[Senate Hearing 114-733]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 11:20 a.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. John Hoeven (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Hoeven, Shaheen, and Baldwin.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENTS OF:
HON. JOHN ROTH, INSPECTOR GENERAL
HON. PETER V. NEFFENGER, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
opening statement of senator john hoeven
Senator Hoeven. The subcommittee will come to order. Good
morning. I would like to welcome our witnesses this morning.
First, I would like to thank Ranking Member Senator Shaheen for
being here and for her work. And then I would like to welcome
both Administrator Peter Neffenger as well as the inspector
general, John Roth. We appreciate both of you being with us
this morning.
This month marks the 14th anniversary since the attacks on
9/11. Our Nation's response to that terrible day's events
included significant and immediate investment in aviation
security, and billions of dollars were spent on new people,
processes, and technology to build layers of security.
These layers start with intelligence programs and passenger
pre-screening in advance of travel, and in the plane itself
with hardened cockpit doors, and awareness of passengers and
crew members. These layers are intended to be adaptive and
agile in responding to current threats and tactics. And this is
important given our adversaries' continued fascination with
aviation as a target and their changing methods.
However, now it appears that the security provided by the
most visible and expensive layer, the screening checkpoint
itself, has been overestimated. Specifically, media reports
cited that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
a failure rate of over 90 percent in covert testing of
checkpoints. For obvious reasons we cannot elaborate on the
details of those tests in an open hearing. However, the failure
calls into question the effectiveness of the people, the
training, the processes that we have instituted, and the
technology.
And remember, all three have to work. All three legs of the
stool--people, process, and technology--have to be strong and
balanced to maintain the security system. And clearly we need
to review the entire process, all three legs, and make changes
to make sure that security is as effective as possible.
With respect to the people, TSA screeners have a
challenging job: they must stay focused on their security
mission while performing repetitive tasks in a high-pressure,
high-throughput environment. Meanwhile, organizations like al
Qaeda disseminate inventive ways to smuggle contraband onto
airplanes and avoid security measures.
Supporting this workforce must be the right processes.
These procedures must be tested and trained as well as applied
consistently. Many of these processes, as we are all aware, are
uncomfortable both for the screeners and the passengers, and
appreciation of both points of view is critical.
Last, TSA has always sought with varying degrees of success
to embrace cutting-edge technology. The 2009 Christmas Day plot
and the use of non-metallic explosives aboard a commercial
aircraft demanded a solution. The advanced imaging technology
(AIT) we have deployed is not a silver bullet. All these
facts--the people, processes, and the technology--must work in
concert. Must work in concert. A failure of any one weakens the
entire system.
prepared statement
Today the inspector general issued the final report associated with
the leaked testing information. To the extent possible in an open
hearing, I have asked the inspector general to lay out the findings and
recommendations in that report. He will also outline his office's other
work on passenger screening in recent years.
Secretary Johnson responded quickly to the leak back in June
outlining a 10-point plan of action. That plan is now yours,
Administrator Neffenger's, to shape and to execute. I look forward to
questioning you about the plan in detail, including the resource
implications, which, of course, is our area of responsibility, and the
right metrics by which to measure progress and success. Very important.
We have to have a way to measure our progress and success.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator John Hoeven
The Subcommittee will come to order. Good morning. I would first
like to welcome our witnesses. Administrator Peter Neffenger is the
recently confirmed Assistant Secretary of the Transportation Security
Administration. The Coast Guard's loss is TSA's gain and we look
forward to working with you in this capacity.
And the Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General, John
Roth. Thank you both for being here.
Thank you also to Ranking Member Shaheen and other subcommittee
members for your time and attention to this important issue.
This month marks the 14th Anniversary since the attacks on
September 11th. Our nation's response to that terrible day's events
included a significant and immediate investment in aviation security.
Billions of dollars were spent on new people, processes, and technology
to build new ``layers'' of security.
These layers start with intelligence programs and passenger pre-
screening in advance of travel and end in the plane itself with
hardened cockpit doors and aware passengers and crew members.
These layers are intended to be adaptive and agile, responding to
current threats and
tactics. This is important given the adversary's continued
fascination with aviation as a target.
However, it now appears that the security provided by the most
visible--and expensive layer--the screening checkpoint itself, was
overestimated. Specifically, media reports cited that TSA had a failure
rate of over 90 percent in covert testing of checkpoints.
For obvious reasons, we cannot elaborate on the details of those
tests in an open hearing. However, the failures call into question the
effectiveness of: (1) the people we have hired and trained; (2) the
processes we have instituted; and (3) the technology we have procured.
All three legs of the stool--people, process, and technology--have
to be strong and balanced to maintain the security system. And, it
seems to me, that we need to review our entire system and make changes
to ensure it is effective.
With respect to people, TSA screeners have a challenging job. They
must stay focused on their security mission while performing monotonous
tasks in a high pressure, high throughput environment. Meanwhile,
organizations like al-Qaeda disseminate inventive ways to smuggle
contraband onto airplanes and avoid security measures.
Supporting this workforce must be the right processes. These
procedures must be tested and trained as well as applied consistently.
Many of these processes--as we're all aware--are uncomfortable for both
the screeners and passengers. An appreciation of both points of view is
critical.
Lastly, TSA has always sought--with varying degrees of success--to
embrace cutting edge technology. The 2009 Christmas Day plot and the
use of non-metallic explosives aboard a commercial aircraft demanded a
solution. But the Advanced Imaging Technology we have deployed is not a
silver bullet.
All of these facets: the people, the processes, and the technology,
must work in concert. A failure of one weakens the entire system.
Today, the Inspector General issued the final report associated
with the leaked testing information. To the extent possible in an open
hearing, I have asked the Inspector General to lay out the findings and
recommendation in that report. He will also outline his office's other
work on passenger screening in recent years.
Secretary Johnson responded quickly to the leak back in June
outlining a 10-point plan of action. That plan is now Administrator
Neffenger's to shape and execute. I look forward to questioning him
about the plan in detail, including the resource implications and the
right metrics by which to measure progress and success.
Senator Hoeven. With that, I'd turn it over to Senator
Shaheen for her opening comments.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
both for your remarks and for calling this hearing this
morning. I also want to thank Administrator Neffenger and
Inspector General Roth both for being here this morning and for
taking on the very challenging jobs that you are doing so well.
The point of the hearing today is really to assure the
public that TSA is taking the appropriate steps to make air
travel safe and to see that taxpayer dollars for aviation
security are being spent wisely. As Chairman Hoeven pointed
out, earlier this year the inspector general performed an audit
of TSA screening by conducting numerous tests across eight
airports of different sizes. The data from the audit are
classified, but I think it is fair to say that all of us agree
that the results were extremely troubling.
The results from those tests were so concerning that the
inspector general halted the audit before it was completed in
order to inform the Secretary of Homeland Security that TSA had
a major problem. The Secretary responded by putting together a
Tiger Team of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA
officials to fully evaluate TSA's screening apparatus. He also
called for agency officials to think outside the box, to
challenge old assumptions, and to listen to the Transportation
Security Administration offices in the field who are doing the
job day in and day out.
So today we will explore what the Tiger Team found, and
discuss changes that are being made to screening techniques, to
standard operating procedures, employee training and
technology, and other innovative ideas to improve the agency.
Now, again, as Chairman Hoeven pointed out, because this is the
appropriations subcommittee on Homeland Security, we are very
concerned about what the resource implications are if these
changes are implemented. We will be looking at TSA's risk-based
approaches to passenger screening, and whether there is an
appropriate balance between security effectiveness and
screening efficiency.
So, again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing
today, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. I will also now
turn to Senator Baldwin. Thank you for joining us, and ask if
you have any opening comments.
Senator Baldwin. Other than to thank you and the ranking
member for holding this hearing. As a member of both the
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and the
Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, following on
implementation of recommendations from the inspector general
has been a great concern of mine, and I will have several
questions after the testimony is received. But I look forward
to hearing that testimony, and thank you for holding this
hearing.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Senator Baldwin. With that, I
would turn to John Roth, the inspector general, for his report.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ROTH
Mr. Roth. Good morning, Chairman Hoeven, Ranking Member
Shaheen, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
inviting me here to testify regarding our work involving TSA.
Our reviews, and there have been 115 reviews, audits, and
inspections, that have given us a perspective on the obstacles
facing TSA in carrying out its important, but very difficult,
mission: to protect the Nation's transportation systems while
at the same time ensuring freedom of movement.
I have been deeply concerned about the challenges TSA faces
in their ability to meet those challenges. These challenges are
in almost every area of TSA's operations: its problematic
implementation of risk assessment rules, including the
management of TSA PreCheck; deficiencies in TSA's duties as a
regulator of our Nation's 450 commercial airports, particularly
in the area of employee screening; failures in passenger and
baggage screening operations, discovered in part for a covert
testing program; TSA's controls over access to secure areas,
including management of its access badge program, its
management of its workforce integrity program, and its
oversight over its acquisition and maintenance of screening
equipment.
I will confess to a degree of frustration that TSA was
assessing risk inappropriately and did not have the ability to
perform the basic management functions it needed in order to
perform this crucial mission. These issues were exacerbated, in
my judgment, by a culture that resisted oversight and was
unwilling to accept the need for change in the face of an
evolving and serious threat. We had been writing reports
highlighting some of these reports for years without an
acknowledgement by TSA of the need to correct those
deficiencies.
However, we may be in a very different place than we were
in recent months. I am hopeful that Administrator Neffenger
brings with him a new attitude about oversight. It will take a
sustained and disciplined effort, but having the courage to
critically assess these deficiencies in an honest, objective
light is the first step, and I believe TSA has taken that first
step in recent months.
We have just completed and distributed our report on our
most recent round of covert testing. The results, of course,
are classified at the secret level, and the Department and this
committee have been provided a copy. The testing, as the
chairman points out, was of the AIT equipment, the advanced
imaging technology, in use at airports across the country. This
is the state-of-art in imaging technology.
While I cannot talk about the specifics in this setting, I
am able to say that we conducted the audit with sufficient
rigor to satisfy the standards contained within the generally
accepted government auditing standards, that the tests were
conducted by our auditors without any special knowledge or
training, and that the test results were disappointing and
troubling. We ran multiple tests at eight different airports of
different sizes, including large category X airports across the
country, and tested airports using private screeners. The
results were consistent across every airport.
Our testing was designed to test checkpoint operations in
real world conditions. They were not designed to test specific
discreet segments of checkpoint operations, but rather the
system as a whole. The failures included failures in
technology, in TSA procedures and process, and human error. We
found layers of security simply missing. It would be misleading
to minimize the rigor of our testing or to imply that our
testing was not an accurate reflection of the effectiveness in
the totality of aviation security.
The results unfortunately were not unexpected. We had
conducted other covert tests in the past of check baggage X-ray
screening, of access controls to secure airport areas, of the
screening of carry-on luggage, and of the previous generation
of AIT machines that were in use several years ago. In each of
these tests, we discovered significant vulnerabilities.
Fortunately, the Department's response to our most recent
findings has been swift and unequivocal. For example, within 24
hours of receiving the preliminary results of the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) covert testing, the Secretary summoned
TSA leadership and directed that an immediate plan of action be
created to correct the deficiencies uncovered by this testing.
These efforts have already resulted in significant changes to
TSA leadership, operations, training, and policy.
TSA has put forward a plan consistent with our
recommendations to improve checkpoint quality in three areas:
technology, personnel, and procedures. This is appropriate, as
the chairman noted, because the checkpoint must be considered
as a single system. The most effective technology is useless
without the right personnel, and the personnel need to be
guided by appropriate procedures. Unless all three elements are
operating effectively, the checkpoint itself will not be
effective. However, this is a difficult problem, and it will
take time to fix.
PREPARED STATEMENT
We will be monitoring TSA's efforts to increase the
effectiveness of checkpoint operations, and we will continue to
conduct covert testing. Consistent with our obligations under
the Inspector General Act, we will report our results to this
committee as well as other committees of jurisdiction.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I
welcome any questions you or members of the subcommittee may
have.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Roth
discussing the transportation security administration's efforts to
address inspector general findings
Good morning Chairman Hoeven, Ranking Member Shaheen, and Members
of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss
our work on the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and areas
we believe are in need of attention for improving the agency. Our
reviews have given us a perspective on the obstacles facing TSA in
carrying out an important, but incredibly difficult mission to protect
the Nation's transportation systems and ensure freedom of movement for
people and commerce.
I testified before a different Congressional committee in May of
this year regarding my concerns about TSA's ability to execute its
important mission. At that hearing, I highlighted the challenges TSA
faced. I testified that these challenges were in almost every area of
TSA's operations: its problematic implementation of risk assessment
rules, including its management of TSA Precheck; failures in passenger
and baggage screening operations, discovered in part through our covert
testing program; TSA's controls over access to secure areas, including
management of its access badge program; its management of the workforce
integrity program; TSA's oversight over its acquisition and maintenance
of screening equipment; and other issues we have discovered in the
course of over 115 audit and inspection reports.
My remarks were described by a Senator at Administrator Neffenger's
confirmation hearing as ``unusually blunt testimony from a government
witness,'' and I will confess that it was. However, those remarks were
born of frustration that TSA was assessing risk inappropriately and did
not have the ability to perform basic management functions in order to
meet the mission the American people expect of it. These issues were
exacerbated, in my judgment, by a culture, developed over time, which
resisted oversight and was unwilling to accept the need for change in
the face of an evolving and serious threat. We have been writing
reports highlighting some of these problems for years without an
acknowledgment by TSA of the need to correct its deficiencies.
We may be in a very different place than we were in May. I am
hopeful that Administrator Neffenger brings with him a new attitude
about oversight. Ensuring transportation safety is a massive and
complex problem, and there is no silver bullet to solve it. It will
take a sustained and disciplined effort. However, the first step in
fixing a problem is having the courage to critically assess the
deficiencies in an honest and objective light. Creating a culture of
change within TSA, and giving the TSA workforce the ability to identify
and address risks without fear of retribution, will be the new
Administrator's most critical and challenging task.
I believe that the Department and TSA leadership have begun the
process of critical self-evaluation and, aided by the dedicated
workforce of TSA, are in a position to begin addressing some of these
issues. I am hopeful that the days of TSA sweeping its problems under
the rug and simply ignoring the findings and recommendations of the OIG
and GAO are coming to an end.
I have been gratified by the Department's response, and believe
that this episode serves as an illustration of the value of the Office
of Inspector General, particularly when coupled with a Department
leadership that understands and appreciates objective and independent
oversight.
our most recent covert testing
We have just completed and distributed our report on our most
recent round of covert testing. The results are classified at the
Secret level, and the Department and this Committee have been provided
a copy of our classified report. TSA justifiably classifies at the
Secret level the validated test results; any analysis, trends, or
comparison of the results of our testing; and specific vulnerabilities
uncovered during testing. Additionally, TSA considers other information
protected from disclosure as Sensitive Security Information.
While I cannot talk about the specifics in this setting, I am able
to say that we conducted the audit with sufficient rigor to satisfy the
standards contained within the Generally Accepted Government Auditing
Standards, that the tests were conducted by auditors within our Office
of Audits without any special knowledge or training, and that the test
results were disappointing and troubling. We ran multiple tests at
eight different airports of different sizes, including large category X
airports across the country, and tested airports using private
screeners as part of the Screening Partnership Program. The results
were consistent across every airport.
Our testing was designed to test checkpoint operations in real
world conditions. They were not designed to test specific, discrete
segments of checkpoint operations, but rather the system as a whole.
The failures included failures in the technology, in TSA procedures,
and in human error. We found layers of security simply missing. It
would be misleading to minimize the rigor of our testing, or to imply
that our testing was not an accurate reflection of the effectiveness of
the totality of aviation security.
The results were not, however, unexpected. We had conducted other
covert testing in the past:
--In September 2014, we conducted covert testing of the checked
baggage screening system, and identified significant
vulnerabilities in this area caused by human and technology
based failures. We also determined that TSA did not have a
process in place to assess or identify the cause for equipment-
based test failures or the capability to independently assess
whether deployed explosive detection systems are operating at
the correct detection standards. We found that, notwithstanding
an intervening investment of over $550 million, TSA had not
improved checked baggage screening since our 2009 report on the
same issue. (Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage
Screening Operations, OIG-14-142, Sept. 2014)
--In January 2012, we conducted covert testing of access controls to
secure airport areas, and identified significant access control
vulnerabilities, meaning uncleared individuals could have
unrestricted and unaccompanied access to the most vulnerable
parts of the airport--the aircraft and checked baggage. (Covert
Testing of Access Controls to Secured Airport Areas, OIG-12-26,
Jan. 2012)
--In 2011, we conducted covert penetration testing on the previous
generation of AIT machines in use at the time, the testing was
far broader than this round of testing, and likewise discovered
significant vulnerabilities. (Penetration Testing of Advanced
Imaging Technology, OIG-12-06, Nov. 2011)
the dhs response
The Department's response to our most recent findings has been
swift and definite. For example, within 24 hours of receiving
preliminary results of OIG covert penetration testing, the Secretary
summoned senior TSA leadership and directed that an immediate plan of
action be created to correct deficiencies uncovered by our testing.
Moreover, DHS has initiated a program--led by members of Secretary
Johnson's leadership team--to conduct a focused analysis on issues that
the OIG has uncovered, as well as other matters. These efforts have
already resulted in significant changes to TSA leadership, operations,
training, and policy, although the specifics of most of those changes
cannot be discussed in an open setting, and should, in any event, come
from TSA itself.
TSA has put forward a plan, consistent with our recommendations, to
improve checkpoint quality in three areas: technology, personnel, and
procedures. This is appropriate because the checkpoint must be
considered as a single system: the most effective technology is useless
without the right personnel, and the personnel need to be guided by the
appropriate procedures. Unless all three elements are operating
effectively, the checkpoint will not be effective.
We will be monitoring TSA's efforts to increase the effectiveness
of checkpoint operations, and will continue to conduct covert testing.
Consistent with our obligations under the Inspector General Act, we
will report our results to this Subcommittee as well as other
committees of jurisdiction.
tsa and the asymmetric threat
Nowhere is the asymmetric threat of terrorism more evident than in
the area of aviation security. TSA cannot afford to miss a single,
genuine threat without potentially catastrophic consequences, and yet a
terrorist only needs to get it right once. Securing the civil aviation
transportation system remains a formidable task--with TSA responsible
for screening travelers and baggage for over 1.8 million passengers a
day at 450 of our Nation's airports. Complicating this responsibility
is the constantly evolving threat by adversaries willing to use any
means at their disposal to incite terror.
The dangers TSA must contend with are complex and not within its
control. Recent media reports have indicated that some in the U.S.
intelligence community warn terrorist groups like the Islamic State
(ISIS) may be working to build the capability to carry out mass
casualty attacks, a significant departure from--and posing a different
type of threat than--simply encouraging lone wolf attacks. According to
these media reports, a mass casualty attack has become more likely in
part because of a fierce competition with other terrorist networks--
being able to kill opponents on a large scale would allow terrorist
groups such as ISIS to make a powerful showing. We believe such an act
of terrorism would likely be designed to impact areas where people are
concentrated and vulnerable, such as the Nation's commercial aviation
system.
mere intelligence is not enough
In the past, officials from TSA, in testimony to Congress, in
speeches to think tanks, and elsewhere, have described TSA as an
intelligence-driven organization. According to TSA, it continually
assesses intelligence to develop countermeasures in order to enhance
these multiple layers of security at airports and onboard aircraft.
This is a necessary thing, but it is not sufficient.
In the vast majority of the instances, the identities of those who
commit terrorist acts were simply unknown to or misjudged by the
intelligence community. Terrorism, especially suicide terrorism,
depends on a cadre of newly-converted individuals who are often unknown
to the intelligence community. Moreover, the threat of ISIS or Al Qaeda
inspired actors--those with no formal ties to the larger organizations
but simply take inspiration from them--increase the possibilities of a
terrorist actor being unknown to the intelligence community.
Recent history bears this out:
--17 of the 19 September 11th hijackers were unknown to the
intelligence community. In fact, many were recruited
specifically because they were unknown to the intelligence
community.
--Richard Reid, the 2002 ``shoe bomber,'' was briefly questioned by
the French police, but allowed to board an airplane to Miami.
He had the high explosive PETN in his shoes, and but for the
intervention of passengers and flight crew, risked bringing
down the aircraft.
--The Christmas Day 2009 bomber, who was equipped with a
sophisticated non-metallic explosive device provided by Al
Qaeda, was known to certain elements of the intelligence
community but was not placed in the Terrorist Screening
Database, on the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List. A
bipartisan Senate report found there were systemic failures
across the Intelligence Community, which contributed to the
failure to identify the threat posed by this individual.
--The single most high profile domestic terrorist attack since 9/11,
the Boston Marathon bombing, was masterminded and carried out
by Tamerlan Tsarnaev, an individual who approximately 2 years
earlier was judged by the FBI not to pose a terrorist threat,
and who was not within any active U.S. Government databases.
Of course, there are instances in which intelligence can foil plots
that screening cannot detect--such as the 2006 transatlantic aircraft
plot, utilizing liquid explosives, the October 2010 discovery of U.S.--
bound bombs concealed in printer cartridges on cargo planes in England
and Dubai, and the 2012 discovery that a second generation nonmetallic
device, designed for use onboard aircraft, had been produced.
What this means is that there is no easy substitute for the
checkpoint. The checkpoint must necessarily be intelligence driven, but
the nature of terrorism today means that each and every passenger must
be screened in some way.
beyond the checkpoint
Much of the attention has been focused on the checkpoint, since
that is the primary and most visible means of entry onto aircraft. But
effective checkpoint operations simply are not of themselves
sufficient. Aviation security must also look at other areas to
determine vulnerabilities.
Assessment of passenger risk
We applaud TSA's efforts to use risk-based passenger screening
because it allows TSA to focus on high-risk or unknown passengers
instead of known, vetted passengers who pose less risk to aviation
security.
However, we have had deep concerns about some of TSA's previous
decisions about this risk. For example, we recently assessed the
Precheck initiative, which is used at about 125 airports to identify
low-risk passengers for expedited airport checkpoint screening.
Starting in 2012, TSA massively increased the use of Precheck. Some of
the expansion, for example allowing Precheck to other Federal
Government-vetted or known flying populations, such as those in the CBP
Trusted Traveler Program, made sense. In addition, TSA continues to
promote participation in Precheck by passengers who apply, pay a fee,
and undergo individualized security threat assessment vetting.
However, we believe that TSA's use of risk assessment rules, which
granted expedited screening to broad categories of individuals
unrelated to an individual assessment of risk, but rather on some
questionable assumptions about relative risk based on other factors,
created an unacceptable risk to aviation security.\1\ Additionally, TSA
used ``managed inclusion'' for the general public, allowing random
passengers access to Precheck lanes with no assessment of risk.
Additional layers of security TSA intended to provide, which were meant
to compensate for the lack of risk assessment, were often simply not
present.
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\1\ As an example of Precheck's vulnerabilities, we reported that,
through risk assessment rules, a felon who had been imprisoned for
multiple convictions for violent felonies while participating in a
domestic terrorist group was granted expedited screening through
PreCheck.
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We made a number of recommendations as a result of several audits
and inspections. Disappointingly, when the report was issued, TSA did
not concur with the majority of our 17 recommendations. At the time, I
testified that I believed this represented TSA's failure to understand
the gravity of the risk that they were assuming. I am pleased to
report, however, that we have recently made significant progress in
getting concurrence and compliance with these recommendations.
Access to secure areas
TSA is responsible, in conjunction with the 450 airports across the
country, to ensure that the secure areas of airports, including the
ability to access aircraft and checked baggage, are truly secure. In
our audit work, we have had reason to question whether that has been
the case. We conducted covert testing in 2012, to see if auditors could
get access to secure areas by a variety of means. While the results of
those tests are classified, they were similar to the other covert
testing we have done, which was disappointing. We are doing work
currently in this area as well, determining whether controls over
access media badges issued by airport operators is adequate. We are
also engaging in an audit of the screening process for the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential program (TWIC), to see
whether it is operating effectively and whether the program's continued
eligibility processes ensures that only eligible TWIC card holders
remain eligible.
Other questionable investments in aviation security
TSA uses behavior detection officers to identify passenger
behaviors that may indicate stress, fear, or deception. This program,
Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT), includes more
than 2,800 employees and has cost taxpayers about $878 million from
fiscal years 2007 through 2012.
We understand the desire to have such a program. Israel is foremost
in their use of non-physical screening, although the differences in
size, culture and attitudes about civil liberties make such a program
difficult to adopt in this country. In the United States, sharp-eyed
government officials were able to assess behavior to prevent entry to
terrorists on two separate occasions:
--Ahmed Ressam's plot to blow up the Los Angeles International
Airport on New Year's eve 1999 was foiled when a U.S. Customs
officer in Port Angeles, Washington, thought Ressam was acting
``hinky'' and directed a search of his car, finding numerous
explosives and timers.
--In 2001, a U.S. immigration officer denied entry to the United
States to Mohammed al Qahtani, based on Qahtani's evasive
answers to his questions. Later investigation by the 9/11
Commission revealed that Qahtani was to be the 20th hijacker,
assigned to the aircraft that ultimately crashed in
Shanksville, Pennsylvania.
However, we have deep concerns that the current program is both
expensive and ineffective. In 2013, we audited the SPOT program and
found that TSA could not ensure that passengers were screened
objectively. Nor could it show that the program was cost effective or
merited expansion. We noted deficiencies in selection and training of
the behavior detection officers. Further, in a November 2013 report on
the program, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that
TSA risked funding activities that had not been determined to be
effective. Specifically, according to its analysis of more than 400
studies, GAO concluded that SPOT program behavioral indicators might
not be effective in identifying people who might pose a risk to
aviation security. TSA has taken steps to implement our recommendations
and improve the program. However, the program remains an example of a
questionable investment in security.
Likewise, the Federal Air Marshal Program costs the American
taxpayer over $800 million per year. The program was greatly expanded
after 9/11 to guard against a specific type of terrorist incident. In
the intervening years, terrorist operations and intentions have
evolved. We will be looking at the Federal Air Marshal Program this
year to determine whether the significant investment of resources in
the program is justified by the risk.
TSA's role as regulator
TSA has dual responsibilities, one to provide checkpoint security
for passengers and baggage and another to oversee and regulate airport
security provided by airport authorities. The separation of
responsibility for airport security between TSA and the airport
authorities creates a potential vulnerability in safeguarding the
system. The concern about which entity is accountable for protecting
areas other than checkpoints has come up in relation to airport worker
vetting, perimeter security, and cargo transport. We have also assessed
whether TSA is appropriately regulating airports, such as whether it
ensures airports' compliance with security regulations. We have found
shortfalls.
In the case of airport worker vetting, for example, TSA relies on
airports to submit complete and accurate aviation worker application
data for vetting. In a recent audit, we found TSA does not ensure that
airports have a robust verification process for criminal history and
authorization to work in the United States, or sufficiently track the
results of their reviews. TSA also did not have an adequate monitoring
process in place to ensure that airport operators properly adjudicated
credential applicants' criminal histories. TSA officials informed us
that airport officials rarely or almost never documented the results of
their criminal history reviews electronically. Without sufficient
documentation, TSA cannot systematically determine whether individuals
with access to secured areas of the airports are free of disqualifying
criminal events.
As a result, TSA is required to conduct manual reviews of aviation
worker records. Due to the workload at larger airports, this inspection
process may look at as few as 1 percent of all aviation workers'
applications. In addition, inspectors were generally reviewing files
maintained by the airport badging office, which contained photocopies
of aviation worker documents rather than the physical documents
themselves. An official told us that a duplicate of a document could
hinder an inspector's ability to determine whether a document is real
or fake, because a photocopy may not be matched to a face, and may not
show the security elements contained in the identification document.
Additionally, we identified thousands of aviation worker records
that appeared to have incomplete or inaccurate biographic information.
Without sufficient documentation of criminal histories or reliable
biographical data, TSA cannot systematically determine whether
individuals with access to secured areas of the airports are free of
disqualifying criminal events, and TSA has thus far not addressed the
poor data quality of these records.
Further, the responsibility for executing perimeter and airport
facility security is in the purview of the 450 local airport
authorities rather than TSA. There is no clear structure for
responsibility, accountability and authority at most airports, and the
potential lack of local government resources makes it difficult for TSA
to issue and enforce higher standards to counter new threats.
Unfortunately, intrusion prevention into restricted areas and other
ground security vulnerabilities is a lower priority than checkpoint
operations.
conclusion
Making critical changes to TSA's culture, technology, and processes
is not an easy undertaking. However, a commitment to and persistent
movement towards effecting such changes--including continued progress
towards complying with our recommendations--is paramount to ensuring
transportation security. We recognize and are encouraged by TSA's steps
towards compliance with our recent recommendations. Without a sustained
commitment to addressing known vulnerabilities, the agency risks
compromising the safety of the Nation's transportation systems.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome any
questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
______
appendix a
recent oig reports on the transportation security administration
Covert Testing of the TSA's Passenger Screening Technologies and
Processes at Airport Security Checkpoints (Unclassified Summary), OIG-
15-150, September 2015
Use of Risk Assessment within Secure Flight (Redacted), OIG-14-153,
June 2015
TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting (Redacted), OIG-15-98, June
2015
The Transportation Security Administration Does Not Properly Manage
Its Airport Screening Equipment Maintenance Program, OIG-15-86, May
2015
Allegation of Granting Expedited Screening through TSA PreCheck
Improperly (Redacted), OIG-15-45, March 2015
Security Enhancements Needed to the TSA PreCheck Initiative
(Unclassified Summary), OIG-15-29, January 2015
Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening Operations
(Unclassified Spotlight), OIG-14-142, September 2014
______
appendix b
status of recommendations for selected oig reports on tsa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report No. Report Title Date Issued Recommendation Current Status Mgmt. Response
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OIG-11-47 DHS Department- 3/2/2011 We recommend Closed Agreed
wide Management that the
of Detection Deputy Under
Equipment. Secretary for
Management
reestablish
theJoint
Requirements
Council..
OIG-11-47 DHS Department- 3/2/2011 We recommend Closed......... Agreed
wide Management that the
of Detection Deputy Under
Equipment. Secretary for
Management:
Establish a
commodity
council for
detection
equipment,
responsible
for:
Coordinating,
communicating,
and, where
appropriate,
strategically
sourcing items
at the
department
level or
identifying a
single source
commodity
manager;
Standardizing
purchases for
similar
detection
equipment; and
Developing a
data
dictionary
that
standardizes
data elements
in inventory
accounts for
detection
equipment..
OIG-12-06 Transportation 11/21/2011 Recommendation Closed......... Agreed
Security includes
Administration Sensitive
Penetration Security
Testing of Information..
Advanced
Imaging
Technology.
OIG-12-06 Transportation 11/21/2011 Recommendation Closed......... No
Security includes
Administration Sensitive
Penetration Security
Testing of Information..
Advanced
Imaging
Technology.
OIG-12-06 Transportation 11/21/2011 Recommendation Closed*........ Agreed
Security includes
Administration Sensitive
Penetration Security
Testing of Information..
Advanced
Imaging
Technology.
OIG-12-06 Transportation 11/21/2011 Recommendation Closed*........ Agreed
Security includesSensit
Administration ive Security
Penetration Information..
Testing of
Advanced
Imaging
Technology.
OIG-12-06 Transportation 11/21/2011 Recommendation Closed......... Agreed
Security includes
Administration Sensitive
Penetration Security
Testing of Information..
Advanced
Imaging
Technology.
OIG-12-06 Transportation 11/21/2011 Recommendation Closed......... Agreed
Security includes
Administration Sensitive
Penetration Security
Testing of Information..
Advanced
Imaging
Technology.
OIG-12-06 Transportation 11/21/2011 Recommendation Closed......... Agreed
Security includes
Administration Sensitive
Penetration Security
Testing of Information..
Advanced
Imaging
Technology.
OIG-12-06 Transportation 11/21/2011 Recommendation Closed......... Agreed
Security includes
Administration Sensitive
Penetration Security
Testing of Information..
Advanced
Imaging
Technology.
OIG-13-91 Transportation 5/29/2013 We recommend Closed......... Agreed
Security that the
Administration' Assistant
s Screening of Administrator,
Passengers by Office of
Observation Security
Techniques. Capabilities
develop and
implement a
comprehensive
strategic plan
for the
Screening of
Passengers by
Observation
Techniques
(SPOT) program
that includes--
Mission,
goals,
objectives,
and a system
to measure
performance; A
trainingstrate
gy that
addresses the
goals and
objectives of
the SPOT
program; A
plan to
identify
external
partners
integral to
program
success, such
as law
enforcement
agencies, and
take steps to
ensure that
effective
relationships
are
established;
and A
financial plan
that includes
identification
of priorities,
goals,
objectives,
and measures;
needs
analysis;
budget
formulation
and execution;
and
expenditure
tracking..
OIG-13-91 Transportation 5/29/2013 We recommend Closed......... Agreed
Security that the
Administration' Assistant
s Screening of Administrator,
Passengers by Office of
Observation Security
Techniques. Capabilities
develop and
implement
controls to
ensure
completeness,
accuracy,
authorization,
and validity
of referral
data entered
into the
Performance
Measurement
Information
System..
OIG-13-91 Transportation 5/29/2013 We recommend Closed......... Agreed
Security that the
Administration' Assistant
s Screening of Administrator,
Passengers by Office of
Observation Security
Techniques. Capabilities
develop and
implement a
plan that
provides
recurrent
training to
Behavior
Detection
Officer (BDO)
instructors
and BDOs..
OIG-13-91 Transportation 5/29/2013 We recommend Closed......... Agreed
Security that the
Administration' Assistant
s Screening of Administrator,
Passengers by Office of
Observation Security
Techniques. Capabilities
develop and
implement a
plan to assess
BDO instructor
performance in
required core
competencies
on a regular
basis..
OIG-13-91 Transportation 5/29/2013 We recommend Closed......... Agreed
Security that the
Administration' Assistant
s Screening of Administrator,
Passengers by Office of
Observation Security
Techniques. Capabilities
monitor and
track the use
of BDOs for
non-SPOT
related duties
to ensure BDOs
are used in a
cost-effective
manner and in
accordance
with the
mission of the
SPOT program..
OIG-13-91 Transportation 5/29/2013 We recommend Closed......... Agreed
Security that the
Administration' Assistant
s Screening of Administrator,
Passengers by Office of
Observation Security
Techniques. Capabilities
develop and
implement a
process for
identifying
and addressing
issues that
may directly
affect the
success of the
SPOT program
such as the
selection,
allocation,
and
performance of
BDOs..
OIG-13-99 Transportation 6/20/2013 We recommend Closed......... Agreed
Security that the
Administration' Transportation
s Screening Security
Partnership Administration
Program. Deputy
Administrator
expedite
developing and
implementing
procedures to
ensure that
decisions on
Screening
Partnership
Program
applications
and
procurements
are fully
documented
according to
applicable
Department and
Federal
guidance..
OIG-13-99 Transportation 6/20/2013 We recommend Closed......... Agreed
Security that the
Administration' Transportation
s Screening Security
Partnership Administration
Program. Deputy
Administrator
establish and
implement
quality
assurance
procedures to
ensure that
the most
relevant and
accurate
information is
used when
determining
eligibility
and approving
airports'
participation
in the
Screening
Partnership
Program..
OIG-13-20 Transportation 9/16/2013 We recommend Closed......... Agreed
Security that the
Administration' Deputy
s Deployment Administrator,
and Use of Transportation
Advanced Security
Imaging Administration
Technology. : Develop and
approve a
single,
comprehensive
deployment
strategy that
addresses
short- and
long term
goals for
screening
equipment..
OIG-13-120 Transportation 9/16/2013 We recommend Closed*........ Agreed
Security that the
Administration' Deputy
s Deployment Administrator,
and Use of Transportation
Advanced Security
Imaging Administration
Technology. : Develop and
implement a
disciplined
system of
internal
controls from
data entry to
reporting to
ensure PMIS
data
integrity..
OIG-14-142 (U) 9/9/2014 This Closed......... Agreed
Vulnerabilities recommendation
Exist in TSA's is classified..
Checked Baggage
Screening
Operations.
OIG-14-142 (U) 9/9/2014 This Open-Resolved.. Agreed
Vulnerabilities recommendation
Exist in TSA's is classified..
Checked Baggage
Screening
Operations.
OIG-14-142 (U) 9/9/2014 This Closed*........ Agreed
Vulnerabilities recommendation
Exist in TSA's is classified..
Checked Baggage
Screening
Operations.
OIG-14-142 (U) 12/16/2014 This Open--Resolved Agreed
Vulnerabilities recommendation
Exist in TSA's is classified..
Checked Baggage
Screening
Operations.
OIG-14-142 (U) 12/16/2014 This Open-Unresolved Agreed
Vulnerabilities recommendation
Exist in TSA's is classified..
Checked Baggage
Screening
Operations.
OIG-14-153 Use of Risk 9/9/2014 Recommendation Open-Resolved.. Agreed**
Assessment includes
within Secure Sensitive
Flight. Security
Information..
OIG-14-153 Use of Risk 9/9/2014 Recommendation Closed......... Agreed
Assessment includes
within Secure Sensitive
Flight. Security
Information..
OIG-14-153 Use of Risk 9/9/2014 Recommendation Closed*........ Agreed**
Assessment includes
within Secure Sensitive
Flight. Security
Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 Recommendation Open-Unresolved Disagreed
Enhancements includes
Needed to the Sensitive
TSA PreCheckTM Security
Initiative. Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 Recommendation Open-Resolved.. Agreed
Enhancements includes
Needed to the Sensitive
TSA PreCheckTM Security
Initiative. Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 Recommendation Open-Resolved.. Agreed
Enhancements includes
Needed to the Sensitive
TSA PreCheckTM Security
Initiative. Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 Recommendation Open-Resolved.. Agreed
Enhancements includes
Needed to the Sensitive
TSA PreCheckTM Security
Initiative. Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 Recommendation Open-Resolved.. Agreed**
Enhancements includes
Needed to the Sensitive
TSA PreCheckTM Security
Initiative. Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 Recommendation Open-Resolved.. Agreed
Enhancements includes
Needed to the Sensitive
TSA PreCheckTM Security
Initiative. Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 Recommendation Open-Resolved*. Agreed
Enhancements includes
Needed to the Sensitive
TSA PreCheckTM Security
Initiative. Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 Recommendation Closed*........ Agreed**
Enhancements includes
Needed to the Sensitive
TSA PreCheckTM Security
Initiative. Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 Recommendation Open-Resolved.. Agreed**
Enhancements includes
Needed to the Sensitive
TSA PreCheckTM Security
Initiative. Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 We recommend Open-Resolved*. Agreed**
Enhancements that the TSA
Needed to the Assistant
TSA PreCheckTM Administrator
Initiative. for the Office
of
Intelligence
and Analysis:
Employ
exclusion
factors to
refer TSA
PreCheck
passengers to
standard
security lane
screening at
random
intervals..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 Recommendation Closed*........ Agreed
Enhancements includes
Needed to the Sensitive
TSA PreCheckTM Security
Initiative. Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 Recommendation Closed*........ Agreed
Enhancements includes
Needed to the Sensitive
TSA PreCheckTM Security
Initiative. Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 We recommend Open-Resolved.. Agreed**
Enhancements that the TSA
Needed to the Assistant
TSA PreCheckTM Administrator
Initiative. for the Office
of Security
Operations:
Develop and
implement a
strategy to
address the
TSA PreCheck
lane covert
testing
results..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 Recommendation Open-Resolved.. Agreed**
Enhancements includes
Needed to the Sensitive
TSA PreCheckTM Security
Initiative. Information..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 We recommend Open-Resolved.. Agreed
Enhancements that the TSA
Needed to the Assistant
TSA PreCheckTM Administrator
Initiative. for the Office
of
Intelligence
and Analysis:
Provide an
explanation of
TSA PreCheck
rules and
responsibiliti
es to all
enrollment
center
applicants and
include this
information in
eligibility
letters..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 We recommend Open-Resolved.. Agreed**
Enhancements that the TSA
Needed to the Assistant
TSA PreCheckTM Administrator
Initiative. for the Office
of
Intelligence
and Analysis:
Coordinate
with Federal
Government and
private
partners to
ensure all TSA
PreCheck
eligible
populations
receive the
rules and
responsibiliti
es when
notifying
participants
of
eligibility..
OIG-15-29 Security 1/28/2015 We recommend Open-Resolved.. Agreed
Enhancements that the TSA
Needed to the Chief Risk
TSA PreCheckTM Officer:
Initiative. Develop
consolidated
guidance
outlining
processes and
procedures for
all offices
involved in
the TSA
PreCheck
initiative..
OIG-15-45 Allegations of 3/16/2015 Recommendation Open-Unresolved Disagreed
Granting includes
Expedited Sensitive
Screening Security
through TSA Information..
PreCheck
Improperly (OSC
File No. DI-14-
3679).
OIG-15-45 Allegations of 3/16/2015 We recommend Closed*........ Agreed
Granting that the TSA
Expedited Assistant
Screening Administrator
through TSA for Security
PreCheck Operations:
Improperly (OSC Modify
File No. DI-14- standard
3679). operating
procedures to
clarify
Transportation
Security
Officer (TSO)
and
supervisory
TSO authority
to refer
passengers
with TSA
PreCheck
boarding
passes to
standard
screening
lanes when
they believe
that the
passenger
should not be
eligible for
TSA PreCheck
screening..
OIG-15-86 The 5/6/2015 We recommend Open-Resolved*. Agreed
Transportation that TSA's
Security Office of
Administration Security
Does Not Capabilities
Properly Manage and Office of
Its Airport Security
Screening Operations
Equipment develop and
Maintenance implement a
Program. preventive
maintenance
validation
process to
verify that
required
routine
maintenance
activities are
completed
according to
contractual
requirements
and
manufacturers'
specifications
. These
procedures
should also
include
instruction
for
appropriate
TSA airport
personnel on
documenting
the
performance of
Level
1preventive
maintenance
actions..
OIG-15-86 The 5/6/2015 We recommend Open-Resolved*. Agreed
Transportation that TSA's
Security Office of
Administration Security
Does Not Capabilities
Properly Manage and Office of
Its Airport Security
Screening Operations:
Equipment Develop and
Maintenance implement
Program. policies and
procedures to
ensure that
local TSA
airport
personnel
verify and
document
contractors'
completion of
corrective
maintenance
actions. These
procedures
should also
include
quality
assurance
steps that
would ensure
the integrity
of the
information
collected..
OIG-15-86 The 5/6/2015 We recommend Open-Resolved*. Agreed
Transportation TSA's Office
Security of Acquisition
Administration enhance future
Does Not screening
Properly Manage equipment
Its Airport maintenance
Screening contracts by
Equipment including
Maintenance penalties for
Program. noncompliance
when it is
determined
that either
preventive or
corrective
maintenance
has not been
completed
according to
contractual
requirements
and
manufacturers'
specifications
..
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*These recommendations were either resolved or closed within the last 6 months.
**TSA management changed their response from disagreed to agreed.
______
appendix c
current and planned oig work on tsa
projects in-progress:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Project Topic Objective
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA Security Vetting of Passenger Determine the extent to which
RailReservation Systems TSA has policies, processes,
and oversight measures to
improve security at the
National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (AMTRAK).
Reliability of TWIC Background Check Determine whether the screening
Process process for the Transportation
Worker Identification
Credential program (TWIC) is
operating effectively and
whether the program's
continued eligibility
processes ensure that only
eligible TWIC card holders
remain eligible.
TSA's Security Technology Determine whether TSA has
IntegratedProgram (STIP) incorporated adequate IT
security controls for
passenger and baggage
screening STIP equipment to
ensure it is performing as
required.
TSA's Controls Over Access Media Badges Identify and test selected
controls over access media
badges issued by airport
operators.
TSA's I11Risk-Based Strategy Determine the extent to which
TSA's intelligence-driven,
risk-based strategy informs
security and resource
decisions to protect the
traveling public and the
Nation's transportation
systems.
TSA's Office of Human Capital Contracts Determine whether TSA's human
capital contracts are managed
effectively, comply with DHS'
acquisition guidelines, and
are achieving expected goals.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
upcoming projects:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Project Topic Objective
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Air Marshal Service's Oversight Determine whether the Federal
of Civil Aviation Security Air Marshal Service adequately
manages its resources to
detect, deter, and defeat
threats to the civil aviation
system.
TSA Carry-On BaggagePenetration Testing Determine the effectiveness of
TSA's carry-on baggage
screening technologies and
checkpoint screener
performance in identifying and
resolving potential security
threats at airport security
checkpoints.
Airport Security Capping Report Synthesize the results of our
airport security evaluations
into a capping report that
groups and summarizes
identified weaknesses and root
causes and recommends how TSA
can systematically and
proactively address these
issues at airports nationwide.
TSA's Classification Program Determine whether TSA is
effectively managing its
classification program and its
use of the Sensitive Security
Information designation.
TSA's Office of Intelligence and Determine whether TSA's Office
Analysis of Intelligence and Analysis
is effectively meeting its
mission mandates.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Mr. Roth, and at this point I
would turn to Administrator Neffenger.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. PETER V. NEFFENGER
Mr. Neffenger. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Hoeven,
Ranking Member Shaheen, members of the subcommittee. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify today and to tell you of our
response to the recent challenges that Inspector General Roth
has highlighted.
TSA at its core is a counterterrorism organization, an
instrument of national power to deter and detect threats and to
protect legitimate trade and travel. We have a no fail mission
to protect our transportation system. This is a mission for
which the consequences of a successful attack overwhelm the
risk equation, and for which we must ensure we deliver success.
This critically important core mission is my highest priority,
and I will tell you that I was greatly disturbed by the
inspector general's findings, which came to light during my
confirmation process.
As I appear before you today, I am in the middle of my
third month on the job. In that 3-month period, I have traveled
extensively to airports and Federal Air Marshal Service offices
across the country. I even managed to get over and visit with a
few of my counterparts in Europe. And I have been thoroughly
impressed with our professionals who occupy our ranks, our
officers, our air marshals, inspectors, and other employees who
swore an oath to serve their Nation in a mission that
encounters nearly 2 million travelers per day in the aviation
sector alone. I have had time to become more familiar with the
challenges facing the agency and to develop a series of
immediate priorities. One of those is to pursue solutions to
the recent covert testing failures.
Overall, there are several critical elements that are
essential to improving screening operations. First, we must
ensure the appropriate measures of effectiveness are in place
to drive an institutional focus on our primary mission. What we
measure is what our employees will pay attention to, so it is
imperative that we get our measures correct. Second, we must
employ a culture of operational evolution, one that constantly
reassesses assumptions, plans, and processes, and it must be
able to rapidly field new concepts of operation. And finally,
we must deliver an effective system and earn the confidence of
the traveling public, and this will only come through
competence, discipline, performance, and professionalism. I
have conveyed these standards to our workforce, and I commit to
you that I will relentlessly pursue these objectives.
We continue to face an adversary intent on attacking the
transportation sector, an adversary who is adaptive and
patient, who presents threats that are complex, decentralized,
and evolving, and these are TSA's most pressing challenges.
They require a renewed focus on our security mission. We face a
critical turning point in evolving TSA, both to address the
findings of the inspector general's report and to begin our
investment in security technologies that can propel us into the
future.
Aviation security includes a range of capabilities, some
seen, many unseen, and every day we employ invaluable tools.
Our intelligence experts, passenger screening canines,
behavioral detection, Federal air marshals, and many others
that protect the transportation system that as recent and prior
tests show, we must continue to improve our effectiveness in
checkpoint screening, which is the fundamental element of the
passenger screening process.
I want to thank Inspector General Roth for his review. I
met with him prior to my nomination, and I met with him as the
administrator to relay the seriousness with which I take his
work, and to gain his continued insights. My staff has met with
his inspection team multiple times following his screening
assessment, and his team has been invaluable in helping us to
identify root causes.
So in response to these findings, TSA implemented an
immediate action plan. The plan ensures leadership
accountability, improves alarm resolution, increases
effectiveness and deterrence, increases threat testing, and
strengthens procedures.
We have also responded vigorously to Secretary Johnson's
10-point plan to review and assess screening operations,
including mission-sensitive training for the entire screening
workforce, which occurred over the past 2 months. We will
complete that as of the end of this week. Testing and improving
the technology, and implementing new procedures and explosion
detection capabilities. We continue to implement this plan of
action, and we will continue to provide regular updates to the
Secretary and to our oversight committees in the Congress.
Of the utmost concern is determining the root causes for
the failures noted. Our conclusion is that the screening
effectiveness challenges were not merely a performance problem,
not merely a process problem, nor were they a failure
principally of the advanced imaging technology. Indeed, AITs
have greatly enhanced our ability to detect non-metallic
threats, and they continue to perform to expected standards
when used properly.
Strong drivers of the problem include leadership focus,
environmental influences, and gaps in system design and
processes. A disproportionate focus on speed and efficiency in
screening operations rather than security effectiveness
powerfully influenced organizational culture and officer
performance. As a result, across TSA there was significant
pressure to clear passengers quickly, often at the risk of not
diligently resolving alarms.
Our analysis also revealed that our officers did not fully
understand the capabilities and limitations of the equipment
that they were using, and several procedures were inadequate to
resolve alarms. We have addressed these, and we have trained
our officers to understand and to use the equipment properly.
Solutions to these challenges require a renewed focus on
security; more streamlined, more effective procedures;
investments in technology; realistic and standardized training,
and new balance between effectiveness and efficiency, and
support for our frontline officers. We will continue to partner
with the airlines and with airport operators in the trade
industry to identify solutions that can reduce the stress on
the checkpoint, and we must rightsize and resource TSA
appropriately.
Our near-term solutions will halt further reductions in
officer staffing to support screening operations; provide
consistent, high-quality training at a centralized location;
and enhance our technology at checkpoints. With your support we
can fund the majority of these investments using base
resources.
As noted, a key element of our solution is to halt further
reductions in our frontline screening workforce. Staffing
levels for fiscal year 2016 planned nearly 2 years ago presumed
a significant increase in the vetted traveling population,
PreCheck passengers, which, combined with the practice referred
to as management inclusion, could have allowed for a smaller
screening workforce.
Budgeting assumptions for fiscal year 2016 also predated
the rise of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and the
renewed transportation security threats we face today. Thus, I
am asking that we hold staffing at current levels as of summer
2015, which is about 5,600 below where we were in 2011, and
includes fiscal year 2016 reductions that have already been
taken in certain aspects of our workforce.
Our mission-essentials training conducted the past 2 months
with every frontline officer and leader across TSA has helped
to reset our focus on security effectiveness, and most
critically we have enhanced our officers' knowledge of the
screening systems they employ. And I have met with our officers
in airports across the country and attended the training
sessions myself. I have heard repeatedly how valuable this
information is to them.
Our new officer training across the country requires
greater consistency and efficiency in its delivery, and we must
do more to establish the professional foundation that is
required of a high-performing counterterrorism organization. As
such, I am committed to expanding our existing TSA Academy at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco,
Georgia, and plan to send, if approved, all new hire
transportation security officers (TSOs) to TSO basic training
beginning in January 2016. Centralized training in a formal,
professional academy ensures consistency and professionalism,
and produces greater enthusiasm, increased confidence in one's
skills, dedication, and connectedness to a common agency
culture and increased focus on mission. The Senate mark, when
added to existing base resources, would fund this training.
We have two existing business case analyses. They were
performed in 2008 and 2011. My staff is updating those at this
moment. I will provide both of those to you and your staff once
we have completed that task. And we have hosted eight prototype
courses this past year at FLETC to validate the concept.
I am deeply committed to this effort because I have seen
the value a common foundation of training, culture, and
operational focus can have on a distributed workforce during my
34 years in the United States Coast Guard. This initiative will
improve our mission focus, and we expect it will increase our
ability to retain and lead a more highly motivated and mission-
ready workforce.
Finally, we are asking for funding for critical AIT
technology software and hardware upgrades. These investments
are essential to our effectiveness, which I would be pleased to
discuss in detail in a classified setting.
[The statement follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter Neffenger
Good morning Chairman Hoeven, Ranking Member Shaheen, and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify in my new role as Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
Since its creation following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, TSA has played an invaluable role in protecting the traveling
public. Fourteen years after the 9/11 attacks, we face threats more
dangerous than at any time in the recent past. Terrorist groups and
aspiring violent extremists, inspired by messages of hatred and
violence, remain intent on striking our Nation's aviation system as
well as other transportation modes. The threat is decentralized,
diffuse, and quite complex.
These persistent and evolving threats are TSA's most pressing
challenge and require an intense and sustained focus on our security
missions. We remain deeply committed to ensuring that TSA remains a
high-performing, risk-based intelligence-driven counterterrorism
organization. We are working diligently to ensure we recruit, train,
develop, and lead a mission-ready and highly-capable workforce, placing
a premium on professional values and personal accountability. Further,
we will pursue advanced and innovative capabilities that our mission
requires to deter, detect, and disrupt threats to our Nation's
transportations systems, with a clear understanding that we must
continue to optimize today's capabilities while envisioning the
checkpoint of the future.
I am intently focused on leading TSA strategically, developing and
supporting our workforce, and investing appropriately, to deliver on
our vital security mission.
improving aviation screening operations
My highest priority for TSA is determining root causes and
implementing solutions to address the recent covert testing of TSA's
checkpoint operations and technology conducted by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG). I was
greatly disturbed by TSA's failure rate on these tests, and have met
with the Inspector General on several occasions to better understand
the nature of the failures and the scope of the corrective actions
needed.
Screening operations are a core mission of TSA. In fiscal year
2014, our officers screened approximately 660 million passengers and
nearly 2 billion carry-on and checked bags. Through their diligent
daily efforts, our officers prevented over 180,000 dangerous and/or
prohibited items, including over 2,200 firearms, from being carried
onto planes. In addition, our workforce vetted a daily average of six
million air passengers against the U.S. Government's Terrorist
Screening Database, preventing those who may wish to do us harm from
boarding aircraft, and conducting enhanced screening of passengers and
their baggage prior to allowing them to board an aircraft. In
conjunction with these screening efforts, and using intelligence-driven
analysis, TSA's Federal Air Marshals also protected thousands of
flights. To ensure compliance with aviation security requirements, in
fiscal year 2014 TSA Inspectors completed over 1,054 airport
inspections, nearly 18,000 aircraft operator inspections, and almost
3,000 foreign air carrier inspections to ensure compliance with
aviation security requirements. Still, as recent and prior testing
shows, we must continue to formulate solutions that will enhance our
effectiveness at checkpoint screening operations.
It is important to acknowledge that the OIG covert tests, as a part
of their design, focused on a discrete segment of TSA's myriad
capabilities of detecting and disrupting threats to aviation security.
TSA conducts similar, more extensive testing that is part of a
deliberate process designed to defeat and subsequently improve our
performance, processes, and screening technologies. TSA's covert
testing program, along with the OIG's covert testing, provides
invaluable lessons learned, highlighting areas in which the agency
needs improvement in detecting threats. Such testing is an important
element in the continual evolution of aviation security.
As we pursue solutions to the challenges presented by recent and
on-going covert testing, there are several critical concepts that must
be in place. TSA must ensure that its value proposition is well
defined, clearly communicated, understood and applied across the entire
workforce and mission enterprise. From my first day on the job, I have
made it clear that we are first and foremost a security organization.
Our mission is to deter, detect, and disrupt threats, and we must
ensure every officer, inspector, air marshal, and member of our agency
remains laser-focused on this mission. In addition, we must ensure the
appropriate measures of effectiveness are in place to drive an
institutional focus on the primary security objectives for all modes of
transportation, and renewed emphasis on aviation measures.
We have demonstrated our ability to efficiently screen passengers:
however, it is clear that we now must improve our effectiveness. By
focusing on the basic fundamentals of security screening, and by
readjusting the measurements of success to focus on security rather
than speed, and by measuring what we value most, we can adjust the
institutional focus and adapt the culture to deliver success. TSA must
adopt a culture of operational evolution, one that constantly questions
assumptions, plans, and processes, and is able to rapidly field new
concepts of operation, performance standards and capabilities,
particularly given the persistent and adaptive enemy we face.
To drive these important changes, it is essential to understand and
assess appropriately the effectiveness of our aviation security
enterprise, to rigorously pursue initiatives to quickly close
capability and security gaps, and employ our own covert testing and
vulnerability assessments. Delivering an effective security system and
earning the confidence of the traveling public will come only through
competence, disciplined performance, successful results, and
professionalism. These imperatives are essential to address the
immediate challenges, and more broadly, to accomplish the important
mission entrusted to TSA.
In late May, in response to the OIG initial findings, TSA developed
and implemented an immediate action plan built on its understanding of
the known vulnerabilities in checkpoint operations. Consisting of
dozens of individual actions, it was designed to:
1) ensure leadership accountability;
2) improve alarm resolution;
3) increase effectiveness and deterrence;
4) increase threat testing to sharpen officer performance;
5) strengthen standard operating procedures;
6) improve the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) system;
7) deploy additional resolution tools; and
8) improve human factors, including enhanced training and
operational responses.
Scheduled for completion in March 2016, TSA is actively engaged in
implementing this plan of action and provides regular updates to the
Secretary of Homeland Security as well as frequent updates to the
Congress.
There are a number of immediate actions that have been completed,
including the following: 1) requiring screening leadership at each
airport to oversee AIT operations to ensure compliance with standard
procedures; 2) requiring each officer to complete initial video-based
training to reinforce proper alarm resolution conversations; 3)
conducting leadership and officer same-day debriefs for threat inject
testing and lessons learned; and 4) performing daily operational
exercises and reinforcement of proper pat down procedures at least once
per shift to ensure optimal TSO performance.
secretary johnson's ten-point plan
In addition to the TSA action plan, Department of Homeland Security
Secretary Jeh Johnson directed a series of actions, which in
cooperation with TSA, constituted a ten-point plan to address these
findings. TSA is now working aggressively to accomplish these actions.
The plan includes the following:
--Briefing all Federal Security Directors at airports nationwide on
the OIG's preliminary test results to ensure leadership
awareness and accountability. This was completed in May and
continues regularly. Last week I also convened the leadership
of TSA--from across the agency and in every mission area--to
discuss our progress, to clearly convey my expectations, and to
outline my vision for the evolution of our counterterrorism
agency.
--Training every Transportation Security Officer (TSO) and supervisor
to address the specific vulnerabilities identified by the OIG
tests. This training also is intended to reemphasize the value
and underscore the importance we place on the security mission.
The training will reemphasize the threat we face, the design of
our security system, integrating technology with human
expertise, the range of tools we employ to detect threats, and
the essential role our officers perform in resolving alarms.
Fundamentally, this training is intended to explain the ``why''
behind our renewed and intense focus on security effectiveness.
We are also training supervisors and leaders to ensure they
appreciate and support the shift in emphasis. Most important,
we are asking our supervisors to recognize their critical role
in supporting our officers' renewed focus on alarm resolution.
TSA is now implementing this training in a phased approach,
which began May 29, 2015 and is to be completed by the end of
September 2015. Over 98 percent of our workforce had completed
training as of this hearing.
--Increasing manual screening measures, including reintroducing hand-
held metal detectors to resolve alarms at the checkpoint. This
has been underway since mid-June and reinforces our ability to
detect the full range of threats.
--Increasing the use of random explosives trace detection, which also
started in mid-June, enhancing detection capabilities to a
range of threat vectors.
--Re-testing and re-evaluating screening equipment to measure current
performance standards. We are retesting the systems in the
airports tested by the Inspector General and assessing
performance of the field systems against those in the labs to
ensure optimal performance. This testing, which began in June
and is ongoing, will help us to more fully understand and
strengthen equipment performance across the enterprise.
--Assessing areas where screening technology equipment can be
enhanced. This includes new software, new operating concepts,
and technology upgrades in collaboration with our private
sector partners.
--Evaluating the current practice of including non-vetted populations
in expedited screening. We continue to take steps to ensure
that we have a more fully vetted population of travelers
exposed to screening in our expedited lanes. For example, as of
September 12th, the practice of Managed Inclusion-2 was phased
out of daily operations.
--Revising TSA's standard operating procedures to include using TSA
supervisors to help resolve situations at security checkpoints.
On June 26, 2015, TSA began field testing new standard
operating procedures at six airports. Lessons learned will be
incorporated and deployed nation-wide. This procedure is
intended to ensure appropriate resolution techniques are
employed in every situation.
--Continuing covert testing to assess the effectiveness of these
actions. For each test, there must be a same-day debrief with
the workforce of outcomes and performance along with immediate
remediation actions. Expansion of our testing also enhances
officer vigilance.
--Finally, we have responded vigorously by establishing a team of TSA
and other DHS officials to monitor implementation of these
measures and report to the Secretary and me every two weeks.
These updates have been ongoing for the past 2 months.
root cause assessment
DHS and TSA are also committed to resolving the root causes of
these test failures. A diverse team of DHS leaders, subject matter
experts, as well as officers and leaders from the frontline workforce
are examining the underlying problems resulting in our performance
failures and will make recommendations on system-wide solutions for
implementations across the agency.
The team's initial conclusion is that the screening effectiveness
challenges noted by the Inspector General were not merely a performance
problem to be solved solely by retraining our officers. Officer
performance is but one among many of the challenges. TSA frontline
officers have repeatedly demonstrated during their annual proficiency
evaluations that they have the knowledge and the skill to perform the
screening mission well. Nor was this principally a failure of the AIT
technology. These systems have greatly enhanced TSA's ability to detect
and disrupt new and evolving threats to aviation. AIT technology
continues to perform to specification standards when maintained and
employed properly, and we continue to improve its detection
capabilities.
The challenge can be succinctly described as a set of multi-
dimensional factors that have influenced the conduct of screening
operations, creating a disproportionate focus on efficiency and speed
in screening operations rather than security effectiveness. These
challenges range across six dimensions: leadership, technology,
workforce performance, the environment, operating procedures, and
system design. Of these six, strong drivers include leadership focus,
environmental influences, and system design.
Pressures driven by increasing passenger volume, an increase in
checkpoint screening of baggage due to fees charged for checked bags as
well as inconsistent or limited enforcement of size requirements for
hand-carried bags and the one bag plus one personal item (1+1)
standard\1\ create a stressed screening environment at airport
checkpoints. The challenges also include the range of complex
procedures that we ask our officers to employ, resulting in cognitive
overload and personnel not properly employing the technology or a
specific procedure. The limitations of the technology, the systems
detection standards, TSA officers' lack of training on equipment
limitations, and procedures that failed to resolve the alarms
appropriately all undermined our ability to effectively screen, as
noted by the Inspector General's report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program, Dated October
21, 2013, requires, with some exceptions for crewmembers, medical
assistance items, musical instruments, duty free items, and
photographic equipment, that the accessible property for individuals
accessing the sterile area be limited to one bag plus one personal item
per passenger (e.g., purse, briefcase, or laptop computer).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A critical component of the problem was confusing messages on the
values of the institution, as expressed in the metrics used to assess
effectiveness and leadership performance. As noted, a prior focus on
measures that emphasized reduced wait times and organizational
efficiency powerfully influenced screening performance as well as
organizational culture. As a result, across TSA, leaders' and officers'
organizational behavior emphasized efficiency outcomes, creating
pressures to expand the populations receiving expedited screening in
TSA Pre-Check lanes, even if they had not enrolled in the program, and
a pressure to clear passengers quickly, at the risk of not diligently
resolving alarms. The combined effect of these many variables produced
the performance reported by the Office of the Inspector General.
implementing solutions
Solutions to the challenges facing TSA will require a renewed focus
on the agency's security mission, a commitment to right-sizing and
resourcing TSA to effectively secure the aviation enterprise, and an
industry commitment to incentivizing vetting of passengers as well as
creating conditions that can decrease the volume and contents of bags
presented for screening in airports.
For TSA, we must renew our focus on the fundamentals of security,
thereby asking our officers and leaders to strike a new balance between
security effectiveness and line efficiency, to field and diligently
perform appropriate resolution procedures and to close technology and
performance gaps. We need our managers and supervisors to support our
officers when they perform their difficult daily mission. As we move
forward, we are guided by a principled, strategic approach, with
specific projects already underway to advance our goal of ensuring we
deliver on our mission to deter, detect, and disrupt threats to
aviation.
Redefine Value Proposition
First, TSA is in the process of ensuring our focus on security
effectiveness is well defined and applied across the entire workforce
and mission space. Our ``Mission Essentials--Threat Mitigation''
course, being provided to every officer by the end of September, is our
initial step. We will follow this initial effort with a range of
initiatives to convey these priorities to leaders and officers using
additional tools, such as a statement of the Administrator's Intent,
the National Training Plan, and in our workforce messaging. Redefining
our values as an agency by focusing on threat mitigation and improving
TSO awareness and knowledge of the threat will provide a new and acute
mission focus. Resolving every alarm, with discipline, competence, and
professionalism are the values we are emphasizing to the workforce.
From my initial field visits, I can report that our officers are
hearing, understanding, and applying this new approach.
Communicate New Standards and Expectations
To communicate these new standards, TSA's Office of Intelligence
and Analysis is pursuing an information sharing project to expand and
ensure standardized information and intelligence sharing to frontline
officers. Expanding the reach of the threat information provided to the
field, enhancing our officers' awareness and understanding of the
threat and the critical role they play in interdicting these threats
creates ownership and a greater commitment to ensuring security
procedures are followed.
Align Measures of Effectiveness to Standards and Expectations
TSA's Office of Security Operations is examining and revising the
current Management Objectives Report to rebalance the field leaders'
scorecard with security effectiveness measures in addition to some
preserved efficiency data. We are operating on the premise that what
wemeasure are the organizational objectives to which our field leaders
will pay close attention. We expect the first iteration of our new
measures to be in the field by the end of October 2015.
Design System to Achieve Desired Outcome
The aviation security system must interdict the full range of
threats on the Prohibited Items List and evolving threats that require
our immediate action. Our concept of operations review project, run by
the Operations Performance and Mission Analysis Divisions, is further
identifying system wide gaps and vulnerabilities and how to ensure the
traveling public is exposed to our mission essential detection
capabilities when transiting the screening checkpoint. The results of
this analysis may lead to a range of recommended improvements, from
clarification of pat down procedures to fielding decisions for new
technologies.
Eliminate Gaps and Vulnerabilities in Achieving Desired End State
Our work in analyzing the root causes has identified a range of
vulnerabilities in TSA; however, there is no single office or
accountable official charged with systemically tracking our
vulnerability mitigation efforts. Centralizing these activities under a
single official should drive systemic research, development, and
fielding of new capabilities. Our TSA Office of the Chief Risk Officer
is managing this project.
Evaluate Performance by using the new Values, Standards, and
Expectations
To motivate behavior, supervisors must clearly communicate the
performance objectives they expect from their subordinate officers and
leaders. Our Chief of Human Capital is working an initiative we are
calling the ``Performance Evaluation Project,'' which is designed to
ensure the appropriate focus on desired mission outcomes is imbedded
within Annual Performance Plans. The field has been notified of the new
performance expectations and officer performance plans will be in place
by October 30th, 2015, using these new standards.
Incentivize Performance to Enact Values, Standard, and Expectations
Several of our field leaders and officers have also recommended a
Model Transportation Security Officer Project to determine model
performance criteria. The project is intended to incentivize
performance and emphasize the values and standards frontline employees
are expected to uphold across the enterprise. I am a strong proponent
of incentivizing performance, as this can be a powerful instrument to
drive employee behaviors. Through these efforts, we intend to convey
our values, measure them, and evaluate performance against these new
expectations, uniting the TSA workforce behind critical agency reforms
that will deliver organizational alignment and strengthen our security
posture.
Finally, we will continue to partner with the trade and travel
industry, the airlines, and airport operators to identify solutions
that can fundamentally alter the reality on the ground for our
screening workforce.
A key element of our solution set will be reassessing and
establishing the new funding baseline for the screening workforce.
Prior staffing levels for fiscal year 2016, planned more than a year in
advance of the covert testing failures, presumed a significant increase
in the vetted traveling population which, combined with managed
inclusion, allowed for a smaller workforce. We recommend to the
Committee that we hold staffing at fiscal year 2015 levels--with
additional adjustments to support training and operational
enhancements--to ensure future reductions remain rational choices that
balance effectiveness with efficiency. We recognize that this
additional personnel request may require additional funding, and look
forward to working with the Subcommittee to identify resources to meet
these emergent requirements. Additionally, we look forward to working
with the Congress to identify means of adding additional field
intelligence officers to ensure every field operation is supported with
a dedicated intelligence officer to facilitate information sharing, and
to expand our fiscal year 2016 efforts at the TSA Academy to train the
workforce. Finally, we expect to invest in Advanced Imaging Technology
detection upgrades based on the OIG findings, requiring authority and
funds in fiscal year 2016/2017 to support our efforts.
mission essentials training
Given the importance of training to our mission, I would like to
elaborate on TSA's approach to training following the OIG covert
testing results. It is critical that we train out these failures so we
do not repeat the mistakes, including those which could have
catastrophic consequences. By the end of this September, we will have
trained the specifics of the failures to every frontline member and
leader of TSA.
This training, referred to as ``Mission Essentials--Threat
Mitigation,'' builds our workforce understanding of the link among
intelligence, technology and the procedures they perform. As of
September 29, over 98 percent of the TSO workforce had completed the
training. The training advances our new value proposition by (1)
providing a detailed intelligence briefing on the current threat; (2)
discussing passenger tactics and techniques that may be used to
dissuade the TSOs from thoroughly performing their screening duties and
what counter measures they can employ; (3) reviewing recent procedural
changes for screening individuals who present themselves as having a
disability; (4) practicing pat-down procedures with the goal of finding
components of improvised explosive devices; and (5) exploring the
capabilities and limitations of the checkpoint equipment and how the
TSO can by following proper procedures. I have been encouraged to see
our TSOs embracing the principles of Mission Essentials training.
Through this training, our employees are being taught how to
respond to social engineering--techniques used by passengers seeking to
manipulate our screening workforce and avoid regular processes. As I
meet with these employees in my travels to airports throughout the
country, I have heard repeatedly that they wished they had been exposed
to this information before. As such, I have charged TSA's senior
leaders to plan to send all new-hire TSOs to the TSA Academy at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, GA, for TSO-basic
training beginning in January 2016. Most of our major counterterrorism
partners in security and law enforcement send their employees through
similar type academies to ensure a laser-focus on mission, and we
should as well. We recognize this initiative may require additional
resources, and look forward to working with the Committee accordingly.
future of screening
As we envision the future of screening, even in the context of the
current challenges, I remain a strong proponent of a risk-based
approach to security. The vast majority of people, goods and services
moving through our transportation systems are legitimate and pose
minimal risk. To support our risk-based approach, it is critical to
continue growing the population of fully vetted travelers, such as
those participating in TSA Pre3 or in DHS trusted traveler programs.
In parallel, I am also reviewing expedited screening concepts with the
intent of moving away from unvetted travelers. This multi-pronged,
risk-based approach will result in separating known and unknown
travelers, with known travelers receiving expedited screening and other
travelers, some high threat, receiving more extensive screening.
I envision a future where some known travelers will be as vetted
and trusted as flight crews. Technology on the horizon may support
passengers becoming their own ``boardingpasses'' by using biometrics,
such as fingerprint scans, to verify identities linked to Secure
Flight. The Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) is the first
step in this process and will provide TSOs with real-time
authentication of a passenger's identity credentials and travel
itinerary.
A second objective is to screen at the ``speed of life'' with an
integrated screening system that combines metal detection, non-metallic
anomaly detection, shoe x-ray, and explosive vapor detection.
Prototypes of these machines exist, which hold great promise for the
traveling public.
Purposeful checkpoint and airport designs that facilitate screening
advances are also a future approach. At Los Angeles International
Airport (LAX) Tom Bradley International Terminal, recent innovative
renovations have been completed so that screening operations are
seamlessly integrated into the movement and flow of the traveling
public. This effort will continue, with six out of eight terminals at
LAX scheduled for design and renovation. Other locations, such as
Dulles International Airport (IAD), have dedicated checkpoints that
separate expedited screening from other operations, allowing TSOs to
follow the appropriate concepts of operations with greater focus and
clarity.
While all airports may not be able to take the same approach, the
future of screening is based on fulfilling the promise of risk-based
security. By increasing the number of fully vetted passengers and
enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of physical screening, I am
committed to refining and advancing our risk-based security strategy. I
look forward to working with this Committee and the Congress to chart a
way forward in this regard.
conclusion
Chairman Hoeven, Ranking Member Shaheen, we have an incredible
challenge ahead of us. Still, I know TSA is up to the task, and will
adjust its focus from one based on speed and efficiency to one based on
security effectiveness. We are on the frontlines of a critical
counterterrorism fight and our workforce is willing and able to do the
job. I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and
sincerely appreciate your time and attention. I look forward to your
questions.
______
dhs oig highlights
covert testing of the transpiration security administration's passenger
screening technologies and processes at airport security checkpoints
unclassified summary
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) conducts or
oversees passenger checkpoint screening at 450 Federalized airports.
Passenger checkpoint screening is a process by which passengers are
inspected to deter, detect, and prevent explosives, incendiaries,
weapons, or other security threats from entering sterile areas of an
airport or getting onboard an aircraft.
As threats to transportation security evolved, TSA needed a
screening technology to detect nonmetallic threats. TSA developed
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) to screen passengers for both
metallic and nonmetallic threats concealed under clothing--without
physical contact. In 2013, TSA equipped all AIT with Automated Target
Recognition software, which displays a box around anomalies on a
generic outline of a body.
Our objective was to determine the effectiveness of TSA's AIT,
Automated Target Recognition software, and checkpoint screener
performance in identifying and resolving anomalies and potential
security threats at airport checkpoints.The compilation of the number
of tests conducted, names of the test airports, and quantitative and
qualitative results of our testing is classified or designated as
Sensitive Security Information. We have shared the information with the
Department, TSA, and appropriate Congressional committees.
We made one recommendation that when implemented should strengthen
the effectiveness of identifying and resolving security threats at
airport checkpoints.
10-POINT SCREENING OPERATIONS PLAN
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Administrator Neffenger. Thank
you, Inspector Roth. We will now go to questions and responses
in 5-minute rounds.
And I would like to start with you, Administrator. Pursuant
to the 10-point plan that the Secretary put forward in June--
and you touched on some of this in your opening comments--has
the training been completed? Have you put everybody through the
training? Have you completed updating the operating procedures,
and have you engaged all of the technology vendors on the
equipment failures? And the second part is, how are you
measuring performance--back to the metrics--and whether you
have achieved the level of performance that you need both in
terms of safety and in terms of trying to be as convenient as
possible for the traveling public?
I know it is kind of a lot, but, again, three legs of the
stool: specific progress on each one, and how you are measuring
that both in terms of safety and convenience to the customer?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman, for the
question, so let me address each one. So this is the people,
process, and technology pieces, and I will address each one in
order.
So with the people piece, we will this week complete the
training of our entire frontline workforce. The latest numbers
I got the latest this morning, we were at about 98 percent, and
that is of the 41,000-plus screeners that we have, they have
all been through what we call mission essentials training. That
is an eight-hour block of time specifically dedicated to
looking at not just the nature of the failures, but then what
we do about correcting, by training, those failures.
So that is looking at the actual specific things that were
done by the inspector general's team, you know, what items got
through, what was the nature in which they got through, and how
were they presented at the checkpoints when they went through.
The second piece of that was there is--concurrent with the
training--an update on the current threat situation to refocus
people on the mission and then to look at what we need to
change in order to make sure that does not happen again. So
what were the root causes of that? Some of it--and, again,
without getting into classified details--has to do with how you
present yourself in the equipment, how the equipment is used,
and understanding what the equipment can do and what it cannot
do.
So that was the purpose of that 8-hour mission essentials
training, and, again, everybody has been through that. I also
required all of the managers to go through that as well,
including the Federal security directors (FSDs) because I did
not want this just to be focused on the workforce. The
management of that workforce has to understand as well what
those issues were. I will talk about the testing of all that in
a moment.
The process piece. I looked at the standard operating
procedures that we have, and I will tell you I was shocked to
see how thick these were. So there were some 3,100 separate
items that we expect that a frontline screening workforce
officer, a transportation security officer to memorize and to
remember. That is an impossibility, and I would argue, not
necessary to meet the mission. So one of the things that we
have done over the past 6 months is to dramatically streamline
those procedures to turn them into more of a quick guide, a
response guide. So we have taken that huge, thick binder and
turned it into a small binder of operations. I'm happy to share
that with the committee so that you can see what the changes
are from what we had then to what we have now. And then train
to those procedures so that it becomes a very clear and
straightforward process to follow.
We have also looked at the way in which we required certain
actions to take place to resolve alarms. And what we found was
that for the same type of alarm, we sometimes had multiple
different processes that we expected people to follow to do
that. Well, that is just hard to follow, and it is hard to
remember, and it allows gaps and vulnerabilities to exist.
We looked at standardizing the way we resolve alarms,
including when you conduct a pat-down. What is that you are
doing? What is the purpose of the pat-down? What do we expect
to find, and what does it mean to actually resolve an alarm and
not simply go through the motions of resolving the alarm?
To test all of this, you have got to go back and see
whether or not you have made any progress, and I have talked to
Inspector General Roth about the follow-on testing that they
are doing. We are doing some follow-on testing ourselves. We
are increasing the rate, type, and detail of our own internal
covert testing, providing more immediate feedback, and then
doing an immediate measured assessment of performance so that
we have a baseline. So we take some of this as a baseline, and
then we establish a baseline going forward.
With respect to the technology, I met personally with the
leadership of the technology manufacturers--the primary
technology manufacturers, including the manufacturer of the AIT
machine. They assured me of their commitment to solving some of
the software challenges. They are working hard on that right
now. We are working with them. We are holding them to account.
We are looking forward to some software upgrades that we are
testing right now. Initial tests are promising. We have to now
put those into an operational field environment to see how well
they work. We are also looking at the potential over the coming
year to do hardware upgrades, which would increase the
resolution of the machines that we are currently using.
Again, how we measure that is we have got to go back and
test it, so there is a tactical measure that has to be done we
immediately go back and see whether or not devices are able to
be moved through the checkpoint in a way that they were before.
I believe that we can--that through a combination of
training of our people, understanding, you know, how far the
technology can take you, how does the human piece fill that
technology gap that will always exist, and then what are the
processes to streamline them and make them as straightforward
and as consistent as possible across the enterprise. Then we
can begin to measure the performance of the system against
those.
Senator Hoeven. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Mr. Roth, I just want to
clarify a couple of things that you said in your testimony. I
think I understood you to say that you have done 115 reviews
through the inspector general's office of TSA. I assume that
has been since the organization or that agency was formed?
Mr. Roth. That is correct.
Senator Shaheen. And you also alluded to a very different
response in--to this audit from some of the previous audits.
And can you just again make that comparison because I think
that is really important for the traveling public to hear. And,
again, to point out, as Administrator Neffenger did, to some
extent that he was actually not at the head of the organization
when the audit was done.
Mr. Roth. That is exactly right. As you noted in your
opening statement, we actually cut the audit off before its
planned completion because of some of the results. And I was
able to personally brief the Secretary and the chief of staff
on that really within a day or two of us conducting the last
audit and making the decision that this had to be reported up
immediately. We could not wait for the draft. You know, what we
would do is we would write a draft, and there would be a formal
comment, and then it would come back.
Literally within 24 hours, there was a meeting with the
senior leadership at TSA with the Secretary and the Deputy
Secretary asking some very serious and pointed questions as to
what was going on. And I was able to brief my auditors on it,
some of whom had been here since TSA started, and they had
never seen anything like it. The response was immediate, it was
unequivocal, and it was highly gratifying, at least from our
point of view.
AVIATION SYSTEM SECURITY: WORKING WITH OTHER PLAYERS
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. Administrator
Neffenger, you talked a little bit about the people, process,
and technology as the chairman did, and about efforts to
address all three of those. But as we know, TSA is not the only
actor when it comes to keeping our transportation systems
secure. So what are you looking at with respect to airports,
and air carriers, and the other players in making sure we have
a secure environment?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, thank you, Senator, and you are
absolutely right. You have to look at the entire system. TSA is
one component of a very large and complex system that is the
aviation environment. So if we are just talking about the
aviation sector, there are lots of opportunities for threats to
enter into that system whether you are talking the passenger
environment, or the aviation--the operating area environment,
or the various actors in that environment.
So the first thing I have done is I have actually met with
quite a few of the various players and their representatives.
So I have met with Airports Council International. They
represent the airports. I have met with a number of airport
directors in my visits. So I have tried--when I visit an
airport, I make it a point to meet with the airport director as
well.
I met with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee which,
as you know, was asked by the Secretary earlier this year to
take a hard look at the trusted work environment as a result of
some of the challenges that were raised by the operation in
Atlanta that was uncovered, the smuggling that was uncovered.
Just this morning, in fact, before this hearing, I met with
the CEOs of all of the major U.S. airlines along with the CEOs
of the major cargo airlines to specifically discuss
collaborating and understanding their role in the security of
the aviation system. No government agency by itself is going to
secure this transportation system. You have to have the
assistance, the cooperation, and the commitment on the part of
all the other players.
I will assure you that that commitment and desire to
collaborate and cooperate is there. I think that in TSA, there
are--there are lots of places we could continue to improve that
relationship and to work more closely with the private sector.
There is nobody with a greater vested interest in the security
of this system than the people who are operating the system:
the airlines, the airports, and all the rest.
So my commitment to them has been to work with them very
closely, to look for opportunities to advance our security
systems, to look for creative and innovative approaches, to get
their help in understanding the system better, to find out
where we are working well together and where we are not working
well together.
So, as I said, as I get smarter in this, I intend to stay
very connected to the industry that we regulate, that we
oversee, and that we operate within to ensure that we are an
effective partner in that in addition to being good at what our
primary mission is.
AVIATION SYSTEM SECURITY: OVERSIGHT
Senator Shaheen. And so, TSA has a coordination role in
addressing those kinds of issues, and I agree with you. I think
the private carriers, the airports, everybody has a stake in
making sure the system is as safe as possible. But I also
appreciate that sometimes players may not act always with that
in mind.
And so, what kind of responsibility does TSA have when you
see something that is not being done in a way that you think is
proper and particularly safe? What can you do, and do you have
statutory responsibility?
Mr. Neffenger. We have statutory oversight responsibility
for the security of the aviation system. And, again, I will
focus on the aviation system, but much of the attention is for
the surface transportation world as well.
As I look at the aviation system, certainly, I think what
an agency like ours can do best is to ensure a high set of
standards, that those standards are enforced consistently
across the system, and that there is a regular oversight of the
implementation of those standards, even if we are relying upon
the private sector to implement and manage those.
I take my experience. When I look back to my experience in
the maritime sector as a Coast Guard officer, I spent much of
the latter part of my career in the maritime security world.
Again, it is a bigger world than there are people in the
government to oversee it. I think that is okay as long as you
have got strong and consistent standards and a good oversight
program there. I think we need to pay attention to that
oversight rule more consistently, I think, when you look at
things like the trusted worker population that is the badged
population.
It never surprises me to find out we have a criminal
element in society. It concerns me if we are not doing
something to identify that criminal element and to wrest it out
of the environment where we think it could pose the greatest
challenge and the greatest problem.
So I am encouraged by the report that the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee (ASAC) provided, which recommended methods
for reducing the number of access points, for example, to the
sterile and secure areas of the airport environment, to do more
effective randomized routine screening of people who have
badges. We are working with the FBI to implement what is called
Rap Back, which is a real-time continuous assessment of
people's criminal history. We do a real-time assessment of
their potential connection to known or suspected terrorists,
but we do not currently do that for criminal history. We are
doing that on a 2-year basis, so we are piloting some projects
with them.
I think that there is more we can do in that environment,
and as I look at the recommendations that came out of the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee, there were 28 in total,
many of them focused directly on this issue you are talking
about. We are working on a plan to implement those so that you
do not just receive these recommendations and go, thank you
very much, and move on. It is very tempting to do that if you
are not careful.
So what I want to do is avoid that temptation, and I have
gone back to the ASAC and said, look, I promise you to come
forward with next steps, and I will do the same thing for
oversight committees. You hold yourself accountable by making
yourself accountable to the people that are asking the
questions. As I said, as I look forward, I think there is a way
to do this that can actually significantly improve our ability
to ensure the safety and security of that operating
environment.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hoeven. Senator Baldwin.
INSPECTOR GENERAL'S RECOMMENDATIONS
Senator Baldwin. Thank you. Let us start with the bigger
picture. Mr. Roth, I remember when you testified before the
Homeland Security Committee back in June, and I was struck with
one of the things that you said in your testimony when
describing how at the time TSA failed to concur with the
majority of the inspector general's recommendations regarding
vulnerabilities with the TSA's expansion of the PreCheck
program. You said, ``We believe this represents TSA's failure
to understand the gravity of the situation.''
Now, Mr. Neffenger, I know he was not speaking about you
because you were not confirmed yet in this post at the time.
And I understand that since that time you have agreed with a
number of the inspector general's recommendations. But I am
interested in your perspective on the gravity of the security
situation that we face at TSA. And in light of the numerous
security shortcomings identified by both the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and the inspector general, can you
explain how you weight those and the necessity to address those
shortcomings compared to other priorities that the TSA has
identified internally in terms of you fulfilling your mission?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, the immediate priority is to address,
I think, the findings of the inspector general. I absolutely
agree with him that these were deeply disturbing and troubling,
and I appreciate the fact that he did come forward right away,
stopped the audit, and said we have got a problem here. And I
know that the Secretary took that as seriously, as has already
been mentioned.
So you have got to address that first because, first of
all, I need to fix that. Second, I need to reinstate confidence
in the traveling public that we know how to do our job. I think
the good news is you can train out those kinds of failures. It
is a matter of focus. I really do believe that we suffered from
a shift in focus from the primary mission to one of efficiency.
I understand where that came from. We were dealing with long
wait times and a lot of dissatisfaction.
But if you are not careful, you can shift it in a way that
leads to failure, and I think that some of what we saw was a
result of that. So that is our immediate challenge right now.
We have to fix that, and I have to test to make sure we
actually got it fixed, and we are in the process of setting up
that next series of tests to ensure that.
PASSENGER SCREENING: PERFORMANCE METRICS
Senator Baldwin. I want to actually just stop you there
because we come back over and over again to the pressure and
the tension between your pressure to clear passengers quickly.
I know the airlines are watching. Obviously passengers give you
feedback on their experience and your vital security mission.
One of the things we heard in our June hearing was just there
are all sorts of metrics associated with the speed with which
passengers are processed, and there are not as many except the
absence of something really bad happening on the other side.
What more is being done to address that constant tension
and pressure there? And I would ask both of you if you have
comments.
Mr. Neffenger. So you have hit a real key point here, and I
think it is one worth thinking about for a moment. You are
right; there is a lot of tension. And the farther away you get
from something actually happening in a system, the more people
are inclined to just say, look, this is really just annoying,
and I would like to get through this system quickly. I get
that.
So I think there are some things you can do. First is you
are right that there was this tension to collect metrics. You
have got to pull the counting of people away from the people
who are supposed to be making sure nothing bad gets through the
system. So I do not want my frontline screeners counting people
when what they really need to be doing is paying attention to
what is coming through the system. Managers can do that, so you
have distributed the duties where I think they belong.
There is a science to queue management, and I am learning
more about that as I make my travels around. I actually talked
to quite a few people about queue management, and I think we
can learn some things. There are some best practices in the
industry that I think we can do a better job of distributing.
But I do not think queue management belongs in that frontline
screener workforce. It belongs in a different location. So that
is one thing that you can do.
Second is, I do think you can measure effectiveness even in
the absence of something happening. I mean, that is in itself a
measure, but it is not the only measure. You can look at the
readiness of your equipment to operate, so it is all the
equipment that we are fielding. Is it calibrated properly? Is
it tested? Is it working at the same standards, and is it
ready? So is there a readiness measure that you have? That is
an idea I bring with me from my military service. You have an
equipment readiness measure that says whether or not you are
prepared to do the things you are being asked to do.
There is a system performance. Is the system performing? As
you look at these measures across, do you see any gaps or any
shortfalls? How is the workforce performance, not just the
daily inject testing, but how are they being assessed because
they go through regular assessment scores? Are you training
them as they are supposed to perform, or are you using
equipment that does not look like anything that they are going
through? And that is some of the reason I want to get to some
centralized training. And then, of course, what are you doing
with respect to covert testing?
Then I think that there are some things--I have seen some
innovative ideas for how you can improve efficiency while not
taking your eye off of security. I mentioned I recently made a
trip to visit with some counterparts in Europe. I was in the
UK, France, and the Netherlands. And some of what they are
doing in terms of creating multiple stations at the checkpoint
to begin to divest, then placing yourself on the queue for the
belt as opposed to following just a line of people allows you
to move more people more efficiently through the system.
And as I have talked to some of the airports around the
country that are in the process of looking to recapitalize
their physical plant, I think we have an opportunity to try out
some innovative designs there going forward. So I think it is a
combination of measures that tell you whether or not you are
ready to do your mission, and there are a number of those that
I have enumerated that we can talk about.
And then it is how--when you do that--effectively can you
move people through while yet resolving all those alarms. And
there are some, I think, some simple changes that we can do
over time to adjust the layout of the system that will move
people more effectively through the system.
PASSENGER PROCESSING DURING SURGE TIMES
Senator Baldwin. And, Mr. Chairman--I do not know if you
are doing another round of questioning, because otherwise I do
have one such suggestion to offer that I have gotten from
feedback from my constituents.
Senator Hoeven. We will have another round, but you can
certainly go ahead depending on how long you think it will
take.
Senator Baldwin. Well, just let me comment on a situation
that has come to my attention. Recently in my home airport, a
lot of the equipment is allocated, the X-ray equipment in
particular, based on passenger averages throughout a year.
Certain communities have surge times when an exceptional number
of people come through airports, whether it is a business that
holds an enormous conference or I suppose in some areas it is
sports team, et cetera. And the allocation of equipment does
not take into consideration those surge times. And so, I would
imagine that it would be able to help with both security and
efficient processing--timely processing of passengers.
In our own case we have a conference that brings 10,000
people in through the airport in 1 week. It happens every year,
and we know it is going to happen every year, hour and a half
wait to get out.
Mr. Neffenger. That was the EPIC convention, right,
recently? I have heard of it.
Senator Baldwin. It is a double entendre in this case.
Mr. Neffenger. So I have asked our local FSD to meet with
the airport director out there. I think that there--you have to
be careful. You do not want to staff to the possible level that
does not occur very often because then you have staff and
equipment that is in excess of what you need. But I think that
there is a middle ground there, and I like that idea of working
with it.
And there may be a way to surge some things in for
expected, particularly if there is something that happens on a
regular routine basis. You know it is going to happen. It is no
different than a reserve workforce that says we are going to
have to do a lot of extra work around the Christmas holiday and
around the Thanksgiving holiday, so you bring in a reserve
staff.
So here is what I will tell you. Let me look at that. I
know that I have asked our local Federal Security Director to
talk about that, and I will follow up on some suggestions I
think that will come out of that as well.
PASSENGER SCREENING: PERFORMANCE METRICS
Senator Hoeven. Administrator, I want to go back to the
testing, tracking, and metrics. So as you implement these
changes to training people, to updating your procedures, and to
technology, how are you testing and how are you measuring that
result? Because this is something that I want to continue to
follow up with you, not just at this hearing, but as we go
forward so we know whether the changes that you are making in
fact accomplish the objective. And I am going to ask Mr. Roth
this same question.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, as I said, there is a readiness
standard that we want to create in the equipment, and by that I
mean I want to know if we have standards to which we expect
equipment to operate, then I want to measure to those standards
on a consistent basis. So one measure is, can I verify that
every piece of equipment, AIT machines in particular, I have
out there is actually performing to the standards I expect it
to, and then what is the nature of that verification, so that
there is a testing nature to that verification? So that is one
measure of effectiveness for the equipment itself.
Then I want to understand how my workforce is performing
with respect to moving people through it. So if I can verify
that the equipment is performing to its highest capability, or
at least to the capability we expect it to perform to, then I
need to make sure that the person who is operating that piece
of equipment operates it to its highest capability, and that
they understand what they need to do when that equipment poses
a challenge in the form of an alarm or something else. And they
also have to understand when that equipment is not working.
So how do you do that? There are injects that you put into
it. You can make the machine operate improperly and see if you
have trained people to catch that. They should be trained to
catch that. You can also do additional covert testing whether
internally or through the inspector general to measure the
performance. And there is an overall performance of the system
as a whole. So as you do in the individual case, then I need to
be able to see that in aggregate across the system whether that
is within a given airport or multiple airports because I need
to know what my variation and variability is across the system.
So what I have asked my staff to do is to develop a series
of, for lack of a better term, what I call dashboard measures
across the board for TSA effectiveness in the aviation
environment in particular. And those measures would be a
measure of readiness of equipment and readiness of people, and
both are measures of whether they have been trained. That is
one measure. I check the first block. And then there are
measures of whether they have been tested on their training,
and then how have they performed on that testing, and then what
is the variability in my workforce because that helps me
determine whether or not my training is actually effective for
what I do.
And then we measure what to do with respect to testing the
system in a real-world environment. So assuming that I think my
equipment is ready and the people are ready, because they seem
to be performing well in a test environment, now what happens
when I put them to the real test when they do not know if
somebody is coming through? This is not a game, and they have
got to catch somebody coming through.
There are lots of obvious details associated with that. I
am not sure if that is responsive to your question, but that is
kind of a large measure of the way in which I look at it.
System readiness, system performance, workforce readiness, and
then workforce performance are my overarching measures, and
then the subcomponents of those to answer those questions.
Senator Hoeven. So you said standards in each of those
areas, and then you test to those standards.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir. And the other thing is you test
whether the standards are appropriate because I may set
standards and then discover that my standards are
inappropriate, and I may find that out because something just
got through the checkpoint, or I may find that out because
somebody has performed to standard, but they still have not
found something. So in some cases on some of the tests, if you
find that a process is not effective at finding a threat item,
then my standard is no longer--is the wrong standard, and I
have got to adjust that.
So you have to have a way to not just set the standards and
assume you got them right, but to set the standards and then
test your standards as well. So there is a component of this
that assures that you are constantly testing the things that
you say are the most critical to do.
Senator Hoeven. Have you set those standards in each of the
three areas--people, procedure, and technology--and have you
set the overall standard?
Mr. Neffenger. We have set many of those standards. I am
not where I want to be yet. We are still working on those. Part
of that is as we look at what the Tiger Team results are, and I
expect the actual full final report by the end of this month. I
will be sharing that with this committee so that you will have
it, and we would look forward to the opportunity to actually
come up and walk you in detail through the findings.
Those findings are showing us exactly where we need to
address our standards. I think we have some standards that are
fine and that are appropriate, and I think we have some that
need to be developed still as we look toward getting this. I
want to get the immediate challenges corrected because I need
to put confidence back in the system.
I am confident in the system. I am confident that a lot of
the training that we have done already has dramatically
improved our ability to catch threat injects coming through. We
will test that over the coming months. I am confident that the
system is safe and the system is working. But I want to work
hard on creating a deliberate process for continuously
reviewing the standards and the training that we need to manage
and to maintain those standards, the equipment that we need to
meet the standards that we set, and then a review process that
allows us to continually adjust those standards over time so
that you do not just set it and forget it.
My great fear is that, particularly in an environment where
security is of the greatest concern and in an environment that
we have, when you have an evolving, and adapting, and learning
enemy, you have to have an evolving, adapting, and learning
system. And the day that you set a security system and say I
got it right is the day you begin to lose the system's
effectiveness.
Senator Hoeven. Mr. Roth, would you respond to that both in
terms of the standards and Administrator Neffenger's sense that
the system is safe, although it needs to be continuously
improved and adapted as the threat changes?
Mr. Roth. Certainly. One of the things that we found during
the audit process was that there were actually no metrics in
place for the FSDs, the Federal security directors, at the
airports involving safety. All the metrics regarded throughput
and wait times and those kinds of things as opposed to safety.
So, of course, you get what you measure, and what we got was
the results of our covert testing.
We do a number of things to try to establish metrics, one
of which obviously and the most visible one is the covert
testing. We believe there is aw value there because it is real-
world testing. It takes the machine out of the lab and puts it
into an environment that is likely to be the thing that will
have to be measured. So we do our own covert testing.
The other thing that we are going to rely, I think, a
little bit more heavily is on TSA's own internal covert testing
that they do. We have already taken a look at it to determine
whether or not it is reliable and trustworthy under sort of our
own internal auditing standards, and we will be working with
those teams to make sure that that system is something that is
reliable because I do think that is the best sort of real-world
measure of whether or not you are succeeding is these kinds of
covert testing. Just like the best measure of a football team
is how they do on Sunday, the best measure of the system as a
whole is going to be whether or not they get through.
We are also going to be doing verification reviews. I
alluded to the 115 different audits and inspections that we
have done. Many of those are closed. For example, we did one on
the behavior of detection officers, and one of the things that
we found was that there were not any established metrics. And
there were some issues with training and a number of other
things. GAO did a similar report with regard to the science of
behavior detection. Those recommendations are closed.
We are conducting a series of verification reviews that
basically say we are going to look at that again and see
whether or not those recommendations made sense at the time and
whether it has fixed the problem that we have identified. So
that is the other thing that we are going to do, particularly
in the area of metrics, for example, with the behavior of
detection officers.
With regard to your question as to whether or not the
threat is or the response to the threat is sufficiently----
Senator Hoeven. Right, and let me stop you for just a
minute. Your sense of the immediate threats or problems that
you identified and how well those are being addressed? Are they
being addressed? What is your sense of that, the immediate
threats issues that you identified?
Mr. Roth. Certainly the response has been everything that
we could have hoped for. I do not think I could imagine a
scenario where they are taking it more seriously than they are
taking it now, and they are putting steps in place. Now, as an
auditor I cannot say that those steps are effective because we
have not done any continuation testing with regard to it. But
if what we are measuring is output, that is, are they making
changes, are they engaging in training, are they tightening up
the rigor by which they are looking at checkpoint operations, I
would have to say that it is as fulsome as I have seen or could
hope for.
But as an auditor, tests matter, and we are going to be
continuing to do tests on this, and then we are going to see
exactly how effective they are.
Senator Hoeven. Right. So it is really important that these
standards are put in place and that you are testing to those
standards right now. And, of course, we follow up on it through
the inspector general. Senator.
EXPEDITED SCREENING
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I want to go back to the
security versus efficiency question because over the past
couple of years, TSA has moved away from a one-size-fits-all
approach, and I for one have thoroughly enjoyed being part of
the PreCheck system. It has gotten me through airports much
faster, and I appreciate that. I know the Global Entry Program
is designed to do the same thing.
So, but I also understand that you are looking at some of
the other efforts around expediting screening like managed
inclusion, and are planning to dial those back. So can you talk
a little bit about that decision? And then I want to make the
connection of what this is going to mean for resources. And I
think you alluded to this a little bit in your testimony
because while I agree security is the number one priority, I
have been in a lot of airports where people feel like
efficiency is also important. And so, how do we balance those?
Mr. Neffenger. Thank you, Senator. And you are right, there
is a balance needed because you also do not want a lot of
people packing up outside the airport. That poses its own
challenges. I think you can find that balance, I really do, but
it starts with remembering what the primary mission is.
So I am a huge fan of a risk-based approach to security. We
all know just intuitively that nearly everyone traveling
through the system is safe to do so. And, because we know that,
those who would harm the system are few in number if not
focused intently on their desire to do damage. So I think--and
I am a big fan of a vetted population. The more I can know
about an individual who arrives at a checkpoint, the safer we
all are, and the more I do not have to worry about that
individual as a risk to the system.
You alluded to the managed inclusion. Managed inclusion, as
you know, is the practice of taking people who are not part of
a pre-vetted population and randomly assigning them to an
expedited screening line as a way of improving efficiency in a
checkpoint operation. And there were some other randomized
things that were done to them, exposure to trace detection and
other things, and perhaps sometimes a pat-down that would
assure you that they were safe to do so.
I think not just the covert testing results, but our own
internal review of that tells me that that was introducing
greater risk into the system than we were willing to accept. So
that process is stopped. As of September 12, we no longer do
that. That had represented about 14 percent of the daily
traveling population--through that randomized assignment that
were being put into expedited screening lines. So that has been
turned off.
Where we still use a version of that is where we have bomb
sniffing dogs, passenger screening canines. Some of you may
have seen these at Dulles Airport. These are dogs that are
trained to detect the traces of explosive vapors that may be
emitted by someone who has been handling or otherwise been
around explosives. Where we have those teams in place, we will
continue to use a version of managed inclusion.
I am also working with the existing vendor, contractor who
is doing the PreCheck enrollment to look for opportunities to
expand that into retail environments outside the airport
environment. We are, I hope, within days or weeks of putting
out the request for proposal, which would allow up to three
private-sector vendors to jump into the enrollment process. We
are also looking at changing some of the enrollment----
Senator Shaheen. Can I just clarify what you are saying?
Mr. Neffenger. Yes.
Senator Shaheen. So up to three private sector vendors who
would actually clear people on behalf of----
Mr. Neffenger. They would not clear on behalf of. They
would do the initial enrollment. TSA always retains both the
statutory responsibility and the requirement to do the actual
vetting. But what they would do is collect the basic
information necessary, submit it to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and submit it to the TSA. And then FBI and
TSA working together would run the names through the various
clearance processes. But it would just provide more
opportunities for people to participate.
I have also worked with the airlines and some of the travel
groups, like the online travel companies, to do more marketing
of the program. And I have been working with my other
counterparts in the Department, Customs and Border Protection
in particular, to look at a way to make things like global
entry, PreCheck, Nexus, and Sentri more understandable and
comprehensible, and more of a one-stop-shop, so that there is
an understanding of what do I get when I pick one of these
items.
I think that we can dramatically increase that population
over the coming year to two years if we can move forward on
some of these initiatives. I think that is the best way to
start to really reduce risk in the traveling population. It
also allows all of us to focus more intently on the people we
do not know much about.
So if you think of a frequent traveler as somebody, and
this will not sound like a frequent traveler, but who travels
just three times per year on average if you are traveling in
the air--that takes care of about 50 percent of the traveling
population. So if you can get a large percentage of those
people to sign up for PreCheck, then you could dramatically
change the whole screening operation, screening environment.
Senator Shaheen. I have a number of other questions, but my
time is up, so.
Senator Hoeven. Senator Baldwin.
Senator Baldwin. Thank you. I wanted to wade back into the
discussion we were just having on behavior detection officers.
In particular, I think it is known as the SPOT Program, the
Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques Program. And if
I understand correctly, the scope of the program is about 3,000
employees involved at a cost of about nearly $900 million over
a 5-year period between 2007 and 2012.
And I guess I just want to understand if what we are
getting for that significant investment if concerns have been
raised. Mr. Roth, I heard you speak about the audit and that
audit is now closed. But could you remind us of some of the
deficiencies that you found in the selection and training of
these behavior detection officers? And I know the GAO also
commented about whether or not it has been effective, but I
would like to hear some of the concerns that you raised, and
then response about the priority we should have on the program
moving forward.
Mr. Roth. Thank you for that question, and this is a
concern that I had since I started this job. The audit was done
before I arrived, and many of the recommendations had been
closed out before I arrived. But functionally, the audit itself
said that there were no performance measures, so we were not
exactly sure what it is that we were getting for the
investment. And you were right; my recollection is about 3,200
full-time equivalents (FTEs) at any given time who are doing
this work.
And the idea is a good one, and I think it emulates what
occurs in some, for example, European airports and some Middle
East airports with regard to this idea that you want to have a
population within TSA who can look somebody in the eye, similar
to what our Customs officers do when they are admitting entry.
And I think in my written testimony I talk about some successes
that we have had in actually keeping terrorists out basically
based on behavior detection.
But there are real questions as to whether or not this
workforce, which is a massive workforce, is appropriately
trained. Certainly our audit had seen that there was one group
of training, and then basically there had been no refresher
training. GAO, I noted, had some real concerns as to the level
of sort of education, sophistication of some of the BDOs who
were taking what are inherently flexible and subjective
criteria and applying them against a vast population. It
requires, I think, a bit of sophistication to be able to do
that, and we were not comfortable with the fact that they had
the population that would be able to do that.
So this is something that we are going to be looking at as
we go forward. We are going to take a look at that audit and
look at those recommendations, and see whether or not those
recommendations actually fix the problem that we had seen. And
if it is not, then we will make further recommendations.
BEHAVIORAL DETECTION PROGRAM
Senator Baldwin. Mr. Neffenger, I am very interested to
hear your reaction to your understanding of that audit and the
value of that program vis-a-vis other priorities that you have.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, thank you, Senator. And this is a fair
question and an appropriate question. Let me just start with a
general comment before getting specific. In general, if this is
a tool I can have in my security toolkit and it works, then I
would like to have it because I like the idea. And I know that
there are law enforcement agencies worldwide that look at
behavior of individuals.
It is not a perfect answer, but these are indicators only.
So whether you are a cop on the beat or you are working at a
higher level of security professionalism, there are things that
I think they will tell you that they rely upon to indicate
whether or not they should just ask some more questions of
somebody if nothing else. So in just a generalized statement, I
think that it is worthwhile to consider it.
Now, have we implemented it correctly in the TSA? I will
tell you that we have come down considerably in our numbers in
that program. It has been reduced by about 15 percent in terms
of actual bodies over the past 3 years. And the name has
changed over time. It is still basically the same idea.
So when I was recently in the Netherlands, the Netherlands
has their version of a behavioral detection program that they
run their frontline officers through as well. And I told them
that, first of all, I would like to understand how they do it.
I would like to look at their training, and I would like to see
whether we can benchmark against that. I have also talked to a
number of large law enforcement agencies near our police
department--L.A. Police Department. These are agencies I have
worked with in the past, and said I know you do some version of
this training for your people.
So I think I would agree with Inspector General Roth that
there is more work to be done to determine the effectiveness of
this, what are the measures you put in place to determine that
effectiveness, can I base it in validated criteria that are
validated by a third party. We have done some of that. I know
that in response--again, this is prior to my arrival, but in
response to some of the previous concerns and recommendations
that we did do an--not TSA internal, but the Department's
Science and Technology Branch did a validation of it, and there
was a report recently provided to Congress.
But here is what I will say. I think that it is one of the
areas I am going to look at hard in the coming months. As I
said, my first priority was to get through this covert testing
business, but then I want to look at all the aspects of TSA
because I want to make sure that we are spending money that is
provided by the taxpayers in the most effective way to ensure
the security of the system.
I would like to think that behavior detection is an
important element of that system. I think it can be. But I want
to make sure it is benchmarked against worldwide standards. I
think that they are out there. So I am looking forward to
working with police departments that are doing this. I am
looking forward to working with other like agencies, our
counterparts in Europe that are doing this to see what they are
encountering, how are they doing it, and can we benchmark
against them, and have they done any studies of their own that
might indicate where we are going. And then I want to take the
training myself just to figure out what I think of it. And then
I will get back.
So my jury is out. If I can come back to you with an
assessment after I do all that.
STAFFING: PEAK FLIGHT TIMES
Senator Hoeven. Administrator, the airports have peak
flight times and off-peak flight times, so if you go through a
checkpoint at a time when they have a whole lot of flights
arriving and departing, or particularly departing, you can have
very long lines. I mean, if you think in terms of a static
workforce versus off-peak times, and that varies throughout the
day. How are you handling that in terms of your workforce? You
need a lot more people certain times during the day than you do
other times. How are you handling that, because this goes to
both safety and convenience issues?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, you implied one of the real
challenges, and that is how to size yourself appropriately when
you have such disparity in terms of throughput in any given
day? Some of that is done with the part time workforce, so you
use--and there is a good reason to have a certain number of
people working part-time because you do have these big peak
periods, and you bring the part-time workforce in to help you
cover those peak periods, and then you move them off during
your non-peak periods.
The other thing you can do during the non-peak times--then
you are going to still need a certain baseline workforce just
to manage it, and they are going to be available to you during
those off-peak times. That is a good time to do some of the
refresher training, some of the ongoing skills training, some
of the focus on the mission piece that I think we need to do
more of, and we need to do it more consistently across the
organization. And then to focus our training on that piece.
So I think it is a continuing challenge, but one of the
things that we are doing right now is looking at a true
staffing model, not just an airport staffing model, but a true
staffing model for the airport. Again, I think back to my
experience in the Coast Guard, you start with, okay, if I have
got a boat, how many people does it take to operate that boat?
And then when it is a bare minimum necessary, first of all? You
know, I need somebody to drive it. I need somebody to run the
engine. I need somebody to throw off the lines. And then, once
I have got that down, then what do I expect that crew to have
to do, and how extreme might what I ask them to do be. So then
how many additional people might I need to have on board or
might I need to vary the size of that crew over time?
That is the same approach we are taking to TSA, and over
the course of the past number of months, we have been looking--
we have been disassembling the entire staffing model to say did
we get it right? What does it take to operate a checkpoint, and
what are the true duties of those people at the checkpoint, and
how are those duties distributed? Are there opportunities to
combine some of those duties? We have found some opportunities
to combine those for greater efficiency.
And then, what do you do about true peak travel times,
whether it is holiday peak travel, which is its own set of
challenges, or it is just peak travel throughout the day. As
you know, you can watch DCA (Ronald Reagan National Airport).
Between 6:00 and 8:00 in the morning, and then 4:00 and 8:00 in
the afternoon is when all the activity seems to happen, and
then it is just dead throughout the remainder of the day.
I can come back to you with examples of how we are doing
that and would be happy to do so, and just show you how some of
those staffing models work, and how you try to find the sweet
spot so that you do not overshoot and wind up with too many
people. But you also are sized such that you do not have
extensive wait periods to get through during those peak travel
times.
STAFFING: TRAINING
Senator Hoeven. So that would indicate some need for part-
time people, as you indicated. Your turnover rate is about 30
percent, or at least historically there has been about 30
percent turnover of those part-time staff. Are you sure then
sending everybody through FLETC (Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center) is the way to go in terms of training? Do you
need some other way to train in order to both manage your staff
and do it in a reasonably cost-effective way?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, there is an ongoing training need, as
you alluded to. The 30-percent rate is what we are seeing as
turnover just in the first 6 months. That is higher than I
would like to see it. It is somewhat consistent with the kind
of new hire turnover you see in other operating agencies,
although higher than the military or others. So there is a
weeding out process that always happens in an agency.
Over time, my overall turnover rate runs around between 10
and 12 percent for our workforce. For the part-time workforce,
that number is around 20 to 25 percent over time. I understand
the concern.
I do think that you can reduce turnover the more you
connect and engage somebody with the mission of the
organization. I do not think there is any substitute for
consistent, baseline, foundational training to create a
professional workforce. I think that over time as you do that,
you will connect that workforce more directly to the mission,
and they will feel more engaged.
So as you look at a world-class training facility like the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center down in Glynco where we
have the opportunity to take existing structure, the intermodal
facility that was built by FAA a number of years ago that has
an airport operating environment in it. And you can put the
actual equipment that they will be training on, and you can
train real-world scenario-based training with play actors from
the community.
FLETC has worked with the local community, so you can
create a true airport environment, and you can do true
scenario-based training. You can train everything from just
day-to-day checkpoint operations to even active shooter
training and the like. You can do it while not taking time away
from the true real-world environment, and you can do that in a
way that connects them to the culture of the organization, the
mission of the organization, and an environment in which they
are dealing with other professionals from around the country.
You can provide them with a certificate that certifies them
as a professional, and you can do that in a consistent,
repeatable, demonstrable, and measureable way. I do not think
there is any substitute for that. When you then put them out
into the field, now you have connected them to an organization
that is larger than just the airport that they are all going
to. We are already moving a lot of people around to about 75
different locations around the country to train, so the
marginal cost is actually relatively small for, I think, what
could be potentially a huge game payoff.
The business case that I am going to present to you
actually spells this out in a more elegant way than I just did,
but I think it can show that there is a way to measure what
some people say is the intangible esprit de corps and
connectedness that you get when you do that. And then that also
frees up the airport environments to do that kinds of airport-
specific skills and operational training that they need to be
able to do that they are having a challenge doing right now.
But when I have compared the syllabi that is the currently
in the on-the-job training environment to what we intend to do
at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, from my
perspective, there is no comparison; you know, going to true
scenario-based as opposed to online training, actually seeing
what happens when the kinds of explosives that we are concerned
about detonate, the kind of damage they do as opposed to just
watching a video. All I can say is the impact is significantly
greater, and I believe that if we invest in our workforce in
that way that we will get a greater investment back from that
workforce in terms of their commitment to the organization.
Senator Hoeven. Senator Shaheen.
STAFFING: MANAGED INCLUSION
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I know we have got a limited
amount of time left, but I wanted to go back to the managed
inclusion. And as you referenced, that is going to require
additional screeners because they are going be more people now
in the lines. And what do you anticipate for additional
personnel that will be required?
Mr. Neffenger. Just as a reminder, we have come down about
5,600 screeners since 2011, and we were targeting a number in
fiscal year 2016 that would have reduced us by about another--
let us see. I am trying to think. I will not get the number
right, but another 600 or 700 people. What I am asking to do
is--and we have made significant progress toward that number
that we planned in fiscal year 2016.
What I am asking to do is to halt right now at the summer
2015 levels, which would put us below our fiscal year 2015
actual numbers on board, slightly above by about 600 or so the
numbers that we had planned to attain in fiscal year 2016. So
this really is halting a further reduction, not necessarily
adding new bodies, although it is more than we would have
predicted in our fiscal year 2016 budget.
And so, I am asking to hold on to that while still taking
reductions in other areas. We are still taking the BDO, the
behavior detection officer, reductions. We are still taking
savings with--that we get as a result of additional inline
baggage systems that are being installed, so that allows us to
save some FTE. And we are taking some savings as a result of
fewer advanced imaging technology machines out there. So those
continue.
But this is specifically with respect to the screening
workforce. And what I need to do, the reason I am asking to
hold is I need to evaluate whether or not we have got it right
on the answer as we try to build the PreCheck population, the
truly vetted population. I do not want to get to the point
where I have excessive times because I have overshot while we
are building up that population.
So this gives me--this buys me a year to work on the
expansion of the vetted population to ensure that we get right
the response to the covert testing failures. And then to work
through the staffing models that we are doing to determine what
the actual staffing has to be in the future. But the reminder
is we have already come down significantly in the size of the
workforce over the past 4\1/2\ years.
SCREENING TECHNOLOGY
Senator Shaheen. So you talked about the technology and we
know about some of the shortcomings of the advanced imaging
technology. What other technologies are you looking at in the
future that can be helpful as we are screening passengers? Are
biometrics something that you are thinking about?
And then, I understand that there are a limited number of
fairly large companies that do the kind of technology that has
been used today. Coming from a State where our foundation is
all small businesses and they are doing a lot of innovative
work, how can we encourage those small businesses to provide
some of the innovation that TSA is going to need?
Mr. Neffenger. I will start with your last point first,
Senator, because I think that is an important one. I would love
to find a way to incentive small business to participate more
often, and more completely, and more effectively in this
system. As you know, there are large start-up costs to people
who want to get into this, particularly in the research and
development side. And we are somewhat hampered by the fact that
many of these systems are propriety in nature, whether we are
talking the software, the architecture, or the hardware itself.
So I think there is a way to approach that.
I think there are things we can do that could incentivize
small businesses. I think that there are more public/private
partnerships that we can do when it comes to research and
development and developmental testing. I have had some
conversations already. Within the Department, I have talked to
some of my former colleagues over at the Department of Defense,
who have programs where they do this, you know, DARPA-like
things where you can incentivize the private sector to come up
with ideas.
Senator Shaheen. The SBIR Program is one of those that----
Mr. Neffenger. Exactly. I am hopeful that we can find some
opportunities going forward. So I am trying to activate all the
people who can think like this and can bring ideas forward. But
I think we need to do something because it is never healthy to
rely upon one or two major vendors as good as they might be.
But going back to my comment that you cannot spend enough time
thinking about this and evolving the system. I want to get some
of the small innovative companies involved as well,
particularly in the realm of software and other technology
designs that could be useful.
That said, what are the kinds of technologies that I think
we can look to in the future? I think we could--a more
integrated experience going through, so in other words, you
ought to be able to test shoes without taking them off their
feet. I have seen some designs that allow us to do that.
Senator Shaheen. Yes, thank you. That would be very nice
for all the women in high heels.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, I know. If you talk about efficiency of
the system, that extra few seconds it takes to both remove
shoes and put them back on can be challenging. Same thing when
you are removing belts, and jackets, and so forth. And I have
seen prototype equipment out there that can address that.
I am encouraged by some of what I have seen with respect to
increasing the resolution ability of the existing equipment as
well as what it might look in the future. For biometrics, the
Europeans are doing some interesting things with kind of real-
time iris scanning that will connect them. Now, that raises
issues for us here obviously if you start looking at--colleting
biometrics on people. But I do think that there comes a time in
the future where your fingerprint becomes your boarding pass,
and it ties you directly to the ID that you present.
We have got technology that we hope to be rolling out that
you have already funded. It is card authentication technology,
which in its trials out at Dulles; it has shown real promise.
And if you are familiar with this, this is the machine that
reads an ID and determines whether or not it is actually a
valid and not a counterfeited ID. It ties the individual who
presents it, or at least it ties the ID to a validated boarding
pass on the day that you are traveling, and it checks it
against certain requirements.
I think the next step is to then validate that the ID is,
in fact, attached to the person who presented it. But
ultimately you can get away from the whole boarding pass piece
entirely, and that will, I think, dramatically improve our
understanding of who is presenting themselves at the
checkpoint. It will tie them to a vetted population if you have
one already. If you are already part of that population, it
will connect you to the secure flight system and it is a real-
time validation where you are going.
Then I have seen a lot of talk about--people have said
things like screening at the speed of light for the security
point of the future. All those are artful terms that are really
just to indicate that there is a security system out there that
I think looks very different from the one we have, but that
would require a huge investment to get to. I think the
opportunity to try some of these things out is where you have
airports, as I mentioned before, that are doing something new
and innovative.
So I have talked to Denver about this, and I am interested
in talking to LaGuardia as they think about recapitalizing, and
some other airports----
Senator Shaheen. Please, that would be great.
Mr. Neffenger. [continuing]. To see an opportunity to do
something different. And I think if you even do a couple of key
demonstration projects, then it may create--first of all, it
gives us a test bed, and it may create an opportunity for us to
look for things like that in the future.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
AIR MARSHALS
Senator Hoeven. I think you have covered most of the
questions that I had. Maybe one I would finish up with is your
plan for the Federal Air Marshals.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, let me start by saying I am really
encouraged by the new director of the air marshals, Rod
Allison, and his plan. What I have asked him to do and actually
what he undertook even before I should say I asked him to do
it--I am encouraging that he continue with his plan because he
had this plan before I was confirmed--to really examine the
entire air marshal operating concept. I think it is a good idea
14 years after the attacks of 9/11 to determine whether or not
we are still positioning ourselves properly in all aspects of
what we do.
I like having a badged law enforcement officer capability
within TSA because I think there are unique challenges to the
transportation system that can be addressed by having a law
enforcement capability within the system. I know that Director
Allison has looked really hard at the current employment
deployment and strategy for the Air Marshals. He is working on
developing a true staffing standard. We have never had a true
staffing standard for the air marshals. I want to know what it
takes to do what we need to do.
I will tell you that there are things that air marshals do
currently on aircraft, which I can provide you in a classified
setting that tell me that some capability like that is always
going to be necessary. The question is beyond that, what else
are we doing with them? And then how can we create other
opportunities within the Air Marshal Program, whether it is the
VIPR teams--visible intermodal protection and response teams--
those interagency, law enforcement teams that look at other
modes of transportation and other aspects of the transportation
system.
So what I would say is, I think this is a good time for the
air marshals because they have got a powerful, and visionary,
and forward, and future-focused leader, who I think over the
coming months is going to present me and oversight committees
with a more compelling vision for them as well as at least a
basis for discussion about the future of the Air Marshal
Program going forward.
I will say this, we do need to get to a point where we can
hire back into the program. We have been on a 4-year hiring
freeze. A lot of the air marshals are aging out on mandatory
retirement over the coming years. I think some 30 percent of
that workforce will time out--for mandatory retirement age--
within the next 5 years. And at a minimum I need to replenish
that workforce with new people coming in. So I am hoping that
we can get the hiring freeze lifted and begin to--at least hire
into attrition rate in the program.
Senator Hoeven. Senator Shaheen.
AVIATION SECURITY: GLOBAL
Senator Shaheen. I just have a final question, and that has
to do with international travel because obviously as we look at
the challenges we are facing from terrorist groups, thinking
about how to address international travel and people coming
into the country is a challenge. Can you talk about what you
are doing in terms of working with other international airports
and our countries around the world to address this issue?
Mr. Neffenger. That is a key point, Senator. I think I
mentioned briefly in my opening statement that a consistent
global approach to aviation security is critical because you do
not want to create the opportunity to exploit differences and
vulnerabilities that naturally exist if you have differences in
your approach.
I did just recently return from meetings with my
counterparts in the United Kingdom, France, and the
Netherlands. This is a specific topic of conversation. We were
also talking surface security in the wake of the recent
attempted attack outside of Paris on the train into Paris.
But one of the things I wanted to do is first understand
how security is over there. And if you have traveled
internationally, you know that there are slight differences,
some nuanced differences, and sometimes very dramatic
differences in the way we do that.
There is an upcoming aviation security conference and
international conference that I will be attending later in
October, and a specific topic of concern for me is that we move
toward a more globalized approach and a more globalized set of
standards to aviation security.
There has been a lot of work done in that regard. I think
there is a lot more that can be worked on, and I want to tie
myself very closely to my international counterparts so that we
do not introduce any vulnerabilities into the system that
should not be introduced.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any
further questions, but I would just like to for the record
acknowledge that we just had a very big visit in this country
from the Pope. It was a huge national security issue, and we
had a lot of law enforcement agencies involved in that, the
Secret Service. And they did a really spectacular job, and I
think it is important for us to acknowledge that.
Mr. Neffenger. And quite a few of our TSA screeners that
were working on the frontlines.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. I would also
like to acknowledge that Administrator Neffenger has made a
real effort to reach out to airport administrators and the
aviation industry. And I think that outreach effort has been
well received. I think it is very important because, as you
said, they are a very important part of the security and the
safety of the screening as well as trying to do it in the most
customer friendly manner for the traveling public. So I think
that is certainly something that is to be commended.
I want to thank you, Administrator Neffenger. At the
outset, Inspector General Roth talked about the need for a
culture change in terms of addressing the problems that have
been found. And what I hear him saying is that you have brought
that mindset of making sure that any changes necessary to
address the challenges and the problems are exactly what you
are going to do, and work with your workforce to make sure that
we are meeting the safety standards that we need to achieve,
and doing it with the best convenience to the traveling public.
And so, in that regard, the standards that you set, and your
testing of those standards, are both vitally important.
And to the Inspector General, thank you for the work that
you have done and the way that you have handled that work both
immediately upon finding your results, but then also as follow
up. And we will look for you for continued verification and
follow up of the people, the technology, and the procedures
that are being put in place, again, to achieve the safety that
we want and the convenience that we want for the traveling
public. So thanks to you both. Again, thanks to Ranking Member
Senator Shaheen.
And with that, this subcommittee stands in recess. Thank
you.
CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS
[Whereupon, at 12:54 p.m., Tuesday, September 29, the
hearings were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
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