[Senate Hearing 114-143]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2016
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Lindsey
Graham (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Graham, Kirk, Blunt, Boozman, Moran,
Lankford, Daines, Leahy, Durbin, Coons, Merkley, and Murphy.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Secretary
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY
opening statement of senator lindsey graham
Senator Graham. The committee will come to order.
It is my pleasure to have Secretary Kerry with us today. We
all look forward to your testimony, Mr. Secretary. I just want
to acknowledge your hard work on behalf of our Nation. You are
very energetic, traveling from one end of the globe to the
other, trying to bring some calm out of chaos.
As to the subcommittee itself, I am now the chairman. I
appreciate the honor of chairing the subcommittee, but my
partner, Senator Leahy, we will continue to do what we have
been doing since I have been here, and that is work together
for the common good.
This is one account that has been bipartisan. We intend to
keep it that way. It represents 1 percent of the Federal
budget, give or take a bit. The amount of return on investment
the American taxpayer has achieved from this account I think is
something we should all be proud of.
There is more than one way to deal with a problem. The
military options are sometimes the most talked about, and there
are other ways to engage the world. This account represents
ways to engage the world without the use of military force.
I worry deeply about the effects of sequestration, Mr.
Secretary, on this account. We are due to spend 2.3 percent of
GDP, somewhere in that range, on defense by the 2024 period.
That will be the lowest amount we spend on our national defense
in decades. This account, which I believe is national defense
in another form, gets dramatically reduced.
What does that mean? It means that all the efforts we have
made to counter malaria and AIDS in Africa and throughout the
world are put in jeopardy. We have made such progress. Mother-
to-child AIDS transmission has been dramatically reduced. There
are countries on the continent of Africa that are inside the
10-yard line in terms of eradicating their AIDS problems. We
are turning the corner on malaria and almost eradicated polio.
The developing world needs America now more than ever. From
an American taxpayer point of view, this has been a good
investment to bring stability, particularly to the continent of
Africa. All is in jeopardy if the Congress continues to sit on
the sidelines and watch sequestration being implemented.
Finally, Embassy security. The entire State Department's
budget is under the appropriation of this subcommittee. To the
diplomats and the contractors who are serving in faraway places
with strange sounding names, God bless you. We worry about your
safety daily. I am here to say, from my point of view as
chairman of the subcommittee, if sequestration is not somehow
moderated or replaced, we are putting in jeopardy the ability
to post people overseas in dangerous areas safely. That, to me,
is not an alarmist view. It is reality.
So I look forward to hearing from the Secretary about a
variety of challenges throughout the world, and would love to
hear your comments about the effects of sequestration on your
ability to manage the department. You have a hard stop at noon,
so we will try to get through the 7-minute rounds.
With that, I will turn it over to Senator Leahy.
statement of senator patrick j. leahy
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I congratulate you
in the way your staff worked with me and my staff throughout
the years. The chairman was right in saying that this is a
committee where we are pretty transparent. We try to work in a
bipartisan way. I remember Senators Dan Inouye and Ted Stevens
doing that. I did it with Senator McConnell. We went back and
forth. Part of the time, I was chairman. Part of the time, he
was chairman. And then it was Senator Gregg in New Hampshire,
and now Senator Graham.
We did work closely together. Our bill was one of the few
that came out with virtually unanimous support. We tried to
check the priorities of whoever was in the White House, whether
it was a Democrat or Republican as President.
One of the things we tried to do also was to give the view
to the rest of the world that we are a lot stronger when we
work together.
Mr. Secretary, you have one of the most difficult jobs in
the world. We have known each other for decades. I have talked
to you about your travels, your indefatigable travels. But the
world seems to be on fire, sometimes literally, in so many
parts of the world.
We had a 14-year war in Afghanistan that set wildly
optimistic goals. But today, much of that country remains under
Taliban control with a weak central government. The government
I believe we should support struggles to function in a highly
insecure and corrupt environment. We had tens of billions of
dollars in aid programs implemented by U.S. contractors, very
little of that can be or will be sustained by the Afghans.
In Iraq, we spent hundreds of billions while dire needs in
other parts of the world, including our own hemisphere, to say
nothing about our own country, were neglected. But there it is,
an unstable, corrupt environment. I believe the future is
anything but secure.
Syria is the world's biggest disaster. Libya looks like it
can become another Syria.
Relations between Israelis and Palestinians have gone from
bad to worse, and we are at a decisive point with Iran.
ISIL has emerged seemingly out of nowhere. It is probably
the best illustration of how naive some were to think that
launching a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein meant that we were
going to be created in that area as liberators.
I have more of my statement that I will put in my record.
But look at Central America. Decades of corrupt
oligarchies, civil wars, despots. Governments there have
squandered the past two decades. Now you have organized crime
and corruption deeply rooted, widespread. I do welcome a new
focus in that region, but I want to make sure that the billions
that are being requested are going to be spent differently than
they were in the past.
Then we have Ebola, HIV/AIDS, spiraling cost of U.N.
peacekeeping, global warming. There is a lot going on.
I do commend the administration. I have spoken to you
privately and the President about this.
I realized that 50 years of policy on Cuba hadn't worked. I
think of the memos sent to the President, to hold tough and
those Castros will be gone any day now. Of course, the first
such memo was sent to President Eisenhower and then President
Kennedy and President Johnson, President Nixon, and so on.
prepared statement
So I think it won't change overnight, but the nice thing
now is that the mistakes made in Cuba and the failures of their
own economy, the Cuban Government can no longer blame it on us
because of our embargo. They are going to have to take
responsibility for their own mistakes.
I will put my full statement in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Thank you Mr. Chairman. This is Senator Graham's first hearing as
chairman of this subcommittee, and I congratulate him and thank him for
the way he and his staff have worked with me and my staff over the
years.
This subcommittee has a history of bipartisanship.
I remember 30 years ago when Senators Dan Inouye and Bob Kasten
worked together, and myself with Senator McConnell, Senator Gregg, and
since then with Senator Graham.
I have served as chairman and ranking member. We have switched back
and forth. But unlike some committees we have worked in a transparent,
cooperative way, drafting the bills and reports together.
We include the priorities of both sides, which has made it possible
to report bills with strong bipartisan votes and the support of the
White House--whether Republican or Democrat.
In a world as dangerous as today, we are far stronger when we act
together.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. You have one of the most
difficult jobs in the Government. The world seems to be on fire--
literally or figuratively--in so many places it is hard to keep track.
We appreciate that you are here requesting the resources to try to put
those fires out.
I think today we are reaping some of what we have sowed. After a 14
year war in Afghanistan that set wildly optimistic goals, much of that
country remains under Taliban control. A weak central government--a
government I believe we should support--struggles to function in a
highly insecure and corrupt environment.
After tens of billions of dollars on aid programs implemented by
U.S. contractors, very little of our investment can be sustained by the
Afghans.
In Iraq, where we spent hundreds of billions while dire needs in
other parts of the world--including our own hemisphere--were neglected,
there is a similarly unstable, corrupt environment where the future is
anything but secure.
In the meantime, Syria is the world's biggest disaster, Libya looks
like it is becoming another Syria, relations between Israelis and
Palestinians have gone from bad to worse, and we are approaching a
decisive point in the negotiations with Iran.
To top it off, ISIL has emerged seemingly out of nowhere, which is
perhaps the best illustration of how little the past administration
knew it was risking when it confidently, and naively, launched a war to
overthrow Saddam Hussein expecting to be greeted as liberators.
Our history is replete with examples of enormously costly, failed
attempts to control events--or to ally ourselves with repressive,
corrupt regimes--in parts of the world we don't understand, seemingly
oblivious to the long-term consequences.
I respect President Obama for wanting to avoid repeating those
mistakes, and I am interested in hearing your ideas for how to do that.
In Central America, after decades of corrupt oligarchies, civil
wars and death squads, governments there have squandered the past two
decades. Poverty, violence, organized crime and corruption are now
deeply rooted and widespread.
I welcome the administration's new focus on that region, but I want
to hear how the billion dollar initiative you propose is substantially
different from the billions we have spent there already.
Then there is Ebola and HIV/AIDS, the spiraling cost of UN
peacekeeping, global warming--the list of challenges for you and this
subcommittee is almost endless.
I want to commend you for the change in our policy toward Cuba,
which has been praised by our allies in this hemisphere.
I hope the Congress will do its part by ending the embargo, which
has failed to achieve any of its objectives. Then the Cuban people will
see that it is their own government, not the United States that is to
blame for the poverty and repression.
Your fiscal year 2016 budget request--with exceptions like the
funding for Central America, the Green Climate Fund, and the State
Department's and the United States Agency for International
Development's (USAID) operating budgets--looks a lot like last year.
It will, like most years, require us to make hard choices. I want
to work with you and Chairman Graham because I think we can do a much
better job of getting what we pay for.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator Leahy.
I have asked the Office of Inspector General to submit
written testimony on the budget request, which will appear in
the record following Secretary Kerry's opening statement.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY
Welcome, Secretary Kerry. We look forward to testimony.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very
much. It is really a pleasure to be here with you today and
with all my former colleagues and some non-former. But I deeply
appreciate the opportunity to testify.
And I welcome your chairmanship, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking
Member Leahy's continued efforts on this committee. I have
always found this committee has worked very hard to be
bipartisan or apolitical, and find the important middle ground
for America, and I appreciate those efforts.
To respect your time, I am going to summarize. The heart of
my message, Mr. Chairman, is really pretty straightforward, and
you spoke to it in your own opening. We do an awful lot on very
little, and the simple reality is that America is leading all
around the world. I am not going to go through all the places
where we are literally taking the lead and making things
happen, whether it is pushing back in parts of Asia against
potentially aggressive behavior; or it is Ebola, the coalition
to deal with that; the ISIL coalition; Syria; Ukraine, Europe,
sanctions; the effort to negotiate with Iran. I can run a long
list.
The bottom line I want to make to all of you is, we are a
great country, and we need to behave like a great country. And
when it comes to the issue of sequestration, it is kind of a
public admission that the Congress is unwilling to or unable to
make choices.
Our job is to make choices, all of us. And the simple fact
is we cannot lead, we cannot do what we need to do in the
world, on the cheap. As this committee knows well, the funds
that we devote to the entire range of foreign policy
programming, everything from our counterterrorism to
nonproliferation initiatives, to helping businesspeople and
travelers be able to open doors, get their visas, move through
rapidly, do business in various countries, all of which creates
jobs here at home, may I add, all of that amounts to less than
1 percent of the Federal budget. And yet it is not an
exaggeration to say that that 1 percent probably has an impact
on 50 percent or more of the history that will be written about
this era.
So I invite members of this committee to work with me and
my colleagues to shape that history in ways that will advance
our Nation's interests and uphold the values that our citizens
represent. And that is really what a budget is. It is a
statement of your priorities and of your values.
ISIL-DAESH
Now, one place to begin is with our efforts to mobilize
countries everywhere to counter violent terrorism. Last week
here in Washington, but every day around the globe, literally,
we are preparing and acting to confront this challenge, and it
goes well beyond ISIL or Daesh, although Daesh, obviously, is a
central part of it.
Since September, we have put together a coalition of more
than 60 countries, with five Arab nations joining us in the
efforts in Syria today. We have launched some 2,500 airstrikes
in Iraq and Syria. And whenever we have combined our air
support with able partners on the ground, the terrorists have
literally been routed.
We have helped the Iraqis to take back territory.
Approximately 30 percent of the territory that had been gained
by ISIL has now been restored to Iraqi hands. And we are
training the Iraqis and preparing for the moment where they can
do more. Thousands of ISIL-Daesh leaders have been taken off
the battlefield. We are undertaking a global effort to restrict
their revenues, curb the recruitment of foreign fighters. And
we are engaged in a round-the-clock campaign to rebut the
terrorist messaging on social media and on other outlets.
Now, we are in the early stages of what is going to be a
multiyear effort, but the momentum that ISIL had built up last
fall, last summer, has dissipated. A key supply line has been
completely severed. ISIL militants can no longer maneuver out
in the open the way they did before. Convoys can't move, and
they can't talk to each other the way they used to.
Throughout, the coalition has been working closely with
Iraq. We have said from day one: President Obama made the right
choice in saying that he was going to calibrate the early
bombing in order to try to make certain that we had a
government transition in Iraq that gave us a government we
could work with. And frankly, with pretty effective diplomacy
on the ground--with our ambassador, our assistant secretary,
the Vice President, others--we were able to help the Iraqis
themselves to make that transition. And now we have an
inclusive government backed by professional security forces
that are enjoying the full support of its people.
So we are looking to you for the resources to help us be
able to continue to bring Sunni tribal leaders more fully into
this process. It is also important that Iraqis speak against
Daesh with one voice. And it is vital that Americans and the
rest of our partners do so as well. The leaders of Daesh have
to understand that they are not going to divide us, and they
are not going to beat us.
Earlier this month, the President transmitted to Congress a
draft Authorization for Use of Military Force. It reflects our
views, but frankly, it profited greatly from the testimony that
I gave the Foreign Relations Committee last December and the
discussions we had on the Hill.
Mr. Chairman, bringing people together and finding answers
to these tough challenges is what we do in our country, I think
pretty darn well. And if we get caught trying to make a
difference in many of these places, then we are living up to
what the world expects from us.
UKRAINE
In Europe, we have been supporting Ukraine. We can go into
that in some greater detail. I won't tie it all up now, except
to say that we are working also on the bilateral economic
reforms necessary through the IMF. And while the situation in
the east obviously still remains very tricky, very tenuous,
even grim, the ultimate outcome is undecided, and Ukrainians
are coming together to rebuild their own democracy. And Europe
is standing firm, and Russia is paying a very significant
price.
IRAN
We are focused, obviously, on Iran. The President has made
clear, and I can't state this more firmly, the policy is Iran
will not get a nuclear weapon. And anybody running around right
now jumping in to say, ``Well, we don't like the deal,'' or
this or that, doesn't know what the deal is. There is no deal
yet. And I caution people to wait to see what these
negotiations produce.
Since 2013, we have been testing whether or not we can
achieve that goal diplomatically. I don't know yet. But it is
the most effective way to solve the problem, and we will prove
that over the course of these next weeks and months.
The P5-plus-1 talks have made inroads since the Joint Plan
of Action. We have halted the progress of Tehran's nuclear
program. We have gained unprecedented insight into it. And we
expect to know soon whether or not Iran is willing to put
together an acceptable and verifiable plan.
CUBA
As you know, in December, President Obama announced plans
to normalize relations with Cuba. Last month, Assistant
Secretary of State Jacobson went to the island for historic
meetings with the government. The next meeting will take place
here on Friday. We will exclusively be talking about the road
to the diplomatic process.
But she conveyed the message echoed by many of you that
America's support for democratic reforms, human rights,
Internet freedom, and the release of political prisoners is
unequivocal. And the change that we are making, we believe,
actually assists the United States to be able to promote the
democracy and the rights that we want for the people of Cuba.
It will also make it harder for those who want to close the
door to blame America for what is happening there, and we
believe, in the end, can help create accountability for the
hardships that those folks live under.
AFGHANISTAN
So, Mr. Chairman, much has happened since my last budget
testimony. For example, in the wake of a fractious election, we
have helped Afghanistan's new unity government to come together
to build on the past economic and social progress and take full
responsibility for the security of its citizens. I was
intimately involved in both negotiating the BSA and this
transition. And I can tell you there is a very different
process of governance now taking hold in Kabul, in Afghanistan.
SYRIA
In addition, we led a successful international effort that
eliminated Syria's declared stockpile of chemical weapons,
placing those weapons beyond the reach of both government
forces and terrorists.
And I ask you just to stop and think: If we hadn't done
that--there were many people saying all you have to do is drop
a bomb or two. Well, a bomb or two would not have gotten the
weapons out. Diplomacy got the weapons out. And thank God they
are out, because if they weren't, ISIS, which controls a
significant portion of Syria, would have access to them.
ASIA
So we have been modernizing our alliances in the Asia
Pacific, maintaining our steadfast support for the
denuclearized Korean Peninsula. We are pursuing ambitious trade
agreements in Europe and Asia. And last August, as you know,
President Obama hosted a historic summit with African leaders.
Especially, we are moving forward in the areas of food
security, youth leadership, and the economic participation of
women.
PEACEKEEPING
We have supported peace operations by the U.N. and African
Union to save civilian lives. And our former colleague Russ
Feingold did an outstanding job of serving as a special envoy
to the Great Lakes region in helping to negotiate an end to the
violence with M23 and a process for the disarmament, which we
are now working on enforcing.
HIV/AIDS
We have PEPFAR, which you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. With
congressional support, we have been able to further reduce HIV
infections to create an AIDS-free generation. That is what we
are on the cusp of. And there are many other challenges,
obviously, on that continent.
ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
We have also been leading on the environment, on the oceans
and marine sanctuaries, promoting democracy and good
governance, supporting human rights and religious liberty.
And I would just close by saying to you, Mr. Chairman, Dean
Acheson served as Secretary of State in 1949-1953 in the shadow
of World War II. And he wrote that the problems that bedevil
American foreign policy are not like headaches that can be
cured by taking an aspirin and getting a good night's sleep. He
wrote, ``All our lives, the danger, the uncertainty, the need
for alertness, for effort, for discipline, will be upon us.''
It is true today, never more so in many ways. Those words
remind us that we long ago entered an era of ever-present
danger. And the test of our leadership has never been to
completely be able to eliminate those risks, because that is
just probably not possible. The test has been whether we can
manage them decisively over time in ways that reduce the peril
and strengthen the forces of democracy, humanity, justice, law,
human rights.
And that is precisely the task that confronts us today. And
I believe that once again, the United States of America is
answering that call.
And I want to express our gratitude to the young men and
women in uniform around the world who bear an enormous amount
of this burden of helping us to do that; also to the average
Americans who contribute to civil society; the work of our
development professionals who put themselves at risk; to
journalists who have lost lives covering these challenges; and
also to you, the Members of Congress who travel, who learn
about these countries, who set the international gold standard,
frankly, for meeting with our partners overseas and thinking
constantly about how we best harness our resources to address
the world's problem.
So like Secretary Acheson, we have had our share of
headaches, and this is an explosive moment in the world. But
the transition that is taking place is really an emergence,
really, of people from a kind of darkness, a recognition that
we are living in a new, modern global world, where everybody is
in touch with everybody all of the time. That raises the
possibilities. It also raises the stakes. And it obviously
pushes back against culture, against learning, against people's
beliefs.
PREPARED STATEMENTS
So we are in an era of uncertainty, but I will tell you
this, one thing remains absolutely sure. This administration,
the United States, I am convinced this Congress, are absolutely
prepared to answer the call.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would be delighted to answer
any questions.
[The statements follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John F. Kerry
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee; thank you for the
opportunity to testify today regarding America's international
leadership and the administration's budget request for the State
Department and related agencies for the 2016 fiscal year.
Last month, in his State of the Union Address, President Obama said
that we ``lead best when we combine military power with strong
diplomacy; when we leverage our power with coalition building; [and]
when we don't let our fears blind us to the opportunities that this new
century presents.''
It is with that guidance in mind that we submit our budget to you
this year and ask for its fair consideration and approval. We do so at
a time and in a world that is marked both by stark tragedy and by great
promise, a world where America's role is critical as are the resources
that only Congress can provide. So we ask for your help. America must
lead, but cannot do so on the cheap. The money we devote to the entire
range of foreign policy programming, everything from Embassy security
to our counter-terrorism and nonproliferation initiatives, amounts to
only about 1 percent of the Federal budget, yet it may impact fifty
percent of the history that will be written about this era. So we all
have a job--to do everything we can, working together, to shape that
history in ways that advance our Nation's interests and uphold the
values of the people we represent.
Mr. Chairman, within the fiscal year 2016 President's budget
request, the Department of State and USAID are seeking a total of $50.3
billion in discretionary funding, including $7.0 billion for Overseas
Contingency Operations. Our requests for all accounts include:
--$3.5 billion to counter the terrorist network known as ISIL,
address the crisis in Syria, bolster regional security, and
respond to the humanitarian catastrophe brought on by the
crises in Syria and Iraq;
--$3.1 billion in continued support for our democratic partner,
Israel;
--$639 million to help our friends in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova
as they seek to strengthen their democracies, withstand
pressure from Russia, and to integrate more closely into
Europe;
--$1.4 billion to support our activities in and to implement the
President's strategy to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region;
--$1 billion to address the root causes of illegal migration from
Central America to the United States, including the inhumane
and perilous migration of unaccompanied children;
--$5.4 billion to finance our leadership and support for
international organizations and peacekeeping efforts and
thereby ensure that other nations will share the costs and
burdens of maintaining global stability and strengthening
consensus principles and norms;
--$3.4 billion to reinforce our partnerships and diplomatic
engagement with Afghanistan and Pakistan;
--$4.8 billion for Embassy Security that will enable the Department
to support overseas security requirements for our personnel and
facilities, and continue implementing the recommendations of
the Benghazi Accountability Review Board. These critical
investments make possible the work of our diplomats to advance
American interests worldwide, assist our citizens, and promote
our ideals;
--$1.2 billion to support public diplomacy and exchanges;
--$8.2 billion for global health, including programs to end
preventable child and maternal deaths; combat infectious
disease through the Global Health Security Agenda; and create
an AIDS-free generation;
--$808 million to invest in clean energy, sustainable growth, and
measures to curb the harmful impacts of global climate change;
--$978 million for the President's Feed the Future initiative to
promote agriculture-led development and help reduce poverty and
hunger;
--$390 million for the President's Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund
to support counterterrorism activities, countering violent
extremism, and crisis response, as well as provide enabling
support to partners engaged on the front lines against
terrorism; and
--Over $2 billion for democracy, human rights, and governance
programs that support governments and citizens to build
societies where people can address legitimate grievances
through the democratic process and express themselves through
strong civil societies.
Mr. Chairman, decades ago, in the aftermath of World War II, Dean
Acheson wrote that the problems that bedevil American foreign policy
are not like headaches that can be cured by taking an aspirin and
getting a good night's sleep. ``They will,'' he asserted, ``stay with
us until death. We have got to understand that all our lives the
danger, the uncertainty, the need for alertness, for effort, for
discipline will be upon us. This is new to us. It will be hard for us.
But we are in for it and the only real question is whether we shall
know it soon enough.''
Secretary Acheson's words remind us that we long ago entered into
an era of virtually nonstop danger, whether in one part of the world or
another or regarding one type of challenge or another. The test for our
leadership has never been to entirely eliminate those risks, because
that is not possible; the test has been whether we can manage them
decisively over time in ways that reduce the peril and strengthen the
forces of democracy, humanity, justice, and law.
That is precisely the task that confronts us today just as it has
confronted earlier administrations and generations. And I believe that,
once again, our country is answering the call. We can see that
leadership in the brave service of our fighting men and women on duty
in strategic outposts and waterways across the planet. We can see it in
our citizens who contribute to international civil society and who work
hard every day to address and ease global challenges from extreme
poverty to women's rights and the protection of religious liberty and
other precious freedoms. We can see it in the work of our development
professionals who are helping millions of people overseas to build
strong communities, expand markets, and contribute to shared
prosperity. We can see it in the Members of Congress from both parties
who devote countless hours to meeting with international partners and
to thinking about how best to harness our resources and relationships
to address shared problems. And we can see it in the daily efforts of
our diplomats to defend America's interests, advocate our principles,
and strengthen our country's position in the world.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, there can be no
question that our diplomatic engagement around the globe today is as
deep and as strong as it has ever been. Let me point to just a few
examples of where our leadership backed by our resources is making an
important difference.
To begin, our country's leadership is on display in mobilizing
actions across the globe to counter and prevent violent extremism. Just
last week, the White House convened a landmark conference to build
solidarity and identify concrete plans to address both the immediate
and long term challenges. The United States is committed to helping
countries in vulnerable regions to enhance their capacity to defeat
terrorist networks and to rebut the radical ideologies that drive those
networks. We have also taken the lead in a robust international effort
to combat the terrorist group known as ISIL. Frankly, coalition
building is a natural fit for the State Department--we're in the
business of bringing other countries to the table to support mutual
interests. And because ISIL is a threat to us all, this menace has
galvanized a Coalition with more than 60 members, a Coalition that is
as diverse as it is dedicated.
Already, nine countries are contributing to air strike operations
in Iraq and a dozen have committed to train security forces there.
Coalition partner pilots are also flying strike missions in Syria, and
hosting the train and equip program for the moderate opposition.
Meanwhile, we're pooling information and resources to cut ISIL's
profits from smuggling and to block access to banks. Our air strikes
have reduced ISIL's ability to profit from oil sales. To slow
recruiting of foreign terrorist fighters, we're engaged in capacity
building in the Balkans, criminal justice reform in North Africa,
helping high-risk communities in the Middle East, and tightening
security at airports. These efforts are in addition to the humanitarian
aid that the United States and many other countries have contributed to
care for refugees and displaced persons in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and
elsewhere in the region.
We are doing much; but we're still in the early stages of a multi-
year campaign. Going forward, we must turn up the heat. Thus far,
whenever our local partners have engaged the enemy on the ground with
Coalition support from the air, we have prevailed. And the fact is that
ISIL's momentum--which some called unstoppable just a few months ago--
has dissipated. A key supply line has been severed. Terrorist fighters
can no longer mass and maneuver in large convoys due to Coalition
airstrikes.
Throughout, the Coalition has been working closely with the
Government of Iraq and with moderate elements of the Syrian opposition.
Success on the ground will depend on strong and legitimate local
partners. That's why this year's request includes $355 million to
support critical governance and security reforms in Iraq. Nothing will
contribute more to the defeat of ISIL than an Iraqi Government that
governs inclusively, respects the rights of and protects all of its
citizens with the help of a professional security force, and as a
result enjoys the full support of its people.
Success will also be more likely if America is able to speak with
one voice in our determination to defeat ISIL. Earlier this month, the
President transmitted to Congress a draft Authorization to Use Military
Force that provides just such an opportunity. As someone who served on
Capitol Hill for almost 30 years, I welcome this step and look forward
to discussing all aspects of this very important proposal with you. The
approval of this authorization would provide a clear and powerful
signal of American unity and resolve.
The fight against violent extremism also continues in Central and
South Asia.
This year, Afghanistan will exercise full responsibility for its
security forces, making possible a significant reduction in the U.S.
military presence. We will, however, continue to consult with Kabul on
security matters, and to administer a robust train, advise, and assist
mission. We are also requesting $1.5 billion to support the new Afghan
Unity Government as it strives to implement reforms and improve
economic performance. This aid will be targeted at helping Afghanistan
to move ahead through better governance, investments in health,
education, and infrastructure, and the equitable treatment of women and
girls.
In Pakistan, the United States is working with the government to
counter terrorist groups that threaten our shared security. Last month,
I met with the country's leadership for our annual Strategic Dialogue
and found--in the wake of the December 16 terrorist attack on the
military school that murdered 132 children--a vigorous commitment to
take on and defeat violent extremist groups. In recognition of our
long-term engagement with the Pakistani people, we're also helping to
promote development, energy security, health, and education.
At the same time, through constant diplomacy and the exchange of
historic visits by our heads of government, we've strengthened our ties
with India, the world's largest democracy, on economic issues, security
cooperation, science, and clean energy.
Closer to home, in Europe, we have been steadfast in supporting
Ukraine's recently-elected government against illegal intervention by
Moscow and violence from the armed separatists that Moscow backs.
Working closely with our international partners, we have approved
targeted sanctions--including against Russia's financial, energy, and
defense sectors--that have imposed a clear cost on the Russian economy
and brought Kremlin leaders back to the bargaining table. The package
of measures signed earlier this month to implement the September 2014
Minsk Protocol mandated a ceasefire and the pullback of heavy weapons.
We have called for full implementation of the Minsk documents,
including the withdrawal of all foreign equipment and troops from
eastern Ukraine, the full restoration of Ukrainian control of the
international border, and the release of all hostages. To date, neither
Russia nor the forces it is supporting have come close to complying
with their commitments. If that failure continues, there will be
further consequences--consequences that would place added strains on
Russia's weakened economy.
Meanwhile, the United States is backing Ukraine's economic reforms
through a $1 billion loan guarantee (and the possibility of another if
reforms continue) and support for a $17.5 billion financial package
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although the situation in
eastern Ukraine remains very difficult, we are working to help the
country emerge from this crisis united, and with the chance to decide
its own future in a Europe where NATO is reinvigorated and leaders in
the Kremlin are judged solely by their actions, not their words.
Mr. Chairman, President Obama has made it clear that Iran will not
obtain a nuclear weapon. Since late 2013, we have been testing whether
that goal can be achieved through determined multilateral diplomacy.
The so-called P5+1 talks have made considerable progress but have not
yet reached a satisfactory consensus on all critical questions. During
our deliberations, for the first time in a decade, we've halted the
progress of Tehran's nuclear program and even rolled it back in key
respects. We will know soon whether we will be able to reach a
verifiable and comprehensive plan to ensure that Iran's nuclear program
is wholly peaceful. We will continue to consult closely with you as our
efforts progress. Although I cannot predict the outcome, I do believe
that an agreement of the type we seek would advance America's interests
and that of our allies in the Middle East, strengthen the global
nonproliferation regime, and serve the cause of international stability
and peace.
In our own hemisphere, we are requesting $1 billion to help our
friends in Central America make the difficult reforms required to
address the region's interlocking security, governance and economic
problems. In recent years, the combination of limited educational and
employment opportunities, epic levels of violence, a lack of sufficient
investment, and corruption have held these countries back while also
spurring attempts at illegal migration to the United States. An
estimated 6 million young Central Americans will enter the work force
in the next decade. If opportunity isn't there, our entire hemisphere
will feel the consequences.
Last December, President Obama announced a change in U.S. policy to
increase communications, commerce, and travel between our country and
Cuba and to initiate the process--supported by this budget--of
normalizing diplomatic relations with Havana for the first time since
1961. In January, Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson went to
the island for a first round of meetings with government officials and
representatives of independent civil society. She conveyed the
message--reinforced before and since by many Members of Congress--that
America's support for democratic reforms, human rights, Internet
freedom, and the release of political prisoners is absolutely firm. We
believe very strongly that the time is right to deprive Cuban
authorities of their longstanding crutch--so that they can no longer
blame U.S. policy rather than their own failures for the hardships
faced by the brave people of Cuba.
This budget also supports the President's rebalance to the dynamic
region of East Asia and the Pacific. Based on President Obama's
strategic commitment, we have modernized our alliances with Japan and
South Korea, strengthened our partnerships with other regional powers,
and supported democratic progress and respect for human rights in
Thailand and Burma. A key element of our policy has been to build a
comprehensive relationship with China that supports its rise in a
manner compatible with international law and respectful of the concerns
and rights of its neighbors. The United States remains committed to the
peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and will continue--in
close consultation with our allies--to bring pressure to bear on North
Korea in support of that goal.
Last August, President Obama hosted a summit attended by some 50
African leaders, during which we discussed plans for future cooperation
and progress. U.S. policy toward the region reflects the continent's
diversity and includes the promotion of investment and trade, energy
access, youth leadership, and the economic participation of women.
Mr. Chairman, American leadership has also been evident in the
fight to halt the deadly spread of Ebola--and it was a team effort. The
State Department, the U.S. military, USAID, the Department of Health
and Human Services (including the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, and the National Institutes of Health, and the U.S. Public
Health Service Commissioned Corps), State and city governments, civil
society, citizen volunteers, and Members of Congress all contributed.
Together, we worked with international partners and with the brave
communities and caregivers of West Africa to confront and contain this
virus. The struggle won't be over until new infections are reduced to
zero. But consider that 5 months ago, experts predicted that the number
of active cases in West Africa would be 1.4 million. The actual level
is less than 2 percent of that number. This is still a terrible human
tragedy--but it is also an impressive demonstration of what
international partnerships can accomplish. We have committed over the
next 3 years to build on these partnerships, through the Global Health
Security Agenda, to strengthen health systems in these vulnerable
countries to prevent a tragedy of this scale from happening again.
We also serve our interests when we exercise leadership within the
U.N. and other international organizations. The United States isn't
everywhere and we shouldn't be everywhere, and so it's a great help to
us when the U.N. is able to contribute to international security and
stability through its peacekeeping and political missions, conflict-
resolution, development, and humanitarian activities. As we continue to
press for reforms within the U.N. system, it is essential that we meet
our own obligations to pay our bills in full and on time. We demand
that of others; we should be consistent in meeting that standard
ourselves.
These are just some of the issues that we're focused on each and
every day. But they're not the only ones. Programs to support
democratic governance contribute to the development of societies that
are peaceful, more prosperous and stable, and better partners for the
United States. As more people around the world stand up for their
fundamental freedoms, demands for U.S. support grow. Unfortunately,
this has coincided with declining funding in recent years. This year,
to meet the growing needs and advance our interests, the President has
requested over $2 billion, a significant increase in democracy and
governance funding.
Our military training and education enhances our security
relationships while exposing students from friendly nations to U.S.
values and respect for internationally-recognized human rights.
Training foreign law enforcement and counterterrorism officials in
American investigative techniques increases their capability and our
security. Implementing stricter export controls, training weapons
inspectors, improving global nuclear, biological and chemical security,
and securing our borders allows us to guard against the most pernicious
of threats: the possibility that terrorists might one day attack our
homeland or our allies with a weapon of mass destruction.
Our global presence does something else: it creates jobs. Through
our contributions to international financial institutions like the
World Bank, we don't just lift the economies of low-income countries;
we open markets for American businesses. Foreign policy is economic
policy, and so the State Department is fully geared toward helping
American entrepreneurs to build prosperity at home and across the
globe. To that end, we're pursuing ambitious, 21st century trade
agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership that will establish landmark labor
and environmental standards and help our manufacturers, farmers,
ranchers, and service providers to increase what they are able to sell
abroad.
We're also leading on the environment, on the oceans and marine
sanctuaries, and in addressing the potentially devastating consequences
of climate change. In November, the leaders of the United States and
China, the world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, came
together to announce ambitious targets to limit carbon emissions in the
post-2020 period. Our budget and our diplomacy are focused on helping
nations to grow in sustainable ways, and to mobilize countries
everywhere to achieve a truly meaningful agreement on climate change in
Paris this December. And here I want to stress the connection between
climate change and other goals. For example, our investments to protect
global food and water supplies are critical. But none of those efforts
will succeed over time if we don't also concern ourselves with what we
put in the air; food security simply will not happen if we fail to curb
the harmful effects of climate change.
All this speaks to why our budget proposals aren't just a
collection of numbers--they're the embodiment of our values and
priorities. After serving in public life for over three decades, I am
aware that there are few more reliable--or damaging--applause lines
than promising to slash the budgets of the State Department and USAID.
President Reagan once lamented that, ``Foreign aid suffers from a lack
of domestic constituency.'' And it's true that, in Washington, long-
term goals can often lose out to more visible short-term projects. But
that's exactly why we need your help--to take the long view and to
recognize how the relatively modest investments we make now can improve
the world and enhance our own security for generations to come.
As we have learned through history, the success or failure of
America's international leadership is not only relevant; it will be a
determining factor in the quality of the lives of our citizens. Foreign
policy can help our workers to find a job or lose one; it can start a
war or forge a peace; it can safeguard our families or expose them to
grave risk; it can enable us to look forward with confidence or it can
place a shadow over the future in which our children and their children
will grow up.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, even though the globe
seems at times to be awash in difficulties, the truth is that many
international vital signs today are positive. Worldwide, extreme
poverty is down and so is child mortality. More babies are being born
healthy; more boys--and girls--are attending and staying in school; and
with U.S. contributions leading the way, we are making welcome progress
in protecting the vulnerable from HIV/AIDS and other infectious
disease.
Meanwhile, each day in diplomatic outposts across the globe,
America's representatives make known the high value our people place on
democratic institutions, human rights, religious liberty, and the
freedoms of speech and press.
So make no mistake, America is leading--with partners when
possible, but alone when necessary. Leading against terror and
proliferation. Leading in support of embattled friends from Ukraine and
Afghanistan to Central America and Somalia. Leading to promote peace in
the Middle East and Africa. Leading to create jobs domestically and
protect the environment globally. Leading against the axis of
suffering--hunger, ignorance, and disease. Leading to build a more
free, just, and humane world. We are leading as one country, including
the administration, Congress, our Armed Forces, our businesspeople, our
citizen activists, and our volunteers.
Scanning the horizon, we are under no illusions about how difficult
the demands of leadership are. Like Secretary Acheson, we have had our
share of headaches. Setbacks along the way are inevitable. Engagement
on all fronts will be required. But we draw strength from our
democratic ideals, inspiration from the example of our predecessors,
and courage from the conviction that the values guiding us are the
right ones. In an era of uncertainty, one thing remains sure: America
will continue to answer the call.
Thank you and now I would be pleased to respond to any questions
you might have.
______
Prepared Statement of Steve A. Linick, Inspector General for the U.S.
Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to highlight some of the
mission-critical work performed by the Office of Inspector General
(OIG) for the Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors
(BBG). First, I want to express my appreciation for the support you
have shown to my office. I am grateful for the overall budget increase
that OIG received in fiscal year 2015. Notwithstanding the fiscal year
2015 increase, along with the increase included in the President's
fiscal year 2016 request, we still face significant challenges, given
the growth of Department funding compared to our own. Still, we have a
substantial and positive impact on the operations of the Department and
BBG.
With that premise in mind, I would like to outline some of our
notable work and new initiatives, including our most recent
responsibility--joint oversight of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR),
the overseas contingency operation directed against the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In the last section of my testimony, I
discuss OIG's resource challenges.
i. state oig's mission and oversight efforts
It is my honor to have led the State OIG for the past 17 months--
since the end of September 2013. OIG's mandate is broad and
comprehensive, involving oversight of the full scope of Department and
BBG programs and operations, including more than 72,000 employees and
280 overseas missions and domestic entities, as well as the U.S.
Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission. These
agencies are funded through combined annual appropriations of
approximately $15 billion and nearly $7 billion in consular fees and
other earned income. OIG also is responsible for full or partial
oversight of an additional $17 billion in Department-managed foreign
assistance.
State OIG differs from most OIGs in that it has a mandated
inspection function. We are statutorily required to periodically audit
and inspect every domestic and overseas operating unit around the world
once every 5 years.\1\ Additionally, since the beginning of my tenure,
we have redoubled our efforts to address some of the top challenges of
the Department, including the protection of people and facilities, the
management of contracts and grants, and the security of sensitive
information around the world. I will elaborate on each of these:
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\1\ This timeframe requirement is routinely waived by Congress each
year.
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Improving Security
Protecting the people who work for the Department is a top priority
for the Department and for OIG. OIG has inspected physical security at
overseas posts for years; however, since the September 2012 attacks on
U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel in Benghazi, Libya, OIG has
significantly stepped up its oversight efforts related to security,
including targeted audits and evaluations. We help safeguard the lives
of people who work in or visit our posts abroad by performing
independent oversight to help the Department improve its security
posture. Unlike many of our other oversight activities, as well as more
traditional Government-wide work conducted by the Inspector General
(IG) community, we cannot attach a dollar-value metric to our efforts
related to physical security. Achievement in this area is not reflected
in our ``return on investment'' statistics. However, our oversight
successes are a source of great satisfaction, and to the degree that
unreasonable risk persists, OIG will vigorously continue to highlight
any deficiencies to the Department and to Congress.
Although the Department has made improvements to overseas security,
challenges remain. Through our inspection and audit work, OIG continues
to find security deficiencies that put our people at risk. Those
deficiencies include failing to observe set-back and perimeter
requirements and to identify and neutralize weapons of opportunity. Our
teams also uncover posts that use warehouse space and other sub-
standard facilities for offices, another security deficiency.\2\ Under
the Department's security rules, office space must meet more stringent
physical security standards than warehouse space. Our audit \3\ of the
Local Guard Program found that firms providing security services for
Embassy compounds were not fully vetting local guards they hired
abroad, placing at risk our posts and their personnel. In other
reports, we found that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (responsible
for setting standards) and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
(responsible for constructing facilities to meet those standards) often
do not coordinate adequately to timely address important security
needs.\4\ Based on our recommendations, those bureaus have taken steps
to improve their communication and coordination. OIG will closely
monitor whether these steps actually sustain improved joint performance
to mitigate security vulnerabilities.
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\2\ Review of Overseas Security Policy Board Exceptions and Secure
Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 Waivers (ISP-I-
13-06, January 2013).
\3\ Audit of Contractor Compliance With and Department of State
Oversight of the Process Required for Vetting Local Guards (AUD-HCI-14-
24, June 2014).
\4\ Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, High Threat
Programs Directorate (ISP-I-14-23, September 2014); Compliance Follow-
up Review of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (ISP-C-11-26,
May 2011); Audit of the Process to Request and Prioritize Physical
Security-Related Activities at Overseas Posts (AUD-FM-14-17, Mar.
2014).
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OIG has also examined the Department's handling of significant
security breaches that resulted in the deaths of U.S. Government
personnel. For example, in September 2013, OIG published a report \5\
on its Special Review of the Accountability Review Board (ARB). As you
know, the Secretary of State convenes an ARB when serious injury, loss
of life, or significant destruction of property at or related to a U.S.
Government Mission abroad has occurred. The most recent ARB was
convened following the 2012 attacks and tragic events in Benghazi.
OIG's Special Review examined the process by which the Department's
ARBs are established, staffed, supported, and conducted, as well as the
manner in which the Department tracks the implementation of ARB
recommendations. We examined the Department's follow-through on long-
term security program improvements involving physical security,
training, and intelligence-sharing over four administrations (since
1998) and found that it lacked sustained oversight by Department
principals. Over time, the implementation of recommended improvements
slows. The lack of follow-through explains, in part, why a number of
Benghazi ARB recommendations mirror previous ARB recommendations. This
underscores the need for a sustained commitment by Department
principals to ensure that ARB recommendations are timely and
effectively carried out.
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\5\ Special Review of the Accountability Review Board Process (ISP-
I-13-44A, September 2013).
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OIG also continues to increase its focus on security issues. OIG is
currently involved in reviewing the Department's reported compliance
with recommendations made by the ARB convened in the aftermath of the
2012 attacks at U.S. diplomatic locations in Benghazi. In addition,
planned fiscal year 2015 security audits include an audit of the
approval and certification process used to determine employment
suitability for locally employed staff and contracted employees, an
audit of emergency action plans for U.S. Missions in the Sahel region
of Africa, and an audit of the Vital Presence Validation Process (VP2)
implementation. VP2 is the Department's formal process for assessing
the costs and benefits of maintaining its presence in dangerous
locations around the world. Finally, we will continue to emphasize
security concerns as we inspect the International Programs Directorate
of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
Improving Oversight of Contracts and Grants
Contracts and grants are critical to the Department's mission. The
Department's obligations in fiscal year 2014 equaled approximately $9
billion in contractual services and $1.5 billion in grants, totaling
approximately $10.5 billion.\6\ However, the Department faces
challenges managing its contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements,
which have been addressed repeatedly in OIG audits, inspections, and
investigations over the years. These challenges were highlighted in two
recent OIG Management Alerts that I provided to senior Department
officials.
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\6\ USASpending, , accessed on February 19,
2015.
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In fiscal year 2014, more than 50 percent of post or bureau
inspections contained formal recommendations to strengthen controls and
improve administration of grants. In our March 2014 Management Alert
\7\ focusing on contract management deficiencies, we reported that over
the past 6 years, files relating to Department contracts with a total
value of more than $6 billion were either incomplete or could not be
located at all. In a September 2014 Management Alert \8\ on grant
management deficiencies, we highlighted weaknesses in oversight,
insufficient training of grant officials, and inadequate documentation
and closeout of grant activities. In fiscal year 2012 alone, the
Department obligated more than $1.6 billion for approximately 14,000
grants and cooperative agreements worldwide.\9\ This is a significant
outlay of American taxpayer funds, which makes oversight and
accountability even more critical. Grants present special oversight
challenges because, unlike contracts, they do not generally require the
recipient to deliver specific goods or services that can be measured.
The Department has agreed to adopt most of OIG's recommendations in
these Management Alerts. OIG will continue to monitor the Department's
efforts and seek additional improvements in this important area.
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\7\ Management Alert: Contract File Management Deficiencies (MA-A-
0002, March 20, 2014).
\8\ Management Alert: Grants Management Deficiencies (MA-14-03,
September 26, 2014).
\9\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Implementation of Grants
Policies Needs Better Oversight (GAO-14-635, July 2014).
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In fiscal year 2015, OIG plans on issuing, among others, audits
involving non-lethal aid and humanitarian assistance in response to the
Syrian crisis, the Iraq Medical Services Contract, and the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Embassy Air Wing
Contract in Iraq.
Enhancing Information Security
Another top management challenge concerns information security. The
Department is entrusted to safeguard sensitive information, which is
often targeted by multiple sources, including terrorist and criminal
organizations. The Department is responsible for preserving and
protecting classified and other sensitive information vital to the
preservation of national security in high-risk environments across the
globe. OIG assessments of the Department's efforts to secure its
information technology (IT) infrastructure have uncovered recurring
weaknesses in unclassified systems and instances of noncompliance with
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) requirements. For
example, we found that unclassified IT systems lacked adequate
controls, allowing unauthorized individuals to enter and manipulate
systems; ineffective security scanning; and weaknesses in cybersecurity
management (including absence of a strategic plan). In a November 2013
Management Alert,\10\ I raised these concerns with senior Department
officials, recommending, among other things, that independent
penetration testing be conducted to assess the system's vulnerabilities
to cyber attack.\11\ This effort is currently underway.
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\10\ Management Alert: OIG Findings of Significant, Recurring
Weaknesses in Department of State Information System Security Program
(MA-A-0001, November 12, 2013).
\11\ Vulnerabilities in the Department's unclassified network also
affect OIG's IT infrastructure, which is part of the same network. We
noted in our November 2013 information security Management Alert that
there are literally thousands of administrators who have access to
Department databases. That access runs freely to OIG's IT
infrastructure and creates risk to OIG operations. Although OIG has no
evidence that its IT systems have been compromised, the potential
exists and places our independence at risk.
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ii. new oig initiatives
Since joining OIG, I have implemented a number of new initiatives
to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of OIG's independent
oversight of the Department's programs and operations:
Management Alerts and Management Assistance Reports
Soon after my arrival, we began to issue Management Alerts \12\ and
Management Assistance Reports.\13\ They are intended to alert
Department leadership to significant issues that require immediate
corrective action. For example, we issued two Management Assistance
Reports recommending that the Department take immediate action (for
example, termination) against certain grantees for misuse of grant
funds. In addition, and as mentioned above, we issued Management Alerts
\14\ relating to serious problems in the areas of grant and contract
management and information security. The response from the Department
to these products has been favorable, as they have concurred with most
of our recommendations.
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\12\ Management Alert: OIG Findings of Significant, Recurring
Weaknesses in Department of State Information System Security Program,
(MA-A-0001, January 2014); Management Alert: Contract File Management
Deficiencies (MA-A-0002, March 2014); Management Alert: Grants
Management Deficiencies (MA-14-03, September 2014).
\13\ Management Assistance Report: Concerns with the Oversight of
Medical Support Service Iraq Contract No. SAQMMA11D0073 (AUD-MERO-15-
20, December 23, 2014); Management Assistance Report: Grant
Improprieties by Nour International Relief Aid (AUD-CG-15-19, January
15, 2015); Management Assistance Report: Termination of Construction
Grants to Omran Holding Group (AUD-CG-14-37, September 18, 2014).
\14\ Management Alert: Contract File Management Deficiencies (MA-A-
0002, March 20, 2014); Management Alert: Grants Management Deficiencies
(MA-14-03, September 26, 2014); Management Alert: OIG Findings of
Significant and Recurring Weaknesses in the Department of State
Information System Security Program (MA-A-0001, November 12, 2013).
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Moreover, we greatly appreciate that this Committee has also
recognized their value. The explanatory statement to the fiscal year
2015 omnibus appropriations bill included language directing the
Secretary of State to submit to Congress a report detailing the status
of each of the recommendations included in OIG's fiscal year 2014
Management Alerts.
Office of Evaluations and Special Projects
The Office of Evaluations and Special Projects (ESP) was
established in 2014 to enhance OIG's oversight of the Department and
BBG. In particular, ESP undertakes special evaluations and projects and
complements the work of OIG's other offices by further developing the
capacity to focus on broader, systemic issues. For example, in October
2013, ESP published a Review of Selected Internal Investigations by
DS,\15\ which addressed allegations of undue influence by Department
management. Currently, ESP is undertaking a joint review with the
Department of Justice OIG of a number of shooting incidents in Honduras
in 2012, which involved Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and
Department of State personnel.
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\15\ Review of Selected Internal Investigations Conducted by the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security (October 2014, ESP-15-01).
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Increased Emphasis on Whistleblower Protections
OIG is also using ESP to improve OIG's capabilities to meet
statutory requirements of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act
of 2012 and other whistleblower initiatives. Department employees,
employees of contractors and grantees, and others have been encouraged
to report fraud, waste, abuse, and misconduct. Such reporting must take
place without fear of retaliation. We have designated an ombudsman (a
senior ESP attorney) for these purposes. We also produced an
educational video and published a guide regarding whistleblower
protections on our website.\16\
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\16\ OIG, Whistleblower Protection, .
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Oversight of Overseas Contingency Operations
The IG community was recently tasked, through an amendment to the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), with additional responsibility
for overseeing current and future overseas contingency operations.
Approximately 8 weeks ago, Jon T. Rymer, the Inspector General for the
Department of Defense (DOD), was appointed Lead Inspector General for
Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)--the U.S.-led overseas contingency
operation directed against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL). Mr. Rymer subsequently appointed me as Associate Inspector
General in charge of oversight. Three OIGs (State, DOD, and U.S. Agency
for International Development) have dedicated staff to this important
project. We are working jointly on: (1) strategic planning, to provide
comprehensive oversight of all programs and operations in support of
OIR; (2) program management, to track, monitor, and update information
provided by our agencies in support of OIR; and (3) communications, to
collect information and prepare periodic reports for Congress on
projects related to OIR. Relatedly, we are in the process of
establishing a hotline dedicated to the contingency operation and
developing joint investigative capabilities for OIR oversight.
Data and Technology
OIG is developing an automated evidence tracking system to enhance
evidence processing accuracy and efficiency, and employee computer
forensic and data processing procedures in order to significantly
reduce agents' time and investigative hours. Further, we are building
the capacity of our new data analytics group and developing a fusion
cell consisting of special agents, forensic auditors, criminal
analysts, and computer specialists. This group of specialists will
enable all of our divisions to proactively analyze financial data to
identify potential vulnerabilities in Department programs and processes
and perform fraud risk assessments.
Suspension and Debarment
We have enhanced our efforts to identify and refer appropriate
cases to the Department for suspension and debarment. Our Offices of
Investigations and Audits prepare detailed suspension and debarment
recommendation packages, in consultation with our Office of General
Counsel, including referral memoranda summarizing all relevant facts
and setting forth the specific grounds for suspension or debarment.
They then submit their packages to the Department's Suspension and
Debarment Officials (SDOs) for action. Between 2011 and 2014, OIG
referred 128 cases to the Department for action.
New Locations
For reasons of oversight efficiency and to have ``boots on the
ground'' at key financial locations, OIG intends, in the near term, to
locate staff in Charleston, South Carolina, where one of the
Department's Global Financial Services Centers resides, and in
Frankfurt, Germany, the site of one of the Department's Regional
Procurement Support Offices. Both locations are responsible for
billions of taxpayer dollars. These moves will allow OIG to more
efficiently and economically access pertinent information and pursue
targeted reviews.
Prosecution of Cases
OIG has initiated a program to place one or more Special Assistant
U.S. Attorneys (SAUSAs) in appropriate positions in the Department of
Justice in order to prosecute more quickly and effectively cases
involving fraud against the Department of State. For example, an OIG
attorney-investigator now works as a full-time SAUSA in the U.S.
Attorney Office for the Eastern District of Virginia.
iii. impact of oig work
Through our independent audits, evaluations, inspections, and
investigations, OIG returns significant value to American taxpayers and
the Department and BBG. In fiscal year 2014, we issued 77 reports,
which included hundreds of recommendations to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the Department and BBG. During this period, we
identified $43.3 million in taxpayer funds that could be put to better
use. Additionally, our criminal, civil, and administrative
investigations resulted in the imposition or identification of $75
million in fines, restitution, recoveries, and other monetary results
last fiscal year. This was in addition to the $1 billion in financial
results from audit- or inspection-related findings and more than $40
million in investigative-related financial results that OIG identified
in the previous five fiscal years.
However, these financial statistics do not adequately take into
account some of our most significant impacts, which cannot be
quantified monetarily--namely, the physical safety and security of
people and facilities, and the integrity of the Department's operations
and reputation. Indeed, the work of our dedicated and talented staff in
reviewing security and leadership at our overseas and domestic posts
has significant effects on the lives and well-being of employees
throughout the Department. This impact is what motivates our employees,
many of whom sacrifice precious and long periods of time with their
families, often at high-threat posts.
iv. oig resources
I am very grateful for your support and the additional financial
resources that OIG has received over the past 2 years, and I would like
to express my thanks to this subcommittee, the committees on
appropriations, and both Houses of Congress. Our budget requests have
been substantially supported by the administration, and we are grateful
for its support as well. These additional financial resources have
enabled OIG to better fulfill its mission.
Although our appropriation has increased in recent years, we still
face significant challenges, given the growth of Department funding
compared to our own. In 1996, when our mission was expanded to absorb
the United States Information Agency, OIG's budget represented 0.70
percent of the Department's appropriation. Over the following decade,
OIG's budget was largely flat.
Through the support of Congress and the administration, OIG's
funding has more than doubled in the last few years. By comparison,
however, the Department's funding nearly quadrupled (more than 380
percent) between 1996 and 2014 accompanied by significant increases in
foreign assistance for which OIG also provides oversight. As a result,
even with the increase included in the 2015 budget and the President's
fiscal year 2016 request, OIG still represents less than one-third of 1
percent of the Department's operating budget. This percentage drops to
less than one-quarter of 1 percent when Department-managed foreign
assistance is included.
In addition to the substantial number of programs and dollars for
which we have oversight, another challenge that we face now is the new
requirement that OIG conduct joint oversight of OIR to defeat ISIL.
Since we are still in the process of defining the scope of our OIR
oversight commitments, long-term impacts on mission priorities are
difficult to predict. Presently, we are funding these responsibilities
out of existing resources, a situation that necessarily reduces
oversight resources for our other mission-critical priorities and
operational needs.\17\ Challenges we face include, among others, the
following:
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\17\ OIG's fiscal year 2015 budget does not include funds for OIR.
Approximately two-thirds of the President's requested fiscal year 2016
increase--$6.27 million--will be directed toward funding 16 positions
to meet our oversight responsibilities for OIR to degrade and defeat
ISIL. The remaining $2.73 million will fund 11 direct-hire positions
needed to strengthen security oversight, particularly in the context of
increased terrorist threats abroad, and to fulfill OIG's other
statutory responsibilities.
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--OIG is statutorily required to inspect and audit every bureau and
post once every 5 years.\18\ However, due to budgetary and
staffing limitations, more than 50 percent of domestic entities
and 100 overseas posts, representing billions of dollars and
tens of thousands of employees, have not been inspected in the
last 5 years. At current staffing levels, OIG estimates that it
will take approximately 8 years to inspect each overseas post
and 11 years to inspect each domestic operating unit. One of
the most important functions of our inspection work is ensuring
the safety and security of personnel and facilities overseas.
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\18\ This timeframe requirement is routinely waived by Congress
each year.
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--In the past decade, there has been a substantial growth in
Department grants and contracts, particularly in high-risk,
high-cost programs and operations, such as Afghanistan. For
example, in the last 5 years, Department procurements have more
than tripled, to approximately $12 billion annually.
--As described above, we remain concerned about the vulnerabilities
of our own IT network. Additional resources may be required to
increase our independence and reduce the risk of OIG systems
being vulnerable to unfettered and undetectable access by the
Department.
In conclusion, Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, and members
of the subcommittee, thank you for opportunity to highlight some of our
significant oversight work and for your continued strong support. We
take seriously our statutory requirement to identify instances of
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement and to notify Congress, agency
leadership, and the public of these deficiencies. My staff and I remain
committed to promoting the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of
the Department and BBG, as well as to protecting the safety and
security of its employees and facilities and sensitive information
around the world. As always, I would be happy to answer your questions
and provide more information on any of our past, present, or future
work.
______
Prepared Statement of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction
improving the effectiveness of u.s. reconstruction efforts in
afghanistan by enhancing oversight and addressing key areas of high
risk
Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, and members of the
subcommittee,
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement for the
record to aid in your consideration of the Department of State (State)
fiscal year 2016 budget request for Afghanistan.
Since 2002, Congress has appropriated approximately $107.5 billion
to rebuild Afghanistan. For fiscal year 2016, the President has
requested more than $5.3 billion in additional reconstruction funding
for Afghanistan, consisting of over $1.5 billion for State and U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) efforts, and $3.8 billion
for the Department of Defense (DOD) to train, equip, and sustain the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It is the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction's (SIGAR) mission to ensure that
these funds are spent as effectively and efficiently as possible and
that they are protected from waste, fraud, and abuse. As funding for
reconstruction projects in Afghanistan continues through fiscal year
2015 and beyond, and as the U.S. military presence and travel
accessibility shrinks, the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse increases.
SIGAR will continue to provide aggressive oversight of ongoing
reconstruction projects and the billions of reconstruction dollars yet
to be spent, while developing creative ways to operate in a more
constrained environment.
This statement summarizes SIGAR's fiscal year 2016 budget request,
recent successes from SIGAR's ongoing work, the challenges SIGAR has in
accomplishing its mission, and steps being taken to overcome these
challenges. In addition, the statement describes key management and
program challenges facing State and USAID, as well as DOD, by
highlighting areas of high risk that SIGAR has identified.
fiscal year 2016 budget request highlights sigar's unique and important
role in overseeing afghanistan reconstruction funds
SIGAR is the only inspector general with interagency authority to
audit, inspect, and investigate the activities of all U.S. Government
agencies and international organizations that receive U.S. funding for
Afghanistan reconstruction. As a result, SIGAR can conduct cross-
cutting reviews of State, USAID, DOD, and other agencies. In addition,
SIGAR is the only oversight agency that focuses solely on Afghanistan
reconstruction, enabling it to examine reconstruction programs and
issues in more depth while still producing timely and high-quality
work. Further, SIGAR is truly independent. We conduct our oversight
autonomously and report directly to Congress and the Secretaries of
State and Defense. To support its ongoing oversight mission, SIGAR has
requested $56.9 million for fiscal year 2016. Although this is
equivalent to the fiscal year 2015 enacted level, SIGAR intends to
reallocate funds within the agency, as discussed below, to address
operational and budgetary changes within Afghanistan's uncertain and
unpredictable environment.
SIGAR currently has the largest oversight presence in Afghanistan,
with more auditors, analysts, and investigators in country than any
other agency. SIGAR's staff of 42 deployed personnel--consisting of 18
Audits and Inspections staff, 20 Investigations staff, and 4 Management
and Support staff--are located at U.S. Embassy Kabul, Bagram Airfield,
and Kandahar Airfield. Most of SIGAR's deployed staff serve at least 2
years in country, limiting the amount of annual turnover compared to
other agencies and providing a stable knowledge base within the U.S.
Government's presence in Afghanistan. SIGAR plans to maintain 41
deployed positions in Afghanistan through fiscal year 2016. SIGAR has
also hired six local Afghan engineers and analysts. To supplement the
deployed and local staff, SIGAR personnel located at the agency's
headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, frequently travel to Afghanistan
on a temporary duty basis for 2 to 8 weeks to conduct audit,
inspection, and investigative work.
By working and living alongside their colleagues in State, USAID,
DOD, and other implementing agencies, SIGAR's staff has a full
understanding of the challenges and dangers of working on the ground in
Afghanistan. SIGAR's investigators located at sites outside Kabul
regularly experience rocket attacks and other indirect fire. An
investigator recently received the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency Sentner Award for Dedication and Courage in
recognition of his courage, uncommon selflessness, and dedication to
duty during an insurgency attack on the Herat Consulate in September
2013. The morning of September 13, 2013, a truck packed with explosives
rammed into the security gate and blew up, killing several guards and
heavily damaging the building. A group of armed insurgents then tried
to storm the compound, but ultimately failed. SIGAR's investigator
assisted the Regional Security Officer by conducting an armed sweep to
ensure that all U.S. personnel were accounted for and that no
insurgents had penetrated the consulate. The investigator also helped
move casualties and held a weapons position covering the blown-open
entrance to the consulate until security forces arrived.
When SIGAR was established in 2008, the agency created four
directorates to accomplish its mission: (1) Audits and Inspections, (2)
Investigations, (3) Research and Analysis, and (4) Management and
Support.\1\ In addition to these directorates, in 2012, SIGAR created
its Special Projects program to examine emerging issues and deliver
prompt, actionable reports to implementing agencies and Congress. The
team conducts a variety of assessments and, to date, has produced 88
inquiry and alert letters, reviews, fact sheets, and other products, on
different aspects of the Afghanistan reconstruction effort. SIGAR was
the only Inspector General with this capability until 2014, when
State's Office of Inspector General followed SIGAR's lead by
establishing a similar group within its own office.
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\1\ Formerly known as the Information Management directorate,
Research and Analysis produces SIGAR's quarterly report to Congress.
Management and Support provides human resources, budget, information
technology, and other support to SIGAR's directorates and staff.
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In late 2014, SIGAR established another unique capability in the
form of its Lessons Learned Program (LLP). SIGAR is the only Inspector
General with the authority to look across the entire reconstruction
effort in Afghanistan to analyze lessons learned and best practices.
SIGAR's previous oversight work has exposed a series of systemic issues
that have hindered the progress of agencies' reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan. These, along with the demonstrated successes of those and
other efforts, will be incorporated into the lessons learned work.\2\
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\2\ Some of these systemic interagency problems, such as
corruption, sustainability, counternarcotics, contract management and
oversight, and strategy and planning, are detailed in SIGAR's December
2014 High-Risk List.
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LLP is planning to release a series of reports focused on key
aspects of the reconstruction effort that will contain actionable
recommendations that can help to improve current and future
reconstruction efforts. These reports will document what the U.S.
Government sought to accomplish through its reconstruction efforts,
assess what it achieved, and evaluate the degree to which these
programs helped the United States reach its strategic goals in
Afghanistan. These reports will distill this knowledge to produce
recommendations to address the challenges stakeholders face in ensuring
efficient, effective, and sustainable reconstruction efforts, not just
in Afghanistan, but in future conflict zones. Through these reports,
SIGAR plans on reaching a diverse audience in the legislative and
executive branches, at both the strategic and programmatic levels, and
in Washington, DC, and the field. LLP has four initial projects
underway, which will address (1) interagency strategy and planning, (2)
coordination of international donor assistance, (3) anti-corruption
efforts, and (4) counternarcotics interventions in Afghanistan
reconstruction. Future projects will focus on other significant issues.
SIGAR sees the LLP and its lessons learned reports as a key legacy
of SIGAR and is working to ensure the proper resourcing for this
important effort. To staff the LLP, SIGAR has hired subject-matter
experts with considerable experience working and living in Afghanistan.
In producing its reports, the LLP is also leveraging the considerable
skills, experience, and resources found throughout SIGAR in its Audits
and Inspections, Investigations, Research and Analysis, and Special
Projects directorates. By leveraging these resources, as well as
SIGAR's unique interagency mandate, LLP intends to do everything it can
to make sure that the lessons from the United States' largest
reconstruction effort are identified, acknowledged, and most
importantly, remembered and used to inform future reconstruction and
development efforts.
SIGAR's Work Continues to Improve the Effectiveness and Efficiency of
Reconstruction Programs, and Reduce Fraud, Waste, and Abuse of
Funds
SIGAR's investigations, audit, and other work continues to have
positive impacts on ongoing and planned reconstruction programs and
agency operations. Since 2008, SIGAR has identified over $1.6 billion
in savings, representing a return of almost $8 for $1 appropriated to
fund SIGAR. SIGAR's investigations have saved the U.S. Government more
than $550 million. Forfeitures, fines, and restitution resulting from
criminal investigations currently total over $18 million. In addition,
SIGAR's investigative work has led to the conviction of over 80
subjects, 64 of whom have been sentenced. During the first quarter of
fiscal year 2015, SIGAR recovered a record $53.7 million for the U.S.
Government from Civil Settlement Agreement payments, consisting of:
--$25 million from Supreme Logistics FZE (Supreme) for falsifying
billing claims by submitting false claims to three prime global
transportation and logistics contractors, causing them to
overcharge the U.S. Government for refrigerated containers when
Supreme used dry goods containers; \3\
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\3\ The U.S. Transportation Command awarded a series of contracts,
collectively referred to as the ``USC-06'' contracts, to three global
transportation and logistics companies: Maersk Line Limited, American
President Lines, and Hapag-Lloyd. Under various USC-06 contracts, those
three companies transported food and cargo destined for U.S. troops in
Afghanistan from the United States to Latvia or other intermediate
ports in Europe. At that point, the three companies then arranged with
various logistics vendors, one of which was Supreme, to carry the cargo
the rest of the way to Afghanistan.
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--$20 million from Supreme Site Services Gmbh for over-billing for
fuel purchased by the Defense Logistics Agency for use by U.S.
and coalition military forces; and
--$8.7 million from Maersk Line Limited for alleged failure of
performance and noncompliant shipments to military outposts
under a contract with DOD.
This nearly equals SIGAR's total budget of $56.9 million for the
current fiscal year. Other significant achievements from prior years
include four convictions resulting from an investigation into an
individual who used his position to steer more than $10 million in
military supply contracts to a company owned and operated by his wife
and mother-in-law. Two notable examples are the convictions of four
individuals after a single investigation uncovered a complex scheme to
steal U.S. Government fuel, and an investigation into a $1.75 million
contract for a clinical engineering support program to assist the
Afghan National Army (ANA) Medical Services that resulted in the
contract being terminated for nonperformance and a $1.5 million cost
savings for the U.S. Government.\4\
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\4\ SIGAR currently has 328 ongoing investigations.
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In addition, SIGAR has completed 188 audit and inspection reports
and made 540 recommendations that have identified nearly $1.1 billion
in questioned costs, funds that can be put to better use, and funds
identified for potential recovery. Of that $1.1 billion, SIGAR's
financial audit program identified approximately $107 million in
questioned costs, $11.5 million of which has been sustained by the
agencies so far. Of the 540 recommendations, State, USAID, and DOD have
implemented 374, or almost 70 percent, with 100 recommendations still
open. These recommendations have, among other things, strengthened
contract oversight, management, and compliance; assisted in building
and sustaining the capacity of the Afghan Government; and ensured
accountability over on-budget support.\5\ For example, based on SIGAR's
audit of the Afghan Air Force's medium-airlift requirement, we
requested that DOD review those requirements and the Afghan Air Force's
ability to fully use its two existing C-130 cargo planes before
providing two additional planes. DOD subsequently determined that a
fourth plane was unnecessary, resulting in potential savings of about
$40.5 million: $19.8 million for the aircraft itself and $20.7 million
for maintenance, parts, training, and aircraft modifications.\6\
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\5\ As of February 19, 2015, recommendation implementation rates by
agency were approximately 66 percent for State, 72 percent for USAID,
and 69 percent for DOD.
\6\ SIGAR-14-80-AL, Afghan Air Force C-130 Aircraft, July 10, 2014,
and SIGAR-14-80a-AL, Afghan Air Force C130 Aircraft Response, October
6, 2014.
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SIGAR's audit, inspection, and quarterly reports continue to be
used by U.S. agencies, international partners, and the highest levels
of the Afghan Government to improve oversight and management of
reconstruction efforts. During my most recent trip to Afghanistan in
February 2015, I met with President Ashraf Ghani and his key advisors,
at President Ghani's request. During that meeting, President Ghani
thanked me for SIGAR's aggressive oversight work. He noted that he
reads and uses SIGAR's audit and quarterly reports. For example, he
carefully followed SIGAR's work examining issues regarding the United
Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) management of the Law and Order
Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which funds Afghan National Police
(ANP) salaries.\7\ He also stated that he is pushing for major changes
in the ANP's salary program as a result of SIGAR's recent audit of the
reliability of ANP personnel and payroll data.\8\
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\7\ See SIGAR Special Project 14-57-SP, Inquiry Letter: UNDP LOTFA
Oversight, May 13, 2014; SIGAR Special Project 14-98-SP, Inquiry
Letter: UNDP LOTFA Oversight Response, September 12, 2014; SIGAR
Special Project 14-99-SP, Inquiry Letter: CSTC-A Role of UNDP Oversight
and Financial Management of LOTFA, September 17, 2014.
\8\ SIGAR 15-26-AR, Afghan National Police: More than $300 Million
in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary Payments Is Based on Partially Verified
or Reconciled Data, January 7, 2015.
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SIGAR continues to have a good working relationship with the
Department of Defense and its subcomponents and commands, most notably
the Combined Security Transition Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A). SIGAR
has also taken great strides to improve its relationships with State
and USAID. In addition, SIGAR coordinates regularly with the other
Inspector General Offices and the Government Accountability Office to
ensure coverage of all aspects of the reconstruction effort and prevent
duplication of effort. For example, SIGAR participates in the Southwest
Asia Joint Planning Group, which meets quarterly and produces the
Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia. As an extra step to
prevent duplication, SIGAR vets its performance audit notification
letters with the DOD, State, and USAID Offices of Inspector General;
and the Government Accountability Office prior to initiating those
audits. Further, SIGAR's financial audit team meets frequently with the
USAID Mission for Afghanistan to ensure, to the extent possible, that
USAID's reconstruction contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements
are audited.
SIGAR Has Taken Steps to Overcome Challenges to Completing Its
Oversight Mission
With the transfer of full responsibility for securing Afghanistan
to the Afghan Government, the end of the International Security
Assistance Force mission, and the beginning of the Resolute Support
Mission, a new phase of the Afghanistan reconstruction effort has
begun. The Afghan Government and international community refer to this
as the ``Transformation Decade,'' which began in 2015 and ends in 2024.
To help guide SIGAR during this period of rapid change in Afghanistan
and address, among other things, how the office will conduct its
oversight mission with less direct access to program and project sites,
SIGAR developed a transition plan for 2014 through 2016. The plan
ensures that SIGAR's transition activities are synchronized with its
strategic plan and other U.S. agencies' transition plans. Over time,
and as appropriate, SIGAR will adjust its functions, methods, products,
and practices, adopting new ones when necessary, to continue to provide
seamless, independent oversight of the reconstruction effort. Further,
SIGAR will take all measures necessary to uphold Government standards
of quality in carrying out its oversight.
For example, to expand our ability to monitor projects remotely,
SIGAR has hired six Afghan engineers and analysts to assist with audit
and inspection work. These local employees have greater freedom of
movement, allowing them to visit sites and facilities that SIGAR's U.S.
staff is unable to visit. In addition, in December 2014, SIGAR signed a
cooperative agreement with Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), a well-
respected Afghan nongovernmental organization, to conduct site visits,
including inspections and engineering assessments of U.S.-funded
projects. SIGAR has assigned an agreement officer to work closely with
IWA to ensure that its work meets generally accepted Government
auditing standards (GAGAS) and SIGAR's internal quality control
requirements. SIGAR has also expanded its use of geospatial imaging
through agreements with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and
Army Geospatial Center. SIGAR is currently pursuing additional methods
for remote monitoring.
In addition, SIGAR plans to continue its financial audit
program.\9\ Established in 2012, the SIGAR financial audit program
contracts with independent public auditing firms to perform financial
audits of completed reconstruction contracts. SIGAR staff oversees the
firms' completion of these financial audits, from notification to the
final report, to ensure the work complies with GAGAS and SIGAR quality
control standards. To date, SIGAR has completed 38 financial audits,
which have, as noted above, identified approximately $107 million in
questioned costs, $11.5 million of which has been sustained by the
agencies, and another 30 financial audits ongoing. When questioned
costs are identified, SIGAR investigators review those costs and
initiate criminal investigations, when applicable.
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\9\ SIGAR produces two types of audits: (1) financial and (2)
performance. Financial audits evaluate completed reconstruction
contracts and identify questioned costs, if any, resulting from
significant deficiencies in the audited entity's internal controls
related to the contracts, and any instances of noncompliance with
contract requirements and applicable laws and regulations. Performance
audits provide objective analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency
of reconstruction programs and make recommendations to improve
performance and operations, reduce costs, and facilitate decisionmaking
by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action
for public accountability.
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SIGAR is also coordinating closely with the Afghan Attorney
General's office to refer criminal and civil cases involving Afghans
for prosecution in Afghanistan. For example, SIGAR conducted an
investigation into bid rigging on the Afghan Ministry of Defense's
(MOD) contract to deliver fuel to ANA sites throughout Afghanistan and
other contracts. In early February 2015, a SIGAR investigator; Major
General Todd Semonite, the CSTC-A commander; and others attended a
meeting with President Ghani at the presidential palace regarding the
investigation. Based on SIGAR's work, President Ghani suspended the
fuel contract and assigned a representative to investigate the alleged
collusion. That representative has since informed SIGAR that President
Ghani cancelled the fuel contract completely and that six MOD officials
were suspended pending the results of the investigation. SIGAR was also
informed that CSTC-A would fund $280 million per year on the contract.
That amount includes $80 million in reserve funding per year. In order
to draw upon the reserve funding, MOD would have to justify and account
for its fuel usage, thus placing conditionality on that funding. In
addition to referring cases to the Afghan Government, SIGAR plans to
share lessons learned with Afghan central government auditors and
facilitate their relationship with the Government Accountability Office
and the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions.
sigar has identified seven areas of high risk to the success of the
u.s. reconstruction effort in afghanistan
Although State, USAID, and DOD have each experienced some successes
in their individual reconstruction efforts, multiple challenges exist
that could undermine the success of the overall U.S. reconstruction
effort. Building on the seven questions SIGAR developed in early 2013
to guide decision makers as they consider whether and how best to use
the remaining reconstruction funds,\10\ in December 2014, SIGAR issued
its first High-Risk List to call attention to program areas and
elements of the U.S.-funded reconstruction effort in Afghanistan that
are especially vulnerable to significant waste, fraud, and abuse.\11\
With the list, SIGAR seeks to highlight program areas SIGAR believes
agencies, such as State, USAID, and DOD, need to focus on and discuss
how specific agencies are failing to mitigate risks in areas under
their purview. In addition to driving agencies to evaluate and address
their own operations, SIGAR intends to use the list as an internal tool
for planning its own oversight work in order to develop recommendations
to help Congress and the agencies correct major deficiencies. The list
proposes some key questions for Congress and the agencies to consider
to improve their reconstruction efforts. In addition to informing U.S.
stakeholders, the list should assist the new Afghan national unity
government in planning and implementing its reform agenda.
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\10\ See SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
January 30, 2013, and SIGAR, Statement for the Record, Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, U.S. Senate, Reducing Waste,
Improving Efficiencies, and Achieving Savings in U.S. Reconstruction of
Afghanistan, April 18, 2013.
\11\ SIGAR, High-Risk List, December 2014.
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SIGAR's first High-Risk List identifies seven program areas:
1. Corruption/Rule of Law
2. Sustainability
3. ANSF Capacity and Capabilities
4. On-Budget Support
5. Counternarcotics
6. Contract Management and Oversight Access
7. Strategy and Planning
Although other areas of risk exist, SIGAR selected these seven
program areas because they are essential to the success of the
reconstruction effort. In other words, if there is a failure in any of
these areas, the entire 13-year reconstruction effort could fail,
resulting in billions of dollars in taxpayer funds being wasted. These
seven areas are also at risk of significant and large scale failure due
to fraud, waste, or abuse; elements of ongoing or planned
reconstruction programs and projects; and subject to the control or
influence of the U.S. Government.
SIGAR recognizes that even in conflict-free areas, no
reconstruction or development program or project is without risk of
fraud, waste, and abuse. This risk is greater in insecure and unstable
conflict areas, such as Afghanistan. However, SIGAR's work and the work
of other oversight agencies has shown reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan are at unnecessarily high risk, which agencies could
mitigate by taking appropriate corrective actions.
Corruption/Rule of Law
Corruption is one of the most serious threats to the U.S.-funded
Afghanistan reconstruction effort. In a February 2014 report, the DOD
Joint Staff wrote, ``Corruption alienates key elements of the
population, discredits the government and security forces, undermines
international support, subverts state functions and rule of law, robs
the state of revenue, and creates barriers to economic growth.'' \12\
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\12\ DOD, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), division
of Joint Staff J-7 (Joint Force Development), Operationalizing Counter/
Anti-Corruption Study, February 28, 2014.
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Reducing corruption and increasing accountability are important
components of the U.S. reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan. However,
in 2010, SIGAR reported that more than $50 billion in U.S. assistance
had been provided for reconstruction in Afghanistan since 2002 without
the benefit of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, and that U.S.
anticorruption efforts had provided relatively little assistance to
some key Afghan institutions.\13\ In a 2013 follow-up review, SIGAR
found that although an additional $46 billion had been appropriated for
reconstruction, the United States still did not have a comprehensive
strategy or related guidance that defined clear goals and objectives
for U.S. efforts to fight corruption.\14\
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\13\ SIGAR Audit 10-15, U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan
Would Benefit from a Finalized Comprehensive U.S. Anti-Corruption
Strategy, August, 5, 2010.
\14\ SIGAR Special Project Report SP-13-9, U.S. Anti-Corruption
Efforts: A Strategic Plan and Mechanisms to Track Progress are Needed
in Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan, September 11, 2013.
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In 2012, SIGAR's Investigations directorate enhanced its
relationship with the Afghan Attorney General's office and began
documenting criminal activity by senior government officials and Afghan
businessmen, and referring those matters to the Attorney General's
office for action. More recently, in April 2014, SIGAR reported that
the single biggest issue limiting the Afghan Government's collection of
customs revenue is corruption.\15\ This is a significant loss since
customs revenue has accounted for between 44 and 48 percent of
Afghanistan's total domestic revenue for the past 3 years. Increasing
domestic revenue is a key goal of both the U.S. and the Afghan
Governments, and significantly reducing or eliminating corruption could
double customs revenues. However, despite spending $198 million to
develop Afghan capacity to assess and collect customs revenue, its
potential as a stable source of government income remains uncertain.
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\15\ SIGAR Audit 14-47-AR, Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have Had
Some Successes, but Challenges Will Limit Customs Revenue as a
Sustainable Source of Income for Afghanistan, April 15, 2014.
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Key questions for consideration are:
--To what extent have U.S. technical assistance and capacity-building
programs dedicated sufficient resources to reducing corruption
within the Afghan Government?
--What steps has the Afghan Government taken to pursue criminal
action against those matters referred by SIGAR?
--What steps are U.S. agencies and the Afghan Government taking to
reduce corruption within Afghanistan's customs collection
system?
Sustainability
Much of the more than $107 billion the United States has committed
to reconstruction projects and programs risks being wasted because the
Afghans cannot sustain the investment without significant support from
the United States and other donors. However, Afghanistan lacks the
capacity--financial, technical, managerial, or otherwise--to operate
and maintain much of what has been built or established during more
than a decade of international assistance. For example, the Afghan
Government's budget for 2014 was nearly $7.6 billion; however, the
Government expected revenues to only cover $2.8 billion, or less than
37 percent, of that amount, with donor grants making up the rest.
SIGAR's work has shown that State, USAID, and DOD have not always
considered sustainability when planning programs or projects,
jeopardizing the massive investment that the United States and other
international donors have made. For example, a 2013 audit examining the
$18.5 million in USAID funds spent to build two hospitals in
Afghanistan found that USAID did not fully assess the Afghan Ministry
of Public Health's (MOPH) ability to operate and maintain the
facilities. The new operation and maintenance costs for the two
hospitals could be five times the costs of the hospitals they replaced,
a burden that neither USAID nor the MOPH has agreed to assume.\16\
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\16\ SIGAR Audit 13-9, Health Services in Afghanistan: Two New
USAID-Funded Hospitals May Not Be Sustainable and Existing Hospitals
Are Facing Shortages in Some Key Medical Positions, April 29, 2013.
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Further, both the international community and the Afghan Government
agree that improving the energy sector is essential to Afghanistan's
economic progress and long-term viability. However, the Afghans cannot
afford to pay for much of the electric power infrastructure that the
U.S. reconstruction effort has provided. In 2014, SIGAR reported that
over 2 years after its completion, the Kabul Power Plant, a 105-
megawatt power plant on the outskirts of Kabul built under a USAID
contract--was not being operated and maintained in a sustainable manner
by the Afghan national power utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna
Sherkat.\17\
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\17\ SIGAR Audit 13-2, Afghanistan's National Power Utility: $12.8
Million In DOD-Purchased Equipment Sits Unused, and USAID Paid a
Contractor for Work Not Done, December 18, 2012.
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In addition to conducting audits, inspections, and special
projects, SIGAR investigates cases involving sub-standard construction
of critical facilities that not only detracts from their expected life
spans but also presents an immediate safety risk for the individuals
occupying those facilities.
Questions for consideration are:
--To what extent has the Afghan Government made progress in
generating revenues to fund government operations?
--To what extent have U.S. agencies developed plans for sustaining
their programs and projects that will be turned over to the
Afghan Government and coordinated these plans with the relevant
Afghan ministries?
ANSF Capacity and Capabilities
A stable security environment is vital to prevent Afghanistan from
again becoming a safe haven for terrorists and to enable much-needed
reconstruction and development activities to occur. A well-developed
and fully capable ANSF is critical to achieving and maintaining this
security. As such, a key component of the U.S. and international
reconstruction effort has been to build the capacity of the ANSF. As of
January 2015, Congress had appropriated more than $60 billion to build,
equip, train, and sustain the ANSF, and DOD has requested an additional
$3.8 billion for fiscal year 2016. However, this significant investment
in Afghanistan's security is at risk, particularly in light of the end
of the U.S. and coalition military combat mission at the end of 2014
and drawdown of those forces.
SIGAR has developed a substantial body of work on U.S. efforts to
develop the ANSF in areas such as infrastructure construction and
maintenance; equipment and other resources, and maintenance of that
equipment; personnel management; capabilities of the ANSF; and
training. For example, in a 2014 audit of ANSF literacy training, SIGAR
reported that widespread illiteracy undermines effective training, use
of technical manuals, understanding orders, inventorying equipment,
documenting operations, and other vital military functions. Despite a
$200 million literacy training contract, the NATO Training Mission--
Afghanistan and CSTC-A did not have the ability to measure the
effectiveness of the training or to determine the extent to which
overall literacy of the ANSF had improved.\18\ In a 2012 audit of ANSF
facilities, SIGAR found that the Afghan Government would likely be
incapable of fully sustaining ANSF facilities after the transition in
2014 and the expected decrease in U.S. and coalition support. The
Afghan Government's challenges in assuming operation and maintenance
responsibilities included a lack of sufficient numbers and quality of
personnel, as well as undeveloped budgeting, procurement, and logistics
systems.\19\
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\18\ SIGAR Audit 14-30-AR, Afghan National Security Forces: Despite
Reported Successes, Concerns Remain About Literacy Program Results,
Contract Oversight, Transition and Sustainment, January 28, 2014.
\19\ SIGAR Audit 13-1, Afghan National Security Forces Facilities:
Concerns with Funding, Oversight, and Sustainability for Operation and
Maintenance, October 30, 2012.
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Based on SIGAR's work, possible questions on the capability of the
ANSF include:
--To what extent is the ANSF making sufficient progress toward
becoming a fully capable and self-sustaining force that is able
to successfully secure Afghanistan?
--What safeguards has DOD implemented--or planned to implement--to
strengthen accountability for U.S.-funded equipment and
infrastructure, and ensure the Afghans have the capacity and
capability to account for, fully utilize, and maintain this
equipment and infrastructure?
On-Budget Support
SIGAR continues to have concerns about the risk to U.S. funds
provided to the Afghan Government in the form of on-budget assistance,
which includes direct assistance (also referred to as bilateral
assistance), government-to-government assistance, and assistance that
travels through multi-donor trust funds before reaching the Afghan
Government.\20\ Since 2002, the United States has committed a total of
more than $7.7 billion in the form of on-budget assistance to
Afghanistan.
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\20\ The major multi-donor trust funds for Afghanistan are the
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, managed by the World Bank ($2.04
billion in cumulative U.S. contributions); the Afghanistan
Infrastructure Trust Fund, managed by the Asian Development Bank ($105
million in cumulative U.S. contributions); and LOTFA, managed by UNDP
($1.45 billion in U.S. contributions).
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SIGAR's prior work has shown that many ministries lack the capacity
or necessary internal controls to effectively manage and account for
on-budget assistance funds, and are unable to do so in a transparent
manner that enables U.S. agencies to oversee those funds. A 2013 audit
of the $236 million Partnership Contracts for Health program raised
serious concerns about an on-budget program that supports the MOPH's
delivery of healthcare services to local clinics and hospitals. The
audit found that, despite MOPH financial-management deficiencies, USAID
continued to provide millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars in direct
assistance with little assurance that MOPH is using these funds as
intended.\21\ Yet another audit found that USAID's assessments of seven
Afghan ministries receiving on-budget assistance from the U.S.
Government found that none of the ministries would be capable of
effectively managing and accounting for those funds unless they
implemented a series of required risk-mitigation measures developed by
USAID.\22\ Further, in a review of DOD's safeguards for funds provided
to the MOD and Ministry of Interior (MOI), SIGAR identified a number of
weaknesses that increased the risk that on-budget funds provided to the
ANSF that made those funds particularly vulnerable to waste, fraud, and
abuse.\23\
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\21\ SIGAR Audit 13-17, Health Services in Afghanistan: USAID
Continues Providing Millions of Dollars to the Ministry of Public
Health Despite the Risk of Misuse, September 5, 2013.
\22\ SIGAR Audit 14-32-AR, Direct Assistance: USAID Has Taken
Positive Action to Assess Afghan Ministries' Ability to Manage Donor
Funds, but Concerns Remain, January 30, 2014.
\23\ SIGAR Special Project Report 14-12-SP, Comprehensive Risk
Assessments of MOD and MOI Financial Management Capacity Could Improve
Oversight of Over $4 Billion in Direct Assistance Funding, December 3,
2013.
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One way to improve Afghan ministries' ability to manage and account
for on-budget assistance is to make this assistance conditional on the
ministries taking defined actions to improve their financial
management, procurement, strategic planning, and auditing capabilities,
among others. During my recent meeting, President Ghani voiced his
support for conditionality on assistance provided to the Afghan
Government, adding that he plans to use conditionality to keep his
government focused on meeting performance targets and prioritizing its
key tasks. In addition, CSTC-A recently made a small portion of its on-
budget support to the MOI conditional on the ministry taking steps to
approve its accounting for ANP personnel and salaries. However, State
and USAID have yet to fully embrace the conditionality as part of their
on-budget support.
Given the ongoing concerns about on-budget support, questions for
consideration are:
--What conditions should U.S. agencies impose on Afghan ministries
before distributing on-budget funding to the Afghan Government?
--What steps are agencies taking to achieve Afghan transparency in
the use of U.S. on-budget assistance?
--What level of oversight access do U.S. officials have to documents,
personnel, and locations funded through on-budget support?
Counternarcotics
The expanding cultivation and trafficking of drugs puts the entire
U.S. and international investment in the reconstruction of Afghanistan
at risk. The narcotics trade, which not only supports the insurgency
but also feeds organized crime and corruption, puts the gains the U.S.
agencies and their international partners have achieved over the past
13 years in women's issues, health, education, rule of law, and
governance in jeopardy. Although the United States has invested $8
billion, as of December 30, 2014, in counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan, that country still leads the world in opium production,
and Afghan farmers are growing more opium than ever before.
Both SIGAR's October 2014 quarterly report and a special project on
opium cultivation highlighted the ineffectiveness of law enforcement
and alternative livelihoods programs in combating opium
cultivation.\24\ A SIGAR report on the Counternarcotics Justice Center
(CNJC) alerted U.S. officials that the CNJC's $11 million detention
facility was not being used for high-profile drug traffickers as
intended; rather, the cells were being occupied by low-profile
detainees. Because the detention center was filled with low-profile
detainees, no cells were available to house mid- and high-profile drug
traffickers. SIGAR also noted that, at the time, the CNJC did not have
procedures in place to handle a high case load.\25\
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\24\ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October
30, 2014, and SIGAR Special Project Report 15-10-SP, Poppy Cultivation
in Afghanistan: After a Decade of Reconstruction and Over $7 Billion in
Counternarcotics Efforts, Poppy Cultivation Levels Are at an All-Time
High, October 14, 2014.
\25\ SIGAR Audit-09-7, Documenting Detention Procedures Will Help
Ensure Counter-Narcotics Justice Center Is Utilized As Intended,
September 30, 2009.
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SIGAR investigations routinely involve analysis of financial flows
out of Afghanistan. For law enforcement to be effective in combating
the narcotics trade, financial information must be made transparent to
ensure that illegal networks can be identified and eliminated. For this
to be accomplished, it is imperative the Afghan Government be Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) compliant.\26\
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\26\ FATF is an inter-governmental body established to set
standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory,
and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist
financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the
international financial system.
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Some questions for consideration on the counternarcotics issue are:
--To what extent has U.S. assistance for counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan succeeded in achieving its overarching goals and
objectives?
--To what extent is the Afghan Government capable of assuming a lead
role--and sustaining--the fragile progress made by U.S.-
supported counternarcotics operations?
--What steps has the Afghan Government taken to be fully FATF
compliant?
Contract Management and Oversight Access
U.S. military and civilian agencies in Afghanistan rely heavily on
contractors to carry out their missions. At times, the number of
contractor employees has exceeded the number of in-country U.S.
military personnel. Although contracting has provided indispensable
support of the U.S. mission, it has also been a massive opportunity for
waste, fraud, and abuse, and an enormous challenge to effective
oversight of funding and performance.
SIGAR has repeatedly found problems with agencies' management and
oversight of contracts and other agreements. In January 2015, SIGAR
reported that it could not complete a full inspection of Gorimar
Industrial Park, built under a $7.7 million USAID contract because
USAID was unable to locate project design, planning, construction,
quality assurance, and related documents that the agency should have
maintained in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation.\27\
Another inspection found that a contractor's noncompliance with
contract requirements and inadequate contract oversight of the
construction of a dry fire range for the ANP in Wardak province
resulted in serious structural deficiencies in the facility.\28\
Notably, improper substitution of clay bricks for bricks composed
mostly of sand resulted in water penetration that essentially
``melted'' the facility building. Because of these irreparable damages,
the ANP demolished and is currently rebuilding the facility,
representing a waste of the almost $500,000 in U.S. funds spent on the
initial construction.
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\27\ SIGAR Inspection 15-30-IP, Gorimar Industrial Park: Lack of
Electricity and Water Have Left This $7.7 Million U.S.-funded
Industrial Park Underutilized by Afghan Businesses, January 27, 2015.
\28\ SIGAR Inspection 15-27-IP, Afghan Special Police Training
Center's Dry Fire Range: Poor Contractor Performance and Poor
Government Oversight Led to Project Failure, January 13, 2015.
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The increasing difficulties U.S. agencies are having--due to, among
other things, drawdown of U.S. and coalition military personnel,
deteriorating security conditions across Afghanistan, and the ongoing
normalization of Embassy Kabul's operations and presence--have made it
much more difficult for agency personnel to oversee their programs and
projects first-hand, thus exacerbating ongoing problems with contract
oversight. USAID has developed a multi-tiered monitoring and evaluation
strategy for Afghanistan that includes using independent, third-party
contractors to monitor and evaluate the agency's programs. State is
reportedly taking similar steps.
Although U.S. agencies may be well intentioned in their efforts to
rebuild Afghanistan, SIGAR remains concerned that the agencies are
implementing and have planned several large-scale reconstruction
programs without fully determining how they will oversee those
programs. For example, in October 2014, USAID announced the launch of
Promoting Gender Equity in National Priority Programs (Promote), a 5-
year, $416 million program that, according to USAID, is ``the largest
women's empowerment program supported by USAID anywhere in the world.''
\29\ Promote's primary goal is to strengthen Afghanistan's development
by boosting female participation in the economy, helping women gain
business and management skills, supporting women's rights groups, and
increasing the number of women in decisionmaking positions within the
Afghan Government. However, it is currently unclear the extent to which
USAID will be able to effectively implement, monitor, and assess the
impact of Promote and the extent to which the program will achieve its
overall goal.
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\29\ Of the $416 million, USAID will fund $216 million and other
international donors are expected to fund $200 million.
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Key questions for consideration regarding U.S. agencies' contract
management and oversight are:
--If security conditions prevent U.S. access for direct management
and oversight in some areas, to what extent have agencies made
reasonable plans for adequate and verifiable remote or third-
party monitoring of contractor performance?
--What steps have agencies taken to improve contract management and
oversight, particularly agency personnel's adherence to
existing regulations and policies and contractors' adherence to
the terms of their agreements?
Strategy and Planning
U.S. agencies have sought to coordinate their efforts to achieve
the U.S. reconstruction objectives in Afghanistan through a series of
Civil-Military Strategic Frameworks (2012 and 2013) and United States
Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plans (2009 and 2011). Since
fiscal year 2007, the number of reconstruction projects and programs
implemented has dramatically increased. However, SIGAR's work has shown
that there has been a gap between the high-level strategic documents
and the various projects and programs being implemented. This lack of
strategic and operational planning to ensure that U.S. activities in
Afghanistan actually contribute to overall national goals threatens to
cause agencies and projects to work at counter-purposes, spend money on
duplicative or unnecessary efforts and endeavors, or fail to coordinate
efforts to maximize their impact.
For example, a 2014 SIGAR audit found that although the U.S.
Government has developed a comprehensive water strategy for U.S.
agencies working in Afghanistan, USAID did not meet three of its key
objectives in four of the nine water projects it has funded since
fiscal year 2010.\30\ During the course of another audit of State's
Justice Sector Support Program, Embassy officials told SIGAR that they
were currently updating the 2009 U.S. Government Rule of Law Strategy
for Afghanistan to, among other things, assist them to identify overall
goals for the Afghan justice sector and help them develop policies and
programs to achieve those goals. However, this strategy has not been
finalized, and there is no clear timeline for its completion.\31\
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\30\ SIGAR Audit 14-52-AR, Afghanistan's Water Sector: USAID's
Strategy Needs to Be Updated to Ensure Appropriate Oversight and
Accountability, April 24, 2014.
\31\ SIGAR Audit 14-26-AR, Support for Afghanistan's Justice
Sector: State Department Programs Need Better Management and Stronger
Oversight, January 24, 2014.
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Key questions for consideration are:
--To what extent do agencies monitor and evaluate the contributions
of specific programs and projects to higher-level U.S.
strategic reconstruction goals for Afghanistan?
--What mechanisms exist to facilitate interagency coordination, and
how effective are these mechanisms?
conclusion
Since 2002, the United States has provided billions of dollars to
rebuild Afghanistan and prevent it from again becoming a safe haven for
terrorist groups. The transfer of security responsibility for the
country to the Afghan Government, the end of the U.S. and coalition
combat mission, and the drawdown of international forces does not mean
the reconstruction effort is over. Much remains to be done before
Afghanistan becomes a country that can ensure its own stability and
security with a capable and self-sustaining ANSF, and has a stable
government that can provide necessary services, such as rule of law and
education, to its citizens. The success of this effort greatly hinges
on the U.S. Government's ability to efficiently and effectively provide
reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan and ensure that funds are not
wasted or abused in what is the most costly rebuilding program for a
single nation in U.S. history. SIGAR is committed to assisting
Congress, U.S. agencies, and other stakeholders by continuing to
provide the aggressive and independent oversight of the reconstruction
effort.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement to assist
your oversight of U.S.-funded reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
SIGAR shares your commitment to protecting U.S. funds from waste,
fraud, and abuse, and is available to answer any questions you may
have.
______
Prepared Statement of Catherine M. Trujillo, Acting Deputy Inspector
General, U.S. Agency for International Development
Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, and members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to provide this written statement to the
subcommittee on behalf of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In the following
pages, I address our oversight and budget requirements as well as
challenges that the agencies we oversee confront in managing and
implementing assistance activities abroad.
usaid office of inspector general oversight
USAID OIG was established to combat waste, fraud, and abuse and
promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in foreign assistance
programs. Our oversight responsibilities extend across USAID programs
and activities, as well as those of the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC), U.S. African Development Foundation, and Inter-
American Foundation. In addition, OIG has limited oversight authority
and responsibility relating to the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC).
OIG executes this mission by conducting audits and reviews of
agency foreign assistance programs and operations; by investigating
allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse; and by conducting extensive
outreach to educate and raise awareness among stakeholders about their
responsibilities to help prevent, detect, and report mismanagement,
fraud, waste, and abuse. OIG employs dedicated Foreign and Civil
Service auditors, analysts, investigators, and Foreign Service
Nationals to carry out oversight of foreign assistance programs around
the world. To ensure independence, OIG maintains administrative,
personnel, and information technology (IT) systems separate and apart
from USAID's. By law, we obtain legal counsel from our own staff of
attorneys, and we fund and independently execute our own management,
communications, and reporting responsibilities.
OIG seeks to deliver a consistently high level of performance and
productivity in providing independent oversight of foreign assistance
programs. Last year, we made good on that commitment through the
issuance of 694 financial and performance audits and reviews with more
than 1,100 recommendations for improving foreign assistance programs.
These audits identified $167 million in questioned costs and funds to
be put to better use, and during the course of the year agency
officials sustained approximately $117 million in costs that we had
questioned. Meanwhile, OIG investigative work led to 8 arrests and 96
administrative actions such as suspensions, debarments, and
terminations of employment. In total, OIG investigations contributed to
more than $23 million in savings and recoveries in fiscal year 2014. To
promote fraud awareness and reinforce adherence to appropriate spending
and accounting practices, OIG provided more than 280 briefings and
training sessions for approximately 8,700 attendees.
Overall, even by the most conservative appraisal, OIG has
consistently served as a net source of revenue for the Federal
Government. For every dollar OIG has spent over the past 5 years, the
agencies we oversee have recouped almost three dollars in sustained
questioned costs, funds to be put to better use, and investigative
savings and recoveries. In addition to these clear direct returns, OIG
has contributed to future economies and efficiencies by strengthening
systems and controls and helping to get agency programs and activities
back on track. By making it plain that there is a cop on the beat in
high-risk international settings, OIG activity has also had a deterrent
effect against waste, fraud, and abuse.
While OIG can point to a strong track record of providing effective
oversight and adding value to foreign assistance efforts, our ability
to continue to meet our mandate is in question. As we look forward to
fiscal year 2016, OIG confronts new oversight requirements and must
take steps to shore up its internal systems, but has not been budgeted
the resources that OIG believes are necessary to address these needs.
USAID's push to expand its use of host country systems in
implementing assistance programs under the Local Solutions Initiative
has increased OIG oversight requirements. As the number of new local
partners has increased, OIG has had to expand audit and outreach
efforts to ensure appropriate controls are in place and that new
partners understand fraud reporting requirements and procedures. OIG
has also had to work more intensively with local law enforcement,
prosecutors, and courts to address misuse of U.S. Government funds on
the part of a growing base of USAID implementing partners not subject
to U.S. legal jurisdiction. Rather than one court system, OIG must seek
to advance prosecutions and recoveries in many jurisdictions scattered
across the globe. This greatly complicates our work and significantly
adds to coordination and liaison requirements.
These developments coincide with the expansion of whistleblower
protections to Federal contractors. Congress extended whistleblower
protections previously enjoyed by Federal employees to employees of
Federal contractors and grantees on a pilot basis. Provided these
additional protections, employees of foreign assistance implementing
partners may be more willing to report allegations regarding waste,
fraud, abuse, and mismanagement to our office. Consequently, we have
intensified outreach to implementing partner personnel with the aim of
increasing their awareness of these protections. Because employees of
agency contractors and grantees are often in the best position to
observe fraud, waste, and mismanagement in foreign assistance programs,
OIG believes that these additional protections have and will continue
to encourage more of these personnel to report matters of concern to
OIG.
The emergence of two overseas contingency operations (OCOs) related
to the Ebola (Operation United Assistance) and ISIL (Operation Inherent
Resolve) response efforts has also placed additional demands on our
office. Whereas in the past, special inspectors general were
established to provide oversight for contingency operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, in 2012, Congress amended the Inspector General Act to
provide for a Lead Inspector General to work with counterpart OIGs to
provide oversight of future OCOs. This arrangement was adopted to
increase the efficiency of oversight efforts by leveraging the
specialized knowledge and standing capacity of the OIGs for USAID and
the Departments of Defense and State. While this new framework promises
to deliver the kind of contingency operation oversight that Congress
and the public expect, it also entails more intensive oversight,
outreach, coordination, and reporting on the part of all OIGs
associated with an OCO, including our office. Notwithstanding these
additional requirements and responsibilities, USAID OIG did not receive
funding to fully address Ebola-related oversight needs in our view, or
any additional resources to support OCO oversight contributions in
Syria and Iraq.
Not only has the intensity of OIG oversight requirements increased,
so too has the amount of funding for which USAID OIG is likely to be
responsible. In addition to substantial funding for Ebola-related
activities in the recent appropriation, USAID and MCC accounts received
a significant increase in the fiscal year 2016 Budget Request.\1\
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\1\ OIG oversight of MCC is funded through MCC's appropriation.
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By any measure, expectations and requirements for our office have
grown, yet our budget reflects historic levels of spending. In fact,
the amount provided for our office in the fiscal year 2016 budget
request is consistent with what we spent last year. So, while our
requirements are increasing, the levels of funding available to us are
standing still.
While promoting efficiency in the agencies we oversee, OIG has
consistently looked for ways to find economies in its oversight
operations. In the austere budget climate of the past several years,
however, OIG has cut funding in several areas that can no longer go
unsupported without adversely affecting the quality of its work.
Important training and professional development activities have been
canceled or postponed, and internal support systems vital to OIG
independence such as those associated with IT and human capital, have
been under-resourced. These and other internal requirements must be
addressed for OIG to continue to properly perform mission-critical
oversight functions.
These challenges are taking a toll on the organization. OIG's IT
and human capital systems are not resourced to deliver the level of
service we need to remain an effective, independent organization. Our
auditors are struggling to keep pace with demands to examine emerging
issues of congressional and public interest and have had to set aside
assessments of the implementation of significant policy and program
initiatives. OIG criminal investigators face average caseloads that
increased by 75 percent over the past several years, and leads are
going cold while they wait in the queue. These conditions have created
an environment in which turnover is too high and morale too low.
Absent relief, these conditions will worsen. OIG anticipates that
this situation will become more serious in the coming months as we
begin to suspend recruitment and hiring activity to bring staff levels
in line with what we can support with the amounts in the President's
budget.
OIG cannot meet the challenges it faces in the coming years within
current budget constraints. We believe that the immediate trade-offs we
must consider to operate within the levels provided in the President's
budget will impair our ability to sustain the kind of broad-based,
robust oversight that Congress has long held us to. In OIG's view,
provided funding at this level, OIG would not be able to properly
deliver on oversight of two active OCOs or fortify its internal
systems, and we would need to divert resources from other aspects of
our operations. OIG would need to recall personnel from international
offices and provide oversight at a distance in several parts of the
world. In particular, we would need to withdraw personnel from two
international offices, significantly roll back oversight of Europe and
Eurasia programs, and suspend plans to enhance investigative coverage
of East Africa by opening a small investigative office in the region.
While these changes will have a significant effect on our staff and
organization, the impact will be felt more acutely in the programs and
operations of the agencies we oversee. Constraints on OIG's ability to
provide needed oversight will reduce accountability and expose foreign
assistance programs and activities to greater risks of waste, fraud,
and abuse.
We look forward to working with the Office of Management and Budget
and Congress to ensure that OIG oversight requirements are adequately
supported in the future.
challenges to the management and administration of foreign assistance
Our oversight work has highlighted a number of significant
challenges that foreign assistance agencies face in administering
related programs and activities. Significant challenges currently
facing foreign assistance include operating in nonpermissive
environments, effectively mitigating risks associated with increased
foreign partner implementation of assistance projects, providing clear
strategic focus, strengthening performance data, improving
sustainability, and planning and operating in the context of budgetary
uncertainty. In addition, the management of human capital, IT, and
financial systems represents a major management challenge for agencies
responsible for foreign assistance activities. Finally, defects in the
oversight arrangement for OPIC also represent a significant challenge
that must be addressed.
Work in nonpermissive environments poses a major management
challenge for foreign assistance agencies. USAID in particular
frequently operates in countries facing conflict, insecurity,
instability, and weak governance. Travel restrictions on U.S. direct
hire personnel and sometimes local Foreign Service National staff
complicate program management and oversight activities. Humanitarian
assistance activities in Syria are operated from neighboring countries,
embassies have closed in Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, and USAID missions
for Iraq, South Sudan, Tunisia, and West Bank/Gaza have been evacuated
or operated with limited staffing at different points in recent years.
These conditions make it extremely difficult to monitor and oversee
development projects and humanitarian assistance efforts, yet the U.S.
Government continues to invest substantial resources in these settings.
Ensuring that agency personnel can responsibly manage related resources
and that implementing partners are able to apply funds to well-
designed, sustainable programs that advance development or
stabilization objectives also represents a significant challenge in
these countries.
USAID plans to channel 30 percent of assistance through partner-
country systems under its Local Solutions Initiative. This means
providing increased funding to and relying to a greater extent upon
foreign government ministries, local non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and local for-profit firms to implement programs. By adopting
this approach, the agency seeks to promote project sustainability and
reinforce local systems for advancing development. This greater
reliance on host-country systems, however, also carries significant
risks. Local recipients are often unfamiliar with U.S. Government
requirements and corresponding management and accountability
expectations. Under current conditions, agency contracting staff cannot
ensure that organizations new to U.S. procurement requirements and
processes use funds properly, heightening the risk of fraud, waste, and
abuse.
Another serious challenge that has emerged in recent years relates
to the need for sustained strategic focus. When coupled with external
mandates, USAID's many initiatives and priorities may divert attention
from core responsibilities and shift focus away from long-term goals
and commitments. Agency personnel report that the number and pace of
new USAID leadership initiatives and priorities have been overwhelming.
In many cases, the agency has not reportedly aligned new initiatives
with current strategies and policies, fully considered field conditions
affecting implementation, or ensured that initiatives are fully adopted
and integrated into agency operations before introducing new ones.
OIG audits frequently find performance data concerning USAID
programs to be unreliable and the agency has yet to take effective,
comprehensive agency-wide action to address problems surrounding the
quality of its data. Because problems associated with data collection
and reporting have presented in USAID activities around the world,
ensuring reliability in performance data has become a real management
challenge. While USAID has made some efforts to address the problem,
such as developing training on data quality standards and the use of
site visits and assessments to detect problems, OIG has observed
deficiencies in this area for many years.
International development efforts are intended to provide program
benefits that are sustained after donor funding ends. Although both
USAID and MCC have incorporated sustainability considerations into
project design and planning activities, OIG audits often identify major
risks to the sustainability of project activities. The sustainability
of foreign assistance projects is often dependent on the willingness
and ability of recipients to maintain investments. In some cases
agencies are unsuccessful in securing recipients' long-term commitments
to support projects at their outset and, in others, recipients renege
on their commitments, failing to uphold gains in capacity or maintain
systems and infrastructure.
Managing around an unpredictable budget process associated with
frequent delays and uncertainty also poses a major difficulty for
foreign assistance agencies. These conditions make it challenging to
initiate large, multiyear programs. In addition, unforeseen increases
or decreases in funding, delays in receiving funds, and hasty
obligations of those funds can all adversely affect project planning
and implementation. When budget and time pressures are overlaid onto
complex procurement processes and requirements, errors in awards and
planning weaknesses frequently arise.
Foreign assistance agencies also face noteworthy difficulties
associated with human capital management. USAID experiences shortages
of experienced, skilled personnel to perform programming and support
functions and these shortages translate into shortcomings in
institutional performance. Deficits in the number of contracting staff
with the knowledge and skills to properly design and administer awards,
for example, lead to extended delays in program design and approval.
Meanwhile, poor human capital development and promotion practices have
contributed to a situation in which many managers reportedly fail to
delegate tasks, recognize employees' strengths and contributions, or
encourage innovation.
IT and financial management are also sources of concern. USAID's
decentralized management of information technology and information
security and reliance on Department of State systems in many locations
make it difficult for the agency to ensure that relevant policies and
procedures are implemented or that external mandates are met. OIG was
not able to provide an opinion on USAID's most recent financial
statement due to the material volume of accounting adjustments the
agency had made to reconcile accounts but could not support. In
addition, incurred-cost audits of USAID's for-profit contractors have
lagged, resulting in a sizable backlog. For its part, MCC continues to
have difficulty accumulating the disbursement data it needs from
foreign-government-managed Millennium Challenge Accounts to prepare
complete, reliable financial statements.
In closing, I would like to highlight a management challenge that
bears congressional resolution: the need to establish an appropriate
long-term oversight arrangement for OPIC. As we noted earlier, USAID
OIG has limited oversight authority and responsibility with respect to
OPIC. Current OIG authorities and responsibilities are identified in 22
U.S.C. Sec. 2199 and annual, interagency agreements between OIG and
OPIC that we have entered into each of the past 3 years. The most
recent agreement provides the basis for OIG to run a fraud awareness
program, conduct an audit to address identified risks in OPIC
operations, report on compliance with information security
requirements, and review the Corporation's purchase card program.
However, neither the statute nor the agreement provide for the full
range of oversight activities commonly undertaken by inspectors
general.
Under the current arrangement with OPIC, our office does not have
independent authority to conduct all oversight activities that we deem
appropriate. OIG does not have needed flexibility to adjust oversight
plans because the law does not specifically authorize OIG to conduct
audits of OPIC programs whenever such work is necessary or desirable,
and the funding and authority for these activities is determined in
annual agreements. Other core activities that are typically the
province of an OIG, like oversight of annual financial statement audits
and the examination of complaints about the effects of projects, are
managed by OPIC itself, rather than an independent entity. In addition,
OPIC has sought to shape the types of oversight we provide as part of
interagency agreements, and perennial delays in its signing of
agreements have postponed OIG oversight activities. This arrangement
with OPIC--whereby the subject of oversight can shape the types of
oversight it receives and the terms on which it is provided--presents
potential conflicts that should be remedied through legislative action.
A number of legislative proposals to address this situation have
been introduced in recent years but none has come to fruition. One
proposal would provide our office with a full complement of OPIC
oversight authorities, while another would assign these to the Export-
Import Bank OIG. Other legislation provides for OPIC to have an OIG of
its own.
While congressional attention to the future of OPIC oversight may
be warranted, the continuing uncertainty surrounding the oversight
arrangement that will ultimately emerge does no service to OPIC and
does little to provide independent assurance that OPIC is managing
resources appropriately. USAID OIG has no position on what specific,
long-term arrangement should be selected for OPIC oversight, but firmly
believes in the value that truly independent oversight can bring to
Federal Government programs and activities. Accordingly, USAID OIG
welcomes continued engagement with OPIC and Congress on this matter and
stresses the importance of securing both adequate funding and
comprehensive audit and investigative authorities for any OIG charged
with overseeing OPIC programs in the future.
Thank you for this opportunity to address the subcommittee. At
USAID OIG, we greatly appreciate your interest in our work and
continuing support for effective oversight.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
And welcome to our new subcommittee members. I hope you
enjoy the experience. I appreciate you being willing to serve
on this subcommittee. And to my past colleagues who have been
here since day one, thank you.
IRANIAN INFLUENCE
Mr. Secretary, do you agree with me that Iran has more
influence in Baghdad, Iraq now than they did in 2009?
Secretary Kerry. I would say that they have more overt
influence, but I am not sure they have actually more bottom-
line influence, because, Mr. Chairman, Prime Minister Maliki
was far more inclined to administer a sectarian government, and
aligned himself much more, in a sense, even though Iran wasn't
as directly engaged.
But Prime Minister Abadi has really been walking a very
important line, which even the Iranians--I was just yesterday
negotiating with the Iranians in a brief conversation. It was
clear to me, because we don't talk about other subjects,
really, but it was understood that the Prime Minister is
working hard to try to bring the country together. I think that
is different than what we had under Prime Minister Maliki.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the government in
Yemen collapsed because of the Iranians' willingness to support
the Houthis?
Secretary Kerry. I think it contributed to it, Mr.
Chairman, without any question whatsoever. But I do know that
the Iranians were surprised by the events that took place and
are hoping, actually, to see a national dialogue produce some
kind of----
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the Houthis
couldn't last 15 minutes without Iranian support?
Secretary Kerry. They will last longer than 15 minutes, but
obviously, Iranian support is critical.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that Assad is a puppet
of the Iranian regime?
Secretary Kerry. Pretty much.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that Hezbollah is a
subcontractor of the Iranian regime?
Secretary Kerry. Totally.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that Iran is trying to
destabilize Bahrain?
Secretary Kerry. There has been influence. I am not sure to
what degree, but we know that they have been involved with the
Shia there.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that Iran is actively
trying to produce an ICBM that could reach faraway places
outside of Tehran?
Secretary Kerry. I think that is the subject of a
classified conversation.
RUSSIA
Senator Graham. Okay. Do you agree with me that when Russia
says there are no Russian weapons or troops in the Ukraine that
they are lying?
Secretary Kerry. Yes.
Senator Graham. Why do they lie?
Secretary Kerry. You're asking me?
Senator Graham. Yes.
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, Russia is engaged in a
rather remarkable period of the most overt and extensive
propaganda exercise that I have seen since the very height of
the Cold War. And they have been persisting in their
misrepresentations, lies, whatever you want to call them, about
their activities. They are to my face, to the face of others,
on many different occasions.
Senator Graham. So we can all collectively say that the
Russian leadership lies when it comes to their behavior in
Ukraine.
Do you agree with me that the Russian dismemberment of
Ukraine has trampled the Budapest Memorandum?
Secretary Kerry. Yes, it has, essentially.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that it is not in our
national security interest for such behavior to go unchecked,
that Ukraine in the late 1990s gave up thousands of nuclear
weapons with the understanding their sovereignty would be
guaranteed by Russia and the United States? Do you believe we
are living up to that commitment to guarantee Ukrainian
sovereignty?
Secretary Kerry. I think we are doing the best we can with
certain limitations that exist. But I think we are doing a
pretty good job of standing up for Ukrainian sovereignty.
Senator Graham. Do you support sending defensive weapons to
the Ukrainian people to defend themselves against this
aggression?
Secretary Kerry. That is a conversation that is taking
place within the administration right now, Mr. Chairman. Until
the President makes his decision, I am going to keep my
consultations personal and private with him.
SYRIA
Senator Graham. As to Syria, do you agree with me ISIL is
not being checked in a meaningful way inside Syria?
Secretary Kerry. Would you say that again?
Senator Graham. ISIL is not being meaningfully checked or
controlled within Syria?
Secretary Kerry. No, I don't agree with that. I believe
ISIL is being checked, but it is not being yet sufficiently
stopped in Syria. There are a lot of reasons for that. But
there are a lot of strategy discussions taking place right now
with our allies and with others that I believe will mount the
strategy necessary to deal with ISIL in Syria.
Senator Graham. You mentioned the Authorization for Use of
Military Force. I have asked a question of the White House
General Counsel. The Free Syrian Army that we are training, we
sent them into fight ISIL. They were attacked by Assad, by
Assad's aircraft or helicopters.
I have been told by the General Counsel that under the
Authorization for Use of Military Force we are considering, we
do not have the authority to engage Assad's aircraft. I am
going to send a letter to the White House General Counsel to
get him to comment on that.
Would you agree with me that any strategy regarding Syria
has to have an Assad component?
Secretary Kerry. Ultimately, yes.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that no Arab army is
going in on the ground in Syria just to fight ISIL. They want
Assad replaced.
Secretary Kerry. Let me come back----
Senator Graham. I mean, Egypt, Turkey----
Secretary Kerry. There are various ways to be able to
contemplate different options regarding Assad that will
ultimately have an impact on our choices with respect to ISIL.
Senator Graham. I guess what I am saying, I agree with
that, but no Arab regional force will engage ISIL alone.
Secretary Kerry. I agree with that.
Senator Graham. They are not going to give Syria over to
the Iranians.
Secretary Kerry. I agree with that.
Senator Graham. So please, I want everyone on this
committee to understand that whatever mythical Arab army we can
create to go into Syria, they are going to require the
replacement of Assad as the price of admission, because to do
otherwise would be to give Syria to Iran.
IRAN
Do you agree with me that the Arabs in the region are very
concerned about Iranian advancement?
Secretary Kerry. Yes.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the Arabs in the
region will not tolerate a nuclear deal with Iran that in their
minds would give the Iranians a nuclear advantage over the
Sunni Arab countries?
Secretary Kerry. Well, the way you have phrased that
question doesn't quite accurately represent what the choice
will be. So I would say to you that we are working very, very
closely with all of our friends in the gulf. In fact, Friday I
will be attending a GGC meeting in London, and we have kept
them fully abreast of what we are doing.
Senator Graham. Have you kept Israel fully abreast of what
we are doing?
Secretary Kerry. Yes, we have.
OBAMA FOREIGN POLICY DOCTRINE
Senator Graham. Okay. I will just close with this, could
you briefly describe the Obama foreign policy doctrine?
Secretary Kerry. Well, the foreign policy doctrine of the
United States is to be engaged and to lead across the world in
ways that advance America's interests and values and protect
our security.
Senator Graham. Do you think it is working?
Secretary Kerry. It is working very effectively in many
places. It is troubled in some places, obviously.
I will give you an example. In Afghanistan, it was not a
small endeavor to help pull Afghanistan out of the morass of
that----
Senator Graham. I agree. I think you have done a good job.
Do you support a condition-based withdrawal in Afghanistan,
of our military forces?
Secretary Kerry. I think the President is on the right
track. I think the evaluation that is going on now with respect
to the adjustments on the troop is appropriate, and the
President will make his decision shortly.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CUBA
Secretary, since you have been Secretary, you and I have
discussed Cuba a number of times, as you know, as I have with
the President, and was involved in a lot of the negotiations
with Cuba.
I have felt that, for 53 years, our policy of unilateral
sanctions against Cuba hurt the Cuban Government far more than
it hurt the Castro government. It was opposed by every country
in this hemisphere. I once told Fidel Castro that our embargo
was the best thing he had going for him because he could blame
a failed economy and a failed political system on the United
States, instead of having to take the blame himself.
You go to Cuba now, as I have many times, and talk with
people, and you hear that most of them there, not all, but
most, who were critics of the Cuban Government say that they
now have hope. They oppose the embargo. They want us to be more
engaged.
Of course, the question is asked, what do we get in return?
Well, of course, the American people who were told that the
only country in the world where their government told them they
couldn't go now, they now have more freedom to go or they can
go as tourists, which you could in any other country.
And I think we can start debunking the myth that the
poverty and deprivations that Cubans are facing isn't the fault
of their government, but of ours.
How do you see what is happening in Cuba? How do you see
this as affecting our relations with other countries in the
hemisphere?
Secretary Kerry. First of all, let me begin, Senator Leahy,
by really honoring and thanking you for your prescience and
long, long commitment to the issue of Cuba. You have been
deeply engaged in that. And you were very engaged in helping to
get Alan Gross out, and we appreciate it.
It is one of those examples of senatorial engagement that
can make a difference on an administration, any administration,
this one or another one.
With respect to Cuba, I want to emphasize to everybody that
what we are trying to do with Cuba is not about what the Cuban
Government is going to do for us. It is about what we can do
for Cuba and for the Cuban people and the American people. This
policy has been in place, everybody knows, for 50-plus years,
and it just wasn't changing anything.
This policy change, I can tell you, has been received with
an extraordinary sense of welcome in Latin America, in Central
America, in Europe, in Asia, and elsewhere. People feel like
this was long overdue, and they think it is the right thing to
be doing. I think the only people unsettled by it are the
Venezuelans.
So, in my judgment, it is the right choice, and the future
is what is going to really define that.
But reestablishing diplomatic relations, Mr. Ranking
Member, will remove the pretext that has been used for decades,
to counter pressure from the Cuban people for more freedom and
economic prosperity and for other legitimate demands. And it
really has the chance to provide the people of Cuba with a
prospect of transformation. We hope we can complete the task.
CENTRAL AMERICA
Senator Leahy. The President's request has a proposal to
establish an independent grantee organization to carry out
broadcasts in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Cuba,
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors will deal with that.
You are on that board. I am going to submit a letter, because
we don't have the full justification I think of a lot of the
money wasted on some of the other broadcasts before. And I
would like to hear from you about how they see this new one
working.
But in Central America, you are requesting $1 billion to
promote trade and economic development and enhance security
there. Those are worthy goals. But we spent billions of dollars
there over 2 decades. We have seen conditions get worse in
Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador.
I am afraid that we may have this Alliance for Prosperity
plan that may be more of a wish list. I would like to see the
Central American private sector invest in their own economic
development and public security. Instead of many who, and I
won't go down and list a whole lot of them, pay for their own
private security. They live in Miami. They live behind walls.
They don't pay taxes. If they don't live in Miami, they keep
their money there. We can help train police, investigators,
prosecutors, and judges to ask them to uphold their part of the
law.
But do you agree that the private sector should be doing
more?
Secretary Kerry. Yes, but I also think, Senator--I know
this. I met personally when I was in Mexico with the presidents
of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, when the unaccompanied
children challenge was at its greatest. We listened very
carefully and worked very hard on how you stem this tide, how
you begin to deal with it.
One of the principal things that the kids were running away
from, or their families enticing them toward where they were,
was the violence, the levels of violence. Secondly, just the
day-to-day absence of opportunity, the standard of living, the
poverty.
So we have put together a security-based and governance-
based--changing governance, how it responds, absence of
corruption, beginning to deal, training the police.
Senator Leahy. The absence of corruption would be a major
thing, especially with the police.
Secretary Kerry. Now our plan is to help train vetted
police, investigators, prosecutors, judges, to increase the
capacity to uphold the rule of law and protect those citizens.
So I know it sounds distant to some people, and they say,
well, why are we doing it there? We are doing it there because
it is our problem, too. They are coming up through Central
America, across Mexico, into Texas, into other places. We were
capturing them. We were putting them in facilities, holding
them. And then the question is, who do you send them back to?
Senator Leahy. I don't disagree that is part of our
problem. But I think of all the money that has been spent down
there, and I would only urge that there be a lot more control
of that money, and a lot more calling on the governments
themselves and the people in those countries, especially those
who can afford it in the private sector, to do a lot more in
the interest of their country than just in the interest of
their own bank accounts.
Secretary Kerry. But they have committed to undertake those
kinds of initiatives. And we are very focused on this, which is
why we have asked for the billion dollars. You know, there was,
once upon a time, an Alliance for Progress. It had a huge
impact on Latin American attitudes towards North America,
towards the United States. It opened up all sets of
possibilities.
Senator Leahy. I realize money is not the only thing. I
mean, look at Haiti. Billions of dollars either spent or
pledged down there, and it is going from bad to worse. You have
a government that is ruling by decree. The economy is in
shambles. Protests by thousands of people who are living in the
streets.
I mention this only because money is not the only answer.
Secretary Kerry. Of course not. Money is absolutely not the
only answer. You can throw money at it and throw it away.
What we have learned in the last 25 years, and these are
lessons that have been significantly applied in the way we are
doing development now, partly the Millennium Challenge
Corporation goals, partly what Raj Shah did while he was
administrator at AID, was change our approach to development.
There is a much greater degree of visibility, a much greater
degree of self-help, a much greater degree of oversight. And we
understand this has to be done carefully and properly.
But if it isn't done, there will be greater levels of
violence, greater levels of upheaval, greater opportunities for
radical groups to grab people. Violence will increase. And the
United States will feel that impact.
So this is not just a sort of do-good, let's help them
deal. This is also in our interests, in our security interests,
our long-term interests, and it meets our values.
So what we are doing is a three-part strategy that focuses
on security, focuses on governance, and focuses on prosperity,
and that piece engages the private sector.
Senator Leahy. Thank you. My time is up, but I will have
further follow-up questions on what the press has uncovered,
which appear to be war crimes in Iraq by the Iraqi Government
and Iraqi military. Those are very serious matters that may
have to be answered in a classified forum, but they are very
serious.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator Leahy.
Senator Kirk.
IRAN
Senator Kirk. Mr. Secretary, I would like to take you to a
chart that I have here. This shows that during the negotiations
run by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy
Sherman, that we have been steadily relieving sanctions on Iran
to the tune of $490 million every 3 weeks. That is about five
times the amount that the Ministry of Intelligence and Security
(MOIS) of Iran pays to maintain Hezbollah.
Secretary Kerry. I am sorry, I missed that. What was the
number?
Senator Kirk. It is $490 million every 3 weeks.
Secretary Kerry. What is that?
Senator Kirk. This demonstrates the point that the Iranian
delegation at the Geneva talks is rented, bought and paid for.
You have been arranging for substantial cash flow to go to Iran
that is five times the amount that the MOIS, the Iranian
Intelligence Service, pays to Hezbollah.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, I hate to say this, but I don't
understand what money you are referring to, from where.
Senator Kirk. This is a steady flow of sanctions relief.
This is the heart and soul of your negotiation. You maintain a
steady cash flow to the Iranians in----
Secretary Kerry. Actually, it is not, Senator. It is not
the heart and soul of our negotiation, at all.
I don't know where your information is coming from, but the
fact is that Iran has gotten significantly less money than they
anticipated and hoped for from the relief that is within the
interim agreement, number one.
Number two, the total may amount, over the period of time,
to somewhere in the vicinity of $14 billion. But that is over
the period of the life of that.
The fact is that, during that time, many times that has
been escrowed in an account that they can't reach. I would say,
$25 billion, $30 billion a year has been put away, and they
can't reach it. They now have well over $100-and-some billion,
I don't know the exact figure, that is put away. They can't
reach it. And the reason they are negotiating today is because
they want to get out from under the sanctions. They are not out
from under. In fact, we added sanctions, I might add. I don't
think I have it all in front of me here.
But our oil sanctions alone have deprived Iran of over $40
billion. Altogether since 2012, we have denied access to more
than $200 billion in lost exports and funds they can't use. And
those revenues are being held abroad in restricted accounts.
I don't know anybody who looks at the interim agreement and
doesn't say, wow, this has really worked, including Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who would like to see it extended,
having opposed it vehemently in the beginning, calling it the
deal of the century for Iran. It was obviously not the deal. It
has restrained their program, stopped work on Iraq, taken their
20 percent enrichment down to zero, given us access to Fordow,
access to Arak, access to their mining, their milling, their
production, their centrifuges.
Senator Kirk. Mr. Secretary, when you say ``access,'' could
you describe how our typical inspection happens? I was just on
the phone with Olli Heinonen, who was the lead nuclear
inspector at the IAEA. In the briefing that he gave me, an
inspection occurs only after 2 hours' notice, always with an
Iranian handler to make sure you only see what they want you to
see.
Did you know that?
Secretary Kerry. That is not accurate. We have people on
site each day. We are tracking exactly what a centrifuge is
doing, how many centrifuges there are, what their production
levels are, where the waste is going. And the IAEA has
determined, as recently as a few weeks ago, that there isn't
one thing that Iran is out of order in, with respect to their
compliance with this agreement.
Moreover, 40 entities have been added to the designation
list on sanctions. Fifteen were added under terrorism
authorities. Thirty-four were added under sanctions evasion and
material support authorities. Three were added under human
rights authorities. Five were identified as Iranian financial
institutions. And eight aliases were added to the list for
entities designated.
That is a pretty remarkable job of raising the stakes on
Iran for any kind of potential violation.
Senator Kirk. I would just point out the notion that
getting Iran to help fight ISIS is like hiring the local town
psychopathic, pyromaniac to join the volunteer fire department.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, were not hiring them. We
are not asking them to do anything. We are not coordinating
with them. They are doing what is in their own self-interest.
They hate Daesh. Every country in the region hates Daesh.
So, yes. They are fighting them. But we're not coordinating
with them. And whatever Daesh they take off the field, we are
delighted to see them go.
RADICAL ISLAM
Senator Kirk. You called them ISIS and Daesh in the same
hearing. If we get two words, could you say the words ``Islamic
radical'' in public?
Secretary Kerry. Yes, I have talked about radical Islamic
problems in many speeches, in many places. You know, obviously,
even in the Muslim world, people talk about political Islam and
radical Islam, so, I mean, I don't have a problem with that.
Senator Kirk. So is that who we are fighting, radical
Islam? And do you agree with that?
Secretary Kerry. Well, that is not the place to place this
debate. What we are fighting are a group who are naming
themselves with a name referring to Islam who have absolutely
nothing that has anything to do with Islam.
Now, is that a fight against Islam? No, it is not. It is a
fight against a radical group of terrorists, frankly,
criminals. What we have here is a criminal anarchy that we are
fighting that is trying to claim legitimacy under a religion,
and a whole bunch of people are fighting back against that.
I am proud to say that many of the strongest voices are
coming from Islam and from the Muslim world itself. The grand
mufti of Egypt called this group satanic and outside anything
to do with Islam. The grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, the same
thing. I mean, there are just huge opprobrium being placed on
this group.
And I think our greater challenge is really figuring out
how we balance the sectarianism that enters into it.
KOREAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION
Senator Kirk. Let me take you to another subject. This is
the Appropriations Committee. Originally, this committee had
approved about $400 million for an organization called the
Korean Energy Development Organization. In the end, Western
powers gave about $1.5 billion to this organization, all under
the management of Wendy Sherman. I wonder if you could follow
up and find out who got that money. Was it Charles Kartman? Was
it Joel Wit who got that $1.5 billion? I think we ought to look
into that.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, I am happy to look into that. I
honestly don't know the details of that at all.
Since you several times mentioned Wendy Sherman, I have
huge admiration for Wendy Sherman. She is a professional, and
she works harder than anybody I have met. And she is doing a
tremendous job working with a team of people in these
negotiations.
But with all due respect, the President of the United
States is the ultimate arbiter of these negotiations, and on
his behalf, me. And running day-to-day, you can dump it on me.
I am responsible.
So, you know, she has done a superb job, and I think we
need to wait and see what, if anything, we come up with.
Senator Kirk. When you say she has done a superb job with
the $1.5 billion that----
Secretary Kerry. Well, I will find out about it.
Senator Kirk. What was actually purchased?
Secretary Kerry. I really don't know. I will have to find
out.
Senator Kirk. This was $1.5 billion, and you have no idea
what happened with it.
Secretary Kerry. What year was that?
Senator Kirk. It was 1996.
Secretary Kerry. Yes, 1996, no, I am sorry, I don't have
instant recall as to what happened in 1996 on that. I was on
the committee. I know there were negotiations. But we will find
out exactly what it was.
Senator Kirk. Back in Chicago, $1.5 billion is a huge chunk
of change.
Secretary Kerry. Well, of course, it is, Senator. But it is
now 2015, and I wasn't Secretary of State then. I was sitting
up there somewhere towards the end, and trying to learn as much
as I could.
Senator Kirk. Right.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Mr. Secretary.
The quote that you had from Dean Acheson, the final half of
it, we have to understand that all our lives, the danger, the
uncertainty, the need for alertness, for effort, that
discipline will be upon us. It will be hard, but we are in for
it. And the only real question is whether we shall continue
strongly enough soon enough.
That is a powerful reflection on how complicated the world
has been and, certainly, as it continues to be now.
I wanted to praise the work of our folks in the Embassies
around the world. We were able, at the end of last year, to
fill a number of the ambassadorships that had been vacant. That
is certainly positive, in terms of our relationships.
And I wanted to mention that I appreciated particularly
that we confirmed Karen Stanton in East Timor. There is a
challenge involving a citizen from Oregon who is being held in
that country, and she has done a wonderful job of helping to
draw attention to it. And I will continue to work with her and
the State Department, hopefully to get her back home. Her name
is Stacy Addison. I just wanted to mention that.
GLOBAL HEALTH INITIATIVE
Second, I wanted to turn to the Global Health Initiative
that is in this budget, and the U.S. support for it. Some of my
constituents really wanted to see the U.S. step up at the
January conference of this year with a multiyear pledge on
vaccinations as one of the most cost-effective ways to impact
global help, with the goal of vaccinating 300 million
additional children. The U.S. did step up with a 4-year
commitment, and I wanted to praise the U.S. for being engaged
in that type of thoughtful international leadership with huge
leverage.
And perhaps down the line, when we have vaccinations for
things like AIDS and Ebola, that will be expanded to address
that world. But in general, I wanted to draw attention to how
that type of international global health work reverberates in
the quality of life around the world.
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE
I wanted to turn to ask a couple questions about the
authorization for the use of military force (AUMF), the draft
AUMF that we have now, that we will be considering. It is my
understanding that the administration is not recommending that
we put a time limit on the 2001 AUMF, and is recommending a 3-
year restriction on the new AUMF. I just wonder if you could
address why not essentially create a sunset on each of these
components, including the 2001?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, first of all, let me begin by
saying thank you for your mention of your constituent. I want
you to know that Embassy officers have been communicating with
the host government officials. On last November 7, we had a
meeting with the Timorese ambassador. We are trying to get the
release passport. And hopefully, we can secure her release.
There really is--I am familiar with the case--no legitimate
explanation for how she has been detained and kept most
recently. So we are going to keep working on that.
With respect to the AUMF, let me just say that the
rationale behind the timeframe is, on ISIL, the President felt
it was really important for a future president to be able to
reevaluate, whoever the President may be. He remembers how he
came in and there was Afghanistan, and he had a 30,000 or
whatever it was troop addition on his plate in the first weeks
when he came in. And what he thinks is that it is very
important that there be an institutionalized process whereby
Congress measures where we are, what have we achieved, whether
the goals are worth it, and so forth.
On the other hand, the 2001 AUMF is, in fact, a very broad
permission to deal with the threat that is ongoing now, about
which there is no real need to sort of reevaluate, I think, and
that is al Qaeda and Taliban and affiliated groups similar to
that who are threatening the United States of America, or who
had a very direct relationship to 9/11 and to the events coming
out of 9/11.
So that is the distinction between the two. And the
President really sees Daesh as one problem over here that ought
to be re-measured in 3 years for a new President, and the other
is a continuum between administrations and as an ongoing
challenge, which we shouldn't limit.
Senator Merkley. I will just comment that I would like to
see us put a timeframe on 2001, despite, as you point out, that
there is an enduring threat. ISIL also emerges from ancient
conflicts, Sunni-Shiite conflicts, emerges from ancient
philosophies about what is the pure approach.
So there are roots that are deep in all these things, and I
don't think it hurts us to be off of a permanent vision and
reevaluate 2001 as well.
Secretary Kerry. Well, the only thing I would say to you,
Senator, as you know, the President is asking that you refine
and adjust the 2001 as necessary, if it is necessary. So he is
not oblivious that it may need some refinement. But he wouldn't
want that authority, I think, at this point in time.
Now he has suggested that the 2002 ought to be repealed,
because there is a distinction between the two.
Senator Merkley. Turning to another phrase in the proposed
draft is ``enduring offensive ground combat operations,'' and
this is in regard to a limitation on the use of ground Army
forces. But the phrase ``enduring'' and ``offensive,''
certainly, is vague, perhaps by intention. But do you want to
offer any clarifying thoughts about that?
Secretary Kerry. Well, ``enduring'' really came out of the
conversation that I had with the Foreign Relations Committee
last December. And I think it was language that was proposed by
Congress, in fact. I think Senator Menendez and Senator Corker
may have put that together.
We thought that it adequately represented a distinction
that left the President the appropriate level of discretion
with respect to how he might choose to fight or what he might
need to do, without any room for interpretation that this was
somehow being interpreted to be a new license for a new
Afghanistan or a new Iraq. That is the distinction.
Both of those required major commitment of combat troops to
a major period of time, obviously enduring combat. But if you
are going in for weeks and weeks combat, that is enduring. If
you are going in to assist someone in fire control, and you are
embedded in an overnight deal, or you are in a rescue operation
or whatever, that is not enduring.
I don't think that the military or most of the folks
debating this have had any trouble drawing that line, at this
point.
But is there some discretion for the President? Yes. But
traditionally, as you know, constitutionally, that has been
interpreted to be exactly what the President ought to have,
even fuller discretion than he is willing to accept here. The
reason he has accepted it is because he recognizes there are
diverse opinions.
This really is sort of step two of step one, which was my
appearance before the AUMF hearing in December, where the
language of the Foreign Relations Committee was considered. And
then it sort of built on that, and the President decided that
looks like that is what Congress can get the biggest vote on.
What we want is as large a vote as possible for Congress to
say Daesh deserves to be defeated, and we are committed to the
fight. We don't want to have this become the victim of a tug-
of-war between one person's or a couple people's strongly felt,
but nevertheless not majority view of what powers the President
ought to have to accomplish this goal.
Senator Merkley. Well, to close, because my time is out, I
appreciate the administration putting forward the AUMF. I think
it is our responsibility under our Constitution to wrestle with
it. I look forward to that conversation.
I am always amazed at the vast complexity of the world
issues that you are working on simultaneously, and the fact
that you can go from the AUMF details to a single citizen from
Oregon, Stacey Addison in East Timor, is amazing. I look
forward to many more conversations. Thank you.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you.
Senator Graham. Senator Boozman.
Senator Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for being here, Mr. Secretary. I know that you
share the same feeling, that oversight is so important in
Congress.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
Recently, the IG for Afghan Reconstruction, in his most
recent quarterly report to Congress, said that the information
that has been published publicly for 6 years is now being
labeled as classified, and additionally reported that the State
Department would not answer questions on economic and social
development activities or the evaluation of anticorruption
initiatives of Afghan Ministry of Defense and the Afghan
Ministry of Interior.
Can you explain why, after 6 years, the State Department
has suddenly refused the IG access to the information? And are
we still continuing to do that? And if so, why?
Secretary Kerry. This is news to me. I am not familiar with
what it is that may have been classified. I am not even sure
that that denies him actual access, but in a classified
structure. So let me find out about that, if I may, because we
have been very open. We have a terrific IG. I brought him on.
We didn't have one previously. He has a strong, independent
record. And we look to him to help us find things that are not
working well, and we have worked very cooperatively. So let me
find out what that is about, and we will come back to you.
Senator Boozman. Thank you very much.
USAID INSPECTOR GENERAL
In a related question, Catherine Trujillo, acting Deputy IG
for USAID--and I completely agree with you. Earlier, you
mentioned in Raj Shah, the good job that he has done in
changing the culture and putting oversight and accountability
in place. She said that the President's budget request is
insufficient and would require the Office of Inspector General
to recall personnel from abroad and resort to, and I quote,
``providing oversight at a distance.'' Again, can you respond
to that?
Secretary Kerry. It is the first I have heard of it, but I
will find out as part of my package to get back to you.
Senator Boozman. Good. Thank you very much.
Secretary Kerry. Yes.
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
Senator Boozman. I recently joined 74 of my colleagues here
in the Senate in writing a letter to express our concerns with
the recent bid by the Palestinian Authority to join the
International Criminal Court. Secretary General of the United
Nations Ban Ki-moon has stated that the Palestinian Authority
will be given member status on April 1. Several weeks ago, the
State Department and White House announced that they would
conduct a review of all U.S. assistance to the P.A. Can you
share what determinations you made thus far regarding the
review? And do you believe the Palestinians have taken the
required steps to trigger a cutoff of U.S. aid?
Secretary Kerry. Well, we believe that the Palestinians do
not qualify as a state to be able to apply. And we have made
that position known to the prosecutor, as did several other
countries.
In addition to that, we stated to the Palestinians in the
strongest terms that we really thought that this was
inadvisable, a terrible exercise of judgment that would have
profoundly negative impacts, among them the potential cutoff of
aid from the United States. And the issue now really will be
determined when and if something happens around April 1 with
their assumption of membership.
What has happened so far is a preliminary inquiry is
underway. It is not a formal investigation under the ICC.
So this is not an answer from the lawyers of the State
Department. I am giving you my quick interpretation from
reading the statute, which I have, that it is arguable whether
or not they have at this point, simply by applying but without
pressing a particular case, crossed that line.
But we still believe what they have done is a mistake. It
is inadvisable. It is destructive. It hurts the building of
confidence. It makes it harder for, obviously, anybody to look
at them and believe that they are ready to be a partner in
things.
On the other hand, they are very frustrated. They are
deeply angry. They see settlement announcements coming out in
large numbers and so forth, and they are politically very
frustrated.
So it is a very difficult situation right now. And we are
staying out of the elections. We don't want to get involved.
But when the election is over in Israel, our hope is that there
may be some opportunity to be able to try to get things right-
sized again and be able to do something constructive. But it is
very difficult.
Senator Boozman. Good. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
ISIL-DAESH
Earlier you talked about the success of airstrikes in Iraq
with ISIL or ISIS. But there are reports from a variety of
sources that ISIS' area of influence in Syria is close to twice
the size it was when the U.S. began airstrikes last June. So we
are championing success in Iraq, and yet it doesn't seem like
we are having much success in fact perhaps going the other way
in Syria.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, there has been a slight increase.
It is a fact; there has been a slight increase of ISIL presence
in Syria. But I can't, by any means, describe what is happening
in Syria as a big advance. They have been stopped in Syria
also.
Remember, Kobani was going to be the big test. And they
were days away from running over Kobani. We came in with very
significant strikes. But more importantly, we came in and
diplomatically worked with the Turks and with the Kurds and
made it possible for Peshmerga to be able to pass through a
corridor and come into Kobani and reinforce it.
And by continuing the strikes and joining in that effort,
ISIL ultimately had to admit it lost. They were defeated. And
they lost as many as 1,000 fighters there.
So we have been able to do some of the things. But I think
it is well known. Everyone knows this. We are going to have to
increase the capacity on the ground in Syria in order to be
able to have more impact. That is what we are building. We are
building it now with the Title 10 overt training that Congress
has approved. That begins this month. And there are other
things that are taking place that will augment the ability of
the moderate opposition to have an impact on Assad.
So I believe that, over the next months, in my judgment,
the pressure can increase significantly on the Assad regime.
That will affect who is willing to do what on the ground.
At the moment, I am not going to pretend to you that the
force is there that is ready to do that. But as Iraq takes
place and confidence is built, and they are driven back into
Syria, which they will be, then the focus will be much more on
Syria.
Senator Boozman. Good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The State Department budget is about 1 percent of the
Federal budget. We have more lawyers at the Department of
Defense than we have diplomats throughout the world. I think we
get a pretty good return on our investments, given all the
troubles that you face.
UKRAINE
I wanted to come back to Ukraine. I agree with the chairman
that it is time for some more serious defensive arms to the
Ukrainians. I think that the Russians at this point have proven
that they are immune to other forms of influence. I wish we
weren't here, but I think as a last resort, the United States
now needs to stand up the Ukrainian army to a degree that
significantly changes the military calculation inside Russia.
But I think this very narrow debate over whether or not we
arm the Ukrainians has obscured the larger project that we have
ahead of us, which is that what we are seeing in Ukraine is
just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Russia's influence
in the region. What we are not debating and talking about on a
daily basis is what they are doing in Moldova, in Georgia, in
Serbia, in Montenegro, in Latvia, in the Baltics. This
asymmetric brand of warfare that they are perfecting where they
buy up press outlets, they pay off public officials--those that
they can't pay off, they intimidate--is just simply not being
matched by the West, in terms of the legal resources that we
can use to try to blunt to those influences.
In your supplemental request, I see a number of line items
that I could guess could be part of a buildup of the kind of
anticorruption efforts, free press efforts, rule of law
efforts, that would help. But having just come back from the
Balkans where I was in the fall, you see in Serbia, for
instance, Russia marching in with greater influence than they
have ever had before, and our Embassy there just trying to
scramble together enough money to run some simple exchange
programs, USAID pulling out.
And I wonder if you could talk a little bit about it,
because I know you are talking about the resources necessary to
run this kind of strategy throughout the region. I wonder if
you can talk a little bit about, within your supplemental and
within your base budget, how we can start to meet this
challenge in ways other than simply just providing arms to one
country amongst dozens that are threatened by this new Russia?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, that is a very important
question, and it couldn't be more important or timely than this
effort. Russia is engaged in a massive, massive effort to sway
nations, to appeal to them, reach out to them. And
fundamentally, tragically, is sort of reigniting a new kind of
East-West zero-sum game that we think is dangerous and
unnecessary, frankly. If you see some of the speeches that have
been made and look at their focus, even just the other day,
Foreign Minister Lavrov at the U.N., at the 70th anniversary
moment, was talking about the U.S. disruptive efforts around
the world and how we are responsible for every ill they see.
And the question asked earlier by the chairman, about how
they present things, and the lies about their presence in
Ukraine and the training, I mean, it is stunning. But it has an
impact in places where it is encountered.
Propaganda works. And so this is where we are hurting
ourselves. I say this so respectively to former colleagues. I
mean, I was frustrated by this when I was here in the Senate
and a member of the super-committee. We were trying to get a
deal that would have freed us up to go out and do the things we
know how to do.
But we are punishing ourselves needlessly by reducing our
ability to be front and center in some of these battles where
we can make a difference. And if the Secretary of State of the
United States has to show up at a pledging conference and we
are not able to pledge or pledge very much, and a whole bunch
of other players are there ready and available to do things,
you are going to see a change in where people go, what they
think, who they think is important. So we do need to invest in
this future in these places.
The battle in Ukraine, I assure you, is not principally
this battle that has been taking place exclusively about
Donetsk, Luhansk, and Debaltseve. That is important, and it is
a land grab, and it is in violation of international law. But
what it does is it stirs the water of Ukraine, makes it very
difficult for private investment to come in, makes it very
difficult for the economy of Ukraine to take off. And the true
battle is a $15 billion problem this year for Ukraine. And we
are scrounging around. We have $1 billion, $2 billion. We may
make a loan guarantee.
But the world is going to have to step up and decide how to
define this current struggle that is taking place. It is not
small pickings, and it is not just a passing fancy. So we need
to fight for the things we have always fought for, the values
we fought for.
And some of that is going to require you, appropriators and
others, to be able to find the wherewithal to empower us to be
front and center where we need to make a difference. And in a
lot of cases, it is helping to build democracy. It is helping
to educate some people, pull them away from the vacuum that
exists, so they don't get grabbed by people who proselytize and
turn them into extremists. I mean, all of these things matter.
And, Senator, you put your finger right on it. Whether it
is Syria, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, other places, they are
all in the firing line, Georgia, Maldova, Transnistria. What we
are trying to persuade people is we are not looking for a zero-
sum game challenge with Russia. We believe that Ukraine could
become the gateway east and west. It doesn't have to be a pawn
between the two. We believe that you could have an economic
arrangement with the European Association agreement and working
with what was--it has a new name now, the customs zone. But
these could be, hopefully, integrated, if people wanted to
implement a different vision.
So that is what we are trying to work toward. But we all
need to be prepared to step up and be there economically for
Ukraine as they reform and try to implement their dream and
vision. It is not good enough to have Poroshenko come here and
get 40 standing ovations and then not step up and deliver what
it is really going to take to help him create the democracy he
wants to create.
Senator Murphy. Thank you.
I think this debate over arming Ukrainians is important. I
think this question of how we resource countries that don't
want to turn into the next Ukraine is infinitely more
important. It is one of the reasons I asked to be on this
subcommittee.
I appreciate the chairman's focus on this question as well.
Thank you.
Senator Graham. Senator Lankford.
Senator Lankford. Thank you
Mr. Secretary, thank you. I appreciate the chance to get to
know you. We did not get to serve together, but I appreciate
the chance to get to know you, and your service, obviously,
around the country and around the world, what you have done.
CENTRAL AMERICA
I want to touch on a couple things that Senator Leahy had
mentioned earlier. One of them was about immigration. You had
any written statement a pretty extensive statement there and a
request for right at $1 billion in funding to deal with
immigration policy with Mexico and Central America. I want to
dive into that little bit more.
What actions did the State Department take last summer when
we saw the slowdown of the unaccompanied alien children coming
into the United States? We saw that rapid stop, and it seemed
to be greater enforcement happening with Mexico and their
Guatemalan border. Is that part of the strategy of the $1
billion in the request?
Secretary Kerry. Yes. There is clearly an enforcement
component required. Very important.
Senator Lankford. Okay. What do you see as part of that?
With that billion dollars, obviously, engaging, trying to not
only deal with the root causes, as you put it in your
statement, in Central America for those folks coming here, but
actually the enforcement arm of that.
What do you anticipate the State Department's operation to
be in working with Mexico and Central America, Guatemala,
Honduras, El Salvador, especially?
UKRAINE
Secretary Kerry. Let me go through it very specifically for
you. But I do want to add one other thing for everybody,
because there was sort of a question earlier about what we are
doing in terms of Ukraine policy.
Look, the last thing we want to do is see the people of
Russia pay the price for what we think are bad political
decisions. But because of the sanctions we put in place, nobody
should diminish the impact that we have had through this united
front. I will just take 1 minute on it. This is quick.
The ruble has dropped over 50 percent in the past 12
months, and it continues to be very volatile. The economic
predictions for Russia are that it will go into recession this
year. Inflation is predicted to exceed 15 percent this year.
Standard & Poor's has cut their bond status to junk. The
Central Bank of Russia has capital outflow in 2014 that hit a
record, $151 billion. And while it still has reserves of about
$375 billion, it is not in a position to do this interminably.
So it has been difficult. We have had to keep all of Europe
united in that effort. So I think we think we are making some
progress on it. Our preference is to have the Minsk agreement
implemented fully and be able to de-escalate the situation.
That is our goal.
CENTRAL AMERICA
Coming to the question of Central America and the request,
$300 million of that $1 billion will help improve security,
speaks specifically to security. And it will also deal with the
extreme levels of violence. It will promote police reform. It
will attack organized crime, and it will also help us in
defense cooperation initiatives.
In economic initiatives, about $400 million is to try to
promote trade, transport, and Border-Customs integration,
enhance workforce development, facilitate business development,
and help small businesses create jobs. And then the improved
governance is to create more accountable, transparent public
institutions. There is about $250 million that will reinforce
democratic institutions; target corruption; strengthen
efficiency, accountability, and transparency of the judicial
system; and also improve the management of public funds and
help create a competent civil service.
It is a big undertaking. We haven't had this kind of
undertaking in Central America in decades. I believe, and I
think the presidents of each of those countries believe, this
could have a profound impact, and it will ultimately help us
deal with the immigration challenge.
Senator Lankford. You have very sharp staff in Central
America that I have met with and flown down there and got a
chance to meet with some of that staff. What they do on a daily
basis, they are doing a very good job for us.
But it is one of the key issues of enforcement that also
affects national policy as well as international policy and the
relationship there.
SYRIA
I need to ask you about Syria. You had mentioned some of
the work happening on chemical weapons and getting chemical
weapons out of the hands of ISIS. Do we have a picture, at this
point, based on all the chemical weapons that have been pulled
out, in the agreements? How often have those chemical weapons
been used in a battlefield situation or are suspected of being
used in last 6 months? Has that tapered off to zero? Where are
we now, as far as the use of chemical weapons?
Secretary Kerry. Well, let me explain that. That is a good
question, and it is important to draw a distinction here.
All of the chemical weapons that are on the annotated
international list of chemical weapons that are prohibited
under the Chemical Weapons Convention were taken out. Those
were declared, and for the most part, we think we found every
one of them, and there are none of those that have been alleged
to have been used.
What has been used is chlorine, and chlorine is not on the
prohibited list. But when mixed in a certain way, it can
produce toxic impact and be used. Now, that has been used.
I think probably the numbers are classified, so I want to
be careful here. But it is fair to say that the bulk of their
use has been by the regime. But it is not exclusive. It appears
as if there has been some by opposition and/or by ISIS.
Senator Lankford. Okay.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The battle that is happening among religious extremism and
among Islamic communities, specifically, that is raging so much
that we are on the edges of and drawn into often, obviously, is
couched in religious terms. The State Department does a
tremendous amount of work worldwide, dealing with carrying our
values of religious liberty and recognition of all faiths. What
changes is State proposing and are you proposing worldwide
dealing with religious liberty issues? Obviously, there is a
lot of work that has already happened. But this has become a
prime issue for us, the recognition of religious liberty, and
that value being spread. So what change are you proposing?
Secretary Kerry. Well, I just swore in Ambassador David
Satterfield, who is a well-known rabbi who has worked for 40
years on religious freedom. He is going to be our Ambassador in
the State Department, reaching out specifically on this issue
of global religious freedom.
In addition, I appointed the first faith-based outreach
office in the history of the State Department. Shaun Casey
heads that up. We have been reaching out to global interfaith
initiatives in order to try to create common ground and reduce
the mythology that surrounds a lot of the accusations made that
stir people up, in terms of violent extremism.
We are deeply engaged, and, in fact, I will be hopefully
meeting with King Salman of Saudi Arabia later this week. King
Abdullah, his predecessor who just passed away, was deeply,
deeply committed to this interfaith initiative. And we had many
different conferences, meetings, outreach efforts going on to
try to bring people together to work on religious tolerance,
religious freedom, and to counter the messaging of the radical
extremists.
Now, we are opening an office in Abu Dhabi, a center that
will be set up, managed, run by the Emiratis who are funding
this effort. But it will house a global group of players who
will be engaged in social media response, working against the
bigotry and the appeals that are appearing on the Internet that
are trying to seduce people into these radical extreme efforts,
and also just generally trying to promote tolerance and
religious freedom.
We are working with leaders. There will be a conference of
women taking place in the Middle East in the next months. There
is another conference that will be taking place, bringing
religious leaders together to specifically address this. Some
of these are, interestingly, being promoted by and initiated by
Muslim nations in the region.
So there is a lot happening on this front, and this was a
very big part of the discussion at the White House summit in
the past week and a major priority of the State Department.
Senator Lankford. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Graham. Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. One cannot be
effective in your job without a sense of history, and you have
that sense of history.
UKRAINE
It was Sunday in Chicago, a bright sunny day, but it was
about 1 degree, and we had a rally outside the Catholic Church
in Ukrainian Village in Chicago. And I spoke to about 500
people there. They were holding, obviously, many Ukrainian
flags and posters, but Lithuanian flags and Polish flags. They
have a sense of history, too. They have endured, personally and
through their families, the aggression of the Soviets and the
Russians.
I am worried about where we are, and I have joined with a
dozen of my colleagues, Democrats and Republicans, urging you
to call on the President to provide defensive arms to Ukraine
and to do it quickly. I sensed the administration was moving
that direction, that Angela Merkel and perhaps President
Hollande begged for time for an attempted ceasefire before we
made that military investment.
And now we know the results reported this morning, that the
separatists have not complied with any of the three sequential
steps prescribed by that agreement. They include full
ceasefire, unfettered access of OSCE, and withdrawal of heavy
weapons.
I hate to be cynical, but when it comes to Russia, they
deserve it. They have time and again promised and not
delivered. Unlike other countries, like Syria and Libya, where
we are mired in complexity, there is clarity here, clarity.
This was the invasion of a sovereign nation by Russia, and they
continue to seize territory.
My question to you, I think you responded to it earlier,
about the President making the ultimate decision on weaponry,
my question to you is this: Did we say to Angela Merkel and
President Hollande, if this does not fail, what is Plan B, and
what are you prepared to do? If this ceasefire doesn't work,
what will Europe do beyond sanctions in response to protect
Ukraine?
Is there a plan B, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Kerry. Yes, there is, clearly, and it involves
some very tough sanctions, among other things. It also will
obviously weigh heavily on the choices that the President has
to make with respect to recommendations that are or are not
being made to him.
But nobody is taking this lightly at all, Senator. I mean,
first of all, we have a request in the budget for Georgia,
Moldova, and Ukraine of $75 million, reflecting an increase
above the bilateral allocations, which is for the Reassurance
Initiative. And that will enhance the interoperability of the
NATO allies and non-NATO partners who are most threatened by
Russia at this moment.
We have a $75 million request for foreign military
financing, and just under $1 billion for overseas contingency
operation funds, I think you know much of which can be
designated to flow here if we need to. In addition to that, we
have committed over $118 million in arming and training--not
arming--training and equipment. But some of it, the eye of the
beholder will determine the arming specifically. $52 million in
high-end defensive equipment, such as counter border radars,
night vision devices, body armor helmets, advanced radios,
explosive ordnance, disposal robots, rations, first-aid kits,
supplies. $47 million in equipment to their border folks to
help them, heavy engineering equipment, thermal imaging, other
monitoring equipment, patrol boats, uniforms, generators, and
more equipment is being planned to be arriving. We have $19
million in global security contingency funds that is training
and equipment to six companies and headquarters elements.
So we are out there doing a lot of different things.
Senator Durbin. Are Germany and France going to join us in
this effort?
Secretary Kerry. Germany and France are doing certain
things that are nonlethal and that are not providing lethal
assistance at this point. There is still a debate going on
about whether or not, in these final moments, with Debaltseve
now, tragically, the victim of the excess, what does that mean?
The latest indications are that several Russian units are now
outside. They are on the border. There is training going on in
Rostov. There are other things that have happened. A lot of
tanks crossed over. A lot of equipment was given earlier.
But at this moment, I would say, it is a question mark
still as to where this is going to go in the next days.
Senator Durbin. I want to close on this topic and just say
that as the cease-fire efforts diminish and the Russians seize
more territory, it becomes problematic. I think we need to move
and be ready to move quickly.
COALITION AGAINST ISIL
Let me switch theaters quickly. Last week, I was in Panama
and met with President Varela. I know that you attended his
inauguration. Panama is the first Latin American nation to step
up and join us in the coalition against ISIS. He is taking some
grief for it in his country from his critics, and I told him
how much we respect the fact that he is willing to engage with
us in fighting what could be a global threat and, certainly, is
a major threat to stability in the world.
Is it our hope to enlarge this coalition in Latin America?
There have been so many disappointments recently in the United
Nations when we have had test votes on some of the outrageous
human rights violations in North Korea, on the Ukrainian
predicament where 15 or 20 Central and South American countries
voted against the United States or abstained when it came to
these declarations. What can you tell us about the prospects of
building this coalition, particularly in the Americas against
the threat of ISIS?
Secretary Kerry. It has some challenges, in terms of this
region. We have sort of been purposefully respectful and
careful of creating problems where they don't exist and
demanding something where there can't be that much
contribution. There are also things that some people are doing
that don't have to be listed and promoted, for instance, on
foreign fighters, on financing.
We have said that every nation, there is something that
everybody can do, and not everybody has to do it publicly. So
there are some who are helping in certain ways, but we don't
feel compelled to try to leverage people massively into this at
this point in time, particularly since some of them are
fighting other challenges. For instance, Colombia, we are
trying to help with FARC, and we would love to see that get
resolved. These things can play in difficult ways.
There are also some tensions between some of the countries
in the region, as I think you know. And there is a group of
countries that we wish were more ready to engage but still are
behaving with sort of a very last century, old kind of rhetoric
that is focused on the United States and blaming us for things
that we are absolutely not engaged in and aren't doing.
Venezuela is paramount among those. I mean, this is a card
that President Maduro loves to play. The minute he has a
political problem, he launches an assault on the United States
and blames us for doing something that we have had absolutely
no inkling of doing. And there is never any evidence, mind you,
of those things.
So it is not an area, I would say to you, that we are
saying we have to have these guys on board visibly in this
coalition, but where they are cooperating in certain ways and
where we can build some greater perhaps cooperation as we go
forward.
We have high hopes for the Summit of the Americas, which
will take place in the beginning of April, in Panama, by the
way, where we hope some of these issues will be more openly
discussed. And we are trying to put civil society and human
rights squarely on the agenda for that meeting.
Senator Durbin. Thanks.
Senator Graham. Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Mr. Secretary, in your comments on religious freedom, I
just want to say I look forward to the new leadership there. I
think we have been wanting in that area in the department, and
I was pleased to be supportive of the person that was nominated
that is going in there now.
I was also pleased when you used the words ``religious
freedom.'' I think in too much of our discussion with countries
around the world, we have talked about the right to worship,
which is a different thing than religious freedom. And I am
glad to see any language that expands that.
I see a couple of questions on the faces of people behind
you. It might be a good test to have, at the State Department
someday, what is the difference between the right to worship
and religious freedom? What is the difference in freedom to
worship and religious freedom? And there is a difference. I am
sure you understand that. And I don't want to take a lot of
time with that, but I am just pleased to hear you using that
language.
IRAQ AND YEMEN
In both Iraq and Yemen, I am wondering what your view is of
why we missed the level of how quickly those countries could
change direction. In Iraq, at one point, we were referring to
ISIS or whatever you want to call it, we're all talking about
the same group, as junior varsity, not quite up to the A game.
A few months later, they control a substantial amount of the
country.
In September, in Yemen, the President saying this is a
great example of the success of our policy. And 6 months later,
we are evacuating the Embassy.
What do you think we missed? What have we learned about the
world today that maybe is different than the world 10 years ago
that leads us to come to those conclusions that turn out to be
so wrong so quickly?
Secretary Kerry. Well, in a sense they weren't altogether
wrong all the time. Let me be precise.
Senator Blunt. Remember, what I am going to ask, of course,
is surely Yemen is no longer the quintessential example of our
positive success in foreign policy.
Secretary Kerry. I don't think I ever called it that.
Senator Blunt. I think the President said this was a good
example of our successful policy.
Secretary Kerry. Well, what he was talking about, in all
fairness, Senator, the President was talking about a way to not
get in the middle of something and still be able to carry out
your CT objectives. That is what it was. He was talking about a
model of our ability to fight al Qaeda and to deal with that
problem.
Now, that relied on cooperation with the government. And we
had a platform from which we were working, and it was
effective.
What did surprise, and it surprised everybody, and by the
way, including Iranians and Saudis whose backyard, in many
respects, certainly, the Saudi backyard, the Iranians reaching
across it, but it surprised everybody that it moved the way it
did. One of the way reasons it moved the way it did was a very
simple rule that we have learned many times over. I can go back
to countless countries and countless revolutions where the
United States picked somebody and they didn't pan out.
What we can't control is the quality of governance. And in
Iraq, what you had was a serious process of deterioration. I
went back and relooked at the figures, because there had been
some accusations, well, the troops came out too soon, this and
that. They weren't combat troops. There was no talk ever of
leaving combat troops, ever. So combat troops wouldn't have
made the difference.
The question is what kind of military did you have? What
kind of leadership did you have? And who did they represent?
And what were they capable of doing? And that was steadily
deteriorating because you had a prime minister who was putting
his cronies in, using it as a personal tool, and excluding a
good part of the country.
So when Daesh came along in Mosul, people didn't want to
fight, because you had a Shia presence in the Sunni part of the
country fighting Sunnis. And they said this is their fight, we
are out of here. And there was no discipline and no capacity to
do it.
So a lot of lessons learned from that about inclusivity and
having a stake in the process.
Senator Blunt. And the ability to resist.
Secretary Kerry. And the ability to resist. Absolutely.
So, Senator, that lesson is really being applied now in the
efforts to try to create greater unity and capacity to be able
to push back and fight back and deal with the issue of
governance.
The same thing in Yemen. In Yemen, you had Hadi, who just
didn't deliver. He had Saleh, the former president, who was
present, creating enormous mischief underneath him with the
people that he still had who were aligned with him, working
with the Houthis, and now they are at each others' throats and
at odds for contesting for power.
There is an effort to create a dialogue now.
IRAN
Senator Blunt. Secretary, let me ask one question, at
least, on Iran. I hear that. I think I asked the
counterterrorism head the other day the same question, and
basically said we overestimated the ability of the incumbent
governments to resist. I think you are saying the same thing,
and I appreciate that answer.
In Iran, the chairman had a long list of countries that he
asked you about where Iran is influencing in a negative way.
What do you think happens if we put Iran on a clock toward
nuclear capacity? How do you think others in the neighborhood
react if there is a 10-year window? I don't want to argue about
the window.
If there is a clock of some kind where Iran within a
certain understood period of time could become nuclear capable
if they tell us they are going to become nuclear capable, that
12-month clock or whatever it is, how do the Saudis react?
Leaving the Israelis out for a minute, do other countries react
in a way that allows Iran to become nuclear-capable without
thinking they have to move in that direction as well? When you
and I visited at the Munich security conference a year ago, I
told you that I didn't think you could contain enrichment, and
I still don't, but I would be glad to hear your answer to that.
Secretary Kerry. Well, that is the test, obviously,
Senator. It is a very good question, and we ought to spend a
little moment on it, just because it really is central to all
of this.
First of all, we are not deliberating whether or not to
give Iran a nuclear capacity, if by nuclear capacity, we are
both talking about a peaceful nuclear-power-oriented program,
not a weapons program, just nuclear power. Iran already has
that kind of nuclear capacity. They have what they allege is a
peaceful program. We have had questions about that, very
serious ones.
But they have nuclear capacity. They know how to enrich.
They already learned how to do it. By the way, they learned how
to do it in another administration's tenure. Back in 2003, Iran
had 164 centrifuges. Today, they claim some 27,000. There are
19,000 of them out there working or capable of working. There
are less than that working today.
So they have nuclear capacity. They got it. They got it a
number years ago when an administration, by the way, had a
policy of no enrichment at all. That was the administration's
policy.
Was that enforced? Did anything happen while they went from
164 centrifuges to 27,000? No. They are where they are.
So we are taking the program that we have got today, and
what we are committed to try to do is make absolutely certain,
hopefully in a failsafe manner, as failsafe as you could be in
nuclear policy, that they cannot develop a bomb, as
distinguished from a peaceful nuclear power program.
Now they have agreed, and it is much unnoticed and not paid
attention to, to live by the NPT. They could pull out of the
NPT. North Korea is not in the NPT. That is one of the
problems. But Iran is in the NPT.
Right now, the IAEA has documented that they have lived by
every single requirement of the interim agreement. They have
taken their 20 percent enriched uranium and they have reduced
it to zero. They have opened up Fordow, the underground
facility, to inspection daily. They have opened Natanz. They
opened up Arak. They have stopped Arak. Not one feature of Arak
has been advanced from the day we made this agreement.
So in effect, I won't go into the numbers, but a certain
number of months of ``breakout time'' has now been growing
larger. Israel is safer today than Israel was before we signed
the interim agreement. And we are trying to come to an
agreement that will, in fact, expand that time even further, so
that if they were to try to break out, we will know. And then
the test is, how do you know you will know? How do you have
sufficient ability to be able to have the inspection and
intrusion necessary to do that?
That is our job. That is what we are trying to do now. So
we can come to you and say, and to Israel, and to the Arab
world and the community, we will have the ability to know what
they are doing sufficiently that they can't break out. And if
they did breakout, we have the same options available to us to
whack them or do whatever you want as we have today.
Now, that makes it a very difficult negotiation. It is a
difficult negotiation. But Iran has lived up to its agreement.
And our hope is that they will do things necessary to prove
they have a peaceful program and give us an assurance that
there isn't some capacity to go covert to slide it off. And I
think it is really important to see it.
Now, are other countries nervous about what may or may not
happen? Sure. Of course they are. And it is our job to sit with
them and show them what we are doing and have them hopefully
understand the full measure of it.
Now we have a 123 agreement with the Emirates. They have
already agreed to enter into some kind of peaceful process. And
obviously, if a program is peaceful, there is going to be a lot
more nuclear discussion in the years of head because I assume
if and when people all get serious about climate change, it is
a zero-emissions form of production, and it may become more
affordable and attractive to people in various parts of the
world, instead of fossil fuels. So we will see where we go.
But we are trying to create a template here that can
withstand public scrutiny to show that they can't produce a
weapon.
One final comment. I know I went over my time, but this is
important.
This concept of breakout is not understood well enough, and
there are a lot of reasons for that. In the 1980s, when I was
in the Senate, and the 1990s, we were debating international
arms control agreements, and breakout then used to mean your
ability, we thought, to deliver a weapon. Breakout in the
context we have been talking about with respect to Iran and its
program does not mean that.
Breakout is the amount of time it takes to develop enough
fissile material for one weapon. We are trying to get a year
for some period of time that we can guarantee that, and then
enough time afterward that everybody is comfortable that they
really just can't go do this without our knowing it, because we
are going to be tracing the uranium trade.
Now, I don't want to get into all the details. It is
inappropriate for me to do that while we are negotiating. But
suffice it to say that we are going to try to have sufficient
understanding.
But once you have the 1 year to be able to have enough
fissile material, you still have to go design a means of
delivery and a means of explosion. That could take 4, 5, 6
years.
No country in the world has ever had the kind of restraint
that we are talking about. We will see what happens.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
We have three more members, and I appreciate if we could
get everybody in.
Secretary Kerry. I will be very quick.
IRAN
Senator Graham. One very quick question. The Iranian
parliament is allowed to vote on any agreement entered into
between the P5-plus-1. Do you object if Congress has that same
right?
Secretary Kerry. Well, the Iranian parliament is
considerably different from Congress, and I think you know
that. And I wouldn't equate the two, or what their rights are,
or what they may or may not do.
And I assure you, they will not be able----
Senator Graham. Do you object to the Congress reviewing
this deal, having a vote on it?
Secretary Kerry. Well, you will review it. Of course, you
will review it. We are reviewing it now, and we will review it
in the days ahead, and you already have a vote, because your
vote is a vote that will be necessary to ultimately terminate
sanctions.
Senator Graham. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Graham.
Thank you, Secretary Kerry. I appreciate your lengthy and
thorough review of the negotiations that are ongoing with Iran.
This is one of the most important challenges that faces our
security, Israel's security, and global security.
You mentioned in your opening testimony that you recognize
the value and importance of closely consulting with Congress,
both before and should there be agreement afterwards. I look
forward to that.
I am grateful for the number of briefing opportunities that
have been made available to me and other members. This is a
difficult and demanding strategic situation. Your exculpation
of exactly what you understand breakout to mean in this
context, for example, is helpful for us to know, as we try and
assess the strength and value of the deal you are seeking to
negotiate.
But it is also a reminder that the nonnuclear components
that I think Iran has not yet fully come forward with helping
the world and IAEA understand the research that was being done
toward the development of warheads or missile systems is a key
component of our having confidence about what the breakout time
is, understood as the broader issue of the ability to deliver a
weapon, and if and when they get the capacity to develop a
weapon. These are all of grave concern.
I don't think there is any disagreement here about strong
support for the $3.1 billion in aid to Israel that is in this
package. I don't disagree at all with your opening statement
that an AUMF needs to be passed here in a way that is
bipartisan and is strong. I look forward to continuing to work
with you and others in the administration on it.
And I welcome your billion dollar investment in Central
America, in order to strengthen a number of countries from
which we really face some challenges, and your testimony
earlier about standing up to Putin's aggression in the Ukraine.
ASSISTANCE FOR AFRICA
But I would like to focus us, in my few minutes, on Africa,
a continent where I chaired the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign
Relations for 4 years and have a persistent interest and
enthusiasm. Let me just lay out a few issues and then ask you
to use the time left to answer them.
First, $2 billion out of $50 billion in this budget is
dedicated to democracy, promoting democracy and governance and
human rights globally. I think that is a modest and absolutely
essential investment. Africa is a continent of 54 countries,
and in a number of them, there are difficult and contested
elections this coming year. So any comment you care to make
about the work we are doing to strengthen civil society in
countries, from Nigeria to Ethiopia to Rwanda, where there are
difficult and contested elections and where our support of
democracy is a key part of advancing our values.
Second, the African summit that happened last August, the
first convening of more than 50 heads of state or heads of
government, I think was a great beginning. It is my hope that
the department and the administration plan to continue a robust
engagement around Power Africa, around the Young Africa Leaders
Initiative, and around security.
So if you have any comments you care to make about the
commitments around security and, in particular, African-led
initiatives to improve security in countries facing extremism,
from Somalia to Nigeria to the Central African Republic, would
be great.
You mentioned in passing the significant and bipartisan
support for appropriations in the work against Ebola. We are
not yet done. We haven't gotten to zero. But many Americans, I
think, wonder whether we are ever thanked by the nations who we
do so much to work with and to help. President Sirleaf of
Liberia will be here Thursday expressly to thank the American
people for the support that our Armed Forces, our uniformed
Public Health Service, USAID, State Department, and many
others, CDC, of course, provided in the course of that public
health crisis.
I strongly support the investment, as Senator Leahy
mentioned previously, in the Global Health Security efforts and
the importance of strengthening health systems.
And last, you in your role on this committee really
championed wildlife trafficking. I think this is an important
issue for us to tackle this year, because so often wildlife
trafficking funds extremism and international gangs. It is the
next stage after narcotrafficking and trafficking in humans.
Wildlife trafficking has become a major source of revenue for
illicit organizations around the world.
If in 3 minutes, you can make a coherent response to any of
those four questions, I would be even more impressed with your
skill, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you very much. I will do it in a----
Senator Coons. And, of course, responses for the record are
always welcome, if we run out of time.
Secretary Kerry. I would be happy to add more.
First of all, thank you for your abiding interest, which is
making a huge difference, and we appreciate it enormously. And
thanks for participating in the global summit.
As you know, we had the African leaders here last summer.
It was an enormously important effort. We requested $260-plus
million, $268 million, to support the initiatives of programs
that came out of the African Leaders Initiative. And that is
$76 million for Power Africa, which is absolutely critical to
bringing electricity to communities so you can have economic
development. It is one of the reasons Ebola is a problem, for
instance. There is just no infrastructure there.
There is funding for Trade Africa and trade investment hubs
that will begin to create greater economic commerce. There is
$10 million for the Young African Leaders Initiative. I have to
tell you, that is one of the most exciting parts of this entire
conference we had. These young leaders came from all over
Africa, hugely educated and energized and ready to go out and
change the world in their countries, working for different
global companies, working for Goldman Sachs. They all came over
here and they are ready to make these kind of transformations
take place in Africa. This is a hugely well-spent amount of
money.
And $110 million for the African Peacekeeping Rapid
Response Partnership, a security governance initiative that we
have to work with various countries. We are making progress in
various places, and we have big challenges.
Nigeria is the challenge, Boko Haram. But Chad, Cameroon, a
couple of neighbors have come together. They are engaged. We
are trying to work with them to help them fight back against
the Boko Haram.
I was in Nigeria to encourage the election process. I met
with President Jonathan, with his opponent. I am sorry the
election was postponed. We are working now to make sure that
election takes place and is accountable and free and fair.
But I think that we have Feed the Future and Food for
Peace, both are taking place there. And, of course, we are
continuing our health initiatives, which are absolutely
essential.
So that is a quick take on it. We have $302 million
requested for peacekeeping operations, and particularly working
with the rapid response partnership, the African Union
peacekeeping initiatives, Somalia, the Central African
Republic, and security sector reform. So there is just a huge
amount that is happening.
A lot of people don't realize it, but I think six or seven
of the fastest growing countries in the world are in Africa,
notwithstanding the turmoil and difficulties of some of
northern Africa and the Horn of Africa. And hopefully if we
stay engaged and we continue to lead and work with other
countries, this can change for the better.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Yes, seven of the
fastest growing economies in the world, according to the World
Bank, are in Africa this decade. So Power Africa and Trade
Africa I think are important initiatives.
There are a number of countries that face real threats from
extremism, and I am grateful for your leadership and look
forward to working together in ways to find bipartisan
solutions to those real challenges to security and democracy.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you very much.
Senator Graham. Senator Daines.
Senator Daines. Secretary Kerry, thank you for being here
today. Many of us were outside of D.C. last week. Many of us
went home. I spent the week back in Montana. One of the top of
mind issues for the average Montanan as we're sitting down,
having cups of coffee, is what is going on in the Middle East,
certainly, and ISIS, this issue of radical Islam.
ISIL-DAESH
Secretary Kerry, during your presidential campaign in 2004,
you used the term ``Islamic extremism'' to describe radical
Saudi clerics. And in 1997 book, ``The New War,'' you described
the Taliban as Islamic fundamentalists. In your opinion, could
one of these terms that you used, and I think correctly used,
Islamic extremists, Islamic radicals, Islamic fundamentalists,
be used to describe ISIS?
Secretary Kerry. Well, first of all, I am pleased to have
anything that I said in 2004 validated in 2015.
But not treating any of this lightly, some, not all--you
know, these guys, there are some of them who have a dream of a
caliphate and who are obviously implementing their very warped
sense of Islam in a horrendous, grotesque way. But they,
certainly, think they are furthering some kind of thing, and I
have called them any number of different things, including
Islamic extremists, if, in fact, they are wearing that hat and
that is what they are trying to do and they are proselytizing
on that basis. But not all of them are.
You have a lot of thrill seekers. You have adventurers. You
have thugs. You have a mix of opportunists. You have an
unbelievable array contained within this. So I think you want
to be careful how you sort of tab it as a whole.
Senator Daines. Mr. Secretary, to look around the world,
David Cameron has been very, very clear, I think provided great
moral clarity on defining this issue. Tony Blair has been very,
very clear on this. In fact, even King Abdullah, who met with
the Appropriations Committee. In fact, we met 2 hours after
that horrible video was released of that F-16 pilot. He said
this is a war inside of Islam. And I think there is a concern,
we lack this moral clarity, that many leaders around the world
are, we are not hearing this from the President and it is
giving great----
Secretary Kerry. Well, make no mistake. Look, I think you
are working too hard to try to create something that isn't
anything here. The President could not be more committed to
beating back ISIS, Daesh, whatever you want to call it. I
prefer to call it Daesh, because then you avoid this notion
that there is anything Islamic about it, which there
fundamentally isn't, and Daesh is a pejorative in Arab terms.
So we all ought to call it that.
But the point I am making is that the President is just
trying to be careful not to lend a whole bunch of other people
who take quick swipes at this, and if you go to the social
media, you will see the degree to which people are trying to
make it look like America is engaging in some kind of religious
war or that this is an effort to be at war with Islam.
So he's trying to be careful. I think it is appropriate the
President is trying to be careful about that.
But make no mistake. All of us understand that there are
radical Islamic extremists engaged in these endeavors, just as
there are others. But when the President speaks, I think it is
appropriate for the President to try, because his voice is so
much more magnified than yours, mine, and others, that I think
it has to be done properly.
VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Senator Daines. I think what we saw of concern last week,
and of course, it created a media firestorm, when the State
Department spokeswoman Marie Harf made the comments that
implied that the way to confront terrorism was through jobs
programs or somehow this was fundamentally a governance issue.
It was her words, in terms of root cause.
So is the administration's belief that the root cause of
this terrorism is economic versus ideological or religious?
Secretary Kerry. Let me speak to that. I am glad you asked
that.
Marie spoke globally about the problem of violent extremism
in the context of the summit that we were having. And she
clearly, as she has almost every day that she speaks, embraced
our military effort. We are going to kill as many of these
terrorists already declared members of Daesh as we can. And the
President's goal is to degrade and destroy ISIS. That is the
goal. He has stated it. I have stated it any number of times.
But the fact is, if all you do is do that, you are not
going to solve this problem. Some Secretary of State is going
to be here in the future, some President will be there, and
there will be a different acronym and you are going to be
talking about how you get rid of them, because there is a big
pool of people out there waiting to be seduced into this.
Why do you think three young girls get on an airplane and
leave Britain? Why do you think there are several hundred
Americans over there? Why are there thousands of people from
Russia, from Germany, from France, from Britain, from various
countries, who are going to Syria to fight? Well, something is
bringing them to that.
Part of our conference the other day was Dr. Peter Neumann,
who has done a huge amount of work on this. He is at King's
College in London. He's the director of the International
Center for the Study of Radicalization. Here's what he said. He
said you have to know who these people are and you have to know
why they are joining. He said so we know these people. We know
their stories. We know there isn't just one story. There are
many of them.
Some of them are pious, but others, not so much. Many have
troubled histories. Some would have had great prospects, if
they had stayed in their European home countries. Some were
driven by the humanitarian suffering of the Syrian people.
Others were seeking thrill and adventure. And, of course, many
were genuinely committed to and enthusiastic about the
totalitarian project of the group that calls itself ISIL.
Here's what he concludes. The real way you are going to
deal with this, he thought, was first the issue of the
fighter's parents. He said that a lot of people have been kept
from the battlefield by their parents and families and what
they come from.
Secondly is the Internet. A lot of the Internet is
radicalizing them.
And thirdly, he said if you really want to get serious
about reducing the pool of people who are susceptible to the
ideas of violent extremists, you have to begin by recognizing a
lot of these people don't even feel a stake in their own
society.
So this is bigger. That is what Marie was saying. She never
set out to say the solution is to give them jobs.
Senator Daines. Yes, Secretary Kerry----
Secretary Kerry. She talked about a much broader array of
things we have to do. And if we can't have a serious
conversation about this without politicizing it on cable TV and
making it a scoring point for 1 day, we are in trouble.
Senator Daines. Well, I think, though, there is great
anxiety and concern back home. Folks back home are seeing this
as an ideological threat.
And I remind all of us here that the 9/11 attackers came
from good families. They were well-to-do. And the greatest
attack on U.S. soil came from individuals who most were from
very rich, top class families.
So I guess I hope we can at least have an open dialogue
here on getting back to the root cause, which I think is more
than jobs and governance, but comes back to an ideology. I
think that is a debate we need to have here in this country.
Secretary Kerry. Well, it is, but why does somebody fall
prey to that ideology? Why does somebody think going and
cutting off somebody's head is a good idea? Why is somebody not
more aware of how women are actually going to be treated when
they show up?
I mean, there is a gap here of knowledge, and there is a
readiness and willingness, and it is different everywhere,
believe me. I have been looking at this now for 30 years, and I
am telling you it is different everywhere. There is no one-
size-fits-all shoe that is going to solve this.
It has to be a holistic approach. But the one thing I want
to say to you, with everything I can summon about imperative,
we have to step up and do more, and we have to view it
holistically, and we have to understand it is a whole bunch of
things. And if we work at it holistically, we are going to win.
If we make the wrong judgments, though, about what is going to
make a difference, then we are going to take a lot longer to do
what we need to do.
Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Graham. Senator Moran.
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your presence here today. I am
a new member of the subcommittee, and I have appreciated the
conversations that I have heard between colleagues and you
today.
ISIL-DAESH
In regards to ISIL or ISIS, whatever phrase or title you
want to use, I consider it one of the greatest threats our
country faces at the moment. When I say at the moment, it is
today, but it is in the future as well. I am always worried
that Presidents, not just this one, but administrations have
the habit of downplaying the risks.
We haven't declared war in this country since World War II.
We sometimes ask Congress for authorization of use of force.
And in this particular case, the request for an authorization
of use of force, it seems to me, diminishes the threat by its
narrowness of scope.
I want to have you reassure me how serious the threat is to
our country, and that the goal here is to make certain that the
American people and our leaders, us in Congress, you in the
administration, administrations to follow, have the support of
the American people to see that we are successful in
accomplishing the goal of defeating this threat. I just want to
encourage the administration to in no way diminish by narrowing
the resolution, by talking about a certain group of countries,
scope, and boots on the ground terminology, and using the
phrase ``enduring.'' Make certain that we have the American
people--I am not a veteran. I grew up with Vietnam in the back
of my life, and it seemed to me that something we should have
learned from Vietnam--first of all, Mr. Secretary, I would say
that one of the things I learned from Vietnam is to always
respect those who served, and I respect your service to our
country.
Secondly, I would say that we should have learned that the
American people need to be told the truth from the very
beginning about how difficult the task is to succeed. Anytime
we downplay that, we run the risk of the American people moving
on before the task is accomplished.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator Moran, that is a very good
question. And you are absolutely correct in your judgment about
not losing focus. So let me try to emphasize as much as I can
without hyperbole, and, certainly, without intimidating people.
This is the challenge of a generation. This is our
challenge. No question about it. But it is not just the
challenge, as I was saying a moment ago, of the kinetic, the
military component of this. It is a bigger challenge than that.
You have to also address the draining of the pool for
future recruits, and that is the only way you win this,
comprehensively. So it is more than just the kinetic piece.
Now, in the context of the kinetic piece and declaring war,
we have not declared war against another state since World War
II. To take ISIS and elevate it and make it into sort of state
status would be a huge mistake. The President is not asking for
a declaration of war, because we don't need a declaration of
war, and it would be bad policy to have one.
But he is asking for us to take this as absolutely
seriously as it deserves to be. This is a threat. They have
already threatened us. They have threatened Western allies of
ours. They have threatened non-Western allies of ours. They
have threatened the world with their version of what they want,
how they want to live, and how they want to impose their life
on other people.
They destroy schools. They destroyed books. They rape
girls. They sell people into slavery. They cut off heads in
public. They burn people alive. This is a horrendous step
backward in the context of the world's march toward civility
and rule of law. And every one of us understands that.
That is why President Obama is so committed. That is why we
had the summit here. That is why we put together 16 nations.
That is why young men and women in uniform are once again at
risk in an effort to take on this fight.
But it doesn't require a declaration of war for us to do
what we need to do. And much of what we need to do is outside
of the normal parameters of ``war.'' It is addressing why
people don't have a greater stake or greater assimilation into
their community, why they don't have other opportunities, why
they are seduced by the Internet by this, how do we block that,
how do we counter it, how do we message it?
Those are why we have five principal avenues of strategy.
One is the military and kinetic. Another is the anti-foreign-
fighter movement. The third is the anti-funding, preventing
them from getting funded. The fourth is the humanitarian piece,
where we are the largest contributor to taking care of the
people displaced in Syria and elsewhere. And the fifth is the
ideology.
We are doing the major messaging across the globe, but
principally in the Middle East, where we are now gearing up
with huge numbers of people engaged in the effort to deal with
social media, countermessage, and galvanize the global
religious community, all faiths, to begin to help speak out,
particularly from Islam itself.
Senator Moran. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
ARMS TRADE TREATY
Let me ask a different line of question, a different
question. I have been involved in a number of efforts to
demonstrate the opposition of members of the Senate to the Arms
Trade Treaty. Despite that opposition by the Senate, by both
Republicans and Democrats in somewhat significant numbers, the
administration negotiated that agreement.
It was a previous Secretary, but now 17 months later, that
treaty has not been submitted to the Senate. I am interested in
knowing what is preventing or stopping that submission to the
Senate, if it is ever going to happen. And in the absence of
being submitted to the Senate, are there operational plans in
which the administration believes that that Arms Trade Treaty
is applicable even in the absence of Senate approval? And I
would also ask why a full legal review has never been done by
the State Department of that treaty.
Secretary Kerry. Is it applicable----
Senator Moran. In the absence of Senate ratification of
that treaty, does the State Department, the administration,
intend to use it as an operable document, meaning something
despite no confirmation in the Senate?
Secretary Kerry. Let me get back to you on that, because
honestly, I haven't had a conversation that has suggested there
is a reason for why it isn't specifically, but let me find out
for you.
Senator Moran. All right. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
Senator Graham. Mr. Secretary, you've been very generous
with your time. I think Senator Leahy has one or two questions.
Senator Leahy. I referred to this earlier. Incidentally, I
appreciated all you said this morning. I think it has been very
helpful, not only to us, but to the American public
understanding our foreign policy.
LEAHY LAW
I mentioned Iraq before. I have seen some very disturbing
photos that purport to show Iraqi security force personnel,
military, and militias operating, with them torturing people,
killing them, either beheading them or beheading them after
they were dead. In any event, they were executed. Of course,
these are war crimes.
Now we provided training and equipment to Iraqi security
forces for years. A lot of it was just abandoned to ISIL, but
nonetheless, we have provided it.
Have any Iraqi units been denied U.S. aid under the Leahy
Law?
Secretary Kerry. Yes. We have refused some units. I think
about 122 units have received aid, but they have all been
vetted for Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Are we able to vet Iraqi recipients of U.S.
aid?
Secretary Kerry. Yes, we are. We are fully capable of doing
that, and all of them are being vetted. And since 2003, there
have been denials on occasions where people have been accused
of human rights abuses.
By the way, there is a current investigation going on,
Senator, which Prime Minister Abadi has called himself as a
result of some of these allegations.
Senator Leahy. If militias had acted in connection with
Iraqi security agents, would that be a violation?
Secretary Kerry. Yes.
Senator Leahy. Thank you.
You always supported the Leahy Law, and I appreciate that.
It is designed to prevent U.S. aid from going to units of
foreign security forces that are committing those violations. I
would assume the State Department still continues to vet those,
whether it is in the Middle East or Central America or anywhere
else. Is that correct?
Secretary Kerry. We absolutely do. We have actually wound
up, and I think I have talked to you on the telephone about a
couple of these, where we have had some problems in certain
countries because we have so assiduously asserted them.
Senator Leahy. I also look at northern Nigeria, I look at
Boko Haram's excursions there. I also look at the difficulty in
getting action out of the Nigerian Government. That is probably
a broad way of saying it.
Some people blame the Leahy Law for not doing more to
support the Nigerian army, so saying that we will give them aid
even if they commit crimes like murder, rape, torture.
Do you have a response on that?
Secretary Kerry. That is not the reason. There are other
reasons for the lack of adequate response, Senator. A lot of
them have to do with governance itself, choices in the military
leadership, absence of, and other problems, but it is not the
Leahy Law that is prohibiting that.
Senator Leahy. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
IRAN
Very quickly, is it a fair summary to say that the Iranians
are wreaking havoc in the Middle East, as I speak?
Secretary Kerry. That is not the way I would frame it. What
I would say to you, Senator, is the Iranians are reaching into
and having an impact and influencing a number of countries in
the region. Are they in Baghdad and having an impact there?
Yes. Are they in Beirut and having an impact in Lebanon? Yes.
Are they in Damascus having an impact? I already characterized
Assad's relationship. Yes. Were they in Yemen and did they have
an impact there? The answer is yes. Are there other places?
Yes.
And I want to emphasize that everything that we are doing
with respect to the current negotiations is focused on the
nuclear component, with a clear understanding that none of
these other areas somehow result in less focus or pressure by
the United States or attention, because we will continue to
push back against those kinds of activities.
Senator Graham. Just very briefly, I think they are
wreaking havoc. I think they destabilized the Yemeni
government, which was helpful in counterterrorism actions
against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. I think they are
propping up Assad, who is one of the great mass murderers of
the 21st century. I think Hezbollah has been a destructive
element in Lebanon and a constant thorn in the side of Israel.
I think what they are doing in Iraq, that Senator Leahy pointed
out, is going to make it very hard for us to come together.
So I would just want to let you know, from my point of
view, we are dealing with people who are hell-bent on expanding
their influence in the Mideast in a destructive fashion, and I
hope we will understand who we are dealing with.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, could I just----
Senator Graham. Please. Absolutely.
Secretary Kerry. The greatest wreaking of havoc of all, and
the most destabilizing thing, would be if, in fact, you had a
nuclear armed Iran that projected even more power and influence
than it has today. That is why we are so committed to not
allowing that and not having that become a possibility. But we
are in close contact working with all of our partners in the
region on pushing back on these other components you just
talked about.
We cooperated with Israel in tracking and interdicting a
ship carrying Iranian rockets that was going to Palestinian
militants. In December, we helped the Bahrain coast guard
interdict a ship carrying weapons of Iranian origin to proxy
groups. In December, President Obama designated the GCC as
eligible for foreign military sales, meaning they can purchase
weapons as an entity in order to lay the groundwork for them to
deal with challenges that they feel from Iran.
So we are not oblivious to these tentacles and these
efforts.
Senator Graham. Have you ever thought of the following,
going to the Iranians and say we will cease negotiations about
your nuclear ambitions until you stop wreaking havoc on the
region. We are going to reapply sanctions with full force. We
are not going to negotiate with you while you destabilize the
region, as a punishment for destabilizing the region.
Have you ever thought of that option?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, there are ways to manage that. I
will talk to you in a classified setting, or afterward.
Senator Graham. Fair enough.
Secretary Kerry. I think there is a better way to answer
that.
Senator Graham. Last question, and you have been great to
share with us your thoughts and your time.
IRAQ AND ISIL-DAESH
Do you agree with me that what you see with ISIL, its
presence in Iraq and Syria and now Libya and throughout the
entire region, is a predictable result or outcome of our
decision not to leave troops behind in Iraq and not to have a
no-fly zone 3 years ago when it was recommended by the entire
national security apparatus of the Obama administration?
Secretary Kerry. I can say definitively no, it is not a
result of the issue of troops being or not being in Iraq. There
is no question in my mind about that.
You can have a greater argument about the issue of no-fly
zone and what choices were made back then, but there is no
question in my mind that the decision about troops, if you look
at what flowed immediately afterward as the troops came down
and left Iraq and the Iraq that existed immediately afterward
for more than a year or so was calmer, less violent, there were
less incidents. And that is a process during which time,
unfortunately, the governance of Iraq did not keep up with the
possibilities that it faced. The troops that would have been
left behind would have been training, to some degree. We can go
into what we did or didn't happen with respect to the training
process.
But as I said earlier in my testimony, the real problem was
the absence of a sufficient level of continuing leadership and
the, frankly, overt discrimination that was taking place
against the Sunni population and the unwillingness even to work
out issues with the Kurds.
So Iraq became fractured well before in a way that lent to
the possibility of ISIL being able to move as it did.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
If there are no further questions this morning, Senators
may submit additional questions for the record until Friday,
February 27, and we request the Department of State's response
within 30 days.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Hon. John F. Kerry
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
Question. What actions have the Department of State and the
administration taken to free Pastor Saeed Abedini from imprisonment in
Iran, and what how is his health and welfare?
Answer. We have repeatedly called for the release of Pastor Saeed
Abedini, who is serving an 8 year prison sentence on charges related to
his religious beliefs. We have raised, and will continue to raise, his
case with senior Iranian officials at every possible level. President
Obama raised Saeed's case with President Rouhani in September 2013, and
highlighted his plight during his speech at the National Prayer
Breakfast earlier this month. Secretary Kerry has, on several
occasions, discussed Saeed's case directly with Foreign Minister Zarif.
Likewise, Under Secretary Sherman raises his case on the sidelines of
the P5+1 negotiations at every opportunity. Because of privacy
considerations, we are unable to comment further on our efforts on Mr.
Abedini's behalf.
Question. What percentage of prior fiscal year assistance for
democracy and governance programs in Syria supports indigenous Syrian
civil society organizations (by organization, amount, and fiscal year),
and how much assistance is anticipated for such purposes in the fiscal
year 2016 budget request?
Answer. The United States provides significant support to civil
society groups and organizations in Syria with the goals of fostering a
robust, inclusive and tolerant society that is empowered to hold
governance institutions accountable, provide services to their
communities, empower marginalized groups and vulnerable populations,
and facilitate the free flow of information. This support is a key
component of our broader U.S. assistance to the moderate Syrian
opposition, and is a critical aspect of our policy to counter extremist
elements in the region, including ISIL, and set the conditions for a
negotiated political settlement in Syria. The United States is
providing more than $330 million in nonlethal and transition assistance
to support the moderate Syrian opposition. As part of this assistance,
the U.S. has committed more than $56 million from a range of accounts
and fiscal years to support Syrian civil society through an array of
activities including training to build organizational capacity,
fostering linkages across civil society groups and between civil
society and local and national governance institutions, and bolstering
their technical capacity to provide services to their local
communities. For the safety and security of those we work with, we do
not publically detail each individual activity or organization we work
with. However, supporting civil society in Syria remains a priority and
these efforts will continue into fiscal year 2016. U.S. assistance to
civil society includes:
Civil Society Capacity-Building and Advocacy Support
U.S. assistance strengthens and empowers networks of indigenous
civil society organizations (CSOs), independent journalists, civic,
women and youth activists to work together and build trust between each
other, and position them to form the basis of a strong and vibrant
civil society. U.S. assistance also supports Syrian civil society
groups across ethnic and religious divides to impart the skills,
knowledge, and resources to lead an inclusive peacebuilding and
reconciliation process and, more broadly to support their active role
in representative, transparent and accountable governance. This
assistance is critical to supporting a future Syria that is accepting
of all religious, ethnicities and genders.
Service Provision by Civil Society Organizations
A large component of U.S. assistance provides support to bolster
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs') ability to work with local
governance actors to provide services to their local communities. The
U.S. Government (USG) has partnered with over 50 CSOs in Syria to
collaborate with local authorities to respond to community needs
through the implementation of a range of projects including education,
minor repairs to water and electricity services, waste management and
agriculture projects. Many of these activities also focus on promoting
ideals of tolerance and coexistence through funding activities such as
the production of short films that promote non-violent activism and
local cleanup campaigns to foster community collaboration.
Internet Freedom and Communications Security
The USG is providing security and technology training for Syrian
activists, human rights organizations, and media outlets to enhance
their security as they exercise their rights of freedom of expression,
association, and assembly online. Our assistance builds the capacity of
CSOs operating within the country to improve their communication,
safety, and security.
Question. What are the implications of an economic assistance
suspension to the Palestinian Authority (PA) arising from Palestinian
action at the International Criminal Court? What are the estimates of
the amounts of funding impacted by such a suspension? Will suspension
of economic aid to the PA result in an increase of humanitarian
assistance for the Palestinian people?
Answer. A provision in the fiscal year 2014 and 2015 appropriations
acts restricts Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance if the
Palestinians initiate an International Criminal Court judicially
authorized investigation, or actively support such an investigation,
that subjects Israeli nationals to an investigation for alleged crimes
against Palestinians. Our view is that this legal restriction has not
been triggered.
We are concerned that if assistance to the Palestinian Authority
(PA) were restricted, or if assistance to the PA were otherwise
withheld, there might be significant consequences--including security
consequences--for both Israelis and Palestinians. A significant portion
of U.S. assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) comes in the form
of budget assistance. Over the last two fiscal years, of the $450
million in budget support to the PA, approximately $425 million--nearly
95 percent--was transferred to Israeli private sector creditors to pay
off PA debts for electricity services. The remaining $25 million in
budget support was paid to East Jerusalem hospitals, also to pay off PA
debts. Should the PA's fiscal crisis remain unresolved, rendering the
PA unable to pay, creditors may be faced with the choice of working
unpaid or cutting off services, exacerbating an already tenuous
situation in the West Bank and Gaza.
U.S. assistance to the Palestinians also advances a two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by working to build the
institutions of a future Palestinian state and improve outcomes for the
Palestinian people. Many of these programs play a valuable role in
promoting stability not just for the Palestinians, but also for Israel.
While it is difficult to estimate specific amounts of funding that
would be implicated by a suspension of funding to the PA, a suspension
could also impact a portion of ongoing and planned programs that
provide assistance to PA institutions.
We are currently reviewing our assistance to the West Bank and
Gaza, including assistance to the PA, to determine how it can best be
used moving forward. This includes considering how legal restrictions
could impact funding. Should legal restrictions on assistance to the PA
be triggered, or if assistance is otherwise withheld, an increase in
assistance to the Palestinian people is possible, but no final
determination has been made.
Question. Can you assure the Congress that the United States will
continue to use our veto against any one-sided resolutions at the
United Nations Security Council?
Answer. The United States has consistently opposed every effort to
delegitimize Israel or undermine its security, including at the United
Nations. We uniformly and firmly oppose one-sided actions designed to
punish Israel in international bodies and will continue to do so.
In most cases of unfair and unbalanced texts introduced in the
Security Council, we have been able to advocate successfully for the
U.S. position during negotiations and, if necessary, form a coalition
of like-minded countries to stop such resolutions from moving forward.
For example, on December 30, 2014, the United States successfully
rallied a coalition to join us in voting against an unbalanced draft
resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that was hastily put
before the Security Council. We made clear to the other members that
the draft text was deeply imbalanced and should not be supported.
Through outreach by Secretary Kerry to multiple leaders represented on
the Security Council, as well as Ambassador Power's tireless work in
New York, the resolution failed to achieve the nine United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) member votes in favor required for adoption.
Separately, the administration used its veto power to defeat another
one-sided resolution in 2011.
We will continue to work with our partners, including in the
Council, to advance the prospect for future negotiations and provide a
horizon of hope for Israelis and Palestinians, while opposing all
efforts that would undermine that goal.
Question. Has any U.S. assistance made available for humanitarian
aid, including reconstruction, in Gaza been diverted for other
purposes?
Answer. Since the onset of the July-August 2014 conflict in Gaza,
the United States has committed $231 million in humanitarian assistance
to Gaza, provided to established U.N. and non-governmental
organizations, including the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the World Food Program,
the United Nations Development Program, UNICEF, the International
Committee for the Red Cross, and others. We are not currently aware of
any reports that U.S. assistance for humanitarian aid in Gaza,
including reconstruction, has been diverted for other purposes. The
United States takes very seriously any reports of diversion of its
assistance, and we have long required our partners in Gaza to take
appropriate steps to prevent U.S. funding from being diverted for non-
intended purposes.
UNRWA has stringent policies and procedures in place regarding
neutrality and preventing UNRWA funds and programs from benefiting
terrorists, consistent with the conditions on U.S. funding required by
section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
Vetting of UNRWA staff, beneficiaries, and other persons receiving
UNRWA payments is a key component of these policies and procedures. In
addition to UNRWA's vetting processes, the State Department also
screens the names of all entities or individuals receiving UNRWA
procurement contracts of aggregate annual value greater than $100,000
on a quarterly basis against the General Service Administration's
database of people and entities that are unable to receive Federal
funding due to connections to terrorist organizations. To date, there
have been no matches. To monitor the delivery and neutrality of UNRWA's
assistance, UNRWA international staff members conduct formal quarterly
inspections of all 255 UNRWA facilities in Gaza and daily monitoring of
all nine concrete factories currently contracted by UNRWA building
contractors to use materials for UNRWA's Israeli government-approved
projects. UNRWA also escorts trucks with construction material to its
delivery destination to ensure that construction material is used for
its intended purpose only.
Consistent with statutory requirements, USAID has appropriate
procedures in place to ensure that Economic Support Fund (ESF)
assistance for the West Bank and Gaza is not provided to or through, or
diverted to, any individual or entity that is known to be involved in
or advocating terrorism, including Hamas. USAID's vetting process
checks non-U.S. individuals and entities within certain thresholds
against law enforcement and intelligence community systems prior to
local prime or sub award issuance. Worldwide, USAID requires grantees
to sign its Certification Regarding Terrorist Financing in order to
receive funds. In the West Bank and Gaza specifically, the annual
Appropriations Act requires annual audits of all USAID direct awardees,
as well as an annual Government Accountability Office audit of the use
of all ESF assistance.
Question. What factors were considered prior to the evacuation of
U.S. Embassy personnel from Sana'a, and what must be considered prior
to their return?
Answer. When the Houthis forcefully entered Sana'a in September
2014, the security situation in the capital significantly deteriorated.
However, despite the instability in Sana'a, and the unpredictable
nature of the political crisis, our Embassy was still able to work with
Yemeni interlocutors and the international community on the ground to
advance and support Yemen's political transition process. However,
recognizing the changed security environment, Embassy Sana'a went on
Ordered Departure on September 24, 2014, and we proceeded to reduce our
staffing levels to minimize our footprint should we have to evacuate.
We also updated our travel warnings and issued several security
messages to American citizens stressing that Yemen was unsafe and they
should depart immediately.
Subsequently, the unilateral declaration by the Houthis on February
6, 2015 that dissolved the Yemeni parliament, created new Houthi-
controlled governing bodies, prolonged the house arrest of the
President and Prime Minister, and pitted the Houthis against nearly all
of Yemen's political elements ultimately led to an untenable security
environment. Accordingly, we re-evaluated our security posture in
Sana'a and determined that our Embassy could no longer operate
normally, and the risks to our personnel were too great.
The Department of State, in concert with the Department of Defense,
had developed specific plans for an additional drawdown of personnel in
November 2014 and further refined those plans as the situation evolved
on the ground. When the Embassy temporarily suspended operations on
February 10, 2015 we successfully moved all our personnel to Sana'a
International Airport without incident. The relocation from Yemen was
conducted safely, swiftly, and most importantly without loss of life,
by highly skilled and experienced personnel. The Department is able to
manage risk by balancing threats, applying appropriate mitigating
measures, and implementing quality security programs.
Although we have temporarily relocated out of Sana'a, we remain
engaged with interlocutors in Yemen and the international community to
advance U.S. policy objectives, including counterterrorism. Since the
suspension of operations at Embassy Sana'a, Ambassador Mathew Tueller
has made two trips to Aden to meet with President Hadi, has met with
him recently in Riyadh, and is based in the region to facilitate
continued engagement as circumstances permit. We continue to monitor
threats emanating from Yemen and we believe we have the resources and
capabilities postured in the area to address them. We remain committed
to ensuring the safe and effective conduct of foreign policy. When the
political and security situation has stabilized, such that there is no
longer a risk of prolonged and severe civil disorder , and the host
government demonstrates a vested interest in maintaining the safety and
security all U.S. personnel and facilities, a return to the country
will be actively considered.
Question. Which countries have endorsed Russian aggression in
Ukraine, and should the U.S. consider withholding bilateral assistance
to those countries?
Answer. There have been no public endorsements by any countries of
Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine. Similarly, no country has
recognized the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) or the
Luhansk People's Republic (LPR). In fact, many nations criticized the
so-called DPR/LPR separatist elections on November 2, 2014, as
illegitimate. Russia, however, stated that it would recognize the
results of the separatist ``elections,'' as the voting supposedly
expressed the legitimate will of the residents in the Luhansk and
Donetsk oblasts.
The State Department is currently reviewing whether any countries
have endorsed or otherwise supported the purported annexation of Crimea
by the Russian Federation. Should it be determined that the central
government of any country has endorsed Russian aggression in Ukraine,
we would consider whether withholding bilateral assistance would be
appropriate or necessary.
The United States does not recognize and will not accept Russia's
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea. U.S. sanctions enacted
against Russia for its occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea
will remain in place until Russia ends its occupation and restores
Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea.
Question. When do you anticipate the U.S. Interest Section in
Havana transforming into a U.S. Embassy, and how will staffing
requirements change with this diplomatic upgrade? Please describe the
process for upgrading the mission.
Answer. The Department is working with the Government of Cuba to
re-establish diplomatic relations and take the steps necessary to
convert the interests sections in Havana and Washington into embassies.
We expect that the costs of this change in status for the U.S.
Interests Section (USINT) in Havana will be minimal for the remainder
of fiscal year 2015, and will be absorbed within resources available to
the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. As with other embassies
around the world, it will be staffed and operated as leanly as
possible. We do not foresee changes to staffing during fiscal year
2015, in part because the building that houses USINT does not allow for
an immediate increase to staffing. We are evaluating physical
modifications that could be made to accommodate additional personnel in
the future as the Embassy expands engagement with the Cuban people and
Government.
The process for upgrading the mission from an interests section to
an Embassy would likely involve several steps. Both governments must
first agree to re-establish diplomatic relations and permanent
diplomatic missions. Next, our mission would send a diplomatic note to
the Cuban Government accrediting our staff to our new Embassy under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. We would also send separate
diplomatic notes proposing the termination of the Interests Section
Agreement with the Government of Cuba and notifying the Swiss that they
no longer need to serve as the U.S. protecting power in Cuba. Once
these steps are completed, the interests section would officially be
changed to an Embassy.
Question. Did the Department of State or other administration
representatives meet with any Cuban human rights activists before
announcing their change in policy? If so, please provide details. To
what extent were the views of such activists considered in the crafting
of the President's new policy of engagement?
Answer. The President has met with representatives of Cuba's
independent civil society, and senior officials from the State
Department and National Security Council Staff meet with them when they
are traveling through Washington DC. In addition, Department officials
and the U.S. Interests Section in Havana regularly meet with them on
the island. We were well aware of their views and priorities and took
them into account in formulating our new policy approach. We did not
share with them the specifics of our intentions to change our policy
approach. We will continue to consult with independent Cuban civil
society to hear their views and plans for future activities, and we
have urged other countries to do the same.
The continued promotion of universal human rights and the
empowerment of all Cubans is the bedrock of our new approach toward
Cuba. We have no illusions the Cuban Government will change its
behavior simply because of our new policy approach, but we are now
better positioned to press the Cuban Government for real change. We
support the key points around which Cuban civil society groups have
rallied, including Cuban ratification and compliance with various U.N.
human rights treaties; legal recognition of independent civil society;
implementation of constitutional and legal reforms to ensure full
respect for labor rights, freedoms of expression, association, peaceful
assembly, and to allow for free elections; the release of prisoners
arrested for political reasons; and an end to government-sponsored
harassment of independent civil society.
We will continue to urge respect for democratic principles as well
as human rights and fundamental freedoms in our discussions with the
Cuban Government.
Question. Did the State Department or other administration
officials meet with any business interests before announcing the
change? If so, please provide details. To what extent were the views of
such business interests considered in the crafting of the President's
new policy of engagement?
Answer. The State Department and other U.S. agencies frequently
engage with the U.S. private sector about U.S. policy and sanctions,
and meet with a broad range of interests as a matter of course. The
Department of Treasury and Commerce's January 16, 2015, amendments to
Cuba sanctions regulations, to which the State Department provided
substantial foreign policy guidance, were aimed at increasing people-
to-people contact, further supporting civil society in Cuba, and
further enhancing the free flow of information to, from, and among the
Cuban people. In implementing this policy, U.S. agencies were mindful
of the perspectives of all stakeholders, including the U.S. private
sector, regarding how regulatory amendments could most effectively
further these policy goals. For example, engagement with U.S.
telecommunications companies was helpful in identifying how regulatory
changes could support increased access to information by the Cuban
people. We, along with our colleagues at relevant U.S. agencies,
continue outreach to inform U.S. business interests of these most
recent changes and to respond to questions.
Question. Yes or no: Do you commit to keeping all relevant
congressional committees informed of engagement with the Cuban
Government going forward?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What specific reforms of the World Health Organization
(WHO) have the administration and other governments considered (or are
actively pursuing) in the wake of the Ebola outbreak?
Answer. The World Health Organization is the critical global public
health agency that cooperates with 194 member states and technical
partners across the spectrum of public health issues such as the
International Health Regulations and their implementation and related
surveillance, preparedness, and response to emergencies and outbreaks.
The WHO has been a key player in international efforts to drive the
number of Ebola cases to zero, and has worked consistently over the
years to finish the job globally on polio eradication. In addition to
its life-saving operational activities, the WHO performs key normative
functions, such as setting quality and safety regulatory standards in
the food and drug sectors, and addressing health system effectiveness.
Currently the WHO is at full capacity in their operations in West
Africa, with over 700 people on the ground dealing with the
epidemiology of the outbreak, laboratory capacity, case management,
contact tracing, running the U.N. medevac system, and working with
partners on social mobilization.
In addressing the valid criticisms of the WHO early response
efforts in the Ebola outbreak, WHO Director-General Margaret Chan
undertook a course correction with changes to the structure of the
response, including personnel changes, to mobilize fully the capacity
of the WHO. She also called for the WHO Executive Board to hold a
Special Session on Ebola (held January 25, 2015). The United States
partnered with South Africa and championed a resolution, ``Ebola:
ending the current outbreak, strengthening global preparedness,'' which
called for measures to both address the immediate Ebola outbreak and to
set in motion additional reform measures. This resolution, and the
accompanying actions, had broad member state support and will make
critical changes in the emergency response capacity so that the
Organization will be able to respond with immediate effectiveness in a
future complex major emergency or disease outbreak.
Immediately following the Special Session, WHO Director-General
Chan appointed a Special Representative for the Ebola Response for the
duration of the outbreak. WHO is taking the reforms adopted at the
Special Session seriously, with work underway to further improve the
Organization's functions by the annual World Health Assembly in May. At
that time, the WHO will report on an interim assessment by experts on
all aspects of the WHO response, the proposed development of a global
public health emergency workforce for rapid deployment in the event of
a public health emergency, strengthened command and control functions
at the WHO for emergencies and outbreaks, and improved human resource
policies related to the functioning of the Organization across its
three levels.
The United States has been a driving force behind an on-going
reform agenda at the WHO underway since 2011. Reforms have proceeded on
four fronts: priority-setting, managerial reforms, governance reforms,
and financing. Member states agreed on streamlined priority setting
processes and a 6-year overall strategy. Management reforms have
encompassed administration, oversight and ethics, and the U.S. has
worked closely with the Organization on human resource reforms to set
in place more flexible contracts, streamlined recruitment processes,
and changes to the workforce model. Some governance processes have
improved with more work underway, and reforms have been implemented to
improve financing.
Question. What is the justification for the fiscal year 2016 budget
request that cuts funding for refugees and disaster assistance below
levels provide by Congress in fiscal year 2015 (under Migration and
Refugee Assistance and International Disaster Assistance,
respectively)?
Answer. The administration remains dedicated to providing strong
support for humanitarian programs worldwide. The President's fiscal
year 2016 request reflects the administration's strong commitment to
these programs, while taking into account the current constrained
budget environment. The fiscal year 2016 request includes $2.453
billion for the Migration Refugee Assistance and $1.741 billion for the
International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account. In addition, the
Department is requesting $50 million in the Emergency Refugee and
Migration Assistance (ERMA) account to respond to urgent and unforeseen
needs.
Overall, this request represents a nearly $850 million increase
from the President's fiscal year 2015 request in response to the dire
humanitarian situation resulting from the conflicts in Syria, South
Sudan, Iraq, and Central African Republic, among others. The Department
of State and the United States Agency for International Development
also plan to carry over approximately $500 million in fiscal year 2015
funding into fiscal year 2016 in order to support humanitarian aid
programs. However, should the need for additional funding from the U.S.
Government this year exceed our current plans, the administration would
tap the planned carryover funding to address them.
With the request and planned carryover, we anticipate having the
funds necessary to support robust U.S. Government support for
humanitarian aid programs in in fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2016.
Question. How does the fiscal year 2016 budget request address or
mitigate the growing global influence of the People's Republic of
China, particularly in Africa?
Answer. Foreign investment is essential to Africa's economic
development, and there is room for both the United States and China to
engage in public and private investment opportunities. The United
States offers a compelling narrative for Africa. Our firms introduce
international best practices, export top-quality products, provide
employment opportunities, and promote economic growth in Africa, while
also generating benefits for the U.S. economy.
China will continue to seek an expanding role in Africa and
elsewhere around the world, and we must maintain our engagement with
China in this regard.
The United States welcomes Chinese engagement in Africa that is
consistent with international labor and environmental standards,
promotes transparency, good governance, and sustainable development,
and maintains a level playing field for all companies. The United
States will continue to press China to not undermine local and
international efforts to promote healthy competition, good governance,
transparency, and responsible natural resource management in Africa and
elsewhere.
We believe that Chinese efforts to build infrastructure and enable
economic growth are generally consistent with our promotion of economic
development in the region. The United States has strong relationships
with many African partners, and we are identifying opportunities to
collaborate with these partners and with China, including through
international institutions, towards common goals that also contribute
to our broader regional and global priorities.
international monetary fund quota reforms
Question. How will failure by the Congress to implement the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) governance and quota reforms included
in the President's request impact the United States?
Answer. U.S. hesitation on IMF reform diminishes our capacity to
influence the international development financing landscape and will
ultimately affect the IMF's ability to respond to geopolitical and
economic crises in a way that serves our vital national interests.
Giving important developing economies a greater vote in the IMF would
preserve the integrity of the existing international financial
infrastructure without increasing U.S. monetary commitments or
endangering the U.S. veto over important IMF decisions.
Despite the fact that the United States championed the 2010 IMF
quota and governance reforms, we are now the only major IMF member
country that has not yet ratified them. The U.S. failure to ratify IMF
reforms is generating criticism abroad and eroding our credibility in
the G-20, with emerging economies, and with international financial
institutions. At the 2014 World Bank/IMF spring and fall meetings, an
increasing number of countries called for moving forward on IMF quota
and governance reforms without the United States. The November G-20
Brisbane Summit Joint Communique stated that the G-20 will begin to
engage the IMF in 2015 to discuss how to advance the reform process if
the United States fails to ratify the proposed reforms by the end of
2014. It is unclear, however, how IMF members would advance reforms
without the United States, and no details have been presented.
Our inaction may also have helped fuel momentum for alternative
institutions that have not yet committed to the international best
practices that protect global financial stability. Since October 2014,
28 countries, including the United Kingdom most recently, have joined
the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), despite
our oft-stated concerns regarding its governance structure and
outstanding questions about its commitment to adhere to international
best standards on lending. We acknowledge the need for additional
multilateral financing for global development but are concerned that
the new institutions are not yet sufficiently committed to maintaining
accepted high standards on governance, environmental and social
safeguards, procurement, and debt sustainability. Institutions that do
not incorporate these standards can undermine development priorities
and create financial crisis vulnerabilities through irresponsible or
politically motivated lending.
Question. What is the policy of the United States regarding
military-to-military engagement with Burma?
Answer. During his November visit to Burma, President Obama stated
clearly that the United States would not expand our engagement with the
Burmese military in 2015. In keeping with the President's direction,
the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State will continue to engage with
the Burmese military as it has since 2012: in a limited and calibrated
manner intended to promote reform and to help ensure the country's most
powerful institution remains engaged in Burma's reform process.
In 2015, engagement with the Burmese military will continue to
promote the ideals and values of a professional military in a
democracy, including accountability, civilian control, rule of law, and
respect for international humanitarian and international human rights
law. In limited circumstances, consistent with past practices, members
of Burma's civilian government and armed forces may attend classes or
observer activities designed to help the country respond to
humanitarian crises or disasters. Additionally, we anticipate
interactions with the Burmese military on the margins of multilateral
fora (e.g. ASEAN) where senior U.S. officials deliver messages
supportive of continued reform to their Burmese counterparts.
We will provide no operational training, field training, weapons,
materiel, or other technologies to any of Burma's armed forces. In
moving forward we will continue to consult broadly with civil society
organizations, ethnic groups, political party leaders, and other
stakeholders in evaluating the impact and appropriateness of our
planned activities.
The administration continues to believe that the United States can
promote positive changes and professionalism within the Burmese
military more effectively through tailored bilateral interactions than
through disengagement, especially given Burma's traditional reliance on
China, Russia, and North Korea as defense partners. However, we have
repeatedly notified Burmese military representatives that before the
United States will consider moving beyond our current level of
engagement, the Burmese military and the Government of Burma must take
further steps to demonstrate concretely its commitment to democratic
reform, national reconciliation with ethnic groups and religious
minorities, adherence to international human rights standards, and
ending all defense sales ties with North Korea in accordance with U.N.
Security Council resolutions.
Question. How do you assess prospects for free and fair elections
in Burma, and do you share growing concerns within Burmese civil
society and democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi that the military will
interfere in the conduct of these elections--as they have done in the
past?
Answer. President Thein Sein publicly announced that Burma's
general election will take place in November 2015. We welcome the
Burmese Government's confirmation that the election will happen in a
timely manner. The credibility of Burma's 2015 election is of utmost
importance to the development of Burma's democratic institutions and
will serve as a critical marker in Burma's reform process. It is
essential that the election be credible, inclusive, and transparent and
allows the people of Burma to freely choose their leaders.
Democracy is not a 1-day event, but a long-term process, and the
United States will support Burma's democratic reforms before, during,
and after these elections. U.S. assistance is intended to strengthen
Burma's democratic institutions, and build capacity among all key
stakeholders. The U.S. Government is providing more than $18 million in
assistance to strengthen the country's political institutions that are
key to democratic governance and support civil society, political
parties, the media, and government to conduct inclusive, transparent,
and credible elections in 2015.
At the same time, the U.S. Government has publicly and privately
encouraged constitutional reforms to decrease the role of active-duty
military in the political structure and pave the way for the Burmese to
freely choose their President in a free and fair 2015 election.
President Obama strongly advocated for constitutional reform during his
trip to Burma in November, consistent with previous U.S. Government
statements on the issue. The government and military have repeatedly
stated they would follow the ``people's will'' when considering
constitutional amendments.
Opposition leaders have long called for high-level talks to forge
stakeholder consensus on the country's political and economic reform
strategy and Aung San Suu Kyi continues to engage the military and the
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) on these issues. On March
2, she held a fifth round of talks with President Thein Sein and
reportedly discussed the elections and possible amendments to the
constitution.
Question. The Government of Burma (GoB) broke a 17-year cease fire
with the Kachins in June 2011. Since then there has been increased
attacks by the Tatmadaw on the Kachins. Further, there has been no
sustained delivered of humanitarian assistance to the nearly 100,000
IDPs pressed up against China's border. The ``Peace Process'' appears
to be more about process and less about peace: what is your assessment
of the peace process?
Answer. The seventh round of formal negotiations towards achieving
a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) will resume on March 16-21 in
Rangoon. Both the GoB and the ethnic armed groups have expressed their
desire to make progress in these talks and maintain momentum.
The discussions will focus on recent fighting in Kachin and Shan
states and seek to formalize the text of the NCA. The unresolved
military aspects of the agreement, such as a ceasefire code of conduct,
the post-ceasefire repositioning of troops, and the establishment of a
joint-monitoring mechanism, will be crucial for the success of the
negotiations.
A ceasefire agreement would be an important milestone. However, it
would not conclude the reconciliation process but rather serve as the
beginning of an inclusive and transparent political dialogue essential
to the creation of a lasting peace. Furthermore, the NCA would not end
all conflict in the country as some armed ethnic groups are not part of
the formal negotiations and would not be able to sign the agreement.
We continue to encourage the GoB and ethnic groups to maintain
their commitment to dialogue as the only path to genuine and lasting
peace, stability, and development in Burma. We remain in close contact
with humanitarian actors in the area to ensure that the needs of the
conflict-affected communities can be met quickly and safely. We
continue to urge national and local government authorities to permit
immediate and unfettered humanitarian access to provide life-saving
assistance to these populations in need. We have appealed to all sides
to exercise restraint and ensure the full protection of civilians and
humanitarian staff in accordance with international humanitarian
standards.
Question. The situation in Rakhine State toward the Rohingya Muslim
population remains appalling, and they live in an apartheid-like
situation. The GoB said they would issue ``white-cards'' which could
have been a pathway to citizenship, but shortly thereafter the
government rescinded the offer.
What measures are being taken by the administration and our allies
to address Rohingya citizenship, to protect their human rights, and
provide humanitarian assistance to affected communities and
individuals?
Answer. Given the dire humanitarian and human rights situation in
Rakhine State and significant concerns raised by the international
community, we consistently press the Government of Burma to pursue
durable solutions to these problems, including developing a path to
citizenship for members of the Rohingya population and taking steps to
end systemic racially- and religiously-motivated discrimination. The
Government of Burma invalidated the ``white cards'' on March 31, 2015,
but there is not yet evidence of an alternative path to citizenship or
legal residency status. While not a direct path to citizenship, the
white cards, provided holders with temporary legal status, access to
some social services, and allowed them to vote in previous elections
and the constitutional referendum. The steps taken by the Burmese
Government that deny the rights of persons who have lived in Burma for
generations belie the Burmese Government's commitments to
reconciliation, equal protection for all under domestic laws and
international standards, and inclusive national elections in 2015.
The resolution of these issues is a critical element in Burma's
transition to a stable, more inclusive democracy. The U.S. Government
is applying diplomatic pressure to encourage the Government of Burma to
uphold its international human rights obligations; ensure the
accountability of security forces and other perpetrators of abuses in
northern Rakhine State; and provide a path to full citizenship for the
Rohingya population. Embassy Rangoon and visiting senior U.S. officials
have regularly raised these issues with the government, including Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy R. Sherman; Under Secretary for
Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Sarah Sewall; Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Tom
Malinowski; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Daniel Russel; and Assistant Secretary of State for Population,
Refugees, and Migration Anne Richard.
During his November 2014 visit, President Obama raised concerns
about the Rohingya in his meeting with President Thein Sein, including
issues related to their citizenship, discrimination against them, and
restrictions on their ability to travel. U.S. officials, and our
allies, have also urged the government to ensure that actions intended
to maintain or restore security and stability in the area are carried
out in a way that do not violate human rights and that those
responsible for violence are held accountable.
During the second U.S.-Burma Human Rights Dialogue in January
2015--led by Assistant Secretary Malinowski and joined by Assistant
Secretary Richard--the Burmese Government acknowledged the importance
of implementing a comprehensive, transparent, and inclusive
reconciliation process in Rakhine State. The Government of Burma and
the United States agreed that this process should prioritize equal
protection for all under domestic laws and international standards and
unfettered humanitarian access to all vulnerable populations. The
United States also welcomed the Government of Burma's commitment to
hold credible, transparent, and inclusive parliamentary elections in
2015. However, the Government of Burma's more recent actions run
counter to these commitments.
As a result of our regular communication with our allies on these
issues, a strongly-worded resolution was passed at the Human Rights
Council last month, which renewed the mandate of the Special Rapporteur
for Myanmar/Burma.
Since fiscal year 2013, the U.S. Government, including the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State
Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, has
provided nearly $152 million in life-saving humanitarian assistance to
internally displaced persons, refugees, and asylum seekers, including
the Rohingya, in Burma and in the region. This funding provides health
and medical care, nutrition and food security, water, sanitation and
hygiene, shelter, non-food items, and services for people with
disabilities. Other activities include support for intra-faith
dialogue, where religious leaders exchange views and perspectives on
the role of religion in politics and an open society; training on
tolerance and diversity; and programs with interfaith speakers to help
local interfaith groups develop advocacy strategies. U.S. assistance
also furnishes local civil society networks with resources to monitor
and mitigate the potential for intercommunal conflict and violence. The
assistance also supports small-scale activities to develop economic
linkages and joint marketplaces for Rakhine and Rohingya communities.
The U.S. Government also regularly engages the broader
international community, including the U.N., international non-
governmental organizations, human rights and civil society
organizations, and the diplomatic corps to coordinate humanitarian
response efforts. This coordination is accomplished by participating in
monthly Chiefs of Mission roundtables in Rakhine State, bi-weekly
diplomatic corps working group meetings, and regular donor and
humanitarian coordination meetings. U.S. Government officials also
consult with community leaders and civil society from Rakhine and
Rohingya communities to understand their perspectives, monitor the risk
of violence, encourage peaceful resolution of conflict, and communicate
U.S. policy and support.
Question. In January, the Buddhist-nationalist monk U Wirathu
called the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burma Yanghee
Lee, a ``bitch . . . whore'' for upholding the rights of the Rohingyas
to ``self-identify'' in accordance with international human rights law.
Further, the Burmese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) issued a press
release on February 3, 2015 which rebuked Ms. Lee for interfering in
the internal affairs of Burma, which was clearly an attempt to
intimidate her and diminish her mandate.
The remarks engendered a swift and apt reply from U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein. The U.N. Secretary
General (UNSG) apparently did not comment or respond.
Has the Department of State discussed U Wirathu's disgraceful
comments and the MoFA press release with the UNSG, and what messages
have been sent to the GoB by the UNSG?
Answer. We support Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee for her work and
her reporting on Burma human rights over the past year. We condemn the
misogynistic attack against her. We have not discussed this issue with
the U.N. Secretary-General, and are not aware of any messages that the
Secretary General sent to the Government of Burma.
Question. Has the Department of State discussed the comments and
press release with the GoB's Ambassador to the U.N.?
Answer. We have not discussed the comments and press release with
Burma's Ambassador to the U.N. The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon expressed
concern to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to an advisor to the
President's office regarding Wirathu's comments.
Question. Congress recommended $2.9 billion for democracy and
governance programs in fiscal year 2014, yet the administration
provided only $1.9 billion for such programs.
How do you explain the reduction in democracy and governance
programs in fiscal year 2014--does this demonstrate the lack of
commitment to democracy and governance abroad by this administration?
Answer. Democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) programs
abroad remain a significant priority for this administration. This
commitment is strongly reflected in the President's budget for fiscal
year 2016, which requests $2.9 billion in foreign assistance for DRG
programs, the same as the fiscal year 2014 request, including increases
for critical programs in Africa and Central America to foster good
governance and fight corruption, strengthen the rule of law, and
promote civil society.
For fiscal year 2014, the Department of State and USAID requested
$2.9 billion to promote and support DRG programs around the world. The
fiscal year 2014 appropriation reduced funding for the key foreign
assistance accounts that support DRG programs, which made it difficult
to fully fund DRG programs included within the President's request. The
fiscal year 2014 allocations balanced numerous foreign policy
priorities, including DRG programs, while ensuring we had met statutory
congressional sector directives included within the bill. After
reviewing worldwide needs and congressional directives, nearly $2.0
billion was allocated to DRG programs in fiscal year 2014, resulting in
a reduction of almost $1.0 billion in global DRG activities as compared
to the President's request.
Question. How important are democracy and governance programs to
combating disease outbreaks like Ebola or the influence of Islamic
extremists?
Answer. Democratic processes and strong governance institutions are
critical in times of crisis such as the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West
Africa. Strong governance is essential to ensuring the successful
management of disease outbreaks and other crises. Also, democratic
systems and good governance contribute to the ensuring the trust of the
public--a key factor in crisis response. We learned from the Ebola
epidemic that community cooperation is a vital component of social
mobilization. Programs that address these issues will be an important
part of long-term recovery.
The Ebola response was hampered by instances of poor governance,
weak institutions, and corruption. The healthcare systems were quickly
overwhelmed and quickly collapsed in the face of the Ebola virus and
the initial emergency response was poorly executed. We are also aware
that a few government officials tried to use the influx of assistance
for their own financial advantage. The United States and other donors
have made it clear that corruption will not be tolerated and the Ebola
response and recovery funds must be used transparently and with great
accountability. We have conveyed that it is no longer business as
usual. The Ebola epidemic, and similar crises, have impressed the need
to change the culture of corruption. We have clearly communicated the
message at all levels of government, and intend to support that message
with programs that build domestic capacity. We have been assured by our
U.S. Ambassadors in the affected countries that the funds delivered for
the Ebola response have been handled appropriately.
A major challenge during the Ebola response was mistrust in
government, which led some communities to resist Ebola outreach teams.
It is critical that governments build that trust with communities going
forward through transparent and equitable delivery of services, free
and fair elections, good governance, improved citizen access to and
participation in decisionmaking, and holding officials accountable.
Programming in the Emergency funding request is intended to develop
efforts to strengthen the infrastructure and operation of healthcare
systems and the regulatory environment. In addition to the ``hardware''
of the infrastructure, funding will also be used to ensure that
necessary personnel are well-trained and prepared.
The fiscal year 2016 request includes funds for the three impacted
countries that will build upon the support provided by the emergency
Ebola funding fiscal year 2015 appropriation to the Department of State
and USAID. With these fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2016 funds,
USAID is supporting economic, social, and governance programs in Ebola-
affected countries to address the potentially sharp increase in extreme
poverty and other second-order impacts, including damage to the
livelihoods of vulnerable households in Liberia.
Question. Over the past several years, the Government
Accountability Office has made numerous recommendations to help improve
the effectiveness and efficiency of State Department programs and
activities. While State has taken action on a number of these
recommendations, according to GAO there are more than 150 GAO
recommendations since 2011 that State has not yet addressed.
What actions will you take over the next year to address GAO's
recommendations?
Answer. We value the recommendations resulting from the work of the
GAO as they identify ways to improve our programs and operations. In
fiscal year 2014 alone, State had approximately 75 engagements with the
GAO. It is our long-standing commitment to complete action on
recommendations in an expeditious manner. Some recommendations,
however, can take a number of years to implement completely. In
addition, there are no State specific areas on GAO's 2015 High Risk
List. State has a collaborative and robust liaison relationship with
GAO and will continue to provide GAO with regular updates as we follow-
up together to assure that recommendations are closed as quickly as
possible.
Question. The fiscal year 2016 budget request includes a request to
use Economic Support Funds (ESF) for ``programs to support initiatives
relating to North Korea that are in the national interests of the
United States, notwithstanding any other provision of law''.
What programs does the administration anticipate for North Korea
that would require use for this broad authority?
What are the impacts and how does sequestration impede the conduct
of diplomacy?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2016 budget request seeks
authority to use Economic Support Funds (ESF) for ``programs to support
initiatives relating to North Korea (DPRK) that are in the national
interests of the United States, notwithstanding any other provision of
law.'' The fiscal year 2016 request does not seek any bilateral foreign
assistance funding for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
and we currently have no plans to fund bilateral programs using ESF. In
past years, the President has requested that the funds appropriated
under ESF may be made available for programs to support the goals of
the Six Party Talks, including nuclear security initiatives relating to
North Korea, notwithstanding any other provision of law. Given the
significant restrictions on assistance to North Korea, this authority
is needed to provide flexibility to support our diplomatic efforts if
we ever do enter into active talks.
Sequestration is an arbitrary across-the-board cut that reduces our
flexibility everywhere, including potentially with respects to our
efforts on the DPRK, and would therefore make the job of diplomacy
harder than it already is.
Question. (a) Have you abandoned efforts to persuade Iran to
dismantle the majority of its nuclear infrastructure? If Iran maintains
most of its infrastructure--even under severe constraints and under a
serious inspection regime--doesn't that allow for a quick breakout
either during the time of the agreement or after the agreement expires?
(b) If Iran maintains thousands of centrifuges and an operational
heavy water reactor, aren't they a nuclear threshold state?
(c) You have said that Iran must address its past weaponization
efforts before any agreement is signed. Yet it has consistently refused
to do so. What must Iran do to at a minimum on this in order for an
agreement to be finalized?
(d) Given Iran's history of cheating on its international
commitments, will anything other than anytime, anywhere inspections
give you comfort that Iran is living up to its commitments? Will
specific penalties be delineated for not living up to those
commitments?
(e) You have said you will not support any further extensions of
the talks if there is no conceptual agreement by March 24. Does that
remain your position under any circumstances?
Answer. (a) Fully dismantling Iran's nuclear program would not
completely eliminate its ability to breakout. Iran has already
sufficiently mastered significant parts of the nuclear fuel cycle after
decades of developing its program. Even if Iran's program were razed to
the ground, it would retain the ability to breakout within a few years.
So we cannot completely and permanently eliminate its ability to
breakout, but we can severely restrain it by putting in place strict
constraints and intrusive monitoring measures. We are seeking a
comprehensive deal that would give us expansive access into and
oversight of all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, which would allow
us to detect any attempts to breakout overtly or covertly. Key elements
of this transparency regime, including implementation of the Additional
Protocol, would continue in place even after the end of a deal.
(b) There are many variables related to extending the breakout time
of the uranium pathway, including the number and types of centrifuges
Iran is able to use and the size of its stockpile of enriched uranium.
We are also determined to ensure that Iran cannot acquire plutonium for
a nuclear weapon from the Arak heavy water research reactor. Cutting
off all of these pathways will involve a variety of constraints and
extensive monitoring measures. It will be critical to find the right
combination of measures to ensure Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon
through either the uranium or the plutonium path. Both of these
elements remain under negotiation, but in the end, we must be assured
that Iran cannot breakout by producing weapons grade uranium or
plutonium.
(c) We are pressing Iran to cooperate fully with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to address all outstanding issues,
particularly those that give rise to concerns regarding the possible
military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program. This includes
providing access to facilities, individuals, and documents requested by
the IAEA. This is one of the issues we are working to resolve in the
negotiations. We believe a comprehensive deal should facilitate the
IAEA's investigation of PMD and ensure there are no ongoing
weaponization activities.
(d) A comprehensive deal must ensure that Iran is subject to
significantly enhanced transparency and monitoring measures to verify
the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program and to quickly
detect any attempts by Iran to break out. We continue to place a high
priority on strict monitoring measures in order to detect violations
promptly and retain an ability to snap sanctions back in place should
violations occur. How exactly that framework would look is still under
negotiation. Our team continues to work toward a package that will best
achieve our goals of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon
and ensuring that Iran's nuclear program is used for exclusively
peaceful purposes.
(e) We evaluate major national security decisions against national
interests. We strongly believe that the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) has
significantly advanced U.S. national security interests by halting and
rolling back Iran's nuclear program in key ways. Without the JPOA, Iran
would be enriching to 20 percent uranium and continuously increasing
its stockpile of uranium to dangerous levels. We will not take a bad
deal. And if we conclude that Iran is unable or unwilling to take the
necessary steps to resolve our concerns, we will walk away from these
negotiations.
Question. Deputy Secretary Blinken testified last month before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and said during the JPOA there were
situations that ``we believe were violations of the JPOA.''
Can you elaborate on those violations? When the violations were
identified, was anyone in Congress notified?
What does it say about Iranian intentions for a long-term agreement
if they are already violating the interim agreement? How will
violations we dealt with in a long-term agreement?
How long did it take for the U.S. to identify a violation had
occurred, and for Iran to stop the violation? Might there be other
violations that we are not aware of?
Answer. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to
verify Iran's fulfillment of its nuclear-related commitments under the
Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). Part of the reason why the JPOA has been
so effective is that it has provided a framework and a mechanism for
all sides to raise questions and resolve issues when they arise. When
we had questions about activities related to the IR-5 centrifuge, we
raised them with Iran as soon as the IAEA reported them, and the issue
was resolved to our satisfaction. The Iranians have confirmed that they
will not continue that activity as cited in the IAEA report.
IAEA access is valuable and gives us insight into what is happening
on the ground. One of the many benefits of the JPOA is that the IAEA
has obtained greater access into Iran's nuclear program to verify that
Iran is meeting its JPOA commitments. As a result of the JPOA, Iran's
nuclear program is more constrained and transparent than it has been in
years.
Question. Mr. Secretary, you worked very hard last year to create a
conceptual framework for talks between Israel and the Palestinians.
Unfortunately, Palestinian President Abbas' response to your proposal
was to form a unity government with Hamas and to leave the negotiating
table and take his case to the United Nations. He pushed for a one-
sided United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that called for
a final agreement within 12 months requiring total Israeli withdrawal
to the pre-1967 lines by 2017. That provocative move was followed by
signing on to the Rome Statute to join the International Criminal Court
(ICC).
What is the U.S. planning to do to try to discourage the ICC from
instigating a full investigation of Israel which can only politicize
the ICC and potentially do great damage to Israel?
Answer. The United States does not consider the Palestinians
eligible to accede to the Rome Statue of the International Criminal
Court. The United States has made clear its view that Palestinian
action in seeking to become a party to the Rome Statute is counter-
productive, will damage the atmosphere with the very people with whom
the Palestinians ultimately need to make peace, and will do nothing to
further the aspirations of the Palestinian people for a sovereign and
independent state. We also made clear that we strongly disagree with
the ICC Prosecutor's decision to open a preliminary examination.
The United States continues to oppose actions--by both parties--
that undermine trust and create doubts about their commitment to a
negotiated peace. Such actions only push the parties further apart.
Question. Mr. Secretary, you worked very hard last year to create a
conceptual framework for talks between Israel and the Palestinians.
Unfortunately, Palestinian President Abbas' response to your proposal
was to form a unity government with Hamas and to leave the negotiating
table and take his case to the United Nations. He pushed for a one-
sided United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that called for
a final agreement within 12 months requiring total Israeli withdrawal
to the pre-1967 lines by 2017. That provocative move was followed by
signing on to the Rome Statute to join the International Criminal
Court.
How is the U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC) an improvement over its
discredited predecessor the Commission on Human Rights?
Answer. The HRC is the only global intergovernmental body that
exists to promote and defend human rights. It is in the vital interest
of the U.S. to ensure that international human rights norms and laws
continue to protect and advance individual freedoms.
Through its membership on the Human Rights Council (HRC), the
United States focuses attention on the world's worst human rights
abusers. We have reached across traditional blocs and geographic
divides to foster solutions to human rights-related problems, and help
shine a spotlight on the human rights of members of groups that have
not received sufficient attention in the past, such as persons with
disabilities, and those who face reprisals for their testimony to U.N.
human rights mechanisms.
Through active U.S. leadership, the Council has authorized
international mandates to expose and address the human rights
situations in countries including North Korea, Iran, Syria, Belarus,
Sudan, and Eritrea. The United States introduced three resolutions
passed by the Council encouraging reconciliation and accountability in
Sri Lanka. The United States also has looked for opportunities for the
Human Rights Council to build the capacity of countries such as Mali,
Somalia, Tunisia, Yemen, Haiti, and Libya to promote and protect human
rights.
The United States drew together a cross-regional group of sponsors
to create in 2010 the first new Special Rapporteur focused on
fundamental freedoms in 17 years, the Special Rapporteur on the rights
to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association. The United
States also strongly supported the establishment of a mandate to
monitor and combat discrimination against women in law and practice. We
collaborated with partners such as the United Kingdom, Turkey and the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to craft resolution 16/18,
which encourages member states to take specific actions to promote
religious tolerance and combat discrimination without infringing on
freedom of religion or expression. This ended years of divisive debates
and voted resolutions on the concept of ``defamation of religions.'' We
took the reins on the mandate for the special rapporteur on freedom of
expression so as to combat efforts to restrict speech.
The United States has also encouraged the Council to pursue a range
of new initiatives to promote and protect specific human rights. For
example, the U.S. worked with Sweden to secure a landmark resolution
that underscores that all individuals are entitled to the same human
rights online as they are offline, and that all governments must
protect those rights regardless of the medium through which they are
exercised. Seventy-nine others co-sponsored that resolution.
While the United States recognizes that the HRC continues to have
deep flaws, including its one-sided bias against Israel, the
administration also knows very well how much worse the HRC was when the
U.S. did not participate. Before the U.S. joined, the Council held five
special sessions on Israel and over half of all country-specific
resolutions at the Council focused on Israel. Since the United States
joined, the Council's focus has dramatically shifted to other urgent
situations, including Syria, Libya, and Iran.
We are working to reduce the structural bias and disproportionate
focus on and bias against Israel. Before the United States joined the
U.N. Human Rights Council in 2009, more than half of all of the
country-specific resolutions adopted there were focused on Israel;
today, we've helped lower that proportion to less than a third. This is
an inappropriate amount, especially considering the fact that the Human
Rights Council has still adopted many more resolutions criticizing
Israel than it has on egregious human rights violators. The United
States will continue to oppose the unfair and disproportionate focus on
Israel at the HRC, and will continue to work toward ending it.
Question. Mr. Secretary, you worked very hard last year to create a
conceptual framework for talks between Israel and the Palestinians.
Unfortunately, Palestinian President Abbas' response to your proposal
was to form a unity government with Hamas and to leave the negotiating
table and take his case to the United Nations. He pushed for a one-
sided United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that called for
a final agreement within 12 months requiring total Israeli withdrawal
to the pre-1967 lines by 2017. That provocative move was followed by
signing on to the Rome Statute to join the International Criminal
Court.
What influence does the United States have to combat discrimination
against Israel, and to remove ``agenda item VII'' as a permanent agenda
item?
Answer. The administration believes the work to improve the Human
Rights Council will remain unfinished so long as the HRC continues to
unfairly single out Israel. Israel is the only country with a stand-
alone item on the HRC's agenda. That is why the U.S. has been vocal in
urging the Council to end its unfair and unacceptable bias.
U.S. leadership since joining the HRC in 2009 has resulted in
notable progress in ameliorating the Council's disproportionate focus
on Israel, although much work remains to be done. Most recently, the
U.S. worked closely with several other states to garner an invitation
for Israel to join the Western European and Others regional group
(WEOG) in Geneva, which will ensure that Israel has the same regional
group coordinating status at the HRC as other U.N. members.
Prior to American membership, over half of all of the country-
specific resolutions the HRC adopted concerned Israel. This number has
been reduced to well under one-third since the United States joined the
Council. Additionally, the HRC held five special sessions on Israel in
the 3 years before our membership, whereas only 2 of the 11 special
sessions called since the U.S. joined the HRC have focused on Israel.
Since the U.S. joined, the Council has held four special sessions on
Syria, along with ones on Libya, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, ISIL in Iraq,
and the Central African Republic.
In the 2011 review of the HRC, the United States pushed strongly to
remove agenda Item 7, which focuses solely on the Israeli-Palestinian
issue, although that effort was not successful. The U.S. will continue
to work to abolish Item 7 and ensure that the HRC stays focused on its
mission to promote and protect the human rights of persons around the
world.
Question. Mr. Secretary, you worked very hard last year to create a
conceptual framework for talks between Israel and the Palestinians.
Unfortunately, Palestinian President Abbas' response to your proposal
was to form a unity government with Hamas and to leave the negotiating
table and take his case to the United Nations. He pushed for a one-
sided United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that called for
a final agreement within 12 months requiring total Israeli withdrawal
to the pre-1967 lines by 2017. That provocative move was followed by
signing on to the Rome Statute to join the International Criminal
Court.
Our Committee included new language in last year's Omnibus
appropriations bill that would reduce our contribution to the
Palestinian Authority (PA) by the same amount that the PA provides in
payments for acts of terrorism by jailed and deceased terrorists. Have
you examined whether these payments continue to date, and if so, have
you determined what that reduction will be?
Answer. As a part of our effort to ensure we are in full compliance
with relevant legislation, we are gathering and reviewing information
about payments the Palestinian Authority made to Palestinians in
Israeli prisons and have not yet made a determination on assistance
moving forward. In accordance with the legislative provision, prior to
the obligation of any fiscal year 2015 Economic Support Funds for the
PA, Congress will receive a report on any reduction that is made
pursuant to the provision.
Question. Can you provide an update on where talks with Israel
stand on a new MOU with Israel?
Answer. Discussions with Israel are underway on a follow-on FMF
MOU. The current MOU expires at the end of fiscal year 2018. Teams from
Israel and the U.S. have met several times after President Obama
directed his national security team in March 2013 to begin discussions
with Israel on a new MOU. As we continue these discussions, we are also
mindful of the mounting fiscal constraints on U.S. foreign assistance
allocations. Israel's security remains of the utmost importance to this
administration.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell
Question. On September 27, 2013, the Department of State reported
that the Congolese Ministry of Interior and Security, General
Directorate of Migration had suspended the issuance of exit permits to
adopted Congolese children seeking to depart the Democratic Republic of
the Congo with their adoptive parents. According to January 2015 data
provided by the Department of State, 963 Congolese children who have
been or are in the process of being adopted by American citizens are
potentially affected by this exit permit suspension, and it is my
understanding that approximately 19 of these children have been or are
in the process of being adopted by Kentucky families. Seventeen months
after the announcement of the exit permit suspension, what is the
administration's strategy to resolve this ongoing adoption stalemate?
In January 2015, the Department of State issued data indicating
that of the children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) who
have been or are in the process of being adopted by American citizens,
52 have I-600 forms pending with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, 24 have ongoing I-604 reviews with the Department of State,
and 98 are awaiting the completion of visa interviews and additional
visa processing by the Department of State. What action is the
Department of State taking to complete these cases in a timely fashion
so that legally adopted Congolese children may depart the DRC with
their adoptive American parents when the adoption exit permit
suspension in the DRC is lifted?
Answer: Our strategy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
has been threefold. First, we have pressed the DRC Government at every
opportunity and at the very highest levels, including during Secretary
Kerry's meetings with President Kabila last May and August, to lift the
suspension immediately for families who have already completed the
adoption process in good faith under existing Congolese adoption laws.
Second, we have pressed the DRC Government to consider the issuance of
exit permits on an expedited basis for those adopted children requiring
urgent, life-saving medical care abroad. Third, to address Congolese
concerns about significant flaws in their current system, we have
offered technical consultations aimed to improve the Congolese
intercountry adoption process.
Since the start of the suspension in September 2013, our efforts
have led to the issuance of exit permits to more than 30 families that
had completed their adoptions prior to the start of the suspension or
had children with life-threatening medical conditions that required
immediate treatment outside of the DRC. However, the list of families
adopting in the DRC despite the suspension continues to grow, and the
Department will not cease its efforts until all the families receive
relief.
Ambassador Swan and the team at Embassy Kinshasa continue to engage
regularly on this issue with the DRC Government as well as with the
families. We are pressing the DRC Government to hold a previously
promised inter-ministerial meeting to address the adoption suspension,
including the question of how to manage already completed adoptions
once new adoption legislation is enacted. Embassy Kinshasa recently
submitted to the DRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs a list of children
whose adoptions were final prior to the suspension. The accompanying
diplomatic note reiterates that our families have already legally
adopted their children, and that the rigorous process and
investigations completed by the State Department and the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) mitigate any deficiency in
the DRC system. The note requests that these children receive exit
permits to join their adoptive families in the United States
immediately. In December 2014, Special Advisor for Children's Issues,
Ambassador Susan Jacobs, led a delegation to the DRC to discuss pending
adoption cases and proposed adoption reforms. Acting Assistant
Secretary Michele T. Bond will visit Kinshasa March 19 to 21 to discuss
adoptions with Congolese officials and to meet with waiting adoptive
parents. The following week, the State Department and USCIS plan to
send a follow-up technical team to consult on adoption reforms in the
DRC and to encourage the DRC Government to pass and implement new
adoption-related legislation. This team will meet with the Ministry of
Interior and other relevant DRC ministries and press for the immediate
issuance of exit permits for the children who have already been
adopted.
The Department continues to press the DRC Government at every
opportunity to lift the suspension.
Consular staffing at Embassy Kinshasa is a high priority for the
Department. In an effort to meet the challenge of completing our orphan
review process as expeditiously as possible, the Department of State
continues to send additional temporary consular personnel to Embassy
Kinshasa. The Department is already seeing faster completion of orphan
reviews and will continue to provide additional staffing support to the
extent warranted by the workload.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt
Question. I have spoken with Ambassador Swan on the issue of
stalled adoptions from the Democratic Republic of Congo in the past,
and it's something that is constantly on the minds of families in
Missouri who are in the process of adopting several of the children
caught in this tragic situation. As of 2 weeks ago, the State
Department has said that they have been unable to set up a meeting with
the Congolese Ministry of the Interior to discuss the adoption
suspension. What is the State Department's strategy to successfully set
up this initial meeting and, finally, to end the suspension?
Answer. Our strategy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
has been threefold. First, we have pressed the DRC Government at every
opportunity and at the very highest levels, including during Secretary
Kerry's meetings with President Kabila last May and August, to lift the
suspension immediately for families who have already completed the
adoption process in good faith under existing Congolese adoption laws.
Second, we have pressed the DRC Government to consider the issuance of
exit permits on an expedited basis for those adopted children requiring
urgent, life-saving medical care abroad. Third, to address Congolese
concerns about significant flaws in their current system, we have
offered technical consultations aimed to improve the Congolese
intercountry adoption process.
Since the start of the suspension in September 2013, our efforts
have led to the issuance of exit permits to more than 30 families that
had completed their adoptions prior to the start of the suspension or
had children with life-threatening medical conditions that required
immediate treatment outside of the DRC. However, the list of families
adopting in the DRC despite the suspension continues to grow, and the
Department will not cease its efforts until all the families receive
relief.
Ambassador Swan and the team at Embassy Kinshasa continue to engage
regularly on this issue with the DRC Government as well as with the
families. We are pressing the DRC Government to hold a previously
promised inter-ministerial meeting to address the adoption suspension,
including the question of how to manage already completed adoptions
once new adoption legislation is enacted. Embassy Kinshasa recently
submitted to the DRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs a list of children
whose adoptions were final prior to the suspension. The accompanying
diplomatic note reiterates that our families have already legally
adopted their children, and that the rigorous process and
investigations completed by the State Department and the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) mitigate any deficiency in
the DRC system. The note requests that these children receive exit
permits to join their adoptive families in the United States
immediately. In December 2014, Special Advisor for Children's Issues,
Ambassador Susan Jacobs, led a delegation to the DRC to discuss pending
adoption cases and proposed adoption reforms. Acting Assistant
Secretary Michele T. Bond will visit Kinshasa March 19 to 21 to discuss
adoptions with Congolese officials and to meet with waiting adoptive
parents. The following week, the State Department and USCIS plan to
send a follow-up technical team to consult on adoption reforms in the
DRC and to encourage the DRC Government to pass and implement new
adoption-related legislation. This team will meet with the Ministry of
Interior and other relevant DRC ministries and press for the immediate
issuance of exit permits for the children who have already been
adopted. The Department continues to press the DRC Government at every
opportunity to lift the suspension.
Question. I have a question regarding the administration's goals
relating to the Paris Climate Change Conference planned for later in
2015. You stated in Lima in December that we must take ``giant,
measurable, clear steps forward that will set us on a new path. And
that means concrete actions and ambitious commitments.'' Yet it has
also been reported that State Department negotiators are hoping for a
``politically binding'' deal that would ``name and shame'' countries
into cutting their emissions.
What exactly is a politically binding deal, and do you plan to
bring a legally binding treaty before the Senate for ratification?
Answer. It is an open question whether the Paris outcome will be of
a nature that requires Senate approval before the President may ratify
it. The appropriate domestic form of the outcome, whether a protocol,
another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force, will
depend upon several factors, including its specific provisions.
To the extent that the referenced New York Times story used the
term ``politically binding'' to describe a non-legally binding outcome,
it would follow that such an outcome would be within the authority of
the executive branch to conclude.
As Secretary Kerry testified during his confirmation hearing, any
international agreement brought into force for the United States will
be done so consistent with the U.S. Constitution.
Question. In early February, the executive secretary of the United
Nations' Framework Convention on Climate Change stated that the goal of
the Paris Climate Conference is to ``intentionally, within a defined
period of time . . . change the economic development model that has
been reigning for at least 150 years, since the Industrial
Revolution.''
Does the administration believe this is the ultimate goal behind
the Paris Conference or any other international climate agreement?
Answer. The ultimate objective of the 1992 U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is stated clearly in Article 2 of
the UNFCCC itself: ``. . . to achieve, in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.'' Article
2 also states that this objective applies to ``any related legal
instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt.'' This is
what we and other UNFCCC parties have been working to achieve over the
past two decades and it remains our ultimate objective. Clean energy
development and more efficient energy use are vital tools to
stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations. Doing so now is far more
affordable than paying for the consequences of climate change later.
The Council of Economic Advisors pointed out last year that delaying
action for a decade would increase the cost of responding to climate
change by 40 percent. In addition, between now and 2035, investment in
the energy sector is expected to reach nearly $17 trillion, creating a
tremendous opportunity, both for clean energy development and for
creating new jobs in the United States and around the world.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James Lankford
Question. When will President Obama appoint a Special Envoy to
Promote Religious Freedom of Religious Minorities in the Near East and
South Central Asia as Congress called for in August 2014 with the
signing into law of the Near East and South Central Asia Religious
Freedom Act?
Answer. I agree that the dire situation of religious minorities in
the Near East and South Central Asia deserves special attention and it
is one of my priorities. As President Obama made clear in his speech to
the Nation in November, ``We cannot allow these communities to be
driven from their ancient homelands.''
Along those lines, I am thrilled to have recently welcomed
Ambassador-at-Large for Religious Freedom, David Saperstein, to the
Department. He just returned from an official trip to Iraq, where he
met with members of religious communities and pressed government
authorities to ensure their protection, safety and security.
My understanding is that the White House is actively considering
how to fill the Envoy position, and I support those efforts.
Question. The fiscal year 2016 budget request includes $500 million
toward a multilateral Green Climate Fund (GCF). It is my understanding
that these taxpayers' dollars will be used to help developing countries
adapt to climate change and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. How
do you justify prioritizing other countries' infrastructure when our
own Nation's highways, roads, and bridges is in need of improvement?
Additionally, since this is a United Nations fund, how will Congress
and U.S. taxpayers know what their money is spent on? Who will report
how much money went to what project(s)?
Answer. Climate change is affecting communities across the United
States as well as countries across the world. Action is required both
here at home and internationally to combat the devastating effects of
climate change. That is why the administration is prioritizing helping
communities across the United States that are and will be most affected
by climate change as well as assisting other vulnerable nations adapt
to climate change and pursue a clean energy pathway.
However, climate change is a global challenge. To significantly
reduce emissions, we need all countries to take action. It is in the
United States' national interest to support and partner with developing
countries to accelerate their climate actions and the GCF is an
important means of achieving this goal. U.S. investments in financing
international climate action will yield many benefits including:
--Protecting the U.S. economy from greater climate change impacts,
--Increasing U.S. competitiveness in the international clean energy
market,
--Helping U.S. national security, and
--Reducing the health impact cost of air pollution.
Moreover, U.S. participation in the GCF is critical to advancing
our international interests in the on-going climate negotiations. The
establishment of the GCF was a central provision of the Copenhagen
Accord, a landmark agreement that recognized for the first time the
importance of developing countries taking action to reduce their carbon
emissions and combat climate change. In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol,
in which only developed countries have emission-reduction obligations,
the Copenhagen Accord contains commitments by a wide range of emerging
economies, including major emitters like China, India, Brazil, and
Indonesia. U.S. commitment to the GCF has and will continue to help us
put pressure on developing countries to put forward mitigation
commitments in a timely manner and to help secure a new global climate
agreement in Paris. That agreement will help the United States and
other countries avoid some of the most catastrophic risks from climate
change, at home and abroad. We have already experienced the high cost
of those impacts here in the United States.
Question. Additionally, since this is a United Nations fund, how
will Congress and U.S. taxpayers know what their money is spent on? Who
will report how much money went to what project(s)?
Answer. The GCF is not a United Nations fund. The GCF is an
independent entity based in South Korea with an independent Board and
Secretariat. While it is designed to contribute to achieving the
objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), the GCF is not an arm of the United Nations or part of the
UNFCCC. The GCF makes independent funding and operational decisions,
and decides how best to respond to any guidance from the Convention of
the Parties (COP).
The GCF's independent Board is made up of 24 members with an equal
number from developed and developing countries. The United States is
represented on the GCF Board by the U.S. Department of Treasury and the
U.S. Department of State serves in an advisory role to U.S. Board
representative. All the activities of the GCF are under the care and
review of the Board, including its U.S. representative. The World Bank
is the present trustee of the GCF.
The GCF will require regular results reporting for the projects and
programs it finances and in turn this information will be reported to
the GCF Board members. The initial results management framework of the
GCF is currently being finalized, and it builds on experience and best
practices from other funds and institutions. This will include regular
and transparent reporting to the Board as well as the ability of
individual Board members to require other regular and ad-hoc reports to
the Board from the GCF Secretariat. The GCF Board is also establishing
an Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) that will report directly to the
Board (independently of the GCF Secretariat) to evaluate GCF
activities. The IEU will conduct periodic independent evaluations of
the performance of the GCF in order to provide an objective assessment
of the results of the GCF, including its funded activities and its
effectiveness and efficiency. The results of the periodic evaluations
will be published.
This administration takes our GCF oversight role seriously and we
are working hard to ensure that GCF funding is used responsibly. To
that end, the GCF will require among the strongest fiduciary standards
and social and environmental safeguards of all multilateral funds in
climate finance today. Board proceedings and documents are among the
most transparent of any multilateral mechanism. This will help ensure
that GCF-financed projects and programs are responsibly designed and
implemented and that all financial resources are managed prudently and
transparently.
Question. Is the forceful removal of Asad part of the
administration's overall, enduring strategy to reestablish a unified
Syria?
Answer. Our strategy in Syria has remained consistent since 2012:
we are committed to a negotiated political transition, in the context
of the Geneva Principles, toward an inclusive government capable of
serving the interests of all the Syrian people; this type of solution,
rather than a militarily-imposed resolution, offers the best hope for a
sustainable end to the conflict. With respect to Bashar al-Asad, the
United States firmly maintains that he has lost all legitimacy and
cannot be part of a political solution. It is clear there can never be
a stable, inclusive Syria under his leadership. His brutalization of
his own people was central to the creation of and helps sustain
extremist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL). We continue to work with our allies to isolate and sanction the
Asad regime. We likewise are focused on strengthening our support for
the moderate opposition and on supporting moderates who stand against
the extremes--whether they be the terrorism of ISIL and other extremist
groups or of a regime that terrorizes its own people. Our support of
the opposition is intended to help enable progress to a political
solution.
Question. Can you please describe what reporting requirements the
U.S. Department of State must provide to Congress when procuring
military and/or lethal equipment/weapons from non-U.S. entities?
Answer. For procurements in support of State Department operations,
the Bureau of Administration, Office of Acquisitions Management is not
aware of any use of appropriated funding for the acquisition of
military and/or lethal equipment/weapons from non-U.S. entities.
For foreign assistance purposes, per section 42 of the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA), the Department of State, the Department of Defense
(DOD), and the Department of Treasury must concur and complete an
assessment and waiver on the procurement of equipment from non-U.S.
entities using Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds. Per section
604(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), the
Department must complete an assessment of the procurement of equipment
using any FAA-authorized funding, including Peacekeeping Operations
(PKO) funds, if such procurement is sourced outside the United States,
the recipient country, or developing countries. This assessment
includes a review of whether or not the commodities and services to be
procured can be sourced from such countries; and whether or not a
waiver on the basis of unforeseen circumstances or efficiency is
appropriate. The section 604(a) waiver has been delegated to the
Secretary of State. There is no congressional reporting requirement
associated with this process.
The Department of State does not have congressional reporting
requirements associated with procurement of equipment by DOD for use by
their department; I would refer you to DOD for such acquisition issues.
Question. What kind and to what extent of humanitarian aid are we
providing to religious minorities affected by the spread of ISIS and
radical Islam, and what more could be done? Please describe the types
of assets contributed, dollar amounts, and Federal agencies involved in
the effort.
Answer. The U.S. Government has long been concerned about the
safety and rights of vulnerable populations in the Levant, including
religious and ethnic minorities. The Department of State has regular
ongoing contact with leaders of these groups in the United States and
throughout the Middle East region to discuss their wellbeing and needs.
Our contacts include Christian leaders, Yezidi activists, civil society
and clergy members, minority diaspora, and advocacy groups.
The U.S. Government also continues to be a primary donor to
displaced Iraqis, contributing nearly $220 million since the start of
fiscal year 2014. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and Consulate General in
Erbil are in daily contact with the Iraqi Government, the Kurdistan
Regional Government, the United Nations (U.N.), and other humanitarian
aid organizations in Iraq to ensure they do their utmost to reach and
assist displaced Iraqis--including minorities. The Department of State
contributed more than $182 million in fiscal year 2014 funds to U.N.
relief agencies and other international and non-government organization
to assist displaced Iraqis. This funding supported the U.N. and
international and nongovernmental organizations that are providing
Iraqis with assistance, including food and water, health and mental
healthcare, shelter materials, clothing, water, and sanitation and
hygiene resources, and basic relief items such as mattresses, blankets,
cooking sets, and other household goods. The U.S. Agency for
International Development provided more than $18 million in fiscal year
2014 and more than $11 million in fiscal year 2015 funds to support the
provision of health services, shelter, water, and sanitation and
hygiene resources. The Department of Defense also contributed $7.5
million in fiscal year 2014 funds for humanitarian assistance for Iraq
displacement and insecurity.
In addition to providing humanitarian assistance, the State
Department has also directed programs funded through Economic Support
Funds to target minority and internally displaced persons (IDP)
communities. Program activities focus on human rights and rule of law
and atrocities prevention and accountability.
The United States remains the single largest donor to the
humanitarian response for Syria, contributing more than $3 billion in
life-saving humanitarian aid to affected Syrians, including IDPs and
refugees in the region, since the crisis began. This support includes
the provision of emergency medical care and medical supplies, emergency
shelter, childhood immunization, food, clean water, and other relief
supplies and support to those affected by the crisis, both in Syria and
in neighboring countries. We are increasing our focus on coordinating
humanitarian and development assistance given the long-term nature of
the conflict and impact on refugee-hosting countries, and increasing
diplomatic engagement with host countries to encourage them to keep
borders open to the most vulnerable seeking refuge.
Question. For more than three decades, U.S. aid to Egypt,
especially in the form of foreign military financing (FMF), has
remained a strong component of American foreign policy in the Middle
East that fosters peace and prosperity in the region. Recent reports
suggest that Egypt is contracting with more non-U.S. military equipment
providers because it is having trouble filling its security needs
through U.S contractors. What are you doing to work with Congress to
ensure that Egypt receives the military equipment necessary from the
United States to combat terrorism within its own borders?
Answer. Egypt is an important strategic partner of the United
States, and our common interests include countering terrorism and
maintaining regional stability, including peace with Israel. Our annual
allocation of $1.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Egypt
is an important instrument in our support to Egypt. FMF helps Egypt to
modernize the Egyptian military by updating and maintaining key U.S.-
origin systems deployed by Egypt that enhance Egypt's capacity to
combat terrorism and protect its borders, and professionalizes Egypt's
armed forces.
U.S. assistance cannot fulfill every military requirement for
Egypt. While approximately 52 percent of Egypt's military hardware is
American origin, Egypt has historically engaged with a number of non-
U.S. providers of military equipment, as do many of our partners around
the world. We expect such engagement, but we also recognize that the
Egyptian armed forces maintain a preference for U.S.-origin systems. We
continue to monitor reports about pending arms sales by Russia, China,
and other suppliers.
We continue to work with Congress to ensure that the United States
maintains support to Egypt, to include seeking annual appropriations
for FMF and the legislative authority needed to provide military
equipment, training, services, and other assistance for this important
partner. We recognize the concerns of Congress that our assistance not
only maintains Egypt's ability to counter the significant terrorist
threat Egypt now faces within its borders and in the region, but also
has been used during the Egyptian political transition process. Our
counterterrorism cooperation with Egypt is part of the President's
broader efforts to work with partners across the region to build
counterterrorism capacity that upholds and enforces the rule of law,
protects innocent lives, and respects human rights and international
norms. The Secretary has been considering the certifications provided
in the Fiscal Year 2015 Appropriations Act, but has not yet made a
decision to move forward.
Assistance from the United States cannot fulfill every military
requirement for Egypt. While approximately 52 percent of Egypt's
military hardware is American origin, Egypt has historically engaged
with a number of non-U.S. providers of military equipment, as do many
of our partners around the world. We expect such engagement, but we
also recognize that the Egyptian armed forces maintain a preference for
U.S.-origin systems. Egypt signed a contract with France valued at
approximately 5.2 billion-euro for the purchase of Rafale fighter
aircraft, a frigate, and associated armaments. We continue to monitor
reports about pending arms sales by Russia, China, and other suppliers.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Question. The Central American governments blame the drug cartels
and gangs, as they should, but it is the weakness and corruption of the
police and public institutions that have created the opportunity for
criminal organizations to flourish. The governments' answer has been to
turn to the military, or to militarize the police, which as we have
seen in Mexico can make things worse. Can you provide us with the
specific steps these governments are going to take to build the kind of
civilian police and justice capacity they need?
Answer. Consistently weak civilian police institutions often lead
governments to turn to military institutions to provide civilian
security. However, the military is not trained for this task. Reliance
on the military for internal security diverts attention and resources
from the real solution--effective national police reform.
The Northern Triangle's own Alliance for Prosperity prioritizes
improving public safety and enhancing access to the legal system as a
key line of action. To achieve these goals we must address the
deficiencies in both the police and judiciaries. Each country in the
Northern Triangle needs to develop a civilian-controlled, professional,
accountable, capable police force. Specifically, all three countries
will focus on improving police training to incorporate core law
enforcement skills and to include vetting, oversight, and transparency
mechanisms. This will be done in close coordination with our existing
programs in each country to improve the civilian police forces and
domestic judiciaries capacity and capability.
In El Salvador, the United States utilizes U.S.-trained Colombian
polygraphists to assist the Salvadoran Government with anti-corruption
efforts. The United States is also assisting the National Academy of
Public Security to deploy virtual classrooms in each department within
El Salvador to improve access to professional training and is providing
training and equipment, including canines, to the National Civilian
Police (PNC) to strengthen border and port security. In addition, the
United States is actively working with the Attorney General to initiate
asset forfeiture cases and is helping the Supreme Court establish a
permanent asset forfeiture court.
In the context of working to strengthen civilian police capacity to
ensure their effective management of internal security
responsibilities, Honduras will introduce a reform plan for the
Honduran National Police by June 2015, with a commitment to recruit,
train, vet, and deploy an additional 6,000 civilian police over the
next 3 years. U.S. assistance is focused on the reform and
professionalization of the Honduran National Police as well. Honduran
officials also want to incorporate more community policing methods and
programs for at-risk youth to prevent and reduce crime, based on proven
models founded with U.S. assistance.
In Honduras the Criminal Investigative School (EIC) is
strengthening and professionalizing members of the justice sector,
specifically the Honduran National Police, prosecutors, and judges, by
proving the basic educational tools needed to pursue criminal
investigations. In 2014 the EIC trained a total of 1,482 justice sector
actors. In 2015 they hope to open a San Pedro Sula Annex to serve as a
training site covering the northern part of the country.
In Guatemala, a police reform plan is addressing need for improved
police recruitment, internal controls, and disciplinary procedures; as
well as a more streamlined process to remove law enforcement officers
who do not respect the rule of law. In order to improve career
development, the Police Academy is working with local universities to
get the Police Academy's curriculum accredited so that cadets can earn
college level credit. In addition, the curriculum will include courses
in human rights training as well as child and women victims'
assistance.
As part of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement with Central America we
will build upon these efforts to, work with police, prosecutors, and
judges to help ensure transparency across the justice system. It is
important to address the public security sector at many levels and
among many stakeholders--including in the judiciary. Effective,
independent, and accountable judicial systems are an essential
component of the rule of law, an important check on corruption, and a
safeguard for citizens. The Northern Triangle governments already
agreed to strengthen this sector, choosing to prioritize efficiency,
transparency, and accountability, as well as to promote independent
monitoring mechanisms to ensure governmental transparency.
At issue is not just access to justice, but the effectiveness,
independence, and accountability of the judicial system.
Question. In Haiti, a lot of the rubble from the earthquake is
gone, and most people have been moved out of shelters. But safe housing
remains a huge problem, and things in general seem to be going steadily
downhill in Haiti. There have not been elections in 3 years, President
Martelly rules by decree, the economy is a shambles, there are regular
protests of thousands of people in the streets, and no solution in
sight. Five years after the earthquake and billions of dollars in
international aid, is this what we should have expected, and is there
any reason to think the situation will be better a year or two from
now? Does the administration have a new plan, or is it more of the
same?
Answer. Since the 2010 earthquake, the United States has made
available $4 billion in assistance for Haiti, some 80 percent of
which--$3.2 billion--has been disbursed as of December 31, 2014. U.S.
assistance to Haiti is having a measurable impact, including providing
access to basic health services for approximately half of all Haitians,
assisting 328,000 earthquake-displaced Haitians find alternative
shelter, generating 5,000 new jobs to date at the Caracol Industrial
Park, helping 70,000 farmers increase their crop yields, and helping
train and commission more than 3,300 new Haitian National Police
officers. Basic health indicators and overall security are improved,
primary school enrollments are up, and Haiti has had positive economic
growth rates since 2011. More remains to be done, and Haiti's
reconstruction and development will continue for many years.
Haitian President Michel Martelly is governing by executive order--
so-called ``rule by decree''--following the January 12, 2015 expiration
of all but 10 of Haiti's parliamentary seats. Parliament did not pass
elections legislation before the January 12 deadline, despite numerous
concessions made by President Martelly.
Article 136 of the Haitian Constitution calls for the president to
ensure regular operations of the government and continuity of the
state. Following Parliament's lapse, President Martelly prioritized the
organization of elections and demonstrated inclusivity by consulting
with the remaining seated senators as well as political party leaders.
On January 23, the President swore in a new Provisional Electoral
Council (CEP), which was structured according to opposition demands.
On February 11, the CEP unveiled draft electoral regulations and a
proposed elections calendar. Following input from party leaders, the
electoral decree was submitted to the Executive and published on March
4. According to the final electoral calendar, the first round of
elections is scheduled to take place in August.
The United States is firmly committed to long term support of the
Haitian people as they build a more prosperous and secure future. The
overall strategy for U.S. assistance to Haiti will continue within the
current parameters, focusing on four areas--infrastructure and energy,
food and economic security, health and basic services, and governance
and rule of law. Governance and rule of law is a priority, as political
gridlock hampers Haiti's economic growth. Despite the Martelly
administration's business-friendly rhetoric, key pieces of legislation
to facilitate investment have not been passed. For prospects to
improve, there needs to be free and fair elections to restore
Parliament, and legislators need to be willing to work with the
Executive to pass legislation and implement key structural reforms to
restore fiscal sustainability.
Question. We know of the increasing threats by ISIL and other
jihadists against Egypt. The beheading of 21 Coptic Christians is the
latest grotesque example.
I also recognize the importance of Egypt in the region and of our
relations with Egypt, which you have often expressed. But I agree with
President Obama that the denial of human rights is one cause of
extremism, and I am concerned that in each of these areas the Egyptian
Government is going in the wrong direction.
The fiscal year 2015 Omnibus provides $1.3 billion in military aid
for Egypt, and requires a certification that the Egyptian Government is
making progress in democracy, human rights and the rule of law, which
it is not.
I am concerned with Egyptian-American citizens who are political
prisoners and the lack of due process for prisoners who have been
subjected to sham trials and sentenced to death or long prison terms.
I am also concerned that we are providing lethal equipment to the
Egyptian military in the Sinai, but there is no reliable way to monitor
whether our equipment is being used consistent with the Leahy Law. Nor
is there any evidence that the Egyptian military itself is accountable
to the rule of law. How do you see the situation?
The fiscal year 2015 Omnibus also calls on the Secretary of State
to consult with this committee ``on plans to restructure military
assistance for Egypt, including cash flow financing''. Is such a plan
being developed and if so by whom?
Answer. We share your concerns and continue to urge the Government
of Egypt to implement the human rights protections of its new
constitution. We have expressed our severe reservations regarding
legislation that criminalizes peaceful dissent and imposes onerous
restrictions on civil society. We continue to press the government to
allow freedom of speech, assembly, association and due process for all
Egyptians.
In 2014, Egypt held a constitutional referendum and presidential
elections. Domestic and international observers concluded that the
constitutional referendum and subsequent presidential election were
administered professionally and in line with Egyptian laws, while also
expressing concerns that government limitations on association,
assembly, and expression constrained broad political participation.
The Egyptian courts recently declared unconstitutional the
redistricting provisions of a new electoral law earlier this month. In
response, President al-Sisi has ordered a re-write of the law to comply
with the court ruling. That effort will delay parliamentary elections
that were scheduled to begin in March 2015.
We welcomed the release of Australian journalist Peter Greste and
note that President al-Sisi has said publicly he will release the other
two Al Jazeera journalists, now out of prison on bail, when their
retrial is completed.
Our Embassy in Cairo continues to provide consular services to
American citizens arrested and detained in Egypt, and I will continue
to press the Egyptian Government to ensure they receive proper
treatment and due process. We regularly ask for humanitarian parole for
Mohamed Soltan, whose trial continues.
We have repeatedly registered our disapproval of mass trials, and
objected to the arrest and prosecution of individuals for peacefully
protesting, as well as the harsh sentences many have received. We
continue to encourage the Government of Egypt to allow non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and civil society to operate freely.
We continue to request access to Sinai for Embassy Cairo personnel
and coordinate closely with the Multinational Force and Observers who
regularly patrol in Sinai to monitor conditions there. We recognize
that success in Sinai will require integration of effective military
action and social/economic development. Our Embassy in Cairo regularly
monitors the use of U.S. equipment supplied to the Egyptian military,
as required by law.
I appreciate the flexibility the Congress provided with respect to
FMF in the fiscal year 2015 omnibus. The administration continues to
carefully review our foreign military financing (FMF) program with
Egypt, but no decisions have been made with respect to pending
democracy certifications or cash flow financing. As that process
continues, we look forward to consulting closely with the Congress.
Question. This subcommittee has strongly supported the Clean
Technology and Strategic Climate Funds. For fiscal year 2016, you are
requesting a total of $500 million for a U.S. contribution to the new
``Green Climate Fund (GCF)''. Can you explain what this Fund does and
what difference it makes whether the U.S. participates or not? How big
a priority is this for the State Department?
Answer. Like the Clean Technology and Strategic Climate Funds
(CIFs) that the subcommittee has strongly supported over the years, the
GCF will assist developing countries in their efforts to combat climate
change through grants and other concessional financing for mitigation
and adaptation projects, programs, policies, and activities. In short,
the GCF is meant to be the successor to the CIFs, and we expect that
the GCF will become the preeminent channel for climate finance,
allowing for the rationalizing of other existing sources of climate
finance. Initially, the GCF will complement many of the existing
multilateral climate change funds such as the Climate Investment Funds
(CIFs); however, as the recognized financial mechanism of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), it will
eventually replace or subsume the other means of international climate
assistance. For instance, the CIFs are expected to sunset once the GCF
is fully operational and our obligations to the CIFs are complete. The
Treasury Department, through the CIF Trust Fund Committees, is already
engaged in a discussion with the CIFs' Administrative Unit and Trustee
as to when and how to sunset the CIFs. Once the sunset is decided, the
CIFs will stop accepting new funds and only approve new projects to the
extent that they have funds on hand, and the GCF will be the primary
vehicle to support developing countries to address climate change.
Moreover, the GCF has been designed with key elements that are new
or improvements on the CIFs and past climate finance vehicles:
Inclusive governance. The GCF's governance structure--headed
by a 24-member Board with an equal number of developed and
developing countries--gives it uniquely high levels of
international acceptance.
High standards. The GCF will require among the strongest
fiduciary standards and social and environmental safeguards of
all multilateral funds in climate finance today. This will help
ensure that GCF-financed projects and programs are responsibly
designed and implemented, and that all financial resources are
managed prudently and transparently. In addition, the Fund has
independent evaluation and integrity units, and Board
proceedings and documents are among the most transparent of any
multilateral mechanism.
Working through the private sector. The GCF will have a
dedicated Private Sector Facility (PSF) that can directly
support entrepreneurs developing low-carbon technologies and
projects, as well as adaptation efforts implemented in
partnership with the private sector. The PSF aims to mobilize
capital from private sector entities from both developed and
developing countries and facilitate innovative instruments that
catalyze greater private sector investment in developing
countries. The Board is also advised by a standing Private
Sector Advisory Group, composed of business leaders from
developed and developing countries.
Adaptation and mitigation. Building on lessons from other
institutions, the GCF will balance (50/50) its support for
mitigation and adaptation activities, building up expertise in
both areas and positioning itself to capitalize on synergies
between them.
Large network of partners. The GCF will have more countries
eligible for funding than most other climate funds. As such it
will work through a large network of partners to help it reach
more regions and communities, as well as unlock opportunities
in both adaptation and mitigation in hard to reach locations.
Diverse Donors. The GCF is being capitalized by contributions
from a broad donor base including developing countries. The GCF
may also receive funding from other sources, including
eventually from the private sector.
Independent, lean organization. The GCF is an independent
entity and will not have a large bureaucracy. By working
through existing mechanisms and entities as implementer, the
GCF will maintain a light footprint and a small secretariat to
administer.
The GCF has so far received pledges totaling $10.2 billion from 31
countries, including many non-traditional donors, including Chile,
Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Mongolia, Panama, Peru, and Republic of
Korea. More are expected to pledge in the future. The U.S. pledge and
U.S. engagement were key factors in securing larger pledges than
originally expected from many developed countries as well as getting
emerging economies and developing countries to pledge resources to the
GCF.
It is in the United States' national interest to support and
partner with developing countries to accelerate their climate actions
through new international investments in the GCF. U.S. investments in
financing international climate action will yield many benefits
including:
--Protecting the U.S. economy from greater climate change impacts,
--Increasing U.S. competitiveness in the international clean energy
market,
--Helping U.S. national security, and
--Reducing the health impact cost of air pollution.
Moreover, U.S. participation in the fund is critical to advancing
our international interests in the on-going climate negotiations. The
establishment of the GCF was a central provision of the Copenhagen
Accord, a landmark agreement that recognized for the first time the
importance of developing countries taking action to reduce their carbon
emissions and combat climate change. Including the GCF in Copenhagen
helped us to secure emerging economy commitments to 2020.
Operationalizing and financing the GCF can help us secure emission
reductions from emerging countries in the post-2020 timeframe. A
significant U.S. pledge to the GCF has and will continue to help us put
pressure on developing countries to put forward mitigation commitments
in a timely manner. We now need to realize a significant portion of
that U.S. pledge in fiscal year 2016, in order to help secure a new
global climate agreement in Paris. That agreement will help the United
States and other countries avoid some of the most catastrophic risks
from climate change, at home and abroad. We have already experienced
the high cost of those impacts here in the United States.
As the premier climate change fund going forward, it would reflect
very poorly on the U.S. and U.S. leadership to not support the GCF. As
such, standing up and financing the GCF is a top priority for the State
Department. The United States is taking a leadership role to address
climate change, but we can't solve this alone. The GCF will play a
critical role in ensuring that the poorest and most vulnerable
countries can take action and in achieving strong commitments from
other countries.
isil
Question. I am concerned that the propaganda of ISIL and ISIL's
supporters are dwarfing counter-ISIL messages, both in volume and
effectiveness. Your Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications is not impressive, yet the White House says that office
will ``drive U.S. Government efforts in discrediting terrorist
propaganda.''
There are concerns that the Department's counter-ISIL messages on
social media are ineffective and dismissed as U.S. propaganda. What is
the Department doing to determine the effectiveness of the Center for
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications' social media operations?
revamped and expanded efforts of the cscc and its counter-isil cell
Answer. We are expanding and revamping the efforts of the Center
for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) to confront the
propaganda of ISIL and other groups. We have recently added an inter-
agency counter-ISIL cell to the CSCC that is focusing on three main
areas:
(1) Expanding our messaging efforts, including on social
media platforms, in Arabic, Somali, Urdu, Hausa, and English to
amplify (a) stories of ISIL defectors and former fighters, (b)
poor living conditions under ISIL, (c) ISIL battlefield losses
and internal divisions, (d) statements from credible voices in
the Muslim world, (e) ISIL atrocities, particularly against
Muslims, who make up a vast majority of ISIL's victims, and (f)
positive narratives emphasizing our values and the examples of
young people around the world who are addressing challenges
they face through productive means.
(2) Expanding partnerships with foreign governments and non-
government organizations (NGO) partners to directly counter
ISIL's messaging. Recognizing that other partners around the
world will have the unique ability to respond to certain
aspects of ISIL's messaging, we are supporting NGOs who are
countering ISIL's narrative and helping other countries to
establish their own counter-ISIL messaging centers. The United
Arab Emirates (UAE) has opened a center that will go live in
early July, and we are working with Malaysia, Tunisia, and
other countries on similar centers.
(3) Coordinating U.S. Government and Coalition messaging by
issuing daily and thematic guidances on the counter-ISIL topic
mentioned above to nearly 3,000 U.S. Government officials as
well as Coalition partners. We are also developing a content
sharing platform so that our Coalition partners and U.S.
Government offices around the world can work together to
upload, download, curate, and produce counter-ISIL content.
Measuring the Impact of Our Efforts
While it is difficult to measure how many of those on the fence
decide not to join terrorist groups, we track: (1) The reach of our
messaging, including the number of times our content in the various
languages is viewed and shared and copied and pasted by other users
(our online rates of engagement (ROE) are consistently above industry
standard); (2) Polling showing that ISIL's approval ratings, including
in the Muslim world, continues to be in the single digits; (3) The
responses to our materials online, which often elicit threatening
replies by ISIL and other terrorists; and (4) The types of counter-ISIL
messaging, including content produced by others, that tends to go viral
and that we can also use. Our efforts are designed to prevent young
people from ever being attracted to ISIL by contesting the information
space and trying to reach the small percentage of those in societies
around the world who may be susceptible to recruitment.
Question. Public diplomacy is only one tool. The White House fact
sheet on the Summit noted the importance of supporting civil society to
counter violent extremism. How do you respond to the concern that some
U.S. allies, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates
have a history of cracking down on civil society and imprisoning
critics of the government?
Answer. We encourage the Governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
the UAE to build inclusive political processes in their countries that
respect civil liberties and fundamental human rights, which are
critical to good governance, political stability, and a rule-of-law
based approach to counterterrorism. Radicalization and recruitment into
violent extremism are shared challenges for these and many other
countries. To be effective, CVE efforts require a range of actors--
including those in government, the private sector, civil society and
communities--to work together on developing and implementing CVE
strategies and programs. Respecting human rights and providing space
for civil society to operate is essential for allowing these kinds of
partnerships to take shape, and for supporting longer-term stability in
the region and beyond.
Question. What efforts are being taken by the Department of State
and the Department of Defense (DOD) to address the impact of U.S. air
attacks against ISIL on innocent civilians in Iraq and Syria?
Answer. We take our responsibility to safeguard civilians very
seriously, and the Department of Defense strives for precision in the
execution of U.S. airstrikes. The Department of Defense complies with
the Law of Armed Conflict and takes all feasible measures during the
targeting process to reduce risks to civilians.
The Department of State maintains extensive channels of
communication with human rights organization, civil society, local non-
government organizations (NGOs), and other contacts on the ground to
obtain allegations of attacks against civilians that we share with our
interagency partners. State takes all allegations of civilian
casualties seriously and shares this information with counterparts
across the U.S. Government to aid in investigations of allegations of
civilian casualties when appropriate.
There is a process in place at U.S. Central Command to determine if
allegations are credible. The key to evaluating the credibility of any
allegation is whether sufficient verifiable information is available--
such as corroborating statements, photographs or documentation that can
help us determine whether an allegation is credible. Once an assessment
has determined an allegation as credible the next step would be a
formal investigation into the matter.
We will continue to work with our Counter-ISIL Coalition partners
to degrade and defeat ISIL in a manner that prioritizes the safety of
civilians and protects the people of Iraq and Syria from the savagery
of ISIL, which continues to kill and abuse civilians.
Question. Venezuela--a country of 30 million people--is sliding
toward chaos, thanks to an inept, corrupt government and the sharp drop
in oil prices. If things continue to deteriorate, where do you see this
leading and are there any governments that might step in to try to
rescue the Maduro Government other than Cuba, which doesn't have much
to offer? Do you see any sign that the Maduro Government can be
convinced to stop its persecution of Leopoldo Lopez and other opponents
of the government?
Are you planning to implement the assets freeze provisions in the
Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act?
Answer. We share your concerns about the political, economic, and
social pressures building in Venezuela. We will not refrain from
speaking out about human rights abuses. We are joined by dozens of
individuals and entities, including the U.N. High Commissioner on Human
Rights, OAS Secretary General Insulza, the Peruvian, Costa Rican, and
Colombian Governments, and the Inter American Commission on Human
Rights, among others. Rather than imprisoning and intimidating its
critics, we believe the Venezuelan Government should focus its energy
on finding real solutions for the country's economic and political
problems through democratic dialogue with the political opposition,
civil society, and the private sector.
While no one can predict the future regarding the speed or
trajectory of Venezuela's downward slide, this year's National Assembly
elections present an opportunity for Venezuelans to engage in
legitimate, democratic discourse. Credible election results could
reduce tensions in Venezuela. We have urged regional partners to
encourage Venezuela to accept a robust international electoral
observation mission, and to hold free and fair elections. Now is the
time for the region to work together to help Venezuela to work toward a
democratic solution to the challenges the country faces. We will also
continue to work closely with Congress and others in the region to
support greater political expression in Venezuela, and to encourage the
Venezuelan Government to live up to its commitments to democracy and
human rights, as articulated in the OAS Charter, the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, and other relevant instruments.
The President issued an Executive order ``Blocking Property and
Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in
Venezuela'' on March 9. This new authority implements and goes beyond
the sanctions provided for in the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and
Civil Society Act of 2014 and is aimed at persons involved in or
responsible for certain conduct, including use of violence and human
rights violations and abuses, including in response to antigovernment
protests, actions that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of
freedom of expression or peaceful assembly, as well as significant
public corruption by senior government officials in Venezuela. The
annex to the Executive order identifies seven individuals subject to
economic sanctions under the Executive order. The Executive order does
not target the people or the economy of Venezuela.
international monetary fund (imf) quota reforms
Question. The President has again requested authorization for the
International Monetary Fund governance and quota reform that were
agreed to in 2010. The President did not begin requesting the authority
to approve these reforms until 3 years ago and has included it each
year since then. The Senate has included the authorities and funding
but each year the House has refused.
The administration's strategy for gaining congressional support for
this has not worked. We are seeing the fallout for not approving the
reforms--the U.S. reputation has been damaged and U.S. leverage at the
IMF has declined. The IMF members have begun to look at other options
to begin implementing the 2010 reforms. Do you know if the
administration plans to do anything different this year to help get
this through Congress?
Answer. The administration strongly calls for congressional
approval of the 2010 IMF quota and governance reforms. The U.S. delay
in ratifying the 2010 reforms has eroded our leadership and capacity to
influence international development financing. Giving important
emerging market and developing economies greater power in the IMF would
preserve the integrity of the existing international financial
infrastructure without increasing U.S. monetary commitments or
endangering the U.S. veto over important IMF decisions. To preserve
U.S. influence, we need to work to recognize the legitimate aspirations
of several growing economies to become responsible participants in the
Bretton Woods Institutions. Delay will ultimately affect the IMF's
ability to respond to geopolitical and economic crises in a way that
serves our vital national interests.
Despite the fact that the United States championed the 2010 IMF
quota and governance reforms, we are now the only major IMF member
country that has not yet ratified them. You are correct that the U.S.
failure to ratify IMF reforms is generating criticism abroad and
eroding our credibility in the G-20, with emerging economies, and with
international financial institutions. Participants at the April 17-19,
2015 World Bank and IMF Spring Meetings criticized the United States
for our inability to implement quota and governance reforms, and
discussed interim solutions to adjust quota shares. As Secretary Lew
underscored at the time of those meetings, the administration is
committed to securing legislation to implement the 2010 quota and
governance reforms. President Obama has requested approval for the
reforms in his current budget request and at the same time the
administration is seeking every possible opportunity to work with you
to obtain congressional approval as soon as possible.
The administration will continue to make passing the 2010 IMF
reform package a priority for this year and will keep Congress informed
of the adverse consequences of failing to do so.
Question. You are requesting $124 million for the next construction
phase of the Kabul Embassy, which is a fraction of the $2 billion we
have spent on U.S. diplomatic facilities in Kabul. This is an
astounding amount. We went through this same thing in Iraq. While the
Department has done a better job of planning for the civilian
transition in Afghanistan, the construction costs are still too high,
particularly when it looks like the security problems will severely
limit the ability of U.S. Embassy staff to monitor programs in the
field. I am afraid we are maintaining a presence in Afghanistan the
size of which cannot be justified for the work that can actually be
accomplished there. Why do 4,816 employees and contractors, including
2,000 guards and diplomatic security officers, planned for Kabul in
fiscal year 2016 make sense?
Answer. Our diplomatic presence in Kabul is vital to U.S. national
security interests and to maintaining the viability of the Afghan
Government. Major policy efforts over the last year--the formation of
the government of national unity, concluding the bilateral security
agreement, preparing Ashraf Ghani's visit to Washington and maintaining
pressure to complete cabinet appointments--demonstrate there is no
substitute for direct, face-to-face engagement by our diplomats,
assistance experts and military. This on-the-ground engagement is the
best way to influence policy makers, oversee accountability of
assistance programs, and build Afghanistan's ability to defend its own
territory and govern effectively, so that it can never again be used as
a safe haven by terrorists to threaten the United States.
This approach is working. A few years ago, we had more than 100,000
troops and more than 1000 diplomats and development professionals
scattered throughout the country. We have reduced those numbers
dramatically and are centralizing in Kabul as the Afghans have stepped
up to govern and secure their country themselves. We are keeping a
constant eye on how effectively we can do our work in the evolving
security environment, a process that includes looking for ways to lower
the number of staff in the field and off-shoring certain functions
wherever possible.
Afghanistan will remain a dangerous place for U.S. diplomats. The
security environment magnifies the challenges to our diplomacy and
greatly increases the security requirements and support staff required
for our mission. With continued support from the Congress, the State
Department is investing in facilities and security to ensure the
safest, most effective platform possible to enable our work. Ongoing
construction and security upgrades will create an Embassy compound that
mitigates insurgent threats to our facilities and personnel, and allows
considerable capacity to sustain operations without relying on local
infrastructure. These efforts represent our best estimate of the long-
term political and security challenges U.S. diplomacy will face in
Afghanistan.
Question. The President's fiscal year 2015 request for refugee and
disaster assistance was $1.5 billion less than the fiscal year 2014
level. For fiscal year 2016, these accounts are once again underfunded,
this time by roughly $800 million below the fiscal year 2015 level,
despite increasing requirements in Iraq and Syria, Gaza, and Central
Africa.
The explanation we've heard is that the Department expects to carry
over $500 million in fiscal year 2015 funds for use in fiscal year
2016. Why not use these appropriated funds when people are freezing in
Syria and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) had to suspend operations in Gaza,
and then request the necessary amount for fiscal year 2016?
Answer. The administration remains dedicated to providing strong
support for humanitarian programs worldwide. The President's fiscal
year 2016 request reflects the administration's strong commitment to
these programs, while taking into account the current constrained
budget environment. The fiscal year 2016 request includes $2.453
billion for the Migration Refugee Assistance and $1.741 billion for the
International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account. In addition, the
Department is requesting $50 million in the Emergency Refugee and
Migration Assistance (ERMA) account to respond to urgent and unforeseen
needs.
Overall, this request represents a nearly $850 million increase
from the President's fiscal year 2015 request in response to the dire
humanitarian situation resulting from the conflicts in Syria, South
Sudan, Iraq, and Central African Republic, among others. The Department
of State and the United States Agency for International Development
also plan to carry over approximately $500 million in fiscal year 2015
funding into fiscal year 2016 in order to support humanitarian aid
programs. However, should the need for additional funding from the U.S.
Government this year exceed our current plans, the administration would
tap the planned carryover funding to address them. With the request and
planned carryover, we anticipate having the funds necessary to support
our humanitarian assistance goals in fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year
2016.
Thanks to generous support from the U.S. Congress, the U.S.
Government (USG) is the largest humanitarian donor in the world,
including to the crisis in Syria. With significant USG funding,
international and non-governmental organization partners have been
better able to plan for the effects of winter this year. In Syria, as
part of its year-round efforts to provide seasonally appropriate
emergency relief, the USG provided supplies such as thermal blankets,
floor coverings, water heaters, warm clothing--including winter coats,
scarves, hats, socks and boots--and additional plastic sheeting for
shelter to prepare Syrians for the cold-weather of winter. Since
October 2014, USG partners have reached over 970,000 Syrians with cold-
weather relief commodities.
In Jordan, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and Government of Jordan preparations for winter began months
ago with cash programs for heaters and gas cylinders, blankets, and
shelter reinforcements for more than 250,000 refugees. In camps, moving
refugees out of tents and into trailers has been a priority for the
last year.
When the first storm struck Jordan in January bringing snow, heavy
rains, winds, and freezing temperatures, U.N. and non-governmental
organization partners quickly activated contingency plans, opening
emergency shelters when necessary, repairing damaged infrastructure,
and providing gas heaters, blankets, and other supplies. In response to
the storm that hit in February, partner organizations were able to
mobilize quickly and ensure families stayed dry without storm
casualties. The World Food Programme (WFP) ensured that food vouchers
were topped up before the storm and stores in camps were pre-stocked
and open. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
(UNICEF) arranged emergency shelter. The response was a model for good
planning and preparation with sufficient funding.
We plan to continue our robust support in fiscal year 2015 and are
urging other donors, including the Gulf nations, to contribute to these
emergencies.
Question. In her recent book ``Thieves of State'', Sarah Chayes
says this about Afghanistan:
``Development resources passed through a corrupt system not
only reinforced that system by helping to fund it but also
inflamed the feelings of injustice that were driving people
toward the insurgency.''
I think that describes our experience not only in Afghanistan, but
also in Iraq and much of Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union. We
seem to make the same mistakes time after time. Even the best controls
do not seem to be enough. Have we learned anything from this? Should
the people who design and administer these programs be accountable?
Answer. The Department of State and the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) are continuously assessing our
assistance efforts in Afghanistan to guard against waste, fraud and
abuse and to ensure our programs achieve intended results. Our
assistance has achieved significant results in Afghanistan despite the
challenging environment. Afghanistan has seen historic improvement in
health, education, electricity generation, government revenues and
other areas that would not have been possible without our support. In
some cases we've been able to work directly with the Afghan Government
to achieve these results, but in many cases we've worked separately
with the Afghan private sector and civil society. Certainly not all
programs have been successful; that is to be expected in a tough
environment like Afghanistan, but we've been vigilant in our monitoring
of programs and continuously examine programs to ensure they are
achieving the intended results. We work closely with outside auditors
and when problems are identified we respond quickly.
Moreover, over the past 3 years the United States and our
international donor partners have encouraged the Afghan Government to
combat corruption proactively and to improve governance by conditioning
a portion of our assistance portfolio on Afghan progress on specific
reform deliverables in accordance with the Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework. This approach resulted in a much improved electoral
framework that made the 2014 presidential election possible as well as
in the passage of an improved mining law, increased government
attention to budget transparency, and an improved asset declaration
process for high-ranking government officials.
The United States has developed comprehensive mechanisms and
processes to protect foreign assistance resources in Afghanistan from
waste and abuse. The U.S. Government employs highly educated and
experienced program designers with expertise in difficult environments
such as Afghanistan. From beginning to end, U.S. Government-funded
programs (whether on-budget or off) take into account the pitfalls
associated with the corruption endemic in Afghanistan and employ
multiple mechanisms to mitigate the risk. Our on-budget programs
specifically work with recipient ministries and governmental entities
to strengthen their capacity to manage and track monetary flows so as
to create internal mechanisms for combating corruption. Ultimately,
there is no substitute for Afghans taking responsibility for their own
development challenges and the hands-on experience that on-budget
programs provide establishes a solid foundation for more effective
Afghan use of resources and ultimately for improved sustainability of
our efforts.
We constantly review our programs and make adjustments based on
lessons learned. One such modification is the launch of a new multi-
tiered monitoring approach to ensure we have sufficient information
necessary for reviewing and evaluating our assistance programs. This
approach collects information from various sources including direct
observation by U.S. Government officials, reports from government,
civil society, and implementing partners, third party assessments and
audits, enhanced communication with recipients and local leaders, and
the use of independent monitors. In addition, we have put in place a
special team in Kabul to collect and organize all this additional
monitoring information to help oversight officials make more informed
decisions.
We work closely with our internal inspectors general and
independent auditors including the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). For instance, we are currently
working closely with SIGAR on a lessons learned project that promises
to inform the design of future programming.
Question. I am very concerned that U.S. citizens working, studying,
and traveling overseas, including members of our military, are at risk
because the United States has not lived up to its obligations under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. That convention guarantees
that when an American is arrested in another country the U.S. consulate
will be notified and can provide help. Unfortunately, even though we
are a required by the Convention, we have not provided the same
guarantee to citizens from other countries arrested here. I have tried
for 5 years to pass the Consular Notification Compliance Act to fix
this problem.
That bill has been supported by the Departments of Defense,
Justice, State, and Homeland Security. Your fiscal year 2016 request
includes the same language as that bill. Is passing this legislation a
priority for the administration? What difference does it make if we
don't pass it?
Answer. Passing the Consular Notification Compliance Act is a
priority for the administration. Compliance with our legal obligations
related to consular notification and access ensures our ability to
protect U.S. citizens traveling and working abroad, including members
of our Armed Forces and their families.
The United States is severely hampered in our efforts to ensure
that other countries respect their obligations under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations when U.S. citizens are detained abroad
if we do not respect our own obligations when foreign nationals are
detained in the United States. Where one country, especially an
influential a country like the United States, is seen to take a
cavalier approach toward its legal obligations, other countries can be
expected to take a cavalier approach to theirs, particularly when U.S.
citizens are involved.
The protection of U.S. citizens will always be a priority, and it
is important that we can continue to rely on the protections of the
Vienna Convention so that our consular officers can continue to provide
essential consular assistance to our citizens abroad. In fiscal year
2014, our consular officers conducted more than 8,685 visits with U.S.
citizens, who were arrested overseas. Our consular officers make a real
difference in the lives of thousands more U.S. citizens detained abroad
each year across the globe by ensuring that they have adequate food,
medical care, access to an attorney, and protection from abuse and
mistreatment while in prison. Passage of the Consular Notification and
Compliance Act is essential to safeguarding our ability to provide
these services to U.S. citizens detained abroad.
Question. The administration has proposed a new Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against ISIL for the next 3 years. It
does not limit the battlefield to Syria and Iraq, ISIL's strongholds,
and it would permit attacks against persons or forces ``associated''
with ISIL. While it would repeal the 2002 law Congress passed for the
invasion of Iraq, it would leave intact the 2001 authorization for the
war in Afghanistan, which the administration has relied on to conduct
attacks that went well beyond the scope of what Congress authorized. In
short, the new AUMF, coupled with the 2001 authorization, would provide
the White House with almost unrestricted authority engage in attacks
around the globe as long as it can justify a connection, however
tenuous, to ISIL. At least that is how I see it. Am I wrong?
Answer. The administration's proposed AUMF reflects bipartisan
input and is specifically tailored to address the threat posed by ISIL.
The proposal contains reasonable limitations and would provide the
President with the flexibility he needs to successfully pursue the
armed conflict against ISIL.
The proposed AUMF would grant the President the authority to use
``necessary and appropriate'' force against ISIL or associated persons
or forces. In order to determine that a group is an associated force
under the proposed AUMF, we must assess not only that the group is in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, but
also that the group has entered the fight for, on behalf of, or
alongside, ISIL (or any closely related successor entity).
This is not an open-ended inquiry, nor does it otherwise provide
the administration with unlimited flexibility to define the scope of
the AUMF. A group that simply embraces the ideology of ISIL would not
be an ``associated force,'' nor would every group or individual that
commits terrorist acts.
Moreover, as the administration has made clear in the context of
our counterterrorism operations, it is not the case that ``we can use
military force whenever we want, wherever we want. International legal
principles, including respect for a state's sovereignty and the laws of
war, impose important constraints on our ability to act unilaterally--
and on the way in which we can use force--in foreign territories.''
Question. Can you provide examples of what the Department is doing
to encourage foreign governments to hold individuals who have committed
gross violations of human rights accountable, in accordance with the
Leahy law?
Answer. The Department has provided guidance to all diplomatic
posts that host governments are to be notified when the U.S. is
withholding assistance from a unit due to credible information that
such unit has been implicated in a gross violation of human rights. In
February 2015, the Department and the Secretary of Defense approved a
joint State--the Department of Defense (DOD) policy that establishes a
process for deciding whether a foreign government has taken steps
sufficient to allow a security force unit credibly implicated in a
gross violation of human rights to regain eligibility to receive
assistance. The aim is to create an incentive to bring to justice those
who have committed abuses. Under the law, the Department is to the
maximum extent practicable, to offer assistance in bringing those
responsible to justice. Depending upon the type of unit involved, the
U.S. military, the Department of State or the Department of Justice may
be in a position to provide concrete assistance in specific cases. Many
of the Department's foreign assistance programs already incorporate
measures to improve transparency and accountability for security sector
institutions, and the Department is committed to providing such
targeted assistance where appropriate. We are working to make more
systematic the range of assistance options available in these
circumstances.
Over the last several years, Department officers at posts and in
Washington have collaborated on cases to develop several successful
country-specific courses of action to encourage host governments to
bring those responsible for certain gross violations of human rights to
justice. We can provide details of these cases in a classified setting.
Question. What is the Department doing to help the Government of
Iraq address sectarian and ethnic tensions, an issue which you have
acknowledged helped pave the way for ISIL's quick advances?
Answer. We have stressed repeatedly that the fight against the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq cannot be based
solely on military efforts, but rather must focus on rooting out the
conditions and policies which allowed such extremism to foment. We are
focused on supporting the Government of Iraq to govern in an inclusive
manner, one that would address the longstanding grievances of religious
and ethnic components which have contributed to the current crisis.
President Obama linked U.S. airstrikes and kinetic action to halt
ISIL's advancement into Iraq in August on forward movement in Iraq's
democratic process, aided by the selection of new Prime Minister Haider
al-Abadi, who has committed, through words and actions, to reform the
policies of his predecessor and govern in an inclusive manner. In his
first 6 months in office, Prime Minister Abadi's government has made
significant strides in improving governance as outlined in Iraq's
National Program for reform and reconciliation. Recently, on February
3, Iraq's Council of Ministers approved two key pieces of draft reform
legislation with significant implications for national reconciliation
now being reviewed by parliament:
1. A revision of the country's de-Baathification law; and
2. A restructuring of Iraq's Security Forces (ISF) to
integrate local-community volunteers, including Sunni tribal
fighters, into provincially based ``National Guard'' (NG)
units.
The Government of Iraq (GOI) has sought our assistance in
developing the National Guard concept based on U.S. experience and our
policy and military advisors continue to play an active role in helping
the Iraqis to develop their security infrastructure in a manner which
would facilitate the inclusion of all religious and ethnic groups into
the counter-ISIL campaign. We also continue to meet with Iraqi leaders
and tribal sheikhs to ensure that all parties have a seat at the table.
A senior delegation of Sunni Sheikhs from Anbar Province traveled to
the U.S. just weeks ago, meeting with Vice President Biden and senior
State and DOD officials and we stressed the importance of all groups
working in coordination on the counter-ISIL strategy.
On February 10, Iraqi President Massum, a Kurd, signed Iraq's new
budget law that included an important agreement on energy exports and
revenue sharing between the central government and Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG). The Department played a significant role in brokering
the agreement between the central government and KRG officials to reach
the deal and continues to serve as a key interlocutor on reconciliation
matters between both parties. Our commitment to Iraq's national unity
has helped fostered better coordination between the KRG and central
government on the current military campaign against ISIL and it is
critical that we continue to work through the central government to
build this trust.
Additionally, Prime Minister Abadi has issued a number of executive
orders to initiate other critical reforms, such as devolving authority
over certain public services to local communities and expediting the
release of prisoners held without charge, to the extent possible within
his constitutional authority as Prime Minister. As part of our strategy
in the counter-ISIL campaign, we continue to work aggressively to
pressure the GOI to enact further reforms to unify Iraqis and promote
human rights and the rule of law. The State Department's Bureau for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), Embassy Baghdad through the
Ambassador's Fund, and USAID continue to carry out targeted
interventions to promote reconciliation, the protection of minority
communities, and respect for human rights. Notably, we are targeting
nearly $10 million in fiscal year 2014 DRL funding for programs which
include activities to address human rights and rule of law as well as
atrocities prevention and accountability issues--key areas for building
reconciliation. Separately, we have contributed over $208 million in
humanitarian assistance for Iraq in fiscal year 2014 targeting at
displaced and vulnerable communities.
Our Ambassador in Baghdad engages regularly with the senior-most
officials in the Iraqi Government pressing for additional concessions
on Sunni political grievances, the clamping down of human rights abuses
by unregulated militias, and the further integration of Sunnis into the
armed forces. We continue to believe that addressing the root causes of
this conflict and supporting the GOI's effort to promote national
reconciliation will be the only effective method to cement battlefield
gains against ISIL.
Question. In an answer to a question about the administration's
claim last fall that Yemen was an example of where the President's
counterterrorism strategy has been successful, you defended that
characterization because the U.S. was able to use Yemen as a base from
which to fight al-Qaeda without getting mired in Yemen's domestic
situation. You also said, ``we can't control the quality of
governance.'' Our engagement with partner countries against terrorism
needs to be more than using their territory as a military base. If a
partner has a poor governance record and lacks political will to fix
it, we should try to find a more sustainable way to combat terrorism in
that region so our efforts do not suffer when the government collapses,
like happened in Yemen. Do you agree?
Answer. We approach counterterrorism (CT) in Yemen and elsewhere
within the context of our overarching political objectives and the
realities on the ground. Among these objectives, and central to the
overarching U.S. counterterrorism strategy, is the development of a
range of partnerships with governmental and non-governmental entities
and civil society in key regions to enable sustained counterterrorism
efforts. To the extent possible, we seek to promote partnerships that
are rooted in a shared analysis of the threats we face, shared
commitments to countering terrorism in a holistic fashion, and shared
dedication to good governance and the rule of law. We seek to develop
partnerships with countries that have the political will and capacities
to counter terrorism within their borders and in their region as part
of a global coalition against violent extremism that encourages our
partners to take an active role in combating a threat that we all
share.
We recognize that successful, sustainable efforts to counter
terrorism require strong governance and the rule of law. For this
reason, a cornerstone of our CT partnership strategy is the development
of rule-of-law institutions and practices that will lead our partners
to pursue transparent, lawful counterterrorism efforts. Our partnership
model also includes civil society and religious community actors who
can work with us disseminating messages to counter efforts by violent
extremists to recruit new members. These same civil society partners
can help drive reform efforts aimed at strengthening governance.
Our partnership efforts have had an impact, even in the face of
chaotic political environments. In Yemen, we supported local forces who
could take the fight to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and
our Yemeni partners succeeded in applying pressure on AQAP in that
context. Yemen's fragile central government and forces within Yemen
that threaten to disrupt the transition process, however, continue to
pose a challenge to our ongoing CT efforts. As we continue to look for
avenues to support CT in Yemen, we are pursuing broad diplomatic
engagement to encourage a peaceful, political resolution that adheres
to the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and National Dialogue
Conference outcomes and enables Yemen to move forward with its
political transition. We continue to support the U.N.-mediated
negotiations that are bringing together all parties, including
President Hadi, to find a way out of Yemen's political crisis while at
the same time maintaining our CT efforts against AQAP.
Question. The President's request includes a proposal to establish
an independent grantee organization to carry out broadcasts to Latin
America and the Caribbean, including Cuba. I understand that the
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBGs) envisions that this new grantee
would consist of Radio and Television Marti and VOA's Latin America
Division. We have not received the BBG's budget justification so I do
not know the reasoning behind the proposal.
Since as Secretary of State you are a BBG board member, can you
explain why this is being proposed and how this will improve broadcasts
to Latin America and Cuba?
Answer. The fiscal year 2016 request proposes the authority for the
Broadcasting Board of Governors to establish and supervise grants to an
independent grantee organization to carry out media activities to Latin
America and the Caribbean, including Cuba. The proposal is intended to
improve the quality, reach, and effectiveness of broadcasting
operations in Latin America and the Caribbean by giving the grantee
organization the ability to recruit and retain staff based on the media
environment and expertise needed in the region. This approach is
consistent with international media operations in other regions,
including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Middle East
Broadcasting Network. The administration is firmly committed to
providing unbiased, objective information to all Cubans through
international broadcasting and digital media.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
Question. Secretary Kerry, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR) has been regarded as one of the most successful global
health programs in history. It has allowed for the extensive expansion
of HIV treatment, and has undoubtedly saved countless lives.
Unfortunately, the pace of new treatment enrollments for PEPFAR
declined for the first time ever in 2014. Despite this, the President
has proposed level-funding for PEPFAR in 2016. I am concerned that this
level of funding will set the U.S. back in its goal of helping
establish an AIDS-free generation.
(a) Given the steep decline in new treatment enrollments for
PEPFAR, what is the President's justification for these cuts and for
continued level-funding for PEPFAR?
(b) Do you believe the goals the U.S. has established to help
combat AIDS worldwide will be accomplished with these funding levels?
Answer. (a) The Obama Administration's commitment to achieving an
AIDS-free generation remains strong. The fiscal year 2016 request for
HIV/AIDS programs under PEPFAR is $5.7 billion, a decrease of $244
million (4 percent) from both the fiscal year 2014 Actual and fiscal
year 2015 Estimate levels. This includes: $1.1 billion for the U.S.
contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria, fulfilling President Obama's commitment to the Fund's fourth
replenishment (2014-2016); and $4.6 billion for bilateral HIV/AIDS
programs, a 7 percent increase over fiscal year 2014, including $300
million for a new Impact Fund, which is on par with the fiscal year
2015 Estimate. The new Impact Fund resources will be awarded to PEPFAR-
supported countries that take concrete steps to use data for
decisionmaking and realign their national HIV/AIDS programs
programmatically and geographically to accelerate progress toward HIV/
AIDS epidemic control, with resources focused on areas with a high
burden of HIV/AIDS. If pursued aggressively, this evidence-based
approach will position a number of countries to reach epidemic control
by the end of fiscal year 2017.
(b) PEPFAR is shifting the way it does business to help reach the
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS' (UNAIDS) ambitious 90-90-90
global target: 90 percent of people with HIV diagnosed, 90 percent of
them on anti-retroviral treatment (ART), and 90 percent of those on
treatment virally suppressed by 2020. Achieving the UNAIDS global goals
of 90-90-90 by 2020 requires a shared responsibility by partner
countries, PEPFAR, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria (Global Fund). To have the greatest impact and to accelerate
progress toward an AIDS-free generation, PEPFAR can best contribute to
achieving the UNAIDS targets of 90-90-90 and controlling the epidemic
by employing a data-driven approach that strategically focuses
resources on geographic areas, at the sub-national level and
populations that have the highest burden of HIV/AIDS.
In fiscal year 2016, PEPFAR's efforts will be driven by five action
agendas: Impact, Efficiency, Sustainability, Partnership, and Human
Rights. These agendas--combined with PEPFAR's overriding commitment to
transparency, oversight, and accountability--will continue to guide the
initiative's work. PEPFAR will focus on doing the right things, in the
right places, and at the right time to control the epidemic and,
ultimately, achieve an AIDS-free generation. This will entail using the
best available data to direct PEPFAR resources toward bringing
evidence-based interventions (e.g., ART, prevention of mother-to-child
transmission [PMTCT], voluntary medical male circumcision [VMMC], and
condoms) to scale for populations at greatest risk and in geographic
areas of greatest HIV incidence. PEPFAR will prioritize reaching scale
quickly and with quality because an expanding HIV epidemic is not
financially sustainable.
Vulnerable populations, including children, adolescents and young
women, as well as key populations will remain a priority for PEPFAR's
investment. PEPFAR will accelerate efforts to prevent HIV infections
and ensure treatment among those who need it most. These efforts will
be data-driven from the national level down to the site level to best
guide programmatic decisionmaking and to solidify sustainability and
quality. Access to viral load testing will be essential so everyone can
ensure they have effective treatment. Transparency and public access to
data will allow for mutual accountability and enables data-driven
decisionmaking, allowing PEPFAR to spend every U.S. dollar effectively
to achieve the greatest impact --an AIDS-free generation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Christopher A. Coons
Question. Extremist groups in more than a dozen countries have
declared allegiance to ISIL and its affiliates in Libya beheaded 21
Coptic Christians last week. Moreover, thousands of foreign fighters
continue to travel to Syria and Iraq and ISIL's online propaganda
threatens to inspire lone-wolf attacks in countries far from the Middle
East. Given these recent developments, how has our strategy against
ISIL changed since airstrikes began?
Answer. The strategy to combat ISIL and related groups outside of
Iraq and Syria rests on the Coalition efforts within Iraq and Syria. In
Iraq, the Coalition is helping Iraqi Security Forces reclaim territory
held by ISIL, suppressing ISIL's ability to conduct large-scale
operations, degrading its command, control and logistics capabilities,
and building the political foundations for long-term security. In
Syria, more than 1200 Coalition airstrikes against ISIL targets have
destroyed ISIL vehicles and buildings, have degraded its economic
infrastructure, and have defended local forces contesting ISIL
advances, such as in Kobani. Our efforts in Syria will deny ISIL safe
haven while creating the conditions for a stable inclusive Syria that
fulfills Syrian's aspirations for freedom and dignity. Our counter-ISIL
strategy in both countries will inhibit the group's capability to
operate globally and expand. In fact, since September 2014, Coalition
efforts have forced ISIL to change its tactics and it is suffering
significant losses, reducing its morale and challenging its ongoing
propaganda campaigns.
Beyond Iraq and Syria, the international community and the Global
Coalition continue to diminish ISIL's capacity to generate revenues and
fund its operations, cut off the flow of foreign terrorist fighters
transiting to and from Iraq and Syria, and expose its empty and
destructive ideology. Starving any new ISIL-related groups of funds and
manpower mitigates the risk of attacks against our international
partners. Over the past 6 months, the international community has been
increasing its efforts to expose the true nature of ISIL to reduce its
draw to foreign fighters and other extremist groups. Similarly,
international organizations and local communities across the globe are
also increasingly working to minimize the influence of this hateful
rhetoric and insulate potentially vulnerable sectors of populations.
Following meetings with Coalition members which Secretary Kerry chaired
in December and January, Coalition working groups are now coordinating
combined efforts to address ISIL's finances, foreign fighter draw, and
messaging and thereby diminish ISIL's global potential.
As these ISIL-related groups have emerged, the United State has
also been working closely with our partners to reduce the safe-havens
that many of these groups exploit, build effective governance and
security, strengthen the capacity of our partners to deal with these
threats internally, enhance economic opportunity, and disrupt any
plots. The United States continues to emphasize the importance of a
multi-faceted, multi-national approach to addressing ISIL and other
extremist groups.
Question. Did President Obama's Countering Violent Extremist
conference reach any conclusions applicable to our anti-ISIL campaign?
Answer. On February 19, the State Department hosted the ministerial
component of the WH Summit to Counter Violent Extremism. It included
more than 60 governments, civil society representatives from more than
50 countries, more than two dozen private sector leaders, Secretaries
General from the U.N. and half-a-dozen regional organizations, the
World Bank, and the World Economic Forum. The conference highlighted
the role that communities, civil society, and the private sector can
play in addressing the broad drivers of violent extremism. The programs
and initiatives catalyzed by this multi-stakeholder global partnership
against violent extremism will certainly pay dividends both in the
context of countering ISIL and preventing future terrorist threats. The
Summit also set in motion a process that will culminate with leaders
meeting on the eight-pillar action agenda that was outlined by
President Obama and others during the meeting. The Summit's action
agenda calls for governments, multilateral bodies, civil society, and
the private sector to take concrete steps to, inter alia, (1) promote
local research and information on the drivers of violent extremism so
we can better target interventions to counter it and prevent its
spread; (2) strengthen the role of civil society, in particular youth
and women; (3) use strategic messaging, including social media, to
counter violent extremist messaging; (4) elevate the role of credible
and authentic voices that support tolerance and non-violence and more
broadly promote educational initiatives to build resilience against
extremist recruiting; (5) prevent radicalization in prisons and
rehabilitate and reintegrate violent extremists; (6) identify and fund
political and economic opportunities for communities that are
vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment to violence; (7)
strengthen community-police and community-security force relations; and
(8) provide development assistance and stabilization efforts.
Throughout the course of the day, participants offered a range of
recommendations on steps government, civil society, the private sector,
and the U.N. and regional organizations can take to advance this action
agenda that will make further inroads against the violent extremist
threat both in the context of addressing the immediate threats and
preventing future ISILs from emerging.
Question. What political, security, and governance initiatives will
we pursue to protect reclaimed territory, reduce corruption, and ensure
more transparent and effective policies in Baghdad if our military
effort successfully ``degrades and destroys'' ISIL?
Answer. In September 2014, Iraq's parliament approved Prime
Minister Haydar al-Abadi's National Program and Political Agreement for
National Unity, which lay out a roadmap for political and security
reforms needed to promote reconciliation and ensure more transparent,
effective, and inclusive governance. Central to that roadmap is a
legislative agenda focused on building ``functional Federalism''--
devolving more governance, including budgetary authority and oversight
of public services, to provincial and local governments. Iraqi leaders
consider decentralization a pillar of their strategy to improve
governance and stabilize the country. For example, the Iraqi parliament
is currently considering legislation establishing provincially based
``National Guard'' units that can secure local communities liberated
from ISIL while operating in close coordination with Iraq's national
command authorities. Long sought by Iraq's various ethno-religious
communities, such devolutionary reforms will be essential to ensuring
that stabilization and reconstruction of local communities liberated
from ISIL will be conducted in a manner that is more inclusive and
responsive to local needs and accountable to local residents.
The Department of State is also working with its inter-agency
partners to calibrate our assistance programs to complement these
reforms--ranging from those aimed at improving efficiency and
transparency in public services to advising and equipping security
forces at the local, provincial and central governmental levels--to
pursue U.S. goals in Iraq. For instance, the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) is providing technical assistance to
the Iraqi Government to decentralize certain functions from the central
government to provincial governments in order to improve the delivery
of essential services.
While authorities in Iraq must be responsible for post-liberation
reconstruction, the United States will remain actively engaged in
reinforcing the Government of Iraq's implementation of the National
Program and other reform and stabilization initiatives. For example, we
and our international partners are evaluating options for supporting
Prime Minister Abadi's request to create an international assistance
fund to augment Iraq's own stabilization efforts. Following meetings in
Berlin and London earlier this year, we and our Coalition partners are
forming working groups to coordinate international contributions
effectively and to ensure those contributions build upon, rather than
supplant, the Government of Iraq's responsibility to rebuild its
country.
Question. A final deal with Iran will reportedly enforce strict
controls for 10 years and then gradually lift restrictions over the
last 5 years of an agreement, after which Iran may be privy to the same
restrictions as other Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states.
How will the U.S. ensure Tehran does not restart its military nuclear
program? What factors will change Iran's negotiating calculus and lead
it to commit to a deal with the United States and the international
community?
Answer. As part of the ongoing P5+1 negotiations with Iran, we seek
to achieve a long-term comprehensive deal to the Iranian nuclear issue.
Our objectives include ensuring Iran's compliance with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), preventing it from acquiring a nuclear
weapon, and ensuring that its nuclear program is used for exclusively
peaceful purposes. Our negotiators and technical experts continue to
work on a comprehensive package that will best achieve those goals.
Following successful implementation of the comprehensive deal for
its full duration, Iran would remain bound by its international
nonproliferation obligations, including the NPT, its International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, and the Additional
Protocol (AP). In particular, the deal would require Iran to bring into
force, and provisionally apply pending entry into force, the AP, which
Iran is not currently implementing. The AP is an essential tool for the
IAEA to have the enhanced access to information and facilities needed
to detect undeclared nuclear activities in Iran.
Verification measures required by Iran's safeguards agreement and
the AP would continue after the deal is completed, and we would be
prepared to respond to any future Iranian non-compliance with its
obligations. Furthermore, we believe the additional insights we would
gain into Iran's nuclear program from the enhanced verification and
monitoring measures under a comprehensive deal would better enable us
to verify Iran's future compliance with its international nuclear
obligations in the longer term.
Most importantly, should Iran not comply with its international
non-proliferation obligations or provide continued access necessary for
verification after the conclusion of this deal, we would retain all of
the options for responding to that situation as we do today, including
aggressive implementation of sanctions as well as the use of military
force.
peacekeeping
Question. The fiscal year 2016 request proposes a series of
security initiatives through the peacekeeping accounts, the Security
and Governance Initiative (SGI), the African Union Rapid Response
Force, and the newly formed African Peacekeeping Rapid Response
Partnership (APRRP). Most notably, the request for the new APRRP
program requests $110 million. In 2015 we will look to support
stability and transitions in Central African Republic, South Sudan, and
Democratic Republic of Congo. How do the new security initiatives such
as APRRP and SGI dovetail with our existing peacekeeping and security
initiatives in Africa?
Answer. SGI will determine focal areas for improved security sector
governance and institutional performance with the partner government.
While SGI could complement existing U.S. Government (USG) programs, it
is intended to target a different problem set than is currently
addressed by security assistance activities. SGI is fundamentally about
governance--to assist our African partners in improving the oversight,
management, and accountability of the security sector to more
efficiently and effectively address shared security challenges.
The African Partnership for Rapid Response and Peacekeeping will
develop the capabilities of partner nations to rapidly deploy forces in
support of an African Union (AU) and/or UN-mandated operation. APRRP
will inject targeted resources to address specific gaps in peacekeeping
rapid response capabilities in the selected partner countries. With
this specific goal in mind, APRRP works with a set of proven partners
to emphasize training, and provision and maintenance of equipment to
enable rapid deployment and sustainment.
APRRP assistance will complement, but not replace, existing peace
operations capacity building programs, such as the Global Peace
Operations Initiative (GPOI), the Africa Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program (which is funded predominantly
through GPOI), and the International Police Peacekeeping Operations
Support (IPPOS) program. GPOI and IPPOS emphasize broader, global
capacity building efforts focused on addressing a wider range of
international peace operations shortfalls and strengthening the
effectiveness of U.N. and regional missions. APPRP partners have and
may continue to receive training through these other programs as well.
maternal and child health
Question. Each year approximately 290,000 women die in pregnancy
and childbirth and 2.9 million newborns die in their first month of
life. Last summer, the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) released its ``Acting on the Call'' action plan for
ending preventable maternal and child deaths. How does the
administration's new budget provide the resources necessary to
undertake the priority actions to save mothers and children in fragile
states and areas of nature or man-made disasters? How is USAID now
using data and evidence-driven decisionmaking to increase the
effectiveness of maternal and child health programming in priority
countries? Does the budget support continued development of a vaccine?
Answer. The fiscal year 2016 budget request provides over $2.0
billion to support USAID's effort in the global goal of Ending
Preventable Child and Maternal Deaths by 2035. This effort is a
continuation of the global movement started at the Child Survival Call
to Action in June 2012, and the Acting on the Call event in June 2014.
To date, more than 178 governments, 220 faith-based groups, and 230
other civil society organizations have signed the pledge to end
preventable child and maternal deaths. Twenty governments have launched
A Promise Renewed since the 2012 Call to Action and have developed
national plans to accelerate progress in reducing child and maternal
mortality, setting clear priorities and costs. Many of these countries
have developed tools to increase accountability and have developed
scorecards to systematically track outcomes and implementation of the
plans.
USAID has identified the investments that will have the greatest
impact, and will enable us to work together with partner countries,
other donors, and multilateral organizations to save the lives of up to
15 million children and nearly 600,000 women by 2020 in 24 focus
countries.
Over the last 2 years, USAID has undergone a rigorous review of
maternal and child health funding to identify inefficiencies and
accelerate progress. USAID has aligned its resources in 24 priority
countries primarily in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, which account
for 70 percent of maternal and child deaths and half of the unmet need
for family planning. This budget reflects life-saving interventions
that have the highest impact, while taking into account work in fragile
states and areas of nature or man-made disasters.
We are also building on our long-standing support of strengthening
immunization programs, in line with the administration's pledge of $1
billion to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, over 4 years (2015-2018).
Further, USAID has been a participant in the development of the global
Every Newborn Action Plan, which was launched at a major international
forum in South Africa last year. It is now being rolled out and
endorsed by governments around the world.
In parallel, we worked with the World Health Organization and other
partners to establish a global target for maternal mortality reduction
of 70 deaths per 100,000 live births by 2030, and USAID released its
Maternal Health Vision for Action to lay out how we will contribute to
this goal and drive down maternal mortality to 50 deaths per 100,000
live births by 2035.
USAID's work is driven by voluntarism and informed choice. As the
largest bilateral donor to family planning in the world, USAID
continues to work with the global community to reach an additional 120
million women and girls with family planning information, commodities
and services by 2020. Family planning enables women to practice healthy
timing and spacing of pregnancies, which could lower child deaths by 25
percent and cut maternal deaths by one-third. In 2013, 8.4 million
additional women and girls used modern contraception in developing
countries.
According to the World Health Organization's most recent malaria
report (2014), an estimated 4.3 million lives have been saved as a
result of the scale-up of malaria interventions since 2000. There was
an almost 60 percent decline in malaria deaths in children under age
five during this time, with most of that improvement occurring since
2007. The financial and technical contributions made by the U.S.
Government--through the U.S. President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) and
investments in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,
as well as those of host country governments and other partners--are a
major catalyst in the remarkable progress that has been made to save
children's lives while also building countries' capacity to fight
malaria.
In 2014, USAID released a Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Strategy, which
is aligned with the 2025 World Health Assembly Nutrition Targets and
reaffirms both USAID's commitment to global nutrition, and our role as
a major international partner in the fight against malnutrition. With
this strategy, USAID aims to decrease chronic malnutrition, measured by
stunting, by 20 percent through the U.S. Government's Feed the Future
and Global Health initiatives, the Office of Food for Peace development
programs, resilience efforts, and other nutrition investments.
Question. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief is at a
pivotal moment, as continued scientific advances and lessons learned in
the field make possible continued declines in new infections and leads
to epidemic control. (In addition, the new DREAMs Partnership aims to
reduce new infections among girls and women aged 15-24 by 15 percent in
hard hit areas across 10 countries.)
(a) How does the funding requested in this budget meet the stated
goal of working towards an AIDS-free generation?
(b) How is the administration using new data tools to direct
funding in transparent and efficient ways?
(c) How will the program support those living with HIV currently
served by programs funded through PEPFAR in rural or more remote
locations?
Answer. (a) The Obama Administration's commitment to achieving an
AIDS-free generation remains strong. With this budget, the United
States, through PEPFAR, will remain the world's largest contributor to
the global HIV/AIDS response. The fiscal year 2016 request for HIV/AIDS
programming under PEPFAR is $5.7 billion, a decrease of $244 million (4
percent) from both the fiscal year 2014 actual and fiscal year 2015
estimate levels. This includes: $1.1 billion for the U.S. contribution
to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, fulfilling
President Obama's commitment to the Fund's fourth replenishment (2014-
2016); and $4.6 billion for bilateral HIV/AIDS programs, including $300
million for a new Impact Fund, a 7 percent increase over fiscal year
2014 and on par with the fiscal year 2015 estimate. The new Impact Fund
will provide resources to PEPFAR-supported countries that take concrete
steps to use data for decisionmaking and realign their national HIV/
AIDS programs programmatically and geographically to accelerate
progress toward HIV/AIDS epidemic control, with resources focused on
areas with a high burden of HIV/AIDS. If pursued aggressively, this
evidence-based approach will position a number of countries to reach
epidemic control by the end of fiscal year 2017.
PEPFAR is shifting the way it does business to help reach the Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS' (UNAIDS) ambitious 90-90-90
global target: 90 percent of people with HIV diagnosed, 90 percent of
them on anti-retroviral treatment (ART), and 90 percent of those on
treatment virally suppressed by 2020. Achieving the UNAIDS global goals
of 90-90-90 by 2020 requires a shared responsibility by partner
countries, PEPFAR, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria (Global Fund). To have the greatest impact and to accelerate
progress toward and AIDS-free generation, PEPFAR can best contribute to
achieving the UNAIDS targets of 90-90-90 and controlling the epidemic
by employing a data-driven approach that strategically focuses
resources on geographic areas, at the sub-national level and
populations that have the highest burden of HIV/AIDS.
In fiscal year 2016, PEPFAR's efforts will be driven by five action
agendas: Impact, Efficiency, Sustainability, Partnership, and Human
Rights. These agendas--combined with PEPFAR's overriding commitment to
transparency, accountability and impact--will continue to guide the
initiative's work.
PEPFAR will focus on doing the right things, in the right places,
and at the right time to control the HIV/AIDS epidemic and, ultimately,
achieve an AIDS-free generation. This will entail using the best
available data to direct PEPFAR resources toward bringing evidence-
based interventions (e.g., ART, prevention of mother-to-child
transmission (PMTCT), voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC), and
condoms) to scale for populations at greatest risk and in geographic
areas of greatest HIV incidence. PEPFAR will prioritize reaching scale
quickly and with quality because an expanding HIV epidemic is not
financially sustainable.
PEPFAR's DREAMS initiative, announced on December 1, 2014, focuses
specifically on preventing HIV infection in 15 to 24-year-old women--a
population that represents nearly 7,000 new infections per week. It is
a $210 million initiative in up to 10 countries, and the goal of the
partnership is to help girls develop into Determined, Resilient,
Empowered, AIDS-free, Mentored and Safe (DREAMS) women. It will provide
a core package of evidence-based interventions that have successfully
addressed HIV risk behaviors, HIV transmission, and gender-based
violence. Evidence shows that girls can reach their full potential and
remain HIV-free when they have access to these interventions.
(b) PEPFAR is using site level quality and results data together
with granular epidemiologic and expenditure data to inform where PEPFAR
resources should be allocated to have the greatest impact. Indicators
are focused on core combination prevention activities which have
demonstrated population-level impact as well as supportive services
indicators. The combination of strengthened monitoring indicators,
information regarding site and service delivery quality, site-specific
program results, and a more detailed understanding of the geographic
distribution of the burden of disease allows PEPFAR to identify exactly
where the front edge of the epidemic is occurring and where programs
are most effective in response. This ability, together with PEPFAR
expenditure data permits realignment of resources to those geographic
and population centers responsible for the waves of ongoing new
infections, enhances PEPFAR's efforts to ensure further declines in
these trends.
Decisionmaking to support these transformations occurs within
PEPFAR country teams, in partnership with stake-holders in-country and
at U.S. Government (USG) headquarter locations. Much of this data will
be made available publically on the PEPFAR Dashboard Website as an
unprecedented step toward transparency.
(c) PEPFAR is strongly committed to focusing our resources where
the virus is. Data transparency, allowing increased data access and
oversight, will allow for mutual accountability and innovation so that
PEPFAR investments can have the greatest impact, while ensuring that
each U.S. taxpayer dollar is spent effectively. PEPFAR is firmly
committed to ensuring that all current patients remain on treatment.
Underlying all of our programming must be a dedication to ensuring
information and program data are understandable, digestible, and
actionable. We need to be more nimble making program improvements for
impact, and we need to act more rapidly based on data.
PEPFAR works closely with partner governments on their national
HIV/AIDS responses. The partner governments will continue to provide
HIV-related services for their citizens with support from PEPFAR.
PEPFAR will continue support for ART in very low prevalence areas;
however, we do want to work with partner governments to ensure that
sites provide the highest quality care, which may require consolidating
site support or transferring individuals to facilities with higher ART
care volume, which will ensure not only continued access to HIV care
and treatment but improved quality of care.
Question. Does the regionalization of the fight against Boko Haram
(BH), including the planned 8,000+ soldier multinational force drawn
from the five regional militaries, represent a real pivot point in
fighting BH? How can we maximize the opportunity this might present,
given the existing impediments to enhanced collaboration with Nigeria?
Are we willing to provide assistance to Nigeria's neighbors that
exceeds what we currently provide to Nigeria? Have resources to provide
such assistance been requested in this budget? Given the widely
reported human rights abuses committed by Nigerian forces in the last
few years, what messages have we delivered to the Governments of Chad,
Niger, and Cameroon regarding the need for their militaries to respect
human rights in the course of counter-Boko Haram operations?
Answer. In recent weeks, Nigeria and its neighbors have made
significant progress in establishing an emboldened multinational
force--the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)--to fight Boko Haram.
After productive expert-level meetings last month in Yaounde and
N'Djamena, the Lake Chad Basin Commission countries (Cameroon, Chad,
Niger and Nigeria) and Benin on February 27 approved and signed a
Concept of Operations for the MNJTF. These developments represent
progress in the region's push to work together to combat Boko Haram.
On March 3, the AU approved the Concept of Operations, which
revises the proposed number of troops upward to 10,000, establishes a
command structure, defines an area of operations, and sets forth a plan
to obtain U.N. endorsement of the force.
The United States, together with the United Kingdom and France,
supports these efforts and has participated in many of the meetings to
develop the concept for the MNJTF. We are actively considering ways to
expand our bilateral support to the member countries as well as to the
MNJTF to support their efforts in the form of equipment, advisory
support, logistics, and intelligence. Because we have only recently
received specific requests for assistance, we have not yet determined
all that we will be able to provide or the form that assistance will
take. We are currently providing limited individual and unit equipment
on a rapid response basis and hope to expand this support in the months
ahead using available funding and authorities. Nigeria, as one of the
largest recipient of security assistance in sub-Saharan Africa, will
continue to be a significant recipient of security assistance to combat
Boko Haram and to confront other security challenges.
Deputy Secretary Blinken met with the heads of delegation Cameroon,
Chad, Niger, and Nigeria during the Countering Violent Extremism Summit
on February 19. During this meeting, Deputy Secretary Blinken confirmed
U.S. support for the region's efforts to combat Boko Haram while also
conveying our commitment to human rights and the need to ensure that
troops engaged against Boko Haram respect human rights and protect
civilians. He also underscored the importance of following military
success against the Boko Haram with police and civilian engagement to
address the underlying conditions so the cycle of violence doesn't
repeat itself. We have been encouraged by the region's commitment to
incorporate human rights standards into the MNJTF's Concept of
Operations and will continue to support their commitment to human
rights training and standards.
Question. The nomination of the first Ambassador to Somalia in more
than two decades is a strong signal of the administration's confidence
in the current Somali Government and the improved security situation.
What is your estimated timeline for a potential reopening of Embassy
Mogadishu? Are resources sufficient to cover all associated costs
included in this budget? There have been significant military advances
against al-Shabaab in recent months. What is the administration's plan
for advancing police reform in Somalia, so that these hard-won gains
are not relinquished amidst a subsequent security vacuum?
Answer. The Department of State does not have a permanent
diplomatic presence in Somalia due to continued instability and the
high-threat security environment in Mogadishu. The Department will
consider increasing our presence posture, as security conditions
permit. U.S. diplomatic officials based in the Somalia Unit of the U.S.
Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya conduct U.S. bilateral engagement with
Somalia. Security conditions permitting, U.S. officials regularly
travel to a secure compound at Mogadishu International Airport to meet
with Somali, international, and civil society actors. They also travel
periodically to other locations in Somalia. The Department currently
expends $1,378,600 to cover lodging, food, and other life support
expenses for Chief of Mission personnel visiting Mogadishu
International Airport. Diplomatic Security incurs expenses of less than
$300,000 annually for security support to U.S. Government personnel in
Mogadishu. The current budget is sufficient to maintain this level of
engagement.
A capable Somali civilian police force is critical to ensuring
recent territorial and operational gains against al-Shabaab and to
extend basic rule of law structures throughout the country. U.S.
Department of State programs are building the capacity of the Somalia
National Police Force to investigate serious crimes and support police
deployments to recaptured areas. We are in the process of awarding an
$8.5 million training and mentoring cooperative agreement to initiate
this 4-year program, which will begin in the spring of 2015. In
addition to police capacity building efforts, we support criminal
justice sector programming that focuses on improving the knowledge and
skills of lawyers in the areas of women's and juvenile justice,
counterterrorism legislation, and procedural law.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham for Senator Shelly Moore
Capito
Question. Please explain how the Department justifies proceeding
with release of the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC)
revised environmental impact statement (EIS) without prior notification
to Congress in direct contravention of the legislative provision in
Public Law 113-235.
Answer. Regarding the language in the Joint Explanatory Statement
accompanying the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2015 (Division J, Public Law 113-235), all
funds currently being expended towards FASTC, including the
Supplemental Environmental Impact statement were obligated for the
FASTC project in prior fiscal years, in accordance with applicable
congressional notification requirements. Expenditures of funds
previously obligated for FASTC are not subject to further notification.
Future obligations for FASTC will be in accordance with applicable
congressional notification requirements.
Question. The most recent cost projections for development and
construction of the FASTC are nearly $500 million. Please provide a
detailed accounting of the total expenditures to date, and identify the
accounts from which those funds were drawn.
Answer. The total project costs going forward for the Foreign
Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) are $413 million, of which
some funding has already been appropriated. Of the money appropriated
to date, the Department of State has obligated $135.5 million for
FASTC, of which $70 million was from Diplomatic and Consular Programs
(D&CP) appropriations provided in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act and $65.5 million was from prior year D&CP
appropriations for the Worldwide Security Program. All funds have been
obligated on a reimbursable work order to the General Services
Administration. As of the date of the hearing, $17 million has been
expended.
Question. The scope of the proposed project at the Foreign Affairs
Security Training Center (FASTC) has been significantly reduced. It is
our understanding that 85-90 percent of the ``hard skills'' training is
currently being performed at Summit Point. Please specifically identify
training services and facilities that will be included at the proposed
facility that are not currently available, or could not be expanded
more cost effectively, at Summit Point.
Answer. A review of Diplomatic Security (DS) expenditures for
contract training facilities in the mid-Atlantic region for fiscal year
2014 indicates that only 38 percent of available funds were utilized
for training at Summit Point. DS believes this is an accurate
proportion of the amount of training that took place at Bill Scott
Raceway (BSR), located in Summit Point, West Virginia.
A primary goal of FASTC is to consolidate U.S.-based advanced
tactical training at one site to achieve operational efficiencies. The
space to be utilized at Pickett to consolidate DS tactical training is
approximately 1,400 acres. BSR has a maximum land size of approximately
750 acres.
FASTC will be a purpose-built, fully integrated facility capable of
24/7 training operations. Fort Pickett has no night time ``quiet
hours'' training restrictions or other noise abatement issues. The Fort
Pickett site will enable DS to have full scheduling control of three
driving tracks on a 24/7 basis, with no concerns about other USG or
commercial clients; long distance firearms ranges up to 1,000 meters; a
Mock Embassy approximately twice the size of the interim structure at
Summit Point; three separate explosives ranges that fully meet Federal
safety requirements; access to an adjacent military/civilian operating
air field capable of taking military aircraft and DOS chartered
aircraft; a live fire shoot house; a half mile long explosives
simulations alley; a large, purpose-built urban training area; and
other advantages that enhance DS training.
Question. The Department claims the proposed new facility for the
Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) will enable
consolidation of the current 11 sites where these training activities
are conducted. Please provide a list of the facilities that will be
closed and/or contracts terminated, the kinds of training currently
conducted at each of the existing facilities, and the anticipated dates
when services at those facilities will be terminated. Explain why these
functions could not be carried out at Summit Point, West Virginia.
Please provide the estimated cost to expand the facilities at Summit
Point to accommodate further consolidation of the remaining hard skills
training from other locations.
Answer. Diplomatic Security currently utilizes contracts with or
pays for the use of 11 sites to conduct its standard hard-skills
training, and plans to consolidate the activities of 10 of them at
FASTC at Fort Pickett. These sites cumulatively account for several
dozen firearms ranges of varying lengths, multiple explosive training
pads and simulation areas, various specialized tactical training
facilities such as live fire shoot houses, etc. Taken together, their
total capacity far exceeds what Summit Point, West Virginia by itself
can provide. The sites and training conducted at them are listed below.
DS would continue to use only Venue 1 below, while Venues 2-11 will be
gradually phased out during the 2017-2019 period.
1. Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Cheltenham,
Cheltenham, Maryland
An indoor range complex utilized for standard firearms re-
qualifications for agents in the Washington, DC area. DS plans
to continue to use this facility on a limited basis for re-
qualifications.
2. Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia
DS utilizes Marine Corps Base Quantico long distance
firearms ranges. The longest firearms range at Summit Point is
100 meters. DS has requirements that extend out to 800+ meters.
3. Interim Training Facility/Bill Scott Raceway, Summit Point,
West Virginia
DS conduct multiple types of training at this site,
including firearms, driving, explosives, fire as a weapon,
first aid (responder), defensive tactics, Embassy defense
scenarios, tactical training in urban environments and room
clearing. Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Quick Reaction Force
training will commence in June 2015. Summit Point also has
noise abatement and night training rules that impede 24/7
training. DS conducts night training (currently at different
venues) between 190-200 nights per year depending upon course
schedules. Also, upon consolidation, DS will require the use of
three high-speed driving tracks on an exclusive basis simply to
meet its own training needs.
4. U.S. Training Center (Academi), Moyock, North Carolina
DS/ATA utilizes this site for crisis response training (SWAT
type training) for foreign nationals. The site has multiple
ranges, driving track, live fire shoot houses (not present at
Summit Point), several urban training areas and explosive
training areas.
5. O'Gara Training Center, Montross, Virginia
DS/ATA utilizes this site for explosives training for
foreign nationals. Additionally, and as with Academi, the site
has multiple ranges, a live fire shoot house, driving track, a
large tactical urban training area and multiple explosive
training areas.
6. Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Huntsville,
Alabama
DS Regional Security Officer students take Post-Blast
Investigative training at this site. Summit Point has one blast
range. Cumulative DS explosives training will require a minimum
of three, with Federal safety standards incorporated in their
construction and operation.
7. Mid-South Institute of Self-Defense Shooting, Memphis,
Tennessee
DS Office of Mobile Security Deployments (MSD) utilizes this
site for advanced firearms training. It has specialized
tactical shooting venues not present at Summit Point.
8. Combat Shooting and Tactics, Nacogdoches, Texas
The office of Mobile Security Deployments (MSD) utilizes
this facility for multiple firearms and tactical training. It
possesses ranges up to 800 yards and a range available to shoot
from vehicles. As noted, Summit Point's longest range is 100
meters, and the capability to shoot from moving vehicles does
not exist.
9. Virginia Ki Society, Fairfax, Virginia
A gym used on an intermittent basis by DS/MSD for defensive
tactics training. The current mat rooms at the DS Interim
Training Facility at Summit Point cannot accommodate
consolidated training of MSD and ATA.
10. Panthera Training Center, Moorefield, West Virginia
DS/MSD currently conducts most of their specialized training
at Panthera. The facility has five flat ranges (50 yards to 800
yards), a live fire shoot house, a driving track, off-road
course, urban training area, and three simunition training
``houses.'' Summit Point does not have the ranges, shoot house
or quantity of simunition training areas.
11. Fort AP Hill, Virginia
DS coordinates with the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) for
use of their urban training area to conduct joint DOD-DS
CAPSTONE exercises (a 3 day 24/7 exercise conducted
approximately 5 times per year as the culmination of the 10
week High Threat Operations course). This exercise requires
night training and generates loud noise due to night time
helicopter operations and the use of loud training munitions
such as artillery simulators and blanks fired from belt-fed
weapons such as machine guns.
DS is currently developing a transition plan to move hard-skills
training from Venues 2-11 to Fort Pickett as the several construction
phases are completed.
The property at Summit Point is privately owned. DS is not able to
provide cost estimates for expansion for a site that is not owned by
the United States Government.
Question. The revised Environmental Impact Study regarding the
Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) estimates a needed
training capacity of 8,000-10,000 trainees per year. It is our
understanding that sufficient training capacity exists at Summit Point
to accommodate this growth. Please verify.
Answer. As part of the original 2009 site selection process, over
30 sites were reviewed by the General Services Administration (GSA) and
the Department of State, including Bill Scott Raceway (BSR), and it was
determined that BSR did not meet the Department of State's hard-skills
security training needs. The Department of State has hard-skills venue
requirements that are not present at Summit Point in West Virginia, nor
is it realistic to expect that Summit Point can almost double its size
(about 750 acres) to match the approximate size of the FASTC site at
Fort Pickett (about 1,400 acres). Further, issues remain at BSR
concerning the exclusive availability of track/range use, noise
abatement, night training and overall capacity to meet the Department
of State's hard-skills security consolidated training needs.
Question. Please provide the estimated annual operating costs for
the proposed Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) facility.
Answer. The Department has analyzed the operating expenses and has
determined that fiscal efficiency can be achieved by consolidating
multiple, disparate, leased or contracted training facilities into a
single, purpose-built facility that satisfies the agency's need for
expanded high-threat training capability and capacity. The projected
operating cost for FASTC is $59 million per year. By consolidating
existing hard-skills operations into a single, purpose built, FASTC
facility, the Department can reduce total annual hard-skills training
operating expenses by approximately $11 million, while nearly doubling
training capacity from 5,000 to 9,200. Not only does consolidation
reduce per-student operating costs by over $7,500 per student, it also
allows the Department to provide critical security training to a larger
population.
Question. The proposed site for Foreign Affairs Security Training
Center (FASTC) is at least a 4-hour drive from the DC area, whereas the
current contract facility at Summit Point is approximately an hour away
from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security headquarters. Please provide an
estimate of the increased costs for trainee travel, per diem and lost
productivity that would result from a more remote location.
Answer. The future location for the Foreign Affairs Security
Training Center (FASTC) will be located in Blackstone, Virginia, a 2\1/
2\ hour drive from the State Department area. While this drive
marginally exceeds the hour and a half drive to Summit Point in West
Virginia, the Department will be able to achieve cost efficiencies by
consolidating existing hard-skills operations from 11 separate
locations into a single, purpose built, FASTC facility in Blackstone,
Virginia. This drive is also a much shorter and less expensive than the
two full travel days and flights that would be required to utilize
FLETC in Georgia. Through consolidation, the Department can reduce
total annual operating expenses by approximately $11 million, while
nearly doubling training capacity from 5,000 to 9,200. Not only does
consolidation reduce per-student operating costs by over $7,500 per
student, it also allows the Department to provide critical security
training to a larger population. Any increase in the costs of buses or
possibly an extra meal by going to Blackstone will be offset by the
overall savings.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham for Senator John Cornyn
Question. Mr. Secretary, the 1944 treaty (``Utilization of Waters
of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande'') governs
water sharing between the United States and Mexico. Specifically,
Article 4 provides that Mexico shall deliver to the United States from
the designated tributaries of the Rio Grande, not less than 350,000
acre-feet annually as an average amount in cycles of five consecutive
years. The treaty provides one set of circumstances under which Mexico
may be allowed to deliver less than the minimum required amount: ``In
the event of extraordinary drought or serious accident to the hydraulic
system on the measures Mexican tributaries, making it difficult for
Mexico to make available the run-off of 350,000 acre-feet annually . .
. '' Throughout Article 4, the language of the treaty makes explicit
reference to 350,000 acre-feet as an annual delivery requirement.
However, the practice of the U.S. Section of the International Boundary
and Water Commission (USIBWC) and the State Department is to treat this
amount as both a delivery ceiling, rather than a floor, and to provide
wide latitude to Mexico to under-deliver even in years without
extraordinary drought or hydraulic system damage.
--Please provide the subcommittee with a fair and thorough reading of
Article 4, specifically addressing this apparent contradiction
between plain language and current practice.
--Is it the position of the State Department that Mexico should be
allowed to end both year-4, and the overall current 5-year
cycle, in a deficit to the United States, even if extraordinary
circumstances have not existed in Mexico's portion of the basin
since 2012?
--Assume that during a future 5-year cycle, Mexico does not
experience extraordinary drought or an accident to the
hydraulic system. Would the Department still allow Mexico to
carry a deficit into the next 5-year cycle? If so, how does
that represent an equitable distribution of water? If not, what
steps would the State Department be willing to take to ensure
compliance within the 5-year cycle and prevent further harm to
U.S. stakeholders?
Answer. Mexico's water delivery obligations related to the waters
of the Rio Grande are spelled out plainly in Article 4 of the 1944
Water Treaty. Article 4, paragraph B, subsection (c) of the treaty
allots to the United States, among other waters, ``one-third of the
flow reaching the main channel of the Rio Grande [from certain
designated tributaries], provided that this third shall not be less, as
an average amount in cycles of 5 consecutive years, than 350,000 acre-
feet (431,721,000 cubic meters) annually.'' Mexico's water delivery
requirement on the Rio Grande is therefore one-third of the entire
measured flow from those tributaries, but in any case not less than the
average annual amount, calculated on a 5-year cycle, of 350,000 acre-
feet. The U.S. Section of the International Boundary and Water
Commission's (USIBWC's) and the Department of State's interpretation of
these provisions is consistent with the terms of the treaty and has not
changed.
Subsection (d) provides for a remedy in situations where at the end
of the 5-year cycle Mexico has failed to provide a total amount that
averages out to 350,000 acre-feet per annum (1,750,000 acre-feet).
Subsection (d) states: ``In the event of extraordinary drought or
serious accident to the hydraulic systems on the measured Mexican
tributaries, making it difficult for Mexico to make available the run-
off of 350,000 acre-feet (431,721,000 cubic meters) annually, allotted
in subparagraph (c) of paragraph B of this Article to the United States
as the minimum contribution from the aforesaid Mexican tributaries, any
deficiencies existing at the end of the aforesaid 5-year cycle shall be
made up in the following 5-year cycle with water from the said measured
tributaries.'' Thus, the treaty provides that Mexico must make up for
any deficiency in total deliveries over one 5-year cycle in the next 5-
year cycle.
The Department and the USIBWC are acutely aware of the impact
drought conditions and delivery shortages in the Rio Grande basin have
had on water users in Texas. The Department and the USIBWC will
continue to work closely with the Government of Mexico and the Mexican
Section of the IBWC to ensure that future deliveries not only comply
with Mexico's obligations under the treaty but also are carried out in
such a way as to provide as regular and consistent a flow as is
practicable.
Question. Mr. Secretary, in a recent report to this subcommittee,
required by the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2015, the State Department cited the adoption of new analytical
software by the Mexican Section of the IBWC and CONAGUA, Mexico's
National Water Commission, as an important achievement in 2014, reached
only after dedication of substantial staff time to the matter.
Please explain how this software adoption milestone will be used
to: commit Mexico to also adopt a model informed by software data on
naturalized flows; provide specific commitments to the U.S. based on
modeling results; and yield additional water to the United States.
Answer. Reliance on a common analytical framework will assist in
the achievement of mutual understanding of the complex factors
affecting the hydrology of the Rio Grande basin. With such an
understanding in hand, the United States and Mexico will have a common
frame of reference for addressing water supply questions in the basin,
including means for achieving enhanced water deliveries, the adoption
of measures to avoid deficits in the future, and the elimination of
Mexico's current accrued water deficit.
Question. The report states that ``Mexican officials have assured
USIBWC and the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City that the Government of
Mexico intends to institute new basin-wide regulations in 2015 that
would include water allocations for the United States.'' U.S.
stakeholders have seen many similar ``expressed intention[s]'' from
Mexico prove hollow in the past--what specific written or formal
commitments has the Department received that lead you to believe that
this time is any different? Please provide such documentation to the
subcommittee, as appropriate.
Answer. Mexico's assurances are part of its diplomatic and
technical dialogue with the Department and USIBWC as we pursue long-
term improvements in water deliveries in the Rio Grande.
______
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Graham. The subcommittee stands in recess. Thank
you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., Tuesday, February 24, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]