[Senate Hearing 114-821]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-821
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND
INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 19, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
35-996 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND
INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY
CORY GARDNER, Colorado, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona TOM UDALL, New Mexico
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. Cory Gardner, U.S. Senator From Colorado.................... 1
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator From Maryland.............. 2
Scott Busby, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Washington,
DC............................................................. 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
James A. Carouso, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 13
Hon. Mark Green, President, International Republican Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 22
Prepared Statement........................................... 24
Murray Hiebert, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Sumitro Chair
for Southeast Asia Studies, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC.......................... 27
Prepared Statement........................................... 29
Kelley Currie, Senior Fellow, Project 2049 Institute, Arlington,
Virginia....................................................... 32
Prepared Statement........................................... 34
(iii)
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and
International Cybersecurity Policy,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:57 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Cory Gardner
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gardner and Cardin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Gardner. This hearing will come to order. We are
doing something entirely unique in the Senate, and that is
actually starting on time and maybe even a little early. So
this may be a historic first occasion. As a new member, at
least, this seems to be something that is of a historic nature.
Senator Cardin. You just violated a tradition of the United
States Senate. Senator Byrd would not be happy. [Laughter.]
Senator Gardner. Let me, again, welcome all of you to the
fifth hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy.
Thank you very much for being here, and thank you to Senator
Cardin for his cooperation and work and support for holding
this very important hearing.
The purpose of the hearing is to examine the trajectory of
democracy in Southeast Asia. This region is critical to U.S.
strategic and economic interests but has for decades been ruled
by authoritarian regimes, often creating tensions for U.S.
policymakers between advancing key national security objectives
and pursuing our fundamental values of freedom and democracy in
the region.
In 1967, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
or ASEAN, was formed, none of its six original members--
Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines,
Brunei--were democracies. Democracies started to take root in
the region only in the 1980s and 1990s, following the example
of democratic transitions elsewhere in East Asia, most notably
South Korea and Taiwan.
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, by 2008, a
region that was dominated by authoritarian regimes throughout
the cold war now looks significantly different. In its report
on Global Freedom in 2009, Freedom House ranked the
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Timor-Leste as
partly free nations, and ranked Indonesia as free.
While since there have been significant setbacks as well in
the region's democratic path, most notably the return of the
military rule in Thailand last year, there are also seemingly
emerging success stories as well.
On November 8, 2015, just earlier this month, there were
elections in Myanmar or Burma, where Suu Kyi's National League
of Democracy party has swept to an overwhelming victory. It
gives us hope that democracy is still on the march in Southeast
Asia.
However, we should never overlook or oversimplify these
challenges. Democracy is not only about the process of holding
elections. It is about instituting the rule of law, enshrining
checks and balances, and respecting fundamental freedoms of
assembly and human rights.
Burma as well as other countries in the region have a long
way to go before that is the case.
So while we look to the elections in Burma with hope, we
must also ask the question of whether a genuine democratic
system can exist when the military has just simply reserved 25
percent of Parliament seats without competition, has instituted
blatantly discriminatory laws, or has disenfranchised whole
segments of the population.
So it is my hope that as we approach the ASEAN summit this
weekend, this hearing can provide a thorough overview of the
state of democracy in Southeast Asia and how U.S. policy can
best encourage our partner nations in this critical region to
follow the democratic path.
With that, I will turn to Senator Cardin for his opening
remarks.
Senator Cardin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your
leadership on this subcommittee. We know that the pivot to the
Asia-Pacific region is critically important to our global
strategy. This hearing is particularly important as we talk
about democratic transitions in Southeast Asia.
During the past few decades, we have seen an incredible
change in Southeast Asia, from poverty and civil war and
authoritarian governments to now tens of millions of people
having opportunity. So we have seen a trajectory that has been
very positive over the last several decades.
But having said that, there has been a concern of late that
maybe that momentum is being lost. Perhaps there is even some
backtracking on the progress that has been made for democracy
and opportunity in Southeast Asia.
I think all of us have to be concerned when we take a look
at the Freedom House 2015 publication, ``Freedom in the
World.'' The organization ranks six Southeast Asian countries--
Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam--as ``not
free''; and five countries--East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Singapore--as only ``partly free.''
Notably, not a single Southeast Asian country was characterized
as ``free.''
So clearly, we have a challenge. There is a question as to
how we are progressing. It is clearly in the U.S. interests,
and it is a strong component of our foreign policy objectives,
to ensure that democracy and human rights are key factors in
the countries that we have relations with.
I take you back to the principles of Helsinki. I served
many years and am now the ranking Democrat in the Senate for
the Helsinki Commission. But the principles of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe is based upon stability.
How can we maintain stability among countries? Countries have
to be able to defend their borders. They have to have the
capacity to do that. Countries need economic opportunity for
their citizens. An economic future is one of the key
ingredients for stability in a country.
But basic human rights--how a country deals with the right
of expression, how a country deals with corruption, how a
country deals with free and fair elections--are very much a
part of whether there will be stability. You cannot have a
military state and expect to have stability. It is not just
because you have resource wealth that you will become a stable
country, as we have seen in too many countries around the
world.
So the attention on good governance and on human rights,
must remain a key focus of our foreign policy.
Now, it is hard to generalize. It is not fair to compare
one country to another. So I think each country is, indeed,
unique. But clearly, there are countries that require our close
attention.
Burma, on November 8 held its first contested national
election since 1990. Arguably, the country has come a long way
from the outright military dictatorship it was under for nearly
50 years. More than 90 political parties were registered to
take part in the most recent elections--but just how
transparent, inclusive, and credible were they? What can we
expect in terms of transition in Burma over the next few
months? Over the long term. Is there anything more the United
States can do for a smooth democratic transition in Burma, as
opposed to one in which it chugs along in fits and starts?
Second, I would like to hear from our witnesses the
prospect for democracy in Thailand. We have had a long
relationship with this country. It is a longtime friend, a U.S.
treaty ally for more than 60 years. This is a country that,
since 1932, has experienced 19 coups, 12 of them successful.
Over a year has passed since the military overthrew their
elected government. The country continues to be ruled by junta.
With the military-appointed National Reform Council
rejecting their own draft constitution in early September,
elections have again been postponed until early 2017. And we do
not even know if they are going to make the early 2017 date.
Third, I would like to hear about Indonesia, Southeast
Asia's largest country, the world's third-largest democracy,
and the world's most populous Muslim-majority country. It is
often one that has been heralded as having successfully
transitioned from an authoritarian regime to one led by a
directly elected president. Is this country one that we should
look to as a model? Or is it too besieged by stalled reforms
and continued interference in politics by the military?
I am hopeful that this hearing can shed some light on how
the United States can use the tools that we have to encourage
and hopefully accomplish a smooth transition in Southeast Asia
to democratic institutions.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
With that, we will turn to our first panel.
Our first witness is Mr. Scott Busby, who serves as the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, where he oversees the Bureau's work in
East Asia and the Pacific, as well on multilateral and global
issues, including U.S. engagement on human rights. Most
recently, he served as director for human rights on the
National Security Council in the White House from 2009 to 2011,
where he managed a wide range of human rights and refugee
issues.
Welcome, Mr. Busby. Thank you very much. We look forward to
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT BUSBY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Busby. Thank you, Chairman Gardner, and thank you,
Ranking Member Cardin, as well, for this opportunity to appear
before you today to testify on the very important and timely
issue of democratic transitions in Southeast Asia. Let me thank
the subcommittee for its continued leadership in advancing U.S.
interests and values and promoting overall engagement with the
Asia-Pacific region. Your work serves as another high-profile
demonstration of the expanded involvement of the United States
in the region, and an important reminder that human rights and
democracy are universal values, not just American ones.
The U.S. Government's rebalance to Asia and the Pacific
region recognizes that our future prosperity and security are
inextricably tied to the region. It reflects the importance we
place on our economic and strategic engagement, as well as our
strong support for advancing democracy, good governance,
justice, and human rights. These goals, in our view, are
mutually reinforcing elements of a unified strategy that at its
core is about strengthening our relationships with the people
of the region and their governments.
When assessing democratic transition in the region, I think
we agree with the assessment that both of you offered, that
there is some good news and there is some bad news. There are
now more Southeast Asians living under democratic rule than was
the case 30 years ago. Democracy is taking root in countries
like the Philippines and Indonesia. And in countries like
Burma, there have been important steps toward full democratic
rule.
At the same time, there is not so good news in countries
like Thailand, Cambodia, and Malaysia. We have seen backsliding
of late. Of course, millions of others Southeast Asians in
countries like Laos and Vietnam continue to live under
repressive and authoritarian governments.
So the democratic picture in the region is mixed.
Nevertheless, we remain committed to the notion that effective
and accountable governance and respect for the rule of law and
human rights provide the foundation for long-term political
stability and sustainable development. Thus, they are a
cornerstone of our approach to the region as a whole, just as
they are in the rest of the world.
Our democracy engagement in Southeast Asia is characterized
by three key objectives: first, the strengthening of civil
society; second, encouraging government transparency and
accountability; and third, increasing access to information.
First on strengthening civil society, in his remarks before
the U.N. General Assembly in September, President Obama noted,
``When civil society thrives, communities can solve problems
that governments cannot necessarily solve alone.''
Southeast Asia is home to a vibrant and active civil
society with which we work closely through efforts like the
Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative. We also employed
grassroots, results-oriented programming across the region to
empower local civil society organizations. Our programs have
trained labor activists; brought human rights principles to
security forces; strengthened election mechanisms; and
empowered citizen journalists to connect, share, and publish
their work. And our rapid response mechanisms have enabled us
to provide immediate relief and assistance to both individual
activists and civil society organizations when they are under
threat.
Still, the region has not been immune to the worldwide
crackdown on civil society.
In Thailand, for instance, the military regime has
restricted civil liberties, including freedom of association,
since seizing power in May 2014.
In Cambodia recently, the government adopted legislation
limiting the ability of nongovernmental organizations to
operate freely.
Despite these tightening restrictions on civil society, new
tools have enabled governments to become more open and
accountable in the region, which is our second goal for our
engagement there.
In the Philippines, for instance, grassroots participation
in the planning and budgeting of poverty-reduction programs in
every one of its municipal and provincial governments has
resulted in greater citizen involvement and better tailored
policies for communities. The Philippines undertook this effort
as a founding member of the Open Government Partnership, a
multilateral initiative in which the United States and
Indonesia were also founding members. We will continue to push
to expand participation in the OGP initiative throughout the
region.
Nevertheless, we recognize that initiatives like OGP only
work if citizens are able to share information openly and
freely. This is why increasing access to information is the
third element in our democracy strategy for the region.
We believe that access to information and freedom of
expression are important indicators of a democracy's health. A
free and open Internet as well as an independent press are
instrumental to, for example, rooting out corruption and
increasing government accountability.
Governments in Southeast Asia are grappling with how to
manage the flow of information with the explosive Internet
growth, as well as new communication tools. We are troubled by
what appears to be backsliding in some countries on these
issues.
In Malaysia, for instance, approximately 30 government
critics have been charged under its sedition law, a law, by the
way, which Prime Minister Najib once publicly committed to
eliminating.
So we face challenges and opportunities in this area as
well.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the region encompasses a range
of countries at different places in the transition to
democracy, some moving in the right direction, others not. A
common thread between them, though, is that their people are
increasingly demanding more from their governments, better
services, more transparency, and a greater role in the
fundamental decisions that shape their lives. The Department of
State will continue to support these aspirations. And backed by
congressional support, we believe that democracy can further
take root and expand throughout the region. Thank you very
much.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Busby and Mr. Carouso
follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement of Scott Busby and James Carouso
Chairman Gardner, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to testify on the very important and timely issue of democracy in
Southeast Asia. We would also like to thank the subcommittee for its
continued leadership in advancing U.S. interests and supporting and
promoting engagement with Asia and the Pacific region. Your work,
including recent visits by committee members and staff, serves as a
high-profile demonstration of the expanded involvement of the United
States in the region, and an important reminder that human rights and
democracy are not only core American principles, but also universal
values.
Viewed from a long-term perspective, we can say that significantly
more people in Southeast Asia are living in democracies than 30 years
ago, although we of course want to see more and faster progress, and
millions still live under repressive and authoritarian governments. In
some countries we have seen recent backsliding in democratic governance
and respect for human rights. In Southeast Asia and around the world,
we remain committed to the notion that effective and accountable
governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights provide the
foundation for long-term political stability and sustainable
development.
rebalance to asia and the pacific region
The U.S. Government's ``rebalance'' to Asia and the Pacific region
recognizes that our future prosperity and security are inextricably
tied to the region. Over the past three decades, the region has
experienced an unprecedented period of prosperity, lifting hundreds of
millions out of extreme poverty. A growing middle class has expanded
business and trade opportunities and driven reciprocal growth in
countries around the world, including the United States.
The rebalance reflects the importance we place on our economic,
security, public diplomacy, and strategic engagement in Asia and the
Pacific region, and our strong support for advancing democracy, good
governance, justice, and human rights. These goals are mutually
reinforcing elements of a unified strategy that, at its core, is about
strengthening our relationships with the people of the region and their
governments. It is about protecting and promoting fundamental human
rights, such as the freedoms of expression, association and assembly,
all prerequisites to a ``government by the people.'' It is about
citizens having the ability to choose their own leaders and influence
the decisions that affect their lives, because solutions to the
challenges facing Asia need to come from the bottom up, not the top
down.
Promoting democracy and human rights, in Asia and around the world,
is the right thing to do. It also strengthens our strategic presence
and advances our strategic interests. It helps build more stable
societies by encouraging governments to give people peaceful outlets
for expressing themselves and to seek the most enduring and reliable
source of legitimacy: the consent of the governed. It supports our
economic goals by promoting laws and institutions that secure property
rights, enforce contracts, and fight corruption. It empowers citizens
to hold their governments accountable on issues like protecting the
environment and ensuring product safety, which are important to the
health and well-being of our own people. It aligns American leadership
with the aspirations of everyday people in the region.
By the same token, our strategic presence in Asia--our alliances,
our trade agreements, our development initiatives and partnerships, our
ability to provide security and reassurance to our friends--enables us
to promote democracy and human rights more effectively. Our partners in
the region are more likely to work with us on these issues if they know
that the United States remains committed to maintaining our leadership
in the region and that we will stand by them in moments of need. To
advance the vision we share with so many of the region's people, we
must be present and principled at the same time.
advancing democracy: civil society, transparent and
responsive governance, and access to information
As we continue to deepen our engagement in Asia and the Pacific
region, the promotion of democracy, human rights, and good governance
is front and center--in private and public diplomacy. Our engagement is
focused in three key areas: strengthening civil society, encouraging
transparent and accountable governance, and increasing access to
information.
In his remarks before the U.N. General Assembly in September,
President Obama noted, ``When civil society thrives, communities can
solve problems that governments cannot necessarily solve alone.''
History has shown that durable change is most likely to come from
within. That means to be truly effective, we must stand up for civil
society, give civil society actors a lifeline of support when they need
it, and help preserve space for them to make the case for change in
their own societies.
Southeast Asia is home to a vibrant and active civil society that
we work closely with through initiatives like the Young Southeast Asian
Leaders Initiative. Countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Malaysia have some of the most vibrant and diverse civil society
organizations in the world. However, the region has not been immune to
a worldwide trend of government restrictions on civil society. One
example is Thailand, where the military regime has restricted civil
liberties since seizing power in May 2014. Next door, the Cambodian
Government has also pushed through legislation restricting the ability
of nongovernmental organizations to operate freely.
Some have argued that these crackdowns are a rejection of
democracy, but in fact, these repressive policies are the result of
democracy's powerful appeal. Democratic movements raise citizens'
expectations and empower them to demand basic rights. Last year,
Indonesia hosted the largest single-day elections in the world. During
that election, citizen-activists built a web app that crowd-sourced a
parallel vote tally and helped increase the Indonesian electorate's
confidence in that historic day. Similarly, the recent elections in
Burma enjoyed the participation of the vast majority of Burma's
citizens, marking another important step in its democratic transition.
In some Southeast Asian countries, new tools have enabled
governments to be more open and to make data about governance more
accessible, which has resulted in a better informed and empowered
citizenry. And we know that open and transparent government is the best
route to advancing both democracy and development. For example, in the
Philippines, the government required grassroots participation in the
planning and budgeting of poverty-reduction programs in every one of
its municipal and provincial governments. That requirement has resulted
not only in greater citizen involvement in the creation,
implementation, and evaluation of programs, but also bettered tailored
policies for communities.
The Philippines undertook this initiative as a founding member of
the Open Government Partnership (OGP)--a multilateral initiative that
includes governments and civil society from around the world working
together on good governance reforms. The United States was also a
founding member of this effort as was Indonesia, which chaired the OGP
in 2014. This partnership allows the U.S. Government to promote
democracy and good governance through practical cooperation with
governments such as the Philippines and Indonesia to improve governance
by making it more open and more transparent.
We will continue to push to expand participation in the OGP in
Southeast Asia. OGP members are required to construct national action
plans in consultation with civil society and to agree upon reforms in
the areas of transparency, anticorruption, good governance, and citizen
participation. This structure ensures that governments make transparent
aspects of their decisionmaking and activity, and it preserves an open
society in which citizens are free to scrutinize and criticize
government and identify opportunities for improvement. This can be an
uncomfortable process for governments, but it is a critical piece of
what makes it possible for citizens to hold their leaders accountable.
As we push for this government-to-government cooperation, we also
realize that initiatives like OGP only work if they are supported by an
open and active civil society that is able to express itself openly and
share information freely. This is why access to information is the
third element in our democracy promotion strategy. In Southeast Asia,
we have seen explosive growth in Internet access and usage, sometimes
catching governments in the region by surprise, even, as they grapple
with how to manage this flow of information. We believe access to
information and freedom of expression are important indicators of a
democracy's health. A free and open Internet as well as an independent
press are instrumental in rooting out corruption and increasing
government accountability.
At the same time, we also are troubled by what appears to be
backsliding in recent months with respect to restrictions on both
traditional and online media around the world, including in the region.
In some countries, defamation and national security laws have been used
to harass, intimidate, and silence journalists and bloggers. In
Malaysia, officials have tightened restrictions on freedom of
expression, and government critics are now victims of charges under
Malaysia's Sedition Laws, which Prime Minister Najib publicly committed
to eliminating only 3 years ago.
And in countries like Vietnam--which has an impressive level of
Internet penetration and has made modest improvement in human rights
over the last few years--many journalists and online activists continue
to suffer harassment or remain in prison for peacefully expressing
their views.
Civil society, government transparency, and access to information
are a three-legged stool upon which strong democracies are built. In
addition to our diplomatic efforts to bolster these foundations, we
also provide grassroots, results-oriented programming. Across the
region, we support dozens of innovative programs that increase the
effectiveness of local civil society organizations to improve their
communities on their terms. Our programs have trained labor activists,
brought human rights principles to security forces, strengthened
election mechanisms, and enabled citizen journalists to connect, share,
and publish their work. Our rapid response mechanisms have enabled us
to provide immediate relief and help activists and civil society
leaders and their organizations when their governments respond
negatively to their insisting on having a voice in the decisions that
most affect their lives.
overview of the region
The experience of democracy in Southeast Asia ranges from vibrant
democracies in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Timor-Leste, to one-
party states like Vietnam and Laos, where citizens do not have the
right to determine their form of government. The countries we are
focusing on today represent some of the diversity we see in the region,
and each requires a separate and unique response.
Burma
November 8 elections in Burma were competitive, with more than 90
political parties campaigning. Millions of people voted for the first
time, seizing this opportunity to move one step closer to a democracy
that respects the rights of all. The people of Burma have struggled for
decades and made tremendous sacrifices for this moment to happen.
International and domestic observers closely monitored the
electoral process, and their analyses confirmed the conduct of the
elections was largely peaceful, transparent, and credible. We continue
to encourage Burma's Union Election Commission to investigate any
irregularities and to take every step necessary to ensure they are
resolved promptly, transparently, and appropriately.
We congratulate the National League for Democracy on its victory in
an overwhelming number of elected union-level Parliament and state and
regional Parliament seats; the results are a testament to Aung San Suu
Kyi's decades-long commitment to democracy in Burma and the Government
of Burma's commitment to furthering its democratic transition.
While the elections were an important step forward, they were
imperfect due to structural and systemic impediments: the reservation
of 25 percent of the seats in Parliament for the military; the
disenfranchisement of people who had been able to vote in previous
elections, including most of the Rohingya; and the disqualification of
candidates based on the arbitrary application of citizenship and
residency requirements.
The United States believes a peaceful post-elections period is
critical to maintaining stability and the confidence of the people of
Burma in the credibility of the electoral process. It will be important
for all political leaders to work together as the new government is
formed and to engage in meaningful dialogue. The statements from
Burma's President Thein Sein and Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing
reiterating their commitment to honor the results of the election are
encouraging; we also welcomed Aung San Suu Kyi's call for calm and
acceptance of the elections results.
Burma's next government will face huge challenges, including
completing the national reconciliation process with various ethnic
groups, reforming the constitution, strengthening respect for and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and addressing the
situation in Rakhine State.
We continue to closely monitor the situation in Rakhine State and
the vulnerable Rohingya population. We are deeply concerned by reports
of ongoing human rights abuses, religious freedom violations, and
exploitative conditions. We have raised our concerns at the most senior
levels with Government of Burma officials, and continue to emphasize
Burma's previous commitments to improve the lives and livelihoods of
all those affected by Rakhine State's humanitarian crisis.
In October, the Government of Burma concluded a multiparty cease-
fire agreement with eight ethnic armed groups. We hope the signing of
this agreement serves as the important first step in the process of
building a sustainable and just peace in Burma. Several ethnic armed
groups did not sign the agreement, however, and the United States
respects their decisions--and welcomes their commitment to continue
discussions within their own communities about the necessary conditions
for signing at a future date. Follow-through on cease-fire agreement
provisions, restraint on military operations, and unfettered access for
humanitarian assistance are now key.
The United States remains committed to supporting democratic reform
in Burma, and the continued engagement of senior-level U.S. officials
has reflected this belief. In May, Deputy Secretary Blinken visited
Burma and other countries in Southeast Asia to raise issues related to
democratization, human rights, and irregular migration. In October,
Deputy National Security Advisor Rhodes traveled to the region to meet
with senior Burmese Government officials, opposition party leaders, and
civil society representatives to emphasize the importance of the
upcoming elections and continued democratic reform. His trip followed
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Assistant Secretary Russel's visit to
Burma in September. Assistant Secretary Russel's October 21 joint
testimony with USAID Assistant Administrator Stivers on the United
States Burma policy to the House Foreign Affairs Committee also served
to underscore high-level U.S. Government attention on Burma's progress
toward democratic and economic reform.
Cambodia
The July 2014 political agreement followed closely contested
elections in 2013 and a long standoff between the government and
opposition. This agreement between the ruling Cambodian People's Party
(CPP) and the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), and the
subsequent ``Culture of Dialogue'' between the parties' leaders,
brought hope that Cambodia's democracy was on a positive trajectory. In
order to secure more transparent elections, the two parties reformed
the National Election Law and overhauled the National Election
Committee (NEC). Recent events, however, including beatings, arrests,
imprisonment of opposition supporters, and the removal of opposition
MPs, have severely limited political space and are a cause for grave
concern. Free and fair elections cannot happen in an environment where
peaceful expression and activity by government opponents is subject to
arbitrary limitations.
The ``Culture of Dialogue'' was meant to replace the rancor that
had characterized past political discourse. It has apparently failed,
as party leaders increasingly trade insults and threats. The use of
violence as a political tool also has returned. On October 26, two
opposition members of Parliament were severely beaten following a
government-orchestrated demonstration that called for the ouster of
CNRP deputy Kem Sokha from his position as National Assembly vice
president. The government officially condemned the violence, but then
granted the request of the ``demonstrators,'' removing Sokha in a
controversial vote. The Cambodian Government's subsequent issuance of
an arrest warrant for CNRP President Sam Rainsy, followed by his ouster
from the National Assembly and consequent loss of parliamentary
immunity, only made matters worse. These actions recall a more
authoritarian period in Cambodia's recent past and raise serious doubts
about the government's commitment to the reforms undertaken in 2014.
In the last year, the Cambodian Government also enacted a series of
laws that substantially limit fundamental freedoms and undermine
Cambodia's democracy. The Law on the Election of Members of the
National Assembly (LEMNA) penalizes NGOs that criticize political
parties during the 21-day period set for campaigning. Meanwhile, other
provisions allow security forces to take part in political campaigns.
Yet other provisions make it easier for the government to strip
parliamentarians of their seats--a power which the government has
proven very willing to use. Similarly, the vaguely worded Law on
Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (LANGO) imposes onerous
registration requirements on any ``group'' undertaking any
``activity,'' potentially subjecting all social activity to regulation.
It is unclear how strictly the Cambodian government will enforce the
law, though early indications are not encouraging.
The opaque legislative process that passed LEMNA and LANGO with
limited public involvement continues, allowing the government to rush
through other controversial laws with little stakeholder consultation.
The National Assembly is set to vote on a draft Trade Union Law that
includes very little input from independent labor unions and may not be
compliant with International Labor Organization standards on freedom of
association. The U.S. Government will continue to urge transparency and
accountability in the legislative process, starting with making draft
laws publicly available.
Looking ahead, we are very concerned that the 2017 local and the
2018 national elections will not be free or fair and could include
violence. We have strongly voiced our concerns about intimidation of
the opposition, noting that the Cambodian people continue to express a
preference for greater freedom and accountability from their
government. We have repeatedly stressed the need for the government to
allow sufficient political space for the opposition. U.S. programs will
play an increasingly vital role in promoting democracy in a country
where democratic values are under threat. We will support efforts to
improve the electoral process, including ensuring reliable voter
registration though assistance to Cambodia's NEC. We will maintain
support for Cambodia's vibrant civil society, enabling it to continue
playing its crucial role in Cambodia's democracy.
Thailand
The United States has a long history of friendship and shared
interests with Thailand over the course of our 182-year-old
relationship. We want Thailand to emerge from the current period as a
strengthened democracy, not only for its own future but also for our
bilateral relationship, which can only fully resume with the
restoration of elected government.
Since the military-led coup in May 2014, the government's timetable
for returning Thailand to democratic governance has slipped several
times. The military-appointed National Reform Council on September 6
rejected a controversial draft constitution written by a separate,
military-appointed committee. A new committee now is working on another
draft charter for approval by public referendum; if it passes,
elections would take place in mid-2017.
We continue to advocate for the full restoration of civil liberties
in Thailand, which we believe is a prerequisite for an open and robust
debate about the country's political future, something particularly
critical now. A year-and-a-half after the coup, the military-backed
government continues restricting civil liberties, including limiting
fundamental freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and trying
civilians in military courts. Media restrictions remain, and
journalists, politicians, and activists have been summoned for
criticizing the regime. We encourage the ruling National Council for
Peace and Order to engage directly with political parties and civil
society, allowing all Thais to express their views without retaliation,
and to take those views into account.
We are not advocating for a specific constitutional or political
blueprint. Those are questions for the Thai people to decide. Rather,
we seek an inclusive political process so that the Thai people have a
meaningful say in the outcomes and accept the results. We are concerned
that, without such a timely, transparent, and inclusive reform process,
it will be difficult for the Thai Government to enjoy the public
support necessary to build lasting institutions.
Due to the Thai military's intervention, we immediately suspended
certain assistance when the coup occurred, as required by law. We will
not resume this type of assistance until a democratically elected
government takes office. In addition, we continue to review, case by
case, whether to proceed with certain high-level engagements, military
exercises, and training programs with the military and police.
We remain committed to maintaining our enduring friendship with the
Thai people and nation, including our long-standing and important
security alliance. We continue to cooperate closely on issues such as
public health, law enforcement, counternarcotics, trafficking in
persons, counterterrorism, refugees and displaced persons, climate
change, and maritime security to benefit both our countries, the
region, and beyond.
Our objective is that Thailand's transition to civilian rule be
inclusive, transparent, and timely and result in a return to democracy
through free and fair elections that reflect the will of the Thai
people. As Thailand rebuilds democratic institutions of governance and
reconciles competing political factions, we are confident that the
country will continue to be a crucial partner in Asia in the decades to
come.
Indonesia
Indonesia began its transition to democracy 17 years ago, after
more than 40 years of authoritarian and military rule. Now, as the
world's third-largest democracy, it is a success story and a model for
other emerging democracies. This accomplishment is all the more
impressive for taking place in the world's fourth-largest country. The
scale of its 2014 Presidential election was remarkable: almost 125
million voters at 550,000 polling stations across the 3,000-mile width
of the Indonesian archipelago. This was the largest single-day election
in the world and voter turnout was almost 70 percent.
Despite these successes, Indonesia still has work to do
consolidating its democratic gains. For example, corruption is
widespread and protection of minority rights is sometimes inconsistent
in practice. Political decentralization has been a major step in
democratization, but also has highlighted the need to improve
governance at all levels. However, these concerns should not obscure
the remarkable progress Indonesians have experienced over the last 17
years. They enjoy more freedom and prosperity than at any other time in
their history; civil society is blossoming, the press is free, and
women have an influential voice. Indonesia is both the world's largest
Muslim-majority country and its third-largest democracy, and so serves
as an example to many other countries.
Malaysia
Malaysia has a parliamentary system of government and holds
multiparty elections. Nevertheless, the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO), together with a coalition of political parties
known as the National Front (BN), has held power since independence in
1957. The ruling coalition lost the popular vote to the opposition in
May 2013 general elections, but was reelected in Malaysia's first past-
the-post system. Opposition gains came despite electoral irregularities
and systemic disadvantages for opposition groups due to lack of media
access and gerrymandered districts favoring those in power.
The United States consistently advocates for free and fair
elections in Malaysia. While we were pleased to see Malaysians across
the political spectrum engaged in the electoral process in large
numbers with unprecedented enthusiasm in 2013, we publicly noted our
concerns about opposition access to the media. Just 3 weeks after the
elections, the government arrested several opposition leaders under the
Sedition Act, a law Prime Minister Najib had publicly promised to
repeal. In March 2014, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was convicted of
politically motivated sodomy charges levied against him in 2008. A
federal court reaffirmed his conviction in February of this year,
raising serious questions regarding rule of law and judicial
independence. Anwar remains imprisoned today, effectively removing him
from politics.
Since June 2015, when Prime Minister Najib became embroiled in
allegations of corruption regarding his ties to state-owned development
company 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), the human rights situation
has trended downward quickly. We are increasingly troubled--and have
been increasingly vocal--about the continued use of the Sedition Act
and other laws to harass, detain, and imprison government critics,
including Anwar. Despite changes to the law, the government still uses
the Sedition Act to silence its critics. The government has charged
dozens with sedition, including opposition members of Parliament, state
assemblymen, community and NGO activists, Internet bloggers, academics,
and artists. It has used national security laws to detain members of
the ruling party who had called for investigations into the Prime
Minister's ties to 1MDB and $700 million in deposits to his personal
bank account.
We frequently engage Malaysian Government officials at the highest
levels about the most significant human rights problems, especially
government restrictions on freedom of expression and the continued
imprisonment of Anwar. Secretary Kerry raised these concerns directly
with Prime Minister Najib in August and again with Deputy Prime
Minister Zahid in October. Our Ambassador and Embassy personnel are in
regular contact with Anwar's family and senior Malaysian officials to
ensure Anwar receives proper treatment--and to reinforce our ongoing
opposition to his politically motivated imprisonment.
Despite significant concerns about the trajectory of human rights--
especially in the past several months--our bilateral relationship with
the Malaysian people is important in its own right. Malaysia is our
second-largest trading partner in ASEAN, and Malaysia has been a global
leader in efforts to stem the flow of terrorist fighters and counter
violent extremism. We have engaged extensively with the Government of
Malaysia on human trafficking, including forced labor, which continues
to be a serious problem. Our cooperation on issues of mutual interest,
such as trade and security, provide a foundation for us to raise our
concerns frankly and frequently with our Malaysian counterparts. In
addition, we will continue to meet regularly with civil society
organizations representing all viewpoints, and provide support where
possible, in order to encourage freedom of expression in Malaysia.
Philippines
Since its independence from the United States in 1946, and
particularly since the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, the
Philippines has advanced into a durable and vibrant Southeast Asian
democracy. While corruption and poverty continue to plague the country,
President Benigno Aquino III has pursued a successful reform-minded
agenda that has delivered tangible results for the Filipino people.
Extrajudicial killings, while still a problem, have become less common
under the Aquino administration.
As we noted above, the Philippines is a founding member of the Open
Government Partnership and a leader in the development of transparency
and good governance tools. Our wide range of official assistance
through USAID in support of the Open Government Partnership with the
Philippines further strengthens the country's democratic institutions
by fostering broad-based economic growth, including through
strengthening the protection of labor rights; improving the health and
education of Filipinos; promoting peace and security; advancing good
governance, and human rights; and strengthening regional and global
partnerships.
tpp and democratic values
Above, we have argued that promoting democracy and human rights and
deepening our strategic presence in Asia are mutually reinforcing
goals. This is also the case with respect to our pursuit of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement. Our ability to advance
democratic values in Asia depends on reassuring friends and allies that
we are committed to the region's security and prosperity. It depends on
the United States maintaining a leading role in shaping the development
of the region's institutions and norms. The TPP will enable us to
continue playing that role. If we do not, others will and they will not
use their leadership to promote universal values of democracy and human
rights. In addition, the prospect of participation in a completed TPP
encourages countries in the region to make progress in human rights and
labor rights.
conclusion
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we continue to implement our strategic
rebalance, within which democracy, human rights, and good governance
play a central role. The region encompasses a range of countries in
democratic transition. A common thread between them is that their
people are increasingly demanding more from their governments--better
services, more transparency, greater tolerance for, and protection of,
religious and ethnic diversity, and expanded opportunities to
participate in and benefit from economic growth. The Department of
State will continue to support these countries and their people as they
seek to strengthen and sustain democratic governance and protect and
promote universal human rights. With continued U.S. engagement backed
by congressional support, we are confident that democracy will continue
to take root and expand in Southeast Asia.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. We are pleased to
answer any questions you may have.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Busby.
Our next witness is Mr. James Carouso, who serves as Acting
Deputy Secretary of State at the Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs. Most recently, Mr. Carouso served as the
counselor for economic affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta
and as Director of the State Department office responsible for
relations with the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei,
Singapore, and East Timor.
Mr. Carouso, thank you. We look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JAMES A. CAROUSO, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Carouso. Thank you very much, Chairman Gardner, Ranking
Member Cardin. It is a real pleasure to be here to have the
privilege to testify before you today.
Promoting democracy and human rights is an integral part of
our daily diplomacy in Southeast Asia, particularly, of course,
in countries that are either not democracies or where democracy
is fragile.
Thirty years ago, as you mentioned, democracies were few
and far between in Southeast Asia. But now, a majority of
Southeast Asians live in democracies in places like the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Timor-Leste. Others have made the
progress toward the democratic path.
In all these places, the people of those nations, of
course, deserve most of the credit. They are the ones who
ousted the authoritarian regimes. But the United States
strongly supported all of these democratic transitions. At all
of our embassies, it is one of the things we do and take pride
in. I will talk briefly about what we are doing in some very
different places that you asked about--Burma, Thailand,
Malaysia, and the Philippines.
In Burma, as you mentioned, millions of people voted for
the first time in the November 8 elections, seizing the
opportunity to move one step closer to a democracy that
respects the will and rights of all. International and domestic
observers confirm the conduct of the elections were largely
peaceful, transparent, and credible. While the elections were
an important step forward, they were imperfect due to
structural and systemic impediments.
Looking ahead, we believe a peaceful, post-election period
is critical to maintaining stability and the confidence of the
people. It will be important for all political leaders to work
together as a new government is formed and to engage in
meaningful dialogue as they tackle the huge challenges that
face the country.
We remain committed to supporting democratic reform in
Burma and our continued senior-level engagement has reflected
this.
In Thailand, a longtime friend and treaty ally, we have
stood for democracy there throughout the past decade of
political turmoil. Our message to the government since the coup
just over 1.5 years ago has been clear. We are eager to see our
bilateral relationship restored to its fullest potential, but
this can only happen when democratic civilian government is
restored. Until then, we will hold back certain assistance that
has been suspended since the coup.
However, we will continue to cooperate with the Thai on
regional and global issues that serve U.S. interests, such as
health, law enforcement, trafficking, climate change, and
regional security. In our interactions with the Thai, we have
repeatedly stressed that it is vital for Thailand to have an
inclusive political process and to fully restore civil
liberties. This is essential to the open debate the country
needs to have about its political future.
In my third example, Malaysia, we were pleased to see
Malaysians across the political spectrum engaged in the 2013
electoral process in large numbers with unprecedented
enthusiasm, but we publicly noted then about our concerns about
opposition access to the media. Soon after the elections, the
government arrested several opposition leaders under the
Sedition Act, a law the prime minister publicly promised to
repeal.
Since June 2013 when the Prime Minister became embroiled in
corruption allegations, the human rights situation has rapidly
trended downward. We are increasingly troubled and have been
increasingly vocal about the continued use of national security
laws to harass and occasionally imprison government critics,
including Anwar Ibrahim, the leader of the opposition.
Finally, in the Philippines, corruption and poverty
continue to be major concerns. President Aquino has pursued a
reform agenda that has delivered tangible results for the
people. Our wide range of official assistance to the
Philippines further strengthens the country's democratic
institutions.
Mr. Chairman, we admire all that so many people in Asia
have done to promote democracy and good governance, while
recognizing there is so much that remains to be done. In our
everyday diplomacy, we will continue to do all we can as a
friend and reliable partner to support efforts to build and
strengthen democracy. We appreciate the work of this committee
in supporting these efforts.
Finally, let me emphasize that trade and investments,
especially TPP, are important both to support the U.S. economy
and to our efforts to promote democracy in the region. Thank
you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Carouso. Thank you again,
Mr. Busby, as well. We will proceed to questions now.
Mr. Busby, as the lead of the Bureau for Democracy and
Human Rights at State Department, the elections in Burma, how
do you think that affects the path to democracy? What happens
over the next several months? What do you anticipate over the
next year? What do you anticipate the U.S. reaction to these
elections being?
Mr. Busby. We thought the elections were a significant,
meaningful step forward. That does not mean we thought they
were fully free and fair. As you yourself noted, 25 percent of
the seats in the Parliament are still reserved for the
military. Many citizens--not citizens. Many residents in Burma
were prevented from voting, most of them Rohingya, which is
very problematic for us and for the international community.
And many would-be candidates for Parliament were disqualified
under opaque and seemingly arbitrary procedures.
So there were significant problems with this election. That
said, the Burmese people turned out in great numbers with great
passion and returned a resounding victory for the National
League for Democracy.
We think this is a significant step forward. Obviously,
there is a lot more to be done in terms of the negotiations
between the NLD and the military and the other political
parties in Burma. But we think it is a significant step
forward.
Senator Gardner. What do you think needs to happen in Burma
over the next month, as these transitions take place, or maybe
perhaps what we do not want to see out of Burma in the next
month as they proceed to the selection of the President?
Mr. Busby. I think we need to first ensure that the
military and the powers that be in Burma do allow the NLD to
take power in the Parliament. We need to ensure that no
irreversible decisions are made by now the lame-duck Parliament
that ties the hands of the incoming Parliament. And I think we
need to see progress on addressing some of the key human rights
challenges in the country, including the release of political
prisoners, addressing the situation of the Rohingya, and trying
to broaden the ceasefire that has been negotiated with some of
the ethnic armed groups, but not all.
Senator Gardner. In terms of human rights issues, the
Rohingya, has the U.S. policy effectively--we have about
140,000 estimates in these camps, refugees--has U.S. policy
been effective in addressing this issue?
Mr. Busby. We continue to be concerned about the number of
Rohingya who remain in camps. That said, a process for
resettling some of those people has begun quietly, which we
think is a positive development. But the fact that so many
remain in camps continues to be of great concern to us.
We raise the Rohingya at every opportunity and at the
highest level, from President Obama on down. Deputy National
Security Adviser Ben Rhodes was there a month or so ago. He
raised the issue. Assistant Secretary Russell was there before
him. He raised the issue. And my boss, Assistant Secretary
Malinowski, has raised the issue on several occasions during
his trips there, including during the human rights dialogue.
We also support efforts by the multilateral community to
highlight our concern about the issue and address the issue.
So we are doing what we can, but it is a tough, tough issue
within Burma. But we continue to press them.
Senator Gardner. At the ASEAN summit coming up, will this
be addressed? If so, what do you anticipate the outcome?
Mr. Busby. I cannot speak for the President in advance of
meetings that he will have there, but our concern about this
issue has been one that he has repeatedly raised. He is
personally seized with it, and I would be very surprised if he
does not take the opportunity to raise it again with Burmese
and other counterparts.
Senator Gardner. Given the outcome of the election, at the
monsoon season's ending last year, we saw a number of refugees
fleeing, the Rohingya taking the refugee approach and fleeing
in boats. Do we anticipate that perhaps again at the end of the
monsoon season? If so, what leverage can the United States
exercise to try to address that, given the outcome of the
elections?
Mr. Busby. After the end of the last sailing season, the
U.S. Government has undertaken a concerted effort with partners
in the region, other governments as well as civil society, to
do what we can to address this problem. We have sought to
identify and target smugglers and traffickers engaged in this
trade. We have pressed the Burmese Government to address the
root causes of the Rohingya problem. And we have pressed other
governments in the region to open their doors to those migrants
who may leave Burma.
It is hard to predict with any certainty what will happen
this sailing season. But it is an issue we are very seized of
and very much involved in trying to address.
Senator Gardner. Mr. Carouso.
Mr. Carouso. If I could, we just got a report today that at
this time last year about 13,000 Rohingya and other refugees,
mainly Bangladeshi, had sailed to the south. This year,
International Organization for Migration estimates only about
1,000. This is in part because of the attention that was
focused on it last year, but most especially the pressure we
have put on the Thai to close these crossings, the pressure we
put on the Thai, Burmese, and the Bangladeshis to crackdown on
the smugglers. So clearly it is having some effect.
I would also note that in Thailand, there is going to be a
second conference on irregular migration. I believe it is in
the first week of December. So it is also critical that the
ASEAN nations have recognized the problem and are trying to
work together to address it.
Senator Gardner. On the second panel, in the testimony from
Mr. Hiebert, he talks about the impact of U.S. pressure versus
U.S. corporation, how that can change the direction or how that
can influence nations in Southeast Asia, in the sense that was
used in the statement that will be coming up, it says,
``Generally, the United States has the most impact as a
champion of democracy in the region when it leads by example
rather than by carrying a stick.''
I was just wondering if you would want to comment on that
and how we use that, perhaps, if that is, indeed, the case, if
you agree with it or not, but what that means for Thailand and
other nations that seem to be heading in the wrong direction?
Mr. Busby. I mean, I would say, globally, serving as an
example is the best way to spark change on human rights or on
other issues around the world.
I am hesitant to generalize about what policies have been
most effective in what countries. I mean, I think in the case
of Burma, for instance, the fact that there were sanctions
there, a significant sanctions regime, did play a significant
role in helping to spark change there.
But I would be hesitant to say, as a general matter, that
carrots or sticks have been more effective than one or the
other.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Busby.
Mr. Carouso, do you care to comment on that?
Mr. Carouso. Each country situation really is different. In
Thailand, for instance, very clearly we have taken action that
focuses on the military since the military is the source of the
problem. But we want to maintain the incredibly close ties we
have with the people of Thailand, the business community of
Thailand, so we are trying to organize ourselves to have the
most influence without affecting our long-term relationships.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Carouso.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Let me again thank both of you for not only
being here today, but for your work in this field.
It would be wonderful if just the U.S. example would be
enough to change behavior among those who have power. In Burma,
of course, there was such obvious oppression in a military
state that it was pretty easy for Congress to identify progress
that had to be made in order to get to any type of a normal
relationship with the country. The elections were pretty clear
mandate, and Burma is making progress. We hope we will see the
day where we will not need any of those types of sanctions.
Corruption is a little bit more difficult. You have
countries that have basically been built on corruption under
totalitarian, authoritarian states. Corruption is so widespread
that it is very difficult to figure out how you can identify a
solution, when people think it is a way of life to pay off
someone in order to go to school, to pay off someone in order
to go a job.
The United Nations has now established in their sustainable
development goals a goal of good governance, at the leadership
of the United States, in order to promote that particular
objective.
What more can we do to enforce anticorruption initiatives
among the Southeast Asian countries? There is not one that does
not have a significant problem with corruption. We seem to
always put that last on our agenda. What more can we do to
fight corruption in that region?
Mr. Carouso. You know, Senator, my father is an immigrant
from Greece. The reason he left Greece was because corruption
was so bad. So 2,000 years after founding democracy, inventing
it, he could not get past the corruption there. So it is a
problem throughout history, and it is, certainly, a problem in
these emerging democracies.
In Indonesia, I spoke to a university. There must have been
500 people in the audience, students. I asked them what the
biggest problem in the country was. They said corruption. They
asked me what they could do about it. I said, ``Do not pay.
Take a picture of someone who asks for a bribe and put it on
the Internet. Do whatever you need to do.'' I am afraid the
answer was that they laughed, because that is the way things
are done.
So the question is how you change a culture of corruption.
One thing we have been trying to do is to talk about our FCPA
and how it works and why it is important and why doing business
with American companies will protect its bureaucrats who sign
contracts with us, because we say we will protect you by making
sure our companies abide by your laws against corruption.
It is a long-term process of changing expectations. While
the United States as an example may not be sufficient, in this
case I think it is probably the best tool we have while we
encourage these countries to reform their judiciary to try
corrupt practices, encourage participation in open governance
programs, and other things. But it is going to be a long haul,
I am afraid.
Senator Cardin. I would point out that one thing you could
do at State is work within the bureaucracies of the Department
of State to put a higher priority on the damage of corruption.
We have been urging working with Transparency International to
develop standards where we can report on the status of
anticorruption in the countries of the world. We do that with
trafficking in persons. We think we need to have an index where
when an ambassador comes and meets with me, I always have the
TIP report in front of me so I can go over what they are doing
on trafficking. We should have a similar effort on corruption.
I agree with you. We are never going to totally eliminate
trafficking. We are never going to totally eliminate
corruption. But we can to a much better job on both.
There are universal standards. We know that an independent
judiciary, an independent prosecutor, having laws against
bribery, financing these operations so that they have adequate
resources--we know that all of these are indications that a
country is serious about fighting corruption.
We also know that corruption is a global problem. What
happened in Ukraine was very much aimed at people who were very
angry and as frustrated as your father was in Greece as to what
they were seeing from their government. They wanted an honest
opportunity in Ukraine. It was not so much Russia versus
Europe. It was that their country was not giving them the
services that they wanted. They decided they had had enough.
But back to my original point about security--you are not
going to have security unless you deal with these issues. But I
really do not think the State Department has put a priority on
this. Am I wrong?
Mr. Busby. I mean, there is a lot of work going on at the
Department on corruption, Senator. My boss, as you may know, is
quite seized of the issue as well and recognizes that for the
purpose of democratization, as Jim has also mentioned,
corruption is often at the top of the list of issues that
citizens want to be addressed.
One thing we are doing at the State Department is sanctions
vis-a-vis corruption. There is an Executive order that
authorizes us to sanction individuals who we believe are
engaged in corruption. There is an active process of trying to
identify individuals who can be sanctioned under that executive
order.
And to go back to the issue of transparency I mentioned
earlier, one of the things that can be done through the
Internet and through other information-sharing devices is to
shine a light on corruption where it occurs. There is a
wonderful app, I think you call it, called I Paid a Bribe. I do
not know how popular it is in Southeast Asia, but I know that
in India, Kenya, and places like that, it allows citizens who,
when they experience corruption, to immediately publicize it. I
know that that has had an impact in some countries around the
world. It is something that I think we should continue to
support and encourage.
Senator Cardin. There are good people at the State
Department trying to do the right thing. I would just urge that
we have to figure out a way to break through the bureaucracy of
the State Department to make this a much higher priority than
it is today.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one other question, if I
might, as it relates to do Thailand.
How much patience do we have here? This is a country where
we have a long relationship. We have a strategic partnership.
Every country in the world, we have some degree of strategic
partnership--with the exception of perhaps North Korea and
Iran. But just about every country, we have reason to want to
have a good relationship with them.
Thailand is, certainly, a country that we want to have a
good relationship with. But how can we condone the lack of
progress in this country toward democratic rule? It has been
the policy of United States for a long time that we do not
acknowledge coups. But it has been a long time now.
The progress seems to be moving at a snail's pace. So why
are we not more aggressive with our friends in Thailand?
Mr. Carouso. It has been incredibly frustrating working
with our Thai friends. As you noted before, they said they had
a roadmap and a new constitution, and they scrapped it. On the
other hand, from what they wrote, it was worth scrapping.
They are also negotiating these new rules without reference
to civil society. We keep telling the government, unless you
bring in all parts of the country and have this understood by
all, it is not going to be what you want.
As I mentioned before, we are trying to target the
pressure, and it is having an effect in terms of seeing the
Thai leadership now almost begging for our understanding. Of
course, unless they do something about it, so what?
We continue to pressure them. We continue to encourage
them. We continue to reach out to civil society and the
political leadership from the civilian days. We have regular
meetings. Our new Ambassador there met with the leader of the
Democrat Party, with the Thai party. A group of former
parliamentarians was just here a couple weeks ago from all
parties on one of our IVLP programs, and it was great because
they said it was their only opportunity to get together and
talk about politics.
So we are trying to build up civil society, and we are
trying to create an environment where change can be made. But
the Thai polity is in a state of stasis, and we are finding it
hard to convince them to take the courageous step for them of
writing a new constitution and letting the people's will decide
the future.
Senator Cardin. That sounded like a good diplomatic answer.
You are well-trained in diplomacy. When you run for the Senate,
you give up diplomacy. I know it is tough, but I think Thailand
is just too important of a country and too close to us to allow
this to just sort of meander without a clear path forward. I do
not see a path forward at this particular moment. That is very
frustrating.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. I think we will go for maybe 10
more minutes or so on this panel, if we could, and then go to
the second panel.
Just to pick up where Senator Cardin left off on that, I
mean the constitution that was written was scrapped. It was, of
course, written by a group of people who were appointed by the
junta to put it together. The new draft is being written by
somebody who has also been appointed by the junta to do it, I
believe chairing the committee to do it.
You cannot have a constitution written that is effective at
that point, can you?
Mr. Carouso. The theory is that at the end of whatever they
write, it will be put to a referendum. I guess there is a
certain hope that if it is not truly a democratic piece of
paper, the people will vote against it.
Senator Gardner. Then the rule continues as it is.
Mr. Carouso. And that is exactly our concern, that they
keep rolling this down the road, which is why our main ask of
them right now is to keep to the schedule and bring in civil
society to help write the document. Otherwise, it is not going
to stand the smell test, and they hear us and nod.
Senator Gardner. So the conversation we had about sort of
the carrots and sticks and the leverage that I asked about in
Burma and others, looking at Thailand, either from leverage or
from a carrot and stick point of view, if we start asserting
leverage, if we start asserting sticks in terms of trying to
sway behavior, what impact does China have on that relationship
with Thailand right now? And how does that affect the
usefulness of carrots and sticks or leverage?
Mr. Carouso. Well, Thailand tries to use the leverage of
China on us, saying do not push us too hard. But there are two
things. One, we have our principles. Two, we have an
understanding that the long-term stability of Thailand depends
on democratic rule, regardless of any short-term shift to
China. Third, we have historical context, which is Thailand has
always played its role as setting off regional powers against
each other, which is how they stayed independent during the
colonial period.
So we listen with some concern to their statements about
China, but I do not think it changes our policy a whole lot.
Senator Gardner. So right now, in terms of looking out, the
scenario for military rule, is it indefinite in the point of
view right now? By 2017, 2018, 2019, we think things will
change, the constitution is approved?
Mr. Carouso. We are trying to take them at their word that
2017 is the next date. We keep telling them that you cannot
keep delaying that date indefinitely because your people will
not accept it over time.
But you know the society is going through transition, and
that is what they keep telling us. It is partially an excuse,
but having lived in Thailand, there is a certain truth to it.
As society developed, as rural Thais demanded a voice in their
country and their economy, the elite urban Thais resisted. They
are going through dealing with this.
This is not to condone it. It is to try to tell you what
they see as their problem.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Carouso.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Again, thanks. Let me turn to Malaysia, if
I might, for one moment. I do not want to lose this opportunity
with the two of you before our committee.
Malaysia has been elevated in its relationship with the
United States as a TPP partner. They got a rather generous
evaluation in the Trafficking in Persons report, being taken
off of Tier 3. They have a very serious problem with
trafficking, which is acknowledged in the Trafficking in
Persons report, the TIP report. Corruption is still a major,
major problem in Malaysia. Now we are talking about having a
trade agreement with Malaysia.
What should we be expecting during the next 6 months in
Malaysia? That is the period of time that many of us will have
to evaluate the TPP before we vote on it. It will be a period
of time in which we have, I think, maximum leverage.
So what do we expect? Give me a roadmap of what I should be
asking for in regard to changes in Malaysia.
Mr. Carouso. Thank you, Senator.
Malaysia has been, from Najib's election, a disappointment,
because we expected so much from him. But especially since
charges of corruption against Prime Minister Najib about 6
months ago, they have been really going downhill on civil
rights.
We have told him this repeatedly from the highest levels,
and President Obama is going to tell the Prime Minister about
our concerns again this weekend when he meets with him.
I would argue that TPP is actually a very useful tool for
TIP because under the labor standards chapter of TPP, they have
to rewrite laws and ensure they have new rules for labor,
including trafficking in persons, to comply with the rules for
TPP. Until they get those passed and implemented, TPP will not
apply to them. So that is within the next 6 months on the TIP
aspect.
As far as the political situation, we will continue to keep
meeting with the Government of Malaysia and encouraging them to
not use sedition and antiterrorism laws against political
opponents, to stop violating free speech, and to open up to
society.
Senator Cardin. And if they do not, what should we do?
Mr. Carouso. All I can say is that we will continue to
encourage them, sir.
Senator Cardin. You've got the diplomacy down so well.
Mr. Carouso. I used to be a banker, so I had to be
retrained.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Busby. I would point out as well that there is a
specific consistency plan as to Malaysia, as there is to Brunei
and Vietnam as well, that lays out the very specific
commitments or very specific things that the Government of
Malaysia has to do in order for TPP to come into effect. So I
think we have taken account as to some of the specificity in
the Malaysia context to try to deal with that through TPP.
Senator Cardin. There are many aspects to the TPP. We are
not going to get into a debate about that. But I do agree with
you that I think Ambassador Froman did do a good job on
enforcement issues in Malaysia and Vietnam, in regard to the
implementation and the failure to do so, the specific trade
relief that will not be granted. So I did note that.
But having said that, there is a lot more to dealing with a
country that lacks the same degree of democratic institutions
to make sure that good governance issues are embedded before
the TPP goes into effect.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Just one last question for this panel from me, and if you
have one too. This will be quick.
Can you talk a little bit about Southeast Asia, the region,
South China Sea?
Mr. Carouso.
Mr. Carouso. In very general terms.
Senator Gardner. Please.
Mr. Carouso. Well, this is, of course, the big geostrategic
issue of the region. What we have been working on is trying to
unify ASEAN as a collective to push back against Chinese
expansionism. We have been trying to get China to agree to a
halt with ASEAN claimant states to no more reclamation, no more
construction, and no militarization.
In fact, when President Xi was in the Rose Garden, he
announced there would be no militarization of the features that
they have established. Now the Chinese have, unfortunately,
walked that back. But we keep citing that. We keep encouraging
our ASEAN friends to keep reminding the Chinese of that
commitment. But it is an issue we take very, very seriously and
work literally every day.
Senator Gardner. And with the meetings this weekend, you
anticipate what outcome on the South China Sea?
Mr. Carouso. I can tell you it will be discussed.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Thank you to the first panel for your participation today.
I truly appreciate your time and your work. Thank you.
Mr. Carouso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Busby. Thank you.
Senator Gardner. If we could be joined now by the second
panel?
Our first witness is Ambassador Mark Green, who serves as
the president of the International Republican Institute.
Ambassador Green served as U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania from
2007 to 2009. Prior to serving as U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Green
served four terms in the U.S. House of Representatives,
representing Wisconsin's Eighth District.
Welcome, Ambassador Green. Thank you very much for your
time, your service, and our opportunity to learn from you
today. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK GREEN, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee.
The International Republican Institute is a nonpartisan,
nonprofit organization that works in about 90 countries around
the world promoting democracy. Eight of those countries are in
Southeast Asia. I think it is safe to say that no region of the
world these days is at once more challenging and more promising
than that region, Southeast Asia. In my brief remarks this
morning, and I obviously have a more extended written
testimony, I would like to discuss very briefly those countries
where challenges remain, and then point to a few countries
where there is progress and there is hope and some reason for
optimism.
To begin with, unfortunately, there are countries, as the
previous panel alluded to, that are suffering from constricting
civil society space and democratic backsliding. Perhaps the
clearest example, as you yourself have alluded to, is Thailand
where a May 2014 military coup has severely curtailed the space
for civil society and for political discourse. What had been a
strong flame for democracy and liberty sadly is reduced to just
a few embers.
The highly antidemocratic process the government is using
to draft a new constitution is very troubling. The first
drafting committee whose members were handpicked by the
military submitted a draft charter, which was rejected in
September, meaning that they will have military rule until at
least 2017. The Prime Minister, a former general who helped to
orchestrate that 2014 coup, has appointed a new drafting
committee, which is being led by a figure who himself was
instrumental in that coup. It is hard to be optimistic about
the results of the new constitution drafting committee.
Thailand currently bans international assistance to
political parties. I think it is shortsighted, and I think it
serves to stunt democratic progress. We would strongly urge
that the United States press for an end to this ban at once.
Thailand is not alone, as you noted, in repressing or
attempting to weaken democratic institutions. Malaysia has seen
new infighting among opposition coalition parties and the
ruling coalition has sharply reduced opportunities for
compromise. Worse yet, it has taken steps to restrict the
movement of democracy activists.
Again, Mr. Chairman, we strongly urge the State Department
to make this a central part of diplomatic discussions. Malaysia
must ended these restrictions on democracy activists as soon as
possible and make it very clear that these activists are not a
threat to the Malaysia Government. Instead, they are resource
to the government and an opportunity to advance democratic
norms.
Cambodia is another country that is missing opportunities
to foster democracy. The longtime ruling Cambodian People's
Party has used the legal system to stifle dissent from
opposition lawmakers, including the recent issuance of an
arrest warrant for longtime opposition leader Sam Rainsy.
The opposition finds itself struggling to consolidate its
own message and to leverage its modest political powers in the
face of these actions. It needs help from an active and
organized civil society.
The United States should stand ready to help with strong
democracy assistance to support these institutions, to
strengthen these organizations. Again, it should be a central
part of our diplomatic engagement.
As to Laos, Mr. Chairman, while that government has long
been repressive and hostile to democratic engagement, in 2009,
the Lao Prime Minister issued a decree permitting nonprofit
associations to exist. We at IRI have been working closely with
several of them.
Given that next year President Obama will be traveling to
Laos when it hosts the ASEAN summit, it seems that this is an
opportune moment for the administration to push for a stronger
role for groups like IRI and others to foster democracy and to
strengthen civil society.
Again, there are reasons for hope. Interestingly, with
respect to both of the countries which I do think provide
reasons for hope, the most recent major elections were
conducted at a time when many outside observers were skeptical.
Yet they showed that people do want a voice in their own future
and that civil society, when given a chance, can play a
constructive role in and create real hope and promise and
opportunity.
Indonesia, as was mentioned in the previous panel, is still
battling issues of corruption. The United States should stand
at Indonesia's side and should promote assistance that helps to
empower local NGOs to take on the issue of corruption.
We should also, as we do with the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, make it clear that we view corruption as a central
part of any assistance relationship that we are going to have.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, with respect to Burma, while there
is a long way to go, I think the words of Aung San Suu Kyi were
quite fair with respect to this election. She said that these
elections were fair, but they were certainly not free. They
were fair in the sense that they probably expressed the view of
most Burmese. Now we see that the NLD has the majority it needs
to make a real difference. Of course, they face tremendous
challenges, and I think, again, one more time, that we should
stand with them to help build the capacity to take on those
challenges and to be far more inclusive in the society that
they foster and forge going forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Green follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Mark Green
Chairman Gardner, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee,
I am honored to have this opportunity to appear before you today. By
way of background, the International Republican Institute (IRI) is a
nonprofit, nonpartisan organization working in some ninety countries
around the world, including eight in Southeast Asia. For over 30 years,
our broad mission has been to advance democracy; well, it is safe to
say that no region of the world these days is at once more
challenging--and more promising--than Southeast Asia.
In my brief remarks this morning, I hope to discuss the state of
democracy in some countries where important challenges remain, such as
Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Laos. On the encouraging side, I will
point to several countries that give reason for optimism and a renewed
faith in the growth of democratic ideals in Southeast Asia, such as
Indonesia and Burma.
challenges and setbacks to democracy
Unfortunately several countries in Southeast Asia, countries of
importance to the U.S., are suffering from constricting space, civil
and democratic backsliding. There is no clearer instance of this
phenomenon than in Thailand, where the May 2014 military coup severely
curtailed space for civil society and political actors to operate
freely. What had been a strong flame for democracy and liberty has been
reduced to just a few warm embers.
Thailand is America's oldest treaty ally in Asia and was once seen
as a democratic beacon in the region. The democratic regression
manifested by the coup and subsequent manipulation of the
constitutional reform process is of serious concern for the democracy
community as well, of course, as Thai citizens themselves. On a recent
trip to Bangkok, I met with a group of women civil society activists.
They were clear and passionate in their belief that the space for civil
society to bring opinions, concerns, and priorities to the military-
controlled government is shrinking rapidly and dangerously.
The highly antidemocratic process the government is using in
drafting a new constitution is particularly troubling. The first
Constitutional Drafting Committee, whose members were handpicked by the
military, began working on a new constitution in January 2015 and
submitted a draft charter to the military-appointed legislature in
September. The legislature has rejected the charter, thus ensuring
continued military rule until at least 2017. Prime Minister Prayut, the
former general who orchestrated the 2014 coup, has since appointed a
new drafting committee, naming a figure who was instrumental in the
coup to be the committee's new chairman.
The military leadership's official line is that a new
constitutional reform is required to rid the political system of the
hyperpartisan factionalism that has caused corruption and political
violence in the past. Given the tightly controlled nature of the reform
process, it is hard not to be very skeptical of whether any government
that emerges can be a credible representative of the people. In order
to restore a political system based on leadership emerging from
responsive political parties, the Thai military government must lift
the ban on international organizations providing technical assistance
to Thai parties. Making political party support available to all Thai
parties will transfer skills promoting modern, issue-based platforms
and party operations. More professional and responsible political
parties will alleviate the acrimonious political environment and remove
the rationale for the military to interfere in politics.
Mr. Chairman, as you well know, Thailand is not the only country in
the region going through challenges and government repression.
Malaysia, has recently seen new infighting among opposition coalition
parties, and the ruling coalition has sharply reduced opportunities for
compromise in meeting the country's important political, economic, and
social challenges. Given increased ethnic tensions and shrinking space
for dissent, we at IRI worry that both the opposition and ruling
coalition have diminishing interest in building better democratic
governance.
All is far from lost, however, and IRI remains committed to
increasing the capacity of party leaders and elected representatives to
speak to priority issues of concern to their electoral base.
Additionally, to counteract divisiveness in Malaysia, IRI is providing
opportunities for the growing youth demographic in Malaysia to engage
in inclusive and moderate policymaking and advocacy. Mr. Chairman, if
there is an urgent recommendation we can make regarding Malaysia, it is
that the U.S. pressure the government to end its policy of restricting
freedom of movement for democracy activists. These individuals are not
a threat to the Malaysian Government, rather an important resource to
further advance democratic norms in that beautiful and important
country.
Not unlike recent setbacks in Thailand, Cambodia's volatile
democratic development recently took a turn for the worse. The longtime
ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) has used Cambodia's legal system
to stifle dissent from opposition lawmakers, including the arrest and
indefinite imprisonment of an opposition Member of Parliament and the
recent issuance of an arrest warrant for longtime opposition leader Sam
Rainsy. What appear to be determined efforts by Prime Minister Hun Sen
and his party to fragment the opposition severely threaten Cambodia's
hopes for democratic growth and progress ahead of crucial 2017 commune
council elections and 2018 national elections.
To make matters more complicated, IRI's local sources report the
opposition finds itself struggling to consolidate its own message and
to leverage modest political powers. It is incumbent upon the
opposition, bolstered by an active and organized civil society, to hone
its message and challenge the decades-long rule of the CPP with valid,
constructive critiques and clear alternative proposals. Given the rapid
deterioration of the legal and political environment and the deliberate
dismantling of the opposition by the CPP, IRI urges the United States
to bolster its democracy and governance assistance to Cambodia and use
every diplomatic opportunity to express deep concern where the ruling
government engages in illegal and undemocratic acts.
Mr. Chairman, I have just spoken of countries where democracy is
facing great challenges. Now I would like to point to a country--Laos--
where the situation remains dire, however, recent events demonstrate a
small window of opportunity for activists engaging in civic life. Last
week, Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes announced that in
2016, President Obama will become the first U.S. President to visit
Laos to attend the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit. In
light of the changing dynamics of our bilateral relationship, now seems
an opportune moment to consider the role we can play in promoting
democratic reform and development in that nation.
Laos is a single-party authoritarian political system that rates
poorly on indicators of government transparency, civic participation,
and freedom of expression. Civil society in Laos was virtually
nonexistent until 2009, when in response to international pressure, the
Lao Prime Minister issued a decree with the first ever process for
independent civil society organizations (called nonprofit associations,
NPAs) to register. IRI has been a leader in training many of these new
independent Lao civic associations. Lao civil society activists face
daunting challenges; nevertheless, new NPAs are applying for
registration and established NPAs are ramping up their important work.
Though the pace of reform is still very slow, with additional resources
and technical support from the United States, IRI contends the Lao
civic movement will expand, strengthen, become more independent and
will increasingly provide feedback to public officials--all important
benchmarks in a gradual evolution to a more democratic society.
reasons for optimism
The political developments in Southeast Asia are far from all
negative. Democratic regression in Thailand, Cambodia, and Malaysia
should not distract us from the positives gains in other parts of the
region, such as in Indonesia and Burma.
Indonesia's 2014 national legislative and Presidential elections
were unquestionably an encouraging new chapter in the country's
democratic progression. Considering Indonesia's checkered past with
authoritarianism, the successful transfer of power from one political
party to another--its first peaceful Presidential level transfer via
the ballot box--was a significant advancement in the consolidation of
Indonesia's transition to democracy. With the election of President
Joko Widodo, the public sent a clear statement about its desire to
address pervasive problems of economic stagnation and corruption.
Recognizing the importance of combating nepotism and political
malfeasance, IRI has launched an innovative program to empower women
across the country to take the lead on fighting corruption in politics
and to increase their participation at the subnational level. Much more
needs to be done. We recommend ramping up support for anticorruption
measures with a focus on the subnational level. By most measures,
corruption remains by far Indonesia's biggest impediment to progress.
Perhaps the most consequential democratic breakthrough in Southeast
Asia has come in Burma, a nation few would have expected to be in this
position only a few short years ago. In my recent trip to the region I
witnessed the increasingly restrictive democratic environment in
Thailand. But in the second part of my trip, in Burma, where I served
as a credentialed observer for their historic parliamentary elections,
I observed the seriousness and enthusiasm with which its citizens
peacefully went to the polls for the country's first competitive
election in 25 years. Though glaring gaps remain in the country's
reform trajectory remain, including rising religious and sectarian
conflict and a flawed constitutional foundation, Burma represents the
most positive democratic shift in the region right now and a real
opportunity for uplifting progress.
IRI formally began implementing programs inside Burma in 2013. We
have engaged more than 200,000 individuals from 340 organizations, from
national political parties to local civil society organizations. Thanks
to the generous support of USAID, as well as the Canadian Government
and working closely with our fellow nonprofit organizations the
National Democratic Institute and the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems, we are proud of the role IRI and the democratic
community have played in fostering new hope in that country.
On November 8 in Burma, with dedication, patience, and a firm
belief in democracy, millions of voters exercised their right to vote,
often under difficult conditions. The ruling party exercised
commendable restraint--something that surprised many observers. With
the results indicating the National League for Democracy now controls a
two-thirds majority of seats in the lower and upper Houses of
Parliament, these bodies will now represent a clear expression of the
desire for continuing democratic reform in Burma. Of course, the
elections serve as only one element of an ongoing and long-term
political process that is now unfolding in the country. As the dust
settles from the elections, this important work will continue in
earnest. As we have seen in many countries around the world, including
in Southeast Asia, successful transitions take persistence, time and
patience. It will be important for the United States to support a long-
term view while insisting in the short-term on maintaining momentum for
reform.
As experience has shown us, the period after elections is when the
hard work truly begins. Voters' faith in these new democratic processes
will only be as strong as the capacity of elected officials to
effectively respond to voters' needs and to adapt accordingly. When--or
even before--the new Parliament convenes next year, newly elected
legislators will need critical skills, and developing their capacity to
engage with citizens and providing them with independent data to make
evidence-based decisions will be critical.
As the dust settles from these elections and Burma navigates the
uncharted territory of becoming a representative democracy, IRI
recommends that international support should be boosted significantly
to strengthen and consolidate democratic institutions. The United
States Government should provide technical support to the newly elected
legislature, including on budgeting, legislative drafting, ethics, and
constituent outreach to provide many first-time officials with the
skills to effectively represent their constituents. IRI also recommends
the U.S. continue its vocal support of the peace process in Burma to be
inclusive of ethnic minority political parties, civil society
organizations and other marginalized groups. A peace process that leads
to a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire and political dialogue will
make an important contribution to democratic consolidation in Burma as
it could remove the rationale for the oversized role of the military in
Burmese politics.
general recommendations
With respect to the administration's policies in promoting
democracy and governance in Southeast Asia, I am grateful to USAID and
the State Department for their support, and urge continued funding in
each of the countries discussed today. To be honest, I am concerned by
the analysis conducted by InterAction that shows that funding for
democracy and governance programs worldwide is down 38 percent since
2010. Further, history shows that these cuts are often made worse by
``raids'' in these funds for other new priorities and initiatives.
During these consequential times in Southeast Asia and around the
world, now is not the time to cut funding, but rather to double down on
our investment in democracy and governance programming.
Finally, IRI recommends the committee consider the importance of a
regional approach to democracy development in Southeast Asia. The U.S.
should continue to support the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) as a unifying regional body and should encourage ASEAN and its
individual member states to prioritize development of transparent and
inclusive democratic governance both within the individual states and
in ASEAN's regional mechanisms. In addition, the U.S. should engage in
and support regional initiatives like the ASEAN Civil Society
Conference/ASEAN People's Forum that amplify civil society voices in
the region, create strong networks among the region's diverse civil
society organizations, and ensure marginalized groups can provide input
and raise concerns about developments in the region.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the United States has long-standing economic,
political, and cultural ties to this region that should not only
continue, but be deepened at every possible turn. Home to 625 million
people, Southeast Asia as a market is the fourth-largest export
destination for the United States after Canada, Mexico, and China. Half
of the world's trade passes through its sea lanes.
The countries throughout Southeast Asia remind us that nothing
about advancing democracy should be taken for granted; indeed, cases
such as Burma vividly illustrate that democracy must be fought for each
and every day, and that it can only succeed with a strong commitment
from all stakeholders. We in the United States are a leading
stakeholder in this effort in Southeast Asia. By sharing our resources,
experience, and technical expertise, we align ourselves with the words
of Ronald Reagan in his 1982 speech to the British Parliament: ``We
must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole
prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of
all human beings.''
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Ambassador, for your testimony.
Our next witness is Mr. Murray Hiebert, who serves as
senior fellow and deputy director of the Sumitro Chair for
Southeast Asia Studies at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Prior to joining CSIS, he was senior
director for Southeast Asia at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
where he worked to promote trade and investment opportunities
between the United States and Asia.
Welcome, Mr. Hiebert.
STATEMENT OF MURRAY HIEBERT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW,
SUMITRO CHAIR FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hiebert. Thank you, Chairman Gardner and Ranking Member
Cardin. It is a real privilege to be here to talk about the
most important region of the world, Southeast Asia.
If you are the fourth speaker, I think all of us are
probably going to roughly conclude that Southeast Asia has a
very mixed picture on the human rights front. I think over the
last 2 weeks, we have had a lot of excitement coming out of
Myanmar-Burma. But of course, the election was flawed, and the
biggest challenges are yet before us. We played one inning of
the game and we have eight innings to go in terms of seeing how
the military responds to Aung San Suu Kyi's election, how they
move forward with ethnic minorities, treatment of the Rohingya,
and a raft of other problems.
As the previous speakers also said, Indonesia is a pretty
good story. Over the last decade, it has moved forward with
becoming a model in the region for orderly transfers of power
and multiparty democracy. That does not mean it does not have
rafts of problems. You earlier talked about corruption. There
are minorities facing discrimination and those kinds of things.
The other pretty good story is the Philippines, which I
guess I called in my report a middling democracy. Their
elections are fairly fair and free, but vote-buying is pretty
widespread. A lot of the politics is run by political
dynasties, and they have a very poor regulatory environment,
widespread corruption, et cetera.
Vietnam, it is still run very much by an authoritarian
communist party but yet the situation probably has eased over
the last decade or so. And interestingly, this year, no
bloggers seem to have been arrested. The national assembly
plays a bigger role. And we saw in the negotiations for the TPP
that Vietnam agreed to allow a free labor union. If they do
not, they are not going to get the benefits of tariff
reductions.
We have talked quite a bit about Thailand already.
Obviously, that country has slipped back miserably and so has
Malaysia, as our previous speaker said. The differences on
Thailand and Malaysia, two countries I have actually lived and
worked in, the differences now between previous authoritarian
times is that the population just demands so much more. In the
long run, Thailand, the junta in Thailand and Najib and the
ruling coalition in Malaysia, are really going to have nothing
but grief if they do not respond to the demands for more
freedom, less corruption, as people are much more aware, much
more educated. So I have to be hopeful there, in the long run,
not tomorrow.
On United States, specifically, to talk about policy toward
Thailand, and some of this has already been addressed, State
really cut back on military assistance but kept a lot of the
other engagement. I would argue that is roughly the right mix
for Thailand. You can only push them so hard. They are really
important to the United States on all kinds of levels. There is
a lot that happens with Thailand in terms of Cobra Gold. It is
one of the biggest embassies, a lot of health cooperation, a
lot of cooperation within ASEAN. And the United States really
risks damaging some of its strategic interests, if it pushes
Thailand too hard, because pushing harder is not going to get
us any further.
You also asked me to talk a bit about pressure versus
cooperation, and you quoted me earlier. I guess what I would
say on pressure, on Myanmar-Burma, I think the sanctions,
certainly, pushed them, but had the United States insisted on
keeping the sanctions in place that were in place until 2011,
2012, the elections would not have been possible. What made it
possible is the beginning of engagement. And so they realized
they were being left behind and really to benefit from global
integration, they had to move. So I think obviously a lot of
domestic stakeholders were important, but the United States
played some role by starting to engage them.
The same is actually true of Vietnam. They are moving,
liberalizing, not democratizing but liberalizing, thanks to
increased engagement.
And then finally on the U.S. approach in the region, I
think some of the aid that Jim Carouso and Mr. Busby alluded to
earlier in terms of USAID projects in Burma, on building
capacity in developing rule of law, in transparent governance,
robust civil society, played a significant role. The same in
Vietnam. We are now starting to see the Vietnamese National
Assembly be open to having advisers in the National Assembly on
revising the country's criminal code.
You asked also if there are any final recommendations of
change of policy. I guess one thing I would say is, if the
military keeps moving in Myanmar--and that is an ``if''; I
would really emphasize the ``if''--if it keeps moving and
cooperating with Aung San Suu Kyi and with minority groups, at
some point we have to consider letting the military see the
benefits of longer-term cooperation and starting to talk to
them, not giving them IMET, but beginning to talk to them more.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hiebert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Murray Hiebert
Some observers argue that the process of democratic reform in
Southeast Asia has been thrown into reverse gear over the past decade
or so. Of course, there are many examples of backsliding and setbacks,
but at a macro level, the general trend is toward improving democracy
in the region, even if fitfully. Generally, we see the region's growing
middle class, as it acquires more education and money along with
increased access to technological innovations and social media,
clamoring for increased freedoms, more transparency, access to
decisionmaking, stronger institutions, and accountability by its
leaders. This is a change from the bad old days when most of the region
was ruled mainly by strong men.
The most exciting story at the moment is occurring in Myanmar/
Burma, where opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi last week scored a
landslide victory over the party of the generals that ran the country
for 50 years, despite flaws in the voting process. In the weeks ahead,
observers will be watching how the military handles the transition to a
democratically elected leader. The election was the culmination of a 4-
year reform process under which most political prisoners were freed,
journalists were given considerable latitude to operate, and the
Parliament began debating and passing laws and legislation which
sometimes bucked the wishes of the ruling elite.
Of course, huge challenges remain going forward including relations
between the military and the civilian government, the peace process
with the armed ethnic groups, treatment of the Muslim Rohingya who were
disenfranchised under the outgoing government, and the need to build
the rule of law and tackle economic reforms and development.
Nonetheless, Myanmar/Burma today is a much different country than it
was a few years ago. Some analysts even wonder if the military's
acceptance of the election results in Myanmar/Burma could serve as a
role model for its neighbors at a time when their leaders are pulling
back from democracy.
In Indonesia, by far the largest Southeast Asian country, a new
President was sworn in in October 2014 following a highly competitive
election that could have turned out quite differently. Less than two
decades after authoritarian President Suharto was forced to step down,
Indonesia has over the past decade emerged as a model for orderly
transfers of power and multiparty democracy in Southeast Asia. Within
ASEAN, Indonesia had an important role to play in gradually nudging the
former military government in Myanmar/Burma to adopt democratic
reforms.
To be sure, problems remain. The anticorruption agency, a well-
respected institution in Indonesia, has lost ground over the past year
amid political disputes. Religious minorities, particularly Shia
Muslims and Christians, often face discrimination. State security
forces still get away with ``widespread impunity''for human rights
abuses, particularly in the western province of Papua, where a low-
level pro-independence insurgency remains active, according to Human
Rights Watch.
A large literary festival in Bali was recently forced by
authorities to remove a program discussing the 1965 mass killings. Two
British filmmakers were recently sentenced to 2 months in jail for
attempting to make a film about piracy in the Strait of Malacca.
Widespread corruption remains a problem within the government, the
judiciary, and among security forces. At the same time, the army
appears to be regaining some political clout and is working to retain
its role in internal security.
The Philippines, which is preparing for another round of elections
next year, might be labeled a ``middling'' democracy. The 2013 mid-term
elections were regarded as generally free and fair by most outside
observers, although vote buying was widespread. Political dynasties are
thoroughly entrenched in Philippine politics, with the President and
three top candidates for the 2016 Presidency all part of well-
established political families.
Governance remains hobbled by a relatively poor regulatory
environment, widespread corruption, and weak rule of law. President
Benigno Aquino has made anticorruption a priority and it has born some
fruit. Arrests of some high-profile individuals, including his
predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, have been touted as evidence of a
commitment to tackle corruption, but not all offenders have been
brought to justice. Many observers are uncertain whether the
Philippines will stay on the path of greater governance reforms after
Aquino steps down in mid-2016.
Extrajudicial killings are perhaps the biggest human rights issue
in the Philippines. Political rivals are the usual targets, but
journalists face serious danger, too. The Philippines is the third most
dangerous country in the world for journalists, behind Iraq and Syria.
Vietnam, meanwhile, remains an authoritarian state headed by the
Communist Party. Elections are held every 5 years for the National
Assembly, but competition is limited to candidates vetted by bodies
affiliated with the ruling party. Human rights organizations are
concerned about Vietnam's detention of peaceful activists (often on
charges of ``abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests
of the state''), strict controls of the press, and the frequent arrests
of bloggers. That said, no arrests of bloggers have been reported
arrested this year.
While politics is tightly controlled in Vietnam, society is much
more open than it was 10 years ago. Unlike in China, the Vietnamese
Government does not try to control social media discussions or block
Facebook. The National Assembly, Vietnam's lawmaking body, plays an
increased government oversight role, frequently calling in ministers
for questioning about their policies and requesting government-drafted
laws to be amended, rather than merely serving as a rubberstamp for
party and government decisions. Most notably, Vietnam has agreed to
allow labor unions to form and operate freely from government control
under the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement.
Thailand is one country that has slipped backward on the democracy
scale over the past decade. In May 2014, the military ousted the
civilian elected government for the second time in 8 years, following 6
months of disruptive political protests. Once home to the most vibrant
media landscape in Southeast Asia, journalists in Thailand were ordered
not to publish articles critical of the military, and public gatherings
of more than five people were banned. Scores have been detained for
participating in illegal gatherings or staging peaceful rallies.
The military considers comments critical of the monarchy (lese-
majeste) to be a criminal offense, and has brought more than a dozen
cases to the courts, which impose sentences of up to 15 years for
offenders. At least two suspects in an ongoing, high-profile lese-
majeste case have died in police custody in recent weeks. In September,
a journalist was pressed to resign from an English-language paper after
he had been detained in a military camp for ``attitude adjustment'' for
critical reporting about the government.
The first attempt by a military-appointed committee to draft a new
constitution was rejected by a reform council that was appointed by the
military. A second draft is expected by January 2016. If it is approved
in a subsequent referendum, elections for a new government could be
held around mid-2017.
Malaysia is also in a slide toward authoritarianism. Early this
year, former opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was imprisoned for a
second time on sodomy charges in an apparent attempt to sideline the
charismatic leader. Between February and July, over 150 lawmakers,
lawyers, journalists, academics, and activists were detained on charges
of sedition or for violating the Peaceful Assemblies Act. Two
publications were shut down for several months in July for reporting on
apparent mismanagement in the state investment fund 1Malaysia
Development Bhd (1MDB). A Deputy Prime Minister and the attorney
general were ousted in July for comments critical of Prime Minister
Najib Razak's handling of the 1MDB scandal.
u.s. policy toward thailand
After the coup in Thailand, the U.S. Government faced two-competing
challenges: support electoral democracy and maintain diplomatic
relations with a treaty ally.
The State Department announced immediately that it was reviewing
all U.S. assistance to the country, and suspended $3.5 million in
unspent military assistance for training and education programs. It
also suspended funds for International Military Education and Training
(IMET) that have totaled about $1.3 million in recent years, and
cancelled several military exercises. Washington also scaled back the
annual Cobra Gold exercises held in February 2015.
But the United States continued most other engagement and
cooperation with Thailand, while urging the military to restore
democracy as soon as possible. At the same time, Washington continued
to press the military to lift its orders restricting freedom of
expression, peaceful assembly and other civil and political rights, and
end the use of military tribunals to try civilians.
In responding to Thailand's political crisis, the U.S. Government
implemented roughly the right policy mix of balancing consistency in
U.S. foreign policy supporting democracy and human rights with a focus
on sustaining a strong and unified ASEAN as the core of regional and
security architecture. U.S.-Thai cooperation runs deep, and to damage
these ties risks harming U.S. strategic interests in Southeast Asia.
Beyond the annual Cobra Gold exercises and long-standing cooperation on
military health research such as drug resistant malaria, the U.S.
Embassy in Bangkok is one of the largest in Asia and serves as the base
for a raft of U.S. activities in the region, including as the regional
headquarters for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
narcotics interdiction, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The United States risks losing geopolitical ground in the region if
it fails to manage this difficult patch in Thailand's political
development. The military has assumed political control in order to
ensure it manages the royal succession after the ailing king dies. More
than a few observers say it is unlikely that we will see real
democratic elections in Thailand until the succession takes place.
Thailand's relations with China have steadily expanded over the
past two decades, and it seems that Beijing incrementally steps up its
ties with the Thai military every time Washington pulls back. The
United States needs to find ways to demonstrate that it remains a
friend of Thailand, one of its longest treaty allies in Asia, and not
be seen as turning its back on the country when politics enter a rough
patch, while still remaining true to U.S. democratic ideals.
impact of u.s. pressure versus cooperation
It is of critical importance that the United States makes its views
on democracy and human rights known to governments in Southeast Asia.
But there are few, if any, examples where pressure and sanctions have
had the desired effect of pushing a regime to reform, unless it has
begun moving in that direction due to internal pressures. Generally,
the United States has the most impact as a champion of democracy in the
region when it leads by example rather than by carrying a stick.
The junta in Burma/Myanmar refused to budge in the face of years of
sanctions from the United States and other Western countries until it
came to the realization on its own that it was being left far behind by
its neighbors. The regime started its reforms by releasing political
prisoners and freeing up the media when it recognized it would reap
strategic and economic benefits through international engagement. The
country's recent elections, which saw the election of Aung San Suu
Kyi's party, would have been impossible if the military-backed regime
felt it faced pressure and isolation rather than engagement and support
from the United States.
Vietnam also stepped up its reforms and eased its tough political
controls in the mid-1990s as the United States prepared to lifts its
trade embargo and normalize relations. Since then, Vietnam has released
more political prisoners (it still holds around 100), and has eased its
restrictions on religious groups and the media. Washington got a
dividend in its relations with Hanoi from the collapse of the Soviet
Union and more recently from China's assertiveness in the South China
Sea, which pressed the ruling party to look to expand its foreign
relations, including with the United States. Similarly, Vietnam's
leadership decided to join the TPP negotiations and agreed to reform
its legal system out of its recognition that the government would face
greater internal challenges if it does not reform itself and respond to
the needs of its citizens.
current u.s. approach in the region
Of course, there were many stakeholders in Myanmar/Burma who
deserve credit for working hard to make the recent elections as free
and inclusive as they were. But foreign players such as the United
States also warrant credit for working hard on a broad range of
assistance programs over the last 3 or 4 years. USAID played a critical
role in building capacity and awareness through its projects targeted
on developing rule of law, transparent governance, robust civil
society, a vibrant parliamentary system, an independent media, and
preparations for elections.
In Vietnam, the United States provided assistance to help the
government implement the massive legal and regulatory changes needed to
implement the bilateral trade agreement between the two countries and
Vietnam's accession to the World Trade Organization. U.S. programs
helped train judges and develop the legal system for commercial dispute
settlement and protecting intellectual property rights. These programs
laid the foundation for the U.S. Embassy to begin advising the National
Assembly on revising the country's criminal code.
Similarly, in the Philippines, the USAID has launched a Partnership
for Growth program, which seeks to address governance problems,
strengthen rule of law and anticorruption measures, and spread the
benefits of fast economic growth to ordinary Filipinos.
These U.S. assistance programs have been highly effective in
promoting democracy among countries in the region and could be expanded
to include other countries.
Assuming the transition in Myanmar/Burma proceeds relatively
smoothly over the next few months, one issue the U.S. Government will
have to address is military-to-military ties. To be sure, the Myanmar
military has been involved in many serious abuses over the past few
decades, and reports indicate that it continues to launch air and
ground offensives against armed ethnic groups in areas bordering China,
even as most of the country held peaceful elections. But if it
continues to cooperate with a new civilian government, Washington may
want to give the U.S. military a green light to increase contacts with
the Myanmar military to ensure that it feels engaged in the transition
and sees potential benefits down the road of continuing to support the
democratic transition.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Hiebert.
Our final witness on the second panel is Ms. Kelley Currie,
who serves as the senior fellow with the Project 2049
Institute. Ms. Currie is also the founding director of the
institute's Burma Transition Initiative. She has previously
served as Asia policy adviser to the Under Secretary for
Democracy and Global Affairs and as foreign policy adviser for
then-Representative John Porter from Illinois.
Welcome and thank you for your testimony today.
STATEMENT OF KELLEY CURRIE, SENIOR FELLOW,
PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
Ms. Currie. Thank you, Chairman Gardner and Ranking Member
Cardin, for giving me the opportunity to come to speak at this
important and timely hearing today.
I am going to focus my remarks on Burma, since I just
returned from there, and do a little bit of a deeper dive on
that country since Murray did such a great job covering the
waterfront in the region. But I would be happy to address other
countries and the broader region during the Q&A.
After working in support of democracy and human rights in
Burma for much of the past 20 years, including as a young
congressional staffer, it was profoundly affecting for me to be
in Burma for the November 8 elections. It is hard to overstate
the NLD's accomplishment in achieving a governing majority,
despite all the barriers that were erected to keep them from
doing so. It is something for which the NLD, its leader Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi, and the Burmese people deserve tremendous
credit.
It has been a source of constant amusement and frustration
to me how many outside and internal observers within Burma have
consistently underestimated how strong the NLD is in Burma, how
well-organized it was at the grassroots level, and deeply
integrated into the communities they were, and how well they
knew their electorate.
It also has been a source of frustration how the experts
have completely underestimated just how frustrated the Burmese
people were with living under the rule of the military
government, both direct and indirect.
I think that these election results are a clear repudiation
of the military's rule in Burma for the past 60 years, and the
role that they have played in destroying a once thriving and
potentially very wealthy country in the region.
But I have to say we are not out of the woods yet. The NLD
and others have filed complaints about large and suspicious
tranches of out-of-constituency advance votes in Shan and
Kachin states. Yesterday, there was an announcement by the
union election commission or by someone in the senior ranks of
the USDP that they could be filing complaints against up to 100
NLD candidates to try to disqualify them from the election.
So I do not think we can give the union election commission
a passing grade, which some have already done, with regard to
these elections without credible investigations into both the
serious allegations on the out-of-constituency advance voting
and how they dispose of these potential complaints against NLD
candidates, which are likely to be quite specious.
The other dark cloud that hangs over this election is the
legacy of disenfranchisement of Burma's Muslim population, both
as candidates and voters. The USDP's despicable effort to use
anti-Muslim sentiment as a political weapon seems to have
backfired in the near term, but let us not fool ourselves that
the sentiments that they tapped into or hoped to tap into have
disappeared.
The situation remains very tense in Burma, and it will be a
generational project to build a more tolerant society. The
forces of intolerance, such as Ma Ba Tha, the Association for
the Protection of Race and Religion, will regroup and adapt.
Leadership that seeks to heal divisions rather than exploit
them will be critical in stemming the influence of these forces
going forward.
While the Tatmadaw and the USDP leadership have repeatedly
stated their commitment to turn over power to the NLD in
accordance with the law--and these are the key words, ``in
accordance with the law''--exactly how this will happen remains
to be seen. President Thein Sein and the commander in chief,
Min Aung Hlaing, have delayed meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi to
discuss the transition until the end of the year.
We have seen little in the way of conciliatory behavior up
till now. Political prisoners continue to be held. Offenses
against ethnic nationalities continue. Humanitarian access
continues to be problematic in Shan, Kachin, and Rakhine
states.
In the near term, we need to express our clear expectation
to the lame-duck government that they should immediately take
steps to address these three issues. It is within their power,
and they can do this very easily in the next 4 months before
they give up power in April, if they do.
Looking ahead to April 2016, I think we need to think about
how U.S. policy should be adjusted to account for Burma's
evolving political situation. But I think we also need to
consider the problems that were created by our own moves away
from a principled approach toward a more pragmatic approach in
Burma.
I frequently heard from civil society and political
democratic friends how frustrated they were with the United
States appearing to move so close to the Thein Sein government
over the past 5 years and how they felt often abandoned by the
United States as a result.
They were also deeply concerned by the way the United
States carried out its assistance programs in Burma, appearing
to have privileged relationships with the government and with
large NGOs rather than working to support real civil society at
the grassroots levels.
These are serious issues that we need to think about going
forward as we try to help consolidate democracy in Burma.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Currie follows:]
Prepared Statement Kelley Currie
Thank you Chairman Gardner, Ranking Member Cardin and other members
of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify before you today on
the state of democracy in Southeast Asia. This is an important and
timely hearing, and I am privileged to be able to share some thoughts
on this subject today.
After working in support of democracy and human rights in Burma for
much of the past 20 years, including as a young congressional staffer,
it was profoundly affecting for me to be in Burma for the November 8,
2015, elections. I watched this historic event from one of the most
remote, poorest parts of the country: Falam township, in Chin State, on
the Burma-India-Bangladesh border. When the early unofficial results in
Falam showed an NLD landslide, it seemed likely to me the NLD would do
very well in the elections, including in at least some ethnic areas.
But I will happily admit that I was as surprised as anyone else at the
scope and depth of the NLD's victory. I knew the NLD should win a
majority of the popular vote, but was concerned about the substantial
structural barriers and institutional biases that the ruling party and
military had set up to keep the NLD from achieving a governing majority
of not less than two-thirds of the elected seats in Parliament. It is
hard to overstate the NLD's accomplishment in achieving a governing
majority, and it is something for which the NLD, its leader Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi, and the Burmese people themselves deserve tremendous
credit.
While Daw Suu's star power was the major factor in the NLD's
ability to pull off such an overwhelming victory, there were a few
other things that jumped out at me over the course of the elections.
The NLD was by far the most organized party in Falam, and apparently
nationwide: their observers had tally sheets, their local office was
taking in results from the field systematically and knew where things
stood all day. In Falam, they were still getting out the vote when
other parties had given up on that, and they knew their vote totals for
Falam well before preliminary consolidation at the township office. I
understand that the situation was much the same across Burma. By the
time I arrived at the NLD's Rangoon headquarters on the day after the
elections, the party knew they had locked in a governing majority well
before the official count made that clear. As someone who used to work
on these things for a living, I was particularly impressed by their
parallel vote count operation, very little of which had been
telegraphed beforehand. It was top notch and its organizers deserve
huge credit.
Second, I suspect that Burma's schoolteachers may have been among
the NLD's most powerful secret weapons at the grassroots level. As
government employees, they were forced to join the ruling Union
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and its predecessor mass
organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA).
Successive military-led governments forced them to work in an anti-
intellectual climate that intentionally sought to keep the population
ignorant. But it turned out that many of these teachers were secret (or
maybe not so secret) NLD supporters. Given their central role as
Election Day workers, they likely helped to keep the vote clean and
more credible than it otherwise might have been.
Further to this point, many outside observers underestimated how
well integrated the NLD was into the local communities and how well
they knew their electorate. In conversations with some of the more
educated and ``higher information'' voters in this small ethnic
mountain township, it was interesting to see how they viewed the
regional parties and the NLD. The young Chin pastor of the largest
church in town, whose family members are heavily involved in one of the
ethnic parties told me he personally was voting NLD because he did not
think it made sense for the future of Chin State to have such regional
parties but rather it would be better to support the NLD and help them
to wrest control of the government for the greater good. While this
level of analysis may not have been typical of the average voter in
Falam, I often I heard this sentiment in various forms.
One of the biggest lingering questions about the elections is,
given the many
tools at its disposal, how and why the ruling USDP allowed itself to
get beaten so soundly? My personal view is that the USDP believed they
would do well enough, without engaging in massive fraud, to peel off
the 80 or so seats they needed in conjunction with the military's 25
percent block to keep the NLD from forming a governing majority in
Parliament. Therefore, they calibrated their manipulation of the
process in the expectation of nudging a much closer vote in their
direction. However, in the face of such a massive NLD landslide, these
manipulations were clearly insufficient. In fact, I believe that if the
USDP had been aware of just how badly they were doing, we would have
seen far more of the kind of manipulation that characterized USDP
victories in heavily militarized areas of Kachin and Shan states. As it
is, the NLD and others have filed complaints about the large and
suspicious tranches of out-of-constituency advance votes in Shan and
Kachin states. I do not believe that the Union Election Commission can
receive a passing grade for these elections without a credible
investigation into the serious allegations of fraud around these votes.
The other dark cloud that hangs over this election is the legacy of
disenfranchisement of Burma's Muslim population, both as candidates and
voters, and the USDP's despicable effort to use anti-Muslim sentiment
as a political weapon. As many have noted, this will be the first time
in Burma's history that its Parliament will not include Muslim members.
I hope the NLD will take steps to address this problem going forward,
and ensure that future elections are not likewise marred by such
discriminatory practices. Further, I am hopeful--but not convinced--
that those who believed this tactic would be effective have been
persuaded from using it in the future. The sentiment that they hoped to
tap into has not disappeared. It will be a generational project to
build a more tolerant society in Burma and the forces of intolerance,
such as MaBaTha, will regroup and adapt. Leadership that seeks to heal
divisions rather than exploit them will be critical in stemming their
influence going forward.
Beyond these issues, the NLD and Daw Suu will inherit a country
that has been severely damaged by nearly six decades of brutal,
incompetent, and venal military rule. The problems she faces as leader
are well known, including but not limited to: an entrenched military
ruling class that is both philosophically and personally opposed to her
leadership; long-running and brutal conflicts in Burma's ethnic
periphery which have only partially been addressed by the so-called
``peace process'' led by Thein Sein's government; massive social,
educational, economic and health deficits wrought by misgovernment and
misallocation of resources; a low-trust society riven with cleavages
that were only partially masked by the elections; an economy that is
just starting to heal itself from decades of plunder and bizarre
policies; and growing drugs and related public health problems that
have mutated as they spread from Burma's borderlands. The NLD must
attempt to manage these problems while the military and its allies who
perpetuated them retain substantial means to thwart improved
governance: a veto on change to Burma's deeply undemocratic
constitutional framework; more than a quarter of the seats in the
Parliament; deep penetration into the country's bureaucratic and
governance structures; and a monopoly on the legal use of coercive
force.
The NLD will also have to contend with voters' expectations and the
inherent dangers of such huge majorities operating within such a
confined political space. Given the decades of misrule that got Burma
into its current condition, it would be difficult for anyone or any
party--no matter how spectacularly gifted or qualified--to meet the
Burmese public's expectations. The NLD is lucky, however, that they
benefit from enormous good will; as long as they do not abuse it, they
should be given a relatively long leash by the people. Among those who
have ridden the NLD wave to victory are a new generation of leaders.
They are young, smart and diverse people who represent the future of
the party and I hope they will be given opportunities to lead. For
example, the new Parliament will include at least 80 former political
prisoners in its ranks. Their voices will be important ones in pursuing
justice and legal reform--two areas where the NLD seems likely focus
early on--and they know well that despite the overwhelming electoral
victory, the Tatmadaw will not give up any ground easily. I have also
had long discussions with NLD economic policy advisors and am confident
that they are working on policy prescriptions that will stabilize and
promote cleaner, more broad-based and equitable growth.
One of the biggest and most urgent challenges for the NLD will be
its strategy for peacemaking and political dialogue with Burma's ethnic
nationalities. The so-called Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)
signed by the government and eight ethnic armed groups in October is a
potential platform for further efforts, but many parties on all sides
have concerns about both the process and substance that underpinned
that effort. The perhaps biggest challenge is the level of cooperation
the NLD can expect from the Tatmadaw. On this front, the picture is
worrying, given how the military has launched several major new
offensives in Shan and Kachin states since November 8. Likewise, the
NLD does not have substantial technical expertise in negotiations, but
seems unlikely to retain much of the infrastructure that the USDP
developed for that purpose given its close association with the
outgoing President Thein Sein. The NLD majority will include a cadre of
newly elected representatives drawn from nearly all of Burma's ethnic
nationalities, as well as a number of new Burman MPs with strong
backgrounds working in multiethnic coalitions in civil society and
other forums. The NLD's somewhat ``scorched earth'' strategy toward the
regional ethnic parties left substantial hurt feelings in its wake, and
the party's relationships with other ethnic leaders are wildly
variable. The NLD will need to reach out to ethnic leaders who were not
part of its winning coalition, including political party and armed
group leadership. So far, Daw Suu and the NLD has called for her party
to be magnanimous in victory, but there is little indication this has
been operationalized on any meaningful level with regard to ethnic
leaders.
Further to this, one of my biggest worries is that because the USDP
and Tatmadaw will represent its only functional parliamentary
opposition, the NLD will become entrenched in oppositional politics
with the military and unable to break free of structural constraints on
policymaking and implementation. What will happen to the USDP as a
party is also an interesting question. The party was decimated: it
appears to have won only 10 percent of seats nationwide, and many of
its top leaders lost their constituencies. While the Tatmadaw and the
USDP leadership have repeatedly stated their commitment to turn over
power to the NLD, exactly how this will happen remains to be seen.
President Thein Sein and Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing have
delayed a meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to discuss the transition,
and we have seen little else in the way of conciliatory behavior up to
now. In the past, the Tatmadaw has used its institutional position to
manage situations into its favor. They have shown they are not above
provoking societal conflict or sacrificing societal goods in order to
maintain their prerogatives. There is no indication this institutional
posture has been changed as a result of elections that really did not
alter their status quo from a legitimacy perspective, and have yet to
alter it from a functional one.
Since the election results became clear, there has been a flood of
expert commentary questioning how well Daw Suu and the NLD will be able
to govern, given their lack of experience. On this point, I would note
her response to these questions: ``We could hardly do worse.'' While
Burma's problems do seem overwhelming, it is important to note how
consistently many Burma ``experts''--both international and domestic--
have underestimated Daw Suu and the NLD over the past 25 years. I
cannot count the number of times I have been told that the NLD is a
``spent force''; that the Burmese people are ``over the Lady''; and
that what ``average Burmese'' are really interested in is economic
development. The election results were a stunning rebuke to much of
this thinking, and I hope will lead some commentators to be a little
more humble in assuming they know what the Burmese people believe based
on their discussions with government officials, Yangon-based diplomats
and Burmese elite intellectuals. I would also caution against the kind
of pearl-clutching some analysts have indulged in over Daw Suu's
dismissive attitude toward the junta's antidemocratic constitution. Her
choice of phrase in explaining how she would lead the NLD government
from ``above the President'' may have sounded inartful to outsiders,
but Burmese voters found it reassuring and seem to hold the junta-
drafted 2008 constitution in the same low regard she does. In any
event, I hope that the NLD will continue to defy their skeptics'
expectations.
As the media caravan moves on to the next shiny object and the
country enters this interregnum, we cannot forget that the current
government will remain largely in place until April 2016. I know the
Burmese people will keep demanding accountability and democracy, but I
am less confident about how principled the international community will
be in doing so for the next few months. This is especially true given
how eager it was to engage with the USDP over the past 5 years. In the
near term, we need to express our clear expectations to the lame-duck
government that they should immediately take steps to address the
following in order to indicate their seriousness in continuing the
reform process and effecting a smooth transfer of power to the NLD:
Unconditional release of all political prisoners, including
those awaiting trial;
Halt offensives against ethnic nationalities area--
particularly indiscriminate airstrikes in Kachin and Shan
states; and
Removal of current barriers to humanitarian access and
space, including in Rakhine state.
On the evening of November 9, I was standing with thousands of NLD
supporters on of all ages, madly screaming their heads off when returns
were announced from the balcony of the party headquarters in Rangoon.
There was not a policeman of any kind in sight; NLD youth managed
traffic as the crowds spilled into and across the busy roadway in front
of the building. Every new announcement of an NLD sweep brought massive
celebrations. One rarely gets the opportunity to live history in that
way, and being there with Min Ko Naing announcing official results from
Pegu division was like a dream. But the reality was that I had gone to
this party with my friend May Sabe Phyu, a prominent Kachin activist
whose husband Patrick was arrested a month ago over a Facebook posting
and remains in jail. This past Tuesday he was again denied bail
apparently on orders from the military. In addition to keeping me
updated about her husband's absurd imprisonment, Phyu Phyu was sending
me harrowing reports of the latest military assaults in her homeland
and the worsening humanitarian situation for the thousands of IDPs in
Kachin state who currently are receiving little international
assistance. Neither political prisoners nor Kachin and Shan IDPs should
have to wait until April to get relief.
Likewise, the situation of the Rohingya remains abominable, and
there is very little hope that it will improve during this interregnum
period. While the USDP's electoral imperative to use them as a
scapegoat may have subsided, their potential utility as a spark for
creating violence and instability remains a tool the authorities are
all to willing to deploy. The monsoon season is now over, and while we
are unlikely to see a repeat of the horrors of the mass migration of
this past spring, many Rohingya will doubtless take to the seas out of
hopelessness and despair. The NLD has indicated a willingness to
address the citizenship problem at some point, but right now this is a
mess that the current regime made and should be held responsible for
addressing in a meaningful way in its waning days. The U.S. and
international community should push hard for the outgoing regime to
open humanitarian space in Rakhine state and pull back on enforcement
of both new and long-standing racist policies that serve as push
factors for migration of Rohingya. The NLD will inherit enough negative
legacies of military rule without also having deal with the immediate
consequences of the USDP's demonization of the Rohingya.
Looking ahead to April 2016, as we think about how U.S. policy
should be adjusted to account for Burma's evolving political situation,
it is important that we consider the problems that were created by our
move away from a principled approach, and toward a more pragmatic
approach to Burma. Following the April 2012 by-elections in which Aung
San Suu Kyi was elected to Parliament, the U.S. began a process of
rapidly normalizing relations with the USDP-led government despite the
fact that key fundamental aspects of Burma's political environment
either remained unimproved or began to worsen. The U.S. did not self-
correct and slow down its engagement until earlier this year, and our
brand in Burma was clearly damaged by this overly optimistic policy.
Democratic civil society, ethnic nationalities leaders and NLD leaders
at various times expressed their concerns that the U.S. was too close
to the Thein Sein government and had abandoned Burma's democratic
movement.
By this summer, it had become clear to many on the ground that the
U.S. and other former supporters of democracy in Burma were willing to
accept something that fell far short of democracy, as long as the
elections were not openly stolen or subject to widespread violence.
This lowering of the bar also had troubling implications for democrats
struggling in Thailand, Cambodia, China, and other countries around the
region. Civil society on the ground viewed negatively much of the U.S.
assistance provided to and through Burmese Government entities,
especially when the coupled with a tendency on the part of USAID and
other large donors to funnel most of the remaining funds through its
usual cadre of contractors. We need to examine how our assistance
programs may have undermined our stated objective of supporting
democracy in Burma.
The NLD's landslide has now gotten much of the international
community off the hook for its questionable behavior heading into the
elections, as they are not forced to deal with the prospect of an
illegitimate minority government comprised of the USDP and the
military. It remains to be seen how the NLD will reflect on this short-
sighted, transactional approach by its erstwhile supporters. I
encourage the U.S. to enter a period of strategic pause and reflection
until we see a real transfer of power, meaning April 2016 at the
earliest. In the meantime, we should undertake serious work to engage
actors on the ground beyond those who seem to have guided us into our
previous policy cul-de-sac. If they are still willing to work with us
and accept our support in building a brighter future for their country,
then we will once again be the fortunate partners of Burma's long-
suffering and potentially victorious democrats.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, and thanks again for all of
your testimony.
Ms. Currie, I will just start where you left off on Burma.
I asked the first panel what needs to happen, what does not
need to happen over the next several months as Burma moves
forward through this election process to finalize the selection
of a President. What do you see happening? What needs to
happen? And what are you concerned could happen?
Ms. Currie. I would like to see us have very clear demands
with the lame-duck government over the next 4 months that they
immediately release all political prisoners, including those
awaiting trial and have yet to be sentenced.
This includes two people who have recently been arrested
just in the past month for postings on Facebook who have been
denied bail, who are sitting in prison because they put
pictures up on Facebook that were mildly satirical. This is
absurd.
This also includes student groups, student demonstrators,
who were arrested in February and still have not been
sentenced. Many of them have been on hunger strikes. They were
tortured and abused very badly when they were arrested. Their
immediate release would send a very strong signal that the
regime is committed to moving forward with Burma's democratic
transition.
Second, the offensives in Shan and Kachin states, which
have actually escalated since Election Day, need to be stopped
immediately. They are targeting civilian populations, or at
least indiscriminately attacking minority positions in these
areas, and causing massive civilian displacement and
casualties. This needs to be halted, and it is fully within
their power to do that.
The third issue, as I mentioned, humanitarian access has
been spotty in Kachin and Shan. You have thousands of IDPs in
Kachin state in particular who have no access to humanitarian
assistance because they are outside of government controlled
areas. And the United States has not done enough to get basic
humanitarian assistance to these people.
Likewise, the situation of the Rohingya in Rakhine state is
just deplorable. It continues to deteriorate. While the numbers
of people taking to the sea this year have not been as inflated
as they were last year, the situation there has not materially
improved for them.
There is plenty of space to open the aperture on
humanitarian assistance there and to allow greater humanitarian
access.
Again, these are all things that are fully within the
control of the authorities and would go a long way to helping
us be comfortable that they are sincere.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Mr. Hiebert.
Mr. Hiebert. Could I just add one thing?
Senator Gardner. Yes.
Mr. Hiebert. I agree with most of what Kelley said. I would
just like to add, yesterday or the day before, Thein Sein, the
President, and the military commander also said they would not
meet with Aung San Suu Kyi until the 100 or so areas in which
they are going to contest the election--something that happened
in the election.
Once they initiate the appeal, there is no deadline by when
the union election commission has to resolve the issue. So if
they are going to keep delaying, as they can with the terms
that they have set out, it is a recipe for unending dispute and
just no transition by the April 1 deadline that Kelley laid
out.
Senator Gardner. What do you think we ought to be doing?
How should we respond to that? What message should we be
sending? What actions should we be taking?
Mr. Hiebert. I think we need to suggest to them that they
should meet at a decent interval, whether they have to meet
this week or next, I do not know. But to wait until everything
is resolved when it is very clear who won this election is kind
of crazy, and it is going to just leave the country in limbo.
They are lame ducks and not ruling. Aung San Suu Kyi cannot
rule the country. You are going to have the military doing the
offensives that Kelley talked about in Kachin and Shan states.
So I think we need to put a little pressure on them, the
United States has quite a bit of clout with them in terms of
pressing them to try to live up to some of what they said
earlier they would do.
Senator Gardner. The State Department is obviously aware of
this. Have you seen any actions that they have taken so far? Or
do they need a little push on this?
Mr. Hiebert. I do not know.
Ms. Currie. There has not been any comment yet out of the
State Department regarding the announcements yesterday that
this was the tactic that the authorities seem to be taking.
And it is a very worrying sign. The delay in meeting and
the sudden appearance of a 100 complaints against 100
candidates, which would clearly be enough to undermine the
ruling majority of the NLD and tip things back toward the
military.
Senator Gardner. Ambassador Green, I do not know if you
want to add anything to that or not?
Ambassador Green. I agree with what you just heard. I think
also part of that is to significantly weigh in with the
positives, the carrot of what can be possible should these
steps be taken.
Burma, obviously, in the days immediately after the
election, enjoyed praise from many quarters and well-deserved
for the technical challenge of administering four different
ballots in many places. But it also has to be clear that that
can go away rather quickly if they do not follow through with
the promises that have been made and the promise of democracy.
So I think it is engagement and clarity and making it clear
what expectations are and what the possibilities are, as long
as they follow through with the significant commitments that
have been made.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. Obviously, as we discussed
prior to the hearing, we talked about the concern throughout
the region of Paris-type terrorist acts spreading to places
around the world, including Southeast Asia.
I guess the question I have is, what accelerator is there?
Is there an accelerator in Southeast Asia? As we talk about the
struggles that some are having toward democracy, maybe some are
slipping away from democracy or freedoms, and more corruption,
is there an accelerator in the region that would either amplify
the direction, the speed of the direction they take for the
direction of good, pro-democracy efforts, and conversely the
direction that it could take in the wrong direction? What could
speed up more government control, less freedom, less
opportunity for the reforms to corruption and transparencies
that we talked about today?
Is it terrorism? Is it financial? Is it natural disaster?
What is the big accelerator in the region that could either,
good or bad, speed the direction?
Ambassador Green. Do you want to?
Mr. Hiebert. I was going to just talk a little bit about
Indonesia and Malaysia, that had--estimates are between 800 and
1,000 or so fighters, though some are family members. You maybe
saw this more earlier today, the deputy prime minister and home
affairs minister in Malaysia signed an agreement with
Ambassador Joe Yun on increased access to U.S. databases on bad
actors, ``terrorists.''
That kind of thing is in the U.S. interests, as well as in
their interests. I am not sure that those kind of agreements
make much difference as accelerators.
At the same time, the United States is working with
Malaysia on maritime domain awareness for the South China Sea,
which is in Malaysia's interest and in the United States
interest. So they are sort of happening on a parallel track.
How you press Malaysia, it is really tough. Some of it can
be done in the TPP. The United States has given them many
warnings or urged them to get going and abandon the Sedition
Act and things like that. But now Najib, the Prime Minister, is
fighting for his political life. It is going to be tough to
turn this around.
Ms. Currie. With Prime Minister Najib and Burma as well as
in other places, I think that appeals to sectarianism are a
danger. And in Malaysia, in particular, it could be potentially
a dangerous situation. As we have seen in Burma, it was not
necessarily productive politically but it is dangerous to the
society, which will have long-term effects. I think that is
true in Malaysia because of the structural ways that Malaysia's
governance system is set up, as well as its economic and more
general system, and how certain groups are privileged and
others are not. And the appeal to the Bumiputera in Malaysia is
one of Najib's last tools that he has at his disposal.
Ambassador Green. If I can, in a slightly longer term view,
one of the most important accelerators of democratic transition
is success. So I think pushing and reinforcing success in
Indonesia to help them take on their great challenges, and the
same thing is true with a Burma depending upon how these next
several months go, those countries succeeding in their
democratic transition, that is one of the most important things
and one of the most important messages that we can send
throughout the region.
Remember, there is a counternarrative in that region that
comes from China, that democracy cannot work in this continent,
in this region. There is this constant refrain that what we are
talking about are merely Western ideas and they do not work in
Asian societies.
Success in Indonesia, hopefully the beginning of success in
Burma, that is what we need to be thinking about, making
significant investments in the NLD so they have the governing
capacity to take on the significant challenges that they face.
Remember, there is an entrenched bureaucracy there that
grew up and operated in an entirely different mindset. They are
going to need a lot of assistance and help from friends like
the United States of America to help them. Their success is the
most important thing that we can see.
Senator Gardner. Mr. Hiebert, I saw you raise your hand.
Mr. Hiebert. I realized one other thing that I should have
added and that is Senator Cardin talked about the TPP lever.
With Malaysia, the TPP is really important because they want to
get out of the middle-income trap. They see this as more access
to the United States and Japan markets. It gives them a bounce
versus the China market.
The United States had some leverage using the TPP and the
TIP. On the trafficking issue, they did not do enough, I would
argue, but maybe as Senators start dealing with passing the TPP
to raise concerns about human rights and democracy issues in
Malaysia, at least the bells will go off that maybe they will
not be included. So that is another lever that you guys might
be able to use.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Again, let me welcome our three members of
the panel, but particularly I want to welcome Ambassador Green,
my former colleague in the House of Representatives. Ambassador
Green had an incredible reputation in the House in regards to
the Millennium Development Act and the PEPFAR program, so it is
good to see there is life after Congress, so it is nice to have
you here. [Laughter.]
You mentioned, Mr. Ambassador, Western ideas. In 1975, the
Soviet Union, in order to show that they were truly a
democratic state in the eyes of the globe, joined us in
establishing the Commission for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, now the OSCE, the implementing arm being the Helsinki
Commission.
And when one mentions Helsinki, they think human rights. It
is broader than human rights, but they do think human rights.
And there are global standards that were agreed to by all
nations by consensus--human rights, good governance, religious
tolerance--all the good universal values that we hold so dear.
These are not Western values. These are universal values.
So no one is trying to import Western values to Southeast Asia.
We want respect for universal values.
The OSCE is a consensus organization, so there is no
ability to enforce other than through putting a spotlight on
problems and using conciliatory tactics to try and make
progress. It would seem to me that such an organization would
be very helpful in Southeast Asia.
I know Southeast Asia has organizations, such as ASEAN.
ASEAN is taking on an ambitious project on the Code of Conduct
for the China Sea. If it works, it will be an incredibly
valuable contribution to regional stability.
But it would seem to me that it would be advantageous for
us to try to strengthen either ASEAN or a regional organization
to judge each other's conduct by universal values, including
good governance.
Is this possible? Would it make sense if we can get it
done?
Ambassador Green. Senator, I could not agree more. I think
one of the successes that we have seen for the Millennium
Challenge Corporation, which is primarily for economic reasons
applicable to Africa, much more so than perhaps this region, is
the fact that we have clear objective indicators that we have
indicated we believe are essential for prosperity and stability
in the long run.
When you take a look at the discussions that take place in
regional settings on that continent, there is a great deal of
looking around to see how one's neighbor is doing, good and
bad.
I think that strengthening regional approaches, which will
require assistance from us to get going, I think is a very
important idea. I think it is a good one. It reinforces what
you said to begin with. These are obviously not Western ideals,
and we should push back forcefully anybody who tries to say
otherwise.
Working to strengthen regional institutions, peer-to-peer
organizations, organizations in which leaders and former
leaders can come and meet and help build capacity in emerging
governments and talk about challenges they face, it is a very
important idea. And I think it is one worth pursuing.
Senator Cardin. Ms. Currie.
Ms. Currie. Thank you for raising this issue, Ranking
Member Cardin, because it is an important issue. There have
been several efforts over the past several decades to try to
build organizations along the lines of the Helsinki Process in
Asia. They have never really gotten very far.
I think that probably the biggest barrier is China and the
role that they play in constraining organizations from forming
a democracy-focused grouping at the official level. And the
governments of even Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, even our
most democratic long-standing allies, can be reluctant to be
seen as bandwagoning against China in that way in the region.
And unless and until we can get China to agree in the way that
the Russians agreed as part of the OSCE process, it will be
very challenging to do that.
But in the absence of official entities that have been
created in the region, civil society has really raced ahead. So
you have seen regional civil society build up their own kind of
networks and their own kind of institutions that are really
shaping how the region responds to these challenges.
Developmental authoritarian narratives still have a lot of
credence at the elite level across the region, and China
certainly promotes that. But at the grassroots level, that
narrative is not nearly as popular. And when people are given
the opportunity to reject it and vote for democratic systems,
they inevitably largely follow that path.
So I think we are in evolutionary period there. The
opportunity is not yet ripe for that kind of regional
organization because of China's role, but I think it is good to
keep thinking about how we build that kind of cooperation.
Senator Cardin. In 1975, the Soviet Union was the dominant
factor on the OSCE. It included Canada and the United States,
and we are not necessarily considered part of Europe.
So it seems to me, even if you look just at Southeast Asia,
dominant players in the development of Southeast Asia include
the United States and China and Russia, by the way. They are
certainly dominant players. It has to be part of the equation.
We do have a seat at the table of ASEAN. It is not a full
seat, but we have a seat. And we have a full mission there,
because we recognize the importance to the United States.
Ambassador Green. Senator, if I can add on to what Kelley
has said, which I agree with, two other factors.
On the positive side, South China Sea and some of the
issues that have been raised, they are also serving as a
reminder to some of these nations about the high price of
China's expansionist philosophy and ideology. It has also
caused some of these nations to have conversations with us on a
number of fronts that maybe would have happened a little more
reluctantly.
Secondly, she makes a very good point about civil society,
the role civil society is playing and seeking to play, which is
why looking at the enabling environment, the regulations, the
registration requirements, in each of these countries is
terrifically important. We should make it a central part of our
diplomatic push to ensure that there is an opening for civil
society to speak with citizens and to act as a link between
citizens and their government.
We are seeing in too many places in the world and in this
region where central governments are seeking to close down
civil society, which is one of the greatest threats to any
democratic progress.
Senator Cardin. Yes?
Mr. Hiebert. I just want to throw out that the two bodies
that are actually active on human rights within ASEAN. ASEAN
itself has a human rights organization that it set up, but like
everything else in ASEAN, it is consensus-driven. So Cambodia
can stop some of the more interesting discussions that
Indonesia, the Philippines would have liked to have had.
And then the second organization is the Bali Forum, which
has annual meetings in Bali bringing people from around the
region. But that is Indonesia-driven.
Some countries like the Philippines are encouraging, are
supportive. But everybody else is basically holding off.
So there are forums that we maybe could consider working
with and encouraging, but the consensus nature of ASEAN makes
some of this stuff tough.
Senator Cardin. It is interesting, because consensus,
certainly, presents a challenge, there is no question, when one
country can prevent action from being taken. It was the reason
why the Soviet Union went forward with the Helsinki final
accords.
On the other hand, it does allow you to bring everyone
together in a less intimidating setting. Putting a spotlight on
a country could be a pretty strong way to make progress.
The other thing about the process is that it gives
legitimacy to any of the participating countries to raise
questions in other countries. You have the right to do that.
That is a powerful right, even in a consensus organization.
So I think there are some major benefits to be had, if we
could set up that type of structure.
My recommendation is--do not try to reinvent the wheel.
Just use the Helsinki model. We have looked at that in other
regions. We looked at in the Middle East. We looked at it in
Asia. We are challenged in our own hemisphere.
So there are ways of trying to improve regional cooperation
by recognizing universal values--again, not Western values, but
universal values.
I do not want this panel to go without raising the Burma
election issue and the Rohingya being disqualified from voting.
How do you even give a stamp of approval on the elections when
so many people were denied the opportunity because of their
ethnic backgrounds?
To me, you can never put a stamp of approval on this
election under those circumstances.
Ms. Currie. I would agree with you wholeheartedly, Mr.
Cardin, that the disenfranchisement of the Rohingya, the fact
that there will not be a Muslim Member of Parliament for the
first time in Burma's history, these are serious societal
problems. They are not just political problems.
The failure--it was not even a failure, the intentional
effort to disenfranchise the Rohingya people.
It was troubling, actually, with your previous panel to
have Mr. Busby self-correct and not refer--he initially called
the Rohingya ``citizens'' and then self-corrected and referred
to them as ``residents.'' I hope that that is not the position
of the United States Government, that the Rohingya are mere
residents of Burma. Maybe it is not for us to decide, but we
certainly should not be sitting up here making that decision ad
hoc on a congressional panel.
This is something that I would like to see the lame-duck
government address in their time in office and not dump on Aung
San Suu Kyi's plate.
But given the way that they have politicized this issue and
attempted to turn it into a political wedge issue to make
things difficult for her, I do not see that happening.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate you correcting the record
here. I agree with your statement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
I want to thank you all for being here today and for
appearing before us and providing your testimony and responses.
For the information of members, the record will remain open
until the close of business next Monday, November 23, including
for members to submit questions for the record.
We ask the witnesses to respond as promptly as possible.
This is your homework assignment. Your responses will also be
made part of the record.
With thanks of the committee, both Senator Cardin and I do
deeply thank you.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]