[Senate Hearing 114-812]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-812
THE U.S. ROLE AND STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: YEMEN AND THE COUNTRIES
OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 6, 2015
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Lester Munson, Staff Director
Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. Bob Corker, U.S. Senator From Tennessee..................... 1
Hon. Ben Cardin, U.S. Senator From Maryland...................... 2
Hon. Stephen Seche, Executive Vice President, The Arab Gulf
States
Institute, Washington, DC...................................... 3
Prepared Statement........................................... 5
Hon. Mary Beth Long, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Metis
Solutions, Washington, DC...................................... 8
Prepared Statement........................................... 10
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Camp David Joint Statement Submitted by Senator Benjamin L.
Cardin......................................................... 38
(iii)
THE U.S. ROLE AND STRATEGY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST: YEMEN AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Corker, Risch, Flake, Perdue, Cardin,
Menendez, Shaheen, Murphy, Kaine, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will
come to order. We thank our witnesses for being here and look
forward to your testimony.
Today's hearing is the third in a series of hearings
examining the role of the United States in the Middle East.
This hearing will focus on two related topics, U.S. policy
toward our GCC allies and the war in Yemen.
In May of this year, the President hosted delegations from
six GCC countries in an effort to allay their concerns about
the nuclear deal and to reaffirm American commitment to our
allies. That was almost 5 months ago. I think it is unclear at
present what the outcome of that has been.
As you talk to our gulf partners, there is clear skepticism
about American leadership in the region.
Meanwhile, there has been a marked increase in American
weapon sales to the gulf over the last few years. That said, a
business relation, certainly, is not equivalent to a strategic
partnership.
There is a strong case to be made that almost every
decision this administration has made concerning the Middle
East over the last few years has been considered with pursuit
of the Iran nuclear agreement in mind, or at least that has
impacted, certainly, their decisions.
Now that the agreement is going to be implemented, it is
vitally important--vitally important--that we close the
daylight between us and our GCC allies.
I hope our witnesses will cover why the GCC is important to
American interests and what the future of security cooperation
in that region should look like.
That future should be on display right now in Yemen, where
the perception of a disengaged America and a resurgent Iran has
led the GCC to take a stand.
Now, in fairness, that stand is not entirely on their own,
as Gulf States are displaying their use of American equipment
and training with surprising effectiveness, but also an
intolerable level of civilian casualties.
The war and the resulting extreme humanitarian crisis are
receiving the reluctant support of this administration. Yet I
am not sure what the defined objectives and end state of that
support is at present. Hopefully, you will help us with that.
I hope our witnesses can help us understand what American
policy toward the GCC countries should look like and how we
balance that against real humanitarian concerns.
Thank you again for appearing before our committee, and I
look forward to your testimony.
And with that, we turn to our distinguished ranking member
and my friend, Ben Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEN CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I strongly support
this hearing and having a discussion on the regional security
strategies involving our Gulf Cooperation Council in Yemen.
Last week, as you know, I introduced legislation, the Iran
Policy Oversight Act, and part of that was a response to the
debate we had during the Iran nuclear agreement review. What
came out loud and clear from all of our Members is that it is
critically important that the United States has a well-
articulated regional security strategy that gives comfort to
our allies, to Israel, to the Gulf Cooperation Council, and
deals with the challenges in Yemen.
So this hearing is, I think, critically important for us to
try to understand what we can do to strengthen the
understanding in the region about the U.S. leadership.
Working closely with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries
is absolutely critical to ensuring that we push back on all
Iranian destabilizing behavior. Although the U.S.-GCC
collaboration has taken on new importance and urgency as the
Iran deal is implemented, it is also important to recognize
that these relationships and the policy objectives of deepening
multilateral cooperation is not new.
U.S. commitment to the legitimate defense needs of the gulf
countries dates back to the first gulf war. U.S. commitment to
security cooperation extends through the last decade's
engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. And recently, this
commitment has been underscored through the U.S.-GCC strategic
cooperative forums hosted by Secretaries of State Clinton and
Kerry and the U.S.-GCC Camp David summit hosted by President
Obama.
U.S. engagement with the GCC is fundamental to achieving
any shared goal in the region, whether it is defeating ISIL,
restoring stability in Iraq and Yemen, shoring up Jordan and
Lebanon, addressing persistent instability in North Africa,
reinvesting in the peace process between Israel and the
Palestinians, or working toward a negotiated political
transition away from Assad in Syria.
The GCC countries play a critical role in a multitude of
shared interests from maritime security to counterterrorism, to
humanitarian response, to the hosting and basing of U.S. forces
in the region.
So there are many, many reasons why this relationship is
critically important.
I want to just add one additional point, if I might, as it
relates to Yemen.
We need to move forward with a political solution in Yemen.
It is not going to be a military victory. There is going to
have to be a political solution in that country. We know it is
not easy. We know it is complicated. But I think the United
States leadership is going to be critically important as we
look at dealing with the impact that Yemen has on the GCC
countries as well as on the regional stability issues.
So I look forward to listening to our witnesses. I look
forward to this discussion. As I was saying before we sat down
with our two distinguished witnesses, there are going to be a
lot more questions than answers, I am afraid. I think this
discussion is going to be important so that we can reach an
understanding as to how the United States leadership can
advance the security of our friends and allies in the region.
The Chairman. Thank you for your comments.
I will introduce our two witnesses.
One witness is the Hon. Mary Beth Long, founder and chief
executive officer of Metis Solutions and was the first-ever
Senate-confirmed female Assistant Secretary of Defense.
We thank you for being here.
Our other witness today is the Hon. Stephen Seche,
executive vice president of the Arab Gulf States Institute and
former Ambassador to Yemen.
So you all have a lot to share with us. We thank you both
for being here. I know you all have been here before and
understand we would like for you to keep your comments to about
5 minutes. Any written materials you have will be entered into
the record.
With that, Ambassador Seche, if you would begin, we would
appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN SECHE, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, THE
ARAB GULF STATES INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Seche. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee, as we meet
this afternoon, powerful, destructive forces are at work in the
Middle East, tearing apart societies, provoking a massive
migration, and threatening the very existence of established
states.
None of this is news to anyone who pays even cursory
attention to events in the region. But what may be less
apparent is the extent to which Arab Gulf States are involved
in the conflicts and the crises that are roiling the Middle
East.
In unprecedented ways, the states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council are employing their wealth and modern military arsenals
to try to achieve outcomes that serve their interests from
Libya to Egypt, and from Syria to Yemen. What drives them and
what the United States can do to influence their behavior are
questions worthy of careful examination. I am very grateful for
the opportunity to contribute to your discussion of these
issues.
My own assessment may seem counterintuitive. On the face of
it, the newfound assertiveness of the Arab Gulf States like
Saudi Arabia and the UAE might well suggest a greater degree of
confidence and maturity than seen in the past. While I would
like to think this is the case, I strongly suspect that it is
motivated at least in equal measure by a collective anxiety
that flows from three major concerns: first, that the United
States, long a guarantor of gulf security, is disengaging from
the region; second, that a resurgent, relegitimized, and
emboldened Iran will increase its efforts to destabilize Arab
Gulf States; and finally, that the wave of political and social
unrest that engulfed the Middle East in 2011 will make its way
to gulf doorsteps, threatening the status quo and the very
survival of the monarchies themselves.
I will very quickly touch on each of these points, which I
examine more closely in my written testimony.
There is no doubt that the fundamental underpinning of the
U.S. relationship with the Arab Gulf States is changing. Their
oil for our security assurances has been the fundamental
premise upon which the relationship has existed for years. But
I think reports of the U.S. disengagement from the region are
wildly premature. We are simply too deeply invested in the
region and the strategic partnerships with our Arab gulf
partners to walk away.
Regarding Iran, I believe that its nuclear program is only
the tip of the iceberg, the part that draws the most attention
because it looms so large in the public mind. It is the threat
that lies beneath that most worries our gulf partners, the
financial and military support Iran provides to destabilizing
political and armed insurgent movements in the region. This
brings me briefly to Yemen because it is here that the Sunni
Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia has chosen to draw a line in
the sand and tell Iran that its interference in the region will
no longer be tolerated, at enormous cost to the Yemeni people
and the nation's already fragile infrastructure.
It has never been my view that the Houthi movement comes
with a ``Made in Iran'' label. In fact, I would argue that the
support provided by former Yemeni President, Ali Abdullah
Saleh, has been much more decisive than whatever Iran has made
available.
Finally, let me address the response of Arab Gulf States to
internal pressure for political reform, which is two-pronged.
On the one hand, they are monitoring internal dissent carefully
and, to one extent or another, taking steps to quash it. At the
same time, there are efforts afoot to provide citizens of the
gulf monarchies with a modest level of political participation
through elections, in particular to municipal councils that
have only limited authority.
Mr. Chairman, while in the long run it is a good thing if
Gulf States are disposed to engage more readily in finding
solutions to regional crises, we can also hope they become
proficient in using tools other than military hardware to do
so. One of these tools might be the political will necessary to
agree to a framework within which GCC states and Iran engage in
direct talks on those issues that divide them.
Of course, nothing would please the United States more than
to see Iran's engagement with its neighbors and the West
increase, whether through trade, investment, academic
exchanges, or tourism. Every contact is seen as one less brick
in the foundation supporting the conservative theocratic regime
in Tehran, a sort of slow-motion soft-power transition to a
more open, inclusive form of governance.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to elaborating
on these points with you and the members of your committee.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Seche follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Stephen A. Seche
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee. As
we meet today, powerful, destructive forces are at work in the Middle
East, tearing apart societies, provoking a massive wave of migration
and threatening the very existence of established states. None of this
is news to anyone who pays even cursory attention to the region, but
what may be less apparent is the extent to which Arab Gulf States are
involved in the conflicts and the crises that are roiling the Middle
East at this moment.
In unprecedented ways, states of the Gulf Cooperation Council are
employing their wealth and modern military arsenals to try and shape
outcomes that serve their interests from Libya to Egypt and from Syria
to Yemen. What drives them, and what the U.S. can do to influence their
behavior, are questions worthy of careful examination, and I am very
grateful for the opportunity to contribute to your discussion of these
issues.
My own assessment may seem counterintuitive. On the face of it, the
newfound assertiveness of Arab Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and the
UAE might well suggest a greater degree of confidence and maturity than
seen heretofore. And while I would like to think this is the case, I am
persuaded that it is motivated at least in equal measure by a
collective anxiety that flows from three major concerns:
(1) That the United States, long the guarantor of Gulf
security, is disengaging from the region;
(2) That a resurgent, relegitimized, and emboldened Iran will
increase its efforts to destabilize Arab Gulf States;
(3) That the wave of political and social unrest that
engulfed the Middle East in 2011 will make its way to their
doorsteps, threatening the status quo and the very survival of
the monarchies themselves.
Allow me to briefly address each of these points:
There is no doubt that the nature of the U.S. relationship with the
Arab Gulf States is changing. The fundamental underpinning of that
relationship--their oil for our security assurances--has come into
question as a result of the shale revolution in this country, and a
profound reluctance on the part of the United States to send American
troops into combat in the region yet again.
This administration, correctly I believe, has decided that the more
appropriate response is to provide essential support to our regional
partners--including the Arab Gulf States--that will allow them to
attend to their own security needs: form their own alliances, build
their own capacity and police their own neighborhoods. This is both a
reasonable and strategically sound approach. In support of this policy,
the United States has committed itself to work with the Arab Gulf
States to prevent and deter external threats and aggression. This
commitment was reiterated just last week when Secretary Kerry met in
New York with the GCC Foreign Ministers under the rubric of our joint
Strategic Cooperation Forum.
This forum is the mechanism identified to tackle the range of
security issues discussed last May when President Obama hosted GCC
leaders at Camp David. Expedited arms transfers, robust
counterterrorism cooperation, enhanced cyber and maritime security, and
establishing an interoperable ballistic missile defense are some of the
key areas where work is being done in support of this strategic
partnership.
As we proceed to intensify our engagement with the GCC member
states, it is important to bear in mind that the GCC is not a monolith:
its six member states bring their own perspectives to the table, and
the challenges inherent in overcoming these differences and developing
a collective and comprehensive approach to defense and security should
not be underestimated. President Obama has gone so far as to authorize
the sale of U.S. arms to the GCC itself, which is a laudable
aspiration, but hardly a practical option: the GCC is not NATO. It has
no procurement authority, and each member state makes its own defense
decisions. Even the effort to establish a peninsula-wide ballistic
missile defense will run into strong headwinds, given that it will
require extensive sharing of sensitive military data among the GCC
states.
My point is that the United States is so deeply invested in the
long-standing, strategic partnerships with the nations of the Arab Gulf
that it is difficult to imagine it disengaging. In this respect, I
strongly suspect that our partners in the region are less worried about
the U.S. packing up and departing than they are about the U.S.
introducing its new friend.
Which brings me to my second point of neuralgia for the Arab Gulf
States: Iran.
Let me suggest at the outset that, in very important respects,
Iran's nuclear program is only the tip of the iceberg here. It is the
part that draws the most attention because it looms so large in the
public mind. But in fact, the biggest threat that Iran poses to its
neighbors is that which lies beneath the surface, if you will: the
financial and military support it provides to destabilizing political
and armed insurgent movements in the region, much of which is delivered
sub rosa.
And in this regard, Iran has been doing quite well influencing
events in the region without having to rely on a nuclear weapon. Its
support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria has been decisive in
the regime's ability to cling to power.
In Iraq, elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Force have
been fighting side by side with the Iraqi Army to dislodge Islamic
State fighters. And in Yemen, the armed Shia insurgency known as the
Houthis, which Iran has supported in a variety of ways for years, still
controls the capital, Sanaa, and other portions of the country, in
spite of having suffered serious military setbacks in recent weeks.
All that said, it is also quite true that the Arab Gulf States are
unhappy with the Iran agreement but again, for reasons that have little
to do with any nuclear weapons threat the agreement is supposed to
neutralize.
Their unhappiness flows from other concerns:
First, that the agreement will provide Iran with a financial
windfall as sanctions are lifted that is estimated to be in the
neighborhood of $100 billion, which Iran will turn around and use to
fuel greater instability in the region by arming insurgents, and
bankrolling subversion of the Gulf States. The Obama administration
argues that, having been cash-starved for so many years, the regime in
Tehran will be under enormous pressure to use this money to rebuild the
nation's infrastructure and improve services to its citizens. Given the
amount of money potentially in play, I suspect there will be a little
bit of both, although it is important to bear in mind that sanctions
relief is calibrated to take place as Iran meets its obligations under
the nuclear agreement.
Another area of concern for the Gulf States is that, courtesy of
the nuclear agreement with the West, Iran has just managed to negotiate
its way out of its political and economic isolation back into the
mainstream of regional affairs. Look at Iran's political leadership,
jetting around the region, calling for direct talks with its neighbors,
proposing four point plans to resolve the conflict in Syria, and
generally acting like statesmen when, in fact, their government's
deeply destabilizing behavior continues unabated.
This brings me to Yemen, because it is here, in one of the poorest
countries on earth, that the Sunni Arab world, led by Saudi Arabia and
the UAE, has chosen to draw a line in the sand and tell Iran that its
interference in the region will no longer be tolerated. In fact, Yemen
is now the most prominent example of a more assertive Arab Gulf
intervening militarily to protect its perceived security interests in
the region. The Saudi-led coalition entered the conflict on March 26,
when it began a campaign of air strikes against Houthi rebels that
continues to this day, a full 6 months later. And while the momentum on
the ground seems to have shifted decisively in favor of the coalition
and their efforts to reinstate the government of exiled President
AbdRaboo Mansour Hadi, it was not until the UAE and Saudi Arabia
introduced ground forces into Yemen that the tide truly began to turn.
Which is not to say that the air strikes did not contribute to the
shifting momentum, but they clearly were insufficient on their own to
make a decisive difference. And the truth is, the Saudi-led air
campaign has wreaked enormous damage on Yemen's civilian population and
its already fragile infrastructure. In a nation of 23 million people,
the United Nations now estimates that 1.5 million have been driven from
their homes and are now internally displaced. A full 80 percent of the
population, according to the U.N., needs urgent humanitarian
assistance.
What this suggests to me is that Saudi Arabia was focused on one
thing as it began its air campaign, and it was something other than the
physical well-being of Yemen's citizens. Saudi Arabia was focused on
sending a clear and unequivocal message to Iran, which it believes is
the driving force behind the Houthi rebellion. This is by no means a
universally held belief, however. Certainly, it is not clear to me that
the Houthi insurgency comes with a Made-in-Iran label. While I do not
doubt that Iran has provided political, financial, and military support
to the Houthis, we must remember that they are a 100-percent Yemeni
phenomenon, and it is almost certainly true that the military support
provided to them by former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been
much more decisive than whatever Iran has made available.
Most worrisome now is that the Saudi coalition, buoyed by recent
gains on the ground, and intent on avenging the death of coalition
forces (45 Emirati soldiers and 10 Saudis died in a single incident on
September 4), are not terribly interested in sitting down to negotiate
an end to this conflict. The United States has been encouraging the
Saudis to reconsider its position, and not for altogether altruistic
reasons. We have supported the Saudi-led coalition since its air
campaign began, providing logistical and intelligence support, and
munitions. I have some sympathy for the U.S. in this case, though: the
Saudis clearly were intent on moving swiftly and forcefully against the
Houthis, and I believe the administration decided it was better to be
in the tent with the coalition where it could perhaps exercise some
influence over the way it conducted itself, than outside where it had
no influence at all. Clearly, things have not worked out as planned,
and where the conflict in Yemen is headed simply is not clear. The
worst outcome, in my estimation, would be a ground assault on the
Yemeni capital, Sanaa, a city of 2 million people, with sizeable
pockets of support for the Houthis, and former President Saleh. I
fervently hope that before the conflict reaches this stage, all the
parties will step back and realize that the only certain outcome of
continued combat is greater suffering for the Yemeni people, and will
decide to negotiate terms for an end to the conflict and a viable
powersharing arrangement.
Finally, let me address concerns among Arab Gulf States that by the
voices calling for political and economic reform in the region will
eventually become those of their own citizens, who will insist on a
greater role in the fundamental decisions of governance that affect
their lives. With the exception of Bahrain, the only Arab Gulf State
with a restive, and majority, Shia population, there is no real
evidence of major domestic fault lines that would generate alarm at
this time. That said, all the Arab Gulf States are monitoring internal
dissent carefully and, to one extent or another, taking steps to quash
it. At the same time, there are efforts afoot to provide citizens of
the Gulf monarchies with some level of political participation through
elections. In some cases, this participation is tightly controlled, as
with the elections held over the weekend for the UAE's Federal National
Council. In other Gulf States, elections focus on municipal councils,
which have only limited ability to make substantive changes. That said,
it is worth noting that, for the first time, women will be able to
participate as both voters and candidates in Saudi Arabia's municipal
elections set for December.
Clearly, America's Arab gulf allies feel much more liberty to
undertake external defense and security initiatives than they do to
make difficult domestic-reform decisions. While in the long run it is a
good thing if Gulf States are disposed to engage more readily in
finding solutions to regional crises, we also can hope they become
proficient in using tools other than military hardware to do so. One of
these tools is the wealth of the GCC states, and we are seeing an
increasing willingness on their part to use this wealth as an
instrument of economic statecraft. And in spite of the fact that a
post-sanctions environment will see Iran reenter the regional and
international economy as a serious competitor, a number of GCC states
should be able to realize clear benefits from economic ties with Iran.
For one thing, the economic isolation imposed on Iran by sanctions
have made its economy heavily driven by domestic demand, which has
represented an average of 85 percent of real GDP over the last 5 years,
according to the IMF. This suggests a lot of pent-up interest on the
part of Iranians to invest their money abroad, which would certainly
contribute to the growth of regional economies. Trade, real estate,
banking and infrastructure are all areas likely to benefit from these
linkages.
Of course, nothing would please the United States more than to see
Iran's engagement with the West increase: whether through trade,
investment, academic exchanges, or tourism. Every contact is seen as
one less brick in the foundation supporting the conservative,
theocratic regime in Tehran, a sort of slow-motion, soft-power
transition to a more open, inclusive governance.
Like it or not, the Iran that emerges from this nuclear agreement
is going to very quickly reestablish itself as a major influence in the
region. To my way of thinking, the most sensible way for the Arab Gulf
States to respond to this new reality would be to consider an approach
to Iran other than the very heavy reliance on acquisition of greater
firepower that is currently underway. While this may provide short-term
comfort, in the long run what is needed is a vehicle that will allow
the Arab Gulf States and Iran to discuss the issues that divide them
and, in doing so, obviate the need to resort to military means to
resolve their differences.
While the exact framework for these negotiations can be discussed,
their value would seem to be clear, particularly given the deep
skepticism with which Arab Gulf States view Tehran's intentions, and
Iranian regime concerns that its neighbors in the region are conspiring
with the U.S. to hasten its demise.
What seems indisputable is that the dynamics in the Gulf region are
undergoing dramatic change, as a resurgent Iran faces off against its
increasingly anxious and assertive Arab neighbors. In between stands
the United States, exercising what influence it enjoys--and it is
limited--to try and ensure that competition in this instance does not
become conflict.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Secretary Long.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARY BETH LONG, FOUNDER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, METIS SOLUTIONS, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Long. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and
members of the committee, thank you very much for the
invitation to be here today.
As the former Assistant Secretary of Defense who was
responsible for strategies in the Middle East, I learned the
critical importance to the United States of our close and
continuing relationship with our gulf Arab partners.
Unfortunately, those close and continual partnerships are
strained today, in part because of the implicit policy that
they view by the United States to allow Iran to build its
regional power and its influence much along the lines of the
Ambassador's comments and to be soft on Iran as far as its
political, asymmetric military and other activities that for
our important gulf neighbors are at least if not more critical
than its nascent nuclear weapons advances.
The United States primary concern in Yemen is that of a
growing perception if not reality that Iran is using this
conflict in order to increase its power and that the Gulf
States have decided they are to respond, again, much along the
lines of my colleague.
The Chairman. If I could, I would have to say it is
actually amazing to hear his presentation. I know most people
understand we have a witness and this side has a witness. It is
amazing how on all these issues, the alignment has been as it
has been.
But anyway, keep going.
Ms. Long. Absolutely.
But I believe ?????? are making a mistake. Yemen is not a
model for United States counterterrorism efforts, as asserted
by the White House a very short time ago, and we are missing
the strategic.
Yemen is just the most recent piece of Iran's efforts to
increase its power and the most recent development of the
Russian-Iranian alliance is worrisome not only in Yemen but in
Syria. And the linkages between these regional participants and
what is happening in both those conflicts is something I
believe that is inimical to U.S. interests and something that
we need to examine.
The reentry of Russian military into the region suggests
that things could get much worse in Yemen in the near term,
particularly to the extent that there is a division of labor
between Russia and Iran on what is happening in Syria and that
the role of Hezbollah in Iran is increased, forcing the
division of labor. And the nascent show of the Houthis willing
to come to the table will be delayed even further because of
operating space or reprieve that they will be getting from Iran
and/or Hezbollah.
In fact, it was a Russian Tochka missile that killed the 45
Emiratis earlier this fall. Russia has long had strategic
interests in Yemen and its use of Iran to further those
interests is something we ought to be thinking about,
particularly in light of what is happening in both Iraq and
Syria.
This is particularly true as the administration does not
appear to be willing to call out either Iran or Russia for what
they are doing in the region, nor to understand Russia and
Iran's full motives, as I believe the GCC does.
Thus far in Yemen, the political situation is at best a
stalemate. The big question is how far must the Houthis be
pushed in order to negotiate and is it really a Houthi decision
any longer, given the myriad players who are now involved not
only on the ground but also in supplying weaponry, advice and
support, including the United States.
Arguably, the clearest benefactors of the ongoing conflict
are Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS, al-Qaeda being,
according to the State Department and the Center for
Counterterrorism in the United States, still the only
organization taking advantage of the power vacuums that play
along the fears of the Sunni tribes who are convinced that Iran
would be allowed to run its course, and it must turn to either
AQ or ISIS in order to counter the Iranian-backed Shia and
Houthis.
What is the nature of the conflict? It is asymmetrical. It
employs missiles and incredibly increasing political meddling
not unlike the political meddling in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and
Lebanon. All of these are at least as worrisome as the Iran
nuclear aspirations.
Of note, Saudi Arabia has over 1,500 kilometers of shared
border with Iran that are at great risk
The American interests in Yemen are legion. We must build a
strategic deterrence to containing Iran in the gulf. We must
increase and demonstrate our partnerships to the GCC in much
more than just selling of weapons as requested. The Gate of
Tears and freedom of navigation along and among the parties
that are using the Strait of Hormuz for the majority of their
oil and gas, not just the United States but China and elsewhere
that have severe impact on American jobs and economy, must be
considered in what we are doing in Yemen and in the region.
So what is the endgame? The endgame for the United States
should be augmenting our very little on-the-ground information
and visibility on what the Gulf States are doing, alleviating
the human suffering and poverty by helping the GCC target
better, and marginalize and mitigate the collateral damage
performed by the military activities. We should expedite the
sales of precision-guided weaponry, targeting, and other
assistance to the gulf Arabs in order to help their military
actions be more effective and reduce the number of casualties.
Although our efforts to work through the GCC and the Arab
League may have been a good idea, they were premature. Neither
organization is able nor equipped to deal with acquisitions nor
our expert regulations and laws. And our bureaucracy alone is
delaying and deterring military support that is necessary to
the ongoing conflict as we speak.
Finally, we need to lead internally. The President and
administration has been opaque in what are United States
interests in Yemen, and we need to come up with a policy and a
strategy that articulates our aims and goals.
And finally, current limitations on our naval deployments
in the gulf as a result of sequestration and the lack of
operational funds due through the BCA is limiting and tying our
military's hands to be effective support. We can do better.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Long follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mary Beth Long
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. I am honored to
be here to speak about the U.S. role and strategy in the Arabian
Peninsula, particularly Yemen. While Yemen looks better now than it did
a few months ago, we are--at best--looking at a stalemate that does not
appear to lead to a political resolution anytime soon. Make no mistake:
Yemen is not a model for U.S. counterterrorism efforts, as asserted by
the White House spokesman in March of this year. Washington must
provide a clear expression of U.S. interests, clarify our policies to
our allies and our enemies, and follow through with timely and decisive
action.
The primary U.S. concern in Yemen is that Iran is using the
conflict there to increase its power in the region. Washington must
help contain Iran and its regional meddling, which counters U.S.
interests. The U.S. should also be concerned about Iran and Russia
working together in Yemen and the broader Middle East. At this time, we
do not understand their strategy or respective roles in what appear to
be a division of labor. Washington must also recognize that Yemeni
territory and islands are critical to U.S. interests. In particular,
the global ``chokepoint'' at the Bab el-Mandab (``Gate of Grief'') is
the gateway to virtually all Suez Canal traffic. Finally, it is
important to note that the threat posed by terrorists and extremists in
Yemen is likely a far greater risk to the U.S. and its Gulf allies than
ISIS currently appears to be.
As an Iranian official said earlier this year, ``We are
everywhere now: Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.'' Yemen
should be on that list, though Iran may be keeping a low
profile.
The Russian-Iranian alliance suggests that the situation in
Yemen could get much worse in the near term. It is a clear
continuation of their aggression in other parts of the Middle
East.
The Bab el-Mandab is not only a key passageway for U.S.-
bound energy, but also to other economies upon which our jobs
and economy relies.
Yemen is still home to the ``single most active extremist
organization planning attacks against the U.S.'': Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), according to State Department and
the Counter Terrorism Center.
The rise of ISIS in Yemen will only make that worse.
The current status of the war in Yemen is thus: the pro-Yemen
Government coalition faces a political stalemate in Yemen although with
recent military success.
A timely political solution to the war in Yemen is needed to
save lives and avoid further humanitarian strain in the
country. The U.N. is trying to push negotiations between the
Yemen Government and the Houthis, but progress appears to be
stalled. The Bottom Line question is how far must the Houthis
be pushed militarily to feel compelled to negotiate?
The Saudi-led coalition of 10 or more countries is making
some progress, having pushed the Houthis out of Aden and moving
north toward Sanaa.
A significant byproduct of the internal chaos is a security
vacuum that AQAP and, to a lesser extent, ISIS are exploiting.
They are portraying themselves as the protectors of Sunnis
against the Shia Houthis and Iran. The Sunni coalition is
offering a counter to that dangerous narrative.
Russia and Iran have partnered to advance the Houthis' interests in
Yemen as part of a broader Middle East strategy of aggression.
Washington does not fully understand how Iran and Russia are
cooperating regionally--they appear to have a strategy and we do not.
In Yemen, there appears to be a tacit division of labor.
The most recent development is evidence of an Iranian-
Russian alliance in Yemen, in addition to their alliance in
Syria and Iraq. Early indications are that their goals may be
inimical to Washington's and its allies' interests. The
Russian-Iranian alliance suggests that things could get much
worse in the near term, particularly to the extent that
Russia's more overt role provides the Houthis with operating
space or reprieve.
What was likely a Russian Tochka missile killed 45
Emiratis fighting in the pro-Yemeni Government coalition in
Yemen earlier this fall. The missile was either supplied
directly from Russia or delivered from Syria through Iran,
according to a Hezbollah official. These missiles require
military guidance to use correctly so it is likely the
Houthis have either Russian or Lebanese Hezbollah
assistance.
There is also reporting that Russia met with Houthis about
future financial alliances prior to the beginning of
coalition airstrikes.
The Obama administration does not appear to be willing to
call out Russia for its military activities in the region and
elsewhere. There is a relationship between what Russia is doing
in Syria and what Russia is doing in Yemen and we need to be
realistic about what that is.
The Obama administration has declared that we support the pro-Yemen
Government coalition, but has not adequately explained to the American
people what are the U.S. interests at stake. A simple answer is that we
support the coalition efforts in Yemen because coalition countries
share our concerns about Iranian influence and terrorism in Yemen.
Containing Iran is critical.
Yemeni territory and islands are critical to the global
``chokepoint'' at the Bab el-Mandab (``Gate of Grief''), which
is the gateway between the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa--
virtually all Suez Canal traffic.
Freedom of Navigation of the Strait of Hormuz. There is
lots of talk of U.S. energy independence, but the bottom
line is somewhere around 25-30 percent of our oil comes
from the GCC countries and must pass unimpeded through the
Gulf (Iran is at 4 percent).
Key passageway not only for U.S.-bound energy, but also to
other economies upon which our jobs and economy relies.
Most powerful threat to Saudi Arabia and other southern Gulf
States.
There are substantial challenges to U.S. and other operations in Yemen.
The U.S. withdrew most of its Embassy staff from Yemen,
meaning we have very little visibility on the ground.
The United Nations has reported that 86 percent of those
killed civilians (2,000 dead/4,000 wounded).
There are 1.5M displaced and 90 percent in urgent need of
humanitarian assistance.
We are supporting the coalition through the provision of
targeting information (though we do not select targets),
intelligence, 45 intelligence analysts, logistical and search
and rescue support, and weapons.
The U.S. relationship with GCC countries, which make up the
bulk of the coalition, is weak.
The U.S.-GCC summit at Camp David in May failed to do the
most important thing: close the credibility gap between the
White House and our GCC partners. Washington's
contributions to the coalition in Yemen could be a
confidence builder and put these important relationships on
firmer ground.
The U.S. made the following assertions of support at the May U.S.-GCC
summit:
On Yemen, the parties emphasized the need to move rapidly
from military operations to a political process and support
U.N. humanitarian efforts (including a Saudi pledge of $274M to
U.N. humanitarian efforts in Yemen);
Security Cooperation--provision of military equipment and
training, and joint exercises;
Security Assurances vs. Guarantees
``We [the U.S.] are prepared to work jointly with our GCC
partners'' was considered a rather ``tepid'' response and
simply sustained misguided efforts to work through the GCC/
Arab League on a unified Arab force. The idea of a united
GCC block is evidence of our failure to understand how the
region works. Notably, Washington insisted on an agreement
that the GCC ``consult'' with the U.S. if it plans to take
military action beyond its borders.
Ballistic Missile Defense (and a revival of the decades-old
goal of a GCC-wide Missile Early Warning System);
Military Exercises and Training Partnership, including more
Special Operations Forces cooperation and training with member
states;
Arms Transfers Fast Tracking (and, again, a misguided effort
for GCC-wide sales after a GCC procurement capability is
established);
Maritime Security;
Counter-Terrorism;
Foreign Terrorist Fighters;
Counter-Terrorism Financing;
Critical Infrastructure and Cybersecurity;
Countering Violent Extremism;
Counter proliferation.
The most important thing that will come out of that meeting is if it
will restore U.S. credibility with our Gulf allies. Timely, robust
follow through is critical.
Bringing the war in Yemen to a close as swiftly as possible and
containing negative Iranian influence will require that Washington
provide a clear expression of our interests and our policies to our
allies and our enemies, and follow through with timely and decisive
action. Washington should:
Help the coalition determine its end game and how to achieve
it definitively. The U.S. should increase our support to the
coalition--particularly in the areas of deterrence--by
providing additional intelligence, logistics and weapons
support. We should also provide additional combat support,
particularly that which supports ground troops' safety and
better directs lethal activity, thus reducing civilian and
economic collateral damage (note: precision guided weaponry
saves lives);
Strengthen U.S. efforts to intercept Iranian and Russian
support, particularly weapons, to the Houthi rebels and
Hezbollah in Yemen. We cannot continue to tie one hand behind
our back by failing to have sufficient military equipment and
activities funded and deployed;
Help secure the Saudi border;
Put pressure on Iran and Russia diplomatically and
otherwise, including by routine coalition exercises;
Lead internally (and lead abroad) by explaining why we
should ramp up our support to ``moderate'' opposition in Syria
and remove the constraints on our military leadership to
provide unfiltered advice on best courses of action;
Fix current and future limitations on our naval deployments
to the region as a result of sequestration and the lack of
operational funds due to the BCA.
The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony.
If I could, I will just briefly, Madam Secretary, you are
referring to a request that the Saudis have right now for
guided weaponry to refurbish what they have been using in
Yemen. I guess there is a concern if we do not act upon that,
they will have to resort to dumb bombs, which in every way will
be more damaging to the civilian population.
I think that is the specific issue you are referring to. Is
that correct?
Ms. Long. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. If I could, you also spoke to something else.
I would like both of you to respond. You mentioned that we need
to demonstrate our support for the GCC in Yemen, so I would
like to ask you both this. Are we involved in the way that we
are there to demonstrate support for the GCC or is there some
national interest in Yemen that we care deeply about, if you
would elaborate? Is it more about us demonstrating support or
is it because Yemen itself has in itself a national interest to
our country?
Ambassador Seche. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will begin and
then let Mary Beth finish where I end off, and probably better.
But I do believe that we are there at the moment
principally because of our alliance with Saudi Arabia. When
Saudi Arabia decided in March to go in with the coalition to
begin the bombing campaign, we did not get a whole lot of
advance warning. We did not get a question as to whether we
thought it was a good idea or not. We were told fundamentally
that Saudi Arabia had decided there was such a crisis on its
southern border, it had to move forcefully and decisively to
route the Iranians and their proxies, the Houthis, as they see
the world.
So we went in I think believing it was better to be in the
tent than not in hopes that we could somehow chart the course
with the Saudis, so this expedition of theirs might turn out
better in the process.
I think the instinct was right. I think the execution has
been less than good. I think what we have now is kind of a
tiger by the tail, where we are now complicit in what the
Saudis are doing with the coalition in Yemen without a real
ability to change the course of what they are doing. We are
trying very hard to persuade them, I think, to see their way
clear to get the parties to the conflict to the negotiating
table, but it has not been easy.
I do believe the Saudis and the coalition members are so
enthused at the moment by what they see in terms of their
victories on the ground, they are reluctant to say let us call
a halt to this and give the Houthis an advantage. So they went
to press harder even perhaps.
I hope that they do not have in mind, in this context, an
attack on the capital, Sanaa. I think that would be an absolute
disaster. It is a city of 2 million people with deep pockets of
support for Houthis and former President Saleh.
I cannot imagine what a ground assault would do, other than
lead to more deaths and more carnage in Yemen. I think it is
very ill-advised.
Ms. Long. I do not disagree. I actually think it is that,
but it is more complicated.
There are three reasons why----
The Chairman. It is what--but it is more complicated?
Ms. Long. More complicated.
The Chairman. It is what?
Ms. Long. It is our support to Saudi Arabia and our support
to the gulf, but I think there are two other very key
interests.
The first are U.S. national interests. I mean, for all our
talk of being energy independent, the fact of the matter is
approximately 30 percent of our oil and gas does come through
either the Strait of Hormuz or the Gateway of Tears, and that
is not going to change in the near future. To the extent it is
not our oil and gas, China and others are still highly
dependent on the oil and gas they transfer through there. And,
as you know, the Gate of Tears also controls all the traffic
that goes through the Suez Canal.
Secondly, it is not only us supporting the gulf and the
Saudis, but it is us showing Iran and us showing Russia that we
are serious about hegemonic behavior in the region, and we do
intend to draw a line and that military involvement,
particularly to the extent in Yemen that we are now seeing, is
not acceptable to United States interests and it is something
that we do not support.
So it is really those three things, our interests, support
to the gulf, messaging to our enemies.
The Chairman. Do you think members of the GCC, without our
leadership, have demonstrated effectiveness in Yemen?
Ms. Long. I think the GCC has done two things. I think they
demonstrated their lack of confidence that we would lead and
join them and thus the reason they have gone out on their own
and delayed in informing us. And I think that they have
demonstrated that they could have remarkable military success.
I do not think that you would find any argument either the
U.S. or in the GCC that this is not something that is going to
be won militarily and it is the political piece that is
missing. And there we do have a lack of--certainly, the goals
have been ambiguous and the means have been even more difficult
to determine.
The Chairman. Mr. Seche.
Ambassador Seche. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I think what we
have seen in Yemen is that the coalition went in without an
endgame. They went in really very hot. They were in a state
seeing what they did see, in terms of the Houthis taking over
territory willy-nilly heading south toward Aden. I think what
we have seen now is that they have learned what we have
learned, that you cannot do this entirely by the air. You
cannot do this just by airstrikes alone. You cannot win a
conflict.
So they had to introduce ground forces, and at some
considerable cost. There was just an attack this morning that
has killed more Emiratis and more Saudis, and this is following
the one in early September in which 55 Emiratis and Saudis were
killed as well.
So I think it has started to really dawn on our gulf allies
that there is more to this than demonstrating to the world a
very resolute Saudi Arabia taking care of its own defense
needs. I think what we have seen, to some extent, is a very
inexperienced Saudi Minister of Defense with the reins given to
him by his father in this case, and asked to control and manage
and orchestrate a very complicated issue in Yemen militarily.
As you suggested yourself earlier, Mr. Chairman, it has not
yet gone as they might have thought.
The Chairman. I think they are learning some of the same
lessons we have learned for the last 15 years.
As far as what our involvement should be with them for a
better outcome, what would the two of you suggest?
Ms. Long. I think three things.
I apologize. We are both so polite.
The Chairman. And you are both on the same page. It is very
refreshing.
Ms. Long. I think from a concrete standpoint, we need to
help them more aggressively with targeting, not only in order
to help them but to be more effective militarily, but we have
to start mitigating these collateral damages and human rights
issues.
The Chairman. And we would do that how?
Ms. Long. There are means of lasing targets on the ground
that I do not believe that we are employing. The White House,
there seems to be some ambiguity as to the extent to which we
are involved in targeting, whether we are preparing packaging
and helping prioritization. I would leave it to our military
experts and our commanders to discuss the detail but,
certainly, more involved targeting.
And as we all know from what happened in Kunduz, it is not
a perfect exercise. But we can certainly do better, and we need
to help them do better, provide them with munitions that are
precision-guided and that can be lased and targeted.
I think one of the big mistakes we are making, and the one
I hear the gulf complain about the most, is this idea of
working through the Arab League and having a unified Arab force
and working through the GCC. It is just misguided. The GCC was
not set up to do procurements. The GCC was not set up for end-
user certification. It is an idea whose time may come, but now
is not it. We need to be working bilaterally.
And although the GCC and the United States talked at Camp
David about expediting exports, I think what has happened in
the follow-through is it has devolved to midlevel or
bureaucrats at my level that are working as much and as well as
they can through the bureaucracy, but this is not an easy
bureaucracy, and it needs leadership and attention at the
highest most levels.
We can increase our intelligence. Our intelligence is still
weak. We have very little visibility on what is going on on the
ground. That visibility, frankly, can also help us monitor what
the gulf----
The Chairman. We have very little visibility of what? Say
that again.
Ms. Long. On what is going on on the ground. We are relying
primarily through third-party and other reporting. We can do
better.
My understanding is from satellite tasking and other
measures, we are extremely limited in the region and that a lot
of our information could be shaped by those who are providing
it to us.
Finally, exercises, we have talked a lot at Camp David
about performing exercises to send signals. We have not really
put any on the table. Part of that are the limitations that are
imposed by our military commanders because of resources, in
part because of the way the budget and sequestration have
evolved, and our naval presence that is available even to go to
the gulf.
I have a further list in my written testimony.
The Chairman. If you would be brief, I am over my time, and
I want to try to set an example.
Ambassador Seche. What I would say, Mr. Chairman, at this
point is if the Saudis, and I believe they do, are looking to
us for a refill on munitions they need to continue to fight in
Yemen, I would really put that offer on the table with
considerable strings. One of them would be that we need to have
the Saudis really facilitate some kind of venue in which talks
can begin.
I think the Saudis have been very slow, as I said earlier,
to see that this is a moment at which talks could be profitable
and productive and perhaps bring an outcome to this conflict. I
think they see this as a military victory right now. I think we
need to make it clear to them that there is no military victory
here and that only some kind of negotiation with all the
parties to the conflict can bring this to a rapid close.
And they need to allow President Hadi, because they really
are the ones who are behind him dictating the terms he will
set, to sit down with the Houthis and others in the conflict
and really come to some kind of a power-sharing agreement that
will allow everyone to be inside a government and be able to
resolve their issues within Yemen themselves.
The Chairman. Thank you both very much.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you both. I certainly agree with your
final comment, as I said in my introductory remarks.
It is clear that security in this region very much depends
upon U.S. leadership, not just because we have the military
capacity and are able to bring a coalition together for
effective results, but also because of the universal values
that America represents--something that is desperately needed
in this region.
So I want to first quote from President Obama in an
interview he gave this past April where he observed that in
many countries across the Middle East populations ``are
alienated, youth that are underemployed, an ideology that is
destructive and nihilistic, and in some cases, just a belief
that there are no legitimate political outlets for
grievances.''
So part of our job is to work with these states and say,
how can we build your defense capabilities against external
threats, but also how can we strengthen the body politic in
these countries so that the Sunni youth feel that they have
something other than ISIL to choose from?
I think the biggest threat that they face may not be coming
from Iran invading. It is going to be from dissatisfaction
inside their own countries.
That is a tough conversation to have, but it is one that we
have to have.
I state that because we should look at what happened in
Egypt. The United States was criticized by the GCC that we were
not strong enough in defending the Mubarak regime. We were
criticized internationally that we were on the wrong side of
history, in regard to the rights of the people of Egypt. Are we
going to be on the right side of regional security in the
Middle East, if we are not effective in bringing about
political reform in the GCC?
We see protests. We saw the protest in Bahrain in 2011, the
Shia.
The question is: How can we effectively engage our partners
in the region on their external security threats in a way that
we can also strengthen their internal rights for their
citizens?
Ambassador Seche. Senator Cardin, I think you have touched
on what is probably the most neuralgic point for our gulf
allies, which is political reform. This is an area where we
have not been able to engage with them as fully and effectively
as I think we all would like.
I think we tend to be deferential. We tend to depend upon
them as security allies. Therefore, we let a lot of the
internal conditions in the Gulf States go by without sitting
down and pressing points about what we think is necessary for
long-term stability, as you said yourself.
I give President Obama credit for speaking publicly about
the need to have these conversations because they are
essential. And I think no partnership can really thrive without
a full scope of discussion about all the elements of security
and stability in those nations. And certainly, civil society,
how they can cultivate a civil society that is supportive of
the regime and not looking to tear it down, is a fundamental
issue for them to come to grips with.
I think so often our gulf allies see civil society and
reform movements as a threat to their longevity. It does not
need to be that way at all. I think they tend to be, in more
cases than not, loyal to the regime. But they do want to see a
little breathing space and a little room where they can become
viable, functional parts of, if not a democracy, at least
something that is more representative and something that is
more inclusive.
Ms. Long. I do not dispute the need to engage our gulf
allies and our allies worldwide on the role of civil society
and engagement of the peoples. However, as a more pragmatist, I
think right now that the problems are not in the gulf and the
problems are not in Saudi Arabia due to internal conflict. And
in fact, the GCC will tell you that one of the reasons it is
operating in Yemen is in order to give the Sunni there some
alternative other than ISIS and AQAP to protect their interests
while they are believe that they are being forced out and
limited in their exercise of their rights by the Shia-led
Houthis, by the Iranians, and by other interlocutors who are
limiting the Sunni ability to exercise their freedoms within
Yemen, and that this is the line that they are drawing.
Having engaged in the gulf countries for many years as one
of the senior negotiators, I have actually found them
remarkably willing to discuss the roles of civil society. The
openness of the conversations has always been very full.
I do not think that is the problem that we are dealing with
now, as the region basically becomes a conflagration of Yemen,
Iraqi, Lebanese, Syria and now nascent conflicts in other areas
where there is actually battle engaging.
Senator Cardin. I would just say that if I had that
conversation with Egypt a few years ago, talking to our
military and the military-to-military relationship between
Egypt and the United States and how close that was, I probably
would have gotten a similar answer.
Arab Spring happened. People want freedom. It may not be
the immediate issue, but it will emerge.
If we do not use the opportunities we have to make those
advances it will come back to hurt U.S. interests and security
interests.
I appreciate your compliments to President Obama, and that
is why I quoted his comments. I am not aware of this being even
on the agenda at the summit. I just think we make a huge
mistake when we do not take advantage of opportunities to make
it clear that we expect advances.
We do not expect overnight change. We do not expect them to
adopt an American system. We do expect them to adhere to
international human rights. And in every one of these
countries, there is need for significant improvement. And I
think at our own peril, if we do not bring that up at times, it
works against our long-term interests.
I want to ask one more question, if I might, before my time
expires, in deference to my colleagues. And that is, I would
like to get your assessment as to how the GCC sees Russia in
this region. Russia obviously has had an impact on Iran
directly, and now in Syria, it is having a much larger military
presence. There is some talk about Russia and Egypt getting
together and having some discussions.
My question basically is, from the GCC point of view, how
do they see their relationship with Russia evolving, based upon
the reliability of the United States?
Ms. Long. I think they are not sure. I think they see Putin
as a stronger leader who is more decisive than our White House.
So in some respects, they are attracted to him. I also think
they are attracted to him because Putin and the Russians often
represented an alternate means to military sales when we were
unwilling. As you see, Egypt, I think, is one of the examples.
I think now that they are seeing Russia's involvement in
Syria, Iraq, and possibly Yemen, they are not sure of Russian
goals. And they are offended and frightened by the fact that
Russia appears to be aligning itself with Iran.
I am sorry, I am not sure that they have decided, frankly.
Senator Cardin. Can we change that equation?
Ms. Long. We need to.
Ambassador Seche. I think that Mary Beth is right on that
issue, Senator. I think that what our gulf partners see now in
Russia is a betrayal to some extent, because they had made
overtures to Russia. The Saudi Defense Minister did go there in
July. They were looking to make some kind of relationship. I
think Russia is a useful foil in some ways for the Gulf Arab
States, as they look to say to us, ``We can find other markets.
We can find other friends. We have other strategic alliances we
can form. It is not just you, Washington. We can go to Moscow.
We can go elsewhere.''
I do not think fundamentally that is a threat to the
primacy that we enjoy with our Arab Gulf allies. I think that
this is something that is useful, and the Gulf States tend to
spread their wealth around, in terms of purchases of military
supplies. They have always done so. They do not adhere to a
one-market relationship with any country. But I do not think it
is a serious courtship.
I do think what we have seen now with Russia coming in and
siding itself with the Assad regime and with Iran and Syria is
a deep, deep distrust of Russian motives. I think we see in
Saudi Arabia just today clerics by the dozen speaking out
against Russia and what it has done basically to punish the
Sunni population in Syria beyond where they have already been
punished by the Assad regime. I think this is going to be the
downfall of Vladimir Putin's adventure in Syria, that he is
going to be seen as really working against the Sunni Muslim
population around the world.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you both for your lifetime of
service.
I want to go back. I have made two trips to the Middle East
this year and talked to most of our GCC partners and four or
five heads of state over there. I want to get more involved in
Russia. But first, I want to talk about the Iranian
involvement, specifically in Yemen.
Just last month, there was an interdiction of a private
vessel with arms, serious arms, going into Yemen. Yet we still
have some sanctions relative to Iran's activity.
Can you be more specific? I would ask both of you this
question. And the second part of that question specifically is:
What is Iran's on-the-ground involvement today in Yemen?
Secondly, How does the military presence in Syria affect our
future position vis-a-vis what we are trying to do in Yemen?
Ms. Long.
Ms. Long. On the first point, interdiction, I think,
statistically, if you go back and look, United States-led and
international interdiction over the last year in particular
against Iranian and other vessels going into Yemen has been
low. The Gulf States will tell you that is one of the examples
of us giving the Iranians a bye, because we have not been
enforcing even the existing sanctions that are applicable to
Iranian military activities, particularly to Yemen, and that
there have been instances where we have backed off. So I am not
sure that we know or anybody really knows the extent.
Certainly, weaponry, the Russian missile incident against
the Emiratis, anyone will you tell you, much like the incident
in Ukraine, successfully firing one of those missiles and
having it hit the target with the precision that it did is no
small feat. It is highly unlikely those were done by Houthis or
tribesmen. It is very likely that they were done either by
Hezbollah, who had access to those weaponry and training in the
past, or by Russians or Iranians who were on site providing
strategic and other help.
I think that the role and the numbers of IRGC or Quds
Force, the Revolutionary Guard of Iran, who are participating
in Yemen, has done nothing but increase. There are some
analysts who think there is a tacit division of labor that is
occurring between Iran and Russia in Iraq, Syria in Yemen,
whereas in one place someone is the weapons supplier and in the
other place someone is the guy on the ground. Russia takes the
air in Syria; Iran takes the ground in Yemen.
But I do not think we have good visibility on the numbers
and types except that it is increasing.
Ambassador Seche. Senator, I think there is no doubt that
Iran has for years supported the Houthi movement politically,
financially, and militarily. This is what Iran does. We know
this around the world. Whenever they see a besieged Shia
community anywhere, they come to its assistance. They do it
anyway they can. They always do it sub rosa if possible,
because they do not want to have any fingerprints on it, but
they are there. And they are there in Yemen, and they are in
Bahrain, as Mary Beth said earlier.
But I think that, again, what we see in Yemen is a
nationalist movement, the Houthis, the Shia. The Zaydis have
been in Yemen for thousands of years. The Houthis are just a
portion of that community. They have grievances that have
endured for years and years. They have had six conflicts with
the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh when he was President over
a period of several years.
So there is a lot of grievance that the Houthis bring that
did not need Iran to provoke them or to spur them on. They have
enough of their own angst and their own anxieties to last a
lifetime.
So I think what we see, though, is Iran taking advantage of
a situation, exploiting it as best they can. I do not think
that the Iranians are there in any really decisive way. As I
said earlier, I think they are there. But I think the Houthis
have been able to do what they have done because they were
speaking to a population in Yemen that was as disenfranchised
as they were.
And it was not a sectarian conflict, I believe, until Saudi
Arabia entered. Then it became very pronounced. Then it was
Sunni Saudi Arabia against Shia Iran.
Prior to that, it was the Houthis with a political message
that really resonated across all sectarian lines in Yemen. And
it was: There is corruption. There is an ineffective
government. There is a better future of reform. But no one is
giving it to us, despite all the time we spent following 2011
trying to get to that point.
Senator Perdue. You both have spoken about the underlying
crisis over there. That is really the religious-sectarian
conflict, Sunni on Shia, Shia on Sunni. In certain countries,
the minority is in control, and so forth. So you have
continuing conflict there.
When you look at it as it relates to nation-states, though,
the concern that I have is that we do not have a strategy. So
when it gets down to the detailed tactics of supporting allies
there relative to the Obama doctrine in the region, I am at a
loss for really how we execute against that.
So my question is, as these strategic partnerships have
failed us in the region, relative to the Obama doctrine laid
out 1.5 years ago, I think at one of the military academies,
How do we go forward with these partnerships that now have
great doubts about our intentions in the area? Without an
overlying strategy long-term, how do they even begin to think
about a GCC close-in strategy relative to Syria and Yemen?
And one last derivative of that is this proliferation
threat. I am really very concerned about that after talking to
these Foreign Ministers and some of the heads of state.
Particularly after the JCPOA, what can we do to combat that,
because that is another derivative of our lack of long-term
strategy?
Ms. Long. I think the most important thing we can do is
become engaged, clearly send signals that we have not left the
region, that we are not going to leave the region, that there
are consequences to the proliferation of weapons, and there are
consequences to entities from outside the region basically
taking what was an internal conflict--and I agree with my
colleague regarding the Houthis--but hijacking it so that it is
has morphed well beyond anything that we would recognize 10
years ago.
Senator Perdue. Sorry to interrupt. I heard the chairman
asked you earlier, how would you do that? And the answer was
more specific arms delivery. But are there any other things
that we could do to execute what you just said?
Ms. Long. Yes. We need to increase our presence in the
gulf, get back to the naval carriers that we had a few years
ago before we had to reduce them because of sequestration.
Senator Perdue. And that creates a real problem. To have
any kind of foreign policy in the Middle East, we have to have
a strong military.
The problem is, right now, we are about to be in a position
where we have the smallest Army since World War II, the
smallest Navy since World War I, the smallest Air Force ever,
and we are not done yet.
I am not trying to make this a political comment, but I
really am trying to point out and get you to answer how serious
this threat is if we cannot back up what you are suggesting, in
terms of interdicting, our position there.
Ms. Long. We cannot. And the way that we are headed with
our congressional impasse on budget and sequestration and the
reduction in our forces, particularly to our naval forces, we
will not be able to in the foreseeable future. And that is
huge, because our credibility is gone, because we are not
participating. We are not following through.
Senator Perdue. And you do not think that is lost on Mr.
Putin or the ayatollah either, do you?
Ms. Long. Of course, it is not. That is why Russia and Iran
have expanded their participation, both militarily and
politically, in all these conflicts that should have been and
could have been contained at least in some respects. They could
have been at least mitigated from creeping into the other
region had we had a strong U.S. foreign policy and a plan that
we were executing. And frankly, we have and had neither.
Senator Perdue. Ambassador, I am out of time, but with your
forbearance?
The Chairman. Sure, absolutely.
Ambassador Seche. Just briefly, Senator. I think you make a
very valid point. I think we probably are not going to increase
our presence in the gulf. We have a very solid presence there
now. We have a number of military bases, Al Udeid. We have the
Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. We have Al Dhafra in the UAE. We have
40,000 service men and women. This is a very strong statement
of our support and strategic partnership in the region.
I think that our gulf Arab allies are worried not so much
because they think we are going to walk away from there, but
because they think we are going to introduce Iran back into----
Senator Perdue. Could I interject just one thing though?
What we are about to do in Afghanistan, that also is not lost
on the leaders in the area. We are about to cut in half,
basically, our troops over there. That is what is being
recommended right now by the administration. That is not lost
on the people there.
So the change in direction is as serious to me as the total
numbers. Would you disagree with that?
Ambassador Seche. I do not think it is changing direction.
This has been plotted out as a course that we are going to take
for years now. I think a lot of circumstances have prevented us
from moving more resolutely toward taking those steps on a
timeline we had initially projected.
So I think what we are seeing now are basically events
forcing us to step away from some of these conflicts. I think
that is fair. I think part of what the President has looked to
do with our gulf allies is build their capacity, build their
ability to do their own self-defense in ways that are
functional and fair to them, and fair to us as an ally.
We cannot be there, and we cannot project our force around
the world as we did once in our history. We have to let those
regional powers, with our support, with our munitions, with our
modern weaponry, with our training, and with our political will
and our political skills, engage in those conflicts and in
those crises effectively.
Senator Perdue. Mr. Chairman, only one comment. I do not
disagree with that. It is the timing of when you do that, and
the vacuum that you leave behind. We have had one really solid
lesson in that recently in Iraq, and I hope we do not do it
again in other areas there. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service and your testimony.
Ms. Long, you said in your written testimony, and I will
quote from it, ``Russia and Iran have partnered to advance the
Houthis' interest in Yemen as part of a broader Middle East
strategy of aggression. Washington does not fully understand
how Iran and Russia are cooperating regionally. They appear to
have a strategy, and we do not.''
You further go on to say the Obama administration does not
appear to be willing to call out Russia for its military
activities in the region and elsewhere. There is a relationship
between what Russia is doing in Syria and what Russia is doing
in Yemen, and we need to be realistic about what it is.
So as we see Russia unfolding in Syria, and regardless of
what one may think about what may be the ultimate consequences
for Russia as a result of that, what would you have the
administration do that it is not doing now that evokes those
comments in your written testimony?
Ms. Long. I think actually the issue with Russia in Iran
actually is not unlike the problem that we have with Russia in
Ukraine, where it is the most recent example of Russian use of
Russian irregulars, of Russian weaponry, of Russian targeting
that went unresponded to not only by the United States but by
NATO. We danced around for quite some time actually identifying
Russian forces in the Ukraine, in Crimea, and others.
This is yet another step in that direction where Russia at
first under the auspices of solidifying its long-term basing in
Syria made noises about moving Russian equipment in. The next
thing we know, it is missile defense equipment. The next thing
we know, it is tanks. The next thing we knew, there is other.
This has been a creeping problem where it finally took Russian
planes flying over Turkey and the incidents of just last week,
or maybe the week before, where our Secretary of Defense noted
Russian involvement in flying sorties and lack of coordination
within 24 hours of us having met with the Russian leadership
about coordinating these things.
This is a pattern of activity. It is not Russia protecting
Russian citizens in the Baltic. It is not Russia protecting
just its base in Syria. There are other motivations here, and
we need to be very clear about those.
Senator Menendez. So what should we do?
Ms. Long. We need to be clear about them and call them out
publicly. There need to be consequences. There could be
hearings, frankly. There could be United Nations resolutions
about examining Russia's role, about examining the equipment
and the level of technology that is moving into Syria. We could
unequivocally back the Gulf States regarding not having Assad
play any role in any kind of reconciliation that may come in
the future. We could actually more forcefully complain about
Russian targeting of moderate Islamic fighters that we have
trained.
Although that has come out a little bit in the U.S. paper,
the President has not made any statements that I am aware of.
We have not made any international resolutions or call for the
unjustified targeting of our trained, moderate----
Senator Menendez. So while I appreciate that, certainly,
anything at the U.N., which might be with the purpose of trying
to focus attention, would be vetoed by Russia or the Security
Council. But it might be worthy of just driving the point of
where Russia is.
I found it a little amazing to see the Secretary of State
next to Foreign Minister Lavrov, side by side, talking about
deconflicting. First of all, I do not think it was necessary at
a press event. Certainly, the sense while deconflicting as a
reality may be desirable, the image it sent is somehow an
ascent to Russia being there, at least at that point in time,
which I thought should have been very clear that there are no
circumstances, at least unless there is a coalition effort and
Russia is committed to working with us as well as the coalition
that exists, to fight against ISIL.
But the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister side by
side talking about deconflicting and nodding about
deconflicting, it boggles my imagination.
Let me ask you this. The reason the GCC countries were
brought to Washington to have a summit is why? What is the core
reason? It was not because there was tumult at this given time,
right? It was not even Yemen, per se.
Ms. Long. No, frankly, the political skeptic in me thinks
it was two things. Number one, we wanted the GCC nations not to
interfere with the Iranian nuclear agreement that was still
being examined by the Hill and the U.N., and we wanted to
reassure them in order to buy their silence. Number two, we
were aware that they were skeptical regarding our overtures
broadly to Iran, and that we wanted to at least publicly appear
to be assuaging those and actually committing to them that we
would do something in parallel to the Iranians.
Senator Menendez. So if, in fact, the reason we bring the
GCC countries is to reassure them of something that to some
degree we have instigated, forgetting about one's views on the
nuclear agreement, I get concerned when I read the President
saying in an interview, I think it was with Tom Friedman, that
Iran should be a regional power.
Now, if you are the GCC countries and you hear the
President of the United States say Iran should be a regional
power, I think you have a lot of reason to be concerned, which
then brings us to the summit and what happened and what has
transpired since.
So I read the statement that basically we are willing to
work with the GCC countries. But at the end of the day, that is
far from even a security assurance much less a guarantee. We
gave security assurances to the Ukraine in the Budapest
memorandum. We wrote it down and told them, give up your
nuclear weapons, and we will make sure that we protect your
territorial integrity. That did not work out too well for
Ukraine.
So there is not even that here, as far as I can tell. There
is no assurance, much less a guarantee. So what is it, in fact,
that at this point the gulf countries have from us, other than
the attempt to warm their concerns and try to make them feel
more comfortable? At this point, from both of you, I would say,
what have you seen take place other than a conference of words?
What have you seen take place? What needs to take place?
If we are talking about weapon sales just as one dimension
of that, at some point you bump up against the qualitative
military edge that we are obligated, and I believe we should
be, to Israel.
So how do you meet those challenges? Could you both comment
on that?
Ambassador Seche. Senator, I think my recollection is it
was a fairly explicit assurance delivered at Camp David, that
any external aggression against our gulf allies would be met by
us with force. So I believe that we did try to make that
reassurance very public and very clear, because I think you are
right. If it is only a question of bringing them over here so
that we can have them walk outside and say, yes, we support the
JCPOA, that is not exactly going to do anything in the long
run.
But I think there is a sense here now that a framework and
a structure have been created to take up the issues. It is not
just arms sales. It is training. It is cybersecurity. It is
maritime security. It is the integrated ballistic missile
defense in the peninsula. All of which is key to the Gulf
States being able to defend themselves with our support, with
our technique, with our technical support, with our expertise,
and with our weaponry.
Senator Menendez. So you believe we gave them explicit
assurances?
Ambassador Seche. I believe we did.
Senator Menendez. And how was that memorialized?
Ambassador Seche. I believe in the communiques that were
issued after Camp David, and I also think that when Secretary
Kerry met in New York on the margins of the U.N. last week in
the Strategic Cooperation forum with the GCC Foreign Ministers,
it was reiterated.
Senator Menendez. One final one, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Long.
Ms. Long. I have a very different view. I think the gulf
allies walked away, and it is very difficult to find any kind
of explicit assurance. We certainly attempted to provide vague,
broad statements, but it was far short of the explicit
guarantees that they asked.
While the list of things that we talked about and the
discussions were broadly presented, none of them were new. All
of those issues have been discussed in our strategic dialogues
on annual basis.
What the gulf allies, I think, walked away with was an
agreement with us that a peaceful Iran in the region that is a
responsible international player is a good thing, that they
understand that our implicit if not explicit policy is to
return Iran to its proper role in the region, that they believe
that that role is a threat to them, and that there is very
little detail as to what we would do and what we are willing to
do currently to deter Iran above and beyond the nuclear weapons
issue.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. This is the subject to interpretation, so I
am not trying to say it is determinative, but the joint
statement coming out of the Gulf Cooperation Council at Camp
David stated the United States is prepared to work jointly with
the GCC states to deter and confront any external threat to any
GCC state's territorial integrity that is inconsistent with the
U.N. Charter. In the event such aggression or threat of such
aggression, the United States stands ready to work with our GCC
partners to determine urgently what action may be appropriate,
using the means at our collective disposal, including the
potential use of military force for the defense of our GCC
partners.
That was the official statement that came out.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to
say to the distinguished ranking member, I am prepared to work
with you on many things. But being prepared to work with you
and actually making--most time between us, it does happen.
Senator Cardin. As I said, it may be subject to different
interpretations, in the beginning. I just wanted to put in the
record the specific language that came out, because it did say
specifically territorial integrity, and it did say specifically
all options, including military.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. With divisions occurring between my
Democratic friends, I am going to turn to Senator Flake.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, can I ask before that we can
put a date on what Senator Cardin just read?
Senator Cardin. It was May 14, 2015. Why not put the entire
statement in the record?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Editor's note.--The statement mentioned above can be found in
the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section at
the end of this hearing.]
The Chairman. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for the testimony.
Let me continue with the JCPOA and the effect of it. We had
a number of hearings over the past couple months to study
JCPOA, and there was grave concern among any of us that while
the nuclear side of the agreement may be tight, may be a net-
plus, many of us had the concern that we might lose some of our
leverage when it came to Iran's malign behavior in the region.
What was going on in Yemen was going on long before the JCPOA
was finalized, and some of these activities obviously have been
going on.
But what is your view there? Do we have the same leverage
we had before, or will we worry even more that we will give
Iran pretext to forgo their obligations on the nuclear side of
the agreement, if we challenge their behavior in the region?
Mr. Seche.
Ambassador Seche. Senator Flake, I do not think that the
JCPOA, the way it is enforced, is going to encourage Iran one
way or another. I think their malign behavior has predated this
agreement, we all know, by years and years. It will continue.
This is not going to be a disincentive to them.
There are separate reasons for them to want to go with the
nuclear agreement. Release of sanctions is the one big one, and
the ability to regain some economic footing in this world of
ours really for them is the big prize, and basically that sense
of being relegitimized, being allowed to come back into the
community of nations.
I also think they understand that if the behavior that they
are involved in now in destabilizing their neighboring states
continues, that is really going to be an impediment to the kind
of work we are looking to do with them.
This had always been the problem, I think, right? We have
had one track, which is the JCPOA, and that is not involved in
the behavioral issues. The behavioral issues are what really
drive our gulf partners crazy, because that they see is not
impeded at all by the agreement. But the agreement has value
inherent in and of itself.
We have to find a way to address the behavioral issues
apart from what the nuclear agreement can do for us. I think
what the nuclear agreement does on balance is a very solid
piece of work. But it does not help us one way or another with
the behavioral issues. That is something we are going to have
to do with Iran, with their neighbors, with the partnerships we
have around the world to try to persuade Iran to give this up.
I think, again, this is probably, to some extent, wishful
thinking, but the hope is that as Iran opens up to investment,
as students travel back and forth, as windows get open and
fresh air blows in, Iran will begin to feel that, and it will
want to become part and parcel of this international community.
I do not see that as a policy, however. That is more like
hope.
Senator Flake. Ms. Long.
Ms. Long. I have a different view, in that I actually think
the Iran nuclear agreement actually greatly impedes our
leverage.
Number one, it is what Iran wanted most. And to the extent
that we exercise any leverage over its bad behavior prior to
the agreement, now having achieved the agreement, we no longer
have that leverage.
More importantly, as a practical matter, the lifting of
sanctions will provide Iran with a windfall of tens of billions
of dollars, some portion of which could be used to support the
IRGC or its other external meddling.
The real problem is, with or without the JPOA and the
leverage, I think the gulf countries would say, to the extent
we have any leverage, we have been unsuccessful in using it.
And, frankly, given our willingness to give Iran a bye and
treat Iran nicely with that with the hope, if not a strategy,
with the hope that if Iran's cool air that blows through its
economic and political systems, that it will become more
moderate, that that is unrealistic. And even if we had
leverage, we would be unwilling to use it for fear of not
opening up these windows to allow the moderates to come forth.
Senator Flake. Specifically, a concern that was raised, you
talked about once we open the door, once we relieve the
sanctions, the concern was raised during the discussion of the
JCPOA that imposition of those sanctions, Iran believes
imposition of any of the same sanctions that we had before--we
all know the only effective sanctions really particularly
imposed unilaterally by us are the ones on their central bank
that make it difficult for them to move money around. If we
were to do that or threaten that, then they would take it, as
they said already, as a violation of the agreement on our part.
So the concern that many of us had is that we would lose
leverage that we currently have, certainly. And if we have not
been able to deter them from this behavior, we certainly will
not be able to do it later.
So it is great concern that we have, because they have said
flat out, imposition of these sanctions would be a violation on
our part.
So with regard to Yemen, specifically, have we seen any
change at all since the signing of the JCPOA that somebody
could tag to, ``Well, hey, Iran may be more reasonable now''?
There has been no change in behavior on either side really in
that conflict, has there?
Ambassador Seche. I have not seen anything material that I
would connect to the JCPOA at all. Again, I do not think that
the Iranians are calling the shots for the Houthis. I think the
Houthis have made their mind up, and what they have done is
based on their own perception of their interests and where they
think they can be.
Once again, I think that former President Saleh was much
more of a support for them than any external support Iran
provided.
Once again, Iran is exploiting the situation as best it
can, but it is not, at the moment, driving the train that the
Houthis are on. The Houthis are their own bosses. They will
make their own decisions based on their own calculations. That
is my judgment.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the committee members.
I have not been impressed with the efforts of the GCC
nations against ISIL. Do I see it wrong?
Ambassador Seche. I do not think that the GCC has come to
grips yet with Sunni extremism, armed Sunni extremism,
terrorism. I think that even when you look at Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, when you look at ISIL in Yemen, I do not
believe they see these organizations as the most serious threat
they face.
Senator Kaine. They see the Shia threat as greater.
Ambassador Seche. They see Iran as the principal threat
they face. I believe to some extent they see that there is an
opportunity for them to use the Sunni extremist organizations
as a tool that they can use to counter the threat posed to them
by Iran, in their perception. So I do not think that is
necessarily something we are going to see them jump at.
Senator Kaine. Secretary Long.
Ms. Long. I do not disagree. I think the GCC nations see
Iran and the Shia militia in Iraq and the border security to be
much more of a threat than ISIL. I think their response on ISIL
is complicated in part because of the physical location of
ISIL, at least traditionally in Syria, and the disagreement
among various other players in Syria as to the role of Assad
continuing and how they would play with the various other
organizations, including the al-Nusra organizations and Qatar's
role. So it is little bit more ambiguous.
Senator Kaine. The willingness of the GCC nations, Sunni
nations, to tackle Sunni extremism, I mean obviously now goes
back many years and continues to be a real concern. I think
their worry about the Shia is very legitimate. I think their
indifference to some of the Sunni extremism is incredibly
troubling.
I do not see the GCC nations doing that much to deal with
Syrian refugees. Am I wrong about that?
Ambassador Seche. No, Senator. In fact, none of the gulf
countries have signed the U.N. Convention on Refugees, so none
of them are under an obligation at this point to respond.
What they have done, and what they have claimed to do, is
taken in a lot of Syrian citizens, Syrian nationals, and they
have done so. But a lot of that happens via work permits. They
come in and they work there. And they also then are vulnerable
to having those permits suspended, and they can be sent out of
the country.
Senator Kaine. A lot of these refugees, they are Sunni
refugees fleeing the Shia-allied Assad atrocities in Syria, but
I am just not seeing a lot of activity.
I compare that with the vigorous response of Saudi Arabia,
for example, to the situation in Yemen. There is a capacity.
There is a willingness. There are resources to act when they
want to. It causes me some significant concern.
I was in Kuwait just coincidentally 24 hours after the
massive Sunni bombing of the largest Shia mosque in Kuwait.
Sunni extremists, ISIL claimed to do that bombing. Now at least
the leadership in Kuwait really worked hard to try to
desectarianize this by having a memorial service in the largest
Sunni mosque and bringing the Shia families there.
But I am just not seeing a lot of that throughout the
region. I am seeing an indifference to the Sunni extremism and
a concern, it could be legitimate, about the Shia influences.
You indicated you did not think, Ambassador Seche--and I
think, Secretary Long, you agreed, too--you did not think that
the Yemen conflict was sectarian at its origins, but now it has
kind of become sectarian because of the squaring off of the
Saudi and Iranian proxies.
You would agree with me--let me not ask a leading question.
Does the United States have a position theologically, Sunni
versus Shia?
Ambassador Seche. I do not believe that we do, Senator. I
think what we are looking at is conduct, behavior, ability to
work with other communities, reach across the aisle, reach
across the table, and really prosper in some fashion that
benefits all of us, so it is a win-win situation.
Senator Kaine. So we should not have a position in a
theological or sectarian debate?
Ambassador Seche. I cannot imagine why.
Senator Kaine. We should not take positions that would be
viewed even unwittingly as expressing a preference in a
theological debate. Would you agree with me?
Ambassador Seche. I cannot imagine why we would.
Senator Kaine. Let us talk about Bahrain for minute. We
have a huge military presence there in the Fifth Fleet. Talk to
me a little bit about the current internal political situation
in Bahrain and that ongoing instability with a small ruling
minority that is Sunni, and a large Shia majority. Talk to me
about whether that instability poses challenges to us in terms
of the stability of the Fifth Fleet headquarters there in
Bahrain.
Ms. Long. The Shia majority in Bahrain is significant. It
is also the largest trading and merchant class and has been
historically.
I think the bigger challenge, beyond the civil society
issue that the Bahrainis are dealing with, with changes to some
of their laws and perhaps incremental but too slow reforms, is
their concern that Iran is using the Shia religious aspects of
this largely I would not even say particularly religious group,
certainly a mercantile group, for its own aims. And sorting out
and separating the legitimate aspirations of the Shia and those
that are being manipulated by Iran is a big problem.
Senator Kaine. And we do not need to go into intel here. I
mean, that is clearly happening, that Iran is manipulating the
disaffection of the 70 percent of the population with respect
to their place in the Nation of Bahrain.
Do you worry about that instability down the road? You were
Assistant Secretary of Defense, so especially as it affects the
viability of our military operations in Bahrain?
Ms. Long. I do not see any dangers to the Fifth Fleet in
the near term. It is certainly a challenge that we need to push
Bahrain to deal with, as we would any of our neighbors or
colleagues.
It is not very dissimilar to our military installations in
Qatar. They all pose their own internal challenges. But I do
not see any physical security threat in the near term.
Senator Kaine. One last comment, just something that I do
not think I thought of until I was listening to your testimony.
It might have been you, Ambassador Seche, or it might have been
both of you, who said that ultimately the solution in Yemen is
not a military solution.
We hear, with respect to Syria, we have heard again and
again from the administration, the ultimate solution is not a
military solution. Even with respect to the battle against
ISIL, we have heard that while there is a huge military
component, the deradicalization and other elements of it
suggest that the ultimate solution is not a military solution.
It kind of got me thinking about when we say at the front
end that the ultimate solution is not a military solution, sort
of what is, over time, the proven utility of use of military
assets to promote an end-state when we all agree at the front
end that the desired end-state is not a military solution? It
seems like we are involved in a number of challenging conflicts
right now where we say at the front end there is not a military
solution here, but we nevertheless use and are asked to use
more military assets to promote the nonmilitary solution.
I am just doing a little bit of historical card sorting in
my brain as to what the proof of the proposition is, that
military assets play a major role in promoting the right
outcome when we state at the beginning that the right outcome
is not a military solution. That is just something I need to
ponder.
Thank you to the witnesses. Thank you to the Chair.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here.
I want to continue to explore some of the issues that
Senator Kaine was raising, particularly the failure of some of
the GCC countries to engage more directly in the threat that we
believe that the Islamic states pose to not just the West, but
to the Middle East as well.
I cannot remember, I think it was maybe you, Ambassador
Seche, who talked about the failure of Saudi Arabia to more
directly put resources into the fight against the Islamic
state.
To what extent do we think that those people who have
funded over the years some of the extreme fundamentalism,
Muslim fundamentalists, are continuing to do that? And how
overt are they? And how much do the governments in some of the
GCC countries understand that that is going on or not?
I would like both of you, if you could, to respond with
what you know.
Ambassador Seche. Senator Shaheen, I think that the issue
of terrorist financing in the gulf has been a long-standing
bone of contention between us and our gulf partners. I think
that we have seen several of the states take measures to try to
close off the avenues that were available.
I do not think it has been government funding, by the way.
I think these are individuals.
Senator Shaheen. No, I understand that, but, certainly, in
the past, the governments of some of those countries have known
that that was going on.
Ambassador Seche. Absolutely. They have, and they turned a
blind eye to it, because it is useful for them domestically.
But I think they have closed off some of the avenues. I
still think that in Kuwait, in Qatar, for example, there are
issues of terrorist financing. But I think the Treasury here
does a very good job of tracking financial flows around the
globe. I think we have been able to close off some of the
opportunities that been available. Not fully, by any means. And
it is complicated, and it will be a permanent conflict we are
going to have to try to resolve.
This goes along with the deradicalization. These are the
toughest nuts for us to crack in this fight against ISIL and
al-Qaeda and others, stop the flow of money, stop the flow of
ideas, and stop the flow of individuals.
You can do the combat. You can do the military side of it.
But these other ones take a generation perhaps to really close
it all off.
Ms. Long. I would agree with the Ambassador. I also think
that there is a perception the gulf countries are somehow
trying to have it both ways with ISIL. That is not the case, at
least the GCC primary countries, the Saudi Arabians and the
Emiratis have been unequivocal in their horror and disgust at
ISIL, particularly after the Jordanian pilot incident. And in
fact, to some extent at least the Emiratis and the Saudis will
tell you that some of their support for Egyptian border
security has been an attempt to keep ISIL on the Libyan side of
the border and not creeping into the Sinai and other places.
I think the confusion and where it gets very difficult is
in Syria, where we talk about the GCC as if it were one entity,
which is our problem, not so much theirs, where there are
differing views among the members as to who is supporting what
particular factions of moderate or less than moderate
opposition to the Assad regime.
Senator Shaheen. Well, to what extent then has the conflict
in Yemen diverted resources that GCC countries might be putting
into the fight against the Islamic state, because they view the
threat from Shia and what is happening in Yemen as more
important? Is that a concern?
Ambassador Seche. I think it has to be a concern. They do
not have that many trained, efficient pilots, for example. They
have a lot of hardware. The software is not at the point where
it wants to be yet. So I think what we are looking at then is a
focus in Yemen, which has been so single-minded that it has
distracted them. And it has also sapped resources from their
ability to address something like we have seen in Syria.
I would love to see Saudi Arabia and the gulf countries now
take a more muscular view of what is happening in Syria, given
the Russian intervention, and make it very clear that their
resources are now going to shift to Syria to make sure that
they can push back against what Russia is doing in support of
the Assad regime, which is anathema to the Gulf States, and
they made it very clear that that is the case.
Senator Shaheen. And to what extent do you think, given
Russia's actions in recent weeks, that they might take another
look at what is happening there and possibly divert some of
those resources back to Syria?
Ambassador Seche. I do not see it happening immediately,
ma'am.
Ms. Long. I agree with my colleague. For them, it is a
priority of threats. Saudi Arabia is extremely vulnerable and
always has been on that border, particularly now that the
Houthis are now being pushed northern. There is an incredible
threat, as far as they are concerned, while ISIS down into
Syria, from a geographic standpoint, but also from a threat
level standpoint, is just further away. Now there are many
other countries involved in Syria and it is a much larger
issue. So for them, particularly, it is a manpower issue. I
think they will remain focused on Yemen.
That is not to say that Saudi Arabia and the GCC are just
involved with military activity. For example, by far the
largest immigration and displaced person issues as a result of
Syria are in Jordan and in Lebanon. Both Saudi Arabia and other
GCC countries are funneling an incredible amount of money to
help with those efforts, particularly in Jordan where basic
human care is beyond the Jordanian Government's effort to
provide with their Iraqi and Palestinian and other issues. It
is something like doubled the population, or even more. So they
are funding a tremendous amount of assistance there.
Senator Shaheen. Actually, that is not what I have
understood from people who are dealing with the refugee
challenges as a result of Syria. It has been that while they
committed a certain amount of money some time ago, in the
current crisis, they have not been forthcoming with providing
resources to provide further help to Jordan and Lebanon and to
the refugees who are fleeing.
So is that recent information that you have gotten?
Ms. Long. No, I know, as in all things, what countries
pledge and what they deliver, sometimes there is a lag. The GCC
is not alone on that. I think the price of oil has caused some
rethinking, as far as budgetary. But I am sure that, in any
case, additional resources are needed.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I just
wanted to go back to a statement that one of you made about the
GCC countries and their complete opposition to Assad continuing
in his position, which has been the United States position and
I think the allies' position with respect to the conflict in
Syria.
So given the stalemate that exists on the ground in Syria,
and the unwillingness on the part of the international
community to make any progress in that conflict, is there any
reason to think we should reexamine that position and try to
figure out how to end that conflict and then figure out what
happens to Assad? I think about Bosnia, for example, where the
priority became ending the conflict and then we went back and
tried to hold the perpetrators responsible for what they had
done. But given where we are and the stalemate there, should we
be looking at reexamining the position that we have taken?
Ambassador Seche. Senator Shaheen, I cannot imagine a
circumstance under which the Syrian people, the Sunni majority
in Syria, would accept Bashar al-Assad or anyone in the Assad-
Makhlouf clan at this point as a leadership figure. I think
they have burned that bridge a long time ago. I think that he
is so discredited and absolutely abhorred inside his own
country now, the best we can do is hope he will find a way that
he can exit as the situation starts to develop where there can
be some kind of national salvation organization or government
or something that would be seen as a fair vehicle that would be
inclusive and would bring all the parties to the table but not
Bashar al-Assad, however.
Ms. Long. I agree.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you both very much.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Ambassador Seche, I would like to turn your attention to
the rapidly escalating humanitarian crisis in Yemen. We have
heard very credible reports that it has grown dramatically
worse since the start of the Saudi-led military campaign. In 6
months, almost 3,000 civilians have been killed, over 1 million
displaced, no humanitarian access, especially in the north, and
a country on the brink of famine.
Certainly, the external military intervention, which has
been supported by U.S. logistics, intelligence, and arms
supplies was a large escalation in the violence. And the
tragedy there shows every sign of growing worse, much worse.
Looking back to last March, it seems like we were on
autopilot to reflexively support a Saudi decision to intervene
without a full examination of the diplomatic alternatives. What
are your thoughts on this now? What might have we done
differently, in terms of diplomatic action, especially in 2014
and earlier this year, to stop the erosion of the transition
that was negotiated in 2012?
Ambassador Seche. Well, Senator, you have touched on a very
sensitive and difficult subject. I think hindsight is 20/20 and
you look back now to what was happening as you say in 2014 when
the Houthis went into the capital, Sanaa, and basically
occupied and took over the reins of government at that time.
That was a moment when I think it should have been clear to
all of us that this was a phenomenon that was not going to go
away, that they had basically restructured and reorganized the
country's governance, for all intents and purposes, and they
were in control. I think at that point, that was probably the
last chance we had, anyone had, to go in and find some kind of
negotiation, because the Houthis had not yet, I do not think,
decided to sweep south all the way to the Gulf of Aden. But I
do think at that point President Saleh counseled them to go
ahead and finish the job now.
Senator Markey. So should we have at that point urged the
parties to renegotiate the transition right then, rather than
this radical escalation, which we have now witnessed over the
last couple of years?
Ambassador Seche. Honestly, Senator, I do not think the
Houthis at that time were ready to negotiate either. I think
they were full of what they had seen as remarkable ease with
which they swept south from their homeland up in Saada in the
north just hard on the Saudi border. So they were prepared at
that point to see how far they could go, and they got the
encouragement they needed from the former President.
This is a very difficult situation, to see how you can
negotiate this.
Senator Markey. What is our greatest leverage right now to
try to force a negotiation between the parties? What would you
recommend as the best strategy that we adopt to bring the
parties to a table? What do you recommend to us?
Ambassador Seche. Well, we do not have a lot of leverage.
What I would use is the little leverage we have. As I said
earlier, if the Saudis do want a brand new supply of modern
weaponry to bring to bear in Yemen, I think we sit down with
them and say, if you need this, we need to find out what your
endgame is. How can you bring this to a negotiated end? What
can be a resolution that is not going to depend upon a military
solution?
And as Senator Kaine said earlier, you say this at the
outset, that there is no military solution. But what is going
to be a negotiation? What is it going to look like? Who is
going to be at the table? And who is going to be willing to
make a concession?
Neither party at the moment, I believe, is prepared to make
the important concessions.
Senator Markey. Okay, and you are not prepared to make a
recommendation as to how we might get them to that point?
Ambassador Seche. Well, we need to speak more publicly. The
White House has recently begun to say that we are disappointed
in the fact that the U.N. envoy talks that were scheduled have
not taken place. This is a modest assertion for us to make
publicly, but I think it is important.
Senator Markey. You are saying it modest. Should it be more
robust?
Ambassador Seche. In my judgment, yes.
Senator Markey. All right, what with the words be? Say the
words that you want to hear spoken.
Ambassador Seche. I am not sure I am ready to write press
guidance at the moment, Senator. But I do think what we need to
say is----
Senator Markey. You are not sure of what?
Ambassador Seche. That I can write press guidance at the
moment. But I think what we want to say is that there is an
important, critical juncture we have reached here where the
outcome at the moment is going to be more human suffering if we
do not find a way to bring the parties to a table.
Senator Markey. Ambassador, Secretary, I have been an
advocate for increased cooperation with our security partners
in the gulf with a particular emphasis on defensive systems.
These most certainly include the kind of ballistic missile
defense systems, such as the Patriot Advanced Capability-3, our
PAC-3 missile defense system, and also advanced air and naval
defense systems. I fear that our failure to strongly advocate
diplomacy in Yemen over the past 2 years, coupled with our
failure to urge restraint in the face of crises last spring,
may put the viability of this critical partnership at risk.
The Leahy Law prohibits U.S. security assistance and many
forms of defense cooperation with forces that have engaged in
gross violations of human rights. If reports are accurate, the
Saudi indiscriminate targeting in the air campaign, and an
overly broad naval blockade, could well constitute such
violations.
If the Yemen war grinds on the way it is going to
apparently happen, we could continue to have indiscriminate
targeting and an overly broad Saudi naval operation that
obstructs humanitarian relief that would constitute gross
violations of human rights under the Leahy law.
What is your perspective on the risk this situation could
present for the long-term viability of our critical security
partnerships in the gulf?
Ambassador Seche. Well, Senator, I think the loss of human
life that we have seen so far in Yemen, and the infrastructure
destruction, in my judgment, borders on a serious violation of
international law. I think that what we need to do with our
allies, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, is really figure out from them
how they see their way out of this. They must have some thought
that they have given to how this is going to end, and we need
to find out if that is viable, if it is feasible, if we can
support that.
If we cannot, then I think we need to find a way to try to
distance ourselves from a conflict that has no end and the only
outcome is more human suffering.
Senator Markey. So, again, what diplomatic actions would
you recommend to ensure respect for human rights in Yemen as
this conflict continues, given the role that we are playing in
providing logistical support for the Saudis, so that we inject
those sets of values into our relationships with the Gulf
States?
Ambassador Seche. Given the conflict at the moment and the
fact that it is ongoing, I do not advocate a public discussion
of this issue. I think that the Saudis and our gulf allies have
proven over the years that they respond best to a private
conversation, to a sense of a friend coming to speak to them to
provide counsel and advice, but not in a public eye, where
there is a finger-wagging attachment to it. So I think we need
to be very cautious, if we are going to use diplomacy on this,
that it is private, it is forceful, and it is straightforward.
I do not think we want to do a nuanced kind of demarche. I
think we want to be very clear to them what we think the
threats and the risks are that they are running at the moment.
Senator Markey. Let me just ask, when you say that, you are
saying that you want a nuanced response from our government?
Ambassador Seche. No, I do not want a nuanced response.
Senator Markey. You do not?
Ambassador Seche. No, I do not. I want something
straightforward and forceful.
Senator Markey. But private.
Ambassador Seche. But private.
Senator Markey. Now would it help if this committee,
unconstrained by the diplomatic relationship that the United
States has with Saudi Arabia, what if this committee spoke
loudly about what we expect of Saudi Arabia? Would that be
helpful?
Ambassador Seche. I think it is always helpful. When I was
in the field, I always found it was very helpful if I could go
to the government of any country and say, ``This is what my
Congress, my Senate, feels. My hands are getting tied on this.
You need to move so I can get this Congress away from this.''
Senator Markey. I think that is an important component to
this right now, because there is an obvious catastrophe
unfolding there, and our silence ultimately is complicity to
the actions that are taking place. I think it is time for us to
stand up and demand from Saudi and others a diplomatic
resolution of this issue in a telescoped time frame.
Thank you both for testifying today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
You all have been outstanding witnesses. I have had numbers
of Senators walk by and thank us for the hearing because of
your testimony, so I want to thank you both for being here.
And just to make an observation, this is not meant in any
way to just be a pejorative statement, but I do not think the
administration itself is committed to anything specifically in
the Middle East. I think it is obviously a very light touch,
except for the nuclear agreement with Iran. They were very
committed to that.
But it appears to me that what is developing is a situation
where you have Russia, Iran, and the Shia countries--I mean,
Iraq, really, let us face it, Iraq appears to me when I am
there to be a country that we are making better for Iran. I
mean, it is just a very different place than it was a few years
ago.
It appears that where we are is basically in a very light-
handed way, although it might get stronger over time, but we
have created a Sunni-dominant sphere for us to operate in.
In the past, we were trying to keep Iraq whole. Obviously,
we are playing almost no role in that today, except, again,
continued Shia domination there.
So am I right? I mean, it appears to me that the GCC of the
Sunni countries are the places where we can develop deeper
ties. We have had deeper ties for some time. We are sort of
abdicating, if you will, the role of keeping the other nation-
states or countries together, and basically creating a very
one-sided relationship in the region.
Can you all respond to that?
Ms. Long. Senator, I think that is exactly it, and it is
the failure of U.S. leadership or even perceived leadership
that is causing some of these conflicts to not only involve
outside parties to a much greater extent than are probably
necessary as evidenced by the fact that the Houthis, we do not
even know if they will come to the table and whether that will
even count because no one knows what influence they are getting
from Iran as far as negotiating a diplomatic resolution. It is
this light touch that has been interpreted by both our friends
and our enemies in the region as us not being involved, us not
being committed, and as one of the Senators pointed out, an
implicit hope that Iran will actually increase its role in the
region at the expense of our traditional Arab allies.
The Chairman. Do you want to speak to that, Ambassador?
Ambassador Seche. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to speak to that, because I do think that we have been
able to begin this process of reconciliation and reassurance
with our gulf allies, who are very much concerned about our
long-term staying power in the region.
I think what has come out of Camp David, and some people
were dissatisfied with the results because they were not
concrete enough, but I think it is a real reassertion of the
fact that we are going to be involved in a strategic
partnership with the countries of the Arab Gulf region going
forward. There is no question in my mind that this is a
cornerstone of our international foreign policy in the Middle
East to have the gulf allies with us, working with us and
trying to come to resolution of these very deep and unsettling
crises.
So I think that there is a way we can do this. I think
introducing Iran into this equation is complicating our ability
to reassure them. But I do not think it needs to be a fatal
blow to this process. I think we need to make sure that we
reassure them Iran can play a role, and we will definitely
monitor what that role is to the extent we can with them,
working with them in partnership.
This is not an easy solution to anything. And it is
probably not a satisfactory answer to your question. But I
think what we have is such a difficult kind of tapestry to look
at that you do not always see how it is going to appear until
you step back a little bit and get a better feel for it. That
is where we are now. We are so close to our allies, so close to
Iran, so close to these issues, I am having a hard time, as I
think that Obama administration is, to say this is what this is
going to look like at the end of the day.
The Chairman. I think Senator Cardin may have a question.
But it seems to me that Yemen involvement that we have had, I
know that Madam Secretary spoke to the fact it was
international interests, but it feels more to me like we did
what we did to demonstrate that we were with the Saudis and our
other GCC friends. It was that that drove us to do what we did,
not necessarily some type of national interest that we thought
was paramount.
I know you said both were apparent in our activities, but
with this administration, it appears to me it was more of a
show because of what was happening with Iran and the
negotiations.
Do you want to speak to that?
Ms. Long. With this administration, I do think the overtly
political was tantamount. As you are aware, we have had some
limited United States forces in Yemen. That continued. And I
think those were a signal previous to the gulf involvement that
we were exercising our protection of our national interests.
But certainly, other interests prevailed more prominently with
this administration, and those are the support of our gulf
allies.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, I just would take exception
with the United States having a light touch here. I would not
call it a light touch, our involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Syria, the Middle East generally, GCC with our military
presence. We are actively engaged. It is not an easy answer.
Senator Markey's comments about the humanitarian crisis
were right on target. We had a hearing on the humanitarian
crisis in Syria and the number of people who could not be
reached. And today we added to that the humanitarian crisis in
Yemen and the number of people who are not being reached there.
And Senator Kaine was correct when he challenged, why are
we using our military? I do not think he was questioning our
military being there, but the role of our military I think is
what Senator Kaine was talking about. We want to see our
military. It has to be engaged there because it is an important
part of our overall strategy.
But we cannot win a military victory in these countries. We
know that. We have to establish a government that represents
all the people. That is what we tried to do in Iraq, and we
have made some progress in Iraq in moving that forward.
We certainly need a political solution in Syria, and it
must be without Assad. I agree with that completely. Assad has
no legitimacy. And we need to transition to a government that
can have the confidence of its people.
In Yemen, we have to get the parties together to talk about
how their future country will represent the will of all its
people.
Mr. Ambassador, I particularly appreciated your assessment
that it is really an internal fight going on, and although
there are external issues, it is more of an internal matter
that has to be resolved.
So I guess my point is that there is no simple answer here.
The United States is critically important.
Certainly there are other players in the GCC areas. There
are other players that are operating, including Russia. But
there is only one country that has the capacity to not only be
involved but to represent universal values that can give us
lasting peace in the region, and that is the United States.
That is why it is so critically important that we try to
get this right. There is no easy answer, but I thought today's
discussion I found very, very helpful. And I thank both of our
witnesses.
The Chairman. I cannot let that stand. I cannot imagine how
anybody would think the steps that you and I encouraged to
happen in Syria that did not were indications of anything other
than an incredibly light touch. I opposed what we did in Libya,
but to go in and take out a leader and leave it in disarray as
we have done is an incredibly light touch.
I think much of what we are doing at present, talking about
just in the last several years, is really more about face-
saving and acting as if we are doing something than really
trying to drive an outcome. I just cannot imagine that there is
anybody in our country that thinks differently than that, but
maybe there is one.
But anyway, with that, if you would, there will be
questions until the close of business Thursday, if you all
would answer those as responsively as you could.
And we thank you very, very much for being here. We thank
you for your service to our country in your various positions.
And with that, our meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Camp David Joint Statement Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release, May 14, 2015
U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement
President Obama and Heads of Delegations of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) member states, the Secretary General of the GCC, and
members the President's Cabinet met today at Camp David to reaffirm and
deepen the strong partnership and cooperation between the United States
and the GCC. The leaders underscored their mutual commitment to a U.S.-
GCC strategic partnership to build closer relations in all fields,
including defense and security cooperation, and develop collective
approaches to regional issues in order to advance their shared interest
in stability and prosperity.
The United States shares with our GCC partners a deep interest in a
region that is peaceful and prosperous, and a vital interest in
supporting the political independence and territorial integrity, safe
from external aggression, of our GCC partners. The United States policy
to use all elements of power to secure our core interests in the Gulf
region, and to deter and confront external aggression against our
allies and partners, as we did in the Gulf war, is unequivocal.
The United States is prepared to work jointly with the GCC states
to deter and confront an external threat to any GCC state's territorial
integrity that is inconsistent with the U.N. Charter. In the event of
such aggression or the threat of such aggression, the United States
stands ready to work with our GCC partners to determine urgently what
action may be appropriate, using the means at our collective disposal,
including the potential use of military force, for the defense of our
GCC partners.
As with Operation Decisive Storm, GCC states will consult with the
United States when planning to take military action beyond GCC borders,
in particular when U.S. assistance is requested for such action.
In this spirit, and building on the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation
Forum, the leaders discussed a new U.S.-GCC strategic partnership to
enhance their work to improve security cooperation, especially on fast-
tracking arms transfers, as well as on counter-terrorism, maritime
security, cybersecurity, and ballistic missile defense. They reviewed
the status of negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran, and emphasized
that a comprehensive, verifiable deal that fully addresses the regional
and international concerns about Iran's nuclear program is in the
security interests of GCC member states as well as the United States
and the international community. The United States and GCC member
states oppose and will work together to counter Iran's destabilizing
activities in the region and stressed the need for Iran to engage the
region according to the principles of good neighborliness, strict
noninterference in domestic affairs, and respect for territorial
integrity, consistent with international law and the United Nations
Charter, and for Iran to take concrete, practical steps to build trust
and resolve its differences with neighbors by peaceful means.
The leaders decided to enhance their counter-terrorism cooperation
on shared threats, particularly ISIL/DAESH and al-Qaeda, to deter and
disrupt terrorist attacks with a focus on protecting critical
infrastructure, strengthening border and aviation security, combating
money laundering and terrorist financing, interdicting foreign
fighters, and countering violent extremism in all its forms.
The leaders, furthermore, discussed how best to address regional
conflicts and defuse growing tensions. In this context, the leaders
discussed the most pressing conflicts in the region, including Syria,
Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, and what could be done to advance their
resolution. They decided on a set of common principles, including a
shared recognition that there is no military solution to the regions'
armed civil conflicts, which can only be resolved through political and
peaceful means; respect for all states' sovereignty and noninterference
in their internal affairs; the need for inclusive governance in
conflict-ridden societies; as well as protection of all minorities and
of human rights.
With regard to Yemen, both the United States and GCC member states
underscored the imperative of collective efforts to counter Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula, and emphasized the need to rapidly shift from
military operations to a political process, through the Riyadh
Conference under GCC auspices and U.N.-facilitated negotiations based
on the GCC initiative, National Comprehensive Dialogue outcomes, and
the Security Council's relevant resolutions. Taking into consideration
the humanitarian needs of civilians, they welcomed the start of a 5-day
humanitarian pause to facilitate delivery of relief assistance to all
those in need and expressed hope it would develop into a longer, more
sustainable cease-fire. They expressed their appreciation for the
generous grant of $274 million provided by Saudi Arabia for the U.N.
humanitarian response in Yemen. The United States reaffirmed its
commitment, in partnership with GCC member states and other members of
the international community, to seek to prevent the resupply of Houthi
forces and their allies in contravention of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 2216.
The United States and GCC member states further affirmed their
commitment to assisting the Iraqi Government and the international
coalition in their fight against ISIL/DAESH. They stressed the
importance of strengthening ties between GCC member states and the
Iraqi Government, based on the principles of good neighborliness, non-
interference in internal affairs, and respect for state sovereignty.
They encouraged the Iraqi Government to achieve genuine national
reconciliation by urgently addressing the legitimate grievances of all
components of Iraqi society through the implementation of reforms
agreed upon last summer and by ensuring that all armed groups operate
under the strict control of the Iraqi state.
The leaders committed to continue working towards a sustainable
political resolution in Syria that ends the war and establishes an
inclusive government that protects all ethnic and religious minorities,
and preserves state institutions. They reaffirmed that Assad has lost
all legitimacy and has no role in Syria's future. They strongly
supported increased efforts to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL/
DAESH in Syria and warned against the influence of other extremist
groups, such as
al-Nusrah, that represent a danger to the Syrian people, to the region
and to the international community. They expressed deep concern over
the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria and
condemned the prevention of aid distribution to the civilian population
by the Assad regime or any other party.
The leaders decided to move in concert to convince all Libyan
parties to accept an inclusive power-sharing agreement based on
proposals put forward by the U.N. and to focus on countering the
growing terrorist presence in the country.
The United States and GCC member states strongly affirmed the
necessity of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of
a just, lasting, comprehensive peace agreement that results in an
independent and contiguous Palestinian state living side by side in
peace and security with Israel. To that end, the United States and GCC
member states underscored the enduring importance of the 2002 Arab
Peace Initiative and the urgent need for the parties to demonstrate--
through policies and actions--genuine advancement of a two-state
solution, and decided to remain closely engaged moving forward. The
United States and GCC member states also recommitted to continue to
fulfill aggressively their pledges made for Gaza's reconstruction, to
include pledges made at the October 2014 Cairo Conference.
The leaders expressed their concern over the delay in electing a
new president of Lebanon, called on all parties to strengthen Lebanese
state institutions, and emphasized the critical importance of Lebanon's
Parliament moving forward to elect a President of the Lebanese Republic
in accordance with the constitution. The leaders also emphasized their
determination to support the Government of Lebanon in its resistance to
ISIL/DAESH and al-Nusrah which threaten Lebanon's security and
stability.
The leaders pledged to further deepen U.S.-GCC relations on these
and other issues in order to build an even stronger, enduring, and
comprehensive strategic partnership aimed at enhancing regional
stability and prosperity. They agreed to meet again in a similar high
level format in 2016, in order to advance and build upon the US-GCC
Strategic Partnership announced today.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release, May 14, 2015
Annex to U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement
President Obama and Heads of Delegations of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) member states came to Camp David to reaffirm and deepen
their close partnership, make progress on a shared set of priorities,
confront common threats, and work to resolve, or at a minimum de-
escalate, regional crises and provide humanitarian assistance to those
in need. The United States has worked with its GCC partners over six
decades on matters of mutual interest, including confronting and
deterring external aggression against allies and partners; ensuring the
free flow of energy and commerce, and freedom of navigation in
international waters; dismantling terrorist networks that threaten the
safety of their people; and preventing the development or use of
weapons of mass destruction. In recent years, we have made significant
progress, under the framework of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation
Forum, to work cooperatively on security and political issues of
regional importance. Today, the United States and GCC member states
recognize the need to consolidate and develop this relationship based
on friendship and cooperation to more effectively address the
challenges we face.
At Camp David, the leaders of the GCC states and President Obama
reaffirmed the longstanding U.S.-GCC partnership and pledged to further
enhance the relationship between the United States and GCC member
states. This partnership is based on a shared commitment to the
stability and prosperity of the region, mutual interest in confronting
the threat of terrorism and other destabilizing activities, and
resolving regional conflicts through political means. The leaders
underscored their mutual commitment to the U.S. GCC strategic
partnership to provide for closer relations in all fields, including
defense and security cooperation, and to develop collective approaches
to regional issues in order to advance their shared interest in
stability and prosperity.
The U.S. GCC strategic partnership involves both enhanced
cooperation between the United States and the GCC collectively and
between the United States and individual GCC member states in
accordance with their respective capacities and interests. It
establishes a common understanding on mutual assurances and heightened
cooperation, including efforts to build collective capacity to address
the threats of terrorism and other regional security threats.
As part of this new partnership, the leaders of the United States
and the GCC decided on the following steps to enhance their
cooperation:
Security Cooperation
The U.S. GCC security relationship remains a major pillar of our
strategic partnership and a cornerstone of regional stability. Our
existing cooperation, including basing, information sharing, joint
military exercises, and provision of sophisticated military equipment
and training are a testament to the sustained value we place on our
shared security interests. The leaders decided at Camp David to enhance
security cooperation in the following areas:
Security Assurances: At the core of the partnership is our shared
interest in a region that is peaceful and prosperous. At Camp David, we
have recommitted to the importance of this vision. President Obama
affirmed that the United States shares with our GCC partners a deep
interest in a region that is peaceful and prosperous, and a vital
interest in supporting the political independence and territorial
integrity, safe from external aggression, of our GCC partners. The
United States policy to use all elements of power to secure our core
interests in the Gulf region, and to deter and confront external
aggression against our allies and partners, as we did in the Gulf War,
is unequivocal.
The United States is prepared to work jointly with the GCC states
to deter and confront an external threat to any GCC state's territorial
integrity that is inconsistent with the U.N. Charter. In the event of
such aggression or the threat of such aggression, the United States
stands ready to work with our GCC partners to determine urgently what
action may be appropriate, using the means at our collective disposal,
including the potential use of military force, for the defense of our
GCC partners.
The United States and GCC member states also decided to set up a
senior working group to pursue the development of rapid response
capabilities, taking into account the Arab League's concept of a
``unified Arab force,'' to mount or contribute in a coordinated way to
counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and stabilization operations in the
region. The United States and GCC member states also affirmed their
strong support for the efforts of the P5+1 to reach a deal with Iran by
June 30, 2015, that would verifiably ensure that Iran does not develop
a nuclear weapon, noting that such a deal would represent a significant
contribution to regional security.
As with Operation Decisive Storm, GCC states will consult with the
United States when planning to take military action beyond GCC borders,
in particular when U.S. assistance is requested for such action.
Ballistic Missile Defense: GCC member states committed to develop a
region-wide ballistic missile defense capability, including through the
development of a ballistic missile early warning system. The United
States will help conduct a study of GCC ballistic missile defense
architecture and offered technical assistance in the development of a
GCC-wide Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. All participants
decided to undertake a senior leader tabletop exercise to examine
improved regional ballistic missile defense cooperation.
Military Exercises and Training Partnership: Building on their
extensive existing program of military exercises and training
activities, the United States and GCC member states decided to
establish a new, recurring, large-scale exercise emphasizing
interoperability against asymmetric threats, such as terrorist or
cyber-attacks, or other tactics associated with hybrid warfare. The
United States will also dispatch a military team to GCC capitals to
discuss and decide on ways to increase the frequency of Special
Operations Forces counter-terrorism cooperation and training.
Arms Transfers: In order to ensure that GCC member states are able
to respond quickly to current and future threats, the United States and
GCC member states will take steps necessary to ensure arms transfers
are fast-tracked to GCC member states contributing to regional
security. To that end, President Obama will dispatch a senior team to
the region in the coming weeks to discuss specific modalities. The
United States and the GCC will work together to set up a dedicated
Foreign Military Sales procurement office to process GCC-wide sales,
streamlining third-party transfers, and exploring ways the United
States could accelerate the acquisition and fielding of key
capabilities.
Maritime Security: To protect shared maritime security interests
and freedom of navigation, the GCC member states decided to increase
their participation in international maritime task forces on counter-
terrorism and counter-piracy. They also decided to take further steps
to exchange information about and, as appropriate, interdict illicit
arms shipments to conflict areas. The United States committed to
provide additional training and technical assistance for coastal
security, protection of offshore infrastructure, and counter-smuggling.
Counterterrorism
Building on a shared commitment to address the acute threats posed
by al-Qaeda, ISIL/DAESH and their affiliates, the United States and GCC
member states will pursue initiatives to further build their capacity
to track, investigate, and prosecute those engaged in terrorist
activities within their borders, as well as to contain and deter
transit, financing and recruitment by violent extremists. The United
States and the GCC will hold a second U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation
Forum Working Group on Counter-terrorism and Border Security to follow
up on previous efforts to cooperate on border security, countering the
financing of terrorism, cybersecurity, and critical infrastructure
protection. Leaders also decided to strengthen counter-terrorism
cooperation in the following areas:
Foreign Terrorist Fighters: The United States and GCC member states
will bolster their joint efforts to identify and share information on
suspected foreign terrorist fighters (FTF). In response to the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), the United States and
GCC member states will work together to implement traveler screening
systems and enhanced biometrics collection capability, and share best
practices to make it more difficult for terrorists to avoid detection
at any GCC airport.
Counterterrorist Financing: The United States and GCC member states
will increase efforts to cut off terrorist financing, including through
enhanced intelligence exchange and enforcement efforts to freeze assets
of individuals and entities designated under relevant U.N. Security
Council Resolutions, especially in the region. The United States will
organize a public-private sector banking dialogue in
the fall of 2015 to facilitate discussions on anti-money laundering and
terrorist financing.
Critical Infrastructure and Cybersecurity: The United States and
GCC member states will consult on cybersecurity initiatives, share
expertise and best practices on cyber policy, strategy, and incident
response. The United States will provide GCC member states with
additional security assistance, set up military cybersecurity exercises
and national policy workshops, and improve information-sharing.
Countering Violent Extremism: Recognizing the need to counter
recruitment by extremist groups from at-risk youth and vulnerable
communities, the United States and GCC member states will provide
financial support for multilateral initiatives to counter violent
extremism (CVE) aimed at strengthening resilience in vulnerable
communities, including support for the Global Community Engagement and
Resilience Fund. In addition, GCC leaders offered to host a CVE
religious leaders conference aimed at boosting efforts that will expose
the true nature of ISIL/DAESH and other terrorist organizations.
Counterproliferation: The GCC member states determined to
accelerate efforts against the proliferation of WMD, the means of their
delivery, as well as advanced conventional weapons, by enhancing
national controls on proliferation-sensitive items and technologies.
Regional Security
The United States and GCC member states reaffirmed their shared
interest in de-escalating regional tensions, resolving regional armed
civil conflicts, and addressing the critical humanitarian needs of
populations affected by conflict. The leaders made clear their belief
that the conflicts in the region, including Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and
Libya, are eroding state structures, creating ungoverned spaces, and
promoting sectarianism, all of which serve as fodder for terrorists and
other extremist groups and directly threaten their shared security
interests.
The leaders set out core principles that, in their view, must
govern efforts to resolve regional armed civil conflicts in Syria,
Iraq, Yemen and Libya, including:
The respect for state sovereignty;
A shared recognition that there is no military solution to
the regions' civil conflicts, and that they can only be
resolved through political and peaceful means; and
The importance of inclusive governance; and respect for, and
protection of, minorities and human rights.
The leaders also held in-depth discussions on the most pressing
conflicts in the region and steps they decided should be taken to help
resolve them.
Iran: The United States and GCC member states oppose and will
cooperate in countering Iran's destabilizing activities in the region
and continue consultations on how to enhance the region's security
architecture. As part of this effort, the United States will work in
partnership with GCC member states to build their capacity to defend
themselves against external aggression, including in terms of air and
missile defense, maritime and cybersecurity, as GCC member states take
steps to increase the interoperability of their military forces and
continue to better integrate their advanced capabilities. At the same
time, the United States and GCC member states reaffirmed their
willingness to develop normalized relations with Iran should it cease
its destabilizing activities and their belief that such relations would
contribute to regional security.
Yemen: The United States and GCC member states expressed deep
concern over the situation in Yemen and its destabilizing impact on the
region. Leaders emphasized the need to rapidly shift from military
operations to a political process, through the Riyadh Conference under
GCC auspices and U.N.-facilitated negotiations based on the GCC
initiative, National Comprehensive Dialogue outcomes, and the Security
Council's relevant resolutions. Taking into consideration the
humanitarian needs of civilians, they welcomed the start of a five-day
humanitarian pause to facilitate delivery of relief assistance to all
those in need and expressed hope it would develop into a longer, more
sustainable ceasefire. They expressed their appreciation for the
generous grant of $274 million provided by Saudi Arabia for the U.N.
humanitarian response in Yemen. Leaders emphasized the importance of
working with the international community to prevent the provision of
weapons to designated Yemeni parties or those acting on their behalf or
at their direction in contravention of U.N. Security Council Resolution
2216.
The United States also reaffirmed its assurance to help GCC member
states defend themselves against external threats emanating from Yemen
and emphasized its particular support for Saudi Arabia's territorial
integrity. The leaders underscored that Yemen's political transition
should be in accordance with the GCC Initiative, National Dialogue
outcomes and UNSC resolutions. Furthermore, leaders stressed the
imperative of collective efforts to counter the shared threat from
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is exploiting the crisis.
Iraq: The United States and GCC member states reiterated their
support for the Iraqi government in its efforts to degrade and defeat
ISIL/DAESH. They encouraged the Iraqi government to achieve genuine
national reconciliation by urgently addressing the legitimate
grievances of all components of Iraqi society through the
implementation of reforms agreed upon last summer and by ensuring that
all armed groups operate under the strict control of the Iraqi state.
GCC member states recommitted themselves to reestablishing a diplomatic
presence in Baghdad and to working with the Iraqi government to support
efforts against ISIL/DAESH, including in Anbar and other provinces.
Libya: Noting growing concern about political deadlock at a time
when violent extremism is expanding, the United States and GCC member
states decided to coordinate their efforts more closely on Libya's
political transition. They will press all parties to reach a political
agreement based on proposals put forward by the U.N. and to urgently
establish a national unity government before Ramadan, and stand ready
to substantially increase their assistance to such a government.
Leaders committed to seek to stem illicit arms flows into Libya, and
called on all Libyans to focus on countering the growing terrorist
presence, including that of ISIL/DAESH, instead of fighting their
political rivals.
Syria: The United States and GCC member states reaffirmed the
importance of a genuine, sustainable political solution as soon as
possible to end the war in Syria and prevent the further suffering of
its people. All affirmed that Assad had lost all legitimacy and had no
role in Syria's future. They affirmed their commitment to working
towards a post-Assad government that is independent, inclusive, and
protects the rights of minority groups. The United States and the GCC
member states committed to increasing support to the moderate
opposition. GCC member states decided to intensify efforts to combat
extremist groups in Syria, notably by shutting down private financial
flows or any form or assistance to ISIL/DAESH, Al Nusrah Front, and
other violent extremist groups, and to intensify efforts to prevent the
movement of foreign terrorist fighters in and out of Syria. They
expressed their determination to work together to mobilize the
international community for post-Assad reconstruction of Syria. All
affirmed their commitment to continue to support Syria's neighbors as
they face the immense challenges posed by the ongoing conflict and to
work together to strengthen the stability and security of these
countries.
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The United States and GCC member
states strongly affirmed the necessity of resolving the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict on the basis of a just, lasting, comprehensive
peace agreement that results in an independent and contiguous
Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with
Israel. To that end, the United States and GCC member states
underscored the enduring importance of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative
and the urgent need for the parties to demonstrate--through policies
and actions--genuine advancement of a two-state solution, and decided
to remain closely engaged moving forward. The United States and GCC
member states also recommitted to continue to fulfill aggressively
their pledges made for Gaza's reconstruction, to include pledges made
at the October 2014 Cairo Conference.
Lebanon: The leaders expressed their concern over the delay in
electing a new president of Lebanon, called on all parties to
strengthen Lebanese state institutions, and emphasized the critical
importance of Lebanon's parliament moving forward to elect a president
of the Lebanese Republic in accordance with the constitution.
U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum
The leaders pledged to further deepen U.S.-GCC relations on these
and other issues, to build an even stronger, enduring, and
comprehensive strategic partnership and work together for the same,
aimed at enhancing regional stability and prosperity.
To ensure continuity of those efforts, and speedy implementation of
decisions expressed in the Camp David Joint Statement of 14 May 2015,
they directed their respective administrations to strengthen the
framework of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, to include more
frequent ministerial and technical meetings for foreign affairs,
defense, security, economic and other areas relevant to the Forum's
activities. They agreed to meet again in a similar high level format in
2016, in order to advance and build upon the U.S.-GCC Strategic
Partnership announced today.
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