[Senate Hearing 114-219]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:33 a.m. in
room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran
(chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Shelby, Moran, Durbin, and
Udall.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Defense Innovation and Research
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK KENDALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND
LOGISTICS
opening statement of senator thad cochran
Senator Cochran. The Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations
will please come to order.
We are today having a hearing on the Defense appropriations
request from the administration for fiscal year 2016, the
Defense innovation and research request.
We want to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses and
thank you for cooperating with our committee and being here
today to discuss the budget request from the administration. We
are specifically going to be reviewing the request for fiscal
year 2016, as submitted by the administration, and specifically
the Defense innovation and research title.
We are pleased to welcome Mr. Frank Kendall, who is Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics;
Mr. Alan Shaffer, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD)
for Development, Research and Engineering; and Dr. Steven
Walker, Deputy Director of Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, or DARPA.
I want to commend Mr. Shaffer as he concludes his work with
the Department of Defense. He will be departing the Department
to serve as Director of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Science Office located in Paris. That is pretty good going.
We appreciate your 38 years of distinguished service, and
we wish you all the best in your future endeavors.
Mr. Shaffer. Thank you, sir.
prepared statement
Senator Cochran. Today we look forward to learning more
about the science and technology investment proposed in the
fiscal year 2016 budget. This subcommittee has been a strong
advocate of science and technology investments and has helped
provide funding to make certain our Nation can maintain its
role as the leader in technology and innovation. We want to
continue to receive the input of experts at the Department of
Defense, as we do our work. We appreciate your joining us today
to testify as our committee continues to evaluate the budget
request.
Your full statements have been received by the committee
and they will be included in the record, printed in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran
Good morning, the subcommittee will come to order. Our hearing
today focuses on the fiscal year 2016 budget request for Defense
Innovation and Research. We are pleased to welcome: Mr. Frank Kendall,
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics;
Mr. Alan Shaffer, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Development, Research and Engineering; and Dr. Steven Walker, Deputy
Director of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
I commend Mr. Shaffer, as he concludes his work with the Department
of Defense. Mr. Shaffer will be departing from the Department to serve
as the Director of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Science
Office located in Paris. We appreciate his 38 years of distinguished
service, and we wish you the best of luck in your future endeavors.
Today, we look forward to learning more about the science and
technology investments proposed in the fiscal year 2016 budget. This
subcommittee has been a strong advocate of science and technology
investments and has helped provide funding to make certain our Nation
can maintain its role as the leader in technology and innovation. We
want to continue to receive the input of experts at the Department of
Defense.
Thank you for joining us today to testify as our committee
continues to evaluate the budget request.
Your full statements will be included in the record.
Now I will turn to the Vice Chairman, Senator Durbin, for his
opening remarks. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Let me now turn to the vice chairman of
the committee, Senator Durbin, for any remarks he may want to
make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN
Senator Durbin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I want to thank Mr. Kendall, Dr. Walker, and Mr. Shaffer
for coming today, and I would also like to echo the comments of
the chairman about Mr. Shaffer's service to our country and
congratulate him on his new position. Once you are settled in,
we are going to come over and visit, of course, and talk about
your perspective on NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
and science for a long time to come.
As I stated last year, I am concerned with the state of our
Federal investment in research and development (R&D). I would
ask my colleagues and those in the audience to take a look at
this chart.
[The chart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Durbin. In the 1960s--the chart starts in 1976, but
in the 1960s, the United States invested 17 percent of the
discretionary budget on research and development. We were
putting a man on the moon and doing a lot of things in that
era. That number is down to 9 percent, 9 percent of our
discretionary budget on R&D.
Between 1960 and 1980, Federal R&D spending as a share of
GDP averaged 1.52 percent per year. However, now it averages
0.8 percent per year. This is a steady decline. This led to a
cumulative $1.5 trillion research investment deficit.
And the second chart I will show you how we compare to
other nations.
[The chart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Durbin. While we are declining in our investment in
research, many other nations are surging ahead. Our nearest
competitor, China, has increased funding in R&D and is on track
to surpass the United States in research and development in a
little over 5 years.
Well, I decided to introduce a couple bills to address
these deficits directly: the American Cures Act, the American
Innovation Act. The Cures Act would increase medical research
for NIH (National Institutes of Health), CDC (Centers of
Disease Control and Prevention), DOD (Department of Defense),
and Department of Veterans Affairs at the rate of GDP (gross
domestic product) inflation plus 5 percent. When I went to
speak to Dr. Francis Collins at NIH, he said, ``Give us 5
percent real growth for 10 straight years and we can make a
difference in the lives of people around the world and save
more than the money that you will put into medical research.''
I see my friend, Senator Moran, here from Kansas. He has always
been an outspoken supporter of NIH research.
The American Innovation Act complements this and would set
science and technology funding at the rate of GDP indexed
inflation plus 5 percent for the Department of Energy, the
National Science Foundation, NASA (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration), and NIST (National Institute of
Standards and Technology). Last year, with the support of my
colleagues on this subcommittee, we successfully increased
basic research across DOD and the services by $260 million and
added $1.26 billion for DOD medical research.
I tried to demonstrate in this subcommittee that we could
do 5 percent real growth as a challenge to the other agencies.
This is a great effort, but the challenge continues. Other
nations are catching us. Some are determined to pass us. If we
live in the world of budget caps, we will find ourselves mired
in a mess.
What former Speaker Newt Gingrich said in the Washington
Post this morning is the reality. The cost that we are going to
incur for healthcare alone is going to far surpass the cost of
research which might avoid some of these terrible outcomes.
I am looking forward to hearing from our panel here on our
technology deficits. You have a lot of successes to point to:
DARPA's investment in cybersecurity, highlighted on ``60
Minutes,'' DOD's investment in nano-satellites and investments
undertaken by DOD's Strategic Capabilities Office. Even though
we do not have a packed room here, I think this is one of the
most important aspects of this appropriation. I thank you for
being here.
Senator Cochran. We can now proceed to hear from our panel,
and I will call on first Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK KENDALL
Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Durbin, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss some of the measures that the Department of Defense is
taking to support and encourage innovation, particularly
actions the Department is taking to improve the productivity
and performance of our Defense acquisition. Our written
testimony has more detail.
I would like to begin by expressing my appreciation for the
work this committee has done to support the DOD science and
technology program and specifically to preserve basic research,
which is the foundation of all of our future capabilities.
The leadership of the Department from Secretary Carter
through Deputy Secretary Work, the Chairman and Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, the service leadership, and my colleagues
who are with me today, Acting Assistant Secretary Shaffer,
Deputy Director for DARPA Dr. Steven Walker, who is sitting in
for Director Arati Prabhakar, are all committed to preserving
the technological military superiority of the Department.
The Department faces two serious threats in that endeavor.
The first is external and the second is internal.
As many of you are aware, I have been expressing my
concerns about eroding technological superiority in the
modernization programs of potential adversaries for some time.
Not too long ago, I briefed Senator Durbin at a highly
classified level about the details of some of the foreign
modernization programs that concern me. I offer the same
opportunity to the other members of the subcommittee.
The short and unclassified version of that briefing is that
potential adversaries are aggressively acquiring technologies
and weapons specifically designed to defeat the power
projection capabilities of the United States. Potential
adversaries have studied the American way of projecting power
and identified perceived weaknesses, particularly our reliance
on small numbers of high-value operational assets.
The foreign systems that concern me include precision
ballistic and cruise missiles intended to attack aircraft
carriers, airfields, and other critical assets; advanced
electronic warfare systems; air-to-air missiles; and space
control systems. The United States cannot afford to be
complacent about our technological superiority.
The other threat to our military superiority is one of our
own making. It is the threat of sequestration. In this year's
budget request, the Department is asking for funding that is
well above sequestration levels. We are trying to recover some
of the readiness that was lost when sequestration was
implemented in 2013. We are also trying to acquire some of the
capability we need to remain competitive. We are requesting
increases in our investment accounts, research and development
and procurement of approximately $20 billion. Sequestration
would force us to prioritize pressing near-term needs at the
expense of these investments, preserving capability now but
increasing our risk in the future.
Uncertainties about future budgets also make effective
planning almost impossible. The uncertainty we face encourages
choices to retain forces that we cannot ultimately afford in
the hopes of future higher budgets.
The Department is committed to pursuing innovation in all
its dimensions. Last fall, Secretary Hagel announced the
Defense Innovation Initiative. Secretary Carter has endorsed
this broad initiative and will be speaking tomorrow at Stanford
about some specific steps the Department will be taking to
foster innovation.
My colleagues with me today will discuss what they are
doing to strengthen the Department's research and engineering
efforts, particularly the science and technology efforts that
acting ASD Shaffer oversees and the cutting-edge innovative
technology that Director Arati Prabhakar and Steve Walker
pursue at DARPA. The name ``DARPA'' is synonymous with
innovation, and one of the joys of my current position is the
opportunity to support and work with this fine organization.
My own efforts are focused on the broader DOD acquisition
enterprise. Just 2 weeks ago, I announced the final details and
implementation guidance for the most recent version of the
Department's so-called Better Buying Power initiatives, Better
Buying Power 3.0. The series of Better Buying Power versions
started in 2010 when Under Secretary Carter and I promulgated
what we now call Better Buying Power 1.0. Although there has
been more continuity than change in this series of initiatives,
the focus has shifted. The most recent version is focused on
innovation, technical excellence, and technological
superiority.
PREPARED STATEMENT
While we will continue all of our core efforts to improve
efficiency and productivity throughout defense acquisition,
this version of Better Buying Power focuses on the steps we can
take to spur innovation and get the greatest value we can from
each of our research and development efforts and from sources
of innovation outside the Department's traditional sources.
These efforts include our science and technology accounts,
DARPA's budget, the work of the DOD laboratories, contracted
research and development, reimbursable, independent R&D
conducted by industry, the Small Business Innovative Research
Program, and other efforts.
We urge you to support all of this valuable work, but most
of all, we urge you to permanently repeal the threat of
sequestration. Removing this specter would do more than any
other single act to spur innovation and preserve our military
technological superiority.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Kendall
Chairman Cochran, Vice Chairman Durbin and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to testify today. I am
joined here with Mr. Alan Shaffer, Acting Assistant Secretary for
Research and Engineering and Dr. Arati Prabhakar, Director of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Together, with the Research
and Engineering enterprise, we work hard every day to advance our
Nation's defense technologies. The Department's current and planned
innovation initiatives reflect our belief that the future security of
the United States and our allies depends upon maintaining our
technological superiority. Our superiority directly correlates with a
healthy and robust industrial base, stable and adequate budgets, and an
effective defense acquisition system. We look forward to the
opportunity to discuss the Department's progress in each of these
areas, and our roles in supporting the Department of Defense (DOD)
Defense Innovation Initiative.
The following written testimony includes a summary of the actions
being taken under the Department's Better Buying Power 3.0 set of
initiatives, which are focused on innovation and technical excellence,
other measures including the Research and Engineering Strategy and an
overview of our Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
investments promulgated by the Assistant Secretary for Research and
Engineering (ASD(R&E)), and the program being pursued by the Director,
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). All of these efforts
are connected parts of a larger whole.
We would like to begin, however, by discussing the reason it is so
crucial for our acquisition system to be more productive; that is the
clear risk the United States faces today of losing military
technological superiority when compared to our Nation's potential
adversaries. Controlling cost and increasing efficiency and
productivity are always important, and the Department remains focused
on improvements in these areas. Our first responsibility, however, is
to ensure the United States has, and will continue to have, dominant
military capabilities relative to any potential adversary. We are
deeply concerned about the adverse trends in U.S. military
technological superiority. The recently released Better Buying Power
3.0 set of initiatives is focused on innovation, technical excellence
and technological superiority largely because of these concerns.
Secretary Carter will be speaking tomorrow about the importance of
bringing advanced technology into the Department more effectively, and
about some steps we can take to make that happen. However, nothing the
Department, or any of us testifying today can do possibly overcome the
negative impact of sequestration. Our budget request for fiscal year
2016 includes a significant recovery in procurement and research and
development investments. If sequestration is allowed by the Congress to
occur in fiscal year 2016, the combined demands of global operations, a
readiness deficiency caused by sequestration in fiscal year 2013, the
expenses associated with force structure we are still in the process of
reducing, and the Congress' refusal to accept recommended sources of
savings will all combine to ensure a disproportionate and devastating
impact on our modernization accounts.
the risk of losing military technological superiority
The U.S. and our allies have long enjoyed a military capability
advantage over any potential adversary. The military capabilities of
long-range precision strike weapons, stealth, wide area surveillance,
and networked forces emerged from what Deputy Secretary Work describes
as a ``technology offset strategy'' that had its origins in the 1970s.
This mix of capabilities was originally designed to deal with the
overwhelming number of Warsaw Pact mechanized forces. The First Gulf
War in 1991 demonstrated the unprecedented impact of these technologies
and marked the beginning of a period of unchallenged American military
dominance that has lasted a quarter of a century and served us well in
several conflicts. We used the same capabilities, with some notable
enhancements, in Serbia, Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq. The U.S. has had
a good run, but the contest is not one sided, and all military
advantages that rely on a technology advantage are temporary.
Globalization has leveled the technology field. Potential adversaries
have taken good advantage of fast moving commercial technology,
acquired technology through cyber theft and espionage, and carefully
studied the American way of war to identify weaknesses and
vulnerabilities.
In the First Gulf War, the United States put a new suite of
technologies and associated operational concepts on display for the
world to observe and study. No nation paid more attention to the
results of the First Gulf War than China. The intelligence estimates in
the early 1990s suggested that, while China might be a concern in the
future because of its accelerating economic growth, it would take 15 to
20 years for China to become a peer competitor. It is now 20 years
later and the intelligence estimates were accurate. China has developed
and fielded a number of advanced weapons designed to defeat U.S. power
projection forces. Many more are in development. These systems include
a range of capabilities, but foremost among them are accurate and
sophisticated cruise and ballistic missiles designed to attack high
value assets, particularly the aircraft carriers and forward bases that
we depend on for power projection. These missiles, fielded in large
numbers, coupled with advanced electronic warfare (EW) systems, modern
air-to-air missiles, extensive counter-space capabilities, improved
undersea warfare capabilities, fifth generation fighters, and offensive
cyber weapons pose a serious and growing threat to U.S. and allied
forces.
To be clear, we do not anticipate or foresee a military conflict
with China. That would not be in any one's interest. However, we do not
want the United States to be in a situation of inferiority or even
parity with respect to military technology and capability. If this came
to pass the United States would lose influence, regional rivalries and
security dilemmas would compound, and the possibility of a conflict due
to a miscalculation would increase.
China is not the only nation of concern. Russia is fielding or
developing advanced systems including unmanned air vehicles, highly
effective air defense systems, fifth generation fighters, and state-of-
the art submarines. Russian doctrine, organization, and equipment while
placing greater emphasis on conventional deterrence, continues to
feature the possibility of a first strike with nuclear weapons in its
doctrine.\1\ North Korea is increasing its nuclear and ballistic
missile capabilities. Iran is acquiring precision missiles that
threaten our forces in the Persian Gulf and our allies and friends in
the region. Globally, the United States' technological superiority is
being challenged today in ways not seen since the Cold War. As all of
this is occurring, the Department lives under the debilitating threat
of sequestration.
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\1\ See 2014 military doctrine, paragraphs 26 and 27.
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Taken together, the foreign modernization programs referred to here
are clearly designed to counter American power projection forces. They
are intended to ensure that the U.S. does not interfere in what Russia
calls ``the near abroad'' and China refers to as inside ``the first
island chain.'' Even if our relationships with these states remain
peaceful and military confrontation with them never occurs, the
capabilities we are concerned about will inevitably proliferate to
other states where the likelihood of conflict may be greater.
department of defense response to emergent challenges
The Department is taking several steps to better respond to the
emerging challenges--most notably through the Defense Innovation
Initiative and the recently released Better Buying Power 3.0. Secretary
Carter is also expected to discuss other steps the Department will
taking when he speaks at Stanford later this week.
The Defense Innovation Initiative
In November 2014, Secretary Hagel announced the Defense Innovation
Initiative (DII) as an ambitious Department-wide effort to identify and
invest in novel ways that sustain and advance the Department's military
superiority and improve business operations throughout the Department.
An ultimate aim is to help craft ``offset strategies'' that maximize
our strengths and exploit the weaknesses of potential adversaries. The
initiative also focuses on attracting, developing and retaining
innovative leaders; improving internal business practices;
reinvigorating wargaming across the Defense enterprise; developing new
operational concepts and investing in leap-ahead technologies. Last
fall the Department also announced the next version of the series of
USD (AT&L) acquisition improvement initiatives, Better Buying Power
3.0, which is focused on innovation and technical excellence. One
shared aspect of DII and BBP 3.0 is the Long Range Research and
Development Planning Program (LRRDPP), a focused effort to identify
innovative and game changing technologies that can be matured over the
next 3 to 5 years.
Through LRRDPP, the Department has reached out to the broadest
possible community to identify technologies that can shape future
military systems and capabilities. The LRRDPP effort will help the
RDT&E community prioritize its investments, identify the S&T
investments with the highest potential impact, and prepare the
Department for development of new innovative capabilities. To support
the LRRDP effort, the Department released a Request For Information in
December 2014 to solicit broad input on five focus areas: Space
Technology, Undersea Technology, Air Dominance and Strike Technology,
Air and Missile Defense Technology, and general ``Other'' Technology-
Driven Concepts. The LRRDPP will complete this summer in time to inform
the fiscal year 2017 budget.
Through the overall DII effort, the Department is investigating new
technologies and operational concepts that will provide an enduring
military advantage. One goal is to identify weapons and systems in the
force today that can be used in more innovative ways. The Department
will also look for promising technologies, including commercial
technologies that can be accelerated into products. Finally, longer
range science and technology investments that will have a high payoff
in the future will be identified. The Department is also devising new
ways of engaging the commercial sector. To be successful, the
Department also has to attract and retain high quality scientists,
engineers, and technical managers. This focus on achieving dominant
capabilities through technical excellence and innovation is the new
emphasis now being implemented in Better Buying Power 3.0.
Better Buying Power 3.0
The Department's continuous improvement approach to obtaining
better results from the defense acquisition system and in everything
the Department obtains by contracting with industry, has been
formulated in a series of initiatives originally called ``Better Buying
Power'' by then Under Secretary Carter. The three versions of Better
Buying Power to date are more about continuity than change. Efficiency
and productivity are at the core of all three versions of Better Buying
Power and many core initiatives appear in all three versions--and
almost certainly would be in any future version. The evolution from BBP
1.0 to 2.0 to 3.0 is based on the premise that emphasis should shift as
initiatives are put in place, experience is accumulated, data is
collected and analyzed, and conditions change. Each iteration of BBP is
characterized by strong continuity with previous iterations. Areas of
continuity include: an emphasis on competition and competitive
environments, incentives linking profit to performance, cost
consciousness demonstrated by active management including targets for
cost reduction, improving the management of contracted services,
utilization of small businesses, and strengthening the professionalism
of the acquisition workforce. BBP 3.0, which was released in its final
version with implementing instructions last week, maintains that
approach, with an increased emphasis on achieving dominant capabilities
through innovation and technical excellence.
The draft of BBP 3.0 was released in the fall of 2014 when it was
distributed for comments from the workforce, industry and other key
stakeholders. Feedback was received from industry, think tanks and
other institutions and the Department worked with the Congress on
legislative portions of the initiatives. BP 3.0 does not reflect
everything that the Department will do to increase innovation in
industry and government, but it is a significant subset of the actions
being taken to enhance innovation and technical excellence in the
Department. The USD (AT&L) will utilize the Business Senior Integration
Group, originally formed under then Under Secretary Carter, as the
management forum to implement the BBP 3.0 initiatives, track them and
identify new opportunities to improve acquisition outcomes. The
Department's management approach remains one of continuous improvement,
with the focus of this iteration of BBP on innovation and technical
excellence.
We have submitted the BBP 3.0 ``implementation instructions,''
which describes BBP 3.0 in more detail for the record.\2\ The following
is a brief summary of key components in the Better Buying Power 3.0
Initiatives that will have impact to the Department's ability to
innovate.\3\ There are seven major areas of emphasis that have a number
of individual initiatives associated with each area. For the purposes
of this statement we will highlight examples of efforts focused on
innovation and technological superiority.
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\2\ Frank Kendall, Better Buying Power 3.0: Implementation
Guidance, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, April 9, 2015 http://www.acq.osd.mil/fo/docs/
betterBuyingPower3.0(9Apr15).pdf.
\3\ Frank Kendall, Better Buying Power 3.0 Fact Sheet (9 April
2015) http://www.acq.osd.mil/fo/docs/BBP3.0FactSheetFINAL.PDF.
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The Department is increasing its emphasis on responsiveness to
threat changes through tighter integration of requirements,
intelligence, and acquisition. When the Department introduces a system
to the field, its capabilities cannot be assumed to remain adequate
against advancing threats. The threat is dynamic, and the Department
must stay ahead of the threat curve. The Department will increase the
use of modular designs, open architectures, and competition to spur
innovation and ensure that our designs can accommodate upgrades that
keep us ahead of potential adversaries at affordable cost.
BBP 3.0 adds a specific initiative on cybersecurity. Innovation
that is stolen before it is fielded, and systems whose capabilities can
be negated by cyber-attack offer no advantage to the United States.
Cyber security is a pervasive problem for the Department. It is a
concern for our programs from inception through retirement. The cyber-
security of the industrial base that supports the department, and the
ability to protect even unclassified technical information, including
design, supply chain, and logistics support systems for our weapons
systems, will be addressed more effectively. Everything associated with
a weapons system is a potential point of attack. The Department has
taken steps to address these concerns, but more action is needed.
The Department intends to make it easier for people to do business
with the government. Under BBP 3.0, barriers to doing business with the
department will be reduced so that we can engage new, innovative
suppliers, especially small businesses. The Department is also working
to find ways to transition commercial technology more effectively, so
that we can leverage a vibrant, innovative commercial technology sector
and get capability into the hands of warfighters more quickly. Outreach
to commercial firms has already increased, as demonstrated in the
LRRDPP initiative which will inform the fiscal year 2017 process.
BBP 3.0 is also increasing the Department's focus on getting the
most out of all of our various research and development investments
leading up to actual product development. This includes the science and
technology, advanced component, and early prototype investments. The
productivity of our in house laboratories, external research efforts
funded through contracts and grants, and the Independent Research and
Development (IR&D) conducted as a reimbursable expense by private
industry are all of concern. Each of these investments will be assessed
and evaluated with a goal of getting as much from them as possible.
BBP 3.0 includes several initiatives designed to encourage
innovation in industry. One is the direction to provide industry with
draft requirements earlier on in the process, allowing industry the
opportunity to provide feedback and to make well informed investment
decisions. The Department will also contract with industry for early
concept definition work to better inform requirements decisions and
analyses of alternatives. Finally the Department will expand the
process of defining ``best value'' in monetary terms so that industry
will know what the government is willing to pay for enhanced
performance. This knowledge will spur innovation by giving industry a
solid understanding of the competitive advantage available to firms
offering innovative ways of achieving higher performance at acceptable
costs.
BBP 3.0 also continues to emphasize professionalism in the
acquisition workforce, with a specific focus in this version on
technical excellence. A strong engineering and scientific government
acquisition workforce is a necessary for effective innovation and
management of development programs. Technical risk management is at the
core of cutting edge weapon system development programs, and the
Department cannot just transfer this responsibility to industry. Well
qualified technical managers, normally with relevant engineering
backgrounds, should be running our development programs. The Department
cannot be an intelligent customer who insists on high levels of
performance and knows how to get the most out of industry, without well
qualified technical managers. The Department would like to work with
the Congress to create greater incentives to recruit, grow, and retain
professionals with these capabilities.
In summary, BBP 3.0 does not end the Department's focus on
controlling costs, critical thinking and sound professional management.
It shifts the emphasis toward the products the Department acquires for
our customers: the warfighters who depend on us to give them dominant
capabilities on the battlefields of the future. BBP 3.0 continues the
effort to strengthen the Department's culture of cost consciousness,
professionalism and technical excellence.
other initiatives impacting innovation
In the spring of 2014, the Department released the Defense R&E
Strategy, which described the technical priorities for the Department.
The first R&E priority is to develop capabilities that mitigate
existing and emergent threats. This effort includes innovation in
electronic warfare, missile defense (both cruise and ballistic), cyber,
preservation of space capabilities, and countering weapons of mass
destruction. The Department is also committed to developing
capabilities that build innovation into existing and future systems.
This includes expanding the use of prototypes and demonstrations to
reduce risk in early acquisition, expanded use of open systems,
modeling and simulation, developmental planning, and systems
engineering. Lastly, the R&E strategy includes a focus on developing
capabilities that deliver technological surprise to potential
adversaries. This includes research in subjects such as autonomy, human
cognition, quantum sciences, and hypersonic flight.
Prototyping and Demonstration Efforts
The Department has increased prototyping where possible within its
budget constraints. This will help to preserve key capabilities in our
industrial base by keeping our design teams healthy while advancing the
state of the art to reduce development lead time and hedge against
threat developments. The Department is focusing these efforts to
support innovation, mitigate current and near future threats, enhance
affordability and develop technological surprise whenever and wherever
possible. The President's fiscal year 2016 budget includes an
``Aerospace Innovation Initiative,'' a new joint program led by DARPA
in partnership with the Navy and Air Force that is intended to develop
the technologies and address the risks associated with the air
dominance platforms that will follow the F-35. This initiative will
culminate with the development of two ``X'' plane prototypes.
investments
The Department's fiscal year 2016 budget request for Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation is $69.8 billion. This includes
investments of Science and Technology (S&T) at $12.3 billion. The chart
below shows the evolution of RDT&E budget lines over the past several
decades. Briefly, the accounts ``Advanced Capabilities Development
(6.4), and Engineering, Manufacture and Development (6.5) are the
accounts that prepare the next force. These accounts have been in
decline over the past decade. In Constant Year (fiscal year 2015) the
overall RDT&E appropriations have declined from $89 billion in fiscal
year 2009 to $64 billion in fiscal year 2015.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The fiscal year 2016 budget request has largely protected S&T, and
has also preserved DARPA at $2.973 million. The table below shows the
investment trends in the last 2 years. While this budget request is
sufficient, the investment request for S&T in Constant Year fiscal year
2015 dollars peaked in fiscal year 2012 at $12.9 billion.
s&t budget
Table 1.--Defense Budget for Science & Technology; Research & Engineering; and DOD Top Line Budget (Fiscal Year
2015 Appropriated and PBR 2016)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent real
change from
Fiscal year 2015 PBR 2016 (fiscal fiscal year 2015
PBR 2015 (dollars appropriated year 2015 appropriated
in millions) (dollars in constant year (fiscal year 2015
millions) dollars) constant year
dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic Research (BA 1)............... 2,018 2,278 2,089 (2,049) -10.05%
Applied Research (BA 2)............. 4,457 4,648 4,713 (4,622) -0.55%
Advanced Technology Development 5,040 5,326 5,464 (5,359) 0.61%
(BA 3)............................
DOD S&T............................. 11,515 12,252 12,266 (12,030) -1.81%
Advanced Component Development and 12,334 12,491 14,402 (14,125) 13.08%
Prototypes (BA 4)..................
DOD R&E (BAs 1-4)................... 23,849 24,743 26,668 (26,155) 5.71%
DOD Topline......................... 495,600 497,396 534,313 (524,029) 5.35%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2.--Service and Agencies S&T Budgets (Fiscal Year 2015 Appropriated and PBR 2016)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent real
change from
Fiscal year 2015 PBR 2016 (fiscal fiscal year 2015
PBR 2015 (dollars appropriated year 2015 appropriated
in millions) (dollars in constant year (fiscal year 2015
millions) dollars) constant year
dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army................................ 2,205 2,555 2,201 (2,159) -15.51%
Navy................................ 1,992 2,155 2,114 (2,073) -3.80%
Air Force........................... 2,129 2,282 2,378 (2,332) 2.22%
DARPA............................... 2,843 2,845 2,901 (2,845) 0.00%
Missile Defense Agency (MDA)........ 176 195 224 (220) 12.61%
Defense Threat Reduction Agency 473 481 485 (476) -1.09%
(DTRA).............................
Chem Bio Defense Program (CBDP)..... 407 430 394 (386) -10.12%
Other Defense Agencies.............. 1,289 1,310 1,569 (1,539) 17.47%
DOD S&T............................. 11,515 12,252 12,266 (12,030) -1.81%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within the S&T accounts, roughly 50 percent is spent in DOD
laboratories and universities, and roughly half ($6 billion) is
invested in Industrial Contracted R&D (CRAD). Industry also spends
roughly $4-5 billion in reimbursable Independent R&D (IRAD). Among
DOD's investments in innovation, DARPA plays a unique role. DARPA's
mission is to explore high risk high payoff technologies.
defense advanced research projects agency's strategic investments
DARPA's strategic priorities can be grouped within four areas, each
one focused on developing and ensuring a family of key capabilities.
The first priority, rethink complex military systems, includes goals
like assuring dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum; improving
position, navigation, and timing without GPS; maintaining air
superiority in contested environments; and asserting a robust
capability in space among others. Second, master the information
explosion, aims to derive meaning from big data and build trust into
information systems. Third, harness biology as technology, which
includes accelerating progress in synthetic biology, outpacing
infectious diseases, and mastering new neurotechnologies. Lastly,
expand the technological frontier, which includes applying deep
mathematics, inventing new chemistries, processes and materials, and
harnessing quantum physics effectively.
DARPA also continues to focus on the important work of
transitioning its technologies to the Services or to other outlets in
support of national security. One of the ways DARPA achieves this goal
is through its Open Catalog--a publicly accessible database of
published papers, open-source code and other resources generated by
DARPA-funded research. Some months ago, for example, DARPA published
the open-source code it developed through formal methods that can
render complex software systems unhackable for given applications. That
code is already being incorporated into a range of devices on the
commercial market, including the automotive industry, changing the
economics and incentives for those who might otherwise seek to disrupt
critical cyber systems.
Further details on each of these areas are available in the
recently released ``Breakthrough Technologies for National Security''
\4\ report. However even through effective collaboration between the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services and Agencies, our
strategic choices will only go so far without consistent funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ DARPA ``Breakthrough Technologies for National Security'' (25
March 15) http://www.darpa.mil/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147488951.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As such, it is essential to remember three facts about research and
development investments. First, our technological superiority is not
assured. It takes active investments in both government and industry to
keep our critical capabilities superior to those of potential
adversaries. We have come to assume technological superiority is a
given; it is not. Second, research and development is not a variable
cost. The number of items we would like to procure or the size of our
force has nothing to do with how much research and development we
should fund. It takes as much research and development to buy one
production asset as it does to buy 1000s. Despite this fact we have a
tendency to cut research and development proportionately to other
budget accounts that do represent variable costs. Third, time is not a
recoverable asset. It takes a certain amount of time to develop a new
weapon system. Once that time is lost it can never be recovered. Today
the Department of Defense is being challenged for technological
superiority in ways we have not seen for many years. Our ability within
the Department to respond to that challenge is severely limited by the
current budget situation. While we try to resolve the issue of the
future size of the Department, so we can plan effectively and execute
our budgets efficiently, we are losing time, a highly perishable asset.
The combined impact of reduced budgets, even without sequestration,
on-going combat operations, and our global commitments significantly
impact U.S. investment in new technology and weapon systems. The rise
of foreign capability, coupled with the overall decline in U.S.
research and development investments, is jeopardizing our technological
superiority. The Defense Department has to balance among many competing
requirements and the President's Budget will, as it always has, reflect
the best balance of force structure, readiness, and modernization
available. Our responsibility is to use the available resources as
efficiently and effectively as possible to deliver needed capability to
our warfighters.
conclusion
All of our efforts to increase innovation and improve acquisition
outcomes are efforts to swim against the current of inefficiency caused
by the threat of sequestration and constant budget uncertainty and
turmoil. We must restore balance to the Department, but we cannot do so
until our plans and future budgets are better aligned. Until that
occurs, modernization investments, particularly research and
development, will suffer. This means that development programs will be
stretched out inefficiently and that production rates will be well
below optimal for many programs. The uncertainty about whether or not
sequestration will be imposed makes it impossible to determine where
the optimal balance between force structure, readiness and
modernization lies. In this environment the tendency is to hang on to
assets that the Department may not ultimately be able to afford. We
need a certain level of funding to sustain the force that is necessary
to execute our national security strategy and we need to remove the
threat of sequestration so that our planning can be on a sound basis.
The Department continues to make the health of our industrial base
a top priority; at the most senior level, the Deputy's Management
Action Group continues to meet specifically to review industrial base
budget implications and the Deputy Secretary and Secretary have taken
action to ensure we are doing what we can to protect critical companies
that make up this important part of what we consider our ``total force
structure.'' The U.S. is well into the process of losing tens of
thousands of engineers and skilled production workers from our
industrial base--this community matched with our technical managers is
essential to continued technological superiority of the Nation.
Given the Department's 5-year plan through 2020, we can tell you
right now what capabilities the Department will have in 2025. If a
weapon system is not in our 5-year plan as a development program today,
the Department will not have that capability in meaningful quantities
within the next decade. It is possible to move a complex weapon system
through development in those additional 5 years from 2021 to 2025, but
we are unlikely to be able to also produce and field a useful inventory
within that same period of time. Technological superiority is not a
tomorrow problem; it is here today. The Department remains committed to
working with the Congress on acquisition improvement, particularly to
stimulate innovation, and we are confident that the initiatives being
pursued under the Defense Innovation Initiative, Better Buying Power,
the R&E Strategy, and DARPA's Strategic Plan will lead to improvements.
Nothing we can do, however, will overcome the harm done through
sequestration and the resulting lack of adequate research and
development funding. We conclude with three truisms about research and
development--the source of all our innovation. First, that
technological superiority against competitive adversaries is not
assured; it depends on a healthy and continuing pipeline of new product
development. Second, that research and development is not a variable
cost; foregoing research and development doesn't lower the quantity we
will have in our inventory-it eliminates future products entirely.
Third, time is not a recoverable asset; the time to develop a new
product is not something we can purchase later, and technological
superiority, once lost is almost impossible to recover.
Senator Cochran. Thank you for your statement.
We will now call on Mr. Alan Shaffer, Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Development, Research and Engineering
for DOD. Mr. Shaffer.
STATEMENT OF ALAN SHAFFER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING
Mr. Shaffer. Thank you, Chairman Cochran, Vice Chairman
Durbin, and members of the committee. I am proud to be here
once again to represent the 100,000-plus personnel in the
Department of Defense research and engineering enterprise, the
enterprise that has powered previous innovation cycles that has
produced the world's most dominant military. The research and
engineering enterprise has been challenged, however, in many
ways over the last several years, but the people continue to
perform remarkably well.
I also want to thank this committee for the longstanding
support of the Department's science and technology (S&T)
program. With your help, we have maintained S&T funding at
above $12 billion a year in fiscal year 2015 and ask that you
support our fiscal year 2016 budget request of $12.2 billion.
In my office, we have revised the way we plan and execute and
S&T program through Reliance 21, an oversight construct that
has created communities of interest to bring scientists working
in specific technology areas together to jointly plan and
execute their Department-wide program in a more effective way.
But to be truly effective, we have to continue to enhance
the connection of my S&T community to the broader Department.
As mentioned by Secretary Kendall, the current national
security environment forces the DOD to examine new ways of
operating to enhance our innovation. My office is directly
involved in both the Defense Innovation Initiative and a large
number of the specific initiatives under Mr. Kendall's Better
Buying Power 3.0.
The Defense Innovation Initiative is a new Department-wide
effort to identify and invest in novel ways to sustain and
advance the Department's military superiority for the 21st
century and to improve business operations throughout the
Department. The initiative has five major lines of effort,
including people, war-gaming, operational concepts, business
practices, and a new long-range research and development
planning program, an effort to reach out to the broadest
possible community to identify technologies that can shape
future military systems and capabilities. This effort will help
the RDT&E (research, development, testing, and evaluation)
community prioritize its investments, protect the S&T
investments with the highest potential impact, and increase the
return on our S&T investments. The effort will complete its
initial review this summer.
Under Better Buying Power, there are a number of specific
initiatives that address the Department's ability to innovate.
I will cite a few that are directly aligned with my office.
Under Better Buying Power, we are more tightly coupling the
acquisition requirements and intelligence community to more
dynamically adjust the changes in potential threats.
We are addressing barriers to the adoption of commercial
technologies in our systems and capabilities.
We are addressing the productivity of corporate independent
research and development.
We are increasing the use of prototypes and experimentation
across the Department to burn down technical risk early in a
program cycle and understand how systems will operate.
We are emphasizing technology insertion and refresh in our
program planning so that we can become much more agile.
We are expanding the use of modular, open systems
architecture to stimulate innovation and allow us to become
more agile.
We are improving the outreach for technology and products
from a global market. As Mr. Durbin showed, technology now is
global and R&D has become a global commodity. We have to go out
and get the best possible for our forces. We are increasing the
participation of small business.
Taken together, these initiatives will enhance our ability
to improve the systems and capabilities we design, develop, and
field well into the future.
In addition, as mentioned by Mr. Kendall, tomorrow
Secretary Carter will be announcing some actions that he is
directing to improve our outreach to and the use of some of the
fasting growing commercial technologies and talent in the
world. Meeting the national security needs for the future
requires we have some urgency in implementing this multi-
faceted strategy. I am confident that with the continued
support of this committee, the professionals who make up the
research and engineering enterprise are up to the task.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
We will now hear from Dr. Steven Walker, Deputy Director of
DARPA.
STATEMENT OF DR. STEVEN WALKER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
Dr. Walker. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Durbin, members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the chance to
participate and be here at this hearing today.
DARPA is part of this broader DOD community and we are also
part of a bigger national R&D ecosystem. Within these
communities, DARPA has a very particular role. That role is the
make the early pivotal investments that help develop
breakthrough technologies. We do that to change what is
possible for the future so we can take big steps forward in
national security capability.
I would like to give you just an example of how our work in
DOD science and technology makes those advanced military
capabilities possible. I want to do that by looking under the
hood a little bit at a trio of new radar and jammer systems
coming online today.
So today our military services are building a new
generation of radio frequency phased arrays to field in the
coming years: The air and missile defense radar that will allow
the Navy destroyers to handle more threat systems at once; a
next gen jammer that will provide more precise jamming at
greater ranges; and the space fence radar that will allow us to
look at lots of objects in space from the ground. Each one is a
big step forward in our military capability.
So let us take a look under the hood at how we have enabled
these capabilities to come to fruition.
One thing you will see in each system is many commercial
integrated circuits. So these are catalog parts. But you will
also find some components you cannot find in any catalog. That
is the unique technology that gives each one of these systems
its power. And that technology is gallium nitride power
amplifiers. These semiconductor components send and receive
radio signals at higher power with much greater efficiency than
chips that they replace.
So where did the gallium nitride radio frequency technology
come from? It actually started as a crazy idea over at one of
our sister agencies, the Office of Naval Research, ONR. A
creative program manager there in the 1990s had this idea for
this new material called gallium nitride. But at the time, he
could only build a very small crystal of material. So that is
how the journey started.
But with DOD basic research investment in new materials at
universities and laboratories, then a big push by DARPA to
demonstrate the first practical devices made with gallium
nitride was done, followed by ManTech and service laboratory
investment and industrial investment to mature the technology,
ultimately building a tech base, an industrial base that
actually could produce these devices. So that is how we can
build the AMDR, next gen jammer, and space fence today. This is
just one example of the impact of science and technology and
how it helps develop and drive new products for DOD.
Looking forward, if you look at our portfolio at DARPA
today, you will see many variations on this theme. Whether it
is platforms and weapons so we can prevail in a highly
contested battle space or cybersecurity or new fields of
research where we see the next seeds of technological surprise,
this work that we do along with the rest of the Department's
science and technology community is the foundation for our
military technological superiority in the future.
So I thank you for your support. The subcommittee's support
over the years continues to be essential to what we do at
DARPA. And I will be happy to take the questions along with Mr.
Kendall and Mr. Shaffer. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kendall, let me start questioning by asking you about
your recent paper, The Challenge to U.S. Technological
Superiority. It seems to portray that other nations' advances
in technologies are placing some of our security interests at
risk. What specific recommendations would you make to the
committee and the Senate to ensure that we are investing in the
correct warfare domains to maintain our technology dominance?
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Chairman, the paper you referenced lays
out some of the threat developments, modernization programs
that I alluded to in my opening remarks. It basically goes
through with the unclassified level some of the very specific
types of systems that are being built.
The United States introduced a way of warfare for power
projection, particularly conventional warfare, that was
unprecedented in its efficiency and effectiveness. That was in
the first gulf war in 1991. The prediction going into that
fight was that we would have 10,000 or more casualties. In the
event, we had less than 300 if I remember correctly.
The reason that we are so dominant on the battlefield was a
mix of technologies that included precision weapons, stealth,
network forces, and wide-area sensors. That same suite of
capabilities, which came out of technology investments of the
1970s primarily, is the set of capabilities we continue to
advance and enhance certainly but that we continue to rely on.
Nobody watched more carefully what happened in the gulf
war, wrote about it more, or reacted to it more than China and
to a lesser extent Russia. It was right after the cold war had
ended, of course. So Russia was not much of a threat at that
time, and China was relatively poor at that time compared to
where they are today. But they have had 25 years since then,
roughly, to invest in capabilities that are designed to counter
that set of capabilities that we demonstrated so dramatically
in the first gulf war. And that is what they have done.
I come in every morning and I get an intel brief when I
come in and I tend to focus on technical intelligence because
it is what I am concerned about. And I have been looking for 5
years now at the weapon system developments that are taking
place, again particularly in China. And it was quite clear to
me 5 years ago that they are focused on investments which are
designed to defeat our power projection capabilities. And many
of those systems have been fielded. There are many more in
their pipeline that will be fielded in the next few years, and
the quantities, of course, are increasing. So that is the
problem we face.
The fundamental things we need to do about that. First of
all, we need to invest adequately. And the reason I gave such a
strong statement about sequestration and about the importance
of preserving our longer term investments is because without
resources nothing that we can do at the Department will make us
adequately efficient or make up for the loss or lack of
resources. That is number one.
We think we have struck a fairly balanced approach to our
investments. There is a lot of work ongoing right now to make
sure we have got the right focus. We think we are in a
reasonably good place but may want to make some adjustments.
Secretary Work came in interested in a third offset strategy,
as he calls it. It is the next generation, the next suite of
capabilities that we would field to go to the next level of
performance, if you will, compared to those that I talked about
earlier. We are in the process of looking at that. Mr. Shaffer
mentioned the long-range R&D planning activity that is ongoing.
That is designed to inform the fiscal year 2017 budget, and we
may make some investments based on that. Secretary Carter is
very interested in making sure we make the right bets for the
future, that the Department makes some conscious decisions
about where we need to go. So that is all work in progress.
We think right now with what we have requested we are in a
reasonably good place. We do expect to make some adjustments in
2017. What we would ask for more than anything else is adequate
funding from the committee, from the Congress to do the things
that we need to do.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION
Mr. Shaffer, what processes have you observed that enable
technology transition from the laboratory to programs of
record? Are there any recent examples of the transitioning of
such technology?
Mr. Shaffer. Yes, sir. So I think at the end of the day,
technology transition is a contact sport. We have got to have
demonstrations and prototypes that the users can then go out
and use and see if they can break it, see how they use it, see
how the capability can be employed. And we have seen a number
of very successful smaller scale prototypes that have been
developed and deployed. I will mention a couple that came out
of our office because I think they are illustrative of the type
of thing that we can do.
About 6 years ago, the Johns Hopkins applied physics
laboratory came to one of my program managers with a small-
scale laser radar that can be put on a UAV (unmanned aerial
vehicle). This system can be used to map the terrain locally in
Afghanistan at roughly the 1- to 2-inch resolution level. We
put that system into a prototype in a UAV, had the Army go use
it in theater, and they ended up finding a lot of caves that
they did not know existed where some of the terrorists were
hiding. The program was so successful it has transitioned into
a program of record in the Army called tactical observing
system, or TACOBS, and is being fielded for future Army
systems.
There are numerous other of those types of capabilities,
but at the end of the day--and we have made a huge push in the
Department to increase our level of prototyping and
demonstrations, but it is actually building a capability,
giving it to the operators so they see how it can be employed,
and then going ahead and modifying the final production system.
We find that we can go much more quickly through the system
that way.
Under Dr. Walker, we found that we needed a longer range
air-to-surface ship missile, anti-ship missile. That program,
known as LRASM (long range anti-ship missile), came out of a
DARPA program. Mr. Kendall went ahead and sent in a transition
plan for LRASM, managed jointly by DARPA and the Navy for a
couple of years, transitioned to a Navy program of record, and
we will actually field some long-range anti-ship missiles in
about a 4-year period. Again, that is another success and it
came about because it is a contact sport, sir.
LONG RANGE ANTI-SHIP MISSILE
Senator Cochran. Well, thank you.
I think I will ask Dr. Walker, since your name has been
associated with that effort, to see what the long-range
capability prospects are for our missile arsenal capabilities.
Dr. Walker. Yes, sir. Mr. Shaffer mentioned the long-range
anti-ship missile. DARPA had three key successful
demonstrations of that capability, and that is moving out into
a program of record. So that is a very big success.
But I think the things I would like to highlight are two
programs that we are actually working with the Air Force on,
both in hypersonics. One is a boost-glide system. Basically you
boost it with a rocket and glide the system to the target. And
the other is a hypersonic air breathing weapons concept where
you also boost that concept. You then take over with the air
breathing scramjet engine on board, and that also hits its
target as well. We are working both of these jointly with the
Air Force.
These are hypersonic speed, so at least five times the
speed of sound. What that buys you is a strike capability for
time-critical targets from long standoff ranges. And so we see
these systems--if we can pull that hypersonics technology into
a weapon system concept, we see that at the end of these
programs the Air Force would be ready to go off into an
acquisition program on those systems potentially if we are
successful.
That is really the future. If you could combine that
capability with any of our platforms, we will have a capability
that will provide us an advantage in a contested environment in
the future.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Durbin.
CYBERSECURITY
Senator Durbin. Thanks a lot, Mr. Chairman.
And let me commend to my colleagues here--I did spend an
hour with Mr. Kendall talking about breakthroughs in technology
on our side and the other side. It is well worth your time. It
is an eye-opener in terms of what we are appropriating here.
So we used to live in the world, the John le Carre world,
of cloak and dagger spies, and we still hear of them popping up
from time to time. But it appears that the real vulnerability
now is in cybersecurity and cyber spying. So when we talk about
the advances being made by our hard target enemies or others
around the world, how much do you attribute to their invasion
of our knowledge, theft of our knowledge?
Mr. Kendall. I have to be careful what I say. But, Senator,
cyber espionage, cyber theft is a huge concern. It is a
pervasive problem. I think I can tell you that we protect our
classified information reasonably well, but we have not done a
good job of protecting unclassified information.
About a year ago, we put in place a mechanism in our
contracts to require people to protect unclassified technical
information to a certain set of standards. They come out of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology. That is a first
step. And we have got about 200,000 contracts I think now which
include that clause, and we are enforcing that so that people
do a better job of protecting technical information. We are
going to evaluate that over time, and we may have to put some
more stringent controls in place.
Getting access to that technology and, if you will, coming
into somebody's computer and unloading their drawings and all
their information is that you save an enormous amount of time
and money in developing your own capability. You take something
as benign as, say, the landing gear design for the F-35, which
there is no real reason why that would have to be classified.
And you can emulate that. You know that there is a successful
design there. It saves you an enormous amount of cost and risk
getting to a similar design. That is a mundane example, but
there are lots of them.
Our ship designs, for example, are basically unclassified,
and they have to be handled that way for a variety of reasons.
But we need to protect all that information much more
effectively.
We are under attack. We are under attack every day, and it
is very depressing to see some of the successful attacks that
have occurred, again unclassified technical information
largely. So we are doing some things there.
We are trying to increase our awareness of cyber threats
and the necessity of doing something about them throughout a
program's life cycle. It is a program manager's responsibility.
It is a lot of people's responsibility to ensure we protect our
information in all aspects by which we could be attacked with
cyber attack. And it is your supply chain. It is your actual
design work at your prime contractor's. It is the features of
the logistics system that connect the weapon system to the
world of suppliers that we have out there. It is the
operational systems on the weapon system. It is everything. And
in all those cases, we have to be worried about cyber
vulnerabilities and take steps to mitigate them.
So I think there is a growing awareness throughout the
Department. Secretary Carter had a meeting on a Saturday just a
week or so ago, brought in all the senior people of the
Department involved in cyber to talk about just this issue and
what our strategy is going to be to address it. We have just
published--I am not sure if it is out today or tomorrow, but we
have a cyber strategy, for example, that we are going to be
publishing. So we are addressing this aggressively. It is not
free to have cyber security. It is going to cost us money, but
we have to do that. The return is there to protect our
information.
BASIC RESEARCH
Senator Durbin. Let me zero in on the budget request this
year. The President's fiscal year 2016 budget request for RDT&E
is $69.6 billion, $6.1 billion over fiscal year 2015 enacted.
$3.5 billion of that requested $6.1 billion goes into more
advanced research like building prototypes and evaluating their
potential for mass production. Only $14 million--$14 million of
that increase--is for science and technology research.
Is there a risk to this approach where we are putting heavy
investment in the basic technologies for the battlefield at the
expense of neglecting our seed corn, the basic research that
should be part of this as well?
Mr. Kendall. Good question, sir.
One of the things I am proud of this administration for
having done is to protect our basic science and technology
accounts. If you look back at the last several years, we have
maintained, despite all the budget fluctuations, a fairly
steady investment in science and technology. We have made a
very minor adjustment, I think, this year in our request there
to get back to more historical norms and to rebalance things a
little bit. But we have worked very, very hard to protect that.
It is about $10 billion to $12 billion out of our $60 billion
to $70 billion of R&D, and that is a very stable part of our
budget.
The part of our budget that has been changing a lot has
been the two accounts which are our pipeline of new products.
It is the prototyping effort and the pre-full-scale development
effort and the effort to actually get a product to where you
are ready to produce it. Engineering, manufacturing,
development it is called. Those two accounts have come down
quite substantially.
The other largest account in the portfolio of R&D
investments is upgrades to new systems. It is called the 6.7
account. That has grown over time substantially. As we have
gone through cuts, everything has come down to some degree
except the S&T accounts. But that shows that we are keeping
things longer and we are putting money into upgrades instead of
into new products in the pipeline. If I compare our new product
pipeline to other countries that we are worried about, it is a
lot of white space compared to a lot of very dense space. Let
me put it that way. So I think if there is a concern, it is not
in the S&T part of the budget. It is in the new product
pipeline part of the budget, that part of the overall R&D
investment.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. The Senator's time has expired.
The Senator from Alabama, Mr. Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
ROCKET PROPULSION SYSTEM
Secretary Kendall, a Reuters article from June 13th of last
year quoted you discussing the Russian rocket engine
replacement, stating--and I will quote--``We have not figured
out exactly how to get there yet.'' Since then, Congress has
appropriated, as you know, $220 million for the new rocket
propulsion system. It is my understanding that 6 months into
the year, nothing has been obligated yet.
How does DOD plan to provide for national security launches
in light of section 1608 restrictions in the law last year and
the lack of a certified alternative launch provider to date?
How do we avoid a gap there?
Mr. Kendall. We are wrestling with that right now, Senator
Shelby. It is a real problem for us. Let me start with the
basics on this.
What we need is assured access to space. Rocket engines are
a part of that, but we do not necessarily go out and buy rocket
engines. We buy launch services. We want somebody to get us
into space reliably. So that is number one. We want to be sure
that when we want to put a satellite up, that we are going to
get it up successfully and not drop it in the ocean. So that is
number one.
We would like to have more than one way to do that. So we
would like to have two sources of space launch in case
something happens with one of them--we have a technical problem
or whatever, somebody goes out of business. So that is next on
our list.
We would like to have competition. We would like to be able
to drive cost down through competition.
So you put those three things first. Then you look at how
do rocket engines fit into all of that.
We have got a problem with the lead time to replace the RD-
180. I think we are committed to getting off of the Russian
source for this. It has been a dependency we have been nervous
about for a long time. Recent current events have made that a
much more significant concern of ours, obviously. So we would
like to get off the RD-180.
The most direct path to do that is to go finance an engine
program somewhere and have somebody build an engine that we
could then make available to whoever wants to provide space
launch services to us. It is hard to do that and make an engine
available that could work on anybody's rocket. They tend to be
tailored very much to a specific platform. But that is one path
we could go down.
The more desirable path for us is to work with the
commercial launch providers out there--and there are multiples
of them. Some of them are very prominent--to have them provide
launch services to us and guarantee that they will provide
those launch services that we want and do so in a competitive
environment. So what we are looking for is what we call public-
private partnerships, business arrangements where we work with
the launch providers, provide them whatever is needed to close
their business case so that they can assure us that they will
be there for us and provide launches we can count on the
reliability of a few years down the road. There is a lead time
to getting there, and that is where 1608 comes in.
Senator Shelby. But we do not want to have that gap. Do we?
We do not want to create a gap.
Mr. Kendall. We do not want a gap. Exactly. That is why
lead time is important. It is going to take us a few years to
either develop a new engine or have launch service providers
that are ready for us and qualified. We have gone out and asked
industry for their input on this. There was a lot of good
input. The next step is another request for information. That
will be followed by a request for proposals. We are proceeding
with the money that the Congress appropriated to do some risk
mitigation on the propulsion side, on the engine side at the
same time. So we have that option available as fallback if the
public-private partnership arrangement does not work out. But
that arrangement I think is the best business deal for the
Government. It is the best way for us to get to assured launch
services that we can count on a few years down the road.
The biggest problem in 1608 is the gap you mentioned. There
is going to be a period of time where we would like to have the
option possibly of using RD-180s if necessary. There are much
more expensive options available to us, but we prefer not to go
that way. So we are trying to manage our way through all this.
It is a very, very complicated situation. I would be happy to
go through it in much more detail with you. We are doing our
best to get to where we need to be as efficiently and
effectively as we can.
Senator Shelby. Let me ask you this. For a launch provider
whose engine is barred by section 1608 at the moment, how far
in advance of a planned launch would they need to seek and
obtain a waiver to 1608? Or we could do it here.
Mr. Kendall. We are working that with that contractor.
Obviously, if the law were changed, it would make things
simpler for us, but the law is written in a way which has some
pretty specific legal requirements that we have to follow. So
we are working our way through that. A waiver exception--
nominally, I am told that there is a 5-year lead time from
engine purchase to launch. I think that could be shortened. I
think it could be shortened to as little as maybe 3 years.
There is about a 2-year lead time from when we contract with
someone for a launch to when we actually do the launch. So,
obviously, if you are going to buy engines, you need to buy
them well ahead of the launch schedule. That is part of the
problem.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions
for the record that I will submit in the interest of time, and
I would hope they would respond to them.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am certain they
will.
Senator Udall was here next first, but he has agreed to
defer to Senator Moran who has another commitment right now.
With your permission, we appreciate that very much.
Senator Moran. Tom, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman,
thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, gentlemen, thank you for joining us.
BETTER BUYING POWER
Secretary Kendall, I would like to take you up on your
offer. I would love to hear what Senator Durbin heard and maybe
more. So I would welcome that chance.
I think this issue--I served as the ranking Republican on
the Labor-H appropriations subcommittee where we spent a lot of
effort trying to figure out how to increase the resources
available for medical and scientific research on the human
side. I am pleased to now be a member of this subcommittee and
believe that the benefits that can come from the research that
we are talking about today are tremendous. So I would tell the
chairman and the ranking member I want to be an ally as we work
together to try to figure out how we do more in regard to
advancing the safety and security of our country but also
creating opportunities for technological and scientific
advances within our economy, which is important to our defense
as well.
This is, I suppose, a provincial issue to some degree.
Wichita, Kansas is the air capital of the world. We manufacture
lots of military and general aviation aircraft. Wichita State
University in particular is working on an innovation
university, trying to tie research and the private sector
together for advancements using science and technology.
And finally, Mr. Secretary, I wanted to thank you. I co-
chair with Senator Murray the Aerospace Caucus. You were our
first guest the day I became a co-chairman, and I became very
interested in what you had to say that evening in Better Buying
Power.
My question that I would take from the concept of Better
Buying Power is, is it still a theoretical concept or are there
ways that we are bringing the private sector and actual
production, use of technology into the acquisition at the
Department of Defense?
Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Senator Moran.
No. It is a very practical hands-on, as Mr. Shaffer alluded
to. The Better Buying Power label originated when Dr. Carter
was the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics. And we have kept the label, which turns out to have
been a pretty good decision in my mind I think. But it is
really a collection of initiatives that has evolved over time,
and they are all designed to give us incremental improvements
in the performance of the acquisition system. And by the
acquisition system, I mean not just our major programs but
everything, all the things we contract out for, all the things
that the Department acquires. Services are half of the things
that we contract out for--more than that actually financially.
It certainly includes our science and technology investments.
In the most recent version, which is focused on innovation
and technical excellence, it includes provisions for getting
greater access to commercial technologies. It includes
provisions for getting greater access to foreign technologies
that can be contributing. It basically looks at all the
possible sources of technology. It looks at all the different
accounts where we spend money on R&D to mature and develop
technology and all the overhead charges associated with that so
that we can move money from nonproductive things to the things
that actually provide technology for our soldiers. So it is all
of those things.
There is a 30-to-40-page document that I put out recently
with all the actions we are taking in each of these different
areas. And what I will be doing over the next 2 years is
overseeing the implementation, managing the implementation of
all these things. So while it does not name technology
specifically, it really is going to get down to the very
details of what we do in a lot of different areas.
Senator Moran. Well, Mr. Secretary, how are you able to get
to the point where the industry, the private sector is
responding to this program and they are utilizing the
opportunities that it provides to change the way they operate,
to advance their technological willingness to invest in
advancements, in a sense, maybe before the Department of
Defense is acquiring something they might be building?
Mr. Kendall. There are a number of provisions in Better
Buying Power designed to incentivize industry. One of them,
which I think is very important, is to tell industry how much
we are willing to pay for enhanced performance. Normally when
we ask for a weapon system proposal, we set a level of
threshold performance, which is the minimum that we will
accept. And we also set an objective, which is what we would
desire. It is higher. Industry almost uniformly will bid to the
threshold level and ignore the objective because the threshold
level is always cheaper. It is less capable and that goes with
cost.
So what we are going to tell industry--we started to do
this--is we are going to tell industry how much more we are
willing to pay for that higher level of performance. So
industry can then make an informed judgment about whether to
invest in technology that will get to that level of performance
or not. Without that information, there is really no incentive
for industry. And then when we do source selection, we make an
adjustment based on the parameters that we set out in the
request for proposals.
We are trying to involve industry earlier on in concept
definition and requirements formulation so that we have an
interaction with industry. We give industry a head start, if
you will, to work on how they would satisfy our requirements,
and we give industry a chance to interact with us earlier so
that we can form our requirements based on their inputs, which
can be beneficial competitively to companies that have better
ideas. And then we ask industry to do analytical work again to
bring in their technologies to help us make some decisions
about requirements.
In general, we are trying to align our incentive, our
financial incentive structure, with the things that we want. In
this case, what we want is innovation, more creative, more
capable products that we can get to the warfighter.
When Secretary Carter speaks tomorrow, he will be talking
about another thing that is also included in Better Buying
Power, which is the outreach and our ability to reach out to
nontraditional sources. So he will be talking. He will be on
the West Coast, one of the places where commercial technologies
are blooming, and he will be addressing some of the things
associated with getting access to those technologies.
Senator Moran. We want to be helpful to this proof of
concept. My time is expiring, and I will submit a couple
questions for the record about proof of concept to demonstrate
that the plan is working and can move to the private sector.
Dr. Walker, one of the things that was said in a March 2015
report by DARPA was future U.S. capabilities require an
integrated system of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, ISR, weapons communication, electronic warfare,
cyber, and other advanced technologies. I will submit a
question for the record to you and perhaps to the Secretary as
well about how we are altering the capabilities to meet those
needs.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you and Senator Udall for your
assistance.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
The Senator from New Mexico.
SEQUESTRATION
Senator Udall. Thank you, Chairman Cochran.
And, Mr. Shaffer, congratulations and thank you for your
service. NATO is a good place to be right now. A lot happening.
And so I agree with Senator Durbin. I think we may see you over
there.
And thank you to the panel for being here today and meeting
with the subcommittee.
As you know, New Mexico plays a very important role in
research and development throughout the Department of Defense.
At Kirtland Air Force Base, directed energy and the development
of new space technologies is a key part of the mission of the
Air Force research lab. The Army research lab in New Mexico
also plays a key role in assessing the durability of new
technologies before they are deployed, as well as the testing
of air defense missile systems at White Sands Missile Range.
White Sands Missile Range is the premier testing range of
the Department of Defense, as you all well know. And while its
mission is to test many of the technologies developed through
R&D, I think we can agree that the future health of White Sands
Missile Range is tied to the continued development of new
technologies, which give our troops the tools they need to keep
their strategic advantage.
And, Mr. Chairman, I pointed out in previous hearings, but
I think it is worth pointing out again, White Sands Missile
Range is currently dealing with a major multimillion dollar
maintenance shortfall, which has been caused by budgeting
shortfalls, including sequestration. This shortfall is a
possible weak spot in the R&D chain if left unaddressed, and it
may take time to rebuild capabilities at White Sands and could
negatively impact testing and the progress for all the military
branches working on developing missile technologies.
I am hopeful that all of you will help communicate this
long-term problem to your counterparts in the Pentagon so that
we can help ensure that our testing capabilities are still able
to support your research and development priorities. And I see
you are nodding. Just reflect that for the record. Thank you.
A question on tech transfer. I believe that technology
transfer is one of the most important priorities in New Mexico
and the Nation. Tech transfer can help the development of
businesses and create new markets for technologies being
developed by the Department of Defense.
How will this budget support technology transfer, and would
an increase in the applicable budget lines help improve the
development of commercial military applications through
cooperative research and development agreements?
Mr. Kendall. Senator Udall, if I could comment on your
comment about the ranges. We are concerned about installations
in general and test ranges in specific. The Department has been
forced, because of budget levels, to take some risk in those
areas. It is not just a White Sands problem. It is a larger
problem than that. So I appreciate your calling our attention
to it.
I will turn to Mr. Shaffer to talk about the tech transfer
and contracted R&D, which is one of his areas.
Mr. Shaffer. Sir, actually we have seen an increase in the
last couple of years in cooperative research and development
agreements (CRDAs) between private industry and our Government
laboratories. We have somewhere in the order of 4,000
individuals CRDAs right now with small companies, and we are
looking to do more.
We have seen an increase in applications of small business
innovative research. And thank you. The ceiling for that
program has gone up. But we have taken management processes to
more tightly couple SBIR with our acquisition program managers.
Mr. Kendall mentioned Better Buying Power 3.0. Some of the
pilots are to actually go ahead and derive requirements from
PEO's and program managers to the Small Business Innovative
Research program specifically to bring technology across the
finish line. We have been very successful. That is a model that
was employed by the Department of the Navy at the Naval
Undersea Warfare Center in Newport, Rhode Island for
predominantly their submarines, and I do not have the exact
number. I remember being shocked by it, but some 70 to 80
percent of the individual components in some of our submarines
emerged from the Small Business Innovative Research program.
So thank you. You are increasing the ceiling on that by a
tenth of a percent per year, and we are getting good payoff
from that.
We are also trying to expand our use of novel contract
mechanisms to allow us to reach out to some of these smaller
companies. They are called other transaction authorities. The
key point with those types of contract arrangements are that we
can get money out to the small businesses much more quickly.
Our standard process of having a competitive bid and award
going out is a very slow and laborious bureaucratic process. So
anything we can do to fund some of these companies in advance,
we do.
We also have extensive ties to small innovative companies
out in Silicon Valley, in Boston, in Austin, Texas from our
defense laboratories and are effectively using those
capabilities. In fact, we have the Laboratory Scientist of the
Quarter Award. We have awarded five of those right now. These
are all young, first-rate scientists and all of them are very
tightly coupled to academia and small businesses, as well as
large businesses, in their field. Mr. Kendall awarded one
yesterday to someone working in superconducting quantum
devices. Tremendous outreach into industry, and we are taking
and bringing that in transition to technology to systems that
we field.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much for that answer, and
thank you for your hard work in that area.
I have a couple of other questions, one on the long-range
research and development plan and also the CHAMP project, but I
will submit those for the record. Thank you very much.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Let me express our deep appreciation to the panel for your
attendance today and your good assistance as we begin to look
more carefully at a lot of our programs that are being funded
because we do not have an unlimited supply of money to
appropriate. And you know that. We know that. Having your
guidance and professional experiences can be very helpful to
this committee as we try to identify what the highest
priorities are and be sure that we are putting money where they
ought to be in research and development of new capacities to
protect our country and our economic interests around the world
as well. So we are in your debt, and we are grateful to you for
your leadership.
Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Our hearing will be adjourned now, and we
ask that any additional written questions be submitted--and the
answers thereto--in a reasonable time.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Hon. Frank Kendall
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Question. Secretary Kendall, have you considered creating a program
for the R&D non-profit community akin to the University Affiliated
Research Center (UARC) program? If not, why not?''
Answer. I have not considered creating a non-profit community akin
to UARC's, primarily because I do not believe it is necessary. We have
the flexibility needed to work with not-for-profits. Multiple effective
and efficient avenues for procuring technical expertise from non-profit
research organizations, regardless of affiliation with a university,
are in common use.
I believe creation of a new program for non-profit research
organizations would add management burden and, without a specific,
essential, and long-term research and development need, would be
contrary to the Better Buying Power 3.0 objective of eliminating
unproductive processes and bureaucracy.
technology domain awareness
Question. In 2014 the National Defense Industrial Association
(NDIA) conducted a study on steps that the Department of Defense can
take to improve the acquisition system. One of the key findings of
NDIA's ``Pathway to Transformation'' report (pg 62) is to develop
Department of Defense Technology Domain Awareness in order to better
identify and exploit technology opportunities and threats derived from
the commercial and other non-traditional sources. What is the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics' plan
to make sure that the DOD Information Analysis Centers' Technology
Domain Awareness initiative is appropriately resourced and supported?
Answer. The Department of Defense Information Analysis Centers'
Technology Domain Awareness (TDA) initiative is currently being
conducted as a limited pilot project. In October 2015, once the pilot
is completed, I will assess the results and determine whether to
continue TDA beyond the initial pilot. If I decide to continue the TDA
programs, I note that the model is customer-funded and would not
require extensive core funds.
prototyping and demonstrations
Question. The Department of Defense is requesting additional
funding in the fiscal year 2016 President's Budget for prototyping and
demonstrations. This emphasis on prototyping weapons before starting
large acquisition programs is a way to decrease the risk of technology
not being ready. How do you ensure prototyping does not lead to
increasing the time to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter by
stretching out technology maturation? Should the U.S. continue to
invest in virtual prototyping using the DOD's high performance
computing assets?
How do you ensure prototyping does not lead to increasing the time
to deliver new capabilities to the Warfighter by stretching out
technology maturation?
Answer. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics guidance ensures prototyping does not lead to
increasing the time to deliver new capabilities by stretching out
technology maturation and risk reduction phase of the acquisition
cycle. The Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5000.02 directs a
draft Capability Development Document (CDD) at Milestone A to inform
the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase. The draft
CDD is a living document driving prototyping and other risk reduction
activities. Should the results of prototyping activities suggest that
technology maturation required to meet the existing need will ``stretch
out'' the TMRR phase, the sponsor can adjust the requirements in the
CDD to reflect the current state of technology, provided the change
still meets the warfighting need.
Additionally, DOD Directive 5000.02's increasing emphasis on
tailoring the acquisition process encourages program managers to work
with the contractor to focus TMRR activities primarily on obtaining key
knowledge points (i.e., employing prototyping and analysis to capture
key weapon system's behaviors in order to advance the system design and
make necessary programmatic decisions). Depending on the knowledge
point, full system prototyping may not be needed, reducing the cost and
the length of the TMRR phase.
Question. Should the U.S. continue to invest in virtual prototyping
using the DOD's high performance computing assets?
The U.S. should continue to invest in virtual prototyping using the
Department's High Performance Computing (HPC) assets. Virtual
prototyping's physics-based high performance computing tools have been
proven effective in many industry and Federal agency applications,
reducing ``time-to-market'' and product development costs. The
Department's HPC tools can virtually prototype military ships, air
vehicles, and radio frequency antennas, accurately predicting the
performance of these weapons systems. HPC tools help engineers identify
design flaws and performance shortfalls and fix them early in the
acquisition process, well before live tests are possible and ``metal
has been cut''.
HPC tools are an integral part of the Department's Engineered
Resilient Systems (ERS) initiative, a concerted Modeling and Simulation
effort to leverage HPC throughout the acquisition process. Through ERS,
HPC tools are enabling the Department to explore larger solution spaces
to address capability needs. These tools have created a virtual common
area for an industry/program office/Warfighter sponsor collaboration to
identify better performance/cost trades, leading to selection of more
efficient and effective solutions that still meet demanding Warfighter
requirements.
railgun technology
Question. Beyond ship-to-shore bombardment and Integrated Air/
Missile Defense (IAMD) missions, what other missions is the
electromagnetic rail gun currently being considered to perform? Aside
from the Navy, what other services have shown an interest in adopting
railgun technologies, and for what mission sets? Is the Navy
considering integrating the railgun onto other vessels beyond the DDG-
1000? If yes, which class of ships? Is a fixed-based/land-based system
being considered for any of the services? How does the DOD intend to
preserve competition and innovation within the limited industrial base
for rail gun technologies? Are there risks associated with providing
railgun weapon system capabilities to our warfighters? Please describe
these risks, and identify which risks are the highest or most
concerning.
missions, additional services, fixed basing
Answer. Beyond the ship-to-shore bombardment (i.e.; Naval Surface
Fire Support (NSFS)) and Integrated Air/Missile Defense (IAMD) missions
for electromagnetic railgun, Anti-Surface Warfare is also being
analyzed. This mission leverages both the strike warheads being
developed by the Navy for NSFS and the closed-loop fire control against
moving targets being developed by the Strategic Capabilities Office
(SCO).
Aside from the Navy, the Army has recently shown interest in the
hypervelocity projectiles that enable both offensive and defensive
missions simultaneously. For 2 years, SCO and the Navy have been
analyzing the mission effectiveness of firing the same projectile being
developed for the electromagnetic railgun and Navy 5'' powder gun from
the Army's current Paladin, future Extended Range Cannon Artillery
(ERCA), as well as future land-based railguns. This year, the Chief of
Staff of the Army signed a memorandum partnering the Army with SCO in
demonstrating both land-to-land bombardment and IAMD with projectiles,
sensors, and fire control that are common with the Navy. The initial
focus will be on the over 900 Paladin and ERCA guns, which are expected
to achieve 1 km/s and 1.3 km/s muzzle velocities, respectively,
equivalent to 9.7MJ and 13.5MJ railguns. This would provide an offense/
defense capable system in the near term whose projectile, sensor, and
fire control architecture would enable future deployments of land-based
railguns at much higher velocities (e.g.; 2km/s at 32MJ). The SCO is
funded to prototype and conduct a series of live-fire demonstrations
with Navy and Army powder guns in the fiscal year 2018 timeframe and a
land-based railgun in the fiscal year 2019 timeframe. Assuming success,
transition of these capabilities to Services would occur subsequently.
The SCO, Office of Naval Research, Naval Sea Systems Command, and Army
have been working with Missile Defense Agency to assess the technology
maturation required to transition land-based railguns. In December
2014, MDA provided to Congress, a report on ``Missile Defense
Applications for Electromagnetic Railgun Technology.'' The report
identifies the technical achievements and tests required to validate
the suitability of the land-based railguns for missile defense
applications and enable transition. The SCO expects these tests to be
completed in fiscal year 2018.
For sea-based railgun, the Navy has studied several hulls currently
in service and is investigating the feasibility of integrating a
Railgun onto a DDG1000-class ship. In response to the current National
Defense Authorization Act, the Navy has initiated a broader study to
examine other Navy hulls. This study is due March 1, 2016.
preserving competition and the industrial base
All the major components of the system have been developed using
competitive means. The Navy competed both the railgun barrel and
projectile, which were awarded separately to BAE in 2014. Prior to
this, pulse power was competed and awarded to three vendors (i.e.,
Raytheon, General Atomics, and BAE). The Navy and SCO are also
prototyping the fire-control sensor for railguns and powder guns
leveraging existing Department sensors, including ground-based fighter
radars. A Request for Information was released with a subsequent
Industry Day in 2015, and 11 vendors requested follow-up sessions with
the government team. As their submitted papers are evaluated, follow-on
efforts may be awarded in fiscal year 2016. Additionally, as a major
performance driver across all missions and guns, SCO has released a
call for papers this month for an Advanced Projectile to reduce
component risk, explore advanced technologies, and broaden the industry
base participating in hypervelocity gun initiatives. Award is expected
to occur in the first quarter of fiscal year 2016.
Should these prototyping efforts be successful, Milestone B will
initiate another full-and-open competition for the electromagnetic
railgun system and major subsystems.
risks and challenges
Fielding electromagnetic railguns does come with unique risks and
challenges associated with high voltage and magnetic fields induced by
large currents during firings. These high voltages present the
potential for electrical shock hazards, which can be mitigated using
existing personnel protection, safety procedures, and electrical
grounding techniques for naval vessels. The magnetic fields created
during railgun firings can be mitigated by creating 15 ft keep-out
zones for humans around the gun mount during firings. This distance is
consistent with existing weapons and sensor keep-out zones. The impact
of the shot blast has also been analyzed and found to be equivalent to
the Navy's existing 5'' gun. Given this, rigorous safety standards and
procedures developed during over the past decade should translate to
Warfighter use of electromagnetic guns.
emerging technology
Question. How important is it for the DOD to have private firms
making independent Research and Development (R&D) investments to
advance technology? How does the DOD let industry know what its
priorities are, and where industry should make those independent
investments? What role do you see for industry in advanced R&D? Do you
envision industry as a partner or competitor to advanced R&D?
How important is it for the DOD to have private firms making
independent Research and Development (R&D) investments to advance
technology?
Answer. Industrial independent Research and Development is an
important component of technology maturation. Maintaining superior
military capabilities for the Department of Defense (DOD) requires some
pluralism in the development of advanced technologies to ensure we
always have the best technologies for the Warfighter. The Department
has a strong science and technology (S&T) program. It has served the
Nation well. However, the ability for private firms to perform
independent R&D that address either existing military capability gaps
from a different perspective or to create new military capabilities not
yet defined is an important element to guard against technology
surprise on the battlefield, creating technology surprise for our
adversaries, and reduce risk and cost to our acquisition programs.
Question. How does the DOD let industry know what its priorities
are, and where industry should make those independent investments?
Answer. All of our outreach is meant to meet the complementary
goals of providing industry an opportunity to exercise independent
judgement on investments in promising technologies that will provide
competitive advantage, while at the same time pursuing technologies
that advance the state of the art in U.S. Military capability. That
said, the Department is constantly making improvements in its outreach.
For example, to better communicate our needs, the Department launched
the Defense Innovation Marketplace (the ``Marketplace'') website in
2013. The Marketplace is a source of information for industry as to the
Department's S&T and R&D priorities and it provides ideas on where
industry might consider investing its research and development dollars.
For DOD R&D personnel, the Marketplace is the place where they can
review the Independent Research and Development (IR&D) projects being
performed by government contractors. IR&D conducted by industry is an
important source of innovation for both industry and the Department.
Additionally, the S&T community hosts Technical Interchange Meetings
(TIMs) with industry. The TIMs are focused on specific technology areas
and companies are invited to submit their IR&D projects that are
responsive to the TIM focus area. All projects are reviewed by subject
matter experts and a significant number of projects are selected for
in-person briefings by the submitting company to the TIM's government
hosts and subject matter experts. Companies participating in these
briefings receive substantive feedback on their projects from the DOD
subject matter experts at the end of the briefing. To date, the
Department has conducted six TIMs, and we plan to increase the number.
For general outreach regarding R&D/S&T, the Department uses fora such
as the National Defense Industrial Association S&T Conferences, as well
as other industry associations and specific briefings to industry
regarding hard technical problems.
Question. What role do you see for industry in advanced R&D?
Answer. While industry's Independent Research and Development is a
fundamental pillar of our advanced R&D work, I would like to see
industry put more of its own money at risk in advancing the state of
the art in R&D. Industry spending on IR&D is a recoverable cost to
industry through its negotiated overhead rates. I believe that if
industry invested more of its own money in advanced R&D; coupled that
with ``reimbursable'' IR&D, DOD-funded contractor research and
development, and the work conducted by our DOD laboratories; we could
buy down technology risks in our programs, create new military
capabilities, and surprise any adversary.
Question. Do you envision industry as a partner or competitor to
advanced R&D?
Answer. In a world where technological superiority can no longer be
assumed, it is imperative that the Department work cooperatively with
industry, academia, and our foreign allies and partners to ensure that
our Warfighters will be dominant.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
Question. I understand that there may be a six-year gap in
guaranteed access to space, under the fiscal year 2015 NDAA Section
1608 restrictions. How, then, does DOD plan to carry out its national
security launches? Will a legislative fix beyond DOD's current proposal
be required?
Answer. To support our national security launches, the Department
of Defense submitted a legislative proposal requesting a modification
of Section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015, Public Law
113-291. If enacted, it would allow use of Russian rocket engines that
had been contracted for prior to February 1, 2014. If these changes are
made and with the addition of a certified New Entrant launch service
provider, the Department believes it can minimize impacts to its
launches while industry transitions fully to domestically produced
propulsion systems.
Legislative proposals beyond the recently submitted fiscal year
2016 proposals are not anticipated at this time.
Question. During the hearing, I asked about how DOD plans to
provide for national security launches in light of fiscal year 2015
NDAA Section 1608 restrictions and the lack of a certified alternative
launch provider to date. Could you please clearly outline DOD's
acquisition strategy for a new rocket propulsion system, for which
Congress appropriated $220 million last year?
Answer. The Air Force is spending the $220 million appropriated for
engine development to reduce the risk of a new engine; however, a new
engine development by itself is not the Department's preferred path.
Based on interaction with industry and the Department's experience, we
do not believe that a dedicated engine development program is the best
approach to developing a launch capability that meets the Department's
goal of two commercially viable, domestic launch service providers
capable of supporting the entire National Security Space manifest. The
Department's preferred approach is to enter into public-private
partnerships with commercial launch service providers for reliable
launch capability solutions. This approach is more likely to enable at
least two launch service providers and maintain our assured access to
space while promoting competition to control cost.
The Air Force's strategy is a four step approach to transitioning
to domestic propulsion while assuring access to space. Step 1, started
last year, is to mature the technology to reduce engine development
technical risk. The Air Force has obligated about $50 million toward
this effort and will invest an additional $45-50 million in the next 6
months. Step 2 is to initiate investment in Rocket Propulsion Systems,
in compliance with the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization
Act. The Air Force will partner with propulsion system or launch system
providers by awarding multiple contracts that co-invest in ongoing
domestic propulsion system development efforts. In Step 3, the Air
Force will continue the public-private partnership approach by entering
into agreements with launch system providers to provide domestically
powered launch capabilities. In step 4, the Air Force will compete and
award contracts with certified launch providers for launch services for
2018 and beyond.
Question. Do you believe that 2019 is a realistic date for
development and certification of a replacement rocket engine or should
the deadline be extended?
Answer. The schedule for availability of a replacement rocket
engine depends upon the maturity of the technology that is proposed,
including its ability to meet performance requirements, and time needed
to conduct testing and certification flights. Based on our knowledge of
the conventional domestic defense industrial base suppliers, 2019 is
not a realistic date for development and certification of a replacement
engine. In addition, the Department must plan for at least 2 additional
years from completion of the engine development for the engine to be
integrated into a new launch vehicle and then certified to fly National
Security Space payloads.
The Department recommends the deadline not only be extended to 2022
but that proposed H.R. 1735 section 1603 language be revised to focus
on the availability of launch capability rather than the certification
of only a new rocket engine.
Question. In executing the acquisition strategy for a Russian
rocket engine replacement, how important is the risk reduction'' phase
to those efforts? Do you believe there is value in in leveraging NASA's
decades of risk reduction and rocket propulsion research development in
developing an American rocket engine replacement? If so, to what degree
is DOD leveraging the existing expertise of the National Institute for
Rocket Propulsion Systems in conducting risk reduction for a U.S.-
developed rocket propulsion system?
Answer. The risk reduction phase is very important. As the U.S. has
very limited experience with oxygen-rich staged combustion (ORSC)
engines, developing a domestic ORSC engine, without first having
independent American technologies, may present significant technical
and schedule risks. The ``Risk Reduction'' phase will help mitigate
these risks by acquiring full-scale combustion experience data and
ensuring availability of design and analytical tools to inform future
development and designs. Among the propulsion community, combustion
instability has been identified as the foremost technical risk to
development of an ORSC engine.
The Department is leveraging NASA's and the Air Force's decades of
experience in rocket propulsion. In particular, NASA's rocket
propulsion test facilities and capabilities are making near-term
critical component demonstration possible, thus allowing the burn down
of engine development risks using existing NASA and Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL) hardware.
The Department is leveraging the National Institute for Rocket
Propulsion Systems (NIRPS) by working with NASA to fully utilize their
expertise and capabilities in mitigating the risks associated with ORSC
engine development. For example, the Department is providing funding to
NASA's Advanced Booster Engineering Demonstration and Risk Reduction
program for the combustion stability demonstration of a 500k-lbf thrust
ORSC combustion chamber, integrated with AFRL's Hydrocarbon Boost
preburners. This integrated demonstration will be performed in late
2016 or early 2017 at NASA's Stennis Space Center in Mississippi.
Additionally, the Department is partnering with NASA, AFRL, academia,
all NIRPS partners, and industry for the development of combustion
stability tools.
Question. Secretary Kendall, earlier this year, you underscored
China's military capabilities that are aimed at defeating, and I quote,
``the American way of doing power projection...when we fight in an
expeditionary manner far from the United States.'' Given China's
reported testing of its hypersonic weapon last year, how important is
it that we develop our own hypersonic weapon in order to deter the
Chinese threat and maintain our forward power projection? Shouldn't we
be keeping pace with China's hypersonic development?
Answer. Hypersonic development is a high priority for our Science
and Technology (S&T) programs, and we believe our program will allow us
to keep pace with any other nation. The Air Force and DARPA are teaming
for two hypersonic demonstration programs: the Hypersonic Advanced
Weapons concept and the Tactical Boost Glide Demonstration.
Additionally, we are continuing development of the Conventional Prompt
Global Strike hypersonic program ($71 million in fiscal year 2015 and
$79 million in fiscal year 2016). The Air Force also has a base S&T
development program to address technical risk. The Department has
allocated $321 million in our fiscal year 2016 budget request and
nearly $2 billion across the Future Year Defense Program to mature
hypersonics. These efforts not only increase our capabilities to better
prepare for any future relevant acquisition, but also to better
understand what other nations, for example China, are doing in
hypersonics.
Question. The Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) completed a
successful flight test on February 4th of this year. In describing the
flight test, a DARPA press release notes that the LRASM procurement
resulted from recent initiatives under DOD's Better Buying Power 3.0.
Could you please describe how DOD's new acquisition strategy stimulates
rapid prototyping and innovative acquisition, with respect to LRASM?
Answer. The new Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 5000.02
allows the ability to tailor the acquisition process under the new
``Model 4.'' When USD(AT&L) established LRASM as the solution to the
Navy's Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 1 requirement,
the program was designated as the pilot for using Model 4 to leverage
the success of the DARPA LRASM demonstration to deliver the LRASM as an
early operational capability to the Air Force (2018) and the Navy
(2019). This rare opportunity to transition a DARPA-Office of Naval
Research demonstration program directly to the Warfighter is reflective
of Better Buying Power Focus Area 3: Incentivize Productivity in
Industry and Government. Specifically, the demonstration program not
only improved the return on investment in DOD laboratories by
leveraging government science and technology efforts from the
demonstration program, but also increased the productivity of
Independent Research and Development (IRAD) by utilizing existing
Lockheed Martin IRAD efforts.
The LRASM Deployment Office (LDO) was established in February 2014
at DARPA as the jointly manned (DARPA, Navy, and Air Force)
organization responsible for implementing the accelerated acquisition
approach. The LDO understood that critical thinking was necessary for
program success and required a commitment to challenging the norm, both
technically and programmatically. The LDO immediately began efforts to
continue technical development, capitalizing on the opportunity to
tailor the program to remove processes, reviews, and documentation that
did not provide a `value added' contribution to providing capability on
time, while maintaining compliance with statutory, regulatory and
milestone requirements. This initiative is directly related to the
Better Buying Power Focus Area 5: Eliminate Unproductive Processes and
Bureaucracy.
Furthering the connection to the Better Buying Power initiatives,
the LDO is closely aligned with both the Intelligence and the
Requirements communities as delineated in Focus Area 1: Achieve
Dominant Capabilities While Controlling Lifecycle Costs. Within weeks
of program initiation, the program received a Joint Requirements
Oversight Council-validated requirements memo and a threat baseline,
providing extremely stable requirements to begin technology maturation
efforts while the Capability Development Document proceeded through the
normal process. Additionally, the LDO has maintained continual
coordination with the resource sponsor to make adjustments to the
program's funding profile as the work required was better understood,
ensuring stability that would minimize development costs while fielding
as rapidly as possible.
The LDO team developed an Acquisition Strategy that tailored the
systems engineering process and technical maturation schedule to feed
Knowledge Points that would serve as intermediate decision events for
specific program needs. The LDO also utilizes a lean governance,
direct-report approach with an Executive Steering Board (ESB) with the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition and the DARPA Deputy Director as co-chairs. Monthly ESB
meetings are the central core for LRASM senior leadership to quickly
affect outcomes and critical decisions.
Additionally, rapidly fielding a warfighting capability requires
close management of risk and potential acceptance of risk appropriate
to the capability gap. The LDO uses a single integrated master schedule
that merges both contractor and government activities and is tightly
coupled with the risk process. This information is reviewed at each ESB
in order to ensure that the program is closely managed toward fielding
the required capability at the time specified by the Warfighter.
Improving the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce is
a specific theme of Focus Area 8. The Department is addressing this in
two particular ways from different ends of the spectrum: ensure that
our current acquisition and science and technology leaders are top in
their field and current investments in the workforce will pay dividends
in the future. When the LDO was created Under Secretary Kendall
personally reviewed resumes to ensure the team leadership possessed the
critical traits to execute the accelerated acquisition of an advanced
technology program. In order to sustain this level of expertise in the
Government and recognition of today's investments aiding in future
endeavors, the LDO has implemented an extensive modeling and simulation
effort that will allow the OASuW Inc 1 to field on time yet provide a
much needed capability for future systems. LDO team is serving as the
system integrator for the modeling and simulation facility that will
provide the validation venue for the program, and the LDO team will
execute the associated testing. As a result, there will be an enduring
capability available for future efforts to leverage along with
competent, proficient government expertise in executing this cost-
effective, efficient methodology for system performance validation.
In all, this program is on track to fill a critical warfighting
capability in under 5 years, compared to an estimated eight-to-ten
years for a standard program, and should serve as an example of how
prototypes can successfully transition to fill immediate warfighting
requirements.
Question. Mr. Shaffer, when you testified before the House Armed
Services Committee last month, you underscored the Army's high energy
laser-mobile demonstrator as a ``low cost capability for counter
rockets, artillery and mortars.'' I understand that DOD's current plans
seek to make the high energy laser a program of record in the 2020's.
If additional funding were provided in the interim, how might we
accelerate the design and development of this leap-ahead technology? Is
there an immediate need for this technology?
Answer. The Department has a well-funded ( $300 million in fiscal
year 2016) cross-service high-energy laser (HEL) science and technology
program. This investment is aimed at demonstrations of the technology
and technical risk reduction. The first HEL system is targeted at a
laser as a component of the Army's Integrated Fire Protection
Capability (IFPC Increment II), for fielding in the mid-2020 decade. In
discussion with our scientists, the consensus is that additional
funding won't substantially accelerate the capability--basic
engineering to mature the technology is funded and moving forward well.
Additional funding could allow competing concepts to reduce risk and
improve the likelihood of success, but would not substantially
accelerate the delivery of the capability.
Question. Mr. Shaffer, when you testified before the House Armed
Services Committee last month, you affirmed SMDC's Nanosatellite and
Kestrel Eye programs as ``pushing back the boundaries of disaggregated
space.'' It is my understanding that a launch date for the
Nanosatellites has been set for August of this year; and, Kestrel Eye
is set to be launched in December of this year. In light of the
constrained budget environment we face, how important is sustained
funding for these programs in order to achieve their anticipated launch
dates?
Answer. For the first two launches, funds appropriated for fiscal
year 2015 will support the launches. Where sustained funding is
required is to support planned subsequent launches later in fiscal year
2016.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt
Question. Secretary Kendall, the subcommittee is aware of the
Department of Defense's recent March 13 Memo citing the value and
special contracting authorities of the R&D non-profit institutions.
While I applaud this as a positive step, what is the Department doing
to better utilize the non-profit community's special role,
capabilities, and skill sets?''
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is well aware of and fully
agrees with the need to seek subject matter expertise not resident
within the Department to keep pace with global technology developments
and evolution. Accordingly, the Department uses existing authorities
and several initiatives to obtain these technical sources of non-profit
organizations that play a central role in providing this expertise.
The Department has a long history of working closely with federally
Funded Research and Development Centers, University Affiliated Research
Centers, and other non-profit research institutions that serve as our
``trusted agents'' on research and development (R&D) issues. My March
13, 2015, memorandum (subject: Utilization of Non-Profit Research
Institutions) emphasized that the following avenues of engagement could
be specifically applied to non-profit organizations:
--One of the most important ways the Department contracts directly
with non-profit institutions is by Title 10, United States
Code, Section 2304 (c)(3)(B), implemented through Federal
Acquisition Regulation 6.302-3. The statute provides authority
to directly contract without the need for ``full and open
competition'' when it is necessary, among other purposes, to
award work to a particular source, ``to establish or maintain
essential engineering, research, or development capability to
be provided by an educational or other nonprofit institution or
a federally funded research and development center.'' The
direct authority enables significant efficiency gains and is
one of the primary ways for the Department to ensure vibrant
interaction with non-profit research organizations.
--The Defense Innovation Marketplace (http://
www.defenseinnovationmarket
place.mil/) is a website that organizes the Department's
Science and Technology planning, acquisition, funding, and
financial information to guide the focus and interactions with
numerous DOD contracts, including non-profit research
organizations. The platform provides notification of broad
agency announcements, requests for information, and requests
for proposals that collectively offer a picture of DOD
priorities. The Defense Innovation Marketplace can serve as a
baseline for the non-profit research community to identify
capability alignment with DOD requirements. The Marketplace
also provides a connection to the Reliance 21 process through
which the Department manages the Science and Technology
portfolio and research priorities.
--The Defense Acquisition University's Service Acquisition Mall (SAM)
provides information regarding the full lifecycle of Research,
Development, Testing, and Evaluation efforts and includes
support to any Service's (R&D) labs. SAM helps the Department's
organizations understand the approaches (e.g., market research)
for acquiring R&D services such as Operational Systems
Development, Commercialization, and Advisory and Assistance.
Military Services and Defense Agencies engaged in R&D are making
use of the Other Transaction Authority provided under Section 845 of
the fiscal year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law
103-160 (as amended) codified as a note in 10 USC 2371, to facilitate
innovation and technology transfer between DOD and industry including
companies that qualify as non-traditional defense contractors under the
requirements of Section 845. For example, the U.S. Army Medical
Research and Materiel Command is soliciting proposals from a Not for
Profit 501(c)(3) to form and manage a self-sustaining Medical
Technology Enterprise Consortium. The consortium will be comprised of
industrial and academic organizations to engage in biomedical research
and prototyping, capitalization of private sector technology
opportunities, technology transfer, commercialization of Government
intellectual property, and follow-on production for the U.S. Army
Medical Research Acquisition Activity.
Question. Secretary Kendall, how do you envision non-profits
playing a role in the new Better Buying Power Initiative, specifically
moving innovation to commercialization?''
Answer. I believe that non-profit Research and Development
organizations are part of the total Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation support structure of the Department of Defense (DOD), and,
as such, can contribute to attain the goals of Better Buying Power
(BBP) 3.0. A key element of BBP 3.0 is removing barriers to commercial
technology utilization. Non-profit research organizations with
commercializable innovations can benefit from this initiative. The
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial
Base Policy, with support from the Director of Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering, is developing a handbook of methods and best
practices, which we anticipate will be completed by August 2015, that
informs DOD managers on effective engagement with commercial technology
companies, including non-profit organizations.
Another key element of BBP 3.0 is to incentivize innovation in
industry and the Government. Technology insertion and refresh are
critical components to keep pace with shortening technology cycle
times. For instance, the technology cycle for information technology
systems is often as short as 18 months. As part of BBP 3.0, the Service
Acquisition Executives and the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
staff will focus on opportunities for technology insertion and refresh
to develop more opportunities for non-profit research organizations to
provide the Department with novel technologies
Question. Secretary Kendall, what steps are you taking to harness
the expertise being developed at non-profits?
Answer. The Department of Defense is already harnessing the
expertise being developed at non-profit organizations with a wide
breadth of multidisciplinary programs. In fiscal year 2012, the
Department awarded approximately $4.9- billion in contracts to non-
profit institutions. Non-profit academic institutions were awarded an
additional $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2012 for basic and applied
research studies across the spectrum of science and engineering
disciplines. The Department will continue to use the unique expertise
non-profit organizations provide, while also leveraging expertise from
industry and government laboratories.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
non-profit research and development
Question. Non-profit research institutions, like the Stanford
Research Institute, have unique capabilities and expertise that can
provide great value to the research and development portfolios of the
Department of Defense.
Undersecretary Kendall, the Department's recent March 13 Memo cites
the value and special contracting authorities of non-profit communities
for Research and Development. What specific action is the Department
considering to better utilize these communities' special role and
capabilities?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is well aware of and fully
agrees with the need to seek subject matter expertise not resident
within the Department to keep pace with global technology developments
and evolution. Accordingly, the Department uses existing authorities
and several initiatives to obtain these technical sources of non-profit
organizations that play a central role in providing this expertise.
The Department has a long history of working closely with federally
Funded Research and Development Centers, University Affiliated Research
Centers, and other non-profit research institutions that serve as our
``trusted agents'' on research and development (R&D) issues. My March
13, 2015, memorandum (subject: Utilization of Non-Profit Research
Institutions) emphasized that the following avenues of engagement could
be specifically applied to non-profit organizations:
--One of the most important ways the Department contracts directly
with non-profit institutions is by Title 10, United States
Code, Section 2304 (c)(3)(B), implemented through Federal
Acquisition Regulation 6.302-3. The statute provides authority
to directly contract without the need for ``full and open
competition'' when it is necessary, among other purposes, to
award work to a particular source, ``to establish or maintain
essential engineering, research, or development capability to
be provided by an educational or other nonprofit institution or
a federally funded research and development center.'' The
direct authority enables significant efficiency gains and is
one of the primary ways for the Department to ensure vibrant
interaction with non-profit research organizations.
--The Defense Innovation Marketplace (http://
www.defenseinnovationmarket
place.mil/) is a website that organizes the Department's
Science and Technology planning, acquisition, funding, and
financial information to guide the focus and interactions with
numerous DOD contracts, including non-profit research
organizations. The platform provides notification of broad
agency announcements, requests for information, and requests
for proposals that collectively offer a picture of DOD
priorities. The Defense Innovation Marketplace can serve as a
baseline for the non-profit research community to identify
capability alignment with DOD requirements. The Marketplace
also provides a connection to the Reliance 21 process through
which the Department manages the Science and Technology
portfolio and research priorities.
--The Defense Acquisition University's Service Acquisition Mall (SAM)
provides information regarding the full lifecycle of Research,
Development, Testing, and Evaluation efforts and includes
support to any Service's (R&D) labs. SAM helps the Department's
organizations understand the approaches (e.g., market research)
for acquiring R&D services such as Operational Systems
Development, Commercialization, and Advisory and Assistance.
Military Services and Defense Agencies engaged in R&D are making
use of the Other Transaction Authority provided under Section 845 of
the fiscal year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law
103-160 (as amended) codified as a note in 10 USC 2371, to facilitate
innovation and technology transfer between DOD and industry including
companies that qualify as non-traditional defense contractors under the
requirements of Section 845. For example, the U.S. Army Medical
Research and Materiel Command is soliciting proposals from a Not for
Profit 501(c)(3) to form and manage a self-sustaining Medical
Technology Enterprise Consortium. The consortium will be comprised of
industrial and academic organizations to engage in biomedical research
and prototyping, capitalization of private sector technology
opportunities, technology transfer, commercialization of Government
intellectual property, and follow-on production for the U.S. Army
Medical Research Acquisition Activity.
Question. Undersecretary Kendall, the Research and Development non-
profit communities' specific skill set--moving innovation to
commercialization--could play a unique role in the recently released
Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative. Does the Department believe that
non-profit Research and Development communities can contribute to the
goals of the Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative? What specific steps is
the Department taking to utilize the non-profit Research and
Development communities towards this end?
Answer. I believe that non-profit Research and Development
organizations are part of the total Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation support structure of the Department of Defense (DOD), and,
as such, can contribute to attain the goals of Better Buying Power
(BBP) 3.0. A key element of BBP 3.0 is removing barriers to commercial
technology utilization. Non-profit research organizations with
commercializable innovations can benefit from this initiative. The
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial
Base Policy, with support from the Director of Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering, is developing a handbook of methods and best
practices, which we anticipate will be completed by August 2015, that
informs DOD managers on effective engagement with commercial technology
companies, including non-profit organizations.
Another key element of BBP 3.0 is to incentivize innovation in
industry and the Government. Technology insertion and refresh are
critical components to keep pace with shortening technology cycle
times. For instance, the technology cycle for information technology
systems is often as short as 18 months. As part of BBP 3.0, the Service
Acquisition Executives and the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
staff will focus on opportunities for technology insertion and refresh
to develop more opportunities for non-profit research organizations to
provide the Department with novel technologies.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Brian Schatz
energy initiatives
Question. In fiscal year 2013, the Defense Logistics Agency spent
more than $15 billion to procure energy for the Department of Defense,
representing almost 5 percent of DOD contract spending for that
year.But energy is more than just an issue of cost. The Defense Science
Board has noted that moving and protecting fuel during military
operations not only adds to the cost of operations, but also
``divert[s] and endanger[s] in-theatre force capability.''I know DOD is
pursuing a number of initiatives to reduce the amount of fuel it needs
and to change the mix of fuels that it uses. Perhaps one area ripe for
reform is getting energy efficiency adopted as a key performance
parameter for all weapons systems that the Department procures so that
we are requiring efforts to reduce the energy footprint of a weapons
system given that its energy footprint has direct implications for our
warfighters.
Can you please discuss the extent to which energy efficiency is
being incorporated into the requirements of acquisition programs? And
given the lessons learned about fuel dependency broadly, is there any
reason why energy efficiency should not be required as a key
performance parameter on all systems?
Answer. By statute, energy is considered in all new weapon system
acquisitions. Program Managers (PMs) define an Energy Key Performance
Parameter (eKPP) to ensure the weapon system characteristic is fully
considered across the entire acquisition program cycle. The eKPP serves
as the foundation and PMs are tasked to complete Energy Supportability
Analysis (ESA) to support the decisionmaking process. The ESA
identifies operational energy shortfalls and informs decisions on risk
mitigation, such as changes in an eKPP, the Concept of Operations,
force structure, and/or procuring additional logistics assets
The role of ESA in informing the eKPP is a recent development and
is maturing. Several programs are using ESA to evaluate program
requirements. The Marine Corps is currently conducting an ESA for
several land vehicle platforms. In addition, the Air Force is preparing
to conduct an ESA on the KC-46 aerial tanker and the F-35 Follow-on
Development variant.
While Energy is a KPP, Energy Efficiency should not be made a KPP.
Energy efficiency is just one of many important considerations in
weapons system acquisition programs, and PMs should be afforded the
ability to use their best judgement in balancing KPPs and other
considerations to ensure the Warfighter is provided the best capability
at the most affordable price.
______
Questions Submitted to Dr. Steven Walker
Question. Dr. Walker, when Dr. Prabhakar testified before this
Committee last year, she noted how our embedded military systems are
vulnerable to cyberattacks and how DARPA is working to counter the
cyber threats of today, as well as those of the future. Could you
please update the Committee on DARPA's research to counter cyber
threats, just as our military would counter kinetic warfare? How
important is sustained funding for DARPA's cybersecurity efforts?
Answer. DARPA's research to counter cyber threats is intended to
provide a diverse set of capabilities as this is not an area where a
``silver bullet'' will address all of the challenges. The following
ongoing DARPA cyber projects are making good progress towards achieving
their goals:
--Active Authentication is developing novel ways of validating the
identity of the person at the console to ensure only authorized
users obtain access to critical resources.
--Active Cyber Defense will enable U.S. cyber defenders to exploit
their ``home field advantage.''
--Automated Program Analysis for Cybersecurity is developing formal
methods based techniques for keeping malicious code out of
application marketplaces.
--Clean-slate design of Resilient Adaptive Secure Hosts is using the
immune system as a model to create computing technologies
resistant to cyber attack.
--Cyber Grand Challenge is stimulating the creation of automated
cyber-defenses capable of responding to attacks at speeds and
scales beyond what is humanly possible.
--High-Assurance Cyber Military Systems is using a clean-slate,
formal methods-based approach to enable semi-automated code
synthesis from executable, formal specifications with the goal
of making ground and air vehicles hack-proof for specified
security properties.
--Integrated Cyber Analysis System is developing techniques to
integrate information technology (IT) system information to
provide cyber defenders with enterprise situational awareness.
--Mining and Understanding Software Enclaves will use huge libraries
of open source software to assure correctness of newly
developed programs.
--Mission-oriented Resilient Clouds is developing technologies to
detect, diagnose, and respond to attacks in the cloud.
--Network Defense is developing technologies to detect network
attacks by analyzing network summary data across a wide array
of networks.
--Plan X is a foundational cyberwarfare program developing platforms
for the Department of Defense to plan for, conduct, and assess
cyberwarfare in a manner similar to kinetic warfare.
--PROgramming Computation on EncryptEd Data is developing techniques
for computing with encrypted data without first decrypting it,
enhancing its confidentiality.
--The Rapid Software Development using Binary Components program is
developing a system to identify and extract software components
for reuse in new applications.
--SAFER Warfighter Communications is developing technology to enable
secure and resilient communications over the Internet,
particularly in adversarial situations.
--Vetting Commodity IT Software and Firmware is developing methods to
ensure that commercial software and firmware is free of
malware.
In addition, since last year DARPA has initiated the following new
cyber projects:
--Building Resource Adaptive Software Systems will enable us to build
software systems that are long-lived, survivable, and robust to
changes in physical and logical resources.
--Cyber Fault-tolerant Attack Recovery will develop diversity-based
architectures for protecting systems without requiring changes
to their concept of operations.
--Edge-Directed Cyber Technologies for Reliable Mission Communication
will bolster the resilience of communication over wide area
networks through new edge capabilities.
--SafeWare will provide provably-secure protection of sensitive
information in software that is vulnerable to capture and
dissection.
--Space/Time Analysis for Cybersecurity will develop new program
analysis techniques and tools for identifying vulnerabilities
to algorithmic complexity and side channel attacks.
--Transparent Computing will make currently opaque computing systems
transparent by providing high-fidelity visibility into
component interactions during system operation.
Sustained funding for DARPA's cybersecurity portfolio is of
critical importance. The cyber domain is one where we see our
adversaries making tremendous technical strides and acting with
increasing boldness. Cyber is likely to be the preferred avenue of
attack for all actors, large and small, given the kinetic advantages we
currently enjoy.
Question. During last year's Defense Innovation hearing, Dr.
Prabhakar noted how both DARPA and the Navy were trying to get the
Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile to operational capability as quickly as
possible. I understand that the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile is
scheduled for fielding in 2018. Could you please discuss the importance
of continuing to adequately fund these efforts?
Answer. The Warfighter has clearly communicated a need to provide
additional Offensive Anti-surface Warfare (OASuW) capability to address
emerging threats no later than 2018. This message began with a U.S.
Pacific Fleet Urgent Operational Needs Statement released in 2008, and
subsequently revalidated in 2014. United States Pacific Command has
articulated a developing capability gap that will result in increased
risk in the operational environment beginning in that timeframe and
increasing thereafter.
The Department is addressing this emerging threat through an
incremental approach, beginning with the OASuW Increment 1 program,
which will field an early operational capability with the Long-Range
Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) to meet the 2018 need until a follow on
capability can be fielded (OASuW Increment 2). LRASM development/
fielding is funded to focus on meeting the time-critical requirements,
while accepting manageable levels of technical risk, and is utilizing
the Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 Model 4 Accelerated
Acquisition process to achieve ``speed to the fleet.'' The program's
funding profile was developed to enable fielding at the time required
by the Warfighter. Due to the accelerated nature of the program's
acquisition strategy, volatility in the funding profile has an
intensified impact on the program's ability to meet the early
operational requirements, and any reduction in funding will increase
risk to fielding the required capability at the specified time.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. We are very grateful for your cooperation,
along with that of our distinguished staff member team, which
is the best in the Senate.
So until then, the subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., Wednesday, April 22, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]