[Senate Hearing 114-778]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-778
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE ALLIANCE FOR PROSPERITY:
IDENTIFYING U.S. PRIORITIES AND ASSESSING PROGRESS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 19, 2016
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-258 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 2
Palmieri, Francisco, principal deputy assistant secretary, Bureau
of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Hogan, Elizabeth, acting assistant administrator for Latin
America and the Caribbean Bureau, U.S. Agency for International
Development, Washington, DC.................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Cardenas, Jose, former USAID acting, assistant administrator for
Latin America and the Caribbean, former National Security
Council Official, Washington, DC............................... 32
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Swigert, Jim, director, Latin America and Caribbean Programs
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs,
Washington, DC................................................. 40
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to questions for the record submitted by Senator David
Perdue to Francisco Palmieri, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs......... 52
Responses to questions for the record submitted by Senator David
Perdue to Elizabeth Hogan, Acting Assistant Administrator for
Latin America and the Caribbean................................ 60
(iii)
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE ALLIANCE FOR PROSPERITY: IDENTIFYING U.S.
PRIORITIES AND ASSESSING PROGRESS
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TUESDAY, APRIL 19, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio,
Gardner, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, Kaine, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order. We thank you for being here. We have two great panels
today, and we are going to examine U.S. support for the
Partnership for Prosperity launched by El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras.
Several Senators have expressed interest in holding this
hearing, given the more than $700 million in appropriations for
fiscal year 2016 and the $771 million requested for fiscal year
2017. I think there is a strong desire to make sure that there
is oversight here, because we want to see it to be successful.
Comparisons have been made to Plan Colombia, which
obviously was successful. There is a lot of interest, as you
can imagine, on this committee to ensure that this is also.
I think we understand the myriad of issues that these three
countries are dealing with. We understand how they affect our
country. And so again, a great opportunity for us to understand
more what your thinking is, and then, of course, we have some
private witnesses that will be here after to share their
expertise.
But obviously, we want to make sure that Central America is
able to secure stability, the rule of law, and economic growth.
We want to understand the strategies. I read all the
briefing materials last night and this morning, and still have
some questions as to how this is all going to tie together.
But we are here today out of our desire to ensure that this
is successful, and we thank you for being with us.
With that, I will turn the meeting over to our outstanding
ranking member, Ben Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really thank you
for holding this hearing.
The U.S. investment in Central America is substantial. The
President's request is a large amount of money, and we have a
responsibility of oversight. And I thank you for conducting
this hearing and look forward to both our panels of witnesses.
Honduras and El Salvador and Guatemala, these are
democratic countries that want security, and they want their
country to grow, and they have incredible challenges. The U.S.
leadership is critical.
Last year, I visited Honduras and El Salvador and saw
firsthand the U.S. efforts. I had a chance to meet with our FBI
and the Transnational Anti-Gang Unit and saw their work
firsthand in dealing with the challenges of gang violence in
both El Salvador and Honduras.
I had a chance during that visit to talk in major detail
about the challenges that are facing the Central America
countries. They have gang violence. We know the MS-13. They
have corruption. Impunity rates are some of the highest in the
world. They have the highest homicide rates in the world. And
they have human rights abusers.
So it is a challenge. It is in our hemisphere. It is in our
security interests to effectively help these countries deal
with these concerns. It will affect our country. We know the
criminal elements on drug trafficking affects America. We know
that gang violence affects America.
I had a chance to interview a gang member, a former gang
member, and he talked about how he had come to my State of
Maryland in order to set up sister gangs. There was an article
in yesterday's paper about the trial taking place in Northern
Virginia involving gang violence.
So we know that this is imported into the United States. It
is in our interests to stop the violence in Central America
before it gets to the United States.
Of course, we know about the victims of trafficking, of
those trying to get to the United States, and the impact of
refugees at our border. So it is in our interests to deal with
it.
The U.S. can make a difference. We saw in Plan Colombia how
we were able to make a consequential difference because the
United States was willing to step up and really be committed to
change in a country. I think we can do that in Central America.
I applaud Vice President Biden for his Alliance for
Progress. I certainly agree with this program and have
supported it, and security is important.
But let me just raise two major caveats. And one is what
the chairman mentioned, that you need to invest in good
governance. When you take a look at how the funds are being
allocated, not enough is being allocated, in my view, to good
governance to combat corruption, to protect freedoms, and to
strengthen civil societies.
Then secondly, there has to be accountability. We are
investing a significant amount of funds. We need to know that
they are doing the job that we said it was to do. And we have
to make sure that the United States is not participating at all
in any of its funds going to support those who are violating
the human rights of its citizens.
So with that in mind, I look forward to hearing our
witnesses, and I know this will be a productive hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I know that both of you know and the audience knows that
Senator Menendez is, obviously, very interested in this issue,
and Senator Kaine also. As a matter of fact, it was a comment
that he made in a hearing that we had months ago that really is
driving the reason we are having this hearing.
I do not know if you want to make a comment or not, but we
thank you for your contribution on this outstanding committee.
The first panel is from the administration. Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Paco Palmieri is being
joined by USAID Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin
America and the Caribbean Beth Hogan. We welcome our official
witnesses and look forward to hearing your testimony.
I think you all understand that your written testimony will
be part of the record, without objection. If you could
summarize in about 5 minutes, we would appreciate it. And if
you could start in the order the I introduced you, that would
be great.
STATEMENT OF FRANCISCO PALMIERI, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Palmieri. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member
Cardin, and members of the committee, for this opportunity to
testify on Central America and our important work in the
region.
I also want to thank the committee for its strong
bipartisan support for our efforts in Central America.
The security and prosperity of Central America is an
essential national security priority for the United States.
Over the next decade, as many as 6 million people will enter
the labor pool in Central America, where low job growth and
high crime rates lead many to choose emigration to Mexico and
the United States over poverty and insecurity.
To provide a viable alternative, the United States and its
partners in the region are taking actions that combine
immediate efforts, such as targeting alien smuggling networks
and launching public messaging campaigns to highlight the
dangers of the journey north, with longer term investments to
address the underlying conditions of the region's longstanding
economic, security, and governance challenges.
In our implementation of the U.S. strategy for engagement
in Central America, we seek the right balance of short- and
long-term action that will ultimately provide an environment
where citizens of Central America can remain and thrive in
their own home communities.
We believe sustained international assistance that balances
security, governance, and prosperity, combined with
demonstrated political will by regional governments and their
respective private sectors and civil societies, has the
greatest potential to affect positive change.
Political will is the most important ingredient. The
Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, and other U.S. agencies work with regional
governments to strengthen criminal justice, improve governance
practices, and promote stronger and more equitable economic
growth. We work with international financial institutions, the
private sector, and, most importantly, civil society and
community-based organizations in the region.
Northern Triangle governments themselves will devote $2.6
billion in 2016 to support their development plan, the Alliance
for Prosperity. To ensure sustainability over the long run,
these governments have taken numerous steps.
In Guatemala, President Morales just extended the mandate
of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala,
known by its acronym CICIG, and appointed a new tax and customs
administration superintendent.
Facing a skyrocketing homicide rate, the Salvadoran
legislative assembly unanimously approved a bill on April 1 to
reduce the ability of gang leaders to direct murders,
extortions, and other crimes from prison. Last year, we aligned
U.S. assistance with the government's Safe El Salvador plan. As
a result, we saw declines in crime and violence in those areas
where we jointly targeted our support.
Honduras has lowered its homicide rate by one-third from
2011 to 2015, and its legislature recently approved, again by a
near-unanimous vote, the OAS-led Mission Against Corruption and
Impunity in Honduras.
However, the tragic murder of indigenous and environmental
activist Berta Caceres on March 3 highlights the vulnerability
of human rights defenders and the deficits in civilian security
in Honduras. We continue to call on the Honduran Government to
conduct a prompt, thorough, and transparent investigation to
ensure it brings to justice those responsible.
We also continue to respond to the sustained, elevated
levels of unaccompanied children and family migration from the
region. Our assistance also ensures respect for the rights of
migrants and protection as guaranteed under domestic and
international law.
The Central American governments must demonstrate political
will to make the difficult decisions that can lead to systemic
reform. The transformation we seek will not happen overnight,
and there may be many setbacks on the path to success. But only
through sustained commitment, both ours and theirs, will
Central America realize its potential.
Thank you again, and I look forward to any questions you
have.
[The Mr. Palmieri's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Francisco Palmieri, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of
State
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Central America
and our important work in the region.
The security and prosperity of Central America is an essential
national security priority for the United States. Over the next decade,
as many as six million people will enter the labor pool in Central
America where low job growth and high crime rates lead many to choose
emigration to Mexico and the United States over poverty and insecurity.
To provide a viable alternative, the United States and its partners in
the region are taking actions that combine immediate efforts, such as
targeting alien smuggling networks and launching public messaging
campaigns to highlight the dangers of the journey north, with longer-
term investments to address the underlying conditions of the region's
longstanding economic, security, and governance challenges. In our
implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America,
we seek the right balance of short and long-term action that will
ultimately provide an environment where citizens of Central America can
remain and thrive om their own home communities.
We know sustained international assistance that balances security,
governance and prosperity, combined with demonstrated political will by
regional governments and their respective private sectors and civil
societies, has the greatest potential to affect positive change.
Political will is the most important ingredient and a focus of Vice
President Joe Biden's successful personal engagement with the leaders
of the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras). Over
the last two years, this has produced significant commitments by
governments to invest their national resources to stimulate economic
growth, promote educational opportunities, target criminal networks,
tackle corruption, and strengthen civilian rule of law institutions.
By advancing three, inextricably linked objectives--prosperity,
governance, and security--the Department of State, the United States
Agency for International Development, and other U.S. agencies work with
regional governments to strengthen criminal justice, improve governance
practices, and promote stronger and more equitable economic growth. Our
efforts build on the political will, commitment, and financial
investment of our partner governments, international financial
institutions, private sector, and, most importantly, civil society and
community based organizations in the region.
For example, Northern Triangle governments will devote $2.6 billion
in 2016 to support their development plan, the Alliance for Prosperity.
To ensure sustainability over the long run, these governments have
taken numerous steps recently to improve fiscal management and increase
government revenues. As of early March 2016, El Salvador had collected
$7.3 million from a special contribution tax for public security,
enabling the Attorney General to hire 100 prosecutors and support
vocational training for youth in high crime areas. In Guatemala, a
number of sectors praised the decision by President Morales to swear in
Juan Francisco Solorzano as the new Tax and Customs
AdministrationSuperintendent in March after a high-profile corruption
scandal led to the ousting of the previous Superintendent last year.
The Guatemalan government also drafted a proposal to reform the Tax and
Customs Administration and initiated a campaign to build congressional
and public support for the reforms. On March 15, the Honduran
government closed its tax collection entity due to corruption and
inefficiency and approved a fiscal responsibility law on April 5 that
will lower the deficit ceiling, increase fiscal transparency, and
improve budget planning.
Facing a skyrocketing homicide rate, the Salvadoran government is
taking steps to address the crippling security situation. The
Legislative Assembly unanimously approved a bill on April 1 to reduce
the ability of gang leaders to direct murders, extortions, and other
crimes from prison. Last year, we leveraged our resources to align with
the government's Safe El Salvador Plan; as a result, we saw declines in
crime and violence in areas where we jointly targeted our support. U.S.
assistance is essential to helping the Salvadoran government turn
around the negative trajectory on homicide and crime rates and improve
citizen security.
Since assuming office in January, Guatemalan President Jimmy
Morales reaffirmed his support for the Alliance for Prosperity, moving
to fulfill Guatemala's 2016 Action Plan commitments and to extend the
mandate of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala
(CICIG). Guatemala continues to combat human smuggling, increase
citizen security, and expand programs aimed at building human capital.
The new administration has developed a strategy to target chronic
malnutrition and the lack of opportunities for youth in the Western
Highlands, an impoverished area of the country from which many young
people migrate. U.S. foreign assistance in areas such as the Western
Highlands is critical to complement Guatemalan government efforts to
improve healthcare, education, and nutrition, and create job and
educational opportunities as an alternative to migration.
Honduras has made impressive strides in addressing its homicide
rate, lowering it by one-third from 2011 to 2015, and its legislature
recently approved--by a near unanimous vote--the OAS-led Mission
Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH). However, recent
developments underscore the importance of continual progress by the
Honduran government to meet its commitments under the Alliance for
Prosperity. The tragic murder of indigenous and environmental activist
Berta Caceres on March 3 highlights the deficits in citizen security in
Honduras. Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez stated the
investigation into Ms. Caceres' murder is a national priority and
condemned the murder in the strongest of terms. We continue to call on
the Honduran government to conduct a prompt, thorough, and transparent
investigation to ensure it brings to justice those responsible. In
addition, despite taking key steps to reform its national civilian
police, Honduras heavily relies on its military police to provide
citizen security. Returning all domestic law enforcement duties to
civilian authorities remains a key component of our security
cooperation in Central America. U.S. assistance will continue to play a
key role in training and professionalizing Honduran civilian law
enforcement authorities, enabling them to increase their capacity to
provide citizen security in Honduras.
The leak of the ``Panama Papers'' earlier this month demonstrated
the need for increased transparency in the international financial
system. It further showed how much work remains to be done in the
worldwide fight against corruption and illicit financial transactions.
For its part, Panama has taken important steps to enhance the
transparency of its financial system, tax regime, and anti-money
laundering standards, including enacting a law in April 2015 that
closed a major loophole in the country's anti-money laundering
regulations. Under the new law, non-financial businesses like law firms
and real estate agents are required to comply with the same reporting
requirements on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing
as financial institutions. In recognition of Panama's recent reforms,
the Financial Action Task Force removed Panama from its ``gray list''
of countries with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies in February 2016. We
continue to engage the Government of Panama at senior levels to
implement this new legal regime, and promote efforts to increase
transparency and accountability throughout the region.
We also continue to respond to the sustained, elevated levels of
unaccompanied alien child (UAC) and family migration from the region.
March 2016 is the eighth straight month in which the U.S. government
apprehended more UACs and family migrant subjects than in the same
month in 2015. Northern Triangle governments share our concerns about
irregular migration and are taking additional steps to respond. The
Salvadoran government appointed ``Border Coordinators'' at two key
ports of entry to oversee the interaction of the numerous agencies
operating at the border, improving communication and coordination.
Guatemala plans to remodel and expand a migrant reception center to
enhance its ability and capacity to successfully reintegrate returned
citizens back into the local community and economy. In Honduras, the
government continues to make progress in apprehending UACs and family
units being smuggled out of the country, and will deliver biometrics
technology to all border posts to increase security this year.
Continued U.S. support will enhance the capacity of Central American
and Mexican governments to manage migration flows, combat human
smuggling and trafficking, and enhance border controls. Our assistance
also includes capacity building in Central America and Mexico to ensure
respect for the rights of migrants and protection as guaranteed under
domestic and international law.
The Central American governments in the region continue to
demonstrate significant political will to make the difficult decisions
that can lead to systemic reform. The transformation we seek will not
happen overnight, and there may be setbacks on the path to success.
Only through sustained commitment, both ours and theirs, will Central
America realize its potential. We are working in partnership with
regional governments and international donors to leverage our
collective efforts and seize this important moment to create the
opportunities to encourage Central Americans to remain at home so they
can help contribute to the creation of a more secure, democratic, and
prosperous region.
Thank you again and I look forward to any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Hogan?
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH HOGAN, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN BUREAU, U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ms. Hogan. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Cardin, and members of the committee, thank you for the
invitation to testify today.
I appreciate your support of USAID's work in Latin America
and the Caribbean, and I am pleased to update you today on our
efforts in Central America.
I would like to focus on what USAID is doing to help
address the challenges the region faces. We see prosperity,
improved governance, and security for the objectives of our
strategy for engagement in Central America as interdependent.
We know that opening doors to employment and education for
citizens, especially youth at risk of gang recruitment, crime,
and violence, will bolster our efforts in security and lead to
freer, more prosperous societies. That is why our prosperity
programs include efforts to support small businesses and
entrepreneurs, to encourage private investment, to train youth
in job skills, and to improve agricultural productivity.
In El Salvador, for example, we have helped 10,000 small-
and medium-sized companies exceed $10 million in domestic sales
and exports, and create over 15,000 new jobs, 49 percent of
which are filled by women.
In Honduras, our Feed the Future program investments
resulted in an increase of nearly 55 percent in the incomes of
more than 180,000 program beneficiaries, some of the country's
poorest people.
These efforts to grow prosperity are only sustainable in an
environment where democratic values and institutions flourish,
where citizens can depend on basic social services, where
impunity is reduced, human rights are respected and protected,
and civil society and the media can play their rightful roles.
The peaceful protests against government corruption that
characterized the Guatemalan Spring offer real hope that we
have entered a new era in Central America.
Our governance projects include help to reform institutions
to root out corruption; to strengthen civil society's ability
to hold governments accountable; to foster a culture of respect
for human rights, especially for the historically marginalized
groups; and to improve fiscal transparency.
For example, in Guatemala, we have supported the National
Forensics Institute since its inception in 2007. This body
played an instrumental role in analyzing the evidence that led
to the indictment of the former President and Vice President on
corruption charges.
Ultimately, none of our efforts in prosperity and
governance will take root in societies that are plagued by
insecurity. The heart of our security work is youth focused, as
we invest in programs that reach those most at risk for gang
recruitment, crime, and violence. We are using tested
approaches in the most violent-prone communities to create safe
community spaces, to provide job and life skills training, and
to build trust between police and residents. Already, we are
seeing tangible results of our crime prevention activities in
El Salvador, where our initial analysis points to a drop in
homicides of more than 60 percent in the 76 communities where
USAID targets its programming.
As we carry out these plans, we are forming partnerships
with the private sector and establishing regional networks that
we hope will accelerate and strengthen our efforts. We
currently have 60 private-sector partners in the Northern
Triangle, from whom we leveraged $150 million in fiscal year
2014 in support of our work for at-risk youth and our efforts
to increase food security and grow incomes.
These are challenging efforts that require increased focus
and manpower, and we are committed to efficient, effective, and
transparent oversight of the programs through which we are
implementing the U.S. strategy.
We use a full range of monitoring and evaluation tools. We
are commissioning external impact studies to better inform our
development work, and have established 5-year strategic plans
to guide our work in each country. In short, we are collecting
hard data to inform our programming so that we can take
advantage of what works and make adjustments along the way.
We are encouraging the Northern Triangle governments to
employ similar oversight methods, using the Partnership for
Growth (or PEG) as a model. As you know, the Partnership for
Growth is founded on principles of country ownership and
partnership; high-level mutual accountability and transparency;
rigorous, evidence-based analysis to focus and prioritize
resources; and a whole-of-government approach.
Through Guatemala and Honduras, we hope to replicate the
Partnership for Growth model. We intend to use the lessons
learned from the implementation of PFG in El Salvador to
encourage mutual accountability, coordination, rigorous
measurement, and transparency with the public.
We believe that with concrete steps and increased
investments we are seeing from the Northern Triangle
governments, coupled with our own investments, we are well-
placed for success.
Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and this
committee, for your support and leadership on U.S. engagement
in the Northern Triangle, and I look forward to your questions.
[Ms. Hogan's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Elizabeth Hogan, Acting Assistant Administrator
for Latin America and the Caribbean Bureau, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today. I am
grateful for the committee's support for the United States Agency for
International Development's work in Latin America and the Caribbean,
and am pleased to have this opportunity to update you on our efforts in
Central America.
development context
As you know, social development and economic growth in Central
America have been stymied by a dramatic rise in crime and violence--
particularly in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras. While the homicide rate has declined in
Honduras, it is still unacceptably high. In El Salvador, the statistics
from 2015 are particularly alarming--over 100 murders per 100,000
people. This surpasses the murder rate at the peak of El Salvador's
civil war in the 1980s.
The recent wave of insecurity is rooted in increased gang violence
and transnational crime, deep-seated social and economic inequity, lack
of economic opportunity, and high unemployment. These problems are
exacerbated by systemic challenges across local and national
governments in the region. Institutions are plagued by lack of capacity
to govern, antiquated management systems, and corruption that continues
to undermine efforts to improve security and advance prosperity.
According to Transparency International (2015), three of the five most
corrupt nations in Latin America and the Caribbean are in Central
America.
We continue to see the consequences of these problems manifest at
our border as children and families make the dangerous journey to the
United States. This migration is deeply concerning to us and our
interagency partners, and USAID is determined to help migrant
returnees, while simultaneously addressing the underlying causes that
drive people away from their homelands. In the immediate term, USAID
supports the work of the International Organization for Migration to
upgrade reception centers across the Northern Triangle, improve intake
and referral services for returned migrants, and provide technical
assistance to governments to improve their own child protective
services and migration data analysis.
regional response from central america
These obstacles are deeply entrenched, and years in the making, but
they are not insurmountable. As we have seen in Colombia, where peace
is within reach after decades of internal conflict and poverty, real
development gains occur when there is a strategic and determined effort
on the part of host governments, an engaged civil society, and
sustained commitment by the United States.
We have already seen promising signs of the Central American
governments' commitment in the form of a serious, regional plan, the
Alliance for Prosperity, which aligns closely with much of our United
States Strategy for Engagement in Central America. The Alliance for
Prosperity lays out the Northern Triangle governments' shared
commitment to grow their economies, create employment, and improve the
life prospects of their citizens, particularly the poorest and most
vulnerable. We are encouraged that the governments of Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador passed 2016 budgets totaling $2.6 billion to
support the Alliance for Prosperity.
Policy reforms undertaken in the past several years have translated
into tangible results on the ground. Newly elected President Morales
has committed to extending the mandate for the International Commission
Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) beyond his own term in office.
With USAID support, the Guatemalan judicial system, Office of the
Attorney General, High Impact Court, and National Forensics Lab have
made progress in combatting impunity. Honduras initiated top-to-bottom
reforms of its National Police and has embraced violence prevention as
policy.
Neighboring El Salvador has developed the most comprehensive
national security plan in the Northern Triangle--Plan Seguro. El
Salvador has started Plan Seguro implementation in ten of the country's
most violent communities, and USAID and the Department of State's
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
have concrete plans to support their efforts. Plan Seguro is financed
by newly imposed taxes on telecommunications companies and Salvadorans
who earn more than $500,000 per year.
These particular actions and local ownership of the Alliance for
Prosperity demonstrate political will from the Northern Triangle
countries. Nevertheless, a strong partnership with the United States is
necessary to achieve and sustain our shared objectives of prosperity,
improved governance, and security, which underpin both the Alliance for
Prosperity and the United States Strategy for Engagement in Central
America. This partnership is in line with USAID's overall mission to
partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic
societies while advancing our security and prosperity.
prosperity
One of our key priorities is to spur greater prosperity in the
Northern Triangle by supporting broad-based economic growth programs
designed to expand business, employment, and educational opportunities
to the poor and those most likely to migrate. We know that opening
doors to employment and education for citizens--especially youth at
risk of gang recruitment, crime, and violence--will bolster our efforts
in security and lead to safer, more prosperous societies.
USAID will continue to support El Salvador in its own efforts to
grow the economy at the municipal and national levels. At the local
level, our work includes projects that help local communities promote
economic development and business opportunities. At the national level,
we are assisting the government to create a more welcoming business
environment, encourage private investment, and improve the ability of
small and medium enterprises to take advantage of market opportunities.
USAID's investments have helped enable domestic sales and exports
by 9,000 Salvadoran companies that have exceeded $100 million and led
to the creation of over 15,000 jobs. More recently, USAID's partnership
with the El Salvadoran small business development agency has expanded
services in two of Plan Seguro's most violent municipalities, bringing
together small business owners, municipal authorities, and police to
create viable business development zones.
In Guatemala, our prosperity programs are geographically focused in
the rural Western Highlands, where poverty levels are the highest.
Chronic malnutrition rates remain around 50 percent country-wide and
average 66 percent in indigenous communities in the Western Highlands.
As a result of USAID's Integrated Program, targeted communities have
seen a reduction in the prevalence of poverty, improved nutritional
status for children, increased income and employment, greater
agricultural productivity, improved access to water, and better health
and educational services. For instance, in the 2,500 communities where
we work, the prevalence of poverty was reduced from 85.9 percent in
2012 to 72.9 percent in 2014, according to an independent evaluation.
According to preliminary data from the latest mid-term evaluation,
chronic malnutrition was reduced from 67.4 percent in 2013 to 64.9
percent in 2015 for children under five in the same target communities.
We plan to significantly expand the Integrated Program to help
address the causes of migration by youth from the region. This includes
exploring new economic opportunities in sectors beyond agriculture, as
well as ramping up workforce readiness and vocational education
opportunities. With additional FY 2016 and FY 2017 resources, we can
expand the reach of our Integrated Program to all of the targeted
municipalities in the Western Highlands with the greatest levels of
migration.
In Honduras, USAID will use additional resources to build on our
successful Feed the Future (FTF) programming, which has shown
significant results in reducing extreme poverty. While monitoring FTF
investments, we have tracked program progress and found that between
2011 and 2015, incomes increased by nearly 55 percent for more than
180,000 of the poorest individuals. Within the last fiscal year alone,
the number of FTF beneficiary families whose incomes rose beyond the
extreme poverty line increased by 30 percent (8,719 in FY 2015,
compared to 6,626 in FY 2014).
Across all three countries, we will invest in clean energy programs
and trade facilitation that promote regional electricity integration,
in support of President Obama's Energy Security Task Force for Central
America, and prepare the poor to actively participate in the 21st
century workforce. Our investments will promote clean energy, and
improve the poor quality of electricity in the region. Less expensive,
more reliable energy will improve the competitiveness of the business
sector while enhancing energy security.
governance
Economic growth and security are only sustainable in an environment
where democratic values and institutions flourish, citizens can depend
on basic social services, impunity is reduced or eliminated, human
rights are respected and protected, and civil society and the media can
play their rightful roles. The peaceful protests that characterized the
``Guatemalan Spring'' offer real hope that we have entered a new era in
Central America. Ultimately, the success of our efforts depends upon
strong and effective governance by the Northern Triangle countries.
We plan to invest the increased FY 2015 and FY 2016 funding in new
initiatives to promote good governance and accountability in the
Northern Triangle. In Guatemala, USAID will complement a Millennium
Challenge Corporationsupported tax administration program to assist
private sector and civil society groups in monitoring the effectiveness
of the tax and customs services. In an effort to address rampant
corruption and build on the wave of public sentiment and support for
reform, we are considering support for the start-up of the Government
of Honduras and Organization of American States' new anti-corruption
initiative, known by its Spanish acronym MACCIH. This would include
resources to help stand up the investigative unit and support the civil
society observatory, which will monitor and promote the implementation
of reforms to the criminal justice system. With FY 2016 resources, we
will continue to support programs that address chronically low tax
revenue collection, improve fiscal transparency, and expand justice
sector reform throughout the region. USAID provides technical training
to judges, lawyers, and court personnel, as well as technical
assistance to the juvenile justice system on important rehabilitation
and reintegration reforms.
In El Salvador, we support civil society to advocate for passage of
civil service laws and transparent policies for hiring and promotion,
and assist the government to develop a national integrity plan that
improves transparency in public resource use. For example, USAID, the
Government of El Salvador, and the Government of Brazil partnered to
support the launch of a new fiscal transparency portal. The portal,
which receives more than 10,000 hits per month, provides a user-
friendly platform for researchers, the private sector, and ordinary
citizens to obtain information about the public budget.
We are also committed to supporting civil society and human rights
throughout the Northern Triangle. We work with indigenous groups, human
rights defenders, and governments to help foster a culture of respect,
especially for historically marginalized groups. We recognize the
important role that these groups, particularly indigenous peoples, play
in sustainable development, conservation, safeguarding biodiversity,
and adapting to and mitigating the effects of global climate change.
Our programs work in partnership with these groups by integrating
consideration of their concerns into our policies, programs, and
projects; strengthening their traditional resource management
strategies; helping to legalize and demarcate their territories; and
helping them to improve their livelihoods.
security
None of our efforts in prosperity and governance will take root in
societies that are plagued by insecurity. The heart of our security
work is youth-focused, as we invest in programs that reach those most
at risk for gang recruitment, crime, and violence. We have supported a
range of tested, community-level approaches to reduce and prevent crime
and violence in high-crime communities across the Northern Triangle.
These approaches include partnering with communities, civil society,
governments and the private sector to develop crime prevention plans,
invest in municipal crime observatories, create safe community spaces,
expand after-school activities, provide job and life skills training,
and build trust between police and residents.
Already we are seeing tangible results of our crime prevention
activities in El Salvador, where our initial analysis points to a drop
in homicides of more than 60 percent in the 76 communities where USAID
targets its programming. This statistic is a stark contrast to other
communities where homicide rates have climbed sharply over the past
year. Additionally, our 200 youth outreach centers reach around 85,000
at-risk youth every year who are susceptible to gang recruitment and
potential migration.
We will use additional resources to help the Northern Triangle
governments scale up what is working, particularly in the communities
from which youth are migrating. We are working with INL to marry the
United States Government's prevention, law enforcement, and justice
interventions, focusing on the youth most at risk of falling into lives
of crime. We are also heartened that the Government of Honduras has
supported this model and directed its own resources to support this
program; it is likewise gratifying that so many elements of our model
are reflected in El Salvador's Plan Seguro.
regional approach
Through our Central America regional platform, USAID recently
released a new regional strategy to address cross-boundary concerns,
including human rights, labor, energy and environment issues, and trade
facilitation. We are developing a new regional trade facilitation
program that aims to reduce the time and costs to move goods across the
border, making it easier for businesses to capitalize on market
opportunities.
Part of our regional program will expand a successful regional
trade and market alliance with the Inter-American Development Bank,
which supports 25,000 small producers in new producer-buyer alliances
across several agricultural value chains. We also plan to extend our
regional agreement with the U.S. Department of Agriculture to promote
food safety, market access, and local capacity in the
Northern Triangle to export safe, high value agricultural products
to the United States. In addition, we are planning new regional
programs to promote human rights and labor rights.
partnering with the private sector
To accelerate progress, we will continue to tap into the resources,
value chains, expertise, and reach of the private sector. We currently
boast a roster of 60 private sector partners in the Northern Triangle,
from whom we leveraged $150 million in FY 2014 resources to jointly
support our vocational training, education, and employment work for at-
risk youth, and increase food security and incomes for vulnerable
communities.
oversight
Operationally, we have made several changes to better equip our
teams to expand successful programs, and design and implement new ones.
One year ago, USAID instituted a Regional Governing Board comprised of
Agency leadership in Washington and the field, which meets quarterly to
identify and share implementation challenges, unblock bottlenecks,
streamline approaches, and update critical stakeholders including
Congress. We recently added a civil society consultation to the
quarterly meetings--in Washington and the field--to ensure that we are
getting a wide-cross section of input into our plans and programs.
USAID has realigned our staffing pattern to accommodate 16 new
positions in the field and Washington that support the implementation
of the U.S. Strategy. We are also unifying all of our procurement
planning throughout the region, so that staff can be mobilized to work
on the highest priority procurements. These changes give us the
management capacity needed to more effectively implement the increased
funding for Central America.
USAID is committed to accountability, transparency, and oversight
of the programs through which we are implementing the U.S. Strategy. We
rely on a full range of monitoring and evaluation tools, including
survey data collection, performance indicator monitoring, analysis,
studies, and external evaluations. Our Missions in the Northern
Triangle are also guided by five-year strategic plans, and their
individual monitoring, evaluation, and learning plans. These tools and
plans not only allow us to establish baselines and track the status of
our programming; they also help us to be more flexible in our approach
by demonstrating what is not working and providing the data needed to
help us adapt our programs and allocate resources accordingly.
For example, last year we expanded our community-based crime and
violence prevention programs in Central America after an independent
and rigorous impact evaluation statistically demonstrated that crime
victimization is dramatically lower and public perception of security
higher, in USAID's treatment communities.
In addition, we recently created a Central America Learning Agenda
to build regional evidence and data collection for each of the three
pillars of the U.S. Strategy. This Learning Agenda allows our team to
compile evidence from ongoing regional assessments and evaluations, and
to plan and carry out performance and impact evaluations for new or
expanded programs.
encouraging cooperation and accountability:
the el salvador partnership for growth model
USAID remains resolutely focused on helping the governments of
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras become more responsive and
transparent to their citizens. We coordinate our support with other
United States Government agencies, and have made our assistance
dependent on significant reform. The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in
Central America reinforces the Alliance for Prosperity, which commits
the countries to monitor and evaluate their own efforts and empowers
civil society organizations to assume an oversight role as well.
Adopting a collaborative approach that encourages not only
partnerships, but also ownership by governments and civil society
requires intensive work, but, importantly, increases buy-in and
commitment.
To accomplish our goals, USAID intends to support the core
operating principles of the Administration's Partnership for Growth
(PFG) model in Guatemala and Honduras, encouraging mutual
accountability, coordination, rigorous measurement, and transparency
with the public. The PFG model, founded on principles of country
ownership and partnership; high-level mutual accountability and
transparency; rigorous, evidence-based analyses to focus and prioritize
resources; and a whole-of-government approach, was first used in El
Salvador, where our efforts ensure that aid follows reform. For
example, USAID leveraged the Millennium Challenge Corporation's
existing efforts to promote key reforms on public-private partnerships
and money laundering--important legislation that was needed to ensure
sustainability for our efforts and was agreed to by the Government of
El Salvador when PFG was launched in 2011. Though Guatemala and
Honduras are not PFG countries, we intend to use lessons learned from
the implementation of PFG in El Salvador to promote reform,
transparency and local ownership of development progress.
conclusion
With renewed commitment from Northern Triangle countries to advance
their own development goals, and our government's support, USAID is
well placed for success. Our programs are strategically designed to
confront current challenges while also enabling countries to better
address emerging threats. As we have seen with the Zika outbreak and
the prolonged drought, preparation and coordination are crucial to
mitigating the effects of, and developing a response to, the crises and
natural disasters that the region regularly faces. Political will, in
combination with improved local capacity, leveraged resources and new
partnerships, will allow us to help Central American governments create
a more peaceful, prosperous, and integrated region.
On behalf of the Agency, I would like to thank Chairman Corker,
Ranking Member Cardin and this committee for your support and
leadership on U.S. engagement in the Northern Triangle. We look forward
to collaborating with you to address long-standing challenges and new
opportunities for reform in the region. Thank you for your time; I look
forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
As a courtesy to the other members, I am going to reserve
my time for interjections. And thank you both for the sort of
higher level testimony.
I do hope that, over the course of questioning, we will
understand how this is going to work with the Alliance for
Property, how these two are going to tie together. I think
there are a number of questions about that.
But with that, Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Thank you both for what you are doing.
There is a general belief that if you are in the Northern
Triangle, you have a better chance to be a member of a family
that has been a victim of a crime than a perpetrator of a crime
being held accountable for their crimes. The impunity rates are
just unbelievably high.
So I am going to ask a couple questions related to what we
are doing to deal with the issues of corruption and the issues
of independent judiciaries and law enforcement.
But let me start first with the brazen murder of Honduran
human rights activist Berta Caceres. In Colombia, we supported
$10 million for dealing with protecting mechanisms for human
rights defenders. What are we doing in regard to protecting
civil societies in the Northern Triangle as part of our plan?
Mr. Palmieri. Senator, thank you for that question.
Across-the-board, the strategy for engagement in Central
America is making investments in better governance, and part of
those investments in the governance area is designed to help
governments better protect their citizens, lower those impunity
rates.
But with respect to assistance directly to civil society
activists, we insist on the highest human rights standards. Our
training of the police forces incorporates human rights
training elements. And in these governments where they have put
in place new legislation to better introduce protective
measures, we are trying to facilitate and accelerate the
implementation of that legislation.
Senator Cardin. Can you put a dollar amount on what we are
investing on trying to protect civil societies operating in the
Northern Triangle?
Mr. Palmieri. I do not have the specific figure, but we
will get that for you, sir.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate that.
I want to follow up on democracy funding, as to what we are
doing in supporting democracy funding. If you could provide us
a look at Plan Colombia, what we spent in that country
successfully. We are not finished yet. Governance was
critically important there, and I think there are lessons to be
learned.
As I look at what we are doing in the Northern Triangle, a
lot of money is being invested in security, which is necessary.
I do not disagree with that. But I do not see the same
commitment as it relates to governance.
Ms. Hogan. Thank you for that very important observation,
and let me assure you that democracy and governance is equal to
the resources and the programs that we are funding under the
other two pillars of prosperity and security. That is the
design of the strategy.
Although the request level for democracy and governance
programs might look smaller to you compared to those other two
pillars, in fact, we are supplementing that with resources from
our Central America Regional Security Initiative, or CARSI
program, which is also doing governance work at the local
level, particularly through municipal services--as well as
improving the transparency of those municipal governments. Our
CARSI program is also supporting human rights, particularly in
the area of gender-based violence programs.
So that is one way that we complement the work that we are
doing in the democracy sector.
Also, under the prosperity pillar, we are using resources
to help provide support to the oversight bodies within
governments, like the supreme audit association, to the
financial management systems under the ministries of finance,
to the overhaul of tax regimes, where in El Salvador, for
example, we have recently helped them put online an e-
procurement system.
Senator Cardin. Let me ask you this, how confident are you
that they have set up the proper mechanism to evaluate their
anticorruption activities? In Guatemala, they have used the
U.N.-backed international commission. That was too
controversial for the other two countries. They wanted to have
more propriety as to the mechanism that was set up, to be more
local.
What is our confidence that they will adhere to
international standards to fight corruption?
Mr. Palmieri. To begin, it is a critical component of the
appropriation, and it is a criteria that we will be certifying
the countries on.
Second, in Honduras, they have reached an agreement with
the OAS on this organization MACCIH that will have independence
and an ability to investigate corruption cases within the
country.
In El Salvador, we are working through the PFG and other
mechanisms to ensure that citizen groups also have a voice in
pressing their governments for greater accountability as well.
Senator Cardin. Look, there is a lot of pressure on
certifications, and I strongly support what is being done on
the appropriations side to make sure that there is
accountability for the release of funds, and they work very
closely with this committee as we work together to put that
into the appropriation process.
But we also know that you have governments that desperately
need funds, and at times we can say, look, we have to be a
partner.
How committed are you on these certifications to make sure
that we demand and accomplish achievable results in fighting
corruption?
Mr. Palmieri. I think it is absolutely essential for the
success of both the Alliance for Prosperity and for our own
strategy for engagement and the congressional support to this
that the governments themselves are involving actively citizen
groups and civil society in the oversight of the Alliance for
Prosperity and our programs.
Senator Cardin. I agree with that.
Mr. Palmieri. We are committed to ensuring that there is a
real process.
Senator Cardin. I agree with that, but it is more than just
involving the civil societies and having more transparency. It
is also reducing the impunity rate so that those who commit
these crimes are held accountable under an independent judicial
system.
Let me just ask one other question quickly, if I might, and
that is the status of those who want to come to America
legally. We have refugee status issues. We have victims of
trafficking that are entitled to relief. We have the Central
American minors program.
It seems like these programs are overly complicated for
those that are victimized to be able to establish a legal path
to come to the United States.
I was there. I was in the community. I have met with young
people. There is a common desire to come to America. I
understand that. The neighborhood I visited, it was very clear
to me in talking to the U.S. people that were there that a
large number of these children will not survive in their
community because of the gang activities.
So what are we doing to facilitate the legal process for
those who are entitled to come to America?
The Chairman. Do so briefly, because we are going to try to
finish by 11:55, okay?
Mr. Palmieri. Yes, sir.
The Central America minors program last year received 7,600
applications, and it has begun to process and get more of those
children who need this protection through the screening process
and into the United States under its protective element.
We always knew when we stood up that program it would take
some time to gain widespread knowledge of it. We expect, in the
year to come, that we will see more and more parents and
children taking advantage of the program, sir.
Senator Cardin. Will you make available to the committee
the numbers that have actually gone through the process, how
long it took, how many have actually been allowed to come to
the United States? Would you get that specific information to
us?
Mr. Palmieri. Yes, sir.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Gardner?
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
holding this hearing today.
Thank you to the witnesses for your service and your time
today.
Mr. Palmieri, just a question for you, on the Mexico border
with these northern countries, what is the situation on the
border itself? You may have talked about this earlier in your
testimony, but I was late. I just wanted to get your taste for
what you think is happening there.
Mr. Palmieri. On the Mexico-Guatemala border, Mexico has
really stepped up its cooperation with the Guatemalan
Government in controlling that border. We have also provided
additional assistance to Mexico in the form of embedded CBP
advisers, biometric equipment. Mexico is doing a much better
job on its southern border on preventing that flow. In fact, in
calendar year 2015, they stopped over 18,000 unaccompanied
children, compared to around 10,000 the year before.
There is a cross-border task force between the two
governments. I think we have a lot of good cooperation from
Mexico.
But more importantly, we are building that same type of
cooperation between El Salvador and Guatemala, and Honduras and
Guatemala, and all three of the Northern Triangle countries, so
that they also are better controlling their borders.
Senator Gardner. So as a result then, we have seen a
decrease in human trafficking as a result of these changes?
Mr. Palmieri. There is a lot of human trafficking and alien
smuggling going on in Central America. We think we have a much
more effective process now that our Department of Homeland
Security elements in our embassies are working on coordinated
investigations. There was a highly successful investigation
that involved Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador last fall that
broke up an alien-smuggling ring.
Part of the critical component of our program in Central
America is to strengthen border controls and the ability to
disrupt these networks.
Senator Gardner. So would you characterize that as a
decrease in human trafficking though?
Mr. Palmieri. I believe we are having success in disrupting
those networks, but the flows remain high. And other conditions
in the region, the longer term underlying conditions continue
to exist, and that is why our investment in this region is so
important, because with 6 million young people looking for
jobs, we not only have to provide security, but we have to help
catalyze greater economic investment and job creation.
Senator Gardner. Just so I understand, you are making these
changes, making these investments, and they have done this, but
we are not ready to commit ourselves to saying that we have
actually seen a decrease in human trafficking then?
Mr. Palmieri. Sir, I do believe there has been a decline in
alien smuggling and human trafficking. The numbers are down
from 2014.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. And what about drug
trafficking?
Mr. Palmieri. Drug trafficking continues to be a very
serious concern throughout the region. It is the primary
transit zone from drugs coming from South America. All three
countries are cooperating with us and working to help interdict
that flow. But we know that coca cultivation rates are up in
South America, and it will be a challenge to continue
interdicting that drug flow.
Senator Gardner. General Kelly, the former command at
SOUTHCOM, talked about how, in his estimation, we have eyes on
roughly 90 percent of the narcotic traffic coming out of
Central and South America.
Do you agree with that assessment? You may or may not have
that information.
Mr. Palmieri. I do not have the specific information that
General Kelly has, but I do think we have good partners. We do
have an effective system in the joint task force in Key West.
We are tracking a lot of it. And we probably do need more
assets in the region, both from our partners and our own assets
there to help interdict.
Senator Gardner. The conversation he had is he talked about
how we had significant ability to watch to know what was being
trafficked, but very little ability to stop, the resources
needed to intercept or interfere with that transfer.
If we have eyes on it, what do we need to do to actually
stop it?
Mr. Palmieri. That is why the strategy for Central America,
and the appropriation that looks at building the capabilities
of our partners in the region on the security front, is so
important. Those investments that help these governments
themselves become more effective partners to the United States
will help us impede that flow.
Senator Gardner. When I was in Mexico this past winter, I
had a conversation about drug trafficking issues. One of the
concerns that was brought up was about some of the policies in
the United States as it relates to certain efforts to legalize
marijuana and other drugs in the United States, and how they
felt that the U.S. was sending a mixed message in terms of
narcotic trafficking and stopping the flow of drugs from Mexico
to the United States.
Are you seeing policies within the United States, domestic
policies, State-driven policies, having an effect on our
conversations in Central America?
Mr. Palmieri. Senator, there you are beginning to get a
little bit out of my area of expertise. I know that all the
countries in the region are concerned that the demand in the
United States spurs the supply in the region. I think it is an
important element of the administration's effort to reduce
demand in the United States. In some respects, we have had
success in that area. But the countries, they do express
concern about it.
Senator Gardner. Ms. Hogan, what do you think, in terms of
the challenges that we are facing in these nations, what is the
most challenging issue?
Ms. Hogan. Certainly, security is the greatest challenge, I
think, that these governments face right now. In fact, the
homicide rates in El Salvador are at the highest levels since
the civil war in the 1980s.
When we testified before a House committee just two months
ago, we noted that the homicide rate in El Salvador was at a
historic high, at 103 per 100,000 persons. It has gone even
higher than that in the past month, now surpassing 120
homicides per 100,000. Compared to Costa Rica, which has eight
homicides per 100,000, you can get a sense of the problem. So
this is a very urgent issue for El Salvador and Honduras,
although there have been gains in Honduras.
I would say that, for Guatemala, the issue is a little bit
different. Although security is of great concern in Guatemala,
there I think it has been decades of noninclusive growth that
have left the indigenous population, which makes up 60 percent
of the population of Guatemala, in desperate poverty. It is
also the driver of migration from the Western Highlands into
the United States.
So our programs in Guatemala are focused specifically in
that region to try to help increase incomes and provide people
an alternative to migrating to the United States.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to express my
thanks to you and Senator Cardin for calling this hearing. It
is a very, very important one, and I want to thank the
witnesses for the good work that you do.
There is reason to be hopeful that, if we make these
investments the right way and we monitor them the right way, we
can see progress. Certainly, the experience that we have had in
working on Plan Colombia over the years suggests you can take a
situation that looks just completely bleak and, with
persistence, lead to significant progress. In Mexico, the fact
that we are now at net migration being even from Mexico is also
a tremendous improvement over the situation many years ago.
Both Colombia and Mexico have still major challenges, but
we have seen progress in some key areas that cause us trouble.
So if we get these investments right, we can be hopeful.
I was with Senator Cornyn in February last year, and we
were in Honduras back where I had worked many years ago. Our
U.S. Ambassador took us to a neighborhood and said, ``I am now
taking you to the most dangerous neighborhood in the most
dangerous city in the most country in the world,'' the
Chamelecon neighborhood in San Pedro Sula. The homicide rate
has come down, but right in the middle of that horrible
neighborhood, there is USAID-run community centers that have
really been part of, and the Honduran Government would say
this, have been part of that one-third reduction in the
homicide rate.
So big, big challenge, will not be quick, but we need not
despair about the ability to move the needle the right way if
we invest the right way.
I want to talk a little bit about the investments.
And the other thing, Mr. Chair, I thank you. I do not do
this enough. The Congressional Research Service report that was
prepared at your request for this hearing is very, very good.
The Chairman. It is very good.
Senator Kaine. And the CRS does a lot of good work every
day, but they did a very good job of laying out how the
investments that we passed last year and those proposed by the
President this year are allocated per account, per country,
what were some of the metrics that would be examined.
So I want to get into the question of metrics, metrics of
success and what we are looking at.
On the security side, it is a little bit easier. I mean,
sadly, instances of violence are one of the easiest things to
measure. So homicide rates per 100,000, you talked about it,
and we are already seeing some progress in Honduras.
There is also a security measure that is important to get
at questions that were raised by Senator Cardin on the
impunity, the number of convictions and prosecutions or whether
people are going scot-free. Those are relatively easy to
measure, not necessarily easy to achieve the measurement you
want, but you can track them.
What measures do you use on the other half of the
investment? So it is security, it is prosperity, it is
democracy, democratization, transparency? What are you looking
at as the measureable signs of progress, kind of the metrics
that you want to see from the three Northern Triangle countries
on the economic and democratization side of these investments?
Ms. Hogan. Thank you for the question.
On the economic side, we want to see inclusive growth. We
want to see increased jobs, particularly for marginalized
groups such as youth, women, LGBTI, and others who have been
subject of harassment or lack of opportunity. So that is
certainly one measure that we will use.
On the democracy front, we want to see a reduction in the
number of cases that are thrown out for a lack of evidence. And
I can say that USAID has invested in Guatemala in 24-hour
courts. That is a model for efficiency in the justice system,
whereby it is open 24 hours 7 days a week and we have co-
located judges, prosecutors, investigators, and medical
professionals, forensic scientists, et cetera.
As a result, what we have seen in these 24-hour courts is
that the cases that had been thrown out for lack of evidence
were 75 percent before these courts were established, and they
have now reduced to 15 percent of cases that are thrown out for
lack of evidence. So what we see is that, rather than relying
simply on witness testimony, now we have the kind of hard
forensic science and data we need to be sure that these trials
go forward, and we can reduce impunity by putting together the
kinds of cases that will put perpetrators in jail.
Senator Kaine. Can I ask, on the transparency side,
Honduras, as you described in your opening testimony, has
embraced a transparency initiative first with the NGO
Transparency International, but now with an OAS independent
agency to try to promote transparency and accountability,
anticorruption in government. Guatemala has done the same.
Remind me about El Salvador? What is going on in El
Salvador with respect to transparency and anticorruption
activities?
Mr. Palmieri. So in El Salvador, they have passed national
legislation that requires more effective public declaration by
public officials. They have created a probity commission. They
are doing it nationally. They have an arrangement with a U.N.
development organization to strengthen some of the
institutional capability, but they have not gone as far as
Guatemala or Honduras and accepted an external entity with an
ability to independently pursue some of these transparency
initiatives.
Senator Kaine. So that might be an area for the committee,
to the extent that we are interacting with El Salvadoran
officials, to hold up Guatemala and Honduras. They have
embraced external, more independent transparency arrangements
or organizations, and that would be the kind of thing we might
encourage in El Salvador as well.
Mr. Palmieri. I think the record of success of the U.N.
agency CICIG in Guatemala demonstrates that you can improve
national efforts with a good external partner that has the
independence to help your institution target those emblematic
cases and make progress on them.
Senator Kaine. Let me ask you a question, and I would love
you to be as candid as you can on this. Some of the success of
what we are doing, which dovetails fairly nicely with the
Alliance for Prosperity among the three nations, does depend on
the degree to which they cooperate with each other, and there
has been some historical enmities between some of these nations
in the past, and they are in different places in their
government, whether there is a new President or a more senior
President. What is the level of cooperation among the three
nations on these efforts?
Mr. Palmieri. I think that is the really historic part of
the Alliance for Prosperity, that with the assistance of the
Inter-American Development Bank, the three countries came
together. As you know, there are some historical enmities
between them. But they agreed on a common approach that is
designed to improve the productive sector, build human capital,
strengthen access to justice, and improve transparency.
They are working on a common approach to the issue, and I
think that is significant and a statement of the kind of
political will that all three countries are putting to the
effort, Senator.
Senator Kaine. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. I do hope somehow we get, maybe we will have
to do it with written questions, but a little more of an
understanding of how the actual dollars align with what the
Alliance for Prosperity is doing.
With that, Senator Rubio?
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
One of the new complications many of these countries in
Central America are facing now is a surge in Cuban migrants who
have figured out you can take an airplane to Central America.
And now some of these countries are basically demanding that
they be allowed to continue their transit here. The argument
they are making is these people do not really want to live
here. They are just coming through here to get to the United
States from Cuba.
Can you describe, first of all, the strains that this is
placing on these countries beyond just the Northern Triangle
countries, the strains that this is placing on Central America?
Is this not a very serious and growing problem that shows no
sign of abatement?
Mr. Palmieri. Yes, sir.
Senator, I think it is a very serious problem. It is most
acutely felt in Costa Rica and Panama. And in addition to
people flying directly, people are flying to Ecuador and making
their way north through Colombia into Panama and Cuba. It is
putting a significant stress on the migration officials in
these countries.
Our concern is that this has to be done in a safe, legal,
and orderly way, and we are working with the region's partners
to develop those goals.
Senator Rubio. But many of their goal is just to hopscotch
through the countries in Central America until they got to the
southern border. They would just cross. And as soon as a Cuban
crosses the border, they just turn themselves in and they are
legally here.
Mr. Palmieri. That is exactly right, Senator.
Senator Rubio. And this is a growing problem. I mean, we
have seen this grow over the last year and a half, and this
route is becoming a well-developed one. I would imagine for
these countries, especially the ones we are talking about today
that are already facing significant challenges internally, this
additional strain is not helpful, to say the least.
Mr. Palmieri. It is putting a strain, as I said, more
acutely in Costa Rica and Panama, where the backup is occurring
because Nicaragua has closed its border somewhat more
effectively to some of that hopscotch that has been taking
place.
Senator Rubio. Okay. Now, switching back to this particular
topic, there has been a lot of comparison done between what we
are trying to do here and Plan Colombia. It was nearly a failed
state when the United States got involved, but I would argue
that there are some very significant differences between Plan
Colombia and the challenges that we are facing here now.
When Plan Colombia came about, it was successful because it
had the full support of the entire political spectrum in that
nation. They knew absolutely that it needed to be done.
Unfortunately, we do not have that yet in the Northern Triangle
or in Mexico for that matter.
Plan Colombia also started out with security. It was the
number one obligation there. They knew that they needed to deal
with security first. Without security, none of these other
things would matter, if you did not have a secure environment
first.
So you had two things, strong leadership from President
Uribe and others, combined with this emphasis on security
first. And only after the security happened were the economic
developments and some of the other things that needed to be
done possible.
So when you look at the violence levels that increasingly
grow and are incredibly high, you have tens of thousands of
people being killed, what exactly does this deal do to help
improve the security? And is it being prioritized on security
first?
Mr. Palmieri. Senator, thank you for those observations.
It is true that security is a critical component of our
approach to Central America. From 2011 to 2014-2015, we
invested a significant amount of money in security efforts.
Senator Rubio. Invested in what, for example? What are the
security efforts?
Mr. Palmieri. In community policing models, in
professionalization of police authorities, in improving their
ability to interdict drug flows through the region.
But what we found is, and why we have pivoted is, that we
needed to balance these investments and to put some more money
into prosperity and into governance. Together we think a more
balanced approach, that maintains the security investments but
then brings along these additional investments in governance
and in economic prosperity, we think this will give us a better
chance of success over the longer term in helping these
countries pursue their own plan, which is the Alliance for
Prosperity.
And, sir, I believe that that is a historic change in the
region, that the leaders of these countries realize that they
cannot go this alone, that they have to work together on a
common set of principles in how to address the challenges their
countries are facing.
Senator Rubio. I understand the balanced approach. My only
question is whether enough emphasis is still on the security
aspect of it, because the truth of the matter is--I understand
that there is a prosperity crisis in that region and that needs
to be addressed. But my argument is you are not really going to
be able to address it as long as you have the amount of money
being spent and invested by these criminal organizations, which
in many cases are much better funded, better paid, better
equipped, better armed than the police agencies we are trying
to empower.
When you talk about security, are you saying we are only
working with police departments? Have there been investments
made in the military, because these countries do not have the
luxury of picking or choosing which agencies are going to
involved in confronting? In the case of Colombia, their
military played a significant role in taking on these
trafficking rings. In fact, some of the most effective antidrug
initiatives, anticriminality initiatives in Mexico were being
conducted, for example, by the Mexican navy even inland.
So where are we investing the security funds? Are we
prohibited from investing funds in their military apparatus?
Mr. Palmieri. Our security investments help both police and
the militaries in the region. Helping professionalize the
militaries to deal with the external drug trafficking routes
that go through their countries, but also helping
professionalize and improve civilian police components.
Senator Rubio. What about, for example, the court systems?
Have we invested in improving their criminal justice systems,
their courts, their ability to prosecute and bring people to
justice?
Ms. Hogan. We have, indeed. And in fact, the very public
corruption cases that took place last year that brought down
the President, the Vice President, and half of his cabinet,
were done because of the investments that we have been making
over years into the prosecutor's office, into the forensics
lab, into the justice sector, the high impact court, for
example, that is going to hear these trials.
So I think we do see signs of success as it relates to
justice sector strengthening. Clearly, much more needs to be
done, but I think that we can share some of the credit in the
successful outcome.
Senator Rubio. One more question, and this is probably for
the State Department. What about extradition? What is the state
of affairs with the ability to extradite kingpins and large
figures in organized crime?
Mr. Palmieri. I particularly want to single out Honduras,
which has made significant progress over the last few years.
They have extradited a number of kingpins. I think the number
is now between eight and 13 high-level people that they have
helped us detain and then extradite to the United States.
Senator Rubio. Okay. Last question, is this money we are
spending, is this budget assistance? Are we basically using it
to help them fund their existing budget? Or are we only
spending money on new programs for specific purposes?
Ms. Hogan. It is the latter. We do not do budget support in
Central America. So our funding goes through implementing
partners. Although we co-design with our partners in
government, they do not manage the money on the U.S.
Government's behalf.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Before turning to Senator Menendez, my first interjection,
I noticed in the Alliance for Prosperity, and CRS did do a good
job laying this out, just a little over 10 percent of the money
is being spent on security, just to follow up on that line of
questioning.
With our budget, what percentage of it is being allocated
for security?
Mr. Palmieri. Of the $750 million appropriation, it is
roughly 40 percent in economic prosperity, which we had not
been doing a lot of.
The Chairman. How much on security? That is all I am
asking.
Mr. Palmieri. Right, about 30 percent of the total, sir.
The Chairman. So 30 percent of our dollars are going toward
security?
Mr. Palmieri. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. One thing to point out is, in Colombia, they
had President Uribe, who cared about this issue and was most
dynamic. What is your sense about the leaders of these three
countries and their commitment to security?
Mr. Palmieri. I think all three countries understand, as
Senator Rubio pointed out, you have to have security first.
In Honduras, President Hernandez has really made lowering
the homicide rate a top priority that has had success.
In El Salvador, President Sanchez Ceren has developed this
plan, Safe El Salvador plan, which targets the most violent
communities.
And in Guatemala, where the violence rates are not quite as
high there, President Morales has reiterated his intention to
continue combatting crime there.
The Chairman. I would just reiterate what was already said,
and that it is very difficult to have much economic growth when
you have tremendous violence taking place. It just cannot
happen.
Do you want to say something, Ms. Hogan?
Ms. Hogan. Yes. I totally agree with that observation. I
just wanted to point out that, in El Salvador, as an example,
we had statistics presented to us from the national police that
showed that between 2014 and 2015 in the 76 communities where
USAID had security programs through CARSI, we saw a 66 percent
decline in the homicide rates in those communities. So this is
even all the more remarkable, given the fact that over that
same period of time, there was a 70 percent increase in
homicides nationwide.
So we know that we are onto a model that works, and we are
very happy to see that the Government of El Salvador has taken
that model and is going to scale it up, and we will help them
scale it up in the 10 most violent municipalities nationwide.
The Chairman. To Senator Menendez, who has been certainly a
leader in focusing on these efforts.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
applaud you for calling this important hearing.
For years, I have been saying, going back to President
Reagan when we spent millions and millions of dollars to
promote democracy in Central America and largely achieved our
goals except that we walked away, which is a history lesson not
only there but in many other places, that we spend millions to
ultimately win the war and then we walk away and do not achieve
a lasting peace and prosperity. And that is in part what we saw
in Central America.
Then during the Merida Initiative, which I was a huge
supporter of in the House of Representatives, as the Western
Hemisphere chair, I must say that I constantly raised the alarm
bells that as we were helping Mexico institutionally and with
its security, we would ultimately create pressure that would
flow, that when we succeeded in Mexico, we would create
pressure that would flow to Central America. Unfortunately, we
did not pay attention to that.
So we have what we have today in part, yes, by the lack of
good governance and institutions that are capable of meeting
the challenge, but also from our own policy perspective I think
we have been shortsighted for some time.
My view of this is that a long-term solution to the
region's challenges is social. It is economic development. And
for too long, the region has remained an afterthought to
various administrations.
This issue is as much a domestic issue as it is a foreign
policy issue. I say that because we hear about the pull factors
that bring people to America, and there are certainly some of
those, having elements of our economy that only, it seems,
others who are willing to work hard at these elements are
willing to come and do those jobs.
But there are clearly, particularly in this case in Central
America, push factors, the violence that is taking place. I
either stay and die, or I take my chance and flee to the north.
So those push people, and so that has a consequence when we
face the challenge of unaccompanied minors and others coming to
our southern border.
Then lastly, it is a national security question for us,
because while it is creating tremendous havoc for the Central
American countries, it is also creating the breeding grounds
for transnational crime, with the gangs, with narcotrafficking
and human smuggling, which I know the chairman is incredibly
concerned about and is one of his passions.
So all of this is mixed up with the Central American
question, which is why this hearing is so important, and I hope
our continuing attention to it as well.
The Chairman. If I could, I know you stepped out to go to
the Finance Committee for a moment, but while you were gone, I
mentioned we are having this hearing because both you and
Senator Kaine had pressed for this type of oversight, and that
is why we are having this today. So I thank you.
Senator Menendez. I very much appreciate the chairman's
willingness to do that.
So let me ask you a couple of questions here.
One is, the administration has actually promoted in-country
processing, which is an extraordinary undertaking. But I hope
we recognize it as a reality that the fact that we are seeking
in-processing efforts for those who are fleeing because they
have a reasonable fear of the loss of their lives or freedom is
a recognition that a good percentage of those who came before
there was in-processing registration possible, and an
opportunity to pursue that, were actually fleeing because of
violence.
Is that a fair statement to make?
Mr. Palmieri. Violence is definitely one of the factors and
conditions in the region.
Senator Menendez. So the question for me is, between that
and Secretary Kerry announcing that the U.S. refugee admissions
program would be expanded with the UNHCR, what is the latest
progress on the issue? Why the delay in announcing details? How
many people have benefited from the program?
Mr. Palmieri. Thank you, Senator.
The Central American minors in-country processing program
is rapidly expanding the number of applicants it is taking and
processing. And we knew, in its initial year, it would have a
slower ramp-up period, but we think now it is more widely known
and more people are taking advantage of it.
With regard to the expansion of in-country processing in
Central America, we have been working with the UNHCR. We have
been working with NGO communities and with different
governments in the region to figure out where and how best to
establish that program. And we hope to come up in the next
weeks to give you a more detailed briefing.
Senator Menendez. Well, I will tell you this. This is not a
new issue. We had notice. We have had experience. And we are,
in my perspective, lagging way behind.
So when the next surge comes, and inevitably it will come,
despite all of our best efforts, I do not know how we are going
to look at that and say that we are going to turn back people
who clearly are at the risk of their lives. When a when a
mother puts a child on that beast of the train and prays to God
that that child will make it, it talks about the extraordinary
circumstances they face.
So this in-processing process, if it is going to work, we
have to get it accelerated and the details have to be clearly
defined, because otherwise we will see another surge, and we
will hear a chorus of voices, and we will spend more money than
what we are spending on this program to detain people at the
southern border and to ultimately send them back.
So I hope that the State Department will accelerate their
process here, because it seems that, to some degree, this is an
aftermath of the thought.
Let me ask you this. Did State and AID spend all of the
fiscal year 2016 money for these purposes, for the larger
purposes?
Ms. Hogan. We have yet to receive our 2016 money.
Senator Menendez. You have yet to receive your 2016 money.
Ms. Hogan. Correct.
Senator Menendez. So in your estimation, is the level of
buy-in by the U.S. to bring about meaningful and material
change in the Northern Triangle countries sufficient? And do
you have the bandwidth to deal with what is necessary here?
Ms. Hogan. We believe we do. In fact, in September of 2014,
having seen the uptick in unaccompanied child migration into
the United States, knowing that the President was going to
request additional resources for a new Central America
strategy, we began then to begin to ramp up our program design.
We realigned staff by increasing our footprint in the Northern
Triangle. We have probably $490 million worth of procurement in
the pipeline for this year.
So we are ready, and we are moving. And we are moving out
now in anticipation of these additional resources coming to us
in 2016, and we will be able to absorb them.
Senator Menendez. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here today and for your work
every day to address the challenges in Central America.
I want to follow up on Senator Menendez's questioning about
what we are doing to address the number of unaccompanied minors
and people coming across, because as you all have pointed out
and as we see, the numbers have decreased over the last couple
of years. They are still at historically higher levels, but
they have decreased. And we have talked about the minors'
program and the in-country processing and about the efforts
that Mexico has taken to address this.
Are there other factors that you would attribute the
declining numbers to? Let me stop with that and ask you that.
Mr. Palmieri. I think the administration's response in 2014
to the surge, working with Mexico, working with the countries
in the region, developing this assistance initiative, has
helped give hope to the region that there will be greater
economic opportunity, greater security, and better governance.
And I think that has helped.
I do also have to report, though, that in this fiscal year,
since October, we have begun to see an uptick in arrivals once
again.
We also know that there is a historic drought in Central
America that has increased the number of people who are at food
security risk this year from about 300,000 last year to maybe
over 3 million that will suffer food security risk this year.
We expect that that will also lead in the months ahead to an
uptick in arrivals.
But all of this, I think, underscores why this approach and
this investment, trying to work on some of the short-term
conditions, strengthening border controls, working with the
governments for more effective repatriation, but also trying to
get at the longer term conditions of job creation, of better
security, is the best way to address this over time for U.S.
interests.
Senator Shaheen. I certainly would agree with that. There
has, however, been some suggestion that the deportation efforts
that have occurred in this country have been a way to try and
send a message to people in Central America and Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador, that they do not want to come to the
U.S. because they are going to be sent back.
Is there any evidence that you all have seen that that is
the case, that those deportations have an impact on people
trying to come into the country?
Mr. Palmieri. There is some polling in the region that
indicates that people are more aware that the United States has
returned unaccompanied children who have exhausted all of their
legal remedies, and that it is harder to stay in the United
States.
Senator Shaheen. Okay, thank you.
I want to switch now to the counterdrug efforts. I am sure
you are all very aware of the challenges that we face
throughout the country with respect to the heroin and opioid
epidemic. In New Hampshire, we have a higher percentage of
overdose deaths than the rest of the country for our
population.
Obviously, having visited the southern border last year and
meeting with some CBP folks, watching them as they were doing
some drug interdiction efforts, one of the things they talked
about is the drugs come across the border from Mexico and then
they go up the interstates, up 35, up 95, and that is how they
get to New England.
So can you talk about how we are coordinating our law
enforcement and counternarcotics efforts with the economic and
development assistance that we are providing to these
countries?
Mr. Palmieri. Yes, Senator. I think it is a critical
priority for our counternarcotics effort to improve the
capabilities of the countries in Central America, but also in
Mexico the ability to interdict and prevent drugs from reaching
our border. We do know that where we can make investments in
security and economic investments in those communities most
afflicted by this violence that we see lower rates of
migration.
At the same time, we continue to make the security
investments working with the Mexican Government and the Mexican
military and police forces, and police forces in the region, to
ensure that they are working in a more coordinated fashion and
that they are more able to interdict drugs as they move up from
South America.
With respect to poppy cultivation, Mexico is a big producer
country, and so we are working with the Mexican Government on
that particular problem as well. And we have seen some progress
in Panama and Costa Rica, which are producing higher levels of
drug interdictions coming out of South America.
Senator Shaheen. And have we seen any progress in Mexico
with the effort to reduce their growing of poppies?
Mr. Palmieri. The most recent poppy cultivation figures
that were released show that there has been a significant
increase in poppy cultivation in Mexico.
Senator Shaheen. So they are not working very well?
Mr. Palmieri. The eradication effort in Mexico is not
having as much success as I think the Mexican Government would
like it to have, and we are working with them to address that
issue. But it is going to require a more sustained effort.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I only have a little bit of time left, but I wanted to ask
about the countries' public health systems, because with the
threat of the Zika virus and all of the implications that that
has, how prepared are the countries of Central America to deal
with the Zika outbreak?
Ms. Hogan. Thank you for the question.
As you may be aware, the President has put forward a CN to
ask for reprogramming of some of our Ebola money to do health
system strengthening in the region, particularly as it relates
to Zika. So we are pre-deployed, if you will, to increase
health specialists in the field that can consult with these
governments, do diagnostics in terms of what is needed. We are
prepared to invest in public education campaigns, in vector
control, and personal protections. We are also prepared to
provide assistance in research and development for vaccines and
diagnostic tools, as well as provide care to pregnant women and
to affected infants.
Senator Shaheen. I am out of time, but what evidence do we
have that the potential for the Zika virus to spread is
significant in these countries? Is it something that we are
worried about at USAID?
Ms. Hogan. We are very concerned about it, yes.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Before going to Senator Markey, I just want
to emphasize that we have an entire committee I think that
cares deeply about Central America. We have three individuals
that happen to be especially knowledgeable, and Senator Rubio,
Senator Menendez, Senator Kaine spent a lot of time there
through the years. But listening to Senator Shaheen's comments,
I mean the fact is what happens in Central America is very
important to the United States also.
I think that there has been a lot of effort put forth in
other parts of the world and not enough in our own hemisphere.
That is why I think we are all, on one hand, very excited about
the efforts that are under way, but on the other hand, wanting
to ensure there are going to be results and that it is going to
be successful because we are certainly seeing the
interdependence that exists here.
So I appreciate that line of questioning. And again, I hope
the committee as a whole will continue to show the kind of
interest in this effort as it is today.
Senator Markey?
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
And in this issue of Zika, without question, because of the
underfunded health care systems in these countries that are
very near our border, it just makes the case once again for
full funding for the President's request, so that we can put
this preventative program in place in the countries that are
going to be the conduit for Zika to come into our country. I
think that the sooner we actually begin to look at that $1.8
billion to $1.9 billion, and just decide we are going to fund
it, is the less likely we are going to have catastrophic
consequences, because these are very weak health care systems
in those three countries, and others like it which also need
the kind of reinforcement which we gave to Liberia and other
countries for the Ebola virus. And as a result, no one died in
the United States.
If we take that same preventative attitude, I think we
would be in far better shape.
But you do not question my premise that they are very weak
health care systems in these countries?
Ms. Hogan. I think it varies depending upon the country,
but, clearly, the countries that we are talking about today in
Central America will require that type of assistance, yes.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
On the human rights front, the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2016 placed various conditions on aid for Central
America, including withholding 50 percent of the funds until
the Secretary of State certifies that they are taking effective
steps to address 12 concerns, amongst them human rights.
Last week, it came to light that high echelons of the
police department in Honduras were paid by drug cartels to
order and carry out assassinations of antidrug officials.
Last month, Berta Caceres, a human rights and environmental
activist from Honduras, was murdered by gunmen who entered her
home in the middle of the night and shot her. This was 1 week
after she received death threats because of her opposition to a
hydroelectric project in Honduras. It may be a good project or
not, but you should not be killed for expressing your views.
I am sorry to say that this type of violence is not
restricted to Honduras. The most recent human rights report
cites significant human rights problems in Honduras but also
Guatemala and El Salvador, countries which suffer from corrupt
and weak justice systems.
So my first question is, in an environment where officials
conspire with criminals to commit murder, what are your
perspectives on how difficult it will be for the Secretary to
certify that the countries of Central America are taking
effective measures with respect to the protection of human
rights?
Mr. Palmieri. Senator, thank you for that question, and it
is a very important issue.
If I could just share a personal story, I served in El
Salvador in our Embassy from 2001 to 2005. I knew Julian
Aristides Gonzalez Irias. I knew Alfredo Landaverde. They were
great friends to the United States. They worked hard to fight
drug trafficking in their country. And this revelation that
they were killed by police officers is a very, very serious
issue that is definitely going----
Senator Markey. So how will this complicate the ability of
the Secretary, of you, to be able to certify that human rights
violations are declining and not increasing?
Mr. Palmieri. We are taking a very hard look at the
certification requirements, and this is an area where the
Honduran Government is going to have to address improving
civilian policing, addressing human rights violations, ending--
--
Senator Markey. Will a partial cut in our aid to Honduras
help the effort, in your opinion? Do we have sufficient
flexibility in that area, that is, in reducing aid, that will
help them to respond?
Mr. Palmieri. I think, first, we have to make an assessment
under the 12 different conditions that we are going to withhold
50 percent of the aid. And once we make a fundamental decision
about whether or not they meet those conditions, then we will
have to address the question of the impact----
Senator Markey. Ms. Hogan, would a reduction in assistance
help to focus the attention of the Honduran Government and
these other governments?
Ms. Hogan. Actually, I would say that it is all the more
reason that we need to support these governments to provide a
human rights protection mechanism that will allow for citizens
and human rights defenders to be----
Senator Markey. But these are last week and last month,
that is the Honduran environmentalist is assassinated, the
antidrug officials were assassinated. So they are not
listening.
Ms. Hogan. One of the things that we are going to be able
to do, given the increased resources that we have under the
Central America strategy is invest $25 million to help these
governments in all three countries develop protection
mechanisms for early warning systems, for rapid response, to
support victims, and to create regional networks of human
rights defenders that can do peer-to-peer learning and benefit
from each other's protection mechanisms that they have devised.
Senator Markey. I want to move along this environmental
front a little bit as well. Mexico, 3 weeks ago, had an auction
for renewable electricity, and the winning bid came back for
1,700 megawatts of electricity at $0.04 a kilowatt hour, which
is at the bottom of the price for electricity for the whole
world.
Now, again, you are going to have to be taking on those
interests in Mexico, in the Central American countries, in
order to have this capturing of solar energy, but I would urge
you to accelerate any programs, a pace at which we have a
Central American electricity program that matches off with
Electrify Africa, this is a tremendous opportunity.
And one final question, which is on MS-13, Mara
Salvatrucha, because these gangs, Salvadoran-based, are massive
up in Massachusetts. So what are we doing to interdict this
relationship as it comes through Mexico and then haunts the
cities of the Northeast but all across America?
Mr. Palmieri. The request includes funding for the FBI's
anti-gang task force in all three countries. Working with the
FBI and local authorities, we have begun to gather greater
understanding and information about these gangs. I think we
have good programs that both prevent the gangs from recruiting
new members and also are enabling U.S. law enforcement to have
greater insight and information about gang activities as to how
they relate to their criminal activity in the United States.
Senator Markey. So these governments just have to know how
important this issue is to us, because it is killing thousands
of people across the United States on a yearly basis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. No, thank you so much.
We are trying to close out the second panel by 11:55, if we
can. I know there is a lot of interest, which I deeply
appreciate.
Senator Coons?
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief
then, if I can.
I am interested in what you view as the drivers of gang
violence and, in particular, recruitment. We have real
challenges in other parts of the world with being effective in
countering violent extremism, and one of the questions is a
better understanding what it is that makes young men and some
young women, but overwhelmingly young men, dedicate their lives
to violence and extremism.
What do you think are our most effective interventions that
can slow or reduce the rate of uptick for the violent gangs
that Senator Markey was just talking about?
Then second, in terms of the investments you are talking
about our making, some of which are short term and some of
which are long term, what do you view as the most important
long-term investments? And how valuable do you think it is for
us to commit to them from one administration to the next, one
Congress to the next, in the same way Plan Colombia did?
I have been very impressed with Vice President Biden's
persistent, engaged, effective leadership on the issues in the
Northern Triangle, and it is my hope that that will be
sustained into the next administration and by members of this
committee as well. But I would be interested in your views on
what matters most in terms of long term.
Ms. Hogan. Thank you very much for the question.
People join gangs for a variety of reasons, of course, but
predominantly it is because they have no other choice for legal
employment, and so they turn to illegal opportunities.
We have benefited greatly from the experience of United
States cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and Boston that
have had great success in reducing gang violence. And we are
using some of those same strategies as we apply them in Central
America.
One of the tools that we use is to focus on who are the
youth specifically that are going to be most prone to violent
behavior and joining gangs, so we call that secondary and even
tertiary prevention programming.
What we have learned is that 0.5 percent of people commit
up to 75 percent of violent crime, so we have to get at those
people. We have diagnostic tools that help us identify who they
are. They tend to have family members or friends who are
already in gangs. They may come from broken homes. They have
homes where violence--particularly domestic violence--is seen
on a daily basis, and then they act out violently outside of
the home.
So we are using those tools to identify youth that are at
most at-risk for joining gangs and creating violent behavior
themselves, and we are designing programs to focus on those
individuals.
I had mentioned earlier that we have seen tremendous
results in terms of the reduction in homicide and violent crime
in the communities where we have employed those research tools.
Mr. Palmieri. Just a quick word about Vice President Biden.
He has been a great champion for both a short-term and long-
term approach to the region and helping work with the Congress
to get these funds. But I also want you all to know he is the
greatest champion within the administration for ensuring that
we have accountability for how we use these funds in the
region.
He met with the three Central American Presidents in
February. They developed a specific action plan for each of the
countries in fiscal year 2016. And he and his staff are keeping
all of our eyes on the ball in terms of making sure there is
accountability for how this money is being used.
Senator Coons. Thank you. Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
First of all, we thank you for your service. You have been
good witnesses. Obviously, you are energetically enthusiastic
about what you are doing. But at the same time, we want to make
sure the monies are spent wisely and we have the appropriate
leadership to make that happen.
So we thank you again for being here, and if you could, we
will take questions until the close of business on Thursday
and, hopefully, you will respond fairly promptly to those.
But again, thank you for your service, and we are going to
move on to the second panel. I feel badly for the second panel,
as they are coming up. A lot of times we have some of the best
testimony at the second panels and, obviously, we sometimes
lose interest here on the committee because of other
commitments. But if you all could be making your way forward,
we would appreciate it.
Again, thank you both for your public service.
In order to hustle it up a little bit here, our panel of
private witnesses brings us testimony from Jose Cardenas, who
served as Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and
the Caribbean at USAID during the Bush administration. He is
joined by Jim Swigert, who is the director for Latin America
and the Caribbean at the National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs.
Again, we thank you both for sharing your tremendous
knowledge and background with us here today.
I think you have been through this many times. If you all
could summarize in about 5 minutes, without objection, your
written testimony will be entered into the record. If you could
testify in the order you were introduced, we would appreciate
it. Again, thank you for coming to our committee today.
STATEMENT OF JOSE CARDENAS, FORMER USAID ACTING, ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, FORMER
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Cardenas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Cardin, and distinguished members of the committee. It is an
honor and a privilege to be here before you today to discuss
the critical issue of U.S. assistance to Central America.
Central America finds itself once again in the midst of a
profound security crisis that directly impacts U.S. national
security. Today, in contrast to the 1980s, the challenges have
less to do with ideology than about escalating criminality,
corruption, and violence that are threatening countries'
sovereignty by undermining democratic institutions, rule of
law, and public security, burdened as these countries already
are with weak public institutions, pervasive corruption and
lack of resources.
Clearly, the United States has a strategic interest in
Central America, a stable, democratic, and prosperous Central
America. Understandably, however, many of you are wary and
should be wary of new assistance programs to Central America
for the reasons I mentioned.
Needless to say, Congress must demand strict accountability
with our assistance, transparency, and set benchmarks to
achieve demonstrable results.
To that end, Mr. Chairman, in my submitted testimony, you
will find a number of specific recommendations that I believe
should guide and condition U.S. assistance to Central America.
But for now, please allow me to outline several key
assumptions, lapidary assumptions, if you will, that must serve
as the foundation of any U.S. approach.
Number one, there is no way this will be neat and tidy.
Taking down drug networks and gangs is a messy business. We
have to remain focused and committed.
Number two, there are no silver bullets. There is not a
question of hard side of assistance or soft side of assistance.
It is going to take all sides, a holistic approach.
Number three, we cannot want it more than they do, Mr.
Chairman. We can only help them if they are truly committed to
helping themselves. They must demonstrate the political will to
get the difficult job done.
Four, we must be clear on sequencing. This is something
that Senator Rubio just mentioned, and I agree 100 percent.
Security doesn't follow from resolving social and economic
problems. Rather, it is only by first creating effective
security that social and economic problems can be addressed.
Five, a strong commitment to human rights is not a
hindrance. It is essential. It creates legitimacy and trust
among the very people we are trying to help.
And there is another assumption that I wanted to make in
the context of listening to the first panel, and that is
building performance incentives into the programs that the
technical folks at AID and State Department are developing,
incentives that can be rewarded when reached, and perhaps we
can speak a little bit more about that.
But beyond these broad truths, Mr. Chairman, the core
priority of any U.S. assistance has to be addressing the lack
of strong institutions to provide for public security, not only
vetting, training, and equipping police forces, but tackling
the twin evils of corruption and impunity.
That means improving the effectiveness of the judicial
systems. It means targeting corruption by improving government
transparency and sanctioning the wrongdoers. It means improving
penal systems. Prisons in Central America aid and abet crime;
they do not deter it. And it means cutting off criminal
organizations at the knees by dismantling financial networks.
Mr. Chairman, only with a dedicated program of institution-
building and reforms to strengthen rule of law can we diminish
the opportunities for transnational criminal organizations and
gangs to thrive and to allow democratically elected authorities
to govern.
In the short term, the imperative is establishing order,
and that means reducing the capacity and incentives of criminal
actors to confront and subvert the state.
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, there is no substitute for U.S.
leadership in ensuring a more secure, stable, and prosperous
Central America. And there is no substitute for local
leadership in making the difficult choices ahead. The same
criminal networks operating with impunity today in Central
America can move just about anything through their smuggling
pipelines right up until the U.S. border.
Right now, our friends in Central America are confronting a
crisis every bit as dangerous as the threats in the early
1980s. The difference then was a government that was willing to
step up to the plate. There is still time to make a real
difference today, but we must do it for their sake and ours.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. Cardenas's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement Jose R. Cardenas, Former USAID Acting Assistant
Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of the
committee, it is an honor and privilege to appear before you today to
discuss the critical issue U.S. assistance to Central America.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ My testimony draws in part from a report by the Western
Hemisphere Working Group of the John Hay Initiative, a network of
foreign policy and national security experts who advise policymakers
from a conservative internationalist tradition, of which I am a member.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thirty years after the guns of revolution fell silent in Central
America, the region finds itself once again in the midst of a profound
security crisis that directly impacts U.S. national security. Today,
the challenges have less to do with ideology than about escalating
criminality, corruption, and violence that are threatening countries'
sovereignty by undermining democratic institutions, rule of law, and
public security--burdened as they already are with weak public
institutions, pervasive corruption, and lack of resources.
Clearly, the United States has a strategic interest in a stable,
democratic, and prosperous Central America, and principally the
Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
The United States has invested much over the past several decades to
promote democracy and economic prosperity in the Americas because a
peaceful, stable, and secure neighborhood benefits us all.
And, not to put too fine a point on it, it also bears mentioning
that until we can make some progress in helping our neighbors in
Central America deal with the current problems we have had a hand in
creating--through our insatiable demand for illicit drugs--then the
notion of securing our southwest border from transnational criminal
organizations, terrorist groups, or migration surges will remain a pipe
dream.
Indeed, we have to recognize that the summer 2014 crisis that saw
an unprecedented wave of migrants--including thousands of unaccompanied
children--pour across the U.S. southern border was the culmination of
long-festering problems that includes in part regional governments'
inability to combat increased criminality and gang activity. It is a
vicious circle: declining security conditions depress economic
activity, which contributes to pushing people to leave their homelands
for the dangerous journeys north.
statistics
The statistics are indeed grim. Due primarily to the drug trade,
Central America is now considered the most violent non-war zone in the
world. According to a United Nations report, the global average
homicide rate stands at 6.2 per 100,000 population; Central America has
a rate more than four times that, making it a sub-region with one of
the highest homicide rates on record. For example, El Salvador's
homicide rate this year is the highest in the world for a country not
at war, with more than a 70 percent spike from the year before. Indices
of crime in all its aspects--extortion, kidnappings, human
trafficking--are all up; robberies in the region overall have tripled
in the past 25 years, affecting one in five people. This explains why
poll after regional poll invariably finds the greatest concern among
the local populations is personal security.
The crime and violence has also exacted a heavy economic cost,
unsurprisingly. Another U.N. report puts the financial costs of
violence at over a 10 percent loss of gross domestic product in
Honduras. With the International Monetary Fund projecting another
lackluster year of Latin American economic growth, the loss of domestic
and foreign investment due to security concerns will resonate even more
drastically. Productivity will also be further impacted by the number
of citizens who will seek refuge in other countries, including the
United States. Driven by economic pressures and rising criminal
violence, the number of Hondurans, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans
attempting to cross the U.S. Southwest border increased 60 percent in
2013.
new routes and new players
The primary driver of this increasing regional insecurity has to do
with the idiosyncrasies of the drug trade. Up until recently, Central
America served mostly as a refueling stop for vessels moving cocaine
northwards. But the region's misfortune is not only that the U.S. has
largely impeded maritime routes from South America, but also that
Colombia and Mexico have made huge strides in pressuring domestic
cartels. As it became more hazardous for traffickers to ship the drug
directly to Mexico, they began seeking more hospitable environments
elsewhere, and that has meant exploiting more aggressively overland
routes through the Central American isthmus. In the counter-narcotics
trade, it's known as the balloon effect: push tough counter-narcotics
one place and the drug traffickers relocate their operations elsewhere.
This, in turn, has translated into a perfect storm of criminal
convergence between modern, sophisticated trans-criminal organizations
(TCOs) and local gangs in a region already challenged by weak
institutions. This has led to ever shifting alliances, competitions,
and turf wars among these criminal elements that have overwhelmed local
security forces and turned neighborhoods into war zones.
The unprecedented expansion of these criminal networks and violent
gangs in the Americas is having a corrosive effect on the integrity of
democratic institutions and the stability of several of our partner
nations. TCOs threaten citizen security, undermine basic human rights,
cripple rule of law through corruption, erode good governance, and
hinder economic development. Speaking of these criminal groups that
have invaded Central America, General John Kelly, the recently retired
commander of Southcom, not long ago described them to Congress as,
``These networks conduct assassinations, executions, and massacres, and
with their enormous revenues and advanced weaponry, they can outspend
and outgun many governments. Some groups have similar and in some
cases, superior training to regional law enforcement units. Through
intimidation and sheer force, these criminal organizations virtually
control some areas.''
Indeed, awash in cash, these criminal organizations can pay off or
suborn anyone and everyone they come in contact with in pursuing their
illicit activity--from border agents to judges, police officers, the
military, politicians, and government officials--allowing them to
create permissive environments, safe havens for free mobility; to meet
and seal deals with other criminal groups; allowing them to expand into
legitimate and other illegitimate businesses; and facilitating money
laundering.
Ultimately distressing is when the activities of organized crime
cross the line into politics and governance. We are increasingly seeing
some of these groups and gangs undermining democracy by replacing
functions of the state and wielding more control over civilian life,
especially in areas where central government presence and oversight is
limited. This constitutes the most profound threat to the integrity and
effectiveness of Central American democracy today.
alliance for prosperity
In response to this untenable situation and the outflow of
migrants, the three governments of the Northern Triangle, with the
assistance of the Inter-American Development Bank, developed a ``road
map'' titled the Plan for the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern
Triangle. This strategy is mostly an economic development plan, and it
contains a fairly honest assessment of the challenges confronting the
three countries as well as a number of broad categories requiring
improvement. Overall, the plan is a good step in the right direction.
However, there are some serious flaws that require attention: it lacks
a sustained focus on addressing the dangerous security situation,
rampant corruption, and widespread impunity, and it falls short on
dealing with weaknesses in local governance and on demonstrating a
robust political commitment.
the role of the united states
To help our neighbors confront the situation, the omnibus budget
deal recently reached by Congress and approved by the president
included $750 million in assistance for these Central American
countries, which represents a step in the right direction.
Understandably, however, many lawmakers will be wary new assistance
programs to Central America due to justified concerns about
institutional weakness, corruption, and political will. With drug
syndicates and gangs working to undermine, infiltrate, and suborn
governments, especially in the judicial and law enforcement sectors,
there will be significant questions about with whom exactly we are
working and what we are truly capable of achieving with our investment.
Needless to say, Congress must demand strict accountability,
transparency, and set benchmarks to achieve demonstrable results.
Before proceeding to a series of specific recommendations that
should guide and condition U.S. assistance to Central America, I would
like to step back for a moment to outline several lapidary assumptions
that must, must, serve as the foundation of any U.S. approach:
1. There is no way this will be nice and tidy. Taking down drug
networks and gangs is messy business and not for the faint of
heart. As the Daniel Day-Lewis movie put it: ``There will be
blood.'' We cannot be intimidated by this. There will be
successes and there will be setbacks. We have to remain focused
on our goals.
2. There are no silver bullets. It is not a question of the hard side
or the soft side; for example, Blackhawk helicopters versus
economic development. It's going to take all sides; a holistic
package that increases security, promotes the rule of law,
targets corruption, and improves governance in each of these
countries.
3. We cannot want it more than they do. In other words, there is no
substitute for political will on the part of our partners. We
must ensure their total commitment to doing what is required to
resolve this situation. And not just central governments, but
local governments and private sector elites as well, who must
all be willing to make the sacrifices necessary to rescue their
own countries. We are not the Lone Ranger. We can only help
them if they are committed to helping themselves.
4. We must be clear on sequencing: security doesn't follow from
solving social and economic problems. It is only by first
creating effective security that the conditions are then
created by which social and economic problems can be addressed.
5. A strong commitment to human rights is not a hindrance, it is
essential. It creates legitimacy and support among the people
you are trying to help, improving not only your capacity for
action, but your chances for success. If the people fear
security forces as much as they do gang members and other
criminals, then that is simply a recipe for failure.
current u.s. policy
Clearly, it is not accurate to say that the Obama administration is
not doing anything about the mounting problems in Central America. They
are doing something. It's just that they are not doing enough and it
lacks prioritization.
The signature program in this regard is the Central America
Regional Security Initiative (or CARSI), although that was originally
created in FY 2008 under the Bush administration as part of the Merida
Initiative, the Mexico-focused counter-drug and anticrime assistance
package--before it was broken off as a separate effort.
Based on lessons learned--in many ways, Plan Colombia--CARSI takes
a comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach to promoting security. In
addition to providing equipment, training, and technical assistance to
support immediate law enforcement and interdiction operations,
according to the State Department, CARSI seeks to strengthen the
capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges
and the underlying conditions that contribute to them. Since FY 2008,
Congress has appropriated an estimated $1 billion for Central America
through Merida/CARSI.
Launched in March 2011, the Central American Citizen Security
Partnership encompasses all U.S. federal efforts to help combat drug
trafficking, gangs, and organized crime in the sub-region. This
includes: drug demand reduction programs and domestic anti-gang and
counterdrug efforts, law enforcement and military cooperation with
partner governments, bilateral and regional assistance provided through
CARSI, and U.S. involvement in the Group of Friends of Central America
donors group. Also formed in 2011, the Group of Friends is working with
Central American governments and the Central American Integration
System (SICA) to implement a Central American Security Strategy.
But despite these efforts, the singular void has been the
perception that the administration is merely checking the policy
boxes--that its heart isn't really into the effort. There is very
little ownership, as if people are reluctant to get their hands dirty
dealing with drugs and thugs. As a result there is precious little
public diplomacy and PA efforts making the argument--both here and
there--that it is in everyone's interests to combat criminality,
because expanding criminality means the steady loss of a country's
sovereignty, in its political and economic system--and it warps the
social structures of countries, corrupting youth and compromising
theirs and their country's future.
a more high-profile response
There is no substitute for U.S. leadership in ensuring a more
secure, stable, and prosperous Central America. To that end, the Obama
administration must make a more public, more concerted effort to re-
engage on Central America with a sense of mission and purpose. Beyond
the security and economic challenges, among the core issues it must
address is the lack of strong institutions to provide for public
security. Certainly, the countries of Central America need better
trained and equipped police forces, but they also need to tackle
frontally the twin evils of corruption and impunity.
That means improving the effectiveness of criminal justice
procedures and practices. Turning around the extremely low
conviction rates, through, for example, faster, fairer, more
efficient and independent courts, better investigatory skills,
improved prosecutorial capacity, and rooting out corrupt
judges.
It means dismantling the financial networks of criminal
organizations. Targeting and confiscating their assets by
developing effective asset forfeiture laws. And then funding
and supporting security programs through the use of seized
property and assets. Strengthening financial investigation
units to uncover and put a stop to money laundering and illicit
campaign contributions.
It means rooting out corruption by improving government
accountability, transparency, and citizen participation. Using
the electronic information revolution and new data mining
techniques to improve oversight of the use of public resources.
It means improving penal systems, specifically prisons. The prison
systems in Central America are horror stories. Prisons must be
overhauled to stop crime and rehabilitate inmates, not to aid
and abet crime from virtual safe havens.
It is also critical that we promote the use of extraditions as a
deterrent for crime and a means to reinforce national security.
The most important contribution that can be made to cutting crime
and violence and strengthening rule of law in Central America is
precisely this kind of institution-building and reform. Again, there
are no silver bullets. Only with a long-term program of state building
and development can we diminish the opportunities for TCOs to thrive
and to allow democratically elected authorities to govern. In the
short-term, the imperative is establishing order, and that means
reducing the capacity and incentives of criminal actors to confront and
subvert the state.
an economic prosperity agenda
Central American economies' dependence on and integration into the
U.S. market means the region stands apart from the gloomy economic
forecasts for the rest of Latin America over the next few years. Still,
there is much to be done to maximize the opportunities moving forward.
In terms of jump-starting renewed economic assistance to the
region, I would single out several areas where U.S. policy can make a
demonstrable difference.
1. If President Obama can rally his Cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet
officials to fan out in support of his Cuba initiative, he
ought to be able to do the same for struggling democratic
countries who actually have an affinity for the United States.
Specifically, the President could instruct the secretary of the
treasury to form a regional working group of finance ministers
to develop a prosperity agenda for aggregating and channeling
private capital and international lending to private-sector
entrepreneurs; setting benchmarks for liberalizing internal
markets, accommodating business creation, and modernizing
infrastructure; identifying best practices to maximize energy
production; and helping people from all walks of life benefit
from expanding international trade.
2. Re-examine the Central America Free Trade Agreement to determine
how our partners can maximize even more the opportunities it
has brought them. That is to say, CAFTA has successfully
integrated them into the U.S. market, but what impact has it
had on trade relations within Central America? How can the
countries in Central America exploit their competitive
advantages as a bloc to improve efficiencies and opportunities.
3. Rising oil and gas production in the United States present an
incredible opportunity to boost economic growth and U.S.
interests in the Western Hemisphere. With the ending of U.S.
restrictions on energy exports, including oil and liquefied
natural gas (LNG), we must find economically feasible ways to
help our neighbors in Central America who struggle with high
energy costs. The lack of easy access to U.S. oil and natural
gas makes it harder to meet the electricity demand that
accompanies growth in manufacturing and tourism.
4. Among Central America's primary exports are agricultural goods such
as fruit, coffee and sugar. This is not a hindrance, but a
gateway to extraordinary opportunities. We should be engaging
through our assistance programs to reform these countries'
agricultural sectors, shifting from traditional crops like
maize and beans with minimum yields to more value-added crops
that appeal to the more refined American palette.
conditionality on u.s. assistance
Moving past broad imperatives, there are also a number of specific
proposals to condition U.S. assistance to ensure accountability and
that our goals and objectives are achieved:
Implement reporting requirements for State Department or USAID,
working with the three governments (reflecting broad societal
agreement) on priorities: providing performance benchmarks,
timelines, and metrics for determining impact, as well as
mechanisms for regular, substantive consultations with civil
society entities.
This plan should include specific actions to strengthen civilian
police forces and judicial systems, including the prison
systems. A specific amount should be allocated to include
vetting and other anti-corruption efforts directed at law
enforcement and judicial authorities.
Consultations shall be conducted regularly with national and
international civil society organizations, the private sector,
and labor and religious organizations about the development,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the program.
Any assistance through a central government entity must be subject
to transparency standards. No funds should be permitted for
budget support.
Designate an amount to strengthen democratic governance, especially
municipal capacity, through U.S.- and regional-based non-profit
or civil society organizations to build and improve:
municipal capacity for ``smart'' governance by exposing
local officials and citizens to best practices that promote
transparency, accountability, responsiveness and
efficiency, and where appropriate, through the use of
information communication technologies (ICTs);
municipal capacity in the area of migrant re-insertion,
including democratic participation of returning migrants;
community policing efforts by strengthening municipal or
community security commissions legitimized under
corresponding national legislation to be inclusive and
representative and to interact both with citizens and
public authorities, including police, to devise and
implement violence prevention strategies; and
the capacity of independent media and independent
journalists to safely conduct investigative reporting and
reporting of corruption, including illicit campaign
finance, and to conduct reporting that is sensitive to and
inclusive of marginalized populations.
Require each of the three Central American governments to
strengthen financial accountability,\2\ including publicizing
the entirety of their respective national budgets and matching
every U.S. dollar of assistance with at least three dollars
from state revenues through better tax collection and enactment
of a ``security tax.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ While Honduras has already taken steps towards this end, this
effort must be sustained. In each country, this local funding should be
directed to the communities with the highest rates of out-migration to
the United States.
\3\ One of the principal reasons that Plan Colombia and the Merida
Initiative with Mexico have been successful is the willingness of the
governments and citizens to bear a larger degree of financial
responsibility through the payment of taxes. In the case of Colombia, a
specific tax was placed on the wealthiest, with their agreement, to
help fund efforts against the guerrillas. In Mexico, the government
matched each U.S. dollar with $5-8 dollars in state funding.
Encourage the three countries to work with international financial
institutions (IFIs), especially the Inter-American Development
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bank and the World Bank, to improve tax collection.
The U.S. executive directors in the IFIs should be directed to use
their ``voice and vote'' in support of municipal fiscal
strengthening.\4\
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\4\ This exception is made because, traditionally, loans from the
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank are arranged with
national authorities that may discriminate against municipalities for
political motives.
Require a specific funding amount from the U.S. assistance package
for the completion of homicide investigations and successful
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
prosecution of criminal offenders.
Provide specific funding for the establishment of an independent,
investigative organization in each of the three countries,
similar to the International Commission against Impunity in
Guatemala (CICIG), to review professional competence, ensure
accountability, uphold the rule of law, implement anti-
corruption measures, deliver judicial reforms to address
impunity, and participate in the preparation of legal cases
against corrupt actors.
While the presumption should be in favor of civilian leadership and
institutions in terms of law enforcement, military forces
should not be excluded from receiving U.S. assistance for
selected missions. Until civilian law enforcement capacity,
performance, and vetting begin to achieve tangible results, our
Central American partners do not have the luxury of choosing
which government institutions to employ in stabilizing their
environments. The overriding imperative must be to establish
security to allow for economic opportunity and democratic
development. Respect for human rights, and vetting of military
units, should be a prerequisite to receive U.S. assistance.
Require a semi-annual report, coordinated and submitted by the
Department of State and USAID, detailing the expenditure of
U.S. provided assistance, from all funding streams (e.g.,
State, USAID, DoD, Inter-American Foundation, Millennium
Challenge Corporation, etc.), detailing the impact of the
assistance measured against the plan and benchmarks submitted
by the three Central American governments, and showing
``tangible progress'' in:
Strengthening the effectiveness of local governance and
delivery of necessary social services;
Reducing corruption and impunity, including anti-
corruption vetting of law enforcement and other security
forces;
Increasing the completion of homicide investigations and
case resolution of criminal offenders;
Reducing the flow of migration from these countries to
the United States;
Reducing overall levels of violence and homicides in
these countries; and
Reducing the flow of drugs to the U.S. from these
countries.
Prohibit the use of U.S. assistance for budget support or as cash
transfers to the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, or
Honduras.
Ensure that U.S. embassies receive adequate funding to ensure
oversight of the provided assistance, including the ability to
report on expenditures, impact, and funding pipelines. The
State Department should compile and provide this reporting to
the U.S. Congress (to the authorizing and appropriations
committees) on a semi-annual basis.
Require the three countries, separately, to sign agreements with
Transparency International.
Create an interagency task force to work with Latin American
counterparts to target corrupt Latin American officials and
designate a single focal point for the express purpose of
assisting Latin American law enforcement agencies to combat
corruption.
The United States must insist on tangible results in partner
countries' efforts to end impunity, hold corrupt officials
accountable, and prosecute human rights violations. The
Executive Branch can be supportive in these tasks by being more
active in using existing authorities to combat corruption and
criminality, such as the use of Treasury Department
designations and the withdrawing of U.S. visas under
Proclamation 7750 (2004). Employing these authorities will send
a strong signal that the United State is serious about the
issue and encourage partner governments to muster the political
will to act.
conclusion
U.S. leadership, access, and interests in our very own
neighborhood, where our past engagement has made a real and lasting
difference, is very much at stake here. The same criminal networks
operating with impunity today in Central America can move just about
anything through their smuggling pipelines. And with many of these
pipelines leading directly to our borders, they can be exploited by
anyone looking to do us harm. This crime-terror convergence is a very
real vulnerability we cannot afford to ignore. All it takes is one
corrupt official who can be bribed to procure official documents such
as visas or citizenship papers and facilitate travel of special
interest aliens.
Beyond that, our own neighborhoods are already being affected by
these criminal networks. International drug traffickers have a presence
in up to 1,200 American cities, as well as criminal enterprises like
the violent transnational gang Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, that
specialize in extortion and human trafficking.
We must up our game in response, engaging through resources and
transferring lessons learned from our own experiences, based on our
successes and our failures. Strengthening governance and fostering
accountable, transparent, and effective institutions throughout the
Americas, while improving the security situation and contributing to
economic growth must remain the core of U.S. policy. Right now, our
friends in Central America are confronting a crisis every bit as
dangerous to their stability as the threats in the early 1980s. The
difference then was an administration that was willing to step to the
plate. There is still time for the current administration to get more
engaged. I sincerely hope it is not too late.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Swigert?
STATEMENT OF JIM SWIGERT, DIRECTOR, LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
PROGRAMS NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Swigert. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and
distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate very much
the opportunity to appear today, and I applaud the committee's
initiative to focus much-needed attention on our close
neighbors in the Northern Triangle of Central America.
Strengthening governments in Central America's Northern
Triangle serves the national interests of the United States. We
have heard a lot about the bad news today. I would say the good
news is that, in the Northern Triangle today, the countries are
represented by increasingly pluralistic democracies. These
democracies like democracies everywhere are imperfect.
Shortcomings relate to the weakness or corruptions of state
institutions. Others stem from too closed or opaque and
noninclusive political systems.
According to public opinion research, citizens in all three
countries put crime and violence as their top concerns today.
Indeed, many Central Americans have told me it is the triple
menace of violence, impunity from the law, and corruption that
they are most worried about.
Four of the five countries in the world with the highest
per capita rates of murder are in Central America, all three
Northern Triangle countries.
This violence poses the biggest challenge to stability and
governance since the armed conflicts of more than 30 years ago.
Its causes are complex. Part has to do with drug trafficking.
Part has to do with gangs. The growth of gangs is aggravated by
high domestic abuse and weak family structures, and violence
against women has reached alarming levels.
The ability to check this criminal violence is limited by
impunity from crime. Weak law enforcement and judicial
institutions are one reason for the impunity. Another is
corruption.
In Transparency International's 2015 Corruptions Perception
Index, all three countries rank lower than average in the
Americas region.
Corruption scandals have implicated former and sitting
Presidents. In 2015, these sparked street protests and civic
pressures in El Salvador and Honduras for international help
for criminal investigations, similar to Guatemala's CICIG.
Citizens want more from their democracy than just regular
elections. They want democracy to deliver on security and
opportunity. And the tension between the public's belief in
democracy in the Northern Triangle and acute disappointment
with its performance adds an element of political volatility to
the governance challenges.
No doubt, individuals despair of solutions migrate to look
for opportunities elsewhere. Nonetheless, I would like to flag
a few hopeful signs.
First, the opportunity offered by the Alliance for
Prosperity. The alliance offers a practical approach for
securing better regional cooperation. And from the perspective
of NDI's democracy strengthening mission, most importantly, the
alliance incorporates explicit governance issues, and the high-
level engagement of the U.S.
Vice President Biden, in particular, has ensured high-level
attention from Northern Triangle leaders. This alliance is a
medium- for long-term process for success. It is important that
the next U.S. President, whoever that may be, continues the
high-level U.S. engagement.
Second, the prospect of new resources is providing real
incentive for governments to reform, and I would flag, in
particular, the role of the Congress by setting conditions on
aid for Central America in the 2016 Consolidated Appropriations
Act, which has outlined steps for improved democratic
governance, combatting corruption, and bolstering civil
society.
Third, steps are under way to strengthen prosecutors and
judges. In Guatemala, Jimmy Morales, the President, has
announced he would extend CICIG's mandate. El Salvador has
appointed a new independent attorney general. In Honduras, the
government has agreed to create with the OAS the Mission to
Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity, MACCIH.
MACCIH's mandate was strengthened in response to civil
society criticism, but doubts about its future remain. Ensuring
action against impunity in the murder of indigenous leader
Berta Caceres will be a critical test of MACCIH's credibility
and of the Honduran Government's political will.
Finally, while the mass street protests of last year have
subsided, citizen groups remain active. Governments and
legislators have begun to engage more with the civic groups,
including many NDI partners. Some long-sought reforms in
Guatemala have moved forward, including some elements of
anticorruption legislation and political reform.
In conclusion, please let me flag just two areas to watch
that are key for governance. First is the status of police
security reform, and second, the need for reform of political
institutions.
On police, there are no easy or quick solutions, but by
improving police vetting and oversight, and holding accountable
security and police officials for abuse, we can begin to break
the pernicious cycle of violence, impunity, and corruption.
And lastly, sustainable economic development and security
reform must be built on a bedrock of political institutions
that today are weak and insufficiently transparent. Without
action in coming years to bring together more transparency and
accountability to political institutions, I fear other efforts
to improve governance are likely to fall short.
Thank you very much.
[Mr. Swigert's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jim Swigert, Director, Latin America and
Caribbean Programs, National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee,
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee today and
discuss with you the serious challenges our close neighbors are
grappling with in Central America's Northern Triangle--El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras--and consider ways that the United States can
work cooperatively with the Northern Triangle's new Alliance for
Prosperity, both with the governments and citizens of these countries,
to address chronic problems such as criminal violence, corruption, and
impunity. These challenges, together with the lack of economic
opportunity, deep social inequality and the corrosive impact of
unresponsive political institutions, help to fuel migration and
undermine democracy. Strengthening democratic governance in Central
America's Northern Triangle--in other words, helping to build healthy
state institutions by increasing the effectiveness, responsiveness and
transparency of all branches of governments and the political parties
that stand behind them--serves the interests of these countries' young
and diverse population and also the national interests of the United
States.
The organization I represent--the National Democratic Institute, or
NDI--is dedicated to strengthening democratic governance, practices and
institutions globally. NDI has worked on the ground in the Northern
Triangle countries of Central America for nearly 15 years, supported by
several international assistance organizations, including USAID, the
National Endowment for Democracy, the State Department Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, the Swedish International
Development Assistance Agency, and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, who currently support our programs in the Northern Triangle.
Today NDI has field offices in Guatemala and Honduras and regularly
engages El Salvador through its regional programs on citizen security,
transparency and political reform. NDI approaches security as a
democratic governance issue, emphasizing citizen participation in
policies aimed at improving the quality of life through prevention of
crime and violence. Our work with civic groups, government officials,
legislators, political parties from all political persuasions, at
national and local levels, exposes us daily to diverse perspectives,
spanning senior political leaders to grass roots activists, and informs
the observations I will share today.
Much in northern Central America has changed for the good since the
authoritarian governments and the wars of the 1970s and 1980s, although
important promises held out by the Central American peace agreements
and subsequent democratic transitions remain unmet. On the positive
side, increasingly pluralistic democracies have taken hold in all three
countries of the Northern Triangle. These democracies--as is the case
with democracies everywhere and especially in countries emerging from
armed conflict--are imperfect. Some shortcomings relate to the weakness
or corruption of state institutions such as the courts and police;
others result from political systems that remain insufficiently
transparent or inclusive, and are slow to adapt to the needs of a
changing and young population. The 2009 coup in Honduras was a reminder
that despite democratic gains, damaging reversals may still occur.
Fortunately, now the three Northern Triangle countries have governments
elected in what NDI can attest were vigorously contested and widely
observed electoral processes. These democratically elected governments
are today being held accountable not just by their political opponents
but by an increasingly active citizenry. That is good news for
democratic governance.
At the same time, the problems of entrenched poverty and stagnant
economies that have long characterized northern Central America endure.
Of the three countries, the poverty rate as measured by the World Bank
(2013/2014) is highest in Guatemala at 40.7 percent , followed by
Honduras at 39.6 percent, although GDP per capita in Guatemala at
$7,503 is considerably higher than Honduras' $4,729. El Salvador
presents a different picture with only 12 percent poverty and $8,201
GDP per capita, and scores much higher than the other Northern Triangle
countries on scales measuring the quality of democracy, market economy,
and political management (see the 2016 Bertlesmann Transformation
Index). Economic growth has resumed since the great recession but at
moderate levels that make reduction of poverty and unemployment a
struggle. Natural disasters have done great damage in the past--I am
old enough to recall Hurricane Mitch--and are a constant threat. A
serious drought currently impacts important agricultural regions of the
Northern Triangle. Viruses such as Zika and Chikungunya are adding
further stress to stretched health care systems. Dependency on external
remittances remains high: these represent a very significant percentage
of GDP: 17.4 percent in Honduras, 16.8 percent in El Salvador, and 9.9
percent in Guatemala. These figures also underscore the close ties
between the Northern Triangle and our country, the source of much of
these remittances.
The economic development challenge is steep. It is compounded by
daunting challenges impeding good governance in what some Central
Americans have described as the triple menace of violence, impunity
from the law, and corruption, all visible to varying degrees in each of
the three countries.
Alarmingly, northern Central America is afflicted by epidemic
levels of criminal violence. Stories of extortion, drug trafficking and
gang violence occasionally grab headlines in the U.S., but are the
daily staple of life in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras and have
been for years. Four of the five countries in the world with the
highest per capita rates of murder are in Central America--including
all three Northern Triangle countries. (The fourth is their small
English-speaking neighbor, Belize.) According to official data, in 2015
homicide rates per 100,000 people hit 103 in El Salvador, 57 in
Honduras, 30 in Guatemala. Murder rates are only one metric--
calculating the extent of extortion or its cost to the economy is far
more difficult. This violence poses the biggest challenge to stability
and governance since the armed conflicts of 30 years ago. According to
public opinion research, citizens in all three countries put crime and
violence as their top concerns, well above unemployment and economic
worries.
There is a psychological toll to such high levels of criminality.
The spring 2016 issue of Americas Quarterly quotes former Salvadoran
guerrilla commander Joaquin Villalobos, who decades ago broke with the
FMLN guerrilla movement that now is El Salvador's governing political
party. Villalobos describes today's violence as the ``worst social
tragedy of El Salvador's history . . . worse than during the war,
because now there is less hope.''
The causes for the violence in the Northern Triangle are complex.
Part has to do with drug trafficking to be sure, and the movement
of Mexican and Colombian cartels into the sub-region to develop new
routes to the U.S. market in reaction to increased pressure brought
about through Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative, which Republican
and Democratic Party-led U.S. Administrations have supported. But more
is involved than patterns of narcotics trafficking, as a comprehensive
Woodrow Wilson Center analysis published in December 2014 well
documented.
That study drew attention to common aspects to the violence in each
of the three countries, as well as important differences. The
penetration and number of youth gang members in Central America is
highest in El Salvador, closely followed by Honduras and Guatemala. The
growth of youth gangs is aggravated by high rates of domestic abuse,
sexual violence and compounded by weak family and household structures.
Violence against women, a result of gender inequality and unequal power
relations between men and women, has reached alarming levels. According
to the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of
Women, El Salvador has the highest rate of femicides in the world,
closely followed by Guatemala and not trailing far behind, Honduras.
Migration has had its impact in both directions. As multiple analysts
have pointed out, the U.S. policy of deporting large numbers of young
Central Americans in the 1990s and 2000s, many gang members, helped to
import the youth gang problem to Central America.
Some causes of violence in Central America exist at the local level
and can be best addressed through local action. However, the ability to
check criminal violence through police action or violence prevention
programs that put in place community-based disincentives is negatively
impacted by the level of impunity from prosecution for crimes. Across
the Northern Triangle impunity for crime is high--up to 95 per cent of
crimes are not resolved.
Weak law enforcement and judicial institutions are one reason why.
Another is corruption. Guatemala, for example, has suffered for decades
from the influence of clandestine criminal networks that use corruption
and violence to undermine government institutions. The brutal murder a
month ago of the Honduran indigenous environmental and human rights
activist, Berta Caceres, was emblematic of the risks human rights
defenders and social leaders face daily throughout the region. The
scant prospect that criminals will ever face prosecution or punishment,
along with doubts regarding the capacity of authorities to prevent
retribution--and uncertain police loyalties given the extent of
corruption--means many crimes go unreported.
Corruption has had a longstanding corrosive influence in government
and on citizens' perceptions of democratic institutions in the Northern
Triangle. In Transparency International's 2015 Corruptions Perceptions
Index, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras rank 72, 123 and 112,
respectively, out of 168 countries surveyed. All three countries rank
lower than average in the Americas region.
Last year, corruption scandals and investigations emerged in the
three Northern Triangle countries which implicated former and sitting
presidents, vice presidents and other high level officials. These
sparked large-scale public protests in Guatemala and Honduras, new
mobilization by civic leaders in El Salvador and increased pressures
for transparency and accountability and for establishment of new
mechanisms in Honduras and El Salvador, similar to the U.N.-sponsored
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, known as CICIG
by its Spanish initials. CICIG has worked under the authority of
Guatemala's independent Public Prosecutor, Attorney General Thelma
Aldana, to investigate and bring to light high level corruption cases,
which ultimately led to the indictment, resignation and arrest of
former Guatemalan Vice President Roxana Baldetti and President Otto
Perez Molina, among other senior officials. With these actions,
Guatemalans sent a powerful message that no individual is above the
law, at the same time reinforcing the country's democratic institutions
by adhering strictly to constitutional processes until scheduled
elections could be completed and a new president took office in January
2016.
Public opinion research in the Northern Triangle countries by
Latinobarometro over the past decade has found that although strong
majorities of their citizens--on average 60 percent of those polled--
are committed to democratic government, dissatisfaction with the
performance of democratic governments has risen: in 2015 averaging 60
percent . In recent years, however, Honduras has proved the exception
to the negative trend, with a turnaround from a peak of 74 percent
dissatisfied citizens in 2013, to a still high 56 percent dissatisfied
in 2015, which analysts attribute to the success of President Juan
Orlando Hernandez' government in reducing the murder rate. The tension
between the public's belief in democracy and acute disappointment with
its performance adds another dimension of political volatility to the
Northern Triangle's challenging governance picture.
Citizens want more from their democracies than just regular
elections. They expect elected governments to deliver on basic state
responsibilities of security and to work to advance economic
opportunity and honest government. Looking at the daunting day-to-day
challenges, it might be easy to get discouraged or to despair about
finding solutions. No doubt many individuals do lose hope and migrate
to look for opportunities elsewhere. Nonetheless, in the Northern
Triangle there are hopeful signs and opportunities for building a
better future, both on a regional and country level.
First, the opportunity afforded by the Alliance for Prosperity.
Until the process of developing the Alliance for Prosperity by the
Northern Triangle countries began in the fall of 2014, most analysts we
talked to in the region characterized government-to-government
cooperation in the Northern Triangle on citizen security issues as
sporadic or limited to security agencies only and lacking a common
focus on governance. The 2011 Central America Integration System (SICA)
Summit in Guatemala made a promising start by bringing in the
experiences of Mexico and Colombia in confronting criminal violence to
share with their Central American neighbors and by helping generate
more focused U.S. attention. The ambitious SICA agenda of priority
regional citizen security reforms, including improved and standardized
legislation to facilitate coordination among neighboring countries, for
the most part was left unfulfilled and to many appears to have been
abandoned. The Alliance for Prosperity process is still taking form and
elements of it need to be strengthened, such as greater consultation
with civic groups. Efforts by governments to reach out broadly to
different sectors of society to get input and build consensus for
government plans for the Alliance have been robust in El Salvador, but
much less so in Guatemala and Honduras.
Nonetheless, I see several reasons now to be cautiously optimistic
about the potential impact of the Alliance.
Limiting the geographic scope to the Northern Triangle makes a
coordinated regional approach more manageable and realistic
than continuing to rely on the broader SICA framework that also
includes Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama and the
Dominican Republic. The ``Northern Triangle'' grouping is
admittedly an artifice--a valid geographic construct of course,
but a grouping of three countries with common challenges but
individual issues and political systems each responsive to its
own political and electoral calendar. No practice of sub-
regional cooperation existed previously outside of ad hoc
meetings. The Alliance is building greater communication among
governments that extends beyond foreign ministries or police
and if continued, should deepen into greater cooperation.
Senior level U.S. engagement helps the Central American leaders
sustain their engagement. The Alliance fits well within the
framework of the U.S. Government Central America Strategy, and
Vice President Biden's active involvement has ensured continued
high level attention and leadership on all sides. Achieving the
promise of the Alliance is a medium to long term process.
Hopefully, the next U.S. Administration will continue active
support for the Alliance.
From the perspective of NDI's democracy-strengthening mission, most
importantly, the Alliance incorporates explicit governance
issues among its four goals and lines of action, including
improved access to justice and strengthened institutions and
transparency.
The second hopeful sign is the increased U.S. funding for the region.
This provides additional needed resources and equally critical,
real incentives for Northern Triangle governments to follow
through on much needed reforms.
In that regard, Congress' role in ensuring oversight and monitoring
for effective use of the resources--with hearings such as
this--has been critical. In addition, the specific conditions
placed on aid for Central America in the 2016 Consolidated
Appropriation Act establish important steps toward improved
democratic governance, combatting cooperation and bolstering
civil society.
This U.S. leadership and expanded commitment has helped enlist
support by others. The Inter-American-Development Bank provides
essential technical expertise to the Alliance grounding it in
an effective regional institution. Colombia, Chile, Mexico,
Panama and Peru have also offered support. Colombian President
Santos traveled to the Northern Triangle countries earlier this
month. When members of NDI's Board of Directors met with
President Santos in Bogota last year, they discussed the
governance challenges in the Northern Triangle and President
Santos underlined Colombia's commitment to further police
training and other assistance.
Third, there is increased interest in international assistance to
buttress national investigative and prosecutorial capacity in
order to reinforce state institutions.
In Guatemala, President Jimmy Morales announced he would extend
until 2019 the mandate of CICIG, the U.N.-sponsored
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala. This
has increased public confidence that the ground-breaking steps
taken in 2015 against impunity and corruption by senior
officials will continue and steps taken to curb clandestine
criminal networks that have weakened and co-opted Guatemalan
institutions.
CICIG provides a proven effective model, and operates with full
respect for national sovereignty in support of Guatemalan
justice institutions. Civic groups in Honduras and El Salvador
have advocated for establishing similar mechanisms in their
countries--a ``CICIH'' or ``CICIES.'' However, the other
Northern Triangle governments have chosen to chart their own
path for strengthening national investigative and justice
institutions.
In January 2016, El Salvador appointed a new independent Attorney
General after the incumbent withdrew his candidacy for
reappointment following severe criticism from civil society
groups. In March, U.S. State Department and the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime signed a joint agreement with a broad
set of Salvadoran institutions designed to strengthen the
prevention, investigation and prosecution of corruption.
In Honduras, the government similarly has resisted civic pressures
to establish a U.N.-backed CICIH. Instead, the Honduran
government reached agreement with the OAS to create a different
international support mechanism, the Mission to Support the
Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (known by its
Spanish initials MACCIH), which started working in Honduras on
April 14. MACCIH will target graft and organized crime through
an international corps of judges and prosecutors who will work
in concert with Honduran counterparts. Although MACCIH's
original proposed mandate was modified and strengthened
somewhat in response to criticism from civil society
organizations, many doubts remain among civil society leaders
about how the MACCIH will function and whether the OAS mission
and Honduran prosecutors will be prepared to take action
against corrupt criminal networks involving the country's
powerful political and business elites. A positive sign: the
Honduran Supreme Court announced the creation of anti-
corruption and extortion tribunals within the next month, as
recommended by the MACCIH. MACCIH's actions to ensure a serious
investigation and prosecution concerning the murder of
environmental activist and indigenous leader Berta Caceres will
be a critical test of MACCIH's credibility and of the political
will of the Honduran government to end impunity.
Finally, while the mass street protests of 2015 have subsided, citizen
groups are continuing to press for action for government
transparency and accountability and improved security.
During 2015, unprecedented mass protests against corruption took
place on a regular basis in Honduras and Guatemala, mobilizing hundreds
sometimes thousands of people in peaceful demonstrations. Civic groups
have shifted from strategies of protest to proposals for reform. Many
NDI civic partners are active in proposing concrete reforms and closely
monitoring government actions, such as the Alliance for Peace and
Justice in Honduras, and the Pro-Justice Movement and Human Rights
Convergence civic society groups in Guatemala, together with social
movements and new civic activists active in the mass street protests of
the past year. Last week, NDI helped convene a forum in El Salvador to
examine the implications of the wave of civic protests across the
region for strengthening democracy and state institutions.
In some cases, governments and legislatures have reached out
actively to civic groups for input. These include many NDI partners.
Civic activists have expressed fears that government outreach could be
just window-dressing. However, in a few cases, following extensive
interaction through informal mechanisms bringing together civil society
leaders, legislators, government and political party leaders, long-
sought reforms have moved forward. For example, in Guatemala, key
elements of anti-corruption legislation and stalled political reform
were approved over the last month. These include limitations on the
power of the president to dismiss the independent Public Prosecutor,
improved regulation for public procurements, and restrictions on future
party-swapping by legislators--a practice closely identified with
corruption. Guatemala's experience over the past year suggest that
sustained public pressure is key for advancing reform
To conclude, let me suggest two areas to watch that will be
influential in determining prospects for meeting the governance
challenges in northern Central America through the Alliance and other
initiatives.
Police, Security Reform and Human Rights
Over recent years, the Northern Triangle governments have sought to
improve the effectiveness of policing in multiple ways. In El Salvador
and Guatemala, military forces at times have been mobilized to support
police actions against youth gangs and patrol streets. In Honduras, a
new militarized police force was formed directly responsible to the
president's office. All three countries have sought to weed out corrupt
elements. For instance, following Honduran media reports of high level
police being involved in the killing of the antidrug czar in 2009 and
his top advisor Landaverde two years later, Honduran President
Hernandez recently announced a presidential decree which was approved
unanimously by Honduran Congress allowing him to purge the police
force. MACCIH will have a role in police purging. This is the fifth
Honduran attempt in the last 20 years to purge the police--the most
recent took place in 2012. Human rights groups throughout the Northern
Triangle have expressed concerns about the militarization of police
functions and denounced abuses. In El Salvador, press investigation of
police vigilantism and targeted killings of youth gang members have
stoked fears of new death squads. Poorly-paid police daily face extreme
dangers, including real threats against their families. The continuing
escalation of violence in El Salvador has led the National Assembly to
authorize extraordinary penal measures. Some figures close to the
government have even discussed the possibility of organizing armed
citizen groups to defend communities against criminal gangs, which
could lead to greater violence and further weaken security forces.
There are no easy or quick solutions. Improving police vetting and
holding accountable police and security officials who abuse positions
of authority, however difficult, is essential to breaking the
pernicious cycle of violence, impunity and corruption.
Reform of Political Institutions
Sustainable economic development and security reform is built on
bedrock of political institutions. The capacity of legislatures to
exercise oversight over the executive needs strengthening, along with
continued international support for building effective independent
judicial institutions. Political finance regulations in the Northern
Triangle are well below norms in place elsewhere in Latin America, and
those laws and regulations that exist are not uniformly enforced. Those
reforms in final stages of approval by the Guatemalan Congress need to
be finalized and then implemented. The Honduran government has proposed
a modest political reform package, focused on campaign finance reform
in response to the arrival of MACCIH, before the 2017 elections which
unfortunately, leaves out the key demands of civic groups. El
Salvador's two strong dominant political parties have helped anchor the
country's stable politics since the peace agreement but both the
governing FMLN and the opposition ARENA have joined in rebuffing civil
society proposals for reform, which in turn has put more stress on the
country's judicial system.
In all three countries, NDI's partners and other civil society
groups have advocated for political and electoral reforms and as
mentioned earlier, in some cases, secured political backing for
government and legislative action. Regional exchanges are taking place
on a regular basis not just among governments, but among political and
civic leaders to share lessons learned and shape common agendas.
Reform-minded legislators have sought to improve democratic governance
and do more to engage citizens on public priorities. Much more needs to
be done to support all of these efforts. Without action in coming years
to bring greater transparency and accountability to political
institutions other efforts to improve governance are likely to fall
short.
Thank you.I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. First, I thank both of you for your
testimony. I found it very helpful.
I agree completely with the points that, yes, you have to
have security. There is no question. You cannot function
without security. But you also have to deal with the human
rights issues and particularly the good governance and
anticorruption issues.
So, Mr. Swigert, let me ask you first, if I might, you have
indicated that there is a need for more funds for democracy and
governance. Could you give specifically where additional U.S.
support could make a difference in the Northern Triangle, if
more funds were available for democracy and governance?
Mr. Swigert. Thank you, Senator Cardin, for the question. I
think U.S. funds are being dedicated to very important areas,
as we heard this morning.
It is critical to get at the question of impunity through
greater support for external mechanisms like the MACCIH, like
the CICIG in Guatemala, and by strengthening judicial
institutions and oversight mechanisms. Police need support as
well. And I think it is critically important that civil society
movements and organizations across the Northern Triangle be
strengthened.
I think there has been insufficient attention to support
for political institutions. It was not so long ago that there
was an enormous setback in democratic governance in Central
America, the coup in Honduras in 2009. I think that clearly
left a vacuum, which was filled, unfortunately, by organized
crime and gangs and drug traffickers as the Honduran state was
greatly weakened.
So there needs to be a continued focus on strengthening the
political institutions in the region. By that, I mean also the
democratic legislatures in the region who have an important
role of oversight of the executive that they need to perform
better than has been done to date.
And lastly, I think though there are resources that are
going to civil society, and civil society has been playing an
increasingly important role in giving oversight of issues such
as police vetting in Honduras, we heard this morning about the
terrible assassination that took place of the drug czar in
Honduras and the new information that has come to light linking
that with senior police officials. In response, the President
of Honduras has adopted a new measure of vetting police and
civil society as being engaged in that. More resources to
support these efforts I think would strengthen governance in
the region.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Mr. Cardenas, I just really want to underscore the point
that you made.
Security is absolutely essential, but if you do not treat
your people fairly, there is going to be a void that is going
to cause instability. We see that very visibly in the Middle
East, where we have not been able to get governments that
represent all the people, leading to a huge challenge on
security.
So I just really wanted to compliment you on the manner in
which have connected the dots.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Rubio?
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
You were both here and you heard the testimony. I think the
number was at about 30 percent of the funds are being spent on
security and another 40 percent on prosperity. I by no means
want to diminish the importance of creating economic growth and
stability for purposes of turning the corner. My argument is
and has been that when you look at other places where these
sorts of activities have been effective, such as in Colombia,
it involved at the beginning especially a significant
investment on the front end in the security aspect of this,
that until you were able to confront the causes of insecurity--
in this case, these criminal organizations which are highly
organized. This is not just street-level crime. We are talking
about highly organized drug trafficking organizations. Until
you are able to confront and defeat that, the way the cartels
were defeated in Colombia, the other aspects, including
prosperity, become more difficult.
So I would ask you both to comment, when you look at the
current levels of funding and how the program is currently
structured, is it doing enough on the security end to lead us
into where we want to be with regards to these countries?
Mr. Cardenas. I share your concern, Senator Rubio, that
perhaps we may be putting the cart before the horse. It is not
that the entire particular country that we are talking about
has to be pacified before we can begin with economic growth
projects. It can be done piecemeal, perhaps sector by sector, a
geographic sector in a country. But I do believe that there are
important lessons to learn from Plan Colombia. The situations
are not analogous, but there are important truths that we
should take advantage of.
One of those is that what President Uribe did in terms of
the central element of pacifying communities was government
presence. So once you have government presence, which by
implication means a security presence, legitimacy of the state,
then you can begin instilling confidence in people to venture
out taking economic risk to start a small business or whatever.
But I do believe that we are only treading water, if we are
trying to combine the two at the same time in a given location.
Mr. Swigert. Senator Rubio, I have no doubt that additional
assistance on the security side could be helpful. I think that
it is important that the way that that is done also include a
focus on ensuring accountability by police.
There have been concerns expressed by a number of civic
organizations in El Salvador, in Honduras, in Guatemala about
the militarization of police forces, and concerns about abuses
that such practices could entail in deploying the army to
patrol streets, for instance.
I think that it is important that we continue to work in
partnership on these citizen security issues in the ways we
found to involve more the citizens in those countries in the
design of security responses, so that the communities
themselves take on responsibility for dealing with these
difficult problems of violence.
Senator Rubio. Again, I know they are not perfectly
analogous, but when you look at the success in Colombia, one of
the things that was present there was a widespread and deep
commitment on the part of its government leaders to confront
this and turn the corner.
In your opinion, and it is hard to ask State Department
officials who, of course, operate in the diplomatic realm, but
in your opinion, having observed this situation, is it your
opinion that the governments, and I know we are addressing
three separate governments, how would you characterize the
level of commitment from leaders in Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras, in terms of confronting this at the same level of
seriousness as what we saw in Colombia?
Mr. Cardenas. Political will is indispensable, and we saw
that with President Uribe. A leader like that only comes around
once in a generation, and in the context of Central America, we
would need three Uribes for three countries. I believe that the
current leaders of these countries want the very best. They
understand the future of their countries relies on drawing
foreign investment and integrating into the world economy.
This is where I believe the United States can play a very
key role in supporting the current presidents of Central
America. That is using the authorities that we have to sanction
wrongdoers, corrupt officials, drug traffickers in their
countries.
What President Uribe did was he necessarily had to break a
lot of furniture to transform that country from a near failed
state into the thriving country that it is today.
Many times in Central America you are not really sure who
the bad guys are. They could be ``respectable businessmen,'' as
we saw in Honduras the Rosenthal family that was recently
indicted. And I commend the administration for pushing that
through.
By either Treasury Department designations of corrupt
officials or drug traffickers or withdrawing U.S. visas, the
State Department has the authority to do that, we can back up
the presidents of these countries to show that the United
States has their back. President Uribe knew the United States
had his back in what he was trying to accomplish in Colombia.
If we join with the presidents of Central America in upsetting
entrenched interests in those countries, I think we can instill
a sense of confidence to keep moving forward in upsetting the
current status quo in these countries.
Mr. Swigert. I would say it is a very different situation
than in Colombia, in the sense that we are talking about much
weaker countries. It is three different countries in what is an
alliance in formation. Each one of those countries has its own
challenges and political dynamics and even different political
calendars.
But I would say that this question of political will is
absolutely key, and I agree that it is extremely important that
the United States use its influence to encourage the
development of stronger political will to confront these
challenges, because some of these challenges are deeply
embedded in the political system in those countries.
The extent of corruption, the way in which political
finance operates, which is another key question where I think
there needs to be progress in coming years, because the lack of
transparency that exists across-the-board makes it very
difficult to know who is sitting across the table from you.
The Chairman. Thank you both.
I just want to follow up on that. Mr. Swigert, we have
invested a lot of money for a long time in judicial reform and
in training police and prosecutors. Is it that political will,
is that the issue that has kept us from being successful for
many, many years? Us, really them being successful, but our
assistance from being successful?
Mr. Swigert. Senator, I think that is an element of it. I
also think that we have made some progress, and I do think that
the external support mechanisms, which many in the region are
clamoring for strengthening, have also made a big difference.
The situation varies by country. In some places, you will
find that there is really a great deal of support at the top of
the judicial system, that there is a belief in the integrity of
the judicial system at the very top level, and I would refer to
El Salvador in that instance. In other places, that doesn't
exist.
In the case of our strategy, I think the strategy that
repeated administrations have followed of working to improve
the capacity of the judiciary is part of the solution. But
another part has to do with bringing to bear some independent
support for investigations and prosecutions.
CICIG has made a huge difference in Guatemala. We will see
whether the MACCIH, the OAS-supported new mechanism in
Honduras, which set up shop last week, is able to do the same.
In El Salvador, they are on a different approach, but I think
that there also is a need for increased cooperation within
international judicial mechanisms for making progress. But the
key issue is political will.
The Chairman. Mr. Cardin, go ahead. Yes, sir.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to pick up on a point that Mr. Swigert made,
and he is absolutely right.
We are at a time and a place in Central America right now
where there is growing popular mobilization against official
corruption in these countries, and that is an important dynamic
that we can take advantage of. And making common cause with
this popular groundswell of opposition, and as Jim mentioned,
these external entities that have been helping these countries
along, is something that deserves our full support, because we
have had a lot of very disappointing experiences over the years
of these countries attempting to heal themselves, and to the
extent that there is outside support locked in with this public
sentiment that we see today, I think we can make some
significant advances that we have not been able to in the past.
The Chairman. That leads me into the next question I have,
and I know you have been involved on the administration side in
the past, and we have invested significant monies in these
countries for a long, long time.
Can you point to successes, return on investment, progress
that has been made with the significant amount of money that
has been invested in these three countries?
Mr. Cardenas. I think when you look at CAFTA, I think that
the CAFTA has made significant progress in integrating these
countries' markets with the United States. So even though that
was not an economic assistance program, it is an example, I
believe, of a program that has incentivized local actors into
productive activity, if you will.
I think that the U.S. assistance programs over the years
that have strengthened democratic institutions, IRI, NDI, NED,
I think that there is a long process.
There is probably not a five-star program out there that
probably would resonate with all of us, but I think it has been
slow, steady progress with the U.S. institutions like the NED
family that have been crucial.
It may not be sexy work, but it has been effective when you
look at where we were and where we are today. It is the
unfortunate confluence of these adverse effects of U.S.
counternarcotics policies in support of Colombia and Mexico
that have squeezed Central America and put this layover of
criminality into what was very steady progress out of the 1980s
that has complicated the issue today.
The Chairman. Do you want to follow up on that, Mr.
Swigert?
Mr. Swigert. I would agree with what Mr. Cardenas has said.
I would just add that I do think in recent time looking at
CICIG and what happened over the course of the last year is
another example of good investment by the United States, which
has been one of the largest international supporters of the
U.N.-backed CICIG mechanism.
Guatemala went through an incredibly wrenching experience.
The sitting Vice President and the sitting President both were
indicted, impeached, and removed from office and sit in jail.
And yet Guatemala remains on a democratic path today. It stuck
with its constitutional mechanisms, and I think that is thanks
to the support that the United States has made to Guatemala and
others over the years.
The Chairman. Well, we want to thank you for your
testimony. I think it has been a great committee hearing.
I want to thank the ranking member in helping make this
happen the way that it has.
We had two government witnesses that obviously are highly
optimistic about what they are carrying out. We have had two
private witnesses who had a lot of experience that provided a
dose of reality and other observations.
We thank both panels for being here. The record will remain
open until the close of business Thursday. If you could respond
fairly promptly to questions that I am sure you will receive
from the committee, we would appreciate it.
The Chairman. Again, one of the great privileges that
Senator Cardin and I have is the constant ability to talk to
people like you that have the kind of experiences that you
have. It is very helpful to us in carrying out public policy.
We thank you for being here today.
I do not know if you want to say anything else or not?
Senator Cardin. I agree with the chairman. Both panels, I
think, complemented each other.
This is an incredibly important moment for U.S. foreign
policy, and I think you helped us deal with it. Thank you.
The Chairman. With that, the committee is adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator David Perdue
to Francisco Palmieri, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
Question 1. As the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, I would like to take this
opportunity to inquire about the State Department's efforts regarding
Haiti's stalled federal elections. As you may know, the second round of
Haiti's presidential elections was postponed due to allegations of
fraud and subsequent threats of violent protests, leaving Haiti without
a duly elected president or a complete federal government in place.
Those familiar with the situation believe a small group of candidates
who were unsuccessful in the first election round are responsible for
inciting these allegations of fraud and sparking civil unrest in order
to trigger a ``do over'' election, even stooping to the level of paying
citizens to take the to the streets. I was discouraged to see the news
last week that yet again the second round of elections have been
postponed. I'm concerned that very little progress has been made as
Haiti's interim president Jocelerme Privert, a former member of the
Haitian parliament, seems more concerned with installing his allies in
key government positions than with completing the election cycle.
What is the State Department doing to help get Haiti's election
cycle back on track by the agreed upon date?
What is being done to identify and call out election disruptors?
Aside from public rhetoric and private talks, is State willing
to use other diplomatic tools of persuasion, including travel
restrictions and/or visa bans, for these disruptors and their
families, who view U.S. travel ability as a status symbol?
Answer. The Department of State is maintaining vocal and consistent
pressure on the Haitian government to promptly complete the 2015
electoral process and seat a democratically elected government,
emphasizing that anti-democratic ``political solutions'' are not an
acceptable outcome. We are supporting Haitian efforts aimed at finding
consensual and constructive solutions that will see the February 5
political accord implemented and a conclusion to the electoral process
as soon as possible. We are urging the verification commission to
expeditiously complete its evaluation and the Provisional Electoral
Council (CEP) to quickly implement the commission's legal and
constitutional recommendations.
We will continue to call both publicly and through diplomatic
channels for the completion of the electoral process. We are
considering appropriate U.S. responses to continued delays, and
identifying the triggers for those responses. At close to $42 million,
the U.S. government is the largest bilateral contributor to Haiti's
electoral process, giving us important leverage. We are working toward
preparing an array of unilateral and multilateral responses, including
UN Security Council action, withdrawal of funding for elections, and
pressure on individual decision-makers.
We have consulted closely with other donors to ensure a consistent
response to possible continued electoral delays. To date, the
international donor community has generally spoken with one voice,
urging political actors to stick with the previously-agreed timetable.
In some cases, international financial institutions' programs may be
affected if there is a prolonged absence of a democratically elected
government in Haiti.
We are also assessing possible additional U.S. responses for those
who deliberately disrupt the electoral process to pursue their own
interests. We will consult internally with Department of State consular
and legal experts, regarding the eligibility of certain individuals for
visa revocation (for which there is a high legal threshold). We are
prepared to back public statements and diplomatic pressures with
concrete consequences, as needed.
Question 2a. I appreciate that Secretary Kerry has been unambiguous
in his support for prompt democratic elections in Haiti. As mentioned
above, some self-interested groups in Haiti sow instability because
their narrow commercial interests benefit from political uncertainty
and the lack of the rule of law. These same groups are campaigning
relentlessly today to strangle the Port Lafito project, a new port and
industrial zone (involving the U.S.-based Seaboard Corporation), that
represents competition with the existing antiquated port in the capital
city. A cartel of port and cargo firms that enjoys sweetheart deals and
no-bid contracts with the government is using its influence with
Haitian authorities--including the courts and the National Port
Authority--to disadvantage the Port Lafito project. The U.S. Ambassador
and his team have been attentive to this issue. But unless we take
decisive action against corrupt individuals involved, Haiti will never
attract the investment it needs to progress.
What specific measures will the U.S. government take to push back
decisively against corrupt practices?
Answer. The U.S. government continues to advocate for fair and
equitable treatment for U.S. investors in Haiti and has called on all
actors involved in the commercial dispute affecting the Port Lafito
project to abide by the rule of law and to maintain a high standard of
transparency. We are also working with the Government of Haiti to
combat official corruption and are exploring what options are available
to impose consequences on individuals participating in corrupt
practices. For example, we will consult internally with Department of
State consular and legal experts, regarding the eligibility of certain
individuals for visa revocation (for which there is a high legal
threshold).
On March 12, 2014, the Government of Haiti passed the Law on the
Prevention and Repression of Corruption which imposes prison sentences
of 3-15 years for a host of newly codified crimes including bribery,
embezzlement of public property, illegal procurements, and laundering
of proceeds of crime. On December 10, Haiti successfully prosecuted its
first case of corruption under the law for embezzlement. The United
States provided training to the judge in the case. We will continue to
support Haitian efforts to bolster the capacity of judges and
prosecutors to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate specialized
crimes.
Question 2b. What information do we have about a bribe allegedly
paid to former President Martelly by Unibank?
Answer. The State Department is aware of the allegations. We have
no further information at this time.
Question 2c. What can the U.S. government do to support the ongoing
investigation by the Haitian Parliament of a no-bid contract issued to
Caribbean Port Services?
Answer. Parliament has not requested support from the U.S.
government to investigate the alleged contract with Caribbean Port
Services, and we have no involvement at this time. We continue to press
the Government of Haiti to uphold fair and transparent procurement
practices.
Question 2d. Why is the director of the National Port Authority
(APN), Alix Celestin, allowed to operate with impunity and in defiance
of the government board of directors by levying inequitable fees on
private ports?
Answer. A statement published on August 3, 2015, by APN Director
Alix Celestin notified all private port operators that the APN would be
changing how it allocates its wharfage fee of $310 for every 20 foot
equivalent (TEU) container. Previously, private operators were only
required to give $155 of the wharfage fee to APN. In the fall of 2015,
APN asserted that it was entitled to all $310/TEU, altering a wharfage
sharing framework in effect since September 2000.
Mr. Celestin has asserted APN's authority as a port regulator,
established under a 1985 decree, to make these decisions, although the
decree does not directly address the question of wharfage. Most
recently, in a case brought by a private port operator, a Summary
Reference Judge determined that the reinstatement of wharfage fees by
APN was an administrative action that falls outside of the jurisdiction
of the lower courts.
The State Department, through the Office of the Haiti Special
Coordinator and our Embassy in Port-au-Prince, has engaged with all
parties involved and is closely following developments on the ground.
We are also working with the Government of Haiti to advocate for the
rationalization of wharfage fees, linking them to actual port
operational costs which could result in a significant reduction in
fees.
Question 2e. Have international donors asked for an accounting of
APN operating funds?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince is not aware of any
formal accounting of APN operating funds; however, the U.S. government
is working closely with the Government of Haiti to combat corruption
within the public sector and improve transparency of financial
management. With support from the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the Government of Haiti is building back the
operability of its Integrated Financial Management System after most of
its physical infrastructure was destroyed in the earthquake. The
Government of Haiti is installing an interface to allow connectivity
between the Government of Haiti revenue collections and the
expenditures management systems. The new program is in line with the
roadmap developed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) to guide
all future investments in the area of information technology to ensure
uniformity and avoid duplication. The U.S. Treasury Department is also
working with the Government of Haiti to Implement a Treasury Single
Account (TSA), which will improve the quality of fiscal information and
create transparency within the expenditure and revenue stream for all
ministries within the government.
Question 3a. From FY 2014 to FY 2016, the State Department and
USAID-managed assistance budget for Central America has more than
doubled, going from $338.1 million in FY 2014 to $748 million estimated
for FY 2016. Yet, the President has now requested $771.6 million for FY
2017--$35 million more than last year.
Can you explain this budget growth for Central America?
Answer. The increase in foreign assistance requested for Central
America reflects the comprehensive approach of the U.S. Strategy for
Engagement in Central America (the Strategy). Consistent with the
Strategy, increased resources will support new assistance for
prosperity and governance programs and expand existing, successful
security investments. The Department of State and USAID's FY 2017
request of $750 million in bilateral and regional assistance for
Central America--a part of the Administration's $1 billion request to
support the Strategy--builds on the FY 2016 appropriation by seeking
the resources necessary to increase economic opportunity, reduce
extreme violence, strengthen the effectiveness of state institutions,
and address challenges that have resulted in an increase in Central
American migration to the United States. By investing U.S assistance in
these areas, we can advance a prosperous, economically integrated
Central America with effective and accountable institutions where
citizens choose to remain and thrive. Doing so, we promote U.S.
national security and expand economic opportunity for the United States
and our partners throughout the region.
Question 3b. Having more than doubled our aid investment in the
last 3 years, what improvements have been made in the region?
Answer. The increase in foreign assistance reflects the
comprehensive approach of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America. The U.S. Strategy focuses on three pillars: security,
governance, and prosperity. A few examples highlight the progress that
has been made:Guatemala continues to fight corruption. The Department
provides critical support through the State Department's Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to fund the UN's
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) to root
out corruption at all levels of government. Recent successes include
the February arrests of tax authority personnel accused of providing
illegal tax refunds. On April 18, President Jimmy Morales requested
CICIG's extension through 2019, reaffirming his promise to institute a
``zero tolerance for corruption.''
Honduras, with the support of USAID's Feed the Future (FTF)
program, has shown significant results in reducing extreme poverty.
Between 2011 and 2015, incomes increased by nearly 55 percent for more
than 180,000 of the poorest individuals. Within the last fiscal year,
the number of FTF families whose incomes rose beyond the extreme
poverty line increased by 30 percent (8,719 in FY 2015 as compared to
6,626 in FY 2014).
El Salvador has demonstrated political will to improve public
security. With the Department and USAID's support, crime prevention
activities are helping reduce homicides in targeted communities. While
national homicide rates are truly alarming--over 100 murders per
100,000 people in 2015--homicide rates are projected to drop by about
two-thirds in the 76 communities where USAID has focused its programs.
Question 3c. From FY 2014 to FY 2016, the State Department and
USAID-managed assistance budget for Central America has more than
doubled, going from $338.1 million in FY 2014 to $748 million estimated
for FY 2016. Yet, the President has now requested $771.6 million for FY
2017--$35 million more than last year.
The Alliance for Prosperity is a five-year plan, of which we are
only in the first year of implementation. Can Congress expect
to see increasing funding requests from the next Administration
for Central America in each of the remaining years of the plan?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID will request funds on an
annual basis commensurate with the challenges facing Central America.
Insecurity, a lack of economic growth and jobs, poor educational
opportunities, poverty, and weak institutional capacity are systemic
challenges in Central America. The summer 2014 surge in migration of
unaccompanied children and families from Central America to the U.S.
southern border was just one symptom of these challenges. Although
prior U.S. assistance yielded successful outcomes, overcoming the
serious and persistent challenges Central America faces requires a
comprehensive approach.
Many of the U.S. Strategy for Central America's lines of action
require sustained U.S. engagement and include assistance to build long-
term Central American capacity. Some FY 2016 and prior-year assistance
will have an immediate impact, including addressing region-wide
challenges such as coffee rust and protracted drought. Assistance will
also improve Central American capacity to serve its citizens in the
mid-term, but some goals will require sustained assistance and Central
American political will.
Question 3d. Is five years a sufficient period of time to implement
the Alliance for Prosperity?
Answer. The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America is
envisioned as a multi-year effort. The systemic changes needed in
Central America will not come overnight, nor will the migration flows
immediately cease. The necessary political will in Central America
exists, but increased U.S. resources to address security, governance,
and prosperity are a key component to catalyze more rapid progress in
Central America. As we have learned from our experiences in Colombia
and Mexico, consistent U.S. engagement and assistance can produce
progress and changes that are sustainable and irreversible. To address
the underlying conditions of poverty, weak governance, and insecurity
in Central America, sustained U.S. involvement can make a positive
difference. We will continually assess progress to ensure foreign
assistance requests accurately reflect developments in the region and
are linked to specific opportunities where they can make a positive
impact.
Question 4. Likewise, the Central America Regional Security
Initiative (CARSI) budget has also more than doubled since FY 2014.
Could you detail for me CARSI's accomplishments thus far?
Answer. The Central America Regional Security Initiative is the
primary funding stream for U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America security programming. In partnership with Central American
governments, the Department of State and the United States Agency for
International Development have established successful programming
models that make short- to medium-term sustainable impacts to reduce
levels of crime and violence, build the capacity of law enforcement and
rule of law institutions, and support prevention programs for youth and
in communities at risk of crime and violence.
The Department and USAID began jointly implementing a Place Based
Strategy (PBS) to reduce violent crime in some of the region's most
dangerous neighborhoods. In Honduras, we have already seen a
significant reduction in homicide rates. For example, in the Chamelecon
and Rivera Hernandez neighborhoods in Honduras, the homicide rate
dropped 17 percent and 47 percent respectively from 2014 to 2015. These
reductions occurred in the concentrated areas where the Department and
USAID jointly implement their programs. Nationally, the homicide rate
dropped 12 percent from 2014 to 2015. The evidence shows that our
programs, in conjunction with host government efforts, contributed to a
reduction in homicides and an increase in safety and security.
Justice sector reform programs also delivered benefits. In El
Salvador, prosecutors mentored via CARSI obtained 424 convictions in
2015, and achieved an impressive 93.4 percent conviction rate. In
Honduras, CARSI-supported units executed a high-profile operation
against the Banegas Band, one of the most notorious criminal
organization responsible for at least nine murders and multiple
attempts at extortion throughout Honduras, arresting 18 suspects and
its leader.
USAID, with the support of Vanderbilt University, concluded a
rigorous three-year impact evaluation of its CARSI-funded community-
based crime and violence prevention programs in 120 high-crime urban
treatment and control communities in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
and Panama. Final results demonstrated crime victimization is
significantly lower and public perception of security higher in
communities USAID's CARSI programs.
Question 5. Funding for ``Other Regional Programs'' has actually
tripled since FY 2014. Can you describe what ``other'' programs are
involved in this grouping, and why these programs collectively have
required a three-fold increase?
Answer. The FY 2017 request includes $10 million for Foreign
Military Finance (FMF) in ``Other Regional Programs'' to support the
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America (the Strategy).
Consistent with the Strategy, increased resources will expand existing,
successful security investments. Regional security assistance, through
FMF, will build the capacity of Central American partner nation
security forces to disrupt maritime smuggling of drugs destined to the
United States and enhance border security to prevent undocumented
migration and illicit trafficking in areas at risk of exploitation by
criminal organizations. These investments will enhance U.S. national
security.The FY 2017 request for ``Other Regional Programs'' also
includes $2.07 million in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and
Related Programs (NADR) with $1.5 million for antiterrorism assistance
and $570,000 in export control and related border security assistance.
Antiterrorism assistance supports targeted training and equipment to
improve law enforcement, while export control assistance funds the
creation of strategic trade controls to counter proliferation threats.
Question 6. The Northern Triangle governments have budgeted $145
million for improving public safety under the Alliance for Prosperity
in 2016. This amount is almost double the $78 million budgeted for El
Salvador and almost triple the $49 million budgeted for Guatemala. This
allocation seems inconsistent with the level of violence occurring in
these three nations, especially El Salvador, which, with 104 homicides
for every 100,000 citizens, recently earned the title of ``the
hemisphere's murder capital'' this year.
Can you shed any light on why the government of El Salvador decided
to allocate less funding to improving public safety than other
Alliance for Prosperity nations?
How is funding from the U.S. and international donor community
being used to address the issue of public safety in El
Salvador?
Answer. The government of El Salvador is committed to addressing
its crippling security situation. El Salvador's budget allocations for
public safety spending in 2016 to support the Alliance for Prosperity
only represent a portion of its total security expenditures. In 2015,
the government of El Salvador, with the support of the international
community, developed a comprehensive security plan, Plan Safe El
Salvador. The Government of El Salvador committed to finance this
ambitious plan, with costs over a five-year period estimated to reach
$2.1 billion, roughly 8.7 percent of Salvadoran GDP. In October 2015,
the Salvadoran legislature approved two special taxes to help finance
Plan Safe El Salvador, demonstrating political will to improve public
safety. In the short time since the new taxes went into force, the
government has already raised over $11 million in additional revenue to
back the plan.
As one example of international donor engagement, the Central
American Bank for Economic Integration issued a $71 million loan to El
Salvador to support prison construction and is negotiating an
additional $100 million loan to improve public safety.
The Department of State and the United States Agency for
International Development focus assistance efforts in the same priority
municipalities identified by the Government of El Salvador in Plan Safe
El Salvador. Assistance strategically implements a balanced and
integrated set of four interventions: primary violence prevention
activities directed at the community at large; secondary violence
prevention activities tailored to individuals considered at risk of
engaging in crime; tertiary violence prevention activities targeted at
individuals already engaged in criminal behavior who are seeking
alternatives; and justice sector activities that provide the community
access to formal criminal justice services and increase trust between
citizens and law enforcement.
Question 7. Please describe the relationship between USAID's
Central America Regional program and the State Department's Western
Hemisphere Regional program.
How do State and USAID work together toward improving the
conditions in Central America?
What challenges do you face? Are there opportunities for better
cooperation and coordination?
Answer. USAID's Central America Regional program coordinates
closely with the State Department's Western Hemisphere Regional
program, as well as all USAID Missions in the region. Through regular
communication and consultation with the State Department at all levels,
both in Washington and in the field, we seek to avoid duplication of
programming and ensure complementarity. For example, USAID and the
State Department have co-organized several successful and ongoing
workshops around the Central America Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI) both in Washington and in the field to ensure agreement on
geographic priorities, co-participation in reviewing proposals, and
monitoring and evaluation plans. In addition, frequent policy meetings,
convened by the National Security Council, facilitate full whole-of-
government coordination.
USAID and the State Department began jointly implementing a place-
based strategy under CARSI in 2015 to reduce violent crime in some of
the region's most dangerous neighborhoods. In Honduras, we have already
seen a significant reduction in homicide rates; in the Chamelecon and
Rivera Hernandez neighborhoods in Honduras, the homicide rate dropped
17 percent and 47 percent, respectively, from 2014 to 2015. These
reductions occurred in the concentrated areas where USAID and the State
Department jointly implement their programs. Nationally, the homicide
rate dropped 12 percent from 2014 to 2015. USAID and the State
Department, in conjunction with host government efforts, are working
together to contribute to a reduction in homicides and an increase in
safety and security.
The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America calls for
increased U.S. investment in the region. To date, we have not faced
significant challenges in coordinating U.S. efforts. As we move further
into implementation of the Strategy throughout the region, we will
continue to promote robust coordination across the U.S. interagency.
Question . I understand that the objectives and efforts of the U.S.
Strategy for Engagement in Central America are generally consistent
with the priorities established in the regionally-led Alliance for
Prosperity. But while U.S. efforts are also relatively closely aligned
on the country-to-country level with those of the Salvadoran and
Guatemalan governments, there is apparently less alignment in Honduras
as a result of the Honduran government's emphasis on infrastructure
construction, which is not a focus of U.S. assistance under the Central
America Strategy.
Why is this the case?
In your opinion, should the U.S. be more supportive of
infrastructure construction in Honduras?
Answer. The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America and the
Alliance for Prosperity (A4P) are complementary in their objective of
addressing the region's development and security challenges. We closely
coordinated with the Northern Triangle governments to ensure our
efforts align and to identify any potential gaps.
Our assistance to Central America differs from A4P in its emphasis
on training and technical assistance to build capacity and
sustainability, as opposed to financial assistance for large-scale
infrastructure. We remain supportive of the many necessary
infrastructure investment initiatives throughout Central America,
including those in Honduras, and work closely with international
financial institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank,
Central American Bank of Economic Integration, World Bank, and other
financial institutions that are providing access to financing for such
projects. Given the large financing needs, the private sector will also
play a key role, and we are working with the countries to improve their
investment climates.
Question 9. For FY 2016, Congress appropriated $30 million to train
and equip Central American militaries. What will these training efforts
entail? Where will the training of Central American militaries take
place?
Answer. In FY 2016, Congress appropriated $25.665 in Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) and $3.15 million in International Military
and Education Training (IMET) funds for Central America. IMET supports
the professionalization of Central American partner militaries and
Expanded IMET (E-IMET) courses, which re-enforce respect for civil-
military relations, rule of law, and human rights. With FY 2016
funding, IMET will support technical and operational training, such as
aircraft or maritime maintenance courses that primarily take place in
U.S. military training facilities. FMF will also support technical and
operational courses, such as maritime maintenance and support, but we
do not have a confirmed location for these courses at this time.
Question 10a. As one of the conditions placed on FY 2016 aid to
Central America, Congress required that the Secretary of State provide
the respective Appropriations Committees with a multi-year spending
plan that specifies objectives, indicators to measure progress, and an
implementation timeline. Congress also required that 25 percent of the
funds for the ``central governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras'' be withheld until the Secretary of State certifies that the
governments are taking ``effective steps'' to inform citizens of the
dangers of irregular migration.
What progress has been made on Secretary Kerry's certification of
``effective steps'' taken by the Northern Triangle governments
to educate citizens on migration?
Answer. The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2016, required the Secretary of State to
make certain certifications prior to the obligation of 25 percent of
certain assistance allocated for the central governments of the
Northern Triangle, to include that each government is taking effective
steps to ``inform its citizens of dangers of the journey to the
southwest border of the United States.'' On March 14, 2016, the State
Department reported to Congress that:
The government of El Salvador has implemented public
awareness campaigns and high-ranking officials have made
numerous public statements on the dangers of irregular
migration and the lack of U.S. immigration benefits for
individuals who arrive in the United States without prior
authorization. The Salvadoran government supported U.S.
messaging campaigns on the dangers of the journey through
statements in print media, television, and radio.
El Salvador's Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to lead
an intragovernmental effort to disseminate information about
the dangers of the journey and immigration laws and policies.
Senior Salvadoran government officials continue to participate
in national and regional fora and events on migration, give
press interviews, and disseminate radio spots and web videos
warning of the dangers of irregular migration.
Salvadoran Foreign Minister Hugo Martinez continues to make
public statements on the dangers of unaccompanied minor travel
to the United States. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs broadcast
video and radio spots from a ``No Pongan en Riesgo Sus Vidas''
(Do Not Put Your Lives at Risk) campaign on national TV and
radio. The Mayor's Office of San Salvador, the Municipal
Institute for Youth, and NGO Democratic Vision launched a
campaign to prevent unaccompanied child migration called
``Sueno vs. Pesadilla'' (Dream vs. Nightmare) in July 2014,
including social media and direct volunteer outreach.
The Government of Guatemala implemented public awareness
campaigns, and high-ranking officials made numerous public
statements, on the dangers of irregular migration and the lack
of U.S. immigration benefits for undocumented migrants who
arrive in the United States. Both former President Alejandro
Maldonado and current President Jimmy Morales made public
remarks urging people not to make the dangerous journey to the
United States and to remain in Guatemala to build
opportunities.
In July 2014, Guatemala's first lady launched a campaign to
dissuade unaccompanied child migration called ``Quedate''
(Stay) in regions with the source of the highest number of
child migrants. The Guatemalan national police developed a
circular on the dangers associated with unaccompanied children
migrating to the United States and incorporated the messaging
in all of its crime prevention activities, many of which target
at-risk youth. In partnership with UNICEF, the Guatemalan
Foreign Ministry launched a messaging campaign to educate
children about their rights.
The Guatemalan government continued messaging to counter
irregular migration in 2015 by emphasizing the importance of
keeping Guatemalan children in Guatemala via radio and
television advertisements, as well as text messaging. It
supported the U.S. government's ``Dangers of the Journey'' and
``Know the Facts'' messaging campaigns. The Guatemalan Ministry
of Foreign Affairs amplified the messages on social media and
on its website.
Since mid-2014, the Honduran government has run continuous
public awareness campaigns, and high-ranking officials have
made numerous public statements on the dangers of irregular
migration and the lack of U.S. immigration benefits for
children and adults who arrive undocumented in the United
States. Honduras began its first nationwide media campaign in
June 2014, using U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs
and Border Protection (DHS/CBP)-provided materials on the
dangers of land-based migration. Honduras also complemented
U.S. messaging campaigns on the dangers of the journey in print
media, television, and radio. Through public service
announcements, Honduras continues to share stories of the
dangers migrants face during their journey to the United States
and is encouraging all sectors of Honduran society to work
together to discourage undocumented migration. The Honduran
government also continues to collaborate with non-governmental
organizations on these campaigns.
Since Honduras' creation of the Child Migrant Task Force in 2014,
the Honduran first lady has regularly released press statements
calling on Honduran parents not to endanger the lives of their
children, emphasizing that irregular migrants would not be
allowed to stay in the United States. The Task Force is
planning more public service campaigns to drive home public
awareness on the dangers undocumented migrants face during
their journey to the United States.
Since this report, the Northern Triangle governments have continued
to educate their citizens about the dangers of the journey and to
dispel misinformation on U.S. immigration policy. The State Department
continues to work with them to achieve this goal.
Question 10b. What percentage of FY 2016 aid falls under the
umbrella of ``assistance for the central governments of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras'' that is subject to 25-50 percent withholding
requirements?
Answer. The FY 2016 Appropriations bill directs that up to $750
million may be made available for assistance for countries in Central
America to implement the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America. While FY 2016 funding allocations have not been finalized, the
Department and USAID at this time assess that $269 million, or about
one-third, of a total possible allocation of $750 million for the
Central America Strategy will directly assist Northern Triangle central
governments. This amount includes both regional and bilateral programs.
These figures will continue to adjust slightly as FY 2016 allocations
move forward, funds are obligated, and regional programming is
executed.
Question 11. The State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs is coordinating the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America. However, each implementing agency is in charge of monitoring
and evaluating its own programs.
Does the State Department have a comprehensive data collection and
monitoring process in place that will allow all the data
compiled from each different agency's programs to be evaluated
together as a part of a larger overview of the U.S. Strategy
for Engagement in Central America as a whole? Please be as
specific as possible.
Does the State Department need additional resources to be able to
analyze the aggregated data for Central America? If so, what
resources?
Answer. The State Department and USAID are committed to improving
our monitoring and evaluation of these programs. We are finalizing an
overarching architecture that tracks the desired outcomes in the U.S.
Strategy for Engagement in Central America (the Strategy). The
strategic goals under each of the three pillars--prosperity,
governance, and security--are linked to a limited set of high-level
indicators described in the Strategy, which define what the U.S.
government, in partnership with Northern Triangle governments, civil
society, and the private sector, aims to achieve in Central America.
U.S. agencies' indicators, assessments, and evaluations will
supplement these strategic level indicators. For example, USAID has
already developed a set of program indicators and a series of planned
assessments, surveys, and evaluations to inform design and assess
impact of programs. The data collected from U.S. agencies will be
compiled and edited annually.
An additional employee within the Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs, supported with FY 2015 ESF, will assist in tracking the
effectiveness of program implementation funded by assistance supporting
the Strategy. The employee will compile and analyze interagency and
third-party data that assesses the performance of Central American
governments and U.S. assistance implementers in support of the
Strategy.
__________
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator David Perdue
to Elizabeth Hogan, Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America
and the Caribbean
Question 1. I would like to take this opportunity to inquire about
the State Department's efforts regarding Haiti's stalled federal
elections. As you may know, the second round of Haiti's presidential
elections was postponed due to allegations of fraud and subsequent
threats of violent protests, leaving Haiti without a duly elected
president or a complete federal government in place. Those familiar
with the situation believe a small group of candidates who were
unsuccessful in the first election round are responsible for inciting
these allegations of fraud and sparking civil unrest in order to
trigger a ``do over'' election, even stooping to the level of paying
citizens to take the to the streets. I was further discouraged to hear
the news last Friday that Haiti's second round of presidential
elections has been postponed yet again. I'm concerned that very little
progress has been made as Haiti's interim president Jocelerme Privert,
a former member of the Haitian parliament, seems more concerned with
installing his allies in key government positions than with completing
the election cycle.
What effect is this political unrest having on Haiti's
reconstruction efforts?
Have these events affected USAID's ability to effectively
administer aid to the Haitian people? If so, how?
Have these events affected any local USAID projects? If so, how?
Please be specific.
Has USAID had to provide additional aid as a result of the delayed
elections?
Answer. Haiti has historically been a challenging environment in
which to work, with chronic weaknesses of governance and recurring
periods of political uncertainty. The overall success of the U.S.
Government strategy in Haiti is predicated on a credible, legitimate
counterpart in the Government of Haiti (GOH). USAID works to support
effective and representative institutions that are essential to improve
the quality of governance in Haiti, thereby bolstering stability and
government legitimacy. Although in many instances the GOH is not
directly involved in assistance projects, not having a legitimately-
elected government as a U.S. development partner can diminish the
economic multiplier effects of the assistance. In addition, the
prolonged absence of a democratically elected government in Haiti could
have an adverse effect on long-standing support for non-humanitarian
programs by the United States and other international partners of
Haiti.
While the urgent priority of the U.S. government is for Haiti to
conclude the electoral process and seat a representational
democratically-elected government as soon as possible, the country is
also facing a deteriorating economy, rising food insecurity, drought
and public health concerns. Continued U.S. foreign assistance is
essential, as the basic needs of the people of Haiti are likely to
increase in times of political turmoil. While we have not noted direct
substantive negative impacts on our programs, in our extensive
monitoring and evaluation, USAID will continue to assess the
performance of the Agency's programs, and make course corrections when
necessary to assure the best use of and maximum results from invested
U.S. resources. Many of USAID's programs (for example, in job creation,
basic education, and our planned new program in water and sanitation),
however, are not immediately dependent on Haitian government policy
decisions.
Despite these continuing challenges, USAID activities have produced
good results in some sectors, such as health, job creation, and
agriculture. For example, our support for small and medium-sized
enterprises has created over 9,000 jobs, and U.S. agricultural projects
have doubled the income of 60,000 farmers by increasing crop yields and
introducing new technology.
Haiti is important to us as a nation, and the U.S. government's
long-term goal is clear: to help the people and government build a more
stable, prosperous future. In support of this long-term goal, the U.S.
government is supporting credible electoral processes. These activities
aim to strengthen Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council (CEP),
political party, and civil society capacity to organize and monitor
regular and inclusive elections that meet international standards for
transparency and fairness. To date, USAID does not anticipate providing
additional foreign assistance on top of that already provided to the
CEP as a result of the delayed elections, although continued delays may
well necessitate increased funding from the Government of Haiti and its
international partners. Going forward, the U.S. government and USAID's
technical partners stand by to assist efforts by civil society, the
GOH, and the CEP to meet demands for increased fairness, credibility
and transparency of the ongoing electoral process. However, each step
will require sustained commitment and political will from the GOH and
the CEP.
Question 2. Please describe the relationship between USAID's
Central America Regional program and the State Department's Western
Hemisphere Regional program. How do State and USAID work together
toward improving the conditions in Central America?
What oversight procedures does USAID have in place to prevent
duplication of efforts?
What challenges do you face in this coordination? Are there areas
in which coordination for planning and implementation of
assistance could be improved?
Answer. USAID's Central America Regional program coordinates
closely with the State Department's Western Hemisphere Regional
program, as well as all USAID Missions in the region. Through regular
communication and consultation with the State Department at all levels,
both in Washington and in the field, we seek to avoid duplication of
programming and ensure complementarity. For example, USAID and the
State Department have co-organized several successful and ongoing
workshops around the Central America Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI) both in Washington and in the field to ensure agreement on
geographic priorities, co-participation in reviewing proposals, and
monitoring and evaluation plans. In addition, frequent policy meetings,
convened by the National Security Council, facilitate full whole-of-
government coordination.
USAID and the State Department began jointly implementing a place-
based strategy under CARSI in 2015 to reduce violent crime in some of
the region's most dangerous neighborhoods. In Honduras, we have already
seen a significant reduction in homicide rates; in the Chamelecon and
Rivera Hernandez neighborhoods in Honduras, the homicide rate dropped
17 percent and 47 percent, respectively, from 2014 to 2015. These
reductions occurred in the concentrated areas where USAID and the State
Department jointly implement their programs. Nationally, the homicide
rate dropped 12 percent from 2014 to 2015. USAID and the State
Department, in conjunction with host government efforts, are working
together to contribute to a reduction in homicides and an increase in
safety and security.
The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America calls for
increased U.S. investment in the region. To date, we have not faced
significant challenges in coordinating U.S. efforts. As we move further
into implementation of the Strategy throughout the region, we will
continue to promote robust coordination across the U.S. interagency.
Question 3a. I understand that the President's FY 2017 request
includes $28 million in global food security funds for Central America.
How will these global food security funds be primarily
concentrated?
Answer. The $28 million requested in the President's FY 2017 Budget
is for the Climate Smart Food Security initiative being led by the
Department of State's Office of Global Food Security. The initiative
will target its efforts on: increasing the resilience of major
agricultural sectors (crops, livestock, forests, and fisheries) to
climate change; mitigating the negative impact of food production
systems on the climate; reducing poverty and hunger; promoting economic
growth while building stronger trading partners; strengthening country-
led commitments to food security; and improving strategic coordination,
and leveraging the inputs of multilateral partners. As part of these
efforts, the U.S. Government will continue to partner with other
governments and the private sector to determine how to integrate
climate smart agriculture into diplomatic dialogues and where public
and private investments can be made to have the greatest potential for
impact. The assistance will be channeled through regional development
agencies to benefit from their expertise in loans, loan guarantees, and
other blended financing mechanisms. To date, the geographical focus of
the initiative has been Central America. The focus may expand to other
regions in the future if additional funding is identified beyond the
resources requested in the Central America budget.
Question 3b. In your opinion, is this funding level adequate to
support the goals of USAID's Central America Regional program?
Answer. The President's FY 2017 budget request for the Department
of State and USAID of $750 million for the Strategy for U.S. Engagement
in Central America will help to support and sustain the three
interrelated pillars of prosperity, governance and security. In
addition to the $28 million in global food security funds, ongoing
activities that are part of the Global Climate Change and Feed the
Future Initiatives will continue to be implemented in FY 2017,
contributing to climate change and food security development goals in
the Central America region. Further, there are ongoing discussions with
other donors including the Canadian and Mexican governments to identify
complementary support for the initiative. Considering these
complementary resources to reach our objectives, the global food
security funding levels requested in the President's FY 2017 Budget for
both Central America and the Climate Smart Food Security Initiative are
adequate.
Question 4. I understand that the objectives and efforts of the
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America are generally
consistent with the priorities established in the regionally-led
Alliance for Prosperity. But while U.S. efforts are also relatively
closely aligned on the country-to-country level with those of the
Salvadoran and Guatemalan governments, there is apparently less
alignment in Honduras as a result of the Honduran government's emphasis
on infrastructure construction, which is not a focus of U.S. assistance
under the Central America Strategy.
Why is this the case?
In your opinion, should the U.S. be more supportive of the
construction of infrastructure in Honduras? If so, why are we
not?
Answer. The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America and the
Alliance for Prosperity (A4P) are complementary in their objective of
addressing the region's development and security challenges. We closely
coordinated with the Northern Triangle governments to ensure our
efforts align and to identify any potential gaps.
Our assistance under the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America differs from A4P in the U.S. Strategy's emphasis on training
and technical assistance to build capacity and sustainability, as
opposed to financial assistance for large-scale infrastructure. We
remain supportive of the many necessary infrastructure investment
initiatives throughout Central America, including those in Honduras,
and work closely with international financial institutions like the
Inter-American Development Bank, Central American Bank of Economic
Integration, World Bank, and other financial institutions that are
providing access to financing for such projects. Given the large
financing needs, the private sector will also play a key role, and we
are working with the countries to improve their investment climates.
While we do not have any plans to use foreign assistance to finance
large-scale infrastructure projects, the United States has supported
technical assistance and capacity building programs in the region,
specifically related to infrastructure financing, and we look to
continue these efforts.
Question 5. Please describe the major initiatives within USAID that
fall under the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)
umbrella.
Answer. A multi-year, multifaceted security assistance package, the
Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) is the main
funding vehicle for the security pillar of the U.S. Strategy for
Engagement in Central America.
Under CARSI, USAID supports an integrated ``three-tiered approach''
to crime and violence prevention revolving around smart targeting:
geographic, demographic and behavior-based. This targeting allows USAID
to focus on the geographic locations where violence occurs, the
individuals and groups at the highest risk of perpetrating or being
victimized by violence, and the behaviors most likely to trigger
violence. This approach blends population-based programs to build high-
risk communities' resilience to crime and violence (e.g., youth
outreach centers, workforce development, small infrastructure projects,
violence prevention committees and community policing) with targeted
interventions to support the highest-risk youth (e.g., psychosocial
counseling, mentoring, restorative justice, and pathways to
reintegration into communities).
USAID, with the support of Vanderbilt University, concluded a
rigorous impact evaluation of its CARSI-funded community-based crime
and violence prevention programs in 120 high-crime urban treatment and
control communities in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. At
the three-year mark, the final results showed a 51% decline in reported
murders and extortion, a 25% reduction in reported illegal drug sales,
and a 19% decline in reported burglaries in neighborhoods benefiting
from USAID-supported programs as compared to the control group of
similar communities.
USAID programs have created over 200 youth outreach centers in
high-violence communities across Central America that provide youth
with a refuge where they can study, obtain vocational training, and
receive job placement assistance. These have been so well received that
the Government of Honduras has pledged $3 million from its security tax
to co-finance 30 additional youth outreach centers in more communities.
USAID has harnessed the resources, technology and training capacity
of more than 100 private entities, including Chevron, Hanes Brands,
Cisco, Intel, and Microsoft, to expand educational and economic
opportunities for Central America's youth. For example, mobile phone
providers Claro and Tigo deliver free internet access to USAID's
outreach centers in El Salvador and Honduras. In El Salvador, Microsoft
has trained over 10,000 youth in USAID's more than 120 youth outreach
centers on software and information technology via their
``YouthSparkInitiative'' Program. Additionally, the regional wholesale
chain PriceSmart recently supported the launch of Honduras' largest
youth outreach center to date.
Under CARSI, USAID and the Department of State's Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) have
begun coordinating assistance in select sites in Guatemala, Honduras
and El Salvador under a ``place-based'' strategy. Based on a proven
model that has been successful in cities, including Los Angeles, Ciudad
Juarez, and Medellin, this effort integrates prevention efforts and law
enforcement, targeting the most dangerous communities and high-risk
youth.
These micro-level interventions are complemented by macro-level
security and justice sector reform efforts to strengthen the
institutions charged with enforcing and administering justice to keep
people safe and reduce impunity. In addition, USAID's efforts continue
to advance national reform agendas, particularly in solidifying
paradigm shifts towards a more integrated violence reduction approach,
driven by data and grounded in evidence.
Question 6a. As a part of the President's FY 2017 request of $772
million, the Administration has requested $135 million through other
U.S. agencies besides USAID and the State Department to support its
whole-of-government strategy in Central America, including the
Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Treasury, and Homeland Security,
among others.
What processes, if any, does USAID have in place to prevent overlap
and duplicative programming among all these separate agencies?
Question 6b. To avoid duplicative programming, USAID participates
in interagency consultations on our current activities and coordinates
closely with the State Department. Coordination on current programs is
complemented by meetings with individual agencies both in Washington
and in the field. For example, for agencies receiving Strategy funds
through foreign assistance, both USAID and the State Department expect
to review proposed interagency programming to ensure it supports the
Strategy and is consistent with the purposes for which funds were
appropriated In addition, there is further coordination at the
technical level, as USAID has ongoing interagency partnerships.
What processes does USAID have in place to monitor and evaluate the
effectiveness of programs through each of these agencies, as
well as an overall, comprehensive data analysis process for the
Central America initiative?
Answer. U.S. agencies with activities funded under the U.S.
Strategy for Engagement in Central America (the Strategy) are expected
to report results that link to the Strategy's goals. These agencies
also will be asked to provide detail on monitoring and evaluation that
links to Strategy objectives.
The State Department and USAID are coordinating to conclude an
overarching architecture that links to the desired outcomes described
in the Strategy. The goals under each of the prosperity, governance,
and security pillars link to high-level indicators described in the
Strategy, which detail what the U.S. government, in partnership with
the Northern Triangle governments, civil society, and the private
sector aim to achieve in Central America. These include:
Help Central American governments reduce violence so that
no country in the region is ranked among the top 10 countries
in homicide rates;
Reduce the youth unemployment rates in Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala by half; and
Reduce poverty rates in these countries to below 40 percent
over the next decade, in part through steady economic growth.
Question 6c. Does USAID need additional resources to ensure that
comprehensive data monitoring and evaluation takes place for the
Central America imitative?
Answer. The President's request includes funding to ensure that we
continue to strengthen monitoring and evaluation under the CEN
Strategy. Agencies implementing activities in support of the Strategy
will supplement these high-level indicators with program indicators,
assessments, and evaluations to measure program-level results, as
described above. For example, through our Central America ``Learning
Agenda,'' USAID has developed a set of program indicators and has
ongoing and planned assessments, surveys, and evaluations to inform
design and assess programs outcomes and impact. We are working with our
field offices to collect data on a regular basis, analyze trends, and
report on results. In addition, in FY 2016 we expect to complete 18
evaluations of programs in Central America, with more to come in
subsequent fiscal years.
Question 7a. Some USAID programs in Central America have been able
to multiply aid funds by leveraging U.S. funding to raise support from
the private sector.
What are some of the most successful examples of private sector
support for USAID development projects in Central America?
Answer. Since 2012, USAID has leveraged approximately $146 million
in private sector and non-USG resources for Central America. This means
that for every USAID dollar spent since 2012, the private sector has
contributed approximately 1.6 times the amount through USAID's Global
Development Alliances (GDA), Development Credit Authority (DCA)
guarantees, and other public-private partnerships.
USAID engages companies such as PriceSmart, Tigo, Claro, Cisco and
Microsoft to provide educational, training, and economic opportunities
for at-risk youth across Central America. USAID reaches approximately
85,000 at-risk youth through 200 outreach centers in some of the
toughest neighborhoods in the region. Some of our most successful
partnerships with the private sector have focused on this crime and
violence prevention work targeted at the community level in Central
America.
Engaging the local private sector has increasingly become an
important factor to ensuring community buy-in and sustainability of
USAID development projects in Central America. In El Salvador, USAID
partners with five Salvadoran foundations to combat citizen insecurity
and strengthen municipal responses to crime and violence in 50
dangerous communities. This activity works closely with mayors,
municipal councils and local residents on designing prevention plans
tailored to the needs of each community. Activities include training
youth and families in conflict prevention, youth leadership programs,
and job training and entrepreneurship. School-based prevention
activities provide training to teachers in violence prevention, support
to parent-teacher associations and psychological counseling in schools
traumatized by violence. At $42 million in combined resources, El
Salvador has established the largest USAID public-private partnership
with local private sector in Latin America and the Caribbean.
In El Salvador, Microsoft has trained over 10,000 youth in USAID's
outreach centers on software and information technology. Microsoft's
ultimate goal is to reach 25,000 at-risk youth through USAID's outreach
centers in El Salvador. Along with local private sector, USAID and
Microsoft also partner to support Superate (Get Ahead!) centers, which
train underprivileged youth in English, computer proficiency, and life
skills to become the next leaders of El Salvador. The Superate centers
continue to receive free Microsoft software, preparing youth to move on
more effectively to secondary education and the workforce. Given the
success of this partnership, other companies in El Salvador established
centers and the model has been replicated in Panama and Nicaragua.
In Honduras, USAID continues to expand our partnership with the
telecommunications company, Tigo, which provides free internet coverage
for over 5,000 at-risk youth. As a result, youth benefit from computer
and vocational training classes, reducing their vulnerability to gang
recruitment. Between 2012 and 2015 alone, USAID doubled the number of
youth outreach centers to 46 with Tigo's expansion of free internet
coverage in Honduras. Also in Honduras, PriceSmart, an American company
and the largest membership wholesale chain in Central America, recently
sponsored the establishment of one of USAID's largest youth outreach
centers located outside of San Pedro Sula, Honduras.
To improve food security, connect farmers to market, and move
150,000 rural Hondurans out of poverty, USAID partners with Walmart and
various local and multinational companies. USAID has developed over 41
public-private partnerships (PPP) with companies to provide training
and technical assistance to small-scale farmers, improve the efficiency
of key value chains, and increase incomes. These PPPs have been a
critical component in increasing incomes of more than 24,000 people by
267 percent in 2014.
In Guatemala, USAID mobilized $26 million in matching funds from
the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and municipalities
to support our violence prevention interventions between 2010 and 2014.
For example, by working with a local bank, USAID pooled some of these
resources to improve working conditions and services of five police
stations.
USAID also partners with the private sector at a regional level to
increase access to finance across Central America. In response to the
worst outbreak of coffee rust in 30 years, USAID partnered with Root
Capital and Keurig Green Mountain Coffee to leverage $15 million in
financing for the region's coffee value chain and agriculture
cooperatives in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, among
other countries.
Question 7b. What methods do you feel have proven most effective in
garnering private support in Central America?
Answer. USAID employs a range of approaches to best harness the
private sector's resources, business expertise, technology and
marketing channels. Two highly-effective models are:
1. Co-funding and co-creation partnerships. USAID uses the Global
Development Alliance mechanism to engage the local and
international private sector in co-funding and co-designing
projects and partnerships to improve the communities in which
they operate, advance USAID's local development goals, and
expand services and opportunities available to local
communities. For instance, companies such as PriceSmart and
Lady Lee in Honduras, or Grupo Agrisal in El Salvador, are
companies deeply committed to improving local conditions and
contributing to efforts to combat crime and reduce violence in
the communities in which they operate.
Often these partnerships are structured with the corporate social
responsibility outfits of large companies. For instance,
Microsoft developed the ``YouthSpark Initiative'' to train and
attract young talent across the globe. In partnership with
USAID in El Salvador, Microsoft is outfitting USAID-supported
youth outreach centers with computers and educational software,
as well as training via the YouthSparkInitiative model. In
Honduras, we are working with PriceSmart through its Aprender y
Crecer (Learn and Grow) Program, a program educating youth
across the region.
In all efforts to garner private support in Central America,
USAID partners with the private sector when business interests
align with our development objectives outlined in each USAID
country strategy. For example, USAID works with several grocery
stores, consumer goods companies, and Walmart to link
agricultural value chains to smallholder producers in
Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. The Global Development
Alliance, a method to jointly design, fund, and implement a
project with USAID to advance our development objectives while
addressing the private sector's business interests, has been
useful to private sector partners to formalize a partnership
with USAID.
2. Unlocking affordable credit/finance for investments in development.
Through USAID's Development Credit Authority, we are using
risk-sharing to get working capital to promising entrepreneurs
and financing to small farmers.
In the Root Capital example mentioned above in part (a), USAID
leveraged $15 million for coffee rust. In Guatemala, through
our Development Credit Authority, we leveraged $12 million in
financing from Guatemalan bank Banrural to support community-
based forestry concessions, associations, and micro, small and
medium enterprises within certified value chains in the Maya
Biosphere Reserve of Guatemala.
Evidence from USAID's partnerships globally demonstrates that
alliances work best and have the greatest development impact
when they are premised on the notions of shared interests,
shared value, and shared risks and rewards. USAID seeks to
partner with companies that are committed to shared value; such
companies recognize there is a competitive advantage to
creating business innovations that address society's needs and
challenges. By forming strategic partnerships with USAID,
companies can share the risks of investing in key emerging
markets like Central America, while contributing to improved
social and economic outcomes in the communities where they
operate.
Question 7c. Does USAID coordinate at all with the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) and its efforts to leverage government
funds to stimulate private investment?
Answer. USAID coordinates with the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) to help stimulate private investment in Central
America. Improving access to clean, reliable energy is one of the key
elements of the Alliance for Prosperity. In 2015, USAID signed a
Memorandum of Understanding with OPIC to support the Clean Energy
Finance Facility for the Caribbean and Central America (CEFF-CCA).
CEFF-CCA will provide targeted assistance to help promising but
undercapitalized renewable energy and energy efficiency projects answer
core technical, business/financing model strategy and structuring, and
other feasibility questions in order to enable them to reach financial
close. OPIC loans and guarantees will be available to eligible projects
and by involving OPIC in this facility, USAID will leverage OPIC's
broad experience with project assessment and promotion.
USAID conducts quarterly reviews with OPIC to share information on
the development of prospective transactions, ensure coordination, and
eliminate any possible duplicative U.S. government efforts. These
efforts support USAID and OPIC's shared objective to stimulate private
investment in Central America and other countries in which both
entities work. To date, the quarterly reviews have enabled USAID and
OPIC investment officers to identify areas of overlap as well as share
positive impacts in priority countries.
Question 8. According to USAID Administrator Smith, ``country
ownership'' is a goal at the heart of every USAID project. Can you
describe how USAID's ``place-based'' strategy plays into the goal of
country ownership for USAID?
How does the place-based strategy work at the municipal level?
When do you plan to publish the place-based strategy metrics that
have been developed jointly by INL and USAID?
Do you foresee the place-based strategy leading to more evidence-
based decision-making on where U.S. aid funds should be
concentrated?
Answer. Local ownership is essential for the successful
implementation of the ``place-based'' strategy. This includes not only
national and municipal authorities, but also private sector partners,
civil society organizations and other community stakeholders.
For example, in El Salvador the ``place-based'' strategy is
carefully aligned in support of the Government of El Salvador's Plan El
Salvador Seguro--a comprehensive, locally-owned, multi-stakeholder-
developed plan that prioritizes 50 of the country's most violent
municipalities. To help catalyze the Plan's implementation, USAID, the
Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) and other interagency partners have
focused ``place-based'' efforts in key communities in the Government of
El Salvador's initial roll-out municipalities of Ciudad Delgado and
Zacatecoluca.
Even though the ``place-based'' strategy is executed at the
community level--geographically comparable to a neighborhood or police
precinct, usually with somewhere between 5,000 and 50,000 residents--
municipal authorities are critical partners, in many cases being the
level of government closest to the people, responsible for day-to-day
service delivery to improve quality of life and living environments,
and entrusted with community development.
In all three Northern Triangle countries, USAID continues to
support municipal crime prevention committees, comprised of local
municipal officials, private sector representatives, civil society
actors and police, who are empowered to develop crime and violence
prevention plans. In all cases where the ``place-based'' strategy is
implemented, these plans serve as blueprints for USAID's community-
level investments.
The overarching metric for the ``place-based'' strategy is a
sustained decrease in homicides. Site-specific operational plans that
define ancillary indicators and benchmarks are currently in
development. Once these plans are developed, USAID and State/INL will
establish a timeline to publish metrics.
As the violence plaguing the Northern Triangle has reached epidemic
levels, evidence shows it is highly concentrated in specific
neighborhoods and perpetrated by a small number of high-risk
individuals. These empirical findings underpin the ``place-based''
strategy's place-based, people-focused approach. Evaluating the results
of its jointly executed place-based strategy feeds into USAID's broader
goal of increasing the evidence base on what works in crime and
violence prevention. This strategy includes the evaluation of current
crime and violence prevention programming, funding diagnostics and
studies to better understand the scope of the problem in the region,
and collaborating with academics and policy makers to promote what
works in the field.
This effort sends a clear signal to the region that both prevention
and law enforcement are crucial--together, at the same time, in the
same places, and working towards the same objectives--to improve the
security situation.
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