[Senate Hearing 114-733]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
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THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:08 p.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. John Hoeven (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Hoeven and Shaheen.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. Secret Service
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH P. CLANCY, DIRECTOR
opening statement of senator john hoeven
Senator Hoeven. The subcommittee will come to order.
I would like to welcome Ranking Member Shaheen, and also
our witness today, the Director of the Secret Service, Mr.
Joseph Clancy.
Thank you for being present. I have some opening remarks,
and then we'll turn to Senator Shaheen for her remarks, and
then, of course, we will invite your opening remarks, Director.
As I said, I would like to thank our witness, Joseph
Clancy, the newly appointed Director of the United States
Secret Service, for being here today, as well as Senator
Shaheen. I look forward to working with everybody on the fiscal
year 2016 appropriations process.
Our focus today is on the fiscal year 2016 budget request
for the Secret Service. With an overall budget request from the
President that exceeds the budget caps, obviously it is
critical that we assess what the Service needs to meet its
mission.
At the same time, our inquiry today is colored by the
unfortunate incidents that have hampered the Service in recent
years. Six months ago today, Omar Gonzalez scaled the fence on
the North Lawn and made his way into the White House.
Last week, more allegations of inappropriate activity came
to light. Until the investigation is completed, I will not
prejudge the outcome. But these recurring events are truly
concerning and need to be addressed.
To that end, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Secretary called for a review by the Deputy Secretary, Deputy
Secretary Mayorkas, and an independent Protective Mission
Panel. We will discuss their findings and the Service's plan
for implementing those recommendations.
But as the mission panel report notes, many of its
recommendations are not novel or unique to last year's White
House fence-jumper incident. Rather, they are challenges that
have been with the Secret Service now over a longer period of
time.
In 1964, the Warren Commission cited, among other things,
an insufficient workforce that was often spread too thin. The
1995 White House Security Review is even more relevant,
highlighting ineffective command and control functions,
communication problems, and the threat of gate-crashers, fence-
jumpers, and even air incursions.
While the times and technology have changed, some of these
issues have not. Again, that is why I emphasize they need to be
addressed both now and on a long-term basis.
Today's hearing offers an opportunity for a candid
discussion of these issues and how this subcommittee can help
address them. This includes the costs associated with one of
the panel's key recommendations, which is replacing the primary
fence around the White House complex.
We will also discuss what seems to be the ongoing issue of
tactical communications, very important, as well as how best to
hire, train, and retain an effective workforce.
Addressing these issues is a funding challenge, but it is
also one of management. The Director and his leadership team
must be examples to instill confidence in the workforce. Recent
surveys of the workforce indicate that that continues to be a
challenge.
And it is one, Director, I know you are very focused on.
This statement would be incomplete if I did not mention the
Service's investigative mission, which is fundamental to its
identity, invaluable to the protection of our financial system,
and critical to your personnel development. The Service is
requesting over $300 million in fiscal year 2016 for this
mission, which includes conducting investigations, operating
the Electronic Crimes Task Forces, and reaching out to help the
private sector, as well as training State and local law
enforcement.
Absent from the President's request is support for the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC),
which the Service has provided for years. The subcommittee is
interested to know why in this budget request, which is over
the cap, that funding is not included. I know it has not been
included in the past. Particularly with the Budget Control Act
(BCA) budget cap exceeded here, I would like to know why it
wasn't included.
In closing, I would like to read a quotation from the
personnel manual that all Secret Service employees are
provided. ``Each point on the Secret Service star represents
one of the agency's five core values: justice, duty, courage,
honesty, and loyalty. These values should resonate with each
man and woman in our organization. The building block, the very
foundation of these values, is our personal and professional
code of conduct.''
So today, we want candid answers about the challenges that
the Secret Service has and how we are going to administer
those. We will be particularly focusing on manpower, on
training, on command and control, and on communications, and
not only in regard to the March 4 incident but the September 19
incident of last year, and really, the ongoing issues that have
been referenced in earlier reports and commissions.
So again, I thank you for being here.
At this point, I will turn to Senator Shaheen for her
comments.
statement of senator jeanne shaheen
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I look forward to working with you as we address the
challenges facing Homeland Security as well as we worked
together on the subcommittee that addressed the legislative
branch of the Appropriations Committee.
This is our first budget hearing for fiscal year 2016, and
it is the first time in over a decade that the Senate
Appropriations Committee has held a hearing with the Secret
Service specifically on its budget.
The Secret Service performs two vital functions: protecting
the President and other authorized individuals while also
protecting the integrity of the U.S. currency and investigating
crimes against the national financial system.
The fiscal year 2016 budget request totals more than $1.94
billion, $273 million more than we appropriated in fiscal year
2015. This increase is on top of additional funding we provided
in the recently enacted fiscal year 2015 appropriation to
address vulnerabilities identified after several security
breaches at the White House.
Based on recent events, it is also obvious that the Secret
Service needs to address a number of operational
vulnerabilities. Some of these issues, such as perimeter
security and enhanced fencing, can be fixed with additional
funding, but other issues are more intangible.
Money can't fix a culture that, in the eyes of many of the
public and many here in Congress, is broken. Director Clancy,
if the Secret Service is going to fix its many problems and
rebuild the trust of the American people, it is going to
require your leadership. But it is also going to require the
men and women of the Secret Service to take individual
responsibility for their actions and to be accountable to the
American people.
Director Clancy, I very much appreciate your forthrightness
in bringing some of these issues to our attention. You have
been appointed by the President to right a listing ship. Time
is of the essence in addressing these concerns. None of us have
the luxury of waiting to find a perfect solution.
We look forward to assisting you. The importance of your
mission can't be overstated. Failure can't be countenanced. In
the face of a determined enemy, the Secret Service must remain
ever vigilant.
I look forward to hearing your testimony this afternoon.
Thank you.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
With that, we turn to Director Clancy.
summary statement of joseph p. clancy
Mr. Clancy. Good afternoon, Chairman Hoeven, Ranking Member
Shaheen, and distinguished members of this subcommittee. I am
pleased to appear before you today to discuss the President's
fiscal year 2016 budget for the Secret Service. As the newly
appointed Director, I am honored to lead the men and women of
this important agency through this challenging time.
With respect to the allegations of employee misconduct on
March 4, 2015, I personally became aware of the allegations on
March 9 when I received a phone call informing me of an
anonymous email that was circulating. On that same date, I
determined that the allegations should be referred to the
Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector
General (OIG).
I made this decision because allegations of misconduct
involving employees at the GS-15 level and higher must be
referred to the OIG in accordance with departmental policy.
I trust the OIG's investigation will be thorough. I have
committed the Secret Service's full cooperation to the OIG, and
I eagerly await the findings of the investigation.
The fact that I did not learn of this allegation until 5
days after it is said to have occurred is unacceptable. I am
very unhappy about it. I called my senior staff together last
week and made clear my expectations for prompt notification of
allegations of misconduct that could affect our mission or that
violate the agency's standards of conduct.
If it is determined that any employees concealed
information about this alleged incident, they will be held
accountable. Our mission is too important for this to happen.
It undermines my leadership, and I won't stand for it.
Over the past several months, I have made extensive
personnel changes in senior leadership in an effort to bring
about positive change. These were not easy decisions, and many
of the people who left served the agency and our country
honorably during their careers. But as the leader of this
organization, I will do what is necessary to put us back on the
right track. And it starts with our people taking
responsibility for their actions on duty and off duty.
Let me also be clear that I do not have the ability to
simply terminate employees solely on the basis of allegations
of misconduct. This is not because I am being lenient, but
because the agency's ability to take action is controlled by
title 5 of the United States Code, which provides Federal
Government employees with certain statutory, due process
rights.
The next step in this process is to wait for the issuance
of the OIG report, at which point we will determine the
appropriate disciplinary actions consistent with our Table of
Penalties.
Once again, if the OIG investigation reveals misconduct,
those involved will be punished.
I have also personally reviewed video surveillance from the
evening of March 4, and I welcome the opportunity to review
this footage with each of you. On the basis of the footage,
previous reports of a crash are inaccurate. There was no crash.
The video shows a vehicle entering the White House complex
at a speed of approximately 1 to 2 mph and pushing aside a
plastic barrel. There was no damage to the vehicle.
Although I am extremely concerned about the allegations of
misconduct and the potential for alcohol involvement, I must
reserve judgment on these matters until the OIG investigation
is completed.
Turning to our budget, I want to thank all members for
their work on the 2015 Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act. For a second year in a row, this
subcommittee worked diligently to provide the Secret Service
with additional resources to support our staffing, training,
and operational needs.
In addition, the 2015 bill includes $25 million to begin
the necessary enhancements associated with the Protective
Mission Panel recommendations that were included in a report to
Secretary Johnson on December 15, 2014. The panel's
recommendations have brought focus to staffing, training, and
leadership deficiencies in the agency, and technology and
perimeter security requirements at the White House complex.
However, because the Secret Service's mission extends
beyond the issues addressed in the panel's report, I am
committed to zero-basing the agency's budget to determine the
full extent of our operational requirements.
The 2016 budget builds on the protective mission
enhancements that are under way this fiscal year. My written
statement provides a thorough overview of the budget request,
and I hope that some portion of today's hearing allows for a
discussion on the many important aspects of this request.
Notably, the budget request provides critical funding for
protective mission enhancements related to the Protective
Mission Panel recommendations; resources to ensure the Secret
Service is prepared for what is projected to be a demanding
presidential campaign; and funds to complete the staffing
requirements for President Obama's protective detail, once his
term in office comes to a close.
Superior performance by the men and women on the frontlines
begins with superior leadership. To that end, I have worked to
open the lines of communication between the rank and file and
their supervisors. I made significant changes in top leadership
positions across the Secret Service to inspire a renewed focus
on staffing, training, protective operations, investigations,
and professional responsibility.
I am in the process of restructuring the Secret Service's
executive leadership to better leverage the experience of
civilian professionals, while allowing law enforcement
personnel to focus on their core areas of expertise.
With the support of the department and the Congress, over
the next several years, I am confident that we can put the
Secret Service on a path to success for decades to come.
Chairman Hoeven, Ranking Member Shaheen, this concludes my
testimony. I welcome any questions you have at this time.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph Clancy
introduction
Good morning Chairman Hoeven, Ranking Member Shaheen and
distinguished Members of the Committee. I am pleased to appear before
you today to discuss the President's fiscal year (FY) 2016 Budget for
the Secret Service. I am grateful to this subcommittee for the
courtesies you have extended to me in my short time back, and for your
support in crafting a budget for fiscal year 2015 that will help the
agency continue the hiring, training, and protective mission
enhancements required to get well. As the newly appointed Director of
the Secret Service, I am tremendously honored to lead the men and women
of this important agency through this challenging time. Despite the
allegations of misconduct involving two senior-level special agents at
the White House Complex on March 4, 2015, in my short time back I have
been impressed by the selfless dedication of the workforce and people's
willingness to make the necessary reforms for the betterment of the
mission. With respect to these recent allegations, the Secret Service
has turned over the investigation to the Department of Homeland
Security's (``the Department'') Office of the Inspector General
(``OIG''). I have committed our full cooperation with this
investigation and eagerly await its findings.
This subcommittee's support is especially critical given the high
protection demands and increased operational tempo expected later this
year. Pope Francis will visit the United States in September with
events planned in Washington, DC; New York, NY; and Philadelphia, PA.
Thus far, only the World Meeting of Families event in Philadelphia,
which is expected to draw 2.1 million people, has been designated a
National Special Security Event (``NSSE'') by the Secretary. Also in
September, the Secret Service will fulfill its obligation to secure the
annual meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (``UNGA'') on its
70th anniversary. The UNGA is always a challenge for the Secret
Service, as it recurs annually in the final weeks of the fiscal year,
but with a major anniversary coinciding with the Papal visit, I expect
this year to be especially demanding on our front-line employees.
Special agents from across the field and headquarters will be called
upon to establish temporary protective details for an expected record
number of visiting heads of state and government, Uniformed Division
(``UD'') officers will provide magnetometer support and protective site
security for multiple venues, special operations teams will be assigned
to high-level visiting dignitaries, and technical security and
communications teams will be working weeks in advance to ensure mission
success.
Superior performance by these men and women on the front lines
begins with superior leadership. To that end, I have worked to open the
lines of communication between the rank and file, their supervisors,
and executive leadership. I made significant changes in top leadership
positions across the Secret Service to inspire a renewed focus on human
capital, training, protective operations, investigations, budgeting,
and professional responsibility. Part of this effort included the
creation of a standalone Office of Training, which will have a direct
impact on the way the agency plans for and conducts operational
training for special agents and UD officers by creating a stakeholder
seat on the Secret Service's Executive Review Board. This will allow
the agency to set clear priorities and better align training
requirements with the demands of the mission. It is critically
important that the Secret Service get back to basics by staffing the
agency at levels commensurate with the workload and incorporating the
required training to ensure optimal performance at all times.
professionalism within the workforce
When I talk about optimal performance, I want to be clear that I
expect all employees in the Secret Service to conduct themselves in a
manner consistent with the oath they swore to uphold when they entered
the agency, and with the individual responsibility and core values that
have guided many generations of employees before them. The conference
report that accompanies the fiscal year 2015 Homeland Security
Appropriations Act requires the Secret Service to submit a report to
the Appropriations Committees ``providing evidence that the [agency]
has sufficiently reviewed its professional standards of conduct; issued
new guidance for the procedures and conduct of employees when engaged
in overseas operations and protective missions; and instituted a
professional standards policy consistent with the agency's critical
missions and unique position of public trust.'' \1\
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\1\ Joint Explanatory Statement, which accompanied H.R. 240,
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015.
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Over the past several years, the Secret Service has taken numerous
actions in response to the recommendations of the Professionalism
Reinforcement Working Group and the Department of Homeland Security's
(``the Department'') Inspector General. These actions include the
creation of a Chief Integrity Officer to centralize discipline
processes and reinforce the importance of leadership and accountability
with supervisors; the establishment of a Table of Penalties; the
creation of an ``Inspection Hotline'' for employees to report
misconduct and allow the agency to initiate swift investigative or
administrative action; and the addition of senior-level employees to
jump teams on all foreign trips.
As these actions took place prior to my appointment, I am committed
to fully reviewing them to ensure they are achieving their intended
outcomes. I firmly believe the Secret Service's mission requires all
employees to strive for operational and personal excellence at all
times.
fiscal year 2016 budget context and summary
Before I provide details on the fiscal year 2016 Budget for the
Secret Service, I want to thank all Members of the Committee for your
work on the fiscal year 2015 Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, which the President signed on March 4, 2015. For a
second year in a row, this subcommittee worked diligently to provide
the Secret Service with resources to help the agency recover from
staffing shortfalls associated with attrition and limited hiring in
fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013, support our training and
operational needs, and expand training for State and local law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges at the National Computer
Forensics Institute (``NCFI'').
In addition, our fiscal year 2015 appropriations includes $25
million above the request to begin the necessary protective mission
enhancements associated with the findings related to the September 19,
2014 White House incursion. The details of that egregious security
breach were documented in a report prepared by Deputy Secretary
Mayorkas (``Mayorkas Report''), which was followed-up by
recommendations from the independent Protective Mission Panel (``the
Panel'') that were included in a report to Secretary Johnson on
December 15, 2014. Taken in sum, these two reports provide a consistent
assessment of what went wrong on September 19, 2014, and steps the
Secret Service must take to ensure a breach of that magnitude never
happens again. The Panel's recommendations in particular have brought
focus to staffing, training, leadership, and technology and perimeter
security requirements at the White House Complex. However, since the
Secret Service's mission extends beyond the issues addressed in the
Panel's report, I am committed to zero-basing the agency's budget to
determine the full extent of our operational requirements. Although the
fiscal year 2016 Budget was formulated prior to my arrival, I believe
it represents an important step forward.
The fiscal year 2016 Budget represents the largest year-to-year
increase for the Secret Service since the agency was transferred from
the Department of Treasury to the Department of Homeland Security more
than 12 years ago and builds on the protective mission enhancements
that are underway this fiscal year. The request totals $1.94 billion,
an increase of $273.3 million or 16.4 percent above the fiscal year
2015 enacted level, and supports 6,647 Full Time Equivalents (``FTEs'')
across the agency. Program increases in the budget total $235.9 million
and include: $86.7 million for Protective Mission Enhancements
associated with the Panel's recommendations; $25.7 million to complete
the staffing requirements for President Obama's protective detail once
his term in office comes to a close; and $123.5 million for protection
costs associated with the 2016 Presidential Campaign and campaign-
related NSSEs.
Protective Mission Enhancements
The $86.7 million requested in fiscal year 2016 to address specific
recommendations made by the Panel can be broken down across four
categories: (1) personnel initiatives; (2) training center
improvements; (3) White House security infrastructure improvements; and
(4) protective technology upgrades. Of all the Panel's recommendations,
there are no greater priorities for me than staffing the agency at a
level commensurate with the demands of the mission, and ensuring that
our employees receive the training they need to do their jobs
effectively.
Personnel Initiatives
For personnel initiatives, the request includes $3.4 million to
continue the Secret Service's efforts to address attrition within the
Uniformed Division. Combining efforts to address attrition with our
aggressive hiring strategy for UD officers in 2015 and 2016 is critical
to meet the Panel's recommendation to ``[increase] the Uniformed
Division, as quickly as can be appropriately managed, by an initial 200
positions'' The Panel also recommended that the Secret Service
``[reform] and professionalize recruiting, hiring, promotion and
rotation [processes]'' To partially address this recommendation, the
Budget includes $4.8 million to enhance administrative support to help
the agency hire people in a more efficient manner, as well as support
focused marketing campaigns to target highly qualified and diverse
candidate populations.\2\ In addition, the Department's Deputy Chief
Human Capital Officer is on a temporary assignment to the Secret
Service to help identify strategies to professionalize the agency's
recruitment and hiring efforts.
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\2\ United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel,
Executive Summary to [the] Report from the United States Secret Service
Protective Mission Panel to the Secretary of Homeland Security,
December 15, 2014, p. 7. Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/14_1218_usss_pmp.pdf.
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Training Center Improvements
The Mayorkas Report made clear that lack of training contributed to
the White House incursion on September 19, 2014, and documented the
confusion that took place that evening between responding UD officers
and special operations teams. Since that time, the James J. Rowley
Training Center (``JJRTC'') has implemented a number of enhancements to
in-service training, including mandatory 4th Shift Training for the
Presidential and Vice Presidential protective divisions, and the
creation of several mandatory integrated training courses for all
Washington, DC-based protective details and UD officers.
To fulfill the Panel's recommendation to ``[train] in conditions
that replicate the physical environment in which [Secret Service law
enforcement personnel assigned to the White House] will operate,'' \3\
the Budget includes $8 million for the design and initial construction
of a White House mock-up at the JJRTC in Beltsville, Maryland. The
Secret Service currently uses a rudimentary, not-to-scale simulation of
the north grounds of the White House, using bike barricades to act as
the fencing. There are no structures, vehicle gates, lighting, or other
aides to enhance the training simulations at the JJRTC. The proposed
White House mock-up will provide a more realistic environment,
conducive to scenario-based training exercises, for UD officers and
special agents during basic recruit and in-service training courses.
Funds requested in fiscal year 2016 will enable the Secret Service to
complete design and move to construction of the White House facade,
including the residence, East and West Wings, guard booths, surrounding
grounds, and roadway.
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\3\ Ibid., p. 7.
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In addition to the White House mock-up facility, the request
includes $8 million to enable the Secret Service to renovate and
modernize the agency's canine training facility at JJRTC to accommodate
the current size of the canine program. The existing facility was built
in 1983 and was designed to accommodate 14 canine kennels; the Secret
Service currently operates 118 canine teams. The existing cages at the
facility are smaller than the current industry standard and have caused
health issues for the dogs.
The Budget also provides funds to renovate tactical training areas
and refurbish existing firearms ranges at the JJRTC. Planned
renovations include updates to the indoor pistol range, which currently
operates on a single air handling system, and only provides heating/air
conditioning for either the ranges or the classrooms when in full
operation. In addition, the outdoor pistol/rifle ranges are in need of
renovations to target systems, air blowers, tower operations, and
lighting. The live fire ``shoot house,'' used for training by the
special operations tactical units, has never been renovated, and is in
need of infrastructure replacement, camera systems, and the addition of
a classroom facility. The Tactical Village, used to recreate a city
street environment for more realistic training scenarios, also requires
infrastructure repair and safety enhancements.
White House Infrastructure Improvements
One of the most well publicized recommendations of the Panel was to
replace the fence around the White House as quickly as possible. As
documented in their report, ``the ease with which `pranksters' and the
mentally ill can climb the current fence puts Secret Service personnel
in a precarious position: When someone jumps the fence, they must
decide, in a split-second, whether to use lethal force on a person who
may not pose a viable threat to the President or the White House.'' \4\
I have said in previous testimony before Congress that if someone does
attempt to scale the White House fence, I want to ensure they are met
with immediate and forceful resistance. But I also view the fence
itself as a needed deterrent for would-be fence-jumpers.
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\4\ Ibid., p. 2.
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To advance the replacement of the existing fence around the White
House, the Secret Service is in the midst of a joint study with the
National Park Service to develop fence options that meet both security
and aesthetic criteria in recognition of the historical importance of
the site. The fence study is expected to be completed next month at
which point the Secret Service will immediately advance to the design
stage of the project using funds provided by Congress in fiscal year
2015.
The fiscal year 2016 Budget provides $8.2 million, requested as
two-year funds, for the construction of the new fence and associated
infrastructure enhancements around the perimeter of the White House.
Although the $8.2 million represents a good faith estimate on the cost
to replace the fence, the agency will have a better sense of the cost
once a preferred fence option is selected and the design work is
underway. Once complete, these enhancements will delay individuals
attempting to scale or defeat the fence, and provide our personnel with
additional time to respond to these attempts. As the Panel noted,
``[every] additional second of response time provided by a fence that
is more difficult to climb makes a material difference in ensuring the
President's safety and protecting the symbol that is the White House.''
\5\
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\5\ Ibid., p. 2.
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Protective Technology Upgrades
While much of the Panel's recommendations pertaining to technology
included classified material, their public report made clear that
``[technology] systems used on the [White House Complex] must always
remain cutting edge, and the [Secret Service] must invest in
technology, including becoming a driver of research and development
that may assist its mission.'' \6\ To address this recommendation, the
Budget requests necessary upgrades to radio communication
infrastructure to modernize and improve the reliability of audio
communications at the White House Complex and throughout the National
Capital Region. As noted by the Panel, these systems are obsolete and
need to be upgraded. The Budget also includes funding to update all
communication, video, and data systems at the Secret Service's Joint
Operations Center, which functions as the command-and-control center
for protective operations at the White House Complex.
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\6\ Ibid., p. 7.
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To enhance protective intelligence activities, the Budget provides
funding to upgrade the system the Secret Service uses to share
information between state, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies
with protective detail responsibilities. This information sharing
system gives law enforcement the ability to better assess the level of
risk that a known person of interest may pose to the law enforcement
community, and is used by approximately 55 law enforcement agencies,
including the U.S. Capitol Police. Pursuant to the Panel's findings,
these upgrades will allow personnel to query multiple Secret Service
databases simultaneously and enable faster dissemination and sharing of
information. The fiscal year 2016 Budget would also give the Secret
Service's Counter Surveillance Division the ability to link suspicious
activity reports from multiple law enforcement agencies, regardless of
the location. This capability would tie into the Protective
Intelligence Division reporting system and allow for the immediate
dissemination of adverse protective intelligence to our law enforcement
partners.
Former President Obama Protective Detail
As authorized by law, the Secret Service protects former Presidents
and their spouses for their lifetimes, and children of a former
President who are under 16 years of age.\7\ As was the case with the
establishment of past protective details for former Presidents, the
staffing and residential security requirements for the Obama Protective
Detail (``OPD'') will require funding across three fiscal years (FYs
2015-2017), with actual protective operations scheduled to begin on
January 20, 2017.
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\7\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3056(a)(3)-(4).
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Significant planning and funding are required well before that time
to ensure that personnel are hired, trained, and stationed in the field
to replace the more experienced special agents who will be assigned to
the new protective division. Estimating the full cost of protecting a
former President this early comes with inherent challenges. The Secret
Service does not know at this time where the First Family will reside
once they leave the White House; whether or not the daughters will be
granted protection beyond 16 years of age as has been done in the past;
and whether or not the President and First Lady will travel at a rate
commensurate with other former Presidents and First Ladies. These
variables will require close attention as they could impact out-year
funding requirements.
Our enacted 2015 appropriations includes $4 million to hire 81
special agents for the OPD. The fiscal year 2016 Budget includes
second-year costs for those new hires, as well as funding to hire an
additional 27 special agents and 30 administrative, professional, and
technical personnel to complete the staffing requirements. The request
also includes funding for permanent-change-of-station expenses and
protective detail training for the special agents who will actually be
assigned to the new division.
2016 Presidential Campaign
With less than 2 years remaining before President Obama's term in
office comes to a close, the Secret Service is preparing for campaign
protection requirements similar to those of 2008, the last time no
incumbent President ran for office. As authorized by law, the Secret
Service protects major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates
and, within 120 days of the general Presidential election, the spouses
of such candidates. Secret Service protection for major Presidential
and Vice Presidential candidates is directed by the Secretary of
Homeland Security after consultation with an advisory committee
consisting of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the minority
leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority
leaders of the Senate, and one additional member selected by the other
members of the committee. This fifth member of the advisory committee
has traditionally been the Sergeant-at-Arms of either the House of
Representatives or the Senate.\8\
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\8\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3056(a)(7).
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During every campaign, the Secret Service's budget temporarily
grows to accommodate the surge in protection requirements associated
with the presidential campaign and nominating conventions. Of the total
$203.7 million requested in fiscal year 2016 for campaign protection
and campaign-related NSSEs, $54.7 million simply reflects a temporary
realignment of existing base resources from the Domestic Field Office
PPA to support campaign protection activities. When people ask how it
is the Secret Service can protect multiple candidates traveling between
different cities and states in a matter of hours, I point to the
special agents who serve in our field offices around the country.
Without the support of highly-trained special agents who have
experience with investigations and protection, the Secret Service would
be unable to handle the surges in protective operations associated with
presidential campaigns, NSSEs, and major events such as the UNGA, or
routine protective operations for that matter.
Since it is impossible to know how many candidates the Secret
Service will be directed to protect when the campaign budget is
formulated, the agency uses scenario-based modeling to estimate the
projected costs of campaign protection activities. As was the case with
previous campaigns, the Secret Service estimated the total number of
protection days and anticipated cost per protection day to develop the
budget for the 2016 Presidential Campaign. One significant change in
the upcoming campaign was the announcement by the Republican and
Democratic National Committees of their decision to move their
respective nominating conventions earlier in the calendar year. Since
the Secret Service is typically directed to begin protection of Vice
Presidential candidates and their families in the lead up to these
events, the number of protection days is projected to be higher than
previous presidential campaigns.
Securing the two nominating conventions is one of the most
expensive and challenging aspects of campaign protection. These high-
profile NSSEs typically attract more than 50,000 participants each and
last three to four days. The Secret Service begins work months in
advance to plan and coordinate comprehensive security operations to
identify and mitigate threats that could harm our protectees, other
dignitaries, and the general public attending these events. For
example, to mitigate the risk of a cyber attack on critical systems and
infrastructure that could adversely affect security plans, special
agents trained in Critical Systems Protection are responsible for
securing venues that are increasingly automated and interconnected,
with major building systems that can be operated remotely. For the
Republican National Convention and Democratic National Convention, as
well as for major campaign sites and the Presidential and Vice
Presidential debates, the Secret Service will protect critical systems
and key infrastructure associated with these venues that may be
vulnerable to cyber intrusions, surveillance, and manipulation.
criminal investigative successes
To accomplish its cyber protection mission, the Secret Service
recruits from within the agency's Electronic Crimes Special Agent
Program, specifically the Computer Forensics and Network Intrusion
Responder disciplines. Special agents trained in these areas are
responsible for the successful investigations into many of the largest
known data breaches in recent memory, including Target, TJ Maxx, Dave &
Buster's, Heartland Payment Systems, and others. Just last month, a
Secret Service led investigation resulted in the arrest and extradition
of Vladimir Drinkman, a Russian national who will face charges that he
allegedly conspired in the largest international hacking and data
breach scheme ever prosecuted in the United States.\9\
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\9\ See http:// www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/
Drinkman,%20Vladimir%20Extradition
%20News%20Release.html.
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Investigating these crimes is not new for the Secret Service. For
over three decades the agency has investigated cyber criminal activity
\10\ and worked to counter some of the most skillful transnational
cyber criminal groups. The Secret Service proactively investigates
cyber crime using a variety of investigative means to infiltrate these
transnational cyber criminal groups and counter every element of their
criminal schemes. As a result of these proactive investigations, the
Secret Service is often the first to learn of planned or ongoing data
breaches and is quick to provide affected companies and institutions
with actionable information to mitigate the damage from the data breach
and terminate the criminal's unauthorized access to their networks.
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\10\ Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1029-1030 as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and explicitly assigned the
Secret Service authority to investigate these criminal violations.
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The Secret Service's global network of 38 Electronic Crimes Task
Forces are the foundation for the agency's investigations of cyber
crime and our primary means of sharing actionable information with
potential victim companies. For example, in 2014, based on information
discovered through just one of the agency's ongoing cyber crime
investigations, the Secret Service notified hundreds of U.S. entities
of cyber criminal activity targeting their organizations.
The Secret Service also invests in developing the capabilities of
our state and local partners. In partnership with the State of Alabama,
the Secret Service operates the NCFI to train state and local law
enforcement investigators, prosecutors, and judges in how to conduct
computer forensic examinations, respond to network intrusion incidents,
and conduct cyber crimes investigations. Graduates of NCFI typically
join the Secret Service's network of ECTFs and have frequently made
vital contributions to significant Secret Service investigations of
transnational cyber criminals.
As the Secret Service investigates cyber crime, we discover new and
emerging cyber criminal methods and share relevant cybersecurity
information broadly to enable other organizations to secure their
networks while protecting ongoing investigations and the privacy of all
involved. The Secret Service accomplishes these objectives through
contributions to industry-leading annual reports like the Verizon Data
Breach Investigations Report and the Trustwave Global Security Report,
and through more immediate reports, including joint Malware Initial
Findings Reports (``MIFRs'').
Last year, UPS Stores Inc. used information published in a joint
report on the Back-Off malware to protect itself and its customers from
cyber criminal activity.\11\ The information in this report was derived
from a Secret Service investigation of a network intrusion at a small
retailer in Syracuse, New York. The Secret Service partnered with the
National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (``NCCIC/US-
CERT'') and the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (``FS-ISAC'') to widely share actionable cybersecurity
information derived from this investigation to help numerous other
organizations, while protecting the integrity of the ongoing
investigation and the privacy of all parties. For UPS Stores, Inc., the
result was the identification of 51 stores in 24 states that had been
impacted, enabling UPS Stores, Inc. to contain and mitigate this cyber
incident before it developed into a major data breach.\12\
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\11\ See http://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications/Backoff-
Point-Sale-Malware.
\12\ See UPS Store's press release. Available at: http://
www.theupsstore.com/about/media-room/Pages/The-ups-store- notifies-
customers.aspx.
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As the Secret Service shares cybersecurity information discovered
in the course of our criminal investigations, the agency aggressively
works to apprehend and bring those involved to justice. Due to the
inherent challenges in investigating transnational crime, particularly
the lack of cooperation of some countries with U.S. law enforcement
investigations, it can sometimes take years to finally apprehend the
top tier criminals. The Secret Service works closely with its partners
in the Departments of Justice and State to develop the capabilities of
foreign law enforcement partners and to foster collaboration.
In July 2014, Secret Service agents arrested Roman Seleznev of
Vladivostok, Russia, through an international law enforcement
operation. Seleznev had been charged in Seattle in a 40-count
indictment for allegedly being involved in the theft and sale of
financial information of millions of customers. Seleznev is also
charged in a separate indictment with participating in a racketeer
influenced corrupt organization (``RICO'') and conspiracy related to
possession of counterfeit and unauthorized access devices.\13\
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\13\ See http://www.justice.gov/usao/waw/press/2014/October/
seleznev.html.
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The Secret Service is committed to safeguarding the Nation's
financial payment systems by defeating cyber criminal organizations.
Responding to the growth of these types of crimes, and the level of
sophistication these criminals employ, requires significant resources
and substantial collaboration among law enforcement and its public and
private sector partners. Accordingly, the Secret Service dedicates
resources to improve its investigative techniques, provides training
for law enforcement partners, and broadly shares actionable information
on cyber threats.
major investment programs
Many of the Secret Service's non-staffing investments in
cybersecurity, protective countermeasures, and IT systems are included
in two programs within the agency's budget: Information Integration and
Technology Transformation (``IITT'') and Operational Mission Support
(``OMS''). Prior to the establishment of these programs, in fiscal year
2010 and fiscal year 2012 respectively, the Secret Service did not have
dedicated programs to invest in new technologies, and for many years
struggled to maintain existing systems with whatever resources were
left over after the agency met its payroll obligations.
Information Integration and Technology Transformation Program
The IITT program resulted from the recognition that the Secret
Service's existing IT infrastructure did not adequately serve the
requirements of our mission. Additionally, in 2008, the National
Security Agency identified critical IT infrastructure, architecture,
and application vulnerabilities that required immediate mitigation. The
IITT program includes four program capability areas: (1) Enabling
Capabilities, which consists of projects related to modernization of
the existing IT infrastructure; (2) Control Capabilities, which
consists of two projects that will provide the IT tools necessary to
secure and control access to Secret Service information; (3) Mission
Support Capabilities, which includes operational and administrative
applications that directly and indirectly support the Secret Service's
mission; and (4) Communications Capabilities, which was originally
conceived in 2009 to enable full communications compatibility with the
White House Communications Agency and includes acquisition and
sustainment of communications devices.
The fiscal year 2016 Budget includes $45.2 million for the IITT
program. This funding will continue investments in IT network
modernization, data systems, applications, security, and communications
to fully support present operational requirements and sustain prior
year investments and achievements.
Combined Operations Logistics Database 2
While the IITT program has provided the Secret Service with a more
secure, efficient, and effective IT infrastructure, one disappointment
is the Combined Operations Logistics Database 2 (``COLD2'') project,
which was planned to provide software applications and systems related
to event planning, human and technical resource deployment,
notification processes, and tracking. However, last month the
contracting officer at the Defense Information Systems Agency
(``DISA'') informed the Secret Service that Option 3 of the COLD2
contract would not be exercised due to contractor performance.
Although the COLD2 requirements are still valid, the contractor did
not demonstrate sufficient progress in meeting the contract objectives.
The task proved too large and too complex for a single undertaking. As
a consequence, the Secret Service has reviewed our requirements and
concluded that UD scheduling, event planning, and enterprise-wide
scheduling are our sequential priorities. We have approached the
Department for assistance in performing an independent analysis to
determine the best path forward to address our prioritized requirements
with options on technical approach and contracting strategies, and I
have directed my staff to keep the Committee updated on these
developments.
Operational Mission Support Program
To address unmet engineering, scientific, and security technology
needs on the White House Complex, Vice President's Residence, and at
temporary sites visited by the President and Vice President, elements
of the OMS program were funded through reprogrammings in fiscal year
2010 and fiscal year 2011 before being put on-budget in fiscal year
2012. OMS supports advanced protective countermeasures projects for
high-priority hazardous materials detection systems, audio
countermeasures, physical security enhancements at the White House
Complex, and cyber protection activities to address known and emerging
threats directed towards the Secret Service's protective interests.
The fiscal year 2016 request includes $50.7 million for the OMS
program, an $8.5 million increase over the fiscal year 2015 enacted
level to accommodate the requirements of the Next Generation Limousine.
The majority of the funds requested in fiscal year 2016 for OMS will be
used to operate, maintain, and sustain capabilities established in
previous years, to include personnel costs, life cycle equipment
replacement, training, and testing.
Although much attention is deservedly focused on the Panel's
recommendations, I ask for your continued support of these established
investment programs which have improved Secret Service operations and
closed critical security gaps over the past 5 years.
conclusion
I care deeply about the Secret Service and agreed to return to
public life to make a difference. It is my highest honor to represent a
workforce I believe is second to none. Much of what I have seen in the
past 5 months gives me great hope, but I also understand the amount of
work that needs to be done to put the Secret Service on a path for
future success. Strong leadership is a hallmark of any great agency,
and I have started to assemble a team of people I believe will take a
fresh look at the way the Secret Service operates and will continuously
strive for innovation and excellence in the fulfillment of the agency's
clear statutory mission.
As noted by the Panel, the replacement of aging infrastructure and
investments in technology to ensure the Secret Service is on the
cutting edge of emerging threats is critical, but successful
stewardship of the agency also requires that I invest in our people.
That investment begins by ensuring that staffing levels across the
agency are commensurate with the demands of the mission and that
training is not viewed as a discretionary function.
With the support of the Department and the Congress over the next
several years, I am confident that we can put the Secret Service on a
path to success for many decades to come. Chairman Hoeven, Ranking
Member Shaheen, this concludes my written testimony. I welcome any
questions you have at this time.
POLICY: INCIDENT REPORTING
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Director. We will go to
questions and responses, and we'll just start with 5-minute
rounds and take as many rounds as necessary. So I will start
with the first 5-minute round.
Director, the first question, and you can make the
distinction as to what you can comment on and what you have to
wait for the investigation in order to comment, but my first
question, relative to the March 4 incident, is that you weren't
notified until March 9.
Talk about that. What is your policy? What are the
reporting requirements not only for this incident specifically,
but in general? Why in the world wouldn't you be notified about
something like this for 5 days? Why wouldn't you be notified
immediately?
Mr. Clancy. Mr. Chairman, you are correct, and I am not
happy about that. We have made that point to our staff. I
brought my staff in last week and showed my displeasure with my
notice on that event.
Typically, I would be notified of any misconduct. With
respect to any criminal activity, I would be notified
immediately. I constantly get reports on activity around the
White House, if there is any. And I did get that evening an
alert on the suspicious package.
So typically, I would be notified. This one puzzles me, but
it will not happen again. We are going to look at the policies
to certainly fine-tune them, to be very specific with what our
supervisors are expected to do whenever we have an incident.
POLICY: DRINKING
Senator Hoeven. When you have an incident where staff have
been drinking and are on scene, on the worksite, what is the
policy? What are the requirements? Whether the individuals are
working or are off duty, what is the responsibility of the
people who are on duty to take action in regard to not only
checking those individuals for their blood alcohol level but
reporting the situation up the chain?
Mr. Clancy. Certainly, any officers or agents who are on
duty have to assess any situation. And if they felt that the
driver or the supervisor was under the influence of alcohol,
they should have taken appropriate action. That action would
have been, certainly, to notify the chain of command all the
way up to my office.
These are allegations at this point. The OIG will determine
what the facts are. Once those facts are known, we will take
the appropriate action through our Table of Penalties, which
are very specific. With, certainly, failure to report, if a
supervisor did not report this incident, there are penalties
for that, as there are if you are operating a vehicle under the
influence.
Senator Hoeven. In this instance, you had not only
individuals who were off duty going through a crime scene, you
also had a situation where they had been using alcohol.
Again, what is your policy for notification when you have
one or both of those circumstances?
Mr. Clancy. Mr. Chairman, first, I would just caution, in
terms of using ``alcohol'' or ``under the influence of
alcohol.'' Until we get the OIG final report, these are still
allegations.
In terms of driving through a secure zone, that is a
violation. Every agent knows that they should not be moving
through a secure zone.
Senator Hoeven. So you have two issues here. You have both
a situation where agents went through a secure zone, and may
have been using alcohol, and you have a situation where either
uniformed personnel, agents, or both, did not report those
facts up the chain.
If that happens, if that incident happened today, what
should be done? What is your policy to address that? What
should the people on the ground have been doing? Or, what would
they do if that occurred today?
Mr. Clancy. Those officers should have reported that up
through the Uniformed Division officer chain up to the deputy
chief, and then up to the SAIC, the special agent in charge of
the President's detail, and eventually over to the Assistant
Director of protective operations, and then to my office. There
is a very specific chain of command that those events should
have been reported up through.
Senator Hoeven. So you have a clear policy and procedure in
place that requires that? That is in place now?
Mr. Clancy. It is in place.
Senator Hoeven. So that was not complied with in this
instance on March 4?
Mr. Clancy. That is correct. Although, Mr. Chairman, I will
say, there may be discretion in some cases. Now, I'm not saying
in this case, but there may be discretion. I can't think of an
example here, but everything doesn't come to my desk. This one,
certainly, should have.
JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER'S ROLE
Senator Hoeven. Just one more question along this line,
what about the role of the Joint Operations Center in providing
that report?
What I am trying to understand is what your policies and
procedures require for this type of instance, and also what
failsafe or additional backup is there to make sure that if
somebody doesn't report up the chain, that there is some kind
of backup to catch that kind of problem. I understand that you
have an investigation ongoing as far as this individual
incident, and we will get all the facts and make sure that
appropriate action is taken. But I am saying, tell me how this
is supposed to be handled today, if an event like this occurs,
as of now.
Mr. Clancy. If the same event happened today, that on-duty
supervisor, on-scene supervisor, should relay that information
up to the deputy chief of the White House, the Uniformed
Division deputy chief. The deputy chief should then relay it up
to the special agent in charge of the President's detail and
then over to the Assistant Director for protective operations.
Now, the Joint Operations Center----
Senator Hoeven. And then the role of the Joint Operations
Center?
Mr. Clancy. The people assigned to the Joint Operations
Center are watching this on the videos. They are seeing the
scene on the videos in the Joint Operations Center, and they
are making a report as well. At the end of the day, they will
make a report of what they have communicated with the watch
commander on scene.
Senator Hoeven. So for the March 4 incidents, both should
have reported that up the chain and did not?
Mr. Clancy. That is correct.
Senator Hoeven. Senator Shaheen.
ETHICS MANUAL
Senator Shaheen. I just want to get a clarification because
I have similar questions to Senator Hoeven.
I am looking at the reference manual that is available for
all Secret Service agents relative to standards of ethical,
professional, and personal conduct.
Mr. Clancy. Yes.
Senator Shaheen. I assume you have a name for it. What do
you call it?
Mr. Clancy. It is an ethics manual that every new officer
and agent receives in training.
Senator Shaheen. But what this says is that you, meaning
each officer, have an affirmative duty to report promptly and
directly to the DHS Office of Inspector General or to the
Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility Inspection
Division any misconduct. And then it lays out misconduct, such
as the alleged misconduct incident on March 4.
But based on your exchange with Senator Hoeven, it sounded
like those options to report to the Office of Inspector General
or Professional Responsibility in the Secret Service office
were not what you were suggesting should have happened there.
Mr. Clancy. Senator, my apologies. Once it reaches the
Assistant Director of Protective Operations, once it goes
through the Uniformed Division, through the agent in charge and
over, then he or she makes a determination whether it should go
to the Office of Professional Responsibility. And certainly,
this one should have.
VIDEO: ERASURE
Senator Shaheen. Okay. When we were coming into the room,
one of the reporters shouted a question to you, which I have
had raised with me, and that is a suggestion that there were
videos of the incident that had been altered in some way by the
Secret Service. I want to give you the opportunity to address
that question in this open hearing.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, Senator.
We have a practice of recording over tape that is on our
cameras after a set period of time. I know I have seen reports
that the tapes have been erased. That is not the case. We don't
have a system where someone can erase tapes, put their finger
on a dial and erase it. But video surveillance are, by
practice, in 72 hours, is recorded over. I know that is a
concern. Rightfully so.
So what I did, I instructed my staff to reach out to the
manufacturer, and hopefully we can get the manufacturer in to
try to re-create those videos, as well as our top forensic
cyber people to come in to work with the manufacturer. And we
reached out to the Office of Inspector General to make sure
that they were comfortable, and they, certainly, can be there
on site as well.
But we understand it is a concern. We are doing everything
we can to retrieve those images, to be as transparent as we can
be.
Senator Shaheen. But just to clarify, there is a video that
exists of the incident, at least one video of the incident?
Mr. Clancy. Along E Street where the incident took place,
at 15th and E, there are different camera angles. What was
captured was the incident with the young lady who dropped the
suspicious package. We do have three clips of that. And then
there were two separate clips of the vehicle in question, of
two agents driving through that checkpoint.
Beyond that, typically, the vehicles would go to a
checkpoint where the canines would sweep the vehicles. That
camera angle, we do not have, and that is what we are going to
go back and hopefully be able to capture with the help of the
manufacturer and our folks.
Senator Shaheen. And you have pointed out that there is an
ongoing investigation of this incident. Can you speak to why
the video that does exist has not been made available, not been
shown publicly?
Mr. Clancy. The video that we do have has been shown to
Members of Congress. We don't release video to the public,
because it may be evidence in a future case. So rather than
taint witnesses or future court hearings, we don't release it.
CULTURE AT SECRET SERVICE
Senator Shaheen. Thank you for that clarification.
You know, one of the things that I know you have said you
find particularly troubling about the March 4 incident is one
of the things that Senator Hoeven and I have raised as well,
and that is the fact that this incident was not reported up the
chain.
I, certainly, am a supporter of whistleblower protections.
I think they are very important. But I am also concerned about
what it says about the culture of the organization that when
this kind of incident occurs, someone feels like they should
talk to a newspaper or Members of Congress before they talk to
someone within the organization.
I wonder if you could talk about the culture that would
suggest that that is what happens.
Mr. Clancy. The first thing we need to do is build trust
within our ranks, up and down. We have to build the
communication. It always comes back to communication. And we
haven't done a good enough job of that. When someone has
something that they want to raise up to a supervisor, we have
to make sure that they get some kind of response back.
Certainly, in this case, it was more than likely difficult
for some of those officers because there were two supervisors
coming through. But we have to create a culture where you have
to raise that to your supervisor and all the way up.
And we are going to do that. As we have talked to our
staff, and I brought them in right after this incident, we
insisted that all communication is brought forward and talked
through the ranks. I have had several meetings with officers.
And, certainly, since I got here, I brought in all the agents
and all the officers together in one room, and we talked about
what those expectations are. I am seeing some positive
movement, as I talk to the officers walking to work each day. I
stop and talk to the officers, and I get a feel for how things
are going. I do see some positive movement.
What happened on March 4 shows we have a long way to go
yet.
INSPECTION HOTLINE
Senator Shaheen. In your statement, you point out that you
have created an inspection hotline for employees to report
misconduct. Can you tell me if that was used by any of the
employees in the aftermath of the recent incident? And how are
you communicating to people about that inspection hotline and
the importance of using it?
Mr. Clancy. I don't know if it was used. The OIG may have
that information. But I will tell you, just again to encourage
this communication. First of all, that hotline number is on our
Web site. But additionally, we have an ombudsman, which we have
been trying to push out. In fact, the ombudsman travels to the
field offices and different offices to, again, try to encourage
people, and let them know they can call us anonymously. If you
see an issue, if you have any concerns, we want to know about
it.
By the same token, we are telling our officers and agents,
if you see vulnerabilities, we need to hear about it. That is
what we are trying to drive home.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
POLICY FOR REPORTING MISCONDUCT
Senator Hoeven. Director, you say, in terms of your
policies and procedures, it is clear that for this type of
incident, it should be reported up the chain both on the part
of uniformed officers or agents and your Joint Operations
Center? It is spelled out clearly in your policies and
procedures, so people know and understand that? Is that
accurate or not?
Mr. Clancy. Mr. Chairman, I cannot say I have read the
policy. I haven't gone back to read the policy. But every
agent, every officer knows they have to report incidents up the
chain of command. Now this one is a very serious allegation of
misconduct. There is an allegation of alcohol. That has to be
reported. Everyone knows that has to be reported. But I don't
have the policy in front of me to read it.
Senator Hoeven. What I am trying to understand is your
follow-up now to ensure that an incident is properly reported
up the chain, whether it is similar to this instance or perhaps
different, trying to understand that both in your policies and
procedures and your interaction within your agency that that
communication has been made so that you have a comfort level or
an assurance that your people understand that incidents have to
be reported up the chain.
Mr. Clancy. Yes.
Senator Hoeven. So I am trying to understand what you have
done, both in terms of your written policies and procedures and
what you have done in terms of you communicating with people in
the agency.
Mr. Clancy. I sent a statement out to the entire workforce
specifically saying these types of events have to be reported
up. And we will continue to push that message out. That is in
our training. It has been mentioned at the roll calls and shift
briefings that this type of event--and to be honest, these
hearings here are actually another tool, a vehicle, to get this
word out to our workforce--that this information has to be
passed up.
VIDEO: RETENTION POLICY
Senator Hoeven. Why do you tape over the tapes after, what
is it, 72 hours?
Mr. Clancy. Seventy-two hours.
Senator Hoeven. And why is it even tapes versus some kind
of ongoing video with disc storage or something where you could
just easily retain it?
Mr. Clancy. I wasn't in the Service when those decisions
were made, regarding the length of time. But my understanding
is there was some concern for privacy issues because we would
be capturing large databases of video surveillance, not only as
guests come into the White House but also the general public
walking along Pennsylvania Avenue or E Street. My understanding
is there is something of a privacy issue.
But I will say that 72 hours, in my view, is obviously too
short of a time. We have to go back and look at the standards
of other agencies and do a good best-practices look at this.
But there is no question we have to hold these videos longer.
Senator Hoeven. So there needs to be some thought given and
analysis as to what that retention policy needs to be, correct?
Mr. Clancy. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hoeven. And how do you intend to proceed with
regard to doing that?
Mr. Clancy. We will put a work group together representing
legal, Uniformed Division, our protective operations people,
and we will work with the Department of Homeland Security to
ensure that we are retaining video the length of time that we
need to.
Senator Hoeven. Yes, it seems to me that you need to report
back to us what that policy should be, how long you should
retain it. And then does that necessitate anything in terms of
your appropriation to make sure you have the ability to do
that? But that is something we need to follow up on.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
FENCE-JUMPER INCIDENT
Senator Hoeven. I am going to switch to the September 19
fence-jumper incident and just ask you to give me your report
on how you feel that you have followed up on that instance,
what steps you have taken that you can talk about that aren't
subject to confidentiality, and what assurances you feel you
have that that type of incident would be prevented in the
future.
Mr. Clancy. Well, first I will say that the Deputy
Secretary Mayorkas report was obviously very helpful, very
thorough, as was the presidential mission panel, the blue
ribbon panel, and the recommendations that they made.
We are moving very briskly through those recommendations.
Anything that could be done immediately, we did, in terms of
additional posts, additional tactical teams. Some of the
recommendations are more longterm, which we fully endorse, such
as--you mentioned the fence. The fence is a longer-term
project. Within the next month, I should get a report on some
options for the permanent fence.
After the National Park Service and the Secret Service look
at those options and select an option, it will take about 6
months to go through that design process. After that, another 2
or 3 months for procurement. And then the construction will
begin. So it could last a year and a half.
We know that is too long. We can't wait a year and a half.
So we have been testing other types of enhancements on the
fence, which I expect to be put in place this summer. It will
be a temporary measure to get us to the final product. But we
have done testing out at our Beltsville facility to make sure
that it will be more difficult for people to get over the
fence.
What we are trying to do is, first, prevent people from
climbing the fence, but also to give our tactical teams and our
officers, time to react, because they are in a very difficult
position, once somebody gets over that fence.
Senator Hoeven. So are there other additional measures that
you have in place now until you complete the fence that
compensates for not having it?
Mr. Clancy. What we have now on the north fence line is,
for lack of a better term, bike rack out on Pennsylvania Avenue
on the sidewalk. It creates that distance I spoke about
earlier. And we have officers posted in the buffer area. It
keeps anyone who may want to jump the fence farther back. It
gives them a little more distance from that fence, and also
gives our officers a better view of who might be trying to get
to the fence.
So they have to get over two fences. Admittedly, the first
one is very easy to get over, but it gives us a chance to
respond.
Senator Hoeven. And one more time, based on what we have in
this appropriation request, what is your timeline for getting
an enhanced fence in place?
Mr. Clancy. The final product, it may be a year and a half.
But the interim fence, this summer.
Senator Hoeven. So interim this summer.
Mr. Clancy. Yes.
Senator Hoeven. The final product, probably next summer.
Mr. Clancy. Approximately a year and a half, yes.
Senator Hoeven. Senator Shaheen.
VIDEO: SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Before we totally leave the video issue, I want to go back
and get clarification that I think was not clear in our
questioning or your comments. You pointed out to Senator Hoeven
and I that the reason you have the video of the incident, since
the Secret Service normally doesn't keep that video beyond 72
hours, is because there was another incident in that location
that you needed to keep that video for. I think it is important
to clarify this so that there is no confusion about the 72-hour
parameter that you talked about.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, Senator, thank you.
My understanding is that when an event like this happens,
you have a suspicious package----
Senator Shaheen. Which preceded the March 4 incident with
the agents.
Mr. Clancy. Right. That was 10:25. The lady showed up and
dropped the package. The agents came approximately 30 minutes
later. So in the Joint Operations Center, they see that view.
They see the camera feed. And the supervisor there, typically,
will look at those screens and he will tag the ones that he
thinks are pertinent for evidentiary purposes. So they will
pick those views, and, typically, they will just keep the ones
that are pertinent to the incident.
I don't know if that answers----
Senator Shaheen. I think that is helpful. I just think we
should make it clear for the record that there is video that
exists and it is kept beyond the 72-hour guidelines that you
normally have because of a prior incident.
Mr. Clancy. Yes. That is correct.
Senator Shaheen. On the same day.
Mr. Clancy. That is correct.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
TRAINING AND STAFFING
I want to go back to the budget request, because you make a
strong case in your statement about the importance of the 2016
budget request. You have talked about the efforts to address
the perimeter fencing issues at the White House. Can you talk
about the $25 million that was provided in the 2015 law above
the 2015 request that begins to address the training and
staffing as well? Because, as you point out, the
recommendations were not just around the perimeter fencing, to
address the fence-jumping incident. They also involved training
and staffing.
Mr. Clancy. Yes. With the training, we were lacking in
training. Because we were very short-staffed, we did not get
our officers and agents out to our training facility like they
should have been. And there was not enough integrated training.
So we have brought additional agents to the White House to
hold post. And we brought in additional uniformed officers get
more people out to training and have this integrated training,
so that the officers and tactical teams and the agents are all
out at our facility, and everyone knows what each other is
doing. I think the report showed that everyone wasn't sure how
the emergency response team would react. So that is the purpose
of getting everyone out there. And we are at 100 percent
getting our officers from the White House out to that 10-hour
training block. I am sorry, that was a 6-hour training block
and a 4-hour training block in the classroom.
But training has been increased 110 percent in the
Uniformed Division since September 19. With the agents,
training has gone up 78 percent.
And, as you know, Senator, we have a fourth shift training,
but we have slacked off that over the years because of
operational needs. So what we have done is make it mandatory.
If you are on the fourth shift training, after you have done
your 2 weeks of days and 2 weeks of afternoon shifts and
midnight shifts, that fourth shift, you have to get out to
training.
We have done some restructuring, too. After I arrived here,
we split our staffing Directorate and our training Directorate,
which were combined at one time. We split them to give them
more focus, because staffing is so critical to what we are
doing. If we can fix our staffing issues, it is going to allow
us to get more training, and it is going to help with our
morale. It is going to help with the quality-of-life for our
officers and agents.
So by splitting that Directorate up, that got us started.
And there are some other things we have done, which I can
address.
OFFICERS VS. AGENTS: DIFFERENCES
Senator Shaheen. Can you describe the differences between
the uniformed officers and the agents that most of the public
see? When they see Secret Service agents, they see people in
regular suits with an earpiece talking into their sleeve. That
is what many people in the public think about when they think
about the Secret Service. But maybe you could just describe the
differences.
Mr. Clancy. First, Senator, I will tell you it is one team,
and that is one thing that we are trying to push forward. We
work together all the time; the officers and agents stand side-
by-side at the White House, on trips, on advances. So it is one
team.
The officers protect facilities, for the most part,
certainly, the White House Complex. They do the magnetometer
checks, the screening of people who come to the White House. We
get about 36,000 people, tourists, per month coming through the
ground floor of the White House. So they do a great job there
at the White House.
And the agents are more responsible for the protectee. So
they travel with the protectees and have that inner perimeter.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Well, I can speak to some of the agents in New Hampshire.
We have some Secret Service agents who have been very helpful
as we have tried to address fraud against seniors. They have
been very helpful with us in doing that.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you.
HIRING
Senator Hoeven. Director, talk about manpower. I know you
are, I know, perennially short of manpower. That is part of the
problem here. People power, having enough men and women to not
only do the job, but to have adequate time for training. You
mentioned the fourth shift. You may want talk about that some
more.
But that is a concern, and it is particularly a concern now
this year, isn't it? Not only, like you say, having more
manpower as you work to get things in place like an improved
fence at the White House, but also you have a number of visits.
You have papal visits. You have the U.N. General Assembly. You
have, of course, the presidential election process starting.
All those are going to require more people power, men and
women.
So how are you going to go about addressing that? How are
you going to hire more people to cover all those bases, because
you have multiple needs, the need to do more training, the need
for these other visits? How are you going to get at that this
year?
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, we had a goal of six classes of agents and six
classes of Uniformed Division going through the hiring process
this year. We have increased that. Now we expect nine classes
of agents to come through in fiscal year 2015 and eight classes
of Uniformed Division officers. So we are going to hire a lot
more people than we had originally planned to.
We are able to do that for a few reasons. One, we brought
in additional administrative support to get our hiring process
sped up a little bit. We are in the process of bringing in
contractors to give us some help with the administrative load
of going through USAJobs and the number of applications we get.
We get 45,000 applications when we put out an announcement for
an agent position. So it is very cumbersome.
The process is a long process. It takes about 7 months. Our
people are given polygraphs. There are background checks. All
of this, it takes time. Medical records. But with additional
help, and the Department of Homeland Security loaned us their
deputy CHCO, their human capital officer, which has been a big
help to us as well, to show us how we can be more efficient.
So we are really putting a lot of focus on the hiring
process, and it is so important.
Just as an example, you mentioned the upcoming events that
we have. For one of the things in fiscal year 2015, we have
hired 81 agents to start, staff, and train for the former
President Obama detail. We have to be ready on January 20,
2017, with a full detail of 108 agents and approximately 30
support staff. So we have already started that process in
fiscal year 2015.
And then next year, we will add 27. We will hire 27 more,
so that we can continue to build that former Obama detail.
But the challenges that we have coming up with the papal
visit in September and the United Nations 70th anniversary,
where we expect 170 heads of state, it is going to be a very
challenging time for the Secret Service. We will also reach out
to our partners, of course, with the Department of Homeland
Security, with Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and others.
But this is where our field offices really help us. In
Philadelphia, they have been planning for the papal visit for
months. New York, Washington, the same. So we are very
fortunate that we have people in place already starting this
process.
So we have a lot of work to do, but we are going to be
well-prepared when the time comes.
Senator Hoeven. How many of these are new people or
additional people versus backfilling, because you have an
attrition challenge, too? So talk in terms of special effort
you are making to get these people in place, particularly given
the time it takes for you to not only hire them but get them
trained, and the special effort you are making. Because just in
a normal year, you have an attrition challenge. Now you need a
net-plus-up.
So what is the special effort that you are making to
accomplish that?
Mr. Clancy. We have some requests in the budget for some
retention initiatives.
Senator Hoeven. And that is a good question, too. Is this
funding adequate for you to do it? I should ask that as well.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, it is. First of all, for the hiring, the
funding for the hiring, we are at capacity as it is now. So the
funding is appropriate to get nine classes in and eight classes
through. We are very thankful for that.
As we build out our abilities in the hiring process, we may
be able to bring in more classes in future years. But the
retention part of it is really important. There is a two-part
problem here. It is one thing to hire people, but we can't
afford to lose our officers and our agents to other agencies or
to the private sector.
Like our cyber investigators, they are very talented. They
are so talented that the private sector would love to have some
of these agents. So we are trying to offer a plan where we can
retain some of our specialists as well as the Uniformed
Division officers.
Senator Hoeven. Do you have the flexibility to do that? Do
you have flexibility in your compensation to be able to do
that, to retain some of those people that you are losing?
Mr. Clancy. We do. We have to get approval for it through
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and others. But yes, we
do have the flexibility.
Senator Hoeven. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. When you talk about flexibility, I assume
you are talking about increased pay for those particular
officers? Is that what you are referencing?
Mr. Clancy. Maybe a bonus or something along those lines.
But it would be very limited. Again, we are going through a
critical time here up through the campaign. That is a critical
time for us. So it would be a very limited type of retention
bonus.
Senator Shaheen. To continue this line of questioning, the
Protective Mission Panel report called for the immediate hiring
of 200 Uniformed Division officers and 85 special agents. When
you talked about the ramp-up on hiring that is going on right
now, was that in response to that report or is that in response
to the increased activities that you are expecting in 2016?
Mr. Clancy. It is both. First of all, we want to meet that
recommendation. It is a good recommendation. We will get the
officers, the 200. We are on schedule to meet that. With the 85
agents that the panel recommended to go to the President's
detail, at this point, we have 30 that have already made that
transition.
Thank you for the work on the continuing resolution. We
will have funding to transfer more people into Washington, and
we will meet that 85 goal of agents on the detail.
Senator Shaheen. And you talked about how important this is
for a variety of reasons to have the staff that you need. Once
you reach those hiring figures, are you comfortable that this
is going to be the right size for the force? Or are you going
to do reevaluations along the line? How are you going to
determine that--when you think you have the number that you
need to do the job?
Mr. Clancy. We are going to constantly evaluate it, as we
always do. Our mission has expanded over time. We take on more
responsibilities.
I just created a new Directorate, an Office of Strategic
Planning and Policy. Under that Directorate, they will build
models: Where are we today? Where do we need to be in the
future? So that is one of the restructuring efforts. We are
doing a restructuring of our executive level. And to be honest
with you, we are leveraging the professionals that we have in
the Service and bringing our law enforcement personnel back to
their core mission.
LEAD AGENCY FOR EVENTS
Senator Shaheen. Just because I am curious when you talk
about planning for events like the pope's visit, the U.N.
General Assembly meeting in New York, who is the lead in charge
of command and control for those kinds of events? Is it the
Secret Service?
Mr. Clancy. Well, Philadelphia has been designated by
Secretary Johnson as a National Special Security Event. So in
those cases, when it is a National Special Security Event, the
Secret Service is the lead agency. New York and Washington have
not been designated this time. And in that case, we are working
with our partners, both local and State.
Senator Shaheen. What criteria are used in determining that
designation?
Mr. Clancy. First, the Governor of the State has to make a
request to Homeland Security, to the Secretary. They review
what the event is and the significance of it, the number of
people, how many dignitaries are attending.
So, certainly, the pope's visit in Philadelphia----
Senator Shaheen. The pope is a top dignitary?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, yes. And with more than 2.1 million people
expected to come to Philadelphia, that met the requirement.
STAFF RESTRUCTURING
Senator Shaheen. Can you talk a little bit more about the
modeling that you are looking at? I assume you are looking at
new ways of determining the size of the force and what you are
going to need in the future. And how far into the future are
you projecting as you are looking at that model?
Mr. Clancy. I think I may not answer this correctly, but
just let me say first, on the executive level, I want to just
explain our model there. Typically in the past, we had the
Director and a Deputy Director. The nine Directorates answered
to that Deputy Director. What I wanted to do was move this more
into a business and use a chief operating officer who would be
equivalent with that Deputy Director. That chief operating
officer position should be out this week, so we will do a
nationwide search to get a good chief operating officer.
Underneath the chief operating officer, we have the Office
of Strategic Planning and Policy led by a civilian. We have a
chief financial officer, who typically would answer to an agent
now is answering to the Deputy Director and eventually the
chief operating officer. But we are trying to leverage these
professionals, these subject matter experts, which we haven't
always done as well in the past. Even in our technical field,
we are using a chief technology engineer to hold a position
over that Directorate, whereas in the past, an agent has. We
just want to make good use of these professionals.
CONSULTING WITH FORMER DIRECTORS
Senator Shaheen. And as you are looking at some of this
planning that you are thinking about for both the short- and
long-term, have you consulted any former Directors of the
Secret Service to see if they have insight on what best
practices are or what they recommend you should be looking at
as you are thinking about those kind of projections? And can
you talk about the extent to which you might have consulted
with them and whether they have had helpful information to give
you?
Mr. Clancy. The former Directors have been very helpful to
me. From day one, they have reached out to offer any advice or
any counsel that I would request. They constantly reach out to
me.
In fact, next week, I have them all coming into my office.
We are going to meet for several hours and talk about where we
are today, where the future is for us. And I really respect
history. I want to hear their stories. They have all been
through similar types of incidents, as well as staffing issues,
as the chairman brought up before, with the Warren Commission
in 1975, the events that year. So I want to hear what they did,
how they built their staffs back up, and how they built that
morale back up.
Obviously, the key part we are going to talk about is the
professional responsibility. What did they do to get the point
across to their agents and their officers to ensure that there
is no misconduct, that we are professional at all times? I am
really interested in their comments.
Senator Shaheen. And will this be the first official
meeting you have had with all of the former Directors?
Mr. Clancy. Since I have been in the acting and full-time
positions, I met with a couple of them, to be honest with you,
a couple of them periodically since I have been here 5 months.
But this will be getting all of them together in a room and
really brainstorming where we are and where we need to go.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
LABOR SHIFT: INVESTIGATIONS TO PROTECTION
Senator Hoeven. Just one other follow-up question on having
adequate personnel, not only retaining adequate personnel, but
also the training. Talk a little bit about how you shift your
workforce from the protection mission, the investigation
mission, and back, and whether that gives you adequate help or
flexibility to help address this manpower issue.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You will see in the
budget, there is a labor shift of approximately $54.7 million
that is being shifted from investigations to protection. What
that does is provide staffing for campaign protection.
This campaign, we don't know how many candidates we will
have. We will have to go back to 2008, that model, because this
year, there is no incumbent.
Senator Hoeven. It looks like there will be quite a few.
Mr. Clancy. There probably will be quite a few, so we will
be very busy. And we have already started to structure some of
our teams. From the field, we will take supervisors and agents
from our field offices and leverage their training, their
abilities, their experience to work as a team with all these
different candidates.
In fact, some of them, as we fill them, they may work the
United Nations General Assembly in September, so they can get
used to working together.
Senator Hoeven. Does that create a problem for, then, your
investigative mission?
Mr. Clancy. Now more and more, we find ourselves with joint
task forces, assigned to joint task forces, working with our
State and local partners. Our Electronic Crimes Task Force, for
example, which we have 36 of them nationally and two on foreign
soil, if our agents get pulled out for protective assignments,
certainly, short term, the task force or the Electronic Crimes
Task Force, those personnel can keep those cases going. So our
investigative mission continues even as we shift over to these
protective assignments.
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
Senator Hoeven. So that leads right into the next line of
questioning I want to explore for a minute, and that is
electronics, cyber, unmanned aircraft, remotely piloted
aircraft (RPA). We had an issue recently with UASs or RPA
unmanned aircraft landing on the White House lawn. Talk about
what you are doing to make sure that you are getting ahead of
this curve, not only in terms of unmanned aircraft, but really
the cybersecurity and the technology issues, which are, of
course, a big concern nowadays.
Mr. Clancy. Right. I think there are two different issues
here. First of all, I will address the UASs, the unmanned
aircraft. We have been out front on this, I will say. We have
spent, thanks to the funding here, $2.5 million over the last
few years. Some of this is classified, so I won't go too far
with it. But obviously, we are working with our Department of
Defense (DOD) partners. We are working with the private sector
to address this issue.
It is a difficult issue in an urban environment. And the
first piece of it is detection. First, we have to know that
these aircraft are up in the air, and we have moved forward
significantly, even in the last few weeks. There was a media
alert that went out a few weeks ago that we were doing some
testing in the national capital region.
So we are very confident that we are moving in the right
direction. We have the right people working on this.
CYBERSECURITY
The second piece of your question, having to do with the
cyber challenges that we have in protecting the financial
infrastructure, we are very aggressive in that field. We have
some very talented people. One of the things we are most proud
of is the National Computer Forensics Institute, where we bring
in local police officers and state troopers and some judges as
well but mostly local law enforcement. We train them at this
facility, then we send them back out to their communities, and
now they are partners with us. They work on the Electronic
Crimes Task Force with us in their respective cities.
In fact, there was a recent case not too long ago where
there was a local police officer in Seattle who had attended
our institute in Alabama, and he took those skills and broke a
very significant case, the Roman Seleznev case, where he was
extradited from Guam about a year ago, I think it is now. But
they are working some very significant cases, our cyber agents.
Senator Hoeven. Do you have some way to test and verify
that you are ahead of the curve when it comes to unmanned
aircraft or to cyber? I mean, do you have a process whereby you
can actually have people within your agency or other agencies
to actually challenge your defenses in both areas to ensure
that they are up to the task?
Mr. Clancy. With regard to the UAS part of it, again, some
of that will be classified and I wouldn't want to get into it
here with what we are doing, what our capabilities are right
now. In terms of cyber, I think our history shows how we have
been very successful in stopping a lot of these transnational
cyber cases. Billions of dollars have been seized, or the
potential of that kind of damage has been stopped by our cyber
investigations.
Senator Hoeven. I think with your cyber mission, that lends
itself well to also having that defense. It just seems to me,
and we may have to talk about it in a confidential setting, but
you need to have some way to test your defenses. You have to
have some other agency or some entity that can test your
defenses when it comes to technology and test your defenses,
procedures, or capabilities, however you want to refer to it,
when it comes to some of the new unmanned aircraft as well.
They are both evolving so rapidly. Though given your
historical mission in terms of technology, you have a lot of
capabilities. We have to make sure that there is funding, and
that we have a way to test those defenses.
Mr. Clancy. Certainly, in the cyber world, there is
research and development. We have a great partnership with
Carnegie Mellon. We have an agent assigned down there, and they
constantly look for new avenues that these transnational
criminals are using to try to hack into our system. So we think
we are staying in front of the curve on a lot of that.
Senator Hoeven. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. When you and I met in my office, one of
the cases we talked about was a scheme by three Romanians who
hacked into Subway restaurants across the United States. The
resident agent in charge was from Manchester, and he worked
with the U.S. attorney and with the New Hampshire State Police
to help crack that case. That kind of cooperation between the
Secret Service and local law enforcement and State efforts I
think is very important.
Can you talk a little bit about the training? You talked
about the officer in Seattle who had gone to the training in
Alabama. Can you talk about the kinds of things they are
trained to look for?
Mr. Clancy. Yes. They are looking at computer forensics as
well as network intrusion. Again, the Electronic Crimes Task
Force, those graduates eventually go to, are really a
convergence of not only local and State law enforcement and
Federal agencies, but the private sector has representatives
there, and academia has representatives there, too. So it is a
really great, broad spectrum of people working together to try
to solve these cyberattacks.
Senator Shaheen. And the training that is held in Alabama,
is that run by the Secret Service?
Mr. Clancy. It is. We do the training, but it is a joint
venture with the State.
Senator Shaheen. The military has a separate Cyber Command
unit. DHS has a focus on cyber. Talk, if you will, about the
coordination that goes on, or is there any coordination that
goes on? And how do you determine who is the point of contact
on particular efforts that are underway?
Mr. Clancy. Well, for the Secret Service, we are protecting
the financial institutions, the financial structure of the
country. So that is our main focus. Some of the other agencies
may be involved in nation-state type of attacks. So there is a
clear delineation of responsibilities.
But there is plenty of work out there, so there is a great
relationship between us and Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI) and, certainly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). We work together and rely on each other's experiences.
Senator Shaheen. It is that coordination that I am really
interested in and trying to get at, because I think in a lot of
breakdowns, whether September 11, looking at the Charlie Hebdo
terrorist attack in Paris, one of the sad pieces of information
that has come out in the investigation of those kinds of
attacks is often that different law enforcement agencies have
different pieces of what was going on, but the communication
about that wasn't shared in a way that allowed people to get at
what was about to happen and how to prevent it.
So can you just talk a little bit more about the
coordination. For Cyber Command, for example, within DOD, as
they are looking at cyber threats, what would they share with
you all and vice versa, as you are looking at cyber threats?
Mr. Clancy. Well, there is the National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center from DHS. And as we develop
these cases, information comes down and is pushed out to the
private sector.
I will give you an example. Not too long ago in Syracuse,
New York, there was a small retailer that our agents noticed
was hacked into. They saw the malware. They alerted the
retailer. But then they also pushed that information out to the
private sector. And as a result of that, there was a much
larger retailer, which I won't name here, but they were able to
go into their systems with that information and see that they
had just recently been attacked by that malware. They were able
to nip it in the bud.
So we put out 400 to 500 notifications to the private
sector each year to help them discover if their systems have
been hacked into.
Senator Shaheen. I have been to the fusion center in New
Hampshire. I know how effective it is in getting out that kind
of information. But say something comes in on the defense side.
How would they get that information to the Secret Service?
Mr. Clancy. From defense?
Senator Shaheen. Do they pick up the phone and call? Is
there a regular meeting? Do they have somebody who sits in the
cyber center at DHS here who can share information? How does
the actual exchange of information happen? I mean, if that is a
classified response, that is fine. I am just trying to figure
out the coordination.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces are a
group of all representatives from all the different agencies
and DOD, so there is constant sharing. There is not an issue in
terms of getting the information out to people.
Senator Shaheen. And how often does that task force meet?
Mr. Clancy. That is constant. They are always typically
sitting side by side in the same office.
Senator Shaheen. Okay.
Mr. Clancy. There is constant communication. In fact, I
think, if I can recall the details of this, more on the cyber
side you had inquired about, there is an individual who I want
to say was in Chicago and there was a threat to a hospital. The
local law enforcement was part of the Electronic Crimes Task
Force, so he immediately got in touch with his partners in that
task force. They were able to look at the IP address from where
that threat came in, and they were able to track it back to a
foreign country. So that gave them some relief that that threat
was not coming from Chicago.
So there is that coordination. It happened very quickly,
and they could alleviate that fear of that threat.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER: COMMUNICATION
Senator Hoeven. Director, on the Joint Operations Center
(JOC), have you taken steps and are you confident that for any
incident that might occur at the White House, that they have
the communications capability to get everybody doing what they
need to be doing as part of a crisis response?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, from a communication standpoint,
absolutely. And I would invite you to come to our Joint
Operations Center at our headquarters to see it. But we have
representatives across-the-board within our agency, from
tactical to Uniformed Division to two technical people and
agents, so that everyone can address any issue around the White
House complex in a moment's notice, and there is that
communication.
Just as an example, our counter-surveillance people whom we
have out on the perimeter of the White House, if they see
something, they can call the Joint Operations Center and ensure
that everybody is aware there is a certain individual who may
be on the perimeter that they are watching. And then if they
stop someone and there are identifiers, and they start to
interview them and there is a concern here, there is a nexus--
they may have intent to do something bad. Now we have systems
in place where we can do a more thorough check for their
background, whether it is criminal background or suspicious
behavior. It's one-stop shopping to tie into other agencies and
find out if this individual has previous history.
Senator Hoeven. In both the March 4 incident, and I realize
that is still under investigation by the Office of Inspector
General, so we will get more information, but even still, based
on what we know already, in both the March 4 incident and the
September 19 incident, communications was part of the issue. We
have talked about just the need to communicate up the chain.
Well, that is something you have to work through your agency,
through the training, the policy and the procedure. And we have
talked about how you are working to address that, and that is
very important.
But we also have to talk about the fundamental capability,
the technological capability to communicate the way you need to
in any given circumstance. I want to make sure that you are
also addressing that technology side so that if the Joint
Operations Center needs to take control and get everybody
moving the same way, even when they may be remote from the
incident, that you have addressed that.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, September 19, specifically, what we found
was that the Joint Operations Center couldn't override an
officer speaking on his handheld radio. That has been
corrected. Now the Joint Operations Center, because they have
the best information, the most current information, they can
override the officer who is on his handheld radio.
On a larger look at this, the Joint Operations Center is in
need of enhancements, a restructuring. The infrastructure needs
to be rebuilt. It was built in 2008, and the equipment is
starting to break more often and getting parts is more
difficult. So that is in the budget as well this year. We are
trying to build up that infrastructure.
If I were to give you an analogy, it is like a race car
that is speeding along 24/7, a high-speed race car that
continuously has to stop for pit stops as tires go flat or
equipment breaks. As the car gets older, it breaks more often.
That is where the JOC is now. It is getting older and older.
There are more breakages. It is actually affecting our
encryption on the radios, trying to get parts to ensure that
our radio communication is encrypted.
We are still in good shape right now, but as we move
forward, we need to build out that infrastructure and improve
upon it.
Senator Hoeven. Is that addressed in this appropriation?
Mr. Clancy. It is. Yes, it is.
Senator Hoeven. And you are confident now for an incident
that occurs in one part of, for example, the White House
complex, an officer or agent reports up, that your Joint
Operations Center can fully take charge of the communications
and have everybody talk about that incident and the response?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Hoeven. Senator Shaheen.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN
Senator Shaheen. Senator Hoeven mentioned in his opening
comments the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children, which has had a special relationship with the Secret
Service. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about that
relationship, but then also talk about whether the funding, as
Senator Hoeven referenced, because OMB has cut all Secret
Service funding for the center again this year. But the
subcommittee in previous years has restored those funds.
Can you talk about whether this should be part of the
funding request through the Secret Service, or if it should be
funded some other way, and how you think the subcommittee
should address that?
Mr. Clancy. My understanding, at least, is that the
President's budget has suggested all these grants go through
the Department of Justice. I will tell you that we have a great
history with NCMEC. And by working with our local law
enforcement partners, we are able to offer forensic services.
We are able to offer polygraph examinations. So we think we
have a lot to offer.
It is obviously a very important mission for us. And we
have been doing this for many years. It is a great partnership,
so we would like to continue to stay involved with the group.
Senator Shaheen. How did that initial relationship begin
between the Secret Service and the center?
Mr. Clancy. I don't have the history for that. I want to
say it goes back to probably 1998. Maybe somebody can correct
me on that--1994 is when we started that relationship.
INVESTIGATIVE MISSION
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Finally, one of the things that we have heard in recent
days from some Members of Congress and some on the outside who
are looking at the challenges that have faced the Secret
Service, really since the incident in Cartagena, is that maybe
the investigative mission should be turned over to somebody
else. Maybe the agency is not able to do all of the areas of
responsibility that it has taken on, and other agencies should
step in.
Can you respond to that and whether you think that is the
way to resolve the challenges currently facing the agency?
Mr. Clancy. I would disagree strongly on that matter for a
couple reasons. First, the experience you get in the field is
so critical from an investigative standpoint taking that
experience to the protective side. You are dealing with people
on the street. You are sizing people up. You are getting a
chance to really see what their mannerisms are. That is in the
investigative field. You are doing the same thing on the
protective side.
On the protection side, also, when the President goes to
Chicago, that office takes control of that initially, until the
President's detail arrives. They do the initial work with the
locals and State law enforcement. They have those relationships
already. When you are working with somebody in investigations
and now you have to ask them for personnel to support a
protective mission, you already have that.
Even from an economical standpoint, say, for example, in
Chicago, there are maybe 50 agents who are already there who
can protect the President when he arrives there. You don't have
to reach out to Washington, if everyone is stationed in
Washington, and have them travel. That is travel money, hotel
money, per diem. We already have people in place there who have
great relationships already. They know the community, so we
rely on them tremendously.
Even in the cyber world, throughout the country, we have
our critical systems protection (CSP) agents. So when the
President comes again, and I will use Chicago as an example, if
he's going to a large indoor facility, that CSP group, they
will look at potential for any cyber attacks that might be
hitting the hotel. Is anybody trying to get control of the HVAC
systems or the elevator banks?
So we use these field offices in the protective mission as
well as in our investigative mission. They are so valuable. It
also gives us that surge potential to, like the pope's visit.
We can bring officers from any of these offices to support the
U.N. 70th as well as the papal visit.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Clancy. I am sorry, one thing I should mention, too,
most important, if we ever have a threat in Kansas City or
Chicago, the first people who are going to respond to that are
our investigators in the field. So we get immediate response.
And we can't farm that out. We can't ask somebody else to go do
that investigation for us. That is most critical.
TOP THREE PRIORITIES
Senator Hoeven. Okay, well, I think we will wrap up.
Director, I guess as just part of concluding, is there
anything else that you want to make sure that you bring up for
this hearing? I would just say, give me your top three
priorities right now. What are your top three priorities that
you have? And then is there anything else you want to make sure
we cover as part of this hearing?
Mr. Clancy. Well, my first priority would be staffing. We
are well on our way to regain our health there. Training, we
have additional work to do there, but we are, certainly, moving
in the right direction. And then within the Service, I would
say, morale.
We have to build this morale up, build up the trust within
the Service, so that we don't have people being concerned about
raising issues up through the ranks. We have to build that
trust. And I think as we get the staffing levels up, the
training levels up, and open these lines of communication, we
are going to be much better off.
ACCOUNTABILITY: TABLE OF PENALTIES
Senator Hoeven. And what is your message to your people,
given what has happened with these incidents? What are you
telling them? And what are you asking of them?
Mr. Clancy. People are going to be held accountable. We
have a very strict Table of Penalties. They all know what the
Table of Penalties are. They have been in place for about a
year. We are revisiting those penalties now to ensure that they
are fair but also severe enough in some of these cases.
But most importantly, if you don't perform in a
professional manner on-duty or off-duty, you are going to be
held accountable.
Senator Hoeven. And we have talked about the problem and
the need to address the problems. But I also, in closing, want
to thank you and the entire agency and all of your personnel
for the important tasks you do and want you to know that we
appreciate it and appreciate all of your people very much.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hoeven. Senator.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Shaheen. Well, I would just echo that and to recall
that the Secret Service has a proud history and tradition, and
has enjoyed the respect of the American public. Hopefully, the
challenges that it is currently facing can be addressed in a
way that again regains that respect. We stand ready to help
you.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department subsequent to the hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
drones
Question. In February, the Secret Service announced that it would
conduct a series of exercises around the Washington, DC area involving
the use drones. I have many concerns about the constitutional, safety,
and privacy implications regarding the use of drones by law enforcement
agencies. However, I also realize that the Secret Service has an
obligation to develop and test methods to counter the threats posed by
small drones.
In light of the drone that recently crashed on the White House
grounds, what steps are you taking to defend against the threats posed
by this rapidly evolving technology?
Answer. Since the plane crash incident on the South Lawn of the
White House grounds in 1994, the Secret Service Airspace Security
Branch and Technical Security Division have implemented numerous
policies and air surveillance technologies to secure the airspace
around the White House and the National Capital Region (NCR). With the
assistance of our interagency and military partners, the Secret Service
has restricted the airspace around the NCR with enhancements to the
pre-existing P-56 (prohibited airspace) restrictions, and the creation
of the Flight Restricted Zone and the Special Flight Rules Area.
The current threat posed by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) has
initiated a Secret Service evaluation and investment into current and
future technologies to identify and eventually mitigate against UAS
incursions into Secret Service protected sites and facilities. Specific
information on the steps the Secret Service is taking to defend against
threats posed by UASs is classified and can be provided separately in a
brief as desired.
Question. In addition to the use of drones by the Secret Service to
test possible countermeasures, does the Service currently operate
drones to assist its investigative or protective mission? If not, does
the Secret Service have plans to operate drones in the future?
Answer. The Secret Service's Counter Surveillance Division
currently participates in a working group dedicated to researching the
threats posed by drones, countermeasures to defeat their use in an
attack, and the use of unmanned aerial systems to enhance its
protective mission. To accomplish this research, the Secret Service is
testing defensive countermeasures around protected properties and the
potential use as an aerial observation platform.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Director. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., Thursday, March 19, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at a time subject to
the call of the Chair.]
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