and your interest in the hemisphere more
broadly.
Let me just underscore this unique moment, I think, in the
Americas for the United States. It is remarkable to see how
U.S. relations with countries of the hemisphere are
increasingly characterized by mature partnerships and shared
values and interests. The depth and breadth of the partnerships
we have with Canada, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and
so many others is extraordinary. I am especially proud of the
renewed commitment to working with Central America and the
Northern Triangle countries, including our $1 billion 2016
request, which we believe will strengthen regional security,
prosperity, and good governance.
Since I last appeared before this committee in February, we
have begun to see the administration's new approach on Cuba
providing space for other nations in the hemisphere and around
the world to focus on promoting respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Cuba.
At the Summit of the Americas in Panama, engagement by the
President and the Secretary reinvigorated our momentum. Our
approach has drawn attention to the potential for greater
political and economic freedom for the Cuban people and the gap
between Cuba and other countries in the hemisphere.
More Americans are traveling to Cuba, meeting Cubans, and
building shared understanding between our people. We have seen
practical cooperation in our dialogues with Cuba on issues in
our national interest, like maritime and aviation security,
telecommunications, and environmental cooperation.
Our future discussions on law enforcement cooperation
coupled with ongoing migration talks will expand the avenues
available to seek the return of American fugitives from
justice, among other issues.
And we are planning on future talks on human rights and
settling American claims for expropriated property.
Most importantly, the President's new approach makes clear
that the United States can no longer be blamed as an obstacle
to progress on such things as access to information or
connecting Cubans to the world.
Fundamentally, on this issue, I am a realist. And as anyone
who ever dealt with Cuba knows, being a realist is essential.
Indeed, as the President made clear prior to his historic
meeting with Raul Castro at the summit, significant differences
remain between our two governments. We continue to raise our
concerns regarding democracy, human rights, and freedom of
expression.
The policy is based on a clear-eyed strategy that empowers
the Cuban people to determine their own future by creating new
economic opportunities and increasing their contact with the
outside world. These changes create new connections between our
countries and help the nascent private sector in Cuba.
But comprehensive changes in our economic relationship will
require congressional action to lift the embargo, and the
President has urged Congress to begin that effort.
The administration's decision to rescind Cuba's designation
as a State Sponsor of Terrorism was a fact-based process, as
the President has emphasized.
While progress has been made in our efforts to reestablish
diplomatic relations, we are not there yet. There are still
outstanding issues that need to be addressed to ensure a future
U.S. Embassy will be able to function more like other
diplomatic missions in Cuba and elsewhere in the world.
But even today under challenging circumstances, our
diplomats unite families through our immigration processing,
provide American citizens services, issue visas, and aid in
refugee resettlement. They work hard to represent the interests
and values of the United States. Our engagement with the
broadest range of Cubans will expand once we establish
diplomatic relations with Cuba.
And tomorrow we will be holding a new round of talks with
our Cuban counterparts to advance these objectives. As we move
the process ahead, we hope we can also work together to find
common ground toward our shared goal of enabling the Cuban
people to freely determine their own future.
Thank you, and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roberta S. Jacobson
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, thank you for the opportunity
to testify today on U.S.-Cuba policy. I know many of you have a deep
interest in U.S. policy toward Cuba and have closely followed our
implementation of the President's new approach to Cuba since December
17. I appreciate the committee's engagement on Western Hemisphere
issues and your strong commitment to democratic values, human rights,
and expanding social and economic opportunity in the Americas.
Before I move to my remarks on Cuba, I wanted to underscore the
unique moment that the United States is facing in the Americas. As
someone who has spent her career working with this region, it is
remarkable to see how U.S. relations with the countries of the
hemisphere are increasingly characterized by mature partnerships and
shared values and interests. Without at all minimizing the difficulties
that we have with some countries, and the challenges that remain with
regard to the subject of the hearing today, the depth and breadth of
our partnerships with Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico,
and so many others is extraordinary and continues to grow. I am
especially proud of our renewed commitment to working with the Northern
Triangle countries of Central America, including our $1 billion FY 2016
request that will strengthen regional security through increased
investments in security, prosperity, and good governance. We have
launched the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative to help countries to
achieve a more sustainable and cost-effective energy matrix. And of
course, the President's new direction on Cuba has generated enormous
good will among all these partners and underscores our desire to turn
the page on the 20th century and to build a more forward-looking
relationship with the region.
Since I last appeared before this committee in February, we have
begun to see the administration's new approach to Cuba providing space
for other nations in the hemisphere and around the world to focus on
promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba and
elsewhere in the region. This was illustrated at the Summit of the
Americas in Panama last April. Engagement by the President and the
Secretary at the summit reinvigorated our momentum on a variety of
issues. Our new approach has drawn greater attention to the potential
for greater political and economic freedom for the Cuban people and the
gap between Cuba and other countries in the hemisphere. More Americans
are traveling to Cuba, getting past the rhetoric, meeting Cubans, and
building shared understanding between our people. We have seen
practical cooperation in our official dialogues with Cuba on issues in
our national interest like maritime and aviation safety,
telecommunications, and environmental cooperation. Our future
discussions on law enforcement cooperation, coupled with the ongoing
migration talks, will expand the avenues available to seek the return
of American fugitives from justice as well as the return of Cubans
residing illegally in the United States. We are also planning future
talks on human rights and settling American claims for expropriated
properties. Most importantly, the President's new approach makes clear
that the United States can no longer be blamed as an obstacle to
progress on things such as access to information and connecting Cubans
to the world.
Now while I like to think of myself as an optimist, fundamentally I
am a realist--and as anyone who has ever dealt with Cuba knows, a
realistic perspective is a very useful one to have. Indeed, as the
President made clear prior to his historic meeting with Raul Castro at
the Summit of the Americas, significant differences remain between our
two governments. We continue to raise our concerns regarding democracy,
human rights, and freedom of expression. And we will seek to engage
with all Cubans to gain their perspectives on the best way forward for
the country.
While the President's new direction on Cuba has been welcomed by
many Cubans and Americans, I know that there are divergent views in the
U.S. Congress on the policy of engaging the Cuban Government. I
appreciate that these views are deeply held and based on personal and
professional experience with Cuba and with broader issues of foreign
affairs.
Our policy toward Cuba is based on a clear-eyed strategy that
empowers the Cuban people to determine their own future by creating new
economic opportunities and increasing their contact with the outside
world. That is why we made it easier for Cuban-Americans to travel and
send remittances to their families in Cuba, and opened new pathways for
academic, religious, and people-to-people exchanges. These changes
create powerful new connections between our two countries and help the
nascent private sector in Cuba, which is already creating opportunities
on the island. The steps we have implemented build on this foundation
by increasing authorized travel, authorized commerce, and the flow of
information to, from, and within Cuba.
Our new approach emphasizes targeted forms of commerce that offer
economic opportunity to independent Cuban entrepreneurs or, like
expanded communications, benefit all Cubans. Comprehensive changes in
our economic relationship will require congressional action to lift the
embargo. The President has urged Congress to begin that effort. In the
meantime, we are using available policy tools to promote a prosperous,
democratic, and stable Cuba.
In a short period of time, we have already started to see U.S.
enterprises seizing the new opportunities. The regulatory changes we
announced are intended to increase the financial and material resources
available to the Cuban people and the emerging Cuban private sector.
They also enable U.S. companies to offer expanded telecommunications
and Internet services in ways that will help all Cubans, including
students, academics, entrepreneurs, and members of Cuban civil society,
advance their aspirations and collectively become more prosperous.
Regarding the administration's decision to rescind Cuba's
designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, as President Obama said,
``throughout this process, our emphasis has been on the facts. So we
want to make sure that, given that this is a powerful tool to isolate
those countries that genuinely do support terrorism, that when we make
those designations we've got strong evidence that, in fact, that's the
case. And as circumstances change, then that list will change as
well.'' We will continue to have differences with the Cuban Government,
but our concerns over a wide range of Cuba's policies and actions do
not relate to any of the criteria relevant to that designation.
While progress has been made in our efforts to reestablish
diplomatic relations, we are not there yet. There are still outstanding
issues that need to be addressed to ensure a future U.S. Embassy will
be able to function more like other diplomatic missions in Cuba and
elsewhere in the world. Even today, under challenging circumstances,
our diplomats do their very best to represent the interests and values
of the United States, just as we do in hundreds of places around the
world. The services our Interests Section offers to Cubans are no
different than those we offer in most other U.S. embassies. Our
engagement with the broadest range of Cubans will expand once we
establish diplomatic relations with Cuba.
We will continue our discussions with Members of Congress as we
move toward a new relationship with Cuba. As this process moves ahead,
we hope that we can also work together to find common ground toward our
shared goal of enabling the Cuban people to freely determine their own
future.
We appreciate your attention to these important issues. Thank you
and I welcome your questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS A. SHANNON, JR., COUNSELOR OF THE
DEPARTMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Shannon. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin,
and members of the committee, thank you very much for this
opportunity to appear before you.
As the chairman noted, we have submitted our testimony, so
I will just hit a few of the high points. I would like to start
by saying it is a pleasure and honor to appear before you with
Assistant Secretary Roberta Jacobson, who has served so ably
and successfully as our principal diplomat in the Americas.
My purpose today, along with the Assistant Secretary, is to
address the regional context in which our Cuba policy is
unfolding and to lay out some of the strategic dimensions of
our diplomacy.
The great American theorist of international relations,
Hans Morgenthau, once wrote, ``Our purpose is not to defend or
preserve a present or restore a past, it is to create the
future.'' He noted that our global engagement, whether it be
diplomacy or force of arms, has always been meant to defend one
kind of future against another kind of future.
It is in this light that we should understand the
President's policy toward Cuba. The decision to engage with
Cuba and seek normalization of our bilateral relationship
attempts to create a new terrain on which to pursue a future
that meets our interests and corresponds to our values.
Our commitment to democracy and human rights, and our
desire and hope that the Cuban people will know the benefits of
liberty and become the sovereigns of their own destiny, is no
less for our action.
The President has been clear about the commitment in our
Cuba policy to our enduring fundamental principles of self-
government and individual liberty. However, he has also been
clear about our inability to effect significant change in Cuba
acting alone across so many decades.
Instead, he determined that our efforts would be more
effective if we could position Cuba squarely within an inter-
American system that recognizes democracy as a right that
belongs to all the peoples of our hemisphere; that believes
that democracy is essential to the political, economic, and
social development of our peoples; and has the juridical
instruments, treaties, and agreements to give shape, form, and
weight to these commitments.
It is our determination that this kind of environment would
be the most propitious to support the only legitimate agent of
peaceful and enduring political change in Cuba: the Cuban
people.
To understand this point better, it would be worthwhile to
take a closer look at what the hemisphere Cuba is a part of
looks like in the second decade of the 21st century. The
Americas and specifically Latin America, has anticipated many
of the events that are shaping our world today. It is a region
that has largely moved from authoritarian to democratic
government, from closed to open economies, from exclusive to
inclusive societies, from autarkical development to regional
integration, and from isolation to globalization.
There are a few points worth making in this regard.
First, Latin America is the first region in the developing
world to commit itself to democracy. It was also the first
region to establish regional and subregional structures to
promote and defend human rights and to build subregional
institutions and mechanisms for dialogue.
Because of this, it has also built shared economic
understandings, including a commitment to market economies,
free trade, and regional integration. But perhaps most
dramatically, Latin America today is pursuing a second
generation of change or transformation. It is attempting to use
democratic governance and democratic institutions to build
democratic societies and states.
The great experiment in Latin America today is to show that
democracy and markets can deliver economic development and can
address the social inequities of poverty, inequality, and
social exclusion.
The profound changes unleashed in Latin America show that
democracy and markets can deliver economic development. And in
effect, Latin America has used democracy and markets to launch
a peaceful, social revolution that is transforming many
countries in the region in long-lasting ways.
Our ability to promote profound and dramatic change in
Latin America is an example of what the United States can
accomplish through diplomacy and engagement. If we accomplish
such a profound transformation in our hemisphere through
engagement, why not try the same approach with Cuba? Better
yet, why not try it in partnership with countries and
institutions that are now prepared to work with us because of
the President's new policy?
Cuba finds itself today part of a dynamic, vibrant region
where transformative change has been the watchword for several
decades. And it finds itself in a region where the momentum of
that change will continue to reshape political, economic, and
social landscapes. In such an environment that the Cuban people
will find many models and partners from which to learn and
choose, we should be one of those models and partners.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this opportunity to
speak. We look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Shannon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas A. Shannon
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on this
important topic.
It is a pleasure and honor to appear before you with Assistant
Secretary Roberta Jacobson, who has served so ably and successfully as
our principal diplomat in the Americas.
She has addressed in her testimony President Obama's policy toward
Cuba, and the steps we are taking to implement that policy. She is well
placed to respond to specific questions you might have about that
policy, and is familiar with the reaction around our hemisphere to our
policy.
My purpose today is to address the regional context in which this
policy is unfolding, and to lay out some of the strategic dimensions of
our diplomacy.
In starting, I would like to note that in my current assignment as
Counselor of the Department of State I have had the pleasure to work on
key administration priorities around the globe. During my travels
throughout Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, as well as my specific
and incidental engagement in the Western Hemisphere, I have had many
opportunities to see, experience, and reflect on the importance of the
United States in the world, and the enduring role and relevance of
American diplomacy.
The great American theorist of international relations, Hans
Morgenthau, once wrote, ``Our purpose is not to defend or preserve a
present or restore a past, it is to create the future.'' He noted that
our global engagement is meant to defend one kind of future against
another kind of future.
It is in this light that we should understand the President's
policy toward Cuba. The decision to engage with Cuba and seek
normalization of our bilateral relationship attempts to create a new
terrain on which to pursue a future that meets our interests and
corresponds to our values. Our commitment to democracy and human
rights, and our desire and hope that the Cuban people will know the
benefits of liberty and become the sovereigns of their own destiny, is
no less for our action.
The President has been clear about the commitment in our Cuba
policy to our enduring and fundamental principles of self-government
and individual liberty. However, he has also been clear about our
inability to effect significant change in Cuba acting alone across so
many decades. Instead, he determined that our efforts would be more
effective if we could position Cuba squarely within an inter-American
system that recognizes democracy as a right that belongs to all the
peoples of our hemisphere, believes that democracy is essential to the
political, economic, and social development of our peoples, and has the
juridical instruments, treaties, and agreements to give shape, form,
and weight to these commitments. It was our determination that this
kind of environment would be the most propitious to support the only
legitimate agent of peaceful and enduring political change in Cuba: the
Cuban people.
To understand this point better, it would be worthwhile to take a
closer look at what kind of hemisphere Cuba is a part of in the second
decade of the 21st century.
The Americas, and specifically Latin America, has anticipated many
of the events that are shaping our world. It is a region that has moved
largely from authoritarian to democratic government, from closed to
open economies, from exclusive to inclusive societies, from autarkical
development to regional integration, and from isolation to
globalization.
Latin America is the first developing region of the world to commit
itself explicitly to democratic governance through the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, the first to build a democratic model of
development, and the first to establish regional structures to promote
and protect human rights.
While creating a broad base of shared political values, Latin
America has also constructed shared economic understandings and a
commitment by many of the most successful countries in the hemisphere
to market economies and free trade. In the process, it has built
subregional integration and political dialogue through organizations
like the Common Market of the South, the Andean Community, the Union of
South American Nations, and the Central American Integration System,
all the while preserving larger hemispheric institutions, such as the
Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas process,
that connect Latin America to the Caribbean and North America.
As Latin America advances into the 21st century, it is undergoing a
second generation of change. Politically, it has consolidated
democratic government and is strengthening democratic states and
societies. This has opened up political institutions to new voices and
actors, deepening the representativeness of many Latin American
governments and challenging traditional elites and interests. In some
countries, weak democratic institutions have not been able to contain
the social energy unlocked by democratization, leading to populism and
political polarization as groups struggle for control of the state. As
troubling as this phenomenon can be, it does not define the
democratization of the region but instead presents a challenge for the
region to show how it can address such incidents through the
organizations and institutional mechanisms it has created.
Economically, Latin America is building innovative integration
mechanisms such as the Pacific Alliance, and reaching into Asia and
North America to find new and important economic partners. We have FTAs
with 12 countries in the hemisphere, and the continued globalization of
Latin America is driven not only by the regions abundant commodities,
especially food and energy, but also by growing middle classes that
have created attractive markets for manufactured goods and services.
The profound changes unleashed in Latin America show clearly that
democracy and markets can deliver economic development and address
long-standing social inequities such as poverty, inequality, and social
exclusion. In effect, Latin America has used democracy and markets to
launch peaceful social revolutions that are transforming many countries
in important and long lasting ways. Our ability to promote profound and
dramatic change in Latin America is an example of what the United
States can accomplish through diplomacy and engagement.
If we accomplished such a profound transformation in our hemisphere
through engagement, why not try the same approach with Cuba? And better
yet, why not try it in partnership with countries and institutions that
are now prepared to work with us because of the President's new policy?
Cuba today finds itself part of a dynamic, vibrant region where
transformative change has been the watchword for several decades. And
it finds itself in a region where the momentum of that change will
continue to reshape political, economic, and social landscapes. In such
an environment, the Cuban people will find many models and partners
from which to learn and choose. We should be one of those models and
partners.
Hans Morgenthau wrote, ``The world has been conscious of America's
purpose in the measure that America is determined to achieve it.'' The
President's actions in regard to Cuba are a clear indication of our
determination to achieve our purpose. How we achieve that purpose opens
a great opportunity for cooperation between the executive and
legislative branches of government. We hope this hearing deepens the
dialogue between us on how we can shape our policy and diplomacy to
achieve our ends while further advancing the integration and well-being
of our hemisphere.
The Chairman. Thank you both.
I want to thank the committee for the way that it has
handled what I think have been some really difficult issues
since we began this year. And I know there are significant
differences of opinion relative to the Cuba policy that have
been laid out. I am really glad we have those differences of
opinion represented here. I look forward to a robust Q&A.
One of the questions that I have had from the very
beginning has been, what are the specific changes within Cuba
that we have negotiated or asked for as it relates to this
policy change? It is my sense that there have really been none.
I wonder if you might expand on that. I think it has been a
question that most people have asked that have not been
following the Cuba situation nearly as closely as you, and that
is, are there specific things that we expect Cuba to do in
return for this change in policy toward them?
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think that as we move forward with this policy, what is
important to understand is the majority of the things that the
President did, he took action on because he believes strongly,
we believe, that they are in our interests and in the interests
of the Cuban people--the United States and the Cuban people.
They were not negotiated with the Cuban Government.
So the regulatory changes that allow for greater purposeful
travel, that allow for support by Americans to the emerging
private sector in Cuba, indeed, the normalization itself to
pursue engagement--normalization and the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations, of course, must be worked out mutually
with the Cuban Government--but the rest of the measures that
were taken to support and, indeed, empower the Cuban people,
were not things that were negotiated with the Cuban Government.
They were actions and policies taken unilaterally by us.
We believe that, over time, especially things like support
for emerging private sector entrepreneurs and, in particular,
hopefully the increase in telecommunications and information
technology in Cuba will make a big difference in the ability of
Cuban citizens to determine their own future. So they were not
negotiated with the Cuban Government, per se.
The Chairman. Ambassador Shannon, do you want to expand on
that any?
Ambassador Shannon. I think Roberta covered it well.
The Chairman. Okay. So let me ask you, I was going to go in
a different direction, but since you mentioned technology, it
was an interesting thing to announce that U.S. companies were
going to be more involved technology-wise. But it is my
understanding that the Cuban Government does not really allow
much access relative to the outside world with communications.
So I am just wondering, we made a big deal out of that
announcement, but what is the net effect of it, if the
government itself does not really allow its citizens to
participate in that way?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, I think it is very important that the
Cuban Government has said, as part of the U.N.'s efforts to
open information to citizens around the world that they want to
expand access for the Cuban people. We are hopeful that that
will happen.
Right now, there is not access for most Cubans. It is very
expensive. It is not available. And it is not necessarily
something they can have in their own homes.
But the ability of the Cuban Government and Cuba, in
general, to have a more up-to-date modern infrastructure on
telecommunications and information is something that is
critical to the modernization of the Cuban economy. And,
therefore, we would like American companies to be part of
bringing better information technology to Cuba, which is why
the President felt it was important to allow American companies
to do so.
The Cuban Government has not yet made decisions to move
forward with that, but there are American companies that are
talking with the Cuban Government. And there is no doubt that
there is a desire for greater information by the Cuban people,
and we would like to do everything we can to enable that.
The Chairman. So since we did not negotiate for changes,
and I understand that, because we thought this was in our
interests, what is it that you think, on the other hand, will
be the response by the Cuban Government? In other words, what
do you think, even though we did not negotiate or even though
we did not try to leverage in any way, what are the policy
changes that will occur inside Cuba as a result of these
changes?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, there have already been underway in
Cuba, obviously, some limited economic reforms. The ability of
half a million or more entrepreneurs to go into 200 or so
approved businesses, business areas in private business, self-
employment, that is an area I think that is really right for
support, that the regulations support.
I would hope there will be many more of these entrepreneurs
emerging and that they will be able to prosper and expand and
be agents for change within Cuba.
There are, obviously, very different views on the political
system as well as the economic system of Cuba. The President
has been clear about that.
We think that engagement with citizens of Cubans by average
Americans who are going for purposeful travel, which has
increased under this policy, and the ability for the private
sector to increase, and hopefully information to increase--and
we are not sure what the Cuban Government will do in the face
of these things. I think they are still absorbing our changes
and making their own policy decisions.
But we know from polling that has been done inside Cuba
that the narrative of the United States being responsible for
economic privations and other disadvantages of the Cuban people
is no longer blamed on the United States. That narrative is
eroding.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
I have one last question. I want to first thank you for the
time that both of you spent in my office on another matter. I
know we talked about the region in general.
I wonder if, Ambassador Shannon, you might just talk a
little bit about the effect that this policy announcement has
had on our ability in the region to discuss other issues of
importance to our country.
Ambassador Shannon. Thank you very much, Senator. This is
an important component of our policy, because we believe that
the decision to engage with Cuba and to normalize relations
removes an irritant that has not only limited where we can work
with some of our partners and others in the region, but it has
also, over time, degraded some of our most important
multilateral institutions, especially in the inter-American
system, within the OAS and Summit of the America's process.
I mentioned in my testimony the region has built a series
of subregional mechanisms and institutions to build dialogue.
For the most part, this has been very positive.
But in some instances, some of these institutions have been
built--I am speaking, in particular, of the community of Latin
America and Caribbean nations--to permit Caribbean and Latin
American countries to have a conversation among themselves with
Cuba where we are not present. And this, in the long term, is
not in our advantage.
Therefore, by working toward normalization, we actually
create an opportunity for the inter-American system to reassert
itself as the premier political, economic, and social
institution in the Americas. I believe this is an opportunity
that we need to take advantage of.
But in particular, in regard to Cuba, the region
understands and knows that Cuba is the only country in the
hemisphere that has not made an explicit commitment to
democracy and has not recognized through the Inter-American
Democratic Charter democracy as a right of all the peoples of
the Americas.
And although they have taken different approaches, we are
really now in a position to be able to press them to work
harder on democracy and human rights issues inside of Cuba.
The Chairman. Thank you both.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Again, thank you both for being here.
Let me just quote from the most recent State Department
human rights report, where it has acknowledged that Cuba is an
authoritarian state where elections are neither free nor fair.
And quoting, ``The principal human rights abuses were
abridgement of the rights of citizens to change the government
and the use of government threats, extrajudicial physical
violence, intimidation, mobs, harassment, and detentions to
prevent free expression and peaceful assembly. The following
additional abuses continued: harsh prison conditions, arbitrary
arrests, selective prosecutions, and denial of fair trials.''
It goes on to say, `` . . . interfered with privacy,
engaging in pervasive monitoring of private communications, do
not respect freedom of speech, severely restricted Internet
access, monopoly on media outlets, circumscribed academic
freedoms, maintained significant restrictions on the ability of
religious groups, refused to recognize independent human rights
groups, prevent workers from forming unions, exercising their
labor rights.
``Most human rights abuses were official acts committed at
the direction of the government. Impunity for the perpetrators
remained widespread.''
That is the most recent report from the State Department.
And then the independent human rights organization, the
Cuban Human Commission for Human Rights and National
Reconciliation, has documented in the first 4 months of this
year about 1,600 cases of arbitrary politically motivated
detentions, which is about the same pace we have seen
historically in Cuba over the last 3 years.
I mention that because I want to get specific here for a
moment as to how you intend to evaluate Cuba's progress on
human rights and use our tools at our disposal to advance that.
I use as an example the OSCE, which is a consensus organization
without enforcement and yet it is known globally for its
commitment to advance human rights. It has been very
successful, the Helsinki Watch, the Helsinki groups.
I am not aware of the OAS having the same type of
effectiveness in advancing human rights in our own hemisphere.
So my question to you is, How do you intend to use the OAS?
How do you intend to use the United Nations now that we have
removed this obstacle, as you see it, as far as having
credibility to raise these issues? How do we intend to use
United States leadership to advance human rights progress in
Cuba? And how can we evaluate whether we are making progress in
that area?
Ms. Jacobson. Senator, thank you. I think there are a
couple things.
First, there is no doubt that we will continue to write
human rights reports that are honest and unflinching in what
they describe as going on in Cuba, that there continue to be
these short-term detentions that should not be going on,
harassing individual human rights activists groups, preventing
them from having their rights exercised.
And so there is a range of tools. One of which the
President highlighted in terms of speaking out. But we also now
have another tool at our disposal, which is direct engagement,
including the human rights dialogue, which will move forward.
There is no doubt from the preliminary conversations we
have had that we have very distinct views of human rights and
universal, internationally recognized human rights. But we will
now be able to have that conversation much more directly going
forward.
In addition, in terms of international organizations and
our ability to work with others more effectively in those
international organizations, as you know, Cuba is suspended
from the OAS. They have been since 1962. But the questions of
looking at human rights issues in Cuba, as Ambassador Shannon
said, whether they are living up to the commitments that all of
the rest of us have made in the hemisphere through the Inter-
American Democratic Charter, through tools like the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, those are tools which we
are more able to use, reference, and discuss with our partners,
who I think are much more engaged in having that discussion
with us post-policy engagement and opening now that we are
more----
Senator Cardin. How will that be reflected? I understand
that. I said that in my opening comments. How can we know that
we are making that progress? What specific agenda items do you
intend to do? And what allies will we have to hold Cuba
accountable for adhering to internationally recognized human
rights?
Ms. Jacobson. Obviously, the best metrics of progress will
be on the ground in terms of whether it is a reduction in
short-term detentions or a growing ability by Cubans of all
stripes to be able to speak and be able to exercise their
democratic rights.
I think the President was pretty clear on our also
understanding that change is not going to come to Cuba
overnight. As we work on this, we have to understand that, in
empowering Cubans to take their own responsibility for these
rights, there will be progress, and there will be setbacks.
We will speak out about those. We will work with other
countries in the various international organizations. I cannot
tell you exactly the agenda, where we will talk with other
countries. We will, certainly, do so at the OAS. We will do so
in the U.N. bodies, whether that is the U.N. Human Rights
Council or other instruments such as those.
Senator Cardin. What leverage will we exercise over Cuba in
regard to our expectations that they will make progress on
these internationally recognized human rights standards?
Ms. Jacobson. I think one of the things that is most
important is the ability to have embassies and to carry out the
functions under the Vienna Conventions to travel around Cuba
and to be able to interact with the widest number of Cuban
citizens, which we have not been able to do up until now. And
that is critical, that our diplomats also be the first-person
observers of things, which has not been the case in the past.
That is obviously something we are working on right now.
Senator Cardin. What countries in our hemisphere do you
believe can you work closest with in putting pressure on Cuba
to comply with international recognized human rights?
Ms. Jacobson. I think that the Ambassador may have more to
say about this. My own view is there are many countries in the
hemisphere that will work with us, whether it is publicly or
behind the scenes. Countries that have committed are obviously
democratic countries committed to human rights, countries
around the hemisphere such as Costa Rica and Uruguay, and
allies like Colombia and Peru and Mexico, which have worked on
tough human rights issues around the hemisphere and will be in
conversations with us.
But many in the region, in the Caribbean, in Central
America, will be working with us on this, committed to the same
principles.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you both for being here.
Secretary Jacobson, before I get to my questions, I wanted
to ask, you discussed that we are in these discussions with the
Cubans and we have distinct views on human rights. I do not
mean to say this is what you meant, but let us just be clear.
These are not two distinct views that both are legitimate. This
is a view of human rights that we have, and a view of human
rights they have, which under no circumstances fits under any
definition of human rights.
Their views on human rights are not legitimate. They are
immoral. The notion you can round up people and arrest them
because they disagree with the government, the theory that can
you send thugs to Panama to beat up on democracy activists, we
would say this upfront, right, that their view of human rights
is not just different from ours, they are flat out wrong and
immoral in their views?
Ms. Jacobson. We have said clearly that we do not think
those views accord with international standards and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Senator Rubio. So the Cubans are flat out wrong when it
comes to human rights?
Ms. Jacobson. On repressing people's rights to free speech
and assembly, we do not think they are correct.
Senator Rubio. There is no moral equivalence between our
view of human rights and theirs?
Ms. Jacobson. I did not say that, and I would not. That is
not what I was trying to say.
Senator Rubio. All right, good. I wanted to get that clear.
Let me talk about travel. It is a big part of what everyone
is talking about. The truth is, going from Hotel magazine,
Hotel magazine wrote a few years ago that Gaviota S.A., which
is owned by the Cuban military, and is a prominent subsidiary
Grupo GAESA, which is the holding company that basically
controls the entire Cuban economy, it is also the largest hotel
conglomerate in Latin America and the Caribbean. It has hotel
holdings equivalent to the Walt Disney Company's holdings, and
it is run by General Luis Alberto Rodriguez Lopez-Callejas.
That is a long name. He is Raul Castro's son-in-law.
Let me read you something that McClatchy newspapers wrote a
few years ago about this network. It wrote, ``Tourists who
sleep in some of Cuba's hotels, drive rental cars, fill up
their gas tanks, and even those riding in taxis, have something
in common. They are contributing to the Cuban Revolutionary
Armed Forces' bottom line,'' in essence, recognizing that if
you travel to Cuba, if you stay in a Cuban hotel, in all
likelihood, you are staying in a hotel run by the Cuban
military. If you rent a car, you are renting it from the Cuban
military. If you fill up your gas tank, you are filling up from
the Cuban military.
And I would add that if you stay at a hotel, you are
staying in all likelihood in a confiscated property, a land
that was taken from a previous private owner who was never
compensated for it. In essence when you travel to Cuba and stay
in one of these hotels, not only are you putting money in the
hands of the Cuban Government, you are trafficking in stolen
goods, because it is property that belonged to a private
holder, some of them American citizens who were never
compensated for it.
So when we talk about increased travel to Cuba and more
commerce with Cuba through travel, what we are really talking
about is increased business ties with the Cuban military, for
the most part.
Is that not an accurate assessment at this time?
Ms. Jacobson. It is, certainly, accurate that the Cuban
state, including the military, runs a large percentage of the
hotels and other infrastructure. We also now have an increasing
number of casas particulars, people's individual homes, which
are being used as hotels or B&Bs--Airbnb is working on that--
and private entrepreneurs moving into spaces to support the
purposeful travel.
Senator Rubio. So then why would we not limit our opening
in travel to say that if you travel to Cuba, you can only stay
at one of these casas particulares or one of these other
nongovernmental, nonmilitary-owned facilities? Why would we
not, as part of our opening, say can you travel to Cuba, but
you cannot stay in a property that was stolen and you cannot
stay in a property owned or operated by the Cuban Government,
which includes even the foreign-flagged hotels, because they
have majority ownership there as well.
Ms. Jacobson. Senator, our strong belief is though we are
aware that there will be some financial benefit to the Cuban
Government by the larger number of Americans going to Cuba, the
benefit of those larger numbers, which could not be supported
only by individual homes, for example, the benefit to the Cuban
people of this larger number of Americans going far outweighs
the increased economic benefit that may accrue to the Cuban
Government.
Senator Rubio. Just so I understand clearly, and bottom
line is you agree that if you travel to Cuba, you are staying
in all likelihood in a stolen property that is in all
likelihood run by the Cuban Government. But that said, the fact
that there are going to be Americans present there, the benefit
of having Americans being able to travel and interact with Cuba
outweighs the economic benefits that are going directly to the
Cuban military.
Ms. Jacobson. I would say that it is possible those
properties are confiscated. It is, certainly, the case that
many of the properties are state-owned. But we do believe that
the benefit outweighs----
Senator Rubio. Other than the private homes you talked
about, which are largely state-owned as well, but at least an
individual is running it, other than the private homes, which
is still a very small sector of the economy, which Cuban hotel
is not owned or operated by the Cuban Government?
Ms. Jacobson. I said that I assume most of them are state-
run, especially because even joint ventures are majority Cuban.
Senator Rubio. They are all state-run. Is there a private-
owned hotel in Cuba?
Ms. Jacobson. I do not know, sir. But I assume there are
none. But as I say, there are these bed and breakfasts and
individual homes.
But again, I think the premise on which we are basing this
is that the benefits of engagement, purposeful travel, are
very, very great to the Cuban people, and seen overwhelmingly
by the Cuban people as of benefit to them, as surveys show.
Senator Rubio. I want to talk about the Internet for a
moment. Cubans, as you said, blamed the United States for lack
of access to the Internet and so forth. It has been couched as
a lack of capacity. In fact, Cubans say, our own President said
that. He said, ``Unfortunately, our sanctions on Cuba have
denied Cubans access to technology that has empowered
individuals around the world.''
But I think you know that is not true. For example, there
is no Japanese embargo on Cuba. There is no South Korean
embargo on Cuba. And, yet, those technologies are not widely
available either.
Is it not true that at the end of the day access to
Internet in Cuba is not simply a function of capacity, because
there are multiple other countries around the world that do not
have an embargo on Cuba that can provide cell technology or
Internet technology. Is it not true that the vast majority of
the impediment to access to the Internet and technology in Cuba
is a result of Cuban Government censorship?
Ms. Jacobson. I think the denial of access has been both
one of policy and one, in terms of access to American products,
also one of polices of the United States. We are taking one of
those two things away.
They are now able to have access to U.S. products, which we
always believe are the best in the world. And that leaves only
policy.
Senator Rubio. I understand. But there are still other
countries--I have a Samsung. Why is Cuba not awash in Samsungs?
All these other countries around the world who do not have an
embargo on Cuba, why have they not been allowed to come in and
offer Wi-Fi and all the sorts of things that developed
countries have?
In essence, it is not a capacity issue. The reason why
people in Cuba do not have access to the Internet ultimately is
because the Cuban Government will not allow it.
Ms. Jacobson. Well, there is a question of infrastructure
that needs to be present to utilize the----
Senator Rubio. But other countries could have provided
that.
Ms. Jacobson. They could have. The Cuban policy is clearly
a big part of this. And we do not know whether that policy will
change. They have said they want to modernize their
telecommunications sector.
Senator Rubio. So why did they not do it with the Japanese,
the Koreans, the Germans, or any number of countries around the
world that have Internet and technology capabilities outside of
United States. capabilities?
Ms. Jacobson. I am hoping they want our stuff.
Senator Rubio. No, I understand that.
Ms. Jacobson. And we will be able to compete well. But we
also see on the island many Samsung phones, many other cell
phone technology of the latest make, but it is not connected to
anything yet.
Senator Rubio. It is connected to the Cuban Government
telecommunications.
Ms. Jacobson. And that will be the question. Can they open
to something that allows their economic development to enter
the modern world and connect Cubans to the world?
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Cardin, as the ranking member on the Latin America
Subcommittee--Senator Rubio is my chairman--I really appreciate
the full committee looking at this.
I do want to pick up on what Senator Rubio said, but in
kind of a different way. When you listen to my colleague, you
would think this was the only country in the world that we have
relations with and we are starting to have relations with where
the state owns hotels.
A lot of my colleagues, maybe all my colleagues on the
Republican side, I cannot be sure, but I think voted to go
ahead with a free trade agreement that includes Vietnam, an out
and out Communist country that pays a minimum wage of 70 cents
and owns many of the hotels, trust me. But yet, we still have
relations.
The reason we have relations are geopolitical reasons, that
we want to work to change these places. So I think my
colleague, with his line of questioning, has really proven the
point, because Russia, some Russian hotels are owned by the
country, China.
Are we going to start telling people what hotels to stay
in, in China and Russia and Vietnam and Cuba? Come on. We do
not do that. We are not an authoritarian country.
You know, if people chose to stay in an Airbnb in Cuba,
that would make me happy. That is a San Francisco-based
company.
I wanted to mention that I am very proud. They are one of
the first United States businesses to take advantage of new
economic opportunities in Cuba that my colleagues, some who sit
on this committee, would take away.
And in March, a New Jersey-based telecommunications company
announced an agreement to provide direct international long-
distance telephone service between the United States and Cuba,
so relatives could talk to each other.
These companies have an opportunity to make an incredible
difference in the lives of everyday Cubans by connecting them
to outside world. Now, there are plenty of problems and
challenges that we face. There is no question about that.
And I was going to ask you, Ambassador or Assistant
Secretary Jacobson, what have been the greatest areas of
progress in the talks so far with Cuba? And what can we expect
from this upcoming round of talks? If you can be brief and
concise, because I have a bunch of other questions.
Ms. Jacobson. I will. Thanks.
I think the greatest progress so far is just the acceptance
by both sides that we do want diplomatic relations, that we
want embassies, and our understanding that we will be able to
operate in Cuba in a way that allows us to engage with more
Cuban citizens. That is incredibly important, and we see that
as really critical to this whole engagement process.
I think in terms of what we will talk about tomorrow, it is
really getting rest of the agreement for an embassy that
operates similar to the way we operate in some other countries.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Assistant Secretary, you testified in a subcommittee
hearing Senator Rubio and I held in February about the impact
of the President's new policy on human rights and democracy in
Cuba. And I asked you about the impact of the President's new
Cuba policy on United States relations with other countries in
the region and the world. And you answered then that the
reaction was immediate and extremely positive. Those are your
words. I was very pleased about that.
Now, we also discussed then the importance of engaging
regional partners on issues related to human rights. Has the
administration been able to leverage regional and international
support for its new Cuba policy to increase pressure on the
Castro regime for its blatant violations of basic freedoms and
systemic repression and abuse of its citizens? Has there been
any success so far in engaging our partners on those issues?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, thank you, Senator. I do think that we
have had conversations, certainly, with many of our hemispheric
partners that have been much more productive than they have
been in the past. I certainly would second what Senator Cardin
said about the fact that in Panama the President was able to
have a roundtable on civil society with the President Tabare
Vazquez of Uruguay and President Solis of Costa Rica, which
included two independent Cuban activists, dissidents, as well
as 12 or 15 others from around the hemisphere.
That is something very unusual. They would not necessarily
have sat with the U.S. President to do that before this policy
change. And the Cuban dissidents who were there were able to
connect with colleagues around the hemisphere, which was not
possible in the past.
I also think that the reaction of the Panamanian Government
to things that happened in Panama, including government-
sponsored nongovernmental organizations preventing the full
exercise of freedom of speech in the civil society forum was
very forceful on how democracies operate, and that, too, was a
change from what we have seen sometimes in the past.
Senator Boxer. I think the fact that our regional partners
got to actually meet human rights advocates is very important,
because a lot of times, you know, see no evil, that is it. But
having spent time with them I think is critical. So that is a
very good report.
Now, Cuban President Raul Castro has said he will step down
in 2018, following the end of his second term. This means for
the first time since 1959, Cuba will not be led by one of the
Castro brothers.
Reports indicate that President Castro is grooming his
first Vice President, Miguel Diaz-Canel, to succeed him. Can
you talk about the importance of this transition of power in
Cuba? And could you shed a little light on this first Vice
President?
Ms. Jacobson. I am not sure I can shed that much light in
this area. What I can say is I do think that a transition that
is taking place is not just one of a normal or even Cuban
election that is taking place in 2018. It is a generational
change. And the exit of either of the Castro brothers is very,
very significant.
There are changes in the way that elections are going to be
done in Cuba. Still not what we would like to see in a free,
multiparty election, but I do think it is going to be
significant.
Obviously, the Vice President, Diaz-Canel, is the next
generation of leaders. We have not met with him. I have not met
with him, but I know many of you have who have gone to Cuba,
many of the codels have. So there may be more knowledge in the
Congress than we have.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, I will close with this.
I think this 2018 election is a real test for us, in a way,
because if we can focus on democracy and freedom and fairness,
it is a very specific thing we can work on, and I am going to
work on that myself.
In closing, may I put my opening statement in the record?
Chairman. Without objection.
[Editor's note.--The statement mentioned above can be found in
the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section at
the end of this hearing.]
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
The Chairman. Absolutely.
Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Jacobson, I want to talk about the legal
authority that President Obama is using to take his actions.
In 1996, in reaction to the Cuban downing of two civilian
aircraft, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996, commonly referred to as the Libertad
Act. Its purpose is to assist the Cuban people in regaining
their freedom and prosperity, as well as enjoying the community
of democratic countries that are flourishing in the Western
Hemisphere. Another reason for the act, and I think the primary
one, is to provide for the continued national security of the
United States in the face of continuing threats from the Castro
government of terrorism and theft of property of United States
nationals.
I think what was noteworthy about the act is it codified
all restrictions under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
that were promulgated by the Treasury Department in 1963, and
it codified the Cuban embargo.
What is also noteworthy is this had long-lasting effects on
United States policy options toward Cuba because the executive
branch is prevented from lifting the economic embargo without
congressional concurrence until certain democratic conditions
set forth in the law are met.
Let me talk specifically about what those conditions are.
In section 203, it says that upon making determination under
subsection (c)(3) that a democratically elected government in
Cuba is in power, the President shall, upon determining that a
democratically elected government of Cuba is in power, submit
the determination to the appropriate congressional committees.
So let me first ask, has the President made a determination
that a democratically elected government in Cuba is now in
power?
Ms. Jacobson. The President has not taken actions under
those aspects of the Libertad Act. So he has not invoked that
part or any of the Libertad Act to take the actions he has
taken.
Senator Johnson. So he simply does not feel like he has to
refer to the Libertad Act? What is he doing, if he is not
basically lifting the embargo? What is this? How is he skirting
it?
Ms. Jacobson. I think the President has made very clear
that Congress is the only body that can lift the embargo. And
as he said in his State of the Union message, he called on
Congress to do so. Therefore, he has made clear that he does
not have the authority to lift the embargo.
Senator Johnson. What is he doing? It seems like a lifting
of the embargo to me.
Ms. Jacobson. What he has taken are Executive actions and
regulatory changes within the Executive's purview, with the
embargo still in place.
As you know, there were, for years, exceptions and continue
to be exceptions to the embargo on agriculture. His changes
make their exceptions on telecommunications and to support the
private sector in Cuba. Those are the kinds of exceptions to
the embargo that are within the executive branch's purview.
Senator Johnson. Okay. Do you basically agree with the
primary purpose of that act, which I read earlier, to ensure
the freedom and prosperity of the Cuban people and, certainly,
to enhance the national security of America?
Do you think those are the two primary policy goals of this
country toward Cuba?
Ms. Jacobson. Certainly, the President has made clear that
what we want is a democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba,
which I think is similar to what is in that act. The question
of our own national security should always be paramount in our
decisionmaking.
Senator Johnson. Ambassador Shannon, I was struck by your
comments, that democracy and freedom is flourishing in Central
America. Certainly, we have some good examples in Colombia
because of courageous leadership, but I am not seeing a whole
lot of democracy flourishing in Venezuela or Cuba, from that
standpoint.
Can you help me out in terms of what you are talking about?
Ambassador Shannon. There is no doubt that democracy is not
flourishing in Cuba. And it is part of the President's effort
to pursue a new approach to see what more we can do to help the
Cuban people begin their own political opening.
But as we look back over the last several decades, what is
important to remember and acknowledge about our hemisphere, is
this was a region that was largely ruled by authoritarian
governments, some military, some not, but which has found
through its commitment to human rights and its ability to
organize and use inter-American institutions, like the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, to develop civil societies around human
rights issues and use that to build democracy.
Whether it is Chile in the 1980s; whether it is our work in
Central America to face down insurgencies and move military
governments to allow elections to take place for civilian
government to take over; whether it is what we have done in
Colombia; whether it is transition to civilian and democratic
governments in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil--I think this
hemisphere has distinguished itself over the past three
decades----
Senator Johnson. Okay. I am running out of time here.
Seeing as the primary purpose is to provide for the
continued national security of America, is anybody going to
make the case that the Castro regime has been helpful in
promoting democracy and freedom in the hemisphere? Is it not
true that they are supporting FARC in Colombia, and supporting
the repressive regime in Venezuela?
Is that not true, Secretary Jacobson?
Ms. Jacobson. What the Cuban Government has done and what
we asserted in the report that we sent to Congress is the
support for the FARC that we have seen recently is support for
the peace process that is going on in Cuba between the FARC and
the Colombian Government. Obviously, that was not always the
case in the past, but at this time we think they are playing a
constructive role in the peace process.
In Venezuela, it is a different issue.
But I think in many areas, we do not see Cuba in national
security terms. We believe the engagement with Cuba through
diplomatic relations will be far better for our interests than
the previous policy of isolation.
Senator Johnson. In regards to the other purpose, to assist
the Cuban people to regain their freedom and prosperity, as
Senator Rubio is pointing out, the United States is basically
the only country engaged in embargo. Cuba has been able to
trade freely with the rest of the world.
I am not seeing the flourishing of prosperity as a result
of that engagement. How in the world do we think being able to
trade with the United States is going to improve their
prosperity at all under the repressive regime of the Castros?
Ms. Jacobson. You are, certainly, right that their economic
system has not made them a magnet for the trade and investment
from other countries that they are able to have.
In other words, other countries could have invested and
been trading with them more than they are. But Cuba has to
change to make that possible.
But they have been able to promote a narrative of the
U.S.'s embargo and isolation from them as the reason for those
economic problems. We have now taken that excuse away, so it
will be obvious that the problems are the lack of movement in
their system.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, today is the 113th
anniversary of Cuban Independence Day. It is a bittersweet
date, given the Cuban people's languishing for more than 55
years under a dictatorship.
As Assistant Secretary Jacobson reopens negotiations
between Cuba and the United States tomorrow, let me be frank. I
have deep concerns that the more these talks progress, the more
the administration continues to entertain unilateral
concessions without in return getting agreement on fundamental
issues that are in our national interests and those of the
Cuban people.
So I know you said in response to another question these
are not things we negotiated, these are things decided
unilaterally. I really cannot believe that.
The Cubans, Castro, said, you want a relationship? You have
to return the three convicted spies, three convicted spies of
the United States, including one who was convicted of
conspiracy to commit murder of three United States citizens in
international airspace. Check, we gave them the three spies.
You want a relationship? Take us off the list of State
Sponsors of Terrorism. Check, we gave them that.
You want a relationship? Stop or change the democracy
programs that we do throughout the world because we do not like
those democracy programs because they interfere with our
totalitarian regime.
So I wake up to an article from Reuters that says U.S.
signals it could change pro-democracy programs in Cuba that
Havana objects to. Cuba has long objected to the pro-democracy
program, which includes basic courses, for my friends sitting
in the press, in basic journalism and information technology to
the United States diplomatic mission in Havana. Check.
Bring us to the Summit of the Americas even though Cuba
violates the Democratic Charter of the OAS. And one of your
people says it does not matter who is invited to the table, it
is what is talked about. Guess what? The Democratic Charter,
the message, Counselor Shannon, that is sent to the hemisphere
is, you can violate the Democratic Charter and still be part of
the club. So why not go ahead and violate it if you think you
are compelled to do so? Pretty amazing.
I have not seen any movement at all toward greater freedom.
As a matter of fact, I would like to commend the committee's
attention to someone inside of Cuba, a Cuban blogger, Yusnaby
Perez.
In The Daily Beast, ``Cuba's 12 Most Absurd Prohibitions
That Tourists May Never Notice.'' I am just going to read a
couple, Mr. Chairman. Cubans cannot access the Internet from
their homes or on cell phones, not because, in fact, of
technology infrastructure. That is not the case. They cannot
access because the government will not let them because
information is a problem. So, yes, they want to perfect greater
infrastructure, but for them to control it.
You cannot live in Havana without a permit. The blogger
goes on to say, can someone from L.A. live in Washington, D.C.?
The answer is obviously yes. But you cannot live in Havana
without a permit from the government.
No public demonstrations are allowed. Imagine that.
No political parties are allowed except the Partido
Comunista de Cuba, the Cuban Communist Party.
No investment in medium and large enterprises.
No inviting a foreigner to spend a night without a permit
in your own home.
Among many others, something as absurd as you cannot bring
from abroad 25 artificial fingernails, in violation of the law.
I ask unanimous consent that the full article it be
included the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[Editor's note.--The article mentioned above can be found in
the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section at
the end of this hearing.]
Senator Menendez. So here we are. Human rights abuses
continue unabated with more than 1,600 cases of arbitrary
political arrests this year alone, only 5 months into the year.
So, President Obama may have outstretched his hand, but the
Castros still have their fists real tight.
You and Secretary Malinowski came before this committee,
heralded that there was a downturn. Guess what? We are
skyrocketing back up in human rights violations and political
dissidents being arrested, including the rearrest of the people
who you negotiated to ultimately be released, several of them
have been rearrested.
Now, despite the desire to move in a different direction, I
see we get nothing in return.
You are taking Cuba off the terrorism list. Well, Joanne
Chesimard on the FBI's 10 Most Wanted Terrorists list for
murdering New Jersey State Trooper Werner Foerster, Charles
Hill wanted for killing a New Mexico State Trooper and
hijacking a United States civilian plane, they are both living
in Cuba, protected by the regime.
The regime says we will talk to you, we will talk to you,
even though your counterpart has already said she got political
asylum and she is not going anywhere, but we will talk to you
about it. We will talk to you about it. We will all talk ad
infinitum.
So I just do not see it. And I hope my colleagues who are
so passionate, and I listened to them, about democracy and
human rights in many parts of the world, in Burma, in Vietnam,
in a whole host of places in the world, but are almost silent
when it comes to Cuba.
Somehow democracy and human rights there is not as
important as other places in the world. I hope we can keep the
same standard.
Let me ask you, Madam Secretary, to your knowledge, were
you or any member of the State Department told not to push for
sanctions on Cuba in violation of sending MiGs and missiles to
North Korea in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions,
the type of missiles that, in fact, were in the hull of a cargo
ship full of sugar being hidden where the MiG insignias of Cuba
were taken off to try to hide it?
Were you told not to push? Or to your knowledge, was any
member of the State Department told not to push for sanctions
at the U.N.?
Ms. Jacobson. Not that I know of.
Senator Menendez. Did the U.N. sanction Cuba?
Ms. Jacobson. They did not.
Senator Menendez. They did not.
Let me ask you this, in the list of State Sponsor of
Terrorism, you got a letter that says that, in fact, Cuba has
not, never did, oddly the Castro regime's assurances also
asserted the Government of Cuba has never--this is in their
letter, and the State Department quoted it--has never supported
any act of international terrorism and that the Cuban territory
has never been used to organize, finance, or execute terrorist
acts against any country, including the United States.
Do you intend for members of the committee to believe that
the Castro regime never supported any acts of international
terrorism over the last half century?
Ms. Jacobson. Senator, I think what is crucial is----
Senator Menendez. No, not what is crucial. Answer my
question.
Ms. Jacobson. Sorry.
Senator Menendez. Do you believe, do you want the committee
to believe the Cuban Government has never sponsored any act of
terrorism over the last half century?
Ms. Jacobson. I cannot say that I would urge you all to
believe that it has never occurred, no.
Senator Menendez. Well, I hope you do not mean to suggest
that the historical examples of providing support to former
armed insurgents in the 1980s, including the M-19 in Colombia,
the FMLN in El Salvador, the FSL in Nicaragua, or the fact that
the Cuban military did not shoot unarmed civilian planes
carrying American citizens over international waters, for which
there are pending indictments from a United States jurisdiction
against several individuals in Cuba, which I am wondering, are
you pursuing that in your negotiations with Cuba about them
answering those indictments?
Ms. Jacobson. That is why we are going to have the law
enforcement conversation for the Justice Department to be able
to pursue----
Senator Menendez. Do you realize who some of those
indictments are against?
Ms. Jacobson. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. And do you think you are going to engage
in a conversation with them responding to justice? Do you think
the Castros are going to say, yes, we are going to appear in a
court? I do not think so.
Ms. Jacobson. Understood.
Senator Menendez. Let me ask you one last question, if I
have the chair's indulgence.
You know, you all came here and said that, oh, there is a
reduction of political arrests in January, as a sign that the
administration's Cuba policy was achieving results. Not
surprisingly, these numbers climbed dramatically in the ensuing
months with more than 450 political arrests in February, more
than 600 in March, more than 1,600 political arrests in total
during the first 4 months of 2015--1,600 in the first 4 months
of 2015.
Now, as I am sure you know, this past Sunday, more than 100
activists in Cuba were violently arrested, including 60 members
of Damas de Blanco, represented there by Bertha Soler,
following their attendance at a church service.
So I guess Bertha was right when she said the Cuban
Government will only take advantage to strengthen its
repressive machinery, because all these women were doing was
marching in white with a gladiola to church. And result of that
is to be beaten and thrown into prison.
That is not success. I do not get it.
The final thing I will say, Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of
other questions, but in deference to my colleagues, and I
appreciate it, is that this is one-sided. I do not know what we
have gotten in return. We have gotten nothing in return, but
the Cubans have gotten plenty in return.
If that is our way of negotiating, then we have a real
problem on our hands. And the message we send in the Western
Hemisphere, in Venezuela, where we have--I do not see our
partners engaging with us because we have changed our Cuba
policy, this opens door toward promotion of democracy. We are
not seeing very much democracy in Venezuela. I am not sure
about it happening in other places in the hemisphere for which
we have challenges as well.
So I think that that is a hollow promise based on what we
see.
I appreciate the chair's courtesy because of my interest.
The Chairman. Absolutely. Thank you.
Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here today. This is an important
topic.
In my career, I have watched and seen the United States
strategy of engagement in various parts of the world, China,
Vietnam, Dominican Republic, Haiti, to mention a few. It has
worked in some. It has not in others.
I echo what Senator Menendez just said about Venezuela. We
buy $32 billion of oil a year. We have not affected their
regime one iota, that I can see.
I have three concerns about what we are talking about today
with regard to changing our relationship with Cuba. One is
their continued support of terrorism. Two is their human rights
record that continues today. And, three, is their activity in
arms smuggling. We will get to those in a second.
I have a very short question. I hope you will be brief.
In 2003, Cuba allowed Iran to operate on their soil. We
know about the attack on U.S. telecommunications. Cuba is
reported to have supplied intelligence services to Venezuela
recently and its allies.
Cuba has provided assistance and safe haven to terrorists,
including members of FARC and Basque ETA. They continue to
harbor fugitives wanted in the United States, including a
fugitive today listed on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list.
Cuba has also helped Islamic extremists, including members
of Hezbollah, slip into North America unnoticed. A Cuban state-
owned enterprise provided Venezuela with advanced technology
they used to provide illicit United States passports, visas,
and other documentation to 173 individuals from the Middle East
between 2008 and 2012.
That is ancient history, according to the administration.
Let us talk about recent history.
Just since President Obama started these secret
negotiations with the Castro regime, since June 2013, there
have been reportedly 15,000 political arrests, 2,500 such
arrests just since the President's speech on United States-
Cuban relations in December.
To make it even worse, between February and March of this
year alone, Cuba has increased the number of politically
motivated arrests by 70 percent.
As troubling as that is, I am even more troubled by Cuba's
continued nefarious activities with regard to arms smuggling.
We know about the earlier shipment of 240 tons of military
equipment confiscated on the way to North Korea, but we are
talking about February 28 of this year, 2015, a Chinese-flagged
vessel, Da Dan Xia, was intercepted in Cartagena, with over 100
tons of explosives, 2.6 million detonators, 99 projectile
heads, and over 3,000 artillery shells. This was bought from a
Chinese arms manufacturer named Norinco, on behalf of
Tecnoimport, which is a shadow company of the Cuban military.
The question is, With this type of activity, what
assurances can you give us? Mr. Ambassador, I would like you it
take a shot at this first. With this kind of continuing and
current activity, why should we be optimistic that just by
opening up economic relations with these people, this regime,
that this type of activity will change?
Ambassador Shannon. Thank you very much, Senator.
I can assure you that just by opening up economic activity
we will not necessarily change behavior. It is a longer process
in this.
But in regard to the larger diplomatic environment, and
Assistant Secretary Jacobson can address some of the more
specific issues, in regard to the larger diplomatic
environment, the fact that these ships were stopped was
significant. The fact they were inspected was significant. The
fact that these items were found was significant and shows an
ability to cooperate with our partners in the region to control
and monitor this kind of activity.
And this will deepen with time as people understand that
the broader purpose of our diplomacy is not simply to normalize
relations with Cuba and build a relationship with Cuba that
will change how we try to promote our interests and democratic
values, but that it is also about how we enhance the
integration and cooperation inside the hemisphere.
And partners who have been leery of working with us around
Cuba issue, because they do not want to get caught in the
vortex of a very powerful and historic animosity, are going to
be more open to engaging with us in this kind of activity.
So I believe we are actually going to be able to do more in
the area of security. We are going to be able to do more in the
area of nonproliferation. We are going to be able to do more in
the area of fighting drugs because of this.
Senator Perdue. Can I ask a followup on that, Mr.
Ambassador? So to follow up on Senator Menendez, why would we
not make that a prerequisite, that better behavior would lead
to open economic relations?
Or, Madam Secretary, either one.
Ms. Jacobson. I think, Senator, if I could, we all want the
same end. It is a question of how we basically motivate that
behavior or how effectively we can help support change.
The President believes firmly that the efforts we made in
the past, which were, in fact, to say you must change first and
then we will engage, just did not work to make the changes
inside Cuba.
Senator Perdue. Can I ask you a question on that?
Ms. Jacobson. Certainly.
Senator Perdue. We have evidence, though, cause and effect
of several other countries, Britain, Canada, others, having
open trading relations with Cuba. We are the only one really
embargoing. And yet that engagement really has not changed
behavior.
So what makes us believe today our opening up of economic
relations with Cuba will actually have that effect?
Ms. Jacobson. I mean, I think that is a fair point. We do
not know yet what the effect of this policy will be on the
Cuban Government. We do see already the beginning of the effect
on the Cuban people.
While we decry the detentions of the activists, we know
there are Cubans benefiting from this new policy in their
independent businesses and in their belief that they are going
to prosper and have a better life because of engagement with
the United States.
The other thing I would say is, I am very engaged with my
E.U. counterpart and with my counterpart in Spain in working
with them so that we can now work together. And when we work
together, not just with our regional counterparts but with our
European counterparts, that is more powerful. I think that
could have a more galvanizing effect.
But it will be slow. I do not deny that.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses.
My colleagues have asked great questions about the
particulars of the United States-Cuba discussion. I want to
talk a little bit about the region.
The Americas and the Caribbean are 35 nations. I guess by
the general count, nearly 1 billion people. If I do my kind of
back-of-the-envelope math, 35 nations means about 600 bilateral
relationships between the nations in the region. Some of the
bilateral relationships are strong and friendly. Some are weak.
They are warm and cold. They change over time.
Is there any other bilateral relationship in the Americas
that does not include normal diplomatic relationships, other
than the United States and Cuba? I am not aware of one, but you
guys are the experts.
Ms. Jacobson. No, sir.
Senator Kaine. So this is the only one of the 600 bilateral
relationships in the Americas that does not involve a normal
diplomatic relationship.
Let me ask you this, I am not aware of any war between
nations in the Americas, our two continents, right now, between
nations, am I right about that?
Ambassador Shannon. You are correct.
Senator Kaine. The only civil war, there are security
challenges, obviously, of many kinds because we are 35 nations
and 1 billion people, but the only civil war right now in the
region is the war between the Colombian Government and FARC and
another smaller terrorist organization that is currently
subject to a negotiation that Cuba is hosting, where the United
States is playing a role accompanying the Colombian Government,
correct?
Ms. Jacobson. Right. That is correct. And we are not
accompanying but have this special envoy now. It is also the
longest running civil conflict in the hemisphere.
Senator Kaine. I do not want to get ahead of myself, but if
that negotiation works out positively, and we have the ability
to be two continents, all Americans, without war, without civil
war, without war between nations, that would be pretty unusual
in the history of these two continents, would it not?
Ambassador Shannon. It would be a historic achievement.
Senator Kaine. And it would be pretty unusual on other
continents, wars or civil wars in Asia, wars or civil wars in
Africa, sadly, wars or civil wars in Europe.
You talked in your opening testimony about increasing trade
in the Americas. The majority of the American trade agreements
are with nations in the Americas. There is more trade between
the nations in the Americas. There has been a move in the last
30 years from governments that have been autocratic or military
toward democracy--again, not that there are not challenges, not
that there are not problem children. We are human beings, after
all. There are going to be challenges.
You each have spent your entire professional careers
working in the Western Hemisphere. It is what you have devoted
your professional lives to. Tell us what it means to the United
States of America to potentially be the anchor and the leading
nation in two continents with no war, no civil war, complete
diplomatic relations, and an ever-increasing trade and
interdependence.
Talk about what that means to the United States of America.
Ms. Jacobson. Senator, I think those are incredibly
important points. And for me, one of the things that I see in
this hemisphere is not only the hemisphere's importance to the
United States and to our people daily, whether trade, familial
ties, the growing influence and culture that we share, and the
way in which the values in this hemisphere are the same as
ours, but I also see this as a model with so many flaws that
still have to be overcome, and challenges that we all face, and
inequalities of systems and democracies even where they exist.
But remember that in the transition from military to
civilian government, truth commissions and the process of that
was first done in this hemisphere with the CONADEP in
Argentina, a model that then South Africa looked at and Eastern
European countries looked at and others have looked in the Arab
world now.
Remembering also that the terrible adjustment of the 1990s
on macroeconomic issues were things that this hemisphere went
through first. And now with the free trade agreements, the
broadening of those economic changes to be greater social
inclusion and ensure that everybody is included in those
benefits is taking root here first.
So I think it is not just what we do for ourselves. It is
what we are then able to do elsewhere, including working with
these partners increasingly capable on global issues that
matter to us, from climate change to the Middle East to
peacekeeping, where Uruguay per capita is the largest
contributor of peacekeepers in the world.
So I think it is not just a phenomenon we will be proud of
here, but one that is in fact projecting outside.
Ambassador Shannon. If I could add briefly, as we look out
on to the globe and see some very demanding and, in some
instances, some frightening security challenges, to have a
strategic enclave in our own hemisphere, where we are fighting
no wars, facing no significant insurgencies or terrorist
groups, and are able to have commerce, both in manufacturing
and services, but also in political dialogue, is a remarkable
thing and a remarkable accomplishment.
To have examples of societies that have moved from
authoritarian government to democracy, have moved from closed
economies to open economies, as I have noted, is a confidence-
builder for other countries around the world who are facing
similar challenges, because our hemisphere has shown that
democracy is not a status quo power structure. It is not about
preserving privilege. It is about addressing profound social
problems and doing so in a peaceful way, in a transformative
way.
So I think we have a remarkable platform in the Western
Hemisphere from which to engage the rest of the world. As the
Assistant Secretary noted, and as I noted in my testimony, this
is a region that is moving from global isolation to global
engagement.
In many ways, one of most interesting stories of the first
half of the 21st century is not going to be inter-American
relations. It is going to be how the Americas relate to the
rest of the world. The fact that we have four of our free-
trading partners being part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
and looking for ways to transform their own economies by
reaching across the Pacific into Asia, and doing so as
democratic countries that support open markets, that support
free trade, and that support the international institutions
that regulate trade, is a dramatic accomplishment, and will
have an impact on the larger economies in South America that
have yet to sign up for these kind of larger agreements.
So we are at a moment of strategic momentum. And if we are
able to show that this hemisphere can function hemispherically
around establishing priorities and building approaches to those
priorities, and if we can show that through our dialogue we can
present a consolidated face to the rest of the world, we will
have done something remarkable.
Senator Kaine. I thank the witnesses for their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
chairman and ranking minority member for scheduling this
hearing. This has been very informative and, obviously, an area
where there is much interest here.
I want to thank the witnesses, and I want to thank them
particularly for explaining that this new policy is not a
reward for good behavior on behalf of the Cuban Government.
Obviously, there are concerns, huge concerns, in terms of human
rights that need to be addressed. But I appreciate the clear-
eyed vision of that, that the administration holds.
And if you could explain, Ms. Jacobson, is it easier to
have those discussions with regard to human rights or perhaps
negotiating for fugitives from American justice if we have
diplomatic relations or a better relationship and better
contact than this situation as it has been?
Ms. Jacobson. It is only possible, really, with a policy of
engagement. Those were things we really could not do before.
Senator Flake. All right. Thank you. That is important, I
think, important in this discussion. We often think, well, you
know, is this a guarantee now, this greater engagement, that
any improvements will be in the offing?
That assumes that we have a good policy now that is
yielding benefits, and we have not. We have not for about 50
years now. And now at least there is a possibility that we
might be able to make some improvements and see increased
freedom for the Cuban people.
So I applaud the administration for taking this position
and for pursuing this.
Let us turn to travel for a minute. It was said before that
when people travel, some do stay in the hotels owned by the
government and, therefore, revenue will flow to government.
There is no doubt that will happen.
But it is significant, as was mentioned by Senator Boxer,
that companies like Airbnb have gone into Cuba now. This a
company that has a Web site that books travel, mostly bed and
breakfast, for people in their private homes. I was just
looking at it while we were here, if you just scroll down, they
have now, I understand, more than 2,000 listings in Cuba.
A bit of perspective, it took them years in some of their
other markets like San Francisco to get up to 1,000 listings.
You have 2,000 listings. I think this is just, I think, a 1,000
over just about 50 days. So it is very significant.
And for the most part or virtually all of these listings
are people in their homes, people who will benefit from visits
by Americans and others. And there is less of a chance that
money will certainly flow through government. Nobody denies
that increased travel will increase revenue that goes to the
Cuban Government, but at what cost to the Cuban Government?
I have always felt that if we lift some of our
restrictions, that the Cuban Government may seek to impose some
of their own, because obviously they want revenue but they fear
what else, the freedom that might come with the increased
travel.
But I have often also said that if somebody is going to
limit my travel, it should be a Communist. That is what they
do. Not our own government here. That is not our purview. That
is not our prerogative, to limit the travel of Americans.
So with regard to Cuban-American travel, I think it is
significant the President lifted some restrictions a few years
ago.
Ms. Jacobson or Ambassador Shannon, can you tell us what
has happened in that regard in terms of increased travel over
the last couple of years with the policy changing with regard
to Cuban-American travel?
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Senator, very much.
I think that it is clear that in the regulatory changes
that the administration has made over the last few years to
increase the ability for families to see each other, for Cuban-
Americans to go to Cuba, as well as the changes most recently
in December, there have been many more Cuban-Americans
traveling. Certainly, it has been critical to us I think to
ensure that remittance amounts go up, and they did dramatically
in the most recent regulatory changes, because in many ways,
they have been the capital that has founded some of the most
important private sector emergence, and will almost certainly
continue to do so, including some of these private homes that
are serving on Airbnb, people who want to run their own
businesses who are allowed to in areas that the Cuban
Government will permit, but do not have the resources to do so
and can be helped by folks in the United States.
Senator Flake. Well, thank you. As one who has traveled
frequently to Cuba over the past 15 years, I can tell you, for
several years there, it was tough to see any change or progress
because the Cuban Government, it seemed they would loosen
controls when they needed to and then tighten them again. But
traveling there over the past couple of years, there has been a
significant difference. And I think it is because of the
increased travel, particularly by Cuban-Americans, that you see
the type of entrepreneurship that has been allowed but will
likely continue now. Much tougher to turn and reverse, that,
certainly, is the feeling that those of us who traveled down
more recently have gotten, and I think that will only increase
with increased American travel.
Like I said before, there are no guarantees that anything
will happen, but change is more likely to occur with increased
contact from the United States.
Let me touch on diplomatic relations and the appointment,
ultimately, of an Ambassador to Cuba. How will that help with
regard to those who do business legally, Americans who do
business legally in Cuba under the new regs, and increased
number of Americans who travel? What benefits will they have,
if we have full diplomatic relations, that they do not have
now?
Ms. Jacobson. Obviously, our interest section in Cuba
already provides some services in both of those areas. But I
would say that having a U.S. Ambassador, having full diplomatic
relations, is always much better in terms of being able to
engage with governments at the highest level, the
representative of the President, and being able to advocate for
those U.S. businesses that can operate legally, being able to
advocate for them against competitors, being able to support
Americans while they are there.
It also critical to us that we have sufficient staff to be
able to support the influx of people and Americans who are
going to Cuba so we can provide those services. We can only do
that with full diplomatic relations.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank the ranking
minority member for mentioning the Freedom to Travel Act that
has sponsorship of the majority of this committee, I think 10
of 19. We look forward to pushing that forward.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thanks for your interest in this issue.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really
appreciate you holding this hearing, you and Senator Cardin,
and doing it in such a balanced way. I very much appreciate
that.
I am honored, Senator Flake, to be on your Freedom to
Travel bill. I think one of the things that is so important is
opening Cuba up to travel, and there could not be better
ambassadors than our citizens going down to Cuba and visiting
about what we are all about in terms of democracy and human
rights and those very, very important values.
At the beginning, I just want to say I very much support
this policy of normalization. I think we are turning the page
on a failed policy that has been going on since the early
1960s. We are moving to empowering the Cuban people, empowering
Cuban entrepreneurs. I really welcome this new chapter of
normalized relations.
It was mentioned earlier, and you were asked several
questions--I really appreciate you both being here and all of
your hard work over the years in this area--about the private
sector. And I have looked for reports on what is happening down
there.
I think it is fascinating, in terms of the growth, the
dramatic growth in the private sector. A 2013 Brookings report,
and there are probably more because that is an old report, is
looking at close to 1 million classified as private sector. You
have 500,000 legally registered as self-employed and you have
another 570,000 farmers who own or lease private plots working
solo or in cooperatives. As I think is mentioned in your
testimony, there is an organic sector also working there,
organic farming and organic marketing.
In addition to that, there is another estimated, from this
report, 600,000 to 1 million who are labeled private sector but
they are considered illegal by the Cuban Government. So there
is also a sector there that is growing.
So you have these two large sectors, which could be in the
range of 2 million. I think that is what, when we travel down
there, when we engage down there, with our commerce, these are
the folks that we are helping. These are the folks that we are
helping grow. These are the folks that we are empowering. And I
think that is a very, very good thing.
Now, one of the areas that I think is critically important
is increasing our agriculture interaction with Cuba. So I am
also proud to be, in addition to Senator Flake, Senator
Heitkamp has a bill to permit increased agricultural sales, I
am on that.
And this week I am introducing the Cuba Digital and
Telecommunications Advancement Act, also known as the Cuba DATA
Act, with Senator Flake, Senator Durbin, and Senator Enzi. The
goal of the legislation is very simple: Give U.S.
telecommunications companies the opening and certainty they
need to invest and help Cuba open to the world, and give the
Cubans the tools they need to engage in a 21st century economy
and to share information and communicate more efficiently with
each other and the world.
Secretary Jacobson, both you and the President emphasized
that access to the Internet is one of the cornerstones to the
new Cuba policy. For those who have not been to Cuba, it is one
of the least wired countries in the Western Hemisphere. Things
we take for granted, such as email on the phone, are basically
nonexistent in Cuba.
What are the major challenges Cubans are facing to access
the Internet? And what can United States companies and the
Congress do to open up Cuba to the global Internet?
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you so much, Senator. Thank you so much
for your interest in this and the conversations we have had.
I think, obviously, a huge part of the obstacles to the
Cuban people right now are sheer access to Internet connected
devices, whether it is computers or whether it is smartphones.
When they have access, that access is expensive. It is almost
prohibitive. Even when the cost came down recently for the
public to access the Internet, it was still extremely
expensive. For most Cubans, it was about a half month's wage.
Then there is a question of whether everything is
accessible once you get on the Web and whether there are things
that are blocked.
So there are huge challenges for the average Cuban. I think
there is a combination of reasons for that, but the Cuban
Government fundamentally has to make decisions, and we
obviously want to encourage in every way possible that
information and access to the Internet be made easier, cheaper,
available, and open for the Cuban people. That will take a
variety of decisions by the government that we are encouraging
them to take by encouraging American businesses to have those
conversations with them, and these are the means to do so.
Senator Udall. The goal, as I think you said in your
testimony, Madam Secretary, of the Cuban Government is to have
Internet access for 50 percent of its population by 2020. So
they have stated this goal, saying we are trying to move there.
This is the goal that the U.N. has also made for developing
countries around the world.
Is this goal achievable by Cuba? If the United States
telecom companies were allowed to invest in Cuba, how long
would it take to completely wire the island?
Ms. Jacobson. That is a great question, Senator. I am not
the best of tech experts, but I will tell you that the tech
companies that I speak to who had conversations either with
Cuba or about Cuba believe it is absolutely possible. And in
terms of how long it would take, a lot depends on what the
Cubans decide to do and what kind of infrastructure they put
in.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much for those answers.
Mr. Chairman, just a final comment, I know that all of the
things that have been mentioned here that are problems, that we
do not agree with, problems and challenges in Cuba, we just
have different goals to try to go those things changed.
And as the last note, I would like to express my support
for the extradition of Charlie Hill. Extradition of criminals,
I think, is an important part of any normal relations between
countries. Charlie Hill, who allegedly murdered a New Mexico
State Police officer and hijacked a plane, must be brought to
justice.
And I know the State Department shares this objective. I
hope we continue to make this a priority until we get it done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
My sense is there may be additional questions, and I will
defer my time for others who may wish to ask additional
questions.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Just a couple points I wanted to
touch on. This Internet thing is important.
I have talked about it extensively in the past. As I listen
to some of this conversation, I think there is still this
perception that somehow the reason why there is no Internet
infrastructure in Cuba is because the United States has not
gone into build it. The Cuban Government had a joint venture
with an Italian company for many years.
By the way, the telecom industry in Cuba is run by the
Cuban Government, and it is a holding held by GAESA, the
holding company run by the son-in-law of Raul Castro.
The bottom line is virtually every telecom company in the
world--and there are dozens of advanced telecom companies in
the world that are not within the territory of the United
States--have had access to the Cuban market, and they have not
been allowed to build out or have dropped out of joint
ventures.
The bottom line is the fact that American infrastructure
will be allowed to come in does not mean the Cubans will allow
it. Here is why: They do not want the Cuban people to have
access to the Internet.
In China, they have something called the Great Firewall.
They have access to the Internet in China. There is all sorts
of infrastructure. China has both nationally owned and private
companies in China that offer telecommunication infrastructure,
yet the people of China do not have access to the Internet the
way you and I understand it because the government places
filters upon it.
This is a government that will not even allow you to bring
certain books onto the island. This is a government that will
not allow you to read certain newspapers on the island.
This idea that they are going to somehow allow AT&T and
Verizon to say, yes, come in, build all of this infrastructure,
unfettered access to the Cuban people, is absurd. They cannot
survive an Internet opening.
So we can pass all the laws we want. The Cuban Government
is still going to place filters, and you still have to work
through their telecommunications company in a joint venture in
order to build infrastructure on the island.
As far as travel is concerned, I think Airbnb, that is
fantastic, that they are building this up. Here is the point,
number one, even private operators on the island of Cuba, bed
and breakfast, casas particulars, whatever you call them, still
pay an exorbitant fee to the government for the right to be
able to provide that service. So they even game that system to
get their hands on money.
That being said, the vast majority of people that travel to
Cuba will not be staying at one of these facilities. They will
be staying at segregated tourist destinations where tourists
are largely brought in. They experience that facility, and then
they leave. And the money is going to the Cuban military.
I have heard discussion about Vietnam, China. Look, we have
full travel to China and Vietnam. We have business with them.
They are not any more democratic than they were when all of
this started. So I think it actually proves my point, that
economic openings do not lead to political openings, by
evidence of China and Vietnam.
But here is my point about the Cuban military: In addition
to the fact that the Castro regime stole 6,000 properties owned
by U.S. citizens or U.S. companies, of which zero dollars have
been compensated, this is the Cuban military that has four,
four senior officials, three senior officials indicted, for the
murder of four Floridians, indicted in U.S. courts. That is the
Cuban military.
This is the Cuban military that was helping smuggle heavy
weapons to North Korea without consequence. They were caught,
no U.N. sanctions, no U.S. sanctions. This is not just the
Cuban military. This is a Cuban military that uses access to
funds to carry out this sort of grotesque activity.
So when we talk about travel to Cuba, business with Cuba,
let us be very clear. We are not doing business with the Cuban
people. You may eat at a home somewhere, but this is still a
very small part of their economy. For the vast and enormous
majority of Americans that travel there, and that includes
congressional codels, journalists, diplomats, everyday American
citizens, you will stay in a government-run facility. Every
dollar you spend there will wind up in the hands of the Cuban
military that sponsors terrorism by smuggling arms to North
Korea, that has senior officials indicted for the murder of
Americans over international airspace, and a Cuban military
that uses every access it has to funds to enrich themselves and
repress the Cuban people.
So there is no economic opening to Cuba. There is an
economic opening to GAESA, which is the Cuban military-run
holding company.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Let me very briefly, and then I will yield
to Senator Menendez.
Just in regards to just some responses here, there are 2
million cell phone users in Cuba. When I was in China, they do
block full access to the Internet, although the U.S. Embassy
site on air quality is one of the most frequently visited sites
by Chinese nationals. It is the only reliable information they
can get about air quality.
Our engagement will bring faster connectivity and more
quality connectivity to the people of Cuba. I am convinced of
that. The technology is there, as Senator Rubio points out. It
is a matter of making it available, and the people of Cuba will
demand that.
And let me just also also point out, in regards to the
Libertad Act, the Libertad Act provides for licensing authority
by the administration, which is common in these types of
legislation. So there are certain authorities included in the
act. And I do look forward to a robust discussion in our
committee.
Mr. Chairman, I would yield the time to Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, I see that Senator Markey
is here, so I will just wait.
The Chairman. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Welcome and thank you for all of the good work, which you
have done. Over the years, there has been clearly an isolation
from our country that Cuba has had to live with. And I very
much appreciate this administration's attempts to normalize our
relations. I think it is important. I think it is a step in the
right direction. And I think the actions which you are taking
are beginning to make it possible for us to envision a day
where we truly have normalized relations with Cuba, but it is
not going to happen overnight. And clearly, Cuba itself has to
deal with behavioral changes that are not going to come easy.
But that said, I think the process has opened, and I think
that we are going to head in the right direction.
I know Senator Udall has already talked about this, but I
think it is important to focus on it, and that is the
relationship that exists between information and freedom. I
think there is, without question, a huge cultural compatibility
that we have with Cuba, otherwise the Red Sox would not be
paying all this money to sign Cuban players right now. They
have at least mastered that part of our culture.
And hopefully, we will be able to use better relationships
to be able to broaden that even further.
Talking about the Internet, talking about
telecommunications, can you just outline a little bit for me? I
may have missed the detail that you gave to Senator Udall. But
what is your hope, in the terms of the transfer and sale of
telecommunications technology into the Cuban marketplace?
Ms. Jacobson. Thank so much, Senator.
Obviously, the regulatory changes are fairly broad in terms
of what can now be sold and provided to Cuba in the
telecommunications and information area. That may be hardware,
whether cell phones or other forms of computers that can now be
sort of not just donated as they could be before but sold to
Cuba--people in Cuba. And it also is services that are
providing information, such as the phone card and phone service
that IDT in New Jersey recently signed a contract with the
Cuban Government to do, or other forms of telecommunications
work.
But I do want to be clear that it is true that all of this
takes a decision by the Cuban Government to move forward with
modernization in their telecom sector. That is, certainly,
true.
American companies can be able to, under our changes,
participate in Cuba, but the Cuban Government has already said
it wants to modernize and said things to the U.N. And we will
have to see if they really take those steps. But we want to be
part of it, if and when they do. We want to encourage them to
do so.
I think as others have said, we think the Cuban people want
that as well.
Senator Markey. I think the more that we have American
tourists down there, the more that we have cultural exchanges,
the more we have students in Cuba, the more normalized to that
extent, it is more likely that the Cuban people--Cuban students
are going to be saying to themselves, why can we not have that
technology?
And it is a resistance, by the way, that existed in our own
country. Our own country did not want to move to the digital
revolution. Our cable and telephone companies did not move to
it. There was not one home that had digital in 1996 in America
until we changed the laws.
We pretty much had to incentivize those companies. We were
going nowhere. Same thing with cell phones, until 1994, it was
the size of a brick and it cost 50 cents a minute, and we did
not have one, ordinary people. Some wealthy businessman, Gordon
Gecko in Wall Street, had one, but not ordinary people.
In 2001, in Africa, only 12 million people had cell phones,
wireless devices. Today it is 800 million.
So we have moved from these devices to these devices very
rapidly in America, but they are doing it in Africa as well.
The more that it insinuates itself into the culture of
individual countries, it changes the culture. It changes the
business relationships. It changes the entrepreneurial spirit
of a country. And we can see it in country after country. It is
not uniform. No question about it, but you can see it. Where it
works, it works big time.
So I think the same thing is going to be true in Cuba. The
more we can move these devices in, and the more the people in
the country demand they have access to it so they are not the
last country in the world without access to modern
technologies, I think we are going to see dramatic telescoping
of the changes that we are hoping that will happen in that
country.
And so of all of the sectors, that is why Radio Marti and
TV Marti were always focused on by the Reagan administration.
They understood the importance of this.
And the openings, which you are talking about here, kind of
puts it in the mind of many Cuban ordinary citizens, why not,
why not us?
So what is the level of negotiation or discussion that is
going on, in terms of these telecommunications technologies?
Who are we speaking to? Who ultimately makes the decision
inside Cuba?
Ms. Jacobson. All right, thank you, Senator.
There are basically two tracks, if you will. One is
government. That is the beginning of conversations with the
Cuban Government about telecommunications. And the other
obviously are many, many private sector conversations with the
Cuban Government, to which we are not a party but we obviously
know about, that they are taking place.
On the government side, we had our Ambassador for
International Communications Policy Danny Sepulveda who was in
Havana about 2 months ago now. That was the first time we had
that kind of conversation with the Cuban Government at an
official level, meeting both with their telecommunications
ministry as well as their telecom provider, which is state-run,
ETECSA, to talk about sort of what kind of infrastructure they
are interested in and how we have done things in the United
States in terms of the regulation and access issues, as well as
obviously many, many United States companies have had
conversations with the Cuban Government. And they are beginning
to think about the solicitations they put out, the request for
proposals, if you will, of their own telecom sector.
Senator Markey. So the quicker we can move them in that
direction, the quicker their whole society changes. It has
happened all over the world. They will not be immune to you.
Thank you both for your great work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Without objection, I would like to enter into the record on
behalf of Senator Rubio a letter to him dated February 18 from
the U.S. Coast Guard. And if there is no objection, I will put
it into the record.
[Editor's note.--The letter mentioned above can be found in the
``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section at the
end of this hearing.]
The Chairman. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to clarify a few issues. Again, we talk about
telecommunications and say the Cuban Government may not allow
this, and it is up to them, and we cannot control them, and
they may not allow it. That is true. They will allow what they
will allow.
But we have had a policy for decades that has not yielded
the results we want. The question is not this policy or a
policy in a perfect world. It is this policy compared to the
nonengagement that we had before. And we know what
nonengagement has yielded.
The Cuban Government may or may not keep their promise to
make sure that 50 percent of the Cuban people are wired by a
certain time. We have no control of that.
We have control of what is in our national interest. And I
think it is more likely that it will occur than under the
former policy we had.
Also, with regard to a statement made that whenever an
American traveler goes to Cuba, every dollar ends up with the
Cuban Government, that simply is not the case. That may be said
by those who have not traveled to Cuba recently. But many
Americans travel to Cuba.
And it is true that you cannot travel to Cuba without some
revenue going to government. That is certain. But the notion
that every dollar spent ends up in the hands of Cuban military
simply is not the case.
You have burgeoning entrepreneurship in Cuba that is a
testimony to the fact that some money does flow to ordinary
Cuban people. That has been particularly the case with the
travel of Cuban-Americans over the past couple of years.
I should mention that when that policy was announced a
couple of years ago, that Cuban-Americans could travel not just
once every 3 years but as often as they like, and remittance
levels were increased, there was talk here in Congress about
reversing that. ``You cannot have that. That is not good for
the Cuban people. It is not good for America.''
I can tell you there is no serious talk today about
reversing that, because why? Because when Americans get more
freedom, we tend to enjoy that and we tend to want more. And I
would suggest that a year from now, the notion that we would
reverse this policy that has allowed more Americans to travel
to Cuba and to help Cuban people have access to more
technology, more capital, more values, more contact with
Americans, will seem as absurd as reversing the changes that
were made with Cuban-American travel just a couple of years
ago.
So again, I applaud you for what you are doing, and I look
forward to working with the administration as this policy
unfolds.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask you, when a Cuban-American sends or visits their
relatives in Cuba and gives them a little money, the only place
really to buy something is the dollar store, is that not true?
If you want to get something?
Ms. Jacobson. I believe, certainly, there is more in those
stores to buy.
Senator Menendez. By the way, who owns the dollar stores?
Ms. Jacobson. They are state-run.
Senator Menendez. Okay. The government.
And so if I want to send a remittance to my relative in
Cuba, the Cuban Government takes a slice, right?
Ms. Jacobson. They do but your relatives probably want
their part of that anyway.
Senator Menendez. But the Cuban Government gets a slice.
Ms. Jacobson. Yes.
Senator Menendez. So let us not deny that the Cuban
Government is greatly enriched by all these resources, which is
why it has been its number one foreign policy objective.
Now let us talk about what full diplomatic relations are.
You are going to be having this discussion tomorrow, as I
understand it, what my colleague Senator Markey said,
normalized relations are.
After the Summit of the Americas, the Washington Post ran a
story suggesting that the talks to restore diplomatic relations
were hung up because the Castro regime was unwilling to grant
unrestricted travel to our diplomats, unwilling to allow us to
send secure shipments to a future embassy, unwilling to allow
us to have the number of staff necessary to operate a future
embassy, and unwilling to remove the military presence around a
future embassy.
So let me ask you, would the State Department actually to
agree to establish an embassy in Havana if all of our diplomats
are not able to travel freely throughout Cuba?
Ms. Jacobson. Senator, what I can tell you is that we have
to have an embassy where our diplomats can get out and travel
and see the country and talk to people. We have restrictions on
the way our embassy personnel travel, in terms of notification
to governments, in many countries around the world that range
from 24 hours to 10 days.
So we are going to do everything possible to make sure that
we have the least restrictions possible but our embassy
officials----
Senator Menendez. So we will accept restrictions that all
of our diplomats at embassy would be able to travel throughout
the country?
Ms. Jacobson. We will make sure that the embassy is on a
par with the way we operate in other places that are
restrictive environments.
Senator Menendez. Would you agree to conditions under which
we cannot send secure shipments to supply a future embassy
without the regime rifling through them?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, Senator, I am not going to necessarily
layout all of the negotiations for tomorrow here.
Senator Menendez. Why not? Wait a minute.
Ms. Jacobson. Senator, no, let me----
Senator Menendez. Are these negotiations secret or do we
not have, the United States Congress, have the right to
understand how you are trying to establish diplomatic
relations?
Ms. Jacobson. You absolutely do.
Senator Menendez. I think the Nation needs to know under
what conditions we are going to have or not have relationships.
Ms. Jacobson. You absolutely do.
Senator Menendez. So are you going to allow the Cubans to
rifle through your diplomatic pouches with impunity or are
going to insist you can send anything to the embassy, as we do
in other places in the world? That is a simple yes or no.
Ms. Jacobson. We absolutely believe in the viability of the
diplomatic pouch. We also believe that it is critical to
resupply a future embassy, as we believe it is important to
supply the building now that has maintenance and upkeep issues.
So that is a critical part of our discussion.
Senator Menendez. So will you accept conditions less than
that?
Ms. Jacobson. We will not accept conditions in which we
cannot securely supply our facilities. We have to be able----
Senator Menendez. Would you agree to open an embassy if you
are not granted the number of staff you need to operate it
efficiently?
Ms. Jacobson. Not if we cannot have the number of staff we
believe we need, no.
Senator Menendez. Are you willing to open an embassy if the
Castro regime does not remove its military cordon from around
the building, which basically is a way to intimidate average
Cubans from approaching our facility?
Ms. Jacobson. We will not open an embassy unless we believe
that the security outside the embassy is appropriate to protect
our installation, but we will also make sure that it is
welcoming of Cubans into the installation as an embassy, the
way we do around the world.
Senator Menendez. Let me ask you, you agreed with me
ultimately that the Castro regime statement as it relates to
that they have never supported, never supported, any act of
international terrorism is not true. So if you agree that these
statements by the Castro regime are categorically false, how
can you explain to the committee why you would think you can
believe any assurances about the regime's current or future
conduct, if they bald-face lied in the first place?
Ms. Jacobson. What I would say, Senator, is that what we
were looking at in the assurances is not necessarily whether or
not their assertions on behalf of all recorded history for the
Cuban Government, we agree with every statement of the past.
What we have to look at is what the requirements are under the
law, which talk about the rejection of international terrorism,
which they have made, and the lack of support or any evidence
for support for international terrorism.
Senator Menendez. So they can partially lie to you, but not
fully lie.
Ms. Jacobson. Senator, we have differences in what they do
not believe they have ever supported international terrorism.
Senator Menendez. But they sent you a letter and the State
Department quoted that specific section, which basically means
you buy into it. It is incredible to believe that that section
of the letter you buy into.
Let me ask you this, the Red Cross under the President's
December 17 announcement was supposed to have access to Cuban
jails. Has that taken place?
Ms. Jacobson. We did not say the Red Cross would have
access to jails.
Senator Menendez. You announced that they would have--I
understand it was access to Cuban jails. What is it that they
have access to?
Ms. Jacobson. I do not believe we ever said that the Cubans
had agreed to that. What we said was that we were hoping that
international organizations would renew their discussions with
the Cuban Government about those issues, including the Red
Cross and U.N. In other words, we----
Senator Menendez. Has the Red Cross been able to get in
freely?
Ms. Jacobson. Not that I know.
Senator Menendez. Not that you know of. Okay.
Last question, we talk about telecom access. A lot has been
discussed here about that. In late February, the First Vice
President Miguel Diaz-Canel, who Senator Boxer referred to as
it looks like he would be the next heir in an election.
First of all, there is no election in 2018. It is a
selection. There is no election. Can we agree on that?
Ms. Jacobson. We can agree that what the Cuban Government
calls an election is not what we believe meets international
standards.
Senator Menendez. It is the Cuban Communist Party, and that
is it. So it is not an election. I do not want to anybody to
think we are working on an election in 2018.
He gave a long, rambling speech, he is the second highest
official in the Cuban Government, about the Internet in Cuba.
One of the most revealing statements was the affirmation that
the regime's Internet strategy would be led by the Communist
Party.
Given the Communist Party's half-century long effort to
deprive the Cuban people of the most minimal standards of
freedom of the press and of information, would you have the
committee believe that the Communist Party will not make every
possible effort to block access to all content that it deems
undesirable, similar to what we have seen in other closed
societies around the world?
Ms. Jacobson. Senator, what I know is that when more people
have access to the Internet, even if governments try to prevent
them seeing things they do not want them to, they are
remarkably inventive in finding ways to do so.
Senator Menendez. Okay, good.
Then let me ask you this. Can we have your assurances that
the State Department and the United States Government will take
all possible steps to ensure that the Cuban people have access
to circumnavigation technologies that would be able to get
around regime censorship?
If we are going to say we want United States companies to
go develop this infrastructure in Cuba, surely we can have
circumvention technologies so that the Cuban people are truly
free to go see any site they want, not only that which the
regime want them to see.
Ms. Jacobson. Certainly, I hope that the majority and vast
majority or all of the Cuban people will be able to have
complete access to the Internet. What I cannot----
Senator Menendez. Hope is not a policy achievement.
I am asking you, if we are going to license companies under
the Libertad Act to go ahead and put infrastructure in Cuba,
can we not make a condition of that license that they have
circumnavigation technologies so Senator Flake and Senator
Udall and Senator Markey and everybody who wants access to the
Internet for the Cuban people, which I also want, we are in
common cause on that, actually can get access to the Internet?
What is so difficult about insisting on circumvention
technology?
Ms. Jacobson. I do not know that we can do that, but I also
know----
Senator Menendez. We can put any condition we want as a
condition of sale.
Ms. Jacobson [continuing]. I also----
Senator Menendez. I wrote that section of law when I was in
House of Representatives.
Ms. Jacobson. I understand.
Senator Menendez. I know what it says, and you can put
conditions on it. I hope to hear back from you whether you will
insist on that as an ability to have U.S. companies--if we want
access for the Cuban people to have the Internet, which I do.
Ms. Jacobson. I do as well, Senator, but I also want them
to be able to have those deals go through and to make it the
most effective way that more on the island can have access----
Senator Menendez. A deal without full access to the
Internet is a deal is----
Ms. Jacobson. More than they have now.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. A deal to an end without
access to the critical information that we think can help
liberate the Cuban people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Any other questions?
I want to thank the committee again. I know there are a lot
of diverse views about this proposed new policy, actually a
policy that is being implemented.
And I want to thank the witnesses for being here. If you
would, the record will be open, without objection, until the
close of business Thursday. If you would answer promptly, we
would appreciate it.
The Chairman. We thank you for your service to our country.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator Barbara Boxer,
U.S. Senator From California
Chairman Corker, Senator Cardin--thank you for holding this
important hearing.
I would also like to extend a warm welcome to our distinguished
witnesses. Thank you both for your service to our country.
Five months ago, President Obama announced that the United States
would begin the process of normalizing relations with Cuba.
This historic decision rejects the failed sanctions policy of the
past 50 years and opens a new chapter in U.S.-Cuban relations that
provides an opportunity for dialogue and constructive engagement with
the Cuban government and, most importantly, the Cuban people.
We are already beginning to see the positive effects of this policy
change.
It has reinvigorated U.S. leadership in Latin America and
improved U.S. relations with countries in the region, which had
been strained by our unilateral sanctions policy.
It has allowed the United States to expand direct support to
the Cuban people by increasing the amount of remittances that
can be sent to Cuban individuals and organizations, easing
restrictions on travel, expanding exports of goods and services
to empower Cuban entrepreneurs and small farmers, and improving
telecommunications and Internet services.
It has led to increased communication between the United
States and Cuban governments on areas of mutual interest
including migration, environmental protection, and law
enforcement cooperation.
It has opened up new opportunities for American businesses
in Cuba.
Tomorrow, Assistant Secretary Jacobson will host a delegation of
Cuban officials in Washington, DC, to continue discussions on the
normalization of ties between our two nations. President Obama's
decision to rescind Cuba's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
after a comprehensive technical review is an important step forward in
this effort.
As we continue to pursue this new policy of engagement with Cuba,
we all know there are many issues that will not be resolved overnight--
including the Cuban Government's abysmal human rights record. And we
will continue to press Cuban leaders on these matters.
But, I agree with President Obama that America's interests and the
interests of the Cuban people are best served by dialogue and
engagement, not isolation.
______
Written Statement of Alan P. Gross Submitted for the Record
by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to submit this brief statement
for the record. Some phenomena occurring in Cuba right now are acutely
apropos to these proceedings. This committee should be aware of some
tangible outcomes directly correlated with U.S.-Cuba policy decisions
made since 2009, beginning with President Obama's Executive order that
eased restrictions on remittances to Cuba. The following is an
approximate sequencing of resultant events:
1. U.S. eases restrictions on remittances from Cuban-Americans to
family members living in Cuba, as well as nonfamily remittances.
2. Cuban Government eases some restrictions on private sector
development; expresses need to reduce the number of Cuban workers
employed in the public sector in order to reduce government deficit.
3. U.S. remittances to Cuba increase.
4. Remittances are used to finance private sector business
development in Cuba. Thousands of private, nongovernment businesses
start up.
5. Cuban Government allows private sector to employ nonfamily
members.
6. More than 500,000 workers are employed in Cuba's private sector
by the end of 2014, representing nearly 11 percent of Cuba's total
workforce.
These changes in Cuba are not anecdotal. In a relatively short
period of time (compared to over five decades of economic sanctions)
positive and constructive shifts in U.S. policy toward Cuba have led to
notable and meaningful changes for the Cuban people. These changes are
completely consistent with U.S. interests and development objectives
worldwide, particularly involving private sector development and growth
and employment generation.
As the members of the committee know, I recently concluded 5 years
of imprisonment in Cuba due to my participation in a USAID-sponsored
program authorized and funded pursuant to the Helms-Burton Act. Prior
to my incarceration, I spent over 30 years working in over 50 countries
to bring about positive change through development programs funded by
private sector clients. These included Fortune 100 companies, USAID and
other international financial and development institutions. For the
last 15 years much of my work involved increasing the availability of
information access to populations around the world. Indeed, this was
the fundamental purpose of the project in Cuba for which I was
ultimately forced to forfeit 5 years of my life.
The principal theme throughout most of my international career has
been export and investment development as an engine of vital and
vibrant economic growth. Consequently, the primary focus of my overseas
work has been private sector development and growth. And with the
advent of new, user-friendly information and communications
technologies prospects of closer linkages between producers, consumers
and the global marketplace have been greatly enhanced.
Export and investment development in emerging markets is important
to U.S. interests. In many ways U.S. foreign policy implemented through
international development work not only serves to improve emerging
market business, social and political environments, it simultaneously
serves as a form of market development for U.S. producers and exporters
as these markets emerge.
I fully support what the President is doing to meaningfully improve
international relations, particularly with Cuba. My 5 years in Cuba did
not deter me from wanting to bring about positive change through
development and constructive engagement. To the contrary, I believe
more strongly than ever that the President's decisive first steps need
to be followed by decisive congressional action, including repealing
Helms-Burton and related statutes.
My beliefs are not based only on the last 5 years, but also over 30
years of international development experience in more than 50
countries. However, my beliefs are not as relevant as the evidence of
change on the ground in Cuba that followed the Executive order. And
while I am totally and personally cognizant of the Cuban Government's
repressive human rights record, I am also experientially (not
experimentally) cognizant that improved personal economic security is
essential to empowering people--including Cubanos--and that such
empowerment is a critical step toward improved living conditions
overall.
If we all want to move forward with Cuba, we cannot be looking
back. It is in our own interests, as well as the interests of the Cuban
people, to move forward together.
______
Daily Beast Article Submitted for the Record by Senator Robert Menendez
[From the Daily Beast, May 15, 2015]
Cuba's 12 Most Absurd Prohibitions That Tourists May Never Notice
It's getting easier to go to Cuba, but not necessarily to live
there. Sometimes it's the little things that make you crazy. But, then,
there are big things, too.
HAVANA--Here's a list of the 12 most absurd prohibitions and
limitations that we Cubans have to endure in our homeland. It is worth
highlighting that the socialist Government of Cuba applies some of them
exclusively to Cuban citizens, while foreign residents and tourists do
not suffer from the bans. A curious double standard, no? And worth
remembering if you are planning a visit and discover your new Cuban
friends can't join you in the fun.
1--Cubans can't access the Internet from their homes or on their
cellphones. ETECSA is the Cuban state-owned telecommunications
monopoly. According to its policy, Internet access in private homes is
not a service provided to Cuban citizens. It is exclusively provided to
state-owned and foreign businesses, and to foreigners residing in the
country, as its website makes clear.
2--No sailing on tourist boats. There is not an actual law that
forbids Cubans getting on boats and ships, but authorities have applied
this restriction for many years. According to Cubatur (a state travel
agent) ``Cubans--no matter where they live--may not be sold a tourist
package that includes a catamaran or a yacht. This enjoyment is
exclusive to foreign tourists.''
3--No cable TV. The socialist firm Telecable is the only one that
provides cable TV. This service is exclusive to the tourist
infrastructure (mainly hotels), diplomats, foreign companies, and
foreigners residing in Cuba. Telecable offers a selection of
international channels such as CNN, Discovery, HBO, ESPN . . .
The Cuban population, for no other reason than being Cuban, cannot
access this service and can only consume national state-owned TV
channels and Telesur (a socialist Latin American channel).
4--Can't live in Havana (without a permit). Can someone from L.A.
live in Washington, D.C.? The answer is obvious. But in Cuba, can
someone from Bayamo live in Havana? The answer is NO, unless he or she
has a permit. The Decree-Law 217-1997 on ``Internal migrations
regarding the city of Havana'' dictates that people from other
provinces may not live in the capital without a ``transitory''
document; that is, an authorization issued by the Ministry of the
Interior. This violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which says, ``Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.'' Not here.
5--No public demonstrations allowed. The Constitution of Cuba
(1976) recognizes the right to demonstrate under certain regulations
while the Penal Code, in its article 209, warns that ``he who
participates in meetings or demonstrations celebrated without
respecting the dispositions that regulate this right, is committing a
felony against public order.'' But in the 39 years that have gone by
since 1976, no law has been adopted to regulate the right to
demonstrate in Cuba. It's a Catch-22. Not to belabor the point,
``Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association,'' according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
6--No Political Parties allowed (except the Partido Comunista de
Cuba). Even though the Cuban Constitution permits all citizens to run
in public elections, our magna carta also mentions in its article 62
that, ``None of the recognized freedoms of citizenship may be executed
against the Constitution, the laws or the existence or ends of the
socialist State, nor the decision of the Cuban people to build
socialism and communism. Violating this principle will be punished.''
The Constitution also declares that, ``The Communist Party of Cuba
. . . the organized vanguard of the Cuban nation, is the superior
managing force of society and the state, organizing and guiding the
common efforts towards the high ends of the construction of socialism
and advances towards the communist society.'' Therefore one can infer
that any political party that is not the Communist Party is forbidden.
7--No investment in medium and large enterprises. Law 188 on
foreign investment regulates investments in Cuba by foreign individuals
and legal entities, as well as by Cuban legal entities that partner
with a foreign party with the objective of investing in Cuba. There is
no mention of Cuban individuals or their right to invest in Cuba. The
only possibility for a Cuban individual who wants to engage in private
economic activity is to become ``self-employed,'' but in this case he
or she is only allowed to work in one of the professions authorized by
the government (such as restaurants, hair dresser, food vendor on the
street, lumberjack, masseur, public toilet security, etc.)
The Cuban police are allowed to fine or even confiscate the vehicle
of a Cuban citizen if he or she gives a ride to a foreigner.
8--Can't import wireless microphones, walkie-talkies and satellite
communication devices without authorization. Resolution 10-2006 states
in its second section that a person who wishes to import wireless
microphones, walkie-talkies and satellite communication devices ``needs
a specific authorization to introduce the equipment into the country
and a license for its installation, exploitation and functioning, both
issued by the Supervision and Control Agency of the Ministry of
Information of Communications.'' And, in case you are getting your
hopes up, it clarifies ``requesting the authorization does not
necessarily imply that it will be granted.''
9--No inviting a foreigner to spend the night without a permit. If
the police or migratory authorities catch a foreigner sleeping without
authorization in the home of a Cuban, the owner of the house may face a
severe fine.
10--Freely selling lobster and shrimps is not allowed. Only the
state and foreigners can sell these delicacies in this Caribbean
nation.
11--If you pick up a foreigner in a private car you may be in
trouble. The Cuban police are allowed to fine or even confiscate the
vehicle of a Cuban citizen if he or she gives a ride to a foreigner
without a taxi license. There is no explicit law that forbids it, but a
foreigner in a car privately owned by a Cuban (there are not that many,
most cars are state-owned) might be interpreted as ``illicit
enrichment.''
12--Bringing from abroad 25 artificial fingernails violates the
law. The Cuban Customs Law establishes exhaustively detailed limits on
the goods that can be imported from abroad into the island. Sometimes
these are ridiculous, especially for items that cannot be found in the
country. Customs Resolution 206 specifically limits the number of
artificial nails to 24 units.
Of course, there are more--many more--bans and prohibitions that
Cuba imposes on Cuba. This was just a taste.
______
Two Letters to Marco Rubio Submitted for the Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Responses of Roberta S. Jacobson and Thomas A. Shannon to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Since President Obama's December 17 announcement to
establish ties with the Castro government, there has been an increase
in the number of Cubans risking their lives to reach freedom in the
United States; well over 2,000 political arrests; a dramatic increase
in weekly violence against democracy activists, such as The Ladies in
White; new long-term political prisoners, such as Cuban artist Danilo
Maldonado ``El Sexto'' and rapper Maikel Oksobo (known as ``El
Dkano''); the beatings and rearrest of most of the 53 political
prisoners who were released as part of the December 17th agreement;
violence employed against Cuban democracy activists even outside the
island, such as the nefarious attacks that took place at the Panama
summit; and Cuban activists who have been barred from leaving the
island, like artist Tania Bruguera and democracy leader Antonio
Rodiles.
We've also heard multiple anecdotes from Cuban democracy leaders
and political prisoners who have told us that during the beatings and
attacks against them now, they are mocked with comments, such as ``this
one is courtesy of Obama'' and ``the United States doesn't care about
you.''
Meanwhile, Cuban dictator Raul Castro has since been named for the
first time as one of Time's 100 Most Influential People, while foreign
dignitaries, such as France's President, and the Japanese and Dutch
Foreign Ministers, visit and fawn over Fidel and Raul Castro in Havana,
but ignore Cuba's dissident leaders.
Do these trends, which are obviously aiding the Cuban
regime, while undermining the Cuban democracy movement, concern
you?
Are you concerned that the Cuban regime is interpreting
President Obama's engagement and unilateral concessions as a
carte blanche for its repressive tactics?
Has the State Department communicated to the Cuban regime
any potential consequences for its continued repressive
behavior?
Answer. We share your deep concern about the Cuban Government's
continued use of politically motivated detentions, at times with
violence, to prevent Cubans from exercising their rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and expression. The Department is constantly
monitoring human rights in Cuba, speaking out to defend our values, and
consulting with other countries. Human rights are central to our
discussions with the Cuban Government and we continue to press for
greater respect of fundamental freedoms and an end to these practices
in our conversations with the Cuban Government.
Our updated approach is designed to advance human rights over time
by empowering the Cuban people. We have no illusions about the
intention of the Cuban Government to maintain tight political controls,
and we continue to monitor reports of arrests of human rights
activists. We want to work closely with Congress on such arrests and on
bringing positive change on human rights in Cuba in general. We are
convinced that, through a policy of sustained engagement, we can more
effectively stand up for our values and help the Cuban people help
themselves.
Question. Ms. Jacobson, a senior State Department official told
reporters yesterday that, ``democracy programs . . . have changed over
time, and they will continue to change over time to reflect a reality,
whether that reality is on the ground in Cuba or in the United
States.'' This statement was in regards to a question involving Raul
Castro's complaints against these programs, which is apparently another
precondition it has placed for the establishment of diplomatic
relations, in particular the training of independent journalists, which
he called ``illegal activities.''
Do you believe that independent journalism is an ``illegal
activity''?
Are you cognizant that U.S. democracy programs toward Cuba
are codified in law?
Have you agreed to adjust these programs, despite their
codification in law, during your negotiations with the Castro
regime?
Will a potential U.S. Embassy in Cuba continue to execute
these democracy programs, as required by law, including the
training of independent journalists?
Answer. We believe that neither independent journalism nor U.S.
Government training exposing Cubans to how individuals in democratic
societies exercise freedom of speech are ``illegal activities.''
Current Cuban laws criminalizing independent journalism undermine human
rights contrary to Cuba's international human rights commitments. The
work of a free and independent media is essential to a democratic
society. And our training falls clearly within the scope of permissible
diplomatic activity under international law.
As Assistant Secretary Malinowski testified before the Senate
Foreign Affairs Committee in February, we will continue to conduct
programs that promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
such as freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly in
Cuba, just as we do for 95 countries around the world. The
administration requested $20 million in Economic Support Funds for FY16
to support the promotion of democracy and human rights in Cuba.
The Cuban Government likely will continue to object to some of our
programs. But as stated in my testimony on February 3, ``We will
continue to use funds appropriated by Congress to support the exercise
of political and civil liberties in Cuba, facilitate the free flow of
information, and provide humanitarian assistance.'' As President Obama
said in April at the Summit of the Americas, ``we are not going to stop
talking about issues like democracy and human rights and freedom of
assembly and freedom of the press.''
Question. Media reports indicate that negotiations regarding the
establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and
Cuba are being stalled by the Castro regime's refusal to allow U.S.
diplomats to move around freely on the island. The Castro regime also
does not want to allow U.S. diplomats the secure passage of supplies
and materials to upgrade our diplomatic mission. Moreover, the Cuban
regime places a heavy security cordon around the U.S. Interests Section
in Havana, in order to vet, harass, and intimidate any Cuban (or anyone
else for that matter) that wants to approach the diplomatic mission.
This is unprecedented in any U.S. Embassy throughout the world. And to
add insult to injury, last week Raul Castro complained about the
``illegal activities'' the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, such as
``the training of independent journalists.'' That was verbatim.
Do you believe training independent journalists is an
``illegal activity''? Will you commit that the U.S. mission in
Havana will continue training independent journalists and
supporting democracy efforts on the island?
Will you commit that the United States will not accept any
restrictions on the movement of U.S. diplomats anywhere in Cuba
as a precondition for establishing diplomatic relations?
Will you commit that the U.S. will not establish diplomatic
relations, so long as the Cuban regime insists on maintaining
its security cordon around our diplomatic facility?
Answer. The United States continuously works to promote freedom of
expression around the world through bilateral engagement, public
diplomacy programming, and multilateral diplomacy. This includes
support for independent journalism, particularly in closed countries
where press freedom is lacking or independent journalists are under
threat. We do not view independent journalism in Cuba or our training
programs as ``illegal activities.''
The United States will continue promoting respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms such as freedoms of expression, association,
and peaceful assembly in Cuba, just as we do for 95 countries around
the world.
We are making steady progress in our discussions with the Cuban
Government on certain operational issues to ensure our Embassy, once
reopened, will be able to carry out the necessary functions to
facilitate this evolving U.S.-Cuba relationship as well as service the
thousands of U.S. citizens visiting Cuba every year to see relatives
and engage in other authorized activities. These operational issues
include those relating to travel restrictions on U.S. diplomats,
controls on access by visitors to the U.S. facility, and limitations on
diplomatic staffing.
The future U.S. embassy will continue engaging with all Cubans,
including those promoting the realization of universal human rights.
Question. Assistant Secretary Jacobson, you stated in an answer to
a question for the record to this committee that ``the reestablishment
of diplomatic relations, including reopening our Embassy in Havana,
will allow us to more effectively represent U.S. interests, including
property claims, fugitives, human rights, and needed political reforms
and increase our engagement with the Cuban people. We will continue to
condemn any example of Cuban Government-sponsored harassment, use of
violence, or arbitrary detention of Cuban citizens peaceably exercising
their freedoms of expression and association. We proposed to the Cubans
starting discussions of outstanding claims, in the event we reestablish
diplomatic relations. On the issue of fugitives, the Department
repeatedly raises fugitive cases with the Cuban Government and will
continue to do so at every appropriate opportunity. We raised several
cases with the Cubans when we met with them January 22.''
Since you last raised these issues with the Government of
Cuba, what progress has been made with regards to the
discussions leading to the return of fugitives Joanne Chesimard
and William Morales to justice; and the unresolved U.S.
certified claims which total $8 billion?
Answer. The Cuban Government has agreed to enter into a law
enforcement dialogue with the United States that will include
discussions with the aim of resolving outstanding fugitive cases. We
believe that this is the best method for addressing these cases.
We also proposed discussions of outstanding claims to the Cubans,
following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. The Cuban
Government has agreed in principle to discuss this issue. Although
reaching agreement on the resolution of outstanding claims is often a
lengthy process, the Department is strongly committed to advancing this
effort.
Question. In a QFR response from the February 3rd hearing on Cuba,
you stated that there were no plans to alter the existing lease
agreement for the Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay. Additionally,
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter wrote in a letter dated February 6,
2015, that ``There are no plans to close Guantanamo Naval Station.''
I would like to enter into the record a letter from Admiral Paul F.
Zukunft the Commandant of the Coast Guard from February 18, 2015. In
this letter, he writes about GTMO: ``Its strategic location, airfield,
moorings, logistics capabilities, and migrant processing facilities
make Naval Station GTMO an indispensable resource for steady-state and
surge events.''
But just yesterday a senior State Department official was quoted as
saying that ``I can't say what the future may bring on this (Guantanamo
Bay), but it's not on the table right now, and I don't know that
there's a reason to justify having it or not having it.''
Can you clarify the statement by the senior official in
your Department with regards to any future talks on Guantanamo
Bay?
Are there any circumstances in which the administration
would modify the lease or status of Guantanamo Bay?
Can you guarantee to this committee that Simon Trinidad
will not be released from U.S. custody as part of Colombia's
negotiations with the FARC?
Answer. We have no intention at present to alter the existing lease
treaty and other arrangements related to the Naval Station at
Guantanamo Bay or to discuss the issue of the Naval Station with the
Cuban Government.
Colombian officials have raised with us a variety of peace process
issues relevant to U.S. interests. Simon Trinidad has been convicted of
serious crimes against U.S. citizens and is serving his sentence in a
U.S. prison. We have made clear to the Colombian Government that his
release is not a matter that we are prepared to discuss.
Question. Assistant Secretary Jacobson, in negotiating a settlement
agreement for claims, such as American certified claims against Cuba
that are worth close to $8 billion, each country gives the other
something the other wants as an exchange. Historically, in these
situations, the other country settles and pays what is owed to American
claimants in exchange for trade and commerce with the U.S. market. Each
settlement process is unique, but one thing is clear, we do not grant
concessions for nothing.
Libya paid the U.S. claimants before they were removed from the
state sponsor of terrorism list, and allowed to do business with U.S.
oil companies, but they also had to renounce terrorism. Vietnam agreed
to pay the U.S. claimants in exchange for trade and commerce with the
U.S. market. Both of those, as in most settlements agreements, were
done with congressional cooperation.
Frankly, this is one of the most disconcerting matters of these
Cuba talks. Not only are we turning U.S. policy on its head, but we
then appear to be ignoring the primary reason why the sanctions were
imposed in the first place. Why are we not talking about claims issues,
U.S. claims issues? As you know, there are nationals from other
countries that also have claims, and they are seeking compensation as
well. Will U.S. taxpayers be left out or put at a disadvantage in this
process?
How do you see this settlement agreement process working with Cuba,
if your administration appears to be eager to give Cuba everything it
wants without getting them to pay for the property they took? Or do you
plan to just give Cuba things you can, while you can, and leave the
real claim settlement negotiations for the next administration to deal
with?
Is your Bureau responding to title IV investigation requests, if
not, why not? Do you need more money for policing and enforcement and
how can we loop in the Treasury Department on these matters, including
the Office of Foreign Assets Control as well as the Bureau of Industry
and Security at Commerce?
Answer. The Department is committed to pursuing a resolution of
outstanding claims against the Cuban Government. We expect that a
discussion of property claims will follow in the months after
diplomatic relations are reestablished. In January, we proposed and the
Cuban Government agreed to discuss pending claims following the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Although reaching agreement
resolving outstanding claims likely will be a complex and lengthy
process, it will nevertheless be greatly facilitated by having better-
developed diplomatic ties.
With respect to title IV of the LIBERTAD Act, there are a number of
factors necessary for a determination that trafficking in confiscated
property has taken or is taking place for purposes of this provision.
The Department continues to review potential cases and respond in
accordance with the statute.
Question. On February 28, 2015, a Chinese-flagged vessel, the Da
Dan Xia, was intercepted in Cartagena, Colombia, carrying 15 containers
of heavy weaponry hidden as a grain shipment. It consisted of 100 tons
of explosives, 2.6 million detonators, 99 projectile heads and around
3,000 artillery shells. The containers marked that they originated from
Norinco, a Chinese arms manufacturer, on behalf of Tecnoimport, a
shadow company of the Cuban military.
This is the second time in 18 months that the Cuban military has
been caught smuggling weapons internationally. As you are surely aware,
last year Cuba was found in breach of international sanctions for
attempting to smuggle 240 tons of weapons to North Korea. Both of these
shipments, with false manifests, also threatened the safety and
integrity of the Panama Canal.
Do you find this weapons smuggling by the Cuban military a
concerning trend? If so, why hasn't the State Department made
any statements about this latest incident?
According to media reports, the Colombian Government will
not disclose what the vessel was supposed to unload in
Cartagena and Barranquilla, its two scheduled stops before
Havana. Has the State Department looked into whether these
weapons may have actually been intended for FARC
narcoterrorists or other rogue groups, particularly as
President Obama was preparing to remove Cuba from the State
Sponsors of Terrorism list?
If weapons sales between China and Cuba are otherwise not
sanctioned internationally, why do you think they went to such
great lengths to hide this shipment?
Despite these two recent incidents to deceive the
international community, the Obama administration was still
willing to accept--as part of the ``assurances'' given in its
rescission memo to remove Cuba from the State Sponsors of
Terrorism list--that the Castro regime has ``never'' supported
terrorist activities, which we all know is another lie. Do you
think accepting lies is wise?
Answer. We are not aware of any information linking the shipment
contents to the FARC. The Department believes it would be premature to
speculate regarding the outcome of Colombia's investigation of the
Chinese-flagged vessel and its captain, who could be charged under
Colombian law for illegal transport of military materials.
Our review of Cuba's State Sponsor of Terrorism designation focused
on the questions of whether Cuba provided any support for international
terrorism during the previous 6 months, and whether Cuba provided
assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in
the future, consistent with the statutory standard for rescission.
There is no credible evidence that the Government of Cuba has,
within the past 6 months, provided support for international terrorism.
The Government of Cuba provided us with assurances that it will not
support acts of international terrorism in the future, consistent with
the requirements of the relevant statutes.
Question. There are roughly three transition models from communism,
the Chinese model, the Russian model and the East European model. Only
in the last one has there been a break with the past and true
democracy, full civil rights and free markets for their citizens. But
by recognizing the regime of Raul Castro, you have made it easier for
the military/technocratic oligarchy that he has put in place over the
years to move into power once he passes from the scene. They will now
be able to acquire funds more easily and show the population that they
have international support. That would be the Russian model or at best
the Chinese model. Neither of those countries has freedom or democracy.
Is a free and democratic Cuba the goal of this
administration?
Answer. Our enduring objective remains the emergence of a
democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba. The goal of our Cuba policy
has been, and continues to be, to empower the Cuban people to freely
determine their own future. Our updated approach is designed to promote
changes that support Cubans' universal human rights and fundamental
freedoms as well as our other national interests.
Question. The East European countries are also staunch friends of
the United States. Many of them have indeed become defense and economic
treaty allies. That is not true of either China or Russia, or of
Vietnam or Belarus, which continue to be rivals internationally. This
administration has been criticized, rightly in my opinion, for not
treating traditionally U.S. allies well and for coddling our enemies.
Does your administration seek a friendly Cuba that sides
with us internationally, or do you just seek stability in the
region?
Does having a friendly regime that shares our values matter
to this administration?
Answer. The President's 2015 National Security Strategy calls for
``promoting a prosperous, secure, and democratic Western Hemisphere by
expanding integration and leveraging a new opening to Cuba to expand
our engagement.'' Our enduring objective remains the emergence of a
democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba. A stable neighbor 90 miles
from our shores that reflects and upholds the democratic values and
priorities shared by all countries of the Americas is strongly in our
national interest. Our ability to achieve this goal is strengthened by
a policy of proactive engagement, rather than isolation.
Question. The President again and again states that our policy of
not engaging with the Castro dictatorship failed. For decades, Europe,
Latin America and Asia have traded with Cuba and allowed people to
freely travel there.
Couldn't we say that their approach failed, too?
Answer. Our enduring objective remains the emergence of a
democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba that respects internationally
recognized human rights. We are convinced that, through a policy of
engagement, we can do more to effectively promote our interests and
values in collaboration with other international partners, thereby
helping the Cuban people begin to enjoy more independence from the
Cuban state.
Cuba is undergoing important changes to its economic, social, and
leadership landscape, allowing for more options for economic autonomy,
loosened restrictions on travel, greater connectivity with the rest of
the world, and generational changes to top leadership. Our policy aims
to empower the Cuban people to take advantage of these changes--as well
as those yet to come--to determine their own future. The President's
new approach makes clear that the United States can no longer be blamed
as an obstacle to progress on issues that are important to the Cuban
people.
Over time, our policy can be judged in terms of its success in
empowering the Cuban people to determine freely their own future,
including respect for universal human rights, greater political space
to express dissent, democratic accountability, and access to
information.
Question. The State Department bureaucracy tried to stop President
Reagan's Brandenburg speech in 1987, in which he called for Mikhail
Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall. State Department officials even
called it ``a mediocre speech'' and a ``wasted opportunity'' and tried
to edit out the reference to the wall. Earlier, in 1983, State also
thought the speech in which the President called the Soviet Union ``an
evil empire'' to be needlessly provocative. Yet, dissidents behind the
Iron Curtain, and especially those in the Gulag, took special comfort
in knowing that America's leaders were on their side. Natan Sharansky,
in the Gulag at the time, said later, ``This was the moment. It was the
brightest, most glorious day. Finally a spade had been called a
spade.''
Would you characterize the nature of the Castro regime for
us here, and call on him to free the Cuban people?
Would you ask the President to do so, in a public manner,
without caveats?
Answer. Our annual Human Rights Report has for years characterized
Cuba as an ``authoritarian state,'' and has detailed Cuba's lack of
respect for political and civil rights.
The administration fully recognizes, and has stated so publically
on numerous occasions, that the Cuban people have long been deprived of
the fundamental freedoms that they deserve. With this in mind, the
fundamental goal of our policy is to advance a Cuba that is democratic,
prosperous, well-governed, and responsive to the rights of its
citizens. As President Obama said at the Summit of the Americas in
April with respect to Cuba, ``Our governments will continue to have
differences and the United States will continue to stand firmly for
universal values and human rights.''
______
Responses of Roberta S. Jacobson and Thomas A. Shannon to Questions
Submitted by Senator David Perdue
Question. The Castro regime, time and again, has violated
international norms. I fear that President Obama's recent shift in
policy toward Cuba is sending the wrong message about our democratic
values as a nation. Cuba has a long history of supporting revolutionary
movements and governments in Latin America and Africa.
In 2003, Cuba allowed Iran to operate on their soil to attack U.S.
telecommunications that posed a threat to the Iranian regime's control
and censorship. Cuba is reported to have supplied intelligence services
to Venezuela and its regional allies. Cuba has provided assistance and
safe haven to terrorists, including members of the FARC and the Basque
ETA. And, they continue to harbor fugitives wanted in the United
States--including a fugitive listed on the FBI's ``Most Wanted
Terrorists'' list. The Cuban Government provides these fugitives with
support such as housing, food ration books, and medical care.
A Cuban state-owned enterprise provided Venezuela with advanced
technology that it used to provide passports, visas, and other
documentation to 173 individuals from the Middle East between 2008 and
2012. Twice in the past 18 months--most recently this February--Cuba
has been involved in arms smuggling that's directly in violation of
international sanctions. Cuban officials have reportedly been involved
in the Venezuelan Government's recent crackdown of pro-democracy
demonstrators.
And since President Obama began his secret negotiations with the
Castro regime in June 2013, there have been reportedly 15,000 political
arrests. There have been 2,500 such arrests since the President's
speech on U.S.-Cuban relations in December.
In fact, between February and March of this year, Cuba has
increased the number of politically motivated arrests by 70 percent.
How can you prove that Cuba will stop this type of
behavior? How can you prove that Cuba has stopped supporting
terrorism?
Answer. The Department's analysis for State Sponsor of Terrorism
(SST) rescission does not imply that we agree on everything with Cuba
or dispute the fact the Cuban Government engages in repressive or
authoritarian activities. Our new approach is not about what the Cuban
Government would do for us, but rather what we can do for the Cuban and
American people.
In our review of Cuba's SST designation, we focused on the question
of whether Cuba provided any support for international terrorism during
the 6 months prior to providing the statutorily required report to
Congress. During that time we had no credible information that Cuba
supported international terrorism.
We also obtained the required assurances from the Cuban Government
that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future,
consistent with the relevant statutes.
We will continuously monitor available information to determine
whether it has resumed support for international terrorism and whether
an SST designation might be appropriate in the future, consistent with
the statutory standard.
Question. What makes you think, that if we normalize relations with
Cuba, that their behavior will change?
Answer. Our previous approach to relations with Cuba over a half
century, though rooted in the best of intentions, failed to empower the
Cuban people and isolated us from our democratic partners in this
hemisphere and around the world. The Cuban Government used this policy
as a rationale for restrictions on its people.
Reestablishing diplomatic relations, which is only the first step
in the long process of normalization, is designed to help empower the
social and economic forces in Cuba that are demanding change and is in
the U.S. national interest. It will give our diplomats increased access
to the Cuban people and will give the Cuban people freer access to our
Interests Section in Havana. Our new approach is not about what the
Cuban Government would do for us, but rather what we can do for the
Cuban and American people. The fundamental goal of our policy is to
advance a Cuba that is democratic, prosperous, and well-governed. We
are convinced that, through a policy of engagement, we can more
effectively promote our interests and values and enable the Cuban
people begin to enjoy more independence from the Cuban state.
Normal diplomatic relations with the Cuban Government will provide
us the opportunity to engage more effectually on a range of important
issues, including human rights. Our discussions with the Cuban
Government will include promoting respect for universal human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
Question. If we do not insist on a demonstrated change in
behavior--encompassing human rights, support for terrorism, and
compliance with arms embargoes--who is really benefiting here? Whose
goals are being met?
Answer. We will not stop insisting on these changes, and we have
not agreed to do so as part of normalization. We believe that
normalization will give us a better platform for expressing these ideas
to the Cuban Government. Moreover, normalization helps take the focus
off U.S. policies and puts it on the Cuban Government's behavior.
Question. On February 28, 2015, a Chinese-flagged vessel, the Da
Dan Xia, was intercepted in Cartagena, Colombia, carrying 15 containers
of heavy weaponry hidden as a grain shipment.
It consisted of 100 tons of explosives, 2.6 million detonators, 99
projectile heads and around 3,000 artillery shells.
The containers marked that they originated from Norinco, a Chinese
arms manufacturer, on behalf of Tecnoimport, a shadow company of the
Cuban military.
This is the second time in 18 months that the Cuban military has
been caught smuggling weapons internationally.
As you are surely aware, last year Cuba was found in breach of
international sanctions for attempting to smuggle 240 tons of weapons
to North Korea.
Both of these shipments, with false manifests, also threatened the
safety and integrity of the Panama Canal.
Do you find this weapons smuggling by the Cuban military a
concerning trend? If so, why hasn't the State Department made
any statements about this latest incident?
Answer. With respect to the March interception of a Chinese ship by
Colombian authorities, the Department has not made any public
statements to date because the Colombian investigation is ongoing. We
believe it would be premature to speculate on the incident, though we
take the matter seriously and continue to consult closely with our
Colombian partners.
Regarding the weapons shipment destined for North Korea, the
administration has worked to ensure that all those responsible for this
egregious violation of U.N. sanctions pay a price for their wrongdoing.
The administration also worked to maximize the diplomatic cost to Cuba
for its role in the incident, including by repeatedly condemning Cuba's
role in the violation in meetings of the U.N. Security Council. We also
welcomed the U.N. DPRK Sanctions Committee's release of an
Implementation Assistance Notice to publicize the facts of the case and
worked to ensure that this Notice made clear Cuba's role.
The United States remains concerned about attempts by North Korea
to circumvent international sanctions and strongly condemns--and will
continue to condemn--any efforts by states such as Cuba to assist in
the evasion of binding decisions of the U.N. Security Council.
Question. Has the State Department looked into whether these
weapons may have actually been intended for FARC narcoterrorists or
other rogue groups, particularly as President Obama was preparing to
remove Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list?
Answer. We are not aware of any information linking the shipment
contents to the FARC. The Department believes it would be premature to
speculate regarding the outcome of Colombia's investigation of the
Chinese-flagged vessel and its captain, who could be charged under
Colombian law for illegal transport of military materials.
Question. If weapons sales between China and Cuba are otherwise not
sanctioned internationally, why do you think they went to such great
lengths to hide this shipment?
Answer. The Department believes it would be premature to speculate
regarding the outcome of Colombia's investigation of the Chinese-
flagged vessel and its captain, who could be charged under Colombian
law for illegal transport of military materials.
Question. The Washington-based Center for a Secure Free Society
reports that a Cuban state-owned enterprise provided Venezuela advanced
technology that it used to provide 173 individuals from the Middle East
with identification cards that are extremely difficult to trace.
The Center noted that one of the individuals provided with an
identification card was Suleiman Ghani Abdul Waked, who is an operative
of Hezbollah.
Can you confirm the Center's findings?
Answer. We take any allegations that threaten our national security
seriously. We share your concern that Venezuelan citizenship, identity,
and travel documents are easy to obtain, making Venezuela a potentially
attractive source of documentation for terrorists. International
authorities remain suspicious of the integrity of Venezuelan documents
and their issuance process.
What risk do these 173 people pose to regional and
international security?
Answer. We remain concerned about Hezbollah's involvement in a
range of destabilizing activities all around the world, including their
members and supporters' involvement in criminal activities. Countering
these activities remains a priority for the United States. Hezbollah
receives funding from supporters around the world who engage in a host
of licit and illicit activities, including drug trafficking and money
laundering, some of which takes place in the Western Hemisphere. We are
concerned about any Hezbollah-linked activity in Latin America.
We remain alert to indications of other activities, particularly
operational activity. I can provide more information in a classified
setting on this issue.
Can you explain what Cuba's objective is in providing such
sensitive technology to Venezuela?
Answer. Cuba and Venezuela have a long-standing and wide-ranging
partnership. They cooperate in areas ranging from intelligence services
to medical services. Many observers have recognized the significant
role Cuba has played in Venezuela over the past decade, including
providing support for sensitive functions like identification
documents.
Our concern is that individuals, regardless of their place of
origin, do not enter the United States with false documentation. The
U.S. Government verifies all documents as necessary. Those who
fraudulently or willfully misrepresent material facts to procure a
visa, admission to the United States, or any other immigration benefit,
which may include submission of false documents to the U.S. immigration
authorities, are ineligible for visas and admission to the United
States.
Question. The most-recent State Department Country Report on
Terrorism noted that ``The Cuban Government continued to harbor
fugitives wanted in the United States. The Cuban Government also
provided support such as housing, food ration books, and medical care
for these individuals.''
In total, how many fugitives does Cuba continue to harbor,
and for how long have these individuals been harbored by
Havana? How many of these can be described as violent
terrorists? What, specifically, are these fugitives wanted for?
Answer. We are concerned about fugitives from the United States in
Cuba and work closely with the Department of Justice and other agencies
to bring those fugitives to justice. This includes fugitives like
Joanne Chesimard and William Guillermo Morales as well as those
individuals who hijacked planes to Cuba, primarily in the 1970s and
1980s. The United States has pressed for the return of fugitives with
the Cuban Government at every appropriate opportunity, including in the
bilateral talks held in January in Havana. Cuba has expelled to the
United States at least four non-Cuban-national fugitives from U.S.
justice since 2011.
Question. Why did the Obama administration not insist that these
individuals be returned to U.S. custody as a prerequisite for removing
Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list?
Answer. The return from Cuba of fugitives from U.S. justice is a
priority of the U.S. Government. We have consistently and will continue
to press the Cuban Government for the return of U.S. fugitives. We work
closely with the Department of Justice and other agencies to bring
those fugitives to justice. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations
and reopening of the U.S. Embassy will allow the United States to more
effectively press the Cuban Government on law enforcement issues
including the return of fugitives.
The Cuban Government has agreed to enter into a law enforcement
dialogue with the United States that will include discussions with the
aim of resolving outstanding fugitive cases. We believe that this is
the best method for addressing these cases.
Question. These fugitives include members of FARC, the terrorist
organization that has been battling the Colombian Government for the
past 50 years. Can you likewise describe Cuba's past and present
support for FARC? How many FARC members does Cuba currently shelter?
Answer. Our review process of Cuba's designation as a State Sponsor
of Terrorism included a comprehensive review of Cuba's actions during
the 6 months prior to submitting our report to Congress, consistent
with the statutory standard for rescission. There is no credible
evidence the Cuban government has, within the past 6 months, provided
material support, services, or resources to members of the FARC or ELN
outside of facilitating the internationally recognized peace process
between those organizations and the Colombian Government.
The Colombian Government told the United States that it has no
evidence Cuba has provided any political or material support in recent
years to the FARC or ELN for terrorist activity in Colombia.
Furthermore, the Colombian Government believes the Cuban Government
plays a constructive role in the peace negotiations with the FARC.
Question. Under the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act
of 1989, a country can only be removed from the State Sponsors of
Terrorism list if ``there has been a fundamental change in the
leadership and policies of the government of the country concerned;
that government is not supporting acts of international terrorism; and
that government has provided assurances that it will not support acts
of international terrorism in the future.''
In light of Havana's continued harboring of fugitives and
terrorists, can you say that there has there been a
``fundamental change in the leadership and policies'' of the
Castro regime?
Answer. There are two possible paths to rescission of a State
Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation under the relevant statutes. The
first requires the President to submit a report to Congress before the
proposed rescission would take effect certifying that: (1) there has
been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
government of the country concerned; (2) the government is not
supporting acts of international terrorism; and (3) the government has
provided assurances that it will not support acts of international
terrorism in the future. The second path requires that the President
submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days before the proposed
rescission would take effect, justifying the rescission and certifying
the subject government has not provided any support for international
terrorism for the preceding 6-month period and has given assurances
that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.
The rescission of Cuba's designation was done consistent with the
second path. We had no credible information that Cuba supported
international terrorism in the 6 months prior to submitting the
statutorily required report to Congress and the Cuban Government has
provided assurances that it will not support acts of international
terrorism in the future. While the United States has significant
concerns and disagreements with a wide range of Cuba's policies and
actions, these fall outside the criteria relevant for determining
whether to rescind an SST designation pursuant to the second path.
We will continuously monitor available information to determine
whether the Cuban Government has resumed support for international
terrorism and whether an SST designation might be appropriate in the
future consistent with the statutory standard.
Question. The State Department's review of Cuba's status as a State
Sponsor of Terrorism focused narrowly only the question of whether or
not the Castro regime is ``not supporting acts of international
terrorism.''
Can you please explain how Cuba's current sheltering of
these fugitives and terrorists does not constitute support for
terrorism?
Answer. Our review of Cuba's State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST)
designation took into account all relevant factors. For the purposes of
our review of Cuba's designation and consistent with the statutory
standard for rescission, we examined Cuba's actions during the 6 months
prior to submitting our report to Congress. During that time period we
have no credible information that Cuba supported international
terrorism. While we continue to have significant concerns and
disagreements with a wide range of Cuba's policies and actions,
including the possible presence of fugitives from U.S. justice in Cuba,
these concerns fall outside the criteria for SST designation.
The return of fugitives from U.S. justice is a priority of the U.S.
Government, and we have consistently pressed the Cuban Government for
the return of U.S. fugitives, and will continue to do so. The
reestablishment of diplomatic relations and reopening of the U.S.
Embassy will allow the United States to more effectively push the Cuban
Government on law enforcement issues including the return of fugitives
from U.S. justice.
The Cuban Government has agreed to enter into a law enforcement
dialogue with the United States that will include discussions with the
aim of resolving outstanding fugitive cases. We believe this is the
best method for addressing these cases.
Question. Cuban officials have reportedly been involved in the
Venezuelan Government's recent crackdown of pro-democracy
demonstrators. This repression, as you know, prompted the Obama
administration to issue sanctions against current and former Venezuelan
officials, citing the ``unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States'' these
actions posed.
Can you detail how many Cuban agents have previously worked
with, and are currently working with, Venezuela to suppress
domestic opposition and bolster their security services?
Answer. According to Venezuelan Government-associated media, an
estimated 40,000 Cuban advisers and aid workers are in Venezuela,
including doctors, teachers, and Cuban military personnel. While both
governments have stated the Cuban presence in Venezuela is limited to
these areas, we are also aware of reports of Cuban-Venezuelan
cooperation in the intelligence services.
Media reports assert Cuban security and military advisers played a
role in activities against Venezuelan protesters, including training
pro-government vigilante groups that subsequently attacked peaceful
protesters during demonstrations. However, we have seen no further
evidence establishing a direct link between Cuban advisers and these
acts of violence.
Question. Why did the Obama administration not insist that Cuba
cease its support for the Venezuelan regime's antiopposition activities
as a prerequisite for its removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism
list?
Answer. While the United States has significant concerns and
disagreements with a wide range of Cuba's policies and actions, these
fall outside the criteria relevant for determining whether to rescind a
State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation.
Consistent with the statutory standard for recession, we focused on
the questions of whether Cuba provided any support for international
terrorism in the 6 months prior to submitting our report to Congress,
and whether Cuba has provided assurances that it will not support acts
of international terrorism in the future.
Question. In light of Havana's support of the Venezuelan crackdown,
can you say that there has been a ``fundamental change in the
leadership and policies'' of the Castro regime, pursuant to U.S. law?
Answer. There are two possible paths to rescission of a State
Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation under the relevant statutes. The
first requires the President to submit a report to Congress before the
proposed rescission would take effect certifying that: (1) there has
been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
government of the country concerned; (2) the government is not
supporting acts of international terrorism; and (3) the government has
provided assurances that it will not support acts of international
terrorism in the future. The second path requires that the President
submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days before the proposed
rescission would take effect, justifying the rescission and certifying
the subject government has not provided any support for international
terrorism for the preceding 6-month period and has given assurances
that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.
The rescission of Cuba's designation was done consistent with the
second path. We had no credible information that Cuba supported
international terrorism in the 6 months prior to submitting the
statutorily required report to Congress and the Cuban Government has
provided assurances that it will not support acts of international
terrorism in the future. While the United States has significant
concerns and disagreements with a wide range of Cuba's policies and
actions, these fall outside the criteria relevant for determining
whether to rescind a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation pursuant to
the second path.
Question. The Spanish Government requested in March that the United
States use the removal of Cuba from the State Sponsor of Terrorism list
to help secure the return of two leaders of the Basque ETA terrorist
group to Madrid.
Can you confirm for this committee that these ETA leaders
remain in Cuba?
Answer. Cuba and Spain have agreed to a bilateral process to
resolve the matter of the two ETA members in Cuba for whom Spain has
requested extradition.
How many more members of the ETA are being sheltered by the
Castro regime?
Answer. The Government of Cuba continues to allow approximately two
dozen members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization (ETA)
to remain in Cuba. The Cuban Government has provided assurances that it
would never permit the ETA members living in Cuba to use Cuban
territory for that organization's activities against Spain or any other
country. We have no information that Cuba has allowed any of these ETA
members to plan, finance, lead, or commit acts of international
terrorism while residing in Cuba in the past 6 months. Additionally,
for those two ETA members for whom Spain has requested extradition,
Cuba and Spain have agreed to a bilateral process to resolve the
matter, which is now underway.
Why did the United States not assist the Spanish Government
with their request?
Answer. The Cuban Government has responded to Spain's extradition
requests and a bilateral process is now underway for Spain and Cuba to
resolve this matter. The Spanish Government has assured the United
States that it is satisfied with this process and that it has no
objection to the rescission of Cuba's State Sponsor of Terrorism
designation.
Question. On Sunday, April 26, nearly 100 members and supporters of
the human rights group Ladies in White were arrested and suffered abuse
at the hands of the Cuban police.
Between February and March of this year, Cuba has increased the
number of politically motivated arrests by 70 percent.
There have reportedly been 15,000 political arrests since the
administration began secret negotiations with the Castro regime in June
2013, and 2,500 since the President's December speech on U.S.-Cuban
relations.
Can you detail in what ways, if any, the United States has
expressed its disapproval of these actions to Cuban officials?
Answer. We raise human rights regularly during our discussions with
the Cuban Government, and continue to make human rights observance a
fundamental part of our policy toward Cuba, as it is with other
countries in the hemisphere.
In March, we raised arbitrary detentions at a planning meeting with
the Cuban Government to discuss the methodology and structure of future
human rights talks. We are in the process of determining dates for the
first substantive human rights talks.
Our updated approach is designed to promote changes that support
Cubans' universal human rights and fundamental freedoms. We believe
that reestablishing normal diplomatic relations, which includes
allowing U.S. diplomats more freedom of movement in Cuba and allowing
Cuban citizens freer access to the U.S Interests Section, will help
improve the atmosphere for promoting such changes.
We remain committed to working closely with Congress on human
rights in Cuba.
Question. Would you agree that the administration's outreach to the
Castro regime has thus far had no effect on Havana's harassment and
imprisonment of dissidents?
Answer. We have not yet seen any significant change in the Cuban
Government's practice of harassing and detaining dissidents.
We have no illusions that the Cuban Government will change its
behavior overnight. At the same time, we are convinced that, through a
policy of sustained engagement, we can more effectively stand up for
our values and help the Cuban people help themselves.
Our enduring objective remains the emergence of a democratic,
prosperous, and stable Cuba that respects and adheres to human rights
norms.
Question. In Freedom House's 2015 ``Freedom in the World'' and
``Freedom of the Press'' reports, Cuba ranked dismally low.
Cuba ranks among the 10 worst-rated nations for freedom of the
press. And Cuba was ranked as ``not free.''
Cuban pro-democracy and human rights activists and civil society
groups are calling on the United States to place human rights reforms
and free and open space for civil society at the center of our ongoing
negotiations with Cuba.
At the same time, the Castro regime is demanding that the United
States stop providing classes to dissidents in Havana, and that we
cease providing Internet access.
How is the United States including democracy and human
rights in the negotiations to restore full diplomatic and
economic ties with Cuba?
Answer. Our updated approach to Cuba is designed to advance human
rights over time by empowering the Cuban people. We believe that
reestablishing diplomatic relations will help us better promote human
rights in Cuba.
On March 31, we held a planning meeting with the Cuban Government
to discuss the methodology and structure of future human rights talks.
The atmosphere of that meeting was professional, and there was broad
agreement on the way forward for a future substantive dialogue. We are
in the process of determining possible dates for the first substantive
dialogue.
We are focused on consulting with and empowering independent Cuban
civil society. Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor Malinowski has held two video conferences with on-island Cuban
civil society and will continue to do so.
We frequently speak out on human rights issues in Cuba and
throughout the hemisphere and will continue to do so.
We will continue to work closely with Congress on bringing about
positive change on human rights in Cuba. We urge you and your
congressional colleagues who may visit the island to raise democracy
and human rights with the Cuban Government and to meet with independent
civil society.
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