[Senate Hearing 114-734]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:36 p.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. John Hoeven (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Hoeven, Shaheen, and Tester.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Science and Technology Directorate
STATEMENT OF HON. DR. REGINALD BROTHERS, UNDER
SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
opening statement of senator john hoeven
Senator Hoeven. The subcommittee will come to order. Good
afternoon to all of you.
I would like to welcome our ranking member, Senator
Shaheen. Thank you for being here and joining us.
Also, Senator Tester, thank you for joining us as well.
Senator Cochran will be joining us in a bit, and there may
be some other members of the subcommittee that will be joining
us as well.
I want to thank and welcome all of our witnesses today.
Thank you very much for your work, and thank you for being here
today, Dr. Reggie Brothers, Under Secretary for Science and
Technology; Dr. Kathryn Brinsfield, Director of the Office of
Health Affairs; and also Dr. Huban Gowadia--I hope I said that
right; if not, correct me--Director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO). So thanks to all of you for being here
and for your work.
We have called this hearing to examine research and
development (R&D) efforts performed at the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). By the Department's own definition,
the fiscal year 2017 request for DHS includes $636 million in
R&D funding. However, a number of congressional priorities have
not been identified as R&D, such as $133 million in Science and
Technology (S&T) laboratory facilities, so that is one thing we
will want to talk about.
As we seek to examine the effectiveness of R&D efforts, it
is important to understand the level of resources being
applied, what is considered operating, what is considered R&D.
So we hope DHS will continue to work with the subcommittee to
better define its funding categories.
My focus for this hearing will be on three key areas.
First, I want to examine the metrics that you are
collecting and how those measures are affecting resource
decisions. How does the Department measure success in its R&D
efforts? How and when do agencies decide to stop a project with
interim solutions or abandon efforts that are not bearing
results?
Second, this hearing is an opportunity to highlight results
from R&D efforts. For example, Science and Technology's work in
big data analytics transitioned from the laboratory and is
generating investigative leads for Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agents, who are satisfied with this new
capability.
In another example, S&T is prototyping technology that
saves lives. Through a joint effort with NASA, a device called
FINDER located four men trapped under 10 feet of mud and debris
after an earthquake in Nepal.
Yet, for the investments that have been made in R&D at DHS
since 2003, do we have the right number of success stories?
What are our metrics? How do we measure success?
Third, I want to hear about projects to address emerging
threats and priorities. An area of particular interest is in
unmanned aerial vehicles, both in terms of countering malicious
purposes by the adversaries, and as an effective force
multiplier for ourselves.
Cybersecurity concerns are foremost in many of our minds,
particularly as we read about possible threats of GPS spoofing
and cyberattacks on airplanes, self-driving cars, and other
items in the Internet of things.
One effort within the Office of Health Affairs fits within
all three of the focus areas that I just outlined for this
hearing--biosurveillance and detection. Today, our only
civilian capability comes through BioWatch, a system to detect
select biological agents in the air. Units placed in 30 cities
around the country capture air samples, and then people collect
and test those samples.
Unfortunately, the current BioWatch system raises issues.
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the
units may not be deployed or sufficiently effective in the most
needed locations. It takes days, in most locations, to get
results. And the number of false positives leads to a lack of
trust by local officials that data may not be actionable.
Several years ago, an effort to enhance BioWatch technology
was abandoned. That may have been the right decision, but now
we see a program continuing along a flat line in terms of
capability, which does not match the threat or necessarily the
need at this point.
Dr. Brinsfield's testimony points out the importance of
planning, exercises, and training as part of BioWatch. DHS
should work with State and local officials on those activities.
The question today is about what the technology provides
and what R&D could bring to improve our biodetection and
surveillance efforts.
In closing, let me just note that effective R&D programs
require a skilled work force, or as my colleague, Senator
Shaheen, has reminded me, people power. I think that is a
direct quote.
Senator Shaheen. I like it.
Senator Hoeven. It is a good one. Consisting of sharp
employees who are managed and led well, and who recognize their
mission.
DHS has a number of work force challenges, but we should
recognize the bright spots, too. DNDO has consistently ranked
as one of the best places to work in the annual Partnership for
Public Service Work Force surveys.
Good work. I want to ask about how DNDO operates and the
lessons other organizations in DHS can learn from its survey
results.
With that, I will turn to Senator Shaheen.
statement of senator jeanne shaheen
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
echo your appreciation to our three witnesses who are
testifying today.
As our adversaries evolve and our environment continues to
change, so too should the Department of Homeland Security.
Research and development investment is one way to provide the
technologies and solutions to detect, deter, and respond to the
risks facing the homeland.
DHS must be strategic in how it prioritizes R&D investments
to counter a myriad of threats such as cyber intrusions, plots
to bring down aircraft, biological or nuclear attacks, violent
extremism, and natural disasters.
Every dollar we spend in R&D has to count, and taxpayers
should expect to receive a good return on investment.
Like Senator Hoeven, I was fascinated by the information
about FINDER. It is the kind of innovation that I think is very
exciting, as we think about what our investments might be able
to do.
And I am encouraged that DHS is beginning to really explore
alternative methods to solve complex problems. DHS recently set
up an office in Silicon Valley to leverage the expertise of
some of this country's brightest minds in technology.
Incidentally, it was interesting to see both Secretary
Carter talking about using expertise from Silicon Valley to
help us think about cybersecurity and other challenges facing
the country, and also Secretary Kerry talking with the private
sector in the media and film business to help us think about
innovations there that could be helpful as we are addressing
the challenges we face with countering violent extremism.
So I do think that this is a very good use of resources to
think about how we better engage the private sector. The office
recently awarded its first contract focused on the security of
network devices.
But while there is progress, I think we also need to
examine the overall spending level for DHS R&D, given the
serious threats that are facing our country. Compared to other
Cabinet-level agencies, DHS dedicates a very small portion of
its total budget to R&D, just over 1 percent.
And we need to connect and enlist our small businesses in a
robust way to help DHS address its technology demand. I know
that this is something that the Secretary is very interested in
doing, because small businesses are really innovators in this
country. They employ nearly 40 percent of America's scientists
and engineers. They produce 14 times more patents than large
businesses and universities. That is one of my favorite
statistics.
Given this extraordinary track record of innovation, it
makes sense to involve small businesses in developing new
technologies. Plus, in New Hampshire, we have a lot of small
businesses, so I like the idea that they can be part of some of
this groundbreaking technology.
Finally, I think we want to learn more today about the
Department's proposal to merge the Office of Health Affairs
together with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. And I look
forward to hearing more discussion about that.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the hearing.
Thank you to our witnesses. I look forward to your
testimony.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Tester, opening statement? Would you like to go
ahead, so you can go to your other hearing?
Senator Tester. I would like to hear the testimony.
Senator Hoeven. Very good.
Under Secretary Brothers, we will begin with you.
summary statement of hon. dr. reginald brothers
Dr. Brothers. Good afternoon and thank you for this
opportunity to discuss research and development in the
Department of Homeland Security and the Science and Technology
Directorate's budget request for fiscal year 2017.
Before I begin, I want to extend my personal thanks to the
subcommittee for its partnership and assistance as I joined the
Directorate almost 2 years ago. Your flexibility has allowed us
to more effectively bring resources to bear on emergent needs
and exigent circumstances in the Department.
The most significant result is a more robust technical
advisory role to the Secretary and the components in urgent
projects. Over the last 2 years, that has included work on
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), aviation security, and social
media screening, among others.
The flexibility is also critical to our expansion of Apex
programs and creation of Apex engines, the benefits of which we
are already beginning to see in S&T in the Department.
I am grateful for your partnership and continued support
moving forward.
Our research and development portfolio at the Science and
Technology Directorate, or S&T, extends across diverse Homeland
Security mission areas including, among others, bio, borders,
cyber, transportation, first responders, and disaster
resilience.
S&T is responsible for six Homeland Security labs, 10
Centers of Excellence, and 144 participating universities, and
a significant support role for the Department's acquisition
processes.
The portfolio must consider the full range of Homeland
Security mission needs in all their considerable breadth and
diversity, with a comparatively modest budget. To accomplish
this, we prioritize where we spend our limited funding against
hundreds of ranked capability gaps provided by end-users.
At the end of the day, we look across this set of potential
projects, check what we can afford to do, where investment
might make the most difference, and execute accordingly.
S&T's fiscal year 2017 funding request is vital to ensuring
we can maintain our existing work on technology and knowledge
products and capabilities. DHS needs to improve operational
effectiveness and efficiencies.
As a research development arm and technical center of
gravity for the Department, investment in innovation through
S&T has significant, lasting impact on improving and maturing
DHS operational capabilities and technology solutions for the
Homeland Security enterprise. Likewise, a downward trend in R&D
budget over time signals decreased potential for science-based
and technical solutions, even as demand increases in the
Department and our State and local stakeholders.
After 2 years at S&T, I am proud of how well-positioned we
are. We have visionary goals that capitalize on creativity, and
serve as north stars within S&T and our broader technical
community. We have an updated strategy that focuses our
portfolio on force-multiplying solutions. We created the first-
ever S&T employee council, and we are seeing initial favorable
momentum in our employee survey scores.
We see promising results from experiments with
accelerators, prize competitions, and other innovative ways to
reach the private sector.
One noteworthy achievement was reestablishment of the
Department's integrative product teams, or IPTs. These are
formal mechanisms for identifying work underway across the
Department and prioritizing technological capability gaps
across DHS mission areas.
Alongside existing IPTs supporting our Nation's first
responders, S&T and its operational partners started five of
these teams to complete these inaugural cycles in only 6
months. They validate ongoing activities and prioritize project
topics in respective mission areas.
The ultimate result is better integration of S&T with DHS
component activities and joint assurance through a formal
report to the Secretary that technological solutions will
address operational needs. The IPT process represents a major
step forward for the cumulative effort across the Department.
I will close with a quick story that illustrates the
evolution from capability gap to solution. Homemade explosives
have emerged in last decade as materials of choice for
improvised explosive devices in numerous terrorist attacks and
plots. Unlike conventional threats, they are produced using
household items and are difficult to detect in small but still
destructive amounts.
These explosives represent one of the Department's top
priorities, and are particularly relevant in wake of what we
know about the recent Brussels attacks.
So what is S&T doing to move the needle? S&T begins with a
need for fundamental understanding of the chemical signatures
of these explosives. Since relative to other explosives, they
are brand new, end-users need to know how they differ from
water or shampoo in how they perform.
We work with our university and interagency partners. And
once S&T has a bedrock of basic science understanding, we are
to figure out safe ways to train canines, to help State and
local bomb squads, to teach transportation security officers
(TSOs) to find them.
Through our lab, S&T brings in the private sector to build
machines and code algorithms powerful enough to see explosives
wherever they are hidden.
And S&T must work with our end-users to determine the
impact of all the above on operations, frontline employees,
State and local enforcement, a huge list of folks who need to
know this and figure out how to get technology out of labs and
integrated into existing teams and complicated systems.
On top of all this, homemade explosives are a moving
target. With each new threat to emerge, S&T starts again from
the beginning. We activate and reactivate our subject matter
experts, university researchers, lab assets, and international
partners to get solutions to operate as quickly as possible.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Secret
Service, the Federal Protective Service, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), State and local bomb squads, canine teams,
border immigration agents--these are men and women on the
frontlines depending on S&T to help them stay ahead of our
adversaries.
Thank you again to the subcommittee for your flexibility
and support of S&T and all the work we do. I appreciate your
time today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Reginald Brothers
Good afternoon Chairman Hoeven, Ranking Member Shaheen, and
distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you today on the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). S&T's mission is to
deliver effective and innovative insight, methods, and solutions for
the critical needs of the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE).
Technology simultaneously enables both homeland security operators and
malevolent actors and, as a result, has a significant and expanding
impact on current and future threat environments. I look forward to
discussing S&T's fiscal year (FY) 2017 budget request and how research
and development (R&D) improves the operational capabilities of DHS
Components and the first responder community.
science and technology directorate's fiscal year 2017 budget request
S&T's budget request is $758.7 million for fiscal year 2017. This
amount represents a decrease of $28.2 million, or 3.6 percent less than
the $786.9 million provided to S&T in fiscal year 2016. Over the last 2
years, the flexibility afforded to S&T has allowed better
responsiveness to emergent needs and exigent circumstances in the
Department and contributed to a more robust technical advisory role to
the Secretary and Components for urgent projects, including countering
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), aviation screening, and social media
screening. The flexibility was also critical to S&T's expansion of Apex
programs and creation of Apex Engines, which have already begun to
benefit S&T and the Department. I thank the Committee for its
partnership and assistance in expanding the profile of scientific and
technical advice in the Department and for its continued support moving
forward in fiscal year 2017.
As part of DHS's new Common Appropriation Structure in fiscal year
2017, S&T's request aligns funding within three of the Department's
lifecycle-based appropriations fund types: Research and Development;
Procurement, Construction, and Improvements; and Operations and
Support. S&T's fiscal year 2017 request includes no funding in the
Department's fourth fund type, which is Federal Assistance.
The fiscal year 2017 budget request includes $469.9 million for
R&D, a $26.1 million decrease compared to fiscal year 2016 funding.
Within the requested amount, $33.0 million is for University Programs,
an $8.6 million decrease, and $436.9 is for Research, Development, and
Innovation, a $17.4 million decrease. By thrust area, the Research,
Development, and Innovation request includes $79 million for Apex; $56
million for Border Security; $58.4 million for Chemical, Biological,
and Explosives Defense; $65.7 million for Counter Terrorist; $71
million for Cyber Security and Information Analytics; $87.4 million in
First Responder and Disaster Resilience; and $19.4 million for salaries
and benefits. The funding in these thrust areas is S&T's principal
means for providing state-of-the-art technologies and solutions and
meeting broad and diverse mission requirements from throughout the
Homeland Security Enterprise.
The request also includes $65.9 million for Acquisition and
Operation Analysis that includes $48.4 million to fund S&T's work to
strengthen the DHS acquisition process, standards development work, the
SAFETY Act, international cooperative research and development,
interagency work, and technology transition support and $17.5 million
for salaries and benefits. To support the DHS acquisition process, S&T
provides test and evaluation oversight, systems engineering, operations
research, and technical risk assessments of major DHS acquisition
programs.
Finally, the budget request includes $133.9 million for Laboratory
Facilities, which includes $111.1 million in operations costs and $22.8
million for salaries and benefits. The request includes funding to
operate the now-under-construction National Bio and Agro-Defense
Facility (NBAF) located in Manhattan, KS. As construction nears
completion and as research programs and veterinary research staff begin
to transition from the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, NBAF will
continue to require funding for operations ahead of the Full
Operational Capability planned by December 2022.
support for the department in fiscal year 2017
The fiscal year 2017 funding request is vital to ensuring S&T
delivers the technology knowledge products and capabilities DHS needs
to improve operational effectiveness and efficiencies. In supporting
end users across the broad and diverse mission areas of the Department,
S&T maximizes value within a comparatively modest pool of funds. As the
technical and research center for the Department, an investment in
innovation through S&T has a significant, lasting impact on improving
and maturing DHS operational capabilities and technology solutions for
the HSE.
S&T is providing technology to strengthen border security. fiscal
year 2017 funding for border security technology will provide needed
capability to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG). In fiscal year 2017, S&T will:
--Demonstrate a southern border capability with CBP to detect, track,
and classify low flying/low observables aircraft along
difficult terrain on the borders;
--Transition to CBP a covert and inexpensive capability to detect
personnel, aircraft, and vehicles crossing the border with
classification algorithms that significantly reduce nuisance
and false alarms;
--Demonstrate a capability mounted on USCG Search and Rescue aircraft
that will permit higher altitude/higher speed searches for
people in the water, enabling larger coverage areas and a
greater probability of detection, resulting in saved lives; and
--Pilot new or improved traveler inspection tools and processes to
strengthen CBP's screening and inspection of travelers entering
the United States.
S&T is testing new and existing capabilities to counter the
terrorist threat. S&T is examining how to counter behavioral aspects of
terrorism and how to counter emerging technology threats. S&T will
evaluate mitigation technologies designed for protection at point,
perimeter, and wide area venues against UAS as part of a multi-agency
team. The resulting testbed will deliver an urban test environment
where DHS and its partners can evaluate countermeasure systems and
score them against their specific operational use cases.
S&T is improving DHS acquisition programs. S&T has become an
integral player in DHS improving acquisition oversight. Work in fiscal
year 2017 includes:
--Technical assessments of 13 major acquisition programs in support
of the Acquisition Review Board (ARB);
--Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) engagement with 45 major
acquisition programs;
--Operations research studies in support of four DHS Components; and
--Continuous support for the Joint Requirements Council's (JRC)
Portfolio Teams.
S&T is improving cybersecurity and cyber-physical systems. S&T is
working to mitigate fundamental weaknesses in cyber systems. In fiscal
year 2017, S&T will attack the following issues:
--Government networks retain significant cyber security weaknesses
that are being exploited, and the National Cyber Protection
System (NCPS) and Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM)
programs need rapid and adaptive capabilities to address these
weaknesses over a 12 to 24 month timeframe. fiscal year 2017
will address key elements needed to support Einstein 3A (E3A)
and CDM, such as classified signatures evaluation, E3A/CDM
integration, measurement infrastructure, treatment of key
Internet traffic protocols and communications, and red-team
capabilities.
--The government automotive fleet remains vulnerable to cyber
hacking. fiscal year 2017 funding completes the establishment
of the technical development consortium between DHS and major
automotive companies and suppliers; it also supports Phase I
development of secure purchasing guidelines for government
automotive fleet management (General Services Administration,
DHS including CBP, Department of Justice, state and local law
enforcement, etc.).
S&T is developing better baggage scanners for aviation checkpoints.
S&T is integrating new technology and more sophisticated technical
approaches to create scanning machines that are faster and more
dependable. In fiscal year 2017, S&T will demonstrate a carry-on
baggage screener that provides better capability with higher throughput
and substantially fewer false alarms. This will support the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to secure
luggage and identify threats in a less obtrusive way in the future.
S&T is supporting first responders with better communications,
decisionmaking tools, and enhanced capability. S&T is working with
first responders to address their most pressing capability gaps and
help them do their jobs more safely and effectively. In fiscal year
2017, S&T will:
--Demonstrate a system with the Los Angeles Fire Department that uses
artificial general intelligence to help responders navigate
unpredictable conditions and improve situational awareness;
--Collaborate with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Homeland Security Investigations to decrease the time it takes
agents to identify child abuse victims and their perpetrators
using imagery analytics related to facial and object
recognition; and
--Operationalize a Hurricane Evacuation Planning tool with Federal
Emergency Management Association (FEMA) that will streamline
and automate updates for storm surge risk maps, evacuation
zones, and evacuation clearance times ultimately helping local
communities make faster, more efficient, and more informed
evacuation decisions and save lives from hurricanes.
S&T is supporting countermeasures that protect the public from
biological attacks. S&T helps our interagency partners understand the
risk of potential pathogens to guide development and acquisition of
countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile. In fiscal year
2017, S&T is delivering three material threat assessments of
filoviruses, smallpox, and botulism toxin to the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services to support potential acquisition of medical
countermeasures and keep the American public safe from harm.
better connecting s&t within the department
A significant accomplishment this year as part of the Secretary's
Unity of Effort Initiative was the re-establishment of a departmental
Integrated Product Team (IPT) process. In August 2015, the Secretary
established mission-focused IPTs for the purpose of identifying and
prioritizing technological capability gaps and coordinating R&D to
close those gaps across the mission areas of the Department. The
overall effort is led by S&T, but the individual IPTs are chaired by
senior representatives from the operational Components, with
representation from operational and HQ Components as well as the Joint
Requirements Council.
The first cycle of IPTs addressed the following five topic areas:
Aviation Security, Biological Threats, Counterterrorism, Border
Security, and Cyber Security. S&T also continues its existing IPT
supporting our Nation's first responders through the First Responder
Resource Group, and additional sub-IPTs were created that address sub-
topics (e.g., maritime security for border security) and key issues
(e.g. resilience). This intentionally broad and inclusive approach also
has helped us address some of the concerns voiced by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office and Congress that R&D in the
Department is insufficiently coordinated. We are on schedule to deliver
results of the inaugural process to the Secretary later this year, and
I am proud of how quickly S&T and our partners in the Department came
together to establish and execute the process.
As they mature moving forward, IPTs will be the primary vehicle for
the Department to identify, coordinate, prioritize, and validate R&D
efforts supporting DHS priority missions. Most importantly, IPTs are
connecting S&T more closely with the offices in Components trying to
fill capability gaps and acquire technological solutions to meet
operational needs. This will strengthen the applicability of S&T's
deliverables and enhance the effectiveness of operational solutions for
the Components.
meeting operational needs and closing capability gaps
I previously mentioned the flexibility afforded to S&T by the
Committee, which has allowed better responsiveness to emergent needs
and exigent circumstances in the Department. In areas such as
countering Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), aviation screening, and
social media screening, S&T has been able to use its resources to
support a more robust technical advisory role.
Last year, the Secretary requested that S&T work with the White
House as interagency lead in developing a capability to counter the
growing UAS threat. S&T's initial role was to lead the interagency
working group including U.S. Capitol Police, U.S. Park Police,
Washington DC Metropolitan Police Department, Department of Justice,
Federal Aviation Administration, and DHS Components that produced the
National Capital Region Gyrocopter Incident Intergovernmental After-
Action Report, released June 2015, and subsequent whole-of- community
response plan. Concurrently, S&T began cataloging relevant existing
technology and developmental work across government including the
Department of Defense. This became the basis for an R&D plan that, as
it unfolds, will help drive private sector development of a capability
or capabilities to meet our customers' diverse needs. Perhaps as
importantly, the effort will inform our customers, to make them smarter
consumers of existing and future technology, as well as the decision
makers responsible for the future policy and legal framework for use of
UAS.
S&T was also able to support the TSA's response to last year's
results of covert testing of passenger screening operations by the DHS
Office of the Inspector General. At the Secretary's request and with
TSA's full cooperation, S&T was tasked to evaluate the current
screening process as a risk-based ``system of systems'' and consider
innovative or disruptive technologies, policies, and operating
procedures that could improve overall screening performance and reduce
risk. This effort was a horizon-focused effort that was complementary
to TSA's own internal, immediate-term evaluation. With the aviation
screening effort as a basis moving forward, S&T and TSA continue their
close partnership in exploring and implementing innovative approaches
to securing the transportation sector.
Finally, last December after the events in San Bernardino, CA, the
Department stood up a Social Media Task Force led by the DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis to assess social media policies, processes,
and capabilities and to develop recommendations to leverage
departmental authorities and capabilities to exploit social media
during the vetting process. As one of three supporting efforts, S&T's
Data Analytics Engine initiated a pilot supporting U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) to address K-1 visa (i.e., fiance/e visa)
and refugee screening requirements using social media. S&T and USCIS
are experimenting with leading-edge commercial tools to understand how
publicly-available social media can inform the immigration vetting
process. S&T has also reviewed hundreds of tools through a Request for
Information and an Industry Day to determine technical capabilities
available in the marketplace relative to all DHS use cases--screening
and vetting, investigations, and situational awareness. S&T plans to
continue to work with industry to identify and/or further develop
social media analytic capabilities for DHS missions. The core technical
capabilities that constitute the Apex Technology Engines help DHS
rapidly develop and deploy new technologies in high-profile and high-
risk events.
The technical advisory role described here is an important and
sometimes under-appreciated aspect of S&T's value to the Department.
The immediacy of the work and difficulty to anticipate funding
requirements in advance also uniquely strain our ability to marshal
resources. For this once again, we are grateful to the Committee for
the flexibility it affords, which augments this ability for S&T to
contribute to the Department's most immediate emergent needs as they
arise.
refinement and innovation in s&t's approach to r&d
One of my first priorities after joining S&T was establishing
visionary goals that would help orient S&T's investments toward longer
horizon, leap-ahead capabilities. As demonstrated above, S&T continues
to work closely with Component partners and other stakeholders on
immediate needs, but the organization at the time lacked comprehensive,
far-reaching visionary goals looking 20 or more years into the future
and driving toward ambitious improvements. S&T shared draft goals in
the Department and with the public through a crowd-sourcing website
where we received more than 1,000 comments and suggestions from all of
S&T's major stakeholder groups inside and outside government. The final
S&T Visionary Goals, with input from the entire HSE, are the following:
--Screening at Speed: Security that Matches the Pace of Life
--A Trusted Cyber Future: Protecting Privacy, Commerce, and Community
--Enable the Decision Maker: Actionable Information at the Speed of
Thought
--Responder of the Future: Protected, Connected, and Fully Aware
--Resilient Communities: Disaster-Proofing Society
To achieve these goals, we recognized that S&T needed to augment
its approach to working with the private sector, and another of my
earliest priorities at S&T was energizing a Homeland Security
Industrial Base. DHS more than many Federal agencies and much more than
the Department of Defense as one example, is dependent on commercially-
available, off-the-shelf products to achieve its mission. Because of
this, partnership with industry, specifically in product development,
is essential. R&D projects can yield isolated, one-off solutions, but a
truly successful portfolio must strategically shape the shelf by
inserting homeland security applications, if not as primary use cases
or applications, at least as considerations during companies' product
development cycles.
I am proud to say that this is an area where we have enjoyed
considerable success over the last 2 years. We launched innovative
accelerator and prize competition platforms to reach innovators and
communities that may have never heard from or worked with government
before. S&T piloted an innovative program in Silicon Valley that aims
to maintain constant, face-to-face contact with venture capital and
start-up communities outside the Beltway including the Silicon Valley
area. We developed a fresh public face by overhauling S&T's website to
be more informative and transparent. Combine all of this with an
updated Strategic Plan publication and willing partners within the
Department including in the Management Directorate and Office of the
General Counsel, and we are beginning to see real interest in the
private sector in participating in a Homeland Security Industrial Base.
Accelerators
Identifying and tapping into sources of innovation is critical to
our ability to support frontline operators keeping the nation safe, and
accelerators (i.e., seed funding and mentorship for entrepreneur teams
and start-up companies to help them attract investment) are a valuable
tool to do just that. Last year, S&T piloted a business accelerator
program to see if accelerators would work in the homeland security
mission space. The inaugural effort, named EMERGES, focused on
commercially-available wearable technology that could be adapted for
first responders. More than 100 startups applied to the inaugural
class, and 18 were selected and eventually featured last September at a
Demo Day in San Francisco. EMERGE passed each of our initial tests,
demonstrating interest in the start-up community in participation and
graduation from our accelerator as well as the ability for companies to
successfully develop products that attract private investment and still
meet homeland security needs. More than half of EMERGE participants
received interest from new private venture capital and strategic
investors, three already offer commercially-available products, and one
was even featured on ``Shark Tank.'' Moving forward, we hope to build
on this success in future iterations of homeland security accelerators
in additional areas of work where the start-up community is ready to
contribute.
Prize Competitions
Last year, S&T launched its InnoPrize program to assist DHS
planning and executing prize competitions. InnoPrize utilizes America
COMPETES Act authority to execute part of President's updated 2015
Strategy for American Innovation, which made it easier to use
competition programs to encourage innovation, solve tough problems, and
advance the core missions of the Department. This is a fresh approach
to operational challenges, problem solving, and innovation aimed at
problem solvers and solution makers uninterested in the burdens of
traditional business with government but who otherwise are capable of
helping.
S&T conducted two prize competitions in our first year of
implementation, one for fresh approaches to the enduring problem of
tracking first responders in GPS-degraded or denied environments and a
second to seed development of a community of interest around the new
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility. Our third competition drew 58
submissions to help USCG improve navigational buoys by minimizing
harmful impact to the ocean floor in environmentally-sensitive areas.
Our experimentation with prize competitions in the last year has
demonstrated their clear potential for widening our base of solvers and
finding fresh approaches to some of the Department's enduring
challenges, and I am excited to see wider use moving forward to
continue infusing fresh perspective into some of our hardest problems.
Silicon Valley Presence
Building upon our existing work and partnerships in Silicon Valley,
S&T is leading a departmental pilot initiative to cultivate a pipeline
of non-traditional partners (e.g., start-ups) to accelerate research
and innovation around homeland security priorities. Ultimately, DHS is
trying to incentivize developers to widen the aperture of earlier in
their development roadmaps to include homeland security solutions,
again with the effect of shaping the shelf of end products available to
our operators and first responders.
S&T worked closely with the DHS Office of Procurement Operations,
including their Procurement Innovation Lab staff, to create an R&D-
appropriate model that would keep pace with the innovation community in
places like Silicon Valley. The first S&T Innovation Other Transaction
Solicitation cycle focuses on securing the Internet of Things and
promoting novel ideas and technologies that improve situational
awareness and security for protecting domains including the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors monitored by DHS. It began with an ideation
workshop connecting government end users and operators with
participants from the private sector (large companies, manufacturers,
venture capital, researchers, and small businesses) to frame the
problem and jointly shape a path forward. The first award in February,
only 30 days after the solicitation, went to a team aiming to secure
Internet of Things infrastructure by improving visibility and providing
dynamic detection as components connect or disconnect from a system.
The Internet of Things solicitation is still open, and if our Silicon
Valley presence continues to benefit the Department, S&T could use it
as a model to launch a similar presence in communities like Austin,
Boston, and Chicago around the country.
Empowering the S&T workforce
One final aspect of S&T I ensured was not overlooked when I joined
the Directorate was our organizational health and internal
organization. It was clear based on conversations with S&T staff, in
addition to a record of below average Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey
(FEVS) scores that empowering the workforce would be critical moving
forward. We performed an organizational health assessment and
complementary root cause analysis to identify the most pressing areas
for improvement. We stood up an S&T Employee Council to guide
implementation and serve moving forward as a springboard for
communication and advice for staff to leadership. Poor organizational
health takes time to turn around, but improvements in S&T's most recent
FEVS scores, including substantial increases in several key indices,
demonstrate that S&T is moving in the right direction.
recent examples of science and technology directorate successes
To conclude, here are a few examples from the Results of fiscal
year 2015 Research and Development report, recently delivered to
Congress, that illustrate some of the strong work in S&T's portfolio
supporting DHS Components and first responders:
--In fiscal year 2015, ICE operationalized its Big Data network
architecture and tools, built by S&T's Data Analytics Engine
and delivered to ICE as part of the Border Enforcement
Analytics Program (BEAP) Apex, for agents in three major
cities. These capabilities look across multiple data sets and
increase the probability of detecting illicit activity. They
led to new insights and investigations and raised ICE's profile
within the counter- proliferation community, creating
collaboration opportunities with other agencies and partner
countries.
--For first responders in fiscal year 2015, S&T licensed the Radio
Internet-Protocol Communications Module (RIC-M) to two
commercial partners to manufacture and sell in commercial
markets. RIC-M as a low-cost interoperability solution that
allows agencies to incrementally upgrade and affordably connect
legacy systems with newer ones, averting a costly need to
refresh entire systems at once and saving the first responder
community millions of dollars. S&T was awarded a patent for the
RIC-M technology and received its first royalties from RIC-M
sales (seven percent of each sale made). The S&T-developed
Finding Individuals for Disaster and Emergency Response
(FINDER) technology also saw real-world operational use in the
April 2015 Nepal earthquake response where it helped save
multiple victims trapped beneath collapsed structures.
--In fiscal year 2015, S&T continued progress on the Integrated
Maritime Domain Enterprise- Coastal Surveillance System (IMDE-
CSS) Program for port and coastal surveillance for CBP and
USCG. A Chesapeake node integrated with Maryland State and
local law enforcement was linked to the original, operational
Air and Marine Operations Center IMDE-CSS node in Riverside,
CA. S&T continues to take major steps with its partners in USCG
and CBP toward a functional, integrated system for situational
awareness across all Federal, state, local, tribal,
territorial, and even private sector assets.
--S&T's ten university-based Centers of Excellence continue to
deliver capabilities to homeland security end users. USCG,
which continues to be one of the strongest supporters and
beneficiaries of the Centers, received a Social Media Analytics
and Reporting Toolkit (SMART, which helps alert to emerging
threats in a geographically- focused stream of social media
during major events) and a new, more sophisticated version of
the Boat Allocation Module (BAM II, which helps save resources
and deploy more effectively across stations). FEMA received the
now-operational Risk Estimator for Embankment Structures to
assess and maintain levees and dams to prevent failure during
future storms.
--TSA received S&T-developed systems in fiscal year 2015 that will
aid implementation of classroom-based training in visual search
and detection training and cross-gender empathy through
appropriate hand placement and position. S&T also delivered
vulnerability assessments of suicide bombers in commercial
aircraft to inform in-flight emergency protocols for response
and mitigation, and S&T's explosives detection canine program
transitioned an S&T-developed non-detonable training aid that
is considerably more affordable and effective than previous
methodology at improving canine detection proficiency.
--FEMA purchased 10,000 device license subscriptions for MobileIron,
effectively covering its entire inventory of working mobile
devices and making MobileIron its solution of choice moving
forward. MobileIron is a mobile configuration manager that
improves policy enforcement and assists enterprise users in
keeping their mixed-use mobile devices secure. S&T enhanced and
delivered the product as part of an In-Q-Tel collaboration.
--In fiscal year 2015, S&T's Transition to Practice piloted,
transitioned, or licensed five cybersecurity technologies to
the marketplace. These are federally-funded tools and
technologies that S&T is converting from laboratory tools to
commercially-available products that will be used to strengthen
our networks. S&T also continues to provide cybersecurity tools
to law enforcement and delivered three tools last year that
ensure computer incident evidence integrity, protect records
from illicit access or modification, and verify physical
location of law enforcement network-enabled mobile devices.
--In addition to technology development for Components, S&T also
supports the Department's efforts to improve and integrate
internal processes. In fiscal year 2015, S&T provided technical
staff and support to the Joint Requirements Council (JRC) that
included assistance with process development and technical
subject matter expertise reach back for the JRC's Portfolio
Teams. S&T also re-established the Department's Integrated
Product Team process to coordinate the Department's R&D and
began a process for technical assessments of DHS major
acquisitions to increase integration of acquisition and R&D
activities.
--During the Ebola response in fiscal year 2015, S&T directed
research at its National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center (NBACC) laboratory to determine the
stability of Ebola in blood and other body fluids under
relevant environmental conditions and surfaces including
personal protective equipment and airline carpet. This effort,
along with previous research on Ebola virus, was adopted by the
White House's Ebola Task Force and influenced the approach and
procedures of multiple Federal agencies during the response.
USCG is also using the information to update its operational
protocols for decontamination of Ebola-contaminated surfaces.
--S&T provided technical assistance to the Secret Service during the
Pope Francis's September 2015 visit. S&T's Modeling and
Simulation Engine generated technical oversight for crowd
ingress, egress, and emergency evacuation during the Pope's
visit including the outdoor mass at the Basilica of the
National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception and surrounding
areas. S&T's models enabled informed adjustments to congestion
and bottlenecks for evacuation planning and resource
positioning for the events.
I thank you again for your support and for the opportunity to
testify before the Committee today on R&D in the Department and S&T's
fiscal year 2017 budget. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Under Secretary.
Now, Dr. Brinsfield.
OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS
STATEMENT OF DR. KATHRYN BRINSFIELD, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY AND CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER
Dr. Brinsfield. Thank you, sir. Chairman Hoeven, Ranking
Member Shaheen, and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today
regarding the Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Health Affairs, or OHA.
Major threats to our Nation's security, such as terrorist
attacks, natural disasters, and pandemics have profound impacts
on public health. I will focus my remarks on how OHA works to
mitigate the public health impacts of biological attacks,
chemical threats, diseases and disasters, to help prepare the
Nation to respond and rebound. I will also explain the
importance of our expertise that supports DHS frontline
operations, our work force, and the preparedness of public
health and medical communities.
We are a crucial link between health security and homeland
security. Our success is the integration of local public health
with emergency management, law enforcement, and intelligence
community partners.
As an example, as part of DHS and FBI's Nationwide
Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, OHA developed a
training program for health professionals to highlight the
critical role they play in identifying and reporting suspicious
activities.
OHA led the development of Federal guidance to help first
responders manage injuries and save lives during an improvised
explosive device or active shooter event. We are building on
that work with Stop the Bleed, a campaign to educate Americans
on actions they can take to control life-threatening bleeding
before medical first responders arrive on the scene.
Like responders nationwide, DHS components also routinely
confront health and medical challenges while conducting their
critical missions. As part of our support to DHS operational
components, OHA manages a unified emergency medical services
(EMS) system for the Department's more than 3,000 emergency
medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics, and ensures the care
they provide is aligned with national standards and consistent
across the Department.
OHA programs also improve our Nation's ability to respond
to the health impacts of chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosive incidents, or CBRNE.
These capabilities require ongoing research and
development. Our role in the R&D process is to set
requirements, coordinate input from State and local partners,
and participate with the interagency on research priorities.
This engagement is critical to addressing emerging threats.
We have all seen the news reports about ISIS's use of
chemicals as weapons. We also know that they desire to attack
and inspire attacks in the United States.
The most appreciable Federal impact in the immediate
aftermath of a chemical attack will be made long before the
incident occurs by focusing on ensuring communities are
prepared to respond effectively in the first hours. OHA's
chemical defense program develops guidance and tools to help
U.S. communities and decisionmakers at all levels of government
prepare for, respond to, and quickly recover from terrorist
attacks and accidents involving toxic chemicals.
OHA also aims to improve decisionmaking about high-
consequence biological threats by providing early detection and
surveillance capabilities. For large-scale biological events,
early knowledge will allow informed decisions that can save
American lives.
The BioWatch program provides Federal, State, and local
leaders with actionable information on detection of a
biological event to enable a coordinated and effective
response.
One important and frequently overlooked benefit of the
BioWatch program is our work in each jurisdiction to ensure
that local decision makers are familiar with how the response
will unfold, should the detection of one of these agents
happen. There is no other program that provides this layer of
biological defense.
OHA and S&T are collaborating on enhancements to BioWatch
that would shorten the time to detect biological agents as well
as address other short- and long-term capability needs.
OHA also co-chairs S&T's biothreat IPT to identify and
prioritize future needs in biodefense.
Naturally occurring biological threats can also greatly
impact homeland security, as evidenced by the 2014 Ebola
outbreak. As chief medical officer of the Department, I led the
coordination of DHS's efforts as part of the whole-of-
government response. OHA issued health advisories to help
protect the DHS work force and engaged Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard daily to ensure protective
actions were in place so critical border security operations of
the Department would continue unencumbered. Our medical
professionals traveled to airports that conducted enhanced
entry screening to provide advice on how to complement Ebola
screening, as well as training to DHS employees on the proper
use of personal protective equipment.
Further, our National Biosurveillance Integration Center,
or NBIC, provided daily updates on the evolving nature of the
Ebola outbreak to more than 1,500 Federal, State, and local
officials, and collaborated with interagency partners on issues
such as potential routes of transmission.
Today, we continue to build upon lessons learned from the
responses to Ebola and other biological threats as we tackle
the reemergence of viruses like Zika.
Thank you for your time. I appreciate the attention this
subcommittee has given to OHA's mission, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kathryn H. Brinsfield
Chairman Hoeven, Ranking Member Shaheen, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today
regarding the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) and how our fiscal year
2017 budget request will allow us to further our health and homeland
security missions.
Major threats to our Nation's security, such as terrorist attacks,
natural disasters, or pandemics, have profound impacts on public
health. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Health
Affairs leads the Department's efforts to meet those health security
threats our nation faces today and prepare for the threats that will
emerge tomorrow.
To us, the protection of our population is core to our mission and
central to everything we do. With in-house experts including
physicians, nurses, scientists, toxicologists, veterinarians,
intelligence and data analysts, emergency management planners, and
first responders, OHA is uniquely positioned at the intersection of
public health and national security to help DHS and government leaders
prepare for, respond to, and recover from the public health
consequences of terrorist threats and other hazards.
OHA experts identify health and medical risks and vulnerabilities,
evaluate protective actions, and understand the decisions and resources
needed to effectively respond to the health impacts of terrorist
attacks, large-scale disasters, and chemical and biological incidents--
whether natural or intentional. We share this expertise with Federal
agencies and state and local governments, to build tools, guidance, and
relationships, which improve the ability of responders at all levels to
coordinate and work together more effectively during a crisis.
OHA leveraged our vast expertise in support of the DHS mission to
protect and secure the homeland during the 2014 Ebola outbreak. As part
of the whole-of-government response, OHA led coordination of DHS's
Ebola response activities, which included working closely with
Departmental components, Federal interagency partners, and various
state and local stakeholders. These efforts were instrumental in
protecting the DHS workforce, the traveling public, and our Nation from
this terrible outbreak. Today, we continue to build upon lessons
learned from the responses to Ebola and other biological threats as we
tackle the emergence--or reemergence--of viruses like Zika or Lassa
Fever.
OHA currently addresses the health impacts of these incidents and
how they impact homeland security from an integrated perspective, using
both technical expertise and workforce health knowledge. OHA does not,
however, conduct research and development. OHA works with the DHS
Science and Technology Directorate to identify priority capability gaps
in the Department's health security and chemical and biological mission
spaces, and provides feedback to jointly assess challenges and
prioritize solutions to fill those gaps.
The President's budget request for fiscal year 2017 will support
continued and improved capabilities in these areas. In fiscal year
2017, the OHA programs and contributions discussed below are proposed
to be included in a new Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and
Explosives Office. The fiscal year 2017 request will allow continued
coordination and maintenance of DHS-wide chemical, biological, and
emerging infectious disease-related strategy, policy, situational
awareness, periodic threat and risk assessments, and contingency
planning. The fiscal year 2017 request also supports our workforce
health protection and Component operational resilience efforts.
OHA brings a very particular, extremely important set of skills and
knowledge to our Nation's health security framework. We provide crucial
links between homeland security components, public health communities,
and interagency partners. We help the Nation prepare for, respond to,
and recover from health impacts of homeland security threats, and we
develop expert guidance and policy for the spectrum of medical and
public health security issues. This unique contribution makes OHA
indispensable to our Nation's security. OHA's programs and budget cost
drivers are discussed below.
Chemical Defense
The Chemical Defense Program (CDP) is comprised of experts in
medical toxicology, emergency medicine, industrial hygiene and public
health who advise DHS and government leaders about chemical threats and
the potential policy and planning consequences. CDP develops guidance
and tools to help communities and decision-makers prepare for, respond
to, and recover from terrorist attacks and accidents involving chemical
agents. CDP provides extensive support at an extreme value, leveraging
partners and resources to improve capabilities.
In 2014, CDP, in partnership with the Department of Health and
Human Services and at the direction of the White House, released a
guidance document to assist emergency planners and public health
officials assess the medical resources needed to respond to mass
casualties from a catastrophic chemical incident.
The Program has also worked directly with localities to conduct
demonstration projects aimed at developing best practices for
responding to chemical incidents in specific venues, such as mass
transit, ports, and stadiums. In fiscal year 2014, CDP completed its
first demonstration project and began development of exercises in four
more venues and cities, which were all completed by the end of CY 2015.
CDP is now developing a final report consolidating the identified
lessons learned from the five venues and cities.
Fiscal year 2017 funding will allow CDP to continue working with
communities to enhance their chemical defense capabilities by
developing guidance tools and implementing the best practices and
lessons learned from demonstration projects.
CDP experts will also continue to provide medical toxicology and
chemical defense expertise to DHS and Component leadership and Federal
government partners.
Biological Detection and Surveillance
Detection and defense against biological threats, be they acts of
terrorism or naturally occurring, remain important mission areas for
DHS. For large scale biological events, knowledge as early as possible
allows informed decisions that can save American lives. To this end,
the Department's operational biodetection and biosurveillance programs,
the BioWatch Program and the National Biosurveillance Integration
Center (NBIC), are critical to our Nation's biodefense. The
capabilities are mutually reinforcing--one provides detection of
selected threats at their onset in high risk areas while the other
provides public health surveillance at a broader level at later stages.
Each capability is supported by a biodefense R&D portfolio in the
Science and Technology Directorate dedicated to creating technology
options that address identified and validated capability gaps. R&D
helps the Department maintains a longer-range view and ensures
operational elements are not caught off guard by emerging or new trends
and threats.
The BioWatch Program is the Nation's only civilian program that
provides early warning in the event of an aerosolized biological
attack. The program consists of planning, preparedness, exercising,
training, and early detection capabilities. Deployed at more than 30
major metropolitan areas throughout the country, the system is a
collaborative effort of health professionals at all levels of
government. The program is operated by a team comprised of field
operators, laboratory technicians, and public health officials from
city, county, state, and Federal organizations. Each hour gained
through early detection and before the onset of medical symptoms,
improves the chances that response efforts will be successful.
The BioWatch Program has succeeded in bringing together state and
local public health, first responders, and law enforcement personnel,
along with locally-deployed Federal officials, resulting in communities
that are better prepared not only for a biological attack, but also for
an all-hazards response.
The current system has been, and will continue to be, extensively
tested, and the program is advancing plans and building capabilities in
early detection and situational awareness. BioWatch builds the
collective capabilities across all levels of government to effectively
and rapidly mobilize in response to an attack, mitigating the impacts
of a catastrophic bioterrorism event. The BioWatch Program is a
critical component of our Nation's response to minimize the impacts of
a biological attack.
The relevant technical capabilities available to adversaries have
only increased since the system's inception in 2003, as biotechnologies
have continued their global development and dissemination. So the need
for BioWatch persists. In the past 2 years, the capabilities of the
system have been independently tested and validated. Four independent
tests have been conducted over the last 6 years that have tested all
components of the BioWatch system. This has included extensive testing
of our identification assays (laboratory tests that detect selected
biological agents), subsystem and system level testing in test chambers
using actual threat agents, and open-air testing of simulated agents in
as near an operational environment as possible. In addition, the
BioWatch Quality Assurance Program has analyzed over 30,400 samples to
monitor operations against performance benchmarks and requirements. The
results of these tests reinforce confidence in the system's ability to
achieve its mission: detecting a large-scale aerosol release of
specific threat agents in our Nation's most populated areas.
The system's capability to detect biological agents was further
affirmed last year when BioWatch detected the subtype of Francisella
tularensis that is pathogenic to humans during confirmed occurrences of
that strain of Tularemia in Denver, Colorado. Though the agent was not
disseminated by an adversary, these detections took place during a
documented uptick in naturally occurring disease. By analyzing
available medical surveillance data and discussing the BioWatch
detections through the BioWatch National Conference Call, local, state,
and Federal officials were provided with additional data for decision
support in responding to this occurrence of Tularemia. This shows that
the BioWatch Program is able to detect an airborne biological agent in
the environment.
The BioWatch Program is more than just an environmental detection
system. BioWatch also helps strengthen jurisdictional preparedness in
the event of a bioterrorism event through coordinating exercises and
drills; providing training, guidance and assessments, and standardized
methodologies for response; and by enabling a forum for all levels of
government to share data and information. Over 500 state and local
partners and stakeholders representing a broad cross section of
government agencies have participated in BioWatch preparedness
activities in the last year. BioWatch has also coordinated
environmental assessment activities, including developing initial
environmental sampling plans for jurisdictions to help characterize an
attack. All of the program's key elements--including response--are
supported by a number of Federal departments and agencies, such as the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) including the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of Defense (DoD),
Environmental Protection Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.
BioWatch also supports major events such as Super Bowls and National
Special Security Events (e.g., 2015 papal visit to three U.S. cities).
Since 2014, BioWatch has been working with DHS S&T, DoD, and other
Federal partners to identify technologies that would substantially
improve BioWatch operations. These improvements are intended to advance
the current ``detect to treat'' capability, which will enable us to
deploy medical countermeasures before the affected population is
symptomatic. Additionally, BioWatch and the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center are working together to improve situational
awareness at all levels of government in the event of a biological
attack.
Given the evolving threats that our Nation faces, both manmade and
natural, greater coordination among Federal, state, local, tribal, and
territorial partners is required. The National Biosurveillance
Integration Center, or NBIC, is uniquely situated within DHS to provide
a fusion of human health, animal health, and environmental data to
develop a comprehensive understanding of the biological threat
landscape and emerging incidents to ensure our Nation's decision-makers
have timely, accurate, and actionable information.
Established in 2004 and transitioned to OHA in 2007, NBIC's mission
is to enable early warning and shared situational awareness of acute
biological events and support better decisions through rapid
identification, characterization, localization, and tracking for
biological events of national significance. To accomplish this, NBIC
monitors thousands of data sources and leverages the expertise of
fourteen Federal departments and agencies, then integrates this array
of information into reports on global and national biological incidents
that could potentially cause economic damage, social disruption, or
loss of life. Over 900 Federal and 1,500 state, local, tribal, and
territorial offices across this spectrum of human, animal, and
environmental health and response have access to NBIC's reports and
analysis.
We are cognizant that reports by the Government Accountability
Office and the Blue Ribbon Panel on Biodefense have acknowledged the
progress that NBIC has made delivering daily situational awareness to
our partners, but have pointed out that we still have work to do to
fully realize the vision of comprehensive biosurveillance integration.
Towards this end, NBIC is working with the Department of Veterans
Affairs on a data initiative that will help to create an aggregated
national view of disease trends, while also facilitating understanding
of those trends in our veteran population. Similarly, NBIC is working
with DoD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency to deploy new collaboration
and analytic tools that will enable biosurveillance analysts from
across the government to collaboratively examine and report on emerging
biological threats. NBIC's efforts are also focused on biosurveillance
tools and reporting for local officials so that they can address the
biological incidents emerging in their own communities, while
strengthening national surveillance as a whole. NBIC will continue to
advance its capacity to conduct biosurveillance reporting and analysis
by developing new collaboration tools, pursuing innovative data sources
and methods, and fostering greater stakeholder engagement.
Requested fiscal year 2017 funding for the Department's biological
detection and surveillance activities will enable OHA to continue
biodetection operations and training in major metropolitan areas,
pursue needed technological advances, and facilitate greater
collaboration with Federal partners to improve the quality of national
biosurveillance analysis and reporting.
Health and Emerging Infectious Diseases
The Department's workforce health protection and emerging
infectious disease programs build connections between current and
emerging health and medical issues. Our highly skilled health and
medical experts help improve DHS planning for CBRNE threats, as well as
provide expertise on medical and health issues impacting the DHS
workforce and those under DHS care and custody.
OHA emergency medical services (EMS) experts are focused on
improving the Nation's ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover
from a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other catastrophic
emergency. We achieve this by collaborating with national organizations
and government entities to help identify EMS system needs and possible
solutions, engaging stakeholders nationwide, and managing an EMS system
for DHS.
As an example, in 2015, OHA led the development of Federal guidance
to help first responders save lives during an improvised explosive
device or active shooter event. The guidance, First Responder Guidance
for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or
Active Shooter Incidents, translates evidence-based response strategies
from the U.S. military's vast experience in responding to and managing
casualties from IED and/or active shooter incidents into the civilian
first responder environment.
Currently, OHA is working with the White House on Stop the Bleed, a
campaign to educate Americans on how to control life-threatening
bleeding before emergency medical care arrives. Stop the Bleed was born
out of recommendations from the National Security Council's Bystander
Working Group, and was launched on October 6, 2015, at a White House
stakeholder event. The Bystander Working Group was composed of both
public and private sector entities. DHS is coordinating external
communications for the initiative and advising on training curriculum
content for bystander courses under development by Federal and
nongovernmental organizations.
OHA will use fiscal year 2017 resources to continue its support for
state, local, and DHS EMS systems, complete the replacement of a new
electronic patient care record system for DHS EMS providers, and
support a voluntary first responder anthrax vaccine pilot initiative.
OHA's health security intelligence enterprise integrates public
health with law enforcement and intelligence community partners,
including at state and local fusion centers and by facilitating
clearances for public health stakeholders. OHA recently launched a
nationwide suspicious activity reporting training program for health
professionals to assist in understanding the critical role they can
play in identifying and reporting suspicious activities. With requested
fiscal year 2017 funding, we will continue to connect these worlds and
strengthen the relationship between health and security to enhance
preparedness efforts.
Finally, the DHS mission depends entirely on its greatest asset--
the men and women of the Department who are responsible for keeping our
Nation safe. OHA plays a key role in maintaining a healthy and
resilient DHS workforce by anticipating occupational health threats and
providing expert medical guidance to DHS and component leadership on
medical and health issues impacting the DHS workforce. One aspect of
this is the Department's Medical Countermeasures Program, which helps
protect DHS workers from biological threats so that they can continue
securing the homeland during a biological event. fiscal year 2017
funding will allow current occupational health activities to continue,
including peer-support and stress management programs to enhance
employee resilience and suicide prevention.
Conclusion
In summary, requested fiscal year 2017 funding will enable OHA to
continue working to enhance the Homeland's health security capabilities
by developing guidance tools and implementing best practices;
strengthen the Nation's ability to anticipate, prevent, characterize,
and respond to chemical or biological incidents; and continue providing
the analyses, assessments, and surveillance data needed to inform and
guide Federal, state, and local decisionmaking regarding the health and
medical consequences of homeland security incidents.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you.
And now, Director Gowadia.
STATEMENT OF DR. HUBAN GOWADIA, DIRECTOR
Dr. Gowadia. Good afternoon, Chairman Hoeven, Ranking
Member Shaheen, and Senator Tester. Thank you for the
invitation to testify with my colleagues from the Department of
Homeland Security in support of the President's 2017 budget
request.
The request includes almost $152 million in the new common
appropriations structure, research and development to defend
the homeland against the threat of nuclear terrorism. This
appropriation supports transformational applied research,
detection capability and assessments, as well as nuclear
forensics.
DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE
At DNDO, our singular focus is preventing nuclear
terrorism. We are charged with and committed to advancing our
Nation's technological edge to deter and defeat sophisticated
and agile adversaries against this threat.
In this endeavor, we are responsible by presidential
directive and congressional mandate for conducting an
aggressive transformational program of research and development
to generate and improve technologies to detect nuclear and
other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control.
We are also tasked with advancing technologies to facilitate
the rapid and accurate attribution of the source of interdicted
nuclear materials.
DNDO by design applies a holistic end-to-end approach to
countering nuclear terrorism, beginning with a comprehensive
understanding of the threat.
By integrating annual assessments of capabilities gaps and
technology maturity with operational requirements, we are able
to appropriately balance our resource allocations to develop
material and nonmaterial solutions. We are authorized to
conduct research, develop and test evaluation, and acquire
radiation detectors for use by DHS operational components, such
as CBP, Coast Guard, and TSA.
The President's 2017 budget request includes $104 million
for acquisition of nuclear detection systems for the Department
of Homeland Security.
The key to executing this end-to-end approach is DNDO's
solution development process. It is our mechanism for managing
programs in compliance with DHS acquisition policy and
processes set forth by the Department's joint requirements
council.
DNDO's process incorporates best practices for lifecycle
management acquisition programs and ensures the continuous
involvement of all operational partners.
When a new technology is deemed necessary to resolve a
capability need, we engage with partners across the R&D
community, including our Federal agencies, Department of
Energy's national laboratories, academia, industry, and
international partners. These collaborations allow us to
leverage developments from across the science and technology
community and minimize redundant efforts.
Our strategy is to fund early research to lower the
technical risk and deliver mature proofs of concept to
industry, enabling their investments in engineering development
to deliver acquisition-ready products. Industry is thereby able
to rapidly develop and improve technologies, and we are able to
stimulate innovation for the nuclear detection mission.
Because DNDO is authorized and appropriated to take a
comprehensive approach to this challenging mission, from threat
analysis to systems acquisition, we are able to seamlessly
transition technologies from bench to field for operational
use, and thereby provide best value for Federal resources.
For example, DNDO led the development of the next-
generation radioisotope identification device. Working closely
with our partners, we identified key operational requirements
that drove the new system design. Based on an enhanced
detection material and improved algorithms, this new technology
is easy to use, lightweight, and more reliable. Because it has
built-in collaboration and diagnostics, it has much lower
annual maintenance costs.
We are also seeing progress with R&D projects in nuclear
forensics. For instance, DNDO recently completed the
development of laboratory-scale plutonium and uranium
processing capabilities that will allow us to generate nuclear
forensics signatures and understand the link between material
characteristics and the originating production process.
It is essential that we are able to identify the origin of
these special nuclear materials to support the United States
Government's commitment to hold accountable anyone that enables
terrorists to obtain or use such weapons of mass destruction.
Despite significant progress, our enduring technical grand
challenges remain and require sustained investment. We need
cost-effective equipment with sufficient technical performance
to ensure widespread deployment. We need next-generation
technologies to search wide areas and capabilities for
radiation scanning in challenging pathways, such as between
ports of entry along our land and sea borders.
We also need technologies that can detect special nuclear
material that is shielded, and enhanced technologies to rapidly
and accurately determine the provenance of seized materials.
So the President's 2017 budget request includes investments
in R&D to bring to bear technologies and innovation to further
the Nation's nuclear detection and forensics capabilities.
Thank you for your sustained and strong support for the
Department of Homeland Security efforts to counter nuclear
terrorism.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Huban A. Gowadia
Chairman Hoeven, Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today to testify
with my esteemed colleagues from the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) in support of the President's fiscal year (FY) 2017
Budget. The President's budget request includes $151.6 million for
research and development (R&D) to defend the Homeland against the
threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism. The Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) is charged with and is committed to advancing
our Nation's technological edge to defeat sophisticated and agile
adversaries against this threat, principally through nuclear detection
and technical nuclear forensics.
My testimony today will center on the President's fiscal year 2017
budget request for R&D under DNDO's purview, as well as the process by
which we carry out these functions. It will also highlight recent
accomplishments attributable to our current R&D model.
Three themes underpin my testimony. First, our R&D successes are
the result of our end-to-end approach that enables a thorough
understanding of the threat, operational issues, and available
technologies. Second, healthy collaboration with the user community and
research partners enables the exchange of information essential to make
progress. Third, while we have our share of technical expertise, the
critical mass of technical capability resides in our national
laboratories, academia, and industry, and we have focused a great deal
of our efforts to sustain the technical expertise for future advances.
mission and authorities
As stated in the President's National Security Strategy, ``No
threat poses as grave a danger to our security and well-being as the
potential use of nuclear weapons and materials by irresponsible states
or terrorists.'' The potentially catastrophic effects of a nuclear
detonation, whether executed by a state or a non-state actor, would
have far-reaching impacts on our Nation and the world.
Recognizing the grave threat of nuclear terrorism, DNDO was
established in 2005 via National Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD)-43/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-14 and
subsequently authorized via the Security and Accountability For Every
(SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-347) to ``serve as the primary
entity of the United States Government to further develop, acquire, and
support the deployment of an enhanced domestic system to detect and
report on attempts to import, possess, store, transport, develop, or
use an unauthorized nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or
radiological material in the United States, and improve that system
over time.'' The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was
established within DNDO in 2006 by NSPD-17/HSPD-4 and was authorized by
the 2010 Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act (Public Law 111-140) to
``ensure an enduring national technical nuclear forensics capability to
strengthen the collective response of the United States to nuclear
terrorism or other nuclear attacks.'' DNDO is responsible for
conducting an aggressive, expedited, evolutionary, and transformational
program of R&D to generate and improve technologies to detect and
prevent the illicit entry, transport, assembly, or potential use within
the United States of a nuclear explosive device or fissile or
radioactive material. DNDO is also responsible for advancing
technologies to accurately and rapidly attribute the source of
interdicted nuclear materials.
DNDO's R&D efforts cover four mission areas: Transformational R&D,
Nuclear Forensics, Detection Capability Development, and Detection
Capability Assessment.
transformational r&d
Within Transformational R&D, DNDO manages four programs spanning
basic research, applied research, and technology development:
--Advancing the fundamental knowledge in nuclear detection and
forensics, the Academic Research Initiative (ARI) focuses on
basic and early applied R&D to address key challenges and at
the same time educate the next generation of scientists and
engineers. The President's fiscal year 2017 request for the
initiative is $11.8M and will include such work as transferring
large solid state and no-power neutron detectors necessary for
detecting nuclear material such as plutonium to industry
partners for covert and extended life operations. Additionally,
the budget request for the program will continue to support
over 100 students at over 30 universities.
--Assessing the feasibility of promising R&D concepts, the
Exploratory Research Program (ER) focuses on later applied R&D
through laboratory proof-of-concept demonstrations. The budget
request for the program in fiscal year 2017 is $26.1M and will
include work such as the demonstration of compact and
inexpensive betatron x-ray sources to enable highly mobile non-
intrusive inspection systems to detect shielded threats.
--Building on R&D concepts previously demonstrated under the ER or
other R&D efforts, the Advanced Technology Demonstration
Program (ATD) further develops these technologies and
characterizes them in a simulated or controlled operational
environment to assess performance and operational utility. The
President's fiscal year 2017 request is $24.1M for the Advanced
Technology Demonstration program and will include work such as
the operational assessment of a machine learning algorithm to
further reduce nuisance alarms in radiation portal monitors.
--The purpose of the Small Business Innovation Research Program
(SBIR) is to stimulate technological innovation by
strengthening the role of innovative small business concerns in
federally funded R&D. The program has been successful in
transitioning near-term solutions into commercial products or
services, such as the development of a fast neutron detector
material called stilbene. In fiscal year 2017, the program will
support 13 projects, which will include transitioning thallium
bromide detectors for radiation pagers to a proof-of-concept.
The portfolios include materials development and supporting
technology, radiation detection techniques, shielded threat detection,
advanced analytics, and nuclear forensics. The President's fiscal year
2017 budget request for Transformational R&D is $64.8M.
nuclear forensics
DNDO's Nuclear Forensics portfolio is organized into three mission
areas: operational readiness, technology advancement, and nuclear
forensics expertise development. The fiscal year 2017 request for
Nuclear Forensics is $20.6M and includes programs such as:
--The Technology Advancement Program benchmarks and advances
forensics methodologies to provide well-understood results and
develops signatures and data evaluation tools to support
attribution assessments. These methods and signatures are
provided to operators in the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and intelligence
community. The President's fiscal year 2017 request is $9.6M
for the Technology Advancement Program and will include such
work as the operation of laboratory-scale processing
capabilities that produce uranium and plutonium materials for
forensics signatures.
--The National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program
addresses the enduring challenge of sustaining a preeminent
workforce of scientists and engineers in nuclear forensics-
related specialties. The program consists of Graduate
Fellowships, Post-Doc Fellowships, Summer Internships, a
Nuclear Forensics Research Award, and an Early-Career Award.
The President's fiscal year 2017 request of $5.0M will support
a total of 39 awards.
detection capability development
DNDO's Detection Capability Development portfolio addresses the
development of technical solutions for detecting nuclear and other
radioactive material in various operational environments and along
challenging pathways. The following programs are among the activities
of Detection Capability Development, for which the President has
requested $21.5M:
--The International Rail Program (IRAIL) analyzes options, develops a
programmatic approach for implementing solutions, and generates
requirements and solutions for detecting and identifying
illicit nuclear or other radioactive materials entering the
United States via freight rail cargo through the 31 ports of
entry identified in the Trade Act of 2002 (Public Law 107--
210). The President's fiscal year 2017 request is $3.1M and
will support activities for detection solutions for freight
rail cargo.
--The Aerial Detection Program seeks to provide a capability via an
aircraft-borne detection system during intelligence-driven
operations to detect and intercept nuclear and other
radioactive threats at distances far removed from major
population centers and critical infrastructure, and with faster
response times than interdictions made via boats and cutters.
The President's fiscal year 2017 request of $3.1M will include
system development activities to determine operational
effectiveness and suitability of currently-available commercial
products.
detection capability assessments
DNDO's Detection Capability Assessments portfolio supports the R&D
and acquisition process for mission-related capabilities. The
President's request for fiscal year 2017 for Detection Capability
Assessments is $44.7M, and the following programs are a subset of those
activities:
--The Test and Evaluation Program conducts rigorous assessment of
radiological and nuclear detection capabilities to inform
acquisition decisions and to develop and implement effective
concepts of operation. The President's fiscal year 2017 request
of $17.8M will include the planning, execution, and reporting
of 11 test campaigns.
--The Studies and Infrastructure Program objectively assesses the
effectiveness and performance of global nuclear detection
architecture programs and processes. The program also supports
the development and maintenance of radiological and nuclear
detection standards and associated conformity testing. The
President's fiscal year 2017 request is $9.4M and will include
work such as the publication of advanced radiography and aerial
radiation detection technical capability standards.
--The Operational Readiness Assessments Program evaluates deployed
systems and operations as well as the performance of detection
technologies in operationally-relevant and controlled
environments. The President's fiscal year 2017 request of $8.6M
will include work such as piloting a computer application that
analyzes radiation portal monitor scans for reducing nuisance
alarms, simplifying alarm adjudication, and increasing threat
sensitivity.
strategic approach
To successfully detect, interdict, and conduct nuclear forensics on
nuclear and other radioactive material, it is essential that we rely on
the critical triad of intelligence, law enforcement, and technology. To
maximize the Nation's ability to detect and interdict a threat, it is
imperative that we apply detection technologies in operations that are
driven by intelligence indicators, and place them in the hands of well-
trained law enforcement and public safety officials. Similarly, to
enhance attribution capabilities, the U.S. Government (USG) must ensure
that information from intelligence, law enforcement, and technical
nuclear forensics is synthesized to identify the origin of the material
or device and the perpetrators.
Addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism requires a whole-of-
government approach, with partners at all levels of government. At the
Federal level, U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG), and the Transportation Security Administration play a critical
role in countering nuclear threats at our borders, in aviation and
maritime environments, and in our domestic transportation system.
Similarly, at the state and local level, law enforcement and public
safety partners are essential to the detection and interdiction of
nuclear threats in their areas of operation and jurisdiction. DNDO aims
to dramatically evolve nuclear detection and technical nuclear
forensics capabilities and to further reduce the cost of advanced
technology without causing operational burden to operators.
The initial R&D investment in nuclear and radiological detection
devices is extremely more costly than most other products. It is
therefore imperative that DNDO fund early research to lower the
technical risk and raise the readiness of the material or technology to
a point where industry is willing to absorb the remaining risk and
develop a product. Thus, DNDO invests in innovative, high-risk, early-
stage technologies, subsequently transitioning them to industry for
commercialization. This positions DNDO to acquire fully integrated
systems once they are commercially available. This approach not only
enables industry to rapidly improve detection technologies and enhance
existing products, but it also stimulates industry to innovate in this
mission space. DNDO has successfully transferred many technologies to
industry for direct commercialization.
Recognizing that some solutions may not require government
development, DNDO now uses a ``commercial first'' acquisition strategy,
engaging first with the private sector for existing solutions and only
moving to a government-sponsored and managed development effort if
necessary. This approach leverages industry-led innovation, takes
advantage of industry's innate flexibility and ability to rapidly
improve technologies, and reduces government-funded development
efforts. In some cases, shifting to commercial-based acquisitions will
reduce the total time to test, acquire, and field technology.
process
DNDO applies a holistic, end-to-end approach to countering nuclear
terrorism, beginning with a comprehensive understanding of the threat,
including the material, the device, and the adversary. We integrate
planning, research and technology development, testing and evaluation,
and technology acquisition, with operational support to Federal, state,
and local operators. For detection, our end-to-end approach begins with
the development of an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture,
which is a framework for detecting, analyzing, and reporting on nuclear
and other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control.
Likewise, through the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center, DNDO
integrates planning, R&D, and operational readiness to improve the
USG's nuclear forensics capabilities.
DNDO's approach enables seamless integration of R&D programs into
the full systems engineering lifecycle from identification of a
technology need to deployment of a system to the field. Our Solution
Development Process provides the mechanism to manage programs in
compliance with DHS acquisition life cycle stage gates, effectively
integrating these programs within the appropriate governance
frameworks, and successfully applying the best practices of industry
and government. We are participating in the reconstituted DHS Joint
Requirements Council as it works to assess joint requirements for
several investment portfolios.
The Solutions Development Process is focused on the execution of an
individual solution development from gap identification to post
deployment activities. The first stage involves an analysis whereby
gaps in the global nuclear detection architecture and technical nuclear
forensics are identified and prioritized. Recognizing the continually
evolving threat and the framework of defense, DNDO annually reviews
multiple sources, including the global nuclear detection architecture
analysis process (which includes threat modeling and risk assessment),
guidance from the national technical nuclear forensics community,
direct end-user interaction, recommendations from external portfolio
reviews, and interactions with other USG R&D organizations.
Next, the identified gaps and needs from the first stage are
translated to prioritized programmatic needs to inform DNDO's budget
formulation and decision process. The results of the gap analyses
provide both concepts for specific topic areas, as well as perspective
on other research areas that could broadly address a range of
capability gaps. These gaps translate into the long-standing technical
grand challenges, which ultimately form the research areas that make up
DNDO's R&D portfolio.
In subsequent stages, a given solution progresses from planning and
analysis to a selection of options. Typically, program documentation
required as part of these stages include a Mission Needs Statement,
Analysis of Alternatives, and Operational Requirements Documents, all
of which require close end-user collaboration. As it relates to R&D,
DNDO continually engages stakeholders to better understand DHS end-user
operations and nuclear detection requirements to inform R&D. Following
the planning and selection stages, DNDO, jointly with operators,
defines solution requirements and implements design, development, and
testing. This is followed by the procurement and deployment of a system
based on life cycle costs. DNDO also performs a post-implementation
review to examine the systems deployed to the field. At each stage of
the Solutions Development Process, the Governance Review Board,
comprised of DNDO leadership and operational partners, conducts
corresponding reviews to assess the health of the program.
One example of a capability that matriculated through the Solutions
Development Process is the development of a next-generation
radioisotope identification device. We worked closely with our partners
to identify key operational requirements that drove the new system
design. Based on an enhanced detection material, lanthanum bromide, and
improved algorithms, this new handheld technology is easy-to-use,
lightweight, and more reliable. Because it has built-in calibration and
diagnostics, it has a much lower annual maintenance cost.
Another example that demonstrates DNDO's end-to-end approach is the
joint effort between CBP and DNDO to address the high volume of
nuisance alarms generated by deployed radiation portal monitors at our
ports of entry. Under DNDO's Radiation Portal Monitor Program, DNDO and
CBP implemented a new approach using Revised Operational Settings (ROS)
to deployed portal monitors. This collaboration and effort resulted in
an average reduction of approximately 75 percent of nuisance alarms
without sacrificing detector performance against threat materials,
allowing officers in the field to redirect their time to other high
priority law enforcement duties. The fiscal year 2017 budget request
for R&D includes work to continue to improve processes to further
reduce nuisance alarms.
collaborations and partnerships
Research and development of new or improved capabilities to aid in
nuclear defense and countering the threat of nuclear terrorism
principally rests with three organizations: DHS's DNDO, the Department
of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development, and the
Department of Defense's (DoD) Defense Threat Reduction Agency. All have
substantial, well-focused R&D programs that address technical gaps in
threat detection and interdiction capability, focused on the unique
needs of their respective mission areas and stakeholders. Further, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence plays an important
intelligence and operational role in supporting the interagency
research agenda.
The interagency works jointly to assure the highest caliber
research is solicited and selected by the Federal Government. These
activities include advance sharing of potential research topics, and
supporting each other's solicitation processes through technical advice
and joint proposal reviews. Specific recent examples include
collaborations with the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
(DARPA) SIGMA program on distributed radiation detection networks and
DNDO's collaboration with the New York City Police Department on the
Radiation Awareness and Interdiction Network (RAIN) Advanced Technology
Demonstration.
Within DHS, DNDO collaborates and coordinates with the USCG R&D
Center and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), which performs
R&D to support other DHS mission areas such as explosive detection.
Some of the technologies developed by S&T can be utilized to detect
radiological or nuclear threats. For example, if S&T develops a Non-
Intrusive Inspection (NII) x-ray scanner to more effectively detect
drugs, explosives, or other contraband, these devices may also be
effective in detecting radiological and nuclear threats. Further, DNDO
also fully and actively supports relevant Integrated Product Teams led
by S&T, including one on border security.
DNDO also works closely with international partners on R&D through
bilateral project arrangements. Two examples include:
--United Kingdom: DNDO and the U.K. Home Office are jointly
developing and evaluating three transformational imaging and
radiation detection technologies for cargo scanning at ports of
entry and departure, one of which is also in collaboration with
S&T.
--Singapore: DNDO and the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs
conducted an operational trial in Singapore of the DNDO
developed RadMap System, which can detect and localize
radioactive materials while moving, as well as overlay
radiation data with visual and laser imaging data to enable a
3D reconstruction of the environment.
DNDO continues to work with international stakeholders with similar
radiological and nuclear detection goals and national capabilities in
the area of R&D. Leveraging agreements between DHS and foreign
organizations will allow DNDO to identify areas of mutual concern and
compare research portfolios to minimize overlap in parallel efforts and
maximize the breadth of R&D being done across mutual portfolios.
measuring progress
To gauge the success of DNDO's R&D programs we internally track
metrics that are indicative of progress and sponsor external reviews to
assess the health and balance of our R&D portfolio. DNDO internally
tracks the following metrics: program milestones, technology readiness
level advancements, publications in peer-reviewed journals,
presentations at recognized scientific conferences, intellectual
property, licenses for software, awards in recognition of scientific
achievements, and the number of students supported. Some of these
metrics provide information about the progress and technological
maturity of the projects and can also be used to assess the viability
of technology transitions. Others indicate the ability to disseminate
information to the broader scientific community and give insight into
DNDO's efforts to cultivate the next generation of scientists and
engineers for the nuclear-related missions. For example, DNDO's Chief
Scientist patented a method and device for detecting moving radiation
sources. The technique detects radioactive sources that are in motion
and facilitates the rapid and accurate identification of the source of
radioactive material. This invention is intended for use at seaports
and border crossings that screen cargo containers, vehicles, or
pedestrians for nuclear or other radioactive materials and in mobile
radiation detectors deployed in search operations.
Additionally, we sponsor external reviews of our R&D portfolio and
will continue to do so in the future. For example, in 2013 and 2015,
DNDO sponsored reviews by an independent party to assess DNDO's
existing R&D plan and portfolio, evaluating the composition,
positioning, and health of the portfolio as a whole against the
strategic objectives of DNDO. The review committee consisted of subject
matter experts, customers, interagency R&D partners, and DNDO
management.
accomplishments
Over the last several years DNDO investments in R&D have resulted
in technologies that have transitioned from laboratories to commercial
products used for homeland security. Some of those examples are listed
below:
--Neutron Detectors for Portal Monitors: DNDO research directly
facilitated the development of new materials to address the
critical shortage of helium-3, the primary material used by
radiation detectors to detect neutrons.\1\ Several different
concepts were developed and evaluated, e.g., boron-coated straw
proportional counters, and are now commercially available. The
alternative materials outperform helium-3 and are less
expensive and more sustainable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Neutrons, in addition to gamma-rays, are key indicators of
materials used in nuclear weapons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Combined Gamma and Neutron Detector Material: DNDO research
directly facilitated the development of cesium lithium yttrium
chloride (CLYC), a single scintillator material capable of both
gamma and neutron detection.\2\ Previously two different
detector materials had to be used, and sensors using CLYC are
now commercially available in detectors that are more compact,
lower power, lower cost, and more rugged than in the past. Due
to its ability to detect neutrons as well as gamma rays, CLYC
now stands as a viable helium-3 replacement for handheld
detectors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Some nuclear materials emit more gamma rays, and others emit
more neutrons. Having one detector material that is sensitive to both
of these primary emissions is advantageous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Small Business-Developed Detector Material: Through the Small
Business Innovation Research Program, DNDO supported the
development of an improved process for the manufacture of
stilbene, a fast neutron detector material.\3\ This is now
available in the United States at lower cost and with improved
performance. Previously, it had only been available from
sources in the Ukraine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Fast neutrons emitted by nuclear material contain energy
information that is helpful in identifying the source material. The
advancement in fast neutron detection could lead to better
identification equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Automated Threat Recognition Software: The DNDO-developed Auto-ZTM
algorithm analyzes X-ray radiography images of cargo to
identify the objects that may be high-Z materials \4\ and
provides a visual ``alarm'' to the operator, noting the
suspicious objects in the image. To date, CBP has acquired and
fielded 11 systems that are equipped with Auto-ZTM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``Z'' refers to the atomic number of an element, equal to the
number of protons. ``High-Z'' materials include lead (Z=82), and
nuclear materials like uranium (Z=92) and plutonium (Z=94), in
comparison to carbon (Z=6) or nitrogen (Z=7), and are typically more
dense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Networked Detectors: Prior DNDO efforts related to an Intelligent
Radiation Sensor System led to new electronics, advanced
algorithms, and cell phone integration, enabling commercially
available networked radiation detection systems to be used for
improved wide- area search capabilities. Some of this
technology is also being evaluated by DNDO in collaboration
with the DARPA via their SIGMA program.
--Enabling Imaging Technology: DNDO R&D facilitated the integration
of compact dual- energy x-ray generators with improved density
discrimination and higher shielding penetration into
commercially available mobile radiography systems.
--Plutonium and Uranium Processing Capability: DNDO supported the
development of a laboratory-scale plutonium processing
capability to produce plutonium materials for forensics
signature development. In addition, a similar, laboratory-scale
uranium processing capability completed by DNDO is now
operating to produce uranium materials for signature
development.
next generation of scientists and engineers
DNDO also supports the next generation of scientists and engineers
needed to execute the mission. DNDO invests in such expertise through
the Academic Research Initiative by supporting areas such as advanced
materials, nuclear engineering, radiochemistry, and deterrence theory.
Since inception in 2007, DNDO has awarded 77 grants to 50 academic
institutions, and supported over 400 students.
DNDO's National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program is
another effort to grow and sustain the scientific expertise required to
execute the national technical nuclear forensics mission. The program
has been recognized by the DOE national laboratories, universities, and
the interagency as a major success in restoring the pipeline of nuclear
forensics scientists. Launched in 2008, this effort is a key component
in preventing nuclear terrorism, and DNDO has supported over 300
students and faculty, and 27 universities, since its inception.
Currently, twenty-one students are pursuing their PhDs, along with
16 post-doctoral fellows conducting research at the laboratories.
Undergraduate scholarship and summer school initiatives are proving to
be effective for recruiting future PhD candidates, with 15 new
undergraduate participants each year.
The program's education awards have directly sponsored nuclear
forensics related curriculum development and research partnerships at
15 universities around the country, including the hiring of eight new
tenure-track junior faculty members. A total of 39 new Ph.D. nuclear
forensic scientists are now in the workforce as a direct result of the
program, already exceeding the threshold target of 35 set for 2018.
These scientists are employed at the national laboratories, Federal
agencies, and U.S. universities.
technical grand challenges
Despite the progress we have made in R&D, there are five technical
grand challenges that require sustained investment and are reflected
within DNDO's Transformational R&D portfolio:
--Cost-effective equipment with sufficient technical performance to
ensure widespread deployment;
--Detection of special nuclear material, such as plutonium and
uranium, even when heavily shielded;
--Enhanced wide-area searches in a variety of scenarios, to include
urban and highly cluttered environments;
--Challenging pathways, such as between ports of entry along our land
and sea borders; and
--Determination of the origins and manufacturing processes of seized
material.
The fact that DNDO has supported the development of detector
materials that did not exist in 2005 and which are now commercially
available is a testament to the end-to-end R&D model DNDO applies to
the particular set of challenges for countering nuclear terrorism.
closing
DNDO's R&D is targeted to transform the basic building blocks of
nuclear detection and technical nuclear forensics for dramatic
capability improvements. We are committed to developing technologies
for our partners to assist them in conducting their mission to protect
the Nation more effectively. We engage in an end-to-end process,
understanding the threat and user requirements; funding research,
development, testing, and evaluation; engaging with industry, academia,
and the national laboratories; and supporting the operator in the
field. We seek the optimal solution for the problem at hand, whether it
requires basic research, an off-the-shelf component, or a non-materiel
capability. We are building not only equipment and capabilities, but
also a trained workforce for the future.
While we have seen significant results and promising technologies,
technical challenges remain and the threat landscape continues to
evolve, which necessitates continual evaluation of current and future
needs and R&D investments and innovations. To this end, DNDO will
continue to work with the interagency, national laboratories,
international partners, industry, and academia to maximize the return
on Federal investment.
Thank you for your continued interest in and support for these
efforts.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Director.
We will now go to questions. We will have 5-minute rounds.
Senator Tester, would you like to proceed?
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Senator Tester. I would like to. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the flexibility.
And thank you, Ranking Member Shaheen, for the same.
We are going to stay with you, Dr. Gowadia, as long as you
just got done talking. You talk in your testimony about working
closely with international partners on R&D through bilateral
arrangements. You specify the United Kingdom and Singapore. Can
you tell me how many other international partners you have that
you are working with on bilateral agreements?
Dr. Gowadia. I do not have the exact number off the top of
my head, Senator Tester. But we have U.K., Sweden, Singapore--
--
Senator Tester. So what you can do is just get that to me
in writing.
Dr. Gowadia. Certainly.
[The information follows:]
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has bilateral
agreements on research and development, through the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security Science & Technology Directorate, with the following
countries:
--Canada
--Israel
--Singapore
--Sweden
--United Kingdom
Additionally, DNDO has bilateral agreements for cooperative
activity in science and technology, operations, and policy for homeland
security matters, also through the Science & Technology Directorate,
with the following countries:
--Australia
--Canada
--France
--Germany
--Israel
--Mexico
--Netherlands
--Singapore
--Sweden
--United Kingdom
DETECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Senator Tester. And if these are agreements that are in
process, or if you are trying to establish them.
The second question I have for you, very briefly, in your
technical grand challenges, detection of nuclear material,
plutonium and uranium, even when they are heavily shielded. How
close are you to being able to do that detection?
Dr. Gowadia. Senator, we do already have capabilities where
we can detect this material using active interrogation
techniques, such as x-ray systems, et cetera. The goal and the
challenge is to be able to do this in environments where we do
not have to use 10 MeV energy rays, for example.
Senator Tester. How close are you to getting there?
Dr. Gowadia. It is hard to predict invention, but we have
developed smaller scale systems, and we will be fielding them
very shortly.
Senator Tester. Okay.
Dr. Gowadia. Importantly, we have developed algorithms that
already ride on systems for today that can do some of this.
RANDOMIZER PROGRAM
Senator Tester. Okay, thank you.
Under Secretary Brothers, the TSA spent about $1.4 million
on a PreCheck (Pre\TM\) randomizer program, a pretty
simple program. I think my 11-year-old granddaughter could have
probably done the program. Nonetheless, $1.4 million was spent
on it.
When I was in the State legislature, we had the same
problem, IT projects that we are farming out to IT companies,
and it seems like we get fleeced a lot more often than we do
not. I am not saying there was a fleecing on the randomizer,
but the fact is that it is a pretty simple thing to be paying
$1.4 million.
Could you just talk about, is most of DHS software stuff
farmed out to private contractors, at this point in time?
Dr. Brothers. I cannot speak to the other components. I can
speak to the kind of work that we do.
Senator Tester. Yes, your IT work.
Dr. Brothers. We do have some IT folks internal. We do farm
some of it out, as you put it, as well. A lot of the IT
software we have is commercially developed.
With respect to some of the algorithm design that we might
do, that is done in laboratories, small businesses, industry,
et cetera.
Senator Tester. By DHS, where they take a program and tweak
it by you guys? Or do you take a standard program and does it
go to an outside source for that tweaking?
Dr. Brothers. Typically, the way we do our job is we
identify needs. We then, through standard solicitation
vehicles, identify potential solution providers. And then we
fund those solution providers. Then through a rigorous method
of evaluating the contracting process, we----
Senator Tester. Yes, so the solution providers are outside
DHS?
Dr. Brothers. Yes.
Senator Tester. The DHS opinion, and I know there are a lot
of folks that want to privatize portions of government, and in
some places it is the right thing to do, in IT's case, it is
your position that this is more financially efficient than
keeping it in-house?
Dr. Brothers. What I can say is that, as you probably know,
there is a tremendous amount of development in the IT space
right now. If you look at where industry is going, there is
tremendous explosion in that type of work as well as investment
of those kinds of dollars. It is hard for DHS or other
government agencies to match that level of investment that the
private sector has.
Senator Tester. Okay. I got you.
It just sometimes makes me wonder. I get the off-the-shelf
stuff, a program is taking care of that has already been built.
There's no need to reinvent the wheel. But, oftentimes, you
spend a lot of money, and we do not end up with much, to be
honest with you. It is not just DHS, by the way.
LOW-FLYING RADAR
I want to continue this on low-flying radar, particularly
on the northern border, but it could be everywhere, southern
border, ports, Great Lakes, wherever it may be. I have been
talking about this for a while. It does not seem to be gaining
any traction.
But I was told that, right now, we could not detect an
airplane, for the most part, on our northern border below 5,000
feet. Is that your knowledge?
Dr. Brothers. So I cannot speak in specifics. What I can
say is our borders and maritime division has developed what
they call their small and dark aircraft program. That is
specifically for that type of problem. It is showing much
better performance than----
Senator Tester. I got you. So I live 100 miles from the
northern border. Would you say that that northern border has
access to be able to realize if there are low-flying aircraft
coming across that border?
Dr. Brothers. Could you repeat the question, please?
Senator Tester. I personally live 100 miles south of the
Canadian line. Do we have low-flying radar on that Canadian
line right now?
Dr. Brothers. Let me get back to you about that
specifically. I want to make sure I get you the right answer.
Senator Tester. I can tell you, and you correct me and I
will correct it for the record, I do not think we do.
Here's the problem. You can take a Cessna 182 and fly it
far lower than 5,000 feet, land in an airport in a small town
like I come from, Big Sandy--and I do not want to tell these
guys how to do this--put your credit card in the machine, just
like you do at a self-service fuel pump, fill up and take off,
and we would never know what the hell is going on.
So we spend a lot of money on security, and we should spend
a lot of money on security, because we need to keep our
citizens secure, but this seems like a no-brainer.
So could you get back to me on what is going on?
Dr. Brothers. More than glad to.
[The information follows:]
The radar coverage along the northern border is less than optimal
below 5000 feet. However, in areas not obscured by mountainous terrain,
low level coverage improves. All sensors along the Northern Border are
ground-based and therefore, the curvature of the earth limits the
ability to detect aircraft at lower altitudes. The most significant
limitation to the coverage along the northern border is the mountainous
terrain, particularly in the western United States.
Radar systems along the Northern Border are designed and sited to
address the air traffic management mission, not necessarily to optimize
detection of low flying aircraft of interest to the national defense
and security mission. However, in areas not obscured by terrain, CBP's
Air and Marine Operations Center is able to monitor some of this lower
altitude air traffic. The vast majority of the aircraft crossing the
northern border complies with CBP and FAA regulations. During calendar
years 2013-2015, of the thousands of aircraft that crossed our northern
border, there were 79 aircraft initially reported/detected as unknown,
74 of which were later determined to be non-suspicious by CBP.
Small Dark Aircraft Detection and Timely Interdiction was
identified as a high-priority capability gap in the recent DHS IPT
process. Going forward, S&T will continue to work with CBP and the
interagency to look at ways to improve our air surveillance
capabilities, including the potential use of portable, flexible, wide
area sensor system that detects and accurately tracks low flying, low
observable aircraft such as helicopters, ultra-lights, small fixed wing
general aviation aircraft in the rugged terrain found in many areas
along the Northern Border.
Senator Tester. I am over time. Sorry, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Hoeven. Go ahead and finish.
Senator Tester. Keep going?
Senator Hoeven. Yes, unless you want to come back.
BAGGAGE SCREENERS
Senator Tester. Okay, I will do one more. I have one more
question. It has to do with baggage screeners. Since you are
the guy we are dealing with, Under Secretary Brothers, we will
stick with you.
Baggage screening is something that I am concerned about,
but I do not know that I should be concerned about it. So what
I want to know is, do you believe the technology we have
deployed for baggage scanners is adequate at this point in
time?
Dr. Brothers. I think there is always the issue whenever we
do a project, for example, whenever we develop a technology,
there is always a tradeoff. There is always tradeoff between
security, privacy, security, speed of commerce, these kinds of
things. Whenever we develop technologies and standard operating
procedures, we are always in that tradeoff space.
So one of the things we are working on right now is working
with TSA to develop better algorithms for existing equipment.
We are working with TSA to start thinking about better actual
technologies in the next midterm. And then going forward, how
do we think of better architecture for the entire airport?
Senator Tester. That is good. So that was not my question,
though. My question was, are the baggage scanners we have now
adequate?
Dr. Brothers. The reason I answered that way is because it
depends on what you call sufficient. There is a whole risk-
based architecture we have.
Senator Tester. I fly four legs a week. Should I be
worried?
Dr. Brothers. I think right now, from my perspective, from
a technology perspective, we have some of the best technology
we have out there.
Senator Tester. Okay. Thank you very much.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate all of your testimony. Dr. Brinsfield, I feel
guilty, but we will get you next time.
MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF R&D
Senator Hoeven. Under Secretary Brothers, I would like to
start with you.
How do you measure effectiveness in your R&D efforts? That
is kind of a broad question, but we can pick up with the UAS,
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) example.
Dr. Brothers. Sure.
Senator Hoeven. Take countering the threat of unmanned
aerial systems by adversaries. I mean, Senator Tester brought
up that example. So what are you doing? How do you deal with
that threat? And how do you determine your effectiveness?
Dr. Brothers. Sure. Let me tell you what we have done so
far. We are leading interagency in the science and technology
part of understanding and mitigating the threat due to
unattended air systems. So we have developed a whole-of-
community response.
The whole-of-community response includes an after-action
report from the gyrocopter incident when it landed at the White
House. It includes operating procedures for law enforcement
when they are faced with these types of incidents. And then it
includes a whole technology piece as well.
So in the technology piece, we have looked at a threat
chain. The threat chain is essentially identify, characterize,
track, mitigate, defeat. So that is the threat chain of how we
think about if we are in a situation where we are threatened
with some unattended vehicle.
Then what we are doing is we are looking at each one of
those areas of the threat chain and evaluating existing
commercial technologies in those areas to figure out what is
best.
At the same time, we are working to understand how we would
use those technologies in an architecture to protect an area,
for example, the National Capital Region.
So then, if you start talking about the metrics, what you
are getting at, with respect to these metrics, for the counter-
UAS space, that is something we are working on right now.
We had a workshop, co-hosted with the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) Jet Propulsion Laboratory. This
was several months ago. At that workshop, we actually came up
with a framework for what the test parameters should be for
testing these types of technologies. So we are in the process
of doing that right now.
Senator Hoeven. How do you determine, then, whether you are
going to continue a project or when you discontinue?
Dr. Brothers. Sure. So what I was getting at is what we are
doing with the whole-of-community response for the counter-UAS
problem. With respect to what we are doing with our portfolio
right now, we have a series of review processes. The first
review process is at a lower level, which really has to do with
schedule and budget and technical performance.
So if we identify a problem with those, that is when we
start knowing that we have to take some action.
Then we look at a higher level. The higher level starts
looking at metrics such as customer buy-in; the potential
impact of the capability; if there is a novel approach; the
technical feasibility of this; the transition likelihood, how
likely is it to actually be used by an operator; foraging,
technology foraging, has the program manager actually done a
good job of looking at commercial technologies to see what they
can leverage from that community; and then also whether or not
this is a competency development for the Department, meaning
are we leading in this area or not. So that becomes a more
strategic evaluation of the portfolio.
Going forward from that, then we start looking at what
percentages of our products or initiatives have excellent key
performance parameters. That starts giving us a sense of, okay,
now, do we really have a good sense of how these things are
going to perform for the intended audience?
We start talking about what percentage of these projects
have been independently evaluated. There is a whole list of
metrics that we have that we talk about that we evaluate these
projects on, not just on an individual project basis, but also
on a portfolio basis.
The reason why we do this is because what we want to be
able to do is start thinking about, strategically, is our
portfolio properly shaped? So, for example, if you think in
terms of looking at our portfolio on axes of impact versus
technical feasibility--that is, what kind of impact will they
have for our operators and how technically feasible they are--
then we can plot all of our projects on charts like that. That
then shows us how well we are doing. Are these highly risky
projects? Are they not? Can they have high impact or not?
Then we start thinking about what kind of balance we have
in that space.
Additionally, we can start thinking about individual
performance parameters, as I mentioned earlier. For example,
the capability impact, the customer buy-in, novel approaches.
Then if we start thinking about portfolio in terms of a
multidimensional plot in those terms, we then compare it to
other organizations, because other organizations, whether they
be more operationally focused, their portfolios more
conservative, or their portfolios more aggressive, they will
all show up with a certain multidimensional representation, so
we can compare our portfolios to those.
So now what we have is we have a process that starts at the
very low level on schedule, budget, and technical feasibility,
and goes up to the very strategic level.
Senator Hoeven. I am going to come back and ask that
specifically, then, in regard to technology for TSA, but I am
going to turn to my ranking member first.
EVALUATING PROJECTS
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I have to say, Under Secretary Brothers, I understand that
there is jargon that you use in evaluating projects, but I did
not understand a thing you said just then. So give me an
example that I can relate to, so that I can explain to people.
Again, I understand you have metrics, and there is jargon
in the metrics that tells you something. But if I am talking to
an average voter out there who says, what are they doing at DHS
to prioritize funding and to figure out what works and what
does not, tell me what I should tell them.
Dr. Brothers. Okay. Let me tell you this way. Let me try a
different way, because I understand the issue with jargon, and
I apologize, because I tend to use jargon too often. I am
trying to break myself of that habit. I understand.
Senator Shaheen. I do not like acronyms either.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Brothers. Okay.
So one of the things that we have done, and I mentioned
this in my opening statement, is we set up these integrated
product teams. The purpose of these teams is to figure out what
gaps we have in capabilities across the Department.
So these can be gaps in our ability to do biosurveillance,
for example, and biothreats. These can be gaps in our
persistent surveillance on the border. They can be security
concerns in cyber. They can be aviation security concerns.
So what we do then is we convene groups of the actual
operational personnel, the people who are doing the work, and
say, what are your problems? We then come up with a list of
what these problems are.
We then put our resources against those problems.
Now, regarding the metrics that I mentioned, the reason I
brought that up is because we have a limited budget and we have
a huge mission space. And so we have to figure out what the
best use of the dollars. This IPT process is helping us do
that. We are now focusing on things that the entire Department
says are real problems.
So now all the metrics and jargon and all that stuff, I
apologize for using earlier, it has to do with how well do
those programs fit into those kinds of gaps that we talked
about. Do they really fit those gaps? Do they really fit the
operational tactics, techniques, and procedures that the
operators use in their missions?
So what we do not want to do is create a technology that is
not relevant to the operators. So that is part of the metrics.
Is this really operational? Did we create something that can
actually transition to the operator?
So can I give you an example?
Senator Shaheen. Please.
Dr. Brothers. Okay, here's a story. Let's take these. These
are gloves. These are firemen gloves. So if you look at these,
they are different colors, but otherwise, they do not look very
different.
The point is, we talked to fire chiefs, and they told us
they had a problem. They said the problem is it is hard to get
these gloves on and off, particularly when these things are
wet, it is hard to get these things on and off. It is
particularly hard to get them on and off because we have to
operate equipment. So wouldn't it be great if we could have
gloves that either we don't have to take off, or if we do, they
are easy to get on and off?
That may not sound like a big deal, but it is a huge deal
if you are trying to fight a fire. It is a huge deal.
And so in order for something to transition, it has to meet
a need. So we talked to our fire chiefs who have a need.
Not only that, it has to be affordable. So that is another
metric. Is this thing affordable?
So we said there is not much difference in cost between the
old ones and the new ones. These things are affordable.
So when we talk about metrics, we have to talk about: Is it
solving a real problem? Is it something that the operator is
going to use?
DHS APPROPRIATE R&D VERSES PRIVATE SECTOR
Senator Shaheen. Okay, let me stop you there, because the
other question that I have is, how do we determine what is
appropriate for DHS to do in terms of R&D and what is
appropriate for the private sector?
So we have a company in New Hampshire, Globe Manufacturing,
that does fireman suits. They do that kind of innovation on a
regular basis as part of what they do. So how do you decide
what is appropriate for DHS to do and what is actually out
there filling a need in the private sector?
Dr. Brothers. Sure. So the people that we address, that do
our work, it is what I call an ecosystem. So it is
universities, academia, laboratories, and industry. That is
small and large industry, as well. And part of our job is to
figure out what part of the ecosystem best addresses these
problems. That depends. It just depends.
That is part of what we call technology foraging. We have
been really trying to push that even harder, how to answer the
question you are talking about. How do we know if we should go
to a laboratory, should we go to large industry, should we go
to small industry?
You mentioned in your statement about the Silicon Valley
office. That is part of our effort to reach out to
nontraditional performers, because I think it is essential,
particularly now that you have so many creative people all over
the place, right? You mentioned small businesses, right? Why it
is important to be able to reach out to them.
I have a meeting I think in May up in New England to talk
about the ecosystem up there, the same thing, because it is not
just Silicon Valley, it is all over the country.
We have to figure out how to do a better job of addressing
this ecosystem with our problems.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
Senator Shaheen. My time is up, but can I ask another
follow-up on this?
The other question that I have is how do we determine what
is part of DHS's portfolio and what is part of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), for example, on the Zika
virus?
How do you coordinate, Dr. Brinsfield, with the CDC on what
they are working on and what you are working on? How do we
coordinate, as you are talking about innovation, how do you
coordinate with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) in the Department of Defense (DOD), with respect to the
innovation that they are doing?
So, Dr. Brinsfield, maybe you could talk a little about
that.
Dr. Brinsfield. Sure, absolutely.
So I think we coordinate with the interagency in a number
of ways. One, obviously, at a sort of senior interagency level,
we get together and meet to discuss some of these issues.
We also have regular calls and meetings with our CDC
counterparts. And we participate on the Department of Health
and Human Services' (HHS) public health and emergency
countermeasures group. So for that, we sit and we help them
define what their priorities are and what we see from the
Homeland Security perspective.
When we do research or when we work with S&T to do
research, we are looking at very specific pieces of the puzzle,
pieces that, as the blue ribbon panel defined, fall to DHS.
Even prior Secretary Shalala pointed out that these are things
that fall to the Homeland Security and DHS space.
For that, we are looking specifically at the environmental
detection piece or how we detect biological agents in the air,
and we are looking at how we coordinate human health, animal
health, and environmental health into a single picture, so that
we can better inform our partners, not just in the human health
arena, but across government and in State and local government
as well.
So we are really trying to focus specifically into those
areas that are what we do at DHS.
One piece of that, you asked how we work with other
agencies specific to DOD, some of the demonstration projects
that the National Biosurveillance Integration Center has done
work closely with DOD and have, in fact, used their
biosurveillance ecosystem and are trialing and beta testing
some of their other systems in a public health environment, to
see if there is cross use of some of those systems.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
TSA TECHNOLOGY
Senator Hoeven. Under Secretary Brothers, TSA Director
Neffenger is working to put together people, processes, and
technology, so that we have effective screening that finds and
stops threats, but still is as convenient as possible for the
traveling public. There is a whole variety of things that we
consider, but it is putting together people, processes, and
technology in the right mix to get the best results.
Technology is your area. As you know, we had the inspector
general report. There are some real issues with the technology
that TSA is working. What are you doing on the technology part
to make this work better?
Dr. Brothers. As I was mentioning to Senator Tester, we are
working with Admiral Neffenger. In fact, we have a meeting with
him tomorrow, the working group.
This working group is to really start addressing in the
near, mid, and long term what these solutions should look like.
In the very near term, we are working with industry on
better software, essentially, for the machines. So there were
some vulnerabilities established, and we are working with
industry to develop better algorithms so that the existing
machines actually work better than they are.
In the near term, or maybe the midterm I should say, we are
also working on better scanning equipment. One of the
challenges--I mentioned this as well--is this whole speed
versus security kind of paradigm. So we are working on
different types of screening technology to enable passengers to
actually move more quickly through the checkpoint.
The third thing we are trying to do is start thinking
about, if you actually think about the airport as a single
entity, can you actually disaggregate the checkpoint? Can you
take the different pieces apart and put them in different
places, so that it is more convenient for the traveling public,
and it still provides even greater levels of security?
This is a longer term type of approach, of course.
We are also working with TSA on what they call their
technology lanes. This is at Denver and at JFK airports, where
they are interested in putting in essentially a sandbox of
equipment.
So we are looking at existing equipment, some of this is in
Europe and other places, this could be different types of
baggage handling types of equipment, in the very near term
improve our capabilities in the airports.
So I think we are looking at this holistically from the
entire airport, but also from the very near term of making the
machines that exist right now better in place, and then adding
existing technology to the checkpoint, to other parts of the
airport, improving, coming up with better screening equipment,
and then, like I said, going to other airport architectures.
Senator Hoeven. So this is a very important area and an
area where you can have significant impact. Do you have the
resources and are you partnering with others to do all you can
in this regard?
Dr. Brothers. I believe we do. We are partnering very well.
Like I said, we are about to make sure--both the Admiral and
myself will be at this meeting tomorrow. We are partnering very
closely with TSA. We are also partnering very closely with
industry. So we are reaching out as much as we can.
I think the questions asked earlier about how we are
working with other agencies, we are working across the
interagency on these kinds of issues as well.
TUNNEL DETECTION
Senator Hoeven. How about for Customs and Border Protection
and ICE in the area of tunnel detection and ground-based
sensors? How are you doing?
Dr. Brothers. So, for example, we have an installation of
an underground system, underground fiber, that can be used to
detect motion, essentially, in underground tunnels. So we have
that installed. It is being tested.
We have done a variety of work with underground sensors.
The issue with underground sensors, quite frankly, is how you
improve their probability of detection and decrease their
probability of false alarm. Whether it be animals or people, we
want to make sure it detects the right thing and only the right
thing, because the more often we have false alarms, then it
becomes an operational nightmare.
Senator Hoeven. How are you coming?
Dr. Brothers. Well, there are improvements. I think
unattended underground sensors have been in the works for quite
some time.
Senator Hoeven. I have been out to see them, yes. I mean, I
know some of what you have out there, but you are continuing to
improve?
Dr. Brothers. We are continuing the work, yes.
Senator Hoeven. And you are making progress, in terms of
improving on it?
Dr. Brothers. Exactly.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you.
TSA RANDOMIZER APP
Senator Shaheen. So I want to go back to the issue that
Senator Tester was raising about the randomizer app, because,
according to an Associated Press (AP) story, the TSA paid IBM
$336,413.59 for the mobile application development, which
included the creation of the randomizer app, which someone
pointed out could generally be designed in about 10 minutes for
about $20.
So do you know about this? And how does something like this
happen? And how do we avoid this kind of expense for something
that probably could've been done for much less money?
Dr. Brothers. You know, Senator, I have no details on that.
I think there are always challenges when people write
requirements in these kinds of things, but I can't speak to
that at all.
R&D EFFORTS
Senator Shaheen. So something like this does not
necessarily go through the Science and Technology Office?
Dr. Brothers. I am not aware that this did.
Senator Shaheen. The 2017 budget proposes combining all of
the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
operations and policy development into one office, but the
research and development efforts remain split.
I do not know if this is for you, Dr. Gowadia or Under
Secretary Brothers, but maybe one of you could walk us through
how you divided up that portfolio and put them in different
offices, while all the other operations are proposed to go in
one office. What is the thinking about that?
Dr. Brothers. I could start. We have had a number of
conversations about this.
I think there are different models of R&D, and I think the
model that S&T has, because S&T is fundamentally an
organization that supports the entire Department, the entire
Department. When you think of an organization like that, my
experience shows it is important to have an interdisciplinary
center mass, meaning it is important to have people of
different diverse backgrounds in proximity to one another,
because, for example, when you look at different types of
technologies, when you look at the advances that have been made
in the biological sciences recently, a lot of those advances
are because of advances in mathematics, commuter science, and
these areas. And if people in these different fields weren't
constantly talking, you would not have those kinds of advances.
So for the kind of crosscutting work that S&T does, I think
it is important that the kind of model we have is
interdisciplinary.
Now what we also talked about is the fact that Dr.
Gowadia's organization is very focused. It is very focused. It
is focused on a specific area. This specific area has its own
specific language and technologies and things. So for that, Dr.
Gowadia has an entire integrated process of R&D and
acquisition.
That is my belief why there are two different processes.
Dr. Gowadia. May I expound just a little bit?
When we were going through the process of looking at what
should come into the new CBRNE office and what should not, one
of the driving principles for the reorganization was to
preserve programs and activities that were working. In
acknowledgment of the fact that the model was working for the
rad/nuke portion of the mission space, the Department decided
to keep DNDO intact and move us over into the new CBRNE office
to minimize disruptions to the organization while achieving the
strategic reasons to do the reorganization.
Speaking from the rad/nuke perspective, and I will pick up
a little bit from what Mr. Brothers mentioned, the mission has
a technical element from start to finish. However, not all
solutions are technical. So when we begin to look at a mission
need, when all of our operational partners, whether they are
within the Department, Customs and Border Protection, TSA,
Coast Guard, ICE, Secret Service, or out from our State and
local partners, when they bring us a mission need, we couple
that with a thorough understanding of the threat, understanding
of the weapons, understanding of nuclear materials, and we are
able then to devise a program forward that sometimes needs new
technology and sometimes does not.
Now, the best way to determine whether you want to go down
one path or another is to use an interdisciplinary approach.
But when I say interdisciplinary at this stage, I mean systems
analysts, policy analysts, intel analysts, nuclear physicists
and engineers, law enforcement, military officers. I have
essentially described for you the DNDO work force.
That is the level of interaction that needs to come into
place to decide how you go down the path of developing a
solution.
Now once a technical solution is deemed necessary, we work
with national laboratories, academia, industry. This is where
the interdisciplinary measures that Mr. Brothers referred to
come to bear. So we have physicists, mathematicians, chemists,
all of them working together on the technical solution.
So when we look at this mission, again, from front to end,
there are technical aspects woven all through the whole system.
If we were to disaggregate the rad/nuke mission based on
function, you would have to recreate technical expertise in
multiple directorates, multiple offices across operational
components. And in this day and age with scarce budgets, it
just does not seem efficient to have to duplicate that
capability.
Senator Shaheen. Well, maybe I did not ask the question
very well. That was what I was trying to figure out, was why,
if we are combining all of the other operational aspects of
CBRNE into one office, why are we not combining the R&D part of
that into that office as well? And why are we instead leaving
it within Science and Technology? That is what I am trying to
understand.
Dr. Brothers. So right now, S&T does the chem and bio work
for the Department. Again, we do work for more than just the
BioWatch mission, for example, for bio. We have a number of
different customers. So to take that and put it into this
office, it would not be an efficient use of the kind of work we
do right now, because we support more than just that mission.
Senator Shaheen. Okay, maybe I need to go see it, because
it is still not clear to me why you would not want to take the
R&D that you are doing as part of that mission and move it with
the rest of that operation.
Dr. Brothers. Because the R&D that we have is integrated
with other missions, so if you move that, you would be harming
the other missions as well. And we have a good working
relationship with the organization, as it is, so we are able to
use the technology they are developing in that R&D in the
organizations as they exist. If you took it out, you would be
harming other missions.
Senator Shaheen. Okay. Thank you.
BIOMETRIC EXIT
Senator Hoeven. Under Secretary, DHS is working on getting
the biometric exit system implemented, and it is something that
we need in order to enforce against visa overstays.
Where are you in terms of technology for the biometric exit
system?
Dr. Brothers. So right now, we have something called AEER,
which is a project that we are working on with CBP, and TSA is
aware of this. It is Air Entry Exit Reengineering (AEER), what
it stands for, so we don't use acronyms.
Senator Hoeven. Senator Shaheen does not like acronyms, so
you are going to have to say the whole name.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Brothers. So the purpose of this project is to look at
commercially available biometric technologies. We actually have
a location in Maryland where these are all set up in checkpoint
type fashion, where we evaluate not just the effectiveness of
the individual technologies, but we evaluate the effectiveness
of the system itself, as the process of going through the
checkpoint.
Where we are right now is we have completed most of the
phases for CBP. We are still working on a detailed business
case analysis of the system, and that is on the exit part of
things. We are now starting to work more on the entry part of
things with CBP.
Senator Hoeven. Is the system ready for implementation?
Dr. Brothers. Right now, CBP is scheduling field trials
with technology based on the types of things we have done and
the information we have given them. But they have to determine
logistics and all those kinds of things. It is more than just
technology. It is how you employ this in the checkpoints and
these kinds of things.
Senator Hoeven. Is AEER significantly different than the
technologies that are available commercially on the market?
Dr. Brothers. These are commercially available
technologies.
Senator Hoeven. So you just combine them?
Dr. Brothers. We are combining them, right. So the issue is
there are a lot of different technologies. So, for example, CBP
wanted to use tablets for their operations. Because we had to
test them out in this simulated environment, we found that that
was not the best idea.
So there is a distinction between whether a technology by
itself works versus whether it works within a complicated
system. So this is taking commercially available equipment and
putting it in the actual operational environment.
Senator Hoeven. Is it ready for implementation?
Dr. Brothers. Technically, yes. But the issue, again, is--
--
Senator Hoeven. So that is a little confusing.
``Technically, yes.'' You have to explain that, because I am
not sure what you mean when you say, ``Technically, yes.''
Dr. Brothers. So there is technology that has been
evaluated as ready to use. There are additional problems with
how this would actually be used in the system by operators.
So you can say there is technology that does various types
of retinal scans and these kinds of things. Does it work? Yes,
it does work. But the question is how would this actually work
in the airport environment.
Senator Hoeven. Absolutely. If that is what you mean by
technically, we do not need technically, yes. We need a system
that is ready for implementation. CBP is telling us that they
are going to put it in this year, so I want to know if it is
ready to go.
Dr. Brothers. As far as I know, they are doing field
trials. They are coming up. I do not have the schedule for
that. That is when this type of evaluation will be completed.
Senator Hoeven. Give me your guesstimate.
Dr. Brothers. For a timeframe? I can get back to you on
that. I really do not have a guesstimate on that.
Senator Hoeven. Okay, because CBP is telling us, I believe,
that they are going to be starting to implement--oh, 2018. I
was a little optimistic there. They are still testing.
Dr. Brothers. Yes.
Senator Hoeven. Very good.
RAD/NUC PREVENTION
Dr. Gowadia, you thought I was not going to come to you or
Dr. Brinsfield, didn't you? It is just the way this is
organized. It is easier for me.
Tell us how DNDO works to prevent radiological or nuclear
materials from entering the United States. So how do you work
to make sure they do not get in here? And what does the public
need to know about this? For the public out there that has a
question when it comes to nuclear material, a dirty bomb or
something like that, what should they know?
Dr. Gowadia. Sir, as the President said in his weekly
address this weekend from the Nuclear Security Summit, the
threat of nuclear terrorism continues to be of grave concern.
And if a terrorist organization, like ISIL, were to get their
hands on some material, they would surely use it.
As such, we have to work with our partners, beginning
overseas. We work through the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), through the State Department's Global Initiative
to Counter Nuclear Terrorism, multiple fora such as that, to
share best practices with our international partners, partner
nations, et cetera, so that they themselves are building
nuclear detection capabilities, nuclear forensics capabilities,
securing their materials as well, adhering to treaties,
building regulatory infrastructure, so that they can prosecute
nuclear smugglers.
As nation-states pick up their own nuclear security
architectures, steadily the world gets more secure. So that is
the first step.
We then work right here at our borders, making sure that we
have detection capabilities in the hands of our CBP officers.
Almost a hundred percent of our containerized cargo is scanned
for radiation detection before it is released into the country.
Almost hundred percent of truck-borne cargo and vehicular
traffic that comes across our northern and southern borders is
scanned for radiation. All Coast Guard boarding parties carry
radiation sensors. All general aviation aircraft are met with
radiation sensors and CBP officers. Similarly, all TSA Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams carry radiation
sensors.
We are building Federal capabilities at our borders and
within our transportation systems. Then we work with our State
and local partners.
Senator Hoeven. So that is important for the public to know
what you just said.
Dr. Gowadia. Absolutely. Absolutely, sir.
We are building, steadily, a multilayered, multifaceted
architecture here. So once we get to our State and local
partners, they are building organic capabilities of their own.
We train them, we exercise with them, we help them decide what
equipment to buy, how much of it to buy. Once it is deployed,
if they need alarm resolution support, we are there to help,
share the information they need to know, so their awareness is
at the right level, et cetera.
So what you are hearing me talk about now is a systematic
approach, a layered, multifaceted approach. So very often you
hear that we have to be right every time; they only have to be
right once.
If we get this right, from material security, detection
capabilities, laws and regulations, nuclear forensics, good
consequence management, we tie all that together in a good
nuclear security architecture, they have to be right so many
times, increasing their operational footprint, allowing our
intelligence community, our law enforcement partners to get
them before they can put nuclear and other radioactive material
to malevolent use.
That is the work we are doing with our Federal partners,
international partners, et cetera.
Senator Hoeven. So whether it is air, whether it is
seaborne, whether it is train, whether it is truck, all cargo
is scanned.
Dr. Gowadia. No, sir. Almost all containerized cargo that
comes to us through our seaports is scanned using radiation
portal monitors, and the high-risk cargo is also subject to----
Senator Hoeven. What was that, the second one?
Dr. Gowadia. All high-risk cargo is also subject to
nonintrusive inspection using x-ray systems.
Now, the important thing is----
Senator Hoeven. First you said containerized, so all
containerized?
Dr. Gowadia. Seaborne containerized.
Senator Hoeven. All seaborne containerized.
Dr. Gowadia. And truck cargo that comes in across our land
and seaports, yes, that, too.
Senator Hoeven. All truck cargo, or just when there is a
perceived----
Dr. Gowadia. All truck cargo.
Senator Hoeven. All truck cargo coming in?
Dr. Gowadia. Yes, sir.
Senator Hoeven. And all containerized seaborne?
Dr. Gowadia. Almost all. It is in aviation that we are
beginning to make strides slowly, aviation cargo.
Senator Hoeven. In aviation, it is based on threat
assessment?
Dr. Gowadia. Yes, largely based on risk assessment.
Senator Hoeven. And then for any train traffic, by and
large, that is containerized now, isn't it? Anything that comes
across the ocean would be. So it would be just essentially
something from Canada or Mexico that is train-borne that might
not be?
Dr. Gowadia. So the train-borne cargo, and I do not have
the exact number, but the vast majority of our train crossings
have, again, these x-ray systems. So the trains are scanned
using x-ray systems.
Nuclear material is very, very dense. On an x-ray image,
you would see it as a dark spot, so there is some capability at
our train crossings.
Senator Hoeven. I am just trying to understand what is 100
percent scanned and what is threat assessment and then scanned.
What I am getting is all containerized, all seaborne
containerized. Trucks, trains would tend to be based on threat
assessment.
Dr. Gowadia. No. Truck cargo, all of it.
Senator Hoeven. All of it.
Dr. Gowadia. Train, all of it at these certain ports of
entry using the x-ray systems.
What we could do for you is we could break it down----
Senator Hoeven. So then are we just talking some of the air
luggage and so forth that is not?
Dr. Gowadia. Now air shipments that that are like FedEx and
the expedited couriers, that is 100 percent scanned as well.
Senator Hoeven. So primarily we are down to, in essence,
luggage of the traveling public. Again, that is threat assessed
and then scanned.
Dr. Gowadia. I would like to pull the string just a little
further on the use of technology. Technology is a critical part
of the global nuclear detection architecture, but it is not the
only part. It is really important that we have systems that can
be brought to bear if an intelligence cue goes up, if a law
enforcement officer needs it.
So our strategy is to make sure that we conduct
intelligence-cued searches using the right technology in the
hands of well-trained law enforcement officers, so we are
building agile technologies that can go to the fight.
Senator Hoeven. Right, I understand. It is scanning. It is
a variety of technologies. But you are also working with TSA on
this piece, as far as the luggage and so forth, backroom
operations, those types of issues.
Dr. Gowadia. With TSA, we are working on two fronts. First
is with their VIPR teams. These are the Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response teams, the guys that go into the
trains, the metros, the subways, et cetera.
And we are also working with them on the air domain
awareness board. With TSA, we are looking at are there regimes
that we can put in place where, given an indicator that there
is a risk, we can separate the population that needs attention
from the population that does not, so we are building scanning
regimes for aviation as well, building out the general aviation
scanning ability.
Now all CBP officers do meet general aviation that arrives
with radiation scanners.
Senator Hoeven. Okay, thank you.
Senator Shaheen. So if I go to the border crossing in
Pittsburgh, New Hampshire, that goes from Canada to the United
States, every truck that comes across that border crossing is
going to be scanned for nuclear material?
Dr. Gowadia. It would go through a radiation portal monitor
and it would be scanned, yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. And any planes that are landing anywhere
in the United States, even at private airfields, are going to
be met by somebody who would be able to scan for nuclear
material?
Dr. Gowadia. International general aviation aircraft are
required to land within so many miles of the border, and then
CBP officers meet them with radiation sensors and scan the
aircraft, the luggage, the people, yes, ma'am.
BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL THREAT
Senator Shaheen. Dr. Brinsfield, as you think about the
threat from biological and chemical weapons, what are your top
priorities? How do you prioritize, I guess, first of all? And
then if you are looking at what we need to do to respond to
that, what criteria are you using in thinking about what the
highest threats are?
Dr. Brinsfield. So I think it is something we spend a lot
of time talking and thinking about, knowing that we have to
prioritize and use our resources wisely in this space. One of
the things that we know from speaking with our colleagues from
public discussions is that the threat really has not changed in
the past decade on the bio space, whereas the risk continues,
and may even be greater.
So we look at the fact that we have to continue our day-to-
day operations with the BioWatch program and support of the
State and local environments, but we also spend some time
thinking about how we would make that system detect more
potential agents, how synthetic biology or the ability to make
new agents will affect our ability to detect in the next
decade, how we think about how those detection capabilities are
used for naturally occurring emerging infectious diseases, and
how that really will change over the course of the next decade
or so.
We also look at that, similarly, in surveillance.
What we have come to find is that the lessons that we would
use in a biological attack get great use in all of these
diseases that have come across our shores in the last few
years.
So those capabilities are really agnostic, if you will, to
whether it is a terrorist use or whether it is a naturally
occurring disease.
Senator Shaheen. So in thinking about that, one of the
challenges that we face in New Hampshire, and I think in many
other States, is the heroin and opioid epidemic, where we have
lost many more people than we anticipate losing from any of the
other biological and chemical threats that we face, barring
some world-threatening disaster.
So how does something like that get prioritized and talked
about? Right now, it appears to me that that is not considered,
along with a list of things like Ebola and the Zika virus, as
being threats to the public health. Yet the impact is much more
devastating than we are seeing from either of those potential
threats.
So how do we look at that kind of threat and determine
whether we need to increase our response to what is happening
there?
Dr. Brinsfield. So we also participate with the Surgeon
General on their national prevention council. That is one of
their priorities, particularly opioids and opioid abuse.
I do not know if I mentioned that I spent 10 years working
in Boston with the Boston EMF.
Senator Shaheen. You did not, but I saw that in your
resume.
Dr. Brinsfield. That is actually one of the things we
looked at back then, was how do you use surveillance to
actually detect where there are overdoses and how that happens.
In the past, it has been a bit controversial if we used
National Biosurveillance Integration Center assets to do that
type of work. But I do believe that when it comes down to it, a
public health emergency is a public health emergency, and we
often do not know if it is caused by an infectious disease or
something else.
I would appreciate the subcommittee's look and support as
we start to think through how we diversify our look into some
of the space.
NATURAL DISASTERS
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much for that response. I
think it is really critical that we take a look at how we are
defining these public health emergencies and the threat that is
really posed to the population.
Certainly, I think we have, as I said, this public health
emergency that we have not really defined as such. So we have
been very slow to respond at the level that we need to in order
to provide communities and States with help that they need.
If I can continue, Mr. Chairman, that then raises the issue
of natural disasters. I guess this question is for you, Under
Secretary Brothers, because as we think about the resources
that we are dedicating to these natural disasters, about $13.7
million I think in this year's budget proposal, natural
disasters probably have a much greater impact to date than we
have seen from threats from terrorism.
So given the diversity of those natural disasters, given
the challenges that they pose, can you help me understand how
we determine how much we dedicate to that kind of research
versus some of the other areas of research within the budget
proposal?
Dr. Brothers. Yes, so this is a hard problem, and it is a
hard problem because it goes to this word called resilience. It
is a difficult word, because it carries all this meaning but it
is hard to actually define quantitatively. So the reason I
bring that up is because, for us to start thinking about
disaster response, part of that is the resilience of our
infrastructure.
So we have recently reformed a science and technology
advisory committee. One of the things I asked that committee to
do was to give me a better sense--this is a committee of world-
renowned experts in different areas. I said, you know, help me
understand resilience. Help me understand, quantitatively, how
do we build a resilient infrastructure, and what that means?
So that is one way I am looking at this.
The other way I am looking at this, I am talking to, for
example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and
said, what are some of your biggest problems?
If you take kind of the confluence of natural disasters,
one of the biggest problems is flooding. So if you say it is
flooding, why don't we figure out what we can do with flooding,
because my concern is, as you look at natural disasters, there
are so many different things we could look at. How do we figure
out what to focus on?
So as I am trying to understand and we are trying to get a
better sense of what resiliency means, and how we do the best
job of tapping that in our communities, if FEMA says, you know
what, we really need to deal with flooding. We need to
understand simple questions like when do we tell people to
evacuate. How can we tell them earlier to evacuate or shelter
in place? Simple questions, right? How do we know where
flooding is going to occur based on geography and based on
property records, where are properties?
So that is a program we are doing right now, trying to help
FEMA do a better job of understanding relatively simple
concepts like that, but that are very difficult for real
decision makers.
Senator Shaheen. I think you are absolutely right about
resiliency. It was one reason why I found it hard to understand
the budget proposal, which last year included a significant
amount of money to help with mitigation, which I define as
another word for resiliency. It is how do we prevent and build
into our infrastructure ways to avoid the worst damage when a
disaster hits.
Yet there was not money in the budget for that this year.
So it seems to me that the more we can do in the way of
prevention resiliency, as you call it, the better prepared we
are going to be when a natural disaster strikes.
Dr. Brothers. Agreed.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BIOWATCH SYSTEM
Senator Hoeven. Dr. Brinsfield, in a biological event,
decision makers need information quickly, but it must also be
accurate. This provides State and local public health officials
the information to take appropriate action. Is the current
BioWatch system capable of providing the real-time actionable
information that officials need?
Dr. Brinsfield. Sir, I would say, yes, and I would also say
that, of course, there is more to do.
So on the yes part, two things. First, the BioWatch system
has spent much time in the last several years updating and
changing the assays so that the issue of what had been called
false positives or detection of a biological agent that did not
cause human disease, those have not happened the last several
years. The assays have been changed. The system is updated, so
that we have better, more useful information.
The system has also been tested. It has been tested in the
laboratory. It has been tested in a controlled environment. And
it has been tested in an open air environment.
And then finally, the recent uptick in tularemia, a disease
that can be naturally occurring in some of the States in the
United States, showed us that even though there were low levels
of human disease in a number of States across the United
States, the system actually picked up in the air the tularemia
and correctly identified areas in States where there was
tularemia in the environment.
So we look at all those different pieces to say, well, yes,
the system does, in fact, work.
Now does it tell State and local decision makers everything
they need to know? No, it does not. So some of the things that
we are looking at is how we can use the system more effectively
in an indoor environment, how we can protect, say, concert
halls and stadiums. How do we work to use the system in transit
or other areas? How can we actually get that information so
that it can be used in a time period where decision makers can
decide whether or not to stay or evacuate as opposed to what we
are doing now, which is helping decision makers decide whether
or not to give antibiotics?
So those are some of the challenges that we look to work
with S&T and hope to solve in the near future.
Senator Hoeven. How close are you to solving it? And how
much is it going to cost? Do you have the level of funding you
need now to do it? You got $82 million in 2016 and you are
requesting $82 million. How much of that do you need to
operate? How much is going into R&D? And how soon until you get
to where you need to be?
Dr. Brinsfield. So that number is purely for the day-to-day
operations, and the continual quality assurance testing, et
cetera, of the systems that currently exist.
The R&D amounts, the pieces that are working through there,
the pieces that are currently outgoing to Request for
Information (RFI) to provide those improvements are something
that we are doing in partnership with S&T. And Dr. Brothers is
actually looking at those numbers right now.
Senator Hoeven. That sounds like a handoff.
Dr. Brothers. Yes. Let me make sure I have actual numbers
for the R&D part of this. I may have to get back to you with
that, in terms of the actual R&D numbers, if we can do that.
What I can tell you, though, is, in terms of what we are
doing with respect to the R&D, we are looking at enhancements,
as Dr. Brinsfield said, to the existing system. We have both
current and near-term and long-term plans for this. We have
sent out a number of RFIs last year. We are about to, early
next year, send out a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA).
But again, this goes to the comments we were discussing
earlier about how we do the best job of reaching out to
industry to understand what the best answers are. So we are in
the process of doing that right now.
Senator Hoeven. We will want to get, from both of you, your
estimate of the timeline to get where Dr. Brinsfield thinks the
system is meeting the need and your estimate of how much we are
spending and what we will need to spend.
Dr. Brothers. Sure.
[The information follows:]
OHA and S&T are currently pursuing near-term enhancements (1-3
years) and long term enhancements (7-10 years). Near-term enhancements
include technologies that decrease time-to-detection and enable field
characterization of the released biological threat. Long-term
enhancements include autonomous systems that screen indoor environments
for biological threats and new laboratory platforms that rapidly
confirm and characterize samples suspected of containing a biological
threat. The over-arching goal of all enhancements is to decrease the
time it takes to detection and characterization of a biological attack
to enable decision makers to respond more rapidly.
The current level of R&D funding for the BioWatch Program is as
follows:
Fiscal year 15: $0.5M
Fiscal year 16: $4.7M
Fiscal year 17: $3 million
The following funding amounts are for R&D, RDT&E, and transition of
technology from S&T to BioWatch.
Fiscal year 16: $4.7M
Fiscal year 17: $3 million
DNDO WORKPLACE SATISFACTION
Senator Hoeven. And then, Dr. Gowadia, what are you doing
over there to get the good marks on DNDO being a good place to
work? Maybe we can do more of that in some of the other parts
of DHS.
Dr. Gowadia. Thank you, Senator, for acknowledging the
incredible work force at DNDO.
Some of the things that I think have been our keys to
success is, one, the interdisciplinary makeup that I mentioned
allows the team to come together with a singular focus, look at
a problem from start to finish, and actually see the needle
move in the field. Nothing is more rewarding, if you'll forgive
me, for a nerd than to actually know that an invention came to
life, changed real action in the field, and made the life of an
officer better.
So we get to do that at DNDO. It is a tremendously
challenging mission. It is very, very rewarding when we are
able to meet with some of these successes.
One of the things we do every year is we analyze our data.
When we get our survey results, we tear it apart as a team, and
we decide one, two, three things we are going to work on that
year. We do a root cause analysis of where things can get
better. Staff are encouraged to be candid and transparent.
One of the first things we did was to increase our survey
response numbers. If your soldiers aren't talking to you, you
can't really help them. So that was the first thing we changed.
We involve them in all solutions. You do not get to
complain at DNDO. You get to fix it. And people get together
and solve problems.
Now, we cannot always do everything, and we are very honest
about that.
Again, every year when you commit to doing something, you
got to see it through. And we do. It has really truly been an
honor and privilege to work with this work force for, now, 11
years.
So thank you very much for acknowledging that.
INTERCONNECTED BY INTERNET
Senator Hoeven. It is good to hear, and it is good you are
getting those results. Good for you.
Two other questions, just to kind of wrap up.
Under Secretary Brothers, this goes to what we call the
Internet of things, everything is so interconnected now. I
mean, we live in such a technological age, do S&T and DHS more
broadly look at just how interconnected everything is? And then
if we have a problem in one area with the Internet or the grid
or something else, how you prevent that from continuing to go
through the different systems, whether it is security systems,
utilities, I mean all of these things? Are there some fail-
safes or kind of protection, given the incredible connectivity
of the Internet of things nowadays? Everything is connected to
everything else.
Dr. Brothers. Senator, you share our concerns. In fact,
this goes to our Silicon Valley activity, where we said, what
if we engage the folks who are actually doing the development
work on the Internet of things and talk to them about security?
What are their concerns?
What we did is we convened a working group with a lot of
industry out there. We said, what do you think the problems
are? What are you concerned about? And they came back with
three major issues. They came back with detecting components
and connections, and how do you know something is connected?
They came back with authenticating components. Is this the
component I think it is? Is this a good component, a bad
component? And then updating, how do you update these
components?
So what we did then is we actually were able to, using our
collaboration with Under Secretary for management's team, able
to quickly turn around in a matter of 2 to 3 months, actually,
go from solicitation to contract award, which is quite a
record, I think, to actually contract one company to look at
the first problem. That is detecting components and
connections, and look at the other ones.
I think we are also working with industry consortia on this
issue. Right now, I think what we are trying to understand is
what is the role we should play here, standards, for example.
So if you are looking at the IT space for cyber, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed
a set of standards, so-called cyber framework, a framework for
thinking about Independent Review Team (IRT).
So right now (IRT) is taking off. We do not want to be left
behind in terms of how we think about security, and we are
aggressively pushing forward in that way.
Senator Hoeven. I think you need to be. It is a holistic
approach where sometimes you can miss the forest for the trees.
You have to look at the whole big picture to know, if something
happens to one part of it, that you can somehow contain it.
Dr. Brothers. Agreed.
Senator Hoeven. And not have it affect everything, the
chain reaction aspect.
Dr. Brothers. Exactly.
Senator Hoeven. I think that is in your bailiwick, if you
will, thinking about that and then finding, as you say, some of
the brightest people from wherever to help you.
Dr. Brothers. It is. We have had conversations about this
whole area of complexity. When you have interconnected systems
and small failures in one, how does that avalanche into larger
failures in others? These are areas we are trying to invest in.
Senator Hoeven. For any one of you, how much do you use
social media to kind of gauge where you should be putting your
efforts or trying to evaluate or determine a risk? Do you have
people looking at social media to see what is coming?
The other thing is, when you come up with something really
good, are you filing patents? Are you getting significant
revenue from that?
Just kind of touch on those.
Dr. Brothers. Thanks for asking that.
In terms of the first question, social media, one of the
things we first did when I came onboard was I was interested in
defining some long-term visions. Where do we want to be in 10,
20, 30 years, so that we can well-align our investment dollars.
So we started this effort called Visionary Goals.
We started by just looking internally and asking our folks,
what do you think are four or five different goals we could
have? We then compiled the list. We then went to the rest of
the components and got their input. We said, what if we
actually went to social media? Just what you are asking.
We actually got 1,500 people who registered for our site. I
thought that was pretty amazing, quite frankly. They came back
with a lot of really fascinating comments on what they thought
was important for Homeland Security to look at.
Then we went beyond that. We said, what if we actually
started a national conversation? We started a national
conversation about wearables for first responders, and we are
expanding that to other areas. We are actually starting as well
with how to develop an ecosystem around one of our
laboratories, a business ecosystem around one of our
laboratories.
So I think we are getting a lot of good results from that,
because one of the issues is how we communicate to our
stakeholders on what our problems are and how do we listen
back. We are finding that a really good process.
With respect to patents, we just received a patent award
this week, so it is timely you asked the question.
This actually has to do with special tape that is used to
secure cargo. We created a new process to make it even more
efficient at what it does.
One of my concerns coming in is, do we take patenting
seriously enough? We have now revamped our patent portfolio
because S&T actually handles the patent portfolio for the
entire Department. So we are looking very strongly at that.
I think when you start thinking about things like patents
and all that, you are making sure that your work force is being
innovative and you are trying your best to stay ahead of this
very rapidly moving space.
Senator Hoeven. Very good.
Anything, Dr. Brinsfield or Dr. Gowadia, that you want to
add to that, on either social media or patents?
Dr. Brinsfield. So we have looked briefly at social media.
We certainly participate in social media connection with our
public health community. And we have also looked at social
media to see if it can predict diseases, outbreaks, worked with
other interagency partners on that without great usability or
success so far in being able to have social media, when people
use terms such as ``sick'' or ``ill,'' actually predict when
there is going to be a biological disease.
So it is something that we have looked at in the aggregate
form, not in particular people, but in the aggregate form,
without it being highly predictive at this point.
Dr. Gowadia. Senator, we do not work directly through the
social media channel, per se, but we work very closely with the
intelligence community. And certainly, our law enforcement
partners stay on top of intelligence indicators and cues for
something that does not fit in their backyard, something that
has gone amiss. And we have a very strong interagency
partnership to make sure that early cues trigger the entire
system.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you.
Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I just have a final question.
But before that, I want to add my congratulations to
Senator Hoeven's to you, Dr. Gowadia, and DNDO for all of the
good work and for the recognition.
It sort of leads me to my last question, because I
understand, Dr. Brinsfield, that one of the areas of your focus
is work force health.
And having watched some first responders in New Hampshire,
law enforcement and firefighters, EMTs who are there on the
frontlines dealing with a crisis, I appreciate their physical
and mental well-being is sometimes very much affected by what
they are doing on their jobs.
So can you talk a little bit about what you are seeing in
your work that is important to protect the work force, both
physically and mentally?
Dr. Brinsfield. Yes, ma'am. I think that is something that
we consider very important, whether you look at it from what we
should do to take care of our employees, or you look at it
purely from a fiscal perspective, we need our work force to be
healthy and effective, and be able to focus on their mission.
To that end, we work carefully with all the different
component medical support systems, so that we give them
advisories on new threats, things that they might have a need
to talk to their work force about. We take particular questions
from the different components on these issues. We have worked
with several of the operational components to help work with
doctors and have them have medical liaison officers or lead
doctors in each of the components that can focus on their
particular mission set and how to keep their areas safe.
We have also worked, as I have mentioned before, with the
EMTs and paramedics. Most of these are dual-trained agents,
EMTs or paramedics. In many areas that our agents within DHS
work, this is the only medical care available to them in either
the short or long range, in some places up to 4-plus hours
before they can get to a regular U.S. system for medical care.
So we have worked very carefully with them to not just
ensure that they are credentialed and qualified and able to do
their jobs, but also that they have the particular protocols
and support systems they need, if they are working in some of
those more unique environments and need special support.
We also are very interested in the mental health and well-
being of our work force. And I know I mentioned before I spent
a long time working with first responder community and have
seen years and years of examples of how wearing it is to work
in this community.
So to that end, we have a program that looks specifically
at those issues. We are looking at ways to bring in more
expertise in this area and really build and develop on that and
have good relationships with our operational component partners
and hope to continue that work.
Senator Shaheen. Are you sharing what you learn with DOD
and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), which is the one
that comes to mind first when we think of mental health and
people who are doing work in that area, because they are facing
a lot of those challenges?
Dr. Brinsfield. Yes, ma'am. In particular, when we first
started looking at this issue, we went and sat at DOD, at the
Chief of Staff's regular meeting that he has on how to prevent
suicide in the work force, and we worked to see if we could
learn whatever lessons we could learn from DOD in this space.
We also are trying to work on some of the relationships
with, say, the International Association of Chiefs of Police
and others to take some of the lessons that they have learned
and be able to use that.
Senator Shaheen. And I assume you are sharing with them
what you are learning as well.
Dr. Brinsfield. Absolutely. One of the things that we are
just beginning to look at, the National Academy of Sciences
Institute of Medicine is interested in putting together a work
area on this, particularly on the well-being of first
responders and how this plays. That is something that we are
working with at the ground floor level.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you all very much. I think the public probably has
very little awareness of the Science and Technology agency
within DHS, and yet you are working on some of the most
innovative aspects of the challenge that we have in protecting
the homeland and keeping people safe, so thank you all very
much.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Hoeven. This will conclude our hearing today.
We appreciate the witnesses' testimony. Again, thanks to
all of you for being here and for the work you do, very
important work that you do.
The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks from today.
Senators may submit written questions for the record, and we
ask that the Department respond to them within a reasonable
length of time.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department subsequent to the hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Senator John Hoeven
Question. In response to a question regarding whether BioWatch was
capable of ``providing the real-time, actionable information that
officials want and need,'' you answered in the affirmative. According
to data you have provided subcommittee staff, however, it could take 24
to 36 hours in order for a hazard to be detected. Furthermore, BioWatch
has repeatedly been the subject of GAO and OIG reports regarding the
quality of information provided. In order to provide the Office of
Health Affairs with the appropriate resources, we must understand the
effectiveness and capabilities of its programs. Could you please
provide additional information to explain your response?
Answer. BioWatch is the nation's only biodetection capability that
provides early warning and facilitates jurisdictional preparedness in
the event of an aerozolized biological attack. The Program provides
accurate and actionable information to local, state, and Federal
stakeholders 12-36 hours after a release--allowing for rapid
decisionmaking upon notification of a biological incident.
Early warning of a biological attack saves lives and mitigates
damage. Each hour gained through early detection and before the onset
of medical symptoms, improves the chances that response efforts will be
successful. Early detection of a biological attack allows response
officials to dispense lifesaving medical countermeasures during a
critical window of time before symptoms appear in the public. If these
medications are dispensed early enough, lives will be saved and many of
those exposed may never even become ill. Without this detection
capability, biological attacks would remain undetected for several days
until symptoms began to manifest in the public. The associated delay in
response would result in increased casualties and fatalities.
BioWatch provides as close to ``real time'' information as
currently technology allows. Analysis has shown that BioWatch's current
notification timeline provides sufficient warning to deploy and
dispense life-saving medical countermeasures to potentially exposed
people before they develop symptoms.\1\ Development of technologies and
methodologies to decrease the time window from attack to detection has
been and remains a priority for the BioWatch Program. The DHS Office of
Health Affairs (OHA) and DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
are jointly developing a plan to enhance the current BioWatch system,
with a major focus on decreasing the time to detect timeline. The
Department will review this plan as part of the ongoing budget
deliberations for fiscal year 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sandia National Laboratories: BioWatch Early Detection for
Exposure Prevention Analysis: Task 2 & 3 Final Results July 31, 2013
(SAND2013-6711P)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the BioWatch Program provides accurate, actionable
information that enables State and local officials to take prompt and
appropriate response actions. The accuracy of the BioWatch data, and
effectiveness of the system, has been affirmed in multiple ways. The
Program's detection capabilities have been independently tested and
validated by 4 testing events conducted over the last 5 years,
including testing in a laboratory, in an aerosol chamber environment,
and in an open air environment. The results of these tests reinforce
the Department's confidence in the system's ability to perform the
mission for which it was intended: detecting a large-scale aerosol
release of specific threat agents in our most populous cities.
Last year the BioWatch Program analyzed over 237,000 samples from
across all BioWatch jurisdictions, with 8 detections that qualified as
a BioWatch Actionable Result (BAR). Although a BAR does not necessarily
mean that an intentional or terrorist-related release has occurred, it
allows for immediate response actions to gather additional information
and assess the Public Health risk, with inputs from Federal, State, and
Local agencies. Recent detections that occurred in the Denver
jurisdiction correctly correlated with an uptick in Tularemia (human
and animal cases), a disease that can be naturally occurring in some
parts of the United States. The accuracy of the BioWatch data is
further affirmed by the BioWatch Quality Assurance (QA) program. The QA
program has analyzed over 35,800 QA samples since 2011, enhancing
defensibility and confidence in the results.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Question. It is my understanding that the Department is working to
identify opportunities for cost savings through performance and
management reforms, including the consolidation of administrative
functions. Can you provide the subcommittee with an update on your
efforts to improve efficiency of operations and help the agency better
accomplish its mission?
Answer. Last year, I asked my leadership at S&T to look at the
organization's administrative functions and check whether there were
options for cost reduction or more efficient processes. In the process,
we realized it does not always make sense to pay wages based on
Washington DC's high cost of living for S&T functions focused primarily
on processing paperwork.
Currently, S&T is piloting an effort to locate much of the
administration associated with S&T's travel at an office in Jackson,
Mississippi. With a lower cost of living and a smaller S&T footprint
through telework, we expect to reduce costs associated with overseeing
travel by 50 percent. We scouted a location for the office space,
identified staff within S&T to lead the effort, and expect the pilot to
be fully up and running by the end of this calendar year.
Question. The Department's Joint Tunnel Task force is seeking
innovative technologies to help Customs and Border Protection and law
enforcement agencies detect illegal intrusions on our border. Are you
collaborating with other Federal agencies, including the Department of
Defense, to advance important research and make use of existing
capabilities in this area? The Engineer Research and Development Center
at the Corps of Engineers has helped develop some useful tunnel
detection capabilities. How can this committee assist you in
strengthening collaborations with others and transitioning these
technologies into the field?
Answer. Thank you for your continued support for S&T's tunnel
detection program. Our program has worked and continues to work closely
with the Department of Defense (DoD) and other Federal agencies on this
challenging issue. In 2010 and 2011, S&T and DoD co-funded a Joint
Capability Technical Demonstration (JCTD) with the Engineer Research
and Development Center (ERDC) to install and evaluate the Border
Tunneling Activity Detection System (B- TADS) in the Otay Mesa area of
the southern border. With ERDC, we also co-funded construction of a
test tunnel at the Yuma Proving Grounds to test existing and prototype
tunnel detection equipment. Working with the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) and DoD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), we developed a
computer model to predict the performance of prospective tunnel
detection sensors. We also regularly work with subject matter experts
at DoD's Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA) Tunnel Program
Office and take advantage of their significant experience with domestic
and foreign geology, environmental noise signatures, and performance
assessments of various tunnel detection technologies. The JIDA Tunnel
Program Office recently funded S&T to make performance predictions of
various tunnel detection systems that could be deployed in their
theater of operations. More recently, we held several technical
interchange meetings with Raytheon, the developer of the B-TADS system,
to explore utilizing our tunnel detection performance modeling tool to
improve its system performance.
S&T's tunnel detection program is grounded on close interagency
collaboration drawing on diverse expertise across the Federal
government. Moving forward, we will continue to leverage resources and
experience at DoD, ERDC, and elsewhere to deliver cutting edge science
and new capabilities to our operators on the border.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Hoeven. With that, the subcommittee stands in
recess. Thanks so much.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., Wednesday, April 6, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at a time subject to
the call of the Chair.]