[Senate Hearing 114-754]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-754
GLOBAL EFFORTS TO DEFEAT ISIS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 28, 2016
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 2
McGurk, Brett, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global
Coalition to Counter ISIL, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to
Brett McGurk by Senator Marco Rubio........................ 44
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to
Brett McGurk by Senator Barbara Boxer...................... 51
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to
Brett McGurk by Senator Ron Johnson........................ 56
(iii)
GLOBAL EFFORTS TO DEFEAT ISIS
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TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker, Rubio, Johnson, Flake, Gardner,
Perdue, Isakson, Barrasso, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Murphy,
Kaine, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order.
Mr. McGurk, I would like to thank you for again appearing
before the committee. You have always been a direct witness,
and we thank you for that. I think after most of your
testifying, whether classified or in public, most people leave
far more informed than they do with most witnesses, and
hopefully you will live up to that today.
Almost 2 years after we began military operations, ISIS has
lost significant amounts of territory: 47 percent of its
territory in Iraq and 20 percent in Syria, according to your
testimony.
Unfortunately, that progress on the ground creates new
threats to our national interests. As our CIA Director said
this last month, as you continue to make gains, ISIS will
likely intensify its global terror campaign and that the
administration's efforts have not reduced the group's terrorism
capability and global reach.
The New York Times reported recently that 1,200 people
outside of Iraq and Syria have been killed in attacks either
inspired or coordinated by ISIS, and nearly half of those
deaths occurred in attacks targeting Westerners.
In the wake of the recent terrorist attack in Orlando, we
expect you to provide and hope you will provide an honest
assessment of where the global fight against ISIS is going and
address some of the fundamental questions we all have. In
particular, I would like to get your view on what actions the
coalition has taken to counter the increased terror threat
posed by ISIS in spite of the organization's losses in Iraq and
Syria, again which we herald, and how the coalition plans to
actually defeat ISIS militarily.
Some of the other questions I hope you will answer include:
do the Syrian democratic forces--and I think there is a lot of
confusion about the various coalitions that are countering
Assad but also countering ISIS, which is primarily made up of
Kurds with an Arab contingent--have enough people to clear ISIS
from the northern Syria area?
And even if we continue to take back territory from ISIS,
are those gains backed by political progress necessary to
sustain them? Obviously, there are rubs between that group and
others, rubs between that group and Turkey itself. And as we
leave it to its own accord, if you will, with these groups
taking on ISIS in their own ways and taking on Assad in their
own ways, are we really creating something that down the road
is going to take us to a political settlement? Or is success on
the battleground leaving behind the same vacuum that led to
ISIS in the first place?
And finally, how do you reconcile the continued glaring
disparity in Syria between a military campaign focused on ISIS
and a failing diplomatic process dependent upon a transition
from Assad? I do not see how the ISIS coalition can be
successful while the Syrian civil war continues.
This administration has declared that Assad must go, but it
certainly appears as if that position is changing or has
changed. I do not see how what is left of the political process
possibly leads to Assad's departure. And I hope you will really
help us understand what is happening behind the scenes there.
I also fear that in spite of continued attacks on our
homeland, our military response to ISIS does not adequately
reflect the direct nature of this threat to the United States.
I think many of us grow frustrated when the administration's
optimistic rhetoric does not often match the results.
Additionally, much of our reliance on proxies to do the
fighting is creating a range of diplomatic and political
problems that will have ramifications for years to come.
With that, again I want to thank you for your service to
our country. I want to thank you for the way that you talk with
all of us in such a direct manner. We look forward to your
testimony.
With that, our distinguished ranking member, Senator
Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I first join you in welcoming Mr. McGurk here and thanking
him for his service to our country in a critically important
position. And I agree with the chairman's assessment. Every
time you have appeared before our committee, either in open or
closed sessions, we learn a lot and we have a great deal of
confidence in the information that you are presenting to us. So
thank you again for the manner in which you have conducted this
office.
Mr. Chairman, ISIS is a global threat both to the physical
safety and the democratic values we hold dear. It destabilizes
already weak states, inflicts horrible acts of brutality, and
inspires radicalization of individuals to perpetuate terrorism
within their own countries as we and our allies have
experienced.
As we see every day across the Middle East, Europe, and
elsewhere, ISIS attacks and propaganda are designed not only to
kill but to turn communities against one another, Sunnis
against Shia, Muslim against Christian, immigrants against
citizens. To defeat ISIS, we are mobilizing the international
community militarily, economically, and diplomatically to
shrink ISIS's safe havens, expand our humanitarian support, and
combat extremism in all forms, both online and our own
political discourse.
Due to the efforts of the administration, the United States
leads a 66-nation coalition united against the scourge of ISIS
terrorism. In the military sphere, we are shrinking ISIS's safe
havens in places like Fallujah in Iraq, in Manbij, Syria, and
Sirte, Libya. Their flow of foreign fighters has been cut, and
they have lost millions in revenues. Yet, as I am sure our
witness will agree, there is a lot more that needs to be done.
There are no quick answers to this challenge.
These efforts have not been without serious costs. We stand
in solidarity with countries such as Jordan, which suffered
another terrorist attack in recent days. I commend our witness,
Mr. McGurk, for his recent visit to Jordan where he reiterated
our unwavering support to the Jordanian people.
We know our global efforts to fight ISIS will not be easy.
As CIA Director John Brennan recently testified, as ISIS
suffers even heavier losses, it will intensify its global
terror campaign. We have got to be careful about that. We might
be able to contain them on the ground, but then what happens
with global terrorism?
But we must remain steadfast and redouble our efforts
especially in the newly liberated areas formerly held by ISIS.
In Fallujah, as we speak, tens of thousands of people who have
been freed from ISIS captivity are now living in displacement
camps in horrible conditions under intense summer desert heat.
I commend our administration's recent pledge to provide an
additional $20 million in humanitarian aid to the United
Nations High Commissioner on Refugees' Iraq response. But more
needs to be done. I call on our other partner nations,
especially those in the Arab Gulf States to assist Fallujah
residents desperately needing water, sanitation, food, and
shelter. We cannot let those who have fled ISIS suffer even
more.
On July 20th, the United States will join with Canada,
Germany, and Japan to co-host a pledging conference in
Washington. This is a critical opportunity for the
international community to continue to support humanitarian and
stabilization efforts in Iraq.
In addition to our humanitarian efforts, our coalition must
work harder on long-term reconstruction and reconciliation
efforts. In the absence of effective services, fair political
participation and good governance, the defeat of this version
of ISIS will only lead to another. The real weapon against ISIS
and their ilk comes not just from the barrel of a gun but from
the ballot box, the schoolhouse, the courts, and a growing
economy. Prime Minister Abadi needs international aid now to
rebuild Ramadi and Fallujah, and he needs international support
to keep spoilers such as Iran from its interference in Iraqi
politics.
Let me conclude with this. As I stated earlier, ISIS
challenges not only our physical well-being but our principles
of pluralism and openness. Let us commit not only to defeating
ISIS on the battlefield but defeating their poisonous narrative
of division. We are all in this fight together no matter what
your religion, sexual orientation, or nationality. If we are
truly going to fight ISIS globally, then we must fight the
forces of divisiveness at home and abroad.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our witness.
The Chairman. Thank you so much for those comments and your
leadership.
With that, Mr. McGurk is Special Presidential Envoy for the
Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. You business card must be
very large.
We thank you for being here today. I know that you realize
you can summarize your comments, if you wish. Your written
testimony, without objection, will be entered into the record.
And with that, thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF BRETT McGURK, SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY FOR THE
GLOBAL COALITION TO COUNTER ISIL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. McGurk. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member
Cardin, members of the committee. I want to thank you for
inviting me to speak to you today with an update on our global
campaign to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant, or
ISIL.
This hearing takes place within weeks of the mass murder
against innocent Americans in Orlando, Florida. And as Director
Brennan testified last week, this criminal act was an assault
on the values of openness and tolerance that define us as a
free nation. And we join the family and friends in mourning the
loss of their loved ones and we wish a full and speedy recovery
to the wounded.
While there has been no connection between the killer and
these attacks and ISIL central abroad, the attacks underscore
the imperative need to defeat ISIL at its core in Iraq and
Syria and across its global networks.
I just returned from a visit to Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and
Israel.
In Jordan, as Senator Cardin mentioned, I met with our
close partner, King Abdullah, just 1 day after an ISIL suicide
bomber killed seven Jordanian soldiers guarding their border.
In Egypt, Egyptian forces are engaged in a struggle against
an ISIL branch in the Sinai, and we have offered our support
and assistance.
In Israel, ISIL's propaganda has sought recently to inspire
attacks to compensate for losses of manpower and territory, and
we must not allow them to succeed.
And in Iraq, on the front lines, Iraqi forces with our
support and assistance are rooting out ISIL's strongholds one
by one, most recently just this past week in Fallujah where
ISIL had held a population hostage for over 30 months.
My statement today will highlight the progress we are
making against ISIL, but that progress cannot discount the
threats that remain nor diminish the truly unprecedented nature
of a challenge that now confronts much of the world.
We analyze ISIL in three dimensions: the core in Iraq and
Syria; the networks that feed its strength, foreign fighter
networks, propaganda networks, and financial networks; and the
global affiliates. There are eight in all that seek to expand
its reach with Libya and the Sinai being the most significant.
Our global campaign plan, bringing together a coalition of
66 partners from around the world, seeks to defeat ISIL in each
of these three areas. My written statement notes the indicators
that we track, many of which are now trending in the right
direction.
Foreign fighters are down and more countries than ever
before sharing information to identify those who are still
traveling.
Outside financing has been severed, and internal financing
has taken a significant hit through painstaking intelligence
work and precision targeting by military forces in Iraq and
Syria.
ISIL's propaganda and messaging is now being challenged 24/
7 through a global network of countries, civil society
organizations, private companies, and individuals.
ISIL's leaders are either in hiding or being killed now at
a rate of one every 3 days, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's
main deputies, terrorists named Haji Imam and Abu Sayyaf,
killed by U.S. military forces.
And ISIL's territory is shrinking, losing nearly 50 percent
of territory once controlled in Iraq and 20 percent in Syria
over the last 18 months.
What makes ISIL different from other terrorist
organizations is its attempt to hold territory and establish a
state-like entity in Iraq and Syria, what it proclaims is a
self-declared and phony caliphate. This notion of a caliphate
has been a primary driver in recruitment for the tens of
thousands of foreign fighters that have joined ISIL in Syria
and Iraq. The territory it controls also allows ISIL to extract
vast resources and, most importantly for us, plan and launch
highly sophisticated external attacks. The attacks we have seen
in Brussels and Paris, for example, we believe stem from ISIL's
external plotting network, which is based in Raqqa and has sent
operatives from Syria to Europe through what is known as the
Manbij Pocket.
That is why we must take the territory away from ISIL and,
just as important, stabilize areas after ISIL, as you
mentioned, Mr. Chairman. I would like to highlight briefly how
we are doing so, pointing to three areas on the map that I had
attached to my written testimony.
Number one on the map is the Manbij Pocket. 3 weeks ago, a
coalition led by the Manbij Military Council--and these are
local people seeking to liberate their own territory from
ISIL--launched an attack across the Euphrates River with the
mission to liberate the strategic City of Manbij. This force is
approximately 3,500 strong, and it is made up primarily of
Arabs, nearly 80 percent Arab, with Kurds and advice and
assistance being provided by our special forces.
Putting together this coalition took painstaking work,
military and diplomatic, but the results thus far are
promising. The forces liberated 1,000 square kilometers and has
begun to push into Manbij City neighborhood by neighborhood. As
they move, they are acquiring a great deal of information on
the ISIL foreign fighter network. We believe this model,
recruiting local forces and providing them support to liberate
their own areas as they model for future operations to isolate
Raqqa.
From the other end of the Manbij Pocket, moderate opposite
groups are beginning to push east against ISIL. This has been
and will remain a tough fight. ISIL is ordered to fight to the
death, but now that we are moving on two fronts, ISIL defenses
are beginning to degrade, and we are hopeful that coalition-
backed forces can take this territory away from ISIL entirely.
Number five on the map is Mosul. Iraqi and Kurdish
Peshmerga forces have launched a series of operations
coordinated from a joint base in Makhmour where we tragically
lost a U.S. marine last month. These operations, one of which
just south of Mosul is ongoing at this hour, are setting the
conditions for the isolation and ultimate liberation of Mosul.
Mosul will be a significant military challenge but also a
political, diplomatic, and humanitarian challenge. The planning
is now underway.
Last week in Erbil in the Iraqi Kurdistan region, I was
invited, together with our talented Ambassador Stu Jones, to
attend a meeting with President Masoud Barzani and Faleh Fayad,
the Iraqi National Security Advisor, to address the difficult
political and humanitarian challenges of the Mosul campaign.
This is one of the more positive meetings I have attended in
Iraq, with all sides focused on the coming liberation of Mosul
and what must be done, including the need for diverse
communities in Iraq to work together. The Iraqi Government
agreed in this meeting to pay and equip 15,000 local fighters
from Ninewa Province for the Mosul campaign, representing
Arabs, Kurds, Shabaks, Christians, and Yazidis. Many of these
fighters have already been identified and our coalition will
proudly help train them.
There is also emerging consensus on the basic stabilization
arrangements for Mosul after ISIL, building on a model that has
worked in Tikrit and now underway in Anbar with local leaders
empowered to restore life to their communities and return the
population with significant backing and support from our global
coalition.
Finally, in Anbar, numbers 7 and 8 on the map, Iraqi
forces, together with over 20,000 local tribal fighters, have
over the past few months alone liberated Ramadi, Fallujah, Hit,
Rutbah and broke a 2-year siege of the City of Haditha. This is
significant progress, testament to our coalition's training of
Iraqi forces who have not lost a battle now in over a year and
key decisions by Prime Minister Abadi to empower the local
people in Anbar in their own liberation from ISIL.
This is not to overshadow the serious problems that have
occurred, including reports of human rights abuses and caring
for IDPs. But there the Iraqi Government has taken immediate
measures to address problems, holding people accountable for
abuse and flowing resources where they are needed.
There is much work to do, particularly in Fallujah where
IDPs last week overwhelmed the capacity of local responders.
Thanks to quick decisions in Baghdad and here in Washington,
tens of millions of dollars in aid is now flowing to these
refugee camps, and the U.N. is hopeful to begin returns next
month. As Senator Cardin mentioned, we will also host a very
important pledging conference on July 20th here in Washington
to generate the resources that are needed to care for these
people.
Returning people to their homes is a key priority for our
coalition, and to date in Iraq, 770,000 people have returned to
areas liberated from ISIL, including 95 percent of the
population of Tikrit, thanks to the support from the Iraqi
Government and a stabilization fund from our coalition.
Accordingly, as we look to accelerate the defeat of ISIL in
these areas, we are equally focused most importantly on what
comes after ISIL, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, and ensuring
its defeat is lasting.
In sum, we have made progress over the last year against
ISIL, but there is a great deal we have left to do on the
ground in Iraq and Syria, here at home, and around the world
against this unprecedented challenge.
And I am grateful for the opportunity again to appear
before you, and I am happy to address your questions.
[Mr. McGurk's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brett H. McGurk
introduction
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, esteemed members of the
committee, thank you for providing me the opportunity to update you on
our global campaign to defeat ISIL.
The fight against ISIL is an unprecedented challenge. More than
40,000 foreign fighters have flowed into Syria over the past five
years, swelling the ranks of violent extremist organizations, the most
significant of which is ISIL. ISIL is determined to establish a state
in Iraq and Syria, and instill terror around the world as part of a
perverse agenda, whereby, according to their own ideology, anyone who
disagrees with them should die. We have no choice but to defeat ISIL by
taking away its territory in Iraq and Syria, severing its global
networks, and suffocating its global affiliates.
I will describe today the progress we are making in all of these
areas, but this progress does not discount the significant threat that
remains, and will remain, for years to come. As an entire government,
and as a country, we must remain vigilant, committed to a sustainable,
global, and long-term effort to defeat ISIL, and ensure that other
violent extremist groups, such as Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaida's official
affiliate in Syria, cannot rise from its ashes.
The support of this Committee and the Congress will be essential to
our success, and it is my honor to appear before you again for an
update on our campaign.
diagnosing the isil threat
We analyze the ISIL challenge in three dimensions: the core in Iraq
and Syria (its phony self-proclaimed ``caliphate''); the global
networks (foreign fighter, financial, and messaging networks); and the
global affiliates (eight in all, with some far more serious than
others). Any successful campaign must address all three, and our global
effort, anchored by a coalition of 66 partners, is designed to do just
that.
At the same time, the ISIL core remains its center of gravity,
allowing ISIL to extract resources, recruit, and plan sophisticated
external terrorist attacks, as we have seen in Paris and Brussels.
Thus, we are focused first and foremost on shrinking the core,
uprooting ISIL from the cities, towns, and villages under its control,
and destroying its underlying infrastructure, including the human
capital of its leaders, now being eliminated one-by-one.
current assessment
In July 2014, I testified before this committee as ISIL was
expanding its territory, threatening Baghdad, and appeared unstoppable.
The situation today is measurably different. ISIL has not launched a
significant offensive in over a year; it is losing cities--Tikrit,
Ramadi, Fallujah, Hit, Shadadi, and soon, Manbij--that were central to
its rise; and the coalition-backed forces arrayed against it are
increasingly confident and on offense, with our support.
I have included an annotated map as an attachment to this
testimony, which points to our focus areas in the core, and
demonstrates that we are now able to apply multiple points of pressure
at once, from Manbij, to Fallujah, to Mosul. ISIL is under more
pressure than ever before, and we will ensure that it increases
dramatically over the coming weeks.
To assess the current situation, I will briefly review eight
indicators that we track week-to-week to determine where we may need
more focused efforts, and how the campaign is doing overall. These
indicators are not exhaustive, but provide a decent top-line overview
of what remains an extraordinarily complex, dynamic, and fast-moving
situation on the ground.
1. Morale
ISIL's morale is plummeting. We have seen credible reports of ISIL
executing its own fighters on the battlefield. Whereas it once claimed
to represent the people under its control, it is now executing anyone
seeking to leave its control. Whereas it once massed and maneuvered at
will across Iraq and Syria, it can no longer operate in the open,
train, or communicate. Whereas it once promised lavish pay for
recruits, and free services in its ``caliphate,'' it is now slashing
pay, cannot provide services, and is facing internal resistance. We
know from other sources, as well, that ISIL fighters are panicking on
the battlefield, foreign recruits are now looking to return home, and
leaders are struggling to maintain discipline, even despite the threat
of execution for disobedience.
This picture from the ground level is also apparent in ISIL's own
propaganda. Whereas ISIL once promised paradise with staged and sun-
drenched scenes from Raqqa and Mosul, ISIL's own leaders now
acknowledge they could lose Raqqa and Mosul.
ISIL spokesman Muhammad al-Adnani, for example, has for years
described ISIL as a global, historic, expanding movement. His
catchphrase was ``remain and expand''--describing the territory under
its control--and he promised ISIL would someday dominate the Middle
East and ultimately control territory in southern Europe.
Adnani's latest statement in May was quite different. No longer the
confident voice of an expanding movement, he acknowledged that ISIL may
lose its holdings in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, including its strongholds
of Mosul, Raqqa, and Sirte. We are now working to ensure that his
prediction comes true, and that Adnani himself--who also leads ISIL's
external operations arm--is eliminated, and no longer able to spew his
incitement.
2. Territory
Territory is not the only indicator that matters, but it
significant for three reasons:
First, territory, with millions of people under ISIL control,
allows ISIL to extract resources, fund external operations, and
embed its violent and genocidal system of control, raping
women, murdering LGBT individuals, indoctrinating children, and
brutally executing anyone who resists.
Second, territory allows ISIL to proclaim itself as vanguard
of a historic ``caliphate,'' which more than anything else we
have seen, drives recruiting from around the world.
Third, and most important, territory and safe haven allow
ISIL to plan future operations against our partners, and our
own homeland, such as the suicide attacks in Paris, Brussels,
and Ankara, which were planned in Raqqa with the support of
logistics nodes in and around Manbij.
For all of these reasons, we must pressure ISIL in the areas it
controls, and then take those areas away from ISIL altogether. I have
included an attached map to guide the briefing on how and where we are
comprehensively shrinking ISIL's territory.
The trajectory is positive. ISIL has not had a major battlefield
victory in over a year. It has lost 47 percent of its territory in
Iraq, and 20 percent in Syria. More important than percentages,
however, is the strategic nature of the territory that ISIL has lost:
nearly the entire border between Syria and Turkey, iconic cities like
Ramadi, Tikrit, and Fallujah, and all the major transit points between
Raqqa and Mosul, such as Sinjar, Hawl and Shahdadi (number three and
four on the attached map), are no longer controlled by ISIL.
We are now working with local partners to shrink this territory
further, through a combination of military, political, and security
measures. I will highlight three areas where active ISIL offensives are
now underway:
Manbij Pocket
First, is the ``Manbij Pocket,'' labeled number one on the
map. This has long been the last stretch of territory with
access to an international border, allowing foreign fighters to
transit in and out of Syria. We commend Turkey for taking
measures to tighten the border on the north side, but the
threat will not reduce until the territory inside Syria is
taken away from ISIL. That is what we are now doing.
Three weeks ago, the Syrian Democratic Forces--a mix of
Syrian Kurds, Arabs, Syriac Christians, and Turkmen--launched a
surprise attack from the east, crossing the Euphrates River and
then rapidly enveloping Manbij city. As we speak, these
fighters are now entering the city limits, under cover of
coalition air support. ISIL has threatened to kill civilians
leaving the city, and ordered a fight to the death. This has
only reaffirmed the importance of this operation, which is on
track to succeed.
This operation against Manbij was planned for months with
military and political components. In my visits to Kobani,
Erbil, and Sulaimaniya, I met the leaders of the military
alliance now leading the offensive. Named the Manbij Military
Council, it is 3,500 strong, over 80 percent Arab, mostly from
the local area, fighting to free their own hometowns. This is a
core premise of our strategy for liberating territory: we want
local people, with local knowledge, in the operations to free
their communities from ISIL, and stabilize the areas after ISIL
is gone.
It took time to build this inclusive alliance, but the
results on the ground, thus far, are promising, and provide a
model as we look to isolate Raqqa--likely the next phase of
operations after Manbij--with a predominantly Arab and locally-
grown force.
The Manbij operation is also proving what we knew going in:
that this area was a locus of ISIL's foreign fighter and
external plotting network. Of the more than 1,000 ISIL fighters
killed in this operation thus far, we believe nearly half are
foreign fighters, and we are collecting information along the
way on how ISIL's foreign fighter networks are organized and
led.
From the other end of the Manbij pocket, we are working with
moderate opposition groups to push east across what is known as
the ``Mari Line'' (the extent of ISIL's westward advance). This
effort had struggled--ISIL had the area heavily defended--
before we launched the second front across the Euphrates, which
pulled ISIL fighters away and allowed our moderate partners to
advance.
We will continue to resource both offensives, and we are
committed to collapsing ISIL within this pocket, an objective
that is central to our own national security. We are also
working, in coordination with Turkey, to ensure that local
mistrust between elements in both offensives can be overcome,
and humanitarian aid can flow into these areas as soon as they
are liberated.
Anbar Province
Second, in Iraq's Anbar province, parts of which had been
dominated by ISIL for nearly two years, Iraqi security forces
and local tribes have recently liberated Ramadi, Hit, central
Fallujah, Rutbah, and broke the siege of Haditha, where Sunni
tribes held out heroically against ISIL since the summer of
2014. Adnani, the ISIL spokesman, once boasted that Haditha
tribes would be wiped off the map, and that fathers would bring
their sons to Haditha and say ``this is where the Jughayfa (a
leading tribe) once stood.'' In fact, Haditha, like Kobani in
Syria, broke the back of ISIL and sparked the momentum we are
now seeing across Anbar province.
This would not have been possible without local support, and
we commend the Government of Iraq and Prime Minister Haidar al
Abadi for supporting a program of tribal mobilization in Anbar
province. There are now 20,000 Sunni tribal fighters working
with Iraqi forces to clear and hold territory, in addition to
over 14,000 local police across the province. We have been
proud to support this program, together with our coalition
partners, at two facilities in Anbar, one on Al Asad airbase
near Haditha, and one at Taqadum airbase between Ramadi and
Fallujah.
The results are impressive and now must be sustained. We have
worked closely with the Government of Iraq to ensure that
tribal fighters are embedded into the state security structure,
thereby correcting a defect in the Anbar ``awakening'' model
from 2007 and 2008, which was hugely successful, but more ad
hoc and sustained with U.S. support. The Iraqis have allocated
resources to these new fighters, and woven their ongoing
support into their national budget, passed by the Iraqi
parliament, thereby helping to ensure ongoing and long-term
support.\1\
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\1\ Article 40 of the 2016 Iraqi Budget Law guarantees that a
minimum of thirty percent of the ``Popular Mobilization Forces'' must
be comprised of locals from the provinces where the GOI is fighting
ISIL. As a result, the GOI has enrolled, and continues to pay and
equip, over 30,000 Sunni Arab volunteers across Iraq with the number
likely to grow to 45,000. In this regard, the Iraqi mobilization
program takes ownership over enlisting local Sunnis into the fight
against ISIL--a principle we must ensure is sustained long after the
battles against ISIL are won.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Fallujah, Iraqi forces broke through the crust of ISIL's
defenses last week and on Sunday announced the full liberation
of the city. I was in Iraq last week and met with Anbar's
governor, and two months ago met with the most prominent
Fallujah sheikhs, all of whom pleaded with us to support their
city's liberation. We have been proud to do so, not only with
military support, but also with an Italian-led training program
for local police to secure the city when military operations
cease, a $100 million nation-wide coalition-funded
stabilization program to help return people to their homes, a
$20 million allocation in humanitarian aid to reinforce the UN-
led effort to manage the flow of Fallujah residents escaping
ISIL's brutality, and a comprehensive mine clearance program.
The Fallujah operation has not been perfect. This is among
the toughest places to fight in all of Iraq, and ISIL had
controlled the city for over 2.5 years. There were concerning
reports of abuses against civilians in the early stages of the
operation, and the outflow of people initially overwhelmed the
UN and humanitarian organizations. This was a primary focus of
my visit to Iraq last week, and while we are encouraged by the
immediate response to reports of abuse, and the infusion of
resources to support IDPs, more must be done, and we have
called on all of our coalition partners to help.
Stabilizing areas after ISIL can be even more important than
clearing areas from ISIL. We are encouraged that, thus far in
the campaign, no significant territory liberated by coalition-
backed forces has been reclaimed by ISIL. Anbar is case-in-
point: we have focused from the beginning, even when the
situation seemed nearly hopeless, on investing local people in
their own liberation, pooling coalition resources on
stabilization needs, and working with the Government of Iraq to
invest local leaders with authority to revitalize populated
areas that had been devastated by ISIL.
We are focused now on reopening the Baghdad-Amman highway
through Rutbah and the Trebil crossing (number eight on the
attached map). This was a key topic of discussion in my
meetings last week with Prime Minister Abadi in Baghdad, and
then King Abdullah II in Amman. This highway before ISIL
contributed to 20 percent of Jordan's exports and nearly $100
million per month in trade; thus, reopening it is a main
priority to help economically shore up some of our main allies
in the region.
We are also working to return people to their homes in
Ramadi, a process that has been slowed by ISIL's planting booby
traps and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in civilian homes
as well as considerable damage to infrastructure in the city as
a result of ISIL's occupation. Tragically, of 60,000 initial
returnees, nearly 100 were killed due to bombs planted in their
homes, a tactic that once again reveals the lie that ISIL
claims to represent the Sunnis of Anbar. In reality, ISIL has
been focused on killing Sunnis to gain power, but lost the
battle, and littered homes with bombs to keep life from
returning to places like Ramadi.
Thanks to coalition contributions, a U.S. company, JANUS, is
now overseeing the painstaking work of clearing Ramadi of booby
traps, and preparing the ground for stabilization projects. We
are aiming to repeat in Ramadi and then in Fallujah what we
ultimately saw in Tikrit, where 95 percent of the population
has returned to their homes after ISIL. Life there is returning
to the streets, with local police in charge, businesses
restarting, the university open, and Iraqi-led rebuilding
projects underway.
Ninewa and Mosul
All of this sets the stage for what will be the greatest
challenge to ISIL as we know it: the liberation of Mosul. For
the past six months we have been working with local forces in
Iraq and Syria to isolate Mosul from its supply routes in
Syria. Operations in Hawl, Shahdadi, and Sinjar, helped cut
roadways between Raqqa and Mosul, forcing ISIL leaders onto
back roads, where they are easily targeted.
Last week, Iraqi forces began an operation from the south to
cut ISIL's access points and sever the connections with areas
ISIL still controls, such as the small towns of Hawija and
Sharqat in Kirkuk and Salah Ad Din provinces. This operation is
now underway and making considerable progress, enabled by
Apache helicopters and other accelerants authorized by the
President in April.
But Mosul is not simply a military challenge. It is a
political, economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian challenge
that, if not done right, may well outstrip the capacity of the
Iraqi government, and the Kurdistan Regional Government, to
manage alone. The only way it can succeed is if everybody--
Iraqi forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, and local fighters from
Ninewa--work together as part of a coordinated political-
military plan.
I am pleased to report that this is now coming together. Late
last year, the Iraqis established a joint headquarters facility
at Makhmour, to the southeast of Mosul (near number five on the
map). U.S. Marines arrived to support this joint operations
center in February, and we tragically lost one of our Marines
there in March. These heroic Marines together with our Special
Forces advisors have helped Iraqi and Kurdish Peshmerga forces
begin to turn the tide south of Mosul, enabling successful
operations to seize villages and strategic territory held by
ISIL since 2014.
The military advances have finally enabled the political
planning that is essential to getting ISIL out of Mosul and
stabilizing Mosul after ISIL. Last week, President of the Iraqi
Kurdistan Region, Masoud Barzani, held a historic meeting with
Iraq's National Security Advisor, Faleh Fayyad, to discuss all
aspects of the Mosul campaign. Barzani and Fayyad invited the
U.S. to attend, and I was pleased to represent the United
States, together with our terrific ambassador, Stu Jones.
This meeting began to solidify planning, to include
authorization and funding for 15,000 local fighters from Ninewa
to take part in the operation--building on the model that has
worked in Anbar--as well as the political arrangements after
ISIL.
We are also working through the coalition to ensure resources
are ready to support internally displaced persons (IDPs) from
Mosul and lay the groundwork for their return and stabilization
after ISIL. Next month at the State Department, we will co-host
with Canada, Germany, and Japan, a pledging conference to
support specific humanitarian and stabilization needs in this
regard.
There is a great deal of work left to do, and we will not put
a timeline on the Mosul operation. But with momentum now on our
side, it is safer to say that ISIL's days in Mosul--where it
proclaimed its phony caliphate to the world--are numbered.
Southern Syria
As we squeeze ISIL out of its strongholds in Iraq and Syria,
we must remain focused on southern Syria, where it may attempt
to fill empty spaces and threaten our partner Jordan. I was in
Amman last week, meeting with His Majesty King Abdullah II and
his national security team, the day after an ISIL attack killed
seven Jordanian soldiers on their border. I expressed our
profound condolences for those lost in this attack, and pledged
unwavering support for Jordan and its Armed Forces.
Jordan has done its part in housing nearly 630,000 UN-
registered refugees and their capacity has reached a limit.
Near the site of the attack last week, approximately 60,000 to
100,000 Syrians are located in a tent city inside Syria across
a berm from the Jordanian border. This is not Jordan's problem
alone; it is an international problem, and one the
international community must work with Jordan urgently to
resolve.
We are supporting moderate opposition fighters in this region
of southern Syria (number nine on the map) to pressure ISIL and
help the defense in-depth of Jordan. These brave fighters have
suffered ISIL vehicle bomb attacks, and last week, Russian jets
bombed the camp, claiming not to know who was there. We have
found Russian explanations of this attack to lack merit, and
while there is now a ``no strike'' box over the area, the
episode once again called into question Russian intentions in
Syria.
Finally, we are working to root out an ISIL presence in the
SW tri-border region of Syria adjacent to Jordan and the Golan
Heights (number ten on the map). ISIL's media statements in
recent months, as they suffer losses on the battlefield, have
focused on Israel as a target, clearly hoping to generate
international headlines to compensate for its defeats. We must
not allow this to happen. Last week, I stood at the border,
where ISIL positions and training facilities were visible in
the distance.
The State Department earlier this month designated the ISIL
affiliate in this area, formally known as Yarmouk Martyrs
Brigade, as a specially designated global terrorist entity, and
we are now working with moderate opposition groups to free
Syrians under its grip from their barbaric rule.
We cannot permit ISIL to re-establish a presence anywhere in
Syria, let alone on the borders of our closest friends.
3. Combat-Ready Fighters
ISIL's access to fighters has steadily diminished, now at the
lowest point we have seen since the summer of 2014. We currently
estimate that ISIL fields 18-22,000 overall fighters in Iraq and Syria,
the lowest assessed range since we began conducting rigorous reviews of
its manpower. This is down from a high-end estimate of 33,000 ISIL
fighters in 2014. We are also seeing significant reduction in the flow
of foreign fighters entering Syria and Iraq each month, and we are
working through our coalition to identify and ensure that ISIL
affiliated fighters cannot travel across borders. In short, we are
making it harder for them to travel into Syria, and once there, making
sure they can never leave.
This is painstaking work, requiring coordination across borders,
and between executive and legislative branches. In September 2014, the
President chaired a UN Security Council meeting to adopt the Chapter
VII Resolution 2178, which calls on all states to take measures to
deter travel of foreign fighters. Since then, our engagement with
Middle Eastern and European partners has achieved results through
increased information-sharing, better border security, improved
counter-terrorism laws, counter-messaging, and improved cooperation
between law enforcement and intelligence services.
Since the adoption of UNSCR 2178, more than 40 at risk countries
have enacted laws or amendments to enhance obstacles for foreign
terrorist fighters traveling into Iraq and Syria. At least 38 countries
have reported arresting foreign terrorist fighters or aspirants, and 30
countries have successfully prosecuted foreign terrorist fighters,
including the United States. In the United States, my colleagues at
Department of Homeland Security and the FBI assess that over 250 U.S.
citizens have joined or tried to join ISIL.
We must remain vigilant, here at home, and around the world. The
United States now has information-sharing agreements with 55
international partners to assist efforts to identify, track, and deter
the travel of suspected terrorists. Equally important, 58 countries,
plus the United Nations, now contribute foreign fighter profiles to
INTERPOL, and there has been a 500-percent increase in suspected
foreign fighter identities in the INTERPOL database. Through our global
coalition, we are discussing with INTERPOL how to appropriately
incorporate foreign fighter data from the battlefield, ensuring that
terrorists who manage to leave Syria can be identified in a routine
traffic stop or at border entry, or those who die in Syria can be
identified to map domestic contacts.
In addition, The European Union parliament in April issued an EU-
wide directive to expand the Passenger Name Record (PNR) database,
which would require more systematic collection, use, and retention of
data on international airline passengers. This is an important step to
ensure the interoperability of data systems across the EU so foreign
fighters and terrorists can be tracked in real time, allowing law
enforcement, intelligence agencies, and border security to foil ISIL
attacks.
4. Access to Revenue
ISIL's revenues are overwhelmingly generated from the territory it
controls, primarily from oil extraction and taxation/extortion of local
citizens. This picture was not clear when we began the campaign in
2014, but through raids by our Special Operators inside Syria, and
incredible work by our unsung intelligence analysts, the U.S.
Government has been able to map ISIL's resource stream, and then,
systematically, destroy it.
Under Operation Tidal Wave II--which aims to degrade and destroy
ISIL's energy assets--the Coalition has carried out precision strikes
against oil fields, infrastructure, oil-tanker trucks, banks, and cash
storage sites that sustain ISIL's war effort. This phase of the
campaign was preceded by many months of planning from across the U.S.
Government. We sometimes hear that we just need to ``bomb the oil
fields'' as if there is a simple military solution to this challenge;
in fact, the military effort is the sharp end of the spear, and its
success depends on hard-earned intelligence, careful analysis, and
target development.
Because we took a systematic approach to this problem, the
operations against ISIL's economic infrastructure have been quite
successful to date. ISIL was forced to halve fighter salaries in Raqqa
and is detaining its own senior officials for trying to steal cash and
gold. This has created a virtuous cycle: terrorist fighters are not
paid, their supplies run low, they have less will to fight, and they
are more easily defeated. Since the strikes against cash storage sites
in Mosul, we have seen fighters thin out, with fewer checkpoints, and
increasing reports of ISIL leaders executing their own rank-and-file
for poor discipline.
This pressure will only increase. Just a couple of weeks ago
outside Mosul, coalition strikes destroyed 600 oil transport trucks.
Since these strikes began, trucks no longer line up at oil fields, and
truck drivers are demanding higher pay to take on the risk of
transporting ISIL oil, thereby increasing costs, reducing revenues, and
making it even more difficult for ISIL to generate revenue from, or to
use, energy resources.
At the same time, we continue to take out ISIL's cash storage
sites, destroying their ability to pay fighters and sustain operations.
In total, we have conducted more than 120 strikes on ISIL cash centers
and oil infrastructure, and this number will continue to rise. We have
also worked closely with Coalition partners in the region, particularly
the Government of Iraq, to cut off ISIL's access to the international
financial system and to disrupt its ability to move and store funds.
ISIL is an adaptive organization, however, and it is working to
adapt to this pressure. It is our mission to adapt faster than they do,
and continue the relentless pressure across the breadth and width of
their operations. We are currently undergoing a careful assessment of
ISIL's adaptation to our campaign, and as they adapt, we will respond
aggressively.
5. Access to Borders
As noted above, ISIL now controls only a 98-kilometer strip of an
international border in Syria, and it is shrinking. The loss of access
to this border will deprive ISIL of its only route for material and
foreign fighters, as well as degrade its ability to plan and launch
external attacks. We know that many of the Paris attackers, for
example, entered Turkey from this strip of border, and later flowed
northward to Europe. This is unacceptable, and we must make every
effort to shut it down these areas entirely to ISIL.
We are also supporting our NATO-ally Turkey on their side of the
border to enhance border defense, utilize technology for monitoring,
and implement effective systems to eliminate the flow of foreign
fighters. It is impossible to seal the border entirely, but we have
seen a marked increase in Turkish defenses, and ISIL propaganda has
even appealed to its recruits not to travel into Syria, but instead,
head to Libya.
They will find an inhospitable welcome in Libya. The Libyans are
rejecting ISIL en masse, and what Adnani promised would be another
citadel of his self-proclaimed caliphate is facing resistance from GNA-
aligned Libyan forces and is now an isolated and shrinking piece of one
city on the central coast, Sirte. In the last two weeks alone, multiple
offensives by forces aligned with the Libyan Government of National
Accord (GNA) advanced rapidly towards Sirte and now have the city
surrounded. These fighters have suffered casualties, but they have kept
moving forward. If the GNA and Prime Minister Sarraj request support
from the international community, and the counter-ISIL coalition, it
will find many willing partners. The international community and our
global coalition have united in support of the GNA.
6. Capable and Confident Leadership
Two years ago, around this time, I was in Iraq when Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi pronounced the establishment of a ``caliphate'' from the
largest mosque in Mosul. It was Ramadan, and the announcement, despite
being denounced by thousands of Muslim leaders and scholars from around
the world, spiked ISIL recruiting and the confidence of its adherents
as a historic movement on the march. Baghdadi and other leaders
throughout the summer of 2014 were appearing in the open, speaking, and
recruiting.
I just returned from another trip to Iraq. It is Ramadan once
again. Yet, we have not heard from the so-called ``Caliph'' in more
than six months. This Ramadan is being celebrated not by Baghdadi, but
by millions of Iraqis taking the streets each night as ISIL and its
leaders have retreated to the shadows.
We have no evidence that Baghdadi is dead, but many of his deputies
are. We have killed more than 100 mid-to-senior level ISIL leaders in
the past few months alone, and the key deputies for Baghdadi in 2014,
terrorists known as Abu Sayaf and Hajji Iman, have been killed by U.S.
military forces. Baghdadi is not far behind.
In short, whereas ISIL once had leaders exhorting fighters in the
open, making public addresses, and mocking the civilized world, its
leaders are now dead, or in hiding, and issuing written orders for
inexperienced fighters to launch desperate missions against the
increasingly confident and capable forces arrayed against them. We will
work to make sure these trends continue.
7. Media
As ISIL loses leaders, territory, and resources, its message
appears to be having less resonance online. We are countering its
message 24/7, with coalition efforts led by UK, UAE, and Malaysia,
providing counter-content with localized focus for different regions of
the world. I have visited the Sawab (``Right Path'') Center in UAE,
which is led by smart and energetic young people determined to defeat
ISIL in cyberspace, and they are succeeding, with innovative media
campaigns focused on ISIL defectors, and the truth behind what ISIL
promises versus what it delivers on the ground, especially for women.
In the United States, the Global Engagement Center (GEC)
coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes government-wide
communications activities to counter ISIL's messaging. The GEC also
help provide assistance with content development platforms, and
amplifying effective voices against the perverse ISIL narrative.
Twitter recently announced that it has eliminated nearly 125,000
ISIL-related or ISIL-affiliated ``handles,'' and that number is
growing. Facebook and YouTube are similarly removing ISIL-related
content from their platforms. Within the coalition, we have widely
publicized how anyone can report ISIL content on-line, so that
platforms can remove it if the content violates a platform's terms of
service, which it often does.
These efforts are having an impact. Pro-ISIL content is down and
anti-ISIL content is up. Whereas ISIL two years ago had nearly free
rein in cyberspace, today, there are reportedly six people opposing
ISIL's message online for each person supporting it. We need these
numbers to increase, and recognize that the most effective voices are
not governments, but individuals, with their own first-hand accounts of
the horror under ISIL rule. As these stories increase, ISIL's message
is on defense, and it is our job to help keep it that way.
The Muslim world is also fighting the ideological battle. Shortly
after Baghdadi declared himself ``caliph,'' 120 Muslim scholars from
around the world released an open letter challenging and denouncing
ISIL's philosophy. The scholars took ISIL's false claims one-by-one,
using evidence directly from the Quran to illustrate how Baghdadi's
whims run counter to the teachings of Islam. More and more Muslims are
taking to the Internet and public spaces to counter ISIL's brand of
hate and take back their faith.
8. Global Branches
From its core in Iraq and Syria, ISIL has declared eight global
branches: Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sinai, Nigeria, Algeria, the
Caucuses, and Afghanistan-Pakistan. We have carefully studied the
situation in all of these locations, and in most, a pre-existing
terrorist organization, such as Boko Haram, chose to wave the black
flag of ISIL. In other cases, such as Yemen, or Afghanistan, small ISIL
affiliates have broken off from larger al Qaida movements. We have been
actively engaged in these regions, against existing threats, such as
AQAP in Yemen, and we should not alter course just because a terrorist
group chooses to fly an ISIL flag. Changing flags does not
fundamentally change the nature of what--in most cases--was a pre-
existing problem, or threat.
Where, however, we see threats emerge anew, or resources directed
from the core in Syria to a global branch, it is a concern and we must
determine how to act, and act effectively. Libya has been the best
example, with ISIL capitalizing on a security vacuum and sending some
of its most experienced operators to establish ISIL-Libya. One was
named Abu Nabil, a Baghdadi acolyte and experienced terrorist. When we
see a leader like this emigrating from the ISIL core to a global
branch, we act. Accordingly, Nabil is now dead, targeted with precision
in a U.S. airstrike. We have also taken military action to degrade the
ISIL network in Libya responsible for launching external attacks in
Tunisia.
To root out ISIL-Libya, however, we are building a robust
partnership with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA). ISIL's
growth in Libya appears to have plateaued in its recruitment of 5,000-
8,000 fighters, most from within Africa. Its recruiting drive for
European fighters has not succeeded, with numbers in the low hundreds;
and for those who made their way to Libya, they may soon lose their
stronghold in Sirte.
ISIL-Libya is now under significant pressure. It has been largely
expelled from Derna and we have increased engagement with our North
African partners to further mitigate the threat, while supporting the
UN-led political process in support of the GNA.
Just a few months ago there was no government on the ground. Today,
the GNA is on the ground in Tripoli, and has aligned forces east and
west of Sirte, which are making gains, isolating the city, and forcing
many ISIL terrorists to flee. These GNA-aligned forces have
demonstrated they are willing and able to fight ISIL, and we are
working with Prime Minister Sarraj on an arms embargo exemption request
to further support the GNA and our local partners on the ground.
The second branch of concern is Sinai, which we assess was
responsible for destroying the civilian Metrojet airliner nine months
ago, killing 224 people. I was in Cairo last week discussing the Sinai
situation, on the heels of visits by Chairman Dunford and CENTCOM
commander General Votel. We are determined to support our Egyptian
partners in degrading and ultimately defeating the ISIL branch in
Sinai.
The Sinai branch is comprised from a pre-existing violent extremist
group, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. We estimate its manpower to be from
several hundred up to 1,000, with some estimates far less than that,
and some slightly more. The current situation in Sinai is a low-grade
conflict combining links to the ISIL core with violent extremist
ideology drawn from Salafist beliefs and long-standing local
grievances. The Egyptian Army has increased combat operations and
closed almost all the tunnels that facilitated arms smuggling along the
Gaza border.
The United States strongly supports Egypt's efforts to combat ISIL-
Sinai, a message I conveyed in Cairo last week. We are providing Apache
helicopters, MRAPs, counter-IED training and border security programs,
and have intensified military-to-military discussions on how we can
help Egypt adopt the counter-insurgency doctrine and tactics it needs
to deal ISIL-Sinai a lasting and permanent defeat.
The Sinai security situation also impacts the Multi-National Force
and Observers (MFO) mission. The U.S. is firmly committed to supporting
the Treaty of Peace and MFO operations. Accordingly, we support the
MFO's decisions to both modernize operations and implement force
reductions that mitigate risk and enable continuation of its mission.
Beyond the Sinai and Libya branches, we continue to monitor ISIL's
attempts to establish additional ones, such as in the Philippines,
Bangladesh and Somalia. We are engaging partners and host nations in a
whole-of-government approach to ensure that ISIL cannot grow roots in
any of these locations.
Accordingly, while we focus on the core in Iraq and Syria, and
cannot be distracted every time a pre-existing terror group waves a
black flag, we are working to enhance the capacity of local partners to
identify and eliminate emerging threats before they can materialize.
This is part of a comprehensive and globally integrated campaign plan
to contest ISIL in all dimensions, and stay attuned and ahead of
emerging threats.
Looking Ahead
Defeating ISIL in Syria and Iraq (measured by its inability to
control significant territory and threaten the viability of the Iraqi
state), suffocating its global affiliates, and drying up its global
networks, are all achievable objectives. Our strategy is making
progress. However, ISIL as a threat, its existence as a cellular
terrorist organization, or an appealing banner for disturbed
individuals searching for meaning in their lives, will be with us for
many years.
To further mitigate the threat, we are focused as much on what
comes after ISIL, as we are on defeating ISIL. In Iraq, the coalition
is providing resources to alleviate human suffering and help return
people to their homes (over 725,000 to date), strengthen inclusive
local governance, address macro-economic risks, and stabilize local
communities through an innovative funding mechanism that is delivering
results. Ultimately, however, long-term stability in Iraq rests on the
Iraqis, and the center of all communities, Sunni, Shia, and Kurd, must
hold against extremes working to pull the country--and their
communities--apart. That center is stronger now than it has been in two
years, but the situation remains fragile and volatile. U.S. engagement
remains vital.
It will also be important to support the Government of Iraq in
reforming security institutions after ISIL, managing the de-
mobilization of volunteer forces, and ensuring that the state has full
control over armed groups, which must operate under an agreed legal
framework.
In Syria, as ISIL is losing territory in the east, its terrorist
rival--Jabhat al-Nusra--is gaining ground in the west, putting down
roots in Idlib province along the Turkish border. Nusra is establishing
schools and training camps, recruiting from abroad, launching major
military operations, and enjoying a sophisticated on-line presence, all
the while providing safe haven for some of al Qaida's most experienced
terrorists. With direct ties to Ayman al Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden's
successor, Nusra is now al Qaida largest formal affiliate in history.
This is a serious concern, and where we see Nusra planning external
attacks, we will not hesitate to act. To end Nusra as a threat,
however, we must find a mechanism to de-escalate and end the Syrian
civil war, thereby allowing the moderate opposition to take charge of
its own territory, without threat of Asad's barrel bombs overhead, or
terrorists down the street. As the war goes on, the opposition is
increasingly interwoven with Nusra, which provides pretext for the
criminal Asad regime to target anyone it wants, on grounds that it is
targeting terrorists. Nobody is fooled by this argument.
At bottom, the Syrian civil war remains an incubator for violent
extremism, and to defeat the threats against our homeland over the
long-term, we must find a diplomatic mechanism to enforce a nationwide
cessation of hostilities, thereby isolating Nusra from the opposition,
concentrating efforts on ISIL, ending bombardments by the Asad regime,
and, ultimately, facilitating the political transition called for in
UNSCR 2254 and the International Syria Support Group.
Conclusion
It is once again an honor to appear before this Committee. Our
global campaign against ISIL is making progress and will accelerate
over the coming weeks. This does not, however, mean the threat of
terrorism will end. It will require constant collaboration with
Congress to stay ahead of this most dynamic and complex challenge. I
look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I am going to reserve my time for interjections and turn to
the ranking member.
Senator Cardin. Once again, thank you for your testimony.
I want to follow up on the point that you raised, the
chairman raised, I raised, and that is what happens after we
take territory. We have had military success in the past. Can
we hold that military success? Are we able to develop
functioning governments that can protect all of the
communities?
In Iraq, as we are starting to get more territory, Fallujah
having fallen, the Sunni civilian population is justifiably
concerned as to their safety as it relates to the Shia militia.
What steps are we taking to protect the civilian population in
these areas that we have been able to militarily reclaim?
Mr. McGurk. So, Senator, thank you.
It is a primary focus of ours from day one. And on a
positive side, so far in Iraq, no areas that have been retaken
from ISIL, that have been liberated from ISIL has ISIL been
able to retake. And that is fairly significant given how
difficult the situation is in Iraq.
What we have done from day one--this really goes back to
the fall of 2014. You know, we are not in the business of
reconstructing Iraq, of repeating mistakes that we made in the
past. We have tried to revolutionize how we do this. We have a
Prime Minister Abadi who is a real partner in Baghdad who
believes in decentralizing power as much as possible and
empowering local people.
So the fundamental example of this was in Tikrit. Tikrit is
a primarily Sunni city, an iconic Sunni city in the heart of a
mixed province of Salah ad-Din Province. It was entirely
depopulated by ISIL in the summer of 2014. It was a site of
mass atrocities, thousands of people killed in mass killings.
Once it was liberated, through the coalition, we were able
to flood resources to Tikrit through a stabilization fund that
we established through the coalition. And this stabilization
fund is focused on the necessities of getting people back to
their homes. And returning people to their homes--it is
important to recognize we looked at this historically in
conflicts like this, one of the hardest things to do in the
world. It can take years, if ever. And in Tikrit, by empowering
the governor, by empowering the local leaders, by making sure
the resources are there, the number of returnees eventually
reaches a tipping point, and now we have almost the entire city
back in the streets of Tikrit. There are local people,
Tikritis, guarding the streets.
Senator Cardin. How do you deal with the Shia militia? How
does the Abadi government deal----
Mr. McGurk. First of all, Shia militias have to act under
the control of the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi state. That is a
fundamental principle of the Government of Iraq. We think most
of these popular mobilization forces do operate under the
control of the Iraqi state, but about 15 to 20 percent of them
actually do not and those groups are a fundamental problem.
The number one thing we do is try to make sure they stay
out of Sunni-populated areas where they can cause real
problems. So in Tikrit, for example, Shia militias are not
inside the streets of Tikrit. That is one thing that gave the
population the confidence to return.
We have a principle when we support Iraqi forces in the
military campaign, we will only support forces on the ground
operating strictly under Iraqi command and control. That means
going from the ground up an Iraqi chain of command into a joint
operations center where we are working with Iraqi commanders.
If there is a unit that is not operating under that structure,
it does not get any support from us.
Senator Cardin. Are you confident Fallujah will be able to
maintain the safety of Sunni civilians?
Mr. McGurk. So Fallujah, of course, just happened. They
just completed the liberation of the last neighborhood over the
weekend. We have about 80,000 displaced people. I am meeting
with the head of one of the U.N. programs later this week. They
are hopeful that all of these IDPs will be under shelter by the
middle of this week and to begin returns next month.
What is also somewhat encouraging about Fallujah is that
the destruction in the city looks to be fairly minimal compared
to other operations. So we are hopeful that we can return the
people of Fallujah to their streets as soon as possible. The
government can lead that process.
And of course, the Shia militia groups that operate outside
the rule of law have to be outside the city, otherwise people
will not return. So absolutely. And we have a plan with local
Fallujah police. Policemen from Fallujah have been trained for
really the last year waiting to go back to guard their streets.
That is what we did in Tikrit, and that is what we are going to
try in Fallujah.
Senator Cardin. I want to ask one more question on this
round, if I might, and that is the legitimacy of ISIL. They
were defining it by territory. They are now losing territory.
Will they be defining it through international terrorism by the
sensational covert attacks that we see all too often? Can we
expect that that may accelerate? And what can we do to counter
that if that appears to be their game plan on legitimacy?
Mr. McGurk. So, Senator, ISIL has always talked about
external attacks. I think I testified even back in late 2013
talking about what Baghdadi was saying, even about attacking--
--
Senator Cardin. But as they start to lose territory, is it
likely that they may accelerate that part of their campaign?
Mr. McGurk. So their core banner in their propaganda has
been the caliphate, retaining and expanding the caliphate. And
in their last main statement by their spokesman, as I mentioned
in my written testimony, is a very different message. He
actually says we might lose all of our territory. We might lose
Raqqa, Sirte, and Mosul. But we are still going to be around.
Still join us. And they are trying to inspire these lone wolf
attacks around the world. And this is what Director Brennan
testified to last week. This is extraordinarily difficult to
stop.
We have to remain vigilant. That is why we have a global
coalition not just for Iraq and Syria, but to make sure that we
are attacking the foreign fighter networks and sharing
information, working with INTERPOL so that as these people try
to travel, they can be picked up. And we are doing better at
that now, but we have a ways to go, and we cannot let up
because ISIL split from--it is Al Qaeda in Iraq. They split in
two directions: one, Baghdadi establishing a caliphate, a
state-like entity, and the other branch, Al Nusra, which is now
Al Qaeda in Syria, which does not really have that notion of
establishing a caliphate. But they are both Al Qaeda. They both
want to kill Westerners. They both want to kill anyone that
does not agree with them, and ISIL will continue to try to
inspire external attacks.
One thing we are doing, though, on the ground, we are not
just taking back territory. As we take back important
territory, we are collecting substantial amounts of information
about the foreign fighter network, about how it is put
together, who leads it, and that helps us really root it out
not only in Iraq and Syria but in the branches and little
networks that exist in France and other places.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Johnson?
Senator Johnson. Mr. McGurk, thanks for coming here.
The analogy I have been using is that of a beehive. If you
have one in your back yard, you can go out there and poke it
with a stick and do damage to it, but you disturb the bees and
they actually become more dangerous.
You have, obviously, been reporting out a fair amount of
progress. We have been making some gains. We are getting
information. We are taking back territory. And yet, the CIA
Director did testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee
and said that our efforts have not reduced their terrorism
capability and global reach and they remain a formidable,
resilient, and largely cohesive enemy.
Do you disagree with that assessment?
Mr. McGurk. I agree with the Director, of course, that this
is something--and I think you see in my testimony I am the last
one working on this most complex issue every single day to
diminish this significant threat.
You know, let me just put a number on it. 40,000 foreign
fighters have traveled into Iraq and Syria over the last 4 or 5
years indoctrinated with this jihadi ideology. That is almost
twice as many, from the numbers we have seen, that went to
Afghanistan in the 1980s, and we know where that eventually led
to. So this is something we have not seen before, and you add
to it social media and the speed of international travel,
everything now, it is an unprecedented challenge and is going
to be with us for years.
Senator Johnson. So again, do you agree with CIA Director
Brennan's assessment that we have not reduced their capability?
They remain a largely formidable, resilient, and cohesive
enemy.
Mr. McGurk. Well, it is not the entity certainly that it
was 18 months ago. You know, the attacks like Brussels and
Paris are attacks that they planned from their safe havens and
sanctuary. So those attacks we believe were organized in Raqqa,
planned. Those sophisticated types of attacks--it is harder for
them to do when you are pressuring them and pressuring their
territory. The lone wolf attacks are the types of things that
are very difficult to stop.
Senator Johnson. But my point being is until we actually
defeat them--and again, we can nibble around the edges. We can
make some progress. We can push them out of Iraq, but they
remain in Syria. I mean, I have yet to hear out of this
administration a game plan for actually defeating them. I mean,
I hear the game plan for making progress, but actually
defeating them--and that is the point I am trying to make. If
we do not defeat them, if we do not deny them the territory, if
we do not deny them the caliphate, if we do not take away those
safe havens--they are incredibly sophisticated. They are
inspiring the lone wolf type of activity we have seen in San
Bernardino, now in Orlando tragically.
There was, by the way, a foiled plot against the Masonic
Temple in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, also probably ISIS-inspired.
So we have to defeat them. Where is the game plan for that?
Mr. McGurk. No, Senator. Our strategy is defeat. It is a 3-
year campaign plan to degrade and defeat. And to defeat, you do
have to take away their territory. So in Iraq, it has been city
by city. In Mosul--I can go through in some detail, but in
Mosul, we have been focused on isolating their key population
nodes, cutting off their connections between Raqqa and Mosul.
The operation in Manbij is about isolating Raqqa, and after
Manbij, we will move on Raqqa.
Senator Johnson. When did the 3-year clock start? Because
President Obama declared our goal of degrading and ultimately
defeating ISIS 22 months ago. We are almost 2 years into it. Or
when did the clock start ticking on our 3-year plan?
Mr. McGurk. We put the campaign together in September of
2014. It took time to generate the local forces to be able to
take on what at the time was the most formidable military force
on the ground.
Senator Johnson. Do you think then that we will have ISIS
defeated, in other words, deny them the territory, deny them
the safe havens even in Syria within another--basically you are
saying about 14 months then if it is a 3-year game plan.
Mr. McGurk. I wanted to go a lot faster than that. One of
the reasons I was in Iraq last week was to focus on the Mosul
campaign. And we will not put a timeline on the Mosul campaign,
but we would like to do it as soon as possible.
One reason we are moving on Manbij right now is to set the
conditions in place to move on Raqqa. And the force that has to
move on Raqqa has to be a predominantly Arab force. That is why
we have increased our special forces inside Syria to train and
equip that force. And after Manbij, the plan is Raqqa. So we
are moving at a tempo that I believe will lead to the
ultimate----
Senator Johnson. Within 14 months, if it is a 3-year game
plan? I mean, we are not going to defeat them within 14 months.
Are we?
Mr. McGurk. Well, I wanted to go a lot faster than that.
Senator Johnson. That is my point. We are not doing this
fast enough. Are we? We are poking the hive with the stick. It
becomes more dangerous. We have not reduced their terrorism
capability or their global reach. When are we going to have a
game plan from this administration to actually accomplish the
goal of defeating them? It is not going to happen in the 3-year
time frame. Is it going to take--what is it going to take?
Mr. McGurk. Well, I understand your question. We want to
speed up their defeat in Mosul. So one thing we are doing--now,
this is on the side. I mentioned it is not just the military,
but we are using Apache helicopters. We are using forward
advisors to begin this operation towards Mosul. There is an
operation going right now south of Mosul that is critical to
isolating ISIL inside Mosul. The Manbij operation is ongoing
right now. It is hard fighting. Once that is done, that sets
the conditions for Raqqa. So it is a step-by-step process to
get to Raqqa and Mosul. We are beginning to totally isolate
their presence in Raqqa and Mosul, and I believe we are setting
the conditions in place to get them out of both of those
cities.
Senator Johnson. Listen, I appreciate your efforts, but I
agree with you. We are not moving anywhere to close to fast
enough.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Mr.
McGurk.
I am not going to repeat lines of questioning that I have
engaged in in earlier hearings.
I share some of Senator Johnson's critique and disagree
with him on some points. But the main disagreement is that we
are not moving fast enough. I think Congress has been in a
position where we have wanted to criticize the administration,
but we are 22 months into a war that we have not even really
debated and voted on here. I just compare this with the level
of detail that we just undertook to try to implement very
piecemeal, narrow reforms in the Department of Defense in the
NDAA bill. The amount of discussion in this body about an
ongoing war where 17 people have been killed and others have
been injured stuns me. But let us just pass that by, because I
am well on the record about it, and get into some particulars.
I do congratulate our troops and the coalition for the
effort that they made to succeed on the battlefield to shrink
the territory that ISIL holds in Iraq and Syria. And I think
that has been very notable, and I expect that to continue.
But let us talk about three areas beyond the original
battlefield where I have concerns. Let us start with Libya.
ISIL in Libya has been losing its center of gravity in
Sirte. That has been a positive. But where does the coalition
believe that the next front will open up in North Africa? There
are about 5,000 ISIL fighters in Libya. Where are they now
located? What is being done to target them? Because I think
North Africa, both because of dangers in Africa but proximity
to Europe, the ISIL presence there is of significant concern.
Mr. McGurk. That is a very good question, Senator.
One reason I was in Cairo last week was to discuss the
whole North Africa region, including of course Libya.
And Libya is a good example because it just highlights how
complicated this is. You know, most foreign fighters that have
joined ISIL have come out of Tunisia, what is kind of seen as
the bright spot of the Arab Spring, and it shows that what is
indoctrinating these young people--some of it is sectarianism
that exists in Iraq and Syria, but some of it is something
else. We have 6,000 Tunisians, many of whom have gone to Libya.
And this is a real problem. Tunisia is a close partner in the
coalition. We are working closely with them, and we are working
with Egypt on the situation in Libya. But also the bright spot
in Libya is that the Libyan people are rejecting the presence
of Da'esh.
So we were concerned about 90 days ago or so when we were
really looking at the Libya situation of this kind of hockey
stick-like growth of the acceleration of ISIL in Libya. Are
they matching what they tried to do in Iraq and Syria? And it
turns out at least that has not been the case. They have kind
of plateaued at about 5,000-6,000 fighters. The numbers vary,
but that is our assessment. They are isolated now in Sirte.
And the Mistratan forces and other forces aligned with the
new Government of National Accord have made real progress, more
progress than we had anticipated. And so now we are looking at
how do we accelerate that progress that is being made.
So I am fairly confident now that we have a strategy in
place in Libya that can at least begin to really degrade that
ISIL presence. Libya has a host of other problems. But the
concern we had of this accelerating growth of ISIL in Libya--it
is something that appears to have been mitigated, but we have
to keep at it.
Senator Kaine. I am going to move to the Philippines. There
has been a recent announcement by ISIL of an aggressive
recruitment effort in the Philippines, working under the
leadership there of Abu Abdullah. And there has even been
recruiting efforts in countries like Malaysia to get foreign
fighters to go not to Syria and Iraq but to go to the
Philippines. Talk a little bit about worries about ISIL efforts
in Asia, the Philippines, and other nations in Southeast Asia.
Mr. McGurk. So another great question.
I was, a year or so ago, in Singapore and Malaysia talking
about the growth in Southeast Asia. Many of these are
preexisting terrorist groups that then fly the flag of ISIL.
Senator Kaine. Just like Boko Haram.
Mr. McGurk. And the question we asked is what is the common
denominator here all around the world for why these groups are
flying the flag of ISIL. And it is this notion of this
caliphate. We hear this everywhere, this notion of a caliphate,
this kind of magnet, this historic movement, which is one
reason why shrinking the territory is so important even to
drying up their global affiliates in a place like Southeast
Asia.
So I saw the announcement in the Philippines recently.
Again, I think--and I mentioned this in my written testimony--
we cannot get too distracted by every time a preexisting
terrorist group flies the flag of ISIL because we are already
dealing with those problems in a whole variety of ways. It is
where we see, as we saw in Libya, ISIL central in Raqqa sending
some of its best leaders into Libya to establish a branch. That
was a terrorist named Abu Nabil. We targeted him and killed
him. In Sinai, we have seen money and leaders try to transfer
to Sinai. That is where we really get concerned. We have not
seen that in Southeast Asia.
So we have to work with our partners throughout the world
but particularly in Southeast Asia to make sure that these
problems remain contained. But we are not seeing that kind of
Libya-like direct transfer of resources from ISIL central all
the way out to Southeast Asia.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. My time is up.
Thanks, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I will use my first interjection in response. I, like the
State Department, which Mr. McGurk works for, like the
Pentagon, like the legal department from the White House, and
like the White House, agree that this administration has all
legal authority necessary to combat ISIS. And so I just want
that to be stated. Certainly we have had multiple hearings on
how to deal with this. And I personally have pushed back
against efforts to limit his ability to conduct the operations
which much of the discussions around an AUMF have been about.
So I just want to say again I support the efforts that are
underway. I would like to see it happen in a much more
expeditious manner. I know it is creating threats to our
homeland, which we have got to counter, but I do support the
administration's statement that they have the legal basis to do
what they are doing. And I want to do everything I can to keep
us as a body from limiting their ability to do that.
With that, I will turn to Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks for the testimony.
Turning to your statement about being able to deny them
territory and impacting their ability to foment terrorism
elsewhere or direct activities, are we seeing a difference in
their ability in that their main headquarters in Raqqa, Syria
really has not been impacted? How much of the activities that
we see elsewhere are being directed from Raqqa or from areas
that we have taken back?
Mr. McGurk. Excellent.
So their ability to move fighters from Raqqa across the
battlefield in Iraq and Syria but most importantly from Raqqa
out of Syria has been significantly degraded.
Senator Flake. Because of the supply routes being
challenged?
Mr. McGurk. Because we have cut off the main roads between
Raqqa and Mosul. They are now forced onto back roads. We, of
course, have a special forces targeting team based in northern
Iraq that goes after them when we are able to see the leaders,
of course. And so we have greatly degraded their ability to
move fighters around.
But most important for our homeland security--and that is
why this operation in Manbij is so important--is that the
sophisticated attacks like Paris and Brussels planned in Raqqa,
they go up through this Manbij Pocket area, they coordinate and
organize in Manbij City, and then move out through Turkey to
conduct their attacks. We have worked with Turkey to close up
that border on its side, and the Turks have done an awful lot
and we commend them for that. But until we take that territory
away, ISIL is still able to move in a way that we are not
comfortable with, which is why this operation in Manbij is so
critical.
So it is much harder for them to move now, but do not take
my word for it. Even in their own statements and Dabiq
magazine, which they kind of put out to their potential
adherents, they are saying, hey, do not come to Syria anymore.
Do an attack at home or go to Libya. And that is because it is
much harder for them to get into Syria. And we have a ton of
information on this as we see every morning in terms of their
inability to get people in, and once they are in, it is very
hard for them to get out. And we want to make sure they cannot
get people into Syria, and once they are in Syria, they are
never going to get out. I mean, that is kind of the essence of
what we are trying to do with the foreign fighters.
Senator Flake. You mentioned in your testimony that we are
killing their leadership at the rate of one every 3 days. What
impact has that had on their planning abilities or the focus or
priorities that they have set, whether it is the caliphate or
external attacks?
Mr. McGurk. So, I think, Senator, I testified before this
committee in the summer of 2014 about a month after Mosul fell,
and what we were seeing then was a highly sophisticated
military-like organization with command and control able to
maneuver around the battlefield in mass force, take entire
cities. It cannot do that anymore. Their leaders are having a
very hard time communicating. They are having a very hard time
organizing where they are going to put their resources. So we
have really degraded their ability to command, to control
across Iraq and Syria, which is one of the preconditions to
actually defeating them. So taking out their leaders is not a
sufficient condition, but it is a necessary condition in order
to actually degrade in the overall network.
Senator Flake. Turn to Iran for a minute. Since the nuclear
deal was struck, we had hoped that some of their posture in the
region would change. Has their posture changed? In Syria, have
we seen a change in terms of Iran's behavior or their
willingness to work with other groups in a positive way, or is
it all still negative?
Mr. McGurk. I in my role have not seen a significant change
in Iranian behavior. ISIL is a threat to Iran. They are
fighting ISIL from time to time, but they are primarily working
to prop up the Assad regime. And they are also supporting some
of these militia groups that I mentioned in Senator Cardin's
question that are operating outside the legal authority of the
Iraqi state, which is a threat to Iraq's own sovereignty, are
kind of supported by Iran. And that is a huge problem. We have
not seen that diminish since the nuclear deal certainly.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Just in closing, let me just say I share Senator Kaine's
view that Congress ought to weigh in with an AUMF, not to
question whether or not we have the authority or the executive
branch has the authority to wage this war. Even putting that
aside, I think it is valuable for our adversaries and our
allies to know that we speak with one voice here. As you
mentioned, this is going to go on for a long, long time, and I
think we would all benefit if the Congress weighed in more
heavily.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. McGurk, for the efforts that you are
undertaking.
I am sure you are aware that there was a widely reported
story this week about weapons being stolen in Jordan. To what
extent do we think any of those weapons are going to ISIS?
Mr. McGurk. Senator, I have seen those reports. I just
cannot address the roots of that story. I can maybe address it
in a different setting.
Senator Shaheen. And to what extent does a story like that
and the ability to steal from under our noses and the noses of
the Jordanians, who are one of our most important allies in
this fight--are they used as propaganda for ISIS in attracting
new fighters and in promoting their cause?
Mr. McGurk. Well, what I will say is, having just been in
Jordan, I met their entire national security team. They are one
of our closest partners in the region. We are supporting their
armed forces 100 percent. They are on the very front line of
this fight, and I think they would be just as concerned as
anyone here with stories like that.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I certainly agree. I think Jordan
has been a terrific ally, which is all the more reason why we
need to get to the bottom of what has gone on there and address
it in a way that does not allow it to continue to happen.
Let me ask because it is very--comparatively easy and
concrete to be able to track what is happening on the
battlefield with ISIS to be able to talk about what the efforts
are to address them, to be able to talk about who in their
leadership we have taken out. I think it is much more difficult
to talk and to address the underlying governance issues that
have allowed ISIS to metastasize, much harder to address the
messaging that ISIS does to attract new fighters. Can you talk
about the extent to which this effort is engaged with both of
those more difficult challenges?
Mr. McGurk. It is extremely difficult, and it is why there
is this balance between speed and sustainability. I mean, it is
true. We could maybe do some things to really speed it up, but
them you will not have sustainable gains. Before you do a major
operation to retake a city, you have to have in place who is
going to hold the city, who is going to govern the city, what
is the humanitarian--you have to have everything in place. This
is extraordinarily difficult.
So what we try to do, particularly in Iraq--and I think we
have had some success here--is to make sure those conditions
are in place before we really move to clear out ISIL from
populated areas. And the governing philosophy of the new
government of Iraq, led by Prime Minister Abadi, is more
decentralization, more federalism, more empowering local people
to control their affairs. And that is very important, and it is
something that we very much support. We have seen the success I
mentioned in Tikrit.
In Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province, similarly about
60,000 people returned to their homes shortly after ISIL was
pushed out of Ramadi, but 100 tragically were killed by these
booby traps and IEDs that ISIL--as they leave, they put booby
traps in people's closets and refrigerators. And that is how
barbaric this organization is.
And so we now have--through the coalition, we raised $15
million immediately. We now have demining experts on the ground
in Ramadi clearing block by block, and that is actually going
quite well. But it is also an indicator of how difficult this
is.
But the heart of your question is really important because
we cannot just defeat ISIL, we have to deliver a lasting
defeat. All of these pieces have to come together. It is one of
the hardest things to do imaginable, but I think if you look at
Tikrit, if you look at what we are trying to do in Ramadi, if
you look at the mobilization of the Anbar tribes in Anbar
Province, we would never have been able to clear all this
territory in Anbar Province all the way out to Rutbah on the
Jordanian border without the support of the local tribes. That
took a lot of work. It took a lot of great work from our
special forces who are out there working with them in Al Asad
Airbase way out there by Haditha, but it has begun to generate
momentum. So you have to pull all these pieces together in
order to deliver a sustainable defeat of ISIL.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I think CIA Director Brennan and others actually have
talked about as we made gains on the battlefield against ISIS,
that there is a greater likelihood that we will see terrorist
attacks in the West and other parts of the world to try and
draw attention away from what is happening on the battlefield.
Do you share that assessment?
Mr. McGurk. Again, I think ISIL has been talking about
attacking us for years. So it is not something new. The
Brussels and Paris attacks were organized a long time ago even
before we started taking their territory away.
What I do think they will try to do, as they are losing
territory, as they are losing their central narrative of this
caliphate, this kind of state that they are creating, they will
try to inspire, through the Internet, these lone wolf types of
attacks. And any deranged individual who wants to commit a
crime can suddenly fly the banner of ISIL and get an
international headline. And they recognize this and they are
trying to inspire it. So I think the risk of that is something
that is very much with us, will be with us for a long time.
But we will push them out of Mosul. We will push them out
of Raqqa, but the ideology that is underpinning this kind of
jihadi ideology--they call it tech fear ideology in which
anybody who disagrees with them deserves to die. That is what
they believe. It is completely crazy. That is going to be with
us for a long time.
We have to defeat them on the battlefield, but there is
only so much the United States can do. We also need our
partners in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia and critical partners of
our coalition to fight that ideological battle, and they are
doing so.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. If I could just interject. I certainly agree
on the ideological battle. We continue to hear from foreign
ministers of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, other places about their
desire to more fully enter the battle on the ground, if you
will. Of course, we hear lots of things. Unless we see
something, it is not real.
They then talk about how the U.S.--they have concerns about
the United States' commitment. Can you share with us the
reality of, with the right effort, Saudi Arabia and others
joining us more fully on the ground?
Mr. McGurk. So I have been to the Gulf quite a bit over the
last year, and the Saudis, of course, and the Emiratees are
very focused on the conflict of Yemen. And as we hope the peace
process there gets underway and that conflict can begin to wind
down, there will be an increasing focus on Da'esh. We, of
course, want these countries to join the air campaign, to be a
part of it. We have heard these same requests from the
possibility of troops on the ground, things like that.
It is very important that all of this is organized under
our coalition effort. We, of course, have planners from all
these countries in CENTCOM about the next steps of what we are
going to do.
And I was in Saudi Arabia with the President at the GCC
Summit about 6 weeks or so ago, and the Saudis make a very
compelling case--and it is true--that ISIL is a fundamental
threat to them. They have plots within Saudi Arabia. Almost
every few weeks, they are breaking up a plot. And so it is this
ideological struggle that has to be led by the Saudis, by the
Egyptians, by the leaders in the Muslim world where I really
think they can take a leading role. We are working with them on
that, but they really need to be the----
The Chairman. But as it relates--I do not want to take up
too much time here. As it relates to them actually
participating, they cite in closed doors with us--it is not
confidential, but they cite the lack of U.S. leadership and
their distrust and therefore their unwillingness to really get
engaged.
Away from the ideological but back to what is actually
happening on the ground especially in Syria, do you believe
that the comments they are making are real?
Mr. McGurk. I think we work very hard to match capabilities
and capacity with needs, and I think I could go through with
you in a very detailed way in a different setting kind of what
we are doing with each coalition partner. We would like to see
those countries participate in the air campaign. They have been
participating in the air campaign. The Jordanians are
participating in the air campaign. And we really need more
assets in the sky as we develop more intelligence and more
targets.
But in terms of ground capabilities, I think our focus on
empowering local actors to liberate their own territory is the
most sustainable solution for defeating ISIL, and that will
remain our fundamental approach.
The Chairman. Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If my memory serves me correctly, back in 2014 we drew
about two or three red lines in the sand for Assad not to
cross. Is that not right? Were we not going to actually do a
strategic bombing in Syria at one point in time and we backed
away from that?
The Chairman. 2013, late August/early September.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My point is I remember that as well, and we did not really
have the resolve in the Senate body itself to really move
forward on that strategic attack, and Secretary Kerry kept
modifying what that attack would be. And pretty much we backed
away from it, drew a couple more lines in the sand, and then
had the 22-month game plan that we are into now on going after
ISIL.
There has not been that much mention of Assad in today's
conversation or, for that matter, much of the conversation at
all. Where does he fit in in terms of this game plan to take
out ISIL right now?
Mr. McGurk. Well, we believe very strongly we have to have
a political transition process that can lead to a sustainable
transition inside Syria. And so long as Assad is leading the
government in Damascus, there is no way this war will ever end.
That is something we have stated very clearly to the Russians.
It is something we have stated very clearly to all the backers
of the Assad regime. This war simply will not end with Assad
leading the regime in Damascus.
And it is this question of the best way to set the
incentives for a sustainable transition. I think militarily
enforced regime change is something that we have seen before
and is extremely risky and leaves unintended consequences.
But the Russians have said that they support a transition
in Damascus. The Russians have claimed that they will support a
cessation of hostilities on the ground in Syria. President
Putin went to his people and said we will support a cessation
of hostilities inside Syria. And quite frankly, the Russians
have not done in this regard what they promised, and this
remains a very serious problem.
Senator Isakson. Are the Iranians the main strength behind
Assad? Are they the force behind him right now?
Mr. McGurk. You know, the level of influence in Damascus is
something that we look at very closely. It is kind of a sliding
scale. I mean, the Russians were kind of seen as the main
influencer maybe about 4 months ago, and I think more recently
we are seeing the Iranians start to eclipse them a little bit.
But both of them are backing the Assad regime.
We say to the Russians, look at this. You guys are in bed
with the Assad regime, with Hezbollah, with the Quds Force,
with Qassem Sulemeini. I mean, what exactly are you guys--what
is your long-term strategy here? And I frankly do not think
they have one. So they came in to try to bulk up the Assad
regime. Then I thought they could find a glide path out of
Syria, but that has really not proven to be the case. The only
way to have a sustainable solution in Syria is a political
transition in which all forces can organize against these
extremist threats.
Senator Isakson. And that is my point. Given the fact that
there is not one on the horizon--a political transition--given
the fact that Syria has just been decimated with the civil war
over 4 or 5 years, given the fact the Iranians are backing
Assad pretty steadily all the way through, there appears to be
no end to Assad's ability to stay in place. Is that not
correct?
Mr. McGurk. Well, I think you hit the head on a very
difficult situation in Syria. So, again, I go back to what the
Russians said they would do but they are not doing, the
cessation of hostilities, trying to deescalate the violence,
trying to organize forces against ISIL and Nusra.
Where this really comes to a head is in Aleppo. In Aleppo,
there are multiple offensives going on. There is an offensive
in southwest Aleppo that is led by the Al Nusra Front, led by
Al Qaeda. Al Nusra is not a part of the cessation of
hostilities. And the Russians know they have every right to go
after and defend Aleppo against that offensive, but what they
are doing instead is launching--the regime is launching a
counter-offensive against the moderate opposition in the north,
groups that are a part of the cessation of hostilities.
So it is a very serious situation, Senator, and it is
requiring a lot of our attention and focus. And the Russians
will either live up to their commitments or not, but right now,
Putin is either proving unable to deliver on what he told his
people he would deliver or unwilling.
Senator Isakson. Well, I know this is a sensitive subject,
and there are certain things you cannot address, probably
certainly things I should not say or ask. But it appears to me
that given Assad's backing by the Iranians and where he is and
what he has endured for the past 3 years and given the matrix
that is going on right now in that part of the world, ISIL,
which we are trying to eradicate, going back to Senator
Johnson's comments in his questioning, in the end game, as long
as Assad is there, it is going to be very difficult to take
ISIL out because they benefit from his staying in that power
and giving them the authority to do what they do. Is that not
right?
Mr. McGurk. Well, where the civil war deescalates, where
you start to see a--and we saw that in the south, for example,
south of Damascus--it frees up opposition groups to actually
fight ISIL. Where the civil war is escalating, opposition
groups are obviously fighting the regime, and that gives ISIL,
Al Nusra more space to grow. So dealing with the civil war is a
fundamental element that in order for a long-term, sustainable
solution, not just against ISIL but also Al Nusra, which is Al
Qaeda in Syria, we have to address.
Senator Isakson. Thank you for your service. We appreciate
it very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Before turning to Senator Menendez, you had mentioned that
when you take out leadership, you are learning a great deal
about some of the relationships they have in other places. Can
you tell us where the central nervous system is relative to the
inspiration efforts to try to get people here in the United
States and other places to conduct operations against
Westerners? Where is that central nervous system housed? Is it
in the caliphate, or is it outside?
Mr. McGurk. I will give you an example of how difficult
this is. So I believe, from everything I see, it is in Raqqa.
And their leader trying to instigate these attacks was Jihadi
John. Jihadi John is known as the brutal murderer of American
hostages. But he was also a computer hacker, and he would sit
in his apartment in Raqqa all day trying to inspire attacks in
the West, here in our homeland and in other partner nations. He
would just sit there in the apartment with hundreds of
civilians in the apartment building. And it creates a real
dilemma. You have to take out Jihadi John. We know where he is,
but you do not want to destroy an apartment building with
hundreds of people.
So we waited for him to come outside one day, and we were
able, with very precise precision, to eliminate Jihadi John. He
was their number one guy on the computer all day trying to
inspire attacks. He was sitting in Raqqa in a crowded apartment
building.
So I believe the heartbeat of it is Raqqa, and that is why
after Manbij, we are going to organize a force to move down and
isolate Raqqa.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McGurk, I have always appreciated your candor in closed
sessions. I appreciate your efforts, and obviously we all wish
you the best of luck.
But I have some real concerns as I have read the testimony
and listened to some of your responses. So let me try to see if
you can help me assuage them.
I want to return to CIA Director Brennan's remarks where he
said--and I quote--unfortunately, despite all progress against
ISIL on the battlefield and in the financial realm, our efforts
have not reduced the group's terrorism capability and global
reach. And he goes on to say, the group would have to suffer
even heavier losses of territory, manpower, and money for its
terrorist capacity to decline significantly. And in fact, as
the pressure mounts on ISIL, we judge that it will intensify
its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance on the
global terrorism agenda.
And then I heard your response to Senator Cardin when he
asked what happens, for example, in Iraq after we take
territory back, and your response was that we are not repeating
past mistakes, we are not reconstructing Iraq.
But it sort of like begs the question. Are we not actually
repeating past mistakes? When you point to the map and you talk
about Anbar and Mosul and Tikrit, these were places where our
men and women gave their lives to fight one form of oppression,
and now we are in midst of engaging in those same locations
again as it relates to ISIL.
So how is this different? How is it that you are suggesting
that we are not repeating past mistakes in terms of holding
territory after we have cleared it and spent an enormous amount
of lives and national treasure--we are doing this now for the
second time--is not a repeat of past mistakes?
Mr. McGurk. Thank you, Senator.
What I meant by that comment specifically was on the model
of reconstruction. We spent $60 billion on reconstruction in
Iraq, and I do not think the record is one that was worth,
frankly, that investment on the specific reconstruction case
because we identified big projects without the real buy-in of
local people.
So what we are doing now, we have this stabilization fund
that requires the local people to identify the immediate
specific needs for their communities. So how do you get the
water back on, lights back on immediately?
Senator Menendez. So I take your answer, your clarification
to be that you meant the funds that we spent for
reconstruction, but what are we doing? Do we believe the Iraqi
forces, ones with our assistance, clearing out Anbar and Mosul
and Tikrit are going to have the ability to sustain and hold
the places that we have cleared so that we are not there for a
third time? Is that your view?
Mr. McGurk. Well, to date, as I mentioned, all the areas
that have been taken back from ISIL--none of them have been
retaken by ISIL. So I think that indicates at least that we
have hit on something that is successful. You know, these are
not American forces in the streets of these cities trying to
hold the territory afterwards. We are organizing local police,
local people who know the streets, who know the people to hold
the territory afterwards.
Senator Menendez. So your answer is yes. Your answer is
yes. We believe that the Iraqis, through all of their combined
forces, once cleared, will be able to maintain those
territories on their own and be able to make sure that ISIL
does not recapture any dominance in them.
Mr. McGurk. I think the record so far in that regard is
encouraging. This does not mean Iraq will not be full of a host
of problems for many, many years to come, but an organized
international genocidal terrorist organization controlling
cities is something that I do not think they will be able to
do.
Senator Menendez. Let me turn to Syria. I assume that the
administration's view is that the peace talks are our best
avenue towards a solution. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. McGurk. That has remained a consensus, an international
consensus, that we need a diplomatic, political transition in
Damascus to lead to a sustainable solution.
Senator Menendez. And that is, in essence, the
administration's hope. That is its policy. Right?
Mr. McGurk. A political transition in Damascus, which is
now enshrined in a U.N. Security Council resolution 2254.
Senator Menendez. So here is my problem. The United Nations
Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. de Mistura, said last week that he
hoped that the Syrian peace talks would resume in July but only
if the security and humanitarian situation on the ground showed
clear improvement. And he said political talks cannot proceed
while hostilities are escalating and civilians are starving.
So on the one hand, we place our hopes in the United
Nations process encouraging the coalition to do the same. On
the other hand, the United Nations does not have a way forward
because the security and humanitarian situation on the ground
is not improving.
So the question remains--I do not particularly view that
Russia and Iran have the same goals as we do as it relates to
Syria and the Syrian people. Do we not need to be engaging in
trying to improve the security and humanitarian situation on
the ground so that the aspirational political talks can move
forward? Should we not be looking at safe zones, no-fly zones,
other elements of trying to create the basis for the
aspirational peace talks to take place?
Mr. McGurk. There is no question that with the current
levels of violence, without a deescalation of violence, without
a cessation of hostilities that can be maintained, the
conditions for a meaningful political process that leads to
transition are extremely difficult. So you are right, Senator.
On the humanitarian side, since the cessation of
hostilities has been in place, we have managed to reach almost
10 times as many people who had been reached in an entire year
before, but it is not nearly enough. And the Assad regime
continues to even attack areas after humanitarian aid is
delivered.
The real flash point of this right now is Aleppo where
these multiple offensives are ongoing, as I mentioned. And we
are working very hard to try to deescalate that. But without a
cessation of hostilities that can be maintained and
humanitarian aid getting to the people in need, the political
process in Geneva really remains at a standstill.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. If I could before turning to the Senator
Perdue. There was a group of 51 people who dissented on U.S.
policy, which I think is a good thing that the State Department
allows that type of dissent to take place, and certainly we do
not want to do anything to stifle that.
I also get the sense that very high leadership within the
State Department has urged that we put pressure on Assad
militarily because of this lack of cessation that has taken
place, and the fact that when humanitarian aid is delivered,
the next day you have a barrel bomb killing the very people
that humanitarian aid was given to.
Can you give us any sense of whether there is a debate
relative to how to handle Assad and the fact that with no
cessation occurring, that maybe enhanced military pressure from
the U.S. may be a route that is worth taking?
Mr. McGurk. We are, Mr. Chairman, looking very closely at
how to have an enforceable cessation of hostilities. And so
that is something that is very much underway.
We have also looked very closely at--you know, the Assad
regime, even just all the open source statistics--about 100,000
fighters on the side of the Assad regime have been killed by
the opposition. GDP has collapsed 80 percent. Those are the
types of assumptions that 4 years ago I think many people
assumed would lead to conditions that would set a political
transition, but it has not.
So what we need is an enforceable cessation of hostilities,
and we are looking at----
The Chairman. Which we do not have and, without pressure,
are not going to get. And I think everyone, including you,
understands the circular situation we are in. It is not going
to happen. I mean, we met with Secretary Kerry in Munich--
Senator Perdue was there and others--felt that this cessation
issue was not real. It has not been real. And I do not see
anything at present that is going to change that dynamic.
I look forward to questioning you further.
I am going to go vote, Senator Perdue, and I will come back
hopefully in time for you and Senator Markey to go vote.
Senator Markey is next, and you are now chairman.
Senator Perdue [presiding]: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. McGurk. Your testimony is always candid
and to the point. I know you are the messenger.
I personally am concerned about the 14 months from now, the
end of the 3 years. And I am not putting words in your mouth,
but I want it on the record I am very concerned about that.
I want to talk about Syria just a minute, though. It seems
to me that we have had witnesses in here that have given us
testimony that the best option in Syria is a Sunni fighting
force on the ground, a coalition Sunni fighting force, not an
American force, not an outside force, but a Sunni fighting
force. We see in Iraq we have got issues with Shia militia and
security after a town is liberated and so forth.
In private meetings with some of the major players, they
have given us information that they are ready to stand up, in
Saudi Arabia's case, potentially 30,000 fighting troops to
fight ISIS in Syria. Their concern is a lack of U.S. leadership
and resolve, and so they are not doing that. They are waiting
on the U.S. And so can you speak to that in a little more
detail?
I am concerned that we get into Syria, it is a much more
confused battle space than what we see in Iraq. Iraq is about
territory now. And as we saw in Afghanistan and we are seeing
today in Afghanistan, when the troops liberate a city and they
turn it over to the police, that is where the Taliban comes
right back. We see it this year as I sit here. So the question
in Iraq is a different one. I am trying to get at Syria
relative to what kind of fighting force is going to be able to
sustain a long-term effort not only to take the ground but to
hold the ground once it is liberated in Syria.
Mr. McGurk. So, Senator, the fundamental premise here of
what we need are local people to liberate and hold their own
territory. So in the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, we need Sunni
Arabs from the local area. So what we have tried to do--I
mentioned mobilizing the tribes of Anbar Province, training
local police. We have a coalition effort led by the Italians
training about 900 local police every 3 months. We are looking
now to triple that by the end of the year. These are kind of
police leaders who then organize the local people. That effort
has actually been successful.
But we very much agree that we need Sunni Arabs to be the
ones to liberate and hold their own territory, but oftentimes
they need help. ISIL in many of these cities and towns that
they have held for years is an army, and they defend it like an
army. And so you cannot just take out a bunch of Sunni
tribesmen and kind of train them for a couple weeks and put
them in the fight to go liberate a city like Fallujah. It just
cannot work.
I have also met with Sunni tribal leaders who are exiled
from Iraq and Syria and claim to have tens of thousands of
people ready to fight. And we say give us the names. We will
get them in the fight. And oftentimes they do not have that
level of influence on the ground. So it is a very complex
dynamic.
What we found in Anbar was really critical is having
presence. So we have two sites in Anbar Province, one in Al
Asad Airbase and one between Fallujah and Ramadi at Taqaddum
Air Base. That is where our coalition advisors are located. And
that has given us the ability to figure out who is who,
organize local Sunni fighters and give them the capacity to
succeed.
And now in Syria, the reason we have gone from 50 special
forces advisors up to 300 is for this very reason. And we
recognize that the force that will alter----
Senator Perdue. I am sorry. Are those 300 special forces
primarily training? Is that what they are doing?
Mr. McGurk. Primarily training and some are out advising.
But the main mission there--again, Manbij will be a
difficult fight. That is ongoing now, but after Manbij, it is
organizing the force that will push down on Raqqa.
Senator Perdue. Can I ask you a follow-up question on that?
Last year in 2015, a training program was initiated. At the
end of the day, we had spent about $45 million in 2015 under
testimony at Armed Services, and we had trained about five
people. So that was an unmitigated disaster.
As we sit here today, the numbers have been reported in the
100 range, and we have spent somewhere close to--I think we are
approaching the $500 million that was authorized, I think.
Can you talk about the training program that we have
initiated? I know that we got special forces there doing that,
but how many forces are really going back in to fight? And are
these really trigger pullers, or are they just enablers or
spotters or support people?
Mr. McGurk. So let me try to explain what we are doing. So
the effort that was tried to kind of organize and train these
brigade-like units is something that did not work.
What we are doing now is there are a lot of fighters on the
ground that are fighting ISIL every single day. Rather than
taking them all out and training them in a 6-week course, what
we are doing now is identifying those groups. They are vetted.
They get support from us. They get supplies from us. And then
we take out a couple of their leaders or some of the people
they identify to learn how to call on airstrikes, to learn how
to do more sophisticated type things, which then is a force
multiplier for that unit.
So we have a system now that is very well structured in
terms of a force that we work with on the ground being able to
call in precision airstrikes, but it takes some training.
Again, rather than trying to organize these large units to
maneuver around, which is something that was not very
successful, we are identifying units that are actually on the
ground. They know the local area. They are able to fight. And
then giving individual leaders those specialized skills that
will enhance their capabilities on the ground.
Senator Perdue. I appreciate that, but we really are not
adding additional fighters through that training mechanism at
this point in any significant numbers. Is that fair to say?
Mr. McGurk. Through that effort, no. What we are trying to
do is organize and grow the force that will move down
particularly on Raqqa because that is a prime target of ours.
Senator Perdue. I noticed the ranking member is back. I
think it is you and me right now until the people get back from
voting.
Senator Cardin. Well, I like the numbers here. This works
well. [Laughter.]
Senator Perdue. I have got another question. I would like
to talk about the second level of the fight. The first fight is
kinetic on the ground and in the air. And I see that is a very
messy fight in Syria with all the different groups that are
fighting each other on different days. I would like to talk
about the hybrid war that is underway. You have related to it
earlier.
In January 2016, the administration announced a major
change in our direction there in terms of trying to counter the
message of ISIS on social media and other hybrid platforms. How
is that working, and have we been able to draft outside voices
to really try to counter ISIS? I guess the question overall is
what are we doing today to truly try to counter the ISIS
message in this hybrid warfare in propaganda and cyber and
social media.
Mr. McGurk. So a great question.
So we, of course, established at the State Department the
Global Engagement Center, the GEC, which is focused on this 24/
7. But this is not something that can just be done out of
Washington. We need a global network to go after their online
messaging.
2 years ago when this started, they had a kind of a free
rein on Facebook, on Twitter, on Youtube, and their message was
one of come join this glorious movement of the caliphate. And
we have really reversed that trend. So Twitter is one data
point. For every single pro-ISIL Twitter handle, there are now
six anti-ISIL, kind of combating them every 24/7 in cyber
space.
Senator Perdue. Where are those six? Are they U.S. handles?
Mr. McGurk. No. They are all over the place. Some of them
are just voices from the region or different parts of the
world.
Senator Perdue. Are they coordinated?
Mr. McGurk. Some of it is coordinated. But what really
works most effectively is kind of the non-coordinated, organic
counter-messaging.
We are also working with those companies. Twitter has taken
off about 125,000 pro-ISIL sites. That is continuing. We are
working with Facebook and Youtube on that.
But you asked a good question, how is this organized? And
the Internet is kind of an organic, obviously, enterprise. You
cannot really just have centers to do this. But we do have
coordinating centers.
Senator Perdue. We have just stood up two Army brigades of
cyber warfare warriors.
Mr. McGurk. We do. We have centers to kind of lead this
effort. We do some here. We have an organization in UAE called
the Sawab Center. I went there to visit them. They are young,
smart, engaged, dynamic, incredible young people, Muslims from
the UAE and from the area that want to fight ISIL online. They
are doing a great job. Malaysia has also been leading this. And
that is important because in different parts of the world, the
message is very different. So in the Gulf, you kind of have a
more religiously inspired messaging focus from ISIL. In Europe,
often it is the sun-drenched scenes of the caliphate. Come
bring your family, you know, literally kids eating ice cream
cones. It is a total lie. And so in Europe, they are working to
counter that.
But I think this network of voices on the Internet now is
starting to turn the tide against their messaging.
Senator Cardin. Let me rescue my colleague. There is no
time left on the vote on the floor. So I want to make sure he
gets over. Even though I am not sure we are voting the same
way, I want to make sure he can get over and cast his vote.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
Senator Cardin [presiding]: Since I have the committee
right now--no. Mr. McGurk, members are coming back. They just
went to vote. I started over on the floor so we could continue
the hearing.
Let me ask you. We have talked about territorial gain and
what happens afterwards. In Syria, you put a lot of confidence
in Manbij, in that area, being able to block the routes to
Turkey. What does Assad do? What does Russia do in regards to
the territorial gains in Syria? What will be their strategy?
Mr. McGurk. So, as you know, we do not coordinate at all
with the Russians. We talk to them to deconflict air space, and
also when we are running an operation, we kind of make sure
that there is no interference. And so far, in most cases, that
has been the case.
The forces we have worked with that have retaken territory
we have found have been able to govern that territory fairly
effectively.
One problem we have in Syria that we have not had in Iraq
is that the ability to get humanitarian assistance,
humanitarian supplies into some of these areas is extremely
limited, and this gets to the issue, of course, with Turkey and
with the Syrian Kurds and kind of that conflict and the border
being closed.
In Manbij, for example, once Manbij is liberated, we have
identified the NGOs, the resources to get humanitarian aid
flowing into Manbij, but we have to find the border posts and
to work with Turkey to make sure that it can get in.
So I would just say so far we have not had any interference
from the regime or the Russians in terms of particularly in the
north where we have taken territory away from ISIL.
Senator Cardin. But as far as the Assad loyal forces
conflicting with the Syrian democratic forces, is that likely
to occur in these areas?
Mr. McGurk. This gets really complicated in northwest Syria
where you Syrian regime forces. You have the Syrian democratic
forces and the Kurds and the YPG. You have Syrian opposition
forces, none of whom really coordinate and many of whom
disagree with each other at a local level.
Actually this morning I was just working on this with some
colleagues. We are working to get the leaders of all of those
groups together, not including, of course, the Syrian forces,
to talk about literally locally based what is happening in this
town, what is happening in that town to try to quiet things
down between groups, all of whom share the threat of ISIL.
This is the most complicated thing from the strategic
level, within the region and different countries and different
capitals not always agreeing with one another, to say the
least, and then at the local tactical level. So we have to work
it really in all dimensions.
So what we are working to do in this northwest Syria area
kind of called the Azaz Corridor is to get the leaders of
different groups together with us to talk about how we can
better work together here to get humanitarian aid flowing and
to better organize forces against ISIL.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]: Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
I want to begin. You talked earlier about now as ISIS
begins to lose control over territory, you are going to see
them increasingly relying on the ability to inspire attacks
abroad by individuals who perhaps are not being directed by
them but are being inspired by them. And you in fact said
deranged individuals who can commit mass atrocities or whatever
and doing it under the banner of ISIS. That seems to describe
what we saw just 2 weeks ago tragically in my home State of
Florida in Orlando. And so what you were saying is that as ISIS
continues to lose territory and the ability to argue that they
have created this caliphate, attacks like the one we saw in
Orlando with individuals that fit that sort of profile will
become more commonplace potentially and not just in the U.S.
but in other parts of the world as well.
Mr. McGurk. Senator, I am not sure I would say more
commonplace. ISIL's propaganda has always called for attacks in
our homeland. But as they lose territory--you know, they have
stopped kind of calling--in Dabiq magazine, for example, I
mentioned they have stopped calling for people to come to
Syria. They are now saying, hey, stay at home. But they have
been saying this for a couple years. So this is a problem. That
is why I just have to be very candid in my assessment. It is
the assessment, of course, of the administration and Director
Brennan. This is a threat that will be with us for years.
We have had 40,000 of these foreign fighters come into
Syria. Fortunately, we are killing them by the thousands inside
Syria so they cannot get out. And we do believe that taking
away their territory, taking away this notion of a caliphate,
which has been a fundamental driver of their recruitment, will
diminish the appeal of ISIL. But that does not mean they could
then fly another banner, whether it is Nusra or something else.
Senator Rubio. The thing I am trying to break through is
this distinction that exists out there between ``directed by
ISIS'' and ``inspired by ISIS.'' In my mind, there is no
distinction. They are two parts of the same strategy, which is
to get people to commit terrorist acts in the name of ISIS in
an effort to terrorize who they view as their opponents and
call attention to their organization. There is no distinction.
Inspiration is a way of directing these attacks as we saw here
just a few weeks ago tragically.
And then you talk also--because this is another point that
I have made. Even if you were to wipe them out on the
battlefield, the ideology that underpins ISIS, this radical
jihadist ideology, will remain in place. I think that when it
comes to the issue of Syria--and this has already been touched
upon in some of the other questions that we have heard here,
Syria will remain a fertile ground for an ISIS-like group. It
will be Jabhat al Nusra next or somebody else to step up and
fill that vacuum as long as Assad is in power. He is the
irritant that creates the conditions by which these sorts of
things exist on the ground. That does not mean that everyone
that is against Assad is a radical jihadist, but his presence
there creates enough of an irritant, especially among Sunni
populations where groups like ISIS or some successor group
could take advantage of that to further their ideology and in
essence take up arms the way ISIS has done. Is that not
correct?
Mr. McGurk. The Assad regime remains an incubator for--the
conflict inside Syria remains an incubator for extremist groups
on both sides of the sectarian divide. And it is the sectarian
divide in the region that super charges these extremists from
both sides. We see young Shia from Afghanistan coming in to
fight in Syria and young Sunnis from all over the world coming
in to fight in Syria. It is something that is destabilizing
most importantly to Syria, but can also spawn attacks outside
of Syria. So getting a handle on the Syrian civil war--I very
much agree with you, Senator--is a fundamental precondition to
mitigating the risks of ISIL and Jabhat al Nusra, which is an
increasing concern.
Senator Rubio. But not just getting a hold of the--I mean,
the removal of Assad is critical. It is a critical component.
Mr. McGurk. Well, the war will not end so long as Assad is
there.
Senator Rubio. Right. And to that point, the process we
have in place now to achieve it through Geneva has been
described to me now by people, including those involved in the
process, as something that is circling the drain, in essence.
It is not going well. The process in many ways has given Russia
cover to do some of the things they have now done like, for
example, much of the Russian military engagement in Syria has
not been targeted at ISIS. It has been targeted at non-ISIS
groups, and in particular, we saw an open source report last
week that they specifically targeted U.S.-backed rebels near
the Jordanian border. Is it not true that much of Russia's
military action in the region has been geared towards non-ISIS
rebels in an effort to basically wipe them out and then turn to
the world and say you have two choices in Syria, ISIS or Assad?
Mr. McGurk. So when Russia first came in, about 70-80
percent of their attacks were against opposition groups,
moderate opposition groups, and after the cessation of
hostilities, we did see that flip so that they were focused on
Palmyra and other areas. But in the last weeks we have, as the
situation particularly in Aleppo has escalated, they are
conducting a significant amount of airstrikes in that northern
Aleppo corridor, which is where we believe the moderate
opposition is based. And so that is a total violation of the
cessation of hostilities.
We have two problems with the cessation of hostilities. One
is Jabhat al Nusra, which is launching these massive
offensives, and then second is primarily the regime air force.
So the regime air force, as far as we can tell, is basically a
criminal enterprise dropping barrel bombs and attacking
civilians under the pretext of attacking Nusra. So long as this
is going on, it is a Petri dish for extremist organizations.
Senator Rubio. Well, my time is up, but I just want to
leave something on the record. I share the objective of
retaking Manbij. I am concerned about the reliance that we
placed in our alliance with the YPG and in their activities
there and what that means both to our relationship with the
Turks and ultimately to their stated goal of uniting the
cantons across northern Syria. I think it is a strategy that
perhaps was viewed as necessary given the realities on the
battlefield, but I think in the long term creates some
significant complications in the region with a number of
different groups, including the Kurds in Iraq.
Senator Markey?
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Mr. McGurk, during the past 2 weeks, both Ambassador
Silliman, the nominee to be Ambassador to Iraq, and Jonathan
Winer, the Special Envoy for Libya, testified before the
committee. It is obvious that tactical successes against ISIS,
whether in Iraq or Libya, will not bring about the strategic
defeat of ISIS unless tactical operations are done in ways that
not only avoid harming civilian populations but proactively
protect them from harm and, two, we and international partners
undertake aggressive political interventions to negotiate
agreements to bring together divergent armed groups under
unified governments that represent and protect all of the
people.
In your testimony, you acknowledged that the Fallujah Shia
militias committed abuses against Sunni civilians who were
fleeing for their lives. It is also apparent that adequate
advance preparations were not made to receive, transport, and
provide relief to tens of thousands of people who fled the
fighting in Fallujah. And I understand that after the fact, the
Iraqi Government says it will hold offenders accountable for
abuses and also that the international community is stepping up
humanitarian relief efforts. But I am very concerned that
after-the-fact fixes may not be enough to convince Sunni people
that the Iraqi Government is on their side.
So my question is, what are the Iraqi Government actions?
What are the armed forces doing before and during military
operations to identify and mitigate foreseeable risks that Shia
militia will engage in sectarian attacks on Sunni civilians?
Are there specific things that our people who work with the
Iraqis are doing or should be doing to ensure that battle plans
include proactive measures to prevent such attacks from
happening? We are politicians on this panel. That is the one
thing that we are experts on. People will not forget if they
were not protected even if there is a tactical victory in any
individual city.
Mr. McGurk. Thank you, Senator. This is critically
important. It is something, when I was in Iraq last week, took
up many of my discussions, particularly with Prime Minister
Abadi and with the Iraqi security leaders.
It is important to recognize that most of the atrocities
committed against Sunnis in places like Fallujah and Anbar
Province are committed by ISIL. ISIL kind of held that
population hostage. We are finding prisoners in dungeons and
cellars in which they were committing incredible atrocities
against Sunnis. When they retook Anbar Province, ISIL massacred
hundreds of people from the Albu Nimr tribe, a very proud tribe
in the central Euphrates Valley.
However, we have to make sure that when security operations
come in to liberate these areas from ISIL, that these lawless
groups are not part of the operation. And as I mentioned, in
the early days of Fallujah, we had a serious problem. About 24
hours, there were serious reports, many of which have turned
out not to be credible but some of which appear to be credible.
And the Special Representative to the U.N. testified before the
U.N. Security Council about this last week, particularly about
the measures that are now in place to mitigate the risk of
this.
So one thing that happens when you liberate a territory and
the civilians come out, you do have to screen the population to
make sure that ISIL terrorists have not infiltrated that
population. So in Anbar, now there is a local official from
Anbar, from the local area that is a part of that process every
step of the way. That is something that the local leaders of
Anbar insisted on, and that is now in place.
And in our discussions in Erbil on how to do the Mosul
campaign--this is a front and center issue--we have to make
sure that these types of events do not occur in Mosul and that
all the forces that take part in the Mosul campaign are
operating strictly under the control of the Iraqi security
forces.
Senator Markey. What does the government say to you?
Mr. McGurk. The government--and this is why the Government
of Iraq is a real partner in this regard. The government is
supportive. I mean, those atrocities were a tarnish on the
government, on the Iraqi army, the Iraqi security forces, and
that is something that Prime Minister Abadi very much
recognizes.
Senator Markey. And did they agree that Fallujah was a
mistake, the way it was conducted?
Mr. McGurk. Certainly. It was really in the 24 hours of the
offensive move into the city in which we had these reports. And
it was top to bottom voices inside Iraq, from the Shia
religious community, from Grand Ayatollah Sistani, all the way
to Muqtada al-Sadr--immediately condemned those reports of
abuse. Of course, the government did. The minister of defense
announced the arrests of some members of the Iraqi army even
who were involved in that abuse. And they have to remain
vigilant against this. When you have got a lot of young people
out on the streets with guns in a type of situation like this,
it is almost impossible to mitigate the risk of anything
happening. However, when you see something like we saw in the
early days of Fallujah----
Senator Markey. How many people have been punished so far
for what happened in Fallujah?
Mr. McGurk. I think about four or five members of the Iraqi
army have been detained and some members of the----
Senator Markey. What is their punishment so far?
Mr. McGurk. I do not think the investigation has been
concluded.
But our principle is and we are saying repeatedly is that
people have to held accountable when reports are found to be
credible.
Senator Markey. What is the answer to why were the Shia
militia allowed to be put in those positions where they can
commit those kinds of atrocities? What is the answer that you
get from the government?
Mr. McGurk. There is one particular unit of the popular
mobilization forces on the Shia side that was operating totally
outside the law in some of the suburbs of Fallujah such as
Saqlawiyah. So I cannot say specifically why that unit was
there in Saqlawiyah. But what I can say is that the government
has taken measures to make sure that it is addressed.
Senator Markey. And I know my time is going to run out.
But I guess what I would say is if those five individuals
and more are not severely punished and punished in a way that
is public and clear, then there will be no discouragement in
the other cities that we are trying to take. So I think your
key political job is just to make sure that there is a
punishment for those people because otherwise other militia
will think that they can do it, get a slap on the wrist, they
accomplished their vengeful purpose, but at the end of the day,
they create a political conundrum that is very difficult to
solve in the years ahead, that we not have to revisit this
thing politically.
So is that a goal that you have, that these people be
punished?
Mr. McGurk. Accountability is fundamental.
Senator Markey. You are saying punishment for those five.
Mr. McGurk. Accountability. That means that----
Senator Markey. Accountability can just be calling them out
and saying do not do it again.
Mr. McGurk. Punishment under the law, yes. So they have to
have a process and people have to be held accountable, and that
means they have to be punished when violations occur.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I know we consider Mr. McGurk to be a global citizen, but
he is indeed a graduate of Hall High School in West Hartford,
Connecticut.
Mr. McGurk. Conard High School actually.
Senator Murphy. Conard. I am sorry. Let me try to recover
from that. [Laughter.]
Senator Murphy. So thank you for being here, Mr. McGurk,
and thank you for taking on what is, frankly, a nightmare of a
job, trying to manage this crisis and manage this coalition,
and we are lucky to have you at the helm.
In response I think to a question from Senator Corker
earlier, you were talking about our concerns about some of our
coalition partners not being as involved as we would like,
especially with the air campaign. And so I wanted to ask you a
question relative to the reasons why some members of the
coalition are not participating at the level that we would
expect.
When I was in Abu Dhabi at the end of last year, I went to
get a brief from the ministry of defense. I was there with
another member to oversee our counter-ISIS campaign. And the
title of the brief, knowing that I was there to talk about the
coalition fight against ISIL, was the threat from Iran. And the
entire brief was about the work that the UAE and other
coalition members are doing to counter the expansion of Iranian
influence. And from what I understand, their focus, the Saudis'
focus and UAE's focus, on Yemen has been one of the primary
reasons why they have been less participatory in the air
campaign against ISIL.
And so speak to the worry that some of us have that this
concentration of focus on Yemen, which is facilitated by U.S.
support, has quite frankly distracted resources from members of
the coalition that we would like to be primarily used in the
fight against ISIL. So we complain about the Saudis and the UAE
sort of withdrawing support from the air campaign against ISIL,
but to many of us, it appears that we have facilitated that
withdrawal by assisting their air campaign in Yemen against the
Houthis. So talk about the intersection of those two conflicts
and how we get some of our partners to focus first on ISIL
rather than first on the Houthis.
Mr. McGurk. There is no question that the conflict in Yemen
has pulled resources away from what was a real focus on the
counter-ISIL campaign. That is one reason we have focused quite
a bit in the recent months on trying to establish a political
process to end the conflict in Yemen.
Our close partners, the Saudis, when they see a threat on
the border, they have to act, and so we recognize their need to
act. The Emiratees have been one of our closest partners
militarily particularly and they have maintained a strong
participation in the counter-ISIL campaign.
But we do very much believe the primary focus here is on
ISIL, that ISIL is a threat not only to us, but it is also a
threat to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. I think that is
something the Saudis will tell you.
But all I can say, Senator, is where we are right now, we
want to end the war in Yemen in order to really focus efforts
on the counter-ISIL campaign. So as these multiple conflicts
have been going on, it has reduced the resources that we have
been able to focus on ISIL over the skies of Syria.
That said, over the past recent months, we have had four
additional coalition partners extend their strikes into Syria.
I was just in Iraq talking to General McFarland, our overall
commander. This is the most kinetic phase of the campaign to
date. 70 percent of the planes now taking off are actually
dropping their munitions. That is because we have better
intelligence. We have more partners on the ground fighting. But
that also brings us to the key point which you are raising is
that we need more resources in the skies as we continue to
accelerate.
So I am hopeful that as the Yemen political process moves
forward--and we all hope that it does--that we will have more
capacity brought to bear against ISIL.
Senator Murphy. Second question. There have been a number
of reports in the press over the last month or so about groups
within the rebel coalition fighting each other, and some of
this is relative to groups that are backed covertly by the
United States. And I understand the limitations on how much you
can talk about that, recent reports about conflicts between the
FSA and the YPG.
For many of us, our reluctance to arm and train groups
inside the fight is because we have a belief that we are in the
second order of fighting today. The first order was a fight
between the rebels and Assad. The second order is the part of
the war in which ISIS has joined. But there are then third and
fourth and fifth orders that may involve groups that have been
funded by the United States fighting each other as the
battlefield shrinks and perhaps we actually make progress
against some of the groups that right now provide a buffer
between organizations that are funded by the United States.
Just speak to the fear that ultimately groups that are
armed today by the United States who may be fighting the same
enemy may ultimately be fighting each other if we are
successful in our effort to try to downgrade the power and
lethality of some of these existing groups.
Mr. McGurk. So, Senator, where we are successful at kind of
tamping down these locally based conflicts is where we have
relationships and a presence on the ground. So in Iraq, we have
had problems between Kurds and Arabs. We have had problems
between different groups in Anbar Province, Sunni-on-Sunni
things. Where we are present and we have relationships, we can
tamp it down.
To be very candid, what is frustrating on the Syria side,
we do not have anybody inside Syria on the ground. Sometimes it
is very difficult to tell what is happening. We rely on people,
particularly in the northwest, telling us what they think is
happening. And our ability to then tamp down localized
escalations is not what I wish it was.
In eastern Syria, where we do have platforms now, we are
developing a relationship base that has been very effective and
that we hope we can build upon in this northwest part of the
country where you are talking about we have these localized
competitions between different groups that we support that we
can work locally to deescalate that.
But I just have to be honest. Without people on the ground
working these problems, it is very hard. It is very hard to do
it by remote control. And in Iraq, we have people on the
ground. We have relationships. When things flare up, we can
really work to flare them down. In eastern Syria, kind of east
of the Euphrates, we have platforms. We are developing close
relationships. To Senator Rubio's question, we recognize we
need an Arab force to move down on Raqqa not just the Kurds.
That is why we have these platforms. We are recruiting the
Arabs by the thousands now. But in northwest Syria, it is
incredibly difficult, and it is one of my frustrations working
on this day to day, frankly.
Senator Murphy. And I think you have identified the Gordian
knot that we all have to deal with, which is that you are
saying without more American presence on the ground, we risk
these local conflicts becoming more heated and more
problematic. But of course, many of us know the risks
associated with putting more U.S. forces on the ground. This is
a tough one to figure our way out of and again part of the
reason why I am glad that you have taken up this assignment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I know we are few minutes past your hard stop, and I will
be very brief.
You had earlier talked about Manbij laying the foundation
for what we would do in Raqqa. And I know you have talked a
little bit with Senator Rubio about the makeup of what needs to
happen.
Do we feel at present the forces can be assimilated to deal
with Raqqa in the near term?
Mr. McGurk. So to Senator Rubio's question, which is an
important one, it is about we recognize we have to have an Arab
force that moves into these Arab areas to push on Raqqa. And
when I was in Kobani in February, this was kind of just getting
off the ground. One of the reasons I was in there was to talk
about this operation, which at the time was the biggest
operation we were going to do in Syria, on a town called
Shaddadi, which is an Arab town. We organized a force then of
about 6,000 or so. 2,500 of them were Arab, the first time we
had a real inclusive mix. It turned out to be successful. That
is one of the things that gave President Obama the confidence
to increase our special forces capability inside Syria to
organize these forces.
Now, what is so important about Manbij is that the ratio is
even reversed. So it is a mostly Arab force moving now on
Manbij, a much more limited role for the Syrian Kurds. So it is
kind of a model of what we would use ultimately to push down on
Raqqa.
The Americans who are working this on the ground every day
in northern Syria--the reports I am getting. They are
encouraged that as we are having success, more and more of
these Arab leaders, the Arab tribal leaders, are coming to join
this force. They want to be part of this push on Raqqa. And so
right now, I think the trend line is good.
But I would not underestimate how hard this is to pull
these forces together, to organize them, to make them a
cohesive unit to be able to push, together with our air
support. However, from Shaddadi, which was a proof of concept,
and now Manbij, I think we have hit on something that can work.
The Chairman. I will ask you in private. I know you do not
want to lay out a time frame for either Mosul or Raqqa, you
know, being in Raqqa. I guess I was in Iraq just a few months
before last June when we thought last June was going to be the
time that we went into Mosul. Obviously, it is this June and we
are still not ready. But I look forward to having that offline
conversation.
I know you are on your way to the White House. I do not
know who the audience is there, but I would say again the fact
that Assad is still killing people the day after humanitarian
aid is being delivered does beg the question of what kind of
force needs to be pressed against him to stifle the civil war.
I mean, this is never going to be dealt with appropriately
until that ends. It is evident that Russia and Iran have not
had the effect on Assad that was contemplated when the
cessation began. And I do hope you are able to talk to me after
today a little bit more about what the thinking is in that
regard.
We thank you for your service to our country.
The record will be open until the close of business on
Thursday. Please answer the written questions that I am sure
will follow as promptly as you can.
Again, we thank you for your service. We appreciate you
being here.
And with that, the meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
responses to additional questions for the record
submitted to brett mcgurk by senator marco rubio
Question 1. Are you aware of the identities of the State
Department officers who signed the so-called ``dissent cable'' that was
leaked to the press two weeks ago?
Answer. I know some of them.
Question 2. Did any of them report to you and had any of them
attempted to make their views known to you prior to signing this
dissent cable?
Answer. None of them report to me.
Question 3. Do you agree with their views and do you support their
recommendations? If not, which of their recommendations do you disagree
with?
Answer. The issues surrounding the Syrian conflict are some of the
most complicated in the world and among the hardest problems we have
seen in some time. We have looked very closely at every angle of this
issue and there are no easy solutions. The process has been rigorous,
and we have fully considered a variety of ideas and their possible
consequences. This is tough work that our diplomats pursue every day,
to include how to defeat ISIL in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. As the
Secretary has said, no one is happy with the situation in Syria and we
continue to assess our approach on how to bring about a cessation of
hostilities, deliver unimpeded humanitarian access to all Syrians in
need, and have a genuine political transition in accordance with the
Geneva Communique.
Question 4. Last week, I spoke to Riad Hijab, the head of the
Syrian Higher Negotiation Committee, who very persuasively argues that
no solution to the crisis in Syria will be achieved until Bashar al-
Assad is removed from power. Do you disagree with Dr. Hijab?
Answer. As the President has said, Asad has lost all legitimacy and
has no place in Syria's future. His regime's brutality against his own
citizens helps extremists like ISIL continue to recruit support.
We believe Asad must go. The decisions for how that takes place
must be made in the context of political negotiations among Syrians,
under the auspices of the United Nations. We support the UN Special
Envoy for Syria's ongoing efforts with the opposition led by Riad
Hijab's High Negotiations Committee and the regime to gain agreement on
a genuine political transition in accordance with the Geneva Communique
of 2012. We are committed to a unified, pluralistic, and peaceful
Syria.
Question 5. What is the United States currently doing to put
pressure on the Assad regime? Don't we run the risk of endless
negotiations with little to show for them due to our unwillingness to
heed the advice of your State Department colleagues and apply some
leverage to the Assad Government and its Russian backers?
Answer. As President Obama has stated, Asad has no role to play in
Syria's future, which must be determined through political negotiations
among Syrians, under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at
achieving a genuine political transition in accordance with the Geneva
Communique of 2012. We are committed to a unified, pluralistic, and
peaceful Syria.
How to achieve the objectives set out in Resolution 2254 is the
subject of regular, frank strategic and tactical discussions within the
Administration. There is no military solution to this conflict. Rather,
we are working to bring about a political solution that includes a
transition away from Asad.
Through the International Syria Support Group, we work with over 25
other countries and entities to implement UN Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, a roadmap to end the conflict in Syria. UNSCR
2254 calls for a nationwide ceasefire and greater humanitarian access
to millions of Syrians, in parallel with political negotiations between
the Syrian opposition and government.
The Secretary continues to press Foreign Minister Lavrov--who has
stated that Russia has significant influence on the Asad regime's
military actions--to act to relieve the needless suffering of the
Syrian people.
Question 6. How many fighters does ISIL currently have under arms?
Answer. On ISIL numbers specifically, we assess that ISIL fields
approximately 19,000 to 25,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria, the lowest
assessed range since we began conducting rigorous reviews of the
group's manpower in 2014. This is down from a high end estimate of
31,500 frontline ISIL fighters in Iraq and Syria based on all-source
intelligence reports from May to August 2014. The decrease reflects the
combined effects of battlefield deaths, desertions, internal
disciplinary actions, recruiting shortfalls, Coalition efforts, and
difficulties that foreign terrorist fighters face traveling to Syria.
Question 7. How many foreign fighters have traveled to Syria since
ISIL swept through large portions of Iraq in 2014?
Answer. Since 2011, nearly 40,000 fighters from more than 120
countries have traveled to Syria and Iraq--including 6,900 with Western
passports. Global efforts to counter foreign fighter flows are making
progress, and we are seeing a drop in the number of fighters traveling
to the conflict zones this year. In May during remarks at the
International Special Operations Forces Convention, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Lisa Monaco
reported the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria is down
significantly over the last year. In early June, during a statement
delivered before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency Director John Brennan noted fewer foreign fighters
are traveling to Syria.
Question 8. How many have now returned to their home countries?
Answer. We rely on Intelligence Community assessments about the
flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and defer to them to provide
more details--many of which are classified--on the basis for their
assessment about the number of FTFs returning from the Middle East. The
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has a broad Center-wide effort
to track foreign fighters traveling to Syria, working closely with
Intelligence Community partners. As part of this effort, NCTC
aggregates information on known or suspected terrorists traveling to
Syria in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). This
effort has created a valuable forum for identifying, tracking, and
sharing information with law enforcement, counterterrorism, screening,
and watchlisting communities on known or suspected terrorists. Forty-
one countries have passed new laws or updated existing legislation to
more effectively identify and prosecute returning FTFs; 38 countries
have reported arresting FTFs; and 30 have successfully brought charges
in FTF cases.
Question 9. Is it correct to say, that Americans should expect to
see more terrorist attacks inspired in some way by the perceived
success of ISIL, as we've seen in San Bernardino and now in Orlando,
yes or no?
Answer. As ISIL continues to face military pressure and losses in
Iraq and Syria, we expect it will continue its efforts to encourage and
inspire attacks around the world. ISIL has used negative propaganda to
inspire attacks in several countries around the world, and we recognize
the difficulty security agencies face in disrupting lone offender
attacks by individuals inspired by the group and other violent
extremist organizations.
We defer to DHS and FBI on the specifics of the threat as it
pertains to the U.S. Homeland and of their threat mitigation efforts.
The Department of State and our diplomatic missions work hand in hand
with domestic security agencies to expand international efforts and
cooperation to mitigate continued terrorist threats to the Homeland and
U.S. interests overseas and to protect our borders. For example, our
efforts to improve border security abroad and to exchange watchlisting
information with our partners aim to stop terrorists from reaching our
shores or from harming our key partners and Western interests. As a
result, more international partners and air carriers are employing
threat-based security and border screening requirements. We will
continue to protect our borders, strengthen criminal justice system
responses, and work with local partners to counter violent extremism
that could potentially target the Homeland.
Question 10. Whatever the military gains in recent weeks in Iraq
and Syria, do you think that the view among elements of the Muslim
community, in the Middle East, and in Western societies, is that ISIL
is winning or losing its current battles?
Answer. Sixty-six partners have joined the United States in the
Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, including Middle Eastern and Muslim
majority countries such as Afghanistan, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, among others. Together we share the
same goal of degrading and ultimately defeating this horrific
organization. Pew Research Center survey data collected in 11 countries
with significant Muslim populations from April and May 2015 shows that
populations in nearly all of these countries (Burkina Faso, Jordan,
Indonesia, Israel, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria, Palestinian territories,
Senegal, and Turkey) express overwhelmingly negative opinions of ISIL.
In addition, Pew Research Center data suggest there is support in
Middle Eastern countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon, for U.S. actions
against ISIL. The 2016 Arab Youth Survey tells us that nearly four in
five young Arabs rule out any support for ISIL even if ISIL stopped
using violence, and most believe it will ultimately fail to establish
its vision of an Islamic state. As ISIL's so-called ``Caliphate'' loses
money and territory and attracts fewer fighters, the terrorist
organization is being put on the defensive. Mindful of the many
challenges ISIL poses across multiple regions, the United States
remains committed to sustaining this momentum.
Question 11. Don't you think that the fact that this non-state
group has stood up to the world's greatest military and a coalition of
more than sixty countries for two and a half years without losing
control of their largest cities is a pretty impressive achievement that
raises some questions about our seriousness in this fight?
Answer. ISIL has not had a major battlefield victory in over a
year. It has lost 47 percent of its territory in Iraq, and 20 percent
in Syria. More important than percentages, however, is the strategic
nature of the territory that ISIL has lost: nearly the entire border
between Syria and Turkey, iconic cities like Ramadi, Tikrit, and
Fallujah, and all the major transit points between Raqqa and Mosul,
such as Sinjar, Hawl and Shaddadi. Loss of territory also equates to
the loss of the tax base critical to sustaining the organization and
funding external operations. ISIL's control of territory is also a
basis for the group's self-declared legitimacy as a state. Denying it
that territory directly denies it that legitimacy. ISIL's control over
towns and cities provides it a base for planning and conducting
external operations. A U.S. and Coalition-supported operation currently
underway in northern Syria has isolated the city of Manbij, severing a
major supply line to Raqqa and isolating an important external
operations hub. In both Iraq and Syria we are now working with local
partners to shrink this territory further, through a combination of
military, political, and security measures.
Question 12. You may be aware of Osama bin Laden's 2001 comment
that ``When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature, they
will like the strong horse.''
Almost three years into this conflict, who do you think many
Muslims in the Middle East, as well as those around the world
who may be inspired by ISIL's apocalyptic worldview, view as
the ``strong horse,''--ISIL or the United States?
Answer. With Coalition support, local forces have now recaptured
from ISIL nearly 10,000 square kilometers of strategically significant
territory in northeastern Syrian and nearly 30,000 square kilometers in
Iraq. Financially, ISIL has been forced to cut its fighters' salaries
in half and levy extortionate taxes on populations under its control to
alleviate economic shortfalls. We have seen a significant reduction in
the flow of foreign terrorist fighters entering Syria and Iraq each
month. According to the 2016 Arab Youth Survey as well as polling
conducted in the region, a majority of respondents in countries like
Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen consider ISIL to be a terrorist
organization, and a majority of young Arabs believe ISIL will fail to
successfully establish its vision of an Islamic state.
Question 13. What are we doing to change this ISIL narrative other
than relying on often inadequate proxy forces to make painstakingly
slow progress on the battlefield?
Answer. Our counter-ISIL campaign has liberated at least one third
of the territory ISIL once controlled in Iraq and Syria, reduced its
manpower by over 10,000, denied it economic revenue, is isolating it
from the outer world, removing its leadership from the battlefield,
directly challenging its global narrative, and is degrading ISIL's
eight official branches. The effects of our counter-ISIL campaign are
reflected in the evolving ISIL global narrative. ISIL spokesman
Muhammad al-Adnani for years described ISIL as a global, historic,
expanding movement. His catchphrase was ``remain and expand''--
describing the territory under its control--and he promised ISIL would
someday dominate the Middle East and ultimately control territory in
southern Europe. Adnani's latest statement in May was quite different.
No longer the confident voice of an expanding movement, he acknowledged
that ISIL may lose its holdings in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, including
its strongholds of Mosul, Raqqa, and Sirte. We are now working to
ensure that his prediction comes true, and that Adnani himself--who
also leads ISIL's external operations arm--is eliminated, and no longer
able to spew his incitement.
Question 14a. Following the Obama Administration's long overdue
determination that ISIL has been committing genocide against
Christians, Yezidis and others in Iraq and Syria, what is the
Administration's plan to ensure the safe resettlement and reintegration
of ethnic and religious minorities into the homelands in Iraq?
Answer. We are committed to assisting people of all ethnicities,
religions, and nationalities who are fleeing persecution and violence.
Voluntary return is often the durable solution preferred by refugees
and displaced persons. The United States supports voluntary
repatriation when refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) can
do so in safety and dignity, and in fact many Iraqis from a broad range
of ethnic and religious backgrounds inform us that that is their first
choice. We believe that refugees and IDPs should be permitted to
integrate locally into their places of displacement if returns are not
feasible. Resettlement to third countries is the last resort, and it
can only apply to a very small percentage of displaced persons each
year.
U.S. humanitarian assistance in Iraq benefits the displaced as well
as host community members in urban areas and camps and informal
settlements, as U.S.-funded humanitarian agencies support local
infrastructure, including schools, medical clinics, and sanitation
infrastructure. U.S.-supported agencies are also conducting quick-
impact projects, such as repairs to wells, garbage collection, and
livelihoods initiatives that strengthen communities' resilience in the
face of sustained trauma. These projects provide hope for the
vulnerable, both the displaced and host community members, that there
is a future for their communities in Iraq once the present conflict has
subsided and that there are reasons to return home.
The United States has provided more than $15 million to the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP)-managed Funding Facility for
Immediate Stabilization (FFIS). Based on priorities identified by the
Government of Iraq and local authorities, FFIS programs provide
immediate assistance to areas liberated from ISIL, and these projects
complement ongoing Iraqi government efforts. By repairing public
infrastructure, providing grants to small businesses, boosting the
capacity of local government, promoting civil engagement and community
reconciliation, and providing short-term employment through public
works schemes, FFIS helps ensure initial services and stability to
promote returns of displaced persons. Through the efforts of the
Government of Iraq, and with the support of UNDP, the United States,
and the Coalition, nearly 100 percent of the pre-ISIL population has
returned to Tikrit, and more than 750,000 people have returned home to
liberated areas throughout Iraq.
In addition to humanitarian assistance, since 2008, the U.S.
government has provided more than $100 million for a variety of efforts
in Iraq that include promoting respect for rights of members of
minority groups and interfaith tolerance, community stabilization,
conflict mitigation, and cultural preservation. The Department of State
has worked to promote respect for the human rights of persons belonging
to religious minorities, including through increased engagement and
staffing of the Office of International Religious Freedom; the work of
Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Middle East and South
and Central Asia Knox Thames; and increased foreign assistance
programming focused on advocating for and promoting religious freedom
around the world.
Question 14b. Does the Administration consider the return of
ethnic and religious minorities to their homelands a critical component
toward achieving a safe, secure, and sovereign Iraq?
Answer. Creating the conditions that allow for the safe, dignified,
and voluntary return home of all Iraqis displaced by ISIL, including
ethnic and religious minorities, is a critical element of long-term
stability in Iraq. Members of ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq
regularly tell us that they want to return to their ancestral homelands
if it is safe for them to do so. To help achieve this objective, the
United States has emphasized stabilization of areas liberated from
ISIL, which entails the deployment of trusted local security, the
restoration of basic services like electricity and water, and the
refurbishment of health clinics and schools.
The United States has supported stabilization efforts through
UNDP's Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization, which channels
funds to rapid projects prioritized by local leaders and UNDP. On July
20, the United States will co-host a Pledging Conference in Support of
Iraq, which will generate hundreds of millions of dollars in
contributions for stabilization, as well as significant contributions
towards humanitarian assistance. Recognizing that preservation of
ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq cannot be sustained without the
widespread understanding of their inherent value within Iraqi society,
the United States supports programs centered on advocacy for key issues
that impact minority communities and programs that promote
reconciliation, stabilization, inclusiveness, and equitable and
representative political participation.
The United States will continue to press the Government of Iraq and
the Kurdistan Regional Government--to permit the voluntary return of
all displaced persons and to ensure that any security screening
processes for returnees, as well as the newly displaced, are
transparent and humane.
To promote long-term stability, the United States has supported
Prime Minister Abadi's efforts to decentralize federal authorities,
giving local communities greater influence over their governance. In
addition, the United States will support Government of Iraq efforts to
hold accountable those who committed atrocities against ethnic and
religious minorities.
Question 14c. What is the Administration doing to train and assist
local forces, including Yezidi and Christian militias, so that they can
help defend their home communities once they are recaptured?
Answer. The United States is committed to helping Iraq build a
strong, capable security force that represents Iraq's ethnic and
religious diversity. Prime Minister Abadi has made it a policy priority
to enroll thousands of local fighters into the Popular Mobilization
Forces (PMF) and increase the recruitment of Sunnis and other
minorities into the Iraqi Security Forces, and we support him in these
efforts.
The United States, through the Government of Iraq, has supplied
equipment to Sunni PMF units at a steady rate over the past year. This
includes rifles and machine guns, anti-armor weapons, ammunition,
vehicles, body armor, and uniforms. Christian PMF units and Christian
volunteers associated with the Peshmerga, including the Ninewa Plains
Protection Force, have received equipment and ammunition from both the
Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). To
date, Christian forces have received hundreds of rifles, sniper rifles,
and light machine guns, tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition, and
hand grenades. Additional equipment is scheduled to arrive in time to
support local fighters prepare for the impending Mosul offensive.
Question 15a. Many U.S. partners and even local citizens have
raised concerns about our reliance on the Syrian Kurdish YPG forces as
our partner in Syria.
What is your response to those that worry about the long-term
agenda of this partner that we have decided to work with in
northern Syria?
Answer. Sustainability of counter-ISIL gains is integral to the
campaign. That is why we are working with the Government of Iraq to
recruit local Sunnis in Anbar and Ninewa who will comprise the local
hold forces that secure terrain liberated from ISIL. In Syria, the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Syrian alliance comprising Syrian
Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, including Sunni Muslims and Christians, has
liberated thousands of square kilometers of northern and northeastern
Syria from ISIL. In February, a 40 percent Arab SDF force seized
Shaddadi, liberated it from ISIL, and has held it since. For that
operation I personally engaged SDF leadership and my DoD colleagues
worked daily with SDF commanders to ensure the correct force
composition. Since the end of May, we have supported an SDF operation
to isolate and seize Manbij in northern Syria. The SDF force conducting
this operation is over 80 percent Arab, mostly from the local area, and
is fighting to free their hometowns. This is a core premise of our
strategy for liberating territory: we want local people, with local
knowledge, in the operations to free their communities from ISIL, and
stabilize the areas after ISIL is gone.
Question 15b. What is the State Department doing to complement the
U.S. military's engagement of the YPG with outreach to other members of
Syrian Kurdish civil society?
Answer. In Iraq and Syria our work is predicated on the
understanding that inclusive and representative governance is essential
to serving local communities and empowering them to resist ISIL. This
conviction guides our interactions with local actors, including
governing officials. We complement this approach with engagement at the
local level to assess the needs of communities, including in majority-
Kurdish areas of northern Syria.
Question 16a. What role is the U.S. playing in finding more donors
to get involved in solving this humanitarian crisis?
Answer. Since January 2014, more than 3.3 million Iraqis have
become internally displaced due to ISIL-related violence and Iraqi
efforts to retake territory from extremist control. The United States
is the single largest donor to the Iraq humanitarian response, having
provided more than $778 million for vulnerable Iraqis since FY 2014. In
light of recent events in Iraq, the U.S. announced an additional
contribution of $20 million in humanitarian assistance on June 21.
However, the United States cannot be the only donor responding to this
crisis. To that end, we regularly discuss Iraq's humanitarian needs
with our international partners, highlighting the needs identified in
the UN's 2016 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan, as well as individual
appeals issued by the UN and other international organizations. On July
20, the United States will co-host with Germany, Canada, and Japan a
pledging conference for Iraq in Washington that seeks to raise
substantial new humanitarian contributions, in addition to
stabilization and demining funds. We expect to announce a significant
new humanitarian assistance contribution at the conference, and these
funds will be available for response to the expected humanitarian needs
following the Mosul operation.
Question 16b. Is the Iraqi government providing appropriate
resources in Fallujah to address this humanitarian situation?
Answer. The Government of Iraq is facing an economic crisis
following the recent downturn in oil prices. The Government of Iraq
allocated $10 million for the immediate response to the Fallujah
displacements, and it manages several camps for internally displaced
persons on the outskirts of Ameriyat al Fallujah and Habbaniya
Touristic City, two Anbar cities that were hosting IDPs from previous
displacement in the province. Nonetheless, the Government of Iraq will
rely on extensive resources from the international community to help it
address the immense humanitarian crisis it is facing, even before the
anticipated liberation of Mosul. In Fallujah, the speed with which the
June military offensive on Fallujah unfolded surprised both the
humanitarian community and the UN system in Iraq, delaying the
provision of immediate relief items to the 85,000 internally displaced
persons (IDPs) who fled Fallujah and its suburbs.
The humanitarian agencies operating in Anbar province were still
not fully prepared for the Fallujah response, due to a combination of
funding shortfalls, access challenges, security threats, and limited
staff surge capacity. The Government of Iraq, the United States, other
donors, and the humanitarian community are taking the lessons learned
in the Fallujah response in order to be more prepared for the expected
offensive on Mosul in coming months.
Question 17. Lieutenant General Thomas Waldhauser who has been
nominated by President Obama to be Commander of the U.S. Africa Command
at his confirmation hearing on June 21, 2016 before the Senate Armed
Services Committee stated that the Administration does not have an
overall grand strategy with regard to Libya and specifically against
the growing threat from ISIL.
Do you agree with that assessment?
Answer. No, I do not agree. We do have a strategy in Libya centered
on U.S. diplomacy playing a leading role in assembling a robust
international coalition to support our interests in a unified and
stable Libya. Our approach is closely linked with a broader
international effort and organized around four components:
1. Advancing implementation of the Libya Political Agreement (LPA);
2. Promoting stability and civilian security;
3. Countering terrorism and violent extremism; and
4. Stimulating the economy and improving humanitarian conditions.
Some elements of this strategy are military, including strikes when
we have identified a threat to U.S. interests or security, but the
overarching strategy is larger than that. It is founded on our
assessment, which is shared with a great number of international
partners, that the only hope for long-term stability and security in
Libya is a unified national government. It is fundamental, therefore,
that our political and counterterrorism engagement be mutually
reinforcing.
The U.S. Government has helped to actively advance the Libyan
political process, support Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj's Government
of National Accord (GNA) and the LPA, and promote security in Libya and
the Maghreb and Sahel region. The United States supports the
aspirations of the Libyan people for a united, inclusive, and
responsive national government after 42 years of authoritarian misrule
and the challenges and divisions Libya has faced since the 2011
revolution. U.S. diplomatic support for the political process led by UN
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Martin Kobler
has contributed to key Libyan political milestones, including the
signing of the LPA in December 2015, the Libyan House of
Representatives' vote to approve the LPA on January 25, and the arrival
of Prime Minister al-Sarraj and the Presidency Council of the GNA in
Tripoli on March 30.
Since the GNA entered Tripoli, Prime Minister al-Sarraj has
undertaken a series of steps to stabilize the country, including
measures to form a Presidential Guard, establish a joint command to
combat ISIL, and ensure that ministries and acting ministers can get to
work to serve the Libyan people, pending formal action by the Libyan
parliament. Along with our international partners, the United States is
supporting Prime Minister al-Sarraj's government as it combats ISIL,
and takes steps to re-establish effective governance, restore
stability, and address Libya's security, economic, and humanitarian
challenges.
Secretary of State John Kerry and Italian Foreign Minister Paolo
Gentiloni co-hosted a Ministerial on Libya May 16 in Vienna to solidify
international support behind Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj's
government, particularly on security. At the Vienna Ministerial, four
international organizations and 21 countries reiterated the
international community's commitment to support the GNA as Libya's sole
legitimate recipient of international security assistance. We support
Prime Minister al-Sarraj's efforts to build an inclusive national
security architecture.
We continue to urge all Libyan forces to enhance coordination and
implement a unified command to direct the fight against ISIL in Libya.
We are ready to respond to the Libyan government's requests to train
and equip vetted, GNA-aligned forces from throughout Libya. The UN arms
embargo allows for the GNA to request exemptions for the weapons it
needs to secure the country and to combat ISIL. The GNA has voiced its
intention to submit appropriate arms embargo exemption requests to the
UN Libya Sanctions Committee to procure necessary lethal arms and
materiel to counter UN-designated terrorist groups and to combat ISIL
throughout the country. We will fully support these exemption efforts
while continuing to reinforce the UN arms embargo to prevent transfer
of illicit arms to Libya and prevent acquisition of arms by non-state
actors.
We continue to assess ISIL activity in Libya and work with our
partners to determine the best way to counter ISIL. As President Obama
has made clear, we will not hesitate when it comes to defending U.S.
national security interests and we have undertaken direct action
against ISIL in Libya, when necessary. Ultimately, defeating ISIL will
require that the GNA fill the political and security vacuum in Libya.
The GNA will need the support of the United States and international
community to be successful in this effort, and we have undertaken wide-
reaching efforts to ensure its success.
Question 18. Are we allowing ISIL and its over 5,000 fighters in
Libya to establish a stronghold that will be difficult for a new,
fragile government in Libya to address?
Answer. Our counterterrorism policy in Libya is focused on
degrading ISIL and other violent extremist groups and reducing the
threat they pose to U.S. interests in North Africa and Europe. The
United States and international community need to bolster Libya's unity
government as a partner to most effectively counter the threat of ISIL
in Libya. ISIL exploits ungoverned areas and an effective, unified
central Libyan government is the best defense against any terrorist
threat. While Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj's Government of National
Accord remains fragile, it has already taken courageous steps to
confront ISIL and taken back significant territory. We must provide it
with our full support.
In Libya as elsewhere, President Obama has demonstrated his
willingness to take action wherever our interests are in danger. In the
past year the United States has conducted direct action against several
terrorist targets in Libya: our June 2015 strike targeted Al-Qaida-
affiliated Algerian Mokhtar Belmokhtar; our November 2015 strike killed
Iraqi national and senior ISIL figure in Libya Abu Nabil al-Anbari; and
our February 19 strikes took out a ISIL training camp and a foreign
fighter facilitator in western Libya. We also are focused on disrupting
the links between the ISIL branch in Libya and the core group in Iraq
and Syria. The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL has committed to a
concerted push to halt the flow of foreign fighters to Libya, disrupt
ISIL finances there, and counter and defeat its destructive message.
Since late May, an offensive by GNA-aligned forces on the city of
Sirte has made important gains. We continue to call on all armed actors
in Libya to coordinate their efforts under the GNA's command.
As Secretary Kerry, 20 other countries, and four international
organizations made clear at the May 16 Libya ministerial in Vienna, we
support the efforts of Prime Minister al-Sarraj's government to
establish civilian command and control over an inclusive, national
Libyan military.
The GNA announced in April that it would form a joint command to
coordinate counter terrorism efforts. It has since formed four regional
operations rooms focused on the fight against ISIL and other terrorist
groups. These decisions have enabled GNA-aligned forces to make
substantial progress against ISIL in and around its stronghold of
Sirte.
The United States and our international partners affirmed in the
May 16 Vienna Communique that the GNA is the sole legitimate recipient
of international security assistance to Libya and that the
international community will support the GNA by providing security
assistance to counter UN-designated terrorist groups throughout the
country. By providing assistance to forces under the GNA's command and
reinforcing the UN arms embargo to ensure weapons do not go to other
groups, we can help empower Prime Minister al-Sarraj to build the
unified, inclusive, civilian-controlled, and capable security forces
that Libya requires.
__________
responses to additional questions for the record
submitted to brett mcgurk by senator barbara boxer
Question 1. I understand that the Administration is in the process
of negotiating a memorandum of understanding to provide $415 million in
assistance to the Kurdish Peshmerga forces for their fight against
ISIL. Can you provide an update on the status of those negotiations for
this MOU? When do you hope to conclude it?
Answer. The United States has substantially increased assistance to
the Peshmerga in support of operations to defeat ISIL and liberate
Mosul. We recognize the severe budget crises affecting both the
Government of Iraq (GOI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
To help the KRG address the crisis, DoD stepped up assistance to
Peshmerga fighters. Sixty-five million in immediate assistance,
including food, bulk medical supplies, fuel, and ammunition began
moving to Erbil in early May. An additional $415 million is on track to
be dispensed later this summer. This additional funding will provide
stipends, food, fuel, ammunition, medical equipment and other
assistance for Peshmerga fighters. Under authority provided by the Iraq
Train and Equip Fund, assistance will be provided by, with, and through
the Government of Iraq.
Question 2. More broadly, how are we working with Iraq's central
government to ensure that the Kurds are getting the weapons and
equipment they need in a timely manner? Specifically, are there delays
in the shipments of weapons and supplies from Baghdad to Erbil, and if
so how is the Administration working to address this problem?
Answer. There is no delay in the shipments of weapons and supplies
from Baghdad to Erbil. We expedite equipment deliveries to the Kurds,
and Baghdad has neither prevented nor delayed the delivery of equipment
to the Ministry of Peshmerga in Erbil. On the contrary, it has
supported a coalition effort that has provided the Peshmerga with
thousands of tons of ammunition and equipment cost-free. While aircraft
carrying weapons and equipment destined for Erbil do stop in Baghdad
for inspection, this usually adds less than a few hours to the transit
time.
Coordination between Baghdad and Erbil has proven critical in the
campaign--Baghdad provided the first flights of ammunition to the
Kurdistan Regional Government after the fall of Mosul in 2014, and the
Ministry of Defense has committed to directing a portion of the FMF
loan to meet the needs of Kurdish forces.
Coordinating U.S. military assistance through the central
government is required by both Iraqi and international law and helps
demonstrate our commitment to a sovereign and independent Iraq. It is
also essential to the lasting defeat of ISIL.
Thousands of Peshmerga have received training at Coalition Building
Partner Capacity (BPC) sites in Iraq. In addition, the United States
and the Coalition have provided the Peshmerga with tens of millions of
dollars in ammunition; weapons including rifles, anti-tank systems, and
high-caliber machine guns; counter-IED equipment; and vehicles,
including ambulances and mine resistant vehicles.
Question 3. Countering ISIL's apocalyptic message, which promises
heaven in exchange for mass murder, is perhaps a more complicated
challenge than defeating ISIS on the battlefield. Can you describe the
State Department's work to counter ISIL's propaganda online?
Answer. Countering ISIL's propaganda online is a complex issue that
needs to be done in accordance with the Department of State's
counterterrorism, human rights, and cyber policies, as well as taking
into account the government's engagement with the private sector
regarding the use of their platforms for violent extremist propaganda
and other content that may be protected under U.S. law. We believe that
we can most effectively counter violent extremists' propaganda on the
Internet by contesting terrorist narratives and worldviews through
competitive or alternative messages--and by building the capacity of
other credible voices internationally to do so.
Leading that effort is the Global Engagement Center (GEC), an
interagency entity, housed at the State Department, which coordinates
U.S. counterterrorism messaging to foreign audiences abroad. The work
of the GEC is focused around four core areas: 1) building and
empowering a global network of partners who message against violent
extremism, 2) developing and procuring thematic guidance and content
that partners can use to inform their messaging, 3) using data
analytics from both the public and private sectors to inform our
messaging efforts and measure our effectiveness, 4) and coordinating
these efforts across the many U.S. national security agencies that
operate in the information space.
The GEC runs collaborative, thematic campaigns with counter-ISIL
coalition nations and other partners to effectively counter and offer
an alternative narrative to ISIS's propaganda. For example, ISIS claims
that it is invincible. In response, the GEC's digital outreach teams
(disseminators of messaging) work in conjunction with our Coalition
partners to highlight ISIS's territorial losses and other information
that counters their claims. The GEC also curates and creates content
from the open source media environment which is then shared with U.S.
government and Coalition partners.
The GEC's foreign language messaging staffers are multilingual with
extensive educational and/or professional experience in their countries
of focus. As a result, the staff is uniquely qualified to understand
the political, social, and cultural backgrounds of the societies to
which they are messaging. This expertise is used to inform broader
messaging efforts and campaigns.
Countering violent extremist messaging is an important part of our
broader strategy to counter violent extremism (CVE). We must also work
closely and creatively with communities, civil society, and the private
sector. Several bureaus at State, including the Bureau of
Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CT), Public Affairs
(R), and the regional bureaus design, fund and implement capacity
building programs to empower credible voices to counter ISIL's and
other violent extremists' messages, among other CVE efforts. Engaged
citizens, communities, and civil and religious groups can also play an
essential role in developing counter narratives. Well-informed and
empowered families, communities, and local institutions represent the
best defense against terrorist ideologies.
There is also a role for governments to play in working with the
private sector and civil society on a voluntary basis to discourage the
use of the Internet to promote violent extremism and to encourage
positive counter narratives
Question 4. How effective are our efforts to counter ISIL's online
propaganda? How are we working with partner governments and NGOs?
Answer. The information campaigns of the GEC and its predecessor,
the CSCC, against ISIL, in addition to violent extremist account
suspensions by social media service providers, and ISIL's battlefield
losses have contributed to a significant decline in ISIL's online
propaganda activities since 2014.
GEC's information campaigns and building of partners' capacity have
contributed to a strong anti-ISIL movement online, which this
year out numbers ISIL at a ratio of roughly 6 to 1 on Twitter,
according to data obtained by The Associated Press.
GEC's information campaigns regularly surpass industry-standard
rates of engagement, indicating strong performance and public
interest in anti-ISIL messaging.
Battlefield losses have forced ISIL to modify its propaganda
narratives and dissemination methods, resulting in less
propaganda and weakened claims of an ascendant caliphate.
Additionally, various U.S. government departments and agencies have
engaged with a range of key technology companies to inform and
encourage companies' voluntary efforts to counter ISIL and other
terrorist groups online and determine how best to build partnerships to
address the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.
As part of this effort to counter ISIL's online propaganda, the GEC
assists in building, empowering, and maintaining a global network of
credible voices to interrupt and undermine violent extremist
recruitment and narratives, and mitigate the emergence of new violent
extremist organizations and affiliates. This is achieved through
partnership building with non-government organizations, to include
civil society, media outlets, and private sector companies. As we work
with non-government partners, we also work with partner governments who
are undertaking similar efforts as part of the Counter-ISIL Coalition.
The GEC coordinates messaging efforts across the Coalition through its
input to messaging themes and narratives provided to the Office of the
Special Envoy to Counter ISIL and the Coalition Communications Cell, to
ensure that there is consistency and unity in U.S. government and
partner nation messaging efforts. ISIL's propaganda presents a global
challenge and calls for a global solution. We are working with partners
in the UK, the UAE, and Malaysia to provide a localized focus to
counter ISIL's destructive narrative. I have visited the Sawab Center
in the UAE, where dynamic young people work to implement messaging
campaigns on themes such as national pride, family cohesion, and ISIL's
inability to govern. Providing an alternative to ISIL's message and
preventing radicalization will continue to be essential to this fight.
Question 5. What is the status of planning for the Mosul
offensive? What is the next phase of the Iraqi military's campaign
against ISIS?
Answer. We are working closely with the Government of Iraq as it
plans the operation to retake Mosul. After the liberation of Fallujah,
Prime Minister Abadi announced that Mosul was the next major operation.
Shaping operations have been underway for a few months, with Iraqi
Security Forces, including Kurdish Peshmerga, maneuvering to set the
conditions for the encirclement and ultimate liberation of Mosul. The
U.S. will continue to provide advice and assistance throughout the
military campaign, but the Government of Iraq is ultimately responsible
for determining the next phase in the operation.
Question. How are we working with the Iraqi Government to ensure
that Iraq is holding areas wrested from ISIS's control?
Answer. The Iraqi government understands that only through
improving security, stabilization, and reconciliation can it ensure the
long-term defeat of ISIL. The United States is a key partner in all of
these efforts.
Once a city is liberated, United States and Coalition advisors
continue to work with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to ensure
adequate security and provide intelligence support. The United States
and Coalition partners are training and equipping ISF entities
responsible for securing liberated areas to prevent the return of ISIL
fighters. These ``hold forces'' are generally comprised of local police
supported by Popular Mobilization Forces from the area.
Stabilization of liberated cities allows displaced Iraqis to
quickly return and begin to rebuild. The United States has provided
over $15 million to the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP)
Funding
Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS), which is the main
Coalition mechanism for immediate stabilization. Based on priorities
identified by the Government of Iraq and local authorities, FFIS
activities repair light infrastructure, provide small grants to
businesses, assist local government with recovery, promote community
reconciliation, and provide short-term employment through public works
schemes, such as rubble clearing. These stabilization projects lay a
foundation for reconciliation and prevent the return of ISIL by
demonstrating support to those communities most impacted by the
fighting.
Long-term reconciliation is in the hands of the Iraqi people and is
the key to preventing the return of ISIL. The United States is working
with the GOI to promote inclusive governance that respects minority
rights and does not discriminate based on sect or belief.
Question 7. How effective are our current training missions to
rebuild the Iraqi military?
Answer. Our efforts are not to rebuild the Iraqi military, but
rather to regenerate forces through targeted training, equipping, and
advising. More than 30,000 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),
including Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and Sunni Popular Mobilization Force
(PMF) personnel, have received training, equipment, or other support
from the Coalition. However, the best measure of effectiveness is not
training metrics, but battlefield success. Since May of 2015, the ISF
have not only prevented ISIL from seizing territory, but have retaken
nearly 50 percent of the land that ISIL held at its height, including
the cities of Ramadi, Fallujah, Sinjar, Hit, Tikrit, and Rutbah. Iraqi
forces are currently undertaking shaping operations to liberate Mosul--
Iraq's second largest city. With every victory the ISF has regained the
confidence and morale needed to maintain an effective military. This
has been and will remain an Iraqi fight, but the Coalition training
mission has been critical to ensuring the Iraqis have the capability to
take their country back from ISIL.
Question 8. Can you provide an update on the coalition's ``five
lines of effort''?
Answer. Representing the basic Counter-ISIL Coalition lines of
effort, the Coalition's Working Groups seek to enhance coordination and
share best practices. (Humanitarian assistance is led by the United
Nations.) To the fullest extent possible, they draw on the activities
of pre-existing multilateral fora and organizations, without creating
duplicative structures and processes, and encourage a prominent role
for countries most directly affected by ISIL, especially Arab and
majority-Muslim states. Each has an Action Plan that outlines specific
objectives, resource needs, key challenges and measures of performance.
Working Groups are active in the following areas:
Coordinating Military Support
As a terrorist group with a unique military and networking
capacity, ISIL represents a significant threat to the global community.
In exercise of the inherent right of self-defense, including the
collective self-defense of Iraq at Iraq's request, Coalition members
are contributing to a dynamic campaign led by the U.S. Central Command
to deny ISIL safe-havens in Iraq and Syria, disrupt its ability to
project power, and build partner capacity. To support this effort, the
U.S. Department of Defense has established a secretariat that
facilitates political-military consultations and holds meetings as
needed.
Disrupting the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters
An unprecedented number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) have
traveled to Iraq and Syria, many of whom joined ISIL. In response, this
Working Group draws extensively on the work of the Global Counter-
Terrorism Forum (GCTF), the UN, and efforts to implement UNSC
Resolution 2178 and the GCTF Hague-Marrakech Memorandum, in accord with
the security measures spelled out in the European Union's Syria and
Iraq foreign terrorist fighters strategy adopted on October 20, 2014.
The Working Group focuses on key lines of intervention including:
identifying current and potential national and transnational
recruitment and facilitation networks; promoting intensified and
accelerated exchange of information on FTF travel and routes;
facilitating effective communication and a swift flow of information
between Coalition members; discouraging individuals from traveling to
participate in the Iraq/Syria conflict on ISIL's behalf; criminalizing
FTF activities and enforcing laws to counter them; disrupting the
travel of aspiring or returning fighters; and as appropriate
prosecuting and/or rehabilitating and reintegrating FTFs upon their
return to home countries. We stress the need to strengthen cooperation
at the international, regional, sub-regional and national levels to
effectively prevent and counter terrorism.
Disrupting ISIL's Financial Access and Economic Sustainment
Understanding and sharing information on ISIL's financial and
economic activities, and focusing international efforts to counter
those activities are indispensable in ensuring ISIL's ultimate defeat.
This Working Group focuses on preventing ISIL's use of the
international financial system; countering its extortion and
exploitation of economic assets and resources, including oil smuggling
and looting of cultural and archeological goods; denying it funding
from abroad, including from external donors, foreign terrorist fighter
financing, and kidnapping for ransom; and preventing it from providing
financial or material support to other terrorist groups. The working
group promotes existing recommendations of the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF), supports the implementation of UN Security Council
Resolutions 2161, 2170 and 2199, and considers, coordinates and
incorporates initiatives in other fora (e.g., the G7, G20, Egmont Group
and INTERPOL).
Developing Narratives to Counter ISIL
ISIL exists in both the physical and information spaces; its
narrative is a threat in itself. This Working Group supports efforts to
expose the bankruptcy of ISIL's ideology and present a balanced
alternative narrative that enhances social resilience against extremist
propaganda and presents a vision of hope for a better future. It
supports and empowers credible and independent community, political,
economic, religious and educational leaders to get their messages out
via both traditional and social media. The group plans and executes
cooperative projects such as joint messaging centers, professional
exchanges, sharing of research, conferences and public events, while
promoting best practices and consistent messaging by Coalition members.
Providing Stabilization Support
Civilian security is essential to success in reclaiming territory
from ISIL. This Working Group has worked to strengthen Iraq's local,
provincial and national authorities and is looking at appropriate ways
to assist liberated areas in Syria. The focus has been on immediate
stabilization--i.e., the first 60 to 90 days after the end of combat
operations--with a goal of laying the foundations for lasting stability
and creating the conditions for the safe and voluntary return of
displaced persons. The group works closely with the Baghdad-based
Stabilization Task Force. It aims at mobilizing international support
for local officials and security forces in developing plans and
instruments for immediate recovery; and for efforts to advise and
assist with civilian planning, police and local governance, and re-
establishing essential services.
Question 9. Specifically, please describe the coalition's efforts
to stop ISIL's funding and financing. What are ISIL's major remaining
sources of revenue, and what can the United States do to cut off those
revenue streams?
Answer. The United States and the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
have made significant progress in recent months disrupting ISIL's
financial and resource networks, and we are seeing the results of these
efforts on the ground. ISIL has cut salary payments to its fighters in
Raqqa by 50 percent, leading many ISIL fighters to defect and leave the
battlefield. ISIL has struggled to fulfill its various governance
obligations such as basic services to Iraqi and Syrian citizens in
ISIL-controlled territory due to stretched finances. ISIL has also
increasingly resorted to the theft of property and arbitrary ``tax''
increases to make up the funding gap. Finally, we have seen
increasingly frequent incidents of corruption within ISIL's ranks as
funds have diminished.
Despite these recent signs of progress, however, the sources of
ISIL's revenues make it an unusual counter-terrorist financing
challenge. ISIL likely made around $500 million in 2015 from oil and
gas sales and about $350 million from extortion. In addition to those
two large revenue streams, ISIL made at least several million from
foreign donations in 2014 and in 2015, between $20 and $45 million from
kidnapping for ransom in 2014 but less in 2015, and less than $10
million from trafficking in antiquities.
Our most effective method of disrupting ISIL's revenues to date has
also been one of the most atypical counter-terrorist finance tools:
military airstrikes against ISIL-controlled oil and gas facilities and
cash storage sites. Operation TIDAL WAVE II, launched in October 2015,
targets ISIL's entire oil and natural gas supply chain and has reduced
ISIL's ability to exploit oil and natural gas for profit in Iraq and
Syria. Coalition airstrikes against ISIL's cash storage sites have also
reduced liquidity in ISIL-controlled territory in northern Iraq by at
least tens of millions and possibly up to hundreds of millions of
dollars.
Kinetic efforts have complemented diplomatic efforts to build a
coalition of countries to disrupt ISIL's finances. In March 2015, the
United States established the Counter-ISIL Finance Group (CIFG) to
serve as the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL's working group on ISIL
finance. Co-chaired by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Italy, the
CIFG includes 39 members and observers focused on disrupting ISIL's
financial networks and limiting its ability to exploit resources in
territory it controls. The CIFG has met five times and plans to meet
again later this year in Kuwait.
The United States and its Coalition partners have also led efforts
at the United Nations to strengthen the international framework for
combatting ISIL's financial and facilitation networks. UN Security
Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 2199 and 2253, in particular, strengthened
the UN Security Council's ISIL and Al Qaeda Sanctions regime and
obligated all countries to prevent direct or indirect support for ISIL
through the illegal sales of oil and historical artefacts and through
kidnapping for ransom. The United States and Coalition partners also
continue to nominate ISIL leaders and facilitators to the UN Security
Council's 1267/1989/2253 ISIL and Al Qaida Sanctions List to disrupt
ISIL's ability to raise and transfer funds. In addition to our
international sanctions, the Departments of State and Treasury have
domestically sanctioned a number of ISIL leaders, financiers,
facilitators, and branches under the Immigration and Nationality Act
and Executive Order 13224.
The United States bilaterally engages key countries in the Middle
East and around the world to complement our multilateral engagement.
Our Embassy in Baghdad worked closely with the Government of Iraq to
decrease liquidity in ISIL-controlled territory to prevent ISIL from
profiting from extortion and ``tax'' collection. The Government of
Iraq's August 2015 decision to suspend government salary payments to
ISIL-controlled territory was the most important of these efforts, as
it hindered ISIL's ability to tax these funds. We estimate salary
payments to ISIL-held areas amounted to at least $170 million per month
in 2015, or the equivalent of roughly $2 billion per year. The United
States has also worked closely with the Government of Libya to help
them improve their ability to monitor and protect the Libyan financial
system from exploitation by ISIL.
The Department of State is also building partner capacity to
counter-terrorist financing in a variety of ways, including helping
partner nations build their capacity to identify, investigate, and
prosecute illicit financial transactions and improve domestic anti-
money laundering and counterterrorism finance regulations.
Disrupting ISIL's financial networks is one of our top priorities,
and our efforts have succeeded in forcing ISIL to cut salaries. There
is no question ISIL remains a well-funded terrorist group, and they
have proven resilient and adaptable in the face of sustained pressure
from the United States and our Coalition partners. We will continue to
adapt our tactics to maintain the effectiveness of our economic
campaign, and we will use all tools at our disposal to disrupt ISIL's
finances and cut ISIL off from the international financial system.
__________
responses to additional questions for the record
submitted to brett mcgurk by senator ron johnson
Question 1. On June 23, 2016, the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs held a hearing to examine the ideology of
ISIS. The committee heard compelling testimony from witnesses who spoke
about ISIS' persecution of certain populations. For example, human
rights advocate Nadia Murad Basee Taho spoke about Yazidi persecution
by ISIS. She described the choice given to Yazidis as ``convert or
die.'' Her mother and six brothers were killed, and she was among 3,000
Yazidi women and girls forced into sexual slavery. She said that today,
``captive Yazidis are systematically used as human shields in combat by
their ISIS captors,'' and ISIS is only encouraged by our ambivalence.
Please explain what specific actions the United States and
coalition partners are taking to protect persecuted groups, including
the Yazidis, from DA'ESH. What specific additional proposed actions are
planned to protect persecuted minorities from these atrocities? What
specific actions have been considered, but not undertaken, and why?
Answer. Since the earliest days of Da'esh's expansion, the United
States has made clear our intent to degrade and ultimately destroy this
odious group, and to act decisively to protect civilians threatened by
mass atrocities. President Obama, in authorizing military operations in
Iraq in August 2014, declared that ``with innocent people facing the
prospect of violence on a horrific scale,'' the U.S. government would
act to prevent a potential genocide. We continue to be guided by this
basic premise.
We see several elements as essential to giving Yazidis, Christians,
and other persecuted minorities a future in their ancestral homelands,
and we are working to address each of these. They include: defeating
Da'esh; stabilizing and securing liberated areas; supporting political
inclusion for all Iraqis and Syrians, including minorities, with equal
participation in governance; stabilizing and securing the situation for
refugees and IDPs and promoting their heritage and right to return
home; and supporting efforts to hold accountable perpetrators of
atrocities.
To achieve these aims, the U.S. and its allies continue robust
military operations against Da'esh, including specific operations aimed
to safeguard, protect or liberate civilian victims. The State
Department operates in close and continuing partnership with the
Department of Defense to share relevant information in real time on
whereabouts and conditions of persecuted individuals, which are
directly incorporated into military planning and operations. In our
policy engagement in Iraq, we have repeatedly emphasized to both the
national government and the Kurdistan regional authorities the need to
take measures to protect all Iraqis, including vulnerable religious and
ethnic minority communities.
In support of Da'esh's victims, we are funding provision of
psychosocial assistance, legal services, local dispute mediation, and
community-based protections in areas to which they have fled and in
areas to which they have returned. To achieve justice and
accountability, we currently support the investigation of missing
person cases in Iraq, and efforts to protect, exhume, and analyze the
contents of mass graves. We are empowering Iraqi and Syrian civil
society organizations to document abuses and preserve and analyze
evidence, and training journalists to report on atrocities and
government response.
Our stabilization efforts are focused on areas liberated from
Da'esh control, as we continue to re-inforce the need for effective,
inclusive and responsible governance in these areas. We are
strengthening local groups to advocate for equal access to government
resources and services irrespective of religion or ethnicity. We also
support programs designed to restore essential services, provide
business grants, and address small infrastructure damage as people
return to their homes. All of these efforts come on top of the billions
of dollars of humanitarian assistance we have provided--and millions we
will provide in the coming fiscal year--to those impacted by violence
in Iraq and Syria and throughout the broader region.
Question 2. On January 8, 2016, the State Department announced
that it was ``revamping its counter-violent-extremism communications
efforts'' with the creation of a new Global Engagement Center (GEC).
The Administration established the GEC to ``more effectively
coordinate, integrate and synchronize messaging to foreign audiences
that undermines the disinformation espoused by violent extremist
groups, including ISIL and al-Qaeda, and that offers positive
alternatives.''
What progress has the GEC made in accomplishing this goal? What
specific additional actions is the GEC planning to take in order to
meet this goal? Has it been successful in seeking out partners in the
Muslim community that can provide effective alternative narratives to
ISIS' recruitment messaging? If so, please provide some examples. What
steps has the GEC taken or is planning to take to coordinate its
efforts with those of other members of the Global Coalition to Counter
ISIL?
Answer. The GEC has made significant progress in coordinating,
integrating, and synchronizing all U.S. government communications
directed at foreign audiences abroad to diminish the influence of
violent extremists. The GEC has detailees from the Departments of
Defense, Homeland Security, and from across the Intelligence Community.
When fully operational, the Center will also comprise staff from the
private sector, as well as the Departments of Treasury, Justice, and
USAID. Working across these agencies, the Center identifies
efficiencies and opportunities to counter violent extremist messaging
in the messaging space.
The Center is designed to be as agile and adaptive as our adversary
and is armed with new authorities, personnel, and cutting-edge
technology. The GEC utilizes state of the art digital analytics tools
from the Intelligence Community, DARPA, and the technology sector.
These tools and technologies help us tailor messages to our audience
and measure the impact of our efforts.
The Center is taking a fundamentally new approach in countering
violent extremist messaging in the information space. We have pivoted
toward partner-driven messaging and content, because while the U.S.
government has a good message to tell, there are an abundance of
credible and diverse voices across the Middle East, Europe, and
Africa--governments, NGOs, and civil society groups--that we are now
leveraging in this fight. We do not publicize who many of our partners
are in order to avoid exposing them to unnecessary danger, but the
following are a couple of examples.
In Kosovo, we recently completed a training program with local
NGOs, designed to amplify credible voices against violent extremism
there. Kosovo is a compelling location because it has one of the
highest numbers of foreign terrorist fighters per capita in Europe, and
an active NGO community focused on countering violent extremism.
In East Africa we worked with a civil society partner to establish
an online, mobile-enabled radio station in Swahili. It airs youth-
produced programming that counters the rising volume of violent
propaganda in the region. The content is aimed at youth living in
neighborhoods where violent extremists recruit. Separately, in the same
region, we run an interactive SMS program to reach populations in
inaccessible areas.
The GEC is not just coordinating efforts to counter violent
extremist messaging across the U.S. government, it is also coordinating
with partners in the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. One example of a
Coalition partnership is the Sawab Center in Abu Dhabi, a joint
messaging center where Emiratis work alongside Americans to counter
ISIL online. Since July 2015, Sawab has launched nine original social-
media campaigns, ranging from voices of victims and defectors, to
affirming positive messages such as national pride. Each campaign has
averaged over 125 million impressions on social media, and Sawab has
consulted and shared its experience with 20 countries and international
organizations interested in similar efforts to counter violent
extremism.
In addition to the Sawab Center, the United States is backing
efforts to create additional countering violent extremist messaging
centers in other counter-ISIL coalition nations. Most promisingly, a
new messaging center is slated to open in Malaysia later this year,
which is a major step forward in our efforts to reach those vulnerable
to violent extremist radicalization and recruiting efforts in Southeast
Asia.
The GEC information campaigns that counter ISIL, in addition to
violent extremist account suspensions by social media service
providers, and ISIL's battlefield losses have contributed to a
significant decline in ISIL's online propaganda activities since 2014.
For example, we have seen that pro-ISIL postings on social media have
recently shrunk from .018 percent of total Twitter postings to .012
percent of total Twitter postings.
According to GEC's Office of Analytics, pro-ISIL postings on
Twitter have decreased by 45 percent since 2014 due to
increased suspensions and increased anti-ISIL sentiment after
ISIL atrocities.
GEC's information campaigns and building of partners' capacity have
contributed to a strong anti-ISIL movement online, which this
year outnumbers ISIL at a ratio of roughly 6 to 1 on Twitter,
according to data obtained by GEC's Office of Analytics.
Using this partners-first, data-driven approach, the Center is
making progress toward discrediting ISIL's narrative and breaking their
brand.
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