[Senate Hearing 114-814]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-814
THE PERSISTENT NORTH KOREA DENUCLEARIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 20, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
35-961 WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Lester Munson, Staff Director
Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Bob Corker, U.S. Senator From Tennessee..................... 1
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator From Maryland.............. 3
Hon. Sung Kim, Special Representative for North Korea Policy and
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Korea And Japan, U.S. Department
of State, Washington, DC....................................... 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
Hon. Robert R. King, Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights
Issues, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC............... 7
Prepared Statement........................................... 9
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
United Nations Press Release, Feb. 17, 2014...................... 42
Written Statement of Michael Kirby, Chair of the Commission of
Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea to the 25th Session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva,
17 March 2014.................................................. 44
Responses of Ambassador Sung Kim to Questions Submitted by
Senator Marco Rubio............................................ 47
Responses of Ambassador Sung Kim to Questions Submitted by
Senator David Perdue........................................... 47
Responses of Special Envoy Robert King to Questions Submitted by
Senator David Perdue........................................... 50
(iii)
THE PERSISTENT NORTH KOREA DENUCLEARIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGE
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Corker, Johnson, Gardner, Perdue, Cardin,
Menendez, Murphy, Kaine, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. We will call the meeting to order.
I think Senator Cardin will be here in just one moment. We
have a good group here. We thank you for being here.
Over the past decade, the Foreign Relations Committee has
convened, every couple of years, at the full committee level to
assess the state of U.S. policy toward North Korea. Through
successive Republican and Democratic administrations, this
committee has received testimony from U.S. Government officials
highlighting the seriousness of the North Korean threat. There
has been surprisingly little variation in their overall
descriptions of the danger and recommended policy
prescriptions. Undoubtedly, we will hear similar testimony
today from our witnesses on a seemingly intractable nature of
the North Korean threat. We thank you again for being here.
Former U.S. officials have all characterized North Korea's
nuclear and ballistic missile activities as posing serious and
unacceptable risk to United States national interests. These
same officials also stress the importance of standing with our
close regional allies, South Korea and Japan, in the face of
destabilizing North Korean provocations. In addition, they all
cited the necessity of cooperating with the international
community to deter further North Korean provocations and
prevent the spread of sensitive technologies to and from North
Korea. They all noted the importance of enforcing U.N. security
sanctions on North Korea, specifically the need for China to
exercise greater influence. And, in recent years, United States
officials have spoken increasingly of the deplorable human
rights situation in North Korea, including highlighting North
Korea's notorious prison camps.
Of course, there have been some differences in the
approaches toward North Korea over the years, particularly with
respect to the tactics of engaging North Korea in appropriate
balance of carrots and sticks. Yet, in the past several decades
of United States policy toward North Korea, it is apparent that
has been an abject failure. Through successive administrations,
North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities have
continued to advance while the North Korean people remain
impoverished and subject to brutal treatment at the hands of
the Kim regime.
I appreciate the complexity of the risk posed by North
Korea, and our limited options. However, it certainly seems
that more could be done to address this issue. For example, at
my request, the GAO recently completed a study examining the
implementation and enforcement of U.S. and U.N. sanctions on
North Korea. The study found that more than half of U.S. member
states have not provided required sanctions implementation
reports to the U.N., with many states lacking the technical
capacity to prepare such reports and enforce sanctions. I
recognize that submitting a required report to the U.N. will
not be a game changer. However, with North Korea's proclivity
for employing evasive techniques to acquire prohibited nuclear
and ballistic missile-related technologies, it is certainly
plausible that they are using some of these countries to
acquire or transfer illicit materials. What are we doing to
encourage or assist member states to submit these reports?
Moreover, are we harnessing existing U.S. resources, including
our export control programs, to raise awareness of U.N.
obligations related to North Korea?
Another area where there is clearly more to be done is
forced labor of North Korean workers overseas. We know that the
Kim regime sends a large number of workers overseas under
contracts with other governments and foreign companies. What is
the United States doing to persuade these countries to end the
use of North Korean forced labor?
Before turning to our witnesses, I would like to
acknowledge the efforts of our chairman on the East Asia
Subcommittee, Senator Gardner. In his short time in the Senate,
he has demonstrated considerable leadership on the North Korea
issue in introducing legislation and convening his subcommittee
a few weeks ago to discuss this very issue.
There is no silver-bullet solution to North Korea, and I
understand that. But, I am committed to working with Senator
Gardner, Senator Kaine, and others on this committee--certainly
Senator Cardin, our distinguished ranking member--to see what
Congress can do to move the needle on North Korea. I hope we
will able to have a thoughtful discussion today that outlines
U.S. interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean
Peninsula and, more importantly, lays out tangible options to
reduce the hazard posed by North Korea's weapons of mass
destruction programs and provides hope to the beleaguered North
Korean people.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
I want to thank our ranking member for the way he helps
lead this committee and, with that, turn to him for his
comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank both of our witnesses for being here.
And thank you for convening this hearing. As you pointed
out, Senator Gardner, 2 weeks ago, held a hearing in regards to
North Korea, and I thought that was very helpful. North Korea
is critically important to our policies in Asia and our global
policy. So, I very much appreciate this hearing.
The United States has invested much in the Korean
Peninsula, including the military commitments that we have
made--the soldiers who gave their lives for that region, as
well as our continuing commitment of military strength on the
Korean Peninsula.
The Republic of Korea is a close ally of the United States,
and obviously their security is very much influenced by the
conduct of North Korea. The rebalance to Asia policy that we
have talked about frequently very much--involves what happens
in North Korea, and we spend a lot of time talking with our
allies in the region about the strategic importance of the
Korean Peninsula.
I visited Seoul 2 years ago. And when you are standing in
Seoul or when you go up to the Demilitarized Zone, you
understand how fragile that region is and how vulnerable it is
on security issues. Clearly, our policy of a denuclearized
peninsula is critically important to the security of the
Republic of Korea and is critically important to regional
security.
I also recognize that we cannot do this alone, that we have
to work with China, we have to work with Japan, we have to work
with other countries in the region if we are going to be
successful. Proliferation is not the only concern we have in
regards to North Korea--their involvement in cyber attacks
obviously, is a major threat to our interests and one that we
need to deal with.
I could not end my comments without talking about the human
rights problems in North Korea. These abuses include large-
scale executions, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment,
rape, forced abortions, and sexual violence. North Korea
operates a series of secretive prison camps where perceived
opponents of the government are sent to face torture and abuse,
starvation, and forced labor. Fear of collective punishment is
used to silence dissent. There is no independent media,
functioning civil societies, or religious freedom.
So, whatever one's views are on the various U.S. policy
efforts in the past two decades, what has worked and what has
not worked, and why, there can be little question that these
efforts have failed to end North Korea's nuclear or missile
programs, failed to reduce threat posed by North Korea to our
allies, failed to alleviate the suffering of the North Korean
people, and have failed to lead to greater security in the
region. Certainly, there are no easy answers when it comes to
how to be successful when dealing with a regime like North
Korea. But, I am hopeful that today's hearing and the
conversations we have today may help us to get to a place
where, 20 years from now, we can look back at successfully
having ended North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, having
addressed the needs of the North Korean people, and having
built greater stability and security on the Peninsula
throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Our first witness is the Honorable Sung Kim, Special
Representative for North Korea Policy and Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Korea and Japan at the State Department.
Thank you so much for being here, sir.
Our second witness is the Honorable Robert King, Special
Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues at the Department of
State.
Thank you, sir.
I think you understand, if you would, please summarize your
comments in about 5 minutes. Without objection, your written
comments will be entered into the record. And we look forward
to the question period.
Thank you both very much. And if you would begin, Mr. Kim.
STATEMENT OF HON. SUNG KIM, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NORTH
KOREA POLICY AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR KOREA AND
JAPAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Kim. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the
committee, thank you very much for inviting me today, along
with my good colleague, Ambassador King, to testify about North
Korea. We appreciate the interest and attention you have given
to this critical challenge.
This year, as we mark 70 years since the end of World War
II and celebrate the tremendous progress the Asia-Pacific
region has seen over the past seven decades, we are reminded
how sadly different the last 70 years have been for the people
of North Korea. North Koreans continue to suffer under a
government that makes choices contrary to their interests,
choices that pose a threat to North Korea's neighbors and the
international community.
The DPRK continues to violate its commitments and
international obligations, and continues to pursue nuclear
weapons and their means of delivery as a strategic national
priority, all at the cost of the well-being of its own people
and while perpetrating horrific human rights abuses against
them.
Holding North Korea responsible for its own choices does
not mean just waiting and hoping the regime will one day come
to its senses. We are committed to using the full range of
tools--deterrence, diplomacy, and pressure--to make clear that
North Korea will not achieve security or prosperity while it
continues to pursue nuclear weapons, abuses its own people, and
flouts its long-standing obligations and commitments. North
Korea's bad behavior has earned no benefits from the United
States. Instead, we have tightened sanctions and consistently
underscored to the DPRK that the path to a brighter future for
North Korea begins with authentic and credible negotiations
that produce concrete denuclearization steps.
Part of our effort to change North Korea's strategic
calculus means leaving no doubt that the United States stands
ready to defend our interests and our allies from the North
Korean threat and have made it a priority to strengthen and
modernize our alliances for the 21st century. In this, we could
have no better partners than our allies and friends in Seoul
and Tokyo. Just last week, President Obama and President Park
Guen-hye again reaffirmed this commitment.
As we maintain the strongest possible deterrence
capabilities, we have also increased the cost to the DPRK of
its destructive policy choices by applying sustained pressure
on the regime, both multilaterally and unilaterally. In
January, the President issued a new Executive order giving us
important, powerful, broad new sanctions tools. And, from the
day it was introduced, we used this Executive order to sanction
wrongdoings in the DPRK regime, and we will continue to use
this new tool along with our other sanctions authorities.
Our financial sanctions are always most effective when
supported by our partners. And so, we have also focused on
strengthening multilateral sanctions against North Korea. Last
year, we led efforts at the United Nations to sanction North
Korea's major shipping firm, and we have stepped up
coordination with the partners to ensure the sanctions was
enforced. Since then, these designated foreign ships have
denied port entry, scrapped, impounded, and all confined to
their home ports in North Korea. And the shipping firm has lost
its contracts with many foreign-owned ships. We will continue
to press for robust implementation of U.N. sanctions and
enhanced vigilance against the DPRK's proliferation activities
worldwide.
Equally important is North Korea's political isolation,
driven by the overwhelming international consensus that North
Korea cannot fully participate in the international community
until it abides by its obligations and commitments. We have
built and maintained that consensus through our active and
principled diplomacy.
That diplomacy, of course, begins with our partners in the
six-party talks--South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Our
coordination ensures that wherever Pyongyang turns, it hears a
strong, unwavering message that it must give up its--it must
live up to its obligations and that the path to a brighter
future begins with credible negotiations and concrete
denuclearization steps.
That principled stance also undergirds the attempts each of
the five parties has made to engage North Korea directly. When
we offer to meet directly with the North Koreans during my
travel to the region, when South Korea strives to improve
inter-Korean relations, when Japan seeks an accounting of its
abducted citizens, and even in China and Russia's dealings with
the North, all five parties have consistently underscored the
imperative of denuclearization, and together we continue to
call on North Korea to refrain from actions that would raise
tensions in the region or threaten international peace and
security. We also have made clear, at the same time, to
Pyongyang that the path of engagement in credible negotiations
remains open.
Ambassador King will brief you on one other very important
piece of our active diplomacy in North Korea, our work to
amplify victims' voices, to sustain the international
community's attention on the suffering of the North Korean
people, and to hold the regime to account for its abuses.
Mr. Chairman, sending a strong, clear message holding North
Korea accountable for its commitments and obligations requires
a sustained and international effort. We and our partners are
engaged in that effort every day through our active deterrence,
pressure, and diplomacy.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kim follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sung Kim
introduction
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me today, along with my colleague
Ambassador Bob King, to testify about North Korea. We appreciate the
interest and attention you have given to this critical challenge.
dprk behavior
This year, as we mark 70 years since the end of World War II and
celebrate the tremendous progress the Asia-Pacific region has seen over
the past seven decades, we are reminded how sadly different the last 70
years have been for the people of North Korea. North Koreans continue
to suffer under a government that makes choices contrary to their
interests--choices that pose a threat to North Korea's neighbors and
the international community.
The DPRK continues to violate its commitments and international
obligations, and continues to pursue nuclear weapons and their means of
delivery as a strategic national priority--all at the cost of the well-
being of its own people and while perpetrating horrific human rights
abuses against them.
u.s. policy
Holding North Korea responsible for its own choices does not mean
just waiting and hoping the regime will one day come to its senses. We
are committed to using the full range of tools--deterrence, diplomacy,
and pressure--to make clear that North Korea will not achieve security
or prosperity while it pursues nuclear weapons, abuses its own people,
and flouts its long-standing obligations and commitments.
North Korea's bad behavior has earned no benefits from the United
States. Instead, we have tightened sanctions and consistently
underscored to the DPRK that the path to a brighter future for North
Korea begins with authentic and credible negotiations that produce
concrete denuclearization steps.
deterrence
Part of our effort to change North Korea's strategic calculus means
leaving no doubt that the United States stands ready to defend our
interests and our allies from the North Korean threat and have made it
a priority to strengthen and modernize our alliances for the 21st
century. In this, we could have no better partners than our allies and
friends in Seoul and Tokyo.
pressure
As we maintain the strongest possible deterrence capabilities, we
have also increased the costs to the DPRK of its destructive policy
choices by applying sustained pressure on the regime, both
multilaterally and unilaterally.
In January the President issued a new Executive order giving us
important, powerful, broad new sanctions tools. From the day it was
introduced, we began using this Executive order to sanction wrongdoers
in the DPRK regime. And we will continue to use this new tool, along
with our other sanctions authorities. In July the Treasury Department
announced new sanctions and updated our listings for previous North
Korean sanctions targets to make it harder for them to hide behind
aliases and front companies.
Our financial sanctions are always more effective when supported by
our partners, and so we have also focused on strengthening multilateral
sanctions against North Korea. Last year, we led efforts at the U.N. to
sanction North Korea's major global shipping firm, and we have stepped
up coordination with partners to ensure the sanction was enforced.
Since then, this designated firm's ships have been denied port entry,
scrapped, impounded, or confined to their home ports in North Korea,
and the shipping firm has lost its contracts with many foreign-owned
ships. This means the DPRK pays a real cost for its maritime
proliferation.
We will continue to press for robust implementation of U.N.
sanctions and enhanced vigilance against the DPRK's proliferation
activities worldwide.
diplomacy
Equally important is North Korea's political isolation, driven by
the overwhelming international consensus that North Korea cannot fully
participate in the international community until it abides by its
obligations and commitments. We have built and maintained that
consensus through our active, principled diplomacy.
That diplomacy begins with our partners in the six-party talks:
South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Our coordination ensures that
wherever Pyongyang turns, it hears a strong, unwavering message that it
must live up to its international obligations, and that the path to a
brighter future begins with credible negotiations and concrete
denuclearization steps.
That principled stance also undergirds the attempts each of the
Five Parties has made to engage North Korea directly: When we offer to
meet directly with the North Koreans during my travel to the region . .
. when South Korean President Park strives to improve inter-Korean
relations . . . when Japan seeks an accounting of its abducted citizens
. . . and even in China and Russia's dealings with the North--all Five
Parties have consistently underscored the imperative of
denuclearization. And, together, we continue to call on North Korea to
refrain from any actions that would raise tensions in the region or
threaten international peace and security.
We also have made clear to North Korea that the path of engagement
and credible negotiations remains open.
human rights
Ambassador King will brief you on one other piece of our active
diplomacy on North Korea: our work to amplify victim's voices, to
sustain the international community's attention on the suffering of the
North Korean people, and to hold the regime to account for its abuses.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, sending a strong, clear message holding North Korea
accountable to its commitments and international obligations requires a
sustained, international effort. We and our partners are engaged in
that effort every day through our active deterrence, pressure, and
diplomacy.
I thank the committee for the opportunity to appear today. I am
happy to answer your questions.
The Chairman. Mr. King.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT R. KING, SPECIAL ENVOY FOR NORTH
KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador King. Thank you, Chairman Corker, members of the
committee. I appreciate the invitation to testify on U.S.
policy on human rights in North Korea with my colleague,
Ambassador Sung Kim. This is an issue on which there is broad
consensus, bipartisan agreement. Both Congress and the
administration are united in our efforts to press North Korea
to improve its deplorable human rights record.
The DPRK remains a totalitarian state, denies freedoms of
expression, religion, peaceful assembly, association, and
movement, as well as worker rights. Tens of thousands of North
Koreans endure deplorable conditions in political prison camps,
where government officials commit systematic and widespread
human rights violations, including extrajudicial killing,
forced labor, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, rape,
forced abortion, and other sexual violence.
Mr. Chairman, since the release of the report of the United
Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea in
February of 2014, we have made significant progress in our
efforts to focus international attention and pressure on North
Korea. The U.N. Commission of Inquiry report concluded that,
``Systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations
have been, and are being, committed by North Korea and its
officials.'' The report found a number of long-standing and
ongoing patterns of systematic and widespread violations which
meet the high threshold required for proof of ``crimes against
humanity in international law.''
One of the most powerful elements of the report were the
detailed testimony of North Korean refugees sharing firsthand
accounts of abuse and violence that they suffered in their
horrific experience in fleeing their homeland. This report was
considered by the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva. A year
ago September, during the high-level session of the General
Assembly, Secretary Kerry hosted a meeting on this issue with
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Foreign
Ministers of South Korea, Japan, Australia, and other
countries. And last fall, the U.N. General Assembly considered
a resolution which welcomed the Commission of Inquiry report,
criticized North Korea, and referred the report to the Security
Council, urging the Council to consider holding to account
those North Korean officials responsible for human rights
violations, including through consideration of referral to the
appropriate international criminal justice mechanism.
In December last year, the Security Council held a serious
3-hour discussion of North Korea's human rights, and placed the
issue on the Council's agenda. At the recommendation of the
Human Rights Council, the High Commissioner for Human Rights
has established a field office to strengthen monitoring and
documentation of human rights in the DPRK and to support the
work of the Special Rapporteur on North Korea Human Rights. At
the request of the High Commissioner's Office, South Korea has
agreed to host this field office, and the office was officially
opened in June.
In all of these activities over the past year and a half,
the United States has played a leading role in gathering
support and in putting pressure on North Korea. As I have
participated in these activities at various U.N. bodies, two
things have struck me. First, North Korea is feeling
international pressure for its human rights abuses. North
Korean rhetoric decrying what it calls ``the human rights
racket'' has become more frequent and more strident. After the
Commission of Inquiry report was released, the North Koreans
condemned the Commission and issued its own fictitious reports
on human rights in the United States and South Korea. The North
sent its Foreign Minister to the high-level session of the U.N.
General Assembly in September 2014, the first time in 15 years
that the North Korean Foreign Minister attended that session.
He was there again this fall. I think this very clearly
indicates the North Koreans are feeling the pressure, they are
uncomfortable, and they are trying to push back.
Second, with a growing number of countries condemning North
Korea's human rights violations, the DPRK has few supporters
left. The vote for the General Assembly resolution critical of
the North and endorsing the Commission of Inquiry report was
adopted by a vote of 116 countries in favor, 20 opposed, with
53 abstentions. Only a handful of countries supported the DPRK,
and those countries were the Who's Who of the world's worst
human rights violators.
As I look back over what has taken place over the past year
to focus attention on human rights abuses in North Korea, I am
reminded of the statement of Commission of Inquiry chair,
Michael Kirby, when he presented the Commission report, ``With
the body of evidence detailing North Korean human rights
atrocities that is now available, no country can honestly say,
'We did not know.'''
Mr. Chairman, I would like to add a couple of words about
another critical issue related to human rights in North Korea.
In the North--our effort to increase access to information to
the DPRK is one of the most important things that we are doing.
In the North, it is illegal to own a radio that can be tuned.
The only radio or television sets that are legal are those that
are preset to state-controlled information channels. Despite
this obstacle, the latest Broadcasting Board of Governors study
of North Korean refugees and travelers found that 30 percent of
North Koreans listen to foreign radio broadcasts inside North
Korea. Foreign entertainment videos are watched by far larger
numbers; 90 percent have seen South Korean dramas--soap
operas--inside North Korea. According to published reports,
over 2 million cell phones now permit North Koreans to
communicate with each other on a domestic network. The system
does not permit international telephone calls, but those cell
phones do allow people to communicate quickly within the
country.
Given the closed nature of North Korean society, radio
remains the most important effective means of sharing
information from the outside world with the residents of North
Korea. The United States is a strong supporter of independent
broadcasting to North Korea. Thank you for the congressional
support for Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, and other
independent broadcasters. These efforts are vital in breaking
down the information barriers that the government has placed on
its own people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear
today.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador King follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Robert King
Chairman Corker, Senator Cardin, and members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me to testify today on U.S. policy on human
rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). This is an
issue on which there is broad bipartisan agreement, and both Congress
and the administration are united in our effort to press North Korea to
improve its deplorable human rights record.
Today, the DPRK remains a totalitarian state, which seeks to
dominate all aspects of its citizens' lives. It is a regime that denies
freedoms of expression, religion, peaceful assembly, association, and
movement, as well as worker rights. Numbers of North Koreas endure
deplorable conditions in political prison camps, where government
officials commit systematic and widespread human rights violations
including extrajudicial killing, enslavement, torture, prolonged
arbitrary detention, as well as those involving rape, forced abortions,
and other sexual violence.
Mr. Chairman, since the release of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry
report in February 2014, we have made significant progress in our
effort to increase international pressure on the DPRK. Our DPRK human
rights policy has focused on giving voice to the voiceless by
amplifying defector testimony, and increasing pressure on the DPRK to
stop these serious violations. And we are committed to seeking ways to
advance accountability for those most responsible.
calling attention to the rights abuses
In February 2014, upon completing a year-long investigation, the
U.N. Commission of Inquiry issued a final report, concluding that
``systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations'' have been
and are being committed by the DPRK, its institutions, and its
officials. The report further concluded ``a number of long-standing and
ongoing patterns of systematic and widespread violations . . . meet the
high threshold required for proof of crimes against humanity in
international law.'' The Commission's comprehensive 400-page report is
the most detailed and devastating expose of North Korea's human rights
violations to date, and it laid bare a brutal reality that is
difficult, if not impossible, to imagine.
One of the most powerful elements of the extensive report was the
detailed testimony of North Korean refugees. The Commission held a
series of public hearings in Seoul, Tokyo, London, and Washington,
where it heard from North Korean refugees sharing firsthand accounts of
the abuse and violence they suffered, such as denial of access to food,
gender-based violence, and numerous other human rights violations in
the prison camps, and their horrific experiences fleeing their
homeland. The full proceedings of these hearings have been made
available on the U.N. Web site in video and in printed transcript.
Over the past year, we have sought to continue the Commission's
great work giving voice to the voiceless. Shortly after the U.N.
Commission of Inquiry's report was presented, the United States joined
Australia and France in convening the U.N. Security Council's first-
ever informal discussion of the human rights situation in North Korea.
Thirteen of the fifteen members of the Security Council attended that
informal discussion with members of the Commission of Inquiry and with
two North Korean refugees.
In September 2014, during the High-Level Session of the U.N.
General Assembly in New York, Secretary of State John Kerry hosted a
meeting on North Korea's human rights violations with the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Foreign Ministers of South
Korea, Japan, Australia and a number of other countries.
Most recently, our Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
Ambassador Samantha Power, hosted a U.N. event in April giving victims
of DPRK abuses the opportunity to detail their experiences. Nearly 300
individuals attended the event, including more than 20 North Korean
refugees, U.N. Permanent Representatives and diplomats, representatives
of nongovernmental organizations representatives, and members of the
press. Three North Korean officials attempted to disrupt the
proceedings by reading a statement during the defector testimony, which
led to a brief confrontation, before they were escorted from the
auditorium. The event was widely covered in the press.
We continue to meet with recent defectors on a regular basis and to
seek ways to continue amplifying their voices, as they speak on behalf
of the millions of North Koreans who are denied enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
monitoring and documentation
It is important that we listen to these refugee voices, not only to
increase our understanding of the ongoing human rights violations, but
also to record the violations committed by the regime, in order to hold
those perpetrators accountable for their abuses.
Since the release of the Commission of Inquiry report, we continue
to engage with civil society and the international community on future
accountability measures. One of the most important steps we have taken
to date is supporting the creation of a field office under the Office
of the High Commission for Human Rights to strengthen monitoring and
documentation of the human rights situation in the DPRK and to support
the work of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on DPRK human rights issues. At
the request of the High Commissioner's office, South Korea agreed to
host this field office. The office was formally opened in June when the
High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid was in Seoul. We welcome the
decision to open this office, which will play an important role in
maintaining visibility and encouraging action on human rights in the
DPRK.
We also continue our support to numerous nongovernmental
organizations who continue their tireless efforts to document the
ongoing human rights abuses in the DPRK.
increasing pressure
In addition to increasing our efforts to amplify refugee voices and
to document violations, we have been increasing pressure on the DPRK to
stop the serious human rights violations documented in the report. In
the immediate aftermath of the release of the Commission of Inquiry's
report, we worked with our like-minded partners to adopt a strongly
worded resolution at the March 2014 U.N. Human Rights Council session,
which welcomed the report and recommended that the General Assembly
submit the report to the Security Council for its consideration and
appropriate action in order that it consider holding to account those
responsible for human rights violations, including through
consideration of referral of the situation in the DPRK to the
appropriate international criminal justice mechanism. The United States
has since supported resolutions addressing the human rights situation
in the DPRK in both the U.N. General Assembly and at the March 2015
Human Rights Council session.
In December 2014, the U.N. Security Council formally discussed the
issue of DPRK human rights. In the procedural vote to place that issue
on the Security Council's agenda, 11 of the Council's 15 members voted
in favor of placing the item on the Seizure List, two voted no, and two
abstained. Since this was a procedural and not a substantive vote,
permanent members of the Security Council do not have a veto. China and
Russia voted against putting the issue on the Seizure List. The Council
had a serious, thoughtful 3-hour discussion of this issue. We continue
to work with other like-minded members of the Security Council with the
intention of continuing to raise North Korean violations and seeking
opportunities to take action.
Mr. Chairman, as I participated in these activities at various U.N.
bodies over the past year, two things have struck me.
First, it is clear that the DPRK is feeling growing international
pressure in response to its human rights violations. The mounting
criticism of its human rights record has had an effect on Pyongyang.
North Korean rhetoric decrying what it calls ``the human rights
racket'' has become more frequent and strident, and, of course, it
blames the United States. After the attention given the Commission of
Inquiry report, the North condemned the Commission and issued its own
so- called ``reports'' on human rights in the United States and in the
Republic of Korea. The North sent its Foreign Minister to the high
level session of the U.N. General Assembly in September 2014 for the
first time in 15 years, and he was back in New York again this fall.
Senior DPRK officials have dramatically increased the number of visits
to other U.N. member states to urge other countries to vote against
resolutions critical of the DPRK's human rights practices in the U.N.
General Assembly and Human Rights Council.
Second, with a growing number of countries condemning North Korea's
human rights violations, the DPRK has very few supporters left. At the
U.N. Human Rights Council sessions in Geneva and the General Assembly
and Security Council sessions in New York, only a handful of countries
supported the DPRK. Most of those that voted against the relevant
resolution on the DPRK did so because of general objections to country-
specific resolutions in those fora, not because they defend North
Korea's human rights record. And those countries that voted against the
resolutions critical of the DPRK were the ``Who's Who'' of the world's
worst human rights violators.
As I look back over what has taken place in the past year to focus
attention on the human rights record of North Korea, I am reminded of
Commission of Inquiry Chair Michael Kirby's statement when he presented
the Commission's report. With the body of evidence detailing North
Korean human rights violations, he said, no one can now say ``We did
not know.'' No country can honestly say that they did not know the
atrocities taking place in the DPRK.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to add a few words about another
critical issue related to human rights in North Korea--our effort to
increase access to information in the DPRK. When the Commission of
Inquiry presented its report to the U.N. Human Rights Council, it also
released a 20-minute documentary, highlighting particularly critical
testimony of North Korean defectors. Because North Korea is one of the
most closed societies on this planet--Internet access is reserved for a
very tiny elite and it is illegal to listen or watch foreign radio or
television broadcasts--ordinary North Koreans had no way to see the
documentary, let alone any independent news reports on the abuses
taking place inside their own country today.
While this information blockade makes it extremely difficult for
North Koreans to read the Commission's report or watch the video, we
have recently seen indications that information from the outside is
becoming more available in North Korea.
It is still illegal to own a radio that can be tuned, and the only
legal radio or television sets are those pre-set to state-controlled
information channels. Despite this obstacle, the latest Broadcasting
Board of Governors (BBG) study, a survey of North Korean refugees and
travelers who were interviewed outside of North Korea, found that:
As many as 29 percent of North Koreans had listened to
foreign radio broadcasts while inside the DPRK.
Foreign DVDs are now being seen by even larger numbers--
approximately 92 percent of those interviewed had seen South
Korean dramas (soap operas) while in North Korea.
According to open source reports, over 2 million cell phones
now permit North Koreans to communicate with each other on a
domestic network, though the system does not permit
international telephone calls. Those cell phones are closely
monitored, but they do allow information to circulate.
Given the closed nature of North Korean society, international
media are among the most effective means of sharing information about
the outside world with residents of the country. The United States is a
strong supporter of broadcasting independent information about North
Korea and the outside world into North Korea. Thank you for the
continuing congressional support for Radio Free Asia (RFA), Voice of
America (VOA), and other nongovernmental broadcasters. These efforts
are important in breaking down the information barriers that the DPRK
Government has imposed on its own people. Because of government
policies, radio remains the most important means to get information
into the DPRK.
Mr. Chairman, together with our partners in the international
community, we must make clear to the DPRK that its egregious human
rights violations prevent economic progress and weaken the country. The
United States has long made clear that we are open to improved
relations with North Korea if it is willing to take concrete actions to
live up to its international obligations and commitments, including
those relating to human rights.
The world will not, and cannot, close its eyes to what is happening
in North Korea. Ultimately, we will judge the North not by its words,
but by its actions. It needs to refrain from actions that threaten the
peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and comply with its
international obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions to
abandon nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, among other
things.
We have consistently told the DPRK that while the United States
remains open to meaningful engagement, North Korea must take concrete
steps to address the core concerns of the international community, from
the DPRK's nuclear program to its human rights violations.
North Korea will have to address its egregious human rights
violations. North Korea's choice is clear. Investment in its people,
respect for human rights, and concrete steps toward denuclearization
can lead to a path of peace, prosperity, and improved relations with
the international community, including the United States. Absent these
measures, North Korea will only continue to face increased isolation--
as well as pressure for meaningful human rights progress from the
international community.
The Chairman. Well, we thank you both for your service, and
appreciate you being here. And you are likely to hear some
frustration today--it is not directed at you individually--
because this issue has been around for a long time and, as I
mentioned in my opening comments, not much has changed, and we
have had different administrations focus on this. I know
Senator Gardner has some legislation that he hopes will focus
on this in a little bit different way.
But, let me start with you, Mr. Kim. Are we deluding
ourselves to think that denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula is even possible?
Ambassador Kim. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I completely share your frustration.
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Kim. As someone who has been working on Korean
Peninsula issues for some time, I share your concern and
frustration that we have not been able to make more concrete
progress.
If you look at what has happened on the nuclear issue, I
think it is easy to reach the conclusion that maybe this is
just an impossible reach. But, frankly, I do not think we have
the option of giving up. I think we have made very clear that
we will never accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, and
I think there is a very strong consensus view in the
international community that North Koreans must live up to
their obligations and commitments. And those obligations and
commitments are not just U.N. Security Council resolutions, but
North Korea itself made commitments, in the six-party process,
to abandon its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.
So, I think the task before us, as challenging as it is, is
to work with the international community to apply enough
pressure, but leaving the diplomatic options open, to persuade
North Korea--to lead North Korea to make some smart decisions
on the nuclear issue. I agree completely, Mr. Chairman, that it
will not be easy, but I also believe that we must continue to
try.
The Chairman. Can you even name some specific steps that
cause there to be a different outcome in North Korea than the
things that have been occurring for so long?
Ambassador Kim. Sir, I do think, over the past 2 or 3
years, our sanctions enforcement has improved. And that has
caused some pain in Pyongyang. I cannot get into too much
detail in this setting, but we do know that revenues from North
Korea's illicit activities overseas have gone down as a result
of stronger international enforcement of sanctions. And this
has to do with better enforcement of not just multilateral
sanctions, but better cooperation from our partners on
unilateral sanctions, as well. And so, that is got to be
putting some pressure on North Korea.
I think if you look at relations between China and North
Korea, while changes have not been dramatic, I think it is--we
can see that there--the relations have been strained, and
perhaps that will lead to Beijing applying some more meaningful
pressure on North Korea to lead them to make some strategic
decisions.
So, I think there are a number of factors that have changed
over a period of time, and I think there is--we obviously need
to continue to work on both increasing pressure but also
intensifying our diplomatic effort with our partners.
The Chairman. Mr. King just referred to a resolution at the
U.N. relative to the human rights abuses that are taking place
in North Korea, but China did not support that. Is that
correct?
Ambassador King. That is correct, yes.
The Chairman. So, I mean, I am sorry, I am not seeing much
of a change. I know that having visited--and I know Senator
Cardin mentioned having visited as well--South Korea, and China
and Japan, all in one trip. It does not appear to me that
China's focused on anything but stability and really does not
want to deal with the issue of North Korea on their border. So,
I am sorry, I am not seeing anything that looks like there has
been much change as recently as a vote--an easy vote, when you
have a country like North Korea that is abusing human beings
the way they are, and you have their neighbor, which will not
even support a resolution highlighting that--I am sorry, I just
do not see a change. You are not involved in China policy, but
I am not seeing any dynamics on the ground that are changing in
any way. If you could illuminate, I would be appreciative.
Ambassador Kim. Mr. Chairman, generally speaking, I agree
with you that we have not seen the kind of serious, concrete,
meaningful changes on the ground in Beijing that would lead us
to be optimistic. But, we have seen some evidence that Chinese
enforcement of sanctions--border patrols, control of export of
dual-use items--have improved. We have also seen that flow of
Chinese assistance to North Korea has not increased any in
recent years.
I think we need to continue to remind China that it hurts
their own interests when they let North Koreans misbehave and
take provocative actions in violation of existing obligations
and commitments. China cares, as you have mentioned, deeply
about stability. Well, at some point, North Korea's
irresponsible behavior will undermine China's desire for
stability. And I think we need to constantly remind them of
that.
As you know, when President Xi Jinping was here a few weeks
ago, he made very clearly publicly that China remains fully
committed to the common goal of denuclearization and that they
would oppose any actions by the North Koreans in violation of
Security Council resolutions. And I think we need to hold them
to that public commitment.
The Chairman. Did the administration bring up with
President Park when she was here the issue of putting THAAD
missile defense system there on the Peninsula? I know they have
been resistant to that. Was that part of the discussion?
Ambassador Kim. Sir, the THAAD issue was not specifically
addressed, as far as I know, but obviously, in the context of
maintaining the strongest possible deterrence capabilities on
the peninsula, the need to improve our missile defenses has
been discussed with the South Koreans, and I think we will
continue to explore how best we can defend ourselves.
The Chairman. Well, it does not appear they are very
receptive to something that would work and certainly protect
their interests and ours. So, I am surprised that we had a
meeting with President Park and that issue did not come up at
the highest level. So, again, it just feels like, to me, we are
easing along the same place we have been for a long, long time.
I am not criticizing you in any way. I see no change. I see no
hope for dealing with this issue. And I do look forward to
additional discussions regarding what Congress might do to push
this along, although the options are fairly limited.
If I could, Mr. King--I have just got a moment--I think the
one issue that gets under their skin is the issue of human
rights. And I thank you for the way that you have highlighted
that. And it is really pretty amazing what they are doing to
their own people. And, while this may be highlighted to a
degree, what would you suggest that we might do here to even
more fully highlight the incredible abuses that they are
wreaking upon the people of their country?
Ambassador King. As you know, Senator, I have a job because
the Congress insisted that there be a position.
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador King. And that continues. The administration is
committed and dedicated to moving forward on--pressing the
human rights issue.
As I mentioned, information is one of the most important
things. Continued support for Radio Free Asia, Voice of
America, is extremely important, in terms of breaking down the
information monopoly in North Korea. We need to continue our
efforts, in terms of pressing North Korea, which we have done
very effectively through the United Nations. And I am not sure
that there is something new that is needed, but we need to
continue that effort, we need to continue that pressure. And
the North Koreans are feeling uncomfortable. We need to make
them feel more uncomfortable, and we will continue to do that.
Thank you for the support that the Congress has given on the
human rights issue.
The Chairman. And I hope at some point--my time is up--but
I hope at some point someone will ask you the question, or you
will slip in the answer regardless of whether they do or not,
relative to what we are doing. They are using forced labor,
sending out forced labor around the world. Unanimously, this
committee passed a modern slavery bill to address the fact that
there are 27 million people around the world today enslaved.
Obviously, North Korea is doing that today, sending people out
around the world. I hope at some point you will highlight that.
Thank you both.
And I will turn to the ranking member.
Senator Cardin. Well, let me join the chairman in thanking
both of you not only for being here but for the public service
that you both provide.
I want to follow up on the human rights issue. Obviously,
the primary focus on North Korea is going to be its nuclear
program. There are those who believe that North Korea has
developed a nuclear program so that we cannot use other tools
in our toolbox to get them to change their behavior, due to our
fear that they could utilize a nuclear response. And that is a
genuine concern. So, a denuclearized Korean Peninsula is
absolutely essential, and we must do everything we can to make
that a reality.
But, I want to get to the human rights issues. I do not
know that there is another country in the world that is worse
to its people than North Korea. And that is not a great honor
to have. Mr. King, in your testimony you have been very clear
about the world condemnation of North Korea in international
bodies. There is no question about that. But, despite all of
the world condemnation of what North Korea does to its own
citizens, it continues to do that. And, yes, information can
make a difference. And the means of communications have
changed. So, North Korea will open up, people will get
information. But, with the regime's oppression, people are
afraid to even talk among themselves about what is going on in
North Korea, due to the fear that someone will inform the
government, and they will be arrested, be sent to camps, and be
tortured, and their families will be tortured.
So, I am looking for new ideas. What can the United States
do, working with the international community on behalf of the
people of North Korea, to protect the citizens of North Korea?
What new ideas can we explore?
Ambassador King. Thank you very much for your interest in
the human rights questions. You always ask the tough questions.
No easy answers, no silver bullets. Part of what we need to
do--and, in some ways, the most difficult thing to do--is
persist. We are looking for a quick solution. We want an answer
before the next news cycle. And, unfortunately, with North
Korea, it is going to take us longer. We are beginning to have
an effect in North Korea. There is more information available
in North Korea than there has been in the past. The fact that
90 percent of North Koreans have seen these South Korean soap
operas--they are great soap operas. I am not a particular fan
of soap operas. But, the one thing that is interesting, as in
the 1950s, when American movies and American television was
first shown in the Soviet Union, people were interested in the
plot, but they were really interested in what the kitchen
looked like. And the same kind of information is now affecting
people in North Korea. People in North Korea know a lot more
now about what South Korea is like. People know a lot more now
about what is going on in the world, because people are
listening to information. It is difficult. It is not easy.
When we look back over where we have had progress, in terms
of dealing with similar kinds of issues--in Central Europe, in
the 1950s and 1960s and 1970s, and suddenly in the 1980s there
was change--we need to continue to persist in what we are
doing, and continue to press the North Koreans.
We are looking at options, in terms of information, but,
unfortunately, in spite of the fact that the rest of the world
is using the Internet, it is virtually nonexistent in North
Korea. The best source of information in North Korea is radio.
And that is how information comes in. It continues to be a most
important element. People have cell phones, but, unlike in
Iran, where people can use their cell phones to access the rest
of the world--there are radio programs where people will call
in from Iran on their cell phones to make comments on a radio
broadcast that is being produced in the United States--in North
Korea, that does not happen. People do not have access to the
Internet, they do not have access to international phone lines.
We need to continue what we are doing. We need to persist
in what we are doing. We need to continue what we have been
doing in the United Nations to raise this issue and raise the
profile of the issue. And I think eventually we will succeed.
But, it is persistence more than new ideas, I think, that are
going to bring about change.
Senator Cardin. Well, I thank you for your commitment
there.
Secretary Kim, it seems to me, to get a change in behavior
in North Korea, it is going to require greater support from
China. China could bring about change in North Korea. There is
a question as to whether they really want to, or not. Having
North Korea as a buffer on the peninsula protects against
Western influence, and therefore some believe that it is not
unhealthy for China to maintain a North Korea presence on the
peninsula--as there is today.
What can we do in our relationship with China to get them
more engaged on denuclearizing North Korea as well as dealing
with the welfare of the people of North Korea? Mr. King
mentioned their challenge to get information. One of the things
we could do is work with China to find ways to open up North
Korea to a little more modern way of communication so that we
can get information to them. In China, people have access to
information. Admittedly, the government censors it and it is
not complete and they have their own propaganda, but at least
the people of China do get access, at least limited access,
much more than the people of North Korea.
So, what we can do in our relationship with China to start
a transformation process in North Korea?
Ambassador Kim. Thank you very much, Senator.
We can do a lot more. More importantly, I think the Chinese
can do a lot more. I mean, it is clear that the Chinese have a
considerable amount of leverage on North Korea. And we are just
not seeing that they are exercising that leverage effectively.
And this is related to the chairman's question earlier, as
well.
I think this notion that North Korea serves as a useful
buffer for China is badly outdated. And I certainly hope that
leaders in Beijing are not subscribing to that notion anymore.
In fact, if you look at the development of Beijing's----
Senator Cardin. Then why are they not more aggressive in
North Korea?
Ambassador Kim. Well, I mean, I think they are, as you
mentioned, constantly concerned about stability, and they are
worried that if they push too hard, too fast, that they will
face instability along their borders.
But, I was going to say that--I mean, I think if you look
at how Beijing's relations with Seoul has evolved and improved,
it is easy to see that the future of China's relations on the
Peninsula is with the Republic of Korea, not with North Korea.
And I think we need to remind China that China's constant
defense of North Korean misbehavior will hurt China's own
interests, and it will undermine China's pursuit of strong
relations with South Korea, with which it has a very robust
trade relationship, economic relationship, people-to-people
ties. It is growing every day. So, I think we need to
constantly remind the Chinese that, first of all, they need to
use their considerable leverage more effectively. They have a
responsibility, as the chair of the six-party process, to find
some way back to credible and authentic negotiations on the
nuclear issue. They have that responsibility.
Senator, with regards to your question about working with
the Chinese on facilitating information flow--and I think this
is something that we should explore. I mean, I am not
optimistic that they will be very forthcoming about it, but it
is certainly worth considering.
Senator Cardin. Well, I will just point out that we are
pursuing a cyber policy with China and we are trying to get a
level playing field there, consistent with our objectives.
Seems to me we may have a chance in regards to the ability of
people to understand what is happening in the world and could
make progress in North Korea.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to pick up where Senator Cardin left off, in
terms of China. Mr. King, you said that China does not want to
use North Korea as a useful buffer. But, then you said they are
concerned about instability along their border. Is it your
view, is it the administration's view, that if they pressed
North Korea to denuclearize, to open up their society, that it
would create a refugee flow out of North Korea into China?
Ambassador Kim. No, sir, I do not necessarily agree with
that perspective. I was just relaying what I understood to be
China's concerns.
Senator Johnson. Okay, I do not understand it. Why does
China continue to support this regime? What is in it for China?
I mean, if North Korea is not that buffer against the West,
then why would they continue to do this? It does not seem like
it is particularly stable to me. A nuclearized North Korea with
ballistic missile technology, firing these things over their
neighbors' heads seems pretty unstable. So, what is in it for
China? I am really trying to understand that.
Ambassador Kim. Well, China has a long-standing special
relationship with North Korea. And our sense is that Beijing is
simply not ready to give up on--or abandon that relationship.
But, I agree completely with you that the actions that the
North Koreans are taking are destabilizing for China's own
interests. And if China really strives to be a leading nation
in the international community, I think they would want a
neighborhood that is stable and peaceful.
Senator Johnson. But, I am looking for a rational
explanation of why China would continue to support North Korea.
Considering every action I have looked at shows that North
Korea just destabilizes the region.
You know, Mr. King, maybe you can answer that for me or
provide some measure of rationale for this.
Ambassador King. I do not have any insights. It is very
clear that the Chinese have been pushing the North Koreans in a
more positive direction. But, I think North Korea is not an
easy ally to deal with. And my guess is, North Koreans are not
being terribly cooperative----
Senator Johnson. Does China fear North Korea because they
have nuclear weapons, by any chance?
Mr. Kim.
Ambassador Kim. I would--may I--I am obviously not speaking
on behalf of the Chinese Government, but my sense is that they
have reached the conclusion that in order to make some positive
changes in North Korea it will require enormous pressure. And I
think their concern is that enormous pressure on Pyongyang, on
the regime, will lead to instability. And I believe that is----
Senator Johnson. So, define ``instability.'' I understand
the word, but define it. What would become less stable than it
currently is? In other words, are they willing to, basically,
put up with North Korea because they repress their population
to the point that the people will stay in North Korea and then
China does not have worry about a refugee flow from North
Korea?
Ambassador Kim. Sir, I mean, again, I am at--you know, I do
not want to be a spokesperson for other Chinese Government----
Senator Johnson. No, I understand. I am just asking for
your theory----
Ambassador Kim. Well----
Senator Johnson [continuing]. Of the case.
Ambassador Kim. Yes. My understanding is that the Chinese
are worried that if there is too much pressure, too fast, on
the regime in Pyongyang, that it will lead to instability in
Pyongyang that spreads over throughout the country, and that
there will, in fact, be refugee flows into China. I believe
that is one of their concerns.
Senator Johnson. Let us talk about sanctions. Mr. King said
that information is key. And I agree with him. Earlier, when
you were answering questions from our chairman, you said that
you cannot describe some of these sanctions in this setting. I
just want to ask, first of all, why?
First, let me ask about the history of sanctions. News
reports and analysis from the Bush administration showed that
the United States sanctioning of individuals, seemed to be
working pretty well. And then, those were relaxed and obviously
did not really affect North Korea's behavior past that point.
Can you just give me a sense of what sanctions have worked,
what has the history been, where are we now versus where we
were during the Bush administration? And the final question is:
What is classified about that? What is sensitive about that? If
we wanted to get information out there, I would think an overt
policy, an overt strategy of sanctioning North Korea, would be
something we would want to publicize.
Ambassador Kim. Senator, I would--maybe I was not clear
enough earlier. I was not suggesting that I could not talk
about sanctions in general. I was suggesting that some of the
specific effects we have had with certain sanctions involves
classified information and, therefore, I could not get into
those.
Senator Johnson. Okay.
But not--okay. So, give me the history of sanctions. What
have we found that has worked? Again, analysis I have read in
open source news showed that when we were sanctioning
individual North Korean leaders, that was effective. And then
we relaxed those sanctions. Is there reluctance to put those
back in place? What is happening?
Ambassador Kim. Well, first, North Korea remains one of the
most heavily sanctioned countries anywhere. We have North
Korea-specific Executive orders that give us a lot authority to
designate North Korean entities--personnel, officials, and
entities that support the regime. We also have general
Executive orders--topic-based nonproliferation Executive orders
that we can apply to the North Korea context. Obviously, export
controls are another way that we control--try to sanction North
Korea.
I believe, Senator, you are referring to the Banco Delta
Asia----
Senator Johnson. Correct.
Ambassador Kim [continuing]. Sanctions that were in place
during the Bush administration. I agree with you, that had a
very effective role--that played an effective role. But, again,
I mean, I should probably defer to my colleagues in the
Treasury Department, but the difficulty of replicating
financial sanctions like that is that, because we were so
successful, the North Koreans are basically operating outside
of the international financial system. Therefore, it is very
difficult to come up with similar sanctions targeting banks
that have dealings with North Korea, because North Korean are
basically operating outside of the international banking----
Senator Johnson. Okay.
Ambassador Kim [continuing]. System. But, I agree with you,
I think we need to continue to explore all possible
opportunities to strengthen our sanctions regime against North
Korea, both in terms of coming out with new unilateral
sanctions, but also making sure that our partners in the
international community are cooperating better in enforcing
Security Council resolution sanctions.
Senator Johnson. So, bottom line, they learned from those,
and they have circumvented those types of sanctions so they are
not as effective anymore.
In your testimony, you said that North Korea continues to
violate its commitments and international obligations. With the
few seconds we have remaining, can you specifically tell us
what are the commitments and international obligations that
they are violating?
Ambassador Kim. Well, sir, I mean, multiple Security
Council resolutions call for North Korea to abandon its nuclear
ambitions--programs, also calls on North Korea to stop using
ballistic missile technology. So, every time North Koreans take
an action, whether it is a nuclear test or, frankly, even
continued pursuit of their nuclear ambitions, it is a violation
of Security Council resolutions. In their own commitment to the
six-party process and the joint statement of 2005, they agreed
to abandon their existing nuclear programs and nuclear weapons
programs. So, clearly they are not living up to their
obligations and commitments.
Senator Johnson. Okay, thank you. I just wanted that on the
record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
It sounds like that China would rather a country of 25
million people be tortured, raped, imprisoned, beat down on
their border than doing anything about it.
Senator Johnson. And apparently they view that as ``stable
situation.''
The Chairman. That is right.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me, first, say, Ambassador Kim, I really appreciate the
service you gave to our country, and continue to do,
particularly the time that you were Ambassador to South Korea.
I think you did an extraordinary job in advancing our
interests, and I want to salute you, as well as Mr. King, who
has for many years worked on the question of human rights with
the incredible Tom Lantos in the House of Representatives,
where we had opportunities to work together. And I must say, I
do not know what you are drinking or eating, but nothing has
changed about you, so, Bob, I will tell you, it is pretty good.
I am glad that the committee remains vigilant with respect
to the threat that North Korea presents to our national
security interests and the security interests of our friends
and allies, whether that threat is conventional, nuclear, or
cyber. And that is exactly what I had in mind when I introduced
bipartisan legislation with several of my Democratic and
Republican colleagues, the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act of 2015 last session and again this session
when Congress failed to take steps on it. And I believed then,
and I believe now, in two guiding principles:
First, that effective deterrence needs leadership. Nuclear
and missile tests, cyber attacks, highlight the continuing
threat that North Korea poses to the United States and our
friends and allies in the region. We need to see more action to
energize a strategy, decisive U.S. leadership, and a broad
international coalition to keep pressure on the regime.
And second, it seems to me that the United States needs
strategic focus, not strategic patience. A strategic approach
to security and stability on the Korean Peninsula should
include effective sanctions, military countermeasures,
diplomatic pressure, the full range of American instruments of
power to keep the world focused on the threat that North Korea
presents.
That is why the 2015 North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act that I wrote expands the ability of the
administration to sanction property and seize funds of the
people or organizations that provide support to the regime. It
expands the ability of the administration to sanction support
for cyber attacks or cyber vandalism, and it enhances the
ability of humanitarian organizations to provide life-saving
assistance to reduce the suffering of the North Korean people.
So, I know several colleagues have joined us. We welcome
others to join us, as well. I shared our draft, before we
introduced it, with Senator Gardner, as the chairman of the
subcommittee, and I think that the legislation you have
introduced has a lot of similarities. I would look forward to,
hopefully, working with you in that regard.
And, Mr. Chairman, when the time comes to move or mark up a
piece of legislation, I certainly would like the consideration
of some of the elements that we will be pursuing, and hopefully
we can work with Senator Gardner to have a joint, unified,
powerful message to the North Koreans.
The Chairman. If I could, that would be our goal. And I
should have mentioned your efforts, also, in regards to
producing legislation to deal with this. And we thank you for
that.
Senator Menendez. No, problem.
Ambassador Kim, have you had an opportunity to look at the
two pieces of legislation that are being considered?
Ambassador Kim. Thank you very much, Senator.
First of all, I remember very well your visit to Seoul
while I was still serving as Ambassador, and it was a wonderful
visit.
We are continuing to look at the legislation that you
mentioned. I do not have any specific comments to make on the
two draft bills. But, we have--obviously appreciate the
attention you and Senator Gardner are giving to this very
important issue.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me just pursue, since we have
the--your expertise here, some of the--there is a lot of
similarity between our legislation, but there are some
differences. The major difference between the two bills comes--
is whether an administration will be required to impose
sanctions in certain cases or be left with discretionary
authority and a flexibility to do so. What considerations would
you urge us to be mindful of when we are addressing that issue?
Ambassador Kim. Sir, in general, I think, you know, it is
important to have some discretion, because I think the goal is
to maximize our effect. And sometimes maximizing that effect
means coordination diplomacy with our partners. And that can be
difficult to achieve if, in fact, there is absolutely no
discretion in how these measures are applied.
Senator Menendez. Legislation that I drafted permits some
discretion. And there is a reticence here, I must say, after
the Iran situation, on the question of what degree of
flexibility an administration will be given, understanding
that, whether it is this one or a future one, there are
concerns about that. So, that is one of the realities. But, I
understand that--the difficulty of the blunt instrument of
something that is automatic even when you do not want it to be
automatic, because you may be having a goal. So, it is finding
the right balance there.
Also, our legislation actually funds the efforts that we
want to do through 5 million of the Assets Forfeiture Funds to
enforce sanctions as well as applying fines and penalties
derived from sanctions enforcement for enforcing the North
Korea Human Rights Act, which I think is important.
Ambassador King, let me ask you, humanitarian exceptions or
hard lines for those who suffer? The two versions differ
substantially on the exceptions it would provide; in the case
of my bill, carving out strong protections from sanctions for
humanitarian organizations that provide important lifesaving
aid to civilian populations facing humanitarian crisises.
President Reagan reminded us that a hungry child knows no
politics. Do we want to encourage humanitarian organizations to
continue to do this work? Are these organizations effective in
the North Korea context?
Ambassador King. One of the things that is involved, in
terms of humanitarian exceptions, we have had that,
traditionally, in most programs that have been adopted, have
been enacted into law--there is benefit, in terms of being able
to do that, because providing humanitarian assistance, as
President Reagan says, is something that we should be able to
do. At the same time, when we provide humanitarian aid, we have
to take into consideration the amount of money that is
available overall. And we also have to take into account our
ability to monitor the delivery of the aid to make sure it is
reaching those that are most in need. And, to the extent that
we are able to take those factors into consideration, I think
there is benefit to an exception. I think it is also
important--and certainly that was the case when we, at one
point, were talking about North Korea and humanitarian
assistance--that we keep the Congress fully informed of what is
going on, what our intentions are, and what our progress is, in
terms of dealing with those issues.
In terms of private humanitarian groups, I think that is
something we ought to encourage. There are a number of American
organizations that are currently involved in providing some
assistance to North Korea. This is done with private funds that
they have raised on their own. They provide a nice counterpoint
to what the official North Korean propaganda is saying when
Americans are providing assistance for multi-drug-resistant
tuberculosis or when they are providing medical equipment that
would not otherwise be available, I think it is helpful and
important. And we have tried to be helpful to organizations
that are providing that kind of aid.
Senator Menendez. One final quick question. Ambassador Kim,
it is a little off topic, but it is about the topic, in the end
of the day. President Park, I see she is in China, Russia. What
does--what is that all about, from your perspective? And how
should we see that, in light of the efforts that we are
making--trying to make as it relates to North Korea and the
security of the Korean Peninsula?
Ambassador Kim. Thank you, Senator.
I think, first, it is important to remember that, for the
Republic of Korean Government leadership and its people, the
U.S.-ROK alliance is fundamental and is the foundation for all
of their international relations. And I think we should view
her efforts with China and Russia in that context.
Starting with the need for Chinese cooperation on the
challenge posed by North Korea, I think there are many reasons
why South Korea wants to improve relations with China. And we
are not troubled by it. I mean, I think it is, in fact, useful
for China to deal with responsible democratic countries like
South Korea that believes in rule of law, respects human
rights, et cetera. They have a huge trade relationship. I mean,
China is South Korea's number one trading partner by a big
margin, and we expect that that will continue. So, there are
many reasons why South Korea would want to engage China and to
work with them on North Korea and other issues.
I think, similarly, with Russia, Russia is a member of the
six-party process, and they have been somewhat constructive in
making clear their commitment to the shared goal of the six-
party process, the shared goal of denuclearization. And I think
President Park probably wants to make sure that the Russians
remain in that position and work with us as we look for a way
back to some credible and authentic negotiations.
Senator Gardner [presiding]. Thank you.
And, Chairman Corker is heading to the floor to vote, and
we will just change in and out here.
And I believe the only way that we will have a successful
sanctions package of legislation is through bipartisan,
bicameral approach. I look forward to working with you on
legislation, and Senator Cardin, of course, who is been at the
first hearing, as well. And so, thank you very much for that.
And look forward to continuing to work with you.
Ambassador Kim, you do not mention the widely used
descriptor of strategic patience in your testimony to describe
the policy toward North Korea. Is strategic patience no longer
the policy the administration is pursuing toward North Korea?
Ambassador Kim. Thank you, Senator.
I am not sure strategic patience was ever our policy, per
se. I think it was to describe the approach we were taking to
negotiations and that we would not rush back to negotiations
just for the sake of talking to the North Koreans.
I think, in terms of policy, it has always been a
combination of making sure that we maintain a very strong
deterrence capability on the peninsula and in the region,
making sure that we continue to work on our sanctions and
pressure, and also making sure that we have closest possible
diplomatic coordination. That was our policy. I think strategic
patience was just to describe the sense that we were not going
to rush into anything----
Senator Gardner. So, strategic patience is not the policy
of the administration. That is what you are saying.
Ambassador Kim. That is--yes.
Senator Gardner. Okay. The previous Secretary of State
believed that it was the policy of the administration.
Ambassador Kim. I believe the Secretary was--then Secretary
was referring to the approach we were taking, that, given all
of the mistakes that we had made on the North Korean issue,
dating back to the agreed framework days in the 1990s, that we
wanted to be cautious and deliberative about resuming any
negotiations. We wanted to make sure that we gave ourselves the
best possible chance to make some lasting and concrete progress
on the nuclear issue.
Senator Gardner. All right, if that is not the policy, then
we are being cautious and avoiding the mistakes that were made,
what are the key differences today, in today's policy, from
strategic patience?
Ambassador Kim. No, I think we have continued to exercise
discipline, in terms of sort of the possibility of resuming
negotiations. We have also continued to work on our sanctions
and pressure. I think our alliances with Japan and Korea have
never been stronger, because we have continued to work at
strengthening those deterrence capabilities. And I think we
have also continued to work on tightening our diplomatic
coordination, not just among the five parties in the six-party
process, but more internationally.
Senator Gardner. So, what would you describe our policy
toward North Korea to be, then?
Ambassador Kim. Well, and I do not have a catchy phrase for
you, Senator, but, I mean, I would say it is a robust
combination of working on deterrence, diplomacy, and pressure.
Senator Gardner. But, nothing really has changed. There is
no new thought toward North Korea. It is just continuing what
has been taking place.
Ambassador Kim. But, I think intensifying our efforts on
all three fronts increases pressure on North Korea. And, as we
mentioned earlier, stronger sanctions enforcement has had some
effect. Now, obviously, short of what we would like to see,
which is complete denuclearization and improvement in the human
rights situation, et cetera. But, we are making it more
difficult for North Korea to continue to pursue their dangerous
capabilities. We are making it more difficult for them to
proliferate, to engage in other illicit activities.
Senator Gardner. Ambassador Kim, while it has not been
significant in terms of a comparable economy, they have seen
economic growth recently. Is that correct?
Ambassador Kim. I think it is always hard to tell their
exact economic state in North Korea, because the information is
so limited. We have seen anecdotal accounts that perhaps life
in Pyongyang may be improving, but that is a far cry from
suggesting that the economy of North Korea is improving.
Senator Gardner. So, you are starting to see some anecdotal
evidence of that. Their nuclear arsenal is growing. Is that
correct?
Ambassador Kim. We know that they have continued to work on
their capabilities, and we believe they are making advances,
yes.
Senator Gardner. And so, it is difficult for me to hear how
the sanctions are effective and that the more pressure we are
bearing is actually working, when they are starting to see some
economic anecdotal evidence of directions--positive direction,
and the nuclear arsenal is growing.
In your testimony, you do not mention cybersecurity as a
concern with regard to North Korea. Do you believe that
cybersecurity or cyber---the cyber threat from North Korea is a
real and growing threat?
Ambassador Kim. Yes. We are very concerned about it. In
fact, I think we saw, with these cyber attack on Sony Pictures
Entertainment, the North Koreans are capable of carrying out a
very destructive cyber attack.
Senator Gardner. And you believe they are a threat to--
asymmetric threat to South Korea as well as United States, from
a military perspective?
Ambassador Kim. They pose a very serious threat to our ally
in South Korea as well as the homeland, yes.
Senator Gardner. How can we counter these threats?
Ambassador Kim. I think we have to continue to make sure
that we maintain the strongest possible deterrence capability
on the peninsula and beyond. I have to say, I mean, as someone
who has worked on U.S.-ROK alliance, I mean, I think we can
honestly confidently say that the alliance has never been
stronger. And that gives me confidence that we can deal with
whatever provocative actions North Koreans may choose to take.
Senator Gardner. On October 18, following the summit
between President Obama and President Park here in Washington,
North Korea's Foreign Ministry has stated that, while it is not
willing to resume talks regarding its nuclear program, it is
willing to sign a peace treaty with the United States to
formally end the Korean war. Is the administration
contemplating any negotiations with North Korea without
preconditions regarding its nuclear program and human rights
abuses?
Ambassador Kim. First of all, with regards to the North
Korean statement suggesting that we enter into peace treaty
discussions, I mean, we have no interest in entering into any
such discussions. I mean, for us, the priority focus has to be
the nuclear issue. And, as they often do, I am afraid North
Koreans have their priorities wrong by suggesting that we sort
of jump some steps, some very important steps, and start peace
treaty negotiations.
Senator Gardner. So, they are--you would--there are
preconditions before you enter into the conversations. Those
preconditions still remain.
Ambassador Kim. Sir, what we have been discussing with our
partners is that we want to make sure that, if and when we
resume negotiations, we do it with the right amount of focus
and commitment from the North Koreans that the goal is
denuclearization. And, frankly, at the moment, we cannot even
get the North Koreans--as you mentioned, the Foreign Ministry
statement--we cannot even get the North Koreans to focus on
denuclearization as a goal. So, that is why we have not resumed
any negotiations.
Senator Gardner. But, would you resume negotiations on
conversations--the six talks--six-party talks even if they
agreed that nuclearization--denuclearization would not be a
part of those conversations?
Ambassador Kim. No, I think North Koreans would have to
agree very clearly that denuclearization is the common goal,
and that they will work with us sincerely in the six-party
talks.
Senator Gardner. As a precondition.
Ambassador Kim. Yes.
Senator Gardner. As a precondition. Thank you.
In April this year, going back to the issue of nuclear
warheads, Admiral Bill Gortney, the Commander of NORAD, said
that North Korea has developed the ability to launch a nuclear
payload in its very own KN-08 intercontinental ballistic
missile that is capable of reaching the United States. As
Admiral Gortney stated, Pyongyang has the ability to put a
weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the homeland. What is your
assessment of North Korea's missile capabilities? Can they
reach the United States? How much more testing do you
anticipate? And are they preparing right now for additional
tests?
Ambassador Kim. We are obviously very concerned, because we
know that they are continuing to work on their missile
capabilities. I cannot comment specifically on the Admiral's
comments in this setting, but we are obviously very concerned
about the advances the North Koreans have made.
Senator Gardner. Do you have any disagreement with his
assessment of the amount of warheads that North Korea has,
their capability in the next 5 years?
Ambassador Kim. Sir, I mean, I do not think I should be
commenting specifically in this setting.
Senator Gardner. Okay.
Ambassador Kim. I mean, I would be happy to provide
additional details in a classified setting.
Senator Gardner. I would appreciate that. And I think we
are trying to work that through right now, in addition to other
questions that we have.
But, I think it is--Senator Murphy, I believe you are next
in line.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to both of our witnesses, for all of your work.
I think we can all agree that we are stuck, and that we
have effectively been stuck since the failure of the ``Leap
Day'' agreement and the North Korean scuttling of it. And I
think it is natural for us to explore what new policy
alternatives may be available to us to try to change the
calculus inside North Korea.
But, I appreciate, Ambassador King, your emphasis on the
importance of persistence. Sometimes continuing a strategy, and
sticking with it, is just as effective, if not more effective,
than constantly changing it when you do not get the results you
want. In the 1980s, we stuck to a policy of, in every possible
forum, calling out Russia's terrible human rights and open
society record. It did not work for a long time, and then all
of a sudden it worked. Over the course of the last 8 years, we
focused like a laser beam on building international sanctions
against Iran to bring them to the table on their nuclear
program. It did not work for a long time, and then all of a
sudden it worked. And so, I think it is important that we take
steps to give some new authorities to the administration, and I
look forward to working with Senator Gardner. But, I also think
it is important for us to recognize that sometimes consistent
pressure does bear fruit. And history certainly has proven
that.
Ambassador Kim, sir, we have had these fits and starts of
negotiations, fruitful talks, and then ultimately the North
Koreans backing away. What have we--I know we are dealing with
a new leader, here, and we are certainly not confident of what
motivates him, but what have we learned, in the past, about
what has brought the North Koreans to the table that should
educate us about the levers that we should be pressing to try
to restart the six-party talks, going forward?
Ambassador Kim. Thank you very much, Senator.
I agree completely that persistence and consistency are
very important. And, in fact, that is the approach that the
administration has tried to take over the past several years.
We are not going to see immediate success on any of these
issues, but I think, through coordinated, sustained pressure,
diplomatic coordination, we are giving ourselves a much better
shot, and making some progress.
I agree, also, that we have learned some very painful
lessons from our past efforts at negotiating with the North
Koreans, starting with the Agreed Framework, there is a much
more bilateral effort, and then, of course, in the six-party
process, the multilateral effort. I think we have learned some
very important lessons. And I would just highlight a couple.
One is that, as you suggested, I think sustained pressure
is important. And that requires coordination and cooperation
from the international community.
I also think it is important for us to be coordinated
diplomatically, as well, so that we are sending a single clear
message to the North Koreans, so that we are not giving the
North Koreans an opportunity to run to Seoul and get some
benefits, run to Tokyo and get some benefits. And I think,
through very close cooperation, we have managed to remain
disciplined together. And I think that is an approach that
should help us position better for any resumed negotiations.
Senator Murphy. We were talking, before, about China's fear
of instability on their border. And we talk a lot about our
desire to get rid of autocrats and despots, but our failure to
talk about what comes next--and so, it actually should be a
conversation that we should be having, as well, if we were to
ratchet up pressure on the regime of Kim Jong-un.
So, can you talk a little bit about what we know or what we
surmise might be a post-Kim Jong-un future in North Korea? I
mean, let us say we were successful in ultimately putting so
much pressure on the regime that there was revolution, that
there was change. Are we confident that what would come in its
place? China seems confident that what would follow on would be
bad for China. It is hard to imagine what could be worse,
right? I mean, it is hard to imagine anything that could be
worse for the North Korean people, that could be worse for the
interests of the United States. But, have we thought through
what comes next?
Ambassador Kim. I mean, I personally agree with you that it
is hard to imagine that whatever follows would be worse. But, I
think it is very difficult to speculate, based on the limited
information we have about the leadership dynamics in Pyongyang.
Plus the fact that the young leader has a habit of getting rid
of some of his most senior advisors on a whim. I think it is
just very difficult to speculate and calculate, assess what the
post-Kim Jong-un political leadership may look like.
Senator Murphy. Ambassador King, just an additional
question. You have talked about the need for international
pressure on human rights. But, you know, we know that the U.N.
vote was not unanimous. Are there pivotal countries that have
not stepped up and implemented the level of sanction or
pressure that we would like to see to try to change the reality
inside the DPRK? Are there countries that we should be talking
to from--at a congressional level, about increasing their
pressure that would be determinative, potentially, ultimately,
on what happens inside North Korea? I mean, let us set China
aside for a second. I mean, we know China, right?
Ambassador King. There are a number of countries that I
think I would like to see more positive on the human rights
situation in North Korea. Many of these are countries that have
a relationship with North Korea that extends back many years.
And some of these are countries which have gone through their
own democratic transition and, hence, ought to be pushing more.
One of the things that we do, both in Geneva, in New York, and
also in terms of meetings that I have here in Washington, is
try to encourage other countries that we think are likely to go
in the right direction to move that way. We have had some
progress, and we are going to continue to do that.
Senator Murphy. Well, to the extent you do not want to call
them out publicly in an open hearing----
Ambassador King. No, not really.
Senator Murphy [continuing]. I think it would be helpful,
through the chair and ranking member, to maybe point us in the
right direction.
Ambassador King. If I see you heading in the right
direction with one country or another, I might come up and talk
to you about it.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your career of service.
Obviously, North Korea is a rogue regime. Admiral Harris,
the PACOM commander--I had the privilege of meeting with him,
back in August--talked about the seriousness of the North
Korean situation and how unpredictable it is. They are
definitely a rogue regime. They are developing programs of
weapons of mass destruction in nuclear, biological, chemical
weaponry. Their cyber warfare efforts are certainly known to us
now after the Sony incident just last year. I am worried about
their nuclear proliferation efforts with Iran, but also the
human rights violations are untenable. Solzhenitsyn wrote a
book a long time ago about his experience in the gulags of the
Soviet Union, and yet what we have going on in Korea today in
the 21st century, in 2015, is just unconscionable.
Ambassador Kim, I would like to talk to you about North
Korea's efforts with Iran and the proliferation. They have--we
know that Iran has had people at each of the three tests, and
North Korea is now talking about their fourth test. And yet, we
had, just recently, a senior American official said, ``It is
very possible that North Korea is now testing for two
countries,'' implying that they are in direct cooperation with
Iran. After the Iran deal--nuclear deal--I am very concerned
about that proliferation effort. Can you speak to that and what
we are doing about that as an administration?
Ambassador Kim. Thank you very much, Senator.
We have long been very concerned about North Korea's
relations with Iran. We know that they have cooperated on
various projects. And this is something that we monitor very
closely. Obviously, we need to stay vigilant and make sure that
such dealings are terminated.
Senator Perdue. Well, how do we do that? I mean, we have
got these sanction programs now that are being released. Iran
has a lot of cash. With our sanctions on North Korea, North
Korea needs cash. Are we monitoring that situation more closely
now that we have signed the Iran deal?
Ambassador Kim. Senator, our experts are monitoring that
situation very, very closely, yes.
Senator Perdue. Okay. Monitoring. Do you expect any change
in current behavior?
Ambassador Kim. Sir, I am--you know, I was not involved in
the Iran deal, so I am not an expert, but I--my understanding
is that Iran obviously has an interest in living up to the deal
and following through in order for them to reap the benefits of
any sanctions waiver.
Senator Perdue. But, our sanctions on North Korea, of which
I was speaking, are really not having much of an impact on
their ability to ship technology. I mean, we just had North
Korea expert, Bruce Bechtol, wrote, just earlier this year,
``North Korea continues to supply technology, components, and
even raw materials for Iran's highly enriched uranium
weaponization program.'' So, it just--it baffles me that we are
quite happy with the status quo, in terms of the effectiveness,
or lack thereof, of our sanctions, relative to this
proliferation--the partnership they seem to have with Iran.
Ambassador Kim. Sir, I mean, I do not think anybody is
happy with the state of--the situation with North Korea.
Sanctions enforcement has improved, and we have had some
successes, in terms of ship interdictions, which have made it
more difficult for the North Koreans to proliferate. And I
believe that applies to the Iran situation, as well.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Ambassador.
Ambassador King, on this forced labor issue, you know,
today it is hard to--you know, we have had hearings here about
human slavery in the 21st century, with 27 million people
enslaved around the world. The Database Center of North Korean
Human Rights, NKDB, recently released a new report about North
Korea's overseas efforts. This report paints an abysmal picture
of the state of forced labor sent to work overseas by the Kim
regime. Some 60,000 laborers overseas have been sent, earning
somewhere between a billion and 2-and-a-half billion dollars on
behalf of the state, in terms of hard currency, for North
Korea. Can you speak to this policy? This is a policy that I am
not sure many Americans are aware of, and what we are--as an
administration, what are we doing?
I mean, North Korea is a Tier 3--one of 23, I guess, Tier 3
countries out there, probably the worst participant in this
forced labor movement around the world. But, for hard currency,
I continue to come back to the money flow. You know, we have
got all these sanctions on North Korea, and yet they are
seeking ways to get hard currency, and here is one way they are
being very successful. Can you speak to that, please?
Ambassador King. The NKDB data is somewhat suspect. And I
can send you some information----
Senator Perdue. Please.
Ambassador King [continuing]. That suggests that $1 to $1.5
billion is way too high.
Senator Perdue. Okay.
Ambassador King. There is concern about North Korean
laborers who are working. There are indications--we do not have
numbers--there are indications there are significant numbers of
them in Russia, where they work in the lumber industry. There
are workers in China, where they work in the textile industry.
Senator Perdue. Are they forced? These are forced--are they
prisoners or----
Ambassador King. You know, forced, yes and no. I mean, this
is not a situation where people are rounded up and told, ``You
are going to work in the lumber camps in Russia.'' It is--
individuals are told they have an opportunity to go. Quite
frankly, for most North Koreans, working abroad provides better
living conditions than staying in North Korea. They are better
fed. They are not paid as much as they would be if they were
hired locally. They are not--but, they are better paid than if
they stayed in North Korea. So, I mean, it is one of these
kinds of things that--it is a signal of--an indication of the
problems in North Korea that these kinds of things go on.
We have raised the issue, and we are monitoring the issue,
where countries that are allies of ours have North Korean
laborers. We are very concerned about making sure they realize
what they are doing. But, most of the laborers tend to be in
places like Russia and China. Very few of them in Western
countries.
Senator Perdue. Do many of those workers ever make it back
to North Korea?
Ambassador King. From what we know, yes. They usually spend
2 or 3 years abroad, and then they return.
Senator Perdue. Is there any correlation between those
workers and the camps, the detention camps inside North Korea?
Ambassador King. Does not seem to be. People who are sent
to the prison camps are not being sent abroad.
Senator Perdue. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Kaine, I know, is returning in a just a moment from
a vote. And, while we are waiting on him to get back----
Have we--I know with Iran, obviously, we developed bunker-
busting capacity to deal with underground facilities they had--
have we, at any case--at any point, have we identified sites
that we would be willing to militarily deal with if certain--if
North Korea got to a certain point in their development? Have
we publicly discussed that? Have we stated a policy, relative
to us dealing with that?
Ambassador Kim. Sir, I am not sure if I can really comment
on this in this setting. Obviously, we are looking very closely
at all of their nuclear facilities.
The Chairman. Do we think we have a good understanding of
where all those facilities are located?
Ambassador Kim. I think we have a fair degree of confidence
about all of their facilities.
The Chairman. Do we know if any of them are in places like
we found Fordow, for instance, to be, where it was under a
mountain? Are these easily accessible with detonations,
munitions?
Ambassador Kim. It is a little difficult for me to comment
on that in this setting, sir. I would be happy to have a more
detailed discussion in a classified setting.
The Chairman. Have we made any public pronouncements,
though, or given any indications that if North Korea got to a
point in their development, if we felt like they were
miniaturizing, that we would take military actions against what
they are doing there within the country?
Ambassador Kim. Sir, I believe our senior officials have
made clear that all options, including military options----
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Kim [continuing]. Remain on the table.
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Kim. But, I am not aware of any specific
comments.
The Chairman. Is it your sense that the administration
would be committed to taking those types of activities if they
felt like North Korea was getting to a point where they were
becoming a threat?
Ambassador Kim. Well, I think, as we discussed, they are
already threat, but, I mean, I can only repeat what our senior
officials have said, which is that all options do remain on the
table.
The Chairman. Well, when you say ``they are already a
threat,'' I mean, one of the issues would be, Have they
developed the ability to miniaturize? Are you saying that you
think they have?
Ambassador Kim. Well, sir, I cannot really comment on that
in this setting. We do know that they have made advances.
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Kim. But, beyond that, I would have to brief you
in a classified setting.
The Chairman. Well, I think we ought to set that up in the
next short period of time. Thank you for that.
As I said in my opening comments, we have had both sides of
the aisle administrations who have made no progress on this
issue, relative to their nuclear weaponry. Has there been any
pushback, from your perspective within the administration, on
policies going forward that might have an effect on them and
cause them to slow the program that is underway? Have you
sensed any pushback within the administration?
Ambassador Kim. Sir, I mean, I think we are constantly
looking for a stronger effort, in terms of both pressure and
diplomatic coordination, to try to change the calculus in
Pyongyang. And that really--that is an ongoing effort. I mean,
for example, on sanctions, we will continue to look at all
possible avenues on how we can increase pressure by both coming
out with new unilateral sanctions, but also improving
coordination on U.N. Security Council resolution sanctions.
That is an ongoing effort. And this applies to the human rights
area, as well. If we can make it more difficult for the North
Koreans to earn foreign currency, put--conduct illicit
activities, improve their capabilities, I think we should
obviously pursue all such opportunities.
I think, on the diplomatic front, as well, we want to make
sure that at least the five parties are united so that the
North Koreans are not able to play their familiar game of going
to Beijing to get some concessions, going to Seoul to get some
concessions, while they make no progress on the nuclear issue,
missile issue, or human rights. And I think, on both fronts,
this is a constant effort that we obviously need to intensify,
because we are not seeing the kind of progress that we would
like to see.
The Chairman. Yes. So, there is not an issue of the
administration having an unwillingness to deal with this issue,
relative to sanctions. At this moment, there has been a lack of
ability to identify those things that you think might have a
greater effect than what is already occurring. Is that----
Ambassador Kim. Definitely, there is no reluctance----
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Kim [continuing]. On the part of the
administration to explore----
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Kim [continuing]. New sanctions, stronger
sanctions, and better enforcement of sanctions----
The Chairman. So, it would appear to me that all five
parties are really not on the same page, and that China
obviously does not appear to be on the same page that we are on
and the other--South Korea and other countries are on, relative
to these discussions.
Ambassador Kim. Well, clearly, as we discussed, Mr.
Chairman, China can do more, and----
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Kim [continuing]. We are going to push them to
do more, in terms of exercising their leverage on North Korea.
But, I would say there is very strong five-party unity on the
common goal of complete and irreversible denuclearization of
the North Korean nuclear program. There is also very strong
unity that North Korea needs to refrain from any actions that
provoke--that destabilize the region and its neighbors.
I think the coordination among the three parties--that is
with our allies, Japan and South Korea--really has been very
robust. I do not see any daylight between us and Seoul, and us
and Tokyo. Even as they pursue their own channels of
communication--in the case of South Korea, obviously they have
an interest in dealing with inter-Korean----
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Kim [continuing]. Issues. For example, this week
they are conducting these family reunions that bring long lost
families together from North and South.
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Kim. Obviously, very important humanitarian
initiative, and we support that, and we do not see that as
undermining our common effort on the nuclear issue, on human
rights, et cetera.
In the case of Japan, they have a very strong interest in
pursuing an--full accounting of the Japanese abducted citizens.
So----
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Kim [continuing]. Important human rights and
humanitarian issue for the Japanese. And we support their
efforts. And we do not see that as undermining our common goal
or common stance on the nuclear issue.
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Kim. I have to say, even with the Russians, you
know, they have been very clear, publicly and privately, that
they remain committed to the goals of the six-party process,
and they do very strongly oppose any actions by the North
Koreans in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
The Chairman. Is there a line that North Korea would cross,
where you think China might want to intervene in a more kinetic
way to keep them from getting nuclear weapons? Have you had any
discussions with counterparts there? Is there a line that they
might cross that would cause China to want to, in a forceful
way, ensure they do not have the ability to deliver nuclear
weapons inside China? I know that China does not perceive them,
probably, as a threat in that way, but is there a line that
they would cross that would cause China to act?
Ambassador Kim. Sir, I think it is difficult to speculate.
All I can say is that I do think it is important for us to
remind the Chinese that their approach, their policies on North
Korea will continue to hurt China's own interests. It will
undermine China's efforts to grow its economy, which can be
possible only if they live in a stable environment. And I think
if the North Koreans continue to pursue dangerous capabilities
and continue to conduct provocative actions, it works against
China's own goals.
The Chairman. My guess is that that advice is being heard
about as much as them advising us on what we ought to do with
Mexico and Canada.
But, anyway, with that, Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thanks for calling
this hearing. It is a very important one.
And I came with many questions. And my colleagues have
actually asked the questions I had when I walked in the room. I
appreciate your testimony and your discussion. But, a question
that came up as a result, Ambassador King, of your written
testimony that you elaborated on a little bit in your, kind of,
oral presentation--and I do not think the question was asked;
forgive me if it was asked when I was gone--I want to go back
to the U.N. action on the resolution that you discussed. So,
let me just make sure I understand this.
There was a resolution put before the U.N. to condemn North
Korean human rights abuses. And I was trying to take notes
quickly as you testified. The resolution received 100-and---
about 150 yes votes, 20 no votes, and there were 73
abstentions. Now, are those--first, let me get--are those
numbers right?
Ambassador King. The numbers were 116 yes, 20 noes, 53
abstentions.
Senator Kaine. Okay, so it is 116 yes, 20 no, and 53
abstentions. What exactly was the resolution?
Ambassador King. This was a resolution that welcomed the
report of the Commission of Inquiry which was very damning, in
terms of North Korea's human rights situation. It called for
referring the resolution to the Security Council for possible--
where the Security Council is asked to consider referring it to
international judicial mechanisms. And very tough, very
critical, on the North Koreans. North Koreans denounced the
resolution. They spoke strongly against it.
Senator Kaine. Was the report that was issued about North
Korean human rights abuses--I mean, there is human rights
challenges all around the world, but it was an unusually tough
report against----
Ambassador King. Yes.
Senator Kaine [continuing]. The situation in North Korea.
Are you aware of any other U.N. report that has been written
about the activities of a sovereign nation that has been
tougher on their human rights record than this recent U.N.
report?
Ambassador King. There are a lot of tough reports on human
rights that have been written on individual countries. There
are tough reports that have been written on more generic
practices that involve more than one country.
Senator Kaine. Let me ask you it a different way. And
actually, I would like to ask you both this question. Are you
aware of a sovereign nation, as opposed to a nonstate
organization like ISIL or Boko Haram--are you aware of a
sovereign nation in the world right now that has a worse
documented human rights record than North Korea?
Ambassador King. The Economist Intelligence Unit put
together a system for ranking countries according to their
human rights record. They ranked 167 countries from best to
worst. North Korea came out number 167. We put them in the
category of Countries of Particular Concern with religious
freedom. They are Tier 3 countries with regard to trafficking.
In all of the rankings--and we do not rank countries from top--
--
Senator Kaine. Right.
Ambassador King [continuing]. To bottom--but, all of the
categories that we put bad actors in, the North Koreans appear
there.
Senator Kaine. And, Ambassador Kim, just from your
professional experience in the State Department, a
distinguished career, are you aware of a sovereign nation in
the world right now that has a worse human rights record than
North Korea?
Ambassador Kim. Thank you, Senator.
No, I am not aware of a sovereign country that has a worse
human rights record, from my professional perspective.
If I may add, from my personal perspective, as well, as
someone who was born on the Korean Peninsula, and having
benefited from South Korea's tremendous rise, not just
economically, but its impressive democratic transformation, I
have always felt a great deal of sadness and sorrow whenever I
travel to North Korea, because it is very easy to see--even
though we are operating in a very controlled environment when
U.S. delegations travel to North Korea, it is very easy to see
that North Koreans are suffering. So, if we, foreign
delegations, can see that easily, I can only imagine just how
much worse the situation must be for North Koreans living in
North Korea outside of Pyongyang. So, and I feel very, you
know, personal about this issue, and this is why I applaud
Ambassador King's efforts to maintain pressure and momentum on
this issue.
Senator Kaine. My questions are really, in some ways, more
about the character of the United Nations than they are--you
know, hearing you describe--and, obviously, with this personal
connection, the--the fact that, across so many different, you
know, spectrums, whether you are talking about forced labor,
whether you are talking about sexual violence, whether you are
talking about repression of any freedom of information--North
Korea, such a violator of basic principles of human rights. So,
how are we to understand, after a very tough U.N. report--this
is not a U.S. allegation, this is a U.N. significant
investigation that is a report about the human rights situation
in North Korea--that 20 nations would vote against a basic
referral to the Security Council and 53 nations would abstain?
What, 73 nations are unwilling to offer simple support for the
notion of a referral of a human rights report that is as
damaging as this--how are we to understand that in the context
of the U.N. as a voice for the values that are the basic values
of the charter under which it was established?
Ambassador King. Defending the U.N. is not my normal
portfolio, but let me say that one of the things I have spent a
lot of time doing is dealing with U.N. organizations in the 6
years that I have been in this position. I have been impressed
with the commitment and willingness of countries to step
forward on North Korea and to make the kind of comments and to
vote the way they have. Most of the countries that have
abstained--and there is a larger number than we would like to
see--are countries that feel human rights should not be dealt
with by focusing on an individual country. We ought to look at
issues like gender rights, we ought to look at education
opportunities, we ought to look at rights of children. Most of
the countries that have problems like that have come through
experiences that suggest that they are making progress, but
they are not there yet. Overall, the fact that the United
Nations condemned North Korea by a significant majority of its
members puts North Korea in a very awkward situation. And it is
the kind of situation--you do not like to vote against your
colleagues when you have got a vote on the floor. If you have
got a colleague who has got a bill you do not like, but happens
to be a good friend, you know the problems you face.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kaine. Yes, but I tell you, I do know the problems
that we all face, but the U.N. was formed around a set of
principles. And I guess it is one thing to vote no. You
indicated some of those who voted no were among the Who's Who
of the worst human rights abusers----
Ambassador King. Yes.
Senator Kaine [continuing]. In the world. But, the notion
that you would abstain, like, ``I am indifferent. I cannot make
my mind up. I do not know whether any action is warranted''--I
mean, that just seems like such an amazingly----
Ambassador King. There are several of those countries that
we are working on.
Senator Kaine. Yes. Yes.
And, Ambassador Kim, do you have a thought about that? I am
not--because I am not an expert of the U.N. and what would be
the norm in a situation like this, but I am--it just strikes me
that if we cannot think of a worse example in the world, in
terms of a human rights violator, a violator of the basic
tenets of the U.N. Charter, if we cannot think of a worse
example, but, even for the worst example, 73 nations out of,
let us see, out of 189 that vote, are--refuse to condemn--or
refuse to suggest a referral of a U.N. study cataloging human
rights abuses, refuse to condemn it or suggest a referral to
the Security Council--I mean, what--tell me--help me understand
the U.N. dynamic.
Ambassador Kim. Sir, I mean, I agree that it is unfortunate
that we could not get all of the member states to vote for this
resolution. I assume, for some of those countries, it is just a
matter of indifference. I assume, for some of those countries,
it is because they have their own human rights issues that they
felt uncomfortable about condemning North Korea's human rights
record.
I think it is important to remember, however, that with the
publication of the Commission of Inquiry report, and with all
of the efforts that we made in the U.N. context, that we were
able to raise awareness about the North Korean human rights
issue, much more so last year than we had done--we were able to
do in previous years. And I think this is an ongoing effort. We
are going to continue to push this issue as an important agenda
for the Security Council, and we are going to continue to work
on--as Bob suggested--continue to work on those countries that
really should be working with us on efforts against North
Korean human rights violations, much more vigorously, so that
when the vote takes place later this year, next year, et
cetera, that we will begin to have much better numbers.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, I will conclude, and I appreciate
you letting me have a little extra time. This is a little
unusual, but I would like to ask that the Commission of Inquiry
report be added----
The Chairman. Entered into the----
Senator Kaine [continuing]. To the record of this committee
hearing, as well as the vote tally on the motion to refer to
the Security Council.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[Editor's note.--The two reports mentioned above was too
voluminous to include in the printed hearing. They will be
retained in the permanent record of the committee.]
The Chairman. And I certainly appreciate the line of
questioning. And thank you for signing the letter last week. I
think we are also going to be able to see the nature of the
U.N. when Iran violated, for the sixth time, the U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1929. I will predict that the U.N. Security
Council will take no action.
So, I am glad that someone of your sensibilities is raising
the kinds of questions you are asking. And hopefully the
committee, in general, will focus a little bit on this entire
issue, relative to the U.N., itself. And thank you for your
testimony in that regard.
Senator Cardin, I know, has a question.
Senator Cardin. Thank you again for your testimony.
Senator Cardin. Just follow up quickly on Senator Kaine's
point. I have been involved in human rights issues for a long
time in the Helsinki Commission. And I must tell you, if you do
not name specific countries, you are not going to get anywhere.
To say that almost the majority of countries in the United
Nations believe we can handle human rights advancements in a
generic sense by saying, ``We are for gender equality,'' or
``We are for stopping trafficking,'' or ``We are for giving
people the right to express themselves,'' but then you do not
address the individual circumstances of states by naming them.
Without that you are not going to get anywhere.
So, I appreciate the fact that, in the last decade, we have
made progress in the United Nations. But, there is still a
long, long, long way to go.
And I would just observe that I have been very impressed by
your testimonies today, both of your testimonies, because you
have linked the security issue with human rights continuously
as we deal with North Korea. And I think that you really do
understand the importance of both of those issues and how they
are interrelated to the United States objectives in North Korea
and that we need to continue to make it clear that there can be
no normalization, as it relates to North Korea, until they deal
with both the security issues and human rights issues, which
are very much interwoven.
I did want to ask one additional question, if I might. And
that is, Ambassador Kim, you were engaged, in the 1990s, when
we had the Framework Agreement with North Korea, and
implementation of the Framework Agreement. Well, today we are
implementing another Framework Agreement. We have passed the
adoption date of the Iranian agreement, and we are now in that
period where that agreement is being implemented. And I would
just ask if you could share with us some of the lessons learned
from North Korea as to how we can be more effective,
particularly in the United States role, but also the
congressional role, in how we implement the Iranian agreement,
using the lessons learned by the Framework implementation for
North Korea.
Ambassador Kim. Thank you, Senator.
Just to clarify, I was not directly involved in the Agreed
Framework days--Agreed Framework effort. I am not that old.
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Kim. I was a very junior political officer
assigned to our embassy in Kuala Lumpur. But, I was able to
observe the implementation talks, which took place in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, so I have some experience.
I think, more generally, one very important lesson that we
took away from both the Agreed Framework effort and the six-
party process is the critical importance of verification. We
should not trust the North Koreans to follow through on their
commitments. And so, I think whatever effort we enter into next
with North Korea, we need to focus very heavily on making sure
that we have the most robust, most intrusive verification
process possible with the North Korean nuclear program. And I
think this is why my colleagues who worked on the Iran effort
focused heavily on verification. And my understanding is that
the Iran deal includes a very robust, unprecedented,
verification process.
Senator Cardin. Any other observations you would make?
Verification, we understand, is critically important. And it
was not--I take it, from way that you were describing it, it
was not as specific as it needed to be in the North Korea
framework of the 1990s. Any other lessons? Because, obviously,
I agree with Senator Corker, and I said in my opening
statement--this is not a reflection on any one administration;
it goes back many administrations--we have not succeeded in our
policies in North Korea.
Ambassador Kim. Sir, one other sort of general observation
I would make, based on my experiences dealing with North Korea,
is that it is important to be comprehensive in scope, because
if we are not very tight, in terms of making sure that we cover
the entirety of their nuclear program, they will find ways to
create loopholes. And so, I think we need to make sure--when we
get started with any renewed negotiations, we need to make sure
that the scope covers their whole nuclear program.
Senator Cardin. And with Iran, we were focused only on the
nuclear side. North Korea, the human rights issues are so
interwoven. As I understand it, the regional partners want to
make sure that we engage on more than just the nuclear aspects
of North Korea. Is that a fair assessment?
Ambassador Kim. Sir, I think that there is consensus that
the human rights issue needs to be addressed. I think there is
still sort of thinking going on about how best to do that. I
mean, I think that we all agree that it should be addressed.
But, whether it should be addressed within the framework of the
six-party talks or not, I think is an open question, because
the agreement in the six-party process is to focus on the
nuclear issue.
But, I agree with you completely that if and when we resume
any serious engagement with North Korea, whether it is
bilateral or multilateral, we need to make sure to focus on the
human rights issue. I do not think we have the luxury, and
frankly it would be irresponsible for us, to sort of cast aside
human rights issues to focus only on other issues. I think we
will have to address all of our concerns somewhat
simultaneously.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Before I turn to Senator Gardner, just to
follow up, you have no sense that there is some forcing event
that is going to cause the six-party talks to start again and
some agreement be reached with North Korea. I mean, there is no
thinking that that is on the horizon, is there?
Ambassador Kim. No, sir.
The Chairman. Okay.
Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, thank
you for holding this hearing. Thank you for your persistence
today, as well.
Does it--following up on the Chairman's question right
there, moving away from six-party talks, since they have not--
we have not moved forward the six-party talks since, basically,
2008--does it make sense to have five-party talks, without--to
have five-party talks, without North Korea at the table, to
talk about what we would be willing to do and how we can move
forward without North Korea at the table if they are not
willing to join?
Ambassador Kim. Senator, thank you very much. That is a
terrific question, and it is something that we have been very
interested in pursuing.
I think it would make a lot of sense for us to have a five-
party gathering in which all five of us at one time share notes
and try to come up with a common strategy. I mean, I have to
say, I think, as I mentioned earlier, we do have fairly strong
unity among the five parties that was built through, sort of,
more individual consultations, us with the other members of the
six-party process. But, I do think it would be useful for us to
try to organize a five-party gathering to coordinate our
efforts.
But, some of the parties have been cautious about, sort of,
the signal that a five-party gathering would send. But, I
sincerely believe that it would be quite useful.
Senator Gardner. Now, the cautious parties, China in
particular, or others?
Ambassador Kim. I believe China and Russia have been
cautious.
Senator Gardner. Was this a conversation point during the
summit with President Park here?
Ambassador Kim. President Park and President Obama had an
extensive discussion on North Korea-related issues, but I am
not aware that that specifically mentioned the five-party
talks.
Senator Gardner. You mentioned the whole scope of the
nuclear program and how, to be effective for a sanction regime,
it has to be effective against the whole scope of the North
Korean nuclear program. Do you believe that means that a more
aggressive implementation of sanctions is required?
Ambassador Kim. Oh, I do believe that we can improve.
Sanctions enforcement can improve, both in terms of what our
international partners do, but also for us to look at some new
ways to strengthen the sanctions regime.
Senator Gardner. Okay. How many sanctions have--how many
entities have been sanctioned in the last 10 months by the
United States in North Korea?
Ambassador Kim. Well, when the President announced the new
Executive order in January, following the Sony cyber attack, we
designated about 13 entities and North Korean personnel. In
July, the Treasury Department issued some more designations. I
do not remember the exact number. But, it is an ongoing effort.
We are continuing to review all available information to find
targets, entities that are involved in illicit activities,
personnel supporting North Korean regimes, dangerous
activities, looking at various organizations to see whether
they merit being on our designations list.
Senator Gardner. So, 13 in January, about that number maybe
in July.
Ambassador Kim. Something like that.
Senator Gardner. And what does that represent of the pool
of sanctionable entities? What percentage does that represent?
Ambassador Kim. Well, but many, many North Korean entities
are already sanctioned. As you know, Senator, I mean, we have a
whole range of sanctions against North Korea--various Executive
orders, export control-related legislation. So, I mean, I do
not have the exact number, but many, many North Korean entities
are already----
Senator Gardner. But, there are a number of others that
could be action taken against, is that correct?
Ambassador Kim.Kim. I am sorry?
Senator Gardner. There could be others that action is taken
against by the United States.
Ambassador Kim. Yes. I think we are constantly reviewing
all available information so that we can--when they meet the
evidentiary requirement, as much as we would like to, I mean, I
do not think we can just, you know, sanction anyone we do not
like. I think they have to--our evidence needs to meet the
requirements. But, when they do, we will not hesitate to make
additional designations.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Mr. King, following up on the end of Senator Kaine's
comments, you--I cannot remember--I apologize if it was
Ambassador Kim or perhaps you who had said taking actions that,
``makes them feel more uncomfortable in North Korea.'' And
perhaps it was Ambassador Kim that had said that, as well. But,
you did say persistence more than new ideas is important when
it comes to, I believe, the human rights actions that we are
pursuing. So, why have we not--and is it a good idea, perhaps,
that we do--take this report, this Commission of Inquiry report
2014, identify these actors, name them publicly, take sanctions
actions against individuals that we name, in an effort to,
indeed, make them feel more uncomfortable?
Ambassador King. The President's Executive order that was
issued, I think January 1 or 2, specified that sanctions could
be imposed for human rights reasons. One of the things that we
are looking at is, Can we identify individuals? One of the
things that we have to do under our sanctions legislation is
identify the individuals that are involved, for example. One of
the things the North Koreans do is make a very careful point of
not identifying those individuals. On the only trip I made to
North Korea since I have been in this position, we had some
discussions about the possibility of humanitarian assistance
that did not go anywhere. But, at the end of the visit that I
made, there was an American citizen who had been held there for
7 months in prison and was given to me as a going away present.
The one thing that was interesting was the process they went
through as they handed him over to me. He was being held in a
hospital. I went to the hospital. I was met by a man from the
``relevant agency.'' And that is all the identification that we
had--that he was from the relevant agency. He did not introduce
himself. He was wearing a uniform, but the uniform had no
insignia. Most uniforms have a name strip. No name strip. We
completed this little kabuki exercise, where he made comments,
I made comments, the prisoner made comments, we all shook
hands. I never found out who the guy was, where he was from.
And that is the way the agencies work over there. When you are
involved in these kind of things, it is very hard to find out
who the people are that are involved. We try. And we are
looking at ways that we can get that information so that we can
look at carrying out human rights sanctions.
Senator Gardner. So, has--so, no one has been named under
the executive order from January.
Ambassador King. In terms of--named for human rights----
Senator Gardner. Yes.
Ambassador King [continuing]. Sanctions, no.
Senator Gardner. And so, do we know of anyone--we certainly
know at least some, correct?--that are responsible? Have they--
--
Ambassador King. We are looking at what we can do and how
we might be able to implement that, yes.
Senator Gardner. And we know the United Nations has
individual names. Is that correct?
Ambassador King. No. The United Nations----
Senator Gardner. They have no one----
Ambassador King [continuing]. Does not.
Senator Gardner. The United Nations has no one.
Ambassador King. The U.N. Commission of Inquiry had largely
the same kind of information that we have.
Senator Gardner. Okay. So, have we--of those individuals
that we have identified, whether it is 1, whether it is 10,
whether it is 100--none of them have been acted upon.
Ambassador King. It is a process that we have to go
through, and we are going through it.
Senator Gardner. How long will that process take?
Ambassador King. I do not make the decisions. This is one
that has----
Senator Gardner. Who makes----
Ambassador King [continuing]. To be worked through----
Senator Gardner. Who makes the----
Ambassador King [continuing]. Treasury.
Senator Gardner. Treasury makes----
Ambassador King. It is basically a question of working
through Treasury. It is also a question of working through the
intelligence agencies, as well.
Senator Gardner. What about--I mean, what--Kim Jung-un
himself? Has he been named under the executive order?
Ambassador King. I do not know that he has been named--no.
Senator Gardner. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Well, I think it has been a very good
hearing, and it is a result of your efforts and Senator
Menendez's efforts and others, relative to this issue. And I
think, if it is okay with you, Senator Cardin, I know that Mr.
Kim referenced some things that he would like to talk about in
a different kind of setting. Seems to me it might be useful to
us to have a classified briefing and bring in others, also,
just to identify exactly where the North Korean nuclear
development activity is, and how far along it is. And so, if it
is okay, we will set that up and then look forward to further
discussions about legislation.
We thank you both for your professional leadership and for
serving our country in the way that you do. And we look forward
to working with you more closely on this issue. Thank you both
for being here.
Without objection, the record will remain open until the
close of business Monday. And if you guys would promptly
respond to questions asked, we would appreciate it.
And again, thank you.
And the meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
[From the United Nations Press Release, Feb. 17, 2014]
North Korea: U.N. Commission documents wide-ranging and
ongoing crimes against humanity, urges referral to ICC
GENEVA (17 February 2014)--A wide array of crimes against humanity,
arising from ``policies established at the highest level of State,''
have been committed and continue to take place in the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, according to a U.N. report released Monday,
which also calls for urgent action by the international community to
address the human rights situation in the country, including referral
to the International Criminal Court.
In a 400-page set of linked reports and supporting documents, based
on first-hand testimony from victims and witnesses, the U.N. Commission
of Inquiry on human rights in the DPRK has documented in great detail
the ``unspeakable atrocities'' committed in the country.
``The gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a State
that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world,'' the
Commission--established by the Human Rights Council in March 2013--says
in a report that is unprecedented in scope.
``These crimes against humanity entail extermination, murder,
enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other
sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender
grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced
disappearance of persons and the inhumane act of knowingly causing
prolonged starvation,'' the report says, adding that ``Crimes against
humanity are ongoing in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
because the policies, institutions and patterns of impunity that lie at
their heart remain in place.''
The second more detailed section of the report cites evidence
provided by individual victims and witnesses, including the harrowing
treatment meted out to political prisoners, some of whom said they
would catch snakes and mice to feed malnourished babies. Others told of
watching family members being murdered in prison camps, and of
defenceless inmates being used for martial arts practice.
``The fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea . . . has
for decades pursued policies involving crimes that shock the conscience
of humanity raises questions about the inadequacy of the response of
the international community,'' the report stated. ``The international
community must accept its responsibility to protect the people of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea from crimes against humanity,
because the Government of the DPRK has manifestly failed to do so.''
The Commission found that the DPRK ``displays many attributes of a
totalitarian State.''
``There is an almost complete denial of the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, as well as of the rights to freedom
of opinion, expression, information and association,'' the report says,
adding that propaganda is used by the State to manufacture absolute
obedience to the Supreme Leader and to incite nationalistic hatred
toward some other States and their nationals.
State surveillance permeates private lives and virtually no
expression critical of the political system goes undetected--or
unpunished.
``The key to the political system is the vast political and
security apparatus that strategically uses surveillance, coercion, fear
and punishment to preclude the expression of any dissent. Public
executions and enforced disappearance to political prison camps serve
as the ultimate means to terrorise the population into submission,''
the report states.
``The unspeakable atrocities that are being committed against
inmates of the kwanliso political prison camps resemble the horrors of
camps that totalitarian States established during the twentieth
century. The institutions and officials involved are not held
accountable. Impunity reigns.''
It is estimated that between 80,000 and 120,000 political prisoners
are currently detained in four large political prison camps, where
deliberate starvation has been used as a means of control and
punishment. Gross violations are also being committed in the ordinary
prison system, according to the Commission's findings.
The report noted that the DPRK consists of a rigidly stratified
society with entrenched patterns of discrimination. Discrimination is
rooted in the songbun system, which classifies people on the basis of
State-assigned social class and birth, and also includes consideration
of political opinions and religion, and determines where they live,
work, study and even whom they may marry.
Violations of the freedom of movement and residence are also
heavily driven by discrimination based on songbun. Those considered
politically loyal to the leadership can live and work in favourable
locations, such as Pyongyang. Others are relegated to a lower status.
For example, the distribution of food has prioritised those deemed
useful to the survival of the current political system at the expense
of others who are ``expendable.''
``Confiscation and dispossession of food from those in need, and
the provision of food to other groups, follow this logic,'' the report
notes, adding that ``the State has consistently failed in its
obligation to use the maximum of its available resources to feed those
who are hungry.''
Military spending--predominantly on hardware and the development of
weapons systems and the nuclear programme--has always been prioritised,
even during periods of mass starvation, the report says. The State also
maintains a system of inefficient economic production and
discriminatory resource allocation that inevitably produces more
avoidable starvation among its citizens.
Violations of the rights to food and to freedom of movement have
resulted in women and girls becoming vulnerable to trafficking and
forced sex work outside the DPRK. Many take the risk of fleeing, mainly
to China, despite the high chance that they will be apprehended and
forcibly repatriated, then subjected to persecution, torture, prolonged
arbitrary detention and, in some cases sexual violence. ``Repatriated
women who are pregnant are regularly subjected to forced abortions, and
babies born to repatriated women are often killed,'' the report states.
The Commission urged all States to respect the principle of non-
refoulement (i.e. not to forcibly return refugees to their home
country) and to adopt a victim-centric and human rights-based approach
to trafficking, including by providing victims with the right to stay
in the country and access to legal protection and basic services.
``Crimes against humanity have been, and are being, committed
against starving populations. These crimes are sourced in decisions and
policies violating the universal human right to food. They were taken
for purposes of sustaining the present political system, in full
awareness that they would exacerbate starvation and contribute to
related deaths.''
The Commission also found that, since 1950, the ``State's violence
has been externalized through State-sponsored abductions and enforced
disappearances of people from other nations. These international
enforced disappearances are unique in their intensity, scale and
nature.''
While the Government did not respond to the Commission's requests
for access to DPRK and for information, the Commission obtained first-
hand testimony through public hearings with about 80 witnesses in
Seoul, Tokyo, London, and Washington, DC, and more than 240
confidential interviews with victims and other witnesses, including in
Bangkok. Eighty formal submissions were also received from different
entities.
The report includes a letter sent by the Commissioners to the
Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, containing a summary of their most serious
findings, in particular the fact that ``in many instances'' the
systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations ``entail
crimes against humanity,'' and drawing attention to the principles of
command and superior responsibility under international criminal law
according to which military commanders and civilian superiors can incur
personal criminal responsibility for failing to prevent and repress
crimes against humanity committed by persons under their effective
control.
In the letter to Kim Jong-un, the Commissioners stated that it
would recommend referral of the situation in the DPRK to the
International Criminal Court ``to render accountable all those,
including possibly yourself, who may be responsible for the crimes
against humanity referred to in this letter and in the Commission's
report.''
Among wide-ranging recommendations to the DPRK, to China and other
States, and to the international community, the Commission calls on the
Security Council to adopt targeted sanctions against those who appear
to be most responsible for crimes against humanity, stressing that
sanctions should not be targeted against the population or the economy
as a whole.
______
Written Statement of Michael Kirby, Chair of the Commission of Inquiry
on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the
25th Session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva, 17 March 2014
President, High Commissioner, distinguished members of the Human
Rights Council, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, last century, the
world was faced with the Nazi ideology that sought to relegate people
to the condition of lesser beings. It used terror, discrimination, and
extermination in concentration camps to achieve its ends. It deployed
totalitarian control to silence its critics.
The world said ``never again.'' It proclaimed the Charter of the
United Nations. It declared universal human rights as our shared
destiny.
Thereafter for almost 50 years, another terrible scourge of
humanity reigned in South Africa: apartheid, the system of racial
segregation under which the rights of the majority were curtailed and
those of the minority maintained. When it fell, the world said never
again.
In the 20th century, the conscience of the world was shocked again
by the cruelty of the Khmer Rouge. They arbitrarily executed and
tortured those perceived as subversive elements. They starved their
population in the name of self-sufficiency. Virtually no one was
untouched. When the killing fields were discovered, the world said
never again.
Here we are in the 21st century. And yet we are faced with a
remaining and shameful scourge that afflicts the world today. We can no
longer afford to remain oblivious to it, nor impotent to act against
it.
The Commission of Inquiry has found systematic, widespread and
grave human rights violations occurring in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea. It has also found a disturbing array of crimes
against humanity. These crimes are committed against inmates of
political and other prison camps; against starving populations; against
religious believers; against persons who try to flee the country--
including those forcibly repatriated by China.
These crimes arise from policies established at the highest level
of the State. They have been committed, and continue to take place in
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, because the policies,
institutions and patterns of impunity that lie at their heart remain in
place.
The gravity, scale, duration and nature of the unspeakable
atrocities committed in the country reveal a totalitarian State that
does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.
These are the ongoing crimes against humanity happening in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which our generation must tackle
urgently and collectively. The rest of the world has ignored the
evidence for too long. Now there is no excuse, because now we know. In
today's world, billions of people have direct access to the horrifying
evidence.
Last month--when the report was made available online--it received
broad media coverage. But the findings of the Commission were not
available to the people in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
What is important is how the international community now acts on
the report. What is most important is immediate action to improve the
lives, and fulfill the human rights, of the ordinary citizens of the
DPRK. A compelling report and wide media coverage are good. But they
are woefully insufficient.
Satellite images show the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, at
night, immersed in darkness in stark contrast to the blazing lights of
its neighbours. This visual impression epitomises the accounts conveyed
to the Commission by the brave witnesses who came before it. Their
country is a dark abyss where the human rights, the dignity and the
humanity of the people are controlled, denied, and ultimately
annihilated.
The DPRK called the resolution this Council passed without vote to
establish the Commission ``a political chicanery which does not deserve
even a passing note.'' The Commission's findings have been
characterized by the DPRK as ``sheer lies and fabrications deliberately
cooked up.'' We have been accused of ``politicising human rights.'' We
are labelled as ``marionettes of the string pullers.'' The release of
the report has been described as a ``politically motivated provocation
aimed to tarnish the image of the dignified DPRK and ramp up pressure
on it in a bid to bring down its social system.''
The Commission does not ask anyone to believe blindly what we say.
Read for yourself the words from the testimony of hundreds of
witnesses who spoke to the Commission of extermination, murder,
enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions, and other
sexual violence. Their testimony is not only in the documents before
you. The authentic voices of victims, families and experts who
participated in the Commission's public hearings are on the Internet--
the same Internet that billions on our planet now use, but access to
which is denied to the ordinary people of the DPRK. Ask yourself, why
this regime forbids such access? Why does it punish its citizens for
watching harmless soap operas from abroad? Why does it restrict radio
and television sets to government controlled stations?
Listen and watch for yourself the public hearing witnesses who
spoke about the state sponsored discrimination and classification of
people; persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds;
the forcible transfer of populations; the enforced disappearance of
persons; human trafficking, forced abortion and the murder of children;
and the denial of food and needless death by starvation.
Make up your own mind on what could be the truth and what could be
fabrication. Freedoms of thought and conscience are rights that many of
us take for granted. But they are forbidden in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea.
If letting victims raise their voices is politicising human rights,
how then can we help these victims?
If the Human Rights Council is not the place to speak up about the
atrocities that we have been told of, or to speak about accountability,
then where is the venue? Is there any venue? Or is the world to
continue to look the other way?
If the International Criminal Court is not the place where crimes
against humanity are to be addressed, then where do we seek
accountability for these wrongdoings?
We have been told to use dialogue, to avoid confrontation, and to
employ cooperation. We have even been criticised for failing to go to
the DPRK and engage with its people. All of our efforts to initiate
dialogue and to offer cooperation have been spurned by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, even up to this month when we reached out
yet again to the DPRK and offered to come without preconditions and
brief their Geneva Mission. Our offer to go to Pyongyang and answer
questions has been ignored. All contact has been rebuffed.
The DPRK claims that the establishment of a country-based mechanism
is political confrontation. Does the same argument then apply to the
Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review, where the DPRK has
not accepted a single recommendation? It has been said that country-
mandated Special Procedures are a provocation. So can the same then be
said of the thematic-mandated Special Procedures that have not been
invited, nor permitted to visit, the country in the last 20 years? For
a place where human rights are said to be perfect, this is a country
that is strangely unwilling to reveal itself to others.
Members of the United Nations: The Commission of Inquiry challenges
you to address, with no further delay, the suffering of millions of
North Koreans. They have been in the forefront of our minds this past
year. Think of them. And act.
Authorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: The
Commission of Inquiry challenges you to respect the human rights of
your citizens.
If you claim that only through dialogue and cooperation the crimes
that we have uncovered and the gross human rights violations that we
have brought to light can be addressed, then start that dialogue now.
Commence that cooperation immediately.
Commit yourselves to an open and honest exchange today in this
forum, during this session. Dismissal of our report and of its findings
by the DPRK should no longer be accepted by the Council as a sufficient
response to allegations of such egregious violations and serious
crimes. Now you have a comprehensive report. And, through our report,
the victims of great wrongs now speak directly to this Council and to
the world.
Show good will. Immediately release, without condition, the tens of
thousands of your citizens who are convicted of offences that were
political in nature. Those who did not receive a fair trial. Those who
were tortured. Demonstrate cooperation by allowing independent monitors
to check and verify that no one in detention is harmed or tortured, or
kept incommunicado.
Abolish immediately and completely the discriminatory Songbun
system, an apartheid of social class.
Prioritize the fight against hunger and malnutrition with all
available resources over propaganda and personal glorification. Wind
back the gross overspending on the fourth largest army on the planet in
favour of food for the people. Allow humanitarian assistance in
accordance with humanitarian and human rights principles.
Engage in dialogue by disclosing the whereabouts of those who have
been forcibly abducted from Japan, the Republic of Korea, and other
countries.
Allow separated families to communicate with each other through
mail and telephone and to permanently reunite. Everyday. Any hour. Not
just a very few in a year, for just a few hours, won by lottery ballot
amongst tearful Koreans grateful for such crumbs. These are human
beings--many of them in their twilight years. They are not political
pawns to be used for bargaining and negotiation.
The findings of the Commission are hard to hear, but truthful.
Our conclusions are heavy, but inevitable.
The recommendations are challenging, but unavoidable.
These are the only recommendations that we could possibly arrive at
following the horrendous but credible accounts that we have heard these
past months. They are the recommendations that our conscience requires
us to put forth to you, to address the kind of atrocities that we have
encountered through the evidence of those who have suffered. Plain
speaking of their suffering requires me to say that it has been caused,
in part, by the indifference of the international community.
We have not made these recommendations lightly, fully aware of the
weight of our words, and the gravity of our assessments. Nothing in our
past lives could have prepared us for what we heard. Our duty is to
report to the world the evidence we found. If this report does not give
rise to action, it is difficult to imagine what will.
The Commission urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to
immediately and unconditionally accept and implement all of the
recommendations contained in this report.
The Commission urges all countries, including China, to respect the
principle of nonrefoulement, and, accordingly, to abstain from forcibly
repatriating any persons to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
given the fearful evidence that we have heard and recorded. There
should be no forced return to DPRK by any State unless the treatment in
DPRK, as verified by international human rights monitors, markedly
improves. Asylum and other means of durable protection should be
extended to persons fleeing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
who need international protection. The victims of trafficking should be
given appropriate remedy.
The Commission urges the members of the United Nations and the
international community, to accept their responsibility to protect and
to implement all the recommendations contained in our report addressed
to them: especially those related to accountability, including the
referral of the situation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
to the International Criminal Court.
The recommendations of the Commission were formulated to be
addressed immediately, in the medium and in the long term. Even those
recommendations that require more time to be implemented demand
attention and action to start now, immediately.
The Commission has completed its work within time and faithfully.
We have discharged the mandate given to us by this Council. We have
done so with integrity, impartiality, and professionalism. You asked us
to identify any human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. We
have answered those questions with evidence. You asked us how those
responsible might be rendered accountable. We have answered that
question with the available options. And with long- and short-term
actions to rebuild person-to-person contacts in Korea. We have
fulfilled our function. It is now up to the Member States of the United
Nations to fulfill theirs. The world is now better informed about
Korea. It is watching. It will judge us by our response. This
Commission's recommendations should not sit on the shelf. Contending
with the scourges of Nazism, apartheid, the Khmer Rouge and other
affronts required courage by great nations and ordinary human beings
alike. It is now your duty to address the scourge of human rights
violations and crimes against humanity in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea.
______
Responses of Ambassador Sung Kim to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Will the U.S. Government press in the United Nations
Security Council to hold another debate on North Korea's human rights
situation this year--for instance, in December, when the United States
is President of the council?
Answer. We are deeply concerned about the suffering of North
Koreans, and we continue to work closely with the international
community to sustain international attention on the deplorable human
rights situation in North Korea and seek ways to advance accountability
for serious human rights violations in the DPRK.
Last year, we worked hard with our partners to ensure the addition
of the situation in North Korea onto the Security Council's agenda and
were successful in holding the first-ever formal discussion by the
Council, on December 22, 2014, of the grave human rights situation in
North Korea. This was a significant step forward and reflected the
concern of the international community regarding the appalling human
rights violations being committed by the DPRK regime. At the session,
in which senior U.N. officials briefed Council members, U.S. Ambassador
to the U.N., Samantha Power, noted that the meeting reflected ``the
growing consensus among Council members and States Members of the
United Nations that the widespread and systematic human rights
violations being committed by the North Korean Government are not only
deplorable in their own right, but also pose a threat to international
peace and security.'' We have made clear our view that the Council must
come back regularly to speak about the DPRK. Working with partners, we
will press to create future opportunities for such dialogue at the
Council.
During such a session we would continue to urge the DPRK to take
action to remedy the violations identified in the U.N. Commission of
Inquiry report, which was requested through a Human Rights Council
resolution, including immediately closing the prison camps and
releasing all political prisoners unconditionally, providing for
greater freedom for all North Koreans, and allowing independent human
rights monitors to observe conditions in the country. As we have done
in the past, we would again urge the DPRK to engage directly with the
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special
Rapporteur Darusman, and thematic special rapporteurs on how to fulfill
its international human rights obligations and commitments. And we
would call on the Security Council to continue to monitor the situation
in the DPRK.
______
Responses of Ambassador Sung Kim to Questions
Submitted by Senator David Perdue
Question. Is this regime, in your view, willing to give up its
nuclear capabilities? Do you believe it is possible to achieve complete
denuclearization of North Korea without regime change?
Answer. The DPRK committed in the September 2005 Joint Statement of
the Six-Party Talks to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing
nuclear programs. The paramount goal of U.S. policy on North Korea has
been and remains the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.
Ultimately, the only practical solution is a diplomatic one. And we
believe the most realistic way to go about achieving that is through a
policy of changing the regime's thinking by making clear that there is
a real alternative available to North Korea and by continuing to
implement and enhance our comprehensive policy of diplomacy, pressure,
and deterrence.
President Obama has said--and Secretary Kerry has underscored--that
North Korea has a choice. North Korea can end its international
isolation and will create opportunities for prosperity for its people.
But to avail itself of those opportunities, North Korea must first
demonstrate its commitment to take steps to come into compliance with
international obligations. We remain open to authentic and credible
negotiations, but the onus is on North Korea to take meaningful actions
toward denuclearization.
Question. How can we more effectively use diplomatic, economic, and
nonproliferation tools to deter further North Korean provocations?
Answer. We remain deeply concerned about North Korea's ongoing
actions in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions and its
commission of systematic and widespread human rights violations, and we
encourage our allies and partners to continue to work with us to
address these provocative, destabilizing, and repressive actions and
policies of North Korea.
The State Department shares Congress' focus on enhancing pressure
on the DPRK and countering the threat to global security posed by the
DPRK's illicit programs and activities. We have important tools to
strengthen that effort, particularly the broad and powerful new
Executive order the President issued in January. The State Department,
along with our U.S. Government and international partners, continually
seeks the most effective means to impede the growth of the DPRK's WMD
and ballistic missile programs, reduce the resources earned through its
proliferation activities, and hold the regime accountable for its
provocative, destabilizing, and repressive policies and actions.
For these efforts to be effective, international cooperation is
key. We are working closely with the U.N. Security Council's DPRK
sanctions committee and its Panel of Experts, like-minded partners, and
others around the globe to harmonize our sanctions programs and to
ensure the full and transparent implementation of UNSCRs 1718, 1874,
2087, and 2094. As a result, we have seen greater actions taken by
member states to prevent illicit North Korea trade in arms, WMD-related
material, and luxury goods--most notably with the seizure by Panama of
a substantial amount of military gear on the North Korean ship Chong
Chon Gang.
We have also expanded outreach to countries that have diplomatic or
trade relations with North Korea to press them not to engage in illicit
activities banned by U.N. resolutions or targeted by U.S. sanctions. We
maintain regular contact and consultations with our allies and partners
to counter--whether through persuasion or pressure--the threat to
global security posed by the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile
programs.
In particular we remain actively engaged with partners, including
China and Russia, at a variety of levels on the importance of enhancing
pressure on Pyongyang. The North Korean nuclear issue, for instance,
was a major topic of discussion during President Xi's visit to
Washington.
Finally, we remain fully prepared to deter, defend against, and
respond to the threat posed by North Korea, and we are steadfast in our
commitment to the defense of the American people, our allies, and our
interests in the region.
Question. Can you inform me of the State Department's current
efforts to halt this sharing of nuclear technology between North Korea
and Iran? What more can be done?
Answer. The United States continues to work closely with the
international community and our partners to address the global security
and proliferation threat posed by the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic
missile programs, including the activities outlined in the Director of
National Intelligence Clapper's 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment. The
United States constantly monitors all available information on the
DPRK's dealings related to its WMD programs and its proliferation
activities worldwide. We also continue to monitor closely any efforts
by Iran to acquire proliferation sensitive technology.
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2094 prohibit the
transfer to, or from, the DPRK of goods, technology or assistance
related to nuclear, ballistic missile, or other weapons of mass
destruction-related programs. In addition, UNSCR 2231 (2015) prohibits
the sale, supply, or transfer to, or from, Iran of ballistic missiles
and related items for up to 8 years and imposes tight restrictions on
Iran's ability to acquire nuclear-related items through an UNSC-
supervised procurement channel.
The United States continues to take concerted efforts, both
nationally and multilaterally, to enhance the full and transparent
implementation of sanctions, including the full suite of U.S.
unilateral sanctions measures and all relevant U.S. U.N. Security
Council resolutions concerning the DPRK and Iran.
Question. As North Korea remains strapped for cash due to
sanctions, do you expect to see more efforts to sell nuclear technology
and material?
Answer. Strong enforcement of existing sanctions is the key to
preventing prohibited North Korean trade in arms and WMD-related
material, and limiting North Korea's ability to profit from its
prohibited activities. The United States continues to work to
strengthen sanctions enforcement, both through national measures and in
the U.N. context.
The United States has actively supported efforts by the UNSC DPRK
Sanctions Committee and its Panel of Experts to improve implementation
of the provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006),
1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013). The work of the Sanctions
Committee and the Panel of Experts has contributed positively to
stronger sanctions enforcement. In recent years, we have seen greater
actions taken by member states to enforce U.N. sanctions, most notably
with the seizure by Panama of a substantial amount of military materiel
on the North Korean ship Chong Chon Gang. The Panel's annual reports
have documented these actions in greater detail.
We have engaged countries across Southeast Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East that have been targeted by North Korea for proliferation-
related transport and sales, reminding them of their obligation to
implement U.N. sanctions and working to strengthen their capacity to do
so.
As we work to increase sanctions pressure, we continue to emphasize
to North Korea that the road to a brighter future remains open. Only by
abandoning its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, abiding
by its international obligations and commitments, and addressing the
concerns of the international community can North Korea achieve the
prosperity and security it seeks.
Question. What tools do we have to change China's calculus when it
comes to Beijing's approach to Pyongyang?
Answer. China has unique leverage, and we will continue to urge
China to do more until we see concrete signs that DPRK leaders have
come to the realization that the only viable path is denuclearization.
China and the United States agree on the fundamental importance of a
denuclearized North Korea; President Obama and President Xi reiterated
this publicly during President Xi's visit to Washington in September.
In recent years, North Korea's continued bad behavior and refusal to
take concrete steps toward denuclearization may be leading China to
reassess its North Korea policy. More can be done and more needs to be
done, however.
We remain actively engaged with China at a variety of levels on the
importance of enhancing pressure on Pyongyang. Both sides agree that
pressure must be an important part of our overall approach on North
Korea, and China has repeatedly expressed its commitment to
implementing U.N. Security Council resolutions. We expect our
engagement on these issues to continue.
Question. How can the U.S. improve implementation and enforcement
of North Korea sanctions, including U.N. sanctions? Are there loopholes
that need to be closed?
Answer. The United States continues to take steps to strengthen and
bolster the existing sanctions regime, both through national measures
and in the U.N. context.
The United States has actively supported efforts by the U.N.
Security Council DPRK Sanctions Committee and its Panel of Experts to
improve implementation of the provisions of U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013).
The work of the Sanctions Committee and the Panel of Experts has
contributed positively to stronger sanctions enforcement. In recent
years, we have seen greater actions taken by member states to prevent
prohibited North Korean trade in arms, WMD-related material, and luxury
goods--most notably with the seizure by Panama of a substantial amount
of military materiel on the North Korean ship Chong Chon Gang.
This, in turn, led to the Sanctions Committee's designating the
major DPRK shipping company involved in the Chong Chon Gang incident
for a global asset freeze, strengthening global efforts to combat the
DPRK's maritime weapons proliferation.
The Panel's annual reports have documented in further detail the
numerous actions that States have taken to enforce U.N. sanctions. U.N.
sanctions are limiting North Korea's ability to profit from its
prohibited activities and limiting the resources it has to invest in
its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
We have engaged countries across Southeast Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East that have been targeted by North Korea for proliferation-
related transport and sales, reminding them of their obligation to
implement U.N. sanctions and working to strengthen their capacity to do
so.
Question. What challenges exist at the United Nations--particularly
on the Security Council--to getting stricter enforcement of sanctions
on North Korea?
Answer. The United States continues to take steps to strengthen and
bolster the existing sanctions regime, both through work in the U.N.
context and through our own national measures.
We continue to work actively and intensely with a broad range of
partners across the international community to improve implementation
of U.N. Security Council sanctions, particularly those that target the
proliferation-related activities of the North's diplomatic personnel,
its cash couriers, its banking relationships, and smuggling of items
for its nuclear and missile programs.
We have also expanded outreach to countries that have, or are
exploring, diplomatic or trade relations with North Korea to press them
not to engage in military, WMD or other activities prohibited by U.N.
resolutions or targeted by U.S. sanctions. Burma's announcement that it
would end its military relationship with North Korea and comply with
U.N. resolutions is the best example of the results of these efforts,
which will continue.
______
Responses of Special Envoy Robert King to Questions
Submitted by Senator David Perdue
Question. What is being done by your office--and throughout the
State Department--to bring attention to and halt this practice?
Answer. We are deeply concerned by the DPRK's systematic and
widespread use of forced labor. The North Korean Government subjects
its nationals to forced labor in prison camps, through mass
mobilizations, and through government-contracted labor in foreign
countries.
The State Department continues to highlight these deplorable
practices through our annual reports, work with international
organizations and governments
that share our concerns, and raising awareness through public events
and private meetings.
We are also leveraging different U.N. tools to highlight the issue,
including by cosponsoring and lobbying for the passage of the annual
DPRK human rights resolutions at the Human Rights Council and the U.N.
General Assembly.
Over the past year, we have also increased our efforts to further
document and disseminate information on forced labor of DPRK workers in
other countries. In June, we hosted a meeting with like-minded
governments at which a former North Korean overseas laborer shared
information about his experience working at a construction site in
Kuwait. This prompted a discussion about possible actions to combat the
practice and improve labor conditions for North Korean overseas
laborers. We are coordinating closely with our embassies in countries
hosting North Korean workers to express our concern regarding the
conditions of forced labor these workers experience and to press for
the reduction and elimination of such forced labor.
Question. What is being done to encourage host states to
investigate practices involving North Korean labor conditions within
their borders?
Answer. We have raised our concerns with several host governments,
and will continue to work with them and other partners on this issue.
As part of these efforts, our Special Representative for International
Labor Rights has raised concerns about North Korean laborers on recent
trips. In addition, we continue to support nongovernmental
organizations conducting international advocacy campaigns to promote
the human rights of North Koreans.
Question. Are there ways to punish nations who host North Korean
laborers? Is State pursuing punitive measures?
Answer. We are developing targeted strategies to address these
issues, with the goal of taking further steps that will have the
greatest chance of improving the lives of North Korean citizens. A wide
range of countries currently host North Korean contract workers, and
our approaches may vary depending on the host country situation. We
continue in diplomatic conversations and public discussions to press
for reduction and elimination of such forced labor.
Question. How effective are these soft-power measures that draw
attention to the failings of the Kim regime, like the U.N. Commission
of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, at changing the actions of
the Kim regime?
Answer. Since the release of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI)
report in February 2014, we have made significant progress in our
effort to increase international attention and pressure on the DPRK.
Our DPRK human rights policy has focused on giving voice to the
voiceless by amplifying defector testimony, and increasing pressure on
the DPRK to stop these serious violations. We are actively working to
advance accountability for those most responsible.
We have maintained pressure on the DPRK by continuing to cosponsor
and lobby for the passage of strongly worded resolutions condemning the
human rights situation in North Korea in both the U.N. General Assembly
and Human Rights Council. A new tough resolution was adopted at the
Human Rights Council in March-April of this year; and a strong
resolution is under consideration at the General Assembly with a vote
expected later this year. In December 2014, the U.N. Security Council
convened its first-ever formal discussion of the human rights situation
in North Korea.
Secretary Kerry and U.N. Permanent Representative Samantha Power
have both hosted meetings at the U.N. to shine a spotlight on North
Korea's gross human rights violations and to give voice to the victims
of DPRK abuses. In addition to public events, we have conducted a
number of campaigns highlighting North Korea's atrocities. North Korean
political prisoners were highlighted as part of our #Freethe20 social
media campaign.
These actions are clearly making an impact. Pyongyang is feeling
the mounting international criticism over its human rights violations
and has begun to respond.
In what has been described by the media as a North Korean ``charm
offensive,'' North Korea sent its Foreign Minister to the high level
session of the U.N. General Assembly in September 2014 for the first
time in 15 years, and he was back in New York again this fall. Senior
DPRK officials have dramatically increased the number of visits to
other U.N. member states to urge other countries to vote against
resolutions critical of the DPRK's human rights practices in the U.N.
General Assembly and Human Rights Council. In May 2014, the DPRK, for
the first time, agreed to consider recommendations made in the first
and second cycles of the Universal Periodic Review process.
North Korea is clearly feeling the pressure. We believe it is
imperative to maintain and even increase this pressure, to follow up on
the recommendations of the COI report and to continue to call out the
DPRK on its human rights violations. Given the nature of the North
Korean regime, and the difficulty monitoring human rights conditions in
one of the world's most closed societies, we must have realistic
expectations regarding the willingness of the DPRK's leaders to change
their atrocious behavior. Nevertheless, we need to continue to focus
the world's attentions on the DPRK's widespread human rights violations
and remind North Korea's leaders that the international community will
seek accountability for the North's actions.
Question. What more can and should the U.S. do to draw attention
and shed light on the atrocities being committed by the Kim regime on
the North Korean people?
Answer. We remain deeply concerned by the systematic and widespread
gross human rights violations committed by the North Korean Government
and documented in the U.N. Commission of Inquiry report. Our DPRK human
rights policy has focused on three objectives: giving voice to the
voiceless by amplifying defector testimony, increasing pressure on the
DPRK to stop these serious violations, and seeking ways to advance
accountability for those most responsible. We have focused significant
resources on amplifying defector voices because we believe these
witnesses' stories are one of the most effective tools for shedding
light on the ongoing abuses and increasing international awareness.
We speak out frequently at the U.N. Human Rights Council and the
U.N. General Assembly on DPRK abuses. Secretary Kerry hosted a meeting
during the opening week of the 2014 U.N. General Assembly with the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, several Foreign Ministers, and North
Korean victims. We led the effort in the U.N. Security Council last
December to place DPRK human rights violations on the Council's agenda,
and we spoke against North Korean abuses at that meeting. We will
continue to work with other Security Council members to ensure
continued attention by the Council.
The U.N. Commission of Inquiry report was instrumental in
strengthening the international consensus on DPRK human rights. We
supported the COI recommendation to establish a field office in Seoul
of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. This office
will be essential in documenting the ongoing abuses and increasing
awareness.
We have and will continue to host public events to shed the light
on the human rights violations committed by the DPRK Government. In
April of this year, Ambassador Power hosted a Victim's Voices panel, as
a U.N. Side Event in New York. Last December, here in Washington, we
hosted a panel of defectors for International Human Rights Day. In the
coming months, we plan to host additional events to provide forums for
defectors to share their stories.
In addition to these and many other public events, we have
conducted a number of campaigns highlighting North Korea's atrocities.
North Korean women political prisoners were highlighted as part of our
#Freethe20 social media campaign. We have also highlighted North
Korea's human rights abuses through a Voices of North Korea campaign
and a Prison Camps of North Korea campaign. We continue to seek out
additional opportunities to leverage social media to draw attention to
these issues.
We support nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which conduct both
documentation and advocacy programs. Some of our NGO partners have been
instrumental in hosting side events on the margins of the U.N. Human
Rights Council and at the U.N. General Assembly. They have produced
numerous reports focused on DPRK abuses ranging from political prison
camps to forced labor. We will continue to support these groups.
Question. The U.N. opened a field office in Seoul to focus on human
rights this June. Can you describe your interactions with the U.N.
field office, and any joint efforts on improving human rights in North
Korea?
Answer. We have fully supported the creation of the Office of the
High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) field office in Seoul and its
mandate to strengthen monitoring and documentation of the human rights
situation in the DPRK; to work toward achieving accountability; and to
support the work of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on DPRK human rights
issues. Since the office's opening in June, Embassy Seoul and various
State Department bureaus in Washington, including the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, have visited the OHCHR office and
met with its staff. Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues
Robert King will also visit the office in November. The office was
formally opened in June and its director arrived in August. As such, we
look forward to increasing our engagement with the office as it becomes
fully operational.
The Seoul office and its staff function independently in accordance
with its mandate from the OHCHR and the international community. We
continue to support the OHCHR office and stand ready to offer our
assistance in any way.
Question. What efforts are being made to help North Korean
refugees? Is any pressure being placed on China to stop its forced
repatriations of North Koreans that illegally migrate to escape the Kim
regime?
Answer. The administration has established mechanisms in several
countries to process North Koreans seeking refugee resettlement in the
United States. In order to avoid jeopardizing the safety of North
Korean asylum seekers or disrupting the efforts of North Koreans
intending to reach the Republic of Korea, we act with utmost
discretion. This also improves our ability to gain the cooperation of
governments in the region. We respect the choice of North Korean
refugees in determining in which country to pursue resettlement. For
many individuals from North Korea, this is one of the first meaningful
choices they are able to make. We are committed to ensuring that each
North Korean refugee who is interested and eligible gains access to the
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. The Department of State is prepared to
share additional details about U.S. Government efforts on behalf of
North Korean refugees with interested Members of Congress and their
staff in a classified setting.
During the past fiscal year, we have continued efforts to
facilitate the admission of refugees from North Korea to the United
States. The U.S. Government coordinated with two host governments to
process the applications of 23 North Koreans who were seeking admission
to the United States as refugees. Fifteen individuals granted refugee
status have arrived in the United States. Of the remaining eight
individuals, four individuals were pending DHS/USCIS adjudication and
four individuals were pending exit permission from the country of first
asylum. The 15 arrivals included 3 unaccompanied minors.
The United States communicated to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that North Korean asylum-seekers are
given priority access to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and that
the United States will consider any North Korean applicant who
expresses interest in U.S. resettlement. Throughout the region, UNHCR
continues to work closely with us on cases of North Koreans seeking
U.S. resettlement. We believe that UNHCR--which holds the international
mandate for refugee protection--is often best suited to offer immediate
protection to North Korean asylum-seekers while their cases are being
processed for third-country resettlement.
Advocates and nongovernmental organizations working in the region
report that the Governments of China and North Korea continue to
severely restrict the movement of North Koreans to and within China.
Despite being a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention on Refugees and its
1967 Protocol, as far as we are able to determine, China continues to
enforce its policy of forcefully repatriating North Koreans apprehended
in its territory back to North Korea. Despite these restrictions and
the risk of forcible repatriation, each year significant numbers of
North Koreans are able to flee North Korea, passing through China en
route to countries where they may seek protection.
The Department of State continues to raise our concerns about
China's treatment of North Korean refugees with Chinese officials on a
regular basis and at senior levels. China has unique leverage, and we
will continue to urge China to respect the U.N. Convention on Refugees
and to pressure DPRK leaders on human rights as well as
denuclearization.
More can be done and more needs to be done, however. We remain
actively engaged with China at a variety of levels on the importance of
enhancing pressure on Pyongyang.