[Senate Hearing 114-219]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 6, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:35 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Shelby, Collins, Murkowski,
Blunt, Daines, Moran, Durbin, Leahy, Feinstein, Mikulski, Reed,
Tester, Udall, and Schatz.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY
ACCOMPANIED BY HON. MIKE McCORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) AND CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER
opening statement of senator thad cochran
Senator Cochran. The committee will please come to order.
Today our Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations reviews the
budget request of the Department of Defense (DOD). We are very
pleased to welcome Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, United
States Army. This is our final scheduled hearing of the year on
the 2016 Defense budget request.
The subcommittee recognizes the uncertainty of the current
fiscal environment and the impact it has on the Department of
Defense and its planning. We also appreciate the complexity of
building the fiscal year 2016 budget request, and we look
forward to comments from Secretary Carter and General Dempsey
on how we can support our men and women in uniform and our
national security interests. We are pleased to recognize Dr.
Carter on his first appearance before the subcommittee in his
capacity as Secretary of Defense. Mr. Secretary, we look
forward to working with you.
Secretary Carter. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. I also want to recognize that this will be
General Dempsey's final appearance before the Defense
Subcommittee as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General
Dempsey, you have served with distinction since 2011, and this
committee is grateful for your contributions. We will miss your
valuable insight when your term comes to an end in October.
prepared statement
The committee also welcomes Mr. Mike McCord, the
Undersecretary of Defense and the Chief Financial Officer for
the Department. I am confident that Mr. McCord will provide the
committee with useful information as the subcommittee
formulates the 2016 Defense budget. Thank you for appearing
before us this morning. Your full statements will, of course,
be included in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran
Today our Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations reviews the budget
request the Department of Defense. We are pleased to welcome: Secretary
of Defense, Ash Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Martin E. Dempsey, United States Army.
This is our final scheduled hearing on the fiscal year 2016 defense
budget request. This Subcommittee recognizes the uncertainty of the
current fiscal environment and the impact it has on the Department of
Defense and its planning. We also appreciate the complexity of building
the fiscal year 2016 budget request and look forward to comments from
Secretary Carter and General Dempsey on how we can support our men and
women in uniform and our national security interests.
We are pleased to recognize Dr. Ash Carter on his first appearance
before the subcommittee in his capacity as Secretary of Defense. Mr.
Secretary, we look forward to working with you.
I also want to recognize that this will be General Dempsey's final
appearance before the Defense Subcommittee as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. General Dempsey, you have served with distinction
since your valuable insight when your term comes to an end in October.
The Committee also welcomes Mr. Mike McCord, the Under Secretary of
Defense and Chief Financial Officer, for the Department. I am confident
that Mr. McCord will provide the committee with useful information as
the subcommittee formulates the fiscal year 2016 defense budget.
Thank you for appearing before us this morning. Your full
statements will be included in the record.
Now I will turn to my friend and the Vice Chairman, Senator Durbin,
for his opening remarks. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. I will now turn to my friend and vice
chairmen of the committee, Senator Durbin, for his opening
remarks.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for being here. And, Secretary Carter, glad to see you and glad
we had a chance to chat for a minute or two. Mr. McCord, thank
you as well for being part of this. Special thanks, General
Dempsey, for your many years of service in the United States
and to the United States in terms of our national defense. You
have risen to the top rank within the White House and
Administration as Chairman of the military side of our defense,
and I appreciate all the talent that you brought to it and all
the dedication. I wish you the best wherever life takes you
with your wife, Deanie, your children, and grandchildren whom
you will now able to enjoy a lot more.
Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, it is important for
us to hear your advice on a number of pending issues. The first
is a threat of our creation called sequestration. There are
efforts within the House and Senate to increase defense
spending by using what is, in fact, a budget gimmick, namely to
shift tens of billions of dollars of funds from the base budget
over to the Overseas Contingency Operations Account. I believe
this effort is not the right way to address the problem. While
I support avoiding sequestration, Congress must address funding
shortfalls for the entire Government and do it responsibly.
Moving programs from the base bill to the war funding accounts
adds to our problems instead of fixing them. The Department of
Defense cannot operate efficiently if the U.S. Government
lurches from one fiscal crisis to another year after year, and
I want to hear from you on that subject, please.
This manufactured budget crisis comes at a time of a
quickly changing global security environment. Our military is
operating all over the globe: operations in Afghanistan and
Africa; stability in the Pacific; responding to Russian
aggression in Eastern Europe. And since last year's hearing, we
have added military operations in Iraq and Syria to a busy
military operational tempo.
There are a number of issues that I hope to get to in the
questioning: maintaining our competitiveness and innovative
edge in technology and medical research; ending what I believe
is an exploitation of servicemembers and their families by
predatory for-profit colleges; making certain that the
Department of Defense can keep track of the contractors that
are working for them. And lastly, and keeping in mind General
Dempsey's persistent admonition that job one is getting our
people right, late last week the Department reported an
estimated 20,000 servicemembers were sexually assaulted last
year. The number of individuals reporting these incidents sadly
is up. More than half of those individuals still experience
retaliation for doing so. We have to make more progress, and it
requires a strong commitment.
This is a daunting array of challenges and just a few of
the many that you face. I look forward to your testimony.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator. Secretary Carter, you
may proceed.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY ASHTON B. CARTER
Secretary Carter. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Vice
Chairman Durbin, members of the committee, thank you for
inviting me here today. And, Mr. Chairman, I want to especially
recognize the sense of civility and courtesy with which you
conduct all you do, including the leadership of this committee.
It does not go unnoticed, least of all by me, and is much
appreciated. And, Vice Chairman, I will make sure that we get
to the issues you raised both in our private conversation and
just now in the course of this, and thank you for your
leadership. And thank you all for thanking my friend and
shipmate, Marty Dempsey, for his wonderful service. I am going
to miss him.
I know all of you on this committee share the same devotion
that I do to the finest fighting force the world has ever known
and to the defense of our great country. And I hope that my
tenure as Secretary of Defense will be marked by partnership
with you on their behalf.
I am gratified that this committee, as well as the three
other Defense committees, recognize the urgent need to halt the
decline in Defense spending imposed by the Budget Control Act.
President Obama and I deeply share in that recognition. And
indeed, I want to commend you and your colleagues for both
recognizing and saying that sequestration threatens our
military readiness, the size of our war fighting forces, the
presence and capabilities of our air and naval fleets, our
future technological security, and ultimately the lives of our
men and women in uniform. The Joint Chiefs have said the same,
and they have specified the kinds of cuts that their services
would have to make if sequester returns.
Over the past 3 fiscal years, the Defense Department has
taken over three-quarters of a trillion dollars in cuts to its
future years' defense spending. The magnitude of these cuts
would stress the most capable planners and programmers. But the
stresses have been made even greater because of the frequently
sudden and unpredictable timing and nature of the cuts, as well
as continued uncertainty over sequestration. And as a result,
DOD has been forced to make a series of incremental,
inefficient decisions, often made well into a fiscal year after
prolonged continuing resolutions are finally resolved.
Moreover, even as budgets have dropped precipitously, our
forces have been responding to unexpectedly high demand from a
tumultuous world. As a result, our belief is our Defense
program is now unbalanced. We have been forced to prioritize
force structure and readiness over modernization, taking on
risks and capabilities in infrastructure that are far too
great. This is a serious problem. High demands on smaller force
structure mean the equipment and capabilities of too many
components of the military are growing too old, too fast, from
our nuclear deterrent to our tactical forces.
Meanwhile, in each of the past several years, painful, but
necessary, reforms proposed by DOD, including many significant
reforms like eliminating overhead and unneeded infrastructure,
retiring older force structure, and making reasonable
adjustments in compensation, have been denied by Congress at
the same time that sequestration looms. And we are starting to
see this double whammy once again in markups of legislation
this year. If confronted with sequestration level budgets and
continued obstacles to reform, I do not believe that we can
simply keep making incremental cuts. As I have said before, we
would have to change the shape and not just the size of our
military, significantly affecting parts of our defense
strategy.
In recent weeks, some in Congress have tried to provide DOD
with its full budget request for fiscal year 2016 by
transferring funds from the base budget into our accounts for
overseas contingency operations, or OCO, meant to fund the
incremental temporary costs of overseas conflicts in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. While this approach clearly
recognizes that the budget total we have requested is needed,
the avenue it takes is just as clearly a road to nowhere. I say
this because President Obama has already made it clear that he
will not accept a budget that locks in sequestration going
forward as this approach does, and he will not accept a budget
that severs the link between our national security and our
economic security. Legislation that implements this budget
framework will, therefore, be subject to veto.
So if we do not come together and find a different path by
fall when a budget is needed, it will put our Department and
our troops in an all too familiar and very difficult position.
We will yet again have to make very hasty and drastic decisions
to adjust to the failure to have an adequate DOD budget,
decisions that none of us wants to make. The Joint Chiefs and I
are concerned that if our congressional committees continue to
advance this idea and do not explore alternatives, then we will
be left holding the bag. That is not where I want to be in 6
months, but since the OCO funding approach is not the kind of
widely shared budget agreement that is needed, we can see now
that it will not succeed.
Moreover, the 1-year OCO approach does nothing to reduce
the deficit. It risks undermining support for a mechanism, OCO,
which is meant, as I said, to fund incremental costs of
overseas conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Most
importantly, because it does not provide a stable multiyear
budget horizon. This 1-year approach is managerially unsound
and also unfairly dispiriting to our force. Our military
personnel and their families deserve to know their future more
than just 1 year at a time. And not just them. Our defense
industry partners, too, need stability and longer-term plans,
not end-of-year crises or short-term fixes if they are to be
efficient and cutting edge as we need them to be. Last and
fundamentally, as a Nation we need to base our Defense
budgeting on our long-term military strategy, and that is not a
1-year project.
This funding approach also reflects a narrow way of looking
at our national security, one that ignores vital contributions
made by the State Department, Justice Department, Treasury
Department, Homeland Security Department, and disregards the
enduring long-term connection between our Nation's security and
many other factors, factors like scientific R&D (research and
development) to keep our technological edge, education of a
future all-volunteer military force, and the general economic
strength of our country.
Finally, I am also concerned that how we deal with the
budget is being watched by the rest of our world, by our
friends and potential foes alike. It could give a misleadingly
diminished picture of America's great strength and resolve. For
all these reasons, we need a better solution than the one now
being considered.
Two years ago, we saw members of Congress come together and
reach a 2-year budget through the Murray-Ryan bipartisan Budget
Act. Although we preferred a longer term solution to
sequestration, that deal was able to provide DOD a measure of
stability needed to plan for more than just 1 year. Today, I
hope we can come together for a longer term multiyear agreement
that provides the budget stability we need by locking in
Defense and non-Defense budget levels consistent with the
President's request.
I pledge my personal support to this effort as well as the
support of the entire staff of the Department of Defense, and I
would like to work with each of you as well as other leaders
and Members of Congress to this end. If we are successful, I am
confident we can build a force of the future that is powerful
enough to underwrite our strategy and to show resolve to
friends and potential foes alike; a force that is equipped with
bold, new technology and ideas, able to lead in cutting-edge
capabilities in cyber and space; a force that is lean and
efficient throughout the enterprise, that continues to attract
and inspire new generations of Americans to contribute to this
great mission. That is the vision for the force of the future I
have been pursuing since I took office 11 weeks ago, and I hope
to continue doing so in partnership with all of you.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman, this a time for coming together and problem
solving, which we have come to know well from members of this
committee. Much like in December 2013, our only choice is to
come together to find a real solution that reflects our
strength and security as a Nation. I look to this committee and
the many leaders who sit on it to help us get on the right path
out of this wilderness. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ashton B. Carter
Chairman Cochran, Vice Chairman Durbin, Members of the Committee:
thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the President's fiscal
year 2016 budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD). Oversight
is key to our system of government. I not only welcome your wisdom and
experience; I also want your partnership, and need your help.
I also want to thank Chairman Dempsey for his leadership, as well
as Deputy Secretary Work and Vice Chairman Winnefeld, in particular for
all their hard work over the past year in helping develop the budget
request we will be discussing today.
introduction and strategy
Shortly after I was sworn in 11 weeks ago, I spoke to the people of
the Department of Defense--military, civilian, and contractor--and told
them I had three commitments as Secretary of Defense.
The first is to them and their families--to safeguard them, to
ensure that they are treated with dignity and respect, and above all to
ensure that when they are sent into harm's way, it's done with the
utmost care.
The second commitment is to the President--to offer him my best
strategic advice as he faces a complex world, to ensure at the same
time that he receives candid military advice, and to see that his
decisions are carried out with DOD's expected excellence.
And my third commitment is to the future--to ensure our military
remains the very best in an ever-changing world, amid fast-moving
technological and commercial change, and as we seek to attract new
generations to the mission of national security.
To meet those commitments, I have since traveled to Afghanistan,
Kuwait, Japan, and South Korea to meet with our troops, commanders, and
allies in those countries. I also released DOD's new cyber strategy,
launched the next phase of our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,
reaffirmed our unwavering commitment to ridding our ranks of sexual
assault, approved new U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation,
and outlined my vision for how people, technology, and innovation will
contribute to our force of the future.
Everything I have done since taking office has reaffirmed for me
that in every region of the world, in every domain--air, land, sea,
space, and in cyberspace--it is America's leadership, and America's men
and women in uniform, who stand between disorder and order--who stand
up to malicious and destabilizing actors, while standing with those who
believe in a more secure, just, and prosperous future for all our
children.
Mr. Chairman, this committee and this Congress will determine
whether our troops can continue to do so--whether they can continue to
defend our Nation's interests around the world with the readiness,
capability, and excellence our Nation has grown accustomed to, and
sometimes taken for granted.
Halting and reversing the decline in defense spending imposed by
the Budget Control Act, the President's budget would give us the
resources we need to execute our Nation's defense strategy.
It would ensure we field a modern, ready force in a balanced way,
while also embracing change and reform, because asking for more
taxpayer dollars requires we hold up our end of the bargain--by
ensuring that every dollar is well-spent.
The President is proposing to increase the defense budget in fiscal
year 2016, but in line with the projection he submitted to Congress
last year in the fiscal year 2015 budget's Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP). The department is executing the plan it presented last year.
Accordingly, for fiscal year 2016, the President is proposing $534
billion for DOD's base budget and $51 billion in Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO), totaling $585 billion to sustain America's national
security and defense strategies.
The Defense Department needs your support for this budget, which is
driven by strategy, not the other way around. More specifically, it is
driven by the defense strategy identified in the 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review, which reflects the longtime, bipartisan consensus that
our military must protect the homeland, build security globally, and
project power and win decisively. We do so in line with our
longstanding tradition of maintaining a superior force with an
unmatched technological edge, working in close partnership with friends
and allies, upholding the rules-based international order, and keeping
our commitments to the people who make up the all-volunteer force.
Our defense budget's priorities line up with our strategic
priorities: sustaining America's global leadership by:
--rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region;
--maintaining a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe
and the Middle East;
--sustaining a global counterterrorism campaign;
--strengthening key alliances and partnerships; and
--prioritizing key modernization efforts.
This budget ensures we can execute our defense strategy with
manageable risk, even as it does require us to accept elevated risk in
some areas.
But--and I want to be clear about this--parts of our Nation's
defense strategy cannot be executed under sequestration, which remains
the law of the land and is set to return 148 days from today.
As I have said before, the prospect of sequestration's serious
damage to our national security and economy is tragically not a result
of an economic emergency or recession.
It is not because these budget cuts are a mathematical solution to
the Nation's overall fiscal challenge--they are not.
It is not because paths of curbing nondiscretionary spending and
reforming our tax system have been explored and exhausted--they have
not.
It is not due to a breakthrough in military technology or a new
strategic insight that somehow makes continued defense spending
unnecessary--there has been no such silver bullet.
And it is not because the world has suddenly become more peaceful--
for it is abundantly clear that it has not.
Instead, sequestration is purely the collateral damage of political
gridlock. And friends and potential enemies around the world are
watching.
We in the Department of Defense are prepared to make difficult
strategic and budgetary choices. We are also committed--more than ever
before--to finding new ways to improve the way we do business and be
more efficient and accountable in our defense spending.
But in order to ensure our military remains the world's finest
fighting force, we need to banish the clouds of fiscal uncertainty that
have obscured our plans and forced inefficient choices. We need a long-
term restoration of normal budgeting and a deal that the President can
sign, and that lives up to our responsibility of defending this country
and the global order. And that means, among other things, avoiding
sequestration.
To be sure, even under sequestration, America will remain the
world's strongest military power. But under sequestration, our
military--and our national security--would have to take on
irresponsible and unnecessary risk--risk that previous Administrations
and Congressional leaders have wisely chosen to avoid.
Sequestration would lead over time to a military that looks
fundamentally different and performs much differently than what we are
used to. Not only as Secretary of Defense, but simply as an American, I
deeply, earnestly hope we can avert that future. I am committed to
working with the members of this committee, and your colleagues
throughout the Congress to prevent it.
I know how proud you and all Americans are that we field the finest
fighting force the world has ever known. But our military superiority
was not built, and will not be sustained, by resting on our laurels. So
instead of resigning ourselves to having the diminished military that
sequestration would give us, I propose that we build the force of the
future, together.
building the force of the future
Assuming the Congress funds the President's fiscal year 2016 budget
and averts sequestration, we have the opportunity to build the force of
the future. We have inherited a long tradition of military excellence
from those who came before us, and we must preserve it for those who
will come after.
But to do so, DOD must embrace the future--and embrace change--
throughout our institution. We at the Pentagon must, as I say, think
outside our five-sided box, and be open to new ideas and new ways of
doing business that can help us operate more efficiently and perform
more effectively in an increasingly dynamic and competitive
environment.
What DOD Needs To Do
As DOD counters the very real dangers we face in the world, we will
also grab hold of the bright opportunities before us--opportunities to
be more competitive and re-forge our Nation's military and defense
establishment into a future force that harnesses and develops the
latest, cutting-edge technology, and that remains superior to any
potential adversary; one that is efficient and accountable to the
taxpayers who support it; and one that competes and succeeds in
attracting the next generation of talented Americans to fill its ranks.
These are the three main pillars on which DOD will build the force
of the future.
Competitiveness through Technological and Operational
Superiority
As other nations pursue comprehensive military modernization
programs and develop technologies designed to blunt our military's
traditional advantages, the first pillar of our future force must be
ensuring that we maintain--and extend--our technological edge over any
potential adversary.
The President's fiscal year 2016 budget includes targeted
investments in modernized space, cyber, and missile defense
capabilities geared toward countering emerging threats that could upend
our technological superiority and our ability to project power. DOD
would look forward to providing a full account of our proposed
modernization investments, and the threats that compel them, in a
classified setting.
The budget also supports the Defense Innovation Initiative, which
will help ensure the military continues to ride the leading edge of
innovation, and makes deferred modernization investments that will
ensure America's nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective.
Across all these efforts, we must be open to global, commercial
technology as well, and learn from advances in the private sector.
That's why, less than two weeks ago at Stanford University, I outlined
some first steps we are taking to be more open, rebuild bridges, and
renew trust between the Pentagon and the tech community--such as
establishing a DOD branch of the U.S. Digital Service, creating a new
Defense Innovation Unit (Experimental) to be located in Silicon Valley,
expanding and improving the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows
Program, and developing a pilot project with the independent, non-
profit startup backer In-Q-Tel to provide innovative solutions to our
most challenging problems.
Because we know that technology alone--however advanced--cannot
sustain our military's superiority, just as important is a ruthless
focus on operational excellence. This means using our existing forces
and capabilities in new, creative, and fiscally prudent ways to achieve
our objectives. This also means working to develop more innovative and
effective strategic and military options for the President, introducing
a new and more rapidly responsive global force management model,
developing new operational concepts, and reforming and updating all our
operational plans.
Competitiveness through Accountability & Efficiency
The second pillar of building the force of the future requires
redoubling our efforts to make DOD more accountable and efficient. We
live in a competitive world and need to be a competitive organization.
If we don't lean ourselves out and maintain our fighting weight, we
have no business asking our fellow citizens for more resources.
As I made clear in my confirmation hearing, I cannot suggest
greater support and stability for the defense budget without at the
same time frankly noting that not every defense dollar is always spent
as well as it should be.
American taxpayers rightly have trouble comprehending--let alone
supporting--the defense budget when they read of cost overruns,
insufficient accounting and accountability, needless overhead, and the
like.
If we're asking taxpayers to not only give us half a trillion of
their hard-earned dollars, but also give us more than we got last year,
we have to demonstrate that we can be responsible with it. We must do
all we can to spend their money more wisely and more responsibly. We
must reduce overhead, and we must curb wasteful spending practices
wherever they are.
DOD has sought to continuously improve our acquisition processes
over the past 5 years, and I am proud myself to have been a part of
that effort. Today, I am recommitting the Defense Department to working
both with Congress, and on our own, to find new and more creative ways
of stretching our defense dollars to give our troops the weapons and
equipment they need.
The department's Better Buying Power initiative is now on its third
iteration since I established it in 2010, with Better Buying Power 3.0
focused on achieving dominant capabilities through technical
excellence. I know well and very much appreciate the strong support for
acquisition reform demonstrated by members of both the Senate and
House, and I share their deep desire to achieve real, lasting results
that benefit both America's security and taxpayers.
DOD is working closely with Senate and House Armed Services
committee members and staff on ways to eliminate some of the burdensome
and duplicative administrative requirements levied on our program
managers. To that end, the President's fiscal year 2016 budget
submission includes a number of legislative proposals designed to help
streamline the program oversight process. We look forward to continuing
our close partnership with Congress to see these measures implemented.
As we sustain our focus on acquisition reform, I believe that DOD
must concurrently undertake a wholesale review of our business
practices and management systems.
Our goal is to identify where we can further reduce the cost of
doing business to free up funding for readiness and modernization--
ensuring that our energy, focus, and resources are devoted to
supporting our frontline operations as much as possible.
We intend to work closely with industry partners--who execute or
enable many of our programs, logistics, training, administrative, and
other functions--throughout this process, both to explore how they
could help us accomplish our missions at reduced cost, and because they
may have new and innovative ideas worth considering.
Additionally, the Defense Department is pursuing creative force
structure changes to be more agile and efficient--such as how we're
modernizing our cruisers and restructuring Army aviation. We've
established a new Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency. And four previous
rounds of efficiency and budget reduction initiatives have yielded
approximately $78 billion in projected and actual savings in fiscal
year 2016, helping to cushion our defense programs from successive
years of budget cuts.
We're also working hard to cut unnecessary overhead: from reducing
management headquarters budgets by 20 percent across the department, to
divesting excess bases and infrastructure.
When DOD recently requested a round of domestic Base Realignment
and Closure, Congress asked that we first pursue efficiencies in
Europe. We did. DOD has approved and is pursuing a broad European
Infrastructure Consolidation--which will result in some $500 million in
annual recurring savings. We now need a round of domestic BRAC
beginning in fiscal year 2017 to address excess infrastructure here at
home.
Simply put, we have more bases in more places than we need. We
estimate DOD has about 25 percent more infrastructure capacity than
necessary. We must be permitted to divest surplus infrastructure as we
reduce and renew force structure. With projected recurring savings from
a new BRAC round totaling some $2 billion a year, it would be
irresponsible to cut tooth without also cutting tail.
For base communities in question, it's important to remember that
BRAC is often an opportunity to be seized. Communities have shown that
BRAC is ultimately what you make of it, and there are plenty of places
that have emerged from it stronger than they were before.
Consider Lawrence, Indiana, which took advantage of Fort Harrison's
closure in 1996 to create an enterprise zone, community college,
recreational facilities, and commercial sites that in just 7 years not
only replaced 100 percent of the jobs lost when the base closed, but
created even more.
Charleston, South Carolina stepped up when the Charleston Naval
Complex closed in 1993, and now is home to more than 80 new industrial
and Federal agency tenants. The former naval base is now producing
millions of dollars' worth of goods that are exported to Europe,
Africa, and the Middle East.
And at former Mather Air Force Base in Sacramento County,
California, the local redevelopment effort has invested $400 million
and created more than 6,500 jobs--over six times the number of jobs
lost when the base closed in 1993. It's now home to scores of
businesses, a mixture of private companies, government agencies, and
non-profit organizations.
These are just a few examples of what can happen when local
leaders, communities, and businesses work together and take advantage
of the opportunities for new jobs and new growth after BRAC.
One more point on accountability: Whether we're improving
acquisition or closing bases, it is not enough to simply tell taxpayers
that we're spending their dollars responsibly. We have to also show
them, which is why good cost accounting and financial auditability is
so important to me.
DOD has made significant progress over the past 5 years in adding
more discipline to our business environment, but there is much work
left to be done, and we remain fully committed to our audit goals.
Today, over 90 percent of DOD's current year, general fund
budgetary resources are under some form of financial audit, with the
Army, Navy, and Air Force now under audit and following the model
employed by the Marine Corps.
We plan to submit every corner of DOD to this kind of audit regimen
beginning in fiscal year 2016. With this foundation, the department
will progressively expand the scope of these audits until all our
organizations, funds, and financial statements will be under audit in
fiscal year 2018. I intend to do everything I can--including holding
people to account--to get this done.
Competitiveness through Attracting Future Talent
Third, but no less important, DOD must be competitive when it comes
to attracting new generations of talented and dedicated Americans to
our calling of defending the Nation.
We know how the attacks of September 11th, 2001 motivated so many
Americans to want to be part of this noble endeavor. Going forward, we
must ensure our future force can continue to recruit the finest young
men and women our country has to offer--military and civilian--like
those who serve today.
As we do this, we must be mindful that the next generation expects
jobs that give them purpose, meaning, and dignity. They want to be able
to make real contributions, have their voices heard, and gain valuable
and transferable experience. We must shape the kind of force they want
to be in. The battle for talent will demand enlightened and agile
leaders, new training schemes, new educational opportunities, and new
compensation approaches.
DOD is already pursuing several initiatives that will help ensure
the military is a compelling career option and improve how we recruit,
retain, and transition both current and future generations of talented
Americans. In recent years, we've been expanding pilot programs that
facilitate breaks in service that let our people gain diverse work
experience. We've tailored our transition assistance program,
Transition GPS, to better prepare servicemembers to enter the civilian
workforce--providing different tracks for those who want to go to
college, those who want skills training, and those who want to be
entrepreneurs. And we've put a renewed focus on military ethics and
professionalism, as well as making sure our military health system is
held to the same high-quality standards we expect from the
servicemembers and military family members under its care.
And we're going to keep doing more, because we have to compete if
we're going to succeed. As I recently told students at my former high
school in Abington, Pennsylvania, today's young Americans are a great
fit for the U.S. military and a great fit for what we do, but because
our mission is so important and since our people are at the heart of
it, we're exploring new ideas that will make us an even better fit for
new generations like theirs. For example, we're looking at ways to
increase the permeability of the wall between the government and young
people working in the private sector, so we can bring in more highly-
skilled people in areas like cyber. We're looking at how we can provide
personnel with more flexibility and choice in their careers, and
improve how we evaluate and promote people based on performance and
merit. And we're making sure that we prepare our people to think
through their next steps after military service from the day they
arrive here, so that they're all primed for success in whatever they
decide to do next.
Because we know how important it is--both for today's
servicemembers and the generation that will follow them--we're also
deeply committed to creating an environment and culture where we live
the values we defend and every servicemember is treated with the
dignity and respect they deserve.
That's why we're continuing to expand combat positions available to
women--because everyone who's able and willing to serve their country
should have full and equal opportunity to do so.
It's why we're striving to eliminate sexual assault from the
military--because as I recently told local ROTC cadets and midshipmen
at Georgetown University and some of our sexual assault first
responders at Fort Myer, no man or woman who serves in the United
States military should ever be sexually assaulted.
And it's why we've been making sure gay and lesbian servicemembers
can serve openly, and that their families receive the benefits their
loved ones have earned.
But for everything we're doing, DOD cannot build the force of the
future by ourselves. We need Congress's help.
What We Need Congress To Do
Since our current defense budget drawdown began several years ago,
I've observed something of a phenomenon here in Washington.
Along with our troops, their families, and our defense civilians, I
thank our supporters on Capitol Hill, including most members of this
committee, who have joined with us in trying to do everything possible
to get Congress to prevent more mindless cuts to our defense budget.
Unfortunately, these combined efforts have been unsuccessful in
actually restoring adequate and predictable resources for DOD. We have
had to endure deep cuts to readiness, weather pay freezes and civilian
furloughs, and cut badly needed investments in modernization and
critical technologies. At the same time, Congress has sometimes sought
to protect programs that DOD has argued are no longer needed, or
require significant reform.
We have had the worst of both worlds--a double whammy of mindless
sequestration coupled with inability to reform.
As many of you know, it wasn't always this way.
During the defense drawdown after the Cold War, DOD had much more
flexibility thanks to the help of Congress. For example, we were able
to resize the Army, retire the A-6 Intruder and many other weapons
systems, and implement multiple BRAC rounds, which freed up dollars we
re-allocated to keep our force structure ready, capable, and deployable
around the world.
I know some of the changes and reforms we're proposing may feel
like a significant change from how we currently do business. But if
anyone can understand how the dots connect and how we need Congress's
help to be able to defend our country, our allies, and our interests in
an increasingly dangerous world, it's you--the members of this
committee.
The fact is, if we're not able to implement the changes and reforms
we need, we will be forced to make painful tradeoffs, even at the
higher topline the President is requesting. We will lose further ground
on modernization and readiness--leaving tomorrow's force less capable
and leaving our Nation less secure. And we will face significant
hurdles to executing our Nation's defense strategy. That's why we need
your help.
the president's fiscal year 2016 budget
As we do every year when formulating our budget, this budget seeks
to balance readiness, capability, and size--because we must ensure
that, whatever the size of our force, we have the resources to provide
every servicemember with the right training, the right equipment, the
right compensation, and the right quality of fellow troops. That is the
only way we can ensure our military is fully prepared to accomplish its
missions.
Almost two-thirds of DOD's fiscal year 2016 base budget--$348.4
billion--funds our day-to-day expenses, similar to what a business
would call its operating budget. This covers, among other expenses, the
cost of fuel, spare parts, logistics support, maintenance, service
contracts, and administration. It also includes pay and benefits for
military and civilian personnel, which by themselves comprise nearly
half of our total budget.
The remaining third of our base budget--$185.9 billion--comprises
investments in future defense needs, much like a business' capital
improvement budget. It pays for the research, development, testing,
evaluation, and ultimately acquisition of the weapons, equipment, and
facilities that our servicemembers need.
Broken down differently, our base budget includes the following
categories:
--Military pay and benefits (including healthcare and retirement
benefits)--$169 billion, or about 32 percent of the base
budget.
--Civilian pay and benefits--$79 billion, or about 15 percent of the
base budget.
--Other operating costs--$105 billion, or about 20 percent of the
base budget.
--Acquisition and other investments (Procurement; research,
development, testing, and evaluation; and new facilities
construction)--$181 billion, or about 34 percent of the base
budget.
Modernization
What makes this budget different is the focus it puts, more so than
any other over the last decade, on new funding for modernization. After
years of war, which required the deferral of longer-term modernization
investments, this budget puts renewed emphasis on preparing for future
threats--especially threats that challenge our military's power
projection capabilities.
Threats to Power Projection and our Technological Edge
Being able to project power anywhere across the globe by rapidly
surging aircraft, ships, troops, and supplies lies at the core of our
defense strategy and what the American people have come to expect of
their military. It guarantees that when an acute crisis erupts anywhere
in the world, America can provide aid when disaster strikes, reinforce
our allies when they are threatened, and protect our citizens and
interests globally. It also assures freedom of navigation and
overflight, and allows global commerce to flow freely.
For decades, U.S. global power projection has relied on the ships,
planes, submarines, bases, aircraft carriers, satellites, networks, and
other advanced capabilities that comprise our military's unrivaled
technological edge. But today that superiority is being challenged in
unprecedented ways.
Advanced military technologies, from rockets and drones to chemical
and biological capabilities, have found their way into the arsenals of
both non-state actors as well as previously less capable militaries.
And other nations--among them Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea--
have been pursuing long-term, comprehensive military modernization
programs to close the technology gap that has long existed between them
and the United States.
These modernization programs are developing and fielding advanced
aircraft, submarines, and both longer-range and more accurate ballistic
and cruise missiles. They're developing new and advanced anti-ship and
anti-air missiles, as well as new counter-space, cyber, electronic
warfare, undersea, and air attack capabilities. In some areas, we see
levels of new weapons development that we haven't seen since the mid-
1980s, near the peak of the Soviet Union's surge in Cold War defense
spending.
Targeted Investments in the President's Budget
One of the reasons we are asking for more money this year than last
year is to reverse recent under-investment in new weapons systems by
making targeted investments to help us stay ahead of emerging threats--
adding substantial funding for space control and launch capabilities,
missile defense, cyber, and advanced sensors, communications, and
munitions--all of which are critical for power projection in contested
environments. The $70 billion we're requesting for research and
development is essential to help build the world's most advanced
fighters and bombers, develop new phased arrays for radar, and produce
the satellites, missiles, and ships that let us strike terrorists in
the Middle East and underwrite stability in the Asia-Pacific.
The budget also makes significant investments in the resilience and
survivability of our infrastructure and forces, particularly in the
western Pacific, with improved active defenses such as our Patriot and
AEGIS systems, as well as selective hardening of key installations and
facilities.
DOD is also addressing the erosion of U.S. technological
superiority with the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII). The DII is an
ambitious department-wide effort to identify and invest in innovative
ways to sustain and advance America's military dominance for the 21st
century.
The DII will identify, develop, and field breakthrough technologies
and systems through a new Long-Range Research & Development Planning
Program, and the President's budget supports this effort through
specific investments in promising new technologies and capabilities
such as high-speed strike weapons, advanced aeronautics, rail guns, and
high energy lasers. The DII also involves the development of innovative
operational concepts that would help us use our current capabilities in
new and creative ways--like adapting our Tomahawk missiles to be used
against moving targets in a maritime environment, or using smart
projectiles that can be fired from many of our existing land- and ship-
based artillery guns to defeat incoming missiles at much lower cost per
round. The ultimate aim is to help craft `offset strategies' that
maximize our strengths and exploit the weaknesses of potential
adversaries.
Our budget is also making focused and sustained investments in
modernization and manning across the nuclear enterprise, even as we
reduce the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. nuclear
posture. These investments are critical for ensuring the continued
safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, as well
as the long-term health of the force that supports our nuclear triad,
particularly after recent troubling lapses in parts of DOD's nuclear
enterprise. To help fund improvements across the nuclear enterprise, we
are requesting an increase of approximately $1 billion in fiscal year
2016, and about $8 billion over the FYDP.
Readiness
DOD must rebuild and recover after more than 13 years of
uninterrupted war. But our effort to do so has been frustrated by two
variables, both of which are out of our hands--one, the continued high
operational tempo and high demand for our forces, and two, the
uncertainty surrounding annual appropriations.
Only over the last couple of years has readiness begun to recover
from the strains of over a decade of war, exacerbated by sequestration
in 2013. Nevertheless, readiness remains at troubling levels across the
force.
While our forward-deployed forces remain ready, our surge forces at
home are not as ready as they need to be. The President's budget
therefore invests in near-term unit readiness by adjusting service end-
strength ramps to reduce personnel turbulence and stress on the force,
while increasing funding to improve home station training and training-
related infrastructure.
This past year has demonstrated that our military must be ready to
fight more than just the last war. We have to be prepared across all
domains--air, land, sea, space, and in cyberspace--to engage in both
low- and high-end missions and conflicts, as well as in the shadowy,
so-called `hybrid warfare' space in between.
While this budget submission's requested and projected funding
levels will enable the military to continue making steady progress
toward full-spectrum combat readiness, the gains we've recently made
are fragile. Sustaining them to provide for ready and capable forces
will require both time and a stable flow of resources, which is why,
even under the budget we're requesting, the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps won't all reach their readiness goals until 2020, and the Air
Force won't do so until 2023.
Army:
For fiscal year 2016, the Army's base budget of $126.5 billion
supports an end-strength of 1,015,000 soldiers--475,000 soldiers on
active duty, 342,000 soldiers in the Army National Guard, and 198,000
soldiers in the Army Reserve--comprising 57 total force brigade combat
teams and associated enablers. The budget also supports 19 brigade-
level training rotations at the Army's Combat Training Centers, which
are critical to the Army's efforts to reach full-spectrum combat
readiness.
While the Army's postwar end-strength target remains a force of
approximately 450,000 active-duty soldiers, 335,000 Army National Guard
soldiers and 195,000 Army Reserve soldiers, this year's budget slows
the drawdown rate. Rather than planning to reduce the active-duty force
by 20,000 soldiers and the National Guard by 14,000 soldiers in fiscal
year 2016, the Army will instead plan to reduce by 15,000 active-duty
soldiers and 8,000 Guardsmen, while still maintaining its schedule for
reducing unit structure. This will help mitigate personnel turbulence
and stress, while also improving unit manning as the Army approaches
its target size.
The Army's budget for fiscal year 2016 also includes $4.5 billion
for Army helicopter modernization. Specifically:
--UH-60M Black Hawk: We are requesting $1.6 billion to support buying
94 multi-mission helicopters in fiscal year 2016, and $6.1
billion for 301 helicopters over the FYDP.
--AH-64E Apache: We are requesting $1.4 billion to support
development and purchase of 64 attack helicopters in fiscal
year 2016, and $6.2 billion for 303 helicopters over the FYDP.
--CH-47F Chinook: We are requesting $1.1 billion to support
development and purchase of 39 cargo helicopters in fiscal year
2016, and $3.2 billion for 95 helicopters over the FYDP.
--UH-72 Lakota: We are requesting $187 million in fiscal year 2016 to
support the final buy of 28 light utility helicopters.
These investments require difficult trade-offs given today's
constrained fiscal environment. That is why the Army is resubmitting
the Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative, which makes the most
efficient use of taxpayer dollars by retiring outdated airframes and
streamlining the Army's helicopter fleet so that platforms can be
modernized and allocated where they are needed most.
As you know, I am committed to reviewing the Army's Aviation
Restructure Initiative. However, the Army believes that fully
implementing the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI), which includes
shifting National Guard Apaches to active-duty units while providing
Guard units with Black Hawks, is prudent for several reasons.
For one, Apaches are in high demand at high levels of readiness
that would require Guard units manning them to mobilize at
unprecedentedly high rates; or alternatively, for the Army to spend a
total of approximately $4.4 billion to fully equip the Guard's Apache
battalions, and then $350 million per year to maintain them at those
high levels of readiness. Meanwhile, Black Hawks are more suitable for
Guard missions here at home. Whether homeland defense, disaster relief,
support to civil authorities, or complementing our active-duty
military, these missions tend to demand transport and medical
capabilities more than the attack capabilities of Apaches. In sum, the
initiative avoids approximately $12 billion in costs through fiscal
year 2035 and saves over $1 billion annually starting in fiscal year
2020. Considering these figures, implementing the Aviation Restructure
Initiative is not only in the best warfighting interest of the Army,
but also in the interest of the taxpayers who fund it.
I know this is a contentious issue. However, we believe the ARI is
the least cost, best solution for the Army's aviation enterprise. DOD
looks forward to making its case to the National Commission on the
Future of the Army established by the 2015 National Defense
Authorization Act.
Navy & Marine Corps:
The Navy and Marine Corps are allocated $161 billion for fiscal
year 2016, supporting a 282-ship fleet in 2016 and a 304-ship fleet by
fiscal year 2020 with a return to 11 aircraft carriers, 386,600 active-
duty and Reserve sailors, and 222,900 active-duty and Reserve Marines.
The President's budget invests $16.6 billion in shipbuilding for
fiscal year 2016, and $95.9 billion over the FYDP. The budget protects
critical Navy and Marine Corps investments in undersea, surface,
amphibious, and airborne capabilities--all of which are critical for
addressing emerging threats. Specifically:
--Submarines: We are requesting $5.7 billion for fiscal year 2016,
and $30.9 billion over the FYDP, to support buying two
Virginia-class attack submarines a year through fiscal year
2020. We are also requesting $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2016,
and $10.5 billion over the FYDP, to support the replacement for
the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine.
--DDG-51 Guided Missile Destroyers: We are requesting $3.4 billion
for fiscal year 2016, and $18.5 billion over the FYDP, to
support the continued development and procurement of two DDG-51
destroyers a year through fiscal year 2020.
--Aircraft Carriers: The President's budget plan enables us to
support 11 carrier strike groups. We are requesting $678
million in fiscal year 2016, and $3.9 billion over the FYDP, to
support the refueling and overhaul of the USS George
Washington. We are also requesting $2.8 billion in fiscal year
2016, and $12.5 billion over the FYDP, to support completion of
the Gerald Ford, fourth-year construction of the John F.
Kennedy , and long-lead items for CVN-80, Enterprise.
--Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and Small Surface Combatants: We are
requesting $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2016, and $9.4 billion
over the FYDP, to support development and procurement of 14
littoral combat ships over the FYDP--including three LCS in
fiscal year 2016. We are also requesting $55 million in fiscal
year 2016, and $762.8 million over the FYDP, to support
capability improvements to the survivability and lethality of
the LCS required for the Navy to modify it into a small surface
combatant.
--Fleet Replenishment Oiler: We are requesting $674 million to
support buying one new fleet replenishment oiler, the TAO(X),
in fiscal year 2016--part of a $2.4 billion request to buy four
of them over the FYDP.
--Amphibious Transport Docks: We are requesting $668 million in
fiscal year 2016 to finish buying one San Antonio-class
amphibious transport dock.
--F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter: The Department of the Navy
is procuring two F-35 variants, the Navy carrier-based F-35C
and the Marine Corps short-take-off-and-vertical-landing F-35B.
The Navy and Marine Corps are requesting $3.1 billion in fiscal
year 2016 to support procurement of 13 aircraft--nine F-35Bs
and four F-35Cs--and aircraft modifications and initial spares,
and $20.9 billion over the FYDP to support procurement of 121
aircraft and aircraft modifications and initial spares.
--Patrol and Airborne Early Warning Aircraft: We are requesting $3.4
billion in fiscal year 2016, and $10.1 billion over the FYDP,
to support continued development and procurement of 47 P-8A
Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft through fiscal year 2020. We
are also requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2016, and $6.1
billion over the FYDP, to support buying 24 E-2D Hawkeye
airborne early warning aircraft through fiscal year 2020.
Making these investments while also abiding by fiscal prudence, we
had to make more difficult trade-offs. For that reason, we are
resubmitting our request to place some of the Navy's cruisers and an
amphibious landing ship--12 ships in total, including 11 cruisers--into
a phased modernization program that will provide them with enhanced
capability and a longer lifespan. Given that our cruisers are the most
capable ships for controlling the air defenses of a carrier strike
group, and in light of anti-ship missile capabilities being pursued by
other nations, this modernization program will, over the next decade
and a half, be a baseline requirement for sustaining both our cruiser
fleet and 11 carrier strike groups through 2045.
I acknowledge and appreciate the plan put forward in the omnibus
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, which
helps us get to our goal, and which we have begun to implement.
However, this plan is more expensive, and results in shorter ship life.
Considering that our plan is critical for our power projection
capabilities, we believe it should be implemented in full, and look
forward to working with the Congress as we move forward.
Air Force:
The Air Force is allocated a base budget of $152.9 billion for
fiscal year 2016, supporting a force of 491,700 active-duty, Guard, and
Reserve airmen, 49 tactical fighter squadrons, 96 operational bombers
out of a total 154-aircraft bomber fleet, and a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent that includes 450 intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
The Air Force's budget reflects DOD's decision to protect
modernization funding for advanced capabilities and platforms most
relevant to both present and emerging threats--in this case, fifth-
generation fighters, long-range bombers, and mid-air refueling aircraft
to assure our air superiority and global reach; both manned and
remotely-piloted aircraft to help meet Combatant Commanders' needs for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and research and
development to ensure continued and competitive space launch
capabilities. Specifically:
--F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter: We are requesting $6
billion to support buying 44 aircraft, aircraft modifications,
and initial spares in fiscal year 2016, and $33.5 billion to
support buying 272 aircraft, modifications, and spares over the
FYDP.
--KC-46A Pegasus Refueling Tanker: We are requesting $2.4 billion to
buy 12 aircraft in fiscal year 2016, and $14.6 billion to buy
72 aircraft over the FYDP.
--Long-Range Strike Bomber: We are requesting $1.2 billion for
research and development in fiscal year 2016, and $13.9 billion
over the FYDP.
--Remotely-Piloted Aircraft: We are requesting $904 million to
support buying 29 MQ-9A Reapers in fiscal year 2016, and $4.8
billion to support buying 77 of them over the FYDP. This
investment is critical to ensuring the Air Force has enough
around-the-clock permissive ISR combat air patrols--in this
case, allowing us to increase from 55 to 60--to meet increased
battlefield demands.
--Competitive Space Launch: This budget supports year-over-year
increases in competitive space launches--going up from two in
fiscal year 2015 to three in fiscal year 2016, and further
increasing to four competitive launches in fiscal year 2017.
The budget also supports investments to mitigate DOD reliance
on the RD-180 space engine that powers the Atlas V Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle rockets.
--Combat Rescue Helicopter: We are requesting $156 million in fiscal
year 2016 for the Air Force's next-generation combat rescue
helicopter--part of a total $1.6 billion request over the FYDP
for research, development, testing, and evaluation--and
requesting $717 million over the FYDP for procurement.
In light of high demand coupled with Congressional consultations,
the Air Force budget reflects DOD's decision to slow the retirement
timelines for three key ISR and battle management platforms.
We chose to defer the retirement of the U-2 Dragon Lady
reconnaissance aircraft until fiscal year 2019, when planned sensor
upgrades to the RQ-4 Global Hawk will combine with other capabilities
to mitigate the loss of the U-2. We chose to delay the previously
planned retirement of seven E-3 Sentry AWACS until fiscal year 2019, so
they can support air operations over Iraq and Syria. And we chose to
delay retirement of any E-8 JSTARS through fiscal year 2020, pending
final approval of the Air Force's acquisition strategy for its
replacement.
The Air Force budget also supports a timeline that would phase out
and retire the A-10 in fiscal year 2019. With the gradual retirement of
the A-10 that we're proposing, the Air Force will better support legacy
fleet readiness and the planned schedule for standing up the F-35A by
filling in some of the overall fighter maintenance personnel shortfalls
with trained and qualified personnel from the retiring A-10 squadrons.
As you know, F-35 maintainer demand has already required the Air
Force to use the authority Congress provided last year to move some A-
10s into back-up aircraft inventory status. I should note that the Air
Force is doing so only to the extent that it absolutely must, and so
far intends to move fewer A-10s into this status than what Congress has
authorized. I know this is an important issue, and DOD looks forward to
working with you on it.
Defense-Wide:
The remaining share of our base budget--about $94 billion--is
allocated across the Department of Defense. This includes funding for
cyber, U.S. Special Operations Command, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, the Defense Health Agency, the Joint Staff, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, and missile defense.
For fiscal year 2016, a $9.6 billion total investment in missile
defense helps protect the U.S. homeland, deployed forces, and our
allies and partners. This includes $8.1 billion for the Missile Defense
Agency, $1.6 billion of which will help ensure the reliability of U.S.
ground-based interceptors, which are currently sited at Fort Greely,
Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The budget also
continues to support the President's timeline for implementing the
European Phased Adaptive Approach.
Overseas Contingency Operations:
Separate from DOD's base budget, we are also requesting $50.9
billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for fiscal
year 2016. This represents a 21 percent decrease from last year's $64.2
billion in OCO funding, continuing OCO's decline since 2010, while also
reflecting continued operational demands on U.S. forces around the
world. OCO comprises funding for:
--Afghanistan and Other Operations: We are requesting $42.5 billion
to support Operation Freedom's Sentinel and other missions.
This includes $7.8 billion for reset and retrograde of U.S.
equipment from Afghanistan, as well as $3.8 billion for
training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces
through our ongoing train-advise-and-assist mission.
--Counter-ISIL Operations: We are requesting $5.3 billion to support
Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes $1.3 billion for
training and equipping Iraqi forces, including Kurdish forces,
and the vetted moderate Syrian opposition.
--Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund: Reflecting the vital role that
our allies and partners play in countering terrorism that could
threaten U.S. citizens, we are requesting $2.1 billion for the
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund that President Obama
established last year.
--NATO Reassurance: We are requesting $789 million for the European
Reassurance Initiative, which the President created last year
to help reassure our NATO allies and reinforce our Article V
commitment in light of Russia's violations of Ukrainian
sovereignty.
The conclusion of major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
has resulted in a 73 percent drop in DOD's OCO costs from their $187-
billion peak in fiscal year 2008.
We are continuing to use OCO as appropriate to finance our
military's response to unforeseen crises, but we must also account for
those enduring priorities that we do not envision going away--such as
supporting our Afghan partners, countering terrorism, maintaining a
strong forward presence in the Middle East, and ensuring our military
is ready to respond to a wide range of potential crises.
The Administration intends to transition OCO's enduring costs to
the base budget between fiscal years 2017 and 2020. We will do this
over time, and in a way that protects our defense strategy--including
DOD's abilities to deter aggression, maintain crisis-ready forces, and
project power across the globe. This transition, however, will not be
possible unless the threat of sequestration has been removed.
Having financed the costs of key military activities--such as
counterterrorism operations and our Middle East posture--outside the
base budget for 14 years, and knowing that the security situation in
the Middle East remains volatile, it will take time to determine which
OCO costs are most likely to be enduring, and which are not. But we
will release a plan later this year, which will also address how we
will budget for uncertainty surrounding unforeseen future crises, and
implications for DOD's budget.
compensation
The choices we face about military compensation are vexing,
critically important, and closely followed, so I want to be direct and
upfront with you.
When our troops go into battle--risking their lives--we owe to
them, and their families, not only adequate pay and compensation, but
also the right investments--in the right people, the right training,
and the right weapons and equipment--so that they can accomplish their
missions and come home safely.
To meet all of these obligations at once, we have to balance how we
allocate our dollars. It would be irresponsible to prioritize
compensation, force size, equipment, or training in isolation, only to
put our servicemembers' lives at unacceptable risk in battle.
For the President's fiscal year 2016 budget, the Defense Department
considered its compensation proposals very carefully, as well as those
approved by Congress in the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.
Accordingly, this budget again proposes modest adjustments to shift
funds from compensation into readiness, capability, and force
structure, so that our people can continue executing their missions
with continued excellence.
As you know, last week President Obama informed the Congress of his
Administration's positions on the recommendations released by the
Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission. The
Department of Defense commends the commission for its 18-month
independent review of the military retirement and compensation programs
administered both inside and outside DOD. Their work confirmed many
positive changes that we're making to uphold our commitments to our
people, and also pointed out areas where we can do better.
As I testified before Congress in March, many of the commission's
proposals would significantly affect our servicemembers and their
families, and DOD owes them, President Obama, and the country our
utmost diligence and most rigorous analysis. And over the past 3
months, DOD has conducted a rapid yet comprehensive review of the
commission's recommendations, working closely with both the commission
and our interagency partners to adopt or refine the specific proposals
where possible.
We are now prepared to support specific proposals for 10 of the
commission's 15 recommendations, and, given the complexities of four
others, we will continue to conduct analysis and work with the
commission over the next few months. In some instances, the Defense
Department is already taking steps to implement these first 10
recommendations, but in areas that will require legislative changes to
do so, we will work quickly to submit proposed legislative language to
Congress as soon as possible.
However, while we agree with the commission that reforms to the
military healthcare system are needed, we also believe that the TRICARE
proposals in President Obama's fiscal year 2016 budget serve as a good
first step by offering servicemembers, military families, and retirees
greater choice and control over their healthcare decisions. DOD looks
forward to working with the commission, our interagency partners, and
interested members of Congress over the course of this year as we
develop additional reform proposals to be considered for the
President's fiscal year 2017 budget.
DOD will continue to work closely with the Congress and the
commission to achieve the goals we share: ensuring the long-term
strength and vitality of our all-volunteer force, and honoring all our
servicemembers--past, present, and future.
impact of sequestration
At the end of 2013, policymakers came together on a bipartisan
basis to partially reverse sequestration and pay for higher
discretionary funding levels with long-term reforms. We've seen how
that bipartisan agreement has allowed us to invest in areas ranging
from research and manufacturing to strengthening our military. We've
also seen the positive impact on our economy, with a more responsible
and orderly budget process helping contribute to the fastest job growth
since the late 1990s.
The President's budget builds on this progress by reversing
sequestration, paid for with a balanced mix of commonsense spending
cuts and tax loophole closures, while also proposing additional deficit
reduction that would put debt on a downward path as a share of the
economy. The President has also made clear that he will not accept a
budget that locks in sequestration going forward.
As the Joint Chiefs and others have outlined, and as I will detail
in this testimony, sequestration would damage our national security,
ultimately resulting in a military that is too small and insufficiently
equipped to fully implement our defense strategy. This would reflect
poorly on America's global leadership, which has been the one critical
but defining constant in a turbulent and dangerous world. In fact, even
the threat of sequestration has had real effects.
You don't need me to tell you that the President has said he will
not accept a budget that severs the vital link between our national and
economic security. Why? Because the strength of our Nation depends on
the strength of our economy, and a strong military depends on a strong
educational system, thriving private-sector businesses, and innovative
research. And because that principle--matching defense increases with
non-defense increases dollar-for-dollar--was a basic condition of the
bipartisan agreement we got in 2013, the President sees no reason why
we shouldn't uphold those same principles in any agreement now.
In recent weeks, some in Congress have tried to provide DOD with
its full budget request for fiscal year 2016 by transferring funds from
the base budget into our accounts for Overseas Contingency Operations,
or OCO. While this approach clearly recognizes that the budget total
we've requested is needed, the avenue it takes is just as clearly a
road to nowhere. I say this because President Obama has already made
clear that he won't accept a budget that locks in sequestration going
forward, and he won't accept a budget that severs the vital link
between our national security and economic security. Legislation that
implements this budget framework will therefore be subject to veto. So
if we don't come together and find a different path by fall when a new
budget is needed, it would put our department and our troops in a very
difficult position. We will yet again have to make some very hasty and
drastic decisions--decisions that none of us want to be made. The Joint
Chiefs and I are concerned that if our Congressional committees
continue to advance this idea and don't explore alternatives, then
we'll all be left holding the bag.
That's not where I want to be in 6 months, but since the OCO
funding approach is not the kind of widely-shared agreement needed, we
can see now that it won't succeed.
Moreover, the 1 year OCO approach does nothing to reduce the
deficit. It risks undermining support for a mechanism--OCO--meant to
fund incremental costs of overseas conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
elsewhere. Most importantly, because it doesn't provide a stable,
multi-year budget horizon, it is managerially unsound, and also
unfairly dispiriting to our force. Our military personnel and their
families deserve to know their future more than just 1 year at a time.
And not just them. Our defense industry partners, too, need stability
and longer-term plans--not end-of-year crises or short-term fixes--to
be efficient and cutting-edge. As a nation, we need to base our defense
budgeting on our long-term military strategy, and that's not a 1 year
project.
This funding approach also reflects a narrow way of looking at our
national security--one that ignores the vital contributions made by the
State, Justice, Treasury, and Homeland Security Departments, and
disregards the enduring long-term connection between our Nation's
security and many other factors. Factors like scientific R&D to keep
our technological edge, education of a future all-volunteer military
force, and the general economic strength of our country.
Finally, I'm also concerned that how we deal with the budget is
being watched by the rest of the world--by our friends and potential
foes alike. It could give a misleadingly diminished picture of
America's great strength and resolve.
The only way we're going to get out of the wilderness of
sequestration is if we work together. I therefore appeal to members of
Congress, from both parties, to start looking for ways to find a truly
bipartisan compromise. I hope they can make clear to their colleagues
that sequestration would also damage America's long-term strength,
preventing our country from making pro-growth investments in areas
ranging from basic research to early childhood education--investments
that, in the past, have helped make our military the finest fighting
force the world has ever known.
Sequestration is set to return in just under 150 days. Letting that
happen would be unwise and unsafe for our national defense, over both
the short and long term.
Short-Term Impact
DOD has had to live with uncertain budgets for the last 3 years,
continuous and sudden downward revisions of our budget plans, and even
a government closure. To continue meeting all of our mission
requirements, we've done our best to manage through these
circumstances, underfunding significant parts of our force and its
support systems. Put bluntly, we have survived, but not thrived. Our
military has made painful choices and tradeoffs among the size,
capabilities, and readiness of our joint force, and we've amassed a
number of bills that are now coming due.
That's why the department has been counting on and planning for a
budget increase of roughly $35 billion above sequestration-level caps
in fiscal year 2016. If it looks like DOD will be operating at
sequestration levels in 2016, on October 1 we will have to swiftly
begin making cuts so that we don't end up $35 billion short as we
approach year's end.
A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would affect all
aspects of the department, but not all equally.
More than one-third of the fiscal year 2016 cuts would come have to
come from Operations and Maintenance accounts, with unavoidable
reductions in readiness and our ability to shape world events in
America's interest. Let me put this more plainly: allowing
sequestration to return would deprive our troops of what they need to
accomplish their missions.
Approximately half of the cuts would have to come from the
department's modernization accounts, undermining our efforts to secure
technological superiority for U.S. forces in future conflicts. Because
there are bills that DOD absolutely must pay--such as the salaries of
our troops--many capabilities being developed to counter known threats
from highly capable adversaries would be delayed or cancelled,
deepening our Nation's vulnerabilities at a time when the world is
growing more dangerous, not less. Sequestration would put a hold on
critical programs like our Aerospace Innovation Initiative, the Next
Generation Adaptive Engine, the Ground-Based Interceptor missile
defense kill vehicle redesign, and several space control efforts.
Deferring these investments is bad policy and makes the Defense
Department less competitive for the future. What's more, it breaks
faith with the troops of today and the troops of tomorrow. And it
undermines the defense industrial base that is a critical foundation
for our national security.
Long-Term Impact
If sequestration were to persist over time, the long-term
consequences would be harder hitting. We would ultimately have a
military that looks fundamentally different, and that performs much
differently, from what our Nation is accustomed to.
If we are forced to sequestration-level budgets, I do not believe
that we can continue to make incremental cuts and maintain the same
general set of objectives as we've had in our defense strategy. I will
insist that new cuts be accompanied by a frank reassessment of our
strategic approach to addressing the threats we face around the world--
what we are asking the Armed Forces to do and to be prepared to do.
I cannot tell you right now exactly what that means--DOD is not
resigned to the return of sequestration--but I can tell you that I will
direct the department to look at all aspects of the defense budget to
determine how best to absorb these cuts. No portion of our budget can
remain inviolate.
What I will not do is let DOD continue mortgaging our future
readiness and capability. I will not send our troops into a fight with
outdated equipment, inadequate readiness, and ineffective doctrine.
Everything else is on the table.
What does that mean? We could be forced to consider pay cuts, not
just cuts in the growth of compensation. We could be forced to consider
all means of shedding excess infrastructure, not just working within
the Congressional BRAC process. We could be forced to look at
significant force structure cuts, not just trimming around the edges.
We could be forced to ask our military to do--and be prepared to do--
significantly less than what we have traditionally expected, and
required of it.
I am not afraid to ask these difficult questions, but if we are
stuck with sequestration's budget cuts over the long term, our entire
Nation will have to live with the answers.
A prolonged period of depressed defense budgets will almost
certainly mean a smaller, less capable, and less ready military. No one
can fully predict the impact on the future. But it could translate into
future conflicts that last longer, and are more costly in both lives
and dollars.
That may sound severe to some, but it is a fact, and history should
be our guide when we think about the true cost of sequestration.
The Case for Repealing Sequestration
I know I'm preaching to the choir here. If sequestration could have
been reversed by just this committee and its counterpart in the House,
it probably would have happened years ago. So I offer the following to
Members of the Committee about what you can remind your colleagues when
you ask for their vote to repeal sequestration:
Remind them that even after the increase we're asking for, DOD's
budget as a share of total Federal spending will still be at a near-
historic low--a quarter of what it was during the Korean War, a third
of what it was during the Vietnam War, and half of what it was during
the Reagan buildup.
Remind them that the increased funding is for modernization that's
critical to keeping our military's technological edge and staying ahead
of potential adversaries.
Remind them that DOD has hands-on leadership from the very top--
me--devoted to using taxpayer dollars better than they've been used in
the past. You have my personal commitment to greater accountability,
greater efficiency, and running this department better and leaner than
before.
Remind them that sequestration's cuts to long-term investments will
likely make those investments more costly down the line. All who bemoan
unnecessary Pentagon program delays and the associated cost overruns
should know that sequestration will only make these problems worse. I
can easily sympathize with my non-defense counterparts in this regard;
knowing how wasteful and inefficient sequestration would be at DOD, I
have no doubt the same is true at other departments and agencies as
well.
Remind them that sequestration's impact on our domestic budget will
cause further long-term damage to our defense--because the strength of
our Nation depends on the strength of our economy, and a strong
military needs strong schools to provide the best people, strong
businesses to provide the best weapons and equipment, and strong
science and research sectors to provide the best new innovations and
technologies.
Remind them that we can't keep kicking this can down the road. The
more we prolong tough decisions, the more difficult and more costly
they will be later on.
conclusion
The men and women of the Department of Defense are counting on
Congress to help assure the strength of our military and American
global leadership at a time of great change in the world.
We must reverse the decline in defense budgets to execute our
strategy and fund a modern, ready, leaner force in a balanced way. We
must seize the opportunity to enact necessary reforms in how we do
business. And we must bring an end to the threat sequestration poses to
the future of our force and American credibility around the world.
As you evaluate the President's budget submission, I encourage you
and your colleagues to keep it in perspective.
In the years since the President's fiscal year 2012 budget
request--the benchmark for cuts prescribed under the 2011 Budget
Control Act--DOD's 10-year budget projections have absorbed more than
$750 billion in cuts, or more than three-quarters of the trillion-
dollar cuts that would be required should sequestration be allowed to
run its course. And while some claim this is our biggest budget ever,
the fact is, as a share of total Federal spending, DOD's fiscal year
2016 budget is at a near-historic low--representing about 14 percent of
total Federal discretionary and non-discretionary outlays. DOD's total
budget remains more than $100 billion below what it was at the height
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I think we can all agree that the world in 2014 was even more
complicated than we could have foreseen. Given today's security
environment--which has over 200,000 American servicemembers stationed
in over 130 countries conducting nearly 60 named operations--our
proposed increase in defense spending over last year's budget is a
responsible, prudent approach.
Some of you may recall how, in 1991, after America's Cold War
victory and amid doubts about America's engagement with the world and
calls for a bigger domestic peace dividend, a bipartisan group in
Congress stepped forward to help shape America' global leadership and
make long-term decisions from which we continue to benefit.
Senators Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar helped craft, pass, and pay for
the small Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that allowed the United
States and DOD to provide the funding and expertise to help former
Soviet states decommission their nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapon stockpiles.
The Nunn-Lugar program was initially opposed abroad, and there were
also doubts at the Pentagon about whether we could implement it without
losing track of funding. I know. I helped lead the program in its early
years. But with slow and diligent effort by American defense officials,
the Congress, and our foreign partners, it worked.
It helped prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the
wrong hands. It helped establish a pattern of international cooperation
and global norms in the post-Cold War international order. And, in the
light of the current instability in Ukraine, it might have staved off
several variants of nuclear disaster.
But it also set an important precedent for our work on this budget
and in the years ahead. It shows what Congressional conviction--
especially when it is bipartisan--can accomplish in foreign policy. It
shows the value of foresight and planning for an uncertain future. And
it shows how spending a relatively few dollars today can generate huge
value down the line.
As the new Secretary of Defense, I hope it will be possible to
again unite behind what our great Nation should do to protect our
people and make a better world, and provide our magnificent men and
women of the Department of Defense--who make up the greatest fighting
force the world has ever known--what they deserve.
Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I noticed in the
submission that we have before us this morning, you have
created or proposed to create a new defense innovation unit, a
point-of-partnership so-called, apparently to be led by a
civilian with a military deputy and staffed with an elite team
of Active Duty, Reserve, and civilian personnel. It sounds like
an ambitious undertaking and may be complicated. And there is
the suggestion that the team will look for breakthroughs in
emerging technologies.
I wonder if you could let us know how much do you think
this is going to cost and how long will it take to have--be up
and running?
Secretary Carter. I surely can provide you with the costs,
and I will do so.
[The information follows:]
The initial cost estimate for Defense Innovation Unit Experimental
(DIUx) startup is $1.75 million in fiscal year 2015 and an estimated
$5.0 million per year thereafter. The unit was officially stood up on
July 2, 2015 in Mountain View, California.
Secretary Carter. As far as the mechanism is concerned, it
is an important effort. It is an experimental effort. This is
our so-called Defense Innovation Unit (Experimental) that I
announced the creation of about a week and a half ago. It has a
couple of things that it brings together, Mr. Chairman. One is
our need to continue to be on the cutting edge, especially the
cyber edge, represented by the Silicon Valley tech industry.
Second, our need, which I mentioned in my statement, to
continue to attract the very best to Defense, so we want to
have an open door so we are an exciting and attractive place
for the country's smartest young people to come and work, even
if they can only work for a period of time and contribute, to
come in and help us out. And third, it combines an ingredient
you mentioned, which is the use of the Reserve component, which
is a huge treasure for our Department. A lot of the reservists
are very technologically savvy, and so they, who are out there
anyway in that region, will contribute to it.
So it brings a number of ingredients together for the
future, and we are going to try it out. It does say it is an
experiment. It is not a costly experiment, but it is critical,
I think, for us to have an open avenue between us and Silicon
Valley. And by the way, this is other innovative corridors as
well. We need to be an innovative department so we stay fresh
and attractive.
Senator Cochran. Thank you. General Dempsey, I would ask
you if you would like to make your opening statement. You may
proceed at this point.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, U.S. ARMY,
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman and Vice Chairman
Durbin, distinguished members of this committee. Thanks very
much at the outset for the very kind words about my service. It
has been a rare privilege to hold this position and to be able
to represent the millions of men and women and their families
who serve around the world. And thank you to this committee for
your support through those years.
So this is my hearing. I thank you for the opportunity, and
if it turns that it is not, then I suppose until we meet again.
On that note, I would like you to know that I fully support
the selection or the nominations of General Joe Dunford as the
19th chairman and of General Paul Selva as the vice chairman.
They will serve with distinction. You can count on them. You
can trust them, which I think is the right word, to provide you
timely, pragmatic, and effective military advice.
I would just like to reiterate something that I have said
in the previous hearings for this fiscal year, which is that
the global security environment is as uncertain as I have seen
in 40 years of service. And we are at a point where our global
aspirations are exceeding our available resources. We have
heard the Congress of the United States loud and clear that we
have to become more efficient, and we have to do the rigorous
strategic thinking to determine the minimum essential
requirements that we believe--that is to say, the uniform
military--are essential to protect our national interests
across the globe.
We think that President's budget 2016 is the answer to that
latter point, which is the minimum essential requirements. In
my judgment, this budget represents a responsible combination
of capability, capacity, and readiness. But we are at the
bottom edge of our manageable risk in achieving and fulfilling
our national security strategy as it is currently designed.
Funding lower than President's budget 2016 and lacking the
flexibility to make the internal reforms that we believe we
need to make will put us in a position where we will have to
change our national security strategy.
For the past--and let me describe what kind of change you
might see--for the past 25 years, the United States military
has secured the global commons. We have deterred our
adversaries, we have reassured our allies, and we have
responded to crises and conflict primarily by maintaining our
presence forward or abroad. It has been our strategy to shape
the future in the international security environment by our
forward presence and by building relationships with regional
partners.
In general terms, about one-third of the force is forward
deployed, one-third has just returned, and one-third is getting
ready to go. This, as you know, puts a significant strain on
the men and women in uniform, but we have kept the Nation safe
by following that paradigm. Sequestration would fundamentally
and significantly change the way we deploy the force, and in so
doing, affect the way we can shape the security environment. We
will probably be almost 20 percent smaller from where we
started when I became the chairman.
And our forward presence will be reduced by more than a
third. We will have less influence, and we will be less
responsive. Conflict will take longer to resolve and will be
more costly in terms of dollars and casualties in an age when
we are less certain about what will happen next, but certain
that it will happen more quickly. We will be further away and
less ready than we need to be. Simply stated, sequestration
will result in a dramatic change to how we protect our Nation
and how we promote our national security interests.
Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, our men and
women in uniform are performing around the globe with
extraordinary courage, character, and professionalism. It seems
to me that we owe them and their families clarity and,
importantly, predictability on everything from policy to
compensation, healthcare, equipment, training, and readiness.
Settling down the uncertainty that we have experienced over the
past 4 years, and our decisionmaking processes, and getting us
out of the 1-year-at-a-time cycle that we have been in will
help us keep the right people in our all-volunteer force. And
that, after all, is our decisive edge. And we will be able to
maintain the military that the American people deserve, and,
frankly, I think they expect.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I am grateful for the continued opportunity to support our
men and women in uniform, and I promise I will run through the
tape, as we say, in the time remaining and make myself
available at any time to help you shape the policy and fiscal
decisions ahead of you. Again, I thank you, the Congress of the
United States, and the members of this committee for your
support.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Martin E. Dempsey
Chairman Cochran, Vice Chairman Durbin, members of this Committee,
it is my privilege to report to you on the state of America's Armed
Forces, the changes in the global security environment, and the
opportunities and challenges ahead.
I am exceptionally honored to represent the men and women of our
Armed Forces. Those who defend this Nation and the families who support
them remain our most valuable national treasure and our competitive
advantage. Deeply experienced from 14 years of continuous deployments
in harm's way, our All-Volunteer Force has been adaptable and resilient
beyond expectation. Our men and women in uniform have performed around
the globe with extraordinary courage, character, and professionalism. I
am grateful for the continued support they receive from this
distinguished body and from the American people.
What makes America's Armed Forces who we are is our ability to
provide options to the national command authority and our elected
leaders to keep our Nation safe from coercion. The American people and
our Allies expect that of us.
Our military remains strong today. However, with threats
proliferating, resources declining, and sequestration just months away,
our ability to assure our allies is in question and our advantages over
our adversaries are shrinking. This is a major strategic challenge
affecting not only our military, but ultimately, America's leadership
in the global world order.
With your support, we can--and we must--sustain our military's
decisive edge by prioritizing investments in readiness, training,
modernization, and leader development. We must make the tough, but
necessary choices in our strategy, our structure, and our resources for
our Nation's future. Our men and women in uniform and the American
people are trusting us to get it right.
joint force operations
It has been an extraordinarily busy time for America's military.
During the past 12 months, the men and women of our Joint Force have
been on point around the world. They have maintained our enduring
global commitments, bolstered long-term partnerships, and responded to
new threats.
Over the past year, the Joint Force continued to support the Afghan
National Security Forces through the first democratic transfer of power
in Afghanistan's history. My regular visits to Afghanistan reinforce
just how much our coalition and Afghan partners have accomplished
together over 13 years of significant investment. The end of 2014
marked the completion of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) mission. While Afghanistan is headed in the right direction
towards a fully-functioning inclusive government, the path is neither a
straight line, nor is it short. Moving forward with NATO's Resolute
Support mission, our remaining force of about 10,000 troops will assist
our Afghan partners in strengthening the Afghan institutions, systems,
and processes that will support long-term security and stability--
ultimately giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed on their
own.
At the same time, the force has maintained pressure on Al Qaeda,
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and other violent
extremist groups both directly and through our partners where U.S. and
allied interests are threatened. We have reinforced our commitment to
our NATO allies in Europe in the face of Russian aggression. We have
helped to address urgent humanitarian crises such as the Yazidi
refugees trapped on Mount Sinjar and the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.
We have maintained an active presence in the South and East China Seas,
while remaining prepared to respond to provocations on the Korean
Peninsula. And we have campaigned against sources of instability in
Africa and in Latin America.
We have also postured with our interagency partners to reinforce
security to our homeland--to include providing ballistic missile
defense, countering persistent threats of terrorism, and improving our
defenses against cyber-attack on government networks and critical
infrastructure.
In the near term, we will sustain--in some cases adjust--these
commitments around the globe to protect our national security
interests. And, while our global mission requirements have decidedly
gone up, we will manage all of these demands with constrained
resources. Consequently, we will have to assume higher risk in some
areas to create opportunity in others.
the changing security environment
Our understanding of the security environment carries important
consequences for our Nation and for our military. It drives our
strategy and budget, shapes the size, structure, and capability of the
force, and affects where and when we send America's sons and daughters
into harm's way.
Last year, I stated that the global security environment is as
fluid and complex as we have ever seen. That has certainly played out
over the past 12 months. We have seen significant shifts in an already
complex strategic landscape--increasingly capable non-state actors who
are taking advantage of the internal conflict within Islam and the
reemergence of states with the capability and potentially the intent to
constrain us. This is increasing the strain on the international order.
In what I often term the ``heavyweight'' category, Russia's
coercive and destabilizing actions have threatened NATO's eastern
flank. Russia is investing deeply in advancing their capabilities
across the board, especially in Anti-Access Area-Denial (A2AD) and
cyberspace. Meanwhile, China is also fielding new defense platforms at
a startling pace. In almost everything we do globally, we must consider
the second- and third-order effects on our relationships with Russia
and China.
In the ``middleweight'' category, Iran seeks to be a hegemon in the
Middle East. Beyond Iran's nuclear aspirations, as one of the world's
leading exporter of arms, Iran employs surrogates and proxies in many
places across the globe. Iran is also becoming increasingly more active
in cyberspace. We have significant interests in the region that would
not be well-served should Iran achieve their purposes.
North Korea is the other ``middleweight.'' Cyclical provocations by
North Korea have increased the risk of potential miscalculation. We
must use all instruments of national power to ensure North Korea does
not achieve its intentions. We have a large stake in maintaining
stability on the Korean Peninsula and supporting our Republic of Korea
ally.
We are also seeing power in the international system shifting below
and beyond the nation-state, particularly across the network of radical
movements that use terrorism as a tactic. This network extends across
an already unstable Middle East and North Africa, vis-a-vis the complex
situations we have seen unfold over the last year in Libya, Gaza, Iraq,
Syria, Nigeria, and Yemen. Within the trans-regional terror network, we
have seen ISIL gain prominence in Iraq and Syria, while inspiring
existing radical franchises like Al Qaeda affiliates and Boko Haram to
rebrand themselves into an even more aggressive ideology. That is what
makes this movement so dangerous.
With our partners, we must keep relentless pressure across the
entire network with our full suite of capabilities to include
intelligence, building partners, and in some cases, direct action. At
the same time, we must be careful not to fixate on a single group, nor
paint these violent extremist groups all with one brush. We have to
apply the right mix of tools of national power at the right time, over
the right length of time, in order to make a difference. Even more
challenging is keeping pressure on a network that adapts and
metastasizes. Overmatch in size and technology matters, but the rate in
which we can innovate and adapt relative to these non-state actors
matters more. This is a generational challenge.
Running north and south in our own hemisphere, the well-financed
transnational organized criminal network is growing extraordinarily
capable. Beyond a drug trafficking network, it is capable of moving
anything from arms and unaccompanied children to terrorists and weapons
of mass destruction. This network deserves more attention not just
because of its effect on the social fabric of our country, but because
of the effect it could have--and is having--on the security of our
Nation.
In cyberspace, our adversaries have become increasingly more
capable, attempting to level the playing field in this critical domain.
While we have expanded authorities and capabilities to defend our
military networks, critical civilian infrastructure and private sector
companies are an Achilles' heel in our Nation's security. Together, we
must reconcile these issues. To this end, cybersecurity legislation
that facilitates information sharing and encourages public-private
partnerships is required to ensure our continued security and
prosperity. Staying ahead of our adversaries in the cyber domain will
require a concerted effort of the whole Nation.
Across the board, as the international order trends towards
instability, strategic risk trends higher. And, while our potential
adversaries grow substantially stronger, most of our allies are growing
more dependent on sustained U.S. assistance. I believe these trends
will continue.
We must bring to bear every tool of national power in America's
arsenal in coordination to address these emerging trends. Likewise,
deepening relationships of trust with our allies and building the
capacity of our partners to be more self-sustaining will be even more
vital in the years ahead.
preparing the joint force
Within the context of the rapidly evolving security landscape, the
Joint Force of the future will require exceptional agility in how we
shape, prepare, and posture. Here are my five guideposts to sustain and
improve the force:
The All-Volunteer Force (AVF)
Our competitive advantage is our people and their adaptability. I
firmly believe that our Nation needs a professional All-Volunteer Force
(AVF). The AVF is the right force for this Nation and the Nation should
never take it for granted. Conversely, the force has earned the trust
and confidence of the American people and must renew that contract
daily.
As part of strengthening the AVF, the Joint Chiefs and I are
committed to offer everyone in uniform equal professional opportunities
to contribute their talent. We are removing the legacy gender-based
barriers to service that no longer make sense. The Services are
progressing through validation of occupational standards and are on
target to recommend final decisions to integrate remaining closed
positions or any exceptions to policy by the end of the year.
To keep the AVF on a viable path, getting our personnel costs in
balance is a strategic imperative. Ultimately, we need to make sure
that we can continue to recruit, retain, equip, and train the best
fighting force on the planet and fairly compensate America's best for
their service.
We owe our men and women some clarity--and importantly,
predictability--on everything from policy to compensation, healthcare,
equipment, training, and readiness. Frankly, right now we are not
delivering. Settling down uncertainty in our decisionmaking processes
will help keep the right people in the Service. To this end, I want to
continue working with Congress to address the growing imbalances in our
accounts in a sensible, holistic way that preserves the All-Volunteer
Force well into the future.
As such, we are looking closely at the recommendations of the
Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission. We are
pleased that the commission supported our request to grandfather any
changes to retirement pay for those currently serving and retirees. And
we will continue to place a premium on efforts that support wounded
warriors and mental health.
We will also keep working with the Department of Veterans Affairs,
other agencies, veteran service organizations, and communities across
the country to make sure those who are transitioning home and
reintegrating into civilian life have access to healthcare, quality
education opportunities, and meaningful employment. This especially
includes those with enduring mental and physical challenges. I
appreciate Congress for recently passing legislation to improve the
access of veterans to mental health and suicide prevention services.
This remarkable generation is not done serving. As such, earlier
this year, the Joint Chiefs and I signed a Call to Continued Service
letter that will go to all transitioning service members, encouraging
them to keep serving the Nation in their communities. Our collective
effort to enable our veterans and their families to continue
contributing their strengths is a direct investment in the future of
America.
Preserving Jointness
Our military has become more integrated operationally and
organizationally across the Services and across the Active, Guard, and
Reserve components, especially over the past decade. However, the
institution tends to work like a rubber band--if you stretch it and
then release it, it will return to its normal form and shape. This is
especially true in a resource-constrained environment. This tension
comes at a time when our ability to win together through jointness is
at its peak. The Joint Chiefs and I are committed to preserving the
strength we have gained as a more seamless force. We are likewise
committed to preserving the vital relationships with our interagency
partners.
Additionally, across the Services, we are resetting how we train
and develop our forces for conflict across the spectrum. For the past
decade, the Joint Force primarily focused on counterinsurgency centered
in the Middle East. As we work to institutionalize the lessons of our
recent wars--for example, by establishing building partnership capacity
as a competency of the entire force, not just Special Forces--we are
also working to restore balance and strategic depth in our
capabilities. This includes those critical conventional areas that were
deemphasized over the past decade by necessity.
Concurrently, we are adapting how we engage and posture around the
world in ways that are more dynamic, more strategic, and more
sustainable. We are reevaluating how we employ our assets around the
globe to better identify opportunities that generate the greatest
advantages. And, we are developing new approaches across and within
commands in how we assign, allocate, and apportion forces inside a
broader interagency construct.
We are also adapting our learning institutions to maximize the
diverse talent of our men and women and to better cultivate agile
thinkers for a global Joint Force. Within our Joint Professional
Military Education (JPME) programs, we are mapping desired strategic
leader attributes to the curriculum to ensure we are delivering them.
And, we are undergoing an integrated, Department-wide effort to
identify and invest in innovative ways to reverse the erosion of U.S.
technological superiority--ensuring that our military remains dominant
now and in the future. We are seeking innovation not only in
technology, but also in leader development, wargaming, operational
concepts, and business processes.
The Defense Industrial Base
Our Nation cannot sustain the world's finest military without also
sustaining the world's strongest and most innovative defense industrial
base (DIB).
An enduring source of strategic advantage, we count on the defense
industry to be able to research, develop, produce, deliver, and
maintain the world-class weapons systems on which our military has long
relied.
I remain concerned that an unstable budget environment will promise
long-term damage to critical segments of the DIB, most significantly in
the small businesses that support our Nation's defense. Furthermore,
sequester-level cuts will lead to a hollow DIB that no longer holds all
of the critical design and manufacturing capabilities our military
needs.
A strong, efficient, and technologically vibrant defense industry
is fundamental to securing our Nation's defense.
Our Allies
Our alliances remain paramount to our own security. We are far more
effective when we have a global network of capable partners with shared
values. Our Allies and partners provide vital basing and access, offer
complementary military capabilities, and help shape outcomes towards a
common purpose. Improving partner capability and capacity in targeted
ways is an important component of our military strategy.
We are continuing the rebalance to the Asia Pacific as part of our
government's larger priority effort to foster stability and growth in
that region. We have old and new partners in the Asia Pacific and we
will continue to develop our relationships, engage more at every level,
and shift assets to the region, over time.
Europe remains a central pillar to our national security and
prosperity. NATO has the capability and must sustain the will to
address the threats to its eastern and southern flanks. In the near
term, we will continue to reassure allies and improve NATO's readiness.
Over the long term, we will adapt our strategies and structures to meet
new realities. NATO is and will remain the most important and most
capable alliance in history.
In every theater, we must guard against a slow erosion of our
alliances and be careful not to shunt the steady work required to
sustain these ties. Remaining the security partner of choice increases
our Nation's collective ability to safeguard common interests and
support greater stability in weaker areas of the world.
The Profession
Rekindling our understanding and our resolve as a profession
continues to be one of my foremost priorities as Chairman. On and off
the battlefield, we must always be good stewards of the special trust
and confidence gifted to us by our fellow citizens. We owe it to the
American people and to ourselves to look introspectively at whether we
are holding true to the bedrock values and standards of our profession.
The vast majority of our force serves honorably with moral courage
and distinction every day. But failures of leadership and ethics, and
lapses of judgment by a fraction of the force show that we still have
work to do.
We are seeing substantial progress in sexual assault prevention and
response, however, we will remain laser-focused on reinforcing a
climate where sexual assault is unacceptable, not just because it is a
crime, but because it is completely counter to our core values.
All of these issues have my ongoing and full attention. We know we
own the profession and must reinforce the enduring norms and values
that define us to continue to be a source of trust and pride for our
Nation.
resourcing our defense strategy
I stated last year that the balance between our security demands
and available resources has rarely been more delicate. The National
Security Strategy (NSS) released earlier this year addresses some of
our top concerns--the decline in military readiness, the strategic risk
that will result should sequester-level cuts return, and the need to
pursue greater integration with our Allies and partners. We need the
full proposed President's Budget (PB) for fiscal year 2016 to support
this strategy and to maintain the military the American people deserve
and expect.
PB16 reverses the decline in national defense spending of the past
5 years and helps ensure we can manage risk, meeting near-term defense
needs while preparing for the future. It represents a responsible
combination of capability, capacity, and readiness investment--leading
to a Joint Force that is global, networked, and can provide options for
the Nation. As the risks to our national security are increasing, this
budget resources the force to remain capable, ready, and appropriately
sized--able to meet today's global commitments and prepare for
tomorrow's challenges.
The Joint Chiefs and I fully support the PB16 budget. It is what we
need to remain at the lower ragged edge of manageable risk in our
ability to execute the defense strategy.
However, we have no slack, no margin left for error or strategic
surprise. And, we remain concerned that we still lack support for the
reforms necessary to ensure that the Joint Force is combat ready and
that we can preserve military options for our Nation into the future.
We need budget certainty and we need flexibility to reset the force for
the challenges we see ahead.
Congress--and the American people--challenged us to become more
efficient and to determine the minimum floor we need to be able to do
what the Nation asks us to do. PB16 is that answer. Funding lower than
PB16, especially if sequestration-level cuts return next year, combined
with a lack of flexibility to make the reforms we need, will render the
overall risk to our defense strategy unmanageable. In other words, our
Nation's current defense strategy will no longer be viable.
I ask Congress to support the entirety of this budget and end the
deep, indiscriminate cuts that sequestration will impose.
Thank you for your enduring support.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, General. We
appreciate your leadership and your statement.
I am going to recognize the ranking member, Mr. Durbin, for
any comments or statement he would wish to make.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Chairman Cochran, and I think I
was going to into the OCO issue, but I think your statements,
both of you, have been unequivocal on that particular issue. So
I would like to go an issue not of budgetary consequence, but
of great consequence nevertheless.
HUMANITARIAN SAFE ZONE
Just a few days ago, I joined with my colleagues, Senator
Tim Kaine of Virginia, Senator Lindsey Graham, and Senator John
McCain, and sent a letter to the President requesting the
administration to consider the establishment of the
humanitarian safe zone, or more than one, around Syria to allow
for the protection and medical treatment of the people of
Syria. I did that with some reluctance, realizing that it would
require a commitment by the United States for the safety of
that zone, and we discussed that yesterday.
But I have to say that though this may not be a genocide by
classic legal definition, it is the humanitarian crisis for our
time with 200 to 400,000 casualties, millions of people
displaced, and no end in sight. You were very candid in your
response yesterday, and I would appreciate it, Mr. Secretary,
if you would tell us what you think of this concept and the
challenge that it could present to us.
Secretary Carter. Sure. Thank you, Senator. You are right,
it is--what is happening in Syria is a terrible humanitarian
tragedy. It has been going on now for several years. There are
many displaced people within Syria fleeing to countries around.
We are caught between two forces or the country is caught
between two forces, both of which are contributing to this
violence against the very people of the country, namely ISIL
(Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and its like on the one
hand, and the Syrian regime on the other hand. As you know, we
are trying to create a third force to combat those two and to
create an environment in which the Syrian people can live in
peace, which they deserve.
Your question is about can we establish ourselves a
humanitarian safe zone. We did discuss that yesterday, and I
will say something about the practicalities of that. That in
concept is an area in which people--to which people could flee
and find safety. I think that was your concept. And what I was
saying to you was that we would need to, and we have thought
this through, how to secure that zone. Doing something like
that would be something that would be contested both by ISIL
forces and other--al-Nusra and others on the one hand and by
Syrian forces on the other would not necessarily be supported
by the neighbors or supported militarily in a strong way by the
neighbors, and, therefore, something we would do ourselves.
That is a combat mission and a major combat mission.
And so, the practicalities of it are significant, and that
is what I was sharing with you yesterday. Perhaps General
Dempsey would like to add something to that. But we would need
to fight to create such a space, and then fight to keep such a
space, and that is why it would--it is a difficult thing to
contemplate or challenge, to use your words.
Senator Durbin. Let me say before the General responds, and
I am anxious to hear his response. My concept is that we would
not be going it alone. My hope is that it would be done either
through the United Nations or in concert with other nations
that might join us in this effort. And I am not naive enough to
believe that ISIL is going to sign up, so we would have to be
prepared to defend the space, and I am anxious to hear the
General's response.
General Dempsey. Yes, thanks, Senator. It would not just be
ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) that would--could be a
potential challenge to the zone, but also the regime itself.
And so, the assumption--I think you are right that this, to be
practical and effective, would have to involve regional
partners.
I can tell you that militarily both at U.S. CENTCOM
(Central Command) and in conjunction with European Command and
our Turkish counterparts, we have been planning for such a
contingency for some time. The question, if you ask can we do
this, of course militarily we can do it. There would be
opportunity costs; that is to say that resources that we have
deployed elsewhere would have to be repositioned.
And I will not miss the opportunity to point out the
cognitive dissonance about talking about doing more in the
world when, in fact, we are facing losing another $250 billion
over the next 5 years. But I will say that it is military--it
is practical militarily, but it would be a significant policy
decision to do so.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
The Senator from Alabama, Mr. Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Secretary
Carter and General Dempsey. I join others in congratulating you
on your long career. It has been 41 years now since you
graduated from West Point. You have served this Nation with
honor and distinction. Thank you very much.
General Dempsey. Thank you.
SPACE LAUNCH
Senator Shelby. Secretary Carter, it is my understanding
that the Department of Defense has recommended a legislative
solution for section 1608, which would allow the use of as many
as 18 RD-180s for future space launch competitions. Is that
correct?
Secretary Carter. It is, yes.
Senator Shelby. Okay. It has also been informed that if the
DOD solution is implemented, and we hope it will be, that there
could be a minimum of 2 to 3 years' gap in assuring access to
space. Have you looked at that?
Secretary Carter. Yes.
Senator Shelby. And do you agree or disagree with that, and
how can we ensure that there is no gap there because these
programs are so important to national intelligence and a lot of
other things. Is that correct?
Secretary Carter. It absolutely is. We cannot afford to
have a gap, and just to scope out the issue as a whole, these
engines that power some of our rocket boosters that take our
satellites--national security satellites into space are
manufactured in Russia. We want to get off of that dependency
on Russia, but it takes some time to do so. And in the
meantime, we do not want to have a gap.
Therefore, our approach is to not order more, but not to
cancel the orders we have placed for the engines while we are
able to prepare competitive entrants that are not Russian into
the space lift business, so that is our strategy. And you are
absolutely right. We cannot afford to have a gap because we
need to be able to launch national security satellites.
Senator Shelby. But it is important for us to build our own
rocket in the future, is it not?
Secretary Carter. Absolutely.
Senator Shelby. But it takes time. Sometimes it is hard to
rush technology that sensitive or that----
Secretary Carter. Correct.
Senator Shelby. [continuing]. Revolutionary in a way. Is
that correct?
IRANIAN THREAT
Secretary Carter. Absolutely yes.
Senator Shelby. I will pose this next question to you and
also to General Dempsey if I can. The Iranian threat, not just
in the Middle East, but to the Persian Gulf, we all are
familiar, not as much as you two are, of what is going on in
Yemen. A lot of our allies are very nervous there, and probably
should be. And as we are negotiating or the administration is
negotiating with Iran on nuclear weapons, it seems that they
continue to supply, train, and so forth their allies all over
the area that is causing us and our allies more than
apprehension.
IRAN
So I would like your comments if you can, where you can, on
Iran. I believe Senator Durbin brought up ISIS in a sense, what
is going on there. We are fighting in a sense with Iranians
there, the Revolutionary Guard and some of them, and then in
Yemen we are on different sides. It is a contradiction. We
understand that happens sometimes. But what are our challenges
with North Korea, too, and perhaps even with Russia?
Secretary Carter. Okay.
Senator Shelby. I know that is a lot of questions.
Secretary Carter. Thank you. I will say something briefly
about some of them and ask the Chairman.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Secretary Carter. You are right that Iranian behavior is
concerning on a number of fronts and in a number of locations
both as regards to the stability of Gulf countries, freedom of
navigation, which is very important, and other things in
addition to their nuclear program, of course, which is the
concern that inspires the negotiations to which you referred. I
will say that for us in the Department of Defense, I think this
creates a continuing requirement for presence in the region,
reassurance of allies and partners in the region by
particularly Israel, but not confined to Israel, but
particularly Israel.
And also, of course, with respect to the nuclear agreement,
the President has said that he would take no deal over a bad
deal, and, therefore, we are under instruction to have a
military option, which we work hard to maintain. So those are
our responsibilities with respect to Iran.
ISIS is a continuing threat both in Iraq and Syria, and
then you see the ability of it as a movement to inspire the
lost and the radical worldwide to acts of violence, so it is
seriously concerning in both of those respects. And we are
combatting it from the air and with partners in both Iraq and
Syria, and we can go into that in substantially more detail if
you wish.
Just to touch on North Korea, North Korea's behavior in
South Korea just a couple of weeks ago continues to be
provocative. Considerable uncertainty about their future
behavior, so we need to watch it carefully. And we say that
South Korea is the place where--our slogan is we need to be
able to fight tonight. It is not a game over there. We need to
be ready every day. And so, as we talk about our budget and our
presence and so forth, one thing we cannot trim is our
deterrent in the Korean peninsula.
I have gone on long enough. We can talk Russia later
perhaps, but let me see if the Chairman wants to add anything
on those subjects. It is entirely up to you.
Senator Shelby. I think General Dempsey wants to say
something.
General Dempsey. Rather than going down the lineup card of
the threats, let me unpack really briefly. I said in my
statement that it is the most uncertain security environment
that I have experienced in 40 years, and here is why: We face
emerging threats from both state actors. You mentioned the
threat that Russia poses to Europe, the threat that Iran poses
not just in the nuclear arena, the threat of the DPRK, a rising
China, which is not yet a military threat, but if left--if that
relationship is not managed carefully--could become one. So we
have--we have state issues with state actors, and we have got a
large body of non-state actors: ISIL, al-Qaeda, other groups
that have aligned themselves. And for the first time in my
career, they are both manifesting themselves simultaneously.
This is not a time to be withdrawing from the world.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. The Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Mr. Secretary, for your eloquent testimony. Thank you, General
Dempsey, for your extraordinary service, and I think you will
obviously attribute it to the brilliant first classman who
mentored you as a plebe at West Point.
General Dempsey. How could I have forgotten, sir?
Senator Reed. Just for the record. But thank you for your
extraordinary service to the Nation and for your testimony
today.
OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS MONEY
In regard to the proposals to move OCO money around and to
do things that might help defense, you indicated previously,
General Dempsey, in testimony that there are nine lines of
operation against ISIL. The Department of Defense has two of
those lines. The other lines are agencies that would not
benefit directly or not benefit as much from this OCO maneuver.
Is that fair to say?
General Dempsey. To tell you the truth, Senator, I have not
looked at anyone's budget other than myself. But it is fair to
say--other than ours. It is fair to say that of the nine lines
of operation, two of them are military. The others are other
agencies of government.
Senator Reed. And those other agencies would be the State
Department, which is not able to ramp up their efforts. In
fact, their efforts are contracted because you have got to fill
the gap somehow or you cannot because you do not have that
expertise. Homeland Security, FBI agents deployed forward, DEA
agents deployed forward. You have got a whole strategy, which
will become unhinged even if you get the extra OCO money.
General Dempsey. Again, Senator, I do not know what the
other departments are lacking. I mean, I literally do not know.
But what I will tell you is in general terms that those kinds
of threats that you described, the threat of non-state actors
in particular, will require a whole of government approach, not
just a military approach.
Senator Reed. Let me just--you know, one example I have
seen that seems to leap out to everybody is the sophisticated
use of social media by ISIL and our response to that--certainly
the Department of Defense is responding. But without State,
without USAID, without traditional non-defense actors who have
a role in this, our response will be, as it has been to date,
unsatisfactory. That is a conclusion. You do not have to
concur, but that is my conclusion.
Mr. Secretary, you also I think made a very interesting
point not only in terms of how can you have a long-term
strategy with a short-term budget. How can you go ahead and do
things that require complementary partners in government--like
we just talked about--when they do not have the resources? But
the other point, too, is the one about how the world is
watching. And you travel to capitals. You talk to defense
ministers, et cetera. And, in fact, you are looking and you are
getting intel about our adversaries or potential adversaries.
And they are looking at us unwilling to invest and pay for
long-term national security. And they get it, I think,
unfortunately. Is that your----
Secretary Carter. That is my experience, and then, of
course, you travel as well. And among our friends it is concern
about whether we have our wits about us in terms of the danger
of the world, the responsibilities of America, and the inherent
strength of our country. And I obviously do not talk to our
potential foes, but they talk to others and say, well, see what
the Americans are doing to themselves.
Now, I think it is important to come back and say we are
still the world's greatest fighting force. We are an immensely
powerful country. We are amazingly experienced, including in
our military, in complex missions. We do take a whole of
government approach, which is necessary in the world, and so
you need to tell people that they cannot look at the
difficulties we have, and we obviously have them in terms of
reaching a budget, and conclude that America is eclipsed or
losing its power. And I hasten to add that.
At the same time, it would certainly improve our standing
were we to come together as I urged behind the future for our
budget.
Senator Reed. There is another aspect to this, too, and I
agree with you. We still remain the paramount military force in
many dimensions, but the gap is narrowing in so many areas. And
it used to be not fight tonight in Korea. It was fight this
month and we could get BCTs (brigade combat teams) there, and
we cannot do that any longer. It used to be we put aircraft up
in the air, it is going to be dominant for 10 years. That
question might not be as long now.
And a lot of the programs that are not reached by OCO or
not reached by some of these proposals are these long-term
investments in capabilities, cyber and elsewhere, that if we do
not make them now, we can keep the lights on, but that gap will
get to the point where the gap disappears. Is that fair?
Secretary Carter. That is very fair.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. The Senator from Maine, Ms. Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, General Dempsey, for your
service.
SHIPBUILDING
Mr. Secretary, twice this morning we have heard General
Dempsey say that this is the most uncertain security
environment that he has seen in his 40 years of service. It is
the Navy that allows us to project power particularly in areas
where we would otherwise be denied access in trouble spots
around the world. Yet the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan does
not include enough funding for ships to fully support the 308-
ship goal over the entire 30-year period.
We have seen the need for naval ships to be deployed. Just
last week a destroyer that was built in Bath Iron Works, which
I had the honor to christen, was deployed in response to the
Iranian naval forces firing upon and boarding a commercial
shipping vessel. At the same time, combatant commander
requirements for missile defense platforms are soaring in the
Middle East and the Asia Pacific regions as our adversaries
develop missile technology. And recently, the Office of Naval
Intelligence just last week described how China has launched
more naval ships than any other country during the past 2 years
and will do so in the next 2 years.
Mr. Secretary, I know you are well aware that ships cannot
be built overnight and that operational requirements are
increasing. What then is the Department's plan to mitigate the
risks associated with the short-falls in shipbuilding and to
preserve a robust shipbuilding industrial base?
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator. First of all, let me
say I completely agree with you. It is one of the great
strengths of our country is our ability to project power around
the world. The Navy is an important ingredient of that, and
also to ensure freedom of navigation and to dominate the naval
commons as we are able to do because of the quality as well as
the size of our fleet, and we are committed to continuing to do
that. And you are right, we cannot do that without an
industrial base that is robust.
We have, as you know full well, a vibrant and competitive
marketplace, but we need to keep that going. And I suppose
where this links up with the discussion we are having today
about the long-term budget is exactly the point you made, which
is ships, particularly ships of the quality that are made in
Bath and elsewhere for our Navy. Those are not 1-year projects.
And so, if you have a 1 year budget horizon, how are you
supposed to build over time to a Navy of the size you need? We
need that kind of horizon, and our industry partners and the
shipyards need that kind of horizon as well, and that is one of
the reasons why we are asking for that kind of planning
horizon.
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
Senator Collins. Thank you. General Breedlove, the U.S.
Commander of NATO, testified last month before the Armed
Services Committee that Russia and pro-Russian separatist
forces continue to exploit the recent ceasefire in Eastern
Ukraine to reset and reposition themselves, and that they
appear to be preparing for a fresh offensive against Ukraine's
military. He voiced his support for providing Ukraine with
offensive military hardware to deter a Russian advance. By
contrast, I recently met with German Chancellor Merkel, who
argued exactly the opposite and against providing offensive
weapons.
Could you give us your thoughts on this issue and what
factors you are considering in deciding whether or not to
provide military weapons to Ukraine, and what your assessment
is of our ability to protect those in Ukraine and the
sovereignty of that country?
Secretary Carter. First of all, General Breedlove is right.
It does appear that the Russian--clearly Russian-backed
separatists in Eastern Ukraine are preparing for another round
of military action that would be inconsistent with the Minsk
Agreement. And we are supporting the Ukrainian military, not
with offensive arms, but with defensive arms.
But I think that Chancellor Merkel is also making an
important point that need not be at variance with helping the
Ukrainian military, namely that the big influencer, if there is
anything that will influence Russian behavior, is the
combination of economic sanctions and the fall in oil prices.
That is what is punishing Russia now. And it is also true that,
since you mentioned Chancellor Merkel, is the weight of
European sanctions that matters most because they do most of
the trade with Russia.
That is why we are so intent on working with the Europeans
led by Germany, and appreciate the steadfastness of Germany in
leading those sanctions because by ourselves, we would have a
lot less pressure to apply to Russia simply because of the
volume of trade with us is less than Russia. So we need
Russia--I mean, we need Germany rather and the Europeans to
apply that kind of pressure. I cannot predict whether that will
work or not, but that is the main thing that is applying
pressure to Russia even as we try to assist the Ukrainians in
defending themselves.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. I have been advised that Senator Mikulski
has a need to be out of here by 11:30, and I was going to ask
unanimous consent that she be permitted to proceed now. Senator
Schatz will be the next Senator following her if there is no
objection. I ask unanimous consent on her behalf.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Schatz. I
need to be involved in a conference with the White House on the
Baltimore situation. First of all, I want to certainly thank
General Dempsey for his many, many, many years of service, but
Dr. Carter, we also want to thank you for coming back. You had
a pretty good life lined up for yourself, and you were willing
to come back and to serve, and we are grateful both to you and,
of course, to General Dempsey. We have heard so much from you,
and I can understand why the men and women in the military have
such not only respect for you, but such affection for you. You
have truly been a soldier's soldier, and I think your
inspirational leadership has been something that has inspired
us all.
THREATS
In terms of the testimony today, I found it enormously
sobering, and the threats that the Nation is facing and then
the threats that we are imposing upon ourselves. It seems that
we have two threats: the threats in the world that you are
sworn to defend and protect, and then there are threats that we
are self-imposing through our approach to the way we are
dealing with our money. The most stunning prospect of yet
another sequester where we all met and kind of bonded more than
2 years ago is really deeply troubling.
BUDGET
The budget that we just passed yesterday is so deeply
flawed that it will only provoke tremendous problems in this
committee, and I am deeply concerned that what we passed
yesterday, despite the best efforts of the chairman, will
result in 302(b) allocations that will only trigger more
gridlock and more confrontation. This is not something I look
forward to as the ranking member. I have such respect for the
chairman, both sides of the aisle, but we are not heading for a
good situation.
Now, there are those who say let us lift the caps on DOD,
and it is clear the compelling needs that you have presented. I
am also going to look at the domestic caps, and I will come
back to my question. But one of the most troubling things that
I heard in your testimony was that we cannot even give our
military or our civilian defense employees a 2.3 percent cost
of living increase, and that we are holding the line at 1.3 to
save a billion dollars.
Well, you had to do it, but my god, what a nickel and dime
approach to our problems. And one of your solutions--again,
this is not a criticism--is let us change the hours of the
commissaries so that our enlisted people even have less
resources to nutritious food and all the good things that come
out of the commissaries, and in some ways are becoming
nutritional settlement houses on many, many bases.
So let me get to my question. As you look at this year's
budget and then appropriations, two different things. There are
those who support the lifting of the DOD caps. How does the
Defense Department look at also the lifting of the domestic
caps? And I am reminded of what General Dempsey has said to me
several times, that out of every four people who enlist in our
military, very desirous of serving, only one is going to be
eligible because one cannot read, the other is too sick to
serve, and the third may have other mental health or addictive
problems that they cannot serve.
So out of four people who want to join our military maybe
to get out of their lives, only one is going to be eligible,
and yet this is where we are. Could you comment about what I
just said?
Secretary Carter. Two comments. First of all, thank you.
And with respect to confrontation and gridlock, I hope that we
are able to come together and get past that by the end of the
year so we do not find ourselves in the situation of
confrontation and gridlock. I earnestly hope we can do that. A
nickel and dime approach to defense, as you say, is not the
right one. We need a longer horizon than that.
Senator Mikulski. And I am not being critical of you.
Secretary Carter. I understand.
Senator Mikulski. I am being critical of ourselves.
NATIONAL SECURITY
Secretary Carter. Of all of us, and it is not a way to run
a proud Department that is protecting us. You mentioned other
departments well. The Chairman mentioned the same thing. I
mean, we are defense, but national security is bigger than
that. National security, which I have to take an interest in
and responsibility for--I think you expect me to--is bigger
than our Department and today's world because of the complexity
of the threats. So we need Homeland Security, and we need law
enforcement and other things that are not military and not in
our budget.
And then finally, you mentioned quality people for our
force. We have a magnificent force in terms of the quality of
the people we have, but that is because we are able to be
selective from a large pool of excellent young Americans who
are patriotic, and able, and want to serve. And you have got to
worry--not worry, but you need to make sure that we have future
generations that are like that. That is why education, and R&D,
and the other parts of what makes a country great in the long
run are important to national security as well. So I think we
do need to think larger about national security.
Senator Mikulski. Did you want to say something?
General Dempsey. No, I have nothing to add, Senator. Thanks
for the kind words, by the way.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. The Chair recognizes Senator Moran.
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. General
Dempsey, Secretary Carter, thank you for the opportunity to
visit with you this morning. General Dempsey, thank you for
your service. Thank you for meeting with me several months ago
at Fort Riley. I appreciate the time you extended to me, and I
value that conversation. Thank you from Kansans for having in
your background advanced degrees from the General Staff and
Command College at Fort Leavenworth. We honor your service, and
are grateful to--a grateful Nation for it. And, Mr. Secretary,
I look forward to getting better acquainted with you and
welcome the entree that you made this morning suggesting that
we do that.
ABSENCE OF SEQUESTRATION
General, let me start by asking you a question. We have had
a conversation that the theme seems to be sequestration, OCO
funding. Let me ask you, in the absence of sequestration, can
you envision any circumstance in which you would be
recommending to the Secretary, to the President, to us as
members of Congress an Army of less than 490,000 men and women
in uniform?
General Dempsey. Absolutely. I mean, the plan we have got
now even at President's budget 2016 takes the Active Army to
450,000.
Senator Moran. Let me ask--make sure you understand my
question. My question is in the absence of sequestration, the
necessity of what sequestration requires, would you otherwise
see a circumstance in which you would be recommending that
$450,000--I am sorry, 450,000 personnel to the Secretary? Is
there a scenario in which that would ever look good for the
safety and security of our country?
General Dempsey. The Chief of the Army and the Secretary
have a plan that they have put forward where they say they can
meet the national security interests at 450 Active, and they
have numbers for the Guard and Reserve, and so I have supported
them in that. But General Odierno himself would tell you that
that number would be a greater risk than a 490 Army. And it
really--the question really then, Senator, becomes, back to my
testimony about the security environment, where do we want to
maintain the kind of forward presence that we have?
If the answer to that is we want to be less forward and
more at home, we just incur risk. And so, as I said, the Chief
of Staff of the Army says he can manage the national security
strategy at 450. Anything below that he says he cannot. He will
also tell you that he would sure like to keep 490, but in the
current budget scenario, we cannot do that.
Senator Moran. Our country is safer at 490 than 450?
General Dempsey. It is almost too stark a choice, Senator,
to be honest with you. I mean, it is almost a bit like the AT&T
commercial. Bigger is better than smaller, I mean, you know, I
can see. But the Army can manage the security strategy we have
at 450, but if this body were to decide that we have the
resources to stay higher than that, I do not think you would
find any of us saying, ``No, thank you.''
CYBERSECURITY
Senator Moran. Thank you, General. Mr. Secretary, I have
been interested in cybersecurity. I appreciate your emphasis. I
know that you are out recruiting. One of the things that seems
clear to me is the opportunity. You mentioned the Reserve in
response to the chairman's question, the National Guard. One of
the things that I think those components provide in regard to
cybersecurity is personnel that have outside experience, that
have the latest technologies and advancements available to them
in their day jobs. And then they bring that to protecting our
country through the work they do then in the Guard or Reserve.
And I think you confirmed that in response to the
Chairman's question about the value of that relationship and
what the Guard and Reserve can provide in cybersecurity. Is
that true?
Secretary Carter. You are so right.
Senator Moran. Would you explain why that is important to
you?
Secretary Carter. It is important because cyber, it
pervades everything we do. None of our equipment or our plans
operate properly, just like much of the rest of society,
without the Web. And so, having the best technology embedded in
our military, defending it so that others cannot disrupt it or
exploit it, using cyber offensively as necessary and required,
these are all important parts of the future of the military.
And we have excellent people in both military and civilian
full time, but there is a great untapped, not yet fully tapped
resource, which is the one that we are talking about that I
completely agree with you, we need to tap even more, which is
our Guard and Reserve. A lot of those people are very cyber
savvy, and using them to help us in this mission is a great
resource.
Senator Moran. Mr. Secretary, this I think can be close to
a yes or no answer. In your better buying power efforts, are
you beyond the theoretical demonstration of the value of this
program, and are you ready to pursue acquisition to prove that
it works, that it is of value?
Secretary Carter. Yes. Yes.
Senator Moran. Thank you. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator. Senator Schatz is
recognized.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Secretary Carter. Thank you, General Dempsey for your service.
Secretary Carter, thank you for the visit in Hawaii, and I want
to especially acknowledge your commitment to the Asia Pacific
rebalance.
CHINA SEA
I want to address what is happening today in the South
China Sea. China is constructing artificial land in the Spratly
Islands in parts of seized territory and redrawing maritime
borders in violation of longstanding, customary, and
international law. While other countries that lay claim to the
Spratly Island have built small outposts and engaged in minor
maintenance on features they already occupy, in one less year
China has rapidly exceeded anything its neighbors have done.
China's artificial islands are expected to support
airstrips which will allow the military to land fighter jets
and surveillance aircraft, adding a military dimension to a
complex regional dispute. Admiral Locklear cautioned that these
expanded land features could eventually lead to the deployment
of long-range radars and advanced missiles. So what are we
doing to deter China's continued aggression in the South China
Sea and to reassure our partners?
Secretary Carter. Great question, and thank you for your
hospitality in Honolulu, and thanks for your interest in the
Asia Pacific strategy, which is critical to us because half of
humanity and half of the world's economy are in the Asia
Pacific theater. So we pay a lot of attention to the Middle
East and so forth, and we need to, but we can never forget that
that is the heart of things.
The Chinese behavior in the South China Sea is something
that we oppose because the militarizing of these situations and
the creation of confrontation over longstanding land disputes
is not the way to resolve problems. We make that clear to the
Chinese. Everybody makes it clear to the Chinese. I will say
one thing. That it is having the effect of--that among the
things China does, it is having the effect of increasing the
pace and depth with which our allies and partners seek out to
work with us. So in the case of the Philippines, for example,
the Filipinos want to do more with us. That is not unrelated.
And so, it is both a--that kind of behavior is both a--
demonstrates--that kind of Chinese behavior both demonstrates
the need for the rebalance in order to make sure that the
stability system of Asia remains as it has for decades, one of
peace and stability. And it is also oddly a source of further
strengthening of our partnerships and alliances in the region,
which we alone have.
Senator Schatz. Thank you. When we look at the challenges
we face from potential adversaries making investments in anti-
access aerial denial capabilities, it is clear we have got to
continue to take advantage of our technological superiority.
Investments in technology like unmanned systems play a role in
restoring conventional deterrence, but they are going to
require continued investments.
The DOD and industry have invested over one and half
billion dollars in the Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration
Program, which was stood up to mature these technologies. The
demonstration program is scheduled to conclude this month, but
extending the program could make it possible to mature these
key technologies and give us an opportunity to learn more about
future U-CLASS operations and carrier air wing integration.
Given the investment we have already made, do you feel it
would be premature to close the program now, and are there
additional tests that you think the Navy could conduct that
would further buy down the future risk?
Secretary Carter. You are absolutely right. The so-called
UCAS-D Program, which is a demonstration, has reached the end
of what it was anticipated to do. I think we are going to have
to, however, do some more research and testing not necessarily
of the same air frame for the reason you cite, namely unmanned
aircraft in the Navy are part of the future. I think we
recognize that. That is what the UCLASS Program is all about,
and we are trying to determine what the requirements will be
for the UCLASS Program going forward. And I think once those
requirements are defined, there will be a path of R&D and
demonstration that falls out of or follows from that definition
of the requirements. We have not yet and the Navy has not yet
finished that process.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you. The time of the Senator has
expired.
The Senator from Montana, Mr. Daines.
NUCLEAR TRIAD
Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Carter,
thank you for being here today. Given the increasing
instability in many parts of the world, including an
increasingly aggressive Russia, and the possibility of the
nuclear Iran, our nuclear triad is as important as it has been
since the end of the Cold War. In fact, my favorite commander
coin is from the 341st Air Wing, which says--out of Montana
which says, ``Scaring the hell out of America's enemies since
1962.''
I applaud the Administration for requesting strong funding
for modernizing our ICBM arsenal, but I have been concerned
about the President's willingness to unilaterally reduce our
arsenal. What is the Administration's outlook on the future of
our nuclear forces, and is the President committed to
maintaining a strong nuclear triad?
Secretary Carter. Yes, the President has expressed a
continuing commitment to the triad, and I think that is
important because as he has to, and I certainly support the
Nuclear Modernization Program and sustainment programs that we
are doing in partnership with the Department of Energy, the
three legs of our triad, as you mentioned, and also the command
and control that goes with the nuclear arsenal.
I know that slogan well and that unit well, but it speaks a
truth, which is that even though nuclear weapons are not in the
news every day, thank goodness, they remain the foundation of
our security. And so, we need to maintain them. We need to
modernize them, and it is important that we have the programs
and the dollars to do that.
Senator Daines. I want to pivot over to talk a little about
Afghanistan and Iraq for a moment. This is probably for
Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, and thank you, General
Dempsey. Honor to have you here this morning truly. Last month
I was in the Middle East with Leader McConnell and some other
Senators. We visited Israel. We visited Jordan. We were in Iraq
and Afghanistan. So impressed in meeting with our men and women
in uniform. I thought very highly of them having spent time
with them. It just raised my expectations. Amazing group.
But we are seeing a stark contrast between the two
countries in Iraq and Afghanistan. It seems we have lost many
of the gains that we made in Iraq, and we are at risk of doing
the same in Afghanistan if we withdraw in the wrong way. We saw
the train, assist, advise mission in Afghanistan. We see that
working well, especially going into this current fighting
season with the Taliban.
What are the commanders on the ground telling you about the
timeline for withdrawal from Afghanistan? I think we were all
glad to see the President put some in flexibility, extend the
troop level now to 2015. But what are you hearing now, and what
are your thoughts about the President's plan to draw down
virtually to zero by January 2017?
Secretary Carter. Well, first of all, thank you for going
there and visiting with our folks, and I am not surprised you
found it uplifting because I think we all do, and incredibly
proud. I will tell you my assessment, and I do not want to
speak for General Campbell, but I think what I see there is
great promise in Afghanistan that we are going to achieve the
objectives we set ourselves. And that is an enormous tribute to
our men and women who have been there these many years now.
And in addition to the performance of our own force, the
important ingredient is the performance of the Afghanistan
security forces because the whole idea here is to build them up
so that they can keep the peace in Afghanistan. That is, so to
speak, our ticket to an orderly--we will never be gone from
Afghanistan because they will be an ally--not ally, but a
security partner for a long time, but, I mean, not a big
military presence there.
The Afghanistan security forces are performing well, and a
key part of that is the fact that President Ghani and Chief
Executive Abdullah have come together in a national unity
government, and they really pay attention to their military.
They take care of them. They also, by the way, thank us for
what we have done. So I think that our strategy is paying off
in Afghanistan is my assessment.
Senator Daines. So do you think, though, the current plan
of withdrawal basically to an Embassy presence only in terms of
security in January 2017, does that put us at risk of watching
the same scenario play out in Afghanistan that we saw happen in
Iraq?
Secretary Carter. Well, I think we are all, including the
President, continually assessing progress and our plans against
that progress. The change that he made in the plan to keep the
force level up about 3 months ago is a reflection of that, and
also a reflection of the importance that Ghani and Abdullah
placed on that and their progress.
Senator Daines. And I guess lastly, probably speaking on
behalf of, again, so proud of the men and women serving over
there in that region. Can you assure us the situation on the
ground and not a political calendar is driving the decision
about withdrawing the remaining U.S. troops?
Secretary Carter. I think everybody wants success here, and
to have gotten so close, so to speak, to get to the five-yard
line and fumble the ball, nobody wants to do that, and nobody
is going to do that. I think that things are--I do not want to
be rosy about anything, but I think that we can see the kind of
success we have striven for so long ahead in Afghanistan, and I
think we are all committed to doing it.
Senator Daines. All right. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. The time of the Senator has expired. The
Senator from California, Ms. Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
to the Chairman I want to wish him the very best. I
particularly want to thank you for your intellect and your good
sense. It is a unique combination, and it is very much
appreciated, so thank you. And to our new Secretary, it is good
to see you in a new capacity. I only see you at the Aspen
Strategy Group otherwise, so it is very nice to see you here.
STEALTH BOMBER
I have got a question. I understand the inclusion of the
$1.2 billion for research and development for the long-range
stealth bomber. This would replace the B-1 and the B-52, and we
know that this is necessary. What I do not understand is the
Air Force's proposal for a new air launched nuclear capable
cruise missile.
As I understand it, for the first 5 years the development
costs are $1.8 billion, but this is only half the cost because
this particular missile will be capable of carrying a high
yield nuclear device. The Air Force missile decision is driving
a life extension program at the Department of Energy for the W-
80 warhead, which is projected to cost another $1.8 billion
over the next 5 years. This is a large expense, and it competes
for funding with our Nation's nuclear nonproliferation
programs.
I question why we need this cruise missile that can deliver
nuclear warheads from great distances in addition to the
numerous gravity bombs, submarine launch ballistic missiles,
and intercontinental ballistic missiles we have armed ourselves
with. I absolutely think it is a mistake to divert our limited
budgetary resources from a nonproliferation effort, which is
going to happen, for this purpose.
So here is the question. Why does the military believe that
this long-range stand-off nuclear missile is necessary to
maintain our nuclear deterrence?
Secretary Carter. You asked about the military. I will say
something first, but then if the Chairman wants to answer as
Chairman. The reason for advanced cruise missiles is to replace
the cruise missiles that exist now in recognition of the fact
that air defenses are improving around the world and that
keeping that capability to penetrate air defenses with our
nuclear deterrent is an important one. And you are absolutely
right, the W-80 warhead is the warhead that will go in the
advanced cruise missile, and it, too, needs work. And that work
is done by the Department of Energy, and that is paid for out
of the Department of Energy budget. And as you indicate,
nonproliferation activities are also in the Department of
Energy budget.
My hope is that we could accommodate both because I think
it is important to have--continue to have a penetrating air
breathing cruise missile for nuclear deterrence, but I also
nonproliferation is incredibly important as well.
Senator Feinstein. Yes. I chair that Energy and Water
Subcommittee, and I have watched the nuclear costs go up all
over, whether it is uranium, whether it is plutonium. Every
project starts out in the hundreds of millions and ends in the
billions, and I really question adding a nuclear cruise missile
to all of the problems we already have. I may have a very hard
voting for it. I just want you to know that. My belief is that
we have enough nuclear weapons in this country, and that they
are huge, and hopefully they will never be used. And I do not
know that the deterrent argument is met by another cruise
missile. This one is nuclear capable. It is stand-off. I do not
know the size of the warhead, but I am going to find out.
General?
General Dempsey. I will just--this will require a much more
comprehensive answer, but it is part of sustaining the triad,
and the Joint Chiefs, all of us, have rendered our advice that
the triad, in order to preserve our deterrent capability, must
be sustained, and that we should not negotiate any further
reductions until we are joined by those other nuclear capable
nations in the world. Our deterrence has worked for the past 70
years, and I would never recommend changing it unilaterally.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator. The Senator from
Missouri, Roy Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman. Secretary Carter, I
thought you were fairly cautious in overall observations about
how the rest of the government should be funded. I know that it
does reflect a lot of what you do, and I appreciated that. I
served--Senator Moran and I at least served with the
Congressman from Georgia in the House, Mac Collins, who one of
his favorite sayings was you have to fish your own cork. I have
never heard anybody else use that saying, but I understand it.
And, of course, your cork here is the Defense Department.
BUDGET
If I have my numbers right, and I would be glad for you or
Mr. McCord, either one, to correct me if I am wrong on this. I
think you requested $534 billion for defense, which last year
it was a little less than $500 billion. I believe the budget
resolution that I voted for yesterday actually gives you more
money than you requested. Do you not want more money than you
requested?
Secretary Carter. Senator, two things. First, defense is my
responsibility as you indicated. However, it is really national
security which is my responsibility, which is why I indicated I
think about things more broadly than that. I think that is
expected and necessary in today's world, so I do think more
broadly about that.
We think that the amount of money we have requested and the
manner in which we have requested it meets the national
security strategy of the United States. I will repeat something
the chairman said, which is, and the reason why we are so
insistent upon the necessity of getting through this budget
wilderness is that having gone through this herky-jerky history
over the last few years, we are on the edge of being able to
accomplish the strategy as we now have it. We have all
testified to that effect, and it is really true. So we need to
get a longer horizon.
It is not just money for this year. It is money as
requested in a multiyear budget plan. That is what we are
asking for so we do not have a one-year-at-a-time approach. You
cannot do defense or national security with a 1 year-at-a-time
approach.
Senator Blunt. Well, I voted for the budget, so I am for
national defense, and I am for looking for ways to help do that
even with the current law. And both the restriction and the
advantage of the current law is it is the law, so to look
beyond that, we do have to get somewhere else. But I think that
current law does lay out a 2 percent increase now not for this
year because we sort of averaged that out last year. But you
have asked for $534 billion, and we ought to look at that, and
I think that Congress has expressed in the joint budget
resolution a desire to give you more than that if you have a
need for more than that. And it will be interesting to see how
that discussion goes on.
In terms of what we are doing, Senator Moran asked about
the right sized force. General Dempsey, I will let you respond
to this first. We had General Grass--he and others from the
Reserves last week to talk about how the Reserve component fits
into that. One of the things that I think came out of that
discussion was a sense that as the full-time force gets
smaller, it would possibly make a lot of sense to look at the
Reserve force and the National Guard in a new way so that they
are there when you need them. Does it seem logical to you that
as the full-time force gets smaller that we would want the
Guard and Reserve to get smaller as well?
General Dempsey. Actually this is a good opportunity for me
to knit this back to what the Senator from Kansas and I spoke
about, which is my responsibility is actually the joint force,
which is to say how do all these things fit together, Army--you
know, to Senator Collins' point about the Navy. Even though I
dress like I dress, I am a big fan of the Navy, and I am a big
fan of the Army. And I think the Air Force----
Senator Blunt. It is that one day of the year you are not
such a big----
General Dempsey. Well, it is actually more than one day a
year.
We play each other frequently in other sports. But I am the
one that has to, on behalf of the Secretary and finally with
his decision, knit it all together into a joint force, and that
includes active Guard and Reserve. And in the world in which we
live, it may seem counterintuitive, but because I said in my
testimony that I cannot sit here before you and tell you
exactly what is going to happen next, but I can tell you with
certainty it will happen more quickly. We have to balance what
is in the active component because they are ready to go
tonight, and the Guard and Reserve, who do incredible work for
the Nation but have to be mobilized. Their training level has
to be increased to a certain level before they are deployed.
And if, by the way, you want to keep the Guard and Reserve
at the same expertise as an active component soldier, they are
going to cost the same thing. So this is about finding the
right balance, and I believe we have found the right balance
among active Guard and Reserve components in our President's
Budget 2016 budget submission.
Senator Blunt. Now, you mean the Guard and Reserve only
cost the same thing when they are called back--when they are
called up to active----
General Dempsey. Well, what I mean is if you want them to
be at the same state of readiness as an active component
soldier, then you have to pay them the same as an active
component soldier to keep them--to give them more drill days,
and to give them the opportunities to prepare.
Senator Blunt. Well, maybe I misstated my question because
what I was talking about was the number of the Reserves that
are ready to ramp up when they need to, not that they would be
active at all times.
General Dempsey. No, I understand, but what I am suggesting
is what we have done in this budget submission is found what we
believe to be the right number of active Guard and Reserve for
the requirements that we see coming in from combatant
commanders on a daily basis, the responses to emerging security
threats, and our war time contingency plans. So we believe we
have done exactly what you have said.
And I would also point out that the active component has
been reduced at much greater rates than the Guard and Reserve.
So the Guard and Reserve have been somewhat, if I could use the
term, ``advantaged'' in the budget process. But I think we
would be taking too much risk if we migrate too much more from
the active to the Guard and Reserve.
Senator Blunt. I am out of time. Thank you for the answer,
General, and thank you for your great service to the country.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator. Thank you. Our next
questioner is Senator John Tester, the Senator from Montana.
Senator Tester. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
welcome, Mr. Secretary, and General Dempsey, Mr. McCord, and
your support staff sitting behind you because I know how
important they are for the jobs that you guys do. I would just
say this, General Dempsey, on retirement, I do not know if
there is going to be any fly fishing in your future, but
speaking about fishing, we have got some pretty good fishing
holes up in Montana and would love to have you come up and try
it out. Thank you for your service.
It is interesting as we have just come off a conversation
on the budget, and we have got the Defense Department here, and
I cannot thank you enough for the work that you guys do in
national security. You are exactly correct. And I look at the
figure, and I know the talk around the budget, and even
though--I mean, as the activities in the Middle East, and the
Pacific, and all over the world tends to make me not want to
sleep at night, and I am sure it has a much bigger effect on
you than me. I am also concerned about the investments we are
making in this country in infrastructure, and housing, and
highways, and electric grid, and the list goes on and on and
on.
MILITARY BUDGET
And my concern is that as we look at the military budget,
you are foremost. I mean, you are up here. You have got the
most senior members on Appropriations on this committee. We
think it is very, very important. We tend to put--we tend to
put infrastructure, and affordable education, and all those
things that has made this country great, due much to the GI
Bill, I might add, in the background, and that is bothersome to
me, too. And as we look at China spending $400 billion on
infrastructure, a little over three times what they spend on
their military, we have got some problems, and I do not expect
you to solve that.
But one of the things that has also bothered me is that as
we go into places like the Middle East, we are the big dog and
we have responsibilities being the leader of the free world. I
get all that. My question is, are other countries stepping up
and helping because, quite frankly, ISIS to me is just as big a
threat in Russia, and China, and here, and Canada, and Brazil,
and India. I mean, these are bad guys.
Are other countries stepping up or do we continue putting
our young men and women on the line, and the lion's share of
the risk, and the lion's share of the money, or is it a shared
a shared endeavor because, quite frankly, I compare it to being
on the playground. As long as somebody else beats up the bully,
I sure as hell ain't going to walk up to him, you know? So talk
to me.
Secretary Carter. I have a lot of sympathy for what you
just said. We are a great country. We assume great
responsibilities. We have values that others admire and that
are worthwhile for people everywhere, and we express that
around the world, but sometimes it does feel like a lonely
mission.
You mentioned some countries, but just to take the Middle
East, for example, we need our partners in the Middle East to
step up and do more. I do not think there is any question about
that. And we say that in Syria. We say it in Iraq. And the
reason is burden sharing, if I might use that phrase, as you
say, but there is another reason as well, which is nothing
sticks if it is just done by us.
Senator Tester. That is right.
Secretary Carter. So if we are going to have peace in Iraq,
for example, and defeat ISIL, the only thing that is going to
keep them defeated is an Iraqi force. We can help, but at the
end of the day it has to be the people there. So for both those
reasons, I think what you say is terribly important.
Senator Tester. And I think it would make our military
budget go a little further if we had some of our allies
stepping up in a bigger way, too. Enough on that.
It is my understanding that the Pentagon is exploring how
to open previously closed combat missions for women and will
report those findings to Congress later this year. Where are we
at in that process?
Secretary Carter. You are absolutely right. We are opening
up to women just as many possibilities or positions as we
possibly can in the military. We are down now to a fairly
restricted, but important, category both in the Army and the
Marine Corps, and the leadership there is looking at what is
possible, what the implications are. I think from our point of
view, and I think is widely shared, we want to do as much as we
can. So, you know, the presumption ought to be that women can
serve everywhere in our military, but there may be exceptions
to that. We are still working our way through that in both the
Army and the Marine Corps, and that process is not complete
yet, but I think it is a very important evolution, and
something that, you know, very good people are, with great
dedication and determination, looking at.
Let me ask Chairman Dempsey----
General Dempsey. Well, we will have our recommendation to
the Secretary in September.
Senator Tester. Okay.
General Dempsey. And the one thing that we have done that
is important to note is we have scrutinized standards so that
we know that we have got the standards correct, and then we can
make a determination of who can meet them.
Senator Tester. To make this crystal clear, in carrying out
this Nation's combat missions, is there a valuable role and has
there been a valuable role for women in uniform?
General Dempsey. Yes.
Senator Tester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator. The time of the
Senator has expired. The Senator from Alaska, Ms. Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General
Dempsey, thank you for your service, and I will just remind you
about that big fish that is on the wall in my office, there are
more in the waters.
There is some fly fishing in Montana, but we would welcome
you at any time. But again, thank you for your service.
ARCTIC
I want to talk a little bit about the Arctic. I just came
from a meeting in my office. I had some primarily men and women
from the War College who wanted to talk about issues, and I
said, okay, if you were sitting in my chair today, what would
you ask the Secretary and General Dempsey, and without
question, it was the Arctic. Where are we in the Arctic when it
comes to U.S. investment? The general opinion is that whether
it is talking about ice breakers, or communication
infrastructure, or even wheeled vehicles that can operate in
Arctic environments, the United States may be 40 years behind,
you know, depending on how you are talking to.
I was at the Arctic Council meeting in Iqaluit last week
with Secretary Kerry, and all anybody wanted to talk about was
Russia's arctic push, and what were we going to do in that
regard. And I think we are all trying to understand exactly
what Russia is doing there. We have had plenty of Arctic
studies. Secretary Hagel completed an Arctic strategy. We have
got a few expenditures that are out there with respect to the
Arctic, but I am not aware of any comprehensive spending
strategy to address how we deal with our national security
deficiencies in the Arctic.
And I know that NORTHCOM is working on a paper to identify
some of our national security needs in the Arctic. I think it
is a little bit vague at this point in time as to whether it is
a full-fledged operations plan or whether it is simply a
planning document. I think we are beyond the time to be doing
plans, and quite honestly I am not really interested in more
studies. I think that we need to be moving forward.
So the question to you, Secretary Carter and General
Dempsey, is if this committee were inclined to give you some
meaningful guidance here on how we would move forward to
implement an Arctic national security within this bill, what do
you suggest we do, because I think we agree we have plenty of
issues from a military and from a defense and a national
security perspective up in the Arctic, but other nations are
looking at us and saying where is the United States. How do we
respond?
Secretary Carter. First of all, let me just associate
myself with the point of view you are expressing. It is going
to be a major area of importance to the United States
strategically and economically in the future. I think it is
fair to say we are late to the recognition of that, but I do
think that we have the recognition, and now you are asking what
is coming in behind the recognition.
Senator Murkowski. Right.
Secretary Carter. And that is just the right question. And
I do not want to give you an off the cuff answer, but I would
like to work with that--you obviously have a lot of expertise,
and I appreciate you going to the Arctic Council meeting. But I
think a plan that is more than aspirational is needed, and so I
would be happy to work with you to that end.
Senator Murkowski. Well, I welcome that. I think it is more
than timely. Some would suggest that we are just so far behind
on this that we have no excuses. Just to the end--to the
discussion about making sure that we maintain the forward
pressure that you have mentioned, General Dempsey. As you know,
we have had listening groups around the country, some 30
different bases that are viewed as potential candidates for
reduction-in-forces moving from the 490 to the 450. We are in a
very unique position up there in Alaska. As you know, we are at
the convergence of three different combatant commands. We have
NORTHCOM, we have PACOM, and we have the European Command. None
of those combatant commanders over the past several months as
we have been discussing with them think that it is prudent that
we see reductions-in-force strength there in Alaska between
Eielson and Wainwright.
And I guess the question to you is: Are we ensuring that we
are making a forward presence, that we are not withdrawing from
the world as Secretary Carter has said? Are people listening to
what the combatant commanders are recommending when it comes to
being prepared for the security issues that present themselves
in the High North?
General Dempsey. Yes. I am reminded of the plaque that is
under the fish in my office which says, ``If I had only kept my
mouth shut, I would not be up on this wall.''
But the answer to your question, Senator, is absolutely we
are listening. I align myself with what the Secretary said. We
really just started this about 2 years ago, and we are probably
late to the meeting, but we are hard at it. NORTHCOM has
probably the most prominent voice because they are the partners
of Canada and, as it turns out, Mexico. But, yes, we have got
some work to do.
[The information follows:]
The DOD recognizes the challenges associated with the
ongoing opening of the Arctic. We also recognize the
opportunities presented for the U.S. to work collaboratively
with Allies and partners to maintain the Arctic as a secure and
stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded,
the U.S. homeland is protected, and where nations work
cooperatively to address issues of mutual concern. Please note,
however, that we are also fully aware of Russia's ongoing
military activities along NATO's eastern and northern flanks,
and that we will continue to monitor the evolution of, and
actions associated with, Russia's force build-up within the
region.
As you are aware, the Department has several military
capabilities that may be employed in a multitude of operating
environments, including the Arctic. These capabilities were
developed, and are regularly improved, in keeping with DOD's
policy of preparing for a wide range of global contingencies.
We constantly review and assess our global defense posture and
capabilities, as well as those of our partners, friends, allies
and adversaries. These reviews and assessments occur in all
theaters, to include the Arctic, and they are performed through
the Department's routine budget and force planning processes.
We have identified many challenges associated with
operating in the Arctic, to include: shortfalls in ice and
weather reporting and forecasting; a lack of navigational aids
and accurate charts; limitations in communications due to lack
of assets and harsh environmental conditions; and a limited
inventory of ice-capable vessels and shore-based
infrastructure. We are addressing these shortfalls in a
coordinated manner by the relevant Federal departments and
agencies under the auspices of the National Strategy for the
Arctic Region and the associated Implementation Plan.
We will continue to invest in ground-based interceptors
(GBIs) in Alaska, and in the North Warning System radars and
air defense assets operating in the Arctic and northern
approaches to North America for decades. These include the
Ballistic Missile Early Warning radar at Thule Air Base, in
Greenland. We will continue our training and exercises in the
Arctic, including our participation in events such as ARCTIC
CHALLENGE, a multinational air exercise hosted by Sweden, and
COLD RESPONSE, a multinational cold weather exercise hosted by
Norway. The prepositioning arrangement between the United
States and Norway and our cost-sharing arrangement associated
with the recently transformed Marine Corps Prepositioning
Program-Norway (MCPP-N), allow us to respond quickly to crises
and contingencies in Norway and throughout the region by
providing assets to operational forces in an efficient and cost
effective manner. We will also continue our training and
exercise program in Alaska.
It will take adequate resourcing to maintain these efforts.
Additionally, any future investments in Arctic infrastructure
or activities must be weighed against investments in other
capabilities, such as resources for strategic weapons
modernization or recapitalization of the U.S. Navy's ballistic
missile submarine fleet. Ballistic missile submarines, coupled
with strategic weapons systems, represent the most survivable
leg of the strategic arsenal and provide the Nation's only
assured nuclear response capability. DOD's challenge is to
balance the risk of inadequate capabilities or insufficient
capacities appropriate for the Arctic environment with the
opportunity costs associated with making premature and/or
unnecessary investments. In recent years, this challenge has
been further complicated by the ongoing threat of sequestration
and repeated downward revisions of the Department's budget
plans.
Senator Murkowski. Well, know that we stand ready to work
with you. I would love to have further discussion about what we
really think of Russia's Arctic push and, again, have a better
strategy moving forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator. The Senator from
Vermont.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, and I welcome you here. General
Dempsey, I think I join with everybody else in complimenting
you on your service.
General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.
Senator Leahy. We are going to miss you. I am going to miss
those breakfasts on St. Patrick's Day.
General Dempsey. We could still do that.
Senator Leahy. Well, we pass the jokes back and forth, and
fortunately there is no press or microphones. And you are
welcome to come fishing in Vermont, too. It is different kind
than elsewhere, and we do have Lake Champlain, and it has got
some great spots.
You know, I am not the first among the members here to talk
about how we have to do more with less. And, Secretary Carter,
you must groan every time you hear that because I am afraid
some are saying we do everything with nothing. I know the
conversation you and I had prior to your confirmation.
NATIONAL GUARD FORCES
There has never been a time in my 41 years here in the
Senate when the military has been as small as it is now, so it
is not just important that--actually it is required. We have
got to invest every dollar wisely. So let me ask this.
Secretary Carter, going back to our earlier discussions, where
are we in the process of deciding how the military is shaped,
what equipment it needs for the requirements that governors
have for National Guard forces and equipment in a domestic
emergency? I think of our Guard actually saving our State, or a
hurricane, others, earthquakes and so on. Are there currently
plans for how the National Guard personnel and equipment that
we fund could be used in a domestic event?
Secretary Carter. Yes, Senator. Thank you. It was actually
several years ago when I was deputy secretary, I asked the
National Guard Bureau to look at exactly the question you are
raising, namely the Guard has a national security function, but
it also has a very important defense support to civil
authorities function, which I respect, and which it has had for
the 200-odd years that the National Guard has been in
existence, and which is critical when it comes to floods and
other kinds of disasters.
And so, the question you are asking is--well, the
background is we have never written down what it is that is
required to respond to those disasters and potential disasters,
and that is the process that General Grass has embarked on.
First he took the State disaster assistance plans. Now he is
looking at the regional disaster assistance plans and trying to
create an overall disaster assistance plan so that we can use
that to inform the resources of the Guard insofar as defense of
civil authorities is concerned. So that is an important new
thing.
Senator Leahy. Well, it is because, of course, in a country
as large as ours, we tend not to have earthquakes in the
Northeast, but look at the terrible earthquakes in some parts
of the West, and you look at tornadoes in the South and so on.
And, General Dempsey, you have to sit there as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs and juggle all the demands and requirements of all
the different departments, including General Grass' and his. Is
this an issue that comes up to you?
General Dempsey. Absolutely, Senator. In fact, I think over
the last several years, the commander of NORTHCOM has gained a
greater voice inside of our processes both for the distribution
of the force and shaping of it. And I will tell you, the other
thing that gets very little notoriety, but is very powerful, is
the partnership between FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and Northern Command, and the Guard Bureau. And the
seven regions of FEMA are well partnered to respond to crises
inside the homeland.
Senator Leahy. I will never forget after we got devastated
a few years ago in a hurricane in Vermont, flying into towns
that had been totally cut off. The bridges had been torn apart.
And going in a small helicopter with our governor and General
Dubie as our adjutant general, and seeing the Guard plowing
down the road creating a new--putting down a pontoon bridge,
building it, and then FEMA arriving in it. It was a salvation,
especially in some of those places because there is no medical
care that can get through otherwise.
And, General Dempsey, my time is about out. You have pushed
hard on changes to work on the issue of sexual assault in the
military. And if you could have your staff let mine know what
you found effective and what more needs to be done because it
is an issue that comes up so often. When I am home, young
people want to go into the military in both sexes, and that is
a question they always ask. So I would like to be able to give
them the best answer possible.
General Dempsey. Happy to do it, Senator. And you used the
past tense ``pushed.'' I can assure you it is the present
tense, ``pushing.'' Present participle actually.
Senator Leahy. Thank you. That is an important part. And
lastly, Secretary Carter, you talked about jet engines. I know
you have been a proponent of the Air Force's Advanced Engine
Program. General Welsh said it was a game changer. I watch it
because, like many other States, so that I remind how does
something this important wind up on the cut-off list.
Secretary Carter. I think you are referring to the ADVENT
Program?
Senator Leahy. Yes.
Secretary Carter. Well, the ADVENT Program is an important
one. It deserves funding. And the reason for that is that we
need more fuel efficient jet engines in the future, and the
reason that we pursued the ADVENT Program was in part as a
follow on and a competitor to the F-135 engine, which is in the
Joint Strike Fighter. So it is an important program, and it is
important for us to stay competitive in the jet engine area
both for military, and by the way also, that is not the reason
we do it, but for commercial competiveness also.
Senator Leahy. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Leahy. If there are no
other questions, let me thank the panel for your cooperation,
your appearance today, and your presentations. They will be
very helpful to us as we proceed to complete the appropriations
process. We are grateful for your service and look forward to
continuing a dialogue as necessary during the 2015
appropriation year process.
Senators may submit additional questions which we will
forward onto you, and request that you respond to them in a
reasonable time.
Secretary Carter. Will do.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Question. Under current law, the United States Air Force is
required to field a flight certified, domestically built rocket engine
by the year 2019. For the current fiscal year, this Committee provided
$220 million for this engine development program. To date, it is my
understanding that the Air Force has only focused on studies and risk
mitigation, and is asking Congress to provide relief on the 2019 date.
We have been told that if the Air Force has any chance to meet this
date, it must immediately begin a significant engine development
program.
If congress does change the due date for this engine, how confident
are you that the engine development will be completed by 2019?
Answer. Historically, it has taken 6-8 years to develop new, large
scale rocket engines. The best strategy to develop a domestic engine by
2019 is to leverage opportunities to partner with industry in their on-
going engine development. However, an engine alone does not result in a
launch solution. The engine must be integrated into a launch vehicle
and tested as an entire system. Even if the engine investment attempts
to minimize changes to existing launch vehicles, we still need to
integrate that new engine into the launch vehicles and launch
complexes, modify the flight software, test the new system, and certify
it for use. This is estimated to take another year or two after
industry develops the engine.
Question. Should we be doing more on rocket engine development to
ensure that the Department of Defense has reliable, domestic access to
space without having to rely on the Russians?
Answer. The Department is committed to transition off the Russian
made RD-180 as quickly as possible and is executing a plan with a goal
of having two domestic commercial space launch providers that can also
lift our national security space manifest to provide assured access to
space. We have started the first step of the process, the technology
maturation and risk reduction. Going forward, per national policy and
the Commercial Space Act, we are seeking public-private partnerships
with industry. The commercial launch industry is developing rockets and
providing the launch services. Our strategy to partner with industry on
not just an engine but a launch system will make sure that we have the
ability to deliver national security assets into space in a
competitive, affordable manner without strategic foreign reliance.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
Question. Under the restrictions of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA
Section 1608, I understand that there may be a minimum six-year gap in
guaranteed access to space. I have also been informed that, even if
DOD's legislative solution is implemented, there may be a minimum 2 to
3 year gap in assured access to space. How necessary is the current DOD
legislative solution, and will action beyond DOD's current proposal be
required?
Answer. The DOD legislative proposal ``Modification of Prohibition
on Contracting with Russian Suppliers of Rocket Engines for the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle Program'' would give the Department authority
to enter into contracts that include Russian-manufactured RD-180
engines. The launch service provider, United Launch Alliance, has
entered into a subcontract under which such rocket engines would be
procured. If these engines are available for future Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle (EELV) contracts, the currently contracted-for engines
could meet the Department's needs through fiscal year 2022. The
availability of RD-180 engines through fiscal year 2022 would ensure
access to the Atlas V, and with the recent certification of the Falcon
9 launch system, the Department would likely be able to meet its
Assured Access to Space requirements, which requires the Department to
ensure the availability of two launch vehicle systems, as established
in policy and law, with a low probability of the occurrence of a gap.
However, it should also be noted that neither the Falcon 9 launch
system (as currently certified) nor the Atlas V are capable of meeting
all the EELV required mission orbits. Therefore, manufacture of the
Delta IV Heavy vehicle must continue until new launch capabilities are
developed and fielded.
Congressional enactment of the language provided in the
Department's legislative proposal is necessary to ensure a smooth
transition away from utilizing the RD-180 engine for National Security
Space launches.
Question. When Secretary James testified before the Senate Armed
Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee last week, she noted that $13
million in fiscal year 2015 funding has thus far been obligated toward
a new rocket propulsion system to replace the RD-180. That leaves $207
million to be obligated during the balance of the 2015 fiscal year.
Yet, Secretary James also stated that, and I quote, ``we intend to
invest an additional, say $45 million to $50 million, we project, over
about the next 6 months.'' If Secretary James was correct in stating
that the Air Force plans to spend $45-50 million over the next 6
months, how does DOD plan to spend the remaining $157-162 million
dollars appropriated?
Answer. We plan to obligate the remaining funds, approximately $160
million, by investing in industry's rocket propulsion systems using
Other Transaction Authority. We released the Request for Proposals on
June 2, 2015 and anticipate a rolling award of up to four agreements
between September and December 2015.
Question. I have serious concerns that the $220 million
appropriated for a rocket propulsion system is going to be spread
across numerous contracts, with little focused effort or results. Could
you please clearly outline DOD's targeted acquisition strategy for a
new rocket propulsion system?
Answer. The Department is committed to transitioning from its use
of Russian rocket propulsion systems in the most efficient and
affordable manner possible. The Department currently procures launch
services, rather than launch vehicle hardware, and is working with
industry determining how to affordably provide these services utilizing
domestically-produced rocket propulsion systems. It should be noted
that transitioning from reliance on the Russian RD-180 engine requires
more than just development of a domestic propulsion system. The
propulsion system must be integrated into a launch system in order to
provide access to space. This view was echoed by the Nation's leading
launch service providers and rocket engine manufacturers in responses
to an Air Force issued Request for Information in August 2014. It must
also be noted that these same providers clarified in testimony that
none of their solutions could directly replace the RD-180 in form, fit,
or function.
Based on those industry responses, the Air Force developed a multi-
step approach to transition to domestic rocket propulsion systems while
assuring access to space. Started last year, the first step is to
mature the technology to reduce engine development technical risk. The
Air Force has obligated about $50 million toward this effort and will
invest an additional $45-50 million in the next 6 months. The next step
is to initiate investment in Rocket Propulsion Systems, in compliance
with section 1604 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015, Public Law
113-291. The Air Force plans to award multiple contracts or other
transaction agreements with propulsion system or launch system
providers that co-invest in on-going domestic propulsion system
development efforts starting this fiscal year. In the third step, the
Air Force plans to continue this approach by entering into agreements
with launch system providers to provide domestically-powered launch
capabilities. To complete the transition, the Air Force's goal is to
compete and award contracts with certified launch providers for launch
services for 2018 and beyond.
Question. I have watched with growing concern as Iran continues to
sow instability in the Middle East by pursuing nuclear weapons,
sponsoring terrorism, developing offensive and defensive ballistic
missile capabilities, and most recently by its aggressive posture in
the Strait of Hormuz. How, if at all, will the Department of Defense's
strategy with regard to dealing with the Iranian threat change, if a
nuclear agreement is signed?
Answer. The Department of Defense's approach toward Iran will not
change as a result of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed to
between the P5+1 and Iran. The Department will remain prepared to
address any scenario related to Iran.
Question. According to a White House fact sheet, Iran's breakout
time to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon is currently
assessed to be 2 to 3 months. I understand that, under the Iran
Framework agreement, not a single centrifuge will be dismantled or
destroyed. Secretary Carter, could you please discuss the threat of a
nuclear Iran, especially if the Iranians are allowed to continue to
enrich uranium?
Answer. We remain very concerned about the prospect of a nuclear-
armed Iran, but we believe that the best way to prevent that is through
an internationally agreed upon nuclear deal that imposes significant
restrictions on Iran's ability to enrich uranium and strict monitoring
of its nuclear program. Although Iran would be permitted to enrich
uranium under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, it would be
enriching within agreed limits and under strict international scrutiny.
Finally, the Department of Defense will continue to be prepared for any
Iran-related contingencies that may arise.
Question. North Korean rhetoric concerning their ability to conduct
a ``preemptive strike if necessary'' against the United States has
recently resurfaced. How important is the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) system for homeland defense against North Korean ICBM
threats?
Answer. In the event that deterrence fails and North Korea launches
an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at the United States, the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system is the means by which we would
defend the homeland. Therefore, it is very important in the Nation's
defense against North Korean ICBMs.
Question. During Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's speech before
Congress in March, he noted that the Islamic State poses a ``terrible
threat'' to his country. What can you tell this Committee about ISIS's
efforts to gain a foothold in Afghanistan, and our military's efforts
to prevent that?
Answer. The Afghan government and coalition forces in Afghanistan
continue to watch closely the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's
(ISIL's) attempt to expand its reach into Afghanistan. Thus far, U.S.
forces have seen some evidence of limited recruiting efforts, and a few
individuals formerly associated with other militant groups have
``rebranded'' themselves as members of ``ISIL of Khorasan Province.''
U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces are collaborating closely in order
to prevent this threat from expanding.
Question. In September of 1988, a GAO report underscored the Air
Force's concerns about ``the A-10's ability to support the Army and
survive the Soviet air defense threat of the 1990s and beyond.'' This
year, the President's Budget again proposes to retire the A-10. While I
appreciate the close air support mission of the A-10, I also understand
the difficult budgetary decisions that DOD faces. Secretary Carter, how
might retiring the A-10 allow the Air Force to recapitalize for threats
10 years from now? What other aircraft will provide close air support
upon the A-10's retirement?
Answer. In a time of reduced budgets, retiring the A-10 fleet will
enable the Air Force to maintain critical readiness funding, sustain
investment in high priority acquisition programs such as the F-35,
Long-Range Strike-Bomber, and KC-46A as well as mitigate shortfalls in
our munitions inventories. Other Air Force aircraft used to provide
close air support are the AC-130, F-16, F-15E, B-1, B-52, and, in the
future, the F-35.
Question. DOD's primary weapons tester released a report in January
of this year, noting critical cybersecurity vulnerabilities in most of
the DOD acquisition programs tested in the previous fiscal year. How
vulnerable are our missile defense and space assets to a cyberattack?
And, what more can we do to protect our military assets against
hardware, software, and supply chain cyber threats?
Answer. Cyber threats to U.S. national and economic security are
increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of impact.
Overall, the unclassified information and communication technology
networks that support U.S. Government, military, commercial, and social
activities remain vulnerable to espionage and/or disruption. We expect
that the likelihood of a catastrophic attack from any particular actor
is remote at this time. Rather than a major cyber event scenario that
debilitates the entire U.S. infrastructure, we foresee an ongoing
series of low-to-moderate level cyber incidents from a variety of
sources. While the cyber threat cannot be eliminated, cyber risk must
be managed. Military systems and operations must be made resilient and
viable in the face of advancing adversary cyber capabilities--
protections for space and missile defense assets are no exception.
As such, we have placed the highest priority on cyberspace defense
in the resilience of systems and capabilities. Specific efforts are
underway to evaluate and secure missile defense systems, control
networks, and space assets, including the ground layer. Department of
Defense (DOD) activities to enhance cyber security and system
resilience against cyberspace exploitation and attack are being applied
across the acquisition lifecycle.
For example, the next generation Operational Control System (OCX)
is the command and control portion of the next generation Global
Positioning System (GPS). OCX provides significant Information
Assurance improvements over the current GPS Operational Control Segment
by preventing/detecting attacks and allowing GPS operators to isolate,
contain, and operate in a cyber-contested environment.
Likewise for missile defenses, the Department is actively and
continually evaluating potential vulnerabilities to adversarial cyber
operations. We are securing missile defense networks/systems and
developing options designed to increase resilience while providing
mission assurance. These actions include looking critically at
supporting infrastructure and key resources, as well as working with
industry and international partners to collaborate, inspire innovation,
and prevent cyber incursion wherever possible.
Moving forward, it is necessary that we establish cyber resilience
requirements, continue to evaluate cyber vulnerabilities, and maintain
a proactive program of remediation and operational resilience. The
Department plans to implement a testing and training regimen that
allows us to train like we expect to fight. We support the continuation
and potential expansion of testing regimes to evaluate cyber
vulnerabilities and manage the resulting risk. We have initiated
improvements in cyber discipline and increased the ability to evaluate
and harden fielded systems. At the same time, the Department is
instituting the policy changes needed to build cyber resilience into
the fabric of our business processes, designs, acquisitions, and
operations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lamar Alexander
electronic health records
Question. The subcommittee heard testimony that all deployment and
sustainment costs for the Department of Defense's Electronic Health
Records System (EHR) are included in the life cycle cost estimate
(LCCE) of $10.5 billion.
Does the Department expect any change orders that would require
additional funds? Does the Department of Defense believe that any
additional funding will be needed during the 18 year life cycle of this
program? Does the $10.5 billion life cycle cost estimate include all
operational costs, including education and training efforts?
Answer. We do not anticipate any change orders within the current
scope of the Program that would require additional funding.
For the items within the current scope of the Program, the
Department of Defense does not expect the need for additional funding.
The $10.5 billion life cycle includes all operational and support
costs within the current Program scope, including education, training,
and change management efforts.
electronic health records
Question. How is the Department of Defense making sure that this
electronic healthcare system will be interoperable with other systems?
Answer. In May 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated a
full and open competition for a core set of capabilities for Electronic
Healthcare Record (EHR) modernization. To that end, the Program
Executive Office Defense Healthcare Management Systems conducted
extensive market research, hosted multiple industry engagements, and
collaborated across the Military Health System, the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA), the Office of the National Coordinator, and
Office of E-Government and Information Technology. These efforts
contributed to the refinement of solicitation requirements in support
of acquiring a configurable and scalable modernized EHR, which is
interoperable with the VA and private sector healthcare providers by
enabling standards-based, secure electronic exchange of medical and
patient data.
Further, in addition to solicitation requirements related to
interoperability, the solicitation includes interoperability as part of
the source selection evaluation. Specifically, the evaluation includes
the likelihood the solution will achieve interoperability with the
Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record Clinical Document Architecture,
along with three other types of standards based interfaces consistent
with the program's interface strategy. Also, the source selection
considers the extent to which the offeror's proposed approach is
consistent with the Defense Healthcare Management System Modernization
(DHMSM) Interface Strategy, which requires interfaces be compliant with
the IPO Information Interoperability Technical Package standards that
details interoperability standards between Departments.
After contract award, the new EHR system will be independently
tested to ensure it meets operational and interoperability requirements
with the VA and private sector healthcare providers. The DHMSM Test and
Evaluation Master Plan describes the testing phases, evaluation
framework, technical certifications, test organizations, test tools,
and test management requirements that will be used to test the new EHR
system. The test phases include contractor integration testing,
developmental testing, and independent operational testing, which will
ensure the EHR has a standards-compliant common clinical data model to
achieve interoperability between DOD, VA, and national/international
partners. During the operational testing, the product will be tested
using typical users in an operationally realistic environment using a
production representative system executing real mission tasks. The
current DOD data sharing infrastructure within the Defense Medical
Information Exchange (DMIX) program will remain operational to ensure
continuity with the VA and national partners during the DHMSM testing
and deployment. The DMIX infrastructure will be an integral part of the
DHMSM test environment and test plan for interoperability testing.
electronic health records
Question. Many TRICARE patients use civilian TRICARE network
providers who are outside of military treatment facilities. How will
vital healthcare information be shared between the Department's
electronic health record system and non-government systems? Was a
cloud-based program considered to address this concern?
Answer. The Defense Healthcare Management System Modernization
(DHMSM) solicitation includes multiple interoperability-related
requirements enabling the sharing of healthcare information. For
example, the solicitation requires that:
`` . . . the EHR System will enable the application of
standardized workflows, integrated healthcare delivery, and
data standards for improved and secure electronic exchange of
medical and patient data between the DOD and its external
partners, including the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA),
and other Federal and private sector healthcare providers. The
workflows inherent to the EHR System will be adopted by and
standardized throughout the MHS via the DHMSM Change Management
process, as applicable. The EHR System will leverage data
exchange capabilities in alignment with the Interagency Program
Office (IPO) for standards-based health data interoperability
and secure information sharing with external partners to
include the VA.''
DHMSM is a performance-based solicitation, so, rather than
dictating how the contractor must accomplish interoperability, the
requirements are outcome-based. To that end, offerors have the latitude
to propose any technical solution, including a cloud-based approach,
for achieving interoperability and data exchange so long as the
approach is consistent with the solicitation requirements.
In addition to solicitation requirements related to
interoperability, the solicitation evaluates interoperability as part
of the source selection. Specifically, the evaluation includes the
likelihood the solution will achieve interoperability with the Virtual
Lifetime Electronic Record Consolidated Clinical Document Architecture,
along with three other types of standards based interfaces consistent
with the program's interface strategy. Also, the source selection
considers consistency with the DHMSM Interface Strategy, which requires
interfaces be compliant with the IPO Information Interoperability
Technical Package standards. The evaluation process also includes
determining if proposals pass key ``Gate Criteria,'' which include data
exchange capabilities that align with national standards used by
governance bodies such as the Office of the National Coordinator (ONC)
and other external standards organizations.
It also requires a data architecture that supports open standards-
based data portability. Offerors will be evaluated on their design
approach to achieving Open Systems Architecture, which includes
utilizing and providing open and standardized Application Programing
Interfaces and services to facilitate integration. The offeror must
continue to adopt emerging standards and maintain compliancy and
currency with ONC IT requirements and applicable national standards.
Finally, in addition to the current systems interoperability
accomplishments and the acquisition of a modernized interoperable
electronic health record system, DOD has added language to the TRICARE
Managed Care Support Contract (T2017) to enable future development of a
time-phased Interoperability Plan to achieve machine-to-machine
interoperability within the TRICARE system and among TRICARE network
providers.
electronic health records
Question. Given the number of questions raised by this procurement
for an electronic health record system, are you considering delaying
the award of this contract pending a GAO or congressional review?
Answer. On July 29, 2015, DOD announced that the contract for the
Defense Healthcare Management System Modernization was awarded to the
team led by Leidos, Cerner, and Accenture. Prior to this announcement,
the procurement had undergone multiple oversight processes, including
but not limited to the formal DOD Peer Review process led by the Office
of the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, pursuant
to DFARS 201.170. The Program Executive Office Defense Healthcare
Management Systems (PEO DHMS) has closely engaged with Congress
throughout the acquisition process, including testifying before
multiple committees and responding to all congressional requests for
information pursuant to FAR 5.403. The PEO also participated in a
Defense Acquisition Board review prior to contract award to ensure
readiness of the project and to fulfill 10 U.S.C. Chapter 144
responsibilities concerning Acquisition Category I Programs. Further,
the PEO issued congressional notifications in accordance with DFARS
205.303 prior to awarding the contract.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt
Question. I understand there was a recent policy change to the per
diem allowance for long-term temporary duty. The policy change was
based on a 2012 NDAA requirement to address cost reductions in overall
travel, without impairing the mission. I have seen the letter from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management on
justification of the policy change and I would stress that the
Temporary Duty of our Nation's soldiers is unique and not fully
comparable to the State Department, VA or Health and Human Services
Department. While this policy change may look good on paper, it may not
look so good for DOD travelers who are forced to pay out of pocket for
basic necessities. Will you commit to revisiting the policy if it is
found to negatively impact morale? Further, can you tell me the extent
to which DOD assessed the impact to businesses, which are dedicated to
supporting our military, was addressed in the determination of this
policy decision? Finally, as a result of this policy change how many
soldiers are forced to pay at least some of their expenses out of
pocket for TDY periods longer than 30 or 180 days?
Answer. The Department's flat rate per diem policy does not force
Service members and DOD civilian employees to pay out of pocket for
authorized travel expenses or bare necessities. Under this policy,
rates now more accurately reflect actual expenses incurred. To ensure
that no one is disadvantaged, the policy allows the Authorizing
Official to authorize reimbursement of actual lodging expenses up to
100 percent of the per diem rate when discounted lodging cannot be
found. Of note, the Services support flat rate per diem; this policy
has worked well since 2008 when it was first introduced by the Services
for contingency travel of over 180 days in duration.
DOD has monitored this policy since it was first adopted 8 years
ago. In fact, we continue to engage our governance bodies and seek
feedback to assess its impact, and will adjust any policy if necessary.
As an example, we have identified three foreign locations where the
reduced per diem is insufficient to cover the meals and incidental
expenses for a few isolated members traveling for U.S. Special
Operations Command. To ensure that these members are properly
compensated, we are revising the policy so that Service Secretaries and
Combatant Commanders can request that travelers receive full per diem
in foreign locations when flat rate per diem will not cover identified
expenses due to unique local security, safety, or sanitary conditions.
The Department also consulted our industry partners through the
Government-wide Travel Advisory Committee (GTAC). The GTAC provided an
opportunity for travel industry leaders and other qualified individuals
to offer their expert advice and recommendations to the General
Services Administration (GSA). Recognizing the merit of a long-term
flat rate per diem policy, the GTAC recommended that all Federal
agencies consider implementing similar policies.
To be clear, DOD travelers are not forced to pay out of pocket for
authorized travel expenses or necessities when on temporary duty (TDY)
travel periods longer than 30 or 180 days. Even with reduced rates,
travelers on TDY in the Continental U.S. for 31-180 days will receive
$1,020-$1,620 every 30 days for meals and incidental expenses (M&IE).
For TDY greater than 180 days, the amount is $759-$1,171. Established
full M&IE rates are based on short stays of less than 30 days in
duration. These rates assume travelers are dining 3 times a day at
full-service restaurants (including taxes and tips); they do not take
into account the economics of the extended-stay lodging/rental market,
nor the change in traveler behavior on extended temporary duty travel.
Providing a per diem allowance for meals affords the traveler autonomy
in making their dining decisions. Travelers may choose to spend more or
less than their allowance. The Department's analysis demonstrates, and
industry best practices support, that the reduced per diem for extended
TDY travel is sufficient and fair compensation. The Department will
continue to ensure fair reimbursement for expenses incurred in support
of the mission.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard J. Durbin
Question. In last year's fiscal year 2015 omnibus appropriation,
this Subcommittee included a provision on the sale of tobacco and
tobacco-related products sold at military resale outlets (SEC. 8073).
The Subcommittee's intent was for tobacco products sold in commissaries
to be priced at parity with the after tax price of tobacco products in
the local community. The text of the language is also clear on that
point. Will you ensure that DOD faithfully implements this provision,
and if so by what date?
Answer. Yes. Currently, prices for tobacco products in military
exchanges and commissaries are set in accordance with section 633 of
the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015, which prohibits the sale of
tobacco products at a price below the most competitive price for that
product in the local community and requires that the price at defense
retail outlets overseas be within the range of prices established for
that product in the United States. Additionally, prices for tobacco
products in military exchanges and commissaries are set in accordance
with section 8073 of the Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act,
2015, which prohibits the sale in the United States of any tobacco or
tobacco-related products at a price below the most competitive price in
the local community, and requires the sale overseas of such items be at
prices within the range of prices established for military retail
system stores located in the United States.
Question. Last year Secretary Hagel initiated a Defense Advisory
Committee on Tobacco to review the Department's tobacco policies and
make recommendations for future changes. As I understand it, the panel
has concluded its work and submitted it to your office for decision.
When will you complete your review of the tobacco panel's
recommendations? Can you assure this Subcommittee that you will be
aggressive in combating smoking in the military?
Answer. The review of the tobacco panel's recommendation is nearly
complete. As you mentioned, the Defense Advisory Committee on Tobacco
(DACT) proposed several recommendations for tobacco use and control
throughout the DOD. These options take into consideration the DOD's
approach to tobacco pricing, tobacco use areas on military
installations, tobacco use in uniform, and other areas related to
education and outreach efforts in collaboration with the Services.
While these policy options are under review, the DOD continues to
make great strides towards reducing tobacco use. In accordance with the
fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the DOD
eliminated the 5 percent discount on tobacco products in all Military
Exchanges and Commissaries. This change is an important step toward
ultimately removing all financial incentive to purchase tobacco
products at Military locations.
DOD will be comprehensive in combating smoking in the military.
Question. In November 2014, the Department of Education announced
it was creating an interagency task force on for-profit colleges. The
task force is based on legislation I introduced with Representative
Elijah Cummings to improve information sharing amongst agencies and
improve oversight of this industry. Will Department of Defense
participate in the task force?
Answer. Yes. The Department of Defense stands ready to support the
Department of Education in this endeavor to the maximum extent
possible. We are committed to strong and effective oversight of the
educational programs offered to our Service members and take our
responsibility of being a good steward of taxpayer dollars and
providing quality educational opportunities very seriously. We continue
to work closely with the Departments of Education and Veterans Affairs
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau on a comprehensive
strategy to strengthen enforcement of, and compliance with, the
enhanced protections delineated in the President's Executive Order
13607, ``Establishing Principles of Excellence for Educational
Institutions Serving Service Members, Veterans, Spouses, and Other
Family Members.'' This mutually beneficial working relationship also
helps promote information-sharing among our agencies on matters
involving complaints, issues of noncompliance, and similar risk-based
information to facilitate our holding educational institutions
accountable when necessary.
As you know, we require signed agreements (Memorandums of
Understanding) between the Department of Defense and each of the more
than 2,600 educational institutions that participate in the Tuition
Assistance (TA) program, regardless of sector (public, private for-
profit, or private non-profit). These agreements (MOUs) are binding
arrangements between the Department of Defense and each educational
institution, and shape our relationships with these institutions.
Question. A loophole in the law does not count this Subcommittee's
funds for TA and MyCAA as Federal dollars for the purposes of the 90-10
rule for Federal education funds. I am working to close this loophole
legislatively. But in the meantime, we have sent a letter to Secretary
Duncan asking him to publish 90/10 data that include DOD dollars. Will
you work with the Department of Education to share data on the Tuition
Assistance program and the MyCAA program?
Answer. Yes. The Department of Defense (DOD) stands ready to
support Secretary Duncan and the Department of Education in this
endeavor. We are committed to strong and effective oversight of the
educational programs offered to our Service members and take our
responsibility of being a good steward of taxpayer dollars and
providing quality educational opportunities very seriously. As you
know, the Department has already improved its oversight in many ways,
such as requiring signed agreements between DOD and educational
institutions that participate in the Tuition Assistance (TA) program,
implementing a centralized postsecondary education complaint system,
and, most recently, launching ``TA DECIDE,'' a college and university
information and comparison tool tailored to the unique needs of our
Service members and families. We have also made TA program data
publically available for download at http://www.dodmou.com/TADECIDE/.
This data can be used to directly support calculations involving the
90/10 rule.
Question. Earlier this year, the Department issued a 'narrowing of
solicitation' for its contract to update DOD's electronic health record
system. In narrowing potential vendors, you eliminated the bid from the
open-source vendor whose system was being used by the VA. First, this
contract is estimated to cost $11 billion, and there are still
questions about whether the remaining bidders can provide a platform
that is interoperable with other government and private systems. Can
you assure us that any system that is awarded the contract will have
the capability of sharing health records across platforms? Second, as
technology evolves the Department's electronic health record system
must be able to stay current and adapt. Given the length of this
contract, if you pick a proprietary electronic health record system,
can you assure us that the vendor will be able to stay current with
improvements in technology?
Answer. To confirm, the Defense Healthcare Management System
Modernization (DHMSM) solicitation was released on August 25, 2014,
with proposals due by October 31, 2014. The Government completed the
evaluation of initial proposals and on February 19, 2015, opened
discussions with offerors who remain in the competitive range. On July
29, 2015, DOD announced that the DHMSM contract was awarded to the team
led by Leidos, Cerner, and Accenture. While DOD cannot comment on the
details of the source selection process, the competition was robust and
supported DOD's objective of acquiring a best value solution for the
enterprise that meets requirements, including interoperability with the
Department of Veterans Affairs and private sector healthcare providers.
Regarding the estimated cost of the DHMSM contract, this has been
misreported in the media. The $11 billion figure (which is now $9
billion based on the latest estimates) represents the life cycle cost
estimate for the entire DHMSM program, not just the contract, through
fiscal year 2032. This initial contract has a value of $4.34 billion
over the next 10 years. In addition, though the DHMSM contract has a
potential ordering period of 10 years, it consists of an initial 2-year
base ordering period and two subsequent option ordering periods
consisting of 3 years each. These are followed by a potential award for
up to 24 months for sustainment post-full deployment. This structure
provides the government the flexibility to change course if offeror
performance or market conditions make it advantageous for the
Government to do so.
Addressing the first part of the question, DHMSM is a performance-
based requirement with interoperability requirements throughout the
solicitation. The contractor's performance will be closely monitored
through a variety of mechanisms, including program office oversight and
execution of the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan, to ensure
compliance with all requirements. As an example of an interoperability
requirement, the solicitation requires that ``the EHR System will
enable the application of standardized workflows, integrated healthcare
delivery, and data standards for improved and secure electronic
exchange of medical and patient data between the DOD and its external
partners, including the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and other
Federal and private sector healthcare providers . . . The EHR System
will leverage data exchange capabilities in alignment with the
Interagency Program Office (IPO) for standards-based health data
interoperability and secure information sharing with external partners
to include the VA.'' Further, in addition to solicitation requirements
related to interoperability, the solicitation includes evaluation
criteria related to interoperability.
Addressing the second part of the question, DHMSM includes
technology refresh requirements throughout the solicitation. Similar to
interoperability, the contractor's performance will be closely
monitored through a variety of mechanisms, including program office
oversight and execution of the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan, to
ensure compliance with all requirements. As an example of a technology
refresh requirement, which is captured within the Open System
Architecture (OSA) requirements, the contractor must provide a
Technology Refresh Plan that minimizes obsolescence, promotes adoption
of emerging standards and new technologies, and maintains compliancy
and currency with ONC and other applicable national standards through
life cycle management and component modernization.
As another example, the contractor is required to use system design
and engineering processes (life-cycle support plan) that enable system
improvements through upgrades of individual hardware, software modules,
or interfaces with newer modular components without redesign of the
entire system or large portions thereof (e.g., migration to a new thin
client interface, adoption of integration technology standard such as
FHIR) and without placing additional data rights/intellectual property
rights constraints on the overall system design. Also, if future
releases of the contractor's commercial EHR include additional
capabilities and software modules, the solicitation requires that those
modules be delivered at no additional cost to the Government as part of
a major release. Further, in addition to solicitation requirements
related to technology refresh, the solicitation includes evaluation
criteria related OSA (inclusive of technology refresh).
Question. Last fall, OSD halted plans to deploy a common eCMRA
software system across DOD to track contracted services. Will OSD
deploy a common software system, and if so when?
Answer. DOD is proceeding deliberately to implement a solution that
will meet Congressional intent: to generate an improved Inventory of
Contracted Services (ICS), using ``instances'' of the Contractor
Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA). These ``instances'' are each
separate and specific operating IT systems of CMRA that are used across
DOD to capture contractor-reported data.
There are currently four ``instances,'' one for each Military
Department and the fourth for OSD and the Fourth Estate, all modeled
after a system developed by the Army, being utilized and accessible
through a common portal at www.ecmra.mil. In the near term, all four
``instances'' of CMRA will be co-located on a Defense Manpower Data
Center (DMDC) server; DMDC will ensure system compliance with DOD
security and Information Technology policies. Because data collection
for the fiscal year 2014 ICS has already been completed, we expect that
this new operational model will be used to generate the fiscal year
2015 ICS.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Question. It seems that the way we are going to end our use of
anti-personnel landmines on the Korean Peninsula--which President Obama
has said he wants to do--is by developing technological and/or
doctrinal and tactical alternatives. Twenty years ago, President
Clinton called on the Pentagon to develop such alternatives, but the
Pentagon did next to nothing. What is the Pentagon doing today, and
what are you planning to do in the future, to finally solve this
problem?
Answer. Since 1997, the Department of Defense has devoted
considerable time and resources to addressing the humanitarian concerns
associated with the use of landmines while maintaining the military
capabilities needed to fulfill our obligations for the defense of the
Republic of Korea. During the past 18 years, the Department has removed
all persistent landmines from the active stockpile and destroyed two
million persistent landmines. The Department has also developed and
fielded the Spider Networked Munition to replace hand-emplaced anti-
personnel landmines. Consistent with current U.S. landmine policy, the
Department has initiated efforts to replace self-destructing anti-
personnel landmines. In 2014, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
approved an Initial Capabilities Document that outlines requirements
for a new generation of terrain shaping capabilities to replace the
current Family of Scatterable Mine (FASCAM) systems. The fiscal year
2016 President's Budget request contains $337 million in fiscal year
2016-2020 to develop a replacement for the Gator mine system. This
summer, the Department expects to complete a comprehensive study of the
operational effectiveness of anti-personnel landmines and technological
alternatives that will help inform future plans to replace the FASCAM
systems.
Question. Is the Pentagon on track to meet its commitment to use
only cluster munitions that have failure rate of no more than 1 percent
by 2018? Since the new policy was announced in 2008, how many times,
including when, where and for what purpose, have Combatant Commanders
authorized the use of cluster munitions that exceed the 1 percent UXO
rate? To what countries and in what quantity has the U.S. transferred
cluster munitions that exceed the 1 percent UXO rate since 2008, and
how will the U.S. ensure they do not use such munitions after 2018?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is on track to meet its
commitment to use only cluster munitions that have a failure rate of no
more than 1 percent by 2018.
Details regarding instances in which Combatant Commanders may have
authorized the use of cluster munitions since 2008 is classified; we
have previously provided these details to Congress in a classified
briefing.
A thorough review of our Foreign Military Sales database confirms
that the Department has complied with applicable law and DOD policy.
The U.S. Government has not sold or agreed otherwise to transfer
cluster munitions that are not compliant with the 1 percent unexploded
ordnance (UXO) rate to a foreign government since 2007. Therefore,
there are no cluster munitions in the hands of foreign countries that
could be subject to any obligation to ensure they not be used after
2018.
Question. As the U.S. expands military engagement in Bahrain, the
human rights situation there continues to deteriorate. What leverage
does our military relationship with Bahrain provide us with regard to
the Bahraini government's handling of internal security consistent with
professionalism and respect for human rights within the Bahraini
security forces? What is your assessment of the Bahraini government's
ability to professionally maintain internal order, and what has been
the impact on Bahrain's security forces of the recent instability? What
are we doing to mitigate the risks to U.S. investments and personnel
associated with increased instability in Bahrain?
Answer. The Department of Defense's bilateral relationship is with
the Bahraini Defense Forces (BDF). Internal security is generally
provided by forces under the Bahrain Ministry of the Interior, with
which the Department of Defense does not have a substantive
relationship. Nonetheless, the Department of Defense consistently
emphasizes during military exercises, training, and engagements with
the BDF, and with all partner nation militaries, the importance of
professionalism, respect for human rights, and restraint.
The Bahraini security forces have shown significant restraint and
professionalism in the face of violent protests in recent years. We
generally assess them to be capable of professionally maintaining order
and we do not assess they have contributed to instability or protests
in Bahrain, which have substantially decreased in recent months.
The Department of Defense continually monitors the situation in
Bahrain to ensure the safety and security of U.S. personnel. The U.S.
Navy Fifth Fleet in Bahrain continually re-evaluates its force
protection posture. We are confident that the measures currently in
place are sufficient to ensure U.S. persons and interests are
protected.
Question. General Dempsey, as the nation is still struggling to
bring to a successful conclusion the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,
I am disturbed by recent testimony by General Odierno that the Army is
currently being revamped in a way that would make it very difficult to
sustain operations of similar length because plans assume a short war.
What are your top concerns for the Joint Force if our assumptions about
the length of the next conflict are too short, and why has DOD approved
the reduction of combat capabilities in the reserve components in the
Army rather than using it as a hedge?
Answer. There is no guidance or assumption regarding the length of
conflict. Although our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-
scale, prolonged stability operations, we will preserve the expertise
gained during the past 10 years of counterinsurgency and stability
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will protect the ability to
regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future demands.
In regards to the Active, Guard, and Reserve force mix, we need to
carefully consider potential changes in the balance among our Active,
Guard, and Reserve forces, leveraging the unique attributes and
responsibilities of our Services and their components. As with all the
Services, the Army seeks to balance capability, capacity and readiness
across its components to support national security requirements.
Further it seeks to provide capabilities the National Guard that best
supports both Federal and State missions. The President's Budget as
submitted does both, despite increased risk given the climate of budget
uncertainty.
Question. General Dempsey, it has now been almost 2 years since the
nation vowed not to take its ``eye off the ball again'' with regards to
sexual assaults in the military. Under your leadership, the Department
and Services have created new organizations, streamlined old ones, made
changes to military law, and created new training and personnel in an
effort to prevent and respond better to allegations. What lessons have
you learned about how to more effectively prevent and respond to it?
Answer. Two years ago, we placed emphasis on the role of leaders in
combating sexual assault. As leaders became more involved, our Service
members recognized their commitment and stepped up to take a more
active role in prevention efforts and became a part of the solution.
That involvement has helped to create more effective education and
training methods. Our Service members are more aware of what
constitutes harassing and sexist behaviors and when and how to
intervene.
Our military faces a variety of challenges--in combat and everyday
life. Eradicating sexual assault from our ranks is a challenge. Our
most effective approach to responding to and preventing incidents of
sexual assault requires active participation of everyone wearing the
uniform.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
russian rocket-engine replacement program
Question. Last year's Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighted the
Air Force's reliance on Russian-made engines to launch U.S. national
security satellites into space. Last year's fiscal year 2015 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the fiscal year 2015 Defense
Appropriations bill both directed the Air Force to develop a U.S.-made
engine by 2019 to replace Russian-made engines. The Appropriations bill
provided $220 million to begin developing an alternative. Yet, the
Defense Department has awarded little of the $220 million to date to
begin to develop an alternative to the Russian-made RD-180 engine.
Further, the President's budget request to continue development of a
U.S.-made engine was $86 million, well below the initial Congressional
investment of $220 million in fiscal year 2015. After 2016, the planned
funding goes down to $60 million in fiscal year 2017 and then $50
million in fiscal year 2018, fiscal year 2019, and fiscal year 2020.
Is the Department still committed to replacing the Russian-made RD-
180 engine with a U.S. engine? If so, why has the Department not moved
forward with an engine replacement program?
Answer. The Department is committed to transitioning from Russian
rocket propulsion systems in an efficient and affordable manner. The
Department currently procures launch services rather than launch
vehicle hardware, and is working with industry to determine how to
ensure these services utilize domestically-produced propulsion systems.
Transitioning from reliance on the Russian RD-180 engine requires more
than development of a domestic propulsion system, as the propulsion
system must also be integrated into a launch system.
The Air Force's strategy is a four step approach to transitioning
to domestic propulsion while assuring access to space. Step 1, started
last year, matures the technology to reduce the technical risk of
engine development. The Air Force has obligated $50 million toward this
effort, and will invest an additional $45-50M in the next 6 months.
Step 2 initiates investment in rocket propulsion systems in compliance
with the fiscal year 2015 NDAA. The Air Force will partner with
propulsion system or launch system providers by awarding multiple
contracts that co-invest in on-going development efforts. In step 3,
the Air Force will continue the public-private partnership approach by
entering into agreements with launch system providers to provide
domestically powered launch capabilities. In step 4, the Air Force will
compete and award contracts with certified launch providers for launch
services for 2018 and beyond. These providers will on-ramp the systems
developed under shared investment while off-ramping legacy systems,
which use Russian RD-180 engines.
recent use of cluster munitions in yemen
Question. Secretary Carter, according to a recent report by Human
Rights Watch, there is substantial evidence that the Saudi-led
collation used internationally-banned cluster munitions in western
Yemen. U.S. policy until 2018 permits the use of cluster munitions with
a less than 1 percent unexploded ordnance rate against clearly defined
military targets and in areas not normally inhabited by civilians. In
Yemen, the attack appeared over a cultivated plateau within 600 meters
of civilian structures.
Are you aware of the report of the use of cluster munitions in
Yemen? [Has the Defense Department examined whether cluster munitions
were used against clearly defined military targets and in areas not
normally inhabited by civilians? Given the fact that cluster munitions
leave behind small submunitions that could harm civilians in the
future, has the Department sought assurances from the coalition that
they will not use cluster munitions in areas normally inhabited by
civilians or close to areas where they live?] Finally, Current Defense
Department policy written by former Secretary Gates would prohibit the
use of cluster munitions by the U.S. with greater than 1 percent
unexploded ordnance rate after 2018. Does the Department of Defense
intend to abide by this policy?
Answer. Yes, we are aware of the report of the use of cluster
munitions in Yemen. The Saudi government reported that the cluster
munitions were used to target vehicles and not people. The cluster
munitions used met the criteria of less than 1 percent unexploded
ordnance. The Saudi government has assured us these munitions will be
used in accordance with the U.S. requirements outlined in the Foreign
Military Sales agreements: ``recipients of such transfers must commit
that cluster munitions will only be used against clearly defined
military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be
present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.'' Policy questions
are best addressed by the through the office of the Secretary.
new air force nuclear cruise missile
Question. Why does the military believe that this long range
standoff missile is necessary to maintain our nuclear deterrent? Given
the nature of the threats we face today, how can the military justify
so much additional funding for deterrence at the expense of non-
proliferation programs?
Answer. Penetrating cruise missiles strengthen the credibility and
effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent by providing the United States
with a unique capability to hold at risk targets deep inside an
adversary's territory despite efforts to deny access. Additionally,
heavy bombers count as one strategic warhead under New START,
regardless of the number of nuclear gravity bombs and cruise missiles
we have in our inventory. This provides the United States with a rapid
upload capability to hedge against unforeseen technical issues in the
other parts of our nuclear deterrent or changes in the geopolitical
environment.
With the retirement of the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
missile (TLAM-N) in 2011, which followed the earlier retirement of the
Advanced Cruise Missile and the elimination of the intermediate-range
Gryphon ground-launched cruised missile, the Air-Launched Cruise
Missile (ALCM) is the United States' only nuclear-armed cruise missile
and its only air-launched, long-range nuclear standoff capability. ALCM
was originally designed to last for 10 years and is now over 30 years
old. As our adversaries modernize their nuclear forces and acquire
increasingly sophisticated air defenses, the credibility of the ALCM as
an element of our nuclear deterrent will inevitably deteriorate. The
Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile will replace the aging ALCM,
thus sustaining the credibility of this unique capability to hold
adversary targets at risk. LRSO is not a new military capability.
More generally, we do not view funding for our nuclear deterrent to
be at the expense of non-proliferations programs. Investments in both
LRSO and non-proliferation programs are needed to address the full
range of security challenges we face, even as we work towards future
negotiated nuclear arms reductions with Russia.
guantanamo
Question. Do you support the cessation of detention operations at
Guantanamo? Do you believe their continuation harms U.S. interests? How
do you plan to help close Guantanamo, which the President ordered on
his second day in office? There have been no transfers of Guantanamo
detainees since January 15. When can we expect to see some additional
transfers of the 57 detainees cleared for transfer? Understanding that
you want to avoid undue command influence, do you believe the military
commissions process is working? When will the 9/11 co-conspirators be
brought to justice? Is the Department seeking additional funds for
construction at Guantanamo related to the ongoing detention operations?
Why does the Department insist on continuing force feeding in a manner
inconsistent with the Bureau of Prisons and against the recommendations
of the Defense Health Board? If so, why?
Answer. I believe it's in our national interest to close the
detention facility at Guantanamo. Legal cases surrounding detainees at
Guantanamo are complicated and legally complex requiring due
deliberation in order to work through the matters in an appropriate and
transparent manner. Both the accused and the government are represented
by able counsel who work diligently on behalf of their clients and in
the interests of justice. These cases are being presided over by
thoughtful and deliberate military judges. I will defer to the Office
of the Convening Authority and Office of the Chief Prosecutor for
Military Commissions on when or if 9-11 co-conspirators will be
prosecuted. The Department submitted to Congress a list of unfunded
priorities which are not endorsed unless enacted funds exceed the
amount requested in PB '16. One of these priorities included SOUTHCOM's
request for $76 million to complete critical repairs to GTMO barracks
to ensure the health and safety of our personnel. This construction is
not related to detention operations, per se, and can be repurposed for
other missions in the future. The Department remains committed to the
safe, humane, legal, and transparent treatment of all individuals
detained by U.S. Forces. Regarding policy decisions about additional
detainee transfers, request for additional funding or how the detention
facility at GITMO may be closed, I defer to the Secretary.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
Question. Commissaries remain a highly valued benefit for our
military families. Yet, the Department's fiscal year 2016 budget cuts
$300 million from commissaries, and proposes a further reduction in the
commissary budget to $500 million by 2017. What is the basis for
proposing these significant reductions? Has there been any assessment
of the impact of these reductions on exchanges, and other welfare and
recreation programs? Additionally, what will the impact of these cuts
have on a military family's budget?
Answer. The Department's ongoing fiscal constraints require a
comprehensive review of all programs. For fiscal year 2016, we believe
the decrease in the commissary subsidy can be absorbed via operating
changes. The operating change most visible to commissary patrons would
be a reduction in operating days and hours, but all commissaries would
remain open at least 5 days a week. Legislative changes, if enacted,
would allow us to include the cost of second destination transportation
in the price of commissary goods worldwide (but would result only
minimal--approximately 2 percent--increases in prices), and would
transition the costs of operating supplies from the appropriation to
surcharge.
For fiscal year 2017 and beyond, the Department believes that the
Defense Commissary Agency must shift to become a partially self-
sustaining business model, while minimizing the impact on active duty
and retiree families who rely on the commissary as a benefit of
service.
Currently, the Department does not have any definitive assessments
of the impact of reduced commissary system operating days and hours
and/or increased commissary prices on the exchanges and morale,
welfare, and recreation programs.
Pursuant to section 634 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2015 (Public
Law 113-291), the Department is conducting a review of the commissary
system utilizing the services of an independent organization
experienced in grocery retail analysis. The Department has awarded a
contract to the Boston Consulting Group to conduct the required
independent study which will result in a report, due not later than
September 1, 2015, that provides details and analysis on the following
issues, including the impact on military families:
--Using variable pricing in commissary stores to reduce the
expenditure of appropriated funds;
--Implementing a program to make private label products available in
the commissary system;
--Eliminating or reducing appropriated ``second destination
transportation'' funding for shipment of goods overseas;
--Converting the defense commissary system to a nonappropriated fund
activity;
--Assessing the impact that elimination or reduction of the
commissary subsidy would have on eligible beneficiaries.
The Department's goal is to protect the value of the commissary
benefit by maintaining 20 percent aggregate customer savings (as
compared to commercial prices) on an average market basket of grocery
items. The commissary's pricing strategy will be targeted in a manner
to maximize the customer savings level and minimize the impact on the
military family's budget.
Question. Fort Meade is rapidly growing, with over 50,000 people
working on Fort Meade every day. However, the Army only has 6,000
Service Members at Fort Meade, and it does not recognize other tenants
on the installation. Therefore, the Army only funds Fort Meade for
6,000 people-- not 50,000 people--which has resulted in a $130 million
O&M project backlog. This is a substantial problem that greatly
contributes to deterioration and substandard maintenance funding for
the installation. What can be done to ensure that the necessary funding
needed to sustain operations at Ft. Meade--for all of the 50,000 people
who actually work there--is provided for?
Answer. The Army's official database of record for Installation
population does recognize the Fort Meade workforce of 51,158 personnel,
including over 40,000 military service members and government
civilians. Within those numbers are over 100 Federal agencies and
units, many of which are reimbursable to the Garrison for their
facilities and services. In keeping with the Army's facilities
sustainment, restoration and modernization practices applied across all
its installations, these workforce figures are indeed being applied in
determining Fort Meade facility funding requirements.
c-130j basing at warfield air guard station (martin state)
Question. The Air Force has stated it would like to divest the A-10
by 2019, and has stated its intention to transfer from the A-10 to C-
130J's in Maryland in 2018. If A-10's are divested with no replacement,
the Air Guard at Martin State will have no flying mission. This mission
is a top priority for Maryland and the Air Force has promised to
replace the A-10's with C-130J's. Can you confirm that the A-10's in
Maryland will be replaced with C-130J's, and confirm when the Air Force
will have a Bed Down plan for the location of these C-130J's?
Answer. The fiscal year 2015 President's Budget submission replaces
the A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft assigned to the 175th Wing (ANG) with
C-130J Super Hercules aircraft in fiscal year 2018. The fiscal years
2016 President's Budget submission reaffirmed this position.
Headquarters Air Force staff is working a transition plan with the
Air National Guard for the bed down of C-130Js at Warfield Air Guard
Station (Martin State Airport) once final A-10 retirement schedules are
determined.
Question. In December of 2014, the Department published its report
on the ``Review of the Roles, Selection, and Evaluation of
Superintendents of Military Service Academies.'' I am pleased that the
Department worked to provide the important recommendations identified
in this report. What are the plans to follow-up on these
recommendations?
Answer. The Department has directed the establishment of a Military
Service Academy Superintendent working group that will be chaired by
the Director for Senior Officer Policy. This working group will be
comprised of members from each of the Services, and its principal task
will be to review the seven recommendations and establish a plan to
enhance the performance, development, and preparation of
superintendents.
The working group will focus on the following areas:
--How to better prepare and train future superintendents for the
challenges of these critical leadership positions.
--The potential for early confirmation for superintendent nominees to
permit more time for preparation and training between
nomination and the actual assignment.
--Developing and adopting more deliberate selection criteria and
preparation processes.
--How to continue strong, vital superintendent-Service military
leader relationships; build a cadre of quality superintendent
candidates; establish a more deliberate selection process for
nominees; and improve continuity and build more effective,
lasting relationships, possibly through longer tour lengths.
Question. The Department just recently published its annual report
on sexual assault in the military. The report shows, among other
things, that retaliation remains a significant problem. I am deeply
troubled that 62 percent of victims who report an assault face some
type of retaliation, and strongly believe this is unacceptable. What
are you doing to address retaliation against victims, besides
collecting data?
Answer. In both 2012 and 2014, 62 percent of Service women victims
who said they filed an unrestricted report of sexual assault indicated
that they perceived professional retaliation (32 percent), social
retaliation (53 percent), adverse administrative actions (35 percent),
or punishments for violations associated with the sexual assault (11
percent). DOD survey responses on retaliation should not be viewed as
an indicator of actionable offenses under military law. DOD asks about
retaliation on surveys as a way to better assess victim well-being and
to understand the stressors experienced following a report of sexual
assault, not to establish a rate that would align with actionable
offenses under military law. While victims certainly perceived
alienation by peers and reprisal by other parties, these perceptions
are only one piece of a criminal retaliation charge. Other factors,
such as the intent of the individual suspected of reprisal and the
behavior experienced by the victim must be evaluated before a criminal
offense can be charged. Thus, the retaliation figure of 62 percent is
an estimate from a survey that assesses victims' broad and unspecified
perceptions.
That said, the Department views retaliation as a significant
concern and is committed to addressing retaliatory action, improving
resources for victims, and providing tools for commanders to prevent
and respond to retaliation. As such, I have directed a number of
initiatives aimed at better understanding the problem and the most
effective ways to combat it, including leadership actions, policy
initiatives, and enhanced training. Below are specific examples of
ongoing efforts reflecting the intensified focus on retaliation at
every level across the Department:
--The DOD Strategy.--Development of a Department-wide strategy to
prevent retaliation as a result of reporting of any crime, not
just sexual assault.
--Review of policy.--The Department is conducting a systematic review
of retaliation allegations made to the Service commands and
Inspectors General to better assess the experience of
retaliation and identify potential points of intervention.
--Survey/Data improvement.--The Department is modifying the questions
it asks in future surveys so as to be able better capture
victim perceptions of retaliation, as it is described in new
policy and law.
--Training.--The Department has already implemented enhanced training
of first-line supervisors who work with our youngest troops--
those at greatest risk for sexual assault--to teach the skills
needed to intervene early should they witness inappropriate or
retaliatory behavior. Additional training enhancements are
currently under review, such as augmenting the focus of
bystander intervention training to include intervening when
retaliation occurs.
--Special Victims' Counsel/Victims' Legal Counsel Program.--The
newly-established Special Victims' Counsel Program attorneys
play an important role in protecting victim's rights and
reducing the negative impact of retaliation when it does occur.
These attorneys are trained to guide victims who are
experiencing retaliation to the appropriate reporting
authorities.
--Awareness campaigns.--The Department is expanding its awareness
campaign on reporting options for those who experience
retaliation after making a report of sexual assault. One effort
underway is to include information on how to report retaliation
on the DOD Safe Helpline (expected to go live in June 2015).
--Case Management Groups.--The Department is leveraging monthly case
management groups to actively inquire about retaliation alleged
by victims and response professionals, and forwarding
allegations to the proper authorities for investigation and
follow up.
--Commander Oversight.--DOD has fully implemented Section 508 of the
Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015. This provision requires
all performance appraisals of commanding officers to address
the command climate established, in order to ensure that all
allegations of sexual assault are properly managed and fairly
evaluated, and that victims can report without fear of reprisal
or ostracism. Further, the Department is establishing new
procedures for commanders to regularly assess--and act on--all
reports of retaliation in any form from a victim, witness or
first responder, as well as identifying the mechanisms
available to commanders and creating action plans to address
retaliation within their units.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
Question. The Department recently released a new report on sexual
assault in the military, an issue that I feel very strongly about and
have worked hard to address. While it is encouraging to see the
estimated number of sexual assaults down, and reporting up, we must do
more to protect our men and women in uniform. No servicemember should
live in fear of sexual assault. I wrote several provisions in the 2014
defense authorization bill to address this--including one that requires
a comprehensive Special Victims' Counsel program in each service, to
help victims get the support and legal advice they need.This program is
a critical part of the progress we are seeing so far. SVCs have more
than 90 percent approval, and demand for those services continues to
rise. This program must be resourced to meet this increased demand.
How many cases is each SVC expected to manage effectively, and how
much additional funding and personnel are needed to meet the growing
demand for these services?
Answer. The number of cases that each victims'counsel can manage
effectively depends on a number of factors, including case complexity,
the counsel's training and experience, the counsel's existing caseload,
the geographic locations of the victim and counsel, and the location of
the hearings. Therefore, I will ensure each Service is properly
resourced to provide victim counsel services in a method that works
best for that Service. If the Department requires additional resource
or support for this program, we will make it our priority to consult
Congress.
Question. The rates of sexual assault in the guard and reserves are
very concerning. The latest sexual assault report says 85 percent of
sexual assaults among reserve members involved another servicemember or
took place in a military setting.
How do you explain why rates are so much higher for guard and
reserve members in military settings versus civilian settings?
Answer. Most Reserve Component members who indicated on the 2014
RAND Military Workplace Study experiencing a sexual assault in the past
year said that the assault was by another member of the military or in
a military setting. The study's results did not provide any further
clarifying details to help explain this finding. We will follow up on
this information in the Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of the
Reserve Component to be conducted later this year.
We agree the findings in the report are concerning. We have made
great strides in facing what was once a silent problem and are
committed to eliminating sexual assault from the DOD. While we are
concerned at the amount of sexual assault that is being reported, we
are encouraged that members are coming forward to report the crime more
often, in both the active and reserve components. We take each report
seriously and are making sure that members receive appropriate care and
counseling and, with the member's consent, we are fully investigating
the incident.
Question. Malaria is a serious threat to our troops in many places
around the world, as well as the local populations.In fact, in 2010 the
Defense Department ranked malaria as the greatest infectious disease
threat to U.S. forces. And in recent years we have seen drug resistant
strains start to emerge.
Please provide an evaluation of malaria's effect on current
military operations.
Answer. Military operations are impacted by malaria. The longer the
Service member is present in endemic areas the greater they are at risk
of acquiring malaria. Force protection must be considered when
deploying to areas known to have malaria. Almost all cases of malaria
can be prevented if these preventive measures are employed: avoiding
geographic areas of risk, employing bed nets, residual pesticides,
permethrin-treated uniforms, and chemoprophylaxis. In addition, Service
members are at risk for a year afterwards as cases can have latent
periods. This is why the Armed Services Blood Program places a 12 month
restriction on voluntary blood donations if the Service member deploys
to malaria-endemic areas. Malaria is endemic in over 100 countries
throughout tropical and subtropical regions of the world. Therefore
military planners must anticipate the geography-based presence or
absence of the malaria threat and countermeasures implemented. Our
Armed Forces have long had policies and prescribed countermeasures
effective against vector-borne diseases such as malaria.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Udall
Question. Secretary Carter, how concerned are you about the
shortfall in funds available for maintenance, in your opinion is this
sustainable, and why is the Department of Defense shortchanging future
readiness by proposing a decreased budget for operations and
maintenance...specifically one which leaves a $220 million backlog in
restoration and maintenance at White Sands?
Answer. Yes, I am concerned about the risk the Department of
Defense (DOD) is forced to accept in global infrastructure maintenance;
but with the Budget Control Act (BCA) and the continued unwillingness
of Congress to authorize a cost saving Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) round, we really have no choice. The Department has, and would
continue to, accept risk in facilities sustainment and maintenance in
order to minimize risk in readiness. While the fiscal year 2016 budget
request moves our investments, including maintenance, in our
installations in the right direction, more needs to be done and it is
essential that we amend the BCA caps so that we can achieve the defense
funding levels necessary to properly support our installations.
Congress could also help mitigate the long-term impacts of this
underfunding by authorizing another round of BRAC as requested in the
President's Budget. By reducing DOD infrastructure to better match our
declining force structure, we can reduce our facility maintenance and
out-year recapitalization requirements and rededicate savings resulting
from a BRAC round on the infrastructure we really need to train and
operate our forces.
Question. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, there has been a
lot of attention to recent failures in the nuclear security enterprise.
Both you and your predecessor have made it a point to once again make
the strategic forces of the United States a priority. Would you agree
that strong funding for the life extension programs, including the B61,
are important and how would they be impacted if we were to allow
sequestration to return?
Answer. In PB16, the Department re-affirmed the nuclear enterprise
as its number one priority, and invested accordingly to address long-
standing sustainment issues and to accelerate recapitalization.
Sequestration-level funding would intensify existing shortfalls, delay
recapitalization, and undermine our foundational nuclear deterrence
capabilities.
Question. Secretary Carter, New Mexico plays an important role
ensuring that our Nation's nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and
effective. One of the next big programs on the horizon is the Long
Range Strike Bomber...And given past cost increases for major programs,
I think it is extremely important that DOD get this one right...with
regards to this program, how will you be working with the national labs
to ensure the LRSB's specifications are compatible with current life
extension programs, including the B61 LEP?
Answer. The LRS-B program has been working closely with all the
appropriate organizations to ensure compatibility with relevant life
extension programs. The program has been engaged on multiple levels
with STRATCOM, Air Force Global Strike Command, the Air Force Nuclear
Weapon Center, B-61 LEP program, NNSA leadership and other Air Force
and Department of Defense organizations involved in nuclear development
efforts. As the program moves forward through the acquisition
lifecycle, the program office will continue this interaction to ensure
the applicable compatibility between life extension programs and LRS-B
continues.
Question. This panel has had a lot of questions about access to
space, particularly with regards to heavy payloads. In New Mexico,
Operational Responsive Space is working to decrease the need for heavy
payloads, as it develops smaller satellite technologies to give the
warfighter access to space based technologies without the need for an
expensive launch or large satellite requiring years to develop.
Secretary Carter, how does the Department of Defense intend to use the
technologies developed by ORS, and will these smaller payloads help
take the pressure off the increased need for heavy launch payloads?
Answer. We do not anticipate significant changes to our heavy
launch system requirements due to Operational Responsive Space (ORS)-
related activities. The ORS program office has a unique mandate and
acquisition authorities with the goal to drive down cost and decrease
delivery time for urgently needed space capabilities, thus enabling a
broad range of replenishment and reconstitution options.
Two examples where the Air Force looks to integrate ORS concepts
are Weather System Follow-On and Space Based Space Surveillance Follow-
On.
Question. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey. I have had a lot of
conversations about 3D printing with the national labs and the
potential for this future technology at the labs and the military. My
understanding is that both the Navy and the Air Force are working to
test this technology, specifically in the battlefield where replacement
parts and other tools may not be easy to acquire. How do you see 3D
printing changing the future of the battlefield, and is the military
concerned that this technology could potentially be a force enabler for
our military and adversaries?
Answer. Services are actively pursuing, fielding, and demonstrating
additive manufacturing, also known as 3D printing, as a means to
increase readiness and agility by reducing acquisition lead times,
cycle times, inventories and logistics footprint. Additive
manufacturing has the potential to transform the supply chain by
enabling on-demand manufacture or repair of critical parts at or near
the battlefield. The Department of Defense is actively partnering with
industry and academia to address intellectual property rights, cyber
security, training, certifications and standards to determine an
effective and affordable DOD strategy. Just as we recognize the
potential value of additive manufacturing, our adversaries are also
pursuing this technology.
Question. Describe the role of the DOD Chief Information Officer
(CIO) in the development and oversight of the IT budget for DOD. How is
the CIO involved in the decision to make an IT investment, determine
its scope, oversee its contract, and oversee continued operation and
maintenance?
Answer. The DOD CIO issues policy and guidance for the development,
collection, and oversight of the Department's IT budget. Policy is
codified in the DOD Financial Management Regulations, and annual IT
Budget guidance is provided by the DOD CIO through the Director, Cost
Assessment & Program Evaluation (CAPE) and Under Secretary of Defense,
Comptroller (OUSD(C)) Integrated Program Budget Guidance and annual DOD
CIO Guidance for Information Technology Budget Submissions.
The CIO is an active participant in the Department's three major
decision --making processes; specifically, the requirements process;
the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution (PPBE) system process;
and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). These processes are used to
manage the Department's investments, including its IT investments.
Question. Describe the existing authorities, organizational
structure, and reporting relationship of the Chief Information Officer.
Note and explain any variance from that prescribed in the newly-enacted
Federal Information Technology and Acquisition Reform Act of 2014
(FITARA, PL 113-291) for the above.
Answer. The Department of Defense Chief Information Officer's (DOD
CIO) reports directly to me and is the Principal Staff Advisor for
information technology (IT) (including national security systems and
defense business systems), information resources management (IRM) and
efficiencies. The DOD CIO is responsible for all matters relating to
the DOD information enterprise, including communications; spectrum
management; network policy and standards; information systems;
cybersecurity; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) policy; and
the DOD information enterprise that supports DOD command and control
(C2). The DOD CIO's authorities align and are consistent with the
authorities and responsibilities prescribed by the Clinger-Cohen Act,
as amended, FITARA and Title 10, United States Code.
Question. What formal or informal mechanisms exist at DOD to ensure
coordination and alignment within the CXO community (i.e., the Chief
Information Officer, the Chief Acquisition Officer, the Chief Finance
Officer, the Chief Human Capital Officer, and so on)?
Answer. The Department of Defense has formal and informal
mechanisms to ensure integration and alignment within and across the
CXO communities. Formal mechanisms include participation by the various
CXO communities in governance venues across the Department. These
formal, chartered venues (see table below for a sampling of the primary
functional venues) are chaired and co-chaired by the CXO officials as
the functional leads, and include the other CXO officials as members.
This broad representation and participation ensure that the views of
CXO officials are shared during deliberative processes, which, in turn,
promote strategic alignment across the Department. Moreover, these
functional venues provide CXO-vetted products to the Deputy's
Management Action Group (DMAG), which is the Deputy Secretary of
Defense's primary management forum to support the Secretary of Defense.
The DMAG prioritizes and deliberates issues that have resource,
management, and broad strategic and/or policy implications.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CXO Officials Governance Forum by CXO
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DSD/Chief Management Officer (CMO/COO).... DMAG (DSD serves as the
Chair and the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff serves as the Co-
chair).
Deputy CMO................................ Defense Business Council
(DCMO is a Co-chair)
Financial Improvement and
Audit Readiness Governance
Board (DCMO is a Co-chair).
CIO DOD................................... Defense Business Council
(CIO DOD is a Co-chair) DOD
CIO Executive Board
(Chair).
USD(C)/CFO................................ Financial Improvement and
Audit Readiness Board
(USD(C)/CFO is a Co-chair).
USD(Acquisition, Technology, and Defense Acquisition Board
Logistics)/Defense Acquisition Executive. (Chair).
USD(Personnel and Readiness)/Chief Human Defense Human Resources
Capital Officer. Board (Chair)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another formal mechanism is the requirement for CXO officials to
coordinate on DOD issuances, policies, and memoranda. As the heads of
their respective functional domains, the CXOs are all formally
chartered by the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense, and
are assigned policy and program responsibilities and functions,
delegated specific authorities to enable the execution of their
responsibilities, and directed to enter into relationships and
engagements with other CXOs and Departmental organizations to ensure
coordination and alignment of their interfacing equities. The DCMO, as
the proponent for the DOD Issuances Program, manages and oversees the
process to ensure that policy and procedural guidance has been properly
reviewed and coordinated with the functional CXO communities, and
issues have been appropriately adjudicated before finalization.
Informal mechanisms that ensure coordination and alignment in the
CXO community are the relationships and communications of and between
the CXO officials and their staffs. Engagement at all levels, between
senior officials, action officers, and subject matter experts across
the various offices, is encouraged and expected in order to synchronize
interrelated efforts across the Department, ensure alignment with
strategic priorities, and develop integrated solutions for DOD senior
leaders.
Question. According to the Office of Personnel Management, 46
percent of the more than 80,000 Federal IT workers are 50 years of age
or older, and more than 10 percent are 60 or older. Just 4 percent of
the Federal IT workforce is under 30 years of age. Does DOD have such
demographic imbalances? How is it addressing them?
Answer. The 80,000+ IT workers referenced by the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) are the Federal-wide population of the 2210
IT Management series. This series is the largest IT/cyber occupation in
the Federal Government, and DOD has almost 36,000 of the employees in
this series (44 percent of the total Federal population). The Federal
age demographics cited by OPM are virtually identical for the
Department of Defense.
The DOD typically hires experienced workers for the civilian
component of its IT/cyber workforce (while the military provides a
large source of younger, entry-level personnel). The two largest
sources of hires into the civilian IT/cyber community come from our
veteran population. For example, in fiscal year 2014, 608 military
retirees and 1,365 prior military (non-retiree) personnel were hired
into this occupation by DOD, comprising 69 percent of the 2210 series'
hires by the Department for last year. These individuals provide a rich
source of experience to the DOD civilian IT/cyber community as they are
already familiar with the DOD environment and mission but they do skew
the age demographics. Additionally, DOD does use internships,
scholarship programs, and college recruitment programs to attract
promising new talent to Federal service in the IT/cyber community. The
Department is currently examining the feasibility of establishing a
Cyber Workforce Development Fund which could be used to help attract
and retain highly qualified individuals at all levels of experience.
Question. How much of the DOD budget goes to Demonstration,
Modernization, and Enhancement of IT systems as opposed to supporting
existing and ongoing programs and infrastructure? How has this changed
in the last 5 years?
Answer. Development, Modernization, and Enhancement (DME)
represented almost $10.5 billion or 28 percent of the total DOD IT
budget submission for fiscal year 2016. Over the past 5 years, annual
DME requests have decreased.
Question. What are the 10 highest priority IT investment projects
that are under development within DOD? Of these, which ones are being
developed using an ``agile'' or incremental approach, such as
delivering working functionality in smaller increments and completing
initial deployment to end-users in short, 6-month timeframes?
Answer. The Department has a number of high priority IT
investments, which follow the Department's Better Buying Power (BBP)
Initiatives. In the case of IT investments, BBP 3.0 expands upon
efforts that were already underway, such as expanding the number of
enterprise IT buys and negotiating enterprise licenses. The Department
uses agile and incremental development approaches for its IT
investments to deliver capabilities to the warfighter incrementally and
with limited fielding decisions as appropriate.
DOD's high priority IT investments include:
--Joint Regional Security Stacks (JRSS).--JRSS are the first or
foundational phase of the Joint Information Environment (JIE),
are a regionally based, centrally managed rack of servers,
switches, and other equipment that are being implemented in a
phased or incremental approach to replace the current set of
separate, individualized, localized Service and Agency security
systems. The investment in JRSS will help to ensure that the
Department's facilities are using the same security
architecture and improve our overall cyber posture and enable
the operations commander and service partners to see a common
network picture.
--Mission Partner Environment.--The Department is working to develop
a more commercially based and robust mission partner
environment/network. This approach will provide a more cost-
effective, rapidly reconfigurable and multi-level data
protection network. It will provide full data media capability
to support operations in all environments, with the ability to
rapidly add and subtract mission partners. This is a top
requirement for all Combatant Commands, and will be fielded in
an incremental manner
--Cloud computing investments.--Cloud computing plays a critical role
in the Department's IT modernization efforts. Our key objective
is to deliver a cost efficient, secure enough enterprise
environment that can readily adapt to the Department's mission
needs. We will use a hybrid approach to cloud that takes
advantage of all types of cloud solutions, provided by both
commercial providers and DOD Components, to get the best
combination of mission effectiveness and efficiency in a
flexible and agile manner.
--Mobility.--DOD continues to evolve areas critical to mobility: the
networking infrastructure, devices, and applications. The goal
is to reduce the cost of accessing information while
integrating a security strategy that protects the data and
incorporates the most recent commercial technologies. Specific
examples of DOD mobility initiatives include: an effort to
simplify the ability to encrypt and authenticate email,
layering multiple commercial standards permitting smart phones/
devices manufactured by vendors such as BlackBerry, Samsung and
Boeing, to handle secret data and the use of commercial cloud
providers to globally distribute and synchronize flight
information for the Air Force's Electronic Flight Bag program.
This enables the Department to deliver capability improvements
incrementally to users as the mobile solutions provide
cybersecurity sufficient for the data and mission.
--Cybersecurity.--The Department's cyberspace operations investments
include a number of critical capabilities designed to identify,
remediate and protect against cyber threats. These include
enclave defense capabilities, zero day defense, and similar
tools. Our efforts in this area are continuous to rapidly
deliver the capabilities that defend against the relentless
evolution of our adversary's attacks.
--Defense Healthcare Management System Modernization (DHMSM).--The
DHMSM program will replace the existing outpatient and
inpatient MHS clinical systems with a single, integrated
capability. This will improve interoperability and data sharing
to clinicians, purchased care providers, and Veterans Affairs.
The DHMSM deployment will enable the standardization of care
across the MHS to ensure that patients receive consistent,
medically and cost effective treatment. When fully operational,
DHMSM is expected to maximize medical readiness for our
military and support DOD's current population of more than 9.6
million beneficiaries and 153,000 MHS personnel.
--Joint Enterprise License Agreements (JELA).--One of the ways the
Department has improved its investments in software is to enter
into Joint Enterprise License Agreements (JELA). These
contractual agreements allow DOD to leverage its size to get
better pricing on software products and purchase licenses when
needed. This is an integral part of the Department's Better
Buying Power 3.0 initiative. DOD is also working with the
General Services Administration and other Federal Agencies as
part of the President's Management Agenda to establish Federal-
wide software purchasing agreements that should even further
reduce the price of software products.
--Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) routers.--As the Department
implements the Joint Information Environment we are eliminating
outdated, unmaintainable circuit switches with multi-protocol
label switching (MPLS) routers that enable us to do everything
over Internet protocol (IP). This change improves security,
provides greater capability, and allows for better use of
existing network capacity.
--Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) Increment 1.--The
Department of the Navy's Next Generation Enterprise Network is
a true success story that is providing capability now. The NGEN
contract delivered $1.2 billion in real savings across the FYDP
as a result of leveraging competitive market forces to drive
down costs. The NGEN contract provides for an enterprise
network for both Navy and Marines and is an integral element of
delivering JIE and JRSS capabilities.
--Joint IT Service Provider--Pentagon (JITSPP) Implementation.--This
is a phased implementation that will result in consolidation of
existing IT service providers into a single organization that
provides common IT services for the entire Pentagon. This
approach will provide for significant cost efficiencies and
commonality of IT services across DOD headquarters.
Question. To ensure that steady state investments continue to meet
agency needs, OMB has a longstanding policy for agencies to annually
review, evaluate, and report on their legacy IT infrastructure through
Operational Assessments. What Operational Assessments have you
conducted and what were the results?
Answer. The Department reviews its operational IT investments for
business value, alignment with the overall architecture, return on
investment, and efficiency & effectiveness as part of existing DOD
processes. For example, the Defense Business Council serves as the
Investment Review Board (IRB) for business systems, pursuant to section
2222 of Title 10, U.S.C., and ensures that defense business system
investments are aligned to the lines of business for the Department;
supports measureable improvements to the Department's business
objectives; and generates a measureable return on investment. Based
upon the reviews, investments are designated for either continued
operation and sustainment or retirement.
Question. What are the 10 oldest IT systems or infrastructures
within DOD? How old are they? Would it be cost-effective to replace
them with newer IT investments?
Answer. The following list identifies 10 of the oldest IT systems
and whether or not the system is being replaced by other capabilities
or systems:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Age in
System Years Future Plans
------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Accounting and Finance 55 No plans to be
System--Reengineered. replaced at this
time.
Integrated Logistics Systems-Supply 51 Scheduled to be
ILS-S. replaced in 2020.
Mechanization Of Contract 50 Scheduled to
Administration Services (MOCAS). replacement.
Item Management Control System--IMCS 47 Scheduled to be
replaced in 2020.
Aircraft Structural Integrity 44 Scheduled to be
Management Information Systems replaced in 2020.
ASIMIS.
Acquisition and Due In System (ADIS) 43 Migrating in 2016.
Reparability Forecast Model System-- 38 Scheduled to be
RFM. replaced in 2017.
Depot Maintenance Workload Planning 38 Scheduled to be
and Control System--DMWPCS. replaced in 2017.
Personnel Budget and Analysis System 35 No plans to be
Web--PBASWeb. replaced at this
time.
MISTR Requirements Scheduling and 34 Scheduled to be
Analysis System--MISTR. replaced in 2017.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. How does DOD's IT governance process allow for DOD to
terminate or ``off ramp'' IT investments that are critically over
budget, over schedule, or failing to meet performance goals? Similarly,
how does DOD's IT governance process allow for DOD to replace or ``on-
ramp'' new solutions after terminating a failing IT investment?
Answer. The governance process for IT systems is similar to that
for major defense weapons systems. Information Systems that critically
breach their cost, schedule or performance parameters are reviewed by
the respective Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) for that investment
in accordance with title 10 USC Chapter 144A (which establishes a
reporting regime for the Major Automated Information System programs)
and/or guidance in DOD Instruction 5000.02 (which governs Operation of
the Defense Acquisition System for programs of all magnitudes). These
reviews follow the basic tenets of capital planning and investment
control, and are used by the decision authority to review cost,
schedule, performance, and operational as well as technical risk as the
basis for the decision. Two MAIS programs have been terminated after
such reviews: the Virtual Interactive Processing System in December
2012 and the Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECCS) in March 2013.
In deciding to ``on-ramp'' a new investment after terminating a
failing investment, the Department looks at root causes of the failure
and puts corrective actions in place before initiating the replacement
investment to address the needed capability.
Question. What IT projects has the DOD decommissioned in the last
year? What are DOD's plans to decommission IT projects this year?
Answer. The following two tables provides a list of IT investments/
systems decommissioned last year and scheduled to be decommissioned
this year.
DECOMMISSIONED LAST YEAR
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combined Federated Battle Laboratories Network (CFBLNet):
4EYES Enclave
CISCO 7500 Routers
DISN Video Services--Global (DVS-G)
System Network Availability Performance Service (SyNAPS)
Third Party Outpatient Collections System (TPOCS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCHEDULED TO BE DECOMMISSIONED THIS YEAR
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interim DOD Enterprise Classified Travel Kit (iDECTK):
DOD Mobility Classified Capability (DMCC) 1.0
DISN Asynchronous Transfer Mode Services (DATMS)
Combined Enterprise Regional
Defense Collaboration Online (DCO)
Patient Movement Items Tracking System (PMITS)
Military Health System (MHS) Learn
Army Knowledge Online AKO) email service
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. The newly-enacted Federal Information Technology and
Acquisition Reform Act of 2014 (FITARA, PL 113-291) directs CIOs to
conduct annual reviews of their IT portfolio. Please describe DOD's
efforts to identify and reduce wasteful, low-value or duplicative
information technology (IT) investments as part of these portfolio
reviews.
Answer. FITARA includes language that allows the Department to use
its existing processes to satisfy many requirements. The annual review
of the Department's IT portfolio under FITARA is accomplished
consistent with section 833 of Public Law 113-291 and section 2222 of
title 10, United States Code, which requires that the Department
annually review its business system portfolio investments. This process
is used to ensure that business system IT investments are aligned to
the Department's strategy, enable end-to-end integration, improve
business operations and leverage the appropriate technology to deliver
agile, effective, and efficient business solutions that support and
enable the Warfighter. The DOD CIO and the DOD Chief Management Officer
co-chair the Defense Business Council, which reviews these investments.
The process is documented in the Department's ``Guidance for Review and
Certification of Defense Business Systems'' and takes a functional
portfolio-based approach in reviewing business systems to ensure
performance, alignment with strategies, and eliminate duplication. The
Department's March 2015 annual report to Congress on defense business
operations includes additional information about the Department's
efforts in this area.''
Question. In 2011, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued
a ``Cloud First'' policy that required agency Chief Information
Officers to implement a cloud-based service whenever there was a
secure, reliable, and cost-effective option. How many of DOD's IT
investments are cloud-based services (Infrastructure as a Service,
Platform as a Service, Software as a Service, etc.)? What percentage of
the DOD's overall IT investments are cloud-based services? How has this
changed since 2011?
Answer. Today, the Department is investing in six DOD provided
cloud services: Armed Forces Billing and Collection Utilization
Solution (ABACUS), DOD Enterprise Email (DEE), DOD Enterprise Portal
Service (DEPS), Defense Collaboration Services (DCS), Global Content
Delivery Service (GCDS), and milCloud. Today, DEE is supporting
approximately 1.6M users. The Department is also making over 20
different investments in several commercial cloud services including:
Akamai's Content Delivery Service, Amazon's East/West US Public Cloud,
Amazon's Government Community Cloud, Blackboard's Learning Management
Cloud, Google Apps for Government, Google Apps for Education, IBM Cloud
Services, Microsoft's Office365 Public Cloud, Microsoft's Office365
Dedicated ITAR Private Cloud, Oracle's Service Cloud, and Schoology's
Learning Management Cloud.
Today, cloud investments only represent about 2 percent of the
Department's IT budget. To accelerate adoption of commercial cloud
services, the DOD CIO recently updated the Department's cloud policies,
published the DOD Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide, and
provided Business Case Analysis guidance that requires new IT
investment efforts to evaluate commercially provided cloud services as
an option.
Question. Provide short summaries of three recent IT program
successes--projects that were delivered on time, within budget, and
delivered the promised functionality and benefits to the end user. How
does the DOD define ``success'' in IT program management? What ``best
practices'' have emerged and been adopted from these recent IT program
successes? What have proven to be the most significant barriers
encountered to more common or frequent IT program successes?
Answer. Success in delivery of IT capabilities is driven by
executing on the basics: cost, schedule, and performance. It must be
delivered on time, be delivered at an affordable price, and perform as
required. Delivering IT capability requires competent IT program
management and more importantly great contracting strategies and
performance management. DOD uses commercial service providers to
deliver many of its IT services. The days of everything being delivered
in a DOD program of record where capabilities are cobbled together in
unique solutions are past.
One of our key priorities is implementation of the Joint Regional
Security Stacks (JRSS). This is the foundation of the Joint Information
Environment (JIE) initiative to replace our current Service- oriented
and localized security architecture and systems with a set of servers,
tools, and software that will provide better C2, more security. JRSS is
a coordinated effort by the Military Services and the Defense
Information Systems Agency to converge outputs from their individual
``programs'' and deliver the improved enterprise networking that JIE
represents. While this is not a traditional program, the fundamental
changes represented by this effort demonstrate how DOD is improving the
effectiveness and efficiency of delivering IT to the warfighter.
The Department of the Navy's Next Generation Enterprise Network is
a true success story that is providing capability now. The NGEN
contract delivered $1.2 billion in real savings across the FYDP as a
result of leveraging competitive market forces to drive down costs. The
NGEN contract provides for an enterprise network for both Navy and
Marines and is an integral element of delivering JIE and JRSS.
Teleport Generation 3 which is managed by the Defense Information
Systems Agency, is another example of a successful program. Teleport
Generation 3 is delivering upgrades to our satellite ground station
gateways that improves communications support in the Ultra High
Frequency (UHF), Extremely High Frequency, military Ka and Commercial
(i.e., C and Ku) SATCOM frequency bands and represents a ten-fold
increase to the throughput and functional capabilities of these
gateways.
One of the barriers to more common or frequent IT program successes
is the customization of software. In looking at programs that have gone
awry in this area, invariably there has been over- customization of the
COTS software to make the software fit existing business processes. Our
focus is on doing the appropriate business process reengineering up
front to minimize customization. We are seeing that pay off in complex
programs like Army Integrated Pay and Personnel System and the Air
Force Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS).
Question. Terry Halverson, the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO),
has outlined a vision for DOD use of cloud computing that empowers the
military departments and components to procure their own cloud
computing solutions. How will the implementation of this transition to
cloud computing be rationalized across DOD to ensure that common
standards, data portability and other enterprise-wide issues are
properly managed and addressed?
Answer. The Department, under the leadership of the DOD CIO, has
established a comprehensive program to improve the interoperability and
standardization of DOD IT capabilities and investments, to include
those using cloud computing services. DOD and CIO policy is designed to
implement a capability-focused, architecture-based approach for
achieving DOD IT interoperability. These policies establish the
procedures and responsibilities for identifying and implementing IT
standards, and for sharing electronic data and IT services, including
cloud computing technologies and services, within the Department.
Question. In a November 2014 letter to GAO, the DOD Principal
Deputy CIO wrote that the department plans to save $2.6 billion by
fiscal year 2017 from consolidating data centers and that such savings
``will increase to $4.7 billion in future years as efficiencies are
gained.'' How many data centers have been closed to date? How much
savings have been realized as a result? By what date does DOD expect to
achieve $4.7 billion in savings?
Answer. As of May 26, 2015, 488 data centers have been closed. DOD
estimates that data center closures and efficiency achievement through
fiscal year 2014 has resulted in $265 million of cumulative realized
savings. DOD expects to achieve $4.7 billion in cumulative savings by
the end of fiscal year 2019, contingent upon DOD Components achieving
prescribed efficiencies by fiscal year 2018 as established by the DOD
CIO in a Memorandum dated July 11, 2013 titled ``DOD Component Data
Center Consolidation Implementation Plans''.
Question. Of the 124 major IT investments DOD funds annually, only
5 of these investments are currently reported as ``high risk'' on the
Federal IT Dashboard. Given DOD's many challenges in the area of IT, is
this an accurate reporting of the risk level of these investments? If
not, what is a more accurate assessment of currently high risk IT
investments?
Answer. The risk levels reported on the Federal IT Dashboard
accurately reflect program risk at the time the assessment was made.
DOD reports its ratings twice a year, as agreed to with OMB. The
ratings currently showing on the dashboard were made of 28 October
2014, and are in the process of being updated.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. The subcommittee stands in recess.
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., Wednesday, May 6, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]