[Senate Hearing 114-63]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-63
THE CURRENT STATE OF READINESS OF U.S.
FORCES IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE AUTHOR-
IZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 25, 2015
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
march 25, 2015
Page
The Current State of Readiness of U.S. Forces in Review of the
Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2016 and the
Future Years Defense Program................................... 1
Allyn, General Daniel B., USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army... 5
Howard, Admiral Michelle J., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations. 14
Paxton, General John M., JR., USMC, Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps................................................... 20
Spencer, General Larry O., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air
Force.......................................................... 28
Questions for the Record......................................... 58
(iii)
THE CURRENT STATE OF READINESS OF U.S. FORCES IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 2015
U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kelly
Ayotte (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Ayotte, Rounds, Kaine
and Shaheen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE, CHAIRMAN
Senator Ayotte. I'm going to call this hearing to order.
Very much want to thank our distinguished witnesses who are
here before us today who have so admirably served our Nation.
This hearing of the Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support will be the second hearing of the year to
receive testimony on the current readiness of our military
forces.
I want to thank my Ranking Member, Senator Kaine, for his
continued leadership on defense issues and his eagerness to
work together in a bipartisan manner for the sake of our
national security.
We are joined this afternoon with a very distinguished
panel. We are here with General Daniel Allyn, Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army; Admiral Michelle Howard, Vice Chief of Staff
of Naval Operations; General John Paxton, Vice Commandant of
the Marine Corps; and General Larry Spencer, Vice Chief of
Staff for the Air Force.
Again, I don't think we can say enough about what a
tremendous group of leaders that we have testifying before this
committee today. I cannot think of a more important hearing
topic for this committee than the readiness of our Armed
Forces.
The preeminent responsibility of the Federal Government is
to provide for the common defense. In order to fulfill this
foundational responsibility of our Government, Congress has
been explicitly charged, in Article 1, Section 8, of the
Constitution, with the authority and responsibility to raise
and support armies, and provide and maintain the Navy. We have
to begin with an objective assessment of our national security
interests and the threats that we're facing around the world.
We then should determine what defense capabilities and
capacities we need in order to protect our interests against
likely threats. That is how you develop a defense budget that
keeps America safe.
Unfortunately, that's not what we have been seeing with the
impact of sequester in Washington. Rather than a reality-based,
strategy-based defense budgets, we are seeing that the impact
of sequester is deeply disconnected from the many threats that
we face around the world right now. In fact, in testimony
before the Armed Services Committee earlier this year, the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), James Clapper, I think
summed up the current situation very well. He said, ``In my 50-
plus years in the intelligence business, I don't know of a time
that has been more beset by challenges and crises around the
world. As these threats have grown in complexity and severity,
the defense budget cuts have created a growing and troubling
gap between the military we need and the military our national
security interests require. The consequences of failing to
address this are grave.''
It's easy for us in Washington to lose sight of the real-
world consequences of our decisions. We all know that the
readiness of our forces is something that we don't often see,
but we'll know right away if it's not there, given what we ask
of our men and women of uniform.
When we send our fellow citizens into harm's way, they rely
on us to provide them with the best possible training and
equipment so that they can accomplish their missions and return
home safely. I think not only do we have a constitutional
obligation to do so, we have a moral obligation to do so. I
know the witnesses before me appreciate that better than
anyone.
That's why I look forward to continuing to work across the
aisle with people like my Ranking Member to address the
sequestration, because we do need to come up with a bipartisan
solution to this in the long term so that we can make the right
decisions today by our men and women in uniform and to ensure
that we are prepared to face the grave threats that,
unfortunately, are unfolding around the world.
Before I go to my Ranking Member, you know, I know that
many of my colleagues right now are having a meeting with
President Ghani, the President of Afghanistan, who just
finished a joint address to the Congress. Having been present
for that address, I think that he, the President, first of all,
made very clear the gratitude that the leader of Afghanistan
has for the sacrifices that our men and women in uniform have
made to help ensure the security of Afghanistan. But, what we
also heard is what a difference our men and women in uniform
have made in Afghanistan, and appreciate the difference we have
made throughout the world, and particularly when he talked
about the freedom with which he believes women should have in
Afghanistan and the fact that, before our presence in
Afghanistan, not one girl went to school.
So, I want to bring this up, because we need to understand
there is no other leader in the world like the United States of
America. If we do not continue to invest in the best military
in the world, then we will not be prepared for the challenges
we face, but also the world will be a much worse place and a
much more dangerous place without our assistance.
I want to--in that regard, I wanted to mention, since we
have the President of Afghanistan here, that there has been a
report, unfortunately, that today there were 6 people killed
and more than 30 wounded in a suicide bombing in Kabul, right
near the presidential palace. So, I think it reminds us that
dangers still remain there, and that they remain many places
around the world. So, your testimony today is so important.
I would like to turn this over to my Ranking Member.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM KAINE
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I echo your comments. It's good to work together on these
issues. We have a bipartisan working relationship and, I think,
a common understanding of the dangers of sequester.
Could they just give us the budget for 15 minutes, just the
two of us, and--we can hammer this out.
Senator Ayotte. We could do it.
[Laughter.]
Senator Ayotte. We really could work this out.
Senator Kaine. Let me start with the thank you that
Chairman Ayotte was talking about with respect to the speech
from the Afghan President this morning. If you were--I wish you
were there. I hope you watched it. It should make you feel
really proud. You know, it made me feel proud on your behalf,
but you should feel proud, and you should feel proud for your
folks, because the notion of a country--I'll just pick one
statistic--that's gone from a 44-year-old life expectancy to a
61- or 62-year-old life expectancy in 15 years, I mean, it--
there's just no precedent in human history for that. I have
been doing my back-of-the-envelope calculation. Seventeen years
of human life multiplied by 30 million Afghans is 510 million
years of human life. That's what the U.S. has enabled them to
achieve, because they didn't have a functioning health system,
and it was a whole lot of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
who came in and helped set it up, but they couldn't set it up
if the security situation didn't enable them to. So, the U.S.
and partners, working together with the Afghan people, have
created a situation where, violence notwithstanding, challenges
notwithstanding, kids are in school, there's a new sense of
optimism and hope, people are living longer. As the President
said, for the kids that are in school, their parents thank you.
For the people who are living longer, their children thank you.
He did that in a very poetic way that was really special.
So, look, but it also means that the work doesn't end. You
can't stop the investment. We've got to continue the
partnership. That partnership demands a military that's ready.
We've had a series of hearings--this is the second one of
this subcommittee, but others--where we've talked about
sequester. Madam Chair, we had one this morning in the Seapower
Subcommittee, where this was the testimony. The Seapower
hearing this morning, chaired by Senator Wicker and Ranking
Member Hirono, dealt with the naval and marine aviation
platforms. That was the hearing. But, they were talking about
the triple whammy of sequester. So, here's the triple whammy of
sequester on this kind of component of readiness. Sequester and
budget caps slows down the ability to purchase new platforms.
So, since we can't purchase the new platforms we need, let's
extend the life of existing platforms, let's take planes that
were meant to fly 6,000 hours and make them fly 10,000 hours.
Well, to do that, you've got to do a lot of maintenance. Since
the planes weren't supposed to fly after 6,000 hours, you find
a whole lot of challenging maintenance problems with planes
that have been in saltwater environments, corrosion because of
saltwater, or have been in desert environments, corrosion
because of sand--so then there's a whole lot of extra depot and
maintenance demand that we didn't necessarily plan for. Oh, by
the way, because we furloughed a whole lot of employees and
stuff, and great aviation mechanics can get jobs elsewhere,
we're down about 10 percent of what we need in the workforce.
So, sequester stopped us on the--slowed us on the new
purchases. Sequester is imposing significant extra demands on
the maintenance of these aircraft. Sequester is driving away
some of our workforce. Yet, we are supposed to, nevertheless,
do the mission that the Nation demands. Then you add to it the
Chairwoman's comment from DNI Clapper, ``This is the most
complex strategic set of challenges we see,'' readiness is not
happening in a vacuum. Readiness is happening after our
military has been at Operational Tempo (Ops Tempo) for 15
years. That, in and of itself--forget about sequester--that has
a readiness challenge to it.
So, you combine 15 years of Ops Tempo and a complex
strategic environment and the budgetary challenges of caps and
across-the-board cuts and furloughs and then sort of the
uncertainty, ``Is Congress going to fix it, or not?'' and you
can see why we have such a huge budgetary challenge that we
have to resolve.
Retired General Mattis, at a hearing earlier this year,
said, ``No foe could wreak such havoc on our security as
mindless sequestration is achieving.'' No foe could wreak such
havoc on our security as mindless sequestration is achieving.
If a large-scale conflict were to occur in the near future,
Armed Forces would not have enough ready forces to respond to
the Combatant Command (COCOM) requirements, we'd likely suffer
additional casualties as a result. We've had that testimony.
So, this has been like an alarm bell that's just been
ringing, you know, on our table next to us. Your testimony,
combined testimony, has been like the alarm bell's been
ringing, ringing, ringing, ringing, ringing. There just has to
be a moment where we take a step to turn off the alarm and
adjust to a better path. In the fiscal year 2014 and 2015
budget, we were able to find a way to reduce the impact of
sequester--not eliminate it, cut it in half. It may be pie in
the sky to think we could eliminate it. But, we ought to be
finding significant sequester relief, whether it's depot
maintenance or extra plane hours or the effect on the workforce
that furloughs create, in terms of morale for people who have
other opportunities. All these are significant.
That's what we'll be hearing about during the testimony
today. I look forward to working with my colleagues trying to
find, based on your testimony, and based on your--you know,
giving us the stories and the anecdotes we need to convince our
colleagues, I look forward to trying to find a better path.
With that, thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
I would like to first call on General Allyn, the Vice Chief
of Staff for the Army.
Thank you, General.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DANIEL B. ALLYN, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY
General Allyn. Thank you, Chairman Ayotte, Ranking Member
Kaine, Senator Rounds, distinguished members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
readiness of your United States Army.
On behalf of our Secretary, The Honorable John McHugh, and
our Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno, I thank you for your
support and demonstrated commitment to our soldiers, Army
civilians, families, and veterans.
There are over 140,000 soldiers committed around the globe,
partnered with our allies, in response to increasing
instability across Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the
Pacific, continuing the mission in Afghanistan, and reacting to
humanitarian crises. The velocity of instability is increasing,
as you have all stated; and now is not the time to drastically
reduce our capability or capacity. The Army needs Congress to
provide adequate, consistent, and predictable funding.
Today, only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when our
sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent. The
fiscal year `15 enacted funding for our Army is $5.1 billion
less than what we had in fiscal year 2014 and challenges
commanders and leaders across our Army to sustain hard-fought
gains in our readiness. We are funded to achieve just enough
readiness for immediate consumption, but are unable to generate
the readiness required to respond to an unknown contingency.
While the fiscal year 2015 budget constrains training, we
remain committed to our Combat Training Center rotations to
develop leaders and build unit readiness. We accept risk in
home-station training to conserve resources for these Combat
Training Center rotations. The result of this approach is that
we expect our units to arrive at our Combat Training Centers
not fully ready for these complex training scenarios and,
therefore, unable to derive the full benefit of this training.
Under the President's Budget in fiscal year 2016 (PB-16),
our goal is to increase regular Army brigade combat team
readiness closer to 70 percent, allowing us to balance force
requirements while maintaining surge capability. But, we need
consistent resources to get there.
Sequestration will undermine readiness, ultimately putting
soldiers' lives and our mission success at risk, and it will
increase significantly the involuntary separation of officer
and noncommissioned officer leaders who have steadfastly served
their country through the last 13 years of war. Sequestration
will also severely impact our ability to maintain our
installation readiness and protect the industrial base, both
key components to maintaining a readiness--a ready force. It
will cut essential funds from military construction,
sustainment, restoration, and modernization on our
installations. Sequestration will degrade the industrial base's
ability to sustain the life-cycle readiness of warfighting
equipment while also maintaining the capability to surge to
meet future demands.
To achieve our required readiness level in fiscal year '16,
we need Congress to support all the cost-saving measures the
Army has proposed. These include compensation reform, a new
round of Base Realignment and Closure, and the Aviation
Restructure Initiative (ARI). Aviation restructure eliminates
700 aircraft from the Active component and 111 from the Guard
and Reserve, but increases our readiness and saves $12 billion.
If the Army does not execute ARI, we will incur additional
costs buying aircraft and performing maintenance, at the
expense of modernizing our systems and maintaining readiness
for our heroic aviators.
The Army remains committed to protecting our most important
resource: our soldiers, civilians, and families. We build
leaders of character and trusted professionals who provide an
environment where every member of our great Army is treated
with dignity and respect, supported by essential soldier and
family programs. We will protect our most vital programs, but
sequestration-driven budget cuts affect every facet of our
Army.
I thank you again for your steadfast support of the
outstanding men and women of the United States Army. I look
forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Allyn follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Daniel Allyn, Vice Chief of Staff United
States Army
introduction
Chairman Ayotte, Ranking Member Kaine, distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the readiness
of your United States Army. On behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable
John McHugh, and our Chief of Staff, General Raymond Odierno, I would
also like to thank you for your support and demonstrated commitment to
our Soldiers, Army Civilians, Families, and Veterans.
We live in a dangerous world and the Leadership of the United
States Army is committed to ensuring our Army is ready. The
accelerating insecurity and instability across Europe, the Middle East,
Africa and the Pacific, coupled with the continued threat to the
homeland and our ongoing operations in Afghanistan, remain a
significant focus for our Army. The Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant's (ISIL) unforeseen expansion and the rapid disintegration of
order in Iraq and Syria have dramatically escalated conflict in the
region. In Europe, Russia's intervention in Ukraine violates
international law and threatens to undermine the post-World War II
security architecture. Across the Asia-Pacific, China's lack of
transparency regarding its military modernization efforts raises
concerns with the United States and our allies, and the continuing
development of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs contributes
to instability. The rate of complex-humanitarian requirements and the
unpredictable nature of disaster relief missions heighten the level of
uncertainty we face around the world, along with constantly evolving
threats to the homeland. With the velocity of instability increasing
around the world and the threat of terrorism growing rather than
receding, now is not the time to drastically reduce capability and
capacity that would occur under prolonged sequestration level-funding.
As the Chief of Staff of the Army stated in his testimony, there is
a growing divide between the emerging geopolitical realities and the
Budget Control Act's (BCA) arbitrary funding mechanism. The Army budget
has decreased in nominal terms every year since 2011. Yet today, the
Army is as globally engaged as ever, with more than 140,000 Soldiers
deployed, forward stationed, and committed worldwide. We are training
alongside our allies and partners to help them develop professional and
capable armies. At home, we are supporting civil authorities while
defending our critical networks against cyber attacks. Yet prolonged
funding at BCA levels prevents us from appropriately balancing
readiness, modernization and end strength, and threatens to make the
Army a hollow force. Under sequestration-level funding, the Army will
be unable to meet its current target for regaining full-spectrum
readiness by fiscal year 2023.
Our Nation requires a trained and ready Army prepared to rapidly
deploy, fight, sustain itself and win decisively against complex state
and non-state threats in diverse, austere environments, rugged terrain
and urban megacities. Readiness is measured at both the service and
unit level. Service readiness incorporates installations and the
critical ability of the Army to provide requisite capabilities in
support of the Joint Force in sufficient capacity to execute the
missions required by combatant commands. Unit readiness is the
combination of personnel, materiel and supplies, equipment and
training, that, when properly balanced, enables immediate and effective
application of military power.
To ensure readiness now and in the future, the Army needs Congress
to provide adequate, consistent and predictable funding. The Army
supports the President's Budget as meeting the required funding and
needed reforms to fulfill our responsibilities defined in the Defense
Strategic Guidance. One critical assumption in the President's Budget
request is that Congress will enact critical cost saving measures we
have proposed. These include compensation reform, sustainable energy
and resource initiatives, a new round of Base Realignments and Closure
(BRAC), and the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI). We ask Congress
to support these initiatives because without the flexibility to manage
our budgets to achieve the greatest capability possible, we will be
forced to make even steeper reductions to manpower, modernization, and
training across the Total Army.
Current State of Readiness
Thirteen years of sustained counterinsurgency-focused operations
have degraded the Army's ability to conduct operations across the
entire spectrum of war. In fiscal year 2011, the Army began a multi-
year transition to rebuild core readiness and build capability to
conduct Decisive Action for Unified Land Operations. The speed and
scale of the funding reductions mandated under sequestration in fiscal
year 2013 curtailed this transition plan by forcing the Army to absorb
the majority of the cuts within the operations and training accounts.
This resulted in tiered readiness of units as opposed to broad gains
across the force.
Last year the Chief of Staff of the Army testified that only two of
our Brigade Combat Teams, the Army's basic warfighting unit, were fully
ready for decisive action operations. Since then, we have trained 13
BCTs to that standard (other CTC rotations were mission-specific for
deploying units) thanks to funding provided in the 2013 Bipartisan
Budget Agreement (BBA). However, of those 13 BCTs, we have consumed the
readiness of nine to support on-going operations. At prolonged
sequestration-level funding, the Army will be unable to train units
quickly enough to outpace, or even meet demand.
With the support of Congress, the Army executed $126.2 billion for
base budget purposes in fiscal year 2014 to begin rebuilding readiness
lost during sequestration in fiscal year 2013. Though known and
predictable, the fiscal year 2015-enacted level of $121 billion is $5.1
billion less than fiscal year 2014, and is challenging Commanders
across the Army to sustain our hard-earned readiness. To operate under
this budget, we are significantly reducing key installation services,
individual training events, and modernization to such an extent as to
jeopardize future readiness and quality of life. For example, Logistics
Readiness Centers were underfunded by $350 million in fiscal year 2015,
which covers funding for dining facilities, contract operations at ammo
supply points, central issue facilities, maintenance, laundry and dry
cleaning operations. In addition to the effect on Soldier quality of
life, these cuts force Commanders to divert Soldiers from training to
perform logistics tasks.
The President's Budget request for fiscal year 2016 increases
readiness funding above fiscal year 2015 levels, which is critical to
sustain and improve the readiness of the force. While the reduced
fiscal year 2015 budget will reduce overall training, we remain
committed to CTC rotations to develop leaders and build unit readiness.
fiscal year 2015 plans fund 19 CTC rotations: two for deploying BCTs
and 17 decisive action rotations (15 Active Army and two Army National
Guard). fiscal year 2016 will continue this level of CTC exercises.
We are improving Training Support Systems to enable more realistic
home station training, increase collective training proficiency and
enhance operational readiness for contingencies across the globe;
however, funding constraints in fiscal year 2015 impede our ability to
maximize home station training goals. We accepted risk in home station
training to conserve resources for units to continue to conduct
training at the CTCs. This resulted in units arriving at the CTCs not
yet ``fully ready'' for these complex training scenarios, and therefore
unable to derive the full benefit of the training. Although the Army
attempts to mitigate the impacts on training readiness, we must
continue to implement the Contingency Force model of fiscal year 2015
in order to maintain readiness for the 24 of 60 BCTs that will receive
sufficient funding to conduct training at CTCs and home station. The
remaining 36 BCTs will train only to Individual/Crew/Squad resourcing
levels. The President's Budget request for fiscal year 2016 allows the
Army to increase training readiness to battalion-level across the
active Component force and to platoon-level in the Reserves. Lower
funding levels will not allow us to achieve this balanced readiness.
Our aim is to provide tough, realistic multi-echelon home-station
training using a mix of live, virtual and constructive methods that
efficiently and effectively build Soldier, leader and unit competence
over time. Training will integrate the unique capabilities of the
Light, Medium and Heavy forces, as well as the capabilities of
Conventional and Special Operations Forces. Training centers including
the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany will increase our
interoperability with Allies. Our goal is to achieve a high level of
readiness for 70 percent of our Active Component BCTs compared to the
current 33 percent, allowing the Army to balance Combatant Command
force requirements while maintaining surge capability - but we need
consistent resources to get there.
We are also increasing funding for our individual and institutional
training. Funding increases focus on leader development, entry-level
training and flight training. The unpredictable nature of human
conflict requires leaders ready to lead in close combat and to
understand the operational and strategic environment, including its
socio-economic, cultural and religious underpinnings. Junior leaders
will frequently confront ethical dilemmas, with resultant decisions
that have strategic impacts. Our leaders must demonstrate the
competence and professional values necessary to achieve operational and
strategic mission success.
However, sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would mortgage the
functional skills and training of individual Soldiers. Sequestration
will force the Army to further reduce Specialized Skill Training by
over 85,000 seats (65 percent drop) and fund only the most critical
courses. This will reduce readiness as Soldiers will lose proficiency
on their individual tasks. These reductions include 900 fewer graduate
flight school seats, resulting in unfilled and unqualified pilot
positions throughout the force. We would continue to emphasize leader
development by protecting Professional Military Education, minimizing
cuts to about 10 percent.
The Army continues to make progress at integrating the unique
capabilities of each of its components to support the needs of the
Combatant Commanders. As part of the Army's Total Force Policy, the
U.S. Army Forces Command is leading the way by partnering Guard and
Reserve divisions and brigades with Active Army peer units. The Army is
also piloting a program to assign Guard and Reserve personnel directly
to Active Army corps and division headquarters. For example, the
Reserve Component rapidly provided support capabilities to Operation
United Assistance in Liberia to augment and replace elements of the
initial Active Component response. We fight as a Total Army, and each
component has a unique role. We must also draw down as a Total Army--
Active, Guard, and Reserve--in order to maintain the correct balance
between capacity and readiness.
As we transition from combat operations in Afghanistan, our Army is
focused on the ability to rapidly deploy forces around the world in
order to meet the needs of our Combatant Commanders. To do this, we
enhanced prepositioned equipment sets and created activity sets to
support operations in Europe, the Pacific and around the world.
Activity sets are prepositioned arrays of equipment that enable U.S.
regionally-aligned forces and multinational partners in Europe to train
and operate. We have also reinvigorated our Emergency Deployment
Readiness Exercise program and enhanced the en route mission command
capability of our Global Response Force. The President's Budget request
provides sufficient capability to respond in each Geographical
Combatant Command's area of responsibility.
The Army continues to be a good steward of the resources returning
from operations in Afghanistan. In 2014, the Army efficiently
synchronized equipment retrograde out of theater. Redeployment and
retrograde operations remain on schedule; however, the Army continues
to forecast a need for reset funding for three years after redeployment
of the last piece of equipment from theater. In addition, we identified
almost $2 billion of potential requirement reductions in Contractor
Logistics and Training Support. These and other changes allowed the
Army to increase the capability of its prepositioned stocks program
without an increase in associated costs.
Finally, during this period of drawdown, the Army is reorganizing,
realigning and restructuring forces. The Brigade Combat Team
reorganization enhances brigade combat power by adding a third maneuver
battalion to 38 BCTs by the end of fiscal year 2015 and reducing the
total number of BCTs to 60 (32 Active Army and 28 Army National Guard)
in the Total Force. This effort decreases the number of headquarters
units and personnel without negatively affecting the number of
operational battalions.
Since May 2014, we have been developing a sustainable force
generation and readiness model to account for the new, volatile,
strategic operating environment and the need to remain regionally-
engaged under budgetary and force-sizing realities. The Sustainable
Readiness Model (SRM) will provide force generation policies and
processes that optimize the readiness of the force and balance the
Army's steady state missions, contingency response capability, and
available resources. We cannot predict the specific events that will
cause the next surge in demand for Army forces, but history suggests it
will come sooner than we expect. The SRM will better enable the future
smaller force to sustain readiness at optimal levels over time.
One critical assumption in the President's Budget request is that
Congress will enact necessary compensation reform and force structure
initiatives. We fully support the modest reforms to pay raises, health
care and other benefits that have been proposed. Without these reforms,
savings assumptions we have included in our planning will not be
realized, placing increasing pressure on further end strength
reductions and reducing funding needed to sustain readiness.
Future Readiness: The Army Operating Concept
While we are most concerned about the BCT's short-term effects on
readiness, we are keenly focused on the long-term readiness of the
Total Force to meet future demands. As such, we developed a new Army
Operating Concept (AOC), ``Win in a Complex World.'' The AOC provides
an intellectual framework for learning and for applying what we learn
to future force development under Force 2025 and Beyond. The foundation
of the Army Operating Concept is our ability to conduct joint combined
arms maneuver. The Army Operating Concept endeavors to build a force
capable of operating alongside multiple partners, able to create
multiple dilemmas for our adversaries, while giving our Senior Leaders
multiple options and synchronizing and integrating effects from
multiple domains onto and from land. Recognizing the changing world
around us, the Army Operating Concept envisions an Army that is
expeditionary, tailorable, scalable and prepared to meet the challenges
of the global environment. The Army Operating Concept sets the
foundation upon which our leaders can focus our efforts and resources
to maintain strategic and operational flexibility to deter and operate
in multiple regions simultaneously - in all phases of military
operations - to prevent conflict, shape the security environment, and
win wars now and in the future.
It is imperative that our Army adapts to the future joint operating
environment, one that consists of diverse enemies that employ
traditional, irregular and hybrid strategies which threaten U.S.
security and vital interests. Through a dedicated ``Campaign of
Learning'' under Force 2025 Maneuvers, we will assess new capabilities,
force designs, and doctrine to ensure the readiness of our future
force. We are focusing our innovation efforts in this Campaign of
Learning to address the 20 Army Warfighting Challenges identified in
the Army Operating Concept. The Army Warfighting Challenges are
enduring first-order problems, and solving them will improve combat
effectiveness. They range from shaping the Security Environment, to
countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, to conducting Space and Cyber
Operations, to Integrating and Delivering Fires, to Exercising Mission
Command. The Army Operating Concept represents a long-term, cost-
effective way to enhance readiness, improve interoperability and
modernize the force.
Installation Readiness
In order to partially mitigate the severe impacts of sequestration-
level funding on training readiness, the Army will be forced to take
significant risk with installation readiness. Installation maintenance
has been underfunded since 2011 which impacts efficiency and readiness.
Sequestration in fiscal year 16 would cut essential funds for military
construction, sustainment, restoration and modernization on our posts,
camps and stations. The President's fiscal year 2016 budget funds 79
percent of the OSD Facility Sustainment Model requirement. Under
sequestration the Army would only be able to fund 62 percent of needed
repairs, limiting repairs to those needed for life, health, and safety.
Restoration and modernization accounts would be underfunded as well.
Without relief from sequestration 20 percent of the Army's
infrastructure will remain in substandard condition and approximately
100,000 maintenance orders will be deferred each month. Recovery from
unfilled maintenance requests will take at least 2-3 years if fully
funded and ultimately will affect morale, retention, and readiness.
A return to sequestration-level funding will result in a $1 billion
decrease to base operations support, requiring installations to
eliminate jobs and scale back or cancel service contracts that employ
people in local communities. We will have to increase further our
reliance on Soldiers to support basic installation functions in order
to provide a safe training environment and adequate quality of life.
These include access control point manning by MTOE units, manning ammo
and fuel handling points, and conducting essential range maintenance.
These requirements pull Soldiers away from important training and
ultimately detract from readiness. We will also reduce contract funding
for a number of quality-of-life services such as custodial services,
waste collection, and grounds maintenance.
It is important to highlight the need for another round of Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC). We simply have too much surplus
infrastructure and will have even more as we continue to downsize. We
are already in the process of separating nearly 152,000 Soldiers from
the Total Army by fiscal year 2018, and sequestration would force us to
separate another 60,000 by fiscal year 2020--for a total reduction of
212,000. In addition, we have reduced over 50,000 Civilians from these
same installations. Without a BRAC and the realized cost savings, the
only alternative is to make additional cuts in training, manpower and
modernization to make up for shortages in installation funding. We have
reduced all that we can from our overseas bases, and are now reducing
personnel at U.S. installations. We expect excess facility capacity
will be about 18 percent Army-wide by late fiscal year 2015.
Industrial Base
The Industrial Base consists of Government-owned (organic) and
commercial industry and is designed to be readily available to
manufacture and repair items during both peacetime and national
emergencies. The current financial uncertainty of sequestration,
combined with the cuts in Army force structure, is driving workload
down. Over 4,500 employees within the organic industrial base (OIB)
have already lost their jobs due to budget uncertainty and declining
workloads since fiscal year 2013, and the Army has deferred $323
million of depot maintenance from fiscal year 2013 into fiscal year
2015. The highly skilled industrial base workforce serves an enduring
mission, and provides critical capabilities in support of our National
defense today, while also preparing for the threats of tomorrow.
Sequestration will result in insufficient resources to complete
critical depot maintenance and will continue to degrade the industrial
base's ability to sustain the life-cycle readiness of war-fighting
equipment while also maintaining the capability to surge to meet the
demands of future contingency operations.
Should sequestration-level funding return in fiscal year 2016,
furloughs, overtime restrictions and hiring freezes will again
negatively impact the OIB productivity, workforce availability and
capability. In order to mitigate the loss of critical skill sets and
ensure the OIB is ready for the next contingency, the Army requires
consistent and predictable funding. We also need to carryover workload
to keep production lines functioning between fiscal years.
The Army is taking several actions to reshape the OIB to support
the Army of 2025 and beyond, to include assessing OIB capabilities and
capacities and effectively aligning them to planned workloads. We are
not sustaining aging systems that are planned for divesture within the
next five years, and we are continuing reset and sustainment of our
modernized platforms. This strategy will enable the Army to sustain and
modernize our most capable fleets, while accomplishing our Title 10
requirements to sustain the core depot and critical manufacturing
capabilities necessary to fight and win the Nation's wars.
Aviation Restructure Initiative
One of our most important reforms is the Aviation Restructuring
Initiative (ARI), which we continued in fiscal year 2015. Our current
aviation structure is unaffordable, so the Army's plan will avoid $12
billion in costs and saves an additional $1 billion annually if we
fully implement ARI. We simply cannot afford to maintain our current
aviation structure and sustain modernization while providing trained
and ready aviation units across all three components. Our comprehensive
approach through ARI will ultimately allow us to eliminate obsolete
airframes, sustain a modernized fleet, and reduce sustainment costs.
Through ARI, we will eliminate nearly 700 aircraft from the active
Component, while removing only 111 airframes in the Reserve Component.
A byproduct of ARI is the reduction in the number of Active Duty Combat
Aviation Brigades from 13 to 10. ARI eliminates and reorganizes
structure, while increasing capabilities in order to minimize risk to
meeting operational requirements within the capacity of remaining
aviation units across all components. If the Army does not execute ARI,
we will incur additional costs associated with buying aircraft and
structure at the expense of modernizing current and future aviation
systems in the Total Force.
The Army notes the establishment by Congress of a National
Commission on the Future of the Army and ARI specifically, and is fully
committed to working with the Commission as it fulfills its charter.
Army Cyber
Network dominance and defense is an integral part of our National
security, and the Army is focused on providing increased capability to
the Joint Force. Investment in cyber capability and readiness is a top
priority, and we are working to improve requirements and resourcing
processes to ensure that they are agile enough to rapidly translate
innovative concepts into realized capabilities. Army readiness includes
cyber readiness.
We are aggressively manning, training and equipping cyber mission
teams and established a new cyber branch to help recruit, train and
retain cyber Soldiers. The Army has grown from zero Cyber teams in
fiscal year 2013 to 24 Army Cyber Mission Teams today at Initial
Operating Capability (IOC). By the end of fiscal year 2016, we will
have 41 Cyber Mission Teams. The Army has established the Cyber Center
of Excellence at Fort Gordon, GA, to serve as our focal point to drive
change across the Army. This is a Total Force effort--Active, National
Guard, and Reserve--and through our Reserve Components we will leverage
the professional expertise within the civilian population to build
greater capacity, expertise, and flexibility across DOD, Federal,
state, and private sector activities. We recently established a full-
time Army National Guard Cyber Protection Team (CPT) that is training
to conduct network defense. We will create three more Army National
Guard CPTs in fiscal year 2016.
We must make prudent investments in our cyber infrastructure,
including facilities, networks and equipment to ensure a capable force.
Network modernization is critical to the success of Army operations
across all domains, and the Army is fully integrated into the build-out
of the Joint Information Environment (JIE). JIE efforts will enhance
the defensibility of our networks while providing global access for the
joint force. However, sequestration-level funding in fiscal year 2016
will reduce network funding by almost $400 million and defer critical
scheduled IT infrastructure upgrades at three major installations,
reducing the Army's warfighting capability and its ability to protect
itself against cyber attacks.
Essential Investments: People and Equipment
Soldiers, Families and Army Civilians
Army Professionalism and the resilience of those who serve--
Soldiers, their Families and Army Civilians--are directly linked to the
Readiness of our Force. That is why we must develop and sustain a
system of capabilities and services that are designed to mitigate the
unique challenges of military life, foster life skills, strengthen
resilience, and promote a strong and ready Army. As Army leaders, we
continue to express our enduring commitment to those who serve,
recognizing that attracting and retaining highly-qualified individuals
in all three components is critical to readiness. Two of our key
efforts, the Army's Ready and Resilient Campaign (R2C) and Soldier for
Life, exist to ensure we are taking care of our most precious resource:
our people, throughout Army life and beyond.
Ready and Resilient Campaign
We will make every effort to protect our most important Soldier and
Family programs, but budget cuts are ultimately affecting every facet
of the Army. To ensure we maintain our focus on our most invaluable
resource: our people, we continue to develop a Ready and Resilient
Army. A Ready and Resilient Army is composed of resilient individuals,
adaptive leaders and cohesive teams that are committed to the Army
professional ethic and capable of accomplishing a range of operations
in environments of uncertainty and persistent danger. We are developing
a comprehensive system that empowers Army Commanders and Leaders to
improve Leader engagement and early Leader intervention. We are taking
a more holistic look at negative behaviors and their correlation in
order to better target training, tools and resources with more emphasis
placed on resilience and prevention skills to reduce incidents of
escalated negative behavioral outcomes.
We continue to provide resilience and performance enhancement
training to Soldiers, Families and Army Civilians through Comprehensive
Soldier and Family Fitness. To date, we have trained more than 26,000
Master Resilience Trainers Army-wide who are taking these skills back
to their formations. We have established an online assessment and self-
development platform where Soldiers, their Families and Army Civilians
can, in their own time, confidentially take action to improve their
overall health and resilience.
We are also emphasizing the importance of sleep, physical activity,
and nutrition. The Performance Triad is a comprehensive plan to improve
readiness and increase resilience through health initiatives and
leadership engagement. Sleep, activity and nutrition are key actions
that influence overall health.
Personal Readiness is critical to mission readiness. Those who
serve must have the physical, psychological, social, emotional and
spiritual preparedness to achieve and sustain optimal performance in
supporting the Army mission.
Soldier for Life
Soldier for Life (SFL) is a program that drives a change in
mindset. We encourage the SFL mindset through senior leader and
installation engagements, and focused training curriculum. We want
individuals to understand from their entry day in the Army that they
will receive the tools to succeed throughout their service lifecycle -
``Once a Soldier, always a Soldier . . . a Soldier for Life!'' As they
return to civilian life, Soldiers will continue to influence young
people to join the Army and, along with retired Soldiers, will connect
communities across the Nation with its Army.
As we reduce the Army's end strength, we owe it to our Soldiers and
their Families to facilitate their transition to civilian life. The
Army supports continuum of service initiatives to help in this effort
by communicating the benefits of continued service in the Reserve
Components. Additionally, the ``Soldier for Life'' Program connects
Army, governmental and community efforts to facilitate the successful
reintegration of our Soldiers and Families back into communities across
the Nation through networks in employment, education and health. Our
pre- and post-retirement services ensure those who served become and
remain leaders in their community. For example, we have developed
strong relationships with government, non-government and private sector
entities to include direct collaboration with the Departments of
Veterans Affairs, Labor, and the Chamber of Commerce to bring
employment summits to installations worldwide.
Sexual Harassment / Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program
Trust between Soldiers, between Soldiers and Leaders, between
Soldiers, their Families and the Army, and between the Army and the
American people is fundamental to readiness. Sexual assault and sexual
harassment undermine that trust.
Across the Army, we are committed to maintaining momentum in Army
SHARP and making further advances along our five lines of efforts:
Prevention, Investigation, Accountability, Advocacy and Assessment. In
the last year, our efforts along the Prevention Line of Effort resulted
in actions such as consolidating SHARP training under TRADOC and
Initial Entry Training and Professional Military Education to increase
the quality and accessibility of our prevention tools. Our
Investigation Line of Effort showed advances in Special Victim
capabilities and Trial Counsel Assistance Programs. The Accountability
Line of Effort had successes through our Special Victim Investigation
and Prosecution capability and through tools such as Command Climate
Surveys and Commander 360 degree assessments. Our Advocacy Line of
Effort resulted in initial indicators of progress in establishing SHARP
resource centers for over 12 installations. We continue to see interim
progress along our Assessment Line of Effort as noted in the 2014
``Department of Defense Report to the President of the United States on
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response.''
Recent statistics outlined in the 2014 ``DOD Report to the
President'' indicate a decrease in unwanted sexual contact in fiscal
year 2014 compared to fiscal year 2012. Within the Army, survey-
estimated rates of unwanted sexual contact for the past year decreased
significantly for active duty women (4.6 percent), compared to fiscal
year 2012 (7.1 percent). In addition, reporting data demonstrates more
victims are coming forward to report sexual harassment and sexual
assault. In fiscal year 2014, sexual assault reporting in the Army
increased by 12 percent over the previous year. We view this as a vote
of confidence and a sign of increased trust. Nevertheless, we must
continue striving to foster a climate where individuals are not afraid
of retaliation or stigma for reporting a crime by ensuring individuals,
units, organizations and specifically commanders and leaders understand
their responsibilities. Retaliation takes many forms and originates
from many sources--leaders, family, friends and, most pervasively, peer
to peer. Retaliation in its simplest form is bullying. It enables
offenders, threatens survivors, pushes bystanders to shy from action,
and breeds a culture of complacency. Retaliation has no place in the
Army and we must stamp it out.
The chain of command must be at the center of any effort to combat
sexual assault and harassment, and we must ensure leaders remain fully
engaged, involved and vigilant. With commanders at the center of our
efforts, we will continue to decrease the prevalence of sexual assault
through prevention and encourage greater reporting of the crime.
Sexual assault and sexual harassment will be eliminated when every
Soldier, Civilian and Family Member stands up and unequivocally acts to
stamp it out. Together, we have an obligation to do all we can to
safeguard America's sons and daughters, and maintain trust between
Soldiers, Civilians, Families and the Nation. Army leaders, at every
level of the chain of command, are doing this through prevention,
investigation, accountability, advocacy and assessments.
Modernization
It is impossible to discuss readiness without highlighting
modernization, as systems and equipment play a key role in future force
readiness. Equipment modernization must address emerging threats in an
increasingly sophisticated technological environment. The Army must
maintain its ability to contend with such diverse threats as cyber
attacks, electronic warfare, unmanned systems, chemical and biological
agents, and air and missile threats. Decreases to the Army budget over
the past several years significantly impacted Army modernization. Since
2011, the Army has ended 20 programs, delayed 125 and restructured 124.
Between 2011 and 2015, Research and Development and Acquisition
accounts plunged 35 percent from $31 billion to $20 billion.
Procurement alone dropped from $21.3 billion to $13.9 billion. We
estimate that sequestration-level funding will affect over 80 Army
programs. Major impacts include delays in equipping to support
expeditionary forces, delays in combat vehicle and aviation
modernization, unaffordable increases in sustainment costs to repair
older equipment and increases in capability gaps.
The centerpiece of the Army's Modernization Strategy continues to
be the Soldier and the squad. The Army will also develop and field a
robust, integrated tactical mission command network linking command
posts, and extending out to the tactical edge and across platforms. The
Army's objective is to rapidly integrate technologies and applications
that empower, protect and unburden the Soldier and our formations, thus
providing the Soldier with the right equipment, at the right time, to
accomplish the assigned mission.
The President's Budget request would provide over $2 billion to
begin to address the growing gaps in our modernization accounts. Even
with this additional funding, modernization will require several years
to recover from the effects of recent budget reductions and regain
balance in the Force. As such, the Army emphasizes early affordability
reviews, establishing cost caps (funding and procurement objectives),
synchronizing multiple processes and divesting older equipment.
End Strength
Readiness includes possessing the capacity to execute the missions
required by the Defense Strategic Guidance and the Combatant
Commanders. The minimum end strength the Army requires to fully execute
the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance is 980,000 Soldiers--450,000 in the
active Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard and 195,000 in the Army
Reserve. All three components will be smaller than pre-2001 force. If
prolonged sequestration-level funding occurs, we will need to reduce
end strength even further--to 420,000 in the AC by fiscal year 2020,
and 315,000 in the National Guard and 185,000 in the Army Reserve, both
by fiscal year 2019. At these levels we assess the Army would be unable
to fulfill all the elements of the Defense Strategic Guidance.
Although the Army expects to lose combat-seasoned Soldiers and
leaders, our focus through these processes will be on retaining those
individuals with the greatest potential for future service in the right
grades and with the right skills.
Recap: Effects of Sequestration
At force levels driven by affordability under full sequestration,
the Army cannot fully implement its role in the defense strategy.
Sequestration would require the Army to further reduce our Total Army
end strength to at least 920,000 or 60,000 below the 980,000 currently
reflected in the President's Budget request and would severely limit
the Army's investment to equip Soldiers to meet the warfighting
requirements of tomorrow. Under sequestration-level funding readiness
will be reduced to a level the Army will be unable to recover from
until well past the current target of fiscal year 2023. Only 24 of 60
Brigade Combat Teams will receive sufficient funding to conduct
required readiness training. An estimated 85,000 seats will be lost in
specialized skills training, and there will be a $1 billion decrease to
base operations support, eliminating jobs, contracts, causing barracks
and furnishings to further deteriorate. While we will protect funding
for the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), funding for home station
training will be severely reduced which will undermine many units'
readiness and inhibit those scheduled for a CTC from adequate
preparation.
We are expecting a decline in the overall readiness of our forces
because of reduced funding in fiscal year 2015, and sequestration in
fiscal year 2016 will dissipate the gains we achieved from the
Bipartisan Budget Agreement in fiscal year 2014 and leave the Army in a
precarious state. Because we cannot draw down end strength in a rapid
manner, operations and training funding would absorb the majority of
the budget cuts resulting from sequestration, leaving the Army hollow--
lacking training and modern equipment and vulnerable if needed in a
crisis. Ultimately, sequestration will put Soldiers' lives at risk.
Closing
As the velocity of instability increases so does the demand for a
ready and modern Army, adequately sized and trained to prevent, shape,
and win. We ask Congress to repeal the harmful cuts arbitrarily imposed
under sequestration-level funding and provide Soldiers with greater
predictability in these uncertain times.
We are committed to working closely with Congress to ensure that we
are good stewards of our Nation's resources. There are critical cost-
saving measures that allow the Army to further reallocate scarce
resources to ensure we remain ready and resilient. These include
compensation reform, sustainable energy and resource initiatives, a new
round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), and the Aviation
Restructure Initiative (ARI). We also ask Congress to support a Total
Army solution to end strength reductions. Cuts must come from the Total
Force - Active, National Guard, and Reserve--to maintain the balance
among all components to best execute the Army's strategic mission. We
ask Congress to support these initiatives because without the
flexibility to manage our budgets to achieve the greatest capability
possible, we will be forced to make even larger reductions to manpower,
modernization, and training.
The United States Army plays a foundational role in the Joint Force
and is indispensible as we work to reassure our allies, deter our
enemies, and when necessary, win our Nation's wars. The strength of the
All Volunteer Force is our Soldiers, Civilians and their Families, and
we must ensure they always stand Ready. History has taught us that the
price of improperly managing the readiness of our force will ultimately
fall on the backs of our fighting Soldiers. With your assistance, we
will continue to resource the best-trained, best-equipped and best-led
fighting force in the world. We thank Congress for their steadfast and
generous support of the outstanding men and women of the United States
Army, our Army Civilians, Families, and Veterans.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General Allyn.
We're now going to hear testimony from Admiral Michelle
Howard, who's the Vice Chief of Staff for Naval Operations.
Thank you, Admiral Howard.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHELLE J. HOWARD, USN, VICE CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES NAVY
Admiral Howard. Chairwoman Ayotte, Senator Kaine, and
Senator Rounds, distinguished members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today.
It is my honor to represent the Navy's Active and Reserve
sailors and civilians, and particularly the 41,000 sailors who
are underway and deployed around the world today. They're
standing watch right now, and ready to meet today's security
challenges. The citizens of this Nation can take great pride in
the daily contributions of their sons and daughters who fulfill
our Navy's longstanding mandate to be where it matters when it
matters.
Recent events exemplify the benefit of forward presence.
Last August, the George Herbert Walker Bush Carrier Strike
Group relocated 750 nautical miles from the Arabian Sea to the
Arabian Gulf in less than 30 hours. They executed 20 to 30
combat sorties per day. For 54 days, they were the only
coalition strike option to project power against the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Then there's the U.S.S.
Truxton, a destroyer that arrived in the Black Sea within a
week after Russia invaded Crimea, to help reassure our allies
in the area. Another destroyer, U.S.S. Sampson, and littoral
combat ship U.S.S. Fort Worth were among the first vessels to
support the search effort for Air Asia Flight 8501 in the Java
Sea. Our forward presence truly allows us to be where it
matters when it matters.
Effectively operating forward around the globe requires a
high state of readiness of our people and platforms. We are
still recovering from a degraded readiness as a result of over
a decade of combat operations. Sequestration in 2013
exasperated our circumstances and created maintenance backlogs
that have prevented us from getting ships back to the fleet on
time and aircraft back on the flight line. Since 2013, many
ships have been on deployment for 8 to 10 months or longer,
negatively impacting the morale of our people and readiness of
our ships.
Our Navy fiscal year 2016 budget is designed to continue
our readiness recovery, restoring our required contingency
operations capacity by the 2018-to-2020 timeframe, while
continuing to provide a sustainable forward presence. It also
includes credible and survivable sea-based strategic
deterrence. With continued overseas operation funding, our
fiscal year 2016 budget meets the requirements of the global
force management allocation plan. This includes at least two
carrier strike groups and two amphibious ready groups operating
forward, fully mission capable and certified for deployment.
Recovery of readiness also requires a commitment to protect
the time it takes to properly maintain and modernize our
capital-intensive force and to conduct full-spectrum training.
Achieving full readiness entails the restoration of shipyard
capacity and aviation depots primarily through hiring and
workforce development, and PB-16 puts us on a path to address
these challenges.
I want to make it clear. The Navy's fiscal year 2016 budget
is the minimum funding required to execute the Nation's defense
strategy. In other words, if we return to a sequestered budget,
we will not be able to execute the defense strategic guidance.
Past budget shortfalls have forced us to accept significant
risks in two important mission areas. The first mission at risk
is ``deter and defeat aggression,'' which means to win a war in
one theater while deterring another adversary in a different
theater. Assuming risk in this mission leads to loss of
credibility and ability to assure our allies of our support.
The second mission at risk is ``project power despite anti-
access aerial-denial challenges.'' This brings risk in our
ability to win a war. Some of our people and platforms will
arrive late to the fight and inadequately prepared. They will
arrive with insufficient ordnance and without the modern combat
systems and sensors and networks required to win. Ultimately,
this means more ships and aircraft out of action, more sailors,
marines, and merchant marines killed.
As we look to the future, the Navy will continue to be
globally deployed to provide a credible and survivable
strategic deterrent and to support the mission requirements of
the regional combatant commanders. The Navy is fundamentally
multi-mission and will rapidly adjust to meet new challenges
that might require U.S. presence and the--and projecting power.
Our Navy will continue to ensure the security of the
maritime domain by sustaining its forward presence, warfighting
focus, and readiness preparations. Since there is no
foreseeable reduction to global maritime requirements, we have
focused our fiscal year Navy budget to address the challenges
to achieving the necessary readiness to execute our missions.
Any funding below this submission requires a revision of the
defense strategy. To put it simply, sequestration will gravely
damage the national security of this country. Despite these
future challenges, we are fortunate to have the highest
quality, the most diverse force in my Navy's history. These
outstanding men and women who serve our Nation at sea make us
the finest navy in the world.
So, on behalf of all our Active and Reserve sailors, our
civilians, and their families, I extend our appreciation to
this committee for your efforts and continued support to keep
our Navy ready to defend this Nation.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Howard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Michelle Howard Vice Chief of Naval
Operations on Navy Readiness
Chairman Ayotte, Senator Kaine, and distinguished members of the
Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support,
I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the current state of Navy
readiness and the resources necessary to provide a ready Navy in the
future as described in our Fiscal Year 2016 budget request. As we meet,
the Navy and our sister Services have entered a third year of fiscal
uncertainty. In addition, new threats to our nation's interests are
emerging and old tensions are surfacing. Today, it is my honor to
represent all our active and reserve Sailors, particularly the 41,000
Sailors who are underway on ships and submarines or deployed in
expeditionary roles overseas today. They are standing the watch and are
ready to meet today's security challenges. American citizens can take
great pride in the daily contributions of their sons and daughters who
serve in Navy units around the world. We are where it matters, when it
matters, ensuring the security that underpins the global economy and
responding to crises.
Last August, the George H.W. Bush carrier strike group, already
forward present in the North Arabian Sea quickly relocated to the North
Arabian Gulf. Flying 20-30 combat sorties per day, this Navy-Marine
Corps strike fighter team was the only coalition strike option to
project power against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
from the skies over Iraq and Syria for 54 days. Similarly, USS Truxton
(DDG-103) arrived in the Black Sea to establish U.S. presence and to
reassure allies a week after Russia invaded Crimea. In the Java Sea,
USS Fort Worth (LCS-3), a littoral combat ship, and USS Sampson (DDG-
102), a destroyer, were among the first to support the Indonesian-led
search effort for Air Asia Flight 8501. This forward presence is
possible because Navy planning and budget decisions continue to be
guided by the three tenets the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
established when he first took office: Warfighting First, Operate
Forward, and Be Ready. Each of these tenets helps drive a strong focus
on readiness--both now and in the future.
Actions of Congress helped stabilize readiness by supporting
increases over sequestered funding levels through the Bipartisan Budget
Act of 2013, and the subsequent authorization and appropriations acts
for fiscal year 2014 and this year. Nonetheless, we have not yet
recovered from the readiness impact of over a decade of combat
operations, exacerbated by the imposition of a lengthy Continuing
Resolution and followed by budget sequestration in fiscal year 2013,
just as we were beginning to reset the force. These circumstances
created maintenance backlogs that have prevented us from getting ships
back to the Fleet on time and aircraft back on the flight line. We
continue our efforts to rebuild the workforce in our public depots--
both shipyards and aviation readiness centers--and reduce the number of
lost operational days, but it will take years to dig out of a readiness
hole.
The fiscal year 2016 Navy budget submission is designed to continue
our readiness recovery, restoring our required contingency operations
capacity by 2018-2020 while continuing to provide a sustainable forward
presence. PB-16 is the minimum funding required to execute the nation's
Defense Strategy, though we still carry risks in two important mission
areas, notably when confronted with a technologically advanced
adversary or when forced to deny the objective of an opportunistic
aggressor in a second region while already engaged in a major
contingency. As the CNO stated in his recent testimony to the full
committee, risk in our ability to Deter and Defeat Aggression and
Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges mean
``longer timelines to win, more ships and aircraft out of action in
battle, more Sailors, Marines, and Merchant Mariners killed, and less
credibility to deter adversaries and assure allies in the future.''
That level of risk arises from capacity and readiness challenges as
well as slower delivery of critical capabilities to the Fleet,
particularly in air and missile defense and overall ordnance capacity.
My testimony today will focus on the current readiness of the Navy,
and our plan, supported by our fiscal year 2016 budget submission, to
meet the challenges to delivering future readiness. If we return to a
sequestered budget in fiscal year 2016, we will not be able to execute
the Defense Strategy as it is conveyed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense
Review and a revision will be required.
current navy operations and readiness
Employing a combination of Forward Deployed Naval Force ships
homeported overseas and rotationally deploying units from CONUS, our
Navy sustains a global presence of about 100 ships and submarines.
Their combat power and other capabilities include the contributions of
embarked Carrier Air Wings or other aviation units, Marine
Expeditionary Units or elements of a Special Purpose Marine Air/Ground
Task Force, Coast Guard detachments, and Special Operations units,
among others. These capabilities are further enhanced by land-based or
expeditionary Navy forces in theater. With additional ships training in
home waters, approximately half the battle force is underway or
deployed on any given day.
Every hour of every day around the globe we are executing missions.
The sun never sets on the U.S. Navy. Ballistic Missile Submarines
sustain the most survivable leg of our nation's nuclear triad. Carrier
Strike Groups (CSGs), Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) and attack
submarines (SSNs) conduct named operations in support of the Combatant
Commanders (COCOMs) or exercise with other nations to build the
partnerships essential to the stability of the global system. Ballistic
Missile Defense-capable Cruisers and Destroyers protect U.S. and allied
sea and shore-based assets. Our units operate with other nations
through exercises or through executing theater security cooperation
plans; activities essential to the stability of the global system. As
an example, last month, USS Fort Worth (LCS-3) practiced the Code for
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) with the Chinese Navy, enhancing the
professional maritime relationship between the U.S. Seventh Fleet and
the People's Liberation Army-Navy [PLA(N)]. Our crews and platforms are
trained and certified to execute their core capabilities across the
spectrum of military operations and are ready to be re-tasked as
required to meet the next challenge. This was the case in August 2014
when the George HW Bush CSG relocated from the Arabian Sea to the North
Arabian Gulf and was on station, ready for combat operations, in less
than 30 hours. The Navy is fundamentally multi-mission and rapidly
adjusts to meet new challenges that might require U.S. presence and
power projection forces.
Navy will continue to sustain the readiness of our deployed forces
under our fiscal year 2016 budget submission, but it will require
several years to fully recover the capability to rapidly respond to
COCOM requirements for a major contingency. In addition to our forces
that are globally deployed today, combined requirements include: three
extra CSGs and three ARGs to deploy within 30 days to respond to a
major crisis. However, on average, we have only been able to keep one
CSG and one ARG in this readiness posture, 1/3 of the requirement.
Assuming the best case of an on-time, sufficient, and stable budget
with no major contingencies, we should be able to recover from
accumulated backlogs by 2018 for CSGs and 2020 for ARGs--five plus
years after the first round of sequestration.
Recovery of readiness also requires a commitment to protect the
time required to properly maintain and modernize our capital-intensive
force and to conduct full-spectrum training. Our updated force
generation model--the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP)--is designed
to meet this commitment as well as better align all elements that
support readiness development. Achieving full readiness entails the
restoration of required capacity to our public shipyards and aviation
depots-primarily through hiring and workforce development. In addition
to aviation depots backlogs, we must also overcome the challenges of
extending the service life of our legacy F/A-18 Hornet aircraft to
10,000 hours. Underlying our plan is the need to operate the battle
force at a sustainable level over the long term. With this plan we
recover our material readiness, keep faith with our Sailors and their
Families by providing more predictability in the operations schedule,
and control the pace of deployments.
Meeting Our Readiness Challenges
The Navy fiscal year 2016 budget request continues to fully support
the readiness of our deployed forces. The budget request sustains our
credible and survivable sea-based strategic deterrent and with
continued overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding meets the
adjudicated requirements of the fiscal year 2016 Global Force
Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). This includes at least two CSGs and
two ARGs, operating forward, fully mission-capable and certified for
deployment. We continue to employ innovative approaches, including the
use of new platforms like the Joint High Speed Vessel and the Mobile
Landing Platform, to ensure the Navy/Marine Corps team continues to
meet the security requirements of our nation, while providing the
opportunity to reset and sustain the material condition of the force.
Greater use of capable auxiliaries helps relieve pressure on our
overstretched amphibious fleet.
Generating the Force
Navy readiness is at its lowest point in many years. Budget
reductions forced cuts to afloat and ashore operations, generated ship
and aircraft maintenance backlogs, and compelled us to extend unit
deployments. Since 2013, many ships have been on deployment for 8-10
months or longer, exacting a cost on the resiliency of our people,
sustainability of our equipment, and service life of our ships.
Navy has managed force generation using the Fleet Response Plan
(FRP) since it was adopted in 2003 and fully implemented in 2007. This
cyclic process was designed to support readiness by synchronizing
periodic deep maintenance and modernization with the Fleet training
required to achieve GFMAP forward presence objectives and provide
contingency response capacity. However, the continued employment of our
contingency response units to generate increased presence over the past
decade has not only increased maintenance requirements, it has also
limited their availability to complete required maintenance and
training. As with previous testimony of the last few years, this
practice is unsustainable.
In 2013 and 2014, for example, Naval forces provided six percent
and five percent more forward presence, respectively, than allocated
due to emergent operations and unanticipated contingencies. This
unbudgeted employment amounted to greater than 2,200 days in theater
over that approved on the global force management plan in 2013 and
greater than 1,800 days in theater over in 2014. We should operate the
Fleet at sustainable presence levels in order for the Navy to meet
requirements, while still maintaining material readiness, giving ships
time to modernize, and allowing them to reach their expected service
lives.
This year, Navy began implementation of the Optimized Fleet
Response Plan (OFRP) to address these challenges. Designed to stabilize
maintenance schedules and provide sufficient time to maintain and train
the force while continuing to meet operational commitments, OFRP aligns
supporting processes and resources to improve overall readiness.
Furthermore, it provides a more stable and predictable schedule for our
Sailors and their Families. We will continue OFRP implementation across
the FYDP.
Ship Operations
The baseline Ship Operations request for fiscal year 2016 provides
an average of 45 underway steaming days per quarter for deployed ships
and 20 days non-deployed, and would support the highest priority
presence requirements of the Combatant Commanders to include global
presence for two CSGs, two ARGs and an acceptable number of deployed
submarines. With OCO, ship operations are funded at 58 steaming days
deployed/24 days non-deployed. The requested funding will meet the full
adjudicated fiscal year 2016 GFMAP ship presence requirement, support
higher operational tempo for deployed forces and provide full operating
funding for individual ship level maintenance and training.
Air Operations (Flying Hour Program)
The Flying Hour Program (FHP) funds operations, intermediate and
unit-level maintenance, and training for ten Navy carrier air wings,
three Marine Corps air wings, Fleet Air Support aircraft, training
squadrons, Reserve forces and various enabling activities. The fiscal
year 2016 baseline program provides funding to build required levels of
readiness for deployment and sustain the readiness of units that are
deployed. Navy and Marine Corps aviation forces are intended to achieve
an average T-2.5/T-2.0 USN/USMC training readiness requirement with the
exception of non-deployed F/A-18 (A-D) squadrons. Because of shortfalls
in available aircraft due to depot throughput issues, these squadrons
are funded at the maximum executable level while non-deployed,
resulting in an overall readiness average of T-2.8/2.4. All squadrons
deploy meeting theT-2.0 readiness requirement and OCO provides for
additional deployed operating tempo above baseline funding.
Spares
The replenishment of existing, ``off the shelf'' spares used in
ship and aircraft maintenance is funded through the Ship Operations and
Flying Hour Programs. With OCO, those programs are fully funded in
PB16. The provision of initial and outfitting spares for new platforms,
systems and modifications is funded through the spares accounts.
Traditionally, these accounts have been funded below the requirement
due to limited funding or past execution issues. Due to the ultimate
impact on readiness, PB16 sustains executable funding levels to reduce
cross-decking and cannibalization of parts driven by large backlogs.
This is complemented by Navy-wide efforts to improve execution of these
accounts, which have shown considerable success in aviation spares over
the last two years, and continues to be a focus area.
Readiness Investments Required to Sustain the Force--Ship and Aircraft
Maintenance
The Navy maintenance budget requests are built upon proven
sustainment models. They are focused on continuing our ongoing
investment to improve material readiness of our surface combatants, and
support the integration of new capabilities into naval aviation.
The fiscal year 2016 baseline budget request funds 80 percent of
the ship maintenance requirement across the force, addressing both
depot and intermediate level maintenance for carriers, submarines and
surface ships. OCO funding provides the remaining 20 percent of the
full baseline requirement to continue reduction of the backlog of life-
cycle maintenance in our surface ships after years of high operational
tempo and deferred maintenance. This year, the additional OCO for
maintenance reset ($557M) includes funding for aircraft carriers (CVNs)
as well to address increased wear and tear outside of the propulsion
plant as a result of high operational demands. Since much of this work
can only be accomplished in drydock, maintenance reset must continue
across the FYDP.
To address the increased workload in our public shipyards and
improve on-time delivery of ships and submarines back to the Fleet, the
fiscal year 2016 budget grows the shipyard workforce, reaching a high
of 33,500 personnel in fiscal year 2017, with additional investment in
workforce training and development. One attack submarine (SSN)
availability is moved to the private sector in fiscal year 2016 with
plans for two additional SSN availabilities in the private sector in
fiscal year 2017 to mitigate total workload. The fiscal year 2016
budget includes $89.5M in MILCON projects and $142M in restoration and
modernization projects for Naval Shipyards in fiscal year 2016, for a
total capital investment of 8.7 percent in these important facilities.
The Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs), Navy's aviation depots, have
been challenged to recover full productivity after hiring freezes,
furlough, and overtime restrictions in fiscal year 2013. They face a
growing workload, particularly for the additional service life
extension of our legacy
F/A-18 Hornets. FRCs are aggressively hiring with a goal of
reaching full capacity by the end of this year. The hiring of
additional engineering support to address new repairs required to reach
10,000 hours of service life, reallocation of some of the workforce,
and contracting for private sector support have all been undertaken to
complete existing work-in-process at the FRCs, particularly for legacy
Hornets. Field teams have been increased to improve flight line
maintenance and understanding of the material condition of airframes
coming to the depots. As new repairs and parts are identified and
approved, kits are developed to ensure long-lead parts are readily
available.
As a result of these challenges, the Aviation Depot Maintenance
program is funded to an executable level of 77 percent in baseline, 83
percent with OCO for new work to be inducted in fiscal year 2016. This
funding level supports a total of 564 airframes and 1,834 engines/
engine modules to be repaired.
Navy Expeditionary Combat Forces
Navy expeditionary combat forces support ongoing combat operations
and enduring Combatant Commander requirements by deploying maritime
security, construction, explosive ordnance disposal, logistics and
intelligence units to execute missions across the full spectrum of
naval, joint and combined operations. In fiscal year 2016, baseline
funding is improved significantly over prior years, providing 80
percent of the enduring requirement, with OCO supporting an additional
15 percent of the requirement.
Readiness Investments Required to Sustain the Force--Shore
Infrastructure
The Navy's shore infrastructure, both in the United States and
overseas, provides essential support to our Fleet. In addition to
supporting operational and combat readiness, it is also a critical
element in the quality of life and quality of work for our Sailors,
Navy Civilians, and their Families. As we have done for several years,
we continue to take risk in the long-term viability of our shore
infrastructure to sustain Fleet readiness under the current funding
level. However, in fiscal year 2016 our facilities sustainment is
improved to 84 percent of the OSD Facilities Sustainment Model versus
70 percent this year. When restoring and modernizing our
infrastructure, we intend to prioritize life/safety issues and
efficiency improvements to existing infrastructure and focus on
repairing only the key components of our mission critical facilities.
Lessor critical projects will remain deferred. Overall, the Department
of the Navy will exceed the mandated capital investment of 6 percent
across all shipyards and depots described in 10 USC 2476 with a 7.4
percent total investment in fiscal year 2016. With the support provided
by the Congress, Navy is on track to exceed the minimum investment in
fiscal year 2015 as well.
Looking Ahead
As we look to the future, the Navy will continue to be globally
deployed to provide a credible and survivable strategic deterrent and
to support the mission requirements of the regional Combatant
Commanders. Global operations continue to assume an increasingly
maritime focus, and our Navy will sustain its forward presence,
warfighting focus, and readiness preparations to continue operating
where it matters, when it matters. We see no future reduction of these
requirements and we have focused the fiscal year 2016 Navy budget
submission to address the challenges to achieving the necessary
readiness to execute our missions. Any funding below this submission
requires a revision of America's defense strategy. Sequestration would
outright damage the national security of this country.
In closing, we should recall that our Sailors are the most
important element of the future readiness of the Navy. Fortunately,
they are the highest quality, most diverse force in our history and
continue to make us the finest Navy in the world. As the CNO says,
``They are our asymmetric advantage.'' On behalf of all our Sailors
(active and reserve), Civilians and their Families let me reiterate our
appreciation for the continued support of the members of the committee.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Admiral Howard.
I would like to now receive testimony from General Paxton,
the Assistant Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.
Thank you, General Paxton.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. PAXTON, JR., USMC, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
General Paxton. Thank you, Chairman Ayotte, Ranking Member
Kaine, Senator Rounds, and distinguished members of the
Readiness Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today and to report on the readiness of your United
States Marine Corps.
Today, as always, your Marine Corps is committed to
remaining our Nation's ready force, a force that's truly
capable of responding to a crisis anywhere around the globe at
a moment's notice. I know that this committee and the American
people have high expectations of your marines. You expect your
marines to operate forward, to stay engaged with our partners,
to deter potential adversaries, and to respond to crises. When
we fight, you expect us to always win. You expect a lot of your
marines. You should.
As we gather today, more than 31,000 marines are forward
deployed and engaged, doing just what you expect and we expect
them to be doing. Our role as the Nation's ready force
continues to inform how we man, train, and equip the Marine
Corps. It also prioritizes the allocation of resources which we
receive from Congress. I can assure you that your forward-
deployed marines are well trained, well led, and well equipped.
In fact, our readiness was proven last year, as your Marine
Corps supported recent evacuations of United States citizens in
South Sudan and then Libya and then Yemen. Those ready forces
are also currently engaged in the Middle East, conducting
strikes against Syria and Iraq, training Iraqi army units, and
protecting our Embassy in Baghdad. They also routinely deploy
and exercise across the Asia-Pacific region, where over 21,000
are west of the International Dateline.
These events demonstrate the reality and the necessity of
maintaining a combat-ready force that's capable of handling
today's crisis today. Such an investment is essential to
maintaining our Nation's security and the prosperity for the
future.
We will work hard with you in order to maintain the
readiness of our forward-deployed forces. While we do that, we
have not sufficiently invested in our home-station readiness
and in our next-to-deploy forces. We have also underfunded or
delayed the full funding for our modernization, for our
infrastructure sustainment, and some of our quality-of-life
programs. As a result, approximately half of our non-deployed
units are suffering personnel, equipment, or training
shortfalls. Ultimately, this has created an imbalance in our
institutional readiness. At the foundation of our readiness, we
emphasize that all marines and all marine units are physically
and mentally ready, are fully equipped, and have sufficient
time to train with quality small-unit leaders at the helm. They
are, thus, ready to move out whenever they're called.
As we continue to face the possibility of full
implementation of the Budget Control Act (BCA), our future
capacity for crisis response, as well as our capacity for major
contingency response, is likely to be significantly reduced.
Quite simply, if our home-station units are not ready due to a
lack of training, a lack of equipment or manning, it could mean
a delayed response to resolve a contingency or to execute an
operational plan, both of which would create unacceptable risk
for our national defense strategy as well as risk to the limits
of mission accomplishment or the physical risk to the force,
itself.
The readiness challenge we already see today provide
context for our messages this morning. Your United States
Marine Corps can, indeed, meet the requirements of the defense
strategic guidance with the President's Budget, but,
unfortunately, there is no margin. As our chairman stated, even
under PB-16, we are already at the ragged lower edge for
readiness.
I thank each of you for your faithfulness to our Nation,
for your support of the Department and all four of our
services.
I request that my written testimony be accepted for the
record.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this
afternoon, and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Paxton follows:]
Prepared Statement of General John Paxton Assistant Commandant United
States Marine Corps
General Paxton was promoted to General and assumed the duties of
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps on December 15, 2012. A native
of Pennsylvania, he graduated from Cornell University with a Bachelor
and Master of Science in Civil Engineering and was commissioned through
Officer Candidate School in 1974.
General Paxton's assignments in the operating forces include Rifle
and Weapons Platoon Commander and Company Executive Officer, Co. B, 1st
Battalion, 3d Marines; Training Officer, 4th Marine Regiment; Executive
Officer, Co. G, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines; Company Commander, Co. L and
Operations Officer, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines; GCE Operations Officer,
II MEF, and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 1st Marine Division. He
commanded the 1st Battalion, gth Marines in support of operations in
Bosnia and Somalia and later the 1st Marine Regiment.
Other assignments include Company Commander, Co. B, Marine Barracks
Washington and Commanding Officer of Marine Corps Recruiting Station
New York. He served as a Plans Division Officer, Plans, Policies and
Operations, HQMC; the Executive Assistant to the Undersecretary of the
Navy; and Amphibious Operations Officer/Crisis Action Team Executive
Officer, Combined Forces Command, Republic of Korea.
As a general officer, he has served as the Director, Programs
Division,Programs and Resources, HQMC; the Commanding General of Marine
Corps Recruit Depot San Diego/Western Recruiting Region; Commanding
General,1st Marine Division; Chief of Staff, Multi-National Forces--
Iraq; Director for Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff; and Commanding
General, II Marine Expeditionary Force and Commander Marine Forces
Africa. Most recently he served as the Commander, Marine Corps Forces
Command; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic; and
Commander, Marine Forces Europe.
General Paxton is a graduate of the U.S. Army Infantry Officer
Advanced Course and Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He has also
served as a Commandant's Fellow at the Brookings Institute as well as
at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Introduction
Chairman Ayotte, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members of
the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness: I appreciate the
opportunity to testify on the current state of readiness in your Marine
Corps and on our Fiscal Year 2016 budget request. We greatly appreciate
the continued support of Congress and of this subcommittee in ensuring
our ability to remain the Nation's ready force.
Since 1775 the Marine Corps, has been our nation's Crisis Response
force. This was mandated by our 82nd Congress. Continuing to fulfill
this role remains our top priority. Balanced air-ground-logistics
forces that are forward-deployed, forward-engaged, and postured to
shape events, manage instability, project influence, and immediately
respond to crises around the globe are what we provide. Marine forces
remain expeditionary and are partnered with the Navy, coming from the
sea, operating ashore, and providing the time and decision space
necessary for our National Command Authority. Ultimately, our role as
America's 9-1-1 force informs how we man, train, and equip our force
both for today and into the future.
This past year has demonstrated that the Marine Corps must be ready
to respond, fight, and win more than just the last war. In 2014 the
performance of your Marine Corps underscored the fact that
responsiveness and versatility are in high demand today and that fact
can be expected in the future.
your marines--operationally responsive
OEF--Afghanistan
In 2014, Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan (MEB-A) concluded
six years of sustained Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations
in Afghanistan. Operations there focused on ensuring the success of the
Afghanistan presidential elections in the summer of 2014 and
transitioning security responsibilities to the Afghanistan National
Defense Security Forces (ANDSF). With Marines serving in an advisory
capacity, the ANSF in Helmand Province held control of all district
centers.
Regional Command (SW) also turned over operational responsibilities
to the
International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC). Today,
a residual Marine presence of several hundred continues to support the
Resolute Support Mission (NATO)/OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (US) in
Afghanistan.
Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force--Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-
CR) Operations
While not as independent, flexible and responsive as our Marine
Expeditionary Units (MEU) embarked and underway aboard Amphibious Ready
Groups (ARG), two SPMAGTF-CRs are filling crisis response critical
capability gaps for the combatant commanders in AFRICOM and CENTCOM.
This past year SPMAGTF-CR units assigned to AFRICOM positioned forward
in Moron, Spain and Signonella, Italy safeguarded the lives of our
diplomatic personnel and conducted military-assisted departures from
the U.S. Embassy in South Sudan in January and our Embassy in Libya in
July 14.
The Marine Corps SPMAGTF-CR unit assigned to CENTCOM (SPMAGTF-CR-
CC) became fully operational on 1 November 2014 and deployed to the
CENTCOM AOR. Since that time, SPMAGTF-CR-CC conducted embassy
reinforcement, Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) exercises, and
provided critical aviation and ground capabilities in the fight against
ISIL. Most recently, Marines from SPMAGTF-CR-CC supported the
evacuation of our Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen in February of this year.
Current Operations
Today, there are over 31,000 Marines forward deployed, conducting a
full range of theater security and crisis response missions. Marines
are currently conducting security cooperation activities in 29
countries around the globe. Over 22,000 Marines are west of the
international dateline in the Pacific building partnership capacity,
strengthening alliances, deterring aggression, and preparing for any
contingency. Your Marines serving today in the operating forces are
either deployed, getting ready to deploy, or have recently returned
from deployment. Our operational tempo since September 11, 2001 has
been high and remains high today. We expect this trend to continue.
institutional balance
The Marine Corps is committed to remaining the Nation's ready
force, a force truly capable of responding to a crisis anywhere around
the globe at a moment's notice. Thus, the American people and this
Congress have rightly come to expect the Marine Corps to do what must
be done in ``any clime and place'' and under any conditions. As our
36th Commandant recently published in his Commandant's Planning
Guidance (CPG), ``you expect us to respond quickly and win always.''
This obligation requires the Marine Corps to maintain a high state
of combat readiness at all times. Readiness is the critical measure of
our Marine Corps' capacity to respond with required capability and
leadership. We look at readiness through the lens of our five
institutional pillars of readiness--high quality people, unit
readiness, capacity to meet the combatant commanders' requirements,
infrastructure sustainment, and equipment modernization. These pillars
represent the operational and foundational components of readiness
across the Marine Corps. We know we are ready when leaders confirm that
their units are well trained, well led at all levels, and can respond
quickly to the unforeseen. This capability helps to minimize
operational risk and provides our national leaders the time and space
to make reasoned decisions.
While we will always ensure that our forward deployed Marines and
Sailors are properly manned, trained, and equipped, we must seek a
balanced investment across the pillars to simultaneously ensure current
as well as future (i.e. next to deploy) readiness. At the foundation of
this readiness, we emphasize that all Marines and all Marine units
(i.e. from home station) are physically and mentally ready, are fully
equipped, and have sufficient time with quality small unit leaders in
place to move and train whenever called upon.
We also fully appreciate that our readiness and institutional
balance today, and the ability to maintain it in the future, are
directly related to today's fiscal realities. During these fiscally
constrained times, we must remain focused on the allocation of
resources to ensure the holistic readiness of the institution (i.e.
training, education, infrastructure and modernization), making every
dollar count when and where it is needed most.
As the Marine Corps looks to achieve balance across the five
pillars of readiness after thirteen years of uninterrupted war, our
efforts have been frustrated by two clearly tenuous variables. First,
the continued high operational tempo of, and high demand for, Marine
forces, and second, the continued budget uncertainty surrounding annual
appropriations (i.e. sequestration and impacts). Both of these
variables have been keenly and repeatedly felt throughout the Marine
Corps all this year as we have protected near-term readiness at the
expense of our long-term modernization and of our infrastructure
investments. This reality has forced the Marine Corps' to make the hard
choice to underfund, reduce or delay funding, which threatens our
future readiness and responsiveness.
As America's 9-1-1 force, your Corps is required to maintain an
institutional capability, an operational balance, and an expeditionary
mindset that facilitates our ability to deploy ready forces tonight.
However, as we continue to face the possibility of sequestration-level
funding for FY 2016, we may well be forced into adopting some short
term or limited scope and scale variations for future unexpected
deployments over the next few years. This means quite simply, that we
will see increased risk in timely response to crises, in properly
training and equipping our Marines to respond, and in their overall
readiness to respond. By responding later with less and being less
trained we may eventually expect to see an increase in casualties.
Readiness and the Capacity to Respond
With the support of Congress, the Marine Corps is committed to
remaining ready and continuing the tradition of innovation, adaptation,
and winning our Nation's battles. The challenges of the future
operating environment will demand that our Nation maintain a force-in-
readiness that is capable of true global response. America's
responsibility as a world leader requires an approach to the current
and future strategic landscape that leverages the forward presence of
our military forces in support of our diplomatic and economic elements
of power.
As stated in the 2012 President's Defense Strategic Guidance, ``The
United States will continue to lead global efforts with capable allies
and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both by
strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by
maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities.'' High-
yield, relatively low-investment Marine Corps capabilities (ready and
responsive air-ground-logistics forces) uniquely support this strategic
approach.
current readiness
Maintaining the readiness of our forward deployed forces during a
period of high operational tempo while amidst fiscal uncertainty; as
well as fiscal decline, comes with ever increasing operational and
programmatic risk. Today, approximately half of the Marine Corps' home-
station units are at an unacceptable level ofreadiness in their ability
to execute wartime missions, respond to unexpected crises, and surge
for major contingencies. Furthermore, the ability of non-deployed units
to conduct full spectrum operations continues to degrade as home-
station personnel and equipment are sourced to protect and project the
readiness of deployed and next-to-deploy units. As the Nation's first
responders, the Marine Corps' home-stationed units are expected to be
at or near the same high state of readiness as our deployed units,
since these non-deployed units will provide the capacity to respond
with the capability required (leadership and training) in the event of
unexpected crises and or major contingencies.
Despite this challenge and imbalance, the Marine Corps continues to
provide units ready and responsive to meet core and assigned missions
in support of all directed current operational, crisis, and contingency
requirements. However, we continue to assume long-term risk
particularly in supporting major contingencies in order to fund unit
readiness in the near term. Consequently, the Marine Corps' future
capacity for crisis response and major contingency response is likely
to be significantly reduced. Quite simply, if those units are not ready
due to a lack of training, equipment or manning, it could mean a
delayed response to resolve a contingency or to execute an operational
plan, both of which create unacceptable risk for our national defense
strategy as well as risk to mission accomplishment and to the whole-of-
force itself. The following sections elaborate on some specific
readiness challenges the Corps is facing today.
current challenges to readiness and the capacitv to respond
As the Nation's first responders, we firmly believe that the Marine
Corps as a service, and in its entirety, is expected to be always in a
high state of readiness. Today however, there are numerous challenges
that have created a readiness imbalance, affecting our capacity to
respond to future challenges with the required capability and
leadership. For example, our home station unit's ability to train is
challenged. Time is the essential component required to fix worn
equipment and to train units to standard. A lower end-strength and
unwavering and high unit deployment to dwell (D2D) ratios exacerbate
time at home stations to prepare, train, and maintain. This, coupled
with temporary shortages of personnel and equipment at the unit level,
validate operational requirements that exceed resource availability,
and a growing paucity of amphibious platforms on which to train, all
contribute to degraded full-spectrum capabilities across the entire
Service. As an example, a D2D ratio of 1:2 means your Marines are
deploying for 7 months and home for 14 months before deploying again.
During that 14-month ``dwell,'' units are affected by personnel changes
and gaps (duty station rotations, schooling, and maintenance), ship
availability shortfalls and growing maintenance requirements, equipment
reset requirements (service life extensions and upgrades), degraded
supply storages, training schedule challenges (older ranges and
equipment, and weather) and more. These collective challenges factor
into every unit's compressed and stressing task to remain constantly
ready. In some case, the D2D ratio is even lower than 1:2 (MV-22
squadrons, Combat Engineer units, and F/A-18 squadrons), placing
considerable stress on high demand, low density units and equipment.
Also concerning is the inability to assess the long-term health of the
force at lower D2D ratios and the impact on overall force retention.
Quite simply, despite OIF and OEF being ``over,'' the unstable world
and ``New Normal'' is causing your Corps to continue to ``run hot.'' As
referenced earlier, just over half of Marine Corps home-stationed units
are at unacceptable levels of readiness. For example, Marine Aviation
contains some of our most stressed units. As operational commitments
remain relatively steady, the overall number of Marine aircraft
available for tasking and or training has decreased since 2003. At that
time Marine Aviation contained 58 active component squadrons and 12
reserve component squadrons for a total of 70 squadrons.
The Marine Corps has 55 active component squadrons today, three of
which (2 VMM, and lVMFA) are in transition. Of the 52 remaining
squadrons, 33 percent are deployed and 17 percent are in pre-deployment
workups to deploy. Our minimum readiness goal to deploy is T-2.0, which
is simply the cut line between a squadron trained to accomplish its
core mission and a squadron that is not. To attain a T-2.0 rating, a
squadron must be qualified to perform at least 70 percent of its
Mission Essential Tasks (METs) (i.e. tasks required to accomplish the
multiple missions that are or may be assigned to a unit). Currently,
our deployed squadrons and detachments remain well trained and properly
resourced, averaging T-2.17. Next-to-deploy units are often unable to
achieve the minimum goal of T-2.0 until just prior to deployment. Non-
deployed squadrons experience significant and unhealthy resource
challenges, which manifest in training and readiness degradation,
averaging T-2.96.
The Marine Corps is actively and deliberately applying resources to
maintain the readiness of deployed and next-to-deploy units. Our focus
is to continue to meet all current requirements, while addressing the
personnel, equipment, and training challenges across the remainder of
the force. We are in the midst of a comprehensive review of our manning
and readiness reporting systems and will develop a detailed plan to
enhance our overall readiness during 2015.
We are also committed to meet the growing expeditionary
requirements of our combatant commanders (COCOMs). To meet COCOM
requirements, the Marine Corps will be required to sustain a D2D ratio
in the active component force of 1:2 vice a more stable, and time
proven, D2D ratio of 1:3. The Marine Corps also has some high demand/
low density units that maintain a current D2D ratio of less than 1:2,
such as the (VMGR/KC-130) community. These communities are closely
monitored for training, maintenance, and deployment readiness as well
as deployment frequency. The Marine Corps will continue to provide
ready forces to meet COCOM demands, but we are carefully assessing the
impact of reduced D2D ratios on our training and quality of life across
all units and occupational fields. What we do know is that the optimal
size of your Marine Corps to meet the requirements of the Defense
Strategic Guidance is 186,800 Marines. This optimal size gives the
Marine Corps the capacity we need to meet current operational
requirements demand with a D2D ratio closer to 1:3 which supports time
for home station units to train and maintain. We continue to validate
and support this assessment. Today, due to fiscal realities, the Marine
Corps is adjusting its active duty end-strength to reach 182,000
Marines by 2017. As we continue to downsize, we must emphasize the
enduring national mission requirement to provide forces that can always
meet today's crisis response demands.
Another significant readiness challenge is the growing gap in the
numbers of small unit leaders with the right grade, experience,
technical skills and leadership qualifications associated with their
billets. Specifically, our current inventory of Non-Commissioned
Officers (NCOs) and Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) is not
meeting our force structure requirements. The technical, tactical, and
leadership demands on our NCOs and SNCOs has grown during 13 years of
OIF and OEF. These Marine combat leaders have proven their mettle. We
remain committed to fully and properly training them and their
successors for the rigors of an unstable world with disaggregated
operations against an asymmetric enemy in a distant and hostile
environment. This dynamic directly affects our current and future
training, maintenance, and discipline. We must train and retain
adequate numbers of SNCOs and NCOs to preclude degraded crisis response
readiness and ensure combat effectiveness. The Marine Corps' PB16
military budget funds a fiscal year 2016 end-strength of 184,000 in our
base budget and supports right-sizing our NCO ranks to provide our
Marines the small unit leadership they deserve and which our Corps and
nation need.
naval expeditionary force
We share a rich heritage and maintain a strong partnership with the
United States Navy. Sea-based and forward deployed naval forces provide
the day-to-day engagement, crisis response, and assured access for the
joint force in a contingency. The availability of amphibious shipping
is paramount to both our readiness and to our overall ability to
respond. The Marine Corps' requirement for amphibious warships to
respond, for war plans, and for contingencies remains at 38 platforms.
The Navy's inventory today is 31 total amphibious warships. When
accounting for steady-state demands and for essential maintenance
requirements we are seeing that far fewer platforms are readily
available for employment. Simply put we have a serious inventory
problem and a growing availability challenge.
This is why the Marine Corps fully supports the Secretary of the
Navy and Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO) efforts to increase the
inventory and availability of amphibious platforms and surface
connectors that facilitate our key concepts of operational maneuver
from the sea (OMFTS) and ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM). The
President's budget supports key investments in LPD-28, LX(R), and ship-
to-shore connectors (SSC), and demonstrates our commitment to global
maritime presence and to our Nation's mandate to sustain an amphibious
capability that can respond to, deter, deny, and defeat threats on a
global scale. We appreciate Congress providing a substantial portion of
funding to procure a 12th LPD, and respectfully request that this
committee continue to support full funding of that amphibious ship. The
enhanced mission profiles of these new, improved and much needed
platforms create operational flexibility, extended geographical reach,
and surge capabilities for all our COCOMs.
Naval investments in alternative seabasing platforms expand access
and reduce dependence on land bases, supporting national global
strategic objectives and providing operational flexibility in an
uncertain world. The naval seabasing investments in the Mobile Landing
Platform (MLP), the Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR)
strategic sealift ship, and the (T-AKE) Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship
as part of the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons (MPS), coupled
with the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), Afloat Forward Staging Base
(AFSB) and ship-to-shore connectors provide additional lift, speed, and
maneuver capability to augment, yet not necessarily replace or
substitute for proven Navy and Marine Corps amphibious combat
capabilities. Although never a substitute for amphibious warships,
particularly in a contested environment, these alternative platforms
will continually complement amphibious ships and can enhance national
readiness and ability to answer COCOM non-combat demands.
While the President's Budget moves us in the right direction, it
will take many years and a sustained effort to address the serious risk
in the current inventory and availability of amphibious ships. The
Marine Corps will continue to work closely with the Navy and Congress
to implement the 30 year ship building plan and to address the current
amphibious availability and readiness challenges.
Building the Force of the Future
As challenging as it has been to prepare Marines for the current
fight, our force must adapt to the ever-changing character and conduct
of warfare to remain ready, relevant, and responsive. Innovation and
adaptability will be required to build the force of the future. For the
last 14 years, the Marine Corps has applied a small but key percentage
of our resources to providing Marines what tey need for today's fight.
While individual Marines are our critical weapons system, we must
outfit him with modem, reliable and useful gear and equipment. Because
readiness remains our first priority in meeting our national security
responsibility, our focus on an unrelenting demand for forces coupled
with a declining budget has forced the Marine Corps to make difficult
choices and to reduce investment in modernization in order to maintain
current and near term readiness. We are consciously, by necessity,
delaying needed modernization.
modernization efforts
Our declining budget has forced the Marine Corps to make difficult
choices at the expense of modernization to maintain current and near
term readiness. In the current fiscal environment, the Marine Corps is
investing only in essential modernization, focusing on those areas that
underpin our core competencies. Today, we have placed much emphasis on
new or replacement programs such as our Amphibious Combat Vehicle
(ACV), a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), our CH-53K Heavy Lift
Replacement, and the critical fifth generation F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF). At the same time, our modernization resources are also
necessarily focused on improving capabilities and extending the life of
current systems in order to fill gaps that can be exploited by today's
threats.
In order to balance modernization across the capabilities of the
MAGTF and ensure a ready and responsive force of the future, our two
top priorities remain the ACV, to include science and technology
efforts toward high-water speed capabilities, and the JSF, both of
which provide the technology required to dominate our adversaries in
the future. Additionally, our investments in Network On-the-Move
(NOTM), Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), and other additional
aviation platforms such as the MV-22, CH-53K, and UH-lY/AH-l Z programs
are vital to the overall combat effectiveness and readiness of our
future MAGTFs. We are also focused on and investing heavily in
extending the service life and improving the interim capabilities of
our legacy systems due to the time required to recapitalize needed
capabilities while ensuring a smooth transition to future requirements.
For example, the need for recapitalization of our 42-year old AAV
is critical and the nation cannot afford to gap this capability. Rising
annual maintenance costs for the AAV and other legacy systems compete
for resources against modernization efforts that seek to replace them
with modem combat capabilities (i.e. ACV). This required allocation of
precious resources works against our other investment and
recapitalization efforts. Additionally, for our legacy aircraft
platforms, the focus is on modernization to make them relevant in
tomorrow's fight while simultaneously providing a bridge to rearrange
our aviation recapitalization efforts. Rapid procurement of these new
systems is critical to solving both our serious current and future
readiness problems.
If we do not modernize, we will actually move backwards. Our
adversaries continue to develop new capabilities exploiting any
technology gaps associated with specific domains and functions. By
under-resourcing equipment modernization we will ultimately fall
behind. Increasing threats, the proliferation of A2/AD weapon systems,
and the aging of key material capabilities present an unacceptable risk
to forcible entry operations and our overall combat effectiveness if
modernization continues to be diminished or halted.
Modernization and innovation are more than just procurement
programs. We will re-energize our MAGTF experimentation and test new
tactics, techniques, procedures, equipment and concepts that will allow
us to meet every challenge. We are maintaining our commitment to
Science and Technology, and we continue to look for opportunities to
expand our efforts in this critical area.
concept development and experimentation
The current and future operating environment will remain volatile,
unpredictable, and complex. To continue to deliver order from the
chaos, we anticipate no lessening in the demand for Marine capabilities
ranging from Amphibious Ready Groups with enhanced Marine Expeditionary
Units (ARG/MEUs) and Special Purpose MAGTFs for crisis response as well
as for more Marine Security Guards at our embassies and consulates
(MCESG). Trends point to greater security challenges to our vital
national interests almost everywhere. Therefore, as our Nation meets
these future challenges, it will rely heavily on the Marine Corps to
remain the ready, relevant, and responsive force of first resort. While
there will be a degree of consistency in our missions, there is likely
to be inconsistency in the operating environment, and we must be
willing to experiment, take risk, and implement change to overcome
challenges in those varied operating environments (threat, access,
communications, etc.). As was the case prior to World War II, the
quality and focus of our concept development, our expansion of science
and technology, the :frequency and significance of our exercises, and
our constant experimentation efforts will remain critical to our
overall readiness, relevance, and indeed our mission success. The end
state of our efforts to link concepts and doctrine to exercises and
experimentation will be to develop and nurture the intellectual energy
and creativity of individual Marines and of units. This will enable the
Marine Corps to continue to be a leader in both tactical and
operational innovation.
A year ago we published Expeditionary Force 21 (EF-21), our Marine
Corps capstone concept. EF-21 establishes our vision and goals for the
next 10 years and provides guidance for the design and development of
the future force that will fight and win in the future environment.
Expeditionary Force 21 will also inform decisions regarding how we will
adjust our organizational structure to exploit the value of regionally
focused forces and provide the basis for future Navy and Marine Corps
capability development to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.
Developed in close coordination with the recent update of our maritime
strategy (i.e. Cooperative Strategy 21 (CS21)), Expeditionary Force 21
describes how the Marine Corps will be postured, organized, trained,
and equipped to fulfill the responsibilities and missions required
around the world. This comprises four essential lines of effort:
refining our organization, adjusting our forward posture, increasing
our naval integration, and enhancing littoral maneuver capability.
all volunteer force
Our Marines and civilians are the foundation of who we are and of
all that we do. We succeed because of our focus on recruiting,
training, and retaining quality people. People are the primary means
through which the Marine Corps remains ready and responsive in
guaranteeing the defense of our great Nation. The resources we dedicate
to recruiting, retaining, and developing high quality people directly
contribute to the success of our institution. Thus, our commitment to
attract, train, and deploy with the best quality Marines must always
remain at the forefront.
Today, the Marine Corps does not have the proper level of personnel
stability or cohesion in our non-deployed units. Having to move Marines
between units to meet manning goals for approaching often accelerated
or extended deployment cycles creates personnel turbulence, inhibits
cohesion, and is not visible in our current readiness assessment tools.
This personnel turbulence affects our combat readiness and our ability
to optimally train, retain, and take care of Marines. Moving forward,
we will improve cohesion by increasing our individual and unit
preparedness across the force as well as emphasizing consistency of
leadership and personnel stability across that same force.
Conclusion
On behalf of the Marines and Sailors and their families, all of
whom provide this Nation with its versatile and reliable force-in
readiness, I thank Congress and this subcommittee for your continued
interest in and recognition of our operational and fiscal challenges
and our key contributions to national security. We are proud of our
reputation for frugality and remaining one of the best values for the
defense dollar. In these times of budget austerity, the Nation
continues to hold high expectations of her Marine Corps, and our
stewardship of taxpayer dollars. The Marine Corps will continue to
answer the Nation's call to arms, meet the needs of the Combatant
Commanders and others who depend upon our service, and operate forward
as a strategically mobile force optimized for forward-presence and
crisis response. Your continued support is requested to provide a
balance across all five of our readiness pillars, so we can maintain
our institutional readiness and our ability to remain responsive . . .
as your predecessors wisely charged more than 60 years ago, ``to be the
most ready when the nation is least ready.''
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General Paxton.
We'll now receive testimony from General Spencer, who is
the Vice Chief of Staff for the United States Air Force.
Thank you, General Spencer.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL LARRY O. SPENCER, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF
STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
General Spencer. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member
Kaine, and Senator Rounds, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for your continued support of America's
airmen and their families, and for the opportunity to share the
Air Force's current readiness posture.
The United States Air Force is the most globally engaged
air force on the planet, and our airmen are defending the
Nation through a wide spectrum of activities, from dropping
bombs and flying space assets to delivering humanitarian relief
and protecting the homeland. We remain the best air force in
the world. But, recent budget cuts, coupled with 24 years of
combat operations, has taken its toll.
Our airmen, your airmen, have always been, and will always
be, the cornerstone of the Air Force. Combatant commanders tell
us that our airmen continue to perform exceptionally well
across the globe. However, we are the smallest and oldest air
force we have ever been, while demand for air power continues
to grow. This is not a complaint. We're happy that what we
bring to the table is recognized as indispensable when it comes
to meeting the Nation's objectives. But, I am concerned. In
fact, I'm more concerned than I--today than I was when I
testified last year.
We have tankers that are, on average, 52 years old; bombers
that are over 50 years old; and fourth-generation fighters that
are, on average, 25 years old. In 1991, if we had used the B-17
bomber to strike targets in Baghdad during the first Gulf War,
it would have been younger than the B-52, the KC-135, and the
U-2 are today. We have to modernize to maintain our
technological advantage, and this is something that we've set
aside, the last few years. Our potential adversaries have been
watching us and now know what it takes to create the best air
force in the world. They are investing in technologies and
doing everything they can to reduce our current airpower
advantage.
Because we have the smallest and oldest air force in
history, we need all of our airmen to be proficient in every
aspect of their mission. Unfortunately, our high operations
tempo has caused our airmen to only be proficient in the jobs
they perform when they deploy. We simply do not have the time
and the resources to train airmen across the full range of Air
Force missions. I'm confident that, with your help, we can
reverse this trend and regain our readiness. But, we will have
to make some difficult choices to balance capacity, capability,
and readiness, all of which have already been cut to the bone.
Our fiscal year 2016 President's Budget submission aims to
balance critical operational training and modernization
commitments, but, even at this level, it will take years to
recover lost readiness. We have already delayed major
modernization efforts, cut manpower, and reduced training
dollars.
One final point. The capability gap that separates us from
other air forces is narrowing. That gap will close even faster
under BCA levels of funding. When sequestration first hit in
2013, we saw the domino effect it had on our pilots,
maintainers, weapons loaders, air traffic controllers, and our
fighters and bomber squadrons. Readiness levels of those
central to combat operations plummeted. In short, we were not
fully ready. We cannot afford to let that happen again.
To quote a young C-17 instructor pilot, ``I am committed to
defending this Nation anytime and anyplace, but I need the
training and equipment to be ready to perform at my best.''
This is critical to answering the Nation's call to fly, fight,
and win.
I'd like to thank you all for the opportunity to be here
today, and for your continued support of your Air Force. I'm
now happy to take your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Spencer follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Larry O. Spencer, Vice Chief of Staff of
the Air Force
Introduction
The United States Air Force has never failed to meet any threat our
Nation has faced and establish an environment that was beyond the
capabilities of our enemies to resist. Our capabilities of range,
speed, and agility give our Nation an indispensable and qualitative
advantage that is unparalleled today and we must retain them going into
the future. Whether it's opening an aerial port to deliver humanitarian
aid, flying a single sortie from middle-America to the Korea peninsula
and back to send a clear message, dropping a bomb, or dropping a
Brigade Combat Team into the conflict zone--we can reach out and touch
anyone, anytime, at any place, in a matter of hours, not days. Since
1947, Americans have been able to sleep soundly knowing that in every
corner of the globe, the United States Air Force is ready.
Through technology, ingenuity, and unparalleled training and
expertise the Air Force provides our Nation and allies more precise and
effective options. But readiness requires the right number of Airmen,
with the right equipment, trained to the right level, and with the
right amount of support and resources, to accomplish what the Nation
asks us to do. While Airmen have performed exceptionally well in major
combat operations such as those in Iraq, and Afghanistan, these
operations come at a price. Today, continual demand for airpower,
coupled with dwindling and uncertain budgets, leave the force with
insufficient time and resources to train Airmen across the full range
of Air Force missions. Proficiency required for highly contested, non-
permissive environments has suffered, due to our necessary engagement
in the current counterinsurgency fights.
We recognize that there are no quick fixes. Even at the level of
the President's Budget it will take the Air Force years to recover lost
readiness. Our return to full-spectrum readiness must include the
funding of critical programs such as flying hours, weapons system
sustainment, and infrastructure, while also balancing deployment tempo,
training, and exercises. We must also be technologically superior and
agile enough to evolve ahead of the myriad of future potential threats.
However, because of the current restrictive and uncertain fiscal
environment we have been forced to make difficult choices within an
incredibly complex security environment. Our current Service readiness
and capacity are degraded to the point where our core capabilities are
at risk. To correct this, the fiscal year 2016 President's Budget (FY16
PB) preserves the minimum capability to sustain current warfighting
efforts, and places the Air Force on a path toward balancing readiness
with necessary modernization in order to meet evolving threats.
Readiness Today; Readiness Tomorrow
The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (as updated by the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review) requires healthy and sustainable Air Force
combat readiness, modernization and recapitalization programs. Since
passage of the Budget Control Act, the Air Force has been forced to
trade capacity in an attempt to preserve capability. We are now at the
point where any further reduction in size equals a reduction in
capability--the two are inextricably linked. Combatant commanders
require Air Force support on a 24/7 basis, and the Air Force does not
have excess capacity to trade away. If asked to accomplish multiple
parts of the defense strategy, we will have to make difficult decisions
on mission priorities and dilute coverage across the board. Unless we
improve readiness levels, our full combat power will take longer to
apply, will pull coverage from other areas, and will increase risk to
our Joint and coalition forces.
The FY16 PB is a step to alleviate some of that risk. It allows us
to preserve our future readiness, including munitions inventories;
protect our top three acquisitions programs; and protect investments
such as the training aircraft system, cyber mission forces and the next
generation of space systems. Our plan is to reduce risk in high-
priority areas by accelerating the modernization of aging fleets and
improving our installations around the country. We are focused on
capabilities, not platforms--preserving and enhancing the agility and
flexibility of the Air Force.
Weapons System Sustainment
Weapons system sustainment (WSS) is a key component of full-
spectrum readiness. Years of combat demands have taken a toll across
many weapons systems. We continue to see an increase in the costs of
WSS requirements. These costs are driven by factors such as the
complexity of new systems, operations tempo, force structure changes,
and growth in required depot-level maintenance on legacy aircraft.
If sequestration-level funding returns, it will hamper our efforts
to improve WSS. Depot delays will result in the grounding of some
aircraft. It will mean idle production shops, a degradation of
workforce proficiency and productivity, and corresponding future
volatility and operational costs. Analysis shows it can take up to
three years to recover full restoration of depot workforce productivity
and proficiency. Historically, WSS funding requirements for combat-
ready forces increase at a rate double that of inflation planning
factors. WSS costs still outpace inflationary growth, and in the
current fiscal environment, our efforts to restore weapons systems to
required levels will be a major challenge.
The longer we fly our legacy aircraft, the more they will break and
require increased preventative maintenance. We have tankers that are on
average 52 years old, bombers that are over 50 years old, and fourth
generation fighters that are an average of 25 years old. If we had kept
WWII's B-17 bomber, and flown it in Operation Desert Storm 1991, it
would have been younger than the B-52, the KC-135, and the U-2 are
today. If we are not able to perform weapons system sustainment on our
aircraft or modernize them so we can improve upon their speed, range,
and survivability, we will lose our technological edge and superiority.
Flying Hours and Training
Our flying hour program is essential to full-spectrum readiness. If
sequestration is implemented, it will affect our ability to accomplish
flying and training requirements and our ability to meet full-spectrum
operations. Readiness is not just influenced by funding, but also
ongoing operations. Time and resources used to conduct current
operations limit opportunities to train across the full-spectrum of
missions. For example, the operational and combat demands over the last
decade have eroded our ability to train for missions involving anti-
access/area denial scenarios. To meet combatant commander requirements,
we have had to increase our deployment lengths and decrease time
between deployments, which affect our reconstitution and training
cycles. Our high operations tempo has resulted in Airmen that are only
proficient in the jobs they do when they deploy.
To fix this problem and be able to meet an increasing demand for
Air Force capabilities in future operations, we need the funding and
the latitude to balance these rotational and expeditionary requirements
with adequate full-spectrum training. The additional funding requested
in the FY16 PB will help us recover flying hour-related readiness due
to the fiscal year 2013 sequester and put us on a steady path toward
full recovery.
Operational Training Infrastructure (OTI)
Full-spectrum training for combat against a high-end adversary
requires specific investment and emphasis on an integrated training and
exercise capability. This includes the availability and sustainability
of air-to-air and air-to-ground training ranges, fully augmented by,
and integrated with, virtual training in simulators and with
constructive models to represent a high-end adversary. This is what we
call our Operational Training Infrastructure (OTI). Our ability to
effectively expose our forces to a realistic, sufficiently dense, and
advanced threat capability cannot be accomplished without our focus on
OTI.
OTI becomes critical when you consider that we must expand our 5th
generation weapon systems. These systems are so advanced that
challenging our operators in live training environments while
protecting the capabilities and tactics of these systems is
problematic. Our approach to OTI will address these training shortfalls
while maximizing the value of every training dollar.
In addition to investments in simulators as part of OTI, our ranges
are used for large-scale joint and coalition exercises that are
critical to training in realistic scenarios. We intend to sustain these
critical national assets to elevate flying training effectiveness for
the joint team and improve unit readiness. The same is true for our
munitions. The FY16 PB includes funding to addresses the shortfalls in
our critical munitions programs and to accelerate production and reduce
unit cost.
Space Readiness
Space-based capabilities and effects are vital to US warfighting
and the Air Force remains committed to maintaining the advantages this
domain provides. Potential adversaries are developing and fielding
capabilities to deny us these advantages and are also fielding their
own space capabilities to support their terrestrial warfighting
operations. We now recognize that space can no longer be considered a
sanctuary. In order to deter and defeat interference and attacks on US
space systems we must improve space domain mission assurance
capabilities against aggressive and comprehensive space control
programs.
Nuclear Readiness
The FY16 PB strengthens the nuclear enterprise, the number one
mission priority of the Air Force. The Air Force's intercontinental
ballistic missiles and heavy bombers provide two legs of the Nation's
nuclear triad. The FY16 PB funds additional investments across the FYDP
to sustain and modernize the ICBM force and funds 1,120 additional
military and civilian billets across the nuclear enterprise as part of
the Secretary of the Air Force-directed Force Improvement Program.
conclusion
A ready, strong, and agile Air Force is a critical component of the
best, most credible military in the world. Air Force capabilities are
indispensable to deterrence, controlled escalation, and destruction of
an adversary's military capability . . . as well as development,
stability, and partnership-building. Today's Air Force provides America
an indispensable hedge against the challenges of a dangerous and
uncertain future, providing viable foreign policy options without
requiring a large military commitment on foreign soil.
Such a force does not happen by accident; it must be deliberately
planned and consistently funded in order to be successful. Continued
investments in Air Force capabilities and readiness are essential to
ensuring that the Air Force maintains the range, speed, and agility the
Nation expects. Regardless of the future security environment, the Air
Force must retain--and maintain--its unique ability to provide America
with Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General Spencer.
In light of the fact that we've had President Ghani here, I
wanted to, in particular, ask General Allyn and General Paxton
about what is happening on the ground in Afghanistan. In--you
know, in particular, I was pleased to hear the President's
announcement this week that he has decided to leave 9,800
troops in Afghanistan until the end of the year. However, it
seems to me that, as we look forward, having spoken to General
Campbell and others about the situation in Afghanistan, that,
even after this year, the most prudent course forward would be
a ground--a conditions-based determination of what we do with
those 9,800 troops. So, could you speak to that issue for me,
in terms of where we are in Afghanistan and the needs we will
have, going forward? You know, and I think one of the things
all of us took from the President's speech today is, we
actually have a partner that we can work with. That is
refreshing.
So, General Allyn?
General Allyn. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I was fortunate to be in Afghanistan with General Campbell
the first week of February, and I had an opportunity to deploy
down to be with both of our divisions that are forward,
providing mission command--one from Kandahar, at Regional
Command South, Tactical Air Command South (TAC-South), and the
other one in TAC-East, from the 3rd Infantry Division stationed
at Bagram. What was very clear to me as they were posturing for
the potential to have to draw down to the directed numbers by
the end of the year was that we had increased the ratio of our
soldiers to contractors to a level that was what I would call
the ``razor's edge of risk.'' We had contractors doing that
which soldiers need to do to assure the security of our forces.
It was really driven by the force manning levels that General
Campbell was posturing for to accomplish the mission.
I also had an opportunity to meet with two of the senior
commanders from the Afghan Security Forces that I had served
with in 2011 to 2012 in Regional Command East, and I asked for
their assessment of where they thought the Afghan Security
Forces were and what gave them concern. They were, overall,
very optimistic, very determined, and very confident that they
could weather the battle against the Taliban if they had the
critical enabling capability that they required from--you know,
from the United States--and, in specific, some of the--closing
the gap for them, in terms of their aviation and their close
air support capability that is not yet fully developed, and to
continue to mature their sustainment capacity. Both efforts are
well underway by the joint team that is there on the ground in
Bagram under General Campbell's leadership. I concur with you
that the ground that we have been able to regain with the
partnership between General Campbell and President Ghani is
very, very inspiring, certainly to us, who have not had that
experience in the last couple of years, but it's also very
inspiring to the Afghan Security Forces. Because President
Ghani has personally gone down to spend time with his forces
and communicate his intent to enable them to fight and win. So,
I think it bodes well as we look forward, ma'am.
General Paxton. Yeah, thank you, Madam Chair. I, too, have
had the opportunity on many occasions to be over in Afghanistan
and, just several months ago, with our Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB) Alpha, who was down in Helmand Province before
they pulled out. I'd echo what General Allyn said a moment ago,
in that the conditions for success in Afghanistan have been
set, both at the tactical level as well as at the strategic
level. Making events on the ground and the commitment to
continue there be more conditions-based than time-based is
always a good thing. I feel good for General Campbell and our
national leadership that, by making things condition-based, we
have set ourselves on a path for success over there, and set
the government as well as the Afghan National Security Force on
the conditions for success.
President Ghani committed as much to the Department of
Defense and the Armed Forces when he was over at the Pentagon
the other day. So, I think we're in a good trajectory now,
ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you both.
I wanted to follow up with General Spencer and Admiral
Howard on the issue of--we're engaged with, obviously, still
the mission against ISIS, which has involved significant use of
our fighters that, if we had met probably a year ago, we
wouldn't have been talking about some of the additional use of
our fighter force in regard to this fight that we face and
challenge that we face there. Can you help update the--both of
you update me on where--what are our challenges, in terms of
having enough fighters, given that this is sort of a situation
that we're, on the air, really helping the Kurds and the Iraqis
on the ground fight the fight? You know, where do you see that,
in terms of extra push on the force? As we do the
authorization, what would you like us to think about that, just
in terms of the current situation on the ground in Iraq and
Syria?
Admiral Howard. Thank you, Senator.
So, as I mentioned in my opening statement, as we maintain
carriers about--the George Herbert Walker Bush was there, and
first the fighter size started to fly nontraditional
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), but then
quickly went into strike missions. As we stay committed in
these endeavors, we will most likely maintain carrier presence
over there. What we're finding is, we're flying the aircraft at
a higher operational tempo. So, as we move forward and we
continue staying engaged in support to the land components, we
end up flying these aircraft much longer, longer distances, and
then we end up consuming their readiness. We're seeing that
play out as we try and extend the life of these fighters,
particularly the legacy Hornets, from 6,000 hours to 10,000
hours.
Then, as we go through and we do maintenance on them, we're
finding that the additional flight time has created
deterioration problems that we just weren't expecting. So, as
Senator Kaine pointed out, it would have been this morning's
testimony, the more--the higher the OPTEMPO and the more we're
engaged, the more we're flying, and then the more hours we put
on these aircraft, and then the longer it is to return them
back to a flyable status. So, we're clearly committed to the--
any--the support that we're tasked to provide, but it does
consume readiness.
Senator Ayotte. General Spencer?
General Spencer. Yes. Madam Chair, first of all, I echo
everything that Admiral Howard had--Admiral Howard said. I'd
like to--but, let me add a couple of things to give you some
context.
Back during Desert Storm, in the Air Force, we had 133
combat aircraft squadrons--133. We--during Desert Storm, we
deployed 33 forward, so we had a lot of squadrons left to do
something else if something came up in the world. Today, we
have 54 fighter squadrons--54 total. So, I would ask you to
think back, if we were in Desert Storm today and we deployed 33
forward. So, that's problem number one.
The other issue is--and that we've--I assume we'll get
into, here--is readiness, because a lot of folks assume you
deploy folks to war and they are as ready as they can get. But,
that's not the case in a counter insurgency (COIN) fight,
because they're getting a lot of training, flying and dropping
smart munitions, but they don't have the sophisticated surface-
to-air threat that they would have in a more--in a higher-level
fight. So, part of our challenge is, we are continually
deploying folks to the current war. We don't keep them back
home long enough to go out and train on these higher-level
threats.
The final challenge I would mention is, we are using up a
lot of smart munitions, and--which are expensive--and the
interesting thing about the OCO budget is, overseas contingency
operations (OCO) allows us to replace smart munitions that have
already been expended. It doesn't let us project ahead.
Senator Ayotte. Really?
General Spencer. So, we--we're always chasing ourselves,
getting behind in the amount of munitions we have.
So, to add a couple with Admiral Howard's comments, I
couldn't agree with you more.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I'd like to turn it over to Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thanks, to the witnesses, for your testimony.
General Allyn, you said something--I tried to write it down
fast, and I'm having a hard time reading my handwriting, during
your testimony, but I think it was, ``We have enough readiness
for immediate consumption, but not enough for a contingency.''
Is that basically the thought you were expressing?
General Allyn. Yes, it is, Senator Kaine. We--for the past,
you know, in--about 6 months after sequestration, our readiness
had degraded to about 10 percent of our brigades being ready
for a global contingency. The next 18 months, we rebuilt that
to just above 30 percent. But, we have been holding steady at
30 percent now for about 4 months, because, as fast as we
generate the readiness, it's being consumed.
As an example, when the ebola crisis hit--
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
General Allyn.--you know, within days, we deployed the
101st Airborne Division, that was a force training and ready to
go to Afghanistan, to divert in and provide essential support
to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to
fight and abate the Ebola crisis. We also deployed a Brigade
Combat Team of the 82nd Airborne Division into Iraq to provide
the plus-up and advise-and-assist capability that was required
in Iraq. Their readiness was, you know, absolutely at the top,
because they had just handed off the Global Response Force
mission to the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd. We had sort of counted
on that brigade coming off to provide some surge capacity for a
number of months, but, instead, you know, a requirement
emerged, and we met it, just as we always will.
So, as we've been, you know, being good stewards of the
resources you are giving us to generate readiness, we are also
responding to emergent requirements.
Senator Kaine. Right.
General Allyn. In 2014, about 87 percent of the emergent
requirements, we met as an Army, as we will continue to do, but
it does speak to the--really, the twofold challenge of building
readiness. You know, we can generate additional readiness, but
we can't control the demand.
Senator Kaine. Right. Right. Is that just basic, kind of,
phraseology, ``We have readiness for immediate consumption, but
not for a contingency"? Would that be kind of a fair statement
that all of you from your respective branches would agree with?
Admiral Howard. So, in particular for the Navy, we look at
the readiness of the units that we deploy and then the forward-
deployed units, and then we've always kept a level of readiness
for the units in order to surge, those that respond to a
contingency, just as General Allyn described. Right now we're
at our lowest surge capacity that we've been at in years, and--
so, we're able to have two carriers out and about, but we've
only got one in backup. The same with the amphibious ready
group (ARG). We've got two out and about and one in backup.
Our goal is to--with this budget, to get us back and
increase that readiness and meet our own goals of two--having
two carriers deployed and three ready to surge, approximately
half the force.
So, yes, as time has gone on, we have literally consumed
the readiness, and then the readiness of the forces that are
next in the wicket.
Senator Kaine. Great, thank you.
General Paxton?
General Paxton. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
I guess the short answer is, absolutely, we generate
readiness, but we consume it as fast as we generate it. We, as
a Corps, are focused primarily on crisis response. As we do
that, we are mortgaging our future for sustainment and for
modernization, and we're also reducing the at-home or home-
station training and availability of units.
I can give you two examples, if I may, Senator. One is in
the Africa Command (AFRICOM) area, and one is in the Central
Command area. In both of those geographic combatant commanders
today, we have a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force.
We would like to say that is kind of like a MEU, a Marine
Expeditionary Unit. It is not as sustainable and expeditionary
ashore, and it certainly doesn't have the power projection and
sovereign capability that we would like to have coming off of
an amphibious platform, a ship. But, we generated those two
capabilities in immediate response to combatant commander
requests. In the case of AFRICOM, it was to help with some
security-force arrangements at some embassies, to work some
train, advise, and assist missions and develop partnership
capacity. Then, in the Central Command area of responsibility
(AOR), it was because of specific risks at two embassies, and
then also to start working on train, advise, and assist
missions with the Iraqi Security Forces.
But, in both of those cases, that has now consumed what
would have been home-station readiness, because it's now
forward deployed. It has brought us closer to a one-to-two
depth-to-dwell, which creates stress on the force. It further
exacerbates the age and the maintenance of our equipment.
Despite the good work of my shipmate and where the Navy's
trying to go with capital investment, it highlights the fact
that we already have a paucity of amphibious ships by
inventory, and that's also exacerbated by the fact that they
have maintenance challenges keeping them in the yard. So, we
can't generate enough sovereign launch-and-recovery capability
for the Nation that we have to do these things with a smaller
unit and go what we call ``feet dry'' ashore. So, we consume it
as soon as we generate it, yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. General Spencer?
General Spencer. Yes, sir. The--first of all, a similar
story from--for the Air Force. The combat air forces that we
have right now, less than 50 percent are fully spectrum ready--
less than 50 percent. Let me give you a couple of examples,
because, again, we're--right now we're just talking about
combat air forces. We haven't talked about nuclear, we haven't
talked about ISR, we haven't talked about space. But, let's
talk about ISR for a second.
I mean, right now we have been in a position of surge in
our ISR caps since 2007. That does not define a surge. So, we
are essentially--
Senator Kaine. Because nobody ever asks for less ISR.
General Spencer. That's exactly right.
Senator Kaine. It just continue--it continues to--
General Spencer. It continues--
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
General Spencer.--it has exploded--the demand has exploded.
So, we have been staffed, if you will, for 55 cap since 2007,
flying 65. We've--we surged, that entire time. So, we have
essentially at our wits' end at the--where we are now, because
we've got--remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots are that we
have just worked to the point where we are worried that we--
whether we can retain them, or not, and whether they will stay.
Now--so, when we first started ISR, as you know, we did a
combination of things. We brought in pilots from other
airplanes, other weapon systems, brought them in, taught them
how to fly RPAs, and we also created a schoolhouse to train new
RPA pilots.
We've now reached the point where the new RPA pilots are
coming up to the point where they can separate. We have asked
them all, in a survey, ``Are you going to take the bonus and
stay?'' Roughly 30 percent say they'll stay. We've already
reached a point where our pilots can go back and fly other
weapon systems, and we're telling them they can't go back. So,
we're asking for volunteers to come back in, we're increasing
their bonuses. We're asking for Guard, you know, to volunteer.
We're--we have a series of things we're doing to try to make
that enterprise healthier, but it's just an indication of what
the current Ops Tempo has done. I can't--I want to footstop
that, because General Paxton mentioned it. The Ops Tempo that
we're under now has now allowed us to bring the--where we are
down low enough so we can--
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
General Spencer.--train and get ready to go again.
Senator Kaine. Right. Well, I'm over time, but just to say,
you know, if we have, essentially, a force that's ready for
immediate consumption, but we don't really have the contingency
ability, you've just got to look at the world and say, ``So,
are we in a world without contingencies, or are we in a world
that is likely to throw some contingencies?'' The answer to
that is just as plain as everyday's front page. We are in a
contingency-rich world right now.
So, thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ayotte. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you for your service.
Admiral Howard, a week ago today we had a group of South
Dakotans in for a meet-and-greet. One of the guys was about my
age, brought in and was very proud of the fact that in his
wallet he was carrying a picture that his son had taken at his
first solo flight in an F/A-18. In doing so, we could see the
pride. But, he said something that was concerning to me, and
that was that it was just unfortunate that it was taking
approximately 18 months for them to reach a certain level of
readiness, where, if they would have had the parts to keep the
aircraft in the air, it would have taken normally about 12
months. It seems to me that, if that anecdotal information
being shared is accurate, that you're going to have a tough
time coming up with the pilots, in a regular order of
operation, just to replace and keep up with the readiness
necessary for the folks that are working right now in combat
areas.
Could you visit a little bit about--number one, is my
estimate--or is my information accurate, in terms of the
challenges you've got right now with keeping aircraft in the
air and operational? Second of all, with OCO funding the way
that it's set up right now--and I'm going to ask this of all of
the members here--is there something that we can do, with
regards to the limitations that we've got, to where we can
modify OCO somehow so that you can access funds that might
otherwise be there, but not available for what your immediate
needs are?
Admiral Howard. Thank you, Senator.
Perhaps a slightly different perspective. This gets down to
that 2013, when we sequestered, we furloughed some of our
artisans and engineers, and then we created a backlog in our
aviation depots. So, when we're looking at the throughput of
those aviation depots, coupled with the aging aircraft, and
then as we open up those older F/A-18s and discover that, by
flying them longer, there's more corrosion, that backlog just
increased. So, we already had the--have and are living with the
impact of that short period of sequester. We now are in the
timeframe where we are hiring the artisans as quickly as we
can, several hundred this year, to help get us to being able to
assess those aircraft quickly and then repair them as quickly
as we can.
This is where OCO has been very helpful. So, we have our
fundamental aviation maintenance account, and then we've
plussed-up that maintenance account to help get that throughput
up to where it needs to be, and to decrease that backlog.
So, for us, right now the limitations for the depot is not
the money. The limitation is literally getting the people hired
and in place; for the people who are new, getting them trained.
But, there's also another piece to it. I think there's a trust
factor there, that, when we want to bring people--proud
civilians in to do all the support for our aircraft, or whether
it's ships, they have to trust that the work's going to be
there, that they can live their lives, pay their mortgages, and
not worry about being furloughed, so that they want to have a
job with the government.
So, we know we have a backlog, and we expect to be able to
clear that up in 18 months. But, all bets will be off if we
sequester again. Then, you're right, then it gets down to, not
just, ``Do we have the aircraft for our pilots to train in?"--
but, when we sequestered last time, I was the Deputy Commander
of Fleet, and I had the very unhappy job of going down and
talking to a cruiser community officer (CO) and his chiefs and
his crew, because we weren't going to be able to get that ship
underway. We talked about what it meant for their
qualifications, what it meant for the--their ability to serve
at sea. If people can't do their jobs, it's an immense
dissatisfier.
Thank you.
General Allyn. Senator Rounds, in terms of the OCO
flexibility that's required, clearly OCO has been critical for
us to meet the readiness and the equipment recovery,
replenishment for our forces that have been deployed in support
of the countless operational requirements, both emerging and
known. We've been thankful for that funding. But, as you talk
about a wider application of OCO in the future, it needs to be
more flexible. It must be more flexible. Because, otherwise, we
cannot use it for all the readiness requirements that we have,
and certainly the year-to-year application of it--
Senator Rounds. Sir, if I could, would you get us a list of
what you need the flexibility on that we may be able to look
at, in terms of OCO funding available?
General Allyn. Yes, sir, we will.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Allyn. The Army, like each of the other services, needs the
fiscal flexibility to address the uncertainty of funding we are dealing
with, in a world were instability is creating increased overseas
requirements. What we really need is sufficient base funding, but where
feasible, we need broader discretion on the use of already appropriated
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds in order to maintain the
readiness of our formations and to respond to new missions. An example
is what has occurred in Europe due to the Russian annexation of Crimea.
This created a demand for the Army to defer sending an active component
Brigade Combat Team to Kosovo, and instead, we sent it to Eastern
Europe to deter and assure. To backfill that brigade, which was
responding to a named operation, we mobilized a National Guard unit to
go to Kosovo. Current OCO rules do not allow us to use OCO to pay the
mobilization costs of the National Guard unit, instead we used base
funding and had to reduce the readiness of other units to pay for those
costs. Allowing for more flexible use of OCO, for direct and indirect
impacts to named operations that may not occur in the geographic area
of the named operation, would greatly improve our readiness.
Admiral Howard. I have nothing further to add to my response.
General Spencer. Senator Rounds' question was directed to General
Allyn, not General Spencer.
General Paxton. The largest issue concerning flexibility in OCO
funding is timing. The Marine Corps begins to plan its requirements for
the OCO budget approximately 18 months before the funding would likely
be made available. Even with our best forecasting, requirements will
change during the year of execution, requiring transfers between
accounts, many of which require Congressional approval.
Additionally, the planning process for long-term modernization,
sustainment and upgrade programs requires a lengthy, multi-year
timeline. Since the OCO budget is developed outside the normal
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process, it is difficult
to use on critical shortfall procurement items in the current year.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
General Paxton. Yeah, thank you, Senator Rounds.
If I may, two things. Number one, to follow up on Vice
Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO) comments, when we have a
challenge with our maintenance and the dollars for
maintenance--and you used F-18s as an example. We call it RBA,
Ready Basic Aircraft. Those are the ones that are through the
upgrades, modernization, and they're ready on the flight line
to take off. When those aircraft are delayed, either because we
don't have money for parts, money for engineers, or money to
actually move the aircraft to the depot, we still have pilots
who are waiting to fly. So, now we have more pilots than we
have aircraft. Sometimes, if we have a higher demand signal,
those pilots may actually go forward. So, the time they have
available to train to them when they get back is shorter. So,
you can see the downward spiral that happens, because then you
have more pilots with a shorter-term time, with less aircraft
to train on, and then you get in this training readiness spiral
that goes down.
If you exacerbate that by the fact that some of those
flight requirements actually have to come from the deck of the
ship that you need bounces on carrier calls or that you need
night vision goggle ops, the minute you perturb the
availability of a ship or an aircraft, the spiral starts, and
it's really hard to regain.
To your second question, on OCO dollars, always helpful.
We'll all work together to get you examples of how that would
help. But, I'd just like to be on the record, sir, that the OCO
dollars are insufficient to the problem we have right now. I
mean, they are single-year dollars. It's a short planning
horizon. It's actually the BCA caps and it's the ability to
forecast across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to
start long-term modernization programs and sustainment and
upgrade programs that will eventually allow us to not only
handle the crisis, but to handle the contingency we need
because we have enough readiness at home station.
Thank you, sir.
General Spencer. Senator, in terms of OCO specifically,
flexibilities of where you may--might be able to help, I
already mentioned one. So, there are certain things, like
munitions, that are after-the-fact. So, we put, in our OCO
submission, munitions that we used last year, but we can't put
in OCO submission what we plan to use this year. So, again,
we're always a year behind.
Timing is really critical, because if the OCO budget comes
late in the year, that does a lot of things to us. One, we are
trying to plan, hoping on the come, not exactly sure what we'll
get passed. There is actually a law that says you have to
obligate 80 percent of our own end money by July. So, if the
money comes late, we've got a problem there that we have to
work through.
We're all afraid to death one of these days, if OCO goes
away, and a lot of the things that are being funded in OCO,
quite frankly, will end up in our base. How is that going to
work? You know, in the Air Force, for example, we have several
bases in the theater right now that we've been told are going
to be, quote/unquote, ``enduring,'' which means we'll probably
hang onto those bases. They're being funded by OCO. What
happens when OCO goes away? How do we get that money into the
base?
Finally, as General Paxton mentioned, planning is a really
big deal, because--particularly in a procurement account. So,
if we're going to buy a weapon system, if we're going to pay
for F-35s or do a multiyear for C-130s, it--that's really
difficult to do if you're trying to do that one year at a time,
because you don't know what's going to come in the next few
years. So, to the extent that those type of purchases can--you
know, I've been told that there's a--there is--that we have had
a multiyear OCO in the past, or a supplemental. I don't know if
that's under consideration. But, the real answer for us is if
we can get that money in the base, that would really be
helpful.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
It would be really helpful to us, especially those of us
that serve jointly on the Budget and Armed Services Committee,
if all of you could submit to us what you think, in terms of
flexibility for OCO, because we don't know how this story ends,
this year, and just--you know, you're, I'm sure, aware of
things that happen on the floor on the budget and all that. It
would be helpful for us to understand that. If the plus-up ends
up being in the OCO line versus the base budget, what do you
really need, to do what needs to be done? I know it's not
ideal. Frankly, there are many of us that want to deal with the
overall BCA in solving it. I'm still committed to doing that.
But, you know, we've got to do what we've got to do around
here. So, just--if you can get that to us, it would be
helpful--all of the branches--to understand what you really
need.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Allyn. Receiving OCO funding instead of base funding for
fiscal year 2016 would allow the Army to conduct its missions and
achieve readiness targets provided that appropriation language and OMB
interpretation fully allowed OCO dollars to be spent on base
requirements. However, in the long term, using OCO to circumvent Budget
Control Act caps would put Army readiness at risk, because steady,
predictable base funding is the key to long term, enduring readiness.
Admiral Howard. What we really need is what we have included in the
fiscal year 2016 Navy budget submission. As we look to the future, the
Navy will continue to be globally deployed to provide a credible and
survivable strategic deterrent and to support the mission requirements
of the regional Combatant Commanders. Global operations continue to
assume an increasingly maritime focus, and our Navy will sustain its
forward presence, warfighting focus, and readiness preparations. We see
no future reduction to these requirements. The fiscal year 2016 Navy
budget submission addresses the challenges to achieving the necessary
readiness to execute our missions.
Overseas Contingency Operations funding is meant to fund
incremental costs of overseas conflicts such as in Afghanistan and
Iraq. OCO does not provide a stable, multi-year budget horizon. Our
defense industry partners need stability and long term plans--not
short-term fixes--to be efficient and cutting-edge. OCO is dispiriting
to our force. Our personnel, active, reserve and civilian and their
families deserve to know their future more than just one year at a
time.
The Navy appreciates Congress' continued action to explore
alternative paths that do not lock in sequestration. Any funding below
our Navy budget submission requires a revision of America's defense
strategy. Sequestration would outright damage the national security of
this country.
General Spencer. Question. It would be really helpful to us,
especially those of us that serve jointly on the Budget and Armed
Services Committee, if all of you could submit to us what you think, in
terms of flexibility for OCO, because we don't know how this story
ends, this year, and just--you know, you're, I'm sure, aware of things
that happen on the floor on the budget and all that. It would be
helpful for us to understand that. If the plus-up ends up being in the
OCO line versus the base budget, what do you really need, to do what
needs to be done? I know it's not ideal. Frankly, there are many of us
that want to deal with the overall BCA in solving it. I'm still
committed to doing that. But, you know, we've got to do what we've got
to do around here. So, just--if you can get that to us, it would be
helpful--all of the branches--to understand what you really need.
Answer. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget supports our
critical needs to execute the defense strategy, but we made tough
choices in capacity and capability / modernization. The Air Force does
not support any reductions to the President's Budget and the short term
solution of using OCO does not address the long term budgeting
challenges created by the Budget Control Act (BCA). Further, this short
term solution does not provide the necessary BCA relief for the other
Federal Agencies that the Air Force works with such as Homeland
Security and Department of Energy. Without relief for the other Federal
Agencies, our partner missions will be at risk. Most importantly, this
solution does not move us towards a more stable budget environment that
is critical to long term strategic planning to meet the Defense
Strategic Guidance and protect the Homeland.
General Paxton. The largest issue concerning flexibility in OCO
funding is timing. The Marine Corps begins to plan its requirements for
the OCO budget approximately 18 months before the funding would likely
be made available. Even with our best forecasting, requirements will
change during the year of execution, requiring transfers between
accounts, many of which require Congressional approval.
Additionally, the planning process for long-term modernization,
sustainment and upgrade programs requires a lengthy, multi-year
timeline. Since the OCO budget is developed outside the normal
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process, it is difficult
to use on critical shortfall procurement items in the current year.
Senator Ayotte. I wanted to ask, General Allyn, can you
give us an update on end strength and where we are, in terms of
numbers, on end strength? How many people have we had to use
involuntary terminations for in 2014? What's been the status of
those individuals? You know, are they--are there people that we
have in combat that we're giving involuntary terminations to?
Then, you know, one thing I think that's fairly powerful as we
look at--if we go to sequester, where does that put our end
strength? I know we've talked about it in the larger committee.
But, also, what does that mean, in terms of involuntary
terminations?
I really want people to understand. I think this committee
understands very well. In some ways, when we talk about
sequester, when you talk to the Armed Services Committee, a
little bit like preaching to the choir, but we want to get this
word out also to the broader Senate. So, if you could comment
on the involuntary termination issue, end-strength numbers. I
would also then ask General Paxton to follow up the same with
the Marine Corps.
General Allyn. Yes, Madam Chair. The bottom line is, we are
at about 498,000 today in the United States Army, headed toward
a end-of-fiscal-year number of 490,000 and budgeted in the,
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to go down to 450,000. To
give you the broader answer first, to get to 450,000 soldiers,
as has been directed by our current budget, that will require
the involuntary separation of 14,000 soldiers. On average--
that's officers and noncommissioned officers--on average, it's
about 2,000 per year. Okay? So, fiscal year 2014 was about
2,100 soldiers. Just over 50 percent of those soldiers served
over two or more combat tours. So, these are soldiers that
answered the call multiple times to meet the requirements that
the Nation had. They were--
Senator Ayotte. Two or more combat tours.
General Allyn. Two or more combat tours for 50 percent of
that--those that we were asking to leave involuntarily. Now,
first and foremost, this is not a choice the United States Army
took. This is a budget-driven requirement. So--
Senator Ayotte. I assume that, if you've done two tours,
you're not terminating these people because they aren't capable
of fighting.
General Allyn. You are absolutely accurate. You asked a
question, were we really having to separate some soldiers that
were forward deployed? The answer is yes.
Let me first let you understand that treating those
veterans of multiple combat tours with dignity and respect is
our absolute number-one commitment. Every single officer or
noncommissioned officer that we asked to involuntarily separate
was briefed, before the board was held, by a general officer--
first general officer in the chain of command, and then, when
the board completed its process and identified those for
separation, they were briefed again, face to face, as much as
possible. In a couple of cases, they had to have the general
officer contact by phone or video teleconference (VTC) with the
immediate commander present to ensure that we treated these,
you know, people who had served so courageously with the
absolute utmost dignity and respect.
Our objective in notifying people that were forward
deployed was to give them the maximum time possible to
transition effectively to the next phase of their life. The
minimum that we wanted to provide them was 10 months, at least,
so that they would have an opportunity to take the benefit of
all of the transition, education, plug them into employment
advisors through programs like our Soldier for Life Initiative,
and ensure that we set them up for success, to include
providing opportunities for mentors from industries around
their communities that they intend to go back to.
So, not a choice that we took willingly or voluntarily, but
we have taken it on, we have ensured the appropriate care of
every one of our soldiers, and are committed to do so as we go
forward.
Senator Ayotte. General Paxton?
General Paxton. Yeah, thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Your Marine Corps today is 184,000. We had grown to 202,000
by some special appropriations and authorizations. That was
temporary. We knew we were not going to be able to sustain
that. So, we had started our downward growth, if you will,
before BCA kicked in.
Under BCA, we have to be at 182,000 by the end of fiscal
year 2017. We expect, if full BCA continues, we could very well
have to go to 175,000.
To date, we have deliberately not broken faith with
marines. Almost all of our separations have been voluntary. We
have had low double digits of majors who were not selected to
lieutenant colonel, and staff sergeants who were not selected
to gunnery sergeant, who we did not continue. But, they were
afforded other venues for separation at that time.
We do have a concern that if the BCA caps come back and we
have to go to 175,000, that at some point we could be forced to
do larger numbers of involuntary termination.
Senator Ayotte. I don't know if--you know, Admiral Howard,
I'm not trying to exclude the Navy and the Air Force on this.
Anything you want to report on this end?
General Spencer. I would only add that we've--we were on a
steady decline in manpower, and finally have--we've drawn a red
line at around 317,000 for active duty, because we just can't
go any lower. Based on our--the levels of maintenance folks we
have on our flight lines, fixing our airplanes, launching
satellites, we've sort drawn a red line and said we can't go
any further.
Admiral Howard. So, along with General Spencer, I think the
Navy and Air Force were on a different journey these last 15
years. I recall, in December of 2000, when I reported to the
Joint Staff and then 9/11 happened the following year,
literally I--we were a Navy of about 14 carriers, 383,000
people, and I think it was close to 312 ships. We're--we've
downsized about 67,000 people, and we're about 279 ships today
The budget we've submitted continues to acquire ships,
build ships, and we would be looking at being back to 304 ships
in 2020. But, because we're a capital-intensive force, our
manning is matched to those ships. So, we would expect to be at
329,000, and about 57,000 Reserve. But, we took--we reduced our
force over the last 14 years. So, along with the Air Force,
we're not trying to get any smaller.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. On the issue of OCO and flexibility, I'm
maybe a little bit like a former Governor. We're all into
flexibility. I like giving folks flexibility.
But, I would guess that, as long as we're talking about
readiness, even putting flexibility doesn't necessarily--I
think, General, you said, it's the caps, not the flexibility.
Flexibility would be helpful. But, won't there always be a
tendency, if you have to choose between priorities, to kind of
short readiness? I mean, you're always going to--you're always
going to do the day's mission and try to have people as well
deployed as you can for doing a deployed mission. If you don't
have enough to choose from, you'll always pick that, and
probably try to save on the readiness side. It seems like
that's one of the challenges. So, even if you allow for
flexibility, it would seem that readiness is always going to be
somewhat at risk in a capped environment when there aren't
sufficient resources, ``Well, we can't--we don't want to short
the folks who are forward deployed during these missions, so
we'll probably--you know, if we have to save it somewhere,
we're going to save on the readiness side.''
So, flexibility, I don't view that as the real solution. I
mean, it could be helpful, but it's not really going to solve
the readiness challenge we have, in my view. Am I wrong to look
at it that way?
General Paxton. Senator, if I may, I'll start, only because
we've just had this discussion this morning in the building.
Although there are some common terminologies and lexicon, each
of the services has to look--
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
General Paxton.--at this in a little different way.
So, on the part of the Marine Corps, we truly envision
ourselves as the 9-1-1 force that you--that the American
public, the American Congress, the taxpayer, they expect us to
be most ready when everybody else is least ready. We don't have
a big role or mission in the nuclear triad and things like
that. We're a rather conventional force, we're a rather small-
unit force, and we're supposed to be forward deployed, forward
engaged. So, we fully expect that we're going to generate
readiness and consume readiness, and, at some point, we will
take risk in some modernization and we'll take risk in some
home-station readiness. We think we're at that ragged edge
right now.
For example, our aircraft are old, too, anywhere from 22 to
29 years, and growing. Our amphibious vehicle capability is 42
years old. So, we're at the point, as General Spencer said
earlier, that we have to modernize. We, early on, after
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF), went into this bathtub, and we had to go all in to
modernize, because the gear was too old.
So, we feel at risk now for modernization and sustainment.
But, we're going to continue to give you fight-tonight forces,
ready forces for the crisis that's at hand, even if we know,
later on, we may eventually get to the point of, ``Yes, but,''
that we'll give you several companies, but not a whole
battalion, we'll give you a squadron with 8 aircraft instead of
12 aircraft.
But, each of the other services, at some point, looks at it
just a little differently. So, that's where the Marine Corps
is, sir.
General Spencer. Yes, Senator. You put your finger on
really what our challenge is, quite frankly, because you said,
in most cases, we would go to readiness if we had a budget
issue, a budget concern. The reason we do that is because we
don't have a lot of choice. We've only got three pots of money.
We have people, procurement, and readiness. People, you can't
just send people home. I mean, you know, you--even if--people--
actually, our military folks were exempt from sequestration,
but, even if they weren't, that's a long process to reduce.
Quite frankly, we can't reduce any more. Similarly with
procurement, those are multiyear purchases that are stretched
out over many years, involve a lot of money. If you start
cutting those, your unit cost goes up.
Senator Kaine. Yeah, you can slow down the next one, but
you can't--
General Spencer. That's--
Senator Kaine.--break the one that you're--
General Spencer. That's exactly right.
Senator Kaine.--in the middle of. Right.
General Spencer. So, then--so, a lot of times, we don't
have any choice, if we have to find fast money, but to go to
readiness, because it's essentially Operations and Maintenance
(O&M) money. But, that's the dilemma, because we--that's where
our readiness is. So, that's the box we're put in.
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
General Spencer. We don't want to do that. We're--all the
services are obviously a little bit different, but, at least in
the Air Force's case, as you know, you know, if we get called
upon, I mean, we've got to be there in hours, not days, weeks,
or months. So, it's--we have to--readiness is critical for us,
yet readiness is the only account we can go reach out and take
money quickly. So, that's the sort of dichotomy we're in.
Senator Kaine. Indeed.
Other comments? General Allyn, Admiral Howard?
General Allyn. I was just going to just reinforce my
teammates' points, here. But, it really does come down to
trying to balance concurrent priorities. As has been stated,
the Army's budget, over 50 percent of it is committed to our
national treasure, our people, you know, both the military and
civilian. So, we've got 50 percent of the budget with which we
wrestle with the dual priorities of readiness and
modernization. We, in the Army, have actually erred on the side
of delivering the readiness that's required for the known and
emerging missions, and taking risk in the mid- to long-term
with modernization. But, that is a--that's a hard choice, and
it's a choice that our Chief and our Secretary take, fully
analyzing, you know, the opportunity costs of doing that.
It's just a very, very difficult position to be in, and
one--with the capacity that this Nation has, we shouldn't be in
that position.
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
General Allyn. You know, our soldiers should expect that,
when they go up against an adversary, that adversary faces an
unfair fight whenever they come up against the United States of
America. We are putting that at risk.
Senator Kaine. Admiral Howard?
Admiral Howard. Senator, thank you. I just wanted to share
that, when I was at fleet, when we sequestered last time, as
General Spencer pointed out, that was the only intermediate
choices we had.
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
Admiral Howard. When you talk about readiness, we had to
cancel deployments of ships. Now you're not where you need to
be, and you're not giving the COCOM any forces, let alone ready
forces.
Then we had to reduce steaming hours and flying hours,
which is the training of the piece Senator Rounds brought up.
We had to take some of the air wings down to tactical hard deck
to generate the savings to hit that lower target budget--budget
target. So, there is, in the immediate aftermath of
sequestration, an impact on the forces and--in the Operations
and Maintenance (O&M) account and in operations and in training
dollars.
Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Last--just a comment. You had--you mentioned
the COCOM, and that reminded me of one other thought. We have
the hearings with the COCOMs, you know, the status hearings,
during the spring. One of the things I'm really always
impressed by, and most recently a conversation with General
Kelly at SOUTHCOM, is the degree to which the COCOMs really
approach their mission with kind of a whole-of-government
approach. They're relying on the intelligence community,
they're relying on the State Department, they're relying on
Department of Justice, they're relying on the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)--especially in the SOUTHCOM, that's
really important. All these agencies are affected by sequester,
too, the partners that our COCOMs rely on. They may not be--you
know, it may not be defense sequester, but they're sequestered
on the nondefense side, and they have a direct impact on the
security mission. So, again, there's a lot of compounding
effects here, and your testimony is good tribute to that.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ayotte. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I think it's becoming obvious in the discussion that, as
you listen to us, we talk about trying to make it--we're trying
to set it up so that there is a way to skin this cat that's out
there right now with BCA basically there and in front of us.
Part of it is to give you as many options as possible in order
to be able to utilize the funds that we are able to allocate,
either through the budget and then through the appropriations
process. I want to make sure that, if we do take a particular
approach, that it is as readily available to you as possible
without other strings attached to it. So, you know, we're not
exactly sure how we skin this cat that's in front of us, but we
want your help in doing so, and that's the reason for the
discussion.
I just wanted to go directly to General Spencer with
something that you said earlier that I think is just so
impactful, and that is that, if we would have been going to war
in 1991, we would have been in the same position as we are
today with the age of our aircraft; we'd be flying B-17s. You
know, in fact, if my information is correct, the Department of
Defense (DOD) currently operates a bomber force that is half
the size of the Cold War force recommended by its 1993 bottom-
up review.
Now, if it's true that advances in sensor technologies and
precision-guided weapons have helped to offset cuts driven by
budget reductions, but--in other words, they have the effect,
though, of acting as a force multiplier--but, that being said,
reduced readiness levels--and that's what we've been talking
about here, are the readiness levels--the readiness levels have
an opposite effect.
I'd just like to talk a little bit, and I want to give you
an opportunity to visit a little bit, about the--what happens
with the--has the combination of reduced readiness and smaller
force size eroded our global strike advantage? Right now we're
talking about aircraft that are very, very old, and you've got
an F-35 that's available right now that you're still trying to
procure, you've got a tanker that's necessary to be set up and
operational, but you also have a need to replace, or at least
to supplement, the B-1 and the B-2. Right now you've got B-52s
that are doing some of that work, but the Long Range Strike
Bomber (LRSB) has clearly got to be maintained, as well, or at
least you've got to be able to procure that in the future. Can
you talk a little bit about what that is and what's going on
right now within the Air Force to try to maintain all of those
goals, and procure and still maintain readiness?
General Spencer. No, thank you, Senator.
Again, you've put your finger right on the issues, here.
You know, the--we've only got 20 B-2s, and if--so, if we have
to have a long-range penetrating bomber that can get through a
lot of the--you know, back when the B-52 and the B-1 was built,
they aren't stealthy, they don't--they won't penetrate some of
the systems that are out there now, so we have to have that
capability. Similarly, for our other platforms, as well. The F-
35, for example, along with the F-22, you know, some of--there
are other fighters being introduced into the market now, so-
called 4.5 generation, if you will, that would beat our--I
mean, the advantage that we have always had, and I think we
still have, is, our pilots are better trained. But, if you give
the adversary a better airplane, then that's a real problem.
So, the faster and the more efficiently we can get to fifth
generation, the better.
Senator Rounds. Do you want to talk just a little bit in--
you made the remark, and then you moved on rather quickly, but
you're talking about a 4.5, which is out there, which is going
to, basically, be in a position to where--we don't ever want to
be in a fair fight, but we want to the advantage to be on our
side all the time. Do you want to talk about that just a little
bit?
General Spencer. Sure, yes. So, the--they are being
produced, as we speak, developed and produced, a fighter that
is ahead of our fourth-generation--the F-15, F-16s--it is
ahead. So, based on the systems they have, we--they would--as
our Chief said, 4.5 kills a fourth-generation airplane. So,
that's why it's--and the sense of--we have to modernize our
fleet, is what I'm saying. The age of our fleet that we have
now won't--is not sufficient for us in the high-end threats and
the high-end fights that we are--that we could be involved in.
So, we--so, if nothing else, to maintain, first, deterrence,
but then to be able to win if deterrence fails. We want to go
in--as General Allyn said, we don't want a fair fight. We want
the best equipment, with the best technology, with the best-
trained both--maintenance folks, pilots, you name it, space
operators--we need the absolute best that we can have. So,
that's really imperative for us to stay on track with our
modernization.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Unless one of the other--
Sir?
General Paxton. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
If I may--I had made the point earlier about how we all
need a planning horizon. We had aging aircraft in both our F-
18s, our AV-8Bs and our EA-6s. We knew we were going to have to
replace them, so we put--we went all in on the F-35, and we're
in that bathtub right now. So, the monies and the planning that
is available to us to bring the F-35 to fruition are critical
for the fight in the future. If we don't--if the BCA kicks in
and we buy fewer, then you lose the economies of scale, you
delay the production line, and then our fight-tonight force and
our fight-tomorrow force are both jeopardized.
Thank you.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
General Allyn. I would just add, for the Army, the same
application that General Paxton just talked about for our--
modernization of our aviation fleet is absolutely the exact
same dynamic. So, we will not procure the more modern UH-60
aircraft that our total force needs, we will not modernize the
AH-64 to the level that it needs to, and our CH-47
modernization will stop after fiscal year `16. So, it is
absolutely critical that we stay on this path.
Admiral Howard. So, we have often used a technological edge
as a warfighting edge. So, as we've had to meet budget targets,
we've had to slow modernization down. But, really what that
gets to is our ability to win in a anti-access aerial-denial
fight. So, as we slow down our ability to modernize weapon
systems on ships or on aircraft or the physical platforms
themselves, it's given potential adversaries an opportunity to
get closer to us and to start--and that gap in the
technological edge is starting to diminish.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ayotte. So, I wanted to--we have--Senator Shaheen
is on her way for some questions--but when--Admiral Howard,
when we met in my office, one of the issues that you raised, we
saw, recently, the attempt by ISIS to expose our men and women
in uniform in the cyber domain. So, I wanted to get your
thoughts on, you know, What are the cyber challenges that our
forces face, and how does all this relate to readiness and our
posture?
Admiral Howard, I'd start with you.
Admiral Howard. Thank you. So, there's two issues. All of
us--one is the force, writ large--our civilians, our Active,
and our Reserve. We all actually live and operate in this
domain. We're in it for our workday, and then, for our sailors
and Reserve, they're in it when they're off duty. So, for us,
we have to continue to develop and train our workforce to
understand that as much innovation and excitement and fun as
you can have on liberty in this domain, there's vulnerabilities
in this domain. Because of the robustness of knowledge exchange
in this domain, the vulnerabilities translate to potential
operational security issues, which is some of what we saw this
week.
So, as--whether they're sailors, Reserves, or civilian, if
they are out and about on social networks, and identify
themselves or identify units, that they have to be trained to
understand operational security in this virtual domain, just as
they understand operational security in the physical domain.
The next piece is, there is a more professional cohort when
you look at the--for us, the information dominance community,
you look at our enlisted, our IT, and then, for officer,
informational professionals, cryptologists, intelligence
officers, and then they are really the heart of our cyber
warriors and the workforce that we're developing to not only
defend our networks, but also develop both offensive cyber
capability, as well. Then, that's--for us, those are the
components, those are the folks we put together, and then they
are the ones that work underneath U.S. Cyber Command in
whatever mission sets they're required to provide.
General Allyn. Madam Chair, I would just add that, you
know, in 2013, we had no Army cyber mission teams. Today we
have 24 that are supporting combatant commanders at the initial
operating capability, building to over 40, you know, by the end
of next year. Their training and development is absolutely
critical.
But, you highlighted a very critical point, and that is, we
should be trying to accelerate the elimination of our
vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, all of us are faced with the
reality of having to take a multiyear approach to this, because
of funding limitations. My belief is, this cyber risk is
accelerating very, very fast.
General Paxton. Senator, if I may, the--it also shows--to
General Allyn's point, it shows the dynamic here--I'm sorry--it
shows the dynamic of the pressure we're under. As the money
gets tighter--BCA cap, if you will--and as the pressure on end
strength goes down, we're--we all spend over 50 cents of our
dollar on our people, the most important weapon system that we
have. In the Marine Corps, it happens to be about 61 cents on
the dollar. We have also stood up cyber mission teams and cyber
support teams, both for the service and for some of the
geographic combatant commanders--in our particular case,
Special Operations Command. So, then you get into the tension
about providing conventional force capability and providing
cyber capability. It really shouldn't be a tension. You should
provide both. But, when you're under an end-strength reduction
and a fiscal reduction, that's hard to do.
General Spencer. Yes, Senator, and we're similar. We've got
20 cyber teams, growing to 40, as General Allyn mentioned.
Because of funding, we've had to stretch that out longer than
we would--we're comfortable with.
You know, I was raised, you know, to keep my personal
business to myself. You know, my daughter puts all of her
business out on Facebook. I don't really get that.
[Laughter.]
General Spencer. But, that's kind of the generation of
folks that are coming in the military now, that everything they
do and everywhere they go and everything they eat and everybody
they talk to is on Facebook. You know, we're realizing now,
that's a vulnerability. So, all of us have--you know, all of
the names that were listed by ISIL on their list, we've
contacted them all and talked to them specifically about these
sort of social networks, if you will, that they put your--you
know, your access out there. Unfortunately for us, I mean, you
can Google any of us, and our whole life history is out there,
whether we like it or not. But, for a lot of our troops that
deploy, again, those, you know, Twitter or Facebook, all
those--they're great social tools, but they also make us all
vulnerable, and they expose our personal--some of our personal
information.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, I think all three of us can
relate to that, certainly.
I wanted to call on Senator Rounds for a brief follow-up
question, and then I'm going to turn it over to Senator
Shaheen.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, and I'll try to make this brief.
It's just a followup to what the Chairman was asking about a
little bit.
In terms of your overseas operation or your downrange
operations, particularly with regard to ISR, have you seen any
kind of a degradation with either regard to the cyber
capabilities or your space capabilities? Anything, in terms of
the items there that you would like to address or that you see
as threats to our capabilities, that we should be aware of, in
terms of things that impact your ability to deliver?
General Allyn. Well, I think we have to be careful, in
terms of, you know, just how much we can talk about, there is--
Senator Rounds. If a simple ``yes'' is there, then--
General Allyn. There is risk out there in that domain.
Admiral Howard. Senator, I'm sure you're aware, for the
Navy, we had, a year and a half ago, multiple simultaneous
intrusions into our network. So, that really, I think, raised
our awareness and our focus on defending our networks and
making sure we mitigate risk in this domain.
Senator Rounds. Impacted you overseas.
Admiral Howard. It was simultaneous, and several different
organizations.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
General Paxton. Yes, sir, there is risk. There has been
intrusion and threat. We need both the policies and the monies
to do the training to combat that, sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
General Spencer. Senator, I agree, and would offer that we
could--any of us, certainly the Air Force, would like to come
and brief you, sort of, one on one, if we could.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you all very much for your service and for being here
today.
I know this--I don't think the Chair has asked this
question, though I know she's very interested in it, as well.
One of the things that I have heard from folks at the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which, of course, is one of the
shipyards that we're very interested in, is that if
sequestration returns, the ability to attract the workers that
we need for the shipyard is going to be compromised. Right now,
they're in the process of hiring 700 people. We're seeing a
whole generation of engineers, technicians, people who have
real expertise at the shipyard who are retiring. If--can you
just talk about what the potential challenges are, if
sequestration returns in 2016, to being able to attract the
workforce we need to fill our public shipyards?
Admiral Howard. Yes, ma'am. So, when I was down at fleet--
this is anecdotal, but--as we sequestered and then we had a
hiring freeze, and then we ended up furloughing different
folks, we found, in some areas, that folks who had sufficient
years decided to retire early, that the potential of not having
a full year of employment, year to year, was enough for them to
rethink.
So, for us, if that happens again and then we have to
reduce maintenance contracts or make similar tough choices, in
particular for our shipyards, we have that--a demographic,
where we have an older cohort that's a substantial part of the
workforce that might make that decision.
The next thing is, for the folks who stay, there becomes
doubt as to--and a lack of trust as to whether they are going
to have a full year's worth of employment. It's not just the
pay. There is that component, because they have to support
their families.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Admiral Howard. But, it's also, they take a lot of pride in
who they are and what they do as helping generate forces for
our Navy or as public servants in other areas.
Senator Shaheen. Is this something that the rest of you are
seeing in a different way as you're trying to recruit folks?
General Allyn. Well, I think, ma'am, the impact of the
furlough across our civilian workers was devastating. It gets
at this issue of erosion of trust. We've got incredibly
dedicated workforce, in uniform and in civilian workforce. But,
there is a limit to, you know, how many times we can keep going
back and asking them to hang in there with us. We have seen a
similar case, where some of them that were retirement-eligible
or could take an early retirement option decided, ``You know,
this has been a great run. I love serving in the Army, but I'm
not sure the Army loves me as much as I love it.'' That's a
terrible feeling for us, who take this on as a profession.
General Paxton. Senator Shaheen, if I may, just as a
overview of our civilian workforce, most of us are pretty lean
in the civilian workforce. Between mil-to-civ conversions and
then outsourcing and contractors, our civilian workforce has
been getting smaller and smaller. The furlough and the BCA caps
had a disproportionate effect on our civilian workforce. So,
there is a sense of an erosion of trust and confidence, and
they're really valuable members of the team. When the
Commandant testified in front of the full committee several
weeks ago, he said that, in the Marine Corps' case, only 1 in
10 in civilian workers, civilian in military is the workforce--
over 90 percent of them work outside of the national capital
region. So, there's this perception there that maybe the
headquarters are bloated and there's a lot in Washington. Now,
they're actually tooth and not tail, and they're actually out
there doing important things for the service and for the
Nation.
The anecdotal story that I bring up is, I went down our
depot in Albany, Georgia, about a year ago, and this was in the
aftermath of the furlough. We had worked very hard to keep
folks there. Some of these folks are working in a very small
county, a very rural county. The other two or three industries
in the county, a rubber and tire plant and a golf plant, had
left. So, the only viable workforce in--major in the area now,
is--there's one health system and then there's the Marine
Logistics Depot. When we started to furlough people, there was
no other place for them to go. Many of them were working on
equipment where they needed a security clearance. As they went
from payday to payday without a security clearance, they were
deathly worried that the creditors would come after them; and
then, the minute the creditor came after them, even if it was a
delayed payment in a home mortgage, that would affect their
clearance, so that, even when the furlough was relieved, we
couldn't hire them back because then they'd be flagged as a
security risk. So, there's this horrible downward spiral when
that happens.
Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Spencer. Senator, we have a similar story. We also
have 96 percent of our civilians that work outside of the
national capital region, so at our training bases, for example,
where we train pilots to fly, the entire flight-line
maintenance operation are civilians, the whole unit. So, if you
think about the Air Force--as an example, when we sequestered,
last--or a year and a half or so ago, we stopped flying
airplanes, we actually put airplanes down, which meant now
pilots can't train, so they lose their certification over time,
maintenance folks have nothing to work on, and airplanes--I
happen to have a '72 Monte Carlo at home, and if you don't
start that thing about once a week and drive it, it's not any
good. Airplane--you have to fly airplanes to have them
efficient.
So, we had airplanes sitting down. Now they're not going to
the depot. Now you've got this stackup. You've got--don't have
airplanes available. As you know, it's going to take X number
of days to get an airplane through the depot. So, now they back
up. So, it's not like if sequestration is suddenly lifted, you
know, everything works well. No. You've got this backlog that
you have to now push through a funnel.
The final thing I'll mentioned, that General Paxton touched
on, is my son, who works for the government--he's a computer
science guy--he--when we furloughed him, he--and this is
similar to what I heard from a lot of other civilians--he was
really frustrated, because--he said, ``I can go work somewhere
else and make more money. I want to be a part of the
government.'' But, he said, ``If they're going to--I've got a
family. And I''--you know, two of my grandkids--``and if every
time there's budget dispute, they lay me off,'' he said, ``I
don't know if I could do that for the long term.'' So, it had--
it took a real toll.
Senator Shaheen. I very much appreciate what you all are
saying. I think it's an important reminder for those who say,
``Well, you know, we exempted uniformed personnel, and so it
didn't have the kind of impact,'' that all of you are pointing
out that it really did. Hopefully, we will act with more sanity
in this budget cycle.
Thank you all very much.
Senator Ayotte. I just have a couple of follow-ups, but,
since I have my colleague, Senator Shaheen, here, I know she'd
want me to follow this one up with General Spencer.
Just wanted to check in on the KC-46As delivery to Pease in
2018. I know there were a couple of testing delays, but are
things looking pretty good, on track?
General Spencer. Yes, Madam Chair. We're on track. As you
know, we had a couple of concerns, but we are still on track.
We had some slack built in. Some of--a lot of that slack's been
taken up now. But, as we stand today, we're still on track. We
still feel good about the schedule.
Senator Ayotte. Excellent. Appreciate that. We appreciated
General Welsh's recent visit to Pease, as well. That was
terrific, and I know it meant a lot to those in our Guard and
those that are part of the 157th Air Refueling Wing. So, please
pass our gratitude on.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Madam Chair. We like to tag
team on this issue whenever possible.
[Laughter.]
Senator Ayotte. I just have a couple of follow-up
questions.
One, General Spencer, I had a question about the joint
terminal attack controller (JTAC) training, because recently it
was brought to our attention, a memo that was dated February
25th, 2014, signed by the Commander of the 18th Air Support
Operations Group, ASOG, Commander. The memo relates to JTAC
training. The issue raised in the memo are problems with ground
force commander coordination, airspace deconfliction, and nine
line errors. The Commander also writes that an increasing lack
of live-fly close air support (CAS) training opportunities and
funds for temporary duties (TDYs) have eroded overall JTAC
proficiency across the 18 ASOG. The Commander notes that
continued decrease in the amount of live-fly CAS controls
available to unit JTACs; and to the credit of the Commander, he
intends to offset that decline with using simulators. So, can
you give me a sense of what's happening with the JTAC training,
and especially live-fly CAS training, and where we are with
that, and just an update on how the JTAC training is going?
General Spencer. Yeah. First, Madam Chair, I have to
apologize. I haven't seen that letter, so I would like to go
back and take a look at it and give you a more--give you a
better response--
Senator Ayotte. Sure.
General Spencer.--so I can get the specifics. I'm actually
going down to Pope Air Force Base on Monday to talk to some of
our--
Senator Ayotte. Okay. Well--
General Spencer.--JTACs--
Senator Ayotte.--we're happy to get it for you, and we'll
be happy--
General Spencer. Okay. So, if--
Senator Ayotte.--if you want to take it for the record and
get back--
General Spencer. So, if I could, I would like to give you--
Senator Ayotte. Absolutely.
General Spencer.--make sure I give you a good response on
that.
[The information referred to follows:]
joint terminal attack controller (jtac) training
Question. I just have a couple of follow-up questions. One, General
Spencer, I had a question about JTAC training because recently, it was
brought to our attention a memo that was dated February 25, 2014,
signed by the commander of the 18th Air Support Operations Group, ASOG
Commander, and the memo relates to JTAC training. The issues raised in
the memo are problems with ground force commander coordination airspace
deconfliction and nine line errors, and the commander also writes that
an increasing lack of live fly CAS training opportunities and funds for
T.D.Y. have eroded overall JTAC proficiency across the 18 ASOG. The
commander notes that continued decrease in the amount of live fly CAS
controls (available unit) JTAC, and to the credit of the commander, he
intends to offset that decline with using simulators. So can you give
me a sense of what's happening with the JTAC training especially live
fly CAS training and where we are with that and just an update on how
the JTAC training is going.
Answer. The 18th Air Support Operations Group (18 ASOG) is trained,
combat mission ready and has certified personnel deployed down range.
Regarding JTAC training, while we anticipate simulation to become a
more significant element of our overall training program, we recognize
that live-fly training will remain an essential tool for our overall
combat readiness. By design, the actual amount of live-fly close air
support controls for JTACs is planned to steadily decline over the
years and transition to a more balanced combination of live-fly events
and simulators. The Air Force is a contributing member of the Joint
Staff J6 led Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee (JFS ESC).
The JFS ESC produces an Action Plan which focuses analytical efforts
and solution recommendations to assist Services and Combatant Commands
in providing enhanced, jointly integrated, interoperable and cost
efficient JFS capabilities to the warfighter. We collaborated with the
JFS ESC to develop and field a Joint Terminal Control Training and
Rehearsal System that provides a realistic, modular, upgradeable and
scalable Joint Combat Air Support training / rehearsal simulation
system. Simulation is already becoming a fundamental part of JTAC
training. In fact, simulation is better than live-fly training in many
areas. For example, simulation can permit more complex mission
scenarios with more simulated aircraft involved resulting in a
significant cost savings. The 18 ASOG is scheduled to receive a JTAC
Dome simulator in the summer of 2015.
Senator Ayotte. No problem. Appreciate that very much.
The other question that I had for you was, you know, about
what's happening at Nellis. Can you confirm for me whether the
Air Force has made a decision to close the A-10 Division at 422
Test and Evaluation Squadron at Nellis? If so--I mean, yes or
no. I don't know if you're making that decision or where things
are.
General Spencer. Yeah, that--again, I'm a deer in the
headlights on that one, as well. You--close the squadron?
Senator Ayotte. Yes.
General Spencer. No, I--again, I'll have to follow up with
that, because I--
Senator Ayotte. Then why don't I give you a follow-up
question--
General Spencer. Okay.
Senator Ayotte.--on that one, too.
General Spencer. Okay.
Senator Ayotte. That's pretty specific.
[The information referred to follows:]
a-10 squadron at nellis afb
Question. The other question that I had for you was you know about
what's happening at Nellis, can you confirm for me whether the Air
Force has made a decision to close the A-10 division at 422nd Tests and
Evaluation Squadron at Nellis. If so, it would be yes or no, I don't
know, if you're making that decision or where things are.
Answer. Yes. The FY16 PB divests the A-10 division at the 422nd
Tests and Evaluation Squadron in fiscal year 2016. However, because of
the prohibition on the divestiture of A-10s contained in the fiscal
year 2015 NDAA, the Air Force will not be divesting A-10s at Nellis AFB
at this time.
Senator Ayotte. I wanted to thank you, Admiral Howard. You
and I talked about this when we met in person, and that is on
the maintenance projects at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Frankly, you know, I want to commend the Navy for meeting and
exceeding its capital investment requirements across all the
shipyards. The thing that you and I talked about was the P-266
project at Portsmouth. I know I was very happy with your
answer, and you're very focused on seeing that go forward. So,
thank you for that.
Admiral Howard. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte. Terrific.
Not to keep you all too much longer, but there was one
question that I just wanted to follow up since I had you all
here, because I think it's important. You know, we spent a lot
of last year talking about how are we going to address sexual
assaults in the military. Having all of you here today, I think
I'd be remiss if I didn't ask you how things were going, where
is the status of--what's the status of the legislation that we
passed, and how do you perceive the implementation of that
legislation in your branches, and--give us an update on how
things are going and where you see we can help some more.
General Allyn. I'll start, Madam Chair.
First of all, we have made significant headway in
eliminating the threat and the presence of sexual assault and
sexual harassment in the military. Most promising is that
reporting is up. Our soldiers are reporting over 90-percent
confidence that, if they report an incident, that the chain of
command is going to take the right actions, both to protect the
person that is--has been assaulted, as well as to ensure
accountability of those who perpetrate the alleged assault.
So, we are continuing a rising level of reporting. We are
seeing a reduction in the incidences of assaults. Both
promising. But, we still have work to do, particularly in
eliminating the risk and the perception of retaliation by our
soldiers inside our formations. So, our sergeant major of the
Army has initiated an effort called ``Not in My Squad,''
because the confidence level that we see at the battalion level
and above is very high, but the incidents are occurring at the
company level and below. So, he is bringing forward a group of
staff sergeants from across our total force to get their input
on how do we improve both ownership of resolving this threat to
our trust and our dignity and respect in our formation, and
accountability to ensure that every soldier, every leader, is
doing everything they can, not only to prevent these acts, but
to prevent even the perception of any--retaliation of any type.
We talked a bit ago about social media and the impact that
that has. What we're seeing is, the most significant level, and
the hardest to defeat, is the retaliation--the social
retaliation by peers and others that's occurring in social
media. So, we are arming our leaders with the tools that they
need and the training to understand how to attack this part of
the spectrum that is somewhat new to most of us, but,
unfortunately, not new to our soldiers.
Admiral Howard. Thank you, Senator.
I'd like to, if I may, refer some of this to the report,
but some of it to the conversations I've had with our sailors
as I've traveled as Vice Chief. So, when I do my all-hands
calls, I talk about this issue, about the RAND survey, and then
ask them for their thoughts. Then, in particular, in San Diego,
I was able to sit down with a group of 40 women who represent
all the different communities on our ships, from commanding
officers to the medical officers to engineers.
The--from the RAND survey, we understand that prevalence
has decreased for both men and women. But, you asked, more
specifically, what changes have we made, some of it based on
law, that really has made a difference. The feedback I'm
getting, which seems to be buttressed by the results of the
survey, is, first of all, having Naval Criminal Investigative
Service (NCIS) be the first one on scene to investigate sexual
assault seems to be bring an objectivity to the whole process.
So, that is an important change that--you know, I think all of
the services are committed to professional investigation when
there's an incident.
The--in our case, bringing in victim legal counsel--this is
the person who's the--who helps the victim through the
process--that person is making a big difference for our sailors
and their trust in the--
Senator Ayotte. That's music to my ears, because that was
my piece, and I'm glad to hear that.
Admiral Howard. I actually just sat down with one of our
first Victim's Legal Counsels. She's in Rota, Spain. She talked
a lot about both her and the Sexual Assault Response
Coordinator (SARC) and what their presence meant to the Victims
throughout the process.
The other is, for the--for us--for the training, the
bystander intervention. I've heard from our sailors, both men
and women, and then it bears out in the metrics, that this
training that we put together, the scenario-based training,
really felt--empowered them to be able to take care of their
shipmates. Then, when you look at the results of the RAND
survey, that when our sailors saw something, nine out of ten of
them took action. The training works. They understand the
importance of taking care of shipmates, whether, when you see
something, you go to help your shipmate, you help your shipmate
make a report through another process, or you report it
yourself. When I've spoken, particularly to the women, they say
the training is very effective, but that the results are even
more impressive. So, thank you for all of that.
General Paxton. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I would echo--and I think the Secretary of Defense was on
record as saying--in the subject of Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response (SAPR), we have had almost unprecedented focus and
significant success and accomplishments. We're not, as General
Allyn said, anywhere near where we want to be, need to be,
should be, but we're going to continue the focus. In the case
of the Marine Corps, we've had almost 1,000 fewer documented
cases of unwanted sexual contact. That's about a 30-percent
reduction, so pretty significant.
The two pieces to your specific question that I'd like to
highlight, if I may, Senator--number one is, there's over 70
pieces of legislation that have either been enacted or
proposed, and it's going to take us a while to work with them.
I would echo what the VCNO said. We have several documented
cases where the victim's legal counsel office--or officer was a
big help, both in comfort to the potential victim and then in
the adjudication and the defense. But, we have also had cases,
too, where we have now introduced a fourth lawyer into what was
a three-lawyer equation, where you had a prosecutor, a
defender, and a judge. You know much better than I, ma'am. But,
we're going to have to work through that, because some of these
cases will be challenged, and you would hate for the one out or
the one each to perturb the goodness of the whole system.
The last piece, if I may, Senator, is just to highlight the
centrality and the criticality of the commander in all this.
We're very appreciative of the work by the committee to keep
the commander involved. Because whether it comes to bystander
intervention, NCO leadership, legal accountability, you have to
have the commander there.
So, thank you.
General Spencer. Madam Chair, similarly, we--because we all
work together on this problem to share lessons learned, and
working together to try to solve this problem. It's similar,
the Air Force. Our prevalence is down by 25 percent, our
reporting is up by 61 percent. So, we think that's all in the
right direction. We've done a lot of work, as you know, through
special victim's counsel, things to make sure victims are taken
care of, make sure that commanders have the tools they need to
prosecute if someone is found guilty.
Our big push right now is on prevention, preventing this
from happening in the first place. So, we've done several
things. About a month ago, we had a Sexual Assault Prevention
Summit. We brought in everyone from E1 all the way up to wing
commanders. We brought in experts around the country, brought
in the Center for Disease Control. We spent a whole week diving
into this issue. The good news was, the answer was yes, you can
prevent it, but it takes a lot of study, a lot of understanding
the crime and to have things that specifically get at it.
Just two weeks ago, I was down in North Carolina, in the
Research Triangle. I met with folks from University of North
Carolina and from Duke who are also working on this crime in
their colleges--local colleges--have a lot of great ideas.
We're partnering with them. In fact, they're on their way now
to Sheppard Air Force Base to work with some of our trainees
there. So, we're--this is something--I can promise you, this is
something I--we all work on. I know I work on it every day.
We're not going to stop until this is fixed.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. We're not going to stop, either.
So, you know, I think this is something we--we did tremendous
pieces of legislation and worked on this collectively in a
bipartisan fashion in the last Congress. Now you've got, as
General Paxton really pointed out, a lot of implementation of--
you know, to get this right. I really appreciate what I hear
most from all four of you, which is understanding the
importance of this and the commitment that we need, you know,
every day to get this right, and to work together on it. So, I
appreciate your giving me an update on that. I look forward to
continuing to work with you, all of you, on this issue.
Thank you all for being here today and for what you do for
the country.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
hollow army
1. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, what does a hollow Army look
like?
General Allyn. A hollow Army is characterized by prolonged and
disproportionate investments across manpower, operations and
maintenance, modernization, and procurement without corresponding
adjustments to strategy. If we have too little of anyone of these, the
Army won't be ready when called upon.
Specifically, a hollow Army is one that appears capable on the
surface, but is unable to adequately meet national objectives without
assuming an extremely high amount of risk. We accept a greater
likelihood of forfeiting the decisive edge we expect our Soldiers to
retain when we face an adversary in combat . . . we create an
opportunity for adversaries to experience a ``fair fight,'' which we
should never permit given our National capacity.
2. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, what warning signs should we look
for when we are coming dangerously close to a hollow Army?
General Allyn. A hollow Army is characterized by prolonged and
disproportionate investments across manpower, operations and
maintenance, modernization, and procurement without corresponding
adjustments to strategy.
By this measure, the Army is not hollow. However, we are beginning
to see the warning signs. The Army today is able to produce only enough
readiness to meet requirements--and we can only achieve this because of
the extra funding made available by the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA).
The result has been a steady erosion of readiness across the force.
Underfunding readiness not only reduces training, but the maintenance
of our equipment as well. This is evidenced by a gradual decrease in
equipment readiness. Because we are underfunding modernization, we risk
our qualitative edge. Our equipment has continued to age, becoming less
reliable and less survivable as the technological sophistication of our
adversaries is increased. Finally, the underfunding of our
installations impacts Soldier and Family quality of life and
ultimately, retention. We've consistently deferred critical
sustainment, restoration, and modernization projects, creating
substandard living conditions on many of our bases. If sequestration
levels of funding continue, we will have a hard time maintaining the
balance between manpower, readiness, and modernization. That is a
template for a hollow force.
3. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, would a return of defense
sequestration in fiscal year 2016 result in a hollow Army?
General Allyn. Not immediately, but the necessary actions to meet
sequestration level funding requirements would keep the Army out of
balance in terms of manpower, operations and maintenance,
modernization, and procurement for several years--until at least fiscal
year 2023. Without a major change in national strategy to account for a
smaller force with reduced capability, the Army will likely experience
a period where it is indeed hollow.
marine corps readiness
4. Senator Ayotte. General Paxton, in your prepared statement, you
writes that ``approximately half of the Marine Corps' home station
units are at an unacceptable level of readiness in their ability to
execute wartime missions, respond to unexpected crises, and surge for
major contingencies.'' What are the primary reasons for this reduced
readiness?
General Paxton. Resource shortfalls in available personnel and
needed equipment at the unit level remain the principal detractors to
achieving the level of readiness home station units need to execute
wartime missions, respond to unexpected crises, and surge for major
contingencies. The Marine Corps' principal concern going forward is the
recovery of full spectrum readiness of our home station units and the
reconstitution of the whole-of-force after over a decade of
unprecedented sustained conflict.
The Marine Corps excels at meeting current operational requirements
in support of the geographic combatant commanders. To maintain the high
readiness of our forward deployed and forward engaged units, we
globally source personnel and equipment from our home station units--
the ready force. Ultimately, readiness comes at a cost and the high
readiness of our forward deployed and forward engaged forces comes at
the expense of our home station units' readiness.
Further compounding the recovery of full spectrum readiness for
home station units is the paucity of available amphibious shipping
essential to unit level training. Although Service-level training is
protected through the future years defense plan, home station training
enablers (primarily simulation systems and ranges, and operationally
available amphibious ships) will steadily degrade due to inadequate
sustainment, recapitalization, and modernization. Without appropriate
funding, lower equipment maintenance levels will begin to quickly
degrade those essential equipment pools, leading to degradation in
training and readiness. Any reduction in amphibious ship maintenance
will directly limit operationally available amphibious warships and
erode readiness. Eventually, the equipment needed at home station will
wear out; when it does, our Marines will lose associated training and
therefore the proficiency necessary to keep these units ready to
respond. Budget Control Act funding levels may force the Marine Corps
to choose between having its home station units being either well-
equipped or well-trained. Training home station units to standard is
necessary since these units constitute the ready force that would
immediately respond to unforeseen crises or major contingencies.
5. Senator Ayotte. General Paxton, which type of Marine units are
having the most readiness challenges?
General Paxton. Approximately half of Marine Corps' home station
units are insufficiently resourced to achieve those readiness levels
needed to execute wartime missions, respond to unexpected crises, and
surge for major contingencies. Using Marine aviation as an example in
this era of fiscal austerity, Marine Corps operational requirements
have increased while the overall number of Marine aircraft for tasking
and training has decreased. Approximately 80 percent of Marine aviation
lack the minimum required Ready Basic Aircraft to train to the minimum
readiness levels. Lack of procurement (future readiness) and aging
legacy aircraft negatively impact aircraft availability for training
and meeting operational demands. A significant training and warfighting
requirement gap of RBA exists. Shallow procurement ramps (not buying
aircraft fast enough) directly increase both the cost and complexity of
maintaining legacy systems beyond their projected life. Marine aviation
is 106 aircraft short of the training requirement or 158 aircraft (10-
squadron equivalent) short of the wartime formations. Out of 52 fully
operational capable squadrons, 13 are deployed and 8 are preparing to
deploy. Of the remaining 31 squadrons, 22 are below the minimum
training level required to go to combat in the event of a contingency.
The majority of the aircraft deficit is caused by insufficient aviation
depot repair capacity and throughput. Our aviation depots have not
fully recovered from the turmoil caused by the last sequester. Marine
aviation is not sufficiently ready now; another sequester would prevent
any opportunity to recover readiness.
6. Senator Ayotte. General Paxton, how can Congress best help with
these readiness challenges?
General Paxton. The Marine Corps' current resource level represents
the bare minimum at which it can meet the current Defense Strategic
Guidance. This budget allows the Marine Corps to protect near-term
readiness, but does so at the expense of long-term modernization and
infrastructure, threatening an imbalance across the five Pillars of
Readiness--high quality people, unit readiness, capacity to meet
commanders' requirements, infrastructure sustainment, and equipment
modernization. An extended imbalance among the Pillars leads to
conditions that could hollow the force and create unacceptable risk for
our national defense.
Congress' continued support, and specifically support of the fiscal
year 2016 President's Budget request, will be critical to ensuring our
ability to fulfill our commitments as outlined in the Defense Strategic
Guidance. Further, an end to both the threat of a sequester and to the
caps imposed by the Budget Control Act would allow the Marine Corps to
begin to address some of the readiness imbalances and would introduce
much-needed budget stability to allow for effective long range
planning.
optimal army size
7. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, setting aside the budget-driven
Army endstrength reduction currently being implemented, based on
combatant commander requirements, what size of an Army do we really
need? Active Component? Guard? Reserve?
General Allyn. Assuming our planning assumptions are correct, the
minimum end strength the Army requires to fully execute the 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), and answer the current demands of the
Combatant Commanders is 980,000 Soldiers, including 450,000 in the
Active Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard, and 195,000 in the
Army Reserve. At these levels, all three components will be smaller
than the pre-2001 force.
However, much like the Chief of Staff and the Secretary, I am
concerned that our 2012 DSG assumptions may prove to be incorrect. The
2012 DSG makes a number of optimistic assumptions regarding the number,
duration, location, and size of future conflicts. Today, we see
requirements and operational environments that were not forecasted in
the 2012 DSG. These include Russian aggression in Europe, the rise of
ISIL, and the rapidly changing security environment in Eastern Asia.
All of these developments challenge our assumptions and elevate our
strategic risk. It is my military judgment that, based on increasing
world instability, we should reconsider currently programmed reductions
in Army endstrength.
impacts of budget cuts
8. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, please describe how defense sequestration,
combined with continuing resolutions, have had a lasting and negative
impact on your Service's readiness.
General Allyn. The readiness of the Army today is insufficient to
support the national security objectives outlined in the guiding
strategic documents and specified within Combatant Commander
operational plans. Reduced funding coupled with sustained demand for
Army forces results in fewer Army units available for contingency
response and at lower levels of readiness. The specific readiness
levels of units and the ability of the Army to execute its Title 10
requirements are classified; however, the causes and implications of
the Army's degraded readiness are clear--over a decade of focus on
counterinsurgency operations jeopardizes the Army's assured dominance
to conduct Decisive Action in support of Unified Land Operations (DA/
ULO). This degraded ability to provide sufficient ready forces to
achieve those objectives outlined by the President has resulted in
increased risk for the Nation.
Army readiness is approaching a tipping point. The combined effects
of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), fiscal and end-strength
reductions, and over a decade of conflict have suppressed the Army's
ability to build readiness across our formations. While the Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2013 (BBA) provided additional readiness funding,
continued improvement requires multi-year consistent and predictable
funding designed to build Army readiness beyond counter-insurgency
towards decisive action in support of unified land operations.
Sequestration will not provide sufficient funding to man, equip,
sustain, and train units to the appropriate readiness levels and places
our Soldiers at risk when responding to unforecasted contingency
operations. The use of continuing resolutions wreak havoc on Army
readiness, modernization, and manpower. It makes long term planning
difficult. As a result, we are forced to train sporadically, and the
materiel and equipment we buy costs more and takes longer to acquire.
Admiral Howard. Sequestration, the Continuing Resolution in fiscal
year 2013, and a decade of combat operations have created maintenance
backlogs that have prevented us from getting ships back to the Fleet on
time and aircraft back on the flight line. We continue our efforts to
rebuild the workforce in our public depots--both at shipyards and
aviation Fleet Readiness Centers--and reduce the number of lost
operational days, but it will take years to fully recover our
readiness.
General Paxton. For the last few years the Department of Defense,
along with all other federal departments and agencies, has had to
operate in an uncertain fiscal environment shaped by sequestration
threats, BCA caps, and the near certainty of starting every fiscal year
under a continuing resolution. Against this chaotic background the
Marine Corps has been forced to make extremely difficult fiscal
decisions that directly impact day-to-day operations. The recent budget
cuts and the looming threat of sequestration have been particularly
difficult to absorb. Today, approximately half of the Marine Corps'
home station units are at an unacceptable level of readiness.
Investment in the future is less than what is required, and
infrastructure sustainment is budgeted below the Department of Defense
standard. The Marine Corps has significantly reduced many of the
programs that have helped to maintain morale and family readiness
through over a decade of war. Additionally, the deployment-to-dwell
ratio is being maintained at a very challenging level. The operating
forces are deploying for up to 7 months and returning home for 14 or
less months before redeploying. These are some of the damages to date
caused by sequestration and lower funding levels.
The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget is the bare bones budget
for the Marine Corps that can meet the current Defense Strategic
Guidance. The budget prioritizes near-term readiness at the expense of
modernization and facilities. Another round of sequestration would
force the Marine Corps to significantly degrade the readiness of our
home station units, which is the Marine Corps' ready force to respond
to crises or major combat operations. The fiscal challenges we face
today will be further exacerbated by assuming even more risk in long-
term modernization and infrastructure in order to maintain ready forces
forward. This is not sustainable and degrades our capacity as the
Nation's force-in-readiness.
Annual continuing resolutions, some lasting several months, will
further complicate these concerns. The delay in receipt of funds,
combined with the uncertainty over when and how much will finally be
appropriated, can wreak havoc on contract award timelines and our
participation in training exercises, and put us at risk of accruing
additional costs in the long run. Furthermore, because CRs only fund
agencies at prior year levels, critical programs may not be sustained.
General Spencer. The Air Force has sought to protect readiness
accounts under sequestration. Despite that, fiscal year 2013
sequestration has had a long-lasting negative impact on Air Force
readiness. Prior to April of 2013, readiness levels were already low,
predominantly due to constant global demand combined with a 20+ year
steady decline in force structure. In 2013, as a result of
sequestration, we were forced to ground 31 flying squadrons, cancel 8
exercises, and significantly curtail 8 more. Additionally, maintenance,
repair, and upgrades to operational training ranges had to be deferred,
degrading our ability to support high-end combat training.
Individually, the training and professional development lost as a
result of sequestration can never be recovered. Institutionally, it has
taken 2 years to recover readiness to a point where still less than
half of our fighter and bomber squadrons are full-spectrum ready. This
is well short of Defense Strategic Guidance requirements. Restored
funding will assist in re-building readiness, but the Air Force will
also need relief from the current ops tempo and time to regain
capabilities lost as a result of sequestration.
9. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, if defense sequestration returns in fiscal year
2016, can we expect the negative readiness effects to last for many
years?
General Allyn. Yes. If sequestration levels of funding continue,
the Army will be out of balance until at least fiscal year 2023 and
will require at least 3 years thereafter to return to a state of full
readiness, albeit with a much smaller Army.
Admiral Howard. Yes. Under sequestration there is no path to full
readiness recovery to execute the required missions of the Defense
Strategic Guidance (DSG). A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016
would necessitate a revisit and revision of the defense strategy. The
required cuts would force us to further delay critical warfighting
capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed for contingency
responses, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego or stretch
procurement of force structure as a last resort. While sequestration
has caused significant near-term impacts, a return to sequestration in
fiscal year 2016 would create further serious problems that would
manifest across the years and be difficult from which to recover.
Assuming a stable budget and no major contingencies for the
foreseeable future, I estimate that we will not recover from the
maintenance backlogs until 2018 for Carrier Strike Groups and
approximately 2020 for Amphibious Ready Groups. Sequestration would
derail these readiness goals.
General Paxton. Yes, the deleterious effects of another sequester
would further compound the turmoil caused by the last sequester from
which we still are trying to recover. We have yet to fully appreciate
the cuts that have been made to date; however, sequestration has a
chaotic effect on the force during a time of extraordinary challenges.
Sequestration does not fund the optimally designed force of 186,800
active component required to meet the strategy. Sequestration prevents
the Marine Corps from generating ready forces to meet operational
requirements now and into the future. Sequestration equates to less
force capacity; we would not have what is needed to fight in a major
war. Essentially, all operational units would be committed for the
war's duration with no relief and we would have very little left for
crises that would occur in other parts of the world. Home station unit
readiness and investments in infrastructure and modernization will
continue to suffer as limited resources are prioritized to protect the
near-term readiness of deployed units in harm's way. A return to
sequestration-level funding with a force of 175,000 active component
would equate to high risk. At this lower resource level, our units that
deploy to combat would not be as well trained and would be slower
arriving. This means that it will take longer to achieve our objectives
and the human cost would be higher. This is what we mean when we say
high risk.
General Spencer. Yes. Individually, the training and professional
development that would be lost as a result of sequestration can never
be recovered. Readiness growth takes time and resources, readiness
develops momentum slowly. Additionally, readiness in a small force can
be lost very quickly when time and resources are not available.
Institutionally, under the Balanced Budget Act, it took 2 years to
recover readiness to a point somewhere near the pre-sequester level.
Even so, still less than half of our fighter and bomber squadrons are
currently full-spectrum ready. We can expect the same or worse for the
foreseeable future if sequestration returns.
10. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, how long will it take to recover?
General Allyn. Under sequestration, the Army will not be able to
bring its manpower, operations and maintenance, modernization, and
procurement expenditures into balance until at least fiscal year 2023
and will require at least an additional 3 years thereafter to return to
full readiness. Meeting Combatant Commander requirements will force
tough decisions about how much ``surge capacity'' we retain, and how
little dwell time between deployments our units continue to absorb.
Increased demands from Combatant Commanders will elevate stress on the
force and the risk to meet contingency response requirements.
Admiral Howard. The fiscal year 2016 Navy budget submission is
designed to continue our readiness recovery, reset the force and
restore our required contingency operations capacity by 2020 while
continuing to provide a sustainable forward presence. However, under a
return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 and beyond, there is no
path to full readiness recovery to execute the required missions of the
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). A revision of the defense strategy
will be necessary.
General Paxton. We have yet to fully appreciate the cuts that have
been made to date by sequestration. A return to BCA-level spending
would further delay readiness recovery. Another sequester would
exacerbate the fiscal challenges we already face today and force
significant challenges upon the Marine Corps. The months-long sequester
of 2013 adversely impacted the aviation depots leading to the release
of artisans whose skills have not been replicated, leading to
maintenance backlogs and today's degraded operational readiness. The
specter of another sequester, especially one that is more than just
months-long, would only lead to compounding the deleterious effects
brought about by the 2013 sequester. The time needed to recover
readiness would exponentially exceed the duration of sequestration, for
an experienced and proficient generation does not grow overnight.
Today, approximately half of Marine Corps' home station units are
insufficiently resourced to achieve those readiness levels needed to
execute wartime missions, respond to unexpected crises, and surge for
major contingencies. There is no recovery under sequestration. It would
take many years to recover readiness once sequestration ends.
General Spencer. The Air Force's current plan calls for a recovery
to 80 percent readiness by the end of 2023. However, this plan was
contingent on full Presidential Budget (PB) 2016 funding, Overseas
Contingency Operations funding moved to baseline, and a reduction of
operations tempo to allow for a 1:4 deployment-to-dwell level. Recovery
is likely to be delayed at least 5 years if sequestration returns in
fiscal year 2016.
unfunded needs
11. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, what is the greatest need for your Services in
respect to rebuilding readiness?
General Allyn. The Army's greatest need is budget certainty.
Building proficient and ready units requires a well-synchronized
training plan supported by available manpower and ready equipment.
Without certainty in funding, it is impossible to fully develop and
source a training plan beyond the short term. Further, a lack of budget
certainty prevents the Army from developing a modernization plan
because we are uncertain how much or how long funding will continue to
enable fielding of modernized capability.
Admiral Howard. Time and stable budgets are the most critical
elements of Navy readiness recovery. A decade of combat operations and
the resulting high operational tempo require a period of time for
reset. With the additional impact of the Continuing Resolution and
sequestration in fiscal year 2013, we have experienced significant
delays. Further budget uncertainty will create additional setbacks to
restoring our readiness.
The fiscal year 2016 Navy budget submission is balanced to continue
on a path towards readiness recovery while sustaining the most critical
procurement and modernization necessary to achieve a ready Navy in the
future. The Navy unfunded priority list forwarded by the Secretary of
Defense reflects the additional procurement and modernization funding
that would improve future readiness with respect to Navy's ability to
execute the Defense Strategic Guidance. However, none of those
requirements are a higher priority than the balanced approach offered
in our fiscal year 2016 budget submission.
General Paxton. The Marine Corps views rebuilding readiness through
the lens of institutional readiness. Institutional readiness consists
of five pillars: (1) Capability and Capacity to Meet Combatant
Commander Requirements, (2) Unit Readiness, (3) High Quality People,
(4) Infrastructure Sustainment, and (5) Equipment Modernization.
Currently, institutional readiness is out of balance. Achieving and
sustaining balance across these pillars now and into the future is
essential to rebuilding readiness. Balanced institutional readiness
leads to the whole-of-force reconstitution after over a decade of
unprecedented sustain conflict to meet current and future requirements.
A budget that supports required end strength and equipment
recapitalization and modernization is an essential component leading to
balanced institutional readiness.
General Spencer. The Air Force needs both time and resources to
rebuild readiness. Currently, time is our greatest need to recover
readiness. However, time available to train (generate readiness) is
severely limited by ongoing rotational deployments. The next
significant limitation to readiness growth is skilled manpower for
maintenance and operations. In short, after years of force reductions,
we have a supply-demand mismatch. Two possible solutions exist: reduce
the number/length of deployments to sustainable levels or increase the
Air Force capacity to meet rotational demand to permit readiness
growth. On the resource side, any defense authorization below PB levels
will prevent full recovery of readiness.
12. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, what additional necessary capability are you
lacking in the fiscal year 2016 budget?
General Allyn. The Army's unfunded priorities list was provided
directly to Congress by the Department of Defense on March 27, 2015.
Admiral Howard. PB-16 provides the minimum funding required to meet
the missions articulated in the Defense Strategic Guidance and
Quadrennial Defense Review. However, Navy had to accept risk in naval
warfare systems' modernization, aircraft procurement, and air and
missile defense capabilities to meet fiscal constraints. There are
three warfare areas that could benefit from additional resources: 1)
improve sensors and systems to defeat current and emerging air-to-air
warfare and anti-ship cruise missile threats; 2) increase strike
fighter, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and
logistic aircraft capacity; and 3) improve undersea warfare sensors and
fire control systems. A summary follows:
Air-to-air Radio Frequency (RF) Kill Chain kits provide
our aircraft the ability to counter sophisticated digital weapons and
combat systems proliferated around the world today.
Destroyer (DDG) combat system modernization will increase
our capacity to meet Combatant Commander Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) warfare
needs (to defeat advanced missiles and strike/fighter aircraft).
Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP
Block II) will provide radar and communications signal intercept, and
defeat anti-ship cruise missiles, enabling surface ships to operate in
an anti-access environment.
Submarine towed arrays are the most important sensors in
our undersea warfare enterprise. Current inventory is inadequate to
reliably meet global demand.
Our legacy strike fighters (F/A-18A-D) are reaching end
of life faster than planned due to use and wear. Improving the
inventory of F/A-18F and F-35C aircraft will help reconcile a near term
(2018-2020) strike fighter inventory capacity challenge, and longer
term (2020-2035) strike fighter model balance within the carrier air
wing.
An additional MQ-4C (TRITON) would increase our capacity
to respond to projected worldwide Combatant Commander ISR demand.
C-40A aircraft fulfill a maritime logistics requirement,
and provide short-notice high-priority cargo and passenger missions
globally. Two additional aircraft will bring the fleet to the minimum
wartime requirement of 17 aircraft to support execution of Combatant
Commander operational plans.
General Paxton. In addition to the fiscal year 2016 President's
Budget request, the Department of Defense has submitted to Congress a
consolidated list of the Services' unfunded priorities. The Marine
Corps portion of this list totals $2.1 billion. Additional requirements
include funding to enhance aviation readiness ($1.5 billion), funding
for additional investments in critical training and weapon systems such
as Networking on the Move, Javelin, and the Infantry Immersion Trainer
($412 million), and for high-priority construction projects ($167
million). These requirements do not supersede those laid out in the
fiscal year 2016 President's Budget request.
General Spencer. In the event congressional funding exceeds the
level requested in the FY16 PB, the capabilities the Air Force would
seek to acquire using the additional resources are identified in our
fiscal year 2016 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL). Readiness is the
highest priority on the UPL; this includes munitions, training,
simulators, ranges, vehicle support, and equipment. The next priority
is modifications for legacy fleets and programs supporting Combatant
Commander requirements.
army brigade combat teams
13. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, if sequestration returns, what
will specifically happen to the readiness of our Army Brigade Combat
Teams?
General Allyn. Sequestration will reduce the resources available
for training and maintenance of units thereby reducing the readiness
levels of our Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). Under sequestration, the
Army will struggle to maintain sufficient readiness to meet all of its
current known requirements. The lack of funding and the need to
dedicate resources to units filling current requirements will result in
a degradation of readiness in every other unit, eliminating the Army's
ability to rapidly respond to a contingency or other crisis. We will
have fewer BCTs ready to respond to emerging crises and unforecasted
demands.
14. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, General Odierno recently
testified that ``The unrelenting budget impasse has also compelled us
to degrade readiness to historically low levels. Today, only 33 percent
of our brigades are ready, when our sustained readiness rate should be
closer to 70 percent.'' What is the primary reason for this degraded
readiness: insufficient training, manning, or poorly maintained
equipment?
General Allyn. Generally, four factors drive unit readiness:
availability of Soldiers, availability of equipment; equipment
serviceability; and unit training. Currently, Soldier availability and
training are the leading factors of degraded readiness. The combined
effects of sustained demand for Army capabilities, fiscal reductions,
and the friction associated with re-organizing of Brigade Combat Teams
(BCT) and the associated downsizing of the force, impact Soldier
availability and the training time needed to restore proficiency.
Unpredictable funding creates an additional, preventable level of risk
to deliver ready forces.
15. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, if sequestration continues, what
percent of units would have degraded readiness?
General Allyn. If sequestration continues, the Army will only be
able to build sufficient readiness to meet current known requirements.
All other units will experience varying levels of degradation in
readiness, ranging from significant to severe.
combat training center rotations
16. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, can you elaborate on how many
Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations would be cut if sequester were
to occur in fiscal year 2016?
General Allyn. The Combat Training Centers (CTCs) continue to be
our Army's premier training venue. If sequester occurs in fiscal year
2016, the Army does not plan on cutting any of the scheduled rotations.
The Army recognizes the value of a CTC rotation to a Brigade Combat
Team not only in terms of maneuver training, but training in processes
such as deployment, field maintenance, mission command, and leader
development--training that cannot be accomplished at home station. As a
result, the Army has elected to accept risk in home station training
and readiness in order to preserve the ability to train these complex
skills. However, the cuts imposed on home station training (HST) as a
result of the sequester will result in many units arriving at the CTC
in a degraded state of readiness--which means they will depart the CTC-
experience less ready than a fully resourced HST model delivers.
public shipyard workers
17. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Howard, Admiral Greenert has testified
that to address the workload to be completed in our public shipyards,
the Navy will need to fund an additional workforce up to 33,500 Full
Time Equivalent (FTEs) workers by fiscal year 2017. Secretary Sean
Stackley stated that shipbuilding is critical to our security. If
sequestration were to occur, how would that impact this Navy plan?
Admiral Howard. If sequestration returns in fiscal year 2016, it
will force deep cuts to the Navy Operation and Maintenance account,
impacting our ability to hire the public shipyard workforce needed to
properly maintain and modernize our existing fleet of nuclear powered
aircraft carriers and submarines. The resulting shortfall in shipyard
capacity would drive delays in maintenance completion, negatively
impacting the readiness of our forces, particularly those needed for
contingency response, and diminish the ability to achieve platform
expected service life. Ultimately, this puts our ability to provide the
forces to support Combatant Commander requirements at risk.
It is also likely that continued sequestration would force us to
forego or stretch procurement of ships and submarines. This would slow
our progress toward achieving the 306-ship force required by the 2012
Force Structure Assessment and driven by the Defense Strategic
Guidance. In addition, the resulting disruptions in the ship design and
construction phases would have significant consequences for the health
and sustainment of the shipbuilding industrial base, which relies on
stability and predictability to cost effectively build the future
fleet.
18. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Howard, how crucial are these new hires
to the Navy's readiness recovery?
Admiral Howard. Increasing the size of the workforce to meet the
workload demand in the public shipyards is critical to ensure our ships
and submarines receive required maintenance after many years of high
operational tempo, achieve expected service life, and are modernized to
keep pace with the evolving threat. Most of the work in the public
shipyards involves nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers,
and there is very limited private sector capacity for this type of
highly technical work. As a result, any shortfall in the public sector
workforce capacity results in maintenance delays and deferrals,
ultimately impacting Navy's ability to provide ready forces.
19. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Howard, what is the work that will
drive this demand?
Admiral Howard. The increasing workload in the public shipyards on
our nuclear-powered ships is driven by a combination of midlife
availabilities on our legacy ship classes and the first docking
availabilities on our newer ship classes. Those include Engineered
Overhauls on Los Angeles Class submarines, Engineering Refueling
Overhauls on Ohio Class submarines, Extended Docking Selected
Restricted Availabilities on Virginia Class submarines, and Planned
Incremental Availabilities (PIA) and Docking PIAs on Nimitz Class
aircraft carriers. The volume of this anticipated work is a function of
these regularly scheduled yard periods and the growth work that has
accumulated as a function of a decade of high tempo combat operations.
20. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Howard, which shipyards will require
this additional workforce?
Admiral Howard. All four public shipyards (Portsmouth, Norfolk,
Puget Sound, and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyards) require additional
personnel to meet the projected workload in fiscal year 2016 and beyond
21. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Howard, how will the increased need
affect each of the four public shipyards?
Admiral Howard. Each public shipyard has unique requirements, based
on their projected workload in fiscal year 2016 and beyond. The
President's Budget for fiscal year 2016 supports these important
increases, which began in fiscal year 2015. The total manpower levels
by shipyard in fiscal years 2014-16, including both Direct and
Reimbursable funded Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs), are as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY14 to FY16 FTE
Shipyard FY14 FTE Total FY15 FTE Total FY16 FTE Total Difference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Norfolk............................. 8,917 9,433 9,732 +815
Pearl Harbor........................ 4,341 4,628 4,765 +424
Portsmouth.......................... 4,601 4,855 5,023 +422
Puget Sound......................... 11,122 12,560 13,283 +2,161
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL........................... 28,981 31,476 32,803 +3,822
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
amphibious warships shortfall
22. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Howard, of the current inventory of 31
amphibious warships, how many are prepared to embark marines and deploy
right now?
Admiral Howard. We currently have two Amphibious Ready Groups
deployed with assigned Marine Expeditionary Units. We maintain at least
one additional Amphibious Ready Group for contingency response.
Additional ships are capable of embarking Marines and/or their
equipment and deploying as Amphibious Task Force (ATF) Lift. While
specific numbers vary based on operational cycles, the total number of
ships available for ATF Lift do not meet the full requirement of the
Combatant Commanders.
23. Senator Ayotte. General Paxton, what is the Marine Corps'
requirement for amphibious warships?
General Paxton. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps have determined the force structure to support the
deployment and employment of 2 MEBs simultaneously is 38 amphibious
warfare ships. Understanding this requirement, in light of fiscal
constraints faced by the nation, the Department of the Navy has agreed
to sustain a minimum of 33 amphibious warfare ships. However, COCOM
demand is more realistically defined at about 54.
It should be noted that, the 33 ship force accepts risk in the
arrival of combat support and combat service support elements of the
MEB, but has been determined to be adequate in meeting the needs of the
naval force within today's fiscal limitations. This inventory level
also provides the needed capacity for a forward presence and a MEB/
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) to respond to a crisis or contingency
within 25 days.
24. Senator Ayotte. General Paxton, what is the impact of the
shortfall?
General Paxton. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps have determined the force structure to support the
deployment and employment of 2 MEBs simultaneously is 38 amphibious
warfare ships. Understanding this requirement, in light of fiscal
constraints faced by the nation, the Department of the Navy has agreed
to sustain a minimum of 33 amphibious warfare ships. However, COCOM
demands are more realistically defined at about 54.
Shortfalls in amphibious warship inventory have multiple negative
effects. The 33 ship force accepts risk in the arrival of combat
support and combat service support elements of the MEB, but has been
determined to be adequate in meeting the needs of the naval force
within today's fiscal limitations. This inventory level also provides
the needed capacity for a forward presence and a MEB/Expeditionary
Strike Group (ESG) to respond to a crisis or contingency within 25
days. Shortfalls also negatively affect our ability to train.
Conducting amphibious operations with our joint services is not just a
matter of putting Marines on Navy ships. Those units must have the
opportunity to operate with each other during their workup to establish
relationships, tactics, techniques, procedures, and build
interoperability.
air force mobilization authority
25. Senator Ayotte. General Spencer, Congress recently provided a
new mobilization authority to give increased access to the Reserve
components. To date, how many times has the Air Force made use of this
new authority and what, if any, impact has this had on the readiness of
Active component units?
General Spencer. The Air Force has utilized 12304b to mobilize
approximately 1350 airmen across a variety of mission sets in support
of fiscal year 2015 Combatant Commander requirements. 12304b has
primarily been used by the Air Force for pre-planned missions in
support of a Combatant Commander when there is no other authorized
mobilization authority (12302) available. The impact on the readiness
of the Active Component is unknown at this time as the requirements
filled by these mobilized reservists would have otherwise gone unfilled
if the Reserve Component was not made available by mobilization. In
other words, the Air Force did not have sufficient capacity in its
Active Component force to fill all requirements levied upon it by the
Combatant Commanders.
If the Air Force could change one aspect of the new authority it
would be to relieve the Service of the requirement to provide prior
notification of the use of 12304b in the ``J-Books'', and allow the
service submission of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to OSD as
sufficient notification. Due to the timing of the ``supplemental'' J-
Book submission, the Air Force is not able to utilize the new authority
for pre-planned Combatant Commander missions paid for out of the
supplemental budget and still allow sufficient notification to the
Reserve Component members to manage their employer and personal lives
with enough time to deploy.
26. Senator Ayotte. General Spencer, please provide deployment-to-
dwell figures for Active and Reserve component units for each mission
design series (MDS), i.e. type of aircraft, for 2012, 2013, and 2014.
General Spencer. With a view towards regaining readiness by 2023,
the Air Force manages our Combat Air Forces (CAF) fighter/bomber fleet
at a 1:4 Deploy-to-Dwell (1:5 Mob-to-Dwell). All other MDS' are managed
at 1:2 Deploy-to-Dwell (1:5 Mob-to-Dwell). Specific MDS' are listed
below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combat Air Forces MDS Component FY12 FY13 FY14
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-1................................. Active 1:2.0 1:2.0 1:1.5
B-2................................. Active N/A N/A N/A
B-52................................ Active 1:2.5 1:3.7 1:3.6
A-10C............................... Active 1:2.2 1:2.3 1:2.0
A-10C............................... ANG 1:20.0 N/A N/A
A-10C............................... AFRC 1:30.0 N/A 1:7.5
F-15C............................... Active 1:17.6 1:7.3 1:4.4
F-15C............................... ANG 1:39.6 N/A N/A
F-15E............................... Active 1:3.4 1:2.9 1:3.3
F-16C+/CM........................... Active 1:8.3 1:2.8 1:5.6
F-16C+/CM........................... ANG 1:14.6 1:22.7 1:21.5
F-16C+/CM........................... AFRC N/A N/A 1:8.6
F-16CJ.............................. Active 1:4.2 1:2.9 1:2.8
F-16CJ.............................. ANG 1:8.2 N/A 1:4.3
F-22................................ Active 1:6.4 1:7.0 1:1.6
HC-130.............................. Active 1:1.1 1:2.8 1:2.0
HC-130.............................. ANG N/A 1:18.1 N/A
HC-130.............................. AFRC 1:12.3 N/A 1:6.4
HH-60............................... Active 1:1.5 1:2.6 1:2.5
HH-60............................... ANG 1:7.9 1:10.3 N/A
HH-60............................... AFRC 1:7.1 N/A 1:7.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAF NOTES:
1. N/A means no contingency deployment for that MDS during that
time frame.
2. CAF Deploy-to-Dwell ratio based on deployment of lead UTCs for
each MDS.
3. Dwell is average for each CAF MDS deployment during specified
fiscal year.
4. We do not track dwell for Low Supply/High Demand weapon systems
such as E-3, E-8, EC-130H, RC-135, U-2, and SOF aircraft (includes
Battlefield Airmen). Dwell is managed by individual crew position and
can vary widely within a single unit.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mobility Air Forces MDS Component CY12 CY13 CY14
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-17................................ Active 1:1.7 1:2.1 1:2.2
C-17................................ ANG 1:6.3 1:6.9 1:7.5
C-17................................ AFRC 1:7.5 1:10.3 1:11.4
C-5A/B/C............................ Active 1:2.3 1:4.7 1:5.3
C-5A/B/C............................ ANG 1:3.8 1:4.5 1:5.2
C-5A/B/C............................ AFRC 1:5.4 1:6.2 1:6.7
C-5M................................ Active 1:5.1 1:4.5 1:4.2
C-5M................................ AFRC 1:5.6 1:13.2 1:11.0
KC-135.............................. Active 1:2.4 1:3.2 1:2.6
KC-135.............................. ANG 1:5.7 1:6.0 1:6.5
KC-135.............................. AFRC 1:5.2 1:5.3 1:6.8
KC-10............................... Active 1:2.2 1:2.6 1:2.3
KC-10............................... AFRC 1:5.9 1:10.0 1:13.1
C-130H.............................. Active 1:3.3 1:2.7 1:3.3
C-130H.............................. ANG 1:7.1 1:11.8 1:10.1
C-130H.............................. AFRC 1:8.1 1:12.5 1:11.1
C-130J.............................. Active 1:2.0 1:2.1 1:2.2
C-130J.............................. ANG 1:57* 1:18.7 1:7.6
C-130J.............................. AFRC 1:6.9 1:5.1 1:6.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAF NOTES:
1. * ANG units in transition from C-130H to C-130J.
2. MAF Deploy-to-Dwell: Ratio of time aircrews are on missions
away from home supporting SECDEF-directed contingency taskings and
TRANSCOM/HHQ-validated taskings vs. time at home station.
3. MAF Deploy-to-Dwell Calculation: Line qualified available
aircrews divided by taskings minus one.
Equipment Reset
27. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, what is the current status of our retrograde and
reset efforts from Iraq and Afghanistan, and what equipment shortfalls
would we face if we were forced to surge in the next 12 months?
General Allyn.
Afghanistan Retrograde:
United States Forces-Afghanistan reported that as of 28 March 2015,
there were 86,900 pieces of Rolling Stock (RS) and 810,000 Twenty-Foot
Equivalent Units (TEU) of Non-Rolling Stock (NRS) in Afghanistan that
includes both supply and ammunition stocks. Of this equipment, about
3,700 pieces of RS and roughly 1,250 TEUs of NRS belong to the Army. By
the end of 2015, the current plan is to reduce these totals by
approximately 25 percent from their current values through either
retrograde, redeployment or divesture efforts. The vast majority of
non-Army equipment is Contractor Managed, Government Owned (CMGO)
equipment that will be divested of in Afghanistan. The Army currently
plans to retrograde a total of about 2,900 pieces of RS and 1,000 TEUs
of NRS and divest all remaining equipment.
Equipment shortfalls due to a surge would be contingent on the size
and scope of the operation. The Army has Army Prepositioned Stocks
(APS) and equipment strategically located in or near the theater of
operation to support several contingency plans that may potentially
mitigate equipment shortfalls and reduce strategic deployment of unit
equipment.
Iraq Retrograde:
There are currently no major retrograde operations on going in
Iraq. We are utilizing our Kuwait based APS equipment to support
CENTCOM operations in Iraq.
Reset:
The Army programmed to reset 841,000 major end items returning from
Afghanistan in fiscal year 2015. However, 84,600 of those items are
still required to support the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and will
be reset once they are no longer required for operations.
Depending on the type of units and equipment required for a surge,
the Army's programmed equipment Reset schedule may be delayed until the
equipment is no longer required for operations and is again available
for Reset.
Admiral Howard. Navy is resetting both ships and our ground Navy
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) forces.
Reset of material readiness in carriers, surface combatants and
amphibious ships, after over a decade of high tempo combat operations,
requires $2.6B across the FYDP. The majority of the work should be
completed by the end of fiscal year 2018. Some reset work will continue
at lower levels through fiscal year 2020 because some of these
platforms require the availability of a drydock to conduct lifecycle
maintenance to achieve their expected service life (drydock maintenance
is normally on an eight year cycle). The Navy OCO request for fiscal
year 2016 includes $557M for this work.
Navy capacity to surge ships for contingency response remains
constrained until this work is completed.
Retrograde for NECC equipment has been successfully executed with
only a small percentage remaining (currently in transit). With OCO
($62M), Navy's fiscal year 2016 budget request supports reset
requirements for all NECC Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) vehicles, including
communications gear and improvised explosive device defeat system
installations.
NECC forces could support a surge if required, but would be
accepting risk related to the inventory of tactical vehicles until
reset is completed in the beginning of fiscal year 2017. Upon
completion of remaining equipment reset, NECC will be fully postured to
support contingency response requirements when necessary.
General Paxton. As a result of the continued support of Congress
via OCO appropriations, the Marine Corps has been executing an
aggressive ground equipment reset strategy to repair and return our OEF
equipment to the Operating Forces as rapidly as possible. All Marine
Corps equipment was withdrawn from Afghanistan in December 2014, and as
of April 2015, all equipment has been returned to CONUS. To date, the
Marine Corps is approximately 60 percent reset-complete and anticipates
reset completion in fiscal year 2017.
Our reset effort is helping in two key ways; (1) Providing an
opportunity to repair, replace or recapitalize war-torn equipment
slated to remain in our inventory; and (2) producing positive readiness
impacts for some of our key high-demand/low-density equipment items.
For example, we expect to see measureable readiness increase in many of
our radar, satellite communications and motor transport systems.
The Marine Corps is optimized and resourced for global crisis
response, and we give priority to the equipping needs of deployed
forces. To address equipping shortfalls in non-deployed units, the
Marine Corps is undertaking a deliberate effort to right-size and
balance our ground equipment inventory to support our future force
structure and ensure equipment is optimally aligned to requirements.
This ``ground equipment optimization effort'' will support
reconstitution to properly scaled and balance force by fiscal year
2017.
General Spencer. After years of effort, major Air Force retrograde
actions are nearing completion. Still engaged in combat, the Air Force
has leaned its footprint and is positioned to support its Afghanistan
enduring commitment equipment levels. Regarding reset actions, we still
face significant work ahead to realize a complete reset of equipment
after years of sustained combat operations. Major Air Force weapon
systems do not have typical one-time ``reset'' requirements. Our major
aircraft and engines are sustained on an ongoing basis. Sustainment
requirements are driven by various timing criteria including aircraft/
engine cycles, life-limited parts, flying hours, etc. Such on-going
sustainment activities underpin readiness. Our major reset areas such
as aircraft procurement, ammunition and missile procurement, aerospace
ground equipment, support equipment, basic expeditionary airfield
resources, and vehicles continue to remain a high priority for the Air
Force. However, depending on the nature of a surge, we would most
likely exacerbate existing munitions shortfalls Air Force wide. Cross
leveling between combatant commands would be required and could create
risk to other operational plans. If the committee would like
additional, more finite detail, we would be happy to provide a
classified briefing upon your request.
Naval Readiness
28. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Howard, in your written statement, you
note that the Navy has only been able to keep one Carrier Strike Group
and one Amphibious Readiness Group in the heightened readiness
posture--just one third of the requirement. What have been the
consequences of that shortfall?
Admiral Howard. CSGs and ARGs deliver a significant portion of our
striking power, and we are committed to keeping, on average, three
additional CSGs and three additional ARGs in a contingency response
status, ready to deploy within 30 days to meet operation plans
(OPLANs). However, if sequestered, we will prioritize the readiness of
forces forward deployed at the expense of those in a contingency
response status. We cannot do both. We will only be able to provide a
response force of one CSG and one ARG. Our current OPLANs require a
significantly more ready force than this reduced surge capacity can
provide. Less contingency response capacity would mean higher
casualties as wars are prolonged by the slow arrival of naval forces
into a combat zone. Without the ability to respond rapidly enough, our
forces possibly could arrive too late to affect the outcome of a fight.
29. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Howard, is the Navy considering forward
deploying any additional carriers to make up for the lost presence
under the Optimized Fleet Response Plan?
Admiral Howard. The Navy continuously evaluates how best to
position our naval forces overseas to meet evolving security
environments, but we have no plans to forward deploy additional
carriers at this time.
While carrier presence varies slightly from year to year, our
overall carrier presence will increase from fiscal year 2015 to fiscal
year 2016. Seven month deployments under OFRP are a sustainable goal
that balances our requirement to generate ready forces, provides
forward presence, gets us to stable maintenance cycles, and enables us
to respond to contingencies.
30. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Howard, how, if at all, is the Navy
used to meet NATO missions?
Admiral Howard. The Navy provides support to a wide range of NATO
missions. Specific rotational requirements are identified through the
Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). Additionally, other
forces are offered in a ``Notice to Move'' (NTM) status. These forces
are offered formally to NATO to be available within 30 days of an
incident.
Specific examples of Navy support to NATO include:
Surface combatants support to Operation Atlantic Sentry,
which provides for the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) of Europe. This
persistent presence is a gateway for future endeavors, including Aegis
Ashore, and establishing an organic NATO BMD capability.
We provide surface combatant and Maritime Patrol Aircraft
support to Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, the U.S.-NATO counter-terrorism
operation.
Surface combatants provide presence in the Black Sea
under NATO auspices. For example, USS VICKSBURG is currently the
command ship for Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG-2) which provided
presence in the Black Sea for nearly the whole month of March. SNMG-2
began operations in January, 2015, and will conclude this June.
Commander, Naval Forces Europe is dual-hatted as a NATO
Joint Force Command, Naples, coordinating NATO operations in Kosovo.
Commander, SIXTH Fleet is also dual-hatted as Commander, Naval Striking
and Support Forces NATO, in Lisbon, Portugal.
We actively participate in NATO exercises: BALTOPS,
TRIDENT JUNCTURE, MARINER, and MANTA. Additionally, we conduct bi-
lateral exercises such as Joint Warrior, to strengthen our
interoperability and tactics with our NATO partners.
Port visits and Distinguished Visitor embarks, such as USS THEODORE
ROOSEVELT's recent visit to the United Kingdom and embarks of senior
government officials from UK, Finland, Sweden, France, and Greece, also
deepen ties with our NATO partners.
31. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Howard, how does that affect the
carrier presence that is required for combatant commander missions?
Admiral Howard. NATO has not requested carrier presence in fiscal
year 2016, and Navy is not sourcing any NATO carrier presence in the
SECDEF-approved fiscal year 2016 Global Force Management Allocation
Plan.
Training and Simulation
32. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, in 2013, training simulation accounts were
severely cut due to sequestration, yet they can provide significant
cost savings where trainees and long-term servicemembers can learn
lessons that don't cost thousands of dollars each time a mistake is
made. How do each of your Services plan to integrate simulators into
your readiness and training agenda?
General Allyn. Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming capabilities
are integral components of the Army Training Strategy. Use of
simulations is integrated into Army training in two ways. First,
simulations are specified in our Unit Training Models and units use
virtual, gaming, or constructive simulations to execute building-block
training events. Units move progressively from simulations based events
to ``live'' events. Similarly, in Army schools, specific simulations
are required in executing Programs of Instruction. Second, Commanders
routinely use simulations to enhance their training. For example, units
train Mission Command using simulations to reduce lower-echelon unit
participation to save on operations and maintenance dollars. Further,
aviation units use the Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCATT)
to practice aviation missions in a virtual environment prior to
expending flying hours.
Admiral Howard. Navy has long recognized the criticality of
integrating Modeling and Simulation (M&S) technology into Navy's
training and readiness plans. M&S technology is a ``readiness
enabler'', and supports Navy's mission to man, train and equip our
forces.
As a result, Navy formally established the OPNAV Simulator Training
Requirements Group (OSTRG), which reviews investment plans for
simulator, Fleet Synthetic Training (FST) and Live, Virtual, and
Constructive (LVC) Training, Joint National Training Capability (JNTC)
programs, and assesses current capabilities and limitations. OSTRG
leverages the Fleet Training Integration Panel (FTIP), and meets bi-
annually to achieve cross-community, multi-mission synthetic training
integration, and proposes live training events for simulator-based
training. Individual platform and integrated simulator/training
requirements are codified in Naval Training System Plans. Furthermore,
Warfare Area Simulator Master Plans, updated during bi-annual FTIP
symposiums, formulate capability-based requirements and acquisition
strategies to expand simulator training. These plans consider legacy
systems as candidates for modernization and reflect the development of
a full range of simulators to support synthetic training. The OSTRG and
its members focus on cost-effective solutions and leverage new
technologies to meet readiness performance standards.
Since PB-14, OSTRG and FTIP members worked to develop the first
OPNAV Simulator Master Plan (OSMP). The goal of the OSMP is to provide
ready, responsive, and adaptive forces at tactical and operational
levels, through a training continuum that balances simulated and live
training events to improve warfighting readiness while reducing Total
Ownership Cost. The OSMP translates validated and Fleet-approved
integrated training requirements into integrated simulator training
roadmaps; and prioritizes and recommends sourcing solutions for Navy's
simulator, FST and LVC training requirements in support of both
platform and warfare area readiness.
General Paxton. There is no doubt that simulators provide a unique
opportunity to provide realistic training opportunities that offset
some of the costs associated with real-world training. These systems
allow for varied training experiences, can minimize ammunition usage,
and decrease logistical costs. In fact, the Commandant's Planning
Guidance for 2015 specifically states that development and use of
simulators remains a high priority for the service.
``We will continue to support the fielding of systems that
enhance our proficiency and safety in operating weapons and
equipment. Our investment in training systems will reflect the
priority we place on preparing for combat and be fully
integrated with training and readiness standards. I expect all
elements of the MAGTF to make extensive use of simulators where
appropriate.''
-Gen. Joseph Dunford
However, as with other modernization efforts, we have had to defer
some simulator development initiatives in order to prioritize near term
readiness. We are currently funding simulator development and testing
through individual system programs and supporting contracts. Due to the
programming cycle, Fiscal Year 2018 will be the first opportunity to
fund enduring integrated simulator capability.
Specifically, the Marine Corps Training and Education Command's
(TECOM) Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Master Plan, Squad Immersive
Training Environment (SITE), as well as the Live, Virtual,
Constructive-Training Environment (LVC-TE) identify service
requirements for simulators and simulations. These requirements are
being addressed by TECOM. In conjunction with this we are continuing
our efforts to integrate aviation systems with ground simulations to
provide opportunities to conduct training that tests the full structure
and capabilities of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
General Spencer. The Air Force uses aircrew simulators in most
cases to augment or supplement live fly training as simulators cannot
replace all live fly training. We focus most of our simulator effort on
providing training in emergency procedures, contested and degraded ops,
mission rehearsal and area denial, all items that are best suited for
training in a controlled and secure virtual training environment.
Simulators are an integral part of the Air Force readiness training
objectives. Without high fidelity aircrew simulators readiness would
quickly be reduced to unacceptable levels.
33. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, what cost savings can the Services leverage from
using simulation technology when preparing our Armed Forces?
General Allyn. The Army maintains a large variety of training
simulators allowing units to train at basic skills such as
marksmanship, driving, tank gunnery, and aviation. Some are networked
to several others allowing battalion task forces to simulate large
scale maneuvers at reduced cost and equipment OPTEMPO.
These training simulators save the Army money when compared to live
training as they require less operations and maintenance funds (e.g.
tank track, ammunition, etc.). However, the cost of acquiring and then
maintaining simulators offsets a considerable amount of these savings--
these systems are costly. Simulators are used to provide baseline and
some sustainment skills, and to rehearse complex actions in order to
reduce risk to Soldiers. Ultimately, however, Soldiers must execute
their training in a ``real-world'' environment--such as with live-fire
exercises. While simulations are vital in building Soldier, Leader, and
unit proficiency, they cannot replicate the complexity and critical
human factors that arise in live, combined arms maneuver exercises
against a thinking adversary.
Admiral Howard. The Navy continues to explore simulation technology
opportunities to ultimately reduce operations and maintenance costs
while sustaining, or improving, force readiness. Simulators are
integrated into individual and team training, both as part of formal
courses of instruction and crew preparation for at-sea operations.
Simulator investments play a pivotal role in improving training
proficiency and delivery. Life cycle costs of simulation are less than
the overhaul, and preventive/corrective maintenance of the tactical
equipment. Simulation can prevent personal injury as well as weapons
damage, saving thousands of dollars as well as damage to personnel
readiness.
Simulators normally operate at a fraction of the cost of
operational equipment (e.g. operation of aviation simulators are
normally 1/10 or less the cost of actual aircraft flying cost). In
addition, simulators do not wear out or break high-valued equipment
during routine training. This applies to all levels of training where
simulators can be used. In some cases, lower fidelity devices can
perform a large percentage of training tasks lowering total procurement
cost of a training system.
General Paxton. There is no doubt that simulators provide a unique
opportunity to provide realistic training opportunities that offset
some of the costs associated with real-world training. These systems
allow for varied training experiences, can minimize ammunition usage,
and decrease logistical costs. In fact, the Commandant's Planning
Guidance for 2015 specifically states that development and use of
simulators remains a high priority for the service.
``We will continue to support the fielding of systems that
enhance our proficiency and safety in operating weapons and
equipment. Our investment in training systems will reflect the
priority we place on preparing for combat and be fully
integrated with training and readiness standards. I expect all
elements of the MAGTF to make extensive use of simulators where
appropriate.''
-Gen. Joseph Dunford
However, as with other modernization efforts, we have had to defer
some simulator development initiatives in order to prioritize near term
readiness. We are currently funding simulator development and testing
through individual system programs and supporting contracts. Due to the
programming cycle, Fiscal Year 2018 will be the first opportunity to
fund enduring integrated simulator capability.
Specifically, the Marine Corps Training and Education Command's
(TECOM) Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Master Plan, Squad Immersive
Training Environment (SITE), as well as the Live, Virtual,
Constructive-Training Environment (LVC-TE) identify service
requirements for simulators and simulations. These requirements are
being addressed by TECOM. In conjunction with this we are continuing
our efforts to integrate aviation systems with ground simulations to
provide opportunities to conduct training that tests the full structure
and capabilities of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
General Spencer. First and foremost, our number one priority is to
sustain and enhance force readiness. We use simulation technology to
maintain, sustain, enhance, supplement, and in some cases, replace
training conducted in a live environment. The use of simulation
technology may or may not result in direct cost savings, but should
result in a more ready force. Therefore, we do not have an additional
cost savings estimate beyond those that have already been programmed
and budgeted.
Training is a key to force readiness and training for combat and
other operational missions is an extremely complex endeavor.
Sophisticated threat systems and advanced operational capabilities are
driving an increased emphasis on the use of simulation technologies
(Live, Virtual, and Constructive-Operational Training (LVC-OT)
capabilities). As threat environments become more dense and more highly
contested, our ability to simulate them in the live training
environment is becoming increasingly difficult. Additionally, our fifth
generation weapon systems are so advanced that challenging them in the
live training environment while protecting their capabilities and
tactics from exploitation is likewise becoming more and more
problematic.
LVC-OT capabilities address these issues by providing solutions for
increasing the value of live operational training, and simulating the
live environment using concurrent, high-fidelity, networked training
systems. Leveraging simulation technology significantly improves our
readiness at a cost that would be otherwise unaffordable. We are
working diligently to maximize the value of every training dollar by
optimizing our LVC-OT capabilities.
34. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Allyn, if sequestration does occur, will training
simulators be cut similarly to the 2013 sequestration?
General Allyn. The Army will seek to optimize its investments in
training by balancing operational training investments, institutional
investments, and simulations investments. All three areas will be
impacted significantly by sequestration much as they were in 2013.
Admiral Howard. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would
necessitate a revisit and revision of the Defense Strategic Guidance.
Required cuts will force us to further delay critical warfighting
capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed for contingency
response, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego or stretch
procurement of ships and submarines as a last resort. We will be unable
to mitigate the shortfalls like we did in fiscal year 2013 because we
are still recovering from operating account shortfalls that were
deferred to later years in the fiscal year 2013 FYDP. Our PB-16 budget
represents the minimum funding necessary to execute the defense
strategy. Sequestration impact to training simulators would come if we
had to stretch or eliminate building new facilities or reduce training
associated with generating ready forces in order to husband dollars.
General Paxton. Despite the unique training opportunities afforded
by simulation systems, such opportunities would, as with all training
efforts across the Marine Corps, be affected by a sequester in fiscal
year 2016. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget request represents
the bare minimum at which the Marine Corps can meet the current Defense
Strategic Guidance. The Marine Corps would be forced to reduce or delay
home station operations and maintenance activities in order to protect
near-term readiness, forward deployed forces, and our capacity to meet
COCOM demands under sequestration. Though no decisions have been made
regarding specific reductions under an fiscal year 2016 sequester,
advanced skills training and service level exercises would likely be
scaled back accordingly, along with advanced training technologies,
simulation systems training, and related activities. We would also
assume additional risk in our modernization accounts, reducing the
amount of investment funding available to develop and procure new
systems.
General Spencer. In 2013 due to sequestration, the Air Force was
required to make several reductions in simulator operations and
support. While we did not remove simulators or completely shut down
simulator operations, the Air Force cancelled large virtual exercises,
reduced travel funding for units not co-located with a simulator, and
curtailed simulator sustainment funding. We don't yet know the specific
training areas that will be impacted by any future sequestration
actions. During any sequestration, the Air Force will balance training
resources to meet fiscal constraints.
Combatant Commander Demand
35. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, what are the current mitigation plans and
strategies to meet combatant commander demand until full readiness is
recovered?
General Allyn. The Army currently meets the majority of combatant
commander requirements for forces. The Army has identified a ceiling to
the Joint Staff that identifies an upper limit for overall demand that
still permits Service readiness recovery. Above this ceiling,
additional requirements would put service readiness recovery at risk.
In the Global Force Management process, the Army identifies which
additional requirements would be above the ceiling, the risks to
sourcing those requirements, and risk mitigation plans. For planned
requirements, these mitigation options include cancelling or delaying
modernization programs and taking risk in services and infrastructure.
For unplanned or contingency requirements, mitigation requires
balancing between repurposing units from other missions, meeting
deployment timelines, and the overall readiness of deploying units.
Admiral Howard. While we continue to source to capacity, the
reality is we do not have sufficient force structure to meet all
Combatant Commander (CCDR) demand. CCDRs must mitigate risk through
judicious employment of allocated forces.
Risk is mitigated through the Global Force Management Allocation
Plan (GFMAP), by allocating forces to the highest priority missions,
and in coordination with the CCDRs, Joint Staff, and other Services, to
ensure global mission requirements are executed at an acceptable level
of risk.
General Paxton.
For the Marine Corps to create dwell time necessary to
build the institutional readiness our nation requires from its 911
force both now and in the future, we will have to change how we provide
forces to meet Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) requirements.
In the near term, your Marine Corps will be ready to
respond to the nation's call; however, our capacity to respond may be
severely diminished.
By reducing the capacity, but not the capabilities of our
forward deployed MAGTFs, we can create some trade space in personnel
and resources necessary to improve institutional readiness.
Reductions in unit capacity alone may be insufficient to
improve D2D significantly and more importantly to optimize unit
readiness. While requiring further study, anticipate each element of
the MAGTF will require uniquely tailored solutions.
By tailoring the MAGTF to the specific capabilities
required by the Combatant Commanders, we can create the opportunity for
the Marine Corps as a Service to regain readiness from over a decade of
conflict. These readiness and recovery efforts will further allow the
Marine Corps to provide a ``ready force'' to support the operations
across ROMO.
General Spencer. The Air Force is currently meeting combatant
commander rotational demand with ready forces, and they are performing
exceptionally well in Operations RESOLUTE SUPPORT and INHERENT RESOLVE.
Unfortunately, this has come at the cost of likely sourcing the demands
of the Defense Strategic Guidance with unready forces. We have
successfully mitigated risk to rotational requirements at the expense
of our broader National Military Strategy. We simply cannot mitigate
all of the risk at our current capacity.
36. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, have you established milestones or metrics to
track the rebuilding of the readiness?
General Allyn. Yes. The Army has developed a combination of metrics
to evaluate our readiness recovery and force generation efforts. Those
metrics consist of, but are not limited to, deploy-to-dwell ratios;
aggregate demand for Army forces, including deploy-to-dwell, theater
committed, or prepare to deploy units; combat training center unit
preparedness results (or other major training event); and minimum
floors of full spectrum readiness. By examining these and other
variables, the Army accurately tracks readiness progress toward
healthy, sustainable force generation levels.
Admiral Howard. Yes. Navy measures our current and projected
operational output through the Fleet Response Plan Operational
Availability (FRP Ao) metric. This measures ``presence delivered'' and
``contingency response capacity'' against a standard of sustainable
levels of presence and the most demanding Combatant Commander
Operational Plan for contingency response capacity. The CNO recently
discussed the FRP metric of 2+3 Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) as our
goal which reflects a sustained global presence of 2 CSGs and 3 ``ready
to respond'' within about 30 days. Across most of the Fleet, Navy will
continue to be challenged through this year, particularly for
contingency response capacity, and then slowly begin to recover FRP Ao
levels through FY 2020 across the force.
Because our depot maintenance challenges are among the most
critical aspects underpinning our readiness recovery, we are monitoring
the hiring plans and output of both aviation depots and shipyards
closely, adjusting as needed. We are investing not only in staffing,
but also in workforce development, to achieve these goals.
General Paxton. Yes. Service-level readiness systems and processes
are informed by, and inform, the Chairman's Readiness System that
codifies readiness reporting and assessment used to track the degree to
which readiness is recovering or decaying.
Our metrics to monitor manning, equipment, and training levels, and
assessment process provides near-term analysis of readiness of the
Marine Corps' ability to execute operational plans and portend
readiness to resourcing linkages.
The full weight of the Budget Control Act would preclude the Marine
Corps from meeting its full statutory and regulatory obligations, and
adequately prepare for the future. Under sustained sequestration for
forces not deploying, the fuel, ammunition, and other support necessary
for training would be reduced thus inhibiting our ability to provide
fully-trained Marines and ready units to meet emerging crises or
unexpected contingencies. We would see real impacts to all home station
units, then our next-to-deploy and some deploy forces . . . this
constitutes the internal decay, the beginnings of the hollow force we
have fought so hard to avoid.
Prior to the onset of sequestration and operational requirements
supporting the New Normal, the Marine Corps was on a trajectory to
reconstitute to a ready force by 2017. Regrettably, this is no longer
the case. We have not fully recovered from the turmoil caused by the
last sequester. Full recovery is frustrated by the specter of another.
Another sequester would prevent any opportunity to further recover
readiness.
General Spencer. The Air Force has employed a readiness recovery
model that assesses the five key ``levers'' of Air Force Readiness
(deploy-to-dwell ratio, and four resource levers--flying hour program,
critical skills availability, access to training resources, and weapons
system sustainment). Additionally, the model provides an analytical
assessment of 20 leading indicators of readiness to provide a detailed
understanding of the range of possibilities for resourcing and ops
tempo over the planning horizon. This methodology helps quantify two
key readiness realities; the readiness generation process takes
resources and time. While one lever cannot fix the problem
independently, a shortfall in any single lever can create a severe
readiness problem. Our readiness metrics are tracked through the Joint
Service system called Defense Readiness Reporting System. This system
communicates commanders' observations, concerns, metrics, and
approaches to their combat readiness, from the field back to the
headquarters staff. The aggregate findings from the field are shared
with our legislators through the Quarterly Readiness Report to
Congress. With that understanding, our requirements to achieve 80
percent readiness by the end of 2023 are PB-level funding of programs
that support the four resource levers, in combination with improved
deploy-to-dwell ratios for our force; through 2023.
37. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, if sequester does happen, how many years would
full readiness recovery be delayed, and how would you respond to the
needs of combatant command?
General Allyn. Under sequestration, the Army will not be able to
bring its manpower, operations and maintenance, modernization, and
procurement expenditures into balance until at least FY23 and will
require at least an additional 3 years thereafter to return to full
readiness. In short, the nation would be accepting considerable risk
for no less than 7 years.
In order to meet the priority needs of combatant commands, the Army
would focus resources on deploying units and decrement training
resources for units not deploying. This will increase the risk for
contingency operations and weaken overall leadership experience across
the Army, but will ensure we can meet Combatant Commander near term
requirements.
Admiral Howard. Under sequestration there is no path to full
readiness recovery to execute the required missions of the Defense
Strategic Guidance (DSG). Our PB16 budget submission represents the
bare minimum necessary to execute the DSG in the world we face. A
return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would necessitate a revisit
and revision of the defense strategy.
In the short term, the required cuts would force us to further
delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces
needed for contingency responses, further downsize weapons capacity,
and forego or stretch procurement of force structure as a last resort.
While sequestration causes significant near-term impacts, it would also
create serious problems that would manifest themselves after 2020 and
would be difficult to recover from. For example, even assuming a stable
budget at PB-16 levels and no major contingencies for the foreseeable
future, we estimate that Navy will not recover from the maintenance
backlogs that have accumulated from the high operational tempo over the
last decade of war and the additional effects of the fiscal year 2013
sequestration until approximately fiscal year 2018 for Carrier Strike
Groups and approximately fiscal year 2020 for Amphibious Ready Groups,
more than five years after sequestration in fiscal year 2013.
As we did in fiscal year 2013, if sequestered in 2016 and beyond,
Navy will deliver ready forces forward to meet the highest priorities
of the Combatant Commanders. Some lower priority deployments may have
to be cancelled and contingency response capacity will continue at
reduced levels.
General Paxton. We are not able to fully assess the impact of a
sequester or BCA funding levels. One of the greatest challenges with
this current environment is the constant change and resultant
uncertainty. We are providing our best estimates for all aspects of our
Title X responsibilities, but we do know that we will have fewer units
resulting in less capacity and high deployment to dwell ratios
(Organize).
There will be reduced time to train, as well as reduced assets
available for training (such as fuel, ammunition, and equipment
readiness) (Train).
Reduced equipment availability and legacy equipment not on par with
the modern battlefield (AAVs, 4th generation aircraft, outmoded radars
and C4I) (Equip).
Over time, sequestered budgets will prevent the Marine Corps from
meeting Combatant Commanders' requirements at an acceptable deployment
to dwell ratio and prioritize training resources toward next to deploy
units, leading to a less-ready force.
With respect to our response to a major contingency, all of the
Marine Corps' operational units would be fully committed with no
capacity for rotation of forces. Bottom line, those units directed to
the operation would remain until the mission is complete regardless of
the duration.
In the near term, your Marine Corps will be ready to respond to the
nation's call; however, our capacity to respond will be severely
diminished.
By tailoring the MAGTF to the specific capabilities required by the
Combatant Commanders, we can create the opportunity for the Marine
Corps as a Service to regain readiness from over a decade of conflict.
This readiness and recovery model would allow the Marine Corps' home
station units to be the ready force that would respond to unforeseen
crises and major contingencies.
General Spencer. The Air Force is committed to meeting Combatant
Commander requirements for all aspects of Air Power projection. To that
end we are performing exceptionally well in Operations RESOLUTE SUPPORT
and INHERENT RESOLVE. If sequester were to return, we would likely
continue to perform at high levels in support of these and similar
operations, to the further detriment of overall full-spectrum
readiness. Under sequester funding levels, our recovery rate to achieve
80 percent readiness by the end of 2023 would slow significantly;
delaying this goal by at least 5 years. Finally, Combatant Commander
requirements extend well beyond counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
efforts and the Air Force is committed to supporting Combatant
Commander needs were we to go to war with a near-peer adversary in a
high-end fight. We would have insufficient ready forces to meet that
demand and the requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance.
Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force
38. Senator Ayotte. General Paxton, in December 2014 testimony,
General Dunford testified that approximately 50 percent of Marine Corps
units at home station were in a degraded state of readiness due to
personnel and equipment shortfalls. He further noted that this lack of
readiness is due, in part, to the increased requirements from the
unexpected Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) crisis
response teams in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM). Did the Force Structure Review Group consider the
Special Purpose MAGTF crisis response team requirements when
determining the optimal number of forces required? If not, how will
this new--and potentially enduring--requirement affect the Marine
Corps' ability to meet personnel tempo goals and readiness requirements
as the size of the force continues to decline?
General Paxton. No, the Force Structure Review Group did not
consider the SPMAGTFs for CENTCOM or AFRICOM when it was originally
convened. However, the 186,800 force was designed to optimally fulfill
a crisis response capability which these units are performing. In a
fiscally constrained environment below 186,800, since we are committed
to maintaining near term readiness and crisis response, the enduring
requirement for these units will negatively affect the readiness of
home station units which are preparing for contingency response in
support of Major Combat Operations (MCO). If we were fully funded at
the optimal 186,800 personnel end strength we would be able to fulfill
our crisis response capability and improve our preparedness for
contingency response because the increased dwell time built into this
end strength allows sufficient time to train, equip, and man home
station units.
39. Senator Ayotte. General Paxton, what is the Marine Corps doing
to ensure we're not `robbing Peter to pay Paul' when you remove
capabilities and readiness from Marine Expeditionary Forces to stand up
Special Purpose MAGTFs?
General Paxton. The current construct of a three-ship Amphibious
Ready Group (ARG) and a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) remains
America's preeminent crisis response force providing deterrence and
decision space across the range of military operations. However,
amphibious war ship inventory and operational tempo constrain the
number of ARGs available to support Combatant Commanders. In a changing
security environment, forward deployed and forward engaged Special
Purpose MAGTFs are employed to provide crisis response, security, and
theater cooperation capabilities as required by the Combatant
Commanders. Special Purpose MAGTFs are intended to fill the crisis
response gap when the paucity of operationally available amphibious
warships precludes the allocation of ARG/MEUs to the Combatant
Commanders.
The Marine Corps' top resourcing priority remains those forward
deployed and forward engaged Marines and Marine units, especially those
in harm's way. To protect the readiness of those forward deployed and
forward engaged units--such as Special Purpose MAGTFs and Marine
Expeditionary Units--personnel and equipment are resourced from home
station units subordinate to the three Marine Expeditionary Forces.
Home station units constitute the ready force that would surge to
unforeseen crises and major contingencies. The Marine Corps is
committed to generating ready forces to respond to all operational
requirements, while working to ensure all Marine Expeditionary Forces
are capable of executing missions. However, another sequester would
prevent any opportunity to recover the readiness our Nation deserves
and lead to creating a hollow force we have fought so hard to avoid. In
a major conflict, resource shortfalls resulting from sequester-level
funding would increase the timelines needed to achieve our objectives
thus elevating the likelihood of mission failure and greater loss of
life.
40. Senator Ayotte. General Paxton, with approximately 50 percent
of home station units, which are needed to respond to major crises,
being declared ``not ready'', what is the Marine Corps' plan to restore
these units to readiness?
General Paxton. Home station units constitute the ready force that
would respond to unforeseen crises and contingencies. As the Nation's
ready force, the Marine Corps will continue to generate ready forces to
meet current operational requirements, work to recover full spectrum
readiness for home station units, and protect those aspects of
institutional readiness that allow for the reconstitution of the whole-
of-force after over a decade of unprecedented sustained conflict.
Personnel shortfalls at the unit level are a principal detractor to
recovering readiness. Actions taken to help restore home station unit
readiness include manning assignment policies that improve (1) leader-
to-led ratios, especially among the Noncommissioned Officer and Staff
Noncommissioned Office grades; (2) required unit personnel fill levels
essential for combat effectiveness, (3) seek to employ the force at a
1:3 deployment to dwell ratio (optimum) in the future, and(4) optimized
readiness across the entire unit life cycle versus only the pre-
deployment training period. The Marine Corps regularly examines
balancing the requirements to meet current operational requirements
against operational tempo that promotes readiness restoration of home
station units.
41. Senator Ayotte. General Paxton, what specific risks are the
Marine Corps taking by having a total force less than the optimal force
of 186,000?
General Paxton. A discussion of required force structure to meet
U.S. national security requirements must be viewed from the lens of the
five pillars of readiness. At PB16 funding levels, the Marine Corps
meets current crisis and contingency response force levels, but with
some risk. We will meet the nation's requirements, the question is, how
well can we prepare those troops for deployment? In order to make
continuous and long term readiness a reality, we have to be able to
train personnel and perform maintenance on equipment. Right now, we
have about a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio. That is, Marines are
deployed for 7 months and home for 14. This allows a proper unit
rotation to ensure that each time a unit deploys they are fully ready.
If we are forced to take further cuts, that level will decrease closer
to 1:1.5 or 1:1. What this means is that units have less time between
deployments to conduct the required training prior to their next
deployment.
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
42. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn and General Paxton, how important
is the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program to the readiness of
each of your Services?
General Allyn. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) fielding will
substantially improve Army readiness by closing capability gaps in the
Army's light tactical vehicle fleet. Tactical mobility is a vital
ground combat force enabler and enhances the effectiveness of combat
and sustainment forces. The current High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) is not suitable in the current environment as armoring
initiatives have overweighed the chassis, limiting its mobility.
Additionally, the HMMWV lacks the requisite on-board power to support
the current mission command systems. Current trends in military
operations require forces to continue to develop expeditionary
capabilities across the range of military operations. The JLTV provides
the mobility Soldiers need, with the protection and on-board power
needed in the future operating environment. The Mine-Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles used in Iraq and Afghanistan lacked the
cross-country mobility JLTV will provide. MRAP's size and weight
limited Army operations to road networks making our Soldiers' movements
predictable and easier to target. JLTV will allow our Soldiers more
flexibility for off-road operations, reducing their exposure to
Improvised Explosive Devices and ambushes. This added mobility coupled
with the increased protection integrated into the JLTV design reduces
our Soldiers' risk. Finally, JLTV is designed to enable the integration
of our current and future mission command. This will enable commanders
to see the battlefield and synchronize combat power to enable mission
success. The Army plans to prioritize early fielding to Infantry
Brigades and Special Operations Forces.
General Paxton. The JLTV is a central pillar of our ground combat
and tactical vehicle modernization plan and critical to readiness of
Marine Corps forces to deploy and to be employed in any clime and
place. The JLTV program, and the capability it will provide, is second
only in importance to our amphibious mobility modernization within our
vehicle portfolio. JLTVs will replace the portion of HMMWVs that are
most at risk; those that perform a combat function and are most likely
to be exposed to enemy fires. Those vehicles are assigned predominately
to Ground Combat Element and Direct Support Logistics units, and
perform mission roles as Heavy Weapons (Machine Guns) and Anti-Armor
(TOW and Javelin) Weapons carriers and critical command and control and
tactical logistics functions.
Initially, we will procure and field 5,500 JLTVs between fiscal
years 2017 and 2022, to replace the highest risk portion of our 18,000
vehicle HMMWV fleet. In addition to providing protection equivalent to
the base MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV), the JLTV will restore off-
road performance and payload to the light vehicle fleet that was lost
when `frag kit' armor was installed on HMMWVs during Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Frag kit armor does not protect against the underbody IED
threat, a major vulnerability of the HMMWV, and the reason why it could
not be used in recent combat operations. The JLTV will support the most
demanding missions, including Joint Forcible Entry and crisis response
operations from the sea. The JLTV will be transportable externally by
CH-53 helicopter and will be capable of being stored and transported in
the spaces formerly occupied by HMMWVs aboard amphibious and maritime
prepositioning ships and surface connectors, such as the LCAC. JLTV
competitive prototypes have also demonstrated fuel efficiency equal to
a similarly equipped HMMWV, while moving, and a 20 percent less fuel
use when at idle.
We are pleased with the performance of the JLTV program and the
three highly competitive vendors, AM General, Lockheed Martin, and
Oshkosh Defense, working with us during the program's Engineering, and
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. We look forward to working with
our U. S. Army partners later this summer as the JLTV program prepares
for its Milestone C decision and the selection of one of the EMD
vendors to produce JLTV, beginning in fiscal year 2016.
43. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn and General Paxton, as the JLTV
program ramps up, how will existing HMMWV (Humvee) vehicles be
reallocated?
General Allyn. As the four JLTV variants (Heavy Gun Carrier, Close
Combat Weapons Carrier, General Purpose, Utility/Shelter Carrier) are
fielded to units, the Army will reallocate the most modern HMMWVs
across all Army Components to replace older model HMMWVs. The Army will
then divest those older model HMMWVs.
General Paxton. Our intent is to replace the entire HMMWV fleet.
Between 2017 and 2022 we will procure the first of the 5,500 JLTV's to
replace the aging and overburdened HMMWV fleet. These 5,500 will
fulfill a portion of the overall requirement we have for roughly
818,000 vehicles. JLTVs will replace the portion of HMMWVs that are
most at risk; those that perform a combat function and are most likely
to be exposed to enemy fires. Those vehicles are assigned predominately
to Ground Combat Element and Direct Support Logistics units, and
perform mission roles as Heavy Weapons (Machine Guns) and Anti-Armor
(TOW and Javelin) Weapons carriers and critical command and control and
tactical logistics functions.
The current Ground Combat Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) outlines our
plan to replace the remaining HMMWV fleet with JLTV, however we will
need to make investments in the ACV during the 2020's to ensure that
this platform remains prepared to carry us into the future. By
sequencing our JLTV buy around the peak years of the ACV program, and
modernizing a portion of our AAV fleet we will be able to achieve our
long range goals within the projected limits of future budget
restrictions. However, if the budget is fully sequestered in fiscal
year 2016 or beyond, it will jeopardize both the timing and resources
required to undertake this strategy and greatly affect our ability to
achieve our requirements in both vehicle fleets.
44. Senator Ayotte. General Allyn and General Paxton, after JLTV is
fully implemented, how many HMMWV's will remain in each Service's
inventory?
General Allyn. The JLTV begins fielding in fiscal year 2018. Based
on Force Structure projections for that year, fielding 49,099 JLTVs
will leave 67,301 HMMWVs distributed across the Total Army.
General Paxton. Our intent is to replace the entire HMMWV fleet.
Between 2017 and 2022 we will procure the first of the 5,500 JLTV's to
replace the aging and overburdened HMMWV fleet. These 5,500 will
fulfill a portion of the overall requirement we have for roughly
818,000 vehicles. JLTVs will replace the portion of HMMWVs that are
most at risk; those that perform a combat function and are most likely
to be exposed to enemy fires. Those vehicles are assigned predominately
to Ground Combat Element and Direct Support Logistics units, and
perform mission roles as Heavy Weapons (Machine Guns) and Anti-Armor
(TOW and Javelin) Weapons carriers and critical command and control and
tactical logistics functions.
The current Ground Combat Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) outlines our
plan to replace the remaining HMMWV fleet with JLTV, however we will
need to make investments in the ACV during the 2020's to ensure that
this platform remains prepared to carry us into the future. By
sequencing our JLTV buy around the peak years of the ACV program, and
modernizing a portion of our AAV fleet we will be able to achieve our
long range goals within the projected limits of future budget
restrictions. However, if the budget is fully sequestered in fiscal
year 2016 or beyond, it will jeopardize both the timing and resources
required to undertake this strategy and greatly affect our ability to
achieve our requirements in both vehicle fleets.
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
Sequestration--Second and Third Order Effects
45. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, in multiple hearings we have heard testimony from
the Service Chiefs on some of the negative effects of sequestration-
level budget caps. In fiscal year 2013, the Services took varied
approaches to implement sequestration cuts. The Army cancelled major
training exercises, the Air Force grounded aircraft, and the Navy
deferred maintenance. Deferring costs into future years can create
second and third order negative such as creating training and readiness
deficits and the loss of capabilities. We have not heard many details
about these second and third order effects. Additionally, because of
the focus on counterinsurgency (COIN) training to prepare for
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, our military now has an entire
generation of officer and enlisted personnel who have never conducted
full-spectrum training. If sequestration remains in fiscal year 2016
and the Services again halts training for pilots, while they will
continue to be paid, if they cannot fly--not only will they lose
proficiency--but their morale suffers and can either lead them to leave
the military or lead to behavior and family problems. Can each of you
provide examples of the inefficient use of resources, such as time
lost, increased long-term costs, and the second and third order
problems those conditions create for training and readiness deficits?
General Allyn. If we return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016,
the Army will experience increased risk through degraded readiness to
both our organizations and our installations.
Reductions to individual training and education will create a
backlog that will take years to correct and create gaps at critical
points in leader development--especially mid-career officers and NCOs.
Unit training for approximately 80 percent of the Force will be
curtailed, impacting basic warfighting skills and readiness posture,
and inducing shortfalls across critical specialties such as aviation
and intelligence. The Army will generate fewer Brigade Combat Teams
(BCTs) to the readiness levels required to support rapid combat
deployment as we balance the readiness levels of BCTs with other
critical enablers such as Combat Aviation Brigades and Combat
Sustainment Brigades. The remaining BCTs will be resourced only to
minimum Individual/Crew/Squad levels. This will stretch the time
required to flow forces into a war-fighting theater, allowing our
adversary more time to prepare and inevitably leading to greater U.S.
casualties.
From an installation perspective, our Army is still feeling the
effects of sequestration in fiscal year 2013 when over 3.2 billion
dollars of requirements were deferred to fiscal year 2014, to include
significant Military Construction (MILCON) and Sustainment, Restoration
and Modernization (SRM) projects. As you know, sustaining facilities is
more cost effective than restoring them and our data shows that for
every 1 dollar we purportedly `save' on sustainment we incur 1.33
dollars of costs in restoration. By 2013, the Army already had a total
restoration backlog of over 15 billion dollars. At current levels of
funding, it will take approximately twenty-six years (2039) to return
all of our installations to standard. A return to sequestration will
only exacerbate this delay in providing our Soldiers and their Families
with the mission essential facilities their selfless service warrants.
Likewise, a return to sequestration will compel the Army to defer
vehicle maintenance. Under sequestration in fiscal year 2013, commands
reduced OPTEMPO to make additional resources available to address the
deferred maintenance workload. Additionally, the Army reduced the
maintenance requirements from ``10/20 standards'' (all routine
maintenance is executed and all deficiencies are repaired) to a Fully
Mission Capable (FMC) plus safety standard, decreasing the quantity of
reliable and deployable equipment.
Admiral Howard. Ship and air depot maintenance backlogs are good
examples of the second and third order effects of sequestration. The
impacts of the growing ship depot maintenance backlogs may not be
immediately apparent, but will result in greater funding needs in the
future to make up for the shortfalls each year and potentially more
material casualty reports, impacting operations. For aviation depot
maintenance, the growing backlog will result in more aircraft awaiting
maintenance and fewer operational aircraft on the flight line for
squadrons training for deployment. This will lead to less proficient
aircrews, decreased combat effectiveness of naval air forces, and
increased potential for flight and ground mishaps.
In addition, sequestration in fiscal year 2013 led to decreases in
the workforce and overall productivity in the depots/shipyards due to
hiring freezes at a time when the Navy should have been increasing the
workforce to meet a growing workload and replace normal attrition.
These outcomes were further exacerbated by workforce overtime
restrictions which prevented recovery of production schedules. A third
order effect was an increase in workforce attrition from accelerated
retirements or pursuit of other employment. While difficult to measure
motivation, the anecdotal evidence suggests that furloughs, lack of
overtime and an uncertain future were key contributors to an increased
loss of experienced workers. The end results were delayed and more
costly shipyard maintenance availabilities, and aviation depots were
unable to execute the necessary workload to keep the required numbers
of aircraft on the flight line.
General Paxton. A return to sequestration--or to BCA caps--would
exacerbate current fiscal challenges and force us to assume greater
risk in our capacity to meet long-term operational requirements. The
Marine Corps' current resource level represents the bare minimum at
which it can meet the current Defense Strategic Guidance. Though we are
committed to generating ready, forward deployed forces, at BCA levels
we will accept significantly greater risk in the next major theater
war. This is a ``one major combat operation,'' reduced-capacity force;
essentially, we would be all in with no rotations, no surge capacity,
and significantly reduced pre-deployment training. There would also be
significant reductions in aviation and ground combat units, further
reducing our available infantry battalions. Coupled with recent
reductions in critical combat support capabilities such as artillery,
tanks, and amphibious assault vehicles, such reductions would result in
wars that last longer and extract a higher human cost.
At BCA levels we would be unable to meet our ongoing operational
commitments and would forgo participation in many of our planned
security cooperation exercises. Though we intend to preserve the Guam/
DPRI effort as much as possible, a sequester would lengthen the
timeline for completion.
In terms of lasting implications, sequestration caps would also
require us to adopt massively inefficient business and operational
practices that end up costing much more over the long term. For
instance, delaying modernization in order to protect near-term
readiness greatly risks driving up acquisition costs. Any interruptions
during program acquisitions--schedule slips, loss of efficiencies, and
potential Nunn-McCurdy breaches--would ultimately increase total
program costs. Deferred modernization would have implications for our
equipment maintenance programs as well. We would be forced to sustain
legacy systems longer than planned, and to shift focus away from
cheaper, more efficient green technologies, toward older, more
inefficient and expensive technologies. We would also reduce regular,
scheduled maintenance on ground equipment (such as depot-level vehicle
overhauls) as a further near-term cost saving measure. However, the net
result of this combination of obsolete technology and reduced
maintenance will drive up operations and support costs over the long
term.
We would see similar effects to our facilities. Long-terms
infrastructure standards would be reduced, resulting in a score of Q3
or ``Poor'' on the Facility Conditions Index. Base operating functions
such as utilities and services would be depressed to minimum levels,
and energy efficiency projects would be eliminated. Over time the
cumulative effects of deferred or canceled maintenance will accelerate
the deterioration of buildings and drive up long term costs.
Finally, the return of sequestration would have costly implications
for our workforce, particularly personnel at our maintenance centers.
Because our depots are required to plan around the Services'
maintenance funding levels, cuts to their maintenance budgets require
corresponding reductions in staffing levels at the depots. This risks
the accumulation of a maintenance backlog that must be worked down with
(more costly) overtime. It also jeopardizes the retention of depot
skilled artisans, thus permanently reducing our throughput/surge
capacity. Our aviation units are experiencing these effects firsthand.
The fiscal year 2013 sequester forced mass layoffs at aviation depots,
which are now struggling to meet maintenance demands for our aircraft.
The number of aviation assets available for training and missions has
thus been reduced, and the readiness of our aviation units has dropped
accordingly.
General Spencer. Meeting the current and expanding demand for
forces against a shrinking capacity has required the Air Force to make
extraordinary choices in order to continue to supply air power.
Examples of this problem manifest themselves in areas like remotely
piloted aircraft (RPA) manning, fighter pilot manning, and maintenance
support to flight operations. RPA pilot numbers are decreasing and RPA
pilot training has been significantly constrained since 2007 due to the
requirement to utilize RPA instructors for surge combat operations and
not to conduct student training. The reduction of Air Force fighter
cockpits limits the capacity to season junior fighter pilots, delays
matriculation, and limits the experience level of our future fighter
pilot leaders. Finally, reductions and limits to total Air Force
manning have resulted in a lack of experienced aircraft maintenance
expertise needed to keep aging legacy aircraft flying and to bring new
weapons systems to active duty. Second and third order effects include
an RPA community that is losing operators faster than it can train
replacements, and a 5-year decline in the acceptance of the pilot
retention bonus. There are no short-term solutions for these
shortfalls. Full Presidential Budget (PB) 2016 funding, Overseas
Contingency Operations funding moved to baseline, a reduction in
deployment requirements, and time are necessary to develop the
experienced Airmen required to repair Air Force readiness.
46. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, what kind of impact would not only stopping basic
training proficiency, but losing the opportunity to conduct advanced
training, and what kind of impact that would have on our future
generation of leaders?
General Allyn. As codified in Title 10 US Code (Subtitle A, PART
II, Chapter 39, Section 671), Soldiers may not be deployed without
completing basic training. Initial Military Training (basic combat
training and initial skills training) transforms volunteers into
Soldiers with the requisite warfighting and technical skills to
positively contribute to their unit. Without this foundational,
institutional training, Soldiers would require burdensome, time-
consuming training at their first unit of assignment. Additionally,
standardization of initial training, when conducted at first unit of
assignment, would be extremely difficult to ensure and lead to an
increased risk of casualties in the event of a contingency. Delaying or
halting the various advanced training courses offered to mid-career
leaders will create a significant gap in professional development. This
gap will force the Army to choose between placing leaders in positions
of increasing responsibility without the appropriate level of
professional education or delaying their promotion until such a time as
the training can be completed.
Admiral Howard. Stopping basic training proficiency and pre-
deployment advanced training would gravely impact the Navy's mission.
We continually operate in a rotational deployment cycle, and the
Combatant Commanders expect deployed Navy units to be ready to execute
any core mission when and where directed. Therefore, full spectrum pre-
deployment training is paramount.
If we return to sequestration, growing numbers of future leaders
would develop experience gaps at key stages in their careers. Although
Navy will prioritize pre-deployment training, sequestration will slow
the training cycle. Non-deployed units will conduct advanced training
``just-in-time'' to complete deployment certification, and their post-
deployment training to sustain readiness may not be funded. This
reduces the total number of training opportunities at each career
level. Joint partner participation in our certification exercises would
also likely be reduced, and other cancelled or down-scoped advanced
training exercises would limit the quantity and quality of additional
training opportunities beyond pre-deployment certification.
General Paxton. We are able to meet our current training
requirements. However, in order to make continuous and long term
readiness a reality, we have to strike the right balance between
deployment for operations and training time here at home. Right now, we
have about a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio. That is, Marines are
deployed for 7 months and home for 14. This allows a proper unit
rotation to ensure that each time a unit deploys they are fully ready.
If we are forced to take further cuts, that level will decrease closer
to 1:1.5 or 1:1. What this means is that units have less time between
deployments to conduct the required training prior to their next
deployment.
More specifically, home station readiness is at risk when personnel
and equipment are sourced to protect the readiness of deployed and
next-to deploy units. This is a logical decision when validated
operational requirements exceed resource availability. Home station
units are expected to be in a higher state of readiness since the
Marine Corps is charged to be the Nations' force in readiness. The way
they preserve this readiness is through training. By way of example, 5
of the last 6 infantry battalions assigned to Marine Expeditionary
Units were not prepared until 30 days before deployment. This is
sufficient for planned deployments, but becomes problematic and
dangerous as conflicts extend or the need to respond to unexpended
crises arises.
To the point about our future leaders, it is essential that we have
the ability not only to train leaders in tactical and technical skills
at Professional Military Education (PME) courses, but also that those
leaders have an opportunity to train with their subordinates during
unit training. Cuts to either facet damage long term leadership
development because leaders do not get the individual development they
require and subordinates are not provided the opportunity to learn
through interaction with seasoned and effective leaders. This creates a
compounding downward spiral of competence and experience that we can
ill afford.
General Spencer. The loss of both basic and advanced training is
reflected in the steady decline of overall Air Force readiness. The
reality is that our current generations of Air Force Airmen have been
heavily involved in low intensity or counter-insurgency conflicts for
the past 14 years. Our Air Force, to include our leadership, is better
than it has ever been at close air support, mobility, and special
operations in low intensity operations. However, this has come at the
expense of full spectrum readiness and the ability to fully support the
Defense Strategic Guidance. For example, by 2012, 10+ years of
cumulative skill atrophy have driven B-1 crews to routinely train for
low-level attack missions at double the desired tactical altitude as a
result of insufficient training proficiency and readiness. Simply put,
the B-1 community sacrificed a distinct tactical and operational
advantage due to fundamental aircrew safety and readiness concerns. A
similar example exists in every Air Force community. Lost training has
extended the matriculation of our future Air Force leaders. Lost
opportunities to train and practice our ``high-end fight'' garner gaps
of experience in our future leaders and insert unseen risk resulting in
errors that will be swift and catastrophic.
Path to Full-Spectrum Readiness
47. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, several of the Military Services have identified
2020 or 2023 as a target to restoring full-spectrum proficiency and
address the degraded state of non-deployed readiness. Meanwhile, the
Navy has an optimized fleet response plan to achieve consistent and
long-term presence around the globe. In the event sequestration could
be avoided--could each of you please describe in specifics how you plan
to restore full-spectrum readiness and what the end-state looks like?
General Allyn. The Army's readiness recovery goal is to build
readiness for current operations and ensure enough operational depth is
ready to sustain larger contingency operations.
The Army's ``get-well'' date is heavily influenced by two factors:
demand for Army forces and funding availability. Assuming no change to
current global demand and the fiscal year 2016 President's Budget (PB)
funding levels are sustained, the Army forecasts achieving fiscal
balance no earlier than fiscal year 2017 and returns to proficiency no
earlier than fiscal year 2020. However, any increase in demand or
reduction in funding will extend this recovery period. Fundamentally,
we deliver full spectrum readiness through a combination of fully-
resourced Home Station Training, culminating in a unit's successful
completion of a decisive action Combat Training Center rotation. If
fully resourced at current force levels, it would take two years to
cycle all our active Brigade Combat Teams through this training
regimen.
Admiral Howard. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) is the
Navy's framework for readiness recovery. It is a disciplined process
which preserves the time necessary to conduct required maintenance and
modernization of our capital-intensive force. It also protects the time
to conduct full spectrum training. Multiple lines of effort are being
aligned to deliver the full readiness impact of OFRP. Achieving the
desired end-state first depends on restoring the capacity of our
shipyards and aviation depots. Our success will result in completion of
maintenance and modernization on schedule; ready units that are
available at sustainable levels from year-to-year to support Combatant
Commander global presence requirements; and additional operational
availability providing full contingency response capacity that is
routinely sustained until the next maintenance cycle begins.
Furthermore, to sustain full-spectrum readiness over time we must
continue on a stable path to procure new platforms and ordnance, while
also modifying existing platforms at a pace that sustains our
warfighting advantage.
General Paxton. Should sequestration be avoided and its deleterious
pecuniary effects put aside, the Marine Corps recognizes that non-
pecuniary actions and time would be required to restore full spectrum
readiness. The Marine Corps is the Nation's ready force, a force
capable of responding to crises and contingencies anywhere around the
globe at a moment's notice. To fully reconstitute the whole-of-force
after over a decade of sustained unprecedented conflict and fiscal
challenges, the Marine Corps would continue taking actions that address
readiness concerns across the Future Years Defense Plan. Those actions
include: (1) Balance readiness between deployed and home station units.
Forward deployed and engaged units will remain a priority for
resourcing. However, to help lessen the burden of high operational
tempo and improve overall readiness, the Marine Corps will employ
deployment-to-dwell ratios that improve home station unit readiness.
Personnel shortfalls at the unit level are a principal detractor to
recovering readiness. Actions taken to help restore home station unit
readiness include manning assignment policies that improve leader-to-
led ratios, especially among the Noncommissioned Officer and Staff
Noncommissioned Office grades; ensuring required unit personnel fill
levels essential for combat effectiveness are protected; and that
readiness recovery is optimized across the entire unit life cycle
versus only the pre-deployment training period. (2) Reconstitute the
force to New Normal and upcoming challenges. To meet current
requirements and preserve readiness recovery, the Marine Corps will
continue to mature its capstone concept and vision for designing and
developing the force now and into the future. (3) Equipment Reset.
Ground equipment supporting Operation Enduring Freedom has retrograded
to the U.S. Much of this equipment has completed the required post-OEF
repairs and subsequently has been redistributed to units. The Marine
Corps is on track to complete repair and redistribution of all OEF war-
torn equipment in fiscal year 2017.
For the Marine Corps, full spectrum readiness equates to Service-
wide capability of operating, effectively and efficiently, across the
range of military operations, and achieving mission objectives at any
time or place. All Marine Corps units would be capable of responding to
a broad spectrum of conflict scenarios. Full spectrum readiness allows
the service to meet current and future requirements. Full spectrum
readiness entails the ability to simultaneously meet (1) current
operations supporting the Combatant Commands, (2) emergent crises and
major contingencies, (3) the demands of the institution that underpins
the ability to effectively and efficiently fulfill the Service's
statutory and regulatory obligations.
General Spencer. The Air Force is the smallest in its history and
lacks the capacity to meet both the rotational Combatant Commander
requirements and the required dwell time necessary to train in-
garrison. With FY16 PB funding and a transition to deployment cycles
that allow sufficient time to build and maintain full-spectrum
readiness, the Air Force will be able to build readiness in the short,
medium, and long term. Short term improvements will be derived from
executing a robust flying hour program that emphasizes full-spectrum
training. Mid-term gains are expected from accomplishing delayed
maintenance and upgrades to weapon systems and support equipment. Long-
term gains will come from investments in our Airmen. It takes time to
recruit and train our Airmen to be journeymen, supervisors, and leaders
who are ready to execute the full-spectrum of missions required of our
Air Force. If 80 percent readiness is achieved by the end of 2023, the
result will be a highly capable Air Force, able to meet the two largest
pillars of the Defense Strategic Guidance with ready forces.
Sequestration Relief for Other U.S. Security Agencies
48. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, the new National Security Strategy released last
month, states that our national security relies on more than just the
work of Department of Defense (DOD). Sequestration is having as harmful
an impact on our diplomatic and international development tools,
Homeland security, law enforcement, and intelligence activities as
well. Would you agree that we should provide sequestration relief to
DOD and all the non-DOD contributors to our national security like the
State Department, the Intelligence Community, the Department of
Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice to name a few?
General Allyn. There are several instruments of national power that
we commonly refer to as ``DIME'' which stands for diplomatic,
information, military, and economic. We are only one component of
this--the remaining agencies provide the bulk of the other national
capabilities. We believe that only through a whole-of-government
approach can our national security objectives be met.
As such, it is our belief that even if sequestration relief were
provided to the Department of Defense, the nation's ability to achieve
its objectives would remain at risk without funding relief across the
whole-of-government.
Admiral Howard. The Navy continues to oppose sequestration for the
entire federal budget because it implements harmful automatic cuts with
no regard for priority. The Navy is globally deployed to provide a
credible and survivable strategic deterrent and to support the mission
requirements of the regional Combatant Commanders. In executing our
operations, the Navy relies on joint and interagency support from other
DoD and non-DoD organizations. Any negative impacts to the
organizations we partner with can have an impact on our ability to
execute operations and the Defense Strategic Guidance. A return to
sequestration would jeopardize the Navy's readiness and damage our
national security.
General Paxton. ``While I do not dispute that national security is
a whole-of-government effort, I cannot authoritatively comment on the
potential impact of sequestration on any organization, other than the
U.S. Marine Corps.''
General Spencer. Yes. Non-DoD agencies should be similarly
considered for relief from sequestration. Any increase in defense
spending should be matched at some level for the non-defense
discretionary spending that contributes to our national security.
49. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, if sequestration-level budget caps remain in
fiscal year 2016, how would you characterize the impact of lost
capability or capacity from these other agencies to meet the
requirements of our Nation's security needs?
General Allyn. The Army, and indeed the Department of Defense,
cannot solely defend national security or meet the nation's strategic
objectives in a way consistent with our values. The military is only
one of the instruments available to the nation for achieving its
objectives and securing its interests. Loss of capability and capacity
in these other areas would certainly make our job more difficult and
hinder the Nation's ability to meet its security objectives.
Admiral Howard. The Navy continues to oppose sequestration for the
entire federal budget because it implements harmful automatic cuts with
no regard for priority. The Navy is globally deployed to provide a
credible and survivable strategic deterrent and to support the mission
requirements of the regional Combatant Commanders. In executing our
operations, the Navy relies on joint and interagency support from other
DoD and non-DoD organizations. Any negative impacts to the
organizations we partner with can have an impact on our ability to
execute operations and the Defense Strategic Guidance. A return to
sequestration would jeopardize the Navy's readiness and damage our
national security.
General Paxton. ``While I do not dispute that national security is
a whole-of-government effort and that sequestration could have an
impact on the ability of other government organizations, I cannot
authoritatively comment on the potential impact of sequestration on any
organization, other than the U.S. Marine Corps.''
General Spencer. The Air Force relies heavily on the support of
both DoD and non-DoD entities and will find it difficult to complete
its mission if our agency partners lose capability or capacity. The
support we receive through these relationships extends to all domains
and strengthens our ability to conduct full-spectrum operations in
support of our national interests.
50. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, in your view, what would be the impact of
sequestration-level budget cuts to Federal support services commonly
used by soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and their families?
General Allyn. The Army collaborates and coordinates with non-DoD
agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, Health and Human
Services, American Red Cross, Department of Labor and the Department of
Veterans Affairs to achieve common Soldier and Family readiness goals.
Non-DoD services and programs are an integral part of the Soldier and
Family readiness system. Therefore, the readiness of Soldiers and
Families who use non-DoD programs will inevitably be impacted by any
reduction in outside agency programs or services.
From a strictly Army standpoint, Soldier and Family programs would
be unavoidably impacted if we are funded at the Budget Control Act
levels. We can protect the highest priority programs such as
Exceptional Family Member Program, Survivor Outreach Services, Child
and Youth Programs, Family Advocacy, and Financial Readiness for
Soldiers and Families. However, there will be increased risk to
programs such as spouse employment, Army OneSource, library services,
and Family and Morale, Welfare and Recreation programs. Reductions will
affect staffing, operating hours, and range of services, resulting in a
potential degradation to readiness, resiliency, and quality of life.
Admiral Howard. Sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would have
serious impacts to readiness overall. Because our Sailors are our most
important asset and we must invest appropriately to keep a high-caliber
all-volunteer force, we would try to minimize the impact to Sailor
support, family readiness, and education programs. However, other
support services may need to be reduced or delayed because of the
significant funding reductions, which could negatively impact their
morale and readiness. Furthermore, across-the-board sequestration cuts
to non-DOD organizations such as the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau and the Department of Labor may also negatively impact the
support services to our people.
General Paxton. It is unclear how sequestration would affect the
budgets and programs of other Federal programs. In regard to Marine
Corps quality of life programs used by Marines and their families,
recent budget reductions have already caused curtailment of many non-
core programs, such as Family Care, Family Readiness, and Semper Fit
and Recreation. We are currently protecting core programs, such as
Behavioral Health, Sexual Assault Prevention, and Wounded Warrior care,
as well as support services for Marines returning from Afghanistan and
transitioning out of the Marine Corps. However, under prolonged
sequestration-level budget cuts, even these programs could be put at
risk.
Fundamentally, sequestration will exacerbate the challenges we have
today including readiness of our Marines and their families including
impacting the five pillars of readiness: high quality people, near unit
readiness, capability and capacity to meet combatant commanders'
requirements, infrastructure sustainment, and modernization. We have
maintained near-term readiness at the cost of our long-term
investments. The Budget Control Act has presented many readiness
challenges and a sequestered budget would further exacerbate readiness
issues.
General Spencer. Under constrained budgets and impending
sequestration, if not repealed, it is becoming more challenging to
maintain diverse quality of life programs and services at adequate
levels. The Air Force is committed to ``Taking Care of People'' and
strives to maintain installation services and family programs to help
build and maintain ready, resilient Airmen and their families. To help
mitigate budget impacts, the Air Force has prioritized Airmen and
family support programs from an enterprise-wide perspective. Our
fitness, child and youth care, food services, and some family support
programs (outdoor recreation, libraries, youth centers, etc.) are
programmed to continue in the FY16 PB request. Funding below the PB
request will force commanders to make difficult decisions to prioritize
these support activities against operational and mission requirements.
51. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, in your view, do reductions to federal support
services hurt education and health care in local communities and
ultimately risk the quality of life and readiness of our servicemembers
and their families?
General Allyn. Through DOD funding, the Army is maintaining a
viable Voluntary Education Program IAW DoDI 1322.25 requirements. If
funding to non-DOD Agencies (community and state schools) were reduced,
it could have some impact on Soldier education by increasing costs not
covered by the DOD programs.
Members of the Army and their families live and work in the
communities surrounding our installations. While some members of the
military live on installations with access to DoD schools, an
increasing number (880 percent of dependent Servicemembers children) do
not. Instead, they use public or private education in the local
community. Our members have access to military healthcare facilities in
many locations but we still rely on local private and public sector
healthcare services to augment our capabilities. Degradation of
healthcare or education services within a community would impact the
quality of life and readiness of our service members and their
families.
Admiral Howard. Since the majority of our Sailors and their
families live in the local communities surrounding the installations,
if local community services are negatively impacted by reductions, our
Sailors and families will likely share the same consequences with the
local community. We have no data or feedback from regions or
installations to substantiate negative impact on local community
services.
General Paxton. In specific regard to military and family quality
of life support programs, we have taken cuts in areas of Family Care,
Family Readiness, and Semper Fit and Recreation. As we move forward, we
will evaluate our programs and develop a plan with a bias toward
decentralizing decision-making and resource allocation. Funding will
focus on sustainment of core readiness and higher headquarters
requirements, such as Behavioral Health, Sexual Assault Prevention, and
Wounded Warrior care. Marines and their families have and may be
impacted by reductions in noncore programs due to accessibility of
programs, establishment or increase of fees to use resources (e.g.,
youth programs, pools, etc.), and hours of operations (e.g., fitness
facilities). However, the Marine Corps has made all efforts to find
savings without resulting in direct impacts to our Marines and families
and those impacts being minimal in areas of noncore programs. Funding
reductions that impact support services do risk Marine and family
quality of life and readiness, but it is not clear the impact on
education and health care in local communities.
General Spencer. Federal support services for education and health
care, combined with Air Force programs, comprise the package of
services that military families rely upon. Funding reductions for these
programs result in less support to service members and their families.
Many Air Force members and their families rely on public education and
medical services available through local communities so reductions in
federal support to these services adversely affect quality of life for
service members.
Aircraft Maintenance Throughput Issues
52. Senator Kaine. Admiral Howard and General Paxton, with the
delay of the F-35, legacy aircraft like the F/A-18 Hornet A and D
models, must undergo service-life extension programs (SLEP) to cover
the gap in aircraft coverage. In addition to sequestration-level budget
caps, there have been reports of obsolescent parts, a shrinking to non-
existent vendor industrial base, maintenance backlogs, and higher than
planned failure rates as the aircraft age. Could you please explain how
even if Congress were to give you additional funding, it may not fix
the aircraft maintenance throughput issues, and how you either need
relief from sequestration, decreased op-tempo, or more people?
Admiral Howard. The Fiscal Year 2016 President's Budget request
provides funding to align F/A-18A-F depot throughput to projected
capacity.
To improve F/A-18 depot capacity, the Department is attacking the
major barriers to production--manpower and material. This includes an
aggressive hiring and training plan for artisans and engineers, and
improved parts availability and staging for high flight hour (HFH)
maintenance events based on common repair requirements. Additionally,
the Navy has collaborated with Boeing in identifying several areas to
improve overall depot throughput, such as employing Boeing Engineering
Support and incorporating Super Hornet modifications at its Cecil Field
facility. The strategy is proving successful as depot production levels
are improving, but requires time to fully mature. With the requested
funding, and under this plan, the Department anticipates continued
improvement in depot throughput to meet annual production requirements
by fiscal year 2017 and full recovery by fiscal year 2019.
A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 is a recurring
concern as the Department requires a stable budget to meet these
objectives. Sequestration and the compound effects of the 2013
government shutdown drove manning shortfalls for both artisans and
engineers and hampered the Navy's ability to respond to unplanned work
found during HFH inspections. Any further reductions in the depot
maintenance, engineering and contractor support budgets will impede the
depot throughput improvement strategy. Moreover, a return to
sequestration will affect recent initiatives including the F/A-18E/F
service life assessment and extension programs (SLAP/SLEP). Current
efforts for Super Hornet SLAP/SLEP include fatigue life analysis,
stress predictions, and inspection and modification development. These
analyses will inform future work and ensure material kits are developed
to better support life extension efforts, but are required prior to the
first aircraft reaching its 6,000 hour limit, expected in CY2017. A
return to sequestration would have a compounding effect that will
further increase risk in our strike fighter inventory management
strategy and reduce the availability of warfighting assets.
General Paxton. The Marine Corps, along with all of the other
services, is facing with issues with our current aircraft and keeping
them relevant and ready while transitioning to new airframes in each of
our aviation communities. The specter of sequestration-level budget
caps frustrates the Marine Corps movement towards recovery and will
reintroduce many of the problems from the first round of sequestration.
Our Aviation Depots were not protected and we experienced a loss of
skilled artisans and personnel. We are still rebuilding the workforce
that we lost. It is critical that we do so to improve the throughput
issues experienced with the SLEP and other engineering challenges we
are experiencing with all of our type/model/series of aircraft: CH-53E,
AV-8B, MV-22, H-1, and the more widely recognized F/A-18A-D. If given
any additional funding, we would protect and grow manpower at our
Depots to help with our Current Readiness challenges and increase our
throughput.
In the near term, we are pursuing commercial alternatives as
additions to our Depots to also increase throughput. This will directly
translate to increased current readiness for all of our type/model/
series of aircraft. We would continue to invest in our current fleet of
aircraft to ensure their relevance on the battlefield as we continue to
upgrade every aviation community. Finally, we would continue to fund
our vital transition plan by purchasing more new aircraft in our
current programs to complete our transitions sooner and divest of our
current fleet faster, helping our Future Readiness.
The Marine Corps stands behind the fiscal year 2016 President's
Budget and the Marine Corps' Unfunded Priorities List. This will help
us keep all of our aircraft relevant and ready while continuing to
build our F-35 fleet in addition to our other transitioning platforms.
A return to sequestration would only exacerbate our issues with our
aircraft, their modernization, and the SLEP programs necessary to make
our way to aircraft like the F-35, CH-53K, and all other transitioning
airframes.
Simulation Training
53. Senator Kaine. General Allyn, Admiral Howard, General Paxton,
and General Spencer, the Chief of Nacal Operations' (CNO) Navigation
Plan from 2015-2019 calls for focus on critical afloat and ashore
readiness, including the ``developing and fielding of live, virtual,
and constructive training, to provide more realistic training at a
reduced cost.'' For example, there is a 3-D software program called the
Multipurpose Reconfigurable Training System ( MRTS) that enables a
sailor to view and access all parts of an engine found aboard Virginia
class submarines. The Marine Corps uses combat convoy simulators at
their bases in Quantico, California, North Carolina, Hawaii, and Japan.
If we are unable to reverse sequestration, how can the Services
leverage simulators to maximize full-spectrum training proficiency in
the face of fiscal constraints?
General Allyn. The Army currently has the appropriate mix of live,
virtual, and constructive training. The three complement each other
allowing Soldiers to practice basic skills and in some cases to
practice complex maneuvers prior to live execution. It is important to
remember that virtual and constructive training cannot replace live
training. Simulation allows for greater repetition and practice, but
does not qualify a Soldier or unit as trained.
While simulations do save some training dollars, they are not a low
cost solution. Simulating training requires complex and maintenance-
intensive systems. The Army will always seek to optimize its
investments in training resources, but there must be balance as some
skills cannot be practiced in a simulator and units must execute live
training to be proficient.
Admiral Howard. There remains a fine balance between the
requirement for live, hands-on training and the complementary training
capability provided by simulation. But even in a fiscally constrained
environment, Navy is making the necessary investments to effectively
leverage the live, virtual and constructive (LVC) training continuum to
deliver more cost effective and higher quality training than live
training alone can provide. New platforms, such as LCS, use simulation
as the focus of their training, saving some of the expense of underway
training operations, while we continue to invest in the Fleet Synthetic
Training (FST) program, linking multiple Navy units, U.S. Joint Forces,
and partner nations across the globe to practice operationally relevant
scenarios. Current and planned investments will support our future
training needs while continuing to improve the overall quality of
tactical training.
Leveraging the successes we have achieved with FST and its
connected tactical ship and aviation trainers, we are also applying
simulation more frequently to maintenance training. The MRTS cited in
your question is a good example. We are creating a virtual Virginia
Class Submarine diesel engine room with considerable savings versus an
alternative brick and mortar solution.
General Paxton. There is no doubt that simulators provide a unique
opportunity to provide realistic training opportunities that offset
some of the costs associated with real-world training. These systems
allow for varied training experiences, can minimize ammunition usage,
and decrease logistical costs. In fact, the Commandant's Planning
Guidance for 2015 specifically states that development and use of
simulators remains a high priority for the service.
``We will continue to support the fielding of systems that
enhance our proficiency and safety in operating weapons and
equipment. Our investment in training systems will reflect the
priority we place on preparing for combat and be fully
integrated with training and readiness standards. I expect all
elements of the MAGTF to make extensive use of simulators where
appropriate.''
-Gen. Joseph Dunford
However, as with other modernization efforts, we have had to defer
some simulator development initiatives in order to prioritize near term
readiness. We are currently funding simulator development and testing
through individual system programs and supporting contracts. Due to the
programming cycle, Fiscal Year 2018 will be the first opportunity to
fund enduring integrated simulator capability.
Specifically, the Marine Corps Training and Education Command's
(TECOM) Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Master Plan, Squad Immersive
Training Environment (SITE), as well as the Live, Virtual,
Constructive--Training Environment (LVC-TE) identify service
requirements for simulators and simulations. These requirements are
being addressed by TECOM. In conjunction with this we are continuing
our efforts to integrate aviation systems with ground simulations to
provide opportunities to conduct training that tests the full structure
and capabilities of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
General Spencer. The Air Force is committed to ensuring force
readiness in the most effective manner. Our combat and mobility
communities, each have unique assets and therefore, different
solutions. Some events/sorties can be replicated in the virtual world,
while others cannot. In addition, for both communities, live training
encompasses more participants than merely the aircrew. Maintenance,
logistics, and airfield operations functions, to name a few, are active
participants of the total flying activity and must be used every day to
ensure combat power is available when and where the nation needs it.
Current aircrew simulators do not exercise the entire logistical chain.
Air Combat Command utilizes simulators as an integrated component
of a daily comprehensive live and virtual training construct. In
conjunction with a command-wide realignment of the Ready Aircrew
Program (RAP--the annual training specification) that occurred in 2010-
2011, simulator training now constitutes 27 percent of total fighter
RAP training, 40 percent of B-1 RAP training, and 50 percent of Command
and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance RAP
training. Given the quality and capacity of the combat simulators,
there are not additional events/sorties that could be transferred to
the virtual environment.
Air Mobility Command (AMC) offset over $700 million in live fly
hours in fiscal year 2014 through the employment of Live, Virtual, and
Constructive (LVC) capabilities. AMC has established a Distributed
Mission Operations capability with networked connectivity for C-17s
with other MAJCOMs and Joint partners to allow for expanded training
opportunities in more realistic environments. AMC will expand upon
current capabilities by connecting tanker (KC-10, KC-135, and KC-46)
and additional airlift assets (C-130s and C-5s) over the next 5 years.
In addition, AMC is pursuing a networked, virtual air refueling
capability for their tanker and airlift systems to allow for additional
migration of refueling training to the simulators (initial capability
in fiscal year 2018).
[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]