[Senate Hearing 114-653]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:38 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Shelby, Murkowski, Blunt,
Daines, Moran, Durbin, Reed, Tester, Udall, and Schatz.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Missile Defense Agency
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JAMES D. SYRING, DIRECTOR,
UNITED STATES NAVY
opening statement of senator thad cochran
Senator Cochran. The subcommittee will please come to
order. Today, we are reviewing the fiscal year budget request
for the Missile Defense Agency. We are very pleased to be able
to welcome Vice Admiral Jim Syring, Director of the Missile
Defense Agency.
For fiscal year 2017, the President's budget requests $7.5
billion for the Missile Defense Agency, a decrease of $800
million, or almost 10 percent, from last year's enacted level.
Over the past year, the Missile Defense Agency has had
numerous successes, including fielding program upgrades to our
Nation's Ground-based Midcourse Defense; establishing an Aegis
Ashore site in Romania; and continuing our cooperative efforts
with our allies worldwide, most notably with Israel.
Recent successful tests of Israeli missile defense programs
clearly demonstrate the value of your work.
Despite the proposed fiscal year 2017 budget reductions,
the budget requests full funding to deploy 44 ground-based
interceptors by 2017. It continues our commitment to regional
missile defense and invests in technologies to address evolving
threats.
We appreciate your efforts to strengthen and expand our
national missile defense capabilities.
Your full statement will be included in the record, and you
may proceed to make opening remarks for the record.
Admiral Syring. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Excuse me, let me ask Senator Durbin if he
wants to proceed with a statement.
statement of senator richard j. durbin
Senator Durbin. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.
I thank the Admiral for joining us. It is an important
discussion that we are going to have this morning, when you
consider Kim Jong-un in North Korea and what he is up to, the
Chinese in the South China Sea, the Russians, Iran. We have a
full plate when it comes to the mission of your agency.
I have a number of questions. I ask that my full statement
be made a part of the record and defer back to the chairman.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Richard J. Durbin
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join you in welcoming Admiral Syring
to our hearing on the fiscal year 2017 budget request for the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA).
The missile threats facing the United States are increasing in
volume and complexity. North Korea is becoming even more belligerent,
China is asserting its military power in the South China Seas, Russia
has violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and several
countries, including Iran, are developing missiles that are at risk for
proliferation.
Against this backdrop, the Missile Defense Agency is charged with
protecting our country and our troops from missile attacks. Fiscal
constraints, combined with the pace of technological change, make this
an extremely challenging mission.
My chief concern is that as we seek to protect ourselves against
new threats, we do not repeat the mistakes of the past. Rushing systems
and equipment into the field before they have been adequately tested
did not improve our national security during the previous
Administration, and ended up costing the taxpayers billions in wasted
defense funds.
The Government Accountability Office continues to have concerns on
this front, particularly regarding some ground-based interceptors
deployed to Alaska and California as well as a key interceptor used on
Aegis warships.
Admiral, under your leadership I believe we have made good strides
in both performance and accountability for many missile defense
programs. I look forward to reviewing what MDA is doing to address the
concerns raised by GAO and others.
In particular, I would welcome an update on the progress made since
last summer's major intercept test, and the preparations for the test
scheduled for later this year. This next event will be the most
realistic test of our national missile defense system yet, and a lot is
riding on it, including President's goal of deploying 44 ground-based
interceptors by 2017.
There are other important topics to discuss--the status of the
Israeli Cooperative Programs, the progress of the Aegis Ashore sites in
Romania and Poland, the ongoing need for better sensors, and efforts to
make missile defense more affordable by looking to next generation
technologies.
Admiral, we look forward to hearing your thoughts on all of these
issues. Thank you for your testimony this morning and for your service
to our country.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
You may proceed.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JAMES D. SYRING
Admiral Syring. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman
Durbin, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate
the opportunity this morning to testify before you.
I request your support of the fiscal year 2017 budget
request, which is necessary to increase our capacity and
capability of both our fielded homeland and regional missile
defense systems, and make critical technology investments for
the future.
With the escalation of the threat from North Korea and Iran
to include increasingly aggressive ballistic missile testing,
we are working hard to find more cost-effective ways to do the
missile defense mission. We need your continued strong support
to improve the reliability of our homeland defenses and
modernize our ground systems.
We are moving forward with the redesigned kill vehicle
program to further improve the reliability of the system.
Ground-based interceptor upgrades and replacements also
remain on track to reach 44 interceptors by the end of 2017.
In fiscal year 2017, we plan to conduct two intercept
flight tests to more fully demonstrate system performance of
the GMD (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense) program against ICBMs
(intercontinental ballistic missile).
Among our planned homeland defense improvements to identify
and track lethal objects, we will begin construction in fiscal
year 2017 of the long-range discrimination radar in Alaska to
improve system performance against the stated Pacific theater
threats.
To stay on schedule, it is critical we receive full funding
for phase 1 of military construction in fiscal year 2017 for
the radar equipment shelter.
To bolster regional defenses in fiscal year 2017, we will
continue to enhance the capability of the Aegis BMD weapons
system and deliver additional Standard Missile-3 Block IBs.
Our plans include maintaining support for the operational
readiness of the Romania Aegis Ashore site we delivered to the
warfighter in December 2015. We also remain on track to deliver
the Aegis Ashore site in Poland by the end of 2018 to improve
European NATO defenses against medium- and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles.
I also ask for your full support of our advanced technology
work to stay ahead of the threat by discriminating and killing
reentry vehicles with a higher degree of confidence in all
phases of flight.
Today, we are focused on directed energy, which I believe
is a potential game-changer. Our work on laser scaling to
achieve greater efficiency and lighter weight will enable a
low-power laser demonstration in 2021 to determine the
feasibility of destroying enemy missiles in the boost phase of
flight.
Finally, sir, we are very aware of the growing cyberthreat
and are working aggressively to ensure the Nation's missile
defenses are resilient and able to operate in this highly
contested cyber environment. We are taking steps to ensure our
cybersecurity structure has the latest security upgrades and
patches, and continually assessing our systems, suppliers, and
overall acquisition processes. We also have a rigorous cyber
and supply chain risk management inspection program to examine
everything about our systems from the trusted supply chain to
the fielded operational capability.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee's
questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral J.D. Syring
Good morning, Chairman Cochran, Vice Chairman Durbin, distinguished
Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to testify
before you today. Our current budget request of $7.5 billion for fiscal
year 2017 will continue the development of defenses for our Nation,
deployed forces, allies, and international partners against
increasingly capable ballistic missiles. The fiscal year 2017 missile
defense program will continue to support the Warfighter and needs of
the Combatant Commanders with the development, testing, deployment, and
integration of interceptors, sensors, and the command, control, battle
management and communications (C2BMC) system for the Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS).
ballistic missile threat
The threat continues to grow as potential adversaries acquire a
greater number of ballistic missiles, increasing their range,
incorporating BMD countermeasures, and making them more complex,
survivable, reliable, and accurate. Space-launch activities involve
multistage systems that further the development of technologies for
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In addition to the Taepo
Dong 2 space launch vehicle/ICBM, North Korea is developing and has
paraded the KN08 road-mobile ICBM and an intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) with a range greater than 3,000 km. Last October North
Korea paraded a previously unseen, new, or modified road-mobile ICBM.
North Korea has recently assumed an aggressive posture, having
conducted rocket and ballistic missile launches in addition to the
launch of the Taepo Dong 2 space launch vehicle/ICBM this past
February. Today it fields hundreds of Scud and No Dong missiles that
can reach U.S. forces forward deployed to the Republic of Korea and
Japan.
Iran has successfully orbited satellites and announced plans to
orbit a larger satellite using a space launch vehicle (the Simorgh)
that could be capable of intercontinental ballistic missile ranges if
configured as such. Iran also has steadily increased its ballistic
missile force, deploying next-generation short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs) with increasing accuracy and new
submunition payloads. Tehran's overall defense strategy relies on a
substantial inventory of theater ballistic missiles capable of striking
targets in southeastern Europe and the Middle East, including Israel.
Iran continues to develop more sophisticated missiles and improve the
range and accuracy of current missile systems, and it has publicly
demonstrated the ability to launch simultaneous salvos of multiple
rockets and missiles. Demonstrating it is capable of modifying
currently deployed ballistic missile systems, Iran has flight-tested a
Fateh-110 ballistic missile in an anti-ship role. By adding a seeker to
improve the missile's accuracy against sea-based targets, Iran could
threaten maritime activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Strait of
Hormuz.
support for the warfighter
Our priority is to continue to deliver greater missile defense
capability and capacity to the Warfighter for employment in support of
Combatant Command priorities. This budget maintains the commitment to
build out homeland defenses to 44 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) by
the end of 2017 and enhance GBI reliability. To strengthen regional
defenses, we plan to deliver a total of 39 SM-3 Block IBs to the Navy
in fiscal year 2017 for use on Aegis BMD ships and at the Aegis Ashore
site, for a total of 146 delivered since December 2013. MDA also will
deliver in fiscal year 2017 61 additional Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) interceptors to the Army, for a total of 205 delivered
since May 2011.
On 18 December last year, we delivered the Aegis Ashore system in
Romania in support of Phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach
(EPAA). The technical capability declaration included the Aegis Ashore
Romania missile defense complex, Aegis BMD 5.0 (Capability Upgrade, or
CU) weapon system, as an integrated component of Aegis Baseline 9, and
Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IB (with a Threat Upgrade). This is the
first EPAA land-based interceptor component, and it is mission capable
today. On 30 December 2015, the U.S. Navy accepted ownership of the
Aegis Ashore site in Romania. U.S. Warfighter acceptance is expected in
May 2016. MDA will continue to support the Navy and NATO through the
operation of the system. Also, plans remain on track to deliver a
second Aegis Ashore site in Poland along with an upgraded missile
defense system and the initial Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA
missiles by the end of 2018 to support EPAA Phase 3.
MDA routinely provides Warfighter operational support by performing
the mission essential functions of BMDS configuration control, asset
management, and operational readiness reporting and by providing an
operational-level interface to United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM), European Command (USEUCOM), Central Command (USCENTCOM),
and Pacific Command (USPACOM) and facilitating increased Warfighter
participation in development of future missile defense capabilities.
MDA will continue to lead the integration of evolving MDA, Service, and
COCOM command and control capabilities through systems engineering
analysis and development of technical integration requirements and
interface control documents to address the continued fielding by U.S.
adversaries of air, missile, and rocket capabilities.
MDA executes a fully integrated test program that synchronizes the
system with the Warfighters trained to operate the system under varying
wartime conditions against current and emerging threats. This ensures
that BMDS capabilities are credibly demonstrated and validated prior to
delivery to the Warfighter. We continue to work closely with
independent testers within DOD--the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Developmental Test &
Evaluation; Service Operational Test Agencies; and Combatant Commands,
represented by the Joint Forces Component Commands Integrated Missile
Defense -to develop an Integrated Master Test Plan to execute a robust,
cost-effective flight test program. Our flight tests feature
operationally realistic conditions and integrate U.S. government
stakeholders--to include Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines--and
allies to prove BMD capabilities before they are fielded. From October
2014 to the present, we have executed 25 flight tests. For the
remainder of fiscal year 2016 we will conduct six more flight tests,
and in fiscal year 2017 16 flight tests. In addition to 22 element
level ground tests, we conducted 11 developmental and operational
system-level ground tests from October 2014 to the present. There are
three more system-level ground tests scheduled for this fiscal year,
and four more planned for fiscal year 2017. Last year we also conducted
or participated in more than 20 multi-event exercises and wargames,
which are critical to the Warfighter and the intensive engineering
efforts across the Agency.
increasing reliability and confidence in the system
Before I review our fiscal year 2017 program, I want to give you a
brief overview of what we are doing within the current program to
increase reliability and confidence in the system and how we are
developing technologies to get ahead of what is sometimes referred to
as the kinetic (hit-to-kill) cost curve.
We are working hard to find more cost-effective ways to do the
missile defense mission. There are challenging scenarios where
adversaries will be able to launch large numbers of relatively cheap
and increasingly complex missiles and our only option is to intercept
them with very expensive weapon systems. MDA is making critical
investments in future system development that we believe will
significantly improve system performance and effectiveness. By
improving reliability, enhancing discrimination, and expanding battle
space to make possible a re-engagement firing strategy, I believe we
can reduce the cost per kill. We also need to investigate solutions
that help reduce reliance on expensive kinetic intercept solutions.
Reliability is paramount and a critical part of how the warfighter
decides upon a shot doctrine, that is, the estimation of how many shots
it will take to defeat a credible threat. With a highly reliable
interceptor, fewer shots would be required. As we are able to decrease
the number of shots we must take against each threatening missile, we
can increase overall warfighter confidence in the effectiveness of the
system. The work we are doing to improve GBI reliability and develop
the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) will help us reach this objective. We
can also improve the missile defense cost curve by increasing the
number of kill vehicles we place on a single interceptor. This is the
rationale behind the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) program--the more
kill vehicles we can put on an interceptor, the greater raid capacity
our Ground-based Midcourse Defense system will have. I will address
both of these efforts in more detail below.
We must also take steps to improve the discrimination and
assessment capabilities of the system. The better Warfighters are able
to determine the lethal payload in a target cluster and assess whether
it has been actually hit, the fewer interceptors they will need to
expend. With our investments in radars while developing advanced
electro-optical sensors, we are striving for a diverse sensor
architecture that eventually will provide highly accurate midcourse
tracking and discrimination. Development of the Long Range
Discrimination Radar and our advanced discrimination sensor technology
and space-based kill assessment programs will improve system target
discrimination and assessment capabilities. Improved sensor coverage
and interceptor capabilities will help the warfighter expand the battle
space in order to reengage threats as needed.
The development of non-kinetic technologies, such as directed
energy, and new concepts of operation, such as boost-phase intercept
and left-of-launch missile defeat, are game-changing and would have a
dramatic effect on the need to rely exclusively on expensive
interceptors.
I will address all of these development efforts and initiatives
below.
homeland defense
MDA remains committed to operating, sustaining, and expanding our
Nation's homeland missile defenses and requests $1.32 billion in fiscal
year 2017 for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, or $440
million below what we requested in PB 16. The fiscal year 2017 budget
request is lower than the fiscal year 2016 budget due to the fact that
the fiscal year 2016 budget provided a significant increase to
historical funding to improve overall reliability and performance and
extend the service life of the GMD system. Last year's larger request
was driven by the developmental content required to reach 44 GBIs by
the end of 2017, the first full year of the RKV program, ground system
modernization, completion of Capability Enhancement (CE)-II Block 1
design and full-rate manufacturing as well as CE-II upgrades,
development, and procurement. This year we will continue efforts to
expand the GBI fleet to 44 by the end of 2017 for Enhanced Homeland
Defense, continue flight and system ground testing, undertake RKV and
C3 Booster development, enhance the Stockpile Reliability Program,
expand the battle space to enable later GBI engagements, upgrade the
GMD ground system, and deploy upgraded GMD fire control software to
enhance our ability to use land-based sensor discrimination data. We
will continue to add precision and confidence in our reliability
assessments by performing failure modes and process analyses,
reliability testing, short-circuit and grounding analyses, and
verification of our on-going development efforts.
Increasing GBI Capacity
We resumed interceptor manufacturing following the successful
intercept in the June 2014 FTG-06b flight test. Since October 2014 we
have delivered eight GBIs equipped with the CE-II Exo-atmospheric Kill
Vehicle (EKV) identical to the configuration flown in that test. We
have also removed eight previously delivered CE-II GBIs and are
modifying them to match the FTG-06b configuration. These upgraded GBIs
began delivery in March 2016. We are completing development of the CE-
II Block 1 EKV and Configuration 2 (C2)/Consolidated Booster Avionics
Unit (CBAU) for the Integrated Boost Vehicle (IBV) to address parts
obsolescence and eliminate several reliability concerns found in the
older GBIs. Our confidence in the CE-II Block 1 IKV design changes was
enhanced by the results of the GM Controlled Test Vehicle flight test
(GM CTV-02+) earlier this year. We expect the FTG-15 intercept test
planned for the end of this calendar year using a CE-II Block 1 EKV and
C2/CBAU IBVto boost that confidence level even further. Upon a
successful FTG-15 flight test, we plan to deliver ten GBIs configured
with CE-II Block 1 EKV and C2/CBAU IBV.
GMD Testing
This past January we successfully executed GM CTV-02+, a non-
intercept flight test involving the launch of a GBI from Vandenberg Air
Force Base and an air-launched IRBM target over the Pacific Ocean. We
were able to exercise fully the new Alternate Divert Thruster in the
CE-II EKV in a flight environment and undertake an early evaluation of
near term discrimination improvements for homeland defense. The EKV
used SPY-1, SBX, and AN/TPY-2 data for target selection.
The next intercept flight test of the GMD system will take place
later this calendar year. FTG-15 will be the first intercept flight
test for the CE-II Block 1 EKV and the C2/CBAU IBV. It also will be the
first intercept of an ICBM range target by the GMD system or any other
BMDS element. A successful test will allow MDA to meet the commitment
to deliver 44 GBIs by the end of 2017. Following FTG-15, MDA, in
collaboration with DOT&E, plans to conduct the FTG-11 operational
intercept flight test in the first quarter of fiscal year 2018, which
will demonstrate the full capability of the GMD system with a two GBI
salvo for an engagement of an ICBM.
Redesigned Kill Vehicle
The primary objective for the RKV is to improve reliability. Its
development will make homeland defenses more robust. We plan to employ
a modular design made up of mature subsystems and components to improve
producibility, maintainability, and reduce unit cost. The RKV program
will strive for performance improvements by incorporating on-demand
communications between the kill vehicle and the ground, a wide field of
view seeker, improved data processing and discrimination algorithms,
and enhanced survivability. We established a cross-industry team to
develop the RKV. We will then compete the production of an RKV-equipped
GBI all-up round. The program schedule includes a controlled test
vehicle flight test of the RKV in 2018 (GM CTV-03) and first intercept
flight test in 2019 (FTG-17) to demonstrate the RKV, with a second
intercept flight test in 2020 (FTG-18). We plan initial deliveries of
the RKV in the 2020 timeframe.
In order to achieve full capability of the RKV, improvements are
needed in other areas of the GMD program. We will modify the booster so
that it can fly in either a selectable two-stage or three-stage mode
and match survivability of the RKV. Additionally, we will upgrade the
GMD fire control software to enable mixed engagements with RKV and EKV
capabilities, utilize improved sensor data for on-demand
communications, and provide improved situational awareness information
to the Warfighter. We will modify components of the In-Flight
Interceptor Communications System Data Terminals (IDT) to enable on-
demand communications.
Ground System Upgrades
The Ground System hardware at Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force
Base is 1990s technology installed in the early 2000s. We have parts
obsolescence challenges and the operating systems are no longer
supported by the original manufacturers. Without an upgrade, ground
system reliability would decay and impact GBI availability to the
Warfighter.
Plans include the refurbishment of Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely,
upgrades to the GMD ground system hardware, improvements to the fire
control software, and substantial reliability testing and assessments
to characterize the reliability and performance of the system. The work
on Missile Field 1 began last year. We will complete the refurbishment
and reactivation of Missile Field 1 in 2016 to provide sufficient silos
for 44 GBIs. We have cleaned out the rust and mold in the utilidor and
upgraded the climate control system to match what we have in Missile
Field 2 and Missile Field 3. (A utilidor is an underground man-made
structure used in extreme cold climates to run utilities lines between
facilities. If the utilities--communications lines, power, heating and
ventilation (HVAC)--were buried into the ground the freeze and thawing
of the ground would crush the plastic casings.) The old Mechanical
Electrical Building (MEB) was demolished and the new MEB completed in
March 2016. We will complete replacement of Command and Launch
Equipment, GMD Fire Control (GFC) equipment, and IDT equipment by 2017.
The Fort Drum, New York IDT construction is complete and now
operationally available to the Warfighter. This new IDT will enable
communication with GBIs launched from Fort Greely, Alaska and
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California over longer distances and
improve defenses for the eastern United States.
We are also initiating a longer term effort to replace the GMD
Communications Network equipment by 2019. We will deliver two
significant upgrades to the GFC software. The first, GFC 6B3, provides
the Warfighter the capability to operate with 44 GBIs, improves
discrimination capability, and adds several warfighter requested
upgrades to improve operational capability. The second, GFC 7A,
improves fail-over between redundant systems and system availability by
removing the aging Command and Launch Equipment and streamlining the
GMD fire control system architecture. Ground Systems Build 7B is also
underway and will be in full development in 2017. The 7B build includes
upgrades for two- or three-stage selectable boosters and associated
flyouts, improved nuclear weapons effects planning, improved battle
management, additional target discrimination capabilities, and the new
RKV On-Demand Communications.
Homeland Defense Sensors
Last year we integrated, tested, and delivered the capability for
the Warfighter to manage the second PACOM AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan and
introduced the boost phase cue capability of that radar site into the
BMDS. This radar and the new C2BMC capability will enhance the overall
performance of the two Japan radar sites when operating in a mutually
supporting AN/TPY-2 dual radar mode, providing improved tracking
coverage for all ballistic missile launches out of North Korea.
The Cobra Dane Early Warning Radar is now operating new software to
enhance object classification for the Discrimination Improvement for
Homeland Defense (DIHD)-Near Term capability. We will continue missile
defense upgrades of the Early Warning Radars in Clear, Alaska and Cape
Cod, Massachusetts. We completed Cape Cod UEWR facilities design in
August 2015 and began facility modifications in September 2015. We
expect to complete the Clear radar upgrade in second quarter fiscal
year 2017 and the Cape Cod upgrade in the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2017.
With our budget request of $68.8 million in fiscal year 2017 for
the Sea Based X-band (SBX) radar, we will continue to support flight
testing with SBX to demonstrate improvements to discrimination and
debris mitigation and be available for contingency operations. SBX will
continue development of Discrimination Improvements for Homeland
Defense. This past year the U.S. Coast Guard and American Bureau of
Shipping 5-year recertification of SBX vessel was completed. SBX also
completed significant industrial work, including overhaul of two
thrusters and three diesel generators, hull preservation, upgrade of
the radar cooling system, and replacement of obsolete computer
components.
In fiscal year 2017 we request $162.0 million to continue the
development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), the new
midcourse tracking radar that will improve discrimination capabilities
against threats to the homeland from the Pacific theater. LRDR will
provide larger hit assessment coverage enabling improved warfighting
capability to manage GBI inventory and improving the capacity of the
BMDS. The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved designation of the U.S.
Air Force as the Lead Service for the LRDR this past August. Supported
by system trade studies and with concurrence from the USSTRATCOM,
USNORTHCOM and USPACOM Commanders, the Clear Air Force Station, Alaska
was selected as the future site of the LRDR. We are also requesting
$155.0 million MILCON in 2017 for construction of the LRDR System
Complex at Clear AFS, to include the mission control facility, the
radar foundation, site infrastructure and security, along with the
necessary utilities to provide initial operations of the radar. We
request the MILCON be fully funded to ensure an on-time delivery of the
facilities, which in turn allows the Radar Prime contractor to erect
the radar equipment shelter and install the radar components to meet
the 2020 operational requirement. The LRDR System Complex Phase 2
project is planned in 2019 to provide a permanent shielded power plant
for the radar system.
Homeland Defense C2BMC
We request $439.6 million in fiscal year 2017 for Command, Control,
Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC). We are fielding C2BMC
Spiral 8.2-1 capabilities to NORTHCOM and PACOM in the 4th quarter of
fiscal year 2017 to support an enhanced homeland defense capability.
This will allow C2BMC to integrate data from multiple TPY-2 radars,
SBX, UEWRs, Cobra Dane, and space sensors to increase system raid size
and tracking capacity by a factor of five. It will also improve the
system information security posture. We also are developing C2BMC
Spiral 8.2-5 to support LRDR sensor management and enhanced engage-on-
remote and support a more robust homeland defense by December 2020.
regional defenses
Our fiscal year 2017 budget request continues to prioritize
deployment of regional defenses to protect our deployed forces, allies
and international partners against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs in support
of Combatant Commanders' near-term and future priorities.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
We have delivered and started training for the fifth Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Weapon System Battery and completed
training on the fourth battery now under Army control. To meet the
demand for THAAD, MDA recently delivered 12 THAAD interceptors for U.S.
batteries and 24 for THAAD batteries operated by the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). This past year we also delivered the latest evolution
in THAAD software, SW B2.2.1 Debris Mitigation Phase I capability and
flight-tested SWB2.7.0. MDA continued to provide maintenance and supply
support of the first deployed THAAD battery (comprising the THAAD
system and AN/TPY-2 radar) in Guam.
This past fall THAAD added two more successful intercepts,
improving its hit-to-kill record since 2006 to 13 for 13. FTO-02 Event
2a was our first operational test of integrated regional BMD
capabilities, with the THAAD and Aegis BMD weapon systems sharing
common defended areas. Two air-launched ballistic missile targets and
one cruise missile target were launched in this scenario. The THAAD
battery destroyed the first ballistic missile target, demonstrating its
advanced algorithm capability and satisfying a condition for the Army's
materiel release of the THAAD weapon system. Following receipt of the
remote cue, the Aegis BMD ship, USS John Paul Jones, operating in the
Integrated Air Missile Defense mode, launched to engage the second
target, but the SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade missile experienced an
anomaly early in flight. The THAAD battery crew, which also had
launched a second THAAD interceptor at the medium-range ballistic
missile, located this second target and destroyed it. The crew of the
USS John Paul Jones then used the SM-2 Block IIIA guided missile to
destroy a cruise missile target. The test, conducted at Wake Island,
also involved the THAAD Terminal Mode AN/TPY-2 Radar, the Forward Based
AN/TPY-2 Radar, and Aegis BMD Spy-1 Radar, and the C2BMC
infrastructure, as well as space sensor assets. Warfighters
representing the entire chain of command operated the BMDS system while
using tactics, techniques and procedures and successfully defended
against air and missile attacks. This test was a valuable demonstration
of the benefits of layered, integrated missile defenses.
In fiscal year 2017 THAAD will participate in two flight tests,
FTT-18 and FTT-15. In FTT-18 THAAD will demonstrate an intercept of a
separating IRBM target using the THAAD radar, launcher, fire control
and communication, interceptor operations and engagement operations.
Turbulent weather in the Pacific Ocean precluded the timely execution
of FTO-02 E2, which forced the delay of FTO-02 E2a. The turbulent
weather forced the delay of FTO-02 E2 into the FTT-18 window in late
fourth quarter fiscal year 2015, effectively forcing the re-planning of
FTT-18 into fiscal year 2017. In fiscal year 2017, we will conduct FTT-
15 to demonstrate the capability of the system to do an endo-
atmospheric intercept against an MRBM target with associated objects.
For fiscal year 2017, MDA is requesting $369.6 million for THAAD
procurement, which includes the purchase of 24 THAAD interceptors. By
the end of fiscal year 2017, MDA will deliver an additional 61 THAAD
interceptors to the U.S. Army, for a total of 197 interceptors in
inventory (this total does not include interceptors expended in flight-
testing including two we plan to expend in FTT-18 and FTT-15). We will
deliver and initiate training for the 7th THAAD Battery and complete
training for the 6th THAAD Battery and turn it over to the Army by the
end of fiscal year 2017. We will also complete the training of the 2nd
UAE THAAD Battery and continue to support the forward deployed THAAD
battery in Guam.
We are requesting $270.3 million in RDT&E funding in fiscal year
2017 as part of the continued development and testing of THAAD baseline
2.0 capabilities. THAAD will continue activities to explore and mature
the design concept of expanding THAAD system interoperability with air
and missile defense systems and expanding the battlespace and defended
area of the current baseline THAAD Weapon System. We are also
requesting $72.1 million for THAAD operations and maintenance for
delivered batteries.
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Aegis BMD continues to be the backbone of the Nation's regional
defense for our deployed forces, allies, partners and friends, and
directly supports and expands our homeland defenses with long range
surveillance and track capability. The fiscal year 2017 budget request
supports continued advancement of the system to counter the growing
threats.
In fiscal year 2015, MDA expanded global BMD capability for the
Aegis Fleet. Together with the U.S. Navy, we completed four BMD Weapons
System upgrades on Aegis ships--two Aegis BMD 3.6 to 4.0 ships (ships
with 4.0 can cover a wider threat set compared to the initial weapon
system), and two Aegis BMD 3.6 to Aegis Baseline 9.C1 (BMD 5.0
Capability Upgrade (CU)) ships (ships with Baseline 9 and 5.0 CU can
conduct the anti-air warfare and ballistic missile defense missions
concurrently). We also commenced four additional upgrades, one from 3.6
to 4.0 and three from 3.6 to Aegis Baseline 9.C1 (BMD 5.0 CU). All
upgrades were done to the existing BMD fleet of 33 BMD-capable Aegis
ships. To meet an ever-growing demand by the Combatant Commanders, we
continued delivery of Standard Missile-3s, including eight Block IAs
and 20 Block IBs. fiscal year 2015 also marked the end of manufacturing
for SM-3 Block IA rounds. We completed 26 Block IA recertifications and
will continue to support maintenance for the deployed SM-3 Block IA
rounds. In 2016, we expect to complete analysis that would support the
extension of service life of the SM-3 Block IAs from 8 to 12 years,
leaving these critically needed assets in the Fleet 50 percent longer.
MDA conducted several critical flight tests this past year to prove
the operational effectiveness of Aegis BMD and support certification of
the at-sea and ashore versions of Aegis Baseline 9 (BMD 5.0 CU) Weapon
System. Starting with FTM-25 on November 6, 2014, we successfully
executed integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) by intercepting one
short-range ballistic missile target with an SM-3 Block IB, while
simultaneously engaging two air-breathing threats with SM-2 Block
IIIAs. For this test, the Aegis Baseline 9 ship, USS John Paul Jones,
was configured in IAMD mode, which provides the ship the ability to
manage SPY-1 radar resources to conduct both anti-air warfare and
ballistic missile defense concurrently. All three targets were
successfully intercepted, and we met all primary and secondary
objectives.
In FTX-19, conducted in February 2015 off the coast of Virginia at
NASA's Wallops Island facility, MDA successfully simulated engagements
against a raid of three short-range targets using the Aegis BMD 4.0
Weapons System, demonstrating coordinated SM-3 engagements between two
Aegis BMD ships utilizing the Distributed Weighted Engagement Schema
between two Aegis ships coordinating engagements. This weapon system
functionality will be used, particularly in raid scenarios, when more
than one ship is able to engage inbound threat missiles, and it
determines a Preferred Shooter solution for SM-3 engagements. During
this test, an Aegis Baseline 9 (BMD 5.0 CU) ship also participated,
performing IAMD by simultaneously conducting simulated engagements of
the three SRBM targets and four simulated anti-air warfare targets.
In July MDA and the Navy conducted a series of four flight test
events to verify the Sea-Based Terminal capability. The Sea Based
Terminal program delivers an added layer of defense for Aegis BMD to
engage short range threats in the terminal phase of flight and defend
the sea base and high value assets ashore. During this series, the USS
John Paul Jones used Aegis Baseline 9 (BMD 5.0 CU) to search, detect,
track, and discriminate two short-range ballistic missile targets and
two cruise missile targets. In four separate flight test events we
verified the Sea Based Terminal capability using the SM-6 Dual I and
the SM-2 Block IV missiles, successfully destroying the short-range
ballistic missile and cruise missile targets and demonstrating the
ability of Aegis Baseline 9 (BMD 5.0 CU) and the SM-6 to conduct both
terminal ballistic missile defense and anti-air warfare. This campaign
marked the first flight of the SM-6 Dual I missile, and it was the
first demonstration of the tactical interface between the Aegis
Baseline 9.C1 Weapons System and the SM-6 and SM-2 Block IV guided
missiles. The SM-6 is a dual-use (anti-air warfare and BMD) missile
that provides an accurate and highly capable BMD capability. It will
replace the legacy SM-2 Block IV for terminal defense as those missiles
reach the end of their service life. We are planning additional flight
tests in 2016 for SM-6 Dual I missiles, which will enter the fleet
inventory this spring.
This past December we successfully conducted the Standard Missile-3
(SM-3) Block IB Threat Upgrade (TU) controlled test vehicle (CTV) test,
which we launched to engage a simulated ballistic missile target. The
simulated engagement was controlled by the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense
Test Complex with Aegis Baseline 9 (BMD 5.0 CU) to verify G-switch
operation of the SM-3 Block IB TU. This test put us in a confident
position later in the day to conduct the operationally realistic FTO-02
E1a intercept test. The Aegis Ashore missile defense test complex at
the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii fired the SM-3 Block IB
interceptor for the first time to collide with and destroy an air-
launched MRBM target. This operational flight test was the first to
demonstrate an intercept using the Aegis Ashore test complex and
demonstrated important modernization updates to the Aegis Weapon
System.
In fiscal year 2017, we will continue our commitment to develop,
test, and deliver global naval capability to the Warfighter and support
defense of our deployed forces and European NATO allies through
supporting operational readiness of EPAA Phase 2 and delivery of Phase
3. In fiscal year 2016, following successful flight testing of the
redesigned SM-3 Third Stage Rocket Motor nozzle to increase overall
missile reliability, MDA anticipates a full-rate production decision
for the SM-3 Block IB. Anticipating that authorization, we request
$463.8 million in fiscal year 2017 to procure 35 SM-3 Block IBs and
supporting material, for a total of 256 procured (235 Defense Wide
Procurement plus 21 RDT&E) and 146 delivered by the end of fiscal year
2017. To recertify SM-3 rounds that have been previously delivered and
deployed to the Fleet, MDA requests $38.9 million in fiscal year 2017
for sustainment of SM-3 assets.
We request $106.0 million for the SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative
Development (SCD) effort with the Japan Ministry of Defense. In fiscal
year 2015, the SM-3 Block IIA executed a controlled test vehicle, in
which controlled first-stage flight through nosecone separation was
successfully demonstrated. In December of 2015, a second controlled
flight test was conducted to further test the Kinetic Warhead and
Throttleable Divert and Attitude Control System. We will complete
flight testing for the SCD Project with two intercept tests scheduled
for the fourth quarter in fiscal year 2016 and second quarter in fiscal
year 2017. In fiscal year 2017, we will begin transition to testing the
SM-3 Block IIA within the U. S. BMDS architecture with the upgraded
Aegis Baseline 9 weapon system and BMD 5.1, for at sea and ashore
deployment, and we request $254.7 million in RDT&E funding to continue
manufacturing rounds to support flight testing and EPAA Phase 3.
MDA is strongly committed to further enhancing capability of the
Aegis BMD weapon system to give Sailors the tools needed to
successfully execute their mission. In fiscal year 2015, we delivered
the BMD 4.0.3 weapon system, which further enhances Aegis BMD's
homeland defense role by improving long range surveillance and tracking
capability to provide data to the GMD system for longer range and more
sophisticated threats. MDA requests $28.3 million in fiscal year 2017
for the BMD 4 series weapon systems to bring advanced threat and raid
scenario capability to the legacy Aegis BMD Fleet. Having certified the
Aegis Baseline 9.C1 (BMD 5.0 CU) weapon system in November of 2015, MDA
is shifting focus towards delivering BMD 5.1 capability on schedule and
requests $92.4 million to continue software development and testing to
certify in fiscal year 2018 and meet the delivery timeline of the SM-3
Block IIA for deployment on ships and at Aegis Ashore sites. In
addition to weapon system development, MDA requests $50.1 million to
procure weapon system equipment for installation and upgrade to the BMD
Fleet and $19.9 million to sustain BMD specific equipment on the
existing Fleet.
Adding an additional layer to the Aegis BMD weapon system, we are
using an incremental development approach integrated within the Navy's
Baseline 9 architecture to develop and deliver a Sea Based Terminal
capability. By expanding the capability of the SM-6 guided missile and
BMD 5 series weapon systems, we are delivering capability to protect
maritime forces against anti-ship ballistic missiles and provide
layered defense for forces ashore. We will further test the first
increment of Sea Based Terminal with follow-on performance testing in
fiscal year 2016 during FTX-21. Sea Based Terminal Increment 2 is on
schedule to be certified and operational in the 2018-2019 timeframe.
European Phased Adaptive Approach
We will continue to support the EPAA as a U.S. contribution to NATO
BMD to provide full coverage and protection of NATO European territory,
populations, and forces from the increasing threat of ballistic missile
proliferation from outside of the Euro-Atlantic area by investing
resources for EPAA development, testing and deployment. It is important
to emphasize that this capability is not capable of threatening, nor is
it intended to threaten, Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. EPAA
Phase 1 was implemented in 2011 with the fielding of an AN/TPY-2 radar
in Turkey and stationing of an Aegis BMD ship in the Eastern
Mediterranean. EPAA Phase 2 achieved technical capability declaration
in 2015, which enhances U.S. and NATO capabilities with the addition of
Aegis Ashore in Romania, additional deployment of Aegis BMD ships home-
ported in Rota, Spain, more capable Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IBs, and an
upgraded Baseline 9 weapon system with BMD 5.0 CU. With Aegis Ashore
Romania turned over to the Navy for operations, in fiscal year 2017 we
have requested $13.9 million for sustainment of the system. To augment
needed ship stationing requirements of EPAA Phase 2, MDA is providing
sustainment support for BMD specific equipment to the four ships that
shifted home ports to Rota, Spain.
Although not directly in support of the BMDS architecture for EPAA
Phase 2, MDA assisted the Maritime Theater Missile Defense Forum and U.
S. Navy in a multi-national, 2 month long event. At-Sea-Demonstration
15 (ASD-15) met its objective to prove multi-national interoperability
for air and ballistic missile defenses. During the seven weeks of live
fire events, four IAMD scenarios were exercised. The capstone IAMD
event was an SM-3 Block IA intercept of a short range threat by the USS
Ross cued by Netherlands' HNLMS De Zeven Provincien, with simultaneous
engagements of air breathing targets by the USS The Sullivans and
Canada's HMCS Montreal. United Kingdom and Spanish ships sent track
data for analysis back to Dahlgren, Virginia. In all, ASD-15
demonstrated the power of a multinational maritime task force to share
information and work cooperatively in a complex integrated air and
missile defense environment.
EPAA Phase 3 will improve defensive coverage against medium- and
intermediate-range threats with the deployment of a second operational
Aegis Ashore site in Poland, equipped with the upgraded Aegis Baseline
9 weapon system with BMD 5.1 and capability to launch SM-3 Block IIAs.
These Aegis Weapon System upgrades are further enhanced by spiral
upgrades to the C2BMC network enabling Engage on Remote capability and
extended defensive coverage for NATO Europe. In fiscal year 2016 we
requested $169.2 million for the construction of the Aegis Ashore site
in Poland. The MDA MILCON contract for the Redzikowo, Poland Aegis
Ashore site was awarded on February 10, 2016, and construction start
was March 2016. We request $57.5 million in fiscal year 2017 for
procurement of Aegis Ashore equipment. We plan to complete this site by
the end of 2018 and will upgrade the Aegis Ashore Romania site to BMD
5.1 when operationally feasible.
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications and Sensors
C2BMC provides persistent tracking, cueing, discrimination, and
fire control quality data to Aegis BMD, GMD, THAAD, and coalition
partners to support homeland and regional defense objectives. We
continue to support Warfighter command, control and battle management
needs across the globe by providing the strategic BMD planner, which
provides Combatant Commanders situational awareness tools to support
weapons release authority for homeland defense and control and tasking
of forward-based AN/TPY-2 radars. C2BMC operators and maintainers are
deployed forward in some of the world's highest threat spots and
continue to provide around-the-clock support to the local commanders.
As the BMDS integrating element, C2BMC has demonstrated proven
interoperability across regional BMD architectures. Of note this past
year in the regional defense area, we integrated with Aegis Ashore to
support Aegis Launch on Remote capability required for EPAA Phase 2
declaration in December 2015. MDA also fielded Cross-Area of
Responsibility capability to USEUCOM and USCENTCOM C2BMC, allowing each
Combatant Command to take advantage of the other's BMD assets. We also
supported enhancements to the BMDS to keep pace with emerging threats
worldwide by investing in the development, integration, and testing of
advanced algorithms to improve discrimination capabilities and enhance
the use of space-based sensor data using the BMDS Overhead Persistent
InfraRed (OPIR) Architecture (BOA). MDA's C2BMC engineers continued to
make progress in the Simultaneous Correlation of Unambiguous Tracks
(SCOUT) algorithms and Aggregated Discrimination. SCOUT is a multiphase
activity to develop a physics-based capability to identify the lethal
object(s) of a threat complex in a moderately complex countermeasure
environment.
We will field C2BMC Spiral 8.2-1 to USNORTHCOM and USPACOM in the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017 in support of enhanced homeland
defense. Spiral 8.2-1 is a complete hardware update to the C2BMC System
that will allow C2BMC to integrate data from multiple TPY-2 radars,
SBX, UEWR, Upgraded Cobra Dane, and BMDS OPIR architecture. It will
increase system raid size and tracking capacity by a factor of five and
will improve the system Information Assurance/Cyber security posture.
Continued development, integration and testing of C2BMC Spiral 8.2-3
(Engage on Remote) will support the EPAA Phase 3 capability declaration
in December 2018. Development of C2BMC Spiral 8.2-5 (LRDR Sensor
Management and Enhanced Engage on Remote) will enable us by December
2020 to reach a robust homeland defense capability. Finally, we will
continue to support incremental improvements to the BMDS to keep pace
with emerging threats world-wide by investing in the development,
integration and testing of advanced algorithms to improve
discrimination capabilities and to enhance the use of space based
sensor data using the BMDS OPIR architecture.
We request $32.1 million for continued operation of the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) in fiscal year 2017. STSS
satellites operate in low earth orbit and continue to collect valuable
test data. STSS collected data on the most complex scenes to date
during the FTX-20 test event in October 2014. (FTX-20 involved the
launch of a separating MRBM and the simulation of an exo-atmospheric
engagement by an Aegis Baseline 9.C1 configured destroyer. GM CTV-02+
involved a non-intercept test of a Ground Based Interceptor against a
complex target scene presented by an air launched IRBM.) STSS also
successfully tracked and collected data during Glory Trips 215 and 212,
and participated in two other Air Force Global Strike Command flight
tests of the Minuteman III.
In fiscal year 2015, we began the process of decommissioning the
Near-Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) satellite that MDA launched in
April 2007. This satellite captured high resolution phenomenology data
from the exhaust plumes of boosting ballistic missiles. The NFIRE
satellite was decommissioned in August 2015 and safely deorbited this
past November. Looking to the future, we completed the Critical Design
Review for the Spacebased Kill Assessment (SKA) in January 2015 and the
SKA Flight Model Manufacturing Review in April 2015; delivered the
first shipset of flight models to the payload integrator in November
2015 and the second shipset in January 2016. The SKA experiment is
comprised of a network of sensors hosted on commercial satellites to
collect data on missile intercepts, make an independent kill
assessment, and pass that information on to the BMDS to support a
multi-sensor kill assessment of the target. In fiscal year 2017 we will
complete the integration and testing of SKA payloads onto hosted
payload modules and satellites and conduct on-orbit deployment,
checkout, calibration and commissioning of the SKA sensor network.
The Services and COCOMs, with logistical support from MDA, are
operating forward based X-band radars (AN/TPY-2(FBM)) in Japan, Israel,
Turkey, and United States Central Command. All of these radars
contribute to regional defense, and some also provide a significant
contribution to the defense of the U.S. homeland. Last year we
completed the integration and performance characterization testing of
the 2nd AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, located at Kyogamisaki (Site KCS). In
order to reduce noise levels at a seaside community near the KCS site,
we completed muffler installation on Mobile Electric Power (MEP) -810
power generators in March 2015. MDA increased environmental protection
for the radar equipment by coordinating and receiving approval for
construction and modification of the Prime Mission Equipment/Rubb
structure at Site KCS. In fiscal year 2015 we delivered new operational
mission profiles that provided cooperative coverage/capability for
USEUCOM and USCENTCOM sensors and successfully completed operational
flight testing of new capabilities in operational flight tests (FTO-02
events) and ground test campaigns, improving cross-Area Of
Responsibility operational mission profiles, debris mitigation logic
and increases operational availability. Last year we completed the
THAAD Reliability Growth Test and critical maintenance periods on
Radars #2, #3 and #5 at Guam. We also delivered Radar #11 to THAAD
Battery #6 and continued production of Radar #12 (the final U.S.
production AN/TPY-2).
We request $653.4 million in fiscal year 2017 to develop, deploy,
test, and sustain BMDS sensors (this includes $162.0 million for the
continued development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar), and
$172.6 million to sustain the twelve (terminal mode and forward-based
mode) AN/TPY-2 radars and support the UEWRs and Cobra Dane radar. We
expect to complete development efforts for the next incremental
software build (CX3.0), which will expand electronic protection
functionality and further improve discrimination and debris mitigation
capabilities to handle more advanced threat set requirements. We will
also develop common U.S. and FMS software architecture for AN/TPY-2 to
improve synergy and achieve cost savings for future software builds. In
fiscal year 2017 we also will deliver the operational Float Antenna
Equipment Unit (AEU) to improve Warfighter operational/maintenance
flexibility; continue fleet-wide depot maintenance to retrofit
Electronics Equipment Units with new signal data processors; and
retrofit a product redesign for AN/TPY-2 AEU transformers with upgraded
reliability improvements across the fleet. AN/TPY-2 radars will
participate in three BMDS flight tests (FTG-11, FTG-15, and FTT-18).
developing new capabilities
MDA is developing technology to address gaps in the BMDS and drive
the cost of defending the homeland down dramatically. MDA's goal for
these investments is to deploy a future BMDS architecture more capable
and cost-effective that instills warfighter confidence in the ability
of the BMDS to defeat missile attacks. Our vision is to shift the
calculus of our potential adversaries by introducing directed energy
into the BMDS architecture. This would revolutionize missile defense by
dramatically reducing, if not eliminating, the role of very expensive
interceptors. Our long-term goal is to deploy lasers on high altitude,
long endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) platforms to destroy ICBMs
in the boost phase. To achieve this vision we must demonstrate two key
elements: laser scaling with high efficiency and excellent beam
quality, and high altitude, long endurance aircraft to carry the laser
system.
We request $71.8 million in Weapons Technology to continue
development and test of our high-powered directed energy program to
build the foundation for the next-generation UAV-borne laser system. A
UAV-borne laser would be capable of acquiring, tracking and eventually
destroying an enemy missile at a much lower cost than the existing
BMDS. Within the Directed Energy project, we will collaborate with our
Air Force and DARPA partners to develop and demonstrate the technology
necessary to scale laser power to a level required for speed-of-light
missile defense. In fiscal year 2015, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology's Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) Fiber Combining Laser achieved
44 kilowatts (kW) continuous power with near perfect beam quality, a
record for fiber combined lasers. In 2017, MIT/LL will demonstrate a 30
kW, low Size Weight and Power ( 7 kg/kW) fully packaged fiber laser.
They also will demonstrate a flight qualified 1 kg/kW fiber amplifier
traceable to BMDS high energy laser system requirements. The Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) achieved similar success with
their Diode Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL) system, reaching 14 kW, a record
for the DPAL system. In fiscal year 2017, LLNL will demonstrate a DPAL
system at 30 kilowatts average power, more than double the power ever
achieved by a hybrid laser. The Agency also will make technology
investments in Divert and Attitude Control Systems for future BMD
interceptors and kill vehicles.
In our effort to mature laser technology for missile defense, we
awarded five contracts with key aerospace partners to produce concepts
for an airborne low power laser demonstrator. We will use these
concepts to guide our requirements for the follow-on competitive design
contracts in fiscal year 2017 under our Technology Maturation
Initiatives program element. MDA requests $90.3 million in fiscal year
2017 for Technology Maturation Initiatives to build on the successes in
weapons technology and discrimination sensor technology. Our vision is
to add high altitude airborne or space-based electro-optical sensors
into the BMDS architecture that can acquire, track, and discriminate
ballistic missile targets.
One of the goals of the Discrimination Sensor Technology flight
test development program is to demonstrate that the Aegis Weapon System
can launch an SM-3, engage and destroy a ballistic missile solely on
tracks from remote airborne sensors. Test campaigns exercise the test
analog of the BMDS architecture using operationally proven
Multispectral Targeting System sensors aboard MQ-9 Reapers as the
tracking element. During FTX-20, FTM-25, and GM CTV-02+, the Reapers
received cues, acquired and tracked the target and transmitted these
tracks to the BMDS C2BMC laboratory at Schriever Air Force Base. C2BMC
fused the tracks and transmitted them via Link 16 to the Aegis
Ballistic Missile Test Bed at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
(SPAWAR) in San Diego, CA where the engagements were simulated in real-
time. During GM CTV-02+ the Aegis Weapon System authorized Remote
Engage Doctrine within 30 seconds of target burnout.
Over the next 2 years, we will incrementally demonstrate the value
of increasingly more capable electro-optical/infrared sensors while
developing tactics and procedures for future operational use. This work
will culminate in a real time Aegis SM-3 engagement using tracking
information from airborne sensor data in 2017 and again using higher
precision, advanced sensor data in 2019. These tests are a crucial step
in developing persistent sensor technology to defeat the evolving
ballistic missile threat first from aircraft and eventually from space.
Finally, MDA will contract with industry to begin the design of an
airborne laser demonstrator to quantify the target acquisition,
tracking, and handover performance required for boost phase missile
defense.
MDA requests $71.5 million for the MOKV effort. We have made
considerable progress on the development strategy for the next
generation exo-atmospheric kill vehicles. In fiscal year 2015, we
awarded three contracts with industry to define concepts for deploying
multiple kill vehicles from a single booster. In fiscal year 2016,
industry delivered their MOKV concepts, and we are evaluating those
concepts. The next step will be to focus on reducing component
technical risk in critical areas identified by industry, which is
necessary to make this revolutionary concept a reality. By 2017 we will
develop and test MOKV command and control strategies in both digital
and Hardware-in-the-Loop venues that will prove we can manage the
engagements of many kill vehicles on many targets from a single
interceptor. We will also invest in the communication architectures and
guidance technology that support this game changing approach.
Ultimately, MOKVs may revolutionize our missile defense architecture.
MDA requests $23.4 million for Advanced Research and development
that capitalizes on the creativity and innovation of the Nation's small
business community and academia to enhance the BMDS. We are also
fostering research between U.S. and foreign universities of allied
nations through international cooperative science and technology
projects. We awarded nine new contracts and exercised continuation
options on ten additional contracts for innovative new research that
can transition onto the BMDS.
MDA also requests $17.9 million for the Advanced Concepts &
Performance Assessment effort, which models the capability of advanced
BMD technology to address evolving threats to the warfighter. The
request will fund the digital simulation and hardware-in-the-loop
framework and models required for testing of the Airborne Advanced
Sensor, Kill Vehicle Modular Open Architecture test bed, and maturing
sensor fusion algorithms.
international cooperation
The fiscal year 2017 budget request includes funding for regional
missile defense capabilities to protect deployed U.S. forces, reassure
allies and partners, and build cooperative regional security
architectures. MDA is engaged with over twenty countries and
international organizations, such as NATO and the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC). MDA is committed to expanding work with our
international partners, to include conducting joint analyses to support
partner missile defense acquisition decisions, cooperative research and
development projects, deploying BMD assets, Foreign Military Sales
(FMS), and co-production efforts. Our major international efforts
reflect the Department's goals in the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and
European Areas of Responsibility and will enable implementation of
EPAA, build partner capacity, and support the strategic shift to Asia-
Pacific.
The investments of our allies and partners in their own missile
defense capabilities allow us to build more effective regional security
architectures that complement U.S. regional missile defense
capabilities. MDA is currently executing an FMS case with the United
Arab Emirates for two THAAD batteries and accompanying launchers,
radars, and interceptors. MDA is actively engaged with several nations,
particularly those in the Arabian Gulf region, to provide program
information and cost data that may inform future decisions to procure
THAAD and other missile defense systems. We are currently conducting a
Ballistic Missile Early Warning Study for the GCC, analyzing sensor and
C4I architecture options for defense of the region.
We continue to have a very strong cooperative missile defense
partnership with Israel. Over the past year, the Israel Missile Defense
Organization (IMDO) and MDA successfully completed the third and fourth
series of tests of the Stunner Interceptor for the David's Sling Weapon
System (DSWS). IMDO and MDA also achieved the successful first
engagement of a ballistic missile target with the Arrow-3 interceptor
in December 2015. This was a major milestone in the development of the
Arrow Weapon System and provides confidence in future Israeli
capabilities to defeat developing threats. The Department continues to
support the critical Iron Dome Program to defeat short-range rockets
and artillery through co-production efforts.
We are making significant progress with our Japanese counterparts
on the SM-3 Block IIA, our largest co-development effort. The
development work, which remains on track for first delivery in the 2018
timeframe, will expand extended deterrence to our friends and allies
and establish an important vehicle for closer defense cooperation ties.
Once deployed at the Aegis Ashore site in support of EPAA Phase 3 and
on ships, the SM-3 Block IIA will improve and expand defenses against
MRBM and IRBM threats.
We continue to work on meeting our EPAA commitments with our NATO
Allies. In December 2015, we completed major weapon system construction
and achieved Technical Capability Declaration of the Aegis Ashore site
in Romania. We anticipate declaring Initial Operating Capability of
EPAA Phase 2 as well as beginning work on the Aegis Ashore site in
Poland in support of EPAA Phase 3 this year. In addition to our
interoperability activities with NATO, MDA continues to work with our
European allies collectively as we build upon the synergy and lessons
learned from ASD-15 as well as bilaterally to further individual
national progress with missile defenses.
cybersecurity/supply chain risk management
We are very cognizant of the growing cyber threat and aggressively
working to ensure the Nation's missile defenses are resilient and able
to operate in a highly contested cyber environment. Potential
adversaries are developing cyber forces as part of their military
structure and integrating them into their overall strategy. We are
working very closely with the Armed Services, the Combatant Commands,
especially Strategic Command's USCYBERCOM, and other agencies in DOD
and the Federal Government to counter this growing threat.
We are improving the cyber hygiene of our missile defense
capabilities by ensuring our cybersecurity infrastructure has the
latest security upgrades and patches. We are assessing our systems, our
suppliers, and our overall acquisition processes. We are ensuring
robust and secure configurations of our critical software and hardware
to reduce the risk of malicious activities. We also have a rigorous
cyber and supply chain risk management inspection program to examine
everything about our systems from the trusted supply chain to the
fielded capability. This helps us ensure the highest possible levels of
compliance.
In support of the DOD Cybersecurity Culture and Compliance
Initiative signed out by the Secretary of Defense on September 28,
2015, we are developing a cybersecurity program that focuses on the
five operational excellence principles: Integrity, Level of Knowledge,
Procedural Compliance, Formality and Backup, and Questioning Attitude.
These principles are fundamental to the DOD cyber enterprise.
We are also instituting the DOD Cybersecurity Discipline
Implementation Plan to mitigate risks for the information systems we
own and manage. Our program implements the DOD campaign four lines of
effort: (1) Strong Authentication, to degrade the adversaries' ability
to maneuver on DOD information networks; (2) Device Hardening to reduce
internal and external attack vectors into DOD information networks; (3)
Reducing the Attack Surface, to lessen external attack vectors into MDA
information networks; and (4) Alignment to Cybersecurity/Computer
Network Defense Service Providers, to improve detection of and response
to adversary activity. These efforts run across all facets of MDA and
the BMDS mission systems and general services infrastructures. We also
created five additional Lines of Effort critical to MDA and the BMDS
including: (1) Safeguarding BMD information in the defense industrial
base; (2) Positioning, Navigation, and Timing; (3) Transitioning to
Risk Management Framework; (4) Cybersecurity Testing and (5)
Cybersecurity Workforce Management (training and certification).
We are also increasing efforts to establish additional
cybersecurity awareness training in support of the DOD Cybersecurity
Culture and Compliance Initiative to improve the individual human
performance and accountability within the DOD cyber enterprise. This
applies to our leaders, service providers, cyber warriors, and all of
our general users. Our efforts align to the DOD Cyber Strategy program
and are meant to enable and augment the existing mandated cyber
training efforts. Our training reinforces DOD training and exists to
shift cybersecurity cultural norms at all levels to increase
cybersecurity situational awareness across all personnel and inculcate
a high level of personal responsibility.
MDA has established an insider threat program in accordance with
the DOD Directive 205.16, ``The DOD Insider Threat Program.'' We are
leveraging computer network defense capabilities, in addition to other
information streams to proactively detect, mitigate and defeat
potential insider threats. This program also ensures that only trusted
individuals have access to MDA program information and systems.
The MDA Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) continues to
provide Computer Network Defense (CND) services as an accredited Tier
II CND service provider to MDA programs of record. The MDA CERT
executes a battle rhythm that includes daily monitoring and
collaboration with USCYBERCOM, Joint Forces Headquarters DOD
Information Networks, and other sources for latest threats to DOD and
the MDA. As a result, the MDA CERT tracked and managed 109 cyber
taskings in fiscal year 2015, contributing to the overall cybersecurity
posture of MDA networks and resources. From August to November 2015,
the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) inspected MDA. The
ISOO is responsible to the President for policy and oversight of the
Government-wide security classification and the National Industrial
Security Program and is a component of the National Archives and
Records Administration. In addition to security classification and
Industrial Security, the ISOO reviewed MDA's cybersecurity program.
ISOO's review confirmed that the MDA operates a robust CNSI program,
one that enjoys leadership support and utilizes numerous best
practices. Nearly all of the program elements are very strong, and the
personnel who implement the program are dedicated and innovative. The
Agency's Security Classification Guides are developed and updated
utilizing a sound process and those that ISOO reviewed were current,
very well prepared, and included all of the elements required by
Executive Order 13526 and ISOO Directive 1. As with any program, there
are areas for improvement. MDA is working those areas for improvement
based on the findings and recommendations.
Over the last year we also conducted two Enterprise Cyber Range
Environment (ECRE) experiments with independent, DOT&E red team
penetration testing on the Joint Information Operations Range (JIOR).
The purpose of these experiments is to determine the BMDS cyber
robustness to both external and insider threats. We are planning an
additional ECRE for the GMD program in May 2016. MDA also completed 85
cybersecurity inspections worldwide to ensure compliance with DOD and
MDA cybersecurity standards. We follow up on these inspections to
ensure remediation of all identified cybersecurity risks.
We must build resilient cyber defenses that are capable of
detecting and mitigating threats without impeding operations in order
to ``fight through'' the cyber threat. MDA collaborates with the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to conduct cyber
penetration testing on key missile defense capabilities. We then use
the results of those tests to conduct risk assessments to prioritize
cybersecurity improvements, develop mitigation strategies, and improve
cyber training. We are also working to develop better cyber concept of
operations to ensure every network defender in every location knows how
to react to cyber challenges.
MDA is working hard to incorporate cybersecurity requirements early
into our acquisition lifecycle. We are focused on ensuring we are
designing and building cybersecurity into missile defenses, rather than
adding it after the fact. In addition, we are working closely with our
industry partners in the defense industrial base to ensure they can
protect both classified and unclassified information they are
processing on their systems to ensure that it will not be exposed to
potential adversaries. We know that malicious cyber actors are
constantly attempting to exfiltrate information from U.S. Industry. We
will continue to work with the defense industrial base, the FBI, and
other partners to identify these issues and raise the costs of this
behavior to those responsible, in coordination with national
authorities and in accordance with national policy.
We are working diligently with the COCOMs, Services, and other
agencies in the Federal Government to ensure the missile defense
capabilities we field will operate successfully in a highly contested
cyber environment. We have structured and continue to improve an
ongoing robust cybersecurity program to protect information about
current and future missile defense capabilities and ensure a persistent
state of enterprise cybersecurity readiness. This ensures that the
Agency remains a strong mission partner, protects and defends MDA
information systems and networks, and optimizes cybersecurity
management and processes at a level commensurate with our critical
national defense mission.
program oversight
There continues to be significant interest in MDA's development and
deployment of the BMDS and management of the missile defense program.
MDA is highly visible and one of the most scrutinized agencies within
the Department of Defense. Each year, throughout the budget hearing
cycle and congressional mark-ups and floor debates of the defense
authorization and appropriations bills, there is intense congressional
oversight of the missile defense program. MDA is also subjected on an
annual basis to numerous Government Accountability Office audits, the
support of which has required MDA to expend significant time and
enormous resources. Dozens of MDA personnel are engaged in supporting
21 GAO audits and answering more than 750 inquiries. Just within the
past year MDA has provided nearly 11,000 pages of internal documents
and prepared responses. MDA has concurred or partially concurred with
all 21 GAO recommendations in their annual Mandate Report since 2011.
In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year
2010 requires that Defense Department financial statements be validated
as ready for audit no later than September 30, 2017. The Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Financial Improvement and
Audit Readiness (FIAR) Directorate, initiated the Statement of
Budgetary Activity (SBA) Examination for the MDA in April 2015 to
evaluate the Agency's readiness for audit. In December 2015, the audit
firm conducting the SBA reported that MDA management's assertion is
fairly stated, which is a successful audit opinion. The Missile Defense
Agency continues to make significant progress with FIAR initiatives and
new Department policies. The successful SBA examination confirmed the
Agency is on track to meet financial statement requirements and full
auditability by the end of fiscal year 2017.
MDA also annually delivers the congressionally mandated Baseline
Acquisition Review (BAR) reports to Congress and GAO. We released the
latest BAR in early March. MDA and the Department also continue to
produce and deliver, as required by the annual defense bills, on
average, over 30 reports to congress on missile defense.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, in closing, I want to
assure Congress that MDA programs are cost-effective, efficient, and
managed in accordance with the Missile Defense Executive Board process
set up by the Department to ensure all missile defense programs and
operational requirements are validated, adhere to sound acquisition
practices, and can meet warfighter demand in a cost effective manner.
Our budget request for fiscal year 2017 will continue to increase the
capability and capacity of fielded homeland and regional missile
defense systems and make measured investments in advanced technology to
reverse the adversary's numerical advantage. I look forward to
answering the committee's questions. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
U.S.-ISRAELI COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS
Let me go to the Israeli cooperative program for a moment.
Stick with me for a minute and tell me if I am catching these
numbers correctly. I think the administration promised some
$600 million between 2010 and 2015, and met that promise in
their budget request, but Congress added to that number, at
least last year, perhaps the year before.
As I understand it, in a budget that is otherwise basically
flat, we are anticipating a 25 percent increase in the Israeli
cooperative programs in the next fiscal year.
Can you give me an idea of the status of the development of
the program and whether you believe that increase is warranted?
Admiral Syring. Sir, if I can, let me separate this into
several parts to thoroughly answer your question.
The fiscal year 2017 budget request from the Missile
Defense Agency and the President was roughly $100 million for
development, and $42 million for Iron Dome procurement,
additional interceptors that are required.
There is talk of additional requests from Israel on the
Hill beyond that amount, which would represent a substantial
increase to our budget request. I will leave that to you and
the committee and Congress for adjudication and decision.
I will testify to the maturity of the program. I am very
confident in the testing that we did specifically with David's
Sling last year, and the successes that they had with four
successful intercepts late last year, that the program is ready
for production.
Senator Durbin. Let me ask you, I believe Congress has
increased the President's request over the last couple years.
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. That's correct.
Senator Durbin. And there is another request.
Admiral Syring. That's correct.
Senator Durbin. My basic question to you is, how is it
being spent the last 2 years? Can you point to it and say it
was money well-spent because of the threat or because of the
development that went faster than we expected?
Admiral Syring. The additional funding that was provided by
Congress went to, primarily, two or three separate areas.
First, Iron Dome procurement of additional interceptors that
were needed after the recent conflict. I would testify
absolutely money well-spent, in terms of what that system did
to protect the population.
Further, we requested and received and we are in the
process of negotiating how we are going to deliver the funding
for the David's Sling weapon system production program, for
additional David's Sling interceptors, production of David's
Sling interceptors.
I can attest with the Iron Dome money that we have given
Israel, that after the signature of the coproduction agreement
with Israel, the workshare of the United States in fiscal year
2015 will meet or exceed the 55 percent goal in the agreement.
So there has been significant U.S. workshare to the funds that
Congress has supplied for Iron Dome.
Senator Durbin. Let me ask you about another issue.
REDESIGNED KILL VEHICLE
The redesigned kill vehicle, RKV, I understand that you are
moving toward something called best-of-breed. From the outside,
it looks like you're taking three defense contractors that
might and should be competing against one another and putting
them in a joint effort.
We have had some questionable experiences with that, have
we not, in terms of procurement in the past? Once you have
eliminated competition, the cost tends to skyrocket. So why
wouldn't it in this situation?
Admiral Syring. Two things, Senator, to answer that
specific concern.
One, in the past, the kill vehicle in the GMD program was
manufactured and led by one company with subs underneath it,
more of a lead system integration role than the government in
the lead role. I felt strongly that the government needed to
take charge of this design, given we have one opportunity to
get it right.
So I put a team, and we call it best-of-breed, of our best
three contractors in this area working together on specific
components and integration efforts under our oversight and
watch through a technical direction agent, similar to what we
have in the Aegis program.
That said, we are going to complete the design with the
full intent to complete production of the production kill
vehicles.
Senator Durbin. So the production itself is going to be
competitive.
Admiral Syring. That is correct.
Senator Durbin. And the actual design part of it, how do
you keep the costs from going through the roof?
Admiral Syring. We will manage tight cost budgets
component-by-component and managed to a should-cost threshold
every step of the design process. Through every design review,
you check costs. And if it starts to become unaffordable in one
particular area, we have the opportunity to revisit and change
and do some trades between components or contractors at
government direction.
And sir, given the state of the program and the need to get
this kill vehicle quickly to the fleet to replace the less
reliable kill vehicles, it is absolutely my recommendation and
my sound backing.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Durbin.
Senator Shelby.
FUNDING
Senator Shelby. Thank you. I want to pick up on the
requests for funding, which this is a funding committee, as the
Admiral knows well.
We have these threats increasing from Iran, North Korea,
China, Russia, and probably some unknown. Who knows.
The question that comes to me is, are you more than
adequately funded? We don't want to shortchange you, because if
we do, we shortchange national security. The security of this
Nation is very, very important.
We would like to hear when you don't want money someday,
because money by itself is not everything, but money funds the
forward and future research and development of everything.
Senator Cochran touched on it, and Senator Durbin got into
it a little bit. Are we losing something here by lack of
funding? It is your responsibility, and I know that, to the
American people, first and foremost, in your job to make sure
that we are on the cutting edge, that we are doing everything
we can to defend this Nation against threats and future
threats.
In other words, I hope we are not going to lose something
here.
Do you see what I am getting at, Admiral?
Admiral Syring. Sir, I do. Let me take that question.
We are adequately funded. We are not losing anything today,
as I sit here, due to funding or funding not being available.
We are working on the projects. I've testified to this
committee now, I think this is my fourth year, on a strategy to
improve our current fielded capability and capacity,
systematically. And we have taken this in a very rigorous step-
by-step approach, to include GMD reliability.
This committee and Congress have been very supportive of
the areas that we did have gaps in the system with,
reliability, in particular, with the GMD system, a radar that
we are now building in Alaska, and necessary for the North
Korean threat.
We have at efforts that are in the beginning stages in the
advanced technology efforts. There is one area that I would
like to focus on in terms of support needed to adequately fund
technology demonstrations and prototypes of advanced technology
to augment the kinetic solutions that we are fielding today.
That is the one area that I see in the future with regards to
advanced technology that I will need support for coming
forward.
The other area is space, and we have talked about space in
the past, and the need for our country, our department, not
just the Missile Defense Agency, to come together and field a
space solution in the future that has missile defense
requirements in it and missile defense capability in it.
Senator Shelby. Aren't we just about going to have to do
that?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. Because of the potential threats out there
and the continued advancement and involvement of offensive
weapons, and so forth?
Admiral Syring. The long-term solution for persistent
tracking and discrimination, in my opinion, will be done
through the space layer.
Senator Shelby. Tell me what you mean when you say that we
have adequate money. In other words, this is adequate for today
and tomorrow? How far down the road are you looking? Or can you
look too far down the road in this area?
Admiral Syring. The programs that we have in development
today that will be fielding between now and 2020 are adequately
funded. And essentially, over the last 3 years, we have had
four new start programs that have been funded by Congress, new
kill vehicle, discrimination efforts, GMD reliability
improvements, and long-range radar in Alaska. So those are
adequately and fully funded.
Senator Shelby. Research and development goes on, I hope
always. But after you develop, you have to deploy. And that's a
different stream of money, isn't it?
Admiral Syring. Sir, there is adequate funding in the
operation support part of my request to accomplish the fielding
that is required between now and 2020.
Senator Shelby. Admiral, do you feel confident that our
missile defense system--you mentioned adequate right now--is
sufficient to protect this country?
Admiral Syring. The missile defense budget is adequately
funded. The missile defense system will meet today's threat and
the threat in the future, and I have high confidence in that
statement.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
The distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral, for your leadership.
CYBERSECURITY
You rightfully pointed out in your opening statement, the
emerging cyberthreat to every system, but particularly to your
system.
If you had additional resources, could you tell us in what
areas of cybersecurity that you could use these resources?
Admiral Syring. As part of our future budget request, what
we are doing is assessing where our prime contractors and
subcontractors are in cyberdefense and resiliency.
We have done a very good job on our tactical system of
protecting, monitoring, and testing against potential attacks
on the core MDA-classified networks and unclassified networks.
Where my concern resides in the future is vulnerabilities
of our cleared defense contractors and working hand in glove
with them to ensure that our future contracts have the
necessary requirements and protection requirements and
standards in them, and at the same time, assessing our current
contracts to make sure that if there are areas that require
investment by us, to get them up to a standard that we are
willing to do that.
Senator Reed. So in effect, the weak link really is some of
the private contractors, and you are going to work with them
with their resources and your resources to strengthen their
protections?
Admiral Syring. Sir, across the board with cyber, it is a
24/7 attack, and we have to maintain constant vigilance to what
we have today and work to improve it.
Where I see, since we are doing pretty well at that level,
is the next layer of vulnerability is our cleared defense
contractors. I would agree with that statement.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
You mentioned also that advanced technology is perhaps a
game-changer, one would hope. A lot of that is your directed
energy research, et cetera. But can you just describe these
efforts? And not only will it make us more effective, will it
help lower costs, too? Is that part of the plan?
Admiral Syring. The answer to your last question is yes and
yes. It will make missile defense in a layered system more
effective and less costly.
Where we are today, and I have testified to this, as in the
past, we have had MIT and Livermore labs gainfully engaged in
reducing the risk with the technology for directed energy,
specifically solid-state laser technology, and have done some
great work now that has in large part enabled, in my view, some
of the contractors that are now leaning in on directed energy
with the services and expanding that now in our thinking to
what can be done with the missile defense mission.
My whole goal with directed energy is to get to a low-power
laser demonstrator in flight to demonstrate boost phase
feasibility by 2021.
Senator Reed. This is not a classified session, but could
you give an indication of where we are vis-a-vis some potential
competitors with respect to this technology?
Admiral Syring. In terms of companies?
Senator Reed. No, in terms of other nation-states that
might also be pursuing this work. If you cannot, that's fine.
Admiral Syring. Sir, I would like to take that for a
classified answer, if I can.
Senator Reed. I appreciate that, Admiral.
SENSORS
Sensor capabilities, you have developed them, et cetera. In
terms of the current anticipated threat to homeland, how would
you prioritize additional sensor capabilities? Are they
important to field now or are there other things that you can
do with existing sensors to protect the homeland?
Admiral Syring. It is, and I have been clear about this, it
is absolutely the step that we are now taking with Alaska and
the step that we need to take in other areas as well to fill
our sensor network. It is the next step of what I have
recommended for us to fill in, in the BMDS architecture.
Senator Reed. But part of this is not just having the
physical sensors. It is having the ability to discriminate
better with the sensors. Is that more of a priority to you in
terms of not a fixed location, but more capability in the
sensor itself?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. We have fantastic tracking and
classification capability with the Air Force early warning
radars that protect us from a trajectory from North Korea and
from Iran, as you know. But those are not necessarily
discriminating radars.
The radar that I am building in Alaska is to that very
point of providing discrimination capability against a complex
threat, and I'll just leave it at that, a complex threat,
meaning other items in the scene with the reentry vehicle to
pick out the reentry vehicle accurately and every time.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
The distinguished Senator from Montana, Mr. Daines.
SECURITY OF MISSILE DEFENSE SITES
Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Syring, thanks for your testimony today and your
service to our country.
Coming from Montana, we certainly know the power nuclear
weapons hold, having one-third of ICBMs for our Nation located
in Montana. And I am grateful for the protection the Missile
Defense Agency is able to provide, so thank you.
It has been made clear to me, this administration does not
take security of our weapons as serious as they should. In
fact, back home in Montana, we have Vietnam-era helicopters,
Hueys, that provide security to our missile silos, and they
cannot even meet the current minimum security standards.
Given the lack of attention to security of our most
powerful weapons, I feel this points to a defense-wide failure
to take security seriously. In fact, we think about placing
missile defense systems even on foreign soil. I fear they could
be even less secure.
The question is, what steps are you taking to provide more
secure missile defense systems to the service branches, should
their sites come under attack?
Admiral Syring. We work very closely with, for example, up
in Alaska, with the Army National Guard that operates the site
in Fort Greely.
A lot of those systems have been built now 10 years ago,
but have been continually improved in terms of the security
capability that we have with integrated electronic detection
systems and intruder alerts. I go there frequently, and they
are constantly training against those types of threats.
It is taken very seriously, and we have been very
successful so far, specifically up in Alaska, with the security
environment.
EAST COAST SITE/NORTH KOREA
Senator Daines. There has been a lot of discussion about
putting a third antimissile battery on the East Coast of the
United States. From a security standpoint, I do believe this is
something our Nation needs, given the growing threats abroad.
But from a financial standpoint, I am also concerned about how
much this might cost.
An additional antimissile battery on the East Coast is
estimated to cost over $3 billion. Do you feel the security
benefit our Nation would gain is worth that investment?
Admiral Syring. Sir, we have testified that both capability
and capacity are important for the GMD system. Currently, we
will have 44 GBIs by the end of 2017 that completely protect
the Continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against an
ICBM threat. It is a matter of how far will the threat progress
in terms of numbers of potential ICBM threats to the United
States.
That is why I have taken this in two steps. I am working
hard with your support to improve the sensor network and
discrimination capability of the current system, so that it
does not become overmatched by a complex ICBM threat from
either North Korea or Iran. In parallel, we are redesigning the
new kill vehicle to make it more reliable and more producible.
At some point, when those parts of the kill chain are
filled in, then a capability discussion on more interceptors
would be warranted. But given where I am with resources and the
state of the system, we are focused on the right gaps,
considering where the threat is today.
Senator Daines. You mentioned North Korea. Certainly, each
year, North Korea continues their rhetoric and their threats
regarding the destruction of the United States.
Having just claimed to detonate a hydrogen bomb and the
continued test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
I am extremely concerned about the threat they pose to the
homeland. What steps are you taking to increase protection from
a North Korean missile attack?
Admiral Syring. Sir, great question.
Back when North Korea flew the Taepodong-2 in December
2012, it really provided the impetus for the decision that we
made in 2013 to undertake all the improvements that we are now
ahead of the curve on, specifically against that threat.
I firmly believe that that decision today has now put us
ahead of where they might be with numbers today and in the
future, meaning increasing the GBI inventory by 50 percent
against that very threat.
With the second ``AN/TPY-2'' radar now in Japan that was
fielded in 2014, it has provided even more robust defense,
specifically to Hawaii and the homeland.
I think we have made all the right steps in anticipation of
that threat escalating, and it appears we were right.
Senator Daines. So the Terminal High Altitute Area Defense
(THAAD) system in South Korea, will that increase our security
level as well?
Admiral Syring. If the decision is made, it would increase
the missile defense posture in South Korea for protection of
them and our deployed forces. The answer is yes.
Senator Daines. Thank you.
SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS
Last question, during the 1980s, President Reagan had the
Strategic Defense Initiative, better known as Star Wars. We
haven't heard a lot about what actions U.S. is taking in space
with both missile defense and satellite defense.
Cutting to the chase here, and the question, I'm running
out of time, what programs is your budget funding this year to
build protection, both in space and from space?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. Great question.
We started this year, and by the end of next year, there
will be 22 payloads fielded on commercial satellite
constellation. For classification reasons, I will just leave it
at that. That will help us experiment and demonstrate what we
call a space-based kill assessment capability.
It is a small step, but it is a necessary step to prove
what function in space can be done persistently and globally. I
think that will be an important risk reducer as the department
decides what we are going to do in the future in space for
missile defense.
Senator Daines. Thanks, Admiral.
Admiral Syring. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you. The time of the Senator has
expired.
The distinguished Senator from Montana, Mr. Tester.
NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION
Senator Tester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ranking Member.
And thank you for being here, Admiral, for this hearing.
Thank you for your service.
You have testified that your priority is to continue
delivering greater missile defense capability and capacity to
the warfighter in support of the combatant commander
priorities. As you know, Secretary James has frequently and
consistently stated that there is no mission more critical than
maintaining our Nation's nuclear capacity, particularly at a
time when our Nation confronts a number of strategic threats
that have already been talked about here today.
Can you speak of the importance of modernizing our nuclear
force, along with developing the missile defense capabilities?
Admiral Syring. Sir, let me dodge the first part of that
question on the importance of nuclear modernization. I assume
there are others that will answer that.
But I will talk about the complement of offensive and
defensive capability. That is certainly on the offensive side.
But what I am doing with missile defense I think is on the
level of where we are with nuclear and nuclear command and
control in terms of the assurance that I must give the American
people and you that we are protected every day, any time.
Space is very unforgiving, as you know. We have to be right
every time.
EAST COAST SITE
Senator Tester. Yes, you do.
Admiral Syring. I view our mission as equally important,
and a strong complement to the offensive capability this Nation
possesses.
Senator Tester. Okay, so you make a good point. You have to
be right every time. As you look at this budget, does it allow
you to be right every time?
Admiral Syring. Sir, given the number of threats that the
intelligence community will testify to what the enemy possesses
today, the answer is yes.
Senator Tester. Okay, I just want to talk about the East
Coast defense system for a second. I know you have talked with
other members of this committee, and there may be others who
ask about it. And I understand you are opposed to it. I just
want to get it clear.
Is the reason you are opposed to it because of the cost or
because of the lack of the threat?
Admiral Syring. Two reasons at this time.
The $3 billion or $4 billion is a strong resource
requirement in today's reduced budget environment.
Senator Tester. Big sum of money, yes.
Admiral Syring. And there are other things, including
sensors, which we talked about, but more importantly, the
redesign of the kill vehicle and the new booster that is funded
in this year's budget needs to be completed and tested before
we go build another site and put interceptors in the ground.
If we are going to build a site, I want to put the best and
most current interceptors in the ground when they are ready.
Senator Tester. I got you. I appreciate that very, very
much.
Look, thank you very much for being here. I appreciate the
work you do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
The distinguished Senator from Missouri, Mr. Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
U.S.-ISRAELI COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS
Admiral, on the question that Senator Durbin started with
on Israel, this committee has been generally very supportive of
our efforts with Israel on things like the Iron Dome or David's
Sling or Arrow. In the unfortunate real-field circumstances
that we have had to test those, and the Israelis have had to
test those, they seem to be proving themselves to be the kind
of investment we would want to be part of to ensure our
security.
It is curious to me that the administration wants to reduce
funding for Israel missile defense this year. Certainly, there
is nothing in the region that suggests the region is more
secure or more peaceful than it has been in the past.
Are you concerned with our failure to have the same
commitment to this program that we have had in the past?
Admiral Syring. Sir, I think that the Congress and the
department in the past have been extremely supportive of
Israel, not only the request but the additional requests that
they have asked for.
For me, it comes down to, how much out of my budget can I
afford to budget for Israeli development and production?
Anything above that, I will testify to the stated maturity of
the program and whether the funds are of good use, and I have
been clear on that.
BUDGET PRIORITIES
But to me, and we have been consistent budget request after
budget request, it has been consistently $100 million to $200
million, out of a precious budget, can I afford to upfront
budget for their requirements?
Sir, everything I do is a risk-based analysis on how much
funding and what is needed and when, and Israel falls into that
category.
Senator Blunt. That brings me to another question. I think
if you look back, and of course you know this, in the original
Missile Defense Agency charter, a primary purpose to have this
agency, as opposed to what other agencies would operate,
maintain, be responsible for our missile defense structure, one
of the main reasons for this agency was to develop cutting-edge
missile systems.
I don't know that we are doing that more than, better than,
our cooperative effort with Israel right now. When you look at
the numbers in the budget, we are constantly trending toward
operations and maintenance and procuring of existing systems,
instead of looking at cutting-edge developments in missile
defense.
Are you concerned as you see the budget switch in that way,
because I do think that was a principal reason to establish the
agency? Others could do what is happening in operations and
maintenance and procurement, but your agency is uniquely
positioned to be looking at what can come next to make us more
secure. It seems to me the budget is heading in a very
predictably different direction now.
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. I think there are two parts to
your question.
First, on Israel, besides the funding that we provide, and
Congress provides even above that, we have provided over many,
many years system engineering and program office support hand-
in-hand with Israel as they have developed and we have
developed these capabilities that are now being tested. So
there's a whole part of the agency that works hand-in-glove
with Israel. I think that has been a great benefit to them and
us.
On where we are with sort of the next cutting-edge
interceptor technology, as you know, we increased the SM-3 1B
diameter from 13 inches to 21 inches to give it further reach
and further capability. We also improved the seeker. This has
been done cooperatively with Japan.
That is a very cutting-edge, state-of-the-art, hit-to-kill
interceptor that is designed for the advanced threat and will
be critical to Poland when I field Poland in the end of 2018.
I am also looking at advanced concepts in the THAAD
program, in terms of what is the next missile beyond the
current THAAD interceptor that we are fielding? Does it need to
be two pulse? Does it need to have a different seeker? I think
you will see us come through those trades.
Specifically, sir, as we become very concerned with a
hypersonic glide vehicle threat we cannot lose sight of our
current interceptors or the next interceptors that need to be
better even than the last.
Those are two regional examples, and then I have cited
where we are with the redesigned kill vehicle. But even beyond
that, sir, in the next year's budget, we contemplate the
concept of multi-object kill vehicle where we put multiple kill
vehicles on one booster stack for the GMD program. That is when
you really start to advance the system, when you can think
about one or two interceptors at most going into a very complex
decoy scene.
There are three areas in specific that we are looking to
improve the next capability.
Do we have a clean sheet design for any of this? No. We
have built our program on the premise of improving and
continually evolving the current fielded capability.
It was the Admiral Meyer adage back in the Aegis program:
build a little, test a little, learn a lot. From a resource
standpoint of where we are in this Nation and in DOD, I think
that what we are requesting and what we have been doing with
relatively little marginal cost to improve the fielded systems
is the best return on investment for you and the taxpayer.
Senator Blunt. Well, I hope that is right.
Senator Cochran. Thank you. The time of the Senator has
expired.
Senator Blunt. And my time has expired.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
The distinguished Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Schatz.
DEFENSE OF HAWAII
Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
Admiral, thank you very much for all of your work.
Can you tell me what you think the threat is to the people
of Hawaii from North Korea?
Admiral Syring. The threat is the same threat that faces
the Continental United States and Alaska, as I sit here today,
from North Korea, a long-range ICBM threat.
Senator Schatz. And what is the level of threat right now?
Can you reassure the people of Hawaii?
Admiral Syring. The people of Hawaii are protected today
from the North Korean threat.
Senator Schatz. The GAO does not share your confidence. Can
you address the concerns in the February GAO report?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
In the report, they did not have any specific
recommendations. In large part in the past, we have agreed with
the recommendations. But if I recall correctly, they were in
three areas, concurrency was one, in terms that we were still
highly concurrent in our development of capability and testing
of that capability. So I have testified, sir, here 2 years ago,
every program has a degree of concurrency. It is a matter of
how you manage that concurrency in a cost-effective way. You
cannot heel-to-toe every qualification, development, design,
and ever come out with anything that would be affordable or
ahead of the threat.
So we, I think, have been very clear on not fielding
capability before it has been tested. And, sir, as you know,
there is a lot of history on this program and the failures it
went through in 2010. There was hardware that was procured in
the past. All of that after the successful flight test has come
together in a very systematic way.
The program that I have laid in for the redesigned kill
vehicle is actually, and I think they noted this in the report,
on the right path in terms of testing well before it is
fielded.
ADVANCES OF ADVERSARY COUNTERMEASURES
Senator Schatz. So I worry about the progress our
adversaries are making with missile technology, particularly
with countermeasures. As you know, PMRF on Kauai will continue
to be a world-class test range for Aegis ballistic missiles and
Aegis Ashore, so that we can continue to improve and test
missiles to defend against future threats.
Can you describe the advancements that our adversaries are
making, especially with countermeasures?
Admiral Syring. Sir, I will have to take the details of
that answer in a classified setting, but let me give you an
unclassified answer right now. They continue to make advances
in several key areas that concern me.
Senator Schatz. Is it your view that PMRF has a role in the
future to play in this space?
ENERGY REQUIREMENTS OF MISSILE DEFENSE SITES
Admiral Syring. We are assessing that. We in the department
have gone through an extensive, and will complete the summer,
what we call a sensor analysis of the alternatives of what else
needs to be there, and Hawaii is part of that analysis. I think
it will be something that we look hard at, in terms of is there
a use of that site operationally as a sensor node, in
particular, that can help us against that very complex threat
that you cited.
Senator Schatz. My last question is about the grid. A lot
of these enterprises are obviously electricity-intensive. Most
of them, it seems to me, are on the commercial grid, to the
extent they are in CONUS or Hawaii or Alaska. So does your
appropriations request adequately fund grid stability, energy
assurance? I know some of that will be the responsibility of
the various services, but I assume some of this is your side of
the shop.
So can you tell me about the resource requirements in terms
of energy assurance?
Admiral Syring. Yes, let me take that part for the record,
and I will get you the complete history.
[The information follows:]
When the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) prepares to deploy a
ballistic missile defense asset, a major factor is the availability and
reliability of commercial power. MDA works with the host military
installation and the local utility provider to ensure adequate,
reliable, and economical commercial power is available for normal day-
to-day operations. For weapon system survivability, the MDA assures
mission readiness by utilizing protected, backup power separate from
the commercial power grid. As a specific example, during the design
phase of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex (AAMDTC),
located at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) on the island of
Kauai, Hawaii, a commercial power study was performed using Naval
Facilities Engineering Command and the Military Construction Architect/
Engineer design firm.
The study evaluated the local power company infrastructure and,
through computer modeling and load flow analysis, determined the
optimum and most cost effective way to deliver commercial power to the
site while maintaining grid stability to both PMRF on-base and
commercial off-base facilities. Energy assurance for the AAMDTC is
provided by an adjacent, back-up power plant that consists of diesel
generators and functions independent of the commercial power grid.
What I will say is that, for our new development in Alaska,
for example, that has absolutely been accounted for upfront in
terms of energy assurance from the grid. And then if the grid
were to go off, we have significant backup power generation
capability that will keep that site online tactically.
Senator Schatz. I'm a little worried that the budget
request doesn't reflect how quickly escalating the threat to
energy security is in the context of MDA. And I want to make
sure that we give you the resources necessary. If the sort of
tactical approach of our adversaries is going to include some
attempt to undermine either cyber or through some other means
to undermine our energy security, then I think we have to
respond, and maybe a little bit more quickly than usual.
Admiral Syring. Sir, thank you.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
The Senator from Alaska, Ms. Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the last question from my colleague from
Hawaii, recognizing the energy-security nexus. It is something
that in Alaska we view ourselves as an island when it comes to
energy, as you are in Hawaii. So that must be an integral part
in terms of the overall national security, making sure that we
don't lapse that, so good things to work on.
Admiral, thank you for your leadership in so many different
areas. I just came from the Military Construction
Appropriations Subcommittee. We just marked up that bill, and
it is good to have that one first out of the box here.
But what we did in that Military Construction markup is
fully appropriate the $155 million the administration requested
for construction of the long-range discrimination radar there
at Clear. I'm sure that that part of it pleases you.
Admiral Syring. Thank you.
Senator Murkowski. Absolutely.
LONG RANGE DISCRIMINATION RADAR
In your testimony, you note that this subcommittee is going
to be considering the request of $162 million to continue
development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR). And
you have outlined before this committee and others why you
believe that this is a significant national security project,
but I wonder if you would address yourself to the question of
whether bringing the LRDR online in the next several years is
even more critical now than it has been in the past, given the
threat environment that we are looking at, and then following
on, how critical it is that we fully fund the development
funding for LRDR this year, just speaking to the generally.
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am.
The decision that we made after the last Taepodong-2 flight
test in the end of 2012, and then revalidated in February, I
think underscores the importance of not just the GMD system,
but the long range discrimination radar, in particular, that
there is a clear intent to continue to pursue ICBM rogue,
mobile technology by North Korea.
Our system today is designed to counter that. If he tests
and then improves capability to make this even more complex in
the future with decoys and countermeasures, and that is the
whole plan today, we need radar in Alaska to help defeat that
threat.
Senator Murkowski. And we need it sooner than later.
Admiral Syring. Ma'am, the prediction is that that
capability will potentially be fielded by 2020. Everything that
we have done to pace the radar development to field in 2020 is
against that very contingency.
Senator Murkowski. So timing is key to the construction,
the development, of the long range discrimination radar.
Admiral Syring. Ma'am, it is the key part, along with the
redesigned kill vehicle, of our strategy of improvement by
2020, for that very threat that we spoke about.
Senator Murkowski. I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, I have to note that when we are sitting in
this committee, my ears perk up every time I hear Alaska. I am
just reminded of the significant role that our State is playing
when it comes to our national security.
IMPROVEMENTS AT FORT GREELY
We have the long range discrimination radar coming in at
Clear. We have the GMD at Fort Greely. We have Cobra Dane out
in Shemya. We have our spaceport in Kodiak.
This is not just because I have sharp elbows here, but it
is because of our strategic geographic location at really the
center of the globe.
I want to ask you a quick question here, Admiral, about the
ground system hardware at Fort Greely. I was looking at your
testimony here and the statement that you made is, ground
system hardware is ``1990s technology installed in the early
2000s,'' and you go on to say the MDA is experiencing parts
obsolescence challenges and operating systems that are no
longer supported by original manufacturers.
With the improvements that you are making at Fort Greely,
does this address this parts obsolescence and these operating
system challenges?
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am.
Funded in the past, funded in this year's budget, and
fielded in the next 2 to 3 years.
Senator Murkowski. Good. So we will no longer be seeing
statements that would suggest that we are not current, that we
are not up-to-date?
Admiral Syring. No, ma'am. We have systematically requested
and approved and started all of the areas that in my view have
significant gaps that need to be improved, from the initial
prototypes that were fielded in 2005.
Senator Murkowski. Great. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
The Senator from Missouri, any questions?
The Senator from Alabama?
Senator Shelby. None.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for your participation
in this hearing and the assistance that you have provided to
this committee.
Senators may submit additional written questions to you,
and we would request you respond to them within a reasonable
time.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Question. Admiral Syring, in addition to land-based ballistic
missile defense systems, do you believe there is merit in further
exploring the idea of using a dedicated sea-based BMD solution? While
some cruisers and destroyers support the BMD mission, those ships are
multi-mission ships and the committee has heard testimony on the
concerns of the Navy with meeting the demands of the combatant
commanders. Would a ship with the ability to support a large radar, a
large magazine of missiles, and the ability to stay on station for long
periods make sense instead of pulling cruisers and destroyers away from
their other duties for the BMD mission?
Answer. In the past, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) examined a
sea-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) option and concluded such a
capability would require a large number of ships per station and entail
greater operating costs than a land-based alternative.
However, MDA believes there is merit to examining the feasibility
of adding sea-based sensor capability that could potentially increase
national BMD and the BMD system architecture.
Question. Does MDA use data from Cobra Judy? Would an additional
mobile, sea-based platform provide value to the BMDS? Given our
Nation's missile defense priorities, what type of payload would provide
the most significant sensor and discrimination capability increase in
shortest period of time?
Answer. [DELETED]
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. The Defense Subcommittee will reconvene on
Wednesday, April 20, at 10:30 a.m., to receive the testimony on
the department's innovation and research budget.
This subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., Wednesday, April 13, the
subcommittee was recessed, to 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, April 20.]