[Senate Hearing 114-766]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-766
TERRORISM AND INSTABILITY
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
INSERT DATE HERE deg.MAY 10, 2016
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 2
Thomas-Greenfield, Hon. Linda, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC...... 4
Etim, Hon. Linda, Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency
for International Development, Washington, DC.................. 6
Siberell, Justin, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Bureau
of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.. 8
Abdoulaye Mar Dieye, Assistant Administrator and Director,
Regional Bureau for Africa, United Nations Development Program,
New York, NY................................................... 32
Fomunyoh, Dr. Christopher, Senior Associate and Regional Director
for Central and West Africa, National Democratic Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 34
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Witnesses' Prepared Statements
Joint Prepared Statement Submitted by Hon. Linda Thomas-
Greenfield and Justin Siberell................................. 44
Prepared Statement of Hon. Linda Etim............................ 50
Prepared Statement of Abdoulaye Mar Dieye........................ 54
Prepared Statement of Christopher Fomunyoh, Ph.D................. 56
Additional Questions for the Record
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Hon. Linda
Thomas-Greenfield and Justin Siberell by Senator Corker........ 60
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Hon. Linda
Thomas-Greenfield by Senator Cardin............................ 68
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Hon. Linda
Etim by Senator Cardin......................................... 75
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Justin
Seberell by Senator Cardin..................................... 77
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Hon. Linda
Thomas-Greenfield by Senator Perdue............................ 82
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Hon. Linda
Etim by Senator Perdue......................................... 88
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Justin
Siberell by Senator Perdue..................................... 93
(iii)
TERRORISM AND INSTABILITY
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Rubio, Flake,
Gardner, Isakson, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Murphy, Kaine, and
Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. I call the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
to order.
We thank our witnesses for being here and look forward to
your testimony.
As much of the world concentrates on the ISIS threat and
instability in the Middle East, the committee takes this
opportunity to consider efforts by the United States and other
partners to counter extremism in the Sub-Saharan Africa area.
Long-term development has been the norm across much of
Africa, including here in our committee with the recent signing
of the Power Africa legislation, which we are all very proud of
and appreciate the way the administration has led on that
effort also, that we hope will bring investment to a key sector
for economic growth and opportunity. Whereas in the Middle East
we have been reacting to abhorrent state and terrorist violence
and the uprooting of millions of people, in Africa we have had
the opportunity of years of influence through diplomacy and
development and partnerships to improve outcomes.
However, violent extremism is not a new phenomenon in
Africa. Three sub-regions have exploded with terrorist
elements, some decades old. Al Shabaab and its predecessors
have long troubled Somalia and its neighbors in east Africa,
including through Al Qaeda attacks on American embassies in
1998. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has evolved since 9/11
into a vicious regional threat across the Sahel and beyond, and
they have fought the Algerian Government since 1991 in one form
or another. Boko Haram, which has declared allegiance to ISIS,
will stop at nothing to carry out its grotesque attacks against
civilians and communities across Nigeria and the Lake Chad
Basin.
All three of these conflicts have drawn international
intervention and resources because the terrorist elements
involved are seen as aspiring to the kind of international
terrorism perpetrated by Al Qaeda and ISIS. And some are
beginning to show increased sophistication in attacks.
Beyond these three conflict and terrorist-ridden regions
are several complex crises that breed on instability brought on
by many factors, the most egregious of which appears to be the
complete lack of government responsibility for its citizens
through corruption and greed rather than any lack of resources.
This includes most recently South Sudan and the Central African
Republic and, of course, the decades-long atrocities in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, all three of which have cost
billions of dollars to mitigate through massive peacekeeping
operations.
While the world seeks ways to address the direct threat of
emergent terrorist groups in a reaction mode, we have had a
chance--and still do--to improve the prospects for many
countries in Africa by leveraging long-term relationships and
development.
I am also concerned that there are efforts to gain traction
in destabilizing other countries we consider relatively stable
now.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, the
lessons that they have drawn from their direct engagement in
these regions, and I hope to better understand what the
underlying factors are that contribute to the terrorist threat
in the region and what U.S. efforts have been made to build a
better response across the whole of government and with
partners in the international community.
With that, I will turn to our distinguished ranking member,
Ben Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, Chairman Corker, thank you very much
for convening this hearing on terrorism and instability in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
I agree with your assessments. The amount of escalating
violence in this region is a major concern and requires the
attention of this committee, of the United States Senate, and
the American people.
I also agree with you that there are multiple reasons for
the instability and crisis in this region, but that there is a
common theme of poor governance. And that is an issue that
provides a vacuum and that vacuum is usually filled with
instability and recruitment of extremists.
So I very much agree with you this is an area of growing
concern in regards to the amount of violence that is taking
place and one that requires us to put a focus on the governance
structures in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. And it is
true. It is from west Africa to the Lake Chad Basin to east
Africa.
In west Africa, circumstances in Mali, we find the
marginalization of ethnic groups that have become now a home
for at least five active terrorist groups, a breeding ground
for terrorist recruitment. The U.N. mission in Mali is the
deadliest peacekeeping mission that we have anywhere. That
should be a sign that things need to change in regards to Mali.
We have the parties coming forward for a peace agreement. Well,
we need to see immediate attention to that and see whether in
fact that peace agreement can be implemented.
In the Lake Chad Basin, Nigeria is of particular concern.
Boko Haram is linked--has pledged its allegiance to ISIS. We
will see how that alliance, in fact, takes place or not. But we
do know it is extremely deadly. The number of deaths have
escalated dramatically, 15,000 since 2009, 2.4 million
displaced people, 5.6 million in need of food. And those
numbers are shocking in their size. I think the world became
engaged in this when 200 school girls were kidnapped, and yet
their fate today is still not known.
In east Africa, in Somalia, we have to pay careful
attention. We know that. And in all of these regions, there is
a common denominator of lack of good governance. This year in
Somalia is said to be a critical one for the consolidation of
the Somali state. A constitutional referendum and completion of
the federal system are supposed to occur. Absent the
establishment of a fully functioning, transparent, inclusive
government, it will be difficult if not impossible to eliminate
the threat posed by Al Shabaab.
While the threats have been clearly identified, what is not
as evident is whether the United States is consistently
applying a comprehensive approach to countering violent
extremism in Africa, one which adequately addresses key drivers
of radicalization such as political and economic
marginalization, corruption, and poor governance and whether
steps have been taken to build the type of capacity in African
countries to counter violent extremist activities.
I hope today's hearing will help us all better understand
the package of programs and activities we are bringing to bear
to combat terrorism and violent extremism in Africa and what,
if any, efforts the administration is making to fully integrate
principles of democracy, anti-corruption, and good governance
into our approach. Security assistance alone will not win the
battle.
Mr. Chairman, let me quote from Deputy Secretary of State
Tony Blinken who recently said that countering violent
extremism is, ``A fight that over time will be won in the
classrooms and houses of worship, on social media, in community
centers, at sites of cultural heritage, on the sports fields,
and within the homes of the people in every corner of the
planet.'' Given how significantly underfunded democracy and
governance programs in Africa have been over the past several
years, I do not see how we could be reaching that threat where
it is. But there are two steps we can take right away to do so.
First is a point I have been making to the administration
for nearly a year. It is critical that we increase investment
in democracy and governance, such as are commensurate with our
security assistance funding. In fiscal year 2015, the last year
for which figures are available, we allocated approximately $1
billion for security assistance and only $170 million for
democracy and governance. I hope that as you discuss
allocations for fiscal year 2016 with the appropriators, you
will indicate you will meet the $312 million for democracy and
governance in Africa called for in the omnibus report language.
And I hope we have a chance to talk about that.
Secondly, the United States must signal to our partners
that our support does not come at the expense of respect for
democracy and human rights. I fear we have sent the wrong
signal to the Government of Ethiopia about our priorities in
this area by failing to support human rights and democracy
activities in that country. To cite just one example, it is
critical that we take the prime minister up on his offer from
last July to work with us on improving democracy in Ethiopia.
In addition, we should be sure that our security assistance
includes support for military and civilian institutions that
support accountability for counterterrorism partner countries
with weak democracy and human rights records.
So, Mr. Chairman, I hope that during the course of this
hearing we are going to hear from our administration officials
exactly what is our coordinated strategy. Yes, we want to fight
extremism. We have to do that. We have to have the military
security assistance, but if you do not have in place the type
of governance that represents the concerns of the population,
there will be instability and a void on which extremists will
capitalize.
And I look forward to our discussion.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much for those comments.
And again, we thank our witnesses. I am going to introduce
all three of you, and then if you would just speak in the order
that you are introduced, I would appreciate it.
Our first witness is Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs at the Department of State.
Welcome. Our second witness today is Linda Etim, Assistant
Administrator for Africa, USAID. Thank you for being here. Our
third witness is Justin Siberell, Acting Coordinator for
Counterterrorism at the Department of State. We want to thank
you all for being here, for your service to our country.
And if you could summarize your comments in about 5
minutes, that would be great. Without objection, your written
testimony will be entered into the record. So thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Cardin, and distinguished members of the committee, let me
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
have a very brief oral statement, and I provided a more
comprehensive written statement for the record.
Africa is home to the world's youngest and fastest-growing
population. It presents significant opportunities for
transformation and growth, as well as many challenges. The
overall trends in Sub-Saharan Africa point to accelerated
democratization, development, and economic opportunity.
Although Africa remains the world's least developed continent,
average real per capita income increased steadily over the last
decade and a half.
However, in spite of these positive trends, instability and
conflict persist in parts of Africa. This instability has a
direct bearing on U.S. national interests and those of our
closest allies. Terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and a range
of transnational criminal organizations exploit state fragility
and conflict. Conflict destabilizes states and borders. It
stifles economic growth, and it robs young Africans of the
opportunity for education and a better life.
While attacks in Brussels and Paris and even in San
Bernardino offer tragic reminders that terrorism can happen
anywhere, Africa has critical vulnerabilities and capacity gaps
that must be addressed. Therefore, we are working with our
African partners to increase their abilities to prevent and
respond to such threats and to address the conditions that
perpetrate the cycles of instability and conflict across the
continent.
Addressing instability in Africa requires a comprehensive
and a balanced approach, as you have stated. We cannot focus
solely on the security aspects of the solution. Military,
intelligence, and law enforcement tools are vital to defend a
range of threats, but they cannot replace robust diplomacy and
the hard work required to strengthen democratic institutions,
to stimulate economic growth, trade and investment, and promote
development, education and broad-based economic opportunity.
The State Department, USAID, the Department of Defense, and
several other agencies offer unique expertise and capabilities,
and it is essential that each organization has the tools to
contribute to our common objectives of building immediate and
long-term stability in Africa.
As you stated, Senator Cardin, civility begins with
building strong and stable democratic processes, addressing
individual and collective grievances created by lack of
governmental accountability, corruption, denial of basic human
rights, and feelings of political inclusion is not just the
right thing for governments and civic leaders to do. It is a
security imperative. Civility in Africa ultimately requires
leaders with the will and the capacity to respond to the needs
and aspirations of their people.
We continue to stay focused on supporting free, fair, and
transparent elections that are inclusive and representative. We
have seen major electoral successes during the past several
years, but there have been some setbacks as well.
However, democratic governance is not only about elections.
National and local governments must deliver essential services
for their people. Civil society and a free press must be
empowered. Independent judiciaries must enforce rule of law,
and professional security forces must respect human rights.
President Obama also has highlighted that the most urgent
task facing Africa today and for decades ahead is to create
opportunity for the next generation. Young people constitute a
majority of Africa's population and stand to gain or lose
tremendously based on the continent's social, political, and
economic trajectory. They also represent the next generation of
African leaders. They must be empowered to contribute to their
country's future so that they are not enticed by extremist
ideologies.
President Obama has warned about the vulnerabilities, and I
quote, ``The vulnerabilities of people entirely trapped in
impoverished communities where there is no order and no path
for advancement, where there are no educational opportunities,
where there are no ways to support families and no escapes from
justice and the humiliation of corruption that feeds
instability and disorder and makes these communities rife for
extremist recruitment.''
We know that groups like Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda,
and associated groups often ensnare their foot soldiers by
simply offering cash or promises of financial reward for
themselves and for their families. It is vital that
governments, sometimes in partnership with the private sector,
use every available resource to offer educational and
vocational opportunities that provide alternatives to these
lethal traps.
We also recognize that strengthening the security and
justice institutions of our African partners is vital for long-
term stability on the continent. As a consequence, we are
partnering with African countries, with organizations, and with
people to develop capable, professional security services,
improved security sector governance, and enhanced regional
coordination for more effective responses.
Once again, I thank you for the opportunity to speak to
you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement submitted by Assistant
Secretary Thomas-Greenfield and Acting Coordinator Justin
Siberell is located at the end of this hearing transcript.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF HON. LINDA ETIM, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
Ms. Etim. Good morning, Chairman Corker. Good morning,
Ranking Member Cardin and all the members of the committee. And
I also thank you for this opportunity to discuss USAID's work
on this very important topic.
Throughout Africa, U.S. national interests and our efforts
to end extreme poverty, to promote resilient democratic
societies, and to increase economic opportunities for people
are increasingly threatened by instability and the spread of
violent extremism.
We believe, as this committee has already stated that
development programming can be a powerful tool to prevent
conflict and instability. Conflict and instability impede
development. They slow investment. They prevent children from
attending schools, as we have seen in northern Nigeria. They
place additional burdens on already fragile health care
systems, as we have seen in the Ebola response case. And they
undermine political systems.
We also know that our activities are designed to reduce
opportunities for extremists to exploit social injustice,
economic inequality, the lack of political integration, and we
need to actually make sure that these activities help to
advance development programming throughout the countries.
Today I will try to discuss how our programs, which are
based on strategic thinking and evidence-based, results-
oriented approaches, seek to prevent violent extremism in
Africa. But I will also touch on the importance of USAID's
governance programs, which seek to reduce social inequalities,
corruption, and institutional weaknesses that can often foster
instability.
When we look at the drivers, experience has taught us that
responding to military conflicts that erupt in fragile states
by deploying large peacekeeping missions or large-scale and
often far too long-term humanitarian responses is very costly.
For that reason, whenever USAID designs a program or a country
strategy, we use our analytic capabilities and knowledge of the
local context to reduce the drivers of fragility. These
assessments consider the push factors that drive support for
violent extremism such as social fragmentation, a sense of
injustice, perceptions of marginalization, and distrust of
government. We also try to address the pull factors that can
attract those who are vulnerable to violent extremism. This
analysis helps to shape our interventions to promote good
governance and rule of law and respect for human rights, as
well as sustainable, inclusive development.
We do not have one single answer as to what causes violent
extremism. A decade of analysis has shown that there is a
strong correlation between state fragility, feelings of
injustice and marginalization as being drivers of violent
extremism. In 2011, USAID issued a policy which we titled ``The
Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency.''
This policy recognized development's unique role in mitigating
the drivers of extremism and advancing U.S. national security.
USAID activities, therefore, are designed to mitigate these
drivers by increasing resiliency at all levels. At the
individual level, we target marginalized communities,
particularly youth, through employment outreach programs,
vocational training skills, and community development
activities. At the local level, we focus on social cohesion
activities, peace committees to build stronger, more resilient
communities. At the national level, USAID has an important role
to play in strengthening government institutions and their
ability to deliver basic services, but also to encourage
inclusion and better transparency.
Youth are a key demographic in our programming, and while
there is no one profile of what at-risk youth look like,
unemployed youth who have migrated to urban and slum areas who
are university graduates or who have no expectations and have
lived through or participated in conflict can be at the
greatest risk. Therefore, our programming focuses on this
important demographic.
In Kenya, for example, 75 percent of the population is
under 30 years of age. Through our Generation Kenya program, we
offer targeted training to at-risk youth populations, closing
the gap between young people who are out of work and employers
who are short of employees with skills. Generation Kenya plans
to place more than 50,000 young people in stable careers by
2020. Going forward, USAID will expand this programming into
violent extremism hotspots working hand in hand with
communities, local and national governments, and the private
sector to ensure its success.
In Niger, our Peace Through Development project produces
and delivers original radio content, which is aimed at
countering extremist narratives through accurate reporting and
peace messaging. It reaches over 1.7 million people in 40 of
the most at-risk communities. We have also directly, through
this program, engaged nearly 100,000 people through civic
education, moderate voice promotion, and youth empowerment
themed events. These programs, we believe, increase citizens'
engagement with the government and decrease incentives for
young people to take part in illegal or extremist activities.
In conclusion, instability is often the product of
generations of neglect and corruption, and its resolution,
therefore, will be the product of generations of concerted
focus, legitimate engagement, and met expectations. Because
trends in extremism are fluid, we know that we must constantly
reassess our priorities, our progress, and our policies to
ensure that our work is actually based on the realities of
today. Through program assessments, implementation, and
evaluations, we are learning what works and what does not work.
We are improving best practices, and we are helping individuals
and communities address these drivers of instability and
violent extremism on their own, through the work of our
missions in the field, and through USAID-supported activities
and resource centers.
USAID's commitment is evidence of the number of individuals
dedicated to this problem set, but we know that we cannot do it
alone. Sustained engagement with strong partners in the U.S.
Government through the Departments of State and Defense,
through the work that your committee is doing here, and with
donor governments, as well as with our partners in the
religious communities, local governments, civil society
organizations, all of these different groups on the ground will
be key to combating extremism today, and they will be key also
to securing peace and stability for years to come.
I thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[Ms. Etim's prepared statement is located at the end of
this hearing transcript.]
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
STATEMENT OF JUSTIN SIBERELL, ACTING COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Siberell. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
As outlined in our statement for the record, a number of
terrorist groups remain active in Sub-Saharan Africa, including
Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, and
Boko Haram, also known as Islamic State West Africa Province.
Regional military forces with United States and
international assistance have made progress against all of
these terrorist groups. Terrorist safe havens in Somalia,
northern Mali, and the Lake Chad Basin have been degraded
significantly.
However, in the face of this pressure, these groups have
shifted to more asymmetric tactics, including attacks against
soft targets. We have seen this dynamic in west Africa
recently. Over the recent months, AQIM and Murabitoun have
carried out a series of attacks against international hotels
and tourist sites in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Cote d'Ivoire,
killing scores of people, including an American citizen.
Similarly in east Africa, we have seen Shabaab become
increasingly aggressive in pursuing attacks against high-
profile targets in Somalia and across the border in Kenya.
We are also concerned by the risk that ISIL's presence may
grow on the continent. As we have seen elsewhere in the world,
ISIL seeks to co-opt existing terrorist groups, as well as
local insurgencies and conflicts, to expand its networks and
advance its agenda. We are watching these dynamics closely. We
are working with partners to contain and drive back ISIL-
affiliated groups wherever they may emerge.
The United States is committed to building and sustaining
partnerships across Africa to counter terrorism and promote
stability. Partnerships are at the core of our approach, and
this is reflected in our interagency efforts as well through
the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, or
PREACT, and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,
TSCTP.
Mr. Chairman, the United States is providing significant
support for regional military operations. Through our
diplomacy, the Department of State continues to encourage
regional leadership and cooperation to sustain these efforts.
Military efforts alone are insufficient, however. As we
deal with the evolving threat environment, the success of our
counterterrorism efforts in Africa increasingly depends upon
capable and responsible and responsive civilian partners,
police, prosecutors, judges, prison officials, and community
leaders who can help address terrorist challenges within a
sustainable and rule of law framework that respects human
rights.
In this regard, the Department of State is training and
mentoring law enforcement units for more than 15 African
countries. We are building their capacity to prevent and
respond to terrorist incidents, conduct terrorism-related
investigations, and improve land border and aviation security.
We are also providing significant assistance for African
prosecutors and courts to effectively and expeditiously handle
terrorism cases. We are working to enhance the capacity of
prisons in Africa to effectively handle terrorist inmates in
accordance with international human rights standards.
Mr. Chairman, we greatly appreciate the funding provided by
the Congress in fiscal year 2016 for the Department's
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund. This funding will enable us
to expand our assistance for law enforcement and justice sector
efforts in key African countries.
At the same time, the Department and USAID are increasing
our focus on preventing the spread of violent extremism in the
first place, to stop the recruitment, radicalization, and
mobilization of people, especially young people, to engage in
terrorist activities. We are expanding engagement with African
partners to better understand the drivers of violent extremism
in order to design effective responses. This includes promoting
greater trust and partnership between communities and law
enforcement.
The President's fiscal year 2017 budget request includes
increased resources for countering violent extremism programs,
including an additional $59 million as part of our overall
request under the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund. These
resources would enable us to expand programs in Africa to
engage communities and youth susceptible to violent extremist
recruitment.
Mr. Chairman, there is no single solution to defeat
terrorist groups and promote stability in Africa. The
challenges are significant, but we believe we have committed
partners in Africa who are making progress. We believe we will
be most effective in the long run with a comprehensive approach
that promotes regional cooperation, the rule of law, and good
governance. We continue to look for ways to enhance this
approach, and we appreciate the strong support of Congress for
these efforts. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you all.
Let me just start by setting context here. If you look at
the regions that we are discussing today and you look at the
numbers of deaths, displacements, the scale of what is
happening in these three regions and other places throughout
Africa really over the course of time is as large as the scale
of terrorist activities in the Middle East. Is that correct?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I would say so particularly
if we look at the case of Boko Haram. The number of people who
have been killed and affected by Boko Haram are as large as, if
not larger than, the number of people who have been killed by
ISIL in the past year. So there is a devastating impact and it
is reflected in the numbers of people killed and impacted by
terrorism in Africa.
The Chairman. And no disagreement from the other witnesses.
Mr. Siberell. No.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this. Obviously, there is
tremendous focus on the Middle East. We have had a lot of
hearings here, and most of us, on the other hand, have traveled
throughout Africa and the Sahel and seen the tremendous threat,
if you will, to stability there. Why do you think the world
focus is more so on areas like the Middle East and less so on
areas like the regions we are talking about right now in
Africa?
Mr. Siberell. Well, I will offer my thoughts, Mr. Chairman.
I think with the case of ISIL, I mean, they emanate from Al
Qaeda in Iraq, and so there has been a focus in particular on
that conflict ongoing. That has, of course, devastated those
societies as well and continues to. That, of course, builds off
of the historic origins of Al Qaeda from the Middle East and
that region. So I think from a terrorism perspective, the focus
generally has been on that region as the core area where these
groups have emanated from.
But it does not--as Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield
just noted, when you look at actual violence, the groups in
Africa are committing extreme amounts of violence. Boko Haram
in particular is a group that has targeted civilians
deliberately, and their deaths on an annual basis--we will
report these in the annual country reports on terrorism. Boko
Haram is consistently in the top ranks of terrorist groups in
terms of committing violence and destabilizing an entire
region. So the challenges and the threats are as great on the
Africa continent, but I would agree with you that the focus
generally speaking tends to remain on the Middle East and those
conflicts.
The Chairman. But for what reason?
Mr. Siberell. I think for ISIL, it is appropriate to focus
on the core area where that group has emanated from, and that
is the main effort in particular against ISIL, against its
presence in Iraq and Syria. And in many ways, when we look at
the spread of ISIL, preventing that will depend on defeating
the group in its core homeland. And so, therefore, the focus in
that regard on that core area is appropriate.
The Chairman. Any other comments?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I would just say that much of
the terrorism that we saw in the past on the continent of
Africa tended to be focused on Africa. So there was not the
comparable threat to the homeland from terrorists in Africa as
we see in the Middle East. But I think we have all come to the
conclusion that terrorism anywhere affects us everywhere, and
we have to address it not just in the Middle East but in Africa
as well.
The Chairman. So the core, central beginnings, if you will,
of this threat emanated from the Middle East, and so hitting
areas where they are establishing a caliphate has been
important. And then secondly, the groups in Africa have not
been seen as a threat to Western entities. Would that be a fair
assessment of the focus?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I would say initially, yes,
but I think we are seeing more and more that this does have an
impact on us. When we look at the attacks in Mali and Burkina
Faso, Americans were victims.
Mr. Siberell. And I would just add that these groups
evolved out of the particular context in Africa but have been
co-opted or joined up with transnational terrorist groups. So
Al Shabaab, which began out of the Islamic Courts group in
Somalia, later affiliated with Al Qaeda and, of course, was
part of Al Qaeda's global agenda. And that has been a
significant concern of the U.S. security community because of
the foreign fighter element that had traveled to Somalia,
including American citizens. So that has been a focus, and the
concern is that Al Shabaab, representing an Al Qaeda affiliate,
does also tend to advance the Al Qaeda agenda.
Similarly with Boko Haram recently, there has been an
affiliation with the Islamic State. So that gives us great
concern to look at the group to determine whether or not they
will, because of that affiliation, begin to change their focus
toward more targeting of international interests, Western
interests, or even externally.
The Chairman. I am going to save the rest of my time for
interjections.
Ranking Member Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you.
And I thank all of our panelists for their incredible work
in a very challenging assignment.
As I said in my opening statement, as the chairman said in
the opening statement, there is no simple solution to the
violence that is taking place, the terrorism that is taking
place. And clearly we need a security response, including
direct support against terrorism. So I strongly support that.
But as you each pointed out, the recruitment of terrorists
is because there is a void, and there are individuals who feel
that they have no other choice and they are prime for
recruitment.
So my concern is are we giving countries a free pass who
are partners in our counterterrorism campaigns, on human rights
and poor governance? I say that and I give you many examples.
In Ethiopia, they just had a parliamentary election. Not a
single opposition leader was elected. We have seen the security
forces there who have killed hundreds of protestors. In Chad,
we have dozens of military officers who have been arrested
because they would not vote for the president. In Somalia, we
have a report in yesterday's ``Washington Post'' that they are
using children for spies. We have had extrajudicial killings by
the military in Nigeria and Kenya. And yet, I do not see a
response by America, the U.S., in regards to these activities.
Am I wrong? Are we giving them a free pass? Should we be giving
them a free pass?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you for that question,
Senator.
In every single one of the cases you mentioned, we condemn
human rights abuses. We regularly condemn those abuses by
security forces and by governments. And we make clear to these
governments that this is a core value for the United States.
At the same time, we are committed to firmly working with
our partners to address efforts to defeat terrorism. We cannot
draw a line and say we are not going to work with you on
terrorism because of human rights violations, but we reinforce
with these governments on a regular basis that they must
respect human rights and civil liberties and rule of law.
Senator Cardin. How do you do that? How do you reinforce
that they must?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We start with a diplomatic
discussion. In the case of Ethiopia, we had intense discussions
with that government over the past year. You may know that as a
result of those discussions we are having a human rights
dialogue being led by our Assistant Secretary for Human Rights,
Tom Malinowski, with the Ethiopians. It is a challenge. We do
not always get our messages through to them, but they are
hearing that these are concerns. And in many cases, they are
upset that we are expressing concerns about human rights.
Senator Cardin. Would you share with me and this committee
the specific methods you have used to transmit your concerns on
human rights violations and the lack of democratic progress? I
would be interested. I see the strong voice of the United
States on counterterrorism issues, which I expect to see and
want to continue to see. I have not seen the same degree of
effort and energy in regards to concerns on the poor governance
and violations of human rights.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Well, first of all, we start
with our embassies, with our ambassadors engaging with
governments and embassies----
Senator Cardin. That is quiet usually.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Sometimes it is quiet and
sometimes our ambassadors do not get meetings because they are
not quiet. They are very, very public in their expression of
concerns.
It also occurs through meetings that I have on a regular
basis with heads of state. It is at the top of the agenda. They
push back. They say we do not respect them as partners because
we are raising human rights concerns, that we do not understand
the situation in their countries. And my response has always
been please understand this is a core value for us.
We also work with their militaries in terms of providing
human rights training. We fund those directly. We do Leahy
vetting for a number of countries, in fact all countries where
we are involved in doing any military training. And there have
been some countries where we have had to make the hard decision
not to work with their military and their security services
because they have committed human rights----
Senator Cardin. From fiscal year 2013 to 2015, the security
assistance budgets for Africa have gone up from a half a
billion to a billion. The democracy and governance budget has
fallen during that period of time. I would think that democracy
and governance funding is a clear indication of our commitment
to good governance and human rights. There is certainly a
shortage of funds. There is no question about that. I would
like to see a larger pie for our global efforts on all these
areas.
As I understand it, a large amount of the decisions as to
how those funds are allocated are based upon who is the most
effective in advocating for need. Have we been ineffective in
advocating for democracy and governance?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I would like to say no
because it is at the top of my agenda.
Senator Cardin. But why has there been a decline in those
funds?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Well, I have to say I am not
an appropriator. If I were an appropriator, I would be giving
more money to democracy and governance.
Senator Cardin. Some of this is soft allocations by
Congress. A lot of this is a complicitous operation between the
people at the State Department and appropriators.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. From the African Affairs
Bureau's standpoint, Senator, you are speaking to the choir. I
do not have enough resources on democracy and governance, and I
think USAID will agree with me on that. We could use more
resources in that area. We know that putting money toward
democracy and governance, putting money toward good elections,
putting money toward building the capacity of civil society
contributes to making countries more stable and respectful of
human rights. And we make strong cases from our standpoint to
support democracy funding so that we have that funding to
implement the program.
Senator Cardin. I would just urge you to do this in a way
that is visible to those of us who support your efforts
because, quite frankly, we do not see that. We are sending our
own messages as loudly as we can, including at this hearing,
that we want to see greater funds for democracy and governance.
But if we do not get the feedback from what is happening in the
missions and the Department, it makes our job much more
difficult.
It looks like countries are getting a free pass. As long as
they are on our coalition team, what they do within their own
country is of little importance to our foreign policy mission,
which you are telling me is just the opposite. So showing that,
not just by a quiet diplomatic contact, but by how we are
making that point would certainly, I think, help us in
accomplishing our mutual desire for good governance.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Good. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Isakson?
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Can anybody tell me what happened to Joseph Kony?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. He is still out there. There
has been a very strong and proactive effort against the LRA. We
have been working with the AU and with the Ugandans and other
partners. And we were able to get his number two who is now
currently in The Hague being tried. But Kony has been elusive.
But our efforts continue very robustly to get him, and the job
is not over until that is done.
Senator Isakson. At one time, we committed 100 special
troops and forces to CAR, I believe, to go after Kony. Are they
still deployed?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. They are. I cannot give you
the exact numbers, but I did meet with the team when I was in
Uganda the last time and they are still working there.
Senator Isakson. Although not recognized as an
international terrorist, there is probably no worst terrorist
than Joseph Kony in terms of children and women. I am glad we
are still committed to trying to bring him to justice, as hard
as that appears to be.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. Talking about the African Union for just a
second, does the African Union address the issue of terrorism
on the continent? Do they have a game plan to deal with
terrorism?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We are working very closely
with the African Union on terrorism on the continent. It is
high on their agenda. In the case of Nigeria, they have been
very much a part of the creation of the Multinational Joint
Task Force in Chad, and we have provided them some funding and
some assistance in their efforts there. The mission in Somalia,
AMISOM, is an AU mission and it is the largest AU mission on
the continent of Africa with troop-contributing countries from
the region. So it is high on their agenda. We are partnering
with them, along with our European colleagues, to make sure
that they have the capacity and the funding to address what has
been a very challenging and difficult threat for them, as well
as us, on the continent.
Senator Isakson. I know we use human rights issues and
labor issues in the approval and participation of AGOA with the
United States and African countries. In fact, I was in the AU 3
years ago when we chastised Swaziland for their lack of
humanity to their laborers and used that as a predicate for
them staying in the African agreement for them to stop it. Are
we leveraging our trade power and our economics as much as we
should in Africa, particularly going after terrorism?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We are. Swaziland is still
not a part of AGOA. We regularly send letters of warnings to
countries if they are not on the right side of human rights and
caring for their people. And AGOA is very important to them,
and it is huge leverage. And in many cases, it has worked to
get governments to turn policies around, and if they have not,
we have kicked them out of AGOA.
Senator Isakson. I know we do on labor issues and human
rights issues. Do we do it on them fighting terrorism as well?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We do, but we do understand
that they have a challenge. They have a capacity challenge, but
there are also all the other challenges that I mentioned and
Senator Cardin mentioned in his statement, lack of governance,
corruption, that have limited the capacity of governments to
fight terrorism. But I think they all have come to understand
that if they do not fight terrorism, they are not going to be
around to do anything else. So they have come to that very
strong realization that they have to partner with their
neighbors, as well as with the international community, to
ensure that terrorists do not take over their countries.
Senator Isakson. China invests a lot of money for its own
benefit in Africa. It extracts a lot of rare earth minerals and
raw materials and things of that nature and builds some roads
and highways. Do we ever engage with the Chinese on the issue
of terrorism on the continent of Africa to try and get them to,
in some way, help us or help the continent to fight it?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We do. I was in China about 4
weeks ago for our annual consultation with the Chinese, and
that was on our agenda. USAID was there recently as well on
consultations to look at how we can better coordinate with the
Chinese on what they are doing in Africa both economically as
well as politically.
Senator Isakson. My experience is that terrorism flourishes
when there is a presence of no education, poverty, and disease
and lack of hope. Africa probably is the poster child for those
qualifications. And the more we can do like the Electrify
Africa bill and the water bill that we have done here and the
food security bill, the more we can uplift the African people,
the better fight we can have against terrorism. Would that be a
fair assessment?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I will turn to my colleague
at USAID, but I absolutely agree with you.
Ms. Etim. I will agree, but I will also say that we have
data that shows that this is actually the case. We see that 10
years of research over all these countries that USAID has
worked in across the world has shown very clear evidence that
when we see governments actually able to deliver services such
as energy, access to electricity, health care, education
services, there is a corresponding decrease in the amount of
feelings of marginalization, feelings of inclusion, and we have
also seen that those countries are usually not the same ones
that are correlated with conflict and instability. It has been
very clear that there is also a clear correlation between where
there is the absence of the delivery of services and where
people do feel marginalized and that they do not have access to
opportunities and that those countries are at risk of conflict.
And it is very glaring.
Now, the links between violent extremism--that is the next
step. Already when you are engaged in conflict, your sympathy
for going to that next level is not as far of a stretch. And so
we know that these are things that actually matter. We know
that development is actually a very important tool in this
space.
Senator Isakson. But just based on my observation, it
appears that where we have made Millennium Challenge compacts
and where we have helped build the infrastructure of these
countries, there has been less of a presence of terrorism than
there is in those countries where we did not. I think that is a
good thing for us to continue to invest money, and I am a big
supporter of the Millennium Challenge Grants and a big
supporter for our engagement on that.
And thank you very much for your service to all of you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I have about a minute and half reserved. I am just going to
ask a quick question.
All of us, I think, are really proud of the work we have
done together on Electrify Africa, on food aid reform, on clean
water, and we have other efforts that are underway. We are
really proud of that work. And I appreciate you mentioning the
benefit that is to people, massive numbers of people, millions
of people.
On the other hand, to bring up a topic that I think Senator
Cardin alluded to and you just did a moment ago, Ms. Thomas-
Greenfield, when we work with governments that we know are
abusing their own citizens, they are corrupt, they are
absolutely subjecting their citizens to terrible atrocities
themselves, those governments, when we work with them to
counter terrorism, how does that work against U.S. interests
relative to causing many of the extremists there to really
harbor ill will towards the U.S. itself by seeing us associated
with governments that they believe are corrupt and not treating
their citizens appropriately?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I think we have to work with
governments to fight terrorism, but we also have to continue to
work with these governments to address human rights
deficiencies in their countries. And I think that the people of
those countries want us to continue to engage. They want our
voices to be heard. They know that when we are engaging with
these governments, that we are also raising concerns about
human rights. And we have gotten some people released from
jail, and we have gotten some governments to moderate their
actions against their citizens. It is not a perfect solution,
but I truly believe that our engagements with them help on the
issues of human rights.
I will give the example of Burundi where we believe that
the military in Burundi has been less active and violent
against citizens because of our engagement with them, because
of the human rights training that they got from our people
working closely with them. The government has been a problem,
but we have seen that that military has been less of a problem
than most people expected.
The Chairman. Briefly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Siberell. Just to add, in addition to what was noted
earlier that all of our civilian-delivered assistance is
subject to requirements for vetting under the Leahy law, we
work with governments to strengthen their rule of law
frameworks under which they would carry out an effective
counterterrorism policy.
So we reject the notion that there is conflict, inherent
conflict, and effective counterterrorism practice and
protection of human rights and civil rights of the people. We
have worked to embody that concept in what is known as the
Rabat Memorandum, which is a document that the United States
Government helped to develop through the Global
Counterterrorism Forum. And this forms the basis of assistance
that we deliver increasingly across the continent in
cooperation with the Department of Justice and prosecutors that
we fund from the State Department to work with governments to
establish strong CT legislation but that also protects the
human rights of the people.
So this is a major challenge in Africa, and I would say
that, on the one hand, you have partners who are willing and
capable but need a lot more assistance to become fully capable
to fight terrorism challenges, but they have weak governance
and weak governance structures. And this is where we have to
strengthen those structures of governments so that as they
conduct military-led and security-led operations to detain
terrorists and to prevent terrorist attacks, they do so in a
framework that enables for those people to be prosecuted and
detained effectively in accordance with international human
rights standards. It is a long-term effort, but we are very
much engaged in that work currently.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Markey?
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
I am just going to follow up on Senator Corker and Senator
Cardin's point, which is that while Nigeria's people most need
help with daunting governance and corruption issues, the United
States is planning to sell the government attack aircraft known
as the A-29 Super Tucano to Nigeria. And it would be to fight
Boko Haram, a group everyone opposes, but the Nigerian military
has a longstanding history of human rights abuses, including
under the current administration.
Just last month, Amnesty International accused the Nigerian
Army of killing hundreds of members of the Shia minority sect
in December. And unfortunately, that is happening in other
countries in east Africa as well.
So what is your perspective on that given the fact that the
people of Nigeria increasingly are seeing U.S. aid move from
humanitarian or anti-corruption efforts over to more military
aid for those who they believe internally are the ones who are
a greater risk to the security of their families?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Our aid is not moving away
from corruption. The new president of Nigeria has made clear
that corruption is one of his highest priorities. He named
three priorities when he came into power; countering Boko
Haram, fighting corruption, and improving the economy. And we
are working very, very closely with this government. In fact,
the Secretary is in London at a meeting hosted by the U.K. on
corruption, and President Buhari is there.
On the issue of assisting the Nigerians in fighting Boko
Haram, they have huge capacity issues. As you may know, last
year we turned them down on a request for Cobras because we
were concerned about their ability to use those and not have
them have an impact on their communities.
Senator Markey. Well, let me ask the question another way.
If there is no success in convincing the people of Nigeria that
their government is not corrupt, that their government is not
fair, will any of this military aid ultimately create the
conditions for a successful effort to defeat Boko Haram from
the inside of the country? Will we ever be successful?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We have to be.
Senator Markey. I know we have to be, but----
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. It has to be multifaceted. We
have to do the security, but we absolutely have to do the
capacity building, the development assistance, the good
governance with this government. We have to do both. We cannot
do one or the other or we will fail. And it will be long-term.
But I have to say the Nigerian people want us there to
assist them on the security side as well because they know that
their government does not have the capacity alone. They want us
there on both of those areas.
Senator Markey. Well, let me ask you this. Internally how
do you think it will affect the view of the people inside of
Nigeria as we increase military aid to the very people who they
fear are using it to harm them, harm the Shia inside the
country, for example? The government forces themselves. How do
you think that will affect how they perceive how the United
States is playing inside of Nigeria, and what could be the
consequences of that if that persists?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. The polls show that we are
extremely popular in Nigeria. The Nigerian people are victims
of Boko Haram, and they know that there has to be some kind of
security and military solution to addressing Boko Haram. And
they want us there to help their military, and I think they
think that if we are there to help, their military will be less
abusive to their people. And that is a point that we have made
to the Nigerians. We are training two battalions of Nigerian
soldiers right now. They have human rights training as part of
that training, and all of them have been Leahy-vetted to
ensure. So we are working with the government to moderate and
stop human rights abuses by the military. But on the security
side, I think the Nigerian people who are victims of Boko Haram
also want to see us help their military address the security
threat that they are facing.
Senator Markey. Well, I just think we are on a thin edge
here. We just have to be very careful, especially if the
government does not control adequately its own military.
Internally the harm that it does to the overall morale inside
the country makes it much more difficult to ultimately combat
Boko Haram. So I just think it is important for us to keep an
eye on that.
And in Congo, there is significant political tension
because President Kabila is trying to prolong his stay in power
beyond the constitutional two-term limit. His security agents
are harassing opposition politicians in a very serious way.
Mass protests of Kabila's apparent attempts to remain in office
appear imminent.
So what is ultimately the likelihood that such protests
could spark further instability in DRC, particularly if the
security forces continue to crack down in response to these
democratic instincts that people have, as has been the case in
the past?
I sent a letter to Secretary Kerry in February suggesting
that the U.S. should communicate to President Kabila to
publicly state his intention to respect the constitution to
step aside at the end of his second term in December, and that
if he failed to do that and made appropriate preparations for
elections, then we should implement sanctions if he does not do
that. In response to my letter, you seem to suggest that
Kabila's actions in the next few months would determine whether
or not State would opt to enact sanctions, and you testified
before this committee to much the same around that time.
It seems to me that the political environment is
deteriorating in Congo and Kabila has not demonstrated an
interest in preserving his democratic legacy. Has the time
arrived for sanctions to be imposed on the Government of Congo?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you for that question.
And, yes, we are looking very, very actively at sanctions
as they relate to those who are involved in violence, and we
have conveyed that to Kabila and his people. The Secretary met
with him a few weeks ago in New York, and our Special Envoy has
been proactively engaged in the region over the past few
months. We are still hopeful that we can get the Government of
Congo and President Kabila to do the right thing. Their
constitution is very clear that his term ends in December, and
they must have an election. And we have conveyed that to him.
We are also working very closely with our other partners,
with the EU, with the French, and others to make sure that we
are all on the same sheet of music on that issue.
Senator Markey. Yes. The election is scheduled for the end
of this year. It is only May. There is plenty of time to set up
an election. Right now, they are talking about the end of 2017
as the earliest. That would be a clear violation of the
constitution.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Absolutely.
Senator Markey. I hope that we make it very clear to him
that we will not accept that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all of you for being here today and for
your ongoing work.
Can you talk about the importance of women's empowerment in
contributing to development in Africa and what we are doing,
what you would identify as the best examples of successful
programs?
Ms. Etim. So I love that question.
I think that we increasingly, especially talking about
conflict and instability, need to talk about the role of women
in peace and security. In fact, that is an actual U.S.
Government policy, which is titled ``The United States National
Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security,'' which talks about
the fact that women are critical agents--not only victims but
also as agents of change--when we are talking about instability
and conflict but also violent extremism.
Our programming runs the gamut, depending on what the
situation or scenario is. In areas where there are vulnerable
communities or where we see that they do not have a lot of
access to legal recourse, economic opportunities, and they
often are coerced or used as instruments of terror or violence
or suffer from gender-based violence, we seek to figure out
ways of empowering local women, communities and allowing them
training, work through economic empowerment, access to
education, which is another sort of critical element that we
are seeing. When women have access to education and when girls
have access to education, we have seen that child marriage
rates have fallen, and their susceptibility to feelings of
acceptance with violent extremist groups also decreases.
So, again, we think that it is very important to target
women and girls in these environments because we have also seen
that not only are they able to make a critical difference in
their own lives, but they are also critical agents of change in
the rest of their communities.
Senator Shaheen. And I do not know whether you or--is it
Mr. Siberell--want to address this. But can you also talk about
how the efforts to recruit people to terrorism, to ISIL, to
Boko Haram--how the difference that we are seeing between the
ability to recruit men and women--I know there has been an
increasing effort to use women as suicide bombers. But can you
talk a little bit about what we see about the--who is easier to
recruit?
Mr. Siberell. Well, I think for most of the groups, the
emphasis continues to be on recruiting young men. But in the
case of Boko Haram, of course, notoriously they have used girls
in suicide bombing operations, which is absolutely despicable.
Some of those are, obviously, coerced into that activity.
I would just build on something my colleague just noted
about the role of women in particular in identifying the seeds
of radicalization. Women play a critical role in most
communities in being close to the people and having an ability
to understand whether or not there are influences coming into
the community that could lead to a process of radicalization
and recruitment into terrorist groups.
So this is one of the areas that we would like to develop
in our CVE programming. We have a program that has been
underway in Nigeria through the U.S. Institute of Peace in
which they are developing a network of influential women, women
who already have a role in the society, to bring them together
into a network and to train those women on observing and
understanding whether there may be signs of radicalization. And
these are the kinds of programs I think that will be very
important as we get down to the community level and address the
drivers to radicalization to violence.
Senator Shaheen. One of the things that we have heard about
the success of ISIL has been their ability to recruit people to
a caliphate. The idea of the caliphate is very important. Are
we seeing that same kind of interest in Africa in terms of the
messaging to try and recruit?
Mr. Siberell. The numbers coming out of Africa that we are
aware of in terms of foreign terrorist fighters, those that
have actually been inspired to travel or to attempt to travel
to Syria and Iraq, are much lower than for other parts of the
world. Whether it be north Africa, the Maghreb countries, even
European states, the Caucasus, and even down into southeast
Asia, the numbers are higher. But that said, there is evidence
of some recruitment among Africans into ISIL, and ISIL's
propaganda is very shrewd in identifying and using recruits who
come from particular regions and then appealing to those
individuals to join the caliphate or come to Iraq and Syria.
Of course, ISIL has been attempting to infiltrate into
other areas of the continent, in particular, in Somalia. And
there is evidence of a struggle and basically a conflict
internally between Al Shabaab and elements that had sought to
adhere or to affiliate with ISIL. They have not seemed to have
the success there, but it does identify that this is an ongoing
concern we have to watch very closely.
Senator Shaheen. And is the cost of getting to Syria, to
Iraq part of the challenge with recruitment, or is it the
messaging that is the issue?
Mr. Siberell. I think there are probably a lot of factors.
That would be one. You know, one of the things that has made
this conflict in Iraq and Syria such a threat to all of us is
the relative accessibility of the conflict to people in Europe
or in north Africa to fly to Turkey. As an example, you can get
into Syria quite easily. And that has been the historical
route. I think it is harder for people in Sub-Saharan Africa to
make those connections and it costs more, so it is more
difficult logistically to do that.
Senator Shaheen. Of the estimated 60 million refugees in
the world today, I understand that about 15 million are in Sub-
Saharan Africa. I assume, but maybe I should not, that
terrorism and instability are driving those migration flows.
Can you talk about that and also talk about the extent to which
climate change is playing a role in the migrations that we are
seeing in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Ms. Etim. Sure. I think we see the Horn of Africa and the
Sahel, not surprisingly, are huge areas where we are seeing the
largest numbers of refugee movements right now and I will just
say internally displaced persons as well because even though
people are not necessarily leaving their borders, they are
definitely moving out.
When we see the up-tick in instability in Somalia, for
instance, we are even seeing people willing to get on boats to
go across to Yemen, which we know has not been secure at all. A
lot of that is because people know that they are not secure or
safe, and when we do our surveys, we have seen time after time
that when people do not feel secure and safe, they will move
across borders. They also move across borders when not only
they do not feel secure and safe, but they do not feel that
there is any opportunity for them to exist on their own in the
country of origin. So we have seen situations where even when
security is paramount, such as in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, where we see large refugee movements, what often causes
people to move across borders and move further is when markets
start closing down or there is not an ability to make a living.
So you have got dynamic populations in these countries that
in a sad way are used to coping and dealing with instability in
very creative ways. But the concurrent pressures of instability
and the lack of opportunity are what are pushing them to move
further afield.
Senator Shaheen. So climate change is a big contributor.
Ms. Etim. And climate change--sorry--is a big contributor
in both. We have seen the El Nino effect right now. Drought in
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia is definitely a big factor. In
2011, we know that the famine was partially caused by drought,
mostly caused by Al Shabaab cutting off access to food. It was
a big reason that people had to cross borders, and we saw the
largest migration of Somalis. It has put pressure on
neighboring countries such as Kenya and South Sudan, even
Sudan, and Ethiopia, and we are seeing that those pressures are
increasing local tensions. In the Sahel, we see very much the
same story. Recurrent drought and problems of the ability to
have accessible land has caused people to move to urban
centers. And again, with the lack of opportunity in some of
these urban and peri-urban centers, we are seeing increased
radicalization as well.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Rubio?
Senator Rubio. Thank you very much.
Let me just begin. This is a question of Secretary
Greenfield. Would you describe Boko Haram as an anti-Christian
terror group whose main motivation is to rid Nigeria of
Christianity? And I say that based on a video released by their
leader in 2014. He said, quote, this is a war against
Christians and democracy and their constitution. Allah says we
should finish them when we get them. End quote.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I would say they are more
than that. I think that is part of their ideology, but they
have killed more Muslims in the north than they have killed
Christians. They are a terrorist organization, and they have no
boundaries.
Senator Rubio. Would you support designating Nigeria as a
country of particular concern for religious freedom?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I would not designate Nigeria
as a country because we have huge, huge and very active
Christian populations in Nigeria throughout the southern parts
of Nigeria into the middle belt and even in northern Nigeria,
and we have a huge Muslim population there as well. So both
communities, until Boko Haram, were able to live together and
work together harmoniously, and I think that that can continue
once Boko Haram is brought to justice.
Senator Rubio. Now, for USAID, what programs exist to
assist the victims of Boko Haram, in particular, psychological
programs for women and girls who have been victims of sexual
violence?
Ms. Etim. I think you put the nail on the head. We have a
comprehensive program right now that is in design to really
target the northeast of Nigeria and looking at the victims of
Boko Haram. We are working with communities right now because,
as we have seen, when people who are leaving Boko Haram or who
have been the victims of Boko Haram return to their
communities, sometimes they suffer from a second wave of
victimization. And so we are working to educate communities
on----
Senator Rubio. In terms of like stigma?
Ms. Etim. Stigma. It has been heartbreaking actually. And
so we are working to educate communities as to what it actually
means, what people suffer, what they go through, and the fact
that they can still be productive members of communities and
societies. We also offer psychosocial support and care. A
number of the Chibok girls that we did manage to return home
are receiving that type of care right now. We are also making
sure that we are working with local clinics and medical
providers to train them in the right techniques. And then we
are also working with community influence-makers, religious
leaders so that there is a message that can be amplified
through various channels that there is recovery that is
possible.
Where possible, we are restarting basic social services
such as education. We are putting more money into emergency
education in the north, and we are hoping that where we can, we
can increase access. And we are also providing assistance to
those who are internally displaced through basic humanitarian
assistance, provision of food and health care.
Senator Rubio. With all this instability in Sub-Saharan
Africa, how has it affected your ability to implement programs.
For example, have there been any programs that have been
suspended due to security concerns?
Ms. Etim. Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, when we work in
unstable environments, we have programs that have to exercise
flexibility. And so we have multiple times suspended and
restarted programs. And I think our model of working in these
climates has to be based on this idea of really developing
longstanding, long-term, long-visioning networks with these
communities so that when insecurity prevents us from moving
into an area for a period of time, we have through our networks
and through understandings of local people on the ground and
our staff who often are from the regions and speak the local
languages--they understand when we can come back and they also
understand how we can still have access and figure out creative
ways of providing assistance to those intended beneficiaries.
So, again, I would really emphasize the flexibility of the
programs, understanding that it is not sometimes always a
continuous flow of programming without stops and starts,
especially in the areas where there is a lot of----
Senator Rubio. That has to be highly disruptive. For
example, if you are assisting a victim of sexual violence and
in the middle of that program that we are offering, security
concerns require us to eliminate people from that setting, and
then it is suspended and then restarted. Is this a commonplace
problem, these stop and starts, because of the security
environment?
Ms. Etim. So it is not that the program will stop entirely.
Usually what we try to do is we have a combination of working
through local implementing partners. And so a lot of times what
happens is we manage to train the trainers so that they still
receive some types of support even as international NGOs or
some of our own staff will have to pull back. And we try to
layer on different types of interventions to ensure that we
have creative ways of making sure that we are able to reach the
beneficiaries.
But it is disruptive. And in extreme cases where we have to
completely not be in a particular area for some time, of
course, these are hugely disruptive. What we have found,
though, is that over time when it has been for sustained
periods of time such as that in most of the cases that we work
in Sub-Saharan Africa, the population is also moving as well.
Senator Rubio. And then on the counter-terror front, there
have been rumors that the leader of Boko Haram, Shekau, is
perhaps fighting in Syria with ISIL. Could you shed any light
on that, Mr. Siberell? I have seen some open source reports
about that.
Mr. Siberell. I have not seen that. I mean, he periodically
appears in videos that are distributed and that we are aware
of. And one of the things that we have noted and watched for
is, after the affiliation of Boko Haram with the Islamic State,
whether there was any difference in the quality of their media
output, which is usually an indicator of an actual strong link.
We have seen a little bit of that, but I have not heard or I do
not know if there is any reporting that I have seen that he is
actually in Syria.
Senator Rubio. Are there any countries that you are
particularly concerned about in terms of recruiting IS
fighters, and how significantly do you assess the threat of
more and more fighters flowing out of east Africa to be?
Mr. Siberell. Yes, we are quite concerned about ISIL or
Daesh, Islamic State's attempts to infiltrate and affiliate
with existing insurgencies or terrorist organizations. We know
that they have been attempting to move into Somalia. Shabaab
itself has recognized this as a threat, and there has been sort
of a fierce struggle internally to hold off ISIL. But that then
raises the possibility that they will look at other Somali
communities in the region to include Kenya, elsewhere. So this
is something that we are very concerned with. And we know that
ISIL will want to continue to build its network of affiliates.
So we have to remain attuned to that. Of course, Libya is a
major ISIL affiliate, and there is always the threat that the
connections might be made from Libya throughout the region, and
we are watching that very closely as well.
As for individuals traveling to the conflict, as noted a
minute ago, there has been some incidence of that, but the
numbers from Sub-Saharan Africa, generally speaking, are low
compared to numbers of foreign fighters from Europe, from north
Africa, from the Caucasus, from southeast Asia in comparative
terms.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks to the witnesses for being here today.
One of the reasons I really admire my colleagues on the
committee is that there are many on this committee who have
spent a lot of time in Africa and non-committee members too in
the Senate who have spent a lot of time on it. And hearings
like this are really helpful.
You know, just a thought on this. I do not have to be
diplomatic because I am not a diplomat.
On the question of the differential in attention, you got
to acknowledge that race--we have to look in the mirror and ask
ourselves if race is part of the reason because if we look
backward at our own history, often things get explained in
retrospect and race is part of the reason. We put Japanese
Americans in internment camps. We did not put German Americans
in internment camps. Well, what explained the difference?
German Americans looked kind of more European like the powers
that be than Japanese Americans did.
There is a school of thought that explains the differential
action of the United States in the 1990s in terms of
intervening dramatically to stop genocide in the Balkans but
not intervening dramatically to stop genocide in Rwanda, and
then kind of, well, why did we intervene in one and not the
other? Some of the answer that is not too pleasant.
So I think that part of the reason to have a hearing like
this and part of the reason I applaud my colleagues who have
spent a lot of time in Africa is we have to, as leaders, kind
of challenge. In some ways, it is kind of a media portrayal too
that terrorist attacks in Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Burkina Faso,
Nigeria, Chad are not worthy of the attention that the attacks
in Brussels or Paris are. And even those in Ankara and Istanbul
and the Sinai do not get as much attention. So all of these are
important and having a hearing like this tries to put it an
equal scale and not suggest that some lives are worth less than
others.
I think there are some other reasons. The Middle East--we
have needed something. We have needed oil, and so that has
probably made us more focused on the Middle East and we have
not focused as much on Africa because maybe we did not perceive
that we needed something as much.
And, again, this is a good reason to have a hearing like
this. Our foreign policy as a nation has just had an east-west
axis that has been undeniable. We have cared about Europe. We
have cared about the Middle East. We have cared about the
Soviet Union, now Russia. We have cared about China. But if you
look at the diplomatic effort that focuses south of the equator
in Africa and the Americas, it has just been less. And so that
is something that is good about a hearing like this.
I wanted to ask a question. I am actually going to make you
do homework for me because we are writing the defense
authorizing bill this week, and I am on Armed Services. And we
are going to grapple with some issues and especially some
issues dealing with AFRICOM. AFRICOM is an interesting regional
command on the military side because probably more than any of
the other COCOMs, it really integrates cross-disciplinary,
military, diplomatic, USAID in trying to deal with challenges
in Africa. As folks who are not part of the DOD, talk to me
about your perceptions of AFRICOM. The one proposal is to fold
AFRICOM back into EUCOM and not have there be a specific
AFRICOM. I would be curious as to your thoughts on that.
And second, talk to me about the efficacy, following up on
Senator Markey's questions, less about the arms sales but about
the training and the exercises we do with African militaries. I
know many of our U.S. ambassadors ask through AFRICOM that we
devote marine units and other units into Africa to do training
on counterterrorism, counter-poaching, counter-human
trafficking to build capacity. In your view as professionals in
this area, how successful are those training efforts that we do
with African security forces?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I will start and then I will
turn to my colleagues.
I hope that AFRICOM is not folded back into EUCOM because
what AFRICOM has meant for us is that we have a military that
is more focused on Africa and has, over the years, become more
understanding of Africa and they have become a great partner
for us. And we very much appreciate that partnership with
AFRICOM and with the military.
As a member of the Armed Services authorizing committee,
there is a key area where we do have concerns, and those
concerns are that as that committee considers its bill, it not
cross some lines into the areas of diplomacy and development,
and those are authorizations that we would like to keep and
where we feel we have better skill sets to carry out those
responsibilities, particularly in the area of community
development, in areas of working on governance. Some of those
authorizations need to be guarded for the State Department and
for USAID, and we have raised concerns there.
But in terms of our relationships with AFRICOM, I think
they are better than at any time when we were working with
CENTCOM. I think we have areas of disagreement, and we have
been able to establish channels of communications between
General Rodriguez and myself where we address those issues. And
we have, I think, had some positive impact on the region. In
all of their training that they do with African militaries,
they have human rights training modules in every single one of
those efforts that we have made. And I think they have paid
dividends for us, and we have been able to use the
relationships that the militaries develop with their military
counterparts to get messages through to those militaries.
And then in terms of lethal weapons, we look very closely
at what we are providing, and as I mentioned to Senator Markey,
when the Nigerians asked for Cobras last year, we did not think
those were appropriate. We were concerned about how they would
be used and the impact on communities those Cobras would have,
and we said no. We think the Super Tucanos are a better piece
of equipment. We can train them on how to use this equipment
effectively and not have a negative impact on communities and
on civilians. So we are working very, very closely with them to
address those concerns to make sure that they do not have the
negative impact.
The Chairman. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Coons, our ranking member on Africa.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Markey is the ranking member on Africa.
The Chairman. That is right. We could not work that out. I
forgot that. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. We were not as successful as we were last
week on State Department authorization. But go ahead.
Senator Coons. Mr. Chairman and the ranking member, I just
want to thank you both for convening this hearing and for your
great engagement on this topic today. Along with Senator Markey
and Senator Flake and Senator Isakson, we have all enjoyed a
chance to work over many years together.
Just two opening statistics. I do think you reminded all of
us that there are positives and negatives to the security
situation in Africa. As some of you know, I host an annual
Opportunity Africa conference in Delaware to try and emphasize
the positives. Africa is a vast and complex continent of 54
countries, the fastest growing continent in the world. The
World Bank says 7 out of 10 of the fastest growing economies in
the world this decade are in Africa, but 8 out of 10 of the
largest United Nations peacekeeping operations are also on the
continent.
I think one of our challenges is to remain appropriately
focused on the difficulties of developing a sustained strategic
framework for engaging with extremism and violence on the
continent while still recognizing the significant growth
opportunities, positive opportunities to reinforce our values
and to work together with our many allies and partners on the
continent and moving forward.
I also just at the outset want to thank the countless
dedicated Foreign Service officers and civil servants at the
State Department and USAID who work so hard to promote our
interests in Africa, as well as those in DOD and law
enforcement who do so much in terms of training and outreach.
On a recent trip with Senator Cardin, I took the time to meet
with a number of FSOs, and it is always to me interesting to
hear just how hard they work. I am impressed with their
determination and drive while working under difficult,
dangerous, and often remote conditions.
So let me just ask this panel what lessons we have learned
from fighting terrorism in Africa. We have got in front of us,
just broadly speaking, three case studies: in the Sahel, with a
focus on Mali; in the Lake Chad region, with a focus on
Nigeria; and in the Horn, where the focus really is Somalia.
And we have very different levels of U.S. engagement, U.S.
expenditure, U.S. policy responses to the significant stability
challenges presented by Somalia, which was literally a
completely failed state but where there is a multilateral
military presence where we have played a significant role, and
I think they have made substantial success in pushing back Al
Shabaab in the Lake Chad region where we are expending less in
money but Boko Haram last year was literally the deadliest
terrorist organization in the world and it should get and
deserves higher attention and higher priority, as Senator Kaine
suggested, for some reasons that are really unappealing I
think.
The United States, by the way, gets more oil from the
continent of Africa than we do from the Middle East. So if it
was merely about resource prioritization, we long ago would
have put Africa at the top of our list. And I am concerned that
we are allowing others to become dominant players in Africa and
we are lagging.
And then last, in the Sahel, we have really predominantly
left the hard work to an AU mission, to the U.N., and to the
French. These are very different responses, but in all three
there are no significant U.S. troop deployments. We may be
central to the activity in Somalia and in Nigeria, but it is a
quite different scenario than we have seen in Iraq and
currently in Syria.
So where are we getting the best bang for our buck? Where
are we making the biggest progress in terms of advancing our
values and our security concerns? And what role does diplomacy,
development, security play in this work? If you would just in
series, what is the strategic framework for making progress?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I will start and then I will
turn to my colleagues.
You asked early what lessons we have learned, and I think
the most valuable lesson we have learned is that this has to be
multifaceted. It cannot be just focused on security and
military. We have to bring in the civilian agencies.
And we also have learned that we cannot own it. We have to
build the capacity of local organizations, local military,
local security services, local civil society. We have to build
their capacity to own it, and we have to be supportive of them.
Third, I think we have learned that we have to partner. So
in the case of Mali--or in the Sahel, we have been
extraordinarily proactive in the Sahel, but we are not in the
lead. We have been involved in the peace negotiations. Our
military has been extraordinarily supportive of the French
effort there. There are so many problems across the continent.
We have to spread ourselves very thin, and we have to look for
other partners. And in that case, we have worked very closely
with our partners in the U.N., as well as in the French
Government, to make sure that we are having impact on the
situation in the Sahel.
And then finally--and this has been said in the room by
everyone--we have to be concerned about human rights. We have
to ensure that these governments understand that human rights
are important for us, and as I have said before, it is a core
value. And they expect to hear from us on human rights issues.
If we do not raise human rights, I think every one of them
would be in shock. So we generally start out in that area with
all of these governments.
Senator Coons. And if I might interrupt before we continue,
we had an exchange earlier about the prioritization of
democracy and governance funding where Ranking Member Cardin
appropriately said--Senator Shaheen and I are both
appropriators and heard that loud and clear. And it is an issue
that I have pressed in recent appropriations hearings of the
State Foreign Ops Subcommittee. We are underfunding democracy
and governance dramatically. And I appreciate your raising that
and that is something that I have made a priority in my
appropriations request this year because, frankly, we send the
wrong message. And I appreciate Senator Markey raising concerns
about DRC and their shrinking space for elections. If we do not
fund our values--and our values essentially are around
democracy and space for opposition parties and for
journalists--they draw conclusions.
Please, if you would, Ms. Etim.
Ms. Etim. Sure and I know very quickly.
What else is the core lessons learned? Partnership,
partnership, partnership: whether it is through other donors
and other partners, but also bringing in the private sector. As
you mentioned before, Africa is also a continent of
opportunities, and we have a diverse set of partners that are
very interested in stability and stabilization. They can be the
drivers that help us to fuel and fund these economic
opportunities that we are talking about for young people, for
actually making the case to host governments of why inclusion
policies are important, and of making sure that they are
working with us to make sure that the international norms are
seen as something that is not only an imposition from a Western
government but is something that should be a standard to which
everybody should aspire. So I think that we have a lot of
opportunities here through partnering with governments and the
private sector, but also local communities, making sure that we
are touching people on the ground where they live and not just
working with institutions and capitals.
Senator Coons. I agree with you.
Senator Isakson raised pointedly the MCC. I was, frankly,
pleased that Tanzania, because of electoral irregularities and
failure to really effectively address corruption, suffered a
really unwelcome setback for them. And this weekend the World
Economic Forum is in Kigali and a great opportunity for us to
continue engagement, and the administration is sending
Ambassador Froman and Fred Hochberg of Ex-Im Bank, among many
others.
If you would, might I have the time to have them conclude?
Thank you. Mr. Siberell?
Mr. Siberell. Well, I think in general the lessons learned
in each of these three conflict areas, as you pointed out, is
that we have in the African continent partners who are willing
to address the challenges from within the region. So they are
committed to the solution, and that is something that is maybe
even unique globally in the way that terrorism issues are being
addressed. So each of those three examples you provided has the
neighbors coordinating. It has not been easy. It takes constant
diplomatic effort to coordinate and keep the momentum in each
of these areas. But the solution you would want in Somalia is a
solution that has developed in terms of the troop-contributing
countries to AMISOM. It is an AU-led mission, the region
addressing its own problems.
Of course, the bigger challenge there also is that these
are governments also that are, generally speaking, in many
cases weak and poor and lack in capacity. And a sustained
solution over time that addresses the radicalization and the
root causes will require improved governance. So it is a long-
term effort here, but the buy-in and the commitment of the
countries themselves to solving the problem is a virtue in my
view.
Senator Coons. Absolutely. I think the fight against
terrorism across Africa is every bit as urgent and every bit as
large in scale as it is in the Middle East. A key difference is
we have allies who are putting their soldiers into the fight.
African soldiers are fighting and dying against terrorism in
Somalia, in Nigeria, in Mali, and we are providing critical
support, training, funding, and resources, but unlike other
places in the world, we have significant numbers of willing
allies who are sending their troops into the fight. And it has
made a real difference, and we should be grateful for their
partnership.
And I am grateful for your service and the chance to ask
questions today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Very good.
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to follow up on some of the questions that Senator
Markey asked regarding the interaction of security assistance
and assistance provided by the State Department. In 2014, it
was the first time that DOD funding for security assistance in
Africa surpassed that provided by the State Department. And it
comes through a lot of different places, but in particular, a
rather opaque fund that the Pentagon runs called Building
Partner Capacity, which is about $10 billion globally, is
increasingly the source of DOD funds to help promote foreign
military sales and stand up military capacity.
And so, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield, I wanted to ask you
about to what extent the State Department and the Africa Bureau
is read into the decisions made at the Department of Defense to
spend Building Partner Capacity dollars. Again, this is a huge
amount of money globally, $10 billion, a lot of it spent in
Africa. To the extent to which you are read in, the extent to
which individual ambassadors have a say as to how that money is
spent to make sure that it is not counteracting the work that
they are doing on the ground, and your broader thoughts on this
sort of long-term transition away from the majority of money in
these countries being State Department money to Department of
Defense money.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you for that question.
We work closely with AFRICOM on any activities that they
are involved in in Africa. We have an annual strategy review
meeting with them where our DCMs from across Africa and USAID
mission directors are invited to come to Stuttgart. I am there.
My colleague from USAID, Linda Etim, is there as well. And we
look across the board at what they are planning to do and look
at what they are planning to do in the context of our mission
programs in terms of our own strategy. So we do work closely
with them. Our ambassadors have veto power on any actions that
they are taking, any programs that they are doing. And in
general, if there is any disagreement, General Rodriguez and I
work those disagreements out between ourselves. So we are very
much in sync with them.
We wish we had that $10 billion to program on the continent
of Africa, and we would be doing some different things. They
have the money, so we want to help them channel that money to
places where it will make a difference on the continent as we
work to fight insecurity and terrorism together. But $10
billion would be a huge contribution to democracy and
governance. I describe my democracy and governance funding as
scraping the mayonnaise jar to get just enough to do the job
that we have to do.
Senator Murphy. Just tell me how much do you have in
democracy and governance.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Let me get back to you with
that figure. It is a moving target.
Senator Murphy. So I would submit that it is probably well
less than----
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Oh, yes, it is.
Senator Murphy.--what the Department of Defense is spending
in the Building Partner Capacity account which, by the way, is
not broken down on a country-by-country basis. So as members of
the Foreign Relations Committee, all we know is that there are
$10 billion spent at the Department of Defense.
I am glad that you are optimistic as to the degree of
coordination that is happening. But for members of the
Appropriations Committee, it is probably a topic that should
get more attention.
Senator Cardin. Would my colleague yield for one second? We
will give you some extra time.
I think you are raising a very fundamental point. We have a
couple members of our committee that serve on Armed Services.
It has been a growing problem, and as we get to the NDAA bill,
there is another effort, as the Ambassador already pointed out.
There may be efforts made to even expand DOD's role in
traditional State Department areas. It is a matter that I think
our committee needs to take a look at on a broader scale than
just Africa.
Senator Murphy. And, listen, there has obviously been a
long-term shift of diplomacy away from the State Department to
the Defense Department. That is happens when you are engaged in
very dangerous places. But I guess I am not as optimistic as
the witness is as to the ability to coordinate this work on a
country-by-country basis.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. It is an effort. I actually
have the figures here. We are actually looking at increasing
that funding in the President's request, increasing support for
D&G programs in Africa. In fiscal year 2017, the request for
that sector is 20 percent above what we did in 2015. Our figure
for 2015 was $286 million, and our figure for our request for
2016 was $311 million. So it is really a drop in the bucket
when you compare that to $10 billion.
Senator Murphy. Listen, it is just another way by which we
communicate our priorities to these countries. So when we are
looking at $300 million on a good day in democracy assistance
and then we are handing out potentially 10 times that amount of
money in an account that has very little oversight from the
United States Congress, it tells these countries what we think
is most important. As part of this balance, it is difficult to
do when the numbers are that skewed in favor of military and
security assistance.
To that end, I do not know exactly who to put this question
to, but maybe, Mr. Siberell, I will ask it to you and to
others. In these three conflict zones that we are talking
about, can you talk a little bit about this mystery, which is
the attractiveness of a Wahabi-oriented, Salafist Sunni
ideology amidst areas that are often dominated by Sufi Muslims?
And the story has to be partially about schools that are on the
ground, funded by some of our allies in the Middle East. Some
of it has to do with young men who go to the Middle East to get
taught in schools funded by our allies in the Middle East. What
is the level of seriousness about the countries on the ground
in understanding and trying to tackle this problem of
radicalization that happens in these Wahabi-funded or Salafist-
oriented schools either in theater or back in the Middle East?
Mr. Siberell. I think it is a real concern on the part of
many governments in the region, and we hear that from those
governments.
As you pointed out, there are likely a variety or a number
of different vehicles through which these ideas or this
ideology penetrates a society. This is not something that is
limited, unfortunately, to areas of Africa. We see it in
Southeast Asia. We see it in other places where you have had
historically kind of an animist approach or an approach to
religion and faith that is tolerant of other traditions, and
that is being kind of worn down by this Salafi ideology. And
then that causes polarization and that causes intolerance. It
causes even sectarian conflict. And so it is a problem
globally.
It also relates probably to the spread of media. People
have access to media coming from different parts of the world,
and there have been media funded through--coming out of certain
regions that have propagated or emphasized a particular view.
So there are a number of different vehicles, and it is a
major concern in these countries.
I think, though, that when we talk about--you have to look
at the particular circumstances almost at the community and the
village level sometimes or what are those influences. And that
is where the very difficult work of countering violent
extremism will be, will be identifying through research and
through data understanding of the drivers at a local level. It
is a very hard issue to address, but especially amidst what is
really a global phenomenon of the infiltration of this
particular religious view.
Senator Murphy. I will just say in handing back my time we
can spend money chasing these dollars around the world, but we
are never going to be able to keep up. It is probably a better
strategy for us to ask about why these dollars are moving into
areas like Africa out of the Middle East, out of the pockets of
many of our friends, probably a better use of our time and
money.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I want to thank our panelists, and I think you can see
there is a lot of interest in what we had to talk about today.
If you could, we will have questions, I know, after this, if
you could respond fairly quickly. We will take questions until
the close of business on Thursday. But we thank you for your
service to our country. And if you could with your crew, we
would like to shift out now to another panel. Thank you very
much.
Our second panel will consist of two witnesses. The first
witness is Mr. Abdoulaye Mar Dieye. Any corrections needed
there, sir? Okay, thank you. Assistant Administrator and
Director for the U.N. Development Program, Regional Bureau for
Africa. Our second witness will be Mr. Christopher Fomunyoh,
Senior Associate and Regional Director for Central and West
Africa at the National Democratic Institute.
We will recognize Mr. Dieye first with his opening
comments, and if you would follow. We thank you both for
sharing your expertise and knowledge with us today. Go ahead,
sir.
STATEMENT OF ABDOULAYE MAR DIEYE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR AND
DIRECTOR, REGIONAL BUREAU FOR AFRICA, UNITED NATIONS
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
Mr. Dieye. I am really honored as Director of the Regional
Bureau for Africa at the United Nations Development Program,
UNDP, to be invited as a panelist before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. This is my very first
appearance. I have submitted a longer text. So I will try to
limit my remarks within 5 minutes.
My purpose today will be twofold. First, I want to briefly
update you on what we at UNDP have learned about instability in
Africa, and second, I will share our view on the possible
developmental approach to mitigate the threats to peace and
stability in what is often referred to as Africa's arc of
instability, which encompasses the Sahel, the Lake Chad region,
and the Horn of Africa.
But let me, before I start, put a sense of perspective even
though we are discussing instability in Africa. As one Senator
stated the continent is doing extremely great. For the last 15
years, it has grown GDP-wise 5 percent a year since 2000.
Violent extremism is amongst the major risks to economies
in parts of Africa. Tunisia's GDP growth has been cut from 3
percent to 1 percent. Chad's GDP contracted 1 percent in 2015
from a growth of 5 percent in 2014. And countries like Kenya
and Nigeria saw a reduction of 25 percent of tourism following
terrorist attacks. We in UNDP estimate that at least 33,000
people have died on African soil since 2011 as victims of
violent extremism, and 6 million are currently internally
displaced due to radicalization.
Mr. Chairman, over the last 2 years, UNDP has held a number
of consultations, conducted a series of studies, and
commissioned research to better understand the violent
extremism scourge in Africa. These various studies and research
converge in showing three major findings.
One, while the drivers of radicalization are multifaceted
and defy easy analysis, their major roots are found in the
combination of poverty and low human development, an endemic
sense of economic and political exclusion and marginalization,
and weak social contracts with a high level of societal
divisions along ethnic or religious lines.
Two, the most fertile grounds for radicalization are the
border areas, which are in most of the countries neglected,
ungoverned, weak governance, and low socioeconomic and
institutional infrastructure.
Three, while there are a number of commonalities which
drive radicalization, there are also some important differences
between countries. For example, socioeconomic factors tend to
be the prominent drivers in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin,
Somalia, and Nigeria, whereas political grievances are a much
more prominent factor in Kenya.
It is with this research and analysis in mind that UNDP
embarked on a development-led approach which seeks to address
the multiple drivers and enablers of radicalization and violent
extremism.
We have launched a 4-year regional initiative on preventing
and responding to violent extremism in Africa, which focuses on
supporting regional institutions, governments, communities, and
at-risk individuals to address the drivers and related factors.
We are working in epicenter countries, in spillover
countries, and in at-risk countries supporting partners to
develop and implement integrated regional and national policies
and strategies, rule of law, community and faith-based
interventions to prevent youth radicalization and deescalate
local conflicts. We also promote social cohesion at the
community level, working with local and national governments to
provide basic social services to citizens. We support
employment creation and we work with local governments to
strengthen public administration and the extension of state
authority.
We have learned that well-resourced, comprehensive, and
integrated programs combining security and development
responses offer the best approaches to combating violent
extremism.
Let me conclude my remarks by emphasizing that for Africa
to meet its full development potential, preventing and
responding to violent extremism is key. This will require
coordinated and collaborative partnerships between governments,
development partners, and civil groups.
I thank you.
[Mr. Dieye's prepared statement is located at the end of
this hearing transcript.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Fomunyoh? Is that a correct pronouncement?
STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER FOMUNYOH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND
REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL AND WEST AFRICA, NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dr. Fomunyoh. Yes, it is correct, Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished
members of the committee, on behalf of the National Democratic
Institute, NDI, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss
terrorism and instability and make the case for why democracy
and good governance should be a central component of any
counterterrorism and stabilization strategy in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
For more than 30 years, NDI has worked around the world to
establish and strengthen political and civic organizations,
safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation,
openness, and accountability in government. The institute has
conducted programs in or worked with participants from
approximately 50 of Africa's 54 countries and I have been
fortunate to be part of our efforts in many of those countries
for the past 2 decades.
Terrorist activity in Sub-Saharan Africa over the past
decade threatens to destabilize the continent and roll back
some of the gains in broadening political space and
participation since the third wave of democratization that
began in the 1990s. Groups such as Boko Haram in northeastern
Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb in northern Mali and the Sahel, and Al Shabaab in
Somalia and the Horn of Africa have caused tens of thousands of
deaths and tremendous economic and social dislocations for
civilian populations. Some of these extremist organizations
operating in Africa are eager to establish alliances with
violent extremist organizations in other parts of the world,
notably Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS.
The international community is right in supporting
counterterrorism efforts that seek to defeat these extremist
groups militarily and must, at the same time, assist the
affected countries to address the root causes and triggers of
the rise in extremism and violence.
The principal motivation of today's terrorists in Sub-
Saharan Africa is deeply rooted in a pattern of religious
beliefs. However, it is noteworthy that governance failures
have exacerbated the impact of this phenomenon and created an
enabling environment in which extremism thrives. When a state
collapses, as was the case with Somalia prior to the emergence
of Al Shabaab, or allows for huge swaths of ungovernable
spaces, as was the case in northern Mali, or fails to fulfill
its basic purpose of providing citizens with access to a
meaningful life, liberty, and property as in northeastern
Nigeria, the social contract between the state and the
citizenry is broken. Discontent with governments that are
viewed as illegitimate or ineffective is a fertile ground for
recruitment as disaffected individuals may easily embrace
extremism hoping to access a better life, political power or
voice, and the resources linked to these attributes in
transition environments. Moreover, oppressed citizens and
marginalized groups that are denied access to basic public
goods and services and opportunities are more vulnerable to
extremist appeals and indoctrination by non-state actors who in
return promise to fulfill their needs.
Efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism in Sub-
Saharan Africa must, therefore, address poor governance as a
part of the overall strategy. Based on institutional lessons
learned through NDI's work, my own experience and expertise as
an African, and what I hear loud and clear from African
democrats, leaders and activists alike, across the continent, I
will strongly offer the following three recommendations for
your consideration.
Any counterterrorism strategy for Africa should be grounded
in the consolidation of democracy and good governance such that
short-term military victories can be sustained in the medium to
long term. We cannot afford to defeat violent extremism now
only to take up the same fight 5, 10 years down the road.
Two, autocratic regimes should not get a pass from the
international community solely because they are good partners
in the fight against terrorism. Shrinking political space,
frequent and overt violations of citizen rights and freedoms,
and the undermining of constitutional rule and meaningful
elections breed discontent and disaffection that form the
fertile ground for recruiters and perpetrators of violence and
extremism. Good partners in countering violent extremism and
terrorism can and should be good performers in democratic
governance. These two principles are not mutually exclusive. In
fact, they are mutually reinforcing.
Africans of this generation are jittery and extremely
fearful of reliving the experience of the Cold War era during
which dictatorships thrived amidst grave human deprivation and
gross human rights abuses just because some leaders were allies
of the West at the time. The fight against terrorism should not
become a substitute for the Cold War paradigm of this century
with regard to Sub-Saharan Africa.
Democratic governance is critical to every counterterrorism
strategy before, so citizen grievances are not allowed to
fester and breed extremism, dissatisfaction, and alienation
from the state; during, to deprive extremists of possible
recruitment grounds; and after, to sustain the peace that would
have been gained militarily for the medium to long term.
Excessive deprivation in both economic terms and in access to
political voice, freedoms, and civil liberties make young
people vulnerable to the recruitment incentives of extremist
movements.
To conclude, let me say that despite the enthusiasm of a
few years ago and some remarkable accomplishments in the last 2
decades, democracy and democratic governance in Africa is under
attack. On the one hand, it is challenged by external threats
from extremist terrorist organizations and, on the other hand,
in some cases, by internal threats from autocratic regimes that
fail to deliver public services, combat corruption, and protect
rights and freedoms. The international community should do
everything in its power to help rid the continent of both
existential threats. Friends of Africa must make sure that they
do not, willingly or inadvertently allow themselves to become
accomplices in denying Africans their basic rights and freedoms
and a secure, prosperous future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for
this opportunity. This is a brief summary of my statement, and
a longer statement will be submitted for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, it will be entered into
the record.
[Dr. Fomunyoh's prepared statement is located at the end of
this hearing transcript.]
The Chairman. We thank you both for your testimony.
And I want to turn to our distinguished ranking member,
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. I want to thank both of you for your oral
presentations, as well as your full statements that are being
made part of our record. I have had a chance to look through
it, and it certainly reinforces the concerns that I have had.
So I want to get a little bit more granular here.
Both of you mentioned the importance of the underlying
causes of radicalization, and although we have to deal with the
immediate issues, if we do not deal with the underlying causes,
it will be short-term success.
We have incredible tools. UNDP is an incredibly important
part of our international efforts to help develop the
prosperity in countries that we hope would provide the long-
term stability. NDI has done incredible service in developing
democratic opportunities around the globe. And of course, the
United States and our development assistance and our security
assistance--these are tools that can provide incredible
opportunities for stability globally. And yet, we point out
that in Sub-Saharan Africa we have not been as successful as we
need to be.
So, therefore, my question to both of you, what has worked
that we should build on? I see your specific recommendations. I
understand. Incorporate good governance, deal with education,
deal with the underlying economic issues. But how do you take
the current programs that are available either through the
United Nations or through private organizations or through
government--how do you take those programs and build on the
ones that are the most relevant to the stability of Sub-Saharan
Africa? And what programs need to be reconfigured because they
are not providing the returns for the investments that are
being made? Can we be a little more specific here?
Mr. Dieye. Thank you, Senator.
Let me first say that when I was listening to the previous
panel, what you said was music to my ears. And you said that it
boils down to good governance. This is the fight that we are
doing first in Africa, but in UNDP. The major portfolio of UNDP
is good governance. And in these countries, we have seen that
poor governance, and ungoverned spaces, have been the major
root causes of not only on the development but the insecurity
that we are seeing in the continent.
And you are right. We have good practices. The issue that
we are seeing here is that most of these countries have very
limited fiscal space and hence cannot deliver to scale the good
practices that we are doing. I think the solution is, number
one, not only limit ourselves to military solutions, but blend
them, military and human rights and then development. But the
good practices that we are having, put them to scale. And to do
so, I think we, the international community, have to understand
that the issue of terrorism is a global public bad, and these
countries with limited fiscal space cannot do it alone. In the
spirit of partnership, we can scale up the good practices.
I am just coming from Kenya and Ethiopia where I saw an
excellent partnership between the two countries in the Marsabit
region where they are doing cross-border initiatives. We have
not discussed it a lot during the first panel. It is at the
border that we see problems. So if we invest in creating
resilience for communities at the border areas, we could have
beneficial results. And I think with good funding, we can scale
up those excellent initiatives.
Dr. Fomunyoh. Senator, the National Democratic Institute,
obviously, does not have the luxury of governmental entities
such as USAID or the Department of State or even a
multinational organization such as UNDP. But with the resources
that we have always received graciously from some of these
agencies, we have tried to put a lot of emphasis on developing
civil society because when you look at statistics or the
studies done by organizations such as Afrobarometer--and I
referenced that in my written statement--75 percent of Africans
aspire to live in democratic societies, believe in democracy.
And so the demand for democracy and good governance continues
to arise on the continent.
Unfortunately, the supply is shrinking. And so programs
that can allow the expansion of political space would bring
more citizens into the process. It would also allow the
citizens to advocate for the proper management of resources
that are channeled to governments or that are created within
these countries.
And so I would put a lot more emphasis on strengthening
civil society, strengthening citizen-based organizations
because some of them are very active, especially even including
in rural areas and some of the areas that have been impacted by
these grievances. I understand that in northeastern Nigeria,
for example, there are a number groups that are engaging with
internally displaced persons that are engaging with some of the
people that are dealing with trauma and some of the impacts of
Boko Haram, and organizations such as those sometimes have
received support from NDI and other organizations in helping
build their capacity to be effective advocates on behalf of
citizens.
Senator Cardin. I agree with both the points you made. I
think border issues are--it is a good point and we need to
concentrate. They are more complicated because the problems can
go across borders, and therefore, the country--we are not sure
what host country is responsible. Unless you have partnerships
between the two countries, it makes it complicated and
difficult.
And I certainly agree with you on civil society. I think
civil society is a critical factor in good governance, and if
you do not have a healthy civil society, it breeds these
problems.
Let me try to get to a third point for your view on that,
and that is the reality or perception that you can get a free
pass from the United Nations or from the United States if you
are working with the international coalition to counter
terrorism and that what you do internal in your country will
not really be of major importance to the international
participation and support. That to me, whether it is real or
perceived, could be a huge problem in dealing with civil
society or dealing with good governance or dealing with
democratic institutional development.
Just share with me your concern as to whether the leaders
of countries that are working with us have the view that the
international community will give them a free pass on
governance issues as long as they are part of our coalition
against violent extremism.
Mr. Dieye. Thank you, Senator.
For us human rights is the bedrock of whatever we do and it
is not negotiable.
Senator Cardin. So you are willing to pull out of a country
if you cannot get the cooperation you need from their leaders?
Mr. Dieye. What we do is we support capacity building.
Senator Cardin. I understand that, but are you willing to
pull out of a country--if you said it is the bedrock, it is the
most important point, if you have a corrupt regime and you are
doing some good work in that country, but at least part of that
is going to support a corrupt regime, are you prepared to pull
out?
Mr. Dieye. When you pull out, there is a cost to the
communities served. So what we do is make a strong
declaration--the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner of
Human Rights make these kind of strong declarations. And I
think we as the U.N. could be better off to support the
capacities and support communities and help countries deal with
human rights. This is a voice that we have to put strongly. But
whatever we do, human rights is embedded in our programs. So it
is a culture we have to infuse into societies and into
government. It takes time. It may not happen overnight, but it
is embedded in all of what we do.
Dr. Fomunyoh. Senator, I would say that the perception is
real and that you hear it as you travel across the continent
even with partner organizations within civil society that when
you go through the list of countries that have become poor
performance, some that were initially on a positive trajectory
but that have been backsliding, that those countries
coincidentally happen to be partners in the fight against
terrorism. And it is a perception that then undermines all of
the declarations and all of the work that has been done to
support civil society in the past.
The example that you raised earlier about Ethiopia is very
clear. It is obvious that Ethiopia has been backsliding on the
democratic governance front, but it is still viewed as a good
ally. And what many civic leaders then pose is the question of
whether these regimes are getting a pass solely because of
their cooperation on that front, whereas these two undertakings
are really mutually reinforcing, and you could be a good
partner on the counterterrorism front and still be a good
performer on the democratic governance front.
Senator Cardin. Well, I agree. It is not a choice of
either/or. It has got to be both. There is no question because
otherwise, again, you get short-term gains, but long term you
are not going to succeed with the type of stability that will
provide not only an opportunity for its citizens but also
eliminate the gap that is used for recruitment of extremists.
So you got to do both.
And I am afraid that we have focused on the
counterterrorism from a military point of view with partners at
times to the exclusion of dealing with the development of good
governance in a country. It seems like this hearing has only
put a spotlight on that. So hopefully we can figure that out.
And just in response to the U.N., you have got to be
prepared to walk away if you do not have a partner that is
providing a fair opportunity to the people of their country.
And it is sometimes difficult because you know that there are
needs out there that you have to deal with, but if it is not
getting through and if it is supporting corruption, then the
better alternative is to look for a new opportunity rather than
continuing the existing partnership.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Now, what he just said, though, is unlikely to ever occur.
Is it not? Let us just be honest with each other.
Mr. Dieye. Do you want me to answer that?
The Chairman. I think you answered with your laugh, but it
is not going to occur. Is it?
Mr. Dieye. But there is way--a suboptimal way of doing it
is not to walk away from a country but go to the communities
and invest in the communities. We say it is rebuilding the
social contract, empowering the communities for them also to
fight for human rights. So that is an investment I think is
worth doing.
Senator Cardin. And just to underscore the point, look, we
always look for a way of providing humanitarian help. We always
look for a way to deal with the human crisis that exists. But
if the host country believes that they are always going to have
a partner regardless of their own activities, you lose the
ability to change the underlying problems within that country.
The Chairman. You know, the first panel was here and we
went down this same line of discussion. There is no question--
is there--that the fact that citizens understand that we are
going to hang in there because the terrorism issue is acute,
the other issues are longer-term--they know that we are going
to hang in there with them on the counterterrorism piece. There
is no question as they see malfeasance relative to governance
and other issues that that creates ill will towards the United
States. Is there?
Dr. Fomunyoh. Obviously, it creates a lot of doubts in the
minds of the people, and we are also dealing with a segment of
the population that is only going to increase. It is the young
people. It is the activists. It is the journalists. And we know
that Africa is a young continent. So the bulk of the population
is in this category of people who aspire to be governed
differently, who aspire to democracy, and who love and respect
the United States for these values. And they are the ones being
put in the position of askance when government enacts anti-
terrorism legislation that has been used to shrink political
space and silence voices. And so we end up not creating friends
with the segment of the population that is the continent of the
future.
The Chairman. And that spurs, by the way, a magnet for
folks to be attracted more so to terrorism. Right? So it just
feeds on each other.
Let us just step back. We all understand there is a
presidential race underway. And we understand--those of us here
understand--that we spend 1 percent of our U.S. budget on
foreign aid. 1 percent. But there is no question that during
the presidential race, there will be discussions about foreign
aid. I mean, I do not think that is possible for that not to
occur. And so people listening to this testimony today,
listening to the fact that we are, on one hand, dealing with
corrupt leaders that are not treating their populations
properly, sending them money that in many ways keeps them in
power, and if they partner with us on counterterrorism, even
more so. On the other hand, we have terrorism. We have people
that are being treated unfairly. And we actually have one of
our committee members here that constantly is focused on this
issue.
So just stepping back and as we debate our Nation's fiscal
issues and our Nation's interest, which I think maybe more so
in this presidential year may be discussed than at times in the
past, if you would, both of you, advocate to me why you believe
that our continued involvements in countries like the ones we
are discussing is an important thing for the United States to
be doing.
Mr. Dieye. Well, Mr. Chairman, simply put, as I said
earlier, although terrorism could be generated by poor
governance in a country, it is a global public good or a global
public bad. It belongs to all the international community. That
is why it behooves us as the international community to fight
them wherever they are.
I am not saying that we should give a free pass, but we
have to fight it and fight also the root causes. That is why
foreign aid is still critical, catalytic, and important in this
fight.
Dr. Fomunyoh. Mr. Chairman, I agree with what my co-
panelist just said, and I will simply add that in many of these
countries American lives, American interests are also at stake.
We may remember the initial bombings of embassies in Kenya and
in Tanzania, that the terrorists did target American
institutions, embassies, and a lot of Americans died in that
process. And so terrorists are a threat to Americans whether
they are on the homeland or trying to operate overseas because
their ultimate goal is probably larger targets than the
villages that get destroyed in a number of African countries.
And so I think it is important to send forth the message that a
stitch in time is worth nine and that we are all threatened by
this phenomenon irrespective of where it finds itself at the
present moment.
The Chairman. But I think that the challenge--you know, I
think some of the debate around--let us go to the Middle East--
ISIS and people act as if we are going to do away with ISIS in
the next year or 2--are missing the fact that the root causes
are long long-term--a long long-term--issue.
The same is true in Africa. The root causes there are a
long-term issue. And I think as Americans look at the resources
that we have and the needs within our own country, sometimes
the simple thought that we can deal with terrorism like that
and maybe the lack of understanding that there are root causes
within Africa, within the Middle East that are going to mean
that if this group is gone, another group is going to be coming
right behind it unless we are dealing with both sides of the
equation. I think people in many cases miss that point because
of the dialogue that is taking place. Would you all agree or
disagree with that?
Mr. Dieye. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. It is not instant
coffee dealing with the root causes of terrorism. It has
started years ago. It will take some more years to deal with.
And as we said earlier, it is the toxic combination of poor
governance, low human development, and weak social contracts
that has created this. And this will take time to deal with. It
is a long-term investment. And again, if we put scale into that
long-term investment and combine it with good security--
security has to be still there--I think we will win over time.
But it will take time. It is not an instant coffee battle in my
view.
Dr. Fomunyoh. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. And I think
that the message can also be conveyed that, first, you have to
stop the bleeding and then you can use democracy and good
governance to build up a lot of the societies in a lot of these
countries. And the example that I have used in the past with
regard to the Sahel, for example, is the difference that
democracy and good governance made in the situation of two
countries that were both bordering countries to Libya but that
dealt with the post-Libya crisis in a very different fashion.
Mali was being poorly governed. The government was accused
of being very corrupt, of maltreating minorities, the Tuareg
minorities, in northern Mali, marginalizing them and causing a
lot of grievances. It was not able to control its borders, and
there was a lot of illicit activities already taking place in
northern Mali prior to the terrorist attacks that really peaked
in 2012.
On the other hand, Niger Republic, which is a neighboring
country to Mali and which even shares a direct border with
Libya, because the government had better control of its
borders, because the government had come up with a policy to
integrate the Tuaregs of Niger into its governance processes,
because the Government of Niger was dealing with
disinternalization and allowing people at the grass roots level
to make decisions that impact their lives directly, Niger was
better able to deal with the after effect of the Libyan crisis
than Mali. And until today, Niger is not a very wealthy
country, but it is surviving in a neighborhood that is infested
by terrorists to its northern border with Libya, to its
northeastern border with northern Mali, and to its southern
border with northeastern Nigeria. And Niger is to be commended
for its effort. This is one example where an African country
that is not necessarily resource-endowed is better able to
manage its economic resources and its human capital in a way
that gives people confidence that the government can respond to
citizen needs and grievances and the country is still doing
well today.
The Chairman. Well, thank you. We are way beyond time. If I
could just ask one last question.
This is a little bit off topic, but we had a really sort of
harrowing hearing, if you will, about U.N. peacekeepers and the
abuses that are taking place. And I would just like to ask in
closing when this is happening, what does that also do relative
to populations and their feelings about people who are working
with them to keep peace, but also, how does that fuel, if it
does--how does that fuel additional attraction to terrorist
groups?
Mr. Dieye. It is a horrible situation. It is not a wide-
scale phenomenon but horrible. Whenever it happens, it puts
discredit on the good work that other soldiers are doing and
even at large. And you have seen the Secretary-General condemn
it strongly.
The Chairman. He condemns, but it still happens. And we see
almost no action taken against peacekeepers. So condemning it
does not mean anything to me.
Mr. Dieye. He has condemned it when it happened lately in
Africa. He has dismissed the head of the mission. He has named
the countries where the soldiers--the perpetrators are coming.
The Chairman. Who has gone to jail?
Mr. Dieye. I think it behooves us to prosecute those
soldiers.
The Chairman. Who has gone to jail?
Mr. Dieye. And I think once the Secretary-General has named
those countries whose soldiers have done it, it behooves the
countries to prosecute----
The Chairman. You understand from my perspective that would
be like us naming the terrorists as bad guys but doing nothing
about it.
Mr. Dieye. And the Secretary-General has also nominated
lately a special coordinator, Jane Lute from the U.S., to
coordinate the efforts of the U.N. to address this despicable
and malign acts that should not happen.
The Chairman. Prosecutions are what will end it, not naming
people, not naming countries, not----
Mr. Dieye. But, Mr. Chair, you would know that the U.N. has
no space for prosecuting soldiers given by contributing
countries. That is why I said it behooves those countries to do
the prosecution once they are named.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Cardin. If I might, I want to just join with the
chairman. I am not satisfied that the United Nations has done
everything it needs to do. I understand you do not have
independent ability to do that, and I understand you have the
politics of dealing with all your member states. But with the
peacekeepers, it was very, very late in the game, and the
action was not adequate. We know that the Secretary-General is
very sincere, and we know that the Security Council has taken
action. But we have not seen the type of enforcement that we
expect.
And I think the same thing is true with the various
programs under the United Nations. That is, the development
programs are critically important. But if you are not prepared
to break your partnership with a corrupt regime, then I think
you are doing a disservice. I understand the humanitarian
needs. I understand dealing with particularly NGO types where
we can do direct humanitarian service. But contracts with
governments that are corrupt need to be prepared to walk away
if we cannot get the type of progress. We do not expect
progress overnight.
So if I can, Mr. Chairman, with your patience, just one
quick question to Mr. Fomunyoh, and that is, what would you
like to see the United States do in order to respond to the
perception that we give free passes to coalition partners in
regards to their human rights violations? Is there something
specific you would like to see us do?
Dr. Fomunyoh. Senator, I think you touched on some of those
issues in the first panel. I think speaking out more publicly
against some of these violations, but also taking actions that
can assure or reassure the vast majority of Africans in these
countries that when the United States says that democracy is
one of its core pillars of its Africa policy, that it really
means it so that there is not a sense of leaders acting with
impunity even at the highest level because then it undermines
everything else.
I would also mention what you discussed in terms of
resources, additional resources for democracy and good
governance programs or democracy support programs and also a
sense that these programs to be effective, because you are
talking about changing attitudes and changing behaviors and
dealing with people who have acted one way for decades and who
now need to act differently, that a sustained level of support
is more likely to pay dividends than short-term, surgical-type
interventions because you need time to be able to create
relationships of trust. You need time for people to trust that
your technical assistance is nonpartisan and means well in
terms of raising the well-being of citizens and putting in
place systems and processes that can endure beyond one
government or one leader. And that requires time and sustained
resources. I think that will go a long way because,
fortunately, for the 3 decades that NDI and the International
Republican Institute, and IFS, and other organizations have
been doing this line of work, we have established the
relationships in these countries that could have a huge impact
if the resources were available.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. No, thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Dieye. I know this is not your--speaking
up regarding the U.N., it was not your area of expertise nor
purview. And I appreciate it. But I think you can understand
none of us at the panel are particularly thrilled with the way
the U.N. has handled the peacekeeping issues and prosecuted.
Calls for prosecution should take place.
Let me just close with this. Look, certainly this hearing
has given us a good sense of the complexities that exist. We
have similar complexities in the Middle East where we are
dealing with countries that leave these vacuums, discriminate
against various sects that are not of their own. And so this is
a challenge we have throughout the world when we are dealing
with issues like this.
But we thank you for your focus today on Africa. As you
heard me mention in the last panel, if you would, there will be
some questions from members in writing. We will close that as
of Thursday afternoon. If you could respond fairly briefly, we
would appreciate it. We thank you both for your expertise and
knowledge and your willingness to share it with us today.
And with that, the meeting is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Witnesses' Prepared Statements
Joint Prepared Statement Submitted by Hon. Linda
Thomas-Greenfield and Justin Siberell
Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of
the committee, for the opportunity to testify on sources of instability
in Africa and our ongoing work with our African partners to address
these challenges.
The United States is committed to partnering with the people and
governments of Africa to promote democracy, peace and prosperity.
Africa is home to the world's youngest and fastest growing population.
It presents significant opportunities for transformation and growth as
well as significant challenges. The overall trends in sub-Saharan
Africa point to accelerated democratization, development, and economic
opportunity. Serious and seemingly intractable conflicts in Angola,
Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone have ended and those countries
are in the process of rebuilding. We have seen several significant
electoral successes during the past year. Although Africa remains the
world's least developed continent, average real per capita income has
been increasing steadily over the last decade and a half and the middle
class is slowly growing.
However, in spite of these positive trends, instability and
conflict persist in parts of the continent. This instability has a
direct bearing on U.S. national interests and those of our closest
allies. Poorly governed localities have been and remain a breeding
ground for extremists that seek to do us harm. Underlining the scale of
the stability challenges facing Africa, eight of the ten largest United
Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in the world are currently deployed
in Sub- Saharan Africa. Added to these, the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) is the largest peace support mission in the world.
In response, Africa's leaders have intensified individual and
collective efforts to address these challenges and take greater
ownership of their own security. The African Union (AU), sub-regional
organizations and individual African governments are taking important
roles in addressing security and political challenges in Africa.
African governments are deploying forces for regional missions to
counter terrorism, promote stability, and support post-conflict
peacebuilding. They are also working to better organize themselves to
confront persistent challenges that require multi-faceted solutions. A
recent manifestation of this drive for stronger regional coordination
and integration is the formation of the G-5 Sahel in 2014 by Burkina
Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.
The United States is pursuing comprehensive and coordinated whole-
of- government approaches to help our African partners build and
sustain their security capacity and cooperation. The drivers of
conflict and instability in Africa are diverse, and our approach to
these threats reflects a range of perspectives, priorities and
capabilities. Military, intelligence and law enforcement tools are
vital to defend against a range of threats, but cannot replace robust
diplomacy and engagements promoting broad-based economic and political
opportunity. We must work with our partners, including civil society,
to address the root causes of conflict, strengthen accountability, and
promote good governance. Stability in Africa ultimately requires
leaders with the will and the capacity to respond to the needs and
aspirations of their people.
countering terrorism and violent extremism
Terrorism and violent extremism are major sources of instability in
Africa. Terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab, Boko Haram (which
now calls itself the Islamic State in West Africa), al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Murabitoun are conducting asymmetric
campaigns that cause significant loss of innocent life and create
potentially long-term humanitarian crises. They are adept at exploiting
state fragility and political and economic vulnerabilities. Terrorists
gain an advantage when security forces and border guards lack the
necessary leadership, training, equipment, intelligence, and mobility
to disrupt their activities. They also gain an advantage when security
forces fail to carry out operations in accordance with international
human rights standards. When governments break the bond of trust and
fail to protect civilians, terrorists can and do exploit these actions
and feed their narrative.
Terrorists and criminal organizations also take advantage of weak
and corrupt criminal justice systems unable to effectively investigate,
prosecute, and incarcerate criminals. Violent extremist ideology and
tactics may be alien and illegitimate to the vast majority of Africans,
but individuals and communities are increasingly vulnerable to
recruitment by violent extremists in a growing number of locales over
the last decade. While the motives for tolerating, or for joining,
violent extremist activities are complex, overlapping, and context-
specific, we see violent extremists focusing their recruitment efforts
where there is a lack of education and economic opportunity, political
and social alienation, poor governance, corruption of elites, and lack
of accountability for abuses by security forces. These terrorist groups
use increasingly sophisticated means to exploit these weaknesses on
social media developing and propagating violent extremist messaging and
narratives.
In the Lake Chad Basin region, despite significant progress over
the past year--due in large part to bolstered Nigerian and regional
efforts--more work remains to end the savage atrocities and ongoing
violence perpetrated by Boko Haram. Boko Haram, which declared its
affiliation with ISIL in 2015, conducts recurring attacks in
northeastern Nigeria and the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad,
and Niger, and they have increased the ghastly practice of forcing
women and children to act as human bombs. The conflict has affected the
lives of communities across the Lake Chad Basin region, with some 2.6
million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and nearly 170,000 Nigerian
refugees forced to flee their country. Since 2009, the conflict has
caused approximately 18,000 deaths.
In the Sahel, AQIM and al-Murabitoun continue to operate in parts
of northern Mali and along the border corridor between Mali, Niger, and
Libya. In recent months, they have responded to military pressure by
turning to more asymmetric tactics. They have increased high-profile
attacks against so-called ``soft targets,'' including a series of
attacks against international hotels, cafes, and resorts in Burkina
Faso, Mali and Cote d'Ivoire.
In East Africa, al-Shabaab last year became increasingly aggressive
in conducting large-scale attacks against African Union Mission to
Somalia (AMISOM) forward operating bases and a range of targets
throughout Somalia. In 2015, al-Shabaab also launched a series of
attacks across the border in northern Kenya, including one against a
university in Garissa that left nearly 150 people dead. Al-Shabaab
reportedly maintains a network of operatives and recruiters across the
wider region who seek to exploit long-standing divisions between
communities and security forces along the Swahili Coast.
We are concerned about the risk that the presence and potential
expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on the
continent will grow. As we have seen elsewhere in the world, ISIL seeks
to co-opt existing terrorist groups, as well as local insurgencies and
conflicts to expand its network and advance its agenda.
As President Obama has said, effectively addressing evolving
terrorism challenges requires strong, capable, and diverse partners who
have both the political will and the ability to disrupt and degrade
terrorist networks. Over the past several years, we have seen African
governments and African communities come together and show leadership
in fighting terrorist groups. In Somalia, AMISOM and the Somali
National Army have pushed al-Shabaab from some of its major strongholds
and supported efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia to promote
stability, but significant shortfalls to stability remain in Somalia.
In the Lake Chad Basin region, military forces have undertaken to work
together through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to counter
Boko Haram. Similarly, forces from eleven Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) states initially responded to the security
crisis in Mali and worked alongside the French military to destroy
terrorist safe havens in northern Mali and provide the stability
required for the peace process to advance. We recognize that progress
has been made, but more needs to be done to maintain momentum against
evolving and adaptive terrorist threats that exist across the
continent.
The United States seeks to promote comprehensive, whole-of-
government capabilities to respond to terrorism. Our primary multi-year
mechanisms for promoting coordinated multi-year interagency approaches
are the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT)
and, in West Africa, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP). Led by the State Department, USAID, and the Department of
Defense, PREACT and TSCTP advance U.S. law enforcement, military,
development, and public diplomacy expertise and resources to support
the efforts of willing regional partners to build and sustain their own
CT capability. Through PREACT, TSCTP, and related initiatives, the
United States uses a wide range of tools and programs to build capacity
and assist regional CT efforts. Areas of support include: (1) enabling
and enhancing the capacity of African militaries to conduct CT
operations; (2) improving the ability of military and civilian security
services to operate regionally and collaboratively on CT efforts; (3)
enhancing individual nations' border security capacity to monitor,
restrain, and interdict terrorist movements; (4) strengthening the rule
of law, including access to justice, and law enforcement's ability to
detect, disrupt, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity; and (5)
reducing the limited sympathy and support among communities for violent
extremism.
While military efforts remain critical, the success of
counterterrorism efforts in Africa depends fundamentally upon capable
and responsible civilian partners--police, prosecutors, judges, prison
officials, religious and community leaders--who can help address
terrorism through a sustainable framework that advances rule of law and
respect for human rights. In that regard, we seek to increase our
capacity-building support for law enforcement, judicial, and other
criminal justice sector institutions. We greatly appreciate the funding
provided by Congress in Fiscal Year 2016 for the Counterterrorism
Partnerships Fund (CTPF). We expect to use this funding to
significantly expand our civilian counterterrorism assistance for law
enforcement and justice sector efforts in several key African
countries.
At the same time, the State Department and USAID are increasing our
focus on preventing the spread of violent extremism in the first
place--to stop the recruitment, radicalization and mobilization of
people, especially young people, to engage in terrorist activities.
In February 2015, President Obama convened the White House
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Summit, which brought together over
60 countries, 12 multilateral bodies, and representatives from civil
society, business, and the religious community. This was followed by
locally-hosted regional summits that advanced the conversation with
more African stakeholders, including in Kenya and Mauritania. The CVE
summit process sparked a broad-based effort to better understand and
address the factors that drive radicalization and recruitment to
violence within specific communities and called for a more integrated
and holistic approach with a broader array of actors--government and
non-government.
As such, we are expanding engagement with African governmental and
non-governmental partners to better understand the drivers of violent
extremism and design effective responses. We are working closely with
government partners--at both the national and sub-national level--to
adopt more effective policies to prevent the spread of violent
extremism. This includes promoting greater trust and partnership
between communities and law enforcement--a key area that contributes to
resilience against violent extremism.
As we announced during President Obama's visit to East Africa last
year, the United States is providing over $40 million in FY 2015
assistance for expanded programs to help counter and prevent the spread
of violent extremism in East Africa. Since then, State and USAID have
analyzed the underlying drivers of violent extremism and are employing
a new approach to programming pooled funds to incentivize collaborative
problem diagnosis and integrated program design. To better understand
al-Shabaab's efforts to recruit and expand in areas beyond its control,
we studied communities at greatest risk to identify key factors that
contribute to both their vulnerability and resilience to violent
extremism. We are expanding ongoing USAID programs and designing new
programs tailored to address those factors and provide funding to
actors in government best suited to do the job. Further to this, the
President's FY 2017 budget request includes increased resources for
CVE, including an additional $59 million as part of the overall request
for the CTPF. These resources would enable us to expand programs in
Africa to engage high-risk communities and youth susceptible to violent
extremist recruitment.
Our approach to supporting regional efforts to counter Boko Haram
provides an excellent example of how we pursue a comprehensive, multi-
sector approach to help address terrorism on the continent. Our ongoing
programs for victim support, CVE, and humanitarian assistance provide
advisors, intelligence, training, logistical support, and equipment.
Specifically, the Department of State is providing $71 million worth of
equipment, logistics support, and training, including human rights
training, to the countries participating in the Multinational Joint
Task Force (MNJTF)--Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. In
addition, in September 2015, the administration directed the use of up
to $45 million in support under the Presidential Drawdown authority to
provide airlift, training, and equipment. We are also providing
training and equipment--through a $40 million Global Security
Contingency Fund program--to build cooperation and capacity across
regional military and law enforcement forces to enhance border security
and disrupt terrorist transit.
These counter-Boko Haram efforts reflect our understanding that
security measures alone will never be sufficient. The Department of
State is also expanding support for law enforcement forces to conduct
investigations and respond to attacks, especially attacks that involve
suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices. We must help our
partners to establish effective criminal justice institutions to handle
terrorism cases in a rule of law framework. That is why we have
deployed Department of Justice legal advisors to assist legislators,
prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials. Furthermore, we must
help countries to make progress in stabilizing liberated areas, improve
delivery of government services, and reducing support for violent
extremism. With USAID's leadership, we are expanding support for
programs to strengthen governance and mitigate conflict in areas
threatened by Boko Haram. In Nigeria and Niger specifically the Office
of Transition Initiatives is working to improve governments'
responsiveness to citizens' expectations and increasing civic
engagement with governing authorities. In Nigeria, we are also advising
the government on developing a reconstruction and long-term development
plan for the northeast, and USAID is delivering urgent education
services to IDPs and conflict-affected communities in the northeast.
We are also responding to the humanitarian crisis caused by Boko
Haram's assault on the people of the Lake Chad Basin. In Nigeria alone,
approximately seven million people are suffering displacement,
deprivation, and/or disease from the consequences of armed conflict and
the UN estimates that 9.2 million are in need of immediate assistance
across the region. In 2015, and thus far in 2016, we have provided a
total of nearly $244 million in humanitarian assistance for Boko Haram-
affected populations throughout the Lake Chad Basin, including for IDPs
and refugees. USAID and the State Department are supporting projects to
increase civilian protection, enhance early warning capabilities,
deliver humanitarian relief, and strengthen the overall resiliency of
communities.
addressing other sources of instability
We are also focused on addressing other sources of instability in
Africa. Several parts of Africa remain plagued by instability, internal
conflict and violence, including Mali, South Sudan, Burundi, the
Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC). We are engaged in aggressive diplomatic efforts to help resolve
these conflicts and support the implementation of peace agreements. We
are actively supporting ongoing peacekeeping missions. We are also
providing significant assistance to address humanitarian needs, prevent
mass atrocities, and address underlying causes of instability. Finally,
we assist African efforts to get ahead of crises through support of
conflict early warning systems and diplomatic responses.
In Mali, we are urging all sides to accelerate their efforts to
implement the peace accord signed in June 2015. Significant delays in
the accord's implementation have prolonged the security vacuum in
northern Mali, undercut our long-term counterterrorism objectives, and
made it difficult to advance reconciliation, reintegration, and
development. Despite these obstacles, we remain committed to advancing
an inclusive peace in Mali through dialogue with all actors and our
support to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
In South Sudan, the U.S. government's overriding focus is
supporting implementation of the August 2015 Agreement on the
Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) so that
the civil war may end and peace, stability, and prosperity take root.
We are currently supporting the Ceasefire and Transitional Security
Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) to ensure that the parties
are adhering to the ceasefire and security arrangements for Juba and
other cities, in accordance with the agreement.
In the CAR, the recent peaceful election and democratic transition
were positive steps, but sustained engagement is essential to end the
cycle of violence there. We are working both bilaterally, and with the
UN, AU, and European Union to support inclusive, representative, human-
rights based approaches to security sector reform and governance that
facilitate post-conflict stabilization and recovery. Since the crisis
in CAR began in late 2013, the U.S. provided over $79 million to train
and equip troops deploying into CAR to provide peace and stability, as
part of the original AU mission and the subsequent UN mission. We are
working to develop activities and programs to prepare the security
forces of CAR to provide citizen security in their country, with full
respect for the law. Ensuring rule of law and accountability are
essential pillars for CAR's future, we are helping to build CAR's
judicial structure, including the development of their Special Criminal
Court. We are also working to help communities throughout CAR by
focusing our long-term development programming on grassroots peace and
reconciliation and expanding access to justice through sexual and
gender-based violence legal training and mobile courts. The United
States is committed to assisting the people and the government of the
CAR with its transition from recent violence to a democratically
elected government that serves CAR's people.
In the DRC, we seek to preserve security gains made over the last
10 years and to continue countering armed groups in the eastern DRC,
while preserving civil society space to foster free and fair elections
and a peaceful transition of power. We have supported defense sector
and law enforcement reform programs for the last decade. Our efforts
include increasing military justice capabilities to hold accountable
human rights violators and criminals in the military. We are very
concerned, however, that a delay in the November elections this year,
and an effort by President Kabila to remain in office after December 20
when he is required by the DRC Constitution to step down, will lead to
widespread violence and instability; such instability could have an
impact on the entire region.
In Burundi, we are using diplomatic engagement at all levels to
urge support for a regionally-mediated dialogue that brings all parties
to the table to peacefully resolve the current conflict. We have also
encouraged accountability for abuses and violations of human rights and
attempts to undermine democracy in Burundi by sanctioning eight
individuals responsible for such activities from both sides of the
conflict. In March, we announced $31 million in humanitarian assistance
to support more than 260,000 refugees who have fled Burundi over the
last year and Congolese refugees and others food-insecure individuals
still in Burundi. This brings the total U.S. humanitarian assistance
for the regional response to the Burundi crisis to more than $86
million. Thomas Perriello, the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes
Region, has made frequent visits to Burundi, DRC, and to other
countries in the region, seeking a diplomatic solution to the current
crisis in Burundi and to the impending crisis in the DRC.
In collaboration with the AU and the UN, we continue to support
regional efforts to end the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA) and bring the remaining LRA leaders to justice. We are pursuing a
comprehensive strategy to build partner capacity, empower local
communities, promote defections from the LRA's ranks, and mitigate the
consequences of the LRA's atrocities. With U.S. support, the regional
forces from Uganda, the DRC, CAR, and South Sudan who comprise the
African Union Regional Task Force have significantly degraded the LRA's
capacity to attack communities and wreak havoc, but the job is not
done.
Increasingly, our African partners recognize the importance of
maritime security. They have begun to lead initiatives to protect
maritime traffic, reduce the loss of national revenue, and increase
economic opportunities. These increased benefits can positively
contribute to environmental and socio-economic development, as well as
increased national, regional and continental stability. By the same
token, they make a substantive contribution to global security. A
comprehensive U.S. policy on maritime security in sub-Saharan Africa
supports not only U.S. security interests but the administration's
broader sub-Saharan Africa policy objectives. The U.S. Government will
encourage and support greater African stewardship of maritime safety
and security at the continental, regional, and national levels.
The Department of State, our interagency colleagues and our
international partners also recognize the serious threats posed by
drug-trafficking. Foreign drug traffickers usually prefer fragile
countries with weak law enforcement and judicial systems. They thrive
in areas where they can operate with impunity--either because legal
systems do not work, or because they can be easily corrupted. The
creation of resilient institutions takes time and the lack of
governance attracts transnational criminal networks. The flow of drugs
through a region risks undermining the States by weakening their
institutions, their local communities, and their social fabric. With
our interagency colleagues, we have collaborated to develop the West
Africa Cooperative Security Initiative.
Through the Early Warning and Response Partnership (EWARP) and
other programs, the U.S. is assisting the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), and soon individual member states with
programs to improve networks for early warning of conflict or other
stability challenges. This will allow our African partners to better
prevent instability so they do not require costly and long term
security and humanitarian responses.
building strong and accountable security sector institutions
We recognize that strengthening the security and justice
institutions of our African partners is vital for long-term stability
on the continent. This includes both military and civilian security
services, and the entities that oversee them. We are partnering with
African countries and organizations to develop capable and professional
security services, improve security sector governance, and enhance
regional coordination and interoperability. In August 2014, President
Obama announced the Security Governance Initiative (SGI), an
innovative, multi-year effort between the United States and African
partners to improve security sector governance and capacity by
collaborating with partner governments to develop sound policies,
institutional structures, systems, and processes to more efficiently
and effectively deliver security and justice to citizens. SGI
complements our other security sector assistance programs by building
underlying institutional capacity, and furthers our efforts to combat
terrorism and instability in sub-Saharan Africa by focusing on
opportunities to address institutional gaps. In SGI's six initial
partners are Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia.
The State Department's International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program supports the professionalization of African
militaries through training in the United States with a heavy focus on
human rights, military justice and civilian control of the military. As
a complement to IMET, the Department also funds the Africa Military
Education Program (AMEP), which supports instructor and/or curriculum
development of select African military education institutions to help
further professionalize African militaries.
The U.S. Government is also helping to resolve conflicts on the
continent by building the institutional capacity of Africans to train
and equip peacekeepers and respond rapidly to conflict. We are training
and equipping African peacekeepers through programs such as the Global
Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and, the Africa Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. We are also
building rapid response capabilities through the Africa Peacekeeping
and Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). ACOTA has trained 297,071
peacekeepers since 2004. We are working to develop professional
security forces that respect human rights, recruit and retain a
representative corps of professionals, and safeguard democratic
institutions in countries emerging from or affected by conflict.
Through APRRP, the United States is strengthening the capacity of
security forces in six partner countries to deploy rapidly to emerging
African crises. The inaugural APRRP partners are Ethiopia, Ghana,
Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda.
promoting good governance, economic growth, opportunity and development
Countering instability requires a broad and multi-faceted strategy.
Given the multiple drivers of instability and conflict in Africa, our
responses must be innovative and dynamic. We cannot focus solely on the
security aspect of the solution. As outlined in President Obama's 2012
Policy Directive for Africa, the United States has four overall
strategic objectives in Africa: (1) strengthen democratic institutions;
(2) spur economic growth, trade and investment; (3) advance peace and
security; and (4) promote opportunity and development. Progress on all
of these objectives is required to improve stability throughout the
continent.
We continue to stay focused on supporting free, fair, and
transparent electoral processes that are inclusive and representative.
We have seen some major electoral successes, for example in Nigeria,
Burkina Faso, and CAR, but there have been setbacks as well. We will
continue to support regular democratic transitions, because they can
help vaccinate a country against feelings of injustice and alienation
that can lead some to heed the siren call of extremism and violence. We
will continue to support democratization efforts through electoral
assistance programs, diplomatic engagement, public outreach, and
election monitoring. We will continue to promote respect for universal
human rights, promote space for civil society to operate freely, and
fight corruption. And we are working with our African partners to
ensure that governments deliver essential services, independent
judiciaries enforce the rule of law, and that professional security
forces respect human rights.
President Obama has highlighted that the most urgent task facing
Africa today and for the decades ahead is to create opportunity for
Africa's next generation. Young people constitute a majority of
Africa's population and stand to gain, or lose, tremendously based on
the continent's social, political, and economic trajectory. They also
represent the next generation of African leaders. Through programs like
the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), we are investing in the
future by building leadership skills, bolstering entrepreneurship, and
connecting young African leaders with one another, the United States,
and the American people. This program will have a long-lasting positive
impact on the continent. Due to YALI's success, we are expanding the
number of Mandela Washington Fellows from 500 to 1,000 this year.
To support economic opportunity and growth in Africa, in 2014,
President Obama also tripled the goals of his Power Africa initiative,
pledging to add 30,000 megawatts of new, cleaner energy generation
capacity and to expand access to at least 60 million households and
enterprises across Sub-Saharan Africa. We thank Congress for its
leadership in passing the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 in February of
this year, which codified the strong bipartisan support for the vision,
goals and approach behind Power Africa, and sends a strong signal of
the United States' long-term commitment to reducing energy poverty in
sub-Saharan Africa.
In addition, we thank Congress for its leadership in reauthorizing
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for an additional ten
years. We are encouraging our African partners to make the most of this
ten-year reauthorization by developing AGOA utilization strategies,
while at the same time laying the ground work to move our trade and
investment relationship forward, beyond AGOA.
YALI, Power Africa, AGOA, and other programs like these are crucial
to creating opportunities for the youth of Africa and ensuring that
they are less susceptible to recruitment by extremists, criminal
enterprises, and human traffickers. Global Health is another top
priority. Through our work under the President's Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief and the President's Malaria Initiative, we are turning the
tide against these insidious diseases and saving lives. Other
presidential initiatives such as the, Feed the Future, and the
Partnership for Growth are also focused on building the sustainable
development needed to support a rapidly growing populations.
conclusion
We appreciate the committee's interest in addressing instability in
Africa and again ask for your help in supporting our relevant funding
requests. We know that the challenges are great, but we believe that
the comprehensive approach that we are pursuing is making progress and
promoting stability that will ultimately benefit the United States and
all of Africa. This will be a long-term process that requires
persistence and sustained partnerships. With your help we have made
significant strides over the past few years, but more work remains to
be done.
Thank you and we look forward to your questions.
__________
Prepared Statement of Hon. Linda Etim
Good afternoon, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin. Thank you
for the opportunity to discuss USAID's work with this committee.
Throughout Africa, our efforts to end extreme poverty, promote
resilient, democratic societies and create economic opportunity while
advancing our security and prosperity are increasingly threatened by
instability and the emerging forces of violent extremism. This is a
global phenomenon and no part of the world is immune.
The United States has a powerful tool to prevent conflict and
instability: international development. As the U.S. Government's
primary development agency, USAID has long recognized the critical role
of development in addressing social, economic, governance, and other
legitimate grievances that can fuel violent extremism and promote
radicalization of individuals and communities. It is also important to
build counter-violent extremism messaging into programming, especially
in local languages that can reach vulnerable populations. Our
activities and interventions are designed to reduce extremists'
opportunities to exploit social injustice, lack of political
integration, economic inequality, religious persecution, and
ideological extremism to recruit followers to violent agendas or
criminal networks.
Violent extremism impedes development. It can slow investment,
prevent children from attending schools, place additional burdens on
already fragile healthcare systems, and undermine political systems.
Today, I'll discuss our programs that help prevent violent extremism in
the Sahel and Horn of Africa and focus on the strategic thinking,
analysis, and approach that form the core of our results-oriented
programs. I'll also touch on the importance of USAID's governance
programs, which seek to address the social inequities, corruption and
weak institutions that often foster instability.
addressing drivers
USAID uses our analytic capabilities and draws upon our knowledge
of the local context to examine the drivers of fragility. Our
assessments carefully consider the ``push factors'' that can drive
people toward supporting violent extremism, such as social
fragmentation, a sense of injustice, perceptions of marginalization,
and distrust of government. We also examine the pull factors that can
attract those vulnerable to recruitment, including social and peer
networks that provide an ideological foundation, and the promise of
financial benefit. We have learned that attitudes of potential recruits
are heavily influenced by their environment, information channels, peer
group norms, and what they hear from trusted sources.
In 2011, USAID issued, ``The Development Response to Violent
Extremism and Insurgency,'' which recognizes development's role in
identifying and addressing drivers of extremism in support of U.S.
national security objectives. This Agency notes that much of U.S.
foreign assistance goes to countries in the midst of, or trying to
prevent, conflict or state failure. Our efforts to prevent and respond
to violent extremism are guided by ongoing research and analysis of the
factors associated with radicalization and recruitment to violence.
USAID helps prevent the spread of violent extremism through
targeted efforts to promote good governance and the rule of law,
respect for human rights, and sustainable, inclusive development, among
other programs. Together with State, USAID is bringing its development
expertise and more than a decade of experience in countering violent
extremism programming to bear--harnessing the full range of analytic
tools to design, support, and measure programs that reduce the
vulnerabilities of communities and build local capacity to resist
extremist groups. This is an essential element of the Agency's
integrated approach, which begins with prevention.
Youth are a key demographic targeted by our programming. According
to the United Nations, in 2015, 226 million youth aged 15-24 lived in
Africa. By 2030, it is projected that the number of youth in Africa
will have increased by 42 percent to more than 320 million.
While there is no one profile of those most at-risk, unemployed
youth who have migrated to peri-urban and slum areas, university
graduates whose expectations have not been met, or youth who have lived
through conflict can be at great risk. Slow economies and an education
that is not tied to market demand leave many youth feeling that they
have no role in their community. They lack a sense of belonging and
feel marginalized. Such perceptions can drive youth to involvement in
destructive or illicit activities.
Gender is a critical element in addressing violent extremism. We
work to move beyond generalized assumptions about men and women based
on common gender stereotypes, recognizing that gender norms for men and
women manifest differently in various social, political, and economic
contexts. For example, women are not only victims of violent extremism
but can be both perpetrators and critical to prevention. As such, a
nuanced and context-specific understanding of gender is needed to
accurately diagnose the push and pull factors that drive both men and
women to participate in violent extremism, a dynamic that has been
largely unaddressed in the research.
Intrinsic to the design of all USAID activities is the belief that
our development assistance has the greatest impact on the drivers of
extremism by increasing resilience. At the local level, we focus on
social cohesion and fostering stronger, more resilient communities. We
support individuals, particularly youth, through employment and
outreach programs, vocational skills training, and community
development activities.
the horn of africa
Terrorist threats in East Africa continue to evolve and spread. The
regional dynamics and conditions that propel extremism in the Horn of
Africa are inextricably linked to neighboring countries. Through the
Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) and
related programs, the U.S. Department of State, the Department of
Defense, and USAID fund projects in Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Ethiopia,
Uganda and along the Kenya-Somalia border to promote civic engagement
and political participation, strengthen civil society organizations,
amplify moderate voices, mitigate conflict, and empower youth and
women; this is a coordinated interagency approach.
In Somalia, al-Shabaab threatens not only the country's viability
as a state but also the region's stability. USAID supports peace and
stability in 17 of 18 regions through targeted community- vetted
interventions that foster good governance, economic recovery, and
reduces the appeal of extremism. USAID also promotes the women, peace,
and security agenda in Somalia. Since 2011, USAID constructed and/or
equipped 12 women's centers across Somalia which are neutral venues
utilized by women for community planning, conflict mitigation and
resolution, counseling services, adult literacy classes, and public
health and safety purposes.
One of USAID's flagship programs, the Transition Initiatives for
Stabilization Plus, improves community resistance to the influence of
al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), by
creating effective local governance, and proactively engaging
communities. We know that communities that realize positive social,
cultural, and economic benefits in recovered areas are more likely to
resist extremism.
This program serves as the bridge between our immediate
humanitarian assistance and our medium- to longer-term development
programs in Somalia. Development programs need peace and stability to
be sustainable and effective. We conduct rapid-impact, high-visibility
work that creates short-term employment opportunities for at-risk
youth, displaced people, and other vulnerable groups. All projects are
carried out in a consultative process between the local authorities and
the community, enabling the civilian population to do something good
for their communities while interacting and engaging with a legitimate
governance structure. This further mitigates conflict, promotes
stability and community cohesion, and strengthens and supports
relationships between residents and their government officials.
In Kenya, USAID targets at-risk youth populations through
Generation Kenya, which closes the gap between young people who are out
of work and employers who are short of skilled employees. By partnering
with the private sector, we provide training and meaningful employment
to vulnerable young people. Generation Kenya has produced impressive
results--100 percent of Generation Kenya's 490 graduates were placed
with employers and 90 percent are still in these jobs. Generation Kenya
plans to place more than 50,000 youth in stable careers by the year
2020. Going forward, USAID will expand its programming in violent
extremism ``hot spots'' working hand and hand with communities, local,
and national governments.
In the Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development has emerged as the leading regional actor in countering
violent extremism. In 2015, it announced a decision to establish a
regional Countering Violent Extremism Center of Excellence, based in
Djibouti. The center will focus on practical and tangible outcomes that
will strengthen countering violent extremism capacities and cooperation
across the region. USAID will support the implementation of the Center
of Excellence's key priorities to ensure that governments, civil
society organizations and other actors have the tools and information
on ``best practices'' to effectively carry out their efforts.
west africa and the sahel
In West Africa, violent extremism is a potentially destabilizing
force which threatens the tenuous progress of the region's development.
In the Sahel, vast porous borders fostering centuries-old socioeconomic
and ethno-tribal ties exist alongside post-colonial boundaries and
enhance the likelihood of spreading tension and instability.
Modernization, urban migration, and the breakdown of social cohesion
and familial and communal interdependence have disrupted historically
strong community and regional ties.
USAID counters this force through our role in the Trans Sahara
Counter Terrorism Partnership. Our programs and initiatives are
designed to reduce the threats of violent extremism and armed conflicts
within the Libya-Niger-Mali corridor and in Nigeria, along Niger's
southern border. By improving national and regional capacities to
resist terrorist organizations, we help disrupt efforts to recruit and
train new members, particularly youth. Our efforts also make it harder
for extremists to establish safe havens. Through the USAID Peace
through Development and Expanded Regional Stability program, we support
Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso's community leaders to engage with
marginalized communities and work with government officials to make
local governance more inclusive and transparent. We engage youth
through vocational and entrepreneurial skills training, civic
education, and leadership training to increase participation in local
decision making, encourage greater citizen participation, advocacy, and
government outreach.
In Niger, our Community Cohesion Initiative engages communities
through small-scale, targeted activities involving local civil society
organizations, governments, and community members. The Niger Education
and Community Strengthening Program works in 150 schools across 22
municipalities to improve educational opportunities for children in at-
risk communities. This support increased school attendance rates from
62 percent to 93 percent in targeted communities. Investments in these
learning opportunities are focused on ensuring an increasingly educated
population is paired with economic opportunity.
The USAID Peace through Development II project has reached 40
Nigerien communities across the regions of Agadez, Diffa, Maradi,
Tahoua, Tillaberri, Zinder and the capital district of Niamey. By
producing and delivering original radio content aimed at countering
extremist narratives that was broadcast across 33 partner stations, the
program has reached over 1.7 million people from groups at risk of
violent extremism. It has directly engaged nearly 100,000 people
through civic education, moderate voice promotion and youth empowerment
themed events. We also facilitate local dialogue and reduce community
tensions by tackling small yet important development projects such as
rehabilitation of a well or brush-clearing that makes it harder for
terrorists and other criminal elements to conduct attacks along popular
roads. Our programs increase civic engagement among Nigerien government
authorities and citizens and decrease the interest of young people to
take part in illegal or extremist activities. These activities also
increase the community's knowledge of the Government of Niger's efforts
to promote security and stability throughout the region.
Across Mali, USAID supports the Government's roadmap for political
transition. Following the successful July 2013 presidential elections,
we are focused on supporting the peace accord that brought an end to
the conflict with the Northern Armed Groups, restoring a sense of
normalcy in strategic areas in the North, and countering violent
extremism through inclusion of marginalized communities. Our assistance
increases the effectiveness and legitimacy of government institutions.
By strengthening the government's public financial management systems
we help ensure that public funds are distributed equitably and justly
throughout Mali, and that decentralization efforts are accompanied with
sufficient skills, training, and oversight to prevent corruption. Mali
is also a partner country Security Governance Initiative, the United
States' joint endeavor with six African partners to improve security
sector governance and capacity to address threats. We've just embarked
on the first-ever Rule of Law program to ensure the Ministry of Justice
obtains and maintains qualified staff to carry out its mission. In
addition, our newest program, the Mali Peace Initiative, builds upon a
three-year, Office of Transition Initiatives program that operated
across Northern Mali to strengthen targeted communities' resilience to
conflict and radicalization. Still, the tragic loss of USAID friend and
partner, Anita Datar, during the November 2015 terrorist attack on the
Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali underscores the challenges that
remain as we continue our efforts to bolster the fragile peace process
and provide assistance to vulnerable communities.
In nearby Nigeria, a surge of violence perpetuated by the terrorist
group Boko Haram, which now calls itself the Islamic State in West
Africa continues. The insurgency has forced large populations to
migrate to more secure areas, disrupting homes and livelihoods and
burdening already stressed basic public services such as education and
health. USAID's programming improves the Nigerian government's
responsiveness to community needs, reducing perceptions of
marginalization and addressing youth vulnerability to violent extremist
influence. Women and girls are not only victims of violent extremism,
but have the ability to prevent recruitment and serve as mediators and
peace-builders. Christian and Muslim women have used the skills
received during USAID-supported training to help citizens in Boko Haram
affected communities manage the effects of trauma and stress and to
conduct inter-religious dialogue to promote conflict prevention and
peaceful coexistence. This is integral to a more holistic and practical
healing process.
The Nigeria Regional Transition Initiative focuses on diminishing
conditions that allow Boko Haram to exist and flourish in the
Northeast. It provides small-scale, strategically targeted assistance
to local partners. For example, we supported UNICEF and other
implementing partners to provide education activities for conflict-
affected children, including internally displaced persons and children
in host communities, in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, and Gombe states. We
provide child-friendly spaces, psychosocial support, and peer mentoring
opportunities for children, while also training teachers in conflict-
sensitive instruction. These activities build a stronger sense of
community and belonging in these traditionally marginalized areas by
facilitating peaceful interactions between the internally displaced and
host communities. We are promoting conflict mitigation, expanding a
sports-for-peace program, and launching a local language radio program
to counter the appeal of terrorist or criminal organizations.
conclusion
We have seen real progress in our efforts. Through program
assessment, implementation and evaluation, we are learning what works
and what doesn't. As we gain experience, we improve our monitoring and
evaluation and gather more baseline data so that we can more
effectively measure program impact.
A central tenet of our development approach is the transfer of
knowledge and skills to stakeholders and partners in African countries.
Through our Missions' work and through USAID-funded resource centers,
such as those referenced above, we train individuals and communities to
own and address violent extremism in their own countries.
At USAID, we're committed to this work. We've increased the number
of individuals dedicated to programming focused on countering
extremism, trained employees on its principles and incorporated
countering violent extremism objectives into our country program
strategies.
Instability in some areas is the product of generations of neglect
and corruption; solutions to these challenges will be the product of
generations of concerted focus, legitimate engagement, and expectations
of results. For our development programs to succeed we must invest in
strong local partnerships and our methods of engagement must be nimble
and creative. Because trends in extremism are fluid, we must constantly
reassess our priorities, our progress, and our policies to ensure that
our work is based on the realities of today.
Toward this end, we are pleased with our strong and productive
partnership with the Departments of Defense and State on the planning
and implementation of programming, as well as our work with other
donors on coordinating efforts to counter extremism. Sustained
engagement--within the U.S. Government, with other donor governments,
and with our partners in the region--will be the key to combating
extremism today and securing peace and stability for years to come.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I look
forward to your questions.
__________
Prepared Statement of Abdoulaye Mar Dieye
Mr. Chairman, Mr Ranking Member, members of the committee, I am
honored, as Regional Director for Africa at the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), to be invited as a panelist before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
UNDP is the lead UN development agency. We are active in 168
countries and territories across the world, including all 53 countries
in Africa. Our mission, as set by Member States through our Executive
Board, is to assist countries to eradicate poverty and, at the same
time, achieve a significant reduction of inequalities and exclusion. We
do this by supporting inclusive growth and development, fostering
democratic governance and building resilient institutions and
communities that are better able to manage risks that can endanger
peace and development.
My purpose today is two-fold.
First, I want to briefly update you on what we, as UNDP, have
learned about instability in Africa.
Second, I will share our view on the possible developmental
approaches to mitigate the threats to peace and stability in what is
often referred to as ``Africa's Arc of Instability'' which encompasses
the Sahel, the Lake Chad Region and the Horn of Africa.
But let me first recognize and celebrate that Africa has made
significant strides on the social, political and economic front since
the turn of the century.
Figures show that Africa's rate of extreme poverty fell from 56% in
1990 to 43% in 2012; steady economic growth and macroeconomic stability
have resurged; and protracted armed conflicts are on a downward trend.
We have seen that these successes tend to be driven by countries that
invest in the safety, security and productive lives of their citizens.
We have also seen, in many instances, genuine and inclusive democratic
transitions leading to more responsive and accountable governments.
This progress, however, is at risk of reversal.
The stark reality is that steady economic growth and macroeconomic
stability have not transformed into sustainable development. Deep
socio-economic inequalities within and between communities in these
sub-regions and indeed across much of Africa persist. While extreme
poverty has been reduced, a vast number of citizens continue to live in
dire conditions with little prospect of attaining the most basic of
human development needs in health, education or livelihoods. It is
estimated that 60% of the population in the region are between the ages
18-30. It is young Africans who are making the grim choice as illegal
migrants--travelling to the North of Africa destined for the West,
setting off on journeys that we know frequently end in death. It is
these youth, particularly females, who are kidnapped, trafficked into
servitude, and exploited. They are young; they are poor; and the
majority are desperate. It is young people, in particular, who are easy
prey for extremist ideologues. They are radicalized, with promises of
relevance and prosperity and encouraged along a path of violence and
destruction. In Nigeria, more than 40% of suicide bombers are female.
One in five suicide bombers deployed by Boko Haram last year was a
child and, usually, a girl.
The exponential growth of violent extremism in Africa, including
the growing convergence between different groups, also presents an
imminent threat to Africa's steady path to prosperity. We estimate that
at least 33,000 persons have been killed in Africa since 2011, and 6
million people are internally displaced as a result of violent
extremism.
Societies and communities bear the brunt of extremist violence.
Extremists target public spaces such as markets and bus stations,
forcing people to make a difficult choice between risking death by
going to work to earn a living, or risking the very survival of their
families. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Lake Chad Basin--
Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon--where over 3 million people are
displaced, thousands have been killed and many more are held captive
across the four countries. The killing of students in Garissa, Kenya,
the kidnapping of the Chibok girls in Dikwa, Nigeria, the suicide
attack on medical students in Somalia, and the recent tragic events in
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and Mali have shown that this phenomenon is
unique in targeting the innocent and vulnerable, breeding discord among
communities, and arresting development.
The impact of extremist violence is not only the loss of lives and
destruction of property--national economies are also negatively
affected. According to the International Monetary Fund, violent
extremism is amongst the major risks to economies in parts of Africa.
Tunisia's GDP growth has been cut from 3% to 1% with a 45% decline in
tourism. Chad's GDP's contracted by 1% in 2015 from a 5% growth in
2014, and Kenya saw a 25% reduction in tourism following terrorist
attacks.
Weak governance and limited opportunities for youth are critical
drivers of socio-political instability. They fuel illegal migration and
violent extremism, significantly intensifying the risk that Africa may
once again be described as a ``blight on the conscience of the world''.
Over the last two years, UNDP has held a number of consultations,
conducted a series of studies and commissioned research to better
understand the violent extremism scourge in Africa. We have just
concluded a seminal ``perception study'' on ``radicalization, violence
and insecurity in the Sahel'', covering border communities in eight
countries--Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon and Nigeria. That study is the first, we believe, to assess
perceptions of affected populations on what they see as the main
factors explaining radicalization, and what they would expect as
solutions. We are also currently conducting research on
``radicalization journey mapping'' with a view to identifying ``the
tipping point to violent extremism''. This research, which interviews
extremists , their families and their communities, covers the zones of
operation of Boko Haram and Al Shabaab in regions of Nigeria, Kenya,
Uganda and Somalia; and it will be extended ( in a phase II) to
Northern Mali and the Lake Chad region.
Preliminary results of these various studies and research converge
in three major findings:
1. While the drivers of radicalization are multi-faceted, and defy
easy analysis, their major roots are to be found in: (i)
poverty and low human development (ii) an endemic sense of
economic and political exclusion and marginalization; and (iii)
weak social contracts with high level of societal divisions
along ethnic or religious lines.
2. The most fertile grounds for radicalization are border areas, which
are, in most of the countries studied, neglected in terms of
socio-economic and institutional infrastructure.
3. While there are a number of common elements which drive
radicalization, there are also some important differences
between countries. For example, socio-economic factors tend to
be the prominent drivers in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin,
Somalia and Nigeria; whereas political grievances are a much
more prominent factor in Kenya.
In short, violent extremism finds fertile ground among the
disenfranchised and in ungoverned spaces.
It is with this research and analysis in mind that we have embarked
on a development-led approach which seeks to address the multiple
drivers and enablers of radicalization and violent extremism.
We have launched a four-year regional initiative on ``preventing
and responding to violent extremism in Africa'' which focuses on
supporting regional institutions, governments, communities and at-risk
individuals to address the drivers and related factors.
We are working in epicenter countries, spill-over countries and at-
risk countries to help partners develop and implement integrated,
regional and national policies and strategies; effective
decentralization; cross-border development initiatives; rule of law;
peer-to-peer, community and faith-based interventions to prevent youth
radicalization and de-escalate local conflicts. We also promote social
cohesion at community level, working with local and national
governments to provide basic social services to citizens. We support
employment creation, and we work with local governments to strengthen
public administration and the extension of state authority.
We have learned that well-resourced, comprehensive and integrated
programs combining security and development responses offer the best
approaches to combating violent extremism. We have further learned that
communities--including faith groups--should be at the center of the
response, with efforts to increase trust and build confidence between
them and law enforcement agencies. These initiatives, combined with
participatory governance and sustained efforts to address inequality,
can bring hope, opportunity and purpose to young people and excluded
communities. This approach is critical in successfully inoculating
communities against radicalization.
Let me conclude my remarks by emphasizing that for Africa to meet
its full development potential, preventing and responding to violent
extremism is essential. This will require coordinated and collaborative
partnerships between governments, development partners and civil
society groups.
Mr. Chairman, I thank this committee for holding these hearings,
which can only rightly add to the sense of urgency that this situation
warrants, and for inviting UNDP to make a submission.
__________
Prepared Statement of Christopher Fomunyoh, Ph.D.
Mr. Chairman, ranking member Cardin, and distinguished members of
the committee, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss terrorism and instability and
make the case for why democracy and good governance should be a central
component of any counterterrorism and stabilization strategy in Sub-
Saharan Africa. For more than 30 years, NDI has worked around the world
to establish and strengthen political and civic organizations,
safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness, and
accountability in government. The Institute has conducted programs in,
or worked with participants from approximately 50 of Africa's 54
countries; and I have been fortunate to be part of our efforts in many
of those countries for the past two decades.
introduction
Terrorist activity in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade
threatens to destabilize the continent and roll back some of the gains
in broadening political space and participation since the global wave
of democratization that began in the 1990s. Groups such as Boko Haram
in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin, Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) in northern Mali and the Sahel, and Al-Shabaab
in Somalia and the Horn of Africa have caused tens of thousands of
deaths and tremendous economic and social dislocations of civilian
populations. Some of these extremist organizations operating in Africa
are eager to establish alliances with violent extremist organizations
in other parts of the world, notably Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The international community is right in
supporting counterterrorism efforts that seek to defeat these extremist
groups militarily and must, at the same time, assist the affected
countries to address the root causes and triggers of the rise in
extremism and violence on the continent.
The principal motivation of today's terrorists in sub-Saharan
Africa is deeply rooted in a pattern of religious beliefs; however, it
is noteworthy that governance failures have exacerbated the impact of
this phenomenon and created an enabling environment in which extremism
thrives. When a state collapses, as was the case with Somalia prior to
the emergence of Al-Shabaab, or allows for huge swaths of ungovernable
spaces, as was the case in Northern Mali, or fails to fulfill its basic
purpose of providing citizens with access to a meaningful life,
liberty, and property, as in northeastern Nigeria, the social contract
between the state and the citizenry is broken. Discontent with
governments that are viewed as illegitimate or ineffective is a fertile
ground for recruitment as disaffected individuals may easily embrace
extremism hoping to access a better life, political power or voice and
the resources linked to these attributes in transition environments.
Moreover, oppressed citizens and marginalized groups that are denied
access to basic public goods and services and opportunities are more
vulnerable to extremist appeals and indoctrination by non-state actors
who in return promise to fulfill their needs. Efforts to counter
violent extremism and terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa must, therefore,
address poor governance as part of the overall strategy. Based on
institutional lessons learned through NDI's work, my own experience and
expertise as an African, and what I hear loud and clear from African
democrats--leaders and activists alike--across the continent, I would
strongly offer the following three recommendations for your
consideration:
Any counterterrorism strategy for Africa should be grounded in the
consolidation of democracy and good governance such that short
term military victories can be sustained in the medium to long
term. We cannot defeat violent extremism now only to take up
the same fight five, 10 years down the road.
Autocratic regimes should not get a pass from the international
community solely because they are good partners in the fight
against terrorism. Shrinking political space, frequent and
overt violations of citizen rights and freedoms, and the
undermining of constitutional rule and meaningful elections
breed discontent and disaffection that form the fertile ground
for recruiters and perpetrators of violence and extremism. Good
partners in countering violent extremism and terrorism can and
should be good performers in democratic governance. These two
principles are not mutually exclusive; in fact they are
mutually reinforcing.
Africans of this generation are jittery and extremely fearful of
reliving the experience of the Cold War era during which
dictatorships thrived amidst grave human deprivation and gross
human rights abuses just because some leaders were allies of
the West at the time. The fight against terrorism should not
become a substitute for the Cold War paradigm of this century
with regards to sub-Saharan Africa.
governance gaps and extremism
According to a 2009 report by the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), marginalized citizens who feel excluded from the
political process may turn to extremist groups to fight for inclusion
or to gain a sense of belonging.\1\ Also, a 2014 study by academics at
the University of Illinois, Chicago, and Pennsylvania State University
found that countries where ethnic groups are excluded from political
power suffer from more domestic terror attacks.\2\ Unfortunately, in
many African countries the politics of exclusion remains a reality.
Identity politics, buttressed by subjective criteria such as ethnicity,
region of origin, and in a few cases religion, breeds discontent and
dissatisfaction within communities.
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\1\ USAID. Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism. February
2009.
\2\ Seung-Whan Choi and James A. Piazza. ``Ethnic groups, political
exclusion and domestic terrorism,'' Defense and Peace Economics.
December 11, 2014.
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Poor governance accounts for low and uneven rates of economic and
human development, poor service delivery, and lack of opportunities for
gainful employment and/or prosperity and societies with these traits
tend to be breeding grounds in which extremist groups thrive.\3\
Dissatisfaction with a government's failures to ensure a reasonable
quality of life can lead to radicalization and a rejection of central
authority.
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\3\ USAID. Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism. February
2009.
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Democratic governance is critical to every counterterrorism
strategy--before, so citizen grievances are not allowed to fester and
breed extremism, dissatisfaction, and alienation from the state;
during, to deprive extremists of possible recruitment grounds; and
after, to sustain the peace that would have been gained militarily for
the medium to long term. Excessive deprivation in both economic terms
and in access to political voice, freedom, and civil liberties makes
young people vulnerable to the recruitment incentives of extremist
movements.
particularities of the terrorist trends in sub-saharan africa
According to the Institute for Economics and Peace's Global
Terrorism Index (2015), sub-Saharan Africa experienced the second
highest number of terrorism-related casualties in 2014, with more than
10,000 deaths.\4\ The greatest terrorist impacts were in northern
Nigeria and neighboring countries in the Lake Chad basin, the Sahel,
and the Horn of Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Institute for Economics and Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2015:
Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism.
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Boko Haram in Nigeria
According to the Index report, Boko Haram is the deadliest
terrorist group in the world (ahead of ISIS, the Taliban, and Al-
Shabaab), having killed more than 7,000 people in terrorist attacks in
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger in 2014 alone.\5\ On a global scale,
in 2014 northern Nigeria suffered 23 percent of all terrorism-related
deaths worldwide.\6\ In recent months, asBoko Haram has been militarily
degraded, it has changed tactics by dramatically increasing cross-
border attacks by suicide bombers in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. Boko
Haram was formed by a Muslim leader, Mohammed Yusuf, who railed against
government corruption and failure to adhere to the ideology of an
Islamic state as a battle cry to recruit young followers, many of whom
saw themselves as marginalized and victimized by the Nigerian
government.\7\ Its first public manifestation was in the attack of a
police station in Borno State in 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Ibid.
\6\ Ibid.
\7\ Brookings Institute. ``The disease is unbelief'': Boko Haram's
religious and political worldview. January2016
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Al-Shabaab in Somalia
In the Horn of Africa, Somalia faces an Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic
terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, which seeks to undermine any semblance of
authority by the Somali government. Al-Shabaab emerged in 1991 after
the collapse of the Somali state and protracted armed conflict among
various ethnically-based factions. The group took advantage of the
power vacuum and prevailing anarchy generated by the intra-Somali
conflict to build camps and train fighters without fear of state
interference. At its peak, Al-Shabaab recruited young marginalized
Somalis by providing basic services to citizens in regions under its
control.\8\ Despite suffering major setbacks and being pushed out of
major cities, Al-Shabaab killed more people in terrorist attacks in
2014 than ever before--more than 800 people were killed in close to 500
attacks, approximately double the number killed the previous year.\9\
Al-Shabaab continues to seek openings to commit terrorist acts outside
of Somalia, as it has done in the past killing civilians in attacks in
Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.
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\8\ Center for Strategic & International Studies. ``Al Shabaab.''
AQAM Futures Project Case Study Series. July 2011
\9\ Institute for Economics and Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2015:
Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism.
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Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, and Al Mourabitoun in
Northern Mali
Despite the military defeat of Islamist militants by African and
French troops (Operation Serval) in 2013, and the signing of a peace
accord in Bamako in June 2015, northern Mali remains vulnerable to
terrorist activity. Recent attacks on western hotels in Bamako and
neighboring Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, underscore the new strategy of
Ansar Dine and Al Mourabitoun, which now focus on attacking ``soft
targets'' such as hotels, cafes, and supermarkets. Terrorists first
gained strength in the region between 2010 and 2012 when extremists and
criminal networks previously active in Algeria in the 1990s moved into
ungoverned spaces in northern Mali and later capitalized on a
separatist movement sparked by dissatisfaction with the performance of
the central government in Bamako and allegations of extreme corruption
and ineffectiveness in public service delivery.
timeliness of counterterrorism partnerships
As African countries have faced these new security threats for
which their militaries were ill- prepared, a variety of partnerships
have emerged to assist national and sub-regional forces, with the
United States playing a lead role. African countries have provided
ground troops to fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Northern
Nigeria and Northern Mali,\10\ and have relied on European nations and
the United States for more sophisticated equipment and specialized
training. The net result has been the degradation of the bulk of
jihadist movements that now have only limited capacity to launch small
scale, albeit deadly, attacks using in some cases, suicide bombers.
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\10\ French troops and a smaller contingent of other European
forces (German and Dutch) are engaged as part of current UN operations
in northern Mali.
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Unfortunately, in some cases, African governments that are
counterterrorism partners are not the best performers on democracy and
good governance, which is also one of the declared pillars of U.S.
policy in Africa. In fact, a number of these countries are ranked as
``not free'' by Freedom House.\11\ There is a growing perception, and
many Africans are fearful that democracy and governance could be
sidelined in pursuit of security, and that counterterrorism has become
a pretext for undermining democratic values and practices. Africans
that lived through the Cold War are beginning to see parallels today as
governments that partner with the West to combat violent extremism may
feel entitled to unconditional support regardless of their poor
performance in other areas. A number of country examples illustrate the
point.
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\11\ Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2015.
Shrinking political space in some counter-terrorism partner
countries--In a number of countries some of the gains in civil
and human rights of the 1990s are being eroded as political
parties and civil society groups are denied political space for
citizen engagement and participation or for their voices to be
heard. In one notable example, while Chad has played an
important role in fighting terrorism in the Lake Chad basin and
in northern Mali, its poor track record on democratic
governance, including recent allegations of extrajudicial
killings of soldiers who voted against the president in the
last election, should give the international community
pause.\12\
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\12\ Convention Tchadienne Pour la Defense des Droits Humains.
``Communique de Presse N 012/2016.''
Newly enacted antiterrorism laws stifle dissent for political
purposes--Ethiopia, for example, is a strong counterterrorism
partner in the Horn, but continues to repress political rights,
restrict speech, and arrest members of opposition parties.\13\
During legislative elections in 2015, the ruling party won all
547 seats in the lower house. The government uses broadly
defined anti-terrorism laws to suppress critics, including nine
journalists who were arrested in 2014 and several more who have
been in detention since 2006. The Committee to Protect
Journalists noted that the 10 journalists detained at the end
of 2015 risk being tried under anti-terrorism laws.\14\
Furthermore, the government has violently suppressed peaceful
protests in Oromia, home of Ethiopia's largest ethnic group,
against a government development plan that would displace
farmers. Security forces have reportedly killed over 200 people
and arrested thousands, including prominent Oromo political
leaders.\15\
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\13\ Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2016.
\14\ Committee to Protect Journalists. 2015 Prison Census.
\15\ Human Rights Watch. Ethiopia: No Let Up in Crackdown on
Protests. February 21, 2016.
Poor performance on constitutionalism and rule of law--Burundi is
now mired in a post-election crisis in which over 400 people
have been killed and hundreds of thousands internally displaced
or become refugees in neighboring countries. To many Burundians
and other international analysts, the crisis emanates from the
current government's recalcitrance in seeking another five year
mandate despite the presidential term limitation of the 2005
Arusha accords. These Burundian democracy supporters believe
that the country's poor track record on constitutionalism and
human rights had been overlooked by counterterrorism partners
because of the regime's troop contributions to the African
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Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
Backsliding on elections and political rights--Recently identified
as a ``key strategic partner'' for its support for AMISOM,\16\
Uganda has declined in its recent Freedom House ratings from
``partly free'' to ``not free'' as a result of the government's
increased violations of civil rights.\17\ Unfair conditions
leading up to this year's national elections further eroded
public confidence in the government, led by one of the longest
serving African presidents.\18\
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\16\ U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs. ``U.S.
Relations with Uganda. Fact Sheet.'' October 2, 2015.
\17\ Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2015.
\18\ State Department Press Statement. ``On the Results of Uganda's
Presidential Elections.'' February 20, 2016.
African democrats are increasingly fearful of a return to the Cold
War paradigm through which a government's involvement in combating
terrorism overshadows the rights of citizens to a responsive and
democratic state. Recent public opinion surveys by Afrobarometer show
that while a very high percentage of Africans aspire to democracy--70
percent of Africans preferring democracy to other forms of government--
fewer than half of those in countries surveyed are satisfied with how
democracy is working in their country, a drop from previous years.\19\
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\19\ Afrobarometer. ``African democracy update: Satisfaction
remains elusive for many'' September 16, 2015.
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recommendations
How, therefore, can counterterrorism assistance better incorporate
democracy building?
Counterterrorism partners should design strategies that also
integrate objectives to improve governance such as by
encouraging more effective decentralization and voice at the
local level in impacted communities and populations.
Counterterrorism initiatives should take a holistic (all of
government approach) that incorporates governance
considerations from conceptualization through
operationalization and consolidation.
Host governments should be encouraged to not only defeat the
negative forces militarily, but also to invest in
rehabilitating communities and creating governance structures
to tackle and eliminate the conditions that fostered the rise
of support for extremism in order to guard against a relapse.
Partners should increase assistance to nascent democracies with
weak political institutions to develop functional, responsive
governments that are able to deliver basic services to their
citizens. Consolidation of democracy should be approached as a
long-term process that requires consistent and continued
support with mechanisms to reward or incentivize good behavior
and penalize poor performance.
Use public diplomacy and other mechanisms to state clearly and
unambiguously expectations for democratic behavior across
Africa, as development partners did so successfully in Nigeria
in 2014/2015. Moreover, such statements, as recently done in
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, should be
followed by concrete actions and long-term commitments to
sustain support for democracy and good governance.
Invest in education to guarantee peace and opportunities for this
generation of youth. As argued eloquently in a recent New York
Times op-ed by renowned journalist Nicholas Kristof, education
can be more effective in combating militancy than military
intervention.\20\ Girls' education in particular can promote a
virtuous cycle of development by increasing the formal labor
force, boosting the economy and reducing demographic growth.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Nicholas Kristof. ``What's So Scary About Smart Girls?'' New
York Times, May 10, 2016.
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conclusion
Poor governance is a driver of discontent and resentment of the
state that can push citizens in transition environments to join or
sympathize with extremist networks. To be successful in combatting
violent extremism and preventing its reappearance or resurgence,
counterterrorism efforts must also address root causes.
Given the high demand for democracy and good governance across
Africa, the continent's partners have a critical role to play in
helping sub-Saharan African countries address issues relating to
terrorism in ways that are consistent with democratic principles. The
international community has many tools at its disposal to continue to
lead in this endeavor.
Despite the enthusiasm of a few years ago, and some remarkable
accomplishments in the last two decades, democratic governance in
Africa is under attack. On the one hand, it is challenged by external
threats from extremist terrorist organizations and; on the other hand,
in some cases, by internal threats from autocratic regimes that fail to
deliver public services, combat corruption and protect rights and
freedoms. The international community should do everything in its power
to help rid the continent of both existential threats. Friends of
Africa must make sure that they do not, willingly or inadvertently,
allow themselves to become accomplices in denying Africans their basic
rights and freedoms and a secure, prosperous future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.
__________
Additional Questions for the Record
responses to questions for the record submitted to hon. linda
thomas-greenfield and justin siberell by senator corker
Question 1. In each of the regions (Sahel, Somalia, Lake Chad)
discussed during this hearing, what country or entity is the lead-
nation on the donor side in ensuring as coherent and effective a
response to the mutual threats being confronted? Which of the regional
countries in each region is the most important to achieving U.S.
interests and why?
Answer. Across the Sahel, the United States coordinates closely
with international partners, most prominently France and the European
Union (EU). The coordination with France in Mali, for example, is very
strong, and our two governments cooperate both operationally and in
design and implementation of foreign assistance programs. We also
exchange information on a regular basis with European partners (such as
the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and Spain), as well as Canadian,
Japanese, and Australian colleagues on shared interests in security
sector reform, border security, counterterrorism capacity building,
maritime security, and related topics.
There is no single country that is most important to achieving U.S.
interests in the Sahel. The Department of State places a significant
emphasis on our support to Niger and Chad and on advancing the
stability and development of Mali. Niger and Chad face threats
emanating from Libya and from Boko Haram and are willing partners for
the United States in train and equip programs, as well as in countering
violent extremism programs. As in Mali, the U.S. cooperation with other
international partners remains strong, most particularly with the EU's
EUCAP-Sahel program. In fact, the United States will be discussing
shared security and counterterrorism equities with the EU in a July
security and development dialogue.
In East Africa, donors coordinate assistance for the Somali
national security forces through the New Deal Working Group on Security
(Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal 2), which is currently co-chaired
by the Governments of Somalia, the United States, and Turkey.
Specifically with regard to the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), the AU takes the lead on coordination of donor assistance. We
supplement these formal processes with direct consultations with other
key donors and stakeholders, such as the EU, UK, France, and Turkey, as
well as the individual AMISOM troop-contributing countries.
There is no single most important country in the context of East
Africa, as several partners each play important roles in promoting
stability in the region. Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda all
contribute more than 4,000 troops each to AMISOM, and are providing
security across broad swaths of the country. Djibouti, while playing a
significantly smaller role in terms of AMISOM troop contributions,
plays an equally important part by hosting the only U.S. base in the
region, which in turn enables our own efforts to promote peace and
stability. Somalia itself may ultimately prove most important, as
professional, effective local security forces capable of confronting
the threat posed by al-Shabaab are needed before AMISOM and other
international counterterrorism efforts can be responsibly drawn down.
In the Lake Chad Basin, we coordinate closely with other donors,
especially the UK, France, and the EU, so that international partners
fill coherent, effective, and complementary roles in helping partner
countries counter Boko Haram. The foreign and defense ministries of the
P3 capitals (U.S., UK, and France) interact regularly at both the
assistant secretary level and the senior working level; the EU is often
folded into these policy-level engagements. In the field, P3, EU, and
UN agencies interact frequently so that our policies and political
messaging are coordinated. These coordination efforts are also designed
to ensure that our support to our African partners in their efforts to
ultimately defeat Boko Haram is complementary and not duplicative or
counterproductive.
For example, the United States, UK, and France coordinate closely
through the Coordination and Liaison Cell (CCL) to support the African-
led Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), based in N'Djamena, Chad.
Additionally, we continue to work closely with the EU so that its 50
million Euro contribution to the MNJTF is effectively and efficiently
utilized and does not duplicate other donor contributions. We also
coordinate closely with the UN to provide humanitarian support to the
people who have been displaced by Boko Haram's violence.
The United States adheres to a regional strategy to counter Boko
Haram, which supports the individual and joint efforts of each Lake
Chad Basin country. We recognize, however, that Nigeria, Africa's most
populous country and the origin of Boko Haram, fills an especially
critical role in defeating Boko Haram and creating the conditions so
those displaced by the terrorists can safely and voluntarily return to
their homes and begin the arduous task of rebuilding.
Question 2 Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield made an important
statement in support of AFRICOM as some have suggested it be folded
back into EUCOM. Would you further enumerate the value and mechanisms
for improving coherence in U.S. policies and efforts in the region?
Does NEA concur with respect to an independent AFRICOM?
Answer. The Bureau of African Affairs (AF) wholly supports U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) remaining as an independent command. Returning
Africa to being a part-time focus for another geographic command would
only be detrimental. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) fully
concurs.
Although not directly related, military cooperation and assistance
to Africa has grown immensely since AFRICOM's inception in 2007.
African countries' participation in peacekeeping operations has nearly
quadrupled, from over 17,859 to now 68,202 African personnel deployed
on missions. Most of these African soldiers have been trained through a
combination of State and DoD assistance. Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI)/Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
(ACOTA) partnerships have increased from 10 countries to 23. AFRICOM's
role in supporting peacekeeping capacity building is also critical to
the success of African peacekeeping. The National Guard State
Partnership Program (SPP) has grown from five to 12. Today, even more
than in 2007, it is critical to have an independent AFRICOM fully
focused on the African continent.
The Department of State (AF and NEA) and AFRICOM have consequently
increased our interaction and cooperation tremendously since 2007. We
regularly participate in AFRICOM's planning cycle, including their
Africa Strategic Integration Conference, the Strategy to Activities and
Resources Working Group, Posture Planning Conference, and the Planning
Conferences for all major exercises. The Department holds several
weekly video teleconferences with AFRICOM, from the front office down
to the working action officer level. AFRICOM general officers are
regular visitors at our office, and our working staffs are on a first
name basis with their counterparts in Stuttgart.
Question 3 What is the definition of CVE? How does CVE programming
fit within the foreign assistance resourcing network and prioritized
for funding relative to other funding? How is CVE management and
programming nested in the executive branch and what entity leads the
inter-agency effort in coordinating, planning, implementing, and
evaluating CVE programming and why?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy on CVE
defines CVE as ``proactive action to counter efforts by violent
extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence
and to address specific factors that facilitate violent extremist
recruitment and radicalization to violence.'' This includes both
disrupting the tactics used by violent extremists to attract new
recruits and building specific alternatives, narratives, capabilities,
and resiliencies in targeted communities and populations to reduce the
risk of radicalization and recruitment to violence. CVE is a critical
component of our overall counterterrorism strategy and is a priority
for the U.S. Department of State (The Department) and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). CVE programming should complement
larger efforts to promote good governance and the rule of law, respect
for human rights, and sustainable, inclusive development.
To advance the goals outlined in the Department and USAID's CVE
Strategy, CVE Programming focuses on four areas: Research, Prevention,
Intervention, and Rehabilitation & Reintegration.
1. Research: Understanding the drivers of violent extremism at the
global, regional, and local levels, and determining the most
effective interventions to address those drivers including how
to measure and explain programmatic effectiveness;
2. Prevention: Mitigating identified drivers of violent extremism,
including expanding government, civil society, and community
capacity to utilize tools that reduce vulnerability to violent
extremist radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization;
3. Intervention: Countering violent extremist messaging and
recruitment tactics as well as providing positive alternatives,
narratives, and/or ``off-ramps'' for individuals caught in the
cycle of radicalization to violence; and
4. Rehabilitation/Reintegration: Establishing policies and programs to
promote the effective rehabilitation and reintegration of
former violent extremists, including those in prisons.
In FY17, the Department requested $186.7 million for CVE
activities. This level is a $46.2 million increase over FY16, and a
$61.3 million increase over FY15. This funding is requested to
supplement activities in some of the most critical areas where
elevating and expanding efforts is necessary to ensure we are
adequately preventing and countering radicalization. In FY16, the
Department will prioritize CVE efforts to the extent possible within
the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), however CTPF was
appropriated exclusively as Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,
and Related Program (NADR) funding, limiting the Department and USAID's
ability to use CTPF to expand on prevention-related work, particularly
with non-governmental and civil society partners who can be some of the
most credible voices and effective actors to counter Da'esh messaging
and recruitment, and counter support for violent extremism. In FY17,
the Department requested $80 million for CTPF, $59 million of which is
requested as Economic Support Funds (ESF), to foster expanded
engagement with non-law enforcement partners. ESF funding is critical
to addressing our CVE objectives in a comprehensive way.
The 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) states
that the Department of State will work to enhance, refine, and elevate
ongoing CVE efforts, particularly those focused on prevention. Although
there is not a single entity that leads the interagency effort CVE
effort, the Department and USAID closely coordinate with relevant
interagency partners to ensure maximum impact of USG CVE efforts.
Secretary Kerry has directed the Bureau of Counterterrorism and
Countering Violent Extremism (CT) to coordinate and serve as the lead
for the Department of State's CVE work, including serving as a hub for
the Department's CVE policy planning, assistance coordination and
innovation, and external engagement. CT is also responsible for
facilitating strategic coordination with the Global Engagement Center,
USAID's CVE Secretariat and the domestic Interagency CVE Task Force,
currently based at the Department of Homeland Security. These efforts
will complement the bureau's critical ongoing work on other
counterterrorism issues; for example, aviation security, counter
terrorist finance, foreign terrorist fighters, designations and
sanctions.
Question 4. Since 2005, the U.S. government's Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has been the primary U.S.
counterterrorism initiative in northwest Africa and received nearly
$300 million in allocated funds from 2009-2013.
How have these resources been applied and how has the method and
mechanism for them evolved?
Answer. The U.S. government allocated $297 million from fiscal
years 2011 through 2016 for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership Program (TSCTP).
Since 2005, TSCTP resources have been applied to: military
counterterrorism capacity building through Peacekeeping Operations
(PKO) funds; law enforcement and justice sector counterterrorism
capacity building through Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and
Related (NADR) funds, and International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) funds; and CVE programs through Economic Support
Funds (ESF) and Development Assistance (DA). Earlier in the
Partnership, such funds were programmed largely bilaterally with a
significant focus on tactical and operational capacity building for
military and law enforcement. CVE programs were innovative but less
integrated with military and criminal justice sector investments.
Today, TSCTP programs have an increasing focus on building
institutions and the sustainment of capabilities, which has led to more
frequent deployments of advisors and mentors. Through TSCTP we are also
working to build synergies between these ``hard'' investments and the
``soft'' side investments made through CVE programs with civil society
participants. The interagency TSCTP community within the U.S.
government has deliberately evolved program designs to complement the
investments of our European and other international partners also
working in the Maghreb and Sahel regions, rather than simply striving
for de-confliction of programs. Border security coordination and
information sharing is one way the United States has stepped forward,
through TSCTP coordination mechanisms, to lead this work. Additionally,
TSCTP programming seeks to bridge civilian and military divides through
innovative program designs that encourage communication and cooperation
between police, gendarmerie, and military in both training and exercise
scenarios. Finally, the TSCTP programs include a stronger emphasis on
truly regional programming, developing avenues for TSCTP member
countries to train and exercise together, share information, and
develop interoperable capabilities--such as Trilateral Cooperation
training investments between Maghreb and Sahel partners.
Question 5. PREACT, or the Partnership for Regional East Africa
Counterterrorism, is intended to help build the capacity of partner
nations in the region to address the threat of al-Shabaab. A 2014 GAO
report indicated that U.S. agencies had not fully considered and
documented the extent to which partner nations could or would sustain
U.S. training and equipment, negating the effect and value of such
investments.
How has the administration ensured partner commitments and aligned
investments with sustainable outcomes?
How have these resources been applied and how has the method and
mechanism for them evolved?
What is the prospect for a broader Africa regional mechanism?
Answer. In response to the 2014 U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report on the Partnership for Regional East Africa
Counterterrorism (PREACT), the Department of State has improved
documentation showing how key factors such as country needs, absorptive
capacity, sustainment capacity, other U.S. efforts, and international
partners' efforts inform PREACT program decisions. Additionally, in the
last two years, both the Departments of State and Defense have deployed
more advisors and mentors to the field to monitor partner nation
sustainment of training and equipment investments. The Department of
State also funds an external monitoring and evaluation (M&E) firm to
monitor partner nation sustainment of military counterterrorism
assistance supported by PREACT PKO. The monitoring of PKO funds
provides an additional opportunity to validate partner commitments and
the alignment of investments with the desired outcomes.
In mid-2015, the Department of State reinvigorated our coordination
efforts through PREACT to operationalize the administration's
counterterrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE) goals.
Interagency working level and more senior level meetings, occur
regularly, and there is a renewed focus on streamlining processes and
procedures across partners. The Department of State explicitly
coordinates border security and CVE programs among the interagency and
with international partners. The Department of State has also enhanced
its oversight and coordination of these crucial security sector
investments, as recommended by the 2014 GAO reviews of TSCTP and
PREACT, through dedicated staff.
In its management of PREACT, the Department of State relies on
interagency coordination and convenes key U.S. interagency and other
stakeholders on a regular basis to share information, assess progress
toward our objectives, and design complementary program initiatives.
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) also hosts multiple planning events each
year, and the Department of State participates to coordinate U.S.
government security assistance in Africa, including specifically on
counterterrorism. In addition, staff supporting PREACT collect and
disseminate monitoring data, support a web-based information portal,
update and maintain digests and matrices of relevant programming, and
share relevant information both within the interagency and with the
international community. The United States has very close working
relationships with key international partners, in the region as well as
with the UK, France, the EU, Canada, Japan, Germany, Spain, Australia,
African and regional institutions, such as the AU, and international
organizations and UN entities.
A region-specific coordination mechanism like PREACT is necessary
to address the extent of the threat in East and the Horn of Africa,
specifically. The Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs has
the responsibility for managing and overseeing both the PREACT and the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) coordination
mechanisms, which enables a smooth transfer of best practices and
lessons learned across the partnerships without having to merge into a
single, broader coordination mechanism. Maintaining regionally-focused
coordination mechanisms facilitates tailored approaches to specific
threats (e.g., threats posed by al-Shabaab, versus Boko Haram, versus
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, etc.).
Question 6. Is the CVE, and now in the international partner
realm--PVE, effort sufficiently experienced to effectively measure
impact? How important are the non-kinetic military components to CVE/
PVE?
Answer. The importance of developing effective tools for monitoring
and evaluating Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Preventing
Violent Extremism (PVE) programming is widely acknowledged in the
international community. Department of State and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID)'s CVE programs are now designed with
the inclusion of monitoring and evaluation plans. Illustrative CVE
measures of effectiveness include: (1) the knowledge and skills
imparted to CVE practitioners by our CVE training; (2) how those CVE
practitioners used the knowledge and skills they gained in their own
initiatives; and (3) the reach and resonance of CVE messaging on local
populations.
The Department of State's Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering
Violent Extremism (CT) recently launched a comprehensive third-party
evaluation of its CVE programming over the last several years, with a
focus on Indonesia, Kenya, and Bangladesh. The Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations (CSO) developed a monitoring and evaluation
guide for CVE programs. The guide is intended to support embassy staff
and program officers increase monitoring and evaluation standards and
provide better feedback on what is or is not working in CVE
interventions.
The United States government must have a comprehensive approach to
countering violent extremism. The Department of State is focused on a
number of important priorities, including messaging and building
partner capacity. We are working to blunt the violent extremist
recruitment message in order to dissuade individuals or communities
from being attracted to or aligning with violent extremist groups. We
are working with partners to develop interventions that could stop and
reverse a radicalization process. We engage diplomatically to encourage
effective policies governments should adopt to rehabilitate those who
have turned away from violence and terrorism, and to reintegrate them
back into society. Further, U.S. military and host nation security
forces are a critical component of a whole-of-government approach to
countering and preventing violent extremism globally. Security forces
play an integral role in mitigating grievances that are driving
radicalization to violence at the local level. U.S. security forces and
host nation security forces around the world are engaging in a broad
range of non-kinetic military activities that contribute to a better
understanding of violent extremism dynamics, and also activities that
directly counter and prevent radicalization to violence through
intelligence, civil affairs, information operations, and public affairs
components. These types of non-kinetic military missions should be
integrated into national-level and interagency CVE strategies and
coordinated with civilian-led CVE activities.
Question 7. One key aspect of U.S. efforts to address terrorism in
Africa is DOD's Global Train and Equip Program (GTEP), which develops
partner nations' military capabilities for combating terrorist groups.
Last year, countries in Africa got nearly $275 million through GTEP,
but earlier this year GAO raised concerns about DOD's assessments of
partner nation absorptive capacity and long term sustainment plans.
Others have expressed concern that U.S. counterterrorism efforts are
weighted too heavily toward military activities.
What is the appropriate balance of civilian and military efforts to
combat terrorism?
Is this balance being achieved in sub-Saharan Africa?
How will it be achieved if it is not and how will it be sustained
if it is?
Answer. The Departments of State and Defense work closely to
formulate, plan and implement security assistance in Africa. The
Presidential Policy Directive on Security Sector Assistance (PPD-23),
released by the administration in 2013, guides this process. The
directive mandates an inclusive, deliberate, whole-of-government
approach to U.S. security sector assistance, which aligns activities
and resources with our national security priorities. The directive
calls for transparency and coordination across the U.S. government to
develop long-term strategies for security sector assistance, which
build the capacity of our partners in a way that is strategic and
sustainable. Particularly through the coordination mechanisms of the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership
for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), the U.S. government
shares information in the design, assessment, monitoring, and reporting
of both military and civilian security counterterrorism capacity
building programs.
The balance of civilian and military efforts to combat terrorism is
different in each context. At this stage of the fight against Boko
Haram, the support for military efforts is necessarily greater than
civilian security efforts, since Nigerian Federal Police are not
deployed in adequate numbers in Northeast Nigeria to perform
stabilization and security functions.
In another example, in the fight against al-Shabaab, military
counterterrorism efforts are a higher priority in the short-term since
the Federal Government of Somalia has designated the Somali National
Army (SNA) to come in behind African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)
operations to stabilize newly liberated areas. However, in the case of
Somalia, the medium- and long-term aims of police-led community
security, versus security provided and led by the SNA, necessitates
some adjustments to increase resources available for civilian security
programming. The Department of State's programming and planning
reflects this emphasis, responding to a need to develop capable police
forces that will support stability created by AMISOM and the SNA.
More broadly, U.S. departments and agencies supporting civilian
security need additional resources, including additional funding and
staff to manage and oversee the programs. The Department of State
agrees that increased support is needed for police, gendarmerie,
National Guard, and other civilian security providers as well as
increased funding for development and good governance programing to
complement the existing volumes of military assistance.
Question 8. The violence perpetrated by the Ethiopian government
against protesters continues and troubling reports of hundreds of
casualties, torture, and disappearances have raised grave concerns that
the U.S. government is looking the other way. This is in addition to
actions that continue to constrain and punish civil society.
What specific actions has the U.S. government taken to address
these human rights and freedoms of Ethiopians?
What steps has the Ethiopian government taken to improve the
volatile situation?
What is the U.S. government assessment of the likelihood of a
violent uprising in Ethiopia over the next 5 years?
Answer. The Department of State remains concerned about the
situation in Oromia where the Ethiopian government's heavy-handed
response to protests resulted in the death of numerous protestors and
the arrests of many others, including journalists and political party
leaders. As a result we have:
1. Issued three public statements since December 2015 that articulated
our concerns about government and security forces' response to
Oromo protestors, called for meaningful dialogue, and cautioned
against using anti-terrorism laws to unduly silence independent
voices . . . voices we view as critical contributors toward
Ethiopia's growth and development goals.
2. Increased embassy outreach throughout the Ethiopian countryside and
specifically to Oromia to engage local officials and the
community.
3. Commended the recent release of a journalist, but continue to
underscore to Ethiopian government counterparts that for
meaningful dialogue to occur it must protect those rights
enshrined in its constitution, including the rights to freedom
of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly. We remain
steadfast in emphasizing the importance of respect for due
process for those detained by investigating allegations of
mistreatment, publicly presenting the evidence it possesses
against them, and distinguishing between political opposition
to the government and the use of violence. These steps would
contribute positively to building trust and goodwill, and
indicate a shift away from a security-centric response to
protests in the Oromia region.
4. Deepened relationships with government and non-government actors
such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, the Ethiopia
Institution of the Ombudsman, and the Office of the National
Human Rights Action Plan at the Ministry of Justice, among
others, through whom we encourage Ethiopia to hold to account
those who have committed human rights violations.
5. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Assistant Secretary Malinowski traveled to Ethiopia three times
to follow-up on democracy, good governance, and human rights
issues discussed during President Obama's July 2015 visit.
Assistant Secretary Malinowski discussed with counterparts
possible avenues for expanding U.S. assistance in building the
capacity of Ethiopian civil society, including by addressing
some of the elements of Ethiopian law that place an especially
onerous burden on civil society organizations. He has
consistently communicated to the Ethiopian government that a
capable, empowered civil society can and would be an important
ally for a government that prides itself on governance.
6. At the 6th bilateral Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights
Working group, where the U.S. was represented by Ambassador
Haslach and Assistant Secretary Malinowski, the situation in
the Oromia figured prominently along with other issues such as
the important role civil society plays in strengthening good
governance. At the conclusion, the Government of Ethiopia
reaffirmed a commitment to strengthen governance and political
pluralism in keeping with the principles enshrined in its
constitution.
The Prime Minister and other Ethiopian officials have publicly
acknowledged the legitimate grievances of the Oromo people and the need
for accountability. The outbreaks of violence in Oromia are, they
agree, a symptom of these governance failures.
The Government of Ethiopia announced on January 13 it had cancelled
the Addis Ababa Master plan, which was a positive development, but not
a solution in itself to address these complex underlying issues. In his
March 10 address to Parliament, the Prime Minister confirmed that the
problems in Oromia ``are direct results of (government)
unresponsiveness and unemployment.''
We understand the government is investigating instances of
corruption that contributed to the grievances Oromo protestors have
highlighted.
We understand the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission is
investigating the situation in Oromia, and we continue to encourage
officials to be transparent with the findings and to pursue every way
possible to ensure, and also be transparent about, subsequent
accountability.
A democratic, secure, and prosperous Ethiopia is in the best
interest of the country's citizens. In our private and public
engagements with Ethiopian officials we underscore the indelible link
between these goals. To help build long-term peace and stability,
citizens of all countries, including Ethiopia, must be able to freely
participate in political life and discourse. This allows grievances and
ideas to be channeled in a peaceful manner. We thus continue to
encourage Ethiopia to respect the constitutionally-enshrined rights of
its citizens.
While we understand that mass protests in Oromia have largely
abated we continue to encourage the Ethiopian government to take
further steps to rebuild trust with the community and engage in
meaningful dialogue. Only through such dialogue will Ethiopia find its
firmest footing as a nation.
Question 9. Kenya remains subject to considerable threat from Al
Shabaab and despite close collaboration with the international
community, continues to react with considerable violation of human
rights and extra-judicial activities and ill-advised policies in key
minority regions of the country.
What progress has been made by the Kenyan government in improving
their rule of law practice and addressing security force
impunity, if any?
What mechanisms is the U.S. and others prepared to employ to
improve such policies?
Answer. The Kenyan security forces and the Kenyan people are facing
very real and serious threats, some of which are also directed at U.S.
persons and interests in Kenya. As the President has noted, we stand
with Kenya in its fight against terrorism and consistently underscore
that respect for human rights and the rule of law are important
elements in the fight against terror.
We strongly condemn reports of human rights violations by Kenyan
security forces and have consistently urged full investigations of
allegations and accountability for any individuals found responsible.
We take seriously our relevant legal and policy restrictions on the
provision of assistance. Ongoing U.S. training seeks to increase the
professionalism and capacity of partner forces to carry out difficult
jobs effectively while respecting human rights. We are also providing
support for independent police oversight bodies, and assisting internal
and external police accountability mechanisms to improve integrity,
accountability, and transparency in the Kenyan police services.
Trainees and units are screened so that we provide assistance in a
manner consistent with our legal requirements and Department policy,
and training includes modules devoted to respect for human rights and
the rule of law. We have excluded some Kenyan individuals and units
from U.S. government training as a result of concerns about human
rights violations. We continue to review all available information to
protect against the Department of State supporting training and
assistance to units who have committed gross violations of human
rights.
Senior U.S. government officials will continue to raise at the
highest levels of the Kenyan government concerns about human rights
violations by Kenyan security forces. We emphasize that any such
violations are counterproductive, and place receipt of U.S. security
assistance at risk. We stress the need for a sustainable and effective
long-term counterterrorism strategy in Kenya that incorporates
government and civil society perspectives. Moreover, we consistently
urge the Kenyan government to hold those responsible for human rights
violations accountable and engage more constructively with members of
populations at risk of recruitment to violent extremism, including
coastal communities.
Countering the threat of violent extremism requires the full
participation of all members of Kenya's diverse population. Through the
Security Governance Initiative, we are working with the Kenyan
government to enhance police human resources management and the
administration of justice in order to foster greater public confidence
in security institutions, prevent the marginalization of segments of
Kenya's population, remove obstacles hindering effective prosecution,
and allow all citizens access to judicial resources and recourse.
Question 10. Recent reports indicate that the export of religious
education funding from the Middle East/Gulf region to smaller African
countries is proceeding apace.
Is such financing and associated engagement by these donor
countries of concern? Is it accelerating?
What does it mean to see continued export of religious influenced
funding for mosques and madrasas from sects that have
historically supported extreme ideology?
Are Salafist groups still exporting violent jihad to unexpected
locales or are those in common areas of investment having
outsized impact?
Answer. Several countries in the Middle East, and in the Gulf
Region in particular, continue to play an increasingly influential role
in advancing development, security, commercial, and humanitarian
objectives in Africa. This assistance, when coordinated closely with
others in the international donor community, can amplify our collective
efforts to support African governments working toward developing
capacities to deliver critical services to underserved or under-
resourced populations.
Religious education is often a viable alternative to schools that
are out of reach for many African families, both physically and
financially. While it is difficult to say whether external donor
support from the Middle East for religious education in Africa is
accelerating, we are always concerned when our African partners lack
the tools necessary to provide viable education options to those who
seek them and most need them. We continue to engage African countries
on these issues, and work closely with those eager to improve access to
education in their countries.
Many African countries have become increasingly vocal about trends
in radicalization and raised concerns about the perceived propagation
of extremist ideology by certain foreign-funded religious organizations
and training programs. Though most of the outreach conducted by
religious charities and non-governmental organizations in Africa is for
non-violent purposes, there are concerns that a select few of these
entities can be misused by violent extremists, facilitators, and
financiers to support terrorist activity on the continent or elsewhere.
This is one of the reasons we are committed to working with African
governments to develop effective solutions to counter violent extremist
ideology.
The Department of State can provide classified information about
groups seeking to export violent messaging or actions in Africa
separately.
__________
responses to questions for the record submitted
to hon. linda thomas-greenfield by senator cardin
Question 1. A Washington Post story from Monday, May 9 relayed a
troubling story alleging Somalia's National Intelligence and Security
Agency (NISA)--which it says we help to fund--uses children as spies.
Is there any truth to the allegations about NISA's use of child
spies? What have we communicated to the Somalis about this, and what
are we going to do if the practice continues?
Answer. We have no additional information to substantiate the
Washington Post allegations that NISA uses children as spies. The
United States supports the Federal Government of Somalia's National
Program for Disengaged Combatants, which calls for the Somali
government to transfer al-Shabaab defectors under the age of 18 to
UNICEF or UNICEF-affiliated partners.
Following the publication of the Washington Post story, the Prime
Minister of Somalia announced the establishment of a fact-finding
committee to investigate the allegations regarding NISA's use of child
spies. The United States continues to press the Somali government to
adhere to its commitments as a party to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child.
Question 2. As you know, combined Department of State and
Department of Defense funding for security assistance in Africa has
grown from just over $500 million in FY13 to approximately $1 billion
in FY15. At the same time, the amounts available for democracy building
have fallen from $230 million in FY13 to only $170 million in FY15.
Support for democracy and governance and anti-corruption are critical
components of counterterrorism efforts, but these activities are
significantly underfunded. I wrote Secretary Kerry to express my
concern about the imbalance in October of last year.
Will the administration meet the directive in the FY16 Omnibus for
$312 million for democracy and governance activities in Africa?
What specific steps has the administration taken to ensure that we
are complementing our security assistance with democracy and
governance funding in countries with poor human rights and
democracy records?
Answer. We agree that democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG)
programs are an important component of our efforts to support
resilient, open, and democratic societies in Africa and around the
globe. In FY 2016, while the 653(a) allocations fulfill the hard
earmark of $2.3 billion for democracy programs worldwide, we agree that
funding for DRG programs in Africa falls short of meeting some
important needs in this sector for the region. The FY 2016
appropriation and accompanying Statement of Managers (SOM) report
greatly increase the number and amount of country and sectoral funding
directives from previous years and limit the Department's and USAID's
ability to deviate from directed levels in the FY 2016 653(a) report.
Relative to the President's request, the appropriation also
significantly cuts the major accounts that fund DRG programs in Africa.
These factors made it difficult to allocate resources for DRG programs
globally as strategically as possible even as we met the $2.3 billion
hard earmark.
Now that the 653(a) report has been submitted, we are reviewing
options to determine what flexibility we might have to increase support
for DRG in Africa including within the five percent flexibility as well
as potentially through Congressional notification. The Office of U.S.
Foreign Assistance Resources (F) and USAID's Office of Budget Resources
Management (BRM) are working closely with the State and USAID Africa
Bureaus as well as with the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor (State/DRL) and the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/DCHA) to ensure that DRG resources
globally reflect the most strategic allocation possible within funding
constraints, including by looking to address priority DRG funding
shortfalls in Africa by shifting current and prior-year funds to meet
the most critical gaps.
We recognize that human rights sensitive security assistance and
core democracy, human rights, and governance programming in the region
are essential to progress in Africa. Democracy, human rights, and
governance (DRG) are fundamental objectives in and of themselves: a
lack of democratic governance creates an enabling environment for
instability, violent extremism, and humanitarian crises, which often
are a result of corruption, poor governance, and weak or nonexistent
democratic institutions. The U.S. government also recognizes the
importance of DRG to achieving and sustaining global development goals,
as well as key U.S. foreign policy objectives.
While the President's request in recent years has included
increasing support for DRG programs in Africa, in the past, annual
appropriations bills have reduced funding for the key foreign
assistance accounts that support DRG programs, which has made it
difficult to fully fund DRG programs included within the President's
Request, including DRG programs in Africa.
The FY 2017 foreign assistance request includes $343.2 million for
DRG programs in Africa and presents the opportunity to partially
reverse this trend by supporting peaceful transitions of power, reform
efforts, and civil society engagement. There is a critical link between
DRG programs and security sector assistance within Africa. Many of our
security assistance accounts also fund activities that touch on rule of
law and human rights concerns. This does not replace the need for core
DRG funding, but it is important to note that some of our security
assistance contributes to DRG objectives.
Question 3. A number of our counterterrorism partners in Africa
have been criticized for failing to adequately and transparently hold
security forces accountable for alleged abuses against civilians. For
example, Amnesty International has alleged that the Nigerian military
killed 350 people in Zaria in December, and buried the bodies in mass
graves to conceal evidence. The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in Kenya has
also been accused of extrajudicial killings of youth and alleged terror
suspects. I have introduced a resolution calling for the Ethiopian
government to investigate the recent killings of unarmed protesters in
Oromia and elsewhere in Ethiopia.
What diplomatic efforts and programmatic support is the U.S.
providing to the military and civilian justice institutions of
our counterterrorism partners to ensure they have the capacity
to hold perpetrators accountable? Are Title 10 funds available
for these types of activities in Africa?
President Buhari stated that he would leave no stone unturned to
deal with all cases of human rights abuses. What efforts has
the Nigerian government made to investigate or try abuses under
either his administration or that of his predecessor?
Has the Ethiopian government committed to investigate alleged
killings and other abuses associated with the recent crackdown
in response to protests in Oromia and similar abuses in other
parts of the country against civil society, journalists and
others? What has been our response to these abuses?
Answer. The Department strongly condemns human rights abuses by any
security forces and has consistently urged full investigations of
allegations and accountability for individuals found responsible. We
take seriously our responsibility to withhold or condition our
assistance in light of applicable legal requirements and ethical
principles. Ongoing U.S. training seeks to increase the professionalism
and capacity of partner militaries and law enforcement to carry out
difficult jobs effectively while respecting human rights. Trainees and
units are screened in accordance with the Leahy law, and all training
includes modules devoted to respect for human rights and the rule of
law. In several countries, we have excluded individuals and units from
U.S. government training as a result of concerns about human rights
abuses. We continue to review all available information to avoid
providing training and assistance to units who have committed gross
violation of human rights.
Senior U.S. government officials raise with partner governments at
the highest levels our concerns about human rights violations by
security forces. The Department emphasizes that any such violations are
wrong, counterproductive, and place elements of U.S. security
assistance at risk. Moreover, we consistently urge our partners at the
executive and ministerial levels, as well as with security force
commanders, to bring those responsible for human rights violations to
justice and engage more constructively with members of populations at
risk of recruitment to violent extremism. Our diplomatic engagements
continue to forge a common understanding of how and why we continue to
uphold our firm and resolute policy to not support individuals or units
that have been implicated in gross violations of human rights.
The White House Security Governance Initiative (SGI) is an
important tool for us to dedicate diplomatic engagement and programming
resources to strengthen the institutions that govern the security
sector. For instance, we are working with the Government of Kenya to
strengthen the justice system by improving access to justice and
efficiency of the case management, and the police human resource
management system by improving internal and external police mechanisms
that address integrity, accountability, and transparency. In Niger, we
are supporting the government to align resources with strategic
security priorities, improve human, material, and financial resource
management, and more effectively communicate its security and defense
policy to the public. In Mali, we are collaborating with officials in
Bamako to improve inter-ministerial coordination across the security
sector, to enhance both the Ministry of Defense and the National Police
efforts to improve recruitment and human resource management, and
position Ministry of Justice human capital to implement their justice
reform strategy. We are in the process of launching SGI partnerships in
Nigeria, Ghana, and Tunisia. These and other program interventions
across the continent align our policy messages with our program
dollars. SGI and complementary programming through other accounts
support institutional development that will generate and sustain
security forces that conduct their work in accordance with rule of law
and respectful of human rights.
The USAFRICOM Office of Legal Counsel conducts Legal Engagement
programming on rule of law and human rights; this includes strategic
communications as well as work with African economic and security
organizations and military-to-military contacts. In addition, the
Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) provides
training, seminars, and exchanges to help build this capacity in our
international partners, to include numerous African countries. Kenya's
Anti-terrorism Police Unit, or the ATPU, is not eligible for Title 10
funds. The Department of State has supported particular elements within
the ATPU through the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program on crisis
response, investigations, and related topics. Each ATA course and
consultation includes human rights modules that emphasize the
importance of conducting policing in a rule of law framework.
We consistently urge the Nigerian government to take all reports of
human rights allegations seriously and investigate them thoroughly. We
stress the importance of respecting human rights and protecting
civilians in all security responses. During his May 2016 visit to
Nigeria, Deputy Secretary Blinken said, ``[Respecting human rights] is
the right thing to do, but it is also the smart thing to do . . .
because ignoring the human rights of citizens risks turning them to
extremism and fueling the very fire that we seek to extinguish
together.'' We regularly raise our concerns with the Nigerian
government about its response to the threat of violent extremism
throughout the country, including its detention policy and practices,
which various NGOs and international experts assert violate
international law. We also discuss related issues with civil society
organizations.
The Nigerian military should provide for disciplined military
operations in accordance with clear rules of engagement and
international law, humane treatment of all detainees, continued and
expanded access for the independent monitoring of all detention
facilities, and accountability for all perpetrators of unlawful
violence and timely justice for victims and their families. In his May
2015 inauguration speech, President Buhari called for overhauling ``the
rules of engagement to avoid human rights' violations in [military]
operations'' and improving ``operational and legal mechanisms so that
disciplinary steps are taken against proven human right violations by
the Armed Forces.''
Last summer, in recognition of the need for enhanced accountability
in the military, President Buhari appointed new leadership for the
military. And in a further effort to improve the protection of
civilians and the overall fight against Boko Haram, President Buhari
moved the command and control center of the military from Abuja to
Maiduguri, the epicenter of the conflict in northeastern Nigeria.
In March 2016, the Nigerian Army, working together with civil
society organizations, created human rights offices that will
strengthen the Army's capacity to protect human rights. The Nigerian
Defense Headquarters also inaugurated a Defense Advisory Committee on
Human Rights to monitor and investigate allegations of human rights
abuses within the military.
In addition, since December 2015, at least six separate
investigations of the Zaria incident are underway by the Nigerian
Senate and House of Representatives, the National Human Rights
Commission, and the Judicial Commission of Inquiry established by
Kaduna State, among others. We continue to urge those carrying out
investigations to do so credibly, swiftly, thoroughly, and with
impartiality.
The Department issued a statement on April 29 expressing concern
over the Government of Ethiopia's decision to file terrorism charges
against Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) First Vice-Chairman Bekele
Gerba and others in the Oromia. The statement also noted that the
government has not yet held accountable any security forces responsible
for alleged abuses. This latest statement was preceded by three
statements issued since December 2015 that articulated our concerns
about government and security forces' response to Oromo protestors and
called for meaningful dialogue . . . to include independent voices. Our
Embassy has increased outreach throughout the Ethiopian countryside and
specifically to Oromia to engage local officials and the community.
The Department understands the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission is
investigating the protests in Oromia. We also understand the government
is investigating instances of corruption that contributed to the
grievances Oromo protestors have highlighted. We continue to encourage
officials to be transparent with the findings and also be transparent
about subsequent accountability. We remain concerned about the
situation in Oromia where the government's heavy-handed response to
protests resulted in the death of numerous protestors and the arrests
of many others, including journalists and political party leaders. We
underscore to Ethiopian government counterparts that in order for
meaningful dialogue to occur, they must protect the rights enshrined in
its constitution, including the rights to freedom of expression and to
freedom of peaceful assembly. We remain steadfast in emphasizing the
importance of respect for due process for those detained by
investigating allegations of mistreatment, publicly presenting the
evidence it possesses against them, and distinguishing between
political opposition to the government and the use of violence. These
steps would contribute positively to building trust and goodwill and
indicate a shift away from a security-centric response to protests in
the Oromia region.
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Assistant Secretary Malinowski traveled to Ethiopia three times to
follow-up on democracy, good governance, and human rights issues
discussed during President Obama's July 2015 visit. A/S Malinowski has
discussed with counterparts possible avenues for expanding U.S.
assistance in building the capacity of Ethiopian civil society,
including by addressing some of the elements of Ethiopian law that
place an especially onerous burden on civil society organizations. He
has consistently communicated to the Ethiopian government that a
capable, empowered civil society can and would be an important ally for
a government that prides itself on governance. At the 6th bilateral
Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights Working group, attended by
Ambassador Haslach and Assistant Secretary Malinowski, the situation in
the Oromia figured prominently along with other issues such as the
important role civil society plays in strengthening good governance. At
the conclusion, the government of Ethiopia reaffirmed a commitment to
strengthen governance and political pluralism in keeping with the
principles enshrined in its constitution.
We continue to work with our African partners to develop and
implement sustainable, effective, long-term counterterrorism strategies
that incorporate government and civil society perspectives.
Question 4. USAID has indicated that endemic corruption is one of
the so called ``push factors'' that favors the spread of violent
extremism. Sarah Chayes, of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, contends that corruption can be a significant factor in
increasing violent extremism. There appears to be political will in
Nigeria starting with President Buhari to root out government
corruption.
What is the administration doing to support the Nigerian government
in this effort? How are we engaging at the local level where
state governments appear to have political will, especially
those in the northeast affected by Boko Haram?
How is the administration building anti-corruption principles into
its security sector activities in Nigeria?
How can we be assured that Buhari's anti-corruption activities are
focused on institutional reforms?
Answer. The Buhari administration has made a promising start in its
ambitious goal of rolling back corruption in Nigeria. Actions to date
include several high-profile prosecutions of former senior officials,
including a former Minister of Defense, a former National Security
Advisor, and a former Minister of Petroleum. The prospect of the
successful prosecution of high-ranking government officials for
corruption, which Nigeria has never seen, is sending a strong signal.
The government has initiated a number of corruption investigations
through the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and taken
serious steps to limit opportunities for graft in the government.
U.S. anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria focus on capacity building
assistance to civil society watchdogs, journalists, law enforcement
agencies, and the judicial sector. The United States supports work by
the EFCC and the judiciary to investigate and prosecute complex
corruption cases. These efforts are designed to partner with Nigeria in
preventing, exposing, investigating, and prosecuting acts of
corruption, and to pursue the recovery of stolen assets. We
consistently urge the Nigerian government to pursue investigations in a
non-partisan manner.
Other promising anti-corruption steps taken by the Government of
Nigeria under the Buhari administration include the establishment of
the Treasury Single Account, which has prevented leakages by increasing
oversight of all agencies spending by consolidating agency receipts
into a unified account for audit and tracking purposes; efforts to
reform the state oil company and the EFCC; and enhanced implementation
of the law on asset declaration by senior officials.
The key to fighting corruption in Nigeria is institutionalizing a
culture of accountability, which means enhancing transparency and
accountability mechanisms across government institutions. We will
continue to partner with Nigeria to ensure that the country continues
along this path of pursuing institutional reforms. The Government of
Nigeria has indicated that it will prioritize improving public
financial management, broadening the tax base to protect the economy
from future oil price shocks, and enhancing debt management systems in
light of expected new borrowing. We are prepared to offer technical
assistance to support this agenda through the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance (OTA), pending a formal
request from the Minister of Finance. Additionally, we welcome
Nigeria's decision to join the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a
global community of like-minded states working together to strengthen
transparency, accountability, and good governance to deliver better
government services to citizens. We stand ready to assist the
Government of Nigeria with its development of its OGP National Action
Plan.
We are encouraging Nigeria to join the Partnership on Illicit
Finance, which aims to build governments' capacity to identify and
prevent illicit financial activity, including that which is linked to
corruption. We are also committed to leading by example on anti-
corruption efforts, including through the U.S. domestic transparency
agenda, the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
cooperation on stolen asset recovery, and use of visa authorities to
deny corrupt officials entry to the United States.
We intend to look for ways to continue efforts to recover stolen
Nigerian assets within U.S. jurisdiction, and have sent experts to
consult with the Government of Nigeria on the formulation of requests
for legal assistance. Nigeria will also be one of the beneficiary
countries of the inaugural Global Forum on Asset Recovery, which the
U.S. will co-host next year with the UK.
Pending Congressional Notification of funds (CN 16-098), we also
plan to work with the United Nations to specifically address corruption
as a driver of violent extremism in the Sahel and West Africa,
including in Nigeria. This includes addressing corruption's role in
resilience, border security, and the damaging effects on countries'
security sectors. At the state and local level, USAID supports
initiatives promoting responsive governance, including governance
programs in Sokoto and Bauchi states, enhanced credibility for
elections, and increased capacity for civic engagement. USAID also
builds capacity in key government agencies to strengthen fiscal
responsibilities and improve transparency.
Through President Obama's Security Governance Initiative (SGI), we
are partnering with the Government of Nigeria to enhance the management
of security and justice services, including in northeast Nigeria.
Proposed areas of focus include improving the Ministry of Interior's
nationwide emergency response planning and coordination capability;
enhancing the Ministry of Defense's materiel needs identification,
procurement, and acquisitions procedures and processes; and assisting
planning for civilian security in northeastern Nigeria.
Over the past two years, a multi-year multi-million dollar grant
funded by the State Department has enhanced civil society's capacity to
partner with government agencies and businesses to fight graft in the
security and judicial sectors. This project includes developing new
technologies for citizen corruption-busters, and is helping Nigeria
adhere to the principles of the Open Government Partnership, a global
community of like-minded states working together to strengthen
transparency, accountability, and good governance to deliver better
government services to citizens. As a result of this project, a U.S.-
supported crowd-sourced platform allows citizens to anonymously report
corruption within the police, and the National Police force decided in
the fall of 2015 to expand this platform nationwide in cooperation with
civil society.
Question 5. Four Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
countries--Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso--have experienced
military coups or attempted coups while participating in the program.
Mali was a significant recipient of military aid under TSCTP prior to
its 2012 military coup. Since then, Mali's military has displayed
severe capacity shortfalls and elements of the security forces have
been accused of serious human rights abuses.
What progress has been made through TSCTP in building partner
capacity in each of the aforementioned countries?
Do you assess that TSCTP countries are better able to effectively
combat terrorism and manage border security as a result of
their participation in TSCTP?
Answer. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has
focused on countries that are among the poorest in the world and have
had significant capacity gaps, but most of these partners have
demonstrated significant improvements in key areas and increased
political will to work individually and regionally to address terrorism
and violent extremism challenges emanating from the Lake Chad Basin
region, Libya, and Mali. TSCTP engagements in Niger, Mauritania, and
Burkina Faso significantly contributed to their abilities to more
effectively address terrorism and violent extremism threats. We have
also witnessed increased commitments by partner countries to the more
holistic whole-of-government CT and CVE approaches promoted by TSCTP.
Terrorist organizations no longer hold large sections of territory or
population centers. They cannot conduct major military-style campaigns
and have reverted to their more traditional asymmetric style of
warfare. The capacity that the U.S. has patiently built over 16 years
has figured prominently in this counterterrorism success. Specifically:
Mali: Despite long term challenges, Mali has displayed a
willingness to work with the United States and allies such as France
and the European Union to address shortfalls in CT capacity. The
international community must stay engaged with Mali over the long-term
to promote increased stability and resilience in the face of multiple
terrorism threats. Following the 2012 coup and the subsequent French
and African intervention to roll back terrorist territorial gains in
northern Mali, TSCTP partner countries Niger and Chad have played
critical roles in assisting French and Malian forces to contain and
degrade the terrorist threat. TSCTP was active in Mali before the 2012
coup, but its current engagements are relatively modest and no longer
focus on building tactical unit-level security sector capacity. In
coordination with the President's Security Governance Initiative (SGI),
TSCTP is focused on institution building including in the security
sector, as well as focused CVE and law enforcement programs.
Niger: President Issoufou's government has demonstrated strong
political will to sustain CT and CVE efforts and Nigerien security
forces, both military and law enforcement, have responded well to
engagement with the United States. Niger actively patrols the
trafficking routes in northern Mali and along the Libyan border. Niger
is a key member of the counter-Boko Haram Multinational Joint Task
Force (MNJTF). TSCTP has historically invested heavily in support of
Niger's border security units, and Niger's relatively strong
performance in the Lake Chad region and along the Libya and Mali
borders is reflective of that support. Recognizing that Niger does not
have adequate forces to sustain efforts to counter threats along three
separate fronts, TSCTP is currently supporting Niger's basic training
school. It also supports focused programs logistics, command and
control, military intelligence and casualty evacuation.
Mauritania: Mauritania has also been a committed and effective CT
partner. TSCTP created effective ground and air forces to counter
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) operating out of northern Mali.
Responding to terrorist threats in northern Mali before and immediately
after Mali's 2012 coup, U.S.-trained and equipped Mauritanian ground
forces used U.S.-supplied Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) equipment, reinforced with their own light attack
aircraft, to defeat VEOs. Since then, the VEO threat to Mauritania has
greatly diminished with no recent attacks. TSCTP is currently focused
on working with Mauritania to sustain the range of projects launched
during the last several years in strong cooperation with our Allies,
France and Morocco.
Burkina Faso: Burkina Faso had not faced a significant VEO threat
until the hotel bombing in Ouagadougou this year. The Department is
formulating a strategy to assist partners like Burkina Faso facing
asymmetric threats. TSCTP has focused on Burkina Faso's border security
in the past and National Defense Authorization Act Section 2282 funds
may build on that effort. Burkina Faso has been a solid partner with
the United States, permitting the long-term stationing of up to six
United States aircraft in Ouagadougou that perform light
transportation, casualty evacuation, and ISR missions throughout the
region.
Question 6. The Kenyan government has indicated that it plans to
close the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, which collectively provide
sanctuary for approximately 600,000 people.
What have we discussed with the Kenyan government about the
implications of closing the camps? When will the closures take
place and what will happen to the hundreds of thousands of
inhabitants?
What will happen to refugees that are not living in the camps? Will
they be expelled? Is it true that Kenya will no longer allow
refugees into the country?
Answer. We are deeply concerned by the Government of Kenya's
announcement of plans to close refugee camps in Kenya, dismantle the
Department of Refugee Affairs, and compel the repatriation of hundreds
of thousands of refugees who have sought international protection in
Kenya. We deeply appreciate the hospitality and commitment that Kenya
has shown over decades of hosting refugees. In high-level engagements
in Washington and Nairobi, including a call between Secretary Kerry and
President Kenyatta, we continue to urge Kenya to maintain its global
leadership role on refugees consistent with its international
obligations. These obligations must be upheld.
Following their initial announcement, the Government of Kenya has
said that they do not intend to close the Kakuma refugee camp. We also
have no indication that refugees outside of the Dadaab camp complex are
to be targeted at this point in time. Kenya has not explicitly said how
it will deal with new asylum-seekers; however, it has said that Somalis
will no longer have prima facie status, implying that new arrivals
would be screened for refugee status.
Kenya's plans to close the Dadaab refugee camp complex by the end
of 2016 and repatriate refugees could put returnees in danger, given
the ongoing conflict in Somalia. We have warned the Government of Kenya
that the disruption, displacement, and hardship caused by closing the
camps could well make thousands of displaced, unemployed, and homeless
people vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups to the
detriment of Kenya's security.
We have informed Kenyan officials that we as donors will not fund
or otherwise support involuntary repatriation of refugees in
contravention to international refugee law and Kenya's obligations. We
strongly support the voluntary return of refugees safely and with
dignity, when and where conditions are appropriate in their countries
of origin, including in Somalia.
We have encouraged Kenya to continue to work with the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Federal Government of
Somalia under the terms of the 2013 Tripartite Agreement on the
voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya as conditions
allow. We have reiterated that we remain committed to working with
Kenya and international partners to find durable solutions for
refugees, including voluntary returns in a matter that upholds
international refugee law and respects humanitarian standards. The
United States has provided hundreds of millions of dollars to help
Kenya host refugees and has resettled more refugees coming from Kenya
than any other country.
We will continue to urge the Kenyan government to uphold its
international obligations while exploring new approaches and
partnerships to ensure shared global responsibility for supporting
refugees and host communities in Kenya and other refugee-hosting
countries.
__________
responses to questions for the record submitted
to hon. linda etim by senator cardin
Question 1. As you know, combined Department of State and
Department of Defense funding for security assistance in Africa has
grown from just over $500 million in FY13 to approximately $1 billion
in FY15. At the same time, the amounts available for democracy building
have fallen from $230 million in FY13 to only $170 million in FY15.
Support for democracy and governance and anti-corruption are critical
components of counterterrorism efforts, but these activities are
significantly underfunded. I wrote Secretary Kerry to express my
concern about the imbalance in October of last year. Will the
administration meet the directive in the FY16 Omnibus for $312 million
for democracy and governance activities in Africa? What specific steps
has the administration taken to ensure that we are complementing our
security assistance with democracy and governance funding in countries
with poor human rights and democracy records?
Answer. The administration's FY 2016 653(a) allocations fulfill the
overall directive level of $2.3 billion for democracy programs
worldwide, however, due to other global constraints in the foreign
assistance budget, funding for DRG programs in Africa currently falls
short of the level in the FY 2016 Omnibus. The FY 2016 appropriation
and accompanying Statement of Managers report increase the number and
amount of country and sectoral funding directives from previous years
and limit USAID's ability to deviate from directed levels in the FY
2016 653(a) report. Relative to the President's request, the
appropriation also significantly cuts the major accounts that fund DRG
programs in Africa. These factors made it difficult to allocate
resources for DRG programs to conform to the Statement of Managers.
Now that the 653(a) report has been submitted, we are reviewing
options to determine what flexibility we might have to increase support
for DRG in Africa including within the 5 percent flexibility provided
by the FY 2016 Omnibus as well as potentially through the
identification of prior year funds. The Office of U.S. Foreign
Assistance Resources and USAID's Office of Budget Resources Management
are working closely with the State Department and USAID Africa Bureaus
as well as with the State Department's Bureau for Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor and USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarian Assistance to ensure that DRG resources globally reflect
the most strategic allocation possible within funding constraints,
including by looking to address priority DRG funding shortfalls in
Africa through shifting current and prior year funds to meet the most
critical gaps.
In all countries including those challenged by crises, insecurity
or closing political space, USAID plans carefully with interagency
partners to ensure that development interventions complement and
reinforce diplomatic and security activities to advance U.S. foreign
policy objectives. Regular country team meetings convened by the
Embassy are one venue in which such information can be shared. On
particular issues of broad interest, such as elections or ongoing
conflict or humanitarian situations, more frequent working-level
meetings are convened to discuss the complementarity of various
agencies' efforts. Particularly in countries with poor human rights and
democracy records, development assistance may play a critical role in
helping to strengthen accountability and responsiveness, ensure checks
and balances, and facilitate credible and peaceful elections, thereby
reducing the potential for further backsliding and instability. With
the DRG funding available, USAID's planning in such countries considers
several factors such as the willingness of the host government to
permit programs to operate and the likelihood of programs to have an
impact.
Question 2. USAID has indicated that endemic corruption is one of
the so called ``push factors'' that favors the spread of violent
extremism. Sarah Chayes, of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, contends that corruption can be a significant factor in
increasing violent extremism. There appears to be political will in
Nigeria starting with President Buhari to root out government
corruption.What is the administration doing to support the Nigerian
government in this effort? How are we engaging at the local level where
state governments appear to have political will, especially those in
the northeast affected by Boko Haram? How can we be assured that
Buhari's anti-corruption activities are focused on institutional
reforms?
Answer. USAID's Nigeria portfolio supports President Buhari's anti-
corruption agenda by focusing on increasing the supply and demand for
transparency and accountability, and on supporting free and fair
elections, which have become a battleground to control resources. These
programmatic choices were made based on a 2013 USAID analysis of the
state of Nigeria's democracy and governance, which identified multiple
forms of corruption as key problems, and further pinpointed two key
avenues through which corruption takes hold. The first is the role of
state and local governments which control the majority of resources and
foster broad-based corruption. The second is the competition for
elected positions to control patronage systems in Nigeria. With this in
mind, USAID designed a portfolio of programs that promote citizen
responsive governance at state and local levels, enhance the
credibility of elections, and increase capacity for civil society-
government engagement. The success of our programs in contributing to
long-term reform will depend upon the actions of the Nigerian
government and especially President Buhari's own administration. Time
will tell if President Buhari is truly committed and able to implement
institutional reforms to fight corruption.
Since 2009, USAID's seven-year, $45 million Leadership,
Empowerment, Advocacy and Development project has been building the
capacity of local and state governments to assume greater
responsibility in addressing the demands of their constituents. The
project works with local and state governments in Sokoto, Bauchi and
Rivers States to improve service delivery in health, education, and
water and sanitation. It promotes citizen participation in government
decision-making processes to ensure and maintain greater transparency.
The project also assists state and local government units to delegate
authority for local decision-making and to regularize mechanisms for
citizen participation.
In addition, USAID aims to strengthen civil society's ability to
influence the development and implementation of key democratic reforms
at the national, state, and local levels. Stakeholder consultations
identified transparency, increased participation of vulnerable groups,
and accountability of state actors as critical components of progress.
The five-year, $19.2 million Strengthening Advocacy and Civic
Engagement project addresses these gaps and supports government reforms
to reduce corruption. The program began in January 2014, and is co-
funded by USAID ($16.7m) and Partnership in the Niger Delta ($2.5m).
USAID supports the northeastern state governments of Yobe, Adamawa
and Borno to decrease the perception of marginalization of the
communities in the northeast by working closely to deliver basic
services in key areas--water, schools, local government offices, and
basic infrastructure that visibly demonstrate the redeployment of
public administration. USAID also works to increase engagement between
the communities and the government in order to build trust--such as
hosting community meetings, discussions, inauguration events of public
infrastructure, and other activities.
Question 3. Measuring effectiveness: We've pushed our development
agencies very hard over the last 15 years to measure and prove the
Return on Investment to the American taxpayer of every aid dollar in
development, which helped spearhead new efficiencies and innovations.
USAID's implementers now have sophisticated program design, measurement
and impact processes. How are we leveraging best practices in M&E from
the development side of our foreign assistance into the governance and
CVE spaces?
Answer. USAID plans and implements programs designed to improve the
development status of the people in the selected countries and regions
around the world in which we work. In order to achieve these
development results and to ensure accountability for taxpayer
resources, we strive to continuously learn and refine our programmatic
approaches. USAID's program performance, monitoring and evaluation
policies apply to our programs in democracy, human rights and
governance (DRG) and countering violent extremism (CVE) as they do to
all other development sectors.
USAID's 2013 DRG Strategy reaffirmed USAID's commitment to
generate, analyze, and disseminate rigorous, systematic and publicly
accessible evidence in all aspects of DRG policy, strategy and program
development, implementation and evaluation. To realize this commitment,
USAID has developed a DRG Learning Agenda, created a significant
portfolio of impact evaluations and other research, and set about
organizing and disseminating research findings. Formulated through a
consultative process, the DRG Learning Agenda for 2016 is comprised of
12 research questions in priority DRG development areas for which USAID
intends to organize and disseminate existing data, generate new
evidence, and produce recommendations through academic research,
program and impact evaluations, and multi-method tests of the theories
of change that guide DRG programming.
USAID has also pioneered impact evaluation in the DRG sector
through a combination of co-financing, development of impact evaluation
procurement mechanisms, and through DRG Center-hosted impact evaluation
clinics. To date, USAID has completed eight impact evaluations in the
DRG sector, has eight impact evaluations ongoing, and 16 impact
evaluations in design.
In addition to impact evaluations, USAID has provided technical
assistance to field missions around the world for 22 performance
evaluations, five high-quality public opinion surveys, and 13 original
research grants. Completed evaluations and other DRG research helps
test and validate DRG assumptions and theories of change, and refine
DRG programmatic approaches. DRG research, including technical
publications, assessments, best practices, and lessons learned
documents is available on USAID's website at https://www.usaid.gov/
node/33416.
The use of development tools in preventing violent extremism is
most effective when performed in line with other measures to counter
violent extremism, and when seamlessly integrated into existing
poverty-alleviation and good governance programs funded by USAID. In
the design of USAID's CVE programs, we first conduct an assessment to
determine which push and pull factors increase vulnerability to violent
extremism recruitment in local contexts. USAID designs CVE programs to
address vulnerabilities identified during the assessment. For example,
drivers of violent extremism might be the marginalization of certain
ethnic or religious minorities, a personal experience of injustice
perpetrated by the state, or a lack of avenues for youth to positively
engage in society. We develop metrics to measure the effectiveness of
lessening the identified drivers of extremism. This could be in the
form of perception surveys that probe the population's trust in formal
government, for example, or identify the number of youth choosing to
engage in legal economic activity. USAID also periodically commissions
national public opinion surveys in African countries affected by
conflict, independent of specific programs, to gauge the likelihood of
backsliding into conflict.
We have invested significant resources to monitor and evaluate CVE
programming, gathering both quantitative and qualitative data. For
example, lessons learned from evaluations of CVE programming in West
and East Africa have been used to inform more effective approaches to
CVE. Additionally, USAID programming builds the skills of local
partners through training in monitoring and evaluation and data
collection, and supports local institutions to undertake independent
research and evaluation. In addition, many CVE programs call for
periodic assessments to gather data for use in monitoring and
evaluation.
Taken together, these predictive and diagnostic tools provide a
strong foundation upon which recommendations might be based for
development priorities in the countries that face steep challenges with
fragility and risk of violent extremism today, as well as those that
may face those challenges in the future.
__________
responses to questions for the record submitted
to justin siberell by senator cardin
Question 1. A number of our counterterrorism partners in Africa
have been criticized for failing to adequately and transparently hold
security forces accountable for alleged abuses against civilians. For
example, Amnesty International has alleged that the Nigerian military
killed 350 people in Zaria in December, and buried the bodies in mass
graves to conceal evidence. The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in Kenya has
also been accused of extrajudicial killings of youth and alleged terror
suspects. I have introduced a resolution calling for the Ethiopian
government to investigate the recent killings of unarmed protesters in
Oromia and elsewhere in Ethiopia.
What diplomatic efforts and programmatic support is the U.S.
providing to the military and civilian justice institutions of
our counterterrorism partners to ensure they have the capacity
to hold perpetrators accountable? Are Title 10 funds available
for these types of activities in Africa?
President Buhari stated that he would leave no stone unturned to
deal with all cases of human rights abuses. What efforts has
the Nigerian government made to investigate or try abuses under
either his administration or that of his predecessor?
Has the Ethiopian government committed to investigate alleged
killings and other abuses associated with the recent crackdown
in response to protests in Oromia and similar abuses in other
parts of the country against civil society, journalists and
others? What has been our response to these abuses?
Answer. The Department strongly condemns human rights abuses by any
security forces and has consistently urged full investigations of
allegations and accountability for individuals found responsible. We
take seriously our responsibility to withhold or condition our
assistance in light of applicable legal requirements and ethical
principles. Ongoing U.S. training seeks to increase the professionalism
and capacity of partner militaries and law enforcement to carry out
difficult jobs effectively while respecting human rights. Trainees and
units are screened in accordance with the Leahy law, and all training
includes modules devoted to respect for human rights and the rule of
law. In several countries, we have excluded individuals and units from
U.S. government training as a result of concerns about human rights
abuses. We continue to review all available information to avoid
providing training and assistance to units who have committed gross
violation of human rights.
Senior U.S. government officials raise with partner governments at
the highest levels our concerns about human rights violations by
security forces. The Department emphasizes that any such violations are
wrong, counterproductive, and place elements of U.S. security
assistance at risk. Moreover, we consistently urge our partners at the
executive and ministerial levels, as well as with security force
commanders, to bring those responsible for human rights violations to
justice and engage more constructively with members of populations at
risk of recruitment to violent extremism. Our diplomatic engagements
continue to forge a common understanding of how and why we continue to
uphold our firm and resolute policy to not support individuals or units
that have been implicated in gross violations of human rights.
The White House Security Governance Initiative (SGI) is an
important tool for us to dedicate diplomatic engagement and programming
resources to strengthen the institutions that govern the security
sector. For instance, we are working with the Government of Kenya to
strengthen the justice system by improving access to justice and
efficiency of the case management, and the police human resource
management system by improving internal and external police mechanisms
that address integrity, accountability, and transparency. In Niger, we
are supporting the government to align resources with strategic
security priorities, improve human, material, and financial resource
management, and more effectively communicate its security and defense
policy to the public. In Mali, we are collaborating with officials in
Bamako to improve inter-ministerial coordination across the security
sector, to enhance both the Ministry of Defense and the National Police
efforts to improve recruitment and human resource management, and
position Ministry of Justice human capital to implement their justice
reform strategy. We are in the process of launching SGI partnerships in
Nigeria, Ghana, and Tunisia. These and other program interventions
across the continent align our policy messages with our program
dollars. SGI and complementary programming through other accounts
support institutional development that will generate and sustain
security forces that conduct their work in accordance with rule of law
and respectful of human rights.
The USAFRICOM Office of Legal Counsel conducts Legal Engagement
programming on rule of law and human rights; this includes strategic
communications as well as work with African economic and security
organizations and military-to-military contacts. In addition, the
Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) provides
training, seminars, and exchanges to help build this capacity in our
international partners, to include numerous African countries. Kenya's
Anti-terrorism Police Unit, or the ATPU, is not eligible for Title 10
funds. The Department of State has supported particular elements within
the ATPU through the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program on crisis
response, investigations, and related topics. Each ATA course and
consultation includes human rights modules that emphasize the
importance of conducting policing in a rule of law framework.
We consistently urge the Nigerian government to take all reports of
human rights allegations seriously and investigate them thoroughly. We
stress the importance of respecting human rights and protecting
civilians in all security responses. During his May 2016 visit to
Nigeria, Deputy Secretary Blinken said, ``[Respecting human rights] is
the right thing to do, but it is also the smart thing to do . . .
because ignoring the human rights of citizens risks turning them to
extremism and fueling the very fire that we seek to extinguish
together.'' We regularly raise our concerns with the Nigerian
government about its response to the threat of violent extremism
throughout the country, including its detention policy and practices,
which various NGOs and international experts assert violate
international law. We also discuss related issues with civil society
organizations.
The Nigerian military should provide for disciplined military
operations in accordance with clear rules of engagement and
international law, humane treatment of all detainees, continued and
expanded access for the independent monitoring of all detention
facilities, and accountability for all perpetrators of unlawful
violence and timely justice for victims and their families. In his May
2015 inauguration speech, President Buhari called for overhauling ``the
rules of engagement to avoid human rights' violations in [military]
operations'' and improving ``operational and legal mechanisms so that
disciplinary steps are taken against proven human right violations by
the Armed Forces.''
Last summer, in recognition of the need for enhanced accountability
in the military, President Buhari appointed new leadership for the
military. And in a further effort to improve the protection of
civilians and the overall fight against Boko Haram, President Buhari
moved the command and control center of the military from Abuja to
Maiduguri, the epicenter of the conflict in northeastern Nigeria.
In March 2016, the Nigerian Army, working together with civil
society organizations, created human rights offices that will
strengthen the Army's capacity to protect human rights. The Nigerian
Defense Headquarters also inaugurated a Defense Advisory Committee on
Human Rights to monitor and investigate allegations of human rights
abuses within the military.
In addition, since December 2015, at least six separate
investigations of the Zaria incident are underway by the Nigerian
Senate and House of Representatives, the National Human Rights
Commission, and the Judicial Commission of Inquiry established by
Kaduna State, among others. We continue to urge those carrying out
investigations to do so credibly, swiftly, thoroughly, and with
impartiality.
The Department issued a statement on April 29 expressing concern
over the Government of Ethiopia's decision to file terrorism charges
against Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) First Vice-Chairman Bekele
Gerba and others in the Oromia. The statement also noted that the
government has not yet held accountable any security forces responsible
for alleged abuses. This latest statement was preceded by three
statements issued since December 2015 that articulated our concerns
about government and security forces' response to Oromo protestors and
called for meaningful dialogue . . . to include independent voices. Our
Embassy has increased outreach throughout the Ethiopian countryside and
specifically to Oromia to engage local officials and the community.
The Department understands the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission is
investigating the protests in Oromia. We also understand the government
is investigating instances of corruption that contributed to the
grievances Oromo protestors have highlighted. We continue to encourage
officials to be transparent with the findings and also be transparent
about subsequent accountability. We remain concerned about the
situation in Oromia where the government's heavy-handed response to
protests resulted in the death of numerous protestors and the arrests
of many others, including journalists and political party leaders. We
underscore to Ethiopian government counterparts that in order for
meaningful dialogue to occur, they must protect the rights enshrined in
its constitution, including the rights to freedom of expression and to
freedom of peaceful assembly. We remain steadfast in emphasizing the
importance of respect for due process for those detained by
investigating allegations of mistreatment, publicly presenting the
evidence it possesses against them, and distinguishing between
political opposition to the government and the use of violence. These
steps would contribute positively to building trust and goodwill and
indicate a shift away from a security-centric response to protests in
the Oromia region.
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Assistant Secretary Malinowski traveled to Ethiopia three times to
follow-up on democracy, good governance, and human rights issues
discussed during President Obama's July 2015 visit. A/S Malinowski has
discussed with counterparts possible avenues for expanding U.S.
assistance in building the capacity of Ethiopian civil society,
including by addressing some of the elements of Ethiopian law that
place an especially onerous burden on civil society organizations. He
has consistently communicated to the Ethiopian government that a
capable, empowered civil society can and would be an important ally for
a government that prides itself on governance. At the 6th bilateral
Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights Working group, attended by
Ambassador Haslach and Assistant Secretary Malinowski, the situation in
the Oromia figured prominently along with other issues such as the
important role civil society plays in strengthening good governance. At
the conclusion, the government of Ethiopia reaffirmed a commitment to
strengthen governance and political pluralism in keeping with the
principles enshrined in its constitution.
We continue to work with our African partners to develop and
implement sustainable, effective, long-term counterterrorism strategies
that incorporate government and civil society perspectives.
Question 2. USAID has indicated that endemic corruption is one of
the so called ``push factors'' that favors the spread of violent
extremism. Sarah Chayes, of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, contends that corruption can be a significant factor in
increasing violent extremism. There appears to be political will in
Nigeria starting with President Buhari to root out government
corruption.
What is the administration doing to support the Nigerian government
in this effort? How are we engaging at the local level where
state governments appear to have political will, especially
those in the northeast affected by Boko Haram?
How is the administration building anti-corruption principles into
its security sector activities in Nigeria?
How can we be assured that Buhari's anti-corruption activities are
focused on institutional reforms?
Answer. The Buhari administration has made a promising start in its
ambitious goal of rolling back corruption in Nigeria. Actions to date
include several high-profile prosecutions of former senior officials,
including a former Minister of Defense, a former National Security
Advisor, and a former Minister of Petroleum. The prospect of the
successful prosecution of high-ranking government officials for
corruption, which Nigeria has never seen, is sending a strong signal.
The government has initiated a number of corruption investigations
through the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and taken
serious steps to limit opportunities for graft in the government.
U.S. anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria focus on capacity building
assistance to civil society watchdogs, journalists, law enforcement
agencies, and the judicial sector. The United States supports work by
the EFCC and the judiciary to investigate and prosecute complex
corruption cases. These efforts are designed to partner with Nigeria in
preventing, exposing, investigating, and prosecuting acts of
corruption, and to pursue the recovery of stolen assets. We
consistently urge the Nigerian government to pursue investigations in a
non-partisan manner.
Other promising anti-corruption steps taken by the Government of
Nigeria under the Buhari administration include the establishment of
the Treasury Single Account, which has prevented leakages by increasing
oversight of all agencies spending by consolidating agency receipts
into a unified account for audit and tracking purposes; efforts to
reform the state oil company and the EFCC; and enhanced implementation
of the law on asset declaration by senior officials.
The key to fighting corruption in Nigeria is institutionalizing a
culture of accountability, which means enhancing transparency and
accountability mechanisms across government institutions. We will
continue to partner with Nigeria to ensure that the country continues
along this path of pursuing institutional reforms. The Government of
Nigeria has indicated that it will prioritize improving public
financial management, broadening the tax base to protect the economy
from future oil price shocks, and enhancing debt management systems in
light of expected new borrowing. We are prepared to offer technical
assistance to support this agenda through the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance (OTA), pending a formal
request from the Minister of Finance. Additionally, we welcome
Nigeria's decision to join the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a
global community of like-minded states working together to strengthen
transparency, accountability, and good governance to deliver better
government services to citizens. We stand ready to assist the
Government of Nigeria with its development of its OGP National Action
Plan.
We are encouraging Nigeria to join the Partnership on Illicit
Finance, which aims to build governments' capacity to identify and
prevent illicit financial activity, including that which is linked to
corruption. We are also committed to leading by example on anti-
corruption efforts, including through the U.S. domestic transparency
agenda, the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
cooperation on stolen asset recovery, and use of visa authorities to
deny corrupt officials entry to the United States.
We intend to look for ways to continue efforts to recover stolen
Nigerian assets within U.S. jurisdiction, and have sent experts to
consult with the Government of Nigeria on the formulation of requests
for legal assistance. Nigeria will also be one of the beneficiary
countries of the inaugural Global Forum on Asset Recovery, which the
U.S. will co-host next year with the UK.
Pending Congressional Notification of funds (CN 16-098), we also
plan to work with the United Nations to specifically address corruption
as a driver of violent extremism in the Sahel and West Africa,
including in Nigeria. This includes addressing corruption's role in
resilience, border security, and the damaging effects on countries'
security sectors. At the state and local level, USAID supports
initiatives promoting responsive governance, including governance
programs in Sokoto and Bauchi states, enhanced credibility for
elections, and increased capacity for civic engagement. USAID also
builds capacity in key government agencies to strengthen fiscal
responsibilities and improve transparency.
Through President Obama's Security Governance Initiative (SGI), we
are partnering with the Government of Nigeria to enhance the management
of security and justice services, including in northeast Nigeria.
Proposed areas of focus include improving the Ministry of Interior's
nationwide emergency response planning and coordination capability;
enhancing the Ministry of Defense's materiel needs identification,
procurement, and acquisitions procedures and processes; and assisting
planning for civilian security in northeastern Nigeria.
Over the past two years, a multi-year multi-million dollar grant
funded by the State Department has enhanced civil society's capacity to
partner with government agencies and businesses to fight graft in the
security and judicial sectors. This project includes developing new
technologies for citizen corruption-busters, and is helping Nigeria
adhere to the principles of the Open Government Partnership, a global
community of like-minded states working together to strengthen
transparency, accountability, and good governance to deliver better
government services to citizens. As a result of this project, a U.S.-
supported crowd-sourced platform allows citizens to anonymously report
corruption within the police, and the National Police force decided in
the fall of 2015 to expand this platform nationwide in cooperation with
civil society.
Question 3. Four Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
countries--Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso--have experienced
military coups or attempted coups while participating in the program.
Mali was a significant recipient of military aid under TSCTP prior to
its 2012 military coup. Since then, Mali's military has displayed
severe capacity shortfalls and elements of the security forces have
been accused of serious human rights abuses. What progress has been
made through TSCTP in building partner capacity in each of the
aforementioned countries? Do you assess that TSCTP countries are better
able to effectively combat terrorism and manage border security as a
result of their participation in TSCTP?
Answer. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has
focused on countries that are among the poorest in the world and have
had significant capacity gaps, but most of these partners have
demonstrated significant improvements in key areas and increased
political will to work individually and regionally to address terrorism
and violent extremism challenges emanating from the Lake Chad Basin
region, Libya, and Mali. TSCTP engagements in Niger, Mauritania, and
Burkina Faso significantly contributed to their abilities to more
effectively address terrorism and violent extremism threats. We have
also witnessed increased commitments by partner countries to the more
holistic whole-of-government CT and CVE approaches promoted by TSCTP.
Terrorist organizations no longer hold large sections of territory or
population centers. They cannot conduct major military-style campaigns
and have reverted to their more traditional asymmetric style of
warfare. The capacity that the U.S. has patiently built over 16 years
has figured prominently in this counterterrorism success. Specifically:
Mali: Despite long term challenges, Mali has displayed a
willingness to work with the United States and allies such as France
and the European Union to address shortfalls in CT capacity. The
international community must stay engaged with Mali over the long-term
to promote increased stability and resilience in the face of multiple
terrorism threats. Following the 2012 coup and the subsequent French
and African intervention to roll back terrorist territorial gains in
northern Mali, TSCTP partner countries Niger and Chad have played
critical roles in assisting French and Malian forces to contain and
degrade the terrorist threat. TSCTP was active in Mali before the 2012
coup, but its current engagements are relatively modest and no longer
focus on building tactical unit-level security sector capacity. In
coordination with the President's Security Governance Initiative (SGI),
TSCTP is focused on institution building including in the security
sector, as well as focused CVE and law enforcement programs.
Niger: President Issoufou's government has demonstrated strong
political will to sustain CT and CVE efforts and Nigerien security
forces, both military and law enforcement, have responded well to
engagement with the United States. Niger actively patrols the
trafficking routes in northern Mali and along the Libyan border. Niger
is a key member of the counter-Boko Haram Multinational Joint Task
Force (MNJTF). TSCTP has historically invested heavily in support of
Niger's border security units, and Niger's relatively strong
performance in the Lake Chad region and along the Libya and Mali
borders is reflective of that support. Recognizing that Niger does not
have adequate forces to sustain efforts to counter threats along three
separate fronts, TSCTP is currently supporting Niger's basic training
school. It also supports focused programs logistics, command and
control, military intelligence and casualty evacuation.
Mauritania: Mauritania has also been a committed and effective CT
partner. TSCTP created effective ground and air forces to counter
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) operating out of northern Mali.
Responding to terrorist threats in northern Mali before and immediately
after Mali's 2012 coup, U.S.-trained and equipped Mauritanian ground
forces used U.S.-supplied Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) equipment, reinforced with their own light attack
aircraft, to defeat VEOs. Since then, the VEO threat to Mauritania has
greatly diminished with no recent attacks. TSCTP is currently focused
on working with Mauritania to sustain the range of projects launched
during the last several years in strong cooperation with our Allies,
France and Morocco.
Burkina Faso: Burkina Faso had not faced a significant VEO threat
until the hotel bombing in Ouagadougou this year. The Department is
formulating a strategy to assist partners like Burkina Faso facing
asymmetric threats. TSCTP has focused on Burkina Faso's border security
in the past and National Defense Authorization Act Section 2282 funds
may build on that effort. Burkina Faso has been a solid partner with
the United States, permitting the long-term stationing of up to six
United States aircraft in Ouagadougou that perform light
transportation, casualty evacuation, and ISR missions throughout the
region.
__________
responses to questions for the record submitted
to linda thomas-greenfield by senator perdue
Question. I understand that the major sources of financing for
Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab stem from connections with Al-Qa'ida,
primarily from North Africa.
To what extent, if at all, does the State Department's Counter-
terrorism Financing Program (CTF) work with DoD ground forces
to target carriers of cash and other hard assets from North
Africa to the Sub-Saharan region?
Answer. The Department of State is committed to countering the
financing of groups like Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qa'ida. In this
context, we use all of the policy tools at our disposal, to include
sanctioning individuals and groups under the Department of State's
Foreign Terrorist Organization and Executive Order 13224 authorities,
as well as building the anti-money laundering and countering the
financing of terrorism capacity of countries in Africa.
The Department of State's counterterrorist financing (CTF)
capacity- building programs are not operationally oriented and, as
such, are not designed to augment DoD initiatives. Rather, our CTF
programming aims to build the capacity of local civilian law
enforcement partners, including banking regulators, to counter
terrorist financing through better information-sharing, investigations,
and prosecutions. This approach builds local capacity to address the
context-specific nature of the CTF threat, as sources of financing for
terrorist groups vary significantly depending on the organization.
For example, in Senegal, Morocco, and Algeria, the Department of
State deploys Department of Justice, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial
Development Assistance and Training, Resident Legal Advisors to
strengthen existing anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism
financing (AML/CTF) regimes through support for legislative and
institutional reforms and training on CTF investigations and
prosecutions. In Tunisia, the Department of State funds activities to
develop the capacity of the Tunisian Financial Intelligence Unit and
other financial sector regulators to identify, report, and deter
terrorist financial activity through consultations and training.
In Somalia, the Department of State is funding the Treasury
Department to provide regulatory training for officials from the
Central Bank of Somalia (CBS). The Department of State also supports
efforts to help Somali financial sector stakeholders identify,
investigate, and deter the financing of terrorism; this includes
mentoring stakeholders on how to effectively implement Somalia's
nascent laws in the area of AML/CFT.
Question 2. Boko Haram in particular profits from an active slave
market in Nigeria which fuels much of their incentive to kidnap and
ransom young girls and foreign nationals.
In addition to working with the Treasury Department and local
partners to prosecute kidnappings, what efforts does State have
in place aimed at targeting the slave market itself?
Has the Nigerian government been cooperative in targeting this
market?
Is there any evidence that Boko Haram is also involved in
trafficking some of those they kidnap to other countries?
How effective is the PISCES system in catching the flow of
traffickers and/or victims of trafficking?
Answer. Trafficking in persons is a modern day form of slavery.
Nigeria has a multifaceted human trafficking problem, which includes
several different forms of sex and labor trafficking. Boko Haram
forcefully recruits and uses child soldiers as young as 12 years old
and abducts women and girls in the northern region of Nigeria, some of
whom it subjects to domestic servitude, forced labor, and sex slavery
through forced marriages to its militants.
The United States actively continues to support efforts to locate
and bring home kidnapped victims of Boko Haram. We continue to provide
a range of assistance to Nigerian authorities to fight Boko Haram,
including intelligence, training, victim support services, and
strategic communications. Our assistance has directly contributed to
the Nigerian military's liberation of hundreds of Boko Haram captives.
The Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in
Persons (TIP) and Embassy Abuja regularly work together to engage with
the Government of Nigeria on trafficking in persons issues. The
Department also produces the annual Trafficking in Persons Report,
which includes a detailed assessment of the Government of Nigeria's
efforts to combat this crime.
The Government of Nigeria has made significant efforts to combat
its human trafficking problem. It has comprehensive anti-trafficking
legislation and an agency dedicated to combat human trafficking
(NAPTIP) that is a model for the region. Nigeria has shelters to assist
trafficking victims and continues to investigate, prosecute, and
convict traffickers. NAPTIP officials are responsive to our requests
for information and cooperative. However, NAPTIP's ability to address
the violent acts perpetuated by Boko Haram is very limited. They have
occasionally provided shelter and services to victims who have been
subjected to trafficking by Boko Haram.
Because PISCES is not installed in Nigeria, it cannot directly stop
human trafficking there. PISCES can be an effective means of
interdicting nefarious actors, but depends on the host nation recipient
of this foreign assistance program to effectively maintain its national
screening list. Assuming the bad actors transit a port of entry
employing PISCES technology, and the person of interest is properly
screened against the national screening list, PISCES would effectively
identify the individual as suspect and worthy of further scrutiny.
Question 3. How would you describe the channels through which Boko
Haram and al Shabaab obtain their weapons and military equipment?
Do their weapons come mostly from African sources, or sources from
other continents?
What efforts are State and/or DoD employing to target potential
channels of weapons flows to hotbeds of terrorism in Sub-
Saharan Africa?
Answer. We believe that Boko Haram continues to use weapons it has
diverted from Nigerian security forces, and to a lesser extent
neighboring security forces.
The United States is committed to working bilaterally and
multilaterally with the Lake Chad Basin countries through training,
equipment, advisors, information sharing, military sales and logistics
support to support the regional security efforts to counter Boko Haram,
which includes preventing Boko Haram from acquiring new weaponry.
We are aware that al-Shabaab continues to use its affiliation with
al-Qaeda to obtain resources, primarily weapons and ammunition by way
of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. More recently, al-Shabaab has
supplemented their weapons caches by conducting large-scale attacks on
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forward operation bases.
These raids, which often result in significant AMISOM and Somali
partner force casualties, have yielded weapons, ammunition, vehicles,
food, and other materiel that al-Shabaab uses to equip low level
fighters.
The United States is committed to supporting AMISOM and Somali
partner forces in combatting al-Shabaab, including efforts to cut off
the group's supply lines and deny it safe haven. U.S. advisors assist
AMISOM and Somali forces in operations to limit al-Shabaab's capacity
to generate revenue, access weapons, and regain strongholds that
provided the group access to ports and other major lines of
communication.
The Department of State can provide classified details about both
Boko Haram's and al-Shabaab's procurement of weapons separately.
Question 4. Numerous reports cite that Nigeria and Tunisia serve
as hubs for regional terrorist actors, in part due to the fragility of
their political institutions. However, their neighbors, Algeria and
Morocco, have managed to remain relatively stable political systems.
In your opinion, what plans or initiatives have Algeria and Morocco
implemented with success that may be able to be applied to
Nigeria, Tunisia and other countries in the Sub-Saharan region?
Answer. While Morocco and Algeria have enjoyed greater political
stability than many of their neighbors, they have not been immune to
terrorism. Morocco has been a source of terrorist fighters to the Syria
conflict, while Algeria continues to face sporadic internal violence
from extremist groups formed in the 1990s. Both governments, however,
have prioritized security and counterterrorism efforts, along with
counter radicalization policies that have contributed to maintaining
overall stability despite these challenges. Tunisia's political
transformation from autocracy to democracy and efforts to modernize and
grow the economy have been complicated by a series of terrorist
attacks. Tunisia continues to make meaningful progress on both fronts,
following the Arab Spring political transformation. Unfortunately
violent extremist groups have nevertheless exploited and radicalized
many young Tunisians.
Nevertheless, Tunisia's leaders have held fast to their democratic
values and their commitment to developing sophisticated security forces
capable of combatting the terrorist threat without impinging on
citizens' freedoms or human rights. Across North and Sub-Saharan
Africa, successful responses to terrorism match an increase in the
capacity and effectiveness of security forces with stronger regional
partnerships, local economic development, civil society engagement, and
these are core goals of our assistance and engagement in Tunisia,
Morocco, and Algeria. And while we routinely draw from successful
programs and policies from other countries, including Algeria and
Morocco, every country requires tailored solutions developed through
close partnership. Building adequate capacity to combat terrorism will
take time, and we believe Tunisia is on a positive trajectory.
Similarly, we recognize the challenges Nigeria faces in its
counterterrorism efforts. We are encouraged by Nigeria's efforts to
strengthen its political institutions and address the grievances of its
population. Most critically, President Buhari has invested in
combatting corruption, which is a major step to restoring public trust
in the government, also key to fighting terrorism. Nigeria has also
improved relations with its neighbors in the Lake Chad Basin, thereby
contributing to improved collective security.
Question 5. South Sudan has been labeled as a ``Level 3
Emergency'' country by the UN, meaning that South Sudan is in the class
of the most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises in the world.
However, the President in his FY17 budget, requested only $1.957
billion for International Disaster Assistance (IDA). This is a 30%
decline in last year's request which administration officials have
explained is due to an expectation of ``declining needs'' in South
Sudan, among a few other countries.
Can you explain why the administration expects the need in South
Sudan to decrease when the UN continues to label it as one of
the worst humanitarian needs in the world?
Answer. USAID will provide a direct response to this Question for
the Record.
Question 6. Have the activities of Al Shabaab and/or Boko Haram
threatened to disrupt any ongoing USAID projects or activities in Sub-
Saharan Africa? If so, which ones?
Have these groups' activities affected the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) developing or ongoing projects in Sub-Saharan
Africa, namely Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Niger, Tanzania, or
Togo? If so, which ones and how?
Answer. USAID will provide a direct response to this Question for
the Record.
Question 7. According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report released in June of 2014, TSCTP program managers were found to
be ``unable to readily provide data on the status'' of funds expended
for interagency counterterrorism efforts. Additionally, country-
specific spending figures are not routinely reported to Congress for
regional security assistance programs, including TSCTP, PREACT, and
some DoD BPC activities, and such spending is generally not reflected
in Department of State and DoD congressional budget justifications. I
am concerned that a lack of initiative-wide, as well as country-
specific, funding data may inhibit congressional oversight of the
scale, scope, and balance of U.S. engagement and assistance to Africa.
Why is spending data for these programs not routinely collected and
reported to Congress?
What specific steps has State taken to implement GAO's
recommendations on this front?
What plans, if any, does State have in place to improve data
collection and monitoring systems?
What additional resources, if any, would be required for State and
DoD to begin including these funding breakdowns in their
respective congressional budget justifications?
Answer. The GAO has officially closed its recommendations in the
referenced 2014 GAO report. Since the fourth quarter of FY 2014, the
Department of State has coordinated and collected financial data on all
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for
Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) programs, including for
the following accounts: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO);
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR);
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); and
Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Development Assistance (DA). The Bureau
of African Affairs updates and maintains these unclassified financial
data, which include country-specific allocated amounts (control
numbers), obligations, unobligated balances (active funds only),
unliquidated obligations, and expenditures (disbursements).
The Department of State tracks TSCTP and PREACT funds by country
and by account. Country-specific figures are generally not included in
Congressional budget justifications (CBJ) for TSCTP and PREACT to
facilitate flexible and regional programming within each partnership.
As GAO's 2014 review of PREACT notes, ``The regional nature of PREACT
encourages implementing agencies to view counterterrorism from a
regional perspective, rather than country-by-country.''
By not requesting TSCTP and PREACT funds by country, we mitigate
the possibility that partners will feel entitled to a specific amount
of funding, which could potentially arise with bilateral assistance
allocations. When specific amounts of funding are allocated bilaterally
it can become more complicated when changes in circumstances and policy
priorities warrant reprogramming those funds.
The regional nature of TSCTP and PREACT also enables multi-country
trainings, exercises, and other engagements where it can be difficult
to attribute specific costs to one partner nation over another. The
joint participation of Senegalese and Mauritanian law enforcement
officials in AFRICOM's 2016 Exercise FLINTLOCK, supported by TSCTP/
NADR/ATA funds, is one such example. Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian
civilian security force participation in PREACT is another example of
how the Department of State employs resources attributed to these
regional partnerships to enable regional interoperability,
communication, and coordination.
Since 2012, the Department of State has made a concerted effort to
go beyond counting the money and the number of trainings completed
toward more holistic assessments of effects. We have made great strides
in the development of, and are now operationalizing, frameworks for
measuring the results of our security assistance, specifically
counterterrorism programs. The Department of State has hired dedicated
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) personnel to help monitor and evaluate
a number of security assistance programs. The Department of State is
working in close partnership with our DoD colleagues to roll out these
models and facilitate the collection of monitoring data. Similarly, the
Department of State developed a standard CVE monitoring framework and
deployed it across all CVE programs funded by PREACT and TSCTP Economic
Support Funds.
We are also enhancing our knowledge management practices and
sharing these frameworks with other partners working in the same
security assistance space. The goals of these knowledge management
practices are coordinated approaches for understanding the outcomes of
our investments, streamlined implementer efforts, and improved M&E
capacity in our partners.
When the Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) is completed, it
is hard to anticipate the exact needs of partner countries due to the
rapidly evolving nature of the terrorist threats. Thus, we often make
final funding decisions at the time funds are being programmed--often a
couple of years out from the CBJ's preparation. The Department of State
can provide country-specific breakdowns of TSCTP and PREACT funding by
request.
Question 8. The U.S. has spent more than $1.8 billion over the
last decade to counter Al Shabaab in Somalia, and, more recently, more
than $400 million in security assistance to the Lake Chad Basin
countries to counter Boko Haram.
What returns on these significant investments have we seen in the
fights against these two groups?
What lessons have we learned in the last decade of countering Al
Shabaab? More recently with Boko Haram?
Answer. The United States has a long counterterrorism partnership
with the Lake Chad Basin Countries, primarily through the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (Cameroon is the newest partner in
2014). Over the course of our partnership, we have seen steady
improvement in those countries' ability to perform counterterrorism
operations. More recently, we are actively partnering with the Lake
Chad Basin Countries by providing advisors, intelligence, training,
logistical support and/or equipment to support their effort to
ultimately defeat Boko Haram. With U.S. and other international
support, the Lake Chad Basin countries have joined together through
unprecedented regional coordination to reduce Boko Haram's ability to
hold territory, deny the group many of its safe havens, and limit its
ability to conduct large scale military style attacks. Boko Haram,
however, remains a deadly organization that conducts asymmetric attacks
against the population in the region. The United States is committed to
supporting the Lake Chad Basin Countries' development of sustained
comprehensive approaches to combating Boko Haram, which would include
conducting effective security operations, providing civilian security
and civil administration, investigating human rights abuses and
repairing civil-military relations, restoring stability, addressing the
humanitarian impact of Boko Haram, and promoting economic development
and job creation to build community resilience to violent extremism and
break the cycle of violence.
The investments we have made in AMISOM and the Somali National Army
(SNA), have achieved significant progress since we began providing
security assistance to both entities in 2007. Al-Shabaab previously
controlled nearly all of southern and central Somalia, with the
exception of approximately sixteen blocks in Mogadishu. Today, due to
the efforts of AMISOM and its Somali partners, al-Shabaab has been
driven from many of the major population centers in southern and
central Somalia, providing secure space for the Somali political
process to take hold. Al-Shabaab remains a potent threat, however, and
much work remains to be done in terms of standing up functional
institutions of civilian governance and professional Somali security
forces. But this should not overshadow the tremendous progress AMISOM
and its Somali partners have made in less than a decade.
In terms of lessons learned, AMISOM has demonstrated the value of
harnessing states in the region to lead the response to regional
challenges. By focusing on supporting and enabling AMISOM and the SNA
in their efforts to combat al-Shabaab, we have avoided large-scale U.S.
military involvement, mitigating al-Shabaab's ability to threaten U.S.
interests.
From our experiences throughout Africa, we have learned that
winning on the battlefield is not enough to defeat terrorism. Long-term
stability is only achieved and sustained by winning the peace, which
includes addressing human rights violations committed by security
forces, holding those responsible accountable, and actively working to
restore citizen trust in security forces. There is no purely military
solution to the Boko Haram problem. We recognize the need for
reconstruction, once the conditions to do so are in place, and are
prepared to work with the Lake Chad Basin countries and international
financial institutions to generate the resources to do so.
Question 9. Some analysts have posited that government-led
initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism may be backfiring.
For example, in a survey of 95 Kenyans associated with Al Shabaab, 65
percent identified the Kenyan government's counterterrorism strategy as
the most important factor that drove them to join the group. Moreover,
in some cases, violent extremist groups may in fact seek to provoke
violent responses from the government in order to fuel support from
targeted communities.
Do you agree that in some cases, government-led efforts can cause a
backlash among vulnerable populations and actually cause more
violence? That U.S. involvement in these initiatives may also
cause these efforts to backfire?
How, in your opinion, can the U.S. aid countries in their efforts
to counter violent extremism without causing this kind of
backlash?
Answer. Government-led efforts to counter terrorism and violent
extremism may cause a backlash from populations who perceive, or are in
fact subjected to, heavy-handed tactics; this dynamic must be assessed
on a case-by-case basis. U.S. security and counterterrorism assistance
to governments emphasizes the importance upholding broadly accepted
human rights standards, rule of law, and adopting a comprehensive
approach towards improving security that involves civil society and
representatives of marginalized communities.
Our efforts are most effective when the United States partners with
credible actors and messengers in communities at risk for
radicalization to violence. This includes efforts to support better
relations between the partner nation law enforcement communities and
vulnerable populations through more robust community policing programs
and other initiatives that promote dialogue and cooperation between at-
risk communities and security forces.
Question 10. As you know, DoD funding for security assistance in
Africa surpassed that provided by the Department of State for the first
time in FY2014 and has continued to rise since. In the past decade
alone, DoD has notified Congress of $1.3 billion in counterterrorism
training and equipment to African countries.
To what extent, if at all, does DoD coordinate with the State for
counterterrorism efforts under the umbrellas of the Trans-
Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the
Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT)?
Do you agree that DoD should be the primary distributor of training
and equipment in the counterterrorism space? If not, why not?
Do some of the DoD's counterterrorism efforts involve training for
countering violent extremism (CVE)?
Answer. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and
Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) are the
lead U.S. counterterrorism initiatives across East and West Africa. As
the lead for both TSCTP and PREACT, the Department of State relies on
expertise from the entire interagency community for the design,
implementation, and oversight of all programming. In particular, the
Department of State coordinates closely with the Department of Defense
(DoD) on nearly all aspects of TSCTP and PREACT funded programming, as
well as related DoD-led counterterrorism efforts.
Department of State TSCTP and PREACT program coordinators interact
regularly with counterparts at AFRICOM and OSD to develop and de-
conflict programming and maximize interaction of the available funding
and authorities. Where possible, Department of State and DoD
synchronize timelines, share best practices and lessons learned, and
facilitate coordination between embassy personnel and program
implementers. DoD and the Department of State also coordinate closely
on Section 2282 programming, DoD's program aimed at building the
counterterrorism operational capacity of foreign military, national
maritime, or border security forces, which requires dual-key approval
from both Secretaries of Defense and State. Close coordination between
section 2282, TSCTP, PREACT, and other capacity building funding is
necessary to ensure programing is synergistic, not duplicative, and
prioritized to meet strategic priorities.
Additionally, DoD leadership and other Departments and Agencies
participate in DOS-led, Deputy Assistant Secretary-level TSCTP and
PREACT coordination meetings quarterly which provide a forum for senior
level interagency dialogue. DoD also takes part in the annual TSCTP
planning workshop. Likewise, State participates at DoD's invitation in
DoD's annual Africa security cooperation planning events, working
groups, and workshops.
The Department does not agree that DoD should be the primary
distributor of training and equipment in the counterterrorism space.
It is a fundamental U.S. foreign policy goal to build the capacity
of our foreign partners to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Our
success achieving these goals depends on the Department's coordination
of this effort, as a key part of our overall bilateral relationship
with a foreign country. That will ensure that all U.S. government
activities in this space reflect a shared vision and an agreed
framework.
Question 11. DoD expends resources for counterterrorism train-and-
equip programs through the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF).
The President has requested $450 million for FY17--almost 80% of the
total amount allocated from FY15-FY16 combined.
Does DoD or State track the equipment provided through these
programs? If so, how?
Answer. I would refer you to the Department of Defense on the
question of how end use monitoring is conducted on materiel provided
with Title X funding, such as CTPF. For its part, the Department of
State does not ``track'' the equipment provided through such programs
unless Title XXII funding, such as Foreign Military Financing, is
ultimately relied on to sustain such equipment in the long term.
Question 12. What, if anything, is DoD doing to ensure that
equipment provided through these train-and-equip programs does not fall
into the hands of terrorists? Please be as specific as possible.
Answer. I would refer you to the Department of Defense on this
question.
Question 13. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) has
expressed concern with the ability of many African countries to absorb,
sustain, and responsibly manage the equipment provided through these
train-and-equip programs, and has urged DoD to invest some of its CTPF
resources into building institutional capacity of African partner
security forces. The HASC report on the FY17 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) also requests DoD to respond to a series of
``concerns,'' including ``the capacity of nations to absorb and sustain
assistance'' and requirements for executive branch congressional
notifications for DoD-administered counterterrorism aid.
Do you share the committee's concerns over whether these countries
have the institutional capacity to adequately manage this
equipment?
Answer. Yes. Absorptive capacity--at an institutional, operational,
and fiscal level--remains a key concern for the Department of State
regarding the provision of equipment and other resources to Africa
partner security forces via Title X authorities. As such, the
Department is wary of providing large influxes of one-time funding to
countries with underdeveloped military institutions and limited
resources.
Question 14. What training, if any, does DoD provide for
maintaining security equipment properly to ensure the biggest return on
U.S. investments?
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense
Question 15. Can Congress expect to see the reports requested on
our partner nations' capacity for maintenance of security assistance
and DoD-administered security aid anytime soon?
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense.
__________
responses to questions for the record submitted
to hon. linda etim by senator perdue
Question 1. Please briefly explain USAID's role in Trans-Sahara
Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional
East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT). How does USAID work with State
to carry out its programs and mission in Sub-Saharan Africa
specifically? How does USAID's approach in Sub-Saharan Africa differ
from other parts of the continent?
Answer. USAID has been a part of the Partnership for East Africa
Counterterrorism (PREACT) and Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) since their inception. These strategic frameworks guide
interagency coordination for countering violent extremism (CVE) in
Africa through a number of channels. Examples include working groups of
core Department of State, USAID, and other U.S. government stakeholders
in Washington, and joint participation in multilateral structures such
as the Global Counterterrorism Forum and CVE forums. To further
coordinate our shared effort, USAID and the Department of State have
recently developed a State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent
Extremism. The working groups encourage missions and embassies to
develop integrated CVE plans for focus regions and countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, as the Agency does worldwide, USAID
implements its programs based on country-level analysis to ensure
programming is targeted and tailored to specific needs. In the case of
CVE, this approach is founded upon rigorous, locally informed risk
assessments and analysis to identify the drivers of extremism, which
guide the design of programming to counter those drivers. Given this
analysis, programming might include interventions such as youth
empowerment, social and economic inclusion, reliable media, improved
local governance, and/or reconciliation and conflict mitigation.
Activities are tailored to meet the specific threat levels, political
environments and material needs of each community. For this reason,
although all efforts are based on an overall goal of reducing
vulnerability to the violent extremist threat, USAID's CVE programs in
Sub-Saharan African countries vary from those in other regions based on
local context. For example, in Kenya our analysis has led to the design
of CVE programs to strengthen cross-border conflict mitigation efforts
and CVE networks along Kenya's volatile border with Somalia. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, where radio is one of the most accessible forms of
communication, CVE efforts have included providing radio programming in
areas where there is often lack of information in the local vernacular.
These radio programs are often the only way in which people in border
communities receive information. USAID's CVE efforts often target
distinct populations, for example at-risk youth or marginalized
communities as in Niger and Cameroon. One area where we are
increasingly focused is the unique role of women in promoting peace and
security. Our CVE programming in West and East Africa are focused on a
gender-aware approach to programming. Our CVE programs go through a
continuous learning cycle and adaptive management--we learn from
continually monitoring the evidence and responding to changing dynamics
on the ground. This emphasis on learning allows for sharing of lessons
and best practices among countries and regions.
Question 2. Numerous reports cite that Nigeria and Tunisia serve
as hubs for regional terrorist actors, in part due to the fragility of
their political institutions. However, their neighbors, Algeria and
Morocco, have managed to remain relatively stable political systems. In
your opinion, what plans or initiatives have Algeria and Morocco
implemented with success that may be able to be applied to Nigeria,
Tunisia, and other countries in the Sub-Saharan region?
Answer. The instability of political systems does not necessarily
correlate with the threat of violent extremism or terrorism. As seen in
other regions, violent extremism can be nurtured even within stable
democracies. USAID addresses violent extremism differently in every
country, based upon rigorous and locally informed risk analysis, with
responses tailored to country- or even sub-national-specific needs. To
be responsive to changing dynamics on the ground in an environment such
as the Lake Chad Basin, we apply a flexible and adaptive approach.
USAID's emphasis on learning allows us to monitor the evidence and
bring in lessons and best practices from other countries and regions as
applicable.
While national political, economic, and security policies have an
influence on successful strategies, Morocco and Algeria have been early
innovators in developing a more comprehensive approach to addressing
violent extremism and terrorism. Morocco, in particular, has been seen
as a leader in preventing recruitment, while Algeria has been a model
for reintegration and rehabilitation.
Morocco's approach has balanced security interventions with
community engagement and the promotion of moderate religious voices.
Morocco recognized the need to engage with educators, religious
institutions, civil society and the private sector. This balanced,
multi-pronged and multi-stakeholder approach has become a cornerstone
for designing effective responses to violent extremism that
significantly reduce vulnerabilities of at-risk communities.
USAID has worked closely with the Government of Morocco, civil
society, and the private sector to translate this approach into action
and tailor it to the needs of at-risk communities. Our programs partner
with local organizations and local government to promote civic
engagement, support education and vocational training opportunities,
and build better relations with police. These interventions help reduce
the appeal violent extremist groups might have for youth by investing
in vulnerable young people, and enabling them to participate in and
contribute positively to their communities. USAID's programming has
been complemented by security-oriented programming by the Department of
State and other agencies. Coupling these community-based responses with
measured, targeted security responses, Morocco has been able to manage
and monitor the growth of violent extremism. This principle was
recently applied within the Algerian context, where USAID supported a
pilot program of this civil society-led model.
Algeria has been a leader in developing approaches to reintegration
and rehabilitation of former terrorist fighters and deradicalization,
something that we believe could also be effective in Nigeria if the
government were to embrace that approach. This leadership is built on
their efforts to develop their methods during the ``Dark Decade'' of
the 1990s. Algerian efforts include engaging repentant terrorists to
become voices in their community to help prevent radicalization.
Algeria has been working with the Global Counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF)
and other counterparts to provide a guide to developing such
programming.
Tunisia is just beginning to develop its approach to preventing and
countering violent extremism, at the same time it is experiencing a
significant political transition. The instability of the political
system during this transition does not appear to be driving
recruitment. Recent studies commissioned by USAID and the Department of
State in Tunisia, and USAID assessments in sub-Saharan Africa (Niger,
Chad and Cameroon), indicate that perceptions of political and economic
marginalization, government injustice and corruption, and unmet
expectations help drive recruitment when coupled with a belief that
joining violent extremists or terrorist groups will provide status and
help solidify identify and bring other rewards. The opportunity for the
average citizen to participate in all sectors of society; provision of
basic services by the Government; and fostering a sense of fairness,
inclusiveness and opportunity appear to be a more effective response
for preventing recruitment by violent extremist organizations. These
measures also appear to resonate with respondents of assessments and
beneficiaries of programs to counter violent extremism in Nigeria,
Niger and Cameroon.
Question 3. South Sudan has been labeled as a ``Level 3
Emergency'' country by the UN, meaning that South Sudan is in the class
of the most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises in the world.
However, the President in his FY17 budget, requested only $1.957
billion for International Disaster Assistance (IDA). This is a 30%
decline in last year's request which administration officials have
explained is due to an expectation of ``declining needs'' in South
Sudan, among a few other countries. Can you explain why the
administration expects the need in South Sudan to decrease when the UN
continues to label it as one of the worst humanitarian needs in the
world? In your opinion, is this funding level adequate for USAID to
carry out its humanitarian mission in Sub-Saharan Africa for USAID
Answer. The U.S. Government is the world leader in humanitarian
response. We play a critical role in responding to the humanitarian
situation in South Sudan, having provided nearly $1.6 billion in
humanitarian assistance to support conflict-affected people in South
Sudan and South Sudanese refugees in the region since the conflict
began in December 2013. Despite the signing of the peace agreement in
August 2015 and the formation of the Transitional Government of
National Unity in April 2016, we expect humanitarian needs to remain
high in South Sudan for months and years to come. Multiple years of
conflict and a worsening economic crisis have eroded populations'
ability to cope and exacerbated food insecurity. A strong international
response, led by the United States, since the conflict began, has
prevented this situation from deteriorating even further. USAID
partners reach approximately 1.3 million people per month with life-
saving aid, including people in UN Protection of Civilians sites and
those in remote, rural areas. Our partners constantly adapt to provide
assistance as efficiently as possible and are using creative solutions
to deliver aid to people in conflict-affected areas despite severe
insecurity and other access constraints. USAID has designated South
Sudan as a Relief-to-Development Transition focus country, where the
Agency seeks to closely coordinate foreign assistance with humanitarian
efforts, supporting an integrated approach across sectors and drawing
on multiple funding accounts to meet the great needs. The close
coordination between USAID's humanitarian and development offices
allows each to leverage the other's funding accounts to jointly
identify and address issues of mutual interest and amplify each other's
investments by developing complementary solutions to the pressing needs
of the South Sudanese people.
The administration remains dedicated to providing strong support
for humanitarian programs in sub-Saharan Africa and worldwide. The
President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 request reflects the administration's
ongoing commitment to these programs in a constrained fiscal
environment. The FY 2017 request includes $6.156 billion for
humanitarian assistance, including $1.957 billion for the International
Disaster Assistance Account, $1.35 billion for Food for Peace Title II,
$2.799 billion for the Migration and Refugee Assistance Account, and
$50 million for the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund.
The overall FY 2017 request for humanitarian assistance is $511 million
higher than the FY 2016 request. In concert with FY 2016 resources, the
request will enable the U.S. Government to respond to humanitarian
needs in sub-Saharan Africa and around the world, including Syria,
South Sudan, Iraq, Burundi, CAR, Nigeria, Ukraine, Yemen, as well as
the humanitarian needs resulting from El Nino.
USAID works collaboratively with a multitude of stakeholders in
sub-Saharan Africa to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance in
response to complex emergencies and natural disasters. To maximize its
resources, USAID coordinates closely with other donors, the United
Nations, host countries, and international and local humanitarian
partners.
Question 4. Have the activities of Al Shabaab and/or Boko Haram
threatened to disrupt any ongoing USAID projects or activities in Sub-
Saharan Africa? If so, which ones?
Have these groups' activities affected the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) developing or ongoing projects in Sub-Saharan Africa,
namely Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Niger, Tanzania, or Togo? If so, which
ones and how? Can you describe how USAID works to mitigate threats to
employees and contractors in these unstable areas? How does is risk
mitigated in program implementation?
Answer. In recognition of the challenging operating environment in
Somalia, USAID has taken a number of steps to mitigate the overall risk
such as: requiring USAID implementing partners to exercise enhanced due
diligence measures; utilizing independent third-party monitoring firms
to monitor USAID assistance in Somalia; and coordinating continuously
with implementing partners, the Federal Government of Somalia, the
United Nations' Department of Safety and Security, the African Union
Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and other non-governmental partners to
triangulate security information and modify USAID programming timeframe
and approaches accordingly.
Regarding Boko Haram, while USAID and its partners incorporate a
high level of security in their operations, the ongoing violence of
Boko Haram is a real and present danger and does threaten to disrupt
USAID's activities at any time. Due to this danger, USAID's main
development assistance programs, managed by the Mission in Abuja, are
largely absent from the most-affected areas, save for a significant
Crisis Education Response program and several modest health
interventions for internally displaced persons, which are viewed rather
as humanitarian assistance-type activities. Boko Haram's actions are
not at this time considered to be a significant threat to the Mission's
main development program activities (e.g., Feed the Future, Power
Africa, PEPFAR, Northern Education Initiative . . . Plus, and Maternal
and Child Survival), which occur in other parts of the country,
including in nearby areas of the northwest and northeast sub-regions.
USAID emergency humanitarian partners are required to create a
location-specific safety and security plan, with funding for security
needs included within the program budget. These implementing partners
are plugged into security management systems available and also
maintain their own informal information-sharing networks.
Our partnership with MCC is strong. Our cooperation ensures program
synergies and our mutual dedication strengthens sustainable growth and
development in partner countries. To our knowledge, MCC's work in sub-
Saharan African countries has not been directly affected by Al Shabaab
or Boko Haram. However, the potential instability caused by these
groups is an ongoing risk to development in countries in the Sahel,
Lake Chad Basin and East Africa regions.
Compacts with Tanzania and Senegal were successfully completed.
Given concerns with the electoral process in Zanzibar, approval of a
second compact for Tanzania remains on hold. A possible second compact
for Senegal remains in the negotiation stage. In Cote d'Ivoire, MCC
continues to work with the Government in the design of a compact
program. In December 2015, the MCC Board of Directors selected Togo as
eligible to develop a threshold program, so this is in the analysis
stage.
The MCC Compact with Niger is scheduled for MCC Board of Directors'
consideration at the mid-June 2016 board meeting. To the south, Niger
suffers attacks from Boko Haram; to the north, from the illegal drugs
and arms entering from Libya; and, to the west, tension caused by
terrorist groups in Mali. However, MCC plans to closely collaborate
with the World Bank, which should increase the chances of success for
this compact by providing key assistance and insight. Moreover, USAID
has numerous ongoing food security efforts in Niger, valued at $220
million over five years, and can facilitate continuing on-the-ground
expertise.
USAID's The Development Response to Violent Extremism and
Insurgency defines engagement criteria including the identification of
risks to the Agency, its partners, and the development investment, and
determination that reasonable steps can be taken to mitigate those
risks. This criterion is considered and reassessed throughout
programming, and USAID's approach of continuous learning and adapting
serves to help mitigate risks, which may be physical, programmatic, and
financial. At the same time, USAID recognizes that some testing is
required in the burgeoning field of CVE. USAID's Policy therefore
advocates a balanced approach, encouraging Agency staff ``to take
risks, informed by the best available information and mitigation
practices.''
In Somalia, Al Shabaab continues to be one of several security-
related challenges--including the presence of an emerging ISIL cell
that has the ability to impede USAID programming. However, while Al
Shabaab remains an ongoing challenge in the implementation of
activities, USAID continues to deliver life-saving assistance to
populations where access permits. We have capitalized on improvements
in access and security across Somalia to deliver tangible development
dividends to Somalis, particularly in areas recovered from Al Shabaab.
These efforts have helped reinforce stability in key areas and improve
confidence in nascent governing institutions. The gains seen from our
development assistance in Somalia align with the administration's
broader countering violent extremism goals and objectives.
USAID's Northeast Nigeria countering violent extremism/
stabilization program operates in select areas of Borno, Yobe, and
Adamawa states, which are the Nigerian states most affected by the
violent insurgency of Boko Haram. Likewise, USAID's sizeable
humanitarian assistance program also operates in the same select areas.
USAID's implementing partners for these programs maintain offices in
the State capital cities of Maiduguri (Borno), Damaturu (Yobe), and
Yola (Adamawa), and their staff travel regularly around the area to
visit work sites and oversee the distribution of aid. For USAID
emergency humanitarian programs, each organization is required to
create a location-specific safety and security plan for their staff,
with USAID funding any reasonable security needs within the program
budget. In addition, implementing partners are plugged into security
management systems available, such as the UN Department of Safety and
Security, and maintain their own informal information-sharing networks.
Question 5. Funding and responsibilities for Countering Violent
Extremism (CVE) programs and counter terrorist messaging under the
umbrella of the U.S.-led TSCTP and PREACT are spread among multiple
offices across several agencies, including State Department's
Counterterrorism and Africa Bureaus and USAID. However, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) found in reports released in 2012 and 2014
that interagency coordination for TSCTP and PREACT was lacking, and
that spending for these initiatives is not necessarily reflected in
State's or USAID's congressional budget justifications. What data
collection programs does USAID have in place today for funds expended
on programs under TSCTP and PREACT? What efforts are currently in place
to provide spending data for these programs to Congress? What specific
steps has State taken to implement GAO's recommendations on this front
since the 2012 and 2014 program management reports on TSCTP and PREACT?
What plans, if any, does USAID have in place to improve data collection
and monitoring systems?
Answer. USAID consistently applies rigorous financial and program
monitoring systems across all programs, including those under TSCTP and
PREACT. Our partners have developed multi-layered monitoring mechanisms
to track assistance, and they conduct financial oversight to comply
with USG audit requirements. TSCTP and PREACT program data is input
into the Department of State-managed Foreign Assistance Coordination
and Tracking System database. USAID also provides annual information on
funds expended to the National Counterterrorism Center on TSCTP, as
well as to the State Department's additional monitoring and collection
efforts specifically for PREACT and TSCTP.
USAID provides data for the TSCTP report compiled by the State
Department's African Affairs Bureau on a bi-annual basis, which is
submitted upon request to Congress. This reporting process was
developed in response to the GAO report's recommendations. TSCTP data
is also now reported to Congress annually in the form of spend plans,
with the last report having been submitted in December 2015. For
PREACT, we contribute program and monitoring data to a State-led
information database, which is shared within the interagency.
Additionally, USAID reports on funds to be expended for CVE in the
annual Operational Plan, led by the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance
Resources, which is used to respond to inquiries from Congress on
foreign assistance programs. We are pleased to provide information to
Congress on these important efforts.
The bi-annual TSCTP report was developed by State and is
implemented based on the recommendations from the GAO report. For
PREACT, State reinvigorated coordination efforts in mid-2015 through
more regular interagency working level and senior-level meetings and a
focus on streamlining processes and procedures across partners.
USAID's CVE program analysis and design calls for periodic
assessments to gather data and often include baseline, midline and
endline assessments. We also work with our implementing partners on
iterative assessments, as conditions on the ground evolve. In addition,
We are investing significant resources to monitor and evaluate CVE
programming, gathering both quantitative and qualitative data, and are
using the lessons learned from these programs to drive effective
approaches to CVE. Our work to build the skills of local partners
includes training on monitoring and evaluation and data collection, as
well as support to local institutions to undertake independent research
and evaluation.
USAID exercises considerable oversight of CVE programming and
ensures our implementing partners are monitoring activities closely.
Monitoring may include random checks and third party monitoring, as
relevant and feasible. Monitoring mechanisms include hiring staff who
speak local languages to conduct monitoring at randomized program
sites. Photos of physical assets are taken to prove the assets we
provide are in fact in place and helping the intended beneficiaries.
responses to questions for the record submitted
to justin siberell by senator perdue
Question 1. According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report released in June of 2014, TSCTP program managers were found to
be ``unable to readily provide data on the status'' of funds expended
for interagency counterterrorism efforts. Additionally, country-
specific spending figures are not routinely reported to Congress for
regional security assistance programs, including TSCTP, PREACT, and
some DoD BPC activities, and such spending is generally not reflected
in Department of State and DoD congressional budget justifications. I
am concerned that a lack of initiative-wide, as well as country-
specific, funding data may inhibit congressional oversight of the
scale, scope, and balance of U.S. engagement and assistance to Africa.
Why is spending data for these programs not routinely collected and
reported to Congress?
What specific steps has State taken to implement GAO's
recommendations on this front?
What plans, if any, does State have in place to improve data
collection and monitoring systems?
What additional resources, if any, would be required for State and
DoD to begin including these funding breakdowns in their
respective congressional budget justifications?
Answer. The GAO has officially closed its recommendations in the
referenced 2014 GAO report. Since the fourth quarter of FY 2014, the
Department of State has coordinated and collected financial data on all
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for
Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) programs, including for
the following accounts: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO);
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR);
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); and
Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Development Assistance (DA). The Bureau
of African Affairs updates and maintains these unclassified financial
data, which include country-specific allocated amounts (control
numbers), obligations, unobligated balances (active funds only),
unliquidated obligations, and expenditures (disbursements).
The Department of State tracks TSCTP and PREACT funds by country
and by account. Country-specific figures are generally not included in
Congressional budget justifications (CBJ) for TSCTP and PREACT to
facilitate flexible and regional programming within each partnership.
As GAO's 2014 review of PREACT notes, ``The regional nature of PREACT
encourages implementing agencies to view counterterrorism from a
regional perspective, rather than country-by-country.''
By not requesting TSCTP and PREACT funds by country, we mitigate
the possibility that partners will feel entitled to a specific amount
of funding, which could potentially arise with bilateral assistance
allocations. When specific amounts of funding are allocated bilaterally
it can become more complicated when changes in circumstances and policy
priorities warrant reprogramming those funds.
The regional nature of TSCTP and PREACT also enables multi-country
trainings, exercises, and other engagements where it can be difficult
to attribute specific costs to one partner nation over another. The
joint participation of Senegalese and Mauritanian law enforcement
officials in AFRICOM's 2016 Exercise FLINTLOCK, supported by TSCTP/
NADR/ATA funds, is one such example. Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian
civilian security force participation in PREACT is another example of
how the Department of State employs resources attributed to these
regional partnerships to enable regional interoperability,
communication, and coordination.
Since 2012, the Department of State has made a concerted effort to
go beyond counting the money and the number of trainings completed
toward more holistic assessments of effects. We have made great strides
in the development of, and are now operationalizing, frameworks for
measuring the results of our security assistance, specifically
counterterrorism programs. The Department of State has hired dedicated
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) personnel to help monitor and evaluate
a number of security assistance programs. The Department of State is
working in close partnership with our DoD colleagues to roll out these
models and facilitate the collection of monitoring data. Similarly, the
Department of State developed a standard CVE monitoring framework and
deployed it across all CVE programs funded by PREACT and TSCTP Economic
Support Funds.
We are also enhancing our knowledge management practices and
sharing these frameworks with other partners working in the same
security assistance space. The goals of these knowledge management
practices are coordinated approaches for understanding the outcomes of
our investments, streamlined implementer efforts, and improved M&E
capacity in our partners.
When the Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) is completed, it
is hard to anticipate the exact needs of partner countries due to the
rapidly evolving nature of the terrorist threats. Thus, we often make
final funding decisions at the time funds are being programmed--often a
couple of years out from the CBJ's preparation. The Department of State
can provide country-specific breakdowns of TSCTP and PREACT funding by
request.
Question 2. Some analysts have posited that government-led
initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism may be backfiring.
For example, in a survey of 95 Kenyans associated with Al Shabaab, 65
percent identified the Kenyan government's counterterrorism strategy as
the most important factor that drove them to join the group. Moreover,
in some cases, violent extremist groups may in fact seek to provoke
violent responses from the government in order to fuel support from
targeted communities.
Do you agree that in some cases, government-led efforts can cause a
backlash among vulnerable populations and actually cause more
violence? That U.S. involvement in these initiatives may also
cause these efforts to backfire?
How, in your opinion, can the U.S. aid countries in their efforts
to counter violent extremism without causing this kind of
backlash?
Answer. Government-led efforts to counter terrorism and violent
extremism may cause a backlash from populations who perceive, or are in
fact subjected to, heavy-handed tactics; this dynamic must be assessed
on a case-by-case basis. U.S. security and counterterrorism assistance
to governments emphasizes the importance upholding broadly accepted
human rights standards, rule of law, and adopting a comprehensive
approach towards improving security that involves civil society and
representatives of marginalized communities.
Our efforts are most effective when the United States partners with
credible actors and messengers in communities at risk for
radicalization to violence. This includes efforts to support better
relations between the partner nation law enforcement communities and
vulnerable populations through more robust community policing programs
and other initiatives that promote dialogue and cooperation between at-
risk communities and security forces.
Question 3. As you know, DoD funding for security assistance in
Africa surpassed that provided by the Department of State for the first
time in FY2014 and has continued to rise since. In the past decade
alone, DoD has notified Congress of $1.3 billion in counterterrorism
training and equipment to African countries.
To what extent, if at all, does DoD coordinate with the State for
counterterrorism efforts under the umbrellas of the Trans-
Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the
Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT)?
Do you agree that DoD should be the primary distributor of training
and equipment in the counterterrorism space? If not, why not?
Do some of the DoD's counterterrorism efforts involve training for
countering violent extremism (CVE)?
Answer. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and
Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) are the
lead U.S. counterterrorism initiatives across East and West Africa. As
the lead for both TSCTP and PREACT, the Department of State relies on
expertise from the entire interagency community for the design,
implementation, and oversight of all programming. In particular, the
Department of State coordinates closely with the Department of Defense
(DoD) on nearly all aspects of TSCTP and PREACT funded programming, as
well as related DoD-led counterterrorism efforts.
Department of State TSCTP and PREACT program coordinators interact
regularly with counterparts at AFRICOM and OSD to develop and de-
conflict programming and maximize interaction of the available funding
and authorities. Where possible, Department of State and DoD
synchronize timelines, share best practices and lessons learned, and
facilitate coordination between embassy personnel and program
implementers. DoD and the Department of State also coordinate closely
on Section 2282 programming, DoD's program aimed at building the
counterterrorism operational capacity of foreign military, national
maritime, or border security forces, which requires dual-key approval
from both Secretaries of Defense and State. Close coordination between
section 2282, TSCTP, PREACT, and other capacity building funding is
necessary to ensure programing is synergistic, not duplicative, and
prioritized to meet strategic priorities.
Additionally, DoD leadership and other Departments and Agencies
participate in DOS-led, Deputy Assistant Secretary-level TSCTP and
PREACT coordination meetings quarterly which provide a forum for senior
level interagency dialogue. DoD also takes part in the annual TSCTP
planning workshop. Likewise, State participates at DoD's invitation in
DoD's annual Africa security cooperation planning events, working
groups, and workshops.
The Department does not agree that DoD should be the primary
distributor of training and equipment in the counterterrorism space.
It is a fundamental U.S. foreign policy goal to build the capacity
of our foreign partners to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Our
success achieving these goals depends on the Department's coordination
of this effort, as a key part of our overall bilateral relationship
with a foreign country. That will ensure that all U.S. government
activities in this space reflect a shared vision and an agreed
framework.
Question 4. DoD expends resources for counterterrorism train-and-
equip programs through the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF).
The President has requested $450 million for FY17--almost 80% of the
total amount allocated from FY15-FY16 combined.
Does DoD or State track the equipment provided through these
programs? If so, how?
Answer. I would refer you to the Department of Defense on the
question of how end use monitoring is conducted on materiel provided
with Title X funding, such as CTPF. For its part, the Department of
State does not ``track'' the equipment provided through such programs
unless Title XXII funding, such as Foreign Military Financing, is
ultimately relied on to sustain such equipment in the long term.
Question 5. What, if anything, is DoD doing to ensure that
equipment provided through these train-and-equip programs does not fall
into the hands of terrorists? Please be as specific as possible.
Answer. I would refer you to the Department of Defense on this
question.
Question. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) has expressed
concern with the ability of many African countries to absorb, sustain,
and responsibly manage the equipment provided through these train-and-
equip programs, and has urged DoD to invest some of its CTPF resources
into building institutional capacity of African partner security
forces. The HASC report on the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) also requests DoD to respond to a series of ``concerns,''
including ``the capacity of nations to absorb and sustain assistance''
and requirements for executive branch congressional notifications for
DoD-administered counterterrorism aid.
Question 6. Do you share the committee's concerns over whether
these countries have the institutional capacity to adequately manage
this equipment?
Answer. Yes. Absorptive capacity--at an institutional, operational,
and fiscal level--remains a key concern for the Department of State
regarding the provision of equipment and other resources to Africa
partner security forces via Title X authorities. As such, the
Department is wary of providing large influxes of one-time funding to
countries with underdeveloped military institutions and limited
resources.
Question 7. What training, if any, does DoD provide for
maintaining security equipment properly to ensure the biggest return on
U.S. investments?
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense.
Question 8. Can Congress expect to see the reports requested on
our partner nations' capacity for maintenance of security assistance
and DoD-administered security aid anytime soon?
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense.
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