[Senate Hearing 114-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 9:04 a.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Lamar Alexander (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Alexander, Lankford, and Feinstein.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
National Nuclear Security Administration
STATEMENT LIEUTENANT GENERAL FRANK G. KLOTZ, U.S. AIR
FORCE (Retired), UNDER SECRETARY FOR
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR
ACCOMPANIED BY:
DR. DONALD COOK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS
ANNE HARRINGTON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION
ADMIRAL JOHN RICHARDSON, UNITED STATES NAVY, DIRECTOR, NAVAL
NUCLEAR PROPULSION, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR OFFICE OF
NAVAL REACTORS
opening statement of senator lamar alexander
Senator Alexander. The Subcommittee on Energy and Water
will please come to order. This morning, we're having a hearing
to review the President's fiscal 2016 budget request for the
National Nuclear Security Administration.
Senator Feinstein and I will each have an opening
statement. I will then recognize each Senator who comes for up
to five minutes for an opening statement, alternating between
the majority and the minority in the order that they arrive. We
will then turn to witnesses for their testimony. General Klotz
will present testimony on behalf of the entire NNSA and we'll
include the full written statements of all the witnesses in the
record. Senators will then be recognized for five minutes each,
alternating between the minority and majority in the order that
they arrive.
First, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here,
and also Senator Feinstein, who I will be working with to draft
the appropriations bill for funds for the NNSA. Our witnesses
today include Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, Administrator of
the NNSA, Dr. Donald Cook, Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, Ms. Anne Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Admiral John Richardson, Deputy
Administrator for Naval Reactors.
We're here today to review the President's fiscal year 2016
budget request for NNSA, which is a semiautonomous agency
within the Department of Energy that's responsible for managing
our nuclear weapons stockpile, reducing global dangers posed by
weapons of mass destruction, and providing the Navy with safe
and effective nuclear propulsion. This is the subcommittee's
third hearing this year on the President's budget request, and
I look forward to hearing our witness testimony.
The NNSA has an important national security mission, but it
faces many challenges. That's why we need to do what we can
to--what we were sent here to do, and that is to govern.
Governing is about setting priorities, and we are going to have
to make some hard decisions this year to make sure the highest
priorities are funded. The President's 2016 budget request for
defense spending is nearly $38 billion higher than what is
allowed under the spending caps in the Budget Control Act. In
fact, spending this year is consistent with the Budget Control
Act fully funding, and NNSA's budget request alone would
require almost the entire increase in defense spending for all
defense programs, including the Department of Defense.
We will work with Senator Cochran and Senator Mikulski to
increase the subcommittee's defense spending allocation, but
we're going to need your help to understand the NNSA's most
urgent priorities, and that's why we're holding this hearing. I
would like to focus my questions on three main areas, all with
an eye toward setting priorities. First, keeping large
construction projects on time and on budget. Senator Feinstein
and I have worked pretty hard on that. Two, effectively
maintaining our nuclear weapons stockpile. And three, properly
supporting our nuclear Navy.
The first one: keeping the large construction projects on
time and budget. NNSA is responsible for three of the largest
construction projects in the Federal Government: the uranium
processing facility in Tennessee, the MOX fuel
fabricating facility in South Carolina, and the plutonium
facility in New Mexico. Combined, these projects could cost as
much as $20 billion to build. Over the past 4 years, Senator
Feinstein and I have worked hard with the NNSA to keep costs
from skyrocketing and to make sure hard earned taxpayer dollars
are spent wisely. We need to make sure these projects are on
time and on budget.
Senator Feinstein and I have focused much of our oversight
on the uranium processing facility, because costs had increased
every time we would get a status update. Three years ago, we
began holding regular meetings with the NNSA administrator and
his team. We said we wanted 90 percent design completed before
we begin construction. We urge the NNSA to take aggressive
steps to get costs under control.
The administrator asked Thom Mason, the laboratory director
for the Oak Ridge National Lab in Tennessee to have a Red Team
to review the project. The result is that review may be a model
for how to keep these kinds of projects on time and on budget.
The Red Team's report included 17 recommendations, nearly all
of which the NNSA has now adopted to keep the uranium facility
within a $6.5 billion budget with completion by 2025.
Based on these recommendations, the uranium facility will
now consist of at least two buildings, one with high security,
one with less security, with construction of these buildings to
begin once their design is at 90 percent. As I understand it,
NNSA recently completed a portion of the site preparation for
this project under budget by $10 million. That is a good start,
and I'm sure I will hear more about that in a few minutes, but
there's a lot more work to do.
I'm going to ask you more today about the uranium facility,
particularly about your schedule for completing the design and
when you anticipate construction can begin. I also want to ask
you about how you are applying the lessons we learned from the
Red Team review there to other big construction projects, and
look forward to any updates that you may be able to provide.
General Klotz, I know you're planning to go to Tennessee
tomorrow to see the progress. I appreciate your hands on
approach to making sure this project is delivered on time and
on budget.
Now on our nuclear weapons, another large portion of the
budget request is the work NNSA is doing to maintain our
nuclear weapons stockpile. I want to make sure we're spending
those dollars effectively. The budget request includes $1.3
billion to continue the four ongoing life extension programs
which fix or replace components in our weapons system to make
sure they are safe and reliable. These life extension programs
are needed, but they are very expensive, and I'll ask you today
whether you will be able to meet your production deadlines on
time and on budget.
And our Navy, Naval Reactors is responsible for all aspects
of the nuclear reactors that power submarines and aircraft
carriers. Naval Reactors is currently designing a new reactor
core that will not need to be refueled during the life of the
ship. This work will save taxpayers billions of dollars,
because it won't have to build two extra submarines to make up
for those that are not in service when they are not being
refueled. The small nuclear reactors that Naval Reactors
designs have had an impeccable safety record. For more than 60
years, there has never been a reactor accident resulting in a
death. Also, want to hear more about your plans for storing the
Navy's used nuclear fuel.
We talked a lot in our hearing last week with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission about Yucca Mountain storing used nuclear
fuel from commercial reactors, and I would like to hear from
you how this issue impacts your operations.
With that, I would recognize Senator Feinstein for her
statement.
statement of senator diane feinstein
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
don't need to say what a pleasure it is to work with you. I was
listening to your opening statement and thinking about how
parallel our concerns are, and the meetings that we have had in
the last 3 years to try to see that the management of these
projects is more efficient and effective. And I think now, with
this new secretary, we are beginning to make some progress. And
so I so appreciate your leadership and our partnership. It's
very special.
This is a big increase. It is $1.2 billion over enacted
2015 levels. I just reached back and asked the staff, and asked
the question, have they ever gotten an increase this big? And
the answer was, well certainly not in the last 4 or 5 years. So
I think this increase really portends some danger for the
nuclear program.
I was looking at the CBO report, which points that out.
Now, this is the projected costs of the United States nuclear
forces 2015 to 2024. But as you know, the increase just there
is $348 billion, according to CBO, and that is an average of
$35 billion a year. I think we have very bright people at this
table, and in terms of what you say, I would really like to
know, what are we going to do to handle this? And I know there
are programs going on to handle it, so if you could put some of
those out on the table that we could take a look at them, that
would be very appreciated.
NNSA is currently undertaking three multibillion-dollar
projects to modernize nuclear weapons infrastructure and
recycle nuclear weapons material for peaceful use. The chairman
talked about them, UPF in Tennessee, CMRR in New Mexico, and
MOX in South Carolina. These projects have all seen
large increases in their estimated costs as well as schedule
delays. In response, the NNSA has taken a step back to re-
examine capability needs and alternative approaches.
For example, Los Alamos has developed an incremental
smaller scale approach to modernizing plutonium production
infrastructure, and the Secretary of Energy has rightly made
improving project management, as the chairman stated, more
broadly a focus of his tenure in the Department. I view these
all as very positive steps, but a lot of uncertainty remains.
Two of these projects, CMRR and UPF, are still in their
initial phases. Even though CMRR will expand use of one
building and reuse another, NNSA may also require the addition
of several modules for plutonium production with an as yet
unspecified cost and schedule. The cost and schedule for UPF
are still being developed and are expected later next year.
So I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can have some meetings
when these costs are known, so that we can take a look at them
and see how we are going to handle them in the future years.
In fiscal year 2015, $715 million was provided to these
three projects. In fiscal year 2016, budget request increases
by $215 million, for a total of $931 million. So if you add up
the fact that smaller projects, or recapitalization efforts,
totals $117 million and $362 million respectively, we get that
$1.3 billion figure, and it's huge. The request for life
extension programs is that $1.3 billion, a $226 million
increase over 2015. Now, that is going to grow.
Last week, the chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council,
Frank Kendall, testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, and he said this. In 2021, we are going to start
having a problem finding ways to afford these systems. And I
think that is probably correct, and I think we have to come to
grips with that, and as a team, hopefully, be able to make some
decisions which can understand that we don't know where we are
going to be financially at that time.
Let me call attention to two specific issues. Despite a
$1.2 billion increase for NNSA, the science function within the
weapons activities account sees virtually no increase in the
President's budget request. With the end of explosive testing
of nuclear weapons, a science-based approach is the foundation
of our stockpile stewardship activities. Even with the science
function in this budget request, science and engineering are
cut in favor of computing and advanced manufacturing, and I
think we must maintain a robust science and engineering
capability.
Second, the defense nuclear nonproliferation account sees a
modest increase over last year. This is positive. But at a
comparable level, at $1.7 billion in 2016, nonproliferation
funding is still down, from $1.9 billion in 2014 and its high
of $2.3 billion in 2012. So I have always thought the
nonproliferation program was very vital, and I see it's on a
downward slope. The Megatons to Megawatts Program is just one
example. Ten percent of all U.S. electricity until 2019 will be
from former nuclear weapons. Also, NNSA has so far removed or
confirmed the disposition of 5,207 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium and plutonium around the world.
Some in Congress and elsewhere want to use the current
tension with Russia to walk away from the leadership role our
country has taken with regard to reducing proliferation
requests. I disagree with that decision. NNSA's
nonproliferation program will play a critical role in securing
materials around the world, helping with peaceful use of
nuclear power in developing countries, and fostering and
monitoring United States nuclear technology exports. In an
increasingly complex world, efforts to reduce nuclear risks
deserve funding and support.
So Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I look
forward to hearing General Klotz's statement and our
conversation that we will have this morning. So thank you very
much.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. And let me
say, as I have said many times before, how much of a privilege
it is just to work with you. It makes life a lot easier, when
we are approaching big, difficult problems, to have a level of
trust and an interest in good management.
General Klotz, at this time, we will turn to you for your
testimony on behalf of NNSA, and after that, we will have
questions for you and the other witnesses. Welcome.
summary of lieutenant general frank g. klotz
General Klotz. Chairman Alexander, Ranking Member
Feinstein, thank you for the opportunity to present the
President's fiscal year 2016 budget request for the Department
of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration.
I'm pleased to be joined by, as you recognized, Dr. Don
Cook, Ms. Anne Harrington, and Admiral John Richardson. We had
provided a written statement, and I appreciate your direction
that it be placed into the record.
We certainly value this Committee's strong leadership in
national security as well as its robust and abiding support for
the mission and the people of the NNSA. Our budget request,
which comprises more than 40 percent of DOE's budget, is $12.6
billion. This is, as has been pointed out, an increase of $1.2
billion, or about 10.2 percent over the fiscal 2015 and active
level.
This funding is extraordinarily important to NNSA's
important and enduring missions, to maintain a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear weapons stockpile without testing, to
prevent, counter, and respond to the threat of nuclear
proliferation and terrorism, and to support the capability of
our nuclear powered Navy to project power and to protect
American interests around the world.
By supporting growth in all four of our appropriations
accounts, this budget request represents a commitment by the
Administration to NNSA's vital and enduring mission and NNSA's
role in ensuring a strong national defense. This mission is
accomplished through the hard work and innovative spirit of a
very highly talented workforce, all of whom are committed to
public service. To provide them the tools that they need to
carry out their complex and challenging tasks, both now and in
the future, we must continue to modernize our scientific,
technical, and engineering capabilities and infrastructure. In
doing so, we are mindful of our obligation to continually
improve our business practices and to be responsible stewards
of the resources that Congress and the American people have
entrusted to us.
To this end, NNSA continues to make progress on key
surveillance and life extension programs, which directly
support the President's direction to maintain a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear arsenal, and funding at the 2016 budget
request level will ensure that these key life extension program
stay on track.
For NNSA's important mission to reduce nuclear dangers
across the world, the fiscal year 2016 budget request shifts
funding for our counterterrorism and emergency response
missions into the defense nuclear nonproliferation account in
order to better align our funds across the spectrum of
activities, which run from preventing, to countering, to
responding to global nuclear dangers. Additionally, the
nonproliferation programs have also been realigned into for
business lines that better reflect the core competencies
resident across that program in our labs and in our production
facilities.
And finally, the request for our Naval Reactors mission
provides funding for three major initiatives, the Ohio-Class
Reactor Plant System Development, the Land Based S8G Prototype
Refueling Overhaul, and the Spent Fuel Handling
Recapitalization Project in Idaho.
For all these missions, NNSA will continue to drive
improvements in the acquisition and project management
practices and policies as well as ensuring Federal oversight
across the enterprise. These highlights are just a hand full of
the critical national security work that this budget funds.
However, as you pointed out, the looming possibility of
sequestration is a major threat to carrying out all of these
missions. In developing the budget, NNSA was directed to
request the funds that we need to accomplish the missions that
we have been tasked to do, and this fiscal year 2016 budget
request reflects this direction.
Another round of sequester cuts would most certainly have a
devastating impact on important programs and projects,
including pushing them further out into the future or perhaps
having to cancel some altogether. It would also have grave
implications for the science, technology, and engineering work
that is taking place at our laboratories and plans, work that
underpins our nuclear security but also the broader national
security.
Again, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Feinstein, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today. And we are
looking forward to answering any questions that you may have.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Frank G. Klotz
Chairman Alexander, Ranking Member Feinstein, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
fiscal year 2016 Budget Request for the Department of Energy's (DOE)
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). We value this
Committee's leadership in national security, as well as its strong and
abiding support for the mission and people of the NNSA.
The President's fiscal year 2016 Budget Request for NNSA, which
comprises more than 40 percent of the DOE's budget, is $12.6 billion,
up $1.2 billion or 10.2 percent over the fiscal year 2015 enacted
level. The NNSA has a unique and special responsibility for maintaining
a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile for as long as
nuclear weapons exist; preventing, countering and responding to
evolving and emerging threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism;
and, supporting the capability of our nuclear-powered Navy to project
power and protect American and Allied interests around the world. By
supporting growth in each of our four appropriations accounts, this
budget request represents a strong endorsement of NNSA's vital and
enduring mission, and is indicative of the Administration's unwavering
commitment to a strong national defense.
The NNSA's mission is accomplished through the hard work and
innovative spirit of a highly talented workforce committed to public
service. To provide them the tools they need to carry out their complex
and challenging task, both now and in the future, we must continue to
modernize our scientific, technical and engineering capabilities and
infrastructure. In doing so, we are mindful of our obligation to
continually improve our business practices and to be responsible
stewards of the resources that Congress and the American people have
entrusted to us. The NNSA took several significant steps toward this
objective during the past year.
NNSA's fiscal year 2016 Budget Request reflects the close working
partnership between NNSA and the Department of Defense (DOD) in
providing for our Nation's nuclear deterrence capabilities and
modernizing the nuclear security enterprise. As in last year's Budget,
DOD is carrying a separate account in its fiscal year 2016 Budget
Request for the out years, fiscal year 2017 and beyond, which
identifies funds for NNSA's Weapons Activities and Naval Reactors. We
urge this Subcommittee's support for alignment of its appropriations
process and national defense or ``050'' allocations, including the
subcommittee 302(b) allocations, with the President's Budget. The
requested allocation supports NNSA and DOD priorities.
Tough decisions and trades in fiscal year 2016 have been made to
meet military commitments and nuclear security priorities. If the
request is not fully supported, modernization of our nuclear enterprise
and implementation of our long-term stockpile sustainment strategy
could be put at risk. The program we have proposed is highly integrated
and interdependent across the stockpile management, science and
infrastructure accounts.
Apart from the need for national defense allocation alignment, the
looming possibility of sequestration is a major threat to all NNSA
missions. The NNSA fiscal year 2016 Budget Request exceeds the caps set
on national security spending in the Budget Control Act (BCA); but is
necessary to meet our national security commitments. Reduced funding
levels will place these commitments at risk. We have made some tough
resource decisions across the NNSA, but the Secretary of Energy and I
believe that our enduring missions are too vital to the Nation's
security to be further constrained by the current BCA spending caps.
Details of the fiscal year 2016 President's Budget Request for the
NNSA follow: Weapons Activities Appropriation
The fiscal year 2016 Budget Request for the Weapons Activities
account is $8.8 billion, an increase of $666.6 million or 8.1 percent
over fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. It is comprised not only of the
Defense Programs portfolio, which is responsible for all aspects of
stockpile stewardship and management; but also the enterprise-wide
infrastructure sustainment activities managed by our Office of Safety,
Infrastructure and Operations, as well as our physical and
cybersecurity activities. It should be noted that in this budget
request we have moved NNSA's on-going emergency response and
counterterrorism and counterproliferation capabilities out of the
Weapons Activities account and into the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation account. This action aligns activities for preventing,
countering and responding to global nuclear threats into a single
account.
maintaining the stockpile
Last year, we again successfully used science-based stockpile
stewardship to certify to the President that the American nuclear
weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective-without the need
for underground nuclear testing. It is important to periodically remind
ourselves that we have been able to do this every year largely due to
the investments we have made and continue to make in state-of-the-art
diagnostic tools, high performance computing platforms, and modern
facilities staffed by extraordinarily talented scientists, engineers
and technicians.
For Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), the fiscal year 2016 request is
$3.2 billion, a $494.7 million increase over fiscal year 2015 enacted
levels, or about 18.4 percent. Approximately $133 million of this
increase reflects a restructuring of the accounts when compared to the
fiscal year 2015 budget request. These changes are discussed below.
With respect to the major life extension programs (LEP), we have
now passed the halfway mark in the production phase of the W76-1 LEP.
This LEP, which directly supports the Navy, is now on track and on
budget. Our fiscal year 2016 Request of $244.0 million will keep us on
track to complete production in fiscal year 2019.
We are also making significant progress in the engineering
development phase of the B61-12 LEP. The B61 is a gravity bomb
associated with Air Force long-range nuclear-capable bombers, as well
as dual-capable fighter aircraft. Working with the Air Force, we
successfully completed environmental flight tests on the F-15, F-16,
and B-2 aircraft on or ahead of schedule. The B6112 LEP will enter
Phase 6.4 Production Engineering in 2016; and, with the $643.3 million
requested, we will remain on track to deliver the First Production Unit
(FPU) in fiscal year 2020.
Based on results from the ongoing surveillance of the nuclear
weapons stockpile performed by NNSA's laboratories and plants, the
Nuclear Weapons Council decided that it was prudent to expand the
planned W88 Alteration (ALT) 370 to now include replacement of the
conventional high explosive in the warhead. The budget request reflects
this decision and includes $220.2 million to support the FPU in fiscal
year 2020.
The budget request also includes $195.0 million to support the
Nuclear Weapons Council decision to accelerate by 2 years an LEP of the
W80 to serve as the warhead for the Air Force's Long Range Stand-Off
system (LRSO). FPU is now slated for 2025.
This budget request also supports our goal of dismantling all
weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2022. In fact,
we have already dismantled more than 42 percent of these weapons in 38
percent of the time allotted. This funding will ensure that we stay on
track to meet our dismantlement commitment.
Within DSW, the budget request also includes $415.0 million for a
new ``Nuclear Materials Commodities'' subprogram to support the
investment needed in nuclear materials to maintain the viability of the
enduring stockpile. Included in this subprogram are Uranium
Sustainment, Plutonium Sustainment, and Tritium Sustainment which are
all crucial to sustain our stockpile, even as we move to lower levels
in our nuclear stockpile. Since last year, we have created and
empowered new program manager positions to oversee each of these
nuclear materials programs. Also included within DSW, is a subprogram
for Domestic Uranium Enrichment. Ensuring we have a domestic uranium
enrichment capability for national security needs is particularly
important in maintaining a domestic source of LEU to produce tritium
and for research reactor conversion program and eventually to produce
HEU for Naval Reactors fuel.
Consistent with the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2015, activities formerly carried
out under Campaigns are now included under Research, Development, Test,
and Evaluation (RDT&E). The funding request for RDT&E is about $1.8
billion, essentially the same as the fiscal year 2015 enacted level.
This includes $623.0 million for the Advanced Simulation and Computing
(ASC) Program, an increase of $25.0 million for the Advanced Technology
Development and Mitigation (ATDM) subprogram that supports high
performance computing; $130.1 million for Advanced Manufacturing
Development, an increase of $22.9 million. This funding will support
work related to electronics-based arming, fusing, and firing, as well
as other technologies that require significant technical effort to
ensure production readiness for manufacturing technologies needed to
replace sunset technologies. We continue to develop and mature additive
manufacturing technologies that can provide significant cost avoidance
by reducing costs to prototype and manufacture tooling and certain
weapons components. These increases are largely offset by relatively
small decreases in the Science (-$22.5 million for a total request of
$389.6 million), Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield
Program (-$10.4 million for a total request of $502.5 million), and
Engineering (-$4.6 million for a total request of $131.4 million)
Programs.
The Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield program has
spearheaded ongoing improvements in both management and operational
efficiencies at NNSA's major high energy density (HED) facilities,
including the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL). As a result of these improvements, LLNL has
been able to increase the shot rate at NIF. NNSA recently completed a
10-year HED Science Strategic Plan to guide work in this important
field.
Partnering with the DOE Office of Science, NNSA continues to make
much needed investments in exascale computing. NNSA's ASC Program
provides leading edge, high-end modeling and simulation capabilities to
sustain and modernize the stockpile today and into the future. The
fiscal year 2016 Request includes $64 million for the ASC's Advanced
Technology Development and Mitigation subprogram to pursue long-term
simulation and computing goals relevant to the exascale computing
needed to support the broad national security missions of the NNSA.
Both the NNSA and DOE's Office of Science continue to collaborate with
the Office of Science providing $209 million towards the development of
capable exascale systems.
Defense Programs also supports the vitality of the broader National
Security Enterprise. An important aspect of this is investing in
Laboratory-, Site- and Plant-Directed Research and Development (LDRD).
Independent reviews have consistently affirmed the importance of the
program to the long-term vitality of the labs. LDRD provides basic
research funding to foster innovation and to attract and retain young
scientific and technical talent. Congressional support is essential to
sustaining this essential national capability.
Finally, another important accomplishment within Weapons Activities
in 2014 was the renewal of the Mutual Defense Agreement with the United
Kingdom. Since 1958, this enduring agreement has enabled mutually
beneficial exchange of nuclear expertise between the United States and
UK, contributing to a long and proud history of defense cooperation
between our two Nations. In this case, the Administration and the
Congress worked closely together to achieve a shared goal. We are truly
grateful for your support.
improving safety, operations and infrastructure
In order to support all of these critical programmatic activities,
we are making important strides in recapitalizing our aging
infrastructure throughout the enterprise. In August 2014, DOE and NNSA
formally dedicated the new National Security Campus (NSC) in Kansas
City, Missouri. The former Kansas City Plant was relocated from the
Bannister Federal Complex, a 70-year-old facility, to the NSC with half
the footprint and a modern operating environment. The move was safely
and securely completed 1 month ahead of schedule and $10 million under
budget. The NSC manufactures or purchases 85 percent of the non-nuclear
components that make up our nuclear weapons, and thus plays a major
role in keeping the Nation's nuclear stockpile safe, secure and
effective.
The fiscal year 2016 request restructures many of the activities
formerly conducted under the Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities
(RTBF) into the Infrastructure and Safety program. This new program
will maintain, operate and modernize the NNSA general purpose
infrastructure in a safe, secure, and cost-effective manner.
Infrastructure and Safety efforts are organized around five elements--
Operations of Facilities; Safety Operations; Maintenance;
Recapitalization; and, Line Item Construction. Together, these elements
provide a comprehensive approach to arresting the declining state of
NNSA infrastructure. The fiscal year 2016 request for Infrastructure
and Safety is $1.5 billion and reflects an increase of $79.4 million
for comparable activities from the fiscal year 2015 enacted level. This
funding will allow NNSA to modernize and upgrade aging infrastructure
and address safety and programmatic risks.
We are developing a 10-year strategic plan that identifies the
activities NNSA is undertaking to arrest the declining state of NNSA
infrastructure, reduce Deferred Maintenance (DM), and dispose of excess
facilities. The major elements of the plan include improving
infrastructure decisionmaking with implementation of new, risk-informed
analytical methods to better evaluate the ability of an asset to
support program core capabilities; improving program management tools
through implementation of standardized and automated processes and
systems for scope, cost, and schedule management; accelerating
recapitalization and construction efforts to revitalize infrastructure
and make better use of the resources by strategically procuring common
systems and components used across the enterprise; and shrinking the
NNSA footprint by deactivating and disposing of excess facilities, with
increased focus on timely deactivation and on repurposing and reuse as
a strategy to avoid new construction. Within this 10-year plan, the
transferring of the old Kansas City Bannister Road facility to a
private developer to repurpose the site for local community use will
eliminate $250 million in DM. We recognize that these goals will not be
met quickly, and that arresting the declining state of NNSA
infrastructure will require steady commitment at all levels of the
organization over many years. We believe that the tools and processes
we are developing and implementing, along with sustained investment in
our infrastructure, will set NNSA on the right path to ensuring a
viable, safe, and effective nuclear security enterprise well into the
future.
The Infrastructure and Safety program addresses the needs of
program specific infrastructure, primarily the Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF) and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
(CMRR) project. RTBF provides a defined level of readiness and
capability through infrastructure investments and strategy development
that are dedicated to special nuclear material processing and inventory
management. The RTBF program accomplishes this mission by modernizing
stockpile stewardship and management infrastructure through capability
investments, strategic development, and line-item construction projects
for the sustainment or enhancement of capabilities. The fiscal year
2016 request is $1.1 billion, with a reduction of $1.4 billion, due to
the transfer of select activities to Infrastructure and Safety. For
comparability purposes, the fiscal year 2016 request for RTBF is
increased more than 50 percent to support a new source of high-purity
depleted uranium, to realign recapitalization of Defense Programs
capabilities through the Capabilities Based Investments (CBI), and to
increase funding for the UPF at Y-12 to $430.0 million and the CMRR
Project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to $156.0 million.
Last year, NNSA successfully executed one of the largest and most
complex contract transitions in the history of the Department with the
award of a contract to Consolidated Nuclear Security to operate and
manage both the Pantex Plant and the Y-12 National Security Complex.
The consolidated contract was written to require efficiencies and
improved operations as a requirement for continued performance beyond
the initial 5-year base period. This is a departure from other
management and operating contracts where efficiencies and effectiveness
are considered but are not mandatory.
Our Office of Secure Transportation (OST) provides safe, secure
movement of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, and weapon
components to meet projected DOE, DOD, and other customer requirements.
It continues to modernize assets by extending the life of the
Safeguards Transporter and is currently looking at options for the next
generation transporter, the Mobile Guardian Transporter. To meet an
increasing workload, OST is planning a small increase in the number of
Federal agents.
The primary mission of NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Security
(DNS) and the Chief Security Officer is to develop and implement sound
security programs to protect Special Nuclear Material (SNM), people,
information, and facilities throughout the nuclear security enterprise.
The NNSA's Defense Nuclear Security fiscal year 2016 request is $632.9
million. The request manages risk among important competing needs even
as NNSA continues to face the challenges associated with an aging
physical security infrastructure that must be effectively addressed in
the coming years. The request includes $13 million to initiate
installation of Argus at the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada
National Security Site. Argus is the enterprise security system for
Category 1 SNM facilities that integrates access control, intrusion
detection, and video assessment of alarms to protect and control high-
consequence assets. DNS also has a prioritized list of smaller
infrastructure upgrade projects it will execute as General Plant
Projects within available O&M funding, for example, lighting systems
supporting perimeter camera assessment, replacement and upgrades to
Argus Field Processors, replacement of ported coax cables and buried
cable electronics that will extend lifecycles and delay total system
replacements. DNS initiated an Enterprise Vulnerability Assessment
process across the enterprise with a focus on standardizing how
vulnerability assessments are conducted and site protection strategies
are formulated.
The Information Technology and Cybersecurity fiscal year 2016
request is $157.6 million, a decrease of $22.1 million or about 12.3
percent from fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. The difference is
attributed to a one-time investment in fiscal year 2015 in the
Infrastructure Program to implement a more secure classified computing
environment. All activities related to the one-time increase were
completed. Information Technology and Cybersecurity supports the
nuclear security enterprise. This work includes continuous monitoring
and enterprise wireless and security technologies (i.e., identity,
credential, and access management) to help meet security challenges. In
fiscal year 2016, NNSA plans to complete the recapitalization of the
Enterprise Secure Network, modernize the Cybersecurity infrastructure,
implement the Identity Control and Access Management project at NNSA
Headquarters and site elements, and implement and coordinate all
Committee on National Security Systems and Public Key Infrastructure
capabilities. In addition, we will leverage the NNSA Network Vision
framework to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of NNSA
Information Technology (IT) services.
defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
In fiscal year 2016, we have realigned the NNSA programs that
continue to support the President's Prague Agenda to address the threat
of nuclear proliferation and terrorism into the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation (DNN) appropriation. NNSA's activities work across the
spectrum to prevent, counter and respond to the threat of nuclear and
radiological proliferation and terrorism. We work to prevent the
acquisition of nuclear or radiological materials, technology, and
expertise; we actively counter efforts to develop the materials and
scientific knowledge needed to construct a nuclear threat device; and
we are poised to respond to terrorist acts by searching for and
rendering safe any such devices.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) account request is $1.9
billion, an increase of $325 million or about 20.1 percent from fiscal
year 2015 enacted levels. At first glance, this figure looks like a
very big increase but the number actually reflects a reorganization of
our budget to include the Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response
(NCTIR) and the Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP)
Programs from the Weapons Activities account. For comparability
purposes, the DNN account increase is $101.0 million or over 5 percent
above fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. Additionally, we have combined
the NCTIR and CTCP programs into a single budget program line to
eliminate confusion about NNSA nuclear counterterrorism programs and
activities. We also changed the NCTIR name to Nuclear Counterterrorism
and Incident Response Program, reflecting this realignment. The DNN
Appropriation will now support two enduring mission areas: (1) The
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program and (2) The Nuclear
Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program. The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Program is also restructuring to place more emphasis
on capabilities as opposed to specific programs. This organizational
restructuring is reflected in the DNN budget restructuring.
To achieve all of these mission objectives, NNSA has restructured
the budget request under the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account
as follows:
--Material Management and Minimization
--Global Material Security
--Nonproliferation and Arms Control
--Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D
--Nonproliferation Construction
--Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program.
Together, this restructuring aligns funding for preventing,
countering, and responding to global nuclear dangers in one
appropriation.
nonproliferation efforts
The fiscal year 2016 request for the DNN Program, excluding NCTIR
and Legacy Contractor Pensions, is $1.6 billion, an increase of $67.9
million or about 4.4 percent above fiscal year 2015 enacted levels.
This past year was a big year for our nonproliferation efforts. Our
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation organization was responsible for many
of the significant deliverables at the third Nuclear Security Summit
held in The Hague last spring. Of particular note, Japan announced at
the Summit that it would work with us to remove and dispose of all
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium from its Fast
Critical Assembly. NNSA is currently working with its counterparts in
Japan to resolve technical and logistical issues to complete this
effort in a timely manner.
Also during the Summit, the United States joined 22 countries in
signing up to a ``Gift Basket'' to secure all Category 1 radioactive
sealed sources by 2016. In the United States, there are approximately
465 buildings with Category 1 devices. Of these, NNSA has completed
security enhancements at 300 and is currently involved in a targeted
outreach campaign to engage the remaining 165 buildings by the end of
spring 2015.
And finally, NNSA partnered with five countries to remove 190 kg of
HEU and plutonium from civilian facilities; which brings our cumulative
total at the end of fiscal year 2014 to an impressive 5,207 kg; this is
more than enough material for 200 nuclear weapons. While relations with
Russia are severely strained, we anticipate that we will continue to
cooperate in efforts to repatriate Russian-origin weapons-usable HEU
material to Russia.
The Material Management and Minimization (M3) program presents an
integrated approach to addressing the persistent threat posed by
nuclear materials through a full cycle of materials management and
minimization efforts. Consistent with the priorities articulated in the
National Security Strategy of the United States and the Nuclear Posture
Review, the primary objective of the program is to achieve permanent
threat reduction by minimizing and, when possible, eliminating weapons-
usable nuclear material around the world. This program includes
elements of the former Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and
Fissile Materials Disposition Programs. The fiscal year 2016 request
for this program is $311.6 million. For comparability purposes, the
request reflects an increase of $38.7 million or about a 14.2 percent
increase above the fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. The funding
increases are primarily for the removal of HEU from miniature neutron
source reactors in Africa as well as preparatory activities for future
shipments from Europe and Japan, which will proceed with appropriate
cost-sharing.
The Global Material Security (GMS) program supports the President's
nuclear and radiological security agenda and the Secretary's goal of
enhancing nuclear security through nonproliferation. We work with
partner countries to increase the security of vulnerable stockpiles of
nuclear weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, and radiological
materials, and to improve partner countries' abilities to deter,
detect, and interdict illicit trafficking. Elements of the former GTRI
program, International Material Protection and Cooperation (IMPC)
program, and Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program
are being combined in GMS, in order to better integrate capabilities
required to support DNN's enduring mission. The fiscal year 2016
request for this program is $426.8 million. For comparability purposes
the request reflects a slight increase of $2.5 million above the fiscal
year 2015 enacted levels. This increase will accelerate the protection
of International Atomic Energy Agency Category 1 radiological sources
in order to meet the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit commitment to secure
these sources by 2016.
The Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) program supports the
President's nonproliferation agenda and NNSA efforts to prevent the
proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction by State and non-
State actors. To carry out the goals of this program, we work with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and foreign partners to build
global capacity to safeguard nuclear materials and prevent illicit
transfers of dual-use materials, equipment, technology and expertise.
We also work with our partners and the IAEA to develop technologies and
approaches to verify and monitor current and future arms control
treaties and agreements. This funding also supports statutorily
mandated activities such as technical reviews of export licenses and
interdiction cases, and technical support for the negotiation and
implementation of civil nuclear cooperation agreements (123
Agreements), as well as international export control outreach
activities, and activities to support and improve the execution of the
NPAC 10 CFR Part 810 application process. The fiscal year 2016 request
for this program is $126.7 million, and reflects a slight increase of
$0.8 million above the fiscal year 2015 enacted level.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN
R&D) program supports innovative, unilateral and multi-lateral
technical capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize: (1)
foreign nuclear weapons programs, (2) illicit diversion of special
nuclear materials, and (3) nuclear detonations. To meet national and
Departmental nuclear security requirements, DNN R&D leverages the
unique facilities and scientific skills of the Department of Energy,
academia, and industry to perform research, including counterterrorism-
related R&D. DNN R&D conducts technology demonstrations, and develops
prototypes for integration into operational systems. The fiscal year
2016 request for this program is $419.3 million, a $25.9 million
increase or about 6.6 percent above fiscal year 2015 levels. Increased
funding is requested for nuclear and energetic materials
characterization experiments and development of advanced diagnostic
equipment capabilities, for long-range nuclear detonation detection,
and technical forensics research. This increase over fiscal year 2015
levels is partially offset by a return to baseline funding for the
Proliferation Detection subprogram after a one-time Congressional
increase in fiscal year 2015 for test bed development and field
experiments.
Nonproliferation Construction consolidates construction costs for
DNN projects previously contained within each program budget.
Currently, the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) is the only project
in this program. The fiscal year 2016 request for MFFF is $345 million
which is the same as the fiscal year 2015 enacted level. The National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 and the Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2015 directed the
Department to conduct additional analyses of the MFFF construction
project. These analyses will include independent cost and schedule
estimates, and examination of alternative approaches for disposition of
the 34 metric tons of weapon- grade plutonium and their relationship to
the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement (PMDA). The Department
has requested Aerospace Corporation, a federally funded research and
development center, to perform these analyses. They will be completed
during fiscal year 2015, and will inform a final decision on the path
forward. The fiscal year 2016 request emphasizes that while the
Department continues to evaluate disposition paths (including the MFFF)
to determine the most responsible path forward, any viable alternative
will require a significant amount of funds to implement.
nuclear counterterrorism and emergency response
The fiscal year 2016 Request consolidates counterterrorism and
emergency response funding into a single Nuclear Counterterrorism and
Incident Response line in the amount of $234.4 million.
Within NCTIR, the Nuclear Counterterrorism Assessment program
represents the primary scientific program to assess the threat of
nuclear terrorism and develop technical countermeasures against it. The
knowledge generated under this program ensures that NNSA's technical
expertise on nuclear threat devices informs DOD and FBI emergency
response capabilities. We have taken steps to address funding
reductions to the nuclear counterterrorism activities. Over the last 2
years these activities, formerly known as Counterterrorism and
Counterproliferation within the Weapons Activities appropriation, have
been funded at a level significantly below the requested amount--70
percent of the Request in fiscal year 2014 and 60 percent in fiscal
year 2015. The fiscal year 2016 request would dedicate $57.8M to
Nuclear Counterterrorism Assessment in support of improvised nuclear
device analysis. Additionally, the request includes funds within
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D for materials characterization
experiments and other research, which supports nuclear counterterrorism
and incident response missions. Full funding of both lines will make it
possible to continue NNSA's vital counterterrorism work at the national
laboratories.
NCTIR continues to work domestically and around the world to
improve preparedness and emergency response capabilities. Its expert
scientific teams and equipment provide a technically trained, rapid
response to nuclear or radiological incidents worldwide. NCTIR assesses
nuclear or radiological threats and leverages that knowledge to provide
contingency planning and training to support national and international
counterterrorism and incident response capabilities. In 2014, NNSA's
emergency response teams deployed more than 100 times in support of law
enforcement and for major public events, such as the Super Bowl, and
conducted five large-scale field exercises with partners from the FBI,
DOD, and FEMA In addition, they deployed over 70 times in support of
DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office support to State and local first
responders. Internationally, NNSA conducted 16 training courses to
improve its foreign partners' emergency management capabilities and
continued to work bilaterally with Israel, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand,
Chile, China, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, Canada, France,
Jordan, the Nordic countries, Armenia and Kazakhstan. New programs were
also started with Romania, Belarus and the Philippines. These
initiatives represent our effort to create a truly global defense
against the threat of nuclear terrorism.
NCTIR will also continue the initiative to equip cities with
stabilization equipment and training, to ensure a prompt and effective
response to nuclear terror threats.
NCTIR also executes the DOE's Emergency Management and Operations
Support program that manages the Emergency Operations Centers,
Emergency Communications Network, and Continuity Programs for all of
DOE, including NNSA.
naval reactors appropriation
Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
During the past year, NNSA helped celebrate the 60th Anniversary of
the USS NAUTILUS first getting underway on nuclear propulsion. The
Naval Nuclear Propulsion program pioneered advances in nuclear reactor
and warship design--such as improving reactor lifetimes, increasing
submarine stealth, and reducing propulsion plant crewing. An example is
the technology being developed by Naval Reactors that will enable the
Ohio-Class Replacement submarine to be designed for a 40-plus year
operational life without refueling, resulting in significant savings.
During 2014, Naval Reactors continued its record of operational
excellence by providing the technical expertise required to resolve
emergent issues in the Nation's nuclear-powered Fleet, enabling the
Fleet to steam more 2 million miles. Through the work of its laboratory
and highly skilled personnel, Naval Reactors also advanced the Ohio-
Class Replacement and the S8G Prototype Refueling projects as well as
initiating integrated testing of the lead A1B reactor plant for the
next generation FORD-class aircraft carrier.
It is generally not well-known that if anything goes wrong with a
reactor on one of the Navy's nuclear carriers or submarines while they
are at sea, Naval Reactors' cadre of experts provide around-the-clock
technical support, and can often resolve the problem and prevent the
ship from having to return to port to be checked out and repaired--
which would be quite costly and disruptive to the Navy's deployment
schedules.
The budget request for Naval Reactors is $1.4 billion, an increase
of $141.6 million, about 11.5 percent from the fiscal year 2015 enacted
level. The request includes the base funding required to safely
maintain, operate and oversee the Navy's 83 nuclear-powered warships,
constituting over 45 percent of the Navy's major combatants. The
increase supports three high priority activities: $186.8 million to
continue development of the advanced Ohio-Class Replacement reactor;
$133 million to continue preparations for the refueling and overhaul of
the Land-Based Prototype reactor plant; and $86 million to continue the
design work of the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project started
in fiscal year 2015. To this end, we would like to thank the
Subcommittee's support for appropriating $70 million for Spent Fuel
Handling Recapitalization Project in the fiscal year 2015 enacted
budget. These activities are essential to maintaining a credible sea-
based strategic deterrent, to maintain the research and training
capabilities of the Land-based Prototype, and to maintain the
capability to safely inspect, store and package naval spent nuclear
fuel.
nnsa federal salaries and expenses appropriation
NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses (FSE) Request is $402.7 million,
essentially equal to the rate of operations in fiscal year 2015, but
8.9 percent above the fiscal year 2015 enacted level. The Request
provides funding for 1,690 full-time equivalents (FTEs) and support
expenses needed to meet mission requirements. We are actively engaged
in hiring to that number in a thoughtful and strategic manner. I would
note that the Request represents an increase of only $1.5 million from
the fiscal year 2015 planned execution level of $401.2 million. This is
due to the fact that the fiscal year 2015 enacted level was
significantly below the request and we will need to use over $30
million of planned carryover to sustain the currently projected
operations of the NNSA Federal workforce. We built up that reserve
through prudent planning and execution to enable us to pay for large
one-time costs, such as the movement of much of our Federal workforce
in Albuquerque into newer leased space. The increase includes a 1.3
percent cost of living adjustment and benefits escalation, additional
support to stand up the Office of Cost Estimation and Program
Evaluation (CEPE) office in accordance with Section 3112 of the fiscal
year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and funding to
improve financial systems integration within the nuclear security
enterprise in accordance with Section 3128 of the fiscal year 2014
NDAA.
In fiscal year 2016, NNSA will continue its on-going efforts to
plan strategically to meet current and future workforce needs by
analyzing how evolving missions are affecting job requirements.
Reshaping of the workforce over the next several years will be
essential, including obtaining both the right staffing size and skill
sets. NNSA will also continue to identify efficiencies, particularly in
travel and support services, to provide a lean and efficient
organization and to support the President's Executive Order ``Promoting
Efficient Spending''.
management & performance
To enhance our ability to carry out our mission and execute this
budget request, we will continue to focus on improving our project
management and cost estimating capabilities. In keeping with the
Secretary of Energy's increased focus on Management and Performance,
the NNSA is committed to manage its operations, contracts and costs in
an effective and efficient manner. The NNSA's Office of Acquisition and
Project Management (APM) is driving continued improvement in contract
and project management practices. APM is leading the NNSA's effort to
deliver results by instituting rigorous analyses of alternatives,
providing clear lines of authority and accountability for Federal and
contractor program and project management, and improving cost and
schedule performance. NNSA participates in the Secretary's Project
Management Risk Committee as a means to institutionalize and share best
practices across the Department.
We have used strategic partnerships with the National Laboratories
to rethink some of our most challenging projects. As a result of the
Red Team review of the UPF at the Y-12 National Security Complex, led
by the director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and a similar
approach to the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR)
Facility capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory, we are
developing a disciplined, modular approach for both sites that will
remove risks early in the process, and establish a well-defined cost
and schedule, both of which were lacking in earlier efforts. This
process will be an important and recurring project management theme at
the NNSA and across the Department of Energy.
The CEPE was established in September 2014 pursuant to the fiscal
year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. This legislation
recognized the effort to improve cost estimating that the NNSA had
already started. The CEPE office is a prime example of actions taken to
improve our cost estimation efforts. Forging a strong partnership with
the Department of Defense (DOD) Office of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE), including joint training activities with CAPE, we
have made good progress in establishing CEPE as an independent office.
CEPE will provide independent cost estimating leadership, rigorous
program analysis, and prudent fiscal guidance. Getting CEPE fully
functional is a high priority for NNSA, and we will closely monitor its
progress as it grows into its full potential over the next few years.
conclusion
The NNSA executes vital missions to ensure nuclear security at home
and abroad. We do this by delivering the technology, capabilities and
infrastructure essential to a 21st century national security
organization. Our workforce continues to rise to the challenge and
deliver mission effective and cost efficient nuclear security solutions
critical for the NNSA to succeed in today's fiscal climate.
In closing, I would also like to mention that the President's
Budget Request is just the first in a series of documents slated for
release this spring. The most important of those yet to be released is
the NNSA Strategic Plan, last updated in May 2011. The goal of this
document is to provide a single integrated guidepost for NNSA's
leaders, our partners at the labs and plants, and Congress and our
external stakeholders. The new strategic plan will articulate a clear
direction and mission to everyone--no matter their rank or position.
Also to be released is the Congressionally-mandated Stockpile
Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP) which details NNSA's multi-year plan
for delivering a safe, secure and effective nuclear stockpile. And for
the first time, we plan to release a companion plan to the SSMP,
tentatively titled, ``Prevent, Counter and Respond'' to address our
plans for nonproliferation, counterterrorism and emergency response
programs. Finally, a report is being prepared for Congress in response
to the Final Report from the Congressional Advisory Panel on the
Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, co-chaired by Norm
Augustine and Admiral Rich Mies.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
URANIUM PROCESSING FACILITY
Senator Alexander. Thank you, General Klotz. We will begin
five-minute rounds of questions, and I'll begin.
General, I would like to start with questions in this round
devoted to the uranium facility, where you're going tomorrow.
Am I correct that you're able to carry appropriated funds over
from 1 year to the next?
General Klotz. Yes, we are.
Senator Alexander. On that facility. And one of the
complaints we've sometimes had about inefficiency is that the
jerky quality of the appropriations process sometimes cause
wasted money, right?
General Klotz. It does.
Senator Alexander. So having a sustainable flow of dollars
based upon a plan can help save money as well by speeding
things up and avoiding the jerkiness of the process.
General Klotz. You're absolutely right, Senator.
Senator Alexander. The budget request for this year is $430
million. What do you need that much money for this year?
General Klotz. Well, in the coming year, we will use this
funding to develop the detailed design and safety analysis for
the three principal facilities which we will ultimately
construct. That's a mechanical and electrical building, it's a
salvage and accountability building, and it's the main process
building. It will also allow us to initiate the last phase of
some site preparation activities, including large-scale
excavation and backfill, in order to make the site ready to
start facility constructing activities in fiscal year 2017.
Senator Alexander. So it's all design and site preparation,
is that correct?
General Klotz. Yes, sir.
Senator Alexander. How----
General Klotz. Excuse me, Senator. There will also be some
long lead procurement things for specialty equipment, like the
specialized glove boxes that are necessary to work with net
radioactive materials. Those are very highly complex pieces of
equipment that require long lead times, so we need to begin the
process of procuring those.
Senator Alexander. When will the design of these buildings
be 90 percent complete?
General Klotz. We expect, on the current schedule, for that
to being during fiscal year 2017.
Senator Alexander. And can you confirm that the designs of
the uranium buildings will be 90 percent complete before the
construction begins?
General Klotz. Yes. For those three facilities, which are
the nuclear facilities associated--for the uranium processing
facility, we will be 90 percent complete before we begin
construction in accordance with our own Department of Energy
orders, 413.3B to be precise, that we follow very carefully.
Senator Alexander. So 2017 would be the date, the estimated
date, for 90 percent design completion.
General Klotz. Yes, sir.
Senator Alexander. And based on that date, will the
buildings be completed on time to meet your commitment to be
operational by 2025?
General Klotz. Yes, sir. It's still our intent to be on
track to have this work done, be out of building 9212, which,
as you know, is the oldest facility that we have there, by
2025, at a cap of $6.5 billion.
Senator Alexander. Well, that was going to be my last
question. Are you still on track to finish the facility under
the $6.5 billion cost cap?
General Klotz. Yes, sir, we are.
Senator Alexander. Well, I thank you for that. And Senator
Feinstein and I have been pretty aggressive the last 2 or 3
years on that. And I appreciate the response of NNSA, its work,
and that of the Red Team, because we basically have an
agreement, as I understand it, that construction won't begin
until we're 90 percent complete with design, and you said that
is expected to be in 2017, that the buildings will be completed
by 2025, and the budget cap is $6.5 billion or less.
General Klotz. Yes, sir. But it's important that we
continue to do some of the site preparation work that is
already underway. In fact, one of the reasons for going to Oak
Ridge tomorrow is to celebrate the completion of the first
subproject that we had in terms of preparing the site for the
construction of these three facilities. And in fact, we had
budgeted $65 million to do some road work associated with the
vehicles that will have to come in and out of the construction
site. We have done some grading. We've done potable water
lines. And as I said, we budgeted $65 million for that, and it
came in significantly below that.
Our next step in this process, which we are ready to begin
immediately, is to do what we call site infrastructure and
services subproject. Again, these are the things that any large
construction project would have to do. For instance, we will
need to put a concrete batch plant on the facility, and a very
unique concrete batch plant, because this has to pour nuclear
qualified concrete. As any construction project, we'll need to
build construction support buildings to house the people who
are doing work there, which will ultimately be 1,700
construction people doing that. And we estimate that that will
be a total of $78 million for a total project cost for this
particular aspect of the work. And as I said, we're ready to
start immediately, and we expect to have that completed in the
spring of 2018.
SAFETY
Senator Alexander. Well, my time is up, but I'm going to
ask this question, because it involves both Senator Feinstein
and me. I celebrate any example of your coming in under budget.
In multibillion-dollar projects, even $10 million is an
encouraging sign to me. And I like the idea that there seems to
be now clear accountability, someone's on the flagpole, for
meeting the goals that we have. We use the example of the
nuclear Navy. My staff reminded me that not only has the
nuclear Navy not had a reactor accident resulting in a death,
it hasn't had a reactor accident. Am I correct about that?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, that's true.
Senator Alexander. Over 60 years. And a lot of that comes
because Admiral Rickover, who I believe interviewed you as
well, Mr. Richardson, is that----
Admiral Richardson. Several times, Senator, yes, before I
got it right.
Senator Alexander. And he probably told you that, if you
had a problem with a reactor, your career was over. Did he say
something like that?
Admiral Richardson. So that's a tenet of our program at
every level. Yes, sir.
Senator Alexander. So this accountability is important. So
one question would be, we've had meetings, Senator Feinstein,
with the accountability team at the uranium processing plant. I
wanted to suggest that maybe a good schedule for that might be
twice a year. We could do it more often, if you would like. And
you might suggest to us when it would be useful, most useful to
us and to you, to have just an informal meeting where we get an
assurance that we're on time and on budget.
Senator Feinstein. With the head of the project.
Senator Alexander. With the head of the project. So will
you think about that and suggest to us whether twice a year
with the head of the project sounds about right? And if so,
what times of the year would make the most sense?
General Klotz. Yes, sir. And thank you so much for that
offer, because we have really benefited from your strong
leadership, your insight, and your counsel, as we've moved
forward through this over the last couple of years. So we will
work with your staff and find the time.
I know you've got a very busy hearing schedule to finish.
And we would like to get in sooner rather than later to do
that. We're anxious to let you know the issues associated with
this particular project, the successes as well as the
challenges that lie before us. I think it's a good news story.
As I said, we benefit from your counsel.
Senator Alexander. Thank you. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much. I hope to cover two
subjects in my 5 minutes. One is the hedge, and the second is a
new nuclear cruise missile.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE
I wrote an op-ed which was in the Washington Post on
December 3 of last year on the hedge, and I just want to read a
small part from it.
Of our stockpile of 4,804 weapons, only 1,600 are currently
deployed, which means there are 3,204 backup weapons. We
maintain this hedge in case of problems with the deployed
weapons or if world events require additional deployments.
Having reserve weapons may be smart policy, but maintaining two
spares for each deployed weapon is excessive.
I would like your reaction to that, anyone on the panel,
and I would like your assessment of what could be saved if the
hedge were cut in half.
General Klotz. Let me, if I could Senator--thank you for
the question--make a general statement, and then I'd like to
pass it over to Dr. Cook, who has responsibility for all the
weapons activities within NNSA, for a more refined answer than
I'll be able to provide.
The whole objective of the campaign of life extension
programs we have for the existing weapons is not only to
sustain their life, but in the process, we will reduce the
number of weapons which we feel is prudent to have in terms of
hedge capabilities. That's the case with both the weapons that
will go on the sea launch, ballistic missiles, as well as the
gravity weapons we have. So that's part of our overall
strategy, that as we prepare these weapons to be extended
another couple of decades beyond which their original design
life is, we are looking to reduce the overall size of the
stockpile, the hedge requirements, but also the amount of
special nuclear material that makes up the entire stockpile.
Don.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much for the question, Senator.
It's important to realize that NNSA executes and NWC approved
program, so they are partners in this. With regard to the
hedge, it is, in fact, a technical hedge, as you described, and
we are on a path to get reductions through appropriate
modernization via life extensions. That will give us increased
confidence that we can reduce the hedge. These decisions are
made within the entity that we work with on the DOD side.
To support what the administrator said, as a result of
doing the W76 life extension, for example, by the time we
conclude that, just a few years from now at the end of 2019, we
will have reduced the number of W76s by a full factor of two.
The 3 plus 2 strategy heads toward three ballistic systems,
that's a reduction from four, and just two elements in the air
carried leg, a modern gravity bomb, the B61 Mod 12, and the
modern cruise missile, the W80-4.
Again, as the administrator said on a few more details,
when we complete the B61 Mod 12, and we'll complete that in
fiscal 2020, the time right now is March 2020, we will again
have reduced the number of bombs by a factor of two. We will
have reduced the special nuclear material by a larger amount
than that, because we set the stage for the retirement of the
B83--1, the last megaton gravity bomb in the American arsenal.
As a result then, we've reduced the amount of special nuclear
material in the bomb leg, by more than 80 percent.
So those are also key to having greater confidence in the
ability of those systems to work. And as that is achieved, then
the technical hedge will be reduced. As an example, we are
ahead of by our dismantlement goals. We are able to take, as
time goes on, more dismantlement work load beyond 2022, which
is where we have it planned today.
Senator Feinstein. I very much appreciate the fact, Dr.
Cook, that you're looking at it.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to have a classified briefing on
that subject, because I have some questions about it, and maybe
you'd like to join me.
Senator Alexander. Well, I would join you. I read your op-
ed, and those are very appropriate questions, important to our
national security, and they cost a lot of money. And so I'd
like to fully understand it, too, so why don't we schedule
that?
Senator Feinstein. That would be excellent. And include in
it the B61 and the number of B61s we have.
NUCLEAR CRUISE MISSILE
The next question is, why do we need a new nuclear cruise
missile? It's a $186 million increase, I think, over the 2015
level of $9 million, and the total cost runs $7 billion to $10
billion, and I know of no compelling case. So if there is one,
maybe you could relate it to us.
General Klotz. Well, thank you, Senator. In the same Senate
Armed Services Committee hearing that you referenced earlier,
the one that The Nuclear Weapons Council Chairman, Frank
Kendall, headed up, Admiral Cecil Haney, who is also the
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, made the case this way.
The Air Force has had a cruise missile, the air-launched cruise
missile, for some decades. That missile, the missile itself,
not the warhead which we have responsibility for, but the
missile itself, is starting to show the signs of age, and that
is raising concerns about the long-term reliability of the
missile. There are also some aging concerns associated with the
support equipment that's associated----
Senator Feinstein. Could I stop you just for a minute?
General Klotz. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Feinstein. How old is the missile when it begins to
show age?
General Klotz. I'd have to get back to you on the specific
life.
Senator Feinstein. If you would, I'd appreciate it.
General Klotz. Yes, we'll get back.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
General Klotz. Yes, we will talk to our friends in the Air
Force about that. The other issue that Admiral Haney expressed
concern about was increasing sophistication of air defenses
across the world and making sure that we have an air-launched
cruise missile capability that can deal with the types of
threats--and again, we can include that in our classified
discussion later.
We, at the NNSA, have a responsibility, obviously, for the
warhead that would go on a new Air Force cruise missile, which
they refer to as the Long-Range Standoff Capability System. So
we have, this past year, made a selection that we would use a
warhead from the family of warheads that the current air-
launched cruise missile uses. We are on a path to have that
first production unit of that particular warhead ready in 2027.
A decision was taken in the Nuclear Weapons Council, and
subsequently at higher levels within the Executive Branch, that
we ought to move the date for the first production unit of that
warhead 2 years to the left, to 2025, based on what the
military saw as a requirement for----
Senator Feinstein. Is to the left, is that----
General Klotz. I'm sorry, 2 years earlier.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
General Klotz. I apologize. And so that explains a
significant portion of the increase in the money that we have
requested for the warhead work, the life extension program that
would support the Air Force's Long-Range Stand-off System.
Mr. Cook. If I could follow up. Because of 2014 has elapsed
and the first production unit is moved up 2 years, in fact,
today, we are 3 years shorter within the first production unit.
What we learned on the W76 and the B61 programs was that we had
funded tech maturation later in the life extension, and it
should have been done earlier. In fact, GAO (Government
Accounting Office) did a report on the life extension programs,
and they especially----
Senator Feinstein. Can I stop you?
Mr. Cook. Surely.
Senator Feinstein. Tech maturation?
Mr. Cook. I'm sorry. Technology maturation for the
componentry and all the elements of the system really means
that they are mature enough to put into a committed life
extension program. In other words, we've resolved all the
difficulties, and we can confidently, on both the cost
estimates----
Senator Feinstein. Are you saying that came earlier than
you thought?
Mr. Cook. No. We did it later in W76 and in the B61, and we
paid for that through having to scramble later in the life
extension program. When the General Accountability Office
reviewed those two LEP's and the three plus two strategy and
where we're going, they suggested that we fund technology
maturation efforts as early as we could. And so, in fact, just
as you've said, while we had $9 million in 2015 and we're in
the first phase of a study to get the requirements right at 6/
1, in July of this year, we moved to the analysis of
alternatives and conceptual development.
Our earlier plan had been $28 million for 2027 first
production unit, but because that was moved up 2 years, we
requested an additional $167 million for a total of $195
million.
Senator Feinstein. Well, my number is wrong. I said $186
million. It's $195 million?
Mr. Cook. One hundred ninety-five million dollars, an
increase from last year's FY NSP for year 2016 of $167 million.
Senator Feinstein. Big jump. Thank you.
Mr. Cook. Yes. Yes.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Alexander. Sure. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. Very
helpful. And we'll schedule that hearing. That would be helpful
for both of us, I think.
NAVAL REACTORS--SPENT FUEL STORAGE
Let me shift gears, Admiral Richardson. Let's talk a little
bit about Naval reactors. We talked two weeks ago, the big
thing for you in this budget is a new facility to inspect and
package that used nuclear fuel that comes to Idaho from the
reactors. That's a subject that Senator Feinstein and I have a
lot of interest in, is basically, you bring the fuel to Idaho,
and you need a facility to put it into dry cask storage, and
then the dry casks are stored temporarily in Idaho until a
repository is open to which they can be transferred, is that
correct?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, Senator. That's a very
important facility for our program, as you said, because we
take all of our spent fuel from all of the submarines and
carriers and send it to Idaho in containers. And at that
facility, we have sort of a shipping and receiving element,
where we take the fuel from the ships, we bring it into a pool
for radiological reasons, and we do processing of those cores
in the pool, and then eventually transition the spent reactor
cores into dry storage, where we store them there----
Senator Alexander. How long are the rods typically in the
pool?
Admiral Richardson. It's an interesting question, because
we're really sort of making up for time now as we move material
through the pool and into dry storage. But we've got an
agreement with the State of Idaho to make that process and do
that transition in less than 6 years, and that's an executable
program for us.
Senator Alexander. You mean the material arrives, and
within 6 years, it's in a dry cask, is that what you're saying?
Admiral Richardson. Exactly. Yes, sir. We're processing a
lot of legacy fuel, but that's a good number in terms of the
capability of the system.
Senator Alexander. You also have an agreement with the
State of Idaho to remove all those dry casks by 2035, is that
right?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. Our agreement with the State
of Idaho really has sort of two fundamental elements to it. One
involves exactly what we just talked about, the throughput of
the material through the pool and into dry storage, and we are
committed to take that inventory that we have right now, the
current inventory, and move all of that into dry storage by
2023. And then for the course that we receive after that, we
have that 6 year commitment to move them through the pool and
into dry storage in 6 years. So we will have eliminated our
backlog by 2023, and be on that 6-year thing.
Senator Alexander. So step one is to get everything into
dry storage within 6 years.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Alexander. But then step two is to get it all out
of Idaho, right?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Alexander. When is that supposed to be?
Admiral Richardson. The second element of our commitment
involves shipment to an eventual repository.
Senator Alexander. Yes, well, where are you going to take
it?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, that remains to be seen.
Senator Alexander. Yes. I had not understood, the relative
amount of material is smaller than I thought. I mean, compared
to the amount of the number--Senator Feinstein, I think you
might be interested in this, too. The material we have from our
commercial reactors is quite a bit of material. Sometimes, it's
described as nearly enough to fill up Yucca Mountain. But the
amount of material that goes into dry casks from our reactors
is relatively small space, is that--how would you describe
that?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. We have about 30 tons of
heavy metal in Idaho right now of that type of material. That
represents about--well, you have 60 percent of that right now
in dry storage. The rest of it is moving through, as I said.
That's about 180 naval cores in dry storage, and those are
loaded into 110 casks. Those casks are ready for shipping when
a repository or interim storage facility is ready. But in
total, we estimate that that total inventory is really less
than 1/10 of 1 percent of the Nation spent fuel.
Senator Alexander. Yes, so 110 casks right now.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Alexander. You still need a permanent repository to
store your fuel.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, in order to meet our current
commitments with the State of Idaho, we have to be ready to be
among the earliest shipments to go when that repository is
ready, and then all of our spent fuel that arrives by 2026 has
got to be out of the State by the year 2035.
Senator Alexander. And your dry casks can go to the same
kind of repository that a dry cask could from a commercial
reactors used fuel, is that right?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Alexander. It could go to Yucca Mountain or to one
of the repositories that we're envisioning through the
legislation Senator Feinstein and I are working on.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. We stay very engaged in those
conversations with the aim of making our casks ready to be
received by that facility.
Senator Alexander. If there were a private repository, not
operated by the Department of Energy but licensed by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that was willing to take your
used fuel, would it be appropriate to use such a repository for
that?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, if it had the appropriate
certifications and licensing, that would be potentially an
option.
Senator Alexander. Yes, there's one license today, but it's
not usable. That's in Utah. But in our hearing with the Nuclear
Regulatory commissioners last week, we heard about a proposed
application from West Texas which would be a privately operated
repository. First, it would have to be licensed by Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. But theoretically, if it's licensed by
the NRC, you don't think of a reason why you could not ship
your dry casks there.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. As long as it's appropriately
certified, nothing comes to mind that would prevent us from
using a facility like that. Again, we would be engaged in the
details of that decision.
Senator Alexander. Senator Feinstein, I don't know if
you've heard him say, the Navy's dry casks in Idaho are about
1/10 of 1 percent the size of the used fuel mass from the
commercial reactors in the country. So it's not very much by
space.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Alexander. Senator Feinstein and I see we're joined
by the Senator from Oklahoma, and we'd be glad to put you in
the rotation after Senator Feinstein if you'd like.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I wanted
to spend a few minutes on the National Ignition Facility at
Livermore.
NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY
On February 6, I sent the Secretary a letter on the use of
plutonium at the National Ignition Facility, seeking assurance
regarding the necessity for such experiments and the safety
precautions for workers and the public. I received the response
yesterday, and I would like to put that letter, dated March 9,
from Secretary Moniz into the record, Mr. Chairman.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much. Let me quote from
the letter. Among the capabilities that the NIF brings to
stockpile stewardship, which is its primary mission, is the
ability to study materials compressed to extremely high
pressures. No other platform can reach the pressures that the
NIF can attain, and plutonium experiments in this regime are
providing invaluable insights required to underpin the codes
and models used to assess the performance and safety of our
Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.
And then regarding the approval of these experiments, Dr.
Donald Cook approved conducting plutonium experiments at the
NIF after assessing myriad factors, including the technical
benefits and technical risks, the risk assessment and risk
management approach used by LLNL and the incremental costs
associated with these experiments.
Now, I asked a question about safety, and that is the use
of plutonium in that specific facility. And what the next
paragraph states is that workers have been trained and
extensive reviews were conducted to verify that the staff
procedures and safety systems were ready to proceed prior to
the planned experiments. And then it goes on to say, the amount
of plutonium used in these experiments is very small. In the
highly unlikely event of an accidental release, exposure to an
individual standing at the site boundary would be a small
fraction, less than .005 percent of the dose that individuals
would receive on a flight from San Francisco to Washington, and
less than .03 percent of the dose that an individual would
receive from a dental x-ray.
So I take you at your statement with respect to the safety
aspects of this. I have been concerned about Livermore being
able to reach its purpose. It's a very expensive facility. And
I wanted to spend a moment to see what you could tell me and
the chairman and the Senator about the likelihood of these
experiments being successful.
Mr. Cook. Well, thank you for the question. It's very well
stated. I appreciate your laying out the background that was in
the exchange of letters on safety.
On the front of how well NIF is being used, there was, 2
years ago, an effort to broaden the base of the use of NIF
comprehensively to the stockpile stewardship programs, that it
was not solely devoted to an attempt at achieving ignition, and
ignition and a drive toward it remains a core part of the
program.
But we had years of experiments built up with regard to
materials and the physics of nuclear weapons at the highest
pressure regimes, as you said, because that understanding is
the core research development, understanding that we need to
avoid ever having to return to underground testing. So for
example, today, more than half of the experiments are devoted
to a broad class of stockpile stewardship and less than half to
ignition, but progress has been made on all fronts. If you have
a second question, I'd be happy to entertain it.
Senator Feinstein. Yes, a second question would be, you
sort of moved over ignition pretty carefully and quickly, but
my understanding is that the strategies in place, and I
understand this is all pioneering work, that the strategies in
place to achieve ignition simply didn't work. And when I talked
to the people out there, what they said is they were going back
to basics, and they were going to come up with another
strategy. I gather that has not been possible, is that correct?
Mr. Cook. I believe that you got correct information from
the lab. And so what was done in the early years was testing
and basically an empirical change of parameters to see whether
ignition could be achieved in the very earliest years. That
could not be achieved. So, in fact, the lab did what it's good
at. It went back to basics, fundamental science, and found, as
they knew and had learned, that the model predictions, the
computations, were not reflective of reality. It isn't that
they were wrong codes. It's that an insufficient amount of
physics had been put in.
When that was in, then there was a drive toward improvement
of the conditions for an ignition. And in fact, Livermore did
achieve the point where, in the fusion fuel in the center of a
capsule, more fusion energy was produced than the thermal
energy that actually went into the compression of the very
spot. This is still short of ignition by quite a bit, almost a
factor of 100 in the number of neutrons produced. But there is,
in parallel with the other stewardship experiments, a solid
commitment to ignition. Step-by-step progress is being made,
and we get regular reports on that.
Senator Feinstein. Just one thing. So you're telling me
that there still is going to be an effort to achieve ignition.
Mr. Cook. There is absolutely an effort to achieve ignition
ongoing right now.
Senator Feinstein. And that has not been dropped?
Mr. Cook. No, it has not.
Senator Feinstein. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Alexander. Senator Lankford.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE HIGH RISK LIST
Senator Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
all being here. And I want to say what I know has already been
said as well, thank you for the work that you do. You do quiet
work that defends our Nation every day, and hardly anyone pays
attention to you, because you're doing your work well. And so I
appreciate what you're doing every day to be able to protect
the Nation and for what you have done for a long time in that.
Let me ask a couple of general questions on some things. I
know you're very aware of the GAO high risk list. The issue on
the high risk list has been cost estimates. You deal with very
difficult processes here. But the challenge is, GAO has
determined some of the projects that go all the way back to
1997, like the Savannah River project, that have far exceeded
the original estimates and the time here.
The concern is initially two things. One is, we have to
live and breathe based on cost estimates and what we think
something is going to cost, and we have to know we have a
reliable estimate coming to us. Second is, the GAO statement is
a little disconcerting.
They made this comment in their report. Since the project
began in 1997, the estimated cost of the project has increased
by more than $6.3 billion. The schedule has been delayed by
about 15 years. They stated, we found that, among other things,
NNSA had not analyzed the root causes of the construction cost
increases to help identify lessons learned and to help address
the agency's difficulty in completing projects within cost and
on schedule. They also mentioned in another spot that there was
a question that they had about the sense of urgency in setting
timelines to get some things completed to even determine how
this gets resolved.
So my question is, for the future, we've got to get good
estimates. I know you want to get good estimates. What is in
process right now, and when will that be done to make sure that
the lessons learned can be implemented?
General Klotz. Now, thank you, Senator, for that question.
And of course, one of the key objectives of Secretary Moniz and
of the current leadership of NNSA is to increase our skills and
our success in terms of doing the basics of large capital
construction projects that begin with good cost estimates, a
very rigorous process by which we identify the requirements
that we actually need, and assessment of alternatives for
satisfying those requirements.
We started to have some success in a couple of areas. For
the last 2 to 3 years, we have been off the GAO's list, high
risk list, for projects under $750 million. And earlier we were
discussing how a couple of those smaller projects have been
delivered actually early and under cost, which tells us that
the investment that we're making in terms of talent, expertise,
and experience in the area of large project management is
beginning to yield some results.
We still have three projects that are on the high risk
list, the GAO's high risk list, the uranium processing facility
at Oak Ridge, the replacement for the chemical and
metallurgical building in Los Alamos, and the MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility in Savannah River. On the first two,
we have adopted a fundamentally different approach about how we
are going to construct these projects that is a mix of
repurposing existing facilities, changing the processes within
those facilities, and whether we do it more efficiently, more
effectively, and instead of building one big box building,
segregating work by the security requirements as well as the
safety or hazard requirements associated with that building.
We're a little more constrained by what we can do, and were
pursuing that in both of those, and I think with very promising
potential. We're little more constrained on the MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility in Savannah River, because the
outside of the building has essentially been constructed, so
the freedom or design space that we have to affect that is
constrained.
Senator Lankford. So give me the top lesson learned here
and the thing that's going to be fixed in the timeframe on
that. So you mentioned several things there, as far as, it
sounds like, changing the way you do your contracting on the
smaller projects. Is that being implemented in the larger
programs for the future? And then I have one other follow up
question, if the Chairman will allow me another minute, as
well.
General Klotz. It is. Making sure that you have people who
actually know about the art and science of large project
construction, which were doing, hiring----
Senator Lankford. Most of the issues due to changes as you
went through it, or most of the issues were the initial
contract didn't understand completely what they were about to
do?
General Klotz. I think most of it had to do with locking in
a cost estimate before we had gotten to the 90 percent design
level. There's a lot of pressure as soon as we conceive of our
project to come up with a number. People want to know how much
it's going to cost. I think we have to be very, very
disciplined and make sure we have gone through that rigorous
cost estimating, analysis of alternatives, early design to
ensure that the cost estimate that we are planning on and that
we are communicating with Congress is, in fact, a realistic
one.
Senator Lankford. Right. The request for funding for this
next year's a little over 10 percent increase in funding,
obviously exceeds the budget caps and all that conversation
that's already happened somewhat here. The question that I have
is, how much of that money is related to some of these cost
overruns that we're now going to get on top of for some of
these big projects and call them done, so were not going to
have those same costs added, let's say, 5 years from now, so
were still catching up to some of the bad estimates from
before, and how much of them are just operational expenses?
General Klotz. I would like to get back with you on the
detail. I don't know that I've quite parsed it out that way.
The request that we have this year is based on what our current
estimates are, which we feel fairly confident about, more
confident that we could have said we were 2 or 3 years ago in
terms of the cost estimate.
Senator Lankford. Right.
General Klotz. And a lot of that depends, of course, on
level and consistent funding, because as you move the costs out
further, it will cost more.
Senator Lankford. It costs more. I understand that.
General Klotz. Yes, sir.
Senator Lankford. But I'm just trying to figure out the
breakdown here, how much of that is still catching up to bad
estimates from before, and how much of that is we're ahead of
it now, and our estimating better in new projects and new
tasks?
General Klotz. I'd like to ponder that question and get
back to you on that.
Senator Lankford. Thank you.
General Klotz. Thanks.
Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Senator Lankford. Senator
Feinstein.
MOX
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much. I wanted to ask about
the mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility. And I think both the
chairman and I remain very concerned about the costs and the
schedule of the MOX facility. Now, this started out
costing $4 billion and being complete in 2016. It's now
expected to cost as much as $13 billion and not be ready until
the late 2020s. Now, we've been into this to a great extent I
think. We know that this is a treaty obligation, that the
Russians are building a fast reactor to deal with it and that
they are further behind than we are, at least that's the
information that I have. The goal of disposing of weapons grade
plutonium is certainly worthy, but the cost is enormous.
Last year when we did this, we saw there were no
alternatives, and that's one of the reasons why we continue to
fund it. So my question is this. And I guess Ms. Harrington,
it's for you. Where is the Department in evaluating
alternatives to MOX, or have you given up? General,
whatever, you're the boss man.
General Klotz. Let me go ahead and start, but I'd love to
give Ms. Harrington an opportunity, because she lives with this
every day. You're right. We are still, as an Administration,
committed to the plutonium management and disposition
agreement. This is an agreement, as you indicated, between us
and Russia, each of us to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons
grade plutonium. This is a key objective that we have. And the
approach that we have adopted was to pursue a production
facility in Savannah River that would use this excess weapons
grade plutonium, mix it with uranium to produce a fuel, mixed
oxide, that could be burned in simple nuclear reactors. So
we've started on that project.
I recall my first hearing with this Congress was before
this Committee the day we had released a report from the
Department of Energy posted on the NNSA Web site that laid out
five different potential options for what we could potentially
pursue that needed to have greater fidelity and greater
costing. At the time, the Administration had proposed the
notion of putting the MOX Fuel Fabrication project
into cold standby. The Congress had different views. We were
instructed to continue construction for 2014. And in the fiscal
year 2015 Appropriations Act, our request for $221 million was
up to $345 million, and we were told to continue to construct
through fiscal year 2015, which we are doing.
So at the same time, the Congress asked us to do two
reports by an external federally funded research and
development corporation to give us and you independent cost
estimates of various options. The first of those reports, which
will identify two options, continuing with MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility construction, and the other one, which we
call dilution and disposal, is due in mid-April. And I believe
the federally funded research and development corporation that
we have asked to do that is on track to do that. The second
one, which will identify a broader range of options, is due in
mid-September.
So as we build the budget request for fiscal year 2017, we
will continue the process of dialoguing with Congress on the
way forward, and we will have greater fidelity in terms of the
out year funding as it relates to MOX. Now, have I
left anything out?
Senator Feinstein. Before you leave, so is the commitment
to stay with MOX?
General Klotz. The commitment through this year, as
required, is to continue construction with the MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility with the funds that were enacted in
2015, and we're doing that. Construction continues to go on.
The Secretary has been down there, along with members of the
South Carolina congressional delegation. I've been down there
twice. Our principal deputy assistant was down there yesterday.
Our deputy secretary has been there. This is a project which is
very, very high in our radar scope in terms of watching how it
proceeds.
Senator Feinstein. Can the $345 million be spent? What if
you decide to do something else?
General Klotz. Well, we can execute the $345 million. I
will tell you what Secretary Moniz has said publicly. This is
not optimal funding rate for construction of a large project
like this, but there is meaningful work that is being done in
terms of constructing this facility as we speak.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Ms. Harrington. The only thing I would go back to, Senator,
is the point you made that the up-and-down cycles of funding
are very disruptive to these kinds of projects. They make them
very difficult to manage. They make them almost impossible to
plan in a rational way, which is why we chose the $345 million
number. It would provide consistency across several years and
predictability in terms of the scope of construction that could
be achieved during that period. So I think there is a strong
rationale for why we put that particular number in the budget.
Senator Feinstein. It's just from my perspective. I don't
want to see us look back on this as we have looked back on one
other project and say, well $600 million has been wasted. So I
think it's really a hard problem for you all.
General Klotz. It is. And again, we're hoping that the
external look, as required by and requested by Congress, will
give us a more solid grounding in terms of the specific cost
estimates associated with the various alternatives.
Senator Feinstein. I hope so. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. General,
in the report, which is due April 16, do you plan to recommend
the lowest cost solution?
General Klotz. Again, Senator. I think we want to wait and
see what the report says and then engage, as we have, in
dialogue with members of Congress in terms of how best to
proceed.
Senator Alexander. Have you learned anything from the Red
Team review of the uranium project that you can apply to the
MOX and the plutonium project in Los Alamos? I know
they are different sorts of projects, but any lessons there?
Because the Red Team review seemed to be helpful and coming to
the current much better management situation it seems that you
have with the uranium project.
General Klotz. Yes, sir. On one level, yes. One of the
things that we did in response to the Red Team recommendations
was to strengthen our oversight of both programs and projects
within the NNSA and within the Department of Energy at large
and establishing a program manager for not only uranium and
plutonium and tritium, but also for the construction of--or for
how we dispose of weapons grade plutonium.
So we have stronger management oversight. But as I've
suggested to the Senator from Oklahoma, there, the facility,
the superstructure for the building, is essentially up. So some
of the things that we have adopted from the Red Team report in
terms of segregating work, dividing up hazard and the security
criteria into different facilities with varying cost per square
footage, are just not possible as far as the MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility at this stage in the project.
Senator Alexander. One of the recommendations, I believe,
in the Red Team review was that it be a continuous sort of
review, that the Red Team not just go home, but every 6 months
or every year, it would do the same kind of thing, because it's
a big project, and there are bound to be surprises and changes
and alterations. Am I right about that? Is that planned?
General Klotz. That's right. In fact, we've already had our
first review late last year in that, and we will run them at
roughly 6-month intervals to do that. And indeed, we're doing
that across NNSA on other projects, but also across the
Department of Energy.
One of the things that came out towards the end of last
year was a directive from Secretary of Energy Moniz for large
projects that there be a continuous process internally and that
there be a periodic process independent of what goes on inside
the Department of Energy or NNSA with experts to review and
question, probe how we are proceeding on these large projects.
Senator Alexander. Well, I have no other questions. I'm
encouraged by that. I think the combination of the kind of
accountability that Naval Reactors have for their reactors and
this sort of continuous review, and an agreement with the
Congress about a time schedule, a budget, and that we don't
build until we have 90 percent of the design complete, I think
the combination of all those things has made some good progress
in terms of these big construction projects. And so, we'll
continue with that.
I don't have any other questions. Senator Lankford, do you
have any other questions?
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Senator Lankford. I have one other quick question. It deals
with the defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation. The
request obviously goes up significantly. That's the combining
of several different programs behind the scenes on that. The
question is, talk me through the several million dollars in the
process of combining those two and why you think this will be
more effective. So why does the cost justify it, basically?
Ms. Harrington. Thank you for that question, Senator. We
took a long time to look at this restructuring. When we look at
the mission that we have to meet going forward and we project
over the horizon, and we've been doing studies along this line
for the past 2 plus years, trying to look at how the evolving
threat environment affects our implementation of mission. The
counterterrorism counter proliferation and the counterterrorism
incident response programs formerly were in the weapons
account, but they worked with the nuclear nonproliferation
programs. That is the sweet spot for these programs to work
together, because much of the drive behind the nonproliferation
programs is, in fact, counterterrorism.
So by pulling those programs out of the weapons account, it
leaves Dr. Cook with a clear pathway toward managing the
stockpile and focusing on that particular very important
mission, and it leaves the defense nuclear nonproliferation
appropriation covering the whole spectrum of prevent, counter,
and respond, as the administrator mentioned earlier. You will
hear this a lot from us, because this is a very important
continuum for addressing the threats that we currently
encounter in the world.
So for us, we currently, already, co-plan, co-train, co-
execute with those offices. Pulling them together into one
appropriation simply increases the opportunity for synergy,
increases the opportunity for efficiencies, for joint planning,
which is something that we have been encouraged to do.
Senator Lankford. No. I understand that, and that's great.
And the structure of it, you're right, make sense, and I'm sure
it's one of those things for several years everyone has looked
at and said, why are they over there, why are they doing that.
Part of my question is, why is it $100 million to make that
transition and that restructuring?
Ms. Harrington. It simply moves the funding that used to be
in the weapons account into the nonproliferation appropriation.
Senator Lankford. And so it has $100 million decrease in
the weapons account as well to be able to offset that? It looks
like it's going up but going up in both areas. We are not
seeing a decrease in one area and an increase in another.
General Klotz. Well, it's largely a transfer out of one
budget category into another budget category. But there is
increase in the defense nuclear nonproliferation account. If
you subtract out the money that was the transfer from
counterterrorism and incident response, we still show about a
4.4 percent increase in what one might call sort of core
nuclear nonproliferation activities which span the range of
trying to lock down special nuclear materials across the globe,
reduce dependence of commercial activities and universities on
highly enriched uranium, enhancing border crossings to prevent
smuggling of special nuclear materials, that whole range of
work continues. As Senator Feinstein noted in her opening match
for marks, it's showing an increase.
Senator Lankford. Incredibly valuable. I guess what I am
trying to figure out is, what part would have had a request for
increase before, regardless of where they're stationed, and
what part is the relocation cost? That's what I'm trying to
find out.
General Klotz. It's just an accounting. It's an accounting
shift from one part of the ledger to another part of the
ledger. There may be some increases, and will get back to you
with specific things that we're doing. In counterterrorism we
have to work very closely with State and local responders on
emergency communications, on training. There, quite frankly, is
a high demand for NNSA, Department of Energy services, by other
domestic agencies that might have to respond, God forbid, to a
terrorist threat or incident in the United States. We do a lot
of training with them. We do a lot of back-and-forth on
particular types of equipment and capability that are necessary
to do that.
And we also do that, quite frankly, with foreign partners
as well. As the interest in civil nuclear power goes up across
the world, there are going to be more and more countries that
have to deal with the safety and security issues associated
with nuclear materials, and we have deep expertise and
experience in this area that fits into this prevent, counter,
and respond spectrum that Ms. Harrington mentioned.
Senator Lankford. Right.
Ms. Harrington. Senator, I do have all the precise numbers,
the comparisons between 2015 and 2016. In the counterterrorism
and incident response areas, very, very modest. It's about a
$10 million increase over last year to account for a
significant drop in the counterterrorism, counter proliferation
budget that resulted from the Congressional action. We felt
strongly about restoring part of that. Some of that is for work
on standoff disablement. If, God forbid, we were ever to have
to encounter a trafficked nuclear weapon or an improvised
nuclear weapon, how could we safely manage it? That is the kind
of research that this will restore.
Senator Lankford. Thank you.
Senator Alexander. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, you began the hearing by asking Admiral Richardson
about the 60 year safety record of the nuclear program of the
Navy, of which we are all very proud, and he escaped any
questions. So I don't want him to feel lonely or unappreciated
or leave here.
Senator Alexander. Ask him a few. Ask him a few.
NAVAL REACTORS
Senator Feinstein. Okay. I will ask him a few. You mention
in your statement, which I have read, about highlights of
operations, that they include the nuclear powered aircraft
carrier, the George Bush CVN 77, the only coalition strike
option in the fight against ISIL militants, for 54 days
executing 20 to 30 sorties each day. Can you talk a little bit
about that, because this, to me, it's kind of present action,
and I would be very interested in knowing how it went, what
broke down, what was imprecise, what was very precise? Can you
summarize it in an unclassified setting for us?
Admiral Richardson. I'm sorry, ma'am, the details of the
strikes themselves?
Senator Feinstein. No, what you can say. If you did 20 to
30 sorties a day, I assume those were strikes?
Admiral Richardson. They were, ma'am. I would have to get
back to but the details on that. Our contribution to that was
really providing the technical support to keep the carrier on
station. And so that's one of the primary functions of my
technical support base is to support today's fleet operations,
and so the response of that team to respond to really a
continuous stream of technical requests and that sort of thing.
Senator Feinstein. Talk about the continuous stream of
technical requests with an ongoing mission of 20 to 30 sorties
a day.
Admiral Richardson. Right. And so, as you know, we are
primarily focused on continuity of power. It's our desire to
provide safe and effective reliable propulsion and power to the
aircraft carrier. And so as they work through their day to day
operations, technical issues come up. We respond to fleet
requests for help. We get about 12 of those per day from the
entire nuclear powered fleet. And so that is a major part of
our business and a significant portion of our budget request.
Some of the more significant accomplishments of that
technical base just this year alone could be directly
attributable to recovering literally 30 to 40 submarine and
aircraft carrier years of operation, as they resolve technical
issues, allowing those nuclear powered warships to continue to
execute their operations in support of the Nation's interests
around the world.
And if that capability did not exist, very, very talented
people supported by the appropriate facilities and equipment,
we would have to potentially pull those submarines and aircraft
carriers in and shut them down pending resolution. It's the
responsiveness of our team that allows them to remain on
station, to continue and to strike, or do whatever job they do.
General Klotz. Could I add something to that, Senator.
Senator Feinstein. Certainly.
General Klotz. And I say this--
Senator Feinstein. And if you would touch on the funding
request, which is $1.375 billion, and that's an 11 percent
increase of $136 million.
General Klotz. Sure. And I say this as a retired career Air
Force officer, that our Naval Reactors does extraordinarily
important work in the day-to-day operation of the U.S. Navy.
And one of the challenges that has happened over the last
couple of years since I've been in this seat, is a significant
reduction in the request of the Naval Reactors portion of the
budget, largely what we might call infrastructure or the base.
There's a lot of focus on the new reactor for the Ohio
replacement submarine or the new reactor for an aircraft
carrier, the research and development that they're doing. But
often what gets overlooked is that day to day operation that
allows the fleet to stay at sea rather than having to go back
to a port and fix it. So the allocation is extraordinarily
important so that we can continue to provide that kind of
support to the U.S. Navy as it carries out its global mission.
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, General. And so just to
describe our budget request, a majority of that request goes to
fund that technical support base at our labs and other
operating sites, to support not only today's nuclear fleet as
we have described, but also to operate the prototype reactors
which have a dual function, a research and development
function, that is the technical work that goes to de-risk the
new reactor core that we are going to put in the replacement
for the Ohio class, as well, the other purpose for those
reactors is a training function, where we train about 3,000
sailors, about 1,000 of those coming through our Department of
Energy facility in New York each year, and so there is this
continuous stream of operators to the fleet.
So the majority of that base funding goes to support those
people, really world-class technical base to get through the
technical issues, as well as there is operating and maintenance
of those prototype reactors, the spent fuel facility, Mr.
Chairman, that we talked about earlier, just to maintain those
facilities operating, dually required periodic and corrective
maintenance to keep those facilities operating.
And as the general said, in the past 5 years, those
facilities have been appropriated to about $550 million less
than the request, and we're trying to get back up on our plan
to stop backlogging maintenance on those facilities. So those
are the fundamental elements of our request in the base. And
then, ma'am, I know you're very conversant on the three
projects, the Ohio class replacement reactor, the refueling
that the general mentioned, and then the spent fuel facility
Idaho that we talked about earlier.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Admiral. Appreciate
it.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Alexander. Thanks, Senator Feinstein. I have no
other questions. Senator Lankford, do you have other questions?
Senator Lankford. No.
Senator Alexander. Well, thank you very much for this. In
summary, I'm encouraged based upon where we were 2 to 3 years
ago in terms of the big projects. And I would like to continue
to have our regular review of those things, so General Klotz,
if you could suggest to us. I'd like to ask you to pick the
times that make the most sense. I mean, if you're going to have
a Red Team review every 6 months, or if there is a budget event
coming, let's have the review--we don't want to make work. We
like to have a review at a logical time where you have
something to tell us and where we can ask questions. I'm
guessing spring and fall are a couple of good times. But think
about that, working with our staff, and then Senator Feinstein
and I will be available to you.
The hearing record will remain open for 10 days. Members
may submit additional information or questions for the record
if they would like.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Alexander. This subcommittee requests all responses
to questions for the record be provided within 30 days of
receipt. Thank you for being here today. This subcommittee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, March 11, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]