TERRORISM AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARIAN AFRICA

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U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Rubio, Flake, Gardner, Isakson, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Murphy, Kaine, and Markey.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

The CHAIRMAN. I call the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to order.

We thank our witnesses for being here and look forward to your testimony.

As much of the world concentrates on the ISIS threat and instability in the Middle East, the committee takes this opportunity to consider efforts by the United States and other partners to counter extremism in the Sub-Saharan Africa area.

Long-term development has been the norm across much of Africa, including here in our committee with the recent signing of the Power Africa legislation, which we are all very proud of and appreciate the way the administration has led on that effort also, that we hope will bring investment to a key sector for economic growth and opportunity. Whereas in the Middle East we have been reacting to abhorrent state and terrorist violence and the uprooting of millions of people, in Africa we have had the opportunity of years of influence through diplomacy and development and partnerships to improve outcomes.

However, violent extremism is not a new phenomenon in Africa. Three sub-regions have exploded with terrorist elements, some decades old. Al Shabaab and its predecessors have long troubled Somalia and its neighbors in east Africa, including through Al Qaeda attacks on American embassies in 1998. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has evolved since 9/11 into a vicious regional threat across the Sahel and beyond, and they have fought the Algerian Government since 1991 in one form or another. Boko Haram, which has declared allegiance to ISIS, will stop at nothing to carry out its grotesque attacks against civilians and communities across Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin.
All three of these conflicts have drawn international intervention and resources because the terrorist elements involved are seen as aspiring to the kind of international terrorism perpetrated by Al Qaeda and ISIS. And some are beginning to show increased sophistication in attacks.

Beyond these three conflict and terrorist-ridden regions are several complex crises that breed on instability brought on by many factors, the most egregious of which appears to be the complete lack of government responsibility for its citizens through corruption and greed rather than any lack of resources. This includes most recently South Sudan and the Central African Republic and, of course, the decades-long atrocities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, all three of which have cost billions of dollars to mitigate through massive peacekeeping operations.

While the world seeks ways to address the direct threat of emergent terrorist groups in a reaction mode, we have had a chance—and still do—to improve the prospects for many countries in Africa by leveraging long-term relationships and development.

I am also concerned that there are efforts to gain traction in destabilizing other countries we consider relatively stable now.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, the lessons that they have drawn from their direct engagement in these regions, and I hope to better understand what the underlying factors contribute to the terrorist threat in the region and what U.S. efforts have been made to build a better response across the whole of government and with partners in the international community.

With that, I will turn to our distinguished ranking member, Ben Cardin.

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

Senator Cardin. Well, Chairman Corker, thank you very much for convening this hearing on terrorism and instability in Sub-Saharan Africa.

I agree with your assessments. The amount of escalating violence in this region is a major concern and requires the attention of this committee, of the United States Senate, and the American people.

I also agree with you that there are multiple reasons for the instability and crisis in this region, but that there is a common theme of poor governance. And that is an issue that provides a vacuum and that vacuum is usually filled with instability and recruitment of extremists.

So I very much agree with you this is an area of growing concern in regards to the amount of violence that is taking place and one that requires us to put a focus on the governance structures in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. And it is true. It is from west Africa to the Lake Chad Basin to east Africa.

In west Africa, circumstances in Mali, we find the marginalization of ethnic groups that have become now a home for at least five active terrorist groups, a breeding ground for terrorist recruitment. The U.N. mission in Mali is the deadliest peacekeeping mission that we have anywhere. That should be a sign that things need to change in regards to Mali. We have the parties
coming forward for a peace agreement. Well, we need to see immediate attention to that and see whether in fact that peace agreement can be implemented.

In the Lake Chad Basin, Nigeria is of particular concern. Boko Haram is linked—has pledged its allegiance to ISIS. We will see how that alliance, in fact, takes place or not. But we do know it is extremely deadly. The number of deaths have escalated dramatically, 15,000 since 2009, 2.4 million displaced people, 5.6 million in need of food. And those numbers are shocking in their size. I think the world became engaged in this when 200 school girls were kidnapped, and yet their fate today is still not known.

In east Africa, in Somalia, we have to pay careful attention. We know that. And in all of these regions, there is a common denominator of lack of good governance. This year in Somalia is said to be a critical one for the consolidation of the Somali state. A constitutional referendum and completion of the federal system are supposed to occur. Absent the establishment of a fully functioning, transparent, inclusive government, it will be difficult if not impossible to eliminate the threat posed by Al Shabaab.

While the threats have been clearly identified, what is not as evident is whether the United States is consistently applying a comprehensive approach to countering violent extremism in Africa, one which adequately addresses key drivers of radicalization such as political and economic marginalization, corruption, and poor governance and whether steps have been taken to build the type of capacity in African countries to counter violent extremist activities.

I hope today’s hearing will help us all better understand the package of programs and activities we are bringing to bear to combat terrorism and violent extremism in Africa and what, if any, efforts the administration is making to fully integrate principles of democracy, anti-corruption, and good governance into our approach. Security assistance alone will not win the battle.

Mr. Chairman, let me quote from Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken who recently said that countering violent extremism is, “A fight that over time will be won in the classrooms and houses of worship, on social media, in community centers, at sites of cultural heritage, on the sports fields, and within the homes of the people in every corner of the planet.” Given how significantly underfunded democracy and governance programs in Africa have been over the past several years, I do not see how we could be reaching that threat where it is. But there are two steps we can take right away to do so.

First is a point I have been making to the administration for nearly a year. It is critical that we increase investment in democracy and governance, such as are commensurate with our security assistance funding. In fiscal year 2015, the last year for which figures are available, we allocated approximately $1 billion for security assistance and only $170 million for democracy and governance. I hope that as you discuss allocations for fiscal year 2016 with the appropriators, you will indicate you will meet the $312 million for democracy and governance in Africa called for in the omnibus report language. And I hope we have a chance to talk about that.
Secondly, the United States must signal to our partners that our support does not come at the expense of respect for democracy and human rights. I fear we have sent the wrong signal to the Government of Ethiopia about our priorities in this area by failing to support human rights and democracy activities in that country. To cite just one example, it is critical that we take the prime minister up on his offer from last July to work with us on improving democracy in Ethiopia. In addition, we should be sure that our security assistance includes support for military and civilian institutions that support accountability for counterterrorism partner countries with weak democracy and human rights records.

So, Mr. Chairman, I hope that during the course of this hearing we are going to hear from our administration officials exactly what is our coordinated strategy. Yes, we want to fight extremism. We have to do that. We have to have the military security assistance, but if you do not have in place the type of governance that represents the concerns of the population, there will be instability and a void on which extremists will capitalize.

And I look forward to our discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much for those comments.

And again, we thank our witnesses. I am going to introduce all three of you, and then if you would just speak in the order that you are introduced, I would appreciate it.

Our first witness is Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Department of State. Welcome. Our second witness today is Linda Etim, Assistant Administrator for Africa, USAID. Thank you for being here. Our third witness is Justin Siberell, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State. We want to thank you all for being here, for your service to our country.

And if you could summarize your comments in about 5 minutes, that would be great. Without objection, your written testimony will be entered into the record. So thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. LINDA THOMAS–GREENFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished members of the committee, let me thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I have a very brief oral statement, and I provided a more comprehensive written statement for the record.

Africa is home to the world’s youngest and fastest-growing population. It presents significant opportunities for transformation and growth, as well as many challenges. The overall trends in Sub-Saharan Africa point to accelerated democratization, development, and economic opportunity. Although Africa remains the world’s least developed continent, average real per capita income increased steadily over the last decade and a half.

However, in spite of these positive trends, instability and conflict persist in parts of Africa. This instability has a direct bearing on U.S. national interests and those of our closest allies. Terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and a range of transnational criminal organizations exploit state fragility and conflict. Conflict destabilizes
states and borders. It stifles economic growth, and it robs young Africans of the opportunity for education and a better life.

While attacks in Brussels and Paris and even in San Bernardino offer tragic reminders that terrorism can happen anywhere, Africa has critical vulnerabilities and capacity gaps that must be addressed. Therefore, we are working with our African partners to increase their abilities to prevent and respond to such threats and to address the conditions that perpetrate the cycles of instability and conflict across the continent.

Addressing instability in Africa requires a comprehensive and balanced approach, as you have stated. We cannot focus solely on the security aspects of the solution. Military, intelligence, and law enforcement tools are vital to defend a range of threats, but they cannot replace robust diplomacy and the hard work required to strengthen democratic institutions, to stimulate economic growth, trade and investment, and promote development, education and broad-based economic opportunity.

The State Department, USAID, the Department of Defense, and several other agencies offer unique expertise and capabilities, and it is essential that each organization has the tools to contribute to our common objectives of building immediate and long-term stability in Africa.

As you stated, Senator Cardin, civility begins with building strong and stable democratic processes, addressing individual and collective grievances created by lack of governmental accountability, corruption, denial of basic human rights, and feelings of political inclusion is not just the right thing for governments and civic leaders to do. It is a security imperative. Civility in Africa ultimately requires leaders with the will and the capacity to respond to the needs and aspirations of their people.

We continue to stay focused on supporting free, fair, and transparent elections that are inclusive and representative. We have seen major electoral successes during the past several years, but there have been some setbacks as well.

However, democratic governance is not only about elections. National and local governments must deliver essential services for their people. Civil society and a free press must be empowered. Independent judiciaries must enforce rule of law, and professional security forces must respect human rights.

President Obama also has highlighted that the most urgent task facing Africa today and for decades ahead is to create opportunity for the next generation. Young people constitute a majority of Africa’s population and stand to gain or lose tremendously based on the continent’s social, political, and economic trajectory. They also represent the next generation of African leaders. They must be empowered to contribute to their country’s future so that they are not enticed by extremist ideologies.

President Obama has warned about the vulnerabilities, and I quote, “The vulnerabilities of people entirely trapped in impoverished communities where there is no order and no path for advancement, where there are no educational opportunities, where there are no ways to support families and no escapes from justice and the humiliation of corruption that feeds instability and disorder and makes these communities rife for extremist recruitment.”
We know that groups like Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda, and associated groups often ensnare their foot soldiers by simply offering cash or promises of financial reward for themselves and for their families. It is vital that governments, sometimes in partnership with the private sector, use every available resource to offer educational and vocational opportunities that provide alternatives to these lethal traps.

We also recognize that strengthening the security and justice institutions of our African partners is vital for long-term stability on the continent. As a consequence, we are partnering with African countries, with organizations, and with people to develop capable, professional security services, improved security sector governance, and enhanced regional coordination for more effective responses.

Once again, I thank you for the opportunity to speak to you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The joint prepared statement submitted by Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield and Acting Coordinator Justin Siberell is located at the end of this hearing transcript.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF HON. LINDA ETIM, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ms. Etim. Good morning, Chairman Corker. Good morning, Ranking Member Cardin and all the members of the committee. And I also thank you for this opportunity to discuss USAID's work on this very important topic.

Throughout Africa, U.S. national interests and our efforts to end extreme poverty, to promote resilient democratic societies, and to increase economic opportunities for people are increasingly threatened by instability and the spread of violent extremism.

We believe, as this committee has already stated that development programming can be a powerful tool to prevent conflict and instability. Conflict and instability impede development. They slow investment. They prevent children from attending schools, as we have seen in northern Nigeria. They place additional burdens on already fragile health care systems, as we have seen in the Ebola response case. And they undermine political systems.

We also know that our activities are designed to reduce opportunities for extremists to exploit social injustice, economic inequality, the lack of political integration, and we need to actually make sure that these activities help to advance development programming throughout the countries.

Today I will try to discuss how our programs, which are based on strategic thinking and evidence-based, results-oriented approaches, seek to prevent violent extremism in Africa. But I will also touch on the importance of USAID's governance programs, which seek to reduce social inequalities, corruption, and institutional weaknesses that can often foster instability.

When we look at the drivers, experience has taught us that responding to military conflicts that erupt in fragile states by deploying large peacekeeping missions or large-scale and often far too long-term humanitarian responses is very costly. For that reason,
whenever USAID designs a program or a country strategy, we use our analytic capabilities and knowledge of the local context to reduce the drivers of fragility. These assessments consider the push factors that drive support for violent extremism such as social fragmentation, a sense of injustice, perceptions of marginalization, and distrust of government. We also try to address the pull factors that can attract those who are vulnerable to violent extremism. This analysis helps to shape our interventions to promote good governance and rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as sustainable, inclusive development.

We do not have one single answer as to what causes violent extremism. A decade of analysis has shown that there is a strong correlation between state fragility, feelings of injustice and marginalization as being drivers of violent extremism. In 2011, USAID issued a policy which we titled “The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency.” This policy recognized development’s unique role in mitigating the drivers of extremism and advancing U.S. national security.

USAID activities, therefore, are designed to mitigate these drivers by increasing resiliency at all levels. At the individual level, we target marginalized communities, particularly youth, through employment outreach programs, vocational training skills, and community development activities. At the local level, we focus on social cohesion activities, peace committees to build stronger, more resilient communities. At the national level, USAID has an important role to play in strengthening government institutions and their ability to deliver basic services, but also to encourage inclusion and better transparency.

Youth are a key demographic in our programming, and while there is no one profile of what at-risk youth look like, unemployed youth who have migrated to urban and slum areas who are university graduates or who have no expectations and have lived through or participated in conflict can be at the greatest risk. Therefore, our programming focuses on this important demographic.

In Kenya, for example, 75 percent of the population is under 30 years of age. Through our Generation Kenya program, we offer targeted training to at-risk youth populations, closing the gap between young people who are out of work and employers who are short of employees with skills. Generation Kenya plans to place more than 50,000 young people in stable careers by 2020. Going forward, USAID will expand this programming into violent extremism hotspots working hand in hand with communities, local and national governments, and the private sector to ensure its success.

In Niger, our Peace Through Development project produces and delivers original radio content, which is aimed at countering extremist narratives through accurate reporting and peace messaging. It reaches over 1.7 million people in 40 of the most at-risk communities. We have also directly, through this program, engaged nearly 100,000 people through civic education, moderate voice promotion, and youth empowerment themed events. These programs, we believe, increase citizens’ engagement with the government and decrease incentives for young people to take part in illegal or extremist activities.
In conclusion, instability is often the product of generations of neglect and corruption, and its resolution, therefore, will be the product of generations of concerted focus, legitimate engagement, and met expectations. Because trends in extremism are fluid, we know that we must constantly reassess our priorities, our progress, and our policies to ensure that our work is actually based on the realities of today. Through program assessments, implementation, and evaluations, we are learning what works and what does not work. We are improving best practices, and we are helping individuals and communities address these drivers of instability and violent extremism on their own, through the work of our missions in the field, and through USAID-supported activities and resource centers.

USAID’s commitment is evidence of the number of individuals dedicated to this problem set, but we know that we cannot do it alone. Sustained engagement with strong partners in the U.S. Government through the Departments of State and Defense, through the work that your committee is doing here, and with donor governments, as well as with our partners in the religious communities, local governments, civil society organizations, all of these different groups on the ground will be key to combating extremism today, and they will be key also to securing peace and stability for years to come.

I thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[Ms. Etim’s prepared statement is located at the end of this hearing transcript.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

STATEMENT OF JUSTIN SIBERELL, ACTING COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. SIBERELL. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

As outlined in our statement for the record, a number of terrorist groups remain active in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, and Boko Haram, also known as Islamic State West Africa Province.

Regional military forces with United States and international assistance have made progress against all of these terrorist groups. Terrorist safe havens in Somalia, northern Mali, and the Lake Chad Basin have been degraded significantly.

However, in the face of this pressure, these groups have shifted to more asymmetric tactics, including attacks against soft targets. We have seen this dynamic in west Africa recently. Over the recent months, AQIM and Murabitoun have carried out a series of attacks against international hotels and tourist sites in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Cote d’Ivoire, killing scores of people, including an American citizen.

Similarly in east Africa, we have seen Shabaab become increasingly aggressive in pursuing attacks against high-profile targets in Somalia and across the border in Kenya.
We are also concerned by the risk that ISIL’s presence may grow on the continent. As we have seen elsewhere in the world, ISIL seeks to co-opt existing terrorist groups, as well as local insurgencies and conflicts, to expand its networks and advance its agenda. We are watching these dynamics closely. We are working with partners to contain and drive back ISIL-affiliated groups wherever they may emerge.

The United States is committed to building and sustaining partnerships across Africa to counter terrorism and promote stability. Partnerships are at the core of our approach, and this is reflected in our interagency efforts as well through the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, or PREACT, and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, TSCTP.

Mr. Chairman, the United States is providing significant support for regional military operations. Through our diplomacy, the Department of State continues to encourage regional leadership and cooperation to sustain these efforts.

Military efforts alone are insufficient, however. As we deal with the evolving threat environment, the success of our counterterrorism efforts in Africa increasingly depends upon capable and responsible and responsive civilian partners, police, prosecutors, judges, prison officials, and community leaders who can help address terrorist challenges within a sustainable and rule of law framework that respects human rights.

In this regard, the Department of State is training and mentoring law enforcement units for more than 15 African countries. We are building their capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents, conduct terrorism-related investigations, and improve land border and aviation security. We are also providing significant assistance for African prosecutors and courts to effectively and expeditiously handle terrorism cases. We are working to enhance the capacity of prisons in Africa to effectively handle terrorist inmates in accordance with international human rights standards.

Mr. Chairman, we greatly appreciate the funding provided by the Congress in fiscal year 2016 for the Department’s Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund. This funding will enable us to expand our assistance for law enforcement and justice sector efforts in key African countries.

At the same time, the Department and USAID are increasing our focus on preventing the spread of violent extremism in the first place, to stop the recruitment, radicalization, and mobilization of people, especially young people, to engage in terrorist activities. We are expanding engagement with African partners to better understand the drivers of violent extremism in order to design effective responses. This includes promoting greater trust and partnership between communities and law enforcement.

The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request includes increased resources for countering violent extremism programs, including an additional $59 million as part of our overall request under the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund. These resources would enable us to expand programs in Africa to engage communities and youth susceptible to violent extremist recruitment.

Mr. Chairman, there is no single solution to defeat terrorist groups and promote stability in Africa. The challenges are signifi-
cant, but we believe we have committed partners in Africa who are making progress. We believe we will be most effective in the long run with a comprehensive approach that promotes regional cooperation, the rule of law, and good governance. We continue to look for ways to enhance this approach, and we appreciate the strong support of Congress for these efforts. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all.

Let me just start by setting context here. If you look at the regions that we are discussing today and you look at the numbers of deaths, displacements, the scale of what is happening in these three regions and other places throughout Africa really over the course of time is as large as the scale of terrorist activities in the Middle East. Is that correct?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I would say so particularly if we look at the case of Boko Haram. The number of people who have been killed and affected by Boko Haram are as large as, if not larger than, the number of people who have been killed by ISIL in the past year. So there is a devastating impact and it is reflected in the numbers of people killed and impacted by terrorism in Africa.

The CHAIRMAN. And no disagreement from the other witnesses.

Mr. SIBERELL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this. Obviously, there is tremendous focus on the Middle East. We have had a lot of hearings here, and most of us, on the other hand, have traveled throughout Africa and the Sahel and seen the tremendous threat, if you will, to stability there. Why do you think the world focus is more so on areas like the Middle East and less so on areas like the regions we are talking about right now in Africa?

Mr. SIBERELL. Well, I will offer my thoughts, Mr. Chairman. I think with the case of ISIL, I mean, they emanate from Al Qaeda in Iraq, and so there has been a focus in particular on that conflict ongoing. That has, of course, devastated those societies as well and continues to. That, of course, builds off of the historic origins of Al Qaeda from the Middle East and that region. So I think from a terrorism perspective, the focus generally has been on that region as the core area where these groups have emanated from.

But it does not—as Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield just noted, when you look at actual violence, the groups in Africa are committing extreme amounts of violence. Boko Haram in particular is a group that has targeted civilians deliberately, and their deaths on an annual basis—we will report these in the annual country reports on terrorism. Boko Haram is consistently in the top ranks of terrorist groups in terms of committing violence and destabilizing an entire region. So the challenges and the threats are as great on the Africa continent, but I would agree with you that the focus generally speaking tends to remain on the Middle East and those conflicts.

The CHAIRMAN. But for what reason?

Mr. SIBERELL. I think for ISIL, it is appropriate to focus on the core area where that group has emanated from, and that is the main effort in particular against ISIL, against its presence in Iraq and Syria. And in many ways, when we look at the spread of ISIL, preventing that will depend on defeating the group in its core
homeland. And so, therefore, the focus in that regard on that core area is appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other comments?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I would just say that much of the terrorism that we saw in the past on the continent of Africa tended to be focused on Africa. So there was not the comparable threat to the homeland from terrorists in Africa as we see in the Middle East. But I think we have all come to the conclusion that terrorism anywhere affects us everywhere, and we have to address it not just in the Middle East but in Africa as well.

The CHAIRMAN. So the core, central beginnings, if you will, of this threat emanated from the Middle East, and so hitting areas where they are establishing a caliphate has been important. And then secondly, the groups in Africa have not been seen as a threat to Western entities. Would that be a fair assessment of the focus?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I would say initially, yes, but I think we are seeing more and more that this does have an impact on us. When we look at the attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso, Americans were victims.

Mr. SIBERELL. And I would just add that these groups evolved out of the particular context in Africa but have been co-opted or joined up with transnational terrorist groups. So Al Shabaab, which began out of the Islamic Courts group in Somalia, later affiliated with Al Qaeda and, of course, was part of Al Qaeda’s global agenda. And that has been a significant concern of the U.S. security community because of the foreign fighter element that had traveled to Somalia, including American citizens. So that has been a focus, and the concern is that Al Shabaab, representing an Al Qaeda affiliate, does also tend to advance the Al Qaeda agenda.

Similarly with Boko Haram recently, there has been an affiliation with the Islamic State. So that gives us great concern to look at the group to determine whether or not they will, because of that affiliation, begin to change their focus toward more targeting of international interests, Western interests, or even externally.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to save the rest of my time for interjections.

Ranking Member Cardin?

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you.

And I thank all of our panelists for their incredible work in a very challenging assignment.

As I said in my opening statement, as the chairman said in the opening statement, there is no simple solution to the violence that is taking place, the terrorism that is taking place. And clearly we need a security response, including direct support against terrorism. So I strongly support that.

But as you each pointed out, the recruitment of terrorists is because there is a void, and there are individuals who feel that they have no other choice and they are prime for recruitment.

So my concern is are we giving countries a free pass who are partners in our counterterrorism campaigns, on human rights and poor governance? I say that and I give you many examples. In Ethiopia, they just had a parliamentary election. Not a single opposition leader was elected. We have seen the security forces there who have killed hundreds of protestors. In Chad, we have dozens
of military officers who have been arrested because they would not vote for the president. In Somalia, we have a report in yesterday’s “Washington Post” that they are using children for spies. We have had extrajudicial killings by the military in Nigeria and Kenya. And yet, I do not see a response by America, the U.S., in regards to these activities. Am I wrong? Are we giving them a free pass? Should we be giving them a free pass?

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you for that question, Senator.

In every single one of the cases you mentioned, we condemn human rights abuses. We regularly condemn those abuses by security forces and by governments. And we make clear to these governments that this is a core value for the United States.

At the same time, we are committed to firmly working with our partners to address efforts to defeat terrorism. We cannot draw a line and say we are not going to work with you on terrorism because of human rights violations, but we reinforce with these governments on a regular basis that they must respect human rights and civil liberties and rule of law.

Senator Cardin. How do you do that? How do you reinforce that they must?

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We start with a diplomatic discussion. In the case of Ethiopia, we had intense discussions with that government over the past year. You may know that as a result of those discussions we are having a human rights dialogue being led by our Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, Tom Malinowski, with the Ethiopians. It is a challenge. We do not always get our messages through to them, but they are hearing that these are concerns. And in many cases, they are upset that we are expressing concerns about human rights.

Senator Cardin. Would you share with me and this committee the specific methods you have used to transmit your concerns on human rights violations and the lack of democratic progress? I would be interested. I see the strong voice of the United States on counterterrorism issues, which I expect to see and want to continue to see. I have not seen the same degree of effort and energy in regards to concerns on the poor governance and violations of human rights.

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Well, first of all, we start with our embassies, with our ambassadors engaging with governments and embassies——

Senator Cardin. That is quiet usually.

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Sometimes it is quiet and sometimes our ambassadors do not get meetings because they are not quiet. They are very, very public in their expression of concerns.

It also occurs through meetings that I have on a regular basis with heads of state. It is at the top of the agenda. They push back. They say we do not respect them as partners because we are raising human rights concerns, that we do not understand the situation in their countries. And my response has always been please understand this is a core value for us.

We also work with their militaries in terms of providing human rights training. We fund those directly. We do Leahy vetting for a
number of countries, in fact all countries where we are involved in doing any military training. And there have been some countries where we have had to make the hard decision not to work with their military and their security services because they have committed human rights——

Senator CARDIN. From fiscal year 2013 to 2015, the security assistance budgets for Africa have gone up from a half a billion to a billion. The democracy and governance budget has fallen during that period of time. I would think that democracy and governance funding is a clear indication of our commitment to good governance and human rights. There is certainly a shortage of funds. There is no question about that. I would like to see a larger pie for our global efforts on all these areas.

As I understand it, a large amount of the decisions as to how those funds are allocated are based upon who is the most effective in advocating for need. Have we been ineffective in advocating for democracy and governance?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I would like to say no because it is at the top of my agenda.

Senator CARDIN. But why has there been a decline in those funds?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Well, I have to say I am not an appropriator. If I were an appropriator, I would be giving more money to democracy and governance.

Senator CARDIN. Some of this is soft allocations by Congress. A lot of this is a complicitous operation between the people at the State Department and appropriators.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. From the African Affairs Bureau's standpoint, Senator, you are speaking to the choir. I do not have enough resources on democracy and governance, and I think USAID will agree with me on that. We could use more resources in that area. We know that putting money toward democracy and governance, putting money toward good elections, putting money toward building the capacity of civil society contributes to making countries more stable and respectful of human rights. And we make strong cases from our standpoint to support democracy funding so that we have that funding to implement the program.

Senator CARDIN. I would just urge you to do this in a way that is visible to those of us who support your efforts because, quite frankly, we do not see that. We are sending our own messages as loudly as we can, including at this hearing, that we want to see greater funds for democracy and governance. But if we do not get the feedback from what is happening in the missions and the Department, it makes our job much more difficult.

It looks like countries are getting a free pass. As long as they are on our coalition team, what they do within their own country is of little importance to our foreign policy mission, which you are telling me is just the opposite. So showing that, not just by a quiet diplomatic contact, but by how we are making that point would certainly, I think, help us in accomplishing our mutual desire for good governance.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Good. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Isakson?
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Can anybody tell me what happened to Joseph Kony?

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. He is still out there. There has been a very strong and proactive effort against the LRA. We have been working with the AU and with the Ugandans and other partners. And we were able to get his number two who is now currently in The Hague being tried. But Kony has been elusive. But our efforts continue very robustly to get him, and the job is not over until that is done.

Senator Isakson. At one time, we committed 100 special troops and forces to CAR, I believe, to go after Kony. Are they still deployed?

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. They are. I cannot give you the exact numbers, but I did meet with the team when I was in Uganda the last time and they are still working there.

Senator Isakson. Although not recognized as an international terrorist, there is probably no worst terrorist than Joseph Kony in terms of children and women. I am glad we are still committed to trying to bring him to justice, as hard as that appears to be.

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Yes, sir.

Senator Isakson. Talking about the African Union for just a second, does the African Union address the issue of terrorism on the continent? Do they have a game plan to deal with terrorism?

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We are working very closely with the African Union on terrorism on the continent. It is high on their agenda. In the case of Nigeria, they have been very much a part of the creation of the Multinational Joint Task Force in Chad, and we have provided them some funding and some assistance in their efforts there. The mission in Somalia, AMISOM, is an AU mission and it is the largest AU mission on the continent of Africa with troop-contributing countries from the region. So it is high on their agenda. We are partnering with them, along with our European colleagues, to make sure that they have the capacity and the funding to address what has been a very challenging and difficult threat for them, as well as us, on the continent.

Senator Isakson. I know we use human rights issues and labor issues in the approval and participation of AGOA with the United States and African countries. In fact, I was in the AU 3 years ago when we chastised Swaziland for their lack of humanity to their laborers and used that as a predicate for them staying in the African agreement for them to stop it. Are we leveraging our trade power and our economics as much as we should in Africa, particularly going after terrorism?

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We are. Swaziland is still not a part of AGOA. We regularly send letters of warnings to countries if they are not on the right side of human rights and caring for their people. And AGOA is very important to them, and it is huge leverage. And in many cases, it has worked to get governments to turn policies around, and if they have not, we have kicked them out of AGOA.

Senator Isakson. I know we do on labor issues and human rights issues. Do we do it on them fighting terrorism as well?

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We do, but we do understand that they have a challenge. They have a capacity challenge, but
there are also all the other challenges that I mentioned and Senator Cardin mentioned in his statement, lack of governance, corruption, that have limited the capacity of governments to fight terrorism. But I think they all have come to understand that if they do not fight terrorism, they are not going to be around to do anything else. So they have come to that very strong realization that they have to partner with their neighbors, as well as with the international community, to ensure that terrorists do not take over their countries.

Senator ISAKSON. China invests a lot of money for its own benefit in Africa. It extracts a lot of rare earth minerals and raw materials and things of that nature and builds some roads and highways. Do we ever engage with the Chinese on the issue of terrorism on the continent of Africa to try and get them to, in some way, help us or help the continent to fight it?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. We do. I was in China about 4 weeks ago for our annual consultation with the Chinese, and that was on our agenda. USAID was there recently as well on consultations to look at how we can better coordinate with the Chinese on what they are doing in Africa both economically as well as politically.

Senator ISAKSON. My experience is that terrorism flourishes when there is a presence of no education, poverty, and disease and lack of hope. Africa probably is the poster child for those qualifications. And the more we can do like the Electrify Africa bill and the water bill that we have done here and the food security bill, the more we can uplift the African people, the better fight we can have against terrorism. Would that be a fair assessment?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I will turn to my colleague at USAID, but I absolutely agree with you.

Ms. ETIM. I will agree, but I will also say that we have data that shows that this is actually the case. We see that 10 years of research over all these countries that USAID has worked in across the world has shown very clear evidence that when we see governments actually able to deliver services such as energy, access to electricity, health care, education services, there is a corresponding decrease in the amount of feelings of marginalization, feelings of inclusion, and we have also seen that those countries are usually not the same ones that are correlated with conflict and instability. It has been very clear that there is also a clear correlation between where there is the absence of the delivery of services and where people do feel marginalized and that they do not have access to opportunities and that those countries are at risk of conflict. And it is very glaring.

Now, the links between violent extremism—that is the next step. Already when you are engaged in conflict, your sympathy for going to that next level is not as far of a stretch. And so we know that these are things that actually matter. We know that development is actually a very important tool in this space.

Senator ISAKSON. But just based on my observation, it appears that where we have made Millennium Challenge compacts and where we have helped build the infrastructure of these countries, there has been less of a presence of terrorism than there is in those countries where we did not. I think that is a good thing for us to
continue to invest money, and I am a big supporter of the Millen-
nium Challenge Grants and a big supporter for our engagement on
that.

And thank you very much for your service to all of you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I have about a minute and half reserved. I am just going to ask
a quick question.

All of us, I think, are really proud of the work we have done to-
gether on Electrify Africa, on food aid reform, on clean water, and
we have other efforts that are underway. We are really proud of
that work. And I appreciate you mentioning the benefit that is to
people, massive numbers of people, millions of people.

On the other hand, to bring up a topic that I think Senator
Cardin alluded to and you just did a moment ago, Ms. Thomas-
Greenfield, when we work with governments that we know are
abusing their own citizens, they are corrupt, they are absolutely
subjecting their citizens to terrible atrocities themselves, those gov-
ernments, when we work with them to counter terrorism, how does
that work against U.S. interests relative to causing many of the ex-
tremists there to really harbor ill will towards the U.S. itself by
seeing us associated with governments that they believe are cor-
rupt and not treating their citizens appropriately?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I think we have to work with
governments to fight terrorism, but we also have to continue to
work with these governments to address human rights deficiencies
in their countries. And I think that the people of those countries
want us to continue to engage. They want our voices to be heard.
They know that when we are engaging with these governments,
that we are also raising concerns about human rights. And we have
gotten some people released from jail, and we have gotten some
governments to moderate their actions against their citizens. It is
not a perfect solution, but I truly believe that our engagements
with them help on the issues of human rights.

I will give the example of Burundi where we believe that the
military in Burundi has been less active and violent against citi-
zens because of our engagement with them, because of the human
rights training that they got from our people working closely with
them. The government has been a problem, but we have seen that
that military has been less of a problem than most people expected.

The CHAIRMAN. Briefly. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIBERELL. Just to add, in addition to what was noted earlier
that all of our civilian-delivered assistance is subject to require-
ments for vetting under the Leahy law, we work with governments
to strengthen their rule of law frameworks under which they would
carry out an effective counterterrorism policy.

So we reject the notion that there is conflict, inherent conflict,
and effective counterterrorism practice and protection of human
rights and civil rights of the people. We have worked to embody
that concept in what is known as the Rabat Memorandum, which
is a document that the United States Government helped to de-
velop through the Global Counterterrorism Forum. And this forms
the basis of assistance that we deliver increasingly across the con-
tinent in cooperation with the Department of Justice and prosecu-
ators that we fund from the State Department to work with govern-
ments to establish strong CT legislation but that also protects the human rights of the people.

So this is a major challenge in Africa, and I would say that, on the one hand, you have partners who are willing and capable but need a lot more assistance to become fully capable to fight terrorism challenges, but they have weak governance and weak governance structures. And this is where we have to strengthen those structures of governments so that as they conduct military-led and security-led operations to detain terrorists and to prevent terrorist attacks, they do so in a framework that enables for those people to be prosecuted and detained effectively in accordance with international human rights standards. It is a long-term effort, but we are very much engaged in that work currently.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Markey?

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

I am just going to follow up on Senator Corker and Senator Cardin’s point, which is that while Nigeria’s people most need help with daunting governance and corruption issues, the United States is planning to sell the government attack aircraft known as the A–29 Super Tucano to Nigeria. And it would be to fight Boko Haram, a group everyone opposes, but the Nigerian military has a long-standing history of human rights abuses, including under the current administration.

Just last month, Amnesty International accused the Nigerian Army of killing hundreds of members of the Shia minority sect in December. And unfortunately, that is happening in other countries in east Africa as well.

So what is your perspective on that given the fact that the people of Nigeria increasingly are seeing U.S. aid move from humanitarian or anti-corruption efforts over to more military aid for those who they believe internally are the ones who are a greater risk to the security of their families?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Our aid is not moving away from corruption. The new president of Nigeria has made clear that corruption is one of his highest priorities. He named three priorities when he came into power; countering Boko Haram, fighting corruption, and improving the economy. And we are working very closely with this government. In fact, the Secretary is in London at a meeting hosted by the U.K. on corruption, and President Buhari is there.

On the issue of assisting the Nigerians in fighting Boko Haram, they have huge capacity issues. As you may know, last year we turned them down on a request for Cobras because we were concerned about their ability to use those and not have them have an impact on their communities.

Senator MARKEY. Well, let me ask the question another way. If there is no success in convincing the people of Nigeria that their government is not corrupt, that their government is not fair, will any of this military aid ultimately create the conditions for a successful effort to defeat Boko Haram from the inside of the country? Will we ever be successful?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. We have to be.

Senator MARKEY. I know we have to be, but——
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. It has to be multifaceted. We have to do the security, but we absolutely have to do the capacity building, the development assistance, the good governance with this government. We have to do both. We cannot do one or the other or we will fail. And it will be long-term.

But I have to say the Nigerian people want us there to assist them on the security side as well because they know that their government does not have the capacity alone. They want us there on both of those areas.

Senator Markey. Well, let me ask you this. Internally how do you think it will affect the view of the people inside of Nigeria as we increase military aid to the very people who they fear are using it to harm them, harm the Shia inside the country, for example? The government forces themselves. How do you think that will affect how they perceive how the United States is playing inside of Nigeria, and what could be the consequences of that if that persists?

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. The polls show that we are extremely popular in Nigeria. The Nigerian people are victims of Boko Haram, and they know that there has to be some kind of security and military solution to addressing Boko Haram. And they want us there to help their military, and I think they think that if we are there to help, their military will be less abusive to their people. And that is a point that we have made to the Nigerians. We are training two battalions of Nigerian soldiers right now. They have human rights training as part of that training, and all of them have been Leahy-vetted to ensure. So we are working with the government to moderate and stop human rights abuses by the military. But on the security side, I think the Nigerian people who are victims of Boko Haram also want to see us help their military address the security threat that they are facing.

Senator Markey. Well, I just think we are on a thin edge here. We just have to be very careful, especially if the government does not control adequately its own military. Internally the harm that it does to the overall morale inside the country makes it much more difficult to ultimately combat Boko Haram. So I just think it is important for us to keep an eye on that.

And in Congo, there is significant political tension because President Kabila is trying to prolong his stay in power beyond the constitutional two-term limit. His security agents are harassing opposition politicians in a very serious way. Mass protests of Kabila’s apparent attempts to remain in office appear imminent.

So what is ultimately the likelihood that such protests could spark further instability in DRC, particularly if the security forces continue to crack down in response to these democratic instincts that people have, as has been the case in the past?

I sent a letter to Secretary Kerry in February suggesting that the U.S. should communicate to President Kabila to publicly state his intention to respect the constitution to step aside at the end of his second term in December, and that if he failed to do that and made appropriate preparations for elections, then we should implement sanctions if he does not do that. In response to my letter, you seem to suggest that Kabila’s actions in the next few months would de-
termine whether or not State would opt to enact sanctions, and you testified before this committee to much the same around that time.

It seems to me that the political environment is deteriorating in Congo and Kabila has not demonstrated an interest in preserving his democratic legacy. Has the time arrived for sanctions to be imposed on the Government of Congo?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you for that question.

And, yes, we are looking very, very actively at sanctions as they relate to those who are involved in violence, and we have conveyed that to Kabila and his people. The Secretary met with him a few weeks ago in New York, and our Special Envoy has been proactively engaged in the region over the past few months. We are still hopeful that we can get the Government of Congo and President Kabila to do the right thing. Their constitution is very clear that his term ends in December, and they must have an election. And we have conveyed that to him.

We are also working very closely with our other partners, with the EU, with the French, and others to make sure that we are all on the same sheet of music on that issue.

Senator MARKEY. Yes. The election is scheduled for the end of this year. It is only May. There is plenty of time to set up an election. Right now, they are talking about the end of 2017 as the earliest. That would be a clear violation of the constitution.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Absolutely.

Senator MARKEY. I hope that we make it very clear to him that we will not accept that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Shaheen?

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you for being here today and for your ongoing work.

Can you talk about the importance of women's empowerment in contributing to development in Africa and what we are doing, what you would identify as the best examples of successful programs?

Ms. ETIM. So I love that question.

I think that we increasingly, especially talking about conflict and instability, need to talk about the role of women in peace and security. In fact, that is an actual U.S. Government policy, which is titled “The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security,” which talks about the fact that women are critical agents—not only victims but also as agents of change—when we are talking about instability and conflict but also violent extremism.

Our programming runs the gamut, depending on what the situation or scenario is. In areas where there are vulnerable communities or where we see that they do not have a lot of access to legal recourse, economic opportunities, and they often are coerced or used as instruments of terror or violence or suffer from gender-based violence, we seek to figure out ways of empowering local women, communities and allowing them training, work through economic empowerment, access to education, which is another sort of critical element that we are seeing. When women have access to education and when girls have access to education, we have seen
that child marriage rates have fallen, and their susceptibility to feelings of acceptance with violent extremist groups also decreases.

So, again, we think that it is very important to target women and girls in these environments because we have also seen that not only are they able to make a critical difference in their own lives, but they are also critical agents of change in the rest of their communities.

Senator SHAHEEN. And I do not know whether you or—is it Mr. Siberell—want to address this. But can you also talk about how the efforts to recruit people to terrorism, to ISIL, to Boko Haram—how the difference that we are seeing between the ability to recruit men and women—I know there has been an increasing effort to use women as suicide bombers. But can you talk a little bit about what we see about the—who is easier to recruit?

Mr. SIBERELL. Well, I think for most of the groups, the emphasis continues to be on recruiting young men. But in the case of Boko Haram, of course, notoriously they have used girls in suicide bombing operations, which is absolutely despicable. Some of those are, obviously, coerced into that activity.

I would just build on something my colleague just noted about the role of women in particular in identifying the seeds of radicalization. Women play a critical role in most communities in being close to the people and having an ability to understand whether or not there are influences coming into the community that could lead to a process of radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups.

So this is one of the areas that we would like to develop in our CVE programming. We have a program that has been underway in Nigeria through the U.S. Institute of Peace in which they are developing a network of influential women, women who already have a role in the society, to bring them together into a network and to train those women on observing and understanding whether there may be signs of radicalization. And these are the kinds of programs I think that will be very important as we get down to the community level and address the drivers to radicalization to violence.

Senator SHAHEEN. One of the things that we have heard about the success of ISIL has been their ability to recruit people to a caliphate. The idea of the caliphate is very important. Are we seeing that same kind of interest in Africa in terms of the messaging to try and recruit?

Mr. SIBERELL. The numbers coming out of Africa that we are aware of in terms of foreign terrorist fighters, those that have actually been inspired to travel or to attempt to travel to Syria and Iraq, are much lower than for other parts of the world. Whether it be north Africa, the Maghreb countries, even European states, the Caucasus, and even down into southeast Asia, the numbers are higher. But that said, there is evidence of some recruitment among Africans into ISIL, and ISIL's propaganda is very shrewd in identifying and using recruits who come from particular regions and then appealing to those individuals to join the caliphate or come to Iraq and Syria.

Of course, ISIL has been attempting to infiltrate into other areas of the continent, in particular, in Somalia. And there is evidence of a struggle and basically a conflict internally between Al Shabaab
and elements that had sought to adhere or to affiliate with ISIL. They have not seemed to have the success there, but it does identify that this is an ongoing concern we have to watch very closely.

Senator Shaheen. And is the cost of getting to Syria, to Iraq part of the challenge with recruitment, or is it the messaging that is the issue?

Mr. Sibrell. I think there are probably a lot of factors. That would be one. You know, one of the things that has made this conflict in Iraq and Syria such a threat to all of us is the relative accessibility of the conflict to people in Europe or in north Africa to fly to Turkey. As an example, you can get into Syria quite easily. And that has been the historical route. I think it is harder for people in Sub-Saharan Africa to make those connections and it costs more, so it is more difficult logistically to do that.

Senator Shaheen. Of the estimated 60 million refugees in the world today, I understand that about 15 million are in Sub-Saharan Africa. I assume, but maybe I should not, that terrorism and instability are driving those migration flows. Can you talk about that and also talk about the extent to which climate change is playing a role in the migrations that we are seeing in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Ms. Etim. Sure. I think we see the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, not surprisingly, are huge areas where we are seeing the largest numbers of refugee movements right now and I will just say internally displaced persons as well because even though people are not necessarily leaving their borders, they are definitely moving out.

When we see the up-tick in instability in Somalia, for instance, we are even seeing people willing to get on boats to go across to Yemen, which we know has not been secure at all. A lot of that is because people know that they are not secure or safe, and when we do our surveys, we have seen time after time that when people do not feel secure and safe, they will move across borders. They also move across borders when not only they do not feel secure and safe, but they do not feel that there is any opportunity for them to exist on their own in the country of origin. So we have seen situations where even when security is paramount, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where we see large refugee movements, what often causes people to move across borders and move further is when markets start closing down or there is not an ability to make a living.

So you have got dynamic populations in these countries that in a sad way are used to coping and dealing with instability in very creative ways. But the concurrent pressures of instability and the lack of opportunity are what are pushing them to move further afield.

Senator Shaheen. So climate change is a big contributor.

Ms. Etim. And climate change—sorry—is a big contributor in both. We have seen the El Niño effect right now. Drought in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia is definitely a big factor. In 2011, we know that the famine was partially caused by drought, mostly caused by Al Shabaab cutting off access to food. It was a big reason that people had to cross borders, and we saw the largest migration of Somalis. It has put pressure on neighboring countries such as Kenya and South Sudan, even Sudan, and Ethiopia, and we are
seeing that those pressures are increasing local tensions. In the Sahel, we see very much the same story. Recurrent drought and problems of the ability to have accessible land has caused people to move to urban centers. And again, with the lack of opportunity in some of these urban and peri-urban centers, we are seeing increased radicalization as well.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Rubio?

Senator Rubio. Thank you very much.

Let me just begin. This is a question of Secretary Greenfield. Would you describe Boko Haram as an anti-Christian terror group whose main motivation is to rid Nigeria of Christianity? And I say that based on a video released by their leader in 2014. He said, quote, this is a war against Christians and democracy and their constitution. Allah says we should finish them when we get them. End quote.

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I would say they are more than that. I think that is part of their ideology, but they have killed more Muslims in the north than they have killed Christians. They are a terrorist organization, and they have no boundaries.

Senator Rubio. Would you support designating Nigeria as a country of particular concern for religious freedom?

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I would not designate Nigeria as a country because we have huge, huge and very active Christian populations in Nigeria throughout the southern parts of Nigeria into the middle belt and even in northern Nigeria, and we have a huge Muslim population there as well. So both communities, until Boko Haram, were able to live together and work together harmoniously, and I think that that can continue once Boko Haram is brought to justice.

Senator Rubio. Now, for USAID, what programs exist to assist the victims of Boko Haram, in particular, psychological programs for women and girls who have been victims of sexual violence?

Ms. Etim. I think you put the nail on the head. We have a comprehensive program right now that is in design to really target the northeast of Nigeria and looking at the victims of Boko Haram. We are working with communities right now because, as we have seen, when people who are leaving Boko Haram or who have been the victims of Boko Haram return to their communities, sometimes they suffer from a second wave of victimization. And so we are working to educate communities on——

Senator Rubio. In terms of like stigma?

Ms. Etim. Stigma. It has been heartbreaking actually. And so we are working to educate communities as to what it actually means, what people suffer, what they go through, and the fact that they can still be productive members of communities and societies. We also offer psychosocial support and care. A number of the Chibok girls that we did manage to return home are receiving that type of care right now. We are also making sure that we are working with local clinics and medical providers to train them in the right techniques. And then we are also working with community influence-makers, religious leaders so that there is a message that can be amplified through various channels that there is recovery that is possible.
Where possible, we are restarting basic social services such as education. We are putting more money into emergency education in the north, and we are hoping that where we can, we can increase access. And we are also providing assistance to those who are internally displaced through basic humanitarian assistance, provision of food and health care.

Senator Rubio. With all this instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, how has it affected your ability to implement programs. For example, have there been any programs that have been suspended due to security concerns?

Ms. Etim. Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, when we work in unstable environments, we have programs that have to exercise flexibility. And so we have multiple times suspended and restarted programs. And I think our model of working in these climates has to be based on this idea of really developing longstanding, long-term, long-visioning networks with these communities so that when insecurity prevents us from moving into an area for a period of time, we have through our networks and through understandings of local people on the ground and our staff who often are from the regions and speak the local languages—they understand when we can come back and they also understand how we can still have access and figure out creative ways of providing assistance to those intended beneficiaries. So, again, I would really emphasize the flexibility of the programs, understanding that it is not sometimes always a continuous flow of programming without stops and starts, especially in the areas where there is a lot of——

Senator Rubio. That has to be highly disruptive. For example, if you are assisting a victim of sexual violence and in the middle of that program that we are offering, security concerns require us to eliminate people from that setting, and then it is suspended and then restarted. Is this a commonplace problem, these stop and starts, because of the security environment?

Ms. Etim. So it is not that the program will stop entirely. Usually what we try to do is we have a combination of working through local implementing partners. And so a lot of times what happens is we manage to train the trainers so that they still receive some types of support even as international NGOs or some of our own staff will have to pull back. And we try to layer on different types of interventions to ensure that we have creative ways of making sure that we are able to reach the beneficiaries.

But it is disruptive. And in extreme cases where we have to completely not be in a particular area for some time, of course, these are hugely disruptive. What we have found, though, is that over time it has been for sustained periods of time such as that in most of the cases that we work in Sub-Saharan Africa, the population is also moving as well.

Senator Rubio. And then on the counter-terror front, there have been rumors that the leader of Boko Haram, Shekau, is perhaps fighting in Syria with ISIL. Could you shed any light on that, Mr. Siberell? I have seen some open source reports about that.

Mr. Siberell. I have not seen that. I mean, he periodically appears in videos that are distributed and that we are aware of. And one of the things that we have noted and watched for is, after the affiliation of Boko Haram with the Islamic State, whether there
was any difference in the quality of their media output, which is usually an indicator of an actual strong link. We have seen a little bit of that, but I have not heard or I do not know if there is any reporting that I have seen that he is actually in Syria.

Senator RUBIO. Are there any countries that you are particularly concerned about in terms of recruiting IS fighters, and how significantly do you assess the threat of more and more fighters flowing out of east Africa to be?

Mr. SIBERELL. Yes, we are quite concerned about ISIL or Daesh, Islamic State’s attempts to infiltrate and affiliate with existing insurgencies or terrorist organizations. We know that they have been attempting to move into Somalia. Shabaab itself has recognized this as a threat, and there has been sort of a fierce struggle internally to hold off ISIL. But that then raises the possibility that they will look at other Somali communities in the region to include Kenya, elsewhere. So this is something that we are very concerned with. And we know that ISIL will want to continue to build its network of affiliates. So we have to remain attuned to that. Of course, Libya is a major ISIL affiliate, and there is always the threat that the connections might be made from Libya throughout the region, and we are watching that very closely as well.

As for individuals traveling to the conflict, as noted a minute ago, there has been some incidence of that, but the numbers from Sub-Saharan Africa, generally speaking, are low compared to numbers of foreign fighters from Europe, from north Africa, from the Caucasus, from southeast Asia in comparative terms.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Kaine?

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And thanks to the witnesses for being here today.

One of the reasons I really admire my colleagues on the committee is that there are many on this committee who have spent a lot of time in Africa and non-committee members too in the Senate who have spent a lot of time on it. And hearings like this are really helpful.

You know, just a thought on this. I do not have to be diplomatic because I am not a diplomat.

On the question of the differential in attention, you got to acknowledge that race—we have to look in the mirror and ask ourselves if race is part of the reason because if we look backward at our own history, often things get explained in retrospect and race is part of the reason. We put Japanese Americans in internment camps. We did not put German Americans in internment camps. Well, what explained the difference? German Americans looked kind of more European like the powers that be than Japanese Americans did.

There is a school of thought that explains the differential action of the United States in the 1990s in terms of intervening dramatically to stop genocide in the Balkans but not intervening dramatically to stop genocide in Rwanda, and then kind of, well, why did we intervene in one and not the other? Some of the answer that is not too pleasant.

So I think that part of the reason to have a hearing like this and part of the reason I applaud my colleagues who have spent a lot
of time in Africa is we have to, as leaders, kind of challenge. In some ways, it is kind of a media portrayal too that terrorist attacks in Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Chad are not worthy of the attention that the attacks in Brussels or Paris are. And even those in Ankara and Istanbul and the Sinai do not get as much attention. So all of these are important and having a hearing like this tries to put it an equal scale and not suggest that some lives are worth less than others.

I think there are some other reasons. The Middle East—we have needed something. We have needed oil, and so that has probably made us more focused on the Middle East and we have not focused as much on Africa because maybe we did not perceive that we needed something as much.

And, again, this is a good reason to have a hearing like this. Our foreign policy as a nation has just had an east-west axis that has been undeniable. We have cared about Europe. We have cared about the Middle East. We have cared about the Soviet Union, now Russia. We have cared about China. But if you look at the diplomatic effort that focuses south of the equator in Africa and the Americas, it has just been less. And so that is something that is good about a hearing like this.

I wanted to ask a question. I am actually going to make you do homework for me because we are writing the defense authorizing bill this week, and I am on Armed Services. And we are going to grapple with some issues and especially some issues dealing with AFRICOM. AFRICOM is an interesting regional command on the military side because probably more than any of the other COCOMs, it really integrates cross-disciplinary, military, diplomatic, USAID in trying to deal with challenges in Africa. As folks who are not part of the DOD, talk to me about your perceptions of AFRICOM. The one proposal is to fold AFRICOM back into EUCOM and not have there be a specific AFRICOM. I would be curious as to your thoughts on that.

And second, talk to me about the efficacy, following up on Senator Markey’s questions, less about the arms sales but about the training and the exercises we do with African militaries. I know many of our U.S. ambassadors ask through AFRICOM that we devote marine units and other units into Africa to do training on counterterrorism, counter-poaching, counter-human trafficking to build capacity. In your view as professionals in this area, how successful are those training efforts that we do with African security forces?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I will start and then I will turn to my colleagues.

I hope that AFRICOM is not folded back into EUCOM because what AFRICOM has meant for us is that we have a military that is more focused on Africa and has, over the years, become more understanding of Africa and they have become a great partner for us. And we very much appreciate that partnership with AFRICOM and with the military.

As a member of the Armed Services authorizing committee, there is a key area where we do have concerns, and those concerns are that as that committee considers its bill, it not cross some lines into the areas of diplomacy and development, and those are author-
izations that we would like to keep and where we feel we have better skill sets to carry out those responsibilities, particularly in the area of community development, in areas of working on governance. Some of those authorizations need to be guarded for the State Department and for USAID, and we have raised concerns there.

But in terms of our relationships with AFRICOM, I think they are better than at any time when we were working with CENTCOM. I think we have areas of disagreement, and we have been able to establish channels of communications between General Rodriguez and myself where we address those issues. And we have, I think, had some positive impact on the region. In all of their training that they do with African militaries, they have human rights training modules in every single one of those efforts that we have made. And I think they have paid dividends for us, and we have been able to use the relationships that the militaries develop with their military counterparts to get messages through to those militaries.

And then in terms of lethal weapons, we look very closely at what we are providing, and as I mentioned to Senator Markey, when the Nigerians asked for Cobras last year, we did not think those were appropriate. We were concerned about how they would be used and the impact on communities those Cobras would have, and we said no. We think the Super Tucanos are a better piece of equipment. We can train them on how to use this equipment effectively and not have a negative impact on communities and on civilians. So we are working very, very closely with them to address those concerns to make sure that they do not have the negative impact.

The CHAIRMAN. Great.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons, our ranking member on Africa.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Markey is the ranking member on Africa.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. We could not work that out. I forgot that. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. We were not as successful as we were last week on State Department authorization. But go ahead.

Senator COONS. Mr. Chairman and the ranking member, I just want to thank you both for convening this hearing and for your great engagement on this topic today. Along with Senator Markey and Senator Flake and Senator Isakson, we have all enjoyed a chance to work over many years together.

Just two opening statistics. I do think you reminded all of us that there are positives and negatives to the security situation in Africa. As some of you know, I host an annual Opportunity Africa conference in Delaware to try and emphasize the positives. Africa is a vast and complex continent of 54 countries, the fastest growing continent in the world. The World Bank says 7 out of 10 of the fastest growing economies in the world this decade are in Africa, but 8 out of 10 of the largest United Nations peacekeeping operations are also on the continent.

I think one of our challenges is to remain appropriately focused on the difficulties of developing a sustained strategic framework for engaging with extremism and violence on the continent while still
recognizing the significant growth opportunities, positive opportunities to reinforce our values and to work together with our many allies and partners on the continent and moving forward.

I also just at the outset want to thank the countless dedicated Foreign Service officers and civil servants at the State Department and USAID who work so hard to promote our interests in Africa, as well as those in DOD and law enforcement who do so much in terms of training and outreach. On a recent trip with Senator Cardin, I took the time to meet with a number of FSOs, and it is always to me interesting to hear just how hard they work. I am impressed with their determination and drive while working under difficult, dangerous, and often remote conditions.

So let me just ask this panel what lessons we have learned from fighting terrorism in Africa. We have got in front of us, just broadly speaking, three case studies: in the Sahel, with a focus on Mali; in the Lake Chad region, with a focus on Nigeria; and in the Horn, where the focus really is Somalia. And we have very different levels of U.S. engagement, U.S. expenditure, U.S. policy responses to the significant stability challenges presented by Somalia, which was literally a completely failed state but where there is a multilateral military presence where we have played a significant role, and I think they have made substantial success in pushing back Al Shabaab in the Lake Chad region where we are expending less in money but Boko Haram last year was literally the deadliest terrorist organization in the world and it should get and deserves higher attention and higher priority, as Senator Kaine suggested, for some reasons that are really unappealing I think.

The United States, by the way, gets more oil from the continent of Africa than we do from the Middle East. So if it was merely about resource prioritization, we long ago would have put Africa at the top of our list. And I am concerned that we are allowing others to become dominant players in Africa and we are lagging.

And then last, in the Sahel, we have really predominantly left the hard work to an AU mission, to the U.N., and to the French. These are very different responses, but in all three there are no significant U.S. troop deployments. We may be central to the activity in Somalia and in Nigeria, but it is a quite different scenario than we have seen in Iraq and currently in Syria.

So where are we getting the best bang for our buck? Where are we making the biggest progress in terms of advancing our values and our security concerns? And what role does diplomacy, development, security play in this work? If you would just in series, what is the strategic framework for making progress?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I will start and then I will turn to my colleagues.

You asked early what lessons we have learned, and I think the most valuable lesson we have learned is that this has to be multifaceted. It cannot be just focused on security and military. We have to bring in the civilian agencies.

And we also have learned that we cannot own it. We have to build the capacity of local organizations, local military, local security services, local civil society. We have to build their capacity to own it, and we have to be supportive of them.
Third, I think we have learned that we have to partner. So in the case of Mali—or in the Sahel, we have been extraordinarily proactive in the Sahel, but we are not in the lead. We have been involved in the peace negotiations. Our military has been extraordinarily supportive of the French effort there. There are so many problems across the continent. We have to spread ourselves very thin, and we have to look for other partners. And in that case, we have worked very closely with our partners in the U.N., as well as in the French Government, to make sure that we are having impact on the situation in the Sahel.

And then finally—and this has been said in the room by everyone—we have to be concerned about human rights. We have to ensure that these governments understand that human rights are important for us, and as I have said before, it is a core value. And they expect to hear from us on human rights issues. If we do not raise human rights, I think every one of them would be in shock. So we generally start out in that area with all of these governments.

Senator Coons. And if I might interrupt before we continue, we had an exchange earlier about the prioritization of democracy and governance funding where Ranking Member Cardin appropriately said—Senator Shaheen and I are both appropriators and heard that loud and clear. And it is an issue that I have pressed in recent appropriations hearings of the State Foreign Ops Subcommittee. We are underfunding democracy and governance dramatically. And I appreciate your raising that and that is something that I have made a priority in my appropriations request this year because, frankly, we send the wrong message. And I appreciate Senator Markey raising concerns about DRC and their shrinking space for elections. If we do not fund our values—and our values essentially are around democracy and space for opposition parties and for journalists—they draw conclusions.

Please, if you would, Ms. Etim.

Ms. Etim. Sure and I know very quickly.

What else is the core lessons learned? Partnership, partnership, partnership: whether it is through other donors and other partners, but also bringing in the private sector. As you mentioned before, Africa is also a continent of opportunities, and we have a diverse set of partners that are very interested in stability and stabilization. They can be the drivers that help us to fuel and fund these economic opportunities that we are talking about for young people, for actually making the case to host governments of why inclusion policies are important, and of making sure that they are working with us to make sure that the international norms are seen as something that is not only an imposition from a Western government but is something that should be a standard to which everybody should aspire. So I think that we have a lot of opportunities here through partnering with governments and the private sector, but also local communities, making sure that we are touching people on the ground where they live and not just working with institutions and capitals.

Senator Coons. I agree with you.

Senator Isakson raised pointedly the MCC. I was, frankly, pleased that Tanzania, because of electoral irregularities and fail-
ure to really effectively address corruption, suffered a really unwel-
come setback for them. And this weekend the World Economic
Forum is in Kigali and a great opportunity for us to continue en-
gagement, and the administration is sending Ambassador Froman
and Fred Hochberg of Ex-Im Bank, among many others.

If you would, might I have the time to have them conclude?
Thank you. Mr. Siberell?

Mr. SIBERELL. Well, I think in general the lessons learned in
each of these three conflict areas, as you pointed out, is that we
have in the African continent partners who are willing to address
the challenges from within the region. So they are committed to the
solution, and that is something that is maybe even unique globally
in the way that terrorism issues are being addressed. So each of
those three examples you provided has the neighbors coordinating.
It has not been easy. It takes constant diplomatic effort to coordi-
nate and keep the momentum in each of these areas. But the solu-
tion you would want in Somalia is a solution that has developed
in terms of the troop-contributing countries to AMISOM. It is an
AU-led mission, the region addressing its own problems.

Of course, the bigger challenge there also is that these are gov-
ernments also that are, generally speaking, in many cases weak
and poor and lack in capacity. And a sustained solution over time
that addresses the radicalization and the root causes will require
improved governance. So it is a long-term effort here, but the buy-
in and the commitment of the countries themselves to solving the
problem is a virtue in my view.

Senator COONS. Absolutely. I think the fight against terrorism
across Africa is every bit as urgent and every bit as large in scale
as it is in the Middle East. A key difference is we have allies who
are putting their soldiers into the fight. African soldiers are fight-
ing and dying against terrorism in Somalia, in Nigeria, in Mali,
and we are providing critical support, training, funding, and re-
sources, but unlike other places in the world, we have significant
numbers of willing allies who are sending their troops into the
fight. And it has made a real difference, and we should be grateful
for their partnership.

And I am grateful for your service and the chance to ask ques-
tions today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good.

Senator Murphy?

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to follow up on some of the questions that Senator Mar-
key asked regarding the interaction of security assistance and as-

DOD funds for security assistance in Africa sur-

assistance provided by the State Department. In 2014, it was the
first time that DOD funding for security assistance in Africa sur-
passed that provided by the State Department. And it comes
through a lot of different places, but in particular, a rather opaque
fund that the Pentagon runs called Building Partner Capacity,
which is about $10 billion globally, is increasingly the source of
DOD funds to help promote foreign military sales and stand up
military capacity.

And so, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield, I wanted to ask you
about to what extent the State Department and the Africa Bureau
is read into the decisions made at the Department of Defense to
spend Building Partner Capacity dollars. Again, this is a huge amount of money globally, $10 billion, a lot of it spent in Africa. To the extent to which you are read in, the extent to which individual ambassadors have a say as to how that money is spent to make sure that it is not counteracting the work that they are doing on the ground, and your broader thoughts on this sort of long-term transition away from the majority of money in these countries being State Department money to Department of Defense money.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you for that question.

We work closely with AFRICOM on any activities that they are involved in in Africa. We have an annual strategy review meeting with them where our DCMs from across Africa and USAID mission directors are invited to come to Stuttgart. I am there. My colleague from USAID, Linda Etim, is there as well. And we look across the board at what they are planning to do and look at what they are planning to do in the context of our mission programs in terms of our own strategy. So we do work closely with them. Our ambassadors have veto power on any actions that they are taking, any programs that they are doing. And in general, if there is any disagreement, General Rodriguez and I work those disagreements out between ourselves. So we are very much in sync with them.

We wish we had that $10 billion to program on the continent of Africa, and we would be doing some different things. They have the money, so we want to help them channel that money to places where it will make a difference on the continent as we work to fight insecurity and terrorism together. But $10 billion would be a huge contribution to democracy and governance. I describe my democracy and governance funding as scraping the mayonnaise jar to get just enough to do the job that we have to do.

Senator MURPHY. Just tell me how much do you have in democracy and governance.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Let me get back to you with that figure. It is a moving target.

Senator MURPHY. So I would submit that it is probably well less than——

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Oh, yes, it is.

Senator MURPHY.—what the Department of Defense is spending in the Building Partner Capacity account which, by the way, is not broken down on a country-by-country basis. So as members of the Foreign Relations Committee, all we know is that there are $10 billion spent at the Department of Defense.

I am glad that you are optimistic as to the degree of coordination that is happening. But for members of the Appropriations Committee, it is probably a topic that should get more attention.

Senator CARDIN. Would my colleague yield for one second? We will give you some extra time.

I think you are raising a very fundamental point. We have a couple members of our committee that serve on Armed Services. It has been a growing problem, and as we get to the NDAA bill, there is another effort, as the Ambassador already pointed out. There may be efforts made to even expand DOD’s role in traditional State Department areas. It is a matter that I think our committee needs to take a look at on a broader scale than just Africa.
Senator Murphy. And, listen, there has obviously been a long-term shift of diplomacy away from the State Department to the Defense Department. That is happens when you are engaged in very dangerous places. But I guess I am not as optimistic as the witness is as to the ability to coordinate this work on a country-by-country basis.

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. It is an effort. I actually have the figures here. We are actually looking at increasing that funding in the President’s request, increasing support for D&G programs in Africa. In fiscal year 2017, the request for that sector is 20 percent above what we did in 2015. Our figure for 2015 was $286 million, and our figure for our request for 2016 was $311 million. So it is really a drop in the bucket when you compare that to $10 billion.

Senator Murphy. Listen, it is just another way by which we communicate our priorities to these countries. So when we are looking at $300 million on a good day in democracy assistance and then we are handing out potentially 10 times that amount of money in an account that has very little oversight from the United States Congress, it tells these countries what we think is most important. As part of this balance, it is difficult to do when the numbers are that skewed in favor of military and security assistance.

To that end, I do not know exactly who to put this question to, but maybe, Mr. Siberell, I will ask it to you and to others. In these three conflict zones that we are talking about, can you talk a little bit about this mystery, which is the attractiveness of a Wahabi-oriented, Salafist Sunni ideology amidst areas that are often dominated by Sufi Muslims? And the story has to be partially about schools that are on the ground, funded by some of our allies in the Middle East. Some of it has to do with young men who go to the Middle East to get taught in schools funded by our allies in the Middle East. What is the level of seriousness about the countries on the ground in understanding and trying to tackle this problem of radicalization that happens in these Wahabi-funded or Salafist-oriented schools either in theater or back in the Middle East?

Mr. Siberell. I think it is a real concern on the part of many governments in the region, and we hear that from those governments.

As you pointed out, there are likely a variety or a number of different vehicles through which these ideas or this ideology penetrates a society. This is not something that is limited, unfortunately, to areas of Africa. We see it in Southeast Asia. We see it in other places where you have had historically kind of an animist approach or an approach to religion and faith that is tolerant of other traditions, and that is being kind of worn down by this Salafi ideology. And then that causes polarization and that causes intolerance. It causes even sectarian conflict. And so it is a problem globally.

It also relates probably to the spread of media. People have access to media coming from different parts of the world, and there have been media funded through—coming out of certain regions that have propagated or emphasized a particular view.

So there are a number of different vehicles, and it is a major concern in these countries.
I think, though, that when we talk about—you have to look at the particular circumstances almost at the community and the village level sometimes or what are those influences. And that is where the very difficult work of countering violent extremism will be, will be identifying through research and through data understanding of the drivers at a local level. It is a very hard issue to address, but especially amidst what is really a global phenomenon of the infiltration of this particular religious view.

Senator MURPHY. I will just say in handing back my time we can spend money chasing these dollars around the world, but we are never going to be able to keep up. It is probably a better strategy for us to ask about why these dollars are moving into areas like Africa out of the Middle East, out of the pockets of many of our friends, probably a better use of our time and money.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I want to thank our panelists, and I think you can see there is a lot of interest in what we had to talk about today. If you could, we will have questions, I know, after this, if you could respond fairly quickly. We will take questions until the close of business on Thursday. But we thank you for your service to our country. And if you could with your crew, we would like to shift out now to another panel. Thank you very much.

Our second panel will consist of two witnesses. The first witness is Mr. Abdoulaye Mar Dieye. Any corrections needed there, sir? Okay, thank you. Assistant Administrator and Director for the U.N. Development Program, Regional Bureau for Africa. Our second witness will be Mr. Christopher Fomunyoh, Senior Associate and Regional Director for Central and West Africa at the National Democratic Institute.

We will recognize Mr. Dieye first with his opening comments, and if you would follow. We thank you both for sharing your expertise and knowledge with us today. Go ahead, sir.

STATEMENT OF ABDOULAYE MAR DIEYE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR AND DIRECTOR, REGIONAL BUREAU FOR AFRICA, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

Mr. DIEYE. I am really honored as Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa at the United Nations Development Program, UNDP, to be invited as a panelist before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. This is my very first appearance. I have submitted a longer text. So I will try to limit my remarks within 5 minutes.

My purpose today will be twofold. First, I want to briefly update you on what we at UNDP have learned about instability in Africa, and second, I will share our view on the possible developmental approach to mitigate the threats to peace and stability in what is often referred to as Africa’s arc of instability, which encompasses the Sahel, the Lake Chad region, and the Horn of Africa.

But let me, before I start, put a sense of perspective even though we are discussing instability in Africa. As one Senator stated the continent is doing extremely great. For the last 15 years, it has grown GDP-wise 5 percent a year since 2000.
Violent extremism is amongst the major risks to economies in parts of Africa. Tunisia’s GDP growth has been cut from 3 percent to 1 percent. Chad's GDP contracted 1 percent in 2015 from a growth of 5 percent in 2014. And countries like Kenya and Nigeria saw a reduction of 25 percent of tourism following terrorist attacks. We in UNDP estimate that at least 33,000 people have died on African soil since 2011 as victims of violent extremism, and 6 million are currently internally displaced due to radicalization.

Mr. Chairman, over the last 2 years, UNDP has held a number of consultations, conducted a series of studies, and commissioned research to better understand the violent extremism scourge in Africa. These various studies and research converge in showing three major findings.

One, while the drivers of radicalization are multifaceted and defy easy analysis, their major roots are found in the combination of poverty and low human development, an endemic sense of economic and political exclusion and marginalization, and weak social contracts with a high level of societal divisions along ethnic or religious lines.

Two, the most fertile grounds for radicalization are the border areas, which are in most of the countries neglected, ungoverned, weak governance, and low socioeconomic and institutional infrastructure.

Three, while there are a number of commonalities which drive radicalization, there are also some important differences between countries. For example, socioeconomic factors tend to be the prominent drivers in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, Somalia, and Nigeria, whereas political grievances are a much more prominent factor in Kenya.

It is with this research and analysis in mind that UNDP embarked on a development-led approach which seeks to address the multiple drivers and enablers of radicalization and violent extremism.

We have launched a 4-year regional initiative on preventing and responding to violent extremism in Africa, which focuses on supporting regional institutions, governments, communities, and at-risk individuals to address the drivers and related factors.

We are working in epicenter countries, in spillover countries, and in at-risk countries supporting partners to develop and implement integrated regional and national policies and strategies, rule of law, community and faith-based interventions to prevent youth radicalization and deescalate local conflicts. We also promote social cohesion at the community level, working with local and national governments to provide basic social services to citizens. We support employment creation and we work with local governments to strengthen public administration and the extension of state authority.

We have learned that well-resourced, comprehensive, and integrated programs combining security and development responses offer the best approaches to combating violent extremism.

Let me conclude my remarks by emphasizing that for Africa to meet its full development potential, preventing and responding to violent extremism is key. This will require coordinated and collabo-
rative partnerships between governments, development partners, and civil groups.

I thank you.

[Mr. Dieye’s prepared statement is located at the end of this hearing transcript.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Fomunyoh? Is that a correct pronunciation?

STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER FOMUNYOH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL AND WEST AFRICA, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dr. FOMUNYOH. Yes, it is correct, Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute, NDI, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss terrorism and instability and make the case for why democracy and good governance should be a central component of any counterterrorism and stabilization strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

For more than 30 years, NDI has worked around the world to establish and strengthen political and civic organizations, safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness, and accountability in government. The institute has conducted programs in or worked with participants from approximately 50 of Africa’s 54 countries and I have been fortunate to be part of our efforts in many of those countries for the past 2 decades.

Terrorist activity in Sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade threatens to destabilize the continent and roll back some of the gains in broadening political space and participation since the third wave of democratization that began in the 1990s. Groups such as Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in northern Mali and the Sahel, and Al Shabaab in Somalia and the Horn of Africa have caused tens of thousands of deaths and tremendous economic and social dislocations for civilian populations. Some of these extremist organizations operating in Africa are eager to establish alliances with violent extremist organizations in other parts of the world, notably Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS. The international community is right in supporting counterterrorism efforts that seek to defeat these extremist groups militarily and must, at the same time, assist the affected countries to address the root causes and triggers of the rise in extremism and violence.

The principal motivation of today’s terrorists in Sub-Saharan Africa is deeply rooted in a pattern of religious beliefs. However, it is noteworthy that governance failures have exacerbated the impact of this phenomenon and created an enabling environment in which extremism thrives. When a state collapses, as was the case with Somalia prior to the emergence of Al Shabaab, or allows for huge swaths of ungovernable spaces, as was the case in northern Mali, or fails to fulfill its basic purpose of providing citizens with access to a meaningful life, liberty, and property as in northeastern Nigeria, the social contract between the state and the citizenry is broken. Discontent with governments that are viewed as illegit-
imate or ineffective is a fertile ground for recruitment as disaffected individuals may easily embrace extremism hoping to access a better life, political power or voice, and the resources linked to these attributes in transition environments. Moreover, oppressed citizens and marginalized groups that are denied access to basic public goods and services and opportunities are more vulnerable to extremist appeals and indoctrination by non-state actors who in return promise to fulfill their needs.

Efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa must, therefore, address poor governance as a part of the overall strategy. Based on institutional lessons learned through NDI’s work, my own experience and expertise as an African, and what I hear loud and clear from African democrats, leaders and activists alike, across the continent, I will strongly offer the following three recommendations for your consideration.

Any counterterrorism strategy for Africa should be grounded in the consolidation of democracy and good governance such that short-term military victories can be sustained in the medium to long term. We cannot afford to defeat violent extremism now only to take up the same fight 5, 10 years down the road.

Two, autocratic regimes should not get a pass from the international community solely because they are good partners in the fight against terrorism. Shrinking political space, frequent and overt violations of citizen rights and freedoms, and the undermining of constitutional rule and meaningful elections breed discontent and disaffection that form the fertile ground for recruiters and perpetrators of violence and extremism. Good partners in countering violent extremism and terrorism can and should be good performers in democratic governance. These two principles are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they are mutually reinforcing.

Africans of this generation are jittery and extremely fearful of reliving the experience of the Cold War era during which dictatorships thrived amidst grave human deprivation and gross human rights abuses just because some leaders were allies of the West at the time. The fight against terrorism should not become a substitute for the Cold War paradigm of this century with regard to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Democratic governance is critical to every counterterrorism strategy before, so citizen grievances are not allowed to fester and breed extremism, dissatisfaction, and alienation from the state; during, to deprive extremists of possible recruitment grounds; and after, to sustain the peace that would have been gained militarily for the medium to long term. Excessive deprivation in both economic terms and in access to political voice, freedoms, and civil liberties make young people vulnerable to the recruitment incentives of extremist movements.

To conclude, let me say that despite the enthusiasm of a few years ago and some remarkable accomplishments in the last 2 decades, democracy and democratic governance in Africa is under attack. On the one hand, it is challenged by external threats from extremist terrorist organizations and, on the other hand, in some cases, by internal threats from autocratic regimes that fail to deliver public services, combat corruption, and protect rights and freedoms. The international community should do everything in its
power to help rid the continent of both existential threats. Friends of Africa must make sure that they do not, willingly or inadvertently allow themselves to become accomplices in denying Africans their basic rights and freedoms and a secure, prosperous future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for this opportunity. This is a brief summary of my statement, and a longer statement will be submitted for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be entered into the record.

[Dr. Fomunyoh’s prepared statement is located at the end of this hearing transcript.]

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you both for your testimony.

And I want to turn to our distinguished ranking member, Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. I want to thank both of you for your oral presentations, as well as your full statements that are being made part of our record. I have had a chance to look through it, and it certainly reinforces the concerns that I have had. So I want to get a little bit more granular here.

Both of you mentioned the importance of the underlying causes of radicalization, and although we have to deal with the immediate issues, if we do not deal with the underlying causes, it will be short-term success.

We have incredible tools. UNDP is an incredibly important part of our international efforts to help develop the prosperity in countries that we hope would provide the long-term stability. NDI has done incredible service in developing democratic opportunities around the globe. And of course, the United States and our development assistance and our security assistance—these are tools that can provide incredible opportunities for stability globally. And yet, we point out that in Sub-Saharan Africa we have not been as successful as we need to be.

So, therefore, my question to both of you, what has worked that we should build on? I see your specific recommendations. I understand. Incorporate good governance, deal with education, deal with the underlying economic issues. But how do you take the current programs that are available either through the United Nations or through private organizations or through government—how do you take those programs and build on the ones that are the most relevant to the stability of Sub-Saharan Africa? And what programs need to be reconfigured because they are not providing the returns for the investments that are being made? Can we be a little more specific here?

Mr. DIEYE. Thank you, Senator.

Let me first say that when I was listening to the previous panel, what you said was music to my ears. And you said that it boils down to good governance. This is the fight that we are doing first in Africa, but in UNDP. The major portfolio of UNDP is good governance. And in these countries, we have seen that poor governance, and ungoverned spaces, have been the major root causes of not only on the development but the insecurity that we are seeing in the continent.
And you are right. We have good practices. The issue that we are seeing here is that most of these countries have very limited fiscal space and hence cannot deliver to scale the good practices that we are doing. I think the solution is, number one, not only limit ourselves to military solutions, but blend them, military and human rights and then development. But the good practices that we are having, put them to scale. And to do so, I think we, the international community, have to understand that the issue of terrorism is a global public bad, and these countries with limited fiscal space cannot do it alone. In the spirit of partnership, we can scale up the good practices.

I am just coming from Kenya and Ethiopia where I saw an excellent partnership between the two countries in the Marsabit region where they are doing cross-border initiatives. We have not discussed it a lot during the first panel. It is at the border that we see problems. So if we invest in creating resilience for communities at the border areas, we could have beneficial results. And I think with good funding, we can scale up those excellent initiatives.

Dr. FOMUNYOH. Senator, the National Democratic Institute, obviously, does not have the luxury of governmental entities such as USAID or the Department of State or even a multinational organization such as UNDP. But with the resources that we have always received graciously from some of these agencies, we have tried to put a lot of emphasis on developing civil society because when you look at statistics or the studies done by organizations such as Afrobarometer—and I referenced that in my written statement—75 percent of Africans aspire to live in democratic societies, believe in democracy. And so the demand for democracy and good governance continues to arise on the continent.

Unfortunately, the supply is shrinking. And so programs that can allow the expansion of political space would bring more citizens into the process. It would also allow the citizens to advocate for the proper management of resources that are channeled to governments or that are created within these countries.

And so I would put a lot more emphasis on strengthening civil society, strengthening citizen-based organizations because some of them are very active, especially even including in rural areas and some of the areas that have been impacted by these grievances. I understand that in northeastern Nigeria, for example, there are a number groups that are engaging with internally displaced persons that are engaging with some of the people that are dealing with trauma and some of the impacts of Boko Haram, and organizations such as those sometimes have received support from NDI and other organizations in helping build their capacity to be effective advocates on behalf of citizens.

Senator CARDIN. I agree with both the points you made. I think border issues are—it is a good point and we need to concentrate. They are more complicated because the problems can go across borders, and therefore, the country—we are not sure what host country is responsible. Unless you have partnerships between the two countries, it makes it complicated and difficult.

And I certainly agree with you on civil society. I think civil society is a critical factor in good governance, and if you do not have a healthy civil society, it breeds these problems.
Let me try to get to a third point for your view on that, and that is the reality or perception that you can get a free pass from the United Nations or from the United States if you are working with the international coalition to counter terrorism and that what you do internal in your country will not really be of major importance to the international participation and support. That to me, whether it is real or perceived, could be a huge problem in dealing with civil society or dealing with good governance or dealing with democratic institutional development.

Just share with me your concern as to whether the leaders of countries that are working with us have the view that the international community will give them a free pass on governance issues as long as they are part of our coalition against violent extremism.

Mr. Dieye. Thank you, Senator.

For us human rights is the bedrock of whatever we do and it is not negotiable.

Senator Cardin. So you are willing to pull out of a country if you cannot get the cooperation you need from their leaders?

Mr. Dieye. What we do is we support capacity building.

Senator Cardin. I understand that, but are you willing to pull out of a country—if you said it is the bedrock, it is the most important point, if you have a corrupt regime and you are doing some good work in that country, but at least part of that is going to support a corrupt regime, are you prepared to pull out?

Mr. Dieye. When you pull out, there is a cost to the communities served. So what we do is make a strong declaration—the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner of Human Rights make these kind of strong declarations. And I think we as the U.N. could be better off to support the capacities and support communities and help countries deal with human rights. This is a voice that we have to put strongly. But whatever we do, human rights is embedded in our programs. So it is a culture we have to infuse into societies and into government. It takes time. It may not happen overnight, but it is embedded in all of what we do.

Dr. Fomunyoh. Senator, I would say that the perception is real and that you hear it as you travel across the continent even with partner organizations within civil society that when you go through the list of countries that have become poor performance, some that were initially on a positive trajectory but that have been backsliding, that those countries coincidentally happen to be partners in the fight against terrorism. And it is a perception that then undermines all of the declarations and all of the work that has been done to support civil society in the past.

The example that you raised earlier about Ethiopia is very clear. It is obvious that Ethiopia has been backsliding on the democratic governance front, but it is still viewed as a good ally. And what many civic leaders then pose is the question of whether these regimes are getting a pass solely because of their cooperation on that front, whereas these two undertakings are really mutually reinforcing, and you could be a good partner on the counterterrorism front and still be a good performer on the democratic governance front.
Senator CARDIN. Well, I agree. It is not a choice of either/or. It has got to be both. There is no question because otherwise, again, you get short-term gains, but long term you are not going to succeed with the type of stability that will provide not only an opportunity for its citizens but also eliminate the gap that is used for recruitment of extremists. So you got to do both.

And I am afraid that we have focused on the counterterrorism from a military point of view with partners at times to the exclusion of dealing with the development of good governance in a country. It seems like this hearing has only put a spotlight on that. So hopefully we can figure that out.

And just in response to the U.N., you have got to be prepared to walk away if you do not have a partner that is providing a fair opportunity to the people of their country. And it is sometimes difficult because you know that there are needs out there that you have to deal with, but if it is not getting through and if it is supporting corruption, then the better alternative is to look for a new opportunity rather than continuing the existing partnership.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Now, what he just said, though, is unlikely to ever occur. Is it not? Let us just be honest with each other.

Mr. DIEYE. Do you want me to answer that?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you answered with your laugh, but it is not going to occur. Is it?

Mr. DIEYE. But there is way—a suboptimal way of doing it is not to walk away from a country but go to the communities and invest in the communities. We say it is rebuilding the social contract, empowering the communities for them also to fight for human rights. So that is an investment I think is worth doing.

Senator CARDIN. And just to underscore the point, look, we always look for a way of providing humanitarian help. We always look for a way to deal with the human crisis that exists. But if the host country believes that they are always going to have a partner regardless of their own activities, you lose the ability to change the underlying problems within that country.

The CHAIRMAN. You know, the first panel was here and we went down this same line of discussion. There is no question—is there—that the fact that citizens understand that we are going to hang in there because the terrorism issue is acute, the other issues are longer-term—they know that we are going to hang in there with them on the counterterrorism piece. There is no question as they see malfeasance relative to governance and other issues that that creates ill will towards the United States. Is there?

Dr. FOMUNYOH. Obviously, it creates a lot of doubts in the minds of the people, and we are also dealing with a segment of the population that is only going to increase. It is the young people. It is the activists. It is the journalists. And we know that Africa is a young continent. So the bulk of the population is in this category of people who aspire to be governed differently, who aspire to democracy, and who love and respect the United States for these values. And they are the ones being put in the position of askance when government enacts anti-terrorism legislation that has been used to shrink political space and silence voices. And so we end up
not creating friends with the segment of the population that is the continent of the future.

The CHAIRMAN. And that spurs, by the way, a magnet for folks to be attracted more so to terrorism. Right? So it just feeds on each other.

Let us just step back. We all understand there is a presidential race underway. And we understand—those of us here understand—that we spend 1 percent of our U.S. budget on foreign aid. 1 percent. But there is no question that during the presidential race, there will be discussions about foreign aid. I mean, I do not think that is possible for that not to occur. And so people listening to this testimony today, listening to the fact that we are, on one hand, dealing with corrupt leaders that are not treating their populations properly, sending them money that in many ways keeps them in power, and if they partner with us on counterterrorism, even more so. On the other hand, we have terrorism. We have people that are being treated unfairly. And we actually have one of our committee members here that constantly is focused on this issue.

So just stepping back and as we debate our Nation’s fiscal issues and our Nation’s interest, which I think maybe more so in this presidential year may be discussed than at times in the past, if you would, both of you, advocate to me why you believe that our continued involvements in countries like the ones we are discussing is an important thing for the United States to be doing.

Mr. DIEYE. Well, Mr. Chairman, simply put, as I said earlier, although terrorism could be generated by poor governance in a country, it is a global public good or a global public bad. It belongs to all the international community. That is why it behooves us as the international community to fight them wherever they are.

I am not saying that we should give a free pass, but we have to fight it and fight also the root causes. That is why foreign aid is still critical, catalytic, and important in this fight.

Dr. FOMUNYOH. Mr. Chairman, I agree with what my co-panelist just said, and I will simply add that in many of these countries American lives, American interests are also at stake. We may remember the initial bombings of embassies in Kenya and in Tanzania, that the terrorists did target American institutions, embassies, and a lot of Americans died in that process. And so terrorists are a threat to Americans whether they are on the homeland or trying to operate overseas because their ultimate goal is probably larger targets than the villages that get destroyed in a number of African countries. And so I think it is important to send forth the message that a stitch in time is worth nine and that we are all threatened by this phenomenon irrespective of where it finds itself at the present moment.

The CHAIRMAN. But I think that the challenge—you know, I think some of the debate around—let us go to the Middle East—ISIS and people act as if we are going to do away with ISIS in the next year or 2—are missing the fact that the root causes are long long-term—a long long-term—issue.

The same is true in Africa. The root causes there are a long-term issue. And I think as Americans look at the resources that we have and the needs within our own country, sometimes the simple thought that we can deal with terrorism like that and maybe the
lack of understanding that there are root causes within Africa, within the Middle East that are going to mean that if this group is gone, another group is going to be coming right behind it unless we are dealing with both sides of the equation. I think people in many cases miss that point because of the dialogue that is taking place. Would you all agree or disagree with that?

Mr. DIEYE. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. It is not instant coffee dealing with the root causes of terrorism. It has started years ago. It will take some more years to deal with. And as we said earlier, it is the toxic combination of poor governance, low human development, and weak social contracts that has created this. And this will take time to deal with. It is a long-term investment. And again, if we put scale into that long-term investment and combine it with good security—security has to be still there—I think we will win over time. But it will take time. It is not an instant coffee battle in my view.

Dr. FOMUNYOH. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. And I think that the message can also be conveyed that, first, you have to stop the bleeding and then you can use democracy and good governance to build up a lot of the societies in a lot of these countries. And the example that I have used in the past with regard to the Sahel, for example, is the difference that democracy and good governance made in the situation of two countries that were both bordering countries to Libya but that dealt with the post-Libya crisis in a very different fashion.

Mali was being poorly governed. The government was accused of being very corrupt, of maltreating minorities, the Tuareg minorities, in northern Mali, marginalizing them and causing a lot of grievances. It was not able to control its borders, and there was a lot of illicit activities already taking place in northern Mali prior to the terrorist attacks that really peaked in 2012.

On the other hand, Niger Republic, which is a neighboring country to Mali and which even shares a direct border with Libya, because the government had better control of its borders, because the government had come up with a policy to integrate the Tuaregs of Niger into its governance processes, because the Government of Niger was dealing with disinternalization and allowing people at the grass roots level to make decisions that impact their lives directly, Niger was better able to deal with the after effect of the Libyan crisis than Mali. And until today, Niger is not a very wealthy country, but it is surviving in a neighborhood that is infested by terrorists to its northern border with Libya, to its northeastern border with northern Mali, and to its southern border with northeastern Nigeria. And Niger is to be commended for its effort. This is one example where an African country that is not necessarily resource-endowed is better able to manage its economic resources and its human capital in a way that gives people confidence that the government can respond to citizen needs and grievances and the country is still doing well today.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you. We are way beyond time. If I could just ask one last question.

This is a little bit off topic, but we had a really sort of harrowing hearing, if you will, about U.N. peacekeepers and the abuses that are taking place. And I would just like to ask in closing when this
is happening, what does that also do relative to populations and their feelings about people who are working with them to keep peace, but also, how does that fuel, if it does—how does that fuel additional attraction to terrorist groups?

Mr. DIEYE. It is a horrible situation. It is not a wide-scale phenomenon but horrible. Whenever it happens, it puts discredit on the good work that other soldiers are doing and even at large. And you have seen the Secretary-General condemn it strongly.

The CHAIRMAN. He condemns, but it still happens. And we see almost no action taken against peacekeepers. So condemning it does not mean anything to me.

Mr. DIEYE. He has condemned it when it happened lately in Africa. He has dismissed the head of the mission. He has named the countries where the soldiers—the perpetrators are coming.

The CHAIRMAN. Who has gone to jail?

Mr. DIEYE. I think it behooves us to prosecute those soldiers.

The CHAIRMAN. Who has gone to jail?

Mr. DIEYE. And I think once the Secretary-General has named those countries whose soldiers have done it, it behooves the countries to prosecute——

The CHAIRMAN. You understand from my perspective that would be like us naming the terrorists as bad guys but doing nothing about it.

Mr. DIEYE. And the Secretary-General has also nominated lately a special coordinator, Jane Lute from the U.S., to coordinate the efforts of the U.N. to address this despicable and malign acts that should not happen.

The CHAIRMAN. Prosecutions are what will end it, not naming people, not naming countries, not——

Mr. DIEYE. But, Mr. Chair, you would know that the U.N. has no space for prosecuting soldiers given by contributing countries. That is why I said it behooves those countries to do the prosecution once they are named.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CARDIN. If I might, I want to just join with the chairman. I am not satisfied that the United Nations has done everything it needs to do. I understand you do not have independent ability to do that, and I understand you have the politics of dealing with all your member states. But with the peacekeepers, it was very, very late in the game, and the action was not adequate. We know that the Secretary-General is very sincere, and we know that the Security Council has taken action. But we have not seen the type of enforcement that we expect.

And I think the same thing is true with the various programs under the United Nations. That is, the development programs are critically important. But if you are not prepared to break your partnership with a corrupt regime, then I think you are doing a disservice. I understand the humanitarian needs. I understand dealing with particularly NGO types where we can do direct humanitarian service. But contracts with governments that are corrupt need to be prepared to walk away if we cannot get the type of progress. We do not expect progress overnight.

So if I can, Mr. Chairman, with your patience, just one quick question to Mr. Fomunyoh, and that is, what would you like to see
the United States do in order to respond to the perception that we give free passes to coalition partners in regards to their human rights violations? Is there something specific you would like to see us do?

Dr. FOMUNYOH. Senator, I think you touched on some of those issues in the first panel. I think speaking out more publicly against some of these violations, but also taking actions that can assure or reassure the vast majority of Africans in these countries that when the United States says that democracy is one of its core pillars of its Africa policy, that it really means it so that there is not a sense of leaders acting with impunity even at the highest level because then it undermines everything else.

I would also mention what you discussed in terms of resources, additional resources for democracy and good governance programs or democracy support programs and also a sense that these programs to be effective, because you are talking about changing attitudes and changing behaviors and dealing with people who have acted one way for decades and who now need to act differently, that a sustained level of support is more likely to pay dividends than short-term, surgical-type interventions because you need time to be able to create relationships of trust. You need time for people to trust that your technical assistance is nonpartisan and means well in terms of raising the well-being of citizens and putting in place systems and processes that can endure beyond one government or one leader. And that requires time and sustained resources. I think that will go a long way because, fortunately, for the 3 decades that NDI and the International Republican Institute, and IFS, and other organizations have been doing this line of work, we have established the relationships in these countries that could have a huge impact if the resources were available.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No, thank you.

And thank you, Mr. Dieye. I know this is not your—speaking up regarding the U.N., it was not your area of expertise nor purview. And I appreciate it. But I think you can understand none of us at the panel are particularly thrilled with the way the U.N. has handled the peacekeeping issues and prosecuted. Calls for prosecution should take place.

Let me just close with this. Look, certainly this hearing has given us a good sense of the complexities that exist. We have similar complexities in the Middle East where we are dealing with countries that leave these vacuums, discriminate against various sects that are not of their own. And so this is a challenge we have throughout the world when we are dealing with issues like this.

But we thank you for your focus today on Africa. As you heard me mention in the last panel, if you would, there will be some questions from members in writing. We will close that as of Thursday afternoon. If you could respond fairly briefly, we would appreciate it. We thank you both for your expertise and knowledge and your willingness to share it with us today.

And with that, the meeting is adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify on sources of instability in Africa and our ongoing work with our African partners to address these challenges.

The United States is committed to partnering with the people and governments of Africa to promote democracy, peace and prosperity. Africa is home to the world’s youngest and fastest growing population. It presents significant opportunities for transformation and growth as well as significant challenges. The overall trends in sub-Saharan Africa point to accelerated democratization, development, and economic opportunity. Serious and seemingly intractable conflicts in Angola, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone have ended and those countries are in the process of rebuilding. We have seen several significant electoral successes during the past year. Although Africa remains the world’s least developed continent, average real per capita income has been increasing steadily over the last decade and a half and the middle class is slowly growing.

However, in spite of these positive trends, instability and conflict persist in parts of the continent. This instability has a direct bearing on U.S. national interests and those of our closest allies. Poorly governed localities have been and remain a breeding ground for extremists that seek to do us harm. Underlining the scale of the stability challenges facing Africa, eight of the ten largest United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in the world are currently deployed in Sub-Saharan Africa. Added to these, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is the largest peace support mission in the world.

In response, Africa’s leaders have intensified individual and collective efforts to address these challenges and take greater ownership of their own security. The African Union (AU), sub-regional organizations and individual African governments are taking important roles in addressing security and political challenges in Africa. African governments are deploying forces for regional missions to counter terrorism, promote stability, and support post-conflict peacebuilding. They are also working to better organize themselves to confront persistent challenges that require multi-faceted solutions. A recent manifestation of this drive for stronger regional coordination and integration is the formation of the G-5 Sahel in 2014 by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

The United States is pursuing comprehensive and coordinated whole-of-government approaches to help our African partners build and sustain their security capacity and cooperation. The drivers of conflict and instability in Africa are diverse, and our approach to these threats reflects a range of perspectives, priorities and capabilities. Military, intelligence and law enforcement tools are vital to defend against a range of threats, but cannot replace robust diplomacy and engagements promoting broad-based economic and political opportunity. We must work with our partners, including civil society, to address the root causes of conflict, strengthen accountability, and promote good governance. Stability in Africa ultimately requires leaders with the will and the capacity to respond to the needs and aspirations of their people.

Terrorism and violent extremism are major sources of instability in Africa. Terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab, Boko Haram (which now calls itself the Islamic State in West Africa), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Murabitoun are conducting asymmetric campaigns that cause significant loss of innocent life and create potentially long-term humanitarian crises. They are adept at exploiting state fragility and political and economic vulnerabilities. Terrorists gain an advantage when security forces and border guards lack the necessary leadership, training, equipment, intelligence, and mobility to disrupt their activities. They also gain an advantage when security forces fail to carry out operations in accordance with international human rights standards. When governments break the bond of trust and fail to protect civilians, terrorists can and do exploit these actions and feed their narrative.

Terrorists and criminal organizations also take advantage of weak and corrupt criminal justice systems unable to effectively investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate criminals. Violent extremist ideology and tactics may be alien and illegitimate to the
vast majority of Africans, but individuals and communities are increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists in a growing number of locales over the last decade. While the motives for tolerating, or for joining, violent extremist activities are complex, overlapping, and context-specific, we see violent extremists focusing their recruitment efforts where there is a lack of education and economic opportunity, political and social alienation, poor governance, corruption of elites, and lack of accountability for abuses by security forces. These terrorist groups use increasingly sophisticated means to exploit these weaknesses on social media developing and propagating violent extremist messaging and narratives.

In the Lake Chad Basin region, despite significant progress over the past year—due in large part to bolstered Nigerian and regional efforts—more work remains to end the savage atrocities and ongoing violence perpetrated by Boko Haram. Boko Haram, which declared its affiliation with ISIL in 2015, conducts recurring attacks in northeastern Nigeria and the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, and they have increased the ghastly practice of forcing women and children to detonate human bombs. The conflict has affected the lives of some 2.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and nearly 170,000 Nigerian refugees forced to flee their country. Since 2009, the conflict has caused approximately 18,000 deaths.

In the Sahel, AQIM and al-Murabitoun continue to operate in parts of northern Mali and along the border corridor between Mali, Niger, and Libya. In recent months, they have responded to military pressure by turning to more asymmetric tactics. They have increased high-profile attacks against so-called “soft targets,” including a series of attacks against international hotels, cafes, and resorts in Burkina Faso, Mali and Cote d’Ivoire.

In East Africa, al-Shabaab last year became increasingly aggressive in conducting large-scale attacks against African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) forward operating bases and a range of targets throughout Somalia. In 2015, al-Shabaab also launched a series of attacks across the border in northern Kenya, including one against a university in Garissa that left nearly 150 people dead. Al-Shabaab reportedly maintains a network of operatives and recruiters across the wider region who seek to exploit long-standing divisions between communities and security forces along the Swahili Coast.

We are concerned about the risk that the presence and potential expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on the continent will grow. As we have seen elsewhere in the world, ISIL seeks to co-opt existing terrorist groups, as well as local insurgencies and conflicts to expand its network and advance its agenda.

As President Obama has said, effectively addressing evolving terrorism challenges requires strong, capable, and diverse partners who have both the political will and the ability to disrupt and degrade terrorist networks. Over the past several years, we have seen African governments and African communities come together and show leadership in fighting terrorist groups. In Somalia, AMISOM and the Somali National Army have pushed al-Shabaab from some of its major strongholds and supported efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia to promote stability, but significant shortfalls to stability remain in Somalia. In the Lake Chad Basin region, military forces have undertaken to work together through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to counter Boko Haram. Similarly, forces from eleven Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) states initially responded to the security crisis in Mali and worked alongside the French military to destroy terrorist safe havens in northern Mali and provide the stability required for the peace process to advance. We recognize that progress has been made, but more needs to be done to maintain momentum against evolving and adaptive terrorist threats that exist across the continent.

The United States seeks to promote comprehensive, whole-of-government capabilities to respond to terrorism. Our primary multi-year mechanisms for promoting coordinated multi-year interagency approaches are the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) and, in West Africa, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Led by the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense, PREACT and TSCTP advance U.S. law enforcement, military, development, and public diplomacy expertise and resources to support the efforts of willing regional partners to build and sustain their own CT capability. Through PREACT, TSCTP, and related initiatives, the United States uses a wide range of tools and programs to build capacity and assist regional CT efforts. Areas of support include: (1) enabling and enhancing the capacity of African militaries to conduct CT operations; (2) improving the ability of military and civilian security services to operate regionally and collaboratively on CT efforts; (3) enhancing individual nations’ border security capacity to monitor, restrain, and interdict terrorist movements; (4) strengthening the rule of law, including access to justice, and law enforcement’s
ability to detect, disrupt, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity; and (5) reducing the limited sympathy and support among communities for violent extremism.

While military efforts remain critical, the success of counterterrorism efforts in Africa depends fundamentally upon capable and responsible civilian partners—police, prosecutors, judges, prison officials, religious and community leaders—who can help address terrorism through a sustainable framework that advances rule of law and respect for human rights. In that regard, we seek to increase our capacity-building support for law enforcement, judicial, and other criminal justice sector institutions. We greatly appreciate the funding provided by Congress in Fiscal Year 2016 for the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF). We expect to use this funding to significantly expand our civilian counterterrorism assistance for law enforcement and justice sector efforts in several key African countries.

At the same time, the State Department and USAID are increasing our focus on preventing the spread of violent extremism in the first place—to stop the recruitment, radicalization and mobilization of people, especially young people, to engage in terrorist activities.

In February 2015, President Obama convened the White House Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Summit, which brought together over 60 countries, 12 multilateral bodies, and representatives from civil society, business, and the religious community. This was followed by locally-hosted regional summits that advanced the conversation with more African stakeholders, including in Kenya and Mauritania. The CVE summit process sparked a broad-based effort to better understand and address the factors that drive radicalization and recruitment to violence within specific communities and called for a more integrated and holistic approach with a broader array of actors—government and non-government.

As such, we are expanding engagement with African governmental and non-governmental partners to better understand the drivers of violent extremism and design effective responses. We are working closely with government partners—at both the national and sub-national level—to adopt more effective policies to prevent the spread of violent extremism. This includes promoting greater trust and partnership between communities and law enforcement—a key area that contributes to resilience against violent extremism.

As we announced during President Obama’s visit to East Africa last year, the United States is providing over $40 million in FY 2015 assistance for expanded programs to help counter and prevent the spread of violent extremism in East Africa. Since then, State and USAID have analyzed the underlying drivers of violent extremism and are employing a new approach to programming pooled funds to incentivize collaborative problem diagnosis and integrated program design. To better understand al-Shabaab’s efforts to recruit and expand in areas beyond its control, we studied communities at greatest risk to identify key factors that contribute to both their vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism. We are expanding ongoing USAID programs and designing new programs tailored to address these factors and provide funding to actors in government best suited to do the job. Further to this, the President’s FY 2017 budget request includes increased resources for CVE, including an additional $59 million as part of the overall request for the CTPF. These resources would enable us to expand programs in Africa to engage high-risk communities and youth susceptible to violent extremist recruitment.

Our approach to supporting regional efforts to counter Boko Haram provides an excellent example of how we pursue a comprehensive, multi-sector approach to help address terrorism on the continent. Our ongoing programs for victim support, CVE, and humanitarian assistance provide advisors, intelligence, training, logistical support, and equipment. Specifically, the Department of State is providing $71 million worth of equipment, logistics support, and training, including human rights training, to the countries participating in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)—Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. In addition, in September 2015, the administration directed the use of up to $45 million in support under the Presidential Drawdown authority to provide airlift, training, and equipment. We are also providing training and equipment—through a $40 million Global Security Contingency Fund program—to build cooperation and capacity across regional military and law enforcement forces to enhance border security and disrupt terrorist transit.

These counter-Boko Haram efforts reflect our understanding that security measures alone will never be sufficient. The Department of State is also expanding support for law enforcement forces to conduct investigations and respond to attacks, especially attacks that involve suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices. We must help our partners to establish effective criminal justice institutions to handle terrorism cases in a rule of law framework. That is why we have deployed Department of Justice legal advisors to assist legislators, prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials. Furthermore, we must help countries to make progress in stabilizing
liberated areas, improve delivery of government services, and reducing support for violent extremism. With USAID's leadership, we are expanding support for programs to strengthen governance and mitigate conflict in areas threatened by Boko Haram. In Nigeria and Niger specifically the Office of Transition Initiatives is working to improve governments' responsiveness to citizens' expectations and increasing civic engagement with governing authorities. In Nigeria, we are also advising the government on developing a reconstruction and long-term development plan for the northeast, and USAID is delivering urgent education services to IDPs and conflict-affected communities in the northeast.

We are also responding to the humanitarian crisis caused by Boko Haram's assault on the people of the Lake Chad Basin. In Nigeria alone, approximately seven million people are suffering displacement, deprivation, and/or disease from the consequences of armed conflict and the UN estimates that 9.2 million are in need of immediate assistance across the region. In 2015, and thus far in 2016, we have provided a total of nearly $244 million in humanitarian assistance for Boko Haram-affected populations throughout the Lake Chad Basin, including for IDPs and refugees. USAID and the State Department are supporting projects to increase civilian protection, enhance early warning capabilities, deliver humanitarian relief, and strengthen the overall resiliency of communities.

ADDRESSING OTHER SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

We are also focused on addressing other sources of instability in Africa. Several parts of Africa remain plagued by instability, internal conflict and violence, including Mali, South Sudan, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We are engaged in aggressive diplomatic efforts to help resolve these conflicts and support the implementation of peace agreements. We are actively supporting ongoing peacekeeping missions. We are also providing significant assistance to address humanitarian needs, prevent mass atrocities, and address underlying causes of instability. Finally, we assist African efforts to get ahead of crises through support of conflict early warning systems and diplomatic responses.

In Mali, we are urging all sides to accelerate their efforts to implement the peace accord signed in June 2015. Significant delays in the accord's implementation have prolonged the security vacuum in northern Mali, undercut our long-term counterterrorism objectives, and made it difficult to advance reconciliation, reintegration, and development. Despite these obstacles, we remain committed to advancing an inclusive peace in Mali through dialogue with all actors and our support to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

In South Sudan, the U.S. government's overriding focus is supporting implementation of the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) so that the civil war may end and peace, stability, and prosperity take root. We are currently supporting the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) to ensure that the parties are adhering to the ceasefire and security arrangements for Juba and other cities, in accordance with the agreement.

In the CAR, the recent peaceful election and democratic transition were positive steps, but sustained engagement is essential to end the cycle of violence there. We are working both bilaterally, and with the UN, AU, and European Union to support inclusive, representative, human-rights based approaches to security sector reform and governance that facilitate post-conflict stabilization and recovery. Since the crisis in CAR began in late 2013, the U.S. provided over $79 million to train and equip troops deploying into CAR to provide peace and stability, as part of the original AU mission and the subsequent UN mission. We are working to develop activities and programs to prepare the security forces of CAR to provide citizen security in their country, with full respect for the law. Ensuring rule of law and accountability are essential pillars for CAR's future, we are helping to build CAR's judicial structure, including the development of their Special Criminal Court. We are also working to help communities throughout CAR by focusing our long-term development programming on grassroots peace and reconciliation and expanding access to justice through sexual and gender-based violence legal training and mobile courts. The United States is committed to assisting the people and the government of the CAR with its transition from recent violence to a democratically elected government that serves CAR's people.

In the DRC, we seek to preserve security gains made over the last 10 years and to continue countering armed groups in the eastern DRC, while preserving civil society space to foster free and fair elections and a peaceful transition of power. We have supported defense sector and law enforcement reform programs for the last
decade. Our efforts include increasing military justice capabilities to hold accountable human rights violators and criminals in the military. We are very concerned, however, that a delay in the November elections this year, and an effort by President Kabila to remain in office after December 20 when he is required by the DRC Constitution to step down, will lead to widespread violence and instability; such instability could have an impact on the entire region.

In Burundi, we are using diplomatic engagement at all levels to urge support for a regionally-mediated dialogue that brings all parties to the table to peacefully resolve the current conflict. We have also encouraged accountability for abuses and violations of human rights and attempts to undermine democracy in Burundi by sanctioning eight individuals responsible for such activities from both sides of the conflict. In March, we announced $31 million in humanitarian assistance to support more than 260,000 refugees who have fled Burundi over the last year and Congolese refugees and others food-insecure individuals still in Burundi. This brings the total U.S. humanitarian assistance for the regional response to the Burundi crisis to more than $86 million. Thomas Perriello, the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, has made frequent visits to Burundi, DRC, and to other countries in the region, seeking a diplomatic solution to the current crisis in Burundi and to the impending crisis in the DRC.

In collaboration with the AU and the UN, we continue to support regional efforts to end the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and bring the remaining LRA leaders to justice. We are pursuing a comprehensive strategy to build partner capacity, empower local communities, promote defections from the LRA’s ranks, and mitigate the consequences of the LRA’s atrocities. With U.S. support, regional forces from Uganda, the DRC, CAR, and South Sudan who comprise the African Union Regional Task Force have significantly degraded the LRA’s capacity to attack communities and wreak havoc, but the job is not done.

Increasingly, our African partners recognize the importance of maritime security. They have begun to lead initiatives to protect maritime traffic, reduce the loss of national revenue, and increase economic opportunities. These increased benefits can positively contribute to environmental and socio-economic development, as well as increased national, regional and continental stability. By the same token, they make a substantive contribution to global security. A comprehensive U.S. policy on maritime security in sub-Saharan Africa supports not only U.S. security interests but the administration’s broader sub-Saharan Africa policy objectives. The U.S. Government will encourage and support greater African stewardship of maritime safety and security at the continental, regional, and national levels.

The Department of State, our interagency colleagues and our international partners also recognize the serious threats posed by drug-trafficking. Foreign drug traffickers usually prefer fragile countries with weak law enforcement and judicial systems. They thrive in areas where they can operate with impunity—either because legal systems do not work, or because they can be easily corrupted. The creation of resilient institutions takes time and the lack of governance attracts transnational criminal networks. The flow of drugs through a region risks undermining the States by weakening their institutions, their local communities, and their social fabric. With our interagency colleagues, we have collaborated to develop the West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative.

Through the Early Warning and Response Partnership (EWARP) and other programs, the U.S. is assisting the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and soon individual member states with programs to improve networks for early warning of conflict or other stability challenges. This will allow our African partners to better prevent instability so they do not require costly and long term security and humanitarian responses.

BUILDING STRONG AND ACCOUNTABLE SECURITY SECTOR INSTITUTIONS

We recognize that strengthening the security and justice institutions of our African partners is vital for long-term stability on the continent. This includes both military and civilian security services, and the entities that oversee them. We are partnering with African countries and organizations to develop capable and professional security services, improve security sector governance, and enhance regional coordination and interoperability. In August 2014, President Obama announced the Security Governance Initiative (SGI), an innovative, multi-year effort between the United States and African partners to improve security sector governance and capacity by collaborating with partner governments to develop sound policies, institutional structures, systems, and processes to more efficiently and effectively deliver security and justice to citizens. SGI complements our other security sector assistance programs by building underlying institutional capacity, and furthers our efforts
to combat terrorism and instability in sub-Saharan Africa by focusing on opportunities to address institutional gaps. In SGI’s six initial partners are Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia.

The State Department’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) program supports the professionalization of African militaries through training in the United States with a heavy focus on human rights, military justice and civilian control of the military. As a complement to IMET, the Department also funds the Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), which supports instructor and/or curriculum development of select African military education institutions to help further professionalize African militaries.

The U.S. Government is also helping to resolve conflicts on the continent by building the institutional capacity of Africans to train and equip peacekeepers and respond rapidly to conflict. We are training and equipping Africa peacekeepers through programs such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. We are also building rapid response capabilities through the Africa Peacekeeping and Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). ACOTA has trained 297,071 peacekeepers since 2004. We are working to develop professional security forces that respect human rights, recruit and retain a representative corps of professionals, and safeguard institutions in countries emerging from or affected by conflict. Through APRRP, the United States is strengthening the capacity of security forces in six partner countries to deploy rapidly to emerging African crises. The inaugural APRRP partners are Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda.

PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC GROWTH, OPPORTUNITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Countering instability requires a broad and multi-faceted strategy. Given the multiple drivers of instability and conflict in Africa, our responses must be innovative and dynamic. We cannot focus solely on the security aspect of the solution. As outlined in President Obama’s 2012 Policy Directive for Africa, the United States has four overall strategic objectives in Africa: (1) strengthen democratic institutions; (2) spur economic growth, trade and investment; (3) advance peace and security; and (4) promote opportunity and development. Progress on all of these objectives is required to improve stability throughout the continent.

We continue to stay focused on supporting free, fair, and transparent electoral processes that are inclusive and representative. We have seen some major electoral successes, for example in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and CAR, but there have been setbacks as well. We will continue to support regular democratic transitions, because they can help vaccinate a country against feelings of injustice and alienation that can lead some to heed the siren call of extremism and violence. We will continue to support democratization efforts through electoral assistance programs, diplomatic engagement, public outreach, and election monitoring. We will continue to promote respect for universal human rights, promote space for civil society to operate freely, and fight corruption. And we are working with our African partners to ensure that governments deliver essential services, independent judiciaries enforce the rule of law, and that professional security forces respect human rights.

President Obama has highlighted that the most urgent task facing Africa today and for the decades ahead is to create opportunity for Africa’s next generation. Young people constitute a majority of Africa’s population and stand to gain, or lose, tremendously based on the continent’s social, political, and economic trajectory. They also represent the next generation of African leaders. Through programs like the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), we are investing in the future by building leadership skills, bolstering entrepreneurship, and connecting young African leaders with one another, the United States, and the American people. This program will have a long-lasting positive impact on the continent. Due to YALI’s success, we are expanding the number of Mandela Washington Fellows from 500 to 1,000 this year.

To support economic opportunity and growth in Africa, in 2014, President Obama also tripled the goals of his Power Africa initiative, pledging to add 30,000 megawatts of new, cleaner energy generation capacity and to expand access to at least 60 million households and enterprises across Sub-Saharan Africa. We thank Congress for its leadership in passing the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 in February of this year, which codified the strong bipartisan support for the vision, goals and approach behind Power Africa, and sends a strong signal of the United States’ long-term commitment to reducing energy poverty in sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition, we thank Congress for its leadership in reauthorizing the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for an additional ten years. We are encouraging our African partners to make the most of this ten-year reauthorization by de-
veloping AGOA utilization strategies, while at the same time laying the ground work to move our trade and investment relationship forward, beyond AGOA.

YALI, Power Africa, AGOA, and other programs like these are crucial to creating opportunities for the youth of Africa and ensuring that they are less susceptible to recruitment by extremists, criminal enterprises, and human traffickers. Global Health is another top priority. Through our work under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the President’s Malaria Initiative, we are turning the tide against these insidious diseases and saving lives. Other presidential initiatives such as the, Feed the Future, and the Partnership for Growth are also focused on building the sustainable development needed to support a rapidly growing populations.

CONCLUSION

We appreciate the committee’s interest in addressing instability in Africa and again ask for your help in supporting our relevant funding requests. We know that the challenges are great, but we believe that the comprehensive approach that we are pursuing is making progress and promoting stability that will ultimately benefit the United States and all of Africa. This will be a long-term process that requires persistence and sustained partnerships. With your help we have made significant strides over the past few years, but more work remains to be done.

Thank you and we look forward to your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LINDA ETIM

Good afternoon, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss USAID’s work with this committee. Throughout Africa, our efforts to end extreme poverty, promote resilient, democratic societies and create economic opportunity while advancing our security and prosperity are increasingly threatened by instability and the emerging forces of violent extremism. This is a global phenomenon and no part of the world is immune. The United States has a powerful tool to prevent conflict and instability: international development. As the U.S. Government’s primary development agency, USAID has long recognized the critical role of development in addressing social, economic, governance, and other legitimate grievances that can fuel violent extremism and promote radicalization of individuals and communities. It is also important to build counter-violent extremism messaging into programming, especially in local languages that can reach vulnerable populations. Our activities and interventions are designed to reduce extremists’ opportunities to exploit social injustice, lack of political integration, economic inequality, religious persecution, and ideological extremism to recruit followers to violent agendas or criminal networks.

Violent extremism impedes development. It can slow investment, prevent children from attending schools, place additional burdens on already fragile healthcare systems, and undermine political systems. Today, I’ll discuss our programs that help prevent violent extremism in the Sahel and Horn of Africa and focus on the strategic thinking, analysis, and approach that form the core of our results-oriented programs. I’ll also touch on the importance of USAID’s governance programs, which seek to address the social inequities, corruption and weak institutions that often foster instability.

ADDRESSING DRIVERS

USAID uses our analytic capabilities and draws upon our knowledge of the local context to examine the drivers of fragility. Our assessments carefully consider the “push factors” that can drive people toward supporting violent extremism, such as social fragmentation, a sense of injustice, perceptions of marginalization, and distrust of government. We also examine the pull factors that can attract those vulnerable to recruitment, including social and peer networks that provide an ideological foundation, and the promise of financial benefit. We have learned that attitudes of potential recruits are heavily influenced by their environment, information channels, peer group norms, and what they hear from trusted sources.

In 2011, USAID issued, “The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency,” which recognizes development’s role in identifying and addressing drivers of extremism in support of U.S. national security objectives. This Agency notes that much of U.S. foreign assistance goes to countries in the midst of, or trying to prevent, conflict or state failure. Our efforts to prevent and respond to violent extremism are guided by ongoing research and analysis of the factors associated with radicalization and recruitment to violence.
USAID helps prevent the spread of violent extremism through targeted efforts to promote good governance and the rule of law, respect for human rights, and sustainable, inclusive development, among other programs. Together with State, USAID is bringing its development expertise and more than a decade of experience in countering violent extremism programming to bear—harnessing the full range of analytic tools to design, support, and measure programs that reduce the vulnerabilities of communities and build local capacity to resist extremist groups. This is an essential element of the Agency’s integrated approach, which begins with prevention.

Youth are a key demographic targeted by our programming. According to the United Nations, in 2015, 226 million youth aged 15-24 lived in Africa. By 2030, it is projected that the number of youth in Africa will have increased by 42 percent to more than 320 million.

While there is no one profile of those most at-risk, unemployed youth who have migrated to peri-urban and slum areas, university graduates whose expectations have not been met, or youth who have lived through conflict can be at great risk. Slow economies and an education that is not tied to market demand leave many youth feeling that they have no role in their community. They lack a sense of belonging and feel marginalized. Such perceptions can drive youth to involvement in destructive or illicit activities.

Gender is a critical element in addressing violent extremism. We work to move beyond generalized assumptions about men and women based on common gender stereotypes, recognizing that gender norms for men and women manifest differently in various social, political, and economic contexts. For example, women are not only victims of violent extremism but can be both perpetrators and critical to prevention. As such, a nuanced and context-specific understanding of gender is needed to accurately diagnose the push and pull factors that drive both men and women to participate in violent extremism, a dynamic that has been largely unaddressed in the research.

Intrinsic to the design of all USAID activities is the belief that our development assistance has the greatest impact on the drivers of extremism by increasing resilience. At the local level, we focus on social cohesion and fostering stronger, more resilient communities. We support individuals, particularly youth, through employment and outreach programs, vocational skills training, and community development activities.

THE HORN OF AFRICA

Terrorist threats in East Africa continue to evolve and spread. The regional dynamics and conditions that propel extremism in the Horn of Africa are inextricably linked to neighboring countries. Through the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) and related programs, the U.S. Department of State, the Department of Defense, and USAID fund projects in Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda and along the Kenya-Somalia border to promote civic engagement and political participation, strengthen civil society organizations, amplify moderate voices, mitigate conflict, and empower youth and women; this is a coordinated interagency approach.

In Somalia, al-Shabaab threatens not only the country’s viability as a state but also the region’s stability. USAID supports peace and stability in 17 of 18 regions through targeted community-vetted interventions that foster good governance, economic recovery, and reduces the appeal of extremism. USAID also promotes the women, peace, and security agenda in Somalia. Since 2011, USAID constructed and/or equipped 12 women’s centers across Somalia which are neutral venues utilized by women for community planning, conflict mitigation and resolution, counseling services, adult literacy classes, and public health and safety purposes.

One of USAID’s flagship programs, the Transition Initiatives for Stabilization Plus, improves community resistance to the influence of al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), by creating effective local governance, and proactively engaging communities. We know that communities that realize positive social, cultural, and economic benefits in recovered areas are more likely to resist extremism.

This program serves as the bridge between our immediate humanitarian assistance and our medium- to longer-term development programs in Somalia. Development programs need peace and stability to be sustainable and effective. We conduct rapid-impact, high-visibility work that creates short-term employment opportunities for at-risk youth, displaced people, and other vulnerable groups. All projects are carried out in a consultative process between the local authorities and the community, enabling the civilian population to do something good for their communities while interacting and engaging with a legitimate governance structure. This further miti-
gates conflict, promotes stability and community cohesion, and strengthens and supports relationships between residents and their government officials.

In Kenya, USAID targets at-risk youth populations through Generation Kenya, which closes the gap between young people who are out of work and employers who are short of skilled employees. By partnering with the private sector, we provide training and meaningful employment to vulnerable young people. Generation Kenya has produced impressive results—100 percent of Generation Kenya’s 490 graduates were placed with employers and 90 percent are still in these jobs. Generation Kenya plans to place more than 50,000 youth in stable careers by the year 2020. Going forward, USAID will expand its programming in violent extremism “hot spots” working hand and hand with communities, local, and national governments.

In the Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development has emerged as the leading regional actor in countering violent extremism. In 2015, it announced a decision to establish a regional Countering Violent Extremism Center of Excellence, based in Djibouti. The center will focus on practical and tangible outcomes that will strengthen countering violent extremism capacities and cooperation across the region. USAID will support the implementation of the Center of Excellence’s key priorities to ensure that governments, civil society organizations and other actors have the tools and information on “best practices” to effectively carry out their efforts.

WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL

In West Africa, violent extremism is a potentially destabilizing force which threatens the tenuous progress of the region’s development. In the Sahel, vast porous borders fostering centuries-old socioeconomic and ethno-tribal ties exist alongside post-colonial boundaries and enhance the likelihood of spreading tension and instability. Modernization, urban migration, and the breakdown of social cohesion and familial and communal interdependence have disrupted historically strong community and regional ties. USAID counters this force through our role in the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership. Our programs and initiatives are designed to reduce the threats of violent extremism and armed conflicts within the Libya-Niger-Mali corridor and in Nigeria, along Niger’s southern border. By improving national and regional capacities to resist terrorist organizations, we help disrupt efforts to recruit and train new members, particularly youth. Our efforts also make it harder for extremists to establish safe havens. Through the USAID Peace through Development and Expanded Regional Stability program, we support Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso’s community leaders to engage with marginalized communities and work with government officials to make local governance more inclusive and transparent. We engage youth through vocational and entrepreneurial skills training, civic education, and leadership training to increase participation in local decision making, encourage greater citizen participation, advocacy, and government outreach.

In Niger, our Community Cohesion Initiative engages communities through small-scale, targeted activities involving local civil society organizations, governments, and community members. The Niger Education and Community Strengthening Program works in 150 schools across 22 municipalities to improve educational opportunities for children in at-risk communities. This support increased school attendance rates from 62 percent to 93 percent in targeted communities. Investments in these learning opportunities are focused on ensuring an increasingly educated population is paired with economic opportunity.

The USAID Peace through Development II project has reached 40 Nigerien communities across the regions of Agadez, Diffa, Maradi, Tahoua, Tillabéri, Zinder and the capital district of Niamey. By producing and delivering original radio content aimed at countering extremist narratives that was broadcast across 33 partner stations, the program has reached over 1.7 million people from groups at risk of violent extremism. It has directly engaged nearly 100,000 people through civic education, moderate voice promotion and youth empowerment themed events. We also facilitate local dialogue and reduce community tensions by tackling small yet important development projects such as rehabilitation of a well or brush-clearing that makes it harder for terrorists and other criminal elements to conduct attacks along popular roads. Our programs increase civic engagement among Nigerien government authorities and citizens and decrease the interest of young people to take part in illegal or extremist activities. These activities also increase the community’s knowledge of the Government of Niger’s efforts to promote security and stability throughout the region.

Across Mali, USAID supports the Government’s roadmap for political transition. Following the successful July 2013 presidential elections, we are focused on sup-
porting the peace accord that brought an end to the conflict with the Northern Armed Groups, restoring a sense of normalcy in strategic areas in the North, and countering violent extremism through inclusion of marginalized communities. Our assistance increases the effectiveness and legitimacy of government institutions. By strengthening the government’s public financial management systems we help ensure that public funds are distributed equitably and justly throughout Mali, and that decentralization efforts are accompanied with sufficient skills, training, and oversight to prevent corruption. Mali is also a partner country Security Governance Initiative, the United States’ joint endeavor with six African partners to improve security sector governance and capacity to address threats. We’ve just embarked on the first-ever Rule of Law program to ensure the Ministry of Justice obtains and maintains qualified staff to carry out its mission. In addition, our newest program, the Mali Peace Initiative, builds upon a three-year, Office of Transition Initiatives program that operated across Northern Mali to strengthen targeted communities’ resilience to conflict and radicalization. Still, the tragic loss of USAID friend and partner, Anita Datar, during the November 2015 terrorist attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali underscores the challenges that remain as we continue our efforts to bolster the fragile peace process and provide assistance to vulnerable communities.

In nearby Nigeria, a surge of violence perpetuated by the terrorist group Boko Haram, which now calls itself the Islamic State in West Africa continues. The insurGENCY has forced large populations to migrate to more secure areas, disrupting homes and livelihoods and burdening already stressed basic public services such as education and health. USAID’s programming improves the Nigerian government’s responsiveness to community needs, reducing perceptions of marginalization and addressing youth vulnerability to violent extremist influence. Women and girls are not only victims of violent extremism, but have the ability to prevent recruitment and serve as mediators and peace-builders. Christian and Muslim women have used the skills received during USAID-supported training to help citizens in Boko Haram affected communities manage the effects of trauma and stress and to conduct interreligious dialogue to promote conflict prevention and peaceful coexistence. This is integral to a more holistic and practical healing process.

The Nigeria Regional Transition Initiative focuses on diminishing conditions that allow Boko Haram to exist and flourish in the Northeast. It provides small-scale, strategically targeted assistance to local partners. For example, we supported UNICEF and other implementing partners to provide education activities for conflict-affected children, including internally displaced persons and children in host communities, in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, and Gombe states. We provide child-friendly spaces, psychosocial support, and peer mentoring opportunities for children, while also training teachers in conflict-sensitive instruction. These activities build a stronger sense of community and belonging in these traditionally marginalized areas by facilitating peaceful interactions between the internally displaced and host communities. We are promoting conflict mitigation, expanding a sports-for-peace program, and launching a local language radio program to counter the appeal of terrorist or criminal organizations.

CONCLUSION

We have seen real progress in our efforts. Through program assessment, implementation and evaluation, we are learning what works and what doesn’t. As we gain experience, we improve our monitoring and evaluation and gather more baseline data so that we can more effectively measure program impact.

A central tenet of our development approach is the transfer of knowledge and skills to stakeholders and partners in African countries. Through our Missions’ work and through USAID-funded resource centers, such as those referenced above, we train individuals and communities to own and address violent extremism in their own countries.

At USAID, we’re committed to this work. We’ve increased the number of individuals dedicated to programming focused on countering extremism, trained employees on its principles and incorporated countering violent extremism objectives into our country program strategies. Instability in some areas is the product of generations of neglect and corruption; solutions to these challenges will be the product of generations of concerted focus, legitimate engagement, and expectations of results. For our development programs to succeed we must invest in strong local partnerships and our methods of engagement must be nimble and creative. Because trends in extremism are fluid, we must constantly reassess our priorities, our progress, and our policies to ensure that our work is based on the realities of today.
Toward this end, we are pleased with our strong and productive partnership with the Departments of Defense and State on the planning and implementation of programming, as well as our work with other donors on coordinating efforts to counter extremism. Sustained engagement—within the U.S. Government, with other donor governments, and with our partners in the region—will be the key to combating extremism today and securing peace and stability for years to come.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I look forward to your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ABDOUAYE MAR DIEYE

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the committee, I am honored, as Regional Director for Africa at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to be invited as a panelist before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

UNDP is the lead UN development agency. We are active in 168 countries and territories across the world, including all 53 countries in Africa. Our mission, as set by Member States through our Executive Board, is to assist countries to eradicate poverty and, at the same time, achieve a significant reduction of inequalities and exclusion. We do this by supporting inclusive growth and development, fostering democratic governance and building resilient institutions and communities that are better able to manage risks that can endanger peace and development.

My purpose today is two-fold.

First, I want to briefly update you on what we, as UNDP, have learned about instability in Africa.

Second, I will share our view on the possible developmental approaches to mitigate the threats to peace and stability in what is often referred to as “Africa’s Arc of Instability” which encompasses the Sahel, the Lake Chad Region and the Horn of Africa.

But let me first recognize and celebrate that Africa has made significant strides on the social, political and economic front since the turn of the century.

Figures show that Africa’s rate of extreme poverty fell from 56% in 1990 to 43% in 2012; steady economic growth and macroeconomic stability have resurfaced; and protracted armed conflicts are on a downward trend. We have seen that these successes tend to be driven by countries that invest in the safety, security and productive lives of their citizens. We have also seen, in many instances, genuine and inclusive democratic transitions leading to more responsive and accountable governments. This progress, however, is at risk of reversal.

The stark reality is that steady economic growth and macroeconomic stability have not transformed into sustainable development. Deep socio-economic inequalities within and between communities in these sub-regions and indeed across much of Africa persist. While extreme poverty has been reduced, a vast number of citizens continue to live in dire conditions with little prospect of attaining the most basic of human development needs in health, education or livelihoods. It is estimated that 60% of the population in the region are between the ages 18–30. It is young Africans who are making the grim choice as illegal migrants—travelling to the North of Africa destined for the West, setting off on journeys that we know frequently end in death. It is these youth, particularly females, who are kidnapped, trafficked into servitude, and exploited. They are young; they are poor; and the majority are desperate. It is young people, in particular, who are easy prey for extremist ideologues.

They are radicalized, with promises of relevance and prosperity and encouraged along a path of violence and destruction. In Nigeria, more than 40% of suicide bombers deployed by Boko Haram last year was a child and, usually, a girl.

The exponential growth of violent extremism in Africa, including the growing convergence between different groups, also presents an imminent threat to Africa’s steady path to prosperity. We estimate that at least 33,000 persons have been killed in Africa since 2011, and 6 million people are internally displaced as a result of violent extremism.

Societies and communities bear the brunt of extremist violence. Extremists target public spaces such as markets and bus stations, forcing people to make a difficult choice between risking death by going to work to earn a living, or risking the very survival of their families. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Lake Chad Basin—Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon—where over 3 million people are displaced, thousands have been killed and many more are held captive across the four countries. The killing of students in Garissa, Kenya, the kidnapping of the Chibok
The impact of extremist violence is not only the loss of lives and destruction of property—national economies are also negatively affected. According to the International Monetary Fund, violent extremism is amongst the major risks to economies in parts of Africa. Tunisia’s GDP growth has been cut from 3% to 1% with a 45% decline in tourism. Chad’s GDP’s contracted by 1% in 2015 from a 5% growth in 2014, and Kenya saw a 25% reduction in tourism following terrorist attacks.

Weak governance and limited opportunities for youth are critical drivers of socio-political instability. They fuel illegal migration and violent extremism, significantly intensifying the risk that Africa may once again be described as a “blight on the conscience of the world”.

Over the last two years, UNDP has held a number of consultations, conducted a series of studies and commissioned research to better understand the violent extremism scourge in Africa. We have just concluded a seminal “perception study” on “radicalization, violence and insecurity in the Sahel”, covering border communities in eight countries—Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Nigeria. That study is the first, we believe, to assess perceptions of affected populations on what they see as the main factors explaining radicalization, and what they would expect as solutions. We are also currently conducting research on “radicalization journey mapping” with a view to identifying “the tipping point to violent extremism”. This research, which interviews extremists, their families and their communities, covers the zones of operation of Boko Haram and Al Shabaab in regions of Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia; and it will be extended (in a phase II) to Northern Mali and the Lake Chad region.

Preliminary results of these various studies and research converge in three major findings:

1. While the drivers of radicalization are multi-faceted, and defy easy analysis, their major roots are to be found in: (i) poverty and low human development (ii) an endemic sense of economic and political exclusion and marginalization; and (iii) weak social contracts with high level of societal divisions along ethnic or religious lines.

2. The most fertile grounds for radicalization are border areas, which are, in most of the countries studied, neglected in terms of socio-economic and institutional infrastructure.

3. While there are a number of common elements which drive radicalization, there are also some important differences between countries. For example, socio-economic factors tend to be the prominent drivers in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, Somalia and Nigeria; whereas political grievances are a much more prominent factor in Kenya.

In short, violent extremism finds fertile ground among the disenfranchised and in ungoverned spaces.

It is with this research and analysis in mind that we have embarked on a development-led approach which seeks to address the multiple drivers and enablers of radicalization and violent extremism.

We have launched a four-year regional initiative on “preventing and responding to violent extremism in Africa” which focuses on supporting regional institutions, governments, communities and at-risk individuals to address the drivers and related factors.

We are working in epicenter countries, spill-over countries and at-risk countries to help partners develop and implement integrated, regional and national policies and strategies; effective decentralization; cross-border development initiatives; rule of law; peer-to-peer, community and faith-based interventions to prevent youth radicalization and de-escalate local conflicts. We also promote social cohesion at community level, working with local and national governments to provide basic social services to citizens. We support employment creation, and we work with local governments to strengthen public administration and the extension of state authority.

We have learned that well-resourced, comprehensive and integrated programs combining security and development responses offer the best approaches to combating violent extremism. We have further learned that communities—including faith groups—should be at the center of the response, with efforts to increase trust and build confidence between them and law enforcement agencies. These initiatives, combined with participatory governance and sustained efforts to address inequality,
can bring hope, opportunity and purpose to young people and excluded communities. This approach is critical in successfully inoculating communities against radicalization.

Let me conclude my remarks by emphasizing that for Africa to meet its full development potential, preventing and responding to violent extremism is essential. This will require coordinated and collaborative partnerships between governments, development partners and civil society groups.

Mr. Chairman, I thank this committee for holding these hearings, which can only rightly add to the sense of urgency that this situation warrants, and for inviting UNDP to make a submission.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER FOMUNYOH, PH.D.

Mr. Chairman, ranking member Cardin, and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), I appreciate the opportunity to discuss terrorism and instability and make the case for why democracy and good governance should be a central component of any counterterrorism and stabilization strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa. For more than 30 years, NDI has worked around the world to establish and strengthen political and civic organizations, safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness, and accountability in government. The Institute has conducted programs in, or worked with participants from approximately 50 of Africa’s 54 countries; and I have been fortunate to be part of our efforts in many of those countries for the past two decades.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorist activity in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade threatens to destabilize the continent and roll back some of the gains in broadening political space and participation since the global wave of democratization that began in the 1990s. Groups such as Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) in northern Mali and the Sahel, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Horn of Africa have caused tens of thousands of deaths and tremendous economic and social dislocations of civilian populations. Some of these extremist organizations operating in Africa are eager to establish alliances with violent extremist organizations in other parts of the world, notably Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The international community is right in supporting counterterrorism efforts that seek to defeat these extremist groups militarily and must, at the same time, assist the affected countries to address the root causes and triggers of the rise in extremism and violence on the continent.

The principal motivation of today’s terrorists in sub-Saharan Africa is deeply rooted in a pattern of religious beliefs; however, it is noteworthy that governance failures have exacerbated the impact of this phenomenon and created an enabling environment in which extremism thrives. When a state collapses, as was the case with Somalia prior to the emergence of Al-Shabaab, or allows for huge swaths of ungovernable spaces, as was the case in Northern Mali, or fails to fulfill its basic purpose of providing citizens with access to a meaningful life, liberty, and property, as in northeastern Nigeria, the social contract between the state and the citizenry is broken. Discontent with governments that are viewed as illegitimate or ineffective is a fertile ground for recruitment as disaffected individuals may easily embrace extremism hoping to access a better life, political power or voice and the resources linked to these attributes in transition environments. Moreover, oppressed citizens and marginalized groups that are denied access to basic public goods and services and opportunities are more vulnerable to extremist appeals and indoctrination by non-state actors who in return promise to fulfill their needs. Efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa must, therefore, address poor governance as part of the overall strategy. Based on institutional lessons learned through NDI’s work, my own experience and expertise as an African, and what I hear loud and clear from African democrats—leaders and activists alike—across the continent, I would strongly offer the following three recommendations for your consideration:

- Any counterterrorism strategy for Africa should be grounded in the consolidation of democracy and good governance such that short term military victories can be sustained in the medium to long term. We cannot defeat violent extremism now only to take up the same fight five, 10 years down the road.
- Autocratic regimes should not get a pass from the international community solely because they are good partners in the fight against terrorism. Shrinking
political space, frequent and overt violations of citizen rights and freedoms, and the undermining of constitutional rule and meaningful elections breed discontent and disaffection that form the fertile ground for recruiters and perpetrators of violence and extremism. Good partners in countering violent extremism and terrorism can and should be good performers in democratic governance. These two principles are not mutually exclusive; in fact they are mutually reinforcing.

• Africans of this generation are jittery and extremely fearful of reliving the experience of the Cold War era during which dictatorships thrived amidst grave human deprivation and gross human rights abuses just because some leaders were allies of the West at the time. The fight against terrorism should not become a substitute for the Cold War paradigm of this century with regards to sub-Saharan Africa.

GOVERNANCE GAPS AND EXTREMISM

According to a 2009 report by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), marginalized citizens who feel excluded from the political process may turn to extremist groups to fight for inclusion or to gain a sense of belonging.1 Also, a 2014 study by academics at the University of Illinois, Chicago, and Pennsylvania State University found that countries where ethnic groups are excluded from political power suffer from more domestic terror attacks.2 Unfortunately, in many African countries the politics of exclusion remains a reality. Identity politics, buttressed by subjective criteria such as ethnicity, region of origin, and in a few cases religion, breeds discontent and dissatisfaction within communities.

Poor governance accounts for low and uneven rates of economic and human development, poor service delivery, and lack of opportunities for gainful employment and/or prosperity and societies with these traits tend to be breeding grounds in which extremist groups thrive.3 Dissatisfaction with a government’s failures to ensure a reasonable quality of life can lead to radicalization and a rejection of central authority.

Democratic governance is critical to every counterterrorism strategy—before, so citizen grievances are not allowed to fester and breed extremism, dissatisfaction, and alienation from the state; during, to deprive extremists of possible recruitment grounds; and after, to sustain the peace that would have been gained militarily for the medium to long term. Excessive deprivation in both economic terms and in access to political voice, freedom, and civil liberties makes young people vulnerable to the recruitment incentives of extremist movements.

PARTICULARITIES OF THE TERRORIST TRENDS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

According to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s Global Terrorism Index (2015), sub-Saharan Africa experienced the second highest number of terrorism-related casualties in 2014, with more than 10,000 deaths.4 The greatest terrorist impacts were in northern Nigeria and neighboring countries in the Lake Chad basin, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa.

Boko Haram in Nigeria

According to the Index report, Boko Haram is the deadliest terrorist group in the world (ahead of ISIS, the Taliban, and Al-Shabaab), having killed more than 7,000 people in terrorist attacks in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger in 2014 alone.5 On a global scale, in 2014 northern Nigeria suffered 23 percent of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide.6 In recent months, as Boko Haram has been militarily degraded, it has changed tactics by dramatically increasing cross-border attacks by suicide bombers in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. Boko Haram was formed by a Muslim leader, Mohammed Yusuf, who railed against government corruption and failure to adhere to the ideology of an Islamic state as a battle cry to recruit young followers, many of whom saw themselves as marginalized and victimized by the Nige-
Al-Shabaab in Somalia

In the Horn of Africa, Somalia faces an Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, which seeks to undermine any semblance of authority by the Somali government. Al-Shabaab emerged in 1991 after the collapse of the Somali state and protracted armed conflict among various ethnically-based factions. The group took advantage of the power vacuum and prevailing anarchy generated by the intra-Somali conflict to build camps and train fighters without fear of state interference. At its peak, Al-Shabaab recruited young marginalized Somalis by providing basic services to citizens in regions under its control. Despite suffering major setbacks and being pushed out of major cities, Al-Shabaab killed more people in terrorist attacks in 2014 than ever before—more than 800 people were killed in close to 500 attacks, approximately double the number killed the previous year. Al-Shabaab continues to seek openings to commit terrorist acts outside of Somalia, as it has done in the past killing civilians in attacks in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, and Al Mourabitoun in Northern Mali

Despite the military defeat of Islamist militants by African and French troops (Operation Serval) in 2013, and the signing of a peace accord in Bamako in June 2015, northern Mali remains vulnerable to terrorist activity. Recent attacks on western hotels in Bamako and neighboring Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, underscore the new strategy of Ansar Dine and Al Mourabitoun, which now focus on attacking “soft targets” such as hotels, cafes, and supermarkets. Terrorists first gained strength in the region between 2010 and 2012 when extremists and criminal networks previously active in Algeria in the 1990s moved into ungoverned spaces in northern Mali and later capitalized on a separatist movement sparked by dissatisfaction with the performance of the central government in Bamako and allegations of extreme corruption and ineffectiveness in public service delivery.

TIMELINESS OF COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIPS

As African countries have faced these new security threats for which their militaries were ill-prepared, a variety of partnerships have emerged to assist national and sub-regional forces, with the United States playing a lead role. African countries have provided ground troops to fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Northern Nigeria and Northern Mali, and have relied on European nations and the United States for more sophisticated equipment and specialized training. The net result has been the degradation of the bulk of jihadist movements that now have only limited capacity to launch small scale, albeit deadly, attacks using in some cases, suicide bombers.

Unfortunately, in some cases, African governments that are counterterrorism partners are not the best performers on democracy and good governance, which is also one of the declared pillars of U.S. policy in Africa. In fact, a number of these countries are ranked as “not free” by Freedom House. There is a growing perception, and many Africans are fearful that democracy and governance could be sidelined in pursuit of security, and that counterterrorism has become a pretext for undermining democratic values and practices. Africans that lived through the Cold War are beginning to see parallels today as governments that partner with the West to combat violent extremism may feel entitled to unconditional support regardless of their poor performance in other areas. A number of country examples illustrate the point.

- Shrinking political space in some counter-terrorism partner countries—In a number of countries some of the gains in civil and human rights of the 1990s are being eroded as political parties and civil society groups are denied political space for citizen engagement and participation or for their voices to be heard. In one notable example, while Chad has played an important role in fighting


[French troops and a smaller contingent of other European forces (German and Dutch) are engaged as part of current UN operations in northern Mali.]

terrorism in the Lake Chad basin and in northern Mali, its poor track record on
democratic governance, including recent allegations of extrajudicial killings
of soldiers who voted against the president in the last election, should give the
international community pause.12

• Newly enacted antiterrorism laws stifle dissent for political purposes—Ethiopia,
for example, is a strong counterterrorism partner in the Horn, but continues to
repress political rights, restrict speech, and arrest members of opposition part-
ties.13 During legislative elections in 2015, the ruling party won all 547 seats
in the lower house. The government uses broadly defined anti-terrorism laws
to suppress critics, including nine journalists who were arrested in 2014 and
several more who have been in detention since 2006. The Committee to Protect
Journalists noted that the 10 journalists detained at the end of 2015 risk being
tried under anti-terrorism laws.14 Furthermore, the government has violently
suppressed peaceful protests in Oromia, home of Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group,
against a government development plan that would displace farmers. Security
forces have reportedly killed over 200 people and arrested thousands, including
prominent Oromo political leaders.15

• Poor performance on constitutionalism and rule of law—Burundi is now mired
in a crisis in which over 400 people have been killed and hundreds of
thousands internally displaced or become refugees in neighboring countries.
To many Burundians and other international analysts, the crisis emanates from
the current government’s recalcitrance in seeking another five year mandate de-
spite the presidential term limitation of the 2005 Arusha accords. These Burun-
dian democracy supporters believe that the country’s poor track record on con-
stitutionalism and human rights had been overlooked by counterterrorism part-
ners because of the regime’s troop contributions to the African Union Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM).

• Backsliding on elections and political rights—Recently identified as a “key strat-
egic partner” for its support for AMISOM,16 Uganda has declined in its recent
Freedom House ratings from “partly free” to “not free” as a result of the govern-
ment’s increased violations of civil rights.17 Unfair conditions leading up to this
year’s national elections further eroded public confidence in the government, led
by one of the longest serving African presidents.18

African democrats are increasingly fearful of a return to the Cold War paradigm
through which a government’s involvement in combating terrorism overshadows the
rights of citizens to a responsive and democratic state. Recent public opinion surveys
by Afrobarometer show that while a very high percentage of Africans aspire to de-
mocracy—70 percent of Africans preferring democracy to other forms of govern-
ment—fewer than half of those in countries surveyed are satisfied with how democ-

RECOMMENDATIONS

How, therefore, can counterterrorism assistance better incorporate democracy
building?

• Counterterrorism partners should design strategies that also integrate objectives
to improve governance such as by encouraging more effective decentraliza-
tion and voice at the local level in impacted communities and populations.
Counterterrorism initiatives should take a holistic (all of government approach)
that incorporates governance considerations from conceptualization through
operationalization and consolidation.

• Host governments should be encouraged to not only defeat the negative forces
militarily, but also to invest in rehabilitating communities and creating govern-

12Convention Tchadienne Pour la Défense des Droits Humains. “Communiqué de Presse N°
012/2016.”
14Committee to Protect Journalists. 2015 Prison Census.
Sheet.” October 2, 2015.
February 20, 2016.
19Afrobarometer. “African democracy update: Satisfaction remains elusive for many” Sep-
tember 16, 2015.
ance structures to tackle and eliminate the conditions that fostered the rise of support for extremism in order to guard against a relapse.

• Partners should increase assistance to nascent democracies with weak political institutions to develop functional, responsive governments that are able to deliver basic services to their citizens. Consolidation of democracy should be approached as a long-term process that requires consistent and continued support with mechanisms to reward or incentivize good behavior and penalize poor performance.

• Use public diplomacy and other mechanisms to state clearly and unambiguously expectations for democratic behavior across Africa, as development partners did so successfully in Nigeria in 2014/2015. Moreover, such statements, as recently done in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, should be followed by concrete actions and long-term commitments to sustain support for democracy and good governance.

• Invest in education to guarantee peace and opportunities for this generation of youth. As argued eloquently in a recent New York Times op-ed by renowned journalist Nicholas Kristof, education can be more effective in combating militancy than military intervention. Girls’ education in particular can promote a virtuous cycle of development by increasing the formal labor force, boosting the economy and reducing demographic growth.

CONCLUSION

Poor governance is a driver of discontent and resentment of the state that can push citizens in transition environments to join or sympathize with extremist networks. To be successful in combating violent extremism and preventing its reappearance or resurgence, counterterrorism efforts must also address root causes. Given the high demand for democracy and good governance across Africa, the continent’s partners have a critical role to play in helping sub-Saharan African countries address issues relating to terrorism in ways that are consistent with democratic principles. The international community has many tools at its disposal to continue to lead in this endeavor.

Despite the enthusiasm of a few years ago, and some remarkable accomplishments in the last two decades, democratic governance in Africa is under attack. On the one hand, it is challenged by external threats from extremist terrorist organizations and; on the other hand, in some cases, by internal threats from autocratic regimes that fail to deliver public services, combat corruption and protect rights and freedoms. The international community should do everything in its power to help rid the continent of both existential threats. Friends of Africa must make sure that they do not, willingly or inadvertently, allow themselves to become accomplices in denying Africans their basic rights and freedoms and a secure, prosperous future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.

Additional Questions for the Record

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO HON. LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD AND JUSTIN SIBERELL BY SENATOR CORKER

Question 1. In each of the regions (Sahel, Somalia, Lake Chad) discussed during this hearing, what country or entity is the lead-nation on the donor side in ensuring a coherent and effective a response to the mutual threats being confronted? Which of the regional countries in each region is the most important to achieving U.S. interests and why?

Answer. Across the Sahel, the United States coordinates closely with international partners, most prominently France and the European Union (EU). The coordination with France in Mali, for example, is very strong, and our two governments cooperate both operationally and in design and implementation of foreign assistance programs. We also exchange information on a regular basis with European partners (such as the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and Spain), as well as Canadian, Japanese, and Australian colleagues on shared interests in security sector reform, border security, counterterrorism capacity building, maritime security, and related topics.

There is no single country that is most important to achieving U.S. interests in the Sahel. The Department of State places a significant emphasis on our support

to Niger and Chad and on advancing the stability and development of Mali. Niger and Chad face threats emanating from Libya and from Boko Haram and are willing partners for the United States in train and equip programs, as well as in countering violent extremism programs. As in Mali, the U.S. cooperation with other international partners remains strong, most particularly with the EU’s EUCAP-Sahel program. In fact, the United States will be discussing shared security and counterterrorism equities with the EU in a July security and development dialogue.

In East Africa, donors coordinate assistance for the Somali national security forces through the New Deal Working Group on Security (Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal 2), which is currently co-chaired by the Governments of Somalia, the United States, and Turkey. Specifically with regard to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the AU takes the lead on coordination of donor assistance. We supplement these formal processes with direct consultations with other key donors and stakeholders, such as the EU, UK, France, and Turkey, as well as the individual AMISOM troop-contributing countries.

There is no single most important country in the context of East Africa, as several partners each play important roles in promoting stability in the region. Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda all contribute more than 4,000 troops each to AMISOM, and are providing security across broad swaths of the country. Djibouti, while playing a significantly smaller role in terms of AMISOM troop contributions, plays an equally important part by hosting the only U.S. base in the region, which in turn enables our own efforts to promote peace and stability. Somalia itself may ultimately prove most important, as professional, effective local security forces capable of confronting the threat posed by al-Shabaab are needed before AMISOM and other international counterterrorism efforts can be responsibly drawn down.

In the Lake Chad Basin, we coordinate closely with other donors, especially the UK, France, and the EU, so that international partners fill coherent, effective, and complementary roles in helping partner countries counter Boko Haram. The foreign and defense ministries of the P3 capitals (U.S., UK, and France) interact regularly at both the assistant secretary level and the senior working level; the EU is often folded into these policy-level engagements. In the field, P3, EU, and UN agencies interact frequently so that our policies and political messaging are coordinated. These coordination efforts are also designed to ensure that our support to our African partners in their efforts to ultimately defeat Boko Haram is complementary and not duplicative or counterproductive.

For example, the United States, UK, and France coordinate closely through the Coordination and Liaison Cell (CCL) to support the African-led Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), based in N’Djamena, Chad. Additionally, we continue to work closely with the EU so that its 50 million Euro contribution to the MNJTF is effectively and efficiently utilized and do not duplicate other donor contributions. We also coordinate closely with the UN to provide humanitarian support to the people who have been displaced by Boko Haram’s violence.

The United States adheres to a regional strategy to counter Boko Haram, which supports the individual and joint efforts of each Lake Chad Basin country. We recognize, however, that Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and the origin of Boko Haram, fills an especially critical role in defeating Boko Haram and creating the conditions so those displaced by the terrorists can safely and voluntarily return to their homes and begin the arduous task of rebuilding.

Question 2 Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield made an important statement in support of AFRICOM as some have suggested it be folded back into EUCOM. Would you further enumerate the value and mechanisms for improving coherence in U.S. policies and efforts in the region? Does NEA concur with respect to an independent AFRICOM?

Answer. The Bureau of African Affairs (AF) wholly supports U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) remaining as an independent command. Returning Africa to being a part-time focus for another geographic command would only be detrimental. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) fully concurs.

Although not directly related, military cooperation and assistance to Africa has grown immensely since AFRICOM’s inception in 2007. African countries’ participation in peacekeeping operations has nearly quadrupled, from over 17,859 to now 68,202 African personnel deployed on missions. Most of these African soldiers have been trained through a combination of State and DoD assistance. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)/Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) partnerships have increased from 10 countries to 23. AFRICOM’s role in supporting peacekeeping capacity building is also critical to the success of African peacekeeping. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) has grown
from five to 12. Today, even more than in 2007, it is critical to have an independent AFRICOM fully focused on the African continent.

The Department of State (AF and NEA) and AFRICOM have consequently increased our interaction and cooperation tremendously since 2007. We regularly participate in AFRICOM’s planning cycle, including their Africa Strategic Integration Conference, the Strategy to Activities and Resources Working Group, Posture Planning Conference, and the Planning Conferences for all major exercises. The Department holds several weekly video teleconferences with AFRICOM, from the front office down to the working action officer level. AFRICOM general officers are regular visitors at our office, and our working staffs are on a first name basis with their counterparts in Stuttgart.

**Question 3** What is the definition of CVE? How does CVE programming fit within the foreign assistance resourcing network and prioritized for funding relative to other funding? How is CVE management and programming nested in the executive branch and what entity leads the inter-agency effort in coordinating, planning, implementing, and evaluating CVE programming and why?

**Answer.** The Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy on CVE defines CVE as "proactive action to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that facilitate violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence." This includes both disrupting the tactics used by violent extremists to attract new recruits and building specific alternatives, narratives, capabilities, and resiliencies in targeted communities and populations to reduce the risk of radicalization and recruitment to violence. CVE is a critical component of our overall counterterrorism strategy and is a priority for the U.S. Department of State (The Department) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). CVE programming should complement larger efforts to promote good governance and the rule of law, respect for human rights, and sustainable, inclusive development.

To advance the goals outlined in the Department and USAID’s CVE Strategy, CVE Programming focuses on four areas: Research, Prevention, Intervention, and Rehabilitation & Reintegration.

1. **Research:** Understanding the drivers of violent extremism at the global, regional, and local levels, and determining the most effective interventions to address those drivers including how to measure and explain programmatic effectiveness;
2. **Prevention:** Mitigating identified drivers of violent extremism, including expanding government, civil society, and community capacity to utilize tools that reduce vulnerability to violent extremist radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization;
3. **Intervention:** Countering violent extremist messaging and recruitment tactics as well as providing positive alternatives, narratives, and/or “off-ramps” for individuals caught in the cycle of radicalization to violence; and
4. **Rehabilitation/Reintegration:** Establishing policies and programs to promote the effective rehabilitation and reintegration of former violent extremists, including those in prisons.

In FY17, the Department requested $186.7 million for CVE activities. This level is a $46.2 million increase over FY16, and a $61.3 million increase over FY15. This funding is requested to supplement activities in some of the most critical areas where elevating and expanding efforts is necessary to ensure we are adequately preventing and countering radicalization. In FY16, the Department will prioritize CVE efforts to the extent possible within the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), however CTPF was appropriated exclusively as Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Program (NADR) funding, limiting the Department and USAID’s ability to use CTPF to expand on prevention-related work, particularly with non-governmental and civil society partners who can be some of the most credible voices and effective actors to counter Da’esh messaging and recruitment, and counter support for violent extremism. In FY17, the Department requested $80 million for CTPF, $59 million of which is requested as Economic Support Funds (ESF), to foster expanded engagement with non-law enforcement partners. ESF funding is critical to addressing our CVE objectives in a comprehensive way.

The 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) states that the Department of State will work to enhance, refine, and elevate ongoing CVE efforts, particularly those focused on prevention. Although there is not a single entity that leads the interagency effort CVE effort, the Department and USAID closely coordinate with relevant interagency partners to ensure maximum impact of USG
Secretary Kerry has directed the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CT) to coordinate and serve as the lead for the Department of State’s CVE work, including serving as a hub for the Department’s CVE policy planning, assistance coordination and innovation, and external engagement. CT is also responsible for facilitating strategic coordination with the Global Engagement Center, USAID’s CVE Secretariat and the domestic Interagency CVE Task Force, currently based at the Department of Homeland Security. These efforts will complement the bureau’s critical ongoing work on other counterterrorism issues; for example, aviation security, counter terrorist finance, foreign terrorist fighters, designations and sanctions.

Question 4. Since 2005, the U.S. government’s Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has been the primary U.S. counterterrorism initiative in northwest Africa and received nearly $300 million in allocated funds from 2009–2013.

• How have these resources been applied and how has the method and mechanism for them evolved?

Answer. The U.S. government allocated $297 million from fiscal years 2011 through 2016 for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program (TSCTP).

Since 2005, TSCTP resources have been applied to: military counterterrorism capacity building through Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds; law enforcement and justice sector counterterrorism capacity building through Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR) funds, and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds; and CVE programs through Economic Support Funds (ESF) and Development Assistance (DA). Earlier in the Partnership, such funds were programmed largely bilaterally with a significant focus on tactical and operational capacity building for military and law enforcement. CVE programs were innovative but less integrated with military and criminal justice sector investments.

Today, TSCTP programs have an increasing focus on building institutions and the sustainment of capabilities, which has led to more frequent deployments of advisors and mentors. Through TSCTP we are also working to build synergies between these “hard” investments and the “soft” side investments made through CVE programs with civil society participants. The interagency TSCTP community within the U.S. government has deliberately evolved program designs to complement the investments of our European and other international partners also working in the Maghreb and Sahel regions, rather than simply striving for de-confliction of programs. Border security coordination and information sharing is one way the United States has stepped forward, through TSCTP coordination mechanisms, to lead this work. Additionally, TSCTP programming seeks to bridge civilian and military divides through innovative program designs that encourage communication and cooperation between police, gendarmerie, and military in both training and exercise scenarios. Finally, the TSCTP programs include a stronger emphasis on truly regional programming, developing avenues for TSCTP member countries to train and exercise together, share information, and develop interoperable capabilities—such as Trilateral Cooperation training investments between Maghreb and Sahel partners.

Question 5. PREACT, or the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, is intended to help build the capacity of partner nations in the region to address the threat of al-Shabaab. A 2014 GAO report indicated that U.S. agencies had not fully considered and documented the extent to which partner nations could or would sustain U.S. training and equipment, negating the effect and value of such investments.

• How has the administration ensured partner commitments and aligned investments with sustainable outcomes?
• How have these resources been applied and how has the method and mechanism for them evolved?
• What is the prospect for a broader Africa regional mechanism?

Answer. In response to the 2014 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), the Department of State has improved documentation showing how key factors such as country needs, absorptive capacity, sustainment capacity, other U.S. efforts, and international partners’ efforts inform PREACT program decisions. Additionally, in the last two years, both the Departments of State and Defense have deployed more advisors and mentors to the field to monitor partner nation sustainment of training and equipment investments. The Department of State also funds an external moni-
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) firm to monitor partner nation sustainment of military counterterrorism assistance supported by PREACT PKO. The monitoring of PKO funds provides an additional opportunity to validate partner commitments and the alignment of investments with the desired outcomes.

In mid-2015, the Department of State reinvigorated our coordination efforts through PREACT to operationalize the administration’s counterterrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE) goals. Interagency working level and more senior level meetings, occur regularly, and there is a renewed focus on streamlining processes and procedures across partners. The Department of State explicitly coordinates border security and CVE programs among the interagency and with international partners. The Department of State has also enhanced its oversight and coordination of these crucial security sector investments, as recommended by the 2014 GAO reviews of TSCTP and PREACT, through dedicated staff.

In its management of PREACT, the Department of State relies on interagency coordination and convenes key U.S. interagency and other stakeholders on a regular basis to share information, assess progress toward our objectives, and design complementary program initiatives. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) also hosts multiple planning events each year, and the Department of State participates to coordinate U.S. government security assistance in Africa, including specifically on counterterrorism. In addition, staff supporting PREACT collect and disseminate monitoring data, support a web-based information portal, update and maintain digests and matrices of relevant programming, and share relevant information both within the interagency and with the international community. The United States has very close working relationships with key international partners, in the region as well as with the UK, France, the EU, Canada, Japan, Germany, Spain, Australia, African and regional institutions, such as the AU, and international organizations and UN entities.

A region-specific coordination mechanism like PREACT is necessary to address the extent of the threat in East and the Horn of Africa, specifically. The Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs has the responsibility for managing and overseeing both the PREACT and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) coordination mechanisms, which enables a smooth transfer of best practices and lessons learned across the partnerships without having to merge into a single, broader coordination mechanism. Maintaining regionally-focused coordination mechanisms facilitates tailored approaches to specific threats (e.g., threats posed by al-Shabaab, versus Boko Haram, versus al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, etc.).

Question 6. Is the CVE, and now in the international partner realm—PVE, effort sufficiently experienced to effectively measure impact? How important are the non-kinetic military components to CVE/PVE?

Answer. The importance of developing effective tools for monitoring and evaluating Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) programming is widely acknowledged in the international community. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s CVE programming is now designed with the inclusion of monitoring and evaluation plans. Illustrative CVE measures of effectiveness include: (1) the knowledge and skills imparted to CVE practitioners by our CVE training; (2) how those CVE practitioners used the knowledge and skills they gained in their own initiatives; and (3) the reach and resonance of CVE messaging on local populations.

The Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CT) recently launched a comprehensive third-party evaluation of its CVE programming over the last several years, with a focus on Indonesia, Kenya, and Bangladesh. The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) developed a monitoring and evaluation guide for CVE programs. The guide is intended to support embassy staff and program officers increase monitoring and evaluation standards and provide better feedback on what is or is not working in CVE interventions.

The United States government must have a comprehensive approach to countering violent extremism. The Department of State is focused on a number of important priorities, including messaging and building partner capacity. We are working to blunt the violent extremist recruitment message in order to dissuade individuals or communities from being attracted to or aligning with violent extremist groups. We are working with partners to develop interventions that could stop and reverse a radicalization process. We engage diplomatically to encourage effective policies governments should adopt to rehabilitate those who have turned away from violence and terrorism, and to reintegrate them back into society. Further, U.S. military and host nation security forces are a critical component of a whole-of-government ap-
proach to countering and preventing violent extremism globally. Security forces play an integral role in mitigating grievances that are driving radicalization to violence at the local level. U.S. security forces and host nation security forces around the world are engaging in a broad range of non-kinetic military activities that contribute to a better understanding of violent extremism dynamics, and also activities that directly counter and prevent radicalization to violence through intelligence, civil affairs, information operations, and public affairs components. These types of non-kinetic military missions should be integrated into national-level and interagency CVE strategies and coordinated with civilian-led CVE activities.

Question 7. One key aspect of U.S. efforts to address terrorism in Africa is DOD’s Global Train and Equip Program (GTEP), which develops partner nations’ military capabilities for combating terrorist groups. Last year, countries in Africa got nearly $275 million through GTEP, but earlier this year GAO raised concerns about DOD’s assessments of partner nation absorptive capacity and long term sustainment plans. Others have expressed concern that U.S. counterterrorism efforts are weighted too heavily toward military activities.

• What is the appropriate balance of civilian and military efforts to combat terrorism?
• Is this balance being achieved in sub-Saharan Africa?
• How will it be achieved if it is not and how will it be sustained if it is?

Answer. The Departments of State and Defense work closely to formulate, plan and implement security assistance in Africa. The Presidential Policy Directive on Security Sector Assistance (PPD-23), released by the administration in 2013, guides this process. The directive mandates an inclusive, deliberate, whole-of-government approach to U.S. security sector assistance, which aligns activities and resources with our national security priorities. The directive calls for transparency and coordination across the U.S. government to develop long-term strategies for security sector assistance, which build the capacity of our partners in a way that is strategic and sustainable. Particularly through the coordination mechanisms of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), the U.S. government shares information in the design, assessment, monitoring, and reporting of both military and civilian security counterterrorism capacity building programs.

The balance of civilian and military efforts to combat terrorism is different in each context. At this stage of the fight against Boko Haram, the support for military efforts is necessarily greater than civilian security efforts, since Nigerian Federal Police are not deployed in adequate numbers in Northeast Nigeria to perform stabilization and security functions.

In another example, in the fight against al-Shabaab, military counterterrorism efforts are a higher priority in the short-term since the Federal Government of Somalia has designated the Somali National Army (SNA) to come in behind African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) operations to stabilize newly liberated areas. However, in the case of Somalia, the medium- and long-term aims of police-led community security, versus security provided and led by the SNA, necessitates some adjustments to increase resources available for civilian security programming. The Department of State’s programming and planning reflects this emphasis, responding to a need to develop capable police forces that will support stability created by AMISOM and the SNA.

More broadly, U.S. departments and agencies supporting civilian security need additional resources, including additional funding and staff to manage and oversee the programs. The Department of State agrees that increased support is needed for police, gendarmerie, National Guard, and other civilian security providers as well as increased funding for development and good governance programming to complement the existing volumes of military assistance.

Question 8. The violence perpetrated by the Ethiopian government against protesters continues and troubling reports of hundreds of casualties, torture, and disappearances have raised grave concerns that the U.S. government is looking the other way. This is in addition to actions that continue to constrain and punish civil society.

• What specific actions has the U.S. government taken to address these human rights and freedoms of Ethiopians?
• What steps has the Ethiopian government taken to improve the volatile situation?
• What is the U.S. government assessment of the likelihood of a violent uprising in Ethiopia over the next 5 years?

Answer. The Department of State remains concerned about the situation in Oromia where the Ethiopian government’s heavy-handed response to protests resulted in the death of numerous protestors and the arrests of many others, including journalists and political party leaders. As a result we have:

1. Issued three public statements since December 2015 that articulated our concerns about government and security forces’ response to Oromo protestors, called for meaningful dialogue, and cautioned against using anti-terrorism laws to unduly silence independent voices… voices we view as critical contributors toward Ethiopia’s growth and development goals.

2. Increased embassy outreach throughout the Ethiopian countryside and specifically to Oromia to engage local officials and the community.

3. Commended the recent release of a journalist, but continue to underscore to Ethiopian government counterparts that for meaningful dialogue to occur it must protect those rights enshrined in its constitution, including the rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly. We remain steadfast in emphasizing the importance of respect for due process for those detained by investigating allegations of mistreatment, publicly presenting the evidence it possesses against them, and distinguishing between political opposition to the government and the use of violence. These steps would contribute positively to building trust and goodwill, and indicate a shift away from a security-centric response to protests in the Oromia region.

4. Deepened relationships with government and non-government actors such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, the Ethiopia Institution of the Ombudsman, and the Office of the National Human Rights Action Plan at the Ministry of Justice, among others, through whom we encourage Ethiopia to hold to account those who have committed human rights violations.

5. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Assistant Secretary Malinowski traveled to Ethiopia three times to follow-up on democracy, good governance, and human rights issues discussed during President Obama’s July 2015 visit. Assistant Secretary Malinowski discussed with counterparts possible avenues for expanding U.S. assistance in building the capacity of Ethiopian civil society, including by addressing some of the elements of Ethiopian law that place an especially onerous burden on civil society organizations. He has consistently communicated to the Ethiopian government that a capable, empowered civil society can and would be an important ally for a government that prides itself on governance.

6. At the 6th bilateral Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights Working group, where the U.S. was represented by Ambassador Haslach and Assistant Secretary Malinowski, the situation in the Oromia figured prominently along with other issues such as the important role civil society plays in strengthening good governance. At the conclusion, the Government of Ethiopia reaffirmed a commitment to strengthen governance and political pluralism in keeping with the principles enshrined in its constitution.

The Prime Minister and other Ethiopian officials have publicly acknowledged the legitimate grievances of the Oromo people and the need for accountability. The outbreaks of violence in Oromia are, they agree, a symptom of these governance failures.

The Government of Ethiopia announced on January 13 it had cancelled the Addis Ababa Master plan, which was a positive development, but not a solution in itself to address these complex underlying issues. In his March 10 address to Parliament, the Prime Minister confirmed that the problems in Oromia “are direct results of (government) unresponsiveness and unemployment.”

We understand the government is investigating instances of corruption that contributed to the grievances Oromo protestors have highlighted.

We understand the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission is investigating the situation in Oromia, and we continue to encourage officials to be transparent with the findings and to pursue every way possible to ensure, and also be transparent about, subsequent accountability.

A democratic, secure, and prosperous Ethiopia is in the best interest of the country’s citizens. In our private and public engagements with Ethiopian officials we underscore the indelible link between these goals. To help build long-term peace and stability, citizens of all countries, including Ethiopia, must be able to freely participate in political life and discourse. This allows grievances and ideas to be channeled
in a peaceful manner. We thus continue to encourage Ethiopia to respect the constitutionally-enshrined rights of its citizens.

While we understand that mass protests in Oromia have largely abated we continue to encourage the Ethiopian government to take further steps to rebuild trust with the community and engage in meaningful dialogue. Only through such dialogue will Ethiopia find its firmest footing as a nation.

**Question 9.** Kenya remains subject to considerable threat from Al Shabaab and despite close collaboration with the international community, continues to react with considerable violation of human rights and extra-judicial activities and ill-advised policies in key minority regions of the country.

- What progress has been made by the Kenyan government in improving their rule of law practice and addressing security force impunity, if any?
- What mechanisms is the U.S. and others prepared to employ to improve such policies?

**Answer.** The Kenyan security forces and the Kenyan people are facing very real and serious threats, some of which are also directed at U.S. persons and interests in Kenya. As the President has noted, we stand with Kenya in its fight against terrorism and consistently underscore that respect for human rights and the rule of law are important elements in the fight against terror.

We strongly condemn reports of human rights violations by Kenyan security forces and have consistently urged full investigations of allegations and accountability for any individuals found responsible. We take seriously our relevant legal and policy restrictions on the provision of assistance. Ongoing U.S. training seeks to increase the professionalism and capacity of partner forces to carry out difficult jobs effectively while respecting human rights. We are also providing support for independent police oversight bodies, and assisting internal and external police accountability mechanisms to improve integrity, accountability, and transparency in the Kenyan police services.

Trainees and units are screened so that we provide assistance in a manner consistent with our legal requirements and Department policy, and training includes modules devoted to respect for human rights and the rule of law. We have excluded some Kenyan individuals and units from U.S. government training as a result of concerns about human rights violations. We continue to review all available information to protect against the Department of State supporting training and assistance to units who have committed gross violations of human rights.

Senior U.S. government officials will continue to raise at the highest levels of the Kenyan government concerns about human rights violations by Kenyan security forces. We emphasize that any such violations are counterproductive, and place receipt of U.S. security assistance at risk. We stress the need for a sustainable and effective long-term counterterrorism strategy in Kenya that incorporates government and civil society perspectives. Moreover, we consistently urge the Kenyan government to hold those responsible for human rights violations accountable and engage more constructively with members of populations at risk of recruitment to violent extremism, including coastal communities.

Countering the threat of violent extremism requires the full participation of all members of Kenya’s diverse population. Through the Security Governance Initiative, we are working with the Kenyan government to enhance police human resources management and the administration of justice in order to foster greater public confidence in security institutions, prevent the marginalization of segments of Kenya’s population, remove obstacles hindering effective prosecution, and allow all citizens access to judicial resources and recourse.

**Question 10.** Recent reports indicate that the export of religious education funding from the Middle East/Gulf region to smaller African countries is proceeding apace.

- Is such financing and associated engagement by these donor countries of concern? Is it accelerating?
- What does it mean to see continued export of religious influenced funding for mosques and madrasas from sects that have historically supported extreme ideology?
- Are Salafist groups still exporting violent jihad to unexpected locales or are those in common areas of investment having outsized impact?

**Answer.** Several countries in the Middle East, and in the Gulf Region in particular, continue to play an increasingly influential role in advancing development, security, commercial, and humanitarian objectives in Africa. This assistance, when coordinated closely with others in the international donor community, can amplify
our collective efforts to support African governments working toward developing capacities to deliver critical services to underserved or under-resourced populations.

Religious education is often a viable alternative to schools that are out of reach for many African families, both physically and financially. While it is difficult to say whether external donor support from the Middle East for religious education in Africa is accelerating, we are always concerned when our African partners lack the tools necessary to provide viable education options to those who seek them and most need them. We continue to engage African countries on these issues, and work closely with those eager to improve access to education in their countries.

Many African countries have become increasingly vocal about trends in radicalization and raised concerns about the perceived propagation of extremist ideology by certain foreign-funded religious organizations and training programs. Though most of the outreach conducted by religious charities and non-governmental organizations in Africa is for non-violent purposes, there are concerns that a select few of these entities can be misused by violent extremists, facilitators, and financiers to support terrorist activity on the continent or elsewhere. This is one of the reasons we are committed to working with African governments to develop effective solutions to counter violent extremist ideology.

The Department of State can provide classified information about groups seeking to export violent messaging or actions in Africa separately.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO HON. LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD BY SENATOR CARDIN

Question 1. A Washington Post story from Monday, May 9 relayed a troubling story alleging Somalia's National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)—which it says we help to fund—uses children as spies.

Is there any truth to the allegations about NISA's use of child spies? What have we communicated to the Somalis about this, and what are we going to do if the practice continues?

Answer. We have no additional information to substantiate the Washington Post allegations that NISA uses children as spies. The United States supports the Federal Government of Somalia's National Program for Disengaged Combatants, which calls for the Somali government to transfer al-Shabaab defectors under the age of 18 to UNICEF or UNICEF-affiliated partners.

Following the publication of the Washington Post story, the Prime Minister of Somalia announced the establishment of a fact-finding committee to investigate the allegations regarding NISA's use of child spies. The United States continues to press the Somali government to adhere to its commitments as a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Question 2. As you know, combined Department of State and Department of Defense funding for security assistance in Africa has grown from just over $500 million in FY13 to approximately $1 billion in FY15. At the same time, the amounts available for democracy building have fallen from $230 million in FY13 to only $170 million in FY15. Support for democracy and governance and anti-corruption are critical components of counterterrorism efforts, but these activities are significantly underfunded. I wrote Secretary Kerry to express my concern about the imbalance in October of last year.

Will the administration meet the directive in the FY16 Omnibus for $312 million for democracy and governance activities in Africa?

What specific steps has the administration taken to ensure that we are complementing our security assistance with democracy and governance funding in countries with poor human rights and democracy records?

Answer. We agree that democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) programs are an important component of our efforts to support resilient, open, and democratic societies in Africa and around the globe. In FY 2016, while the 653(a) allocations fulfill the hard earmark of $2.3 billion for democracy programs worldwide, we agree that funding for DRG programs in Africa falls short of meeting some important needs in this sector for the region. The FY 2016 appropriation and accompanying Statement of Managers (SOM) report greatly increase the number and amount of country and sectoral funding directives from previous years and limit the Department’s and USAID’s ability to deviate from directed levels in the FY 2016 653(a) report. Relative to the President’s request, the appropriation also significantly cuts the major accounts that fund DRG programs in Africa. These factors
made it difficult to allocate resources for DRG programs globally as strategically as possible even as we met the $2.3 billion hard earmark.

Now that the 653(a) report has been submitted, we are reviewing options to determine what flexibility we might have to increase support for DRG in Africa including within the five percent flexibility as well as potentially through Congressional notification. The Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F) and USAID’s Office of Budget Resources Management (BRM) are working closely with the State and USAID Africa Bureaus as well as with the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (State/DRL) and the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/DCHA) to ensure that DRG resources globally reflect the most strategic allocation possible within funding constraints, including by looking to address priority DRG funding shortfalls in Africa by shifting current and prior-year funds to meet the most critical gaps.

We recognize that human rights sensitive security assistance and core democracy, human rights, and governance programming in the region are essential to progress in Africa. Democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) are fundamental objectives in and of themselves: a lack of democratic governance creates an enabling environment for instability, violent extremism, and humanitarian crises, which often are a result of corruption, poor governance, and weak or nonexistent democratic institutions. The U.S. government also recognizes the importance of DRG to achieving and sustaining global development goals, as well as key U.S. foreign policy objectives.

While the President’s request in recent years has included increasing support for DRG programs in Africa, in the past, annual appropriations bills have reduced funding for the key foreign assistance accounts that support DRG programs, which has made it difficult to fully fund DRG programs included within the President’s Request, including DRG programs in Africa.

The FY 2017 foreign assistance request includes $343.2 million for DRG programs in Africa and presents the opportunity to partially reverse this trend by supporting peaceful transitions of power, reform efforts, and civil society engagement. There is a critical link between DRG programs and security sector assistance within Africa. Many of our security assistance accounts also fund activities that touch on rule of law and human rights concerns. This does not replace the need for core DRG funding, but it is important to note that some of our security assistance contributes to DRG objectives.

**Question 3.** A number of our counterterrorism partners in Africa have been criticized for failing to adequately and transparently hold security forces accountable for alleged abuses against civilians. For example, Amnesty International has alleged that the Nigerian military killed 350 people in Zaria in December, and buried the bodies in mass graves to conceal evidence. The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in Kenya has also been accused of extrajudicial killings of youth and alleged terror suspects. I have introduced a resolution calling for the Ethiopian government to investigate the recent killings of unarmed protesters in Oromia and elsewhere in Ethiopia.

- What diplomatic efforts and programmatic support is the U.S. providing to the military and civilian justice institutions of our counterterrorism partners to ensure they have the capacity to hold perpetrators accountable? Are Title 10 funds available for these types of activities in Africa?
- President Buhari stated that he would leave no stone unturned to deal with all cases of human rights abuses. What efforts has the Nigerian government made to investigate or try abuses under either his administration or that of his predecessor?
- Has the Ethiopian government committed to investigate alleged killings and other abuses associated with the recent crackdown in response to protests in Oromia and similar abuses in other parts of the country against civil society, journalists and others? What has been our response to these abuses?

**Answer.** The Department strongly condemns human rights abuses by any security forces and has consistently urged full investigations of allegations and accountability for individuals found responsible. We take seriously our responsibility to withhold or condition our assistance in light of applicable legal requirements and ethical principles. Ongoing U.S. training seeks to increase the professionalism and capacity of partner militaries and law enforcement to carry out difficult jobs effectively while respecting human rights. Trainees and units are screened in accordance with the Leahy law, and all training includes modules devoted to respect for human rights and the rule of law. In several countries, we have excluded individuals and units from U.S. government training as a result of concerns about human rights
abuses. We continue to review all available information to avoid providing training and assistance to units who have committed gross violation of human rights.

Senior U.S. government officials raise with partner governments at the highest levels our concerns about human rights violations by security forces. The Department emphasizes that any such violations are wrong, counterproductive, and place elements of U.S. security assistance at risk. Moreover, we consistently urge our partners at the executive and ministerial levels, as well as with security force commanders, to bring those responsible for human rights violations to justice and engage more constructively with members of populations at risk of recruitment to violent extremism. Our diplomatic engagements continue to forge a common understanding of how and why we continue to uphold our firm and resolute policy to not support individuals or units that have been implicated in gross violations of human rights.

The White House Security Governance Initiative (SGI) is an important tool for us to dedicate diplomatic engagement and programming resources to strengthen the institutional development that will generate and sustain security forces that conduct their work in accordance with rule of law and respectful of human rights.

The USAFRICOM Office of Legal Counsel conducts Legal Engagement programming on rule of law and human rights; this includes strategic communications as well as work with African economic and security organizations and military-to-military contacts. In addition, the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) provides training, seminars, and exchanges to help build this capacity in our international partners, to include numerous African countries. Kenya’s Anti-terrorism Police Unit, or the ATPU, is not eligible for Title 10 funds. The Department of State has supported particular elements within the ATPU through the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program on crisis response, investigations, and related topics. Each ATA course and consultation includes human rights modules that emphasize the importance of conducting policing in a rule of law framework.

We consistently urge the Nigerian government to take all reports of human rights allegations seriously and investigate them thoroughly. We stress the importance of respecting human rights and protecting civilians in all security responses. During his May 2016 visit to Nigeria, Deputy Secretary Blinken said, “[Respecting human rights] is the right thing to do, but it is also the smart thing to do… because ignoring the human rights of citizens risks turning them to extremism and fueling the very fire that we seek to extinguish together.” We regularly raise our concerns with the Nigerian government about its response to the threat of violent extremism throughout the country, including its detention policy and practices, which various NGOs and international experts assert violate international law. We also discuss related issues with civil society organizations.

The Nigerian military should provide for disciplined military operations in accordance with clear rules of engagement and international law, humane treatment of all detainees, continued and expanded access for the independent monitoring of all detention facilities, and accountability for all perpetrators of unlawful violence and timely justice for victims and their families. In his May 2015 inauguration speech, President Buhari called for overhauling “the rules of engagement to avoid human rights’ violations in [military] operations” and improving “operational and legal mechanisms so that disciplinary steps are taken against proven human right violations by the Armed Forces.”

Last summer, in recognition of the need for enhanced accountability in the military, President Buhari appointed new leadership for the military. And in a further effort to improve the protection of civilians and the overall fight against Boko Haram, President Buhari moved the command and control center of the military from Abuja to Maiduguri, the epicenter of the conflict in northeastern Nigeria.
In March 2016, the Nigerian Army, working together with civil society organizations, created human rights offices that will strengthen the Army’s capacity to protect human rights. The Nigerian Defense Headquarters also inaugurated a Defense Advisory Committee on Human Rights to monitor and investigate allegations of human rights abuses within the military.

In addition, since December 2015, at least six separate investigations of the Zaria incident are underway by the Nigerian Senate and House of Representatives, the National Human Rights Commission, and the Judicial Commission of Inquiry established by Kaduna State, among others. We continue to urge those carrying out investigations to do so credibly, swiftly, thoroughly, and with impartiality.

The Department issued a statement on April 29 expressing concern over the Government of Ethiopia’s decision to file terrorism charges against Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) First Vice-Chairman Bekele Gerba and others in the Oromia. The statement also noted that the government has not yet held accountable any security forces responsible for alleged abuses. This latest statement was preceded by three statements issued since December 2015 that articulated our concerns about government and security forces’ response to Oromo protestors and called for meaningful dialogue...to include independent voices. Our Embassy has increased outreach throughout the Ethiopian countryside and specifically to Oromia to engage local officials and the community.

The Department understands the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission is investigating the protests in Oromia. We also understand the government is investigating instances of corruption that contributed to the grievances Oromo protestors have highlighted. We continue to encourage officials to be transparent with the findings and also be transparent about subsequent accountability. We remain concerned about the situation in Oromia where the government’s heavy-handed response to protests resulted in the death of numerous protestors and the arrests of many others, including journalists and political party leaders. We underscore to Ethiopian government counterparts that in order for meaningful dialogue to occur, they must protect the rights enshrined in its constitution, including the rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly. We remain steadfast in emphasizing the importance of respect for due process for those detained by investigating allegations of mistreatment, publicly presenting the evidence it possesses against them, and distinguishing between political opposition to the government and the use of violence. These steps would contribute positively to building trust and goodwill and indicate a shift away from a security-centric response to protests in the Oromia region.

Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Assistant Secretary Malinowski traveled to Ethiopia three times to follow-up on democracy, good governance, and human rights issues discussed during President Obama’s July 2015 visit. A/S Malinowski has discussed with counterparts possible avenues for expanding U.S. assistance in building the capacity of Ethiopian civil society, including by addressing some of the elements of Ethiopian law that place an especially onerous burden on civil society organizations. He has consistently communicated to the Ethiopian government that a capable, empowered civil society can and would be an important ally for a government that prides itself on governance. At the 6th bilateral Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights Working group, attended by Ambassador Haslach and Assistant Secretary Malinowski, the situation in the Oromia figured prominently along with other issues such as the important role civil society plays in strengthening good governance. At the conclusion, the government of Ethiopia reaffirmed a commitment to strengthen governance and political pluralism in keeping with the principles enshrined in its constitution.

We continue to work with our African partners to develop and implement sustainable, effective, long-term counterterrorism strategies that incorporate government and civil society perspectives.

Question 4. USAID has indicated that endemic corruption is one of the so called “push factors” that favors the spread of violent extremism. Sarah Chayes, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, contends that corruption can be a significant factor in increasing violent extremism. There appears to be political will in Nigeria starting with President Buhari to root out government corruption.

• What is the administration doing to support the Nigerian government in this effort? How are we engaging at the local level where state governments appear to have political will, especially those in the northeast affected by Boko Haram?

• How is the administration building anti-corruption principles into its security sector activities in Nigeria?
How can we be assured that Buhari's anti-corruption activities are focused on institutional reforms?

Answer. The Buhari administration has made a promising start in its ambitious goal of rolling back corruption in Nigeria. Actions to date include several high-profile prosecutions of former senior officials, including a former Minister of Defense, a former National Security Advisor, and a former Minister of Petroleum. The prospect of the successful prosecution of high-ranking government officials for corruption, which Nigeria has never seen, is sending a strong signal. The government has initiated a number of corruption investigations through the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and taken serious steps to limit opportunities for graft in the government.

U.S. anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria focus on capacity building assistance to civil society watchdogs, journalists, law enforcement agencies, and the judicial sector. The United States supports work by the EFCC and the judiciary to investigate and prosecute complex corruption cases. These efforts are designed to partner with Nigeria in preventing, exposing, investigating, and prosecuting acts of corruption, and to pursue the recovery of stolen assets. We consistently urge the Nigerian government to pursue investigations in a non-partisan manner.

Other promising anti-corruption steps taken by the Government of Nigeria under the Buhari administration include the establishment of the Treasury Single Account, which has prevented leakages by increasing oversight of all agencies spending by consolidating agency receipts into a unified account for audit and tracking purposes; efforts to reform the state oil company and the EFCC; and enhanced implementation of the law on asset declaration by senior officials.

The key to fighting corruption in Nigeria is institutionalizing a culture of accountability, which means enhancing transparency and accountability mechanisms across government institutions. We will continue to partner with Nigeria to ensure that the country continues along this path of pursuing institutional reforms. The Government of Nigeria has indicated that it will prioritize improving public financial management, broadening the tax base to protect the economy from future oil price shocks, and enhancing debt management systems in light of expected new borrowing. We are prepared to offer technical assistance to support this agenda through the Department of the Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance (OTA), pending a formal request from the Minister of Finance. Additionally, we welcome Nigeria's decision to join the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a global community of like-minded states working together to strengthen transparency, accountability, and good governance to deliver better government services to citizens. We stand ready to assist the Government of Nigeria with its development of its OGP National Action Plan.

We are encouraging Nigeria to join the Partnership on Illicit Finance, which aims to build governments' capacity to identify and prevent illicit financial activity, including that which is linked to corruption. We are also committed to leading by example on anti-corruption efforts, including through the U.S. domestic transparency agenda, the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, cooperation on stolen asset recovery, and use of visa authorities to deny corrupt officials entry to the United States.

We intend to look for ways to continue efforts to recover stolen Nigerian assets within U.S. jurisdiction, and have sent experts to consult with the Government of Nigeria on the formulation of requests for legal assistance. Nigeria will also be one of the beneficiary countries of the inaugural Global Forum on Asset Recovery, which the U.S. will co-host next year with the UK.

Pending Congressional Notification of funds (CN 16-098), we also plan to work with the United Nations to specifically address corruption as a driver of violent extremism in the Sahel and West Africa, including in Nigeria. This includes addressing corruption’s role in resilience, border security, and the damaging effects on countries’ security sectors. At the state and local level, USAID supports initiatives promoting responsive governance, including governance programs in Sokoto and Bauchi states, enhanced credibility for elections, and increased capacity for civic engagement. USAID also builds capacity in key government agencies to strengthen fiscal responsibilities and improve transparency.

Through President Obama’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI), we are partnering with the Government of Nigeria to enhance the management of security and justice services, including in northeast Nigeria. Proposed areas of focus include improving the Ministry of Interior's nationwide emergency response planning and coordination capability; enhancing the Ministry of Defense's materiel needs identification, procurement, and acquisitions procedures and processes; and assisting planning for civilian security in northeastern Nigeria.
Over the past two years, a multi-year multi-million dollar grant funded by the State Department has enhanced civil society’s capacity to partner with government agencies and businesses to fight graft in the security and judicial sectors. This project includes developing new technologies for citizen corruption-busters, and is helping Nigeria adhere to the principles of the Open Government Partnership, a global community of like-minded states working together to strengthen transparency, accountability, and good governance to deliver better government services to citizens. As a result of this project, a U.S.-supported crowd-sourced platform allows citizens to anonymously report corruption within the police, and the National Police force decided in the fall of 2015 to expand this platform nationwide in cooperation with civil society.

Question 5. Four Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) countries—Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso—have experienced military coups or attempted coups while participating in the program. Mali was a significant recipient of military aid under TSCTP prior to its 2012 military coup. Since then, Mali’s military has displayed severe capacity shortfalls and elements of the security forces have been accused of serious human rights abuses.

- What progress has been made through TSCTP in building partner capacity in each of the aforementioned countries?
- Do you assess that TSCTP countries are better able to effectively combat terrorism and manage border security as a result of their participation in TSCTP?

Answer. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has focused on countries that are among the poorest in the world and have had significant capacity gaps, but most of these partners have demonstrated significant improvements in key areas and increased political will to work individually and regionally to address terrorism and violent extremism challenges emanating from the Lake Chad Basin region, Libya, and Mali. TSCTP engagements in Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso significantly contributed to their abilities to more effectively address terrorism and violent extremism threats. We have also witnessed increased commitments by partner countries to the more holistic whole-of-government CT and CVE approaches promoted by TSCTP. Terrorist organizations no longer hold large sections of territory or operate with impunity. They cannot conduct major military-style campaigns and have reverted to their more traditional asymmetric style of warfare. The capacity that the U.S. has patiently built over 16 years has figured prominently in this counterterrorism success. Specifically:

Mali: Despite long term challenges, Mali has displayed a willingness to work with the United States and allies such as France and the European Union to address shortfalls in CF capacity. The international community must stay engaged with Mali over the long-term to promote increased stability and resilience in the face of multiple terrorism threats. Following the 2012 coup and the subsequent French and African intervention to roll back terrorist territorial gains in northern Mali, TSCTP partner countries Niger and Chad have played critical roles in assisting French and Malian forces to contain and degrade the terrorist threat. TSCTP was active in Mali before the 2012 coup, but its current engagements are relatively modest and no longer focus on building tactical unit-level security sector capacity. In coordination with the President’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI), TSCTP is focused on institution building including in the security sector, as well as focused CVE and law enforcement programs.

Niger: President Issoufou’s government has demonstrated strong political will to sustain CT and CVE efforts and Nigerien security forces, both military and law enforcement, have responded well to engagement with the United States. Niger actively patrols the trafficking routes in northern Mali and along the Libyan border. Niger is a key member of the counter-Boko Haram Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). TSCTP has historically invested heavily in support of Niger’s border security units, and Niger’s relatively strong performance in the Lake Chad region and along the Libya and Mali borders is reflective of that support. Recognizing that Niger does not have adequate forces to sustain efforts to counter threats along three separate fronts, TSCTP is currently supporting Niger’s basic training school. It also supports focused programs logistics, command and control, military intelligence and casualty evacuation.

Mauritania: Mauritania has also been a committed and effective CT partner. TSCTP created effective ground and air forces to counter Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) operating out of northern Mali. Responding to terrorist threats in northern Mali before and immediately after Mali’s 2012 coup, U.S.-trained and equipped Mauritanian ground forces used U.S.-supplied Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) equipment, reinforced with their own light attack aircraft, to defeat VEOs. Since then, the VEO threat to Mauritania has greatly diminished with no recent attacks. TSCTP is currently focused on working with Mauritania to sustain the range of projects launched during the last several years in strong cooperation with our Allies, France and Morocco.

Burkina Faso: Burkina Faso had not faced a significant VEO threat until the hotel bombing in Ouagadougou this year. The Department is formulating a strategy to assist partners like Burkina Faso facing asymmetric threats. TSCTP has focused on Burkina Faso’s border security in the past and National Defense Authorization Act Section 2282 funds may build on that effort. Burkina Faso has been a solid partner with the United States, permitting the long-term stationing of up to six United States aircraft in Ouagadougou that perform light transportation, casualty evacuation, and ISR missions throughout the region.

Question 6. The Kenyan government has indicated that it plans to close the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, which collectively provide sanctuary for approximately 600,000 people.

• What have we discussed with the Kenyan government about the implications of closing the camps? When will the closures take place and what will happen to the hundreds of thousands of inhabitants?
• What will happen to refugees that are not living in the camps? Will they be expelled? Is it true that Kenya will no longer allow refugees into the country?

Answer. We are deeply concerned by the Government of Kenya’s announcement of plans to close refugee camps in Kenya, dismantle the Department of Refugee Affairs, and compel the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of refugees who have sought international protection in Kenya. We deeply appreciate the hospitality and commitment that Kenya has shown over decades of hosting refugees. In high-level engagements in Washington and Nairobi, including a call between Secretary Kerry and President Kenyatta, we continue to urge Kenya to maintain its global leadership role on refugees consistent with its international obligations. These obligations must be upheld.

Following their initial announcement, the Government of Kenya has said that they do not intend to close the Kakuma refugee camp. We also have no indication that refugees outside of the Dadaab camp complex are to be targeted at this point in time. Kenya has not explicitly said how it will deal with new asylum-seekers; however, it has said that Somalis will no longer have prima facie status, implying that new arrivals would be screened for refugee status.

Kenya’s plans to close the Dadaab refugee camp complex by the end of 2016 and repatriate refugees could put returnees in danger, given the ongoing conflict in Somalia. We have warned the Government of Kenya that the disruption, displacement, and hardship caused by closing the camps could well make thousands of displaced, unemployed, and homeless people vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups to the detriment of Kenya’s security.

We have informed Kenyan officials that we as donors will not fund or otherwise support involuntary repatriation of refugees in contravention to international refugee law and Kenya’s obligations. We strongly support the voluntary return of refugees safely and with dignity, when and where conditions are appropriate in their countries of origin, including in Somalia.

We have encouraged Kenya to continue to work with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Federal Government of Somalia under the terms of the 2013 Tripartite Agreement on the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya as conditions allow. We have reiterated that we remain committed to working with Kenya and international partners to find durable solutions for refugees, including voluntary returns in a manner that upholds international refugee law and respects humanitarian standards. The United States has provided hundreds of millions of dollars to help Kenya host refugees and has resettled more refugees coming from Kenya than any other country.

We will continue to urge the Kenyan government to uphold its international obligations while exploring new approaches and partnerships to ensure shared global responsibility for supporting refugees and host communities in Kenya and other refugee-hosting countries.
Question 1. As you know, combined Department of State and Department of Defense funding for security assistance in Africa has grown from just over $500 million in FY13 to approximately $1 billion in FY15. At the same time, the amounts available for democracy building have fallen from $230 million in FY13 to only $170 million in FY15. Support for democracy and governance and anti-corruption are critical components of counterterrorism efforts, but these activities are significantly under-funded. I wrote Secretary Kerry to express my concern about the imbalance in October of last year. Will the administration meet the directive in the FY16 Omnibus for $312 million for democracy and governance activities in Africa? What specific steps has the administration taken to ensure that we are complementing our security assistance with democracy and governance funding in countries with poor human rights and democracy records?

Answer. The administration’s FY 2016 653(a) allocations fulfill the overall directive level of $2.3 billion for democracy programs worldwide, however, due to other global constraints in the foreign assistance budget, funding for DRG programs in Africa currently falls short of the level in the FY 2016 Omnibus. The FY 2016 appropriation and accompanying Statement of Managers report increase the number and amount of country and sectoral funding directives from previous years and limit USAID’s ability to deviate from directed levels in the FY 2016 653(a) report. Relative to the President’s request, the appropriation also significantly cuts the major accounts that fund DRG programs in Africa. These factors made it difficult to allocate resources for DRG programs to conform to the Statement of Managers.

Now that the 653(a) report has been submitted, we are reviewing options to determine what flexibility we might have to increase support for DRG in Africa including within the 5 percent flexibility provided by the FY 2016 Omnibus as well as potentially through the identification of prior year funds. The Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources and USAID’s Office of Budget Resources Management are working closely with the State Department and USAID Africa Bureaus as well as with the State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance to ensure that DRG resources globally reflect the most strategic allocation possible within funding constraints, including by looking to address priority DRG funding shortfalls in Africa through shifting current and prior year funds to meet the most critical gaps.

In all countries including those challenged by crises, insecurity or closing political space, USAID plans carefully with interagency partners to ensure that development interventions complement and reinforce diplomatic and security activities to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives. Regular country team meetings convened by the Embassy are one venue in which such information can be shared. On particular issues of broad interest, such as elections or ongoing conflict or humanitarian situations, more frequent working-level meetings are convened to discuss the complementarity of various agencies’ efforts. Particularly in countries with poor human rights and democracy records, development assistance may play a critical role in helping to strengthen accountability and responsiveness, ensure checks and balances, and facilitate credible and peaceful elections, thereby reducing the potential for further backsliding and instability. With the DRG funding available, USAID’s planning in such countries considers several factors such as the willingness of the host government to permit programs to operate and the likelihood of programs to have an impact.

Question 2. USAID has indicated that endemic corruption is one of the so called “push factors” that favors the spread of violent extremism. Sarah Chayes, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, contends that corruption can be a significant factor in increasing violent extremism. There appears to be political will in Nigeria starting with President Buhari to root out government corruption. What is the administration doing to support the Nigerian government in this effort? How are we engaging at the local level where state governments appear to have political will, especially those in the northeast affected by Boko Haram? How can we be assured that Buhari’s anti-corruption activities are focused on institutional reforms?

Answer. USAID’s Nigeria portfolio supports President Buhari’s anti-corruption agenda by focusing on increasing the supply and demand for transparency and accountability, and on supporting free and fair elections, which have become a battleground to control resources. These programmatic choices were made based on a 2013 USAID analysis of the state of Nigeria’s democracy and governance, which identified multiple forms of corruption as key problems, and further pinpointed two
The key avenues through which corruption takes hold. The first is the role of state and local governments which control the majority of resources and foster broad-based corruption. The second is the competition for elected positions to control patronage systems in Nigeria. With this in mind, USAID designed a portfolio of programs that promote citizen responsive governance at state and local levels, enhance the credibility of elections, and increase capacity for civil society-government engagement. The success of our programs in contributing to long-term reform will depend upon the actions of the Nigerian government and especially President Buhari's administration. Time will tell if President Buhari is truly committed and able to implement institutional reforms to fight corruption.

Since 2009, USAID’s seven-year, $45 million Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development project has been building the capacity of local and state governments to assume greater responsibility in addressing the demands of their constituents. The project works with local and state governments in Sokoto, Bauchi and Rivers States to improve service delivery in health, education, and water and sanitation. It promotes citizen participation in government decision-making processes to ensure and maintain greater transparency. The project also assists state and local government units to delegate authority for local decision-making and to regularize mechanisms for citizen participation.

In addition, USAID aims to strengthen civil society’s ability to influence the development and implementation of key democratic reforms at the national, state, and local levels. Stakeholder consultations identified transparency, increased participation of vulnerable groups, and accountability of state actors as critical components of progress. The five-year, $19.2 million Strengthening Advocacy and Civic Engagement project addresses these gaps and supports government reforms to reduce corruption. The program began in January 2014, and is co-funded by USAID ($16.7m) and Partnership in the Niger Delta ($2.5m).

USAID supports the northeastern state governments of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno to decrease the perception of marginalization of the communities in the north-east by working closely to deliver basic services in key areas—water, schools, local government offices, and basic infrastructure that visibly demonstrate the redeployment of public administration. USAID also works to increase engagement between the communities and the government in order to build trust—such as hosting community meetings, discussions, inauguration events of public infrastructure, and other activities.

Question 3. Measuring effectiveness: We’ve pushed our development agencies very hard over the last 15 years to measure and prove the Return on Investment to the American taxpayer of every aid dollar in development, which helped spearhead new efficiencies and innovations. USAID’s implementers now have sophisticated program design, measurement and impact processes. How are we leveraging best practices in M&E from the development side of our foreign assistance into the governance and CVE spaces?

Answer. USAID plans and implements programs designed to improve the development status of the people in the selected countries and regions around the world in which we work. In order to achieve these development results and to ensure accountability for taxpayer resources, we strive to continuously learn and refine our programmatic approaches. USAID’s program performance, monitoring and evaluation policies apply to our programs in democracy, human rights and governance (DRG) and countering violent extremism (CVE) as they do to all other development sectors.

USAID’s 2013 DRG Strategy reaffirmed USAID’s commitment to generate, analyze, and disseminate rigorous, systematic and publicly accessible evidence in all aspects of DRG policy, strategy and program development, implementation and evaluation. To realize this commitment, USAID has developed a DRG Learning Agenda, created a significant portfolio of impact evaluations and other research, and set about organizing and disseminating research findings. Formulated through a consultative process, the DRG Learning Agenda for 2016 is comprised of 12 research questions in priority DRG development areas for which USAID intends to organize and disseminate existing data, generate new evidence, and produce recommendations through academic research, program and impact evaluations, and multi-method tests of the theories of change that guide DRG programming.

USAID has also pioneered impact evaluation in the DRG sector through a combination of co-financing, development of impact evaluation procurement mechanisms, and through DRG Center-hosted impact evaluation clinics. To date, USAID has completed eight impact evaluations in the DRG sector, has eight impact evaluations ongoing, and 16 impact evaluations in design.
In addition to impact evaluations, USAID has provided technical assistance to
field missions around the world for 22 performance evaluations, five high-quality
public opinion surveys, and 13 original research grants. Completed evaluations and
other DRG research helps test and validate DRG assumptions and theories of
change, and refine DRG programmatic approaches. DRG research, including tech-
nical publications, assessments, best practices, and lessons learned documents is

The use of development tools in preventing violent extremism is most effective
when performed in line with other measures to counter violent extremism, and
when seamlessly integrated into existing poverty-alleviation and good governance
programs funded by USAID. In the design of USAID’s CVE programs, we first con-
duct an assessment to determine which push and pull factors increase vulnerability
to violent extremism recruitment in local contexts. USAID designs CVE programs
to address vulnerabilities identified during the assessment. For example, drivers of
violent extremism might be the marginalization of certain ethnic or religious minori-
ties, a personal experience of injustice perpetrated by the state, or a lack of avenues
for youth to positively engage in society. We develop metrics to measure the effec-
tiveness of lessening the identified drivers of extremism. This could be in the form
of perception surveys that probe the population’s trust in formal government, for ex-
ample, or identify the number of youth choosing to engage in legal economic activity.
USAID also periodically commissions national public opinion surveys in African
countries affected by conflict, independent of specific programs, to gauge the like-
lihood of backsliding into conflict.

We have invested significant resources to monitor and evaluate CVE pro-
gramming, gathering both quantitative and qualitative data. For example, lessons
learned from evaluations of CVE programming in West and East Africa have been
used to inform more effective approaches to CVE. Additionally, USAID program-
ming builds the skills of local partners through training in monitoring and evalua-
tion and data collection, and supports local institutions to undertake independent
research and evaluation. In addition, many CVE programs call for periodic assess-
ments to gather data for use in monitoring and evaluation.

Taken together, these predictive and diagnostic tools provide a strong foundation
upon which recommendations might be based for development priorities in the coun-
tries that face steep challenges with fragility and risk of violent extremism today,
as well as those that may face those challenges in the future.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO JUSTIN SIBERELL BY SENATOR CARDIN

Question 1. A number of our counterterrorism partners in Africa have been criti-
cized for failing to adequately and transparently hold security forces accountable for
alleged abuses against civilians. For example, Amnesty International has alleged
that the Nigerian military killed 350 people in Zaria in December, and buried the
bodies in mass graves to conceal evidence. The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in Kenya
has also been accused of extrajudicial killings of youth and alleged terror suspects.
I have introduced a resolution calling for the Ethiopian government to investigate
the recent killings of unarmed protesters in Oromia and elsewhere in Ethiopia.

What diplomatic efforts and programmatic support is the U.S. providing to the
military and civilian justice institutions of our counterterrorism partners to en-
sure they have the capacity to hold perpetrators accountable? Are Title 10 funds
available for these types of activities in Africa?

President Buhari stated that he would leave no stone unturned to deal with all
cases of human rights abuses. What efforts has the Nigerian government made
to investigate or try abuses under either his administration or that of his prede-
cessor?

Has the Ethiopian government committed to investigate alleged killings and
other abuses associated with the recent crackdown in response to protests in
Oromia and similar abuses in other parts of the country against civil society,
journalists and others? What has been our response to these abuses?

Answer. The Department strongly condemns human rights abuses by any security
forces and has consistently urged full investigations of allegations and account-
ability for individuals found responsible. We take seriously our responsibility to
withhold or condition our assistance in light of applicable legal requirements and
ethical principles. Ongoing U.S. training seeks to increase the professionalism and
capacity of partner militaries and law enforcement to carry out difficult jobs effectively while respecting human rights. Trainees and units are screened in accordance with the Leahy law, and all training includes modules devoted to respect for human rights and the rule of law. In several countries, we have excluded individuals and units from U.S. government training as a result of concerns about human rights abuses. We continue to review all available information to avoid providing training and assistance to units who have committed gross violation of human rights.

Senior U.S. government officials raise with partner governments at the highest levels our concerns about human rights violations by security forces. The Department emphasizes that any such violations are wrong, counterproductive, and place elements of U.S. security assistance at risk. Moreover, we consistently urge our partners at the executive and ministerial levels, as well as with security force commanders, to bring those responsible for human rights violations to justice and engage more constructively with members of populations at risk of recruitment to violent extremism. Our diplomatic engagements continue to forge a common understanding of how we continue to uphold our firm and resolute policy to not support individuals or units that have been implicated in gross violations of human rights.

The White House Security Governance Initiative (SGI) is an important tool for us to dedicate diplomatic engagement and programming resources to strengthen the institutions that govern the security sector. For instance, we are working with the Government of Kenya to strengthen the justice system by improving access to justice and efficiency of the case management, and the police human resource management system by improving internal and external police mechanisms that address integrity, accountability, and transparency. In Niger, we are supporting the government to align resources with strategic security priorities, improve human, material, and financial resource management, and more effectively communicate its security and defense policy to the public. In Mali, we are collaborating with officials in Bamako to improve inter-ministerial coordination across the security sector, to enhance both the Ministry of Defense and the National Police efforts to improve recruitment and human resource management, and position Ministry of Justice as the human capital to implement their justice reform strategy. We are in the process of launching SGI partnerships in Nigeria, Ghana, and Tunisia. These and other program interventions across the continent align our policy messages with our program dollars.

The USAFRICOM Office of Legal Counsel conducts Legal Engagement programming on rule of law and human rights; this includes strategic communications as well as work with African economic and security organizations and military-to-military contacts. In addition, the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) provides training, seminars, and exchanges to help build this capacity in our international partners, to include numerous African countries. Kenya’s Anti-terrorism Police Unit, or the ATPU, is not eligible for Title 10 funds. The Department of State has supported particular elements within the ATPU through the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program on crisis response, investigations, and related topics. Each ATA course and consultation includes human rights modules that emphasize the importance of conducting policing in a rule of law framework.

We consistently urge the Nigerian government to take all reports of human rights allegations seriously and investigate them thoroughly. We stress the importance of respecting human rights and protecting civilians in all security responses. During his May 2016 visit to Nigeria, Deputy Secretary Blinken said, "[Respecting human rights] is the right thing to do, but it is also the smart thing to do... because ignoring the human rights of citizens risks turning them to extremism and fueling the very fire that we seek to extinguish together." We regularly raise our concerns with the Nigerian government about its response to the threat of violent extremism throughout the country, including its detention policy and practices, which various NGOs and international experts assert violate international law. We also discuss related issues with civil society organizations.

The Nigerian military should provide for disciplined military operations in accordance with clear rules of engagement and international law, humane treatment of all detainees, continued and expanded access for the independent monitoring of all detention facilities, and accountability for all perpetrators of unlawful violence and timely justice for victims and their families. In his May 2015 inauguration speech, President Buhari called for overhauling "the rules of engagement to avoid human rights violations in [military] operations" and improving "operational and legal mechanisms so that disciplinary steps are taken against proven human right violations by the Armed Forces."
Last summer, in recognition of the need for enhanced accountability in the military, President Buhari appointed new leadership for the military. And in a further effort to improve the protection of civilians and the overall fight against Boko Haram, President Buhari moved the command and control center of the military from Abuja to Maiduguri, the epicenter of the conflict in northeastern Nigeria.

In March 2016, the Nigerian Army, working together with civil society organizations, created human rights offices that will strengthen the Army's capacity to protect human rights. The Nigerian Defense Headquarters also inaugurated a Defense Advisory Committee on Human Rights to monitor and investigate allegations of human rights abuses within the military.

In addition, since December 2015, at least six separate investigations of the Zaria incident are underway by the Nigerian Senate and House of Representatives, the National Human Rights Commission, and the Judicial Commission of Inquiry established by Kaduna State, among others. We continue to urge those carrying out investigations to do so credibly, swiftly, thoroughly, and with impartiality.

The Department issued a statement on April 29 expressing concern over the Government of Ethiopia's decision to file terrorism charges against Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) First Vice-Chairman Bekele Gerba and others in the Oromia. The statement also noted that the government has not yet held accountable any security forces responsible for alleged abuses. This latest statement was preceded by three statements issued since December 2015 that articulated our concerns about government and security forces' response to Oromo protestors and called for meaningful dialogue to include independent voices. Our Embassy has increased outreach throughout the Ethiopian countryside and specifically to Oromia to engage local officials and the community.

The Department understands the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission is investigating the protests in Oromia. We also understand the government is investigating instances of corruption that contributed to the grievances Oromo protestors have highlighted. We continue to encourage officials to be transparent with the findings and also be transparent about subsequent accountability. We remain concerned about Ethiopian government counterparts that in order for meaningful dialogue to occur, they must protect the rights enshrined in its constitution, including the rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly. We underscore to Ethiopian government counterparts that in order for meaningful dialogue to occur, they must protect the rights enshrined in its constitution, including the rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly. We remain steadfast in emphasizing the importance of respect for due process for those detained by investigating allegations of mistreatment, publicly presenting the evidence it possesses against them, and distinguishing between political opposition to the government and the use of violence. These steps would contribute positively to building trust and goodwill and indicate a shift away from a security-centric response to protests in the Oromia region.

Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Assistant Secretary Malinowski traveled to Ethiopia three times to follow-up on democracy, good governance, and human rights issues discussed during President Obama's July 2015 visit. A/S Malinowski has discussed with counterparts possible avenues for expanding U.S. assistance in building the capacity of Ethiopian civil society, including by addressing some of the elements of Ethiopian law that place an especially onerous burden on civil society organizations. He has consistently communicated to the Ethiopian government that a capable, empowered civil society can and would be an important ally for a government that prides itself on governance. At the 6th bilateral Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights Working group, attended by Ambassador Haslach and Assistant Secretary Malinowski, the situation in the Oromia figured prominently along with other issues such as the important role civil society plays in strengthening good governance. At the conclusion, the government of Ethiopia reaffirmed a commitment to strengthen governance and political pluralism in keeping with the principles enshrined in its constitution.

We continue to work with our African partners to develop and implement sustainable, effective, long-term counterterrorism strategies that incorporate government and civil society perspectives.

**Question 2.** USAID has indicated that endemic corruption is one of the so called “push factors” that favors the spread of violent extremism. Sarah Chayes, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, contends that corruption can be a significant factor in increasing violent extremism. There appears to be political will in Nigeria starting with President Buhari to root out government corruption.
What is the administration doing to support the Nigerian government in this effort? How are we engaging at the local level where state governments appear to have political will, especially those in the northeast affected by Boko Haram?

How is the administration building anti-corruption principles into its security sector activities in Nigeria?

How can we be assured that Buhari's anti-corruption activities are focused on institutional reforms?

Answer. The Buhari administration has made a promising start in its ambitious goal of rolling back corruption in Nigeria. Actions to date include several high-profile prosecutions of former senior officials, including a former Minister of Defense, a former National Security Advisor, and a former Minister of Petroleum. The prospect of the successful prosecution of high-ranking government officials for corruption, which Nigeria has never seen, is sending a strong signal. The government has initiated a number of corruption investigations through the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and taken serious steps to limit opportunities for graft in the government.

U.S. anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria focus on capacity building assistance to civil society watchdogs, journalists, law enforcement agencies, and the judicial sector. The United States supports work by the EFCC and the judiciary to investigate and prosecute complex corruption cases. These efforts are designed to partner with Nigeria in preventing, exposing, investigating, and prosecuting acts of corruption, and to pursue the recovery of stolen assets. We consistently urge the Nigerian government to pursue investigations in a non-partisan manner.

Other promising anti-corruption steps taken by the Government of Nigeria under the Buhari administration include the establishment of the Treasury Single Account, which has prevented leakages by increasing oversight of all agencies spending by consolidating agency receipts into a unified account for audit and tracking purposes; efforts to reform the state oil company and the EFCC; and enhanced implementation of the law on asset declaration by senior officials.

The key to fighting corruption in Nigeria is institutionalizing a culture of accountability, which means enhancing transparency and accountability mechanisms across government institutions. We will continue to partner with Nigeria to ensure that the country continues along this path of pursuing institutional reforms. The Government of Nigeria has indicated that it will prioritize improving public financial management, broadening the tax base to protect the economy from future oil price shocks, and enhancing debt management systems in light of expected new borrowing. We are prepared to offer technical assistance to support this agenda through the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA), pending a formal request from the Minister of Finance. Additionally, we welcome Nigeria’s decision to join the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a global community of like-minded states working together to strengthen transparency, accountability, and good governance to deliver better government services to citizens. We stand ready to assist the Government of Nigeria with its development of its OGP National Action Plan.

We are encouraging Nigeria to join the Partnership on Illicit Finance, which aims to build governments’ capacity to identify and prevent illicit financial activity, including that which is linked to corruption. We are also committed to leading by example on anti-corruption efforts, including through the U.S. domestic transparency agenda, the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, cooperation on stolen asset recovery, and use of visa authorities to deny corrupt officials entry to the United States.

We intend to look for ways to continue efforts to recover stolen Nigerian assets within U.S. jurisdiction, and have sent experts to consult with the Government of Nigeria on the formulation of requests for legal assistance. Nigeria will also be one of the beneficiary countries of the inaugural Global Forum on Asset Recovery, which the U.S. will co-host next year with the UK.

Pending Congressional Notification of funds (CN 16-098), we also plan to work with the United Nations to specifically address corruption as a driver of violent extremism in the Sahel and West Africa, including in Nigeria. This includes addressing corruption’s role in resilience, border security, and the damaging effects on countries’ security sectors. At the state and local level, USAID supports initiatives promoting responsive governance, including governance programs in Sokoto and Bauchi states, enhanced credibility for elections, and increased capacity for civic engagement. USAID also builds capacity in key government agencies to strengthen fiscal responsibilities and improve transparency.

Through President Obama’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI), we are partnering with the Government of Nigeria to enhance the management of security
and justice services, including in northeast Nigeria. Proposed areas of focus include improving the Ministry of Interior’s nationwide emergency response planning and coordination capability; enhancing the Ministry of Defense’s materiel needs identification, procurement, and acquisitions procedures and processes; and assisting planning for civilian security in northeastern Nigeria.

Over the past two years, a multi-year multi-million dollar grant funded by the State Department has enhanced civil society’s capacity to partner with government agencies and businesses to fight graft in the security and judicial sectors. This project includes developing new technologies for citizen corruption-busters, and is helping Nigeria adhere to the principles of the Open Government Partnership, a global community of like-minded states working together to strengthen transparency, accountability, and good governance to deliver better government services to citizens. As a result of this project, a U.S.-supported crowd-sourced platform allows citizens to anonymously report corruption within the police, and the National Police force decided in the fall of 2015 to expand this platform nationwide in cooperation with civil society.

**Question 3.** Four Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) countries—Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso—have experienced military coups or attempted coups while participating in the program. Mali was a significant recipient of military aid under TSCTP prior to its 2012 military coup. Since then, Mali’s military has displayed severe capacity shortfalls and elements of the security forces have been accused of serious human rights abuses. What progress has been made through TSCTP in building partner capacity in each of the aforementioned countries? Do you assess that TSCTP countries are better able to effectively combat terrorism and violent extremism as a result of their participation in TSCTP?

**Answer.** The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has focused on countries that are among the poorest in the world and have had significant capacity gaps, but most of these partners have demonstrated significant improvements in key areas and increased political will to work individually and regionally to address terrorism and violent extremism challenges emanating from the Lake Chad Basin region, Libya, and Mali. TSCTP engagements in Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso significantly contributed to their abilities to more effectively address terrorism and violent extremism threats. We have also witnessed increased commitments by partner countries to the more holistic whole-of-government CT and CVE approaches promoted by TSCTP. Terrorist organizations no longer hold large sections of territory or population centers. They cannot conduct major military-style campaigns and have reverted to their more traditional asymmetric style of warfare. The capacity that the U.S. has patiently built over 16 years has figured prominently in this counterterrorism success. Specifically:

**Mali:** Despite long term challenges, Mali has displayed a willingness to work with the United States and allies such as France and the European Union to address shortfalls in CT capacity. The international community must stay engaged with Mali over the long-term to promote increased stability and resilience in the face of multiple terrorism threats. Following the 2012 coup and the subsequent French and African intervention to roll back terrorist territorial gains in northern Mali, TSCTP partner countries Niger and Chad have played critical roles in assisting French and Malian forces to contain and degrade the terrorist threat. TSCTP was active in Mali before the 2012 coup, but its current engagements are relatively modest and no longer focus on building tactical unit-level security sector capacity. In coordination with the President’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI), TSCTP is focused on institution building including in the security sector, as well as focused CVE and law enforcement programs.

**Niger:** President Issoufou’s government has demonstrated strong political will to sustain CT and CVE efforts and Nigerien security forces, both military and law enforcement, have responded well to engagement with the United States. Niger actively patrols the trafficking routes in northern Mali and along the Libyan border. Niger is a key member of the counter-Boko Haram Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). TSCTP has historically invested heavily in support of Niger’s border security units, and Niger’s relatively strong performance in the Lake Chad region and along the Libya and Mali borders is reflective of that support. Recognizing that Niger does not have adequate forces to sustain efforts to counter threats along three separate fronts, TSCTP is currently supporting Niger’s basic training school. It also supports focused programs logistics, command and control, military intelligence and casualty evacuation.

**Mauritania:** Mauritania has also been a committed and effective CT partner. TSCTP created effective ground and air forces to counter Violent Extremist Organi-
zations (VEOs) operating out of northern Mali. Responding to terrorist threats in northern Mali before and immediately after Mali’s 2012 coup, U.S.-trained and equipped Mauritanian ground forces used U.S.-supplied Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) equipment, reinforced with their own light attack aircraft, to defeat VEOs. Since then, the VEO threat to Mauritania has greatly diminished with no recent attacks. TSCTP is currently focused on working with Mauritania to sustain the range of projects launched during the last several years in strong cooperation with our Allies, France and Morocco.

Burkina Faso: Burkina Faso had not faced a significant VEO threat until the hotel bombing in Ouagadougou this year. The Department is formulating a strategy to assist partners like Burkina Faso facing asymmetric threats. TSCTP has focused on Burkina Faso’s border security in the past and National Defense Authorization Act Section 2282 funds may build on that effort. Burkina Faso has been a solid partner with the United States, permitting the long-term stationing of up to six United States aircraft in Ouagadougou that perform light transportation, casualty evacuation, and ISR missions throughout the region.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD BY SENATOR PERDUE

**Question.** I understand that the major sources of financing for Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab stem from connections with Al-Qa’ida, primarily from North Africa.

- To what extent, if at all, does the State Department’s Counter-terrorism Financing Program (CTF) work with DoD ground forces to target carriers of cash and other hard assets from North Africa to the Sub-Saharan region?

**Answer.** The Department of State is committed to countering the financing of groups like Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qa’ida. In this context, we use all of the policy tools at our disposal, to include sanctioning individuals and groups under the Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist Organization and Executive Order 13224 authorities, as well as building the anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism capacity of countries in Africa.

The Department of State’s counterterrorist financing (CTF) capacity-building programs are not operationally oriented and, as such, are not designed to augment DoD initiatives. Rather, our CTF programming aims to build the capacity of local civilian law enforcement partners, including banking regulators, to counter terrorist financing through better information-sharing, investigations, and prosecutions. This approach builds local capacity to address the context-specific nature of the CTF threat, as sources of financing for terrorist groups vary significantly depending on the organization.

For example, in Senegal, Morocco, and Algeria, the Department of State deploys Department of Justice, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training, Resident Legal Advisors to strengthen existing anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) regimes through support for legislative and institutional reforms and training on CTF investigations and prosecutions. In Tunisia, the Department of State funds activities to develop the capacity of the Tunisian Financial Intelligence Unit and other financial sector regulators to identify, report, and deter terrorist financial activity through consultations and training.

In Somalia, the Department of State is funding the Treasury Department to provide regulatory training for officials from the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS). The Department of State also supports efforts to help Somali financial sector stakeholders identify, investigate, and deter the financing of terrorism; this includes mentoring stakeholders on how to effectively implement Somalia’s nascent laws in the area of AML/CFT.

**Question 2.** Boko Haram in particular profits from an active slave market in Nigeria which fuels much of their incentive to kidnap and ransom young girls and foreign nationals.

- In addition to working with the Treasury Department and local partners to prosecute kidnappings, what efforts does State have in place aimed at targeting the slave market itself?
- Has the Nigerian government been cooperative in targeting this market?
- Is there any evidence that Boko Haram is also involved in trafficking some of those they kidnap to other countries?
• How effective is the PISCES system in catching the flow of traffickers and/or victims of trafficking?

Answer. Trafficking in persons is a modern day form of slavery. Nigeria has a multifaceted human trafficking problem, which includes several different forms of sex and labor trafficking. Boko Haram forcefully recruits and uses child soldiers as young as 12 years old and abducts women and girls in the northern region of Nigeria, some of whom it subjects to domestic servitude, forced labor, and sex slavery through forced marriages to its militants.

The United States actively continues to support efforts to locate and bring home kidnapped victims of Boko Haram. We continue to provide a range of assistance to Nigerian authorities to fight Boko Haram, including intelligence, training, victim support services, and strategic communications. Our assistance has directly contributed to the Nigerian military’s liberation of hundreds of Boko Haram captives.

The Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP) and Embassy Abuja regularly work together to engage with the Government of Nigeria on trafficking in persons issues. The Department also produces the annual Trafficking in Persons Report, which includes a detailed assessment of the Government of Nigeria’s efforts to combat this crime.

The Government of Nigeria has made significant efforts to combat its human trafficking problem. It has comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation and an agency dedicated to combat human trafficking (NAPTIP) that is a model for the region. Nigeria has shelters to assist trafficking victims and continues to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers. NAPTIP officials are responsive to our requests for information and cooperative. However, NAPTIP’s ability to address the violent acts perpetuated by Boko Haram is very limited. They have occasionally provided shelter and services to victims who have been subjected to trafficking by Boko Haram.

Because PISCES is not installed in Nigeria, it cannot directly stop human trafficking there. PISCES can be an effective means of interdicting nefarious actors, but depends on the host nation recipient of this foreign assistance program to effectively maintain its national screening list. Assuming the bad actors transit a port of entry employing PISCES technology, and the person of interest is properly screened against the national screening list, PISCES would effectively identify the individual as suspect and worthy of further scrutiny.

Question 3. How would you describe the channels through which Boko Haram and al-Shabaab obtain their weapons and military equipment?

• Do their weapons come mostly from African sources, or sources from other continents?
• What efforts are State and/or DoD employing to target potential channels of weapons flows to hotbeds of terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Answer. We believe that Boko Haram continues to use weapons it has diverted from Nigerian security forces, and to a lesser extent neighboring security forces.

The United States is committed to working bilaterally and multilaterally with the Lake Chad Basin countries through training, equipment, advisors, information sharing, military sales and logistics support to support the regional security efforts to counter Boko Haram, which includes preventing Boko Haram from acquiring new weaponry.

We are aware that al-Shabaab continues to use its affiliation with al-Qaeda to obtain resources, primarily weapons and ammunition by way of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. More recently, al-Shabaab has supplemented their weapons caches by conducting large-scale attacks on African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forward operation bases. These raids, which often result in significant AMISOM and Somali partner force casualties, have yielded weapons, ammunition, vehicles, food, and other materiel that al-Shabaab uses to equip low level fighters.

The United States is committed to supporting AMISOM and Somali partner forces in combatting al-Shabaab, including efforts to cut off the group’s supply lines and deny it safe haven. U.S. advisors assist AMISOM and Somali forces in operations to limit al-Shabaab’s capacity to generate revenue, access weapons, and regain strongholds that provided the group access to ports and other major lines of communication.

The Department of State can provide classified details about both Boko Haram’s and al-Shabaab’s procurement of weapons separately.

Question 4. Numerous reports cite that Nigeria and Tunisia serve as hubs for regional terrorist actors, in part due to the fragility of their political institutions. However, their neighbors, Algeria and Morocco, have managed to remain relatively stable political systems.
In your opinion, what plans or initiatives have Algeria and Morocco implemented with success that may be able to be applied to Nigeria, Tunisia and other countries in the Sub-Saharan region?

Answer. While Morocco and Algeria have enjoyed greater political stability than many of their neighbors, they have not been immune to terrorism. Morocco has been a source of terrorist fighters to the Syria conflict, while Algeria continues to face sporadic internal violence from extremist groups formed in the 1990s. Both governments, however, have prioritized security and counterterrorism efforts, along with counter radicalization policies that have contributed to maintaining overall stability despite these challenges. Tunisia’s political transformation from autocracy to democracy and efforts to modernize and grow the economy have been complicated by a series of terrorist attacks. Tunisia continues to make meaningful progress on both fronts, following the Arab Spring political transformation. Unfortunately violent extremist groups have nevertheless exploited and radicalized many young Tunisians.

Nevertheless, Tunisia’s leaders have held fast to their democratic values and their commitment to developing sophisticated security forces capable of combating the terrorist threat without impinging on citizens’ freedoms or human rights. Across North and Sub-Saharan Africa, successful responses to terrorism match an increase in the capacity and effectiveness of security forces with stronger regional partnerships, local economic development, civil society engagement, and these are core goals of our assistance and engagement in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. And while we routinely draw from successful programs and policies from other countries, including Algeria and Morocco, every country requires tailored solutions developed through close partnership. Building adequate capacity to combat terrorism will take time, and we believe Tunisia is on a positive trajectory.

Similarly, we recognize the challenges Nigeria faces in its counterterrorism efforts. We are encouraged by Nigeria’s efforts to strengthen its political institutions and address the grievances of its population. Most critically, President Buhari has invested in combatting corruption, which is a major step to restoring public trust in the government, also key to fighting terrorism. Nigeria has also improved relations with its neighbors in the Lake Chad Basin, thereby contributing to improved collective security.

Question 5. South Sudan has been labeled as a “Level 3 Emergency” country by the UN, meaning that South Sudan is in the class of the most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises in the world. However, the President in his FY17 budget, requested only $1.957 billion for International Disaster Assistance (IDA). This is a 30% decline in last year’s request which administration officials have explained is due to an expectation of “declining needs” in South Sudan, among a few other countries.

• Can you explain why the administration expects the need in South Sudan to decrease when the UN continues to label it as one of the worst humanitarian needs in the world?

Answer. USAID will provide a direct response to this Question for the Record.

Question 6. Have the activities of Al Shabaab and/or Boko Haram threatened to disrupt any ongoing USAID projects or activities in Sub-Saharan Africa? If so, which ones?

• Have these groups’ activities affected the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) developing or ongoing projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, namely Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Niger, Tanzania, or Togo? If so, which ones and how?

Answer. USAID will provide a direct response to this Question for the Record.

Question 7. According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released in June of 2014, TSCTP program managers were found to be “unable to readily provide data on the status” of funds expended for interagency counterterrorism efforts. Additionally, country-specific spending figures are not routinely reported to Congress for regional security assistance programs, including TSCTP, PREACT, and some DoD BPC activities, and such spending is generally not reflected in Department of State and DoD congressional budget justifications. I am concerned that a lack of initiative-wide, as well as country-specific, funding data may inhibit congressional oversight of the scale, scope, and balance of U.S. engagement and assistance to Africa.

• Why is spending data for these programs not routinely collected and reported to Congress?
• What specific steps has State taken to implement GAO’s recommendations on this front?
• What plans, if any, does State have in place to improve data collection and monitoring systems?
• What additional resources, if any, would be required for State and DoD to begin including these funding breakdowns in their respective congressional budget justifications?

Answer. The GAO has officially closed its recommendations in the referenced 2014 GAO report. Since the fourth quarter of FY 2014, the Department of State has coordinated and collected financial data on all Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) programs, including for the following accounts: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR); International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); and Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Development Assistance (DA). The Bureau of African Affairs updates and maintains these unclassified financial data, which include country-specific allocated amounts (control numbers), obligations, unobligated balances (active funds only), unliquidated obligations, and expenditures (disbursements).

The Department of State tracks TSCTP and PREACT funds by country and by account. Country-specific figures are generally not included in Congressional budget justifications (CBJ) for TSCTP and PREACT to facilitate flexible and regional programming within each partnership. As GAO’s 2014 review of PREACT notes, “The regional nature of PREACT encourages implementing agencies to view counterterrorism from a regional perspective, rather than country-by-country.”

By not requesting TSCTP and PREACT funds by country, we mitigate the possibility that partners will feel entitled to a specific amount of funding, which could potentially arise with bilateral assistance allocations. When specific amounts of funding are allocated bilaterally it can become more complicated when changes in circumstances and policy priorities warrant reprogramming those funds. The regional nature of TSCTP and PREACT also enables multi-country trainings, exercises, and other engagements where it can be difficult to attribute specific costs to one partner nation over another. The joint participation of Senegalese and Mauritanian law enforcement officials in AFRICOM’s 2016 Exercise FLINTLOCK, supported by TSCTP/NADR/ATA funds, is one such example. Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian civilian security force participation in PREACT is another example of how the Department of State employs resources attributed to these regional partnerships to enable regional interoperability, communication, and coordination.

Since 2012, the Department of State has made a concerted effort to go beyond counting the money and the number of trainings completed toward more holistic assessments of effects. We have made great strides in the development of, and are now operationalizing, frameworks for measuring the results of our security assistance, specifically counterterrorism programs. The Department of State has hired dedicated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) personnel to help monitor and evaluate a number of security assistance programs. The Department of State is working in close partnership with our DoD colleagues to roll out these models and facilitate the collection of monitoring data. Similarly, the Department of State developed a standard CVE monitoring framework and deployed it across all CVE programs funded by PREACT and TSCTP Economic Support Funds.

We are also enhancing our knowledge management practices and sharing these frameworks with other partners working in the same security assistance space. The goals of these knowledge management practices are coordinated approaches for understanding the outcomes of our investments, streamlined implementer efforts, and improved M&E capacity in our partners.

When the Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) is completed, it is hard to anticipate the exact needs of partner countries due to the rapidly evolving nature of the terrorist threats. Thus, we often make final funding decisions at the time funds are being programmed—often a couple of years out from the CBJ’s preparation. The Department of State can provide country-specific breakdowns of TSCTP and PREACT funding by request.

Question 8. The U.S. has spent more than $1.8 billion over the last decade to counter Al Shabaab in Somalia, and, more recently, more than $400 million in security assistance to the Lake Chad Basin countries to counter Boko Haram.

• What returns on these significant investments have we seen in the fights against these two groups?
• What lessons have we learned in the last decade of countering Al Shabaab? More recently with Boko Haram?
Answer. The United States has a long counterterrorism partnership with the Lake Chad Basin Countries, primarily through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (Cameroon is the newest partner in 2014). Over the course of our partnership, we have seen steady improvement in those countries’ ability to perform counterterrorism operations. More recently, we are actively partnering with the Lake Chad Basin Countries by providing advisors, intelligence, training, logistical support and/or equipment to support their effort to ultimately defeat Boko Haram. With U.S. and other international support, the Lake Chad Basin countries have joined together through unprecedented regional coordination to reduce Boko Haram’s ability to hold territory, deny the group many of its safe havens, and limit its ability to conduct large scale military style attacks. Boko Haram, however, remains a deadly organization that conducts asymmetric attacks against the population in the region. The United States is committed to supporting the Lake Chad Basin Countries’ development of sustained comprehensive approaches to combating Boko Haram, which would include conducting effective security operations, providing civilian security and civil administration, investigating human rights abuses and repairing civil-military relations, restoring stability, addressing the humanitarian impact of Boko Haram, and promoting economic development and job creation to build community resilience to violent extremism and break the cycle of violence.

The investments we have made in AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA), have achieved significant progress since we began providing security assistance to both entities in 2007. Al-Shabaab previously controlled nearly all of southern and central Somalia, with the exception of approximately sixteen blocks in Mogadishu. Today, due to the efforts of AMISOM and its Somali partners, Al-Shabaab has been driven from many of the major population centers in southern and central Somalia, providing secure space for the Somali political process to take hold. Al-Shabaab remains a potent threat, however, and much work remains to be done in terms of standing up functional institutions of civilian governance and professional Somali security forces. But this should not overshadow the tremendous progress AMISOM and its Somali partners have made in less than a decade.

In terms of lessons learned, AMISOM has demonstrated the value of harnessing states in the region to lead the response to regional challenges. By focusing on supporting and enabling AMISOM and the SNA in their efforts to combat al-Shabaab, we have avoided large-scale U.S. military involvement, mitigating al-Shabaab’s ability to threaten U.S. interests.

From our experiences throughout Africa, we have learned that winning on the battlefield is not enough to defeat terrorism. Long-term stability is only achieved and sustained by winning the peace, which includes addressing human rights violations committed by security forces, holding those responsible accountable, and actively working to restore citizen trust in security forces. There is no purely military solution to the Boko Haram problem. We recognize the need for reconstruction, once the conditions to do so are in place, and are prepared to work with the Lake Chad Basin countries and international financial institutions to generate the resources to do so.

Question 9. Some analysts have posited that government-led initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism may be backfiring. For example, in a survey of 95 Kenyans associated with Al Shabaab, 65 percent identified the Kenyan government’s counterterrorism strategy as the most important factor that drove them to join the group. Moreover, in some cases, violent extremist groups may in fact seek to provoke violent responses from the government in order to fuel support from targeted communities.

• Do you agree that in some cases, government-led efforts can cause a backlash among vulnerable populations and actually cause more violence? That U.S. involvement in these initiatives may also cause these efforts to backfire?
• How, in your opinion, can the U.S. aid countries in their efforts to counter violent extremism without causing this kind of backlash?

Answer. Government-led efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism may cause a backlash from populations who perceive, or are in fact subjected to, heavy-handed tactics; this dynamic must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. U.S. security and counterterrorism assistance to governments emphasizes the importance upholding broadly accepted human rights standards, rule of law, and adopting a comprehensive approach towards improving security that involves civil society and representatives of marginalized communities.

Our efforts are most effective when the United States partners with credible actors and messengers in communities at risk for radicalization to violence. This in-
cludes efforts to support better relations between the partner nation law enforce-
ment communities and vulnerable populations through more robust community po-
licing programs and other initiatives that promote dialogue and cooperation between
at-risk communities and security forces.

Question 10. As you know, DoD funding for security assistance in Africa sur-
passed that provided by the Department of State for the first time in FY2014 and
has continued to rise since. In the past decade alone, DoD has notified Congress of
$1.3 billion in counterterrorism training and equipment to African countries.

• To what extent, if at all, does DoD coordinate with the State for counterter-
rorism efforts under the umbrellas of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterter-
rorism (PREACT)?
• Do you agree that DoD should be the primary distributor of training and equip-
ment in the counterterrorism space? If not, why not?
• Do some of the DoD’s counterterrorism efforts involve training for countering
violent extremism (CVE)?

Answer. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Part-
nership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) are the lead U.S. counter-
terrorism initiatives across East and West Africa. As the lead for both TSCTP and
PREACT, the Department of State relies on expertise from the entire interagency
community for the design, implementation, and oversight of all programming. In
particular, the Department of State coordinates closely with the Department of De-
fense (DoD) on nearly all aspects of TSCTP and PREACT funded programming, as
well as related DoD-led counterterrorism efforts.

Department of State TSCTP and PREACT program coordinators interact regu-
larly with counterparts at AFRICOM and OSD to develop and de-conflict program-
ming and maximize interaction of the available funding and authorities. Where pos-
sible, Department of State and DoD synchronize timelines, share best practices and
lessons learned, and facilitate coordination between embassy personnel and program
implementers. DoD and the Department of State also coordinate closely on Section
2282 programming, DoD’s program aimed at building the counterterrorism oper-
ational capacity of foreign military, national maritime, or border security forces,
which requires dual-key approval from both Secretaries of Defense and State. Close
coordination between section 2282, TSCTP, PREACT, and other capacity building
funding is necessary to ensure programming is synergistic, not duplicative, and
prioritized to meet strategic priorities.

Additionally, DoD leadership and other Departments and Agencies participate in
DOS-led, Deputy Assistant Secretary-level TSCTP and PREACT coordination meet-
ings quarterly which provide a forum for senior level interagency dialogue. DoD also
takes part in the annual TSCTP planning workshop. Likewise, State participates at
DoD’s invitation in DoD’s annual Africa security cooperation planning events, work-
ing groups, and workshops.

The Department does not agree that DoD should be the primary distributor of
training and equipment in the counterterrorism space.

Question 11. DoD expends resources for counterterrorism train-and-equip pro-
grams through the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF). The President has
requested $450 million for FY17—almost 80% of the total amount allocated from
FY15-FY16 combined.

• Does DoD or State track the equipment provided through these programs? If
so, how?

Answer. I would refer you to the Department of Defense on the question of how
end use monitoring is conducted on materiel provided with Title X funding, such as
CTPF. For its part, the Department of State does not “track” the equipment pro-
vided through such programs unless Title XXII funding, such as Foreign Military
Financing, is ultimately relied on to sustain such equipment in the long term.

Question 12. What, if anything, is DoD doing to ensure that equipment provided
through these train-and-equip programs does not fall into the hands of terrorists?
Please be as specific as possible.

Answer. I would refer you to the Department of Defense on this question.
Question 13. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) has expressed concern with the ability of many African countries to absorb, sustain, and responsibly manage the equipment provided through these train-and-equip programs, and has urged DoD to invest some of its CTPF resources into building institutional capacity of African partner security forces. The HASC report on the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) also requests DoD to respond to a series of “concerns,” including “the capacity of nations to absorb and sustain assistance” and requirements for executive branch congressional notifications for DoD-administered counterterrorism aid.

- Do you share the committee’s concerns over whether these countries have the institutional capacity to adequately manage this equipment?

Answer. Yes. Absorptive capacity—at an institutional, operational, and fiscal level—remains a key concern for the Department of State regarding the provision of equipment and other resources to Africa partner security forces via Title X authorities. As such, the Department is wary of providing large influxes of one-time funding to countries with underdeveloped military institutions and limited resources.

Question 14. What training, if any, does DoD provide for maintaining security equipment properly to ensure the biggest return on U.S. investments?

Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense.

Question 15. Can Congress expect to see the reports requested on our partner nations’ capacity for maintenance of security assistance and DoD-administered security aid anytime soon?

Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO HON. LINDA ETIM BY SENATOR PERDUE

Question 1. Please briefly explain USAID’s role in Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT). How does USAID work with State to carry out its programs and mission in Sub-Saharan Africa specifically? How does USAID’s approach in Sub-Saharan Africa differ from other parts of the continent?

Answer. USAID has been a part of the Partnership for East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) and Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) since their inception. These strategic frameworks guide interagency coordination for countering violent extremism (CVE) in Africa through a number of channels. Examples include working groups of core Department of State, USAID, and other U.S. government stakeholders in Washington, and joint participation in multilateral structures such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum and CVE forums. To further coordinate our shared effort, USAID and the Department of State have recently developed a State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism. The working groups encourage missions and embassies to develop integrated CVE plans for focus regions and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, as the Agency does worldwide, USAID implements its programs based on country-level analysis to ensure programming is targeted and tailored to specific needs. In the case of CVE, this approach is founded upon rigorous, locally informed risk assessments and analysis to identify the drivers of extremism, which guide the design of programming to counter those drivers. Given this analysis, programming might include interventions such as youth empowerment, social and economic inclusion, reliable media, improved local governance, and/or reconciliation and conflict mitigation. Activities are tailored to meet the specific threat levels, political environments and material needs of each community. For this reason, although all efforts are based on an overall goal of reducing vulnerability to the violent extremist threat, USAID’s CVE programs in Sub-Saharan African countries vary from those in other regions based on local context. For example, in Kenya our analysis has led to the design of CVE programs to strengthen cross-border conflict mitigation efforts and CVE networks along Kenya’s volatile border with Somalia. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where radio is one of the most accessible forms of communication, CVE efforts have included providing radio programming in areas where there is often lack of information in the local vernacular. These radio programs are often the only way in which people in border communities receive information. USAID’s CVE efforts often target distinct populations, for example at-risk youth or
marginalized communities as in Niger and Cameroon. One area where we are increasingly focused is the unique role of women in promoting peace and security. Our CVE programming in West and East Africa are focused on a gender-aware approach to programming. Our CVE programs go through a continuous learning cycle and adaptive management—we learn from continually monitoring the evidence and responding to changing dynamics on the ground. This emphasis on learning allows for sharing of lessons and best practices among countries and regions.

**Question 2.** Numerous reports cite that Nigeria and Tunisia serve as hubs for regional terrorist actors, in part due to the fragility of their political institutions. However, their neighbors, Algeria and Morocco, have managed to remain relatively stable political systems. In your opinion, what plans or initiatives have Algeria and Morocco implemented with success that may be able to be applied to Nigeria, Tunisia, and other countries in the Sub-Saharan region?

**Answer.** The instability of political systems does not necessarily correlate with the threat of violent extremism or terrorism. As seen in other regions, violent extremism can be nurtured even within stable democracies. USAID addresses violent extremism differently in every country, based upon rigorous and locally informed risk analysis, with responses tailored to country- or even sub-national-specific needs. To be responsive to changing dynamics on the ground in an environment such as the Lake Chad Basin, we apply a flexible and adaptive approach. USAID’s emphasis on learning allows us to monitor the evidence and bring in lessons and best practices from other countries and regions as applicable.

While national political, economic, and security policies have an influence on successful strategies, Morocco and Algeria have been early innovators in developing a more comprehensive approach to addressing violent extremism and terrorism. Morocco, in particular, has been seen as a leader in preventing recruitment, while Algeria has been a model for reintegration and rehabilitation.

Morocco’s approach has balanced security interventions with community engagement and the promotion of moderate religious voices. Morocco recognized the need to engage with educators, religious institutions, civil society, and the private sector. This balanced, multi-pronged and multi-stakeholder approach has become a cornerstone for designing effective responses to violent extremism that significantly reduce vulnerabilities of at-risk communities.

USAID has worked closely with the Government of Morocco, civil society, and the private sector to translate this approach into action and tailor it to the needs of at-risk communities. Our programs partner with local organizations and local government to promote civic engagement, support education and vocational training opportunities, and build better relations with police. These interventions help reduce the appeal violent extremist groups might have for youth by investing in vulnerable young people, and enabling them to participate in and contribute positively to their communities. USAID’s programming has been complemented by security-oriented programming by the Department of State and other agencies. Coupling these community-based responses with measured, targeted security responses, Morocco has been able to manage and monitor the growth of violent extremism. This principle was recently applied within the Algerian context, where USAID supported a pilot program of this civil society-led model.

Algeria has been a leader in developing approaches to reintegration and rehabilitation of former terrorist fighters and deradicalization, something that we believe could also be effective in Nigeria if the government were to embrace that approach. This leadership is built on their efforts to develop their methods during the “Dark Decade” of the 1990s. Algerian efforts include engaging repentant terrorists to become voices in their community to help prevent radicalization. Algeria has been working with the Global Counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF) and other counterparts to provide a guide to developing such programming.

Tunisia is just beginning to develop its approach to preventing and countering violent extremism, at the same time it is experiencing a significant political transition. The instability of the political system during this transition does not appear to be driving recruitment. Recent studies commissioned by USAID and the Department of State in Tunisia, and USAID assessments in sub-Saharan Africa (Niger, Chad and Cameroon), indicate that perceptions of political and economic marginalization, government injustice and corruption, and unmet expectations help drive recruitment when coupled with a belief that joining violent extremists or terrorist groups will provide status and help solidify identity and bring other rewards. The opportunity for the average citizen to participate in all sectors of society; provision of basic services by the Government; and fostering a sense of fairness, inclusiveness and opportunity appear to be a more effective response for preventing recruitment by violent extremist organizations. These measures also appear to resonate with respondents
of assessments and beneficiaries of programs to counter violent extremism in Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon.

**Question 3.** South Sudan has been labeled as a “Level 3 Emergency” country by the UN, meaning that South Sudan is in the class of the most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises in the world. However, the President in his FY17 budget, requested only $1.957 billion for International Disaster Assistance (IDA). This is a 30% decline in last year’s request which administration officials have explained is due to an expectation of “declining needs” in South Sudan, among a few other countries. Can you explain why the administration expects the need in South Sudan to decrease when the UN continues to label it as one of the worst humanitarian needs in the world? In your opinion, is this funding level adequate for USAID to carry out its humanitarian mission in Sub-Saharan Africa for USAID?

**Answer.** The U.S. Government is the world leader in humanitarian response. We play a critical role in responding to the humanitarian situation in South Sudan, having provided nearly $1.6 billion in humanitarian assistance to support conflict-affected people in South Sudan and South Sudanese refugees in the region since the conflict began in December 2013. Despite the signing of the peace agreement in August 2015 and the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity in April 2016, we expect humanitarian needs to remain high in South Sudan for months and years to come. Multiple years of conflict and a worsening economic crisis have eroded populations’ ability to cope and exacerbated food insecurity. A strong international response, led by the United States, since the conflict began, has prevented this situation from deteriorating even further. USAID partners reach approximately 1.3 million people per month with life-saving aid, including people in UN Protection of Civilians sites and those in remote, rural areas. Our partners constantly adapt to provide assistance as efficiently as possible and are using creative solutions to deliver aid to people in conflict-affected areas despite severe insecurity and other access constraints. USAID has designated South Sudan as a Relief-to-Development Transition focus country, where the Agency seeks to closely coordinate foreign assistance with humanitarian efforts, supporting an integrated approach across sectors and drawing on multiple funding accounts to meet the great needs. The close coordination between USAID’s humanitarian and development offices allows each to leverage the other’s funding accounts to jointly identify and address issues of mutual interest and amplify each other’s investments by developing complementary solutions to the pressing needs of the South Sudanese people.

The administration remains dedicated to providing strong support for humanitarian programs in sub-Saharan Africa and worldwide. The President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 request reflects the administration’s ongoing commitment to these programs in a constrained fiscal environment. The FY 2017 request includes $6.156 billion for humanitarian assistance, including $1.957 billion for the International Disaster Assistance Account, $1.35 billion for Food for Peace Title II, $2.79 billion for the Migration and Refugee Assistance Account, and $50 million for the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund. The overall FY 2017 request for humanitarian assistance is $511 million higher than the FY 2016 request. In concert with FY 2016 resources, the request will enable the U.S. Government to respond to humanitarian needs in sub-Saharan Africa and around the world, including Syria, South Sudan, Iraq, Burundi, CAR, Nigeria, Ukraine, Yemen, as well as the humanitarian needs resulting from El Niño.

USAID works collaboratively with a multitude of stakeholders in sub-Saharan Africa to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance in response to complex emergencies and natural disasters. To maximize its resources, USAID coordinates closely with other donors, the United Nations, host countries, and international and local humanitarian partners.

**Question 4.** Have the activities of Al Shabaab and/or Boko Haram threatened to disrupt any ongoing USAID projects or activities in Sub-Saharan Africa? If so, which ones?

Have these groups’ activities affected the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) developing or ongoing projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, namely Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Niger, Tanzania, or Togo? If so, which ones and how? Can you describe how USAID works to mitigate threats to employees and contractors in these unstable areas? How does it mitigate risks to its personnel in program implementation?

**Answer.** In recognition of the challenging operating environment in Somalia, USAID has taken a number of steps to mitigate the overall risk such as: requiring USAID implementing partners to exercise enhanced due diligence measures; utilizing independent third-party monitoring firms to monitor USAID assistance in Somalia; and coordinating continuously with implementing partners, the Federal Gov-
ernment of Somalia, the United Nations’ Department of Safety and Security, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and other non-governmental partners to triangulate security information and modify USAID programming timeframe and approaches accordingly.

Regarding Boko Haram, while USAID and its partners incorporate a high level of security in their operations, the ongoing violence of Boko Haram is a real and present danger and does threaten to disrupt USAID’s activities at any time. Due to this danger, USAID’s main development assistance programs, managed by the Mission in Abuja, are largely absent from the most-affected areas, save for a significant Crisis Education Response program and several modest health interventions for internally displaced persons, which are viewed rather as humanitarian assistance-type activities. Boko Haram’s actions are not at this time considered to be of significant threat to the Mission’s main development program activities (e.g., Feed the Future, Power Africa, PEPFAR, Northern Education Initiative…Plus, and Maternal and Child Survival), which occur in other parts of the country, including in northern and northeast sub-regions. USAID emergency humanitarian partners are required to create a location-specific safety and security plan, with funding for security needs included within the program budget. These implementing partners are plugged into security management systems available and also maintain their own informal information-sharing networks.

Our partnership with MCC is strong. Our cooperation ensures program synergies and our mutual dedication strengthens sustainable growth and development in partner countries. To our knowledge, MCC’s work in sub-Saharan African countries has not been directly affected by Al Shabaab or Boko Haram. However, the potential instability caused by these groups is an ongoing risk to development in countries in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin and East Africa regions.

Compacts with Tanzania and Senegal were successfully completed. Given concerns with the electoral process in Zanzibar, approval of a second compact for Tanzania remains on hold. A possible second second compact for Senegal remains in the negotiation stage. In Cote d’Ivoire, MCC continues to work with the Government in the design of a compact program. In December 2015, the MCC Board of Directors selected Togo as eligible to develop a threshold program, so this is in the analysis stage.

The MCC Compact with Niger is scheduled for MCC Board of Directors’ consideration at the mid-June 2016 board meeting. To the south, Niger suffers attacks from Boko Haram; to the north, from the illegal drugs and arms entering from Libya; and, to the west, tension caused by terrorist groups in Mali. However, MCC plans to closely collaborate with the World Bank, which should increase the chances of success for this compact by providing key assistance and insight. Moreover, USAID has numerous ongoing food security efforts in Niger, valued at $220 million over five years, and can facilitate continuing on-the-ground expertise.

USAID’s The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency defines engagement criteria including the identification of risks to the Agency, its partners, and the development investment, and determination that reasonable steps can be taken to mitigate those risks. This criterion is considered and reassessed throughout programming, and USAID’s approach of continuous learning and adapting serves to help mitigate risks, which may be physical, programmatic, and financial. At the same time, USAID recognizes that some testing is required in the burgeoning field of CVE. USAID’s Policy therefore advocates a balanced approach, encouraging Agency staff “to take risks, informed by the best available information and mitigation practices.”

In Somalia, Al Shabaab continues to be one of several security-related challenges—including the presence of an emerging ISIL cell that has the ability to impede USAID programming. However, while Al Shabaab remains an ongoing challenge in the implementation of activities, USAID continues to deliver life-saving assistance to populations where access permits. We have capitalized on improvements in access and security across Somalia to deliver tangible development dividends to Somalis, particularly in areas recovered from Al Shabaab. These efforts have helped reinforce stability in key areas and improve confidence in nascent governing institutions. The gains seen from our development assistance in Somalia align with the administration’s broader countering violent extremism goals and objectives.

USAID’s Northeast Nigeria countering violent extremism/stabilization program operates in select areas of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, which are the Nigerian states most affected by the violent insurgency of Boko Haram. Likewise, USAID’s sizeable humanitarian assistance program also operates in the same select areas. USAID’s implementing partners for these programs maintain offices in the State capital cities of Maiduguri (Borno), Damaturu (Yobe), and Yola (Adamawa), and their staff travel regularly around the area to visit work sites and oversee the
distribution of aid. For USAID emergency humanitarian programs, each organization is required to create a location-specific safety and security plan for their staff, with USAID funding any reasonable security needs within the program budget. In addition, implementing partners are plugged into security management systems available, such as the UN Department of Safety and Security, and maintain their own informal information-sharing networks.

**Question 5.** Funding and responsibilities for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs and counter terrorist messaging under the umbrella of the U.S.-led TSCTP and PREACT are spread among multiple offices across several agencies, including State Department’s Counterterrorism and Africa Bureaus and USAID. However, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found in reports released in 2012 and 2014 that interagency coordination for TSCTP and PREACT was lacking, and that spending for these initiatives is not necessarily reflected in State’s or USAID’s congressional budget justifications. What data collection programs does USAID have in place today for funds expended on programs under TSCTP and PREACT? What efforts are currently in place to provide spending data for these programs to Congress? What specific steps has State taken to implement GAO’s recommendations on this front since the 2012 and 2014 program management reports on TSCTP and PREACT? What plans, if any, does USAID have in place to improve data collection and monitoring systems?

**Answer.** USAID consistently applies rigorous financial and program monitoring systems across all programs, including those under TSCTP and PREACT. Our partners have developed multi-layered monitoring mechanisms to track assistance, and they conduct financial oversight to comply with USG audit requirements. TSCTP and PREACT program data is input into the Department of State-managed Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System database. USAID also provides annual information on funds expended to the National Counterterrorism Center on TSCTP, as well as to the State Department’s additional monitoring and collection efforts specifically for PREACT and TSCTP. USAID provides data for the TSCTP report compiled by the State Department’s African Affairs Bureau on a bi-annual basis, which is submitted upon request to Congress. This reporting process was developed in response to the GAO report’s recommendations. TSCTP data is also now reported to Congress annually in the form of spend plans, with the last report having been submitted in December 2015. For PREACT, we contribute program and monitoring data to a State-led information database, which is shared within the interagency. Additionally, USAID reports on funds to be expended for CVE in the annual Operational Plan, led by the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, which is used to respond to inquiries from Congress on foreign assistance programs. We are pleased to provide information to Congress on these important efforts.

The bi-annual TSCTP report was developed by State and is implemented based on the recommendations from the GAO report. For PREACT, State reinvigorated coordination efforts in mid-2015 through more regular interagency working level and senior-level meetings and a focus on streamlining processes and procedures across partners.

USAID’s CVE program analysis and design calls for periodic assessments to gather data and often include baseline, midline and endline assessments. We also work with our implementing partners on iterative assessments, as conditions on the ground evolve. In addition, We are investing significant resources to monitor and evaluate CVE programming, gathering both quantitative and qualitative data, and are using the lessons learned from these programs to drive effective approaches to CVE. Our work to build the skills of local partners includes training on monitoring and evaluation and data collection, as well as support to local institutions to undertake independent research and evaluation.

USAID exercises considerable oversight of CVE programming and ensures our implementing partners are monitoring activities closely. Monitoring may include random checks and third party monitoring, as relevant and feasible. Monitoring mechanisms include hiring staff who speak local languages to conduct monitoring at randomized program sites. Photos of physical assets are taken to prove the assets we provide are in fact in place and helping the intended beneficiaries.
efforts. Additionally, country-specific spending figures are not routinely reported to Congress for regional security assistance programs, including TSCTP, PREACT, and some DoD BPC activities, and such spending is generally not reflected in Department of State and DoD congressional budget justifications. I am concerned that a lack of initiative-wide, as well as country-specific, funding data may inhibit congressional oversight of the scale, scope, and balance of U.S. engagement and assistance to Africa.

- Why is spending data for these programs not routinely collected and reported to Congress?
- What specific steps has State taken to implement GAO’s recommendations on this front?
- What plans, if any, does State have in place to improve data collection and monitoring systems?
- What additional resources, if any, would be required for State and DoD to begin including these funding breakdowns in their respective congressional budget justifications?

Answer. The GAO has officially closed its recommendations in the referenced 2014 GAO report. Since the fourth quarter of FY 2014, the Department of State has coordinated and collected financial data on all Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) programs, including for the following accounts: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR); International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); and Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Development Assistance (DA). The Bureau of African Affairs updates and maintains these unclassified financial data, which include country-specific allocated amounts (control numbers), obligations, unobligated balances (active funds only), unliquidated obligations, and expenditures (disbursements).

The Department of State tracks TSCTP and PREACT funds by country and by account. Country-specific figures are generally not included in Congressional budget justifications (CBJ) for TSCTP and PREACT to facilitate flexible and regional programming within each partnership. As GAO’s 2014 review of PREACT notes, “The regional nature of PREACT encourages implementing agencies to view counterterrorism from a regional perspective, rather than country-by-country.” By not requesting TSCTP and PREACT funds by country, we mitigate the possibility that partners will feel entitled to a specific amount of funding, which could potentially arise with bilateral assistance allocations. When specific amounts of funding are allocated bilaterally it can become more complicated when changes in circumstances and policy priorities warrant reprogramming those funds.

The regional nature of TSCTP and PREACT also enables multi-country trainings, exercises, and other engagements where it can be difficult to attribute specific costs to one partner nation over another. The joint participation of Senegalese and Mauritanian law enforcement officials in AFRICOM’s 2016 Exercise FLINTLOCK, supported by TSCTP/NADR/ATA funds, is one such example. Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian civilian security force participation in PREACT is another example of how the Department of State employs resources attributed to these regional partnerships to enable regional interoperability, communication, and coordination.

Since 2012, the Department of State has made a concerted effort to go beyond counting the money and the number of trainings completed toward more holistic assessments of effects. We have made great strides in the development of, and are now operationalizing, frameworks for measuring the results of our security assistance, specifically counterterrorism programs. The Department of State has hired dedicated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) personnel to help monitor and evaluate a number of security assistance programs. The Department of State is working in close partnership with our DoD colleagues to roll out these models and facilitate the collection of monitoring data. Similarly, the Department of State developed a standard CVE monitoring framework and deployed it across all CVE programs funded by PREACT and TSCTP Economic Support Funds.

We are also enhancing our knowledge management practices and sharing these frameworks with other partners working in the same security assistance space. The goals of these knowledge management practices are coordinated approaches for understanding the outcomes of our investments, streamlined implementer efforts, and improved M&E capacity in our partners.

When the Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) is completed, it is hard to anticipate the exact needs of partner countries due to the rapidly evolving nature of the terrorist threats. Thus, we often make final funding decisions at the time funds are being programmed—often a couple of years out from the CBJ’s preparation. The
Department of State can provide country-specific breakdowns of TSCTP and PREACT funding by request.

Question 2. Some analysts have posited that government-led initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism may be backfiring. For example, in a survey of 95 Kenyans associated with Al Shabaab, 65 percent identified the Kenyan government’s counterterrorism strategy as the most important factor that drove them to join the group. Moreover, in some cases, violent extremist groups may in fact seek to provoke violent responses from the government in order to fuel support from targeted communities.

• Do you agree that in some cases, government-led efforts can cause a backlash among vulnerable populations and actually cause more violence? That U.S. involvement in these initiatives may also cause these efforts to backfire?

• How, in your opinion, can the U.S. aid countries in their efforts to counter violent extremism without causing this kind of backlash?

Answer. Government-led efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism may cause a backlash from populations who perceive, or are in fact subjected to, heavy-handed tactics; this dynamic must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. U.S. security and counterterrorism assistance to governments emphasizes the importance of upholding broadly accepted human rights standards, rule of law, and adopting a comprehensive approach towards improving security that involves civil society and representatives of marginalized communities.

Our efforts are most effective when the United States partners with credible actors and messengers in communities at risk for radicalization to violence. This includes efforts to support better relations between the partner nation law enforcement communities and vulnerable populations through more robust community policing programs and other initiatives that promote dialogue and cooperation between at-risk communities and security forces.

Question 3. As you know, DoD funding for security assistance in Africa surpassed that provided by the Department of State for the first time in FY2014 and has continued to rise since. In the past decade alone, DoD has notified Congress of $1.3 billion in counterterrorism training and equipment to African countries.

• To what extent, if at all, does DoD coordinate with the State for counterterrorism efforts under the umbrellas of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT)?

• Do you agree that DoD should be the primary distributor of training and equipment in the counterterrorism space? If not, why not?

• Do some of the DoD’s counterterrorism efforts involve training for countering violent extremism (CVE)?

Answer. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) are the lead U.S. counterterrorism initiatives across East and West Africa. As the lead for both TSCTP and PREACT, the Department of State relies on expertise from the entire interagency community for the design, implementation, and oversight of all programming. In particular, the Department of State coordinates closely with the Department of Defense (DoD) on nearly all aspects of TSCTP and PREACT funded programming, as well as related DoD-led counterterrorism efforts.

Department of State TSCTP and PREACT program coordinators interact regularly with counterparts at AFRICOM and OSD to develop and de-conflict programming and maximize interaction of the available funding and authorities. Where possible, Department of State and DoD synchronize timelines, share best practices and lessons learned, and facilitate coordination between embassy personnel and program implementers. DoD and the Department of State also coordinate closely on Section 2282 programming. DoD’s program aimed at building the counterterrorism operational capacity of foreign military, national maritime, or border security forces, which requires dual-key approval from both Secretaries of Defense and State. Close coordination between section 2282, TSCTP, PREACT, and other capacity-building funding is necessary to ensure programming is synergistic, not duplicative, and prioritized to meet strategic priorities.

Additionally, DoD leadership and other Departments and Agencies participate in DoS-led Deputy Assistant Secretary-level TSCTP and PREACT coordination meetings quarterly which provide a forum for senior level interagency dialogue. DoD also takes part in the annual TSCTP planning workshop. Likewise, State participates at
DoD's invitation in DoD's annual Africa security cooperation planning events, working groups, and workshops.

The Department does not agree that DoD should be the primary distributor of training and equipment in the counterterrorism space.

It is a fundamental U.S. foreign policy goal to build the capacity of our foreign partners to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Our success achieving these goals depends on the Department's coordination of this effort, as a key part of our overall bilateral relationship with a foreign country. That will ensure that all U.S. government activities in this space reflect a shared vision and an agreed framework.

Question 4. DoD expends resources for counterterrorism train-and-equip programs through the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF). The President has requested $450 million for FY17—almost 80% of the total amount allocated from FY15-FY16 combined.

- Does DoD or State track the equipment provided through these programs? If so, how?

Answer. I would refer you to the Department of Defense on the question of how end use monitoring is conducted on materiel provided with Title X funding, such as CTPF. For its part, the Department of State does not “track” the equipment provided through such programs unless Title XXII funding, such as Foreign Military Financing, is ultimately relied on to sustain such equipment in the long term.

Question 5. What, if anything, is DoD doing to ensure that equipment provided through these train-and-equip programs does not fall into the hands of terrorists? Please be as specific as possible.

Answer. I would refer you to the Department of Defense on this question.

Question. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) has expressed concern with the ability of many African countries to absorb, sustain, and responsibly manage the equipment provided through these train-and-equip programs, and has urged DoD to invest some of its CTPF resources into building institutional capacity of African partner security forces. The HASC report on the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) also requests DoD to respond to a series of “concerns,” including “the capacity of nations to absorb and sustain assistance” and requirements for executive branch congressional notifications for DoD-administered counterterrorism aid.

Question 6. Do you share the committee's concerns over whether these countries have the institutional capacity to adequately manage this equipment?

Answer. Yes. Absorptive capacity—at an institutional, operational, and fiscal level—remains a key concern for the Department of State regarding the provision of equipment and other resources to Africa partner security forces via Title X authorities. As such, the Department is wary of providing large influxes of one-time funding to countries with underdeveloped military institutions and limited resources.

Question 7. What training, if any, does DoD provide for maintaining security equipment properly to ensure the biggest return on U.S. investments?

Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense.

Question 8. Can Congress expect to see the reports requested on our partner nations' capacity for maintenance of security assistance and DoD-administered security aid anytime soon?

Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense.