    [Senate Hearing 114-]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 114-23]

                           NAVAL COOPERATIVE STRATEGY

                                   __________

                                 JOINT HEARING

                                   before the

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                                     of the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                              meeting jointly with

            SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                                     of the

                 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                              [Serial No. 114-10]

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 MARCH 18, 2015

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                      ______

                             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    94-225                         WASHINGTON : 2015
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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                      J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman

    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi       JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama               RICK LARSEN, Washington
    ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia          MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice      HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
        Chair                                Georgia
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             SCOTT H. PETERS, California
    PAUL COOK, California                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
    JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana             SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
    RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana
    STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
                   David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
                  Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
                            Katherine Rember, Clerk

                                     ------
                 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                      BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
    DON YOUNG, Alaska                    PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee,      ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
      Vice Chair                             Columbia
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                JERROLD NADLER, New York
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        CORRINE BROWN, Florida
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            RICK LARSEN, Washington
    ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas  MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
    LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania           GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
    BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas              DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
    BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    RICHARD L. HANNA, New York           ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
    JEFF DENHAM, California              JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin            ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
    THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              JANICE HAHN, California
    TOM RICE, South Carolina             RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            DINA TITUS, Nevada
    RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois               SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
    MARK SANFORD, South Carolina         ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
    ROB WOODALL, Georgia                 LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    TODD ROKITA, Indiana                 CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
    JOHN KATKO, New York                 JARED HUFFMAN, California
    BRIAN BABIN, Texas                   JULIA BROWNLEY, California
    CRESENT HARDY, Nevada
    RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania
    GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
    MIMI WALTERS, California
    BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia
    CARLOS CURBELO, Florida
    DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
                                     ------

            Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

                      DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
    DON YOUNG, Alaska                    JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      CORRINE BROWN, Florida
    MARK SANFORD, South Carolina         JANICE HAHN, California
    GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana             LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    CARLOS CURBELO, Florida              JULIA BROWNLEY, California
    DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina         PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York                  Officio)
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex
        Officio)
                 John Clark Rayfield, Professional Staff Member
                     Dave Jansen, Professional Staff Member

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Donegan, RADM Kevin M. ``Kid,'' USN, Acting Deputy Chief of Naval
      Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5).........     4
    Michel, VADM Charles D., USCG, Deputy Commandant for Operations..     2
    O'Donnell, MajGen Andrew W., Jr., USMC, Assistant Deputy
      Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, Deputy
      Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command....     3

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut,
          Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection
          Forces.....................................................    36
        Donegan, RADM Kevin M. ``Kid,'' joint with MajGen Andrew W.
          O'Donnell, Jr..............................................    43
        Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................    35
        Michel, VADM Charles D.......................................    38

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward,
          Engaged, Ready.............................................    59

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Cook.....................................................   103
        Mr. Garamendi................................................   103

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]

                           NAVAL COOPERATIVE STRATEGY

                                  ----------

            House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
                Services, Subcommittee on Seapower and
                Projection Forces, Meeting Jointly with
                Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
                Transportation, Washington, DC, Wednesday,
                March 18, 2015.

        The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:48 p.m. in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
    (chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection
    Forces) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
         FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
                           PROJECTION FORCES

        Mr. Forbes. Welcome this afternoon to the joint Seapower
    and Projection Forces and Coast Guard and Maritime
    Transportation hearing on naval cooperative strategy.
        We thank our witnesses for being here.
        Normally, we would have opening statements by the chairmen
    and ranking members of both subcommittees, but today all of the
    chairmen and ranking members have agreed to waive their opening
    remarks. They will be placed in the record. Mr. Courtney, that
    is my understanding. And, Mr. Hunter, it is as well.
        [The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes and Mr. Courtney can
    be found in the Appendix beginning on page 35.]
        Mr. Forbes. So we are delighted today to have three very
    distinguished witnesses to appear before our joint hearing.
        We have Vice Admiral Charles Michel, U.S. Coast Guard, the
    Deputy Commandant for Operations; Major General Andrew
    O'Donnell, U.S. Marine Corps, Assistant Deputy Commandant,
    Combat Development and Integration, Deputy Commanding General,
    Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and Rear Admiral Kevin
    Donegan, U.S. Navy, Acting Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
    Operations, Plans, and Strategy.
        General, we want to thank you for your work on this
    strategy. You have done a great job. We look forward to hearing
    your comments. We will put your full testimony in the record.
    But we would love to have you take 5 minutes or so to summarize
    it in any way that you would like to do so. And so I don't know
    which of you would like to start off, but we are going to turn
    the floor over.
        Admiral, we are going to recognize you now and look forward
    to your comments.

     STATEMENT OF VADM CHARLES D. MICHEL, USCG, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
                             FOR OPERATIONS

        Admiral Michel. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Forbes, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Courtney,
    and distinguished members of the committees, good afternoon and
    thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the Coast
    Guard's role in the ``Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
    Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready.''
        With the committee's permission, I also propose to enter
    the strategy document itself into the record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 59.]
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Some unnumbered photographic pages at the beginning and
    end of the report were not reproduced.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Admiral Michel. The Coast Guard stands ready alongside the
    Navy and Marine Corps, reaffirming our unified commitment to
    confront national security threats from and on the sea.
        The Coast Guard is a member of the Nation's five armed
    services and a global maritime force that complements the other
    sea services' roles in fulfilling the Nation's broad maritime
    goals. The Coast Guard leverages unique authorities,
    capabilities, and partnerships essential to national and
    homeland security.
        The Coast Guard is at all times an armed service under
    title 10 and simultaneously has broad law enforcement
    authorities under title 14. The Coast Guard provides its
    greatest contributions to the collective strategy in the
    critical areas of maritime security operations, all-domain
    access, and maintaining flexible, agile, and ready forces.
        Maritime security operations protect sovereignty and
    maritime resources, support free and open seaborne commerce,
    and deter and counter threats that seek to exploit maritime
    domain, including weapons proliferation, terrorism,
    transnational crime, piracy, sanctions avoidance, and unlawful
    seaborne migration.
        As the Navy and Marine Corps rebalance efforts to address
    national imperatives in the Asia-Pacific region, Coast Guard
    operations projected forward in the Western Hemisphere transit
    zone increase in importance.
        The Coast Guard's offshore patrol cutter, or OPC,
    acquisition is the key service recapitalization to maintain our
    forward-deployed, complementary, non-redundant capability in
    combating transnational criminal networks, the greatest threat
    to national security in this hemisphere. These assets can't
    arrive too soon.
        Our medium-endurance cutters currently on scene, which
    annually interdict more than three times the amount of cocaine
    seized domestically and at every air, land, and sea border of
    the United States, will be 55 years old, on average, when the
    first OPC deploys to the Western Hemisphere transit zone.
        The Coast Guard also plays a unique role in achieving all-
    domain access. The Coast Guard's ability to operate in polar
    regions ensures the Nation's maritime security interests are
    met in the increasingly strategic Arctic Ocean as well as in
    Antarctica. Through its unique authorities in international
    partnerships, the Coast Guard has an active maritime security
    presence in 29 countries and has 60 bilateral agreements with
    foreign governments that enhance maritime governance, rule of
    law, and global leadership.
        In the cyber domain, Coast Guard authorities and
    responsibilities span the dot-mil, dot-gov, and dot-com
    domains. To accomplish the collective goals of this strategy,
    it is imperative for our forces to remain flexible, agile, and
    ready.
        Critical to remaining forward, on call, and ready 24
    [hours] by 7 [days] to engage in a strategic and complementary
    manner are investments in the OPC acquisition, improved
    aviation capabilities, integrated command and control systems,
    and a proficient workforce.
        In conclusion, the Coast Guard is fully committed to the
    strategic priorities of the strategy and remains a forward,
    engaged, and ready member of our sea services across the globe
    and at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today
    and for all you do for the men and women of the Nation's Armed
    Forces and specifically the sea services. I look forward to
    answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Michel can be found in
    the Appendix on page 38.]
        Mr. Forbes. Admiral Michel, thank you so much for your
    testimony, for being here with us today.
        General, we now recognize you.

     STATEMENT OF MAJGEN ANDREW W. O'DONNELL, JR., USMC, ASSISTANT
     DEPUTY COMMANDANT, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, DEPUTY
      COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

        General O'Donnell. Thank you.
        Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, Chairman Hunter,
    Ranking Member Garamendi and distinguished members----
        Mr. Forbes. General, you might want to pull that mic
    [microphone] just a little closer. Sometimes it is difficult
    picking up.
        General O'Donnell. Thanks.
        The Marine Corps' ability to serve as the Nation's premier
    crisis response force is due, in large part, to this
    subcommittee's continued strong support. And on behalf of all
    marines, I thank you.
        Admiral Michel highlighted some key points from the
    ``Cooperative Strategy of the 21st Century Seapower.'' And I
    would like to briefly highlight the role of your Marine Corps
    as an element of U.S. power.
        When it comes to being where it matters when it matters,
    the Marine Corps is committed to keeping our force forward-
    deployed and forward-engaged. This means that today there are
    around 30,000 marines deployed in over 40 countries. These
    forces are currently conducting strikes in Syria and Iraq,
    training the Iraqi Army, and protecting our Embassy in Baghdad.
    They also include 22,500 marines in the Pacific, all of which
    are west of the International Date Line.
        These forces are conducting exercises and training with
    their Pacific partners and are staged to rapidly respond to any
    crisis or contingency in the region. As Admiral Donegan will
    mention, this strategy recognizes that we will continue to
    invest in strengthening alliances and, also, partnerships.
        Marines deployed onboard amphibious ships and those forces
    forward of station routinely conduct theater security
    cooperation exercises to ensure interoperability and enhance
    our partners' capabilities. There is no substitute for the
    mission. And as this committee has heard before, virtual
    presence is actual absence.
        This strategy paints a path forward in operating in an
    increasingly complex environment. It complements and amplifies
    the characteristics required of the Marine Corps and our
    capstone concept, Expeditionary Force 21. In doing so, it
    highlights the importance of naval forces in gaining and
    maintaining overseas access in peace or war.
        Your Navy and Marine Corps team provides the United States
    the ability to project sustainable combat power overseas
    without the need to ask for assistance or permission from
    anyone. This capability is essential to protecting our
    citizens, advancing our national interest, and promoting global
    stability.
        Today's security environments, as well as the challenges of
    constrained and uncertain budgets, require creative responses
    to fulfill our global commitments. Our forward-stationed and -
    deployed marines remain our Nation's 911 force and readiness,
    and this strategy will ensure that they remain poised to do so
    in the future.
        Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. And I look
    forward to answering your question.
        [The joint prepared statement of General O'Donnell and
    Admiral Donegan can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
        Admiral Donegan.

    STATEMENT OF RADM KEVIN M. ``KID'' DONEGAN, USN, ACTING DEPUTY
     CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND STRATEGY
                                (N3/N5)

        Admiral Donegan. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney,
    Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, distinguished
    members, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today with my shipmates from the Marine Corps and Coast Guard
    to discuss this sea services ``Cooperative Strategy for 21st
    Century Seapower.''
        With the permission of the subcommittee, I propose to keep
    my remarks brief, but have submitted a separate statement for
    the Department of the Navy that----
        Mr. Forbes. All of the remarks will be so ordered. It will
    be put in the record. Thank you.
        Admiral Donegan. Thank you.
        Now I will offer a brief overview of the strategy and then
    touch on some of the--just a few of the highlights. First, the
    ``Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward,
    Engaged, Ready,'' explains how we will build and employ the
    naval forces in support of national security interests. It
    describes a force built and ready for any challenge, from high-
    end warfight to humanitarian operations.
        Now, the strategy was revised mainly due to changes in the
    geopolitical landscape since 2007, including threats from
    violent extremist organizations, like the Islamic State of Iraq
    and the Levant, evolving threats from North Korea and Iran,
    potential opportunities and challenges with a rising China, and
    recent Russian aggression in the Ukraine.
        Additionally, we face new and evolving challenges that
    threaten our access in cyberspace and the global commons. We
    have also sought to align our maritime strategy to new national
    strategic guidance and are very aware of the impact of changes
    in the current fiscal environment.
        Most importantly, this strategy describes a seapower that
    is critical for our Nation and our global economy. The strategy
    is underpinned by naval services with combat-credible forward
    presence that will be where it matters, when it matters, and
    our continued commitment to our allies and partners.
        We will also continue to meet the historic naval functions
    of deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime
    security. But our strategy has adapted, starting with an
    emphasis on warfighting first. In addition, we describe a new
    function, all-domain access, that focuses on maintaining the
    access we need to be where it matters, when it matters.
        The strategy balances the disposition of our forces and
    capabilities against regional threats. It also embraces
    innovation and efficiency in building a modern and capable
    force of more than 300 ships that will overcome any challenge
    to our ability to fight and win.
        Several key takeaways from the strategy include warfighting
    first. Defending our Nation and winning its wars is a core task
    of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. Due to varied threats
    we face as a nation, the sea services--U.S. Navy, Marine Corps,
    and Coast Guard--together with other services, must have the
    capabilities and capacity to defeat any adversary and defend
    the homeland while honoring our alliances worldwide.
        ``Where it matters when it matters'' means that, operating
    forward, we will provide the President options to defend our
    interests, deter and deescalate hostilities, respond to crises,
    and keep conflict far from our shores. The naval services also
    protect the strength of our U.S. economy by globally deploying
    that combat-credible power to ensure the unimpeded flow of
    commerce.
        We recognize one of our advantages as a nation and a Navy
    has been our extensive network of alliances, partnerships, and
    coalitions. By leveraging the robust capabilities of naval
    forces worldwide, we are better postured to collectively face
    new and emerging challenges in the 21st century.
        Accordingly, we are going to look for new ways to enhance
    relationships and form partnerships with traditional and
    nontraditional maritime partners who share a stake in
    international commerce, safety, security, and freedom of the
    seas.
        Our new essential function, all-domain access, will ensure
    that we organize, train, and equip to overcome threats and
    assure access and freedom of action in any domain to enable us
    to fight and win, should a war be inescapable.
        Our strategy also continues the efforts to rebalance forces
    to the Asia-Pacific. Evolving challenges in the region,
    including the recent activities of China's navy and the
    proliferation of anti-access/area-denial technologies, require
    that we maintain a leading role in that region.
        Our force design construct ensures our capability and
    capacity to support global presence requirements. In building
    the future force, we are going to balance investments in a
    flexible, agile force while appropriately developing our people
    as well as the operational concepts and capabilities to remain
    capable and combat-ready.
        Finally, I will note that the new strategy is not the end
    of our work. It is part of a larger effort throughout the Navy
    to energize our existing culture of strategic thinking that has
    led to innovation and an increase in operational excellence.
    This has already been instrumental in aligning our budget
    requirements and operational concepts. The strategic continuum
    will also align our strategic documents. It will oversee
    iterative wargaming, new concept development, and further
    increase those strategic linkages to the budget.
        In closing, our foremost priority remains the security and
    prosperity of our Nation, the American people, and our way of
    life. The strategy ensures that the Navy, Marine Corps, and
    Coast Guard remain forward, engaged, and ready to continue
    protecting American citizens and advancing U.S. interests as we
    have done for more than two centuries.
        Thank you.
        [The joint prepared statement of Admiral Donegan and
    General O'Donnell can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]
        Mr. Forbes. Admiral, thank you.
        And since we have a joint hearing today and a lot of
    members who want to ask questions, I am going to defer my
    questions to the vice chairman of the Seapower and Projection
    Forces Subcommittee and the chairman of the T&I [Transportation
    and Infrastructure Committee] Coast Guard Maritime
    Transportation Subcommittee, Mr. Hunter from California.
        Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I guess my first question--or first comment is I am on the
    Armed Services Committee, too. We don't see the Coast Guard in
    here very often. I mean, it is kind of a strange thing that you
    are not in here more often. But it is good that you are at the
    same time.
        I guess the first question I have is about the Arctic.
    Let's talk about the Arctic. There is no plans to get an
    icebreaker. Unless the Navy buys in and unless there is a
    whole-of-government approach, we are probably not going to have
    an icebreaker. We are not going to buy one. We are going to
    have to lease one.
        But, at the very least, I would like to know what the Navy
    buy-in is and if the Navy really--do we care about the Arctic?
    And, if we don't, that is fine. If we do, what are we doing
    about it?
        Admiral Donegan. Sir, clearly you directed that at the
    Navy.
        This strategy clearly talks about the Arctic. It talks
    about it in a couple ways. We address it in relation to climate
    change and----
        Mr. Hunter. Admiral, let me be more specific.
        You need an icebreaker to get up there and break ice to be
    able to operate there. So I don't care about the climate change
    stuff at all, frankly. I am curious about the actual icebreaker
    and acquiring a ship that can break ice to get the Navy and the
    Marine Corps and whoever else up there or having to save
    somebody if you had to.
        Admiral Donegan. Yes, sir. As you know, the different
    missions and focuses are given to different services and
    different organizations.
        The U.S. Coast Guard was given the responsibility for the
    national icebreaking mission. So we are working closely with
    the Coast Guard as we identify the operating requirements and
    capabilities needed for future icebreakers.
        We absolutely agree in the future that we are going to need
    to be up there more than we are today. From the Navy side, we
    are increasing the exercises we do up there and our research so
    we understand that domain. But we do agree that in the future
    we are going to need to be up there more often.
        Mr. Hunter. Okay. The Coast Guard's budget is minuscule
    compared to yours. The Coast Guard's budget also got cut by the
    President by 26 percent, just their acquisition budget.
        So they are not going to be able to make the ships that
    they need going back about 10 years, let alone a $400 million
    icebreaker--$400 million to a billion-dollar icebreaker. It is
    going to take Navy money. It is going to take something like
    that.
        Admiral Donegan. Sir, as you know, the Navy has its own
    challenges in the shipbuilding account. And adding an
    icebreaker, not being something that was tasked to the Navy to
    do, would only pressurize our accounts further. But I fully
    understand your point of view, sir.
        Mr. Hunter. So you all recognize the mission. You write
    about the Arctic, but really don't have any way to get up there
    and do anything there. We just say it is important.
        Admiral Donegan. Sir, for us, as we talk about it in the
    strategy, we talk about when we need to be up there and for
    what missions that we have.
        And for the portion that I will mention--was going to
    mention a little bit earlier was our Arctic road map lays out
    for us how we are going to do that and when in the future we
    believe we have to be there more than we do today.
        And you are right, sir. As a country, we have to figure out
    and make sure that we have that access as those areas open up
    for us to move about and commerce starts to travel the routes
    that we know are opening now--beginning to open now.
        Mr. Hunter. That is all I have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Forbes. Mr. Courtney is recognized.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And like Chairman Hunter, it is a pleasure to see the Coast
    Guard here in the room today.
        Last time Mr. Wittman and I were over in Brunei, we were
    touring the 5th Fleet, ships that were tied up there, and all
    of a sudden we saw two white hulls there and actually had a
    great visit onboard the ship. The captain, of course, was
    trained at the Coast Guard Academy in New London.
        But, frankly, it was nothing but high praise from the Navy
    partners in terms of the work that the Coast Guard was doing in
    that mission. And, obviously, this report really is just a
    confirmation of what is really happening. This isn't just sort
    of talk that we are hearing about today.
        I just really have one question, which is about the sealift
    and logistics force piece of the puzzle that you guys are
    working on here. I think you will agree that this is a vital
    piece of our ability to execute the national military strategy
    regardless of area of responsibility.
        Given the age of the Ready Reserve Fleet and its need for
    recapitalization, coupled with the fragility of the Maritime
    Security Program, what measures are being taken to ensure that
    we will have a viable and stable sealift and logistics fleet in
    order to execute this new maritime strategy?
        And anyone who wants to take that question, the floor is
    yours.
        Admiral Donegan. Well, sir, I think I will take it first
    and then see if there's others.
        I think you will see in the strategy that strategic sealift
    is a key element of the sea services' ability to sustain
    forward operations. In particular, in the strategy, what we
    talk about is it is expected that the naval services can
    establish a sea base.
        And from that sea base, we need to be able to do what it is
    that we need to do, whether that be project power, whether it
    be to launch the marines ashore on an amphibious operation or
    to just have the presence that we need to have in the area.
        Critical to that is being able to sustain that sea base.
    And that comes through a combination, as you know, of the
    combat logistics force and, also, a Maritime Security Program
    [MSP] and the other methods we use to support that force.
    Aerial refueling, for example, is another method. So we
    absolutely agree that it is a requirement.
        What we are working on now is defining--we understand the
    MSP program, for instance, is under pressure, especially as we
    move forward to the future. We understand that combat logistics
    forces that we have right now, we have to look at them closely.
    We have just completed a study on the combat logistics force
    piece of the question that told us that we have enough of the
    combat logistics force to sustain our operations in peacetime.
        And what we are going to do in the coming months is
    continue that work through our iterative wargaming process
    where we look at the sealift--military sealift security program
    and the combat logistics forces and ensure that, for each of
    the war plans that we have and the other future operations,
    that we have a method to be able to continue to sustain that
    sea base.
        It is absolutely essential that we do that, and we need to
    continue to make sure we have that in the future as some of
    these programs come under pressure.
        Mr. Forbes. Mr. Garamendi, I know you were detained and got
    here just a few minutes after we started. But we also have
    recognized--we put all of our opening remarks in the record.
    And yours will be placed in the record.
        And Mr. Garamendi is the ranking member of the
    subcommittee. So we now recognize you for any questions that
    you may have.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Chairman Forbes.
        My colleague, the chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Hunter,
    raised the question of the Arctic and the lack of an
    icebreaker. This is really a question that goes to Admiral
    Michel, but, really, to inform my colleagues on the naval side
    of this committee that we are not going to be able to put
    together a new icebreaker without, as Mr. Hunter said, an all-
    of-government strategy, one that we are going to have to take
    money from several different places in order to make this
    happen.
        The National Science Foundation is interested. The Navy is,
    as Mr. Hunter pointed out very carefully, and certainly the
    Coast Guard. So we are going to have to figure out some way to
    do that.
        My question really goes a little beyond the very important
    point that Mr. Hunter raised, and it goes to the existing Polar
    Star. You have authority, Admiral Michel, to take the ship out
    of the water, check it out.
        What is the status of that process?
        Admiral Michel. Well, there is a couple different Polar-
    class icebreakers. The Polar Star is actually operational right
    now.
        Mr. Garamendi. The other one.
        Admiral Michel. Yeah. I know they get confusing.
        I just had the pleasure of presenting a master cutterman
    certificate to the captain of the Polar Star at McMurdo Station
    down in Antarctica here just about 6 weeks ago.
        So the Polar Star is active. It is actually on its way to
    regular maintenance, dry dock. The Polar Sea, on the other
    hand, has been inactive for a number of years. It had a major
    machinery casualty.
        There is money in the President's budget that continues the
    preservation work on there and begins the survey process of
    determining how much it would take in order to reactivate that
    ship.
        Understand both these ships, the Polar-class, were built in
    the mid-1970s. Some of the technology--actually, most of the
    technology on there has been--only exists in museums anymore.
    So this is kind of a challenge. Plus, Polar Sea, in part, was
    cannibalized so that we could get Polar Star underway. So it is
    in a different condition than Polar Star is.
        So we are getting--we have got a process here to try to get
    our arms around that and start looking at what resources it
    would take in order to activate a ship like that. And that is
    where we stand with the Polar-class reactivation.
        Mr. Garamendi. My question had a--four letters--``when''
    question.
        Admiral Michel. Well, the preservation work is going on
    right now. We anticipate it is 15 to 18 months for us to get a
    good survey of the ship. It is going to have to be pulled out
    of the water. Again, we are going to have to do a serious
    survey on some very old machinery that you can't even really
    purchase anymore.
        So 15 to 18 months is our estimate so that we can get sort
    of a good cost on what that would take and a good timeline for
    how long it would take to get that reactivated. And, again, we
    would be looking for about--a 7- to 10-year reactivation
    timespan is what we would be shooting for.
        Mr. Garamendi. How about a new icebreaker? When will you
    finalize the requirements for that?
        Admiral Michel. So a new icebreaker we hit--we are in the
    early stages of an acquisition of that icebreaker. And we have
    been doing some of the work on that. The problem, sir, is that
    we have not built a heavy Polar-class icebreaker in this
    country for over 40 years.
        The Polar-class was the last that were done. These are
    exceedingly complicated ships just because they exist in one of
    the most challenging environments on the Earth. And they are
    basically designed to collide with blocks of solid ice. So this
    requires special steels, construction techniques, and things
    like that.
        You are looking at many years in order to be able to scope
    out a project like this, determine who could actually in this
    country build a vessel of this class. The only operators of
    heavy Polar-class icebreakers are us and the Russians. That is
    it. So there is very limited expertise in this area. It is
    going to be expensive, particularly if we have to build one.
        Mr. Garamendi. We know that we buy our rocket engines from
    Russia. Maybe we can buy a ship from Russia, since you seem not
    to be too anxious to get about the task.
        Admiral Michel. Well, it would obviously require
    legislative action in order to purchase a ship from Russia.
        Mr. Garamendi. We understand that.
        But what my question really goes to is that you seem to be
    hemming and hawing and putting off some day into the future
    what our subcommittee thinks to be a very, very important
    activity.
        Mainly, we need an icebreaker. The Navy needs an
    icebreaker. This country needs an icebreaker. And the United
    States is now the chair of the Polar Committee. And all I am
    hearing from you is, ``We are going to get about it someday.''
        Fifteen to eighteen months to figure out whether the
    present ship can even float and then who knows how long before
    the requirements are in place is not satisfactory.
        Admiral Michel. I understand the dire situation, sir. I was
    there looking at that only pathway in and out of Antarctica
    that our ship is the only one that can break.
        But here is where we are with acquisitions. As dire as we
    are on the Polar icebreaker--and I, as a sailor, understand
    that. It keeps me up at night--the OPC is even more dire. And
    that is a much larger class of ships that--even on the
    trajectory that we are talking about, 55 years old is the
    average age of those ships that will be coming offline.
        Mr. Garamendi. We understand that. Admiral, you seem not to
    understand where I am driving you.
        Your committee knows that it needs--that this country needs
    one more heavy icebreaker. We can't get by with just one. We
    need another one. The Navy and the Polar--all of those issues
    are before us.
        And what I am hearing from you is the inability for the
    Coast Guard to get us the specific information that we need to
    be able to make a decision about where to go with this issue.
        You are saying 18 months before we know whether we can
    rebuild the existing, and you seem not to--I don't know--5 to 7
    years or maybe longer before you are willing to give us the
    requirements for a new one.
        We want to make a decision. We cannot make that decision
    without the information that you need to develop for us sooner
    than later. I hope I am clear here.
        Admiral Michel. Yes, sir. And I will provide you with the
    information as soon as I can get it. This is a complex effort.
        Mr. Garamendi. I think I had best stop because I am about
    to climb up and down your back. That answer is not a
    satisfactory answer, as soon as you can get it. I am looking at
    a timeframe here where we have been prepared for more than a
    year and a half now to make a decision. We need your
    information in this timeframe.
        I understand we are not going to get it this year. But if
    you come to us next year with the same attitude and the same
    delay and obfuscation, I guarantee you that at least the
    ranking member of this committee is not going to be happy.
        I yield back my time.
        Mr. Forbes. We thank the gentleman.
        And we will go to Chairman Wittman.
        We do point out--I think our witnesses would love to build
    some more ships if we can give them some money to do it with. I
    know Admiral Donegan from his Navy account is looking at the
    Ohio-class replacement that is going to be $60 billion and
    scratching his head as to where we are going to get that.
        I know I was just looking at our combatant commander
    requirements for BMD [ballistic missile defense] capability.
    They go up from this year at 44 ships to needing 77 in fiscal
    year 2016. And, yet, we were getting ready to put aside 11
    carriers which had 5 of those BMD.
        And last year the Marine Corps had to fight to get its
    amphibious ship, which we wouldn't have got if it hadn't have
    been for Mr. Wittman's hard work on his subcommittee.
        So we want to continue to work with you guys. And I think
    Mr. Garamendi and Mr. Hunter are saying, if you can help get
    the information--we realize you can't build it without dollars.
    So we do thank you for your help in that.
        Chairman Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you so much for your service to our
    Nation.
        I do want to drill down a little bit into the ``Cooperative
    21st Seapower Strategy.'' Some questions come up with that.
        Admiral Michel, you talked about flexibility and agility. I
    think that is critical. The question then becomes, though is:
    How do you operationalize it--and I want to get everybody's
    perspective--how do you operationalize it between the Joint
    Chiefs and the COCOMs [combatant commands], especially with all
    the challenges they have?
        And, as you know, the strategy now says we are going to
    have all-domain access in addition to the other four tenets of
    seapower.
        The question is: How do you achieve that? How do you make
    sure, too, that within your C2, your command and control--how
    do you make sure that you integrate Coast Guard into that?
        We see integration of Coast Guard in certain mission sets,
    but not in every mission set. And with there being
    organizational differences or separation between the Coast
    Guard and the Navy and Marine Corps, much of this sounds great.
    But the question is: How do you operationalize that?
        And then adding to the complexity of saying, ``Now we are
    going to have all-domain access,'' which means in the
    electromagnetic spectrum, in cyberspace, air, sea, land--I
    mean, that is a pretty complex environment. How are we going to
    achieve that? They are great assertions in the strategy. Give
    us your thoughts about operationalization.
        Admiral Michel. I will take it here from the Coast Guard
    perspective. First of all, any equipment we buy, we try to make
    sure it is interoperable with the other sea services.
        So we carry Navy-type, Navy-owned equipment on the majority
    of the vessels that we operate because we are required to
    operate as a specialized service of the Navy during time of war
    when the President directs. So we ensure interoperability
    through our equipment purchases.
        Mr. Wittman. Let me stop you right there because I think
    that is an interesting question I want to build on.
        As we are talking about shipbuilding and building lots of
    ships, we talk about building Navy ships, DDGs [destroyers],
    CGs [cruisers]. We talk about building medium-endurance
    cutters--the new class of medium-endurance cutters, the long-
    range cutters.
        It seems like, to me, there is a great opportunity there to
    say, ``Listen, why don't we look at some common hull forms so,
    when we do acquisition, we are not acquiring Coast Guard ships
    here and Navy ships there.'' We can say, ``Listen, the national
    security cutter is real similar to the DDG''?
        Give me your perspective on how we can gain economies there
    to where--if we are going to have this cooperative strategy,
    does cooperation get down to the operational perspective of
    getting ships on the water?
        Admiral Michel. Well, it absolutely does. And we had a very
    robust discussion with the Navy as we were determining the
    requirements for the national security cutter, including
    looking at the LCS [littoral combat ship] and some of the other
    things that the Navy was doing.
        Now, the LCS didn't end up being exactly what we needed for
    the Coast Guard. It is a little bit more ship than I think the
    Coast Guard needed for its mission set. But a very robust
    dialogue went on in there.
        On the other vessels, the FRCs [fast-response cutters] are
    probably a little bit small for most of what the Navy is doing,
    and the OPC is going to have its own requirements.
        But, again, we try to--Coast Guard tries to borrow and
    leverage from the Navy as much as we possibly can. So when they
    get a weapon system or communication system or any type of
    intelligence capability, we are all over it with the Navy. And
    they are completely open with us because it is to our mutual
    benefit to actually share those systems. So we have got a very
    robust dialogue, sir.
        General O'Donnell. Sir, just a couple comments. Exactly
    what you are talking about. And you are well aware because you
    were the leader of all that when we got the LPD-17 hull form
    for what we are working on next.
        Probably the same thing that the admiral mentioned, too,
    with the Marine Corps. Our Naval Board [Navy and Marine Corps
    Naval Board] works very, very hard to make sure that we are
    aligned with other services and, as you know, with the
    Commandant's Planning Guidance not only with the Coast Guard,
    but with SOF [Special Operations Forces], and making sure that
    we are integrating with everybody.
        So that is the big thing about the C2 and then making sure
    that we all are using the same type of equipment and we are all
    on the same frequencies.
        The other comment that I would just make very quickly is
    that the things that the Marine Corps is doing, we had kind of
    a little bit of a heads-up. As you know, we rolled out EF-21
    [Expeditionary Force 21] last year, about a year ago this time.
    Of course, the Commandant came out with his Planning Guidance
    about 2 months ago. So we have already kind of hit the ground
    running. And we are pretty well aligned already with the tenets
    that are in this strategy.
        So we feel pretty good. We have already had a couple
    exercises. The EW-15 [Expeditionary Warfare 2015] just went up
    and we came up with 232 gaps that we have to work on. But most
    of them are not--luckily, are not going to be equipment pieces,
    just a little bit how we are doing business.
        Admiral Donegan. Sir, just the fact that we are here
    together gives you the indication--and this is the second time
    the three services have come together to build this strategy--
    should give you an indication that we get it in terms of what
    you said, that our objective is to make sure that the
    individual pieces add up to more when we put them together. I
    think that is really what you are trying to say.
        There's a bunch of examples. The Naval Board was one. The
    Air-Sea Battle Office is another. It is now, as you know,
    chaired--we changed the name, Joint Access and Maneuver in the
    Global Commons. But it is now chaired by a marine. Marine
    three-star General Glueck is chairing that right now to drive
    us to that interoperability that you are talking about and take
    it beyond the strategy and put the strategy into action.
        Mr. Wittman. Sure. Very good.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Forbes. Ms. Gabbard from Hawaii is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        My question was with regards to the portion of your
    strategy where you talk about the sea services deploying
    tactics, techniques, and procedures that target adversary
    vulnerabilities and you talk about striking the right balance
    between kinetic and non-kinetic actions.
        I would like to see if you can detail more what those non-
    kinetic actions would look like.
        Admiral Michel. I will take it from the Coast Guard
    perspective. Just here in the Western Hemisphere, the Coast
    Guard and the Navy have worked together actually for decades
    against transnational organized crime, most of which isn't
    taken care of as a kinetic matter. It is actually taken care of
    as a law enforcement function.
        So Navy ships carry around Coast Guard law enforcement
    detachments so that we can use the sensor packages and the
    floating hull of the Navy to transport our law enforcement
    folks out there who have actually got the authority to take
    down the narcotraffickers [narcotic traffickers].
        And there is a whole range of other different activities
    that we work with them in sort of non-kinetic or asymmetric
    arenas. Piracy is another example of that type of work. And
    some of the other things I listed under maritime security
    operations, which have as their endgame, not a kinetic endgame,
    a smoking hull in the water, but a law enforcement action or a
    sanctions enforcement or other types of things. And that
    ability to cooperate between Navy equipment and Coast Guard
    authority has been gold here in a lot of missions.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
        Admiral Donegan. I think that a good way for us to explain
    the non-kinetic and kinetic--if we just talk about this new
    function that we talked about, which is all-domain access, it
    is a perfect example that we can describe the difference
    between kinetic and non-kinetic.
        If striking the balance means we can't have systems--things
    that just shoot down other things, for example, that is cost-
    prohibitive. We will run out of money long before we run out of
    the enemy having an ability to get at us.
        So in our work in achieving all-domain access, it means
    working across the full spectrum, using all domains, to
    degrade, disrupt, deny, use the cyber and electromagnetic
    domain to make it harder for them to see us--the enemy to see
    us, for example and, therefore, they can't employ their weapons
    or, if they did, they wouldn't go to the right place so that we
    then can focus our kinetic resources on what got through after
    we did all that other work to make it much harder for them to
    be able to find us, see us, target us.
        Ms. Gabbard. You mentioned in your focus on the Indo- and
    Asia-Pacific region how, by 2020, approximately 60 percent of
    Navy ships and aircraft will be based in the region.
        What do you foresee could arise that would cause you to
    deter away from that plan between now and then?
        Admiral Donegan. Well, in other words, to not focus on
    the--or continue the rebalance----
        Ms. Gabbard. For you to not reach that size of presence in
    the Asia-Pacific region.
        Admiral Donegan. Since that is our focus area and most of
    the forces that we have there are already targeted to go
    there--in other words, we have the forces there. Our FDNF
    [Forward Deployed Naval Forces] forces are there. We have
    already begun establishing our LCSs in Singapore. We have
    already--the Marines have already moved some forces, as you
    know, into Australia. We have plans to move a sub--an
    additional submarine into Guam and additional ships into Japan,
    and they are on track and going to happen in the near term--it
    is going to be hard for us to come off of that because of the
    forces that are already there and, in the short term, what we
    expect to be there just in the next year or so, ma'am.
        Ms. Gabbard. Great. Thank you.
        I ask the question because I obviously believe it is
    important that we recognize and continue to uphold kind of the
    commitment--the strategic commitment that we have made to the
    region, recognizing the opportunity and the strategic necessity
    to do that.
        Given the environment that we sit in both fiscally and
    politically and otherwise, it is good to hear the affirmation
    that this is something that is well on its way.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Forbes. Now recognize the gentleman from California,
    Mr. Cook, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        I want to talk a little bit about maritime prepositioning
    and where we stand on that. I was led to believe we still
    haven't replenished the supplies that were in there from our
    previous engagements in the Middle East.
        Can you give me an update on where we stand on that and
    Diego Garcia, if you could?
        General O'Donnell. Yes, sir. I will get you all the
    information here. But let me just very quickly go over it.
        We still only have two squadrons. We shut down the other
    squadron. So we still have two squadrons with 12 ships.
        Each of those would have the mobile landing platform, which
    you are familiar with, the one--the exercises we have been
    doing off of Camp Pendleton, to be able to selectively offload
    equipment, load it onto transports, most likely, LCACs [Landing
    Craft Air Cushion], and put it towards the beach.
        So we still have the 12, with the mixture of the old and
    new, the T-AKEs being the new ones, that are built in San
    Diego. But most of the other ships that we are building right
    now that will be on that thing will be that 12, along with that
    mobile landing platforms that will help us move those things
    around.
        And the ships--it is my understanding--I will confirm
    this--all the ships have been replenished and all the gear is
    on the normal cycle to be turned into Blount Island and turned
    around on time.
        Mr. Cook. Do we have anything at Diego Garcia right now?
        General O'Donnell. I will have to get back to you on that.
    That is where the ships are. But I don't know if we have
    anything ashore.
        Mr. Cook. Yeah. And I am just a little nervous about--you
    know, the Pacific is--the world is very big, and it is a long
    ways from North Korea to Australia and to Guam. And, you know,
    I understand the concentration. And we were in Japan together,
    of course.
        The other thing maybe I wanted to follow up on is: What is
    the situation with Okinawa right now in terms of relocation? I
    know we had that issue in the past. And there has been a change
    in policy with the Japanese in terms of they certainly, I
    think, welcome military forces there. If you could just----
        General O'Donnell. Yes, sir. As I mentioned when I saw you
    in Yokota, I was 2 years at U.S. Forces Japan. And I saw the
    Congresswoman there, too.
        I don't think there is a change in policy. And this is not
    my lane. We can get you the information. I don't think there is
    a change in policy by the Abe government. They are going
    forward.
        There is that same issues down in Okinawa. But it is my
    understanding that the work is still going forward. And that is
    the agreement that we have between our two governments, that
    they will build the FRF [Futenma Replacement Facility] and we
    will move there.
        Mr. Cook. When is that supposed to be finished? Do you know
    offhand?
        General O'Donnell. I will have to get you that number. It
    is way down the road. As we said in Japan, we would tell them,
    ``When you build it, we will move.'' So it is really kind of in
    their court right now. So we are working towards that.
        Mr. Cook. Okay. Okay.
        General O'Donnell. I will get you the exact date though,
    sir.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 103.]
        Mr. Cook. Okay. Thank you very much.
        And, by the way, I did want to throw in a plug for the
    Coast Guard. I had the pleasure of visiting the Coast Guard
    Academy, a great, great institution. I encourage all my
    colleagues to go there. I wouldn't recommend going there in the
    winter. Go to Hawaii. Visit the Congresswoman.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Forbes. Ms. Graham from Florida is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Ms. Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You can go to Hawaii or you can come to Florida.
        I recently had a chance to tour the Coast Guard facility in
    my district. And thank you for all you do. And I specifically
    want to thank the Coast Guard for all that you did during the
    tragedy that occurred last week where we lost a helicopter
    training group of marines and soldiers. Thank you very much for
    all that you are doing.
        And thank you, gentlemen, as well, the other two
    representatives here.
        My question is for Admiral Michel.
        I understand the Coast Guard has been undergoing an
    acquisition program for a total of 8 national security cutters,
    25 offshore patrol cutters, and 58 fast-response cutters.
        In February of last year, the Coast Guard awarded three
    firm-fixed-price contracts for preliminary and contract design
    of the OPC. One of those contracts is in my district, Eastern
    Shipbuilding Group, which is located in Panama City, Florida.
        Now, I know that you can't comment further on any of these
    finalists, but I just want to be on the record of supporting
    Eastern Shipbuilding. It is a phenomenal small shipbuilding
    operation. I have toured it. And it is a great shipbuilding
    yard.
        With that said, Admiral Michel, can you comment on the role
    of the OPC in the naval cooperative strategy and, also, on the
    carefully crafted ratio of 8 national security cutters, 25
    offshore patrol cutters, and 58 fast-response cutters. I would
    much appreciate your response.
        Admiral Michel. Yes, ma'am. Well, the OPC is really going
    to be the workhorse of the Coast Guard fleet, and it replaces
    our medium-endurance cutters, two classes of those, our 210-
    foot cutters, which will be 55 years old, if everything stays
    on track, and then our 270-foot cutters, which will be about 35
    years old when they come off the line with the OPC.
        We are very much looking forward to the design work that
    comes through, and we are very encouraged that we are going to
    be able to get an affordable and capable platform for the OPC
    as we move forward.
        But this really does go to the cooperative strategy because
    the OPC is going to be the bulk of the work that is going to be
    done here in the Western Hemisphere, which is Coast Guard work,
    by and large, that we have got to do, maritime security work,
    work against transnational criminal organizations, fisheries
    enforcement, search and rescue, marine environmental
    protection, responding to natural disaster, this whole basket
    of things.
        This is going to be the workhorse for the Nation. And it
    will allow the Navy and our other forces who are pivoting to
    other areas where we have national security concerns--they can
    rest assured that the Coast Guard is there because we are
    forward, engaged with our offshore fleet, of which the OPC is
    going to be the centerpiece of that fleet.
        It is going to be complemented by the higher-end NSC
    [national security cutter], but the OPC is going to be the
    workhorse for the Nation in that maritime security role. And we
    owe it to our sailors to give them decent equipment. And 55-
    year-old ships, which can almost take Social Security--we
    shouldn't be putting our sailors out there.
        So, again, we very much appreciative of the support, very
    much look forward to the designs, and it is critical to the
    Nation.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Graham. Thank you. And I look forward to it as well.
        And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
        Mr. Forbes. I thank the gentlelady.
        Mr. Graves from Louisiana is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Graves. Thank you for being here today. I appreciate
    the opportunity to discuss with you a number of issues
    important to south Louisiana.
        Thank you for your update on the ``Cooperative Strategy for
    21st Century Seapower'' [CS-21]. It is certainly helpful to see
    the integration of forces.
        In that update, you are only as strong as your weakest
    link, right? And the Coast Guard does play an important role in
    CS-21, particularly the role of the OPC and the role of the C-
    27Js.
        When you look at the budget request, you are not seeing
    additional funds in there. So I am having trouble understanding
    how the Coast Guard is actually going to fulfill its role
    without the resources there to, I guess, actually conduct the
    mission that is laid out in CS-21. And then what type of
    repercussions does that have with your sister agencies?
        Secondly, I think this is perhaps part of a larger problem,
    when you look across--as I recall, the AC&I [Acquisition,
    Construction, and Improvements] account this year does, as
    Chairman Hunter noted, experience a significant reduction this
    year. Yet, your mission is expanding, as has been discussed
    here today.
        And so can you help me understand or kind of connect the
    dots there?
        Admiral Michel. Well, it has been pretty clear and our
    Commandant has testified that we have had acquisition
    challenges, budget-driven in large part, and it has forced us
    to continue to extend the length of our ships, whether they are
    the medium-endurance cutters or the Polar-class icebreakers,
    where we have just got kind of a patchwork of things to be able
    to do.
        We have got the budget. We are going to deal with it. It is
    going to allow us to finish out the eight NSCs, which we need.
    It is going to allow us to move forward with the FRCs. But we
    have got some serious challenges, and I don't mean to downplay
    those.
        Mr. Graves. Thank you, Admiral.
        General and Admiral, could you just quickly comment. You
    know, again, focusing on the weakest link comment that I made
    earlier, do you see the Coast Guard with its aging fleet being
    able to fulfill the mission? Are they dragging you down--and I
    certainly understand acquisition challenges in other agencies
    as well. But are they dragging you down and challenging your
    ability to complete your mission?
        Admiral Donegan. I will start first. Well, the Coast Guard
    is not dragging us down by any means. They are all in in not
    only the strategy, but in working with us.
        Where they are challenged resource-wise, for instance, if
    we talk about the Pacific and the Asia-Pacific region, for
    example, if they can't get out there and participate in a
    particular exercise that we need to with a ship, they are there
    with the rest of their forces, whether they send a LEDET [law
    enforcement detachment] there or they have already built
    relationships with the countries we are going to work on.
        We are leveraging the relationships that they have already.
    Of course, we would like them to have more resources and ships
    to be with us in those regards. But given the challenges that
    they have, we are working as closely as we can to get the most
    out of it.
        So I look at it more as not particularly that you are as
    strong as your weakest link, but we are stronger because we are
    doing this together.
        General O'Donnell. Yes, sir. And I would just echo what Kid
    just said. I mean, by no stretch of the imagination are they
    dragging us down.
        But I think us working together and being here together
    kind of shows you that we are all in on this strategy and that
    we--where some of the things that perhaps we can do, the Marine
    Corps can do that the other two gentlemen either side of me
    can't do, we are going to fill those lanes.
        And, of course, there are plenty of gaps in the Marine
    Corps that both these services can help us with, too. So, no,
    by their being all in, I think we all are.
        Mr. Graves. Thank you.
        And I want to echo the comments of some of the more senior
    members in regard to the icebreakers. It seems like that is,
    once again, a capability that is potentially going to challenge
    all the services if it is not aggressively addressed.
        One other comment, Admiral Michel. I keep looking at your
    name. In south Louisiana, that would be ``Michel.''
        Admiral Michel. It actually is.
        Mr. Graves. Oh, is it? There we go. I was listening to
    other folks. I will stop following the elders here.
        Very quickly, in the Coast Guard's Western Hemisphere
    strategy, you list transnational criminal organizations as a
    mission of the Coast Guard and something you plan to address.
        Could you talk about, just briefly, how that dovetails or
    intersects with CS-21 and how CS-21 perhaps addresses that
    challenge.
        Admiral Michel. Sure. The Western Hemisphere strategy was
    designed by the Commandant specifically to work with CS-21 so
    that we could focus our core competencies here in the Western
    Hemisphere and allow our Navy/Marine Corps folks to focus in
    other areas.
        So the strategy itself, which talks about combating
    networks, primarily transnational criminal organization
    networks, which for a lot of these countries are national
    security threats--I mean, ask a country like Honduras, you
    know, the extreme murder rates and homicide rates and things
    that they have in there.
        And the Coast Guard's presence there really is critical to
    these nations because it polices off cocaine before it actually
    gets into Central America and creates death and devastation.
    Just the effectiveness of the Coast Guard last year seized 91
    metric tons of cocaine.
        That is about one and a half times all the cocaine seized
    within the United States last year by every law enforcement
    agency and all that seized at every air, land, and sea border
    of the United States combined. So that is how effective that
    is.
        And Coast Guard interdiction efforts are much closer to the
    head of the snake that starts this than a buy-bust on the
    streets of one of our hometowns. So it is a critical national
    security function. It is complementary to the Navy and the rest
    of our sea services and was designed exactly to work like that,
    sir.
        Mr. Graves. Thank you, Admiral.
        General, Admiral, thank you very much.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Forbes. Mr. Cummings is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Michel, let me ask you just picking up on what you
    were just talking about. Before he retired, Admiral Papp
    indicated that there had been an approximately 30-percent drop
    in drug interdictions as a result of the cuts required by
    sequestration several years ago.
        What trends have there been in drug interdictions over the
    past year? And if we return to sequestration, what impact would
    that have on drug interdictions? I mean, you gave some very
    high numbers you just mentioned. And I am just wondering.
        Admiral Michel. Yes, sir. Well, I can tell you, based on
    long years of experience--I used to be the Director of Joint
    Interagency Task Force South [JIATF-South], which was right in
    the middle of this fight, sir.
        And here's the bottom line for major cutters of the Coast
    Guard. And this has been over many years. One cutter year's
    worth of effort seized about 20 metric tons of cocaine. That is
    about a billion dollars in traffickers' profits.
        Over many years, that was about the national average for
    all the cocaine seized within our borders every year by one
    ship of the Coast Guard. That is how effective maritime
    interdiction is. But you got to get the ships to do it.
        Right now the figures are here and there, but about three-
    quarters of those high-confidence intelligence cases that we
    know are moving out there on the water we can't interdict
    because there is no ships in order to be able to do it.
        Mr. Cummings. So you know they are out there?
        Admiral Michel. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Cummings. You just can't get to them?
        Admiral Michel. Yes, sir. I, as JIATF Director, used to
    watch the vessels go by, but there were not enough ships out
    there to be able to action it. And then, once it gets into
    Central America, it is broken into such small parcels it
    becomes hard to police up. Plus, it creates corruption, death,
    destruction all its way, wherever it moves on its way up to our
    citizens.
        So it is tragic when it gets past us. But, again, that is
    forward, engaged, ready, complementary, non-redundant seapower
    capability of the Nation that works directly with our partners.
    So it is tragic that we have to see that go by. But if we don't
    build ships, that is what ends up happening.
        Mr. Cummings. What impact have asset failures had on the
    Coast Guard's ability to perform its mission?
        Admiral Michel. Well, lots of different things, sir. We are
    lucky that--we had a major casualty on Polar Star. But, thank
    god, it was kind of out of the ice by the time that it actually
    happened. But that is a daily occurrence for the Coast Guard.
        And our medium-endurance cutter fleet, our 210-foot fleet,
    over 20 percent of the operational hours were consumed by
    breakdowns. The ships are just that old that--I don't say we
    are in a death spiral yet, but we spend increasing amounts of
    lost operational time and continuous investment in these old
    class of ships that could be spent on recapitalization efforts.
        Again, I wouldn't want to say we are in a death spiral, but
    we are definitely playing with fire with these old ships. As a
    sailor who has been around a long time, these ships are really
    old and they need to be replaced.
        And it has an impact on a daily basis. And that is what
    keeps me awake. And I manage all this old infrastructure with
    all these pressing missions that are on top of us. That is why
    they pay me the money. But it is a very uncomfortable position,
    sir.
        Mr. Cummings. So what do you have to give up, then? So you
    are spending this time repairing old ships. You got them
    falling apart. And what gives? I mean, do you have a priority
    of what gives or is it just sort of haphazard?
        Admiral Michel. Sir, the risks to the Nation in the key
    areas of the Coast Guard that are fulfilled by these platforms
    increases every day. Whether it is risk of access to
    Antarctica, whether it is risk of access to the Arctic, whether
    it is fisheries enforcement, whether it is maritime law
    enforcement, whether it is our ability to respond to a
    hurricane or a national disaster or an oil spill or a mass
    migration incident, the risk in that fleet goes up every single
    day.
        Now, we have brought some of it down through the national
    security cutter and the fast-response cutter, which are way
    better assets than the ones that they replaced, but they are
    fewer in number. Our major cutter fleet is going to go even
    under the current plan from 44 ships down to 33 ships. Now,
    they are a little bit more capable ships, but, still, the
    numbers don't lie.
        So this is all about risk management. And that is what I
    spend the majority of my day, sir, is managing risk, where to
    place assets, which ones to bring in the yard, how long can we
    run the ships before they break or catch on fire. That is what
    I do on a daily basis, sir. And that is what we are incurring
    as additional risk.
        Mr. Cummings. Last question.
        Can you discuss the state of the Marine Safety Program.
    That is something I have always been very interested in. What
    is happening with it?
        Admiral Michel. Well, that is a whole other side of the
    Coast Guard that is critical to the national security and the
    economy of the United States. That is all ensuring that our
    waterways operate correctly and that we have got licensed
    mariners and safety equipment and all that.
        And that is definitely one of the priorities of the
    Commandant of the Coast Guard. Under our Energy Action Plan, he
    has asked us--well, he has tasked me with putting together an
    entire plan to revitalize our Marine Safety Program, which is
    another investment we are going to have to make to ensure that
    we can respond to new developments in offshore oil
    infrastructure or Bakken crude oil moving down the Nation's
    waterways or a whole range of different activities.
        The marine industry is incredibly vibrant in this country
    and uses technology more and more as time goes on. But to keep
    up with that, instead of being a regulatory hurdle to that
    industry, really requires significant investment and increased
    expertise and capacity in our people.
        For a while there, they were building out one tank barge a
    week down on the gulf coast. And each of those requires Coast
    Guard inspection. Each one of those requires a waterway to be
    operated safely on. And that is a whole other mission set of
    the Coast Guard. And the Coast Guard is stretched pretty thin.
        But you have got my commitment to work on that area, sir.
    It is on my task list that is getting pretty long these days.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Forbes. Mr. Byrne is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here today, and I know that
    each one of you are dealing with lots of difficulties because
    of budget cutbacks, and I appreciate what you do. You are
    managing a very difficult situation with a very difficult
    budget situation. So it is our job to try to make that a little
    better for you.
        And by the way, Admiral Michel, I have got two Coast Guard
    bases in my district in Mobile, and I have been out in the air
    assets and in the marine assets, and I have seen for myself
    some of the challenges you've got in the Coast Guard, and my
    hat is off to you for what you have been able to do so far.
        Admiral Donegan, I have a question for you. The 2015
    strategy identifies the importance of U.S. naval cooperation
    with international partners, and I firmly believe the
    interoperability with our allies is critical to creating an
    agile force. Can you elaborate on the impact of having forward-
    deployed assets, like the littoral combat ship in regions like
    the South China Sea, and what the presence of ships like the
    LCS means to our partners in that region.
        Admiral Donegan. Yes, sir. I certainly can. The--as you
    rightly said, this strategy really talks as one of the
    underlying--underpinning things, along with being forward,
    being engaged, and the engaged piece is with our partners, to
    build that alliance, to build those trusts--to build that
    trust.
        To have ships like LCS, as you know, we are putting four
    into Singapore, and we are going to get some more bang for the
    buck in terms of presence by rotating crews on those ships.
    That is part of the innovation piece that we are talking about,
    but it allows us to be responsive to things that happen that
    build up our credibility in the region, that when the allies
    turn and look, they see and know and are assured that we are
    going to be there.
        The LCS, for instance, was one of the first ships to--Fort
    Worth that we had over there that responded when we had the
    recent airliner go down. That is an example. When you have
    humanitarian assistance or disaster response exactly that kind
    of ship can provide, but also when we move into the higher-end
    piece, as you know, that ship fills gaps in mine warfare,
    antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare. So it was also
    meant to contribute and will contribute in the event that we
    have to, together with our partners, get involved in any kind
    of conflict. So absolutely, that ship will bring us back a
    return on investment.
        It is also in other places, though. As you know, we are
    going to base them in San Diego and Jacksonville, Florida. So
    the one certainly based in Florida will have better access to
    support the Coast Guard and what we were just talking about in
    the SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] commander and the missions
    he has on counter-drugs.
        It is also going into--into Bahrain to replace the mine
    ships we have there, but as you know, building the partnerships
    amongst the navies in the Gulf requires that you have a ship
    that is compatible with them where they can see you operating
    side by side with their ships, and we can definitely do that.
        An example is, we just did a mine countermeasure exercise
    in the Gulf. We had on the order of 44 nations and 38 different
    ships participating in that event. Nowhere else can you bring
    together that many nations to build partnerships and build that
    trust that we are talking about.
        Mr. Byrne. Are you already working on plans for how you
    will utilize the LCS when it is redesigned to be a frigate?
        Admiral Donegan. Yes, sir. We are in the forefront of that,
    as you know, but it is going to bring additional capability,
    which means in those mission sets that I just talked about, you
    are talking about enhanced--enhanced reliability and
    survivability because of the weapons systems that we are
    putting out.
        Mr. Byrne. Well, thank you. I think the LCS has proven to
    be a very wise investment by the Navy and by the country, and I
    appreciate your plans and your usage of it, and I yield back.
        Mr. Forbes. I would like to finish up where we started by
    saying what a good job that the three of you did with all of
    the individuals working with you. We appreciate your hard work
    on this, but it is a piece of paper. So, Admiral Donegan, how
    do we go from strategic theory to operational effectiveness?
        Admiral Donegan. Sir, that is a great question, and the
    good news is while we were building the strategy, we took on
    the piece of how do we operationalize it? How do we implement
    it?
        First of all, we have to implement it together, and so
    because it is a strategy written by us together, all of the
    services are going to participate in--already participate in
    the process of implementation. Some of those processes are well
    underway with the Naval Board, with our Coast Guard and Navy
    warfighting talks, with the Navy and Marine Corps warfighting
    talks, but we also are planning on a series of--as you know, we
    have a classified annex is coming with this--after this
    strategy. That is part of the operationalizing when we bring
    together the staffs here in the Pentagon with our Naval War
    College which runs wargaming for us, with forward-deployed
    fleet commanders and combatant commanders and begin--and
    execute war games and modeling and simulation where we can
    iteratively look at the problems that we are facing in each
    region.
        Each region has a certain threat, and each region has a
    certain plan to deal with that threat, and what we are working
    forward to operationalize this strategy is, is now looking at
    the current way we would get at that threat, running it through
    a series of war games, and determining if we have any gaps we
    need to fill, and if we fill those gaps--how would we fill
    those gaps? I am sorry.
        It is not all about buying something new. It may be an
    adjustment to the concept. So we have concept development work
    going on. It may be something innovative like--like we are
    doing with high-energy lasers or railguns. Or it may be
    something in cyber. It may be another way to get at the
    problem, but it isn't just buying something, as I talked about
    before, where you get into this thing-on-thing problem. So we
    are doing that.
        As you know, the Navy has also developed a strategy
    subspecialty code. That is where we have identified the really
    smart folks, placed them in all the right places so we can link
    the strategy to what it is we go buy. Because in the end, this
    force will be what we bought and also how we employ it. So the
    first part gets at how we employ the second piece. We have to
    link this strategy to what we buy.
        So those are some of the things. There is more--more into
    the continuum that we call the strategic continuum that does
    that linkage.
        Mr. Forbes. We heard Mr. Garamendi, Mr. Hunter correctly be
    concerned about building icebreakers and more ships. If Mr.
    Wittman was here, he would be concerned about his aircraft
    carriers. Mr. Courtney would certainly be concerned about his
    Virginia-class submarine.
        As I look at the strategy, it is going to call for an
    additional 23 forward-deployed ships, and projects about a 60-
    percent increase of Navy ships and aircraft in the Indo-Pacific
    region by 2020.
        Where do they come from? Do we build them? Do we bring them
    from other parts of the globe? And if we build them, do we have
    the industrial capacity to accommodate the strategy for either?
        Admiral Donegan. Well, sir, it is a combination of a little
    bit of each of what you said. We are building more. As you
    know, the Secretary was in here and talked to you about his
    plan for building some more, but it is also about the
    innovative employment of the assets that we do have.
        An example is if the ships that we can put forward bring us
    more return on investment. So in terms of the commodity that we
    give, and that commodity is forward presence, so the ships we
    put into Rota, Spain, we are putting four ships into Rota,
    Spain. They are high-end DDGs with the ballistic missile
    defense capability. If we were to resource that same commitment
    of presence from the United States, we would need 10 of those
    ships. So part of the increase in the presence that we are
    getting is the fact that--how we are employing those ships. The
    LCSs that we are putting into Singapore, we are putting four of
    those there. They are not going to be based with their
    families, but we are going to rotate crews.
        Our modeling and simulation tells us that we will basically
    get a twofold increase in presence because of that concept. So
    we will get--two ships, it would take back here, to keep that
    one forward, if that would make sense. If we were doing
    rotational, we would need twice as many LCSs to do that same
    kind of presence.
        So it is a combination of the innovative way we are
    employing it. It is a combination of growing the force to some
    extent with those that are already in the shipbuilding plan.
        Mr. Forbes. Please, General.
        General O'Donnell. Sir, thanks.
        I would just make one comment that we are already looking--
    the Commandant has made it very clear that we are looking at
    all avenues to get marines out on ships.
        Now, most of the alternate platforms we talked about
    earlier coming from the MPS [maritime prepositioning ships],
    those are for the low end of the ROMO [range of military
    operations], but they could be out there doing theater security
    cooperation or humanitarian assistance and those types of
    things, and that helps take some of the pressure off the
    amphibs [amphibious assault ships].
        So we still have to--they are not a replacement for the
    amphibs, but they are complementary in that they could probably
    reduce some of the workload on those amphibs. And so we are
    looking very closely at that, and we are working, obviously,
    very closely with the Navy on that, and we see some--we see
    some real opportunity there to help reduce some of that thing.
        The last thing I would leave you with, and I didn't get a
    chance to mention before, but coming from 2 years in Japan and
    watching--watching--I can't speak to the South China Sea, but I
    certainly can speak to the East China Sea, and the Japanese
    Coast Guard taking the brunt of that. They have learned a lot
    watching how our United States Coast Guard and United States
    Navy work together very closely hand in glove, and the 2 years
    I was there I saw them--a lot more interoperability among their
    own ships by just watching and learning from the gentlemen on
    either side of me and their service. That is all.
        Mr. Forbes. Let's suppose my last question, and then Mr.
    Garamendi has a final question, but I know the President's--the
    Navy's President's budget request for fiscal year 2016 is 300
    ships. We are currently at 287, and let's just say we have one
    member that may slide in here, be just a little skeptical that
    we don't get there.
        If we do not get there, and we have a reduction in the
    number of ships, is this strategy still possible with your
    ships?
        Admiral Donegan. Sir, we wrote--the three services wrote
    this strategy based on what our assessment of that environment
    that I described earlier says that the Nation needs from the
    sea services.
        So the first thing that I will say is the targets that we
    want to get to and how we are going to employ the force and the
    way we are going to do it and the capabilities we need, and to
    some extent, the numbers are what we believe the Nation needs.
    Now, that said, if we get less than that, we are still going to
    move out on that trajectory with those priorities, and then we
    are going to be coming back and talking to you about the risks
    that then we are going to be taking and where that would be.
        We will still work as, you know, on innovation and
    efficiency to reduce that risk as much as we can, but we will
    be very open and transparent with where we see the risk coming
    if we are--if we are not given the resources to the level that
    we describe in some parts of this strategy.
        Mr. Forbes. Mr. Garamendi has a final question, and after
    his question, as I told each of you before, we are going to
    give you whatever time you need as a summation or if there is
    anything you need to clarify or add that we haven't put on the
    record.
        Mr. Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    putting together this hearing. And, gentlemen, thank you for
    your participation and your service.
        Admiral Donegan, the revised Cooperative Strategy for
    Seapower implies the ready deployment of sea service assets,
    and it does, in fact, mention the involvement of the Military
    Sealift Command [MSC], and that its central contribution is
    that the MSC vessels and capabilities are available. And it
    does raise the question of whether our domestic sealift
    capacity is sufficient to meet the needs of this new strategy.
        Is it sufficient?
        Admiral Donegan. We believe right now it is sufficient. The
    question, though, I think that we have to address is looking
    forward as we continue our iterative wargaming and simulations
    and modeling that we are doing. As we move to the future and
    that force is potentially less available or comes under greater
    stress, we have to define--see if the--if the combination of
    all things that give us sealift, which is the combat logistics
    force combined with Military Sealift Command and the other--and
    the other sealift that we bring to support our sea base are
    enough to do it.
        I think that it is going to be a function of the scenario
    and the location of where it occurs, and we also have, as you
    know, because each of those vessels require escorts, we have to
    work that piece, too, to make sure that we have the right size
    and shape.
        Right now, for what we have in the current force, yes, and
    I think as it comes under stress because less of those become
    available, we are going to have to reevaluate that as we go
    along.
        Mr. Garamendi. Okay. We have some significant concerns
    about the future of the Military Sealift Command, the aging of
    the ships, and the like. I would like to get into more detail
    with you on that.
        Just another set of questions quickly. The Navy is using
    UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] off its ships, and, Admiral
    Donegan, my understanding is that you are advancing this
    program very rapidly and that you are--have some satisfaction
    with the potential that it brings to expanding the ability of
    the ship to see what is going on and to do its task. Is that
    the case?
        Admiral Donegan. Sir, specifically, the strategy talks
    about continuing to develop unmanned systems that improve our
    abilities to do what we need to do, and the unmanned brings
    endurance, for sure, and it brings capabilities that man does
    not--does not bring, and I am not just talking about in
    airplanes. So this is airplanes, this is subsurface, and this
    is on the surface. So this strategy has us looking hard at
    that.
        In terms of unmanned airplanes, as you know, we have a
    validated demand for our UCLASS [Unmanned Carrier-Launched
    Airborne Surveillance and Strike] system based--which is CVN
    [aircraft carrier] ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance], but it also has with it survivable and
    possesses a strike capability. That demand has been validated,
    and we are moving forward with that.
        Mr. Garamendi. Yeah. And I noticed, Admiral Michel, that
    the U.S.--that the President's budget does not have any money
    for UAVs. Are you working with the Navy vaulting off their work
    and their systems and the application of their systems to the
    Coast Guard?
        Admiral Michel. Sir, we have been all in with the Navy on
    unmanned aerial systems for things that might be useful to the
    Coast Guard. Some of the Navy systems are a little bit too
    high-end for us, but certainly in the areas--shipborne systems
    like Fire Scout or ScanEagle or the smaller ones, and we have
    operated a number of those systems off Coast Guard cutters.
        From the Coast Guard perspective on the unmanned aerial
    system, be extremely interested for the same reasons that the
    Navy is. You know, optimal sensor capability, extending the
    range of the ship. Very attractive. You know, whether those
    would be land-based or sea-based or whether they should be
    small and cheap or higher end and more capable, really the
    Coast Guard is evaluating all that because we have got to make
    sure that whatever investment we make there is a wise one, but
    the Navy has been--and the Marine Corps, for that matter, have
    been completely open with us and let us be full participants,
    sir.
        Mr. Garamendi. And I would hope you would do this at a
    little faster strategy, a little faster than the icebreakers.
        Finally, very quickly, the Navy is deploying a Poseidon UAV
    off the coast of California, probably for training purposes out
    of San Diego. The Coast Guard might consider being in some sort
    of a coordinated arrangement with the Navy since they will be
    looking at the same water you are presently unable to see. So I
    just--if you look into that and come back to me with the
    potential that it might have between the two forces?
        Admiral Michel. Yes, sir. We will do that.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 103.]
        Mr. Forbes. Mr. Hunter is recognized for any final
    questions he may have.
        Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just one quick question. General, what do you do when it
    comes to logistics right now? Do they change at all with this
    new plan? Meaning the amphibious logistics having stuff
    everywhere for when we are everywhere?
        General O'Donnell. No, sir, no. It is the same strategy.
    You were out, but we talked a little bit about that, and
    certainly with both the two squadrons that we have that are out
    there with the MPS, and then, as you know, the MLP [mobile
    landing platform] will bring that new capability of the
    selective offload and be able to bring those things ashore.
        But I think it kind of gets back to the--as you well know,
    it is--everything gets a vote. So it depends on really kind of
    what the situation is going to be. If it is on the low end of
    the ROMO or whether it is going in the high end, but we are
    definitely going to have to have the--and the Commandant has
    been working very hard for the last couple of months on
    wargaming some of the high-end stuff, the A2/AD [anti-access/
    area denial], and I am sure you were briefed on it, but as we
    work through that, it will not change the fundamentals of the--
    of the organization on how we do the logistics, but just a
    little bit on the distances and how we would protect it and how
    the sea base--and, of course, we are dependent on the other
    services to help us with that.
        Mr. Forbes. Mr. Courtney.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Langevin
    was here a short time ago, had to leave, but he asked me if I
    could just to forward one concern he had and--or question he
    had. Again, I think as we all know, Jim does a lot of work in
    terms of cyber security with his subcommittee.
        And what he was curious about was that the strategy of all-
    domain access in terms of whether or not that extends to
    cybersecurity, electromagnetic spectrum, intelligence command
    control, other non-kinetic regimes. And I was just wondering if
    any of you could talk about that a little bit for the record.
        Admiral Michel. I will talk about--excuse me, sir. From a
    Coast Guard perspective, I--that is a new term, and I think it
    is exactly the right term, and it encaptures those things
    beyond the physical domain, so the ability to conduct cyber
    operations, electromagnetic spectrum, and that is very
    important to the Coast Guard to be able to do that. We are
    incredibly interconnected. We have our own networks. We want to
    be able to exploit or do whatever we need to do regarding
    adversaries' networks, and we have a whole regulated industry
    that we deal with which has cyber challenges as well from a
    Coast Guard perspective. So we really have a prominent place in
    dot-mil, dot-gov, and dot-com, and I am not aware of anybody
    else in the government that has that array of expertise and
    access, but the ability to conduct cyber operations, the
    ability to do the things that are necessary in cyberspace as
    well as the nonphysical domains, absolutely critical to the
    Coast Guard missions. And we have got to build out a workforce
    and a capability in order to get at that. So thanks, sir.
        Admiral Donegan. Sir, quickly from our standpoint is the
    reason that we--this group together as we were building the
    strategy came up with the concept of all-domain access was
    partly because of this cyberspace issue that we see in front of
    us. So it is absolutely central to the piece about access
    because we are talking about in all domains. It doesn't have to
    be the physical space by any means. So we have taken this
    onboard pretty hard. As you know, we have an information
    dominance score that is tacked on this.
        We have--the Naval Academy has stood up their cyber center
    so we can start at the very beginning in the training for this,
    but where it is really going to come to an end is--point in the
    warfighting end of the business is the ability to have the
    access and use that domain to our advantage. First, we have to
    defend our systems, but we also have to be able to reach out
    and touch others to be able to potentially degrade, to
    potentially disable so that we are not constantly, as I said
    earlier, putting one of our things against another thing and
    losing that cost battle.
        Mr. Courtney. Okay. And so, again, Jim's sort of
    observation in the notes that he left here is that, you know,
    at some point this is about standing up the, you know, the
    human capital to be able to do that, and, I mean, it sounds
    like you are trying to sort of form these centers of excellence
    at the different training facilities and--yes, sir.
        General O'Donnell. Well, I would just comment that a Marine
    force in cyber is--they are all connected with each other, and
    of course to CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command], but I think that
    kind of gets what you are talking, sir, is making sure you have
    the human capital and the capabilities and the--training the
    right people to do those things that it will be this part of
    the all-domain we talked about.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Yield back.
        Mr. Forbes. And now I would like to give each of you an
    opportunity anything--last comments that you have, and in doing
    that, could you also include a little follow-up to Mr.
    Courtney's question. It is one thing to stand these things up.
    How do we measure success in the non-kinetic domains? That is a
    little trick here for us, and if you would include that in your
    summation. And, Admiral Michel, we are going to start with you
    since everybody slaughtered your name today, and thank you so
    much once again for being here.
        Admiral Michel. Well, thanks for giving the opportunity for
    me to be here. I think having the three sea services in front
    of you is really the message that I want to convey here, is
    that your sea services are working together on a daily basis.
    We have folks who work in each other's commands. We do
    operations together on a daily basis, whether in the physical
    domain or whether in the cyber domain. So the taxpayer gets a
    huge benefit from its investment in all three sea services
    because we're interoperable. We face similar or same
    challenges, and we work together on a daily basis in a very
    cooperative manner. So that is the one key takeaway.
        I know we focused a lot on Coast Guard acquisitions. I
    don't want to--we had our discussions regarding that, but your
    Coast Guard is ready. The Commandant reports that your Coast
    Guard is ready today. We are concerned about the risks that we
    are taking, particularly with aging equipment, but your Coast
    Guard is ``Semper Paratus'' [``Always Ready''], and I can
    report that to you today.
        Issue on cyber, I appreciate your comments, sir. This is a
    workforce issue. I don't think it is going to be--you know,
    regardless of whatever whiz-bang equipment, we are either going
    to win or lose on this based on our people and being able to
    train and retain those high-quality people that are going to be
    necessary to conduct the cyber operations that we need in order
    to make the Nation successful.
        Boy, measuring success in the non-kinetic realm is a lot
    harder in many ways, but as a Coast Guardsman, most of our
    endgames are not smoking holes in the ground. They are law
    enforcement actions, they are regulatory actions, or dealing
    with resilience and being able to rebuild infrastructure and
    different things like that. So the Coast Guard is comfortable
    with trying to measure success in non-kinetic solutions, but it
    is going to be very difficult.
        What I would say is our strategies, typically, if we can
    defend ourselves, make sure that we conduct our operations in
    whatever areas we are, and then be able to protect the American
    people and our other stakeholders at an adequate level, that is
    probably the ultimate measure of success in most of the non-
    kinetic areas we operate, and that would include cyber.
        Mr. Forbes. General.
        General O'Donnell. Yes, sir. Let me answer your last
    question first about how do you measure success. You know, it
    is more than just being able to keep in your C2 systems up and
    running to be able to command and control and do the things
    that you want to do, but you have to be able to have those as--
    as Admiral Michel had just mentioned how we are going to make
    sure we have people in there that are monitoring those types of
    things. But it is going to be very, very difficult to find out.
    You are only going to find out if you failed within those--
    within those cybers. But all of us--I know all the services are
    working very hard on that.
        And the other part, the only thing I would comment about
    your other question was that everybody in this room manages
    risk, and we started about a year ago with Expeditionary Force
    21, the Commandant's Planning Guidance a couple of months. And
    as I mentioned to you before, we have already kind of moved out
    on making sure that we are doing all the experimentation and we
    are working those things to operationalize this strategy.
        Unfortunately, you know, we don't have a forecast on what
    the budgets are going to be and how they--but we only plan for
    those. But the basic, as I mentioned, the basic tenets of the
    strategy, whether it is the EF-21, CS-21, or the Commandant's
    Planning Guidance, sir, I will assure you that we are working
    to make sure those tenets stay the same, and that is being
    ready when this Nation is least ready, being forward deployed,
    forward engaged, building trust, working all those issues, and
    being the 911 force that you expect us to be, and there is no
    doubt about that; and whatever funding we end up with, we will
    execute our mission.
        Mr. Forbes. General, thank you. And, Admiral Donegan, we
    will let you have the last word.
        Admiral Donegan. Thank you, sir.
        I will start with getting at the hardest question you give
    us, which is how do we measure success in that domain. It is
    very difficult. We are working, and it is not one service that
    is working on this. As you know, Admiral Rogers and Cyber
    Command are working with all of us as we move forward to sort
    that out.
        In the near term, it is cyber hygiene and making sure that
    we have that piece right, that we have the basic things that we
    need to be doing as a service. In the longer term, though, it
    gets beyond--it gets beyond that. When we--when we are working
    in acquiring our systems, we have to acquire them with this in
    mind as we go forward, and one of the metrics needs to be that
    that has to be one of the things we are looking at as we go
    along, and it is, but it will need to continue to be. It wasn't
    necessarily one of the things in mind for some of the older
    systems that we bought. So we have to bear that in mind, but it
    is going to be difficult, and I don't think that it is going to
    be easy.
        And in closing, I think I can speak for all of us when I
    say we are very proud of the strategy that the three services
    put together. A lot of work went into it, but we are equally
    proud of the game plan we have for moving forward to put it--to
    continue to put it and implement it and make sure that we can
    execute the strategy, and we look forward to working with this
    committee and the rest of Congress as we do that.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you all for being here today. Thanks for
    the work you have done, and please communicate to your staffs
    and the people that work with you how much we appreciate the
    jobs that they have done, and with that we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
    ?

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 18, 2015

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 18, 2015

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                       DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 18, 2015

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 March 18, 2015

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                RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

        Admiral Michel. In recent discussions with the Navy, the TRITON UAV
    is still in early testing phases. Any operational use of this
    capability is approximately 4 to 5 years away. The Coast Guard will
    remain in contact with the Navy and discuss options for collaboration,
    once it is operational.   [See page 27.]
                                     ______

                   RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COOK
        General O'Donnell. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) has been
    fully reconstituted after substantial quantities of prepositioned
    equipment were downloaded for Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I and II.
        The status of the equipment aboard the Maritime Prepositioning
    Ships Squadrons (MPSRON) is ready for issue.
        Each ship of the MPF rotates through maintenance at Blount Island
    Command, Florida every three years. Equipment is downloaded and
    undergoes maintenance, upgrades, or replacement. Additionally, any
    equipment which may be damaged as a result of exercise use is repaired
    as rapidly as possible. In FY15 there are 12 scheduled exercises in
    which MPF equipment will be utilized.
        The MPF is made up two MPSRONs. MPSRON-2 is located in Diego Garcia
    and MPSRON-3 is located in Guam/Saipan. A third, MPSRON-1, was located
    in the Mediterranean until the end of FY12, when it was deactivated.
        Each MPSRON contains six ships. The six ships in each MPSRON are
    two large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships (T-AKR); three roll-on,
    roll-off ships (T-AK); and one dry cargo/ammunition ship (T-AKE).
        The T-AKEs are the newest additions to the MPF. While the T-AKRs
    and T-AK carry vehicles, equipment, and containerized supplies, the T-
    AKEs carry palletized supplies which allows the distribution of
    tailored support packages to forces ashore.
        During FY15 and FY16, the MPF will receive two additional ships
    called Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP). These ships permit the transfer
    of vehicles and equipment from T-AKRs to smaller craft for movement
    ashore. They are, in effect, a ``pier in the ocean'' which will enable
    a Marine force to operate from the sea without the need for a logistics
    presence ashore.
        While our goal is to preposition 80% of a MEB's equipment set on
    each squadron, we currently have 67%. The ships currently assigned to
    the program are fully loaded, utilizing all available square-footage.
    It will take additional ships to reach that 80% goal.
        The Marine Corps does not preposition anything ashore in Diego
    Garcia.
        The only Marine Corps ashore prepositioning site is the Marine
    Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N). Substantial quantities of
    prepositioned equipment were removed to support OIF and we have worked
    steadily to replace them. While this effort was going on, MCPP-N was
    reorganized to support a battalion-sized response/contingency force, as
    well as three reinforced company-sized units.   [See page 16.]

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