[Senate Hearing 114-825]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-825
U.S. POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 4, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Lester Munson, Staff Director
Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. Bob Corker, U.S. Senator From Tennessee..................... 1
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator From Maryland.............. 2
Haim Malka, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Middle East
Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. 3
Prepared Statement........................................... 5
William Lawrence, Visiting Professor of Political Science and
International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs,
The George Washington University, Washington, DC............... 11
Prepared Statement........................................... 13
(iii)
U.S. POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Corker, Risch, Flake, Gardner, Perdue,
Cardin, Shaheen, Murphy, and Kaine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. Call the Foreign Relations meeting to order
and thank you our witnesses for being here.
Today's hearing is the fifth in a series of hearings we
have held looking at the role of the United States in the
Middle East and North Africa. We have looked at Iraq and Syria,
the Arabian Peninsula, the refugee crisis, and have heard from
the administration. Today gives us an opportunity to look at
the region in which the Arab Spring began: North Africa.
Almost 5 years after widespread protests began in Tunisia
and spread across the region, North Africa remains a fragile
and volatile region. Five years later, most of the region's
economies are in serious trouble, violent insurgencies and
terrorist groups have spread, and governance ranges from
democracy to autocracy.
Tunisia, which may hold up as a model for the region, is
struggling on both security and economic fronts. Tunisia
deserves the admiration of all of us for what they have done,
and they have received it through a Nobel Peace Prize. But, I
would like to hear the views of our witnesses on what steps the
United States should be taking in order to ensure Tunisia's
continued success.
Libya, a country in the middle of a civil war, has been
working through a U.N. process for a unity government for over
a year at this point. I know the Libyan Chief of Mission is in
the audience today, and we welcome her. And I would like to
recognize the frustrations she must feel as terrorism and
humanitarian crises spread across Libya.
In October, the U.N. Representative announced an agreement,
which the two parties have not yet signed. We have been hearing
for a year that U.S. policy in Libya is to support the U.N.
process as the process drags on without resolution. I hope our
witnesses can weigh on what steps we should be taking.
Egypt, a country that has seen some of the worst political
turmoil in the region, continues to play a vital role as home
to the largest population in the Arab world and their origin of
many ideas and movements throughout the Middle East. But, U.S.
policy there seems adrift, as it is in much of North Africa. I
hope our witnesses today--I am sure you will--can help us focus
on a U.S. strategic interest, what they are in North Africa,
and what steps we should be taking to reach them.
I want to thank you again for appearing before the
committee, and with that turn to our distinguished ranking
member for his comments, and then I look forward to your
testimony.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
We have had a series of hearings focused on the Middle
East. Obviously, it is an area of great importance to the
United States. It has extreme challenges, and we very much want
this committee to be engaged in our policies in the Middle
East.
Now, northern Africa is very important to that. Although it
has not been in the headlines as much as some of the other
areas of the Middle East, it holds out tremendous consequences
for U.S. interests.
So, I thank you very much for convening this hearing, and I
thank our two witnesses for being here. As the chairman pointed
out, Arab Spring started in northern Africa. In Tunisia, a
street vendor set himself afire, the Jasmine Revolution, and
now they are getting attention because of Nobel Peace Prize to
the National Dialogue Quartet. But, Tunisia's stability is
being threatened. Its democratic reforms and economic stability
have been impacted by terrorism, affecting the country's
overall stability.
In Libya, we have a civil war. It is not uncommon for that
region to have civil wars. There is no military solution, here.
The political solution is going to be critical, and we welcome
our witnesses' views as to how we are progressing on achieving
that political accord for the future of Libya.
In Egypt, a critically important country to the United
States, President Sisi has had his challenges. There is no
question about that. But, the one lesson I think we have
learned here is, stability in that critically important country
can only be reached if there is political reform that provides
human rights for the people of Egypt. And we welcome your views
in that regard.
Morocco and Algeria, two countries whose political
stability did not really change much during Arab Spring, were
able to weather that type of challenge, but they do have other
challenges, no question. Political reform is still very much
critically important to both of those countries. And the
western Sahara region still has yet to have the type of
stability that is necessary for the people of that region and
its political future.
So, Mr. Chairman, as we look at northern Africa, we know
that we have challenges. We have challenges dealing with
terrorism. And how do we engage the countries of that region in
an effective counterterrorism strategy? We have a problem of
young people. The young people need economic opportunity, and
they want political reform. How do we channel that energy that
exists in northern Africa in a positive way, considering the
U.S. objectives?
So, for all those reasons, I think this hearing is
particularly timely, and I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
We will now turn to our witnesses. Our first witness is
Haim Malka, the deputy director and senior fellow for the
Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
We thank you for sharing your wisdom with us today.
And the second witness is Dr. William Lawrence, a visiting
professor of political science, International Affairs, at the
Elliott School of International Affairs of the George
Washington University. Quite a title.
Dr. Lawrence. Thank you.
The Chairman. We appreciate you being here, and I hope you
will summarize your comments in about 5 minutes. If you have
any written materials, it will be, without objection, part of
the record.
And, with that, Mr. Malka, if you will begin, we would
appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF HAIM MALKA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW,
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Malka. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member, and members of the committee.
It is an honor to sit here before you to speak about North
Africa, a region which is undergoing historic change and poses
risks and opportunities for the United States.
You have my written testimony, already, where I detail the
importance of North Africa to core U.S. interests, analyze the
state of play in the region, and set forth ideas for U.S.
policy, moving forward. Rather than rehash that written
statement, what I thought would be more helpful was to share my
approach to North Africa with you and focus on Tunisia and
Libya, two countries that highlight the risk and opportunity
for the United States.
I like to think about North Africa as a long-term
investment. When I first came to Washington, DC, in 2001, the
area between the Navy Yard and South Capitol Street was pretty
much a wasteland. It was full of empty lots, it was known for
drugs, crime. Few people wanted to go there. But, despite
seeming marginal to the city, and despite its many problems,
the area held real promise. In 2004, Major League Baseball and
the city of D.C. had a vision and were committed to building a
ballpark there.
Fast-forward a decade, and the area around Nationals
Stadium has created jobs, generated new business, housing,
improved the city's security, and has become an important
symbol of the city's progress. Vision, investment, risk,
commitment, all changed the fate of that corner of the city in
the Nation's Capital.
We should be thinking about North Africa as a similar
investment for the United States. The Maghreb states of North
Africa have been marginal to U.S. interests for decades, but,
since 2011, the region has become central to many of the global
issues we already care about and which you have mentioned at
the beginning of this hearing. Most importantly, security and
counterterrorism, political change in the Arab world, and
stability in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
I would like to briefly outline three important factors
shaping the region which directly affect U.S. interests.
First, Libya has become the Islamic State's most important
base outside of Syria and Iraq, and is emerging as a new hub
for regional jihad. The fight between two competing governments
in Libya creates a security vacuum that the Islamic State
exploits. Islamic State is now recruiting in North Africa, and
marketings Libya as a more accessible destination for jihad
than Syria. An Islamic State several hundred miles from the
shores of Europe would be devastating to U.S. interests and the
surrounding countries.
Second, Tunisia is the best opportunity for an Arab State
to transition from dictatorship to more representative and
accountable government. The United States has been promoting
political change globally and in the Arab world for decades.
Helping Tunisia succeed would not only achieve long-standing
U.S. objectives, but could be the most effective countermeasure
to the jihadist narrative. Despite many positive steps forward,
Tunisia remains vulnerable to political polarization, economic
stagnation, terrorism, and deep socioeconomic challenges which
fuel radicalism, especially among young people.
Third, it is important to understand that what happens in
North Africa has an impact far beyond its borders. The region
is deeply networked into Europe, the Middle East, and sub-
Saharan Africa. Protests in Tunisia, as we already mentioned,
spread throughout the Arab world. Jihadists from every
neighboring region transit through Libya for arms, weapons, and
sanctuary. And smuggling networks traffic weapons, goods, and
people from across Africa through the region and onto Europe.
This has created a new humanitarian disaster and refugee
crisis, which is straining European infrastructure, policing,
and fanning the flames of nationalist politics in Europe.
Now, there is no blueprint for how to meet these
challenges, but there are several policy considerations and
conclusions that can guide a more effective U.S. policy.
First, we must continue to invest in American diplomacy.
U.S. engagement makes a difference, especially during pivotal
moments. By extension, when the United States remains on the
sidelines or unfocused, other governments fill the void and
often pursue policies that undermine U.S. interests and
perpetuate conflict. As a positive example, the U.S. Ambassador
to Tunisia at the time played an important role at critical
moments in Tunisia's transition, and helped make the difference
between political compromise and more divisions and violence.
In Libya, despite the many challenges that we face, the United
States should continue pushing for a unity government, and it
should consider, with the EU, more targeted sanctions against
those Libyans in both governments that oppose the unity accord.
Second, we should be prioritizing investment and assistance
to at-risk countries that show potential; most importantly,
Tunisia. The importance of Tunisia's success requires a more
consistent and robust aid package. Fully funding the
administration's aid request for FY 16, rather than cutting it,
would send an important message of U.S. commitment to Tunisia.
Speeding up the delivery of eight Black Hawk helicopters, which
is being delayed, would also help Tunisia fight terrorism more
effectively. At the same time, it is important to remember not
to oversecuritize our aid and partnership with Tunisia.
Security is a crucial component, but it must be part of a
comprehensive strategy.
Third and finally, we have to have realistic expectations
about what is achievable in the short term. Many of the current
challenges facing the region are chronic problems that do not
have easy solutions. In the meantime, the security environment
will likely deteriorate before it improves. Having realistic
expectations about what is achievable in the short to medium
term will help sustain a more effective policy.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, other members of the
committee, this is a pivotal moment in the region. To reap the
benefits of more effective engagement in North Africa, the
United States must take a long-term investing approach. We need
an investment strategy that sees the opportunity, clearly
identifies our interests and objectives, acknowledges
manageable risks, and has the staying power to ride out the
inevitable fluctuations. If we stay that course, we position
ourselves to ultimately strengthen American interests and to
reap dividends long into the future.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Malka follows:]
Prepared Statement of Haim Malka
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to talk
with you about U.S. policy in North Africa. In a time of great historic
change and uncertainty, North Africa poses both perils and
opportunities for the United States. Future trends in this region will
not only affect the people living there, but will also deeply affect
global U.S. interests.
The Maghreb states of North Africa have been marginal to U.S.
strategy for decades, yet changes in the region since early 2011 make
it increasingly central to a wide range of U.S. interests. These
include: security and the fight against violent extremism, political
reform in the Arab world, and U.S. security and economic interests in
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The U.S. Government has
acknowledged these shifts in North Africa through modest increases in
foreign assistance, most importantly to Tunisia. The Tunisian people
inspired millions after deposing a longtime dictator, and set in motion
tectonic shifts across the Arab world. In my judgment, however, U.S.
engagement has not yet matched the importance of the Maghreb. We ignore
the region at our own risk.
Three core factors explain U.S. interests in North Africa:
(1) Geography
North Africa borders three regions that are vital to the United
States: Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Trends in the region
affect everything from Europe's migration crisis to U.S. forces in the
Mediterranean to the safe passage of shipping through the Suez Canal.
The sheer volume of illegal migrants transiting through North
Africa on their way to Europe is not only a humanitarian disaster, but
it is straining infrastructure, budgets, and security in Europe. This
trend could also strengthen extreme nationalist political forces in
Europe. It challenges political stability in Europe and NATO's
credibility as an effective collective security institution.
North Africa is also deeply intertwined with sub-Saharan Africa
through diplomatic, trade, military, and religious ties. Moreover, vast
smuggling networks which traffic in goods and people connect North
Africa with Europe, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa. When
Malian mercenaries on Muammar el-Qaddafi's payroll fled Libya in 2011,
they filled the ranks of militant groups in Mali. The political
infighting that ensued led to al-Qaeda's takeover of northern Mali in
mid-2012. Moreover, insecurity in North Africa directly affects
developments in Sahelian countries where the United States has
identified key security threats--for example in Niger and Chad, where
U.S. forces are helping to build more effective counterterrorism forces
to battle Boko Haram and other militant groups.
Turning to the Middle East, while many see North Africa as marginal
to the region, it is clear that what happens in the region is
increasingly important to the Middle East's core. The Arab uprisings
that swept across the region began in North Africa, and the
governmental responses--both cracking down in the case of Egypt, and
exploring more democratic openness in the case of Tunisia--have their
locus in North Africa.
North Africans from Tunisia and Morocco especially are globally
networked, primarily through expatriate communities in Europe, but also
throughout the rest of North Africa and the Middle East. These networks
transmit what happens in those countries far beyond their borders. The
most worrying negative example of this is the large numbers of young
Tunisians and Moroccans fighting with the Islamic State group (ISG) and
jihadi-salafi militias in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.
Since 2011, Arab governments and Turkey have noticed these
connections, and they have played a more active role in the region. The
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey have been
the most assertive outside actors in the region. They seek to harness
regional alliances to protect their core national interests and expand
their spheres of influence at a time of greater regional polarization
and conflict. Morocco for example, is now participating in the anti-ISG
coalition in Syria and the Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen.
External actors are also more willing than ever to act independently
and expend significant political and financial capital to influence
political outcomes in North Africa. Some, like the UAE, have even
launched independent military air strikes in Libya. That Arab
governments in the gulf see the region as central to the future of the
Middle East should further alert us to its importance.
(2) Terrorism
Libya is the ISG's most important base outside of Syria and Iraq,
and it is emerging as a hub for jihad. Thousands of extremist fighters
have come to Libya, where they train and network. Some trained fighters
then return home, where they pose a security risk and launch terrorist
attacks. An Islamic State outpost in the southern Mediterranean--only
100 miles from European shores--threatens American security and
economic interests, puts neighboring states at risk, and makes it
unlikely that a stable political order and economic development will
emerge in Libya in the near future.
According to a U.N. Working Group, the Islamic State commands
approximately 3,000 fighters in Libya, mostly in its base in Sirte.
Almost half of those are believed to be Tunisian, but there are
Moroccans, Sudanese, Nigerians, and other nationalities joining as
well. Since revolutionaries overthrew the Qaddafi regime in August
2011, Libya has served as a training ground and transit point for
Tunisians and other North African jihadists on their way to Syria and
Iraq. While Syria remains the main destination for jihadi fighters, in
time, Libya could eclipse Syria as the primary destination for
jihadists from North Africa, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa.
Evidence on social media suggests jihadists are debating the merits
of joining the Islamic State in Libya versus Syria and Iraq. For North
Africans and for many Europeans, Libya is closer and easier to reach
than Syria. Libya shares 2,700 miles of land borders with six
neighboring states. (By comparison, the U.S.-Mexico border is 2,000
miles long.) Crossing porous borders, especially from Tunisia and
through the Sahara Desert, can be perilous, but is relatively
straightforward.
Terrorists in Libya often do not stay in Libya. ISG operatives in
Libya have already struck Western tourists in neighboring Tunisia,
undermining its security and economy. Not only are jihadists from
across North and sub-Saharan Africa joining the ISG in Libya, but
weapons from the conflict have reached insurgents in Egypt's Sinai
Peninsula as well as in the Gaza Strip. Putting this into perspective
it is important to note that al-Qaeda was able to wreak havoc from its
isolated base in the Afghan mountains. A jihadi stronghold off the
shores of Europe poses direct long-term threats to U.S. interests.
Libya's role in regional and global jihad is not new. Libyans
formed jihadi-salafi groups in the 1990s and 2000s, which fought
alongside al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. Following the
overthrow of the Qaddafi regime in August 2011, many former jihadists
returned to Libya and took advantage of the security vacuum, lack of
government consensus, plentiful arms, and pools of young idle men.
Libya quickly became a transit point for North African jihadists to
train before reaching Syria, and an important hub for weapons,
training, and sanctuary.
Algerian terrorist mastermind Mokhtar Belmokhtar's group transited
through Libya on its way to attack Algeria's In Amenas gas facility in
January 2013, where it killed 40 people. As fighting and diplomacy in
Syria begin to shift, more North African, sub-Saharan African, and
European jihadists could seek to join the ISG in Libya. Their presence
poses a long-term threat to Mediterranean shipping, border security in
North Africa and the Mediterranean, tourism, economic growth, and
political stability.
Terrorism is not only a central problem for Libya. The rise of
terrorist violence in neighboring Tunisia, which shares a 275-mile
border with Libya, has been a persistent threat. Tunisia's Ansar al-
Sharia leadership fled to Libya and regrouped there after it was banned
in the summer of 2013. Tunisian ISG members who were trained in Libya
carried out attacks against Westerners at the Bardo Museum in Tunis in
March 2015 and at a beach resort in Sousse in June 2015, killing more
than 50 people combined. The attacks undermined Tunisia's security and
weakened its economy, which relies on tourism for approximately 7
percent of its GDP.
Tunisia has its own domestic terrorism problem, even without
spillover from Libya. By most accounts Tunisians make up the single
largest foreign group of fighters in Syria and probably also in Libya.
More than 4,000 Tunisians have joined jihadi groups in Syria since 2011
out of an estimated 30,000 foreign fighters. That is roughly 13 percent
of foreign fighters in Syria from a relatively small country of only 11
million people. There is no single driver of radicalization. Young men
are attracted to radical groups for a range of ideological, social,
financial, and criminal reasons. As long as the deeper socioeconomic
issues driving radicalization persist including youth marginalization,
unemployment, and a broader sense of humiliation and despair, Tunisians
will continue to join radical groups and pose a long-term challenge to
the country's development.
(3) Political change in the Middle East
Tunisia is an important example of how an Arab country can
transition from autocracy to more representative and accountable
government. Success stories are few, but Tunisia is a strong candidate
to be one of them. Politics seem to be bringing people together out of
necessity, and the population seems overwhelmingly committed to change
through politics rather than through violence.
For more than a half-century, the United States has promoted good
governance and reform globally, and in the Middle East and North Africa
in particular. While the emphasis has shifted from administration to
administration, promoting accountable and representative government
remains a core objective of U.S. foreign policy. Congress has approved
tens of billions of dollars in aid to meet that objective. Tunisia,
despite its numerous challenges, remains the best opportunity for
building a new kind of compact between an Arab Government and its
citizens. In many ways, it has become a test case for U.S. commitment
to the idea of reform, and other governments are watching.
Moreover, the United States has a unique opportunity to build a new
kind of partnership with an Arab country. Over time Tunisia could
become an important asset and partner in the region in counterterrorism
cooperation, naval security, peacekeeping, and trade.
But it is much too early to celebrate. While Tunisia has made
important strides forward, as recognized by the Nobel Prize Committee,
it remains vulnerable to a host of threats and challenges including:
political polarization; radicalized youth; deep socioeconomic problems;
economic stagnation and corruption; and a wide gap between the
country's coast and underdeveloped interior, any of which could
precipitate crises that would make democratic consolidation more
difficult.
With all this at stake, it is worth identifying the most important
trends affecting North Africa right now. I would like to draw your
attention to three key points concerning the situation in the area.
(1) Libya's political conflict creates a security vacuum exploited
by the Islamic State group and other militants, which destabilizes
every country in the region. Competition and rivalry between Libya's
two governments is the biggest factor contributing to the ISG's
expansion in Libya. These two competing governments--one based in
Tripoli in the west and the other (recognized by the United States and
Western governments) in the eastern town of Tobruk--are more interested
in fighting each other than cooperating to defeat the ISG. Without a
unified government Libya will be unable to begin the long process of
building state institutions, renewing its oil exports, reviving its
economy, and disarming hundreds of militias that undermine the idea of
a unified state.
The disintegration of the Libyan state is one of North Africa's
biggest challenges. The conflict is largely a question of legitimacy.
Those who fought Qaddafi claim revolutionary legitimacy. Some claim
legitimacy from elections or recognition by Western governments.
Hundreds of militias claim legitimacy and authority by force of arms
and tribal affiliation. In the 4 years since Qaddafi's demise Libya has
had three governing bodies: the National Transitional Council (NTC),
which formed during the rebellion against Qaddafi; the General National
Congress (GNC) which was elected in July 2012; and the Council of
Deputies or House of Representatives (HOR) elected in June 2014. U.N.-
led negotiations seek to create a national unity government, but that
effort stalled in October when both Libyan governments objected. Both
governments are equally responsible for the talks' failure.
It is tempting to reduce Libya's conflict to a battle between
Islamist and nationalist forces. But the reality is more complicated.
The country is divided along multiple fault lines which do not neatly
fit into ideological categories but rather are based on intersecting
tribal, ethnic, local, and regional dynamics. Moreover, neither
government is unified. When the HOR Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni
tried to leave Libya to join U.N.-led talks in Malta regarding the
national unity government, he was blocked from traveling by forces
commanded by Khalifa Hifter, who is nominally the military chief of the
HOR government. The government in Tripoli is also divided between
political factions and militias representing different ideological,
tribal, and local forces.
Libya's ongoing conflict threatens all of its neighbors. After
decades of Qaddafi meddling in the region's affairs, Libya has become
an arena for proxy wars by external actors. The quandary is that even
if a unity agreement is formed it will not solve Libya's deep problems.
But without a unity government there is little possibility for any
group to secure enough legitimacy to begin rebuilding Libya.
(2) Tunisia remains vulnerable to political polarization, economic
stagnation, terrorism, and deep socioeconomic challenges which help
fuel radicalization. The commitment of Tunisia's main political
factions to compromise is an important achievement. Yet, this consensus
is fragile and overshadowed by deep political divisions, which prevent
the government from addressing controversial issues that could
undermine the economic and political interests of nearly every key
political actors. This includes the powerful labor unions and rival
leading parties Ennahda, with Islamist ties, and Nidaa Tounes, which
has ties to the former Ben Ali regime. The government's justifiable
preoccupation with security has allowed it to sidestep a range of
critical yet controversial debates. Rather than address a range of
urgent economic issues such as investment, tax, and banking reform as
well as job creation, corruption, and youth marginalization, the
government has delayed any serious debate on these issues for fear of
alienating powerful constituencies.
An economic reconciliation law intended to uncover past financial
abuses and corruption that is under debate is an important example. The
law is part of a broader transitional justice process aimed at
uncovering past abuses under the old regime. Rather than prosecute past
offenders, the law offers amnesty in exchange for admitting financial
crimes in a secret tribunal and repaying any ill-gotten funds with a
fine. Opponents of the law claim that it excuses crimes committed under
Ben Ali and undermines the whole idea of breaking with Tunisia's
authoritarian past. The government however, argues that the returned
money will be used to create jobs and provides greater certainty for
Tunisia's business community, which has been cautious of investing in
the domestic economy for fear of prosecution. Every side in the debate
has merit. The challenge for Tunisians is to decide the appropriate
balance between investigating past abuses and avoiding new and
potentially destabilizing political conflicts.
In all of this an unlikely coalition between Ennahda and Nidaa
Tounes, which formed largely in opposition to Ennahda's rule, has
allowed the government to pass legislation virtually unchallenged. So
far the leaders of Ennahda have prioritized political consensus and
compromise over a religious and conservative agenda.
The current government has largely focused on security, which is
driven by three primary threats. First, since 2012 Tunisia has faced a
low-level insurgency in the Chaambi Mountains on the eastern border
with Algeria from the Okba ibn Nafaa Brigades, a loose group of
militant cells largely affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM). Since the end of 2012 insurgents have killed dozens of Tunisian
soldiers and security personnel near the Algerian border. According to
some reports at least one Okba ibn Nafaa cell has pledged allegiance to
the ISG.
The second threat is driven by the presence of the ISG in Libya and
the growing role of Tunisians in Libyan jihadi groups. The ISG in Libya
is aggressively recruiting Tunisians and is now marketing jihad in
Libya to them as the gateway to Tunisia. For the ISG, Tunisia
represents a low-cost opportunity to disrupt a neighboring state. This
is important both to plant the flag of ISG operations in Tunisia in its
competition with al-Qaeda, but also to undermine the narrative of
Tunisia's democratic transition. It is still unclear to what extent the
Libyan branch of the ISG's outreach to Tunisians is driven by the ISG's
leadership in the Levant or a local initiative to take advantage of
Tunisia's close proximity and pools of radicalized youth. In either
case, Tunisians are responding, which escalates the threat to Tunisia.
Tunisia's future stability will be directly shaped by Libya,
because the two countries are close neighbors that are deeply linked by
family, historic, and economic ties. The two countries share a porous
275-mile border which is overrun by smugglers and criminal gangs which
help facilitate the movement of goods and people. Many Libyans have
family in Tunisia and before 2011, nearly a quarter-million Tunisians
(out of a population of 11 million) lived and worked in Libya, where
jobs were plentiful. After the Qaddafi regime fell between 750,000 and
one million Libyans (out of a total population of approximately 6.5
million) fled to Tunisia.
More than 40,000 Tunisians currently live and work in Libya, which
makes it difficult to distinguish between those who seek to fight jihad
and those who seek legitimate jobs. Libya is also more accessible and
easier to reach than Syria. It is relatively straightforward to cross
the Libyan-Tunisian border and the ISG is deliberately reaching out to
Tunisians and other would-be jihadists from the Maghreb to join the
group in Libya. As long as the ISG remains active in Libya, Tunisia
will be in the jihadi crosshairs.
Third, radical preachers urging violence have nurtured a homegrown
jihadi-salafi movement in Tunisia. A legacy of state secularization
dismantled Tunisia's religious institutions after independence in 1956,
depriving religious scholars the intellectual tools to combat salafi
and jihadi-salafi ideas that increasingly filtered into Tunisia over
the past few decades. Following the overthrow of Ben Ali, radical
preachers took control of nearly 20 percent of the country's mosques,
though the government has reasserted control over most. Many young
people are driven by the simplicity of the salafi message and the
rebellion it poses to the limited Islamic teaching and practice that
was tolerated under Ben Ali. Tunisia's Government and religious
institutions will need to develop a long-term strategy to build more
credible religious institutions that are relevant to the population,
most importantly young people.
(3) Algeria and Morocco have been spared the political violence and
tumult plaguing their neighbors, but they face many of the same chronic
socioeconomic problems and a number of potentially destabilizing long-
term challenges. Compared to their neighbors in Tunisia and Libya,
Morocco and Algeria have enjoyed relative stability. Yet, their ongoing
political conflict over the western Sahara prevents greater Algerian-
Moroccan cooperation that is vital to addressing the region's broader
security problems. Under the current circumstances it is unlikely that
the Algerian-Moroccan rivalry can be mended in the immediate future.
Morocco remains politically stable compared to its neighbors
largely due to cooperation between the monarchy and the Justice and
Development Party (PJD), a political Islamist party integrated into
politics for more than a decade that now heads the government. Each is
dependent on the other, and each has an interest in cooperating to
advance their interests. Meanwhile the economy has shown signs of
improvement, and the instability in Tunisia and widespread violence in
Libya remind many Moroccans that the alternative to the current
predicament could be much worse. Still, Morocco faces many of the deep
socioeconomic challenges and grievances that radicalize young people in
other parts of the region. More than 1,500 Moroccans have joined jihadi
groups in Syria, and local radicalized cells pose a persistent risk.
Morocco's security forces have been vigilant against jihadi-salafists,
but radicalization remains a long-term challenge. Moreover, a
multifaceted grassroots opposition which called for widespread change
in early 2011 has been divided and weakened, yet persistent calls for
change could erupt again in the future.
Algeria is still enjoying more than a decade free of the widespread
violence that gripped the country in the 1990s during its war on
terrorism. That stability was largely fueled by high energy prices,
which provided funds for massive public spending projects, subsidies,
and government handouts used to address socioeconomic grievances and
demands. But that stability may be only temporary. AQIM remains active
in Algeria's mountains, and the attraction of the ISG could shift
jihadi dynamics leading to a more aggressive jihadist campaign against
the government. Lower oil prices have already depleted foreign
reserves, and the government faced a $50 billion shortfall in its 2015
budget. Politically, a long-lasting feud between the Presidency and
certain military factions appears largely resolved in favor of the
Presidency. Yet, President Bouteflika, who brought stability to Algeria
after a decade of violence, is old and ailing. The lack of a clear
succession plan creates uncertainty about Algeria's political stability
in the next year. Instability in Algeria would negatively impact every
country in the Maghreb and Sahel.
the u.s. approach
The United States is more engaged in North Africa today than at any
point in the last half-century. It has deep ties with Morocco
stretching back to the cold war, growing relations with Algeria, and
receptivity in Tunisia to building a new partnership. Yet, its
engagement and commitment remains unfocused, underfunded, and not
commensurate with the Maghreb's level of importance to vital U.S.
interests. There is no blueprint for how to meet numerous challenges
the region poses, in part because every country in North Africa is
different, has its own historical experiences that influence society
and politics, and is at a different stage of political development.
Still there are a number of policy conclusions that can guide a more
effective U.S. policy moving forward.
(1) Continue to invest in diplomacy. The U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia
played an important role urging Tunisia's main political factions to
cooperate at crucial junctures in the country's transition. That direct
engagement likely made a difference between political compromise and
stability instead of violence and division. In Libya, pushing the two
competing governments toward a unity government is also important. The
United States can ratchet up pressure on warring Libyan factions
through the use of more targeted sanctions against Libyans actively
blocking a unity government. The European Union is debating additional
sanctions and the U.S. Government should coordinate more closely with
Europe on this point. Ultimately, Tunisians and other North Africans
must make their own decisions based on their own interests. But the
record shows that U.S. diplomats and political engagement can have a
positive impact under certain conditions. When the United States stays
on the sidelines or is ambiguous about its desired outcomes, however,
other governments fill the void and often advocate narrowly driven
policies, which undermine U.S. interests and often perpetuate political
conflict. Support by different U.S. allies for Libya's competing
governments for example, has helped perpetuate Libya's political
crisis.
(2) Prioritize investment in and assistance to at-risk countries
that show potential, most importantly Tunisia. The United States has
recognized Tunisia's progress, declaring it a major non-NATO ally,
provided loan guarantees, and increased U.S. assistance since 2011.
That aid has been an important sign of U.S. friendship. But the level
of U.S. aid compared to other countries in the Middle East remains
modest. The administration requested $134 million in assistance for
Tunisia in FY 2016. The Senate's recent appropriation bill cut nearly
one-third of the requested aid for Tunisia, while increasing aid for a
number of other countries. Of course, there are finite resources
available for foreign aid, and taxpayer dollars must be carefully
scrutinized. But the importance of Tunisia's success at a time of
historical challenges requires a more consistent and robust aid
package, which Tunisians and Americans should formulate together. At
the very least, fully funding the requested aid for FY 2016 would send
an important message of U.S. commitment.
(3) Speed up military assistance and sales that we have promised.
In July 2014 Tunisia's Government requested to purchase 12 UH-60M Black
Hawk helicopters to strengthen its border defenses and counterterrorism
capabilities. The order was later changed to eight Black Hawks because
Tunisia could not afford the full order, with an expected delivery date
at the end of December 2016. (Four of the models were for modified
versions with a number of weapons upgrades.) But in September 2015
Tunisia's Government was notified that the four modified versions would
not be delivered until mid-2019, nearly 5 years after the initial
request. Moreover, they were informed that the cost would nearly double
from the original agreement. The Black Hawk sales were an important
signal of U.S. commitment to Tunisia's fight against terrorism at a
critical time. But the lengthy delay in delivery diminishes the value
of U.S. support, because Tunisia faces an immediate threat. It not only
limits Tunisia's military capabilities as the country is fighting an
al-Qaeda insurgency on the western border and the ISG in Libya on its
eastern border, but it could also push Tunisia to seek aircraft and
military supplies from alternative sources. This would undermine an
important opportunity to build long-term defense and servicing
contracts with a professional military force in the region, which has
proven itself to be apolitical and committed to civilian government. At
the same time, it is important not to oversecuritize our aid and
partnership. Security is a crucial component, but it must be part of a
more comprehensive strategy to help Tunisia.
(4) Have realistic expectations and a long-term investment
approach. Many of the challenges currently facing the region are
chronic problems that do not have easy solutions, and in some cases
will take more than a generation to improve. In the meantime the
security environment will likely deteriorate before it improves, posing
new challenges for U.S. interests and those of our partners. As the
United States clarifies its policy objectives and priorities in the
region, taking a long-term investment approach while having reasonable
expectations of what is achievable in the short to medium term will
guide a more effective policy. Most importantly, the United States
should seek to build long-term partnerships across a range of
institutions and constituencies in the region beyond governments.
Investing in student exchange programs, joint research and development
initiatives in specific fields, and more diverse trade can overtime
foster deeper, more resilient, and more valuable partnerships.
It is in the United States interest to invest in and forge deeper
partnerships with the states of North Africa for the reasons argued
above. There is great potential to create more stable societies,
economies, and governments which are accountable to their people.
Ultimately the people of the region must make their own decisions about
the kind of future they want. The United States cannot force political
decisions or set local agendas. But it can play a role in supporting
these countries in the midst of historic changes.
Stability and progress in North Africa strengthens a wide range of
global U.S. interests encompassing security, counterterrorism, and
diplomacy. That requires a long-term investment approach that sees the
opportunity, acknowledges the manageable risk, and has the willpower to
ride out the inevitable fluctuations. If we stay that course, we
position ourselves to ultimately strengthen America and to reap
dividends long into the future.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony. We
look forward to our questions.
Dr. Lawrence, if you would begin, we would appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM LAWRENCE, VISITING PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Lawrence. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin,
distinguished members of the committee, 5 years ago next month,
the Arab Spring erupted across North Africa and into our
collective consciousness like a shot heard round the world,
upsetting long-held notions about what was possible and likely
in the region. One young Tunisian self-immolation lit a torch
of change across the Middle East and North African region. And,
to its credit, evidenced by the recent Nobel Peace Prize,
Tunisia is considered the one last flame of hope in a region on
fire. But, beneath the billowing smoke and raging fire, there
are profound tectonic shifts that caused the Arab Spring that
are continuing, producing, all at once, new challenges and new
opportunities for the United States. As others have testified
before you in recent weeks, powerful destructive forces are at
work, but this is by no means the whole story.
As I testified before this committee, in the subcommittee,
in November 2013, we are still living in the North Africa
region in the wake of a world historical moment, where
accelerated change continues in profound but cacophonous ways.
So much is happening, we often miss most of what is going on
because so much is happening in so many places at once, and we
find great difficulty in adapting our traditional strategies to
moving targets, oscillating between risk-averse reflexes to
disengage and let them fight it out or, with the considerable
resources of our powerful military at our disposable, a wishful
desire to deliver a sledge hammer deathblow, a coup de grace to
our mortal enemies and anyone allied with them, and be done
with it. Neither approach will work. We have to think big and
bold and, at times, venture outside of our comfort zone. But,
like a cancer surgeon, we need a holistic, comprehensive, and
aggressive approach with microscopic precision to achieve the
right macrolevel effects.
Many things remain unchanged from my 2013 testimony, so I
will not reproduce all that, but, summarizing them.
Number one, Syria remains the biggest problem in North
Africa. And, all of these, I am happy to answer questions about
it during the Q&A.
Number two, the main causes that drove the profound changes
we see in North Africa are economic more than political or
security oriented, although there are political and security-
oriented problems that we have to address.
Number three, North African young people made these
revolutions, and we have to address our strategies towards
these young people.
Number four, we must not get demography wrong. So, for
example, Tunisia's problem is not a young bulge. They have
already had a demographic transition. Tunisia's problem is
unemployed university graduates who are unemployed at three,
four times the rate of less-educated Tunisians, and so, we have
to think about that.
Number five, the revolutionary forces that produced all
this change are fed up with the very geopolitical--with our
geopolitical foes and our geopolitical friends in the region,
and we have to think about that.
Number six, North Africa is different. Of the 18 countries
that rose up in the winter of 2011, the North African nations
played a much larger role than nations of the east. They
incubated this change over a longer period. They provided much
of the political culture of protests, and continue to have the
greatest chance of success in the region.
Number seven, major events go unreported--or underreported
in the Western press. Two years ago, it was Bloody Friday in
Tripoli. Now we are having a major leadership crisis in Nidaa
Tunis. We have the aftermath of the sacking of the Algeria
intelligence chief. A whole list of things that are causing
major changes that are being reported, and we have to dial in
and understand those.
We still suffer from the various ways information gets
filtered to us. One of these, I have long called the ``Egypt
effect,'' where, if Egypt is doing well, the region is doing
well; and if Egypt is not doing well, the region is not doing
well. And we have to get around that filter.
We tend to focus on the national, and not the subnational
and the transnational.
We have to address the fact that more and more of these
states are, in Yahia Zoubir's terms, becoming managers of
violence rather than dealing with the underlying problems
causing the violence.
And like Haim, the last point is, I continue to be
concerned about our very light footprints, not just with
regards to Libya, but in Tunisia and Algeria, as well.
To be sure, some things have changed since my last
testimony. The primary one is, Libya got worse. And the second
civil war broke out, in May 2014, launched by General Heftar in
response to a string of political assassinations in Benghazi.
And this has meant that Libya has transitioned from a country
of 100 different communal conflicts to 100 different communal
conflicts and now one big conflict with coalitions fighting.
And all of that will have to be addressed in the peace plan.
In Tunisia, we need to continue to support political
reconciliation, but we also have to support real economic
reconciliation, transitional justice, and reform in every
sector, starting with the security--with security-sector
reform. To get there, we need to increase our assistance to
Tunisia to $800 million annually as part of a $5 billion
package of grants and loans that Tunisia will need to succeed
with its democratic transition. To reach this goal, we have
been advocating for a donor conference for Tunisia to make up
this shortfall. And, of course, the Senate must restore the $50
million of multisecurity assistance cut following the two
terrorist attacks in Tunisia and the President's visit to
front-page disappointed headlines in the region. And it is
worth noting, in a Zogby poll of 2014 in the region, there is a
sharp decline in confidence that the United States is committed
to democracy, because of our lack of assistance to Tunisia and
democratic forces.
Supporting inclusive politics, however, is the solution, I
believe, to all the problems. We need an inclusive solution to
Libya that includes civil society and the two main factions. We
need to continue to push for inclusive solutions for Tunisia,
especially in the economic realm. We need to promote inclusive
politics in Algeria, inclusive politics in Morocco, where there
is a continuing--a new crackdown on civil society, and
inclusive politics when it comes to western Sahara, where, I
have long argued, power-sharing provides the best chance for
success.
Right now, we are having opposite arguments being made.
Zero-sum solutions for Libya. Zero-sum solutions for Egypt. And
this very negative trend of all-or-nothing political--desire
for political outcomes is alienating the very youth I began by
talking about. That is why 90 percent of Egyptians stayed away
from the polls in recent parliamentary elections. That is why
80 percent of young Tunisians stayed away in the 2014
elections.
The United States must support inclusive political
outcomes. And, for Egypt, let me say that--start with 177
elected parliamentarians in jail, the most jailed Parliament in
the world. Start with the hundreds on death row on trumped-up
charges. Perhaps if Egypt can begin with these two groups, we
can create the conditions for a political dialogue in Egypt
that would get the current regime toward the type of political
inclusivity that we all seek.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lawrence follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Lawrence
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of the
committee, 5 years ago next month, the Arab Spring erupted across North
Africa and into our collective conscious, like a shot heard ``round the
world,'' upsetting long-held notions about what was possible, and
likely, in the Middle East and North Africa region. One young
Tunisian's self-immolation lit a torch of change across that region,
and Tunisia, as evidenced by the recent Nobel Peace Prize, is
considered the one last flame of hope in a region now on fire. But
beneath the raging fire and billowing smoke, the profound tectonic
shifts that caused the Arab Spring continue to move, producing both new
challenges and new opportunities for the United States. As others have
testified before you in recent weeks, powerful, destructive forces are
at work, but this is by no means the whole story.
As I testified before this committee in November 2013, we are still
living in the North African region in the wake of a world historical
moment, where accelerated change continues in profound but cacophonous
ways. So much is happening that we often miss much of it, happening all
at once, in so many places. We then find great difficulty in adapting
our strategies to moving targets, oscillating between the risk averse
isolationist reflex to disengage and ``let them fight it out,'' or,
with the considerable resources of our powerful military at our
disposal, a wishful desire to work with authoritarian friends to
deliver sledgehammer death blows, coups de grace, to our mortal enemies
and anyone allied with them, and be done with it. Generally speaking,
neither approach will work. We do, however, have to think big and bold,
and at times venture outside of our comfort zone, but like a cancer
surgeon, we need a holistic, comprehensive and aggressive approaches,
delivered with microscopic precision, to achieve healthy macro level
effects.
Many things remained unchanged from my 2013 testimony before the
Near East, South Asia, and Central Asia Subcommittee, including that:
(1) Syria remains the biggest problem in North Africa. (Syria has
radicalizing effects and blowback effects. Thousands of North Africans
are fighting there, thousands have died there, and many hundreds have
returned, when they manage to escape the clutches of the so-called
Islamic State or al-Nusra, only to fall usually into the same miserable
contexts that propelled them to seek escape.)
(2) The main drivers of these profound changes are economic, more
than political or security-oriented. (As a result, we have to be
creative and aggressive economically--as well as with regards to
security and politics. Economic growth strategies should not be limited
to the oft-mentioned area of entrepreneurship and foreign direct
investment, but should also address deep-seated issues economic justice
and economic opportunity. There have been over 400 self-immolations
across the region since Mohamed Bouazizi, including more self-
immolation suicide in Tunisia just last month. Roughly half of the
economic activity and over half of the labor force in all of these
countries are in the informal sector. However, governments and
traditional civil society still rail against the informal economy--the
survival economy--as if it was the problem and not part of the
solution. Building on the work of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto,
we should reenvision the informal sector as an engine of growth, rather
than a problem to be eradicated. Excluding the informal sector and its
actors is not the answer, and that very exclusionary approach is what
started the Arab spring in the first place, with the crackdown on a
street vendor.)
(3) North African young people made these revolutions and continue
to have high, dashed expectations. (And they will continue to seek to
force change. They are also not just ``kids over there in the North
Africa.'' They are products of U.S. policy and generosity. It was our
investments in vaccinations, our investments in mother-child health
care, our investments in education and exchange programs, our
investments in any number of areas that created the youth bulge in the
first place. The youth bulge was not created by high fertility. It is
created by dropping mortality rates, which dropped twice as quickly as
fertility rates across the region in recent decades, due to modern
medicine, modern nutrition, and modern sanitation, also influenced by
American know-how and development largesse. Many of these kids, many of
the revolutionaries, studied in American universities. They were our
classmates, our students, and as things continue to unfold they are
wondering why we are not more present in their time of need. They are
plugged into U.S. technology, economics, politics and culture. But now
the chickens of successful developmental policy and engagement have
come home to roost, and we have not sufficiently adjusted our
assistance policies to take account these new realities. Big
investments in health and education and on training of women and youth
are the old model that has helped create a new set of problems, largely
by increasing lifespans, creating the youth bulge, and providing a
workforce for often nonexistent jobs. Now, 10 million jobs need to be
created in the coming years across the MENA region to absorb a dramatic
surplus in vibrant, trained human capital, a surplus that our largesse
and good will helped create in the first place.
(4) Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt still have a youth bulge,
but Tunisia does not. Tunisia has already turned the demographic corner
with low mortality and low fertility and a median age of 31. Tunisia's
problem, rather, is unemployed university graduates--unemployed at
several times the rate of those with much less education--and
unemployment among marginal populations, especially in impoverished
areas of the interior, and among women. (Following the two 2015
terrorist attacks, which caused a well-documented crisis in tourism,
the attacks also caused foreign direct investment and local private
investment to dry up. This has led to a situation of zero or negative
growth; Tunisia may well suffer in 2015 its second year of recession
since the revolution.)
(5) As we slip back into familiar geopolitical analysis and
comfortable pre-Arab-Spring geopolitical positions, we have to keep in
mind that the revolutionary forces that will continue to cause unrest
are fed up with both our geopolitical foes and our geopolitical friends
and are looking for new management. (The comparison I made in 2013 to
the 1848 Springtime of the Peoples in Europe, building on Dr. John
Owen's work at University of Virginia, still applies. In 1848, only one
monarchy was overturned, but the process to overturn all of Europe's
monarchy's was set in motion, and we risk now siding again too closely
with the monarchs and violent authoritarian leaders against the people
who seek rights, dignity, and well-being.)
(6) North Africa is different. Of the 18 countries rocked by the
wave of protest in the winter of 2011, the North African nations played
a much larger role than Middle Eastern nations. North Africa incubated
this change over a long period, and it provided much of the political
culture, the slogans, the songs, the rap lyrics, and the hybridic
ideologies that challenged the status quo across the region. (North
Africa continues to be the place where most of the positive change is
taking place in the wake of the Arab Spring and where the greatest
post-Arab-Spring potential exists, in every one of its countries. It is
also worth noting that in part because of common experiences and
aspects of political culture, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco have
produced the most cogent and reliable analyses and strategies to
influence positive outcomes for Libya; to date, they have played a very
positive role, and we should continue to follow their lead on Libya.
This cannot be said for the countries east of Libya, all of which tend
to choose sides, projecting on North Africa their own Middle Eastern
conflicts and rivalries, which polarizes Libya further and prolongs
Libya's second civil war.)
(7) Major events go unreported or underreported in the Western
press. (Two years ago it was the tragic Bloody Friday massacre in
Tripoli. Now, it is major unreported and underreported developments,
including a leadership crisis within Tunisia's ruling party Nidaa Tunis
which has caused 35 top members to ``freeze'' their participation in
the party and could cause it to splinter, a scandal among Libyans
regarding the U.N. envoy and emails sent to the UAE, the aftermath of
the sacking of Algeria's intelligence chief--Bouteflika's longtime
raison d'etre, and worsening crackdowns on civil society across the
region.)
(8) We still suffer from various ways in which the information from
the region gets filtered, with terrible distorting effects. One of
these distorting filters, I have long called the Egypt effect, which
posits (wrongly) that when Egypt is going well, the region is going
well, and that when Egypt is doing badly, everyone else is suffering
from whatever malady Egypt has. (Tunisia in particular and North Africa
in general are very much on their own trajectory and should not be
viewed through that Egyptian lens.)
(9) That said, we do ourselves a disservice when focusing too much
on nation-state level changes and dynamics and ignoring the subnational
and the transnational. (Cross regional effects are complex and
interwoven. For example, the ways in which regimes and protesters learn
in real time from the experiences in neighboring countries
significantly impacts what happens in the learning country. This is not
a case of just Egypt influencing the region, but every country
influencing every country in the region in complex ways.)
(10) We increasingly have devolved into a situation of regime-
managed violence rather than positive change. (Restive populations with
higher expectations because the Arab Spring and states creates a
situation which forces regimes, in the words of leading expert Yahia
Zoubir, to become ``managers of violence.'' To whatever degree each of
these states are to blame for that violence, or are simply victims of
antiregime violence, varies from state to state. But there is no
question that all five states need help quelling the post-Arab-Spring
increase in turbulence and violence, some of it in the name of
democratization and rights, some of it in the name of jobs and
benefits--such as price subsidies--and some of it fomented by the more
nefarious forces including dangerous hooligans and full-blown
terrorists. But while helping these states manage violence, let us not
get on the wrong side of the democratic change, as we did in some of
the cases of the Arab Spring more than others, and always ask in our
assistance and in our partnerships: how does this policy affect the
majority of young people that are trying to emulate our democratic
system of government, and with their efforts to make political change?)
(11) I continue to be very concerned about our light footprint not
just vis-a-vis Libya, to which we should have many more resources
devoted, but in Tunisia and Algeria.
To be sure, some things have changed since my 2013 testimony. The
primary one that the situation in Libya worsened. With the launch of
the second Libya civil war in May 2014 in response to and a string of
political assassinations in Benghazi and gains by radical militias in a
couple of communities, General Heftar has attempted, with limited
success, to turn dozens of small Libyan communal conflicts into one
large winnable one. Now this new large conflict pitting the Dignity
coalition against the Dawn coalition has to be resolved, along the with
myriad communal conflicts that already blighted the Libya landscape.
The Arab Spring was about a lot of things: dignity, fighting
corruption, creating jobs, development of less favored areas, and
empathy and compassion for others across countries and across borders
fighting for the same things. But as much as anything else it was about
inclusivity. Young crowds were not just fighting for their own
interests, they were fighting for the rights of every self-respecting
and respectful citizen to have a seat at the democratic table, with no
ideological or identitarian litmus tests. This included women,
Islamists, secularists, ethnic groups such as Amazigh or Tebu, the
marginalized poor and other subaltern groups, and a wide ideological
spectrum, including everything from Muslim feminists to democratic
Salafists, from democratic socialists to populist nationalists, and
from local Troskyist and Maoist labor leaders to free market liberals.
The new counterrevolutionary anti-inclusion politics--which had
been previously justified for decades on security grounds--has returned
and has devastated politics in Egypt and Libya, and threaten gains in
Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Exclusionary politics is also why 90
percent of Egyptians stayed away from the recent parliamentary polls
and over 80 percent of young Tunisians away from the 2014 elections.
What does this mean for U.S. policy? It means not backing zero-sum
politics and zero-sum outcomes. It means the U.S. must support an
inclusive political outcome for Libya with a full role for civil
society and both the Tripoli and Tobruk governments, and in particular,
the Warfalla, Zintan, and the Misratans. It means the U.N. needs to
refrain from declaring again and again the achievement of a new
political deal, and then tweeting at everyone that they need to sign
on. The U.N. needs to honestly broker a full comprehensive solution
that represents the largest possible number of Libyans, excludes none
of the major players, and does not triangulate and maneuver around key
factions.
It means in Tunisia that we need to support continued political
reconciliation, economic reconciliation, transitional justice, and
reform in every sector, starting with security sector reform. Security
reform needs to be baked into security assistance to the largest extent
possible. To achieve a wide variety of goals in Tunisia, we need to
increase our assistance to $800 million annually, as a part of a $5
billion package of grants and loans. The stakes in Tunisia are enormous
for the region, and the Tunisian democratic transition, which is at a
tipping point due in large part to terrorist attacks, must succeed. To
reach this goal of $5 billion in annual global assistance, we need to
help organize a democracy donor conference for Tunisia, designed to
raise $25 billion over the next 5 years to make up Tunisia's budget
shortfalls and extraordinary transitional needs. The Senate must also
restore the $50 million in mostly security assistance passed by the
U.S. House of Representatives.
While admiration of the U.S. continues to rank much higher in North
African states than in Middle Eastern states, a telling 2014 Zogby poll
flagged a sharp decline in confidence that the U.S. is committed to
democracy across the Middle East. Given the geopolitics of the Middle
East, broadening and deepening support for Tunisian democracy sends a
profound message not just to Tunisians, but to tens of millions of
youth waiting for the U.S. to match its encouraging rhetoric in favor
of democracy with concrete action.
Supporting inclusive politics also means we must continue to deepen
our engagements with Algeria, particularly in the economic and cultural
realms, while encouraging efforts within the Pouvoir to work with the
opposition and introduce political and constitutional reforms.
Supporting inclusive politics means working with Morocco to improve its
human rights performance both in the north and in the Western Sahara,
beginning by curtailing its current crackdown on civil society and
working with Morocco on reform and on reopening spaces for healthy
political contestation.
Pursuing inclusive politics for Egypt is probably the toughest nut
to crack. We have to use every diplomatic and Track Two lever at our
disposal, while maintaining Camp David-linked assistance, to facilitate
eventual negotiations with hundreds of thousands of exiled and jailed
revolutionary opposition leaders and rank and file, when the time is
right, which may be sooner than we think. President Sisi did mention
today en route to meetings in London that he is open to allowing the
Muslim Brotherhood to play a role in Egypt, and this type of concession
is to be encouraged. In the near future, Egypt must release 177 elected
parliamentarians and release hundreds on death row for political
reasons for crimes they did not commit. Releasing these two groups of
several hundred individuals could set the stage for eventual political
reconciliation with the forces that won the 2011-2 elections.
Zero sum politics gets us a nothing in Egypt, nothing in Libya,
nothing in Tunisia, nothing in Algeria, nothing in Morocco, and nothing
in Western Sahara, whether zero sum warfare, zero sum elections, or
zero sum negotiations. The solution in every case is powersharing--a
concept advanced by Jacob Mundy--and we should be advocating this at
every turn, endearing ourselves to majoritarian, democratic youth
across the region. This is what North African democrats and young
citizens expect from us, and this is what we need to do to help empower
citizens to work with us on in favor of the same goal, a stable,
prosperous North Africa with strong relations with the United States.
The Chairman. Thank you both.
I am going to reserve my time for interjections along the
way, if that is okay, and we will start with Senator Cardin.
Thank you very much.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me thank, again, both of our witnesses.
And you both agree that an important part of our strategy
in North Africa rests with our appropriation process, both of
you saying that we should adhere to the President's request. In
some actions already in Congress, they have already reduced
those. If money was the sole issue here, obviously, looking at
Egypt, that has not necessarily been an effective means of
bringing about the types of reforms that we would have hoped to
have seen.
So, I want to just concentrate on Libya for one moment, if
I might. When we talk about Tunisia, and the ability of
terrorists to be trained in Libya and then enter Tunisia, we
are seeing that that terrorism is affecting their economy and
tourism being dramatically reduced. Unless we can get some
resolution on the issues in Libya, the instability in that
region will continue. The Sahara Desert area is very difficult
for us to be able to monitor. So, the United Nations brokered a
unity agreement, which has not been embraced by either side of
the civil war. Can you just share with us briefly your
prognosis as to whether we have a reasonable chance to get an
effective coalition government that can stand up to the
challenges in Libya? And is the United States playing a strong
enough role, here?
Mr. Malka. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
I will start off by addressing your question about efforts
to reach a Libyan unity government. Part of the challenge we
face in Libya is that, even if a unity government is reached
between the two different governments in Libya, that does not
necessarily solve the problems in Libya, in terms of the
multiple conflicts there. As Professor Lawrence mentioned,
there is not just one binary conflict between the Tripoli
government and the Tobruk government in Libya. There are
multiple conflicts going on in Libya between different regions,
between tribal groups, between cities. The conflict does not
fit into two neat ideological, political packages.
So, there are many, many issues that Libya faces that we
have to address. And even if an agreement is reached, it does
not mean that the two competing governments are actually going
to work together. And I think what we need to do, in terms of
the U.S. Government, is ratchet up the pressure that we do have
on those two governments----
Senator Cardin. Well, as I understand, there is a framework
for an agreement. It has not been embraced by either side yet.
Is that----
Mr. Malka. There is a framework. That is correct, sir,
there is a framework----
Senator Cardin. Do you have confidence that, if that is
embraced, it can work?
Mr. Malka. Well, as I said, even if it is embraced, there
still remain challenges to effective cooperation, because the
level of polarization and the other multiple conflicts could
prevent real cooperation. I think the main objective before us
is for the two competing governments to reach a unity agreement
and then have a sustained counterterrorism campaign that
targets the Islamic State and other jihadist militant groups in
Libya. That should be the first objective, and that is what we
should be trying to promote. And, in doing that, we need to
ratchet up the pressure on both sides by making it clear that
we will support additional sanctions against people in both
governments that are blocking the unity government.
Senator Cardin. And ``we,'' you mean United States.
Mr. Malka. The U.S. Government, that is correct, working
with the Europeans, who are currently debating that, as well.
Senator Cardin. Dr. Lawrence, I am going to let you answer
that question, but I want to expand it a little bit. In our
hearings on the gulf countries, it was clear that they really
cherished their relationship with the United States and felt
that it was critically important for the stability of their own
country, but they also wanted to see a more aggressive United
States involvement in the problem areas, whether it was in
Syria or dealing with the Iranian issues or in Iraq. They felt
that the United States presence was critically important, more
so than the other competing powers, particularly Iran, Russia,
and even Europe. So, in northern Africa--that is, Tunisia and
the other countries we are talking about--how important is the
United States participation, relative to other regional powers,
in bringing about a confidence of stability for their country?
Dr. Lawrence. Why do I not deal with the second question
first and then go back to the----
Senator Cardin. Okay.
Dr. Lawrence [continuing]. Libya-specific question.
The U.S. role has huge potential, and we have not--we are
not doing enough. If you look at, for example, polling data
from the MENA region, the United States is viewed more
positively, generally, in North Africa than in the Middle East.
If you look at institutional relationships, the close
relationship between the Tunisian military and the U.S.
military, even closer than to the French military, the large
numbers of the Libyan political class that were educated in the
United States, many of which did not return to the United
States for decades, these communities that are pro-American are
very upset, on a regular basis, about the lack of U.S.
engagement in North Africa, whether it is helping democracy in
Tunisia or seeking democracy for Libya. So, there is a feeling
there, less caused, I would say, by U.S. disengagement,
although that is part of the story, but more caused by the huge
expectations built up by the revolutions and all of the
rhetoric coming from the U.S. Government about how important
these transitions were to the United States, and then lack of
follow-through, in terms of helping these countries address all
the challenges we have been talking about.
It is also worth nothing, I think, in answer to your first
question, that Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are playing very
positive roles in Libya, and all three of them have taken a
rigorously neutral stand on Libya that is helpful. No country
to the east of Libya is taking a neutral position on Libya, and
they are taking polarizing positions, backing one faction or
another in ways that will probably lower the chance for
successful agreement or--once we have an agreement--success of
that agreement, and lower--and increase the chance for a
prolonged civil war in Libya.
So, the short answer is, regionally, look west. Algerians
and Moroccans and Tunisians are doing a great job on Libya. And
do not take much advice from the east, for the reasons that
were included in the premise of your question.
Now, specifically on the deal, one of the interesting
aspects of the U.N. process--let me talk about a bad thing and
a good thing--one of the bad things is that Leon kept
announcing success when he did not have buy-in. And so,
literally, you would have the U.N. tweeting, asking that sides
sign up to an agreement we just heard an announcement that he
agreed to. So, there has been this--one diplomat described this
as ``crafty triangulation.'' I see it as problematic, because
if you keep declaring victory when you do not have victory, you
create more problems than you solve. And I think the new Libya
envoy that Ban Ki-moon has named, the new--a German, the name
is escaping me right now--has an opportunity to start fresh
with the negotiations because we do not have buy-in from either
side yet.
But, one of the positive things that came out of the
negotiations, which were well led--the negotiations were very
good, and I have a white paper on it. I am--that I submitted to
the State Department, I would be happy to share with the
committee, about, you know, the nitty-gritty of the deal and
what the various issues are for each side. But, what was very
interesting is that Misrata, who are on one side of the major
conflict in Libya right now, and Zintan, who are on the other
side, started to peel away. Now, this was reported as the
press--as fragmentation on each side, but was actually a
positive development, that the two strongest military forces in
Libya were seeking a middle ground. In addition to that, the
Algerians have been advocating including the Warfalla, which
was a pro-Qadhafi tribe, in a kind of three-way new force that
stabilizes Libya and makes this unity agreement work.
But, I have to agree with Haim wholeheartedly that--and I--
again, quoting another senior State Department official, he
said his main concern was not that Libya gets a deal or does
not get a deal, it was what was going to happen once there was
a deal. And it is going to be very long, slow slog to make the
deal work.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Thanks for the testimony.
The conventional wisdom has been that Tunisia, at least,
has some of the democratic institutions that will help it as it
moves forward. Other than Tunisia, what other country in the
Maghreb has that--I mean, are we just starting from scratch
with the others? How long will it take? And, first, with
Tunisia, is--you are talking about a robust aid package, and
involvement there for the United States. What else does Tunisia
need? And then, address the issue of institutions--civil
institutions in the other countries.
Mr. Malka. Thank you. I agree that Tunisia does have a long
history of institutions. Those institutions were not always
effective. They were put to use by authoritarian governments.
But, there is an educated and effective bureaucracy in Tunisia.
Similarly, in Morocco and Algeria, there are also effective
institutions and bureaucracies.
Morocco and Algeria have been relatively stable compared to
their neighbors, for different reasons. In Morocco, there is a
balance of power between the monarchy, which is the executive
authority in Morocco, and an Islamist political party that has
been integrated into parliamentary politics for more than a
decade, which coexist. And the King of Morocco's reform package
in early 2011 helped satisfy some of the minimal demands that
people had for change.
Now, the other aspect of Morocco, and Algeria to some
degree, is that people look around the region and see what has
happening in Libya, they see what is happening further away, in
Syria, they see the instability in Tunisia, and they think to
themselves, that things could get a lot worse, so maybe the
current situation is not so bad.
But, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria all have institutions.
They certainly need to be strengthened. There is a lot of work
to be done in all three countries in the justice sector, in
particular, in education. But, the problem that I see is that
Morocco and Algeria face many of the same long-term challenges
that drive radicalization and many of the same kind of
socioeconomic problems that drive youth marginalization as
their neighbors. And while they are stable now, we are not sure
about what is going to happen down the road. In Algeria, for
example, the President has consolidated his power, as far as we
know, against certain elements of the military, but oil prices
have declined, and Algeria is dependent on oil prices, on oil
revenues, to sustain large public spending projects, to sustain
subsidies, and other economic benefits that have helped buy
stability in Algeria over the last decade.
So, there is a lot of uncertainty about what comes down the
road in Algeria and Morocco. It is important to note that
Morocco also--despite its stability, has also produced large
numbers of foreign fighters that have gone to Syria. The
current estimate is about 1,500 Moroccan fighters in Syria. The
number is probably higher. There are also Moroccans turning up
in Libya, as well, fighting with the Islamic State. So, a lot
of the problems that we see in Tunisia and other parts of the
Arab world are also present in Morocco and in Algeria.
In terms of what Tunisia needs, your second question, there
is a long list of what it needs. I think the two immediate
priorities are security and the economy. And that is what the
government has been focused on almost exclusively. Security and
the economy are deeply linked together, because Tunisia relies
on tourism for about 7 percent of its GDP. And the terrorist
attacks in March and June, which killed over 50 people in Tunis
and a seaside resort, have hit the Tunisian economy very hard.
A number of tourist resorts and hotels have closed down,
impacting the Tunisian economy.
So, what Tunisia needs is jobs, economic growth; and, in
order to get that, it needs to get a handle on its security.
Once it starts getting a handle on the security, it can start
dealing with the many other problems--education reform, youth
marginalization, corruption--that also fuel discontent in
Tunisia.
Senator Flake. Go ahead.
Dr. Lawrence. Building on what Haim ably outlined, I will
add a few data points for you.
Number one, thousands of North Africans, including from
Algeria, too, although in smaller numbers, and Libyans, have
gone to fight in Syria. Hundreds have been killed from each of
the countries, and hundreds have returned. And there is some
very interesting anecdotal evidence that those returning from
the conflicts are falling into the same miserable economic
conditions that propelled them, and looking for new jihad. So,
we literally have kids escaping from the battlefields in Iraq
and Syria, at the threat of being shot for desertion, returning
home and not finding any opportunities, and looking for a new
struggle, a new fight. So, this is something that economic
assistance to these countries and economic messaging from the
regimes, you know, would clearly begin to address.
As Haim pointed out, tourism is the third-largest--well, he
said--I am talking about--but, it is the third-largest industry
in Tunisia, but the other thing that terrorist attacks in
Tunisia did was, it dried up foreign direct investments and
local private investment, which is not seeking to invest in
Tunisia anymore, because of instability. Tunisia needs, as he
mentioned, security help, but also security sector reform, as
outlined very nicely in the Crisis Group report; economic help,
but also economic reform; and it needs transitional justice.
And all of these things are things the United States can help
with.
On Libya, let me just mention that it is not that there are
no institutions in Libya. We often hear that. There are
institutions in Libya. There are lawyers, and there is a
justice system, and there are ministries. The problem is that
they were significantly weakened by the Qadhafi regime, and
have not been built up since. Right now, the brightest hope--or
the two brightest hopes in Libya are two things: a robust
private sector, which is actually still growing and--in terms
of, like, cafes and small service--that is still growing in
Libya; and the other is municipalities. Municipalities are
functioning, and a lot of the U.S. assistance has turned
towards the municipalities upon which good things could be
developed.
Two more data points. For Algeria, we did not not have an
Arab Spring in Algeria. We had the largest protest since 1988.
And, more importantly, according to Ministry of Interior
statistics, we have over 10,000 microprotests in Algeria every
year. In Morocco, we increasingly have microprotests. In their
Arab Spring, we had a million in 80 cities simultaneously,
unheard-of level of protests. They had a big Arab Spring. They
are having thousands of microprotests in Morocco. These
microprotests are mostly about economic issues, also health and
other things, education. But, a--nuts-and-bolts, service-
delivery issues that the crash in oil prices is not helping,
and that is--there are small things we can help them do, and do
better, to address the demands of youth.
Thank you.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your testimony. This is very helpful.
We had a hearing yesterday, in one of our subcommittees, on
the response to the buildup of Russian propaganda, and a lot of
the same phrases got used there that get used here, this lack
of American focus, this lack of American attention, this lack
of American leadership. Sometimes you do not really understand
what those words mean, because we have got a lot of smart
people at the State Department, and we have a lot of people
that are spending a lot of time focused on these problems,
trying to sort them out.
And so, Mr. Lawrence, I wanted to sort of drill down on a
point you made. You talked about the fact that there were
expectations built up, and then we did not make good on those
expectations. And my sense is that that is not an expectation
that there was going to be an extra two or three people at the
State Department working every day on Tunisia, that that was an
expectation that there were going to actually be resources that
were going to be delivered on the ground to help support this
transition.
Now, the President asked for double the amount that he had
last year, but last year's amount of money that we delivered to
Tunisia was about $60 million, somewhere around that. This is a
country with a GDP of $47 billion. I mean, that is not a
transformational amount of aid, that is not at a amount of
money, wherever it goes, that is going to make a difference.
So, I get the critique about whether our strategy is right, but
is this not, at some level, when you are talking about both
these countries, but, in particular, Tunisia, which is at the
moment of making this swing--is this not really a matter of
just not simply having the necessary resources to back up our
talk with real action?
Dr. Lawrence. You have answered your own question, in many
ways, but let me flesh out some of the points that you made and
that I agree with wholeheartedly.
To quote Ann Patterson before this committee last week, I
believe, or the week before, the State Department has been
mostly focused on crisis management. And so, there is a certain
amount of bandwidth that could have been oriented towards North
Africa. That got sucked up in solving Syria, dealing with
Yemen, massive refugee crises, increasing counterterrorism
threats. And, frankly, at one level--and Haim mentioned this,
and I mentioned it--we actually need more diplomats in the
embassies and more people at the State Department focusing on
North Africa. That actually matters. And one of the things--for
example, at AID--I mean, AID has a pretty big Tunisia and Libya
teams, but most of what AID does is farm out resources to NGOs
that can do the heavy lifting, the hard work.
Let me mention, also, in passing, something I did not say
in answer to the previous question, to keep myself short, but
you have 1.2 million Libyans of a country, of 5\1/2\ million,
living in Tunisia right now. And Tunisians and Libyans need
almost identical types of training. So, you could--that is a
twofer--you could start training Libyans and Tunisians in the
same security sector-related, justice-sector-related, all these
different fields--economic developments, entrepreneurship--in
Tunisia right now, at very low cost--you know, we are talking
about programs that cost millions, not billions--and taking
advantage of the opportunity that we have there.
Now, in terms of the paltry U.S. aid, I could not agree
more. I mean, Tunisia, before and after the revolution, was
ninth in U.S. assistance to MENA. Now, Jordan needs a lot of
money. They have a lot of Syrian refugees. Lebanon needs help.
Other countries. But, everyone in the region knows we are not
supporting Tunisia in a way that matches our rhetoric, and that
is disturbing. It is disturbing when you see decreasing
positive numbers for democracy among young people, when they
see us, in their minds, abandoning our own rhetoric, and going
back to the old tried and true ways of backing local
authoritarian leaders on security grounds.
So, it is not that we cannot address security and
counterterrorism issues, as Haim said, it is that we have to
walk and chew gum at the same time. And that means engaging
young people. There are many ways to do this. Let me mention
one.
You have hundreds of thousands of unemployed university
graduates in Tunisia that took part in a revolution. Some of
them will be given public-sector jobs with no meaning, because
the public sector does not have anything for them to do, right?
The traditional private sector cannot absorb them. What do we
do? How about national service projects, where you put young
Tunisian university grads out in the field, like Peace Corps--
this has been discussed; no one has done anything yet--to deal
with literacy, to deal with public health, to deal with, to
deal with. An ex-Peace Corps volunteer from Morocco started
Corps Africa. She has been trying to get into Tunisia, and has
not found a way in yet. She is starting a new branch in Mali.
But, there is huge human capital potential in Tunisia, huge
human capital potential in the Libyan diaspora, and we are not
taking advantage of it.
Senator Murphy. Mr. Malka, let me ask you a question
specifically about Libya. This is yet another proxy war in the
region in which you have Egypt and the UAE on one side, Qatar
on the other side. Are we best off trying to increase our
intervention inside the country, focus our resources on trying
to solve the problem through direct intervention by talking to
the sides of this conflict who, as I understand, are not always
terribly interested in talking to us, or are we better off
working with the funders and with the regional players, who
seem to be digging in on opposite sides of the conflict? Which
is--I mean, I know the answer is probably both, but let us just
posit a world in which we do not have the resources or the
bandwidth to do both. Which are we better off--where are we
better off putting our resources?
Mr. Malka. Sure. Well, we certainly need to be talking to
our allies in the Middle East. Turkey also has been playing an
active role in Libya and other parts of North Africa. And I
think, you know, the fact that they are so engaged and invested
in North Africa--as you mentioned, the Qataris, the Emiratis,
the Egyptians--proves how important this region is to the core
interests of the Middle East.
I think it would be a mistake to just pursue the policies
of one side or the other side, because, as I mentioned in my
oral testimony, oftentimes external actors are driving policies
that actually undermine our own interests and perpetuate the
conflict. And I would argue that, by having Libya as a proxy
struggle between several Gulf States and Turkey on the other
side perpetuates the conflict. And that is not in our
interests. We are better served by supporting the U.N. process,
pushing for a unity government, trying to get the different
parties together, and branching out and reaching out to other
elements of the two Libyan governments that we have not been
actively engaged with, and trying to promote a unity government
as a first step.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Gentlemen, I was in Morocco a few months
ago, and I could not--the feel there is so much different than
right next door in Tunisia. And I appreciate your statements
about, ``Well, they have problems, too. They have foreign
fighters that have left, and they have these microprotests.''
And I--you know, I guess I disagree a bit that there is some
similarity. I mean, they are so different. I mean, look a
microprotest is one thing. Taking up arms and killing people at
a resort, and what have you, is something else. I mean, we have
microprotests here in the United States, and live with it. We
have microprotests in my own home every day, and somehow we get
by. But, the situation in Morocco seems to me to be something
that we can live with, the Moroccans can live with, with the
world can live with, but the situation in Tunisia is so much
different. And so, I guess I beg to differ with you to some
degree in trying to equalize those countries. Tell me why I am
wrong.
Mr. Malka. Sir, I did not intend to indicate that all of
the countries were similar. I think every country in the region
is very different. And, in fact, in my written testimony, I
actually detail how they are different, how each country has a
different political model, a different economic model,
different historical experiences that shape their society and
their politics, and are at different stages of their political
and economic development. So, I do not think either one of us
thinks that Morocco is the same as Tunisia is the same as
Algeria.
What I think is important to note about Morocco, and what
sets it apart from the other countries in the region, is that
Morocco, by and large, has a strategy to deal with the many
problems that it faces. It has a strong Executive that can set
policy and that has control of the bureaucracy--importantly,
the security services, the economic structure--that can help
implement that policy. The other----
Senator Risch. And why is that not happening in Tunisia?
Mr. Malka. Well, part of it is a problem of legitimacy. Who
has legitimacy? Tunisia, still faces deep political
polarization within the political establishment between
Ennahda, and on the one side, and Nidaa Tounes, on the other,
which has deep ties to the former regime, and also the labor
unions, which are very strong. So, while they have come
together toward political compromise and consensus, there are
still these deep problems within Tunisia, and this deep
political polarization. There are questions of authority, there
are questions of legitimacy, which you do not necessarily have
in Morocco, where you have a strong executive.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Mr. Lawrence--Dr. Lawrence?
Dr. Lawrence. You are correct to point out that Morocco is
different and Morocco is in better shape than its neighbors. We
often have debates--this very debate, in academic circles, you
know, about what is similar and what is different between the
countries. And I am often arguing that there are important
similarities that get overlooked.
I think the issues facing youth are very similar. The
protests, slogans, and culture are very similar. The tactics of
microprotests are very similar. The networks sending fighters
to Libya are all connected. The huge informal sectors, 50
percent of the economy in everyone in the countries we are
talking about and the majority of the people working in them,
are all connected and all networked. So, we separate Morocco,
or any of these countries, out at our own peril by not
understanding what the connections are and what the differences
are.
In terms of the amount of bandwidth that we should be
applying to these problems, and, in agreeing with that sort of,
I think, question beneath your question, I would say, between
the four countries we are talking about today, we should be
putting probably 40 percent of our effort on Tunisia and 40
percent on Libya and probably 10 percent on Algeria and 10
percent on Morocco, for precisely the reasons you are talking
about. Morocco is a lot further along.
But, Morocco, as I said, had a huge Arab Spring, continues
to have deep poverty and problems that need to be addressed.
And do not forget--and this is important for Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia--the--Morocco has an Islamist party, a promonarchy
Islamist party that is the largest party, and that the Prime
Minister is controlled by, right? So, Morocco has kind of made
its peace with the Islamists in its way. Tunisia is making its
peace, although it is more deeply polarized. And Algeria has
made its peace, but there are some problems there, in terms of
the political class in general and the weakness of political
parties. But, they have all had similar experiences, in terms
of the secular Islamist dialogue, they are all learning from
each other. And I do not think any of these countries really
has the silver bullet or the perfect model for the others to
follow. As Haim said, Morocco is on its own path. It is aware
of its challenges. And the main concern of Morocco-watchers is
that the reform process slows to such a glacial pace that there
is no progress. And all friends of Morocco want to do is help
accelerate that process.
So, for example--if you permit me, I have 10 more--15 more
seconds--Morocco passed a wonderful new constitution. It has
not passed most of the organic laws that put the constitution
in motion. If you look at the most pro-Morocco Web sites, they
are talking really only so far, including several packages of
laws passed, about the increased participation of women in the
decentralization organic law, but there is almost none of these
post-new-constitution projects that have borne the fruit
promised in 2011. So, this is the concern about the pace of
reform in Morocco. If it slows too much, Morocco will suffer
instability.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
You know, my time is almost up, and I wanted to ask a bit
about--I think--and maybe we will get this in another round,
but we really need to drill down into the details in Libya. You
know, I think the world is focused on these two groups that are
trying to make peace. I think you--both of you have underscored
that that is just the tip of the iceberg, that, because of the
numerous other conflicts that are going on, even if that works
out, there are going to be a lot more challenges there. And I
would like to hear your thoughts on that, but my time is up, so
I will yield the floor, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks, to the witness, for great testimony.
Question about Algeria. Question about Algeria and Morocco.
So, on Algeria, President Bouteflika is in his fourth term,
I think, and relatively old. As you look forward, what do you
think the post-Bouteflika political, kind of, status will be?
What is your prediction about Algeria, post-Bouteflika?
Mr. Malka. That is the huge question, because what happens
in Algeria will affect every country in the Maghreb and every
country in the Sahel and potentially Europe, as well. Algeria
is a crucial country. And in the 1990s, it faced a--fought a
brutal civil war, a war against terrorism, where more than
150,000 people were killed, and Algeria exported instability to
the entire region, and even to Europe, where there were terror
attacks linked to Algeria. So, what happens in Algeria is
crucial.
President Bouteflika came to power and ushered in a decade
of stability and security free of the widespread violence that
we saw in the 1990s. Sure, there are still protests,
socioeconomic protests, as Professor Lawrence has mentioned.
There is still an al-Qaeda insurgency in the mountains of
Algeria, which occasionally attacks civilians and security
forces. But, by and large, President Bouteflika has brought
stability to Algeria, in part because of high oil prices, which
allowed him to promote an economic stabilization policy to
provide for the needs of his population. It is not clear that
whoever takes his place is going to have the same kind of
assets, tools, and power to hold together the various
constituent groups and power centers within Algeria. Oil prices
are declining, so, for this year, the first year in a long
time, Algeria has had a budget deficit, a $50 billion deficit
for 2015, where it had to tap into its reserves. That is a
worrying sign for Algerians, most importantly, because it was
in the 1980s when the price of oil collapsed that they began
the process of political reform, which led to elections that
were won by the Islamists, and then led to the civil war.
So, the Algerians carry a lot of historical baggage with
them from that period. And my concern is that what comes after
Bouteflika is not going to be as stable, it is not going to be
as certain, and it could have a negative impact on the region,
as well.
Dr. Lawrence. I do not have much to add, and I am curious
to hear your Algerian-Morocco question. But, let me add, when
Bouteflika came to power in 1999, he came to power on a
reconciliatory platform. And one of the aspects of making
Algerian politics right that was important to him was getting
control of the military and security forces. With the sacking
of General Mediene--Toufik Mediene, in August, in many ways I
believe he has accomplished the last thing he intended to
accomplish. So, I am actually looking for--and I have even
heard talk about a 4\1/2\-term Presidency. You know, I feel
like Bouteflika feels--feels like he is just about done. That
was, like, the last piece of the Bouteflika puzzle.
Now, if you are pro-Bouteflika, like a lot of Algerians
are, this was getting control of occult forces in Algeria. If
you are anti-Bouteflika and the corruption around Bouteflika,
you saw the DRS as the last-standing institution strong enough
to keep the Bouteflika clan in check, so you see the sacking as
a problem. This just augers for more factional fighting among
Algerian elites, following Bouteflika, and I do not see an
accelerated push towards democratization in Algeria, in part
because of what I was talking about, elite struggles.
If I can add one more point, the fact that you have so many
microprotests in all these countries, including Algeria, means
that politics does not work. Citizens with grievances do not go
through political parties, and they do not go through NGOs,
they go to the streets. And then a oil-rich regime responds
with direct aid in response to protests. So, that is a broken
political system. And it will not be until NGOs are given more
room to maneuver, which they do not have yet, and political
parties develop some strengthen in Algeria, that you will have
real politics.
Senator Kaine. I agree with the points you made earlier
about Tunisia, that we need to really help shore them up and
help them succeed. I am also very worried about the next
chapter in Algeria and your point, Mr. Malka, that Algeria will
affect everything else.
Let me move on to the Algeria-Morocco--there are a lot of
similarities between the countries, including that President
Bouteflika was born in Morocco, so there are many similarities.
There are some significant differences--oil rich versus, you
know, not a lot of oil assets on the Moroccan side. But, the
poor state of relations between those two countries, it just
seems like, if we are interested in civility in the region,
doing what we can to help better the state of relations between
Algeria and Morocco is really important. So, what would your
advice to us be on that?
Mr. Malka. That is a tough one, because both sides are
entrenched in their position, and----
Senator Kaine. With respect to western Sahara and other
issues----
Mr. Malka. With respect to western Sahara and a general
regional rivalry, which, from our perspective, does not make a
lot of sense.
Senator Kaine. Yes.
Mr. Malka. And with the security situation in the region
being as it is, I think probably more difficult and challenging
than it has been in at least 15 years, it would be in the
interest of Algeria and Morocco and the region and the United
States and Europe for the Algerians and Moroccans to work more
closely together. It is in everyone's interests for that to
happen.
Unfortunately, I do not see a lot of potential for progress
on that front at the moment. I do not see a lot of potential
for Algeria and Morocco to resolve their differences and come
together and start cooperating more closely. But, the U.S.
Government, despite the fact that there is not a lot of
progress, I think that it is something that the U.S. Government
should continue to urge both sides to cooperate, even in small
ways, to help improve security.
Dr. Lawrence. I will add two data points to that. And I
agree with that. One is, there have been a lot of attempts for
Morocco and Algeria to cooperate on energy, on borders, on
other economic activities, and every time it seems like there
is going to be a breakthrough, the western Sahara ship blows
up. A Minister travels to Moscow, makes an offhanded comment,
and the next thing you know everything falls apart again.
I have--a second point is, I have long argued that as
Morocco democratizes, solutions for western Sahara get more--
get possible. So, Nabila Mounib, the head of this delegation
that is been dealing with the Sweden IKEA dispute and all
that--right?--she said once in a conference I was at, that the
problem with western Sahara and Morocco was not that Moroccans
did not believe it was western Sahara, it was that the western
Saharan issue had always been [speaking foreign language] and
that Moroccan citizens really have no say in--and now that the
political parties and civil society are given openings, and
then it is shut down again, and openings again to go down in
the western Sahara area, you are increasingly have--hearing
more about human rights in the western Sahara area, and seeing
political organization in the western Sahara area. And I think
the more progress that is made in democratizing the north and
the western Sahara region, the more chances we will have for an
eventual opening downstream, in terms of the Algerian-Moroccan
dispute over----
Senator Kaine. Great, thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Dr. Lawrence and Mr. Malka, for being here
today.
Dr. Lawrence, you mentioned just talking about some of the
challenges facing youth in Morocco as well as Algeria. Mr.
Malka, in your testimony, you talked about radicalized youth
issues. Can you lay out the demographic of the youth population
in North Africa?
Dr. Lawrence. If I can just make--because I have the data--
right?--and then I will defer to Haim, which I mispronounced.
The median age in Tunisia is 31. That is past transition--you
know, the--30 is the cutoff the demographers use. The median
age in Algeria and Morocco is 27. The median age in Egypt and
Libya is about 24. And then when you get down to the
Mauritania-western Sahara, that area, you are talking about
median age of 19. So, we have----
Senator Gardner. The median age in Libya and Egypt is 24,
you said?
Dr. Lawrence. Twenty four.
So, we have youth-bulge issues for the medium term in
Morocco and Algeria, for a longer term in Algeria and Libya,
and for a much longer term in the Sahel area. But, in Tunisia,
we are dealing with a different demographic.
I do not--that is one data point--I do not know if, Haim,
you want to say something more about that.
Mr. Malka. Sure. I will just add that, the demographic
issue is changing, also. I mean, we talk about unemployment, we
talk about the lack of jobs. But, if we look at some of the
other social factors that are going on--for example, the age of
marriage has increased dramatically in North Africa, and it is
comparable to that of Europe now. It is much higher than in
other parts of the Middle East. In some places, in some
countries, it is above 30 for a man to get married.
Now, that has an impact--a direct impact on social
stability. If somebody does not have a job, if they do not have
a family, then they have less responsibility; therefore, they
can go off to Libya to get a job, they can go to Libya to fight
with a----
Senator Gardner. Right.
Mr. Malka [continuing]. Jihadist group, they can go to
Syria to seek adventure and get married. So, these issues are
deeply tied to radicalization, to some of the other social
issues that are going on in the region. And I think we need to
understand better how these different social issues underneath
the surface are affecting the politics, stability, and
security.
Senator Gardner. And so, that delay in starting a family,
is that primarily economic-driven? No opportunity, and so they
put that off just----
Mr. Malka. It is directly linked to economic opportunity,
to the lack of jobs, because, in order to get married, one has
to have an apartment, one has to have money to pay for a
wedding, to be able to pay a dowry and sustain a family.
Senator Gardner. And so, in terms of our economic policies
through State Department and others--public diplomacy efforts,
trade, economic efforts--have we adjusted State Department
policies to meet that challenge?
Mr. Malka. Well, part of the challenge is not just what we
are doing, it is what these countries----
Senator Gardner. Yes.
Mr. Malka [continuing]. Need to do. And we have talked a
lot about U.S. strategy and objectives and what we need to do,
but these countries need to do lots of different things to help
us help them. So, Tunisia, for example, almost 5 years after
the revolution, still does not have a coherent foreign
investment law. So, it makes it difficult for us to want to
invest in Tunisian companies, because there are no clear
banking rules, there are no clear insurance regulations.
Tunisian capital is sitting on the sidelines and unwilling to
invest in the local economy, because they are uncertain about
the economic reconciliation law and whether they are going to
be prosecuted for past financial crimes committed under the Ben
Ali regime.
So, it is not just about what we need to do. These
countries also have to take certain steps to improve their
economy, to disentangle the authoritarian economic systems that
perpetuate unemployment, lack of education, monopolies, import
regulations that support smuggling in the informal economy, and
a long list of other economic reforms that they need to enact.
Senator Gardner. Dr. Lawrence.
Dr. Lawrence. Just two quick data points, Tunisia-specific,
which I think is the most important that we are dealing with
today.
Tunisia is working on all these laws. Two MPs from the
Finance Committee were here last week, and they are along the
way, and they are having discussions, and there are drafts
going up to Parliament, but democracy is slow, and these things
take months to negotiate. And so, Tunisia will have an
investment law, probably wintertime, maybe banking law next
year. This economic reconciliation package has been taking
forever, and it is caused a lot of consternation. So, we are
talking about a 2-, 3-year window before Tunisian reforms begin
to have the salutary impact that we are looking for to help us.
So, we are going to have to support Tunisia, independent of
their reform, and getting out ahead of the reform.
Another data point is, Tunisia is having a hard time
meeting payroll. So, how do you reform, if you cannot even pay
your government workers? So, let me give you----
Senator Gardner. What percentage of the public in Tunisia
is employed by the government?
Dr. Lawrence. Oh, it is 25 percent, in that range--20-25
percent.
Religious education. Tunisia has the weakest religious
education infrastructure in the three countries, Tunisia to the
west. Ten percent of imams and mosques have any religious
training. Only half of them have college degrees. So, you have
imams in the mosques who need to be trained--right?--who have
received almost no training. And this is a legacy of the Ben
Ali era, when there was no investment in religious education.
And this gets back to messaging, if you permit me just 10
more seconds. We are not doing well in messaging. There is that
whole youth culture across the region----
Senator Gardner. ``We,'' as in our----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
Senator Gardner [continuing]. Public diplomacy efforts.
Dr. Lawrence. Yes. Yes. We have not really dipped in
enough. We are doing a lot of, you know, counterterrorism
messaging, but we are not engaging enough with our youth and
their youth, you know, talking about common interests. We could
do a lot in the area of cultural exchange and messaging to
young people that we are not doing yet.
Senator Gardner. Would love to follow up with you on how we
can increase opportunities to engage in better public diplomacy
efforts, particularly with that demographic. I think that is
something that we could be very much involved with and
effective with.
I want to shift a little bit to the Sinai Peninsula a
little bit. Talk about Egypt's counterterrorism efforts on the
Sinai Peninsula and what the United States can do to help
combat the threat of extremism in the Sinai.
Mr. Malka. The Egyptians have a growing problem in the
Sinai, and it is not just contained in Sinai, it is shifting
over to the other side of the Suez Canal. We saw, just this
morning, another attack in northern Sinai, but there have been
attacks in Egypt proper, as well. So, this is an ongoing
challenge for the Egyptians that is getting worse.
The problem in Sinai is not just an issue of simple
counterterrorism, because Sinai has been a neglected region for
decades. There is not one government that has been responsible
for neglecting Sinai, but it is many, many of Egypt's past
governments and policies that have largely alienated the
population. So, there is not only a domestic or indigenous
Bedouin population that supports radical groups, but there is a
radicalized Palestinian population, primarily in northern
Sinai, with connections to Gaza.
So, this seems to be a long-term challenge for the
Egyptians, and the politics of exclusion in Egypt have fanned
the flames and made this problem worse, because, as the
Islamists that were in power have been weakened and divided,
some of those Islamists who, at one point, may have chosen the
path of politics are now choosing the path of violence, and
that strengthens the ranks of jihadists and other militant
groups in Sinai.
Senator Gardner. And what should the United States policy
would be to address that?
Mr. Malka. Excuse me?
Senator Gardner. What affects--changes should United States
policy take--undertake to help Egypt address this?
Mr. Malka. Well, we help with general counterterrorism and
military cooperation, intelligence-sharing. That has been
ongoing. I am not sure that we have a silver bullet for how the
Egyptians can address that problem. This is a long-term threat
that they face. We can try to encourage more political
inclusion, more tolerance for political voices in Egyptian
politics, but that is a long-term process that is not going to
change the current environment in Sinai anytime soon.
Senator Gardner. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here this morning.
There have been a number of stories that I have read--news
reports--about Tunisia's transition to democracy and the role
that women played in that, the positive role. I wonder if you
could talk a little bit about the role of women in Tunisia and
compare that to, say, Morocco and Algeria, and what we can do
to support a positive role for women in those societies.
Dr. Lawrence. Tunisia suffered, before the revolution, from
the same problem all these states suffered. It is what call, in
the Middle East studies business, ``regime feminism,'' where
feminists became so close to the regime to get political and
economic rights guaranteed that, when the regimes themselves
became disqualified, the women's movements were negatively
affected. So, for example, the leading feminist organization in
Tunisia took 6 to 9 months after the revolution to even have a
fruitful meeting without a lot of, you know, clashing between
the groups because of the closeness to the Ben Ali regime and
the Trabelsi family and all the corruption that came before.
They were reorganized enough by 2013 that they played a major
role in the--keeping democracy on track in Tunisia and keeping
women's rights a central focus in the summer of 2013. And there
are some people that feel that Tunisian women should have
gotten the Nobel Peace Prize along with others, and they played
an important role.
Tunisia has a long history of parity for women. They have
done an amazing job getting women into Parliament. I think it
is 38 percent in Parliament, one of the highest in the world.
They had gender parity, according to one UNDP metric, before
the revolution. And so, for me, elite Tunisian women have done
well in the past, they are doing well now. I think my main
concern about women in the other countries, including Tunisia,
is that poorer women, marginal women working in the informal
sector are not doing well. And the Nobel prize-winning leader,
Abbassi, yesterday, had some very interesting data on
unemployment among rural Tunisian women, and it is pretty
alarming.
Mr. Malka. Thank you. I do not have much to add to that. I
mean----
Senator Shaheen. Can you do the comparison to Morocco----
Mr. Malka. To Morocco.
Senator Shaheen [continuing]. And Algeria?
Mr. Malka. Sure. I think, at the elite level, again, in
Morocco and Algeria you will also find women who are at the
forefront, who are active, who are well educated, articulate,
and play a role. I mean, you have government Ministers in
Morocco that are women. So, at the elite level, I am always
impressed when I go to Morocco and when I meet with Moroccan
business leaders, Tunisian leaders. It is always a woman who is
spearheading and leading the delegation. But, it is the lower
level of society which is primarily uneducated, you have a
large problem with rural illiteracy for women in many of these
countries. And so, the problem is not that the elite are not
progressing, but that the gap between the elite and the more
underprivileged sectors of society is widening dramatically.
Senator Shaheen. And is it widening more for women than men
in those societies?
Mr. Malka. I would say it is, in part because of gaps in
literacy, primarily, in a place like Morocco and Algeria.
Senator Shaheen. You talked about--or you alluded to ISIS
fighters from Tunisia and Morocco and northern Africa. Is there
a reason why those societies have served as fertile recruiting
grounds, maybe more fertile even than some other more
repressive societies?
Mr. Malka. That is one of the huge questions that we----
Dr. Lawrence. We talk about that all the time.
Mr. Malka [continuing]. Keep trying to answer and keep
trying to figure out. I mean, it is really an irony that the
country with the most hope for political progress, for changing
the social, political, economic dynamics, Tunisia, has produced
the largest number of foreign fighters in Syria, more than
4,000 foreign fighters in Syria since 2011, and the largest
number of foreign fighters in Libya now fighting with ISIS.
There is not one reason for this; there are many reasons. And
we keep trying to analyze the drivers of radicalization in
these countries. Some people join because of ideological
reasons, some people join because of economic reasons, some
people join because they want adventure and--or a sense of
power. So, there are lots of reasons.
Senator Shaheen. When----
Mr. Malka. I am sorry.
Senator Shaheen. Let me just dig down on that a little bit
further. When you talk about ``there are lots of reasons,'' how
do we determine what those reasons are? Are those based on--I
mean, we have not done a poll, I assume, of ISIS fighters, so
these are based on anecdotal interviews with people who have
gone off to fight----
Dr. Lawrence. Before he continues, there has actually been
some polling of ``why your friend joined ISIS.'' So----
Senator Shaheen. Okay.
Dr. Lawrence [continuing]. We actually have polling data on
that, but go--continue----
Mr. Malka. There is anecdotal evidence from--for example, I
was recently in Tunisia and spoke with a young man who had a
job at a production company. He had told us that two of his
friends from high school, from his gang in the neighborhood--
and I do not mean that in the negative sense, just his groups
of friends----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Mr. Malka [continuing]. Went off to fight in Syria and were
on Facebook with him, trying to encourage him to go to Syria.
So, I asked him, ``Why did they leave and go fight in Syria?
And why did you stay?'' And he did not really have a good
answer. And security services are working very hard to try to
build profiles of jihadist fighters and to try to understand
why people are going to fight jihad. And they are having a
tough time coming up with the profiles, as well, because there
is no single profile.
One of the interesting things that I learned on my recent
trip to Tunisia, I was going to speak with civil society
activists in Tunis, and I was walking into the building, just
sort of a decrepit, you know, nondescript building. I was
walking up the hallway and into the office, and I saw lots of
pictures and posters on the wall, of the revolution, people--
young people waving Tunisian flags and out in the streets and
protesting and demanding a better future. Those pictures
demonstrated and captured the hope that many young people had
of changing their societies, of changing their futures,
changing their destinies. And when they saw that that reality
was not changing as quickly as they expected it to change, they
started to lose hope. And it is that despair--it is that
despair which is driving people to Syria, to Libya.
And what is interesting is, it is not just Syria and Libya.
Despair is driving people to take their lives into their own
hands and try to cross the Mediterranean Sea and get to Europe.
People are committing suicide in Tunisia, young people, in
higher numbers. And it is very hard to get accurate numbers of
this. But, jihadism and radicalization is one avenue for people
who feel despair and hopelessness.
Senator Shaheen. Rising expectations.
Mr. Malka. Yes.
Dr. Lawrence. If I may add, I think the simplest rubric to
approximately everything he said, and why I focused on it in my
oral testimony, is inclusion/exclusion. You are included
politically, you are going to be more likely to not pursue
these. You are included economically, you are more----
And just to offer some data points on what Haim just said
at the end, there have been 400 self-immolations since
Bouazizi, including more just last month in Tunisia. So, there
is various types of escapism. There is escapism through
suicide, there is escapism through going to fight a jihad,
there is escapism running to Europe, there is depression, there
is--at one point, a Libyan expert said, ``We do not need 10,000
U.N. peacekeepers in Libya, we need 10,000 psychiatrists.'' You
know, so there is society-wide----
Senator Shaheen. Yes.
Dr. Lawrence [continuing]. Youth dislocation and despair
that need to be addressed. And so, as I say, in all of our
strategizing and all of our thinking, think youth, think, ``How
does this program affect youth? How am I including youth into
it?''
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both.
The Chairman. Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to Egypt just a minute, if we may, and
then I have one quick question on Tunisia. I would like to come
back to that.
But, first, let us talk about Egypt. I am concerned.
Secretary Kerry, just in August, had a dialogue over there, and
is encouraging Congress to sort of turn a blind eye to some of
the social concerns and governmental concern or governance
concerns to continue to support them from a security
cooperation perspective. Do you think we are finding the right
balance between encouraging them to--Sisi, particularly--in the
direction of good governance at the same time that we,
obviously, are still supporting them, from a security
cooperation perspective? Would you respond to that, Mr. Malka?
Dr. Lawrence. I heard Mr. Malka, so I----
Senator Perdue. Oh, I am sorry, go ahead. I----
Dr. Lawrence. I will take the first stab and----
Senator Perdue [continuing]. Thought you were telling him
go ahead.
Dr. Lawrence. No, I will take the first stab and then I
will----
[Laughter.]
Dr. Lawrence. The short answer is no. I think, when it
comes to these sort of authoritarian leaders, we have been
hearing from civil society in the region for decades, and we
know what you do. What you do is, you signal your displeasure
in public and private ways, in ways that make things better.
You--as I mentioned, there are 177 parliamentarians that we
could get released from jail. There are hundreds with death
penalties for crimes being committed we could help get out.
Just as the beginning of the 40,000 Egyptians that have been
jailed.
Senator Perdue. So, you are--what you are saying, then,
is----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
Senator Perdue [continuing]. We are really sending
conflicting messages. Is that right?
Dr. Lawrence. Yes. We are sending conflicting messages, and
it is not only demoralizing Egyptians, the 90 percent that did
not show up to vote, it is demoralizing the whole region, like,
``What are you doing?'' Right.
Senator Perdue. So, are you concerned that Sisi turns to
Moscow recently as a function of this, or is this related?
Dr. Lawrence. Absolutely. I mean, he turned to Moscow, in
part, because he thought he could get support without strings.
And this is a real problem. And so, you used the word
``balance.'' ``Balance'' is the right word. I was the cochair
of the U.S.-Egypt Science and Technology Fund for 4 years, and
it was part of that 250 million--I do not know what it is at
right now--of assistance that we benefit more from that
program, or as much as the Egyptians do, right? A lot of our
arms manufacturers--right?--our agriculture--you know, it is
not that the Egyptian assistance--that is why there is a big
lobby for it. It is not just that people love Sisi, right? This
Egyptian assistance that goes back to Camp David benefits the
United States in a number of ways--business community, science
community, agriculture, military----
Senator Perdue. And peace in the region, where their
relationship with Israel, the----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
Senator Perdue [continuing]. Last decade----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
Senator Perdue [continuing]. Or so, and Jordan.
Dr. Lawrence. And so, I am all for full engagement with
Egypt. It is more about signaling, right? Are you signaling
that you are concerned? Are you helping getting some people out
of jail? We recently spent a lot of political capital getting
Mohamed Soltan out of jail. Mohamed Soltan is now outspoken,
and the Egyptians may be regretting letting him out, but that
sends an important message to everybody--to Islamists, modern
Islamists, radical Islamists, non-Islamists, secular,
opposition in Egypt, the 15,000 that have been arrested that
are not Islamists in Egypt--you know, that we care about more
than just geopolitical stability, and that we would--and that
we understand that long-term geopolitical stability depends, in
part, on democratization of these societies and opening up on
human rights.
Senator Perdue. And also that the economy is moving. Right
now, Egypt's economy is not.
Dr. Lawrence. All the indicators are terrible on the
Egyptian economy. And there is only so many checks the gulf
countries are going to be able to write----
Senator Perdue. So, you create a disenfranchised--
particularly young people coming into the workforce early in
their career----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
Senator Perdue [continuing]. They are disenfranchised. You
have mentioned that in Tunisia, in the depression you are
talking about----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
Senator Perdue [continuing]. The suicide rates, and so
forth.
Dr. Lawrence. Just as bad in Egypt.
Senator Perdue. Just as bad in Egypt----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
Senator Perdue [continuing]. Is that right?
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
Senator Perdue. Okay.
Dr. Lawrence. Haim, do you want to add something?
Mr. Malka. It is difficult to strike----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
Mr. Malka [continuing]. The right balance between our
military cooperation and support for human rights. I mean, Sisi
is playing a different game. The Gulf States are playing a
different game. The Russians are playing a different game. And
the Egyptians know that they have alternatives. When we were
debating here--and it is an important debate--whether there was
a military coup in July 2013--when we were debating that, the
gulf countries were writing checks for billions of dollars,
saying, ``Okay, if you are going to cut aid, if you are going
to hold up transfer of weapons, no problem, we have other
alternatives.'' And that weakens the American hand, because
Egypt is important, for lots of things, for the overflight
rights, for the preferential treatment in the Suez Canal, for
Arab-Israeli peace, for its center of gravity, not only in the
Levant, but also in North Africa, as well. And that is
important. And those serve a lot of global American interests.
So, trying to promote human rights and trying to get President
Sisi to do what he clearly does not want to do, when we do not
have a lot of leverage, is difficult.
What I think we need to be focusing on in Egypt, and in
other countries as well, is less about talking about democracy
and more about promoting tolerance and inclusion and rethinking
this tolerance that many countries, like Egypt, which used to
be very cosmopolitan, multiethnic, multireligious societies
once upheld, we need to promote this inclusivity and this
tolerance in Egypt.
Senator Perdue. When you have got Tunisia--and I would like
to go back to that in the time remaining--that, you know, you--
after the overthrow of President Ben Ali, something like 20
percent as--I have seen estimates as high as 20 percent of the
mosques there were dominated by radical imams. And so, that
throws another source of imbalance in Tunisia, which, so far,
has been a model, in terms of what we can hope for in these
countries in that area. Are we doing what we should be doing in
Tunisia to--you know, to support the balance toward tolerance,
as you say, and inclusion? I mean, I like those two words. I
mean, are we--as a country with a very dominant foreign policy
position in the region, are we doing what we should be to
encourage Tunisia in the same vein?
Mr. Malka. Well, I think----
Senator Perdue. And to help them--not just encourage them,
but to help them.
Mr. Malka. Sure. There have been positive examples of how
the United States has played a positive role urging political
consensus and compromise in Tunisia. And I think the former
Tunisian Ambassador played a critical role at different points
in Tunisia's crises in 2013, in 2015, and continuously urged
the parties to come together, despite their differences. And
that made a difference. And that is why it is so important that
we are fully engaged, that we do have larger diplomatic staffs
in the region, because U.S. engagement and diplomacy matters at
critical junctures. And when we are not active, when we are on
the sidelines, other countries with different interests will
come in and promote narrow agendas that often time promote
conflict and--sustained conflict rather than political unity
that is so important for these countries to try to get beyond
many of the problems that they face.
Dr. Lawrence. Let me add that, in Tunisia, they lost
control of many of their mosques. I know Tunisians that just
stopped going, because there was nothing there for them----
Senator Perdue. Right.
Dr. Lawrence [continuing]. That they, you know, could
tolerate. On both sides of this coin, either government-baked
sermons that were just impossible to listen to, you know,
scratching on the--or all the way to this--``What is this
salafist saying? It does not represent my version of Islam.''
Tunisian government is doing better at getting control of that,
but the problem is that the government has been more focused on
closing mosques and getting rid of certain imams than it has
been on actually addressing the issue of what kind of Islam
they want to have in Tunisia.
And, in terms of the other side of the inclusivity piece,
the Islamists have included in Tunisia--and it is an example
for the region, model for the region--but, the inclusivity
question in Tunisia right now has more to do with economic
security. So, how do we include old-regime elements--this is
the economic reconciliation piece--without forgiving all of the
sins that cannot all be forgiven? And how do we reform the
security forces without sweeping everything under the rug?
Algeria did that. Algeria had no transitional justice after
their wonderful reconciliation ending the war. And a lot of
Algeria's problem is because they never did that. Tunisia has
an opportunity to actually reform the security forces and
actually reform the economy in ways that address constructively
and proactively with the former regime elements that want to be
a part of things, but some of them want to be a part of it with
no cost and with no historical rendering.
Let me just say one more thing on Egypt that I think the--
the catch phrase is ``holistic.'' You can do counterterrorism,
as Haim said, but you have to do it in a holistic manner that
addresses economics, which Sisi is talking about before his
trip to the U.K., and politics, which he is not talking about
at all. The long-term social contract in all of these countries
always was, before the revolutions, ``Benefit economically from
the--whatever we are doing, leave the politics to us.'' The
Arab Spring turned that upside-down and said, ``No, actually,
politics is a function of economics. Economics is a function of
politics. And we need to do both politics and economics.''
Sisi is trying to go back to the old system, where, ``It is
a security argument. I am going to help you benefit
economically, but leave the politics to me.'' And----
Senator Perdue. Well, it looks to me like we are losing
influence over Sisi, too----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
Senator Perdue [continuing]. Because of this power vacuum
that I see being created----
Dr. Lawrence. So, we have to walk and chew gum. We have to
continue to engage with him and find common ground, continue to
push him. I mean, he may not even have had these elections if
he had not been pressured, in part, by us.
Senator Perdue. Right.
Dr. Lawrence. And so, we have to remain engaged. And, as I
said, I do not think we should cut one dollar of assistance to
Egypt, but I do believe that we need to use other levers at our
disposal to continue both the signal to the regime that it
needs to get better, and to Egyptian civil society that all
hope is not lost.
Senator Perdue. Right.
Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
To the issue of Egypt. And I know, Dr. Lawrence, you
mentioned, ``As Egypt goes, North Africa goes.'' I think that
is what you said earlier. Go back, if you will, and explain,
from your perspective, both of you--we had Mubarak that we cast
aside quickly. We had the Muslim Brotherhood, and conflicting
issues there. And now we have Sisi, that is a professional,
that we withheld support from. Just walk through that and tell
me the impression, if you will, that we have left in the
region, relative to our varying support, if you will, for--and
lack of support--for the entities that have come and gone, and
where that leaves people to think about where we will go in the
future.
Mr. Malka. Thank you. I think it sends an ambiguous
message. And people in the region are confused by U.S. foreign
policy. I mean, in Egypt, in Tunisia, in lots of conversations
I have had throughout the last 4-5 years, people will say to
me, ``Well, why is the United States supporting the Salafis?
Why is the United States supporting the Muslim Brotherhood? Why
does the United States not care about democracy and human
rights? And why has the United States forgotten the liberals?''
I mean, every different constituency in the region believes
that the United States is shunning them and not paying enough
attention to them, and not helping them. And that is a function
of our policies, which have not necessarily been clear. We
supported--first, we supported Mubarak stepping aside, we
supported the Morsi government and the Muslim Brotherhood--or
we did not necessarily support them, but we engaged with them.
We accepted President Sissi, when he came to power. So, there
does not seem to be, from the perspective of the region, a lot
of coherence to this policy. And I think it leaves people
confused and unsure about what the United States is going to do
next.
Dr. Lawrence. Let me add to that, that--and I agree
entirely with what Haim just said about confusion in the
region. But, we can be clearer. We should have been clearer in
dealing--in our dealings with the Muslim Brotherhood during the
interim period. And for all of the economic problems that Egypt
had during that period, it was actually the least violent
period in Egyptian history in the last 10 years, was the--I
mean, sorry, since the revolution--was the period that Morsi
was in power. In part, for--another point I want to make here,
and I call this the ``chain of conversations.'' We need, in our
rhetoric and our engagements, to support hardcore secularists
talking to the secularists willing to engage with Islamists,
talk to the moderate secularists and the moderate Islamists and
encourage that conversation, encourage the conversation between
the moderate Islamists and the democratic Salafists, encourage
the conversation between the democratic Salafists and the
violent Salafists, because the more people see hope in an
inclusive democratic system, the less they are going to engage
in spoiler activities and violent activities at each end of the
spectrum. And we have spoilers on both ends.
In Libya--to shift to Libya for a minute--Libya is a
complicated place. If you look at Libya polling, most Libyans
want Sharia on the constitution--right?--something that does
not make sense to a lot of Americans. But, at the same time,
most of the Libyans think the most important thing that a
Libyan politician or a Libyan political party can do is have
good relations with the West. So, how do you explain that? You
explain that, because Libyans are both being revolutionary and
reasserting their Islamic identity when Islam was manipulated--
right?--in the Qadhafi years, and, at the same time, they were
cut off from the West for decades by sanctions, and they want a
robust engagement from the West, they do not feel they are
getting.
Moving over to Tunisia, we had the same----
The Chairman. Wait a minute, I----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. I do not really want to do that.
So----
Dr. Lawrence. Okay.
The Chairman. So, back to Egypt, though.
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
The Chairman. What I am trying to say about the Muslim
Brotherhood, that they were the most inclusive government that
has existed in recent times?
Dr. Lawrence. Absolutely not. They won with 51 percent of
the vote, and they----
The Chairman. Well, what is your point, then?
Dr. Lawrence [continuing]. They ruled in a 50-percent--51-
percent majoritarian way. They were just less violent and, by
and large, more respectful----
The Chairman. But----
Dr. Lawrence [continuing]. Of their political adversaries
than the precedent and the subsequent regimes----
The Chairman. But, to the question----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. What signals, through those
various gyrations, have we sent to Egypt and, from your
perspective, ``as Egypt goes, North Africa goes''--what----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. What has been the message that
has been heard there through these multiple gyrations?
Dr. Lawrence. Well, I think our biggest failing was not
anything during the Morsi period. And I know the diplomats that
worked hard in the April-to-June timeframe of 2013 trying to
avert the coup. Morsi was offered a deal, similar to the deal
the Ennahda Party got in Tunisia to step down. He got
conflicting advice, so then Nushi told him to take the deal.
Adderwan told him not to take the deal. And Morsi went with the
``stick it out'' philosophy, when he could have stepped down
and--as the Tunisian Islamist Party did, and accept a
transitional government. So, that was a piece of it.
I do not think, during the Morsi period, there is much more
the United States could have done, except to make clear that we
were not favoring Islamists as Islamists. We were fading
Islam--we were favoring Islamist democrats as democrats.
I think, come the coup in July 2013--and I was on BBC
America July 4th, saying this is a coup, you know--it was a
coup. And I think, by not calling it a coup and by reacting in
a confusing way, we alienated the entirety of Egyptian youth. I
mean, I was an election observer in 2013 and--or 2014, in
Egypt, the last elections before this one, and everyone voting
was over 40. I mean, Egyptian youth were just not there. And if
you ask Egyptians under 35, you know, ``What is your view of
the United States?''--it is not just confusion, it is disgust
about how the United States did not support democracy at a time
that mattered. Now, these people did not know how hard U.S.
diplomats tried to keep the Egyptian revolution on track. And
it was a valiant effort. But, getting too cozy with Sisi too
quickly sent messages that are problematic now----
The Chairman. Well, I did not think we got cozy enough. I
will be honest.
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
The Chairman. We withheld support. I did not think that
indicated a lot of coziness. And so, I would disagree 180
degrees. I think we left them hanging out there. They did not
know whether we supported them, or not. As was mentioned
before, they got tremendous support from other people in the
region, and, at a moment in time when we might have helped
shape some of these issues that you are laying out, we were in
a quasi-mode, where, you are right, we did not call it a coup,
but, at the same time, we were withholding support for them,
militarily, at a time when they needed some show of support
from the United States. So, I could not disagree more. I mean,
we did not cozy up very quickly. I mean, am I missing
something?
Dr. Lawrence. Well, my view may be a little more nuanced
than I have made it sound, but let me say this. Egypt gets a
huge amount of military assistance. So, no withheld assistance
during the period we were withholding it had much of an impact
on Egypt. It had a big impact on U.S. interests, you know, that
liked to have a certain amount of arms sold to Egypt, but it
did not really have much of an impact on Egypt.
I think, at a moment of a coup, if you immediately line up
with the coup-maker and say, ``We are with you,'' yeah, in a
post-revolutionary country, that is an important issue. And,
you know, we have had American citizens held in Egyptian jails,
one of whom I mentioned. We have had a human rights
catastrophe. And it is watched in 24/7 news cycles across the
region. So, if our goal is only short-term geopolitical
advantage, and if our only goal is having a strong ally in a
region on fire, then you are right and I concede. But, if we
want to have a policy that has medium- and long-term success
and which captures the imaginations and the efforts of young
people, withholding aid to Sisi for a little while, only to
restore it, is the wrong message. It was not a strong----
The Chairman. So, the right message was? I have been
confused by the testimony here. But, the right message----
Dr. Lawrence. Pushing for political inclusive outcome in
Egypt as hard as we could.
The Chairman. Why would Sisi not see that to be in his
interest now?
Dr. Lawrence. Well, I would say that he----
The Chairman. I mean, he is a smart guy.
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
The Chairman. He is a smart guy. He is----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. Educated. He is a leader. He----
Dr. Lawrence. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. Does want to be there for the
long haul. Why would he not view greater inclusiveness, over
time, in Egypt to be in his interest?
Dr. Lawrence. I would say--and I welcome Haim to chime in
if he wants, but I would say that he chose the comfortable
path, and the comfortable path was to demonize the half of
Egyptian society that had voted for the FJP, the strong quarter
of Egyptian society that supported them, and now stand,
basically, completely alienated from Egyptian politics, and
restore the pre-revolutionary order. And it is an order that
worked, in his mind; it is an order that was successful in
keeping occult forces at bay. If your main issue is the
ideology of your adversary--right?--and excluding that ideology
of--at all costs, then that is the reasonable course.
What I have been arguing all along is that the point of the
Arab Spring was that everyone would have a seat at the table,
and everyone who played the democratic game would get their
seat. Right? That was not Sisi's view. Sisi's view was, ``I
will exclude my ideological enemies, en masse''--by the
millions, in terms of voting, and by the tens of thousands in
jail--``because I do not agree with them ideologically.'' It is
a formula that can work, to some short-term degree, but I do
not think it bodes well for Egypt's long-term political and
economic development.
The Chairman. Mr. Malka.
Mr. Malka. Yes, I think it is a little bit more complex.
And what was interesting was, in July 2013, who President
Sisi's allies were. There were Salafi political parties that
supported President Sisi's takeover of Egypt. And----
Dr. Lawrence. As a survival tactic.
Mr. Malka. Well, as a survival tactic, as a political
tactic. Because they are also competing for Islamist votes
against the Muslim Brotherhood, but that is sort of a separate
issue. So, I think, inclusivity, yes, it is important for long-
term stability, absolutely. But, it is not that Sisi excluded
everyone, and there are different elements within Egypt that
are playing a role. Granted, they have not done very well in
recent parliamentary elections, but, I think, over time, the
goal should be to expand space for other voices in the Egyptian
political system. But, as long as opposition political forces
believe that the game is already cooked, that the outcomes are
already set, there is less of a willingness to participate. And
that goes for Tunisia, it goes for Morocco, it goes for other
countries, as well.
The Chairman. What did that signal--us going into Libya. We
had worked with Qadhafi to rid the country of weapons of mass
destruction. Certainly, he was not a good person. No question.
That is an understatement. But, what signal did that send, when
an uprising occurred there? We took him out. What signal did
that send to the region? I am just curious.
Mr. Malka. Well, I was in Morocco when the bombing campaign
started, and everyone that I met with during that visit was
warning us against what was happening, was warning not to get
involved militarily in Libya, and to just leave the state as it
was. I think the problem was going in without a strategy for
how to put Libya back together after Qadhafi, and that is where
things fell short. And I think that sends more of a signal,
rather than the initial military intervention. What sends a
signal is the lack of a strategy. And then, in the--the
perception that, after deposing Qadhafi, that the United States
walked away and left Libya to fall apart to its own devices.
That sends a signal that the United States is not really
committed, that it does not follow through, that it only has
short-term interests, and not long-term interests. And this
goes back to my initial point that, if we are going to be
engaged, we need to be engaged for the long haul, we need to
manage the risks, and we need to be committed to following
through.
Dr. Lawrence. If I may add to that. Algerians felt very
strongly that way, too, and gave us strong advice to stay out
of Libya for these reasons. They predicted the outcome.
Moroccans and Tunisians, in terms of the population, by and
large, were very much in favor, because they saw our action as
a pro-Libyan population. What people often forget is, half of
Libya had already broken away by the time NATO got involved.
So, it was not an issue of us going in and toppling Qadhafi. We
did not even take Qadhafi out. It was Libyan militias, after--
the convoy was bombed, but the--when the convoy was bombed, it
was not even bombed knowing Qadhafi was in it. The civil war
that would have happened in Libya would have gone on for much
longer without the NATO intervention, in my opinion, but I
agree wholeheartedly with Haim's answer to your question and,
insofar as that was the premise of your question, that going
into Libya without a plan to stabilize Libya afterward was a
mistake.
Now, let me add one thing. I was on all five of the State
Department working groups on Libya in 2011. We had a great
plan. What happened was--after the fact, is that a succession
of Libyan governments were never ready, did not have the
bandwidth, always wanted the sort of next iteration of the
process--the minister be named, the vote, the--to happen. And,
by the time Libyans had realized it was too late, it was too
late. And now, a lot of Libyans have taken to blaming the
United States for not having followed through.
But, I would argue wholeheartedly that, although the United
States have--should have devoted more diplomatic bandwidth to
Libya all along, the mistake, post-revolution, was primarily a
Libyan mistake and a Libyan inability to accept international
assistance, not primarily a Western mistaken in planning.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you all for being here.
I asked the questions, not to in any way cast blame or
anything else, but to--you know, here we are, the purpose of
these hearings--and this is the last one--is to help us
``develop,'' as a committee, an approach to the Middle East.
And yet, what I see, and what I see continuing to happen, is
just a series of sort of ad hoc steps--that have been going on
for some time; again, I am not in any way--it is just an
observation--a lack of any real consistencies. And the thought
of maybe developing a Middle East policy with so many
countervailing forces, if you will, at work, and each country
being so different, relative to what they are dealing with,
somewhat, you know, makes the task of ``having a Middle East
policy'' somewhat daunting.
And I am getting ready to sign off, here, and thank you all
for being here, but would either one of you all want to respond
to that?
Dr. Lawrence. I think it was Yitzhak Rabin that used to
say, ``You have to fight terrorism like there is no dialogue,
and you have to have dialogue like there is no terrorism
problem.'' And I think, you know, the degree to which, going
forward, we can emphasize with vigor our commitment to
democracy, human rights, and inclusive dialogue while, at the
same time, going after the bad guys in an aggressive way--and,
you know, bad guys who will stay bad guys; there is always bad
guys.
And if I can add one more point, in--there is always--
this--in every society throughout history, there is always very
nasty people who want to do nasty things. For me, the main
issue is, What sea are they swimming in? Is it a sea of
population that is sympathetic because they have--they are
using the same grievances that population has to justify their
awfulness? Right? Or is it a population that is turning against
them that is beginning to see dividends from the governments,
local and national, and international assistance that seems to
be taking their grievances seriously and at least beginning to
address them? And if you tip that balance in the right
direction, those bad guys have smaller and smaller areas to
operate in. So, this is my----
The Chairman. Yes, I would just add that some people would
observe that our pursuit of democracy, when countries have not
yet been ready for that, has helped create much of the chaos
that exists in the region.
Dr. Lawrence. And I would argue it is coming anyway. See,
democracy is coming anyway. And the analogy I used for the Arab
Spring is 1848 Europe, where one monarchy flipped, but the
momentum against monarchies began. That took decades. And there
was a lot of chaos in mid-9th century Europe to--even if they
are not ready for democracy, the youth populations are. See?
And this is what we have to deal with. Hungary, youth
populations wanting democracy, how do we deal with them?
Mr. Malka. Thank you.
I think one of the things that we need to think about when
we pursue a policy: first, clearly state what our interests
are, clearly state what our objectives are, and not get bogged
down in process, but also think about outcomes, as well, which
is what our allies and our enemies often do in a much more
focused way than we do. But, we need to show long-term
commitment. We need to promote inclusive politics. But, we need
to send a signal to the people of the region, to the
governments in the region, that we care, that we have an
interest, and that we have a long-term investment plan.
Part of that is also going to include understanding and
acknowledging what we cannot change. There are lots of things
that we are trying to change. There are a lot of outcomes we
are trying to get to. But, we also have to understand what our
limitations are, in terms of persuading people like President
Sisi or other governments that we deal with on a regular basis.
So, understanding our limitations, but also setting realistic
objectives, I think, will help guide a more effective policy.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both. You have been very,
very good witnesses and obviously interact with each other a
lot. We appreciate that.
And the record will be open----
We want to welcome the Charge again for being here. She
nodded in approval with some of the things you said, and was
silent with others, so I do not know if you all want to talk
with her about some input that she may wish to give, but you
would have been a great witness today. We thank you for
participating in the audience, anyway.
The record will be open, if it is okay, through the end of
business on Friday. And you know the drill. If you get
questions, please respond to them fairly quickly.
But, we thank you both. You have helped us. And, for that,
we are very appreciative.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]