[Senate Hearing 114-653]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:39 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Shelby, Collins, Murkowski,
Graham, Blunt, Daines, Moran, Durbin, Reed, Tester, and Udall.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary of Defense
STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY
ACCOMPANIED BY MIKE MCCORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
opening statement of senator thad cochran
Senator Cochran. The Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations
of the United States Senate will please come to order.
We want to welcome the Honorable Ashton B. Carter,
Secretary of Defense, and General Joseph F. Dunford, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This is our first review of the 2017 defense budget request
with these witnesses. The subcommittee understands the
challenges that we face in developing the content and setting
the limits of spending for the Department of Defense. We look
forward to our distinguished panel of witnesses and thank them
for their distinguished service to the U.S. military and our
country.
I will first recognize General Joseph Dunford in his first
appearance before the Defense Subcommittee and as Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are grateful for your leadership
and appreciate your appearance before our committee.
We also are pleased to have the Secretary of Defense,
Ashton Carter, who is a person we've gotten to know pretty well
over time in his distinguished service.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran
Good morning, the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations of the
United States Senate will please come to order. We want to welcome the
Honorable Ashton B. Carter, Secretary of Defense, and General Joseph F.
Dunford, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This is our first review of the fiscal year 2017 defense budget
request with these witnesses. The Subcommittee understands the
challenges we face in developing the content of the budget for the
Department of Defense.
We look forward to our panel of witnesses and thank them for their
distinguished service to the U.S. military and our country.
I am pleased to recognize General Joseph Dunford in his first
appearance before the defense subcommittee as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. General Dunford, we are grateful for your leadership
and appreciate your appearance before our subcommittee.
I am also pleased to have Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who
is a person we have gotten to know pretty well over time during his
distinguished service. Mr. Secretary, we ask you to proceed to make any
opening statements that you think will be help to the committee's
review of the Department's budget request.
Senator Cochran. Secretary of Defense, we ask you to
proceed to make any opening statements that you think would be
helpful to the committee's review of the Department's budget
request.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Chairman Cochran,
distinguished members, appreciate your having me here, Chairman
Dunford, and Under Secretary McCord today, and above all, for
steadfastly supporting our men and women, military and civilian
alike, who serve and defend our country all over the world.
Over the last 2 weeks, I visited many of these troops in
the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, and I couldn't be prouder
of what they are doing to advance our security, stand by our
friends and allies in those critical regions.
I am pleased to be here with Chairman Dunford to discuss
President Obama's 2017 defense budget, which marks a major
inflection point for the Department of Defense. In this budget,
we're taking the long view, we have to, because even as we
fight today's fights, we must also be prepared for what might
come 10, 20, 30 years down the road.
Last fall's Bipartisan Budget Act gave us some much needed
stability after years of gridlock and turbulence, and I want to
thank you and your colleagues for coming together to help pass
it. That budget deal set the size of our budget, and with this
degree of certainty, we focused on its shape, changing that
shape, in fundamental but carefully considered ways to adjust
to a new strategic era and to seize opportunities for the
future.
Let me describe the strategic assessment that drove our
budget decisions. First of all, it is evident that America is
still today the world's foremost leader, partner, and
underwriter of stability and security in every region of the
world, as we have been since the end of World War II. That's
thanks in large part to the unequivocal strength of the United
States' military, and as we continue to fulfill this enduring
role, it's also evident that we're entering a new strategic
era.
Today's security environment is dramatically different from
the last 25 years, requiring new ways of investing and
operating. Five evolving strategic challenges--namely, Russia,
China, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism--are now driving DOD's
(Department of Defense) planning and budgeting as reflected in
this budget.
I want to focus first on our ongoing fight against
terrorism, and especially ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant), which we must and will deal a lasting defeat, most
immediately in its parent tumor in Iraq and Syria, but also
where it's metastasizing, and all the while we're continuing to
help protect our homeland.
Let me give you a quick snapshot of what we're doing to
pressure and destroy ISIL's parent tumor in Iraq and Syria,
beginning with Iraq, which Chairman Dunford and I both visited
over the course of the last week. There, with our support,
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Ramadi; have been reclaiming
further ground in Anbar Province, mostly recently, the city of
Heet; and along with Iraqi Kurdish forces, have begun
operations to isolate and pressure Mosul, with the intent of
collapsing ISIL's control over that city.
As we've made this progress, and with momentum in this
campaign clearly on our side, last week in Baghdad, I announced
a number of key actions we're taking to continue accelerating
our campaign against ISIL.
We'll be placing advisors with the ISF, that is, the Iraqi
Security Forces, down to the brigade and battalion level to
help enhance decisionmaking and responsiveness. We'll be
leveraging Apache attack helicopters to support the ISF's
ongoing efforts to envelop and then retake Mosul. We'll send
additional HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) to
support the Iraqi ground offensive there. We'll provide
financial assistance to the peshmerga, up to $415 million, to
bolster one of the most effective fighting forces against ISIL.
And to do all this, we're going to need to adjust how we use
our forces already there and also bring in about 215 more of
them. As in the past, President Obama has approved all these
actions at my and the Chairman's recommendation.
We're also doing more in Syria. As the President announced
earlier this week, we're increasing U.S. forces there sixfold,
from 50 to 300. This comes after capable and motivated local
forces supported by our coalition retook the east Syrian town
of Shaddadi, severing the last major northern artery between
Raqqa and Mosul, and, therefore, between ISIL and Syria, and
ISIL and Iraq. These additional 250 personnel, including
Special Operations Forces, will help expand our ongoing efforts
to identify, train, and equip capable, motivated local forces
inside Syria to help isolate and pressure Raqqa. They will also
serve as a hub to incorporate partner SOF (Special Operations
Forces) from both longstanding traditional allies and Gulf
countries to augment our coalition's counter-ISIL efforts
there.
I should note, however, that Syria is an area where we need
your help, particularly in releasing $349 million in Section
1209 funds to help train and equip our partners on the ground,
which is a centerpiece of our strategy there.
All of this comes on top of what we've already done to
accelerate the military campaign, such as intensifying our air
campaign based on new intelligence, introducing an
expeditionary targeting force, and expanding the fight against
ISIL to every domain, including cyber and space. And as we're
accelerating our overall counter-ISIL campaign, we're backing
it up with increased funding for 2017, requesting 50 percent
more than last year.
But I have to say much still hinges on the nonmilitary
aspects of countering ISIL, particularly efforts to address
political and economic challenges in both Iraq and Syria.
That's critical to ensuring that ISIL stays defeated.
Next, two of the other four strategic challenges reflect a
return in some ways to great-power competition. One is in
Europe, where we're taking a strong and balanced approach to
deter Russian aggression. We haven't had to devote a
significant portion of our defense investment to this
possibility for a quarter century, but now we do.
The other challenge is in the Asia-Pacific where China is
rising, which is fine, but behaving aggressively, which is not.
There we're continuing our rebalance to the region to maintain
the stability we've underwritten for the past 70 years,
enabling so many nations to rise and prosper in this, the
single most consequential region of the world for America's
future. And as I saw in India and the Philippines at the
beginning of my trip, our engagement in the Asia-Pacific is
deeply appreciated and in high demand by enduring allies and
new friends alike.
Meanwhile, two other longstanding challenges pose threats
in specific regions. North Korea is one, and that's why our
forces on the Korean Peninsula remain ready, as they say, to
``fight tonight.''
The other is in Iran, because while the nuclear accord is a
good deal for preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, we
must still deter Iranian aggression and counter Iran's malign
influence against our regional friends and allies, especially
Israel, to which we maintain an unwavering and unbreakable
commitment, and also our Gulf partners, with whom I met last
week in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.
Now, addressing all of these five challenges requires new
investments on our part, new posture in some regions, and also
new and enhanced capabilities. For example, we know we must
deal with these challenges across all domains, not just the
usual air, land, and sea, but also especially in cyber,
electronic warfare, and space, where our reliance on technology
has given us great strengths and great opportunities, but also
led to vulnerabilities that adversaries are eager to exploit.
Key to our approach is being able to deter our most
advanced competitors. We must have and be seen to have the
ability to ensure that anyone who starts a conflict with us
will regret having done so.
In our budget, our capabilities, our readiness, and our
actions, we must and will be prepared for a high-end enemy,
what we call full-spectrum. In this context, Russia and China
are our most stressing competitors, as they have both developed
and continue to advance military systems that seek to threaten
our advantages in specific areas. We see them in Crimea, Syria,
and the South China Sea. In some cases, they're developing
weapons and ways of war that seek to achieve their objectives
rapidly before they think we can respond. Because of this, DOD
has elevated their importance in our planning and budgeting.
In my written testimony, I have detailed how our budget
makes critical investments to help us better address these five
evolving challenges. We're strengthening our deterrence posture
in Europe by investing $3.4 billion for the European
Reassurance Initiative, quadruple what we requested last year.
We're prioritizing readiness and training for our ground
forces, and reinvigorating the readiness and modernization of
our fighter aircraft fleet. We're investing in innovative
capabilities, like the B-21 Long-Range Strike Bomber, micro-
drones, and the Arsenal Plane, as well as advanced munitions of
all sorts.
In our Navy, we're emphasizing not just increasing the
number of ships, which we're doing, but especially their
lethality, with new weapons and high-end ships, and extending
our command elite in undersea warfare, with new investments in
unmanned undersea vehicles, for example, and more submarines
with a versatile Virginia Payload Module, that triples their
strike capacity from 12 Tomahawks to 40.
And we're doing more in cyber, electronic warfare, and
space, investing in these three domains a combined total of $34
billion in 2017. Among other things, this will help build our
cyber mission force, develop Next-Generation Electronic
Jammers, and prepare for the possibility of a conflict that
extends into space. In short, DOD will keep ensuring our
dominance in all domains.
As we do this, our budget also seizes opportunities for the
future. That's a responsibility I have to all my successors, to
ensure the military and the Defense Department they inherit is
just as strong, if not stronger, than the one I have the
privilege of leading today. That's why we're making increased
investments in science and technology, innovating
operationally, and building new bridges to the amazing American
innovative system, as we always have, to stay ahead of future
threats. That's why we're building what I've called the Force
of the Future, because as good as our technology is, it's
nothing compared to our people. And in the future, we must
continue to recruit and retain the very best talent. Competing
for good people for an all-volunteer force is a critical part
of our military edge, and everyone should understand this need
and my commitment to meeting it.
And because we owe it to America's taxpayers to spend our
defense dollars as wisely and responsibly as possible, we're
also pushing for needed reforms across the DOD enterprise, and
we need your help with all of them, from continuously improving
acquisition, to further reducing overhead and excess
infrastructure, to modernizing and simplifying TRICARE, to
proposing new changes to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, that
defines much of our institutional organization.
Let me close on the broader shift reflected in this budget.
The Defense Department doesn't have the luxury of just one
opponent or the choice between current fights and future
fights. We have to do them both, and that's what this budget is
designed to do, and we need your help to succeed.
I thank this committee again for supporting the Bipartisan
Budget Act that set the size of our budget. Our submission
focuses on the budget shape, making changes that are necessary
and consequential. We hope you approve it.
I know some may be looking at the difference between what
we indicated last year we would be asking for and what the
budget deal gave us, a net total of about $11 billion less. It
is provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act out of a total of
almost $600 billion. But I want to reiterate that we've
mitigated that difference and that this budget meets our needs.
And in this context, I have serious concerns with a proposal
from one of the defense committees to underfund DOD's overseas
warfighting accounts by $18 billion and spend that money on
programmatic items we did not request.
While I don't expect this committee to consider such a
proposal, I have to say that this approach is deeply troubling
and flawed for several reasons. It's gambling with warfighting
money at a time of war, proposing to cut off our troops'
funding in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria in the
middle of the year. It would spend money on things that are not
DOD's highest unfunded priorities across the joint force. It
buys force structure without the money to sustain it and keep
it ready, effectively creating hollow force structure and
working against our efforts to restore readiness. It doesn't
address the much bigger strategic risk DOD faces, of $100
billion in looming automatic cuts. In fact, it's a step in the
direction of unrattling the Bipartisan Budget Act, which
provided critical stability that DOD needs now and desires for
the future, and it's another road to nowhere with uncertain
chances of ever becoming law, and a high probability of leading
to more gridlock and another continuing resolution, exactly the
kind of terrible distraction we've seen for years that
undercuts stable planning and efficient use of taxpayer
dollars, dispirits troops and their families, baffles friends,
and emboldens foes. I cannot support such maneuvers as
Secretary of Defense.
The fact is DOD's greatest strategic risk is losing the
stability we got from the budget deal this year, and having
uncertainty and sequester return in future years. That's why
going forward, the biggest budget priority for us strategically
is Congress averting the return of sequestration, to prevent
that $100 billion in automatic cuts, so we can maintain
stability and sustain all these critical investments over time.
We've seen this done before, and that same support coming
together is essential today to address the security challenges
we face and to seize the opportunities within our grasp. As
long as we work together to do so, I know our national security
will be on the right path and America's military will continue
to defend our country and help make a better world for
generations to come.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ash B. Carter
purpose of this testimony
Chairman Cochran, Vice Chairman Durbin, Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me here today, and for your steadfast support
for the men and women of the Department of Defense (DOD), military and
civilian alike, who serve and defend our country all over the world.
I'm pleased to be here with Chairman Dunford to discuss President
Obama's fiscal year 2017 budget submission for the Defense Department.
At this time last year, we were all facing the bleak prospect of
looming budget sequestration, and the damage its return would do to our
people and our mission. I'm grateful that our country's leaders were
able to come together last fall to avert that dismal future, and reach
a budget deal that--after several years of fiscal turmoil and
reductions--has allowed for greater investment in all our elements of
national security and strength. That was what I urged since becoming
Secretary of Defense, including in last year's budget testimony before
this committee, and given the threat environment we face around the
world, forging that deal was the responsible thing to do. It allows our
military personnel and their families to know their future more than
just 1 year at a time, which they deserve. It lets our defense industry
partners be more efficient and cutting edge, as we need them to be.
And, perhaps most importantly, it sends a signal to the world--to
friends and potential foes alike--of our Nation's strength and resolve.
The President's budget submission accordingly adheres to that
budget deal--requesting a total of $582.7 billion for the Defense
Department in fiscal year 2017, for both the base budget and Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) funds combined. How we plan to invest
those funds, along with our planned investments for the next 5 years--
as detailed in the customary Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) that's
included in the President's budget submission--are critical to DOD's
ability to carry out our mission of national defense with the
excellence the American people expect of their military, which is today
the finest fighting force the world has ever known.
As you know, no one got everything they wanted in the budget deal--
I said last year that we needed to rise above our differences, and I'm
glad many members of Congress were able to do that--so in budgeting and
programming for fiscal year 2017, we had to make responsible choices.
The President's budget submission reflects those choices, and we need
your support for them. This is particularly true for prudent and
necessary reforms--some of which the Congress has long denied, in spite
of the cost to both DOD and to America's taxpayers. Indeed, while DOD
is grateful to this and the other defense committees for your support
for the budget deal, it is also the defense committees that in recent
years have been tying our hands on reform, as I will address later in
this testimony.
We should remember, however, that the budget deal only covered 2
years. Unless Congress addresses the years beyond it and heads off
sequestration, DOD will face $100 billion in cuts from 2018 to 2021,
which would introduce unacceptable risks. So Washington will need to
come together once again--not unlike last year, and 2 years before
that--to provide stability and protect our national security.
That's important, because in this budget submission, we're taking
the long view. We have to, because even as we must fight and win
today's fights, we must also be prepared to deter and if necessary
fight and win the fights that might come 10, 20, or 30 years down the
road. Last fall's budget deal set the size of our budget, and with this
degree of certainty we focused on changing its shape in fundamental
ways--making choices and tradeoffs to adjust to a new strategic era,
and seize opportunities for the future.
a strategic turning point for the defense department
Let me now describe the strategic assessment that drove our budget
decisions. First of all, it's evident that America is still today the
world's foremost leader, partner, and underwriter of stability and
security in every region across the globe, as we have been since the
end of World War II. As we fulfill this enduring role, it's also
evident that we're entering a new strategic era.
Context is important here. A few years ago, following over a decade
when we were focused on large-scale counterinsurgency operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD began embarking on a major strategy shift to
sustain our lead in full-spectrum warfighting. While the basic elements
of our resulting defense strategy remain valid, it's also been
abundantly clear to me over the last year that the world has not stood
still since then--the emergence of ISIL, and the resurgence of Russia,
being just the most prominent examples.
This is reflective of a broader strategic transition underway, not
unlike those we've seen in history following major wars. Today's
security environment is dramatically different--and more diverse and
complex in the scope of its challenges--than the one we've been engaged
with for the last 25 years, and it requires new ways of thinking and
new ways of acting.
Accordingly, five evolving challenges are now driving the focus of
DOD's planning and budgeting.
Two of these challenges reflect a recognition of--return to, in
some ways--great power competition. This is something we haven't seen
for some time, and that requires heightened focus given its potential
impact on our Nation and the world. The first such challenge is in
Europe, where we're taking a strong and balanced approach to deter
Russian aggression--we haven't had to devote a significant portion of
our defense investment to this possibility for 25 years, and while I
wish it were otherwise, now we do. The second is in the Asia-Pacific,
where we haven't faced great power competition since the end of World
War II, and where China is rising, which is fine, but behaving
aggressively, which is not. There, we're continuing our rebalance, in
terms of weight of effort, to maintain the regional stability we've
underwritten for the past 70 years, allowing so many nations to rise
and prosper in this, the single most consequential region for America's
future.
Meanwhile, two other longstanding challenges pose threats in
specific regions. One is North Korea, which remains dangerous to both
us and our allies--that's why our forces on the Korean Peninsula remain
ready, as they say, to ``fight tonight.'' The other is Iran--because
while the nuclear accord is a good deal for preventing Iran from
getting a nuclear weapon, and doesn't limit DOD in any way, we must
still deter Iranian aggression and counter Iran's malign influence
against our friends and allies in the region, especially Israel, to
whom we maintain an unwavering and unbreakable commitment.
Challenge number five, no less important than the other four, is
our ongoing fight to counter terrorism, and especially defeat ISIL--
most immediately in its parent tumor in Iraq and Syria, and also where
it is metastasizing, in Afghanistan, Africa, and elsewhere--at the same
time as we're protecting our homeland. While ISIL must and will be
defeated now, in the longer perspective and in our budgeting we must
also take into account that as destructive power of greater and greater
magnitude falls into the hands of smaller and smaller groups of people,
countering terrorists will be a continuing part of the future
responsibilities of DOD and other national security leaders.
DOD must and will address all five of these challenges as part of
its mission to defend this country. Doing so requires some new
investments on our part, new posture in some regions, and also new and
enhanced capabilities.
Key to our approach is being able to deter the most advanced
adversaries while continuing to fight terrorist groups. This means we
must have--and be seen to have--the ability to impose unacceptable
costs on an advanced aggressor that will either dissuade them from
taking provocative action, or make them deeply regret it if they do. To
be clear, the U.S. military will be ready to fight very differently
than we have in Iraq and Afghanistan, or in the rest of the world's
recent memory. We will be prepared for a high-end enemy--what we call
full-spectrum. In our budget, our plans, our capabilities, and our
actions, we must demonstrate to potential foes that if they start a
war, we are able to win, on our terms. Because a force meant to deter
conflict can only succeed in deterrence if it can show that it will
dominate a conflict.
We have this ability with respect to North Korean and Iranian
military forces, as well as in executing the military aspects of
countering terrorists, as we're doing now against ISIL. That won't
change, even as we know that military power alone cannot prevail
without capable and motivated local forces to sustain ISIL's defeat--
nor can the United States alone deliver a lasting defeat--against the
toxic ideology of terrorists like ISIL that have so little regard for
the lives of fellow human beings.
In this context, Russia and China are our most stressing
competitors, as they've both developed and are continuing to advance
military systems that threaten our advantages in specific areas, and in
some cases, they're developing weapons and ways of war that seek to
achieve their objectives in ways they hope would preempt a response by
the United States. Because of these facts, because the implications of
any great-power conflict would be so dire for the United States and the
world, and because of those nations' actions to date--from Ukraine to
the South China Sea--DOD has elevated their importance in our defense
planning and budgeting to ensure we maintain our advantages in the
future.
While we do not desire conflict with any of these nations--and, to
be clear, though they pose some similar defense challenges, they are
very different nations and situations--we also cannot blind ourselves
to the actions they choose to pursue. That is the responsible course of
action for the Defense Department. Our military is first and foremost a
warfighting force, and even as we seek to deter wars, we must also be
prepared to fight and win them, which is itself a key part of
deterrence.
Our military must be balanced with the proper size and capability
to defeat any attack against U.S. forces and our allies. And because of
the decisions in this budget, our military will be better prepared for
both present and future challenges, and better positioned to deter, and
if necessary fight and win, wars against even the most high-end of
potential adversaries.
As this budget addresses those five evolving challenges, it also
seizes great opportunities--in supporting new and innovative
operational concepts; in pioneering and dominating technological
frontiers, including undersea, cyber, space, electronic warfare, and
other advanced capabilities; in reforming the defense enterprise; and
in building the force of the future. I will address the investments
we're making to do so later in this testimony.
supporting the strength and wellness of today's fighting force
Before I address how this budget ensures we meet those challenges
and seize those opportunities, I want to first emphasize our enduring
commitment to supporting the men, women, and families of the world's
finest fighting force. Above all, this means exercising the utmost care
in decisions involving the deployment and employment of our troops. It
also requires devoting a significant share of our budget every year
toward supporting the people, military and civilian alike, who execute
DOD's missions around the world.
To ensure we have a force that's ready to carry out today's
missions, this budget invests in the four main things that every
soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine needs to do their job--the right
training; the right equipment; the right force size, meaning the right
number of people alongside them; and the right compensation.
The Right Training
In fiscal year 2017 and beyond, the budget makes critical
investments in training throughout the force to rebuild toward full-
spectrum combat readiness and continue recovering from the damage
caused by sequestration in recent years--though, it's important to
remember that restoring readiness requires not only sufficient funding,
but also time. The budget maximizes use of the Army's decisive action
Combat Training Centers, funding 19 total Army brigade-level training
rotations. It provides robust funding to sustain the Navy and Marine
Corps' current training levels and readiness recovery plans for fiscal
year 2017--optimizing Navy training while maximizing the availability
of naval forces for global operations, and fully funding the Marine
Corps' integrated combined arms exercises for all elements of its
Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. And, because recent operational demands
like the fight against ISIL have slowed the Air Force's return to full-
spectrum readiness, the budget increases funding--as part of a $1
billion increase over the FYDP to support Air Force readiness--to
modernize and expand existing Air Force training ranges and exercises
here at home, providing pilots and airmen with more realistic training
opportunities when they're not deployed.
The Right Equipment
The budget also makes important investments to provide our men and
women in uniform with functioning, well-maintained equipment so that
when we send them into the fights of today, they're able to accomplish
their mission and come home safely. For example, to address the Navy
and Marine Corps' growing maintenance backlog in tactical aviation, the
budget funds a 15 percent increase in F-18 depot maintenance capacity,
and it buys an additional 16 F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet fighter jets
between now and fiscal year 2018--providing a significant boost to the
health of the Navy and Marine Corps' 4th-generation fighter aircraft
fleet so it's ready and capable for today's missions. To help ensure
the Air Force has enough ready and capable aircraft for both combat
missions and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), the
budget funds improvements in the avionics and electronic warfare
systems of legacy fighter and bomber aircraft, and it supports the Air
Force's `get well plan' for remotely-piloted aircraft.
The budget also makes critical investments in every domain to
research, develop, test, evaluate, and procure the right technology and
equipment our military will need to deter and if necessary fight and
win full-spectrum conflicts in the future. I will detail those
investments later in this testimony.
The Right Force Size
The flexibility provided by last fall's budget deal allowed us to
maintain DOD's desired targets across the FYDP for end-strength and
active-reserve mix for our ground forces--without it, sequestration
likely would have forced further reductions. Therefore, the budget
stabilizes our total ground force end-strength by the end of fiscal
year 2018 with an Army of 450,000 active-duty soldiers, 335,000
soldiers in the Army National Guard, and 195,000 soldiers in the Army
Reserve--comprising 56 total Army brigade combat teams and associated
enablers--and a Marine Corps of 182,000 active-duty Marines and 38,500
Marine reservists. For the Navy, the budget continues to grow the size,
and importantly the capability, of the battle fleet--providing for
380,900 active-duty and reserve sailors in fiscal year 2017, and an
increase from 280 ships at the end of fiscal year 2016 to 308 ships at
the end of the FYDP. The budget also supports an Air Force of 491,700
active-duty, reserve, and National Guard airmen--maintaining 55
tactical fighter squadrons over the next 5 years, and providing
sufficient manpower to address high operating tempo and shortfalls in
maintenance specialists for both tactical fighters and remotely-piloted
aircraft.
The Right Compensation
In fiscal year 2017, the budget provides $177.9 billion in pay and
benefits--including healthcare, housing allowances, commissaries,
retirement, and other benefits--for DOD's 2.1 million military
personnel and their families. I will discuss DOD's proposed reforms to
some of these areas later in this testimony. To help make sure DOD is
competitive for the best talent, the budget includes a department-wide
pay raise of 1.6 percent in fiscal year 2017. This is an increase above
fiscal year 2016's pay raise of 1.3 percent.
It's important to note that of all the cuts we've taken to our
previously-planned budgets since the Budget Control Act was passed,
including cuts from sequestration--altogether so far totaling at least
$800 billion over 10 years--less than 9 percent of those reductions
came from military compensation proposals. This should make clear that
we've worked extremely hard to protect our people, and that we do need
to address some places where savings can be found, such as through
modernizing and simplifying our military healthcare system, which I
address later in this testimony.
More Than Military Readiness
Beyond ensuring the combat readiness of America's military, our
commitment to the force of today also encompasses what we're doing to
ensure the dignity of our people. We're putting a priority on
preventing and eliminating sexual harassment and sexual assault in the
military, investing $246 million in fiscal year 2017 to help support
survivors, reduce retaliation for reporting, and eradicate these crimes
from our ranks--and soon, DOD will deliver to Congress our strategy on
addressing retaliation, in particular. We're also helping provide
transition support and advocating for employment opportunities for
veterans, investing a total of $109 million in fiscal year 2017 so our
people can make the most of their potential and keep making a
difference when they complete their service in uniform. And we're
fostering greater diversity of our force, because our strength depends
on being open to the widest possible pool of talent that can meet our
standards--young Americans today are more diverse, open, and tolerant
than past generations, and if we're going to attract the best among
them to contribute to our mission, we ourselves have to be more
diverse, open, and tolerant, too. It's the only way to compete in the
21st century.
That's one reason why we're opening all remaining combat positions
to women, so that we have access to 100 percent of our population for
every position in the all-volunteer force and every American who can
meet our exacting standards has the full and equal opportunity to
contribute to our mission. That said, since the declaration that opens
all career fields to women is by itself not sufficient for their full
integration, I've asked the military services to mitigate any concerns
about combat effectiveness by incorporating my seven guiding
principles--transparent standards, population size, talent management,
physical demands and physiological differences, operating abroad,
conduct and culture, and assessment and adjustment--into their
implementation plans, which I have reviewed and approved and are now
being carried out. First and foremost, this means the services will
continue to apply objective standards for all career fields to ensure
leaders assign tasks and career fields throughout the force based on
ability, not gender. This may mean in some cases, equal opportunity may
not always equate to equal participation. Integration provides equal
opportunity for men and women who can perform the tasks required; it
does not guarantee women will fill these roles in any specific number
or at any set rate, as adherence to a merit-based system must continue
to be paramount. Also, we must incorporate concrete ways to mitigate
the potential for higher injury rates among women, and leverage lessons
learned from Iraq and Afghanistan to address concerns regarding
operating in areas where there is cultural resistance to working with
women. We must address attitudes toward team performance through
education and training, including making clear that sexual assault or
harassment, hazing, and unprofessional behaviors are never acceptable.
Our core beliefs in good order, discipline, leadership, and
accountability are foundational to our success in integration. And it
is absolutely critical that we embark on integration with a commitment
to the monitoring, assessment, and in-stride adjustment that enables
sustainable success.
Finally, it's important to remember that our commitment to the
force of today is not limited to those who serve in uniform. In fiscal
year 2017, it also includes $79.3 billion to support our civilian
workforce of 718,000 Americans--men and women across the country and
around the world who do critical jobs like helping repair our ships and
airplanes, providing logistics support, developing and acquiring weapon
systems, supporting survivors of sexual assault, and helping care for
our military's wounded, ill, and injured personnel. The budget includes
$7.7 billion to support our military families, because they serve too.
It includes $3.1 billion to help take care of our wounded warriors, to
whom our commitment is and must remain as strong as ever. And it
includes our enduring pledge to support the families of the fallen,
whose loved ones made the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of our country.
adjusting to strategic change
Another significant portion of our budget goes toward DOD's current
operations all around the world, in every domain, to help defend our
country, our allies, and our interests. Our budget's investments and
programming decisions in this area reflect my commitment to helping the
President address key national security challenges, and my priorities
for how we must adjust to strategic change--in countering terrorists,
whether ISIL, al-Qaeda, or others; in taking a strong and balanced
approach to deter Russian aggression; in operationalizing our rebalance
to the Asia-Pacific; in deterring Iranian aggression and malign
influence; in standing alert on the Korean Peninsula; and in addressing
threats from multiple directions in cyber, space, and electronic
warfare. We don't have the luxury of choosing between these challenges;
we must and will address them all, and not only be prepared across the
spectrum of conflict, but also for the possibility of multiple
conflicts in overlapping timeframes.
Countering Terrorism
It is clear that our mission of countering terrorists and other
violent extremists around the world will be with us for some time. The
Department of Defense has strong counterterrorism capabilities, and we
continue to deploy them to protect America.
Dealing ISIL a Lasting Defeat
We must and will deal ISIL a lasting defeat, which is why the
budget provides $7.5 billion in fiscal year 2017 for Operation Inherent
Resolve. This investment will be critical to continuing to implement
and accelerate the coalition military campaign plan that the United
States has developed, that our key allies support, and that focuses on
three military objectives: One, destroy the ISIL parent tumor in Iraq
and Syria by attacking its two power centers in Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa,
Syria; these cities constitute ISIL's military, political, economic and
ideological centers of gravity, which is why our plan has big arrows
pointing toward both. Two, combat the emerging metastases of the ISIL
tumor worldwide wherever they appear. And three, our most important
mission, which is to protect the homeland.
To eliminate the parent tumor in Iraq and Syria, DOD is enabling
local, motivated forces with critical support from a global coalition
wielding a suite of capabilities-ranging from airstrikes, special
forces, cyber tools, intelligence, equipment, mobility and logistics,
training, advice and assistance. It must be local forces who deliver
ISIL a lasting defeat, because only they can secure and govern the
territory by building long-term trust within the populations they
liberate. We can and will enable such local forces, but we cannot
substitute for them. Accordingly, the budget's investment in the
counter-ISIL campaign includes $630 million for training and equipping
the Iraqi Security Forces, and $250 million for enabling Syrian anti-
ISIL forces.
This is a worthy investment, as we've already started to see our
investments over the last several months start to pay off. For example,
it was Iraqi soldiers who took back Ramadi, reversing a loss the Iraqi
army suffered last spring. Our support to them included advanced
training, tactics, air support, and the portable bridges that carried
the Iraqi military across the Euphrates River and into the decisive
fight. Ramadi, like recent Iraqi gains in Bayji, Tikrit, and Sinjar,
demonstrates that the approach we are taking is having an effect as
Iraqis prepare for what will be a tough fight for Mosul. Likewise in
Syria, local anti-ISIL forces we've enabled with equipment and
ammunition have had successes in Tal Abyad, al-Hawl, the Tishreen Dam,
and Shaddadi. It is imperative to keep building on this momentum.
As we work with our partners to destroy ISIL's parent tumor in Iraq
and Syria, we must also recognize that ISIL is metastasizing in areas
like North and West Africa and Afghanistan. Having taken out ISIL's
leader in Libya in November, we are also now prepared to step up
pressure on ISIL in Afghanistan to check their ambitions there as well.
Finally, at the same time that we accelerate our campaign, so must
every one of our coalition partners--there can be no free riders.
That's why in Brussels this February I convened the first-ever meeting
of defense ministers from 27 other countries involved in the military
coalition to defeat ISIL to follow up after I personally reached out to
dozens of defense ministers to urge them to consider filling critical
military and non-military needs in the campaign. And I'm gratified to
report that coalition members responded to our challenge--and not only
NATO allies like Canada and the Netherlands, but also Gulf nations,
including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In sum, nearly 90
percent of the countries participating in the coalition's military
campaign have either stepped up their role or committed to do so in the
coming days. Their decisions to expand air operations, send more
trainers, provide logistical support, help with reconstruction, or make
other contributions will all help our coalition intensify the counter-
ISIL campaign and bring about ISIL's lasting defeat.
None of this changes the fact that our counter-ISIL campaign is a
hard and complex fight. We have tactical and strategic goals, but they
will take time--and, as is often said, the enemy gets a vote. For our
part, we will remain focused, committed, and resilient because this is
a fight we can, must, and will win, as our efforts to accelerate our
campaign are already producing real and promising results.
Ensuring Long-Term Stability in Afghanistan
After more than a decade of war in Afghanistan, we have to make
sure our gains there stick, which is why the budget continues to
support our two missions in Afghanistan--countering terrorism, and
training, advising, and assisting the Afghan National Defense and
Security Forces (ANDSF). In support of those two missions, the
President announced last fall that the United States will maintain a
continued presence of 9,800 troops through most of 2016 before drawing
down to 5,500 troops by January 2017. As I told our troops there when I
visited them this past December, while Afghanistan remains a dynamic
fight, we are determined to ensure that terrorists--regardless of
whether they're al-Qaeda or ISIL--never have or find safe haven there
again.
The budget provides $41.7 billion in fiscal year 2017 for Operation
Freedom's Sentinel--including funding to support our posture in U.S.
Central Command, the full funding of $3.4 billion to support the ANDSF,
and $1.4 billion to support other coalition partners. Importantly, this
allows us to continue strengthening and developing the ANDSF's
aviation, logistics, intelligence, and special operations capabilities,
with the intent of reducing their dependency on us over time. Also, in
addition to upholding our commitments to Afghanistan, the Afghan
people, and other partners, the budget reflects that the United States
will retain several key locations in 2016 and beyond, including
facilities in Kabul, Bagram, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. As we do so, the
United States will support the continuation of the NATO mission in
Afghanistan in 2016 and beyond, and continue to consult with our NATO
allies and partners to ensure that the U.S. and NATO missions in
Afghanistan are mutually supportive.
Our continued presence in Afghanistan is not only a sensible
investment to counter threats that exist and stay ahead of those that
could emerge in this volatile region; it also supports the willing
partner we have in the government of Afghanistan. It is in the United
States' interest to help them succeed, for the benefit of their
security, our security, the region and the world.
Establishing an Alternative to the Detention Facility at
Guantanamo
The Defense Department is resolutely committed to responsibly
closing the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay through the
establishment of an alternative detention facility. I share the
President's belief--and the belief of many in Congress--that doing so
would benefit our national security, which is why DOD will continue to
transfer Guantanamo detainees to other countries when we have
substantially mitigated any security risks to the United States.
Over the last 5 months, we completed transfers for 27 detainees,
bringing the population to 80. Like every transfer that came before
them, the decision to transfer these detainees happened only after a
thorough review by me and other senior security officials of our
government.
That said, because many of the remaining detainees currently cannot
be safely transferred to another country, we need an alternative to
this detention facility. Therefore, I support the President's plan to
establish and bring those detainees to an appropriate, secure,
alternative location in the United States. I appreciate that Congress
has indicated a willingness to consider such a proposal, and, in
accordance with the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, DOD
delivered that plan to Congress in February. We look forward to working
with Congress to identify the most appropriate design, legislative
foundation, and geographic location for future detention and to lift
the restrictions preventing the responsible closure of the facility at
Guantanamo.
Supporting and Maintaining our Counterterrorism
Capabilities
In addition to the specific funds outlined above, the budget also
reflects other investments we're making in DOD's posture to ensure we
can counter terrorism effectively wherever it challenges us. For
example, the budget sustains our robust funding for U.S. Special
Operations Command, allocating $10.8 billion in fiscal year 2017. To
bolster our partners in fighting terrorism, it requests $1 billion for
our Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund. And it supports the development
of DOD's transregional counterterrorism strategy, which I'd like to
outline now.
The terrorist threat is continually evolving, changing focus, and
shifting location, requiring us to be flexible, nimble, and far-
reaching in our response. Accordingly, the Defense Department is
leveraging the existing security infrastructure we've already
established in Afghanistan, the Middle East, East Africa, and Southern
Europe, so that we can counter transnational and transregional
terrorist threats like ISIL and others in a sustainable, durable way
going forward. From the troops I visited in Moron, Spain last October
to those I visited in Jalalabad, Afghanistan last December, these
locations and associated forces in various regions help keep us
postured to respond to a range of crises, terrorist and other kinds. In
a practical sense, they enable our crisis response operations, counter-
terror operations, and strikes on high-value targets, and they help us
act decisively to prevent terrorist group affiliates from becoming as
great of a threat as the main entities themselves. This transregional
approach is already giving us the opportunity and capability to react
swiftly to incidents and threats wherever they occur, and it maximizes
our opportunities to eliminate targets and leadership. An example of
this in action was our November strike on Abu Nabil, ISIL's leader in
Libya, where assets from several locations converged to successfully
kill him. To help implement this strategy, including in the fight
against ISIL and its metastasis beyond Iraq and Syria, the budget
includes an additional $175 million in fiscal year 2017--$9 million to
help bolster our posture in the Levant, and $166 million to help us
better address threats in North and West Africa in conjunction with our
European partners.
Because the accelerating intensity of our precision air campaign
against ISIL in Iraq and Syria has been depleting our stocks of some of
the GPS-guided smart bombs and laser-guided rockets we use against
terrorists the most, the budget invests $1.8 billion in fiscal year
2017 to buy over 45,000 more of them. Furthermore, DOD is also
exploring increasing the production rate of these munitions in our
industrial base--calling on America's great arsenal of democracy to
help us and our partners finish the job of defeating ISIL.
Also, because our remotely-piloted intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft play an important role in countering
terrorism, the budget includes $1.2 billion for fiscal year 2017 and
$4.5 billion over the FYDP to increase the number of around-the-clock
permissive ISR combat air patrols from 70 today to 90 by the end of
fiscal year 2018. Using a mix of MQ-9 Reapers, Extended Range Reapers,
and MQ-1C Advanced Gray Eagles--and comprising 60 patrols from the Air
Force, 16 from the Army, and 14 that are government-owned and flown by
contractors for the Air Force and U.S. Special Operations Command--
these investments will be critical as the need for ISR continues to
increase around the world.
Finally, because it helps us maintain a larger Air Force fighter
fleet that can drop more smart bombs in our counter-ISIL air campaign,
the budget also further defers the A-10 Thunderbolt's final retirement
until 2022. I saw some of the A-10s that are flying bombing missions
against ISIL when I was at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey last December,
and we need the additional payload capacity they can bring to the
fight. Accordingly, we are also changing the rate at which we will
phase out the A-10 as we approach 2022, as I will explain later in this
testimony.
A Strong and Balanced Strategic Approach to Deter Russia
Despite the progress we've made together since the end of the Cold
War, Russia has in recent years appeared intent to erode the principled
international order that has served us, our friends and allies, the
international community, and also Russia itself so well for so long. In
Europe, Russia continues to violate the sovereignty of Ukraine,
Georgia, and Moldova, and actively seeks to intimidate its Baltic
neighbors. In Syria, Russia has been pouring gasoline on a civil war,
fueling the very extremism Russia claims to oppose. At sea, in the air,
in space, and in cyberspace, Russian actors have engaged in challenging
international norms. And most disturbing, Moscow's nuclear saber-
rattling raises questions about Russia's leaders' commitment to
strategic stability, their respect for norms against the use of nuclear
weapons, and whether they respect the profound caution that nuclear-age
leaders showed with regard to brandishing nuclear weapons.
To be clear, the United States does not seek a cold, let alone hot
war with Russia. We do not seek to make Russia an enemy, even as it may
view us that way. But make no mistake--we will defend our interests,
our allies, the principled international order, and the positive future
it affords us all. That's why the United States is taking a strong and
balanced strategic approach in response to Russia's aggression:
strengthening both our allies and ourselves, including through
investments in this budget, while also giving Russia the opportunity,
if it chooses, to rejoin the international community and work with us
where our interests align.
Since Russia began its illegal attempted annexation of Crimea a
little over 2 years ago, DOD's budgets have made valuable investments
in reinforcing our NATO allies; for example, contributing to NATO's
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, and stepping up our training and
exercises under Operation Atlantic Resolve. This budget builds on that
significantly, and breaks new ground by re-envisioning and recommitting
to deterring--and, if deterrence fails, defeating--any aggression
against our allies in the future. The 20th century NATO playbook was
successful in working toward a Europe whole, free and at peace, but the
same playbook would not be well-matched to the needs of the 21st
century. Together with our NATO allies, we must write a new playbook,
which includes preparing to counter new challenges like cyber and
hybrid warfare, better integrating conventional and nuclear deterrence,
as well as adjusting our posture and presence to adapt and respond to
new challenges and new threats.
To further reinforce our NATO allies and build our deterrence
posture in the face of Russia's aggression, this budget significantly
increases funding for our European Reassurance Initiative to make a
total investment of $3.4 billion for fiscal year 2017--more than
quadrupling the $789 million that we requested last year--allowing us
to increase the amount of prepositioned equipment sets in Europe as
well as the number of U.S. forces, including Reserve forces, rotating
through Europe to engage with friends and allies. This increase
supports the persistent rotational presence of an armored brigade
combat team for 12 months out of the year, which will give us a total
of three brigade combat teams continuously present in Europe. It
supports more training and exercises with our European friends and
allies. It supports more warfighting gear, including forward-stationing
equipment for an additional armored brigade combat team by the end of
2017. It supports prepositioning equipment for a division headquarters
and other enablers in Europe, such that this equipment--along with
assigned Army airborne and Stryker brigade combat teams and Marine
Corps heavy vehicles and equipment already in Europe--will allow us to
rapidly form a highly-capable combined-arms ground force of division-
plus strength that can respond theater-wide if necessary. And it helps
strengthen our regional air superiority posture--among other things,
allowing us to keep an additional F-15C tactical fighter squadron based
in Europe, and also improve airfield infrastructure to enhance
operations for Air Force fighters and Navy maritime patrol aircraft.
In addition, the budget reflects how we're doing more, and in more
ways, with specific NATO allies. Given increased Russian submarine
activity in the North Atlantic, this includes building toward a
continuous arc of highly-capable maritime patrol aircraft operating
over the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap up to Norway's North
Cape. It also includes the delivery of Europe's first stealthy F-35
Joint Strike Fighters to our British allies. And, given Russia's use of
hybrid warfare--exemplified by the so-called `little green men' in
Ukraine--the budget supports more rotational presence of U.S. special
operations forces exercising in Europe.
The budget also significantly funds important new technologies
that, when coupled with revised operational concepts, will ensure we
can deter and if necessary win a high-end conventional fight in an
anti-access, area-denial environment across all domains and warfighting
areas--air, land, sea, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic
spectrum. While I will address these areas in greater detail later in
this posture statement, investments that are most relevant to deterring
Russia include new unmanned systems, enhanced ground-based air and
missile defenses, new long-range anti-ship weapons, the long-range
strike bomber, and also innovation in technologies like the
electromagnetic railgun, lasers, and new systems for electronic
warfare, space, and cyberspace. The budget also invests in modernizing
our nuclear deterrent.
Consistent with our strong and balanced approach, the door will
remain open for Russia to reassume the role of respected partner going
forward. While that would be greatly welcomed by the United States, and
the Department of Defense, it's up to the Kremlin to decide--first by
demonstrating a willingness to return to the international community.
Operationalizing the Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific
The budget also supports operationalizing our rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific region. In a region home to nearly half the world's
population and nearly half the global economy, for 70 years the United
States has helped underwrite a stable security environment that allowed
the people, economies, and countries in the Asia-Pacific to rise and
prosper. We fully intend to continue these efforts so that bright
future can be possible for everyone in this important region.
Accordingly, the budget helps improve DOD's geographically
distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable
posture in the region, through which the United States seeks to
preserve peace and stability, and maintain our strategic advantage in
an area that's critically important to America's political, economic,
and security interests. Investments in the budget reflect how we're
moving more of our forces to the region--such as 60 percent of our Navy
and overseas Air Force assets--and also some of our most advanced
capabilities in and around the region, from F-22 stealth fighter jets
and other advanced tactical strike aircraft, to P-8A Poseidon maritime
surveillance aircraft, to our newest surface warfare ships. They also
reflect how we're developing and implementing new posture initiatives--
in places like Guam, the Northern Marianas, the Philippines, Australia,
and Singapore, as well as modernizing our existing footprint in Korea
and Japan--and continuing to strengthen existing partnerships and
develop new ones, from India to Vietnam. And they reflect our efforts
to support and strengthen a regional security architecture that
benefits everyone--from strengthening and modernizing our alliances, to
bolstering our ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), to building the security capabilities of our many friends and
allies, who increasingly want to do more with us in the region. In
support of this effort, the budget fully supports our 5-year, $425
million Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative begun in fiscal
year 2016.
For this region, as it does with Europe, the budget also
significantly funds important new technologies to ensure we can deter
and if necessary win a high-end conventional fight in an anti-access,
area-denial environment across all domains and warfighting areas--air,
land, sea, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. These
investments--which I will outline later in this testimony--are
important for ensuring our forces can go anywhere, at any time, and
succeed in whatever mission we ask of them.
It's important to remember that America's rebalance has never aimed
to hold any nation back or push any country down. The United States
wants every nation to have an opportunity to rise, because it's good
for the region and good for our collective interests. That includes
China. As we welcome the growth and prosperity of all Asia-Pacific
nations, it is clear that the U.S.-China relationship will be complex
as we continue to balance our competition and cooperation. There are
opportunities to improve understanding and to reduce risk with China--
for example, we've agreed to four confidence-building agreements,
including one meant to prevent dangerous air-to-air encounters. But
there remain areas of concern.
For one, the United States joins virtually everyone else in the
region in being deeply concerned about the pace and scope of land
reclamation in the South China Sea, the prospect of further
militarization, as well as the potential for these activities to
increase the risk of miscalculation or conflict among claimant states.
U.S. military presence in the region is decades-old, has been
instrumental in upholding the rules-based international system, and has
laid the foundation for peace and security in the region. Our interest
is in maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight, full and
unimpeded lawful commerce, and that disputes are resolved peacefully.
To accomplish this, we will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever
international law allows. We also expect China to uphold President Xi's
pledge not to pursue militarization in the Spratly Islands of the South
China Sea.
Also, we are closely watching the long-term, comprehensive military
modernization program that China, as well as other countries, continues
to pursue. While there is no question that the United States retains a
decisive military edge in the Asia-Pacific today, China is investing in
capabilities to counter third-party--including the United States--
intervention during a crisis or conflict. These capabilities include
ballistic and cruise missiles of increasingly greater range and
accuracy, counter-space and offensive cyber capabilities, and
electronic warfare systems. To maintain a lasting competitive
advantage, DOD is taking prudent steps to preserve and enhance
deterrence for the long term. The budget reflects this, including with
investments to continue adapting our forces, posture, operations, and
capabilities to deter aggression, defend our allies, and sustain our
military edge in the Asia-Pacific.
Deterring North Korea
The budget also supports investments necessary to deter North
Korean provocation and aggression, ensure our forces on the Korean
Peninsula remain ready and capable to `fight tonight' if necessary, and
defend against threats emanating from North Korea against the United
States and our allies. This includes threats posed by North Korea's
nuclear and missile
programs, against which DOD is fully capable of defending the U.S.
homeland. Our position has been, and remains, that North Korea must
abide by its international obligation to abandon its nuclear and
missile programs and stop its provocative behavior.
North Korea's nuclear test on January 6th and its ballistic missile
launch on February 7th were highly provocative acts that undermine
peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. The
United States condemns these violations of U.N. Security Council
resolutions and again calls on North Korea to abide by its
international obligations and commitments. We are monitoring and
continuing to assess the situation in close coordination with our
regional partners.
DOD remains fully capable of fulfilling U.S. treaty commitments to
our allies in the event of a North Korean attack, and we're working
with our Republic of Korea allies to develop a comprehensive set of
alliance capabilities to counter the growing North Korean ballistic
missile threat. I spoke with my South Korean counterpart shortly after
the nuclear test, and reiterated our commitments as strong and
steadfast allies. Also, a few hours after the ballistic missile launch,
the United States and the Republic of Korea jointly announced the start
of formal consultations to discuss the feasibility of deploying a
Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the Korean
Peninsula at the earliest date.
Checking Iran's Malign Influence while Strengthening Regional Friends
and Allies
The Middle East presents a kaleidoscope of challenges, but there,
as everywhere, DOD's budget--and accordingly our actions and strong
military posture--is guided by our North Star of what's in America's
interests. Defeating ISIL in Iraq and Syria, which I discussed earlier,
is of course one of those interests, but amid this region's complexity
and uncertainty, we also have other interests of great importance,
which are to deter aggression; to bolster the security of our friends
and allies, especially Israel; to ensure freedom of navigation in the
Gulf; and to check Iran's malign influence even as we monitor the
implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That's why
DOD maintains tens of thousands of American personnel ashore and afloat
in the region, along with our most sophisticated ground, maritime, and
air and ballistic missile defense assets.
While the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action places significant
limitations on Iran that will effectively cut off its pathways to the
fissile material for a nuclear bomb, it does not limit in any way what
DOD can and will do to pursue our defense strategy in the region. It
places no limits on our forces, our partnerships and alliances, our
intensive and ongoing security cooperation, or on our development and
fielding of new military capabilities--capabilities we will continue to
advance in order to provide all options, as the President has directed,
should Iran walk away from its commitments under this deal. So if Iran
were to commit aggression, our robust force posture ensures we can
immediately respond and rapidly surge an overwhelming array of forces
into the region, leveraging our most advanced capabilities married with
sophisticated munitions that put no target out of reach.
This budget invests in maintaining those abilities going forward,
which is important, because Iran and its proxies will still present
security challenges. Iran supports Assad in Syria, backs Hezbollah in
Lebanon, and is contributing to disorder in Yemen, while still
directing hostility and violence to our closest ally in the region,
Israel. To continue to meet our commitments and enhance our cooperation
with our friends and allies in the region, especially Israel, the
budget makes critical investments--including $146 million to support
Israel in fiscal year 2017. This reflects our unshakeable commitment to
Israel and its security, with funding for Iron Dome, David's Sling,
Arrow, and other cooperative defense programs--not only ensuring that
Israel can defend itself, but also preserving and enhancing Israel's
qualitative military edge, which is a cornerstone of our defense
relationship.
Meanwhile, with critical investments in other areas, the budget
enables DOD to continue to advance our preparations, posture,
partnerships, and planning to preserve the President's options for any
contingency. It strengthens the regional security architecture in a way
that blunts Iran's ability to coerce its neighbors. And it helps us
stay ahead of the risks posed by Iran's ballistic missiles, naval
forces, cyber capabilities, and support for terrorists and others in
the region.
Addressing Threats in Cyber, Space, and Electronic Warfare
Even as we make adjustments in our budget to address the five
evolving challenges posed by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and
terrorist groups like ISIL and al-Qaeda, we are also making adjustments
to address emerging and increasing threats that transcend individual
nations and organizations. That's because, as we confront these five
challenges, we know we'll have to deal with them across all domains--
and not just the usual air, land, and sea, but also particularly in the
areas of cyber, space, and electronic warfare, where our reliance on
technology has given us great strengths, but also led to
vulnerabilities that potential adversaries are eager to exploit.
As I made clear when I released DOD's new cyber strategy last
April, we have three missions in cyberspace--first and foremost, to
defend our networks, systems, and information; second, to help defend
the Nation and our interests from cyberattacks of significant
consequence, working with other departments and branches of government;
and third, to provide options that can augment our other military
systems. Given the increasing severity and sophistication of the
threats and challenges we're seeing in cyberspace--ranging from ISIL's
pervasive online presence to the data breaches at the Office of
Personnel Management--the budget puts a priority on funding our cyber
strategy, investing a total of $6.7 billion in fiscal year 2017 and
$34.6 billion over the FYDP. This is a $900 million increase over last
year's budget. While these funds will help us continue to develop,
train, and equip our growing Cyber Mission Force, and also make new
technological investments to strengthen our cyber defenses and
capabilities--both of which I address later in this testimony--the
budget also reflects our efforts to make a fundamental shift toward a
culture of accountability in cyberspace, from instituting a DOD-wide
cybersecurity scorecard to monitor our progress to increasing
individual knowledge about practical ways to defend against cyber
intrusions. Our people understandably hold themselves to very high
standards when it comes to caring for, attending to, using, and being
accountable for the weapons they carry into battle, and we must do the
same when it comes to interacting with our networks and cyber
capabilities--not only among our cyber warriors and IT professionals,
but throughout the DOD workforce.
While at times in the past space was seen as a sanctuary, new and
emerging threats make clear that's not the case anymore, and we must be
prepared for the possibility of a conflict that extends into space.
This means that as we continue to ensure our access to space so we can
provide capabilities like reconnaissance, GPS, and secure
communications that enable and enhance our operations in other domains,
we must also focus on assuring and defending these capabilities against
aggressive and comprehensive counter-space programs of others. Though
competitors may understand our reliance on space, we will not let them
use it against us, or take it away. As I will discuss later in this
testimony, this budget makes important investments to do just that--
sustaining and building on the major shifts DOD began funding in last
year's budget submission--with a total of more than $22 billion for
space in fiscal year 2017. With the presence of so many commercial
space endeavors, we want this domain to be just like the oceans and the
Internet: free and open to all.
Finally, high-end competitors have also invested in electronic
warfare systems as a cost-effective way to challenge the United States
and try to blunt our technological advantage. By jamming our radars,
communications, and GPS, these systems would seek to disrupt the
integrated capabilities that allow our forces to identify, target,
reach, and destroy an enemy with precision. We cannot allow that to
happen, which is why this budget deliberately invests in buying more
electronic protection and resiliency for our current systems as well as
developing more advanced capabilities. I will address these investments
in more detail later in this testimony.
seizing opportunities for the future
The other significant share of our budget goes toward making sure
DOD will be ready for the future. Our budget's investments and
programming decisions in this area reflect my commitment to create a
Defense Department that's open to change and new ideas to ensure a
better future for both DOD and the Nation, and my priorities in doing
so. These are best understood through the four key pillars of this
commitment--namely, updating and refining warfighting strategies,
operational concepts, and tactics; driving smart and essential
technological innovation; building the force of the future; and
reforming the DOD enterprise.
While I will describe what we're doing in each of those areas
momentarily, the dynamic strategic environment I described earlier in
this testimony explains why such change is so important--not for the
sake of change, but for the security of this country. We cannot let
those challenges overtake us; we have to stay ahead of them and stay
the best. That's why as Secretary of Defense I've been pushing the
Pentagon to think outside our five-sided box.
Updating and Refining Warfighting Strategies, Operational Concepts, and
Tactics
Because our military has to have the agility and ability to win
both the fights we're in, the wars that could happen today, and the
wars that could happen in the future, we're always updating our plans
and developing new operational approaches to account for any changes in
potential adversary threats and capabilities, and to make sure that the
plans apply innovation to our operational approaches--including ways to
overcome emerging threats to our security, such as cyberattacks, anti-
satellite weapons, and anti-access, area denial systems. We're building
in modularity that gives our chain of command's most senior decision-
makers a greater variety of choices. We're making sure planners think
about what happens if they have to execute their plan at the same time
as another contingency is taking place, so they don't fall into the
trap of presuming the contingency they're planning for would be the
only thing we'd be doing in the world at that time. And we're injecting
agility and flexibility into our processes, because the world, its
challenges, and our potential opponents are not monolithic, and we must
be just as dynamic to stay ahead of them.
As I mentioned earlier, DOD is continuing to embark on a force-
wide, all-service transition from an era focused on counterinsurgency
operations to an era focused on the full spectrum of military
operations. While we do so for many important reasons, it's also
important to note that we don't want to forget or turn our back on
counterinsurgency, but rather enable most of our forces to be capable
of doing a lot more than just that. A smaller segment of our force will
still specialize in these skills, and DOD will retain the ability to
expand our operational capacity for counterinsurgency missions should
it become necessary.
The transition to full-spectrum operations is and will be coupled
with demonstrations to clearly signal it and make that signal credible,
which is key to conventional deterrence. The same is true for our
investments in capabilities--in new technologies, new operational
concepts, and also innovative ways for how we use what we already
have--these must and will be demonstrated as well. This is accounted
for in the budget, as are other investments we're making to recommit
ourselves to deterrence across the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels of conflict.
Recognizing the immense value that wargaming has historically had
in strengthening our force in times of strategic, operational, and
technological transition--such as during the interwar years between
World War I and World War II, when air, land, and naval wargamers
developed innovative approaches in areas like tank warfare and carrier
aviation--this budget makes significant new investments to reinvigorate
and expand wargaming efforts across the Defense Department. With a
total of $55 million in fiscal year 2017 as part of $526 million over
the FYDP, this will allow us to try out nascent operational concepts
and test new capabilities that may create operational dilemmas and
impose unexpected costs on potential adversaries. The results of future
wargames will be integrated into DOD's new wargaming repository, which
was recently established to help our planners and leaders better
understand and shape how we use wargames while also allowing us to
share the insights we gain across the defense enterprise.
Driving Smart and Essential Technological Innovation
The investments this budget makes in technology and innovation, and
the bridges it helps build and rebuild, are critical to staying ahead
of future threats in a changing world. When I began my career, most
technology of consequence originated in America, and much of that was
sponsored by the government, especially DOD. Today, not only is much
more technology commercial, but the competition is global, with other
countries trying to catch up with the advances we've enjoyed for
decades in areas like precision-guided munitions, stealth, cyber, and
space. So now, as we have in the past, DOD must invest to ensure
America pioneers and dominates these and other technological frontiers.
DOD is therefore pursuing new technology development along with new
operational concepts, and new organizational constructs--all of which
are reflected in or supported by this budget submission--to maintain
our military's technological superiority and ensure we always have an
operational advantage over any potential adversary. How we do this is
important, because while the Cold War arms race was characterized
mostly by strength, with the leader simply having more, bigger, or
better weapons, this era of technological competition is uniquely
characterized by an additional variable of speed, such that leading the
race now depends on who can out-innovate faster than everyone else.
It's no longer just a matter of what we buy; what also matters is how
we buy things, how quickly we buy them, whom we buy them from, and how
quickly and creatively we're able to upgrade them and repurpose them to
be used in different and innovative ways to stay ahead of future
threats.
In particular, this means leveraging the capability of current and
emerging technologies, including commercial technologies wherever
appropriate. It means demonstrating and seeding investments in new
capabilities and concepts to counter advanced anti-access, area-denial
challenges across all domains and in every region where they persist--a
particular focus of DOD's effort to develop a third offset strategy.
And also, it means investing in and operationalizing our security by
leveraging advances in cyber, space, electronic warfare, biotechnology,
artificial intelligence, and other areas. Our technologies and
capabilities must be able to operate so that no matter what any of our
enemies might throw at them, they are able to defeat attempts to be
hacked.
Accordingly, this budget invests a total of $183.9 billion in
fiscal year 2017, and $951 billion over the FYDP, to help research,
develop, test, evaluate, and procure the right technology and
capabilities our military will need to deter and if necessary fight and
win full-spectrum conflicts in the future. For the second year in a
row, the budget increases funding for our research and development
accounts, which total $71.8 billion in fiscal year 2017. That includes
$12.5 billion specifically invested in science and technology to
support groundbreaking work happening in the military services, in our
dozens of DOD labs and engineering centers across the country, and in
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop and
advance disruptive technologies and capabilities in areas like undersea
systems, hypersonics, electronic warfare, big data analytics, advanced
materials, energy and propulsion, robotics, autonomy, and advanced
sensing and computing.
At the same time that DOD is making investments in technologies
themselves, we're also investing in building and rebuilding bridges
with America's vibrant, innovative technology community and forging
more connections with the commercial technology base--and it's
reflected in our budget. In fiscal year 2017, this includes $45 million
for our Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental (DIUx), which we opened in
Silicon Valley last August to build relationships and better tap into
the region's innovation ecosystem. It also includes $40 million for our
pilot program with the independent, non-profit startup backer In-Q-Tel,
leveraging its venture capital model to help find innovative solutions
for some of our most challenging problems. And it includes $137 million
to support our public-private partnership-funded Manufacturing
Innovation Institutes, including the one focused on flexible hybrid
electronics that I announced in Silicon Valley last August. In all
these areas, similar to how DOD's historic investments in things like
GPS and the Internet later went on to yield great benefits for not just
our security but also our society, we hope the investments we're making
in some of these fields along with our partners in the technology
industry will lead to incredible advances that today we can only
imagine.
Importantly, technological innovation must be done in concert with
operational innovation. It's not enough to have or create new
technologies or weapon systems; how they are used is key. The budget
reflects work DOD has been undertaking in this area though multiple
lines of effort. First, there's our Long-Range Research and Development
Planning Program--an effort named after the mid-1970s project that
brought together a cross-section of military, academic, and private-
sector experts who paved the way to a future of GPS-guided smart bombs,
battle networks, and stealth--and also our Advanced Capability and
Deterrence Panel. Both focus on identifying and charting longer-term,
leap-ahead investments for strategies and capabilities that will give
us an advantage several decades from now, and together they make up
nearly 60 percent of our science and technology investments in this
budget submission.
Now, to focus on maintaining our near-term advantage, DOD has an
office that we don't often talk about, but that I want to highlight
today. It's called the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO). I created
SCO in 2012 when I was Deputy Secretary of Defense to reimagine
existing DOD, intelligence community, and commercial systems by giving
them new roles and game-changing capabilities to confound potential
opponents. I picked a talented physicist to lead it. SCO is incredibly
innovative, but also has the rare virtue of rapid development and the
even rarer charter to keep current capabilities viable for as long as
possible. So it's good for both troops and taxpayers alike.
SCO is focused on thinking differently, which is incredibly
important to innovation when it comes to technological capabilities.
Thinking differently put us in space and on the moon. It put computers
in our pockets and information at our fingertips. It's how we came to
have airplanes that take off from the decks of ships, nuclear
submarines beneath the seas, and satellite networks that take pictures
of the world and show us where we are in it. And this kind of bold,
innovative thinking isn't lost to history. It's happening every day, in
SCO and many other places throughout the Department of Defense.
Most people don't often hear about it because most of its work is
classified; however, SCO has been a tremendously useful part of DOD.
It's received large support from all the services, as well as our
combatant commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the intelligence
community, and also Congress--with its budget growing from $140 million
in its first year, fiscal year 2014, to reaching $845 million for
fiscal year 2017 in this year's budget submission. To show the return
we're getting on those investments, I'd like to highlight some projects
SCO has been working on that we're funding in the budget.
First is a project focused on advanced navigation, where SCO is
taking the same kinds of micro-cameras and sensors that are littered
throughout our smartphones today, and putting them on our Small
Diameter Bombs to augment their targeting capabilities. This will
eventually be a modular kit that will work with many other payloads--
enabling off-network targeting through commercial components that are
small enough to hold in your hand.
Another SCO project uses swarming, autonomous vehicles in all sorts
of ways, and in multiple domains. For the air, they've developed micro-
drones that are really fast, and really resilient--they can fly through
heavy winds and be kicked out the back of a fighter jet moving at Mach
0.9, like they did during an operational exercise in Alaska last year,
or they can be thrown into the air by a soldier in the middle of the
Iraqi desert. And for the water, they've developed self-driving boats,
which can network together to do all sorts of missions, from fleet
defense to close-in surveillance--including around an island, real or
artificial, without putting our sailors at risk. Each one leverages the
wider world of technology. For example, the micro-drones use a lot of
commercial components and 3D printing. And the boats build on some of
the same artificial intelligence algorithms that NASA's Jet Propulsion
Laboratory wrote for the Mars lander.
SCO also has a project on gun-based missile defense, where we're
taking the same hypervelocity smart projectile developed for the
electromagnetic railgun, and using it for point defense by firing it
with artillery we already have in our inventory--including the five-
inch guns at the front of every Navy destroyer, and also the hundreds
of Army Paladin self-propelled howitzers. This way, instead of spending
more money on more expensive interceptors, we can turn past offense
into future defense--defeating incoming missile raids at much lower
cost per round, and thereby imposing higher costs on the attacker. In
fact, we tested the first shots of the hypervelocity projectile out of
a Paladin earlier this year, and we found that it also significantly
increases the range.
There's also a SCO project that we're calling the arsenal plane,
which takes one of our oldest aircraft platforms, and turns it into a
flying launch pad for all sorts of different conventional payloads. In
practice, the arsenal plane will function as a very large airborne
magazine, networked to fifth-generation aircraft that act as forward
sensor and targeting nodes--essentially combining different systems
already in our inventory to create wholly new capabilities.
The last SCO project I want to highlight is how we're creating a
brand new capability with the SM-6 missile, an interceptor that's
designed to launch from our Navy's surface ships and be highly
maneuverable and aerodynamic to stop incoming ballistic and cruise
missiles in the atmosphere. It's one of our most modern and capable
munitions--and thanks to work done by SCO, we've been able to modify
the SM-6 so that in addition to missile defense, it can also target
enemy ships at sea. This new anti-ship mode makes the SM-6 doubly
useful, taking the defensive speed and maneuverability already sitting
in our Aegis destroyers' launch cells and leveraging it for offensive
surface warfare lethality. That makes it a potent new capability for
our fleet, and also a good deal for the taxpayer by using the same
thing twice. We already know this works; it was fully tested this past
January to great success. And, as I will address later in this
testimony, this new operational concept is strongly reflected in our
2017 budget.
Those are just a few projects that SCO has worked on so far--and
they're working on a lot more, including some surprising ones.
Now, with all of that in mind--from why we need to invest in
technological innovation, to how we're doing it--let me address the
specific investments this budget makes in technologies and capabilities
to deter, and if necessary fight and win, a full-spectrum conventional
war against even the most high-end of adversaries. In concert, they
will help maintain our military's edge both under and on the sea, on
land, in the air, in space, in cyber and electronic warfare, and in the
modernization and maintenance of our nuclear enterprise.
Maritime Investments
In the maritime domain, the budget refocuses our Navy on building
lethality for high-end conflicts while continuing to grow the battle
fleet to meet, but not exceed, the department's warfighting posture
requirement of 308 ships. Our investments reflect an emphasis on
payloads over platforms, on the ability to strike from sanctuary
quickly so that no target is out of reach, and on closing capability
shortfalls that have developed over the last several years.
First, the budget maximizes our undersea advantage--leveraging and
growing our commanding lead in an area where the U.S. military should
be doing more, not less, going forward. It provides funding for
important payloads and munitions, including $170.8 million in fiscal
year 2017 and $1.5 billion over the FYDP for an improved heavyweight
torpedo as well as research and development for an advanced lightweight
torpedo to stay ahead of existing and emerging undersea challenges. It
includes $5.2 billion in fiscal year 2017 and $29.4 billion over the
FYDP to buy nine Virginia-class attack submarines over the next 5
years; four of those submarines--up from three in last year's budget--
will be equipped with the versatile Virginia Payload Module that can
more than triple each submarine's strike capacity from 12 Tomahawk land
attack missiles to 40. The budget also invests $500 million in fiscal
year 2017, and $3.4 billion over the FYDP, to upgrade 49 of our
submarines' combat systems and enhance underwater acoustics on nine of
our existing Virginia-class submarines. It increases funding for
unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) by over $100 million in fiscal year
2017, part of a total $173 million in fiscal year 2017 and $1.2 billion
over the FYDP that invests in, among other areas, rapid prototyping of
UUVs in multiple sizes and diverse payloads--which is important, since
UUVs can operate in shallow waters where manned submarines cannot. And
it includes $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2017 and $6.4 billion over the
FYDP to continue procuring the advanced P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol
and surveillance aircraft. Together, all these investments--totaling
$8.2 billion in fiscal year 2017, and $41.9 billion over the next 5
years--will ensure we continue to have the most lethal undersea and
anti-submarine force in the world.
Second, the budget makes significant investments to bolster the
lethality of our surface fleet forces, so they can deter and if
necessary prevail in a full-spectrum conflict against even the most
advanced adversaries. It invests $597 million in fiscal year 2017, and
$2.9 billion over the FYDP, to maximize production of the SM-6 missile,
one of our most modern and capable munitions, procuring 125 in fiscal
year 2017 and 625 over the next 5 years--and this investment is doubly
important given the SM-6's new anti-ship capability. It also invests in
developing and acquiring several other key munitions and payloads--
including $1 billion in fiscal year 2017, and $5.8 billion over the
FYDP, for all variants of the SM-3 high-altitude ballistic missile
interceptor; $340 million in fiscal year 2017, and $925 million over
the FYDP, for the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile; $221 million in fiscal
year 2017, and $1.4 billion over the FYDP, for the Advanced Anti-
Radiation Guided Missile, including its extended range version; and
$435 million in fiscal year 2017, as part of $2.1 billion over the
FYDP, for the most advanced variant of the Tactical Tomahawk land-
attack missile, which once upgraded can also be used for maritime
strike.
Third, the budget reflects decisions we've made to ensure that we
look at our overall warfighting posture, rather than only the presence
that contributes to it, in determining whether our maritime forces can
deter and if necessary fight and win a full-spectrum conflict. Having
grown the size and the capability of our surface and subsurface fleet
over the last 7 years, this budget will continue to do both. It will
ensure we meet the department's 308-ship posture requirement--indeed,
growing the battle fleet to 308 ships by the end of the FYDP--and it
will make our naval forces as a whole more capable, more survivable,
and more lethal than they would have been otherwise.
The budget invests $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2017 and $18.3
billion over the FYDP to continue to buy two DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class
guided missile destroyers each year over the next 5 years--a total of
10 over the FYDP--as well as $400 million in fiscal year 2017 and $2.8
billion over the FYDP for modernizing our destroyers, 12 of which will
also receive upgrades to their combat systems. It continues to support
11 carrier strike groups, investing $2.7 billion in fiscal year 2017
and $13.5 billion over the FYDP for new construction of Ford-class
carriers, as well as $2 billion in fiscal year 2017 and $8.9 billion
over the FYDP for midlife reactor refueling and overhauls on our
current carrier fleet. And, as I will discuss in the reform section of
this testimony, it supports modernizing our guided missile cruisers--
providing them with more capability and a longer lifespan while freeing
up significant funds that can be put toward a variety of uses.
I'd like to now address the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), where we
made an important tradeoff so we could put more money in submarines,
Navy fighter jets, and many other critical areas. As such, the budget
takes a new approach to the LCS and its associated frigate--buying a
total of 40, not the 52 or more that were planned starting back in
2002. Let me explain why. First, to be clear, we're investing in LCS
and frigates because we need the capability they provide, and for
missions like minesweeping and anti-submarine warfare, they're expected
to be very capable. But now, in 2016, we have to further balance our
shipbuilding investments among guided missile destroyers and Virginia-
class attack submarines. We face competitors who are challenging us on
the open ocean with new submarines, ships, aircraft, and missiles--
advanced capabilities we haven't had to contend with in a long time,
meaning that we must now invest more in higher-end capabilities across
our own fleet. The department's warfighting analysis called for 40
small surface combatants, so that's how many we're buying. Over the
next 10 years, this will let us invest almost $8 billion more into
highly lethal ships and capabilities--all the while increasing both the
number of ships and the capability of our battle fleet. While this will
somewhat reduce the number of LCS available for presence operations,
that need will be met by higher-end ships, and it will ensure that the
warfighting forces in our submarine, surface, and aviation fleets have
the necessary capabilities to defeat even our most advanced potential
adversaries. Under this rebalanced plan, we will still achieve our 308-
ship goal within the next 5 years, and we will be better positioned as
a force to effectively deter, and if necessary defeat, even the most
advanced potential adversaries.
Land Investments
To ensure our ground forces have the capabilities to counter
emerging threats and the demonstrated ability to deter and if necessary
fight and win a full-spectrum conflict, the budget will help provide
our Army, Marine Corps, and special operations forces with greater
lethality in several forms. This includes a next-generation shoulder-
launched weapon, a life extension program as well as a replacement for
the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) that can be used for improved
counter-battery and long-range strike, and increased firepower for
Stryker armored fighting vehicles. Together these investments comprise
$780 million in fiscal year 2017 and $3.6 billion over the FYDP.
Additionally, the budget invests $735 million in fiscal year 2017,
and $6.8 billion over the FYDP, in the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
intended to replace the military's Humvees--procuring more than 2,000
vehicles in fiscal year 2017, and a total of more than 17,700 vehicles
over the next 5 years. It also invests $159 million in fiscal year
2017, and $1.7 billion over the FYDP, in the Amphibious Combat Vehicle,
which will replace the Marine Corps' aging Amphibious Assault Vehicle--
helping procure over 200 vehicles over the next 5 years. And, as I
discuss later in the reform section of this testimony, it supports the
Army's ongoing Aviation Restructure Initiative--investing $1.1 billion
for 52 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters in fiscal year 2017, and $5.7
billion for 275 Apaches over the FYDP, as well as $1 billion for 36 UH-
60 Black Hawk utility helicopters in fiscal year 2017, and $5.6 billion
for 268 Black Hawks over the FYDP.
The budget also invests $9.1 billion for missile defense in fiscal
year 2017, and $47.1 billion over the FYDP. This reflects important
decisions we've made to strengthen and improve our missile defense
capabilities--particularly to counter the anti-access, area-denial
challenge of increasingly precise and increasingly long-range ballistic
and cruise missiles being fielded by several nations in multiple
regions of the world. Instead of spending more money on a smaller
number of more traditional and expensive interceptors, we're funding a
wide range of defensive capabilities that can defeat incoming missile
raids at much lower cost per round, and thereby impose higher costs on
the attacker. The budget invests in improvements that complicate enemy
targeting, harden our bases, and leverage gun-based point defense
capabilities--from upgrading the Land-Based Phalanx Weapons System, to
developing hypervelocity smart projectiles that as I mentioned earlier
can be fired not only from the five-inch guns at the front of every
Navy destroyer, but also the hundreds of Army M109 Paladin self-
propelled howitzers. Additionally, the budget's missile defense
investments maintain DOD's commitment to improving our homeland and
theater defense systems--as we're increasing the number of deployed
Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) from 30 to 44, redesigning the exo-
atmospheric kill vehicle to improve the reliability of the Ground-Based
Midcourse Defense system, and funding improvements and follow-on
concept development for the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
system. Specifically, we're investing $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2017
and $5.8 billion over the FYDP for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
program; for THAAD, we're spending $640 million in fiscal year 2017 and
$3.6 billion over the FYDP, which includes procuring 24 interceptors in
fiscal year 2017 and 149 over the FYDP; and, to research, develop, and
deploy a new Long-Range Discrimination Radar, we're investing $317
million in fiscal year 2017 and $1 billion over the FYDP.
Air Investments
To ensure the U.S. military's continued air superiority and global
reach, the budget makes important investments in several areas--and not
just platforms, but also payloads. For example, it invests $2.4 billion
in fiscal year 2017 and $8 billion over the FYDP in a wide range of
versatile munitions--including buying more Small Diameter Bombs, JDAMs,
Hellfires, and AIM-120D air-to-air missiles. We are also developing
hypersonics that can fly over five times the speed of sound.
The budget continues to buy the stealthy, fifth-generation F-35
Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. It includes $10.1 billion in fiscal
year 2017 and $56.3 billion over the FYDP to procure a total of 404 F-
35s across the force through 2021--43 F-35As for the Air Force in
fiscal year 2017 as part of 243 to be purchased over the FYDP, 16 F-
35Bs for the Marine Corps in fiscal year 2017 as part of 97 to be
purchased over the FYDP, and 4 F-35Cs for the Navy and Marine Corps in
fiscal year 2017 as part of 64 to be purchased over the FYDP. This
represents a slight deferral in Air Force F-35 procurement, which we're
doing in order to free up funds to maintain a larger-size Air Force of
55 tactical fighter squadrons, and to improve avionics, radar, and
electronic warfare systems in legacy bomber and fighter aircraft like
the F-15, F-16, B-1, B-2, and B-52 fleets--increasing their lethality,
survivability, and therefore usefulness in a full-spectrum conflict. At
the same time, it also represents an increase in the Navy and Marine
Corps' F-35 procurement, which is important to ensure sufficient high-
end capability and numbers in our aircraft carriers' tactical fighter
fleet.
Additionally, the budget invests $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2017
and $12.1 billion over the FYDP for continued development of the B-21
Long-Range Strike Bomber, as well as $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2017
and $15.7 billion over the FYDP to continue upgrading our aerial tanker
fleet--buying 15 KC-46A Pegasus refueling tankers in fiscal year 2017
as part of 75 aircraft to be purchased over the FYDP.
The budget also reflects important decisions regarding future
unmanned aerial systems, such as the Navy's Carrier-Based Aerial
Refueling System (CBARS), formerly known as the Unmanned Carrier-
Launched Air Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program--by focusing in
the near-term on providing carrier-based aerial refueling, we're
setting the stage for a future unmanned carrier air wing. With this
approach, the Navy will be able to quickly and affordably field the
kinds of unmanned systems that its carrier air wings need today, while
laying an important foundation for future, more capable unmanned
carrier-based platforms. We know we need to ensure aircraft can operate
off the carrier in high-threat environments, and we're working hard to
make them unmanned--it's just that the UCLASS program as previously
structured was not the fastest path to get us there. This approach will
allow us to get started integrating unmanned aircraft onto our aircraft
carriers affordably and as soon as possible.
Furthermore, to maximize the capabilities and extend the reach of
all our airborne systems, the budget reflects how we're expanding
manned-unmanned teaming--from buying Navy MQ-4C Triton unmanned
maritime surveillance and patrol aircraft, which can be paired with our
P-8A Poseidon aircraft for a variety of missions; to buying Army AH-64
Apache attack helicopters that can pair with MQ-1C Gray Eagle scouts;
to buying Air Force F-35s that can network with both payloads and
platforms.
Cyber and Electronic Warfare Investments
This budget significantly increases our cyber capabilities, with
new investments totaling over $900 million in fiscal year 2017 compared
to last year's budget.
Because defending our networks is and must be DOD's number-one
mission in cyberspace, the budget makes significant investments to
improve our defensive capabilities to deny a potential attack from
succeeding. These include $336 million over the FYDP to support more
capable network perimeter defenses, as well as $378 million over the
FYDP to train and strengthen DOD's Cyber Protection Teams to respond to
security breaches, grow our cyber training and testing ranges, and
support tool development that will let our Cyber Mission Force quickly
respond to cyberattacks against our networks regardless of where they
are stationed around the world.
Reflecting our renewed commitment to deterring even the most
advanced adversaries, the budget also invests in cyber deterrence
capabilities, including building potential military response options.
This effort is focused on our most active cyber aggressors, and is
based around core principles of resiliency, denial, and response.
As part of DOD's second cyber mission--defending the Nation--the
budget invests in an advanced capability to disrupt cyberattacks of
significant consequences. And to support DOD's third cyber mission--
providing offensive cyber options that if directed can augment our
other military systems--the budget invests $347 million over the FYDP
to help provide cyber tools and support infrastructure for the Cyber
Mission Force and U.S. Cyber Command.
DOD has a unique level of resources and cyber expertise compared to
the rest of the Federal Government, and following the recent data
breaches of the Office of Personnel Management's information technology
systems, DOD has undertaken responsibility for the development,
maintenance, and cybersecurity of the replacement background
investigation systems and their data infrastructure. To provide proper
support and a dedicated funding stream for this effort, the President's
budget includes $95 million for DOD in fiscal year 2017. Also, on a
separate but related note, the budget invests $454 million over the
FYDP to ensure DOD will continue to have access to the trusted
microelectronic components needed in our weapon systems. By developing
alternative sources for advanced microchips and trusted designs, this
funding will help ensure the long-term security of our systems and
capabilities.
Meanwhile, to protect our platforms and ensure U.S. freedom of
maneuver in contested environments, the budget also continues to
support research, development, testing, evaluation, and procurement of
advanced electronic warfare capabilities--totaling $3.7 billion in
fiscal year 2017 and $20.5 billion over the FYDP. To enhance the
electronic survivability and lethality of fighter and bomber aircraft
like the F/A-18, F-15, and B-2, we're investing in both offensive and
defensive airborne capabilities, including the Air Force's Defensive
Management System modernization and Eagle Passive Active Warning
Survivability System, and also the Navy's Integrated Defensive
Electronic Countermeasures and Next Generation Jammer. We're upgrading
the radar on our E-3 Sentry AWACS with enhanced electronic protection
to make adversary jammers less effective. Investments in the Navy's
Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program will help our ships
protect themselves better. And to help protect our ground forces, the
budget invests in the Army's Common Infrared Countermeasures and
Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool, as well as the Marine
Corps' Intrepid Tiger pod.
While cyber and electronic warfare capabilities provide, for the
most part, different techniques to achieve similar mission objectives,
an integrated approach can yield additional benefits. This is reflected
in our budget, including investments intended to ensure we can hold
even the most challenging targets at risk.
Space Investments
As I mentioned earlier, this budget continues and builds upon
important investments in last year's budget to help secure U.S. access
to space and address space as an operational domain.
After adding over $5 billion in new investments in DOD's 2016
budget submission to make us better postured for contested military
operations in space--including over $2 billion in space control efforts
to address potential threats to U.S. space systems--this budget largely
sustains those investments over the FYDP. While there is much more work
ahead, we are on a good path in our efforts to complicate an
adversary's ability to defeat our systems while also enhancing our
ability to identify, attribute, and negate all threatening actions in
space.
Meanwhile, the budget also supports strengthening our current
space-based capabilities, and maturing our space command and control.
It invests in more satellites for our Space-Based Infrared System to
maintain the robust strategic missile warning capability we have today.
And it allocates $108 million over the FYDP to implement the Joint
Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC), which will
better align joint operations in space across the U.S. government.
DOD must have assured access to space through multiple reliable
sources that can launch our critical national security satellites,
which is why the budget invests $1.8 billion for space launch in fiscal
year 2017 and $9.4 billion over the FYDP. Because we want to end the
use of the foreign RD-180 engine as soon as possible, because we have a
strong desire to preserve competition for space launch in order to
ensure multiple launch service providers can sustain uninterrupted
access to space, and to control costs, the budget includes funds for
competitive public-private partnerships to help develop new launch
services, which we believe is the most responsible way forward. Merely
developing a new engine would not give us the assured access to space
that we require. We plan to take advantage of the emerging commercial
space launch marketplace using an innovative, more commercial
approach--investing through competition in new launch services in
return for priced options for future launches.
Nuclear Enterprise Investments
The budget also makes reforms and investments needed to continue
providing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Compared to
last year's budget submission, it adds $10 billion over the next 5
years, for a total of $19 billion in fiscal year 2017 and $108 billion
over the FYDP for maintaining, and modernizing the nuclear force and
associated strategic command, control, and communications systems. This
reflects DOD's continuing commitment to the nuclear triad and its
critical mission.
In addition to making an array of investments across the nuclear
enterprise--from increased funding for manpower, equipment, vehicles,
and maintenance, to technological efforts that improve the
sustainability of our bomber fleet--the budget also fully funds the
first stages of our key nuclear modernization effort, in particular the
replacement of our Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. The Ohio
Replacement Program is allocated $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2017 and
$13.2 billion over the FYDP, which in addition to research and
development will allow the first year of construction on an
incrementally-funded first ship to begin in fiscal year 2021.
We expect the total cost of nuclear modernization to be in the
range of $350-$450 billion. Although this still presents an enormous
affordability challenge for DOD, we believe it must be funded. Previous
modernizations of America's strategic deterrent and nuclear security
enterprise were accomplished by topline increases to avoid having to
make drastic reductions to conventional forces, and it would be prudent
to do so again. I hope DOD can work with Congress to minimize the risk
to our national defense.
Building the All-Volunteer Force of the Future
While we have the finest fighting force in the world today, that
excellence is not a birthright, and we can't take it for granted in the
21st century. We have to earn it again and again, starting with our
most enduring advantage--our people.
That's what building the force of the future is all about: making
sure that long into the future, my successors will be able to count on
the same excellence in people that I do today. And we have several
overarching priorities to help us do that, like attracting a new
generation of talented Americans, promoting diversity, and rewarding
merit; carving tunnels through the walls between DOD, the private
sector, our reserve force, and other agencies across the government;
and updating and modernizing our personnel management systems with
technology and data analysis to help improve the choices and decisions
we make related to our people.
I made this commitment to President Obama when he asked me to serve
as Secretary of Defense, and so shortly after I was sworn in, I visited
my old high school in Abington, Pennsylvania to outline my vision for
the force of the future. I talked about how, in the face of
generational, technological, and labor market changes, we in the
Pentagon must try to make ourselves even better at attracting talent
from new generations of Americans. In the months that followed, I went
to places like Silicon Valley and St. Louis, and heard from companies
like Facebook, Boeing, and LinkedIn about what they're doing to compete
for talent in the 21st century. And this past December, I announced
that we're opening all combat positions to women, to expand our access
to 100 percent of America's population for our all-volunteer force.
Throughout this process, we've always been mindful that the
military is a profession of arms. It's not a business. We're
responsible for defending this country--for providing the security that
allows our friends and family members and fellow citizens to go to
school, go to work, to live their lives, to dream their dreams, and to
give the next generation a better future.
The key to doing this successfully is leveraging both tradition and
change. While the military cannot and should not replicate all aspects
of the private sector, we can and should borrow best practices,
technologies, and personnel management techniques in commonsense ways
that work for us, so that in future generations, we'll keep attracting
people of the same high caliber we have today--people who will meet the
same high standards of performance, leadership, ethics, honor, and
trust we hold our force to today.
Last spring I asked DOD's Personnel and Readiness chief to lead a
team in developing a package of bold proposals, which they did--
building on the great work the military services were already doing,
and also coming up with some new ideas. Subsequently, a senior
leadership team led by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work and Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul Selva has been
working with the service vice chiefs to closely analyze each proposal
and make recommendations before I decide. While this process is still
ongoing for some proposals, I've decided to announce my decisions on
other proposals as I've made them, which I will now detail.
Greater Permeability and Talent Management
I outlined the first link we're building to the force of the future
at George Washington University last November, announcing over a dozen
new initiatives in several categories that are intended to make our
future Defense Department better connected to 21st century talent.
First, we're creating what we call `on-ramps' for people who aren't
involved with DOD but want to try contributing to our mission. One way
we're doing this is by having better managed internship programs that
more effectively transition promising interns into employees. Another
is our new Defense Digital Service, which brings in talent from
America's vibrant, innovative technology community for a time to help
solve some of our most complex problems. We're also going to bring in
resident entrepreneurs, who will work with senior leaders on
challenging projects for a year or two. And we're going to hire a chief
recruiting officer to bring in top executives for stints in civilian
leadership roles, as we had in the past with people like Dave Packard,
co-founder of HP, who also served as Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Second, we're creating short-term `off-ramps' for those currently
in DOD, so they can gain new skills, experiences, and perspectives from
outside and then bring them back in to help keep us strong, creative,
and forward-thinking. One way we're doing this is by expanding and
broadening the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellowship program,
including by opening it up to qualified enlisted personnel. Another
example is the Career Intermission Pilot Program, which lets people
take a sabbatical from their military service for a few years while
they're getting a degree, or learning a new skill, or starting a
family. DOD plans to seek authorities to make this program permanent,
and looks forward to working with Congress to do so--similar to how we
were able to partner last year to update and modernize retirement
benefits and ensure that the 80 percent of our force that doesn't serve
20 years will get the benefits they earned whenever they move on to
whatever's next in life.
And third, we're going to use 21st century data and technology to
improve and modernize our talent management systems. We're launching
LinkedIn-style pilot programs to help give servicemembers and units
more choice in matching up for future assignments. We're creating an
Office of People Analytics to leverage big data to inform our personnel
policies. We're finally implementing exit surveys, so we can have
quantitative data on why people decide to leave. And to help us keep
bringing in the best people, we're looking at ways to evaluate recruit
performance, improve outcomes, and better analyze trends that if left
unchecked could indicate or lead to our military's insularity from the
rest of society.
Family Support and Retention
Next, in January, I announced our so-called second link to the
force of the future, a set of several initiatives with a singular
focus: strengthening the support we provide our military families to
improve their quality of life. They were developed keeping in mind
DOD's recruiting, retention, and career and talent management needs, as
well as our closely-linked readiness and warfighting demands, which
must always guide us.
We know that our all-volunteer force is predominantly a married
force--52 percent of our enlisted force is married, and 70 percent of
our officer force is married. We also have another 84,000 military-to-
military marriages, with 80 percent of them stationed within 100 miles
of each other. So while we recruit a servicemember, we retain a family.
This means that what we do to strengthen quality of life for military
families today, and what we do to demonstrate that we're a family-
friendly force to those we want to recruit, is absolutely essential to
our future strength. While we often speak of commitments to family and
country in the same breath, the stresses of military service on our
families are heavy and well known; among the stresses military families
face, having and raising children is near the top. We also know that at
10 years of service, when women are at their peak years for starting a
family, women are retained at a rate 30 percent lower than men across
the services. And we know that a high level of work and family conflict
is one of the primary reasons they report leaving service.
To build the force of the future, tackling these problems is
imperative, especially when the generation coming of age today places a
higher priority on work-life balance. These Americans will make up 75
percent of the American workforce by 2025. Nearly four-in-five of them
will have a spouse or a partner also in the workforce--twice the rate
of baby boomers. These Americans wait longer to have children, and when
they do have children, they want to protect the dual earning power of
their families to provide for their children accordingly.
That's why, for starters, we're providing a more competitive
standard for maternity and paternity leave across our joint force--
setting 12 weeks of fully paid maternity leave as the standard across
the joint force, and working with Congress to seek authorities to
increase paid paternity leave for new fathers from 10 to 14 days, which
they can use in addition to annual leave. These changes put DOD in the
top tier of institutions nationwide, and will have significant
influence on decisionmaking for our military family members. For both
mothers and fathers alike, this establishes the right balance of
offering a highly competitive leave policy while also maintaining the
readiness of our total force. While I don't take lightly that 12 weeks
of maternity leave represents a downshift from what the Navy pursued
last summer, we will be at the forefront in terms of competition,
especially as part of the comprehensive basket of family benefits we're
providing across the joint force. This will be an increasingly
important factor as current and future generations of parents have
different views and expectations in parenting, and we must continue to
be able to attract and retain the best talent among them.
Additionally, we're expanding the childcare we provide on our
bases, because whether for single parents, for families in which both
parents work outside the home, or for every mother or father in our
military, childcare hours should be as responsive as possible to work
demands. So based on feedback from pilot programs, and in the interest
of responding to typical work hours at our installations, we will
increase childcare access to 14 hours a day across the force. By
providing our troops with childcare they can rely on --from before
reveille to after taps--we provide one more reason for them to stay on
board. And we show them that supporting a family and serving our
country are by no means incompatible goals.
We're also making relatively inexpensive improvements so that our
workplaces are more accommodating to women when they return from
maternity leave, with a focus on making it easier for them to continue
breastfeeding if they choose. To make the transition between maternity
leave and returning to work for military mothers smoother, to enhance
our mission effectiveness, and to comply with standards that apply to
nearly every organization outside the military, we're requiring the
installation or modification of mothers' rooms throughout all
facilities when there are more than 50 women regularly assigned.
Furthermore, we can also be more creative about making reasonable
accommodations for members of our force who face difficult family
geographic situations while at the same time preserving our force's
effectiveness. Data indicates that allowing family members to trade the
ability to remain at a station of choice in exchange for an additional
active-duty service obligation is one approach that could increase
retention, while preserving readiness. DOD will be seeking legislative
authority to this effect--when the needs of the force permit a
servicemember to stay at their current location, we will seek to
empower commanders to make reasonable accommodations, in exchange for
an additional service obligation.
Finally, as a profession of arms, we ask our men and women to make
incomparable sacrifices. We ask them, potentially, to place themselves
at risk of sacrificing their ability to have children when they return
home. To account for this more fully in the benefits we provide our
troops, DOD will cover the cost of freezing sperm or eggs through a
pilot program for active-duty servicemembers--a benefit that will help
provide our men and women, especially those deployed in combat, with
greater peace of mind. This investment will also provide greater
flexibility for our troops who want to start a family, but find it
difficult because of where they find themselves in their careers.
Each of these initiatives is significant in its own right. Taken
together, they will strengthen our competitive position in the battle
for top talent, in turn guaranteeing our competitive position against
potential adversaries. The initiatives approved to date total $867
million across the FYDP; we've included this in our budget because it's
a worthy investment that will yield great returns.
More Still to Come
While these first two links are important, we will have more to
announce on the force of the future in the coming months. For example,
we're taking a serious look at some commonsense reforms in our officer
promotion system, and I greatly appreciate Congressional leaders from
both parties who have indicated their support for such reforms in
principle. We're also looking at ways to improve how we manage our
civilian personnel, working with the government-wide Office of
Personnel Management as well as Federal employee unions. In both of
these efforts, working with Congress will be essential to ensure that
our force of the future is as strong as the force of today.
Reforming the DOD Enterprise
As I've said consistently from the moment I became Secretary of
Defense, I cannot ask for more taxpayer dollars for defense without
being candid about the fact that not every defense dollar is spent as
wisely or responsibly as it could be, and also being determined to
change that and make our department more accountable. That's why
reforming the DOD enterprise is so important--from improving how we're
organized so we can best respond to the challenges and opportunities of
the future security environment, to continuing to improve our
acquisition and enterprise-wide business and audit practices, to
reducing excess infrastructure and overhead, to modernizing the
military healthcare system.
Before I address the reforms in this budget submission, it's
important to consider the recent history of defense reform--how DOD has
been embarked on a reform path for much of the last 7 years, and how we
appreciate Congress's work with us over the last year on acquisition
and modernized retirement reforms.
Despite what some may think, this administration hasn't been
dragging its feet when it comes to defense reform--the reality has been
quite the opposite. Beginning in 2009, we reduced the number of senior
executives and general and flag officers, while working with Congress
to trim management headquarters staffs by 20 percent, and move DOD
toward auditability. We've done three iterations of the Better Buying
Power initiative I established to continuously improve our
acquisitions, with Better Buying Power 3.0 incorporated into this
budget, and we're seeing compelling indications of positive
improvements, including in areas like reduced cost growth and reduced
cycle time. And we've continually submitted much-needed reforms to
strengthen the efficiency and capability of our force--many of which
have been continually denied, either in whole or in part, at a cost for
both taxpayers and our troops. This last part poses a real problem,
because every dollar Congress denies us in reform is a dollar we can't
invest in security we need to deter and defend against today's and
tomorrow's threats.
Now is the time for action. DOD will work closely with Congress on
any anticipated reform legislation, and we welcome an open and
collaborative process. In the past, legislative reform has proven to be
a double-edged sword--sometimes it leads to constructive change, which
is good, but other times it just adds to bureaucracy and overhead, even
if that was never the intent. I hope that with the focus on reform
we've recently been seeing in this and the other defense committees in
Congress, we can work together to do reform right. And we should,
because there's a lot that needs to be accomplished in many areas.
Continuously Improving Acquisition
DOD has been, and still is, absolutely committed to improving
acquisition outcomes. After 5 years of implementing our Better Buying
Power (BBP) initiatives for continuous process improvements in the
defense acquisition system, we're seeing compelling indications of
significant improvement in acquisition outcomes--for example, annual
growth metrics for contracted costs on our major programs have dropped
dramatically from a peak of 9.1 percent in 2011 to a 30-year low of 3.5
percent in 2015, and a much higher percentage of major programs are
projecting cost reductions relative to initial baselines than in the
past. While these developments are positive signs, we can and must do
more to sustain and where possible accelerate our momentum to keep
improving and deliver better military capability while protecting
American taxpayers.
We need to continue reducing overhead and bureaucracy associated
with the acquisition system, making it more agile and having a faster
flow of commercial technology into our weapon systems. DOD is
comfortable with the reforms in the fiscal year 2016 National Defense
Authorization Act--which included several legislative reforms that DOD
proposed last year--and we strongly support the increased role of the
service chiefs in acquisition programs, particularly on cost and
requirements trade-offs. Going forward, it's important that we take the
responsible approach to absorb these reforms and see their effects
before making additional major changes.
DOD also appreciates Congress's interest in flexibility and
agility, because the pace of threat changes and technology development
are not compatible with our long cycles of budget submission,
authorization, and appropriations. And DOD will be looking for
opportunities to work with Congress to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of our acquisition process. In particular, we would
welcome greater flexibility in appropriations or reprogramming to
initiate development of urgently needed capabilities. The flexibility
to start a program as soon as a threat is identified would save
critical time--as much as 2 years under current practices--and position
both DOD and industry to more quickly initiate development, without a
long-term commitment, outside the traditional budget cycle. This step
would represent a `free' 2 years of lead time to acquiring a new
capability.
Leaner Business Practices and Reducing Excess Overhead and
Infrastructure
The budget submission reflects several important efforts to spend
taxpayer dollars more efficiently, generating savings that would be
much better invested in other areas like the fight against ISIL or
deterring Russian aggression.
Part of this means making more reductions to overhead, and also
adopting some commonsense business practices that are long overdue--
which in total we expect to help save nearly $8 billion over the next 5
years. By better managing the 20 percent management headquarters
reductions I mentioned earlier, including delayering and flattening
management organizational structures, and also by increasing the
reduction to 25 percent, reviewing service contracts, and making
business operations and IT more efficient, we expect to save close to
$5.9 billion over the FYDP. And we're modernizing how we manage our
commissaries and military exchanges, to optimize their business
practices and respond to the changing needs of their customers. Unlike
commissary and military exchange reforms proposed in previous budgets,
this new approach protects the benefits they provide our people while
still generating expected savings of about $2 billion over the FYDP.
We're also making real progress on reforming DOD's myriad systems
and business processes to meet our commitment to be audit ready by the
beginning of fiscal year 2018. The three military departments began
audits of their budgets for the first time last year, and DOD financial
audits currently cover over 75 percent of our total General Fund
budgetary resources and just over 90 percent of the current year
dollars.
In addition, we need to stop spending so much money to hold onto
bases we don't need, and implement a domestic round of Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) in 2019 as we're requesting. While it's helpful that
the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act allowed a study
of DOD's excess infrastructure, the bottom line is that we have more
bases in more places than we need, with preliminary analysis indicating
that we have over 20 percent excess infrastructure. To ignore this fact
while criticizing DOD for wasteful spending is not only a sin of
omission, but also a disservice to America's taxpayers. Last year's
Congressional denial forced the BRAC round to slip from 2017 to 2019,
further prolonging our ability to harvest savings we greatly need. By
then it will have been 14 years since DOD was allowed to right-size its
domestic infrastructure, which any business leader or citizen would
think is ridiculous--and they'd be right. Now is the time to fix it.
Reexamining Goldwater-Nichols and Defense Institutional
Reform
I appreciate that Congress shares my desire to make institutional
reform a priority. As a learning organization, the U.S. military and
the Defense Department has a long history of striving to reform our
command structures and improve how our strategies and policies are
formulated, integrated, and implemented. Indeed, even before the
Defense Department was even established, military leaders and
policymaking officials were discussing how the military services could
be unified, and exploring ways to develop stronger policy processes and
advice. The result was the National Security Act of 1947 and its
amendments, which, among other historic changes, established the
position of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the National Security Council. Later reforms, particularly Eisenhower-
era changes, helped strengthen the offices of the Defense Secretary and
gave new authorities to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
But it was the Goldwater-Nichols Act, enacted 30 years ago this
fall, that's most responsible for today's military and defense
institutional organization. It solidified the chain of command from the
President to the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders. It
affirmed civilian control of the military by codifying in law that the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is outside the chain of command, in order
for him to be able to provide vital, objective, independent military
advice to the Defense Secretary and the President. At the same time, it
also strengthened the Chairman's role, created the position of Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and centralized the role and voice of the
Combatant Commands. And it reinforced the concept of jointness,
especially with respect to the careers of senior officers, by requiring
them to gain professional experience outside of their service in order
to advance further in their careers. All senior officers know these
policies today, for they are integral to career advancement and
achievement, and they reflect the reality of how our servicemembers
train and fight every day as a joint force. Around this time, albeit
unrelated to Goldwater-Nichols, important changes were made to reform
defense acquisition, based on the recommendations of the Packard
Commission.
As a whole, all these changes were overwhelmingly beneficial--a
credit to the work of not only the members of Congress who passed the
legislation, but also their staffs. What they put into law has given us
generations of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who've grown
accustomed to operating together as a joint force--overcoming many
inter-service frictions of decades before. And it's enabled our Nation
to draw greater benefit from the advice of many valued Chairmen--from
General Colin Powell during Operation Desert Storm, to General Joe
Dunford today.
This year, as Goldwater-Nichols turns 30, we can see that the world
has changed since it was enacted: instead of the Cold War and one clear
threat, we face a security environment that's dramatically different,
even from the last quarter-century. It's time that we consider
practical updates to this critical organizational framework, while
still preserving its spirit and intent. For example, we can see in some
areas how the pendulum between service equities and jointness may have
swung too far, as in not involving the service chiefs enough in
acquisition decisionmaking and accountability; or where subsequent
world events suggest nudging the pendulum further, as in taking more
steps to strengthen the capability of the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs
to support force management, planning, and execution across the
combatant commands, particularly in the face of threats that cut across
regional and functional combatant command areas of responsibility, as
many increasingly do.
With this in mind, last fall I asked DOD's Deputy Chief Management
Officer, Peter Levine, and Lieutenant General Tom Waldhauser of the
Joint Staff, to lead a comprehensive, department-wide review of these
kinds of organizational issues--spanning the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant commanders, and the military
departments--to identify any potential redundancies, inefficiencies, or
other areas of possible improvement. And they've now come to some
preliminary recommendations. Over the coming weeks, we will execute
some of these decisions under our own existing authority. For others,
where legislation is needed, we would like to work with Congress on
implementation as it considers this year's National Defense
Authorization Act. Of course, both House and Senate Armed Services
Committees have their own important reviews of this issue underway as
well--making this area ripe for working together, something we've been
doing effectively, and will continue to do on this topic. Because when
it comes to these fundamental matters of our national security, that's
what we have to do--work together.
First, we need to better develop transregional and multifunctional
integration and advice--an imperative considering that the challenges
we face today are less likely than ever before to confine themselves to
neat regional or functional boundaries. Terrorism is one example, of
course; beyond that, we also face potential future nation-state
adversaries with widening geographic reach, but also widening
exposure--something we may want to take into account in order to de-
escalate a crisis and deter aggression. And in other cases, we may have
to respond to multiple threats across the globe in overlapping
timeframes. In an increasingly complex security environment like this,
and with a decision chain that cuts across the combatant commands only
at the level of the Secretary of Defense, we're not postured to be as
agile as we could be. Accordingly, we need to clarify the role and
authority of the Chairman, and in some cases the Joint Chiefs and the
Joint Staff, in three ways: one, to help synchronize resources globally
for daily operations around the world, enhancing our flexibility, and
my ability, to move forces rapidly across the seams between our
combatant commands; two, to provide objective military advice for
ongoing operations, not just future planning; and three, to advise the
Secretary of Defense on military strategy and operational plans, for
example, helping ensure that our plans take into account in a
deliberate fashion the possibility of overlapping contingencies. We
will pursue these changes in line with Goldwater-Nichols's original
intent, which is to enable the military to better operate in a seamless
way, while still preserving both civilian control and the Chairman's
independence to provide professional military advice outside of the
chain of command. Some have recommended the opposite course--to put the
Chairman into the chain of command--but both Chairman Dunford and I
agree that would erode the Chairman's objectivity as the principal
military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense.
The second area where we need to make updates is in our combatant
commands--adapting them to new functions, and continuing to
aggressively streamline headquarters. Adapting to new functions will
include changes in how we manage ourselves in cyberspace. DOD must deal
with the five challenges facing our Nation, across all domains--not
just the traditional air, land, sea, and space, but also cyberspace,
where our reliance on technology has given us great strengths and great
opportunities, but also some vulnerabilities that adversaries are eager
to exploit. That's why the budget increases cyber investments over the
next 5 years, and why we should consider changes to cyber's role in
DOD's Unified Command Plan. Meanwhile, DOD is currently in the process
of reducing our management headquarters by 25 percent--a needed step--
and we're on the road to accomplish that goal thanks to the partnership
of the congressional defense committees, which once again we deeply
appreciate. We can meet these targets without combining Northern
Command and Southern Command, or combining European Command and Africa
Command--actions that would run contrary to why we made them separate,
because of their distinct areas of emphasis and increasing demands on
our forces in them. And indeed those demands have only further
increased in recent years, with each command growing busier. So instead
of combining these commands to the detriment of our friends, our
allies, and in fact our own command and control capabilities, we intend
to be more efficient by integrating functions like logistics,
intelligence, and plans across the Joint Staff, the combatant commands,
and subordinate commands, eliminating redundancies while not losing
capability. Much can be done here. Additionally, in the coming weeks
the Defense Department will look to simplify and improve command and
control where the number of four-star positions have made headquarters
either top-heavy, or less efficient than they could be. The military is
based on rank hierarchy, where juniors are subordinate in rank to their
seniors; this is true from the platoon to the corps level, but it gets
complicated at some of our combatant and component command
headquarters, where we have a deep bench of extremely talented senior
leaders. So where we see potential to be more efficient and effective,
billets currently filled by four-star generals and admirals will be
filled by three-stars in the future.
Next is acquisition. Thirty years after the Packard Commission's
recommendations led to the establishment of an undersecretary of
defense for acquisition, service acquisition executives, and the roles
of program executive officers and program managers, it's clear we still
can and must do more to deliver better military capability while making
better use of the taxpayers' dollars. One way we seek to improve in
this context is by streamlining the acquisition system itself. This
will include evaluating and where appropriate reducing other members of
the Defense Acquisition Board--it's currently composed of about 35
principals and advisors, each of whom is likely to feel empowered as a
gatekeeper for acquisition; reducing these layers will both free up
staff time and focus decisionmaking energy on overcoming real obstacles
to program success rather than bureaucratic hurdles. And we also intend
to reduce burdensome acquisition documentation--just for one example,
in cases where the defense acquisition executive serves as the
milestone decision authority, the current process dictates that 14
separate documents be coordinated within the department. Reducing these
paperwork requirements in a meaningful way, and pushing approval
authority lower down when a program is on the right track, will
eliminate redundant reviews and shorten review timelines--ultimately
getting capabilities fielded to our troops sooner, which our service
chiefs and our combatant commanders desire and deserve.
The last major area where we need to update Goldwater-Nichols is in
making changes to joint personnel management. One of the hallmarks of
Goldwater-Nichols is that it made joint duty required for all officers
who wanted to rise to the highest levels of our military. In so doing,
it led to great advances in jointness across the military services--
such that almost all our people know why, and how, we operate as a
joint team--and it's also significantly strengthened the ability of our
Chairmen, our Joint Chiefs, and our Combatant Commanders to accomplish
their joint responsibilities. But as we've learned over the years what
it takes to operate jointly, it's become clear that we need to change
the requirements for joint duty assignments, which are more narrow and
rigid than they need to be. Accordingly, we're proposing to broaden the
definition of positions for which an officer can receive joint duty
credit, going beyond planning and command-and-control to include joint
experience in other operational functions, such as intelligence, fires,
transportation and maneuver, protection, and sustainment, including
joint acquisition. For example, while a staff officer in a combatant
command would get joint duty credit, an officer in a combined air
operations center coordinating with servicemembers in all different
uniforms to call in airstrikes against ISIL might not. In another case,
take two cyber airmen working at a combatant command--one does cyber
plans and gets joint credit, the other does cyber targeting and
doesn't. And while a logistics planner at a combatant command doesn't
receive joint credit, their operational plans counterpart does. So what
we're proposing will fix these discrepancies and fulfill the true
purpose of Goldwater-Nichols, which was to ensure meaningful joint
experience. Additionally, we're also proposing to shorten the amount of
time required to accumulate joint duty, from 3 years to 2 years, so top
personnel have more flexibility to take on command assignments and
other opportunities to broaden and deepen their careers.
Now, going forward, it's important to make all these updates under
the guiding principle of `do no harm.' Goldwater-Nichols took 4 years
to write, and it's been incredibly successful over three decades--to
the credit of the reforms it put in place, we are not driven today by a
signal failure like Desert One. To the contrary--I'm deeply proud of
how our people have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 15
years. So we come at this from a different direction, and the updates
we make now must not undo the many positive benefits that Goldwater-
Nichols has had for DOD. Instead, they must build on them.
Modernizing and Simplifying the Military Healthcare System
DOD greatly appreciates that Congressional leaders have said 2016
will be the year to reform our military healthcare system, TRICARE,
after having passed retirement modernization reform in 2015. As you
know, DOD has proposed various ways to reform TRICARE for several
years, so we look forward to working very closely with Congress in the
year ahead. The reforms reflected in the budget give beneficiaries more
simplicity and choice in how they manage their healthcare, while also
incentivizing the much more affordable use of military treatment
facilities. This will not only save money, but also maximize the
workload and readiness of our military's medical force, giving our
doctors, nurses, medics, and corpsmen the experience they need to be
effective at their mission. Together this should generate about $548
million in fiscal year 2017 and almost $7 billion over the FYDP that
can be better spent in other ways without sacrificing the care of our
people. It's time to get this done.
Making Sure Retirement Reform Works
DOD greatly appreciates being able to work closely with Congress
last year in reforming the military's retirement system. In this year's
budget submission, we are including a few modifications to military
retirement reform to help make sure those reforms work in the best
possible way for the future strength and success of our military.
First, continuation pay should not be an entitlement at 12 years of
service, but rather a vitally important force shaping tool. DOD should
have the flexibility to determine if and when to offer this benefit so
we can better retain the talent we need the most at any given time.
Second, the blended retirement plan that Congress passed last year
needs some modifications to avoid having adverse effects on retention--
in particular, slightly raising the maximum matching contribution from
4 percent to 5 percent. To improve retention, we also propose
increasing the number of years a servicemember has to serve before
matching contributions begin--so instead of beginning them at the start
of their third year of service, it would be at the start of their fifth
year of service, after their first reenlistment. DOD looks forward to
working with Congress to make these proposals a reality.
The Right Force Structure for Current and Future Operations
The budget also reflects critical decisions on force structure
reforms, all of which are vital to making sure our troops have the
capabilities they need for both present and future missions. While
Congress has too often rejected such reforms out of hand, our decisions
this year show that when world events and operational demands require
the Defense Department to change its plans, it does so. In turn,
Congress must do the same, and recognize that with a set budget and the
need to invest in advanced capabilities to strengthen high-end
deterrence, it's time to seriously consider these reforms and stop
tying our hands from implementing them.
I mentioned earlier that we're pushing off the A-10's final
retirement until 2022 so we can keep more aircraft that can drop smart
bombs on ISIL; in addition to changing when A-10s will be retired,
we're also changing how it will happen. As 2022 approaches, A-10s will
be replaced by F-35s only on a squadron-by-squadron basis as they come
online, ensuring that all units have sufficient backfill and that we
retain enough aircraft needed to fight today's conflicts.
While some members of Congress may think the Navy's phased approach
for modernizing its guided missile cruisers is just a ploy to quickly
retire them, that is incorrect--in fact, retiring them now or anytime
soon would be a serious mistake. Our cruisers are the best ships we
have for controlling the air defenses of a carrier strike group, and
given the anti-ship missiles being developed by other nations, we not
only can't afford to go without them; we also need them to be as modern
and capable as possible, and for them to stay in service as long as
they can. The Navy's plan is still smarter and more affordable than the
approach laid out by Congress, saving us $3 billion over the FYDP that
we're putting to good use elsewhere in the budget. And to make clear
that this is not a ploy to quickly retire our cruisers, we will be
submitting proposed legislative language that Congress can pass to hold
the department to its word.
Additionally, the Army is continuing to implement its Aviation
Restructure Initiative in accordance with the fiscal year 2015 National
Defense Authorization Act as the Chief of Staff of the Army reviews the
recent findings of the National Commission on the Future of the Army.
While we will revisit the Army's aviation transfer plan when we receive
the Chief of Staff of the Army's report, the Commission's proposal to
keep four Apache battalions in the Army National Guard could cost over
$2.4 billion if the Army fully equips all 20 active battalions and
keeps all aircraft currently dedicated to its equipment set in South
Korea. By improving the readiness of the Army's Apache attack
helicopters, and better leveraging the diverse capabilities Black Hawk
helicopters bring to the table for National Guard missions--both here
at home, and around the world when called upon as an operational
reserve--the Army's planned Aviation Restructure Initiative is in the
best interests of both the Army as well as the taxpayers who support
it.
The Opportunity of Reform
Regardless of how any of our proposed reforms might be initially
received, DOD needs Congress to work together with us on a path forward
for all of them, because there's a real opportunity in front of us.
With last fall's budget deal, you showed that cooperation and
prudent compromise for the good of our future security and strength was
actually possible. And our reform submissions on things like the A-10,
commissaries, and TRICARE reflect the fact we've heard Congress's
concerns about past submissions, and made adjustments accordingly.
If we don't lead the way ahead together, both troops and taxpayers
alike will be forced to deal with the consequences. So let's work
together on their behalf.
requests of this committee: the imperative of working together
Before concluding, I want to reemphasize the big picture, because
this budget marks a major inflection point for the Department of
Defense, and we need your support for it.
For a long time, DOD tended to focus and plan and prepare for
whatever big war people thought was coming over the horizon, at one
point becoming so bad that after a while, it started to come at the
expense of current conflicts--long-term at the expense of the here-and-
now. Thankfully we were able to realize that over the last decade,
correct it, and with help from Congress turn our attention to the
fights we were in.
The difference today is that, while such a singular focus made
sense when we were facing off against the Soviets or sending hundreds
of thousands of troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, it won't work for the
world we live in. Now we have to think and do a lot of different things
about a lot of different challenges--not just ISIL and other terrorist
groups, but also competitors like Russia and China, and threats like
North Korea and Iran. We don't have the luxury of just one opponent, or
the choice between current fights and future fights--we have to do
both, and we have to have a budget that supports both. That means
funding a force with the right size, readiness, and capabilities to
prevail in today's conflicts while simultaneously building a force that
can prevail in the future--recognizing that future force won't exist
unless we take actions today. That's what this budget submission was
designed to do, and we need your help to do it.
I thank this committee again for overwhelmingly supporting the
Bipartisan Budget Act that set the size of our budget; our submission
focuses on the budget's shape, and we hope you approve it. I know some
may be looking at the difference between what we proposed last year and
what we got in the budget deal, but I want to reiterate that we've
mitigated that difference, and that this budget meets our needs.
In this context, I have serious concerns with a proposal from one
of the defense committees to underfund DOD's overseas warfighting
accounts by $18 billion dollars, and spend that money on programmatic
items we didn't request. While I don't expect this committee to
consider such a proposal, I have to say that this approach is deeply
troubling, and flawed for several reasons. It's gambling with
warfighting money at a time of war--proposing to cut off our troops'
funding in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria in the middle of
the year. It would spend money on things that are not DOD's highest
unfunded priorities across the joint force. It buys force structure
without the money to sustain it and keep it ready, effectively creating
hollow force structure, and working against our efforts to restore
readiness. It doesn't address the much bigger strategic risk DOD faces
of $100 billion in looming automatic cuts; in fact, it's a step in the
direction of unraveling the Bipartisan Budget Act, which provided
critical stability that DOD needs now and desires for the future. And
it's another road to nowhere, with uncertain chances of ever becoming
law, and a high probability of leading to more gridlock and another
continuing resolution...exactly the kind of terrible distraction we've
seen for years, that undercuts stable planning and efficient use of
taxpayer dollars, dispirits troops and their families, baffles friends,
and emboldens foes. I cannot support such maneuvers as Secretary of
Defense.
The budget deal was a good deal--it gave us stability, and for that
we remain grateful. Doing something to jeopardize that stability would
concern me deeply. The greatest strategic risk we face in DOD is losing
that stability this year, and having uncertainty and sequester in
future years. That's why going forward, the biggest concern to us
strategically in the Congress is averting the return of sequestration
next year so we can sustain all these critical investments over time.
By working together, I am confident we can succeed, because in many
ways we already have. If we think back to those defense investments and
decisions that changed the course of our Nation's and our military's
history for the better--and not just in technologies like GPS, the
Internet, and satellite communications, but also in other areas, like
jointness and the all-volunteer force--they were all able to benefit
our security and our society because they garnered support across the
aisle, across branches of government, and across multiple
administrations.
That same support for what's in this budget is essential today to
address the security challenges we face and seize the opportunities
within our grasp. We need your support in the decisions that our senior
military leaders and I are advocating for. We need you to work with us,
and not tie our hands, when it comes to pursuing smart and critical
reforms. And we need you to provide adequate, stable, predictable
resources, as only you can, by coming together as you have before--
including, in the coming years, to avert the return of sequestration
once again. As long as you do, I know our national security and
national strength will be on the right path, and America's military
will continue to defend our country and help make a better world for
generations to come.
Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, General Carter.
I am now going to invite the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Dunford, to make whatever opening statement
he would submit to the committee. And then we will turn to our
members of the subcommittee for any questions of the panel.
General Dunford.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC,
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Dunford. Chairman Cochran and distinguished
members, thanks very much for the opportunity to join Secretary
Carter and Secretary McCord in appearing before you here today.
I am honored to represent the extraordinary young men and
women of the joint force. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and our civil servants remain our single most
important competitive advantage. And thanks to your support,
the United States' military is the most capable fighting force
in the world.
I don't believe we should ever send Americans into a fair
fight; rather, we have to maintain a joint force that has the
capability and credibility to assure our allies and partners,
deter aggression, and overmatch any potential adversary. This
requires us to continually improve our joint warfighting
capabilities, restore full-spectrum readiness, and develop the
leaders who will serve as the foundation for the future.
The United States is now confronted with challenges from
both traditional state and non-state actors. The Department has
identified five strategic challenges, and Secretary Carter has
outlined those challenges. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea
continue to invest in military capabilities that reduce our
competitive advantage. They're also advancing their interests
through competition with a military dimension that falls short
of traditional armed conflict in the threshold for a
traditional military response. Examples include Russian actions
in the Ukraine, Chinese activities in the South China Sea, and
Iran's malign activity across the Middle East. At the same
time, non-state actors, such as ISIL and Al Qaeda, pose a
threat to the homeland, the American people, our partners, and
our allies. Given the opportunity, such extremist groups would
fundamentally change our way of life.
As we contend with the Department's five strategic
challenges, we recognize that successful execution of our
defense strategy requires that we maintain credible nuclear and
conventional capabilities. Our strategic nuclear deterrent
remains effective, but it's aging, and it requires
modernization. Therefore, we are prioritizing investments
needed for safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
We're also making investments to maintain a competitive
advantage in our conventional capabilities, and we must further
develop capabilities in vital and increasingly contested
domains of space and cyberspace.
As the joint force acts to mitigate and respond to
challenges, we do so in the context of a fiscal environment
that has hampered our ability to plan and allocate resources
most effectively. Despite partial relief by Congress from
sequester-level funding, the Department has absorbed $800
billion in cuts and faces an additional $100 billion of
sequestration-induced risk through fiscal year 2021.
Absorbing significant cuts over the past 5 years has
resulted in our underinvesting in critical capabilities, and
unless we reverse sequestration, we'll be unable to execute the
current defense strategy, and specifically to address the five
challenges that the Secretary mentioned in his opening remarks.
The fiscal year 2017 budget begins to address the most
critical investments required to maintain our competitive
advantage, and to the extent possible, within the resources
provided by the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Act, it addresses the
Department's five challenges. It does so by balancing three
major areas: investment in high-end capabilities, the
capability and the capacity to meet our current operational
demands, and the need to rebuild our readiness after an
extended period of war. In the years ahead, we'll need adequate
funding levels and predictability to fully recover from over a
decade at war and delayed modernization.
OHIO-CLASS SUBMARINE
A bow wave of procurement requirements in the future
include the Ohio-class submarine replacement, continued cyber
and space investments, and the long-range strike bomber. It
will also be several years before we restore full-spectrum
readiness across the services and replenish our stocks of
critical precision munitions. And I know the committee has
heard from the service chiefs on the specifics of readiness
recovery.
In summary, I'm satisfied that the fiscal year 2017 budget
puts us on the right trajectory, but it will take your
continued support to ensure that the joint force has the depth,
the flexibility, the readiness, and the responsiveness that
assures our men and women will never face a fair fight.
Once again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you this morning, and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Joseph Dunford, Jr.
introduction
Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Durbin, members of this Committee,
this posture statement addresses the state of our Nation's armed
forces, the current security environment, and the opportunities and
challenges that lie ahead.
I am humbled and honored to represent the incredible men and women
of our Joint Force. During my first 5 months as Chairman, I have
engaged Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen at
every level. I am confident, and you should rest assured, that the
United States' military is the most capable fighting force in the
world. The character, ingenuity, competence, and self-sacrifice of the
service members in our All-Volunteer Force remain our single greatest
warfighting competitive advantage. I would like to express my gratitude
to this distinguished body for its support in ensuring that we maintain
the best equipped, trained, and led force in the world.
With the continued support of Congress, the Joint Force will
continue to adapt, fight, and win in current operations while
simultaneously innovating and investing to decisively win future
conflicts. We must never send young Americans into a fair fight.
Rather, we must maintain a Joint Force that assures our allies and
partners, deters potential adversaries, and has unquestioned overmatch
when employed. This requires us to focus on improving joint warfighting
capabilities, restoring joint readiness, and developing leaders who
will serve as the foundation of the future Joint Force.
strategic environment
The institutions and structures that have underpinned international
order for the last several decades remain largely intact. However, the
United States is now confronted with simultaneous challenges from both
traditional state actors and non-state actors. The Department has
identified five strategic challenges--Russia, China, North Korea, Iran,
and Violent Extremist Organizations. Russia, China, Iran, and North
Korea present two distinct challenges to our national security. First,
they continue to invest in military capabilities that reduce our
competitive advantage. Second, these actors are advancing their
interests through competition with a military dimension that falls
short of traditional armed conflict and the threshold for a traditional
military response. This is exemplified by Russian actions in Ulcraine,
Chinese activities in the South China Sea, and malicious cyber
activities. At the same time, non-state actors such as ISIL, al-Qaida,
and affiliated organizations are destabilizing parts of the
international community, attacking our global interests and threatening
the homeland. We must address these challenges to protect the stability
of the international order and preserve U.S. influence.
Successful execution of our defense strategy requires that we
maintain credible nuclear and conventional capabilities. Our strategic
nuclear deterrence force remains safe, secure, and effective but is
aging and requires modernization. We are prioritizing renewed long-term
investments in early warning sensors; nuclear command, control, and
communications; and our triad forces. Similarly, we are making
investments to maintain a competitive advantage in our conventional
capabilities. However, potential vulnerabilities to our national
security extend beyond just conventional or nuclear threats. To
preserve the security of the homeland, we must prevent the
proliferation and use of WMD and associated technologies. We must also
further develop our capabilities in the vital and increasingly
contested domains of Cyber and Space.
Future conflict with an adversary or combination of adversaries i s
taking on an increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multi-
functional nature. This is a marked shift from how past conflicts were
fought and will put significant stress on the Department's
geographically-based organizational structure and associated command
and control (C2) architecture. Future conflict will spread quickly
across multiple Combatant Command geographic boundaries, functions, and
domains. We must anticipate the need to respond to simultaneous
challenges in the ground, air, space, cyberspace, and maritime domains.
It is this type of operating environment that informed our investments
in the President's Budget 2017 and our efforts to more effectively
integrate joint capabilities.
As the Joint Force acts to mitigate threats to U.S. interests
against the backdrop of the Department's five strategic challenges, we
do so in the context of a fiscal environment that hampers our ability
to plan and allocate resources most effectively. Despite partial relief
by Congress from sequester-level funding since fiscal year 2012, the
Department is absorbing approximately $800 billion in cuts compared to
the 10-year projection in the fiscal year 2012 Budget, and faces an
additional $100 billion of sequestration-induced risk through fiscal
year 2021. Absorbing cuts of this magnitude has resulted in
underinvestment in critical capabilities. President's Budget 2017 takes
necessary steps toward s balancing the needs of meeting current and
future operational requirements, investing in capability development,
and keeping faith with service members and their families. We must
continue to work together to develop future budgets which provide the
investment levels and flexibility needed to address our national
security interests.
current assessment of the joint force
As directed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S. Armed
Forces must be able to simultaneously defend the homeland while waging
a global counterterrorism campaign, deter potential adversaries, and
assure allies. If deterrence fails, the U.S. military must be capable
of defeating one adversary while denying a second adversary's
objectives in a different region. Due to shortfalls in capacity and
critical capabilities such as ISR and long-range strike, as well as
increased timelines for force movements, the Joint Force will be
challenged to respond to a major contingency while simultaneously
defending the homeland and continuing the counter-VEO mission.
Capability and capacity shortfalls would be particularly acute if the
force were called to respond to a second contingency on an overlapping
timeline. Moreover, some allies and partners are less capable or
willing to fill these gaps than in the past.
Today, Combatant Command assigned missions can be accomplished, but
all Combatant Commanders cite resource limitations and capability
shortfalls that may increase casualties, lengthen response timelines,
and extend the duration of a future conflict. There are also shortfalls
in our ability to conduct day to day shaping activities that serve to
mitigate the risk of conflict and properly posture the force in event
of conflict. These shortfalls include the number of ready response
units in the Services' non-deployed force, theater ISR assets, Command
and Control, intelligence, cyber operations, precision munitions,
missile defense, and logistics.
Recovery of full-spectrum Joint Force readiness remains fragile.
The adverse impact of budget reductions over the past several years
combined with a persistently robust global demand for forces and
capabilities continues to impede our ability to rebuild readiness after
more than a decade of contingency operations. Regaining full-spectrum
capabilities and appropriate levels of material readiness will take
time, resources, and a healthy industrial base.
The Joint Force has maintained competitive advantage in technology
for several decades. However, this advantage has been eroded by our
adversaries' efforts to improve their war-fighting capabilities and
avoid or counter U.S. military technological strengths. Moreover, the
rapid pace of technological advances combined with the wide
proliferation of new technologies has allowed our adversaries to more
easily acquire advanced capabilities. This is highlighted by the
increasing ease of access to cyber and space technologies and expertise
in the commercial and private sectors. Adversaries are able to diminish
the long-term advantage of key U.S. capabilities by leveraging access
to commercial technology, targeting our defense industrial base with
cyber espionage and sabotage, and developing capabilities within
tighter development cycles than our bureaucratic acquisition cycle
allows.
capability trends for key challenges
The Department's five strategic challenges were the primary driver
behind our risk assessment. For a classified analysis of these
challenges and our response options, please review my Chairman's Risk
Assessment and the Secretary's Risk Mitigation Plan.
Russia.--Russia's actions threaten NATO cohesion and undermine the
international order. Russia's military modernization and doctrine
development aim to neutralize traditional U.S. competitive advantages
and limit strategic options.
The Russian military presents the greatest challenge to U.S.
interests. Russia is also the only actor aside from the United States
that can project strategic power simultaneously in multiple regions. To
assure our national security and reinforce international order, the
United States and our NATO allies must improve our military capability,
capacity, and responsiveness to deter a resurgent Russia. While Russia
has not signaled the intent to directly attack the United States or our
NATO allies, Russia's National Security Strategy identifies the United
States and the expansion of NATO as threatening their national
security. Moscow's strategic nuclear capabilities represent a potential
existential threat to the United States, and their non-strategic
nuclear capabilities threaten our allies and U.S. forward-based forces
in Europe and Asia. Russia has also shown a willingness to use
competition short of traditional military conflict--such as in
Ukraine--to pursue its strategic goals.
In recent years, Russia has undertaken a long-term strategic
armaments program designed to develop military capabilities and systems
that erode our competitive advantage across the spectrum of conflict.
Russia has modernized its strategic nuclear forces, enhanced their
force projection and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and
significantly increased its proficiency in executing hybrid operations.
Operations in Ukraine and Syria serve to demonstrate these new
capabilities and increase their proficiency.
In the Cyber domain, Russia is a peer competitor of the United
States and has demonstrated a willingness to exploit cyber to achieve
its objectives. We suspect Russia has conducted a range of cyber
operations against government, academic, and private networks. Russian
cyber capability could potentially cause considerable damage to
critical network equipment and national infrastructure throughout the
United States and Europe. In the near to medium term, Russia is also
modernizing its counter-space capabilities to defeat a wide range of
U.S. space-based capabilities while seeking to secure Russian freedom
of action.
In summary, Russia is improving its high-end warfighting
capabilities and closing the gap on our competitive military
advantages. Since 2008, Russia has demonstrated increasingly
sophisticated military capabilities and doctrine. In these operations,
Russia has broadly operated across the spectrum of conflict to include
information operations and cyber warfare. Russia is the only actor that
can project strategic power in multiple regions to threaten U.S.
national interests and coerce U.S. and allied decision-makers.
President's Budget 2017 addresses Russia's aggressive policies and
military modernization through investment in a number of high-end
capabilities. The budget request also quadruples funding for the
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) to $3.4 billion in fiscal year
2017 to reassure our NATO allies and deter Russian aggression.
China.--China's rapid military modernization and expanding presence
in Asia and beyond increase the probability for misunderstanding and
miscalculation.
China is engaged in a sustained military modernization effort that
is reducing our competitive military advantage against it. This effort
is coupled with an ambitious foreign military-to-military engagement
program that aims to acquire advanced tactics, training, and procedures
from other developed militaries. China is also seeking to improve the
joint capability of its armed forces to project power-enhancing its
ability to fight and win a high-intensity regional conflict. Critical
to Chinese efforts is the development of capabilities that specifically
counter U.S. operational strength.
Over the course of the last year, China's military operations have
expanded in size, complexity, duration, and geographic location.
Additionally, China continues to make large-scale investments in
advanced A2/AD capabilities, including short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles employing
countermeasures to deny U.S. missile defense systems. China is also
investing in land attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space
weapons, cyber, improved capabilities in nuclear deterrence and long-
range conventional strike, advanced fighter aircraft, integrated air
defenses, undersea warfare, and command and control capabilities.
China's nuclear-capable missile forces pose a military risk to the U.S.
homeland. China's land-based missile forces continue to expand,
increasing the number of nuclear warheads capable of striking the
United States as well as bases in the Pacific theater.
The aggregate of China's expanding, well-resourced, and well-
trained cyberspace forces represent a threat to the United States.
China's use of computer network attacks in a conflict with the United
States or our allies and partners could seriously limit access to
cyberspace and further degrade deployment and sustainment of forces. In
the Space domain, China continues to enhance its ability to support
terrestrial operations. By pursuing a diverse and capable range of
offensive space control and counter-space capabilities, China is also
working to diminish U.S. space dominance.
In summary, China's rapid military modernization is quickly closing
the gap with U.S. military capabilities and is eroding the Joint
Force's competitive military advantages. China's military forces can
constrain U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific and hold key
U.S. infrastructure and facilities at risk. Its strategic capabilities
are improving and present an increasing risk to the U.S. homeland and
our allies.
President's Budget 2017 is supportive of our commitment to the
Asia-Pacific rebalance. It invests in high-end capabilities,
particularly those needed to maintain undersea dominance and to counter
A2/AD capabilities. The budget request also funds the buildup of Guam
as a strategic hub, initiation of P-8 maritime patrol aircraft
rotations in Singapore, implementation of rotational initiatives in
Northern Australia, and positioning F-35 fighters in Japan in 2017.
North Korea.--North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
programs, increasing asymmetric capabilities, and willingness to use
malicious cyber tools threaten the security of the homeland These
capabilities, alongside conventional forces, also threaten our allies
in the region.
North Korea has an opaque and confrontational national leadership,
the fourth largest army in the world, and increasing nuclear and
ballistic missile capabilities. The regime represents an immediate
threat to U.S. allies in the region and an increasing threat to U.S.
territories and the homeland.
The United States maintains a competitive military advantage
against the relatively low-technology North Korean military. However,
in the event of a conflict on the peninsula, North Korea may be able to
seize the initiative and rapidly escalate hostilities utilizing special
operations forces, mass, and long-range fires. Risk of large numbers of
civilian and military casualties remains high.
North Korea continues to develop its offensive and intelligence-
collection capabilities aimed at exploiting U.S. and allies' cyber
domains. North Korea's current cyber capabilities remain modest and
pose the greatest threat to poorly defended networks. We expect North
Korea to continue investing in more capable cyber tools to develop
asymmetric options which can be effective against more sophisticated
networks.
In summary, North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear
developments, willingness to conduct malicious cyber activities, and
potential to seize the initiative in a conflict on the peninsula pose
risks to the security of the United States and our allies.
As previously noted, President's Budget 2017 is supportive of our
commitment to the Asia-Pacific rebalance and accounts for the
challenges posed by North Korea. The budget provides additional funds
for conventional munitions and continues investment in missile defense.
Iran.--Continued expansion of Iranian malign influence in the
Middle East threatens the stability and security of key regional
partners. Iran is increasingly capable of restricting U.S. military
freedom of action in the region.
Iran is improving the quality and quantity of select conventional
military capabilities. Specifically, Iran continues to leverage its
position on the Strait of Hormuz to pursue an area denial strategy with
increasing capability and capacity of ISR, anti-ship cruise missiles,
fast attack craft, fast inshore attack craft, submarines, and mines.
Iran augments its maritime patrol capacity with unmanned aerial
reconnaissance systems and is developing an armed unmanned aerial
system capability. Improvements in the quality, quantity, and lethality
of Iran's military capabilities threaten both U.S. interests and
freedom of action within the region.
To date, Iran has not demonstrated the capability to strike the
continental United States with a ballistic missile. However, Iran has
made significant strides in its missile development programs since
2009, when it successfully launched its first satellite. In 2010, Iran
unveiled a new space launch vehicle that--if configured as a ballistic
missile--would be capable of reaching the United States. In the Cyber
domain, Iran's capabilities present a limited but increasing threat to
the United States. Iran has demonstrated some degree of success in
targeting vulnerable critical infrastructure networks.
In summary, Iran and its malign activities present the greatest
threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East and North Africa. Tehran
has demonstrated the ability to project influence across the region and
presents an asymmetric threat to the United States and its regional
partners. Iran's conventional military modernization is not likely to
compete with U.S. capability, but its ballistic missile force can hold
key regional U.S. infrastructure at risk.
President's Budget 2017 addresses Iran's malign activities though
investments in capabilities that improve our posture, enhance regional
partnerships, and provide options in the event of a contingency.
Specifically, the budget funds additional capabilities for power
projection, sea control, and regional missile defense.
Violent Extremist Organizations.--VEOs threaten the stability and
security of key regional partners and many of our closest allies. Their
ability to inspire attacks threatens the security of U.S. citizens and
interests at home and abroad.
VEOs are distinct from the other four threats, representing both an
immediate and long-term risk. Counter-VEO operations will require
continued focus and resources even if the Joint Force is called on to
respond to a contingency involving Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea.
While VEOs do not pose an existential threat to the United States, they
continue to increase their abilities to inflict harm upon our vital
interests. Several of our partner nations-from South Asia to the Middle
East and Africa--are battling VEOs that have established territorial
control and are directly challenging existing governments. U.S. values
and the rules-based international order are also threatened by VEOs.
Additionally, VEO-driven conflicts have generated mass migration and
significant flows of foreign fighters to and from conflict zones, which
poses risk to the United States and our allies and partners in the
Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.
The President's Budget 2017 submission funds our ongoing counter-
VEO operations. President's Budget 2017 OCO funding will help establish
counterterrorism platforms in South Asia (Afghanistan), the Middle East
(Levant), East Africa (Djibouti), and an enhanced presence in North/
West Africa. These platforms will provide sustainable, flexible, and
scalable nodes from which to conduct planning and synchronize
operations within the U.S. Government and with allies and partners.
crosscutting sources of military risk
The Joint Force faces a variety of crosscutting sources of military
risk: gaps and shortfall s that impact our ability to accomplish our
missions and objectives, both in today's operations and in tomorrow's
potential conflicts.
Multiple, Overlapping Contingencies
In accordance with the 20 14 Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S.
Armed Forces must be capable of simultaneously defending the homeland
while waging a global counterterrorism campaign, deterring potential
aggressors, and assuring allies. If deterrence fails, U.S. forces must
also be capable of defeating an adversary and denying the objectives
of--or imposing unacceptable costs on--a second aggressor in another
region. The Joint Force will be stressed to execute a major contingency
operation on desired plan timelines with available assets, while
simultaneously defending the homeland and continuing the countertenor
fight against VEOs. Response to aggression by another adversary at the
same time would be further limited due to capacity shortfalls, force
movement timelines, and the dedication of enabling forces and
capabilities elsewhere.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
A lack of theater ISR surge capacity diminishes the Joint Force's
responsiveness and flexibility to support emergent crisis or
contingency. Current theater ISR assets and associated analytic support
capacity remains short of Combatant Commanders' increasing
requirements.
High Demand--Low Density Capabilities
HD/LD capability and capacity shortfalls affect our ability to
achieve assigned missions. We continue to operate systems in several
critical mission areas and deploy personnel with specific specialty
skills at high rates, resulting in minimal to no surge capacity in
those areas. Similar to ISR, this negatively impacts the Joint Force's
responsiveness and flexibility to support emergent requirements. HD/LD
capability shortfalls that pose significant military risk include:
missile defense systems, naval expeditionary forces, personnel recovery
assets, airborne command and control systems, explosive ordnance
disposal assets, air superiority and global precision strike units, and
cyber mission forces.
Munitions
Key precision guided munitions shortfalls are exacerbated by
ongoing operations and may impact potential contingency response.
Additionally, our current global inventories are insufficient for
theater missile defense (TMD), standoff, and air-to-air munitions
needs.
Logistics
We are seeing increasing risk associated with the Joint Logistics
Enterprise's ready and available capacity. Critical logistics enablers
lack capacity and responsiveness: 79 percent of such units report
reduced readiness levels which affects mission accomplishment
flexibility and increases vulnerability. A majority of these elements
are motor transportation, engineer, and cargo handling units necessary
to support the deployment and sustainment of combat elements. Of these
units, the vast majority reside in the Reserve Component (RC). As such,
any contingency that requires responses on a timeline faster than that
designated for RC mobilization will face risk from the lengthened
timelines for combat forces and their sustainers to arrive in theater.
president's budget 2017 summary
President's Budget 2017 addresses the Department's five strategic
challenges--a resurgent Russia, a rising China, North Korea, Iran, and
VEOs--by balancing the demands of readiness, capacity, and capability
within the resources provided by the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Agreement.
The total fiscal year 2017 topline, which is approximately $17 billion
below what we planned in President's Budget 2016, required us to defer
modernization in favor of near-term readiness and force structure.
These reductions and delays in modernization will exacerbate the
procurement bow wave we confront at the end of the Future Year Defense
Program (FYDP) and compound risk to the overall balance of the Joint
Force.
President's Budget 2017 also contains fiscal risk. The budget
assumes higher toplines in fiscal year 2018-2021, continued favorable
economic factors, and future efficiencies. We also continue to depend
on OCO funding for ongoing contingency operations and Joint Force
readiness recovery.
Key Capability Investments
Given a constrained topline, President's Budget 2017 prioritizes
investments to modernize the future Joint Force while balancing
capacity and readiness.
TACAIR
The Air Force accepts risk in the ``air'' domain in order to invest
in nuclear enterprise, space, and cyber priorities. Cuts in fifth
generation fighter aircraft procurement create risk in the mid-2020s,
which will be mitigated by 4th generation fighter aircraft
enhancements. President's Budget 2017 funds 54 Air Force combat-coded
fighter squadrons in the base budget and one squadron supporting the
European Reassurance Initiative in the OCO budget (a total of six more
squadrons than the President's Budget 2016 plan for fiscal year 2017).
The Department of the Navy will procure additional F-35C (+10), F-35B
(+3), and F/A-18E/F (+14) over President's Budget 2016 levels. The
Department of the Navy will also complete its planned buy of 109 P-8A
by fiscal year 2019.
Cyber
State actors will remain the most capable threats to computer
network operations. Non-state actors--VEOs, ideological hackers, and
cybercriminals-have demonstrated high-level network intrusion skills
against the U.S. Government and private entities and will continue to
develop sophisticated tools to achieve their objectives. Developing and
growing the Cyber mission force will require a long-term concerted
effort. President's Budget 2017 invests in both quantity and quality of
cyber capabilities. It funds $6.78 in fiscal year 2017 (a 13 percent
increase) and approximately $34 billion across the FYDP in cyber
posture and capabilities--including investments in strategic cyber
deterrence, cyber security, and offensive cyber.
Space Acquisition
President's Budget 2017 makes significant investment in space
posture and capability. We are funding $7 billion in fiscal year 2017
and approximately $38 billion across the FYDP, including space
situational awareness, space launch capabilities, and command & control
of critical space architecture. Other budget items will harden follow-
on communications and warning satellites, accelerate GPS replacement to
assure targeting accuracy and ability to resist jamming, and add
security features to prevent exploitation and increase overall system
resilience, safety, and stability.
Airborne ISR
There is an ever-increasing demand for ISR assets to inform and
enable our current and future warfighting efforts; President's Budget
2017 invests in aircraft procurement and ISR support infrastructure.
This is an area where we must increase both capacity and capability in
the coming years. Continued shortfalls will stress the force to meet
current requirements and do not provide any surge capacity to address
near-peer challengers or overlapping contingency operations.
The Navy is reducing planned Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne
Surveillance and Strike program capabilities in order to deliver a low-
end, permissive-environment tanking and surveillance capability (saving
approximately $680 million across the FYDP). The Air Force projects no
significant change from President's Budget 2016, maintaining its plan
for 60 M Q-9 Combat Air Patrols and JSTARs Recapitalization.
Power Projection
President's Budget 2017 addresses critical power projection
capabilities and related assets required to operate in non-permissive
environments stemming from adversary advances in A2/AD. President's
Budget 2017 leverages ongoing initiatives to improve survivability of
critical assets and enhance offensive strike capability. It invests in
hypersonic vehicle concepts, flight demonstrations, infrastructure, and
advanced conventional warheads. It also funds improvement in critical
base and missile defenses through expedient shelters and multispectral
camouflage. Finally, it increases the survivability in the undersea
domain by investing in Maritime Strike Tactical Tomahawk capability,
Unmanned Undersea Vehicle capabilities, additional Virginia Payload
Modules, and Acoustic Superiority Program upgrades on OHIO- and
VIRGINIA-class submarines.
Shipbuilding
Joint Force shipbuilding investment is on track to meet fleet goals
in President's Budget 2017. The Navy continues to grow the size of the
fleet toward the goal of 308 ships to meet warfighting and posture
requirements. President's Budget 2017 continues procurement of 10 DDG-
51 Flight III destroyers across the FYDP but reduces planned Littoral
Combat Ship procurement from 52 to 40. It also invests in undersea
capabilities as described previously.
Munitions
President's Budget 2017 invests in rebuilding depleted stocks of
precision guided munitions and in future critical munitions
capabilities and enhancements. Specifically, the budget includes $1.8
billion for precision guided munition replenishment due to usage during
ongoing operations. Looking toward the future, the Navy is maximizing
production of SM-6 missiles while maintaining required levels of other
advanced munitions. It is also beginning development of follow-on
torpedoes and modernizing Tactical Tomahawk to enhance maritime strike
capability. The Air Force will continue with last year's plan to
convert unguided bombs into all-weather smart weapons. The Marine Corps
and the Army are funding RDT&E to support fiscal year 2020 development
of area effects munitions compliant with the Departmental cluster
munitions policy. Finally, the Army plan procures an additional 80 Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Service Life Extension Program
missiles, which bridges the capacity gap until the Army can develop and
procure improved capability ATACMS.
Nuclear Enterprise Sustainment and Recapitalization
Because nuclear deterrence is the highest priority of the
Department of Defense, President's Budget 2017 enhances investment in
all three legs of our aging nuclear triad. Within the nuclear
enterprise, the budget funds $19 billion in fiscal year 2017 and
approximately $108 billion across the FYDP, adding $9.8 billion (an
increase of 10 percent) to sustain and recapitalize the nuclear triad
and strategic command, control, and communication systems. I t invests
in legacy strategic bomber modernization, ground-based strategic
deterrence, incremental funding of the first ship of the OHIO-class
replacement program, long-range strike bomber, long-range standoff
cruise missile, and the security helicopter replacement.
Counterterrorism
The fiscal year 2017 budget request includes approximately $13
billion to support counterterrorism efforts in South Asia
(Afghanistan), the Middle East (the Levant), East Africa (Djibouti),
and an enhanced presence in North/West Africa. These capabilities are
essential to implementing a new framework to counter terrorism,
particularly against ISIL, that more effectively synchronizes counter-
VEO efforts within the Department and across the government.
People and Institutions
Talent and Leadership
Beyond budgets and technology, the All-Volunteer Force remains our
greatest asset and true warfighting competitive advantage. The future
operating environment will place new demands on leaders at all levels.
Our leaders must have the training, education, and experience to meet
those demands. We are undertaking a series of significant changes to
the personnel systems which have previously underpinned the Joint
Force: military pay and compensation modifications, retirement reforms,
talent management initiatives, and diversity integration efforts. These
changes aim to make the Joint Force an inclusive, more agile, and
stronger force by leveraging the talents of all qualified citizens to
meet the challenges of the future. The Services are responsible to
assess and execute these changes; not all will be easy. However, we are
committed to preserving standards, unit readiness, and cohesion, and we
will steadfastly adhere to our principles of dignity and respect for
all service members over the continuum of their service and beyond.
End strength
Our end strength is driven by strategy but is also constrained by
current fiscal realities. President's Budget 2017 projects the force
end strength consistent with the 2014 QDR forecasts. However, the
emergence of ISIL and Russian revanchism has changed the strategic
environment since the QDR was published. Force availability shortfalls
hamper our ability to rapidly respond to multiple, overlapping
contingencies. End strength reductions below the current plan must be
carefully weighed against the end states sought by the Department.
Active Duty Service end strengths in the proposed President's
Budget 2017 remain relatively constant across the FYDP (less than 0.7
percent overall reduction by fiscal year 2021). The Active Component
will be reduced by 9,800 personnel across the Services by fiscal year
2021, with most of that reduction coming in the Army by fiscal year
2018. Reserve Component end strength will see negligible decreases.
Specifically, the Army will maintain end strength and capacity to meet
operational requirements, and build a rotationally focused and surge-
ready 980K Total Army (450K Active Component), consistent with the 2014
QDR. Both the Navy and Marine Corps will maintain Active Component end
strength numbers at 323K and 182K, respectively. The Air Force will
maintain Active Component end strength at 317K.
conclusion
President's Budget 2017 reflects difficult choices made in the
context of today's security challenges and fiscal constraints. Our
budget submission balances investment in the high-end capabilities
needed to counter major power competitors, the capacity to meet current
operational demands and potential contingencies, and the need to
rebuild read ness after an extended period of war. However, to
accommodate a constrained topline, President's Budget 2017 defers near-
term modernization which will only exacerbate a coming bow wave of
strategic recapitalization and other procurement requirements. More
broadly, the cumulative effect of topline reductions over the past
several years has limited the flexibility and resiliency of the Joint
Force, and looking ahead I am concerned that the demand for future
capabilities and capacity will outpace the resources available, forcing
even more difficult decisions to match strategy and resources. I am
grateful to Congress for your continued support, and I look forward to
working with you to ensure the United States maintains the most capable
fighting force in the world--and to ensure we never have to send
American men and women into a fair fight.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, General. I appreciate your
comments and your leadership.
I'm going to call on the Senator from Alabama, Mr. Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you alluded to a number of these things in
your opening statement, but correct me if some of my
observations might be off. We have a resurgent Russia under
Putin, who seems to be very venturesome, to say the least, and
nobody to rein him in at the moment other than himself and
maybe dangerous to the world. We have a China that thinks long
range, that we do a lot of trade with, but is determined to
modernize their nuclear weapons system--they're doing it; it
costs a lot of money, as you well know--and perhaps to build a
blue-water navy, which takes years we know, and at the same
time, looking forward to challenging us in some of the busiest
trade routes in the world.
Then we have Iran coming on. Perhaps maybe the
administration is looking for some kind detente with them or
something, I don't know, but I see that as a real danger.
Then you've got North Korea, which you alluded to, that the
only people I know that can rein him in would be China, if they
chose to.
Then we've got the Middle East, and perhaps a de facto
dismembership of some areas and things going on.
Are we fighting in the Middle East a war of a sense of
containment? You know, are we fighting a war to win? And what
is the goal there?
But first let's talk about the macro stuff. Is that----
Secretary Carter. Senator, yeah, I think you characterized
things quite well. I don't believe that the nuclear agreement
with Iran constitutes a grand bargain of any kind or will lead
to your word ``detente'' of any kind, or at least we're not
anticipating that.
Senator Shelby. What do you think it does constitute?
Secretary Carter. Well, it takes off the table one danger
to us, but we are standing unchanged in our posture there
because Iran--the possibility of Iranian aggression, malign
activities in the region, our friends and allies, that's
unchanged.
MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY
And that gets to the second part of your question, which is
about our strategy in the Middle East in general. And I think
that the Middle East is a very complex and disturbed place, but
our eyes are firmly on American interests. Those are clear. The
place may be turbulent, but our interests are clear. One of
those interests is, and of course, the paramount one is,
defending our own people from terrorism arising there. That is
why we're intent upon, determined, and I'm confident we will,
defeat ISIL in Iraq and Syria. But as you also indicate, there
must follow that some putting back together of Iraq and Syria
as places that can keep their own order. That's a big
challenge----
Senator Shelby. It is.
Secretary Carter. [continuing]. But it's one that we work
on with Prime Minister Abadi. I just saw him last week. The
Chairman was in Iraq. Syria is a much more complicated
situation, but Secretary Kerry is working on the diplomacy
associated with that. But I think we start with, not the
complications of a complicated region, which I don't expect to
go away anytime soon, but with American national interests and
our need to defend them.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Secretary, bring us up to date on
Russia, from your perspective. I know this is an unclassified
hearing here, but are you concerned about Russia at times?
Secretary Carter. Yes. Yes. And I think you characterized
it quite well. And our response to that, and our posture on
that, is a strong one, a balanced one, strong in the sense that
we are making investments, I detailed some of those, our budget
details more, to make sure that we keep our military edge
there.
Senator Shelby. Number one.
Secretary Carter. Yes. We are also quadrupling the European
Reassurance Initiative, which allows us to do more with our
NATO partners there. We're challenging our NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organization) partners and working with them to develop
what I've called a new playbook for NATO, a playbook that
anticipates the kind of aggression or undermining, ``little
green men'' type undermining, that will be different from the
old Cold War situation, but still needs to be countered. So we
have a lot of concerns about Russia. We work with them where we
can, but where we can't, we need to stand strong.
Senator Shelby. We live in a tough world, don't we?
Secretary Carter. We do.
RD-180 ENGINE
Senator Shelby. Sir, just to digress just a minute. The RD-
180 engines, we've talked about this, we've worked with you
before on that----
Secretary Carter. Yes.
Senator Shelby [continuing]. Some of us have here. How
important is it, one, for us to build the American engine,
which we all want to do, you know, down the road, not to rely
on anybody except ourselves? And how important is it that we
have those engines, a number of them, for a few years, we do
this for our national security to keep from having----
Secretary Carter. Well, our budget does propose that we
continue to buy RD-180s for a time, and I'll explain why. Down
the road, we want to have two or more competitive launch
service providers that are purely American, that's where we
would like to get to. In the meantime, we have to launch our
national security payloads, and there are two ways we can do
that: we can hold our noses, buy RD-180s, until that situation
is created, or--and fly Atlases with RD-180s; the alternative
is to fly our payloads on Delta, which is technically feasible,
but much more expensive. And so that's the choice, and we have
chosen the choice of going Atlas, recognizing the distasteful
fact that that necessitates purchase of up to 18 more RD-180
engines, the alternative being Delta, but the alternative being
much more expensive. It's that simple.
Senator Shelby. Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran. The Chair now recognizes Senator Steve
Daines, the distinguished Senator from Montana.
Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Carter and General Dunford, for being
here this morning.
Last month, the President held a nuclear summit here in
Washington speaking about the need for our allies to protect
their nuclear weapons, and all the same time while here in
America in our backyards we're not meeting our own security
standards. It's been made public now that our Vietnam era
helicopters don't meet the requirements to provide adequate
security to the nuclear silos in Montana as well as Wyoming and
North Dakota. The Air Force has known about this since before
9/11.
Given the increased risk for terrorism here at home, I'm
concerned on how low the priority list this seems to be. The
Air Force still has not decided how they're going to replace
these helicopters, but either direction they go is going to
take over a year, and I think that's unacceptable.
INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
Secretary Carter, what steps has the Department taken to
move this timeline forward? And when can we expect to see
helicopters that actually meet the security requirements to
properly defend our ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missile)?
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator. First of all, let me
associate myself with your basic premise, which is we need a
safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent as far into the
future as I can see. And the ICBMs are a critical part of that,
and for their safety, a replacement of the UH-1Ns, which are
now the helicopters, very old helicopters, that convey the
security forces around the silo fields, as you very well know,
definitely need to be replaced. They need that to be done
urgently. I'm monitoring that closely, the acquisition strategy
that the Air Force and the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics are putting together to do that.
There are a couple of alternatives there. They're moving
forward with that, and I think perhaps the best thing I can do
is offer you a briefing on their acquisition strategy. But they
are under direction to go quickly in view of precisely the fact
that you cite and that Admiral Haney has certainly brought to
my attention, also to the Chairman's attention, so I'm very
aware of the issue.
Senator Daines. I appreciate it. And we have a very porous
northern border there, it's big country out there in Montana
and the Dakotas and so forth, so I appreciate your support, and
I look forward to a briefing on that, Secretary Carter, as
well.
I wondered, has the Department considered activating the
National Guard or utilizing other resources that might secure
the weapons until the Air Force purchases a replacement
helicopter that meets the requirements?
Secretary Carter. Senator, that may be a very good idea. I
have not heard that in our discussions. I'll take that back and
add it. I should say that the Guard in general around the
country provides a critical augmentation for us in NORTHCOM and
also STRATCOM. So it is part of the planning in both of those
commands to make use of the reserve component, including the
Guard. And, of course, the Guard has proven very valuable to us
overseas over the last 15 years.
Senator Daines. All right. Thank you, Secretary Carter.
I want to talk a little about cyber attacks potential
threat to our nuclear assets. The fact that the Air Force can't
physically secure our nuclear weapons makes me concerned that
they can't protect them from one of our fastest growing threats
that our Nation faces, and that's the cyber attack threat.
I've been in the nuclear launch centers there in Montana.
In fact, they look like something out of a Cold War movie, and
that's because they haven't been updated since then. In fact,
some of the communications equipment was designed in 1975,
critical communications equipment, and I think, if I remember,
John Denver's ``Thank God I'm A Country Boy'' was a top 10 hit
that year.
CYBER DEFENSE
While I understand some older equipment may actually have
its benefits, the risk of cyber attacks is out there. It's
especially true with communications equipment because some of
our nuclear emergency action messages and retargeting messages
are traveling over telephone wires. I think we both can agree
there is some risk in that.
Secretary Carter, what steps is the Department taking this
year to increase the cyber defense of our nuclear command,
control, and communications systems?
Secretary Carter. Well, Senator, I'm highly aware of the
issue you raised. My very first job in the Department of
Defense in 1980 was at its center, Nuclear Command and Control,
and a lot of those systems haven't changed since then. The only
good thing I'll say about that is that because they're not
heavily computerized, they're not easy to get into with a cyber
attack either. But we do need to modernize them, as you say,
and we're investing a lot of management attention, I think of
the Chairman and myself, and also resources in doing so.
I prefer going into detail with that in the form of a
classified briefing to you on the side, but your basic point,
which is that as we modernize the command and control system,
it inevitably includes modern information technology in it, it
will, of necessity, have cyber vulnerabilities. And CYBERCOM's
first job is to protect our own networks, and Admiral Rogers,
our CYBERCOM commander, knows that nuclear command and control
is our most important network; therefore, the most important
part of the most important part of his job is to secure the
nuclear command and control systems from cyber attack, and the
Chairman knows that, and we work on that.
And perhaps you would like to add something, Chairman?
General Dunford. No, sir, but I think you'll see that, when
you say, ``What are we doing?'' I think you'll see it in two
places in the budget. You know, I mentioned the nuclear command
and control up front; we need to modernize that. And then
there's about $6.7 billion in the budget this year invested in
cyber specifically, and I think both of those areas are going
to improve the challenge that you talked about.
Senator Daines. All right. Thank you, General Dunford.
Senator Cochran. The time of the Senator has expired.
Senator Daines. I'm the son of a Marine, General Dunford,
so I got raised right. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. The distinguished Senator from Missouri,
Mr. Blunt.
MILITARY FAMILY STABILITY
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman. I want to talk to both
of you, both General Dunford and the Secretary, about a bill
that I introduced last year with Senator Gillibrand, from New
York, called the Military Family Stability Act. I think it's
very much in line with the initiative that you're making, the
Force of the Future initiative, where people could even stay at
an assignment longer if that was something that worked better
for education or a spouse's professional career.
What we were proposing, Secretary and General, what we were
proposing, and are proposing, is that there be another option,
which would be that people, the family, could either stay a
little longer or could move a little earlier. We'd like some
help that I think we're not getting from the Department to talk
about how we could make this work in a way that would minimize
the cost but still maximize the opportunity.
And, General, I know that in your great career, you have to
have seen a number of times when families were needlessly
frustrated because the school year was a month before it
started or a month after it was over or--we had a media
opportunity on this and had several spouses come in, one being
transferred from Florida to--or from Hawaii, rather, to Fort
Leonard Wood, so she got a teaching contract at the University
of Missouri Science and Technology. She got in a Ph.D. program
at Saint Louis University, but then the move didn't occur in
June, and then the move didn't occur in July, and she went
ahead and had to move. Her husband would have been more than
willing to go to available quarters on the base and let her
move become the move for the family, and that just wasn't
allowed. I would think in what you're trying to do to keep
these highly trained people in the military, a greater level of
flexibility.
So I want you to respond to that, but also what I want you
to do is help us figure out if it keeps costs down to limit
this to two times in a career or 60 days instead of 6 months.
We proposed up to 6 months thinking seldom would a family use
this, seldom would they use it for 6 months, but when we talked
to people in your office, it's, ``Well, we want to multiply
this by 6 months for every family that ever possibly moves and
assume they'll all take advantage of it.'' It's just not
reasonable, and I think it's what you're trying to do. But we
could use more flexibility when someone needs to move, wants to
move, but just a month or two would make a big difference for
their family.
So if you would just both respond to that, that's my
question.
Secretary Carter. I'll start off, and then General Dunford
and I have talked about this. First let me thank you and
Senator Gillibrand for identifying this issue. I couldn't agree
with you more. We are a married force. More than 70 percent of
our officers are married. More than half of our enlisted are
married. And so we try to do everything we can consistent with
the profession of arms and readiness and cost to make their
military service and their family life compatible. That's why
we extended maternity leave and paternity leave, but only as
much as we could consistent with costs and readiness, and have
taken other steps. So I appreciate that. And to your question,
we would look forward to working with you on that.
I think, as I understand the proposal, and as we worked on
the proposal, cost is--I understand the intent, agree with the
intent--managing the cost is the issue, so we're happy to work
with you to that end.
And with that, let me see what the Chairman would like to
add.
General Dunford. Senator, I am aware of the challenge that
you outlined, and like Secretary Carter, I very much appreciate
your focus on military families. And I think without hyperbole
we could say we would never have the quality all-volunteer
force we have today, we would never be able to have done what
we've done over the past 14 years in particular, were we not to
have strong families supporting our men and women in uniform.
I've also looked at it, and one, I'll commit to working
with you and your staff to try to make whatever adjustments are
necessary to move that through, and I have, over my career,
seen countless individuals who have had to make those difficult
choices. If my wife were here, I would tell you exactly how
many moves we've made, but I think it's somewhere in the order
of 20, and it's actually eight in the last 7 years. Now, our
children are all grown, so it's a little easier these days. But
I have made the choice on a couple of occasions to precede my
family for exactly the reason you outlined, so that they could
finish the school year and then join me at my next duty
station.
So I conceptually fully support what we've trying to do
here and again appreciate your focus on that. And I think that
what we want to do is balance the money. What I would say is
this, if we had another dollar to spend on families, this might
not be priority one, but it would be a priority. In other
words, there are a number of things our families have come to
us, and that's a big piece of what I think we want to talk
about as well as if we had another dollar to spend on families,
where would we spend it? And we've spent a lot of time
soliciting their input, and we would like to make that part of
the dialogue as well.
Senator Blunt. Thank you both.
Senator Cochran. The Chair recognizes the distinguished
Senator from Maine, Senator Collins.
RUSSIAN CAPABILITY
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Carter and General Dunford, Russia, as Senator
Shelby has pointed out, has been increasingly aggressive in the
Ukraine, in the Baltics, and in the Middle East. The reckless
and provocative actions of the Russian military forces deployed
in these areas increase the likelihood of a miscalculation that
could lead to real problems between Russia and NATO. In
addition to the violation of Turkish airspace by a Russian
fighter, two Russian fighter jets recently flew dangerously and
recklessly close to a U.S. destroyer, the USS Donald Cook,
which was built in Bath Iron Works, by the way, in recent days.
And Russian helicopters shortly thereafter also harassed the
destroyer, flying in a simulated attack profile and failing to
respond to numerous safety advisories that were sent in both
Russian and in English.
I am interested in knowing what conversations you each have
had with the Russian Defense Ministry to protest these very
dangerous incidents and to reduce the likelihood that Russian
military forces operating near our NATO forces will engage in
behavior that eventually is going to lead to military
engagement or a serious problem and accident.
Secretary Carter. Thanks, Senator. First let me say I share
your concern as we do more and as Russia does more. That's the
nature of the tension that has built up in Europe especially
over the last couple of years since events in Crimea and
Ukraine. It's important that the Russian military conduct
itself professionally in the way ours invariably does, and
Russia has not always done that.
And to answer your question, I'll start and then the
Chairman can do it. We do have a channel both for the Middle
East, a military-to-military working channel, to deal with
unprofessional conduct and unsafe or potentially dangerous
incidents. We have that at sea, we have it in the air. It
operates quite well, by the way, in Syria, even though we and
Russia don't see the events in Syria at all the same way. We
have managed at a professional military level to avoid
incidents, and that's worked very well, but it hasn't worked
perfectly all around the world. And so we do bring these things
up through Russian channels. We have seen more of them in
recent years. They are dangerous. It's unprofessional behavior.
Let me just ask if the Chairman wants to add anything
about----
Senator Collins. General.
General Dunford. Senator, I share your concern about both
Russian capability development and their behavior of late. The
Secretary talked about the specific mechanism we have in place
to deal with these kind of issues. I initiated a dialogue in
the fall with my counterpart, General Gerasimov. I have now
spoken to him three times. And the real reason for trying to
establish that relationship is exactly to get at the issue that
you raised, and that is to mitigate the risk of miscalculation,
which when you look at the nuclear enterprise, the cyber
enterprise, the space enterprise, conventional capabilities,
and what we increasingly see now, you know, those activities
that really fall short of traditional war, but nonetheless
affect our national interest and national interest of our
partners, I think the risk of miscalculation arguably is
greater than it was in the Cold War because the spectrum of
challenges is wider today than it was traditionally narrow to
just the nuclear enterprise. So we have agreed not to share in
public the nature of our conversations so I can maintain that
dialogue over time, but our Nation has conveyed the message
that you'd expect us to convey on these particular incidents.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I hope it was a very tough
message.
Finally, in my 25 seconds that I have remaining, let me
just express to Secretary Carter my disappointment in the
Department's reversal of its commitment to provide American-
made athletic footwear to new recruits. Under the longstanding
Berry Amendment, our troops are supposed to be outfitted with
clothing and footwear that is made in this country, and that's
why I've recently introduced legislation that's been
cosponsored by several of my colleagues to require the
Department to follow the law.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
The distinguished Senator from Illinois, Mr. Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And members of the committee, I want to apologize for not
being here at the outset. We had a last-minute meeting, caucus
meeting, called, and we're doing everything within our power to
maintain peace and harmony in the Senate, so it took a few
moments.
[Laughter.]
MILITARY AIRCRAFT
Senator Durbin. I was late in attending, and I apologize.
I saw that video, but you both saw it too, as those planes
were flying over the Donald Cook, right over their ship. And I
called the Russian ambassador afterwards and said, ``What was
this all about?'' ``Oh,'' he says, ``they were perfectly within
their rights to do that.'' It didn't sound right to me. So give
me, if you will, some basic standards here where we can judge
that kind of conduct. And also, if you can't put yourself in
the place of the commander of that vessel as he sees a foreign
aircraft approaching, he has a responsibility too, to the crew
on board. What standards would he use in response?
Secretary Carter. Well, thanks, Vice Chairman, and I'll
start out and then ask the Chairman to pitch in, but it is
quite clear what standards of professionalism are when one
military aircraft is approaching another warship, so it's not
plausible that that kind of conduct was normal and
professional, and we don't think it was normal and
professional, as again, our people conduct themselves normally
and professionally in all cases.
With respect to the behavior of our own people, I mean, I
think it was very commendable, they didn't act in such a way as
to escalate what was an inherently unsafe situation, but
there's a real risk there because that ship captain has a
responsibility to defend his ship, and an inherent right of
self-defense. And so he doesn't have to ask anybody up the
chain of command, to me, or anything when it comes to his
inherent right of self-defense, and we expect him to exercise
that right in an appropriate way. That creates, in
circumstances like this, an inherent danger, and that's why
what the Russians were doing is so unprofessional and so
concerning to us, but our own people comported themselves, as
they always do, in the way you would expect very
professionally.
And I'll ask the Chairman if he wants to add anything.
General Dunford. Vice Chairman, there is a very fundamental
requirement that the Russians had that they didn't observe, and
that is, to communicate clearly what their intent is. And what
is that so important? It's because the commanding officer of
the ship has to make an assessment as to hostile action and
hostile intent. And I can tell you the combination of unsafe
aviation practices, and there are well-known norms that they
should have remained within, combined with failing to properly
communicate what they were doing, puts that commanding officer
in a situation where he's got to make a judgment call.
And back to Senator Collins' question, that type of
behavior absolutely risks--establishes risk and miscalculation
and obviously something much broader than just Russian unsafe
and irresponsible behavior in and around the USS Donald Cook.
Senator Durbin. Several times I've had this conversation
with the Russian ambassador about my concern about the safety
of the Baltics, Poland, and many of our allies in that region
of the world. He has said--he almost laughs me off, ``Why do
you keep bringing that up? I don't know why you're so concerned
with it.'' This incident occurring near that theater is proof
positive that we can't take this for granted, and I can assure
you, I think you already know, the feelings of these countries
is the United States is essential to their future, and our NATO
alliance continues to be an important part of it. Now, there's
a pretty substantial increase in the European Reassurance
Initiative and the request by the administration. And I would
like to ask you, if you can, to tell, expand a little bit on,
what we think in this coming year needs to be done to make it
clear that we're going to stand by our allies in NATO.
EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE
Secretary Carter. Yes. There is a whole host of things, and
I'll describe some of the most important ones, and then the
Chairman can add whatever I've forgotten. Yes, we have
quadrupled our request for the ERI (European Reassurance
Initiative), hope we get favorable consideration of that. We
think it's necessary. What is it going to pay for? It pays for
more presence on a rotational basis of U.S. forces, ground
forces, air forces, and naval forces in theater with particular
attention to the Baltic States, who are very much exposed on
that flank of NATO. It also provides equipment, including heavy
equipment, tanks, armored personnel, carriers, artillery, and
so forth, both rotationally deployed and in what in the old
days we called pre-pos, that's pre-positions, there's another
name for them now, I forget, but just a whole host of stuff.
Senator Durbin. If I can interrupt just one second. Mr.
Secretary, my time is up, but I also believe that the buildup
in Kaliningrad is something that we should be very mindful of.
Most Americans don't know where Kaliningrad is, but it is
smack-dab in the middle of this theater, and it's controlled by
the Russians.
Secretary Carter. Yes.
Senator Cochran. The time of the Senator has expired.
The distinguished Senator from South Carolina, Mr. Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is an appropriations hearing, so we're trying to
figure out, do we have the money, right? If we go back in
sequestration next year, if there is not some relief from
sequestration, how much damage will that do to our ability to
deal with the threats we just discussed?
Secretary Carter. Well, it does a lot of damage. It does
the physical damage, meaning that we can't pay for the things
that we have programmed we think are essential----
Senator Graham. Would it seriously compromise the ability
to defend this Nation?
Secretary Carter. It does.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General Dunford?
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. Since 2011, when sequestration first went
into effect, we've had the Syrian civil war, the collapse of
Libya, the rise of ISIL, holding territory the size of Indiana,
Russia's invasion of the Ukraine, annexation of the Crimea,
China is building islands over resource-rich waters claimed by
others, the Iranians are destabilizing the Mideast, they are in
fact in control of four capitals, and North Korea is running
wild. Is that a fair assessment of the highlights of what's
happened since 2011? I may have left a few out.
Secretary Carter. I think it's a fair assessment.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Secretary Carter. It's a dangerous world out there, and
that's why we've got to avoid sequestration.
DEFENSE SPENDING
Senator Graham. Since 2011, we've cut defense spending by
$150 billion. Does that make any sense to you given the threats
I just described?
Secretary Carter. I described in my opening statement my
dismay----
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General Dunford?
Secretary Carter [continuing]. Over the budget over the
last 7, 8 years the way it's happened.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General Dunford?
General Dunford. I agree it doesn't make any sense,
Senator.
Senator Graham. The last time we looked at a strategy-
driven budget, not across the board hitting an artificial
number, was 2012 when you looked at the strategies we need to
deal with the threats we face. We're $400 billion short of
funding that strategy. Would you say now is the time to close
that gap?
Secretary Carter. Two things about that. You've got to--we
have done our job, which is to create our budget around our
strategy. I described that strategy and the principal threats
that it needs to counter. The only thing I would say about 2012
is it's now 2016, and so things are different, and I think you
gave some examples of ways in which things are different.
Senator Graham. Yes, if we're----
Secretary Carter. We're not trying to carry out a strategy
that is 4 years old. We're trying to carry out our strategy of
today, and where we have a Russia that is more clearly
problematic than it was 4 years ago, we have the ISIL campaign
to wage. So both in the base and the OCO (Overseas Contingency
Operations) you seek reflected the strategy that's appropriate
to right now.
Senator Graham. Gotcha. So we were $400 billion short in
2012, and the threats were less then.
What percentage of DOD's budget is health care?
TRICARE COSTS
Secretary Carter. The healthcare is about $50 billion out
of the 500-odd-ish, so about a little over 10 percent.
Senator Graham. What will it be in 15 years?
Secretary Carter. Well, it had been growing, as healthcare
costs had throughout the country, in a really unsustainable way
up until about 2----
Senator Graham. Is it still unsustainable?
Secretary Carter. No, it has slowed. I don't think that we
take credit for that, our own management, in that regard.
That's a trend you see around the country as well, but it's
very welcomed to us because $50 billion is a lot of money, we
want to take good care of our people and their families, but
$50 billion----
Senator Graham. We haven't had a premium adjustment in
TRICARE since 1995 of any significance. Is it time to have a
premium adjustment?
Secretary Carter. We have made some adjustments, and we are
proposing more this year.
Senator Graham. What percentage of TRICARE costs are
absorbed by the patient population?
Secretary Carter. Let me ask if Under Secretary McCord
knows. I'm sure we can get you that number.
Mr. McCord. It has dropped----
Senator Graham. It's 5 percent, I think. So get back with
me on that.
[The information follows:]
In 1996, when TRICARE was fully implemented, a working age
retiree's family of three who used civilian care contributed on average
roughly 27 percent of the total cost of its healthcare. Today that
percentage has dropped to less than 9 percent.
V-22
Senator Graham. I just got back from Moron, Spain. The
Marines are doing a great job, as they do everywhere. Their
goal, their mission, there is to provide quick reaction force
in case one of our embassies or consulates in that part of the
world, in Africa, finds itself in a situation of Benghazi. They
fly the V-22. I was told they have two teams that can pre-
position and in a couple of days get to where we need to go.
They're doing the best they can with what they have. I was also
told, due to training problems with our pilots, they're going
to have to take six of the V-22s out of the fight to redeploy
them back to the United States to have more planes so that our
pilots can meet their training requirements. Have you heard
that, General Dunford?
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
General Dunford. Senator, I have, and I will tell you that
that is characteristic of the aviation enterprise across the
board. There is not enough of what we call ready basic aircraft
to maintain----
Senator Graham. I want this committee to know if there is a
bad situation next year, that the marines cannot get there,
that because of budget problems, we're having to take aircraft
out of the fight, redeploy them back to the United States, and
their capability to deploy is going to be cut in half.
General Dunford. Senator, if I could touch on that, we
looked at this pretty hard. We can meet the requirement. And I
realize that you were just in Moron, but I personally in a
previous life, not in this job, in a previous life, spent a lot
of time on this issue.
Senator Graham. Are they going to take the six airplanes
back?
General Dunford. They are, and there are going to be
sufficient planes to meet the requirement established by the
combatant commander. And that will allow us to--here was the
choice we had, we can meet the requirement once or twice with
the contingent of aircraft that are on the ground right now, or
we can meet the requirement on a sustained basis with an
adjusted level of aircraft. Were I to have the perfect world, I
would have been able to do both, which is have sufficient
aircraft back home in a sufficient deployment-to-dwell rate and
thicken the operational forces forward to mitigate risk
further.
What I'm confident of is that we have the minimum aircraft
to meet the combatant commander's requirement, and no, I'm not
happy that we had to reduce the number from 12 to 6, that does
reduce the flexibility, it reduces the depth, but it was a
decision, I'll be honest with you, I was personally involved in
that decision before I changed assignments.
Senator Graham. You had to make that decision.
General Dunford. I had to make that decision.
Senator Graham. Because we put you in that spot.
General Dunford. We were balancing risk on two sides, and
the risk management we did was those six aircraft.
Secretary Carter. Can I just amplify that? That is a small
piece of a major issue. The Marine Corps' principal readiness
issue has to do with aircraft maintenance at this----
Senator Cochran. The time of the Senator has expired.
The distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, thank you. I'll begin
with a headline from the New York Times, April 20th, ``Russia
Bolsters Its Submarine Fleet, and Tensions With U.S. Rise,''
which raises a question from our perspective of the continued
construction and deployment of the Virginia-class submarine,
particularly VPM, which allows us to make up for the retirement
of some converted Ohio-class submarines. How critical is that
to our ability to confront what is already recognized as a
resurgent Russia undersea?
Secretary Carter. It's critical for Russia and all the
other--four, at least, of the five other dangers we face. I
should just--want to amplify what you said, and what I said in
my statement. Undersea dominance is an area of clear American
dominance. We want to keep that edge. That's why, as you say,
we're doing the Virginia Payload Module, the Virginia
submarines themselves, unmanned undersea--you know about things
that we're doing that we can't really talk about here, but
keeping that undersea dominance is critical.
Senator Reed. And that requires adequate robust funding,
not just in this year, but going forward.
Secretary Carter. Yes.
SUBMARINES
Senator Reed. In fact, operationally, we dropped I think to
48 submarines at some point, which is much lower than the
COCOMs----
Secretary Carter. SSNs, yes.
Senator Reed. In fact, every COCOM that I've spoken to, and
also the CNOs, is that they cannot meet all the demands for
submarines. Is that correct, General Dunford?
General Dunford. It is. The numbers of submarines that are
being requested even today, Senator, by the combatant
commanders, falls less than the inventory that we have.
Senator Reed. And then switching gears, but another aspect,
which is the Ohio-class replacement, the nuclear triad is a
significant deterrent force, thank goodness, and the first leg
of that triad that's being renovated or remodeled, whatever
the--replaced is the submarine, and somewhat obvious, it's the
most durable leg because of its abilities to stealth.
Secretary Carter. Yes.
Senator Reed. That is going to require some relief in the
Navy shipbuilding budget going forward. Are you contemplating
that, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Carter. Yes. I think we all recognize the Ohio-
replacement program, if it comes out of the rest of the
shipbuilding program of the Navy, it will decimate the
shipbuilding program of the Navy. We can't have that, so we're
going to need additional funding. And it is the critical
survivable and enduring part of our triad, and that's why
building those 12 boats with the 16 tubes to replace the 14
boats we now have with the smaller number of tubes, we'll have
more tubes overall, and a new submarine has to be done because
the hull has submerged and come to the surface so many times,
the hull gets stressed, and there is no way you can keep that
going, so we've got to replace them.
Senator Reed. And we have a National Sea-Based Deterrence
Fund, which is a prototype really, not just for the sea-based
deterrence, but eventually as we get further down in the
development of the penetrating bomber and recapitalization of
our land-based systems, we'll need a similar fund, but that is
a vehicle that you could use, and do you anticipate using to
help relieve this pressure?
Secretary Carter. Yes. We're going to need some budget
relief of some kind. Unfortunately, the money has got to come
with a new label, but----
Senator Reed. Just one other issue, which has been brought
up, and this is the impact of sequestration. And most of your
activities involve not just the Department of Defense, but
other agencies, SOUTHCOM particularly with respect to homeland
security, with the Coast Guard, the State Department constantly
in every venue. They face similar issues, I presume, and even
if you were to be granted relief, if they are not able to pull
their weight, you can't get the job done. Is that a fair
estimate?
Secretary Carter. It is. I have said this has been part of
our budget discussions over the last few years over the
sequester. Obviously, I'm the Secretary of Defense, so I care
very deeply about the defense budget, but I know we can't do
the job of protecting our country as one agency. We do need
Homeland Security, we need the Intelligence, we need the State
Department, we need the Energy Department, it makes big
contributions, and so forth. And then I'm also aware that all
the technology we've been talking about comes from the American
technology base. So the country's larger strength is also
important to our military strength. So important as we are, I
realize we can't do the job all by ourselves.
Senator Reed. I think the Chairman wants to make a brief
comment.
Senator Cochran. The time of the Senator has expired.
Senator Reed. Excuse me.
Senator Cochran. The distinguished Senator from Kansas is
recognized.
GUANTANAMO BAY
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me
ask just a couple of questions and make a few comments.
Mr. Secretary, we've had conversations about Guantanamo Bay
detainees, and I want to follow up on that. First of all, tell
you that I visited Guantanamo Bay in February. A couple of
observations. First of all, I want to make certain that our
most senior military leaders are not afterthoughts in the
decisionmaking process that may occur in regard to what happens
to detainees at GTMO. I remain totally opposed to bringing them
to the United States, but I have had enough conversations with
military officers to believe that there is not adequate
consultation with folks who would be fully engaged in--should
be fully engaged in the decision, but fully engaged in their
detention here in the United States. Is that not a--you're
shaking your head.
Secretary Carter. First of all, I thank you very much for
visiting them. And I'm incredibly proud of the job they do down
there. They're extraordinarily professional, and it's a lousy
job in many ways that we give them. So I appreciate your going
there, and I'm sure it bucked them up to have you there.
The reason that we take such care, I do, and you're talking
about uniformed involvement, the Chairman, but also the
Attorney General, the FBI Director, and the Director of the
CIA, and the Director of National Intelligence, and everybody
in any of these matters that involve transfer to the custody of
another country, the reason we take that so seriously is that
we want that done in a way that it mitigates the risk of a
return, which we saw a lot of in years past. We don't want to
see any more of that.
But the fundamental thing is that not all of these guys can
ever be transferred, in my judgment. So that raises the issue
of, what are we going to do with these people that I can just
tell you, not on my watch, and I'll bet you not on my
successor's watch either, is anybody going to transfer these
people. So I personally would prefer, and I've said this
openly, that we find another place to do it in the United
States, and I know that that's something you don't support, and
others do, but I do believe it would be better to put--and I
would like to have that done before the next President comes
along, get this off his or her plate, if possible.
But the underlying reality, the reason we need a detention
facility, an enduring detention facility, for these people is
that some of them are too dangerous, and there is no way that
we're going to, even with extensive consultations with another
country, and them giving us all the safeguards and so forth
that we receive, that I'm going to say it's safe to transfer
them. So we need a facility that keeps on.
You might want to add to that, if you're welcomed to.
Senator Moran. Mr. Secretary, let me, and then maybe
perhaps General Dunford can add, let me add two other
observations from my visit to Guantanamo Bay. One, I learned
that GTMO detainees know of their transfer before Members of
Congress do. You're required by law to notify Congress, but I
am told that they learn of that potential transfer before we
do, and I've introduced legislation with a number of my
colleagues to make certain that we not just are notified but
have ability to prevent that transfer.
And, secondly, a concerning issue that arose in my
conversations while at GTMO is, what is happening in
circumstances today when a terrorist is captured in Syria? In
Afghanistan? In Iraq? I'm told that there are memorandums of
agreement in some countries, but not in Syria. We have not had
a detainee brought to GTMO since 2008, and I have a real
interest in knowing what's transpiring across the globe when we
detain and capture someone, and where are they going? Perhaps
that a conversation for a different setting.
Secretary Carter. It is. We have a number of options, and
so we think that through, and basically we deal with it on a
case-by-case basis, and I would prefer that we do that in a
different setting.
Senator Moran. General Dunford, have I excluded you from
something you wanted to say?
General Dunford. Senator, just very quickly, first, I was
down after your visit, and I very much appreciate you visiting,
and the men and women that are down there very much did. And I
think the one thing you saw down there, despite whatever
conversations we had about Guantanamo Bay, the one thing we can
all be proud of is the behavior of the men and women down
there, the discipline and the commitment that they have to the
mission. I most recently was down there in March and couldn't
have been more impressed.
I want to assure you that I have had opportunity to talk
about this issue with Secretary Carter and the President on
several occasions, and the point I've made is, number one, we
have to have a place to detain people when they're picked up on
the battlefield; number two, there has to be some system that
we have to prosecute those that need to be prosecuted; and
number three, those that are found guilty, there has to be
long-term incarceration available if, through the legal system,
we determine they have to be there. And those three
requirements, whether or not we have a facility currently in
Guantanamo Bay or in the United States, all have to be
adequately addressed, and I think that's the most important
military equity.
And then, of course, on the mechanics of moving to the
United States, the costing and all those kinds of things,
Admiral Tidd, who I believe you saw on that visit, he is
personally engaged in supporting the administration and the
details of moving Guantanamo Bay to the United States were that
to be done.
Senator Cochran. The time of the Senator has expired.
Senator Moran. Thank you to those who serve in Guantanamo
Bay.
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cochran. The distinguished Senator from Montana is
recognized, Mr. Tester.
Senator Tester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today, and thank
you for what you do.
NUMBER OF AMERICAN TROOPS ON THE GROUNDS
The President recently announced they will be increasing
the number of American troops on the ground in Syria and Iraq
by 250 and 200 respectively. I had heard on the news shortly
after that that our allies are making the same kind of
commitment. Is that correct?
Secretary Carter. It is. It is. They're----
Senator Tester. And is the number of troops that our
allies, the NATO allies, are sending in, they can't be sending
250----
Secretary Carter. It's substantial in Iraq. I believe the
number is around 2,500, so it's----
Senator Tester. Total?
Secretary Carter. This is just in Iraq.
Senator Tester. Yes.
Secretary Carter. They're doing more, and I can't--I don't
want to speak for them because these are their special forces--
--
Senator Tester. No, no, no. That's fine.
Secretary Carter [continuing]. And they and we try to be
quiet about what we're doing.
Senator Tester. Yes, well, if it's classified----
Secretary Carter. But they're in there all--but, no,
they're in there also. And of course, I have been urging--and
I'll be back in Brussels next week meeting with members of the
coalition, getting others to do more as we do more to get this
done.
SYRIA
Senator Tester. Okay. That's good. And I appreciate that.
What about Syria? Is it the same kind of effort?
Secretary Carter. And ditto in Syria.
Senator Tester. What's--and ditto in Syria?
Secretary Carter. They're coalition partners, a somewhat
different mix----
Senator Tester. Okay. Perfect.
Secretary Carter [continuing]. Of parties in Iraq and
Syria, they have different relationships with those two
countries.
Senator Tester. Okay. And are they following these troops
with additional resources? I assume the United States is.
Secretary Carter. Yes. Yes, they are. Obviously, we're
always urging them to do more, even as we're looking for
opportunities to do more ourselves. And one area where we
talked to the Gulf countries, I was in the Gulf last week with
the President, was on stabilization and reconstruction. You
know, Ramadi is now recaptured, but it's a mess, so somebody
has to get the water going, get the power going, get the
schools opened, and that kind of thing, and so we're looking to
some of our partners in the Gulf and in Europe to help us in
that dimension as well as the military dimension.
Senator Tester. And I'll apologize for my next questions
ahead of time because I don't know that you're going to know
the answer, but if you do, God bless you. What are our short-
term objectives there, in Syria, and in Iraq as far as that
goes? We'll just call it Middle East.
Secretary Carter. Oh, yes. In Syria, the immediate
objectives are to continue to what Shaddadi did, namely, to
separate and make impossible or very difficult any travel or
communication between Mosul and Raqqa, effectively sever the
tumor in half.
Senator Tester. Okay. Okay.
Secretary Carter. And, secondly, begin to gather forces and
enable them. That's where the 1209 funding I mentioned earlier
comes in to Raqqa, because the objective in Syria is to
collapse ISIL's control of Raqqa. In Iraq, the next step after
Ramadi and Heet, the thing we're focused on is collecting and
positioning before Ramadan commences the forces for the
envelopment of Mosul. Some of those are ISF forces coming from
the south, some of them are two brigades of peshmerga coming
from the north. We would like to complete that envelopment
before Ramadi. So those are two of the immediate operational
objectives.
Senator Tester. Okay. And to achieve those two objectives,
how long?
Secretary Carter. We would like that, the objective of
positioning the first for the envelopment of Mosul before
Ramadan, which is now 5 weeks away.
Senator Tester. Okay. And what about cutting off the
communication channels with Syria? What about cutting off the
communication channels in Syria that you talked about?
Secretary Carter. That is something that I've charged our
CYBERCOM with doing.
Senator Tester. Okay.
Secretary Carter. It's the first ever--I can't talk about
that too much in here, but you can imagine we don't think that
people ought to be able to sit in Raqqa planning against
Americans.
Senator Tester. Okay. You talked earlier, and I can't
remember who asked the question about Russia and Syria and the
fact that we don't--we do not see life the same, which is true.
Do we have--do our--Russia and the United States have any
objectives that are the same in Syria?
Secretary Carter. We have objectives--we have objectives in
common with what they said they wanted to do, but not actually
what they did.
Senator Tester. Okay.
ISIL
Secretary Carter. What they said they wanted to do was to
fight ISIL, and that's fine with us, have at it, and they have
every reason to fight ISIL because ISIL is fighting them----
Senator Tester. Right. Right. Gotcha.
Secretary Carter [continuing]. And has for a long time. But
they came in instead and backed Assad.
Senator Tester. Yes.
Secretary Carter. So that wasn't quite--they said one
thing, did another. So we have a problem with their behavior,
but still, if they would get on the right side of this thing,
that would be good.
Senator Tester. One last question, and this is an easy one.
Is there any more to be interpreted into the flyovers that they
talked about by the Russian planes other than just a pilot
screwing around, or is there another message there?
Secretary Carter. I can't speculate on that. It is
unprofessional behavior, and whether it's encouraged from the
top, whether it was encouraged from higher up or not, I can't
say, but we do expect it to be discouraged from higher up from
now on. That's the reason why the Chairman had the
conversations he did, and these pilots need to get the word,
``Hey, knock it off.'' This is unprofessional. This is
dangerous. This could lead somewhere. You know, we're going to
have to--we obviously disagree about things, but we can't be
accidentally stumbling into something.
Senator Cochran. The time of the Senator has expired.
The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator from Alaska,
Ms. Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
F-35
Secretary and General, welcome, and thank you for your
leadership in so many different ways. I just listened to the
discussion this morning so much focus on Russia. I will just
remind my colleagues, 57 miles, 57 miles between my State and
Russia. So we're keeping an eye, as I know you all are.
And I want to speak just very quickly, first of all, about
the F-35s. We had a pretty good announcement this spring. Thank
you. I appreciate the announcement of the record of decision in
signing the two squadrons of the F-35s there at Eielson. This
is the first beddown F-35 at a beddown in the Pacific, and I
think it's a very important step forward in national security.
There is some discussion going on right now among the
Appropriations Committee between the House and the Senate. The
House has suggested that perhaps not the full funding for the
F-35 beddowns be moved forward in the time that has been
prescribed by the administration. Can you tell me in your words
why it's important from a national security perspective that
the Air Force field the F-35As in the Pacific in the 2020-21
timeframe and why it makes sense that we fully fund this
beddown now rather than a more phased approach?
Secretary Carter. I can, Senator. The reason that we put
that in our budget is that the F-35 is one of our, obviously,
our most capable advanced tactical fighter, and it's part of
the Asia-Pacific rebalance, which Alaska is a part of by dint
of strategic location. And we made the decision several years
ago to position our most modern and advanced equipment to the
Asia-Pacific. So we're increasing not only the numbers, but the
qualitative edge of our forces in the Asia-Pacific, and then
some recognition of the vastness of the region, but also that
it is, as I said earlier, the most--the single part of the
world, much as the Middle East is in the news all the time,
this is the part of the world that is most consequential for
America's future because half of the world's population lives
out there and half of the world's economy is out there.
ARCTIC
Senator Murkowski. I appreciate that, and I appreciate the
focus again on the region that I'm talking about within the
Arctic. And we had a conversation last year that I thought was
pretty consequential, and it was regarding the Arctic. At that
time, you stated before this committee that the Arctic is going
to be a major area of importance for the United States
strategically and economically in the future, and you went on
to say, ``I think it's fair to say that we're late to the
recognition of that.'' And you closed your remarks with a
statement, ``I think a plan that is more than aspirational is
needed, and so I would be happy to work with you to that end.''
I found those words very encouraging. I thought it was actually
paradigm shifting, but we haven't really seen much.
I was moving through very quickly this morning as others
were asking to see if there wasn't some more clarity there on
our Nation's defense needs in the Arctic, more so than there
was a year ago, but I'm not seeing a timeline for investments,
I'm not seeing this aspirational plan. So can you give me an
update when it comes to our Arctic defense needs? Are we any
better off than we were a year ago?
Secretary Carter. I can. Oh, absolutely. I agree, I agree
with everything I said then, including the need to do what
we've done this past year, and so we are paying increasingly
attention to our, what I'll call our strategy toward the
Arctic. There's no other way to say it.
I might ask the Chairman to comment on that because I think
that was part of the sum of the exercising that he led just a
few weeks ago.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you.
General Dunford. Senator, I think, first of all, the
decision to leave the brigade, the elements of the brigade
combat team, in Alaska, that I know you were very involved with
was in part----
Senator Murkowski. Well, and thank you. That was so smart,
so important.
General Dunford [continuing]. Informed--I know the
Secretary's decision to do that was in large part informed by
our focus on both the Pacific and the Arctic. I also would tell
you that our investments in undersea, our investments in space
and cyberspace and those kind of things focused on the Russian
threat have to do with every place that Russia operates at, and
increasingly as we think about Russia strategically, you know,
we were focused for some years, I think fair to say, on Europe,
but much broader now as we look at the Russia challenge in
particular, it's a Pacific challenge, it's an Atlantic
challenge, but as you correctly point out this morning, it's an
Arctic challenge as well.
But I would tell you that the capability enhancements that
we're making in those fundamental areas with Russia that have
been spoken about today and are articulated in the President's
budget very much will improve our posture in the Arctic. And
what the Secretary is really alluding to, too, is increasing
the exercise program that General Breedlove has established in
the European Command for the very purpose of deterring Russian
behavior and ensuring that they understand that we can respond
anyplace we need to respond to, and it's also sending a message
to our partners as well that they are assured of that response.
Senator Murkowski. Well, I appreciate that, and my time has
expired.
Senator Cochran. The time of the Senator has expired.
Senator Murkowski. I again thank you for the decision with
the 4th Airborne Combat Brigade Team, but I will remind you
that we're still--it's basically in a 1-year pause, so the real
question then becomes how we deal with that after this next
year. So we look forward to further conversation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. The Senator from New Mexico, Mr. Udall, is
recognized.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much, Chairman Cochran.
And, Secretary Carter and Chairman Dunford, thank you for
your service. Good to have you hear today.
As you probably know, folks from my State have a proud
history of military service, and you may not know this, but
there is more DOD land in New Mexico than any other State. I
think it's about 3.5----
Secretary Carter. I do know that.
Senator Udall [continuing]. Total acres there, 3.5 million
total acres. Each of New Mexico's bases provide a unique
capability that supports our national security, from Kirtland,
its future space capabilities; Holloman, training future RPA
pilots; Special Forces who trained in Cannon and are engaging
ISIS in Iraq and Syria; and just this week, the Navy announced
it's building a railgun facility at White Sands Missile Range.
TEST RANGES
Mr. Secretary, the fiscal year 2017 budget emphasizes
defense innovation. DOD calls these efforts the Third Offset,
and as you know, this will require advanced testing and
evaluation capabilities. And I'm concerned that years of
funding shortfalls at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) could
degrade its capabilities. This could affect Holloman, too,
because it uses WSMR's airspace. Are facilities like White
Sands Missile Range adequately postured to test these future
capabilities? How is DOD addressing these shortcomings?
Secretary Carter. Well, first of all, thank you and
everyone else who has military installations in their State,
for hosting--we have almost invariably wonderful relationships
with the communities in the States, and that's certainly true
in your State, and grateful for it. And I am aware of how much
you do.
And in the specific matter of WSMR and test ranges in
general, we do have a recognition, which is reflected in the
investments that go with the Third Offset and other technology
efforts we have to improve a number of our ranges, WSMR being
one of them. In the years where we were, in my judgment, not
making adequate investments in future technologies, one of the
ways we didn't make those investments was in range
infrastructure upgrades, and so forth. So we know we're a
little behind in that regard. All the services know that, and
they're all investing in improving range instrumentation
facilities and so forth, and that's going on at WSMR and
elsewhere.
Senator Udall. Great. Thank you. The Army recently
conducted a successful test of the Integrated Air and Missile
Defense Battle Command System at White Sands at the range
there, and as the United States rebalances to the Pacific,
missile defense for our allies in South Korea and Japan, it's
of increasing importance. How can we leverage the testing and
facilities at White Sands and Holloman Air Force Base to
increase our coordination and training with both those
countries on missile defense and combined air defense as well
as search and rescue?
Secretary Carter. It's important because integrated air and
missile defense is one of those things that is inherently
regional, and so countries that have a common security threat,
it makes sense for them to work together. That's why we work
with the Japanese and the South Koreans against the North
Korean missile threat, which, as we all know from the news in
recent weeks, is a real one.
And I said I was in the Gulf last week, by the way, and
also there, talking to the Gulf partners, all of whom have
individually procured from us air and missile defense systems.
We're trying to get them to network in the same way. And the
kind of testing we can do at WSMR is the way that you integrate
different kinds of sensors and different kinds of missile
defense systems so they share and apportion the battle space in
a smart way.
Senator Udall. Great. Thank you. Just a final quick
question. As you know, the National Labs have made significant
progress on the B61 life extension. Behind that is the W80-4.
And I guess my question there is, will you work to ensure that
NNSA and the Air Force coordinate appropriately to complete
this on time and within budget?
Secretary Carter. Yeah, absolutely. We need to work, and we
have worked very closely with the Department of Energy. I have
a great relationship with the leadership there, excellent
leadership, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy, and
we have the Nuclear Weapons Council, which is the way that for
decades now DOE, NNSA, and DOD have worked together, and we
need the B61-12 and we need the W80 to keep a safe, secure, and
reliable nuclear deterrent, which we have to have.
Senator Udall. Thank you both. I really appreciate it.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator from New Mexico.
The Chair now recognizes the Senator from Kansas, Mr.
Moran.
CYBER
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I'll try
to be brief in case other Senators have a follow-up question.
Secretary, let me raise a topic that you and I had a
conversation about when we first met cyber, the cyber mission,
cybersecurity. Recruiting is a significant component of our
ability to meet our cyber needs. I am happy to report that 300
new enlisted airmen in Kansas are ready to go to work in
cybersecurity. They're ready to join the force. Unfortunately,
what we know is that security clearances are still being held
up by OPM, and in fact, the indications are that the backlog is
in the thousands and won't catch up till 2025, and I would
raise this topic for your consideration and ask you to help
find a solution at OPM so we can get these young men and women
cleared.
Secretary Carter. Understand, Senator. We're working on
that.
Senator Moran. Thank you very much.
END-FORCE STRENGTH
And then, General, let me talk about end-force strength.
I'm worried that we are downsizing particularly our ground
troops, Marines and Army, beyond what we should be doing, and
particularly in light of recent deployments, I wonder if we're
not putting--I think I know the answer. We're putting fiscal
conditions or considerations ahead of operational and defense
perspective, and I would like your thoughts in regard to that.
General Dunford. Senator, thanks. And my thoughts really
reflect my experience prior to this as a service chief and from
where I sit right now. To me, the number one priority that we
have today is to make sure whatever size force we have is
capable. And so this year, although there were challenges with
the force structure, we said we have the minimum force
structure necessary to meet the strategy, but where I was most
concerned was to make sure that the force that we had, had the
proper training, had the proper equipment, and had the proper
leadership. And so what you have identified is a priority that
we had to make, a choice that we had to make, to balance risk,
the risk of the size of the force and again, it could meet our
strategy. You would always want to have more depth, but I would
only want to, as a leader, have more depth, meaning more force
structure, if I could be assured that that force structure
would be properly supported and translated into capability, and
I think many of our readiness challenges right now reflect that
even with the force structure that we have, we're not providing
adequate training, we're not providing adequate equipment and
weapons and so forth, and now modernization is falling behind.
So trying to achieve that balance, Senator, is really what this
year has been all about.
Senator Moran. General, am I incorrect in my thinking,
which is that in order to have adequate training and
preparation, the size of the end-strength has to be sufficient
because of deployments, you need to be training at the same
time soldiers and marines are being deployed; therefore,
there's a relationship between readiness and end-strength?
General Dunford. No question, Senator. That's absolutely
one of the variables. It's an important variable in our overall
readiness equation.
Senator Moran. Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. I thank the Senator, and I thank all the
Senators for their participation in the hearings.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
And to our distinguished panel of witnesses, we want to
thank you for your continued assistance to the committee and
your participation in this hearing today. We're grateful for
your service, and we look forward to a continuing dialogue
throughout the fiscal year 2017 in the appropriations process.
Senators may submit additional written questions, and we would
appreciate your responding to them in a reasonable time for our
record.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Hon. Ashton B. Carter
Questions Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell
fort knox medical clinic expansion
Question. Will the location of the new Fort Knox medical facility
allow for potential expansion if Fort Knox were to gain additional
active-duty units and servicemembers?
Answer. The location of the new Fort Knox medical facility will
allow for potential expansion if Fort Knox were to gain additional
active-duty units and service members. In accordance with UFC 4-510-01,
the site includes future building expansion for 20 percent of the
enacted DD Form 1391 gross building area. The site also allocates
adjacent land for the construction of a VA Community Based Outpatient
Clinic. Additionally, the demolition of the current Ireland Army
Community Hospital will clear land immediately west of the new medical
clinic, which will then be available for future development.
fort campbell airfield
Question. Does DOD have plans to repave the airfield at Fort
Campbell? If so, please provide details of this plan, including the
anticipated start date.
Answer. Yes, DOD plans to repave the Fort Campbell Army Airfield.
The U.S. Army Mission and Installation Contracting Command-Fort
Campbell announced an anticipated contract award date in mid-June. The
current plan is to begin the repair of the supporting facilities and
infrastructure, including the taxiway, ramp and electrical vaults, in
order to repave the airfield within the April to July 2017 timeframe.
fort campbell barracks
Question. Does DOD house any servicemembers at Fort Campbell in
Korean War-era barracks? If so, does DOD have plans to ensure that
these facilities are brought up to date for Fort Campbell
servicemembers, many of whom have been deployed multiple times?
Answer. Yes, the Fort Campbell training battalion currently
utilizes two Korean War-era barracks buildings for temporary housing.
They have a quality rating of Q2 adequate, and do not require
renovation or repair at this time. The Soldiers are moved to permanent
barracks when they are assigned to their unit, usually within ten days.
military sexual assault prevention and response
Question. What steps is DOD taking to prevent sexual misconduct in
the military? How does DOD plan to ensure that victims of sexual
assault and harassment in the military do not face retaliation for
reporting these crimes?
Retaliation
Answer. The Department is committed to a military culture that
rejects destructive behavior and supports those who have the courage to
report a sexual assault, or any other form of crime or misconduct. We
released the Retaliation Prevention and Response Strategy in late April
2016 to develop a uniform retaliation prevention and response process
across the Department of Defense. The strategy targets key issue areas
associated with retaliation, such as: standardizing definitions,
improving data collection and analysis, streamlining investigation and
accountability efforts, strengthening reporter protections, and
creating a culture intolerant of retaliation.
To further combat retaliation we have:
--Enhanced the Safe Helpline (SHL) to provide an anonymous reporting
option for allegations of retaliation through a secure web form
at safehelpline.org. SHL staff members are trained on how to
guide people to the right authorities in the DOD to report
retaliation allegations;
--Leveraged the Case Management Group chairs (Commanders) to ask
about retaliation allegations reported at the installation
level;
--Enhanced training of first-line supervisors who work with our
youngest troops--those at greatest risk for sexual assault--to
teach the skills needed to intervene early should they witness
inappropriate or retaliatory behavior; and
--Developed tools to assess progress in eliminating retaliation as
follows:
--Refined our survey questions to use questions that are
behaviorally-based, and align with policy and law to
achieve greater clarity as to the scope and specificity of
the range of perceived retaliation, and
--Captured victim feedback on their reported experiences of
retaliation through the Workplace and Gender Relations
Survey, Survivor Experience Survey, and Military
Investigation and Justice Experience Survey.
Sexual Assault
The Department is committed to reinforcing a military culture where
every Service member understands their role in upholding ethical
standards of behavior as a way to prevent sexual assault. We are
engaged in the following actions to further our sexual assault
prevention efforts:
--Expanding Service-led training on intervention to ensure Service
members have the tools and confidence to step in;
--Publicizing sexual assault case outcomes on Service websites and
installations to underscore Service commitment to holding
offenders appropriately accountable;
--Collaborating among base and local communities to foster
responsible alcohol use;
--Updating our prevention strategy to reflect the importance of
addressing risk and protection factors;
--Conducting research at the installation level (Installation
Prevention Project) to identify risk and protective factors in
order to better link sexual assault prevention activities with
desired outcomes; and
--Reinforcing leadership roles and responsibilities using a variety
of information-sharing methods, such as:
--Dialogue with commanders at every level;
--Prevention Roundtable with SAPR prevention leads;
--SAPR Connect Online Portal with nearly 2,000 members around the
world; and
--Quarterly application-focused webinars and workshops.
Tools to Assess Progress in Preventing Sexual Assault:
--Command Climate Surveys which identify strengths and challenges
impacting the work climate. The results of these surveys assess
efforts by commanders and inform commanders of their unit
activities, culture, and deficiencies to be addressed;
--A full range of metrics that include all key attributes of
successful performance measures, such as, changes in
problematic attitudes and behaviors that lead to sexual assault
or retaliatory behaviors for reporting a sexual assault.
Sexual Harassment
OUSD (P&R) established an integrated processing team (IPT) in
February 2016 to further strengthen both the prevention of and response
to sexual harassment policies. The Department is developing policy that
will provide revised terms, definitions, and processes for sexual
harassment prevention and response and will clarify the framework for
oversight of sexual harassment and response programs. The policy will:
--Ensure accountability across all Services and the National Guard
Bureau (NGB) in addressing incidents (including anonymous
reports) of sexual harassment, with additional focus on joint
environments.
--Require the Services and the NGB to provide complete and accurate
data on incidents of sexual harassment (including anonymous
reports) by applying uniform data and reporting requirements.
Ongoing Service activities include:
--Sexual harassment prevention training at all levels of the
organization.
--Department of the Navy's training initiative, Chart the Course, is
scenario-driven interactive training on the prevention of, and
response to, a variety of destructive behaviors, including
sexual harassment, which is conducted by command facilitators.
Training must be completed by all Sailors before September 30,
2016.
--Department of the Navy also conducts face-to-face mandatory annual
Equal Opportunity/Sexual Harassment and formal grievance
procedures training.
--Army Sexual Harassment and Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP)
program uses Integrated Case Reporting System (ICRS) to provide
senior leaders with informational dashboards and reports to
improve their prevention efforts.
--Air Force recently tested the implementation of an automated data
collection and tracking system for the case management of
sexual harassment and discrimination complaints, both formal
and informal. Air Force policy requires that all formal
complaints and commander-directed investigations of informal
complaints be documented in Air Force Equal Opportunity Network
and reported by commanders to the General Court-Martial
Convening Authority.
mental health treatment and care
Question. Many of our Nation's servicemembers continue to struggle
with mental health issues, particularly post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI). Are there any additional
resources or authorities that DOD needs from Congress in order to
provide effective treatment and care to servicemembers with mental
health issues?
Answer. No additional resources or authorities are needed from
Congress at this time. Since September 11, 2001, with the support of
Congress, the Department of Defense (DOD) increased the outlays for
mental healthcare by a 10 percent compounded annual rate from fiscal
year 2002 through fiscal year 2014, with care now embedded into both
primary care clinics and fighting units across the Department. The
number of mental health providers in the Military Health System has
risen 42 percent from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2015.
In 2011, the Department conducted a review of mental health
providers as part of a report to Congress, Mental Health Personnel
Required to Meet Mental Health Care Needs of Service Members, Retired
Members, and Dependents, as required by the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2010, Section 714. At that
time, the Services reported sufficient availability of the current
mental health provider types. Further, a more recent DOD/Department of
Veterans Affairs Report \1\ conveyed that staffing models utilized by
the Services confirmed the Services have the mental health provider
types they need. Mental health treatment services continue to meet the
mental health demands of our Service members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Department of Defense/Department of Veterans Affairs Report to
Congress in Response to Senate Report 113-44, pg. 133, accompanying S.
1197, the NDAA for fiscal year 2014: Mental Health Counselors for
Service Members, Veterans, and Their Families.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also, the NDAA for fiscal year 2015, removed TRICARE statutory
limitations on inpatient psychiatric treatment (30 days for adults, 45
days for children) and residential treatment center care for children
(150 days), enabling removal of all quantitative limitations on mental
health treatment provided under TRICARE. TRICARE program manuals are
already in coordination for incorporating these changes. Additionally,
a Proposed Rule, ``TRICARE: Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder
Treatment,'' was published in the Federal Register (FR Vol. 81, No. 20)
on February 1, 2016, which proposes to revise TRICARE coverage by
eliminating quantitative limits on mental healthcare, consistent with
mental health parity for medical/surgical procedures. This will expand
access to care for TRICARE beneficiaries.
opioid abuse in the military
Question. Substance abuse disorders continue to be a challenge for
military servicemembers. What steps are being taken by DOD to address
substance abuse issues, particularly opioids, in the military?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken several
major policy and program changes to ensure the DOD is addressing
substance use disorders (SUDs) in the military, including opioids.
These efforts include the removal of the ban on substitution therapies
for the treatment of SUDs (2013), implementation of a DOD-level
committee to coordinate SUD services (formed in 2011), and proposed
changes to TRICARE coverage for SUD care. While data show an increase
in the SUD epidemic across the country, particularly regarding
prescription misuse, overall prescription drug misuse is low in the
military and on the decline. Within the DOD, between fiscal year 2010
and 2015, there was a 29 percent decrease in the number of Service
members receiving a primary diagnosis of Opioid Drug Dependence and/or
Opioid Abuse, with an overall prevalence rate of 0.2 percent (Military
Health System (MHS) Data Repository, extracted February 24, 2016).
Despite this, DOD has strengthened its partnership with several
entities including the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
The Proposed Rule: ``TRICARE: Mental Health and Substance Use
Disorder Treatment'' published on February 1, 2016, will expand access
to SUD care for TRICARE beneficiaries. In particular, the Proposed Rule
seeks to expand access to care for opioid use disorder, allowing
office-based opioid treatment by individual TRICARE-authorized
physicians as well as adding coverage of qualified opioid treatment
programs as TRICARE authorized institutional providers.
In 2014, a panel of VA and DOD clinical experts was convened to
update the SUD clinical practice guideline (CPG) that included a
systematic review of all applicable evidence. This CPG was finalized
and widely distributed to healthcare providers within the VA and DOD in
December 2015. The DOD and the VA are also in the process of updating
the Management of Opioid Therapy for Chronic Pain CPG with an
anticipated release date of December 2016.
In 2013, DOD instituted mandatory training for all prescribing
providers regarding the effective use of opioids to treat and manage
pain, the identification of patterns of misuse and addiction, and the
tools to intervene in cases where misuse and addiction are suspected.
Consistent with requirements outlined in the October 21, 2015
``Presidential Memorandum Addressing Prescription Drug Abuse and Heroin
Use,'' DOD is reviewing current training practices addressing the pain
management education and training needs of clinicians in the MHS. This
includes targeting best opioid prescribing practices. Under the
auspices of the President's Office of National Drug Control Policy, the
DOD and VA have collaborated for a number of years on the ``Joint Pain
Education Project'' (JPEP) to build a primary care curriculum for pain
management. The JPEP curriculum has been promulgated by the Uniformed
Services University School of Medicine, to ensure that developing
military medical leaders understand the issue of opioid medication use
and misuse within the larger context of an integrative approach to pain
management.
In its efforts to identify substance use problems early, the MHS
has four primary tools to monitor opioid prescriptions. These are the
Pharmacy Data Transaction Service; the Controlled Drug Medication
Analysis Reporting Tool; the Polypharmacy Medication Analysis Reporting
Tool; and, the Defense Health Agency Prescription Monitoring Program.
Overall, these monitoring tools focus on capturing all beneficiaries'
prescription information and alerting Military Treatment Facility
healthcare providers of prescription trends through actionable reports
that can be utilized to address concerns.
fort campbell maintenance facility
Question. It is my understanding that the major maintenance
facility at Fort Campbell is decades old and in need of replacement.
Does DOD have plans to replace this aging facility? If so, please
provide details of this plan.
Answer. The Army's Military Construction and Facility Sustainment,
Restoration and Modernization resources are focused on facilities that
are in the worst condition or on projects that address urgent readiness
priorities. The Army's Military Construction budget is at historic
lows. The Army will continue to review and prioritize all military
construction requirements in future budget cycles to replace aging
facilities to support operations, training and readiness. The Army
recognizes the need to recapitalize and consolidate the existing
failing and obsolete facilities of the Logistics Readiness Center (LRC)
at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, in support of improved efficiency
maintenance readiness.
dod programs for military spouses and families
Question. As you know, servicemembers at Fort Campbell have been on
a near-constant cycle of deployment in support of the Global War on
Terror. Many Fort Campbell servicemembers have deployed abroad multiple
times, resulting in substantial time away from their spouses and
families. What programs does DOD currently offer to help support
spouses and families of servicemembers at Fort Campbell--and other
military installations--when they are deployed and once they return
home? Does DOD require additional authority from Congress to help
support military spouses and families?
Answer. DOD does not require additional authority from Congress to
help support military spouses and families.
The Army provides many programs and assistance to families while
Soldiers are deployed, to include families residing at Fort Campbell.
The Army Family Readiness Groups, made up of family members and
supported by the deploying unit, are established to serve as a
communications mechanism between families and the deploying command.
This conduit facilitates the transfer of accurate information between
the command, deployed Soldier, and his/her family members. It also
serves as a focal point to address issues and concerns raised by family
members. The Virtual Family Readiness Group (vFRG) web system provides
the functionality of a traditional FRG, in an ad-hoc and on-line
setting, to meet the needs of geographically dispersed units and
families across all components of the Army.
DOD provides ongoing support to military families through
installation-based Military and Family Support Centers, Reserve
Component Family Programs, and Military OneSource throughout the
military life cycle. Some of those programs and services become of
increased value to military families when a Service member is preparing
for, in the midst of, returning from, or reintegrating following
deployment. Specific transition assistance related to the deployment
cycle is provided to enhance the military family's emotional and
practical preparedness for the deployment. Assistance includes
education about the deployment process, known impacts on families, and
resources available to help them manage their deployment experience.
Developed to address members of the Reserve Component, the Yellow
Ribbon Reintegration Program is a DOD-wide effort to promote the well-
being of National Guard and Reserve members, their families, and
communities, by connecting them with resources throughout the
deployment cycle.
The DOD's Spouse Education and Career Opportunities offers a
comprehensive suite of tools and resources designed to assist military
spouses in the pursuit of their educational and career goals. The
Military Spouse Employment Partnership is an employment and career
partnership connecting military spouses with more than 300 partner
employers who have committed to recruit, hire, promote, and retain
military spouses in portable careers. Since the program began in mid-
2011, partner employers have hired more than 95,000 military spouses at
all levels and across many industries.
In addition, families with young children are eligible for respite
child care services that provide temporary relief or a ``short break''
to the parent or guardian who is responsible for caring for their
child. Child care fee assistance programs designed to `buy down' the
cost of child care while the Service member is deployed are also
available.
Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) programs are essential to
readiness and resilience of Service members and their families, both
during deployment and once the Service member returns home. MWR offers
programs such as outdoor recreation, fitness, library, bowling, dining,
travel, entertainment, cultural arts, and other leisure activities that
lead to improved personal health and well-being, and helps build strong
military families. In the deployed environment, the MWR Internet Cafe
and Morale Satellite programs provide the capability for warfighters to
stay in touch with family and friends throughout the deployment cycle.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
sexual assault and harassment
Question. The issue of sexual assault and harassment in the
military is again in the headlines, both with the recent suspension of
a Naval Academy professor, and with an Associated Press investigation
that called into question statistics that were supplied to Congress on
prosecutions. How can we have confidence in a system in which due
process for alleged victims and defendants looks so different from the
justice system most Americans use?
Answer. The Congressionally established military justice system is
a fair system that often provides victims and criminal defendants with
more rights than do civilian justice systems. For example, the military
justice system provides a defense counsel to every service member tried
by a special or general court-martial without regard to indigence.
Additionally, consistent with 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1044e, which was enacted
by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2014, counsel
are made available to represent service members, their dependents, and
some Department of Defense civilians who report being the victim of a
sex offense. Once again, this is a greater protection than is available
in any civilian criminal justice system of which we are aware.
It would be inappropriate to discuss the Naval Academy case
mentioned in the question, as proceedings related to that case are on-
going. I asked my staff to examine the Associated Press article
mentioned in the question. That review found that both the AP article
and a non-profit organization report that was discussed in the article
drew conclusions based on inadequate information, misunderstanding of
the military justice system, and mischaracterizations of the assertions
that the Department of Defense actually made.
The trial of a court-martial case resembles trials in Federal
district courts, with evidentiary rules that follow closely the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Additionally, due process is protected in the system
by the Congressionally established United States Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces, a court comprised of civilian judges appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate that sits atop the military
justice system.
Of course, no justice system is perfect. The Department of Defense
believes it is important to continually assess the military justice
system and, where possible, recommend improvements. The Department did
just that when it established the Military Justice Review Group, which
scrutinized the system for a year, resulting in the proposed Military
Justice Act of 2016, which the Department transmitted to Congress on
December 28, 2015. Enactment of that legislation would further
strengthen the military justice system.
domestic response
Question. With a smaller military than ever, the Nation needs to
plan carefully how its dual-use forces will be able to carry out their
dual uses under the States' authority and how that will interact with a
Federal response, should it be needed. Can you describe the current
all-hazard planning process and how the National Guard personnel and
equipment this Committee funds will be used to respond to a domestic
disaster?
Answer. Consistent with Presidential Policy Directive 8: National
Preparedness, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has led a
deliberate all-hazard planning process to ensure integrated regional
plans are in place for each of the 10 FEMA regions. The purpose of
these plans is to speed disaster responses by enabling quick decisions
based on pre-determined plans. The Department worked closely with FEMA
to integrate planning efforts and identify both response and
coordination requirements challenges during major disasters. This
integrated regional all-hazards planning process informs the
Department's development of its own contingency plans for supporting
civil authorities.
When not in Federal service, National Guard personnel may be
utilized by governors as they determine necessary, to protect the
safety and welfare of State residents in the aftermath of a domestic
disaster. National Guard personnel may use Federal property issued to
the National Guard of their State in support of those activities. In
certain circumstances, National Guard personnel and equipment may, as
authorized by law or with the consent of the appropriate governor, also
be utilized by the Department to support the Federal Government's
efforts to assist affected States.
The Department invested billions of dollars in building, equipping,
training, and sustaining the Army National Guard and Air National Guard
as capable forces ready to carry out the Department's national defense
missions. These expenditures also ensure that each governor has
significant capabilities and capacities in their Army National Guard
and Air National Guard to respond to domestic disasters. If necessary,
each governor also has access to nearby State capabilities through
cooperative agreements under the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact program. This ``storm-tested'' and proven system stands as the
cornerstone of the Nation's mutual aid program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
conventional vs. nuclear cruise missile
Question. Secretary Carter, during our hearing last year, I asked
you why the Defense Department needs a new nuclear cruise missile. You
responded: ``The reason for the advanced cruise missile is to replace
the cruise missiles that exist now in--in recognition of the fact that
air defenses are improving around the world and that keeping that
capability to penetrate air defenses with our nuclear deterrent is an
important one.'' Mr. Secretary, as you know, we can penetrate enemy air
defenses with a variety of ballistic missiles, as well as with our most
advance bombers that carry gravity weapons. We also have developed and
are fielding an advanced conventional cruise missile called the Joint
Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile capable of attacking targets behind
advanced air defense systems.
Secretary Carter, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review called on the
military to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons by strengthening
conventional capabilities. Why do we need a new nuclear cruise missile
when a conventional alternative already exists?
Answer. The United States requires the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO)
cruise missile in order to meet U.S. nuclear deterrence objectives and
extended deterrence commitments once the existing AGM-86B Air-Launched
Cruise Missile (ALCM) reaches the end of its service life. Although the
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and its extended range
version (JASSM-ER) are effective conventional weapons, they do not
provide a nuclear deterrent, nor do they meet the performance
characteristics and operational requirements, including range, for the
ALCM and the LRSO. Conventional weapons cannot provide the same effects
as a nuclear weapon on large-area or hardened targets. Nor can
conventional weapons duplicate the ALCM's unique contribution to and
role in effective nuclear deterrence, which requires that an adversary
believe the United States can respond in kind to a nuclear attack.
Deterrence could fail if an adversary believes limited nuclear weapon
use against the United States or its allies might coerce the United
States to grant concessions or abandon its objectives due to a lack of
credible response options. Such a situation could encourage
destabilizing aggression by adversaries, or drive U.S. allies to seek
their own nuclear arsenals.
were conventional alternatives considered?
Question. Secretary Carter, the fiscal year 2016 National Defense
Authorization Act required a report on the cost of the new nuclear
cruise missile. The report your Department submitted does not actually
contain an overall cost estimate. I understand the Air Force is still
developing that estimate. There is one line in this report that I would
like to bring to your attention because it is factually incorrect, and
I believe the error reflects the way this program has been considered
to date. The report states: ``The 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review...committed to maintaining a viable standoff nuclear deterrent
for the air leg of the nuclear triad.'' The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
did no such thing. It stated: ``In addition, the Air Force will conduct
an assessment of alternatives to inform decisions in fiscal year 2012
about whether and (if so) how to replace the current air-launched
cruise missile (ALCM), which will reach the end of its service life
later in the next decade'' (emphasis added).
Secretary Carter, as you can see, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
made no commitment to maintaining a nuclear cruise missile capability.
I understand that the Air Force is currently conducting an analysis of
alternatives for the existing nuclear cruise missile. Do you know if
the Air Force is considering conventional alternatives? If the Air
Force does not consider conventional alternatives, will you direct them
to do so?
Answer. While the decision to replace the current Air Launched
Cruise Missile (ALCM) had not yet been made at the time of the 2010
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Air Force subsequently completed an
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for replacement of the ALCM. The AoA
determined that an ALCM replacement was the only option that would meet
United States Strategic Command nuclear deterrence requirements.
Replacing the ALCM supports the NPR objective of sustaining a highly
capable strategic bomber force, both for effective regional deterrence
and to provide a rapid and effective hedge against geopolitical
uncertainties and technical challenges in the other legs of the Triad.
As is the case for all U.S. nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence is the
fundamental role of the ALCM and its replacement, the LRSO.
Conventional weapons cannot duplicate the nuclear-armed cruise
missile's contribution to and role in effective nuclear deterrence.
Development of the LRSO is a key component of the Nation's nuclear
modernization plan and will help ensure we maintain a credible and
effective deterrent in the face of evolving threats.
deterrence value of a nuclear cruise missile
Question. In a 2014 letter to this Committee, Under Secretary of
Defense Frank Kendall suggested that a new nuclear cruise missile has a
purpose ``beyond deterrence'' and provides the President ``uniquely
flexible'' options in an extreme crisis.
Can you explain what mission the nuclear cruise missile would have
``beyond deterrence? ``What ``uniquely flexible'' options does the new
nuclear cruise missile offer? Are we talking about a limited nuclear
war with low-yield weapons?
Answer. The Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) program is critical for
maintaining the range of options currently available to the President
for deterring nuclear attack on the United States and its Allies and
partners, or defending our vital interests. It provides flexibility to
achieve U.S. objectives while limiting the scale of destruction if the
President determines a nuclear strike is required. The ability to
conduct a nuclear strike is not distinct from the fundamental
deterrence role of U.S. nuclear weapons; retaining credible response
options strengthens our ability to prevent nuclear attacks from ever
taking place. In addition, an effective nuclear deterrent contributes
to deterring conventional attack by nuclear-armed adversaries by
convincing them they cannot escalate their way out of failed
conventional aggression. Sustaining the capability currently provided
by the AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile will not lower the nuclear
threshold or increase the likelihood of U.S. first-use. Indeed, the
United States has long maintained a high threshold for nuclear use
together with a diverse range of nuclear explosive yields and delivery
means. The use of nuclear weapons would only be considered in extreme
circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States and
its allies and partners.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Udall
trusted foundries
Question. A 2015 GAO report found that DOD faces uncertainty about
future access to trusted leading-edge microelectronics due to a
business change at IBM. I believe New Mexico is part of the solution
here. We are already funding efforts to modernize the foundry at Sandia
National Labs. New Mexico is also home to a large Intel chip foundry.
In April, Intel announced a major nationwide restructuring, with
thousands of layoffs. The New Mexico plant will continue to operate,
but there is an opportunity for DOD to reach out to Intel and consider
options to collaborate. What are DOD's plans to address trusted foundry
concerns? And will DOD reach out to see if Intel can help meet DOD
requirements?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) conducted an extensive
series of reviews and analyses last year to address the IBM foundry
sale and its impact on current and future access to trusted, leading-
edge microelectronics. Our efforts broadly engaged stakeholders from
DOD, the Intelligence Community, Department of Energy (DOE), industry,
academia, and other organizations to inform a comprehensive strategy
and plan. We have resolved near-term concerns and preserved access to
all of the former IBM technologies, now produced by Global Foundries
United States 2, LLC. Long term, DOD will transition to an alternative
approach that uses trusted and assured microelectronics in order to
reduce risk and the reliance upon sole source foundry operations. This
new trust model will introduce advanced techniques and processes to
protect microelectronics designs and intellectual property while at the
same time enabling access to commercial, state-of-the art technology.
While we have engaged Intel in the past, they are currently not
interested in being a Trusted Foundry at this time. The company has
engaged with several Federal agencies to support broad, high level
discussions on alternatives to the Trusted Foundry model, but those
engagements are at very early stages. DOD has engaged in the past with
Intel and other manufacturing leaders and we intend to continue
engaging with industry as we transition to the new trust model for
microelectronics.
DOD will remain a strong participant with interagency partners,
ensuring collaboration on strategies to address United States
Government microelectronics trust and access needs. One example is
DOD's participation with the DOE assessment of future microsystems
technology needs and modernization plans for the Sandia National
Laboratories' Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications
Silicon Fabrication Facility.
cyber threats in a kinetic environment
Question. Regarding the discussion of creating a unified cyber
command. I wanted to say again. The warfighters of the future--special
ops, infantry, sailors, marines, or cyber warriors--must be trained to
react to cyber threats in a kinetic environment. Last year, I worked to
include language that would make this a priority. Will the Department
of Defense support this effort to strengthen our warfighters
capabilities?
Answer. The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy directs that our
military forces prepare and be ready to operate in an environment where
access to cyberspace is contested. All of our operational military
forces are receiving foundational training enabling them to carry on
with their missions while under cyberattack. Substantial efforts are
underway to help ensure unencumbered access and freedom of maneuver in
cyberspace, continuity of command and control, full situational
awareness, and resilience of our forces, all in the face of determined
hostile cyber activity in a kinetic environment. This includes the
continued integration of cyberattacks into exercises and mission
rehearsals at the Service, Combatant Command, and Joint levels, and
establishment of additional fallback capabilities.
high energy laser test facility
Question. The High Energy Laser Test Facility located at White
Sands Missile Range is a one-of-a-kind directed energy testing facility
in the United States. In light of near peer competitors' interest in
such technology, I believe that we need to ensure our advantage in
directed energy. How can we ensure that HELSTF's funding is brought
back up to the level that OSD recommended in the 2009 OSD report? Can
you commit to revisiting that funding decision for HELSTF? (HELSTF is
funded at $2.6M and OSD recommended $6.4 in their 2009 report)
Answer. In 2011, in response to a Test Resource Management Center
and the High Energy Laser Joint Technology Office study, the Army
transferred the High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility (HELSTF) from
the Army Space and Missile Defense Command to the Army Test and
Evaluation Command to gain efficiencies and allow divestiture of
capabilities no longer needed. This transfer enabled the Army to
maximize the use of the facility by reducing duplication of effort,
instrumentation, and facilities while providing high quality support/
products for DOD acquisition and Science and Technology (S&T) community
customers. The 2009 study did recommend $6.4 million as the annual
required funding versus the $2.8 million that the Army has funded since
2010. However, the efficiencies gained by the command realignment
described above as well as additional funding from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Central Test and Evaluation Investment
Program (CTEIP) and the Test and Evaluation (T&E)/S&T Program
(approximately $12 million over the last 10 years) have continued to
keep the instrumentation at the appropriate level. HELSTF remains the
Office of the Secretary of Defense-designated site for High Energy
Laser testing and is a key asset for all DOD Components in the
development of these weapons systems. As new requirements arise, they
are addressed by Army, OSD CTEIP, and OSD T&E/S&T resourcing solutions,
and the Department will ensure funding is adequate to meet
requirements.
remotely piloted aircraft training mission
Question. The Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) training mission at
Holloman continues to grow as the mission requirements and demands for
RPA's increases. How does this budget support these increased
requirements, and what is our strategy to retain current and future RPA
pilots and sensor operators?
Answer. The Air Force MQ-9 Program of Record Steady State capacity
is 60 combat air patrols (CAPs) per day. However, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to use OCO funding to
support an additional 10 government-owned, contractor operated (GOCO)
CAPs, increasing combatant commander capacity to 70. To address force
health in the fiscal year 2017 President's Budget request, the Air
Force doubled Undergraduate RPA training, funded a third initial
qualification training squadron, and kept two operational squadrons,
slated for divestiture, through fiscal year 2017. We are also
converting to an MQ-9 only fleet in order to reduce training,
maintenance and sustainment burdens on our Total Force and streamlining
the Air National Guard MQ-9 enterprise to help supplement the Active
Duty force. Finally, we are analyzing a number of initiatives under the
Culture and Process Improvement Program to normalize MQ-9 operations
over the mid- and far-term.
syria troop levels
Question. Are there any future plans to send additional troops to
Syria during this calendar year?
Answer. The President recently approved sending up to 250
additional troops to Syria to support indigenous counter-ISIL forces, a
key component in our approach to defeat ISIL. At this time I have not
recommended sending any additional troops beyond the additional 250 to
Syria. That said, the Department is constantly looking to build upon
success and adapt the military capabilities we are using to defeat
ISIL. If it becomes apparent that additional U.S. forces in Syria could
deliver strategic affects, I would not hesitate to recommend an
increase in those forces.
mosul
Question. Does the Department of Defense have adequate resources
and confidence in the Iraqi military to respond to a potential
humanitarian disaster if the Mosul dam fails? If not, what more can be
done to help prepare the Iraqi people and their government for such a
possibility?
Answer. The Mosul Dam faces a serious risk of catastrophic failure
with little warning. A catastrophic breach of the Mosul Dam would
result in severe loss of life, mass population displacement, and
destruction of the majority of the infrastructure within the projected
flood-wave path.
The number and spread of people in need along the 300-mile flood
path will likely overwhelm the capacity of the Iraqi government and any
one humanitarian aid actor to provide assistance. This suggests a need
for an international, coordinated response to help meet potential
widespread needs.
The U.S. Government continues to coordinate with the Iraqi
government on early warning and education strategies, including early
warning systems and communication plans. The United States also
continues to encourage donors and non-governmental organizations to
prepare for a potential catastrophic failure of the Mosul Dam. Key
preparedness activities include flood awareness messages,
communications, response planning, and the mapping of priority
locations at risk of flooding. The Iraqi military will play a part in
the response to any failure of the Mosul Dam, but unlike the U.S.
military, the Iraqi military's capability and contribution are very
limited given its ongoing fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL) and poor logistics and supply systems. Should the
Mosul Dam fail, the U.S. Department of Defense will support the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) with its humanitarian
response, including with transportation for assessments and urgent
life-saving needs.
sandia infrastructure simulation and analysis center
Question. The Department of Homeland Security currently utilizes a
Sandia program called the national Infrastructure Simulation and
Analysis Center. This program assesses the technical, economic, and
national security implications of infrastructure in terms of
protection, risk mitigation, event response, and event recovery. This
is a capability, that if expanded for international analysis, that
could benefit policy makers and decision makers at the Department of
Defense, Department of Energy, State Department, and USAID. Do you
believe that this tool would benefit decision makers at the Department
of Defense and would you support the expansion of this program for use
by other departments to support our interests overseas?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) leverages the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) analytic capabilities to assist with
identifying and addressing risk to DOD missions. If DHS expands its
analysis work with the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center to include international analysis, the DOD would explore
additional possibilities to partner with DHS to enhance and complement
its internal modeling, simulation, and analysis capabilities. The DOD
values its existing interagency partnerships, including those with DHS.
The DOD recognizes the importance of the reliability and resilience of
infrastructure such as power, water, and telecommunications that are
outside the purview of DOD, both domestically and overseas. The DOD
understands that a failure of supporting infrastructure could
jeopardize mission execution.
small micro-satellites
Question. How important are small micro-satellites for the
Department of Defense's space strategy, and how are you working with
private industry to increase access to space via microsatellites? Do
you agree that Operational Responsive Space is still an important part
of this strategy, and is there a possibility that the Department of
Defense could better utilize private infrastructure such as the
Spaceport in southern New Mexico?
Answer. The DOD sees potential in micro-satellites and recognizes
that contributions from private industry can provide new and innovative
opportunities to operate to, through and from space. Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) can and does contribute to the overall strategy,
especially as a means of engaging with industry. For example, the ORS
Office is collaborating with Raytheon Missile Systems and Rincon
Research Corp to prototype responsive, semi-autonomous manufacturing of
cubeSats using existing infrastructure in Tuscon, AZ.
The form factor of microsatellites and cubeSats can simplify
payload integration and could open up the possibility for a wider range
of launch providers and platforms that may operate from a spaceport.
The Air Force's Rocket Systems Launch Program and ORS office are making
use of state sponsored spaceports, including Spaceport America in New
Mexico where ORS has, to date, sponsored four launches.
third offset
Question. You recently reached out to Silicon Valley and other hubs
of innovation as you touted the Department of Defense's third offset.
As you move forward I would like to encourage you to engage with
employees and contractors at the National Labs as well. Will you reach
out to these employees and private businesses in New Mexico and
elsewhere?
Answer. As its name implies, Defense Innovation Unit Experimental
(DIUx) is just that, an ``experiment.'' We hope to evolve DIUx as a
model that captures the engagement practices for DOD to operate in a
technology ecosystem by identifying and leveraging novel technology,
business practices, and ideas from non-traditional sources as well as
providing the technology ecosystem's insights into DOD inventions that
may have commercial value. Our current activities in Silicon Valley and
the recently announced office in Boston represent the Department's
initial tests of this strategy. We hope this experiment proves
successful as a model for how the Department can interact with other
technology clusters, including the national labs across the country,
including New Mexico, to help find and accelerate novel technology
adoption that will increase our country's competitive advantage. Thank
you for your interest in the DIUx concept and your support of our
Nation's defense.
german air force to depart holloman air force
Question. With the recent decision by the German Air Force to
depart Holloman Air Force at the end of 2019, there is an opportunity
for expansion at the base. Either through a new domestic mission or a
training mission with one of our numerous allies. What options are the
Department of Defense considering for a new mission at Holloman? Is the
Department of Defense reaching out to allies to determine if there is
interest in a training mission at Holloman? As the United States
continues to pivot towards the Pacific, is there an opportunity for a
partner such as Japan or the Republic of Korea to take on this
opportunity? Both partners are expanding their Air Forces and require
access to airspace which is diminishing in their countries due to
commercial air traffic, while airspace in New Mexico remain plentiful.
Would you agree that the United States and its allies would benefit
from such close training and coordination?
Answer. The Department of Defense values training partnerships with
our allies and partners, and we will continue to seek new opportunities
that are in our mutual interests. I agree that the United States and
our allies and partners benefit from close training and coordination.
Since we received the official notification from Germany on the
departure of the German Air Force, we have not yet had the opportunity
to match Holloman's facilities with a requirement from another ally or
partner nation or with a new domestic mission. We are in very
preliminary requirements discussions with allies and partners on this
matter.
As for Japan and the Republic of Korea, neither country has
expressed an interest in allocating aircraft to new missions away from
their homelands as this would require taking operational assets away
from homeland defense. However, as both nations procure new aircraft in
accordance with their modernization plans, their training needs might
present an opportunity for training in the United States, possibly at
Holloman Air Force Base.
______
Question Submitted to General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.
Question Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
operational use of the reserve component
Question. I am proud that the 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team of
the Vermont National Guard has been selected by the Army to associate
with the 10th Mountain Division in the new pilot program, building on a
relationship that has been strong for many years. This association is
in the spirit of the recommendations on the Commission on the Future of
the Army that Senator Graham and I proposed 2 years ago, and the
concept of an operational reserve. How important is keeping the Reserve
Components operational for the future? How can we better plan for using
units from the Reserve Component for predictable missions?
Answer. It is absolutely essential that the Reserve Component (RC)
remain operational in the future. With constrained defense budgets,
reductions in military end strength, and the increase of transregional,
multi-functional, and multi-domain threats, the Reserve Components are
indispensable to their Service and are a major part of the Total Joint
Force.
Congress' support to programs like the Army's Associate Unit
Program significantly adds to our joint readiness and joint warfighting
capability, and our ability to use Reserve Component units for
predictable missions.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. Until then, the subcommittee will stand in
recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., Wednesday, April 27, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]