[Senate Hearing 114-820]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-820
PUTIN'S INVASION OF UKRAINE AND THE PROPAGANDA THAT THREATENS EUROPE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND REGIONAL
SECURITY COOPERATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 3, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
35-995 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Lester Munson, Staff Director
Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND REGIONAL
SECURITY COOPERATION
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. Ron Johnson, U.S. Senator From Wisconsin.................... 1
Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire............. 2
Prepared Statement........................................... 2
Benjamin G. Ziff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 3
Prepared Statement........................................... 5
Leon Aron, Resident Scholar and Director of Russian Studies,
American
Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC........................... 14
Prepared Statement........................................... 16
Peter Pomerantsev, Senior Fellow, Transitions Forum, Legatum
Institute, London, United Kingdom.............................. 19
Prepared Statement........................................... 21
Maksymilian Czuperski, Special Assistant to the President and
CEO, the Atlantic Council, Washington, DC...................... 23
Prepared Statement........................................... 24
Heather Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and
the Arctic, and Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic
and International
Studies, Washington, DC........................................ 28
Prepared Statement........................................... 30
(iii)
PUTIN'S INVASION OF UKRAINE AND THE PROPAGANDA THAT THREATENS EUROPE
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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Europe and Regional
Security Cooperation,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:47 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Johnson, Gardner, Shaheen, and Murphy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON JOHNSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Johnson. This hearing will come to order.
I will not talk about our prehearing banter.
First of all, I want to welcome all of our witnesses here.
I want to thank you for your thoughtful testimony and your
taking the time to appear before this committee.
The hearing title is ``Putin's Invasion of Ukraine and the
Propaganda that Threatens Europe.'' I took my first trip into
eastern Europe a couple of months after I was sworn in, in
2011, and we visited Georgia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States. I
have been back there a number of times since then. The
conditions literally have not changed, from the standpoint of
the pressure that Russia is applying to those fledgling
democracies, people that are trying to shed themselves of the
legacy of corruption, people who are trying to improve their
lives through democratic process and freedom. And, of course,
Vladimir Putin, that apparently threatens him. And so, it is
been instructive as we have taken those trips, particularly
with colleagues, how effective Vladimir Putin's disinformation
and propaganda really has been.
My sense is, I have not been--I am, you know, new to the
Senate in 2011. I traveled the world in my business. So, I have
not been involved in things like Radio Free Europe and Voice of
America, and understanding exactly how those broadcasting
outlets were really functioning, or not functioning. But, my
sense is, they obviously played a key role during the cold war;
but, once the Berlin Wall fell, it seems like we declared
victory and stopped our efforts. Based on testimony, it sounds
like we were starting to ramp those things up again, but, from
my standpoint, we cannot ramp them up fast enough. We have got
to push back on what is, like I said, very effective, on--the
standpoint of Vladimir Putin. We have the truth on our side,
and we need to convey that truth.
So, again, I certainly want to thank the witnesses for your
thoughtful testimony.
And, with that, I will turn it over to Senator Shaheen for
opening comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a statement that I will enter for the record, but
let me just point out that I have been to Europe several times
over the last 4 or 5 months, and--both eastern Europe, Ukraine,
and the Baltics. And one of the things that I heard everywhere
I went was the impact of Russian propaganda in those countries.
And I think it is important for us not to lose sight of the
ways that the Kremlin has been able to use its state-owned
media to harass journalists, for disinformation, and to create
space for Putin's recklessness abroad.
I think it is important for us to look at ways that we can
leverage opportunities offered by new media technologies, by
the insight and assistance of our European allies to create
opportunities for Russians, for Ukrainians, and for all of
those people who have been within eastern Europe to access
accurate information and make their own informed decisions.
I had the opportunity, earlier this year, to present an
Atlantic Council Freedom Award posthumously to Boris Nemtsov.
As we all know, he had been tireless in promoting freedom and
openness in Russia. And I remember--I presented the award to
his daughter, and I think she very aptly summarized the threat
posed by Russian propaganda. She said, ``Russian propaganda
kills. It not only kills reason and common sense, it literally
kills.'' And that, I think, was a very important statement for
us to remember today at this hearing and as we look, going
forward, at how to combat that propaganda.
So, again, I look forward to the discussion today, and very
much appreciate all of those people who will be testifying.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeanne Shaheen, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire
Thank you to our witnesses for agreeing to testify today, and to
you, Senator Johnson, for working with me to call this important
hearing.
I recently returned from a trip to Europe that included a stop in
Kiev. There, officials described to me how important Russian
information warfare is to President Putin's strategy in Ukraine. Their
comments echoed concerns I've heard from others in Central and Eastern
Europe. Clearly, Russian propaganda has become a strategic export,
designed to promote the agenda of Vladimir Putin abroad, undermining
democracy and free markets and to maintain Russian influence in what it
considers to be its sphere of influence. Our partners in Europe, in
particular those with Russian-speaking populations, are rightfully
concerned that Ukraine was just one victim of Russia's hybrid warfare,
and are looking to the United States to assist them in countering
disinformation emanating from the Kremlin.
Even as we focus here on the outward effects of Russian propaganda,
we should not lose sight of the ways the Kremlin uses its control of
state-owned media, harassment of journalists and disinformation to
deceive the Russian population and create political space for Putin's
recklessness abroad.
The U.S. Government is not new to promoting truth and transparency
overseas, but I worry that more than 25 years after the fall of the
Berlin Wall, we have gotten rusty. These times require a renewed effort
that takes full advantage of the resources at our disposal. We must
leverage the opportunities offered by new media technologies and the
insight and assistance of our European allies to create opportunities
for Russians, Ukrainians, and all people to access accurate information
and then to make their own informed decisions.
Earlier this year, I had the honor of presenting an Atlantic
Council Freedom Award posthumously to Boris Nemtsov for his tireless
efforts to promote freedom and openness in Russia. Nemtsov had vocally
opposed Russian involvement in Ukraine, and was, at the time of his
murder, working on a report to highlight the human toll on Russian
soldiers. His award was accepted by his daughter Zhanna, who aptly
summarized the threat posed by Russian propaganda. She said: ``Russian
propaganda kills . . . it not only kills reason and common sense, it
literally kills.''
I'm looking forward to today's discussion, and to hearing from both
the administration and distinguished experts from academia and the
media on how the U.S. can best help our allies confront Russian
propaganda.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Our first witness is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Mr. Benjamin Ziff. As I said, he is the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of European and Eurasian
Affairs. In this capacity, he is responsible for relations with
the Baltic and Nordic countries and manages the European Public
Diplomacy Portfolio. He joined the Foreign Service in 1988 and
has worked in public diplomacy positions in Australia, Israel,
Panama, and Peru.
Secretary Ziff.
STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN G. ZIFF, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Ziff. Well, thank you, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
Shaheen, members of this committee, for the opportunity to join
you today, and for this--your personal investment so many of
you have made in our shared vision of Europe whole, free, and
at peace. Your bipartisan support, your visits to Ukraine, the
assistance you and your fellow Senators have provided are truly
making a difference in the region.
We have all heard the popular Kremlin refrains asserting
that there are no Russian soldiers in Ukraine, that Ukraine is
on the verge of collapse, or that Americans, and not corrupt
leaders, are the cause of domestic discontent overseas. The
Kremlin sponsors this misinformation with a sophisticated $1.4-
billion-a-year propaganda apparatus, at home and abroad, which
claims to reach 600 million people across 130 countries in 30
languages. In the face of the Kremlin's attack on the truth,
the free flow of reliable, credible information is our best
defense.
In my remarks today, I will describe how we use our public
diplomacy tools and foreign assistance to amplify fact-based
messages, support credible independent voices, and improve
access to diverse sources of information.
In the fiscal year 2015, the State Department and USAID
allocated $66 million in U.S. foreign assistance funding to
sustain civil society and independent media in Eurasia and
southeast Europe, of which more than 60 million supports
independent media. In addition, we have also dedicated $4
million from the public diplomacy budget to bolster our staff
and our programming. These funds help partners who are
susceptible to Russian aggression build democratic principles,
independent media, and a civil society intolerant of
corruption.
In fiscal year 2016, President Obama is requesting a 26-
percent increase to the State Department and USAID for an
assistance budget in this sector, proposing $83 million to
surge our support for civil society and independent media in
countries most vulnerable to Russian pressure. This increase is
needed in countries that continue to be under threat, not just
in Russian-speaking areas, but also in the western Balkans, as
well. Our public diplomacy and foreign assistance resources
create programming focused on delivering our messages and
supporting local democratic voices throughout the region. Our
efforts in Russia, in the Russophone world, and in Western
Europe, help audiences identify objective reporting over the
Kremlin's noise, and 90 percent of all Russian-language news,
entertainment, and sports in the world are produced in Moscow
and controlled by the Kremlin.
We at the State Department employ a combination of short-
term, rapid-response messaging with medium- and long-term
programs to boost resilience and build capacity to recognize
and reject Kremlin propaganda. A few days after the shoot-down
of the MH17 airliner in July of last year, Embassy Moscow
plugged into the State Department's network of 130 Russian-
language specialists and released hourly messages and content
from journalists on the ground that helped negate Russian
conspiracy theories.
Rapid response is certainly crucial. However, the best
defense against Kremlin propaganda gaining traction is a
proactive approach that strengthens allies as they fight
propaganda on the front lines. The United States is not alone
in dealing with Russian disinformation, as you well know. We
are joining forces with our partners in Europe. Through a group
of message experts from like-minded countries, a 20-plus
network of government and international--multilateral
organizations known as the Friends of Ukraine, we regularly
consult on messaging campaigns, media trends, and Kremlin
propaganda tactics. Longer term, local independent voices and a
strong independent media are the real answer to free and
democratic societies throughout the region.
The exchange and training programs we sponsor link and
educate regional and transatlantic journalists and other
opinion leaders. We recognize that, despite Moscow's
significant investment in disinformation, its efforts have
limited effectiveness abroad. A Pew Research poll published in
August indicates that a median of only 30 percent of those
polled outside Russia see Russia favorably. President Putin,
himself, is viewed even less favorably, with only 24 percent of
respondents having confidence that President Putin will do the
right thing in world affairs.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Shaheen, members of this committee,
America's investment in public diplomacy is about more than
countering a single country. It is about protecting the rules-
based system across Europe and around the world. It is about
saying no to borders changed by force, to big countries
intimidating their neighbors and demanding a sphere of
influence.
I thank the subcommittee for its bipartisan support and
commitment to public diplomacy and to a Europe whole, free, and
at peace. And I welcome your questions.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ziff follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary Benjamin Ziff
Thank you Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Shaheen, members of this
committee for the opportunity to join you and for the personal
investment so many of you have made in our shared vision of a Europe
whole, free, and at peace. Your bipartisan support, your visits to
Ukraine, the assistance you and your fellow Senators have provided are
truly making a difference in the region.
We have all heard popular Kremlin refrains asserting there are no
Russian soldiers in Ukraine; that Ukraine is on the verge of collapse;
or Americans, and not corrupt leaders, are the cause of domestic
discontent overseas.
While many of these claims can easily be refuted, their around-the-
clock dissemination attempts to sow doubt, confusion, and suspicion and
question even the most basic truths.
The Kremlin sponsors these efforts with a sophisticated $1.4-
billion-a-year propaganda apparatus at home and abroad, which claims to
reach 600 million people across 130 countries in 30 languages. The
Russian Government also funds think tanks and outside organizations in
its neighboring states to help achieve its goals of promoting the
Kremlin's false narratives; portraying the West as a threat; and
undermining trust in independent media as well as Western institutions
and values.
In the face of the Kremlin's attack on the truth, the free flow of
reliable, credible information is the best defense. This is why the
State Department has focused its efforts on supporting independent
media; improving access to high quality, objective information;
exposing false narratives; and building the capacity of civil society.
After all, truth should be discovered, not dictated.
Strong independent journalism is a key element in any democracy and
will eventually prevail over disinformation and propaganda.
In my remarks today, I will expand upon these areas and describe
how we use our public diplomacy tools and foreign assistance to amplify
fact-based messages and support credible, independent voices and to
improve access to credible information. Finally, I will focus on our
diplomatic and security engagements that reinforce the positive story
our allies and partners in Europe tell about our transatlantic
relationship and commitments.
In FY 2015, the State Department and USAID allocated $66 million in
U.S. foreign assistance funding to sustain civil society and
independent media in the Eurasia and Southeast Europe region, of which
more than $16 million supports independent media. In addition to our
foreign assistance funds, we have also dedicated $4 million from the
public diplomacy budget to bolster our staff and programming. These
funds help our partners who are susceptible to Russian aggression build
democratic principles, independent media, and a civil society
intolerant of corruption.
In FY 2016, President Obama is requesting a 26-percent increase to
the State Department and USAID foreign assistance budget in this
sector, proposing $83 million to surge our support for civil society
and independent media in countries most vulnerable to Russian pressure.
This increase is needed in countries that continue to be under
threat of democratic backsliding, especially where the Kremlin's
influence is strong and growing--not just in Russian-speaking areas,
but also in the western Balkans. Increasingly, reports indicate that
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, are targets
of Russian pressure and disinformation. This is not new, but
susceptibility is increasing.
We are putting our current public diplomacy and foreign assistance
resources to good use, mainly toward programming focused on delivering
our messages and supporting local, democratic voices throughout the
region.
the audience
In Western and Central Europe, we work with our European partners
to underscore allied unity and bolster resolve to work together on
global challenges. We also offer Western journalists opportunities to
view the realities on the ground in countries, like Ukraine, where the
Kremlin tries to distort the facts.
For Russian-speaking audiences, especially in Eastern Europe and
Eurasia, we offer information and programming alternatives while
bolstering the capacity of civil society and independent journalists to
identify and tackle disinformation. This population is particularly
vulnerable to disinformation since Russian is the 10th most-spoken
language in the world--the 5th most when counted as a second language--
and since 90 percent of all Russian language news, entertainment, and
sports in the world are produced in Moscow and controlled by the
Kremlin.
Inside Russia, we work with media--traditional and social--to reach
the public and maintain a dialogue with the Russian people through
programs that accurately describe U.S. policy, society, and values.
Embassy Moscow is at the forefront of this engagement and has increased
its nongovernmental exchanges budget by $2 million, and its English
language programming by $400,000.
Yet, our work to connect with ordinary Russian citizens continues
to be hampered by the Kremlin. All 29 American Corners in Russia were
closed down over the last 2 years, and the Library of Foreign
Literature ended our long-standing (22-year) partnership last month,
closing the American Center there.
The outcry from ordinary Russians angry about losing this cultural
tie with America was immediate and loud. Thanks to them and the efforts
of our Embassy team, we relaunched a new American Center on Embassy
grounds, and had a huge turnout at its first public event. Our hope is
that we can continue to provide an undistorted view of American
literature, culture, entertainment, and values to those who seek it in
Moscow.
near term: messaging
On a daily basis, our efforts help audiences identify objective
reporting over the Kremlin's noise.
To do this, we employ a combination of short-term messaging
strategies with medium- and long-term programs to boost resilience and
build capacity to recognize and reject Russian propaganda. The State
Department has implemented a rapid response system to support our
overseas posts in times of heightened Kremlin propaganda. Armed with
the facts, our embassies are able to adapt the content and materials we
supply to their own audiences and amplify the truth rapidly.
For example, a few days after the shoot down of the MH17 airliner
in July of last year, Embassy Moscow plugged into the State
Department's network of 130+ Russian language officers and released
hourly messages and content from journalists on the ground to help
negate the rampant obfuscation and conspiracy theories being blared by
the Russian news media.
Similarly, in September 2015, after photoshopped images alleging
U.S. Ambassador Tefft's presence at a Russian opposition rally were
released, Embassy Moscow responded by producing a photo collage of the
same picture of the ambassador altered to show him at various events--
including landing on the moon. The Embassy's success in discrediting
the risible attempt at propaganda went viral, reaching over 1 million
Russians, and forcing the Russian news outlet that shopped the image to
withdraw its own story.
This kind of ``rapid response'' counter messaging, while
necessarily reactive, is crucial to defend against the manipulation of
truth. But the best defense against Russian propaganda gaining traction
is proactive. It is designed to instill strength and independence in
local communities and allies fighting propaganda on the front lines and
it encourages higher standards of journalism.
For Ukraine, we are constantly reviewing our policies and needs
through a department-wide working group organized by Deputy Secretary
Blinken. Under Secretary Stengel and I cochair this group, which meets
weekly to maintain a focus on Ukraine's successes in the face of overt
Kremlin aggression and messaging distortion. Through this consultative
process, we update our Embassies daily on current policy priorities,
messages, and programs, and all State elements work to communicate our
policy and support for Ukraine as one voice.
To reach the broader Russian-speaking population, the Department
spokesperson's office last week launched a Russian-language version of
its Twitter feed. Now, our official statements reach audiences in the
region directly, without having to be interpreted by third parties.
Along these lines, we are also engaging directly with independent media
within Russia. State has placed interviews of more than a dozen
Assistant Secretaries, Special Envoys, and other senior officials in
such outlets this fiscal year.
partnering with others on messaging
The U.S. is not alone in dealing with Russian disinformation. To
correct untruths not only in Ukraine and Russia, but across Russian-
speaking communities, we are joining forces with our partners in the EU
to identify, analyze, and debunk Russian disinformation where and when
we find it; highlight Ukraine's progress in building its democracy,
fighting corruption, and advancing reform; bolster the Russian-speaking
areas of Europe seeking to resist disinformation; and fortify
transatlantic unity through institutions like NATO and the EU.
Through a group of messaging experts from like-minded countries--
known as the ``Friends of Ukraine''--we regularly consult on messaging
campaigns, media trends, and Kremlin propaganda tactics. Friends of
Ukraine (FoU) is a growing 20+ member network of governments and
multilateral organizations committed to responding to disinformation in
real time through multiple voices. Efforts by the FoU have helped to
keep Ukraine on the front burner, even when the Kremlin's media machine
has tried to distract its audiences with other topics.
NATO also is active in this area through its Strategic
Communications Center of Excellence in Riga, Latvia. The newly opened
center designs programs to advance StratCom doctrine development and
standardization, conducts research and experimentation to find
practical solutions to existing challenges, identifies lessons from
StratCom operations, as well as enhances training and education efforts
and interoperability throughout the alliance.
And, our partners at The European External Action Service (EEAS),
the EU's diplomatic corps, have started a new Strategic Communications
unit, which directs public diplomacy messaging and programs throughout
the Eastern Partnership countries. I visited Brussels recently and met
with the leadership of this new unit, and was impressed by their team
and the content and campaigns they are developing. We are committed to
helping one another share content and distribute information through EU
and U.S. channels, and this spring I hope to bring the State Department
and EU teams together to enhance this much-needed collaboration.
long term: building capacity
While rapid response counter-messaging is a critical element of our
strategy, local independent voices and a strong independent media are
the real answer to free and democratic societies throughout the region.
State Department and USAID programs support free media in the region to
provide open, objective, accessible information to all. Exchange and
assistance programs provide critical tools and increase access to a
variety of local news sources, high-quality fact-based content, and
honest investigative journalism.
We are proud of the exchange programs and ``tech camps'' we sponsor
to link and train regional and transatlantic journalists and other
opinion leaders. By November, we will have trained 120 ``Tech Camp''
alumni--60 in Prague and Riga and 60 more in Kiev--who will go on to
support strong independent journalism by sharing best practices and
resources.
We are also working with the EU to cooperate on supporting the
creation of new regional programs to support Russian-language media,
based on the European Endowment for Democracy's (EED) Feasibility Study
on Russian Language Media Initiatives.
Altogether, in FY15, the State Department and USAID allocated
approximately $16 million to support independent media. Already, we
have success stories that we are proud of including:
Launching a year-long investigative journalism training and
exchange program for up to 75 journalists from the Baltics.
The Regional Investigative Journalism Network, supported by
USAID and DRL, which connects local investigative journalists
throughout the region and helps them investigate and report on
cases of corruption and misuse of government authority.
And, the 5-year Ukraine Media (U-Media) Project, which
promotes the development of a free, vibrant, and professional
media sector in Ukraine and also serves as a watchdog in the
public interest. The U-Media program has adapted to the
changing context in Ukraine by promoting balanced political
coverage across Ukraine through local content production,
exchange visits, public discussions, and webcasts with special
attention to the South and East. Local media partners also
monitor and publicize intimidation and attacks on civic
activists and journalists and government interference in
independent media coverage of Ukrainian politics.
While training and exchanges are critical to our efforts,
information is also impeded by the lack of communications
infrastructure in many areas tied to Kremlin-sponsored programming.
To help build capacity, the Broadcasting Board of Governors' (BBG)
new Russian-language news program, Current Time, is on air in nine
countries via 25 major market commercial, satellite, and public media
outlets.
Nearly 2 million viewers in Russia are watching Current Time online
weekly, and BBG's digital media engagement has grown by an average of
2.5 million Russian-speakers per week.
A popular BBG program, ``Footage v. Footage,'' is devoted to
pointing out inconsistencies in Russian reporting and debunking myths.
BBG has also helped to bring about a contract with PBS Distribution
for nearly 400 hours of Russian-language public media content to
Ukraine, Lithuania and Estonia.
These stations will air these programs for Russian language
speaking audiences starting in November of this year.
In late August, BBG also donated its recently developed ``Fly Away
FM System,'' which is suitable for use as low power FM transmitters.
While BBG's contributions, our exchanges, and public diplomacy
programming are vital to our strategy against Kremlin disinformation,
we must continue to ensure our commitments and support to our allies so
that we continue to have a positive story to tell.
resilience for the future
Ultimately, countering disinformation is a security issue,
especially when the goal of Russian disinformation and propaganda is to
destabilize, distract, and divide our allies.
Addressing this problem is an important part of our diplomatic
effort to promote a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
The Baltic States are primary targets of Russian disinformation,
especially since all three--Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia--are valued
NATO allies. Just as we are cooperating with them to counter Russian
disinformation, we work together in the realm of collective defense.
The combination of our diplomatic efforts ensures that the U.S. not
only has a positive story to tell, but that others will be able to hear
it over the Kremlin's noise.
Despite Moscow's significant investment in disinformation, its
efforts have limited effectiveness abroad. A Pew research poll
published in August indicates that a median of only 30 percent of those
polled outside of Russia see Russia favorably. Putin himself is viewed
even less favorably, with only 24 percent of respondents having
confidence that Putin will do the right thing in world affairs.
Here in the United States, we have not seen evidence that the
Kremlin's misinformation has gained any traction: A recent Pew poll
indicated 75 percent of Americans have no confidence in Putin to do the
right thing in world affairs.
This reveals that even while Europe, and in particular Ukraine,
works through tough challenges and fights disinformation, our work
together continues to speak more loudly than Russia's meddling.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Shaheen, members of this committee, America's
investment in public diplomacy is about more than fighting a single
country.
It is about protecting the rules-based system across Europe and
around the world. It is about saying no to borders changed by force, to
big countries intimidating their neighbors or demanding a sphere of
influence.
I thank this subcommittee for its bipartisan support and commitment
to public diplomacy and to a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
I look forward to your questions.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Secretary Ziff.
Can you talk to me about, you know, what our efforts--you
know, how they are divided between the new media, social media,
and, you know, traditional broadcast outlets, the effectiveness
of radio versus TV versus those, and how are we allocating
those resources?
Mr. Ziff. Certainly, Senator.
We are working across all media spectra in the State
Department. We focus--we have 63 embassies and consulates in
the--in Europe and Eurasia with teams of people who are devoted
to messaging and to countering propaganda and to putting
America's messages out there. These people work with
traditional media. They all have Web sites and Twitter feeds,
as well, and they all sort of deal with opinion leaders and
deal with the media on the ground there.
From the State Department, the Broadcasting Board of
Governors has increased its Russia-language programming by over
100 percent. Its streaming online TV reaches 2.5 million people
a week. And our Twitter feeds from the State Department are
also very popular and very engaged.
We kind of divide the efforts up between Washington, as the
supplier of the meta message to our posts abroad, and each of
these posts is able to adjust and use the material we provide
in ways that best address their local audiences.
Senator Johnson. Give me some assessment, though, in terms
of the effectiveness between broadcast and--I mean, your--in
other words, your assessment, the State Department's, in terms
of pushing it out through the Internet----
Mr. Ziff. Sure.
Senator Johnson [continuing]. Again, into the eastern
European countries, but then also the effectiveness, and how do
we reach citizens inside Russia?
Mr. Ziff. Sure. TV is the 800-pound gorilla in this area.
Certainly in Russia, the Kremlin controls about 90 percent of
the TV programming there. So, within Russia, TV is the way that
the Kremlin gets its message out. Overseas, it is much less
effective. We are seeing that Russian television is not doing
anywhere near as well overseas as it does within Russia.
Online, we are focusing a lot on online, because even the
people who may not like us all have, sort of, iPhones, and so
we are focusing a great deal on Twitter and on streaming media
as a way to reach the audiences throughout western Europe, the
border countries, as well as Russia. Russia is a harder
environment to work in, but, obviously, in western Europe and
the border countries, it is a much more welcoming environment
for our efforts.
Senator Johnson. How do we push information to Russia,
though? I mean, is it radio? Are we completely blocked by TV?
Are we completely blocked on the Internet?
Mr. Ziff. No, sir. As I mentioned, the Broadcasting Board
of Governors does reach Russia through its streaming TV
programs. Our Embassy in Moscow also reaches people through its
Twitter feed and has electronic engagement. And I believe that
the radio programming coming out of the border countries also
reaches Europe, as well--Russia, as well.
Senator Johnson. Can you talk about--within those border
countries, you know, to what extent, or what percentage, has
Russia invested--and those individuals aligned with Russia
invested in those broadcast outlets and totally control them?
Mr. Ziff. I do not have those figures for you right now,
Senator. I will be happy to try and get them for you.
Mr. Ziff. I know that audiences in some of the border
countries, the Russian-speaking audiences, do tune in to
Russian TV; though, for example, Estonia just recently began
its own Estonian national Russian-language television station,
which is apparently doing very well. And I know other countries
are looking very closely at how they address the needs of
Russian-speaking audiences within their own borders.
Senator Johnson. In your testimony, you talked about rapid
response, and you used the downing of the airliner as one
example. Can you cite other examples----
Mr. Ziff. Sure.
Senator Johnson [continuing]. And just also talk about--How
do we counter, specifically, other than just rapid response--I
mean, is our broadcasting--is it organized enough where we are
specifically addressing and countering specific pieces of
propaganda? Now just an instance like that, but, I mean, the
specific pieces of propaganda that Russia is pushing.
Mr. Ziff. I would say that it depends on the situation,
Senator, because, while, as I said, we do emphasize rapid
response, we think that the whack-a-mole approach to every lie
and every exaggeration is counterproductive, because it is
reactive and you are always behind the curve. The way to really
fight this and look at this is a medium- and long-term
challenge where we strengthen the local abilities, local
journalists, local civil society, that they can identify this
problem in Russian propaganda from the outset.
Another example of rapid response, you asked for, a Russian
outlet tweeted a photoshopped photograph of our Ambassador in
Russia at a--to--his presence, purportedly, at a opposition
rally, when, in fact, he was nowhere near there, and, within 2
hours, our Embassy in Moscow had photoshopped our Ambassador on
the Moon, at an ice hockey rink, and doing other ridiculous
things, which highlighted that this was pure propaganda, and
did not work. This tweet was retweeted extensively within
Russia. So, that is another example of--a tactical example of
how we would fight back against a particular message.
Senator Johnson. Okay.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
How are we coordinating with our European allies to combat
Russian propaganda? I understand that there is a center in
Brussels that the EU is operating out of. There is a NATO
center in Riga. There is a variety of nongovernmental
organizations and media outlets, like Deutsche Welle who are
also working on this issue. So, can you talk about how
coordination occurs between all of these entities? Or does it?
Mr. Ziff. I sure can, Senator. Thank you very much.
I am just back, 10 days ago, from Brussels, where I met
with our colleagues in the European External Action Service.
They have got a large team in Brussels which is doing pretty
much what we are doing here. We coordinate weekly with them. We
have secure video teleconferences with them. We talk to them
frequently. We share products, as well, with them. The--our
embassies are also, sort of, our lead coordinators, across the
board, with their local interlocutors. Obviously, the border
countries are the most aware of this threat and are most
organized to combat it. Fact, the--we just had a--the European
Endowment for Democracy just had a conference in Warsaw in
September to discuss, sort of, ways that the continent itself
can work to strengthen civil society and journalistic abilities
to be able to fight this problem.
Senator Shaheen. And to what extent are we working with
dissidents inside Russia who are also trying to get correct
information out to Russians, people like Boris Nemtsov?
Mr. Ziff. Well, I would like to discuss in a--sort of
offline, if I could.
Senator Shaheen. Okay.
Mr. Ziff. That would be, I think, a more useful
conversation.
Senator Shaheen. So, can you talk a little bit about the
impact that we are seeing of the Russian propaganda on European
politics? I have been watching some of the recent elections,
and seen the gains that nationalist parties are having. To what
extent do we think those are being fed by Russian propaganda?
Mr. Ziff. Well, I believe that you can look at Europe right
now, and the challenges that they are facing are--with
migration and other things--are a ripe field to be taking
advantage of. I do not know of any specific, sort of, elements
that I would want to talk about here, with Russia funding any
particular elements. But, obviously, even without that, given
the conditions on the ground, the migrant crisis, and others,
it is a fertile environment for all kinds of propaganda and all
kinds of misinformation.
Senator Shaheen. We have been having a series of hearings
in the Armed Services Committee talking about military reform
and the potential for military reform. And one of the things
that has come up in--for example, that former Secretary of
Defense Bob Gates said, a couple of weeks ago, when he was
before the committee--he talked about the fact that we had
abolished the U.S. Information Agency, back in the late 1990s,
and we really had not replaced that with other--with a direct
program, I guess is the best way to put it. So, to what extent
are we working with--is State working with the Department of
Defense on some of these issues? And do you see that as a
priority, as we think about how to respond to Russia and to
some of the other threats that are coming, certainly from ISIS,
as the result of their very effective efforts on the Internet?
Mr. Ziff. Well, you are talking about a topic very near and
dear to my heart, Senator. My father was a USIA officer, and I
was a USIA officer before joining the Department of State. And
I can attest to its qualities and what it did. And I can also
attest that the incorporation of those qualities into the State
Department has, in some ways, made us more flexible, more
adaptable, and brought us closer to policy. So, I--while I
certainly emotionally lament the departure of USIA, I think the
State Department has done a very good job in responding to a
21st century threat, which is broader than the one that was
presented by the Soviet Union back in the day.
As far as the Department of Defense, obviously we
coordinate very closely. We are in constant contact with our
colleagues in--on the military side. They are--sort of, in the
European Command--and they are very--they are helping us a
great deal in a--in producing, sort of, some products and some
initiatives that allow us to have a sort of whole-of-government
approach to this problem.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Ziff, for your testimony today.
While the cease-fire in eastern Ukraine is fragile, it does
appear to be holding, at least at this point. What do you
believe is--the State Department--what does State Department
believe that Putin's next step is Ukraine?
Mr. Ziff. Well, perhaps you should ask Mr. Putin that, Mr.
Gardner. I think the--the cease-fire is holding, Senator, but
the--their--our goal is full Minsk implementation. The Minsk
Accords have to be implemented, and we are not seeing that
moving forward. The hostages have not been released. The full
withdrawal of weapons has not been completed. And the full--the
free access by--of humanitarian assistance has not been
allowed. So, in those ways, we see that the Kremlin and
President Putin are not complying with the terms of the Minsk
agreement.
Senator Gardner. Is there any sense of escalation or any
anticipation of escalation?
Mr. Ziff. I think perhaps the--oh, yeah, thank you--there
has been--thank you very much--there have been some--an uptick
in attacks over recent days. We have 17 casualties since
September 1, and 50 wounded, some mines, some boobytraps. This
is still a--sort of a blip in the cease-fire; nonetheless,
something we are following very closely and we are very
concerned about, because, obviously, violence is the last thing
we want to see reoccur in that zone.
Senator Gardner. So, 17 casualties since September 1.
Mr. Ziff. Yes, sir.
Senator Gardner. Could you give, sort of, a timeframe from
when the Minsk was entered into, what that means?
Mr. Ziff. Well, I think the issue was, when the cease-fire
began, there was supposed to be a cease-fire. Nonetheless----
Senator Gardner. Seventeen.
Mr. Ziff [continuing]. There were--killings continued.
Senator Gardner. And if fighting renews, what is the U.S.
strategy?
Mr. Ziff. Excuse me?
Senator Gardner. What is the U.S. strategy if fighting
resumes?
Mr. Ziff. The U.S. strategy? Let me defer that to my more
military-inclined colleagues, Senator, because our assistance
to Ukraine, to this point, has not included lethal aid, but we
have not ruled out the possibility, if conditions change. We
are watching closely and seeing what occurs on the ground. Our
focus right now is on getting Minsk implemented and making sure
that the Russians and the separatists fulfill their
commitments.
Senator Gardner. Surely, State has had conversations, if
there was a renewal of fighting, with the government. Is that
correct?
Mr. Ziff. I do not--I am not aware of any such
conversations. I would imagine that our Ambassador on the
ground may have done so.
Senator Gardner. Okay. And the sanctions against Putin, how
do you--how effective do you believe they have been? Are there
things that we could do to strengthen them and make them more
effective in targeting critical sectors, oil and gas or others?
Mr. Ziff. Well, I think--we have sanctioned almost 100
individuals and enterprises on the Russian side in, sort of,
response to their actions in Ukraine and in Crimea. Those
sanctions are ongoing. They are having an effect. We are seeing
an effect, not only by those sanctions, but also the Russian
countersanctions. It is affecting the Russian economy. We
believe this is a way to motivate the Russian and sort of, the
Kremlin and its entourage to change their behavior. In fact, if
Minsk is not implemented, we are looking to roll over those
sanctions for another period, come January.
Senator Gardner. Do you believe that the Russian actions in
Syria are on a parallel track, or are they, in some ways, a
attempt for a bargaining chip in Ukraine?
Mr. Ziff. Well, Senator, luckily, my responsibilities
encompass Europe and do not extend to the Middle East. And I am
very grateful for that on a daily basis. And so, I recommend
that that question be directed to people who are more focused
on the Middle East.
Senator Gardner. Okay, but--so, no conversations that you
have had with anybody regarding a possible--possible use of
Syria's activities in Ukraine, try to create a bargaining----
Mr. Ziff. Well, no, we----
Senator Gardner [continuing]. Position of some kind.
Mr. Ziff. I have discussed the counterpropaganda aspects of
that in our response is to the Russian narratives regarding
Syria, but not specifically to the military options on the
ground.
Senator Gardner. Okay. And do you believe--did you
anticipate further Russian activity to destabilize other Baltic
allies? I know you spoke to that with Senator Shaheen briefly,
but would just love to see your response on United States
commitment to NATO if Russia moves against our NATO allies in
the Baltics.
Mr. Ziff. I think, Senator, article 5 is article 5. And our
commitment to article 5, we have a rotating presence throughout
the Baltics which demonstrate our resolve. We are cooperating
extensively on military and, as I said, civil society and
counterpropaganda efforts. I would imagine that our commitment
to those countries is crystal clear.
Senator Gardner. There was a--articles recently--and you
may or may not be able to answer this question, but there were
articles recently about Russian activities surrounding our
transatlantic cable--communications systems. Certainly
provocative action, if true. Can you highlight any activities
that may be taking place around some of our communications
systems?
Mr. Ziff. Not in this forum, Senator.
Senator Gardner. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. Secretary Ziff, I would like to give you
an opportunity just to--if there is anything else you would
like to convey to the committee before we release you. But, I
do have one quick question.
You mentioned that the hostages have not been released. Do
you have--does the State Department have a number on what those
hostage levels are?
Mr. Ziff. Well, we have several prominent hostages,
Senator. We treat them all the same. We believe they are all
important, and they all need to be released, whether they are
prominent or not. Some of them were kidnapped, as you well
know. The human cost of the Ukrainian conflict is extensive,
and these are more victims. So, we believe, as part of any
agreement, this is a--sort of a requirement.
Senator Gardner. But, do we have a count? I mean, do we--
are we operating with a certain level, here?
Mr. Ziff. I do not have that number in hand. I am happy to
get it to you, Senator.
Senator Johnson. Okay.
Do you have any further comments before we----
Mr. Ziff. I would just like to conclude to--by reinforcing
the fact that our--the State Department's view, this--the work
against the Kremlin's propaganda is not necessarily a short-
term effort. This is a medium- and long-term effort to make
sure there is no fertile ground in Europe or Eurasia for the
kind of efforts that they are doing. And I know that it is
frustrating, on occasion perhaps, to see the lies and the
distortions occur. But, the best defense we have is to make
sure that we have well-trained, able journalists and publics on
the ground in Europe who can discount those.
Senator Johnson. Okay.
Thank you, Secretary Ziff.
We will seat the next panel, then.
[Pause.]
Senator Johnson. Again, I want to thank the witnesses for
your time and for your testimony.
We will start, moving from my left to right. First witness
will be Dr. Leon Aron. Dr. Aron is a resident scholar and the
director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise
Institute. Dr. Aron serves on the Broadcasting Board of
Governors, which oversees the operations of several
international broadcasting outlets, including Voice of America
and Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty.
And, I know in your testimony, Dr. Aron, you are testifying
on your own behalf, not as governor of the Broadcasting Board
of Governors.
So, Dr. Aron, please.
STATEMENT OF LEON ARON, RESIDENT SCHOLAR AND DIRECTOR OF
RUSSIAN STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Aron. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
You have made the disclaimer for me, so more time.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, the
aggressive, often sophisticated and Internet-savvy propaganda
campaign is skillful, it is flexible, it is adapted to the
geography of the audience. While general patterns are similar,
and I will discuss them in a moment, the content may differ
considerably, depending on the ethnicity, political culture,
and geography of the target audience. Thus, in western and
United States, the RT television networks aims not so much to
sell what might be called the Russia brand, but, rather, to
devalue the notion of democratic transparency and
accountability, to undermine confidence and objective
reporting, and to litter the news with half truths and quarter
truths. ``Question More'' is RT's advertising motto, and it is
not coincidental, for the Russian propaganda seeks to exploit
several key conventions and tendencies of Russian media and
Western audiences. Let me mention a few.
First, truth is in the eye of the beholder. As a former
insider observer of the Russian media put it, Russian
propaganda uses the idea of a plurality of truths to feed
disinformation, which, in the end, looks to trash the
information space.
Two, there are two sides to every story, and the
credibility of the source is secondary. And therefore, RT fits
rather smoothly in the panoply of Western media.
Just to be on the safe side, though, RT, which does not
broadcast in Russian, never identifies itself as a Russia-based
and government-funded network.
Four, RT and the Sputnik News Network, which was launched
last year, find the soil of the Western media markets already
fairly lucent and fertilized as far as conspiracy theories are
concerned. Did the U.S. Government orchestrate 9/11? Why not?
Twenty-three percent of Germans thought so, as did 15 percent
of Italian. Seven years after the fall of the Twin Towers,
between one-fifth and a quarter of Britons, French, and
Italians told pollsters that they have no idea who was behind
the attacks. Well, then, after the CEO of France largest oil
company, Total, who had opposed economic sanctions on Russia,
was killed when his plane slammed into a snowplow operated by a
drunken driver at the Moscow Airport, Russian commentators
asserted that he was killed by the CIA. And why stop there? Did
the CIA aid Ukrainians in shooting down the MH17 Malaysian
airliner? That was one of the versions put out. Plausible. Did
the Russian opposition kill its own leader, Boris Nemtsov to
embarrass Putin? Possible.
Yet, for all the seemingly fertile soil of the Russian
propaganda distortions, the impact of the Russian
disinformation campaign on the democracies of western and
central Europe appears paltry. Where the ratings were credibly
established, RT was barely visible, apart from the presold
audiences on the extreme left and right. And the main reason is
the highly competitive media environment that exposes people to
wide range of facts and interpretations.
Now, the situation is quite different, grimmer, when we go
east to the countries collectively known as the former Soviet
Union. There the effectiveness of Russian propaganda is greatly
enhanced by two factors. First, the presence of ethnic Russian
minorities, some of whom nurture grievances, and, second, the
existence of far fewer alternative sources of credible
information than in the east and--west and central Europe. It
is here that what is known as the weaponization of information
occurs. News and analysis as means of provoking strong negative
emotions potentially leading to hatred, incitement, and
ultimately justification of violence.
In Kiev, earlier this year, one of my most memorable
meetings was with the dean of the School of Journalism at the
Kyiv Mohila Academy, Professor Evhen Fedchenko. Together with
his students, her runs a Web site called StopFake.org, which
records some of the Russian propaganda masquerading as news.
Here is just two examples. Russia's most widely watched Pervyi
Kanal, or First Channel, television network, broadcast an
interview with a terrified woman identified as a refugee from
the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government. She said
she witnessed Ukrainian soldiers publicly executing the wife
and the son of a pro-Russian separatist. The child was
crucified on a bulletin board in the center of the city while
the woman was allegedly dragged behind a tank until she was
dead. The story was proven to be a complete fake.
Another example. A popular Russian television channel
posted on social media sites an invented conversation between a
Ukrainian military commander and a German doctor in which they
discuss in detail the harvesting of internal organs, presumably
of deceased members of the pro-Russian population caught up in
the fighting. The officer is quoted as saying, ``We would have
a great deal of material to work with, thanks to our Western
partners.''
Fortunately, there is an antidote to this poison. It is
impossible, of course, to sanitize all of this, but the--
because of the lopsidedness of funding and manpower, but there
is enough to deflate the effort considerably.
As usual, the best medicine is a rich, diverse, and
uncensored democratic media environment, but as such
environment does not yet fully exist in most post-Soviet
states, the U.S. international media could be of great help.
I wonder if I could have 2 more minutes. I am almost done.
It is an interesting story.
Despite being barred from the domestic outlets in Russia,
the online audience for Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and
Voice of America has been growing in Russia, reaching 4.7
million this summer. Last year, a Gallup nationwide survey in
Ukraine showed the site of the VOA audience--the size of--I am
sorry--VOA audience across all the media platforms in Ukraine
and in the Russian-language doubling since 2012 to nearly 7
million adults who use VOA every week. That is 18 percent of
all adults in Ukraine. In Kiev, I was repeatedly struck by the
deep appreciation across the board, across the political
spectrum, both in the media elites and political elites, at the
fact that the VOA and the Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe
content was superior, not just to the Russian propaganda, but
also to the output of the oligarch-dominated domestic Ukrainian
television.
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, we are facing a determined and
often refined propaganda effort. From the sophisticated
exploitation of Western media patterns and vocabulary to
outright lies and crude fakes, the goal remains the same: to
undermine the people's trust in democratic politics and
policies and in free and fair media. As this effort is vital to
the maintenance of the present Russian regime, it may be with
us for a long time. So, time and talent and task and risktaking
innovation, and, yes, money, for U.S. international media will
continue to be needed to counter this effort.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Aron follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Leon Aron
Thank you Mr. Chairman. First, a disclaimer: the testimony I am
about to give will be given in my capacity as a private expert and not
as a Governor of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
Mr. Chairman, the ranking member, members of the committee, the
aggressive, often sophisticated and Internet-savvy propaganda campaign,
underwritten by the Russian Government to the tune of at least half a
billion dollars a year, is flexible and skillfully adapted to the
geography of the audience. While general patterns are similar and I
will discuss them in a moment, content may differ considerably
depending on the ethnicity, political culture and geography of the
intended audience.
Thus, in Western Europe and the United States, the RT television
network aims not so much to ``sell'' what might be called the ``Russia
brand,'' but rather to devalue the notions of democratic transparency
and accountability, to undermine confidence in objective reporting, and
to litter the news with half-truths and quarter truths.
``Question more!'' is RT's advertising motto--and it is not
coincidental. For the Russian network seeks to exploit several key
conventions and tendencies of Western media:
First, truth is in the eye of the beholder. As a keen and
formerly inside observer of the Russian media effort put it,
Russian propaganda uses ``the idea of a plurality of truths to
feed disinformation, which in the end looks to trash the
information space.'' \1\
Second, that there are two sides to every story, and the
credibility of the source is secondary.
``The medium is the message,'' Marshall McLuhan famously proclaimed
in the 1960s. Half a century later, the message is increasingly
detached from the medium, and words from those who utter them. After
all, post-modernism postulates that ``there is no author, there is only
the text.'' My favorite modern English poet, Robert Graves, started the
poem, titled ``Forbidden Words,'' with these four lines:
``There are some words [that] carry a curse with them:
Smooth-trodden, abstract, slippery vocables.
They beckon like a path of stepping stones;
But lift them up and watch what writhes or scurries!''
But when showered by these smooth-trodden and slippery vocables,
how often do Western media bother to lift the stones?
Third: since the credibility of the source is of secondary
importance, Russian propaganda finds itself fitting rather
smoothly into a panoply of Western media. (Just to be on the
safe side, RT, which does not broadcast in Russian, never
identifies itself as a Russia-based and government-funded
network.)
Fourth: RT and the Sputnik news network, launched last year,
find the soil of the Western media markets already fairly
loosened and fertilized as far as conspiracy theories are
concerned. Did the U.S. Government orchestrate 9/11? Why not?
Twenty-three percent of Germans thought so, as did 15 percent
of Italians.\2\ Seven years after the fall of the Twin Towers,
between a quarter and one-fifth of Britons, French, and
Italians told the pollsters they had no idea who was behind the
attack.\3\ Well, then, after the CEO of France's largest oil
company, Total, who had opposed economic sanctions on Russia,
was killed when his plane slammed into a snowplow operated by a
drunken driver at a Moscow airport, Russian commentators
asserted that he was killed by the CIA.\4\ And why stop there?
Did the CIA aid Ukrainians in shooting down the MH 17 Malaysian
airliner (one of the ``versions'' suggested by Russian
propaganda)? Plausible. Did the Russian opposition kill its own
leader, Boris Nemtsov, to embarrass Putin? Possible.
Fifth: With all the so-called value judgments to be taken
out of the reporting, there are no more ``just'' wars or wars
of ``aggression''--only ``conflicts.'' Just as there are no
``victims'' and ``perpetrators,'' only ``violence.'' So when RT
and Sputnik editors read or see or hear news in the leading
Western media about ``renewed violence'' in the ``conflict''
between Ukraine and Russia, they find it easy to build up on
and extrapolate from them to twist the truth. Especially, when
almost one in three Germans was reported last summer to find
Russia not responsible for the violence in Ukraine, that's
another opening for RT to exploit.
Yet for all this seemingly fertile soil for Russia's distortions,
the impact of the Russian disinformation campaign on the democracies of
Western and Central Europe appears paltry, if not to say negligible.
Where the ratings were credibly established, RT was barely visible,
apart from the ``pre-sold'' audiences on the extreme left and right.\5\
The main reason is a highly competitive media environment that exposes
people to a wide range of facts and interpretations.
The situation is quite different when we go east, to the countries
collectively known as the Former Soviet Union. There the effectiveness
of Russian propaganda is greatly enhanced by two factors. First, the
presence of ethnic Russian minorities, some of whom nurture grievances;
and, second, the existence of far fewer alternative sources of credible
information than in West-Central Europe.
It is here that what is known as the ``weaponization of
information'' occurs: news and analysis as a means of provoking strong
negative emotions, potentially leading to hatred, incitement and,
ultimately, the justification of violence.
A couple of months ago, while searching Russian-language sites for
information on the growing presence of Russian fighters with ISIS in
Syria, I was directed by one of the links to one of Russia's most
popular sites, an equivalent of Facebook called VKontakte, which has
hundreds of thousands of visitors each day both from Russia and the
Former Soviet Union. Before I could get to the articles I was looking
for, I saw pictured at the top of the opening page a cartoonish Uncle
Sam holding on his lap a baby clad in a black uniform with a
Kalashnikov on its back. The caption read: ``ISIS is a project of
America's two-party system.''
As an expert on Russian propaganda in Estonia put it, this effort
has produced ``a separate reality created by Russian media'' in which
he claims many ethnic Russian Estonians already live and which creates
enormous problems for democratic politics.
In Kyiv earlier this year one of my most memorable meetings was
with the Dean of the School of Journalism at the Kyiv-Mohila Academy,
Professor Evhen Fedchenko. Together with his students he runs a Web
site called StopFake.org, which records some of the Russian propaganda
masquerading as news. Here are a few examples:
A report in the Russian media that the U.S. President has
extended a decree that bans balalaikas (which are traditional
Russian musical instruments) in the United States until 2020.
Russia's most widely watched Pervyi Kanal, or First Channel,
television network, broadcast an interview with a terrified
woman identified as a refugee from the territory controlled by
the Ukrainian Government. She said she witnessed Ukrainian
soldiers publicly executing the wife and son of a pro-Russian
separatist. The child was crucified on a bulletin board, while
the woman was allegedly dragged behind a tank until she died.
The story was proven to be a complete fake.
Another popular Russian television channel posted on
VKontakte and other social media sites an invented conversation
between a Ukrainian military commander and a German doctor in
which they discuss in detail the harvesting of internal organs,
presumably of deceased members of the pro-Russian population
caught up in the fighting. The officer is ``quoted'' as saying
that ``we would have a great deal of material to work with,
thanks to our Western partners.''
Again, bear in mind that Russian television, especially the news
programs I just mentioned are viewed by millions of people, especially
ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers, outside Russia.
Fortunately, there is an antidote to this poison. It is impossible,
of course, to sanitize all of the lies, given the lopsidedness of the
manpower, but there is enough of it to deflate the effort considerably.
As usual, the strongest antidote is a rich, diverse, and uncensored
democratic media environment. But as such an environment does not yet
fully exist in most post-Soviet states, the U.S. international media
effort could be of great help.
Despite being barred from domestic outlets in Russia, the online
audience of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America online
has been growing, reaching 4.7 million this summer. In my office last
week, a top Russian pro-democracy leader, Vladimir Milov told me that
``Radio Liberty is by far the finest and most influential of unofficial
sources of political information and analysis in Russia today!''
According to independent research, nearly 2 million Russians are
watching RFR/RL's flagship 30-minute nightly news program Nastoyashchee
vremya or Current Time online every week.
Last year, a nationwide Gallup survey in Ukraine showed that the
size of the VOA audience across all of its media platforms in the
Ukrainian and Russian languages had doubled since 2012 to nearly 7
million adults using VOA every week--that is 18 percent of all adults
in Ukraine plus nearly 3 million using RFE/RL.
In Kyiv I was repeatedly struck by the deep appreciation by
Ukraine's political and media elites of the content provided by Radio
Liberty. RFE/RL content is being recognized as superior not just to the
Russian propaganda but, to the output of the oligarch-dominated
Ukrainian media, which is just as important. As a result, several top
Ukrainian television networks competed for the prime time broadcast
rights for Current Time.
Mr. Chairman, we are facing a determined and often refined
propaganda effort. From the sophisticated exploitation of Western media
patterns and vocabulary to outright lies and crude fakes, the goal
remains the same: to undermine the people's trust in democratic
politics and policies and in free and fair media. As this effort is
vital to the maintenance of the present Russian regime, it will be with
us for a long time.
Time, and, talent, and risk-taking innovation and yes, money for
U.S. international media will continue to be needed to counter it.
Thank you.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ Stephen Castle, ``A Russian TV Insider Describes a Modern
Propaganda Machine,'' New York Times, February 13, 2015.
\2\ ``International Poll: No Consensus on Who Was Behind 9/11.''
World Public Opinion, September 10, 2008.
\3\ Ibid.
\4\ Alan Cullison, ``Russia Uses MH17 Crash for Propaganda,'' Wall
Street Journal, July 23, 2015.
\5\ The Daily Beast reports that in 2012, RT's daily viewership did
not reach the minimum Nielsen rating threshold of 30,000 people in the
United States, and that in Europe, its audience has amounted to less
than 0.1 percent of total viewership, except in Britain where it does
slightly better, garnering 0.17 percent of the total viewing population
in 2015. RT's oft-cited figure of ``630 million people in 100
countries'' refers to the potential geographical reach of its
programming based on where RT is available--not on how many people are
actually viewing it. See: Katie Zavadski, ``Putin's Propaganda TV Lies
about its Popularity,'' The Daily Beast, September 17, 2015.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Dr. Aron.
Our next witness is Peter Pomerantsev. Mr. Pomerantsev is a
senior fellow at the Legatum Institute, as well as an author
and documentary producer. His writing is featured regularly in
the London Review of Books, Atlantic, the Financial Times,
focusing largely on 21st century propaganda. His book about
working as a TV producer in Putin's Russia, ``Nothing is True,
and Everything is Possible,'' was published in 2015.
Mr. Pomerantsev.
STATEMENT OF PETER POMERANTSEV, SENIOR FELLOW, TRANSITIONS
FORUM, LEGATUM INSTITUTE, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. Pomerantsev. I cannot talk about Russia right now
without at least sending my personal condolences to the
families and loved ones of the victims of this terrible air
disaster that happened over Egypt recently.
I was looking this morning, actually--I had jet lag--I was
looking at the sort of--the sort of Instagrams and social media
sites of some of the victims, and there were young people who
had been on holiday, and it was absolutely clear that their
lifestyles and aspirations were no different to young people in
Wichita. And that was always the dream of social media and of
the Information Age, that it would bring people together across
borders, that it would be a catalyst for mutual understanding.
And yet, throughout the world, we are seeing the Information
Age becoming the Misinformation Age. We are seeing new
information technology and old--the old power of television,
which is so much more--bigger and more global now, being used
to sew enmity and hatred. We have the example of ISIS. In
southeast Asia, we can see how China is using the doctrine of
the three warfares to make sure media and psychological war to
undermine the United States. We have plenty of influences--
instances of misinformation being used inside the United States
to mess with the stock market, for example.
And, of course, we have Russia, which is really the avant
garde of making the Information Age into the Disinformation
Age. It does so domestically. If Stalin was 75 percent violence
and 25 percent propaganda, Putin's the other way around, he is
75 percent propaganda and 25 percent violence. And they do it
internationally through, really, a doctrine that is now right
in the middle of Russian military thinking, the idea that you
can bring other countries to their knees, that you can,
basically, enhance your foreign policy power, largely through
information and psychological operations--again, with a minimum
of violence.
If there is one key theme that runs through the whole of
the Kremlin's thinking, it is cynicism. It is the idea that,
domestically, there is no alternative to Putin. You know, you
create a media space where all the possible opposition is gone,
the ones that remain are freaks, basically, and Putin is built
up as the strongest and only alternative. It is a cynicism that
says there is no difference between democracies and
authoritarian regimes. That is the main message of the
Kremlin's propaganda, both domestically and internationally.
They are always saying, ``The U.S. is just as bad as we are.
Europe is just as bad as we are.'' They are not trying to get
Putin's Pew numbers up. You know, they are just trying to erode
faith in democratic systems elsewhere. Putin does not want to
be loved internationally. He wants to be feared. That is a
very, very different kind of process.
And the biggest cynicism is, they say there is no
difference between truth and lies. You know, so it does not
matter if Vladimir Putin says, one day, ``There are no Russian
soldiers in Crimea,'' and, a few weeks later, says, ``Oh, yes,
there are,'' because what they are saying is, there is no value
to the idea of truth.
And I worked in the European Endowment for Democracy
Project, and we looked at a--at little focus groups in eastern
Europe in the sort of a--in what we call the ``front-line
states.'' We looked at the 90 million Russian speakers outside
of Russia. You know, and we talk about international--90
million outside of Russia. And here is--I am doing, like, a
compendium quote, what we heard from a lot of different people
in Latvia or in eastern Ukraine, and they were, like, ``We have
so many media surrounding us--American, Russian, Ukrainian,
international--we do not believe anyone anymore. But, the
Russians tell such an emotional story, it is so cinematic and
entertaining, that we go with the Russians. It rings true to
our hearts.''
So, it is the opposite question from the cold war, when we
had to break through censorship to get information to people.
Now the problem is too much information, people do not trust
anyone, and the Russians tell this incredibly compelling story
of crucified children, incredible game shows. Channel One, the
biggest Russian channel, is a very successful entertainment
machine, not just a disinformation machine.
So, we face a slightly new challenge. It is a challenge, in
one word, to balance out cynicism to win trust, to create
communities of trust again. That is the Russian strategy, to
destroy, divide, and conquer, sew fear and distrust. How do we
do that? There are so many things that we could be doing. There
is no basic Russian-language news agency that would be giving
people information about their daily lives, you know, about
hospitals, roads, something people knows about them and,
therefore, they can relate to. We can talk about increasing
media literacy. We can talk about investing in narrative
programming, not just sort of news and talk, but the kind of
big TV shows and big narrative projects that really convince
people that you understand them. But, the most important thing
that we need is an understanding that the age of--that
misinformation is--may be one of the great challenges of the
21st century, and that we need a strategy to start addressing
it.
I will do one last thing. The last time we had a burst of
information technology was the start of the 20th century, when
radio appeared, when cinema appeared. And that led, not to a
better world, that led to the emergence of totalitarian
propaganda, which swept away critical thinking. We stand at the
start of a tide now. Russia is just exploiting--ruthlessly and
successfully exploiting this trend. It is happening across the
world. And that tide will only grow and grow.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pomerantsev follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Pomerantsev
Peter Pomerantsev is a Senior Fellow at the Legatum Institute,
London, where he runs a project on 21st century propaganda and how to
counter it. He was the coauthor of a study commissioned by the Dutch,
U.K. and Latvian Governments to the European Endowment for Democracy,
which identified ways to strengthen independent Russian language media.
He is one of the coauthors of a new project by CEPA, funded by the
Smith Richardson Foundation, on how to counter Russian propaganda in
Europe.
Pomerantsev frequently contributes to the FT, Foreign Policy,
Politico and many other publications. He has testified to the U.S.
Congress on how to combat Kremlin propaganda. His book about Russian
media, ``Nothing is True and Everything is Possible,'' is long-listed
for the Guardian and Samuel Johnson Prizes and is translated into over
10 languages.
The West is belatedly waking up to the power of the Kremlin's media
machine. The Supreme Commander of NATO called the annexation of Crimea
``the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen.''
Zhanna Nemtsova, daughter of murdered Russian opposition politician
Boris Nemtsov, blames the climate of hate created by Kremlin propaganda
for the murder of her father and starting the war in Ukraine. ``We are
losing the information war'' complains the British head of the House of
Commons culture and media committee.
The Soviet Empire may be gone but the Kremlin still has media
hegemony over the Russian language space: the 149 million citizens of
Russia, as well as the estimated 93 million in the former U.S.S.R. who
have Russian as a fluent first or second language (not to mention a
further 5 million or so in Germany).
A recent project by the European Endowment for Democracy, a
Brussels foundation, looked for ways to tackle this challenge. I was
one of the authors, and we soon found differences between today's
situation and the cold war.
Back in the 20th century the job of Western Russian language media
such as the BBC World Service or Radio Free Europe was to break through
the information iron curtain. The battle was for alternative points of
view and against censorship. Today TV is strictly controlled by the
Kremlin inside Russia, but there is easy access to other media online.
Meanwhile Russian speakers in Ukraine, Moldova or the Baltics have
access to a plethora of media, Kremlin, local and Western, each
presenting strikingly contradictory versions of reality.
Take Estonia, where viewers who followed the rival Russian and
Western stories of the causes for the downing of MH17 ended up simply
disbelieving both sides. Something similar is happening in Kharkiv, a
town on the Russian-Ukrainian border, where polls showed a high number
of people cynical about all media, whether Russian, Western, or
Ukrainian. In a landscape where viewers trust no one, they are still
most entranced by Russian television channels which, according to
Latvian focus group respondents, ``are emotionally attractive, because
some news you watch as an exciting movie. You don't trust it, but watch
it gladly.''
In order to woo viewers the Kremlin has utterly blurred the lines
between fact and fiction. Kremlin ``current affairs'' programs are
filled with spectacular scare-stories about Russian children crucified
by Ukrainian militias or U.S. conspiracies to ethnically cleanse East
Ukraine. In a context where no one ``believes'' any media, all that
matters is that the ``news'' is sensationalist and cinematic.
The challenge for independent media is thus not simply to deliver
information, but to win trust. This necessitates content that is
engaging, reflecting both national and local contexts, and that delves
deep into the lived reality of Russian-language speakers across the
region.
Reality-based, locally relevant, engaging programming is the one
type of content Kremlin media, despite its many successes, does not
produce.
News ignores local social problems, whether it's the health
service, schools or courts. There is currently no quality Russian
language news agency covering the whole of the Russian speaking world.
A first step could be to expand the Russian language bureaus of such
agencies as the BBC or AFP so they could cover the local news the
Kremlin ignores; or create a news-hub that maximized existing sources.
One might not be able to convince Kremlin-captive audiences about who
shot down MH17, but one can be more relevant to them by focusing on
local issues.
Kremlin entertainment meanwhile is largely devoid of socially
engaged documentary formats: docu-soaps about institutions such as
schools or the army; reality shows exploring ethnic tensions. Local
broadcasters need help, both financial and professional, to create this
sort of quality content to create the local versions of radio hits like
``This American Life'' or ``Make Bradford British,'' a British
documentary program that grappled with ethnic hatred by putting people
of different races in one house (in the style of the U.S. show Big
Brother) and forcing them to confront their prejudices. Imagine a
Russian-language program that would use a similar tactic to probe an
emotionally charged subject--say, the bitterness between Russians and
Ukrainians in a place such as Kharkiv.
New programs could also invite Russians to tackle historical
traumas through formats such as the popular BBC series ``Who Do You
Think You Are?''--a show that follows celebrities as they trace the
lives of their ancestors, often engaging with the horrors of 20th-
century wars and genocide. In the Russian case, these kinds of programs
would require their subjects to explore the human cost of the gulag,
the holodomor (Ukraine's enforced famine under Stalin), and the KGB
arrests. Some participants would discover their ancestors among the
victims; others, among the executioners. In both cases, they would have
to reckon with past traumas, a highly emotional and cathartic process.
Such content would also allow the audience to move away from the
collective historical narratives imposed by the Kremlin, which stress
how Russia's leaders, from Stalin to Putin, led the nation to triumph.
Ideally programming would dove-tail with policy priorities:
judicial reform in Moldova, for example, accompanied by entertainment
shows about courts. BBC Media Action (the charity arm of the BBC funded
by grants and not the license fee) have been working with the fledgling
Ukrainian public broadcaster on short dramas about young people caught
up in the war from different parts of the country. The budget is
painfully miniscule but it's exactly the sort of project we need so
much more of.
Apart from classical media programmes we should also prioritize
media literacy projects which help populations withstand the new
Kremlin propaganda and tell the difference between spin and evidence-
based inquiry. Online investigative projects, such as Ukraine's myth-
busting Stop Fake or Alexey Navalny's corruption-busting Web site which
finds the secret cash stashes of crooked politicians, are powerful not
only because of the information they provide, but because they involve
citizens in an interactive, open source search for the truth and thus
build communities of trust and critical inquiry.
The key thing is to recognize, as Vladimir Putin understands so
well, that media and entertainment are as essential to societies and
security as doctors or soldiers. The West made a dreadful mistake in
the 1990s, abandoning the development of media in the former Soviet
Union to the ``free market'': instead media were captured by oligarchs
or corrupt regimes, who have used them for malign ends. After the cold
war it was considered part of the ``peace dividend'' to slash funding
for Radio Free Europe or BBC Russian. A much greater cost is being paid
now.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Pomerantsev.
Our next witness is Maksymilian Czuperski. Mr. Czuperski
serves as a Special Assistant to the President and CEO of the
Atlantic Council. At the Atlantic Council, he has led efforts
to open-source intelligence and digital forensic research,
including for the report, ``Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin's War
in Ukraine.'' This report demonstrates Russian involvement in
the conflict in Ukraine using open-source information and
social media. He has appeared in the BBC, Vice News, and
conducts regular briefing and workshop sessions for governments
within the NATO alliance on these innovative methods.
Mr. Czuperski.
STATEMENT OF MAKSYMILIAN CZUPERSKI, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Czuperski. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
Shaheen, members of the committee.
I am honored to appear before you today as a Polish citizen
and an EU citizen who was raised on a continent defined by
division of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, where the
children of former enemies grew up as friends, and where the
longest era of peace on the continent has been marked by
freedom, democracy, tolerance, and, foremost, trust.
But, today, this vision, long a key U.S. strategic goal, is
being tested by forces that seek to undermine the Europe I grew
up in. No geopolitical event has made that more clear than
Russia's invasion of Ukraine last year. And, critically, it is
not only boots on the ground that challenged this vision, but
also a raging propaganda machine aiming to destroy the West's
confidence in its ideals and accomplishments in Europe. This
Russian-led propaganda machine has become so effective, that
we, as the West, have sleepwalked into the unimaginable: the
armed annexation by one state territory belonging to another.
This propaganda machine is providing a cover for a revisionist
Russian leader.
And so, ``I can tell you outright and unequivocally that
there are no Russian troops in Ukraine.'' These words the words
of President Putin early this year, and they were outright and
unequivocally a lie. When Western officials presented strong
evidence that Russian troops have, in fact, been deployed in
Ukraine, the Kremlin was quick to dismiss the evidence as just
images from computer games. And, for a long time, the Kremlin
succeeded in discrediting us, because today's information
systems are also, unfortunately, hotlines for which ill-
intentioned leaders can channel deception. As we fumbled, a new
reality was emerging. We are no longer merely in an Information
Age in which narratives are shaped by one flow of information
pushing against another, but, in fact, we are in an Engagement
Age, where the narratives we create are shaped by how we engage
with one another.
Unlike in the past, citizens have unprecedented power to
access the vast amounts of information, not to mention create,
engage, share, and, most importantly, discover information
freely. This is a new age that has brought the world and Europe
itself closer together, but also, at the same time, it is being
hijacked by less benevolent forces, such as those of Mr. Putin.
Troll shops and cutting-edge media factories in Russia work
around the clock to engage and misinform their audiences
through flashy content. We know this, because some of those who
were tasked with the job of spreading lies 140 characters at a
time came out, revealing a glimpse into what happens within
those troll shops.
The spreading of digital breadcrumbs is an attempt to
undermine our Western narrative and values, and divide NATO and
the EU. But, the Engagement Age has also reached Russia,
providing us with new opportunities to challenge Mr. Putin's
deception. Because the desire to share and connect is
fundamentally a value shared by all. Hence, rather than rely on
the government's information to expose Mr. Putin's lies, the
Atlantic Council's report ``Hiding in Plain Sight'' collected
and presented the facts that the Kremlin has been trying to
hide so desperately.
When we post selfies, videos, photos, tweets, and Facebook
updates, then we frequently leave so-called ``digital
breadcrumbs'' behind that are often publicly accessible and
even entail geotags with exact geographical details of where a
crumb was created. Anyone can access those digital breadcrumbs.
And using innovative forensic research techniques, we were able
to then tell the true story of what had unfolded in Ukraine.
This is no civil war, and has not been a civil war, but,
rather, a Kremlin-manufactured war fueled by Russian equipment,
fought by Russian soldiers, and directed by Mr. Putin. One of
the many Russian soldiers we found to have been sent to fight
in Ukraine was Bato Dambayev, who, after participating in
fighting in Donbas, returned home to his home region, Buryita,
more than 4,000 miles away on the Russian-Mongolian border.
Like many of his friends, he documented his adventure by
posting selfies and pictures along the ways. And these methods
also allowed us to then tell the story what actually had
happened on the day that MH17 was downed. Eliot Higgins and his
colleagues Bellingcat Way would actually identify the very BUK
missile system that is believed to have downed MH17, and that
was supplied to by Russian forces.
But, if we could expose Russia's war in Ukraine, despite it
being publicly denied by its leader, we ask ourselves, What was
the potential for these methods within civil society and
journalists? Simon Ostrovsky, of VICE News, tested our digital
forensic research methods by recreating Bato's journey. And as
we watched Simon standing in the very location that Bato was
taking his selfies, we are able to see how protecting our
narrative nowadays is much more powerful in the hand of our
journalists and the public rather than just in the hands of the
government.
And hence, we recommend that these skills, these digital
forensic research skills, are trained to the public and to
civil society so that they can help us more proactively
distinguished between fact and fiction. This requires
empowering citizens to be part of the process in stopping those
who otherwise would attempt to blind us.
So, in closing, let me please underscore that Mr. Putin has
used the crisis in Ukraine and Syria, first and foremost, to
consolidate his own authority at home, and--at home so that he
can distract from the bad governance that he has been leading
while repressing civil society, independent media, and social
media networks. Therefore, revealing Putin's deception of his
own people is a key part of the strategy to end the aggression
in Europe by hitting him where he is most vulnerable.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Czuperski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Maksymillian Czuperski
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Shaheen, members of the committee,
I am honored to appear before you today. As a Polish citizen, I was
raised on a continent that was defined by the vision of a Europe whole,
free, and at peace. A Europe in which the children of those who were
once enemies became each other's best friends, and in which freedom,
democracy, and tolerance have served as unifying forces during the
longest era of peace and prosperity on the European Continent. A Europe
in which diversity laid the foundation not for bloodshed and violence,
but solidarity and progress. This Europe has become a beacon of hope--
an opportunity for a better future for the thousands who risk their
lives as they seek to reach its shores, or remain steadfast in the face
of oppression and injustice, just to inch closer to that dream.
But today this vision--which has long been a key U.S. strategic
goal--and the continent this vision helped define are being tested by
forces that seek to undermine the Europe I grew up in. No geopolitical
event has made that more clear than Russia's invasion of Ukraine last
year. And, critically, it is not only Russian boots on the ground that
challenge the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, but also a
raging propaganda machine aiming to destroy the West's confidence in
its ideals and accomplishments in Europe.
This Russian-led propaganda machine has become so effective that
we, as the United States and Europe, have sleep-walked into the
unimaginable: the armed annexation by one state of territory belonging
to another, an act not seen in Europe since 1945. This propaganda
machine is providing cover for a revisionist Russian leader to reverse
the progress that the Western nations have made together in Europe over
the past two decades, and create a Europe divided, dictated to, and at
war.
``I can tell you outright and unequivocally that there are no
Russian troops in Ukraine.'' \1\--These were the words of Vladimir
Putin, and they were, outright and unequivocally, a lie.
In fact, Putin has been lying to his own people while Russian
citizens and soldiers have been fighting and dying in a war of his own
making. Thanks to the propaganda machine he has built; it has been
possible for the Kremlin to deny any allegations of Russian involvement
in Ukraine. Said Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in January of this
year: ``If you allege [that Russian troops are in Ukraine] so
confidently, present the facts. But nobody can present the facts, or
doesn't want to. So before demanding from us that we stop doing
something, please present proof that we have done it.'' \2\
When Western officials did indeed present strong evidence that
Russian troops have been deployed in Ukraine, the Kremlin was quick to
dismiss the evidence as ``just images from computer games'' \3\ and has
sought to discredit information released by NATO, the U.S. Government,
and its European allies as a ``smear campaign.'' \4\ And for a long
time the Kremlin succeeded, because today's information systems are
also, unfortunately, hotlines through which ill-intentioned leaders can
channel misinformation.
As we stumbled while Europe's borders were redrawn, a broader new
reality was also emerging: We are no longer merely in an information
age, in which narratives are shaped by one flow of information pushing
against another and simply presenting the truth can discredit lies.
Today, we are in the engagement age whereby the narratives we create
are shaped by how we communicate with one another. Unlike the past, we
have unprecedented power to access vast amounts of information that is
now in citizens' hands, not to mention the power to create, engage
with, share and most importantly discover this information freely. It
is a new age that has brought the world and Europe itself closer
together, and made it more open, but that is now being hijacked by less
benevolent forces such as those of Mr. Putin.
Moscow has seized this new space through a concentrated and
engaging propaganda campaign--hybrid information warfare if you will--
with the aim of sowing confusion and encouraging or justifying the
West's ambivalent response to Russia's aggression, now also in Syria.
Troll-shops and cutting-edge media factories in Russia work around
the clock to engage and misinform their audience through flashy
content. We know this, because all of us have seen the deceptive videos
posted online by the outlet RT that today claims to be the most watched
news network on YouTube with over 2 billion views.\5\ And some of those
who were tasked with the job of spreading lies 140 characters at a
time, such as 34-year-old Lyudmila Savchuk, have come out providing us
with a rare glimpse into what happens within these shops.\6\
This spreading of ``digital breadcrumbs'' is an attempt to
undermine our Western narrative and values, and divide NATO and the EU,
by exploiting divisions within both nations and communities.
But the engagement age has also reached Russia. In fact, the
Kremlin has recognized the potential of this new age to the degree that
it is concerned about its impact on its own people. Several weeks
before Mr. Putin sent his troops--little green men as they were known--
to Crimea and launched his propaganda assault on Ukraine, he first
struck at home.
On January 24, 2014, the Russian equivalent of Facebook, the
network VKontakte, with its 60 million daily users, was forcefully
taken over from its former CEO Pavel Durov, by businessmen allied with
Mr. Putin in an attempt to control the potential dangers of the
engagement age to Russia's leadership.
But, while Mr. Putin is attempting to control the digital space,
there are limits to the level of control that can be put on
opportunities for the Russian people to engage with one another and to
discuss what is actually happening in Russia.
This also provides us with new opportunities to challenge Mr.
Putin's propaganda machine.
The desire to share and connect is a fundamental value shared by
all. Hence, rather than rely on government information to expose Mr.
Putin's lies, the Atlantic Council's report, ``Hiding in Plain Sight:
Putin's War in Ukraine,'' collected and presented the facts that the
Kremlin had been trying to hide by tapping into people's desire to
share and engage: When we post selfies, videos, photos, tweets, and
Facebook updates then we frequently leave so called ``digital
breadcrumbs'' behind that are often publicly accessible and even entail
geotags with the exact geographical details of where a crumb was
created. Anyone can access these ``digital breadcrumbs.'' But we, of
course, don't take these face value, which why using innovative digital
forensic research and verification techniques including geolocating we
can differentiate between fact and fiction. This allowed us tell the
true story of Russia's war in Ukraine.
This was no civil war. The evidence presented in ``Hiding in Plain
Sight'' makes clear that the conflict in Ukraine's east is a Kremlin-
manufactured war, fueled by Russian equipment, fought by Russian
soldiers, and directed by Mr. Putin.
Our team at the Atlantic Council was able to reveal numerous cases
of Russian soldiers being sent to fight in Ukraine. One of them was
Bato Dambayev of the 37th Motorized Infantry Brigade who, after
participating in the fierce fighting in Donbas, returned home to the
city of Buryita along the Russian-Mongolian border more than 4,000
miles from the Ukrainian conflict. An ordinary Russian soldier, he had
trained at large camp near the Russian city of Kuzminka from where he
was sent across the border to fight in Ukraine. Like many of his
friends, he documented his adventure by posting selfies and pictures
along the way.
For a long time, the Kremlin has succeeded in setting the narrative
for the Ukraine conflict, even managing to convince many that it is
purely a civil war. But the story of Bato and thousands of others like
him shows a different reality. The innovative methods used to show
Bato's journey, are also the methods our colleague, award winning
citizen, journalist Eliot Higgins and his team at Bellingcat, used to
uncover the Russian military brigade that is believed to have supplied
the very BUK missile launcher that downed the civilian aircraft known
as flight MH17.
But if we could expose Russia's war in Ukraine despite it being
publicly denied by its leader, we asked ourselves, what potential did
these methods hold for civil society leaders and journalists?
That's why we shared our findings with Simon Ostrovsky of VICE
News. He was able to follow the journey of Bato and verify once again
that these innovative digital forensic research methods and open source
intelligence produce results. As we watched Simon standing in the very
locations that Bato's selfies were taken, we recognized that one of the
strongest means of protecting our narrative against misinformation is
equipping and training journalists with these new methods, to use in
both their own countries and abroad.
We also produced this body of research for an even more compelling
reason: If the international community cannot distinguish fact from
fiction, or chooses not to do so in public, it is unlikely to coalesce
around an effective strategy to support Ukraine and deter Mr. Putin.
Our experience taught us that:
(1) The best antidote to misinformation in this hybrid war is
clarity; to speak the truth but foremost to empower the public
to reveal and communicate it clearly.
(2) Second, social media forensics and geolocation analysis
are powerful tools:
Information once available only to intelligence
agencies is now available to all. We do not need to
engage in an information war, rather we need to empower
civil society, journalists and citizens to distinguish
between fact and fiction.
This matters: because it can help overcome the
healthy skepticism that the public may have toward
official government narratives.
This is the new reality of a world in which
individuals and nongovernmental actors play critical
roles in the engagement era.
The best part is--you don't need to believe me or my
coauthors--
the methods we've used in our report are essentially a
tool that we don't control.
This is the principle behind the concept of ``information defense''
put forward by our colleague, Ben Nimmo, a British specialist in
analyzing information warfare. He argues that the key to defeating
disinformation is to support media, academics and civil society in
gathering information on areas of particular concern, so that they can
debunk any disinformation as soon as it is released.\7\ We therefor
recommend expanding that support into the digital arena through
concrete training programs and workshops for journalists, civil society
leaders, and ordinary citizens, not only here at home but also in
regions most effected by the propaganda war, so that they can navigate
the engagement age more effectively and do so equipped with
groundbreaking new digital forensic research methods.
This concept was proven in Syria, where colleagues such as the
Bellingcat group and blogger Ruslan Leviev have spent 4 years building
up an intelligence picture of the conflict from social media.\8\ When
Russia began bombing targets in Syria and claiming that they were from
the Islamic State, it took Ruslan Leviev just hours to prove that the
Russians were lying, and were, in fact, hitting the moderate
opposition. Russia's claim that it is focusing on IS was shredded on
the first day--leaving it without the diplomatic legitimacy that
striking IS would give.
It is important to bear in mind that Mr. Putin has used the
Ukrainian and Syrian crises first and foremost to consolidate his own
authority at home, whipping up patriotic sentiment to paper over the
Kremlin's own failures in governance while repressing civil society,
independent media, and social networks.
Chairman Ed Royce rightly pointed out in his Wall Street Journal
op-ed earlier this year, that Russia's propaganda machine, ``may be
more dangerous than any military, because no artillery can stop their
lies from spreading and undermining U.S. security interests in Europe''
\9\--For that it is time that we put resources where they matter as we
did in the cold war, but with the understanding that a new era requires
new thinking and new solutions: It is time that we don't blindly push
information, but engage in the digital infosphere with our citizens so
that they can play a role in distinguishing between fact and fiction.
This requires empowering citizens to be part of the process and
stopping those who otherwise attempt to blind.
Therefore, revealing Putin's deception of his own people is a key
part of a strategy to end his aggression in Europe, by hitting him
where he is vulnerable.
We must also demonstrate solidarity with those Russians who are
courageous enough to take a stand against the lies of the Putin regime.
The first victims of Putin are the people of Russia, who deserve
better.
Confronting Mr. Putin's aggression does not imply a confrontation
against the Russian people. As the cosigners of the preface in our
report ``Hiding in Plain Sight'' point out: ``We all share a common
vision for a Europe whole, free, and at peace, in which Russia finds
its peaceful place. But Mr. Putin's war in Ukraine threatens this
vision and the international order.'' \10\
----------------
End Notes
\1\ http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49261.
\2\ http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/22/us-ukraine-crisis-
davos-poroshenko-idUSKBN0KU1TX20150122.
\3\ http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/kremlin-
satellite-images-russian-troops-computer-games-n191771.
\4\ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28492474.
\5\ https://www.rt.com/news/214723-rt-two-billion-youtube/.
\6\ http://www.voanews.com/content/russians-get-glimpse-of-
internet-troll-factory/2846484.html.
\7\ http://www.li.com/events/information-at-war-from-china-s-three-
warfares-to-nato-s-narratives.
\8\ https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2015/09/07/are-there-
russian-troops-fighting-in-syria/.
\9\ http://www.wsj.com/articles/countering-putins-information-
weapons-of-war-1429052323?alg=y.
\10\ http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/hiding-in-
plain-sight-putin-s-war-in-ukraine-and-boris-nemtsov-s-putin-war.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Czuperski.
Our final witness is Ms. Heather Conley. Ms. Conley is
senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, and
Director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS, she served
as an executive director at the American National Red Cross and
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau for
European and Eurasian Affairs.
Ms. Conley.
STATEMENT OF HEATHER CONLEY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR EUROPE,
EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC, AND DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Conley. Mr. Chairman, Senator Shaheen, thank you so
much for this opportunity to testify before you today on a
subject of great importance concerning Russian influence in
Europe.
I believe this is a subject area where there is little
holistic understanding of the Kremlin's tools and methodology
in either Europe or the United States, and, without
understanding how this influence works and the tools that are
deployed, we cannot identify appropriate responses to counter
and ultimately combat this increasingly effective form of
manipulation. I am particularly concerned how it is being
deployed within NATO countries today.
Strategic communications directed toward the Russian people
and the international community is an essential part of
Russia's full-spectrum toolkit designed to shape the 21st
century battlespace. There are conventional and nonconventional
components to this strategy and, as Senator Gardner had
mentioned, one of the conventional approaches today, Russian
submarines, are closely examining the locations of European
undersea fiber-optic cables to disrupt all Internet and
communication lines, military command and control, essential
commerce, the functioning of critical infrastructure that will
prevent government communications to its population. In fact,
this summer, a Russian vessel continually harassed a Swedish
research vessel, which was lying a new fiber-optic cable
connecting Sweden to Lithuania. Again, Ukrainian military
forces have repeatedly underscored the effectiveness of Russian
military forces in jamming their radar in military
communications as well as UAVs operated by the OSCE to monitor
the Minsk cease-fire agreement. And clearly the United States
and NATO forces need to exercise these various scenarios to
better prepare for their eventuality.
But, the focus of this hearing is to gain a better
understanding of the Kremlin's use of nonconventional means to
shape and influence public opinion and political outcomes in
democratic societies. But, please make no mistake, these
nonconventional means equally shape the future battlespace.
The origins of the Kremlin's policy were developed shortly
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and can be found in
Russia's Compatriot Policy. This policy establishes links
estimated to 40 million ethnic Russians and Russian speakers
living beyond the borders of the, at that time, newly formed
Russian Federation. The definition of a Russian ``compatriot''
has been refined over time, but, generally, a compatriot
demonstrates a connection to Russian culture, history, values,
and language.
Now, this concept has evolved to justify the protection of
ethnic Russians living in the post-Soviet space, which means
that Russia will intervene in a foreign country's internal
affairs on behalf of, quote, ``their'' ethnic Russian
populations. And in 2013, President Putin approved Russia's
foreign policy concept, which provided for a comprehensive
toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives, building on
civil society's potential, information, culture, and other
methods and technologies to protect ethnic Russians abroad.
And, of course, on March 18, 2014, this policy was the
justification for Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, when
President Putin stated that, ``Millions of Russians and
Russian-speaking people that live in Ukraine and will continue
to do so, Russia will always defend their interests.''
So, it is estimated that the Kremlin spends approximately
$100 million annually to fund organizations such as Russkii
Mir, or the Russian World Foundation. This entity supports
Russia's Compatriot Policy. It provides funding to filmmakers,
exactly as Dr. Aron was saying, to make that entertaining
discourse, that liveliness that people watch, civil society
organizations and political entities that promote the Russian
language, Russian policies in general as well as affirming
Russia's historical narrative of other period during and after
the Second World War, which presents the then-Soviet Union as a
liberator.
Again, it is important to note that these policies have
been in place in the mid-1990s. They have continued to evolve--
in fact, accelerated--since the ``color revolutions.'' The
Kremlin has put an enormous amount of focus on the Compatriot
Policy, using all tools at its disposal.
In 2011, actually, the CSIS Europe program conducted a
comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of Russia's
Compatriot Policy in Estonia. Mr. Chairman, with your
permission, I ask that a copy of this report be submitted for
the record. And we can see how its impact affects different
countries in different ways, depending on the population and
the historical relationship with Moscow, but there are a lot of
commonalities.
[Editor's note.--The report mentioned above was too voluminous
to include in the printed hearing. It will be retained in the
permanent record of the committee.]
And, if I may, just to give you an example of how this
works: In Latvia, a country with 22--26 percent ethnic Russian
population, and it works using Russian-owned media outlets. For
example, in Latvia, the main three media outlets are controlled
by Russian entities. For example, one is owned by Bank Rossiya,
which has already been sanctioned by the United States. It owns
half the shares in one station, while the other channels are
owned by a single holding company, Baltic Media Alliance, which
has 11 subsidiaries in the Baltic States alone. This alliance
operates the most popular Russian television channels in the
Baltic States, rebroadcasts very popular Russian television
shows. The other channels are owned by two other Russian
oligarchs. One Russian channel is registered in the United
Kingdom, holds a U.K. broadcasting license, and falls under
British regulatory scrutiny. These channels are used
extensively to encourage Russian policies, and, in fact, once
received--was prompted by the U.K. regulator to state that the
channel was in violation of British regulations.
This is a complicated way of saying that, in many ways, the
problem is our own system. Russian companies are purchasing
these media outlets, they are controlling them, they are
controlling the message. The Compatriot Policy influences
political parties, politicians, it uses cultural vehicles, it
uses the Orthodox Church. It is a comprehensive policy, and it
is happening within NATO countries today to shape public
opinion, shape policy, potentially to provoke. This is
extremely difficult to combat, because it takes democratic
societies to fight that which is in their own system. I believe
it requires an enormous amount of transparency and
diversification of media resources and outlets.
I am heartened to hear from Doctor Aron that RFE/RL is
reaching those, but I fear those tools are limited. We have to
look inside our own societies, diversify our media, initiate
significant anticorruption, anti-kleptocracy initiatives, and
fight for transparency in our media. Those are the best methods
to combat this growing Russian influence in our own societies.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Conley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Heather A. Conley
Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify today on a subject of great importance
concerning Russian influence in Europe. This is a subject area where
there is little holistic understanding of the Kremlin's tools and
methodology in either Europe or the United States. Without
understanding how this influence works and the various tools that are
deployed, we cannot identify appropriate responses to counter and
ultimately combat this increasingly effective form of manipulation.
Strategic communications, directed toward both the Russian people
and the international community, is an essential part of Russia's full
spectrum tool kit designed to shape the 21st century battlespace. There
are conventional and nonconvention components to this strategy with the
conventional or military applications being the most straightforward.
Today, Russian submarines are closely examining the locations of
European undersea fiber optic cables to disrupt all Internet and
communication lines, military command and control, essential commerce,
the functioning of critical infrastructure, and prevent government
communication to its population. This summer, a Russian vessel
continuously harassed a Swedish research vessel which was laying a new
fiber optic cable that connects Sweden to Lithuania, ultimately
preventing the Swedish vessel from laying the cable. Ukrainian military
forces have repeatedly underscored the effectiveness of Russian
military forces in jamming their radar and military communications in
combat as well as UAVs operated by the OSCE to monitor the Minsk cease-
fire agreements.\1\ Clearly, U.S. and NATO forces need to exercise
these various scenarios to better prepare for their eventuality.
The focus of this hearing, however, is to gain a better
understanding of the Kremlin's use of nonconventional means to shape
and influence public opinion and political outcomes in democratic
societies. But, make no mistake, these nonconventional means equally
shape the future battlespace.
The origins of the Kremlin's policy were developed shortly
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and can be found in Russia's
Compatriot Policy. This policy established links to the estimated 40
million ethnic Russians and Russian speakers living beyond the newly
formed borders of the Russian Federation.\2\ The definition of a
Russian compatriot has been refined over time but generally a
compatriot demonstrates a connection to Russian culture, history,
values, and language. More recently, the policy has evolved to justify
the protection of ethnic Russians living in the post-Soviet space which
means that Russia will intervene in a foreign country's internal
affairs on behalf of ``their'' ethnic Russian populations. In 2013,
President Putin approved Russia's Foreign Policy Concept which provided
for a ``comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives
building on civil society potential, information, cultural and other
methods and technologies . . .'' \3\ to protect ethnic Russians abroad.
On March 18, 2014, this policy was the justification for Russia's
illegal annexation of Crimea when President Putin stated ``Millions of
Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue
to do so. Russia will always defend their interests . . .'' \4\
It is estimated that the Kremlin spends approximately $100 million
annually to fund organizations such as Russkii Mir, or Russian World
Foundation, which support the implementation of its compatriot
policy.\5\ Russkii Mir provides funds to filmmakers, civil society
organizations and political entities that promote the Russian language,
Russian policies in general as well as affirm Russia's historical
narrative of the period during and after the Second World War,
presenting the Soviet Union as a liberator. It is important to note
that although this policy has been in place since the mid-1990s, the
policy has been accelerated since the advent of the ``color
revolutions'' beginning in the 2003-2004 period, administratively
streamlined in the Kremlin, and significantly funded. In 2005, the
Russian Presidential administration created a specific Department for
Inter-Regional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries which was
designed to renew influence in the post-Soviet space and prevent color
revolutions.
In 2011, the CSIS Europe Program conducted a comprehensive
assessment of the effectiveness of Russia's compatriot policy in
Estonia. I ask that a copy of this report be submitted for the record.
Although the compatriot policy is deployed differently in each country
depending on the composition of the population and historical
relationship with Moscow, there are common traits. In Latvia, for
example, the Russkii Mir Foundation reports that there are
approximately 100 Russian compatriot organizations.\6\ Increasingly,
these compatriot organizations support political parties and individual
politicians sympathetic to the Kremlin whose goal is to create an
internal political forces within the country to increase Russia's
political influence while simultaneously eroding confidence in the
democratic state. In Latvia, these organizations promote the message
that Riga discriminates against its 26 percent ethnic Russian
population by suppressing use of the Russian language and citizenship
as well as endorsing neofascist political tendencies. In 2012, these
political forces, aided by Russian-owned media outlets, were able to
advance a referendum to constitutionally mandate that Russian become
the second official language in Latvia (which is currently not allowed
by the Latvian Constitution). The referendum was unsuccessful--the
Russian language is freely used in Latvia--yet it demonstrated that
these well-funded groups, utilizing democratic processes (that are
ironically unavailable in an authoritarian Russia) are very capable of
internally pursuing the Kremlin's policy agenda, sowing societal
divisions and delegitimizing democratic governments.
These divisive political messages are successfully amplified and
magnified through Russian media outlets. Russian news outlets copy
their Western media counterparts assiduously, while inserting their own
biased commentary into their programming. While they play popular music
and cover human interest stories, they also report frequently on
rampant corruption and decadence in the West, play on the fears of
extremism and nontraditional society, and air ``news'' stories of
fascists taking over in Ukraine and European leaders subservient to
their U.S. masters.
But Russian-based networks are not the only channels broadcasting
such programming; many of Europe's ``independent'' news outlets have
been purchased by local oligarchs who are in collusion with the
Kremlin. Once again, looking to Latvia as an example, the three most
popular television stations--which operate commercially--are either
indirectly or directly controlled by the Russian Government. Bank
Rossiya (which has already been sanctioned by the United States, with
$572 million frozen in U.S. accounts) \7\ owns half the shares in one
station while the other the channels are owned by a single holding
company, Baltic Media Alliance (BMA), which has 11 subsidiaries in the
Baltic States alone. BMA operates the most popular Russian televisions
channel in the Baltic States and rebroadcasts popular Russian
television shows. One channel is owned by two Russian oligarchs.\8\ Two
other Russian television channels are registered in the United Kingdom,
hold a U.K. broadcast license, and fall under British regulatory
scrutiny. These television stations were used extensively to encourage
signatures for the Russian language referendum in Latvia which prompted
the U.K. regulator to state that the channels had violated British
regulations.
Other European countries, such as Bulgaria, also have a very high
percentage of Russian-owned media outlets which are used effectively to
counter government policies, such as anticorruption or judicial reform
as well as policies which support the U.S. or the European Union. In
2012, for instance, VTB Capital--the investment arm of Russia's second-
largest bank--led a consortium with Bulgaria's Corporate Commercial
Bank (KTB) to purchase the largest telecommunications company in
Bulgaria, BTC. VTB is 60 percent owned by the Russian Government and
owns 9 percent of KTB (which also happened to be one of the banks
implicated in Bulgaria's summer 2014 banking crisis). Since making
these strategic acquisitions, Russia has been accused of using
Bulgarian media outlets to advance its national interests. A =20
million media campaign backed widespread antishale protests throughout
the country, and was handled by several media companies with Russian
connections--presumably to keep Bulgaria dependent on Russian oil and
gas. These acquisitions have also coincided with a decline in
Bulgaria's media independence ranking as tracked by international watch
dogs and monitors, including the World Bank and Freedom House.
While Russia's compatriot policy is designed for (and is most
efficacious in) former Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries, Western
European countries as well as the U.S. are not immune from its
influence, particularly political party financing in Europe and its
pervasive media. In June 2015, a new faction was created in the
European Parliament called the ``Europe of Nations and Freedoms (ENF)''
party. Although newly formed, the ENF consists of 39 members from 8
European countries and is unabashedly pro-Kremlin in its positions. As
of August 2015, ENF members had voted 93 percent of the time in favor
of the Kremlin's positions,\9\ and they have opposed the EU's
Association Agreement with Ukraine, backed Russia's annexation of
Crimea, and refused to condemn the murder of Russian opposition leader,
Boris Nemtsov. This new grouping is led by the leader of France's far-
right Front Nationale, Marine Le Pen, who received a =9 million loan
from the Moscow-based First Czech-Russian Bank last November.\10\
These pro-Russian EU politicians have been bolstered by Russia's
effective and broad-reaching media campaign which has used television,
radio, and Internet sites as mediums to convey its messages across
Europe. The main perpetrator of these tactics is the increasingly
sophisticated Russian news outlet, RT (formerly Russia Today). RT
purports to reach over 700 million people and has an annual budget
comparable in size to the BBC's World News Service. The United
Kingdom's media regulator, Ofcom, has recently sanctioned RT for biased
coverage of events in Ukraine.
Other effective channels of Russian influence are the Russian
Orthodox Church and the use (or, more accurately, misuse) of history
propaganda. The compatriot policy also defends and disseminates Russian
traditional values, particularly those clash of values between a
traditional society and secular democracy, through the voice of the
church. Perhaps most insidious is the use of the Soviet historical
narrative which portrays the U.S.S.R. as a liberating power during the
Second World War and vanquisher of the Nazis; but not as an occupying
power that the West never recognized--a frequent theme on Russian
television. Thus, Russian television channels regularly show film
documentaries that exhort Russia's liberation and heroic role which
continues to reinforce this narrative among ethnic Russian populations.
The Russian security services provide substantial funds for the
production of such patriotic films. However, native populations in many
European countries see the role of the Soviet Union during and after
the Second World War quite differently and therefore view these
recitations as a diminishment of their own history of independence.
This is the challenge we face and let me be clear, the challenge is
daunting. Russia's network of influence has been active for over two
decades; it is well funded; and has largely succeeded in creating dense
and opaque networks in many NATO countries. These intertwined networks
work together to subvert government action, influence policy action,
finance political parties and significantly control domestic and
international media space. We must educate European and Americans
citizens about the Kremlin's true objectives rather than simply hope,
as we do today, that they will not be persuaded.
Recognizing the challenge and educating about the nature of the
threat is the first step; now the United States and Europe must take
effective countermeasures.
I do not believe financing a major U.S.-backed information
dissemination campaign toward Russia will be effective. The Kremlin has
efficiently closed all access to any independent journalism or media by
implementing extraordinary measures to suppress alternative narratives
to its prevailing views at the time. In this environment, a State
Department fact sheet, no matter how correct, will do very little.
However, social networks in Russia do continue to exist that can
circumvent these measures to receive independent information through
social media. I would urge RFE/RL to explore how to reach and expand
these loose social networks but realistically, this will only target a
small, urban population and not effect change in Russia.
The United States and Europe must also significantly enhance
measures of transparency and diversify the media outlets functioning in
our own countries. Countries should insist on greater transparency
requirements to identify the true ownership of media holding companies.
If one country or its affiliated commercial enterprises acquire an
excessively large holding in any one company, efforts should be made to
diversify outlets. Television and radio remain the most powerful
sources of information in some of the most vulnerable NATO countries.
Regulatory mechanisms should be strengthened to control overly biased
coverage, and firm penalties--such as the suspension of broadcasting
licenses--should be considered as a deterrent.
Most importantly, the U.S. should also initiate a major
anticorruption/antikleptocracy initiative, in cooperation with the
European Union, to root out malignant Russian economic influence in
Europe. America's greatest soft power instruments are its global fight
against corruption and ability to prevent the use or misuse of the U.S.
financial system to further corrupt practices. This is the Kremlin's
greatest vulnerability and the U.S. has the reach and ability to affect
change.
Sadly, when European governments begin to take decisions to suspend
media outlets, the Kremlin will cry foul that ``free speech'' and
``media freedoms'' have been trampled. If a European Government
initiates anticorruption activities, seeks energy independence, or
implements banking and judicial reform, media outlets and previously
unknown NGOs actively and vociferously work against any reform efforts
to enhance transparency. It is perhaps the greatest irony that the
Kremlin proactively uses our democratic institutions, civil society and
laws to undermine our democracy and erode confidence in our societies.
In other words, we can speak exhaustively about Russia's media methods
and influence but this is really about how we--the United States and
Europe--can strengthen the rule of law and transparency and improve the
health in our democracies to fight against this influence. It is our
vigilance and our transparency that is needed the most.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ Amb. Daniel B. Baer. ``Ongoing Violations of International Law
and Defiance of OSCE Principles and Commitments by Russian Federation
in Ukraine.'' U.S. Mission to the OSCE. October 15, 2015.
\2\ Nikolai Rudensky, Russian Minorities in the Newly Independent
States: An International Problem in the Domestic Context of Russia
Today. National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of
Eurasia. M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1994. Pp. 58-60.
\3\ Foreign Policy Concept (2013): Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki
Rossiiskoi Federatsii.
\4\ Vladimir Putin, ``Address by President of the Russian
Federation.'' The Kremlin, Moscow. March 18, 2014.
\5\ Sanita Jemberga, Mikk Salu, Eesti Ekspress, Sarunas
Cerniauskas, Dovidas Pancerovas, ``The Kremlin's Millions,'' Re:
Baltica. August 27, 2015.
\6\ See Catalogue, Russkii mir Foundation.
\7\ Philip Shiskin, ``U.S. Sanctions Over Ukraine Hit Two Russian
Banks Hardest.'' Wall Street Journal. March 5, 2015.
\8\ Springe I., Benfelde S., Miks Salu M, (2012): The Unknown
Oligarch, Re: Baltica.
\9\ Peter Kreko, Marie Macaulay, Csaba Molnar, Lorant Gyori.
``Europe's New Pro-Putin Coalition: The Parties of No." Institute of
Modern Russia. August 3, 2015.
\10\ Suzanne Faley and Maia de la Baume, "French Far Right Gets
Helping Hand with Russian Loan." The New York Times. December 1, 2014.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Ms. Conley. And without
objection, the requested information will be entered in the
record.
Let me start with you, Ms. Conley. You talked about
Compatriot Russians. And obviously, there was pretty fertile
ground in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Where else in eastern
Europe would there be that fertile a ground, in terms of Russia
having influence?
Ms. Conley. Again, the Compatriot Policy has an extremely
broad definition, so if you love Tolstoy, if you love great
Russian literature and music, you are a compatriot, because we
enjoy those cultural aspects, the language. So, it has a very
broad definition. Clearly, where there are strong ethnic
Russian minorities, such as in Latvia and Estonia, it has a
particular focus on Russian language, on Russian citizenship.
But, in Bulgaria, where networks are very strong in culture and
society, it works in a very different way, through business,
through the financial sector, through energy, through the
media. And so, it is used differently, but it reaches civil
society, NGOs, the media, and it portrays a picture that the
West is weak and decadent, and its credibility is low, and an
authoritarian model is a much better model of governance.
Senator Johnson. The question I was really--and maybe
somebody else could answer this, is--What other Russian ethnic
populations within other countries is vulnerable? Is--any
population who is vulnerable, as what we saw in Crimea or
eastern Ukraine.
Dr. Aron.
Dr. Aron. Well, there is----
Senator Johnson. Your----
Dr. Aron. Thank you very much.
As I mentioned, and as Ms. Conley mentioned, there is the
Baltic republics--Estonia and Latvia--from a quarter to one-
third of the ethnic Russians. Now, they have some grievances
that are legitimate. In many cases, there were or--there is
less now, but there were facts of discrimination against them,
based on their inability to communicate well in the language of
the country. They were settlers, essentially, sent there after
the Baltics were reconquered by the Soviet Union, 1944-45.
So, the Russian--there are border areas, especially, with
Estonia, Narva, where the Russian minorities are especially
vulnerable to this propaganda. And, as I mentioned, the
propaganda there is not terribly sophisticated, it is not--I
delineated between the two. It is more like the--those last two
dramatic examples that I used. Plus, do not forget that they
are watching, until recently, until, for example, Estonia
launched its Russian channel--they watch Russian TV. In other
words, what is fed to domestic audience is also fed, not just
to the Russian speakers in Latvia or Estonia, but also in
Kazakhstan, where there are millions of Russian speakers, and
all over in the post-Soviet Union.
That creates, I think, a vulnerability, because the local
elites, or at least until now, did not pay much attention to
those people. There was a certain amount of ethnic prejudice.
As Stalin was mentioned here, he made sure that ethnic
minorities within each of the so-called Soviet republics were
vulnerable so that only the center, only Moscow--that they
could only look to Moscow to protect them. And, in many
regards, that is how it is--remains, and that is what Russia is
exploiting.
Senator Johnson. Would you, I guess, kind of agree with me
that the vulnerability is really related to the economic
conditions, as well, where they have got a huge economic
advantage of potentially joining with Russia, they are going to
far more vulnerable to the propaganda than if they are
economically----
Dr. Aron. Well, yes and no. For example, the impoverished
mining areas in Donbass and Luhansk, it is not, as they used to
say in the Soviet times--it is not an accident that that is
where Putin went. In addition to that being heavily ethnically
Russian, it is also----
Senator Johnson. So, it is a combination of the two.
Dr. Aron. Yes, those areas were in total decline, as mining
areas are in most of the world. So, he definitely found very
fertile soil there.
I was in Estonia earlier this year, and the Estonians feel
pretty good that their miners, who make about 10 times more
than their Russian counterparts, are harder to sway than the
Ukrainian--or Russian Ukrainian miners. Still, though, as I
said, it is not always economic. It is also the voice of the
motherland, it is hidden or not so hidden discrimination
against Russian minorities, or at least the memory of this
discrimination. So, it works a long all kinds of factors.
Senator Johnson. You had mentioned these two examples of
pretty extreme propaganda, and you said they are proved--the
stories were proved false, fake. Who proved them fake? And how
was that accomplished?
Dr. Aron. It was proven by--and as somebody mentioned,
here--I think, Peter--civil society is a huge resource. This
group that I mentioned, StopFake, in Ukraine, in Kiev, is one
of quite a few that go after the Russian propaganda, and they
actually--these people actually go--and the Ukranian
journalists--they go on the ground, and they interview people.
And the--just to mention that story about the--ostensibly, you
know, a child--a child and a wife of a pro-Russian separatist
being so horribly murdered. They actually interviewed her
parents, and they said, ``Well, you know, the husband joined
pro-Russian separatists, left her without money, and she did it
because the Russian television paid her.'' So, it is possible
to unravel it, but it requires an effort. And that effort has
to be encouraged through civil society. USAID, BBG cannot do
it. It has to come from the civil society.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Pomerantsev, we hear reports that
Vladimir Putin has very high public opinion approval ratings in
Russia. In your testimony, you talked about that really the
attitude in Russia is very cynical--high level of cynicism. Can
you kind of square those two differences of opinion, I guess?
Mr. Pomerantsev. Well, the--well, I mean, cynicism in the--
look, opinion polling in authoritarian regimes is a very
complex thing. You know----
Senator Johnson. So, you do not buy it.
Mr. Pomerantsev. I think we have to look at the environment
in which it happens. There are no alternatives, so, you know,
Putin is the only one left standing. So, who do you like? Do
you like Putin?
No--look, just--cynicism, when you do not believe the facts
around you--I mean, ``Do you think Putin is corrupt?'' People,
like, ``Yeah.'' ``Do you think your government is doing well?''
``Yeah. But, every government is bad.'' But, still there is an
emotional, you know, high that comes from victory. Eight-four
percent is pretty common for any military leader.
But, listen, there was a great little bit of--a great
little bit of research the University of California did about
China, about people watching the main news. And in a very, very
subtle way, they did sociology, not telling people what they
are actually asking. And most people, after they watched the
news, did not think the government was good. They thought it
was strong. A lot of propaganda is a signal. This is the rules
of the game. This is the stuff you have got to say. Nod. Say
this, and you can keep your little corrupt business, et cetera,
et cetera, et cetera.
When you do more deep sociology in a lot of these bits of
the world, it is a really mixed picture that you get. So, for
example, are there Russian soldiers in Ukraine? A lot of
Russians say, ``Do you mean officially?'' That was in
sociological reviews. So, you have to go a little bit deeper.
But, without a doubt, I mean, there has been an emotional,
you know--you know, catharsis from the Crimean experience. The
question is, How deep does that go? Is that like a football
match? ``Yay, we got Crimea, now where is our food?'' Or is
that actually something deeper, and will it take us somewhere
very, very dark? The parallels in the 20th century are obvious.
So, I think that is what we are all asking ourselves. Is this a
momentary high or is this something more long term and much
more frightening?
Senator Johnson. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you all very much for being here.
Mr. Pomerantsev and Mr. Czuperski, it is my understanding
that about 60 percent of Russians have access to the Internet,
and that the Internet is relatively unfiltered compared to some
other dictatorships. So, why do more Russians not see
differences between what they see on the Internet and what they
see on State-controlled media?
Mr. Pomerantsev. It is actually interesting, when you look
at the Internet. Internet gives us--it does give us some
glimmers of hope. So, the Kremlin, since 2012, since the
protests against Putin, invested very heavily into the
incident, creating these mixtures of entertainment and
disinformation, Internet projects, like Life News, which is
like a mixture of tabloid, celebrity, fascists in Ukraine. They
do quite well, but they actually get the same number of hits
as, sort of, Alexei Navalny's anticorruption blog. So, it is a
much more equal thing, and it shows that there are Russians who
want, you know, evidence-based, fact-based news.
But, listen, it is--nowadays--today's dictators, they do
not really work through censorship, they work through putting
so much disinformation out there, people cannot tell, you know,
the good from the bad, disinformation from real information. A
lot of, sort of, authoritarian regimes work this way. You just
confuse everyone, and, in that confusion, people cannot tell
what they want, so they just go with--you know, they go with
the flow.
So, authoritarian regimes across the world have worked out
how to use the fact that there are so many different sources of
information, for themselves.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Czuperski.
Mr. Czuperski. One of the really interesting things that
happened leading up to the occupation of Crimea was that, way
before President Putin's strike in Crimea and his ``little
green men'' started appearing, is that, in fact, the biggest
social network, the Facebook equivalent, VKontakte, in Russia,
with over 60 million daily users, was overtaken forcefully from
Mr. Pavel Durov, and overtaken by Kremlin associated oligarchs
and businessmen. And that shows you just to what degree, while
they might not be censoring entirely the Internet, as Peter
pointed out, there is an attempt to try to control what is
being released, at what time, and when, and get a deeper
understanding of those new networks to understand how to mold
public opinion even deeper. So, there is an effort there.
Senator Shaheen. Ms. Conley, in your testimony, you say
that you do not believe that financing a major U.S.-backed
information dissemination campaign would be effective in
Russia, but you do talk about the opportunity to explore how to
reach and expand loose social networks, which I assume access
to the Internet would be an important part of that. So, can you
talk a little bit about how you see that happening, compared to
what you have just heard from the other two witnesses?
Ms. Conley. Absolutely. In conversations we have had with
colleagues that are working in the Moscow Bureau of RFE/RL,
that, in some ways, there is an attempt to control the
Internet. Again, Internet usage in Russia is very much highly
urbanized. Less, obviously, rural populations, television and
radio is a much greater source of their information, which is
very much Kremlin-controlled, but that there are still vibrant
networks, using Facebook and elsewhere, and they do crave fact-
based information, they do want the truth. To be able to use
those networks effectively--but, again, it almost has to grow
organically. There is extraordinary distrust from top-down
information. But, if we can expand those networks--but, make no
mistake, the Duma, in passing regulations and rules, is trying
to stop those avenues. There is extraordinary use of
cyberactivities to track them, to follow them. We certainly saw
that in Ukraine.
So, to allow and support creative uses of these networks,
to let that information in, I just think a government, top-down
approach is not going to be effective, that we have to be,
exactly, innovative, creative, using these networks, and that
they can help spread the story, rather than have it come in, as
we did it traditionally during the cold war, with large and
heavy funding. That is just not going to be how we are going to
fight this battle in the 21st century.
Senator Shaheen. I mentioned to the earlier panel that we
have been doing these series of hearings in the Armed Services
Committee about military reform and what the world--the 21st
century looks like for combat and war. And one of the points
that was made at one of those panels today was that, as we are
looking at how to combat this kind of propaganda, it is very
much what you have just said, that the way to do that is
through network--organic networking that individuals are doing
in theater, wherever that may be. So, talk, if you can, a
little bit about how to promote those kinds of independent,
organic efforts that would spread and help with information-
sharing and correcting the story that is being put out by
state-owned media.
And, I do not know, Ms. Conley, if anybody else wants to
respond to that. Maybe you could begin.
Ms. Conley. I am happy to start. Again, I think the
challenge is--because so much has been shut down within Russia
itself--is perhaps using Russians that have left Russia, but
still retain their contacts, their networks, trying to work
through them. Again, not to create, again, fulfill the myth of
the foreign agents and that contamination of the West, but to
allow them to use those--their existing networks to help pull
the truth towards them. I think it is using a lot of young
people. Again, it is sort of the reverse troll factories,
right? We want to use young people and their friend network to
try to spread the truth. But, I think we should look to our
allies that have ethnic Russian populations within their
countries, and try to see where we can reverse engineer and
work through those networks to provide the truth rather than
the alternative universe that they are presenting.
I will let my other colleagues speak to it, as well.
Senator Shaheen. Anyone else want to speak to that?
Dr. Aron. I wonder if I could----
Senator Shaheen. Dr. Aron.
Dr. Aron [continuing]. Illustrate something in----
Senator Shaheen. Sure.
Dr. Aron [continuing]. Illustrate something that Peter said
in response to your question. I think he is absolutely right,
the--it is--so far--so far, it is not the Iranian or the
Chinese method of actually censoring sites, but overwhelming
them with trolls.
And let me give you an example from my own research. I have
been very interested in the Russian--ethnic Russian and also
Russian-language fighters in ISIS. As you know, Russian is the
third-largest language there now, after Arabic and English. And
I was doing research on the Internet, and I was directed to the
Russian equivalent of Facebook, which was mentioned here, of
Vkontakte--an enormous site--by one of the links. And, indeed,
I saw my article that--the article I was looking for. But,
before I saw the article, on the top-right of that page, I saw
a cartoon. It was Uncle Sam with a baby on his lap, clad in a
jihadist uniform, with a Kalashnikov AK-47 behind him, so you
make no mistakes. And the caption says, ``ISIS is a product of
America's two-party system.''
So, this is clearly--every major system now, every major
site--social site, unless they are, as you call them, dissident
sites, say, you know--who are hanging by a thread. But, if you
are an important site, and if you want to make money, and if
you want to host, I think it is your obligation to display
these types of messages. And then people come to the Internet,
they do not know what to believe. And they are constantly being
proffered these types of messages.
Senator Shaheen. Yes, Mr. Czuperski.
Mr. Czuperski. One of the things that Peter was mentioning
is trust, and building trust. And the methods that we use to
now report digital forensic research methods that let us verify
whether a digital breadcrumb is accurate or inaccurate, I think
really speaks to that. And the more we can spread these
techniques to the public and journalists, I think, the more
impressive we can see results, where we can start growing this
trust again in communities that are skeptical toward us.
The most impressive mark of our report was not so much that
we created it and it showed us what was happening in Ukraine,
but, in fact, that we created the tools for the public to just
go out there and verify the facts themselves. And that is what
Simon Ostrovsky in writing the story. I am going to show you a
picture where he is actually standing in the very spot where
that picture--where the picture was taken a few months earlier.
And I think that that really highlights that, if we empower a
journalist with these new techniques to navigate the digital
space, we can really show what is happening, and they will need
to do that, trickle down, but let it trickle up.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. We have 10 minutes left on a vote. Do you
want--would you like to keep it going? I will quick go and come
back. Is that okay?
Senator Murphy. Yes, let me try to fit some questions in
now.
Senator Johnson. Do you want to do that? And I will go
vote, and then I will come back.
Senator Murphy. That is fine.
Senator Johnson. Okay. So, you keep it going until then. If
you have got to leave, then put it in recess, and I will be
back. That make sense?
Senator Murphy. Sure.
Senator Johnson. Okay.
Senator Murphy [presiding]. Thank you all. And I apologize
for not being here for your testimony.
But, I caught, Mr. Pomerantsev, of your sort of rendering
of the underlying message of the Russian propaganda campaign
essentially being one of nihilism, that there is nothing
worthwhile believing in, that, you know, you should not believe
their narrative, but you really maybe even should not be our
narrative that there is really no truth. And so, if that is the
case, if that is sort of the underlying message, then I wonder,
as we are trying to decide between these two competing
strategies of either seeding a bunch of local narratives versus
trying to tell one narrative directed from the outside as to
whether we are just effectively feeding into their methodology
by putting resources into a variety of different local accounts
who are all going to have, you know, some distinct, separate
agenda behind them, or whether we are better off attempting to
husband our resources together and try to tell one narrative to
try to sell a simple truth, like ``Russia invaded Ukraine,''
like ``Russia took down the plane''--right?--instead of
investing in all of these disparate story lines, given the fact
that their whole strategy is about trying to create lots and
lots of disparate story lines.
So, I hear a lot of you, sort of, making this
recommendation, that maybe it is not worthwhile to do one big
project, that it is worthwhile to invest in a lot of other
projects. But, tell me if I am wrong, that sounds like it might
actually just sort of feed into their entire strategy, which is
not to tell one narrative, is to just try to spread out the
narratives as widely as possible.
Mr. Pomerantsev. You have actually asked the key question
that I am wrestling with in my think-tank work. How do we get
the balance between talking to every audience in their own
language and to what concerns them? Right now, if you come to
someone in Natava and try to tell him the truth about MH17,
forget about it. It is too late. They are already too confused,
too cynical, and too kind of, ``Probably the--some masons did
it.'' You know, they are too far gone in the conspiracy world.
If you go and talk to him about his roads, he will listen to
you. So, a lot of the time, it is about changing the
conversation and talking to people about what is important to
them.
However, the secret of us--for us to--as we move forward,
is to link that to a larger strategic narrative. And the
strategic narrative is actually there to be seized. It is about
trust, dignity, all these things that, you know, 1989-1991 were
all about. But, we are going to--the skill in the 21st century
is going to--to do both. And we are all just figuring out how
to do that.
ISIS did the same thing, by the way. ISIS change their
narrative for whoever they are talking to. They do violent
jihadism to get Westerners to come. In the local world, where
nobody likes violent jihadis, they do truth and prosperity.
They change their story everywhere.
So, everybody has--and a lot of this has got to do with the
nature of media nowadays. It is very fractured. People live in
their little ecosystems. So, you cannot just stand there and
scream, ``The Russians did MH17,'' when it is too late. You
know, all the research about debunking shows it does not
actually work. You know, nobody listens. Everybody is in their
little world. So, you have to learn how to talk to people and
bring them out of it.
There is one more factor, though. And we have all been
talking about, you know, how popular Putin is. And this is
something that we have to look at, as well. And here,
governments can really help, because it is quite expensive. We
have to understand the difference between perception and
behavior. So, people in Narva, in east Estonia, will tell you
how much they love Russia, how they are offended at being in
Estonia. And you are, like, ``Where do you want your kids to go
to school?'' They are, like, ``London, obviously.'' This
happens everywhere. We have to do a very different type of
sociology, a real targeted audience analysis that really looks
at what motivates people, and speak to that. And you will find
that, half the time, they are good Westerners. You missed the
start of my speech. I talked about the Instagrams and, sort of,
Facebooks, or these very tragic victims of this terrible plane
crash, the Russian plane that exploded over Egypt. You look at
their lives, you realize, ``My God, they are no different to
kids in Wichita.'' You know? So, we have to learn how to speak
to the behavior, and suddenly we will find people's behavior is
much closer to our ideals than the nihilism that Putin talks
about.
Senator Murphy. Other----
Mr. Pomerantsev. That was a long answer, sorry.
Senator Murphy. Yes. No, that is fine.
Other thoughts on this? I know, Ms. Conley, I heard you
make a very specific recommendation about really not trying to
do one big, consolidated project. But, how do you make sure
that a more diffuse effort does--just does not add to the
static?
Ms. Conley. Well, I actually argue that the diffusive
nature in the networks is actually an antidote to a very
networked approach that Russian influence is showing using all
tools at its disposal--culture, the church, every vehicle that
they use. And we have to start thinking in a very much network-
decentralized approach, where we are tapping into this. We are
being much more proactive.
And, Senator Murphy, as you were talking, I almost
encounter this same argument with sanctions. You know, ``If we
do this, we feed into Putin's narrative of encirclement, `We
are at war with the West.' '' But, we must take actions. He is
going to develop a counternarrative to whatever the West does
in response to his behavior. And I think that is a challenge we
just have to accept and meet. But, if we can be, in some ways,
many wares on many levels, from civil society to the government
to cultural use--the United States, in many ways, left the
playing field after NATO and European Union expansion in 2004,
and we have to return to the playing field, being engaged with
civil society, being engaged with the media, not just doing
technical assistance, but being present and being very
proactive and countering a narrative. When that is the only
narrative you have, that is what you buy.
And just to comment on Peter's question. In this survey
that we did on Estonian behavior, you ask an ethnic Russian in
Narva, they--yes, they listen to Russian news, but they are
glad that they are in Estonia, for the benefits of Estonia. And
I think we have to not overplay this, but also understand that
they are, 24/7, being bombarded by lots of disinformation--how
the West uses every tool of--it is a soft power, it is
attractiveness, but at all levels. And we just have not been
that innovative, and we have not been that omnipresent as the
Russian Russkiy Mir, the Compatriot Policy, has been
omnipresent in these societies.
Senator Murphy. So, let me ask a question about the means
of gaining omnipresence. So, we spend most of our time here
talking about strategy, and we do not actually spend a lot of
our time in this committee--and I can be preachy now that I am
the only person here----
[Laughter.]
Senator Murphy [continuing]. We do not actually spend a lot
of time talking about resources. And, you know, the fact is, is
that this guy has just a lot more resources than we are willing
to devote to this project. And I think, as you correctly
identified, this is not just about support for the Broadcasting
Board of Governors; this is about building up civil society,
because the propaganda does not come from television stations,
it comes locally from churches and business groups and
nonprofits and all sorts of organizations and individuals that
are seeded with money and resources. And we spent the 1950s
building up rule of law, building up stable democracies at a
time when we were spending 3 percent of GDP on foreign aid.
Today we are spending 0.1 percent of GDP on foreign aid.
And so, I will put the question back to you. I am happy to
have others comment. I want to have a conversation about
strategy, but, if we are going to try to do what Mr.
Pomerantsev said, which is to have a subtlety of strategy that
both seeds locally-based narratives while also trying to tell a
consistent story line, that is just not a question of the right
strategy, that is a question of resources. And we do not have
it right now. That has got to be a challenge to this Congress,
as well, I would assume.
Ms. Conley. Thank you, Senator.
I would--first, step one is focus. Mr. Putin has a singular
focus. We lack that focus. So, that is step one. And a strategy
of reaching and making Europe important to us, making it
important to be there.
As far as the resources, again, when we were working so
closely with the Baltic states and central Europe as they were
looking to their aspirations to join the European Union and
NATO, we were everywhere. We were engaged. The Seed Act. We
were working in civil society, technical assistance. Now,
everyone who has been through that period--and it was a very
successful period of deep engagement, a great deal of
assistance. We had technical advisors. We were everywhere at--
with our European colleagues.
Now it is a success. They have entered these institutions.
But, our mistake was, we said our job was done. And we have to
understand that all democracies are works in progress. And what
we did not realize is that these institutions in central Europe
and the Baltics are still young, and democracies can backslide.
Hungary is backsliding. Bulgaria is backsliding. These are NATO
allies that we have article 5 treaty obligations for. We have
to reinvest in them, in their institutions and their societies.
We cannot want it more than they do, but we have to return--and
that is very hard to tell the American taxpayer that here is a
country--European countries that are doing well, that have
joined the euro and that we have to reinvest. But, that is
about how we build the antibodies to growing Russian influence,
because, if we are not there, Russia will step in.
So, it is a comprehensive new strategy, a reinvestment plan
into Europe. And I think that would take a lot of focus and
attention that I have not seen to date.
Senator Murphy. Yes. And again, it is focus and attention.
I do not disagree. But, it is also a question of whether we are
willing to come up with the resources to do it.
Because we have just a few minutes left on this vote, I am
going to pretend like I am back in charge of the subcommittee,
and I am going to--I am going to recess it so that Senator
Johnson can come back and wrap up. So----
[Laughter.]
Senator Murphy. Oh, well done. It is all yours.
Senator Johnson [presiding]. I walked fast.
Thank you, Senator Murphy.
But, I have got to get my bearings, here.
Mr. Czuperski, one of other questions I wanted to ask you,
you--again, there is very compelling evidence--I saw those
photos of, you know, the digital footprint. How does Russia
suppress that kind of information internally?
Mr. Czuperski. I think the beauty of this is that it is
partially hard to suppress. If you are my superior in the
military, and I am an 18-year-old lad that just joined the
forces, I am doing the most exciting thing in my life, and you
are going to ask me to give you my phone. I will give you my
throwaway phone, but I am probably going to keep my flashy
smartphone, and then I am going to go off into war and start
tweeting everything that is happening, because it is so
exciting. And so, I think it is hard to suppress this basic
human desire of sharing, especially people that are of that
generation.
The second interesting point is that at times we have
actually seen--some of the camps that we have seen along the
Russian-Ukraine border, we have seen that soldiers actually
have not been posting and leaving digital breadcrumbs from
those specific camps, but the irony was that a lot of these
guys have girlfriends that visit them and then post pictures on
their behalf later on, once they leave the camps.
So, in a way, I think it is a--it is the beauty of the
decentralized Internet. You can only suppress so much, but it
is going to keep on breathing and flourishing, one way or the
other.
Senator Johnson. So, it is hard to totally control society.
We have heard reports that Russia, the government, was
threatening families who might have lost a loved one in--
particularly in Moscow, but, ``Do not say anything to anybody
or you will not get the pensions.'' I mean, are those reports
largely true, or are there other forms of threats or
intimidation that Vladimir Putin is engaged in to try and
suppress this information?
Mr. Czuperski. I am not sure which reports specifically you
are referring to, but we are aware that the cargo 200s, dead
bodies that have been shipped back from Ukraine, back to
Russia, times have been put to rest, the people that died,
under very strict and muted circumstances, where the families
were invited, but not the unit members, and so forth. So, there
is definitely a concrete effort within the Russian Government
to mute any noise of Russian casualties in Ukraine.
And one of the perhaps most interesting development in this
recent year was a new law put in place by Mr. Putin that
prohibited Russian citizens from speaking about deaths in times
of war.
Senator Johnson. Okay. So, it was actually the law in
place.
Dr. Aron, you were speaking about the growing effectiveness
of Voice of America. And the comment you made was that it was
superior to just normal public media outlets. Can you just
explain what you are talking about there?
Dr. Aron. Well, it is--I have found--thanks--I have found
that--on my trip to Ukraine, I was struck repeatedly by both
media and political elites there telling us how much they
appreciate the content of both Voice of America and Radio Free
Europe, Radio Liberty. And there are--how some of the top
Ukrainian television networks were actually vying for the
content and trying to get the rights to several flagship
programs of--television programs by VOA and Radio Free Europe,
Radio Liberty.
You know, let me give you another example. A top democratic
leader of Russia, opposition leader, Vladimir Milov, was
visiting here last week, was in my office, and he said,
``Without a doubt, of all the unofficial sources of political
information and analysis, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty,
based in Moscow, is by far the most popular and by far the most
credible.''
What I have found is the cache of credibility which is
extremely highly praised in--I also was in Moldova. And I am
sure it is probably the case in other post-Soviet nations. That
is utterly precious. That is--you know, I knew that, in theory,
but it was very gratifying to see it face-to-face. And this is
something that we need to maintain and support.
Senator Johnson. Is it the strength of the brand name? Is
it the quality of the content? Is it production values? I mean,
that is what--I am trying to get a sense--you know, because
what we do not want to do, then, if it is the brand, we do not
want to change the brand name just to modernize things, if--so
that----
Dr. Aron. Well----
Senator Johnson. If you understand the thrust----
Dr. Aron. Well--well--well----
Senator Johnson [continuing]. Of my question.
Dr. Aron. Well, brand is definitely there, because this was
the most popular two stations during--and plus the BBC and
probably Deutsche Welle--during the cold war. But, that is for
the older generation, while--I was talking to younger people,
as well, and they believe that--I think it is all those things
that you mentioned. It is the credibility, it is the
authenticity of journalistic research. It is the fact that they
live by the democratic media rules, that they will not--and
partly also because they are not a government organization.
Senator Johnson. You mentioned the BBC. Can you kind of
compare the quality, the depth, the extent of BBC verse the
Voice of America?
Dr. Aron. Maybe Peter would be better off, being a British
denizen.
Mr. Pomerantsev. Well, the--well, there is hardly anything.
The BBC closed its Ukrainian service, and it masterfully scaled
down its Russian one. It is now going through a review, where
there is talk--I know--you need someone from the BBC to answer
this, but I know there was a--they applied for funding to
create a BBC Russian language via a 24-hour channel, but
probably will not be that. It might be, like, an online thing.
So, I think the Brits have realized that, as Heather has
stressed repeatedly, that they thought everything was fine in
the Russian-speaking world, and, oh, my word, were they wrong.
But, you know, you are the last guy standing, basically. The
Russian--the BBC Russian operation is tiny compared to what it
was.
Senator Johnson. In my opening comments, I was talking
about my basic sense that, obviously, Radio Free Europe, Voice
of America, these things were very strong in the cold war, and
we kind of almost mothballed the things. I realize it is
difficult to answer it this way, but I am an accountant, I like
numbers. On a scale of 1 to 10, let us say 10 is the most
effective, let us say that is our countermeasures that we were
employing the cold war. How low did it go, and where are at
right now? And I would kind of like all of you to potentially
answer that.
And, Ms. Conley, we will start with you because you were
shaking your head.
Ms. Conley. Sorry. You know, I think presently our
effectiveness on a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the most
effective, 1 being the least--I think we are at a 3 or 4. I
think we are now finally awakening to the magnitude of the
challenge, while RT, Sputnik, the purchases of European media
markets by Russian oligarchs, we--and all the touch points that
Russia's policy of influence reaches--we realize we have an
enormous task, the resources are low. I do not think it is an
information campaign only. It is a major part of the battle.
And shaping public opinion is critical.
But, I just want to underscore to you, Mr. Chairman, that
it is bigger than that. It reaches and touches these citizens
in business, culture, economics. It really requires an enormous
Western, American presence, of which we have not seen and since
these countries had, you know, just achieved independence. We
have to return to that.
So, I think it is a holistic approach of which the
communications is one, but it is more comprehensive than that.
Senator Johnson. So, is RT at 10 right now?
Ms. Conley. I do not give them--I do not over-give them,
but I would say they are a 7 to 8.
Senator Johnson. Pretty darn good. How low did we go, if we
are at 3 now?
Ms. Conley. Well, as I said, I want to be optimistic that
we were at a 2 and a 3, because we understand we need to grow
and grow and put resources and focus. But, I think we have a
long way to climb before we can be as omnipresent as Russian
influence is today.
Senator Johnson. Anybody else----
Dr. Aron. Sure.
Senator Johnson. Anybody want to----
Dr. Aron. Yes. I wonder--and, you know, displaying my
biases of being a governor of BBG--it depends. It depends on
the country, it depends on the audience. We cannot say that--as
you remember, RT is hardly this, you know, all-powerful,
seductive monster. It is--you know, the credible polling that
was done in western Europe, I have the numbers; I did not want
to bother you with this, but I certainly will provide them.
Dr. Aron. They barely registered. I mean, they are--they
barely registered as the--in the first 100th of the most
watched television stations.
Senator Johnson. But, their target--their target really is
not western Europe. It really is----
Dr. Aron. Precisely. They do not--exactly. So, we are
mixing things up here a bit. In western Europe, and even in, I
would say, central and--say, Poland, or the non-Russian-
speaking Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. Very negligible.
Russia is not--our Russia--Russia today is not all-powerful at
all. In the U.S. market, it is very, very low. Very low. I
mean, in----
Senator Johnson. But, I guess, really I am talking about
the effectiveness toward the targeted market.
Dr. Aron. Exactly.
Senator Johnson. And----
Dr. Aron. Well----
Senator Johnson. You know, and let us face it, the targets
are changing, which is one----
Dr. Aron. It--well----
Senator Johnson [continuing]. Of the questions I had.
Dr. Aron. They distinguish between targets. And I think the
main target is--you know, RT is a glamour project. RT--you
know, as I have written, Putin went to tour their offices, and
he said, ``This was a project to counter the Anglo-Saxon
domination''--I swear to you--``Anglo-Saxon domination of
airway.'' CNN. Right? But, where the weaponization of
information occurs, where it is--actually blends with Putin's
tactical needs, it is Russian TV, itself, the ability to
control its content, and the ability to project it on the
Russian speakers in the former Soviet Union.
So, in--as I said, in Ukraine, I think VOA and Radio
Liberty or Radio Free Europe are doing fairly well. I would say
it is probably better than 3 or 4, probably a 5 and 6. But, we
are developing. We are a bit behind in a social media, but we
create that, and we work on this.
So--but, the point is--and here I agree with Heather--the
point is, is that it is a complex issue. The goal of the
Russian--propaganda is just one part of it--the goal is to
overwhelm Western societies with the cynicism, to show them
that, ``While we are bad, but nobody is good,'' and, as I said
in my presentation, to undermine the people's belief and trust
in democratic institutions. It is as simple, but also as grand,
as that.
Senator Johnson. Anybody else want to weigh in?
Mr. Pomerantsev. Yes, I would really like to add to this
course. We are playing different games. What Russia--and China
has got exactly the same idea in its three warfares, a lot of
other groups that are seeing--you know, they are looking at the
world, ``How can we upset the world order as it is now? How can
we upset the global commons?'' And they have worked out that,
if they unify all these things that we always thought were the
strength of democracy--open markets, open media,
multiculturalism--they can progress and achieve tactical ends.
Their power is not: Russian TV over here, Russian TV over here,
Gazprom over here. Their power is that, at a key moment, they
can unite it all. We cannot do that. But, we have to start
thinking about how we are going to manage these new challenges
without sacrificing our democratic values.
So, we are playing a different game. They are--it is not
about RT versus BBC. It is about a new vision of how you manage
your global role versus, you know, a vacuum on our side.
Senator Johnson. Are you basically describing the fact that
we are trying to defend the entire chessboard, and Russia is
going to bring--consolidate those powers on a particular
target, on a particular piece?
Mr. Pomerantsev. And--but, with one grand----
Senator Johnson. At a particular point in time.
Mr. Pomerantsev [continuing]. One grand strategic aim. The
aim is never Crimea or Syria. Their aim is you. Yes? They are
after you. They want to psychologically prove that America is
impotent; therefore, the Pax Americana, for what it still is,
is pointless; and therefore, why do we not be more corrupt,
more violent, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera? That is the
ultimate aim. It is a--Syria is a psychological operation, a--
rather than a ground operation, in that sense.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Czuperski.
Mr. Czuperski. You can actually see how they are
consolidating what Peter was describing, when you look online
into the digital space regarding Syria. Today, you had posts
from Sputnik in Russia that they are claiming that more than
2,000 ISIS targets have been hit by Russia, which is absolutely
nonsense. But, they do it effectively, because they consolidate
all those outlets at the same time and leave a big footprint
online that claims Russia versus ISIL, and here is the
accomplishments that we make.
And so, perhaps representing the digital generation on this
panel, the space that we are most incompetent in is the space
that we have created, and that is online. We tweet, but we
tweet to send long press releases to someone that, quite
frankly, no one really cares about, and we send out YouTube
videos that put us to sleep. Whereas, Russia today--today, in
fact, is able to claim to have more than 2 billion viewers as
the largest network--Russian news network--online. And so, they
are just transforming completely the way that you communicate
online, while we still use 20th century methods to communicate
in the 21st century platform, and that is online. So, we have
to transform the way we communicate in that space; otherwise,
we are going to lose the battle.
Senator Johnson. I will give you each a chance to kind of
make a closing comment. But, one of the things I just--you
know, in your closing comments, if you could just kind of
address--it sounds like we are making progress. How much more
progress do we need to make? I mean, are we on a pretty good
path, or do we need to, here, Congress of the United States,
allocate more resources, devote more time to push this to the
next level?
We will start with you, Dr. Aron.
Dr. Aron. Well, if you do not mind, I just--I will just say
what I said before, that the most effective antidote, the most
effective medicine is a rich, diverse, and uncensored
democratic media environment. Now, I think if we talk about
strategy, and not from--you know, rushing from putting one fire
after another--the idea is to try and build this type of
environment in--where--in places that are most vulnerable to
the Russian propaganda. Now, again, it immediately gets to what
Heather was talking about. You cannot build a democratic,
vibrant media in a society that only half free or half
authoritarian. So, immediately, you hit certain institutional
walls. But, I think the direction should be that.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Dr. Aron.
And actually, Dr. Aron mentioned a word I was going to ask
you, Mr. Pomerantsev, because you said we need a strategy. Can
you kind of describe what your concept of that strategy would
be in your closing comments?
Mr. Pomerantsev. Sure. It starts from recognition that in
the 21st century, misinformation is a huge problem, that it is
a threat to democracy and a rules-based global order. We will
need institutions as wide-ranging as the ones we created in the
20th century, a completely different--a supercharged public
diplomacy, reinvigorated. New NGOs. We will need NGOs that--for
disinformation; in other words, as big as Amnesty International
was for human rights. We will need centers of research focusing
on the way damaging digital means spread. That is possible to
do, but you--you know, Google can do it commercially, but we
are not putting any resources, that I know of, into doing it in
the foreign policy field.
So, we are actually talking about a completely new set of
institutions and practices. We can get into--there is action
being taken on micro things, little things, like--little bit
more for anticorruption, little bit more for investigative
journalism. But, I have not heard of a vision anywhere yet.
So, weirdly, we are way behind. We invented it, as both
Maks and, I think, Leon have said, but we are kind of way
behind in really understanding the consequences.
Senator Johnson. So, we have a ways to go.
Mr. Czuperski.
Mr. Czuperski. So, I think--sorry, thanks--perhaps the most
important thing to do as we navigate this new Engagement Age is
to equip the public with methods to create something called
information defense, as laid out by our friend Ben Nimmo, where
we proactively are able to have a set of skills in place ready
to debunk facts as they occur. So, the next time a plane downs,
we are not falling trap to Russia claiming a certain thing. And
the best way to do that is, as Peter said, putting the funding
to NGOs, putting the funding to civil society and journalists
so they, themselves, can create the tool and develop them
further. And especially in the digital space. If we do not
seize the digital space that we created, then we--it is going
to turn back onto us.
Senator Johnson. Thank you.
Ms. Conley.
Ms. Conley. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding these
types of hearings. This is how we have to attack the problem
and build awareness. We do need a long-term strategy. It is
going to require a reinvestment of the United States in all of
these countries, with new resources at all levels of society.
This is ideological. We like to say this is not the cold war,
but it is liberal versus illiberal, cynicism versus optimism,
open societies versus authoritarian. This is our great
challenge. We rose to the occasion during the cold war. We are
going to have to rise to the occasion again using a 21st
century toolkit.
But, make no mistake, this is a confrontation of great
magnitude. And when the West diminishes its presence, Russia
will step in and fill that vacuum, whether that is in Syria,
whether that is in Ukraine. And so, that is our great
challenge.
And I thank you for holding this hearing and continuing to
raise awareness and focus on this issue.
Senator Johnson. Well, thank you.
I want to, again, thank all the witnesses for taking the
time, and your thoughtful testimony and your thoughtful answers
to our questions.
The hearing record will remain open until November 6 at 5
p.m. for the submission of statements and questions for the
record.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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