

NATO: REVIEWING THE AGENDA AND ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF THE WARSAW SUMMIT

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THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2016

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:48 a.m. in Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Corker, Rubio, Gardner, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, Murphy, and Kaine.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.

In just a couple weeks, NATO will meet in Warsaw for the biennial meeting of the Alliance heads of states. Never has there been a more critical or opportune moment to discuss and recommit to the central tenets of the Washington Treaty—collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.

Threats to the Alliance have not diminished. Rather, they have grown more complex and dispersed. The Russian Federation has repeatedly, it would appear, intentionally bombed innocent civilians in Syria, begun remilitarizing the Arctic, violating both the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Open Skies Treaty. Russia adds to this continuing collection of abuses in the cyber domain and along NATO's eastern flank where Russian forces continue to occupy portions of Ukraine and Georgia that were invaded at least in part to keep those aspiring NATO members from joining the Alliance.

Additionally, the Islamic State has begun targeting civilian populations and NATO members, attacking both Paris and Brussels.

And finally, the flow of asylum seekers into Europe, both through NATO member Turkey and across the Mediterranean, has placed numerous pressures on NATO, its members and their operational capacities.

The Alliance remains committed to and involved in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. Just last week, I called on President Obama to clearly articulate his intentions for U.S. troop strength for this mission prior to the summit in order to deliver a clear message about U.S. leadership and the efforts to secure a sta-

ble and democratic Afghanistan and generate essential support for our NATO allies in this endeavor.

At the Wales Summit in 2014, the Alliance began to lay the groundwork for changes that will ensure NATO's preparedness to act. The NATO readiness action plan was approved to bolster NATO's air, naval, and ground forces' presence along the eastern flank. This included the establishment of a very high readiness joint task force capable of deployment within a few days to respond to threats against any ally. This force should be fully operational by the end of 2016.

The Alliance also agreed to and had increased the scale and scope of military exercises to improve the preparedness in a combined operating environment.

At the Wales Summit, allies also recommitted to halting the decline in defense spending and move towards a target of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense within a decade. This has been an issue that has been with us for a long time. We have got to overcome this. It is a problem with our Alliance that again has got to be taken seriously.

It is encouraging that 16 of the allies have increased or maintained steady defense budgets since that time. However, only five nations currently meet the 2 percent target: the United States, Estonia, Greece, Poland, and U.K. The Warsaw Summit must call for and build upon plans to improve burden sharing across the Alliance.

More importantly, the Warsaw Summit must assure a larger transition from simply reassuring allies to actively deterring aggressors; such a shift requires difficult discussions of force posture, readiness, authorities, and planning.

Today we will examine the opportunities available at the upcoming summit. We need to address a number of issues, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and certainly the questions that will follow.

With that, our distinguished ranking member, Senator Cardin.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND**

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very, very timely hearing.

First, we apologize to our two witnesses for the delay because of the business meeting. But that is the way we get our work done in this institution, and we were able to move a lot of legislation today and resolutions.

As I said, this is very timely with the Warsaw Summit taking place next month.

As I said in the comments on the resolution that we just passed in the committee, NATO has challenges. It has challenges in dealing with Russia's aggression. It has challenges dealing with the terrorism threats. It has challenges dealing with the migration issues and immigrants. It has the Warsaw Summit dealing with expansion of membership of countries that desire to become part of NATO. One is ready. Others are very much interested in furthering the progress towards membership with NATO.

It is interesting. I would say the two most important organizations for security of Europe is NATO and EU. And EU is having a major vote today in Great Britain with Brexit, and I know we are all anxious to see how that turns out. I certainly hope that "remain" wins and that Great Britain remains part of EU. The EU clearly needs to reform, but I think it is in England's interest as well as Europe's interest for them to work out their problems collectively and not separately. So we will see how that goes, but it is certainly a matter of great international interest, what is happening in Europe today.

But it does underscore the point, whether it is EU or NATO, that we too often take these institutions for granted, and it is important to take a moment and remind ourselves why they are important and why they exist and to remind ourselves we helped establish and build these institutions to begin with. These institutions are fundamental to preserving peace, stability, and promotion of these values that we hold dear.

So I hope at this hearing we will have a chance to take a look at what we expect to accomplish in NATO.

First, is NATO achieving the appropriate balance between its efforts to address Russian aggression on NATO's eastern borders and its efforts to address the complex security challenges posed by instability and violence from the south.

Second, all NATO members must fulfill their budgetary commitments to dedicate 2 percent of their GDP to defense. Our chairman has mentioned that at every meeting we have had with a NATO ally, publicly, privately, and has been very consistent about our expectations. We are patient people. Well, maybe we are not that patient. But we expect to see greater progress. I know we have seen some progress, but it is something that is critically important, we believe, for NATO's future.

Finally, we should view the aspirations of potential member states like Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. We know that there is going to be action taken on Montenegro. There has already been action taken. But in addition, that has already been done in regards to Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. What is expected in this summit that will help those countries in their goal to become our allies in NATO?

In preparation for the summit, I am concerned about the potential disputes that have emerged among member states. I was glad to work with the chairman on a resolution we just passed which emphasizes unity. I hope that other legislatures across the Alliance will consider passing similar measures before the summit. Public support expressed through its elected representatives is the best message that we can send as Russia attempts to erode the support or the Alliance. One such measure came from the parliament of Montenegro last week which passed a resolution expressing strong support for NATO membership.

Both of our witnesses today recently joined with 32 national security leaders on an important open letter calling on the administration to move forward with the ratification of the protocols for Montenegro. I agree with this letter. It is time for the administration to quickly send the protocols to the Senate for consideration. There is no reason for delay.

I would close with a note of caution. As we look at the strategic and short-term threats that face the Alliance, we can never stop the process of reexamining our assumptions. One of the reasons why a strong, agile, and flexible NATO is necessary for the 21st century is precisely because it is a critically important tool for shaping our relationship with Russia so that we can build a constructive relationship with Russia that we all seek to have. We all seek to have a positive, constructive relationship with Russia.

In my assessment, that is not possible now given Russia's leadership, orientation, and behavior. Our goal is to seek to influence and change that behavior and to build a productive relationship. We are not looking for needless confrontation, and we should not take decisions which would not allow us to change our course if Russia changes its course.

Do not get me wrong. We must be tough and work to establish a legitimate deterrent to support our friends in Europe. But we also should be smart in defining our long-term security interests of the United States. And I hope at this hearing we can have further help as to how we can develop those goals.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for those comments and the way that you work with us on the committee.

Our first witness is the honorable Derek Chollet who serves as Counselor and Senior Advisor on Security and Defense Policy at The German Marshall Fund. From 2012 to 2015, Mr. Chollet was U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs where he managed U.S. defense policy towards Europe, including NATO, the Middle East, Africa, and the western hemisphere.

Our second witness, Mr. Ian Brzezinski, currently serves as Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has more than 2 decades of experience in U.S. national security matters, having served in senior policy positions at the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Congress, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO policy from 2001 to 2005.

We thank you both very much for being here. We thank you for your patience. We look forward to you summarizing your comments, and without objection, your written testimony will be entered into the record. And if you would just begin in the order I introduced you, I would appreciate it. Again, thank you for being here.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEREK CHOLLET, COUNSELOR AND SENIOR ADVISOR, SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. CHOLLET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Cardin and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be back before you to talk about the priorities for the upcoming NATO Warsaw Summit.

The summit next month comes at a critical time for the Alliance, perhaps the most perilous moment in the 25 years since the end of the Cold War. With so many challenges testing the transatlantic partnership from the east, to the south, and indeed from within,

Warsaw must be successful. And I very much commend the resolution that you passed earlier this morning both on NATO, as well as the resolution on Russia. I think those are important statements, and I hope the full Senate would pass those soon.

So what would success at Warsaw look like? I will briefly discuss four priority areas.

First, the Warsaw Summit needs to consolidate the reassurance measures that NATO has taken to shore up its eastern flank and to set a road map for what it can do in the future. Russia's aggression and reckless behavior has brought back serious questions about the credibility of NATO's deterrent. Since 2014, the U.S. and its partners have taken important steps to reassure our most vulnerable allies about our common commitment to their security. Now we must transition from reassurance to deterrence.

Before the 2014 summit in Wales, NATO's actions were about crisis response. Today the Alliance has taken meaningful steps toward sustained support. The U.S. has acted with a request to significantly boost its funding for the European Reassurance Initiative and by augmenting its force presence.

Now, it is important to note that NATO allies have stepped up as well, contributing a more credible deterrent force in the Baltics and Poland, with a proposal for four battalions stationed in the east on track to be approved at Warsaw.

There has also been considerable augmentation of our exercises and training in Europe, as exemplified by the recent Anakonda exercise in Poland and the Baltops maritime exercise, and enhanced NATO command and control in eight new small headquarters in the east.

Second, the Alliance must also grapple with the threats from the south and the confluence of crises emanating from the Middle East and North Africa.

Now, I do not think that we can expect that this will ever become a NATO-only mission like Afghanistan, but NATO countries have a vital role to play. NATO has been training Iraqi forces in Jordan and appears close to conducting training in Iraq. Moreover, as Secretary of Defense Carter mentioned last week after the NATO defense ministerial, a decision will likely be taken at Warsaw to deploy such key NATO assets as AWACS aircraft to the anti-ISIL campaign.

The Alliance also needs to continue to deepen its relationships with key partner countries in the region, and I welcome the announcement this week for Israel to open an office at NATO headquarters.

Third, beyond these important military steps to enhance deterrence, the Alliance must reaffirm its open door. While the question of how much further NATO should enlarge will remain contentious within the Alliance, Montenegro's pending membership is a real opportunity to demonstrate a clear continued commitment to the open door.

And this is why, as Senator Cardin mentioned, earlier this week I joined with over 30 of my former government colleagues, including by colleague to the right, to sign an open letter to the Obama administration and the U.S. Senate to ratify Montenegro's accession protocol as quickly as possible, ideally by the end of this year.

But we must also be clear that this will not be the last word on the open door, and I believe it is imperative to continue to explore ways to deepen our cooperation with Georgia, as well as get more member states involved in helping Ukraine enhance its security and defense reform.

And finally and most important, yet perhaps most difficult, the Warsaw Summit must be a moment to galvanize support for the Alliance among our publics, the kind of support necessary to make the required sacrifices, whether that is deploying troops or spending the necessary resources on defense. Indeed, it is fair to ask if NATO allies will not step up now, given all the threats that they face, when will they.

Now, the U.S. is not immune from such pressures, and we have seen some question whether NATO is worth it. I think it is important to note that NATO continues to enjoy significant support among the American people. A recent poll by the Pew Research Center showed that 77 percent of Americans believe that being a member of NATO was a good thing for the U.S. I agree. Yet, in a climate of decreased budgets and increased demands globally, European members of the Alliance will need to be seen as carrying their fair share of the burden.

Now, although there has been some positive movement toward increased European spending since the 2014 summit in Wales, there is still reason to be concerned. Europe remains mired in its own internal struggles whether from migration, the rise in populism, its enduring economic crisis, and the future of the EU itself, which only makes it harder for European leaders to think strategically and muster the political will for shared sacrifice. And depending on the outcome of today's vote on Brexit, this challenge may only become harder.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee, these are just a few of the priorities for the upcoming summit. There are many other agenda items from boosting cyber defense to the enduring mission in Afghanistan, to helping bring security to Libya that I would be happy to discuss with you further.

Once again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning, and I look forward to your questions.

[Mr. Chollet's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEREK CHOLLET

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of this committee, I greatly appreciate for the opportunity to be back before you to discuss the priorities of the NATO Warsaw Summit. The Summit next month comes at a critical time for the Alliance—perhaps the most perilous in the quarter-century since the end of the Cold War. With so many challenges testing the Transatlantic partnership—with threats from the East, the South, and indeed from within—Warsaw must be successful. So what would success look like? I'd like to discuss briefly four priority areas.

First, the Warsaw Summit needs to consolidate the reassurance measures NATO has taken to shore up its Eastern flank, and set a road map for what can be done in the future. Russia's aggression and reckless behavior has brought back questions about the credibility of NATO's deterrent. Since 2014, the U.S. and its partners have taken important steps to reassure our most vulnerable allies about our common commitment to their security. Now, we must transition from reassurance to deterrence.

On that score, I believe the Alliance is on track. Before the 2014 Summit in Wales, NATO's actions were about crisis response; today, it has taken steps toward

sustained support. The U.S. has acted with a significant boost in funding to its European Reassurance Initiative and by augmenting its force presence in Europe. It is important to note that NATO allies have stepped up as well, creating a more credible deterrent force in the Baltics and Poland, with the proposal for four battalions stationed in the East on track to be approved at Warsaw. I think it is important that these front-line forces have what they need and are ready to fight. There has also been considerable augmenting of our exercising and training in Europe (as exemplified by the recent Anakonda and Baltops exercises), and improved readiness and responsiveness of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (NATO's spearhead force) and NATO's command and control in eight new small headquarters in the East. It is also important that NATO update its military planning.

Second, along with these challenges in NATO's East, the Alliance must also grapple with challenges to its South, and the confluence of crises emanating from the Middle East and North Africa. I don't think we can expect that this will ever become a NATO fight—like Afghanistan—but NATO countries have a vital role to play. And increasingly we are seeing the Alliance step-up. NATO has been training Iraqi officers in Jordan and appears close to conducting training in Iraq. Moreover, as Secretary of Defense Carter indicated at last week's NATO Defense Ministerial, a decision will likely be taken at the Warsaw Summit to use NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) surveillance aircraft in the U.S.-led anti-ISIL campaign. Additionally, NATO's deployment in the Aegean Sea has been essential in responding to the refugee and migrant crisis. NATO is also exploring the transformation of Operation Active Endeavour into a broad maritime security operation. Furthermore, as a recent GMF Advisory Panel Report for the Warsaw Summit argued, to respond to today's challenges it is important that the Alliance continues to deepen its relationships with key partner countries—and I welcome the announcement this week for Israel to open an office at NATO headquarters.

As NATO considers these challenges to its East and South, it cannot see these issues as zero-sum. We must avoid the danger of a split in the Alliance between the Eastern and Southern partners in terms of which priority deserves more attention and resources. We must do both. After the end of the Cold War, when the moment of a Europe whole, free and at peace seemed upon us, there were questions about NATO's future role. During this time, a common refrain was the Alliance needed to go "out of area or out of business." Today, at a moment in which we must again confront threats to Europe's security order, NATO experts and officials are embracing a new mantra: "in area or in trouble."

Third, beyond these important military steps to enhance deterrence, the Alliance must reaffirm its open-door policy. While the question of how much further NATO should expand will remain contentious within the Alliance, Montenegro's pending accession is a real opportunity to demonstrate a clear, continued commitment to the open-door. This is why earlier this week I joined with over 30 of my former government colleagues in a bipartisan open letter urging the Obama Administration and U.S. Senate to ratify Montenegro's accession protocol as quickly as possible, ideally by the end of this year. But we also must be clear that this will not be last word on the open-door; I believe we must continue to explore ways to deepen cooperation with Georgia, as well as get more member states involved in helping Ukraine enhance its security and defense reform.

Finally, and most important—yet perhaps most difficult—the Warsaw summit must be a moment to try to galvanize support for the Alliance among our publics—the kind of support necessary to make the required sacrifices, whether that is deploying troops or spending the necessary resources on defense. Indeed it is fair to ask: if NATO allies will not step up now, will they ever? The US is not immune from such pressures, as we've seen some question whether NATO is "worth it." It is important to note that NATO continues to enjoy significant support among the American people—a recent poll by the Pew Research Center showed that 77% of Americans believed that "being a member of NATO was a good thing for the U.S." Yet, in a climate of decreased budgets and increased demands, European members of the Alliance will need to be seen as carrying their fair share of the burden.

Although we have seen some positive movement toward greater European spending since the 2014 Summit in Wales, there is still reason to be concerned. Europe remains preoccupied by its own internal struggles—whether from migration, the rise in populism, its enduring economic crisis or the future of the EU itself—which only makes it harder for European leaders to think strategically and muster the political will for shared sacrifice. And depending on the outcome of today's vote on Brexit, this challenge may only become harder. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, members of this Committee, these are a few of the priorities for the upcoming summit. There are many other agenda items—from boosting cyber defense to possibly helping in Libya—that I would be happy to discuss further. Once again, I thank you

for the opportunity to appear before you this morning, and I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, sir.

**STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW,
BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee, it is a privilege to participate in this hearing addressing the challenges confronting the NATO alliance.

NATO's summit next month portends to be its most significant since the end of the Cold War. No previous summit in this era has had to address a set of challenges as complex, as proximate, and as forbidding as those now present on the Alliance's eastern and southern frontiers.

The most urgent of these challenges is the destabilizing combination of Russia's geopolitical assertiveness and growing military power. The decisions NATO promulgates in Warsaw must present a credible deterrent to Russian aggression, revitalize the vision of a Europe whole, free, and secure, and ensure that all allies share equitably in the burdens that flow from these objectives. These are three criteria by which to measure success or failure at the Warsaw Summit.

Last winter, as you pointed out, the Alliance committed itself to establishing an enhanced forward presence in central Europe and appears to be on track to deploy battalion level units in each of the Baltic states and Poland. Battalions, roughly 800 to 1,000 troops, are small units when juxtaposed against the airborne, mechanized, and tank divisions deployed in Russia's western military district. This is an environment where the opponent's advantages include proximity, speed, and massed fire power.

In order to be an effective deterrent, these NATO units must be able to survive for a limited amount of time amidst an intense attack. They will require reconnaissance and surveillance assets to mitigate the risk of surprise and air defense assets to enhance their survivability. They must have sufficient lethality to impose costs on an aggressor even if the expectation is not to defeat that adversary. These units must bristle with anti-armor capabilities and perhaps even their own artillery and tanks. And here I would urge you to look at the history of the Berlin Brigade because that was a heavily armed, forward-deployed unit.

The war plans that guide these units will have to be integrated with those of their host nations, and that synchronization will have to be exercised regularly.

The Alliance has to be postured to reinforce in real time these forward-based battalions. Toward that end, NATO will need to conduct in the very near future brigade- and division-level exercises to refine and demonstrate that capability.

And NATO will need to delegate to its commanders the authorities necessary for them to martial in real time the Alliance's military assets in the event of provocation or aggression. There may be no time for North Atlantic Council deliberations.

Moscow can be expected to closely observe the capability that accompanies NATO's new force posture. It will be very readily appar-

ent whether or not this force is a steely reflection of Alliance commitment to its collective defense mission.

A second critical issue that will define the Warsaw Summit is the Alliance's relationship with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. The reinforcement of NATO's eastern frontier should be accompanied by a significant deepening of the Alliance's relationship with these nations, particularly Ukraine. This is an important requirement if we are to reanimate the vision of an undivided and secure Europe and erase the red line that Moscow has been allowed to draw across the continent.

Toward these ends, NATO leaders at the Warsaw Summit should embrace Ukraine and Georgia's European and transatlantic aspirations. They should be given a clear road map to NATO membership, recognizing it will take time for them to meet the criteria of membership.

The Alliance should incorporate Georgia and Ukraine into the security initiatives it is developing to reinforce the Black Sea region. Their territories could be used for anti-submarine, air defense, surveillance, and other operations useful to counter Russia's militarization of occupied Crimea.

And the Alliance should expand the security assistance it provides Ukraine. The time is long overdue to grant Ukraine the lethal defensive equipment it has requested, be it anti-tank, air defense, and other weapons. None of these actions would threaten Russia's territorial integrity, but they would complicate Russian military planning and increase the risks that would come with further aggression. Nor are they inconsistent with an effort to normalize relations with Russia. In fact, these steps are necessary to prompt a de-escalation of tensions between Moscow and the West.

And finally, our NATO allies must demonstrate commitment to share in all the burdens that come with addressing the full spectrum of challenges before the Alliance. Washington has wisely reversed course on mistaken withdrawal of U.S. combat capability from Europe. It will deploy an armored brigade back to Europe. It committed to preposition in Europe an equipment set for a second armored brigade, and this is on top of two army brigades and all the air and naval assets the U.S. has long stationed in Europe.

Reports that allies are only able or willing to contribute three battalions to this effort in contrast to our contribution is disturbing. An absence of a robust West European force presence along NATO's eastern frontier risks transforming a demonstration of Alliance resolve and determination into a reanimated and divisive burden-sharing issue.

Mr. Chairman, Russia is, of course, not the only challenge before the Alliance today, but the threat posed by Russia is distinctive for its urgency and its proximity, the scale of Russian conventional forces, and the risk of nuclear escalation.

Presenting a unified and credible commitment to the Alliance's core defense mission and the vision of a Europe whole and free must stand at the top of the NATO agenda in Warsaw. This will require strong leadership from the United States, but success in this regard will ensure the vibrancy and relevancy of NATO and, most importantly, reinforce the prospects of peace.

Thank you.

[Mr. Brzezinski's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF IAN J. BRZEZINSKI

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, Members of the Committee, I am honored to participate in this hearing addressing the challenges now confronting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the decisions the Alliance will make during its summit meeting in Warsaw on July 8 and 9th.

NATO is the institutional cornerstone of transatlantic security. This Alliance serves our national interests by leveraging the political legitimacy and military capacity of its European and North American members. It is history's most successful military Alliance, and it remains as relevant today as it has ever been.

NATO's meeting Warsaw next month portends to be its most significant summit since the end of the Cold War. No previous summit in this era has had to address a set of challenges as complex, proximate, and forbidding as those now present on the Alliance's eastern and southern frontiers.

The most urgent of these challenges is the destabilizing combination of Russia's geopolitical assertiveness and growing military power. The decisions NATO promulgates in Warsaw must present a credible deterrent to Russian aggression, revitalize the vision of a Europe whole, free, and secure, and ensure that all allies share equitably the burdens that flow from these objectives. These are three criteria by which to measure success or failure at the Warsaw summit.

THE CHALLENGE FROM RUSSIA

President Putin's ongoing invasion of Ukraine is but one element of a revanchist policy that he has articulated and exercised since taking office in 1999. His central objective is clear—the reestablishment of the power, territorial control, and hegemony of the former Soviet Union. Putin's campaign history includes Moscow's attempt to subvert Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2007 cyber attack against Estonia, the separatist movement in Moldova, energy embargoes against Lithuania and Ukraine, and the 2008 invasion of Georgia.

His strategy is multifaceted, leveraging the full scope of Russian economic and political power. It integrates information warfare as well as extensive intelligence and criminal networks to exploit the weaknesses of neighboring states.

Putin's strategy ultimately rests on a foundation of Russian military power. Under his personal direction, the Kremlin has driven forward a determined modernization of Russia's armed forces. Some \$700B has been dedicated over this decade to expand the Russian fleet, introduce 5th generation aircraft, deploy new missiles, increase his nation's special forces capabilities, and militarize the Arctic.

This modernization effort has been effective. It has increased the ability of Russian forces to rapidly mobilize and deploy in mass over great distances. It has integrated into Russian operations the use of long-range precision strike weapons—as was recently demonstrated by Russia's use of Kalibr cruise missiles to destroy targets in Syria. It features a significant investment into Russia's tactical and strategic nuclear arsenals. And, it has yielded a military more capable of conducting sophisticated combined arms operations.

These capabilities have been demonstrated and refined through an aggressive array of large scale exercises, a good number of which have involved between 100,000 and 160,000 personnel. They feature rapid deployments over Russia's vast territory and the integration of nuclear and conventional warfare. Among the more notable exercises have been no-notice snap drills that have simulated the seizure of territory of NATO allies and partners across the Baltic Sea, as far West as Denmark.

The contingency the Alliance's political leadership must address today is Russia's ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy significant forces for the seizure of limited swaths of territory along its periphery. NATO must counter Russia's increased ability to undertake such a mission and complete its execution before the Alliance's political decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council, has had a chance to achieve consensus on what had transpired and whether or not it would be worth the costs and risks of reversing that aggression.

DEFINING SUCCESS AT THE NATO SUMMIT

Addressing this contingency and the geopolitical ramifications of Moscow's ambitions and military power has emerged as a, if not the, principal focus of this July's NATO summit. The strategy and actions Alliance leaders promulgate in response to this challenge must a present credible deterrent to Russian aggression, revitalize

the vision of a Europe whole, free and secure, and ensure that all allies contribute equitably to the missions that flow from these objectives.

ASSESSING NATO'S EMERGENT FORWARD ENHANCED PRESENCE

Last winter, the Alliance committed itself to establish an “enhanced forward presence” in Central Europe. NATO leaders appear to be on track to approve plans for the deployment battalion level units in each of the Baltic States and Poland and an improved force posture in the Black Sea region.

Battalions—roughly 800-1000 troops—are small units when juxtaposed against the divisions of Russian airborne, mechanized, and tank units deployed in Russia's Western Military District and the sophisticated aircraft, air defense systems, helicopters, ships, submarines, and missiles that reinforce them.

If these NATO battalions are to be an effective deterrent against a force of this magnitude, they must be able to survive for at least a limited amount of time amidst an aggressive attack. They must have sufficient lethality to impose costs on an aggressor—even if the expectation is not to defeat that adversary. And, the Alliance must demonstrate readiness and determination to quickly reinforce these battalions. To be credible, NATO's forward enhanced presence will require the following:

- *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Assets:* These forward deployed units will need ISR to mitigate the advantages proximity provides Russian forces. Advance warning will be key to minimizing the risk of surprise by aggressor forces, enabling time needed to hunker down and move to defensive positions.
 - *Air Defense:* In an environment where air and missile threats are significant and proximate, air defense, and possibly missile defense, capabilities will be needed to protect these battalions.
 - *Lethality:* As previously noted, such limited deployments alone cannot be expected to defeat the large combined arms assault Russia can unleash across its border. But, these units can bristle with the firepower necessary to impose costly losses upon an aggressor. These battalions will need robust anti-armor capabilities, perhaps even their own artillery and tanks.
 - *Integrated NATO-Host Nation War Plans:* The war plans that guide these forward deployed elements will have to be integrated with those of their host nations. This is to ensure full synchronization of effort by NATO and national forces in time of crisis and conflict. Exercising this integration is critical not only to refine these plans, but also to demonstrate combat readiness to an adversary.
 - *Reinforcement:* The Alliance must be postured so that it can reinforce on short notice these forward based assets. Some progress is being made on this front. This month, two large multinational exercises featured scenarios focused on the logistical and combat challenges of reinforcing forward deployed forces amidst a high intensity conflict. Poland hosted ANEKONDA 16, the largest air, ground, and sea exercise conducted by NATO allies and partners in Central Europe. It featured 31,000 troops, including 14,000 U.S. personnel. The U.S. Sixth Fleet hosted BALTOPS 16, a large scale multinational maritime exercise demonstrating the Alliance's capability to secure sea lines of communication and conduct amphibious operations in the Baltic Sea.
- These exercises were important first steps, but they were nationally hosted, not NATO hosted, exercises. The Alliance will have to launch in the near future brigade and division level exercises focused on the plans it finalizes for its forward enhanced presence.
- *NATO Command Authority:* In an environment featuring an aggressor whose advantages include proximity, speed, and massive firepower, NATO must delegate to its commander the authorities necessary for them to marshal in real time Alliance military assets in the event of provocation and/or aggression. The North Atlantic Council is not likely to have the decision-making speed necessary for the full spectrum of contingencies these forward deployed assets must address.

During the Cold War, NATO's generals and admirals were entrusted with the authority to deploy forces and engage opponents in analogous scenarios. This trust needs to be returned to the Alliance's military chain of command.

Over the decades of that by gone era, the Berlin Brigade served as an effective deterrent. It was a forward-based fighting force equipped with tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers. A massive deployment of NATO forces on the border be-

tween the two Germanys stood ready to reinforce the Berlin Brigade on a moment's notice. These forces were regularly exercised to make clearly evident the war plans the Soviets would "trip" into action if the Allied outpost in Berlin was attacked.

Moscow will closely observe the capability and preparations that accompany NATO's emergent enhanced forward presence. It will be will be readily apparent whether or not this force is a steely reflection of Alliance commitment to its collective defense mission.

ROLLING BACK THE GREY ZONE

A second critical issue that will define the Warsaw summit is NATO's relationship with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Russia's incursions into Ukraine and Georgia and its continued occupation of Moldova's Trans-Dniester region is a direct threat to the vision of a Europe whole, free, secure, and at peace. Putin's aggression against these countries was triggered simply by their desire to join the West.

To date, the West's responses to this aggression has not caused President Putin to change course. His forces continue to occupy Ukrainian, Georgian, and Moldovan territory. In Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, they are being reinforced and in the latter they continue to attack Ukrainian forces. In Georgia, Moscow has been encroaching upon Georgian territory through limited land grabs, informally called "borderization."

The failure of the West to more forcefully leverage its economic weight, political power and security assistance against this aggression has allowed a grey zone to emerge in Europe's strategic landscape consisting of nations whose efforts to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic community continue to be challenged by Moscow's territorial and hegemonic aspirations.

A reinforcement of NATO's eastern frontier should be accompanied by a significant deepening of the Alliance's relationship with these nations, particularly Ukraine. The NATO summit presents an opportunity to reanimate the vision of an undivided and secure Europe and erase the red line Moscow has been allowed to redraw across the continent.

Toward this end, NATO leaders at the Warsaw Summit should embrace Ukraine's and Georgia's European and transatlantic ambitions, including their desire to join NATO. These nations should be given a clear roadmap toward that goal, recognizing it will take them time to meet the political and military criteria necessary for membership.

Second, the Alliance should incorporate Georgia and Ukraine into the maritime, air, and ground force initiatives it is developing for the Black Sea region. Their territories would be useful for anti-submarine, air defense, surveillance and other operations necessary to counter Russia's effort to leverage its occupation of Crimea into an anti-access/area-denial bastion spanning across that sea. The firsthand experiences of Ukrainian and Georgian troops defending against Russian battlefield tactics should be integrated into the Alliance's training and exercises.

Third, the Alliance should expand the security assistance it provides Ukraine. The time is long overdue to grant Ukraine the "lethal defensive equipment" it has requested, including anti-tank, air defense and other weapons. Russia's large scale exercises, the base it is building next to Ukraine's eastern frontier, and its military build-up in Crimea underscore the challenges Kyiv would face should Putin decide to drive deeper into Ukraine, a possibility that cannot be discounted in light of Moscow's rhetoric and belligerent military posture.

NATO should also conduct exercises and ISR operations in Ukraine to signal solidarity, train the Ukrainian armed forces, and provide them better situational awareness.

None of these actions would threaten Russia's territorial integrity, but they would complicate Russian military planning and increase the risk that would come with further aggression deeper into Ukraine. They would help erase the red line that Moscow has been allowed to draw across Europe.

Failure to transform the NATO-Ukraine partnership in this way will not avoid conflict with Russia, it will only ensure that Ukraine remains weak in the face of Russian aggression. That is not only an enticement for Putin's revanchist ambitions, it is yet another recipe for an enduring military confrontation with Moscow.

TRANSATLANTIC BURDENSARING

Finally, in order for the Warsaw Summit to be a success, our NATO allies must demonstrate commitment to share in all the burdens that come with addressing the full spectrum of challenges before the Alliance.

Today, as part of its response to Russian aggression and other military provocations, Washington has reversed course on a mistaken withdrawal of U.S. combat

capability from Europe. It deployed an armored brigade combat team on a persistent, rotational basis to Central Europe. It committed to preposition in Europe an equipment set for a second armored brigade. That is on top of the two army brigades and the air and naval assets the U.S. has long stationed in Europe, not to mention the ongoing construction of the European Phased Adaptive Approach missile defense system.

It will be important for Europe, particularly Western Europe, to make a significant contribution to the Alliance's forward enhanced presence. Reports that Germany, Canada and the United Kingdom are the only allies able and/or willing to contribute battalion level elements to this effort is disturbing. France (whose generals command NATO's second strategic command, Allied Command Transformation), Italy, Spain and others need to make similar contributions. Failure to incorporate a robust West European element into NATO's enhanced forward presence would risk transforming a needed demonstration of Alliance resolve and determination into a reanimated and divisive issue of burden-sharing.

CLOSING

Mr. Chairman my remarks focused on the NATO-Russia relationship. The Warsaw summit, of course, includes other pressing matters, including the Alliance's mission in Afghanistan and chaos that defines the Alliance's southern front. But, the threat posed by Russia is distinctive for its urgency and proximity, the scale for Russian conventional forces, and the risk of nuclear escalation.

For these reasons, presenting a unified and credible commitment to the Alliance's core defense mission and the vision of a Europe whole, free, and secure must stand at the top of the Summit agenda. This will require strong leadership from the United States, but success in this regard will not only ensure the vibrancy and relevancy of NATO, it will reinforce the prospects of peace.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both for your testimony.

I am going to reserve my time for interjections and defer to the ranking member.

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both our witnesses for their contribution to this hearing.

I do note, Mr. Chairman, that we do have the Montenegro Ambassador with us today. Welcome, Mr. Darmanovic. It is wonderful to have you here.

I want to sort of focus in on the Russian issue for one moment, if I may, on the eastern front. Russia, of course, regularly performs military exercises to show its force. My staff tells me that included 80,000 personnel, 12,000 pieces of heavy equipment, 65 warships, 15 submarines, 220 aircraft.

Recently NATO conducted war games in eastern Europe last month that included 31,000 troops, far less than what Russia does in its military exercise. And there were comments made by the German foreign minister characterizing those exercises as war mongering. And Bulgaria refused to participate in NATO's fleet in the Black Sea.

So my question is, do we have unity here? Russia understands strength. Do we have unity within NATO to recognize that Russia represents a real threat to NATO's security?

Mr. CHOLLET. Senator, I can start with that. I think we do have unity, but I do not think we can just assume it. And I think the examples you cited are very good because they do show that there is politics in all these countries. The Russians are playing quite aggressively in all of these countries in the media markets and by funding opposition groups to try to stir up these kinds of reactions.

I think it is just important to note that a lot of the measures that NATO has taken in the last 2 years since the Wales Summit that both Ian Brzezinski and I mentioned were things we were not dreaming of 3 years ago. I mean, they were very much in response

to Russia's aggression: the four brigades that I think will be agreed to in Warsaw, the U.S. augmentation of our presence, for the first time German troops in Poland as part of the BJTF. So I think this is significant.

But there is going to be an enduring question that we are going to face that Warsaw will not answer, that we are going to have to face moving forward. How much is enough to achieve deterrence? It is not realistic that we will ever achieve what you would call deterrence by denial, having equal amount of forces on either side of the border. And what Defense Secretary Carter has talked about is the need to have a new kind of playbook. What we are most worried about—and I am sure we will get into this later—is hybrid warfare, not a Russian invasion en masse across the borders of the Baltics or into Poland but something that looks more like Ukraine, which is harder to figure out initially, but deeply destabilizing and very dangerous.

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Brzezinski, I want you to respond, but let me just add at least my concern of what is happening between Russia and our NATO allies. When you look at Russia's activities of aggression in Ukraine, in Moldova, Georgia, they are intentionally causing an unrest supported by military that causes our NATO allies to say, gee, are these countries ready for membership in NATO. So in a way, NATO is encouraging Russia's aggression because if they continue their engagement, it is less likely that NATO will expand sooner to more members.

So is NATO aware of this? Does NATO recognize that countries such as Georgia that really want to become members of NATO, that they are falling into a Russian trap to be more aggressive because it means it is less likely they will get membership?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, to answer your last question, there is general awareness, but also an unwillingness to recognize the reality that Russia uses a full spectrum strategy to undermine the preparedness of NATO aspirant nations and to create division and skepticism within the Alliance about the readiness of those aspirants for membership. So there is no question that there is a hybrid dimension to President Putin's strategy to fulfill his ambitions to recreate Moscow's control over the former Soviet space.

But with that said, I think it is important while we focus on the hybrid threat to also remember that Russia's strategy of hybrid warfare rests on a foundation of conventional and nuclear military power. That is what it falls back on.

If you look at the invasion of Ukraine, and specifically the seizure of Crimea, that was complemented by a massive 100,000 to 150,000-man exercise in Russia's Western Military District along Ukraine's eastern frontier. And while we remember Crimea as a hybrid engagement because it featured "the little green men," we often forget that soon after those little green men started their operations, they were followed by 20,000 to 30,000 Russian special forces. So that event was actually pretty conventional. That is an important point to remember.

My fear, on your point about unity, is that while we do have some unity, I am not sure we have sufficient unity. That is reflected in the debate we have seen recently in the EU over the sanctions imposed on Russia. Yes, the EU is on course to extend

those sanctions by 6 months, but the debate between the west Europeans and the central Europeans has intensified on this subject, and that to me is disconcerting.

Look at the difficulty the Alliance has had in generating the forces for its forward enhanced presence. The fact that the Alliance could only get European nations to come up with two battalions to me is troubling. The forward enhanced presence was meant to extend from the Baltic Sea all the way down to the Black Sea, and include Romania and Bulgaria. We are not getting a forward enhanced presence in Romania and Bulgaria because our allies could not generate another two battalions. We do not have the will or the capability to come up with those battalions. That is disturbing.

And finally, sir, regarding your point on exercises, not only have Russian exercises been massive, but there have also been SNAP exercises that I think are disturbing. Why? Because they demonstrate the Russians' ability to mobilize rapidly large amounts of force and to deploy them with great speed. We have not conducted a NATO SNAP exercise since the end of the Cold War. I do not think NATO commanders have the authorities to even do a SNAP exercise. That has to be changed.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

If I could follow up, I am going to have my first interjection.

On the unity issue, you know, we go to the Munich Security Conference each year. We obviously have a great friendship with Germany, a lot of investment in our country by German entities. So a good relationship.

I will tell you the fact that Germany, the powerhouse of Europe, the driver of European policy, spends 1.18 percent of their GDP on NATO, I find it to be highly offensive. And you know, when you look at the fact we have just under 40,000 U.S. troops based in Germany, so if you are sitting there and the United States has 40,000 troops in your country, you have no concerns. And by the way, the majority of people in Germany believe that they should not take part in providing Article 5 protection for other NATO countries.

So, I mean, I would like greater explanation as to whether we really have unity. I mean, in essence, we are the provider of security services. They are the consumer of security services. We have nearly 40,000 troops on the ground in Germany, and they cannot contribute 2 percent of GDP to defense spending, the economic powerhouse of Europe. I got to tell you I find that offensive.

And I would just like for you all to respond as to how we push these countries. Most experts do not believe they are going to get to 2 percent anytime soon. I think you all would agree with that. So how do we deal with this?

And by the way, it may be one of the moderating forces that keeps these sanctions from continuing to go in place on the second round. I do not know if that is true or not, but we will see. The second part—I said maybe that is not true. The rest of it if you would respond to it, I would appreciate it.

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, Senator, I share your frustration on defense spending in Europe, in Germany specifically, but more broadly

among all but five of the members, and really one of those five is Greece. That is a different story.

The CHAIRMAN. That is because their economy imploded and all of a sudden——

Mr. CHOLLET. And we have had the same conversations, I am sure, you and I when I was in government and now that I am out of government with our German colleagues.

I think it is important to note in the specific case of Germany, obviously, they have their own difficult history that they grapple with when it comes to questions of their military. It was only 20-some years ago that Germany deployed its military outside of Germany for the first time since World War II, which was in the Balkans. And Germany has been a partner of ours in Afghanistan for 10-plus years.

And they have a very active defense minister, who I know you know, who is trying very hard to push that bureaucracy and push the German parliament to spend more on defense, modernize its capabilities, and it is a good thing. So we want to encourage that because there are forces within Germany who want what we want, which is greater capability, a Germany that is more willing to project its power militarily. But we are not there yet, and there are counter-forces, some of those counter-forces aided and abetted by the Russians, to push back on those efforts.

I think we have to share our realism about the odds of having all of the Alliance get to 2 percent. But I think, nevertheless, we have to keep pressing this very, very hard. Ultimately it is going to be a political decision, and that is one of the frustrations I certainly had in government because defense ministers and security experts would get together and everyone would agree vigorously that they need to spend more on defense, but then they would go back to their capitals and get shouted down by their finance ministers and others. So it is just a fight we need to keep fighting.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have nearly 40,000 troops in their country. They feel no threat. They feel no threat. They are living off of us, and I just find it offensive. And again, I could see some of the other countries that have had difficulties. Germany, with them being the leading entity in the European Union right now—I just find it more than offensive. And it is a lot of rhetoric. The action is not there. You say bureaucracy. It is a vote. It is a vote of their parliament. And the majority of the people there do not believe they should respond in protection of other allies. I just think they have got a lot of work to do, and I am going to keep hammering on this. They are being laggards. They are laggards as it relates to NATO. Laggards. And I just do not think we are strong enough in our discussions with them.

Senator Murphy?

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for being here.

So NATO is an alliance not to counter Russian aggression. It is an alliance to counter all threats, all aggression. In fact, the only time that Article 5 has been operationalized is in defense of an attack against the United States by Al Qaeda.

So here is just a simple question. We spend all of our time talking about Russia. What is the greater threat to NATO today? Is it Russia or is it ISIL and Islamic extremism?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Senator, I would say without question it is Russia because Russia has the force buildup on the Alliance's eastern frontier. It has demonstrated state-on-state aggression. It has invaded two countries in the last decade: Ukraine and Georgia. It continues to occupy part of Moldova. If you look at the pattern of Russian military provocations, they have become more brazen and more risky over the last 2 years. It has not been steady state. It has steadily escalated and become more confrontational.

I am not talking just about the Donald Cook being buzzed by aircraft. I am talking about SNAP exercises in which they simulate the seizure of all the islands of the Baltic Sea. I am talking about nuclear threats and exercises they conduct that involve integration of nuclear and conventional operations.

So, yes, ISIL is chaos. It is horrible. The violence there and to the south is disturbing, but I do not think it presents the same existential threat that Putin's provocations and his geopolitical aspirations present the Alliance.

Senator MURPHY. So I think that is very interesting answer. So as you look out over the next 24-month time horizon or you pick your time horizon, 24 months, 5 years, you think it is more likely that you are going to have a Russian attack inside the NATO alliance than it is to have a large-scale or series of large-scale ISIL attacks. That is a slightly different way I am asking the question, but it is more specific. I mean, you think there is a greater threat of Russia moving across the border of NATO than there is of major attacks from violent extremist groups.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. No. I would say that there is—almost guaranteed, almost certain to have some sort of terrorist attack against a NATO ally by ISIL. That is certainly a higher probability than a Russian maneuver to seize Warsaw or Berlin. Much higher.

But what I am worried about is the buildup that Russia has on its western frontier, the provocative nature of its military operations that increases the likelihood of inadvertent conflict. And we had a small taste of that in southern Turkey. We were very lucky that that engagement between the Turkish air force and the Russian air force occurred against an expeditionary Russian force and not well defended, that was very much on its own. It could have been a whole different ball game if that shootdown had happened in a highly militarized area such as the Baltic area. So I am not worried about an intentional attack against NATO. I do not think that is in Putin's plans, but I am worried that his activities do raise or increase the risks of inadvertent conflict with all the escalatory dynamics that would come with it.

Senator MURPHY. Mr. Chollet, I think that is an interesting answer. I do not have it, but I think—well, tell me your thoughts.

Mr. CHOLLET. While completely agreeing with the threat that Russia poses, I think the answer to your question is it is really both. One of the challenges, getting back to this question of unity that we have within the Alliance, is a growing divide between those countries who are most exposed to the threat to the east and those countries who are most exposed to the threat to the south. And

from a U.S. perspective, I really think when we look at our interest in a transatlantic relationship that is strong and a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace, it really has to be both. And that is why, as I said in my statement, the Warsaw Summit has to show meaningful steps that the Alliance is addressing threats from both the south and the east.

One of the challenges NATO has is when we look at the tools of the Alliance. They are actually better for the challenges of the east in deterring Russia than they are to the south. And one of the things NATO has struggled with is how actually to address the threats to the south, and some of that is by actually acting within the Middle East, as I mentioned earlier, in Jordan and Iraq or contributing capability to the anti-ISIL fight. Some of that is maritime mission, which NATO is involved in now, to help with the migrants coming up through the sea. But that is going to be a real challenge for the leaders when they get together is how they show a signal of resolve to the east, but then also determination to deal with threats to the south.

Senator MURPHY. I thank you both for that answer. And I agree it is both. But we have major challenges with the Europeans today with respect to their counterterrorism surveillance and intelligence operations. They see those questions about how they work together to try to catch bad guys within Europe as a question that is often separate from the conversation about the future of NATO.

And so I do not disagree with almost any of the recommendations that you have made vis-a-vis the threat from the east, but I would hope that part of the discussions about the future of NATO is standing up a truly continent-wide counterterrorism capability that is fully integrated with ours that is seen as part and parcel of our mission under the umbrella of NATO. If it is viewed that way, I think it is much more likely that some of the tough decisions that are necessary will actually get made.

I think you are right that it is both, but I think we tend to spend almost all of our time thinking about NATO through the prism of the Russian threat when we might be able to get more done on the counter-ISIL threat if it was viewed through this construct.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine. Oh, I am sorry. Senator Gardner. Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Kaine, I thank you very much for that. I appreciate that.

And thank you to the two witnesses for your time and testimony today.

A couple of weeks ago, we had a hearing with Deputy Defense Secretary Carpenter talking about a number of issues. I asked him about the RAND study that came out about 4 or 5 months ago that stated that Russian forces could overrun NATO's Baltic states in less than 3 days, and Deputy Secretary Carpenter basically said, yes, that is true.

General Hodges yesterday, I think it was reported, made statements that Russia could overrun the Baltic states within 36 to 60 hours.

Mr. Carpenter mentioned that there were some studies and analysis that they had conducted at the Department of Defense. Are ei-

ther of you familiar with the studies or analysis that the Defense Department has done along the lines of the RAND studies?

Mr. CHOLLET. Senator, I am aware that they were doing those studies, but I was not a participant.

Senator GARDNER. You have not had a conversation with them to see what exactly and where the analysis—

Mr. CHOLLET. My understanding is, as I think Secretary Carpenter mentioned to you, it is not different than what outside groups, RAND and others, have been doing to try to do tabletop exercises to run scenarios about what that would look like.

Senator GARDNER. We spent a lot of time in Europe recently talking about sort of the muscle memory of what it means to protect Europe, to fight a war in Europe. We talked about, as our focuses turned to the Middle East and intelligence needs in the Middle East and terrorism, the intelligence loss that we have in Europe when it comes to Russia. Would either of you like to expand on that and what we are doing to fill the gap when it comes to our sort of blind spots in intelligence in Europe?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. When it comes to intelligence, most of those intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets that we once deployed against the Soviet Union and for a limited time against Russia have been redeployed out of the EUCOM area of operations, and probably rightfully so. But it has left us with our eyes sort of half closed, and as a result, we are not really as aware of Russian movements as we were, so to speak, during the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Russia's SNAP exercises have underscored this blind spot because they have often caught EUCOM and our NATO allies off guard.

For example, I was in Poland a year and a half ago, and there was an exercise in Kaliningrad, that enclave between Lithuania and Poland. It involved 10,000 troops, 50 ships, 250 APCs. We were caught surprised. The exercise I mentioned about a year ago in which they simulated the seizure—the Russians did a 40,000 to 50,000-man exercise simulating the seizure of parts of northern Norway, the islands Aland off Finland, Gotland off Sweden, and Bornholm off Denmark. It was a surprise to us.

That is why I mentioned in my testimony the importance of bringing increased ISR capabilities, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, for these forward-deployed forces because it is going to be essential to give them as much time as possible to hunker down in light of the Russians' ability to leverage proximity for surprise.

Senator GARDNER. And do you see this—I am sorry. Go ahead. I am sorry.

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, Senator, just briefly I concur completely that we lost a lot of muscle memory in the 25 years since the end of the Cold War that we are slowly trying to build back.

Intelligence is a key gap. One of the things I hope will be agreed to in Warsaw is a decision by NATO to create a new senior leadership position within the Alliance, an Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence, which can help bring together the various pieces of intelligence capability that NATO does have, but more importantly try to augment that over time. That is a U.S.-proposed ini-

tiative. So I am hopeful that at Warsaw we will see some success there.

Senator GARDNER. And so the \$3.4 billion that we have in the fiscal year 2017 budget for the European Reassurance Initiative—how much of that can address this need? Is that enough? Is it working?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That money is largely allocated for forces. There is some sliver of some funding for ISR in there, but probably not enough to address the requirements. It cannot just be U.S. ISR. It has to also be—as the chairman has mentioned, it has got to be European ISR. They have to make those investments too.

Senator GARDNER. And do you see any movement that they are beginning—I mean, when we talk about the need to fulfill their obligation to NATO in the funding, do you see any movement on ISR and others?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. There is some good news over the last 2 years, and Derek deserves some commendation for that. Spending has actually reversed its long downward trend. It is now upward in Europe. The Secretary-General came out, I guess a week or 2 ago, and said that of NATO allies, 20 of them in 2016 are spending more money than they did last year. In the overall, it is about a point and a half up, not enough, not fast enough, but at least going in the right direction. And some of that investment is going into ISR.

Mr. CHOLLET. Just to add to that, the 2 percent GDP metric is one that we talk about the most, but within that is an agreement to spend 20 percent of your new money on modernization, of which ISR is the central part. And that is actually a better story than the 2 percent. So even though we are not where we need to be, even close to that, on the 2 percent, we are actually looking all right on the 20 percent across the Alliance.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. If I could add. If there was a second key area that has to be a focus on how money is spent, it is to increase the readiness of the force pool in Europe. The force pool has degraded over the last decade and a half significantly. The ready forces that the Europeans have are now stretched thin with the operations they have underway, be it in Afghanistan or in Africa. The Europeans may not be as ready as we would like them to be to rapidly mobilize and deploy battalion or brigade level assets to the east to reinforce NATO's enhanced forward presence in the event of a crisis. The readiness pool of European forces is a real concern.

Senator GARDNER. Now, Mr. Chairman, I am sorry. Do you mind if I have one more question?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator GARDNER. I think you have talked about this, when I was trying to smack in to smash in other hearings today in between those hearings, the Brexit vote that is taking place. Obviously, they would stay and remain in NATO, but what impact do you see that having should they leave the European Union, if any at all, on NATO?

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, I think there is no question that it would—because if they were to choose the European Union, it will mean for the next several years Europe will yet have another existential question before it. And unfortunately, it will mean less bandwidth for all of what we are talking about this morning because political leaders, publics will be consumed by the future of the EU project

and, therefore, have less energy to deal with the issues that we have been talking about today.

Now, oddly, it may make NATO more important, and it may help the Brits, oddly enough, to want to be closer to NATO to show that they are still part of an alliance. So it could change the incentives that way. But I think it is very hard to see this as anything but negative for our security interests in Europe.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I agree completely with Derek. I should add another dimension. An EU that is minus the U.K. is likely to be a slightly less transatlantic oriented EU. It is going to be an economically weaker EU. It is going to be probably a little bit more of a divisive EU. Most importantly from NATO's perspective, it is going to be less of an Atlanticist EU. And to have a community of nations like that, who make up much of NATO, to have that Atlanticist orientation diluted cannot be a net gain for the Alliance. It is actually a net loss.

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Senator Kaine?

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the witnesses.

My perception—and you know, I think one of the virtues and vices of this committee is you kind of really dive into the regions where you are assigned, and my committee is more Middle East and Latin America. So I am always fascinated by these hearings about Europe because I really learn, and I am going to have you educate me a bit.

But my perception, as an educated layperson watching the Russian situation, is that the economy is horrible and Putin is the kind of leader than when there are threats because things are not going well internally, he is a little more likely to be externally adventurous.

There are elections coming up in September, legislative elections in Russia. Are you at all worried that the next 90 days might be a period where there might be a little more likelihood of something being a little nutty on the adventurism side from Russia, on an aggressive side because of the need to try to gain torque in this electoral campaign, or does the election look fairly set right now and they would not need to worry about that?

Mr. CHOLLET. Very briefly. I am sure we agree on this. The answer is yes. I am worried, and it is not just the election. It is actually how Russia responds to the Warsaw Summit because if we succeed in having the Warsaw Summit be a show of unity, a demonstration that the NATO has resolved in augmentation of the deterrent, Putin may feel the need to respond in some way to show that he is still willing to do what it takes. And so I think it is already a pretty perilous period, but I think given the summit, given their elections, given perhaps an EU that is mired in an existential crisis about Brexit, I think it is an opportunity for Russia's adventurism to come back.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I agree but allow me to add another angle. First, I do not think Putin's reelection is much in doubt. He has a good grip on the polity there and the electoral dynamics. It is not even an election. It is a recoronation.

Second, actually the economy is kind of going in his direction due to a slight increment in gas prices. That takes a little bit of economic pressure off of him.

But I do think that Putin will be looking at how to discredit the Alliance's decisions at Warsaw, including the credibility, at least the perceived credibility, of NATO's force posture decisions, and that leaves me concerned. And certainly, as Derek pointed out, he will try and exploit any divisions within the Alliance that flow from Brexit or a division within the Alliance over how much support to provide Ukraine. My big fear is that he will interpret a reinforcement of NATO's eastern frontier with no change in the NATO-Ukraine relationship as basically a green light to press further on into Ukraine.

Senator Kaine. Let me ask a question so that I will sound smarter at my next Armed Services Committee hearing. On that committee, I am always digging into our folks over cyber issues. I do not really think we have got a clearly articulated cyber doctrine in this country in terms of what is deterrence, do we have a publicly announced posture of doing X if somebody does Y, and if you do not have a publicly announced posture, you do not have a deterrence doctrine. I think all kinds of questions. What does it mean to be, quote, under attack? What is war in the cyber domain? I do not really think we have answered those things.

But Russia has been pretty darned effective. They conducted cyber war during conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. They had a role in sponsoring a statewide attack in Estonia in 2007. The Estonians did not invoke Article 5 because of perceived lack of support from NATO allies. At the time, NATO was not sure were they, quote, under attack. If they were, quote, under attack, was it a Kremlin-induced attack. And so there was a lot of paralysis/analysis going on.

This summit is supposed to have NATO designating cyber as a fifth domain of warfare. But I would like your all's thoughts about, as we are going into NATO, what should we be trying to achieve in Warsaw with respect to, A, cyber being a fifth domain of warfare but, B, really trying to hammer down on doctrine because the NATO nations have a combined capacity that is massive. Russia has got a capacity. They are good at this and they use it. We have a combined capacity. I am not sure we are harnessing it, and I think we are somewhat paralyzed about how to use it. And I would love your thoughts about that.

Mr. Brzezinski. You are absolutely right that Russia and other adversaries are much more sophisticated, much more experienced in the use of cyber as an element of hybrid, multifaceted strategies to pursue their aggressions. You could have mentioned also the cyber attack against Estonia being the first large-scale cyber attack.

It is good that NATO is moving forward with the development of a doctrine to guide the cyber dimension of its operations. I think it is good the NATO has a cyber center. We have to incorporate this dimension of warfare into NATO operations.

With that said, I think for the foreseeable future cyber activities are really going to be in the realm of NATO member states rather than the Alliance as a whole. Just as the way we have tank divi-

sions that are U.S. divisions and are allocated to a NATO operation, cyber operations are not probably going to be conducted out of NATO headquarters in Brussels for a number of reasons. NATO will not, for a long while, have the personnel necessary for that. It will not have the computer set-ups for that, and it probably will not come to full agreement on exactly what to do.

I am not too worried about that because during the Cold War, we had lots of elements of a comprehensive Western strategy, of which NATO was a lead player, a partial player and not much of a player at all. The latter two will be the likely direction cyber warfare plays in the West's response with the threats, for example, from Russia. It will remain primarily a dominion of a national armed force rather than the Alliance. It will not be like AWACS. It will be more like a national contribution to an Alliance operation.

Mr. CHOLLET. Very briefly, and I concur with all of that. Last week, at the defense ministerial, they announced that cyber would become an operational domain. They said that a cyber attack can be considered an Article 5 attack. That will help within NATO for better coordination, for better planning, for greater management of resources, and that is all good, but I think the caveat that Ian has mentioned is very important, which is it will probably mainly in the national realm.

However, this is also an area where NATO-EU cooperation could be important and particularly when we think of resilience. So when there is an attack, it is one thing to understand what has happened and respond to it in some way, but then there is also the resilience, getting the systems back online. And I think this is an area where NATO could explore that further. And since it is not a purely military answer—it is something that involves other realms where it may be more appropriately done in the EU context - it is where NATO and the EU can work together, which is yet further reason why we do not want the EU mired in another crisis for the next 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Menendez?

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first draw a premise for my question, so you understand where I am coming from.

So of NATO's 28 member states, only five are meeting or exceeding the 2 percent GDP defense spending for support of the Alliance, which leaves the United States spending about 75 percent of the military spending for all NATO members.

At the last summit in Wales, 28 members agreed on three main outcomes: enhancing readiness and collective defense in response to Russian aggression; increasing defense spending and boosting military capabilities; and third, boosting NATO's support for partner countries outside the Alliance.

And these main outcomes were a recognition of several driving forces. First, Putin had already gained control, from my perspective, of the narrative and successful international intervention in Georgia, was in the process of repeating this in the Ukraine; and second, fear in Europe among our friends and our allies alike that commitments are not necessarily always going to be steadfast, as

is exhibited in the context of Ukraine where our commitments were enshrined in the Budapest Agreement and memorandum.

So my question is—and in fact, it was not until Congress passed strong new sanctions legislation against Russia that Putin had any indication that the United States would be an obstacle to his ambitions, either personal or nationalistic.

So in my view, the U.S., and NATO by extension, should be thinking about what Putin's reaction will be but more focused on registering what NATO will not tolerate at the end of the day. In essence, how do we go from merely defense to deterrence? Because when we have seen actions taken—all right, Ukraine was not a NATO member, but I get concerned that the message being sent is that what we will do in response to Russian aggression is signaling to the Russians that they can be more and more aggressive in Putin's grand design.

So what is it that NATO needs to do to move from just defense, which is important, but also to a sense, a more muscular sense, of deterrence? How do we ultimately prepare? How does NATO prepare for the out-of-the-norm actions of an irregular military action, as we saw in the Ukraine? And what is our comprehensive ability to deal with that? Those are some of my key concerns because if we are doing 75 percent, we want everybody to step up, but in the interim, Russia feels that it can continue to make these incursions without real consequences other than some sanctions, which are important. You know, I was one of those who tried to lead on that. But it just seems to me that NATO needs to have both in its defense posture, through its diplomacy, through a whole host of things a more robust sense of deterrence, not just simply defense. Could you speak to that?

Mr. CHOLLET. Sure, Senator, I can take the first crack.

I completely agree with you that we need to move into a strong deterrence mode right now. I think there are multiple components of that. One starts with presence and posture. Being in particularly those most vulnerable states, particularly in Poland and the Baltics, is very important. There is going to be a question on numbers, as Ian has raised, whether we have enough there. But it is very important that those forces are warfighting forces. They are forces that can get into the fight in hours, not days or weeks. They are forces that have the capability both in terms of the lethal capability but also the ISR and the resupply to be able to be in that fight. They need air defense as well. So I think that is very, very important.

Secondly, planning—

Senator MENENDEZ. But that is not present right now.

Mr. CHOLLET [continuing.] No. Well, hopefully in Warsaw there will be a decision to ensure that that is present. And some of that is also what the quadrupling of U.S. defense spending in Europe is going to be towards as well. So it is not present now. It needs to be, and hopefully in Warsaw we will have good news.

Second is planning. We need to do greater planning for all sorts of contingencies in Europe. That planning was the other thing that had atrophied in the 20 years since the end of the Cold War. And the U.S. is doing its own planning, but also it needs to be NATO planning for various contingencies, some of which you discussed.

And then third is procedure, ensuring that military authorities and the political leaders in Brussels have the right procedures in place to be able to make quick decisions. And I know that is a very difficult issue to get at because it is about ultimately political control and how much you want to pre-delegate to military leaders. There has been some modest progress over the last several years in that realm, but I think it is something we need to explore further at Warsaw.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. You asked the ultimate question about deterrence. I was listening to Derek, and I agree with everything he says. What I would add is that the key element of deterrence is your ability to exhibit, demonstrate steely determination. And in the case of Russia, I do not think the West has exhibited steely determination against the aggression and provocative actions it has taken.

When Russia invaded Ukraine, we should have immediately mobilized and moved forces out to the Baltics and to Poland and to the Black Sea. We should have imposed immediately much harsher sanctions, sanctions that would have had some blowback, but that would have exhibited in itself determination to fully leverage that dimension to impose high costs on the aggressor.

The problem with the West's policy over the last 2–3 years in response to Russia is that we have had an incrementalist approach, slowly ratcheting up our presence levels and our sanctions. We went through several iterations of sanctions, and I would argue they are not even as powerful as they should be. They should be sectoral sanctions. We have deployed largely U.S. company-level elements to central Europe, not battalions, not brigades, elements that the Russians knew they could overrun anytime.

With Ukraine, our assistance has been half-hearted. They have been begging for lethal assistance for 2 years. The West still balks on that. This communicates a lack of resolve to the Russians and gives someone like Putin a feeling that he can continue to push on. So decisiveness and speed and leveraging our advantages, which in our case I believe includes the respect that even the Russian general staff has for U.S. forces, using our economic leverage—we have a 15 to 2 economic advantage in terms of GDP of the United States and Europe against Russia, \$30 trillion versus \$2 trillion. We are not leveraging that as we should. We should leverage it immediately. That kind of speed of response reflects determination and I think would have registered more profoundly within Moscow's decision-making circles. If we had done that, we probably would not be in as deep of a mire as we are today.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I will just close by saying the sooner we exhibit that steely determination, the better off we will collectively be.

Thank you both.

Senator CARDIN [presiding]. Senator Shaheen?

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for being here.

Before I get into my questions, I wanted to just follow up on that comment, Mr. Brzezinski, because I do not disagree with what you are saying. I think steady, quick resolve is very important. But how would you have suggested we should have dealt with the Euro-

peans who were reluctant on the lethal weapons issue? Listening to the French and the Germans talk about their response on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, they were very reluctant. Are you suggesting that we should have gone ahead and provided those weapons despite the concerns of the Europeans?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes. The problem with seeking complete unity sometimes means you are diluting the effect of your response. So sometimes you have to break out of 100 percent unity. You seek and go with coalitions that would be willing to act together. It is my assessment that we would have had a number of Europeans who would have been willing to work with us to arm the Ukrainians from the start. We should have done that, and I believe the rest would have followed.

Senator SHAHEEN. Let me thank you both for your open letter in support of Montenegro's accession to NATO. And can you talk a little bit, both of you, about what you see are the benefits of their joining NATO and whether this sends any kind of a message to the Russians that is helpful?

Mr. CHOLLET. Senator, I think that Montenegro has been a partner of ours for many years. They have contributed to NATO missions. They have worked alongside the United States military in difficult places. They are a key player within the Balkans, and the Balkans, as you know very well, is a region that is still struggling, and I think having another member of NATO from that region would be very important. And Montenegro, over the past several years, when I was in government and worked very closely with their defense minister and other senior folks, has made great strides in addressing some of the concerns that the United States and others had about their readiness to be a full member of NATO. And they deserve great credit. And the parliament, just in the last week, has yet again endorsed their entry into NATO.

So I think one cannot overstate what Montenegro will bring to our collective defense, but I think certainly having it a part of the member states and as well as the signal it sends to other aspirant countries and also to Russia and others who may want to have a veto over what NATO may do is very, very important for the Warsaw Summit. If we had had more time before Wales, I think we might have been able to get it done before the Wales Summit. That is why I am very glad and very hopeful that it will be done this year, if the administration can get the paperwork up to you all and hopefully the Senate could be able to act before the end of the year.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

I want to pick up on Senator Kaine's comments about cyber because I certainly agree with him that we do not seem to have a uniform strategy around our response on cyber.

And I had the opportunity to visit Estonia back in March and see the Cyber Center of Excellence there that has been accredited by NATO and was very impressed with the kinds of work that they are doing and the research that I think then is available to all of the NATO members.

So can you talk about how important that kind of a center is to developing the capacity that NATO needs as they are looking at the challenges they are facing today compared to, say, 20 or 30 years ago?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think it is very important, and I commend the Estonians for taking the leadership on this position. They have been some of the most adept at leveraging the commercial and social capabilities that come with the Internet and other elements of cyber.

Yes, it is important to have a center of excellence. It is important for NATO to give emphasis, as it is now, to developing and deploying cyber capabilities and doctrines. The Alliance's designation of cyber as a warfare domain is a needed step. That will help ensure continuity and consistency and a synchronization of national efforts in the cyber domain. This is important because it is very easy for nations who are pursuing national approaches to cyber to do so in very different, in not conflicting, ways—in large part because this is some of the most secretive dimensions of warfare. It is very unlikely, I think, that everyone in NATO is going to have the same outlook and also same capacities and same capabilities in the cyber domain simply because it is not a bullet. It is not a rifle. The classified, secret character of this domain will make it a challenge to ensure full continuity of cyber operations across NATO allies.

So with that said, I will just reiterate what I said earlier which is that it is important that NATO do this. It needs to drive forward. The more consistency and continuity and more assured capability we have across the Alliance, the better, but it is most likely that this is going to remain primarily in the realm of the most edgy stuff. It is going to remain within the national domains.

Senator SHAHEEN. And I think that was clear as the result of what I saw there at the center. But the fact that they are doing work that can then be shared with other countries within NATO seems to me one of the really important aspects of what NATO can provide on the cyber issue. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Just to follow up on Senator Shaheen's comment relative to the lethal weaponry to Ukraine, I would just be interested, Mr. Chollet, in your response though it does not matter now in some ways, although I will say 35 Ukrainians died last month. 40,000 troops are amassed, both regular and irregular, in eastern Ukraine. They are killing Ukrainians. And I just would love to hear what your response to that would be. I know there are differing opinions.

Mr. CHOLLET. Sure, I am happy to, Senator.

When I served in government, I was for lethal assistance to Ukraine, but I also do think it is important to put it in context. The United States has provided around \$600 million in security assistance to Ukraine since 2014. That is compared to about \$10 million or so that we gave to Ukraine in 2013. So that is a pretty significant up-tick. And that is going to training and reforming the Ukrainian military, which needs a lot of help. It is not going to lethal assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. And we support that effort, but the lethal weaponry—

Mr. CHOLLET. Understood, yes. When I served in government and now that I am out of government and able to speak for myself, I support lethal assistance. I know that President Poroshenko will be attending the Warsaw Summit, and there will be a meeting with

him with the North Atlantic Alliance there, and that is very important. NATO has made some decisions to augment its own effort to help reform the Ukrainian military. It is very important for us to have the Ukrainian military get up to NATO standards for a lot of reasons because it makes it easier to partner, but also it helps their professionalization to deal with the corruption problems that the Ukrainian military has as well. So I think that is all very, very important.

I still actually think the lethal assistance issue is still relevant today, and I am hoping my former colleagues in government are still taking a close look at that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there is an election taking place and things may change in January.

I do want to acknowledge, as the ranking member did, the Ambassador from Montenegro. He sat expressionless when you all were talking about his country's accession to NATO. I thought he would smile, but he did not. Now he is smiling.

I want to thank you both for your testimony.

I just will say this. I think that all of us, I mean, everybody on this committee, knows the importance of NATO. I think one of the greatest threats to NATO is when people begin to realize that maybe it is not a true alliance. And I just hope that in Warsaw there is some commitment demonstrated, especially by our European partners. I think everybody understands we are very committed. We are more than committed.

But I have to tell you it is so frustrating. We have been talking about—Madeleine Albright was here 4 years ago talking about this and was concerned about it when she was Secretary of State. And it just does not change. And it is almost like we want it to be a strong alliance so badly we continue pushing.

And I appreciate what you mentioned the 20 percent going to upgrading, and obviously you can spend 2 percent and it will all be on salaries and take you nowhere. And I think the qualitative changes are important, and I applaud those.

But I just hope that our NATO friends realize the frustration that is mounting as we deal with our own economic issues, as we deal with our own indebtedness and the realization more and more by people that most of the countries are not pulling their load and they depend so heavily upon us, on the other hand, for their security.

So, anyway, we thank you all for highlighting the many things you did today. You are outstanding witnesses. Thank you for your service to our country.

I do not know if our ranking member wants to close with anything.

Senator CARDIN. I just join you again. I thank both our witnesses for their contributions.

I think the point that you made, Mr. Chairman, is shared. NATO is extremely important but it is an alliance, and if it does not act as an alliance, if there is not a shared commitment, then it is not as strong as it needs to be. And the challenges today are on two fronts. There are more than two fronts, but two major fronts, both of which are extremely serious: Russia and terrorism. And the Alli-

ance needs to be as strong as it must be, and it is not at its full potential, and it has got to improve.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

If you could, the record will be open until the close of business Friday. I know you have all done this before. And please, if you could, answer fairly promptly any written questions that come in.

Thank you again for your patience on the front end and for sharing your wisdom with us today.

And with that, the meet is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

